

MOVEMENT EFFECTS ON POLICY ADOPTION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES:
THE CASE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

Akram Al-Turk: Movement Effects on Policy Adoption and Socio-Economic Outcomes: The Case of Affordable Housing Mobilization in the United States
(Under the direction of Kenneth (Andy) Andrews)

Do social movement organizations (SMOs) have varying effects on policy adoption and on policy impact? I address this question by testing whether affordable housing SMOs in U.S. cities have an effect on two outcomes: the adoption of either a housing trust fund or inclusionary zoning ordinance (policy adoption) and the number of affordable housing units built with federal tax credits (policy impact). I find that SMOs have a more direct effect on policy adoption than they do on impact, but that SMOs have a moderating effect on the latter. Specifically, they dampen the negative effects of poverty on the number of affordable housing units built, they bolster the effects of administrative spending on units built, and they lessen the effects of an affordable housing policy on units built. The latter finding indicates that outcomes (e.g., policy adoption) that SMOs attained in earlier stages of the policy process may in fact dampen their effects in latter stages. This finding suggests that research on SMO outcomes that examines multiple policy stages can provide insights into why SMOs affect those outcomes differently. The paper's findings also show that structural conditions such as poverty were the strongest predictors of both policy adoption and impact, suggesting that future research should consider how such structural conditions moderate or are moderated by SMOs.

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INTRODUCTION

Do social movement organizations (SMOs) have an effect on policy impact? Much of the research on the outcomes of SMOs has focused on whether these organizations affect the political process or, in other words, whether they attain different kinds of responsiveness from political actors (Burstein 1991; Schumaker 1975). For example, collective actors may be granted access to policymakers (*access responsiveness*) (Gamson 1990) or their issue of interest is put on the political agenda, while in other cases, a law that seeks to address the issue is passed or enforced (*policy responsiveness*). Less attention has been paid to what Schumaker calls *impact responsiveness*, the “degree to which the actions of the political system succeed in alleviating the grievances” of those demanding change (1975:495). In other words, while researchers have shown that collective action can have an effect on access, agenda-setting, policy adoption, and policy implementation, less is known about the effects of collective action on the social and economic impact that policies are intended to change.

Scholarship that focuses on the policy outcomes of SMOs typically examines how collective action affects one kind of response (either access, agenda-setting, policy adoption, or, less frequently, policy implementation). This is likely a result of the conclusion by many policy scholars that political action operates in self-contained domains (Burstein 1991; Kingdon 1984). In other words, the collective actors and processes involved before, say, a policy is adopted are different from those after that policy is adopted. In cases where scholars have looked at the effects of SMOs on multiple responses, most have focused on responses leading up to policy adoption, but not after (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; Soule and King 2006).

What do we know about why SMOs have an effect on political responsiveness? Much of the research has suggested that collective actors have an effect on political outcomes when they are able to mobilize resources and if they operate in a favorable political context. In studies that examine the effects of the political environment, researchers find that political context—often measured as the partisan makeup of the electorate—plays a mediating role in the effectiveness of SMOs. The grievances of SMOs and the constituents they may represent are sometimes included in analyses, but much recent social movement research has argued that grievance is a poor predictor of both movement emergence and movement outcomes (but see Simmons 2014). Similarly, social structures—such as poverty and racial makeup—are rarely discussed in social movement outcomes research.

This paper, then, addresses three related questions. First, do SMOs have an effect on policy impact? Second, can the effects SMOs have within one policy domain (in this case, policy adoption) help us better understand the effects they have in another (socio-economic outcomes)? And third, are there factors, aside from political context, that moderate the effects of SMOs on socio-economic conditions? My findings suggest the following: SMOs have a stronger and more direct effect on policy adoption than on policy impact. SMOs, however, do seem to have a moderating effect on the latter. They do so in two specific ways. First, they dampen the negative effects that poverty has on socio-economic outcomes, and second, they increase the marginal effects that policy implementing agencies have on those outcomes. My findings also suggest that, once a policy is adopted, the effects of that policy may mask or dampen the effects of SMOs on socio-economic conditions. Finally, my results suggest that, rather than partisan political context, social conditions—in this case, poverty rates—moderate the effects of SMOs.

I address the questions above by focusing on the issue of affordable housing in the 200 most populous cities in the United States, and I examine whether SMOs, from 1990 until 2010, had an effect on two outcomes: 1) the adoption of either a housing trust fund or inclusionary zoning ordinance (policy responsiveness), and 2) the number of affordable housing units built with federal tax credits (impact responsiveness). Affordable housing in the United States is an appropriate policy issue for this kind of study for two primary reasons. First, organizations that work to alleviate issues related to affordable housing often focus their efforts on policy advocacy, service provision (i.e., building housing units), or both, and therefore, unlike some social movement sectors, affordable housing organizations can potentially have a direct effect on both policy adoption and impact (or, alternatively, their impact, if any, on the latter may be indirect).

Second, since the 1980s, the federal government began a process of devolution that transferred more housing policy responsibilities to states and municipalities (Goetz 1993; Schwartz 2010). While the federal government continues to spend part of its budget on housing programs and subsidies, states and municipalities—through the use of block grants from the federal government—have had increasing responsibilities on how to spend money on local affordable housing (Marwell 2010). Moreover, the availability and use of affordable housing are closely tied with zoning regulations that are enacted by municipal policymakers. Therefore, given the variation in local policies and in the availability and use of affordable housing in U.S. cities, I am able to discern the effects of movements on policy and impact responsiveness.

THE CASE: AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES

According to estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, more than a third of Americans in the mid-2000s either lived in physically deficient housing, spent more than 30 percent of their income on housing (considered an excessive cost burden), or were homeless (Schwartz 2010). Whereas the physical conditions of homes and overcrowding posed the most significant challenges for homeowners and renters in the mid-20th century, the greater concern today is housing affordability. In the late 2000s, more than 16 percent of all households, and a quarter of renters, spent more than half of their income on housing needs. Affordability affects low-income renters disproportionately. Of all renters that have a severe housing cost burden (i.e., spend more than 50 percent of their income on housing), nine out of ten are in the bottom quartile income group. Further, low-income renters face the most severe shortage of available, affordable housing units. In 2013, for every 100 household that makes less than 30 percent of the area median family income, only 39 housing units were affordable *and* available (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2015). For renters and many low- and middle-income households, the housing cost burden is greater now than it has been at any point in the last 40 years. This cost burden has long-term effects, especially for low-income households. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies, low-income families with severe housing cost burdens spend one-third less on food, two-thirds less on health care and transportation, and half as much on clothing as low-income families without the same housing cost burden (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2009; Schwartz 2010).

The federal government has historically played the most significant role in both shaping housing policy and providing housing assistance to low-income households. The government has used a mixture of subsidy programs and tax exemptions. Subsidy programs include funding for public housing, provisions for housing vouchers, and block grants to state and local governments to spend on community development and housing projects. The biggest tax exemption program is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which has contributed to the development of at least 1.5 million rental units. The role of the federal government in affordable housing, however, has changed since the 1970s. Two trends are worth noting. The first is that the federal government, in the mid-1980s, stopped funding the construction of new public housing and shifted much of its funding toward housing vouchers and LIHTC, both of which now account for over half of all federally subsidized rental assistance. The second trend of the last few decades is that more housing policy decisions are now made at the local and state levels.

Non-state actors also have a long history of involvement in matters related to affordable housing, both in seeking to shape housing policies and in providing affordable housing to low-income households. On the heels of the Great Depression and during the New Deal and post-World War II eras, affordable housing movement organizations, such as the National Tenants Organization, the National Unemployed Councils, and local organizers in big cities such as New York City, helped make affordable housing a national policy issue (Yates 2006). In addition to efforts to increase the salience of affordable housing and effect policy changes, community organizers and nonprofit organizations, since the early 1900s, have also been interested in the provision of affordable housing, either by promoting better tenement conditions in those early years or, increasingly over time, by providing housing for the elderly and low-income

households through the use of federal funds (Bratt 2006; Swanstrom and Koschinsky 2000; Vidal 2012).

THE EFFECTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ON POLICY OUTCOMES

Researchers have argued that the effects of collective action on political outcomes are based, in part, on collective actors' abilities to mobilize resources and the political context in which they operate. Amenta et al. (2010) show that most recent social movements scholarship also takes into account political mediation, which looks at whether support from political actors affects the success of social movements. Based on studies that conclude that collective action led to a positive outcome, Amenta et al. (2010) find that most (94 percent) saw variations in effects when including mediating factors, such as partisan political context.

Although scholars have consistently shown that resource mobilization and political context affect political outcomes, Amenta et al. (2010) find that a small fraction of social movement outcomes research addresses multiple policy outcomes (i.e., different kinds of responsiveness) related to a movement's issue and an even smaller fraction address the potential political or social benefits (i.e., impact responsiveness) obtained as a result of policy changes. Regarding impact responsiveness, Amenta (2006) argues that examining whether collective actors achieve "collective goods" is a more flexible approach than considering whether a movement achieved its stated goals. Scholars, however, have noted that determining the causal relationship of collective action on outcomes, especially impact responsiveness, is particularly difficult. In addition to including political context in an analysis, other suggestions include ensuring that the research is comparative (across contexts) and dynamic (over time) (Giugni 1999; Meyer 2010).

Researchers that have examined the effects of movements and advocacy organizations on different policy outcomes have argued that collective actors typically have a greater effect on outcomes in the earlier stages of the policy process (Duffy, Binder, and Skrentny 2010; King et al. 2005; Soule and King 2006). King et al. (2005) argue that each stage in the policy process has more stringent rules than the stage before it, and therefore movements and advocacy organizations are likely to have less influence during later stages. Drawing on field theory, Duffy et al. (2010) argue that the policy formulation and implementation stages constitute different fields that are governed by different institutional and political logics.

If policy responses operate under different logics, it stands to reason that the factors social movement scholars have argued affect policy outcomes likely have varying effects on those outcomes. A few studies have examined these varying effects. Soule and King (2006) provide evidence from the process to pass the Equal Rights Amendment that, in earlier stages (e.g., the introduction of a bill), social movements, with the presence of political allies, matter because legislative action is less consequential and legislative rules are more lenient. On the other hand, later in the policy formulation stage, they show that the presence of political allies and social movements matters less. Olzak and Soule (2009) argue that social movements, especially those that use non-confrontational protest, have an effect on early stages in the policy process. Based on their case, they suggest that, while movements may not have a direct effect on legislation outcomes, they have an indirect effect—by influencing agenda-setting, which ultimately has an effect on later policy responses.

Olzak and Soule's (2009) argument that collective actors have an indirect effect on later policy outcomes (i.e., ones after a policy is adopted) raises a broader question about how collective actors may affect impact responsiveness. If collective actors are shown to have an

effect on impact, is that because they had an effect on earlier policy responses, such as agenda-setting and policy adoption, or did collective actors continue to have an influence, as Amenta et al. (2005) suggest, because they continued to be organized and viable?

While many studies of social movement outcomes focus on national-level issues, scholars have also examined the effects of movements and organizations at a more local level (Andrews 2001; Cress and Snow 2000; Martin 2001; Weldon 2011). At the municipal level, researchers have shown that the presence of social movement or advocacy organizations is positively associated with policy outcomes, including environmental sustainability policies, living wage policy adoption, and housing and community development expenditures (Portney and Berry 2015; Swarts and Vasi 2011; Yerena 2015). Although studies of social movement activity at the municipal level examine the same factors thought to influence national-level outcomes, one important distinction is about the policymaking process itself. The factors that influence the decisions being made at the municipal are different from those that influence higher levels of government (Berry and Portney 2014).

Urban policy scholars generally agree that local policymaking is not, contrary to previous research, based strictly on a city's economic competition with other cities (Peterson 1981; Schneider 1989), but instead is based on political considerations and how power is distributed within a city. Recent urban politics scholarship has drawn on multiple theoretical traditions. These include the urban growth machine literature, which argues that elite-led coalitions focus on economic growth that serves their interests (Kimmelberg 2011; Molotch 1976), the pluralist tradition, which suggests that power in American cities is fragmented and decentralized among different political actors (Dahl 1961), and research that focuses on how political and economic elites act in coordination (Gendron 2006; Stone 1989).

Researchers have argued that a number of political factors affect urban policymaking and interest group behavior. These include a city's level of electoral competition (Trounstein 2006) and the partisanship of the local leadership (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009; Gerber and Hopkins 2011) and the electorate (Palus 2010; Swarts and Vasi 2011; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014).

Scholars have found that liberal policies—those that are intended to benefit larger and marginalized segments of society—are often a function of more electoral competition. This is due to the fact that, in theory, competitive elections stimulate higher voter turnout, including among citizens that would benefit from liberal policies (Soule and Olzak 2004). Scholars, however, have found contradictory empirical evidence on this relationship, and the causal direction between the two is not clear. Trounstein (2006) shows that dominant urban regimes are, controlling for other factors, more likely to win elections by larger margins, and these dominant regimes spend less on public goods such as health and public welfare. One implication of this is that less competitive elections may either lead to or be a reflection of city leaders focusing less on similar public goods such as affordable housing.

The ideological makeup of the electorate has also been shown to affect policymaking decisions. At the municipal level, scholars have long argued that local governments often face institutional restraints, which make them unresponsive to the electorate. A number of scholars, however, have found empirical evidence that the partisanship of both mayors and the electorate does have an effect on policy outcomes, including most notably the spending decisions of local governments (Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Palus 2010; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014). Scholars have also found that the ideological makeup of the electorate has an effect on policy adoption at the municipal level (Swarts and Vasi 2011).

DATA AND METHODS

Data for this paper are compiled from multiple sources. The unit of analysis is the city (defined as “place” by the U.S. Census Bureau), and the time period is between 1990 and 2009. Variables are measured annually. My analysis uses data on cities in the United States that had populations above 100,000 people in 1990 (N=200). The reason for this threshold is twofold. First, data availability is limited for smaller cities. Second, the administrative and legislative capacities of smaller cities are different from those of bigger cities, and therefore comparing the two may be misleading. Similar studies that have examined policy outcomes at the city level have used between 50 and 200 cities as their sample size (Martin 2001; McClure, Schwartz, and Taghavi 2015; Meltzer and Schuetz 2010; Metzger 2014).

Dependent Variables

To assess the effects of affordable housing organizations on both policy adoption and policy impact, three dependent variables will be used, one for the former and two for the latter.

Policy Adoption

Cities use two broad approaches to encourage the provision of affordable housing. The first is a set of zoning regulations intended to require or incentivize both for-profit and nonprofit housing developers to build affordable housing units. For example, a regulation may require that developers rent or sell a certain portion of new units to low-income residents. Incentives include tax abatements or “density bonuses”—an increase in the number of units or square footage allowed if developers set aside units for low-income residents, and in other cases, a city may waive affordable housing requirements in exchange for a fee paid toward a land trust. While the effects of these zoning policies on the availability of affordable housing are unclear (Schwartz 2010), affordable housing advocates promote their adoption.

Approximately 500 jurisdictions in the United States have at least one inclusionary zoning program. Of the 200 cities in my study, twenty-seven adopted at least one of these programs for the first time between 1990 and 2009. Data on these policies come from a database compiled by the National Housing Conference's Center for Housing Policy in 2014 that relied on previous work done by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (National Community Land Trust Network 2014)

Cities also establish housing trust funds to encourage affordable housing. These funds are intended to ensure that adequate and dedicated public funding is used, among other things, toward the production of affordable housing. Thirty-three cities in my sample established a housing trust fund for the first time between 1990 and 2009. The Center for Community Change, a Washington, DC-based nonprofit organization, compiles data about which cities have a housing trust fund and in what year a fund was established. The Center makes their data available on its website.

Socio-Economic Impact

I use the annual number of low-income housing units built with Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) to measure socio-economic impact. LIHTC is the largest subsidy for low-income rental housing in the United States. The credit, established in 1986, provides housing developers (both nonprofit and for-profit) financial incentives to invest in low-income rental housing. More households live in LIHTC-funded units than in public housing (Schwartz 2010). The data are available from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The LIHTC database was most recently revised in 2014 and has information on the over 39,000 low-income housing projects that have been implemented since 1987. The database includes

information such as the project's address, the number of units built in that project, the year the credit was allocated, the year the credit was placed in service, and other information.

Independent Variables

Data for my main independent variable of interest—affordable housing organizations—come from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS updates its Business Master File (BMF) at least quarterly and posts this on its website. The BMF is a list of all tax-exempt organizations in the United States, and it contains over fifty variables—including income, date an organization received recognition of tax-exempt status, location, a National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities code (explained below), and activity codes—on these organizations. Although the IRS updates this information regularly, the file it posts online is a cumulative file and no archive files are available for download. However, the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute downloads this data regularly and provides researchers access to them (for a fee or through library subscriptions) going back to 1989. NCCS slightly modifies the IRS version, most notably by including the latest NTEE code for an organization if it is missing in the IRS file.

The IRS is the most comprehensive source of data for nonprofit organizations, but the data have their limitations. The first is that some organizations—including organizations with less than \$25,000 gross receipts—are not required to register. For the purpose of this study, this means that the data likely underestimates smaller organizations or informal advocacy organizations or coalitions. Another limitation of the data is that the BMF contains inactive organizations. While the IRS tries to verify that organizations are still active, this is not a perfect system, and the BMF is likely to overestimate the number of active organizations. For the

purpose of a cross-city study like this, however, it is unlikely that there would be systematic differences between cities or over time.

Political context has been shown to affect the passage of local policies such as living wage ordinances (Swarts and Vasi 2011) and housing policies such as inclusionary zoning (Meltzer and Schuetz 2010). My main political indicator is the partisanship of voters, in presidential elections from 1988 until 2008. Data sources for this measure are found in appendix A. I also include the proportion of city expenditures that are spent on housing and community development. I use this measure as a potential predictor of both policy adoption and policy impact. The rationale for including municipal expenditures as a predictor of policy adoption is that this measure serves as a proxy for the political will of city officials. I use municipal expenditures as a predictor of policy impact because of a city government's role in supplementing funding toward affordable housing.

Because of data limitations, I am only able to test the effects of local city politics for 129 cities. I use two measures: the proportion of residents in mayoral elections voting for a Democratic candidate and the vote difference in those elections (to test the effects of electoral competition). I include this analysis in appendix D.

Municipalities in the United States differ in how much autonomy they have to enact local ordinances, and much of this variation is based on state-level factors. To control for these, I include four controls. The first is a state's home rule powers that it grants to its municipalities. I focus on whether a state grants functional home rule, which is the power of a municipality to exercise self-government. The second control I use is whether a state has an inclusionary zoning statute that requires or encourages the use of inclusionary zoning. I compiled data on these two measures using a survey conducted for the National Association of Home Builders (Hollister,

McKeen, and McGrath 2007). The third and fourth controls are the proportion of state legislatures that are Democrats and the party of the governor in office (Klarner 2013a, 2013b).

A number of city-level characteristics are included to test whether demographic or economic factors have an effect on my outcomes of interest. Demographic data come from the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Decennial Census. A city's total population is included to ensure that the number of housing units built is not simply a function of the size of a city (Portney 2013), which would potentially have an effect on the resources a city can invest in affordable housing projects. To test whether a city's level of housing needs (Martin 2001; Swarts and Vasi 2011) have an effect, I included data on poverty rates and racial composition.

I include the number of existing rental housing units that are affordable to low-income households as another control. Using data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata System and from HUD, the Urban Institute, among others, have calculated the number of affordable rental units that are available to extremely low-income renters (i.e., those with incomes below 30 percent of an area's median income, or AMI). The Urban Institute uses the following formula to calculate adequate, affordable, and available housing units, at the county level, to low-income households in the following way: "affordable occupied units + affordable vacant units – units occupied by higher-income renters – substandard occupied units – substandard vacant units" (Leopold et al. 2015:16). I use their data, available at the organization's website.

For independent variables that are not measured annually, I interpolate to fill in the gaps. I log the number of organizations and population variables because of skewness. And I use an inverse hyperbolic sine (ihs) transformation for the number of housing units built. I do so because there were many city-years where no housing units built, and therefore logging this variable would have resulted in a substantial amount of missing data. The inverse hyperbolic sine

transformation can be interpreted similarly to the log transformation. The $\ln(x)$ is approximately equal to the $\log(2*x)$. Finally, in both sets of analyses, I lag all independent variables by one year. Descriptive statistics of all variables are found in table 1.

My analysis proceeds in two steps. I first estimate the effects of all affordable housing organizations, along with political factors and demographic controls, on the likelihood that a city adopts either an inclusionary zoning policy or a trust fund. For this analysis, I use a Cox proportional hazards models. I only model first “failures,” and therefore once a city adopts a policy, it is removed from the risk set. I use the Efron method to handle ties, as this is typically more accurate than using the Breslow method (Singer and Willett 2003). Because data on organizational characteristics begin in 1989, my starting point for all my analyses begin then. Cities that adopted a policy before 1990 or after 2009 ($n=10$) are dropped from the risk set.

For these Cox regression models, I tested to see whether the proportional hazards assumption held by examining whether Schoenfeld residuals were correlated with time (Allison 2014). Results from this test show that none of the variables in my Cox regression models is correlated with time. Therefore, the proportional hazards assumption holds.

The second step in my analysis is to estimate the effects of housing organizations on socio-economic impact. For this analysis, I use fixed-effects models to estimate the effects of organizational, political, and demographic factors on the number of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit units built. I also include the dependent variable from my first set of analyses—the adoption of an affordable housing policy—to see whether policy adoption also has an effect on socio-economic conditions.

For my fixed-effect models, I tested to see whether I should use random-effects models instead. I use a Hausmann test. Results indicate that I can reject the null hypothesis that the random-effects model is efficient. Therefore, my use of the fixed-effects model is justified.

RESULTS

Figure 1 shows the time trends of the two dependent variables. The figure shows that forty-six of the two hundred cities in the sample adopted its first affordable housing policy between 1990 and 2009. About one policy a year was adopted in the 1990s, and almost half of the policies were passed in the first half of the 2000s. As for the average number of affordable housing units built, there was a steady increase until around 2003—a number of years before the 2008 financial crisis—when the average number of units began to decline steadily. Figure 2 shows the average number of housing organizations over the same twenty year period, indicating a steady increase in organizations over this time. The number of organizations did decline slightly during and after the financial crisis.

Policy Adoption

Table 2 presents means of potential explanatory variables for whether a city adopts an affordable housing policy (in cities where a policy was adopted, I measure the mean before a city adopted the policy). The table suggests that the number of organizations is positively associated with policy adoption. The bivariate relationship between political opportunity and policy adoption shows that there is a positive association between the proportion of the electorate that votes for a Democrat and policy adoption.

The other measure that has a statistically significant association with policy adoption is a city's poverty rate. Unexpectedly, the poverty rate is negatively associated with policy adoption.

Appendix A shows a list of the cities that adopted their first affordable housing policy between 1990 and 2009 by poverty quartile and largely confirms this finding. Twenty-eight of the forty-six cities (61 percent) had poverty rates below the median in the year the policy was adopted.

I present cox regression models in table 3 to test whether the above relationships hold in a multivariate analysis. Model 1 includes the number of organizations, along with demographic factors, and model 2 assesses the significance of the proportion of Democrats and the proportion of a city's budget spent on housing expenditures. Model 3 includes these explanatory variables, along with state-level controls. These first three models produce similar results. The first is that, in all models, the number of housing organizations is positively associated with the likelihood of a policy being adopted. The results of model 3, for example, indicate that a 10 percent increase in the number of housing organizations is associated with a 10.8 percent ($\exp[1.027/10]$) increased likelihood of policy adoption.

Models 1 through 3 in table 3 also show that the proportion of the electorate voting for a Democratic presidential candidate is positively associated with the likelihood of policy adoption, while the share of municipal expenditures that goes toward housing has null effects. The results from model 3 show that a 1 percentage point increase in the number of Democratic voters is associated with a 4.9 percent ($\exp[4.774/100]$) increased likelihood of policy adoption.

Expectedly, the supply of available and affordable housing units is negatively associated with a policy being adopted. As the supply goes down, the likelihood of policy adoption increases.

Finally, a city's poverty rate is negatively associated with policy adoption, which confirms the bivariate results found in table 2 and appendix A. Again using the coefficients from model 3, the results indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the poverty rate is associated with a 14.6 percent ($\exp[-15.835/100]$) decreased likelihood of policy adoption.

Model 4 tests whether the effect of organizations is politically mediated by including an interaction term between the number of organizations and the proportion of people voting for a Democratic presidential candidate. Model 5 tests whether the effect of organizations may depend on municipal expenditures going toward housing. Both models show that these potential mediating factors do not have an effect on policy adoption. The main effect of both models, however, is positive and at least marginally statistically significant, suggesting that, even in the absence of Democrats or a city's commitment to fund housing programs and projects, the presence of organizations is positively associated with policy adoption.

Appendix D includes three variables to test the possibility that municipal elections have an effect on policy outcomes. Including these indicators reduces the size of the sample from 181 to 129, and the results suggest that local election results—the proportion of Democratic voters, the presence of a Democratic mayor, and electoral competition—do not have an effect on the likelihood of policy adoption. Further, the predictors found to have an effect in table 3—housing organizations, poverty, available and affordable housing units, the proportion voting for a Democratic presidential candidate, and the party of the state's governor—continue to have an effect on policy adoption in this model.

Policy Impact

Table 4 shows mean values of independent variables, by whether a city's number of affordable housing units built was above or below the median number, among the sample, by year. A number of variables—including the number of organizations, the poverty rate, proportion Democrats, and whether a policy was adopted—are all positively associated with higher numbers of affordable housing units built.

Results from the models in table 4, however, do not confirm some of these bivariate relationships. In particular, all models in the table point to one strong finding that mirrors results from the cox regressions: a city's poverty rate is inversely related to the number of affordable housing units built. Model 1 in table 5, which includes both demographic variables and political indicators, shows that organizations do not have an effect on the number of units built. Proportion Democrats and the presence of an affordable housing policy also do not have an effect, while the proportion of municipal spending on housing is positively associated with the number of housing units built. A 1 percentage point increase in municipal spending on housing is associated with a 4.2 percent ($\exp[4.096/100]$) increase in the number of LIHTC housing units built. The poverty rate has a strong, negative association with units built. Results from model 5 indicate that a 1 percent increase in the poverty rate corresponds to a 15.7 percent ($\exp[-17.112/100]$) decrease in the number of housing units built.

The null findings for the effects of housing organizations and an affordable housing policy in table 5 may be masking some of the interactive effects that policies, organizations, and administrative spending often have on social policy outcomes. The consistently strong, negative effect that poverty has on both policy adoption and impact also requires further examination. Models 2-7 in table 5 and figures 3-5 present results from a number of interaction effects on the number of housing units built.

Model 2 includes an interaction between housing organizations and proportion Democrats, and similar to the findings from the cox regression, suggests that this particular form of political mediation has no effect on housing units built. Model 3 includes a similar interaction effect, this time one between the number of organizations and whether a policy is in place. The findings in this model suggest that, in the absence of the other, policies and organizations are

positively associated with the number of units built. More specifically, as the number of organizations increases above a particular threshold, the marginal effect of a policy on units built, shown in figure 3, is no longer positive.

Model 5 includes an interaction effect between organizations and municipal spending on housing. The results show that, on their own, organizations have no effect on units built. The interaction effect, shown more clearly in figure 4, on the other hand, suggests that an increase in the number of organizations increases the marginal effects of municipal spending. In other words, a city's expenditures on housing are positively associated with units built when there are a sufficient number of organizations present and becomes more positive as the number of organizations increases.

The findings from models 2, 3, and 5 in table 5 suggest the following: a higher proportion of Democrats in a city does not affect organizations' effects on units built, organizations have a positive marginal effect on units built in the absence of a policy (and vice versa), and the marginal effect of administrative spending on housing on units built increases as the number of organizations increases.

What about the effect of poverty, which has, in all models, been negatively associated with the number of units built? Do the effects of policies and organizations differ under different levels of poverty? Model 4 interacts poverty rates with the number of organizations. The findings are similar to those in model 5: organizations do not have a direct effect on units built; rather, they have an impact on the marginal effects of poverty. As shown in figure 5, the marginal effect of poverty decreases (becomes less negative) as the number of organizations increases. Model 6 includes an interaction term between poverty and policy adoption, and the results again show that policy adoption has varying effects on housing units built. As shown in figure 6, the

marginal effect of a policy being in place is positive in cities with low levels of poverty, and the marginal effect becomes negative in cities with high rates of poverty.

Taken together, figures 5 and 6 suggest the following: as poverty rates increase, the marginal effect of a policy in place on the number of units built decreases, while the marginal effect of organizations increases. These findings, along with the results from model 3—which indicated that policy adoption and the number of organizations may be working at odds with each other—suggest that poverty, policy adoption, and organizations interact together to produce different policy outcomes. If that is the case, it seems likely that organizations have varying effects that depend not only on how impoverished a city is or whether an affordable housing policy is in place, but also on different configurations of these two factors. I test this proposition in model 7 and show the results of the interaction terms in table 6. The results confirm findings from earlier models: organizations have a positive marginal effect on the number of housing units built in cities with higher rates of poverty and especially in high-poverty cities where no policy is in place.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Using the case of affordable housing policy in U.S. cities from 1990 to 2009, I examined the question of whether SMOs have an effect not only on policy adoption but also on longer term policy, or socio-economic, outcomes. The findings show that SMOs have a more direct effect on policy adoption than they do on socio-economic outcomes, confirming previous research that argues that movements have more influence in earlier stages of the policy process (King et al. 2005; Soule and King 2006). The findings, however, do suggest that SMOs have an indirect

effect on socio-economic outcomes and point to three general implications for future research on the outcomes of SMO activity.

First, while SMOs may not have a direct effect on socio-economic outcomes, the findings of this paper suggest that SMOs have a moderating effect. Given that varying socio-economic outcomes are likely a result of the policies in place (if any), the administrative capacity of the implementing agency, and social conditions, it makes sense that SMOs, including those involved in service provision, may only play a minor or behind-the-scenes role. The research question, therefore, may need to shift from “Do SMOs have an effect on socio-economic outcomes to “Under what conditions do SMOs have an effect on socio-economic outcomes.”

The findings from this study suggest that SMOs have the following effects on other factors: 1) they dampen the negative effects of poverty on the number of affordable housing units built, 2) they bolster the effects of administrative spending on units built, and 3) they lessen the effects of an affordable housing policy on units built. I will come back to this third point below. The first two findings, then, indicate that SMOs have a positive, indirect effect on socio-economic outcomes.

The finding that the presence of housing SMOs counteracts the effects of an affordable housing policy provides two insights, one substantive and the other for future research. The first is that, when it comes to their effects on socio-economic outcomes, SMOs are essentially “picking up the slack.” As the marginal effects from model 7 in table 5 (shown again in table 7) indicate, organizations have a positive effect on the number of units built in high-poverty cities that do not have a policy in place. And therefore, in this particular case, if a policy is in place, it seems to have a positive effect in low-poverty cities, while housing SMOs have a positive effect in high-poverty cities without a policy in place.

This finding has implications for future research. While much previous research on social movement outcomes examines only one policy domain (Amenta et al. 2010), two of the central findings of this paper—that SMOs have a positive effect on policy adoption, and that those policies influence whether SMOs have an effect on socio-economic outcomes—suggest that not examining multiple domains together potentially masks some of the mechanisms by which SMOs do or do not have an effect. For example, the findings of this paper suggest that the success of SMOs in earlier policy stages may dampen their effects in later stages, not necessarily because of any changes in the SMOs but because the policies in place may actually be working. Disentangling what happens between these stages, therefore, could help us better understand the mechanisms by which movements effect both policy and socio-economic changes.

Finally, this paper tested whether mobilization (the presence of SMOs) and/or political mediation (mobilization in different political contexts) had effects on policy and socio-economic outcomes. The political context was measured in two different ways—the proportion of people voting for a Democratic presidential candidate and the share of expenditures that a city spends on housing. The findings suggest that, when using electoral partisanship, there is little support that political mediation is associated with either policy adoption or impact. On the other hand, another version of political mediation—the effects of organizations conditional on municipal spending—did have a positive association with policy impact—the number of affordable housing units built.

Rather than political context, a city's poverty rate was the strongest predictor of both whether a city passed an affordable housing policy and the number of affordable housing units built. These findings have a couple of implications for future research. The first is that political mediation models should go beyond using, or better justify the use of, partisanship as a measure

of political context. This should especially be the case when other measures of political context—such as the funding commitments of administrative bodies or their technocratic capacities—may better explain particular outcomes. The second implication is that, depending on the policy issue, political context may matter less than social structural conditions, such as poverty and inequality. The suggestion here is not that these factors tell us something about grievances, but rather that they moderate or are moderated by the presence of SMOs, policies, administrative spending, and political context and can therefore help provide better explanations of policy and socio-economic outcomes.

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Summary Statistics, City-Year Observations, 1990-2009

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Policy in Place	3620	0.114	0.318	0	1
LIHTC Units Built	3620	134.914	251.561	0	2994
Number of Organizations	3620	22.063	41.380	0	535
Population (logged)	3620	12.324	0.707	11.342	15.932
Proportion Nonwhite	3620	0.387	0.174	0.078	0.881
Poverty Rate	3620	0.166	0.061	0.032	0.349
Available, Affordable Housing Units (Per 100 Extremely Low-Income (ELI) Renters)	3620	32.035	13.098	8.863	75.769
Proportion Democrats (Pres. Elections)	3620	0.501	0.111	0.190	0.872
Proportion of Municipal Expenditures on Housing	3620	0.049	0.048	0	0.382
State Level Controls					
- Functional Home Rule	3620	0.770	0.421	0	1
- Inclusionary Zoning in State Statutes	3620	0.451	0.498	0	1
- Proportion Democrats in Legislature	3620	0.540	0.114	0.114	0.908
- Party of Governor (0=Rep, 1=Dem)	3620	0.407	0.489	0	1

Figure 1. Number of Housing Units Built and Total Number of Policies Adopted




Figure 2. Average Number of Housing Organizations




Table 2. Means of Independent Variables, by Policy Adoption

	Policy Adopted		<i>SE</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
Number of Organizations	17.380	35.833	1.72***
Proportion Nonwhite	0.387	0.399	0.01
Poverty Rate	0.170	0.157	0.00***
Population (logged)	12.215	12.725	0.03***
Available, Affordable Housing Units (Per 100 ELI Renters)	32.563	31.600	0.64
Proportion Democrats (Pres. Elections)	0.492	0.526	0.01***
Proportion of Municipal Expenditures on Housing	0.049	0.049	0.00
State Level Controls			
- Functional Home Rule	0.765	0.783	0.02
- Inclusionary Zoning in State Statutes	0.436	0.437	0.02
- Proportion Democrats in Legislature	0.539	0.546	0.01
- Party of Governor (0=Rep, 1=Dem)	0.404	0.436	0.02
Observations	2844	497	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3. Cox Regression Models of Policy Adoption, 1990 - 2009

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
No. of Orgs (logged)	1.068*** (0.276)	0.964*** (0.264)	1.027*** (0.261)	0.924+ (0.517)	1.023*** (0.279)	1.414*** (0.361)
Population (logged)	-0.358 (0.264)	-0.315 (0.237)	-0.251 (0.223)	-0.270 (0.232)	-0.250 (0.225)	-0.117 (0.234)
Proportion Nonwhite	0.538 (1.075)	-0.550 (1.117)	-1.563 (1.306)	-1.535 (1.335)	-1.558 (1.312)	-1.482 (1.316)
Poverty Rate	-15.996*** (4.191)	-16.895*** (4.449)	-15.835*** (4.062)	-15.850*** (4.049)	-15.848*** (4.092)	-7.777 (5.633)
Avail., Aff. Hsg. Units	-0.045** (0.017)	-0.052* (0.019)	-0.053* (0.018)	-0.054* (0.019)	-0.053* (0.018)	-0.051* (0.018)
Dems (Pres. Elections)		4.774*** (1.445)	4.449* (1.481)	3.844 (2.880)	4.444* (1.489)	5.240*** (1.544)
Mun. Exp. on Hsg		0.207 (3.389)	-0.990 (3.491)	-1.036 (3.523)	-1.156 (4.831)	-0.961 (3.543)
Home Rule			0.099 (0.391)	0.098 (0.391)	0.099 (0.392)	0.142 (0.393)
Incl. Zoning in Statutes			0.318 (0.350)	0.313 (0.352)	0.317 (0.350)	0.319 (0.354)
Governor (1=Dem)			0.715* (0.325)	0.716* (0.324)	0.714* (0.325)	0.701* (0.333)
Dems (State Leg)			1.607 (1.289)	1.586 (1.298)	1.610 (1.294)	1.547 (1.305)
Orgs X Dems (Pres.)				0.193 (0.729)		
Orgs X Mun. Exp.					0.069 (1.794)	
Orgs X Poverty Rate						-3.135+ (1.891)
N	3206	3201	3201	3201	3201	3201
Cities	181	181	181	181	181	181
BIC	458.8	466.0	491.1	499.1	499.1	497.2

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4. Means of Independent Variables, by Number of Units Built

	Number of Units Built Above Median Among All Cities		<i>SE</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	
Number of Organizations	10.433	33.928	1.32***
Proportion Nonwhite	0.366	0.408	0.01***
Poverty Rate	0.156	0.176	0.00***
Population (logged)	12.063	12.590	0.02***
Available, Affordable Housing Units	30.178	33.929	0.43***
Proportion Democrats (Pres. Elections)	0.489	0.514	0.00***
Proportion of Municipal Expenditures on Housing	0.053	0.046	0.00***
Policy Adopted	0.084	0.145	0.01***
Observations	1828	1792	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5. Fixed Effects Models of Low-Income Units Built (inverse hyperbolic sine), 1990 - 2009

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
No. of Orgs (logged)	0.138 (0.156)	0.454 (0.403)	0.159 (0.158)	-0.246 (0.302)	-0.015 (0.186)	0.148 (0.157)	-0.279 (0.257)
Population (logged)	0.207 (0.773)	-0.059 (0.859)	0.187 (0.772)	0.565 (0.801)	0.360 (0.785)	0.089 (0.776)	0.587 (0.783)
Proportion Nonwhite	1.298 (3.956)	0.525 (4.006)	0.473 (3.954)	2.033 (4.076)	1.463 (3.927)	0.470 (3.918)	0.744 (4.015)
Poverty Rate	-17.112** (5.591)	-17.522** (5.624)	-17.604** (5.575)	-22.459** (7.228)	-16.142** (5.705)	-16.190** (5.561)	-18.560** (5.967)
Avail., Aff. Hsg. Units	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.011)	0.003 (0.011)
Dems (Pres. Elections)	1.347 (1.172)	2.876 (2.020)	1.380 (1.175)	1.197 (1.156)	1.155 (1.179)	1.350 (1.171)	1.176 (1.174)
Policy Adopted	0.145 (0.241)	0.202 (0.245)	1.193** (0.442)	0.137 (0.243)	0.147 (0.239)	1.757** (0.619)	
Mun. Exp. on Hsg	4.096** (1.434)	4.202** (1.415)	4.168** (1.440)	4.079** (1.443)	-0.543 (2.335)	4.216** (1.430)	4.065** (1.468)
Orgs X Dems (Pres.)		-0.642 (0.719)					
Orgs X Policy Adopted			-0.339* (0.132)				
Orgs X Pov Rate				2.251 (1.682)			
Orgs X Mun. Exp.					2.405* (1.106)		
Policy X Pov Rate						-10.262* (4.281)	
No Pol., High Pov							-1.583+ (0.810)
No Pol., Low Pov.							-1.073* (0.536)
Policy, High Pov.							-0.402 (1.211)
No Pol., High Pov X Orgs							0.634* (0.282)
No Pol., Low Pov X Orgs							0.246 (0.202)
Policy, High Pov. X Orgs							0.246 (0.352)
Constant	1.773 (9.492)	4.759 (10.440)	2.357 (9.510)	-2.115 (9.747)	0.183 (9.630)	3.374 (9.571)	-1.313 (9.652)
N	3416	3416	3416	3416	3416	3416	3416
Cities	181	181	181	181	181	181	181
BIC	15439.8	15446.5	15441.9	15445.1	15441.8	15440.9	15466.8

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 3.




Figure 4.




Figure 5.




Figure 6.




Table 6. Marginal Effect of Organizations
on Housing Units Built

		Policy in Place	
		<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Poverty	<i>High</i>	-0.033	0.355*
Rate	<i>Low</i>	-0.279	-0.033

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES

Policy Adoption			Years
	Housing Trust Funds	Center for Community Change	
	Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances	National Housing Conference's Center for Housing Policy; Lincoln Institute of Land Policy	Early 1990 - 2009
Policy Impact			
	Affordable Housing Units Built with Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC)	U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development	1990 - 2009
Organizations			
	Affordable Housing Organizations	Internal Revenue Service; National Center for Charitable Statistics	1989, 1995 - 2009
Political Context			
	Presidential Elections (by county)	U.S. Census Bureau; Federal Elections Project (American University); Charles Stewart (http://web.mit.edu/cstewart/www/election2004.html)	1988 - 2008
	Municipal Budgets	Census of Governments; Pierson, Hand, and Thompson 2015	1990 - 2009
	Local Elections	Ferreira and Gyourko 2009; Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014	1990 - 2009
Controls			
	Governors and State Legislatures	Klarner 2013a, 2013b	1989 - 2009
	State Home Rule and Inclusionary Zone Statutes	Hollister, McKeen, and McGrath 2007	1989 - 2007
	Affordable Housing Supply	Urban Institute; Integrated Public Use Microdata Series	2000 - 2009
	Demographic Factors	U.S. Census Bureau	1990 - 2009

APPENDIX B. CODING SCHEME FOR ORGANIZATIONS

	IRS NTEE Codes	Keywords
Affordable Housing Organizations		
	L01 (Housing, Shelter Alliance/Advocacy Organizations); S01 (Community Improvement, Capacity Building Alliance/Advocacy Organizations); S21 (Community Coalitions)	“housing coalition”
	S20 (Community, Neighborhood Development, Improvement (General)); S31 (Urban, Community Economic Development); S32 (Rural Development)	“community development,” “CDC,” “development corp,”

**APPENDIX C. CITIES THAT ADOPTED FIRST AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY
BETWEEN 1990 AND 2009**

City	Poverty Quartile At Time of Adoption	Year Policy Adopted
-----	-----	-----
Charlotte, NC	Low Poverty	2002
Indianapolis, IN	Low Poverty	2000
Alexandria, VA	Low Poverty	1992
Hayward, CA	Low Poverty	2004
Oceanside, CA	Low Poverty	1991
Irvine, CA	Low Poverty	2003
Stamford, CT	Low Poverty	2003
Virginia Beach, VA	Low Poverty	2007
Santa Rosa, CA	Low Poverty	1992
San Jose, CA	Low Poverty	2003
Concord, CA	Low Poverty	2004
Citrus Heights, CA	Low Poverty	2003
Huntington Beach, CA	Low Poverty	2004
-----	-----	-----
Oxnard, CA	Low-middle Poverty	1999
Nashville, TN	Low-middle Poverty	2000
Albuquerque, NM	Low-middle Poverty	2007
Denver, CO	Low-middle Poverty	2002
Portland, OR	Low-middle Poverty	1996
Salt Lake City, UT	Low-middle Poverty	1991
Pasadena, CA	Low-middle Poverty	1991
Durham, NC	Low-middle Poverty	2003
Anaheim, CA	Low-middle Poverty	2005
Austin, TX	Low-middle Poverty	1999
St Paul, MN	Low-middle Poverty	1994
Winston-Salem, NC	Low-middle Poverty	1991
Yonkers, NY	Low-middle Poverty	2008
San Diego, CA	Low-middle Poverty	1990
Evansville, IN	Low-middle Poverty	2002
-----	-----	-----
Madison, WI	Middle-high Poverty	2004
Louisville, KY	Middle-high Poverty	2007
Tucson, AZ	Middle-high Poverty	2006
Ann Arbor, MI	Middle-high Poverty	2004
New York, NY	Middle-high Poverty	2005
Oakland, CA	Middle-high Poverty	2003
Salinas, CA	Middle-high Poverty	1992

Sacramento, CA	Middle-high Poverty	2000
Tempe, AZ	Middle-high Poverty	2009
Minneapolis, MN	Middle-high Poverty	2002
-----	-----	-----
Philadelphia, PA	High Poverty	2005
Tallahassee, FL	High Poverty	2005
St Louis, MO	High Poverty	2001
Long Beach, CA	High Poverty	2005
Atlanta, GA	High Poverty	2009
Knoxville, TN	High Poverty	1993
Los Angeles, CA	High Poverty	2002
Milwaukee, WI	High Poverty	2006

**APPENDIX D. COX REGRESSION MODELS WITH LOCAL ELECTION DATA, 1990
– 2009**

	(1)
Number of Orgs (logged)	0.921** (0.324)
Population (logged)	-0.242 (0.269)
Proportion Nonwhite	-1.980 (1.467)
Poverty Rate	-11.978** (4.403)
Avail., Aff. Hsg. Units	-0.059** (0.022)
Dems (Pres. Elections)	4.468** (1.732)
Mun. Exp. on Hsg	3.954 (3.695)
Home Rule	0.400 (0.473)
Incl. Zoning in Statutes	0.164 (0.409)
Governor (1=Dem)	1.105* (0.462)
Dems (State Legislature)	0.838 (1.806)
Dems (Local Elections)	2.626 (2.261)
Democratic Mayor	-0.771 (0.635)
Vote Diff (Local Elections)	-2.381 (1.825)
N	1850
Cities	129
BIC	373.8

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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