

IN THE MIDST OF EUROPE: THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY  
COOPERATION

Zesely Bryan Haislip III

A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Political Science in the TransAtlantic Master's Program in the School of Arts and Sciences.

Chapel Hill  
2014

Approved by:

Holger Moroff

Milada Vachudova

John Stephens

© 2014  
Zesely Bryan Haislip III  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

## ABSTRACT

Zesely Bryan Haislip III - In The Midst of Europe: The United States and European Security Cooperation  
(Under the Direction of Holger Moroff)

Given recent focus on a supposed U.S. policy shift to the Pacific region, this research looks to Europe and the security cooperation organizations to understand if this new focus has come due to increased distance between the United States and European countries. The analysis intends to show that there is still a strong connection between the two sides of the Atlantic, and that the United States has many avenues through which to stay in touch with decisions made in European security organizations. Important background on the institutional development of the two case organizations creates a foundation to understand the analysis and conclusions. Through analysis of NATO and CSDP, it is clear that the United States has a strong ability to influence the civilian and military operations carried out by the European Union's supposedly independent defense institution.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	v
INTRODUCTION.....	1
LITERATURE/BACKGROUND.....	4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	11
ANALYSIS.....	15
NATO CASE.....	15
CSDP CASE.....	18
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES.....	21
CONCLUSIONS.....	23
IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH.....	25
CONCLUSION.....	27
REFERENCES.....	28

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

COREPER	Council of Permanent Representatives
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CWG	Council Working Groups
EU	European Union
HI	Historical Institutionalism
LI	Liberal Intergovernmentalism
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSC	Political and Security Committee

## **I. Introduction**

Since the end of the Cold War, regional security cooperation has been in a state of change and evolution. Because the period from the 1945 to 1989 held such tension, security organizations were commonplace and the need for them was obvious. However, with the fall of the United Soviet Socialist Republic, a common defense organization focused around counterbalancing the Soviet threat was left with a mission that lacked direction. This lack of a singular opponent was widely hypothesized to lead to the decline of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), simply because it would become a defense institution without a common enemy. For an organization that had been so integral in the international arena since the end of World War II this seemed an odd turn of events yet it was the logical conclusion many drew from the institutional structure and the stated goals of NATO throughout the Cold War. In addition, the new, security-focused, branch of the European Union was still trying to find a footing in Europe and the world. The fledgling European Union institution was given little chance to succeed due to poor experiences in past attempts at political or defense iterations. The doubt in regards to this institution also grew from the years of focus on economic issues and a seeming avoidance of a more high-level issue like security. This had been separated and seen as the territory in which NATO would act. However, the experience of both of these actors has outstripped the expectations of scholars and policymakers alike. NATO has adapted its mission and structure in order to reassert its necessity in the post-Cold War world; and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been learning and evolving as it time goes on and has finally begun to operate missions and do work in areas it cares about. The Balkan conflicts in the

mid-1990s gave the organizations a new purpose – to clean up in the aftermath of the Cold War. This meant crisis management, conflict prevention, and other valuable peace processes that required redesigning and developing new goals and tactics.

This research will look into these two actors and use them as case studies to examine the potential impact of the United States in major European security organizations. The historical and theoretical backgrounds will set the stage and help to show why the analysis made by this paper is currently needed. Using appropriate international relations theory in coordination with relevant integration theory will allow the analysis to address issues in both the structure and actions of these two organizations. The analysis will focus on the decision-making structures and military/police actions of each institution as examples of how the United States can or does have an impact on these actors. By addressing these two facets of the institutions, the analysis will look at a more complete picture than if it was to focus strictly on the military capabilities of either. The main analysis will be followed by a section on the implications of the research and the ways in which such possibility for influence is important for those in both theoretical and practical fields. Through the investigation of potential implications, the analysis intends to show that NATO and the European Union are open to US influence, even if they are not directly under such an influence.

Overall, this research will show that, given the current state of affairs in the international arena, the United States has the ability to make a strong and measurable impact on the ways in which regional security issues are handled. Whether it chooses to act on the ability it has is well beyond the scope of this analysis, but the implications of such influence will be discussed following the analysis. By doing this, the analysis hopes to show that the security of Europe and the European Union are still inexorably tied to the United States; and despite the relatively

popular idea of the shift to a more Asia-centric model in U.S. grand strategy there is still a great importance placed on the transatlantic link.

## **II. Literature/Background**

The substantive literature for this research revolving around NATO and the European Union falls into three main categorical groups. The first of these looks at the institutional evolution that has brought them into their current iterations, by doing this the literature creates a strong background for the categories that follow. Both underwent a substantive phase of change in the early 1990s, and it is from these challenges that the present structures developed. The second grouping is literature used in the analysis to cover the decision-making structures of the two institutions and to help illustrate similarities and differences in the way they reach agreement on an issue or begin deployment of forces. The last set of sources relating to NATO and the EU specifically addresses the concrete actions taken by NATO and the Common Security and Defense Policy branch of the EU. In using these sources, the analysis combines the history of the organizations and the decision-making processes to understand how and why they do what they do. Within each of these sections, research includes specific examples relating to the connection between the two groups and their members.

Much literature has been produced on the state of NATO since the end of Cold War, and the whole range of predictions were made. Some scholars such as Gärtner (1998, 10) predicted the evolution of the security arena in a way that specialized NATO to maintain its collective defense while a new institution was created to deal with the new need for crisis management. Others took a more drastic approach, deeming the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War as the “end of history” as had been known and the arrival of a more homogeneous and

universal system (Fukuyama 1989, 1). In either case, such predictions apparently underestimated the institutional inertia of NATO; meanwhile almost no one expected the introduction of a European Union security entity to take over relevant responsibility from the Western European Union. Conflict still exists and while those predicting a rise in the need for crisis management were correct, how it would be handled was hard to determine.

For the EU, life until the end of the Cold War was about evolution and growth, but with a focus on economic integration and the strength of a market. While this has continued with the expansion of the common market and the introduction of a common currency, the most surprising thing to emerge in the post-Cold War era has been a renewed focus on the political and security aspects of integration. After failed attempts at political union during its early stages, the EU mostly abandoned such aspirations with the goal of functionally integrating in the way that best improved the European situation after World War II. However, the relatively new European common security project is seen by those within the Union as a logical step given the evolution of the EU and its increasing role in international interactions. If they are to be more involved than ever, they should have a role that is complete and multifaceted (Anderson 2006, 25). Their initial push to be taken seriously in military terms was overzealous, though not without good intention. However, the 60,000-troop goal was unlikely to succeed from the start, and instead a more cooperative notion came into being.

Due to the historical context of these institutions, both NATO and the EU have made drastic changes in their mission and structure in order to adapt to the new international environment. However, it is the decision-making processes – and the actions that result from such decisions – that are of more interest in this context. One key part of the change is the Berlin

Plus agreement, a series of negotiated guidelines that expand the interconnectivity of the two organizations and allow the European Union to make use of “NATO assets and capabilities” (eeas.europa.eu). Finalized in 2003 three after many years of summits and negotiations, Berlin Plus creates a common ground on intelligence sharing, planning infrastructure, and in-field command capabilities. By doing this, the two groups illustrate the changing climate and fully set the stage for a larger connection in the future. It was in fact, a key element in giving CSDP the technical ability to undertake military missions as opposed to monitoring or police missions (eeas.europa.eu).

For NATO decisions are made at multiple levels within the institution, with the importance and thematic context of the issue playing a large role in how the decision process is undertaken. The North Atlantic Council is the main decision-making institution and it uses a consensus building process in order to pass decisions. They have deliberately separated their idea of consensus from that of unanimity because there are no formal votes to determine a decision. Instead, they rely on a process through which uncertainty – spoken and unspoken – is taken into account and addressed. If consensus cannot be reached initially, the options will be amended in such a way as to best fit the needs and ideals of the members. This body consists of one representative from each member country; and it is chaired by an impartial Secretary General. These representatives work on important (but usually non-military) issues like the overarching Strategic Concept for the organization, the institutional budget, and the working of the Partnership for Peace (Gallis 2003, 2). However, another body deals with the other issues not addressed by the NAC. This institution is known as the Military Committee and, similar to the NAC, is made up of representatives from each member country. The only exception to this is France, as they removed themselves from the Military Committee in 1966 while under the

presidency of Charles de Gaulle (Gallis 2003, 2). Decisions started in this branch of NATO are often made and then passed to the NAC for approval although this is not a necessary step. Issues that will be problematic for French national interest are sometimes passed directly from the Military Committee as a means to circumvent a potential consensus stalemate.

The European Union is a relatively more complex organization to understand, however it contains some basic features of the decision-making process that can allow analysis of CSDP to be more comprehensible. Three main groups that have a strong impact on the CSDP actions, and others have influence depending on the saliency of the military issue being addressed. These are the Council Working Groups (CWGs), Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). These groups may work in concert or individually, but they tend to have similar processes for reaching a decision. The theory behind the way that the European Union has integrated and formed these groups will be discussed in the next section, but what is most important for understanding the decision-making process is the combination of rational bargaining and unanimity based consensus building. While these things are often put in contrast to each other, scholarly work shows that within the European Union this sort of blurring of lines is common (Howorth 2012, 439). The CWGs are consensus-building groups that are often seen as places for a stronger influence of member states but in fact, they tend to be a place for the socialization of national representatives. Similarly, Howorth (2012, 442) describes the atmosphere of COREPER as “cognitive blurring of the sharp definitional boundaries between the national and the European”. Through this, the author intends to show that these groups work hard within their mandate to do the best job possible for the benefit of the decision, not necessarily in regards to the red lines set by their national governments. More illustrative however, may be the decision-making structure of the PSC. Made up of national

ambassador level representatives, it is often seen by scholars and analysts as the linchpin for decisions on CSDP. Quantitative data procured through surveys done show that a strong value is placed on the informal meetings and norms that have developed between these representatives. In addition, 80% of those asked said that they saw their work with CSDP as helping to form a European identity and saw this as a necessary task (Howorth 2012, 445). They also referenced the previously mentioned idea of shifting decision-making from a purely rational negotiation to a consensus building operation. These three parts of the decision-making process show that a strong focus is given to the more informal side of meetings within the European Union, and specifically in relation to CSDP. There are other structures and individuals within the CSDP structure with influence, such as the EU Military Committee, Civilian Committee, and the High Representative; however, these will be brought up in more detail during the analysis and implications sections of the paper.

In regards to the concrete actions taken by NATO in the security arena, the organization has a long tradition of providing defense support in Europe, but its move after the Cold War to an increased focus on out-of-area operations has led it to operation around the world. Two examples used in this analysis will be Operation Ocean Shield– an anti-piracy effort off the Horn of Africa, and Operation Joint Endeavor – an officially concluded mission in Bosnia Herzegovina. The first operation is an ongoing mission focused on combatting the issue of piracy in east Africa and the waters around the area. Because of the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden and this region of the Indian Ocean, the issue is especially prevalent for NATO. The current iteration of the operation began in 2009 and NATO forces have worked with other organizations and third countries to both directly fight and disrupt pirates, but also to conduct

surveillance and train local forces to fight the pirates. This mission illustrates a case in which NATO forces work alongside European Union personnel on a common goal but under different command structures and with varying methods. The NATO website's official section on the mission highlights improving "regional capacity-building" and dissolving "logistics and support" as key methods for achieving mission goals ([www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)). The second operation in question is one that has officially ended, although some NATO forces remain in the area for support purposes. The initial piece of this operation, now known as Joint Endeavor, was the first military engagement undertaken by NATO in the post-Cold War era. As the conflict evolved, the response and level of engagement in both troop number and strategic importance also grew. Although there was the official establishment of a "single, democratic, and multiethnic state" and elections were held in 1996, NATO forces remained there until 2004 to supervise the transition and prevent further violence ([www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)). Despite the official transfer of operational responsibility to the European Union, some forces remain to work on internal defense reform, fight terrorism, and apprehend war criminals.

For the EU, there have been many firsts in the last two decades, but the two missions mentioned above will be used to maintain consistency for the analysis to come. Both operations represent important actions, and they have helped the Union maintain involvement, at differing levels, in global security affairs. Operation Atalanta/NAVMAR is the maritime mission conducted off the coast of Somalia and focusing on the piracy highly prevalent in the region. Just like with the NATO led mission, Atalanta intends to disrupt pirates directly, but it also specifically alludes to the groups as organized crime units and treats this mission as anti-piracy but also anti-crime and in this way differs slightly from the stated NATO operation. The CSDP website notes two unique goals for Atalanta that set it apart from other similar missions: protect

World Food Programme shipments and local fishing operations. The second mission is a follow up to NATO's Joint Endeavor, named Operation Althea. While most of the combat had already ceased, the Council approved the mission to take over for previous NATO efforts (Dijkstra, 458). This deployment is listed as a Police Mission as opposed to a full-scale deployment with the goal of supporting a peaceful transition and assisting in the training of national police and defense forces. Finally, the ideas of ensuring a "strong commitment to the international community" and providing the ability for Bosnia Herzegovina to stay "on track towards EU membership" are the most important goals for the mission ([www.euforbih.org](http://www.euforbih.org)).

The next section will address the theoretical framework through which these sources will be analyzed, and the reasoning behind the specific theories and ideas chosen for this purpose. By bringing together the historical and developmental background with the theory, the initial sections of this research intend to create an appropriately strong foundation on which to build the analysis that will follow.

### **III. Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework for this research focuses around two main theory families – international relations and integration theories. By using both types, the analysis will be better able to address the cases of NATO and CSDP from a structural standpoint as institutions and from a decision-making perspective as international actors. The main theories used here will be realism, constructivism, historical institutionalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism since each provides a varying viewpoint from which to see NATO and CSDP.

Realism is an important theory because it has defined much of the strategy used by the United States, and therefore NATO since the beginning of the Cold War (and even earlier, though the prior periods hold less relevance for this research). It is possible to see that NATO was in fact formed, at least in part, because of realist thinking. Given that the alliance came into relevance as a major player to balance the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact, it illustrates the realist idea of balance of power (Ashley 1981). The power dynamic within NATO also represents some key values of realism in that, despite the appearance of an equal influence, the United States holds a very strong sway over the actions of the alliance. It is also important to note that NATO represents individual states and does not have an independent, overarching structure similar to that of the European Union. Realism is also important for the implications of this analysis because it will suggest courses of action for U.S. and European policymakers, concerning the institutions in which they take part. After all, in realist theory, national interest is the primary motivation for state action, and so any choice a state is a part of should serve to advance these interests (Wolfowitz 2009, 68). Realism in this context will help to make some of

the main points in the analysis and begin to show that despite the more unified institutions of the European Union, the power lies with the individual nations, which leads to the meat of the analysis for this research.

Constructivism applies more easily to the structure and action of the European Union, although certain tenants of the theory can be seen in NATO and U.S. actions as well. While much of the realist theory looks to international anarchy and rational independent actors, the constructivist tradition uses socially created ideals to interpret important events and actors. Within the EU, the focus on informal norms and forming a common identity gives value to the ideas of constructivism. (Guzzini 2000) The process of socialization also encourages states to look at the international arena through a more constructivist lens, which shows the importance of understanding more than simply the rational facts but also the value in social interaction and interstate cooperation with higher goals than national interest. Constructivism is valuable for this analysis because it creates an alternative to the realist tradition most commonly associated with U.S. grand strategy (Wendt). It also provides a stronger reflexive tool with which to assess the actions of NATO and CSDP than does other international relations theories. Finally, the utility of constructivism for this research arrives in its social element. While the interactions between the two institutions has less to do with social construction, the actions they choose to undertake are certainly under the influence of various social elements at the national and international level (Guzzini 2000).

Historical Institutionalism as a theory of integration helps the analysis to look into the ways that NATO and CSDP have changed from the end of the Cold War until the present, and speaks to the importance of this institutional evolution in the overall international system. It also falls in line with this research due to a long-term approach to understanding the actions of

national or international actors. As Broschek (2012, 103) puts it, historical institutionalism (HI) focuses on “moving pictures” instead of “snapshots” when looking to explain the actions and decisions of actors. This indicates a strong impact of timing on decisions, and lends itself to a look at the post-Cold War era since both organizations in question here were victims of inopportune timing when the wall fell and they had to change their form in order to survive. Another important tenant of HI is path dependency. Although this sounds to be a sort of determinism, in fact it is simply used to help simplify the analysis of actions throughout long and “far-reaching” periods of change (Broschek 2012, 104). This sort of path dependency will be relevant in the analysis and implication of this research because it creates theoretical support for the influence of single nations on the trajectory of a larger international organization.

Lastly, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) plays a large role in understanding why actors aggregate and form larger organizations. As an integration theory, it helps us to make sense of the formation of the European Union and, through this, gives us insight into the types of dynamics present within institutions that have formed through this model. Among most scholars, LI is a baseline theory in this field and its popularity relates to the saliency it has with relation to the way that the EU developed over the years since the end of World War II. An important part to the integration process that LI recognizes is the functional progression of institutions and the decision-making processes (Franchino 2012, 325). As a theory, it competes with institutionalism on the way that states cooperate within integrated institutions, but it provides valuable insight and a strong counterbalance through which to assess the strengths and weaknesses of decision-making processes. One thing that separates the two integration theories is that LI falls in line more with the constructivist theoretical family, as it predicts negotiations ending at a point that falls *above* the lowest common denominator for involved parties (Franchino 2012, 334). This can

be seen throughout many, but not all, Union decisions on priority issues. A final part of LI is a focus on state preference, yet this theory proposes that such preferences are more “issue specific” than wholesale viewpoints.

## **IV. Analysis**

The analysis for this research will be broken down into sections on each of the two institutions as well as a section that compares and contrasts NATO and the European Union. This structure intends to show that each has individual strengths and weaknesses before bringing the analysis together with the head-to-head comparison and analysis. Furthermore, such an analytical structure will set the stage for a discussion about the potential implications of the analysis.

### **a. NATO Case**

When thinking about the development of NATO after the end of the Cold War, and the impact that the United States might have on the decision-making process, one does not have to look far. In this case, it is hardly debatable that the U.S. has a very important role in the institutional structure and decision-making (Kempin 2013, 59). It is often said that NATO goes as the U.S. goes, and one scholar even went as far as to say that “U.S. global military activities will determine the future of NATO,” but perhaps the level of influence is not quite as complete as many people think (Gärtner 1998, 4). It is possible that the structure that has developed in recent years to create a multilateral atmosphere within NATO. A stronger multilateral institution would lead to the idea that U.S. impact is diluted by more interaction with other countries during decision-making. However, this analysis will not argue that the U.S. is losing its grip on the Atlantic Alliance. Instead it will argue for the opposite – that the changes made to NATO structures reflect the national interest of the U.S. even more prominently. For this idea to take root, however, it is important to consider the way in which American power is projected abroad. While most scholars believe that the international atmosphere has moved away from a unipolar

system, it is clear that the United States still pursues a grand strategy of primacy. Through this, it hopes to create and foster its influence around the globe. Through both political, military, and cultural means, the U.S. strives to maintain the head of the order (Brooks, et al). As such, the very structure of NATO as a collective defense organization means that if any nation were to leave the potential to defend the rest would diminish. However, it is the United States that holds the real lynch-pin to the Alliance, and were it to only worry about its own security it is likely that the others (apart from the major European powers) would struggle to maintain their safety should a threat arise. Because of this fact, the U.S. can leverage its necessity into influence within the organization. After all, as a major international organization, NATO gives the States a secondary channel through which to reach its goals. Some feel that unilateralism on the part of the U.S. creates levels of resentment among allies and neutral parties alike. It is clear that, while governmental leaders do not always make perfect decisions, politicians are aware of the international environment in regards to their public opinion and will act to achieve goals in the most efficient way possible. While NATO's decision-making structure focuses around consensus building, it is not a unanimity based process and compromise can be steered to benefit unhappy states in other ways. It is also clear that because the U.S. provides a large portion of the funding and capabilities, and has been the traditional leader, they hold a stronger influence during negotiation sessions than smaller countries. There is even a second option for passing decisions if they U.S. cannot initially convince allies to agree. While use of the Military Committee as a work around only officially excludes France from the process, it indicates to the other major power states that the U.S. is serious about the matter at hand. Such a tool allows the U.S. to put pressure on other countries (even if they are not France) through a sort of pseudo-brinkmanship.

However more important the following section on the European Union is the role that NATO plays in giving the United States influence on other regional security institutions. Because the members of NATO are also members of various other organizations like the OSCE or EU, the U.S. could use their position and influence in NATO to gain an advantage in other institutions. Another advantage that the U.S. has in creating influence internationally is that all new members of the European Union have become participants in NATO's Partnership for Peace and then full members prior to gaining Union membership. Such an interaction allows the U.S. and the common structure of NATO to impact rising countries prior to their involvement in the European Union (Kempin 2013, 60). It is also important to remember that, even though some countries may feel resentful of U.S. out of area actions, the States still has much to offer its allies in both economic and military standpoints (Brooks 2012, 11). The military side of things also comes into play during NATO missions around the world. Due mainly to the presence of the U.S., NATO operates many missions and is often the leader of cooperative operations. As was mentioned in the background, the end of NATO's mission in Bosnia Herzegovina occurred in 2004 yet there are still officials present helping the European Union to oversee its own operation ([www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)). This shows that other groups rely on the well-established and well-funded infrastructure of NATO command to coordinate and run their supposedly 'independent' missions. Part of this mission overlap stems from the membership overlap that exists between the two nations, but much of it comes from the simple fact that NATO has a more experienced and established institutional structure for handling such missions. The coordination between NATO and other institutions reinforces its importance and gives it a valuable bargaining position that can give strong states in NATO (in this case the U.S.) not just a unilateral upper hand but also an institutional advantage in negotiations or requests for assistance. It is for these reasons that the

research believes that despite a move towards a multilateral structure, NATO still bends to the will of the U.S. when it is required to do so. In addition, the Atlantic Alliance actually adds the ability of the States to influence the decisions of others because it adds to the strategically important resources to which the U.S. has access. This relative doubling of American influence means that the States go into talks with a stronger position and a greater reputation behind them.

#### **b. CSDP Case**

The case of NATO and a look at why the U.S. has a strong overall impact institution is not that hard to make, but the following section will test the analysis in a different way, because the linkages are not always as clear between the United States and the European Union as an institution. This section of the analysis will look to develop points at which the decision making structure is open to external influence and then move on to analyze the way that the EU operations reflect either the potential for U.S. involvement or actual influence of the United States.

Institutionally, the overlap in membership and security interests led to the development of a security infrastructure in CSDP that reflects that of NATO. However, what make the European Union structurally unique is that it has both intergovernmental procedures and supranational processes. This dichotomy has been pushed together within the EU and this creates an unavoidable two level game for politicians and national representatives (Callanan 2011, 17). Because of such a situation, the institutions can be accessed from either the institutional level or the national level, which gives third parties (such as other states, interest groups, or other international organizations) multiple “access points to influence the content of EU legislation” (Callanan 2011, 27). Originally, the idea behind CSDP was to give the Union more autonomy from NATO on security matters. Despite this intention, an independent development was flawed

due to a lack in other comparable models on which to draw lessons. It seemed only logical to look to the structure, culture, and strategic goals of NATO as a starting point. One individual had as much influence on the development of current CSDP as any other actor, and he is Javier Solana. Prior to being appointed as the first High Representative in the European Union, he was the Secretary General of NATO and therefore had firsthand experience with the way that the Alliance was structured and run. It is unlikely that in the few months between appointments he left the U.S. strategic culture he was a part of in NATO and moved to a solely European identity. Because of this, he led the development of CSDP in the image of the Atlantic Alliance. He has even stated “a new transatlantic bargain is in the making” as a result of “new realities of a new century” (Gärtner 1998, 5). This appears indicative of a shift from independence to dependence between CSDP and NATO, and shows that now more than ever the European Union relies on the U.S. for support in its security infrastructure.

Strategically, CSDP does not yet have a full set of coordination capabilities and must look to the NATO/U.S. command structure for military technology and doctrines. In a similar way, U.S. security interests (as presented through NATO) are often accepted as generalizable interests for all members of NATO and the European Union. This indicates a sort of cultural hegemony, led by the United States, which ties these two major security organizations to one another (Kempin 2013, 68). While opponents of realism will argue that, a true military hegemony no longer exists in the world, this sort of hegemony reflects a global order in which ideas and cultures permeate downward. In this way, such an idea represents a hegemony in the way that a constructivist might imagine it to exist. Even though it is still based on military prowess, it is not necessarily about true power level but instead a perceived power – a hegemony of reputation in which those below do not necessarily fear but strive to emulate those above

them. The European Commission has even fed into such a hegemony by suggesting to its members “that spending on the security and defence industry should emulate the U.S.” (Kempin 2013, 62). Another important factor that has led the Union to be open to U.S. influence and NATO assistance is that they are doing exactly what the Commission suggested and are striving to be a major player in the security arena despite working with a severely limited defense budget. They cannot have both an impressive defense institution and one that is cheap as well. Therefore, they have chosen the expensive American model, and then rely on NATO to supplant the capabilities they cannot afford on their own. Such a situation looks like clear evidence to the influence that the U.S. has over CSDP. If this influence did not exist, the European Union would choose a reduced security dimension that allows them to avoid competition with NATO at all. Anderson and Seitz (2006, 31) identify another point that can help to illustrate the struggles that CSDP has had in creating a truly autonomous security institution. They talk about how the Union is currently focusing more effort on the process of nation building, but has not yet reached the stage of state building. This is relevant because while the EU is trying to create a single identity, it cannot yet effectively create the functions that will make it resemble a single state. CSDP is often tagged as an effort to rally support for the European identity, but such a campaign seems likely to be unsuccessful since most individual states have drawn back their own militaries.

In relation to military, civilian, or police actions carried out by CSDP, there are a few examples that illustrate just how reliant on NATO and the U.S. the European Union operations are. The first instance came at the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia. At the time, Union supporters hailed this as the opportunity for the Union to prove it was capable of being a global security actor. The U.S. allowed them the first chance to solve the crisis, but NATO ended up taking the lead in the Yugoslav engagement after the EU could not muster the force needed. Operation

Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina also illustrates the need for NATO (or U.S.) involvement. The 2004 mission actually increased burden sharing between the two actors and decrease the autonomy of European Union actions. It took advantage of the Berlin Plus agreement on capability sharing and used much of the preexisting command structure NATO left behind when the majority of its forces were withdrawn. Many have claimed that “Europeans are not loathe to use force,” but they must recognize that until such a time as the Union can convince its members to pay more into CSDP, NATO will continue to be a necessary part of any European led expeditionary mission. Overall, since the end of the Cold War the influence of the U.S. has fluctuated but has remained in existence. In the early 1990s the U.S. were seen as overbearing, and so they evolved the relationship with Europe into one with more nuance in which the influence is still there but the impact is lighter.

### **c. Differences and Similarities**

So what is different between how the U.S. can influence NATO and CSDP? This question is straightforward, and the analysis thus far has hoped to show that there are many ways that the U.S. has an easier time shaping decision making in NATO. As a founding member with a tradition of leadership, the States leads NATO’s negotiation process. Throughout the analysis up to this point, evidence has been provided to support this role as a senior member and leader within the Alliance. Without the U.S., the NATO would likely not have survived the post-Cold War transition. Much of the Atlantic Alliance’s capability relies on the funding, technology, and troops of the United States. These can be seen as the main factors that grant the U.S. its strong influence on the decision-making process of NATO. On the other hand, determining American influence in CSDP has been a more a complicated case. The structure, procedures, and membership all prove to be obstacles that the U.S. must overcome in any attempt to create and

foster its national interest within the European Union. Because the U.S. has no direct method to affect the decision-making process, it has to take other avenues to have its voice heard and respected in regards to important issues or missions. It has used globalization to spread both its popular culture and strategic culture to its allies around the world, and through this, it has become the model after which to build a security regime. This illustrates that the influence exercised in CSDP requires more effort but does not seem to have any less value vis-à-vis its effectiveness. These are the key ways in which the two institutions requires different strategies and levels of effort to be affected.

However, the similarities between the two organizations might be just as telling in the context of this analysis. Because CSDP was modelled in part after NATO, it shares many common structures and processes. Both prefer consensus, and although the European Union pushes for unanimity, the fact that formal voting is avoidable in each setting shows that American experience in NATO negotiations benefit should they attempt to involve themselves in CSDP matters. The two organizations have moved toward a focus on crisis management as the new idea of what the regional security institution should do. Clearly, NATO's capabilities allow it to participate in more heavy military operations, but the common shift to management over intervention shows a sharing of strategic culture and an exchanging of ideas. Such interactions create another avenue for American influence, and in fact represent the presence of U.S. ideals in CSDP, since much of the European Union's military doctrine and strategy has migrated from NATO. Despite the supranational character of some aspects of the EU, both organizations ultimately answer to their members in regards to security actions. This intergovernmentalism shows that even with the Union's higher aspirations, individual states still value their sovereignty on security issues. This is important for the U.S. because it shows that realism still permeates all

states and such common ground can be used to influence CSDP via individual members. The two groups have also conducted missions in many of the same locations, and during these missions have shared command infrastructure and local facilities. This proximity might make access to an integral part of the decision process, commanders on the ground, easier and a connection made in the field might be more valuable than one made in Brussels. This brings up another similarity – they both operate from a headquarters in Belgian capital. Just like shared field command structures, this allows for intermingling of personnel and the creation of a single shared culture, potentially shaped by American popular and strategic culture.

Such similarities and differences show that while the two institutions are unique organizations, their commonalities are important for creating access points for U.S. influence in either organization. Having so much in common also illustrates just how much CSDP relies on the capabilities of NATO to carry out its actions. In fact, only monitoring missions or rescue operations have been carried out by the EU in a manner that was entirely independent of NATO structures or capabilities (Gärtner 1998, 12). Perhaps the most important commonality is that despite the varying configuration of states, the European Union contains U.S. allies and as such, anything that affects Europe will have some repercussions for the government in the United States. This idea leads perfectly from the analysis into the implications of the research for policy and practice in the U.S. or Europe.

#### **d. Conclusions**

The analysis above has brought out a few key points that can help to illustrate the connection between the United States, the European Union, and the regional security organizations they occupy. Firstly, by showing the predominance of the U.S. in NATO, the analysis provides an example of how one country can lead an alliance of strong states and have

strong influence throughout. This is relevant to the goal of the paper because it gives credence to the argument that the States could have an impact on the way that European security is handled at an intergovernmental level. By looking into the impact of the U.S. on NATO, the analysis also led into a better understanding of how the U.S. might be able to exercise its power within the European Union, an institution of which it is not a part. Through unilateral negotiations, individual influence, structural model imitation, and other such channels the U.S. has had a large role in the way that CSDP developed and continues to operate. In regards to current operations, the burden sharing that occurs between NATO and CSDP provides another manner in which an advantage can be exercised by U.S. leaders over the missions and actions the European Union takes. While they certainly are not likely to make constant use of such a tactic, the possibility exists that withholding NATO capabilities might affect the decision-making process within CSDP. The analysis has also been shaped to show that while CSDP is unique in many ways, its structure, mission, and very existence has been the product of the influence of NATO and the U.S. Whether such influence was direct or indirect, intended or accidental, it is hard to ignore that the CSDP has come to resemble the model first used by NATO under the supervision of the United States. The fact that they share the same city for their base of operations, and share many of the same members shows that ideas and thoughts flow between the two. While CSDP was created to separate Europe from the will of the United States, this has not occurred in the way that was originally desired and it may have tied the two even closer together.

## **V. Implications and Further Research**

So why are such conclusions about the interconnectivity of these two organizations, of the U.S. and Europe, important for practical people in government or academia? It is in part because the connection flies in the face of the recently anointed “pacific pivot” as created by scholarly and popular publications alike (Beitelman 2012, 1086). By concluding that the opportunity for influence is still alive, the analysis gives politicians in the United States reasons to maintain the connection it already has and not risk losing its valuable influence. It also opens the door for U.S. policymakers to continue the grand strategy of primacy it has used instead of opting to look within the United States and retreat from the longstanding international commitments it has developed. Clearly, this analysis does not address the likelihood of any of the possible outcomes, or look in depth at the mood of any particular governing body. However, it does paint a more general picture of the importance of the connection for the United States and also for the European Union and its members. With this in mind, there are also implications of this analysis that are important for the Union, depending on the path it wishes to take in the future. Should the EU desire to continue its operations with the support of NATO resources, it need only maintain the ties described and analyzed here. On the other hand, if there is some level of hesitancy about the depth of such an influence by a single actor, no matter their intentions, then this analysis could provide European decision makers with a means of understanding how their processes are susceptible to outside influence. This could in turn lead to a renewed push for military independence from NATO, as was the original intention of the CSDP project. Overall, the analysis and its conclusions can be seen as a good starting point for a lengthier discussion on the

actual impact of the United States on European regional security. Such research could look more deeply into the political climate of the two institutions (through primary sources), the major actors in each (more such interviews), and the more technical specifics of each body's decision-making structure.

## **VI. Conclusion**

Regional security organizations play an important role in the way that states interact and that decisions are made. The current distribution demands a focus on the two main European organizations of this nature, NATO and CSDP. While the Atlantic Alliance has existed for a much longer period, their contemporary forms developed during the same moment. The end of the Cold War was a catalyst for change around the world, and the impact that it had on global politics created the power dynamic that exists between the two institutions. By virtue of direct U.S. involvement in NATO, there is a stronger case for American interests leading this group. However, this thesis has sought to show that despite the initial aims of the Common Security and Defense Policy, the United States can also play an influential role in the development of EU security policy and implementation. From unilateral agreements to burden sharing, the U.S. government has many avenues to engage in European security. Given the current international climate, this integration into the continent benefits both the States and the Union, and can help to increase the strength of connections between the countries and the overarching security organizations. This analysis cannot say whether the governments believe in their own rhetoric about the shift to a larger focus on the Pacific, but it does indicate that Europe is still of vital importance to the United States, and it has hoped to make the network of influence connecting the two clearer.

## VII. References

- Anderson, Stephanie and Thomas R. Seitz. 2006. "European Security and Defense Policy Demystified: Nation Building in the European Union" *Armed Forces & Society*. 33 (1): 26-42.
- Ashley, Richard K. 1981. "Political Realism and Human Interests" *International Studies Quarterly*. 25 (2): 204-236
- Beitelman, David A. 2012. "America's Pacific Pivot" *International Journal*. 67 (4): 1073-1094.
- "Berlin Plus Agreement" European Union. *European External Action Service*. 27 Mar. 2014. [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm)
- Brooks, Stephen G.; Ikenberry, John; Wohlforth, William C. 2012. "Don't Come Home America: the Case against Retrenchment." *International Security*. 37 (3): 7-51.
- Broscheck, Jorg. 2012. "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Federalism" *World Political Science Review*. 8 (1): 101-128.
- Callanan, Mark. 2011. "European Union Decision-Making: Reinforcing Interest Group Relationships with National Governments?" *Journal of European Public Policy*. 18 (1): 17-34.
- "Common Security and Defence Policy – Missions and Operations" European Union. *European External Action Service*. 5 Dec. 2013. [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/index\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/index_en.htm)
- Dijkstra, Hylke. 2012. "Agenda-setting in the Common Security and Defence Policy: An Institutional Perspective." *Cooperation and Conflict*. 47 (4): 454-472.
- Franchino, Fabio. 2012. "Challenges to Liberal Intergovernmentalism" *European Union Politics*. 14 (2): 324-337.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1989 "The End of History?" *The National Interest*. (Summer): 1-27.
- Gallis, Paul. 2003. "NATO's Decision-Making Procedure" *Congressional Research Service – Library of Congress*. 1-6.
- Galston, William A. 2010. "Realism in political theory" *European Journal of Political Theory*. 9 (4): 385-411.
- Gärtner, Heinz. 1998. "European Security, NATO and the Transatlantic Link: Crisis Management" *European Security*. 7 (3): 1-13.

- Giegerich, Bastian, Barya Pushkina, and Adam Mount. 2006. "Towards a Strategic Partnership? The US and Russian Response to European Security and Defense Policy" *Security Dialogue*. 37 (3): 385-407.
- Goldgeier, James M. 1997. "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision" *The Washington Quarterly*. 21 (1): 85-102.
- Golub, Jonathan, and Bernard Steunenberg. 2007. "How Time Affects European Union Decision-Making" *European Union Politics*. 8 (4): 555-566.
- Guzzini, Stefano. 2000. "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations" *European Journal of International Relations*. 6 (2): 147-182.
- Hertz, Robin, and Dirk Leuffen. 2011. "Too Big to Run? Analysing the Impact of Enlargement on the Speed of European Union Decision-Making" *European Union Politics*. 12 (2): 193-215.
- Howorth, Jolyon. 2012. "Decision-making in security and defense policy: Towards supranational inter-governmentalism?" *Cooperation and Conflict*. 47 (4): 433-463.
- Immergut Ellen M. and Karen M. Anderson. 2008. "Historical Institutionalism and West European Politics" *West European Politics*. 31 (1-2): 345-369.
- Infantis, Kostas. 2007. "NATO's Strategic Direction after Riga: NATO's Post-Cold War Adaptation" *International Journal*. 62 (3): 576-588.
- Jones, David T. 2012. "In Defense of NATO." *American Diplomacy*. np.
- Kauppi, Heikki., Mika Widgren and Juan D. Carrillo. 2004. "What Determines European Union Decision Making? Needs, Power, or Both?" *Economic Policy*. 19 (39): 221-266.
- Kempin, Ronja, and Jocelyn Mawdsley. 2013. "The Common Security and Defence Policy as an Act of American Hegemony." *European Security* 22 (3): 55-73.
- McCalla, Robert B. 1996. "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50 (3): 445-475.
- Monteleone, Carla. 2011. "The Enabling Factor: the Influence of US-EU Cooperation on UN Peace Operations" *European Security*. 20 (2): 265-289.
- Naert, Frederik. 2005. "European Security and Defence in the EU Constitutional Treaty." *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*. 10 (2): 187-207.
- "NATO Organisation." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *NATO*. Web.  
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/structure.htm>

- Norheim-Martinsen, Per M. 2010 “Beyond Intergovernmentalism: European Security and Defense Policy and the Governance Approach” *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 48 (5): 1351-1365.
- Ojanen, Hanna. 2006. “The European Union and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defense Policy” *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 44 (1): 57-76.
- “Political/Military Background” EURFOR BiH. *European Union*. Web.  
[http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=132](http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=132)
- Sanjian, Gregory S. 1992 “A Fuzzy Set Model of NATO Decision-Making: The Case of Short-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe.” *Journal of Peace Research*. 29 (3): 271-85.
- Stokman, Frans, and Robert Thomson. 2004. “Winners and Losers in the European Union” *European Union Politics*. 6 (1): 5-23.
- Tsebelis, George. 2013 “Bridging Qualified Majority and Unanimity Decision Making in the EU” *Journal of European Public Policy*. 20 (8): 1083-1103.
- Tsebelis, George, and Xenophon Yataganas. 2002. “Veto Players and Decision-Making in the European Union after Nice: Policy Stability and Bureaucratic/Judicial Discretion” *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 40 (2): 283-307.
- Vincent, Jack E., Ira L. Straus, and Richard R. Biondi. 2001. “Capability Theory and the Future of NATO’s Decision Making Rules” *Journal of Peace Research*. 38 (1): 67-86.
- Weinrod, W. Bruce. 2012 “The Future of NATO” *Mediterranean Quarterly*. 23 (2): 1-13.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics” *International Organization*. 46 (2): 391-425.
- Whitman, Richard G. 2004. “NATO, the EU and ESDP: an Emerging Division of Labour?” *Contemporary Security Policy*. 25 (3): 430-451.
- Wolfowitz, Paul. 2009. “Realism” *Foreign Policy*. 174: 66-68, 70, and 72.
- Zhelyazkova, Asya. 2013. “Complying with EU Directives’ Requirements: the Link between EU Decision-Making and the Correct Transposition of European Union Provisions” *Journal of European Public Policy*. 20 (5): 702-721.
- Zwolski, Kamil. 2012. “The EU as an International Security Actor after Lisbon: Finally a Green Light for a Holistic Approach?” *Cooperation and Conflict*. 47 (1): 68-87.