

Re-examining the Role of Southern Democrats:
An Analysis of the Southern Advantage in Congress between 1947 and 1992
and its Effect on Conditional Party Government

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ABSTRACT

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(Under the direction of Erik Engstrom)

The traditional story of the Congressional literature tells us that institutional forces shaped the shift in power between Northern and Southern Democrats in the 1970s. Specifically, past work suggests that Democratic Party reforms weakened the Southern Democrats by depriving them of leadership positions. This paper argues that electoral replacement was much more likely the engine of change. Northern Democrats did take control of the Congressional Committees in the 1970s, but that transition was a quarter decade long transition in the making rather than a skilled political maneuver. A secondary analysis contributes to our understanding of the Democratic Caucus in the House by examining how Southern Democrats came to establish their base of power prior to the 1960s. Using an Event History Analysis, the conclusion here is that Southern Democrats enjoyed a substantially more favorable electoral environment which contributed to their enhanced seniority over time.

To Ashley and Luke

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Re-examining the Role of Southern Democrats: An Analysis of the Southern
Advantage in Congress between 1947 and 1992 and its Effect on Conditional
Party Government

Over the course of the past forty years, Congressional scholars have advanced our understanding of Congress and the forces that guide its members. Within that context, detailed analysis has extended our understanding of partisanship within the institution, how members are elected, and how the structure of Congress guides its members. Despite those critical advances, the discipline still relies on a number of untested, yet critical, assumptions. First, David Rohde (1991) suggests that we all know that Southern Democrats achieved an unprecedented overrepresentation in membership on so-called prestige committees and in committee chairs in the period leading up to the critical reform era (the early 1970s). Upon closer inspection, Rohde's work appears to contain no detailed analysis of the extent to which Southern Democrats achieved a substantial bias in their favor. More importantly, we are left without a clear picture of what a substantial bias would even look like. Since the presence of a bias is a critical component in Rohde's study, it seems imperative that additional analysis be conducted. Second, a related set of assumptions involves our understanding of the

manner in which Southern Democrats came to dominate the prestigious committees. Again, the extant work simply takes the dominance in this period as a well understood given: “It is well known that in the twentieth century Southern representatives tended to serve longer in Congress than members from other regions” (Brady, Buckley and Rivers 1999, 500). We may know that Southern Democrats served longer, but the literature appears agnostic regarding the question of how that institutional bias in membership developed.

This project is an effort to critically examine these two omissions from the literature. The first section will examine two separate yet related topics. Initially, we will examine the extent to which Southern Democrats controlled the committee process on the eve of reform. Rohde (1991) informs us that we should expect critical changes in Congress following the Democratic Party’s internal rule changes between 1972 and 1975. While other reforms took place over the course of a 20 year period, that three year timeframe is the critical time period and thus the focus of our attention. We will ultimately discover that on the eve of reform, the imbalance in these committees was already being resolved. Then, the focus turns to examining the extent to which the committees, committee chairs, and general Democratic Caucus changed in the manner that Rohde suggests. Again, we will conclude that Congress did not change as expected.

Having established that the reform era did not proceed as expected, it is important in the second section to examine how Southern Democrats even arrived at the point of having the excess power that they held in the 1960s. Using an event history analysis, the overwhelming conclusion is that electoral forces united in the 1920s-1960s to produce a Democratic Caucus with seniority concentrated in the hands of the Southern members of the Caucus. Controlling for other factors, the conclusion is that, in that time period, being Southern decreased the risk of primary losses and general election losses, while Non-Southerners were more likely to seek appointment to other federal and state offices. These findings more firmly establish exactly how the Southerners came to enjoy the power they did establish prior to the reform era.

I. Reexamining the Congress of the 1960s and 1970s

A. Examining Representation in Congressional Committees

Rohde's 1991 book painted an entirely new picture of the Congressional landscape. In introducing us to the concept of Conditional Party Government, he argues that party government exists only when there is homogeneity within the party caucuses and a clear distinction between the two parties. To advance that argument, he examines the critical institutional

reform period of the United States Congress that spans the 93rd and 94th Congresses (1973-1976). He suggests that Northern Democrats pushed through a series of intra-chamber rule changes that permitted them to take control of their party. Their opposition, the Conservative Coalition, had allegedly biased control of Congress by having Southern Democrats hold the key positions of power within the Congress. Consistent with this argument, we would expect to see Southern Democrats in a few key positions. In particular, we would expect them to hold a sizeable number of committee chairs (especially on the prestige committees)¹ and have sizable numbers of members on the prestige committees. If Southern Democrats did not hold these positions on the eve of the reform era, then a critical piece of Rohde's explanation falls.

To consider these expectations, we can examine those who held committee chairs and those who were on the critical prestige committees during this period. Charles Stewart and Garrison Nelson have conducted previous analysis on this subject and have kindly made their data available on the web (Nelson 2007). Their dataset permits us to examine every member of Congress between 1947 and 1992 and their committee membership with leadership status in each term. Using this data, it is possible to examine the power of Southern Democrats through time.

¹ The Prestige Committees are defined as the Rules, Appropriations, Ways & Means, and Budget Committees. Special Focus is placed on the Rules Committee, because much of the legislative agenda could be stalled in that committee.

Figure 1A² provides the percentage of Democratic chairs in the US House broken down by region from 1947 through 1992.³ The most notable trend in this figure is that the low point of Non Southern Committee Chairs happens in the 89th Congress in 1965. By the start of the reform era in the 93rd Congress, Southern Democrats had already taken quite a hit in their share of Committee Chairs. In addition, the only downward movement in the series between 1965 and the peak in 1979 is the small downward tick in the 94th Congress, the real focal period after the bulk of the reforms. While we see a notable decrease in the power of Southern Democrats after 1965 (with Non Southern Democrats passing the Southern Democrats in the number of chairs by 1969), it is important to place our analysis within the relevant context of the time. If the number of Non Southern Democrats in Congress was increasing, then we would expect to see more representation for that group. Figure 1B does provide us with evidence of Southern Democrats losing seats in Congress. By 1957, Non Southern Democrats achieved a majority of the Democratic Party, but they certainly did not hold a majority of chairs at that time.

² All Tables and Figures are available in the Appendix that is included with the paper.

³ It should be noted that the Democratic Party did not control Congress for all of these terms. In the 80th and 83rd Congresses, the Republican Party actually controlled Congress. So in these cases, the percentage of Chairs is actually the percentage of ranking members. Because the inclusion of these two terms does not alter our impressions, they remain to avoid the confusion associated with unnecessarily missing data points. In addition, I use the standard ICPSR coding for Regions. The South is defined as the focal point of the Old Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia. The Border South is defined as the states that directly border the Deep South: Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, D.C., West Virginia. The rest of the nation is grouped as the Non-South.

Based on this initial look at the data, we need another way to conceptualize bias. Rather than relying on raw numbers, I created a measure of the extent to which each group is getting what they “should” receive or what they “deserve.” This is not a perfect measure, because we would expect there to be some sort of delay between the time that a region gains seats and when it realizes its success at the level of receiving Committee Chairs. Using the proportion of the total number of Democratic members in Congress from the various regions (Non South, South, and Border) as our baseline expectation for chairs and committee membership, it is possible to calculate a deviation from that expectation for each Congress that serves as a reasonable proxy of the bias in the Committee system. Figure 2A depicts this deviation in the expected number of committee chairs for each region. Plainly obvious from this figure is that Non Southerners experienced a huge deficit in their hold on the share of chairs during the 1960s. In the 89th Congress, Non Southerners received over 30% fewer chairs than we would expect based upon their share of seats in Congress. Figure 2B shows the same trend but expresses the trend in terms of seat loss rather than percentage loss. At the worst point, Non Southerners lacked almost 8 chairs that they “deserved.”

All of these findings are consistent with our general tendency to assume overrepresentation by Southern Democrats, but the findings are not wholly consistent with Rohde’s analysis. When the reform movement was

hitting its stride, Non Southern Democrats suffered a mere 10% deficit from the expected number of chairs. That deficit translates into 2 lost Chairs – one to the Border South and one to the Deep South. For there to be an uprising to resolve a crisis in representation, one would expect to see a much larger deficit – more like the one experienced in 1965 than the one experienced in 1973. In addition, by 1981 the deficit in chairs had returned to the same position from 1973 – a loss of 2 seats again. Had the reform period really caused the changes that Rohde suggests, one would have expected to see these deficits permanently resolved. Of particular interest, the bias actually gets worse in 1975 when Northern Democrats had theoretically hit their stride in reclaiming Congress from the Conservative Coalition. Figures 2C and 2D depict the same trend, but do so with a grouping of the Border States and the Deep South. The implications do not change when these figures are consulted.

A secondary piece of Rohde’s argument is that Northern Democrats were able to take control of appointing members to the big prestige committees after the reform period:

Committee independence and influence was also counterbalanced by the measures that strengthened the Democratic party leaders, the second reform track. The transfer of Democratic committee-assignment powers to the Steering and Policy Committee, coupled with direct Speaker control over Rules Committee appointments, expanded leadership influence over members’ access to the most desirable spots in the committee system (Rohde 1991, 165).

As a result, it seems relevant to examine these same deviations for the

membership of Appropriations, Rules, Ways & Means, and Budget. Beginning with the Appropriations committee, Figure 3A shows the percentage deviation in membership across the same time period. In this case, it is the Border States that really controlled the Appropriations committee. By 1973, the Non Southern share deviated by less than 2%. Consulting Figure 3B, that deviation represents a 0.5 seat loss on Appropriations. In fact, the Deep South actually suffered a larger deficit on Appropriations than the Non-South. Consistent with the analysis on Committee Chairs, by 1979 Non Southerners returned to their previous status with a deficit in representation. Grouping the South and Border South in 3C, the appearance is different, but the implication is the same – in 1977 the Non Southerners achieved parity on Appropriations, but most years show the same two seat deficit across the board.

The Rules Committee is described by Rohde (1991) as one of the critical places Northern Democrats sought to establish control. Figure 4A shows that in this case, even more so than any other, Non Southern Democrats achieved parity in 1967, a few Congresses before the start of the reforms. A pro-Southern bias does not establish itself again until the end of the reform period. Figures 4B and 4C depict the same trend and show the insignificant Southern bias through much of the reform period. Ways & Means provides an even more confusing pattern. Figure 5A shows that the

1950s represent the greatest Southern *deficit*. Figure 5C provides the best evidence of a Southern advantage, but even here, the advantage expands and dissipates throughout the reform period and into the following years. Finally, the Budget Committee is the last of the prestige committees. Established in the 93rd Congress, Figure 6A depicts Budget's inconsistent trend that is similar to that of the Ways & Means Committee. Southern advantage dips in 1973 and 1979, but it rebounds in the other years. Figure 6B and 6C yield the same conclusions.

A final look involves aggregating all of the prestige committees to see if we can find any trends with a broader base of information. Figure 7 presents the analysis excluding Budget while Figure 8 includes Budget. Because the Budget Committee does not exist for all of these years, it is important to consider it as a potentially separate case. Figure 7A shows that the largest bias exists for the Border States, but 7B shows that at worst that bias is only a four seat bias across the three committees. The Non Southern states do improve their standing in these committees in 1973 and reach parity, but two interesting trends are notable. First, the Non Southern states found themselves with a 3 seat deficit in 1975, just 1 congress removed from achieving parity. Second, the Non Southern states stalled at about a 1%-2% deficit (~1 seat) until 1989. Adding the Budget committee in Figure 8 does not change our conclusions. 8C depicts a trend in which the combined Border

and Deep South achieved small advantages in some years, but for the most part the South and the Non South bounced back and forth between having small advantages and losing control.

Through this analysis, we learn quite a lot. First, history did not play out exactly as Rohde suggests. On the eve of reform, Southerners did not have disproportionate power, and the reform period appears to do little to change the Southern hold on committees. Throughout this period, Southern Democrats were decreasing in their numbers (largely replaced by Republicans), but they continued to hold more seats and Chairs than they should. If anything, the implication appears to be that replacement might have had a powerful effect, but the rules changes appear to do little. A second implication of this analysis is that we do find that Southerners had a substantial overrepresentation, but that tremendous bias really just occurred earlier than suggested. In the 1950s and 1960s, Southern Democrats did have a substantial power base in Congress. Section II will be devoted to understanding how that power base was established.

B. Considering the Implications for Conditional Party Government

Before moving on to Section II, we do now have a new twist that needs to be resolved in Rohde's analysis. While not the core focus of this paper, this

argument does invoke a key debate among those who study the structure of the parties in Congress. A critical part of the Conditional Party Government argument is that these party based rule changes culminated in the Democratic Party's movement in a liberal direction after 1972 (Collie and Brady 1985, Rohde 1991, Aldrich and Rohde 1998). Other scholars have echoed most of the findings, but have also suggested that some trends have existed across time that have consistently empowered majorities regardless of the homogeneity of the party base in Congress. It has been argued that traditional arrangements like the power of the party to pick leadership, controlling staff, floor agenda control, rules committee control, and select committee membership control have persisted even without homogeneity (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 2002). For advocates of Conditional Party Government to be correct, they need for replacement to provide homogeneity, for individual members during this period to move in a liberal direction, and for the party to have been successful in creating the organizational structure it preferred. Based upon the analysis above, we already have evidence that the Democratic Party failed to place the members it desired: it is fairly clear that well after the reform period the Southern Democrats continued to have an overrepresentation of chairs and seats in prestige committees. Resolving the replacement question and the ideological shift question is still necessary.

The first additional step is to resolve the question of whether or not

replacement achieved the expected outcome. Resolving this is simple; we would expect that new Democrats were largely liberal. Fortunately, we can examine the average ideology score for new Democrats in each region across time. The expectation is that most of these newer Democrats will be coming from Northern states and thus that the party will move in a liberal direction. Majority minority and urban districts should spawn most of the new Southern Democrats after 1970 and thus we would expect them to move in a liberal direction as well. There are two ways to examine this question – from the perspective of the entire Democratic Caucus and from the perspective of the Democratic chairs.

Figure 9 provides the mean DW-Nominate score for the Democratic Caucus in each Congress by Region. Consistent with Rhode's (1991) analysis, Southern Democrats did move noticeably in a liberal direction in the 93rd Congress – 1973. Table 1 provides a simple statistical test of this movement. This test compares the 5 Congresses before the ideological movement to the 5 Congresses after the movement. While not a sharp movement in the liberal direction, the change in 1973 is a statistically significant move of 0.0854 increments ($p < 0.0001$). The change in the other regions is not particularly large and not significant.

Figure 10 provides the same picture, but this time we capture only the DW-Nominate scores of the Democratic Chairs by region. Consistent with

Figure 9, there is a notable move in the liberal direction by Southern Chairs in the 93rd Congress. Table 2 provides the same test as the previous section comparing the 5 years before and after the Reform era changes. Again, the liberal move by Southern Democrats is small – only 0.0694 increments – but the move is significant ($p=0.03$). The movement in the Chairs from the other regions is quite small and does not reach conventional levels of significance. Because the sample sizes are so small, I do report the difference for all regions combined and find that the 0.1 increment movement is significant ($p<0.0001$). These findings provide support for Rhode's position that the Southern Democrats were in fact changed in their voting behavior by the Rules changes in 1973. In fact, these last two figures serve to replicate Rhode's own analysis.

The second step is to examine the extent to which continuing members changed their views. We now know that aggregate changes occurred in the Southern Democratic group between the 92nd and 93rd Congresses. What we do not know is whether or not minds were actually changed by the Rules changes. Recent scholarship provides inconsistent findings on this subject. One school of thought suggests that members do not change their voting patterns through time (Poole 2003). Once members arrive in Washington, we expect them to adhere to a consistent ideology throughout their terms in the Congress. A second viewpoint suggests that it is possible for members to

change their votes across time. Jacobson contradicts Poole and argues that members do change their voting patterns through time with Democrats being more likely to have moved to the left and Republicans being more likely to have moved to the right (Jacobson 2008, 17). For our purposes here, Jacobson's analysis does not resolve the debate. First, Jacobson only looks at the period after 1980. We really need to know what was going on during the critical reform period. Rohde presents one case study of Jaime Whitten, who is seen to change his votes during this period, but we receive no other systematic evidence (Rohde 1991, 46). Second, with additional controls, Jacobson's finding for Southern Democrats is not significant for the period after 1980 (Jacobson 2008, 17). My expectation is that many members probably do change their attitudes to some extent, but it would be unusual for Southern Democrats to change their views during this critical period. Southern Democrats might have faced some challenges from Northern Liberals, but many of these Southerners were established and likely had ideological commitments to their positions. Resolving this debate requires looking at the ideology scores for continuing members. Consistent with Poole (2003), the hypothesis here is that Southern Democrats did not change their voting patterns.

In order to test this hypothesis, I carved out members who served in both the 92nd and 93rd Congresses. By doing this, we can examine the extent

to which members changed their voting behavior in response to the Rules changes. If ideology did not change among this group, then we know that replacement is the primary mechanism for Democratic Party changes in the 1970s. Table 3 provides the statistical test of the mean difference for continuing members of the Democratic Caucus. During this period, continuing Southern Democrats moved 0.0147 increments ($1/20^{\text{th}}$ of a standard deviation) in a liberal direction and the change is not significant ($p=0.34$). The findings for the other regions are the same. Conducting the same analysis for the continuing Chairs yields similar results. Table 4 provides the statistical tests for each of the regions. Consistent with the continuing members of the broader caucus, the continuing Chairs changed very little. Of note, the Southern Chairs move all of 0.0002 increments on average ($p=0.5007$). The other regions show similarly small movements. These tests for continuing members suggest that the Rules changes did very little to alter the behavior of members of Congress – be they general members of the Caucus or the Chairs themselves. New member certainly did join the Caucus and new individuals rose to being Chairs. Those new individuals certainly did change the ideological flavor of the Democratic Party, but Rules changes had very little to do with their arrival in Washington.

The final test of this theory is to examine the leadership of the prestige committees. According to Rhode, the Chairs of these Committees were of

particular importance to the Northern Democrats. If these Committees were held by Southerners who were replaced by Northern Democrats, then the power of the Rules changes would be more credible. Table 5 provides the names of the Chairs, their region, and their DW-Nominate scores for each term of Congress. In the case of each committee, an established Chair left in the 1970s opening the door for the Party leadership to insert a party loyalist. In each case, a moderate (though not conservative) Democrat, who was simply atop the seniority ladder, came to power. On the Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills (D-AR) served for 9 Congresses and maintained a relatively conservative Nominate score. Mills departed unceremoniously from his position as Chair in 1974, leading one to wonder whether or not he was forced out by the Party leadership. In reality, Mills' bouts of public intoxication and his links to Argentine stripper Fanne Foxe ultimately lead to his demise (Zelizer 2000). Albert Ullman (D-OR) had served since 1957 and sat atop the seniority list on the Committee and thus rose to power in the 94th Congress. The Appropriations Committee featured 8 term chair George Mahon (D-TX). Despite a very conservative Nominate score, he survived the Rules Change era until his retirement in 1978, when he was replaced by seniority leader Jaime Whitten (D-MS), who had been elected initially in 1941. Finally, the Rules Committee featured more turnover than the other prestige committees during this period. William Colmer (D-MS) was an

established segregationist who campaigned three times for Richard Nixon (Kuzenski, Moreland and Steed 2001). He conspicuously departed after the 92nd Congress. Additional research suggests, however, that he had just completed his 40th year in Congress in 1972! He retired and endorsed his young aide, Trent Lott, who would run under the GOP banner in 1972. Replacing Colmer as Chair was Ray Madden (D-IN) who was originally elected in 1943 and held a substantial seniority lead. In each of these cases, the Committee did move to the left with new leadership, but the change was much more a function of replacement than ideological shift of the Chair or a deviation from seniority order. Figure 11 plots the DW-Nominate scores of the Chairs of these Committees and depicts clearly the overall broader ideological move to the Left.

It is certainly possible that Rohde and others who have argued in favor of the rules changes affecting Congressional output would respond to this analysis by suggesting that the Speaker's enhanced power could still affect outcomes in the Congress. To some extent, this criticism is a fair one. The reform era certainly did enhance the position of the Speaker and the Steering and Policy Committee. If their power had a direct effect, we would still expect that the voting patterns of continuing members would change. The preceding section provides evidence that any ideology changes that occurred in Congress came about because of replacement rather than institutional forces.

In this view, any increased power in the Speaker came about simply because like-minded ideologues came to Congress who were willing to support a more liberal Speaker. As such, the argument here is that we have limited direct evidence of leadership changes by the Democratic Party systematically affecting the work of Congress.

In future analysis, a critical control is needed to ensure that our analysis is accurate. By the 1965 to 1977 period, a rural/urban split was likely growing in the South. We have empirical evidence suggesting that the growth of Suburbs was a critical part of the Republican strategy in the South (Shafer and Johnson 2006). As such, it would not be surprising if Urban Southern Democrats did change their vote patterns while their suburban and rural counterparts fought against Republican takeover by maintaining their conservatism. If this hypothesis is correct, then we would have even more persuasive evidence that the rules changes of 1970s did not produce the anticipated results. That finding would certainly undermine the theoretical basis for the Conditional Party Government argument and provide us with a much more detailed understanding of the reform era. Having examined the reform era and found some expected trends, the next section begins the process of exploring how a Southern Democratic bias ever developed.

II. A Closer Look at How the South Achieved the Unprecedented Power that it Did Achieve before 1965

A. Examining Existing Work on Historical Southern Electoral Patterns

It is no secret in the Political Science literature that the South has established an unusual political tradition. Classic works have demonstrated that the period of Reconstruction brought a few Republicans to power in the South, but when the Federal Government left a prolonged period of Democratic control was spawned (Key 1996). Schattschneider (1960) describes the “System of 1896” as having regionalized politics with Southern areas becoming monolithically Democratic and Midwestern and Northeastern areas becoming monolithically Republican. While these works provide us a clear picture of the electoral world, we ironically receive only a limited picture of how the Southern politicians achieved so much seniority relative to their Northern, Midwestern, and Western colleagues. This section is an effort to resolve that debate and gain a better understanding of the process that resulted in Southern Democrats controlling committee assignments and committee chairs.

A number of scholars have made valuable contributions to our understanding of this critical period in American history, but they ultimately fail to tell the entire story. Of note, Witmer (1964) examines the number of

members serving additional terms beyond their freshman term in the House and finds that through time there is a remarkable increase in the return rate to Congress. He attributes some of this trend to life expectancy increases and additional staff, but also makes a regional observation. Consistent with other research, he observes that the Southern return rate is higher, but gives us no reasons for this trend. More recent work has examined the related topic of increasing “careerism” in the House. Examining the period from 1870 to 1930, Brady, Buckley and Rivers (1999) do note that reelection rates were higher in the South during this period, but their analysis ends before the Depression and thus compromises what we can learn. They do provide us with one critical piece of guidance in suggesting the importance of primaries: “It was during this period that Democrats achieved dominance in the South. In a one-party system, competition occurs in primary, not general, elections. Once Southern incumbents were renominated, they were almost certain to win the general election” (Brady, Buckley and Rivers 1999, 503). Rising from this work, it will ultimately be important to examine the differences in primary elections in the North and the South following the Depression.

While we still have cause to examine the path for Southerners to achieve their unprecedented seniority, the Southern politics literature does provide us with a number of critical details about the electoral system during this period. Examining partisanship across the South, recent work has

examined just how much the Democratic Party controlled the South. In 1952, Southern party identification was 75% Democratic, and it continued along that path until the 1970s. In the context of statewide Southern office, the picture is even more stark. Until 1994, when there was a dramatic surge in statewide Republican elections, the number of statewide GOP officeholders across the South was less than 20% (Hayes and McKee 2008). These findings certainly show that a lack of competition at the General Election level in the South is one cause of enhanced Seniority among Southern Democrats.

Additional work paints an excellent portrait of Southern partisanship and realignment, but the bulk of it examines contemporary politics and thus does not carefully examine the rise to power for Southern Democrats before 1970. We have learned that Black support for the Democrats has decreased Democratic support in the South (Petrocik and Desposato 1998) and that generational change has accelerated the process by providing a fertile soil for GOP mobilization (Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 2002). Other works suggest that the Civil Rights era fundamentally moved the GOP into control (Carmines and Stimson 1989), while Reagan's efforts completed the realignment of the South (Black and Black 2002). All of these empirical works contribute to our understanding of Southern politics, but none concretely explains how the Southern Democrats ever reached their zenith of power in the 1960s.

B. Explaining the Period of Party Convergence with the Southern Democratic Rise to Power

Much of the desire for explaining this period comes from the need to explain other unusual trends in the politics of the 1960s. At the same time that the graphs in section 1 show a trough in the expected number of Non Southern Democratic chairs and committee members, other scholars have shown that partisanship experienced a strange crash. Shickler (2002) shows that the Republican and Democratic floor medians converged between 1950 and 1980 only to expand back to their previous distance thereafter. He also shows that the standard deviation of the party's ideology scores shot upward during the same period while being low prior to and after this period. The exact same period also features a uniquely high sophomore surge and a uniquely low retirement slump (Alford and Brady 1991). Figure 12 depicts this uncharacteristic spike beginning in 1960. If that were not a sufficient number of unusual commingling trends, Figure 13 shows this same time period as a uniquely pro-incumbent period as well. Finally, Polsby (1968) demonstrates that the run up to the 1960s represented a unique time period for the enhanced professionalization of the United States Congress, with more representatives staying longer and more resources available to them.

Consistent with all of these trends is a notable increase in the power of Southern Democrats. While this is hardly a new observation, the explanation

of how Southern Democrats came to occupy their positions of power might well be the cause of these other trends as well. Figure 14 overlays two different trends. On the left is the party unity score for Southern Democrats. The data for those unity scores is taken directly from Rohde (1991, 15). The variable on the right is the Non Southern seat bias on the prestige committees from Section I. The trends certainly match well and the correlation coefficient is .67. A time series regression of Southern Democratic unity scores on the committee bias produces a significant relationship at the .007 level where $B_1 = 4.22$ with an R^2 of 0.44. Given these results, it is reasonable to conclude that we are measuring similar trends. As such, it seems critical that we examine the path to this bias.

A number of scholars have examined this period with an eye toward explaining the incumbency advantage of this era. The consistent message of this literature is that incumbents are rewarded during the election season because of the benefits they have delivered during their time in office (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974; Cover 1977; Erikson 1971; King and Gelman 1991; Mann and Wolfinger 1980). The most common reason for this incumbency advantage is an overwhelming resource advantage among incumbents. Because incumbents are well known and have an institutional track record, they are able to raise substantial sums of money that assists with their reelection efforts (Abramowitz 1991; Cox and

Katz 1996; Kazee 1983; Levitt and Wolfram 1997; Fiorina 1977). While this literature goes a long way towards explaining contemporary trends in reelection rates, it assists very little in this project. Because we want to know how a tremendous imbalance occurred initially, merely understanding that incumbents have an advantage is of little value. In both regions (North and South), incumbents should have had advantages. In addition, the bulk of this work asserts that these incumbency and resource advantage effects are relatively recent phenomena.

Abromowitz, Alexander, and Gunter (2006) add their own spin on this problem and demonstrate that competition in the House has declined for two reasons. First, much like those authors above, they find that financial advantages have contributed to incumbency advantages. Second, consistent with Oppenheimer (2005) and Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani (2003), they find that a shift in the partisan composition of House districts has left districts less competitive in the aggregate. This second explanation is an interesting explanation for recent electoral changes, but again it is a recent phenomenon. We have no reason to believe that in the 1940s congressional districts fundamentally shifted in their partisanship. As such, this explanation for modern trends, while intriguing, is of little value.

Despite an ongoing research tradition to explain why marginal races have disappeared, some authors have adopted a completely different

perspective. In the most extreme case, we are told that this entire research project has been misguided and has incorrectly concluded that the marginal races ever disappeared: “Clearly, if House incumbents are no more likely to win reelection, if the marginals have not really vanished, if seat swings are hardly less sensitive to vote swings, electoral competition has not, in any meaningful sense, declined” (Jacobson 1987, 132). This analysis offers a unique spin that simply comes along too late to be of any value in our explanation. We now know, based on Section I, that a gross imbalance had occurred prior to the period in which the marginal seats allegedly disappeared. As such, Jacobson’s explanation provides great insight into the 1970s and beyond, but again does not contribute to our understanding of the period that’s leads up to the reform era.

Fortunately, a couple of projects do have insights that apply directly to our understanding. In one of his classic “soaking and poking” works, Fenno (2000) directs us to the manner in which a particular Southern House member, Jack Flynt (D-GA), faced each of his elections. Specific reference is made to the fact that the only election that ever mattered in the South was the Democratic Primary. Based on previous work, this alone is not surprising. What is interesting is that Flynt only experienced one primary challenge between his initial election in 1954 and his retirement in 1978. The reason for his retirement was a changing district and the belief that he would never

become Chair of Appropriations. (Fenno 2000, 86). The initial expectations for a seat like this would be intense biennial primaries and token opposition (if any) in the general election. Fierce primaries like the 2006 Connecticut Democratic Primary between Lieberman and Lamont should have been the norm. This example from Fenno suggests that, in fact, Southern Primaries were hardly competitive either. Other empirical work has established that these primaries allowed for the creation of a “personal vote” that propelled candidates forward in subsequent elections (Katz and Sala 1994).

Fortunately, this primaries hypothesis is a testable proposition. The obvious direction is to estimate the probability of facing a primary challenge in the North and the South in the years between 1930 and 1965. If Southerners were uniquely immune from primary challenges and thus any competition at all, we would expect to see more Southern Democrats in leadership roles.

Ultimately, this section aims to resolve a period that is an apparent aberration in the scholarly work. The first step is to examine primary election rates by region. The existing literature provides a mixed picture, but in general suggests that we should see limited electoral competition of any variety in the South. In addition, retirement rates also need to be considered. It is always possible that Southerners embraced the idea of being “careerists” earlier than did representatives in the North. When seniority is the path to being a committee chair and sitting on prestige committees, then regions

with members that have a tendency to stay in Congress longer will inevitably be rewarded with leadership positions. Because Roosevelt should have brought with him a sizeable number of Northern Democrats in the 1930s, there should have been ample senior Democrats from the North by the 1960s to serve as Chairs. Since there apparently were not, general tendencies to seek reelection almost have to be a key part of the explanation.

Apart from primary losses and retirements, the most obvious way to leave Congress is through a disappointing performance in a general election. The expectation is that Southerners should face almost no general election challenges and thus that the Non-South should face a much higher risk of general election losses. The final paths to departure are less common, but still important. It is possible that there could be a higher death rate among one region in Congress than others. Since only a few extremely senior members are needed to control the committees, if fewer Southerners died in Congress we then would ultimately see more chairs from the South. In addition, corruption is certainly a common problem in Congress. If Southerners were expelled from Congress at a lower rate, then that could explain the presence of longer serving Southerners. Finally, members of Congress can leave to take a wide variety of other offices. If Non-Southerners were more likely to seek these other offices, then it is possible that Southerners could be left to control the US House.

C. Data and Methods

The initial plan for this section was to utilize the exact same dataset as Section 1. Doing so would permit an estimation of the probability of becoming a Chair in each region. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict the probability of being a Chair, while also considering the various paths that can lead someone to depart from the US House. As a result, this section relies on a merged dataset that combines the ICPSR Congressional Biographical set and the first dimension DW-Nominate scores from Poole and Rosenthal. Instead of predicting whether or not someone becomes a Chair, the model will examine the duration that each member serves in Congress and thus establish a hazard rate by region. Because the Democrats allocated all of their Committee Chairs by seniority prior to the Reform Era, predicting duration of membership is essentially the same thing as predicting the probability of becoming a Chair.

Seven variables are included in the model as explanatory variables. The first two variables provide the only two demographic controls that are available in the dataset, gender and age. Gender is included strictly as a control and there are no expectations associated with it. Women do live longer than men so it is important to include the possibility that Women could ultimately serve longer because of their general longevity. Age is included as a control, but the expectation is that the older a member is, the

more likely he or she is to depart from the Congress. Two regional dummy variables are included as well. Separate dummies are included for the Deep South and the Border South.⁴ The baseline category, Non-South, is excluded and the other dummies serve as comparisons against the Non-Southern category. The expectation is that in each of the models the Southern and Border categories will be associated with longevity in Congress. Nominate scores are also included in the model as a control. When considering an outcome like a primary loss, voting record likely plays a critical role in explaining why someone lost an election. Finally, two interaction terms are included. I interact the region dummies with the DW-Nominate scores to capture the extent to which ideology in the South contributes to longevity in the Congress.

The preceding variables are estimated in a Cox Event History Regression. This method permits us to analyze the factors that contribute to longevity in Congress. Survival is defined as being re-elected to Congress, while death is defined as departing from the chamber. This analysis examines hazard rates from the 70th through the 90th Congresses. The 90th Congress is one Congress past the peak of the Southern Bias in Committee Chairs that is identified in Figure 2. Looking at the data, it becomes clear that the longest anyone serves in Congress is about 20 terms. So, the start of the analysis is 40 years prior in the 70th Congress. As a result, the analysis

⁴ The same coding scheme for regions from section I is used again in Section II.

runs from 1927 through 1968. Because the number of possible durations is relatively small, there are a large number of ties. Consistent with methodological work on the subject, the Efron method is used to obtain a more accurate method of accounting for the composition of the risk set (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

The final methodological components that merit discussion are the organization of the data in the event history analysis. Because there are multiple outcomes that serve to terminate a Congressional career, a competing risks model is necessary (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The initial analysis is essentially a pooled analysis that provides the coefficients for a model that simply predicts any departure from the House. The subsequent parts of the analysis re-estimate the model and consider each outcome separately. Doing so permits the analyst to weight how the different covariates contribute to different possible outcomes – in this case the different means of exiting the House. Finally, the model contains both static covariates and time varying covariates (TVCs). The region dummies and gender are fixed for each observation (each Congress) of each member. The age, ideology, and region-ideology interactions take a different value for each Congress. TVCs provide a richer analysis without complicating the interpretation of the results.

D. Results of the Event History Analysis

Table 6 presents the results of the event history analysis. The pooled model is presented in the first column and presents a picture that is consistent with our initial expectations. Gender has no effect on the departure from Congress, while each additional year older does increase the failure rate. As we would expect, getting older is associated with departing from the Congress. In the case of the regional dummies, compared to the baseline Non-Southern category, Southerners did tend to stay in Congress for longer. Being Southern is associated with a lower failure rate and thus a longer duration as a member of Congress. The ideology measures produce interesting results. While being more conservative tends to increase the failure rate, the South*Nominate interaction suggests that being a conservative Southerner depressed this effect. This finding is consistent with what we see in terms of Southern Committee Chairs during this period – Conservative Southerners tended to stick around much longer than other groups in Congress. The pooled model provides us with a general picture of the Southern path to establishing power, but many reasons for departure are included. The subsequent columns provide the competing risks component of the analysis and paint a much more complete picture.

Losing in the General Election is the most common way to depart from Congress and thus is the first place to examine the differences between the

South and the Non-South. As expected, age continues to contribute to a higher failure. In addition, both of the regional dummies suggest that representatives from the Southern regions were substantially more likely to survive general elections. Without a competitive competing party, it would be hard to imagine the opposite outcome. For the Democrats, being more conservative (and thus more moderate) contributed to a higher likelihood of an election loss. Consistent with our expectations, the South moved toward higher levels of seniority in part because of their near immunity from meaningful general election challenges.

Primaries present a very different set of risks for members of Congress. Over the relevant period, about half as many members lost in primaries as in general elections, but the raw number is sufficiently high to attract our attention. Age continued to contribute to losing a seat, while gender had no effect. In this case, the region dummies did not have a meaningful effect. There was no statistically significant difference in the primary risks for Southerners and Non-Southerners. Being more conservative in Democratic primaries did present the higher risks of loss that one would expect. The South*Nominate interaction tells us that Southern conservatives, however, were much less likely to lose. Consistent with previous findings, Southern conservatives were safer in the primary, the only place that they faced serious challenges. While older research has suggested

that Southern primaries could be vibrant, competitive forums, the results here suggest that Conservative Southerners were uniquely safe – setting the stage for their lengthy careers in Congress.

Outside of electoral settings, there are a variety of factors that could mitigate Southern control of the senior positions in the Democratic Caucus. The first of these factors is death. A sizeable number of members do die in Congress. Table 6 shows that age is only predictor of dying in office and being older does increase the failure rate and thus increase the risk of dying. None of the other variables reach even marginal levels of significance. In contrast to death, retirement is the obvious voluntary path to leaving the US House. Age and being female contribute to retirement, but the regional dummies do not. Being more conservative is associated with departing – perhaps some evidence of self selection during this period that would culminate in a more liberal caucus in the 1970s. The South*Nominate interaction suggests at marginal levels of significance ($p < 0.1$) that Conservative Southerners were less likely to retire.

In addition to simply retiring from the chamber, a member could claim another office at either the state or federal level. The only significant predictor of duration in this case is being Southern – which is associated with a lower likelihood of departure. None of the predictors reach traditional levels of significance. Finally, though it is rare, a member could be expelled from

the chamber because of corruption or outside mischief. Not surprisingly, being older is associated with maturity or having survived long enough to not be caught. Conservatives apparently faced a higher risk of being expelled ($p < 0.1$), but there is no difference among the regional groups.

The overall picture presented here is that electoral forces provided the Southerners with a protective cushion relative to the Non-South. Other reasons for departure could have mitigated that effect, but, if anything, other factors like appointment to another office only contributed to Southern longevity relative to the Non-South. While this model does not directly explain the forces that contribute to being a Chair, it does provide a comprehensive picture of the forces that contribute to how long a member stays in Congress. Because longevity was directly linked to the likelihood of being a Committee Chair through the seniority system, this model provides excellent leverage into understanding how the South achieved its advantage in the US House. It would have been reasonable to expect that at least some factor would contribute to a Non-Southern advantage, but in every case presented here the Southern members enjoyed a favorable electoral environment for longevity and made strategic moves that contributed to their staying in the US House for longer periods of time than their Northern counterparts.

III. Conclusion

This paper aims to fill two notable gaps in the literature. Section I is an attempt to understand the true committee dynamics of the reform period in the 1970s. Having established that the committees did not change in the ways that Rohde (1991) suggests, we turn to a project that examines the convergence in opinions of the Southern Democrats who remain. In addition, the examination of committees shows that Southern Democrats did have disproportionate power in the years before the reform era. Section II is an effort to understand how that imbalance came about. Utilizing existing databases that provide annual details for members of Congress, it becomes clear that a wide variety of electoral and strategic factors contributed to the advantage that Southerners established in the 1960s.

Since so much of our theory relies on explaining this unusual period in Congressional history, understanding the period between 1930 and 1975 appears to be all the more important. The conventional wisdom among Congressional scholars has been to accept the story that strategic decisions guided fundamentally important institutional Democratic Party reforms in the early 1970s. The traditional story suggests that those reforms affected committee structure, committee membership, leadership positions on committees, and Congressional output. The research presented here challenges that traditional story. The theory of Conditional Party

Government specifically invokes this traditional wisdom and suggests that party reform efforts were the critical factor in establishing a homogenous Democratic Party Caucus. This paper does not challenge the outcome that parties became relevant after the Reform Era, but it does provide substantial evidence that replacement rather than institutional reform was the vehicle of change in the 93rd Congress.

APPENDIX

Table 1: T-Test for Difference between 5 Year Periods before and after the start of the 93rd Congress by Region for the Democratic Caucus

	Region		
	South	Border	Non-South
Mean Dw Nom Score 88th-92nd Congress	-0.0303	-0.2444	-0.3801
Mean Dw Nom Score 93rd-97th Congress	-0.1157	-0.2304	-0.3730
Difference	0.0854	-0.0139	-0.0071
Standard Error	0.0147	0.0190	0.0075
p value	<0.0001	0.7672	0.8260
N	767	238	1654

Table 2: T-Test for Difference between 5 Year Periods before and after the start of the 93rd Congress by Region for Democratic Chairs

	Region			All Regions
	South	Border	Non-South	
Mean Dw Nom Score 88th-92nd Congress	-0.0350	-0.2666	-0.3581	-0.1948
Mean Dw Nom Score 93rd-97th Congress	-0.1044	-0.3219	-0.4043	-0.3115
Difference	0.0694	0.0553	0.0461	0.1167
Standard Error	0.0369	0.0436	0.0278	0.0268
p value	0.0322	0.1083	0.0509	<0.0001
N	82	31	111	224

Table 3: T-Test for Difference between 92nd and 93rd Congresses for Continuing Members of Congress by Region

	Region		
	South	Border	Non-South
Mean Dw Nom Score 92nd Congress	-0.0595	-0.2405	-0.3950
Mean Dw Nom Score 93rd Congress	-0.0741	-0.2396	-0.3947
Difference	0.0147	-0.0009	-0.0003
Standard Error	0.0363	0.0648	0.0167
p value	0.3432	0.4946	0.4934
N	116	34	275

Table 4: T-Test for Difference between 92nd and 93rd Chairs for Continuing Committee Chairs of Congress

	Region			All Regions
	South	Border	Non-South	
Mean Dw Nom Score 92nd Congress	-0.0912	-0.3180	-0.2889	-0.2137
Mean Dw Nom Score 93rd Congress	-0.0913	-0.3200	-0.2826	-0.2111
Difference	0.0002	0.0020	-0.0063	-0.0026
Standard Error	0.0868	0.0114	0.1003	-0.0026
p value	0.5007	0.4385	0.4755	0.5153
N	12	4	14	30

Table 5: Prestige Committee Chairs (1947-1983)

Ways and Means Committee					Appropriations Committee				
Congress	Year	Chair	Region	DWNom	Congress	Year	Chair	Region	DWNom
80	1947	Robert Doughton	South	0.037	80	1947	Clarence Cannon	Non-South	-0.113
81	1949	Robert Doughton	South	0.061	81	1949	Clarence Cannon	Non-South	-0.105
82	1951	Robert Doughton	South	0.085	82	1951	Clarence Cannon	Non-South	-0.096
83	1953	Jere Cooper	Border	-0.149	83	1953	Clarence Cannon	Non-South	-0.087
84	1955	Jere Cooper	Border	-0.145	84	1955	Clarence Cannon	Non-South	-0.078
85	1957	Jere Cooper	Border	-0.14	85	1957	Clarence Cannon	Non-South	-0.069
85	1958	Wilbur Mills	South	-0.147	86	1959	Clarence Cannon	Non-South	-0.061
86	1959	Wilbur Mills	South	-0.151	87	1961	Clarence Cannon	Non-South	-0.052
87	1961	Wilbur Mills	South	-0.156	88	1963	Clarence Cannon	Non-South	-0.043
88	1963	Wilbur Mills	South	-0.16	88	1964	George Mahon	South	-0.095
89	1965	Wilbur Mills	South	-0.165	89	1965	George Mahon	South	-0.095
90	1967	Wilbur Mills	South	-0.17	90	1967	George Mahon	South	-0.095
91	1969	Wilbur Mills	South	-0.174	91	1969	George Mahon	South	-0.095
92	1971	Wilbur Mills	South	-0.179	92	1971	George Mahon	South	-0.095
93	1973	Wilbur Mills	South	-0.183	93	1973	George Mahon	South	-0.095
94	1975	Albert Ullman	Non-South	-0.325	94	1975	George Mahon	South	-0.095
95	1977	Albert Ullman	Non-South	-0.325	95	1977	George Mahon	South	-0.095
96	1979	Albert Ullman	Non-South	-0.325	96	1979	Jamie Whitten	South	-0.187
97	1981	Daniel Rostenkowski	Non-South	-0.374	97	1981	Jamie Whitten	South	-0.202

Rules Committee				
Congress	Year	Chair	Region	DWNom
80	1947	Adolph Sabath	Non-South	-0.524
81	1949	Adolph Sabath	Non-South	-0.529
82	1951	Adolph Sabath	Non-South	-0.535
83	1953	Howard Smith	South	0.126
84	1955	Howard Smith	South	0.14
85	1957	Howard Smith	South	0.154
86	1959	Howard Smith	South	0.169
87	1961	Howard Smith	South	0.183
88	1963	Howard Smith	South	0.197
89	1965	Howard Smith	South	0.211
90	1967	William Colmer	South	0.271
91	1969	William Colmer	South	0.291
92	1971	William Colmer	South	0.31
93	1973	Ray Madden	Non-South	-0.388
94	1975	Ray Madden	Non-South	-0.387
95	1977	James Delaney	Non-South	-0.288
96	1979	Richard Bolling	Non-South	-0.492
97	1981	Richard Bolling	Non-South	-0.494

Table 6: Event History Model Predicting Duration before Departure from US House

Variable	Overall			Gen Election Loss			Primary Loss			Death			Retire			Apt to Other Office			Expelled		
	Coef.	St Err	p	Coef.	St Err	p	Coef.	St Err	p	Coef.	St Err	p	Coef.	St Err	p	Coef.	St Err	p	Coef.	St Err	p
Female Dummy	0.234	0.199	0.239	-0.273	0.385	0.478	0.199	0.591	0.737	-0.966	1.015	0.341	1.374	0.303	p<0.001	0.014	0.590	0.982	-1.834	-	-
Age [TVC]	0.026	0.004	p<0.001	0.015	0.006	0.015	0.021	0.009	0.022	0.070	0.012	p<0.001	0.046	0.009	p<0.001	-0.009	0.011	0.398	-0.116	0.047	0.013
Border State Dummy	-0.202	0.230	0.380	-1.010	0.438	0.021	0.596	0.412	0.148	-0.832	0.933	0.372	-0.326	0.558	0.559	0.590	0.516	0.253	-0.413	1.407	0.769
Southern State Dummy	-0.697	0.126	p<0.001	-2.369	0.271	p<0.001	-0.030	0.282	0.915	-0.229	0.403	0.571	0.032	0.275	0.906	-0.887	0.379	0.019	-0.748	0.900	0.406
Border*Nominate [TVC]	0.873	0.993	0.93	0.910	2.058	0.658	0.798	1.839	0.664	-3.762	3.214	0.242	-1.251	2.165	0.563	3.703	2.305	0.108	2.183	8.051	0.786
South*Nominate [TVC]	-1.709	0.507	0.001	1.476	1.454	0.310	-4.337	1.041	p<0.001	-1.030	1.333	0.440	-1.687	1.010	0.095	-2.041	1.409	0.148	-3.075	3.690	0.405
DW*Nominate Score [TVC]	0.667	0.276	0.016	0.961	0.375	0.010	2.656	0.793	0.001	-0.641	0.865	0.458	1.404	0.714	0.049	-1.075	0.655	0.101	4.850	2.856	0.089
Log Likelihood	-4801.929			-1801.627			-959.461			-482.352			-991.146			-751.936			-59.448		
Total N	4361			4530			4718			4780			4716			4741			4775		
Failure N	808			294			165			93			174			126			11		

Notes: TVC Denotes Time Varying Covariates. Data: ICPSR Congressional Biographical Set & Poole & Rosenthal's 1st Dimension DW-Nominate Scores.

Figure 1A: Percentage of Democratic Chairs by Region




Figure 1B: Percentage of Members by Region




Figure 2A: Percentage of Deviation between Membership Percentage and Chairs Received by Region




Figure 2B: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Chairs Received by Region




Figure 2C: Percentage of Deviation between Membership Percentage and Chairs Received by Region (Grouping South and Border South)




Figure 2D: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Chairs Received by Region




Figure 3A: Percentage of Deviation between Membership Percentage and Appropriations
Committee Membership by Region




Figure 3B: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Appropriations Committee Membership by Region




Figure 3C: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Appropriations Committee Membership by Region (Grouping South and Border South)




Figure 4A: Percentage of Deviation between Membership Percentage and Rules Committee Membership by Region




Figure 4B: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Rules Committee Membership by Region




Figure 4C: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Rules Committee Membership by
Region (Grouping South and Border South)




Figure 5A: Percentage of Deviation between Membership Percentage and Ways & Means Committee Membership by Region




Figure 5B: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Ways & Means Committee Membership by Region




Figure 5C: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Ways & Means Committee Membership by Region (Grouping South and Border South)




Figure 6A: Percentage of Deviation between Membership Percentage and Budget Committee Membership by Region




Figure 6B: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Budget Committee Membership
by Region




Figure 6C: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Budget Committee Membership
by Region (Grouping South and Border South)




Figure 7A: Percentage of Deviation between Membership Percentage and Flagship Committee Membership (Ways & Means, Rules, and Appropriations combined) by Region




Figure 7B: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Flagship Committee Membership
(Ways & Means, Rules, and Appropriations combined) by Region




Figure 7C: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Flagship Committee Membership (Ways & Means, Rules, and Appropriations combined) by Region (Grouping South and Border South)




Figure 8A: Percentage of Deviation between Membership Percentage and Flagship Committee Membership (Ways & Means, Rules, Appropriations, and Budget combined) by Region




Figure 8B: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Flagship Committee Membership
(Ways & Means, Rules, Appropriations, and Budget combined) by Region




Figure 8C: Seat Deviation between Membership Percentage and Flagship Committee Membership
(Ways & Means, Rules, Appropriations, and Budget combined) by Region (Grouping South and
Border South)




Figure 9: DW-Nominate Scores for the Democratic Caucus
by Region




Figure 10: DW-Nominate Scores for the Democratic Chairs
by Region




Figure 11: DW_Nominate Scores for the Prestige Committee Chairs (1947-1983)




FIGURE 12






FIGURE 13



From (Erickson 1995)

Figure 14: Southern Democrat Party Unity Score Overlayed with Non Southern Democrat Seat Deviation on Prestige Committees



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