THE POLITICS OF HOME IN JERUSALEM:
PARTITIONS, PARKS, AND PLANNING FUTURES

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ABSTRACT

Nathan W. Swanson: The Politics of Home in Jerusalem: Partitions, Parks, and Planning Futures
(Under the direction of Banu Gökarıksel)

At a time when Palestine and Palestinians are ubiquitously framed through the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict” and the “peace process”, the spaces of everyday life for Palestinians are often ignored. This is in spite of the fact that so many of the Israeli policies and technologies of occupation and settlement are experienced materially by Palestinians in these spaces. In this dissertation, then, drawing on feminist geopolitics, I consider everyday Palestinian spaces like the home, neighborhood, and village—with a focus on Jerusalem—to better understand geographies of occupation and settlement in Palestine/Israel today. I argue, through attention to Palestinian experiences on the ground, that widespread representations of Jerusalem as either a “united” or “divided” city fail to capture the Palestinian experience, which is actually one of fragmentation, both physical and social. As a case study in fragmentation, I turn to the zoning of Israeli national parks in and between Palestinian neighborhoods, arguing that parks have served the purposes of settlement in less politicized ways than West Bank settlement blocs, but like the settlement blocs, have resulted in dispossession and restrictions on Palestinian construction, expansion, and movement. In the second half of the project, I turn to resistance against dispossession and the confines of the “peace process,” looking first at recent Palestinian and Israeli community mapping projects and arguing that they resist erasure and fragmentation through their maps and through the mapping process. Finally, while Palestinian refugees displaced in the creation of Israel are marginalized from the formal peace process, I argue that
those internally displaced in Israel continue to politicize and struggle for their dispossessed homes, villages, and lands by challenging the state’s development plans and by planning alternative futures.
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<td>ILA</td>
<td>Israel Land Authority</td>
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<td>INPA</td>
<td>Israel Nature and Parks Authority</td>
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<td>JNF</td>
<td>Jewish National Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSM</td>
<td>Open Street Map</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>see PNA</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PNA</td>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United National General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or, The UN Refugee Agency</td>
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<td>UNSCOP</td>
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INTRODUCTION

We live at a time of great displacement. Some of this is economic displacement, as the gentrification of urban spaces drives out marginalized and neglected communities, whether through “revitalization” projects in Durham, North Carolina, or the construction of World Cup and Olympic Games stadiums and facilities in Rio de Janeiro. Some of this is environmental displacement, as we witness the first climate change refugees in modern history, from Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana (Davenport & Robertson 2016), to the island nation of Tuvalu in the Pacific (Maas 2014). Finally, some of this displacement is forced displacement, the result of war and other forms of violence, most notably in Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. As of the start of 2016, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reports that there are an estimated 65.3 million people worldwide who are in a situation of forcible displacement, the highest number in the history of the agency (UNHCR 2016).

Under any of these forms of displacement, whether it is from particular neighborhoods or cities, or from entire states or regions, displacement ruptures everyday connections between people and places and relationships between people and other people. Home is central to the experience of displacement itself and to the struggles that follow, whether this means cultivating a sense of home in new surroundings, trying to return to and/or to remember a home that was lost, maintaining or rebuilding the sorts of social relations that had defined home, struggling for rights and inclusion in a new homeland, or simply struggling to find basic shelter and bodily
security. Home, then, in its many meanings and complex forms, material and immaterial, becomes entangled with geopolitics and geopolitical forces in all sorts of ways.

For Palestinians, many of whom are part of one of the most protracted refugee situations and one of the largest refugee populations today, home certainly takes on complex meanings, many of which are affected in at least some way by geopolitical events and conflicts. Millions of Palestinian refugees, whether in the many refugee camps in Arab host states or as citizens of Western states, express their longing to return to their homeland, and some still hold keys to the houses from which their families fled during the 1948 war that brought the establishment of Israel. Some refugees in Arab states have been displaced once or twice more since their initial displacement, most recently following the U.S. wars in Iraq and the ongoing civil war in Syria. For those Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, many continue to experience dispossession due to the expansion of Israeli settlements and/or as a result of military incursions and seizures in and around their communities and farmlands. Finally, Palestinian citizens of Israel, who constitute nearly 21% of the state’s population of 8.5 million, speak of experiencing second-class citizenship and of being alienated in their ancestral homeland by the Israeli state and society, and many of them have been internally displaced since the establishment of the state, prohibited by Israel from returning to their homes and village lands (see, e.g., Kanaaneh & Nusair 2010).

In this dissertation, I focus on the entanglements of home and geopolitics in the context of historical and ongoing displacement in and from Israel-Palestine, based on fieldwork in Jerusalem in 2012 and 2013. While I generally focus on Jerusalem in this project, I also look to other parts of Israel and historic Palestine to position the current struggles in that city within broader histories and geographies. In diplomatic, media, and even some academic discourses,
the political situation in Israel-Palestine is typically framed through traditional geopolitical terms as a conflict between two sides, over roughly the same territory, to be resolved through negotiations and the “peace process” that began in the 1990s. In contrast, compelled by alternative understandings of war, conflict, and territory emerging from feminist geopolitics, I began this project wanting to better understand Israel-Palestine through the spaces and experiences of everyday life. I chose to focus on Palestinians due to the uneven power relationship between Israel—a settler society with one of the world’s most advanced militaries—and those Palestinians under its rule, part of a broader indigenous population that is today dispersed throughout the Middle East and beyond. It is this uneven power relationship that allows Israel to participate in the summits, meetings, conferences, and other the motions of the peace process, while at the same time, radically transforming the material “facts on the ground” over which they are negotiating. Meanwhile, Palestinians in Israel have no official representation in this peace process, and Israel has cut Palestinian residents of annexed Jerusalem from Palestinian institutions, meaning that the everyday lives and the spaces of everyday life of both of these groups are determined by the “colonial present” of Israeli rule (Gregory 2004).

In the broadest terms, I began this project by asking: how are the everyday geographies and experiences of the Palestinian home and neighborhood in Jerusalem shaped by Israeli geopolitical strategies and practices? Additionally, how are Palestinians contesting their displacement and dispossession and the settlement of their villages, neighborhoods, and lands? How does an approach to understanding Palestinian struggles in the spaces of everyday life change how we think about the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict”? Based on my observation of and participation in events and meetings, interviews with activists and residents, and an archive of news articles, NGO reports, and other documents that I assembled during fieldwork, I will argue
that Palestinian homes and communities are linked to Israeli territorial consolidation through processes of fragmentation, dispossession, and landscape transformation. At the same time, I will argue that Palestinians resist these very processes through embodied spatial politics and practices attentive to the very spaces of everyday life. Throughout the dissertation, I draw out discrepancies between the dominant discourses of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process—those following traditional geopolitical framings of conflict—and the geographies and experiences of home, village, and neighborhood for Palestinians on the ground, discrepancies which I argue threaten the ability of the peace process to bring any lasting peace to Israel-Palestine.

*Home and Geopolitics*

I trace the earliest stimulus for this project back to a number of years ago, when I was living in Egypt, a student in the International Human Rights Law program at the American University in Cairo. Two months after the end of “Operation Cast Lead,” Israel’s military campaign against the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, a friend of mine, another AUC student, returned to her home in Gaza for the first time in two years. Following her visit, she posted a blog entry, accompanied by photos of the widespread destruction of homes, mosques, schools, and other structures in Gaza, and she ended her post by saying—if I may paraphrase—“While the rest of the world is building its futures toward the sky, the people of Gaza are building our futures in shelters underground, to protect us from the next attack.”

Several months later, during a graduate seminar in Geography, I read Bachelard’s (1958) classic text on the home, in which he identifies a certain intimacy and security in the spatialities of the home, particularly in its verticality. While the roof above our heads, Bachelard argues,
seems rational because it protects us from the rain, there is something irrational to the cellar below, which is always dark and frightening. In Gaza’s colonial present, it occurred to me through my friend’s post, this spatiality had been completely reversed: the roof could not protect someone in Gaza from the next Israeli F-16 strike, so digging a shelter or tunnel would be a more rational approach to seeking security. While feminist critiques have both challenged and provided nuance to Bachelard’s (1958) understanding of the home, particularly his claim that the home is necessarily a safe space of comfort and leisure, I began through the example of Gaza to think about the home not only as a private space for seeking comfort and security, but also a social space tied to the outside world and a political space tied to territory and struggle.

My approach, then, to understanding Palestinian geographies and politics of home is informed both by the feminist scholarship on home and the framings and critiques of feminist geopolitics. Feminist scholars have given particular attention to analyzing the home through an emphasis on the power relations that shape its lived experience (Rose 1993). For instance, they have demonstrated ways that roles and responsibilities in the home are often sharply gendered, as well as limitations women often face in access to economic resources, due in part to the historical undervaluing of household labor (Bowlby et al. 1997). They have also argued it is a space that often facilitates women’s isolation from the public sphere (Blunt & Dowling 2006) and is the most common site of violence against women (Pain 1997). Accordingly, Bachelard’s understanding of the home as a necessarily secure and comfortable refuge is, therefore, reflective of some measure of socio-economic privilege (see Young 1997), or other forms of privilege, and is more complicated by those everyday lived experiences of the home in which uneven power relations dictate mobilities, economic activities, and basic material and psychological conditions.
Moreover, the pursuit of a “secure” and bounded “home” is necessarily accomplished through processes of “othering” and exclusion (Massey 1994)—that is, deciding who does and does not belong within its bounds—thereby implicating intimate connections between the home and the formation of identities, as well as their spatial implications for everyday life (see Honig 1994; Martin & Mohanty 1997). Processes of identity production and practices of exclusion are, of course, not confined to the space of the house, nor is the logic of bounding in search of security. Indeed, as Bowlby et al. (1997) explain, “A concept of home often is employed by governments as a bounded and clearly demarcated space for . . . the promotion of national identity and nationalism. In this context, the haven of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ are spaces from which undesirables – those who do not conform – are excluded” (343). Young (1997) similarly describes such political projects as “attempts to project . . . a local feeling of belonging onto a huge territory”, demonstrating the prevalence of both territory and scale in geographical imaginations of home.

While accepting the feminist critiques of the inequalities that can define home life, Young (1997) is guided by bell hooks in arguing that “‘home’ can have a political meaning as a site of dignity and resistance” and that therefore “the values of home should be democratized rather than rejected” (Young 1997, 157). In this line, we have repeatedly seen, in post-colonial settings and among oppressed communities, the home as a site of resistance and a place of belonging that contrasts public spaces dominated by various oppressors (see hooks 1999; Blunt 2005). At the same time, in the other direction, we have seen the state take interest in the home, particularly in colonial or settler colonial contexts, and even in its conquest and/or destruction (e.g., Çelik 1997). This is certainly true for Palestinians, as displacement and dispossession—both historical and ongoing—are central to Palestinian narratives of the situation in Israel-
Palestine and have been central to the very formation of Palestinian national identity (Khalidi 1999). The ruins of hundreds of Palestinian homes and villages in present-day Israel attest to the scale of these demolitions historically (Morris 2004; Khalidi 2006), and ongoing displacements and demolitions in Israel and the Occupied Territories—whether the result of military, administrative, bureaucratic, or economic forces—attest to the great anxiety of millions of Palestinians under Israeli rule as to the future of their own homes, communities, and livelihoods.

I approach Israel-Palestine through the framework of home, and other finer scales like the neighborhood and village, following scholars of critical and feminist geopolitics, who emphasize the need to abandon “big picture” understandings of the world in order to challenge both the state’s narratives and its spatial projects (e.g., Ó Tuathail & Dalby 1998; Dowler & Sharp 2001). These “big picture” approaches are those typically found in traditional geopolitics scholarship, as well as traditional International Relationship scholarship. Such approaches privilege the state or agents of the state in their analyses of conflicts over territory and tend to marginalize or ignore the experiences of people on the ground who may experience territorial conflicts in complex and multiple ways. For Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998), then, critical geopolitics is “a ‘situated knowledge’ that intervenes to disturb the ‘god trick’ of traditional geopolitics, which claimed to re-present effortlessly the drama of international politics as an intelligible spectacle without interpretation” (5–6, citing Haraway 1988).

Feminist geopolitics scholars expand upon this argument to call explicitly for research that is attentive to forms of social differentiation—gender in particular—and that locates the effects and influence of geopolitics in the spaces and practices of everyday life (Dowler & Sharp 2001; Dixon & Marston 2011; Massaro & Williams 2013). To this end, some have focused on tracing the experiences of differentiated bodies in situations of armed conflict over territory to
broader structures of power and privilege (Hyndman 2007; Fluri 2009, 2010), while others have focused on the entanglements of bodies in territorial-demographic projects of the state, entanglements extending to relationships and family planning (Smith 2011, 2012). Still other feminist geographers have drawn attention to ways that the nation is constructed, contested, or even threatened through everyday embodied practices or performances in public space, thereby locating the interests and influence of the state in the everyday (Gökarıksel 2012; Gökarıksel & Secor 2009; Koch 2011; Staeheli 2011; Staeheli et al. 2012). Still others have focused on the ways in which bodies on the ground organize to produce territories that undermine the violent practices and security logics of the state and other violent forces (Koopman 2011; Swanson 2016). Through these engagements and others, then, feminist political geographers are increasingly turning to the spaces, experiences, and practices of everyday life in studies of territory, conflict, state power, and the pressing geopolitical questions of the day.

In this project, then, I am compelled to focus on struggles over territory “from below”—in those spaces of everyday life—rather than “from above”, and I am therefore not engaging the “Israeli-Palestinian” conflict through the framework of the state and its agents. Although traditional theories of international relations and geopolitics are able to accommodate non-state actors, they continue to privilege the state and state officials in narrating and interpreting territorial conflict. In the case of Palestinians, they are without a state of their own, and all Palestinians within historic Palestine—even if they live in an area nominally controlled by the Palestinian Authority—ultimately fall under Israeli sovereignty and are subject to Israeli authority. As such, understanding Palestinian experiences of home and dispossession requires an approach to conflict over territory framed through the relationship on the ground between Palestinians and the State of Israel, rather than the Palestinian Authority and the State of Israel in
the context of negotiations and peace processes, even if these events can play a role in shaping experiences on the ground.

Through this approach, I follow traditions of feminist geopolitics in understanding the limits of the state and looking outside of the state in analyses of territory and conflict. I focus on finer scales of everyday in this dissertation for much the same reason that feminist geographers focus on other intimate spaces like the body: the home and neighborhood or village, like the body, becomes a site for territorial claims, contestations, and struggles. Homes are counted, homes are contested, homes are seized, and homes are defended. Homes and neighborhoods are, as Smith (2012) describes “love and babies” in the contested territory of Kashmir, “sites at which geopolitical strategy is animated and made material” (2). In Smith’s case, babies become so important for geopolitics because of the link between demographic counts and territory. In the case of Israel-Palestine, Palestinian homes and city neighborhoods are important because of the link between settlement and territory—even if “demographic threat” discourses are also popular among Israelis (see Kanaaneh 2002)—given that the displacement of Palestinians from their homes, whether through gentrification, zoning and planning schemes, demolition, or other means, furthers the Zionist project of Jewish-Israeli settlement in Palestine.

Through Israeli settlement and Palestinian displacement comes territorial expansion and consolidation—after all, “[s]ettler colonialism destroys to replace” (Wolfe 2006, 388). It is not insignificant, in this sense, that one of the first acts that settlers do after taking control of a house in East Jerusalem is to raise the Israeli flag over the home, as though an army has conquered territory from an enemy and must mark its (military masculinist) victory for the state. Certainly this conquering impulse flows from the militaristic orientations of masculinist nationalisms, which feminist scholars critique, and from the specific masculinist orientations of the Israeli
military and of Israeli/Zionist nationalism, which scholars have also critiqued (e.g., Mayer 2005; Massad 2006). Indeed, even when settler organizations, courts, and bureaucrats are involved, it is ultimately the Israeli military and other security forces that provide the force behind the dispossession and erasure of Palestinians. In this dissertation, I will describe, on the one hand, ways that the Palestinian home and neighborhood become targets of the state, particularly the settler state, and on the other hand, ways that the home becomes a site of contesting erasure and challenging fragmentation. In doing so, I will highlight not only the policies and actions of the Israeli state, but also those of its public agencies and private allies in the dispossession, displacement, and division of Palestinian communities. Conversely, I will illustrate the significance of embodied practices within Palestinian homes, neighborhoods, and villages that unsettle the state’s territorial projects (see Moore 2005), as well as the foundational framings and assumptions of the official Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

This framing of the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict” as a case of settler-colonialism positions this dissertation project within a broader shift in Geography, Palestine Studies, and other disciplines toward this framework. While there is a long history in the Palestinian national movement of connecting the Palestinian struggle with the struggles of other indigenous peoples, more recent scholarly attention has “focus[ed] on Palestine as an exceptional case” generally and on the post-1967 conditions of West Bank occupation specifically (Jabary Salamanca et al. 2012, 2–3). This renewed interest in settler colonial theory to explain Israel-Palestine has also come at a time of stalemate in the peace process, during which time settlements in the West Bank continue to increase with effectively no progress at a diplomatic level between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Additionally, the framing of Israel-Palestine as a case of “apartheid”—in comparison to the South African apartheid regime—also has a long history but
one which began to pick up after the fall of the regime in South Africa (see Zreik 2004). The merits and applicability of this framework continues to be debated among scholars (see, e.g., Pappé 2015; Soske & Jacobs 2015), even as it is cited increasingly by activists. While I find this framework compelling in many ways, and agree with others than apartheid and settler-colonialism can co-exist, I am more drawn toward settler colonial theory in my analysis. This framework allows me to focus on dispossession and the settler-indigenous relationship between Palestinians and the State of Israel without compelling me to compare either the experiences of Palestinians and Israelis or the case of South Africa and Israel.

Methodologies and Evolution of the Project

I began this project intending to focus on Palestinian struggles for home through three case studies: (1) struggles against gentrification and displacement in the Ajami neighborhood of Jaffa (now Tel Aviv-Yafo), (2) struggles against evictions and demolitions in the Silwan neighborhood of East Jerusalem, and (3) the discursive space produced by NGOs through monitoring reports and analyses of home demolitions and evictions. I chose these cases because I wanted to compare Palestinian struggles against dispossession on both sides of the “Green Line” (the 1949 armistice lines) and because of the proliferation of NGOs throughout Israel-Palestine that increasingly define and represent struggles. Methodologically, I planned to volunteer as a participant-observer in a community organization in both Ajami and Silwan, conduct interviews with activists and NGO staff members in Jerusalem and Jaffa/Tel-Aviv, analyze the discourses of organizational reports, and arrange photovoice projects with community groups.
I left for Jerusalem initially in August 2012 with an openness to adjust this research plan as needed after preliminary conversations with organizations and activists. Arriving with minimal contacts, I began to visit areas of the city I had visited before, and those I had not, in order to understand on the ground what I had found in initial readings of NGO reports and news articles. In doing so, I began to assemble an archive of these articles and reports. I also began to follow—usually through email and social media—the newsletters and event calendars of a number of organizations in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Israel-Palestine that work specifically on Palestinian issues (e.g., Adalah Zochrot, Emek Shaveh, B’Tselem, the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, Ir Amim, Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem), and I also began to track the event offerings of Palestinian and Palestinian-affiliated cultural institutions, including bookstores, in the city (e.g., Yabous Cultural Center/Al-Quds Cinema, Centre for Jerusalem Studies/al-Quds University, Institut Français de Jérusalem-Chateaubriand, Educational Bookstore, the American Colony Bookshop).

During my first few months in Jerusalem, through a number of public events hosted by these organizations and institutions—including lectures, activist-led tours, film screenings, and exhibitions—and subsequent informal conversations with staff members and other activists that I met, I began to shift the structure of the project and to direct my focus to specific issues related to the geopolitics of Palestinian homes and communities. Specifically, I took away three main conclusions from my initial weeks of observations and experiences. First, through my navigations of the city, my daily attempts to keep up with news from mainstream and activist media outlets, and my early informal conversations, I came to understand a fragmentation of Palestinian communities in Jerusalem that was physical but also social and political. I began to follow a wide variety of issues that Palestinian communities in Jerusalem were facing on an
ongoing basis—sometimes unique and sometimes shared with other communities—that prompted different forms of struggle in different neighborhoods. I also discovered that some communities worked with others in the city, while others did not, dispelling any myth that there was a monolithic Palestinian struggle in East Jerusalem.

Second, in my early conversations (and some of the NGO reports), activists and residents repeatedly mentioned the presence of Israeli national parks in East Jerusalem and the difficulties that they cause for Palestinian residents of the city. While I was aware that parks were used by Israel as a justification for refusing permits for Palestinian construction and for demolishing homes, I did not realize the extent of the network of Israeli parks in East Jerusalem, nor had I considered the geopolitical work that they do locally and internationally. Given the frequency with which these themes arose, I decided that the parks and discourses of nature needed to be addressed in any discussion of home in Jerusalem, and I quickly discovered that mobilitizations of nature in the city reveal a whole series of contradictions about home and dispossession.

Finally, following a tour in West Jerusalem about its Palestinian history and a series of events for “Lifta Cultural Week,” including a tour of the dispossessed village, I realized that I did not need to extend my dissertation geographically to Jaffa to include struggles for home in Israel, inside the green line. To the contrary, there were plenty of struggles related directly to 1948 that were ongoing in West Jerusalem. These included efforts to save the village ruins of depopulated Lifta from “development” into luxury Jewish housing, as well as legal efforts in Israeli courts for the recognition of Palestinians’ rights to various homes in West Jerusalem that have been re-populated by Israelis since 1948.

In addition to shaping the dissertation chapters that I outline below, these early experiences in the field set the stage for the methods that the chapters required, which primarily
include observation and participation in public events, organizational meetings, and activist-led tours; informal and semi-structured interviews; and archives of news articles, NGO reports, and other documents from institutions. In the end, my fieldwork in Jerusalem stretched across twelve months between early September 2012 and late December 2013.

- **Participant-Observation:** I observed a number of public events in East Jerusalem, including lectures, exhibitions, and film screenings at the Yabous Cultural Center, the French Institute, Palestinian bookshops, and elsewhere, and I participated in five activist-led tours in the city, two in East Jerusalem by Emek Shaveh, two in West Jerusalem by Zochrot, and one in West Jerusalem by an expelled resident of the village of Lifta. I also attended a conference on the Palestinian right of return that was organized by Zochrot in September 2013, and through an Israeli professor based in Jerusalem, I was connected with the Coalition to Save Lifta and observed (with a minimal level of participation) the three meetings that took place in 2013 while I was in the field, two of which were held in Lifta (one focusing on environmental issues and the unique ecosystem of the village surroundings) and one of which was held in Jerusalem’s Old City. The language of these meetings constantly shifted between Hebrew, Arabic, and English.

- **Informal and semi-structured interviews:** Many of my early interviews took the form of informal conversations about my project and the issues on the ground I was beginning to identify. These not only helped me to focus my project, but they also provided, through the trust that was built, some of the subsequent contacts and references that were useful in arranging formal interviews and identifying participant-observation opportunities. The ten formal, semi-structured interviews that I conducted—each between 1 hour and 1.5 hours—took place primarily in the final quarter of my fieldwork period. These
interviews with Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Palestinians working with NGOs in Jerusalem and beyond, and an Israeli archaeologist, allowed me to gather personal experiences with some of the places and situations I was addressing and to fill in gaps between what I wanted to know and what was available through their organizations’ work and other sources. For the most part, requests for interviews were made by emailing or visiting organizations, sometimes with a referral from an activist I had met for an informal interview.

- **Archive:** From the first days in the field, I began to compile an archive of news stories, NGO reports, United Nations reports, and other documents, which in the end reached nearly 1000 items (news articles the overwhelming majority). News sources consisted primarily of articles from mainstream Israeli newspapers like *Haaretz* and *The Jerusalem Post* and from the Palestinian news agency *Ma’an*, which provide the most detailed coverage of particular neighborhoods and villages within Israel-Palestine generally and Jerusalem specifically. I also archived documents from regional sources like *Al-Jazeera* and from local and international activist media, including the *Alternative Information Center*, *Electronic Intifada*, *Mondoweiss*, and *+972 Magazine*, and occasionally I included relevant articles from well-known international media like *The Guardian* or *The New York Times*. In general, most of the articles dated from the early 2000s through the present. I also archived NGO reports and a few UN reports, primarily in digital format, but I also have a few in print that I collected from organizations. The NGOs from which I collected reports consist primarily of Israeli organizations based in Jerusalem (*e.g.*, Ir Amim, Bimkom, Emek Shaveh) or elsewhere in Israel (*e.g.*, B’Tselem), in addition to a few reports from Palestinian organizations (*e.g.*, Adalah). Some of these NGOs define
themselves through specific professional affiliations (e.g., Bimkom–planners, Emek Shaveh–archeologists), while others work broadly on human and civil rights (e.g., Adalah and B’Tselem) or on issues of equality in Jerusalem specifically (e.g., Ir Amim).

I draw on data compiled through each of these methods to varying degrees throughout my four main chapters. I explain the relevance of each method in each chapter.

Fieldwork Ethics

In the collection of this data—and in my fieldwork experiences more generally—I was guided by feminist theories of knowledge production, positionality, and relationality, which collectively formed, for me, a feminist ethics of fieldwork. From the moment I first arrived in Jerusalem, until the last interview in my final days in the field, I was continually reminded of two particular articles I had read earlier in graduate school, both of which grappled with the embodied experience of fieldwork, and in doing so, raised questions about interactions with other people in the field.

In the first piece, Robyn Longhurst, Elsie Ho, and Lynda Johnston (2008), in reflecting on a research project they had recently completed, discuss some of the seemingly mundane embodied activities that were part of the research process and that are often taken for granted by researchers in the process of producing knowledge. Specifically, Longhurst et al. discuss activities like eating unfamiliar and potentially “strange” foods in the homes of the migrant women they were interviewing, and it is in those moments that they “think about the ways in which bodies—comportment, eating, facial expressions, speech acts—‘matter’ in research encounters” (210). Recalling Longhurst’s experiences at a migrant center lunch, she realizes that
some of the women she is researching are watching her carefully as she selects and tastes the foods they had brought—some of which she was hesitant to try—and she describes the link she felt in that moment between her reactions to the food and her relationships with the women she was researching. After all, as Longhurst et al. argue, “Bodily reactions, gestures, physical presence, the smell of bodies, tone of voice and comportment all make a difference to the research process. Sensory perceptions and emotions provoke feelings of like and dislike, desire and fear, acceptance and oppression” (214).

When I first read this piece a few years before fieldwork, I immediately identified with the concerns of the authors as a vegetarian who has had to navigate generous offerings and overwhelming hospitality. In the longer term, this piece became, for me, a reminder of the importance of seemingly banal activities and interactions in the course of fieldwork, and it impressed upon me an urgency to be sensitive toward the time, workloads, emotions, and anxieties of those I met in the field. As such, while I entered the field with a planned project knowing it would be adjusted, it was important to me that I develop the project based on what I was hearing from others, not merely on my own observations. My initial conversations in the field, then, shaped the chapters that I planned to write.

More practically, though, this sensitivity guided my interactions with people that I interviewed, those who helped me with contacts, and others. For example, there were several times that activists or community members seemed enthusiastic about helping me contact people to interview, but then I did not hear back from them. There were times I pushed by contacting them multiple times, with some effect, but there were others that were visibly exhausted from defending their home, village, and children, and from working for a poverty wage to support their families. In this case, despite their willingness to assist me, it felt unethical to push too
much, given the stresses that they faced in their everyday lives. The result of this sensitivity was that I ended my fieldwork with far fewer interviews than I originally expected—fortunately, those that I did conduct were rich in content and provided me what I needed for my chapters.

The second article that profoundly shaped my feminist ethics of fieldwork was an article by Jennifer Fluri (2010) focusing on her embodied experiences as a researcher in Afghanistan. In this piece, Fluri examines her positionality in relationship with other bodies she encountered in the field, ranging from Afghan taxi drivers to western aid workers. Moving from place to place in Afghanistan as she does her research, Fluri explains how each space is occupied, traversed, secured, endangered, violated, protected, and/or gendered differently for different people in that space, primarily through the lens of bodily security and practices like dress that factor into that security. Attentive to multiple scales of geopolitical power and multiple forms of privilege, she describes the ways that her positionality could change dramatically between city and village, taxi cab and street, home and institutional compound.

Like the Longhurst et al. (2008) piece, this Fluri (2010) article continually came to mind in the course of “doing” fieldwork—in moments of planning, calling, interviewing, and so on. In addition to the sensitivity I have described toward the seemingly mundane, I found myself in these moments thinking about my own positionality and how that related to the way I conducted research. For instance, I was aware that while I was pushing for contacts and interviews for my dissertation—and more broadly my own career—others were struggling for their homes. It is for this reason that I ended up interviewing more people affiliated with NGOs and community organizations—those who were already oriented toward working with the public and with academics—than ordinary residents of the villages that interested me.
More broadly, I was also aware that my very presence in the country was afforded by privileges of nationality and race, which motivated me perhaps more than anything to take seriously the research project at hand. I thought about these systems of privilege so frequently that I kept waiting for someone to challenge me on my position within those structures and my ability to run around doing this project. In the end, no one ever did, but twice I brought it up myself in conversations, both with friends who were Palestinian women with Israeli citizenship: both told me they did not think the topic was very interesting, but the one of them, who was also a graduate student, told me she was glad I was at least thinking about it as a way to guard against exploiting people in the field in the way that academics often do. Still, Fluri’s piece provided for me a constant reminder of my own positionality vis-à-vis others in the field, which affected the choices I made in how far to push for interviews and what sort of assistance I should expect from people who were usually overworked, underpaid, and had worries of their own.

Finally, both of these pieces helped me to think about the relationships I made in the field and the extent of those relationships by encouraging me to think about my position—or potential position—in local social and political networks. Because of the fragmentation I describe in the first chapter, Palestinian NGOs and village/neighborhood-based organizations in the city have complex relationships with one other and with Israeli and international organizations and institutions. Some groups will work with Israelis, but some will not. Some groups may work with other Palestinian groups that work with Israelis, while others may boycott them for working with Israelis. Palestinian and international cultural institutions are also entangled with these networks in various ways. As a researcher, it became important for me to understand some of these relationships for practical reasons, such as knowing whether to mention the work of an NGO to someone in a community organization that finds the NGO’s work problematic.
At the same, I also found myself having to navigate these networks in an embodied sense. For instance, in my original research plan, I intended to engage in a full-time participant-observation role with one or two organizations in Jerusalem. Early in my fieldwork, however, I contacted a community group after receiving a phone number from a contact in a cultural institution, who I mentioned when I called. Before the conversation went very far, however, the person in the community organization triple-checked with me to clarify that I had only received a number from someone at the institution with regard to my own studies and that I was not trying to interview someone on behalf of the institution. Additionally, I learned later that this organization explicitly boycotts a Palestinian NGO in the city on the grounds that the NGOs seek to “normalize” the Israeli occupation, an NGO which itself is careful not to work with anyone they see as “normalizing” the occupation.

As I began to understand these networks, it became clear to me that the depth of my relationship with one organization would largely determine my relationship with—and thus my ability to engage with—other organizations. For this project, I ultimately chose to abandon the type of participant-observation that I originally planned, and instead of engaging deeply with one organization, I was able to speak with multiple people on multiple occasions in multiple organizations without an official link to any organization—and without placing myself deeply in community politics. In the future, I may decide to work more closely with one organization, but for this project, I opted to avoid an official relationship with one place in order to be able to approach a wider range of organizations and to form my own relationships that would not be pre-determined by affiliations.
As I began dissertation fieldwork, even with an extensive background on issues in Jerusalem, I was constantly struck by the sharp contrasts between the grand, geopolitical narratives of the “conflict” and the “peace process” in particular and the realities on the ground. More specifically, those early observations and conversations in Jerusalem that revealed a fragmentation of Palestinian neighborhoods in the city also revealed a geography that stood in contract to the framings of the peace process—that there is a potentially divisible city between a unified (Jewish Israeli) West Jerusalem and a unified (Palestinian) East Jerusalem. It is to these contrasting geographies that I turn in Chapter One. Relying primarily on my archives, interviews, and tours, I document the fragmentation and containment of Palestinian areas of the cities through Israeli practices and policies neighborhood by neighborhood. I argue that debates under the framings of the official peace process over whether Jerusalem is or will be a “united” or “divided” city obscure the geographies of fragmentation and dispossession on the ground in and around Palestinian neighborhoods.

Chapter Two, the result of repeated conversations in the field, continues the discussion of fragmentation through a case study of Israeli national parks and their specific role not only in fragmentation, but also their role, often de-politicized, in Palestinian dispossession. This case demonstrates that Palestinian homes and neighborhoods are entangled with Israeli territorial consolidation and territorial claims through national parks zonings that restrict Palestinian construction and ascribe Jewish narratives to Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem. In this chapter, I draw from activist-led tours, NGO reports, news archives, and interviews with an Israeli activist and Palestinian residents. I argue that despite their widespread appearance as
apolitical—that national parks are within the realm of science, not politics—the network of Israeli national parks in Jerusalem act as settlements do in the West Bank, dispossessing Palestinian residents of the city and constricting their homes and neighborhoods.

In Chapters Three and Four, I shift focus from fragmentation and dispossession to Palestinian resistance to erasure, displacement, and dispossession. In Chapter Three, I discuss two mapping projects, one by a Palestinian organization in Jerusalem that works on community-building and another by an Israeli organization that educates Israelis about the Palestinian experience of the 1948 war and the memory of hundreds of destroyed villages. Through these mapping projects, I argue that Palestinians and Israeli activists are resisting historical and ongoing erasure by the Israeli state on the map—with an emphasis on local, everyday sites and scales—while also connecting and empowering communities through an embodied mapping process to resist fragmentation and erasure on the ground. In this chapter, I draw data from interviews and my news archive.

Finally, in Chapter Four, I turn to the struggle to save the West Jerusalem village of Lifta, the last depopulated Palestinian village from 1948 still standing in various stages of ruin. Because many of Lifta’s residents fled to East Jerusalem in 1948 and therefore came under Israeli rule in 1967, I position this village alongside recent struggles of Palestinians in Israel to both prevent new forms of displacement and to contest the mass displacements of 1948 by planning Palestinian futures on dispossessed village lands. Relying on interviews, field notes from a right of return conference, news archives, and historical texts, I argue that in Lifta and elsewhere, displacement and dispossession of the intimate sites of the home and village are challenged by Palestinians—in some cases even sixty-some years since homes were physically destroyed—through embodied practices that centralize those intimate spaces and that connect
memories of home with return. All of this is done by Palestinian communities who have been purposefully excluded from the official Israeli-Palestinian peace process and therefore act outside both the Israeli state and the Palestinian leadership in asserting their rights and defining their futures.
CHAPTER 1: TERRITORY, BORDERS, AND SETTLEMENT: JERUSALEM IN FRAGMENTS

“Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.”

- Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel, § 1, 13 December 1980 (Israel Knesset 2009).

“There is no meaning or value in negotiations for which the agreed objective is not ending the Israeli occupation and achieving the independence of the state of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital . . .”


INTRODUCTION

Every round of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, the latest of which ran from summer 2013 until its collapse in spring 2014, brings Jerusalem into the headlines as one of the most significant points of contention between the negotiating parties. Indeed, it is difficult to find any media coverage of Israel/Palestine in general and the “peace process” in particular that does not reference disputes over the status of Jerusalem and competing Israeli and Palestinian
claims to its lands, sites, and history. At the heart of this contention, as framed in political and popular discourses, is whether, following some sort of peace agreement, the Israelis will continue to control the eastern areas of Jerusalem—occupied since 1967 and where thousands of Israeli citizens now live—or whether those areas of the city will form the capital of an independent Palestinian state established in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Accordingly, when Jerusalem is consistently framed as the target of two competing historical and nationalist claims, its possible futures are rendered as either “united” or “divided”, pending a negotiated resolution through an increasingly elusive “peace agreement” between the Israelis and Palestinians. While the Palestinian position on “dividing” the city has more accurately meant “sharing” (sovereignty over) Jerusalem in some sort of “open city” framework (see Albin 1997), this more nuanced understanding of “dividing” the city is not necessarily communicated in political speak or in mass media coverage of Israel-Palestine and the peace process.

In the present tense, too, Jerusalem is understood through a united-divided binary. Indeed, despite the insistence of Israeli municipal officials and national politicians that the city has been (re-)united since 1967, Jerusalem has been so universally accepted as “divided” that the use of a phrase like “this divided city” in media reports or political statements seems to be more a requirement than a provocation. Still, the “united vs. divided” framings of Jerusalem both stem from and provide service to the broader state-centered narratives of geopolitical conflict that have defined the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict” in recent decades. Such narratives often collapse (unequal) power relations between Israel and the Palestinians into a territorial conflict between two sides with comparable material capacities and political and legal standings. To accept, then, the generic assumption that Jerusalem is divided politically between Israelis and Palestinians, even if there is an assumed connection to territory, may be to erase the specific geographical
forms of division—or as I will argue, the geographies of fragmentation—that we see on the ground, not to mention the power relations that are producing them. It is also to accept state-centered understandings of geopolitics from above that ignore the embodied experiences of life on the ground, experiences which can produce territorial formations outside of the state and which give lived and material meanings to core geopolitical concepts like peace and conflict.

QUESTIONS, METHODS, AND OUTLINE

So what does Jerusalem look like on the ground to those who live in, work in, and otherwise experience the city? Is it a united city? A divided city? Something else? What are the geographies that define and/or disrupt the real or imagined divisions of Jerusalem? In particular, how do Palestinian residents, lacking self-determination and living under military occupation, experience the city that is so universally understood as divided but whose sovereign insists it is a “united, eternal capital”? I began to ask myself these questions regularly during my initial weeks and months of fieldwork in the fall 2012, as I began to try and understand the geographies of home, dispossession, and resistance experienced by Palestinians. Although no negotiations were taking place at the outset of my research period, discourses in the international media and international political bodies indeed followed the “peace process” framing that I have just summarized. What I observed on the ground, however, was a clear dissonance between the Jerusalem of the news and political-speak and the Jerusalem of Palestinian activists and community groups and of my own experiences. It is from these observations, and informal interviews with acquaintances, that this chapter emerges.
At the outset of fieldwork, I began compiling a news archive related to contemporary (and later historical) struggles of Palestinians in the Jerusalem area. In doing so, I found myself spending an hour, two hours, sometimes even three hours every morning reading local, international, and activist media reports of events that had taken place in Palestinian areas of the city (and in Israel-Palestine more generally) during the past twenty-four hours. On any given day, it seemed I was tracking one, two, three, or even more of the following sorts of developments: An important court decision had been issued the prior evening about the status of an eviction in Sheikh Jarrah. Several children were arrested overnight in Silwan, accused of throwing stones at Israeli soldiers. A home in Al-Tur was demolished in the early hours of morning for lacking a construction permit. Israeli activists are joining a group of Palestinian refugees in a campaign to save their ancestral homes in West Jerusalem from development projects. A man from Isawiyya who has been on a hunger strike in an Israeli prison has just released a statement over his administrative detention. Flying checkpoints were erected yesterday afternoon in Beit Hanina after an alleged attack on a nearby settlement. There is a demonstration being planned for later in the afternoon in Beit Safafa against the construction of a bypass across Palestinian land. Palestinian students in Abu Dis just hammered through the separation wall but were met with skunk spray and tear gas on the other side. A right-wing member of the Knesset has escorted another group of Israelis to the Al-Aqsa compound, closing it off to Palestinians for several hours. Last night a man from Shu’afat learned upon entering the country from Jordan that his Jerusalem residency has been revoked due to his extended period abroad for graduate school.

While well-informed Palestinian officials and even NGOs and activists frequently list the various forms of dispossession, discrimination, and harassment that Palestinian residents face
from the Israeli state and municipal authorities, including some of those mentioned here, I began to understand in developing my archive that the geographies of these issues are largely unexamined or neglected, especially at the scales of the home and neighborhood. That is, these issues are not necessarily experienced uniformly throughout Palestinian areas of the city; rather, certain neighborhoods (or villages, depending on their history) experience certain forms of settlement and occupation to greater degrees than others, and actual commonalities among neighborhoods are not necessarily apparent at the sites and scales of everyday life.

In this chapter, then, I argue that Jerusalem is not a divided city, but rather a fragmented city, a distinction which is significant both for understanding the (geo)political situation in Israel-Palestine and the ongoing peace process, but also for understanding contemporary forms of territorial conflict and struggle that are simultaneously “global” yet not international. This approach follows the argument of feminist scholars that approaching conflict from the embodied perspective on the ground complicates simplistic mappings of territory from above and instead reveals the multiple ways that spaces are experienced simultaneously (Massey 2005; Fluri 2010). I begin this chapter with a brief history of Jerusalem, with a focus on its modern expansion and the wars of 1948 and 1967, and I continue with a summary of the diplomatic events that have produced contemporary discourses on Jerusalem and its (in)divisibility. I then trace, neighborhood by neighborhood, the geographies of dispossession that Palestinians in Jerusalem are facing today, with a focus on threats to or losses of homes, lands, and linkages to other Palestinian communities. These forms of dispossession, I argue, reveal not a city divided between West (“Israeli”) and East (“Palestinian”) Jerusalem, but rather a city in which Palestinians are separated from one another in the pursuit of Israel’s broader geopolitical strategies. In my analysis that follows, I look at this fragmentation more broadly and its physical
and social effects on Palestinians in Jerusalem. In doing so, I consider the relationship between consolidation and fragmentation of territory and the way that the “borders” of Jerusalem are reterritorialized in, around, and between spaces of everyday life. I also reflect briefly on the role of infrastructure in territorial consolidation in general and in settler colonial expansion in particular.

I conclude that, rather than assigning Palestinians a geography of “East Jerusalem” with a set of uniform “East Jerusalem issues” and masking the fact that it is disappearing, the geographies of Palestinians in Jerusalem today should be understood through their actual, embodied experiences on the ground, experiences that both complicate the discourses of the peace process and inform contemporary debates on geopolitical conflict and struggle. Data presented in this chapter emerges primarily from archives of news and NGO reports, along with interviews with Palestinian NGO activists. Attached to this chapter, I include a number of maps that illustrate the historical growth, proposed divisions, and ongoing fragmentation of the city.

EXPANDING JERUSALEM: A BRIEF HISTORY

Late Ottoman Period (mid-1800s–1917)

Despite Jerusalem’s long history, spanning several millennia, the sprawling city that we see today has a relatively modern history and is the result of Palestinian expansion, European Jewish settlement, and the absorption of surrounding Arab villages. In fact, it was not until the mid-1800s that the city significantly grew beyond the medieval city walls, from what is now called the Old City (see Map 1.1). At the outset of this period of expansion, buildings outside of
the Old City were generally religious in nature, or they were summer homes of elites surrounded by security walls, and cemeteries were also located outside of the city walls (Davis 2002, 18). In the mid-to-late 19th century, however, following Ottoman land and administrative reforms, as well as an increased military presence providing security in the area, increasing numbers of Palestinian families—not only elite ones—began to build summer homes outside of the increasingly crowded Old City (Davis 2002, 19). A number of European churches and Christian organizations also started building churches, guest houses, hospitals, schools, and other institutions during this period, both within and outside of the Old City, and many Palestinian Christians were able to access lands outside of the city walls through their religious affiliations (Davis 2002, 18–19).

Jewish communities, too, began building outside of the city walls in the mid-19th century, beginning with the neighborhood of Mishkenot Sha’ananim, to the southwest of the Old City, in 1855 (Davis 2002, 21). Jewish construction in Jerusalem accelerated, though, beginning in the mid-1870s with the establishment of Jewish building societies, following Ottoman land reforms in the prior decade that enabled foreigners to purchase land more easily (Kark & Oren-Nordheim 2001, 76). Like their Arab, Greek, and Armenian counterparts at this time, then, Jewish residents of the crowded Old City began to move outside the walls (Kark & Oren-Nordheim 2001, 75–77). At the same time, increasing numbers of Jews from Europe and elsewhere (e.g., Yemen) also began to arrive in Palestine, and they settled in Jerusalem to such a degree that the Jewish population of the city surpassed that of any other community sometime around the 1880s, though population counts made prior to the 20th century vary greatly and remain highly contested (see Kark & Oren-Nordheim 2001, 28; Davis 2002, 11, 17). Much of the Jewish construction was focused north and northwest of the Old City, especially along and in
proximity to the road to Jaffa. While the Jewish building societies were responsible for a vast majority of the Jewish neighborhoods constructed during the initial building boom of the 1870s and 1880s, from the late 1880s through the end of the Ottoman period, new Jewish neighborhoods tended to be either commercial projects or philanthropic in nature (see Kark and Oren-Nordheim, 82–85).

It is these sorts of planned neighborhoods—as opposed to the building of Arab summer homes and religious institutions—that are typically at the center of histories of the “New City” of Jerusalem (Davis 2002, 20). As Rochelle Davis (2002) warns, however, such an “emphasis on neighborhoods is problematic, for it focuses exclusively on the one community that built organized neighborhoods and treats the other methods of building homes and communities as aberrant” (p 20). The Arab role in the development of modern Jerusalem—and the role of other Jerusalem communities—is often marginalized or ignored, then, due to the form and distribution of their building projects, and as a result of gaps in the historical record regarding the construction of full-time residences by non-Jewish communities outside of the Old City (Davis 2002, 21–22). This marginalization serves the argument of many Zionists that modern “West Jerusalem” is thoroughly and indisputably Israeli and that Palestinians have no claim to or history in any of it.

Still, a number of today’s Jerusalem neighborhoods located near or immediately outside of the Old City—some of which are now Jewish neighborhoods—have Arab origins from the late Ottoman period (see Davis 2002, 52–57). These are located primarily to the southwest of the Old City, including Abu Tor, Baq’a, Qatamon, and Talbiya, and to its north, including Musrara, Bab Al-Zahira, Wadi al-Joz, Sheikh Jarrah. Additionally, Arabs in Jerusalem rented homes in the southwestern neighborhoods of the German Colony, built by German Templars, and the
Greek Colony, built by Greeks connected to the Greek Orthodox Church. From the mid-19th century until 1917, nearly one hundred new neighborhoods were constructed in Jerusalem, more than three-quarters of them Jewish (Kark & Oren-Nordheim, 79–81), and the total area of the “New City” grew to be four times larger than the original walled city (Davis 2002, 17).

Alongside the expansion of the city during the late Ottoman period came new and/or improved infrastructure networks (e.g., electricity, telegraph lines, paved and gravel roads, sewage systems), public services and institutions (e.g., police and fire services, a city park, a city hospital), and administrative regimes (e.g., construction permit procedures) (Davis 2002, 11–12). With regard to inter-communal relations during the final Ottoman years, historians have found high levels of cooperation in civic and institutional affairs between religious groups (Campos 2011), as well as records of close familial and personal relations between members of different religious and ethnic groups (e.g., Tamari 2005b, Lynd et al. 1993). At the end of Ottoman rule in 1917, Jerusalem was the largest city in Palestine, and although major economic development and industrialization had been focused along the coast, Jerusalem was the political, cultural, and of course, religious center of Palestine at the time of transition to British rule (Davis 2002, 15, 17).

*British Mandate for Palestine (1917–1948)*

After driving the Ottoman Army from Palestine in 1917, Britain (and France) began to administer former Ottoman territories in the Levant through the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, following the terms and divisions of the 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement. In 1923, Britain was formally assigned a Mandate for Palestine by the League of Nations. During the decades of British rule that followed the First World War, Jerusalem’s political importance
increased greatly as site of the Mandate administrative headquarters, and the city continued to expand both in size and in population. At the outset of British rule, there were approximately 54,410 people living in the city, including 31,147 Jews (57%), 11,663 Christians (21%), and 10,600 Muslims (19%) (Kark & Oren-Nordheim, 28). In addition to the growth taking place in Jewish Jerusalem, newly constructed areas outside of the Old City walls increasingly became home to Arab (and Greek and Armenian) middle and upper class families—not just elites—while older and poorer members of these communities largely remained in the Old City (Davis 2002, 33). The populations of the “New” and Old City remained connected, however, during this period through family and business connections, and indeed the economies of the two remained linked in a number of ways (Davis 2002, 34–35).

At the same time, Palestinians also migrated to new neighborhoods of Jerusalem from other parts of the country—particularly from its hinterland—in search of economic and educational opportunities, reflecting a broader pattern of rural-urban migration in Palestine in the early 20th century (Davis 2002, 36). Some of the immediate Jerusalem villages, such as ‘Ein Karem, Lifta, Deir Yassin in the west and northwest, were eventually connected to the city and to neighboring Jewish settlements, both physically and economically, and were “invariably on their way to urbanization” by the time of the 1948 war (Tamari 2002, 71–72). Social life in Jerusalem during the British period, especially in the new western and southwestern Arab neighborhoods, was shaped by the proliferation of social and cultural institutions and the expansion of shopping and entertainment options (see Davis 2002, 39–49), some of which became sites shared with the rapidly increasing numbers of Jewish residents of the city. Although British planning and administrative practices tended to “divide” the city along lines of old versus new, historical versus modern, preservation versus development, these divisions, as
Roberts (2013) argues, invariably facilitated Zionist settlement in the city at the expense of indigenous Palestinian communities.

Throughout the country, beginning in the very early years of the Mandate, the amicable relations experienced in the late Ottoman era between indigenous Palestinians and newly arriving Jewish immigrants began to deteriorate. Jews were no longer immigrating to Palestine for religious reasons primarily, but for nationalist (Zionist) reasons, and the Zionist movement adopted land and labor policies intended to maintain separation between the Jewish and indigenous non-Jewish communities (Gelvin 2008, 209–210). In the first half of the 1930s, as Jews left escalating anti-Semitism in Europe, the Jewish proportion of the total population of Palestine increased from 17% to 31%, while at the same time, indigenous Palestinian farmers were being rapidly displaced from agricultural lands that their landlords—many absent and abroad—were selling to Zionists (Gelvin 2008, 210–211).

Thus, as increasing number of Zionist settlers arrived and their project become increasingly one of state-building, a distinct Palestinian nationalism began to emerge in opposition—alongside existing trends toward Arab or Syrian nationalism—and tensions increased between the Jewish and Arab populations throughout Palestine, though some Jewish settlements and Palestinian villages certainly maintained amicable and sometimes co-dependent relations. In 1936, Palestinians launched what would become a violent uprising against British colonial rule in Palestine and the deteriorating political and economic conditions linked to British collusion with the Zionist settler-colonial project. The Great Revolt, which British security forces quelled in the cities quite rapidly, extended for three years in rural parts of Palestine, where “the British launched a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, employing tactics all too familiar to Palestinians today” (Gelvin 2008, 211–212). Most importantly, it was in response to
this revolt that the British began to discuss seriously the possibility of partitioning Palestine between Jews and Arabs, and Jerusalem would indeed play a unique role in these discussions, which I summarize in the subsequent section.

The relatively rapid construction of new neighborhoods and expansions of others in the first half of the twentieth century, along with changing demographics and increasing communal tensions within the city, certainly posed a challenge to British Mandate authorities as they struggled to establish functioning municipal institutions. This is made clear in a series of Mandate-era documents just recently released into the UK National Archives, which describe the efforts of the Mandate administration to define the office of mayor and, in particular, to determine who should be mayor (e.g., should there be a fixed or a rotating religious identity of the mayor). ¹ Most tellingly, in a 1944 communication to the colonial office in London, one British administrator on the ground observed, “The Jerusalem mayoralty constitutes a major political problem; to some extent, it is the Palestine problem in miniature. . . . So far as the feelings of both sides go, whether rightly or wrongly, it is almost a case of ‘who holds Jerusalem will hold Palestine.’”

1948–1967

The British response to the Great Revolt was the 1939 White Paper—which proposed controlling Jewish immigration, monitoring land transfers, and ending the Mandate the following decade—was criticized by both Arabs and Jews, though it was still adopted by the British (Gelvin 2008, 212). It was not until after the end of the Second World War, however, that widespread violence again erupted in Palestine, and in 1947, Britain turned the question of
Palestine to the brand new United Nations, having decided to terminate its mandate over the country (Gelvin 2008, 212). Later that year, the United Nations General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into two states, one for the Arabs and one for the Zionists, with Jerusalem remaining an international zone. A Civil War erupted in Palestine over the plan to partition the country immediately following the UN vote, and in early 1948, in the midst of this violence, Britain declared it would unilaterally withdraw from Palestine on 14 May—which it did (see Gelvin 2002, 212–213). That same day, the Zionist leadership declared the establishment of the State of Israel; fighting continued, however, as armies from neighboring Arab states entered Palestine the following day in support of the Palestinians.

During the war, the Palestinian villages and neighborhoods of West Jerusalem were emptied of their residents through a variety of means (see Krystall 2002). The village of Lifta, for instance, became a periodic battleground after the village coffee shop was attacked by Zionist militias in late 1947 (Pappé 2006, 67). Perhaps the event that most affected the fate of Palestinian West Jerusalem, though, was an attack on the western Jerusalem village of Deir Yassin by members of the Irgun group and Stern Gang on 9 April 1948, during which nearly one hundred Palestinian residents of the village were killed (Pappé 2006, 90–91). News of this event, well-known today among Palestinians as the Deir Yassin Massacre, was spread widely by Zionists forces as a warning to other Palestinian fighters and populations and by Palestinians as a way of “invit[ing] Western pressure against the Zionists” (Tamari 2002, 76). Throughout the Arab neighborhoods of West Jerusalem, news of the massacre instilled a fear in Palestinians for what was to come, and many took refuge elsewhere in Jerusalem and beyond, with the intent of returning to their houses after fighting had subsided. Those who initially remained in West Jerusalem were eventually expelled by Zionist forces later in April 1948, and although the
British were still in Palestine at this time, they did not intervene in Zionist attacks on Arab Jerusalem except in the case of Sheikh Jerrah, north of the Old City, where the wealthiest Palestinians had their family compounds (Pappé 2006, 98). By the end of the 1948 war, the western side of Jerusalem had been emptied of its indigenous residents and was controlled by Zionists forces, and the eastern villages and neighborhoods of Jerusalem, along with the Old City, were under the control of Jordan. The 1949 armistice lines—referred to as the Green Line—therefore cut right through Jerusalem and although the broader armistice lines were not official borders, they delineate what is today described as the “pre-1967 borders” of Israel.

This was the first time in history that Jerusalemites experienced such a division. As Albin (1997, 121) explains,

The period 1948–67 is . . . unprecedented in terms of the city’s division between Israeli and Jordanian rule, and its physical partition by concrete walls, barbed wire and minefields. During this time Jerusalem developed into two cities with almost no contact, into two distinct worlds linked to different political systems, cultures, economies and municipal administrations.

In June 1967, Israel attacked the surrounding Arab states under the guise of preventative war and seized the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. This marks the beginning of the occupation of the West Bank, including the Old City and eastern neighborhoods and villages of Jerusalem. Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem—like elsewhere in the newly occupied territories—began immediately after the war, and the Israeli Knesset formally annexed East Jerusalem in 1980 in a move that has yet to be recognized by the international community (Smith 2010, 437–438).
NEGOTIATING JERUSALEM

Pre-1948 Partition Plans

While the future status of Jerusalem is today tied to the “peace process”, discussions over its (in)divisibility can be understood in a longer history of proposed partitions of Palestine generally and Jerusalem specifically. In this section, then, I briefly summarize the two most significant proposals for dividing Palestine—and the fate of Jerusalem in those plans—before tracing the history of Jerusalem’s position in peace negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. In the aftermath of the initial phase of the Great Revolt, British officials formed the Peel Commission in 1937 to investigate the causes of recent violence in Palestine and recommend a path forward (Smith 2010, 137). The Commission concluded that the Mandate for Palestine was unsustainable due to the competing Arab and Jewish statehood ambitions and recommended that the country be divided into a Jewish state and an Arab State, the latter of which would be linked to Transjordan (Smith 2010, 138). In specific, the Commission recommended that the Jewish state be established in the north of the country and along the Mediterranean coast south to Tel Aviv, which were the areas in which Jewish settlements in Palestine were most concentrated and which accounted for roughly 20% of the area of the Mandate (Smith 2010, 138). The rest of the country would be allotted to an Arab State, except the greater Jerusalem area and the lands surrounding the road to Jaffa, which would remain under British control as a separate entity (Smith 2010, 138). The Peel Commission’s partition plan was rejected immediately by Palestinians for a number of reasons, including that the Jewish state allocation contained 250,000 Arabs who would be forcibly removed and that the country’s most
fertile lands would be lost in the partition (Smith 2010, 138). The Zionist leadership, despite disagreement within the movement, was “cautiously favorable” to the Peel partition, in that it would mean sovereignty—the actual borders could be moved later, the leadership believed, as the population grew through Jewish immigration from Europe (Smith 2010, 138). Of course, the Peel Commission’s plan was never implemented and the Great Revolt continued in the Palestine countryside until autumn 1939, around the same time that Britain declared war on Nazi Germany and a period of relative calm began in Palestine.

Following the Second World War and the renewal of tensions in Palestine, the British government brought the question of Palestine to the United Nations after deciding to end its mandate. Accordingly, the General Assembly established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to study conditions on the ground and offer recommendations for the future. After visiting Palestine, the committee concluded that the British Mandate should indeed end to make way for statehood, and although members were split over the number and configuration of states they should recommend to the General Assembly, the majority supported partitioning Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and a UN-administered international zone consisting of Jerusalem and Bethlehem (Smith 2010, 192–193). Under this plan, 56% of Palestine was assigned to the Jewish state, and the remainder—minus the Jerusalem “corpus separatum”—was assigned to the Arab State, at a time when Jews constituted approximately one-third of the population of Palestine and owned just under 6% of the land (Pappé 2006, 29–33; see also Khalidi 1997). Following the General Assembly’s approval of this plan through UNGA Resolution 181 in November 1947, Civil War broke out in Palestine, and by the end of the 1948 Palestine War, Israel occupied not only the territory allocated to a Jewish state but also some of the territory allocated to an Arab state.
The Peace Process

The Palestinian national movement was revitalized and remade in exile, beginning with the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1960s and accelerating under the leadership of Yassir Arafat in the 1970s (Gelvin 2007; Khalidi 1997). With the signing of the Oslo I Accord in 1993, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO recognized the State of Israel, and the parties agreed to negotiate a peace agreement with one another. This agreement marked the start of the “peace process” that continues until today. While the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established and Areas A, B, and C were defined with the initial Oslo agreements, it was agreed that “permanent status” negotiations over the major issues of contestation between the Israelis and Palestinians, including Jerusalem, borders, and refugees, would take place following an interim period of Palestinian self-rule that was not meant to least more than a few years (Albin 1997, 117). More than twenty years later, none of the deadlines set by the initial Oslo agreements have been met, and a weak Palestinian National Authority continues to govern in limited parts of the West Bank.

While the Oslo Accords designated Jerusalem a “final status issue” subject to negotiations, political and diplomatic discourses regarding the possibilities for its future status have been shaped profoundly outside of the negotiations framework. In other words, the range of possible answers to the questions of whether Jerusalem will be united or divided (or shared) and what a division between Israelis and Palestinians might look like have been, in many ways, answered outside of negotiations, both before and after the agreed Oslo framework. Most significantly, perhaps, is that during the first two decades of Israeli statehood, “the international community came to recognize West Jerusalem, captured during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948–49,
as sovereign Israeli territory. The question, ‘Whose Jerusalem?’ thus became limited to the part east of the 1967 Green Line” (Albin 1997, 122). As such, in diplomatic and media speak, the western neighborhoods of Jerusalem even those with Arab origins, are not even on the table for negotiation under the Oslo framework between Israelis and Palestinians.

Since 1967—both before and since the signing of the Oslo agreements—significant changes in the “facts on the ground” have also been achieved at the hands of the Israeli government and the Jerusalem municipality, particularly in the construction of Jewish settlements and in the complementary restriction on Palestinian expansion. Following the 1967 occupation and official annexation of East Jerusalem, Israel began enacting “‘unification’ policies” that would move Jerusalem materially toward the united and eternal Jewish capital that Zionists claimed rhetorically (Albin 1997, 122). The material effects of these policies on Palestinian communities on the ground at the neighborhood scale are described in the following section. More broadly, though, “New Jewish neighborhoods, built to isolate Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem from the West Bank and to erase the East-West demographic division of the city, [have] rendered East Jerusalem ethnically mixed and a future physical partition very difficult” (Albin 1997, 122).

Israel’s transformations of the city have occurred in spite of United Nations resolutions and various forms of diplomatic pressures from abroad, particularly the West, and in spite of ongoing resistance by Palestinians on the ground in Jerusalem. Edward Said, in 1995, argued that Israel’s ability to undertake such significant material transformations could be attributed to its efforts to first transform discourses about the city through “projecting” the Jerusalem it intended to create:

Israel was . . . able to project an idea of Jerusalem that contradicted not only its history but its very lived actuality, turning it from a multicultural and multireligious city into an
“eternally” unified, principally Jewish city under exclusive Israeli sovereignty. Only by doing so first in projections could it then proceed to the changes on the ground during the last eight or nine years, that is, to undertake the massive architectural, demographic, and political metamorphosis that would then correspond to the images and projections (Said 1995, 6–7).²

At the same time, events like the First Intifada had made visible at least the “political and psychological” divisions within the city—and the inherent failings of Israel’s attempts at forced unification—which underscored the need for Jerusalem to be included among the issues requiring a negotiated settlement between the Israeli’s and Palestinians (Albin 1997, 138). Nevertheless, by the time the Oslo Accords were signed, the international community had come to a position recognizing “the need to avoid a physical redivision of the city”, meaning that “Israel’s argument that sovereignty over all of Jerusalem must remain exclusively in its own hands, in order to avoid a return to the experiences of the 1948–67 period, became more persuasive” (Albin 1997, 122). In this vain, immediately following the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israeli leaders—in addition to accelerating settlement activity in eastern areas of Jerusalem—began to frame the negotiation of Jerusalem as one related merely to management of and access to religious sites in the city (Albin 2005, 347).

It was not until July 2000, during the Camp David Summit hosted by President Clinton, that the Israelis and Palestinians first negotiated over Jerusalem, and further, that Israel expressed openness to an arrangement that would divide or share sovereignty over it (Albin 2005, 348). Despite a series of concessions and agreements over surrendering and sharing sovereignty in the city, these negotiations eventually failed over the issue of the Al-Aqsa compound (Haram al-Sharif / the Temple Mount) (Albin 2005, 348). While the terms of these failed talks would become the starting point for future initiatives (e.g., the “Road Map” introduced by George W.
Bush), the united-versus-divided framework remains at the center of political discourses, particularly given that an uncompromising “united” position remains so popular throughout a broad span of the Israeli political spectrum. Even when “divided” is understood as “shared” at a political level, though, the Oslo framing fails to consider the actual fragmentation experienced on the ground by Palestinians.

DISPOSSESSION AND DISRUPTION

I now draw from the news archive I compiled during fieldwork—and a few other sources—to trace the processes of dispossession and disruptions of everyday spaces Palestinians experience in present-day Jerusalem, neighborhood-by-neighborhood. I begin in the southwest of the city and proceed anti-clockwise through East Jerusalem and conclude with a brief discussion of Palestinian struggles over West Jerusalem today. For a map showing each of these neighborhoods, see Map 1.6.

Southern Neighborhoods

**Al-Walajeh** lies at the southwest margins Jerusalem and was historically a village. The original village of Al-Walajeh was evacuated and destroyed in 1948 and then rebuilt soon afterward on village lands on the other (then-Jordanian-administered) side of the Green Line (see Khalidi 2006, 321–23). Since the start of the 1967 occupation, some of the village lands have been confiscated for the nearby Israeli settlement of Gilo and its infrastructure (Paq 2014), and the ruins of the original village have become picnic and recreational ground for Israelis (Khalidi
Now, the village is about to be severed from Jerusalem by the Israeli separation wall, even though much of the village falls within the current Israeli-defined municipal boundary. As a result, residents of Al-Walajeh will also be severed from an estimated 85% of their agricultural lands (Paq 2014). Further, in summer 2013, the Jerusalem Planning and Building Committee voted to establish a new national park, Refaim Valley Park, at the southern edge of the city, approximately 20% of which sits on lands of Al-Walajeh (Hasson 2013d; Wilson 2016a). For the past decade, village residents have demonstrated against the wall’s construction, which, in addition to losses of lands and livelihoods generally, has meant significant alternations to the village’s terraced agricultural landscape, including the uprooting of olive trees.

Beit Safafa is a south Jerusalem village that is home to approximately 9,000 residents, including many Jewish Israelis, and it is widely regarded as a politically “quiet” Palestinian community. The village has been bisected now multiple times, beginning in 1948 when its lands fell on both side of the Green Line, and since 1967, village lands have also been confiscated for the building of Israeli settlements and roads that serve them. In recent years, residents have been trying to stop construction of a major, six-lane highway that will cut through the neighborhood and disconnect residents from schools, mosques, and commercial centers. Based on a development plan adopted in the early 1990s and a construction plan approved in 1999, the highway is an extension of Route 50 (the Begin Highway), a major north-south roadway running through western neighborhoods of the city (Hasson 2013a). The Israeli government is extending the highway to reach West Bank settlements south of Jerusalem and surrounding Bethlehem (collectively called Gush Etzion) and thereby give residents of the settlement bloc easier and faster access to both western Jerusalem and the highway to Tel Aviv.
Palestinian residents of Beit Safafa tried to stop construction of the highway—or at the very least, obtain concessions on overpasses and noise barriers—through the Israeli courts, and during my fieldwork period, also staged a series of demonstrations and installed a protest tent on village lands in protest of the highway project (Wagman & Frehse 2013a, 2013b; Deger 2013). Following an initial dismissal in the district court in February 2013 (Hasson 2013a), Beit Safafa residents appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court, who in summer 2013 ordered the government to address their concerns (Hasson 2013c). Accepting the municipality’s claim that concessions had been resolved following an August 2013 meeting with the community, the Supreme Court denied residents any further appeals in January 2014 (Hasson 2013g; Hasson 2014). In interviews with local and international media, municipal authorities dismissed issues over the highway extension through Beit Safafa as merely a disagreement between residents of a city and city officials and rejected any contextualization within the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (Lidman 2013; Sanders 2013).

**Sur Bahar**, another far-southern neighborhood that was historically a village, faces land confiscation for yet another road. This would be part of the southeastern stretch of an Israeli ring road slated to run through East Jerusalem, which would connect with the network under construction near Beit Safafa and roughly follow the route of the separation wall that cuts off other eastern neighborhoods of Jerusalem from the core of the city.

Located to the northeast of Sur Bahar is **Jebel al-Mukabber**, a neighborhood that has lost sizable lands since 1967 for settlement construction and that suffers from severe neglect from the Jerusalem municipality in terms of roads and other infrastructure networks, and social and city services (Bimkom 2013). The most urgent issue in Jebel al-Mukabber, however, is a
housing shortage and overcrowding, which has resulted from limitations on expansion space for residents due to “open space” designations by Israel (Bimkom 2013).

The Holy Basin

Although the Old City, where most of the “holy sites” are concentrated, was the only space understood as Jerusalem until the 19th century, its precise footprint has certainly changed over the several millennia of its history. Both the religious and touristic center of Jerusalem, the cost of living is high in the Old City, and housing-related restrictions for Palestinians, along with Israeli settlement activity, result in financial and other pressures. Israeli soldiers are stationed throughout the Old City at all times, and they frequently clash after Friday prayers with Palestinians protesting the occupation and threats to al-Aqsa Mosque. During the course of my fieldwork, demonstrations of varying sizes took place almost every Friday, typically in the area just outside of Damascus Gate, the primary entrance to the Old City used by Palestinians. Since 1967, Israeli settlement organizations have bought properties peppered throughout the city’s Muslim and Christian Quarters, which also contributes to the high security presence (see Ju’beh 2001). For the past decade, there only has only been a master plan in place for construction and development in the Jewish Quarter, which falls under a separate development scheme from the other quarters, meaning that Palestinian residents of the city are effectively unable to obtain any permits for construction or remodeling. The city council came close to approving a master plan that would address these issues in early 2013, however several council members thwarted this plan on the basis that it did not provide for a new Jewish settlement in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City (Hasson 2013b).
Silwan, known widely as one of the tensest neighborhoods of Jerusalem, is located immediately south of the Old City, over and around some of the oldest parts of the city. For this reason, some of the land in the north of the village is referred to Israelis as the “City of David”, and an Israeli settler organization, Elad, sponsors archeological and tourism development projects there, which are carried out at the expense of Palestinian residents. The state has also declared a national park on most of Silwan’s lands, Jerusalem Walls National Park, subjecting scores of Palestinian homes to demolition orders, and settlers that have moved into the neighborhood frequently instigate clashes between their private security forces and village residents, particularly children, who are then often arrested in night raids. I focus on Silwan and this national park in greater detail in Chapter Two.

The neighborhood of Abu Tur, or ath-Thuri, is located to the south and southeast of Silwan, and residents there face increasingly crowded living conditions due to the lack of available land for expansion (see Bimkom 2013). Part of the land constraints are related to the planned expansion of the same Israel national park that affects construction in Silwan.

Residents of at-Tor, located east of the Old City on the Mount of Olives, have long faced home demolitions for building without (nearly unattainable) permits, and they live with poor quality roads and under-developed infrastructure networks, especially with regard to sewer lines (Bimkom 2013). Conditions in at-Tur are also increasingly crowded, and the Israeli government’s plan for a new national park north of the village covers much of its only remaining land available for expansion. I focus more on this park and its broader contexts in Chapter Two. Additionally, an Israeli settlement sits at the northwestern edge of the village, and another group of settlers occupies a couple of buildings in its southwest (Bimkom 2013).
The eastern Jerusalem villages of Sheikh Sa’ad, Sawahira, Abu Dis, al-‘Eizariya, and az-Za’yim were all drawn outside of—or were split in two by—the municipal boundaries set by Israel during annexation, despite their historical links to the rest of the city. More recently, these neighborhoods have also been cut off from the rest of Jerusalem by the separation wall (or will be cut off once construction is complete), which has severed commercial ties and severely compromised access to education, healthcare, and other necessary services. While some Palestinian Jerusalemites had moved to places like al-‘Eizariya from more central areas of the city in the 1980s and 1990s due to housing shortages, many of them moved back as the wall approached, afraid of losing their residency and/or dreading the disruptions of checkpoints (Dhaher 2014). Finally, the wall dispossessed Palestinians in some of these villages of their agricultural lands, and when the route of the wall has sliced right through neighborhoods, it has separated members of families from one another. Some of these villages, too, have lost lands to Israeli settlement construction and expansion since 1967 and/or to infrastructure projects that serve West Bank settlements.

North of the Old City

Sheikh Jarrah, one of the early urban neighborhoods of the city for elite Muslim families, has become a major site of sustained demonstrations against evictions and settlement, as courts have been turning over Palestinian homes occupied by Jews prior to the 1948 war to Israeli settler organizations (see Bimkom 2013). While Jewish Israelis have been successful in
recovering properties from which Jews fled in 1948 and that subsequently fell under Jordanian control until 1967, Palestinians have not been able to recover properties from which they fled or were expelled in 1948 on the Israeli side of the Green Line.

The people of al-Issawiyya, most of which is located in an area that was part of an Israeli enclave inside the West Bank between 1948 and 1967, are facing limitations on growth due to a national park zoning and a landfill plan, and residents have long lacked municipal and civil services. In the course of my fieldwork, a resident of the village being held in an Israeli prison, Samer Issawi, launched a prolonged hunger strike, and demonstrations in support of Issawi resulted periodically in violent responses from occupation forces. Due to Israeli “development” plans, as well as its bordering the Hebrew University and a major Israeli hospital, al-Issawiyya is largely disconnected from other Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.

Far Northern Neighborhoods

Shu’fat, is located along the road between Jerusalem and Ramallah and is in the midst of three Israeli settlements. The population of the neighborhood has risen dramatically in recent decades following new construction of Palestinians homes (mostly for the upper-middle class), and now there are housing shortages, causing sharp increases in housing costs (Bimkom 2013). Further, a refugee camp that was established on village lands after 1948 has been cut off from Jerusalem and is essentially no longer provided city services, despite being located within the municipal boundaries. Beit Hanina, to the north of Shu’fat, is also crowded due to settlements on lands confiscated from the village and due to the inability of Palestinians to obtain building permits, which in turn have subjected homes to demolition. The separation wall runs along
multiple sides of the neighborhood, which limits the possibilities of expansion. Part of the
crowding in both of these neighborhoods can be traced to the construction of the separation wall,
as residents of Jerusalem that were going to be cut off from the city have moved to places like
Shu’fat and Beit Hanina (Bimkom 2013). Finally, Beit Iksa, in the northwest of the city, is
about to be cut off from Jerusalem because of the separation wall, and only residents will be able
to enter and exit the village through a single gate.

West Jerusalem

Following the 1948 war, the homes from which Arabs had fled or were expelled in West
Jerusalem were treated as “absentee” property, and Israeli Jews were settled in the houses as
quickly as possible (Krystall 1998). Both during and in the aftermath of the war, empty/emptied
Palestinian homes in West Jerusalem were looted extensively by Jewish fighters and civilians
(Krystall 1998; Segev 1986). Today, pre-1948 Arab homes in western areas of Jerusalem are
marketed as “Arab houses”—a term used merely to signal a specific genre of architectural
design, rather than to indicate history—and these structures are highly valued (Stein 2010, 10).
Although in the language of the peace process West Jerusalem is not up for negotiation, for
many Palestinians with family homes in the western neighborhoods that were dispossessed in
1948, West Jerusalem is not necessarily a “done deal”. Rather, they maintain claims over those
homes until today, and many are struggling for their homes in a variety of ways. There are, for
instance, a number of long-running court battles being fought by the descendants of some of
those dispossessed in 1948 but who remained in the areas declared as the State of Israel.
During fieldwork, I met one such woman who took me to her family’s home north of the Old City has been seeking title to her father’s home for decades now, and while she lives currently in Europe, she returns twice each year to meet with lawyers about her case. At one point, she was offered her father’s brother’s dispossessed home in the same family compound, but she refused, not wanting her rights fulfilled at the expense of another member of her family.

There is also an active, ongoing struggle taking place today over the village of Lifta, which is the last remaining village from 1948 that has not been destroyed or repopulated. Facing the threat of the development of luxury Jewish housing and tourist amenities on top of their village ruins, people from the village are contesting the “development” plan in order to stop the settlement of their homes and lands (see Golan et al. 2013). I focus on this struggle in Chapter Four.

Since the capture of the West Bank in 1967, many Palestinians from West Jerusalem that had been displaced in 1948 to East Jerusalem and beyond have returned to see their family homes, now inhabited by Israeli Jews. Some made this journey in the years immediately following the start of the occupation, but refugees and their descendants continue to make these journeys until the present. To illustrate, George Bisharat, a former law professor at UC-Hastings, visited his family’s dispossessed home in the Talbiya neighborhood in the 1970s and has written ever since about the visit and his family’s efforts to regain their property (See, e.g., Bisharat 2003). In terms of more recent visits, a documentary film that I acquired from an East Jerusalem book store during fieldwork, Stranger in My Home (Gharib fi Beiti) (2007), by filmmaker Sahera Dirbas, follows several Palestinians to their family’s dispossessed homes in West Jerusalem that are now occupied by Israelis. The film’s subjects describe their memories of the home and their reflections on the visit and its meaning both before and after going to the houses, and some are actually welcomed inside and talk with the current inhabitants.
Finally, just as my fieldwork was beginning, a book called *Once Upon a Land* was published (in Hebrew and Arabic) by members of Zochrot, an Israeli NGO promoting awareness of the Palestinian *nakba* in Israeli society. This book contains walking tour itineraries of dispossessed Palestinian villages and urban neighborhoods throughout Israel, with explanations of homes, business, and other structures, along with brief stories of life before 1948 (Gardi et al. 2012). I also participated in an author-led tour of Palestinian West Jerusalem organized by Zochrot, which was offered in celebration of the book’s publication. The publication of this book reflects broader efforts to keep political focus on pre-1948 Palestinian homes and lands, which I discuss later in the dissertation.

**PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION**

The general outcomes of all of the issues facing Palestinians in the city may indeed be dispossession, displacement, and/or confinement, but even when struggles are shared between two or more neighborhoods, the physical landscapes themselves are sliced, split, trimmed, bisected, or otherwise divided, with resulting political and social effects. Looking broadly at the issues facing Palestinians in eastern neighborhoods of Jerusalem, it is clear that Palestinians throughout the city face some of the same struggles, while many neighborhoods also face situations unique to other parts of the city. Accordingly there is really no grand, coherent “East Jerusalem” struggle that compels a clear and easily organized resistance; rather, by design, there is a long list of struggles that are distributed unevenly throughout the city.

Home demolitions, for example, may threaten Palestinians throughout Jerusalem—in fact, one-third of Palestinian homes in the city are slated for demolition under Israeli law—but
demolition orders are enforced more frequently in Silwan than in Shu’fat. Similarly, the construction of roads to serve Israeli settlements may only be at the margins of some of the northern and far eastern neighborhoods, but in Beit Safafa, the highway cuts right through the village. Over-crowding and construction permit denials are commonplace throughout nearly all of the Palestinian neighborhoods, but in some areas it is less risky to build without a permit than others (and indeed the crowding is less intense in some areas than others). Although Israeli national parks now adjoin a great number of Palestinian neighborhoods, in some locations they threaten future growth, while in others they sit directly over existing homes.

In the face of these threats, Palestinian communities have organized and responded in different ways. In Beit Safafa, for instance, residents have organized demonstrations but also worked within city government apparatuses and the Israeli court system to seek relief on the route of the road. Residents of Sheikh Jarrah have also demonstrated against the evictions of Palestinians to hand over properties to Jewish settler organizations, and property owners have challenged confiscations in court. In Silwan, residents are constantly involved with legal proceedings over properties and arrested youth, but they have also established community centers and social services to educated outsiders, organize residents, and fill in gaps left by the municipality and the state. In Abu Dis, students at al-Quds University and other youth activists periodically hammer holes in the concrete separation wall, the recordings of which go viral among Palestinians and broader activist communities; indeed, in other neighborhoods of Jerusalem and throughout the West Bank, the wall has become a site of sustained demonstrations against its construction and the resulting dispossession and interruption.
Fragmentation of the Physical Landscape

A number of the modes of dispossession Palestinian experience today in Jerusalem are ones that transform physical landscapes in significant ways, and I have focused primarily on these divisions while going through the Jerusalem neighborhoods. The settlement enterprise in East Jerusalem has not only been dependent on lands belonging to Palestinians, but in many cases, settlements have been established between Palestinian neighborhoods, physically interrupting their connections to one another and preventing future Palestinian expansion on these lands. The roads built to the settlements within the city also frequently divide Palestinian neighborhoods, and roads constructed to serve Israeli settlements deeper inside the West Bank can also run directly through—or slice off pieces of—Palestinian village lands. The same is true of the separation wall, which not only severs the West Bank from Jerusalem, but also separates (or expropriates) agricultural property of Palestinians in outer neighborhoods. All of these divisions of Palestinian communities and properties also present obstacles to the expansion of Palestinian neighborhoods, which leave them easily isolated from one another.

Social and Political Fragmentation

The physical fragmentation of Palestinian Jerusalem facilitates the social and political fragmentation of Palestinians in Jerusalem as well. Fragmentation has been a foundational part of the experience since 1948 and often recognized as such (see, e.g., Abdulhadi 2003), even though it has taken many forms, both material and social. Certainly, though, the two are related, and political fragmentation has been a major effect of physical separation and dispersion. Maya
Mikdashi (2013, 24), reflecting on the meaning of settler colonialism and the relationship between American and Israeli settler colonialism, argues that “With the passage of generations, reservation land [in the U.S. context] is continually fragmented and parceled into smaller pieces, effectively diluting the collective bargaining rights of Indigenous peoples.”

At the level of Palestinian nationalist politics, this dilution of bargaining rights may be recognizable in the ways that Israel has exploited and even encouraged political fragmentation among Palestinian political factions. This is plainly evident in the Fatah-Hamas / West Bank-Gaza split of recent years and in Israel’s efforts to prevent reconciliation. It was, after all, in response to the these Palestinian parties announcing their intentions to form a reconciliation government that Israel terminated the most recent round of peace talks (Somfalvi 2014)—even though, now in 2016, no form of “reconciliation” has yet to be realized.

Still, the social effects of fragmentation can also be seen at the scale of the city in terms of the political relationships between residents of different Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem. While Palestinians throughout the city are actively resisting and challenging processes of dispossession and neglect by the state and municipality, the bulk of these struggles are restricted within neighborhoods, despite so many challenges being shared with residents in other parts of the city. One Palestinian mobilization activist with an NGO in Jerusalem told me quite explicitly:

... Jerusalem communities are fragmented. And we do believe that they are intentionally fragmented, that [the] “divide and conquer” policy—actually, the Israeli institution in general is known [for] it—it’s what’s been going on against the Palestinians since the occupation in ‘48. Even before the occupation in ‘48, since the immigration [of Jews] began. And in Jerusalem it is reflected in the creation of various challenges which are different or differ from a community to another. So some communities suffer from
illegal settlement, some communities suffer from army and police brutality, some
communities suffer from land confiscation and house demolitions, and so on. The result
is that the struggles—the different struggles—around Jerusalem are very much localized.
So you find that if there is an initiative for change in certain communities, it’s usually
around this community’s issues, and it doesn’t have a bigger or broader picture or point
of view of the whole case of Jerusalem.”

This same NGO is addressing this phenomenon through mapping and other cross-neighborhood
activities, which I describe in Chapter Three, on mapping and resistance. Another activist, based
in a community center in another neighborhood, concurred that different neighborhoods and
villages have not effectively connected with one another in their struggles, but this activist noted
that their community has tried to improve this recently by at least communicating more with
activists elsewhere. Still, neighborhood activists, organizations, and community centers remain
plenty occupied with resisting the dispossession and interruptions targeting their communities.
They are occupied with court proceedings, occupied with planning and holding demonstrations,
occupied with mobilizing community members to take on the risks of public protest, occupied
with running children’s programs to make up for absent municipal services, occupied with
meeting diplomats about their issues, occupied waiting for traffic on narrow and crumbling
roads, occupied writing social media posts to educated publics about recent events—all of which
resonate with Peteet’s (2003) argument that the Israeli occupation is, among other things, even
“stealing time” of the Palestinians under occupation. It is no wonder that inter-neighborhood
solidarities and joint political actions have been so difficult to develop.
While the fragmentation of Jerusalem challenges the “united versus divided” binary presented in the peace process discourses, it also speaks to recent work in Geography on territory, borders, and infrastructure in Israel-Palestine and beyond.

**Territory**

Much of what I have described in the Jerusalem context resembles what others have identified at the broader scale of the West Bank, including widespread dispossession for the sake of settlements, construction of the separation wall, and the paving of roads (see, e.g., Usher 2006; Weizman 2007; Handel 2014). Derek Gregory (2004, 101), in describing the fragmentation of the West Bank that has resulted from Israeli settlement activity and the related infrastructure of roads and checkpoints, writes, “This fractured Palestinian landscape, wrenched by brutal spatial torsions, afforded a dizzyingly surreal contrast to the centrifugal space reserved for Israelis . . .” (emphasis added). The later part of this quote serves as an important reminder that the fragmentation of the Palestinians landscape is related strongly to the expansion of the Israeli landscape. In other words, as Israel consolidates its own territory, it necessarily breaks apart and appropriates Palestinian territory: the two processes are complementary to one another (Veracini 2006, 24).

Certainly this has been the case in Jerusalem: as the Israeli presence in eastern areas of Jerusalem has continued to expand, the Palestinian neighborhoods have been both enclosed and compressed. As a U.S.-based activist recently wrote, “Israeli geographic existence and
expansion is contingent upon Palestinian geographic contraction. Every five dunams of Israel is five less dunams of Palestine, what Patrick Wolfe calls a relationship of ‘negative articulation.’” (Johnson 2016, citing Wolfe 1994). Thus, while “divide and conquer” has long been the mantra assigned to colonialism, “fragment and consolidate” may well be the mantra appropriated assigned to settler-colonialism and other dispossessive enterprises like gentrification, in that the latter projects are primarily focused on land than on power alone.

This is not to deny that population control is at the center of Israeli security strategies. In fact, the fragmentation of the city has certainly facilitated the control of the population, which was made clear just recently in October 2015. Following escalating settler violence and confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators across the West Bank, and a series of alleged stabbing attacks on Israelis by Palestinians in Jerusalem, the Israeli government almost overnight installed thirty-five checkpoints at the entrances to a number of Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem (B’Tselem 2015b). Most of these checkpoints were formed by a row of concrete blocks preventing any vehicles from passing, along with several consisting only of soldiers searching cars and pedestrians (B’Tselem 2015b). This quick and easy sealing off of Palestinian neighborhoods, if anything, demonstrates the effects of nearly five decades of isolating and fragmenting Palestinian communities in a Jerusalem that is still promoted by Israel as “united.”

As such, it is also revealing of the differences between geopolitical framings of the city from above and the embodied experiences of the city from below at the scales of the home and neighborhood.
Related to the fragmentation of Jerusalem is also the proliferation of borders for Palestinians in the city. On the one hand, the Israeli separation wall serves as one of the clearest and most widely cited examples of the militarization of borders in the contemporary world. Weizman (2007) in particular has described both the materiality of the wall and the highly advanced technological surveillance regime associated with it, variations of which are seen along the U.S.-Mexico border and elsewhere. Certainly the wall has had enormous and catastrophic effects on Palestinian communities in Jerusalem and the other parts of the West Bank (Chiodelli 2013), and many have contemplated the role of the wall in shaping Israeli-Palestinian relations in the future (see, e.g., Dumper 2014).

On the other hand, although the separation wall has created such a formidable—though not impenetrable—barrier for Palestinians in and around Jerusalem, the fragmentation of the city has also produced borders for Palestinians at finer scales. In surrounding Palestinian neighborhoods with settlements, roads, parks, and other barriers, Palestinian growth is confined to those spaces. At even finer scales, homes are confined to their existing parameters through the denial of construction permits by the municipality, and in Palestine, homes are often expanded not merely as a family grows in size, but as it expands generationally. Of course, with the variety of obstacles Palestinians face, some of the borders are at the edges of communities, but they may also cut through the heart of communities, particularly in the case of settlement activity and road construction. With settlements also come increased “security” regimes, meaning that Palestinian residents near settlements are subject to increased numbers of Israeli security forces around their homes and neighborhoods and are subject to multiple form of surveillance.
Further, Palestinians may experience borders and/or checkpoints at the entrances of not only Israeli settlements in eastern Jerusalem but in Israeli neighborhoods of West Jerusalem. These sorts of border experiences came up frequently in informal conversations with acquaintances and activists, and a few times during fieldwork, Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem were assaulted in West Jerusalem areas for being in the “wrong side” of the city. “Flying checkpoints”, temporary checkpoints that are erected and removed seemingly randomly in time and place, are also set up frequently in eastern areas of Jerusalem. Again, Gregory’s (2004, 126) description of the West Bank seems apt in describing Jerusalem: “The occupied territories have been turned into twilight zones, caught in a frenzied cartography of mobile frontiers rather than fixed boundaries. These enforce a violent fragmentation and recombination of time and space, which is nothing less than a concerted attempt to disturb and derange the normal rhythms of everyday Palestinian life.” Thus, in a “united” city, the embodied Palestinian experience of Jerusalem is anything but united.

*Infrastructure*

As previous sections make clear, dispossession of Palestinians in Jerusalem today takes place not only for the building of settlements, but also for the *infrastructure* that supports those settlements. This is particularly true with regard to the Israeli road networks in Jerusalem. The bypass highway cutting through Beit Safafa, for instance, is being constructed for the convenience of settlers in the Bethlehem and Hebron areas driving to Jerusalem and beyond to Tel Aviv. At the same time, ring roads being built on and between Palestinian lands in the far eastern and southeastern parts of the city are meant to serve Israeli settlements in those areas and
others deeper in the West Bank. Even the “open spaces” and national park areas, which restrict Palestinian growth, are strongly linked to settlement, as I will argue in the next chapter. Given the growing interest in infrastructure among geographers recently, the role of infrastructure in the consolidation of territory and in settler-colonialism can certainly be a part of the emerging conversations.

CONCLUSION

Across both sides of the “Green Line” established following the 1948 war, Palestinians are engaged in a variety of struggles to protect their homes and neighborhoods from dispossession and settlement. Although some strategies of dispossession may be experienced by all Palestinians in Jerusalem, many are intensely focused in particular areas. This distribution is arguably strategic on the part of the Israeli state and Jerusalem municipality, as each of the material transformations Palestinians face in some way furthers Israeli/Zionist settlement in Palestine, whether through bypass roads over and through indigenous villages, the demolition of Palestinian homes, or the zoning of national parks.

The physical fragmentations I have described in this chapter, experienced at finer scales like the home and neighborhood, and even the body, are accompanied by political fragmentation across Palestinian communities in Jerusalem. Understanding this fragmentation and viewing it as intentional, activists and community-based organizations are trying to connect struggles between and across neighborhoods and villages and overcome these divisions—because as one community mobilization activist put it in an interview, “I think everyone is aware that when you
work together, you work better” (Interview). In Chapter Three, I look more specifically at these efforts in the context of community mapping projects in Jerusalem.

To conclude, I want to argue that we must rethink how we talk about “united Jerusalem” or “divided Jerusalem” through consideration of the historical and contemporary struggles I have outlined in this chapter. These discourses are important because, as Khalidi (2013, ix) has recently argued in the context of Israel-Palestine, “the words employed by politicians and diplomats define situations and determine outcomes”—it is these discourses that “set conditions not only for perceptions, but also for possibilities”. Thus, the framings of Jerusalem in the language of the “peace process” enables—or perhaps even encourages—us to ignore the realities on the ground today and the vastly unequal power relations that are producing those realities. On this note, Khalidi (2013, x) argues in his own work on diplomatic history that “language employed in the Middle East political context . . . has often been distorted and then successfully employed to conceal what was actually happening”.

Changes in the “facts on the ground” in Jerusalem, particularly in those spaces of everyday life where Palestinians experience the conflict in material terms, are in fact producing one possible future for the status of Jerusalem—the “complete and united . . . capital of Israel”. Further, a discourse that marginalizes geographic specificities—the geographies of dispossession in this case—by framing Jerusalem as the target of two competing nationalism, is to neglect the power relations that allow such significant changes in the facts on the ground. It is necessary, then, to challenge discourses that make power invisible and that thereby limit possible futures. In the next chapter, I focus specifically on the Israeli national parks that I have mentioned in this chapter, for it is in the establishment of these parks—perhaps more than anything else—that the (geo)political has been so easily concealed.
Map 1.1: Old City of Jerusalem. This map shows the Quarters of the Old City, divided among religious and—in the case of the Armenian Quarter—ethnic lines, in addition to important city gates. Like any borders, these were not and are not absolute in terms of movement and everyday life, but they generally align with the location of major religious sites and housing patterns.

Map Source: Epson291 at Wikimedia Commons [Public domain], https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:OldCityMap.PNG
Map 1.2: Jerusalem, 1948–1967. This map, created by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), illustrates the post-1948 division of Jerusalem between Israeli control in the western areas and Jordanian control in the eastern areas, including the Old City, in addition to the so-called “no man’s land” that straddled the 1949 Armistice Line. This division remained in place until Israel captured the eastern neighborhoods of Jerusalem during the 1967 war.

Map Source: http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/MAPS/images/jer_maps/PartitionedJerusalem.html
Map 1.3: Israeli Annexation of Jerusalem. The boundaries delineating Jerusalem as a municipal unit have changed several times over the course of the last century, as illustrated by this map by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). After the city was divided following the 1948 war, both the Israelis and Jordanians set their own municipal boundaries to replace the British Mandate boundaries. Since capturing the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in 1967, Israel has extended the municipal boundaries on both sides of the 1949 Armistice line to those shown in dark blue on this map.

Map 1.4: Peel Commission Partition Proposal, 1937. This map, produced by PASSIA, illustrates a partition of Palestine into a Jewish state, Arab state, and a Mandate zone, as proposed by the Peel Commission. The Commission found the Mandate unsustainable and proposed a Jewish state be created in the north of the country and along the coast running between the northern border and the Tel Aviv area. The Commission recommended that Jerusalem remain in a special mandate zone under British rule.

Map Source:
http://www.passia.org/publications/bookmaps/page1.htm

Map 1.5: UN Partition Plan, 1947. After World War II and the creation of the United Nations, Britain brought the Palestine question to the international body, which sent a committee to study conditions on the ground. The committee later proposed partitioning Palestine into a Jewish state, Arab state, and international zone for Jerusalem administered by the U.N., shown in this map by PASSIA.

Map Source:
Map 1.6: Jerusalem Neighborhoods, 2015. This map comes from a liberal Zionist organization called Ir Amim—“city of peoples” in Hebrew—which works and reports on issues of inequality between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem and envisions Jerusalem as a shared city. I include this map for its effectiveness in delineating each neighborhood of the city, which in turn allows the viewer to see that Israeli settlements have been built in and around Palestinian villages and neighborhoods. At the same time, this map leaves western, pre-1967 areas of the city—some of which were historically Palestinian—whole and undisputed, a mapping trend that is critiqued by Grassroots Jerusalem, a Palestinian NGO that I discuss in Chapter Three.

Map Source: http://www.ir-amim.org.il/sites/default/files/Greater%20Jerusalem%20Eng%202015.jpg
ENDNOTES

1 UK National Archives, FCO 141, 1944.

2 Said also critiques the Palestinian failure to offer its own projection of Jerusalem or to challenge that of Israel: “It is a sign of Palestinian powerlessness and, it must be said, collective incompetence that to this day the story of Jerusalem’s loss both in 1948 and 1967 has not been told by them, but—insofar as it has been told at all—partially reconstructed either by Israelis sympathetic and unsympathetic or by foreigners. In other words, not only has there been no Palestinian narrative of 1948 and after that can at least challenge the dominant Israeli narrative, there has also been no collective Palestinian projection for Jerusalem since its all-too-definitive loss in 1948 and again in 1967. The effect of this quite extraordinary historical and political neglect has been to deprive us of Jerusalem well before the fact” (Said 1995, 6).

3 Palestinians regularly cross the barrier, including construction gaps, typically at great risk, in pursuit of work or family reunification. Examples of these stories are illustrated in a documentary, Mutasalloon [The Infiltrators], which was screened in Jerusalem while I was doing fieldwork.
INTRODUCTION

While some colonial relations of power have been highly visible through military, commercial, and/or administrative institutions and personnel, other less visible exercises of colonial power have also greatly shaped the colonial experience for subjected populations. In settler-colonial settings specifically, the more overtly violent forces of dispossession, whether state or private, have often operated to further indigenous dispossession in tandem with less visible forms of power, including law, planning, and bureaucracies—all of which have been the subject of critique by feminist and post-colonial scholars. Legal mechanisms for nature and heritage “preservation,” including the establishment of national parks, fit squarely in this category, particularly when preservation is treated as a professional, technical matter. This is not to suggest that these processes should be understood as less violent in their implementation or their effects, only that they may be more susceptible to de-politicization in societies like Israel that are perpetrating but not experiencing them.

As I will argue in this chapter, the fragmented geographies of Palestinian Jerusalem have been made possible, in part, by the zoning of Israeli national parks. Since the beginning of the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel has established two national parks in and around...
Palestinian neighborhoods of the Holy Basin and has others currently in the proposal stages throughout eastern areas of the city. In this chapter, I focus on two of these national parks and one of the proposed parks as a case study in the fragmentation of the city, given their locations and their effects on Palestinian homes and neighborhoods. I argue that Israel uses national parks to bolster territorial claims to territories occupied since 1967, while also preventing and even reversing Palestinian expansion in the city. In a longer historical perspective, the transformation of indigenous Palestinian homes and villages to Israeli natural and recreational spaces—through demolition and replacement—suggest that the establishment of national parks in Jerusalem should not be understood as merely an “occupation” policy but as a settlement policy, with its roots in 1948 and the early years of the Israeli state.

QUESTIONs, METHODS, AND OUTLINE

As I began initial, informal conversations with activists and community organizations at the start of my fieldwork about housing struggles in Jerusalem, I repeatedly heard an emphasis on the difficulty that Israeli national parks cause Palestinian residents in a number of areas of the city. While I was aware that much of the neighborhood of Silwan overlapped with an Israeli national park, and that the park zoning has resulted in great difficulties for residents of the village, I was less aware of this park’s linkages to a broader network of Israeli parks in East Jerusalem, and I had not theorized their establishment within a longer history of natural spaces in Israel-Palestine. Given the rate at which parks were arising in my early conversations, particularly regarding Silwan, and the role I began to see parks playing in the fragmentation of
the city, I decided to research them further in order to analyze not only their role in settlement
and dispossession but also their relationship to the Israeli consolidation of territory.

In this chapter, then, I attend to the following questions: What is the role of Israeli parks
in Palestinian dispossession in and fragmentation of Jerusalem? How does the zoning of parks
affect Palestinian spaces of everyday life like the home and neighborhood? Why do national
parks not have the same political connotations associated with Israeli settlement constructions
and other Israeli landscape transformations in Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank? What
historical precedents exist for the establishment of parks and other natural spaces in Israel, and
what do these tell us about the Jerusalem parks? Finally, how do Israeli parks in East Jerusalem
lend support to Israel’s geopolitical claims, and in what ways do they further Israeli settlement of
the city?

Because the national park in Silwan is linked so strongly with archeological activity, I
began this chapter in the field mindful of the work of Abu El-Haj (2001), who argues that Israeli
archaeology has played a central role in defining Israeli nationhood and that it has provided
“scientific” justifications for Israel’s territorial claims and expansions. As Abu El-Haj argues,
however, “[b]y the 1990s, neither the practice of archaeology nor the particular configuration of
politics and polity to which it had long been bound remained hegemonic in Israeli society” (239).
Instead, archeology had become “partially hijacked” by “a national-religious agenda”, and
“broader assumptions that archaeology had helped to produce had begun to unravel” through the
critiques of Israelis and Palestinians alike. It is this same period—the 1990s—that saw the rise
of the peace process, and while the Israeli national parks in East Jerusalem have their roots in the
1970s and 1980s, the political use of these spaces intensified in the 90s, and new national parks
continue to be proposed until today. The zoning of national parks in occupied territory, then, has
not necessarily been disrupted by the peace process, in part because of discourses of nature and preservation that allow for their de-politicization. Running parallel to the intensification of national park enforcement and their continued zoning is Israel’s increasing promotion of its “environmentalism” and environmental technological advances, which Palestinian activists have argued purposefully “green-washes” the Israeli occupation (see, e.g., Abunimah 2014, 145–62).

On the ground in Jerusalem, I found there is certainly an awareness of the network of Israeli national parks and an awareness of their political nature, and indeed a number of Israeli NGOs that advocate for Palestinian equality in Jerusalem and co-existence between Jews and Arabs have attended to the political use of parks in their recent work (e.g., Bimkom 2012; Ir Amim 2012). These include Bimkom–Planners for Planning Rights and Ir Amim (Hebrew for “city of peoples”), in addition to Emek Shaveh, an organization of Israeli archaeologists that works specifically against the political use of archeology and parks in Israel-Palestine. While Israeli NGOs opposing the overtly political use of parks against Palestinians tend to interpret their zoning through analyses of marginalization and/or discrimination in the context of disputed territory (see, e.g., Bimkom 2012, 31), my analysis takes this further to interpret the role of national parks in the settler-colonization of Palestine.

I begin this chapter with a brief overview of the administration of national parks in Israel, before presenting a history and description of two existing Israeli national parks—Jerusalem Walls National Park and Emek Tzurim National Park—and a proposed national park on the eastern slope of Mount Scopus. I follow this section with an overview of the effects of park zonings on homes and neighborhoods of the city and the well-being of their Palestinian residents. While these NGOs and activists in Jerusalem recognize the political role of Israeli parks in the city, they are regarded more broadly in Israeli society as non-political, and instead technical,
professional, and/or environmental. Accordingly, I transition to my analysis with an overview of the discourses of nature and preservation that allow for this type of de-politicization.

This sets the stage for my central argument of this chapter, which is that Israeli parks in Jerusalem are in fact (geo)political by design, a means to further Palestinian dispossession and Zionist settlement. Following the lead of feminist geopolitics scholars, this design is most clear in their effects on the ground—on homes, neighborhoods, villages, and on everyday life—effects which are easily marginalized in the masculinist discourses of objective science that so often frame conservation projects. Positioning the Jerusalem parks within a longer history of Israeli territorial consolidation, I show the connection between the post-1967 parks in East Jerusalem and the parks, preserves, and forests established following 1948. Finally, following Wolfe’s (2006) argument that “[s]ettler colonialism destroys to replace,” I return to the Jerusalem context and conclude with an analysis of the functions of the Jerusalem parks in indigenous erasure and settler replacement. Data in this chapter is drawn primarily from my archive of NGO documents and news reports, participation in two political tours of national parks in Jerusalem, an interview with an Israeli archaeologist and activist, and an interview with a community activist in Silwan.

ISRAELI NATIONAL PARKS IN JERUSALEM

Since the beginning of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the Israeli government has established two national parks in and around Palestinian neighborhoods, and others are in advanced planning stages. In this section, I focus on the two existing parks—Jerusalem Walls National Park and Emek Tzurim National Park—as well as one of the proposed parks—Mount Scopus Slopes National Park—located at the edge of the historic basin. A map
from Emek Shaveh, included with this chapter, shows these parks and their locations in relation to the Old City and other areas of East Jerusalem.

*Israeli Nature and Parks Authority*

National parks in East Jerusalem, like other Israeli national parks, are administered by the Israel Nature and Parks Authority (INPA), an agency within the Ministry of Environmental Protection. The INPA was established in 1998 as a merger of two agencies created in the 1960s that had been responsible for managing nature reserves and national parks separately (Kadman 2015, 44). At present, the agency administers more than 80 national parks and more than 250 nature reserves. Kadman (2015) explains the difference between the two categories under Israeli law: “Natural reserves are areas in which the natural environment, including flora, fauna, and landscapes are being preserved. National parks are declared for ‘public leisure in nature’ or for ‘preserving values of historical, archeological, architectural, natural or scenic importance’” (46, quoting the National Parks, Nature Reserves, National Sites and Commemoration Sites Law of 1998). New national parks are formally proposed by the INPA, although efforts may begin in municipal planning and development offices, and final approval for parks are issued by the Israeli Minister of the Interior (Bimkom 2012, 9).

In executing its mandate to preserve and administer nature reserves and national parks, which may involve the construction and maintenance of tourist amenities, the INPA is not required, as Bimkom (2012, 7) notes, to serve or even consider the needs of people living within designated park lands.² To the contrary, the law allows the INPA to restrict the activities of residents living within national parks, particularly with regard to construction. At the same time,
the government does not have to purchase homes or private property falling within declared national park lands, meaning that the INPA can regulate the activities of residents without the costs and controversy of formally seizing property, except in cases where residents might seek compensation through the courts (Bimkom 2012, 7).

For Israeli national parks containing antiquities, which is certainly the case in Jerusalem, the Israel Antiquities Authority (IAA) is also involved. This organization, which falls under the Israeli Ministry of Culture and Sport, is responsible for “the country’s antiquities and antiquity sites, their excavation, preservation, conservation, study and publication thereof, as well as the country’s antiquity treasures” (IAA 2016b). Under Israeli law, “antiquities” include all human-made objects predating 1700 and any newer objects declared as antiquities by the overseeing Minister due to their historical significance (IAA 2016a, quoting the Antiquities Law of 1978). Accordingly, the IAA has authority over the substantial archeological excavations that have taken place and that continue to take place in and around the Jerusalem Walls National Park.

Jerusalem Walls National Park/City of David

Several years after Israel captured East Jerusalem, the Israeli government established the first Israeli national park in the city, Jerusalem Walls National Park, on 31 March 1974 (Bimkom 2012, 14). This park does not cover the Old City of Jerusalem, but rather a small strip of surrounding land to the north and sizable swaths of land to the east, south, and southwest, all of which total around 1100 dunams (272 acres). To the south of the Old City, the park lands cover a large area of the Palestinian village of Silwan, particularly its Wadi Helweh neighborhood, and encompassing land on both sides of the Green Line, the park includes areas of the formerly so-
called “No Man’s Land”, a gap in the armistice lines between the Israeli and Jordanian sides between 1948 and 1967 (Emek Shaveh 2014a, 6).

Within the Jerusalem Walls National Park, and under and around Silwan, are ruins of the earliest layers of Jerusalem’s long history. The bulk of the ruins, located in several areas of the village, are now part of the “City of David” archeological and tourist site, though as Greenberg and Mizrachi (2013) explain, “The village and the archeological site are intertwined, and it would be artificial to separate them” (8). Excavations in Silwan began in the mid-1900s and continue through the present day (Emek Shaveh 2010, 24). These excavations have unearthed ruins of homes, palaces, pools, springs, tunnels, city walls, and other structures, reaching as far back as 5,000 B.C.E. and also including the Canaanite, Judaic, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and Islamic periods (see Greenberg and Mizrachi 2013, 42–43).

As the naming of the site for King David might suggest, the Jewish histories of Jerusalem are emphasized throughout the park (see Emek Shaveh 2010, 24–25). Through an agreement with the INPA, the City of David site is run by an Israeli settler organization called Elad (a Hebrew acronym meaning “To the City of David”), which was founded in the 1980s with the aim of increasing the Jewish presence in East Jerusalem (Bimkom 2012, 17). Today, Elad runs all aspects of the tourist operations at the City of David, sponsors a number of archeological digs, and acquires property in Silwan through a variety of means to draw tourists and move in Jewish settlers (Rapoport 2006b; Ir Amim 2009; Hasson 2010; Bimkom 2012; Emek Shaveh 2014a). Elad has also signed an agreement to operate a popular archeological tourist site surrounding the southern areas of the Western Wall inside the Old City, though this agreement is pending in the courts (Hasson 2015b, 2016a).
A major future project in Silwan planned by Elad, having survived objections and appeals by Silwan residents, Emek Shaveh, and others, is a massive tourist center called the Kedem Center, to be built over the former Givati parking lot, where ruins dating to the Iron Age have been recently excavated (Ettinger 2016; see also Emek Shaveh 2014c). Both Elad and state agencies have been working to connect the ancient ruins in Silwan with sites inside the city walls, particularly the Western Wall and Temple Mount, in ways that “create a new ‘Old City’” centered around Jewish history (Emek Shaveh 2013a, 3; WHIC 2016). The Kedem Center will be perfectly positioned to do just that, given its location between the City of David Visitors Center and the Dung Gate of the Old City, which is next to the Western Wall Plaza. This new construction could potentially challenge Jaffa Gate, which faces West Jerusalem and opens to the Christian and Armenian Quarters, as the primary Old City entrance for Jewish-centered tourism of ancient Jerusalem, bringing that regular flow of traffic instead to East Jerusalem (see Emek Shaveh 2013a, 24). Elad also hopes to expand the City of David archaeological site eastward, which it began to do in 2012 through an excavation project with Tel Aviv University and the IAA (Emek Shaveh 2013b, 8). An additional part of this eastward expansion is a 2010 plan by the Jerusalem Municipality to construct “The King’s Garden” through the al-Bustan neighborhood of Silwan, a narrow green space that would connect the valleys running to the east and the south/southwest of the Old City (Ir Amim 2012; Emek Shaveh 2013).

**Emek Tzurim National Park**

In June 2000, Emek Tzurim National Park was established on more than 165 dunams (around 41 acres) to the northeast of the Old City on a slope of the Mount of Olives, between the
Palestinian village of as-Suwaneh and the Palestinian neighborhood of Wadi al-Joz, and to the south of the campus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Bimkom 2012, 19; Emek Shaveh 2014, 18).³ The lands themselves belong to Palestinians from as-Suwwanah and at-Tur, and some belong to the Islamic Waqf (B’Tselem 2014; Emek Shaveh 2014, 18). At the lower entrance of Emek Tzurim National Park, coming from the direction of the Old City, a sign greets visitors: “Welcome! Zurim Valley National Park is an urban nature site that preserves the traditional landscape of the Mount of Olives as it has been over the past 2,000 years.” At the top of the park is an observation area, which INPA officials have claimed provides the same view of the Old City that pilgrims would have had in ages past (B’Tselem 2014). Stone trails have been constructed that zig-zag up and down the slope of the park lands, and hundreds of olive trees have been planted on terraces, many of which were transplanted from elsewhere in the West Bank after being uprooted to clear the path for the Israeli separation wall (Rapoport 2006a).

Despite the claim on the welcome sign of preserving a 2,000 year old landscape, prior to the construction of the stone pathways, planting of olive trees, and landscaping of the terraces and other features, the park had been an open space containing accumulations of construction waste (Bimkom 2012, 20). The Jerusalem-area INPA official responsible for shaping and developing the site to its present form believed he was performing “a rescue operation . . . to prevent the obliteration of the landscape and its flora, and to restore its ‘former glory’ (Bimkom 2012, 20, quoting a talk given by the official). This official had previously worked for Elad in East Jerusalem and has been involved in West Bank settlement construction (Rapoport 2006a). The Emek Tzurim National Park lands do not contain any archeological excavations or sites or objects of historical importance, unlike the Jerusalem Walls National Park (B’Tselem 2014). Further, as a guide from Emek Shaveh noted during a political tour of the park, the park presents
not an ancient, biblical landscape, but rather a terraced agricultural landscape characteristic of Ottoman Palestine.

Any developments in the Emek Tzurim park lands since its declaration as a national park, including the landscape transformations, have been done for attracting tourists (Bimkom 2012, 20). The primary activity taking place in Emek Tzurim National Park since 2004 is an attraction run by the Elad organization called the “Temple Mount Sifting Project” (Emek Shaveh 2013, 18). Operating under a large tent erected in the park, this project brings Israeli and international tourists, as well as Israeli school groups, to sift through piles of dirt and debris that were cleared from the Haram ash-Sharif/Temple Mount compound during the 1990s as part of renovation work by the Islamic Waqf. Elad markets this attraction, for which there is a per-person charge equivalent to $4–6, “as an essential salvage project and as a scientific endeavor of great importance”—an opportunity for anyone to discover important but recklessly discarded objects from the Temple (Emek Shaveh 2013, 18). While the IAA has indeed identified objects in the piles dating from ancient through contemporary eras, and Elad highlights them all over the project blog, Emek Shaveh (2012, 2013) argues that there is little scientific value to any finds:

[the project’s] scientific significance was doubtful from the outset, and using it to sift layers of rubble from sites where proper excavations had already been held falls short of scientific standards. This use even increases the chances of counterfeiting and diverts the focus of the excavation from the site as a whole to the individual findings (Emek Shaveh 2013, 18).

During my tour of the park, the guide from Emek Shaveh invited us to throw anything into the pile that we wanted to be “discovered” during the next week as an artifact of the Temple.
Proposed Mount Scopus Slopes National Park

The final Israeli park I want to address in this chapter, the Mount Scopus Slopes National Park, is not yet a national park—and there is a chance it never will be—but it is in advanced planning and proposal stages, and some landscaping work has been done on the site. Key events in the story of this proposed park unfolded during my fieldwork period, and these events reveal, perhaps clearest of all, the political nature of parks in Jerusalem. The Mount Scopus Slopes National Park, approved initially in 2011 at the level of the local District Planning Committee, is proposed for the eastern side of Mount Scopus over an area of approximately 750 dunams, or 185 acres (Bimkom 2012, 21). The bounds of the park would run from the outer limits of the Palestinian village of at-Tur in the south to the outer limits of the Palestinian village of al-Issawiyya in the north, and from the Hebrew University campus in the west to Israeli Highway 1 in the east; a thin band of park land would also snake along the border between the University and al-Issawiyya (21–22). To the immediate east of the proposed park is the Palestinian village of az-Za’ayyem and the Israeli police’s “Judea and Samaria Headquarters,” and farther east is the planned Israeli settlement zone E-1 that would link the Ma’ale Adumim settlement bloc to Jerusalem (see 20–22).

The planned park covers a few Palestinian homes but is primarily zoned over presently open space on lands owned by Palestinians from the villages of al-Issawiyya and at-Tur, who use some of the lands for planting and livestock grazing (Bimkom 2012, 22). In the early 2000s, both villages were working on master development plans for these lands to help alleviate the housing shortages that both continue to face (Bimkom 2012, 21; B’Tselem 2015a). After learning of these plans for Palestinian construction, the INPA drafted the plans for the Mount
Scopus Slopes National Park, claiming “the desire to turn this place into a national park existed for a long time . . . and the rumors [of the Palestinian plan] gave the [INPA] plan incentive”’’ (Rapoport 2006a, quoting the deputy director general of the INPA).

From the beginning, the purposes for establishing the Mount Scopus Slopes National Park have been questioned not only by nearby Palestinian residents and activists, but also by a wide range of Israeli and Palestinian planners, scientists, journalists, and others, as there is no apparent natural, historical, or archaeological reason that this space should be preserved with a national park. As Emek Shaveh (2014a) explains:

The Mt. Scopus Slopes National Park does not contain significant antiquities sites. Aware of the paucity of remains in the area, the Nature and Parks Authority determined three main goals for the development of the park: Development of desert agriculture, bicycle trails, and walking paths headed in the direction of the Emek Tzurim National Park (19).

Accordingly, in the INPA’s proposal for the park, the agency emphasized the historic and touristic significance of connecting the Judean Desert, which begins just east of the Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus, with the green landscapes of Jerusalem and the Holy Basin, citing biblical links between the two areas (Rapoport 2006a; Emek Shaveh 2014a, 19). Indeed, the park’s western boundary atop Mount Scopus would only be separated from the observation point of the Emek Tzurim Park by a mere street crossing.

While still in the proposal phase, meaning final approval has not been granted by the Israeli Interior Ministry, municipal and INPA officials have been bulldozing earth and Palestinian agricultural infrastructure on the proposed park site periodically for several years now (Ma’an 2013b; Hasson 2013e; Eisenbud 2013b). At the time I toured the East Jerusalem parks with Emek Shaveh in late September 2013, the Mount Scopus Slopes National Park remained in that phase between committee approval and final approval by the Ministry. A few
days after this tour, however, for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the INPA set up a booth on Mount Scopus next to an existing observation platform overlooking the proposed park lands in order to provide information to the public about the new national park (Hasson 2013e). At some point in the day, a staff member with the INPA was captured in an audio recording explaining the purpose of the park; Haaretz reported the staff member’s explanation: “‘The idea is to protect all the slopes as open space. Especially to block construction so the city does not expand to [the open space], so the communities do not expand to it’” (Hasson 2013e, quoting the unidentified INPA employee). Within a couple of days of this report, the proposal for the national park on Mount Scopus Slopes was shelved by then-Minister of Environmental Protection Amir Peretz, who stated that the proposed park zone was “‘devoid of particularly sensitive natural value or unique archeological remains that justify turning it into a natural park’” (Hasson 2013f, quoting a statement by Peretz).

This was not the end of this park’s story, however, as support for the park remained among far-right Israeli politicians. Less than two weeks after the cancellation of the park, the candidate for Jerusalem Mayor from Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party, Moshe Lion, along with other party officials, held a tour and press event on the proposed park lands, where, as The Jerusalem Post reported, “Lion asserted . . . that the park must be built to curb Arab attacks against Jewish residents of the area, and stressed the tactical importance of such an undertaking, both for national security and Jerusalem” (Eisenbud 2013b). On 30 October, less than a month after the park’s cancellation, the Israeli government released more than two dozen Palestinian prisoners as part of an agreement with the Palestinian Authority earlier that summer to begin another round of peace negotiations (Jerusalem Post 2013a). Alongside the prisoner release, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that 1500 new housing units would be built in
an East Jerusalem settlement, that the government would support Elad’s construction of the Kedem Center in Silwan, and that the Mount Scopus National Park was on the table once again; according to Israeli media, Netanyahu referred to these measures as “compensation” for the prisoner release (Jerusalem Post 2013b; see also Emek Shaveh 2013c).

Despite advancing from a lower stage after this initial announcement (Hasson 2013h), the Mount Scopus Slopes National Park has still not received final approval from the Interior Ministry. Last summer, however, the Jerusalem municipality began labelling the proposed park area a “garden” and continued some of the same landscaping work that was proposed for the national park (Hasson 2015a). The municipality did so under a law that authorizes city governments “to use vacant areas . . . for the benefit of the public by temporarily converting them into parks or parking lots,” a law typically applied to small, empty city lots (B’Tselem 2015a). As an activist from al-Isawiyya told Haaretz, though, “‘They’re always looking for a different reason to get their hands on this land’” (Hasson 2015a).

PARKS AND FRAGMENTATION

The Israeli national parks have had material, everyday effects on Palestinians in Jerusalem, particularly at scales of the home and neighborhood. Before theorizing the significance of the parks with regard to territory and settlement, I want to briefly summarize some of these more immediate effects on the embodied experience of home in Jerusalem.

According to a report from the Occupied Palestinian Territory branch of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as of 2009, the Israeli government had allocated approximately 35% of the East Jerusalem lands annexed after 1967, most of which
were owned privately by Palestinians from surrounding villages, for the construction of Jewish settlements (UNOCHA 2009, 7). Another 30% of the annexed lands had no official master plan through which Palestinian construction would be approved—though some of these areas now have plans and others are in the works and/or stalled—and 22% had been zoned for infrastructure and as “green” spaces (UNOCHA 2009, 7–8), a designation that includes national parks but also other categories that restrict building (Bimkom 2012, 6). Only the remaining 13% of annexed lands were allocated by Israel to Palestinian construction, but because this includes areas that were already developed, very little land in the city is actually open to Palestinians for construction and expansion (UNOCHA 2009, 7–8). Further, where roads, utilities, and other infrastructure are underdeveloped or absent altogether, Israel does not issue building permits, even though the fault for this lies with the Jerusalem Municipality, and Palestinians are subject to lower caps on construction density than Jewish neighborhoods and settlements (8).

**Palestinian Homes and Neighborhoods**

Under restrictions dictated by the national park zoning, construction is effectively prohibited for Palestinians living within the parks (Bimkom 2012, 2013). Accordingly, permits are nearly impossible to obtain for these Palestinians inside national parks, just as they are for Palestinians in East Jerusalem more broadly (Bimkom 2013; ACRI 2015). Of the three parks described in this chapter, these restrictions affect Silwan the most, where residents suffer from overcrowding and poor infrastructure, both exacerbated by the park restrictions (Bimkom 2013; WHIC 2016).
Unable to obtain construction permits because of their location in the Jerusalem Walls National Park, many residents have added-on to their homes or built new structures, which are now subject to fines and at risk of demolition by the Jerusalem Municipality (Bimkom 2013). In fact, throughout East Jerusalem as a whole, because housing is needed yet building permissions are unavailable and/or prohibitively costly in time and money (see UNOCHA 2009), more than a third of Palestinian homes have not been constructed with the required permits; as such, these residents—nearly 100,000 Palestinians in all—are at risk of displacement due to demolition (UNOCHA 2014). In Silwan, dozens of homes have been demolished since 2000 alone (Za’tari & Molony 2014), and even when residents fight demolition orders in the Israeli courts, or at least delay the demolitions by paying fines, the financial costs are steep, and the residents may not prevail anyway (see ACRI 2015). Under the King’s Garden project being planned by the municipality—part of the expansion of the current park—up to 56 additional homes in al-Bustan neighborhood of Silwan are threatened by demolition, the orders for which the Municipality issued in 2005 (Ir Amim 2012, 8–9, 12–13; Za’tari & Molony 2014, 40–50, 69–73).

The problem of overcrowding and the inability to build and expand also applies to the neighborhood scale for Palestinians in and near Israeli national parks. The Jerusalem Walls National Park has certainly helped to contain Silwan from expanding, even in spite of “illegal” construction that may take place. With regard to Emek Tzurim National Park and the proposed Mount Scopus National Park, the role of parks in bounding Palestinian neighborhoods is perhaps even more apparent. Emek Tzurim effectively halts any possible growth of Wadi al-Joz to the east and as-Suwwaneh and at-Tur to the north and northwest. Given that other planning restrictions also affect these neighborhoods (see Bimkom 2012, 2013), the prospects of future growth in any other direction, including upward, are also extremely limited.
These same neighborhoods are also threatened by one to two of three other proposed national parks that I did not discuss in this chapter, the Mount of Olives National Park, Simon the Righteous National Park, and Bab as-Sahrah National Park (Bimkom 2012, 11, 28–31). These are all in very early stages, part of a yet-to-be-approved “local outline plan” called “Jerusalem 2000” that was developed by the district-level planning committee (11). Finally, with regard to the proposed Mount Scopus Sloped National Park, al-Issawiyya and at-Tur would be limited in their ability to expand to the south and north, respectively, which was indeed the very purpose of the park. Given that these neighborhoods had been working on master plans that would allow them to expand, the initial declaration of the park was meant not as an obstacle to hypothetical future growth, but rather a negation of an actual plan through which Palestinian communities could improve their situations of overcrowding and insufficient infrastructure.

Finally, because the Elad organization is directly involved in both the Jerusalem Walls National Park and in moving Israeli settlers into Silwan, it is important to note that the Israeli settlements within this park cause great hardships and unnecessary violence for the indigenous Palestinian residents of the village. Although some properties in Silwan have been purchased by Elad through a variety of means—some of which are “shady”, according to Ir Amim (2009)—a number of Palestinian families have also lost their homes in Silwan under Israel’s Absentee Property Law, which has enabled Elad to acquire properties, in cooperation with the state, in which Jews lived prior to 1948 for the purpose of moving in Israeli settlers (Za’tari & Molony 2014). Accordingly, the management of the national park by a powerful settler organization is linked to multiple forms of dispossession for Palestinians of Silwan, and those who remain in their homes face both everyday insecurities and disturbances due to the Israeli settlements in the neighborhood and their associated security regimes (Interviews with Silwan residents 2013).
Uneven Development

In addition to the hardships caused by fines, demolitions, and court costs, Israeli national parks contribute to uneven development in Jerusalem. This is particularly true with regard to those neighborhoods where the Israeli state—and/or private actors like Elad—invests in infrastructure and other developments targeted toward attracting tourism, from which Palestinian residents do not benefit. Such disparities are perhaps most glaring in Silwan, where Palestinians are not only excluded entirely from any benefits that could be derived from increases in tourism to the City of David sites that are entangled with the village (see Greenberg & Mizrachi 2013), but they are also paying for this development with the loss of public spaces and private property, in addition to the everyday hardships described above.

While increasingly numbers of tourists are arriving to the Silwan area, the tour busses shuttle them between the Old City and Elad-run sites in and around the village. This is also true with regard to the sifting project in Emek Tzurim National Park: tourists and other groups are bussed to this Palestinian area of Jerusalem, but tourist revenue only flows to Elad for their sifting tent admission fees. This selective bussing phenomenon—through which the Palestinians who live and conduct business near important tourist sites see less tourism revenue than Israeli tour operators bussing them in—is also seen in other contexts in Israel/Palestine. For a long time, this was the experience with nearby Bethlehem, as Israeli tourism operators would bus in international tourists for a day to take them to the holy sites, but the tourists would not stay overnight in Bethlehem nor be allotted much time to spend in its shops and restaurants. Because this trend has been gradually reversing in recent years, the Israeli tourism industry and the Israeli tourism ministry are now trying to find ways to combat it, possibly by slashing government
grants for tour operators who book tourists in Palestinian hotels in Bethlehem rather than more expensive Israeli hotels in Jerusalem (Hasson 2016b). Both the industry and government would, of course, prefer international tourists bus to Bethlehem but sleep in Jerusalem, not vice-versa.

Further, while millions of shekels are invested in parks established to attract and serve Jewish Israelis and foreign tourists (e.g., Eisenbud 2013), investments by the municipality in utilities, education, and other services for Palestinian residents of the city are extremely insufficient (see Bimkom 2013; ACRI 2015). Municipal spending for the benefit of Palestinians is also disproportionately low relative to the Jewish Israeli population: in 2013, for instance, Palestinians were 37% of the Jerusalem population, but they were only allocated an estimated 10–13% of the city budget (Ir Amim 2014). Accordingly, this is a city in which 75.4% of the 300,000 Palestinian residents live below the poverty line, including 83.9% of children (ACRI 2015, 1). The parks, then, represent a more general trend in unequal investments in and services for Palestinian communities in Jerusalem, while also presenting the land issues unique to national park zones. These present inequalities, combined with the restrictions on Palestinian construction and expansion due to the national parks, mean that the possibilities for future development are also greatly reduced.

NATURE, PRESERVATION, AND POLITICS

A Professional Occupation

Certainly the Israeli national parks in East Jerusalem have significant effects on Palestinian life in the city, particularly for those Palestinian residents whose homes border them
or exist within their bounds. For Palestinians, then, parks are another part of the Israeli occupation. For Israeli society at large, however, national parks are not understood as political in a general sense, nor as geo-political in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, national parks are understood as a means of protecting important natural features and archeological features, which is done at the hands of scientific experts and technocrats.

Several Israeli NGOs have confronted this political denial in their recent work, including Bimkom, a group of architects and planners advocating “democracy and human rights in the field of spatial planning and housing policies” in Israel and areas of the West Bank under full Israeli civilian and military control (i.e., the settlement blocs of “Area C”) (Bimkom 2016). In a 2012 report on national parks in Jerusalem, the organization argues:

Nature and landscape preservation also serve the authorities, in many cases, as a means for seizing land and Judaizing the territorial space. Thus, despite the fact that the process of planning and declaring national parks presents the semblance of a purely professional and a-political process, the actual state of affairs is more complex than it appears. In certain cases, and in certain places, the process of planning and declaring national parks and nature reserves seems not only to further the protection of nature and heritage as well as high quality open spaces, but also to serve as an instrument for limiting the development of the built environment in Palestinian communities (4).

Similarly, in an interview with Yonathan Mizrachi (2013), an archeologist with Emek Shaveh who frequently leads political tours through Israeli national parks in Jerusalem, I asked Yonathan to explain an argument he had made previously in one of those tours, which is that national parks were “easier” than West Bank-style settlement blocs:

It’s very simple. I mean, most of us are pro-open spaces, -green areas, -historical monuments, and . . . the Israeli public doesn’t see the link between national parks and political decisions. It’s considered a professional point. Now that’s one thing, one level. Whenever you declare a place a national park, it’s much easier to raise public support, especially in Jerusalem which is historically
important for the Israelis and to the international community. Now, it’s also very interesting because when you declare a national park, you don’t bring people—you bring tourists, maybe, but you don’t put an outpost, you don’t build houses, you don’t bring people to live there. So the international community doesn’t immediately consider it a settlement. But facts on the ground—ok, it’s not the same because people don’t live there, so you’re not going to have new Israeli neighbors [in] Issawiyya [a northeastern Jerusalem neighborhood]. But you’re going to have new Israeli tourists, maybe, coming and going, not staying. But the land was taken anyway, so the land no longer belongs to the residents, and that’s the effect that the Israelis gain by doing this kind of declaration. And the international community less criticizes them.

Mizrachi noted later in the interview that a daytrip to a national park is a favorite activity for many Israelis, especially on holidays, and that Israelis are “very fond of their national parks,” which makes their establishment even less likely to be scrutinized. He is explicit, too, that the de-politicized understanding of parks applies not only to Israeli society but also to the “international community,” referring to the steady stream of diplomats and politicians who work in and visit Jerusalem from around world.

*Producing and Protecting Nature*

The understandings of parks and preservation that both Bimkom (2012) and Mizrachi (2013) identify in Israeli society and among international diplomats—e.g., “professional” and “a-political”—are sustained by a particular discourse of “nature” that positions certain environments as spoiled by and/or vulnerable to humans and human activity. This discourse, Quiroga (2009) argues, is rooted in “the Western dualism between nature and culture, a vision which distances in an artificial manner human activity from the natural environment and that has been imposed on much of the world” (123). Under this dualism, “nature” can and must be protected from human
activity, and in some cases, the effects of human activity may need to be reversed to “restore” a natural environment to a previous state (123–24). Tourism often becomes entangled with these efforts as a means for funding and justifying preservation, but tourism and tourism industries often become a part of defining what a particular “natural” space should look like (124).

Given that the “pristineness” of nature—however it is conceived by those forces shaping it in discursive realms—must be protected from destructive human influences, nature reserves, national parks, and other protective designations, as Quiroga explains, “are becoming an increasingly important tool for controlling human activities as well as for mediating people’s interaction with certain zones and regions that . . . are considered to be pristine and threatened” (123). These sorts of designations, and the threats they are said to address, are also understood to require a range of scientific experts that can manage these sites and shape these environments (127). Consequently, with a reliance on trained professionals approaching threats to nature through “the apparently . . . neutral realm of science”—as Escobar argues in the context of development—it becomes “possible to remove all problems from the political and cultural realms” (Escobar 1995, 45, cited in Quiroga 2009; see also Braverman 2009, 4). In other words, the means of preserving natural spaces become seen as “technical”, and they can be actively or naively denied to be “political.” Tellingly, it is frequently local residents and especially indigenous communities that call attention to the political motivations of some preservation projects, practices, and policies (Quiroga 2009), as they are so often excluded from and/or actively harmed by them in various ways (e.g., Hall et al. 2011; Peluso & Watts 2011; see also Cronon 1996).
Those Israeli NGOs that have argued the national parks in Jerusalem are indeed “political”—even if this argument is not broadly understood in Israeli society—interpret the “politics” of the parks in different ways. That is, different groups have different explanations for why the state declares national parks, which principles or values they violate, what immediate and long-term effects they have, and what should be done to cure the problems they create. For instance, in the 2012 Bimkom report on national parks, the organization argues that the state of Israel frequently uses planning for “a political agenda centered on Jewish holding of the land” and that the zoning of parks, then, provides “a means for seizing land and Judaizing the territorial space” (4). In the conclusion of the report—reflecting its title, *From Public to National: National Parks in East Jerusalem*—Bimkom frames its specific critique of the parks of East Jerusalem as an issue of re-purposing “open public space” for Israeli national purposes, which translates to discrimination against a “minority population” “in disputed territory” (31, emphasis in original). Considering all of the parks together, Bimkom identifies “political-demographic characteristics and motives” that violate “the values that the national parks are supposed to preserve”, and the group argues that preservation efforts must be compatible with the well-being of the population (31, 33).

In another report, this one from Ir Amim (2012) about the proposed Garden of the King National Park project in al-Bustan, Silwan, this organization emphasizes discrimination against Palestinians in planning and construction permit processes, which through the proposed park’s implementation, would result in demolitions and other hardships. Ir Amim also focuses its critique on the park’s role in expanding the Elad organization’s holdings, arguing that
“Settlement contiguity is a major obstacle to any future political resolution of Jerusalem” (15). Emek Shaveh (2014a) is perhaps most direct in arguing that national parks and the associated archeological work are employed as political arguments for Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem. The state and the Elad settlement organization, Emek Shaveh explains, support these arguments by increasing Israeli visibility on these park lands and using tourism and archeological excavations to “infus[e] historical-national content as deemed appropriate by the State of Israel” (5). Accordingly, their national parks report concludes with connections to higher politics: “[A]rchaeological excavations and national parks have the same effect as a range of Israeli political activities conducted in East Jerusalem, and may even offer a broader effect—at least on the Israeli public” (20).

Without necessarily rejecting the conclusions reached by these Israeli NGOs—regarding discrimination and inequalities in planning, regarding the misuse of public space, regarding the use of parks to diminish Palestinian geopolitical claims or inhibit a negotiated resolution—I want to develop some of their general arguments and reframe them through the lens of settler-colonialism. None of the reports I have presented here use the word “occupation” to describe the political context of East Jerusalem—except, tellingly, when quoting the testimony of a Palestinian resident (Ir Amim 2012, 10)—nor do they mention settlement beyond the context of the Elad organization. Given that these are Israeli organizations trying to appeal first and foremost to Israeli society and officials, as well as to the international community, this limitation may be expected, given that even liberal Zionists tend to accept Israel’s territorial claims over at least some parts of East Jerusalem (see Badran 2013). Whether deliberate, strategic, or unconscious, the absence of occupation and settler-colonialism nonetheless shapes the analysis in their public reports. As such, I want to further develop the arguments made by these
organizations about the marginalization of Palestinians and the claiming of territory, while also outlining the ways that parks serve broader functions of indigenous removal and settler replacement.

ISRAELI PARKS AND TERRITORIAL CONSOLIDATION

Dispossessed 1948 Villages

In Israel, the deployment of nature and natural spaces—in the form of national parks, forests, nature reserves, and recreation sites—for political ends has a history running back to the early years of the state. Indeed, nature was even used against indigenous Palestinian at rhetorical levels prior to 1948 by early Zionists who projected Palestine in imperialist Europe and North America as a sparsely populated “wasteland”, a land needing to be redeemed from the poor stewardship of its Arab inhabitants (Bar-On 1996; Gregory 2004). Tree-planting became a part of this “redemption” of the land beginning with the earliest Zionist settlers (Kadman 2015, 41). Since the establishment of the state, the Israeli government and quasi-state agencies, particularly the Jewish National Fund (JNF), have established parks, forests, and recreation sites atop indigenous Palestinian villages uprooted during the 1948 war (Khalidi 2006; Kadman 2015). Having initially destroyed the dispossessed villages themselves to prevent the return of the Palestinian refugees, the planting of forests contributed to what Pappé (2006, 225–34) describes as the “memoricide” of these villages, the erasure of their history and memory through both discursive and material means.
In tandem with this dispossession and erasure of the indigenous people, there are territorial claims being asserted by the settler state. In the immediate aftermath of the 1948 war and declaration of the state of Israel, Zionist forces occupied more territory than was allotted to the Zionist movement in any partition plan, the United Nations plan in particular. The JNF, as Braverman (2009) argues, is both “Israel’s land-laundering body” and “Israel’s afforestation agency” (48–57), and it is this quasi-state agency that helped to facilitate Israel’s large-scale expropriation of Palestinian refugee lands between 1948 and 1960 (Forman & Kedar 2004). It is no wonder, then, that Braverman (2009) is able to conceptualize the JNF’s millions of European pine trees as “flags” planted in opposition to Palestinian olive trees.

Today, nearly half of the destroyed Palestinian villages are “included within tourist and recreational sites, such as JNF forests and parks, nature reserves, or national parks run by the Israel Nature and Parks Authority (INPA), marked hiking trails signposted by the SPNI [Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel], and privately operated tourist sites” (Kadman 2015, 112). As Kadman (2015) has carefully documented in her study of these sites (160–96), Zionist narratives of the spaces—through signage, brochures, etc.—commonly emphasize Jewish history and/or any biblical or national significance, erasing or marginalizing Arab and other histories (112–140). In this sense, the Israeli parks, forests, preserves, and other natural designations have promoted Israeli and Jewish claims to those Palestinian village territories, both rhetorically through the narratives provided for the sites, and also through the embodied practices of Israelis visiting and using those spaces, as encouraged by the state and others.
Claims to East Jerusalem and the West Bank

Initially enacted upon rural Palestinian villages, the consolidation of Israeli territory through nature preservation zonings now takes an urban form in Jerusalem through the national parks. As the Israeli NGOs concerned with these parks have argued, national parks are used by Israel for the purposes of increasing the Israeli presence in East Jerusalem, while also containing the total Palestinian population as much as possible to ensure a strong Jewish majority (Bimkom 2012, 2013; Ir Amim 2012). At the same time, they have argued that the Israeli parks are used to foster and promote connections between today’s Israeli Jews and Jewish societies of ancient historical eras—targeting both Israeli Jews and the international community (Emek Shaveh 2010, 2014a; Mizrachi interview 2013).

In the rest of the West Bank, outside of the eastern areas of Jerusalem, there are similar claims being made to territory and similar efforts for excavation and preservation of sites, specifically near Palestinian villages and communities in “Area C” (Emek Shaveh 2014b, 2015). These operations are different administratively, in the sense that archeology and nature preservation zones are not run as they are in Israel by the IAA and INPA, respectively, but rather by designated professional wings of the IDF’s Civil Administration (Mizrachi interview 201; Emek Shaveh 2014b, 2015). Still, archeological and “preservation” work in the occupied West Bank has resulted in Palestinian dispossession, restrictions on Palestinian construction and land use, and even demolition orders for entire Palestinian villages (see e.g., Hass 2012).
Landscape Transformation

Taken together, the Israeli consolidation of territory both inside and outside the Green Line—a line which Emek Shaveh points out in its tours has been replaced with a “green belt” (2013)—has resulted in significant landscape transformations in Israel-Palestine (Benvenisti 2000; Gregory 2004; see also Salaita 2015). These transformations are certainly evident in the demolition of villages inside Israel after 1948 and their replacement with Israeli settlements, farms, and natural spaces. At the same time, transformations in Jerusalem have been visible since 1967 in the form of widespread archeological excavations in Silwan, the demolition of homes in the city and the construction of settlements, and the careful and deliberate landscaping work by INPA in Emek Zurim National Park—and also in the yet-to-be-approved parks on Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives.

The transformation of Silwan is perhaps the most extreme of these cases, as Jonathan Mizrachi of Emek Shaveh told me in our interview:

I think Silwan is a very interesting case . . . because this is the most successful case for the Israelis, when they succeeded to take a village, or part of a village, and give it a new identity. Which means that: most of the Israelis today call Silwan “City of David”; if you ask them, everyone knows City of David. And I think that’s very much thanks to the archeology and to the excavations, to the tourist sites.

While re-naming Palestinian Arab villages, roads, regions, natural features, and other place signifiers with Hebrew names has been central to the Zionist project (Benvenisti 2000, 11–54; Peteet 2005; Masalha 2015), the Israeli transformation of Silwan into the City of David (Ir David in Hebrew), as Mizrachi suggests, is about more than a name. The Elad organization, along with the state agencies and other professionals responsible for the archeological sites and the
Jerusalem Walls National Park, have all transformed the village *while the residents are, for the most part, still living there*. They have turned Silwan into a massive tourist site with settlements, causing dispossession, demolition, and disruptions for Palestinians along the way.

The transformations of Palestinian landscapes are illustrative of a particular relationship of power that is not just colonial but settler colonial. Wolfe (2006) argues that settler-colonial projects function through a “logic of elimination” that involves both the “negative” acts of dispossessing or destroying indigenous societies and the “positive” acts of rebuilding societies in their place (388). In this formula, although “Settler colonialism destroys to replace,” Wolfe also posits that “invasion is a structure not an event” (388). The long history of Palestinian erasure and Israeli replacement certainly attests to Wolfe’s argument, and the East Jerusalem national parks are part of this invasion. Not only do the Israeli parks restrict and/or erase Palestinians and Palestinian landscapes, but following the logic of elimination, they replace those landscapes with ones that serve the purposes of the Israeli settler state, particularly in terms of defining home and belonging and in terms of boosting geopolitical claims.

**IMPLICATIONS: PARKS AND SETTLEMENT**

*Home, Nation, and Belonging*

When Israel establishes its national parks in occupied territory, the state is making much broader statements about who belongs in those parks and who does not, about who belongs in the nation and who does not. In the context of a settlement project, these parks serve as attempts to alienate the indigenous residents from their land and strengthen connections *instead* between the
settler society and the territory of the indigenous people. There are certainly parallels here to the United States, where American national parks have long transformed the territories of indigenous nations, some containing holy sites, into “national treasures” of the settler society, dispossessing, excluding, and erasing the indigenous peoples from those spaces (see Keller & Turek 1998; Burnham 2000; Stevens 2014).

This same phenomenon can be seen throughout the history of green spaces in Israel, as parks, forests, preserves, and other designations have “hidden” depopulated village ruins in acts meant to alienate the indigenous residents who fled them—and arguably those who remained behind as well. With these village ruins erased from public view, it becomes very easy for recent generations of Israelis to grow up not knowing the histories of those places and the people who lived there, or about the broader histories of Palestinians in their homeland prior to 1948.

National parks, by definition, are even more exclusionary than other categories of green spaces, given that Palestinians are not part of the “nation” actually declaring them, and indeed, in Jerusalem, indigenous Palestinians are excluded from the parks in both material and discursive ways. The material exclusion is most evident in Emek Tzurim National Park and the proposed Mount Scopus Slopes National Park, where the Palestinian home is excluded from those zones under planning law. With regard to Silwan and Jerusalem Walls National Park, Palestinians are excluded entirely from the (Jewish) history that Elad presents of the City of David, and even the layers of the Islamic period found in the Givati parking lot excavation were “misplaced”/“lost” by the IAA (Mizrachi interview 2013). In each of these parks, Palestinians are cast as invaders and destroyers or, at the very least, failed caretakers of natural and architectural “treasures”, which is often how both settler societies and conservationists view native peoples (Wunder 2003; Sundberg & Kaserman 2007; Quiroga 2009).
Beyond defining the nation and excluding those who do not belong, national parks have also been connected with territorial formations and geopolitical claims. Returning to the US context, there was a strategic geography to the establishments of national parks, as they were, for the first several decades of national parks, established exclusively in the western areas of the continent. These were areas of the American “frontier” that had recently been conquered and were in the process of being consolidated into US territory (Cronon 1996). Until this day, American Indian nations continue to struggle for rights in and around some of those US national park lands.

For Israel, Jerusalem is part of its “frontier”: it is a city that straddles the “Green Line” separating territories that much of the world recognizes as “Israel” and territories that no state in the world recognizes as “Israel.” In West Jerusalem, perhaps unsurprisingly, there are no “national parks”, as parks in and around Israeli neighborhoods tend to be standard municipal parks for public use, even those with “nationalist” names like the large “Independence Park” near the Old City. At the same time, there is one large green space in West Jerusalem—the lands and ruins of the Palestinian village of Lifta—which contains centuries of architectural heritage and also has natural value, but this green space within the frontier is slated not for protection but for the development of luxury Jewish housing (Golan et al. 2013). I focus on the struggle over Lifta in Chapter Four.

In contrast, in efforts to justify the annexation of East Jerusalem, Israel uses archeology to “prove” Jewish connections to the land and zones national parks to bring Israelis to eastern areas of the city “beyond the frontier”, even when those parks are not actually protecting
anything of natural, historic, or heritage value. They are able to zone these parks, though, without stirring the same level of political controversy in the international community and the Israeli left that we see over the settlement blocs elsewhere in the West Bank. Still, the effects of these parks on Palestinian homes and communities resemble in some ways the effects of other forms of Israeli settlement, particularly in the way that they prevent growth, restrict land use, bring militarization and insecurity, and can result in demolitions and displacement. The Israeli parks are linked to one another in ways that allows for Israelis and international tourists to travel from one to another seamlessly, without revealing the hardships and complications their zoning may have caused to Palestinians nearby. In this sense, the possibilities for contiguous travel through green spaces of East Jerusalem certainly recall the contiguous journeys that Israelis are able to make between settlements in the West Bank through landscapes that have been fragmented for the native Palestinians.

CONCLUSION

Palestinian residents inside and adjacent to Israeli parks—in addition to dealing with the everyday effects of parks on their homes and lives—are joined by Israeli groups like Emek Shaveh in challenging the depoliticized understandings of parks, archeology, and preservation in order to make clear their role in both Palestinian dispossession and marginalization, and in Israeli geopolitical claims to territories occupied since 1967. In this chapter, I have placed these parks in historical context in Israel-Palestine, while also looking at their role in settler colonialism. I have argued that the Israeli national parks of East Jerusalem, in their purposes and their effects,
function as West Bank-style settlement blocs, even though they only minimally involve the construction of buildings and the transfer of Israeli citizens to Palestinian neighborhoods.

The state’s exploitation of particular discourses of “nature” and “preservation” for the purposes of furthering continued settlement in occupied territory comes at a time, on the one hand, when Israel is increasingly condemned in Europe and elsewhere for its settlement activity in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank and, on the other hand, when Israel is touted for its environmental commitments, achievements, and innovations around the world. That these two trends can co-exist is a testament to the durability and ubiquity of scientific and environmental discourses that allow for the separation of nature and politics. Still, settler colonial theory, in its focus on identifying and challenging erasure (and replacement), provides one framework through which the political might be made visible. In other words, making visible the erasure of Palestinians performed through Israeli preservation laws, practices, and officials brings into focus their relationship with more overtly political forms of Israeli settlement that are recognized as such.

Having argued in the previous chapter that Palestinian geographies of Jerusalem are physically and social fragmented through Israeli occupation and settlement, this chapter on national parks has served as a case study within that broader argument. The case of parks illustrates the need to challenge disembodied understandings of space, as well as masculinist, “objective” discourses of science and preservation. Embodiment is particularly important here, as the Israeli settlement of Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem through national parks involves not only the exclusion of Palestinian residents, but also the introduction of Israeli bodies passing through as tourists and giving Israeli national meaning to Palestinian lands. Further, the (housing construction) activities of Palestinian residents surrounding the parks—as Sundberg and
Kaserman (2007) describe in the context of Latinxs crossing the U.S.-Mexico border—become positioned in Israeli discourses as a threat to the pristineness of the park landscape.

In the next two chapters, I turn to recent and ongoing contestations by Palestinians and Israelis of the fragmentation and dispossession that have come with Zionist settlement in Jerusalem and beyond.
Map 2.1: Israeli National Parks in Jerusalem. This map, distributed by the Israeli NGO Emek Shaveh, shows the boundaries of existing and proposed Israeli national parks in the Holy Basin.

Image 2.1: General view of Jerusalem Walls National Park and Silwan from the south, with the Old City visible in the center background. *Photo by the author.*
Jerusalem Walls National Park

Image 2.2: Givati parking lot excavation and entrance to the City of David Visitors Center immediately behind it, across the main street of Wadi Hilweh neighborhood. In the background is the Silwan neighborhood of Ras al-Amoud to the right and center, and to the left in the background is the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives. *Photo by the author.*
Image 2.3: Givati parking lot excavation surrounded by Silwan village homes. *Photo by the author.*
Image 2.4: The City of David archeological park, run by the Israeli settler organization Elad.

*Photo by the author.*
Image 2.5: Western side of the Old City Wall, near Jaffa Gate, also part of the Jerusalem Walls National Park. *Photo by the author.*
Emek Tzurim National Park

Image 2.6: Entrance sign to Emek Tzurim National Park, explaining the park’s purpose. Photo by the author.
Image 2.7: Young trees in Emek Tzurim National Park, with the Palestinian neighborhood of Wadi al-Joz in the background. *Photo by the author.*
Emek Tzurim National Park

Image 2.8: Elad’s Temple Mount sifting project tent in Emek Tzurim National Park. Photo by the author.
Image 2.9: View of Emek Tzurim National Park landscaping from the observation point at the top of the slope. The Old City—most noticeably, blue and gold Dome of the Rock—is visible in the left-hand side of the background. Photo by the author.
Image 2.10: View of Emek Tzurim National Park landscaping from the observation point at the top of the slope. The structures in the immediate background are Palestinian neighborhoods, and the built-up areas in the far background are Israel neighborhoods of West Jerusalem. *Photo by the author.*
Image 2.11: View of the proposed Mount Scopus Slopes National Park from the Mount Scopus observation point (looking east). The park would run from the point where this photo was taken until the road visible in the center-left of the photo and in front of the Palestinian village of Az-Zaayyim visible in the center-right of the photo. *Photo by the author.*
Image 2.12: View of the proposed Mount Scopus Slopes National Park from the Mount Scopus observation point (looking toward al-Issawiyya in the northeast). *Photo by the author.*
ENDNOTES

1 Since the early 2000s, there has also been increasing media coverage of Israel’s politicization of parks—prompted most recently the publication of these reports—including in online activist-centered media like The Electronic Intifada and Mondoweiss but also in mainstream Israeli, Palestinian, and international press, ranging from Haaretz to Ma’an, to The New York Times, to The Guardian.

2 This situation is actually unique to Jerusalem, because while Israel has established national parks in other cities, these parks actually “contain sites of unquestionable natural or heritage value,” and they were not established “in the heart of built areas” (Bimkom 2012, 31–32).

3 The core of the campus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which predates the declaration of the state of Israel, sits in what was an Israeli enclave surrounded by Jordanian-controlled territory between 1948 and 1967, although now it has expended beyond the Green Line as well.

4 To illustrate, on Israeli “Independence Day” in May 2016, more than 150,000 people visited Israeli national parks (Times of Israel 2016).

5 According to Weizman (2007), “Pine trees were chosen both because of their fast growth and because of the acidic deposit of pine needles they leave on the ground, which eradicates most smaller plants and undergrowth between the trees. ‘Pine deserts’ were meant to make the land unusable for Palestinian shepherds by depriving their flocks of pasture” (120). Of course, Braverman (2009) also notes that the European pine tree also serves to replicate the Eastern European forest landscapes familiar to Ashkenazi Jews.
CHAPTER 3: MAPPING AND APPING IN ISRAEL-PALESTINE: CHALLENGING ERASURE IN JERUSALEM AND BEYOND

INTRODUCTION

In the previous two chapters, I have described the fragmentation of Palestinian Jerusalem and have emphasized the resemblance of this fragmentation to that of the West Bank taking place at a larger scale through Areas A, B, and C. This West Bank fragmentation was represented in a well-circulated art map—L’archipel de Palestine orientale (“The Archipelago of Eastern Palestine”)—by Julien Bousac for Le Monde diplomatique (2009), which shows Area C—under full Israeli control in both civil and security affairs—as part of a greater ocean surrounding the “islands” of Palestinian-controlled Areas A and B (see Map 3.1). In this map, almost all of East Jerusalem is below water, part of the Canal de Jérusalem. Although an art map for a newspaper, this map accentuates effectively the separation that Palestinian communities in the West Bank experience, a separation that is not necessarily as clear in traditional mappings of Areas A, B, and C used by diplomats, international organizations, and human rights groups.

Indeed, this map looks very different from typical mappings of Israel and the Occupied Territories, which always mark the Green Line so foundational to the official peace process and to Palestinian statehood, even as it has been erased through Israeli settlement and military activity. Bousac’s map does not suggest that the possibility of a peace agreement along the 1967
borders is merely threatened or at risk, but rather it suggests that something more permanent has already taken place—that while diplomats talk and talk about the 1967 lines, the Palestinian lands inside those lines are actually disintegrating. In this sense, in calling out the geographies of occupation and settlement produced by Israel, the archipelago map may be more effective than many traditional maps in communicating some of the “facts on the ground” and the urgency to address them. At the same time, Bousac’s map is effective in communicating the effects of fragmentation on everyday mobilities: while maps of Areas A, B, and C show the separation of the Palestinian-controlled areas, it is not necessarily clear what that separation means on the ground because the Areas on those maps may appear more like simple jurisdictional lines than lines revealing territories that have been all-but-annexed by Israel.

In all of this, Bousac’s map presents the inverse of many Israeli mappings of Israel-Palestine, which tend to emphasize Israeli built-up areas and de-emphasize Palestinian areas (see Leuenberger & Schnell 2010). Sometimes they are de-emphasized to the degree that they are completely invisible, an example of which is found in the map distributed by the Ministry of Tourism on its official tourism promotion website (see Map 3.2). In this map, the Green Line is completely absent, and inside the West Bank, large Israeli settlements are marked the same as Palestinian cities, while the only roads visible are Israeli highways serving the settlements.1 Palestinian-controlled Areas A and B are lightly shaded but entirely empty but for the few city dots, as if these lands were without people and/or undeveloped.
While the archipelago map itself was produced in France, Palestinian and Israeli activists have also been making maps in recent years that challenge Israeli mappings of Israel-Palestine. This comes at a time when the discussions of the peace process, through traditional geopolitics framings, become so fixated on the fate of the map—i.e., the contortions that final map of Israel and a Palestinian state might require—following peace negotiations. In this short chapter, I look at recent mapping projects by Palestinian and Israeli activists who are resisting both the Palestinian erasure evident in the Tourism Ministry’s map and the geographies of Palestinian fragmentation Israel is producing in Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, depicted in Bousac’s map.

In doing so, I ask: in what ways are maps of Israel-Palestine, and Jerusalem in particular, being challenged from below, and how do they complicate the assumptions and discourses of the peace process? How do recent mapping projects engage with the geographies of fragmentation and dispossession I have identified in previous chapters? Finally, how are spaces of everyday life like home, village, neighborhood mobilized in these mapping projects?

I begin this chapter with a very brief overview of mappings of/in Palestine. I continue by introducing two case studies of recent mapping projects upon which my analysis will focus: first, a Jerusalem area map produced by Palestinians in the city through the NGO Grassroots Jerusalem, and second, a smart phone map-based app created by the Israeli NGO Zochrot. My subsequent analyses of these mapping projects focus on their politics of visibility, their redrawing of lines, and in the case of Grassroots Jerusalem, the role of the mapping process in
their community mapping projects. In this chapter, I draw primarily from interviews with Grassroots Jerusalem staff and news archives related to Zochrot’s app.

**MAPPING PALESTINE**

Jerusalem and Palestine both have long histories of cartographic representation, to the extent that Wood (2010) regards “Palestine [as] a paradigm in the history of map-making” (232). Jerusalem has appeared in map art since the early centuries of Christianity—in the mosaic “Madaba map” in Jordan, for instance (see 232–33)—and the city frequently appears as the center of the world in mappae mundi—world maps from Medieval Europe—including in Heinrich Bünning’s well-known 1581 map Die ganze Welt in einem Kleberblat (“The Entire World in a Cloverleaf”), which today can be found painted on Armenian tile and mounted in the public square outside (Israel’s) Jerusalem City Hall on Jaffa Road, near the Old City (see Image 3.1). It was in the mid-16th century, too, that biblical maps of Jerusalem and the “Holy Land” were first printed in Protestant Bibles in Europe as scientific evidence “testifying to the ‘truth’ of the text” (Delano Smith 1990, 67, 73).

Despite this long history of religiously motivate artistic mappings, to the extent that geographers associate mapping with state and colonial power (see Harley 2001; Wood 1992, 2010), the first modern mappings of Palestine did not occur until the 19th century during the late Ottoman period. It was around this time that European empires, including Britain, France, and Russia began mapping Palestine as part of broader interests in the potential collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Wood 2010, 236), and in the 1920s, the British Mandatory government began cadastral surveys throughout all of Mandate Palestine, building on earlier surveying efforts by
Ottoman authorities, European Jewish and Christian settlers, and others (Gavish & Kark 1993; Gavish 2005).

Later, following the 1948 war, it was the very maps produced by the British surveys on which Hebrew place names would replace Arabic ones on a massive scale, continuing a process that Jewish settlers began earlier and that the British in fact had carried on (Azaryahu & Golan 2001; see also Benvenisti 2000; Peteet 2005; Masalha 2015). In addition to removing Arabic names from the Israeli map, hundreds of Arabic place names lost relevance on the map through the demolition of hundreds of villages—even if some of their names managed to survive in some form (see Kadman 2015).

RECENT ACTIVIST MAPPING PROJECTS

The Palestinians are, of course, not the only indigenous people to be erased from the map by colonial or settler-colonial states (Harley 2001), and indeed indigenous peoples have long used maps in countering their dispossession and erasure (e.g., Bryan and Wood 2015; Peluso 1995). During and immediately following my fieldwork in Jerusalem, I encountered two counter-mapping projects by Palestinian and Israeli activists, one based on contemporary Jerusalem and another focused more broadly on pre-1967 Israel, including western Jerusalem. I argue that both of these maps respond “from below” to the historical and ongoing fragmentation and erasure that I have been describing in the previous two chapters, particularly with regard to visibility, the (re)drawing of lines, and emphasis on the mapping process.
The NGO Grassroots Jerusalem, established in 2009 and headquartered in the northeastern Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah, describes itself as “a platform for Palestinian community-based mobilisation, leadership and advocacy that helps Palestinian communities in Jerusalem strategically address the humanitarian, developmental and political issues which systematically disempower and dispossess Palestinians across the city” (GJ About 2016). The organization identifies and connects community-based groups and movements throughout the city to bring them together “for sharing and exchanging information, knowledge and experience and coordinating on issues of urgent and long-term concern.” They structure their programming and activities through “three interlocking pillars”: local mobilization, global mobilization, and mapping and assessment. The organization’s broadest goal is to achieve, through community empowerment, a Jerusalem that is “[a] healthy, sustainable society based on justice and dignity,” and the activists there also work to promote Palestinian issues in the international community.

Grassroots Jerusalem engages in mapping with Palestinians in Jerusalem, particularly through neighborhood-based or village-based organizations, because so few maps of the city that are produced “appropriately represent Jerusalem the way Palestinians understand and experience the city” (GJ Mapping 2016). In this vein, the organization rejects not only Israel’s annexation boundaries for the Jerusalem Municipality and the de facto border presented by the separation wall, but Grassroots Jerusalem also rejects the very division of Jerusalem into “East” and “West” as colonial and ethnic—not merely geographical—in nature. While providing Palestinian residents of Jerusalem with the setting and resources “to reflect their city on the map,” the group
sees mapping more broadly as a way to “bring[] to light the realities of spatial control, identif[y] issues of shared concern and provide[] the knowledge necessary for community members to connect, coordinate and resist.”

Grassroots Jerusalem staff, interns, and community members have completed a number of mapping projects using a variety of technologies and published maps in a variety of formats. They have populated Open Street Map (OSM) with the streets, buildings, and other contents of Palestinian neighborhoods, they have printed city-scale maps identifying neighborhoods, and through their website they offer digital downloads of “The Real Map of Jerusalem” ($5) and “Wujood: The Grassroots Guide to Jerusalem” ($10). On the “Discover Jerusalem” portion of their website, Grassroots Jerusalem presents information about Palestinian neighborhoods and villages in the greater Jerusalem area, including their histories, social and economic profiles, and the struggles they face under occupation. Central to the Discover Jerusalem interface is a webmap—using an Open Street Maps basemap—with layers identifying Palestinian community organizations, educational institutions, health and recreation centers, businesses of all varieties, religious institutions and structures, tourist sites, and Israeli Occupation infrastructure.

During my fieldwork, the mapping coordinator at Grassroots Jerusalem gave me a print copy of one of their city maps during a visit to conduct interviews. This map, called “Freedom of Movement in Jerusalem?” was published in late 2013 through a grant from the European Union\(^2\) and was a slightly earlier version of the map I am including with this chapter as Map 3.3—“Freedom of Movement in the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area?” This map of the Jerusalem area is presented as the city’s first community-based map, and it departs in a number of ways from both the typical Israeli maps (whether governmental or touristic) and the sorts of Jerusalem maps used by the United Nations and NGOs. I will focus on some of these departures in my
analysis below, particularly with regard to visibility, the (re)drawing of lines, and the emphasis on the mapping process.

*Zochrot’s App for 1948 Villages*

The second mapping project I consider in this chapter comes in the form of a smart phone app produced by Zochrot called “iNakba.” Zochrot (Hebrew for “Remembering”) is an Israeli NGO—with regular Palestinian involvement—that was established in 2002 to raise awareness of the Palestinian nakba in Jewish Israeli society and to promote the return of Palestinian refugees “as the imperative redress of the Nakba and a chance for a better life for all the country’s inhabitants” (Zochrot 2014b). The organization has published histories of depopulated villages in Hebrew and Arabic (with occasional English) and has also collected oral histories of the events of 1948 from Israelis and Palestinians alike. Zochrot regularly conducts tours of dispossessed Palestinian villages and urban neighborhoods inside Israel, which are attended by Israelis, Palestinians, and internationals (see Bronstein 2005). They also organize an annual conference on the Palestinian right of return and an annual nakba film festival. Their website contains an extensive archive of hundreds of photos and videos of their events and activities, along with a wide variety of educational materials about the nakba and return.

During my fieldwork, Zochrot published—in print and digital form—the first “nakba” map in Hebrew (Bronstein 2015), which was previously available in Arabic and English through the work of Salman Abu Sitta and the Palestine Land Society. The Zochrot nakba map, is now in its second edition and, like its predecessors by Abu Sitta, marks the locations of the hundreds of Palestinian villages depopulated in 1948 and subsequently destroyed. It also shows almost 200
Syrian villages in the Golan Heights destroyed under Israeli occupation since 1967 (see Bronstein 2015). I want to focus in this chapter, though, on another recent mapping project by Zochrot, which came in the form of a free smartphone app called iNakba.

The app “iNakba: The Invisible Land” was released for the iPhone—and later for Android devices—in the hours leading up to Israel’s “Independence Day” holiday in May 2014, a few months after I returned to the US from fieldwork. The purpose of the app, as Zochrot (2014a) describes it, is to “allow[] users to locate and learn about Palestinian localities destroyed during, and as a result of, the Nakba since 1948.” In many ways, this mobile app offers another version of the “Nakba Layers” from 2006 that Quiquivix (2014) describes, which were custom layers for Google Earth that presented locations of and information about the dispossessed villages from 1948—only the iNakba app comes in a new and highly portable format. Upon loading the app, following a few seconds of the title screen, which features a 19th century British Palestine Exploration Fund map (see Image 3.2), the user is presented with a country-scale (Google Maps-based) webmap with hundreds of pins marking destroyed villages (see Image 3.3). Like with other map apps on smart phones, users can “pinch” to zoom in and out and then select a pinned village (see Image 3.4). (In the screenshot images included with this chapter, I have selected the village of Lifta, which is the focus of my next chapter.)

After selecting a destroyed village, a new screen appears with a photo of the village site and/or ruins (if available) and basic information about its pre-1948 district, its estimated population in 1948, the date of its conquest and the name of the conquering militia, and the names of Jewish settlements on the village core or surrounding agricultural lands before and since 1948 (see Image 3.5). In addition to an information page, each village has a page for photos (see Image 3.6) and a page for videos, where both Zochrot and users of the app can
upload content. Users who create an account are also able to “follow” any village(s) they choose, and there is therefore a page for followers of each village as well. Finally, because many village sites are in such a state of ruin and/or not located along main roads, the app contains the GPS coordinates for each village, to which users can be redirected in Google Maps or Waze for help locating the exact site of a village (see Image 3.7). Zochrot intended that people would use the app to visit village ruins—although of course millions of Palestinians cannot—and the group aims one day to implement its full village tours into the app (Hatuqa 2014).

RESISTING FRAGMENTATION THROUGH MAPPING

In some ways, these two mapping projects are very different. After all, the Grassroots Jerusalem maps are made by Palestinians, and the Zochrot app designed primarily by Israelis, though both depended upon the production of Palestinian knowledge and promote Palestinian narratives of the past and present. Further, some Grassroots Jerusalem maps are printable city maps that look from a distance very much like a traditional, professionally produced map. The Zochrot map app, on the other hand, is an interactive webmap that runs on a smartphone and has no printability—although the information and media in the app is also available on the Zochrot website—and the mapping interface looks very familiar to those who regularly use these devices for navigation. In these ways, neither attempt to challenge the aesthetics or technologies of mapping in any radical way. Still, in the political context of Jerusalem and Israel-Palestine, both of these mapping projects are countering, from grassroots activist levels, Israeli mappings of the same spaces, and they do so with attention to finer scales of home, neighborhood, and village.
Visibility and “Reality”

In both the Grassroots Jerusalem mapping projects and the Zochrot app, activists are directly countering erasure of Palestinian communities. In the case of the iNakba app, Zochrot is responding to the historical dispossession and destruction of Palestinian villages by returning them to the map of Israel from which they have been erased. At the same time, this smartphone format means that users can use the GPS feature of the phone to guide themselves to the precise village site on the ground. Accordingly, even the landscape transformations that were undertaken by Israel to conceal the villages cannot keep users from finding them.

With regard to the Grassroots Jerusalem mapping projects, Amany, the mapping coordinator, told me in an interview that their projects provide Palestinians the opportunity to “reflect[] the reality that exists [in] Jerusalem back to the map, because until now, Israeli mappers were controlling this technology.” Although Amany and others help to coordinate the mapping of neighborhoods in Open Street Map, they leave decisions for what exactly to upload into OSM up to the neighborhoods residents themselves. While these sorts of neighborhood mappings typically involve labeling sites like schools, religious institutions, community organizations, and even businesses, in some neighborhoods they have even identified houses with particular family names. I asked Amany about this, given that this sort of data is not usually uploaded to OSM:

It was a community decision. I mean, they felt like adding their own houses. I see it as a powerful statement: “We’re here, we exist.” The main atmosphere here in Jerusalem—or let’s say the main struggle actually—for people here is to prove existence. And adding my house is a huge statement from a community member that “I’m here, you can’t really delete me from the map; you can’t delete me from the reality. I will [do] everything in order to stay here and struggle [over]
keeping my house.” The whole political atmosphere is around transfer from Jerusalem in various ways, so in that way it’s a tool for maintaining my existence in Jerusalem, saying to the whole world, “Yeah, Abu Mohammed from Wadi al-Joz—he has a house in Wadi al-Joz. You can see it on the map.” So Abu Mohammed decided it’s his own way to fight back all of these Israeli policies for transferring Jerusalemites from Jerusalem.”

Accordingly, some Palestinians are using the mapping initiatives led by Grassroots Jerusalem to not only counter their collective marginalization by “filling in the map” of Palestinian areas of the city, but they are also mobilizing their individual homes as a means (they hope) of preventing future dispossession and erasure. Noting that residents often become excited when learning about the possibilities available through Open Street Maps, Amany added, “They like the idea they can really control the space again.”

(Re)drawing Lines

Both groups are also redrawing lines on or through their mapping projects. Grassroots Jerusalem, on their website, critiques two types of maps and works to provide alternatives in their own work (GJ Mapping 2016). First, they seek to counter the tourist maps that emphasize attractions in Israeli areas and promote Israeli businesses, while marginalizing or ignoring Palestinian neighborhood attractions and commercial areas. Many of these maps even shift the center of maps away from the Old City to the west, so as so include more Israeli neighborhoods of the city than Palestinian areas, and the tourist maps tend to adopt Israel’s preferred place names—for attractions, roads, regions, etc.—over their Arabic names. Second, they are responding to maps produced by the UN and NGOs who address human rights of other issues in eastern neighborhoods of the city but “leave the West side of Occupied Jerusalem blank and
unrepresented and do not display the Palestinian neighbourhoods and villages displaced during the Nakba of 1948 nor the Israeli colonies which replaced them” (GJ Mapping 2016).

Looking at Grassroots Jerusalem’s freedom of movement map (Map 3.3), they have responded to both critiques. First, they have centered their map of Jerusalem on the Old City, allowing just as much space for eastern Jerusalem and western Jerusalem in the map’s framing. Second, they have filled in neighborhood names in western, Israeli neighborhoods of the city, while also designating Palestinian neighborhoods dispossessed in 1948 with a key, a symbol of Palestinian refugee return. In my interview with Amany, she repeated the website’s statement that Grassroots Jerusalem does not recognize the division of Jerusalem between “East” and “West” and pointing to this very map, she emphasized that “You can see [Israeli] settlements in ‘67 and settlements in ’48 with the same color... [I]t’s a huge political statement saying we don’t differentiate between both.” Zionist settlement on both sides of the Green Line is therefore treated the same in their map, and while the Green Line itself is shows, it is not as prominent as it is in the typical NGO/UN-style maps.

Instead, this map seems to choose a different division for Jerusalem, which is one that is a total reflection of approaching a mapping of the city from below. Instead of “East” or “West,” this map emphasizes access to Jerusalem, because what does it mean to be included in a map of Jerusalem if you are not actually able to access the core of the city due to the separation wall? Focusing on mobility in the greater Jerusalem area, Grassroots Jerusalem includes checkpoint locations and the path of the wall, challenging the “East”/“West”, “united”/“divided” formula for the city and instead reflecting the fragmentation of the city that is experienced from below.

For its part, the iNakba app by Zochrot also redraws lines in the sense that, at a broader scale, it upsets the line dividing the territories occupied in 1948 and the territories occupied in
1967. It does so in the same way that Quiquivix (2014) argues the Google Earth “Nakba layers” did: by disrupting the assumption of the peace process that pre-1967 Israeli lands are off the table in negotiations. Under the current Oslo framings, “suggestions that Israel resides on ‘occupied’ land is permissible discourse only about the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” not about lands inside the Green Line (Quiquivix 2014, 453). Every pin in the iNakba map app, then, pokes a hole in this delicate discourse.

Community Building Through Process

Finally, in their mapping projects, Grassroots Jerusalem, emphasizes the social and political importance of the mapping process in its potential role in community-building. The organization approaches the mapping of each Jerusalem neighborhood or village through one of two ways: first, if they have community partner organization in that location, they work closely with them to populate OSM according to their community’s wishes. Alternatively, if Grassroots Jerusalem does not have a partner in a neighborhoods, they will bring in a group from a Jerusalem youth organization elsewhere in the city or from the Geography Department at Al-Quds University. This allows Palestinians from one part of Jerusalem to visit and become acquainted with—through mapping and talking with residents—an area of the city they do not know. As both Amany and her colleague Fayrouz emphasized in interviews, Palestinian residents are able to connect struggles in their own neighborhood with struggles in others. Further, Amany told me that by approaching communities individually for mapping, she finds herself constantly “zooming in and out” to connect situations on the ground with larger patterns of fragmentation and disruptions (Israeli highways, national parks, etc.)
Further, as part of their mapping projects, Grassroots Jerusalem collects oral histories and other stories that help residents of neighborhoods or villages think about their community’s unique identity and history as they are deciding how to approach their mapping projects. Similarly, Fayrouz sees these meetings during mapping and mobilization initiatives as sources of hope and empowerment for people in Jerusalem; despite the difficult situations so many Palestinians in the city are facing,

. . . it’s important to see the happiness that comes out of initiatives and how people suddenly feel alive. I think that, in general, people who are hopeless here feel that they don’t feel alive in Jerusalem; they feel like, “ok, I wake up in the morning, probably 4 or 5 in the morning in order to get to my job; it’s a very hard job that I dislike—it’s not what I want to do. I don’t really want to build houses in settlements, or I don’t want to make food for Israelis or tourists. I want to draw, or I want to become a singer, or I want to research geography or geology or whatever. People don’t choose what they want to do here. But then once there are initiatives, then suddenly people feel alive and suddenly are happy—people are happy. I mean, we attend events and we organize events and people who come to participate usually like the mingling, they like getting to know each other. I mean, we had a nice opening here in our garden where we gathered a lot of community members who didn’t know each other and who have never met before, and they met here and suddenly you would see bunches—like little bunches—of people, little groups of people sitting and talking, just talking trivial stuff probably. . . . And I think that it—I mean, I’m sure you know what I mean since you are coming with this feminist point of view—but the sharing of feelings, knowing that someone else shares your feelings, that someone else shares your concerns, your hopes, and your aspirations, gives you a feeling of strength and power. And I think that’s one of the biggest achievements or positive results of networking, because then people don’t feel alone anymore, and they don’t feel that they’re doing very little, small things that don’t show. They see the results.

Through mapping their villages, neighborhoods, and homes from below, Palestinians working with Grassroots Jerusalem are countering Israeli maps that erase or marginalize them, while also
CONCLUSION

Edward Said (1996), in critiquing the Palestine Liberation Organization’s lack of “a discipline of detail” in its early negotiations with Israel after signing the Oslo Accords, argued that Palestinians needed their own detailed maps and plans if they were to ever see anything beyond rhetorical promises of independence and an end to occupation. Said argued in particular that

the main task for Palestinians is to know and understand the overall map of the territories that the Israelis have been creating, and then devise concrete tactics of resistance. (In the history of colonial invasion maps are always first drawn by the victors, since maps are instruments of conquest. Geography is therefore the art of war but can also be the art of resistance if there is a counter-map and a counter-strategy) (27–28).

While Said may have been directing his criticism toward the Palestinian leadership, it is arguably Palestinians from below that have actually responded to this call and are today developing counter-maps and counter-strategies to Israeli occupation and settlement (see Quiquivix 2014). The Palestinian leadership, on the other hand, is increasingly undermining grassroots movements, particularly those that threaten to destabilize the foundations of the “peace process” on which it depends. In the fourth and final chapter, I turn to internally displaced refugees in Jerusalem and elsewhere who are mobilizing their long-dispossessed homes and villages in pursuit of futures unrecognizable to both Israel and the Palestinian leadership.
Map 3.1: *L’archipel de Palestine orientale* (“The Archipelago of Eastern Palestine”), created by Julien Bousac for *Le Monde diplomatique*. This art map presents Areas A and B of the West Bank as land and the surrounding lands lost to Israel from 1948 through today as water. Such a map emphasizes the ongoing fragmentation of the West Bank for Palestinians and the contemporary reality of restricted mobilities between Palestinian population centers.

Source: http://www.imaginaryatlas.com/2013/03/14/the-palestine-archipelago/.
Map 3.2: Map of Israel from the Israeli Ministry of Tourism’s official tourism website. This map for tourists effectively incorporates the West Bank—labeled “Samaria” and “Judea”—into Israel, with seamless land and road connections. There are no international boundaries marked within historic Palestine, and areas fully or partially controlled by the Palestinian Authority (i.e., the Gaza Strip and West Bank Areas A and B) are only subtly shaded to set them off from Israel.

Image 3.1: Heinrich Büning’s 1581 map *Die ganze Welt in einem Kleberblat* (“The Entire World in a Cloverleaf”), painted on Armenian tile and displayed in the square outside the (Israeli) Jerusalem City Hall on Jaffa Road in West Jerusalem, near the Old City. *Photo by the author.*
Image 3.2: iNakba App by Zochrot. Title screen, featuring a background map of the Jaffa area from 1880 by the (British) Palestine Exploration Fund. *Screenshot captured by the author.*

Image 3.3: iNakba App by Zochrot. Large scale map with pins marking all of the destroyed Palestinian villages that are documented in the app. *Screenshot captured by the author.*
Image 3.4: iNakba App by Zochrot. Smaller scale map of the Jerusalem Area with pins for the destroyed villages of West Jerusalem; Lifta is selected in this screenshot. *Screenshot captured by the author.*

Image 3.5: iNakba App by Zochrot. Lifta Info page, giving basic information about the village’s capture and subsequent settlement, as well as its previous population and administrative district before 1948. *Screenshot captured by the author.*
Image 3.6: iNakba App by Zochrot. Lifta Photos page, where users can upload their own photos of the village, which will be seen by other who use the app. Screenshot captured by the author.

Image 3.7: iNakba App by Zochrot. Lifta Directions page, instructing users that because many villages are not on existing roads, users should drive to their approximate area and then follow the links to Waze or Google Maps, which will lead them to the village pins. Users can switch between English, Hebrew, and Arabic language options, as show in this screen. Screenshot captured by the author.
ENDNOTES

1 A counter-map focused specifically on the Israeli highway system, which emphasizes roads in Israel-Palestine that Palestinians from the Occupied Territories can and cannot use, has been created by Visualizing Palestine and can be found at http://visualizingpalestine.org/visuals/segregated-roads-west-bank.

2 More recently, in spring 2016, Grassroots Jerusalem launched a fundraising campaign to try and eliminate the need for funding from foreign governments and institutions (Loewenstein 2016).
CHAPTER 4: FUTURES BEYOND RECOGNITION: CONTESTING ERASURE AND PLANNING RETURN

INTRODUCTION

Soon after returning from fieldwork, I heard a poem called “The Wall Clock” by Samih al-Qasim, a Palestinian citizen of Israel:

My city collapsed and the clock remained ticking;
Our neighborhood collapsed and the clock remained ticking;
The street collapsed and the clock remained ticking;
The square collapsed and the clock remained ticking;
My house collapsed and the clock remained ticking;
The wall collapsed . . . and the clock remained ticking.

(Adonis et al. 1984, 84–85). In putting together this chapter, this poem resonated strongly with me, for it served as a reminder of the longevity of struggle for Palestinian homes that were dispossessed in 1948 in the creation of Israel, which continue today, even after their destruction and in spite of the exclusion of 1948 refugees from the official Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

The Palestinian “right of return”—that is, the right of Palestinians (and their descendants) displaced in the 1948 war that created Israel to return to their ancestral homes and villages—is one of the most contentious issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Like the status of
Jerusalem, the refugee issue is among those that the Israelis and Palestinians have agreed to postpone until the final stage of peace negotiations. Still, debates and discussions over both the “right” and the “return” of refugees typically ignore the position of internally displaced Palestinians inside Israel, those indigenous Arabs of Palestine who fled or were driven from their homes and lands in the 1948 war but who remained under Israeli rule at the war’s end. These Palestinians now hold Israeli citizenship, but like the refugees in exile outside of historic Palestine and present-day Israel, they have not been allowed to return to their ancestral homes and villages. Nonetheless, as I argue in this chapter, Palestinian refugees inside Israel, at grassroots levels, continue to politicize these spaces by visiting them, fighting for them, returning to them, and planning for their futures.

On 1 November 2012, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas appeared in an interview on Israel’s Channel 2 and declared that he had a “right to see” Safed, the city in present-day Israel from which he was expelled as a child in 1948, “but not to live there” (Zeiger 2012). In doing so, Abbas confirmed long-held convictions by critics of the Oslo peace process that the Palestinian leadership would be willing to jeopardize, or waive altogether, the rights of Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 to return to their villages and lands in the context of a negotiated two state solution. In the interview, Abbas declared explicitly that “Palestine”, to him, meant the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and that the rest of historic Palestine he regards “now and forever” as “Israel” (Zeiger 2012). While then-Israeli President Shimon Peres expressed praise for Abbas’s “brave words” and hailed him as a “real partner for peace” (Ravid 2012), many Palestinians—activists, refugees, politicians, and others—responded with condemnation for his apparent concession on a core Palestinian demand (e.g., Abunimah 2012; Abusalama 2012; AJE 2012a; Ma’an 2012g; Massad 2013; Nicky 2012;
Sherwood 2012). In the face of this backlash, Abbas clarified that the “right of return” had not been surrendered for all Palestinians, merely that he personally had no plan to seek return (Issacharoff & Ravid 2012).

This event was neither the first nor last in recent years to spotlight the increasing distance between the policies and posturings of the official Palestinian leadership and the needs and desires of Palestinian communities, including those under PA rule and those elsewhere. In fact, the interview with Abbas on Israeli television came only six weeks after mass demonstrations and strikes by Palestinians throughout the West Bank against the Palestinian Authority over its economic policies and over previous economic agreements with Israel (e.g., Ma’an 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e, 2012f). In the course of these protests, demonstrators burned effigies of PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, an economist who had previously worked for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and who was and remains highly regarded by American, European, and Israeli officials, and some protestors demanded the resignation of Abbas himself (Ma’an 2012b, 2012d).¹ These demonstrations eventually subsided after the PA cancelled its plan to raise the value added tax rate and to increase fuel prices.

In contrast, a few weeks after Abbas’s Channel 2 interview, the Palestinian leadership enjoyed a wave of popularity, at least in the streets of the West Bank, after it succeeded in its efforts to secure “non-member observer state” status in the United Nations General Assembly on 29 November, having failed to achieve full membership the previous year (AJE 2012b, 2012c).² While many Palestinians celebrated the vote in the General Assembly as an international recognition of Palestinian (national) rights and an affirmation of Palestine’s place in the international community, other Palestinians—both before and after the 2012 vote—responded critically to Abbas’s UN strategy and to the potential risks to Palestinian rights involved in his
pursuit of statehood in the West Bank and Gaza through international organizations (see, e.g., Abunimah 2011a, 2011b; Bahour 2011; Baroud 2012; BNC 2011; Carlstrom 2011; Fleming-Farrell & Delaney 2011; Massad 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Nayel 2011; see also Goodwin-Gill 2011; Qafisheh 2013).

QUESTIONS, METHODS, AND OUTLINE

While the recent protests in the streets of the West Bank had illustrated the increasing dissatisfaction with the Palestinian leadership by those directly under its authority, critiques of the UN campaign, in contrast, largely concerned and/or emerged from the rights and well-being of Palestinians outside of the West Bank in Gaza, particularly Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948. This is significant, given the positions of these two groups vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority, itself a product of the Oslo peace process. The PLO does not represent Palestinians citizens of Israel in negotiations—the result of both their complex relationship historically and of Israeli pressures (see, e.g., Pappé 2011)—and the Palestinian leadership has been increasingly accused of abandoning Palestinian refugees generally and their right to return specifically. Importantly, these two categories—Palestinian citizens of Israel and 1948 refugees—are not mutually exclusive, and it is this intersection which is the primary focus of this chapter as I link a Palestinian struggle in West Jerusalem to others within the Israeli side of the Green Line.

In the case of Jerusalem, a number of Palestinian villages to the west of the city, which had been integrated with its urban neighborhoods to varying degrees by the end of the Mandate period, were depopulated during the 1948 war. Like the refugees from hundreds of other “nakba
villages” in present-day Israel, the displaced residents of West Jerusalem villages—just as the residents of the city’s depopulated western neighborhoods—were not permitted by Israel to return to their homes following the war. These villages include ‘Ayn Karem, Deir Yaseen, Lifta, and al-Maliha. Lifta differs from the other western Jerusalem villages, however, in the sense that, while its lands were confiscated by the state and some were used for the construction of Jewish Israeli housing, the Palestinian structures were never fully destroyed and the core of the village remains relatively intact. Further, while some of Lifta’s refugees ended up in Jordan, the West Bank, or further afield following the 1948 war, many Liftawis were displaced to village lands on the eastern, Jordanian-controlled side of the green line. Thus, after the 1967 war, many Lifta refugees were able again to visit their village again, like other Palestinian refugees displaced from West to East Jerusalem in 1948. While few Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have accepted Israeli citizenship, their physical access to their dispossessed village, as Jerusalem residents, positions them similarly to displaced Palestinians inside the pre-1967 borders of Israel.

In this chapter then, I ask: in what ways do indigenous Palestinians who have been dispossessed of, but not fully separated from, their homes and villages relate to those village lands? Specifically, how do the 1948 Palestinian refugees and their descendants inside Israel challenge displacements that took place as far back as 68 years ago? How do they understand the role of memory in the present, and in the future? I focus my questions in the context of the Jerusalem village of Lifta, given the current, active struggle over its future, but I also look to other Palestinian communities and locations in Israel for a broader context of Palestinian activism over nakba villages. Within the broader questions of the dissertation, I also ask what these case studies tell us about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, particularly with regard to
refugees and return. As I will argue in this chapter, the ongoing struggle over Lifta and the emerging forms of Palestinian activism elsewhere in pre-1967 Israel challenge dominant discourses of the negotiated peace process with regard to the right of return—namely that Palestinians should regard the 1948 territories as lost and that any return of refugees to Israel would be in very small numbers so as not to threaten a Jewish majority. The cases in this chapter testify to the exclusion of Palestinian citizens of Israel and the 1948 refugees—and certainly those who fall in both categories—from the official peace process and these assumptions. Further, the cases here reveal that dispossessed Palestinians continue to identify with their native villages and to claim their rights to return to them, even decades after their destruction, and they maintain relationships with other villagers and with their village lands through embodied practices that go beyond mere memory of the past and look toward the future.

I begin this chapter with a brief introduction to Palestinian citizens of Israel and their relationship both to the State of Israel and to the Palestinian national movement and its leadership. I also summarize dominant discourses surrounding the Palestinian right of return in the framework of the Oslo peace process. I then turn to the struggle for the dispossessed West Jerusalem village of Jerusalem, a struggle which is not merely ongoing but also particularly active. Following a background on Lifta, I discuss a coalition of Israeli and Palestinian activists working to save the ruined village from a development plan for luxury Jewish housing. I also discuss the events of Lifta Cultural Week and of the village’s significance to other Palestinians. Next, I turn to three other struggles in Israel over dispossession—specifically, the Prawer Plan in the Negev and return movements in al-Lajjun and Iqrit villages—in order to situate the struggle for Lifta in a broader context. (For clarity and convenience, all of these locations can be found on a map attached to the end of this chapter.)
Finally, in analyzing these cases together, I argue that they offer contributions to our understandings of home and memory and that they reveal the limits of seeking recognition from the State of Israel. In doing so, I contend that newly emerging forms of activism over nakba villages seek futures that are beyond recognition—unintelligible to Israel, the Palestinian leadership, or the framings of the peace process. For this chapter, I draw upon my attendance at and observations of meetings of the Coalition to Save Lifta, events during Lifta Cultural Week, including a village tour, and a conference on the right of return held in Tel Aviv. I also rely on interviews about Lifta conducted with an active member of the Lifta Society and with NGO workers who surveyed the village. Finally, I draw from the archives I compiled during fieldwork consisting primarily of news articles and NGO documents. Before discussing the struggle for Lifta, I begin with a brief overview of the internally displaced Palestinians in Israel, who are citizens of the state but also refugees through its establishment.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PALESTINIANS

Palestinian Citizens of Israel

During the “1948 war”—which is used throughout this chapter as shorthand for the civil and subsequent regional war that took place in Palestine-Israel between 1947 and 1949—approximately 750,000 indigenous Palestinians, more than half of their population, were dispossessed of their homes, villages, and lands, and became refugees (Pappé 2006; Gelvin 2007). Of the roughly 150,000 Palestinian Arabs who remained inside Israel after the war, approximately 25% of them were internally displaced from their villages or other places of
residence (Boqa’i 2008/2009, 3; Gelvin 2007, 135)—and they remain internally displaced in Israel. At present, there are at least 300,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel who are internally displaced, out of 1.6 million Palestinian citizens of Israel in total, a figure which includes those from dispossessed villages as well as those displaced through other circumstances (33).

Following the 1948 war, to prevent the return of the refugees to their homes, the Israeli army demolished the houses and other structures in some 531 depopulated villages from which Palestinians fled or were driven (Pappé 2006). Today, only traces of the Palestinian villages remain in various stages of ruin, traces which have been carefully documented by historian Walid Khalidi (2006) in his book All That Remains (see also Falah 1996). Those village structures that survived Israeli demolition and that remain intact today are typically used by members of Jewish communities—or settlements, as some Palestinians regard them—that have been built since 1948 on lands of depopulated villages (see Khalidi 2006). These communities, however, have generally been built on agricultural lands belonging to the villages, rather than on the destroyed village cores. The ruins of the village cores have typically been covered with pine forests planted by the Jewish National Fund (see Braverman 2009; Kadman 2015), a significant landscape transformation which historian Ilan Pappé (2006, 225–34) has described as part of the “memoricide” of pre-1948 Palestine. In the depopulated Palestinian urban neighborhoods, on the other hand, recently immigrated Jews needing housing were often placed in the homes, which also helped prevent refugees from returning; those urban structures largely survive until today.

Despite holding Israeli citizenship, internally displaced Palestinians, like the refugees in neighboring states and beyond, have not been allowed by Israel to return to their lands and rebuild their homes and communities, and ownership of their property was transferred to an Israeli government “custodian” soon after the establishment of Israel under the terms of the 1950
Absentee Property Law (Fischbach 2003; Tamari 2005a). Nevertheless, internally displaced Palestinian citizens of Israel have maintained multiple forms of connections with their ancestral village lands and communities, which I describe in detail in this chapter, even if they have been unable to return to them permanently. These connections include, for example, making regular visits to village lands (and taking subsequent generations with them), continuing to use the religious structures where they still stand, and/or holding community events at the village site (Ben-Ze’ev & Aburaiya 2004).

Internally displaced Palestinians, like Palestinian citizens of Israel more generally, face systemic social and legal discrimination and speak of treatment as second-class citizens (see Jamal 2005). Between 1948 and 1966, Palestinians in Israel lived under military rule, while at the same time demanding citizenship from the new state established in their homeland (Pappé 2011, 34–35). They eventually received Israeli citizenship beginning in 1952, years after legal provisions had been made to facilitate citizenship and immigration rights for Jews worldwide (Robinson 2013, 97–108). While the status and experiences of Palestinians in Israel have been—and arguably still remain—relatively under-reported and under-examined in both media coverage and academic literature vis-à-vis their counterparts living under direct Israeli military occupation (see Abu-Lughod 2010), there has been work in recent years addressing precisely this gap (e.g., Abdo 2011; Ghanem 1998; Hijab & Minns 1990; Kanaanah & Nusair 2010; Molavi 2013; Pappé 2011; Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker 2005; Robinson 2013; Rouhana 1997; Rouhana & Sultany 2003; Shafir & Peled 2002). Within this body of literature, scholars have challenged Israel’s claims that Palestinian Arab citizens enjoy equal citizenship in a democratic system and have instead described the Israeli citizenship regime as an “ethnic democracy” (Smooha 1997) or an
“ethnocracy” (Ghanem 1998; Shafir & Peled 2002; Yiftachel 2006)—though others have critiqued these models for erroneously treating Israeli Jews as a single ethnic group (Abdo 2011).

Today, Palestinian citizens of Israel face legal discrimination under the provisions of fifty-some laws, a database of which the Palestinian Israeli NGO Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel maintains on its website. According to Adalah (2012), these laws “directly or indirectly discriminate against Palestinian citizens of Israel in all areas of life, including their rights to political participation, access to land, education, state budget resources, and criminal procedures.” Additionally, they face social discrimination in Israeli society and economic inequality vis-à-vis their Jewish counterparts, and despite the fact they are indigenous to the country, speak frequently of being made to feel like strangers by both the state and society (see Kanaaneh & Nusair 2010; Robinson 2013).

At the same time, the Palestinian citizens of Israel have had a complicated relationship historically with the Palestinian national movement and its dominant institutions, given that they were established in exile by refugees and shaped by that experience. Indeed, in the decades before the war and displacements of 1948, as Gelvin (2007) explains, a variety of “nationalisms in Palestine” had preceded “Palestinian nationalism” itself. While there many have been some signs of an emerging Palestinian nationalism in the early years of the British Mandate, there were certainly expressions of Arab nationalism in Palestine among some elites, as well as sentiments with Syrian nationalism at both the elite and popular levels. The French and British mandates in the Levant ensured the separation of Palestine from Syria, however, and the Zionist project in Palestine provided an impetus for a unique Palestinian nationalism, one which began to embrace the Mandate borders and which defined itself against the Zionist settler movement (Gelvin 2007). While the Great Revolt that began in 1936 may be the defining event in the spread of
Palestinian nationalism among the masses, with unique national symbols, figures, and objectives, its aftermath also saw the expulsion, imprisonment, or escape of the emerging national leadership, laying the groundwork for the defeat and expulsions in 1948.

This mass displacement before, during, and after the war crushed the Palestinian national movement temporarily, but ultimately, the shared experiences of expulsion and exile diminished many of the major differences among indigenous Palestinians that had previously hindered the development of Palestinian nationalism and “ultimately resulted in the universalization of a uniform Palestinian identity” (Khalidi 1999, 193). The nationalist movement was revived, then, with the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1960s and its rise under Arafat in the 1970s (Gelvin 2007; Khalidi 1999). The PLO originally sought, in its charter, a single, democratic, non-Zionist state in the borders of Mandate Palestine; in the 1970s, however, the leadership began to pursue an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (Gelvin 2007, 207–208). This independent state in 22% of Mandatory Palestine was initially presented as a temporary step toward a single state in all of historic Palestine (208), however, since 1987, the Palestinian leadership has explicitly called for a Palestinian state alongside Israel (160). Since the 1990s, with signing of the Oslo Accords, the PLO that had formed in exile has been based in the West Bank city of Ramallah, and the Palestinian Authority, despite falling under the PLO in theory, “increasingly appears to be gaining in political significance at the PLO’s expense” (PASSIA 2014, 1). Given the PA’s much narrower mandate—i.e., Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, as opposed to all Palestinians worldwide—this is certainly cause for alarm for those millions of Palestinians who live outside of PA rule.

For the Palestinian citizens of Israel, identification with “Palestinianness” and the Palestinian national movement has been suppressed by the Israeli state since its early years
(Pappé 2011). The Zionist establishment even prefers to refer to them as “Israeli-Arabs” until this day, and the state continues to promote this identification in schools, institutions, and elsewhere, even as fewer and fewer Palestinian citizens accept it for themselves and increasing numbers of them reject it outright (BADIL 2012; Younis 2015). With geographical and social isolation from the rest of Palestinians in exile since 1948, and from those in the West Bank and Gaza until 1967, Palestinian citizens of Israel were not naturally linked politically to other Palestinian communities, and indeed some became active in the Israeli political system from the very beginning of the state, joining and/or supporting primarily left-wing and mainstream parties (see Pappé 2011). There were and remain, however, limits to their participation in the Israeli political process—both practical and ideological—and voting in Israeli elections remains controversial among Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Following decades of fragmentation, the First Intifada in the late 1980s became a key moment for strengthening the relationship between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians elsewhere. Just weeks after the start of the uprising in the West Bank in December 1987, Palestinians citizens of Israel called for strikes and organized demonstrations as part of a “Day of Peace”, which was “the first time political action was coordinated between Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line” (Pappé 2011, 174). After the event, Palestinians in Israel began arranging for food, supplies, and funds to be transferred to those in the Occupied Territories resisting occupation at grassroots levels. The following year, as Palestinian citizens in Israel prepared for “Land Day”—a commemoration of protests in 1976 against massive land appropriations by Israel, during which several Palestinian citizens were killed, dozens were wounded, and scores were arrested—organizers called to connect their own struggle with those in the West Bank and Gaza. In turn, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza organized Land
Day demonstrations to support the Palestinian citizens of Israel (Kimmerling & Migdal 2003, 196; Pappé 2011, 175). As Kimmerling & Migdal (2003) explain, that year’s “Land Day was a key event, then, not only in forging political solidarity among Arab citizens of Israel, but in cementing the acceptance of the ‘1948 Arabs’ back into the larger Palestinian world and into the heart of mainstream Palestinian nationalism” (196).

A few years later, when Israel began negotiating the Oslo Accords, Palestinian citizens of Israeli were deliberately excluded from the process by Israel, with the acquiescence of the PLO (Pappé 2011, 195). Nevertheless, increasing identification with a Palestinian identity and with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (and beyond) are noticeable in both electoral politics and grassroots activism among Palestinians in Israel. This is well reflected in the “Haifa Declaration”, a statement formulated between 2002 and 2007 by a group of scholars, activists, writers, artists, journalists, and others, all Palestinian citizens of Israel seeking to “go beyond the boundaries of power politics and the limitations imposed on political parties’ discourse to freely discuss . . . our collective future and status in our homeland, the major challenges facing our society, our relationship with our people, nation, and the state of Israel” (Mada 2007, 4). In the declaration, among other things, they emphasize their Palestinian and Arab identity, position Israel as a settler-colonial project, and express hope for reconciliation, justice, and equality through the framework of a bi-national, democratic state of Israel (alongside an independent Palestinian state).
A few years prior to the Haifa Declaration, the National Committee of the Internally Displaced, based in Nazareth, internally displaced Palestinians in Israel issued their own statement affirming their right to return. The statement said in part:

We, the some 250,000 internally displaced, part of the Palestinian Arab minority, citizens of this state, did not fall from the sky. We are not immigrants, but natives in our land. The Israeli government is not allowed—on ethic, moral, legal, and political grounds—to keep us displaced in our homeland, far from our towns and villages of origin. International law and principles protect our natural right of return. . . .

We demand the cancellation of the Absentee Property Law which defines us as “Present Absentees”, as well as the cancellation of all other laws providing or ethnic discrimination, and to return the displaced to their homes.

The National Committee demands its right to maintain the holy sites in all destroyed villages and to protect our historic sites.

We call upon all Palestinian national institutions, political parties, and our people to stand on our side. As part of the entire Arab-Palestinian people, we wish to declare:

- The refugee issue is the heart of the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
- The Palestinian refugees’ right to return to their homeland and homes is a sacred right whose implementation must be based on UN Resolution 194. . . .
- We warn of the consequences of conspiracies against Palestinian refugee rights, whether conducted openly or behind closed doors. We state with loud voice that there will be no just solution without a solution of the issue of the refugees and the internally displaced.
Although the internally displaced refugees have made these demands known, they are effectively unrepresented in the official Israeli-Palestinian peace process, just like other Palestinian citizens of Israel. This is due in part to maneuverings by Israel to exclude the Palestinians in Israel (Pappé 2011, 195), but it is also due to Palestinian leadership’s long-time neglect of this Palestinian community and its more recent priority to establish an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza at all costs (see Massad 2006). As citizens of the state of Israel, their official representative in negotiations is the Israeli government, which discriminates against them directly and indirectly in a multitude of ways (Adalah 2012) and has been fighting a losing battle since 1948 to keep them from identifying with their counterparts in the Occupied Territories and the diaspora. Further, many Palestinian activists and scholars have expressed fear that a two-state solution, especially under current political conditions, could both provide justification for the inferior legal status of Palestinian citizens of Israel and threaten the rights of refugees to return to their dispossessed lands inside pre-1967 Israel.

With regard to the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the argument in its most basic terms is that, in exchange for a state in the West Bank and Gaza, the PLO would be forced to formally recognize Israel as a “Jewish state”, which would in turn legitimate the current inequalities in Israel that privilege Jewish citizens and discriminate against non-Jewish citizens. Indeed, this is a demand that Israel has placed publicly on the Palestinians, albeit relatively recently (see Zreik 2011), in addition to demands that the Palestinian state be demilitarized, that Israel maintains a presence in the Jordan Valley, and that Israeli control the borders of the Palestinian state. In the context of an Israeli government and society that is increasingly nationalistic and moving rightward—and in which the Defense Minister is a long-time advocate of transferring lands
densely populated by Arab citizens to a Palestinian state against their will—there are also fears of further Palestinian displacement.

At the same time, and perhaps more obviously, with regard to the refugees and the right of return, critics of the peace process have always expected that Israel would never agree to a full-scale return of refugees displaced in the 1948 war, and Israeli officials and representatives have not provided any reason to believe otherwise. There could, perhaps, be “returns” to the areas of historic Palestine in which a Palestinian state was established, but refugees and their descendants could not expect any return in large numbers to their dispossessed homes and lands, contrary to UNGA Resolution 194. The denial of return has been accompanied by a number of justifications, ranging from Israeli “security” concerns, to issues of “practicality”, to the threats Palestinian refugees would pose to Israel’s “Jewish and democratic” nature. While Israel has historically shown less resistance to a monetary compensation agreement for refugees, Israeli officials have also promoted the idea that the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 and the immigration of Jews from Arab countries soon afterward equated to a region-wide population exchange (and therefore nothing is due to the Palestinian refugees). There is certainly, then, broad skepticism and/or indifference among refugees and their advocates toward the Palestinian leadership establishing a state in part of historic Palestine, whether through negotiations or the UN, particularly given its perceived surrender on refugee rights.8

Certainly these critiques and their responses have emerged from a multitude of sources and have taken all sorts of nuanced forms. Nevertheless, Palestinian concerns over the intentions of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators alike go beyond mere speculation. In fact, both of these critiques were largely substantiated with the publication of the so-called “Palestine Papers”—thousands of pages of secret PLO documents leaked to Al-Jazeera in 2011—which revealed that
“Palestinian negotiators privately agreed that only 10,000 refugees and their families, out of a total refugee population exceeding 5 million, could return to Israel as part of a peace settlement” and that “PLO leaders also accepted Israel’s demand to define itself as an explicitly Jewish state, in sharp contrast to their public position” (Black & Milne 2011).

In mainstream political and media discussions today about the future of Israel-Palestine, the very possibilities for those futures are generally defined through and limited by the discourses of the simultaneously stalled and ongoing peace process (see Khalidi 2013, ix). Within this framework, the ancestral lands of refugees and internally displaced Palestinians are widely understood as “settled”—that outside of some possible land swaps here and there, the dispossessed lands making up the bulk of Israel today will remain part of Israel and are not even up for negotiation. Further, if any 1948 refugees are allowed to exercise their right to return to present-day Israel in the context of a peace agreement, it will be a token few—a point which even the PLO seems to have conceded.

In other words, the Palestinian lands depopulated in 1948 do not have much hope of a Palestinian future under the peace process, just as in mainstream Zionist discourses in Israel, they do not even have a Palestinian past. Palestinian narratives of the 1948 war and its aftermath—especially those related to forced displacement of indigenous Palestinian communities—continue to be widely rejected in Israeli society, despite progress made by groups like Zochrot that are trying to educate Israeli society about the nakba (Bronstein Aparicio 2005, 2016). Given the scale of destruction of the hundreds of villages, and their “memoricide”, many Jewish Israelis do not even know they existed, let alone that many had histories reaching back hundreds or thousands of years. 9 There is, however, at least one depopulated village that no one can miss, as
it sits in partial ruin at the western entrance of Jerusalem on the major highway to/from Tel Aviv and the Mediterranean coast. It is to the “last standing nakba village” of Lifta that I now turn.

STRUGGLE FOR LIFTA

About Lifta

The Palestinian village of Lifta, the former core of which sits on a steep slope to the northwest of Jerusalem, is located along the road connecting Jerusalem to Jaffa and cities of the Mediterranean coast. The history of the village extends to ancient times, most likely the biblical site of “Mei Neftoach,” which is also the Hebrew name assigned to the site following its depopulation and the establishment of Israel (Khalidi 2006, 300; see also Benvenisti 2000, 11–54; Peteet 2005; Masalha 2015 on post-1948 renaming in Hebrew). Lifta’s original lands covered a vast area northwest, north, and northeast of the Old City of Jerusalem, and during the British period, the village expanded outside its core to connect with new construction west of the Jerusalem Old City (Khalidi 2006, 301). Because of its vast land holdings, its quarries, and its talented builders, the villagers of Lifta indeed played a great role in the expansion of western areas of Jerusalem in the early 20th century (Tamari 2002, 72–73). The resulting wealth that came to some Liftawis also brought new villas and other construction to the village core (72).

While the Palestinian residents of Lifta—numbering more than 2,500 in the mid-1940s—were primarily Muslim, there were a few Christians as well (Khalidi 2006, 300–301), and some of the new construction on Lifta lands connected seamlessly with newly constructed Jewish neighborhoods (Tamari 2002, 72). Further, as Tamari (2002) explains, “[b]ecause of [Lifta’s]
proximity to Jewish and mixed neighbourhoods (Romeima, Giv’at Shaul, Mahne Yehuda, Mea Sha’rim) the village had substantial and amicable economic relations with the Jerusalem Jewish community. Lifta was probably the only Jerusalem village that was physically intermeshed with the Jewish communities of Jerusalem” (73). Liftawis had particularly close relationships—both economic and social—with the predominantly Arab Jews of Romeima, with whom they shared at least some (Arab) cultural customs and traditions (Davis 2011, 191). By the end of the Mandate period, Lifta had two coffee houses, a clinic, a high school, and a number of skilled trade shops (Tamari 2002, 73).

Lifta was first attacked relatively early in the Palestine Civil War that broke out following the 1947 UN Partition Plan, due to its strategic importance along the highway between Tel Aviv-Jaffa and Jerusalem. Following episodes of gunfire exchanges between Arabs in Lifta and the Jewish Haganah in early December 1947, some Liftawis left their homes, and by mid-December there was a regular armed Arab presence in the village made of Liftawis and others, just as there were Jewish militias in and around adjacent Jewish neighborhoods (Morris 2004, 119–20). On 27 December, the Zionist Irgun attacked one of Lifta’s coffee shop, killing several people, and over the next few days Liftawis left the village to take refuge in Ramallah (120). Many returned in mid-January but then left again a few weeks later, after the Zionist Stern Gang attacked Lifta and destroyed a number of houses (120).

The evacuation of Lifta was a significant event in the Zionist conquest of Jerusalem, and David Ben-Gurion celebrated it as such during a trip from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in early February 1948 in an address to leaders of his political party:

> When I come now to Jerusalem, I feel I am in a Jewish (Ivrit) city. This is a feeling I only had in Tel-Aviv or in an agricultural farm. It is true that not all of Jerusalem is Jewish, but it has in it already a huge Jewish bloc: when you enter the city through Lifta and Romema, through Mahaneh
Yehuda, King George Street and Mea Shearim—there are no Arabs. One hundred percent Jews…. In many Arab neighbourhoods in the West you do not see even one Arab. I do not suppose it will change. And what happened in Jerusalem and in Haifa — can happen in large parts of the country. If we persist it is quite possible that in the next six or eight months there will be considerable changes in the country, very considerable, and to our advantage. There will certainly be considerable changes in the demographic composition of the country (quoted in Pappé 2006, 67–68).

In the initial years after the war, the Jewish Agency placed recently immigrated Jews, primarily Kurdish and Yemeni, in many of Lifta’s houses; thirteen of these Jewish families remain today in houses of Upper Lifta—illegally in the state’s view—but most left in the 1960s with compensation from the government (Golan et al. 2013).

Despite one area of the village core being leveled during the 1948 war, Lifta is unique among “nakba villages” in that it largely remains intact. Today, some 50 buildings in various stages of ruin are part of what appears as a large green space at the western entrance of Jerusalem. Although some of Lifta refugees ended up outside of Palestine/Israel following the 1948 war—in Amman and Chicago, among other places—many ended up in East Jerusalem and Ramallah and were therefore able to visit their village again after Israel captured the rest of historic Palestine in 1967. It was at this point that Israel drilled holes in all of the ceilings so that the visiting refugees would not try to return (Odeh Interview 2013), just as the army had done elsewhere in 1948 and afterward. In recent decades, Israeli development schemes have been proposed for Lifta, many of which incorporate the village ruins without their Palestinian history. The latest of these plans proposes the construction of a luxury Jewish housing project over and around the village ruins, with tourism and recreation amenities. It was the struggle against this plan that was being waged in the course of my fieldwork, and it is still ongoing.
Coalition to Save Lifta

Originating from a municipal planning committee, Plan 6036\textsuperscript{10} was approved in 2006, having been in the works since the 1980s. Under the terms of this plan, 268 luxury Jewish housing units, along with commercial areas and tourist amenities, were to be built on Lifta village lands, incorporating the ruins of the depopulated Palestinian homes and other structures into the new construction (Golan et al. 2013, 72).\textsuperscript{11} “The plans are thus not in denial concerning the Palestinian space of the village,” argue Shoshan and Bronstein (2006), “On the contrary, they are aware of its advantages and use them, through the practices of preservation, to elevate the touristic and commercial real-estate value of the project.” In December 2010, tenders were published by the Israel Land Administration for construction in the village (Hasson 2011), and the Jewish long-term residents of depopulated homes in Upper Lifta were served with eviction papers (Golan et al. 2013, 72).

In response to the ILA moving forward with Plan 6036, the Coalition to Save Lifta came together to fight the plan’s implementation (Golan et al. 2013, 72). Varying greatly in their backgrounds and political orientations, as well as their motivations for joining the group and their ideas for Lifta’s future, members of the coalition include “refugees from Lifta who seek to maintain their historic and property rights and their right to return to their village in the future; architects and planners who want to preserve the built heritage of Lifta; environmentalists who object to damaging one of Jerusalem’s green areas; human rights activists, and others” (72). In March 2011, a petition was filed in an administrative court, through the efforts of the Coalition, to prevent implementation of the plan on the grounds that it threatened to destroy heritage and violated the rights of the displaced Liftawi refugees (Ersheid 2011).
After issuing a temporary injunction against the ILA in summer 2011 (Ershied 2011), Judge Yigal Mersel ordered in favor of the Coalition in February 2012, voiding the publication of tenders and effectively freezing the plan’s execution (Hasson 2012). The judge based his ruling on purely technical grounds related to changes the ILA had made on the conservation survey process, and ignored the petition’s arguments about the rights of refugees (Broude 2012; Hasson 2012). This relief was only temporary in the sense that the ruling related to procedure and not the concept or substance of the plan itself, which the court could not have cancelled even if it wanted to, owing to a lack of jurisdiction (Golan et al. 2013, 73). What it did do, however, in requiring an independent conservation survey be completed before tenders could be issued, was raise the bar on future attempts to develop the site (Broude 2012).

Soon after the ruling, activists in the Coalition held a press conference at the top of Lifta, overlooking the village, to celebrate the ruling and to announce their intentions going forward to engage in a thorough, comprehensive survey of Lifta from multiple academic disciplines and perspectives, treating the village as an “open campus” (Lidman 2012). In an interview the following year, a 1948 refugee active in the Coalition and an unofficial media ambassador for Lifta, Yacoub Odeh—who insisted I use his real name in my writing—reflected on this event. Recalling himself standing in front of a group of cameras, with other activists beside him, and the house in which he was born not far behind him down Lifta’s steep slope, Yacoub told me, smiling, “You can’t imagine my feeling. Nothing [is] better than justice for a human being.”

Even with this victory, however, the Coalition does not know if it will indeed “Save Lifta” in the end, as another member told me bluntly in fall 2012, several months after the court ruling. The Coalition has, though, been working on multi-faceted surveys of the village, some of which were in progress while I was doing fieldwork and some of which were completed. True to
the “open campus” concept offered at the February 2012 press conference, one of the meetings of the Coalition to Save Lifta that I attended was held in the village itself and was focused on the natural features of the site and its biodiversity. In this walkthrough of the village, we examined and discussed the unique plants and wildlife found in Lifta and the surrounding valley, guided by one of the Israeli environmental activists in the Coalition, with contributions from a graduate student in the natural sciences at the Hebrew University.

During this same period, activists and academics were also pursuing recognition of the village’s cultural and natural value through UNESCO, which could possibly strengthen the argument for protection. In January 2015, Israel’s national UNESCO commission approved an application from the Coalition and other groups to include Lifta on the UNESCO World Heritage Site “Tentative List” (see Lifta Society 2015), which is a required step before a site can be nominated and considered for full World Heritage Site status (UNESCO 2016). The depopulated village site was formally submitted to UNESCO on 5 February 2015 as “Liftah (Mey Naftoah) – Traditional Mountain Village” and described as such:

The only historic, intact Palestinian village. Due to its abandonment in 1948, as result of historic events, it has never been re-occupied, or demolished, thus preserving in the most authentic way all the elements of a hilly, East Mediterranean village. All other similar villages were [either] destroyed or continued to be inhabited thus evolved and changed losing most of their authenticity and integrity. The typology of houses in this village presents a variety of traditional housing with no parallels in their state of conservation, authenticity, integrity and variety.  

Lifta, like other sites, will have to be on the tentative list for at least a year before it can be considered for nomination (UNESCO 2016). In the same round, the committee also nominated ‘Ein Karem, another uprooted West Jerusalem village that contains important Christian religious sites; unlike Lifta, ‘Ein Karem has been repopulated with Israeli Jews since 1948.
With a group as broadly composed as the Coalition to Save Lifta, there have certainly been considerable disagreements among members with regard to strategies, assumptions, and imaginations of the village’s future. Daphna Golan, Zvika Orr, and Sami Ershied (2013), scholars who are part of the Coalition themselves, outline some of these (Ershied is also the lawyer who filed the petition). For instance, while some Palestinian members—and indeed some Jews—may have wanted the Coalition to emphasize the nakba and right of return in the Coalition’s work, there were some Israeli members who were more interested in advocacy that focused on preserving heritage and the natural environment (72–73). There were also disagreements among Palestinians of different generations over whether to approach the Israeli courts: first and third generation refugees generally supported it, while the second did not, believing that any relief the court could give—if indeed it gave any—would be very limited (73). Because Palestinians and Israelis also work to save the village in contexts outside of the Coalition, they have not sought to “solv[e] the potential tension between a site of memory and a site of return”; rather, they focus Coalition efforts on “the broadest common denominator” of stopping development plans for Lifta (75, 79).

Lifta Cultural Week

Several months after the court ruling, in summer of 2012, another group under the name COLLECTIVE Memory | Imaginaries | Planning, or Collective MIP, met in Jerusalem to think about Lifta and its future (Sabbagh 2012). This group of young Palestinian planners and architects from Jerusalem and Bethlehem were not gathering as Liftawis themselves, but they saw Lifta as an important space for Palestinians collectively and as “a battleground of
narratives.” As such, the collective decided to embark upon “an exercise in critical cartography and foraging into the memory and testimonies of Lifta’s dispossessed community” in a project to be called *Re:Lifta*, which would go beyond “finding an immediate solution to the remains of the village” and instead “re-imagine Lifta as a narrated typology of return, a landscape of memories and ideas.” Sabbagh (2012), a member of Collective MIP, argued that a focus on the “immediate solution” for Lifta would only allow them to think and create within the confines and realities of Israeli occupation and oppression. Emerging, then, from current political parameters they decided to imagine Lifta in the future, after the return of its refugees.

Collective MIP reached out to other artists and scholars and to Liftawis in the course of the Re:Lifta initiative and worked with Yabous Cultural Center (Jerusalem) and the Cultural Heritage Protection Committee to organize a series of events that would allow the collective to present its work to other Palestinians and to accompany it with related educational and cultural activities. “Lifta Cultural Week” was held from 15–18 November 2012 at Yabous and included film screenings, a traditional embroidery display, an art exhibition, lectures and panels, and a tour of the village, in addition to the Re:Lifta exhibition on display throughout the weekend. I attended a number of these events, including the opening ceremony, film screenings, and the village tour led by Yacoub Odeh—my first time to visit Lifta. The Lifta Cultural Week events I observed were attended primarily by Palestinians, including Liftawis, others from Jerusalem, and a few from ’48, as well as an international and/or Israeli here and there.

The opening ceremony that Thursday evening, 15 November 2012, began with a few words from organizers and a few words about Lifta, but it also began with a somber note about events elsewhere in the country preceding the event. The day prior, Israel had launched “Operation Pillar of Defense, killing several Palestinians in airstrikes that day and a dozen more
the day of the opening event; the Israeli operation, which officials claimed was a response to rocket fire from Gaza, would last until the following week and leave scores of Palestinian civilians dead and many more injured (see B’Tselem 2013). In the opening comments for Lifta Cultural Week, the principal speaker made a point to underscore the connection between what happened in Lifta in 1948 and what continues in Gaza until this day. Following opening comments, the exhibitions were opened on the second level of Yabous. With the embroidery display in a gallery room to the side, Re:Lifta was projected on four screens in the main lounge space, which is named for Mahmoud Darwish. On each of the screens was a different slide show presentation; all played simultaneously and on loop, and music played in the background as observers moved from screen-to-screen.

The first screen offered a series of infographics presenting the past, present, and possible futures of Lifta, including its geography and climate, its pre-1948 homes and village life, the story of its dispossession, the fate of Liftawis since 1948, information about Plan 6036, and a list of issues to consider in planning for return. This presentation was based on archival documents and discussions with refugees, and was “an attempt to visualize collective narratives”. The second screen presented drafts plans and sketches of what a returned and revived Lifta might look like in the year 2028, when Lifta’s remaining refugees and their descendants have returned. Their designs are attentive to memory and the ruins, to infrastructure and accessibility, and to the unique natural environment and topography of the village site. They also look at the question of density and how to design for a much larger population than was expelled in 1948.

On the third screen of Re:Lifta, artists and planners focus on future narratives of a returned Lifta through imagined media reports from and about the village. For instance, a newspaper reports the construction of Lifta’s new mosque and features advertisements for Lifta’s
radio station and for the chance to soar over the village in a hot air balloon. One the fourth and final screen, we see posters and flyers advertising imagined future events in Lifta and promoting tourism and return to the village. This display includes a Lifta version of the well-known “Visit Palestine” poster and a flyer for an art exhibition held in the village. At least some of the exhibition participants, including from Collective MIP, were on hand at the opening event, and a couple of them approach me and talked briefly, seeming curious but amused that someone who they could see was not Palestinian was interested enough in the exhibition to record films of the presentations like some of the Palestinians were doing. I was later given contact information by the Center for one of the members I had not met, but when I wrote to see if he or others would be interesting in being interviewed, I unfortunately did not hear back. The exhibition in full has not been posted or published—or presented elsewhere, to my knowledge—but a few of the images can be found in Mahdi Sabbagh’s portfolio, and one is published in Golan et al. (2013).

Lifta’s Broader Significance

The work of the Coalition and the initiatives of Collective MIP demonstrate the breadth of interest in Lifta by Palestinians and others, and indeed, Lifta holds significant meaning for many different people for many different reasons. There are a lot of intuitive reasons why Lifta might be significant to Palestinians, regardless of whether their family is from Lifta or not—it is, after all, the last 1948 village still standing without re-settlement, and the struggle to save it now is a very visible reminder that erasure is ongoing since 1948. Indeed, Palestinians from Lifta continue to identify with the village (and with other villagers) and to visit their depopulated family homes, and therefore, even as the state denies them any hope of returning to them
permanently, the village remains a place of both identity and political empowerment. While Lifta is unquestionably a politically contested site, and simultaneously an inspirational site for imagining alternative futures, I want to conclude my discussion of Lifta with a few brief passages reflecting personal meanings of Lifta from Palestinians—two who had done work there but were not from there, and one who was a 1948 refugee—that I interviewed during fieldwork.

Talking with two young Palestinian women who had studied architecture and were now interning with a West Bank-based NGO focused on promoting Palestinian heritage, their affinities for Lifta were certainly “Palestinian” but not necessarily in a purely nationalist sense. These two interns, one of whom had grown up in Europe but was living in Ramallah and another of whom was from Jerusalem, had been involved with one of the many surveys and studies of Lifta before and since the struggle to save it. As such, they had been to the village several times and spent a great deal of time studying, measuring, and documenting the site. They expressed to me the importance of Lifta in terms of its invaluable architectural heritage, but their professional work with Lifta also registered at personal levels.

To illustrate, when I asked them about their early impressions of the ruined village while doing their work there, the architect who had grown up in Europe replied:

It was a shock for me... [M]y grandparents always talked about their houses in Haifa — because I’m from Haifa — so at some point, I saw my grandpa and grandma living there. . . . [T]hey aren’t from Lifta, but I saw their living there from the houses. . . . I felt the history from Palestine. My grandpa and grandma always talk about it — I saw it there in Lifta. . . . [I]t’s a little bit weird, but the smells — I smell history there. I smell how people lived there, and how they walked . . . . I felt that, and for that, I never felt when my grandpa and grandma talk about it, it was like, “I don’t know what they are talking about,” but when I was in Lifta, I felt that.

Through her embodied experience in Lifta—carefully documenting every stone and structure and sensing the village through sight, sound, touch, and smell—the family archive of stories she had
been accumulating all of her life about Haifa took new meaning among the Lifta village ruins. Lifta, then, offered her a sense of belonging to Palestine and to Palestinian culture and heritage, despite not having any direct ancestral ties to this village. This belonging was produced, instead, through material practices and the emotional connections that developed to this place.

Her colleague, despite growing up in Jerusalem, had only looked at Lifta from the car window until surveying the site. While she did not connect the village to a personal or familial experience of displacement in our interview, through working there, she too came to understand Lifta as a space of everyday life, a site of lived experiences that had been destroyed in 1948:

It’s everything that Palestine represents . . . . [W]hen I used to go to Jaffa, I used to pass that road, and they would say, “This is Lifta, in the valley.” I used to look, “Ok, Lifta”, but when I went there, for me it was a shock to see how beautiful the landscape is, how beautiful the buildings are. And it was such a sad—happy-sad—experience for me to get to know the houses there, to have such a relationship with the buildings. It’s intimate because when you think . . . . people used to live there, people used to climb the stairs, to go down to the ‘ein [spring]—and try to fantasize how they looked like, how is everything. And for some time, I wanted to be in this experience, to live the past. But Lifta, as I said, does not just represent the past; it represents the future and the present.

For both young architects, then, it was the material experience with the homes and other buildings in Lifta that gave meanings to the site as one that is important for Palestinian history and heritage, a meaning that may intersect with, but cannot be reduced to, national narratives about lost territory.

Finally, while Lifta may have brought to life memories or histories they had heard about the past in ways that “shocked” them—or made them “happy-sad”—they very openly expressed fears about the future. Said one:
My fear is that the hard work that we did in Lifta is going to be just documentation, and one day Lifta will be just gone. And no one will ever remember Lifta. That’s my fear. What I would like . . . I would love to see . . . people living there—Palestinian people going back and living there. I know it’s such a fantasy or romantic dream or whatever, but I would love that. Or at least Lifta to be exactly what it is right now, not to become a settlement. Just stay the way it is.

Her colleague jumped in immediately, “I’m very afraid. . . . If it’s a settlement, I will cry. I am sure I will cry.” Even regarding major damage to a wall of one of the large villas caused by snow the previous winter, one them said, “It’s really heartbreaking to see such [a] building. . . . It’s amazing how bad it feels when you see it just going down like this.”

Yacoub Odeh, who was driven out of Lifta at the age of eight, speaks somewhat more optimistically about the future, if only in the long term, and while he is also incredibly active in the present—through the Coalition and elsewhere—to save his village, he is probably the most interviewed person on earth about Lifta’s past. Living in East Jerusalem, he regularly visits the village, one of many Liftawis to do so; indeed, any time that I visited Lifta during my fieldwork, a group or two of Palestinians with ties to the village were also walking the grounds, usually with younger generations. Sometimes they even go by bus in the hundreds. Although Yacoub is no stranger to nationalist politics and national liberation struggles—he was imprisoned by Israel for seventeen years as a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—the materiality of the spaces of Lifta and the memories of everyday lived experiences there were central to the meanings of and connections to Lifta he described in our interview.

Just as he had done during the tour in Lifta he led the previous year, Yacoub told me stories from childhood in the village, all centering around seemingly mundane moments of everyday life—memories of watching animals, of going to school, of buying sweets in the shop next to the mosque on Fridays, of gardens and orchards in the village, of the African Palestinian
from the Old City selling *ka’ak*,\(^{15}\) of the smell of falafel and the sight of his mother making taboon bread. Yacoub also told me about the structure of his multi-generational family home, about who lived or what was kept on each floor, and more generally about the connections between Liftawis and their homes:

Lifta depended on agriculture, and also work . . . in cutting stones—cutting stones from their land for building, to sell it and to use it in building their houses. So they are proud that they cut their houses from the stone of their land, cut by their hands, prepared by their hands and built also by their hands. So there is a moral relation between the man, or the family, and their house. The house is a part of their efforts. So they are close: they love their houses. Also, you know, the house is not only the shelter: it is a shelter [and] under this shelter there is a life. . . . [A]lways I feel eager to go home to the house where I [was] born, in spite [of] some of it fall[ing] down. I am so eager to go, I want to go, as if I have things there. Why? Because I [was] born there—I grew up, [spent] my early childhood. My father [was] born there also. My father married there. My four brothers and sisters [were] born also in that house. [Every] good thing and bad thing for my family was in that house. So I feel that it is a part of me. I feel that it is alive in my mind and in my heart, as I lived there. The Jewish Zionist army kicked me out, but still I carry it inside me.

Wherever he goes in the world, Yacoub says, he introduces himself as being “from Lifta, living in Jerusalem.” The people of Lifta have a number of societies and associations in Palestine, Jordan, and the United States to maintain community ties and to celebrate and mourn together. When he takes younger generations of Liftawis to the village, he teaches them about its history and about daily life before its depopulation to make sure they do not grow apart from it.

Yacoub also works with a number of human rights and other organizations in Jerusalem, in particular those advancing housing rights and fighting against house demolitions, and he sees connections between what happened in 1948 and what is happening to Palestinians since 1967. Yacoub told me that he believes all people have a right to housing that should be guaranteed by
governments and that decent housing is central to living with freedom and dignity on one’s own land. He is adamant about his right to return to Lifta, like so many Liftawis and like so many other Palestinian refugees and their descendants displaced by Israel settlement and occupation:

I think we have the right not only to dream, to struggle, to go back home, and—we believe as the sun sets down and the sun rises up again—we have the right to continue our family, our life there—if not for us, the coming generations will achieve it. . . . You can be strong with the gun for one day, two years, but not forever. . . . I think the time will come to have our right.

Yacoub therefore sees a future for Lifta that is Palestinian, even if the current struggle to keep it from “development” could make that future seem so distant, and even if his village is regarded as “now and forever” Israel in the confines of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Indeed, even under an outcome most favorable to Palestinians, the official peace process cannot deliver Yacoub’s geographies of home: “The time will come to go back home. I feel all of Lifta is my home, all of Palestine is my home, but the house I [was] born in and lived in is special, a part of me.” Surely it is the memories of and affections for this home—so central to his very identity—that keeps Yacoub struggling for its future.

PALESTINIAN LAND STRUGGLES IN ISRAEL

The ongoing struggle to save Lifta from demolition and development, and to claim for it a Palestinian future, should be understood in a broader context of current struggles against displacement in Israel and of activism that has emerged in recent years over the fate of Palestinian villages dispossessed in 1948. Taken together, the cases of Lifta, the Prawer Plan, and village return movements disrupt the dominant discourse of the peace process—promoted both by the Israeli government and the Palestinian leadership—that no territory inside pre-1967
Israel is subject to Palestinian claims in that it is “now and forever” Israel, to quote Abbas. Rather, they reveal an ongoing politicization from below, at grassroots and community levels, of Palestinian spaces in Israel that shifts focus from 1967 to 1948, links historical dispossession with the present and future, and demonstrates the limits for Palestinians seeking recognition through the Israeli state.

*Preventing Displacement: The Prawer Plan*

Indigenous Bedouin communities, traditionally nomadic, have faced relocation, concentration, and land expropriation schemes at the hands of the Israeli state since its inception, particularly in the Negev Desert region in the south of Israel/Palestine. Prior to 1948, approximately 80,000 Bedouin lived in the Negev region, and all but 13,000 were displaced amidst the war (Pappé 2011, 64). Since the early years of the state, the Israeli government had sought to confine Bedouin tribes to townships planned and constructed by the state, and in turn, expropriate vast amounts of their lands for Jewish Israeli development and other purposes (Amara 2013, 35).

The Bedouin citizens of the northern area of the Negev, today numbering around 200,000, have resisted relocation and expropriation plans from the start, and only half of them currently live in the state’s seven townships, which offer poor living conditions and are overcrowded. The other half of the Bedouin population in the Negev lives in more than forty “unrecognized” villages—“unrecognized” because they have been made illegal by the state through zoning. Amara (2013) explains: “When preparing state zoning plans in the Negev, Israeli planning authorities excluded Bedouin villages from these plans and zoned their lands as
military, industrial, or green areas rather than residential. This characterization enabled the Israeli government to treat the villages as having been ‘illegally’ built over ‘state land’” (35).

Accordingly, many Palestinian Bedouin citizens of Israeli living in these villages, which do not receive any basic utilities or services, have been subject to home demolitions and crop destruction by the state (Amara 2013, 35). Because the Israeli government effectively takes “nomadic” to mean that any Bedouin relationships with their lands are trivial, the state has sought to resolve Bedouin land claims through minimal monetary compensation as quickly as possible, while also challenging Bedouin claims in court and threatening—and indeed carrying out—home demolitions (37–39). The “unrecognized” village of al-Araqib, for instance, has received considerable media attention, given that it has been demolished by the state 100 times between July 2010 and July 2016, and the government has taken the villagers to court seeking more than $460,000 to cover the first several demolitions (Wilson 2016b). Following a nearly forty year period of trying to “resolve” state and Bedouin claims, by 2008, around 88% of claims were still unresolved, leading the Israeli state to commission plans and proposals to “develop” the Negev region while also finalizing Palestinian Bedouin land expropriations (38–40).

The most recent plan to relocate Bedouins was called the Prawer Plan, which would have recognized less than half of the Bedouin land claims and relocated at least 30,000 people to government-designated population centers in the northern Negev (Nsasra 2011). The actual geography of the plan was kept secret by the Israeli government until a left-wing Member of Knesset, Dov Khenin, published a map online which showed exactly which lands would be confiscated (Omer-Man 2013). The plan was initially approved by the Israeli government in October 2011, and following a series of recommendations and amendments over the following year, the final version of the Prawer Bill was approved by the Cabinet in May 2013 and sent to
the Knesset, where it passed its first of three required readings by a slim margin (Amara 2013, 39–42). Soon afterward, Palestinians throughout Israel and in the Occupied Territories began to organize and demonstrate against the Prawer Plan.

While I was doing fieldwork, major demonstrations were planned for 30 November 2013, building on previous actions earlier that summer against the “Nakba in the Negev” (Zonszein 2013). The focal point of this “Day of Rage” was the Bedouin village of Hura in the Negev, to which more than 1,000 demonstrators traveled from other parts of the country to stand with the Bedouins protesting there (Activestills 2013). At the same time, Palestinian and Israeli activists organized smaller demonstrations around the slogan “Prawer Will Not Pass” in several cities throughout Israel-Palestine—and some were even held abroad—in solidarity with the Bedouin struggle. In Hura, clashes broke out between demonstrators and police, with some young protestors throwing stones, and security forces responded with tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets (Ma’an 2013a)—much like they do regularly in East Jerusalem, where I observed a smaller demonstration, and in the rest of the West Bank.

Two weeks later, the Israeli government announced it was suspending the plan (Aderet & Lis 2013), and while it has not been formally revived since then, demolitions and court cases continue for the Bedouin, and the government has approved construction of new Jewish settlements in the Negev that will displace Bedouin villages (Roth 2015). Still, the movement against the Prawer Plan “mobilized youth to take to the streets, including many who were not politicized,” and it “managed for the first time in a while to unite efforts across the fragmented sections of Palestinian society for one cause, as Palestinians in the 1948 territories, the West Bank and Gaza Strip all organized protests” (Alsaafin & Hassan 2013). Waving Palestinian
flags from Haifa to Hura to Hebron, activists had connected the experiences of 1948 with the Prawer Plan and with other forms of ongoing dispossession and displacement.

\textit{Planning a (Palestinian) Future: al-Lajjun}

Many of the Palestinian citizens of Israel engaged in struggle against the Prawer Plan would have carried with them a history of displacement and dispossession in their own families and communities. Just as Palestinian citizens of Israel (and others) are challenging contemporary displacement, however, they are also challenging historical displacements through new forms of activism that look to the future and are rooted in spatial politics. Particularly active during my fieldwork period were internally displaced Palestinians from the villages of al-Lajjun and Iqrit.

The Muslim village of al-Lajjun was located in the Jenin district of Palestine, at the edge of the biblical site of Armageddon, and had a history dating back to the Roman Empire (Khalidi 2006, 334). After a population increase during the years of the British Mandate, al-Lajjun had more than 1100 residents by the time of the 1948 War (334–35). The village was attacked by units of the Palmach, a pre-state Zionist militia, in the overnight hours of 15–16 April 1948 (Morris 2004, 242), by which time women and children are reported to have been evacuated from the village (Khalidi 2006, 336). Zionist forces destroyed much of al-Lajjun and several neighboring villages during this campaign, and many villages in the area were forcefully evacuated (Morris 2004, 242, 346). The Golani Brigade, part of the Haganah, fully captured al-Lajjun around 30 May 1948 (Morris 2004, xvi, 346; Khalidi 2006, 335–36).

Many of the village’s residents were displaced to the nearby Arab city of Umm al Fahm. Today, only the mosque and a few homes and other structures of al-Lajjun remain in varying
stages of ruin (Khalidi 2006, 336–37). Following the 1948 that resulted in the declaration of the
state of Israel, an Israeli kibbutz—Kibbutz Yosef Kaplan, which later became Kibbutz
Megiddo—was established in January 1949 near the core of the village and on its lands, and a
few structures that remain are used by residents of that kibbutz (Morris 2004, xix; Khalidi 2006,
336). Other stones from demolished structures were cleared from their original site by
bulldozers to transform village lands for agricultural use (Khalidi 2006, 335). At the northeast of
al-Lajjun’s village lands is the archaeological site of Tell al-Mutesellim, or Tel Megiddo, which
is the ancient Greek city of Armageddon. These ruins are now a UNESCO World Heritage Site
and an Israeli national Park, Megiddo National Park.

Over the past several years, young Palestinian activists inside Israel have worked with
displaced residents of al-Lajjun on preserving their memories of the village and on making
detailed plans for rebuilding and returning. This has been part of a larger project that began in
2012 called “Our Return” (‘Udna in Arabic), co-sponsored by the Arab Association for Human
Rights, the Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced, Baladna
Association for Arab Youth, and Zochrot (see Nashef 2013). During my fieldwork, in
September 2013, I attended a conference in Tel Aviv sponsored by Zochrot called “From Truth
to Redress: Realizing the Return of Palestinian Refugees,” the purpose of which was “not to
argue whether the Palestinian refugees have a right to return, but to see how this right can be
realized” (Zochrot 2013). The conference—despite a public campaign led by the far-right
Zionist organization Im Tirzu¹⁶ to have it shut down (see Sheizaf 2013a)—was held at an Israeli
museum established on the lands of a village dispossessed in 1948.

At the conference, Shadi Darwish, a representative from al-Lajjun Group for the Vision
of Return, which is associated with the “Our Return” project, presented on the internally
displaced Palestinians from the village and on their group’s recent return projects. The Lajjun group consists of thirteen members who are third generation refugees from the village, internally displaced in Israel; they collectively reject any Israeli use of al-Lajjun village lands and maintain their right to return to them (Darwish 2013). After speaking with displaced persons from the village and with a variety of experts and practitioners about village histories and customs, the physical geography of its site, and relevant legal and planning issues, the group drafted a plan for rebuilding al-Lajjun for its 16,000 refugees and their descendants, with the aim of presenting it to the broader community for their input. They also used this process for compiling a village archive, given that Palestinian archives were largely destroyed or confiscated by Israel in 1948, and they met with other groups involved in “Our Return” in order to connect their villages’ stories and struggles.

The Lajjun return group worked with a young Palestinian architect from the area to illustrate their planned return in the form of a 3-D model, which was shown at the conference in the form of a video production. The 3½-minute clip begins with a series of black and white images of Palestinian refugees fleeing during the 1948 war, until the music playing in the background suddenly rises in mood and intensity, at which point we see a color photo from a 2011 Nakba Day demonstration, when refugees from Lebanon and Syria marched to the border to try and cross into Israel-Palestine (see AJE 2011). Then a fly-through of the 3-D model of al-Lajjun comes into focus, starting from a spring at the edge of the village, over which sits the Return Club for the Youth of al-Lajjun. From the spring area, we are taken through a row of trees into the heart of the village, where we are greeted by a “Welcome to Lajjun” sign in Arabic, English, and Hebrew. The camera then flies us through a large open square at pedestrian level, where we see a variety of people—men, women, young, old, families, individuals—strolling,
exploring, and visiting with one another. Next, the camera conducts a close-up panning of the buildings that surround the open square, where we see among homes and other buildings, the Lajjun Museum, the Lajjun Society for the Preservation of Nature, and the Lajjun Arts Foundation. Finally, the camera pulls away from the square and just as we notice on the right-hand sign a statue of a skeleton key—a symbol of Palestinian return—the camera begins to ascend from ground level and sweep to the right, revealing a Palestinian flag waving over the city, the final image before fading to the credits.

The architect who worked on this project explained in a later session at the conference that, in designing the returned village, he and the other youth activists wanted to plan a Lajjun where they themselves would actually want to live in the future, in terms of modern services and amenities, for example. He also emphasized the need that the group identified to rebuild the village’s destroyed bus station in order to re-establish al-Lajjun’s linkages with surrounding villages and major cities. At the same time, they wanted to ensure that the built and natural landscapes of the village would be familiar to the original refugees returning home and faithful to their memories, allowing the new heart of the village to serve as a memorial to the original village destroyed by Israel (Habib-Allah 2013).

Planning a (Palestinian) Future: Iqrit

While the youth of al-Lajjun have made plans to rebuild and return in large numbers, Palestinian youth from the dispossessed village of Iqrit have begun to physically return in much smaller numbers. Iqrit, whose history spans several thousand years, was a Christian village located atop a hill not far from the Lebanese border (Khalidi 2006, 15). On the lands surrounding the hill,
villagers from Iqrit planted grains, orchards, olive groves, and other foods, while other parts of the village lands were populated by pine and oak trees (15–16). By the time of the 1948 war, the population of Iqrit was around 600 (Morris 2004, 506). Iqrit was captured by Zionist forces, without resistance from the villagers, relatively late in the 1948 war, on 30 October, around which time more than two dozen other Palestinian villages in the region also fell (Morris 2004, 474; Pappé 2006, 181, 186).

While the village was not immediately depopulated or destroyed, on 7 November, the Israeli army ordered the residents of Iqrit to evacuate “temporarily” due to ongoing military activities in the area, transporting them to nearby Rama and putting them up in homes recently emptied of their Muslim inhabitants (Morris 2004, 506). They were assured by the army they would be able to return to Iqrit after about two weeks but were prevented from doing so. Toward the end of December 1948, the few people who had managed to stay in the village—predominately children and elderly residents—were removed from Iqrit following “a house-to-house sweep” (507). None of the villagers were ever permitted to return, despite repeated requests to the army, which in 1949 invoked British Mandate era emergency laws to justify preventing return to Iqrit (Pappé 2006, 186). Historians later identified the expulsion of Iqrit, on the one hand, as part of a military plan to depopulate the Lebanese border region of indigenous Arabs (Morris 2004, 505–506, 509), and on the other hand, as part of a settlement policy aimed at increasing the Galilee’s Jewish population vis-à-vis its much higher Palestinian Arab population (Pappé 2006, 185, 187).

Because the Israeli army continued to prevent Iqrit’s refugees from returning to their village following the war—even with support from prominent Israeli officials like President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi and Minister of Minority Affairs Bechor-Shalom Sheetrit—the internally
displaced refugees of Iqrit turned to the courts (Morris 2004, 508–509). In May 1951, they asked the Israeli Supreme Court to invalidate their expulsion and to force the army to stop preventing their return (Pappé 2006, 186). The Court issued a ruling in Iqrit’s favor on 31 July of that year, but the army tried to subvert this decision by producing and distributing a “fabricated” expulsion order that it retroactively dated back to November 1948 (186). As Pappé explains, “a formal order of expulsion [issued] during the 1948 war . . . would have turned Iqrit into just another depopulated village, like the other 530 Palestinian villages whose expulsion the Israeli courts had condoned retrospectively” (186).

In the midst of this legal battle, “[o]n 24 December 1951—Christmas Eve—the IDF razed what remained of Iqrit with explosives” in order to prevent the return of the internally displaced refugees (Morris 2004, 509). The army claimed that the village was destroyed in the course of military exercises (Pappé 2006, 187). Since 1948, several Israeli towns have been built on the outskirts of Iqrit village lands: Shomera in 1949, Goren in 1950, Even Menachem in 1960, and Gornot ha-Galil in 1980 (Khalidi 2006, 17). Today the only remaining Palestinian structure in Iqrit is the Greek Catholic Church, which sits at the top of the hill. Fig trees, pomegranate trees, and other plants have grown over much of the village ruins, which are visible in the form of stone rubble. The village cemetery was also spared from destruction.

Since the time of their expulsion in late 1948, the internally displaced Palestinians from Iqrit have held public demonstrations for their right to return, in addition to seeking relief through legal and political channels (Ryan 1973; Ashkar 2013). As recently as 1995, there was support within the Israeli government to at least allow the refugees to farm the village lands, but a plan approved by the cabinet was never implemented after the murder of Yitzhak Rabin and the subsequent change in government (Shpigel 2015). There have also been disagreements with
Israel over the issue of ownership, as the state wants to maintain title to the expropriate village lands and merely lease them to the village (Jiryis 2012). They have even submitted a proposed master plan to the Israeli government (see Cook 2013), but no action has been taken (Shpigel 2015), and they continue to fight in the Israeli courts.

Because most of the Iqrit refugees live in the Galilee region and relatively close to the village and because they have not surrendered their right to return there, they have continued to visit their lands and use the village site in various ways. For instance, they have continued to conduct monthly services in the village church and celebrate major Christian holidays like Christmas and Easter, and they have continued to bury their dead in the village cemetery, although there was a period during which even cemetery use was not allowed (see Jiryis 2012). They have also held annual summer camps for Iqrit youth since the 1990s, which include cultural and recreational programming but also workshops and discussions about Iqrit’s history, culture, and future (Ashkar 2013; Strickland 2013). 19

Following a protest in Haifa at the end of the 2011 summer camp, a group of the Iqrit youth decided they were no longer content with short visits to the village for summer camps, funerals, church services, or other gatherings (Ashkar 2013). Instead, they decided they wanted to live there permanently—to return to Iqrit. Having made their plans and preparations, then, at the end of the next summer camp in August 2012, a group of fifteen to twenty Iqrit youth stayed in the village, basing their encampment in and around the village church. They have maintained a small but continuous presence in the village, with people coming and going, until today.

Their presence in Iqrit, however, has not been without periodic harassment from Israeli agencies and officials. At the start of the return encampment, for instance, the Iqrit youth planted trees, which were uprooted several days later by representatives of the Israel Land
Administration (ILA), who also posted notices asserting the agency’s ownership of these expropriated and “nationalized” lands (Ashkar 2013). The activists have also been prevented from any new constructions on the site, as Israeli officials quickly destroyed both a chicken coup and garbage and recycling apparatus the youth had built. Later, in June 2014, Israeli police and the ILA raided the encampment, seizing furniture and other items, uprooting plants, and detaining three of the youth, who were later put under brief house arrest (Deger 2014). Despite these encounters with the state, however, the Iqrit church was at least granted access to the national power grid in December 2015 following a court order (Shpigel 2015).

Although Israel still maintains its claims to title over the village and does not recognize the youth’s “return” as such, the Iqrit youth activists have declared since the start of their encampment that they have indeed returned to their village, having taken the deliberate decision to exercise their “natural right to live on [their] ancestors’ land”.20 They understood their return as the next stage of the same struggle started and sustained by their parents and grandparents. At the Zochrot return conference, a representative from this group, Amir Ashkar, spoke about their return to Iqrit. Ashkar (2013) emphasized, as many others in the group have done in media interviews, that the only way they had ever known anyone to actually return to Iqrit is through their burial in the village cemetery. They insist, instead, that Iqrit is meant to be a place for life and for living; as such, they have set up a soccer field and held cultural festivals and activities. The Iqrit returnees have also connected with—and indeed inspired—groups from other displaced Palestinian communities, and they have welcomed strangers to teach them about the church and the village. When younger children from Iqrit visit the village site, the returnees now make a point to explain to them that they are visiting a “revived” village, not merely a “dead” ruin. They
even teach them about the unique weather atop the village’s hill, Ashkar explained—just in case they are thinking about moving there one day.

THE POLITICS OF HOME AND MEMORY

The cases of Lifta, the Prawer Plan, and the village return movements in al-Lajjun and Iqrit demonstrate the politicization of Palestinian homes in Israel through struggles than began in 1948 but continue to this day. Indeed, Palestinians frequently speak today of the historical continuity of dispossession by Israel throughout historic Palestine, whether in the pre-1967 territories or in the West Bank and Gaza, through the refrain “the nakba is ongoing.” The cases in this chapter reveal, at the same time, that dispossession has certainly been met with resistance by indigenous Palestinians, who are increasingly identifying with one another in a nationalist sense but who are also increasingly struggling together—and in solidarity with one another—as a result of shared experiences brought by a single settler-colonial project.

From Jerusalem to the Negev to the Galilee, Palestinians in Israel are contesting and resisting dispossession and erasure, even more than 65 years after the initial mass depopulation of 1948 took place. This is the case when Palestinians assert a right to save Lifta, when the people of al-Lajjun draft construction plans for rebuilding, when the youth of Iqrit decide they are no longer going to be refugees, and when the Bedouin of the Negev rebuild their village one hundred times in six years. While many of the movements I have described in this chapter are youth-led movements, they have also centered the memories, struggles, and desires of the “first generation”—the generation that experienced first-hand the events of 1948—in planning the futures of their village and its residents. As such, these struggles are multi-generational and can
be expected to continue in the foreseeable future, even as the original refugees from 1948 continue to pass away.

Additionally, while recent activism by Palestinians in Israel has centralized history, the politics of home employed by the movements are also highly attentive to space and place. For instance, given so many Liftawis now live in East Jerusalem, the village site has been central to so much of the struggle to save it. The Coalition has held meetings and press conferences on the ruined site; tours organized by both Palestinians and Israeli activists have brought people through the streets and structures; Collective MIP attended carefully to its physical environment and its remains in their work; and Liftawis from the village regularly visit and maintain their connections to the space. Resistance to the Prawer Plan, too, has attended to specific spaces, which was evident in the mobilization of protests in the Negev in 2013, when activists bussed into a small town from across the country to resist the plan where it was designed to be implemented. In al-Lajjun, activists have taken “return” beyond a right or a political slogan and created a physical plan for the site through a process that involved meeting at the village with older generations. In Iqrit, although people of the village have spent plenty of time since 1948 in courtrooms and holding demonstrations in cities like Jerusalem and Haifa, the youth returned to the church and village to practice their return in the very space for which they are struggling, insisting it is a place for life (not merely burial in death). In their spatial politics and practices, then, like marginalized communities elsewhere (see hooks 1999; Blunt 2005; Blunt & Dowling 2006), Palestinians in Israel are mobilizing home—even if a home has been destroyed for six decades— “as a site of dignity and resistance” (Young 1997, 157).

Arguably the stagnated peace process has actually facilitated the increasing identification with “Palestinianness” across the Green Line. While Israel originally saw the Oslo Accords as
an opportunity to de-link Palestinian citizens of Israel from those in the Occupied Territories following the increasing instances of cooperation and solidarity during the First Intifada, those linkages have been on the rise once again. Younger generations of Palestinians have grown up watching the explosion of the settlement enterprise in the Occupied Territories since the 1990s, have seen Palestinians killed on both sides of the Green Line after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and are now witnessing renewed Jewish-only settlement efforts in the Negev (and Galilee). It is no wonder, then, that younger generations of Palestinians in Israel might identify strongly with those in the West Bank and Gaza, and vice-versa (see BADIL 2012), given the continuity of dispossession over space and time and given shared experiences of state repression. Indeed, even while Palestinian citizens of Israel demand full and equal rights as citizens of the state, Palestinian flags waive at demonstrations in Jaffa, Haifa, Nazareth, and the Negev, just as they do in Ramallah, Bethlehem, or al-Khalil/Hebron.

The politicization of Palestinian homes and village lands in Israel disrupts one of the central assumptions of the peace process, namely that lands occupied by Israel prior to 1967—those lands on which the state was declared in 1948 and which are widely recognized internationally as Israel—are not subject to Palestinian claims. Thus, while PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be in agreement on this point when (/if) they approach the negotiation table, Palestinians at grassroots levels are undermining both the PLO’s priorities and strategies and the Israel government’s position that those lands are already settled and have no place in negotiations. Although unrepresented by either party in the peace process, Palestinian citizens of Israel are demanding more than either of them seem willing to offer anyway.
RETURN AND RECOGNITION

In the context of Israel-Palestine, debates over “recognition”—in its many definitions and nuances—are numerous and usually highly contentious. Palestinians demand the right of return to their homeland; Israel demands from the PLO that it recognizes Israel as a Jewish state; The Palestinian Authority asks the United Nations and its members to recognize the State of Palestine; and so on. By those who demand it, recognition is often regarded as something deeply meaningful—that earning it is a major victory, and that granting it is, at best, a generous gesture and, at worst, a weak concession.

Debates over “recognition”, and are more specifically its limits, arise in a wide range of contexts and struggles. Brown (1995), for instance, in her critique of identity politics, argues that earning recognition from the state does not necessarily lead to liberation, but to the contrary, may subject that identity to regulation, while also sustaining unjust structures of power. Recognition and its limits have also been debated within indigenous studies in work largely focused on the ways that liberal settler-states reconcile their (settler) sovereignty with indigenous claims to nationhood through a variety of political, economic, and legal concessions (Coulthard 2014, 3). Drawing on Fanon, Coulthard (2014, 15) critiques recognition politics, arguing that the recognition of indigenous peoples by the settler-state has, in effect, merely exchanged an “overtly coercive” means of colonial domination for liberal form of colonial domination. Accordingly, echoing Brown (1995), some of the oppressive power structures they were originally trying to resist have actually been replicated. Recognition, then, is no substitute for decolonization.
The “mutual recognition” between the PLO and Israel in the 1990s certainly resonates with Coulthard’s (2014) argument based in the Canadian context. Although Israel acceding to the PLO’s demand for recognition as “official representative of the Palestinian people”, in exchange for the PLO’s recognition of Israel, was hailed worldwide as a major breakthrough toward peace, Israel offered this recognition at a point of relative weakness for the PLO, empowering an organization losing influence to popular resistance in the Occupied Territories during the First Intifada (see Massad 2006, 96–100, 115). Indeed, Palestinians as a whole have benefited very little from this exchange of recognition, which Joseph Massad (2006), Ilan Pappé (2011), and others have argued was exactly the point. What recognition of the PLO did, however, was pave the way toward a legal and institutional framework for the Israeli occupation through the Oslo Accords.

Through the case studies in this chapter, on the other hand, we see internally displaced Palestinians and other activists not looking for recognition from the Israeli settler-state, but rather building futures that are beyond recognition, in many senses of the word. Having first been marginalized by both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships and written out of the peace process by design, Palestinians in Israel are refusing the possible futures available through its framings. Under these constraints of the peace process, their lands under the peace process are part of “Israel” and few, if any, refugees displaced in 1948 will be permitted to return home. In contrast, the movements and activists I have described in this chapter are building Palestinian futures for the villages and lands inside Israel in ways that are unrecognizable to both the PLO and Israel, neither of whom are fighting for their return.

At the same time, they are not seeking recognition of their rights to return to their lands by way of their citizenship in the State of Israel which has made clear that option is not available.
Iqrit demonstrates the limits of Israeli recognition more than any other case. Fighting their dispossession in the Israeli courts, the people of Iqrit won a ruling in their favor from the Israeli Supreme Court, the highest court in Israel, which ruled their expulsion was illegal and ordered that they be allowed to return home. In the Israeli justice system, there is no higher recognition the people of Iqrit could have achieved, yet they were still prevented from returning home. As such, when the youth returnees decided they no longer wanted to be refugees, they returned to their village without the state’s recognition of their rights to the land. In the past, Israeli officials and their advisors have said that even if there was an agreed arrangement for Iqrit’s people to go back, the state will not recognize their permanent property rights out of fear other refugees would see this as precedent. Similarly for al-Lajjun, the people are drawing material plans to return to their demolished village, without permission from the state or recognition of their rights.

Throughout this chapter, I have emphasized both past and future in discussion of present struggles. I have done so, in part, to underscore that Palestinians indeed are building Palestinian futures, which is a significant way that indigenous peoples in other settler-colonial contexts have resisted erasure. Unsatisfied being “Israeli Arabs” with second-class citizenship, Palestinians in Israel, young activists in particular, have asserted an identity that connects them to others who are living in or have been expelled from their homeland. As the same time, for the Palestinian activists and communities I have discussed in this chapter, both past and future are contested, and neither can be de-linked from the other. The return movements have centered the collective experiences of the past—including the original refugees themselves—in their present struggles and in their future plans, demonstrating that in the spatial politics and practices, memory and return are necessarily connected.
Massad (2013) has argued that decolonization of Palestine will begin with the return of the Palestinian refugees, and research confirms the desires of many to indeed return to their villages and lands (e.g., Brand 1995; Holt 2011). In this sense, the movements in Iqrit, Lifta, al-Lajjun, and elsewhere seem to be escaping the potential traps of recognition and taking their “unrecognizable” rights. As Yacoub from Lifta made clear in our interview, any “peace process” that does not deliver return will resolve very little: “We are human beings. We have the right to live free, to build our state, to return home. Without returning back home, no solution. Because the Palestine case is the refugees. Whoever believes they can house us in Jordan or Lebanon is a joke. We will never forget our village, our cities, our towns, and we are struggling to go back.”

CONCLUSION

The case studies presented in this chapter, like others, reveal a clear disconnect between the discourses of the official Israeli-Palestinian peace process—its promises, its limitations, its possibilities—and the realities on the ground. This is true for the Palestinian refugees from the Jerusalem village of Lifta, whose dispossessed lands are “off the table” in the peace process because they are west and not east of the Green Line. Although the state of its ruins may be unique, the struggle for Lifta, when considered in the broader contexts of dispossession in Israel—both historical and contemporary—does not seem so unique at all. Rather, Palestinians throughout Israel are challenging dispossession and planning for return in ways that disrupt the discourses and assumptions of the peace process and are “unrecognizable” to Israel and even to the official Palestinian leadership.
At the beginning of this chapter is a poem by Samih al-Qasim, a well-known Palestinian Druze poet who was a citizen of Israel and who passed away soon after I finished my fieldwork. To me, this poem speaks to the very issues outlined in this chapter, which is why it resonated with me so strongly when I read it after his death. Amidst the ongoing waves of dispossession and destruction—the collapse of the city, the neighborhood, the street, the square—that have defined the Palestinian experience for at least 70 years, the clock—even with the collapse of the wall—has remained ticking. It is a ticking that suggests, on the one hand, a steady patience, predictable and reliable—tick… tick… tick… tick…—and on the other hand, a deafening sense of urgency and anxiety—TICK, TICK, TICK, TICK.

It is simultaneously the patience and the urgency that I sensed during fieldwork as I listened to both refugees and to younger activists talk about a multi-generational experience of dispossession and about hopes and plans for futures near and far. In the Negev, Palestinian Bedouin fight to keep their towns and neighborhoods from collapsing, and as they do, the clock remains ticking. The streets and squares of Al-Lajjun sit now in a pile of stones next to an Israeli farm, but the clock is still ticking. In Iqrit, the houses fell, but the church did not, so they hung the clock there, and it remains ticking. Lifta’s walls have not yet fallen, and the clock is still ticking. “The time will come to go back home,” Yacoub told me, so I know he is watching these clocks closely.
Map 4.1: Chapter Locations. This map of Israel-Palestine provides locations for the villages discussed in this chapter, including Iqrit, al-Lajjun, and Lifta villages, as well as the region affected by the proposed Prawer Plan. This map was produced by the author.
Image 4.1: Sign pointing to the Lifta spring, with the Arabic scratched out from the middle line—a common sight in Jerusalem. In Hebrew, Arabic, and English, the Arabic name “Lifta” is only a parenthetical, rather than primary, name of the site. *Photo by the author.*
Image 4.2: Lifta Village from Above. This photo was taken from the former Jaffa Road, near the site of the press conference following the court ruling, meaning that the backdrop to the event looked similar to this. In the background of the photo is the Israeli settlement of Ramot, which is just over the Green Line in the West Bank. *Photo by the author.*
Image 4.5: Lifta Spring, used today as a mikveh (Jewish ritual bath) by Jewish Israelis. *Photo by the author.*
Image 4.6: Main street running through Lifta, facing south toward agricultural terraces. Photo

by the author.
Image 4.7: Cacti growing outside a depopulated home in Lifta. This type of cactus (saber in Arabic) has become a symbol of the destroyed villages of 1948 because it is so frequently found around the ruins of villages, and because saber also means “patience” (see Davis 2011, 173).

*Photo by the author.*
1 In fact, Mahmoud Abbas’s presidency, which began in 2005, expired under the Palestinian Basic Law in 2009, but he has remained the *de facto* President of the Palestinian National Authority in the absence of a presidential election. Following the most recent nationwide elections in the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas won a plurality of seats in Parliament but was prevented by Israel, with support from the United States and other members of the Quartet, from forming a functioning government. A political struggle between Hamas and Abbas’s Fatah, including periods of violent clashes, continued over the year following the election and eventually led to the split in Palestinian leadership over the West Bank (Fatah) and Gaza (Hamas). Despite multiple announcements of reconciliation and unity agreements by faction leaders, this divide continues until today, with the Gaza Strip under a crippling siege implemented by Israel and supported by the Egyptian (military) government.

2 In United Nations General Assembly Resolution 67/19 (2012), the General Assembly voted to “accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations, without prejudice to the acquired rights, privileges and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations as the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and practice”. The resolution also encouraged the United Nations Security Council to approve Palestine’s recent application for full UN membership—an application which ultimately never received a vote—and endorsed a two-state solution based on pre-1967 borders.

3 Historians differ on the number of villages depopulated and destroyed from 1948 through the early 1950s, due to among other reasons, methodological decisions in counting and discrepancies among pre-1948 atlases, surveys, censuses, gazetteers, and other sources. Thus, Pappé (2006) and Abu Sitta count 531, while Khalidi (2006), following the Institute for Palestine studies (see xii–xx), counts 418. While there are yet other estimates—the lowest of which are still in the hundreds—the most commonly cited numbers in Palestinian narratives are 531 and 418.

4 A well-known exception to this rule is the Palestinian village of ‘Ayn Hawd, which was transformed into the Jewish Israeli village of Ein Hod after its depopulation (Slyomovics 1998). Some of the dispossessed villagers later built a new village of ‘Ayn Hawd not far from the original village from which they were expelled, though it was unrecognized for decades by Israel.

5 The searchable database is available at http://www.adalah.org/en/law/index. In addition to existing laws, the Adalah database also includes legislation that has been proposed in the Israeli Knesset.

6 The Haifa Declaration was one of four similar statements released around this same time by Palestinians in Israel (see Pappé 2011, 250–254).

7 The statement by the National Committee of the Internally Displaced is available (in English) in the Documents and Source Material section of the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, volume 29, issue 4, pages 156–58.

8 The “indifference” of some refugees is represented well in a passage from Gelvin (2007, 141–42): “[I]n the aftermath of Oslo, when a reporter from the *New York Times* asked an elderly camp dweller his opinions about the possibility of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, the old man shrugged, held up an old key, and replied with indifference, ‘My house is not within those borders.’”
There are a number of recent projects, productions, and works of art that have attempted, like Zochrot, to educate Israeli Jews (and others) about the events of 1948 and the depopulated villages. For instance, responding directly to the “memoricide” of depopulated villages is the documentary *The Village Under the Forest* by Mark J. Kaplan, released in 2013, which focuses on the ruins of Lubya village that lie under a forest planted after 1948 to conceal it. The trailer is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISmj31rJkGQ. Another documentary released the same year is *On the Side of the Road* by Lia Tarachansky, which focuses on nakba denial in Israeli society and features interviews with Israeli veterans of the 1948 war. The trailer for *On the Side of the Road* is available at https://vimeo.com/65278501.


The mosque and cemetery were later zoned off after objections were filed during a comment period (Golan et al. 2013, 72).

The “Temporary List” entry for Lifta, which includes a brief explanation of the site and reasons for its submission, is available on the UNESCO website: http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/6061/.

Any quotations in this paragraph come from the brochure that accompanied the exhibition, which I have on file.

Available at https://issuu.com/mahdisabbagh/docs/sabbagh_portfolio_issuu_26b43936fc64af (last accessed 11 July 2016).

Ka‘āk is a popular type of Middle Eastern bread, oval or circular in shape and covered with sesame seeds; it is typically sold by street vendors from carts or small stands.

Im Tirtzu, which means “if you will [it]” in Hebrew, is a far-right, nationalist, ultra-Zionist organization that frequently targets Israeli peace and human rights groups, as well as companies, organizations, and individuals, including Israeli academics, that they accuse of anti-Zionist biases. Among its activities, Im Tirtzu engages in media campaigns, files lawsuits in Israeli courts, organizes lectures, events, and protests, and publishes reports. Just a few weeks before the Zochrot conference, the Jerusalem District Court rejected a slander claim filed by Im Tirtzu against some Israeli activists who had created a Facebook page calling the organization “fascist”; the court said that “because there exist ‘certain lines of resemblance’ to fascism, calling them as such cannot be considered slanderous” (Sheizaf 2013b).

The Lajjun video has also been posted online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYKWz2ywPiw. For a related video from 2015 showing a 3-D model for return to the village of al-Ghabisiyya, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sm3b9HbrjQ.

The people of Iqrit even reached out to Pope Francis during his visit to Israel-Palestine in 2014, as they did during visits by his two predecessors (Ma’an 2014).
The Iqrit Community Association maintains a website containing information about the village’s history, people, legal issues, and more at http://www.iqrit.net.

The full statement from the Iqrit youth activists, posted 15 October 2012, is available on their Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/notes/iqrit-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%AB-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%AA/%D9%86%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B4-%D9%86%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B4-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%88-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D8%AD%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%B1/250969978358781
CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have focused on the realities that I observed during fieldwork on the ground in Jerusalem, and in Palestine-Israel more generally, that challenged the geopolitical discourses of the official Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Specifically, I found that these discourses, which are largely focused on the rise and fall of negotiations and their potential to resolve core issues like Jerusalem, occupy the attention of diplomats, politicians, and media outlets to the extent that they mask the realities life on the ground, including the altering of “facts on the ground” by Israeli governmental bodies and private organizations.

As such, the political geography of Israel-Palestine looks different from the spaces and experiences of everyday life for Palestinians than it does from traditional geopolitical lenses focused territorial conflicts between state actors. Indeed, “from below,” the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict” does not look at all like a conflict—which implies a relative degree of equality in political and military power, typically between states—but rather a stateless, indigenous people’s multi-faceted struggle for their basic rights to their homes, lands, and community well-being. Thus, while Israel’s strategy of consolidating territory and legitimizing territorial claims on both sides of the Green Line may follow traditional geopolitical logics, for Palestinians, those territorial claims run through their homes, villages, and neighborhoods. In this dissertation, I have focused on the ways that these consolidations and claims shape the spaces of everyday life for Palestinians, especially in Jerusalem, and in doing so, have demonstrated both the historical legacies and contemporary continuities of settler-colonialism in Israel-Palestine.
In Chapter One, I described Israel’s fragmentation of Palestinian Jerusalem, a fragmentation that is both physical and social and that in many ways can be compared to the fragmentation of the West Bank in both its means and its effects on Palestinian homes and communities. I argued, following feminist geopolitics, that this experience of fragmentation can be understood “from below”, through the spaces of everyday life, complicating the assumption of the official peace process that Jerusalem is or will be either a “united” or a “divided” city. As I demonstrate in this chapter, Israeli pressures at finer scales—whether limitations on home construction, shrinking boundaries of neighborhoods, or insufficient funding for social and municipal services—serve Israeli geopolitical interests at broader scales, particularly as they relate to demographic ratios in the city.

In order words, these limitations placed on homes and neighborhoods serve to limit the number of Palestinian bodies in Jerusalem by limiting the very spaces they can inhabit. Given that limitations on the construction of Palestinian homes and neighborhoods are enacted in tandem with the construction of Israeli settlements in eastern areas of the city, we see in Jerusalem that urban fragmentation and settler colonialism go hand-in-hand. Further, while the discourses, technologies, and institutions of modern planning are central to other dispossessive processes around the world, including gentrification, they are also harnessed specifically in the service of settler-colonialism, furthering Israel’s territorial claims in Jerusalem and beyond.

In Chapter Two, I turned to Israeli national parks as a case study in fragmentation. I looked at existing and proposed national parks in and around Palestinian neighborhoods, arguing that these parks be understood as Israeli settlements in their ways of claiming territory and in their effects on Palestinian homes and neighborhoods. In a challenge to the masculinist discourses of scientific objectivity that often serve to depoliticize natural conservation projects, I
argued that Israeli national parks are inherently geopolitical and serve to dispossess Palestinians both materially and discursively from their lands.

In claiming “natural” spaces as “national” spaces, the Israeli state seeks to redefine Palestinian lands in eastern parts of Jerusalem as holy lands linked to an exclusively Jewish history. The Palestinians on those lands, then, are seen as illegitimate occupiers of important national spaces and environmental threats to the pristineness and sustainability of those “natural” spaces, echoing discourses of national parks and nature in other settler-colonial contexts like the United States. Beyond the branding of Palestinian lands as Israeli national park lands, however, agents of the Israeli state and private settler organizations have also understood the presence of non-Palestinian bodies—and particularly Israeli and/or Jewish bodies—as tourists in these spaces as essential to their territorial claims. Limitations on Palestinian homes, and thus the bodies that inhabit them, are therefore coupled with the bussing-in of non-indigenous tourists in an effort to redefine these lands—or, to unmake and make these territories—as Israeli and not Palestinian, both materially and discursively.

In Chapter Three, I focused on resistance to the fragmentation that I observed in Jerusalem and beyond in the form of mapping projects that have challenged historical and ongoing erasure of Palestinians and that emphasize the political potential of the mapping process for connecting struggles across Palestinian neighborhoods and villages. I argued that Palestinian and Israeli activists are using these maps to make statements of visibility and to challenge Israeli mappings of Jerusalem and Israel-Palestine. The maps by these groups also challenge the confines of the official peace process by representing the city of Jerusalem from below, from the perspective of an occupied population, and by calling attention to spaces inside the “Green Line” that are supposedly off the table in negotiations. In both the Zochrot and Grassroots Jerusalem
mapping projects I presented, finer scales like the home, village, and neighborhood were at the center of challenging the Israeli state’s territorial projects at broader scales, just as these finer scales were at the center of the Israel’s consolidation of territory.

In the context of the Zochrot app, this map app project was meant to lead interested bodies—Israeli, Palestinians, tourists, or others—to the ruins of dispossessed Palestinian homes and villages, thus taking earlier mappings of these villages, as pinpoints on a national map, to another scale. The legitimacy and finality of their dispossession from Palestinians and subsequent consolidation into the Israeli settler state is therefore contested through embodied experiences in these dispossessed villages and education about their histories. At the same time, Grassroots Jerusalem’s mapping projects in Jerusalem contest the settler-colonial transformation of urban landscapes, including place names, through embodied cartographic practices. In mapping neighborhoods from below, they not only connect Palestinians across fragmented territories, but they also present—using their word—the “reality” of Palestinian Jerusalem overseen, ignored, or denied by the God’s eye of the Israeli state and, to some extent, the international community. Both Zochrot and Grassroots Jerusalem, then, see embodied practices and experiences as essential to resisting territorial projects of the Israeli state.

Finally, in Chapter Four, I looked at struggles in Israel over homes and villages that are threatened with displacement and/or that were depopulated in 1948 with the establishment of Israel. I began with the struggle to save Lifta in West Jerusalem, and positioned this struggle in the context of the Prawer Plan, and efforts to return to and rebuild two 1948 villages, Iqrit and al-Lajjun. I argued in this final chapter that material and emotional connections to homes and villages remain long after their dispossession and even their destruction, in part through an attention to place and through embodied practices, and that Palestinians in Israel are not only
contesting historical and ongoing forms of displacement, but they are planning futures for their homes and villages that are explicitly Palestinian, contrary to the framings of the peace process which position them as Israeli. Once again, then, Palestinian dispossession and subsequent Israeli territorial consolidation are both discursively contested and actively resisted at intimate scales of the body, home, and village/neighborhood. Embodied practices of home, memory, and planning for the future become central to not only challenging historical dispossession but to challenging ongoing forms of settlement that transform Palestinian homes and other everyday spaces into territory of the Israeli state. While the violent conquest of these lands is effectively rendered invisible to the Israeli public through their transformation into forests, recreation sites, and occasionally Israeli Jewish residential areas, the presence and activities of Palestinians in their village lands and ruins in many ways “unsettle” those transformations.

Throughout the dissertation, my analysis has been guided primarily by scholars of feminist geopolitics, who challenge traditional masculinist and militaristic approaches to territory and conflict “from above”—from the perspective of the “God’s eye”—and who consider, instead, the effects of geopolitical conflict “from below”. As such, it was the perspective of feminist geopolitics that encouraged me to seek to understand Palestinians geographies of home and dispossession that went beyond the discourses of the peace process, while also paying attention to the efforts of those discourses in the Palestinian spaces of everyday life, particularly the home, neighborhood, and village. From this perspective, I found that realities on the ground—some the effects of Israel exercising colonial power, others the effects of Palestinian resistance—complicate the recent assumptions and trajectories of the peace process.

Further, while many Israelis and Palestinians on the ground, along with diplomats, activists, and others worldwide, question whether the peace process is even “alive” or “dead,”
my research shows that this process excludes a great number of people on the Palestinian side, arguably intentionally on the part of both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships. Specifically, I found that the hopes, needs, and perspectives of Palestinians in Jerusalem and Palestinians in Israel are largely absent from the framings of the peace process. Not only does this exclusion threaten the exercise of their individual and collective rights, but it also undermines the possibilities for negotiations to actually reach an actionable and durable plan for peace for both Palestinians and Israelis. As such, whether the “peace process” is “alive” or “dead,” or whether it produces a lasting peace—or whether it turns into something entirely different—the exclusion of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and the Palestinian citizens of Israel ensures that they will continue their grassroots and community-based struggles for home long after the era of Oslo.
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