

Women's Works: The Evolution of Tanzanian Women's Movements from Late Colonialism to Post-Structural Adjustment

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ABSTRACT

Gender has become an important area of increased focus in discourses on human rights and development over the last thirty years, but unfortunately that focus has primarily been on liberal approaches to gender as mediated through international organizations. The history of Tanzania offers an opportunity for more expansive scholarly interrogations of gender within political action in Africa. In particular, the evolution of women's movements in Tanzania from the early independence era to post-structural adjustment is instructive for understanding the potential of non-elite women's subaltern mass movements and the limitations of liberal institutionalism. This article examines that evolution, tracing these movements after first identifying theoretical entry points that allow for a better understanding of the work of Tanzanian non-elite women.

Keywords: Tanzania, Women's Movements, Ujamaa, Gender, Subaltern

Introduction

The increasing prevalence of feminist gendered discourses within international governance bodies is one of the most important developments of the past thirty years. Unfortunately, the increasing utilization of gendered analysis has been siloed. Discreet aspects of policy around political liberation and economic development have been reformed in the name of gender equity, but larger areas of sustained gender-conscious justice have yet to be integrated into global economic and political systems. Indeed, gendered reforms are often explicitly liberal and singular, like gender quotas for state parliaments, or ill defined, like the vague but popular goal of women's "empowerment." These efforts are not without impact, but they are rarely intended to fundamentally alter larger social realities. As a result, non-elite women continue to be disproportionately politically marginalized, despite policy modifications supposedly intended to create equality. In African contexts, this global reality has been exacerbated by a history of colonial looting predicated on creating poverty and ignoring grassroots desires that extends into the present day.

Ensuring that the needs of African non-elite women are met through future policy reform requires more than a reworking of Western discourses and institutions. A truly egalitarian project of gendered reform requires drawing on the work of non-elite women in specific and historicized African contexts. The case of Tanzanian non-elite women in the second half of the twentieth century is particularly generative, given the centrality of both women and egalitarianism in Tanzanian politics and the post-independence state. Comparing the political contributions of Tanzanian non-elite women during the anti-colonial independence movement to women's movements working in the ongoing aftermath of structural adjustment demonstrates both the

potential of feminist discourses that explicitly consider class as a gendered concern within development and the limitations of gender advocacy movements that fail to fundamentally alter systems of poverty. This article attempts to serve as an entry point to that comparison by identifying theoretical frames for best understanding the work of Tanzanian non-elite women, evaluating the structure and impacts of movements in both eras, and suggesting a path forward for similar scholarly work.

Prioritizing the Knowledge of Tanzanian Women

Before examining the local and global implications of Tanzania's history, it is useful to first acknowledge the theoretical constraints of this article. While this research primarily looks at the work of non-elite women, it is not possible to ascribe a singular experience to non-elite women at any point in Tanzania's history. So, the most effective pathway to understanding their movements is to recognize the concerns and actions they mobilized around. This methodology precludes mapping the experience of European or Western women's movements onto the experiences of Tanzanian women, as the experiences of non-elite women in Tanzania are not necessarily analogous to those of women in other contexts. Scholarship on their work should not default to presuming a singular experience of womanhood. Although some aspects of patriarchy in Tanzania require external critique, it is important not to assume that patriarchy is universal or that prominent external representatives of powerful feminisms have greater relevance in feminist debates than local actors. As a foundational work on the colonizing impacts of academic feminism, Chandra Mohanty's seminal article "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" is particularly useful for framing this conversation. As Mohanty (1988) suggests, essentializing analysis only reinforces neocolonial norms of knowledge production and undermines the goal of allowing for autonomy among non-elite African women. In fact, at varied moments in the historical arc of women's movements in Tanzania, the efforts of non-elite women have run directly counter to dominant Western feminisms that emerged in response to European and American forms of patriarchy.

In order to avoid the prioritization of hegemonic external opinions, it is powerful to acknowledge the women involved with specific movements as the primary experts on the value of those movements, embracing them as organic intellectuals, following Gramsci (Zompetti 1997). Gramsci's model notes that cultural and political knowledge are created and embodied across class, race, and gender hierarchies, and that those individuals closest to the embodiment of any group's particular reality have a unique understanding of that reality, and, by extension, a knowledge of movements that can change their lived experiences (Zompetti 1997). This approach is valuable in the case of Tanzanian women's movements for a number of reasons, not least of which is because it is instructive on how to handle global contestations of the label of woman. It might be valuable to question the particular value of womanhood as an identity given its connection to essentialized binaries of sex. However, such an interrogation should not take priority in the case of Tanzania given the wide popularity of womanhood as an identity with significant meaning shared by women in both internal and external liberation struggles. Similarly, while the power of singular feminized motifs like motherhood has been critically interpreted by scholars such as Carole Pateman (2005), the limitations and efficacy of such motifs receive little attention here given their productive use in examining Tanzania.

The Possibility of Letting the Experiences of Non-Elite Women Speak

An intention to think and write through a decolonized lens does not inherently lead to effective execution of decolonial scholarship. The legacy of Western movements like Marxism or the Enlightenment cannot be simply waved away as if ignoring them dispels their relevance or prevalence. As a result, the arguments that follow are still framed within an academic set of norms that prioritizes the voices of specifically credentialed individuals who are given the bulk of unevenly divided resources. Given this structural limitation, it is important not to build scholarship on Tanzanian women's movements in a way that further limits the capacity for the experiences of non-elite women to be heard. In the face of dominant discourses, the non-elite women of Tanzania are particularly susceptible to erasure. At the intersection of African, black and brown, women, and poor identities, the communities that comprise Tanzania's non-elite classes are antithetical to the hegemonic value systems that organize global economic and social value. By the very nature of their exclusion, they represent the global apotheosis of another Gramscian idea that Gayatri Spivak (2010), among others, has widely expanded – the subaltern. Defined simply, the subaltern are those members of society who are marginalized and silenced by hegemonic values.

As Spivak (2010) argues, it is nearly impossible to represent subaltern voices or interests since dominant existing methods of knowledge creation and representation are rooted in disregarding their needs and desires. This manifests as a scarcity of scholarship around Tanzanian women generally, and in an even greater absence of opinion polls, social histories, and political treatises geared toward understanding Tanzanian women peasants. Such absences make it difficult to examine the meaning of Tanzanian women's actions, let alone interrogate the complicated nuances of race, kinship, and religion that further complicate their intent. Tanzania has consistently ranked as one of the twenty-five poorest nations in the world, so even comparatively middle-class women have lacked the ties to financial and political power that might classify them as elite in a comparative sense (Mtonga 1993). This means that, at least within the context of current study, the elite woman status in Tanzania is largely confined to those with unique access to wealth and education, whose contact with success and/or power has primarily stemmed from connections to patriarchal systems of control. As such, existing scholarship primarily excludes wealthy individuals who have operated outside grassroots movements. One such woman is Saira Dewji, whose complicity in extractive economies has done little to add to gendered attempts at political change (Pederson and Kwek 2017). Similarly, less attention is paid to liberal discourses that have already been deeply interrogated, like legislative gender quotas, which have helped to elevate well-connected women into the halls of power, but have done little to reshape the actual nature of those same halls. Naming these scholarly restrictions amplifies those activists and methods most closely aligned with or tied to the actual development of non-elite Tanzanian women. Attempting to demonstrate the lessons of Tanzanian subaltern women for the larger context of gendered liberation policies in Africa would not be effective, or perhaps even possible, without understanding that the most important women involved come from the subaltern.

Independence-Era Tanzania as an Exceptional Case for Women

With those intellectual preconditions established, it is possible to examine the successes of non-elite women in building political power during the early political creation of an independent Tanzania. Starting in the mid-1950s and continuing through the early 1960s, non-elite women

helped create an early vision of Tanzania (then Tanganyika) as a radically egalitarian state, and coordinated networks of political and social collaboration for subaltern women that shaped the future of Tanzanian policy. With that early push, and perhaps more than in any other early post-colonial African state, poor and marginalized women directed the actual priorities of the independence movement, and the newly-created state rewarded them with universalized public goods like education and healthcare. Support for gender justice, or at least a greater degree of gender equity, was advanced through the power of a new politics of liberation and shared networks of organic political participation.

In some scholarship, this gendered success is attributed to the radical and inclusive vision of Julius Nyerere, the most prominent pro-independence leader in colonial Tanganyika and the independent nation's first president (Ladner 1971). He espoused Ujamaa – an influential political theory of specifically African socialism that roughly translates from Swahili to “familyhood” and includes a comparatively enlightened understanding of women as equally valuable to men, if in compatible roles rather than integrated ones. This helped set the tone for the inclusion of poor and socially marginalized women in Tanzanian politics (Lal 2010). However, this was not a spontaneously offered gift of power and enfranchisement given to powerless masses out of pity. Nyerere's personal politics certainly made him receptive to poor women's inclusion in the advocacy and actions of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), but it was the pre-existing acuity and determination of subaltern women that made it necessary for him to act on his most inclusive impulses.

As Susan Geiger has documented, in these early days, Nyerere was himself taught by a variety of women about the importance of gender equity, African specificity, and emancipatory politics (Geiger 1996). Their input carried weight both because of the limitations of Nyerere's own personal context, and because of the power that the sheer number of Tanzanian women carried as a collective. While Nyerere, possessing a Scottish graduate degree, was the most educated person in Tanzania and the lineal son of the chief of his local kinship network, it was not solely his social standing that granted him primacy among early Tanzanian leaders (Bjerk 2017, 41). The popularity of his well-articulated belief in a post-colonial system that would distribute prosperity more fairly, but avoid solely relying on the external ideology of Leninism, probably played a larger role in his pre-independence ascendancy and certainly in his post-independence popularity. This politics of socialism might seem to avoid the explicit question of gender, but it was actually especially dependent on the thoughts and needs of poor women. Material needs require poor Tanzanian women to labor, and, in Nyerere's conceptualization of Ujamaa, society would reflect the industrious norms of poor women rather than the apathy of elite women (Nyerere 1968).

Further, Nyerere's experience of comparative privilege isolated him from some of the impacts of gendered coloniality, but the extensive contributions of women helped ensure that his emancipatory politics did not fall into the rigidly exclusionary sexism of other African leaders like Leopold Senghor (Eko 1986). It was also after conversations with women who were politically marginalized by chiefs when they attempted to attend TANU meetings and women who led recruitment tours that Nyerere actually began to shape more aggressive recruitment plans for TANU (Geiger 1982). In his words, “women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania” (Nyerere 1968). The claim of one prominent woman leader that it was she who had to teach Nyerere Swahili as an adult was likely a vast overstatement, but it speaks to the larger role that Tanzanian women played on an interpersonal level, using their experiences to shape responsive leaders (Geiger 1996). Women without traditional social power thus fostered

the roots of Tanzania's earliest national political reality. They were not simply relegated to advisory positions though. Non-elite women were also able to assume positions of leadership and power, contradictory though this might seem in light of their status as subaltern.

The Roles of Non-Elite Women

Bibi Titi Mohammed is undoubtedly the most famous of the non-elite women political leaders, and, after an unfortunate period of scholarly neglect, her impact on the success of independence is now often cited. Her independent contributions are worth noting, but she also more broadly represents a certain kind of non-elite woman leader in Tanzania who effectively shaped greater gender equity through grassroots organizing. In 1955, Titi Mohammed was a working member of a dance and music group in Dar es Salaam (Geiger 1982). She was sporadically involved with the early movement. However, when a colonial administrator came to Tanzania and asked to meet with the head of TANU's women's auxiliary, an organization that did not exist, Titi Mohammed filled the imaginary role (Geiger 1987). This quickly escalated into her founding and leading an early version of a TANU women's organization, recruiting 5,000 members in under 3 months. Under Bibi Titi Mohammed's leadership, the group was not a passive women's auxiliary, like earlier local elite social clubs that discussed knitting and small-scale charity work (Geiger 1987). To the contrary, it was in some ways the foremost engine of independence. Unlike in Kenya, the Tanzanian push for independence involved little violent conflict, so the hierarchical and masculine trappings of militarization were not a barrier to entry for women (Geiger 1987). Even more importantly, because of gendered assumptions around roles, women of the colonial era were better positioned than men to organize support for independence through events like concerts, rallies, and meetings.

Using preexisting social spaces like dance halls and family homes, Bibi Titi Mohammed helped create a network of women leaders who spread TANU's vision of egalitarian independence across the country (Geiger 1987). These women were not rich socialites, but rather working-class fish mongers, fruit merchants, and beer brewers. Bibi Titi Mohammed herself was Muslim – part of a religious community purposefully disenfranchised by colonial administrators – as well as illiterate (Geiger 1996). At the same time that she coordinated the birth of Tanzania through her barnstorming cross-country advocacy, she still worked as a music leader. Her working spirit fueled the movement and demonstrated the dedication of working women to the cause of independence. She represented the localized woman leaders, who ranged in age from 17 to their 80s, across the country (Geiger 1996). These women were active in the movement because they believed independence would bring greater justice, and because there seemed to be no other way to demand the education, enfranchisement, and political autonomy that most of them craved.

The Roles of Elite Women

The prevalence of working-class women leaders did not completely preclude elite women from holding positions of power, but it did shape how those elite women approached their accountability to womanhood as a political identity and the roles available to them. In many young independent African nations, local elites parlayed the vacuum left by colonial powers into personal riches. Elite women, particularly the collaborating African quasi-gentry, benefited enormously from this exploitation of power, and, as such, even when they supported policies that challenged gender inequities, they were often limited in their advocacy as they prioritized class

exploitation over gendered liberation. This resulted in meaningful, but very limited, gains like finishing schools for young girls. In postcolonial Tanzania, this was far less frequently the case, and elite women leaders were usually the most committed allies of working-class women.

Two women emblematic of this allyship were Lucy Lameck, an Oxford-educated daughter of a politically influential Christian family, and Lady Marion Chesham, a white American-British expat whose husband had been a wealthy landowner (Geiger 1997, 129–32 and 198–201). Alongside Titi Mohammed, both Lameck and Chesham served in the first post-independence session of the Tanzanian legislative assembly in 1962, and tirelessly advocated for poor women as members of parliament through to 1975 and 1972, respectively. Both women used their legislative roles to support Titi Mohammed as a voice for working women in matters as serious as the provision of equal parental status for women, and as mundane as rebuking a male member of parliament who insinuated that poor young women were destroying the social welfare of Tanzania with their covertly sexual dancing (Geiger 1997, 129–32 and 198–201). Lucy Lameck supplemented this commitment in her cabinet role as Parliamentary Secretary of Cooperatives and Community Development, where she helped ensure that Tanzania's development policies benefited the rural poor. In total, she led programs that expanded new craft and agricultural skills to over 100,000 women (Jellicoe 1962).

Similarly, outside of her legislative duties, Lady Chesham helped found the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF), which funneled external aid to internal development projects in Tanzania (Black 1992, 146). During Chesham's tenure, the CDTF encouraged projects targeted at eliminating burdens for poor women, based on the idea that women would be the driving force behind community development if they were given knowledge, time, and opportunity – a premise that was a radical approach to development aid at the time. After she stepped down, Chesham passed leadership of the agency to a working-class Tanzanian woman named Martha Bulengo (Black 1992, 146–48). This type of early leadership of poor women encouraged their elite counterparts to prioritize the needs of poor women in gender equity advocacy, and also stymied the class divisions that limited the efficacy of female political figures elsewhere. This contributed to stronger political coalitions around the identity of womanhood, and helped expand access to social services like education, health care, and agricultural training, which was limited by class or gender in comparable contexts.

The Impact of these Early Women's Movements

The wide scope of the contributions of poor Tanzanian women resulted in both the kind of prescriptive representation now widely celebrated in liberalized contexts, and more broadly beneficial reforms like the expansion of more equal educational opportunities that erased racial segregation (Lewis et al. 1962, 34). By the time independence was actually achieved in 1961, Bibi Titi Mohammed was described as the second most popular and well-known politician in Tanzania (Geiger 1996). By 1955, women had constituted most of TANU's registered membership and poor women made up the vast majority (Geiger 1996). Many of the women involved in the independence movement had joined in part because the party promised an expansion of education, and, eventually, an expansion of accessible health options – promises that were partially fulfilled.

Women constituted an undeniable part of the body politic, and gendered advocacy was embedded in the fiber of the country's egalitarian politics. In many other newly postcolonial contexts, singular women who helped build independence movements were often uninterested in broad reforms that benefited the majority of women. Thus, the above successes, while impressive

on their own, are even more surprising given the external pressure to marginalize poor women. In the case of education, for example, the very first relevant UNESCO reports actually suggested reducing investment in women's education, a request the Tanzanian state ignored (Lewis et al. 1962, 54). This early context suggests some important lessons for modern gendered movements. Central to the success of Tanzanian women's success were specific policy asks, a connection to the larger ideology of equality, explicit acknowledgement of gender, and open democratic organizing led by non-elites. In coordination, these made the contribution of the early women's movement particularly effective. Nevertheless, there were obvious limitations. The upper echelons of leadership remained primarily in the hands of men and the political arena remained frustratingly androcentric. More broadly relevant to poor women, their concerns around land rights and protection from domestic violence were largely ignored for the time being. In a sense, these early successes were meant to hold a promise of continued reforms. Unfortunately, that promise later went partially unfulfilled.

The Decline and Inflection Point of Early Women's Movements in Tanzania

If the political action of working-class Tanzanian women during the independence movement was rooted in optimism about the possibility of socialist class politics, then the growth of women's movements after structural adjustment was at least partly imagined as a response to the failures of the utopian Ujamaa vision. After maintaining relative political stability for most of the 1960s, the Tanzanian government started rapidly accelerating their commitment to radical socialism in 1967 (Nyerere 1968). The expanded implementation of Ujamaa continued throughout the 1970s. In many instances, Ujamaa drastically improved measurements of human welfare like literacy and gender parity in primary schools, but these benefits were somewhat offset by a villagization scheme that coercively relocated over 4 million people (Scott 1998, 223). The expansion of the state greatly benefited social welfare projects, but also limited space for dissent. Non-elite women sat at the crux of these contradictions. Under Ujamaa, many of the aims of women's movements around education, employment, and political equality were met (Scott 1998, 223). However, during the same period, the political power of the women's organization was largely undermined, and most prominent women leaders were removed from official office for various reasons, including the charges of treason that would functionally exile Bibi Titi Mohammed from public life (Geiger 1996).

The uncomfortable balance between increasing human welfare for women and decreasing political space for women's voices was not the low point for Tanzanian women's movements. The nadir emerged as the larger project of Ujamaa began to collapse. Starting in the late 1970s, a war with Uganda, growing national debt, and the global oil crisis pushed the Tanzanian economy into collapse. By 1985, Nyerere had resigned, and by 1986, the Tanzanian government had signed an agreement with the IMF that implemented neoliberal austerity across the board (Hodgson 2002). At this point, women's potential for political power became more limited, due to the increased domination of international neoliberal reforms within Tanzanian politics; at the same time, those same policies undermined the human welfare programs that had benefited poor women in the past. The breakage created space for new kinds of movements. After the implementation of structural adjustment, women's movements in Tanzania followed the global trend toward NGO-ification with mixed results. Non-elite women increasingly benefited from organizations that catered to needs the state had previously ignored, but were also generally harmed by the reduction of direct governmental accountability (Badri and Tripp 2017).

Successes and Failures of Post-Structural Adjustment Women's Movements

Several particularly notable organizations focused on women's advocacy grew out of a blossoming moment for Tanzanian NGOs, including national groups Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) and Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA) (Badri and Tripp 2017). In the growing space for dissent in the 1990s, both organizations saw an opportunity to combat remaining gendered inequalities and injustices that had gone ignored under the politics of Ujamaa. Leaders at TAMWA have since described their organization as having psychologically rejected dependency on state reform to embrace the gender-oriented development and social change that flourished under Ujamaa (Badri and Tripp 2017). Building from this approach of external activism and international events like the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 which resulted in the Beijing Declaration, both organizations have experienced meaningful success in advocating for political reforms that create legal protections for women's equality, such as the Laws of Marriage Act and Village Land Act of 1999, which codified that customary practice could not be utilized to deny women the ability to own land (Badri and Tripp 2017). TGNP, in particular, has boldly advocated for LGBTQ individuals, vastly expanding the gender purview of feminist organizing in Tanzania. Smaller NGOs have used similar approaches to advocate for the specific needs of disabled women and women from ethnic minorities like the Maasai (Hodgson 2002). Some scholars, like Ali Mari Tripp, have argued that this growth of gender-focused NGOs in Tanzania, and in Africa more broadly, represents an unprecedented opportunity for activists and organizers interested in advancing the social and civil rights for non-elite Tanzanian women (Tripp 2003). This approach understands the modern growth of NGOs that are interested in supporting women as a continuation of the work done by women during the independence movement.

However, the success of these independent NGOs as replacements for a unified political movement of liberation grounded in gendered analysis should not be overestimated. As one example, the scholarly optimism of those such as Tripp (2003) ignores that the neoliberal political reality that enables the growth of NGOs is a rupture with the socialist politics that enabled past gendered advocacy. In the past, poor women in Tanzania were able to push for significant change because political organizing had few barriers to entry, which allowed them to reimagine their existing social connections as vectors for political engagement. In contrast, NGOs are funded through complex international financial structures that require technical skills like grant writing and bilingual or multilingual fluency, not to mention the more basic prerequisites like advanced literacy and numeracy. As a result, Tanzanian NGOs working on gender are unable to employ the poor women they advocate for and claim to represent. Working class women are effectively barred from participating in their own liberation. Tripp implicitly acknowledges this undemocratic reality when she lists modern faces of Tanzanian feminism and is only able to draw on elites like academics, consultants, and politicians (Badri and Tripp 2017). By the same token, Tripp describes poverty as the foremost issue facing Tanzanian women, but only a few of the legislative reforms she describes being passed are directly tied to combatting poverty in any substantial and structural way (Badri and Tripp 2017).

These flaws in representation and legislation point to a larger failure. Fettered by their reliance on international donors, and unable to meaningfully appeal to any universal mandate, NGOs like TAMWA and TGNP lack the capacity to advocate for the kind of radical reforms that are most likely to change the systemic and continuing issue of poverty for women in Tanzania. The cost of structural adjustment has not only been political for poor women. By most human development metrics, women in Tanzania are worse off under the newly liberalized system than

they were under the socialism of the 1970s. In fact, structural adjustment programs generally tend to create significant inequality, which in turn exacerbates the marginalization of the poor (Babb 2005; Elson 1988; Gindling and Robbins 2001; Konadu-Agyemang 2000). In Tanzania, this has held true for everything from maternal health outcomes to education equity, leaving most metrics worse off than comparable measures from almost any point during Ujamaa (Lugalla 1995, 53).

Unfortunately, the most recent developments in Tanzanian politics suggest that the strength of gender equity movements will continue to shrink. In recent years, the Tanzanian state has grown more authoritarian under President Magufuli, who was elected in 2015. Increasingly, individual consolidation of wealth has been encouraged and celebrated, corrupt resource extraction by foreign companies has become normalized at the highest levels of government, and dissent, even from journalists and intellectuals, is more dangerous than at most earlier moments in Tanzania's history (Reuters 2017). This all leaves little room for new gendered political advocacy. TGNP, for example, has already experienced such significant backlash from its LGBTQ advocacy that it has had to reduce its public visibility. Without the widespread political support of peasant women, NGOs and activists will become even more susceptible to the coercive limitations of the state. In turn, the deteriorating social conditions of non-elite women will continue to unravel. President Magufuli's recent decision to reverse existing policy norms and expel any school girls who become pregnant before graduating suggests that the legislative victories for women's rights from the past few decades are at risk of vanishing as quickly as the social welfare successes of Ujamaa (Aglionby 2017). In this historical moment, Tanzania stands at the precipice of another possible radical shift in the structure of political organizing around the needs of non-elite women.

Conclusion

There is no inherent virtue in romanticizing Tanzania's early post-colonial past. Bibi Titi Mohammed and Julius Nyerere are not mythical figures, and the political compromises of the early independence movement are not above criticism. It is not hard to see how the political marginalization of women under later Ujamaa represented a failure of the supposedly equality-focused mandate of the country's leaders. However, by the same token, it is also important not to undervalue the successes of the era. Since the early 2000s, it has become popular in development circles to celebrate Tanzania's supposed recovery from economic collapse. While Tanzania's economy has largely stabilized, it is important not to underestimate what was lost when the IMF used austerity to crush one of the most heterodox and revolutionary African governments of the twentieth century. Given the continuing futility of trying to solve gendered, racial, and geographic inequities as independent development problems, the work of subaltern women in shaping the Tanzanian state's most effective politics and policies is a historical touchstone. The legalistic gender advocacy that has gained global dominance in the modern era is impressive, but in comparison to earlier Tanzanian liberation movements, it lacks a cohesive politics of systemic change. This is reflective of a broader failure among policy analysts to consider the factors of class and power in the implementation of feminist politics.

In Tanzania, non-elite women's early integration of gendered development norms into a larger politics of postcolonial freedom and egalitarian wealth distribution not only allowed them greater access to powerful movements of liberation, but also forced self-proclaimed ally communities, like elite women, to more radically address their needs in the long term. On a localized scale, this historical legacy of class and gender collaboration seems to be a uniquely

powerful tool for any attempt to resist authoritarian neoliberalism in Tanzania. On a global scale, policy makers and scholars need to use historical movements like those of pro-independence women in Tanzania to imagine and support new movements that center the needs of intersectionally marginalized groups, particularly at the nexus of class and gender. Committing to this class-conscious and gendered justice of solidarity is one part of reimagining the limited politics of liberal intervention that have failed to substantively undermine patriarchies across the world.

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