**WHEN WHISTLEBLOWERS BECOME TRAITORS**:

*Approaching Internal Relations in the Intelligence Community from a Psychological Perspective*

Senior Honors Thesis

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**Abstract**

The tension between secrecy and transparency is not a new dichotomy in either US politics or popular conversation. However, in 2013, when Edward Snowden leaked classified documents to the media about an extensive surveillance program known as PRISM, the views held by many Americans regarding security and accountability reached new extremes. This study takes an interdisciplinary approach to examining one of the most central elements of this issue — the Whistleblower’s Dilemma. Referring to a situation of internal ethical conflict in which an individual must compromise one core value to uphold another, the Whistleblower’s Dilemma has no higher stakes scenario than the United States’ Intelligence Community (IC). This quantitative and qualitative content analysis examines interviews with IC whistleblowers who reported on classified information in order to identify motivations and deterrents to their behavior. Four psychological variables were examined (valuation of fairness, loyalty, public service motivation and perceived personal cost) in order to identify potential similarities and differences between internal and external IC whistleblowers. Findings demonstrated that all whistleblowers expressed being disturbed by wrongdoing (fairness), a sense of responsibility (PSM) and values-consistent behavior (PSM). Internal whistleblowers expressed higher PPC, valuation of practical fairness and specific loyalty to the government, while external whistleblowers demonstrated higher PSM, valuation of “big picture” fairness and higher levels of loyalty in general. The results of these findings were applied to the development of internal relations strategies to increase internal reporting, decrease external reporting and contribute knowledge to current insider threat

programs.

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**Introduction**

The tension between secrecy and transparency is not a new dichotomy in either US politics or popular conversation. However, in 2013, when Edward Snowden leaked classified documents to the media — particularly those about an extensive surveillance program known as PRISM — the views held by many Americans regarding security and accountability reached new extremes (Stone, 2013). These seemingly divergent ideologies are not only present in public debate but are also found in the personal belief systems of people working firsthand with government secrets: members of the Intelligence Community (IC). When these individuals are exposed to classified information that they believe is immoral, illegal, or unconstitutional, they must make a choice to either report it or not. If an individual decides to report on what they have seen, they must then choose whether to do so through designated internal channels or through external channels, like the media. This research examines the psychological determinants that play into these decisions and proposes internal relations strategies to increase internal reporting and decrease external reporting.

***The Intelligence Community and Internal Relations***

The Intelligence Community is a federation of seventeen “executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of national security of the United States” (User, 1). Some of the agencies within the IC are well-known to the public, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. However, the IC also includes organizations that are less recognizable, such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and those not typically associated with the traditional idea of intelligence, like the Department of Treasury (User, 2). While corporations and organizations in the public sphere have external goals (i.e., increasing profit, building relationships with shareholders, etc.), they also have internal objectives (i.e., high productivity levels, low turnover, etc.) that are foundational in allowing them to achieve their external goals. In a similar manner, members of the IC must have a strong foundation internally before they can successfully accomplish their individual and collective missions externally. Internal relations refers to the process of internal communication between an organization and its employees for the purpose of building a relationship between the two entities that simultaneously enhances the workers’ experience and serves the organization’s mission (internal). This study and the internal relations strategies that are recommended will be applied specifically to departments within member organizations whose employees deal with classified information.

***Whistleblowing and Protection in the Intelligence Community***

Whistleblowing, the decision to report wrongdoing, is defined as, “an activity of disclosure by organizational members [or ex-members] for illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers [or previous employers], to persons or organizations who may be able to effect action” (Near, 1996). Federal laws, such as the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, are in place to shield whistleblowers from employer backlash (1989). However, because of the sensitive nature of information in the IC, that protection is only offered to employees who *internally* report wrongdoing. These specific protections were established in the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, which created an avenue for IC employees to raise concerns before a designated congressional committee (TOPN). Choosing to circumvent these internal channels by externally reporting classified information to the public is illegal and in some circumstances, may be treasonous.

This research examines the personal characteristics of whistleblowers before and after the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 was established and touches on the contextual factors that informed their decision to report either internally or externally. The analysis will present a holistic understanding of the psychological perspective and situational context of IC whistleblowers. Ultimately, this analysis will form the basis for the recommendation of internal relations strategies to promote internal reporting while simultaneously reducing external reporting of classified information.

**Literature Review**

The concept of whistleblowing in the Intelligence Community has reached an unparalleled level of prominence in recent years. Between the 2016 release of Oliver Stone’s film “Snowden” and the debates over WikiLeaks’ publication of national security information from former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emails, there has been no shortage of media coverage on the matter. However, the importance of this topic is evident in ways that lie beyond the public eye. Understanding whistleblower behavior and creating internal relations strategies that deter external whistleblowing is foundational to the protection of national secrets that have the power to protect or destroy human life. This information includes everything from the names of American officers working on covert foreign missions to surveillance methods that detail how the United States targets terrorists. Because the stakes are so high when it comes to external whistleblowing, even *internal* whistleblowers — who utilize proper, legal channels to bring issues to light — may nonetheless face backlash.

When it comes to predicting or explaining whistleblowing behavior, scholars have used three classifications: personal characteristics (personality, motivations, age, gender, conceptualization of justice, etc.), contextual factors (organization type, ethical climate of the individual’s team, support from supervisors, risk of retaliation, etc.), and characteristics of the wrongdoing (type, severity, amount of accumulated evidence, etc.). This study focused on personal characteristics and contextual factors and analyzed them from a psychological perspective. Thus, it is helpful to understand prior research on behavioral ethics, as it relates to motivating and deterring reporting behavior. This will provide a framework and context for the study in application to internal relations strategies.

***Behavioral Ethics: Motiving and Deterring Reporting Behavior***

While extensive research has examined the structural and organization factors involved in whistleblowing, few scholars have looked into the psychological determinates of reporting. The conversation about behavioral ethics is founded on what is called the “whistleblower’s dilemma”— choosing what is right when all the options are wrong (Malek, 2010). This quandary is based on the idea that individuals who report wrongdoing must make certain ethical sacrifices in the pursuit of a greater ethical concern. In *Moral Theory*, W. D. Ross describes situations like these as ones of “competing moral duties” (Meyers, 2003). Is it better to be a silent bystander or a snitch? Is it patriotic to do your duty and keep your word, or to speak out and expose potential problems? From this perspective, whistleblowers have to choose between something right and something good, or between something wrong and something bad. Concerns surrounding the ethics of whistleblowing are amplified when national security is involved. While the corporate world may describe a whistleblower’s actions as disloyal and might blacklist them from a future in that industry, a reporter in the IC who blows the whistle is considered a traitor and might face imprisonment. Yet even so, some individuals in the IC are compelled to whistleblow. This internal conflict is one reason why the study of behavior related to whistleblowing is so complex.

Within the study of behavioral ethics, the dichotomy of fairness versus loyalty is one of the most significant dilemmas faced by a potential whistleblower. This dichotomy, and other psychological themes like perceived personal cost and public service motivation, are important facets of the study of motivating and deterring whistleblowing behavior.

Although fairness and loyalty are both viewed as desirable moral qualities (Haidt, 2007),

there may be instances when one must choose to either be loyal or to be fair. Past research has shown that people tend to live more exclusively by rules of fairness, but when these qualities are at odds, individuals tend to choose loyalty over fairness (Dungan, Waytz, & Young, 2014). For example, if someone observed a robbery, they might be likely to report it to the police — but if the robber was that person’s brother, the choice might be to conceal. Scholars have shown there are elements that can impact the weight of loyalty in this decision, including relationship type (Rai & Fiske, 2011), perceived duty (Baron, Ritov, & Greene, 2011), and cultural differences (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Waytz, Dungan, & Young 2013).

Whistleblowing offers a prime example of these two qualities being pitted against one another. “Whereas fairness norms typically require that people report and punish wrongdoing, loyalty norms … indicate that reporting another person to a third party may constitute an act of betrayal” (Waytz, Dungan, & Young 2013, p. 1028). Waytz, Dungan and Young (2013) connected the notions of fairness and loyalty and addressed the degree to which an individual’s valuation of fairness over loyalty could be used to predict his or her willingness to whistleblow given a variety of influences. These researchers found that people who identify more with concepts of loyalty are less likely to whistleblow, while those who value fairness are more likely to engage in reporting behavior. It was also demonstrated that people’s value systems are not fixed — when a person is primed toward either fairness or loyalty, their circumstantial value of that quality increases. For example, if someone was told to write an essay on the importance of fairness, the individual would subsequently place more importance on being fair, increasing their willingness to whistleblow. Interestingly, the effect is even stronger when people are primed toward loyalty — meaning the person’s willingness to whistleblow decreases more significantly than someone’s willingness to whistleblow would increase if they were primed toward fairness. Waytz, Dungan and Young’s (2013) research affirmed previous studies that found the ratio of fairness and loyalty that individuals used to make whistleblowing decisions is not constant across situations. In agreement with Rai and Fiske (2011), these authors found that the proportions within this ratio are dependent on the closeness of the individual’s relationship with the person or entity involved in the wrongdoing (Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013). For example, someone would be swayed more significantly by loyalty if the entity were a family member or friend, whereas the person’s judgment would orient more toward fairness if the situation was focused on an acquaintance or stranger. Thus, the results of this foundational study reveal that everyone has a distinct, personal valuation of fairness and loyalty, but that the ratio is dependent on personal relationship with the wrongdoer and it can be manipulated by experience — all of which influence whistleblowing behavior (Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013).

From a slightly different perspective, business and ethics scholar Near (1996) argued that the idea of loyalty needs to be amended and specified for each context where it presents itself. For example, the dichotomy would be destabilized if someone had a high valuation of loyalty but that loyalty was directed to the public and not the person’s employer. In that case, the person would feel they are being disloyal by *not* whistleblowing.

Near (1996) has identified additional traits related to whistleblowing intent, including the idea that people’s valuation of whistleblowing is a better predictor of whistleblowing behavior than personality type. She goes on to say that whistleblowers are often:

…older or have more service, are better educated, and are more likely to be male …, highly paid, have high job performance, hold supervisory or professional status, and report that they work in a role with the responsibility to report wrongdoing and have the knowledge of channels to do so (Near, 1996, pg. 511).

These findings are important because they challenge the stereotypical image of a whistleblower — an entry-level employee who is disillusioned or disgruntled with the organization.

While the dichotomy of fairness versus loyalty and personal characteristics provide a framework for understanding whistleblowers, these systems cannot fully explain whistleblowing behavior. Cho and Song (2015) highlighted three more important influences on whistleblowing behavior — public service motivation (PSM), perceived personal cost (PPC) and education on whistleblowing. PSM describes the motivation of whistleblowers to act in favor of the public good, while PPC describes the level of perceived harm they fear they will experience as a result of reporting. Cho and Song (2015) found that as an individual’s PPC increased, his or her whistleblowing activities decreased. Simultaneously, as PPC decreased, whistleblowing behavior increased (Cho & Song 2015). This study went on to explore factors that decrease perceived personal cost and found that organizational support and protection alleviate the effects of PPC, thus increasing whistleblowing intention (Cho & Song 2015). In agreement with earlier studies, higher levels of PSM and greater amounts of education on whistleblowing increased whistleblowing behavior (Perry & Wise, 1990). These concepts are essential in understanding the mentality of whistleblowers, and the motivations and deterrents of reporting behavior.

The findings surrounding fairness versus loyalty, PPC and PSM are particularly relevant to the development of internal relations strategies in the IC. The importance of effective internal relations cannot be overstated — these strategies influence everything from job retention and satisfaction to productivity and collaboration. Internal relations, or lack thereof, shapes an organization’s culture and motivates behavior in one direction or another. However, at the basis of internal relations is a very simple concept — relationship building. Thus, in order to create systems and strategies to increase internal reporting and decrease external reporting, it must start on a relational level. The psychological themes outlined above demonstrate what drives people to report or to stay silent, and will provide a framework for the development of effective relational strategies.

Based on this literature, this study seeks to answer the following RQ:

RQ1) What are the similarities and differences in psychological motivation for internal

and external whistleblowers in the Intelligence Community?

It is hypothesized that:

H1) External whistleblowers will express higher levels of PSM

H2) Internal whistleblowers will express higher levels of PPC

H3) Internal whistleblowers will express higher levels of loyalty

H4) External whistleblowers will express higher levels of fairness

**Methods**

This thesis sought to answer questions underlying the psychological qualities of IC whistleblowers that influence their reporting behavior. The variables examined included the dichotomy of fairness versus loyalty, PPC and PSM. The findings were analyzed to create internal relations strategies with the purpose of increasing internal reporting and decreasing external reporting of classified information.

Since access to most IC whistleblowers was limited, this study was executed by means of examining existing interviews. The analysis included interview transcripts from 14 whistleblowers. These whistleblowers were chosen based on their employment with a member organization of the IC, the nature of their reporting (i.e., individuals who reported on classified information rather than less relevant topics like financial fraud or sexual assault), and the availability of information about their case. Interviews were selected if the topics being discussed related to the reasons why the person chose to whistleblow and the circumstances surrounding that process. The majority of whistleblowers that were analyzed were Caucasian men whose reporting incidents took place between 1971 and 2016. The plurality of these individuals have three recorded interviews used in the study, while the most prominent individuals had up to five transcripts that were analyzed.

All interview data was found through open sources, such as GoogleScholar, as well as academic databases through the UNC Libraries’ portal. Some of the interviews originate from news sources and were already transcribed in a usable format, while others were audio, video or stationary file formats that required transcription. The interviews in non-usable formats were transcribed by an online transcription service and paid for through funding from TISS-CAE and Honors Carolina.

In order to examine psychological themes, this thesis utilized mixed methods content analysis. Wimmer and Dominick (2006) define content analysis as a systematic procedure to examine the content of recorded information and make replicable, valid references from data to its context. This form of analysis is used to examine themes in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from historical war analysis to medical research. For this study, quantitative content analysis was used through a cross-platform system called Dedoose to detect themes that relate to what deterred and motivated whistleblowers’ reporting behavior. Specifically, this program was used to track the ways in which fairness, loyalty, PPC and PSM influenced whistleblowers’ reporting behavior. Each of those psychological variables were operationalized using associated word dictionaries that frame ways in which abstract notions of ethics. For example, PPC was coded for by breaking down each aspect of its definition into subunits that were individually coded for to capture the entirety of the concept. PPC was sub-coded to include: References of Harm, Protectionist Action, Fear and Paranoia and Focus on Personal Cost. The same approach was taken with PSM, which was sub-coded to include: Values-Consistent Behavior, Social Improvement, Service, Altruism and Responsibility. Similar approaches were taken with fairness and loyalty, with an emphasis placed on defining the directionality of the values. Fairness was sub-coded to include: Concern for Rights, Rights of Others, Rights of Self, and Disturbed by Wrongdoing. Loyalty was sub-coded to include: Loyalty to Public, Loyalty to Government, Loyalty to Constitution and Loyalty to Self. The definition of each of these codes and their applications are further defined in the defining quantitative and qualitative codes section.

The purpose of the quantitative aspect of the study was to configure the number of times these themes surfaced in each transcript and to track the similarities or patterns in these themes across the body of whistleblowers being analyzed. This data was also used to look for potential differences in motivation between whistleblowers who reported internally and those who reported externally, in addition to gleaning demographic information like age, position and employment status. This data was important to collect because understanding the motivation of past whistleblowers gave the researcher a foundation on which to build internal relations strategies that are relevant to this specific community and issue.

The qualitative aspect of this analysis then examined the findings more closely to determine whether the psychological themes previously shown to influence reporting behavior have had a demonstrated impact on IC whistleblowers. To facilitate this analysis, the directional scales from Watyz and Young (2013), and Cho and Song (2015) — which provide precedent on the ways in which each variable reportedly increases or decreases whistleblowing intention – were used. Findings about whistleblower characteristics, in addition to other themes and patterns that were found between different whistleblowers’ experiences, were subjected to further analysis. Why do whistleblowers say they chose to externally report? What barriers do whistleblowers say they were met with in the process of attempting internal reporting? What fears did the whistleblowers talk about toward both internal and external reporting? The combination of the quantitative data and the patterns that surfaced in response to this qualitative analysis were used as a foundation for recommendations for internal relations strategies specific to the IC.

**Defining Quantitative and Qualitative Codes**

***Public Service Motivation***

In the qualitative analysis, codes were constructed to encapsulate every aspect of public service motivation. This term was defined by the codes: 1. Service, which encompassed any time the whistleblower spoke or behaved in a way that was motivated by a desire to serve, 2. Altruism, which encompassed any statements or actions by the whistleblower that were reflective of a desire to help others in the face of personal costs, 3. Responsibility, which encompassed any statement or action taken by the whistleblower that reflected feelings of self-imposed responsibility or obligation. 4. Social Improvement, which encompassed statements and acts reflective of a desire to positively impact and improve society, 5. Values-Consistent Behavior (VCB), which encompassed statements and actions made that reflect a desire to behave in a way that is consistent with the individual’s closely held beliefs or values.

***Perceived Personal Cost***

In the qualitative analysis, codes were constructed encapsulate every aspect of the perceived personal cost. This term was defined by the codes: 1. Protectionist Action, which encompassed any action the whistleblower intended to take or took for the purpose of protecting himself from harm, 2. Personal Cost, which encompassed any time the whistleblower spoke about harm they experienced beforehand or as a result of whistleblowing, 3. Fear, which encompassed any moment the whistleblower discussed fear of harm or retaliation. 4. Paranoia, a subset of Fear, and encompassed statements or acts reflective of paranoia, 5. References of Harm, which encompassed any time the individual referenced another whistleblower from the past or present that had experienced harm as a result of their efforts.

***Loyalty***

In the qualitative analysis, codes were constructed not only to encapsulate characteristics of loyalty, but also the direction of that loyalty. This term was defined by the codes: 1. Loyalty to the Public, which reflected statements by the whistleblower that portrayed loyalty to American citizens or citizens of the world, 2. Loyalty to the Constitution, which reflected statements by the whistleblower that portrayed loyalty to upholding and defending the constitution, 3. Loyalty to the Government, which reflected statements by the whistleblower that portrayed loyalty to the agency they worked for or more broadly to the U.S. government, 4. Loyalty to Self, which reflected statements by the whistleblower that portrayed loyalty to their own beliefs, experiences or ideology.

***Fairness***

In the qualitative analysis, codes were constructed to capture the notion of fairness and its orientation. This term was defined by the codes: 1. Concern for Rights, which was further defined by two sub-codes, Rights of Others and Rights of Self, and captured statements made reflecting each of those concerns, 2. Disturbed by Wrongdoing, which encompassed statements made by the whistleblower that reflected strongly negative emotional arousal in response to wrongdoing.

**Findings**

***Nature of the Whistleblower***

Through examining these fourteen government whistleblowers’ experiences and intentions, findings tended to show that results could be grouped into two broad categories. Type 1 includes individuals who took direct action to internally or externally whistleblow and consider themselves to be whistleblowers. Type 2 includes individuals who took action that resembled whistleblowing but viewed the action as a part of their job and did not initially consider themselves to be whistleblowers. Typically, in response to government retaliation, many individuals in this second group eventually take on the identity of a whistleblower and fight back to further expose wrongdoing and/or the infringement on their own rights. For the purposes of this analysis, Type 1 includes: Binney, Drake, Ellsberg, Fellwock, Manning, Snowden, Tamm, Tice and Wiebe. Type 2 includes: Carpenter, Kiriakou, Loomis, Provance and Sterling.

Beyond this classification, these whistleblowers can also be divided into internal and external whistleblowers. Although, at this point, all of these individuals have disclosed the nature of their reporting with the public and can thus technically be considered external whistleblowers, this categorization refers to the *initial* nature of their reporting process. For the purposes of this analysis, internals include: Binney, Carpenter, Loomis, Sterling and Wiebe. Externals include: Drake, Ellsberg, Fellwock, Kiriakou, Manning, Provance, Snowden, Tamm and Tice. Of the Externals, several attempted – or claimed to attempt – internal whistleblowing without success before they chose to report externally.

Although there is a wide diversity in motivation and reporting type within the Externals and internals, this study observed the general trends that each group demonstrated in relation to public service motivation, perceived personal cost, loyalty and fairness. The findings from these two groups was then compared and contrasted.

***Public Service Motivation – Overview***

The findings for PSM supported the first hypothesis (H1). Internals expressed lower levels of PSM than Externals in each of the characteristic’s five defining categories. Values-Consistent Behavior (VCB) and Responsibility each showed the widest differences between Externals and Internals, with Externals expressing both a greater concern about behaving in a way that is consistent with their values, as well as a greater tendency to feel responsible and burdened by factors outside of their direct control. The two groups were most similar in their desire for Social Improvement, but it should be noted that only Externals explicitly expressed intentional Altruism in their thought processes.

***Public Service Motivation – Values-Consistent Behavior (VCB)***

One of the characteristics used to define PSM is Values-Consistent Behavior, which was coded in this study to capture sentiments that reflect an individual’s desire to behave in a way that is consistent with their beliefs and values. While the majority of VCB excerpts come from Externals, several Internals, such as Jeffrey Sterling, also expressed this quality. When Sterling was initially being accused of leaking classified material from the CIA, he went to Congressman Lacy Clay to look for help. During his time there, one of the staff members told him he should flee the country. His reaction to that advice can be seen in the excerpts below:

Here’s a black man who works with a black representative, knowing what we’ve gone through in this country, and me trying to exert and stand up for my civil rights. You mention CIA to him, and the only response that I got was I should run away. Well, my mother didn’t teach me that. You don’t run away. You stand up for yourself (Document: WB\_Sterling\_1.docx, Position: 2807-3135).

I was the youngest of five brothers. One went to the Army, one was in the Navy, and another went to the Marines. My stand-up-for-yourself, be-yourself sort of attitude, that was instilled to me by my mother (Document: WB\_Sterling\_1.docx, Position: 3252-3459).

Taking Sterling’s words collectively, it is evident that he believes in the importance of standing up for his own rights. This valuation appears to be anchored in both his familial upbringing and experience with discrimination as an African-American man on the timeline of American history. This is an example of VCB because this value drove him to action — or in this case, against action — when he chose to stand in court rather than fleeing the country.

William Binney, who whistleblew about an NSA surveillance program called Trailblazer, describes his motivation for whistleblowing in the excepts below:

So 9/11 happened, and after that, we ran into the illegal activity with the spying on U.S. citizens, a violation of the Constitution and the laws, and we said: ‘We can't stick around and be a party to this. We can't be an accessory to all these crimes. We have to get out’ (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 16016-16289).

I mean, they all took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution, and they've all scrapped that. They basically are violating their oath of office (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 23629-23780).

From Binney’s statements, it appears that he highly values the Constitution and believes in the importance of being true to the oath he had taken to protect it. His prioritization of these values made him unable to stand silently by while a program was running that violated the Constitution. From the second excerpt, it is clear he perceived that people who were supporting this program were actually breaking their oath of office. After making unsuccessful internal attempts to bring these issues to light, Binney demonstrated further VCB by resigning from his position — unable to “be an accessory to all these crimes.” The reason he chose to simply leave the NSA rather than bringing his concerns to the public also appears related to VCB:

We were still traditional employees of the government and wanted to stay inside the government to try to get the government to change its ways to make it, to right itself as opposed to having to force it by going to the Fourth Estate, the public (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 29194-29440).

This statement of VCB, which speaks highly of loyalty to the government, will be further explored in later analysis, but it demonstrates an important point in relation to PSM. Binney’s “traditional employee” sentiments — which were consistent with statements from other Internals — indicate that higher rates of VCB cannot be used as the *sole determination* of an individual’s directional whistleblowing intention.

That said, it was still more common for Externals to expressly connect their actions with their beliefs and to do so in direct relation with whistleblowing behavior. Thomas Drake provides an example of VCB while reflecting on a conversation with one of his friends:

[He said to me] ‘Just let it run its course, Tom, and do your best to survive for the rest of your life, right, because you already paid a high enough price and luckily you didn't end up in prison. You know what liberty and freedom means.’ I said, yeah, that's why I'm out here in public defending it (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 80533-80819).

In this quote, he describes the situation he was facing after speaking to the press, facing charges and ultimately getting off without a prison sentence. He agrees with his friend on the value of “liberty and freedom,” two notions that he continued to discuss openly throughout his interviews as motivating factors behind his original decision to whistleblow:

See, I had served in the Air Force during the Cold War. Okay? I flew in RC-135s, listening in on the Warsaw Pact. I became—the target country in which I became an expert as a crypto linguist was East Germany. Okay? So I was certainly well aware of what a surveillance police state looks like and sounds like. Okay? You don't listen in on those type of communications year after year without it affecting you in terms of what does that mean, right, and why it's important not to go in that direction (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 17970-18470).

Beliefs and values that are strong enough to motivate behavior are typically anchored in experience or core aspects of an individual’s identity. The power that East Germany’s police-state exercised over its people through mass surveillance had an impact on Drake, increased his valuation of American freedoms, and ultimately played a role in driving his attempts to defend those protections when he felt they were endangered.

John Kiriakou, who whistleblew about the CIA’s torture policy, similarly expressed VCB in his description of a situation that occurred while he was working over counterterrorism operations in Pakistan:

I was asked by one of the leaders in the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center if I wanted to be trained in the use of these techniques. I told him that I had a moral problem with them, and I did not want to be involved (Document: WB\_KIriakou\_4.docx, Position: 2032-2244).

In this statement, which refers to a moment when Kiriakou was approached about developing skills in enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT), he refused to be involved on moral grounds. Looking further into his motivations, it appears that the moral grounds he was referring to are related to human rights and American exceptionalism. When asked about why he did not believe that the U.S. government should be using EIT, he replied,

“Because we’re Americans, and we’re better than that” (Document: WB\_Kiriakou\_4 .docx, Position: 343-395).

In an interesting application of personal VCB to a national level, Kiriakou went on to say,

Well, who are we to criticize other country’s Human Rights practices when our own Human Rights practices should be called into question? (Document: WB\_Kiriakou\_5 .docx, Position: 6991-7127)

This statement reflects a level of cognitive dissonance from what he viewed as hypocrisy in the United States’ international position (values) not reflecting their own policies and actions (behavior). Another example of cognitive dissonance resulting from a lack of VCB can be seen in Thomas Tamm’s realization that his office within the Department of Justice was likely taking part in wrongdoing:

She told me that she just assumed that what we were doing was illegal and she didn't want to ask any questions. That really ate away at me and bothered me, because I thought I had gone into law enforcement to enforce the law. I didn't like the fact that I thought, or that a supervisor thought, that we might be doing something illegal (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 4979-5315).

Tamm’s words show an interesting contrast between his own reaction and that of his co-worker’s to the same scenario. Although they were both equally aware that something illegal might be happening around them, she simply turned a blind eye while he was disturbed and could not let it go. This is an example of cognitive dissonance, around which Festinger (1962) developed a theory that argues people are compelled to keep their attitudes and beliefs in harmony. Cognitive dissonance itself refers to a situation “involving conflicting attitudes, beliefs or behaviors… [which] produce a feeling of discomfort leading to an alteration in one of the attitudes, beliefs or behaviors to reduce the discomfort and restore balance” (McLeod, 2008). It is interesting to note that this is highly reminiscent of how the Whistleblower’s Dilemma is defined. Thus, Values-Consistent Behavior, and the cognitive dissonance that results when it is hindered, appears particularly important within the context of PSM and the motivations behind whistleblowing intention.

***Public Service Motivation – Service and Altruism***

Service, another characteristic used to define sentiments of PSM, refers to statements or behaviors that reflect a desire to serve the country and/or the American people. This sentiment was expressed in a variety of ways, including explanations behind military enlistment, as well as more civilian oriented service, where words like “helping” and “contributing” were commonly used. External whistleblowers exhibited this quality in interviews more than twice as often as Internals. Edward Snowden, an External who whistleblew about a surveillance program known as PRISM, expressed the following in reference to his thought process before releasing NSA documents to the media:

I had doubts because I really wanted to make sure, my first principle for all of the journalists, for everyone involved in this was that we have to do no harm, right? We have to make sure that this serves the public interest, because this is an extraordinary action (Document: WB\_Snowden\_6.docx, Position: 40946-41214).

Snowden’s statement expresses a desire to ensure his actions are leveraged for the public interest, not their detriment. This perspective is representative of the way many Externals described the motivations behind the finer details of their reporting process. It is also reflective of how they justified the potential personal costs of their actions — they were serving the public, an idea greater than themselves.

In the case of Externals, expressions of service often overlapped with Altruism, which refers to statements or actions that reflect a desire to help others in the face of personal costs. In the excerpts below, an example of this crossover can be seen as Snowden describes his thought process behind the decision to whistleblow and its implications:

…If you realize that that’s the world you helped to create and it’s going to get worse with the next generation and the next generation who extend the capability as of this sort of architectural repression, you realize that you might be willing to accept any risk and it doesn’t matter what the outcome is. So long as the public gets to make their own decisions about how that’s applied (Document: WB\_Snowden\_2.docx, Position: 5316-5710).

I'm willing to make a lot of sacrifices for my country—that should be clear at this point, I think, since I had to live in exile for the last three years, and I lived in a very comfortable life before that (Document: WB\_Snowden\_4.docx, Position: 1288-1493).

Samuel Provance, an External who whistleblew about torture at a Baghdad military prison called Abu Ghraib, also demonstrated Altruism in his recognition of both the personal costs he faced and the greater purpose he was serving*,*

Well, on a personal level, obviously, I would say it’s not worth it, you know, but this is bigger than me (Document: WB\_Provance\_1.docx, Position: 33009-33115).

In contrast, Internals tended not to demonstrate qualities of Altruism, and their expressions related to Service embodied slightly different themes. While people like Snowden and Provance often spoke of service in reference to their actions of whistleblowing, Internals like Loomis and Binney tended to reference Service in defense of their personal patriotism or in relation to thwarted attempts to serve the public interest. In the example below, Edward Loomis, a former systems analyst from the NSA and internal whistleblower of Trailblazer, explains his mentality when the FBI started investigating him as a potential leaker of classified information:

I was not the easiest person to live with at the time, because I was just—here I am, an Eagle Scout, a retired Scoutmaster, very high level in the Order of the Arrow and a devout patriot, and my patriotism is being questioned by the government that I had served for 43 years. I just couldn't—it just didn't make sense to me (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 27033-27463).

Loomis’ statements reflect an obvious patriotism and reference behaviors that demonstrate service to the country. However, unlike excepts from Snowden, Loomis’ words appear to come from a sense of shocked indignation and are said in defense of his national allegiance, rather than as an explanation of what motivated his whistleblowing behavior.

Binney demonstrated a similar desire to serve in the excerpt below, where he describes the situation in the wake of 9/11 when his proposals to deploy ThinThread were being rejected.

So we were sitting there, basically frustrated, not being able to help anybody (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 10477-10556).

His short statement of frustration reflects that his desire to initiate ThinThread was at least partially motivated by his desire to serve the country — to help people. This statement and its relatively subtle allusion to Service was typical of Internals. That subtlety stands in contrast with the more direct references to Service from Externals like Snowden. It is possible that external whistleblowers, facing a higher level of government pushback and often being portrayed as national traitors, feel compelled to focus more on their desire to serve the public when describing their motivations. This is particularly true of Snowden’s second excerpt from this section, in which he explicitly says that he is willing to make a lot of sacrifices for his country — referencing his exile as evidence. It is also possible that Externals naturally spoke more often and explicitly about Service because of their higher levels of loyalty to the public. This possibility will be more explicitly explored in the analysis of Valuation of Loyalty.

***Public Service Motivation – Social Improvement***

Desire for Social Improvement, another characteristic used to define PSM, encompassed statements and acts reflective of a desire to positively impact or improve society. Of all the traits of PSM, Externals and Internals were most similar in their expression of this characteristic, though Externals still showed slightly higher rates. Bradley Manning, now known as Chelsea Manning, was an Army private who released classified information to WikiLeaks about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. She describes the social good that she hopes will come from her actions in the excerpt below:

I am hopeful that people can gain more of an understanding of how the world operates. Across the world, governments can easily become centered on themselves and their interests, at the expense of their people. I am also hopeful that, perhaps, the next time a democratic government thinks about committing military forces to the occupation of a country which is likely to lead to an insurgency, we can try and look back, and learn from the last time. War is a terrible thing, and this type of warfare is one of the worst. I hope that we can avoid getting excited about this kind of thing in the future (Document: WB\_Manning\_2.docx, Position: 1375-2019).

Binney also demonstrates a desire for Social Improvement as an Internal through of his and J. Kirk Wiebe’s extensive efforts to implement an alternative surveillance program that protected U.S. citizens and saved the judicial process from fraud:

…we explained all of the ways that they could protect U.S. citizens and ensure that it wasn't collected; the data that was relevant; the content that was associated with them wasn't collected. All of that could have been filtered out right up front and never taken into any database… (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 22579-22877).

When ThinThread was rejected for Trailblazer with the underlying notion that privacy needed to be sacrificed for security, Wiebe expressed frustration with the government messaging that he felt manipulated society into choosing one good thing over another when it was possible to have both.

…there is no reason, technologically, to sacrifice privacy for ability to catch bad guys. They are two separate things, separate, no need to mingle the two. There's no balance, there's no trade-off, no nothing. We can do both 100 percent (Document: WB\_Weibe\_1.docx, Position: 26175-26416).

These statements demonstrate that this characteristic of PSM — the desire to positively impact and improve society — was present among most Intelligence Community whistleblowers.

***Public Service Motivation – Responsibility***

PSM is also defined by an attribute termed Responsibility, which encompassed statements and actions that reflected feelings of self-imposed responsibility or obligation, typically to society. The primary way this manifested was when individuals took it as their duty to expose or try to remedy wrongdoing, but this also revealed itself in more indirect ways. For example, many individuals expressed a weight of responsibility for organizational failures and national crises in which they were sometimes involved but did not have enough power to actually influence. This often resulted in strong feelings of guilt and regret. One of the most obvious examples of this characteristic can be seen in Thomas Drake, who expressed the sentiment in almost every interview question he answered. Take the following excerpt*,*

What do you do? I mean, I'm not the one who made the decisions, but I now have the dirty knowledge. So I decided that I could not remain silent (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 6645-6789).

When Drake initially encountered Trailblazer and the fraud that was involved, he acknowledged that he was not the decision-maker, but because he knew about the wrongdoing, he felt obligated to speak against it:

I'm burdened by the massive multibillion-dollar fraud on an extraordinary scale, that the response to the failure of the government to provide for the common defense was ‘let's just spend a lot more money because we're too big to fail’ (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 2691-2924).

This statement presents a highly representative picture of Drake in relation to Responsibility. First, the notion of feeling “burdened,” both by systems that he had influence over and those which he did not, is seen throughout his interviews. The following excerpts demonstrate the scope of Drake’s embodiment of this quality:

I'm burdened by the mass surveillance regime that was put into place in the deepest of secrecy. All of this I'm burdened by. And it's going on 14 years now. I looked into the Pandora's box, and it was very, very dark. And the abyss looked back at me (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 2925-3175).

But remember, this part of the burden. I was there literally when they had tried to drop the World Trade Center towers the first time (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 17084-17219).

If you have information that rises to a level that says something is happening and it's going to be really bad, you've got to share it, you've got to bring in the key people, you've got to take action to prevent it (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 22268-22483).

We sent out reports then that [the terrorists] were going to come back. And they came back. Okay? This is part of the burden, this burden that we just failed the nation… (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 8685-8840).

…right after 9/11, the workforce knew we had failed the nation. People really took it hard, 'cause that was our responsibility was to provide for the common defense, and we hadn't done that, so almost 3,000 people are murdered (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 33827-34082).

[ThinThread] was actually formally canceled in August 2001. I attempted to resurrect it shortly after 9/11—it was, again, a burden that I carry: it had a two-page classified implementation plan, and it was all rejected (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 61845-62055).

That's why I'm burdened by history. Remember, I am burdened by the dark chapters of the 20th century. I'm burdened by my own father's history from World War II. I'm burdened by what happened during the Cold War (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 49541-49753).

Beyond Drake’s feelings of responsibility to the nation and the burden that he carries in light of that obligation, there are also undertones of guilt in many of the statements he makes. In reference to his work with the NSA, he tends to use the subject pronouns “we” and “us” and the possessive pronoun “our,” even in reference to agency wrongdoing that he did not have influence over. This choice of pronoun reflects a personal association with the organization. While this may be a common feature of speech for someone who has worked for the government for most of his life, it is interesting in Drake’s case because he does not make a single statement that indicates loyalty toward the NSA or the government. Even still, he feels personally burdened by every aspect of the organization’s known wrongdoing. In this way, Drake appears to have tied his identity to the NSA or perhaps the government as an entity, such that its wrongdoing feels like the equivalent of his own personal wrongdoing.

This trait, which was expressed so consistently throughout Drake’s interviews, also ran as a steady theme in the speech of other Externals. In the following excerpt, Provance demonstrates not only feeling a personal burden and sense of responsibility to expose the torture happening at Abu Ghraib, but also the assumption that others felt the same way about the issue:

I was trusting that the investigation would uncover, you know, what had happened, you know, that people under this unbearable burden of, you know, the scandal and the assumed scrutiny would begin — you know, somebody else, others, many others, would begin talking or confessing (Document: WB\_Provance\_1.docx, Position: 27528-27844).

He went on to express shock that no one else ultimately came forward to testify about what was happening:

Even the mechanics knew the things that were going on. And that’s why, even to this day, I’m just completely amazed that there’s been nobody else that, you know, has had their conscience bother them to come forward and say, look, you know, this is what was really going on… (Document: WB\_Provance\_1.docx, Position: 12715-12987).

Provance’s statements demonstrate that he not only felt obligated to expose truth about a situation of wrongdoing, but also that he expected other people who were involved to feel similarly and act likewise.

Other Externals talked more specifically about the growing weight of the burden they felt and its impact on their actions. Specifically, many explained that the actions they took were done in order to relieve the weight of the burden they felt. In the excerpt below, Snowden describes the weight of his growing awareness of wrongdoing and how it induced his actions:

But overtime, that awareness of wrongdoing sort of builds up and you feel compelled to talk about it… (Document: WB\_Snowden\_2.docx, Position: 1033-1100).

Interestingly, he uses the second person, “you,” when describing these feelings — generalizing them to the experience of other people in a way that reflects a similar mentality to Provance.

Perry Fellwock, who whistleblew about the NSA’s involvement in Southeast Asia, describes a similar desire to relieve the burden he feels. In his case, this burden was weighted with guilt and disgust over his involvement with the U.S. in that region of the world. His motivations for speaking out insinuate that he saw his whistleblowing actions as a form of recompense:

It's a burden—in a way, I just want to get rid of it. I don't want to get sentimental or corny about it, but I've made some friends who love the Indochinese people. This is my way of loving them too (Document: WB\_Fellwock\_2.docx, Position: 58198-58398).

Manning, another External, goes on to describe how her whistleblowing actions relieved the burden she felt and gave her a clear conscience:

Although the information had not yet been publicly by the WLO, I felt this sense of relief by them having it. I felt I had accomplished something that allowed me to have a clear conscience based upon what I had seen and read about and knew were happening in both Iraq and Afghanistan everyday (Document: WB\_Manning\_1.docx, Position: 30357-30702).

Internals also showed characteristics of Responsibility, but they occurred less often and were typically more indirect. These individuals often described taking action in a way that demonstrated they felt “personally responsible” over a situation. For example, Shawn Carpenter, a back-hacker for Sandia who discovered weaknesses in government databases that led to critical data breaches, describes his response after taking the issue to management:

It was this discovery that prompted my meeting with [supervisors] when I was told that ‘it was not my concern.’ Later, I turned [the information about security breaches and intel theft] over to the U.S. Army and the FBI and helped investigate how it was taken and where the path led (Document: WB\_Carpenter\_2.docx, Position: 1965-2197).

His actions, particularly after explicitly being told by his supervisors that the issue was not his problem, demonstrate a great amount of personal responsibility and initiative.

Another characteristic frequently demonstrated by Internals in relation to Responsibility was the collective ownership they felt over organizational failures. Wiebe describes his feelings of Responsibility in the wake of 9/11 in the following excerpt:

But we all felt like a great wrong had been done and that we were all somewhat if not all culpable in the fact that [9/11] had happened, because when you're at NSA, you know NSA was founded basically so that we would never experience another Dec. 7, 1941, another Pearl Harbor, and this was de facto a failure by NSA (Document: WB\_Weibe\_1.docx, Position: 6122-6435).

I remember a deep sinking feeling in my gut as I pushed the accelerator even faster to get into work, because I knew something terrible had happened. My concern was, how did it happen, and why didn't we stop it? How could we have missed it? How could we have? (Document: WB\_Weibe\_1.docx, Position: 5181-5440).

Wiebe demonstrates a difference from Externals by demonstrating feeling weighted by a sort of “collective culpability.” While he felt responsible for not stopping the tragedy of 9/11, he speaks about his feelings only in light of the entirety of the NSA, focusing on how “all the employees” at the agency were feeling, using the pronoun “we” more often than “I.” This is seen even in the questions he asks himself, “…why didn’t *we* stop it? How could *we* have missed it? How could *we* have?”

The comments that Loomis makes on the exact same issue demonstrate the contrast in two Internals’ approaches to feelings of Responsibility. In describing whether or not people at the NSA felt burdened by the results of 9/11, Loomis initially responds without including himself in the assessment:

Oh, yeah, very definitely. I know the SIGINT [signals intelligence] director slept in her office for like two weeks. Didn't even go home. There were a lot of guilt feelings, probably more so by the analysts who were charged with focusing on the terrorism problem than a lot of the other analysts, as well as engineers and computer scientists (WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 3734-4010).

Unlike the Externals, who spoke specially about their own feelings of responsibility, Loomis focuses entirely on how the office felt without even including himself — another way of expressing “collective responsibility.” Loomis continues to seemingly downplay his own emotions when directly asked a question about his own feelings of responsibility:

I mean, we didn't feel like we were responsible, but I felt some remorse, since ThinThread had not been allowed to go into operation… (WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 3950-4214).

He initially answers the question with the pronoun “we” and denies that neither he nor others in the office felt responsible for the results of 9/11. This stands in relative contradiction to his earlier comments about the level of guilt people felt. He finally refers directly to himself at the end of the excerpt, saying he “felt some remorse.” This entire statement again appeared to downplay what his actual emotions. At the end of that same interview, his true feelings seem to be revealed when he breaks down crying and is barely able to speak the following words:

…Because [9/11] didn't have to occur, I believe. I don't think it was necessary. I do believe it could have been prevented with revisions to the way we were permitted to operate before 9/11 — revisions that *I tried* to get the general counsel to embrace…I tried…and they wouldn't do it. I felt this ever since it occurred, that over 3,000 people's lives were lost ... and it's just a weight that I have been having trouble bearing. I'm sorry (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 32091-32643).

Loomis describes the results of 9/11 in light of his inability to establish ThinThread, a weight he says he has trouble bearing. This avoidance then acceptance process reveals an important element of Responsibility. Unlike the Externals, the internal reporting process that Loomis went through appeared to do nothing to relieve his feelings of responsibility or guilt. His tendency to talk about others’ feelings and downplay his own, only to later reveal deeper internal feelings, demonstrates an unresolved sense of Responsibility. This stands in relative contrast to Externals — many of whom talked about living without regret, being happy with their choices and having a clean conscience. In the excerpt below, Tamm provides an example of an External on reflecting back on his choices:

As Mr. Comey said, some of us will look back and be ashamed. And I'll look back and say, "I think I did the right thing (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 31680-31801).

***Perceived Personal Cost (PPC) – Overview***

The findings for PPC supported the second hypothesis (H2) — Internals expressed higher levels of PPC than Externals in three of characteristic’s four defining categories. References of Harm showed the widest difference between Internals and Externals, as Internals spoke about harm that other people had experienced as a result of whistleblowing at a far greater frequency than Externals. Further, Internals demonstrated about twice as much Protectionist Action and Focus on Personal Cost as did Externals. In contrast, Fear Impacting Behavior, which included measures of Paranoia, was more frequently expressed by Externals than by Internals.

***Perceived Personal Cost – References of Harm***

One characteristic used to define PPC is References of Harm, which encompasses any time an individual referenced another whistleblower from the past or present who had experienced harm as a result of their efforts. This characteristic was seen most often in Internals, who tended to focus on the injustice and personal costs faced by other Internals. Additionally, they shared a notion of unsurprised pity about the fate of Externals. Loomis and Binney describe their frustration with the justice system in response to the treatment of Drake, a fellow whistleblower, in the excerpts below:

But what really bothered me, the people that had leaked to The New York Times, Tom Tamm and Russell Tice, they were never charged with anything. Tom was charged with espionage, and he had never leaked anything of that to The New York Times or to The Baltimore Sun (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 29390-29655).

Well, I looked at the stuff that [Drake] was indicted for, and that material was clearly marked unclassified, and all they did was draw a line through it and classified that material, and then they charged him with having classified material. It's like framing him; ‘we're going to frame you after the fact, OK?’ That was a charade (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 31311-31636).

Wiebe went on to describe the personal harm that was experienced by Loomis in the face of backlash from whistleblowing:

Yes, that's true. Ed probably took it worst in terms of cost to family and self, physically, mentally, because Ed went into the shadows. He became a recluse, quiet. He lost his wife. And I think he was actually afraid to talk to Bill Binney and myself and Diane Roark… (WB\_Weibe\_1.docx, Position: 23383-23672).

Since the vast majority of internal whistleblowers did not enter the reporting process expecting to receive backlash, most of their references to harm are done in retrospect and often express shock at the treatment others experienced. The few statements that were made referring to their thought process before whistleblowing demonstrate that the harm they had seen Externals experience played a role in deterring them from taking the same route. When Loomis was asked if he ever considered externally whistleblowing, he responded:

Not at all, not at all. We saw what they did with Chelsea Manning. We know that if they had their hands on Snowden, he'd be locked up in Leavenworth and stripped naked and not be given access to a lawyer (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 30125-29655).

In contrast, Externals showed less surprise over the negative fates of other whistleblowers and tended to connect their References of Harm to frustration with a perceived lack of results and support. This can be seen in Snowden and Kiriakou’s responses:

…They got nowhere, other individuals who had done the same thing, whether they’re Thomas Drake, William Benny, Kirk Wiebe, Ed Loomis, Diane Roark who even went to congress. All of these individual raised similar concerns and yet the issues we’re not corrected… (WB\_Snowden\_6\*.docx, Position: 8882-9182).

…there was really no support in the mainstream media for any whistleblowers, not for me, not for Ed Snowden, not for Chelsea Manning, not for anybody (Document: WB\_Kiriakou\_5\*.docx, Position: 3506-3657).

Externals also tended to make reference to previous “truth-tellers” and talk about how those peoples’ lives served as an inspiration to them. For example, Daniel Ellsberg — who whistleblew about the Vietnam War through the Pentagon Papers — was a catalyst for the actions of Fellwock and Kiriakou. Fellwock makes reference to Ellsberg in the excerpt below:

But even being against the war, it's taken a long time for me to want to say these things. I couldn't have done it nine months ago, not even three months ago. Daniel Ellsberg’s releasing the Pentagon Papers made me want to talk (Document: WB\_Fellwock\_2.docx, Position: 58004-58199).

Similarly, Ellsberg says he was inspired by Randy Kehler, a Harvard graduate who worked with the War Resister’s League and was imprisoned after refusing to take part in the draft. These references of both frustration and inspiration set Externals apart from Internals.

***Perceived Personal Cost – Protectionist Action***

A second characteristic used to define PPC is Protectionist Action, which refers to any action the whistleblower intended to take or actually took for the purpose of protecting himself from harm. It is notable that there were not many references to this kind of behavior across the sample of whistleblowers, but those who did speak of Protectionist Action tended to be Internals. Loomis, who showed the highest frequency of PPC, provides an example of this behavior in his response to being raided by the FBI:

…something happened on that July 26th. I dropped all communication with Bill, Kirk, Tom and Diane. I had no communication with them at all. I went into a shell. I didn't even communicate with my coworkers that I had known for years, one of which was sitting right next to me at my desk when I was raided at L-3 Communications (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 24851-25189).

His actions were encouraged by his lawyer, who thought he might be involved in a conspiracy and advised him to disassociate from his former co-workers. He took that advice even further and ended up cutting himself off from many friends and family members. These actions were relatively typical of whistleblowers who did not expect retaliation for their actions.

Only two Externals, Tamm and Fellwock, showed significant tendency toward Protectionist Action — an uncommon theme amongst this sample of Externals. Fellwock, who also expressed high levels of Fear and Paranoia, commonly backed out of interviews and rescheduled meeting locations at the last minute with journalists — even decades after his whistleblowing ventures. He left the following message with one reporter after several conversations about meeting for an interview years after his whistleblowing ventures:

On advice [sic] of counsel, I cannot meet with you. Please do not attempt to contact me. I have no interest in the matters you mentioned (Document: WB\_Fellwock\_1.docx, Position: 346-484).

While Fellwock’s Protectionist Action occurred more in the distant aftermath of his whistleblowing ventures, Tamm demonstrated the characteristic even before he blew the whistle. In describing his first in-person meeting with a journalist over wrongdoing in the Justice Department, he talks about his evasiveness and careful testing of the waters:

Well, I did a little probably ridiculous song and dance of just getting to know him and not really disclosing anything at the first meeting, and he assured me that he would never reveal his sources…I don't think I even really told him where I worked the first time. And so I just kind of got to know him, kind of tried to assess his character and see whether I thought that this was going to be worth it (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 17376-17960).

Even after he had gone through the reporting process and been called by the FBI for questioning, he continued to exhibit clear elements of Protectionist Action during the investigation process by not returning calls from the FBI and refusing to be a witness against himself:

Well, with my background, it was pretty unnerving. I put the [FBI] agent off for quite sometime. I said I would get back to them, and then I didn’t, and then he would call. Then I wouldn't get back to him. Finally, I don't know whether he came by my office—I was still with the Department of Justice in a different unit—and I told him that I chose not to talk to him. I chose to exercise my rights under the Constitution to not be a witness against myself (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 21829-22415).

In light of this sample, Protectionist Action does not appear to be a characteristic that is broadly seen across IC whistleblowers. In addition, this characteristic’s presence does not seem to depend on the avenue of a whistleblower’s reporting (Internal vs. External) but rather their expectation of retaliation, personal experience and other aspects of their personality.

***Perceived Personal Cost – Fear and Paranoia***

Another characteristic used to define PPC is Fear, which encompassed statements that reflected fear related to experiencing personal harm or retaliation as a consequence of their actions. This category also included a subset that coded for statements or acts reflective of Paranoia. This trait and its subset were the only characteristics of PPC that were more commonly expressed by Externals than Internals. The differences between the two groups in this category seemed to stem from their perceptions of their individual circumstances. Internals tended to express more uncertainty about their future and anger over what they perceived as injustice in response to their legal reporting behavior. In contrast, Externals expressed broader features of fear and paranoia, especially those whom understood the illegality and consequences of their actions. Examples of the wide ranging fears Externals faced can be seen in the excerpts below.

Manning feared standing against the power of the government:

I am always afraid. I am still afraid of the power of government. A government can arrest you. It can imprison you. It can put out information about you that won’t get questioned by the public – everyone will just assume that what they are saying is true. Sometimes, a government can even kill you – with or without the benefit of a trial. Governments have so much power, and a single person often does not. It is very terrifying to face the government alone (Document: WB\_Manning\_2.docx, Position: 0-460).

Snowden feared being assassinated:

I could have people come after, or any of their, their third party partners. You know, they, they work closely with a number of other nations or you know, they, they could pay off the tri-heads or, you know, any, any of their agents or assets (Document: WB\_Snowden\_2.docx, Position: 4143-4388).

Fellwock expressed paranoia in relation to speaking about his past:

They can’t do anything to me for what I did back then, but I don’t want them to do anything to me for what I’ve done now. I’ve already spoken too much. This is not a good time. This is not a good time for our country (Document: WB\_Fellwock\_1.docx, Position: 697-914).

Tamm feared the potential consequences of his actions:

I wondered whether I'd be out on bond or whether the bond would be so high that I wouldn't be able to make the bond. I'm claustrophobic, so I didn't look forward to that possibility. And I had worked in the death penalty area, and if someone reveals what's called signals intelligence secrets, there is potentially a death penalty possibility… I was concerned that someone would say, "Well, it is signals intelligence…” I was preoccupied with what was going to happen to me and when it was going to happen and what was going to happen, if it was going to happen… (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 19412-19707).

***Perceived Personal Cost – Focus on Personal Cost***

The final characteristic used to define PPC in this study is a Focus on Personal Cost, which coded for any time the whistleblower spoke about harm they experienced before – or as a result of – whistleblowing. This was the most commonly expressed trait of PPC among both Internals and Externals, but was referenced almost twice as frequently among Internals. References to personal cost came from a variety of angles, including physical, financial, emotional, family, social and reputational. While both Internals and Externals reported experiencing harm in each of these six categories, Internals placed a greater emphasis on financial and family costs, while Externals tended to focus more on physical and emotional costs. Both Internals and Externals placed relatively equal emphasis on social and reputational costs.

Whistleblowers detailed a wide range of physical costs in association with their reporting behavior. In the excerpt below, Manning describes the hardship of her imprisonment in Kuwait not long after she was detained by the military.

It’s a very difficult feeling to describe…I was taken to a prison camp in Kuwait, where I essentially lived in a cage inside of a tent. I didn’t have any access to the outside world. I couldn’t make phone calls. I didn’t get any mail. I had very limited access to my lawyers. There was no television or radio or newspapers. I lost the sense of where in the world I was (Document: WB\_Manning\_2.docx, Position: 461-850).

Snowden similarly expresses physical costs in his references to exile in Russia but is not as overt as Manning in the way he describes his situation. The excerpt below demonstrates his relative subtlety in talking about the costs he faces:

I'm willing to make a lot of sacrifices for my country that should be clear at this point, I think since I had to live in exile for the last three years, and I lived in a very comfortable life before that (Document: WB\_Snowden\_4\*.docx, Position: 1288-1493).

His description of living in exile for three years as a “sacrifice,” and his insinuation that his life is not as comfortable now as it used to be, demonstrate physical personal cost. Though Externals expressed physical costs more frequently, Internals also embodied this quality. For example, it can be seen in Binney through the way he describes being raided by the FBI and held at gunpoint in a compromising position:

Well, the first I knew the FBI was in my house was the guy pointing a gun at me when I was coming out of the shower. That's the first I knew (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 25689-25802).

Whistleblowers also detailed a wide range of financial costs, though Internals demonstrated at a higher frequency than Externals. For example, after internally exposing wrongdoing related to Trailblazer, former NSA employees Loomis and Binney faced alleged backdoor pushback from the NSA and interference from the FBI in their business ventures involving the use of ThinThread:

We did have several indications of interest in what we were doing—NRO, CIA and INSCOM. Every time we went to actually get a contract, all of a sudden there would be a last-minute phone call that would be made, and it would evaporate (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 14297-14537)

Well, they basically destroyed our business and blackballed us for any business in the community or anywhere. Every time we tried to do something in business, they sent the FBI after us, so they were trying to put us out of business permanently (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 29451-30341)

Other examples from Internals include Carpenter being fired from Sandia, Weise losing his pension from the NSA and Sterling being unable to get another job after being fired by the CIA. In Sterling’s case, the financial hardship he faced left him homeless for a period of time before some of his friends took him in as a nanny for their new baby. In the excerpts below, Sterling describes a measure of his experience:

After I had been fired, I had nowhere to go. No one would hire me. I was living out of my car, essentially, and I had hit rock bottom (Document: WB\_Sterling\_1.docx, Position: 1171-1306)

And it was difficult to come to that realization that I go from being a case officer in a Central Intelligence Agency, I have a law degree, to I’m a nanny. But such is life (Document: WB\_Sterling\_1.docx, Position: 1453-1627)

One example of financial hardship experienced by an External can be seen in the case of Kiriakou, who ended up taking a plea bargain and going to jail for 30-months in order to avoid crippling court fees.

In reference to emotional costs, Externals demonstrated a higher frequency than Internals. Several examples from this type of personal cost were described in earlier sections of the results — Tamm recounted the anxiety he felt in waiting to discover his fate, Manning talked about the constant state of fear she experienced and Drake explained the weight of the burden he lived under. From the perspective of an Internal, Wiebe demonstrates this characteristic in his description of life in the midst of a long and invasive investigation process:

But you feel pretty low; your self-esteem takes a big hit. There is discord in the family, because kids, family, wife may ask you: "Well, what did you do to bring this upon the house? Why was I held on a couch all day, and why was my daughter Meghan or Kristen crying?" So there are these tough periods you get through, but you do get through them (Document: WB\_Weibe\_1.docx, Position: 23029-23377).

From this excerpt, it is evident that Wiebe’s references to emotional costs are linked to focused references about costs related to family.

In the case of costs related to family, Internals expressed the characteristic slightly more often than Externals. For example, Loomis lost his wife in a divorce as a result of the strain that the investigation put on his marriage — he describes the circumstances:

It was beginning to put a strain on my marriage because I saw no closure on this investigation. I was not the easiest person to live with at the time, because I was just—here I am … a devout patriot, and my patriotism is being questioned by the government that I had served for 43 years… It tore me up. I became a recluse, pretty much. … Didn't tell my kids. I didn't tell my father. It was rough, very rough (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 27033-27710).

In this case, Loomis describes the indirect impact that his whistleblowing decision had on his family. Binney and Wiebe described family costs more directly in their descriptions of the raids on their homes and the way in which Carpenter’s wife was threatened at the workplace. When it became clear to Carpenter’s management that he was passing information to the FBI about government database breaches, he was fiercely rebuked. In the process, his wife — who also worked at Sandia — was brought into the situation and subtly threatened. In the midst of organizational retaliation, she ended up quitting her job. Carpenter describes that initial meeting with management:

At one point, Mr. Held yelled, "You're lucky you have such understanding management & if you worked for me, I would decapitate you! There would at least be blood all over the office!" During the entire meeting, the other managers just sat there and watched. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Held said, "Your wife works here, doesn't she? I might need to talk to her” (Document: WB\_Carpenter\_1.docx, Position: 5466-5837).

Externals also described costs related to family as a result of their reporting behavior. Kiriakou, in the wake of his investigations into the CIA, experienced a similar situation to Carpenter when his wife was harassed in the workplace and was repeatedly accused of leaking classified information to him. He describes elements of the situation:

Then the CIA started harassing my wife, who at the time was a senior CIA officer, … (Document: WB\_KIriakou\_4.docx, Position: 4037-4118).

…this sort of became our life. We would be under FBI surveillance. She would be called into the CIA’s Office of Security. I would have trouble getting a security clearance when I went to Capitol Hill. It just became this pattern of harassment (Document: WB\_KIriakou\_4.docx, Position: 4420-4666).

Tamm, another External, also expressed the impact on his family when the FBI came and raided his house:

My heart just sunk. I pulled into some neighbor's driveway, and eventually my wife came out, and she was trembling and crying and asking what was going to happen to us (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 23837-24050).

I've learned that they rushed into the house, and they all went to separate rooms, and two of them woke up two of my children in bed — they were awakened by strangers wearing guns (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 24839-25018).

Beyond the costs related to family, Internals and Externals expressed almost equal levels of social and reputational costs in light of their whistleblowing behavior. In describing social costs, individuals often referenced losing friends or being ostracized by co-workers. Carpenter gives an example of the social costs many whistleblowers experienced:

Of the several hundred colleagues I worked with during my career there, a grand total of two still talk to me -- even after the verdict. My friends in computer security that are still working there think their phones are tapped by Sandia counterintelligence, and are terrified to even call me from home (Document: WB\_Carpenter\_1.docx, Position: 834-1138).

In reference to reputational costs, people often described being “very publically” accused of crimes they did not commit, falsely portrayed in the media, and shamed in front of friends and co-workers. For example, Provance describes how his testimony was twisted to present him as a “bad apple”:

…the army ended up using my testimony against me and even, you know, putting me in with that category of, you know, animal house nightshift and bad apples, you know, which it was insane as insane (Document: WB\_Provance\_3.docx, Position: 43-238).

Similarly, Tice talks about how – after his whistleblowing ventures – the NSA attempted to portray him as being mentally unstable:

And what they did is call me in – nine months after my routine psychological evaluation – which I passed with flying colors, like every other one I’ve had in my entire career—passed with flying colors….They called me in for an “emergency” psychological evaluation, and they declared me nuts (Document: WB\_Tice\_2.docx, Position: 8045-8334).

From a different angle, Loomis describes the perceived reputational costs and shame he experienced when his office was raided by the FBI and he was searched by an NSA police officer in front of his co-workers:

Then they took me back into a conference room. An NSA security officer came over from NSA, and the two of them went through my daypack to make sure I wasn't stealing anything. I mean, it was the most humiliating thing I've ever been through in my life (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 19863-20115).

Beyond the results from specific categories within Focus on Personal Cost, it is also significant that Externals and Internals expressed such different frequencies of the characteristic in general. One might assume that Externals, who objectively experience more severe consequences from their reporting process, would have a higher Focus on Personal Cost — but that is not the case. It is important to remember that this particular code is accounting for the individual’s *focus* on personal cost, not necessarily the actual *level* of personal cost they experienced. As an illustration, take the following example from Drake:

I ended up being summarily visited by the FBI in November 2007 when they raided me, raided my house, and raided my office down at the National Defense University. And then, long story short, in April 2010 I was very publicly indicted on a ten felony count indictment, five under the Espionage Act, facing 35 years in prison (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 1811-2139).

Drake describes the personal costs he faced over the course of a three-year investigation in just two sentences. Rather than focusing on the harm he experienced, the majority of his interview responses were centered on governmental wrongdoing and systemic issues. In contrast, Drake’s point succinctly demonstrated the primary focus of responses from Internals like Loomis and Wiebe. While Externals like Drake tended to discuss the personal costs they suffered as a single part of their much larger whistleblowing narrative, Internals tended to talk in “before” and “after” oriented language. For example, Internals like Loomis would often spend the beginning of the interview discussing the issue or wrongdoing they had witnessed and brought to light, only to transition to the results of that story, which focused almost entirely on the costs they had suffered, rather than the outcome of the wrongdoing.

***Valuation of Loyalty – Overview***

The findings for Valuation of Loyalty did not support the third hypothesis (H3). Externals expressed higher levels of loyalty than Internals in three of the characteristics’ four defining categories. Loyalty to Government, the only category in which Internals expressed a higher frequency than Externals, was also the category that demonstrated the widest difference in relative frequency between the two groups. Loyalty to Public showed the second greatest relative difference between groups, with Externals showing loyalty to the public at a much higher frequency than Internals. Loyalty to the Constitution and Loyalty to Self were much more similar, though Externals still showed a slightly higher tendency to demonstrate both loyalties.

***Valuation of Loyalty – Loyalty to Public***

For the purpose of this analysis, Valuation of Loyalty was defined in four different ways, including Loyalty to Public. This value encompassed statements made by whistleblowers that portrayed loyalty to American citizens or citizens of the world. It is also notable that Externals demonstrated this valuation more than twice as often as Internals. By a wide margin, Snowden demonstrated the highest valuation of public loyalty from any individual. He states that everything he did in his decision to whistleblow was for the public interest — to put the power of decision making back in the hands of the people and the democratic process.

But really, it comes down to when I stepped up it was not to dictate outcomes [in relation to surveillance] and I think that’s ultimately the mark there. It’s about allowing the public a chance to participate in democratic processes in order to play their part and determine the outcome (WB\_ Snowden\_6\*.docx, Position: 9775-10032).

We have these rights for a reason and if we are going to change the boundaries of our rights, that’s a public decision. That’s not a decision for some official sitting behind the closed door somewhere. That’s something that we have to arrive on. We have to have broad social purview that and we have to agree that these things are necessary (Document: WB\_Snowden\_6\*.docx, Position: 27600-27944).

Snowden also regularly makes statements such as, “This isn’t about me, it's about us,” apparently in an effort to deflect attention from himself and back to the public issues he had uncovered. He goes on to say in multiple interviews that he never intended to become a public figure by revealing himself as the source of the PRISM leaks; he claims it was done in an effort to humanize the issue and help it gain enough publicity to create a public discussion about surveillance.

***Valuation of Loyalty – Loyalty to Government***

The second definition of loyalty was Loyalty to Government. This value encompassed statements by whistleblowers that reflected loyalty to the agency they worked for, or more broadly to the U.S. government. It is notable that Internals expressed this form of loyalty more than five times as often as Externals, and it was the only orientation of loyalty that Internals demonstrated higher value in than Externals.

Loomis expressed the highest valuations of Loyalty to Government. Even after the wrongdoing he witnessed and the backlash he experienced as a result of internally whistleblowing, Loomis’ loyalty and idealism remained in place. When Binney and Wiebe — long time co-workers and friends — told him about the illegal, warrantless surveillance going on at NSA, he refused to believe it. In the excerpt below, he describes how Binney and Wiebe’s discovery of Trailblazer’s unconstitutionality motivated their retirement:

They found out about that, and I just refused to believe it. So that was the motivation that they had retired under. Mine was because I thought the hierarchy at NSA had made some very dumb decisions (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 6916-7115).

He only became a “believer” many years later when the documents Snowden released confirmed his co-workers’ allegations. He describes his response in light of discovering the truth:

I mean, I was naive, and I admit that; I'll be the first to admit I was extremely naive. And I've told everybody I've talked to on this topic that I was a nonbeliever until June 6 or 7 of this year [2013]. I became a believer overnight (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 31286-31515).

They were right; I was wrong. Shame on me. Shame on me for believing my government and not believing my fellow comrades who I'd worked with for a number of years (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 31120-31285).

This idealism was a common theme in association with Loyalty to Government. Many of the individuals who expressed this form of loyalty also expressed higher frequencies of shock, confusion and disbelief at the level of backlash they were experiencing. Wiebe provides an example of what might be called “wrecked idealism”:

…clearly the government was after us; we were wondering why. I didn't want to believe it was for the IG report that we had sent to the DoD IG [Department of Defense Inspector General] in December or September 2002. I didn't think our government was capable of that kind of nastiness after giving a whole life of honest meritorious service to the agency (Document: WB\_Weibe\_1.docx, Position: 17356-17708).

Internals also expressed Loyalty to Government and the established systems in their disapproval of certain actions by Externals. For example, although Loomis came to believe that the government was engaging in warrantless surveillance in light of Snowden’s leaks, he describes that he did not agree with the younger man’s methods. Despite the lack of success Loomis and his co-workers had while attempting to report through internal channels and the backlash they ultimately experienced, he still expresses loyalty to the established systems:

I do object to him releasing so much... I think all he needed to do was just support Sen. [Ron] Wyden (D-Ore.) by showing him: "Here's the FISA warrant. Now you've got something you can talk about with the rest of the Senate Intelligence Committee (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 30659-30927).

Binney demonstrated the second highest frequency of Loyalty to Government across Internals. He describes this loyalty motivating his decision not to go to the press, even when his internal attempts left him with nothing but backlash.

We were talking about it as what are the options left. We said of course that there was an option—Kirk called it the nuclear option—which was to go to the press with all of this and expose all of it, and we discussed that and said, "No, we still need to stay within. We were still traditional employees of the government and wanted to stay inside the government to try to get the government to change its ways to make it, to right itself as opposed to having to force it by going to the Fourth Estate, the public (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 28920-29440).

Interestingly, Tamm demonstrated levels of loyalty to the government that were equal in frequency to Binney. Tamm was the only External who expressed anything that indicated loyalty to the government throughout his interviews. In contrast with Internals like Loomis and Binney, Tamm appears to have been driven to report externally largely out of Loyalty to Government. He initially joined the Justice Department out of a respect for the law and desire to enforce it — he had strong feelings about the sanctity of government and how its branches were intended to function. When he ultimately encountered wrongdoing within the government itself, he initially tried to resolve it by reaching out to another branch of government that could check the power of the judiciary. However, he soon discovered that this wrongdoing had permeated several levels. Seeing the state of the governmental deterioration, he felt that only the fourth estate could successfully reform and protect the government from itself. He describes his reaction to this issue:

I was upset, I would say, with what I thought was being done to the way our government was supposed to work. I was pretty upset (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 16881-17009).

It is also interesting to note that Tamm expressed the same “wrecked idealism” seen in Internals who demonstrated Loyalty to Government:

And in retrospect, it really is kind of naive, but I actually thought that somebody might say, ‘You know, you actually did the right thing, and we'd like to offer you a job again in the Department of Justice’ (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 27679-27888).

***Valuation of Loyalty – Loyalty to Constitution***

The third defining characteristic of Valuation of Loyalty was Loyalty to Constitution. This code encompassed statements that portrayed loyalty to upholding and defending the constitution. For both Internals and Externals, this direction of loyalty received the highest frequency of references. However, Loyalty to Constitution still received slightly higher frequencies among Externals than Internals. Drake demonstrated the highest level of loyalty to the Constitution by a wide margin, followed by Snowden and Binney. One of the thought processes that these men consistently expressed was that they ultimately took an oath to the Constitution — nothing else:

I was eyewitness to the subversion of the Constitution. I took an oath to that Constitution, and I was going to hold true faith and allegiance to the same. I didn't take an oath to the president. I didn't take an oath to secrecy. I didn't take an oath to anything else other than defending and supporting the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 6844-7208).

Drake went on to say that, for many years, he found himself defending the Constitution against his own government. Since his loyalty was to the Constitution, not the government, he was willing to report wrongdoing to the public when his internal whistleblowing attempts proved unfruitful:

…the only thing left that I have is defend it. So I decided to keep defending it from within until I no longer could. That's when I went outside the system (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 30289-30447).

Binney expressed similar sentiments as an Internal, placing a heavy focus on his oath to defend the Constitution. He appears almost offended as he talks about principles that were violated and the way people disregarded the oath they took:

Well, at my point, I said: ‘Well, obviously, this place has gone rogue. It is just now violating everything, every foundational principle of this country, the Constitution fundamentally, and not counting any number of laws’ (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 12086-12310).

I mean, they all took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution, and they've all scrapped that. They basically are violating their oath of office (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 23629-23780).

Drake, who expressed zero loyalty to the government and high loyalty to the Constitution, took his concerns externally when he the internal processes of reporting proved unsuccessful. In contrast, Binney expressed high loyalty to both the government and to the Constitution, which led him to work intensely within the government to remedy wrongdoing. When his efforts, and those of his counterparts, proved unsuccessful, his loyalty to both the government and Constitution led him to resign from his position rather than report externally. This demonstrates that it is not merely the level of valuation someone has for loyalty which helps determine their avenue of reporting, but the direction and intersection of their specific loyalties.

***Valuation of Loyalty – Loyalty to Self***

The final defining characteristic of Valuation of Loyalty was Loyalty to Self. This valuation captured statements by the whistleblower that portrayed loyalty to their own beliefs, experiences or ideology. This direction of loyalty was the also relatively equal between Externals and Internals, with Externals showing just a slightly higher frequency. After Loyalty to Constitution, this represented the second highest directional valuation of loyalty for Internals. Kiriakou stands as an appropriate example of someone driven by Loyalty to Self. He was something of an “accidental” whistleblower in his initial voicing of CIA torture policy on ABC, but, overtime, he started facing consistent backlash from the agency that culminated in a prison sentence. Kiriakou demonstrates loyalty to himself in his description of how that pushback motivated him to action:

Well, that's why I maintain the CIA is the organization that made me a human rights activist. It's the CIA that's made me want to take to the streets to defend our civil liberties. Otherwise, I wouldn't have given it two minutes of thought (Document: WB\_Kiriakou\_1\_2\_3.docx, Position: 23970-24211).

In a later reference to whether spending time in jail would silence him, he responded in kind:

No, quite the opposite. In fact, I said, again, in a speech before I went to prison, if [the agency] thought this would shut me up, they don't know me at all, because now I've devoted my life to fighting them (WB\_Kiriakou\_1-2-3.docx, Position: 44808-45009).

Kiriakou goes on to talk about his experience with reporting and the charges brought up against him. His perspective highlights both a desire to not be frightened into silence by the CIA and the personal offense that he felt in light of the agency’s attempt to quiet him — all reflective of Loyalty to Self:

Giving a speech about the Arab Spring or about torture is not against the law. And I felt that, that I didn’t want to be cowed. I didn’t want to be frightened into silence by the CIA. …it sounds silly maybe, but I’m still personally offended by these espionage charges, which were dropped, of course. The espionage charge is used as a hammer by the administration to force people into silence (Document: WB\_KIriakou\_4.docx, Position: 4978-55481).

Other examples of Loyalty to Self can be seen in the words and actions of Sterling and Tamm. Some excerpts from them that were previously used in reference to Values-Consistent Behavior also demonstrate evidence of Loyalty to Self. At one point, Sterling expresses how his mother taught him to stand up for himself and not run away, which he talks about in the context of choosing not to flee the country in the face of retaliation.

My stand-up-for-yourself, be-yourself sort of attitude, that was instilled to me by my mother (Document: WB\_Sterling\_1.docx, Position: 3372-3459).

You don’t run away. You stand up for yourself (Document: WB\_Sterling\_1.docx, Position: 3090-3135).

The concept of Sterling standing up for himself was instilled in him by his mother and speaks highly of Loyalty to Self. Tamm expresses a similar inclination toward Loyalty to Self in the context of being true to how he was raised, and thus true to himself:

…but ultimately, I was being true to myself, I think. I was being true to how I was raised. I hope my father would be proud of what I did (Document: WB\_Tamm\_1.docx, Position: 31299-31428).

***Valuation of Fairness – Overview***

The findings for Valuation of Fairness supported the fourth hypothesis (H4). Although Externals showed higher overall Valuation of Fairness, there were aspects of the variable’s sub-code that were still embodied more by Internals than Externals. For example, though Externals showed higher frequencies in respect to Concern for Rights and Disturbed by Wrongdoing, Internals showed higher frequencies in relation to Rights of Others and Rights of Self. In this way, it appears that Externals tend to focus more on the “bigger picture” in terms of fairness, while Internals are more concerned with how fairness related to issues that directly affected their lives and the lives of others.

***Valuation of Fairness – Concern for Rights***

For the purpose of this analysis, Valuation of Fairness was defined in reference to rights and wrongdoing. The first code, Concern for Rights, encompassed statements made that demonstrated the defense of rights and protections under the law in general. These were often “big picture” statements that made reference to larger themes, like the wishes of the founding fathers and the sanctity of the law. For example, Snowden references the current debate about Privacy Rights in the context of the unerringness of rights:

Well, but the idea is that we did not fight a revolution for the benefit of policy protections. We don’t need to justify why we need our rights. I don’t need to say why I had or why I need to be able to hide something. I don’t need to say I had something to hide or I don’t have something to hide (Document: WB\_Snowden\_6\*.docx, Position: 25592-25890).

Through his statements, Snowden touches on broad issues related to the ownership and exercising of rights. He goes on to describe his desire for the public to be able to choose how the boundaries of those rights are to be established — one of the primary motivating factors behind his decision to whistleblow. He expands on this idea in the excerpt below:

We have these rights for a reason and if we are going to change the boundaries of our rights, that’s a public decision. That’s not a decision for some official sitting behind the closed door somewhere. That’s something that we have to arrive on. We have to have broad social purview that and we have to agree that these things are necessary (Document: WB\_Snowden\_6\*.docx, Position: 27600-279440).

Drake and Kiriakou, other Externals, also voiced broad concerns related to ideas of surveillance encroaching on civil liberties:

It makes the Nixon era look like pikers, what happened in 9/11, in terms of the government simply unchaining itself from the rule of law and operating under extraordinary emergency conditions, the equivalent of martial law in the country, but in secret (Document: WB\_Drake\_1.docx, Position: 4654-4907).

They’re focused on somebody else but you know what—eventually they’re going to get to you and then there won’t be anybody to speak up for you and to save you. This is a very slippery slope, this lost of civil liberties and we’re devolving into a surveillance state that I'm sure our founding father has never envisioned (Document: WB\_Kiriakou\_5\*.docx, Position: 7710-8032).

Kiriakou’s statements reflect a distrust of government and a concern over liberties that he felt were being lost. At the same time, he makes an even larger claim about how the nation is going in a direction that the founding fathers had never envisioned for it. These “big picture” ideas were common amongst Externals, but not Internals, who tended to focus on rights in more “immediate” ways.

***Valuation of Fairness – Rights of Others***

The second code measuring valuation of fairness was named Rights of Others, which encompassed statements made in reference to specific concerns over others’ rights. Internals demonstrated this characteristic with a higher frequency than Externals, but both groups still regularly made mention of this concern. Binney extensively describes his concern over the neglect of people’s rights in reference to Trailblazer:

[All this information] was acquired without a warrant, you know. And this is the kind of data that they would use to arrest people, which they did. So I couldn't be a party to that. That's just a total violation of our justice process (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 16725-16973).

And I said: "They are violating the constitutional rights of everybody by taking in all this data and building the social networks of everybody. It's a violation of the First Amendment” (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 17392-17626)

So it's a violation of that one, not counting the collection of content or anything else that's related to that, which is, you know, a violation of your Fourth Amendment rights, or use of it to arrest you, which is a violation of your Fifth Amendment rights, not testifying against yourself (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 17916-18207).

Several Internals also discussed the concern specifically over their colleague’s rights, particularly those of fellow internal whistleblowers. Loomis and Binney mention on several occasions the injustice that Drake faced:

But what really bothered me, the people that had leaked to The New York Times, Tom Tamm and Russell Tice, they were never charged with anything. Tom [Drake] was charged with espionage, and he had never leaked anything [classified] to The New York Times or to The Baltimore Sun (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 29390-29655).

Wiebe goes on to express disquiet over the way both internal and external IC whistleblowers were not given an honest hearing:

I don't think we'd be sitting here today if Kirk Wiebe, Ed Loomis, Bill Binney, Tom Drake, Diane Roark and Ed Snowden had a good, robust path for whistleblowers to get an honest hearing about things wrong in their home organizations, especially those that violate the basic rights of Americans (Document: WB\_Weibe\_1.docx, Position: 29547-29841).

Overall, these examples provide insight into the concern that Internals particularly felt in relation to the specific rights of others — whether fellow Americans or fellow whistleblowers.

***Valuation of Fairness – Rights of Self***

The third code measuring valuation of fairness was named Rights of Self, which encompassed statements made that indicated concern for the individual’s own rights. Internals demonstrated this characteristic with a higher frequency than Externals. These statements tended to relate to individuals’ concerns about their right to free speech, a fair trial and rights related to practicing business. It is interesting to note that people who expressed high levels of Loyalty to Self also tended to express higher frequencies in this category. One individual who exemplifies this is Kiriakou, who spoke about how the backlash he faced after whistleblowing on torture policy made him into an activist. In the excerpt below, he makes mention of his rights to free speech when talking about why he chose to stand against torture:

Because I think that—that torture is something that needs to be discussed. … And frankly, I have a First Amendment right to free speech (Document: WB\_KIriakou\_4.docx, Position: 4682-4921).

Carpenter and Snowden provide examples of one Internal and one External who did not express Loyalty to Self but still made reference to their rights. In the excerpts below, they discuss their desire for a fair trial — one of the most common concerns within Rights of Self across both Internals and Externals.

All along, I wanted my day—okay, week and a half—in court, and to have the opportunity to tell a jury my side of the story (Document: WB\_Carpenter\_1.docx, Position: 576-703).

I'm much happier here in Russia than I would be facing an unfair trial in which I can't, I can't even present a public interest defense to a jury of my peers. We've asked the government again and again to provide for a fair trial and they’ve declined and I, I feel very fortunate to have received asylum (Document: WB\_Snowden\_5\*.docx, Position: 354-658)

Another example of how individuals expressed Rights of Self was in reference to financial and business ventures. The following excerpt makes mention of Loomis’ frustration over the NSA’s interference after he and his colleagues had gotten legal clearance to utilize ThinThread and operate as a contractor:

The motivation was that we felt that we were being denied an opportunity to obtain business within the intelligence community. We felt there was interference by NSA management in that regard (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 15007-15199).

***Valuation of Fairness – Disturbed by Wrongdoing***

The final code measuring valuation of fairness did not relate to rights but the level to which an individual was Disturbed by Wrongdoing. It captured statements made by whistleblowers that reflected strongly negative emotional arousal in response to perceived misconduct. This characteristic showed the highest frequency of occurrence by both groups within the category of Valuation of Fairness, but Externals still expressed slightly higher levels than Internals.

Both Internals and Externals often used words such as alarmed, shocked, disturbed and disgusted as they described the wrongdoing that they had witnessed. Provance describes his feelings in the wake of learning about the torture occurring in the prison where he worked*,*

And, you know, I would ask questions about interrogations and stuff, and the things they started telling me were alarming, you know, beginning with the nudity (Document: WB\_Provance\_1.docx, Position: 1224-1383).

He goes on to express his disillusioned distress at seeing his fellow Americans wishing death on all Iraqis when he understood the mission of the war to be freeing Iraqi and standing against the Saddam Regime. The coldness he witnessed in his fellow soldiers toward the fate of these prisoners disturbed him:

You know, they could say just look at them all — whether or not they were guilty—they were still the enemy, which didn’t make sense to me and kind of confused me … You know, we were supposed to be the, you know, heroes or collaborators. But, yeah, you know, I see everybody hating, you know, even wishing death on, on, you know, innocent people, you know, and not caring whether they lived or died. And then that was something that I—I couldn’t relieve to this day (Document: WB\_Provance\_3.docx, Position: 750-1385).

Another External, Snowden, also expressed this quality in discussing how the switch from only collecting foreign intelligence to collecting both foreign and domestic surveillance “alarmed” him:

And that's the real key, when I think about what I saw and what really alarmed me during my time at the NSA and CIA it was that we had pivoted—we had changed from focusing on traditional methods of surveillance… (Document: WB\_Snowden\_6\*.docx, Position: 29779-30167).

From the perspective of an Internal, Binney expressed disgust at the results of 9/11 in light of what he viewed as governmental culpability:

It's disgusting that all those people had to die. That's disgusting that our government did that. They traded the security of the people of the United States for money. That's disgusting (Document: WB\_Binney\_1.docx, Position: 36530-36717).

Loomis expressed similar elements of Disturbed by Wrongdoing in his description of the results of 9/11 on the Middle East and in the lives of American military members:

They know what has grown from the 9/11 terrorist attack. We've had endless war—Afghanistan and Iraq—and what we've left behind is nothing but deplorable conditions for the people that we left behind. We've ruined the lives of so many servicemen and -women. I'm sorry. It's just very unfortunate (Document: WB\_Loomis\_1-edited\*.docx, Position: 31788-32089).

These Internal and External examples demonstrate the scope of IC whistleblowers’ embodiment of Disturbed by Wrongdoing, an influential characteristic in motivating reporting behavior.

**Discussion**

The results of this research demonstrate the complexity that is involved in both an individual’s decision to whistleblow, and the motivations that lead them toward either internal or external reporting. This complexity makes it impossible to gauge a person’s potential whistleblowing decision by looking at just one characteristic of their motivations. Thus, this discussion seeks to make a few connections between findings to demonstrate the interplay of the four variables — PSM, PPC, Loyalty and Fairness. This examination will ultimately demonstrate a measure of these variables’ collective impact on whistleblowing directionality. In light of this analysis, internal relations strategies will be suggested to promote internal reporting and reduce external reporting of classified information.

***Commonalities***

Looking at the results as a whole, it is important to first highlight commonalities amongst the whistleblowers in this sample. Almost everyone in the sample demonstrated qualities of Values-Consistent Behavior (PSM), Responsibility (PSM) and the notion of being Disturbed by Wrongdoing (Fairness). It is perhaps no surprise that these three qualities would be expressed as a running theme amongst IC whistleblowers because they essentially tell the story of how people approach the Whistleblower’s Dilemma. First, someone is exposed to wrongdoing and is disturbed by it. Second, the sense of responsibility the person feels does not allow them to ignore the issue. Third, the person ultimately takes action in a way that aligns with their values and beliefs. The following analysis weighs the other variables to provide further insight into what qualities motivate specific decision making during the whistleblowing process.

***Direction of Loyalty***

In terms of Valuation of Loyalty, individuals typically expressed only two of the four types (Public, Government, Constitution, Self) defined for this variable. For example, Snowden demonstrated high levels of loyalty toward the public and the Constitution but almost none toward the government or himself. Likewise, Kiriakou demonstrated high levels of loyalty toward the Constitution and himself, but very little in relation to the public or the government. These two whistleblowers did not express the same combination of loyalties, but in the absence of loyalty to the government, they both chose to whistleblow externally. In contrast, Internals like Loomis demonstrated high levels of loyalty to the government and himself, but almost none toward the public or Constitution. From these findings, it is evident that while IC whistleblowers may be motivated by a variety of different loyalties, their level of Loyalty to Government tends to correlate most with their whistleblowing directionality. One exception to this is Tamm, an external whistleblower who demonstrated high levels of loyalty toward the government and himself, low levels of loyalty toward the Constitution and almost none in relation to the public. His circumstance is unique amongst Externals, particularly in that his Loyalty to Government — to cleanse it of pervasive wrongdoing — appears to be what led him to whistleblow externally.

***Public Service Motivation***

While PSM is a quality that is thought to be embodied in general by people who work in the public sector, it is clear that Externals embody this quality more than Internals. Overall, this group demonstrated PSM about twice as frequently as Internals. Yet, the sub-code that set these two groups apart was Altruism, which was only expressed by Externals. This inclination to value service even in the face of personal costs appears to be one of the driving factors behind the motivation and follow-through of external whistleblowers. As was stated in the Commonalities section, whistleblowers place a high priority on VCB — but whether or not this characteristic manifests through internal or external reporting may depend partially on Altruism. An example of these differences can be seen in the reporting strategies of Binney and Provance. Both men were Disturbed by Wrongdoing that they witnessed, but when internal reporting proved unsuccessful, Binney chose to resign while Provance decided to report to the media. These actions may be reflective of both Provance’s significantly higher valuation of VCB and his propensity toward Altruism.

**Application to Internal Relations in the IC**

***Perceived Personal Cost (PPC)***

IR Strategy Recommendation:

1. Protect internal whistleblowers from organizational backlash
2. Increase the effectiveness of internal reporting channels

Previous research demonstrates that as an individual’s PPC increases, whistleblowing activity decreases, and vice versa (Cho & Song 2015). In this study, PPC was measured in relation to the directionality of whistleblowers. The results demonstrated that PPC is higher for internal whistleblowers, except in specific reference to Fear and Paranoia. Previous studies have also explored factors that decrease PPC and found that organizational support and protection alleviate its effects — increasing whistleblowing intention (Cho & Song 2015).

Traditional approaches to whistleblowers in the corporate world utilized intimidation and retaliation to prevent and punish whistleblowing activity — primary factors underlying PPC. Since the Whistleblowing Protection Act, legislation has been put in place to decrease the occurrences of these methods, but the act’s protection does not apply to the reporting of classified information. In light of the high stakes scenarios in the IC and the number of recent leaks that have impacted national security, it may be tempting for agencies to employ traditional strategies to prevent whistleblowing. However, aside from the ethical implications of that choice, attempting to squelch all potential whistleblowing activity would not likely produce the desired results of protecting classified information or promoting organizational success.

One reason that attempting to suppress whistleblowing by increasing PPC would not likely decrease external whistleblowing is because internal whistleblowers appear to be the ones who feel its effects most strongly. External whistleblowers who intentionally reveal classified information are not ignorant of the potential consequences of their actions — which is likely also the reason these individuals expressed lower levels of PPC. They knew the consequences of their decisions and had already accounted for the cost before they took action. In contrast, internal whistleblowers, who used the proper reporting channels and did not expect backlash, perceived a higher personal cost for their actions when they were met with retaliation. The apparent hardship that internal whistleblowers in the IC have faced has likely already increased the PPC of future Internals, thus decreasing internal whistleblowing intention. As was described in the literature review, reducing the number of internal whistleblowers would be a detriment to the overall health of the organization and reflect an attitude of ethical negligence.

Aside from the undesired effect of decreasing internal whistleblowing, attempting to increase PPC with traditional strategies could inadvertently increase external whistleblowing. While many potential whistleblowers may be deterred by PPC, those who are highly motivated will not be cowed. Having an internal culture that opposes reporting behavior make these individuals more likely to turn toward external sources. Snowden, in his reasons for leaking classified information to the media, describes how he learned from the experiences of past whistleblowers like Drake, Binney and Wiebe. In light of their experiences, Snowden surmised that the internal reporting system was broken — that it was impossible to effect change by using the proper channels. “Whether whistleblowers' actions are justified or not, and whether their concerns are legitimate or not, retaliation accomplishes little and may cost much. It is simply not a viable long-term strategy for dealing with employee dissenters” (Barnett, 1992). With this knowledge, it is logical to view the reception and treatment of internal reporters as a means of influencing potential external reporting behavior.

In light of PPC, two strategies for increasing internal whistleblowing and decreasing external whistleblowing include: 1. Reducing internal whistleblowers PPC by protecting them from organizational intimidation and backlash, and 2. Increasing the effectiveness of internal reporting channels. While an individual may be motivated by a host of factors in terms of their reasons for reporting wrongdoing, the primary motivation whistleblowers express for choosing external channels is that they wanted to initiate change. Thus, if internal channels were reformed and provided employees with the opportunity to effect change in circumstances of actual wrongdoing, the majority of externally minded whistleblowers would lose their motivation to take that avenue. Importantly, the primary way that employees will be assured that these channels have truly been reformed is by the way the organization treats and responds to current and future internal whistleblowers.

Implementing these two strategies will necessitate a change in organizational culture from one that fears whistleblowing to one that values it. While this may seem counterintuitive, a shift in this direction will ultimately be worth the health it brings to the organization internally and the protection it provides externally.

***Dichotomy of Fairness and Loyalty***

IR Strategy Recommendation:

1. Promote explicit organizational loyalty
2. Promote implicit organizational loyalty

Previous research demonstrates that having employees who value both fairness and loyalty is beneficial and leads to internal reporting (Dungan, Waytz, & Young, 2014). However, in the absence of loyalty, or when someone values fairness more than loyalty, it can lead them to report externally. Studies have also demonstrated that individuals vary in terms of the levels at which they value these two qualities (Dungan, Waytz, & Young, 2014). In whistleblowing situations, that ratio can be manipulated based on experience and the individual’s relationship with the entity committing wrongdoing. These findings from previous research are supported by this study’s results, which demonstrates that external whistleblowers in the IC have a high Valuation of Fairness and low Loyalty to Government (with Thomas Tamm as the exception).

Viewing these results in the context of internal relations strategies, it is possible that increasing people’s loyalty in relation to the government would have an impact on decreasing external whistleblowing. Increasing organizational loyalty is a common desire amongst businesses in the corporate world. Similar concepts and strategies can be applied to agencies in the IC by establishing a culture that explicitly (overtly) and implicitly (covertly) primes people toward loyalty. Examples of explicit priming can already be seen on the CIA website. The following statements were found under the sections entitled *Why Choose the CIA?* and *Our Culture*:

* “Why work for a company when you can serve your nation?” – *Associating loyalty to the nation with loyalty to the CIA*
* “We promote an environment where employees are valued for their individual contributions toward our mission. … Many of our employees have been here for years and plan to stay.” – *Demonstrating that the CIA has a culture that both promotes and produces loyalty through longevity*
* “Meet the talented people whose passion is focused entirely on our mission....” – *Demonstrating that the CIA has a culture that values total commitment to the agency’s mission*

Priming explicitly for loyalty is important and effective but has not been demonstrated to impact employee behavior like implicit loyalty (Carter). Implicit loyalty is involved in everything from why someone will work for the same company for 40 years to producing patriotism and binding sports teams together. This is a loyalty that is *felt* and can be expressed in emotions that range from feelings of affection and security to those of gratitude and indebtedness. This form of employee loyalty is intensely sought after in the corporate world, and although the stakes are higher in the IC, the same principles likely apply.

Experts say that while good benefits and workplace flexibility are important, those aren’t the biggest determinants of employee satisfaction and internal loyalty. A few of the most significant factors include having an enjoyable, inspiring workplace environment and the presence of approachable team leaders who are trustworthy and invest in genuine relationships with their team members (Carter). Some of the highest ranking corporations in employee satisfaction, retention and loyalty include Salesforce, Southwest Airlines, Google, Anadarko Petroleum and Eli Lilly. Examining these organizations’ best practices in relation to increasing valuation of loyalty would be helpful in findings tactics that may apply to agencies in the IC.

***Psychological Motivations and the Insider Threat Program***

Understand the Diversity of Externals’ Motivations to Create More Accurate Behavioral Models

While organizations need internal relations strategies to influence future whistleblowing behavior, it is also becoming common for entities to take a more current, direct role. In the case where sensitive corporate or governmental information is involved, organizations often initiate insider threat programs. These programs work in a variety of ways to safeguard against the intentional and unintentional mishandling of sensitive information by privileged individuals, such as employees, contractors and consultants. In the context of the IC, an External who reported classified information outside of the proper channels would be considered an insider threat. This section applies the diversity of psychological findings from this study to the development of more accurate behavioral models for the IC’s Insider Threat Program.

In the aftermath of Chelsea Manning’s disclosure on WikiLeaks in 2011, the Insider Threat Program was established. Created under Executive Order 13587, this program was initiated with the goal of deterring Externals from releasing sensitive information. However, from publically available information, this program appears to be handicapped by several weaknesses, including:

* The inability to behaviorally differentiate potential Internals from potential Externals
* The inability to identify and deter “atypical” insider threats who operate outside of traditional behavioral models

In order to avoid inadvertently doing damage by wrongly flagging potential Internals, the Insider Threat Program must develop more accurate behavioral models. These models must take into account the diversity of motivations that lead individuals to whistleblow and use that information to more accurately interpret and predict their behaviors. This expansion would also allow the program to identify and deter more atypical insider threats that do not align with traditional behavioral models. Snowden stands as the most obvious example of an atypical insider threat. According to an article that summarized FBI Chief Information Security Officer Patrick Reidy’s words during a Black Hat presentation, “…depending on how Snowden’s behavior patterns and personal traits lined up with other known threats, spotting his plans might have been impossible.” From the recent news about Vault 7 — a massive leak of cybersecurity intelligence from the CIA — it is likely that this inability to detect nontraditional insider threats remains to this day (see WikiLeaks “Vault 7 CIA Hacking Tools Revealed”).

In an age of constant change and innovation, it may not be possible to effectively rely on traditional models for detecting today’s potential insider threats. In order to develop a framework for better understanding the breath and diversity of potential Externals, this research presents the Intelligence Community External Reporter Typology (ICERT) (Figure 1). The purpose of this theoretical model is to expand the IC’s current understanding of whistleblower types so that behavioral models can be expanded to account for a wider variety of potential Externals. The goal of ICERT is not to specifically predict or outline every possible motivation behind the desire to whistleblow — it may be impossible to account for the number of variables involved. Rather, the usefulness of a typology can be thought of similarly to a color wheel. Although the human eye can perceive up to one million different hues of color, that does not negate the fact that they can all be reduced down to three primary colors. Like a color wheel, ICERT is a system of categorization that helps reduce and classify something that is complex in nature so it can be better understood.

After broad motivational categories have been established, behavioral models can continue to be broken down even more specifically to account for the different levels of action and inaction involved in the steps toward externally whistleblowing (Wang & Hong, 2010). Thus, ICERT is meant to be a platform on which to build and expand, rather than being an end unto itself. When a greater diversity of Externals’ motivations are broken down and understood, the potential benefits are wide reaching:

* Fewer Internals will be falsely flagged as insider threats, thus reducing their PPC and increasing potential internal whistleblowing intention
* The IC will have a greater capacity to identify and deter Externals, thus protecting classified information from exposure
* Internal relations professionals will be able to create and implement strategies that specifically target potential atypical Externals in a way that effectively encourages them toward legal channels of internal reporting and away from external channels

**Limitations and Future Research**

The primary limitations in this study are centered around the content available for analysis. This study’s use of a small sample size could have impacted the depth of its findings and their applicability to the broader IC. In addition, the use of only Internals who have since come into public light may have biased that group’s results in a direction that is not indicative of the majority of Internals. In addition, this research utilized publically available interviews with IC whistleblowers, which were completed by different sources and across a number of years. Although each interview focused on the nature of the individuals’ reporting, their motivations, and the results of their reporting behavior, each interviewer had their own style and asked different questions. Future research in this area should be done from within the IC itself. This would provide access to a larger sample size, the ability to interview Internals who have not come into the public light and the opportunity to have direct access to whistleblowers.

Another limitation in respect to the content was that each individuals’ motivations were analyzed only in terms of how *they* described themselves. People are not always honest and often use their words to paint a picture of their lives that places them in a more favorable light. Thus, it is likely that some individuals had ulterior motives in their decision to whistleblow that were not captured by this content analysis. Finally, this research is limited by its lack of inter-coder reliability. Although another coder was not necessary because this study focused on thematic analysis through qualitative measures and keyword searches, its results could be generalized on a broader scale if intercoder reliability was established in the quantitative categories. Future studies should test the coding measures with an inter-coder process.

In order to build on the findings of this study, future work should focus on expanding analysis to other psychological and situational features of motivation that are relevant to whistleblowing. Other variables might include the Type of Wrongdoing, Attitude Toward Government, Organizational Cultural Perception, History of Whistleblowing, Commitment to the Job and Work-Life Balance. Future research should work to develop internal relations strategies that apply more specifically to the IC context. Future findings on the subject of whistleblower motivation and psychology should also be used to improve ICERT and ultimately contribute greater depth to the Insider Threat Program.

**Conclusion**

This quantitative and qualitative content analysis examined interviews with IC whistleblowers who reported on classified information in order to identify motivations and deterrents to their behavior. The results demonstrated support for three of the four hypotheses, in that PSM and fairness were associated with greater external reporting, and PPC was associated with greater internal reporting. Although the hypothesis that greater loyalty would be expressed by Internals was not supported, Internals did demonstrate higher levels in the sub-code of Loyalty to Government.

The analysis of these findings demonstrate the significance of PPC and its comparatively severe impact on Internals’ reporting behavior. The dichotomy of fairness and loyalty was also examined, and although whistleblowers demonstrated a wide variety and mixture of motivations, Loyalty to Government was found to be most indicative of whistleblowing directionality.

The results from these findings were applied to the development of internal relations strategies to increase internal reporting and decreasing external reporting of classified information. These strategies focused on protecting internal whistleblowers from organizational backlash, increasing the effectiveness of internal reporting channels and nurturing organizational loyalty. In light of these findings, ICERT was presented as a framework for the development of more accurate behavioral models that capture the diversity of Externals’ motivations. These findings were applied to the Insider Threat Program in the hopes of bringing depth that provides greater protection for Internals, the capacity to better detect Externals and ultimately reduce the likelihood of leaks that would otherwise be a detriment to national security.

**Appendix**

Figure 1: Theoretical Intelligence Community External Reporter Typology (ICERT)



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