EFFECTS OF PARTISAN IDENTITY AND PARTISAN STEREOTYPES ON EVALUATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Serge Severenchuk: Effects of Partisan Identity and Partisan Stereotypes on Evaluations
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While previous research shows that party cues can affect evaluations outside the expressly political realm, we do not know the causal mechanism for this phenomenon. It could be that partisanship as a social identity affects evaluations, or it could be that partisan stereotypes are responsible for bias in evaluations. By drawing from literature on party identification, social identity, and trait ownership theory, this research examines this causal mechanism. Furthermore, while previous literature has examined how partisan identity and stereotypes bias evaluations, how both of these factors bias evaluations at the same time has not been previously examined. Studying partisan bias is important because these factors have the potential to affect the distribution of resources for ordinary, non-elected individuals on a mass-scale. To carry out this examination, I conducted a survey experiment on college students in the Southeastern United States. While the small sample size in this survey limits the ability to find statistically significant results, I do find some support for my theory. Namely, I find some evidence that partisan identity biases people's evaluations. I also find some suggestive evidence that stereotypes can, at times, off-set or reinforce the bias from partisan identity on evaluations.

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Introduction

Previous literature shows that party cues can affect evaluations of people and objects outside the expressly political realm (Carsey, Banda and Severenchuk n.d.). However, we do not know the causal mechanism behind this phenomena. It could be that partisanship as a social identity biases evaluations. Alternatively, party cues could serve as a heuristic for partisan stereotypes that could be affecting evaluations. While previous research examined the impact of partisan identity and partisan stereotypes on evaluations of people (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Jerit, Kuklinski and Quirk 2009; Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012; Phillips and Carsey 2013; Rahn 1993; Kinder 1986; Greene 2001; Newman 2003, 2004; Kelleher and Wolak 2006; McAvoy 2008), how evaluations are affected when exposed to bias from these two factors at the same time, has not been previously examined. Such an exploration is important, for politics in general deals with distribution of resources. If partisanship as a social identity and partisan stereotypes (or both at the same time) bias evaluations of people in a substantively meaningful way, then we have a psychological mechanism that affects the distribution of resources on a mass-scale.

Trait ownership theory asserts that regardless of their partisanship, people associate some positive traits with Democrats and others with Republicans (Hayes 2005). In other words, there are some positive stereotypes for Democrats and Republicans. When it comes to partisanship, in line with previous research on partisanship and social identity, we expect people to favorably bias their evaluations when their partisanship matches the partisanship of the person they are evaluating, and negatively when it does not match the person they are evaluating.

Bring together social identity theory and positive partisan stereotypes reveals that in

some cases the bias from these two forces might reinforce each other, and in other cases it might not. In this paper I develop a theory about how people's evaluations are biased by these two forces in different scenarios. To test this theory, I conduct a survey experiment on college students in the Southeastern United States. In this study I experimentally mimic situations that individuals encounter in everyday life. This allows me to compare the direction and magnitude of bias when evaluations are expected to be biased by partisan identity, partisan stereotypes, or both at the same time. While the small sample size in my survey limits my ability to get statistically significant results, most of my findings are consistent with my theoretical expectations. Namely, I find some evidence for the in-group favoritism hypothesis. I also find some evidence that, in some situations, people experience cross-pressures from their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes. Moreover, although there are some mixed findings, I also find some suggestive evidence that at times the bias from partisan stereotypes can either offset or reinforce the bias from partisan identity.

Effect of Partisanship on Evaluations

Partisanship affects the attitudes and behaviors of citizens in a variety of ways. For instance, partisanship influences political attitudes, policy, and candidate evaluations (Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Jerit, Kuklinski and Quirk 2009). It also remains one of the best predictors of vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002).

There are two major schools of thought regarding partisanship. The 'Michigan model,' which falls into a social-psychological perspective, and the 'tally model,' which mostly fits into a rational choice perspective. The two approaches have different conceptions of why and to what extent partisanship should bias evaluations in the political arena.

The Michigan model, first proposed by Campbell and his colleagues, views partisanship as a psychological attachment to one's own party. It stresses the affective nature of partisanship, and predicts that partisanship is pervasive in it's influence on, perceptions of, and reactions to the political world (Campbell et al. 1960). An alternative perspective, first proposed by

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Fiorina became known as the 'tally model.' This approach views partisanship as a sum of political assessments, and argues that citizens make prospective choices by considering retrospective evaluations (Achen 1992; Fiorina 1977; Zechman 1979)

While in the 'tally model' citizens make rational decisions, in the 'Michigan model' their decisions are heavily shaped by the psychological bond to their party (Fiorina 1977; Campbell et al. 1960). Hence, the Michigan school offers a perspective that predicts that partisanship will shape evaluations beyond rational assessments by the voters (Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2002a). This social-psychological approach was later revised by Green et al., who conceptualize of partisanship as a type of social identity. From this perspective individuals have a partisan social identity, which is expected to influence evaluations of candidates and the political world around them (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002).

Social identity theory predicts that when individuals categorize themselves as the in-group and others as the out-group, we should observe in-group favoritism in evaluations (Allport 1954; Brewer 1999; Struch and Schwartz 1989; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Transue 2007; De Cremer and Van Vugt 1999; Dovidio and Gaertner 2000). Empirical research shows that the categories of groups do not have to be meaningful for in-group favoritism to occur (Tajfel 1970). Categorizing oneself into the in-group and others into the out-group does not always lead to out-group bias (Struch and Schwartz 1989; Brewer 1999). However, under the conditions of the U.S. two-party system–competition, negative feelings towards opponents, and feelings of moral superiority over the other party, we should observe out-group bias (Brewer 2001; Doosje et al. 1998; Mackie and Smith 1998; Mummendey and Otten 2001).

Effect of Partisan Stereotypes on Evaluations

Stereotypes are commonly defined as people's knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a group (Hamilton and Trolier 1986). Just like with many other groups, people have conceptions of what partisans are like. That is, they have stereotypes of partisans (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Hayes 2005). For instance, in 1997 a survey presented respondents with

words and asked them to select the ones that describe Democrats and Republicans. For Democrats, 40 percent of respondents picked "middle class," and "minorities." For Republicans, 55 percent of respondents selected "big business," and 52 percent selected "rich people" (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). When the partisanship of a candidate is known, it can function as a heuristic for partisan stereotypes, which in turn can affect evaluations (Arceneaux 2008; Rahn 1993).

A number of studies show that perception of personality traits affects evaluations (Bartels 2002b; Rahn 1993; Kinder 1986; Greene 2001; Newman 2003, 2004; Kelleher and Wolak 2006; McAvoy 2008). Iyengar et al. (2012) found that the tendency of partisans to stereotype each other on traits has increased in recent decades. The authors found that from 1960 to 2010 the likelihood of Democrats and Republicans associating negative traits with the opposing party and positive traits with their own has increased by about 50% (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). Some of these personality traits have been shown to be associated with Democrats, while others with Republicans (Hayes 2005). In particular, by applying the logic of Petroick's (1996) issue ownership theory to traits, Hayes proposes a theory of trait ownership. The author shows that some traits are 'owned' by Republicans, while others by Democrats (Hayes 2005; Petrocik 1996).[1] What is particularly interesting about Hayes' work is that people (irrespective of their party identification) hold some positive stereotypes about both Republicans and Democrats. One of Hayes' strongest findings is that Republicans are perceived to be strong leaders, while Democrats are perceived to be empathetic and compassionate (Hayes 2005).

Effect of Partisan Identity and Partisan Stereotypes on Evaluations

Previous literature shows that partisan identity (Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Campbell et al. 1960; Jerit, Kuklinski and Quirk 2009; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002), and partisan stereotypes (Arceneaux 2008; Rahn 1993; Hayes 2005) can bias evaluations. How-

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[1]Not all traits are owned by one of the two parties.

ever, how evaluations are affected when exposed to both of these forces at the same time has not been previously examined. Moreover, while previous research shows that partisan cues can affect evaluations of non-political events and objects, we do not know the causal mechanism behind party cues biasing evaluations(Carsey, Banda and Severenchuk n.d.). It could be that partisanship as a social identity is biasing evaluations via in-group favoritism. Alternatively, partisan stereotypes could be affecting evaluations. By looking at conditions where we would expect the influence of one, or both of these forces at the same time, this research furthers our understanding the mechanism through which partisan cues can bias people's assessments.

Since this research is concerned with both the effects of partisanship as social identity and partisan stereotypes on evaluations, by necessity I have to look at evaluations of people (as opposed to evaluations of objects). This is simply because partisan stereotypes are about, and hence only apply to people. In order to evaluate the effects of partisanship as a social identity, I follow previous research in taking the examination outside the expressly political realm, for it helps to isolate different functions of partisanship (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012; Phillips and Carsey 2013; Carsey, Banda and Severenchuk n.d.). Consequently, this research examines how partisan identity and partisan stereotypes affect evaluations of people outside of the political realm.

The increasing partisan polarization in the U.S. in recent decades has led to an affective polarization between partisans (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). Klar and Krupnikov (2016) in their exploration of independents, find that this polarization has lead some people to avoid identifying as partisans or engaging in behavior that could betray their partisan attitudes. Instead an increasing number of Americans choose to identify as independents (Klar and Krupnikov 2016). As the authors argue, people's need to make a positive impression on others is driving them to abandon partisan identification or publicly partisan behavior (Klar and Krupnikov 2016). The authors' experiments show that exposing partisans to news clippings depicting partisan polarization increases likelihood that a person will identify as

an independent (Klar and Krupnikov 2016).[2] If partisans are aware of the increasingly negative feelings towards members of the opposing party, and that partisan labels can bias assessments of individuals, then Klar and Krupnikov's (2016) findings of individuals choosing to identify as independents can be interpreted as strategic behavior to avoid negative bias on their evaluations by members of the opposing party.

While individuals with partisan preferences might, at times, avoid revealing their partisanship, in cases when their partisanship is known, their evaluations can be biased via a party heuristic, either by partisan identity of the evaluator or partisan stereotypes. An important caveat to the previous statement is that a person's partisanship does not have to be correctly identified for them to be subject to partisan bias. Their partisanship can be mis-identified, but as long as the person doing the evaluation thinks that they 'know' the partisanship of the person they are evaluating, the evaluation should be biased by partisan identity of the evaluator, and has the potential to be subject to bias from partisan stereotypes.

For a person to be subject to bias from partisan stereotypes, three conditions must hold. First, their partisanship should be identified, second the stereotype needs to be relevant to the evaluation at hand, and third, stereotype needs to be owned by the party of the person being evaluated. For instance, imagine that there is a stereotype that Democrats are good at math. If we are evaluating potential tutors, for a Democrat to benefit from this positive stereotype we would first need to know their partisanship. If on the other hand we are evaluating chefs, the stereotype of Democrats being good at math should have no impact on our evaluations of chefs. Going back to an example of evaluating tutors, if in the course of the interview we find out that our candidate is Republican, this should not change our evaluations of the candidate. This is because finding out that they are Republican (unlike finding out that they are Democrat in this example) does not provide the evaluator with any extra information in regards to math ability of this candidate. We would not expect the

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[2]In these experiments those who switched from identifying as partisans to identifying as independents (after being exposed to news clippings highlighting partisan polarization) did not show a change in policy preferences or interest in politics.

Republican candidate to be punished, unless there is a negative stereotype of Republicans being bad at math. In which case, a candidate's partisanship would provide an evaluator with relevant negative information about the candidate's math ability.

From the findings of Hayes (2005) we know that people hold some positive stereotypes of both Democrats and Republicans. Hence, we should have situations where, regardless of one's partisanship, these stereotypes should be exerting a positive bias on evaluations. More-over, from the literature on partisanship and social identity, we know that one's partisanship should affect evaluations positively when a person's party identification matches that of the person they are evaluating, and in the negative direction when it does not (Allport 1954; Brewer 1999, 2001; Campbell et al. 1960; De Cremer and Van Vugt 1999; Dovidio and Gaert-ner 2000; Doosje et al. 1998; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Mackie and Smith 1998; Mummendey and Otten 2001; Struch and Schwartz 1989; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Transue 2007).

These propositions can be stated more formally as the following set of hypotheses:
H1: When partisanship of the evaluator matches the partisanship of the person they are evaluating, partisan identity should bias evaluations in the positive direction.
H2: When partisanship of the evaluator does not match the partisanship of the person they are evaluating, partisan identity should bias evaluations in the negative direction.
The first hypothesis is consistent with predictions of social identity theory, and is sometimes referred to as in-group favoritism hypotheses. The second hypothesis, as mentioned, is what we could observe under the conditions of the two party system in the U.S. It is sometimes referred to as out-group bias hypothesis.

When an individual knows the partisanship of the person they are evaluating they can find themselves in a variety of situations. There are times when the bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotype should reinforce each other. This should be the case when partisanship of the individual doing the evaluation and the person being evaluated match. For example, if a Republican respondent is evaluating a Republican individual and leadership

is a relevant trait to this evaluation, we would expect both the individual's partisan identity and partisan stereotype to reinforce each other and bias evaluations in a positive direction (in comparison to the baseline). Other times, bias from the partisan identity and partisan stereotypes should be at cross-pressures with each other. Specifically, this should be the case when the positive stereotype is owned by the party of the person being evaluated and partisanship of the that person and the individual doing evaluation do not match. In such an scenario we would expect partisan identity of the evaluator to bias evaluations in the negative direction, and partisan stereotype to bias evaluation in the positive direction. For example, if a Democratic respondent is evaluating a Republican individual in a scenario where leadership as a trait is relevant to the evaluation at hand, then partisan identity of the respondent should be biasing the evaluation in the negative direction, and the positive stereotype of Republicans being strong leaders should be affecting evaluations in a positive direction (Hayes 2005). Finally, if partisan stereotype is not relevant to the situation, or if the subject being evaluated is not of the same party that owns the positive stereotype, then the evaluation of this person should only be biased by partisan identity.

These propositions have a number of testable empirical implications. Namely, in terms of magnitude of bias we should observe the following:

H3a: When bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes reinforce each other, the magnitude of bias should be bigger than the magnitude of bias when evaluations are biased only by partisan identity.

H3b: When bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes reinforce each other, the magnitude of bias should be bigger than the magnitude of bias when evaluations are at cross-pressures with each other.

H4a: When subjects experience cross-pressures from their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes, the magnitude of bias in their evaluations should be smaller than the magnitude of bias when their evaluations are biased by partisan stereotypes and partisan identity in the same direction.

H4b: When subjects experience cross-pressures from their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes, the magnitude of bias in their evaluations should be smaller than the magnitude of bias when their evaluations are biased only by partisan identity.

In, summary in terms of magnitude of the bias, we should observe the following:
Bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes reinforce each other > bias from partisan identity > bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes at cross-pressures.
As hypotheses 3 and 4 imply, the bias from positive partisan stereotypes should always bias evaluation in the positive direction. This is because (under conditions when we would expect partisan stereotypes to bias evaluations) positive stereotypes provide the evaluator with relevant positive information about a subject that causes them to bias their evaluations in the positive direction.

Furthermore, if subjects experience significant cross-pressures in their evaluations, we would expect them to experience cognitive conflict. Hence, they should take longer to answer the evaluation questions than subjects that do not experience cross-pressures in their evaluations. Stated more formally:
H5: Subjects that are expected to experience significant cross-pressures should take, on average, longer to answer evaluation questions than subjects that are not expected to experience cross-pressures.

Bias on Evaluations for Independents

Previous literature shows that independent leaners, at least when it comes to partisan preferences, behave much in the same way as partisans do (Keith et al. 1992; Klar and Krupnikov 2016).[3] Hence, we can expect partisan identity and partisan stereotypes to bias evaluations in a similar manner for leaners and partisans. When it comes to 'pure independents', that is, independents that do not lean either towards Republicans or Democrats, the

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[3]Individuals who identify as independent, but admit to lean towards either a Democratic or Republican party.

story is a bit more nuanced.

If pure independents simply lack a partisan identity, then we would not expect them to react to partisan cues. The reasoning is straightforward. Partisans bias evaluations because they identify with their group (which is expected to cause in-group favoritism and out-group bias) (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). If pure independents do not identify with their group, then they would not be expected to engage in in-group favoritism or out-group bias. Which brings us to the next hypothesis.

H6: If pure independents lack a partisan identity, their evaluations should not be affected by partisan cues.

On the other hand, 'independent' could also constitute a meaningful political identity of its own. There is some suggestive evidence that this might be the case. For instance, Klar (2014), has found that for partisans, strength of ideological identification predicts political engagement. The same is not true for independents. Instead, political engagement of independents can be predicted by the importance of their identity as an independent to them. This finding led the author to assert that 'independent' is a meaningful political identity (Klar 2014). Furthermore, there is also evidence that suggests that independents dislike partisan polarization (Klar and Krupnikov 2016). Hence, if pure independents actually identify with their group (as opposed to simply lacking an identification with the two parties), we would expect them to translate their negative feelings about polarization and competition with Democrats and Republicans into negative bias against these out-groups. That is, we would expect pure independents to bias their evaluations negatively when they are exposed to either Republican or Democratic party cues. Stated more formally:

H7: If pure independents have a meaningful political identity, exposure to partisan cues should result in negative bias in their evaluations.

Regardless of whether pure independents have a meaningful political identity, we would expect their evaluations to be affected by the stereotype heuristic. That is, if pure independents are exposed situations where an individual being evaluated is from the same party

that owns the positive stereotype (assuming the stereotype is relevant to the situation), then they should bias their evaluations positively, in comparison to cases when they do not know the partisanship of the person they are evaluating. Going back to the earlier example, if pure independents are evaluating a Republican individual and leadership is relevant to the evaluation, then the observed bias should be indicative of the effects of partisan stereotypes on evaluations. Which brings us to the next hypothesis.

H8: When a positive partisan stereotype is relevant to the evaluation, pure independents should bias their evaluations in a positive direction.

Study Design

To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this study conducts a survey experiment on college students in the Southeastern United States. I am interested in examining how partisan identity and partisan stereotypes bias evaluations. As discussed above, in day-to-day life, individuals can find themselves in a variety of situations. At times their evaluations are subject only to bias from partisan identity, or partisan stereotypes (when a pure independent is doing the evaluation). At other times, their evaluations are biased by both forces, either in the same, or in the opposite directions.

To examine how partisan stereotypes and partisan identity bias evaluations, I place respondents in plausible experimental conditions that mimic each of these situations. While in the real-world a variety of partisan stereotypes exist, currently one of the strongest findings for partisan stereotypes that individuals share regardless of their partisanship is that Republicans are good leaders and Democrats are empathetic and compassionate (Hayes 2005). Consequently, examining these stereotypes serves as a natural starting point for exploration of how partisan stereotypes bias evaluations in general. In order to make these stereotypes relevant to the evaluation at hand, I had respondents evaluate a business manager and a nursing professional. These professions were chosen because leadership and empathy/compassion should be relevant traits to these professions, respectively.

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	1st	2nd	3nd	Mean Ranking	Ordered Rank
Business Manager					
Leadership	54.5	17.9	13.8	2.00 (0.13)	1
Empathy/ Compassion	1.6	4.9	7.3	5.92 (0.17)	7
Knowledge	4.1	17.1	21.1	4.31 (0.18)	4
Intelligence	11.4	21.1	13.8	3.80 (0.18)	3
Decency	0.8	4.9	4.9	5.99 (0.16)	8
Morality	4.9	3.3	12.2	5.30 (0.18)	6
Ability to Inspire	4.1	14.6	13.0	4.88 (0.19)	5
Competence	18.7	16.3	13.8	3.76 (0.19)	2
Nursing Professional					
Leadership	0.8	1.6	5.6	6.40 (0.15)	7
Empathy/ Compassion	27.2	22.4	16.0	2.98 (0.17)	2
Knowledge	30.4	24.8	19.2	2.80 (0.17)	1
Intelligence	12.8	20.8	22.4	3.46 (0.15)	3
Decency	1.6	3.2	12.0	5.55 (0.15)	6
Morality	7.2	5.6	10.4	4.66 (0.16)	5
Ability to Inspire	0.0	4.8	3.2	6.58 (0.15)	8
Competence	20.0	16.8	11.2	3.55 (0.18)	4

Note: After removing missing cases the sample size, n, for a nursing professional is 125 and the sample size for a business manager is 123. The first three columns report a percentage of respondents ranking a particular trait in either 1st, 2nd, or 3rd place. The forth column gives mean ranking with standard errors for these means in parentheses. The last column gives the overall rank-order of a trait.

Table 1: Ranking of Traits in the Order of Importance for a Business Manager and a Nursing Professional

To determine whether the assumption that leadership is relevant to evaluations of a business manager, and empathy/compassion are relevant to the evaluations of a nursing professional is reasonable, I presented respondents with eight traits and asked to rank them in the order of importance. Results for both a business manager and a nursing professional are presented in Table 7. The first three columns show a percentage of respondents placing the relevant trait in that place. The fourth column shows mean ranking, with standard errors for these means in parentheses (lower rankings indicate that the trait is more important). The last column rank orders traits, with the trait that was ranked by respondents as most important in the first place, and the trait that was ranked as least important in relative terms, in the 8th place.

When it comes to a business manager, 86.2 percent of respondents place leadership between first and third most important trait. The mean ranking for leadership is 2. This makes it, on average, the most important trait for the business manager (as indicated by the last column in the table). Therefore, we can assert that from the perspective of respondents, leadership is clearly a relevant trait to the evaluation of a business manager.

When it comes to a nursing professional, 65.6 percent of respondents ranked empathy/compassion somewhere between first and third most important trait. The mean ranking for this trait is 2.98. Considering that respondents rated these traits on a scale ranging from 1st and 8th place, this is still a relatively high ranking. Overall, empathy/compassion is ranked as the second most important trait (as shown in the last column of Table 7). Hence, we can conclude that from the perspective of the respondents, empathy/compassion are relevant to the evaluation of a nursing professional.

After answering some demographic questions about themselves respondents were assigned at random to either a control group, a Democratic cue, or Republican cue condition. Respondents assigned to the control group, were asked to evaluate a business manager and a nursing professional without being given a partisan cue. This serves as a baseline. Respondents assigned to either a Democratic or a Republican party cue, evaluated Democratic or

	Control Group	Democratic Cue	Republican Cue
Ind			S +
Dem		PID +	S +, PID −
Rep		PID −	S+, PID +

Table 2: Expected Sources of Bias in Evaluations of a Business Manager

	Control Group	Democratic Cue	Republican Cue
Ind		S +	
Dem		S +, PID +	PID −
Rep		S +, PID −	PID +

Table 3: Expected Sources of Bias in Evaluations of a Nursing Professional

Note: In Table 2 and 3 "PID" represents bias from partisan identity, "S" represents bias from a partisan stereotype. The symbol "+" indicates that bias is expected to be in the positive direction, and "-" indicates that bias is expected to be in the negative direction.

Republican professionals for both prompts. Table 2 and 3 show the sources of bias that evaluations of a business manager, and a nursing professional should be exposed to, respectively. The table is broken down by experimental condition, represented by columns, and partisanship, represented by rows. Since previous literature shows that independent leaners behave in much the same way as partisans do Keith et al. (1992); Klar and Krupnikov (2016), they are included in either the Democratic or Republican category, respectively. Bias stemming from partisanship identity of the respondent is represented by "PID" and bias stemming from the partisan stereotype is represented by the symbol "S." Whether evaluations should be biased in the positive or negative direction is represented by "+" and "-" symbols respectively.

As can be seen in Table 2 and 3 evaluations of pure independents (assuming they lack a political identity), should only be biased by partisan stereotypes. In particular, their evaluations should be biased when they are evaluating a Republican business manager, and a Democratic nursing professional.[4] Furthermore, as shown in Table 2 Democrats and Re-

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[4]As discussed in the section "Bias on Evaluations for Independents," it is possible that independents have a meaningful political identity of their own, instead of simply lacking one. Whether

publicans should be exposed to bias only from their partisan identity when evaluating a Democratic business manager. When evaluating a Republican business manager, the evaluations of Democrats should be biased by both partisan identity and partisan stereotypes, but in opposite directions. When Republicans are evaluating a Republican business manager, their evaluations should be biased by both forces in the positive direction.

When it comes to evaluations of a Republican nursing professional (see Table 3), Democrats and Republicans should only bias their evaluations due to their partisan identity. When evaluating a Democratic nursing professional, partisan stereotype of Democrats being empathetic/compassionate is relevant. Hence, the evaluations of Democrats should be biased in the positive direction by both their partisan identity and the stereotype heuristic, while the evaluations of Republican respondents should be biased in the negative direction because of their partisan identity, but in the positive direction because of the stereotype heuristic.

In terms of experimental prompts, in the first scenario respondents were asked to imagine that they were selected to help choose a business manager who will manage their company or department. They were presented with a profile of a reasonably qualified individual with prior management experience. For instance, the following is a prompt was received by those assigned to the Republican cue condition.

> "Mark Smith graduated from a state college with an economics degree and 3.3 GPA. In college Mark was a member of College Republicans and was actively involved in several other student organizations. He currently holds a management position where he is directly responsible for overseeing about 20 workers. Mark has about 3 years of management experience. He moved to the area about 2 years ago with his wife and daughter Mary."

For the Democratic cue condition, "College Republicans" was replaced with "College

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they do or do not is an empirical question. If "independent" represents a meaningful political identity, then we should observe a negative bias in evaluations of a Democratic business leader, and a Republican nursing professional (H7). Since, most of the literature asserts that pure independents lack political identity, and Klar's (2014) assertions to the contrary are mostly speculative, for simplicity sake, predictions for pure independents in Table 2 and 3 assume that pure independents lack a meaningful political identity.

Democrats", and control group omitted that party, and simply stated that "in college Mark was actively involved in several student organizations." While in the prompt respondents are revealed that Mark was a Democrat or a Republican in college, since they are not given any information to the contrary, respondents are very likely to infer that Mark is still a Democrat or a Republican, respectively.

After reading the previous prompt, respondents were asked to answer four evaluation questions. Two of them were indicative of behavioral intent: 1) "How likely would you be to select Mark to manage your company or department?" 2) "If Mark is not selected by the committee, how likely are you to recommend him for another business management position?" The other two questions had to do with the affect towards that individual: 1) "How comfortable would you be with someone like Mark managing your company or department?" 2) "How enjoyable do you think you will find Mark working in your company or department?" Since there is some concern for priming effects from earlier presented questions on latter questions, these questions were presented in a randomized order. Responses to all questions were measured on a 5-point scale, randing from "very likely" to "very unlikely," from "very comfortable" to "very uncomfortable," or from "very enjoyable" to "very unenjoyable".

After the business manager scenario, respondents were asked to imagine that they have been asked to help choose nursing professional that will work in their community. The following is a prompt that respondents in the Democratic cue condition received.

> "Joe Stevens has recently finished nursing school and received his RN (registered nurse) license. While pursuing his studies, Joe has worked in a hospital as a CNA (certified nursing assistant) for 3 years. Joe's supervisors at the hospital generally have a good opinion about him. He moved to the area a couple of years ago with his wife and daughter Holly. On his free time Joe coaches high-school soccer, and volunteers at the local Democratic party."

In a similar manner to the experimental treatment in the first scenario, for Republican cue condition, the phrase "local Democratic party" was replaced with "local Republican party," and the control group excluded mention of Joe's partisanship and simply stated that

"On his free time Joe coaches high-school soccer." After reading this prompt, respondents were asked to answer four questions that mirrored the questions presented in the business manager scenario. The questions were measured on the same scale and randomized in the order which they were presented, just like in the first scenario.

It's noteworthy that gender was kept constant for both prompts. This was done in order to keep gender from interfering with the results. Since business manager and a nursing professional are professions that are gendered (stereotypes of these professions are tied to gender), not specifying gender would have likely resulted in a considerable portion of respondents (if not the majority) in assuming that the business manager was male, while the nursing professional was female.[5] This would result in evaluations being affected by gender stereotypes in addition to partisan identity and partisan stereotypes.

While explicitly including male names in the prompt keeps the gender constant, respondents might view male nursing professional as less empathetic/compassionate (in comparison to a female nursing professional). A similar effect is likely to be observed if the business manager was female. That is, respondents might have viewed her as lower on a leadership scale than a male counterpart. All this should do, however, is lower the average baseline evaluation. That is, to the extent that a male nursing professional is viewed as less empathetic/compassionate than a female counterpart, the average evaluations in the control group should be lowered. However, the only thing changing from control to experimental conditions is whether party cue of a professional is specified (which serves as a heuristic for partisanship and partisan stereotypes). Hence, the previously hypothesized effects of partisan identity and partisan stereotypes on evaluations should still be observed.

After respondents answered questions for both scenarios, a robustness check was performed to assess whether respondents in the sample hold partisan stereotypes that we expect them to hold based on prior literature. Respondents were asked to think about Republicans

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[5]This assertion is supported by previous research, which shows that when information is omitted, people tend to "fill-in" the details in congruence with their expectations (Gilliam Jr. and Iyengar 2000).

and Democrats and asked how well a certain trait describes them. A total of six traits were examined (including leadership, and empathy/compassion). Answers were recorded on a 5-point scale, randing from "extremely well" to "not very well at all."

This robustness check is necessary because previous research examining partisan stereotypes examines them by looking at elected officials (Hayes 2005). There is a chance that these stereotypes only apply to elites, and are not relevant to evaluations of ordinary non-elected individuals. Alternatively, it could be that the sample used in this study (college students in introductory political science course) are not representative of the national population in terms of the partisan stereotypes that they hold.

Whether respondents are asked to evaluate Republicans or Democrats on these traits first can affect answers to their evaluations of who they evaluate second. Thus, respondents were randomly assigned the order in which they evaluated Republicans and Democrats. The six traits on which respondents evaluated Republicans and Democrats were also presented to respondents in a random order.

The decision of whether to place this robustness check before or after the main experiment involves some trade-offs. Conducting it at the end risks the possibility that some of the results observed in it will be due to priming in the main experiment. However, conducting the robustness check before the main experiment, risks contaminating the results of the main experiment. Since I am primarily concerned with measuring the relative size of bias of partisan identity and stereotypes, as well how these two forces bias evaluations together, I decided to conduct this robustness check after the main experiment.

Results

As previously mentioned the survey was conducted on college students in an introductory political science course in Southeastern United States. The sample size for the survey, n= 136, is small by conventional standards. The main analysis for the evaluation questions is broken down by experimental condition (either a control group, or one of the partisan cue

conditions), and partisanship of the respondent. This further divides the sample size into smaller subgroups that are used for analysis, and affects the ability to get statistically significant results. Moreover, although we have meaningful expectations for pure independents, there was a very small number of them in the sample, n= 3. Hence, they are excluded from the following analysis.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict the direction of the bias for partisan identity. Hypotheses 3 and 4 predict the magnitude of the bias when partisan identity and partisan stereotypes reinforce each-other, when they are at cross-pressures with each-other, and when evaluations are only subject to bias from partisan identity. Figures 1-4 present results that test these hypotheses. These figures show mean responses to the evaluation questions, broken down by experimental condition and partisanship.[6] The set of columns on the left represents responses in the control group, the set of bars in the middle represents responses in the Democratic cue condition, and the set of bars on the right represents responses in the Republican cue condition. The dark gray bars signify responses for Republican respondents, and the light gray bars signify responses for Democratic respondents. Responses to the four evaluation questions were recorded on a 5-point scale. They were from 0 to 4, so that 4 represents "very likely," "very comfortable," and "very enjoyable" responses, while 0 represents "very unlikely," "very uncomfortable," and "very unenjoyable" responses.

Figure 1 presents results for the behavioral intent questions for the business manager scenario. In particular, the subfigure on the left presents results for the likelihood of selecting the business manager, and the subfigure on the right presents results for the likelihood of recommending a business manager if they are not selected by the committee. Figure 2 presents results for the affect questions for the business manager scenario. Specifically, the subfigure on the left presents results for the level of comfort question, while the subfigure on the right presents results to the enjoyment question.

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[6]* In the bar charts signifies statistically significant difference from the control group at $p < .01$ level.

In-group favoritism hypothesis, H1, states that respondents should bias their evaluations in the positive direction when evaluating a fellow partisan. In figure 1 and 2 we should observe results for H1 when looking at Democratic respondents' evaluations of a Democratic business manager. For these questions respondents do appear to be engaging in in-group favoritism. However, results only reach conventional levels of significance for the likelihood of recommending, and level of enjoyment questions (when results are significant at $p < .01$ level). Hence, we find some support for in-group favoritism hypothesis, H1.

Furthermore, I hypothesized that when partisanship of the person doing evaluations and the person being evaluated do not match, evaluations will be biased in the negative direction (out-group bias hypothesis, H2). We should observe results for this hypothesis in figure 1 and 2 when looking at Republican respondents' evaluations of a Democratic business manager. Although results are not statistically significant, at no point do respondents appear to be biasing their evaluations in the negative direction. Hence, we do not find any support for hypothesis 2.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b made predictions about the magnitude of bias when bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes reinforce each other. In particular, in these cases we expected the magnitude of bias to be bigger than when respondents are expected to experience cross-pressures from their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes, or when their evaluations are only biased by their partisan identity. In figure 1 and 2 these two forces are hypothesized to reinforce each other when Republican respondents are evaluating a Republican business manager. Although in general, Republicans appear to be biasing their evaluations favorably from control group, the magnitude of the bias is not the biggest as predicted by hypotheses 3a and 3b. In fact, the magnitude of bias appears to be bigger when partisans are only biased by their partisan identity (in this case when Democrats are evaluating a fellow Democratic business manager). Furthermore, the magnitude of bias is not consistently bigger in comparison to cases when respondents should be experiencing cross-pressures. Once again these results are not statistically significant, so we can not

tell whether respondents' evaluations when they are expected to experience bias from their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes in the same direction are different from their evaluations in the control group. Hence, we can not support hypotheses 3a and 3b.

Hypotheses 4a and 4b predicted the magnitude of bias when the bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes were expected to be at cross-pressures. Specifically, we expected the bias in this case to be smaller in comparison to times when respondents' evaluations were only biased by partisan identity or when their evaluations are biased by partisan identity and partisan stereotypes in the same direction. In figure 1 and 2 we should observe results for these hypotheses when looking at Democratic respondents evaluating a Republican business manager. No consistent results appear from the figures. For instance, for the likelihood of recommending and level of enjoyment questions, the bias appears to be smaller when respondents are hypothesized to experience cross-pressures, than when biases from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes are expected to reinforce each other. For the other two questions (likelihood of selection, and comfort level) the magnitude of bias when respondents are expected to experience cross-pressures is bigger than when the biases from their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes are expected to reinforce each other. While results appear to be mixed for these hypotheses, they fail to reach conventional levels of significance. Thus, we can not support hypotheses 4a and 4b.

Figure 3 and 4 present results for behavioral intent and affect questions for a nursing professional scenario. In particular, in Figure 3, subfigure on the left presents results for the likelihood of selecting a nursing professional question, and subfigure on the right presents results for likelihood of recommending a nursing professional. In figure 4, the subfigure on the left presents results for the level of comfort question, and the subfigure on the right presents results for the level of enjoyment question.

In regards to H1, while partisans appear to be biasing their evaluations favorably when evaluating fellow partisans, for the exception of selecting a nursing professional question (significant at $p < .01$ level), results fail to reach conventional levels of significance. This can

Figure 1: Mean Responses to Behavioral Intent Questions for Business Manager Scenario

Note: In figure 1, light gray bars represent mean responses for Democratic respondents and dark gray bars represent mean responses for Republican respondents. The mean response for each group of respondents is specified above the columns. In the figure * signifies statistically significant difference from the control group at p < .01 level.

Figure 2: Mean Responses to Affect Questions for Business Manager Scenario

Note: In figure 2, light gray bars represent mean responses for Democratic respondents and dark gray bars represent mean responses for Republican respondents. The mean response for each group of respondents is specified above the columns. In the figure * signifies statistically significant difference from the control group at p < .01 level.

be seen in figure 3 and 4 by looking at Republican respondents' evaluations of a Republican nursing professional. Hence, in evaluations of a nursing professional scenario we find some support for hypothesis 1.

Similarly to the business manager scenario, we do not find support for out-group bias hypothesis (H2). In figure 3 and 4, this can be seen by looking at evaluations of Democratic respondents of a Republican nursing professional. Hypotheses 3a and 3b made predictions about the magnitude of bias when the bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes is expected to reinforce each other. In the figures we observe results for these hypotheses by looking at Democratic respondents evaluating a Democratic nursing professional. Consistent with our predictions, the magnitude of bias is the biggest, except for the likelihood of selecting a nursing professional question. However, results are only statistically significant (at p < .01 level) for the level of comfort question. Hence, when looking at evaluations of a nursing professional, we find some support for hypotheses 3a and 3b.

Figure 3: Mean Responses to Behavioral Intent Questions for Nursing Professional Scenario

Note: In figure 3, light gray bars represent mean responses for Democratic respondents and dark gray bars represent mean responses for Republican respondents. The mean response for each group of respondents is specified above the columns. In the figure * signifies statistically significant difference from the control group at p < .01 level.

Figure 4: Mean Responses to Affect Questions for Nursing Professional Scenario

Note: In figure 4, light gray bars represent mean responses for Democratic respondents and dark gray bars represent mean responses for Republican respondents. The mean response for each group of respondents is specified above the columns. In the figure * signifies statistically significant difference from the control group at $p < .01$ level.

Hypotheses 4a and 4b predict the magnitude of bias for cases when bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes are expected to be at cross-pressures with each other. In figure 3 and 4, this should be observed when Republican respondents are evaluating a Democratic nursing professional. Consistent with these predictions the magnitude of the bias is the smallest for all four questions, although results are not statistically significant. Hence, we can not support hypotheses 4a and 4b, but the results are consistent with these hypotheses.

Next, I examine whether, under hypothesized conditions, respondents experienced significant cross-pressures from the influence of their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes by looking at the time it takes respondents to answer the evaluation questions. Hypothesis 5 states that if respondents experience significant cross-pressures, they should take, on average, longer to answer the evaluation questions than respondents who do not experience cross-pressures.

Since there is a concern (especially with a small sample size) that the average length

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of response will be influenced by influential outliers (by both those who quickly record a response to a question without taking it into consideration, and those who might have taken breaks while taking the survey), I first remove 2.5 percent of the fastest and 2.5 percent of the slowest responses to the four questions for each scenario. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the timing data for both scenarios before and after the extreme values were removed. Taking out 2.5 percent of the fastest and slowest responses reduced the timing data by 8 observations in both scenarios. Specifically, the following values were removed from the business manager scenario: 4.49, 5.58, 7.97, 9.39, 76.68, 77.72, 124.75, 195.36, and the following values were removed from the nursing professional scenario: 4.07, 4.88, 5.26, 5.96, 108.47, 167.88, 225.02, 6875.72.

Scenario	Min	Median	Mean	Max	SD
Before removing outliers					
Business Manager	4.49	23.64	29.00	195.40	71.66
Nursing Professional	4.07	14.35	70.09	6876.00	2797.39
After removing outliers					
Business Manager	9.50	23.64	26.91	72.74	22.08
Nursing Professional	6.32	14.35	16.68	69.47	23.22

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Timing Variables

Note: This table shows descriptive statistics for timing variables for business manager and nursing professional scenarios before and after the extreme values were removed.

After removing outliers, I calculated the average duration of time, in seconds, that it took respondents to answer the four questions evaluating a business manager and a nursing professional, respectively. Results are shown in tables 5 and 6. The standard errors for these averages are included in the parentheses. The table is broken down by experimental treatment and party identification of the respondent. To remind the reader in which conditions we expect to see cross-pressures from partisan identity and partisan stereotype bias, the table also indicates whether in a given case, evaluations will be biased by either partisan identity or partisan stereotypes (this is presented in a similar manner as it was done in Table 2 and 3).

	Control Group	Democratic Cue	Republican Cue
Dem	26.95 (2.84)	28.01 (2.55)	32.13 (3.38)
		PID+	S+, PID −
Rep	24.25 (1.88)	23.92 (1.67)	23.50 (2.07)
		PID−	S+, PID +

Table 5: Average Response Time in Seconds to Evaluation Questions of a Business Manager

	Control Group	Democratic Cue	Republican Cue
Dem	16.44 (1.28)	15.35 (1.24)	18.93 (1.60)
		S +, PID +	PID −
Rep	14.24 (.94)	18.85 (3.42)	16.53 (2.57)
		S +, PID −	PID +

Table 6: Average Response Time in Seconds to Evaluation Questions of a Nursing Professional

Note: Table 4 and 5 show mean response time in seconds, along with standard errors in the parentheses. To remind the reader in which cases respondents are predicted to experience cross pressures, the tables also include predicted sources of bias on evaluations. "PID" represents bias from partisan identity, "S" represents bias from a partisan stereotype. The symbol "+" indicates that bias is expected to be in the positive direction, and "-" indicates that bias is expected to be in the negative direction.

When Democrats are evaluating a Republican business manager, they are hypothesized to experience cross-pressures. As expected, in this condition they take longer to answer the four questions, on average 32.13 seconds, in comparison to 26.95 seconds when they are in the control group, and 28.01 seconds when they are exposed to only partisan identity bias (though based on difference between means test, results do not reach conventional levels of significance). Similarly, when Republicans are evaluating a Democratic nursing professional, they are hypothesized to experience cross-pressures. In line with these expectations, Respondents take longer in this condition, taking an average of 18.85 seconds, in comparison to 16.53 seconds when they are exposed to bias only from their partisan identity, and 14.24 seconds when they are not subject to bias from either partisan identity or stereotype heuristic (that is, when they are in the control group). Once again, results do not reach conventional

levels of significance.

We can get additional leverage by pooling timing results for both the business manager and nursing professional scenario, and then comparing cases in which respondents are expected to experience cross-pressures with the cases in which respondents are not expected to experience cross-pressures. Before we can do that, we have to account for the fact that respondents took longer to answer the four evaluation questions in the business manager scenario than similar questions in the nursing professional scenario. This is likely to be caused by respondents receiving the business manager scenario in the survey first. Since questions were similar for both scenarios, the shorter response times in the nursing professional scenario are likely due to respondents increased familiarity with the questions and answer choices.

To account for the different baseline response times for the two scenarios, I first transformed the timing variables (for the different scenarios shown in table 5 and 6) to be expressed as deviations from the mean response time in the relevant control group. I then pooled the timing results for the business manager and the nursing professional scenarios and compared response times for cases when respondents were expected to experience significant cross-pressures with cases when they were not expected to experience significant cross-pressures. Results are presented in Table 7. Note that hypothesis 5 predicted that respondents will take longer when they experience cross-pressures, in comparison to cases when they do not. Hence, this table breaks down scenarios in the experiment in a way that directly tests hypothesis 5. Average length of time (when expressed as a deviation from the mean response time in the control group) is 4.95 seconds when respondents are expected to experience cross-pressures, in comparison to .36 seconds when respondents were not expected to experience cross-pressures. Difference between means test shows that this difference is statistically significant at $p < .01$ level. Thus, based on the results in Table 7 we can support Hypothesis 5.

Cross-Pressures (S+, P−)	All Other Cases
4.95*	.36
(2.41)	(0.65)

Table 7: Average Deviations in Response Time to the Evaluation Questions in Both Scenarios

Note: This table shows average deviations in response time from mean time in the relevant control group for cases where respondents are expected to experience cross-pressures and cases when they are not expected to experience significant cross-pressures. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. In the table "*" signifies significant difference between means at $p < .01$ level.

Perception of Partisan Stereotypes in the Sample

As mentioned previously, this research checks whether respondents actually hold the stereotypes that Republicans are good leaders and Democrats are empathetic and compassionate. In this robustness check, respondents were asked how well a certain trait describes Democrats or Republicans, on a 5-point scale ranging from "Extremely well" to "Not very well at all." Responses were reverse coded so that 4 represents "Extremely Well," and 0 represents "Not very well at all." Table 8 presents mean trait scores for Democrats and Republicans. The columns for Democrats and Republicans show mean ratings, along with standard errors in parentheses. Once again lower mean responses indicate that a trait describes Democrats or Republicans better. The column on the right shows the difference in ratings for Democrats and Republicans. A significant and large difference signifies that a particular trait is owned by the party that has a lower mean score on that trait.

First, it's noteworthy that both Democrats and Republicans are rated favorably on leadership and compassion/empathy. Mean responses range from 1.69 to 2.35. Responses of 2 indicated that a particular trait describes partisans "Moderately well" and response of 3 indicated that it described partisans "Very well." Hence, none of the ratings indicate that Democrats or Republicans completely lack a particular positive trait. That is, it seems that neither Democrats nor Republicans are stereotyped negatively on these traits. Hence, as aforementioned, evaluations of Democrats and Republicans should not be negatively bi-

ased by partisan stereotypes when the other party is associated with a positive trait that is relevant to the situation at hand.

Second, contrary to expectations, results consistently indicate better ratings for Democrats on all traits. This is even true for traits like leadership and morality, which previous literature found to be owned by Republicans (Hayes 2005). These results reach conventional levels of significance, except for the trait of "competence."

	Democrats	Republicans	Difference
Compassionate/ Empathetic	2.35	1.69	.66**
	(.09)	(.10)	
Competent	2.14	2.01	.13
	(.08)	(.09)	
Good Leaders	2.21	1.93	.28*
	(.08)	(.09)	
Honest	1.96	1.66	.30*
	(.08)	(.08)	
Intelligent	2.33	2.04	.29*
	(.07)	(.08)	
Moral	2.22	1.85	.37**
	(.08)	(.09)	

Note: Table 8 shows mean trait scores for Democrats and Republicans with standard errors for these means in parentheses. These means were calculated from responses that ranged on a five-point scale from 0 to 4, with higher numbers signifying more favorable rating. In the table * signifies significance at $p < .05$ level and ** signifies significance at $p < .01$ level. Sample size, n, is 136.

Table 8: Mean Personality Trait Scores for Democrats and Republicans

Given the surprising nature of these results, I break down trait ratings for Democrats and Republicans by respondents' partisanship. This allows me to examine whether ratings are driven by respondents assigning their party more favorable ratings, as opposed to both Democrats and Republicans agreeing that members of a certain party own particular traits. Hence, Table 9 presents mean ratings for the same traits in a similar format as Table 8, but breaks it down by partisanship of a respondent.

	Democrats	Republicans	Difference
Compassionate/			
Empathetic			
Democratic respondent	2.93	1.12	1.81**
	(.09)	(.11)	
Republican respondent	1.43	2.61	1.18**
	(.11)	(.12)	
Difference	1.50**	1.49**	
Competent			
Democratic respondent	2.40	1.67	.73**
	(.09)	(.11)	
Republican respondent	1.73	2.55	.82**
	(.12)	(.12)	
Difference	.67**	.88**	
Good Leaders			
Democratic respondent	2.61	1.55	1.06**
	(.09)	(.10)	
Republican respondent	1.57	2.55	.98**
	(.10)	(.11)	
Difference	1.04**	1.00**	
Honest			
Democratic respondent	2.22	1.39	.83**
	(.11)	(.10)	
Republican respondent	1.57	2.08	.51**
	(.09)	(.13)	
Difference	.65**	.69**	
Intelligent			
Democratic respondent	2.55	1.73	.82**
	(.09)	(.11)	
Republican respondent	2.00	2.55	.55**
	(.11)	(.12)	
Difference	.55**	.82**	
Moral			
Democratic respondent	2.54	1.48	1.06**
	(.11)	(.12)	
Republican respondent	1.71	2.43	.72**
	(.11)	(.12)	
Difference	.83**	.95**	

Note: Table 9 shows mean trait scores for Democrats and Republicans
with standard errors for these means in parentheses. The means are broken
down by partisanship of the respondent. These means were calculated from
responses that ranged on a five-point scale from 0 to 4, with higher numbers
signifying more favorable rating. In the table * signifies significance at $p < .05$ level and ** signifies significance at $p < .01$ level. Sample size, n for
Democrats = 83, and n for Republicans = 50.

**Table 9: Mean Personality Trait Scores for Democrats and
Republicans by Respondents' Partisanship**

When we consider respondents' partisanship, for all analyzed traits Democratic respondents give more favorable ratings to Democrats, and Republican respondents give more favorable ratings to Republicans. These results are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. Moreover, these findings are consistent with previous research that shows that in the age of polarization, partisans are more likely to associate positive traits with their own party, and negative traits with the party of the opponents (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). However, these results are inconsistent with trait ownership theory, which predicts that respondents, regardless of their partisanship, should associate some traits with Democrats and others with Republicans (Hayes 2005).

Consequently, from the results in Table 9 it seems that Democrats and Republicans in my sample don't hold the hypothesized stereotypes. That is, they don't agree that Democrats or Republicans own a particular positive trait, instead they simply assign more positive ratings to members of their own party. Since the evaluation questions (behavioral intent and affect questions) are also broken down by partisanship of the respondent, the perception of traits in Table 9 should be driving respondents' evaluations in the experiment. This could be one of the reasons for lack of findings for stereotype bias discussed earlier.

Furthermore, the seeming incongruity in the results shown in Table 9, which show that partisans assign favorable ratings to their party, and those in Table 8, which show that Democrats receive favorable ratings for all the traits, is due to the discrepancy in the number of Democrats and Republicans in the sample. More specifically, while the sample has 83 Democrats (including partisan leaners), it has only 50 Republicans (also including leaners). Hence, because ratings of Democrats are weighted heavier in the overall mean, the overall mean ratings are skewed in the direction of Democratic respondents.

Conclusion/Discussion

This research conducted a survey experiment in order to examine how stereotypes and partisan identity bias evaluations of ordinary people. It mimicked situations that people

might encounter in the real-world, and placed respondents in scenarios where their evaluations were predicted to be biased by their partisan identity and stereotypes, either in the same or opposite directions. In other scenarios, their evaluations were only expected to be biased by partisan identity.

While the survey's small sample size, n= 136, affected my ability to get statistically significant results, I did find some support for my theory. In particular, I found statistically significant support for in-group favoritism hypothesis (though results are not statistically significant in each case when we expect to observe in-group favoritism). This is consistent with prior findings of social identity theory and partisanship as social identity literature. Moreover, there is some suggestive evidence (mostly when looking at the nursing professional) that bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes can, at times, reinforce each other, and at other times offset each other (though results most of the time fail to reach conventional levels of significance).

Furthermore, by looking at the time it took respondents to answer the evaluations questions, I found evidence that respondents do experience significant cross-pressures from their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes under hypothesized conditions. The timing findings are in conflict with the finding that respondents in the sample do not appear to hold partisan stereotypes predicted by previous literature (which implies that they do not experience cross-pressures under hypothesized scenarios). It is noteworthy that the timing results provide us with an implicit measure of whether respondents experience cross-pressures, while the results for perception of partisan traits (since they rely on self-reports) provide us with an explicit measure. Given that explicit measures are known to be subject to misreporting, this discrepancy in results could be due to respondents not reporting their true perceptions of partisan traits (Rudman 2004).

Moreover, there are a few additional plausible explanations for surprising results for respondents' perception of partisan traits. It could be that political science college students, or college students in general are inclined to give more favorable ratings to Democrats on all

traits that were examined. That is, on average, college students could have a more positive opinion of Democrats, than the general population. Alternatively, political events at the time the survey was conducted could have affected these results. In particular, the survey was conducted in the Spring of 2016 when Donald Trump was a front runner for the Republican nomination. This also could have influenced students ratings for both Republicans and Democrats. Specifically, if students' opinion of Trump is mostly negative then it's possible that it could have spill-over effects on their evaluations of Republicans (more negative ratings), and Democrats (more favorable ratings). Finally, as previously mentioned, it could be that partisan stereotypes are held for elected officials, and are not applied to ordinary individuals.

Most of the results suggest that both partisan identity and partisan stereotypes can affect the evaluations of people. Hence, potentially both of these factors can affect the distribution of resources for ordinary, non-elected individuals. It's likely that a larger, more representative sample of the general population would result in a different conclusion for perception of traits among respondents, and more significant results for the way that partisan identity and partisan stereotypes bias evaluations. Hence, further examination is warranted. In particular, the survey experiment could be repeated on a bigger, nationally representative sample.

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