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ABSTRACT

“Under the direction of Karen Hagemann and Konrad Jarausch”

In theory, based on the United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, all children have the right to education. Yet, what that right entails is still contested, particularly for ostensibly temporary residents. This dissertation uses an interdisciplinary and transnational approach combining history and education research as well as drawing on political science to examine the debates on and policies towards the education of migrant children in the Federal Republic of Germany between its founding in 1949 and the signing of Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, with a focus on children with Italian, Greek, and Turkish citizenship in the states of Baden-Württemberg, West Berlin, and North Rhine-Westphalia. Through these case studies, the dissertation examines not only the changing debates and policies of federal and state governments responsible for the implementation of education policies. It also analyzes how the migrants’ countries of citizenship attempted to influence their schooling abroad, the role the European Community played, and the influence of children’s parents. Examining 40 years of regional, national, and transnational debates and policies within their changing historic context, this study demonstrates how different integrative or exclusionary school initiatives were developed and their impact on different groups of migrant children. It argues that given incompatible state interests and the arrival of continually new waves of migrants, there cannot be a single, perfect answer, but that even imperfect solutions are better than none.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although individually authored, in the end, a dissertation in history involves extensive networks of scholars as well as individual support. As such, with the completion of this manuscript I owe a debt of thanks to the many individuals and institutions across the United States and Europe without whom I would never have reached this moment. First and foremost, I would like to express my appreciation for my advisors Karen Hagemann and Konrad Jarausch for their years of invaluable mentorship, oversight, and encouragement. The other members of my committee – Donald Reid, Susan Pennybacker and Sarah Shields – have also provided invaluable guidance, stretching my project in ways initially unimagined. Donald Reid deserves special thanks for shaping my early conceptualization of the project and always making the research exciting. Cemil Aydin has also provided invaluable recommendations and guidance.

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the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office, and Stephanie Zloch at the GEI, as well as Sylvia Lopez and Karen Atkinson at the OECD Archive.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHARTS AND TABLES ........................................................................................................... ix

GLOSSARY .......................................................................................................................... xi

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1: THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND THE SCHOOLING
OF CHILDREN OF DISPLACED PERSONS, EXILES AND
REFUGEES (1949-1959) .................................................................................................... 28

Establishing the Right to Education for Migrants across Europe ........................................ 30

West Germany and Compulsory Schooling for Displaced
Persons and Foreigners ..................................................................................................... 39

Degrees of Responsibility for Education in West Germany and
Europe .................................................................................................................................. 56

CHAPTER 2: COMPULSORY SCHOOLING AND EXTRA
PROGRAMS FOR THE CHILDREN OF "GUEST WORKERS" (1960-
1966) .................................................................................................................................. 72

International Advocacy and Italian Language Instruction in West
Germany .................................................................................................................................. 74

Integration and Cultural Maintenance through Preparatory Classes
(Vorklassen) .......................................................................................................................... 95

Shaping Compulsory Schooling in the European Community and
West Germany ..................................................................................................................... 110

CHAPTER 3: EDUCATION REFORM, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, AND
PLANS FOR RETURN MIGRATION (1962-1969) .............................................................. 128

A Question of Return Migration and Greek National Education in
Teaching Identity ................................................................................................................. 131

Considering National Private Schools within the Länder Education
Administrations ..................................................................................................................... 143
Supplementary Schools and Diaspora for the Greek Government and Parent Groups.................................................................................................................. 158

Turkey, Literacy, and Qualified Labor .................................................................................................................................................................................. 168


Enforcing Compulsory Schooling and Complications with Promoting Integration.................................................................................................................. 191

Writing New Bars for Success and Encouraging Secondary Schooling........................................................................................................................................ 204

West German Uproar over School Teachers, Textbooks, and Foreign Relations .......................................................................................................................................................... 213

Citizenship Status and Equalizing Access from Primary through Secondary Schooling .................................................................................................................................................. 228


Greek Plans for Return Migration and new Bilingual School Programs .......................................................................................................................................................... 245

The European Community and Education for Migrant Workers’ Children .......................................................................................................................................................... 258

The Turkish State, National Identity, and Religious Education .................................................................................................................................................. 274

Considering Citizenship and Schooling for National Minorities in West Germany ........................................................................................................................................... 286

CHAPTER 6: EQUALITY IN EDUCATION AND CONTINUING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITY CHILDREN IN THE SCHOOL (1976-1984)........................................................................................................................................................................... 302

Separate but Equal? Citizenship in Scholastic Dis/advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 306

The Socio-Economic Divide in West German Scholastic Performance .................................................................................................................................................. 316

The Italian Ethnic Minority and Special Schools for the Learning Disabled ........................................................................................................................................... 326

Gender Discrimination and the Image of Turkish Girls with Headscarves .................................................................................................................................................. 340

CHAPTER 7: FROM A CONSERVATIVE PUSH FOR RETURN
MIGRATION TO MULTICULTURALISM (1982–1990) ................................................................. 355

Pushing West Germany’s Minority Groups to Leave ...................................................... 358

Greek Bilingual Instruction and the Pressure for Return versus Multiculturalism ................................................................. 374

Turkish Instruction: National Identity, Language, and Islam ...................................... 394

Interculturalism, a European Identity, and Italian Language Courses ...................... 410

CHAPTER 8: THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION FOR ETHNIC GERMANS, ASYLUM SEEKERS, AND FOREIGN NATIONALS (1987–1992) ................................................................. 428

Returning Ethnic Germans and Reunification ............................................................. 431

The Right to Native Language for Kurdish Ethnic Minorities .................................. 445

Compulsory Schooling for the Children of Asylum Seekers .................................... 452

State-Language Instruction and the Breakdown of Yugoslavia ................................. 468

CONCLUSION: MIGRATION AND EDUCATION ........................................................... 478

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 491

Archives ......................................................................................................................... 491

Selected Primary Literature from Libraries and Archives Organized by Relevant Institution .................................................................................................................. 493

Secondary Literature: ................................................................................................. 504
Chart 1.1: The West German Compulsory School System in the 1950s............................. 46

Table 1.1: “Foreigners” (Aufländer) in West Germany by Country of Citizenship, 1955 ........................................................................................................... 60

Table 1.2: National Instruction for “Homeless Foreigners” in 1961 .................................. 67

Table 2.1: Schoolchildren in Public Schools in Baden-Württemberg by Citizenship, 1960-1963 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 92

Table 3.1: Schoolchildren with Greek Citizenship enrolled in Primary and Lower Level Secondary Schools, 1963-1972 ................................................. 134

Chart 3.1: The West German Compulsory School System in the late 1960s and 1970s ........................................................................................................................................................................ 146

Table 3.2: Total Schoolchildren with Foreign Citizenship in Public Primary and Lower Secondary Education, 1965-1972 ...................................................... 155

Table 3.3: Schoolchildren with Turkish Citizenship enrolled in Primary and Lower Secondary schools, 1965-1972 ................................................................. 175

Table 4.1: Schoolchildren (Total and “Foreign”) enrolled in General Education in the FRG, 1969 and 1973 ........................................................................................................................................................................ 194

Table 5.1: Foreigners Residing in Selected European Countries by Country of Citizenship, 1960s – 1980s (in Thousands) ........................................................................... 194

Table 5.2: Births (Total, West German and “Non-German”) in the FRG in Thousands, 1965-1990 .................................................................................................................. 194

Table 5.3: Children in FRG’s Regular and Vocational Schools in Thousands, 1965-1990 ........................................................................................................................ 194

Table 6.2: Total Schoolchildren and Schoolchildren with Italian Citizenship in Special Schools for the Disabled in the FRG, 1976-1985........................................................................................................ 330

Table 7.1: Number of Schoolchildren with Non-German Citizenship in West German Public Schools by Citizenship and Percent of Total, 1979–1988 ........................................................................................................ 364

Table 7.2: Schoolchildren in Mother Language and Cultural Classes by Language in Primary (P) and Secondary Lower Schools (SL),
Table 7.3: Instructional Hours for Primary Bilingual Instruction in Baden-Württemberg for Schoolchildren with Turkish or Greek Citizenship, 1982

Table 7.4: Enrollment in General Education by School Type and Citizenship in Thousands, 1982 and 1987

Table 8.1: Ethno-national German (Aussiedler) Migration to West Germany, 1968–1992

Table 8.2: Asylum Applicants by Region of Origin (Total and Percentage of Total), 1980–1992

Table 8.3: Children in the West German Länder Schools by Citizenship, 1985-1992
**GLOSSARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Abitur</em></td>
<td>Diploma from a higher German secondary school qualifying for university admission or matriculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Abschluß</em> (also <em>Schulabschluss</em>)</td>
<td>School certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz</em> (AL)</td>
<td>Alternative List for Democracy and the Protection of the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Anzeigepflicht</em></td>
<td>Disclosure requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Arbeiterwohlfahrt</em> (AWO)</td>
<td>Workers’ Welfare Association (social democratic welfare association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Arbeitsgruppe &quot;Unterricht für ausländische Schüler&quot; des KMK Schulausschusses</em></td>
<td>Working Group on &quot;Instruction for Foreign Workers&quot; of the KMK's Subcommittee on Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ausländergesetz</em></td>
<td>Foreigner Laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ausländerbeauftragte</em></td>
<td>Office of the Commission for Foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ausländerbehörde</em></td>
<td>Immigration authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ausländischer Arbeitnehmer</em></td>
<td>Foreign worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Aussiedler</em></td>
<td>Resettler (Returning “ethnic” Germans from Eastern Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Auslandstürken</em></td>
<td>Turks Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Baden-Württemberg</em> (BW)</td>
<td>Baden-Württemberg (West German federal state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Beamte</em></td>
<td>German civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Berufsschule</em></td>
<td>Vocational school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bezirk</em></td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bildungsberater</em></td>
<td>Educational consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bund-Länder-Kommission für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung</em> (BLK)</td>
<td>Federal-Länder Commission for the Planning of Education and Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
Bundestag West German Parliament
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Grüne) Alliance ‘90/The Greens (Greens)
Caritas Catholic welfare organization
CERI Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (OECD Center in Paris)
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) Christian Democratic Union of Germany
Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU) Christian Social Union of Bavaria
Denkschrift Memorandum
Deutsche Volkstum German Folkdom
Diakonisches Werk Protestant welfare organization
DP Displaced Person (DP)
Einklassige Schule One-room school including all age groups
Ergänzungsschule Supplementary school
Ergänzungsunterricht Supplementary instruction
Erlass Decree
Ersatzschule Substitute school
Erziehungsrat/rätin Educational Authority
Europarat Council of Europe (CoE) (since 1949)
Europäische Gemeinschaften (EG) European Communities (EC) (1958-1992)
Europäische Union (EU) European Union (since 1992)
Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Grundgesetz (EWG) European Economic Community (EEC)
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) Free Democratic Party
Flüchtling Refugee
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German Term</th>
<th>English Equivalent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flüchtlingslehrer/in</td>
<td>Refugee teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Förderlehrgang</td>
<td>Special support class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fördermaßnahme</td>
<td>Support measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gastarbeiter/in</td>
<td>Guest worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gastschüler/in</td>
<td>Guest schoolchild</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genehmigungspflicht</td>
<td>Licensing requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gesamtschule</td>
<td>Comprehensive school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gesprächskreis</td>
<td>Conversation group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grundgesetz</td>
<td>Basic Law (West German constitution, introduced 1949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grundschule</td>
<td>Primary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnasium</td>
<td>Higher secondary school that leads to the Abitur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hauptschule</td>
<td>Lower secondary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heimat- und Sachkunde</td>
<td>Local studies (History geography, and social studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heimatvertriebener</td>
<td>Expellee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heimatunterricht</td>
<td>Cultural instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innere Mission</td>
<td>Inner Mission, protestant Welfare organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jugendamt</td>
<td>Youth Welfare Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jugendbericht</td>
<td>Youth Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinder heimatloser Ausländer</td>
<td>Children of homeless foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konsularklasse</td>
<td>Consular class (&quot;embassy mother language and cultural course&quot; in Great Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Länder or Bundesländer</td>
<td>West German states (federal states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Translation</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landesamt</td>
<td>State office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landesarbeitsamt</td>
<td>State Employment Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landtag</td>
<td>State Bundestag</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lehrplan</td>
<td>Curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehrschichtigen Einschaltungsklasse</td>
<td>Stepped preparation class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menschenwürde</td>
<td>Human dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerpräsident</td>
<td>Minister President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muttersprachlicher Ergänzungsunterricht</td>
<td>Mother language and cultural instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord Rhein-Westfalen (NRW)</td>
<td>North Rhine-Westphalia (West German federal state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberschulamt</td>
<td>Regional School Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persönlichkeit</td>
<td>Selfhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pflichtsprache</td>
<td>Required language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realschule</td>
<td>Higher level secondary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regierungsbezirk</td>
<td>Administrative District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regierungspräsident/in</td>
<td>District President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reichsschulpflichtgesetz</td>
<td>German compulsory schooling laws (during the German Empire, Weimar Republic, and Third Reich)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schulamt</td>
<td>School Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schulaufsichtsbehörde</td>
<td>School Regulatory Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schulausschuss</td>
<td>School Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schulleiter</td>
<td>Principal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Schulpflichtgesetz</strong></td>
<td>Compulsory schooling law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Schulträger</strong></td>
<td>Authorities responsible for the maintenance of the schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senate/Senator</strong></td>
<td>Senate/Senator (body of the Ministers/Minister in the city states of West Germany: Bremen, Hamburg and West Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Silentien</strong></td>
<td>Homework help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sonderklasse</strong></td>
<td>Special class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sonderschule</strong></td>
<td>Special school for the learning disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)</strong></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sprach- und Kulturgut</strong></td>
<td>Language and cultural assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (also Kultusministerkonferenz or KMK)</strong></td>
<td>The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Übergangsklasse</strong> (in NRW)</td>
<td>Preparatory class (implies “Transition class”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unterrichtsverwaltung</strong></td>
<td>Educational Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verschleppte Person</strong></td>
<td>Displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volk</strong></td>
<td>People or nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volksgruppe</strong></td>
<td>Ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volksschule</strong></td>
<td>Primary and lower secondary school (grades 1-8/9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vorbereitungsklasse</strong> (in BW)</td>
<td>Preparatory class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vorbereitungsklasse in Langform</strong></td>
<td>Long form preparation class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vorklasse</strong> (in KMK Recommendations)</td>
<td>Preparatory class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vorschule</strong></td>
<td>Preschool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wanderarbeiter</strong></td>
<td>Migrant worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westberlin (B)</td>
<td>West Berlin (West German federal city-state with special legal status)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westeuropäische Union (WEU)</td>
<td>West European Union (1954-1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeugnis</td>
<td>School transcript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zusätzliche muttersprachliche</td>
<td>Extra mother language and cultural instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ergänzungsunterricht</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
INTRODUCTION

In February 1964, the Kölnische Rundschau, a local West German paper published in Cologne, ran an article titled “Bambini Want to Learn in German Schools.” The article described how migrant children with Italian citizenship in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) hoped to attend West German schools. These little bambini planned to live in West Germany. In consequence, they needed to attend local schools and learn to participate in North Rhine-Westphalian society and in the work force. But, the children and their families also wanted to maintain connections to their heritage. In order to have a touch of home, the newspaper reported, the children also hoped to take classes in Italian language and culture.\(^1\)

Although the West German press would not frequently use the word “multicultural” until the 1980s, that was what the news article was describing. German multiculturalism was, however, distinct from the American, British, or French versions. In those states, legacies of colonialism and specific histories of migration had led to citizenship laws permitting some migrants or their children to naturalize. In contrast, West German citizenship law, based on jus sanguinis (right of blood), stipulated that only individuals with German ancestry could be “German.”\(^2\) As such, regardless of migrant families plans to stay or emigrate, they and their children would remain legal foreigners. Nonetheless, active participants in society, many of these

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children would grow up identifying themselves as part of both Germany and Italy. That difference frequently encouraged the development of diasporic communities. German society adopted the so-called “mixed salad” multiculturalism as opposed to a “melting pot.”

In this dissertation I trace how the Federal Republic of Germany became a multicultural country through the development of West German public school programs for migrant children between 1949, when the state was founded, and 1992 with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht and changes to Germany’s citizenship laws. During that period, West Germany became home to several waves of migrants. The FRG first absorbed thousands of migrants who had arrived in the country during the Second World War or shortly thereafter. Labor migrants from across the Mediterranean (from countries such as Italy, Greece, and Turkey) followed, the majority between 1962 and 1973. During that period the families of many so-called guest workers joined them in West Germany. After 1973, migration to West Germany was predominately family migration. During the 1980s, increasing numbers of asylum seekers,

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4 This dissertation focuses on the Federal Republic through unification, but does not talk about the German Democratic Republic (GDR) at any length. As discussed in Chapter 8, the reason behind that decision was the GDR’s relatively small population of young “foreigners.” Although the GDR did support a guest worker population and actively recruit from Vietnam and other good, communist states, the East German government also included provisions against children and pregnancy in their contracts. Furthermore, for those children who did live in the country, there were very few special programs for schools. See Jan Behrends, Fremde und Fremd-Sein in der DDR: zu historischen Ursachen der Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Ostdeutschland (Berlin: Metropol, 2003).

5 The so-called guest-worker groups included workers, and to some extent their families, from countries with which West German had signed bilateral labor agreements. Discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.
predominately from Eastern Europe, joined other migrant groups. With each new group, the West German government had to decide how much these groups should integrate.

Analyzing the changing and contested debate on how best to educate children with foreign citizenship and the school policies implemented in West Germany, this project explores four main questions: First, upon arrival, what rights different migrant groups had to education and whether their citizenship status influence the realization of their supposed rights? Second, how did the state actors involved, from regional and national governments to supranational institutions, debate schooling for migrant children? Third, how these different actors tried to ensure those rights through policy and programs? Fourth, where any of those policies and school initiatives implemented over the forty years under examination successful? These questions emphasize which education policies were implemented in West Germany, how these policies shifted, and which factors influenced those changes.

For the West German Federal and Länder (state) governments, schools played a central role in debates on integration and cultural maintenance. For many of the families and state actors involved, schools were the space in which children learned to be good citizens as well as to actively participate in the work force. It was in the public schools, after all, that teachers

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7 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland; Klaus J. Bade, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3rd ed. (Hannover: Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1994); Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven; Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

8 In West Germany, culture and education fell under state jurisdiction and not federal. The European Union was a reorganization and expansion of the European Community, which was established in the 1950s. The new EU included 28 Eastern- and Western European states (Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 713–720; Konrad H. Jarausch, Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe in the Twentieth Century (Princeton University Press, 2015), 520–525).
taught children what the family was supposed to look like and what voting was, alongside basic literacy in the host country’s state language. As such, schools were central to a migrants’ ability to fully integrate.

The 1964 *Kölnische Rundschau* article from the opening paragraph described early efforts to develop school programs that permitted both integration and cultural maintenance. The article’s author informed readers about how the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education and the Italian Consulate in Cologne were collaborating to make simultaneous cultural maintenance and integration possible. The Consul and representatives from the NRW Ministry of Education had already begun offering consular instruction. The Italian Consul now envisioned the inclusion of children with Italian citizenship in the state school system. The state Ministry of Education, the article continued, was considering that request, weighing the children’s right to education and debating whether the Ministry should change their school laws to include all children, or only West German citizens.9

Legally, in an age of human rights, every school age child from these groups of migrants had the right to education.10 What form that education should take was rarely clear. The West German Länder had to decide what, exactly, that right meant for the different groups. Yet each government in Europe, including the West German Federal and Länder governments, differentiated between their citizens and minority or foreign children.11 After all, despite each

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9 “Bambini möchten in den deutschen Schulen lernen: Italiens Generalkonsul Dr. Bocchetto über seine Pläne.”

10 According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948, all children have the right to education.

11 Because West German citizenship law during this period was primarily based on *jus sanguinis*, several groups of non-citizens, by the 1980s, would argue with increasing voracity that they were not in fact foreign despite possessing non-German citizenship. In consequence, this study tries to acknowledge their preferred self-identification and differentiate between groups who themselves migrated and minority groups with non-German citizenship. Nonetheless, readers should be aware that West German officials frequently treated these groups apiece, simply calling them all “foreigners.”
child technically having a right to education, migrants without citizenship or foreign citizenship had different legal rights than local citizens in most European states. In addition, many minority groups and the governments of the countries of citizenship emphasized cultural diversity, demanding recognition of cultural and/or religious differences. These states argued that compulsory schooling should reflect citizenship status. Others claimed that the children needed to be treated exactly the same in order to be equal. Each actor defined and challenged the meaning of equality and how a child’s rights should be realized, disputing whatever local practice might be.

Discussing the concept of equality, it is necessary to address issues of discrimination and racism. Within discussions on schooling, West German Ministries of Education and society at large were very careful to avoid the appearance of racism. Seeking to move beyond the legacy of the Third Reich, the West German government included prohibitions against discrimination in its new Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Many individuals across the political spectrum argued that they had moved beyond the Third Reich’s scientific racism. What politicians and scholars in the Federal Republic did acknowledge was xenophobia and culturalism. The problem here is that many individuals in Germany assumed (and continue to assume) cultural differences based on physical attributes. Within broad definitions of the word, that is exactly what racism is. In short,

12 I use the phrase “country of citizenship” instead of “sending country” or “country of origin” because of the different migrant and minority groups’ changing relationship to the relevant state government. Migrants moving from a country with a bilateral labor agreement could consider themselves “sent,” but a refugee flees. In turn, an individual who migrates comes from a country of origin. An individual with foreign citizenship born in the “host” country, however, originates from within that “host.” See David Bartram, Maritsa Poros, and Pierre Monforte, Key Concepts in Migration (SAGE, 2014), 23–40.

13 A. Dirk Moses, “The Fate of Blacks and Jews: A Response to Jeffrey Herf,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 2 (June 2008): 269–87; Tina Campt, Other Germans: Black Germans and the Politics of Race, Gender, and Memory in the Third Reich (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2004). The West German Basic Law from 1949 is the West German constitution. The Basic Law was supposed to be temporary, provision until unification and the creation of a more permanent constitution thereafter. The course of history did not meet the original authors’ expectations and the Basic Law would be upheld after unification in 1990.
although the expression of racism is different in Germany than in England or the United States, it
is still a problem that influences children’s acceptance in mainstream society and chances in the
schools.  

Depending on where a migrant children or children of migrants lived, they experienced
different levels of acceptance or discrimination had different access to schooling. Because
education policy fell under Länder jurisdiction in West Germany, each individual Länder
government had to decide how to respond to international voices even as they debated what right
migrant children had to what kind of education. In consequence, foreign governments had to
negotiate individually with the eleven Länder Education Administrations.  

Coalitions of the four (five after 1980) major parties controlled the Länder governments, influencing how regional
Education Administrations approached both migration and education. Those parties included the
conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria
(CSU), which frequently supported educational advancement based on merit and, in the late
1970s, officially pushed return migration.  

The Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Liberal

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15 Each of the Länder and West Berlin had their own Ministries or Senate Departments for Education. These Ministries or Senate Departments changed names frequently over the more than four decades this project covers. For example, in Baden-Württemberg, the Ministry of Education is currently the Ministerium für Kultus, Jugend und Sport Baden-Württemberg. The Ministry’s name is currently abbreviated Kultusministerium, which was the Ministry’s official name until 1978. In contrast, since 1995, North Rhine Westphalia’s Ministry of Education has been the Ministerium für Schule und Weiterbildung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, but was the Kultusministerium Nordrhein-Westfalen from 1946 to 1995. Berlin’s Senate Department for Education is the Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Jugend und Wissenschaft, but was the Senat für Bildung, Jugend und Sport from 1981-2006, the Senat für Schulwesen from 1963 to 1981, and Senator für Volksbildung from 1949 to 1963. Because I am only discussing the portion of those Ministries and Senate Departments discussing education, I refer them as Education Administrations when referring to all or multiple of the West German Länder Ministries or Senate Departments of Education. Referring to individual departments, I use either Education Administration or Ministry of Education or Senate for Education when relevant.

16 There were multiple members of both parties that actively disagreed with that stance, including several Ministers of Education. For a discussion of the major German political parties and their stances on migration, see Klaudia
Party (FDP), and the Green Party (since 1980), in contrast, often advocated measures supporting integration and equality of opportunity. In addition, and frequently more importantly, local economic and social conditions as well as legal and scholastic traditions also influenced each Länder government. In consequence, the different Länder frequently took divergent stances on how education policy for migrant and/or minority children should be shaped that changed drastically over the years.

Acknowledging those differences, this project combines an analysis of international and national debates on the education of migrant children with the study of regional policies and local practices in West Germany with examples drawn from Baden-Württemberg, West Berlin, and North Rhine-Westphalia. These three Länder Ministries of Education often led the conversation about developing school programs and, with some of the largest populations of non-citizens, were usually early adopters. Furthermore, their internal differences highlight the influence regional differences could have on program development and the extreme variations of policy implementation. In Baden-Württemberg, under a Christian Democratic government, the Ministry of Education usually argued for migrant integration, claiming that the state was responsible for ensuring equality of opportunity for all children. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education’s official policy stipulated that it was the countries of citizenship that were responsible for any extra cultural initiatives for foreign citizens. In contrast, North Rhine-Westphalia, usually controlled by a Social Democratic-Liberal (SPD-FDP) government, initially argued for mother language and cultural programs at the expense of integration. West Berlin’s

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17 It should be noted that when discussing ‘liberal’ in scholarship based on German language materials, the term usually refers to individuals who identify with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) party and its ideology.
Senate for Education, governed by vacillating party coalitions, meanwhile, only became involved in the debate in the 1970s when its own migrant population of foreign citizens took off. At that point, the local Senate for Education built on programs for integration and cultural maintenance already in place.

Despite differences, the Länder Ministries of Education frequently tried to coordinate their policies and collaborate on the federal level through the Standing Conference of Länder Ministers of Education (the Kultusministerkonferenz, or KMK). Even then, however, regional interpretations shaped regional implementation of the KMK’s recommendations. Within and among each other, the different Länder governments debated the following three points: first, whether migrant children with foreign citizenship should fall under compulsory schooling laws; Second, if they could receive state support for their integration; and third if the children were entitled to cultural or mother language classes within the parameters of the normal school day.¹⁸

Alongside internal politics and economic developments, the international communities and country of citizenship governments also influenced Länder policy. Demonstrating their impact, I compare the Italian, Greek, and Turkish governments’ efforts to shape the education of their citizens in West Germany and look at how the Council of Europe and European Community tried to guide and standardize school development. Where the Italian Government declared in the late 1950s that its citizens were now mostly permanent West German residents, the Greek Government announced in the early 1960s that its citizens would all return to Greece. In contrast, Turkey focused first on general literacy, before, as of the early-1970s, avidly

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advocating cultural and language instruction. Added to their different assumptions regarding the permanence of their citizens’ migration, these three states also viewed schooling differently, their own laws demanding specific kinds of educational competencies in subjects like math and language. Furthermore, their internal finances and relative stability influenced their advocacy abroad. While the Italian and Greek governments were willing to pay for cultural classes, the Turkish government did not have the financial capacity to do so until the 1970s.

Both host county and country of origin interest in the issue of education for migrant groups meant that the issue was an international and European wide concern. To guide and standardize programs and development, thereby promoting cultural compatibility and preserve children’s rights, supranational organizations like the Council of Europe (founded in 1949 to promote human rights and European cooperation) became involved in the question in the 1950s. The Council of Europe was enormously influential as individual state governments struggled to, at the least, not be viewed as lagging behind their fellow Member States. Likewise, once the European Community became involved in education in the 1970s, its members also tried to shape national policies and advocate specific best practices. Both supranational organizations tried to overcome by pushing measures such as degree equivalency and foreign language acquisition across the entire European continent. Each of these levels of international and

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19 The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 as an early effort to develop an international organization through which the different European states could cooperate and avoid another World War. Toward that end, the body “to protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (Council of Europe, “The Council of Europe in Brief - Who We Are,” Council of Europe, 2015, http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us). The group currently includes 47 members, 28 of which are European Union Member States. The Council of Europe is discussed in Chapter 1.

20 Bartram, Poros, and Monforte, Key Concepts in Migration, 23–40.
supranational efforts had a role in shaping West German education policy toward children with foreign citizenship.\textsuperscript{21}

This project argues that the multiple layers involved in addressing the question of education for migrant school age children was part of the problem with finding a solution. Each of the local, national, and supranational actors involved had their rights, their ideals, and their proposed solutions. The changing meaning of citizenship, education and social equality, varying economic resources, and the transformation of the labor market all influenced education policy. Furthermore, while policies were frequently well-meaning, lack of financial and material resources or personnel often prevented full implementation. Further complicating the issue was the tension between individual rights and collective minority rights.\textsuperscript{22} Each individual migrant wanted a different balance of integration or cultural rights. Policies addressing large groups only benefit some individuals, usually the ethno-national majority within the migrant group or even the West German ethno-national majority.

**Migration in Post-1945 Germany**

Directly influencing the development of education policy for children with non-German citizenship in West Germany was who counted as “migrant” or “foreign.” In 1949, the newly implemented West German Basic Law tied citizenship explicitly to German ethnicity (*jus sanguinis*). Most of the other European states implemented citizenship laws based on place of birth (*jus soli*), often because of their colonial relationships, perception of diaspora, and official histories of multi- or monoethnicism. In contrast, the Federal Republic, the founding fathers and


mothers decided to maintain laws dictating that only individuals with ethnic German heritage could claim citizenship, following the letter of the Prussian and National Socialists' laws. Post-war reconstruction combined with the Cold War tensions between East and West Germany meant that it was politically expedient to tie citizenship to paternity. In consequence, through West Germany’s first forty years of history, children part of non-German groups migrating to or born in West Germany had few options for becoming legally German, regardless of preference. As non-citizens, their rights, including the right to education, depended on whether they had citizenship to another country or were stateless. If they did have citizenship, then their rights were conditional on the various bilateral and international agreements involving the relevant state governments.

Those citizenship laws reflected (and were part of) West German politicians and society’s fallacious depiction of Germany as monoethnic. As part of the post-1945 efforts at reconstruction and an emphasis on supposed normalization, the Federal Republic’s government downplayed the place of minorities and immigration in German society and culture. Instead, the first two Federal Governments, coalitions of Christian Democratic and Christian Social Unions with the Liberal Party (CDU/CSU-FDP) under Christian Democratic Chancellors Konrad Adenauer and then Ludwig Erhard, stressed economic reform and rehabilitation of the country’s international reputation alongside trying to stabilize local infrastructure like the school system.

23 Klusmeyer, “Aliens, Immigrants, and Citizens.” For information on the connection in Germany between its colonies and citizenship, see Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884-1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 79–130. School laws had not been unified under the *Kaiserreich* or under the Weimar Republic although the different territorial units within those polities would develop agreements regarding basic standardization in order to promote equivalency.

24 Social scientist Karen Schönwälder’s 2001 book showed how the self-image of the British and West German states regarding welfare and inclusion influenced the reception of migrants and the extension of rights, arguing the FRG’s self-perception as a homogenous nation negatively influenced its willingness to extend social services or citizenship (*Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität: Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Grossbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren* (Essen: Klartext, 2001)).
Furthermore, the largest migrant groups who stayed in West Germany after the war were returning ethnic Germans, whose entry fit into the political narrative of Germany as a welcoming home for Germans.  

Connected to a history of high rates of emigration, West German politicians viewed almost anyone not part of the loosely defined German ethnicity as foreign.  

Nonetheless, part of the West Germany government’s efforts to rehabilitate its international reputation in the postwar era involved trying to demonstrate its willingness to treat non-ethnic nationals well. In light of the recent past, West Germany’s Basic Law laid out the most liberal asylum laws of any European state. In addition, the West German government became party to the Council of Europe’s 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. With that Convention, Member States sought to safeguard human rights for all individuals, including displaced persons, stateless individuals, refugees, and asylum seekers. For the West German government, signing on was not entirely voluntary, but partially required by international oversight. For example, in 1950, the Allied High Command dictated that the West German state was responsible for ensuring the equal treatment – including schooling – for all displaced persons and refugees living in West Germany.  

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25 To read more on the “ethnic German” expellees, see Bade, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl; Rainer Schulze, Reinhard Rohde, and Rainer Voss, eds., Zwischen Heimat und Zuhause: Deutsche Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in (West-) Deutschland 1945-2000 (Osnabrück: Secolo, 2001).  
With West German statesmen and women still depicting the county as monoethnic, the booming economy in the 1950s and 1960s led West Germany to become home to more than a million non-German citizens at the request of the state. West Germany signed guest worker agreements with Italy in 1955, Greece and Spain in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 1968. Under the guest worker programs, West German employers “invited” migrant workers (one in three of whom were women) and their families from these countries to live and work in West Germany.28 Wanting to break with the memory of forced labor used during the Second World War and demonstrate a changed attitude from the past, the West German government made sure to at least verbally acknowledge the migrants' right to dignity. The Länder governments did so in part through offering some social care, including access to public schools.29 Yet despite the clear establishment of small diasporic communities, the Federal Government officially claimed that these immigrant groups were supposed to leave after only two years.

In the mid- and late 1960s claims regarding the impermanence of these minority communities was belied by the clearly established, decade-long residence of some non-German citizens. That obvious trend towards stability gave increased relevance to the ongoing question of integration versus cultural maintenance and the position of these non-nationals under political and eventually public scrutiny. Public schooling, as a site both of contact and social


29 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland.
indoctrination served as a central point of question on techniques for integration. The push in the 1960s to reform education across Europe in order to promote equality of opportunity lent additional weight to the debate on schooling for non-nationals. With politicians, educators, and parents across West Germany decrying the discriminatory nature of the tripartite public school system (including *Hauptschule*, *Realschule*, and *Gymnasium*), those exploring to the question of education of migrant children asked how they were supposed to fit in.\(^{30}\) If the children attended school, it was usually only at the primary and lower secondary school (*Hauptschule*) level, which prepared schoolchildren solely for unskilled or semi-skilled labor. Only students completing one of the two upper level secondary certificates were likely to be allowed to train for skilled labor, and even then the division was stark. A *Realschule* certificate meant eligibility for training for skilled professions while a *Gymnasium* certificate permitted application to university.\(^{31}\)

As it became more and more evident during the 1960s that many labor migrants would stay in West Germany, some of those affiliated with the Social Democratic and Federal Democratic Parties promoted the idea of the Federal Republic as a country of immigration. While some government bodies, including the majority of the *Länder* Ministries of Education, agreed with that position, the Federal Government did not change its official position even after Willy Brandt became West Germany’s first Social Democratic Chancellor (1969-1974). In line with that reticence, early efforts in the West German parliament to reform citizenship law to

\(^{30}\) The sociologist and SPD politician Ralf Dahrendorf, one of the most influential voices in this debate, elucidated for example, that despite being supposedly merit based, the tripartite secondary school system preferred male, urban Protestants from well-to-do families. Children who were female, Catholic, rural, or from lower socio-economic backgrounds only sometimes completed secondary education at all (Ralf Dahrendorf, “The Crisis in German Education,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 139–47).

enable long-term foreign residents to naturalize largely failed. Foreign citizens, despite being recognized as belonging to permanent minority communities, remained legally and socially “foreign.”

The discourse on migration and the related policies changed dramatically after the 1973 Oil Crisis that led to the first severe economic crisis in post-1945 Europe. No more “guest workers” were needed leading to a recruitment stop implemented in November 1973. Unintentionally, however, this and associated changes to residency laws prompted many foreign citizens already in West Germany to bring in even more family members. The fresh wave of migration, including thousands of children as well as “foreign” live births in the country, challenged the claim that West Germany was not a country of immigration. With one in ten schoolchildren entering the first grade legally a foreign citizen, the West German Federal Government and the ethno-national majority increasingly viewed the groups as established minorities and not temporary visitors. By the time Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt became Chancellor in 1976, the West German parliament, the Bundestag, was starting to discuss West Germany’s substantial and disparate minority groups as “foreign fellow residents” instead of solely “guest workers” and “foreigners” generally.

The development of the European Community further influenced the understanding of who counted as “foreign” and transformed the connections between citizenship, ethnicity, and migration with education. In the early 1970s, European Community policy increasingly extended to cultural and education rights as well as promoting economic opportunity. Hence, while not

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citizens, European Community Member State nationals had almost identical legal rights to local
citizens anywhere within the European Community. When another economic recession hit in the
late 1970s, West Germany and other Member States used the legal divide between them and
Third County (non-EC) states to differentiate between children with varying levels of rights.\textsuperscript{34}

The worldwide economic recession in the late 1970s and a second oil crisis in the late
1970s/early 1980s contributed to a rise in xenophobia and the election of a CDU/CSU-FDP
government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who was elected on the platform of “Germany for
the Germans.” Already under Schmidt, the Federal and \textit{Länder} governments had begun to cut
and consolidate state programs for things like extra education courses for migrant children in an
effort to trim state budgets. The Kohl government continued that trend, slashing funding for
social expenditures, particularly for groups like minorities or foreign nationals.\textsuperscript{35} The Federal and
the \textit{Länder} governments also tried to push non-citizens to leave and attempted to discourage new
migration by limiting access to work or residency permits. Attempts to further limit migration
through family reunification was, however, partly stymied by the Christian democrats’ emphasis
on family and the Supreme Court’s decision that prevention of nuclear family reunification
violated individual human rights.\textsuperscript{36}

By the end of the 1980s, however, the situation had against changed. The promotion of
the upcoming expansion of the European Community and transformation into the European
Union combined with the rise of local social activists promoting multiculturalism meant that the

\textsuperscript{34} Gori, \textit{Towards an EU Right to Education}; Ute Frevert, “How to Become a Good European Citizen,” in \textit{The
Making of Citizens in Europe: New Perspectives on Citizenship Education}, ed. Viola B. Georgi (Bonn:
Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2008), 37–51.


\textsuperscript{36} Ute Knight and Wolfgang Kowalsky, \textit{Deutschland nur den Deutschen?: Die Ausländerfrage in Deutschland,
Frankreich und den USA} (Erlangen: Straube, 1991); Ulrich Herbert, \textit{Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in
Christian Democratic-Liberal Federal Government had to change its tune. Kohl began to vocally support multiculturalism, even as his government tried to further limit new migration. Even their efforts there, however, floundered as first border changes in the east and then multiple international crises led to an influx of both ethnic German foreign nationals and new asylum seekers.\(^{37}\)

In the context of the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe (1989-1990) and the wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-2001) a flood of German national migrants and asylum seekers came to Germany even as it underwent unification. These new waves of migrants posed a challenge for German society and its institutions including the education system. Continued pressure from various West German political groups including the rising Green Party led the West German Parliament to finally approve changes to citizenship laws. New rules provided some avenues for established migrants to naturalize and also limited the connection between German ethnicity and citizenship. While local and international stipulations meant that the majority of West German minorities did not choose to apply for naturalization, the legal change was indicative of changing social perceptions. In the ethno-national majority’s eyes, the “foreigner” could now, at least partially, choose to be “German” and become part of an official “German minority” group.\(^{38}\)

From the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 to the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, education played a central role in the discussion of immigration and integration. Public schools were a primary site where schoolchildren learned to be good citizens

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and a part of local society. In consequence the education system is of central political importance as well as an ongoing concern. In the debate on the education of migrant children, language and literacy led directly into discussions of integration versus the maintenance of cultural ties to the home country and the question of eventual repatriation. Alleged support for return migration from both the countries of citizenship and host countries meant that all governments involved officially backed cultural and language instruction to prepare children for their return. If a child could not read in the home country's language, how were they supposed to find a job after repatriation? The provision of specific instructional classes then became a marker of a state’s political intentions and lingual fluency: a symbol of belonging.

**Historiography**

There is a rich scholarship exploring post-1945 European migration, education, and policy development that this project brings together and builds on. These bodies of scholarship are usually separate, but my project draws on each of them to examine the intersection between debates and practices. In so doing, the project connects the policies implemented with the various state actors’ goals influencing their development, looking at the process from conceptualization to evaluation.

Historical scholarship on West German immigration encompasses both host country and migrant perspectives on the experience of immigration. Klaus Bade and Ulrich Herbert were among those who began an indepth examination of post-1945 immigration, focusing primarily on how the economic and cultural conditions of the FRG influenced migration patterns and

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affected social acceptance. More recently, scholars have moved beyond emphasis on the host country, looking at international influence and migrant or minority group actions. Among them, studies by Karin Hunn and Roberto Sala have examined the role of the “sending countries” in affecting immigration policy and the experiences of immigrants and guest workers. These scholars have demonstrated how the countries of citizenship cultural and identity politics, emigration policies, and citizenship laws have influenced the rights and decisions of migrant – predominately labor – groups from specific places of origin (for Hunn and Sala, Turkey and Italy respectively). Researchers like Rita Chin, Alexander Clarkson, and Simon Goeke have built on that work, highlighting West German migrant and minority groups as actors through analysis of their political and cultural decisions. This scholarship emphasizes the emotional and pragmatic choices many migrant and minority individuals took based on their socio-political environment. Their work highlights the importance of the continued identification with the country of citizenship, but providing excellent analysis of specific cases do not demonstrate the complications engendered by the diversity of individual national identification.

The West German state was, however, only part of the mass migration in the post-1945 era, as scholars in history as well as the social sciences have shown. Moving away from West Germany, scholars like Nermin Abadan-Unat compare immigration experiences across Europe, placing West Germany as a destination alongside other, predominately Central and Western

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European, states. Within the social sciences, there has been some consideration of international policy on the right to education for migrant labor, such as the Commission of the European Community’s own histories or Gisella Gori’s discussion of the European Union’s legislation, but these do not look at local implementation. Through an examination of West German school policies and practices, this project brings together two main lines of immigration historiography by examining the school system as a site of contestation for diverse state actors as well as the immigrant families and schoolchildren.

Whereas historians of West German immigration concentrate on national trends and labor policy, educational researchers have explored the impact of diversity in the classroom. Cristina Allemann-Ghionda compares the attempts to accept diversity in a variety of European school systems. Looking directly at the composition of the West German schools, Leonie Herwartz-Emden focused on the impact of heterogeneity and gender in the classroom on schoolchildren with migrant backgrounds. Examining the situation with an eye toward the present and a focus on the German schoolroom, this scholarship often overlooks special programs designed for foreign nationals. Scholars like Ingrid Gogolin, Ursula Neumann, and Lutz Reuter have looked at the issue as a right, but by focusing on law and high politics they have not explored the historical

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development of school programs. In order to understand the current debates in Europe and Germany regarding minority groups and their success in the education system, it is also necessary to consider the development of these school programs for “foreign” children both in regards to policy considerations and results. Multiple excellent studies on German migration in history and social science have generally focused on the narrative of the development of federal policies and have considered the actors influencing those policies.

**Theory, Methodology, Primary Sources, and Organization**

With its multi-perspective analysis this project is an interdisciplinary study that combines migration, legal and cultural history, and the history of education with discourse and policy analysis. Through its layered analysis, the project combines local, national, and international histories with a focus on transnational influences. First and foremost, however, this project is a history of migration. As Leslie Moch and Dirk Hoerder remind us, migration history is necessarily “transdisciplinary” in order to acknowledge the multiple actors and complex issues relating to population movements and transcultural interactions. It is migration history that brings together places of origin and destination, exploring different aspects of movement from causation to integration. This study focuses on the destination, emphasizing the multiple kinds of groups who migrate, looking at the actors involved in shaping their experiences, and exploring the willingness of the people in the place of residence to absorb the new arrivals.

Migration histories frequently engage with the complex issue of citizenship as a central component of the question of belonging in the place of residence. Yet citizenship is not easy to

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define. As Dieter Gosewinkel lays out, on its surface, the concept of citizenship denotes membership to a political community and is frequently used as a legal category defining the relationship between an individual and a state.\textsuperscript{49} Citizenship often entails an obligation to the state, but also is supposed to guarantee an individual’s civil and political rights in exchange. The entire concept, however, is fraught with contention as different individuals are extended or denied different kinds of rights or even access to citizenship based on birth, gender, or heritage as scholars like Ruth Lister and Kathleen Canning have shown.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, as Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal explains, in an age of supposedly global human rights, the meaning of citizenship has been further diluted as those rights once associated with the citizen are extended to humans generally (although not universally). Added to that, the development of supranational institutions like the European Union and the spread of dual- or multiple citizenship frequently means that an individual has membership to multiple polities, raising questions about loyalty and the meaning of each relationship.\textsuperscript{51} That transformation, however, takes place during the forty years of this study. Consequently, in this study, because of the peculiarities of West German citizenship law, citizenship is viewed as an amorphous concept frequently wielded by the ethno-national majority as a tool for inclusion and exclusion, often used explicitly to discriminate between groups and deny or extend rights and privileges.\textsuperscript{52}


\textsuperscript{52} Gosewinkel, “Historical Reflections on Citizenship in Europe,” 34.
In order to understand how citizenship and the concept of belonging are frequently utilized beyond the level of discourse, I turn to the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to shape my understanding of the social, cultural and political importance of education. Bourdieu argues that the school system is not only a place where basic skills are to be imparted, but also a kind of space in which one learns social behavior and accumulates “cultural capital.” He defines cultural capital as a non-economic resource in the form of knowledge, skills, and education that allows an individual to both navigate society and move beyond their socio-economic background. This includes not just facts, but also styles of behavior. According to Bourdieu, the acquisition of cultural capital is a significant determining factor in children's success in schools and later in society and the work force. School is thus a vital space for the creation of social hierarchies in society, the inclusion and exclusion of social and ethnic groups in society and the creation of national identity.

Closely related to the importance of the education system for the creation of social hierarchies and processes of inclusion and exclusion is its role in the definition of identity and citizenship. One main function of public schools, as John Dewey has argued, was and is to teach young nationals how to be good citizens. Children were and are indoctrinated with the state-approved social and political capital. It is frequently in public schools that children learn everything from how to cross a street and the approved use of language alongside the role and form of the state as well as the responsibility of the citizen. But, as Abdelmalek Sayad shows in

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54 At the turn of the twentieth century, John Dewey showed how states require and fund public schools in order to teach children how to be good citizens. See John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005); Jürgen Oelkers and Heinz Rhyn, eds., Dewey and European Education: General Problems and Case Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000). James van Horn Melton laid out the development of compulsory schooling in central Europe in his Absolutism and the
his work on migrant labor moving between Algeria and France, immigrant communities do not fit neatly into the national categories nation states and their school governments are aiming for. Instead, othering by the host community and continued ties to the “sending country” force these groups into a liminal space between both.55 Both Dewey and Sayad provide crucial insights for my own study, which help me to understand the different interests that informed the debates and the implemented education policies for migrant children in a more nuanced way.

In order to understand the concepts of “identity” and “nationality” that were so central for all the relevant actors’ (who participated in these debates) goals and claims as well as the implementation of the policies in their complexity, I turn to Catherine Hall and other post-colonial theorists. These scholars look not only at identity formation and “categories of difference” like class, gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality but also critical examine the national project itself.56 By considering the complex pressures existing in the conceptual space between the host and “sending countries,” these theorists examine the formation of subjective conceptions of identity for migrant groups located outside of the dominant political, economic, and social discourse of the home country. To engage with these negotiated spaces, my project analyzes multiple overlapping categories of difference (nationality, ethnicity, class, generation, and gender) rather than fixed or static conceptions of an “immigrant,” “foreign” or “German” identity.

Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). In it, he demonstrates how compulsory schooling developed in Europe with the intention of teaching school age children to become good subjects. Brian Puacca also demonstrates how public schooling was used to reform and shape citizenship and politics in post-1945 Germany in his Learning Democracy: Education Reform in West Germany, 1945-1965 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).


Using these theories to create an interpretative framework, this project draws on primary sources from multiple archives and libraries across Germany and Europe. The main groups of primary material include five different source groups. The first set is the correspondence between West Germany’s Education Administrations (at both the federal and state levels) and the sending countries’ legations addressing the changing aims for integration as well as possible school programs for so-called foreign schoolchildren. These letters demonstrate the diverse state governments’ changing official stance and further show how they attempted to work together. The second group is made up of the protocols from the frequent conferences held between the Federal Republic and the migrants’ countries of origin, in which representatives debated policies regarding the education of foreign nationals in West Germany. These conferences provided a space in which officials from all of the countries involved – including countries of citizenship and host countries across Europe – to debate appropriate policies for the care (especially the education) of non-nationals. Adding to this international perspective, the project brings in the Council of Europe and European Community’s perspective through the third group. This includes reports and directives attempting to standardize and control the development of care for migrant communities, thereby acknowledging the influential role that the role the international community played.

Looking specifically within West Germany, the fourth group focuses on the federal government’s reports as well as the protocols of the debates inside the West German as well as Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, and North-Rhine Westphalia’s parliaments. This group brings the international debates down to the regional level, showing how the West German federal and state governments understood the issue of migration and what responsibilities they viewed as accruing
to the state. It is here that party politics becomes evident as different Länder Members of Parliament (MPs) requested the relevant Ministry of Education explain itself or take action.

In order to get a glimpse of the implementation and results of the programs designed, for my fifth source group, the project explores regional education administrations and school boards’ reports on school initiatives designed for children with migrant backgrounds. These documents provide an understanding of how teachers viewed these programs as well as provide insight into how teachers sent from the migrants’ countries of origin to teach language and culture in the Federal Republic fit into West German school systems. They further analyze the programs’ successes and failures, bringing in biased requests for more funding, program cuts, and demands for clarification.

Placing these different sources in discussion, this study is organized chronologically in eight chapters. Chapter 1 “The Right to Education and the Schooling of Children of Displaced Persons, Exiles, and Refugees (1949–1959)” examines how the new Federal Republic and Länder governments addressed compulsory schooling laws for non-German citizens in the 1950s. Chapters 2 “Compulsory Schooling and Extra Programs for the Children Guest Workers (1960-1966)” and Chapter 3 “Education Reform, Private Schools, and Plans for Return Migration (1962-1969)” carry those developments forward, looking in Chapter 2 first at the Italian Government’s request for mother language and cultural programs for foreign citizens and then in Chapter 3 at the Greek and Turkish governments’ demands regarding private schools.57 Chapter 4 “Rising Numbers of Migrant Schoolchildren, Equalizing Access to Education, and the Question of Success (1967-1974)” analyzes the efforts on the part of the Federal and Länder Education Administrations to extend equality of opportunity to all children and the substantial


The analysis of forty years of transnational debates in the education of migrant children and the implemented school policies demonstrate the importance of schools not only as a site where children learned basic skills, but also citizenship and identity. The study shows how schools were a contested space for implementing social goals and shaping children’s identities as locals and/or foreigners. Consequently, the supranational, state, and non-government actors involved continually shaped and revised school initiatives in their attempts to create an “ideal” citizen or guest. As each of the actors, from the Council of Europe to Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education to Italian Parent Groups, each had different and sometimes contradictory goals, leading to the development of programs that often conflicted with one another.
CHAPTER 1: THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND THE SCHOOLING OF CHILDREN OF DISPLACED PERSONS, EXILES AND REFUGEES (1949-1959)

Between 1949 and 1950, hundreds of parents classified as Displaced Persons (DPs) tried to enroll their children in North Rhine-Westphalian schools.\(^1\) These parents hit an immediate hurdle, however, as their children did not fall under the purview of school laws. Using those laws, the local school administrations in NRW as elsewhere in the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany often turned these children away, on the grounds that they did not speak enough German or were not themselves ethnically German. School principals, unsure if non-Germans were even allowed to attend public schools, wrote local school administrations, which in turn asked the \textit{Länder} Education Administrations if non-German children should be allowed to attend public school. Already short-staffed and under-funded, the school principals wanted to know if they had to allow these non-nationals in their schools and what their education was supposed to entail.\(^2\)

Approaching the issue, the \textit{Länder} Education Administrations looked to international trends and their own legal traditions. They wanted to avoid any suggestion that they were still

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\(^1\) Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulpflicht für Kinder ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf, August 25, 1950), NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW.

\(^2\) For discussing the legal status of the children without German citizenship, I use the phrasing from the various \textit{Länder} Education Administrations. These government ministries did not necessarily adhere to international norms and standards regarding wording, but used the terms they viewed as legally relevant. Hence, Displaced Persons were usually referred to as “homeless or stateless” individuals. According to the Federal Ministry for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims, “homeless foreigners” were “foreign citizens or stateless individuals who, as of 30 June 1950, came under the care of the High Commissioner for Refugees of the United Nations and had their residence in the Federal Republic or West Berlin” (Bundesminister für Vertriebene, “Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Kriegsgefangene, heimatlose Ausländer: 1949-1952,” 1953, 9–11, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History.Vertriebene; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., “Gebiet und Bevölkerung,” in Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1953), 31).
trapped in a Nazi mindset and thus tried to adhere to the new international norms and standards of the postwar era. In the early 1950s, that meant turning to the recently implemented United Nations and the Council of Europe’s Human Rights guidelines, which established education as a fundamental right. The West German Education Administrations would then carefully follow these norms and eventually contribute to the development of new norms and standards, particularly after the establishment of the European Community.

At both the local, national, and international level, a central concern regarding schooling for non-citizens was how to reconcile education as a human right with public schooling as a tool for teaching citizenship. All children had to receive an education in order to have full access to their other rights. Furthermore, education was a positive right, meaning it had to be compulsory in order to ensure that children received it. Yet, public schools taught citizenship and belonging. Should, the various European Ministers of Education asked, non-citizens participate in the public system if it taught them to be other, particularly if their parents planned on returning to their places of origin? Would it be better to encourage ethno-national classes? It would not do, after all, to be accused of forcing non-national minority schoolchildren to assimilate.

How the international community and West German Education Administrations answered those questions depended on exactly which groups they were discussing at any given moment. For both Europe and West Germany like other West European countries, the main groups under consideration in the early 1950s included “stateless and homeless children” (heimatlose und staatslose Kinder), mostly Displaced Persons, moving out of refugee camps five

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3 “Europe” as used in this study refers to the continent in its broader sense and includes those countries/states that either view themselves as “European” or have membership to an international European body (i.e. the Council of Europe). It is important to note that based on this definition, “Europe” includes the Republic of Turkey. This definition reflects the definition of “Europe” the West German Federal Government used in its official reports, statistics, etc.
years after the end of the war. It was these children, after all, who had an immediate need for as well as a clear entitlement to post-war Germany’s limited resources, on account of the atrocities of the immediate past. As the decade progressed, however, European and West German Ministries of Education would extend the same questions to political refugees, German expellees or returnees, and increasing numbers of spontaneous migrants and migrant workers from the Netherlands and other European states. These children had citizenship, but if all children had the right to education and West Germany wanted to maintain its friendships with its neighbors, then schooling was essential.⁴

Establishing the Right to Education for Migrants across Europe

In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration Human Rights (UDHR) stipulating in Article 26: “Everyone has the right to education.” It continued “Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.”⁵ Without literacy, after all, children – future citizens – would be unable to fully participate socially or politically.⁶

⁴ During their discussions of “foreign children” generally in the 1950s, the Ländere Education Administrations almost always meant “Displaced Persons,” homeless or stateless individuals, and refugees. That approach to the question of schooling for “foreign children” directly impacted the kinds of school programs the Ländere Education Administrations developed and what their rights to education and cultural maintenance meant in practice.


The emphasis on “everyone,” however, did not preclude an implicit emphasis on nationality and citizenship with regards to these rights. Despite the inclusive language of the Universal Declaration, the governments involved in the United Nations – in the early powerwar years 51 nations – assumed that the country of citizenship was responsible for ensuring its citizens’ (not residents’) rights both locally and abroad. Citizenship status was thus central to an individual’s access to universal rights. That interpretation meant the system began to break down for migrants and was a hollow promise for stateless individuals. These individuals had no state power to advocate on their behalf. Recognizing the problem, various international communities, particularly the United Nations and the Council of Europe, claimed responsibility, first for stateless or homeless individuals and refugees and then for exiles, over the course of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Addressing one group at a time, they defined and redefined a state government’s responsibility for its residents without local citizenship. As new groups crossed international borders either voluntarily or unwillingly, the various international communities and their members had to address the question of who was responsible for ensuring these groups’ fundamental rights and what those rights meant.

One of the aims of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the attempt to reorganize postwar societies after World War II and prevent the atrocities of this war from ever repeating themselves. Already in the last war period, international heads of state had tried to assess the causes of the war and methods for preventing a repetition. In his Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1999), Mark Mazower discusses the extremity of this devastation. See also Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 63–100.
promote communication. In addition to that, however, those leaders felt that the pre-war emphasis on minority rights had, in part, been what led to the mass genocide. To prevent another genocide, new plans focused on the dignity of the individual instead of the minority. Every citizen was supposed to be equal, regardless of gender, socio-economic background, or ethnicity. Toward that end, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in late 1948, a list of fundamental rights for every individual that every state was supposed to guarantee its citizens.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, even before the Universal Declaration was published, the assumption of state responsibility for its citizens and nationals led the Allied Powers to implement a policy of ethnic homogenization across Europe. The conflict had devastated the continent and most resources – from food to teaching materials – were available only in limited quantities. In consequence, the relevant national government was supposed to ensure its citizens’ welfare by providing housing, food, and education. While some individuals, forcibly relocated during the war, voluntarily returned to their places of origin, others were shoved across state borders. Groups with uncertain or contested citizenship status often ended up in camps so that the international community could monitor and provide for them.

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8 After the First World War, some world leaders had, of course, already tried creating an international institution. Yet that body, the League of Nations, while accomplishing an impressive amount with limited resources, had been unable prevent the outbreak of the Second World War (Susan Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations,” The American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (October 1, 2007): 1091–1117).


10 For example, in Czechoslovakia and other eastern European states, the populations and governments forced the ethnic German population to leave the country regardless of longevity or guilt (Benjamin Frommer, National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, trans. Allison Brown (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 204–216).
The International Refugee Organization (IRO), which was eventually folded into the United Nations, organized the care and education of those individuals – Displaced Persons (DPs) – who ended up in camps with no clear citizenship claims. The camps’ staffs processed the individuals who came through its doors, often sending them onward. Millions moved on, but hundreds of thousands remained in camps across Europe without clear destinations. As different groups of Displaced Persons’ stays extended from months to years, many groups in the camps either set up schools or had the camp administration arrange education programs. Many of these groups were taught by teachers drawn from within their own groups, who taught the language and curricula of the group and not of the country of residence. One example is the DP camp in Backnang near Stuttgart in West Germany with a larger group of displaced persons from Poland. Here, a Polish-speaking teacher was selected to educate the children in the camp with funding from the International Refugee Organization. After being denigrated and treated as sub-human by the Nazis, many of these groups felt that the maintenance of their cultural heritage was extremely important.

As the camps’ residencies turned from months into years, many of the camps’ administrations tried to incorporate the local curriculum into the camp schools. In theory, for example, the camps in North Rhine-Westphalia had schools that included intensive German language instruction in addition to an introduction to North Rhine-Westphalia’s curriculum. In practice, however, teachers were often in short supply and teaching materials were only

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11 For a discussion of the camps, including the treatment of youth, see Derek Holmgren, ““Gateway to Freedom’: The Friedland Refugee Camp as Regulated Humanitarianism, 1945-1960” (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, forthcoming).


13 “Stoffverteilungsplan für die 3 ersten Jahrgänge der polnischen Lagerschulen 1952,” Abschrift (Munich, 1952), MK 62244, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv.
occasionally available. Consequently, despite International Refugee Organization funding, the schools were frequently only staffed by teachers from within the refugee or exile community. Children, in turn, often did not receive any instruction in the local language.¹⁴

The camps were, however, only supposed to be a temporary measure, and the international community had to develop a more permanent solution. The issue was particularly pressing, as instead of depopulating many of the camps continued to receive new migrant groups, particularly as the Cold War began to heat up. Furthermore, five years after the end of the war, thousands of Displaced Persons (100,000 in West Germany alone) were still living in camps. The international community simply did not have the funding to continue caring for these DPs, refugees, and exiles indefinitely. With state governments across the world having to address the issue, the heads of state agreed to supplement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with the 1951 multilateral treaty on Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.¹⁵ The Convention stipulated that refugees who had fled before 1 January 1951 were entitled to state support in their country of residence. In short, the state governments who signed the convention agreed to expand their responsibilities beyond their own citizens to include refugees associated with the Second World War.


The broad guidelines defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees were, however, unclear about implementation and provided only limited oversight. To fill that gap, ten European states established the Council of Europe (CE) in May 1949 to address questions of human rights and refugees within a specifically European context. In the name of peace, the Council was supposed to promote cooperation between the European states in the areas of social and economic development – including the implementation of human rights.\textsuperscript{16} The idea was that if each of the European states and peoples could understand each other better, then they would be able to cooperate peacefully, thereby avoiding another World War and genocide. Yet, without the authority to create law, the Council focused predominately on the exchange of information and discussions of best practices, as well as on the creation of (small) programs to test and promote those practices.\textsuperscript{17}

Looking at war refugees and Cold War exiles, the Members of the Council of Europe, which had expanded to fourteen states by 1951 (Greece, Iceland, Turkey, and West Germany), decided that part of ensuring peace meant promoting cultural understanding. That goal necessitated a celebration of diversity in and among the various European societies. The Council Members assumed that countries of citizenship would keep a look out for their own ethno-nationals, expecting them to step in or raise concerns if their citizens were mistreated. The Council acknowledged, however, that some individuals did not have state protection, such as exiles or refugees. To watch over these groups and those European nationals not represented in

\textsuperscript{16} Established on 5 May 1949 by the Treaty of London. The original ten signatories included Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Turkey and Greece are both listed as founding members, but officially joined in 8 August 1949, while West Germany became a member almost a year later, on 30 July 1950.

\textsuperscript{17} Part of the Council of Europe’s early work (1951) included supervision of a European fund for exiles administered by a specialized agency placed under the CE’s aegis (Council of Europe Bundestagary Assembly, “Creation of a European Cultural Fund for Exiles,” Recommendation 17, (December 8, 1951), http://assembly.coe.int/).
the Council, the Council members assembled a Special Committee in 1951. Without funding to actually assume full responsibility, however, the Council of Europe’s Committee took on the role of an advocacy group to pressure its member state governments into action.

Combining its commitment to diversity in the name of peace and its role as an advocate for under-represented migrant groups, the Council of Europe pressed for the expansion of state responsibility beyond the United Nation’s Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In particular, it focused on promoting diversity, as the Council pushed its member state governments to encourage cultural maintenance among its refugee and exile populations. For example, in 1952 the Council’s members decided that exiles – those from Eastern Europe – needed additional support. In a move motivated by Cold War politics, the Council declared that it “consider[ed] it most important that its proposals preserve among the exiles now in Western Europe their cultural inheritance and national civilizations.” The Council of Europe’s members agreed that measures encouraging the preservation of cultural inheritance for stateless persons, refugees, and exiles should be implemented “without delay.” Those measures for cultural maintenance included everything from supplemental cultural instruction to private schools – which either local groups or the state was supposed to fund.

According to the Council of Europe’s members, education was a central component of preserving cultural inheritance, but it was also a fundamental human right. Expanding on the

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Council of Europe’s European Convention of Human Rights, signed in November 1950 and effective in September 1953, established each individual child’s entitlement to an education – particularly at a primary school level.20 According to the Council of Europe’s member states, all children needed to have access to state schools regardless of background. Yet, in saying exiles and refugees were also supposed maintain their cultural connections, both the United Nations and the Council of Europe implied that these groups needed to be treated differently. With its declaration, the Council of Europe’s members agreed that the local state was not only responsible for providing schooling for the Displaced Persons, refugees, and exiles living within local borders, but that that education should include cultural instruction. Instead of pushing homogeneity, the states were supposed to accept difference at the states’ expense.

That emphasis on the connection between culture and citizenship featured heavily within the zeitgeist of the period. According to most of the European governments, school was, after all, the place where children learned to be citizens and thus a part of the local society. In France, for example, schoolchildren who went through the entire French school system were theoretically French.21 In West Germany, that direct connection between school and citizenship was weaker, because German law denied almost all non-nationals the option to naturalize, but a public education still taught German-ness and how to participate in German society and its labor


market. In almost every West and Central European country migrants who voluntarily relocated needed to go through the system in order for the government to count them as locals, if they ever were at all. Refugees and exiles, as “forced migrants,” were supposedly not moving to become part of the local community, but to escape danger in their place of origin. As such, the Council Members felt that host countries should not add to these migrants’ trauma by forcing them to assimilate into the local community. Hence, children from these groups did not necessarily need to attend local schools. Taking it a step further, to promote understanding and accept exiles’ and refugees’ rights as minorities, the state government was supposed to at least support, if not outright offer, access to cultural and language instruction.

Those declarations of state responsibility specifically for Displaced Persons, refugees, and exiles did not, however, include either foreign nationals who migrated voluntarily or asylum seekers. The international community continued to differentiate between those groups which had clear state governments to advocate on their behalf on the one hand and those who – arguably – chose to leave their countries of citizenship and live abroad. Asylum seekers, in contrast, frequently fell through the cracks as a different other whose categorization was left ambiguous by the international community. Clearly, these asylum seekers could not rely on their country of citizenship to advocate properly on their behalf, but they also had one – and they were often not expected to permanently relocate.

Based on these assumptions of state responsibility, in the early 1950s, using the presumed connection between citizenship and rights, several countries choose to limit their school laws or

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refuse some schoolchildren with foreign citizenship entrance to public schools. All children had the right to education, technically, but the “everyone” in that phrasing was interpreted as citizens and nationals. Instead, the United Nations and Council of Europe would have to advocate on those non-nationals’ behalf, pushing inclusion under compulsory schooling laws and advocating for cultural instruction. Their advocacy, however, highlighted the perception of difference as they emphasized the right to a continued connection to cultural heritage beyond state residence.

**West Germany and Compulsory Schooling for Displaced Persons and Foreigners**

It was within this international framework that the North Rhine-Westphalian and other West German Ministries of Education responded to their school boards’ questions regarding the education of the “homeless children” (DPs) moving out of refugee camps. Where the international committee in the beginning of the 1950s was, however, almost entirely focused on stateless, refugee, and exile children, the local Ministries of Education in West Germany – like in North Rhine-Westphalia – had to also decide what public schooling for other migrant and established minority groups should entail. In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the question of schooling for Displaced Persons became intertwined with concerns about schooling for migrant ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and those of Dutch citizenship from the West. For each of these groups, citizenship status and a perceived need for assimilation was central in determining if a specific group should be allowed to attend public schools and what that schooling would encompass.

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulated that all children should be able to attend (at least) primary school and declared that schooling should be free and compulsory, but West Germany, like many members of the United Nations, interpreted that
wording as explicitly applying to citizens. Under the Third Reich (and previously under Prussian) law, compulsory schooling laws only included “German” children. The Nazi laws had also, however, established a standardized school system across the Reich where none had previously existed. In order to maintain some equivalency between the Länder instead of returning to the varied school systems existing during the Weimar Republic, in the 1940s the Ministries determined that it was “useful and practical” to continue implementing the Nazi laws. In establishing new laws in the late 1940s, the Ministries did remove direct references to the Nazis, including the stated aim of public schooling being “to ensure the education and indoctrination of the German youth in the spirit of National Socialism.” Yet, they maintained stipulations that the school system was for Germans.

Trying to de-Nazify and rebuild with limited resources, the West German education system was stretched almost to the breaking point. The school system suffered from more than a decade of Nazi government and total war. There were few teaching materials available and even fewer that did not espouse Nazi propaganda. For the first years after the war, the Allied High Command and new local governments had to explicitly teach the children who had grown up

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26 KMK, “Schulpflicht der Ausländer,” Beschluß (Bonn, January 18, 1952), B 304/2057/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

27 See, for example, North Rhine-Westphalia’s “Ersten Gesetzes zur Ordnung des Schulwesens” from 8 April 1952. Compulsory schooling laws under the Weimar Republic had not guaranteed the right to a public education for “foreign children” either. However, the Weimar Republic’s school laws had dictated that the various minority and foreign groups that the children belonged to were entitled to educate their own children. Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution covers schooling.
under Nazi leadership a new form of citizenship and educate them in what democracy was. Many principals and teachers did not want to try and fit a group with new needs in or seat more children in overflowing classrooms.28

While the Länder agreed to maintain the Nazi school law, education still fell under local Länder jurisdiction. Consequently, in 1949 and 1950 as parents from the Displaced Persons communities asked if their children could attend school, each of the eleven Länder Education Administrations had to write their own laws. The Kingdom of Bavaria’s Ministry of Education (under a Christian Socialist Union (CSU), a religious-conservative, government) was one of the first to address the issue directly. With one of the largest populations of non-Germans, at the end of the decade, in January 1949, a ministry representative acknowledged that, under the Third Reich’s school law, only German children fell under compulsory school law. “But we in Bavaria,” the representative explained, “base our policy on the old Bavarian law, which, in contrast to the Prussian, covered all children living in [the state].”29 The representative further explained that, if the children of Displaced Persons registered at the local schools (Volksschule) and knew sufficient German to follow instruction, the child would be admitted. The Ministry did not intend, however, to have the local school authorities force Displaced Persons to attend primary school.30 The Bavarian government would not officially change its laws until 1952, but with the Ministry’s 1949 statement, the government had effectively settled the legal side of the question.

28 Brian Puaca’s 2009 Learning Democracy discusses the condition of schools and education in post-1945 (West) Germany.

29 The Bavarian school laws the representative referred to dated back to 1902. It was only with the Reichsschulpflichtgesetz of 1938 that foreign citizens and ethnic minorities were excluded (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus, “Schulpflicht von Ausländern” (Munich, January 5, 1949), MK 62243, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv).

30 Ibid.
In contrast, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education (under Christian Democratic Union control, the sister party to the CSU) felt that non-Germans should not be covered by their compulsory schooling law. North Rhine-Westphalia had exactly those Prussian laws in its background that the Bavarian Ministry of Education representative had referred to. Prussian law had, like the Nazi and West German school laws after them, stipulated that education was the provenance of the citizen. Building on that tradition at the end of the 1940s, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education representatives decided that foreigners should be allowed to attend school voluntarily, but compulsory schooling was for “Germans.”

Although parental requests and international attention forced the Länder Education Administrations to address the right to schooling for non-Germans, the numbers of “homeless or stateless children” in the Federal Republic was actually relatively small. And – at the beginning of the decade – the largest concentrations were still in the refugee camps, as they did not have an automatic right to free movement. For example, as of 28 July 1950 in Baden-Württemberg (Württemberg-Baden at the time) there were 1,573 homeless foreign children from 0-6 years of age, 538 children from 6-14, and 272 youths from 14-20. The majority of these individuals spoke little to no German and had, up to that point, been instructed by teachers of their own nationality and language who were paid by the International Refugee Organization.

Limited German language skills and divergent cultural identities complicated the question of education for the Bavarian and North Rhine-Westphalian – as well as the other nine Länder’s – Education Administrations. The Nazi repression of cultural difference and insidious

31 Kultusministerium NRW and Koch to Regierungspräsidenten in Münster, “Schulpflicht für Kinder ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit sowie ihre Aufnahme in deutsche öffentliche Schulen,” April 12, 1951, NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW.

32 KMK, “Beschulung der Kinder heimatloser Ausländer in Württemberg-Baden.”
racial policies meant that the new West German state governments needed to avoid clearly repressive policies. The Education Administrations agreed that the Nazi past meant the Länder governments were now responsible for providing restitution. As the Bavarian Ministry of Education’s statement highlights, its government decided that school age DPs should be allowed to attend school if they had sufficient German language skills. The Bavarian Ministry of Education and other Länder Education Administrations asked, however, if the children should attend if they could not speak German. Furthermore, should the children be required, like German nationals, to learn to be German in the education system? Or, should new classes be established for minority groups?

The question of German language mastery was one of the most immediate, in part because of concerns over participation, but also because it connected the school age Displaced Persons to the migrant ethnic Germans arriving in the thousands from across Eastern Europe. Those migrant ethnic Germans were actually the largest migrant group arriving at the end of the War and through the 1950s in the British, American, or French zones and then the new Federal Republic. Because citizenship law in the post-Nazi state was based on paternity (jus sanguinis), these supposedly “ethnic German” individuals were immediately entitled to citizenship, regardless of their level of German language mastery. As of 1950, this included approximately 8 million individuals in a population of almost 48 million (16.6 percent). In contrast to the proportionally small number of Displaced Persons, once recognized as citizens each of these so-


34 For a discussion of different kinds of citizenship regimes based on either paternity or birth right, see Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
called “Heimatvertriebene” received the entire range of rights associated with that status.\textsuperscript{35}

Alongside the rights to housing, to free movement, and to labor was the right to an education.

Applied to ethnic German children, the Ländere Education Administration interpreted the right to education to include a state obligated to try and level the playing field. The West German Basic Law acknowledged “inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.” The Basic Law further specified that citizens had the right to the free development of their personality and rejected any discrimination on grounds of sex, ancestry, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious and political views.\textsuperscript{36} Consequently, the Ländere felt responsible for ensuring the migrant ethnic German’s ability to participate. The Ländere governments interpreted this as indicating a responsibility for providing German language instruction for any “German” child without sufficient mastery.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{36} Articles 1, 2, and 3. My emphasis. The Bonn Basic Law was still regarded as a provisional constitution in the early 1950s. KMK, “Verhütung der Diskriminierung und Schutz der Minderheit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (KMK, 1954), B 304/2057/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. (Translation gesetze-im-internet.de) The Länder constitutions (some written before the Bonn Basic Law) repeated these assurances or expounded thereon. See, for example, the Article 128 from the Bavarian Constitution from 2 December 1946.

\textsuperscript{37} Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulpflicht für Kinder ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit.” For comment on Austria, see also Kultusministerium NRW and Tiebel to Regierungspräsidenten in Detmold, “Schulbesuch von Schülern, die nicht die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzen,” January 15, 1963, NW 1223-296, Landesarchiv NRW.
They had the right, after all, to “equality of opportunities” on par with “German children” born in the country.

Despite efforts to promote equality of opportunity for all “German children,” the Ländere Education Administrations assumed that migrant ethnic German children would attend Volksschule and not the higher levels of the tripartite secondary system (i.e. Realschule and Gymnasium; see Chart 1.1). Each year, only a limited number of children were selected to attend the higher levels of secondary school (as dictated in the Basic Law). This selection was supposed to be based on merit and skill without regard to background at the end of the fourth grade (or fifth, depending on location), yet migrant children (of any sort) entering the country after the age of ten were usually placed directly into the Volksschule, regardless of their past academic achievements. Even those migrant children who were enrolled from a younger age often did not have the language fluency or home support system necessary for selection for the higher tracks. This meant that most forms of skilled employment and university training were rarely a viable option.  

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38 As many Ländere began to reform their school systems during this period, some states also developed a Mittelschule as a buffer between primary and secondary schools (see Chart 3.1). Eventually, comprehensive schools (Gesamtschule) would be developed in an effort to simplify the complex system of secondary (and to some degree vocational) education. To some extent, it would actually complicate matters, particularly as multiple different forms of comprehensive schools developed, some combining the different levels of secondary school, some simply housing lower secondary and Realschulen in the same building, not to mention other combinations. For a discussion of the development of Gesamtschulen, see Jürgen Oelkers, Gesamtschule in Deutschland: Eine historische Analyse und ein Ausweg aus dem Dilemma (Weinheim: Beltz, 2006).
Chart 1.1: West German Compulsory School System in the 1950s

As the Chart above illustrates, the *Volksschule* track of the tripartite structure that the children were pushed through ran eight years (usually ages six to fourteen, but increasingly nine years) of “full time” school and then led into vocational education. Full time instruction included primary school (which all children attended together) for the first four or five years and then what became the lowest level of secondary school (*Hauptschule*). After completing the *Volksschule*, a school-age youth was (technically) obligated to participate in vocational training.

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It should be noted that this is a simplification of the West German school system. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furck, eds., *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart*, vol. 2., Deutsche Demokratische Republik und neue Bundesländer, 6 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 644–651; and Hans Döbert, “Germany,” in *The Education Systems of Europe*, ed. Wolfgang Hörner et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 299–300.

Later separated into primary school (*Grundschule*), usually running between the 1-4 classes, followed by lower secondary (*Hauptschule*) with the 5-8/9 classes. It should be noted that the documents from this period use the term “*Vollzeitschule*.” This is in comparison to the later possibility of attending part-time school while simultaneously working. It should be noted that the West German school system usually functions on a half-day system, particularly for the younger grades. See Karen Hagemann, Konrad Hugo Jarausch, and Cristina Allemann-Ghionda, eds., *Children, Families, and States: Time Policies of Childcare, Preschool, and Primary Education in Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011); and Karen Hagemann and Karin Gottschall, “Die Halbtagsschule in Deutschland: Ein Sonderfall in Europa?,” ed. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, *PISA-Studie - Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte* 41/2002 (October 12, 2002): 12–22.
(Berufsschule) if they were under the age of eighteen. Yet, youths needed a “school-leaving certificate” to place in any sort of vocational training program and to obtain qualification for any form of semi-skilled labor. Older migrant children and youths – regardless of their citizenship status – often did not have time to complete the requirements or obtain sufficient German language mastery before they turned eighteen. As a result, many newly arriving youths finished school without receiving any certifications. This in turn meant that it was not uncommon for migrant children to be denied vocational training.

Although the vast majority of migrant children in West Germany were deprived of fully equal educational opportunities, immigrant status was not the only social factor highly correlated with educational opportunity and achievement. Many ethnic German children were also denied these opportunities. In the late 1940s and 1950s, there was a clear divide between which groups were able to attend higher secondary schooling tracks. Those enrolled were largely white, urban, protestant males from upper socio-economic backgrounds. Furthermore, despite compulsory schooling laws, many ethnic German children dropped out before completing any form of school certificate.

Despite the fact that migrant children with German citizenship and, to a lesser extent, ethnic Germans of lower socio-economic status faced a discriminatory and rigid system, they still had the right to receive support, however limited, in contrast to children without German citizenship. The Länder governments were, after all, not obligated to provide any scholastic support to newly arrived migrants without German citizenship. Nonetheless, perceived moral obligation on account of the Nazi past as well as changing international perceptions about who

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41 KMK, “Verhütung der Diskriminierung.”

42 Ralf Dahrendorf, Bildung ist Bürgerrecht: Plädoyer für eine aktive Bildungspolitik (Bramsche: Nannen-Verlag, 1965).
was responsible for stateless, refugee, and exile school age children meant that school administrations often felt that they were supposed to do something.\textsuperscript{43}

That belief in responsibility was tempered, however, by practical and material concerns. Although most of the school age Displaced Persons entered public schools in ones and twos, local school boards worried about the children’s level of German language mastery.\textsuperscript{44} The very existence of these German language courses and semi-bilingual instruction in the camps gave space for schools to deny “foreign children” admittance, particularly when “foreign children” spoke limited or no German. In many L"ander, North Rhine-Westphalia among them, it was not uncommon for school administrators to tell the parents of non-German schoolchildren that enrollment was “pointless” and suggest they return instead to the camp schools. These institutions supposedly already had the necessary German language instruction to prepare for “German schools.”\textsuperscript{45} These school principals claimed that “foreign children’s” limited German language skills meant that they should not be permitted to enter public schools for fear of disrupting the classroom.

To overcome language barriers, the L"ander Education Administrations did consider putting school age Displaced Persons in classes with migrant German children, thus preparing them for enrollment in regular instruction, but hesitated. Part of that reluctance was on account

\textsuperscript{43} Several international communities, from the United Nations to the Council of Europe, included the right to education in their lists of basic human rights. See the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 26 and Beiter, \textit{The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law}, 93.

\textsuperscript{44} Kultusministerium NRW and Koch to Regierungspräsidenten in Münster, “Schulpflicht für Kinder ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit sowie ihre Aufnahme in deutsche öffentliche Schulen.”

\textsuperscript{45} Even when releasing rules in 1951 stating that all Displaced Persons should be allowed in West German schools, the Ministry of Education in North-Rhine Westphalia stipulated that they had to be able to speak German to do so (Kultusministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen and Koch, “II E 2 035 - Tgb.Nr. 2207/51,” Vermerk, (April 12, 1951), 51, NW 1223-296, Landesarchiv NRW). It is important to note that this decree was published when Displaced Persons, etc., already legally came under West German school laws, just like children with German citizenship.
of the majority of the Education Administrations’ opinion that non-German children were not entitled to the same support structures as ethnic German children. Another side of that indecision, however, was the children’s parents’ preference. After all, Displaced Persons might not have clear citizenship status, but families still had their own ethnic heritage. Treating these children the same as ethnic German children would be paramount to forced assimilation.

In addition, as the UDHR and the Council of Europe’s Convention stipulated, “parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.” For many of the parents living in the camps for years, the provision of cultural instruction for their children was important. For various groups of ethnic Poles, Russians, Lithuanians, and later Hungarians fleeing various pressures in the East, the camps provided a central gathering point and the schools provided a continued connection to “their” language and culture. These groups were loath to lose that connection, so, as they were slowly removed from the camps, they often petitioned to continue the classes on the weekend, in the afternoons, or even via private schooling.

Although the Ländere Education Administrations did not want to deny these groups access to language and cultural classes, they also assumed that the DPs and stateless children still in the country were permanent residents and would likely be granted citizenship. In order to avoid having thousands of youths without school certifications (and consequently only employable as unskilled labor) and because of the moral imperative associated with the Nazi past, these West German officials felt that the DPs remaining in West Germany unquestionably needed to

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47 The DP camps, for example, became a center of Jewish culture and education in West Germany. For a discussion of camp schools for Polish DPs, see Anna D. Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann, “Patriotism, Responsibility, and the Cold War: Polish Schools in DP Camps in Germany, 1945-1951,” The Polish Review 47, no. 1 (2002): 35–66.
integrate into West German society. According to the Education Administrations, this
necessitated attending West German schools. Yet, the compulsory schooling law went both
ways. Children with non-German citizenship were not guaranteed the right to participate, but the
state also had no legal recourse to force them to attend.

Even as the Länder Ministries of Education debated the rights of school age Displaced
Persons among themselves, on 9 February 1950, the Allied High Command (AHC) sent a letter
to the Federal Government to announce that as of 1 June the approximately 100,000 DPs
(“verschleppten Personen” in the official German translation) in the country would be the
responsibility of the West German state. The Allied High Command further stipulated that
these individuals would come under West German laws just like any West German citizen. For
the individual Länder’s Ministries of Education, this meant that those “stateless and homeless
children” already in the camps or West German villages and cities now fell under Länder
compulsory schooling laws.

The Allied High Command’s letter forced the Länder Education Administrations to
seriously address what education for school age Displaced Persons should entail, particularly
regarding access to German public schools or national private schools. Over the following
months, the Kultusministerkonferenz held a series of meetings examining the issue of “foreign
ethnic groups” and schooling, with particular focus on DPs and other refugee groups that were in

48 It should be noted that the term “verschleppten Personen” would later refer to the “German” Heimatvertriebene
and not to Displaced Persons. Nonetheless, the Ministries of Education and KMK would consistently understand the
group referred to here as to mean the children of homeless and stateless foreigners. National migrant/minority
groups were not technically included under this rubric, even if some of the supposed homeless and stateless
foreigners came from the same national or ethnic backgrounds.

49 J.E. Slater to Kanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, February 9, 1950; Lukaschek, “Entwurf eines Gesetzes
über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer im Bundesgebiet” (Bonn: Bundeskanzler, September 21, 1950); and

50 “Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge (Bundesvertriebenengesetz - BVFG),”
the country “as a consequence of West Germany’s past.”\textsuperscript{51} The resulting 1950 recommendations on the “Construction of Schools for Foreign Ethnic Groups” (“Schulangelegenheiten; hier: Errichtung von Schulen für fremde Volksgruppen”) followed international recommendations in three parts: First, the Länder Education Administrations felt that the schoolchildren decidedly needed more German instruction in order to enable the children to take “subject classes in German as soon as possible.” The second recommendation stipulated that “the children of Displaced Persons” should, “where the possibility exists,” receive instruction in their mother tongue as well as in the history and geography of their homeland by teachers of their nationality. The third part reminded the Länder Education Administrations that, under the Basic Law, the construction of private schools was permissible for the children of Displaced Persons.\textsuperscript{52}

The decision straddled the divide between assimilation and cultural acknowledgement. On the one hand, school age Displaced Persons were now clearly subject to compulsory schooling laws. On the other hand, when convenient, the children were supposed to be allowed to receive cultural instruction. In so doing, West German schools were going to acknowledge the children’s right to a free education while trying to respect difference. That respect was, however, also somewhat mercenary, and local schools could pass off some of their costs to private associations or other state ministries.

Although the Kultusministerkonferenz’s recommendation’s title indicated a general discussion of “foreign ethnic groups” the actual wording of the text meant that it was only applicable to the Displaced Persons already subject to the compulsory schooling law. The core

\textsuperscript{51} The first official discussion took place during the KMK’s 27/28 October 1950 meeting in Freiberg. See “Schulangelegenheiten; hier: Errichtung von Schulen für fremde Volksgruppen,” Beschluß der KMK (Freiburg: KMK, October 27, 1950), B 304/2057/3 Az. L1472, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\textsuperscript{52} Article 7 of the Basic Law, see Germany, Grundgesetz, 2–3.
issue of the recommendations was how to decide on the states’ obligation to provide extra instruction, or how far to support access. The issue at stake was, in short, how to acknowledge difference while bringing “homeless children” fully under West German law. For the individual West German Ministers of Culture in 1950, as with migrant ethnic Germans, this primarily meant that the children needed to learn German. Basic literacy was the goal, not the completion of school certificates or secondary schooling.

The KMK’s 1950 decision established parameters for the education of “homeless foreigners,” but the question of compulsory schooling for other “foreign” groups continued to be a concern for many schools. Refugees continued to arrive in West Germany, predominately from various states in the communist bloc, but other national minorities began to enter the country as the decade wore on, particularly in search of work.53 Even at the beginning of the 1950s, migration from neighboring states was already picking up. While there were over 100,000 DPs and refugees in the country in 1950, that was less than a quarter of the overall number of “foreigners,” who by 1951 numbered over 485,700.54 Consequently, while the children of DPs could unquestionably attend public schools, there remained a significant number of children with foreign citizenship who did not necessarily have that right.

The largest migrant group in 1951 was actually the 75,000 Dutch citizens living in West Germany (58,000 in North Rhine-Westphalia alone). Concerned about their citizens’ access to schooling, the Dutch government advocated on their behalf, exactly as the Council of Europe had assumed that they would. What the Dutch government wanted in the early 1950s was simply

53 Bade, Migration in European History, 227–239.

54 Bundesminister für Vertriebene, “Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Kriegsgefangene, heimatlose Ausländer,” 9–11; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, “Gebiet und Bevölkerung,” 1953, 31. “Homeless foreigners” are “foreign citizens or stateless individuals, who had their residence in the Federal Republic or West Berlin and were under the custody of the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees on 30. June 1950.”
inclusion under compulsory schooling laws.\textsuperscript{55} There was a brief inquiry on the part of the School Board in Münster as to whether a reciprocity agreement already existed between the two states (as it did with Austria), but no evidence of such an agreement was discovered. Instead, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education unequivocally declared that schoolchildren with Dutch citizenship did not fall under compulsory schooling laws in the state. Furthermore, as North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education felt that the group was integrating without trouble, the Ministry had no intention of taking further action. Dutch schoolchildren did, however, have the right to attend school voluntarily.\textsuperscript{56}

The Kultusministerkonferenz’s School Committee under Eugen Löffler (teacher and politician\textsuperscript{57}) from Württemberg pointed to the “pressing necessity” of the situation for non-Germans and recommended that the individual Länder alter their school laws to include “foreign children” under compulsory schooling.\textsuperscript{58} Löffler argued that it was crucial for the different Länder to create a common right to compulsory schooling for all children. For Löffler, this meant not only that refugees and DPs should be brought under the law, but that an the


\textsuperscript{56} Ministerpäsident des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen to Kultusminister Nordrhein-Westfalen, “Schulpflicht der Kinder niederländischer Staatsangehörigkeit in der Bundesrepublik,” October 2, 1951, NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW. The Ministry of Education further decided that there was no need to try and get the Dutch government to include West German children under its compulsory laws, because NRW’s government would then be forced to reciprocate.

\textsuperscript{57} Dr. Eugen Löffler (1983-1979) taught in Gymnasien in Württemberg from 1903-1918, when he became part of Württemberg’s Ministry of Education (becoming Oberregierungsrat in 1922 and Ministerialrat in 1924) until 1951 with a short exceptions of 1927-1928 and 1930, 1931 when he worked in the Ministry of the Interior and assisted in developing the Reichsvolkschulgesetz. After his retirement, he continued to be active in education policy development. Among of institutions and committees, he was a part of the Deutschen Ausschuß für das Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen (Bonn) and the KMK, where he was Chair of the Committee for Auslandsschulwesen (1951-1956) and the Committee on Education (1950-1955). See “Bestand Q 1/20: Zur Person Löfflers,” Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg (Stuttgart), accessed November 15, 2013, https://www2.landesarchiv-bw.de.

\textsuperscript{58} Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulpflicht der Ausländer,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf, January 21, 1952), NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW.
establishment of compulsory schooling for all the citizens of foreign States who had their residence in the Federal Republic or were planning a long stay was “as pressing [a] necessity.”

The Kultusministerkonferenz did not follow the Committee for Education’s suggestions. Instead, the recommendation released in conjunction with the KMK’s January 1952 meeting in Königswinter stated that, in order to avoid difficulties and unequal legal relationships, compulsory education ought be extended through provisions at the Länders level for “homeless foreigners” as well as the citizens of foreign states and stateless foreigners. Discussion of the recommendations in the assembly, however, made it clear that while all DPs and homeless children in West Germany had to be included under each of the Länders’ compulsory schooling laws, the individual states could make their own decisions regarding the inclusion of “foreign nationals.”

No one who studies West German education would be surprised that the West German Länders responded to the KMK’s recommendations regarding the education of foreigners in different ways. All eleven Länders did in fact pass new school laws including DPs and homeless foreigners under compulsory schooling as required by the KMK’s recommendations. Only eight of the eleven states, however, complied with the full intent of the recommendations and included all foreigners in their new compulsory schooling laws. Among them, Bavaria’s new 1952 law, as planned, extended compulsory schooling to all children, specifying that any child

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59 Even in this, however, it was acknowledged that an all-inclusive compulsory schooling law would not, in fact, be all-inclusive, as the children of foreigners with the right of exterritoriality and the children of the occupying powers would be exempted. Sekretariat and Burkart, “Schulpflicht der Ausländer,” Beschluss (Bonn: KMK, September 8, 1951), NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW.

60 KMK, “Schulpflicht der Ausländer.”

61 Note that the compulsory schooling laws covered any child who was legally stateless or homeless (without a country of citizenship) at the time, not only Displaced Persons.
staying in the state for longer than two days outside of holidays had to attend.\textsuperscript{62} The Education Administration claimed that including not only citizens “but foreigners and the homeless” under general compulsory schooling “reflected the Bavarian spirit and constitution.”\textsuperscript{63}

Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and the Saarland, in contrast, only extended the right to education. For North Rhine-Westphalia, the question had partly been one of the high numbers of resident foreign citizens, like the Dutch nationals, for whom the state government was hesitant to acknowledge responsibility. In 1953 the North Rhine-Westphalian Education Administration did, however, declare “foreign children’s” voluntary school attendance should be “assisted in every way.”\textsuperscript{64} On the other end of the same spectrum, Saarland’s Ministry of Education did not think it had enough residents without German citizenship to make any sort effort worthwhile. Whatever the Education Administration’s reasons, within those three Länder, children with foreign citizenship could attend school on a voluntary basis, but were in no way required to. Consequently, these West German Länder had no legal obligation to provide support for entrance into the schools or for mother language and cultural instruction. But this also meant that the West German Länder could not compel the children to attend.

Regardless of inclusion under compulsory schooling laws, each of the Länder Education Administrations agreed that children without German citizenship were inherently other (i.e. not German). Even that broad statement, however, meant different things according to citizenship


\textsuperscript{63} Art. 128 and 129 of the Bavarian constitution (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus, “Begründung” (Munich, 1951), MK 62206, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv). See also KMK to Bundesminister für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kreisgeschädigte, “Schulpflicht für heimatlose Ausländer,” December 19, 1960, B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\textsuperscript{64} Teusch, “Aufnahme ausländischer Schüler,” \textit{Amtsblatt des Kultusministeriums NRW}, June 3, 1953, 75.
lines and based on legal status. That difference meant that, regardless of what the right to education entailed, different groups of children needed to be treated differently. Part of that disparity in treatment was supposed to be a celebration of diversity in order to acknowledge cultural heritage. Another side to that decision, however, was a separation of resources. Reflecting international trends, the Länder Education Administrations took responsibility for their own citizens as well as for school age displaced persons, stateless individuals, and exiles.

**Degrees of Responsibility for Education in West Germany and Europe**

On 13 December 1955, the Council of Europe’s members released the “European Convention on Establishment.” In it, the member states stipulated that children of any associated parties should be permitted to enter those primary, secondary, and vocational and technical schools under state control on “equal footing with the nationals” of the host country. Furthermore, school attendance was to be compulsory for those school age nationals residing within the territory of any of the other contracting parties. Although the Convention would not come into force until 23 February 1965, its emphasis on equal education reflected new international trends regarding the perception of the state’s responsibility for providing public schooling for non-citizens.\(^{65}\)

Two major developments in the mid-1950s led to a fundamental shift in how both West German and the international community discussed schooling for non-nationals. First, as many European states recovered from the devastation of the Second World War, they turned toward the question of economic alliances and collaboration. Six of the members of the Council of

Europe, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany, decided to form a series of economic partnerships focused on resource exchange. The second change, intertwined with the first, was the growth of labor migration. As economies grew, jobs opened up across Europe, leading to expanded labor migration. The West German Federal Government placed itself in the middle of the debates on expanding European collaboration and cooperation. Under the leadership of CDU Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Government saw the Council of Europe and European Community as way to improve its international reputation and expand the West German economy.

The emphasis on collaboration and focus on peace meant that, verbally at the least, the different states pushed forward the idea of equality. The idea of a unified Europe opened the idea that public schooling was for more than the citizen. Equal access to education was also about treating fellow European citizens as equals. That equality implied inclusion under compulsory schooling laws as well as assistance with integration into the West German school system. Nonetheless, refugees and exile groups were still viewed as deserving or in need of cultural support.

Although the West German Länder failed to implement a common policy regarding compulsory schooling, the question of if the children should be allowed into West German

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67 Konrad Adenauer was German Chancellor from 1949 to 1963 (born 1976, died 1967). He was member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and a Roman Catholic. His willingness to participate in the development of what became the European Community is partly attributed to the West German government’s desire to rebuild its European connections and improve its economic status.

schools had been settled. Nonetheless, for most of the Länder, uncertainty remained as to what compulsory inclusion necessitated and what it meant in practice. Questions about German and mother language instruction as well as about private schools continued to vex the different Ministries of Education, particularly as the rate of migration increased. For the next decade, the Ministries would discuss the major issues in periodic meetings of the Kultusministerkonferenz. But the Länder also developed different approaches to schooling “foreign children” as their own situations developed. These approaches were, in turn, heavily dependent on which “foreigners” were involved and the size of the minority groups. Despite their legal foreignness, for example, the Austrian, Dutch, and Polish communities were treated differently based on their exact legal status as well as their comparative degrees of difference from the West German ethno-national majority.

In West Germany, most minority groups were spread out, with “foreign” children attending German schools in ones and twos, meaning language competence was not actually a common problem. It was unusual for a West German classroom to have larger groups of “non-German” children attending. With most children speaking German, those who did not had space to learn the language without overburdening teachers. Nonetheless, to avoid stressing teachers when there were larger groups as well as to accommodate new groups, some Länder Education Administrations, like Baden-Württemberg’s, developed programs for language and cultural support for “homeless” and refugee groups. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education considered itself responsible for ensuring that all children enrolled in public schools, even if they did not fall under compulsory education laws. Consequently, the Ministry deemed it necessary to provide newly arriving groups, like those from Hungary in 1956 after the failed Revolution, with
intensive German language instruction in order to prepare them for participation in West German schools.  

Via additional efforts to encourage enrollment in West German schools, Baden-Württemberg’s Education Administration attempted to ease entrance into the classroom. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education dictated that, if there were problems with language, then the (usually singular) child could temporarily be placed either in a lower grade level, or spend 1-2 hours a day in the first grade. As soon as the child had a sufficient mastery of the language, then s/he was to be moved to a grade corresponding to his/her age group.  

Baden-Württemberg’s four regional school boards claimed that there were supposedly no difficulties with this course of action and that the children generally mastered the German language quickly. School principals in turn reported that the “foreign school children … in no way interrupted the normal course of instruction.” The school officials’ reports did acknowledge that classroom teachers sometimes faced difficulties if the child spoke little or no German to begin with, but the Ministry of Education judged that “contact between the children [was] very important.” The readiness of the local school children to welcome “foreign children” and to also be helpful after instruction created a very good atmosphere. Therefore the attendance of “foreign children” in the schools was generally welcomed.

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71 Ibid.

72 The Regional School Boards went as far as to claim that from this view, the few problem cases were more than compensated for.
Table 1.1: “Foreigners” (Ausländer) in West Germany by Country of Citizenship, 1955\(^73\)

<table>
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<th>Bavaria</th>
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<td>725</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>2,499</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>78,207</td>
<td>61,190</td>
<td>1,682</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>79,906</td>
<td>15,642</td>
<td>11,909</td>
<td>22,956</td>
<td>6,575</td>
<td>1,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>13,311</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>1,953</td>
<td>7,320</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>20,553</td>
<td>7,476</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>5,988</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>91,166</td>
<td>19,863</td>
<td>19,540</td>
<td>21,141</td>
<td>8,112</td>
<td>6,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless</td>
<td>51,094</td>
<td>20,065</td>
<td>5,123</td>
<td>10,349</td>
<td>2,953</td>
<td>3,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>466,675</td>
<td>147,266</td>
<td>65,231</td>
<td>119,245</td>
<td>31,307</td>
<td>18,144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were, however, some larger groups and areas with higher concentrations of schoolchildren. As Table 1.1 shows, by 1955 the largest groups of “foreigners” were those from Poland, the Netherlands, and Austria. In 1955, the three national groups at the center of this study (Italian, Greek, and Turkish citizens) were comparatively small, although the number of individuals with Italian citizenship was already growing. Nonetheless, through the 1950s, “foreigners” continued to imply mainly refugee groups or exiles from Eastern Europe. Länder Education Administrations discussing “foreign children” frequently overlooked migrants from the West, such as those with Dutch and Austrian citizenship. For children with Austrian citizenship this was in part because of the language similarities, but also because of the

\(^73\) It is important to note that the West German Federal and Länder governments all counted the individual citizenship groups in this list as “European” – including Turkish citizens. See Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., “Gebiet und Bevölkerung,” in Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1956), 48.
longstanding reciprocity agreement regarding compulsory schooling.\textsuperscript{74} For children with Dutch citizenship the situation was, as discussed above, more complicated. The NRW Ministry of Education, responsible for the majority of them, explicitly refused to include them under the compulsory schooling law, but “welcomed” them if they voluntarily registered. In addition the Ministry denied requests for any assistance for Dutch cultural or language classes, claiming that the Netherlands were culturally similar enough to (West) Germany to render such extra instruction superfluous.\textsuperscript{75}

Further complicating the matter was the development of the European Community. Six of the Council of Europe’s member states expanded their areas of collaboration by creating the European Economic Community (EEC), one of the pillars of the European Community, under the Treaty of Rome in 1957.\textsuperscript{76} Initially, the European Community focused on the trade of materials and labor. Culture, already addressed under the auspices of the Council of Europe, was supposed to remain firmly under the sovereignty of the individual member States. As such, schooling was (almost) a taboo subject.\textsuperscript{77} What the EEC focused on instead was resource exchange – which included manpower. Yet, with the establishment of the European Community, 

\textsuperscript{74} Regierungspräsident Aachen to Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulpflicht der Kinder von Holländern,” August 11, 1951, NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW; and Kultusministerium NRW, Referat II B 2 to Referat II A 4 and II C 6 im Hause, “36 - 0/0 Nr. 67/62,” June 12, 1962, 62, NW 1223-296, Landesarchiv NRW.

\textsuperscript{75} See Ministerpräsident des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen to Kultusminister Nordrhein-Westfalen, “Schulpflicht der Kinder niederländischer Staatsangehörigkeit in der Bundesrepublik.” These children did not come under the purview of the compulsory schooling law at that time. The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education actually recommended against trying to include West German schoolchildren under Dutch Compulsory Schooling Law as those kinds of international agreements usually required reciprocity. See Kultusministerium NRW, Referat II B 2 to Referat II A 4 and II C 6 im Hause, “36 - 0/0 Nr. 67/62.”

\textsuperscript{76} For more on the evolution of the European integration, see Warleigh, \textit{European Union}, 12–36.

an equal footing in education became even more important between countries like the Netherlands and West Germany. The six Member States (Belgium, the Federal Republic, France, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) could not discuss labor exchange without considering qualifications. Vocational training was, after all, a central component of developing a work force. Hence, building on the “European Convention on Establishment,” the Treaty of Rome guaranteed “freedom of movement, non-discrimination and ‘the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications.’”78 It also promoted cooperation relating to “basic and advanced vocational training.”79 In so doing, cooperation began to influence the primary goals of public education, shifting its value from primarily being about citizenship to being increasingly focused on vocational opportunity, although the effects would only fully become clear in the 1970s. For the West German and Dutch Education Administrations in the late 1950s, the European Community connection made the question of school integration and equivalency more important. The two governments explored the possibility of additional student and labor exchanges.

In contrast, the West German Education Administrations approached the Polish ethnic minority as a foreign other with significant cultural distance. The West German Education Administrations viewed ethnic Polish children, both citizens and stateless, as culturally different enough to warrant cultural classes. In addition, during the 1950s, the majority of the ethnic Polish children in Germany were either Displaced Persons or had fled Cold War Poland, meaning they fell under the compulsory school law. Their legal status also meant they were

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78 Article 57 of the Treaty of Rome.

included in KMK’s rubric of groups deserving cultural instruction.\textsuperscript{80} Hence, while the local Education Administrations did not have a legal obligation to provide cultural instruction, there was no legal bar preventing the establishment of Polish language classes. Providing such instruction was, in fact, advisable.\textsuperscript{81} For this group, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education (as well as other Länder Education Administrations) consistently provided support instruction. Alongside extra German language classes, the North NRW of Education frequently gave ethnic Polish groups as well as other stateless children and Eastern European nationals permission to establish weekend or afterschool cultural and language classes.

Although the Polish nationals living in West Germany did not have a state government to advocate on their behalf, there was an incredibly active Polish Association. The Association campaigned for cultural instruction across the country and was largely successful.\textsuperscript{82} By 1953, in the American and French zones there were already 1,179 children taking part in Polish language instruction in 24 locations, of which 790 were in extra classes and 389 in preschool. In the British Zone, there were a total of 2,221 children in Polish language instruction, in Polish schools (407 in Lower Saxony and North-Rhine Westphalia), in extra classes, and in preschool (913),

\[80\textsuperscript{ \text{Furthermore, there already a history of providing Polish language and cultural instruction in some German – including North Rhine-Westphalian – schools. During the Wilhelmine period there had been a large ethnic Polish minority group with German citizenship in the Rhineland. After years of demands from the Polish minority, the predecessors of the North Rhine-Westphalian governments permitted Polish instruction in German public schools. See Richard Charles Murphy, \textit{Guestworkers in the German Reich: A Polish Community in Wilhelmian Germany} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and Peter O’Brien, “German-Polish Migration: The Elusive Search for a German Nation-State,” \textit{International Migration Review} 26, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 373–87.}\]

\[81\textsuperscript{ \text{Article 7 Paragraph 5 of the West German Basic Law. See also KMK, “3. Errichtung polnischer Schulen in der Bundesrepublik,” Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die 32. Sitzung des Schulausschusses am 6./7.10.54 in Munich (Munich: KMK, October 7, 1954), Anlage, B 304/2057, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.}\]

\[82\textsuperscript{ \text{KMK, “3. Forderungen des Verbandes polnischer Flüchtlinge in Deutschland betreffend Errichtung polnischer Schulen in der Bundesrepublik.”}\]
while 1,140 attended German schools (901 taking part in extra classes in the Polish language).\(^{83}\) Although happy with these developments, the Polish Association continued pushing for additional instruction and private schools.

The Polish private schools in North Rhine-Westphalia were not legally private schools, but camp or supplementary schools. Partly in order to alleviate any burden on local German schools caused by having to teach children without German language skills, NRW hosted a handful of other non-public classes in association with the camps, including one near Münster and one in Augustdorf (Administrative District Detmold). The first was for children in first through third grade, taught by one Polish national. The second was for first through fifth grades (156 schoolchildren). Four Polish teachers taught in both Polish and German. The teachers for these classes, selected from within the groups, were then paid by the Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Affair’s office for DPs, Refugees, and \textit{Aussiedler} (resettler or returning “ethnic Germans”).\(^{84}\)

Technically, Article 7 of the Basic Law guaranteed the right to establish private schools. The article stated:

Private schools that serve as alternatives to state schools shall require the approval of the state and shall be subject to the laws of the Länder. Such approval shall be given when private schools are not inferior to the state schools in terms of their educational aims … A private elementary school shall be approved only if the educational authority finds that it serves a special pedagogical interest or if, on the application of parents or guardians, it is to be established as a denominational or interdenominational school or as a school based on a particular philosophy and no state elementary school of that type exists in the municipality.

\(^{83}\) Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, “Notiz: Der Stand der polnischen Schulwesens in der Bundesrepublik” (Bonn, March 4, 1954), B 304/2057, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\(^{84}\) Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales’ Landesbeauftragter für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Aussiedler. Kultusministerium NRW and Koch to Regierungspräsidenten in Münster, “Schulpflicht für Kinder ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit sowie ihre Aufnahme in deutsche öffentliche Schulen.” The DPs/ minority groups wanted to continue mother tongue and cultural classes alongside West German schooling.
According to the article “foreign” minority groups and/or foreign governments were eligible, theoretically, to establish private schools for school-age children belonging to national minorities, if the parents’ desired instruction was unavailable in public schools.\(^{85}\) Permission was, however, only granted on a case-by-case basis, and even then these schools’ leaving certificates were not guaranteed West German recognition.\(^{86}\) The Länder Education Administrations only reluctantly granted permission.

With the majority of the children spread out across the country, there were only a few locations with a large enough concentration to even warrant consideration for the establishment of private schools (see Table 1.1). Nonetheless, there were some regions where private schools were established for “foreign children,” usually run by private institutions. By the mid-1950s, the Länder Education Administrations had only given permission for five such private national schools. The largest of these schools was for the approximately 8,000 Lithuanians living around Diepholz in Lower Saxony and on the border between Baden-Württemberg and Hesse, and was intended to provide “special school possibilities” (besondere Schulmöglichkeiten). There, the Lithuanian children attended a Lithuanian primary school, after which the majority of the graduating schoolchildren attended a Lithuanian Gymnasium in Schloss Tennhof near

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\(^{85}\) Article 7, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Basic Law.

\(^{86}\) Paragraph 15 then stated that the foreign certificates (Prüfungszugnisse) of any homeless foreigners (heimatlose Ausländer) require, as do all foreign certifications, the special recognition of the Ministry of Education in the area in which they have their residency. See Kultusministerium NRW to Schulkollegium beim Regierungspräsidenten in Düsseldorf und and Regierungspräsidenten Aachen, Arnsbeg, Detmold, Düsseldorf, Köln und Münster, “Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer vom 25. 04. 1951 (BGBl. I vom 27. 04. 1951 S. 269),” September 8, 1951, NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW.

The Länder education officials were responsible for ensuring that these schools did not fall behind public schools in their teaching goals (Lehrzielen) and that such establishments (Einrichtungen) not separate out school children based on their parents’ circumstances (Besitzverhältnis).
Lampertheim in Hesse.\textsuperscript{87} The others included the Orthodox Russian diocese’s administration of West Berlin and Germany’s Russian Gymnasium for children of Russian exiles in Munich.\textsuperscript{88} West Berlin also hosted a French Gymnasium for both German children and other nationals.\textsuperscript{89}

By the mid-1950s, problems with the few private schools and camp schools available heightened reluctance to permit more.\textsuperscript{90} Children attending the Polish schools in North Rhine-Westphalia experienced difficulties transferring into local public schools, having both limited German abilities and frequent problems in other subjects.\textsuperscript{91} Furthermore, there was significant anti-German sentiment in the school materials the classes used. In addition, the Polish Association frequently pushed for more Polish instruction time than many of the ethnic-Polish parents actually wanted. Many of the parents, after all, had no intention of moving to a Poland under communist leadership. As such, many parents wanted their children to learn some Polish, but also attend German schools and become part of German life. These parents did not want their children to have a full Polish education.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{87} KMK, “Verhütung der Diskrimierung,” 7–8. The school costs are covered by land grants, parental contributions, and donations (\textit{Landeszuschüsse, Beiträge der Eltern und Spenden}).

\textsuperscript{88} During its existence, however, the school received funding from the Bavarian state and had its exit exams (\textit{Abschlussprüfung}) recognized by the state. The Russian gymnasium closed as of 14 November 1955 because of a lack of teachers on the one hand and a limited number of schoolchildren on the other. See Höhne and Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus to Sekretariat, “Russisches Gymnasium in Munich,” February 13, 1956, B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\textsuperscript{89} There was also the Nicolaus Cusanus Gymnasium in Bonn for American children (KMK, “Verhütung der Diskrimierung,” 7-8).


\textsuperscript{92} KMK, “3. Forderungen des Verbandes polnischer Flüchtlinge in Deutschland betreffend Errichtung polnischer Schulen in der Bundesrepublik.”
With the majority of parents focused on integration and spread across West Germany, at the end of the decade only around 800 schoolchildren participated in extra language and cultural instruction, while the camp schools were mainly closed. Those few were spread through Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein. Even among those few hundred, there were ethnic Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Estonian, and Hungarian schools. The primary focus of the instruction was to impart the children’s mother language and the history of the country of origin, although Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia also offered religious instruction. In each of the Länder, a “foreign teacher” led the instruction.\(^{93}\)

**Table 1.2: National Instruction for “Homeless Foreigners” in 1961\(^{94}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of Children</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baden-Württemberg</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Polish and Latvian</td>
<td>Religion und native tongue</td>
<td>Ministry for Displaced Persons as well as Regional School Administrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bavaria</strong></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Ukrainian, Polish, and Lithuanian</td>
<td>Native language and history</td>
<td>No state support, private funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Rhine-Westphalia</strong></td>
<td>392</td>
<td>Polish, Latvian, Ukrainian, Estonian, and Hungarian</td>
<td>Native language, social studies, and Religion</td>
<td>State Minister for Social Affairs’ subsidy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower Saxony</strong></td>
<td>143</td>
<td>Polish and Ukrainian</td>
<td>Native language and social studies</td>
<td>City of Braunsweig Social Services Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Schleswig Holstein</strong></td>
<td>137</td>
<td>Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian (as of 1958)</td>
<td>Native language and social studies</td>
<td>No state support, private funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{94}\) Kultusminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein and Grothusen to Sekretariat, “Nationaler Ergänzungsunterricht für Kinder heimatloser Ausländer,” V 11 a - 04/3938, (May 18, 1961), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
From the mid-1950s through the end of the decade, the members of the Kultusministerkonferenz would claim that, in general, problems with minorities and education “only existed in Schleswig-Holstein,” and then only in regards to an ethnic Danish minority group with West German citizenship. The group had special rights regarding schooling and language acquisition because of their long history in Schleswig-Holstein, but they still explicitly needed to be “German,” as they were most decidedly staying in the FRG. Part of the issue with this group, then, was the continued difference between their schooling and the standard West German system. It was unclear where they were supposed to fit.

Through the end of the decade, the Education Administrations reported that all other groups integrated well and easily. The different Länder Administrations claimed that, even without the requisite German language knowledge, children usually participated in West German classrooms without problems. The “foreign children” were reported to typically master sufficient German language skills for participation in public schools within a year. Some local school boards claimed that the presence of “foreign children” actually added to the school atmosphere and encouraged a healthy learning environment.

Part of the Education Administrations’ lack of concern and perceived success related to the continued smaller sizes of most newly arriving migrant groups. Länder initiatives for “foreign children’s” care were designed with the idea that there were not (and would not be) that many of them in most schools. Furthermore, educational success in general was seen in the enrollment in school, the acquisition of passable German language skills, and the demonstration

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95 KMK, “Verhütung der Diskriminierung,” 7–8. Because of the historical relationship between the local government and the Danish speaking minorities of the region, the minority group had some special rights in regards to schooling. The Ministry of Education in Schleswig-Holstein sent out a decree on 7 March 1950 establishing the conditions of the establishment of private schools for the Danish minority. For this group, after the first year of establishment, these schools received a yearly allowance of up to 80 percent of the personnel and extraneous costs. This grant went far beyond what Schleswig-Holstein could grant other West German private schools.95
of frictionless participation in the classroom. As with migrant German children, the Ländere
Education Administrations were not concerned about whether or not children with foreign
citizenship could complete secondary schooling or enroll in vocational programs. Any worries
over vocational schools that did exist tended to focus on the right of the children to attend at all.

The Ländere Education Administrations’ lingering concerns focused on the degree of
difference between local and foreign groups and how that influenced state responsibility. In
North Rhine-Westphalia, the Ministry of Education treated Austrians as locals, the Dutch as
foreigners too culturally similar to warrant acknowledgement of cultural difference, and the
Polish as foreign others despite long-term ties. Furthermore, the Austrian and Dutch
communities usually arrived during this period as spontaneous or labor migrants, while the
Polish communities were frequently refugees and exiles. Non-European minority groups were
generally too small to take active note of and were therefore considered less problematic than
those groups from Eastern Europe.

The international understanding among European states’ Educational Administrations
during the 1950s shifted from stressing general human rights that would somehow mysteriously
be extended to every individual to the idea that it was in the state’s best interest to extend
compulsory schooling to all children, regardless of their country of citizenship. The Council of
Europe and the European Community wrote about the issue in terms of world peace, mutual
exchange, and economic development, while the European Community considered the problem
in view of labor exchange and equality. These international bodies discussed the issue usually in
regards to smaller forms of exchange, looking at refugee populations or spontaneous migrants.96

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96 Spontaneous migrants are those individuals who only apply for residence permits and/or visas after migration. See
Ahmet Akgündüz, Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974: A Multidisciplinary Analysis
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 51; and Joanne van der Leun, “Excluding Illegal Migrants in The
They were not exploring education for long-established minorities, but rather recent and new minority or migrant groups.

**Conclusion**

At the beginning of the 1950s, public schooling in West Germany was predominately about teaching citizenship and basic literacy. As the decade progressed, however, changes within the international community meant that schooling became a fundamental human right necessary for the realization of personhood, integration, and increasingly vocational opportunity. As the emphasis within the concept of schooling changed, so too did the perception of the state’s responsible for ensuring non-citizens access to education as well as what that education was supposed to entail.

As long as schooling was about citizenship first and foremost, a state could argue that its responsibility – and its resource expenditure – was solely towards and for its citizens. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its emphasis on education for all was focused on equality between citizens, regardless of minority status, gender, or otherwise. In West Germany, that commitment was particular important given the Nazi past atrocities, and because of the material deficits in what the state could provide. Fighting an uphill battle to teach its citizens democracy, West Germany did not want to accommodate non-citizens and their particular concerns as well.

The Länder Education Administrations could not, however, entirely ignore their minority populations without German citizenship. These groups, predominately Displaced Persons, were there as a result of the Nazi past and German atrocities. Consequently, despite their status as
stateless and homeless, West Germany had a responsibility for their welfare – including their education. Yet, again, the situation was different for minority groups with citizenship (like the Danish minority in Northern Germany). Those minorities needed to learn to be German, even as they retained their ethnic identity. For the Displaced Persons, the nature of Nazi oppression meant that the West German state needed to provide these groups with access to cultural and language instruction. But their presumed residence was to be merely temporary.

As the various Displaced Persons from the Second World War integrated into society, new immigration did not stop, although the reason for such migration shifted. During the mid-1950s, the majority of new migration included ethnic Germans leaving various eastern states as well as spontaneous migrants from across the European continent. These spontaneous migrants moved with increasing frequency across state boundaries in search of jobs. International pressure – including the Council of Europe’s emphasis on collaboration and equality combined with the development of the European Community – meant that there was increased importance placed on treating these migrants the same as local host country nationals.

Equal treatment and education did not necessary mean inclusion in compulsory schooling and certainly did not guarantee cultural instruction. These migrants remained foreign others, even as the international community pushed equality and equivalency. Nonetheless, state governments in countries like West Germany judged and weighed their needs differently based on their citizenship status. Based on their judgement, each of the West German Länder would develop their own programs.
CHAPTER 2: COMPULSORY SCHOOLING AND EXTRA PROGRAMS FOR THE CHILDREN OF "GUEST WORKERS" (1960-1966)

In 1960, during initial bilateral discussions about the schooling of children with Italian citizenship living in West Germany, the Italian Consul in Cologne, Giovanni Mayr, laid out the Italian government’s aims. First and foremost, the Italian government wanted all Italian citizens in the Federal Republic to receive a German education, partly with an eye toward integration into West German society through the schools.¹ As part of a second set of goals, the Consul hoped that the North Rhine-Westphalian government would work with him to set up supplementary language and cultural classes. Mayr wanted teachers (both male and female) chosen by the “Italian side” to provide instruction while the West German authorities footed the bill. Finally, he suggested that these “consular classes” could be required for the children of Italian workers in West German public schools, but also made available to ethnic German schoolchildren as an elective.²

Mayr’s suggestions were a response to the development in the last five years. In 1955, West Germany and Italy had signed a bilateral labor agreement for the recruitment of migrant workers with Italian citizenship. The West German economy was flourishing while Italy, particularly in the south, was plagued by unemployment. In order to alleviate that pressure, the

¹ In contrast, the parents of Spanish children in North Rhine-Westphalia would express hesitation to enroll their children in West German schools as they expected to return to Spain. See Kultusministerium NRW and Rürup to Herrn Gemeindedirektor der Gemeinde Hückelhoven-Rathe, “Einschulung von Kinder ausländischer Arbeitskräfte,” August 15, 1963, Landesarchiv NRW.

² Consolato d’Italia, Colonia to Kultusministerium NRW, “No. 24583,” November 14, 1960, NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW.
Italian state requested the agreement. For the Italian government, the agreement went toward furthering their goal of European integration. For that integration to fully benefit the state, the growing number of families with Italian citizenship in West Germany needed to integrate and be capable of getting jobs.

Working with the Italian legations in the Federal Republic, the Länder Education Administrations debated internally and among themselves what kind of school initiatives they should develop for the children of Italian workers. These new migrant groups were not refugees, stateless persons, or expellees, nor were they spontaneous migrants. Consequently, none of the programs in place for those groups (discussed in Chapter 1) applied. New guidelines were needed, outlining what “integration and cultural maintenance” should entail for this group. Determining best practices and legal obligations toward these diverse new, European Italian so-called guest worker groups, three issues framed the Länder Education Administrations’ considerations. First, the children of Italian workers living in West Germany were there at the invitation of West German businesses. Consequently, the West German governments – including the Education Administrations – felt that the Länder governments had some responsibility for their welfare. As a part of that status as so-called “guest worker children,” however, the permanency of their residence in West Germany was unclear. Second, children with Italian citizenship were, according to the Länder Education Administrations, culturally different from the German ethno-national majority. As such, they were theoretically eligible for cultural classes as the ethnic-Polish minority had been in the 1950s. Third, the Italian state was a member of the European Community. Consequently, the Länder Education Administrations had to weigh their

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actions and regulations regarding this group within the context of their work within the European Community. That membership also meant it was likely that Italian citizens would remain in West Germany. Such possible long-term residency thus necessitated integration.

With other guest worker states’ requests following the Italian’s, the Italian governments’ demands shaped early West German policy regarding the care of children with non-German citizenship who entered the country as “the children of foreign workers.” Each of the policies regarding integration and cultural maintenance which the Länder Education Administrations developed for “Italian children” would – in the name of equality – be extended to all children with citizenship from a state with a bilateral labor agreement with West Germany. In 1960, however, when the Italian delegation made its first official request for inclusive compulsory schooling and cultural instruction, the West German delegation viewed the issue as a matter of friendly state relations, hardly a pressing matter.

International Advocacy and Italian Language Instruction in West Germany

The Italian government first raised the question of Italian instruction for its citizens in West Germany in 1960 during a meeting of the West German-Italian Joint Cultural Commission. During that meeting, the Italian delegations expressed interest in setting up cultural and language classes for Italian citizens, as it had already done in Belgium. These classes were, however, to be provided in conjunction with regular West German schools. The Italian government assumed that children “would remain in West Germany permanently” as residents and therefore needed to

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4 Wanderarbeiter (migrant workers), ausländische Arbeitnehmer (foreign workers), or Gastarbeiter (guest workers). Fremdarbeiter (foreign worker) was off the table as it was the term the Nazi’s used for their foreign and forced labor during the Third Reich. See Ulrich Herbert, “Immigration, Integration, Foreignness: Foreign Workers in Germany since the Turn of the Century,” International Labor and Working-Class History, no. 48 (Fall 1995): 91–93; and Robert Sala, “Vom ‘Fremdarbeiter’ zum ‘Gastarbeiter’: Die anwerbung italienischer Arbeitskräfte für die deutsche Wirtschaft (1938-1973),” Vierteljahrshefte Fur Zeitgeschichte 55, no. 1 (January 2007): 93–120.
integrate into the West German school system. Italian maintenance was only supposed to be a bonus.\(^5\)

Neither the West German nor Italian governments saw the schooling of Italian citizens in West Germany as solely an issue of the children’s education. For the Italian government, their citizens’ education was important, particularly in light of continued illiteracy in Italy. In addition, however, for both the West German and Italian governments the children’s education was a tool to promote their own international political goals at a bilateral level, as well as at the level of the expanding European Community. For both the Italian and the West German governments, their views of European Community integration and local agendas shaped what school initiatives they were willing to permit and develop and, eventually, what programs the children had access to.

For the Italian government during the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, one of its major goals was to promote European integration, partly in order to improve its international reputation and alleviate unemployment. In the immediate post-1945 period, the Italian state had to recover international reputation, because of its Fascist past, its alliance with Nazi Germany and the devastation that World War II had caused. The Italian peace treaty stipulated the loss of significant territory and required the Italian state to pay reparations to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Hoping for an alteration to that treaty and in order to be again recognized as an important international player, the pro-Western government threw itself into international developments. Under Christian Democratic Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi (1945 to 1953) the Italian state supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Marshall

Plan, the European Recovery Program initiated by the United States.\textsuperscript{6} Nonetheless, while interested in a strong Atlantic connection, the Italian state’s position remained weak, leading it to push for further European cooperation in the hopes of increasing its international standing, particularly in the Mediterranean. That hope led the state’s involvement in the founding of the Council of Europe and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).\textsuperscript{7}

After De Gasperi, under successive Christian Democratic Prime Ministers, the Italian state played a central, if often ignored, role in the “re-launching of Europe.” The Italian state also had a long Europeanist tradition it hoped to profit from. The new generation of Italian politicians promoted the European Economic Community as an opportunity for igniting the Italian economy and for social modernization. It was partly Italy, then, in various discussions with the members of the ECSC and later the European Economic Community (both of which were later folded into the European Community) that pushed for the development of a European social policy as well as freedom of movement for Community Member State nationals.\textsuperscript{8}

The Italian delegation’s successes in the European sphere led to access to the West German labor market.\textsuperscript{9} The Italian state suffered from high unemployment, which it hoped to alleviate through labor migration. For Italy, there was a long tradition of labor emigration beginning with the founding of the state in the 1860s.\textsuperscript{10} The young state initially tried to stem emigration, but finding that goal impossible, developed programs for encouraging their cultural


\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 42–45.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 50–51.

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 51.

\textsuperscript{10} Mark I. Choate, \textit{Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad} (Harvard University Press, 2008).
maintenance instead. In the post-1945 era, the Italian state resumed those efforts, partly to alleviate high unemployment, particularly in southern Italy.\textsuperscript{11} Only with expanded European cooperation, however, was it able to send significant numbers of workers abroad.

For migrant workers, West Germany was a particularly attractive destination on account of its booming economy. In the 1950s, all across Western and Central Europe, the various European economies were recovering from the war. The Federal Republic’s economy exploded, growing fast enough that it needed additional workers.\textsuperscript{12} Until the construction of the Berlin Wall by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1961, the majority of the country’s labor needs were filled by refugees from communist East Germany in 1961, the majority of the country’s labor needs were filled by ethnic German migrants. Nonetheless, the West German state also fell back on older traditions of recruiting seasonal labor from across Southern Europe, partly with an eye toward its international reputation.\textsuperscript{13} In the company of countries like Switzerland, West Germany would become the destination country for the largest total number of migrant workers during the period.\textsuperscript{14}

Like for the Italian government, until the mid-1960s the West German government under Christian Democratic Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard saw the European Community and

\textsuperscript{11} Varsori, “Italy’s European Policy.”

\textsuperscript{12} For a discussion of the re-militarization of West Germany, see Friederike Brühofener, “Defining the West German Soldier: Military, Masculinity and Society in West Germany, 1945--1989” (Ph.D., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2014), 1945–1989.

\textsuperscript{13} Herbert, “Immigration, Integration, Foreignness: Foreign Workers in Germany since the Turn of the Century”; and Oliver Grant, Migration and Inequality in Germany, 1870-1913 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 17, 90–91.

European integration as a way to improve its international standing. Unlike the Italian state, however, it was the German Democratic Republic, not the Federal Republic, that had to pay war reparations to the Soviet Union. Without that drain on state finances, and with Marshall Plan funding, West Germany was able to rebuild relatively quickly.

In order to improve its international relations and support that growth, the West German government signed (as host country) a series of bilateral labor contracts with a series of eight different states (sending countries) in Southern and South Eastern Europe as well as North Africa. Responding to the Italian government’s’ advocacy, the Federal Republic’s first “guest worker agreement” was with the Republic of Italy in 1955. The other agreements would, as mentioned, be signed with Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 1968.

For the Italian Government, by 1960, five years after signing its bilateral labor agreement, there were enough children with Italian citizenship abroad generally and in West Germany specifically to make the schooling of its emigrants an active concern. Because the largest communities of Italian citizens in West Germany lived in North Rhine-Westphalia and

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Baden-Württemberg, the question of compulsory schooling and integration was a pressing issue. The Italian government did not want its citizens to move abroad only to become illiterate in both Italian and German, thereby effectively becoming unemployable.

Concern over literacy and employability combined with the Italian state’s focus on European cooperation led the Italian state to push integration. With a long tradition of labor emigration, the Italian state was fully aware that a large portion of its citizens would not return to Italy. These migrants, however, could provide a bridge between the Italian and West German states, encouraging collaboration as they developed connections in both countries. Hence, for the Italian government, both its own and its citizens’ best interests were served by full integration into the West German school system and society. That integration, however, did not preclude continued identification as Italians, particularly as they were not eligible for German citizenship (which was still based on paternity). To fully take advantage of possible connections, the children needed to identify as Europeans, encompassing both the Italian and German sides of their identity. It was toward that end that the Italian delegation in 1960 promoted full integration into the school system combined with a few hours of Italian instruction to encourage a cultural connection.19

The Italian state did not, however, think that only its citizens should be representative of European integration. Even before trying to establish Italian instruction for its own citizens, the Italian state tried to promote Italian language instruction in West Germany for the ethno-nation German majority. In the name of European integration and in line with the Council of Europe’s recommendations promoting modern language instruction, the Italian state argued that both countries needed to establish more language classes. When the two countries signed their 1956

19 “2. deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission (1960).”
bilateral Cultural Agreement, in the section on education, the Italian government largely concentrated on the establishment of language classes for Germans in Italy and Italians in the Federal Republic, although they also discussed the few German schools already in Italy. Those few German schools in Italy were mainly for the children of high-level officials and diplomats, which neither the Federal Republic of Germany nor the Republic of Italy’s governments were particularly concerned about in the 1950s. Modern language classes, however, could theoretically be made available to a large number of school children in both countries. The Italian government argued – both with West Germany directly and in bilateral and international meetings on the European level – that it was these kinds of classes that would best promote cultural exchange and European integration by encouraging communication and hence understanding.21

The West German Länder Education Administrations theoretically agreed with the Italian government’s arguments regarding modern foreign language instruction.22 Nonetheless, the Länder decided to focus on English as a first foreign language and established Latin and French

20 The Cultural Agreement between the FRG and the Republic of Turkey was signed on 8 February 1956 and came into power on 9 December 1957 (“Kulturabkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Italienischen Republik,” Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II no. 5 (1958): 77–84). Cultural Agreements framed the involved countries’ cultural relationships. Among other things, the Agreements outlined acceptable cultural exchange by committing to, among other things, literary and film translations, music and theater troops exchange, as well as archeology. Most of the Agreements also incorporated final paragraphs dictating the creation of (bi-yearly) Joint Commissions, during which the relevant parties involved could discuss implementation and possibly changes. For a discussion of what “cultural politics” are, see Zsolt Nagy, “Grand Delusions: Interwar Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1918-1941” (Ph.D., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012), 1918–1941. For a discussion of Italy’s cultural politics at the beginning of the 1970s, see UNESCO, “Cultural Policy in Italy; and a Survey Prepared Under the Auspices of the Italian Commission for Unesco” (Paris: UNESCO, 1971).

21 “Kulturabkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Italienischen Republik”; and “1. deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission (1958).”

22 Many secondary schools across Europe continued to emphasize the classical languages, including Ancient Greek and Latin instead of modern languages, which included modern French, English, and Italian.
as the normal options for a second required language.\textsuperscript{23} In consequence, while the Italian government pushed for more Italian language instruction in West Germany, only a few Länder Education Administrations would provide Italian language courses as a voluntary third or fourth modern foreign language in upper levels of secondary schools (Realschule or Gymnasium).\textsuperscript{24} Consequently, the majority of children in West Germany had little to no exposure to, much less opportunity to learn, the Italian language.\textsuperscript{25}

In contrast, demonstrating its commitment to modern language acquisition, the Italian state made significant efforts to ensure the spread of German language acquisition. In Italy, the study of foreign languages began in the first year of lower secondary school.\textsuperscript{26} The Italian state introduced the compulsory three-year middle school (for around eleven to fourteen year old students), a form of lower secondary school, in 1962 in order to meet the new demands that post-1945 industrialization placed on the work force. In so doing Christian Democrat Luigi Giu,\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Some of those guidelines were part of the 1955 Düsseldorf Agreement (Saul B. Robinson and J. Caspar Kuhlmann, “Two Decades of Non-Reform in West German Education,” \textit{Comparative Education Review} 11, no. 3 (October 1967): 311–30).
\item \textsuperscript{24} See “3. Sitzung Deutsch-Italienisch Gemischte Kommission: hier: IV. Unterricht der deutschen Sprache in italienischen Schulen und der italienischen Sprache an deutschen Schulen,” Protokoll, (January 23, 1963), B 90, Bd. 815, PA AA.
\item \textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid}. All children in West German secondary and intermediate schools had to take at least one modern foreign language, and schoolchildren in secondary modern schools, which about half of the secondary school pupils attended, had to learn two with the possibility of learning a third foreign language. For example, in Berlin, modern languages were taught in the top forms of primary schools and the teaching of modern foreign languages in primary school was spreading steadily into the other Länder. In Italy in the new intermediate school, the study of foreign languages began in the first year. Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education, “I. Resolutions Adopted by the 2nd and 3rd Conferences of European Ministers of Education on Modern Language Teaching; and II. Summary of Action Taken on National and International Level as a Follow-up of the Resolutions (extract from the Document Min.ed./London (64) 1),” Fourth Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, February 28, 1964), Box 2431, Council of Europe.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Luigi Giu (1914-2010) was the Italian Minister of Education, at the time the “Italian Minister of Public Instruction,” under Christian Democratic Prime Ministers Amintore Fanfani (January 1954 to February 1954, July 1960 to June 1963, December 1982 to August 1983, and April 1987 to July 1987), Giovanni Leone (Prime Minister
\end{itemize}
Italian Minister of Education between 1962 and 1968 for the various center-left coalition governments, sought to extend that lower secondary school to all citizens instead of an elite cohort, thereby encouraging equal opportunity. The addition of the lower secondary school to the five-year primary school system meant that a larger number of schoolchildren had a chance to attend university instead of vocational training, thereby producing a needed skilled labor base.\textsuperscript{28} Part of those changes included curricular development and the addition of foreign language instruction.\textsuperscript{29} Largely successful, by 1963, according to the numbers provided by the Italian government during a joint meeting of the Cultural Commission, there were 62,306 Italian schoolchildren who were learning German in Italy as a required subject.\textsuperscript{30}

Nonetheless, even in 1964 as the \textit{Länder} Education Administrations reformed the local school system, they continued to dismiss the possibility of Italian language instruction for ethnic Germans.\textsuperscript{31} Part of this decision was evidenced in the October 1964 Hamburg Agreement (\textit{Hamburger Abkommen}), prepared by the Kulturministerkonferenz, which aimed to standardize the West German school system. The Hamburg Agreement stipulated that all schoolchildren were

\begin{itemize}
\item from June 1963 to December 1963 and then June 1968 to December 1968 as well as President December 1971 to June 1978, and Aldo Moro (in office December 1963 to June 1968 and then again November 1974 to July 1976). During his political career, Giu would also serve as Minister of Health and Minister of the Interior.
\item Günter Brinkmann and Wolfgang Hörner, “Italy,” in \textit{The Education Systems of Europe}, ed. Wolfgang Hörner et al. (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007), 397.
\item For more on reform of the curriculum into the 1970s, see Lamberto Borghi, “Lower Secondary Education in Italy with Particular Reference to the Curriculum,” \textit{Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education} 10, no. 2 (January 1, 1980): 133–40.
\item See “3. Sitzung Deutsch-Italienisch Gemischte Kommission.” The Italian Delegation expressed frustration when the West German delegation claims that they could not really do anything because of \textit{Länder}-jurisdiction and the Düsseldorf Agreement.
\end{itemize}
to start learning their first required foreign language – usually English – in all schools from the fifth grade onwards (occasionally the sixth). The Agreement also laid out the levels/years for a second foreign language, which were still supposed to be Latin, French, or English. The Agreement, however, also opened up the possibility of learning a different first or second foreign language, offering local schools the option of offering alternative languages. Yet, relatively few Länder Education Administrations offered Italian language programs at any level of secondary schools.

For children with Dutch citizenship, in contrast, the Kultusministerkonferenz and the Foreign Office considered the possibility of permitting Dutch in place of French as an acceptable second foreign language, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia where the largest group of Dutch children lived. A small number of North Rhine-Westphalian schools already offered Dutch language instruction (a few Realschulen had put together two-hour working groups, and there were two four-hour working groups in two Gymnasien in the border town Emmerich). Furthermore, the Dutch and West German delegations at the first meeting of the Joint West German-Dutch Cultural Commission set up a working group to look into the question of “support of language in the partner country” and explore ways language teachers could be made available.

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34 Förderung der Sprache im Partnerland. The conversation about Dutch language instruction in West Germany focused predominately on the post-secondary level with some emphasis on the training and exchange of language teachers. They did, however, discuss the question of schoolbooks and the first meetings (since the 1950s) of the presentation of history for the schoolbooks. See Kräling, “Deutsch-niederländisches Kulturabkommen,” November 9, 1965, Anlage 1, B 90, Bd. 854, PA AA; and “Sitzung der Deutsch-Niederländischen Kulturkommission: Förderung des niederländischen Sprachunterrichts in Deutschland,” Bulletin - Presse und Informationsamt der
The Länder Education Administrations’ willingness to develop Dutch language programs for secondary schools but not Italian ones stemmed from multiple concerns. First, there were actually more school-age Dutch citizens living in North Rhine-Westphalia in the early and mid-1960s than Italian citizens. In addition, because of earlier migration, the Dutch government started advocating for its citizens’ scholastic inclusion beginning in the mid-1950s. Perhaps more importantly, however, although both the Netherlands and Italy were European Community Member States the West German government viewed them as culturally different. According to the North Rhine-Westphalian Education Administration, Dutch citizens were culturally similar enough that they did not need support for integration or for cultural classes. In contrast, Italian citizens were not only culturally different enough to warrant consideration of cultural classes, but for many ethnic Germans they were culturally inferior, a subaltern group of Southerners, Mafioso, and garlic (or spaghetti) eaters. Furthermore, the West German authorities assumed that children with Italian citizenship would only be in lower secondary schools, meaning any Italian language programs in the higher levels of secondary school would be for ethnic German children.\(^\text{35}\)

Although the West German Federal and Länder governments were not receptive to providing Italian language instruction to the local ethn-o-national majority, they were willing to consider developing Italian language and cultural programs for Italian citizens in West Germany.

Consequently, when the Italian delegation surprised the West German delegation during their 1960 Joint Cultural Commission meeting with the Italian government’s request for Italian cultural instruction for its citizens, the West German delegation felt the appeal was “eminently reasonable,” particularly in comparison to the idea of promoting Italian language classes for ethnic Germans. Unable to take any action, however, the German delegation suggested the Italian legation approach the Länder Education Administrations or the school boards in cities with larger groups of Italian citizens, like Essen in North Rhine-Westphalia.

The Italian government directed its Foreign Missions to approach the Education Administrations in North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg, two of the Länder with the largest communities of Italian citizens. The two Länder had several similarities. At the time, a Christian Democratic Coalition (CDU) led their governments. Both were industrial states with factories in need of unskilled labor, making them two of the largest areas of recruitment. It was not a coincidence that these two Länder were among the three that had not changed their compulsory school laws in the early 1950s to cover foreign citizens, although they encouraged voluntary school attendance. Consequently, not only were these two Länder prime locations for Italian consular courses, but the Italian consulates were already pressing for changes to local school laws in order to promote integration. Nonetheless, despite their similarities, when the

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37 The North Rhine-Westphilian Ministry of Education released a series of decrees directing local schools to provide assistance to foreign children if they needed help in order to attend. The Ministry of Education stated that for those who did not have West German citizenship, extra classes could be put together under Paragraph 4 of the school law, if it “seems necessary for pedagogical reasons.” The North Rhine-Westphilian Education Administration stressed, however, that the organization of these classes was in no way related to inclusion under compulsory schooling law in connection with 2. AVOzSchFG. See the Ministry of Education’s Decree from 3 June 1953 (Teusch, “Aufnahme ausländischer Schüler,” 75). Kultusministerium NRW and Tiebel to Regierungspräsidenten in Detmold, “Schulbesuch von Schülern, die nicht die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzen,” January 15, 1963, NW 1223-296, Landesarchiv NRW.
local Italian Consulates inquired about setting up cultural instruction the North Rhine-Westphalian and Baden-Württemberg Education Administrations approached the question of cultural instruction from opposite directions.

Of the two, the North Rhine-Westphalian Education Administration in Düsseldorf was the first to take action, responding to the local Italian Consulates’ requests as well as logistical considerations. In November 1960, when the Italian Consul in Cologne approached the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education with the recommendation from the Joint Cultural Commission in hand, the Ministry of Education was supportive.\(^\text{38}\) Although not pressing, the Ministry felt that the creation of Italian language classes for schoolchildren with Italian citizenship would be a positive development. According to the Ministry, however, there were barely enough children with Italian citizenship in West Germany to make the issue relevant.\(^\text{39}\) Instead, the Ministry saw cultural courses as a sign of goodwill between the host and sending country as well as needed support for the connection between “foreign children” and their culture. As a result, the Ministry’s representatives neither agreed to open these courses to “German” children nor to make them compulsory.\(^\text{40}\)

The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education’s willingness to immediately address the issue upon request stemmed from the state’s emphasis on developing selfhood

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\(^\text{38}\) Consolato d’Italia, Colonia to Kultusministerium NRW, “No. 24583.”

\(^\text{39}\) With only a few hundred schoolchildren with Italian citizenship in North Rhine-Westphalia, the West German press and ethno-national majority’s parent groups were as of yet almost entirely uninterested in the issue. Occasional articles on the issue usually highlighted new Ministry of Education efforts in the respective state after a press release on the issue. See, for example, “Ausländerkinder in deutschen Schulen: Eine Auskunft des Kultusministeriums,” Staatsanzeiger für Baden-Württemberg, February 25, 1961, 15 edition.

(Persönlichkeit) of the child, a central component of which was ethno-cultural identification. For the Ministry, the development of ethno-cultural identification was a fundamental human right, one that it was supposed to protect. Toward that end, for North Rhine-Westphalia, cultural instruction took precedence over integration during the 1960s. Integration was important, but integration required a public education that would teach Germanness. As the children of migrant workers – including Italians – were not going to become German citizens, they needed to be taught what it meant to be whoever they were.

Arguing that, in the name of human rights, children had a right to maintain their own cultures, the North Rhine-Westphalian Education Administration began working with the Italian Consulate in Cologne to develop language and cultural courses – eventually called “consular classes” – in 1961. While it was the first Education Administration to work on the issue in West Germany, the Italian and North Rhine-Westphalian representatives involved did not start with a blank slate. The Italian government had already set up classes for language and cultural instruction in Belgium with the assistance of the Belgian government. Once it was clear that something was actually going to be done, the Italian Consulate in Cologne called one Magliulo, who had led the team setting up the consular courses in Belgium, to work with the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education. Although with parameters modified to meet local needs, the consular instruction developed in North Rhine-Westphalia would be based on the earlier

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42 Kultusministerium NRW, “Besprechung am 27. Sept 1961 with MR. Prof. Dr. Magliulo and Mr. Finocchi,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf, September 28, 1961), NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW.
Belgian courses, which ran five hours a week for children attending local public schools corresponding to their age. Instruction, using Italian school materials, focused on the Italian language, history, geography, and religion. They would almost immediately begin to include some German language training, as both the Consulate in Cologne and the six District Presidents (Regierungspräsidenten) in North Rhine-Westphalia expressed concerns that some of the children had limited German language knowledge and hence some difficulties following the West German classes.43

From the beginning of the joint Italian-German team’s discussions about consular classes, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education had agreed to finance the instruction. The Ministry felt that, as an important aspect of education, it had a responsibility for providing cultural instruction even if the schooling of Italian citizens was not yet legally the state’s responsibility. That willingness, however, also shaped the consular class’s structures and limited the number of schoolchildren who would be reached. Initially, the Italian and North Rhine-Westphalian team wanted to set up classes for any group of five schoolchildren with Italian citizenship. The team abandoned this preference, however, because the number of teachers from Italy needed for such a set-up was prohibitive. Even more problematic was the fact that, based on North Rhine-Westphalian wage stipulations, the teachers would have needed to teach a minimum of five classes to earn a living wage, which would have been impractical (if not impossible) in regions where only a single class was needed. In the end, the international team settled on groups...

43 See Regierungspäresident Düsseldorf to Schulämter der Stadt- und Landkreise des Bezirks, “Italienische Kinder in den Volksschulen des Regierungsbezirks Düsseldorfs,” December 5, 1961, NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW. This general set up was still in place in 1965 under the Decree from 13 October 1964 (II C 36-6/1 Nr. 2995/65), see Kultusminister NRW II C 3 (Bermann) to II A (im Haus), “Unterricht für Kinder von Ausländern,” March 25, 1965. It had changed, however, to state that there would be “5 hours weekly with another 2 possible.” In addition, the courses were supposed to be set up during normal class hours, without specification of what they were to replace.
of a minimum of 15 schoolchildren (maximum of 25) for a single class with five weekly hours of
instruction taught by teachers selected by the Italian Ministry of Education.

After some delays, involving the availability of schoolrooms and the arrival of the
teachers from Italy, the Italian consular classes began in the 1961/62 school-year in January
1962, in the region around Düsseldorf. Additional classes were already scheduled to begin with
the upcoming school year 1962/63 starting after Easter 1962. Although the courses spread
quickly, the process of arranging additional classes required a series of back-and-forth
communications that took some time. Once an Italian Consulate had determined that there was a
group of 15-25 school children with Italian citizenship, the Consulate, in communication with
the individual District Presidents, alerted the Ministry of Education. The relevant local school
board then had to confirm the group’s existence, after which the North Rhine-Westphalian
Ministry of Education would arrange for classrooms with the relevant District Presidents and
local education authorities and discuss funding for the teachers’ wages with the Ministry for
Finance. Meanwhile, the local Italian Consulate had to coordinate with the Italian Ministry of
Education in Rome to arrange for personnel and school materials. The local Italian Consulates
technically employed the teachers, but the North Rhine-Westphalian state paid them. Those
wages, based on a special work contracts, included weekly remuneration of 8,- Deutsch Marks
per instructional hour. In addition, these teachers, who taught up to six classes a week, received

44 By March 1962, the Ministry of Education sent out general instructions to the four District Presidents in NRW.
Magliulo was to contact them individually (Consolato Generale d’Italia, Colonia to Kultusministerium des Landes
Nordrhein-Westfalen and Werner Schültz, “No. 04618, Pos. F-12/19,” March 26, 1962, 19, NW 141-111,
Landesarchiv NRW). Prof. Magliulo also mentions this concern in “IV. Die Betreuung der italienischen
Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik,” Gemeinsame Niederschrift, (January 27, 1962), B 304/3245/1, Bundesarchiv
Koblenz.

45 Kultusministerium NRW to Sekretariat, “Deutsch-italienisches Kulturabkommen,” October 31, 1961, NW 141-
111, Landesarchiv NRW.

46 Kultusminister NRW II C 3 (Bermann) to II A (im Haus), “Unterricht für Kinder von Ausländern.”
remuneration from North Rhine-Westphalia for costs incurred for travel between the different classes.  

By the end of 1962, the consular courses received general acclaim. Reports from the District Presidents and notes from the Italian Consulate in Cologne declared that the children’s guardians were happy about the Italian-language classes. Magliulo, in turn, praised the consular courses under development in North Rhine-Westphalia, claiming that they had met with success. Nonetheless, not all of the evaluations were positive. For example, the Chair of the Kultusministerkonferenz’s School Committee argued that while there were benefits, the classes also brought with them “considerable difficulties,” referring to the long lag times between requesting courses and actual implementation, among other issues.

Happy with the consular courses in North Rhine-Westphalia, the Italian Government wanted to reach more of its citizens across West Germany. During a 1962 meeting between the West German and Italian delegations, Magliulo forcefully requested that the other four Länder interested (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, and Saarland) send him information about the “Italian children” living in their borders. Yet, although the Italian government felt the instruction was important, the majority of the Länder governments did not. In 1962, there were simply not enough children with Italian citizenship in any of the Länder to make the issue a serious concern. Instead, the various West German bodies involved – from the Foreign Office to

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48 Ibid.

49 “IV. Die Betreuung der italienischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik.”


51 “IV. Die Betreuung der italienischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik.”
the Educational Administrations – viewed these courses as a positive acknowledgement of small
national minorities and a demonstration of “friendliness” to foreign states.\(^{52}\)

In some \textit{Länder}, like Baden-Württemberg, the small size of the group was one of but not
the only reason for delay. Only in January 1962, as North Rhine-Westphalia got its first Italian
consular courses off the ground, did Baden-Württemberg discuss opening similar courses with
the Italian Consulate in Stuttgart.\(^{53}\) The initial delays in starting the dialogue had been first on
account of the Italian Consul in Stuttgart’s illness, but then due to an unfavorable analysis from
Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education. In 1960, only 367 schoolchildren with Italian
citizenship, of different (and changing) ages and therefore class levels, lived across Baden-
Württemberg. Gerhard Storz, Christian Democratic Minister of Education from 1958-1964,\(^{54}\)
argued that that geographic and individual diversity meant the establishment of any centralized
measures for cultural education would lead to unnecessary complications, due to “new
difficulties and unexpected barriers.”\(^{55}\) According to Storz, the Italian population living in
Baden-Württemberg was too small to warrant any especial efforts.

\(^{52}\) \textit{Ibid.} It was actually not infrequent that the Federal Government had only limited knowledge of what was actually
happening with the schooling of “foreign children.” See, for example, \textit{Ständige Konferenz der Kultusministers der
Länder an den Vorsitzenden des Schulausschusses, “Unterrichtskurse für Kinder italienischer Arbeitnehmer,”
February 7, 1963, B 304/3245/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.}

\(^{53}\) See Sekretariat, “Deutsch-italienisches Kulturabkommen,” Vermerk (KMK, December 1, 1961), B 304/3245/1,
Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and “IV. Die Betreuung der italienischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik.” By January
1962, BW and Hesse had also begun talks with the relevant consulates (Bavaria and Saarland had not).

\(^{54}\) Dr. Gerhard Storz (1898-1983), a soldier in the First World War, was a German pedagogue, writer, and Christian
Democratic politician. He held the office of Minister of Culture in Baden-Württemberg between 1958 and 1964,
during which time he worked to reform the Gymnasium system and supported the founding of the Universities in
Konstanz and Ulm.

\(^{55}\) Largest group of 39 lived in Stuttgart (Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/682: Schriftliche Antwort des
Kultusministeriums Baden-Württemberg auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abd. Stefie Restle betr. Ausländerkinder in
For Storz, however, the bigger issue was the social role of schools and education. The Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education under Storz argued that it was responsible for enrolling all children into West German schools, not for providing cultural or foreign language support. Storz believed that these children lived in West Germany and at least some of them would remain in the country. Therefore, in his view, the school’s role for foreign residents was exactly the same as it was supposed to be for local children: to prepare them to act as Germans as long as they lived in Germany. Only with a full German education would they be able to participate in local society.

### Table 2.1: Schoolchildren in Public Schools in Baden-Württemberg by Citizenship, 1960-1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Children</th>
<th>Total foreign (% of Total)</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>886,572</td>
<td>1,208 (.14)</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>938,189</td>
<td>4,061 (.43)</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>1,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>963,181</td>
<td>5,000 (.52)</td>
<td>1,906</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>1,755</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet, within two years, as Table 2.1 demonstrates, the total number of “foreign schoolchildren” had more than tripled in Baden-Württemberg, changing the situation. The Berlin Wall had been erected and West German companies had started aggressively recruiting Southern European workers. With a (slowly) growing number of schoolchildren with Italian citizenship, multiple schools now enrolled more than a single “foreign schoolchild” in individual classes. At

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56 Ibid., 1140; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1962), 92.


58 Kultusministerium BW to Sekretariat der KMK, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” January 30, 1964, B 304/3244/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1966), 95.
the end of 1962, that transformation, together with continued pressure from the Italian Consulate in Stuttgart and the West German Foreign Office, led Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education to agree to the construction of a “central course” in greater Stuttgart, where 51 “children with Italian citizenship” attended local schools. In that central course for children with Italian citizenship, Italian teachers would instruct the children in their mother tongue as well as in history, geography, and German.\(^59\)

By June 1963, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education had formulated a set of general guidelines for its four Regional School Boards to follow when working with the Italian Consulates – or those of other foreign states – to set up new classes. Similar to the guidelines in North Rhine-Westphalia, the Ministry’s decree stipulated that foreign consulates could set up a class for any group of at least 15 children with foreign citizenship, to run five hours a week.\(^60\) In contrast to North Rhine-Westphalia, these classes were the responsibility of the Italian government. The Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education permitted them in addition to regular instruction, but declared it would not fund them. Initially Baden-Württemberg’s Education Administration provided no financial concessions, except to instruct the relevant schools to make schoolrooms available. Within the year, however, the Ministry of Education began providing small subsidies per class to the Consulate. In the 1960s, this difference between North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg was almost purely financial. Otherwise, the Italian government had almost complete control over the teachers, organization, and content of the courses.\(^61\) In the 1970s, however, that difference in funding would lead to different curricula

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\(^59\) Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/2524.” – this question was put forward by the SPD during the 3rd Wahlperiode.


\(^61\) By January 1964, Baden-Württemberg had not only began 20 classes for children with Italian citizenship, but also classes for children with Spanish and Greek citizenship (see Table 2.1 for numbers of schoolchildren) as well.
and operations as the Ländere – like North Rhine-Westphalia – funding the courses sought to take increasing control over them.

In 1963 and 1964, with regulations in place for cultural classes for Italian citizens, both North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg started permitting similar classes for the children of Greek and then Spanish citizens as well.62 Despite not being European Community Member State nationals (they joined the EC in 1981 and 1986 respectively), these two ethno-national groups’ countries of citizenship also had bilateral labor agreements with the West German government, making associated migrants’ care partly Ländere responsibility. Consequently, when the Spanish and Greek governments expressed interest in having something similar to these Italian consular classes for their growing migration populations (see Table 2.1), the Ländere governments agreed. With guidelines for cultural and language instruction already in place, North Rhine-Westphalia’s and Baden-Württemberg’s (and other Ländere’s) Education Administrations extended permission for “sending country” governments (countries with bilateral labor agreements) to establish consular classes.63

Yet, it should be noted that neither of the Ländere Education Administrations extended permission to create courses for all ethno-national minority groups. This privilege was only extended to those with a supposedly significant degree of cultural difference.64 In North Rhine-

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Westphalia, for example, the Education Administration continued to deny any need to construct supplemental cultural and language classes for schoolchildren with Dutch citizenship as the “maintenance of the Dutch language was not a priority.” According to the Ministry of Education, there were already a “considerable” number of Dutch children in North Rhine-Westphalian schools who mastered the German language quickly and consequently did not need special training.

The development of Italian language instruction in West Germany reflects the involved state actors’ divergent assumptions regarding the place of Italian citizens and Italian culture in West Germany. For the West German Education Administrations, the assumption that ethnic Italian children needed consular instruction when the Dutch did not reflected the West German perception of Italian children as a foreign other. Despite the Italian state’s inclusion in the European Community, the West German (and other Member States) often treated the Italian state and its citizens as inferior. Nonetheless, both in the European Community as well as in West Germany, the Italian state played an influential role in shaping policy and regulations.

Integration and Cultural Maintenance through Preparatory Classes (Vorklassen)

In the early 1960s, the Italian state wanted its citizens to maintain cultural connections, but its first goal was still for its citizens to attend West German schools and succeed. After the

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65 Kultusminister NRW II A to Referat II B 2 (im Haus), “II A 36.0/0 Nr. 1090/62,” June 27, 1962, NW 1223-269, Landesarchiv NRW. The Dutch Consulate began this discussion in house by requesting information on Compulsory Schooling for Dutch citizens in NRW. See Kultusministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen and Referat II B 2 to Referat II A 4 im Hause and Referat II C 6 im Hause, “II B 2 - 36 - 0/0 Nr. 67/62,” June 12, 1962, NW 1223-269, Landesarchiv NRW. Yet, in North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the government used its 1963 regulations to argue that the government only needed to act when there was a necessity (Kultusministerium Nordrhein-Westfalen and Tiebel to Regierungspräsidenten in Detmold, “Schulbesuch von Schülern, die nicht die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzen”).

66 Kultusminister NRW II A to Referat II B 2 (im Haus), “II A 36.0/0 Nr. 1090/62”; and Kultusministerium NRW, Referat II B 2 to Referat II A 4 and II C 6 im Hause, “36 - 0/0 Nr. 67/62,” June 12, 1962, NW 1223-296, Landesarchiv NRW. They did, however, restate that should the schoolchildren with Dutch nationality wish to attend West German public schools, then NRW’s Ministry of Education would foot that bill.
Berlin Wall went up in 1961, cutting off most of the East-West migration, West German companies began recruiting more aggressively from the South. As more workers with Italian citizenship set down roots in Germany, they began bringing their children into the country. The foreign populations in individual schools soared (see Table 2.1). Where previously, most migrant school children with Italian citizenship had arrived in ones and twos, making integration relatively easy, the larger groups of children now arriving had difficulties integrating into the school system. In order to alleviate these problems for its citizens, the Italian government advocated new school initiatives to prepare children with Italian citizenship for integration into the local school system.67

At the start of the 1960s, in line with international guidelines including Council of Europe recommendations, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education Administration assumed the state was responsible for both enabling and easing the enrollment of schoolchildren with foreign nationalities into West German schools. Yet, as the number of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship increased, multiple children in a classroom who could not speak German frequently caused disruption. It became clear that the Länder needed to take new steps to assist integration if the Education Administrations were to fulfill their obligations.68 Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education Administrations (as well as those of Hesse, Bavaria, and Lower Saxony, whose populations of “foreign schoolchildren” were also growing) had to decide what steps to take. The stance on cultural maintenance and integration


that the two Länderr Education Administrations’ in Baden Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia took would again influence the development of school initiatives in the other federal states.

Regarding the question of integration, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education addressed the issue early. Although in 1961 the Ministry still did not view special measures as necessary, the Ministry was already making plans for an “expected increase” in schoolchildren with non-German citizenship “due to new migration.”69 As Christian Democratic Minister of Education Gerhard Storz would outline in response to an inquiry from Social Democratic Member of Bundestag Stefie Restle,70 the Ministry had three special measures under consideration. For smaller schools with a limited number of “foreign children,” the Ministry anticipated providing – in addition to regular instruction – private instruction in the German language, which was to be paid for by the parents, their employers, or the Youth Office. For larger cities with particularly sizeable groups of “foreign children” of a single nationality, the Ministry proposed creating “centralized special classes” (later renamed preparatory classes). The final measure under consideration was the creation of special support classes for the schoolchildren of the largest ethnic groups. Storz envisioned these being run along the lines of the boarding institutions with support classes for migrant ethnic German youths.71

By 1962 the anticipated increase in labor migration was underway. As the number of children with non-German citizenship nearly quadrupled (rising to 4,061, see Table 2.1), some


70 Stefie Restle (born 1901- died 1978) was a member of the SPD from 1926 and worked alternately as a stenographer and accountant before serving as a Member of Bundestag (Abgeordnete) from 1950 until 1968 (from 1950-1952 as MP in the Württemberg-Baden Bundestag, from 1952-1953 in the Constituent Assembly, and from 1953-1968 in the Baden-Württemberg Bundestag). Her main focus was on social policy.

cities (i.e. Waiblingen near Stuttgart) began reporting that the dozens of newly arrived children could not be easily integrated. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education wanted to prevent its local schools and teachers from being overwhelmed. In response, the Ministry began implementing its planned measures. The third of the outlined initiatives (special support classes) would never become widespread, but the first (German language instruction) and second (preparatory classes) became standard practice through the subsequent decades, although not in the forms in which they were initially envisioned.

The first measure, “Extra Instruction in German,” was intended for “foreign children” who needed to master the German language in order to follow classroom instruction and eventually “earn a diploma in secondary schools.” Funded by the state Baden-Württemberg, this supplemental German language instruction was supposed to be for smaller groups (less than 20) of newly arrived children or for children who needed language support after enrollment in “German schools.” Furthermore, it was only to be made available for older schoolchildren. Based on past experience, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education took the stance that non-German citizens born in the country or starting in the first or second grade did not need extra support and should enroll directly in West German schools. These children were supposed to learn their German with “German schoolchildren” of their own age group.

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72 Kultusministerium BW, “Schulische und kulturelle Betreuung der Kinder der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer.” See also Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/2371: Kleine Anfrage der Abg. Krause und Gen. betr. Schulische Betreuung ausländischer Kinder und Jugendlicher.” In response to this growing number of “foreign children” and their limited German language knowledge upon school attendance, the SPD Members of Bundestag (MPs) asked the State Government several questions about how measures had changed since the previous inquiry in 1960/61. They inquired about costs, school attendance (particularly in regards to vocational schools).

Nonetheless, based on the reports of the four Regional School Boards, older children did need extra support. It was for larger groups of older “foreign children” that the second measure – preparatory classes – was designed. These classes were supposed to prepare newly arrived children for entrance into the West German school system. So as to avoid overwhelming Baden-Württemberg’s schools, groups of a minimum of 20 schoolchildren from a single language group living in a single (or a few) school district(s) were supposed to be gathered into their own classes. In these classes, teachers from the children’s country of origin taught two-thirds of the classroom instruction in their native tongue while a German teacher provided one-third of the children’s lessons in German. The goal was to provide the children with enough German language skills to enable them to participate in the West German classroom while preventing them from falling behind their age group.\textsuperscript{74} The Ministry of Education planned for children to attend the classes for up to one year and then transfer into a local public school (primary and lower secondary) class corresponding to their age and level.\textsuperscript{75} Neither Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education nor the Italian consulates considered higher levels of secondary schools (\textit{Realschulen} and \textit{Gymnasien}) at this juncture.

In contrast, although North-Rhine Westphalia’s Ministry of Education had jumped at the chance to develop consular courses, the Ministry waffled over special measures for integration. Yet, the Italian Consulate in Cologne and the six North Rhine-Westphalian District Presidents claimed that some “children with foreign citizenship” (Italian) were “not attending West German


schools” at all. Supposedly, some parents only enrolled their children in the Italian consular courses for the five-to-six hours of weekly Italian instruction. Furthermore the District Presidents (particularly the one in Düsseldorf) complained that those children who did attend public school had limited German language skills, hampering regular classroom instruction. Taken together, it appeared that something needed to be done.

In a September 1963 letter to North Rhine-Westphlian Christian Democrat and Minister of Education Paul Mikat, Roberto Cerchione, the consul general from the Italian Consulate in Cologne, suggested that the situation could be resolved through the “establishment of special preparatory classes.” Stressing that these measures were only for those cities where the entrance of several schoolchildren simultaneously made inclusion in the West German classroom difficult, Cerchione proposed two possible types of courses. The first would provide equal amounts of Italian and German language instruction. The second proposal was for the creation of a stepped Italian class, which would be taught increasingly in German until the children were able to participate in German classes. The Consulate recommended the Volksschule in Homberg (in North Rhineland), where 58 children with Italian citizenship lived, as a possible location for a trial run.

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76 Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf to Kultusminster NRW, “Beschulung der Kinder italienischer Gastarbeiter,” April 15, 1965, NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW.

77 Ibid.

78 Paul Mikat (born 1924, died 2011) was a CDU politician, professor of Civil Law, Canon Law, and Legal History at an der Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, and Minister of Culture in NRW from 1962-1966 (when the Social-Liberal coalition came to power). During his tenure, he tried to answer the pressing teacher shortage by bringing in teachers with shorter periods of training.

The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education did set up a trial stepped class in Homberg, but subsequent evaluations from the school and the responsible District President in Düsseldorf advised against further implementation. Not only were most of the “guest schoolchildren” with Italian citizenship still spread out (on 19 November 1963, the largest groups were in Oberhausen, with 143, Moers, with 129, and Düsseldorf, with 53), but, while the Italian group was by far the largest, children with Italian citizenship only made up 26 percent of the total number of foreigners. Furthermore, the District President in Düsseldorf stressed that of those, the percentage of guest pupils whose German language skills was insufficient for “successful participation in German elementary school was actually only 6.8%.”\(^8\) This, based on the opinion of the District President in Düsseldorf, was too small to warrant the creation of special courses.\(^8\)

The other District Presidents in North Rhine-Westphalia were similarly against the implementation of the Italian Consulate’s recommended stepped-classes. The District President in Münster admitted that there were technically enough schoolchildren in Gelsenkirchen (38 “Italian children”) for two such classes. Nonetheless, the District Presidents felt that the measures already in place for the children to receive instruction from an Italian teacher sufficed. The other four District Presidents (in Aachen, Arnsberg, Cologne, and Detmold) each acknowledged that there were some areas in which to establish preparatory classes. They reported, however, that the local educational authorities claimed that either families lived too far apart or parents wanted their children in normal German schools.\(^8\) In later discussions of the

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\(^8\) Underlining in original document.

\(^8\) Erbstösser, “Zusammenstellung der Berichte der Regierungspräsidenten über die Möglichkeit, eigenen Schulklassen (vorklassen) für italienische Kinder zu bilden,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf: Kultusminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, April 7, 1964), NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW.

\(^8\) Ibid.
North Rhine-Westphalian ministerial meetings, the Ministry of Education would add that there was insufficient space (schoolrooms) available and not enough Italian teachers with either sufficient comprehension of the German language or experience in single classroom schools.\(^8\)

Despite these unenthusiastic responses, the Italian legation continued to press for more special classes. On 6 February 1964 Dr. Domenico Boccetto, the Italian Consul for Cologne, and the Italian expert Magliulo met with representatives from North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education to discuss the issue. The Italian representatives argued that the five-hour language and cultural classes (49 of them in North Rhine-Westphalia as of February 1964) were only suitable for those children \textit{already} in the country. Newly arrived children, the Italian delegation claimed, needed extra support before they could fully participate in West German schools. These children reportedly “experienced psychological problems” due to their sudden transplantation into the West German classroom from Italy. According to the Italian representatives, this supposedly led all too often to a loss of desire to attend school and could promote unrest in the classroom. It was in order to alleviate these adjustment difficulties as well as to serve the “spirit of the European Community” that more intensive efforts, such as the stepped classes, were needed.\(^8\)

The Italian Legation’s new vision for stepped preparatory classes entailed classes for children between the ages of six to fourteen in North Rhine-Westphalian schools, to be given in Italian but based on the West German curriculum. From the third grade onward, the classes would also include some Italian history and geography as well as extra German language

\(^8\) Single classroom schools included all grade levels in one classroom, usually under the instruction of one or two teachers simultaneously. Erbstösser, “Probleme des Unterrichts für Kinder von ausländischen Gastarbeitern,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf: Kultusminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, April 7, 1964), NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW.

instruction, to be taught by West German teachers. As ever, once the children had acquired sufficient German language skills, they were then supposed to be transferred into the corresponding West German class.85

Despite the Italian Consul’s arguments, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education continued to oppose any additional Italian-heavy classes. The Ministry instead argued, based on its District Presidents’ reports, for direct enrollment in West German schools in the same class level that they had attended in Italy with supplementary consular classes. Unable to agree on the proper course of action, the Ministry of Culture in North Rhine-Westphalia and the Italian Legation decided to wait to implement any new initiatives until the Kultusministerkonferenz could produce standardized recommendations regarding the schooling of “guest worker children,” which it was scheduled to do shortly.86

The Kultusministerkonferenz’s School Committee began actively re-examining the question of the schooling of foreign children in early 1963, gathering information on what the individual West German Länder were already doing and examining the legal implications. The Italian Government had consistently appraised the KMK’s Secretariat of its concerns regarding the development of language and cultural courses since 1960. Only in early 1962, however, when the Federal Ministry of Labor passed the issue on to the KMK, did the group address the issue.87 At that point, Social Democrat Hans Reimers, Director of Education in Hamburg and


Chair of the KMK School Committee, was of the opinion that, as of 1963, the issue was going to become serious. Whereas before early 1963 most of the children (predominately from Italy, Spain, and Greece) were being absorbed easily into West German schools, he expected that there would be problems as the number of new arrivals increased in the following years.\textsuperscript{88} The issue needed to be examined before it developed into a problem.

The base on which the \textit{Kultusministerkonferenz}’s School Committee built their debate differed in three regards from the discussions of the early 1950s. First, the perception of the responsibility of the state in guaranteeing the right to education had changed. Where previously, a state had been responsible for its own citizens and for \textit{not preventing} the education of the children of foreign citizens, it was now assumed that a (host) state was accountable for ensuring their access and attendance.\textsuperscript{89} Furthermore, within the \textit{Länder} governments there was in this period of general education reform a series of increasingly within the school system for its own citizens, a question which increasingly bled over into debates about “foreigners.”\textsuperscript{90} Consequently, the KMK now approached the question of “instruction for the children of foreigners” with the idea that \textit{all} children (regardless of citizenship or relation to the EEC) should unquestionably come under the purview of compulsory schooling laws.\textsuperscript{91}

The second major difference was that the \textit{Kultusministerkonferenz}’s discussions (at all levels) now clearly took “foreigners” to imply “migrant workers” in contrast to displaced persons.

\textsuperscript{88} Hans Reimers to Sekretariat der KMK, “Sch. 151,” March 19, 1963, B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\textsuperscript{89} Baden-Württemberg had, as discussed below, actually already passed the law, although it would not come into force until the following school year.

\textsuperscript{90} For a brief look at the crisis of the West German education system during the 1960s, see Ralf Dahrendorf, “The Crisis in German Education,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary History} 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 139–47.

\textsuperscript{91} Sekretariat der KMK, “Unterricht für ausländische Kinder und Jugendliche in den Ländern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; hier: Bericht zur Vorbereitung der ad hoc-Konferenz 1974 der europäischen Erziehungsminister” (Bonn: KMK, May 24, 1973), B 304/3285, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
or homeless, stateless, or refugee children. By 1962, the number of “children of homeless foreigners” taking part in national supplementary instruction had sunk to 830. By 1964, discussions on national supplementary instruction had little connection to West Germany’s Nazi past, focusing now on the Länderei responsibility to “foreign children” generally or the “children of foreign workers” specifically. The Länderei Education Administrations continued to feel a responsibility for not forcing assimilation, in part because of that past although the new migrant groups in the country were relatively unconnected to the Third Reich.92 Yet, although debates about educational initiatives clearly focused on the newly arriving children of migrant workers, the wording of the official recommendations and general debates concerned “foreign schoolchildren.” The Länderei Education Administrations were unclear at this juncture as to whether their new recommendations should apply to all children, or just groups associated with so-called guest worker countries.

The third change evinced by the Kultusministerkonferenz’s debates was that trends within the European Economic Community were clearly leading toward emphasis on the equality of education access for all Member State nationals. It was this that the KMK’s School Committee claimed was the main impetus behind their eventual recommendation. “The development of the EEC into a common labor market,” the School Committee declared in their April 1963 meeting, was “leading a larger number of foreigners and their families [to stay] either temporarily or

92 Schulausschuß der KMK, “88. Sitzung des Schulausschusses am 6./7. 02. 1964 in Rendsburg; hier: 12. Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter: Beratung über eine Empfehlung,” Niederschrift (Rendsburg: KMK, February 7, 1964), B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. In many ways, the stance the KMK’s Education committee initially took regarding “the children of foreigners” mirrored its stance on “the children of homeless foreigners,” the schooling of whom it had been considering for over a decade. See, for example Schulausschuß der KMK, “17. Nationaler Ergänzungsunterricht für Kinder heimatloser Ausländer: Beteiligung der Länder an der Finanzierung,” Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die 75. Sitzung des Schulausschusses am 8./9. 2. 1962 in Bremen (Bremen: KMK, February 9, 1962), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. See earlier meetings about refugee and homeless children’s education in the 37th Meeting (1955) as well as the 73rd Meeting (1961) among others (See B 304 folder 2058 in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz).
permanently in the Federal Republic." If, like the stateless and homeless children from the 1950s, they were going to remain in West Germany, the children of migrant workers needed to be able to succeed in the West German education system. Consequently, the Länder Educational Authorities should see “it as their responsibility to enable the enrollment of the children of foreigners into German schools and to ease the process through appropriate measures.” According to the KMK’s School Committee this meant that the main task of the different Education Administrations was to promote integration. Furthermore, West Germany’s relationship with the European Economic Community made the consideration of the requests of Foreign Governments regarding the education of their citizens important.

Nonetheless, while the integration of “foreign children” into the West German school system was vital, some of the West German Education Administrations assumed – as did many families and most of the sending country governments – that a majority of the new foreign migrants were not permanent transplants. The Greek government was particularly adamant that its citizens would someday come “home.” Given these claims, the members of the Kultusministerkonferenz had to determine the extent to which different national minority or migrant (foreign) groups should be required to participate in a strictly (West) “German” education or be allowed to have replacement instruction in their mother tongue or attend national private schools. After all, if most of the children were indeed going to leave the country, their future access to employment and social inclusion in their “country of origin” was at stake.


94 Discussed in Chapter 3.
In order to resolve the uncertainty over temporary or permanent establishment in the country, the *Kultusministerkonferenz*’s eventual 1964 recommendations on the “Instruction for the Children of Foreigners” tried to bridge the two. The KMK’s School Committee had determined and the plenum agreed that both integration and cultural maintenance were absolutely necessary. To this end, the Committee recommended that the KMK adopt a set of dual goals. The first aim was the *full* integration of the foreign child into the German school within the framework of compulsory schooling. The second aim was the support of the foreign child in its native language.\(^95\)

Just as it had with displaced persons and refugees groups from the 1950s, the KMK outlined programs for both integration and cultural maintenance. To alleviate problems with initial enrollment for new migrants, the KMK outlined programs similar to Baden-Württemberg’s preparatory classes.\(^96\) In West German schools, children were also entitled to extra German instruction. On the other side, because it was important that the children “not be cut off from their cultural heritage” and be able to return if desired, the KMK recommended setting up classes like North Rhine-Westphalia’s Italian consular courses, although the *Länder* representatives disagreed over how much funding West German states should provide.\(^97\)

To the Italian Consulate in Cologne’s delight, the *Kultusministerkonferenz* members’ support of the idea of preparatory classes prompted North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of


\(^{97}\) Schulausschuß der KMK, “88. Sitzung des SchA; and TOP 12.” The preparatory classes had different names in different *Länder*. For the KMK, they were “*Vorklassen,*” “*Vorbereitungsklassen*” in Baden-Württemberg, and eventually “*Übergangsklassen*” in North Rhine-Westphalia. See Sekretariat der KMK, “*Vorbereitende Notizen für das deutsch-griechische Expertengespräch am 23. 3. 1976*” (Bonn: KMK, March 1976), B 93, Bd. 1154, PA AA.
Education to agree to develop local Italian classes in accordance with the suggested parameters (two-thirds Italian, one-third German). The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry specified that, in areas where there was a large number (at least 20) of Italian (and later Greek) “guest worker children,” preparatory classes should be arranged at the beginning of the school year. The classes were to be held in German schools under the leadership of the German principal and were to follow the local curriculum. The Italian General Consulate was entitled to select class teachers, who would teach two-thirds of the instruction. A German teacher was then to provide the remaining weekly hours of class time in the German language. Participation in these courses would be limited to one year, after which children were to be enrolled in the German class corresponding to their age.\footnote{98 Kultusministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen to Regierungspräsidenten, October 13, 1964, NW 388-16, Landesarchiv NRW. For the mention of the possibility of constructing such classes for “Greek guest worker children” (Kultusministerium NRW to Regierungspräsidenten, Erlaß, (October 20, 1964), NW 388-16, Landesarchiv NRW). For less that 20, then the Decree “Unterrichtung italienischer Gastarbeiterkinder” from 13 October 1964 (II C 36-6/1 Nr. 2995/64) remained valid.}

Although by the end of 1964 the general framework for the “guest worker classes,” extra German language instruction, and mother language instruction were clear in both North Rhine-Westphalia and in Baden-Württemberg, there were significant problems with implementation. The primary issue was that there was no stable, homogenous group of “children of foreign workers” to work with. Instead, the children who entered or left West Germany belonged to different age groups and had diverse backgrounds, as well as having disparate citizenships, nationalities, or mother tongues, all in addition to possessing unequal German language skills. These differences made the development of any single instructional class difficult, as any single group of 20 “Italian schoolchildren” usually had children with drastically different needs.
Even where appropriate groups existed, there were still other hurdles the Länder Education Administrations and the local Consulates had to face in order to get classes of any type underway.\(^9\) A lack of resources – from classroom space, to teachers, to school materials – not infrequently prevented approved measures from even getting off the ground. Schools in which preparatory classes were technically supposed to be established sometimes refused to allow the classes on the basis of limited classroom space. Severe teacher shortages led to multiple instances in which there was no “German teacher” for German language instruction. In such cases, the relevant “foreign teacher” (who was also overburdened) often tried to make up the difference, but frequently did not actually have the German language skills to do so.

The size of classes also quickly became an issue. The Länder Education Administration often denied permission to split classes until they had reached some 50 to 70 children, as there was often nowhere to put new classes and no teachers to instruct them. Furthermore, migrant workers and their families – particularly in these earlier years of the guest worker programs – often did not stay put. Foreign families moved frequently, meaning foreign schoolchildren enrolled in or left school in the middle of the year. This fluctuation made planning difficult, particularly in those Länder who had to budget for teachers, such as North Rhine-Westphalia. Just because local policy claimed foreign children were entitled to receive specific types of instructional support did not necessarily mean that there was money for it.

Learning materials presented yet another type of problem. The lack of textbooks did not actually prevent the classes from getting off the ground. Instead, missing materials meant that

\(^9\) For West Berlin, as of the end of 1963, when the KMK was gathering information on the numbers of children with foreign citizenship in West Germany and measures in place to educate them, there were 77 (15 Italian, 1 Spanish, 10 Greek, and 51 “other”) such children. Falling under compulsory schooling law, each of the listed children attended public school. “Because of [this] limited number of schoolchildren, there were no “measures for the school care of foreign children either planned or implemented.” Sekretariat der KMK to Mitglieder der KMK, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik,” Questionnaire Nr. 545/63, (June 7, 1963), B 304/3244, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
many children simply did not have access to textbooks or handouts. The availability of materials was further complicated by the fact that relevant school texts often simply did not yet exist. This was true, for example, for classes teaching children German as a foreign language. The few books designed for use in West Germany were usually for adults and not conceptualized with children in mind. For the lessons taught by the foreign teachers, the issue was often handled by importing the German language books in use in the teachers’ countries of origin. It was, however, considered a poor stop-gap and did not solve the issue for the courses taught by West German teachers.

The development of preparatory classes directly reflected the question of balancing integration with cultural maintenance. These classes, funded by the local Länder governments, were supposed to be about moving children into the West German school system. They were not intended to last more than one year and were supposed to facilitate German language acquisition while preventing children from missing any education. After that, however, the children were supposed to enroll directly in West German schools and, preferably, take an extra five hours of language instruction. That balance reflected the increasing assumption across the European states that the state was responsible for creating equality for all children by educating them within the local system. Nonetheless, while the different state governments in the European Community generally agreed that all children needed to have equality within the host country system, they did not necessarily agree on what that entailed.

Shaping Compulsory Schooling in the European Community and West Germany

Although the Italian legations praised the extension of consular instruction and preparatory classes in 1963, the Italian government continued to press for full inclusion under all
West German Länder compulsory schooling laws. After all, as the Italian Consulate in Cologne claimed, the extension of compulsory schooling was necessary in order to force schools to accept schoolchildren with Italian citizenship. Some school principals, the Consulate claimed, “neglected school children with limited German language knowledge.” Compelling school-age children to attend and compelling the schools to accept the children was vital to fulfilling their right to education and ensuring scholastic success.

The Italian Consulate’s requests were part of an ongoing debate over the meaning and necessity of compulsory education and integration in West Germany and the European Community between 1963 and 1965. Within the Länder, individual Education Administrations discussed the connection between the state, the individual, and a public education. At the European Community level, Member States debated whether or not education was supposed to be a purely sovereign issue, or if the connection between primary schooling and vocational training was strong enough to warrant European Community regulation. Among the West German states, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia were two of the only Länder that had not expanded compulsory schooling laws in the 1950s. Discussing the issue in the 1960’s, their Education Administrations’ arguments on the subject built on their consideration of

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101 Kultusministerium NRW to Regierungspräsidenten, “II C 36-6/1 Nr. 2483/83,” 83. For the stance of the Italian Consulate, see Consolato d’Italia, Colonia and Cerchione to Mikat and Kultusminister Nordrhein-Westfalen, “14768.”

102 “3. Sitzung Deutsch-Italienisch Gemischte Kommission”; and Consolato Generale d’Italia, Colonia to Kultusministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen and Schütz, “No. 04618, Pos. F-12/19,” 19. The Dutch Consulate in Cologne agreed, explicitly adding its voice to the Italian Government’s in 1962 with a letter stating that it was aware of Italian efforts regarding the inclusion of foreign nationals under compulsory schooling and it too wanted the same. See Kultusministerium NRW II B 2, “Schulpflicht für niederländische Kinder, die in der BR wohnen” (Kultusminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, January 15, 1963), NW 1223-296, Landesarchiv NRW; and Kultusminister NRW, “Vermerk” (Düsseldorf: Kultusministerium NRW, May 17, 1962), NW 1223-296, Landesarchiv NRW.
both consular instruction and preparatory classes. For the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education, compulsory education was about teaching culture and human rights. For Baden-Württemberg, compulsory schooling was an issue of state responsibility. Across each of these regional and supranational levels, however, the discussion centered on the perception of equality and rights.

Although appreciative of the Italian Consulate’s continued requests for school reform, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education’s representatives continued to balk at the idea of including all children with foreign citizenship between 1960 and 1965. Because the Ministry claimed a child’s right to education in order to develop their selfhood (and clear ethno-national identification), education was not only about success in the school system. Furthering that claim was the role of schooling in teaching minors to be good citizens. Part of the reason the NRW Ministry of Education had encouraged consular instruction was because “guest worker children” (including from Italy, Greece, and Spain) were not supposed to be – nor could they legally become – German. Furthermore, in contrast to displaced persons and refugees from the 1950s, “guest worker children” were possibly temporary residents who might return to their countries of citizenship. Hence, as foreign citizens, the right to developing selfhood needed to include national association, which meant access to consular classes. After all, NRW’s Christian Democratic government claimed that its goal in the care of “guest workers” was to ensure the “human dignity of their guests.”

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103 It would take legislation in Saarland until 1972 to officially alter its law. The Ministry of Education in Saarland argued – and would continue to argue for some years – that the state did not have enough schoolchildren with non-German citizenship to make changing its laws worthwhile. Saarland would, however, provide some mother language and cultural instruction and release a decree in 1966 on the “school instruction for children of foreign guest workers” in 1966 (Kultusministerium Saarland, “Erlaß betr. Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” Amtliches Schulblatt für das Saarland V/III-10-, no. 9 (June 13, 1966): 165–66).

104 Yet, whatever actions the state took, state support was only to be secondary to churches and charities’ assistance. Erbstösser, “Probleme des Unterrichts für Kinder von ausländischen Gastarbeitern.”
Nonetheless, in 1963 the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education acknowledged that it needed to change its compulsory schooling law to encompass all legal residents. Pressure from local Church groups as well as the Council of Europe over the concept of equality meant that continued exclusion contravened international norms. New developments within the European Community also meant that, at least for Italian – and Dutch – citizens, compulsory schooling would be extended regardless.105 For the following three years, however, the Ministry of Education would waffle over whether or not that inclusion under schooling laws meant exactly the same treatment as the ethno-national majority, or if there should be exceptions. Did equality permit difference?

The importance of the question of whether or not equality permitted difference stemmed in part from the fact that educators across West Germany had been pressing for education reform since the 1950s with increasing fervency. The concern became widespread in 1964 when the theologian and educationalist Georg Picht published an a book on the “Deutsche Bildungskatastrophe” (“German Education Catastrophe”). The book’s publication ignited public alarm over the issue and leading to a widespread outcry.106 Picht, an ethno-German protestant minister, claimed the West German system was inherently discriminatory and argued that the limited number of schoolchildren entering the higher levels of secondary school left the country

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105 Part of what the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry focused on was the concept of equality. The right of every child in North Rhine-Westphalia to education was laid-out in Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the state constitution. This provision realized the normalized right of the individual to the free development of their personality according to his/her individual physical and mental abilities as set out in Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the Bonn Basic Law. It further protected the selfhood of the individual regardless of his/her citizenship and forbade any assault on human dignity. The state constitution supposed every individual was equal whether or not s/he was a West German citizen. Hans Heckel and Paul Seipp, Schulrechtskunde: Ein Handbuch für Lehrer, Eltern und Schulverwaltung, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1960), 199.

without enough trained workers.\textsuperscript{107} The resulting public uproar over the “crisis in German education” meant that the \textit{Länder} governments were particularly concerned about making sure all relevant schoolchildren were ensured their right to equal opportunities.\textsuperscript{108}

Even before Picht’s 1964 book, the SPD and its youth organizations, the German Federation of the Trade Unions Unions, as well as West German Catholic and Protestant Church groups and charities had pushed for education equality regardless of citizenship or class. The main church groups (predominately Catholic and Protestant) and charities were among the first to provide and advocate for school initiatives for children with foreign citizenship. Through the late 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, as the number of children with non-German citizenship increased, various church and charity organizations took an active interest in these children’s welfare. The Catholic Church advocated for its parishioners’ children (from Italy, Spain, and Portugal), providing some language classes and cultural instruction, as well as some extra religious training. In 1961, the Evangelical Church in West Germany assumed some level of responsibility for children with Greek citizenship, as there were no large Protestant groups migrating to West Germany at the time. The Evangelical Church felt that Greek Orthodox

\textsuperscript{107} The Ambassador wrote about the “therewith associated national structure.” Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne and Alexis Kyrou to Kultusminister NRW, “Schulung der Kinder der griechischen Gastarbeiter,” July 30, 1964, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW.

\textsuperscript{108} Kultusminister NRW to Sekretariat der KMK, “Deutsch-griechisches Kulturabkommen,” October 21, 1964, NW 141-115, Landesarchiv NRW; Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne to Kultusminister NRW, “Notiz 3452/64,” November 10, 1964, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW; and Gerhard Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium des Innern, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der BRD,” May 29, 1964, B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. In a October 1964 the Greek Embassy’s Sozialrats Chryssochon would reiterate the Greek government’s wish for private schools in a the meeting with NRW’s Ministry of Education, the Inneren Mission, and Evangelische Hilfswerk Rheinland, the Greek Embassy’s Sozialrats Chryssochon explained, because “Greek guest workers in Germany would only be [in the FRG] for a short while – likely some two years.”
children had been ignored and sought to fill that gap, providing education programs for schoolchildren with Greek citizenship.\(^{109}\)

Alongside offering school programs, the church groups demanded equality of opportunity for all children, just like the state claimed should exist. Unlike the state, however, the churches did not limit the concept of “everyone” to citizens.\(^{110}\) From 1961 onward, already having taken up advocacy on behalf of Greek children, the Protestant Inner Mission began campaigning for the extension of compulsory schooling to all foreign ethno-national groups in addition to extra language instruction.\(^{111}\) The Inner Mission decried unequal treatment in the schools for Greek children in contrast to the children and youths of “Spätausiedler,” ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, who immediately received West German citizenship. Furthermore, “one could also not compare [the children of Greek citizens] with the children of stateless foreigners, because these too had the right to schooling.” According to the protestant welfare organization Innere Mission, North Rhine-Westphalia’s contemporary school law created a discrepancy between children’s care and denied them (foreign children) equal treatment, which the Innere Mission argued was insupportable.\(^{112}\)

Listening to the various church demands for equality of opportunity for all children and the Italian and Dutch legations’ requests regarding a right to education, the North Rhine-

\(^{109}\) Church Committee on Migrant Workers in Western Europe, Presseveröffentlichung (Geneva, October 29, 1965), ADW, HGSt 2990. See also ADW, HGSt 3020 and 3933.

\(^{110}\) Discussed in Chapter 1.

\(^{111}\) Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Kirchliches Aussenamt and Gerhard Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium and Pietsch, “9609/62,” August 31, 1962, B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Schulausschuß der KMK, “88. Sitzung des SchA; and TOP 12.”

\(^{112}\) Welsch, “Unterricht für griechische Kinder,” Vermerk II E 1. 36-6/1 Nr. 2609/61 (Kultusministerium NRW, September 25, 1961), NW 141-106, Landesarchiv NRW.
Westphalian Ministry of Education began reexamining its compulsory schooling law. In a thirteen-page report on the issue in 1963, more than half the document was taken up with considerations of “rights” (human and individual). According to the Ministry of Education, the state government needed to decide if (a) North Rhine-Westphalia should maintain its current regulations, under which only specific groups of “foreigners” fell under compulsory schooling law. The state government also had to, (b), decide if it was legally appropriate and permissible for all children, irrespective of their citizenship, to fall under the compulsory schooling law. The answer to the question of legal permissibility was to be determined by an examination of whether domestic or international law could be read as prohibiting the extension of compulsory education to “foreign children.”

The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education cited international standards of human rights to argue that all children – even the foreign and stateless children – had a right to education. The Education Administration argued that the state’s continued use of the Nazi compulsory schooling law (Reichschulpflichtgesetz, 1938) contravened these basic human rights. As the National Socialists had not been concerned with the dignity of man, they had not recognized general civil rights and had not seen any reason to align school laws therewith. According to the Ministry of Education, it was therefore understandable that the former regime

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114 Kultusministerium NRW II B 2, “Entwurf eines Landesschulpflichtgesetzes.”

had excluded foreigners and stateless persons from compulsory education. What was not acceptable was for the current government to continue using Nazi laws. To be in line with basic human rights treaties, agreements, and conventions (i.e. the “European Convention on Establishment” from 13 December 1955), the North Rhine-Westphalia’s government needed to change the state’s school law.

While the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education, under Christian Democrat control until 1966, acknowledged that the fulfillment of human rights dictated that all children be included under the compulsory schooling law, the Ministry still saw a problem with the extension of the law due to what it viewed as the purpose of public schooling. The main point of a state-funded education, according to both the NRW government and the members of the Council of Europe, was to make it possible for a democratic regime to function. In a democratic country, the point of a compulsory education was to teach children how to be citizens. What then was the place of a foreign citizen in a local school? If foreign nationals attended school in West Germany, they would learn how to be (West) German and not how to be a citizen of their own country.

In contrast to North Rhine-Westphalia’s focus on the right to education and the fulfillment of personhood, Baden-Württemberg’s Christian Democratic Minister of Education Gerhard Storz made his official case for changing compulsory schooling law to the other Ministers and Bundestag in 1963 on the basis of state responsibility. He argued that the government’s role, as defined by the state’s legal code, included the maintenance of social order.

116 Kultusministerium NRW II B 2, “Entwurf eines Landesschulpflichtgesetzes.” They also mentioned Kindergarten at the meeting. As I am focusing on public schools, I will not do a full examination of preschools. See Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulische Betreuung der Gastarbeiterkinder im Landes NW,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf: Kultusminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, July 1, 1963), NW 141-114, Landesarchiv NRW.

and the requirement to uphold local law. Storz had already directed his staff and schools throughout Baden-Württemberg to treat all foreign nationals as if they were already under the compulsory schooling law.\textsuperscript{118} Now, however, the sharp increase in foreign schoolchildren would threaten Baden-Württemberg’s social order unless they were to attend school. Hence, local school law needed to cover the “children of guest workers.” He further informed the Ministers that, in upholding that new law, the Ministry of Education would be responsible for providing school programs – like the preparatory classes – enabling all children to attend and effectively participate in Baden-Württemberg’s public schools.\textsuperscript{119}

Some of Baden-Württemberg’s Members of Bundestag expressed reservations to Storz’s suggested revisions. One of their concerns centered on the fact that a portion of the migrant youths arriving in West Germany had already completed compulsory schooling in their countries of origin. Some officials suggested that this could mean that these children did not need to fall under Baden-Württemberg’s compulsory schooling laws and therefore did not need to fill seats in the already-overfull regular classrooms. Baden-Württemberg had a pressing teacher shortage, after all, and if these children did not need to add to the existent teachers’ burdens, why send them to school? Storz replied that some of the main countries of origin (i.e. Greece and Turkey) had only four or five years of compulsory schooling, meaning that many youths with school certificates were only eleven or twelve. West German child labor laws dictated that these children and youths could not be employed until the age of fourteen. Excluding them from schools would leave them in the streets before their fourteenth birthdays. Compulsory schooling

\textsuperscript{118}The exception being that the schools were not to dispatch truancy officers or compel the attendance of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship.

\textsuperscript{119}On 15 January 1963, a talk took place with representatives of the Ministry of Education at the recommendation of the Ministry of Labor regarding “the question of the schooling and cultural care of children of foreign workers.”
was therefore particularly necessary in order to prevent them from becoming criminals. Presented with these concerns, the dissenting Members of Bundestag agreed that compulsory schooling to the children of all foreign workers was clearly necessary.120

On 21 April 1964 Baden-Württemberg’s Landtag officially changed its schooling law, which came into effect on 1 April 1965. As the Ministry of Education had planned since 1963, the new compulsory schooling law’s § 41 extended general compulsory schooling to all children and youths that had their residence, place of employment, or school in the state.121 It further declared that compulsory schooling required the regular attendance of instruction and other school activities and stipulated that schooling meant attendance in a “German school.” As laid out in the West German Basic Law, only the school regulatory authorities could permit exceptions.122

Throughout the discussions, first Storz and then Wilhelm Hahn (CDU), who served as Minister of Education between 1964 and 1978,123 stressed the importance of compulsory schooling law because of the relationship between the state and the individual. Both men emphasized the ongoing residence of migrant children in the Federal Republic. Regardless of whether they would someday return to their countries of citizenship, the children needed to be


123 Dr. Wilhelm Hahn (1909-1996) was a Lutheran Theologian and CDU Politician appointed by Kiesinger as Minister of Culture in 1964. He served until 1978.
able to operate in West German society while in the country. The state, in turn, had a responsibility for ensuring that the children were able to function in West German society. Toward that end, as soon as the new law came into force, Hahn sent out a decree to the Regional School Boards expanding on what the law was supposed to mean in practice. The decree specified that small groups, as well as first and second year schoolchildren, were to be enrolled directly into regular classes. In contrast, for large numbers of foreign citizens from a single foreign nationality, local schools were to set up preparatory classes, as well as extra German language instruction and consular courses. In contrast, although specifying that in Baden-Württemberg there was no legal right for foreign language and cultural instruction, the Ministry under Hahn acknowledged that the children had a right to it if a non-governmental party footed the bill. In order to ensure the provision of the Italian (or Greek, Spanish, and Turkish) language and cultural instruction the Ministry of Education also agreed to continue providing limited financial support specifically for personnel and travel costs.

The European Economic Community took an arguably similar stance to Baden-Württemberg. The EEC declared in July 1961 during a meeting in Bonn that the Six Member States, “inspired” by their desire to “confirm their spiritual values and political traditions,” had

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125 Kultusministerium BW to Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg (Stuttgart), Nordbaden (Karlsruhe), Südbaden (Freiburg), Südwesten (Tübingen), “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch von Ausländerkindern, (insonderheit) von Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” Erlaß U II 2111/29, (April 14, 1965), EA 8/201 Bü 672, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

126 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Kultusministerium BW, “Einschulung ausländischer Kinder in die Volkschule.” Ministerial Piazollo from the Ministry of Education also noted that the next meeting of the KMK would be addressing these questions, particularly regarding the conclusion of further cultural agreements. Based on the newly created Titel 605 in Chapter 04 02 of the Education Administrations, the Ministry of Education agreed not only to assist with the costs for 1964, but also reimburse some monies for the 1963 classes.
decided that they needed “to strengthen their political, economic, social, and cultural ties.” On that basis, these states announced that their relationship “must extend beyond the political frame in its narrow sense.” Henceforth, their cooperation would include “the fields of education, culture, and research, where it [would] be guaranteed by periodical meetings of the Ministers concerned.” The EEC would nonetheless not make a clear step into the realm of education until 1964.

The gap in the European Community’s efforts was partly on account of unclear jurisdiction. Nonetheless, The Member States used the Treaty of Rome’s Article 128, which stipulated the European Community Member States work toward the development of a common vocational training policy, to begin discussing compulsory schooling. The European Community Member States debated the issue in 1961 and 1962, considering stipulations in their Regulations and Directives laying out the importance of compulsory schooling for all Member State nationals, but the wording vanished from the final texts. Only after the European

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127 Underlining in original text. The six included Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands.

128 Declaration released after their 18 July 1961 meeting in Bonn. See Committee of Senior Officials, Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the EEC Countries Issued after Their Meeting in Bonn on 18th July 1961, Information Document, Third Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, September 27, 1961), Box 2428, Council of Europe. Underlining in original document.

129 In accordance with Article 128 of the Treaty of Rome stipulating that “the Council shall, acting upon a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, lay down general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development both of the national economies and of the common market.” See Nigel Johnson Principal Lecturer in Law, “From Vocational Training to Education: The Development of a No-Frontiers Education Policy for Europe?,” Education and the Law 11, no. 3 (September 1, 1999): 200.

Community developed policies on vocational training in 1963 claiming the training could only be undertaking with a solid “basis of a general education” could the Member States draw a clear jurisdictional right. In their 1964 Council Regulation 38/64 on the free movement of workers, the six Member States included declared that the children of Member State nationals who lived and worked in another Member State fell under the same rules and conditions as the host country nationals regarding participation in general instruction as they already did for vocational education. The Regulation further specified that the Member States were responsible for providing measures to enable these children to take part in said instruction.

Despite the supposed inevitability of the issue in 1963, only in November 1965 did the North Rhine-Westphalian CDU government change its compulsory schooling laws to include children with foreign citizenship. The new law came into effect in December 1966, in the same month when the newly elected Länder government under the SPD Prime Minister Heinz Kühn came into power (1966-1978). The new school law required all resident children and youths,

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which the Ministry of Education explicitly noted included the “children of guest workers,” attend West German public schools. In addition, however, the Ministry of Education supplemented the law with a decree guaranteeing the children supplemental mother tongue and cultural instruction (when there was a large enough group). CDU Minister of Education Paul Mikat, in office until December 1966, claimed that the changes in the law and relevant regulations permitted a compromise “between on the one side the legitimate wishes of the foreigners for the protection of their way of life, on the other side the support of equal educational chances for all children, and finally the necessities regarding German school regulations.”

For the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education in 1965/66 it was important to in no way imply that all children were the same even if they were now equal in the eyes of the law (unregistered and paperless schoolchildren excluded). On that basis, the Ministry declared that it did not intend to distance the children from their ethnicity or their nationality. The Ministry announced that instruction in German classrooms should “under no circumstances integrate [foreign schoolchildren] into the German people, but encourage the development of a friendship between the peoples.” The compulsory schooling law and associated regulations were supposed to enable the children to maintain “a connection to their home and people.” To maintain this link, the “guest worker children” were to continue to receive the extra mother tongue and cultural

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134 Kultusministerium NRW and III A 2 to IV A, “Beschulung der Gastarbeiterkinder,” November 5, 1965, 2, Landesarchiv NRW; and Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulbesuch der Gastarbeiterkinder,” Erlaß (Düsseldorf: Kultusministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, December 16, 1966), NW 388-13, Landesarchiv NRW. The law encompassed all the various rights that German school children and parents had, including participation in free access to school materials, school leaving certificates, transference into a higher level secondary school, active and passive choices (Wahlrecht) for the parents in the selection of class- and school tutelage.


instruction under the parameters initially established in 1962 for children with Italian citizenship.\textsuperscript{137}

While approaching the issue from different directions, both Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia ended up with similar compulsory school laws and education initiatives for the children of foreigners or foreign guest workers. As of 1966, both Länder supported extra German language instruction, preschool, and native language and cultural courses. Yet despite more commonalities in their programs than differences, disparities in approaches to the relevant questions and outlook would eventually lead to significant divergences between their handlings of children with non-German citizenship. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education’s claim that its role was to ensure compulsory education meant that the state was willing to fund preparatory courses and German language instruction. The funding that the state did provide for consular instruction was paid to the relevant consulate, and then only as a subsidy. In contrast, The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education’s insistence that the children were inherently foreign and hence needed to learn to be foreign meant that the state was more willing to fund programs for cultural instruction.

These different approaches to compulsory schooling demonstrate changing views of the foreign citizen and the role of the host country. The various European supra-national organizations and state level institutions agreed that all children should be educated – and that the host country state had a responsibility for providing that education. Agreeing on that as a standard meant in this early period of educational reform in all Western European countries that compulsory education was no longer solely about learning citizenship, but also associated with equality of opportunity and entry into the labor market. The various government bodies involved

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
in the discussion between 1960 and 1966 thus agreed that compulsory education was paramount, particularly in a society, which claimed that all members had a right to equality of opportunity. What that education was supposed to entail continued to be a source of some contention.

It should be pointed out that during the joint German-Italian Commission Meeting in Rome on 25-27 May 1966, for that brief moment, it could reasonably be said that the wishes of the Italian side regarding the care of Italian guest workers had been realized.138 With the firm inclusion of the children of Italian workers under a compulsory schooling law (even if North Rhine-Westphalia and Saarland would take more time to officially change their laws) and native-language instruction expanded across West Germany, the Italian government’s requests regarding the schooling of their citizens would shift toward requests toward expansion of services, closer monitoring, kindergartens, and vocational education, as discussed in the next chapter.139 The following years would be about expanding and improving services, but the overall goals – integration and general cultural maintenance – would not change.140

Conclusion

Across Western and Central Europe in the early 1960s – as demonstrated by the recommendations coming out of the Council of Europe and the European Community – there


139 For a list of the Italian government’s requests from the end of 1965, see Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung to KMK, “Deutsch-italienische Vereinbarung über die Anwergung und Vermittlung italienischer Arbeitnehmer nach der BRD; hier: Niederschrift über die Tagung der deutsch-italischenen Gemischten Kommission vom 18. bis 25. 10. 1965 in Rom,” December 20, 1965, B 304/3245/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

140 Oberschulamt Nordbaden to Kultusministerium BW, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch von Ausländerkinder, insbesondere von Kindern ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” December 10, 1965, EA 3/609 Bü 68, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. The European Community also established European Schools in Karlsruhe (and other places). In 1965, there were around 110 schoolchildren with Italian citizenship attending. Alongside German instruction, the children received eight hours of instruction in Italian weekly. For a discussion of the early development of the Europa-Schulen in West Germany, see PA AA, B 93, Bd. 79.
was a sense that all children needed to be educated within the host country system regardless of their citizenship. That general agreement did not mean, however, that the state governments involved agreed on what the state’s responsibility was toward children with foreign citizenship or what the place of those children in the public school system was.

In West Germany, the situation was complicated by the Education Administrations’ assumption that the child’s place in the school system differed based on their reason for entering the country, their ethnicity, and their citizenship status, as well as their connection to the European Community. Migrants had been coming to West Germany for jobs since the state’s establishment, as evidenced by the minority in the country with Dutch citizenship. Those migrants, however, arrived as spontaneous migrants, neither fleeing oppression nor invited through bilateral labor agreements. As such, the West German states did not have any special responsibility toward them. In contrast, the children of so-called guest workers, including Italian citizens, were predominately in the country because of German action, meaning they were entitled to some measure of state support.

Added to that, schoolchildren with Italian citizenship were European Community Member State nationals. It was unclear, however, in the 1960s how much that legal difference should matter for the new migrants arriving as migrant workers. By the mid-1960s, European Community membership legally included a right to residence and inclusion under a compulsory schooling law. Yet West Germany responded by expanding that compulsory schooling to all children of migrant workers. Nonetheless, what would prove important both in the early 1960s and later years was the right to residence. That right influenced both the Italian state and migrants with Italian citizens’ expectations regarding their permanency of residence and hence the importance of integration.
State support based on the school initiatives developed in the 1950s for stateless and homeless children could include both integration and cultural maintenance. Although looking back at those programs, the Ländere Education Administrations treated new foreigners as a new and distinct category. To handle their education, ensure their rights, and extend a friendly hand to the foreign government in question, the Länder governments developed new policies and programs explicitly with Italian citizens in mind. Yet, categorized as so-called guest workers, the Länner felt they had to include all children with citizenship to one of the states with bilateral labor agreements with West Germany under those new policies. The other guest-worker state governments, however, were not European Community Member States in the 1960s. That difference meant those other governments often had different rights than Italian citizens, changing their migrants’ situation in West Germany and the countries of origin’s goals.

Between 1962 and 1965, more than 240,000 migrants with Greek citizenship moved to West Germany.¹ The Greek government argued that each one of those individuals would return to Greece. Given that in the same period, over 110,000 Greek citizens migrated out of Germany, mostly back to Greece, return migration was a concern. On account of the expectation of return and in order ensure those migrant citizens’ equality of opportunity, the Greek government requested permission to build national private schools in West Germany. Without a Greek education, the Greek government argued, these children would be doomed to illiteracy as well as unskilled or semi-skilled labor in Greece. The children’s short residence in West Germany was not supposed to ruin their future chances in Greece.²

¹ The majority of these individuals migrated from Greece, but not all of them. In addition, these statistics do not account for circular or pendular migration. Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1965), 73; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1966), 77; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1967), 73; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1968), 64.

In contrast, during the same period, the Turkish government stressed the importance of its emigrants’ integration into the West German school system. The Turkish government also felt that many of its citizens (over 180,000 arriving and in West Germany and 46,000 leaving between 1962 and 1965) would probably return to Turkey. The state was, however, battling 65 percent illiteracy and could only offer uneven access to secondary schools or vocational training in Turkey. For its emigrants in West Germany, therefore, the Turkish government argued their best chances for future opportunity were to be found in the West German public schools and vocational programs. With that education in hand, any young Turkish citizens remaining in West Germany or returning to Turkey would have the possibility of finding semi-skilled or skilled labor.

In West Germany, where thousands of Greek and Turkish workers found jobs in the 1960s and 1970s, most Länderei Education Administrations had developed their policies for foreigners based predominately on the Italian state’s requests and with an eye toward European Community development and equality goals. Emphasizing integration, the Länderei Education Administrations stressed attendance in a specifically German school. The children of so-called


5 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ankara, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1964 Türkei” (Ankara: Auswärtige Amt, April 7, 1965), 9, B 97, Bd. 168, PA AA.

6 It should be noted that despite compulsory schooling requirements including some vocational training, schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship only infrequently entered the vocational tracks because of missing qualifications from primary and lower secondary schooling (Hans Huber, “Berufliches Bildungswesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in *Das europäische Bildungswesen im Vergleich: Türkei*, ed. Wolfgang Eltrich (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Akad. für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, 1984), 88–92. For more on Turkish children in the German school system from the Turkish perspective, see Hamdi Binay, “Türkische Kinder im deutschen Bildungssystem aus türkischer Sicht,” in *Das europäische Bildungswesen im Vergleich: Türkei*, ed. Wolfgang Eltrich (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Akad. für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, 1984), 118–37.
guest workers were welcome to take consular instruction based on the Italian model, but they needed to attend public schools in order to someday participate in the West German workforce.

Each of these state governments’ Education Administrations increasingly stressed the vocational aspect of equality of opportunity in a period where most of the educational reform across Europe was driven by the booming labor market.\(^7\) The Council of Europe’s member states’ representatives, including those from West Germany, Greece, and Turkey, agreed that education in the nineteenth century had focused on reading, writing and arithmetic. In contrast, “European Countries today have realized that they must give all children of all social classes the chance of pursuing studies that will provide them with a general and vocational education which as a whole will ensure full and free individual development and supply the knowledge necessary for the practice of a vocation.”\(^8\) The Council of Europe’s Member States argued that, in an increasingly technologized society, schooling was vital in order to obtain first vocational training and then skilled labor. In order for all children to have the equality of opportunity that a democratic, post-class society was supposed to offer, they had to have the same opportunities in school.\(^9\)

Yet, the Greek government was not wrong. Many labor migrants expected, in theory, to return to their countries of origin. Depending on the relationship between the host country and country of citizenship, that schooling in the host country could prove worthless or incredibly

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\(^7\) During the 1960s, the Council of Europe pressed the host countries to admit migrants and foreign citizens into the public school system on the same basis as host country nationals in order to avoid discrimination. The West German, Turkish, and Greek states were all members.

\(^8\) Committee of Senior Officials and Jean Thomas, “Educational Problems Common to European Countries,” Collective Report ESC/HF (61) 3, Third Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, October 16, 1961), Box 2428, Council of Europe.

valuable. Depending on the situation in the country of origin, compulsory schooling in West Germany could, in theory, prove detrimental to a child’s opportunities upon return to their countries of citizenship. In such a case, what kind of education did the children need? Each government actor involved answered that question differently, based on local circumstances and personal assumptions about the children’s futures.

**A Question of Return Migration and Greek National Education in Teaching Identity**

In October 1964 the Greek Embassy’s Social Council laid out the Greek government’s desire for private schools in a meeting with North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as the *Diakonisches Werk*, a protestant welfare organization, in the Rhineland. The Greek government had begun a long campaign for national private schools in 1962, when only around five hundred school-age children with Greek citizenship were in the country.¹⁰ Now, as the number of schoolchildren reached into the thousands, the Embassy’s Social Council argued that the issue was “urgent” (see Table 3.1). On behalf of the Greek government, he explained that the Kingdom of Greece’s government wanted these schools because “Greek guest workers in Germany w[ould] only remain [in the Federal Republic] for a short time – likely two years.” He claimed that through attendance in Greek schools (grades one through five) in Germany, the Greek government aimed to maintain the connection between these children and their home, which he told the German delegation Greek parents also wanted.¹¹

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¹⁰ Sekretariat der KMK to Mitglieder der KMK, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik,” Questionnaire Nr. 545/63, (June 7, 1963), B 304/3244, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

¹¹ In addition, in the national private Greek schools, children would have received additional German language instruction in order to give the children “an important advantage in their futures.” Kultusminister NRW to Sekretariat der KMK, “Deutsch-griechisches Kulturabkommen,” October 21, 1964, NW 141-115, Landesarchiv NRW.
The Greek government was only one of several governments concerned about reintegration and the question of identity and national schooling. Of the eight states that signed bilateral labor agreements with West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, only Italy was a European Community member state. Technically, the bilateral agreements were designed for temporary labor, with the expectation that workers would return to their countries of origin after around two years. Without the right to movement for European Community member states, these “Third Country nationals” (non-European Community) initially had to renew their contracts to stay longer. Consequently, many of these governments expected a majority of their citizens to someday return. When they did, in the early 1960s, these governments did not want to have school-age citizens who were either illiterate in their mother tongue or who added to the rate of unemployment by being unable to participate in “home” systems. At the least, after all, many jobs, particularly skilled labor, necessitated a minimum of lingual fluency and literacy.

With thousands of workers migrating abroad during the 1960s these concerns over qualifications and literacy became pressing, particularly for individuals moving to countries like West Germany. On the European continent, the majority of migrant workers and their families moved from Southern and South-Eastern Europe and North Africa, where there was a surplus of manpower. Coming from diverse locations, they moved to find jobs in Central and Western European countries with rapidly growing economies. Having lost its colonies after the First

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13 For a discussion of West German foreign policy during the 1960s, see Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge* (Munich: Beck, 2001), 206–223.

World War, West Germany did not have access to labor from former or current colonies, making the country a primary destination for non-colonial labor migration.\textsuperscript{15} That relationship meant, however, that in contrast to some colonial migration, there was no prior relationship between the school systems. Each state involved – both origin and destination – had a distinct school system built on decades or centuries of tradition.\textsuperscript{16} With different emphases in the curricula, language requirements, and length of compulsory schooling, the systems were frequently incompatible, making movement for children between multiple countries challenging. As the Greek Social Council pointed out in West Germany, a child’s education in one country often did not count in another.

For the Greek government, the desire for private national schools was premised on the expectation of return, but also on the state’s vested interest in its citizens’ future employment and national identification. As Dimitrios Zachos discussed, as with many countries, in Greece there was a “critical relationship between citizenship, ethnicity, and education.”\textsuperscript{17} For the Greek state, equality of opportunity for all its citizens was measured against those citizens in Greece. The Greek government’s education system was centralized, with the Greek government setting the national curriculum and publishing schoolbooks. In consequence, all Greek children theoretically


learned the same material. Operating in the Greek work force necessitated specific qualifications
and expected certain knowledge learned in the schools.  

Table 3.1: Schoolchildren with Greek Citizenship enrolled in Primary and Lower Level
Secondary Schools, 1963-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bund</th>
<th>NRW</th>
<th>BW</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>Bavaria</th>
<th>Hesse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4,051</td>
<td>1,338</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5,802</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>7,570</td>
<td>2,804</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>10,965</td>
<td>4,129</td>
<td>2,997</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>1,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>16,702</td>
<td>6,028</td>
<td>5,087</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>2,293</td>
<td>1,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>25,471</td>
<td>9,126</td>
<td>7,317</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>3,447</td>
<td>2,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>34,109</td>
<td>12,624</td>
<td>9,921</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>4,713</td>
<td>3,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>36,747</td>
<td>14,160</td>
<td>10,673</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>4,140</td>
<td>3,678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, for the Greek government and many members of Greek society, “Greekness”
was tied to language, religion, and tradition. As the Greek Ambassador wrote the North Rhine-
Westphalian Minister of Culture in 1964 on behalf of the Greek government, he paid “attention
to the Greek children, concerned about the maintenance of their mother language, religion, and

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18 For a brief discussion of the system in the mid-1960s, see IBE, “Greece,” in International Yearbook of Education
(Geneva: IBE, 1966), 149–53. For an overview of the system’s development, see Anna Frangoudaki, “Greek
Education in the Twentieth Century: A Long Process Towards a Democratic European Society,” in Greece in the

19 Volksschulen/Grund- und Hauptschulen. KMK, “Der Schulbesuch ausländischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 1965/66 - 1972/73: Allgemeinbildende Schulen” (Bundeseinheitlichen Schulstatistik, 1974), 7–9, 12, 14, 18.
The numbers for 1963 are approximate. In part because schooling was not compulsory, the Education
Administrations in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia were unsure as to how many children with
foreign citizenships of any sort they had enrolled in their public schools, much less in their territories generally.
Sekretariat der KMK to Mitglieder der KMK, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischen Arbeitnehmer in der
Bundesrepublik,” 63; and Schulausschuß der KMK, “87. Sitzung des Schulausschusses; hier: 11. Unterricht für
Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” Protokoll (KMK, December 17, 1963), NW 388-13, Landesarchiv NRW.

Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, August 7, 1962), Box 2430, Council
of Europe.
their traditions as well as their connection to the [Greek] national structure.”

According to the Greek government, children with Greek citizenship needed to learn each one of those points in order to be fulfilled as individuals and to successfully integrate upon return. As such, the children needed more than the paltry five hours of weekly instruction that consular instruction (based on the Italian model) offered.

Although several governments directly associated national identity with public school attendance in the 1960s the Greek government’s emphasis on the importance of ethno-national identification surpassed that of many other nation-state governments. The Greek state had a long history of encouraging its nationals’ association with the state and supporting their migration to Greece. From the early development of the new state in the nineteenth century, the government promoted a Greek identity for its citizens and for ethnic Greeks abroad. Initially, the idea of Greekness was intimately tied to Greek Orthodoxy. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne

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21 Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne and Alexis Kyrou to Kultusminister NRW, “Schulung der Kinder der griechischen Gastarbeiter,” July 30, 1964, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW.


23 The French system was also centralized. In association, schooling was central in teaching French citizens Frenchness. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 85–113; and Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 112–140.


emphasized that understanding of Greekness when it legitimized the compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange primarily on the basis of religious affiliation. Increasingly, however, the Greek language became central to the state’s understanding of Greekness, in part due to territorial expansion and an influx of minorities. From the 1920s onward, schooling played an important role in assimilation, particularly regarding language. By the 1960s, both language and religion were vital for understanding Greekness, even if language was beginning to supersede religion. That direct tie between religion, language, and citizenship meant that the issue of literacy and cultural capital was more pressing for the Greek state than for many others.

Greek religious instruction raised issues, but was relatively simple to solve. The West German Education Administrations did not have a problem with Christian religious instruction, particularly in religious teachings stemming from a clear hierarchy. The West German public school system included religious instruction, but that instruction usually meant either Protestant or Catholic instruction directed by Church leaders. Where the Italian and West German states argued that schoolchildren with Italian citizenship could receive sufficient religious instruction alongside ethnic German schoolchildren, most Greek citizens identified as Greek Orthodox, instruction in which the German system did not offer. As a central component of “Greekness,”

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29 Some of the Länder began offering “ethnics” instruction instead of explicitly religious instruction. In additional, families could, in theory, opt out of religious instruction entirely. For schoolchildren with Italian citizenship, religion was not a significant concern as the majority was Catholic (in 1961, 44.1 percent of West German residents belonged to the Catholic Church, 50.5 to the Evangelical Church in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1968), 42)). For more on the relationship between the German Protestant and Catholic churches and the West German school system, see Karl Dienst, “Die Rolle der evangelischen und katholischen Kirche in der Bildungspolitik zwischen 1945 und 1990,” in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furck (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 110–28.
the Greek state argued its citizens needed access. Although following different paths, some lengthening after school instruction while others permitted Greek Orthodox instruction in the schools, the Länder Education Administrations agreed to the Greek state’s demands and permitted Greek Orthodox instruction in those areas with enough schoolchildren to warrant classes.30

Theoretically, the Länder Education Administrations could appreciate the Greek government’s desire to promote national identification. Although the concept of “Germanness” was less defined, there was a sense that, to be German, children needed to have German paternity, perhaps speak the language, and perhaps identify as Catholic or Protestant. Yet none of those individual components, except ancestry, were actually required in the 1960s.31 In part because of the cultural wars from the late nineteenth century, cultural heritage was supposed to be transmitted through the appropriate church, if relevant, and a child’s parents and guardians.32 Hence, while public schools taught some of the central components of Germannness, particularly in regards to citizenship, there was supposedly a barrier between the state and culture.33


33 For more on the development of the public school system and relationship to the German state, see Marjorie Lamberti, The Politics of Education: Teachers and School Reform in Weimar Germany (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002).
The value the Greek government placed on its citizens’ education abroad reflected its importance in Greece. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Greek government aggressively battled illiteracy through the expansion of schools and education programs for adults and children alike. The state’s efforts between 1951 and 1964 resulted in a decline in illiteracy rates from 24 to 15 percent.\footnote{The leftist Papandreou government also pushed curricular reform and changes to the structure of the vocational and university systems.} The leftist Minister of Education and later Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou’s further attempts to implement significant school reforms in the early 1960s were less successful.\footnote{Andreas M. Kazamias, “The ‘Renaissance’ of Greek Secondary Education,” \textit{Comparative Education Review} 3, no. 3 (February 1, 1960): 22–27. Georgios Papandreou (Γεώργιος Παπανδρέου, 1888-1968), Greek politician, served three times as Prime Minister of Greece (1944-1945, 1963, and 1964-65). In 1961, he founded the Center Union party (EK), with various liberal and dissatisfied conservative politicians. The party would split in 1965, although exist nominally until 1977. During his long political career, he served in multiple ministries, including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Education. In the 1920s, he reformed the Greek education system and, in the 1950s and 1960s, tried to continue those reforms (Harris M. Lentz, \textit{Heads of States and Governments Since 1945} (New York: Routledge, 2014), 1452–1453).} Despite his efforts, financial limitations, conservative resistance, and broader political problems, including the Royal Coup (\textit{Apostasia}) in July 1965 and Papandreou’s forced resignation as Prime Minister, prevented the majority of his proposed changes.\footnote{Papandreou resigned in 1965 during the Royal Coup (a.k.a. the July Evens or the Apostasia) and King Constantine II appointed Stephanos Stephanopoulos (Greek: Στέφανος Στεφανόπουλος, born 1898, died 1982) from the Center Union as Prime Minister. See Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1965,” Cultural Report (Athens: Auswärtige Amt, March 1, 1966), 2, B 97, Bd. 117, PA AA; and Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1966” (Athens: Auswärtige Amt, February 15, 1967), 1–3, B 97, Bd. 117, PA AA.} Even the reforms that initially appeared to move forward were slowly dropped, one after another. Among them, a program for new schoolbooks fell through, as the needed millions of drachma were unavailable. The new conservative government under Prime Minister Georgios Athanasiadis-Novas, appointed by King Constantine, did temporarily extend compulsory schooling to nine years, three of which were to be filled at a secondary school on par with a \textit{Gymnasium} and
limited the number of years at Lyzeum to three.\(^{37}\) However, illiteracy among adults continued to hover around 15 percent, and the growing population in the cities made expanding secondary and vocational schools increasingly difficult. The new military government established in 1967 rolled back the remaining reforms, ending plans to further spread secondary schools.\(^{38}\)

Papandreou’s planned reforms included a blueprint for altering the entire framework of Greek literacy. In Greece, literacy was a complicated and controversial issue, which was part of the reason the Greek state argued for permission to build national private schools in West Germany. Not only was the Greek writing system unique, but the scholastic written language (Katharevousa) differed in form from the modern Greek (Demotic Greek, or dimotiki) spoken in homes. Katharevousa, a ‘puristic’ language taught in schools, was a compromise between ancient and modern Greek developed in the nineteenth century and used in official and various formal purposes. Katharevousa was rarely spoken, but any schooling beyond compulsory education required fluency (as did legal courts).\(^{39}\) Part of the leftist Papandreou government’s desired reforms was to use Demotic Greek instead of Katharevousa in the schools.\(^{40}\) The failure of the reforms, however, meant that to be counted literate in Greek, schoolchildren living in

\(^{37}\) Wallace Graves and Cosmas P. Stivaktas, “Public Secondary Education in Greece,” The High School Journal 45, no. 8 (May 1, 1962): 329–34; and reas M. Kazamias, “Plans and Policies for Educational Reform in Greece,” Comparative Education Review 11, no. 3 (October 1, 1967): 331–47. Georgios Athanasiadis-Novas (1893-1987), lawyer and member of the Center Union (EK), was appointed Prime Minister by King Constantine in 1965. He tried to form a government, but failed to get a vote of confidence and was replaced the same year. He would be among the politicians involved in brokering the end of the Military Junta in 1974 (Lentz, Heads of States and Governments Since 1945, 333–334).

\(^{38}\) Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1967” (Athens: Auswärtige Amt, February 22, 1968), 2, PA AA.

\(^{39}\) Regierungspräsident Köln to Kultusministerium NRW, “Sprachkurse für Kinder griechischer Nationalität innerhalb des Regierungsbezirks Köln,” November 23, 1962, NW 141-114, Landesarchiv NRW. Citing that agreement, the Regierungsbezirk set the recommended weekly hours at five and told the Greek Consulate that it would pay the teachers the Greek Ministry of Education’s selected (with approval).

\(^{40}\) Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1965,” 2; Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1966,” 1–3 Mackridge, Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976, 315–317.
Greece or West Germany had to learn *Katharevousa*. In effect, a child in West Germany needed to learn Demotic, *Katharevousa*, and German in primary school. In higher levels of secondary school they would have had to add English and possibly a second foreign language as well.

Because of the importance of identity and literacy, in 1962 the Greek government only briefly accepted consular instruction as sufficient for its citizens in West Germany. That year, across West Germany, local Greek consulates requested and received permission to set up classes similar to the Italian consular courses. Within the year, however, those same consulates pressed for permission to build private schools. Ideally, the Greek government wanted to establish Greek full-day classes wherever there were 20 to 30 children living in proximity. Instruction would have been in Greek, with a few additional hours of German per week in order to provide them with an “important advantage for their futures in Greece.” The Greek Government was willing to fund the classes, although the Greek Embassy in Bonn suggested that the West German governments provide the necessary schoolrooms as well as select and pay the teachers for German language instruction.

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43 Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne and Kyrou to Kultusminister NRW, “Schulung der Kinder der griechischen Gastarbeiter.”

In contrast, for the Italian government, five hours of weekly consular instruction (usually) sufficed, in part because the promotion of “Italianness” was not a vital component of schooling in Italy. In Italy, most people identified according to their regional and familial ties. As historian Roberto Sala and others have shown, the Italian state’s promotion of “Italianness” was largely a project to encourage continued identification among citizens abroad. With state-funded radio programs and afterschool classes in places like West Germany emphasizing Italian identification, only after arrival did many Italian citizens began to identify as Italians (if even then).45 Furthermore, with local governments in charge of schooling, the specific cultural and social capital to be inculcated in schoolchildren was not specified by the state, leading to greater flexibility in education content.46

With schools under central control, Greek identity markers were not the sole concern of the Greek state regarding its citizens’ education. The amount of time spent in specific subjects mattered. Where children in West German learned different material depending on which of the Länder they resided in, all children in Greece theoretically learned the same material. For a child living in West Germany, the Greek government felt their education in primary school was too limited. The West German school week, with half-day instruction, averaged 25 hours a week (different every year), while the Greek school week averaged thirty.47 In addition, the Greek

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A school week featured an average of three hours a week more science and math than the German. That difference, added to different content in language, history, and religion meant that a primary-school-age child returning to Greece from West Germany did not have the necessary knowledge in any subject to participate in public school classes. In consequence, while the West German government did not recognize the Greek diploma or qualifications, the Greek government refused to recognize even a single year of schooling in West Germany.

The Greek government continually reiterated its requests to establish Greek schools in the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, in 1963/64, there were very few places in West Germany where Greek national schools actually made sense. Even in North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg, where more than 50 percent of the schoolchildren with Greek citizenship lived in the mid-1960s (see Table 3.1), families with Greek citizenship were too spread out. The Greek Embassy recommended busing in some cities inorder to overcome the prohibitive distances involved, but even then only a handful of classes would have been possible. The Greek government conceded that, in locations where Greek classes could not be set up, the introduction of a few weekly hours of Greek mother tongue and cultural instruction by a Greek teacher would be “an adequate alternative solution.” Wherever there were sufficient numbers, however, the Greek government insisted that private national schools were necessary.

Impact of Greek ‘All-Day’ School on Teachers’, Students’ and Parents’ Lives” (Ph.D., Brunel University (United Kingdom), 2014).


49 Ibid., Annex II.

50 Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium des Innern, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der BRD”; and Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne to Kultusminister NRW, “Notiz 3452/64,” 64. The Greek Ambassador was also quick to agree that in areas where the construction of independent Greek schools was not possible, the introduction of a few weekly hours of Greek instruction by a Greek teacher would be a sufficient alternative solution.
As the decade progressed, however, the number of schoolchildren in West Germany with Greek citizenship rose to more than 15 thousand (see Table 3.1). Often living in concentrated communities, there were soon several locations where Greek national private schools were theoretically possible. With more than half of its citizens in Germany living in two of the states without compulsory schooling laws covering its nationals (until 1965 in Baden-Württemberg and 1966 in North Rhine-Westphalia), the Greek government took matters into its own hands and tried to provide unofficial access to Greek instruction for its citizens.

For those states, like the Greek, that expected their citizens to someday return, worries over the exact educational attainment of their citizens were legitimate. The entire concept of return migration necessitated return integration, which the West German and European Community’s perception of education equality did not support. The West German understanding of equal opportunities specifically meant within West Germany – as it was understood during the Italian and Dutch fight for inclusion.\(^\text{51}\) The two governments expected the majority of their citizens to remain in West Germany, meaning that the children needed to be able to operate in the German workforce. For other groups, however, if they took return seriously, the question of how much they should actually integrate became pressing. Because the Greek government was one of the first to seriously raise this issue in West Germany, its requests would shape early debates on return migration among West German Education Administrations.

**Considering National Private Schools within the Länder Education Administrations**

The West German Länder governments, while taking the Greek legates’ concerns seriously, almost all argued that promoting equal opportunities meant enrolling in local public schools. For the West German Ministries, this meant, at bare minimum, the ability to enter the

\(^{51}\) Discussed in Chapter 2.
school (primary and lower secondary) system and eventually to attend vocational training. For both the Greek government and the Länder, the permissibility of private schools was tied into the question of compulsory schooling and the meaning of equality of opportunity. Furthermore, the construction of non-state schools was strictly regulated, as discussed in Chapter 1, by Article 7 of the Basic Law. The Greek state might argue that its school age citizens needed a specifically Greek education, but by the mid-1960s the Länder Education Administrations viewed themselves as committed to ensuring equality of opportunity in the Federal Republic, which did not necessarily permit difference.

The general situation regarding schools in West Germany made the extension of “equality” particularly germane. When the widespread concern over the “crisis of the German education system” became a firestorm in 1964, private schools did not fit into the Länder governments’ envisioned reforms for wider inclusion in part because of the connections between the public secondary school system and vocational training. Children in private schools, including Greek, would not necessarily have the correct training to attend vocational school, which would defeat one of the core goals of compulsory schooling and the envisioned educational reforms. Yet, one of the other primary goals of education was to teach citizenship, which is to say how to be German. Hence, as in these West German officials’ minds, “guest worker children” were clearly not (West) “German children” because of their citizenship status, they therefore needed different treatment at some level. Just not necessarily a complete, private education.

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52 As discussed in Chapter 2. See Georg Picht, Die deutsche Bildungskatastrophe: Analyse und Dokumentation. (Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1964); and Ralf Dahrendorf, “The Crisis in German Education,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 139–47.
Challenging that assumption, however, was a decrease in emphasis on teaching national identity as the European Community and Council of Europe member states stressed equality of opportunity across Western, South, and South Eastern Europe. This trend that was reflected in the agenda of the educational reforms started all over West Europe. Within a democratic structure and human rights regime, all children needed equal chances. Toward that end, most of the western European states began extensive school reforms in the 1950s that would extend through the 1960s and 1970s. Included in those reforms were extensive building projects by which many states tried to make education more accessible. For the extension of compulsory schooling and a more accessible higher education for broader social strata, after all, new school buildings and more teachers were necessary. The West German Länder were among those Education Administrations that were extensively reforming their systems, increasing the years of compulsory schooling, extensing early childhood education, and trying to make access equitable (see Chart 4.1).


54 Wohlgemuth, “Supplementary General Education, Preliminary Comparative Study,” Third Conference of European Ministers of Education (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, September 27, 1962), 8, 2432, Council of Europe. The Italian constitution as of 27 December 1947 (promulgated on that day) provided for the extension of compulsory schooling beyond fourteen years of age. The Italian system was broken into five years of primary school and three years of either middle school or vocational education. The Yugoslav government (as of 1969) also had eight years of compulsory education (ages seven to 15). The Spanish government also changed its laws in 1970 to extend to the fourteen years of age, was previously twelve (John McNair, “Education in Spain, 1970-80: The Years of Compulsory Schooling,” *Comparative Education* 17, no. 1 (March 1, 1981): 47–57; and Aharon F. Kleinberger, “A Comparative Analysis of Compulsory Education Laws,” *Comparative Education* 11, no. 3 (October 1, 1975): 219–30).

55 As discussed in Chapter 2.
Among the school reforms, most of the Länder Education Administrations expanded the length of compulsory schooling from eight years to nine or ten. Furthermore, most built more higher level secondary schools and increased the number of schoolchildren who attended. In many Länder, with the notable exceptions of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, the number of total schoolchildren in West Germany enrolling in Gymnasium reached 30 percent. The percent of children in the lowest level of the secondary school, the Volksschule, declined from 80 percent in 1952/63 to 50 percent in 1969/70 (and 30 percent in 1995/96). Partly in consequence, lower secondary school, which had previously been viewed as the standard course of study, developed

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a reputation for taking the left-over students. Over the 1970s and 1980s, those schools (lower secondary) would increasingly become known among the public as schools for foreigners.\(^57\)

Within this atmosphere of emphasis on access for all, the West German \textit{Länder} Educational Administrations had to decide how much difference in education was either desired or tolerable while at least acknowledging the foreign governments and ethno-national minority groups’ demands. Hardly a major political or social issue for the West German public in the mid-1960s, the schooling of non-nationals was primarily a concern for government officials: the local school administrations, the \textit{Länder} Ministers of Education, the West German Federal Foreign Missions, and Foreign Consulates (as well as the Foreign Missions of the major religious institutions). For these groups, this was a question of practical considerations, international reputations, and bi-lateral relationships, as well as the right to an education.

By 1965, these different entities already held divergent views on the issue of private national schools. The Greek government had been pushing each of the relevant \textit{Länder} (particularly Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and North Rhine-Westphalia) for permission to build private schools as well as submitting generalized requests to the West German Foreign Office. With each application, the Greek legates pressed for their goals separately, trying to convince one government to grant what another refused.\(^58\)

The West German Foreign Office enthusiastically supported the idea of foreign national schools in West Germany. The Federal Republic had a large network of German schools spread

\(^57\) Ibid.

\(^58\) Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium des Innern, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der BRD”; and Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne to Kultusminister NRW, “Notiz 3452/64,” 64. The discussions between the Greek Consulate in Berlin and the West Berlin Senator for Education reached this conclusion as well, deciding that in the 1960s, Greek schools did not make sense in West Berlin (Senator für Schulwesen to Leonidas Evangelidis, Griechische Militärmission, and Gerd Effler, “Unterricht für griechische Kinder,” September 8, 1971, B Rep 002 23582, Landesarchiv Berlin).
across the world. These schools were funded and maintained partly in order to spread German culture, but also to provide larger communities of Germans abroad (usually the children of diplomats or workers associated with international projects) with access to the German education system. While these schools often taught predominately local or international non-German pupils, schoolchildren with West German citizenship were by and large expected to eventually return to West Germany and participate in higher levels of secondary and/or post-secondary schooling. Depending on the country hosting the schools, teachers sent from West Germany tried to adhere as closely to West German curricula as possible. The Foreign Office viewed the Greek and Turkish governments' requests for national schools in light of its negotiations over the West German schools in those countries: the more leeway the Länder granted foreign schools in the Federal Republic, the more control the Federal Republic would likely have over German schools in Greece and Turkey.59

The Länder Education Administrations’ were less enthusiastic. Their approaches to national schools were informed by their specific interpretations of equality of opportunity and degree equivalency. Article 7 of the Basic Law did permit private schools, as did the majority of the individual Länder’s school laws. But (as discussed) these laws stipulated that, in order to create a private school, a special pedagogical interest which necessitated such had to exist.60 The Länder Education Administrations were concerned that differences between the West German system and other national school systems would mean that private schools following the country


60 Ralf Dahrendorf, “The Crisis in German Education,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 139–47.
of origins’ systems would effectively limit a child’s choices in West Germany to unskilled or semi-skilled labor. Hence, based on most of the Länder’s understandings of equality of opportunity, private national schools would decidedly not promote equality. Furthermore, the Education Administrations mostly held that, as the “foreign children” would at least remain long enough to enter the labor market, they could not have a special pedagogical interest beyond a few hours of extra instruction. After long debates, most of the Länder Education Administrations argued that these schoolchildren did not need private schools.

The Bavarian Ministry of Education was the one significant exception. It viewed the new migrants' status as comparable to the “homeless and stateless foreigners” (i.e. displaced persons and exiles from the Second World War).61 In the 1950s, the Bavarian Ministry of Education had permitted the construction of a small number of private national schools as well as excused ethno-national minority groups from compulsory education in German public schools.62 As all foreign groups were entitled to the same treatment, the Ministry recognized all migrant groups’ special pedagogical need for private schools. To maintain equivalence across citizenship and national lines, the Bavarian government approved national schools in Munich and Nuremberg for children with Greek citizenship. The Ministry further supported these schools by providing up to 20 percent of the teachers' wages.63


63 Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus to Königreich Griechenland Griechische Kommission Abreitsamt Munich, “Besuch der Volksschule für Kinder griechischer Gastarbeiter,” IV 30 381, (May 17, 1963), MK 62244, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; and Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus,
The Berlin Senate for Education also technically approved private schools, but the point was moot in 1965 as the state did not host enough foreigner children to make this approval relevant. Berlin's compulsory schooling law permitted private schools and enabled the state government to provide financial backing. In practice, however, the Greek Consulate informed the Senate for Education that extra language and cultural classes were sufficient due to the low number (ten in 1963, eighty-nine in 1967, see Table 3.1) and wide separation of children with Greek citizenship. Arguably, even bussing would have produced too small a class. The Senator for Education was prepared to consider a Turkish school along similar lines, but the Turkish government did not pursue the issue. It should be noted, however, that the state already hosted private French and American schools with predominately international pupils, often the children of business men and women or the American and French armed forces.

In contrast, as the governments in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia wrote and then passed their new compulsory schooling laws (in 1965 and 1966 respectively), their Education Administrations explicitly tried to discourage the development of national private schools. Yet before those laws passed, neither state could require foreign children’s


Berlin’s Private School Law (Privatschulgesetzes (PrSchG)) Article 1 from 13 May 1954 (GVBl. S. 286) dictated that it was permissible for both natural and legal entities to open and operate private schools. Based on Article 8 Paragraph 1, money could be made available from the state of Berlin based on application from approved Private Schools.


Senator für Schulwesen Berlin to Evangelidis, Griechische Militärmision, and Effler, “Unterricht für griechische Kinder.”
attendance in West German schools and could not legally prevent them from attending other
schools. With the Länder governments unable to prevent their creation or discourage enrollment,
a few unofficial “Greek schools” sprang up with Greek state support in both Länder. A portion –
it is unclear how many – of the rising numbers of children with Greek citizenship simply
attended these classes, sidestepping German schools entirely.

Although Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education Administrations
technically disapproved of private national schools, they provided the unofficial Greek schools
with varying degrees of support. By 1964 there were nine Greek school classes in North Rhine-
Westphalia. Without clear instructions from their Ministry of Education, the local school offices
handled them differently. Three of the local school offices financed three private Greek schools
in full for 20 hours of weekly instruction. Another school office supported twelve hours of
private Greek instruction and the rest (five) were given support from the Ministry of Education
for six to nine instructional hours. The Greek Embassy planned to establish a further four classes
in the following months, for which the Embassy hoped for financial support. Increasingly,
however, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education used established guidelines for the
five hours of after school consular instruction as an excuse for not supporting national private
classes.69

68 Vorsitzender des Schulausschusses to Kultusministerium BW, “Schulische Betreuung der ausländischen
GastarbeiterKinder (Sch. 66),” January 29, 1965, B 304/3244/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Schulausschuß der
KMK, “Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die Sitzung (Nr. 96) des SchA der KMK am 18/19. 12. 1965 in Koblenz;
hier: Schulische Betreuung von Kindern ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” Vermerk (Koblenz: KMK, February 18, 1965),
B 304/3244/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

69 Welsch, “Errichtung einer Schule für griechische Kinder in Düsseldorf,” Vermerk II C 33-61/0 Nr. 772/63
(Düsseldorf: Kultusministerium NRW, March 20, 1963), NW 141-114, Landesarchiv NRW. In the note, Welsch
lays out how the Greek Ministry of Education – through its consulates – requested permission in 1963 to run its own
school in Düsseldorf. An internal memo in the NRW Ministry of Education responded saying that they are
committed to encouraging the children of Greek parents to learn the German language as quickly as possible and
further have 5 hours weekly instruction in their mother language. After school instruction would increasingly
become the excuse on why the Länder did not need to permit actual private schools.
Baden-Württemberg’s Education Administration attempted to end its unofficial Greek schools after passing its new 1965 compulsory schooling law. Arguing that most children would have a long residency in West Germany, the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education declared that all children with their residence in Baden-Württemberg needed to attend German schools unless they received individual exceptions through written application to the Ministry. After the new law came into power, the Ministry declared that any Greek classes that overran the approved five hours for extra mother tongue instruction were required to transform into one-year preparatory classes and prepare the children to attend West German schools. Yet, once they were in regular instruction, the Ministry officials worried about too much instruction. To prevent the children from being overwhelmed by any extra class time, the Baden-Württemberg Education Administration recommended that schools cut normal instruction as much as possible in those subjects in which the children also received instruction in their mother tongue.

Yet, legally, the Baden-Württemberg Education Administration’s distaste for private schools did not necessarily negate the possibility of purely Greek classes through so-called “supplementary schools.” In English (and for the Greek government), these schools would count

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71 Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne and Kyrou to Kultusminister NRW, “Schulung der Kinder der griechischen Gastarbeiter.”


73 Kultusministerium BW and Nothardt, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch 1965.” BW did briefly consider permitting Greek schools and sent a letter to the other Länder Education Administrations to inquire into their practices. See Kultusministerium BW and Gantert to KMK and Sekretariat, “Schulpflicht von Kindern ausländischer Gastarbeiter Kinder (B 4940/24),” January 12, 1965, B 304/3244/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
as private or charter, as they followed their own curriculum. In the German system, however, there were some important distinctions. In the German system, “private schools” charged pupils tuition and/or received support from the state while following a different curriculum.

Supplementary schools, in contrast, were organized and funded entirely by the responsible party running the school. In addition, the West German Basic Law stipulated that supplementary schools did not require special state approval, although school-age children did need authorization from the relevant West German authorities to attend. Nonetheless, depending on local Länder school laws, supplementary schools usually came under from some form of government oversight and faced certain restrictions.

In 1966, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education (and that of Hesse, which hosted a Lithuanian Gymnasium in Frankfurt am Main) indicated that it might be willing to permit supplementary schools for the children of migrant workers with certain restrictions. That tentative permission came in response to several Greek parent groups and the local Greek Consulates’ concerns about the removal of the Greek schools. The parents argued that they would be returning and wanted their children to be prepared to reintegrate into their home school system. The Ministry of Education qualified their permission, however, establishing a set of

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required parameters for those foreign states, like Greece, interested in applying. First and foremost, any national supplementary schools had to run a minimum of eight (later nine) years, even if the foreign state’s school system only ran five or six (like the Greek). The school curriculum also had to offer at least five hours of German language instruction a week, and include the educational goals needed for eventual attendance in a West German vocational school. Otherwise, the responsible party (i.e. the Greek Government) could use its own curriculum under its own oversight.\(^{77}\)

Even as Baden-Württemberg’s Education Administration outright rejected Greek private schools and then made exceptions between 1964 and 1965, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education hesitated over making any decision, just as it did regarding preparation classes.\(^{78}\) Part of the Ministry’s indecision stemmed from its intention to eventually extend compulsory schooling to all children regardless of citizenship. For the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education, this meant placing children with foreign citizenship under the same laws and guaranteeing them the same rights and options as those children with West German citizenship. On the other hand, just as in Baden-Württemberg, regular public schools and the Greek Legations reported that the children’s parents and guardians wanted Greek foreign schools.\(^{79}\) With more than 1,300 schoolchildren with Greek citizenship in North Rhine-


\(^{78}\) Discussed in Chapter 2.

\(^{79}\) Greek foreign schools were those in which Greek teachers taught based on the Greek curriculum.
Westphalian schools, the number of requests was substantial (see Table 3.1). Unsure of its course, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education again announced that its decisions would follow the KMK’s recommendations.\(^{80}\)

**Table 3.2: Total Schoolchildren with Foreign Citizenship in Public Primary and Lower Secondary Education, 1965-1972\(^{81}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BW</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>NRW</th>
<th>Bavaria</th>
<th>Hesse</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8,793</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>10,574</td>
<td>4,662</td>
<td>3,767</td>
<td>32,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>13,178</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>12,595</td>
<td>6,317</td>
<td>5,581</td>
<td>46,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>16,528</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>14,494</td>
<td>6,730</td>
<td>6,868</td>
<td>53,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>20,646</td>
<td>1,702</td>
<td>22,535</td>
<td>9,958</td>
<td>8,849</td>
<td>76,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>27,815</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>30,360</td>
<td>14,163</td>
<td>11,213</td>
<td>102,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>36,559</td>
<td>5,652</td>
<td>39,806</td>
<td>18,825</td>
<td>15,550</td>
<td>137,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>46,419</td>
<td>8,098</td>
<td>58,276</td>
<td>24,909</td>
<td>20,065</td>
<td>185,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>53,101</td>
<td>10,646</td>
<td>70,802</td>
<td>29,093</td>
<td>24,091</td>
<td>222,235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1965, the *Kultusministerkonferenz* and its Education Committee approached the issue of private national schools for the children of migrant workers in terms of equality of opportunity and fulfillment of the right to education. From the get-go, the General Secretary of the *Kultusministerkonferenz*, Social Democrat Hans Reimers from the Ministry of Education in Hamburg, set the tone of the discussions with the argument that children with non-German citizenship were best served by West German schools, with extra instruction in their own language and other relevant subjects.\(^{82}\) He argued it was imperative for all children to receive a

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\(^{80}\) Kultusminister NRW II C 3 (Bermann) to II A (im Haus), “Unterricht für Kinder von Ausländern,” March 25, 1965. This was further complicated by the fact that there would be no possibility for NRW’s school administrations to oversee these schools as the relevant authorities did not have the language skills necessary.


\(^{82}\) Hans to Gerhard Stratenwerth, “Sondersitzung der Referenten für die schulische Betreuung der ausländischen Gastarbeiterkinder, 31. 03. 1965 (Sch. 159),” April 9, 1965, B 304/2058/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Dr. H. Reimers also served as the West German representative to the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education and hosted the second meeting in Hamburg in 1961.
West German education in order to open doors to vocational possibilities. Furthermore, according to Reimers, institutions like one-class schools would almost certainly have lower success rates than West German classes.\textsuperscript{83} Hence, to ensure equality of opportunity, children with non-German citizenship needed to be in local schools and not in private national schools or spending too much time in supplemental schools.\textsuperscript{84}

The \textit{Kultusministerkonferenz} would take its Education Committee's advice that “founding national schools” was “inadvisable.”\textsuperscript{85} Using the argument that schools following curricula other than the approved West German program of study would not lead to the qualifications necessary for vocational training, the KMK recommended permitting only supplementary schools, if anything. In order to discourage foreign states from putting together such classes, the KMK also recommended against providing any West German financial support, personnel, or rooms. Possible exceptions were built into the final recommendations primarily on account of the private schools already receiving Bavarian state support.\textsuperscript{86}

As in regards to preparatory classes, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education used the \textit{Kultusministerkonferenz}’s decisions to justify its subsequent compulsory school laws.\textsuperscript{87}

The Ministry specified that all children with their residence in North Rhine-Westphalia had to

\textsuperscript{83} KMK, “Schulbesuch ausländischer Schüler, 1965/66 - 1972/73,” A.1.1. Note that basic education includes primary as well as all three levels of secondary schools (and occasionally middle school), making the total number higher than those in the chart for solely Grund- and Hauptschulen.

\textsuperscript{84} Hans Reimers to Stratenwerth, “Sch. 159.” The Kulturministerkonferenz’s School Committee held a special meeting to discuss the issue on 31 March 1965 in Bonn.


\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{87} Kultusministerium NRW to Herrn Minister über Herrn Staatssekretär and Abt. Leiter III im Hause, “Schulunterricht für die Kinder griechischer Gastarbeiter,” December 10, 1965, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW.
fulfill their school requirements in German *Volksschulen* (primary and lower secondary schools) and vocational training schools. Exceptions were only possible with official permission upon by application of the relevant schoolchild’s guardian. Regardless, NRW’s Ministry of Education was averse to giving the necessary permissions, claiming attendance in foreign schools would “make compulsory schooling illusionary.”

For the majority of the *Länder*, the issue of equality of opportunity and the longer residence of many of the children meant that education in a West German school trumped preparation for return. Children with non-German citizenship did not, according to the majority of the *Länder*, offer a pressing enough pedagogical basis for making exceptions to the compulsory schooling law requirements for attendance in public school advisable. Private national schools were to be discouraged if not outright banned. Yet, even as the majority of the *Länder* Education Administrations agreed and held to that decision, there were still exceptions, reinterpretations, and alternatives, including supplementary schools depending on the specific group, location, and request involved.

Despite the Greek government’s arguments, the *Länder* Education Administrations, with the exception of the Bavarian, agreed that equal opportunity within West Germany required

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89 Article 1 (2) SchpflG

90 Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulunterricht für die Kinder griechischer Gastarbeiter,” Vermerk III A 36-6/1 Nr. 3792/65 (Düsseldorf, November 30, 1965), 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW. The Greek government had not liked NRW’s guidelines on “the schooling of the children of guest workers” (Decree from 20 October 1964 - II C 36-6/1 NR. 3205/64) either. The Greek Embassy expressed its desire that either the previous status quo be upheld or an exception made specifically for Greek citizens. The Greek government still wanted their own schools following their curriculum under their own oversight. The Ministry of Culture felt that the special exception was impossible. Anything given to the Greek state would have to be extended to all of the sending countries (Kultusministerium NRW and Brikkötter, “Über die Besprechung am 31. 10. 1967 im Dienstzimmer des Herrn Min. Rat Domhof,” Protokoll (Düsseldorf, October 31, 1967), 388-21, Landesarchiv NRW).
attendance in a West German public school. Without that education, regardless of how German a schoolchild learned to be, there would be no chance that the child would be able to enter the West German labor market. Without that opportunity, the state would be denying the child their rights as an individual. Even North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education, which emphasized the children’s right to be foreign, argued that children who remained in West Germany for a substantial length of time needed to be in West German public schools.

**Supplementary Schools and Diaspora for the Greek Government and Parent Groups**

In 1966, the Regional School Administration in North Württemberg (where the majority of children in Baden-Württemberg with Greek citizenship lived) and the school office in Stuttgart reported that the Greek guest workers exhibited a “striking sense of belonging” and “strove to maintain their Greek way of life as well as to pass it on to their children.” On account of this, many parents disregarded the new compulsory school law (if they were even aware of it) and sent their children to consular and private classes amounting to Greek schools instead of to West German public schools. Their children, the parents claimed, needed a Greek education because of their imminent (in three years or less) return to their country of origin. Since the Greek Ministry of Education did not recognize their West German education, children without a Greek education abroad had problems entering the Greek school system. After listening to arguments for over three years from the Greek government (as well as others) and multiple minority parents groups, the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education acknowledged the possibility that migrant children might return to their countries of citizenship.

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Consequently, the Ministry conceded that some families might legitimately want national instruction or additional consular instruction. Adding an internal element to the equation, several German schools reported problems with incoming “Greek schoolchildren unable to understand German school instruction,” creating barriers to integration. These schools, as well as the Regional School Administrations, supported the development of Greek national schools. With its compulsory schooling law now firmly in place, the Baden-Württemberg Education Administration seriously considered alternatives to public school that would still ensure the children’s equal opportunities.

Before Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education entertained the possibility of permitting expanded Greek instruction, several parent groups looked for (unofficial) loopholes in order to continue national classes. In the name of maintaining their cultural heritage and enabling their children to reintegrate smoothly into Greek society, these parent groups either developed their own schools or sent their children to unofficial schools run by private institutions, such as the “Griechische Erziehungsgesellschaft König Otto von Griechenland e.V.” (King Otto Greek Association for Education). These unofficial schools (unapproved by either Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education or any of the Regional School Administrations) did not follow a West German curriculum and usually provided no German language instruction.

After the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education announced the possibility of establishing supplementary schools, some of these parents groups requested official


94 Schulausschuß der KMK, “97. Sitzung des SchA.”

legitimization for their schools. Backed by the local Greek Consulate, one group of parents asked to turn three Greek classes at the German Schiller School in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt into an actual school, a request the Stuttgart school office supported. These three classes (first and second, third and fourth, and fifth and sixth grades) provided 25 hours of weekly instruction for 155 children. The classes lacked any German language instruction, as the three teachers had only a limited mastery of German.96 With the full support of the Greek Embassy, and because the school office argued that integrating 155 children into the local system would be difficult, in late 1966 Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education acceded to the parents’ requests and opted to recognize the classes as a Greek supplementary school. The Ministry would eventually also recognize a supplementary school in Ludwigsburg and some other select locations.

In order to try and ensure the children’s equal opportunities as well as social order, however, the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education placed restrictions on the supplementary schools. The Ministry acknowledged that some children might return to their countries of origin after a short stay, necessitating national instruction. That some, however, was not all. Long-term residents still needed to integrate in order to have equal opportunities in West Germany.97 To try and separate out the groups, the Ministry of Education directed its local

96 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Staatliche Schulämter, “Einschulung der Kinder griechischer Gastarbeiter; hier: Freistellung zum Besuch einer sechsklassigen griechischen Ergänzungsschule in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt,” June 14, 1966, EA 3/609 Bü 68, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. On account of these constant claims and demands, the Regional School Administration in North Württemberg, recommended that the Ministry of Culture permit the construction of a supplementary school under Article 45 Paragraph 1 of Baden-Württemberg’s School Law. Permission for attendance, however, was to be limited to those families planning only short stays in the Federal Republic.

school office to grant permission to attend Greek national schools only to those children whose parents were committed to leaving West Germany within a three year timeframe. Aware that migrants often changed their plans, the Ministry of Education limited permission to attend national private schools for up to three years during the relevant family’s first three years of residence in the Federal Republic. If the family stayed in West Germany longer than three years, the Ministry of Education officials felt that the family needed to integrate. 98

Nonetheless, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education acknowledged that even long-term residents might want to eventually return to Greece (or to other countries of origin). To facilitate their possible emigration, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education first tacitly and then officially approved the expansion of Greek extra consular instruction from five hours weekly to up to ten in December 1966 for children eligible to attend consular instruction who were enrolled in public schools. That ten hours could only be given up to three afternoons a week. 99 The extended hours were supposed to permit children time to not only learn the language, but also to receive two hours of weekly religious training. 100

Even with these kinds of concessions, many parents and guardians, as well as children with Greek citizenship, did not necessarily adhere to the Länder Education Administration’s rules and regulations, arguing that Greek national instruction was simply more important.


Protesting their limited access to Greek language instruction, various parent groups wrote letters to the Education Administrations and took action on their own.  

In Ludwigsburg, at the beginning of 1968, the local school office and the Regional School Administration Nord-Württemberg reported that “only a minority” of schoolchildren with Greek citizenship actually attended West German schools. The majority went instead to Greek supplementary schools, although some visited German public schools in the morning and then the Greek school in the afternoon. Taken together, these children received some 40 hours of instruction per week (compared to 20 to 30 hours of typical public school instruction), which the Regional School Administration believed overwhelmed the children.

Bowing to widespread parental demands, continued pressure from the Greek state, and the recommendations of its School Administrations, in 1968 Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education changed its private school law to permit the construction of additional supplementary schools. The Ministry of Education continued, however, to instruct the regional school administrations to only grant permission for attendance to children whose parents were committed to leaving the country within a three-year period. Based on the new law, these schools did not need special approval for construction, but fell under disclosure requirements to

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101 For example, there was a group of Greek guest workers in Düsseldorf who, even after their children learned the German language in preparatory classes continued to send their children for instruction in Greek by Greek teachers instead of German classes. Kultusminister NRW to Auswärtige Amt, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” June 5, 1968, 388-21, Landesarchiv NRW.

102 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Kultusministerium BW, “Einrichtung von Vorbereitungsklassen für griechische Kinder im Kreis Ludwigsburg.”

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid. The private school law was changed on 14 May 1968 (Kultusministerium BW, “Privatschulgesetzes in der Fassung Vom 14. Mai 1968”). To attend, the children had to be individually released from their compulsory schooling requirements at a German school (Article 41 Paragraph 5 SchVOG).
reveal curricula, etc., to the local Education Administration. The responsible parties – here the Greek Government – had to carry the costs in full, a stance the Ministry of Education upheld partly with an eye to discouraging the establishment of such schools.

By the 1967/68 school year, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education had made similar concessions in response to parental demands on the school offices, school office recommendations, and foreign state pressure. Under North Rhine-Westphalia’s new school law, Greek schools run by the Greek government were permissible as supplementary schools if the Greek state was willing to cover the costs on its own. As in Baden-Württemberg, these supplementary schools did not need approval, but fell under disclosure requirements. In contrast to the system in Baden-Württemberg, however, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education declared that it would release schoolchildren in groups instead of based on individual applications (lists sent to the relevant Educational Authority), making it easier for guardians to obtain permission for their children to attend. The children would only be released from West German school attendance, however, if the relevant West German officials were convinced that the educational goals established for the West German lower secondary school were met.

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106 Kultusministerium BW to Generalkonsul der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Saloniki, “Eröffnung einer griechischenPrivatschule in Stuttgart.” Despite permission for supplementary schools, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Culture maintained its general position against private schools.


108 Article 36 of the Schulordnungsgesetz (Landesregierung NRW, “Gesetz über die Schulpflicht im Lande Nordrhein-Westfalen (Schulpflichtgesetz-SchpflG)”).

109 Under Article 1 (2) of the Schulordnungsgesetz

110 Kultusminister NRW to Auswärtige Amt, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausl. Gastarbeiter.”
Even as Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education Administrations made concessions regarding expanded Greek national schools and instruction, the Greek government collapsed during the 21 April 1967 Coup of the Colonels. Responding to internal instabilities and frustration, a conservative group of colonels decided that, to save the Kingdom, they needed to step in. Within months of taking control, the new government rolled back the remaining education reforms of the early 1960s. Intending to renew the national Greek-Christian spirit in the country, the Junta government also instituted flag salutations as well as obligatory religious services.

In West Germany, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger’s government, the first Grand Coalition of CDU and SPD (1966-1969) was shocked by the authoritarian military coup and imposed sanctions. Yet, several Christian conservative politicians in the Federal and Länder governments appreciated the military government’s anti-communist rhetoric, which harked back to the Greek Civil War. The colonels had been afraid that a victory by the leftist Center Union could lead to a government coalition with the Greek Communist Party. Some conservative branches of the CDU and CSU, as historian Alexander Clarkson discusses, took up the Greek junta’s logic, willing to accept the claims for exceptionalism forwarded by Francoist Spain and the successive Turkish military governments.


112 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1967,” 2.


115 Ibid., 123–124.
In its battle against the specter of communism, the Greek military government’s intent to renew the Greek-Christian spirit extended to Greek citizens abroad. On account of the coup, migration from Greece had picked up and the number of workers and their families moving to West Germany increased significantly (see Table 3.1). In 1969, concerned that these same Greek citizens were being improperly educated in Greekness, the military government argued that its citizens were in danger of receiving substandard schooling in West Germany. As the Greek government continued to claim all of its citizens would return imminently, that schooling was a problem. The Ländere Education Administrations’ arguments about the lengthening residence of some members of the growing Greek population in West Germany were pushed aside with the reiterated claim that a West German education effectively prevented returning schoolchildren from participating in higher levels of secondary schools in Greece. To alleviate this pressing dilemma, the Greek government wanted to create more Greek national schools following the Greek education plan with the financial support of the Federal Republic, as was already the case in Bavaria. They further hoped to extend the national preparation classes in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia from one year to six.116

The Greek military government’s reversal of education reforms and nationalistic stance changed the tone of its relationship with West Germany, but not its substance. In fact, despite the coup and conservative education reform, the Greek government’s material requests remained fundamentally static through the end of the decade. The successive Greek governments each had a different vision of education within Greece, but they each maintained the necessity and

importance of receiving a purely Greek education abroad. Rigidly adhering to supposedly traditional school forms, the new military government was unwilling to even consider any concessions regarding the education of its citizens abroad. Indeed, fledgling discussions about degree equivalency between Greece and West Germany (the two sides had gotten as far as agreeing they should work on it) were effectively derailed.

In contrast, with both the West German and Italian school systems decentralized and requiring a minimum of eight (later nine or ten as the two systems underwent reform) years of compulsory schooling, considerations of equivalency were simpler between than with other guest worker countries. Over the course of the 1960s, the Italian and West German states explored the possibility of degree equivalency even as both countries reformed their secondary school systems. The Italian government opted to move first, recognizing the West German secondary school certificate in order to support those Italian citizens who did return in the mid-1960s. West Germany, in contrast, would not recognize the Italian secondary certificate until the early 1980s. Even then, the agreement disappointed the Italian government as the West German only recognized the Italian school certificate at a lower secondary school level. The Italian

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118 Auswärtige Amt to Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Rom, “Anerkennung der von italienischen Schülern deutscher Schulen in Italien erworbenen Reifezeugnisse durch die Italienischen Behörden,” November 14, 1967, PA AA. The Italian Consulate in Cologne informed the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education that as long at the school transcript included a note verifying participation in Italian instruction in West Germany then the West German school certificate would be considered valid without a test in Italy.
government felt that it should be valued at least at the level of the Realschule (lower level of higher secondary, below the Gymnasium).\textsuperscript{119}

Because of the rigid structures of both the West German and Greek school systems, the Greek government argued that children with Greek citizenship and their parents or guardians had to choose either the Greek or German system. By attending a West German school with only afterschool instruction in Greek (between five and ten hours a week), the children were unable to reintegrate into the system upon return to Greece. Their futures were hence tied to the German system, a system in which they were usually already behind unless they began in the first or second class. In contrast, without the specific West German qualifications required in either vocational training or institutions of higher education, those children attending Greek national schools had little to no chance of anything other than unskilled labor in West Germany. Both sets of concerns were quite serious. Children with Greek citizenship had documented problems reintegrating into the Greek school system after attendance in West German schools. Yet, not all children returned to Greece. Those who did remain, in turn, were unlikely to finish their secondary schooling in West Germany unless they started their education in the country. Either way, the majority of these children were effectively cut off from higher education tracks or vocational education in either system.

The situation facing Greek citizens was more explicitly nationalist than most of the other ethno-national minority groups migrating to West Germany during this period. While smaller than many of the other minority groups, the voracity and extremity of their demands in contrast to governments like Italy’s shaped many of the \textit{Länder} Education Administrations’ policies. The

contrast between the Italian and Greek governments and communities’ requests fostered the double goals most Länder Education Administrations had developed. On the one hand, they stressed integration with cultural maintenance, on the other they emphasized the reverse balance— all in the name of equality of opportunity. For both, some level of integration and cultural maintenance was advisable, but the result was entirely different. With different citizenship groups facing different possible futures and likely tenures of residence in West Germany, the Education Administrations did not want to refuse to an entire group the possibility of either success in the West German system or return.

**Turkey, Literacy, and Qualified Labor**

Not all state governments were as decided in their goals for their citizens abroad as the Greek or Italian. In 1967, the Turkish delegation at the Joint West German-Turkish Cultural Commission meeting in West Berlin took a moment at the tail end of the three-day session to underline the “growing importance of the question of the instruction of the children of Turkish guest workers” in West Germany. They made sure to include a mention of the value of the children’s technical and cultural education as well as the importance of the Turkish college and university student groups. On the occasion, the Turkish delegation expressed its “lively satisfaction at the facilitation and assistance from various German organizations and hoped that the cooperation and support will be continued into the future.”

The brief 1967 addendum on the schooling of its citizens abroad reflected the Turkish state’s comparatively limited engagement with the topic during the 1960s in contrast to the Greek or Italian governments. Where the Italian and Greek governments took the initiative,

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approaching the West German Education Administrations, the Turkish government became involved in the conversation when Länder Education Administrations alerted the “sending country governments” about the 1964 Kultusministerkonferenz recommendations. Unlike the other two states, the Turkish government did not have a long history of diaspora formation, meaning that in the 1960s it had to establish a system for addressing emigration and return migration for the first time in the state’s history. Furthermore, in the 1960s, the Turkish government was in the middle of trying to combat illiteracy and reform its own education system even as it addressed massive social unrest and political instability. It was then that the Turkish legations happily took the West German Kultusministerkonferenz and Länder regulations as the foundation of its own programs for its citizens in West Germany.

The Turkish state’s educational goals in the 1960s vacillated as the government changed and society shifted dramatically, influencing discussions of schooling for its emigrants. At the beginning of the decade, the Turkish government was combatting illiteracy, which hovered at around 50 percent. The Turkish compulsory school system featured five years of compulsory schooling at 26 hours of instruction a week, but not all children had access to a school or, if they did, class sizes of upwards of 50 pupils often made learning difficult. In consequence, as discussed above, at the beginning of the 1960s the country faced illiteracy rates of approximately 50 percent and the government was trying to make access to primary schools widespread.


Teacher shortages, however, made that an almost-unattainable goal.\textsuperscript{124} That deficit led in turn to a shortage of qualified workers and training programs (as well as a continued lack of teachers). This development contributed to student unrest at the end of the 1960s, which in turn was one reason for the 1971 military coup.\textsuperscript{125} Working in these conditions, until the end of the decade, the Turkish government’s discussion of its citizens in West Germany’s schooling stressed integration, literacy, and vocational training, rarely mentioning equality of opportunity. With internal struggles and limited resources, instruction for its citizens abroad temporarily took a back seat. With limited primary school distribution and circumscribed emigration, the Turkish state had yet to establish cultural indoctrination as a primary goal for citizens abroad. The Republic of Turkey, founded in 1920, initially cut off most avenues for emigration, concentrating on developing its interior. Until the Korean War (1950-1953), which ended nearly 30 years of virtual non-involvement in world affairs, relatively few Turkish citizens migrated abroad for any reason.\textsuperscript{126} Within the decade, however, part of Turkey’s opening included bilateral labor agreements with multiple Western and European states.\textsuperscript{127} As these workers moved abroad and


either began families abroad or had their children follow them, the Turkish government lacked a system in place for addressing their schooling.\footnote{For more on female and family labor migration, see Esra Erdern and Monika Mattes, “Gendered Policies - Gendered Patterns: Female Migration from Turkey to Germany from the 1960s to the 1990s;” in \textit{European Encounters: Migrants, Migration, and European Societies Since 1945}, ed. Rainer Ohliger, Karen Schönwälder, and Triadafilos Triadafopoulos (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 167–85.}

Adding to that dilemma, the Turkish government and the diverse Turkish population did not have a cohesive concept of “Turkishness.”\footnote{Mustafa Saatci, “Nation–States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish–Kurdish Conflict,” \textit{Nations and Nationalism} 8, no. 4 (October 1, 2002): 549–64.} When the Republic of Turkey was declared in 1923, Atatürk and the other founding fathers verbally tied “Turkishness” to secular Kemalism.\footnote{Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) was an army officer credited as the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey. He officially served between 1923 and 1938 as the first President of the country. See Soner Cagaptay, “Passage to Turkishness: Immigration and Religion in Modern Turkey,” in \textit{Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict: Challenging the Nation-State}, ed. Haldun Gülalp (Taylor & Francis, 2006), 61–82.} For the government, “Turkishness” was about the desire to live together, compatible with religious and ethnic diversity.\footnote{Kaplan, \textit{The Pedagogical State}, 41–43, 65–66; and Niyazi. Berkes, \textit{The Development of Secularism in Turkey} (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964).} Yet, at the same time, the aggressively nationalistic government (like many other states during the period) pressed for the assimilation of new migrants into its highly heterogeneous population. As its Christian population rapidly shrunk after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the concept of “Turkish” increasingly emphasized ethnic assimilation and included Islam despite government protestations of secularism.\footnote{It should be noted that the Christian population shrank in part because of the forced population transfers between Greece and Turkey in 1923 in association with the Greco-Turkish war and the Treaty of Lausanne. Allied and Associated Powers (1914-1920)., George II, and Atatürk, \textit{Treaty of Peace with Turkey: And Other Instruments Signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, Together with Agreements Between Greece and Turkey Signed on January 30, 1923, and Subsidiary Documents Forming Part of the Turkish Peace Settlement.} (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1923).} With 96 percent of the population being Muslim by 1945, perhaps it was unsurprising. Highlighting that connection, the
Turkish state’s naturalization practices in the interwar period required a high level of cultural and religious assimilation.\textsuperscript{133}

Nonetheless, within that Muslim majority, a significant portion of the population did view themselves as ethnically Turkish, something the government was invested in reforming.\textsuperscript{134} Other groups of citizens identified as Kurdish or as part of the country’s other minority groups rather than Turkish.\textsuperscript{135} Many citizens did not speak Turkish and, although the majority of the people identified as Muslim, they practiced different forms if they practiced at all.\textsuperscript{136} State policies also tried to promote some form of homogenization through a centralized school system and other regulations.\textsuperscript{137} Yet, the implementation of policy (particularly in rural communities) often proved problematic due to limited resources and the spread of the population within the large country.\textsuperscript{138} Even if the state had had a clear consensus on what Turkishness was supposed to be, with uneven dissemination of even primary schooling the state could not effectively promote it.

Without a clear ability to promote Turkishness and with a focus on disseminating basic literacy, the Turkish state viewed its citizens schooling abroad as an important but not pressing. A

\textsuperscript{133} Cagaptay, “Passage to Turkishness: Immigration and Religion in Modern Turkey.”


child with any education was often better qualified than a large portion of their fellow citizens. Hence, while there was no direct equivalency of degrees between Turkey and West Germany at the time, children attending West German schools were not considered to be at a disadvantage if they returned to Turkey (unlike children with Greek citizenship). The Turkish government also encouraged integration into West German schools because of associated avenues for vocational training. The Turkish government hoped that workers traveling to West Germany would learn skills to bring back home with them.

The shortage of qualified workers in general and teachers in particular meant that the Turkish state’s early discussions about education in meetings with West German representatives or within the Council of Europe emphasized vocational training. The Turkish government was interested in arranging training for Turkish teachers and recruiting foreign instructors to fill needed positions in Turkish schools. The Turkish government asked West Germany to send teachers (particularly secondary and vocational) to Turkey and applied for support from the Council of Europe. To assist their long-time friend, West Germany did in fact begin sending instructors “East,” particularly those trained in the sciences and for vocational training.

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139 There were unofficial agreements between the Turkish and West German government in the early 1970s regarding the recognition of secondary school certificates as prerequisites for entering colleges and universities based on discussions during meetings of the Joint West German-Turkish Cultural Commission such as “6. Sitzung des mit der Durchführung des deutsch-türkischen Kulturabkommens beauftragten Ständigen Gemischten Kulturausschusses,” Protokoll (Bonn, May 25, 1971), 4, B 85, Bd. 771, PA AA.


141 “2. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses,” 4, 7; Auswärtige Amt, “Besuch des türkischen Erziehungsmiisters,” Vermerk (Bonn, April 17, 1961), B 90, Bd. 859, PA AA; and “5. Sitzung des mit der Durchführung des deutsch-türkischen Kulturabkommens beauftragten ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses,” Protokoll (Ankara, November 19, 1969), 6–7, B 85, Bd. 771, PA AA. According to the Foreign Office, the Turkish and German governments had been friends for more than 30 years, going back to their cooperation during the First World War. See Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Lage des Türkischenunterrichts an der deutschen Schule Istanbul” (Istanbul: Auswärtige Amt, February 4, 1961), B 90 859, PA AA.
Council of Europe’s Council of Cultural Cooperation (CCC) also established a program for the further education of Turkish teachers, funding their training in several other countries, including West Germany.\(^{142}\)

The emphasis on basic literacy and vocational training did not mean the Turkish state and migrants with Turkish citizenship were uninterested in cultural education. After all, in 1964, the number of “Turkish guest workers” had reached some 80,000, and by 1965 the number of schoolchildren enrolled in West German public schools rose to almost 3,000 (see Table 3.3). Thus, when the Turkish government received the West German Kultusministerkonferenz framework for “school instruction for the children of foreign workers” in 1964, the Turkish state responded almost immediately. The Turkish Consulates in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia, where the largest residency groups with Turkish citizenship lived, inquired into the details of establishing the consular courses and preparation classes laid out in the Recommendations and even looked into the option of setting up Turkish private schools.\(^{143}\) Some parent groups and private Turkish organizations also looked into the possibility of establishing Turkish schools. At the behest of these parent/guardian and private groups, the West German Embassy in Ankara and the Turkish Government requested information from the West German

\(^{142}\) Among the first of the Council of Europe’s programs through the Council of Cultural Cooperation (CCC) was for the “Weiterbildung türkischer Lehrer.” Under this program, some one hundred Turkish teachers with different subject specialties were sent to twelve different participating Council of Europe Member States for two-years further education programs at the cost of the host country between 1964 and 1970 (seventeen of these were sent to the FRG). See Arend, “Les programmes d’études des enseignements primaire et secondaire,” Annexe V (B); and Auswärtige Amt, “Dienstinstraktion für den neuen Deutschen Botschafter in Ankara” (Bonn, February 25, 1966), 6–7, B 97, Bd. 134, PA AA.

\(^{143}\) Arbeits- und Sozialminister NRW and Wolf to Bergmann and Kultusminister NRW, “Schulunterricht für ausländische Kinder,” March 10, 1965, NW 141-115, Landesarchiv NRW. For the request from Turkey, see Türkische Botschaft to Kultusminister NRW, “952/331,” April 6, 1965, NW 141-115, Landesarchiv NRW. In April, the Turkish Embassy wrote to the KM-NRW to say that the staff appreciated knowing about the rules from 1964 and were looking into where instruction was possible. Made aware of the 14/15 May 1964 Recommendations, the North Rhine-Westphalian Minister of Labor Dr. Wolf during the opening of the Turkish Center in Bonn. There he asked if the “Turkish children” could receive extra instruction in addition to the lessons in the German school to the tune of five weekly-hours by a Turkish teacher paid by NRW, just like Italian children.
Foreign Office about the possibility. The number of inquiries, however, were relatively few in comparison with Greek parent groups despite comparable numbers of school age citizens (in 1965, over 4,000 schoolchildren with Greek citizenship and under 3,000 with Turkish compared to 1967, when both had more then 7,000. See Tables 3.1 and 3.3.

Table 3.3: Schoolchildren with Turkish Citizenship enrolled in Primary and Lower Secondary schools, 1965-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>NRW</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>BW</th>
<th>Bavaria</th>
<th>Hesse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,956</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5,119</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1,453</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>7,191</td>
<td>1,608</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>10,402</td>
<td>2,428</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>2,957</td>
<td>1,763</td>
<td>1,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>15,868</td>
<td>3,863</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>4,072</td>
<td>2,606</td>
<td>1,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>25,533</td>
<td>6,117</td>
<td>2,725</td>
<td>6,028</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>2,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>41,397</td>
<td>11,176</td>
<td>5,025</td>
<td>8,463</td>
<td>5,925</td>
<td>3,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>57,261</td>
<td>16,533</td>
<td>6,825</td>
<td>11,046</td>
<td>8,045</td>
<td>4,955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Turkish government’s and parent groups’ inquiries into private schools generated the varied, complicated responses the Greek government had also received. The West German Foreign Office responded enthusiastically, encouraging the Länder governments to assist (financially and otherwise) the Turkish government’s efforts, in part to gain leverage over the German schools in Turkey. Nonetheless, the Länder Education Administrations balked at making any new financial concessions, agreeing only to provide consular classes or language

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144 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara to Auswärtige Amt, “Türkische Schulen in Deutschland,” October 8, 1964, B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and “Errichtung von Schulen für Kinder türkischer Gastarbeiter in der BR,” Questionnaire GS-1274/64, (October 22, 1964), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. The West German Embassy in Ankara encouraged permitting the construction of such schools, mentioning (as a side note) that permitting private Turkish schools in Germany would ease the situation of the German school in Istanbul under the spirit of reciprocity. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkische Schulen in Deutschland” (Ankara: Auswärtige Amt, October 6, 1964), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

assistance based on established regulations. The Länder Education Administrations felt, after all, that any concession extended to one sending country government had to be extended to all of them. In following, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education outlined the same options it gave the other state governments, including payment for Turkish teachers on the same basis as its own. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education, in turn, acknowledged that the Turkish government did have options for establishing consular courses or supplementary schools, if it chose to apply. As with all national supplementary schools, however, the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education would only fund the preparation classes for integration. If the Turkish government wanted consular instruction, it would have to finance the classes.

The Turkish government dropped its inquiries into national private instruction, but maintained an interest in language and cultural classes through the end of the decade. Private and supplementary schools were simply too complicated and expensive for the Turkish state to commit to. Only after the 1971 coup would the new Minister of National Education again raise the issue. In contrast, the Turkish government tried to set-up consular and preparation classes across West Germany, particularly (although not exclusively) in those Länder like North Rhine-

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146 Several Länder recommend strongly against the conclusion of a relevant agreement (entsprechenden Abkommen) with Turkey. See KMK and Möllenkamp to Auswärtige Amt, Kulturabteilung, “Errichtung von Schulen für Kinder türkischer Gastarbeiter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.”

147 Ibid. The KMK tried to let the Foreign Office know about the rules for establishing private schools for Turkish children in the Federal Republic. In 1965, there were relatively few private national schools. Bavaria had permitted a select few for migrant groups. Otherwise, the main three private national schools included the French and American schools in Berlin as well as the Lithuanian Gymnasium in Frankfurt am Main.


Westphalia that financed the instruction directly. To work with Länders Education Administrations and staff the programs, the Turkish Government (through its Embassy in Bonn) created a “Working Program” in 1965 to address the problems that “naturally” arose from the growing number of “Turkish workers” employed in the Federal Republic. Through the Working Program, the government intended, among other things, to send 15 primary school teachers. These instructors were to teach “additional special mother tongue instruction” to Turkish schoolchildren attending German schools.

Multiple problems arose, however, in arranging for Turkish teachers to go to West Germany, effectively limiting their number for the subsequent five years. Arguments about who should pay for travel costs, disappearing visa applications, and concerns regarding spousal accompaniment meant multiple-month delays before the first teacher even arrived in West Germany. In addition, the Turkish state’s budget prevented it from sending many teachers to Länders, like Baden-Württemberg, which required Turkey to pay their salary. Even when it did

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150 For NRW, Dr. Schnoor answer described the acceptable Übergangsklassen that the Turkish Government could establish in NRW: for a minimum of 20 children of the same language for preparation to transfer into German schools, or the afterschool instruction (mother language, Landeskunde, history, and religion of their “home” (23. 09. 1965 - III A 36-6/1Nr. 2964/65). The teachers were paid by the Ministry of Culture (Kultusministerium NRW and Schnoor to Sekretariat, “Schulische Betreuung der Kinder türkische Gastarbeiter; hier Entsendung von türkische Volksschullehrern,” III A 36-6/1 Nr. 2721/66, (August 15, 1966), B 304/3245/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).

151 The Turkish Embassy includes a list of places where it thinks that the teachers should be employed. Included one in Hamburg; one in Bremen; one in Niedersachsen; six in NRW; one in Hesse; one in Saarland; two in Baden-Württemberg; and two in Bavaria (Botschaft der Türkei, “Verbalnote 4581/1080,” (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Türkische Botschaft, December 9, 1965), B 304/3245, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).

152 Among other concerns, there were multiple problems with visas, questions about spousal accompaniment, as well as Turkish government changes. The 57th meeting of the KMK’s Subcommittee on Foreigners from December 1966 mentions that there are problems with the Turkish teachers. Part of the issue was the expectation from the Turkish side that the Länders would pay for travel costs. Ibid.; and Auswärtige Amt and Rummel to Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, “Türkische Gastarbeiter in der Bundesrepublik; hier: Entsendung von türkische Volksschullehrern,” January 6, 1966, B 304/3245, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

153 Auswärtige Amt, “Türkei; and enthält u.a.: Einreise türkische Lehrer, 1970-1971” (Bonn, 1971), B 85, Bd. 1044, PA AA.
fund teachers, remuneration proved problematic, as Turkish salaries did not match the various West German wage structures nor provide enough for living costs in West Germany. The Turkish schoolteacher’s salary was simply not comparable to the German. Consequently, some Turkish teachers left their posts after arrival, opting to work instead as “guest workers” for a higher salary. Combined with the teacher shortage in Turkey, these problems led the Turkish government to limit the numbers of teachers, despite continued requests from the Länder Education Administration when there were enough students for another class.

With the Turkish government focused on other issues, such as substantial internal student unrest, some of the Länder Education Administrations and private Turkish and German organizations began to organize and staff native language and cultural instruction for the children of Turkish migrant workers on their own. For example, while mother tongue and cultural instructional classes in Baden-Württemberg were technically only available at the application of the sending country government, the state did host a few private classes, often at the behest of local companies. In Pforzheim in Baden-Württemberg the social democratic Workers’ Welfare Association (Arbeiterwohlfahrt) sponsored a class run by a Turkish teacher. Fifteen children from the city and another eight from the area were taught every Saturday afternoon for two hours. Most other cities felt that the distance was too great for most of the children, although some firms, like Daimler-Benz in Mannheim (which employed a significant number of

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154 This would continually lead the Turkish legations in West Germany to advocate for West Germany to take over all of the consular teachers’ wages (Botschaft der Türkei, “4581/1080”; and Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für Gastarbeiterkinder in Deutschland,” IV 4 - 88 (Ankara, March 2, 1971), B 93, Bd. 747, PA AA).

155 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für Gastarbeiterkinder in Deutschland.”
employees with Turkish citizenship) expressed willingness to help despite problems with distance.\textsuperscript{156}

As the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education funded local consular classes, it took a different approach when local schools and Turkish parent groups expressed interest. Unable to procure sufficient teachers from Turkey, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education began instructing its Regional School Administrations to accept applications from teachers with Turkish citizenship. These teachers had Turkish qualifications, but had migrated to West Germany to work in various (often auto) factories. Pointing to groups of schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship who did not have access to any Turkish consular instruction, these teachers first applied on their own initiative to set up classes within German schools. As the decade progressed, however, some school administrations advertised for qualified Turkish teachers through various news outlets instead of approaching the Turkish Consulate.\textsuperscript{157}

Depending on \textit{Länder} regulations and financing, the \textit{Länder} Education Administrations promoted Turkish cultural and language instruction for multiple reasons. To begin, once the school initiatives were regulated, children with the relevant citizenship status were technically entitled to the stipulated consular instruction. Parents or guardians with Turkish citizenship could still request the classes, even if the Turkish state was not providing them. In Baden-Württemberg, the Ministry of Education’s stance that the state was not responsible for the classes


\textsuperscript{157} Schulamt für die Stadt Köln and Oberreiguenrgrat, “Beschulung Türkischer Kinder,” April 15, 1969, NW 388-18, Landesarchiv NRW; and Türkisches Konsul, Essen to Franz Domhof, March 3, 1971, NW 388-18, Landesarchiv NRW.
and associated regulations meant that the Education Administration did not have to act, although some schools did draw money from their own budgets. Those groups that did try and provide classes, however, were often labor organizations. In contrast, according to the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education, children were entitled to cultural and mother tongue instruction and needed to maintain connections to their cultural heritage, not assimilate. In consequence, the Ministry of Education felt responsible for offering the classes, regardless of country of citizenship involvement. Technically, however, the country of citizenship government still had the right to select teachers.\textsuperscript{158}

Despite the hurdles to sending teachers abroad, the Turkish government reconfirmed its interest in its citizens’ education and access to mother language and cultural instruction throughout the late 1960s. In 1966, both the West German and Turkish delegations agreed that they would be “happy, if Turkish children were offered the opportunity to secure and deepen their knowledge of their mother language as taught by Turkish elementary school teachers employed by the \textit{Länder} Educational Authorities.”\textsuperscript{159} With similar language in 1967, the Turkish delegation would announce the growing importance of the question of the instruction of the children of Turkish guest workers in Germany during a meeting of the Standing Joint German-Turkish Cultural Commission in Berlin.\textsuperscript{160} The state was unable, however, to commit to action,

\textsuperscript{158} In Bavaria, Dr. Kessler, \textit{Ministerialdirigent}, claimed there were not up to that point either from the Turkish Legation or from any other side applications for the establishment of extra instruction, support instruction, or any other school measures for the “children of Turkish guest workers.” Consequently, the Bavarian Ministry of Education had yet to establish any such measures (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus and Kessler to Sekretariat, “Schulische Betreuung der Kinder türkische Gastarbeiter; hier Entsendung von türkische Volksschullehrern,” Nr. III/8 - 4/108 999, (October 11, 1966), B 304/3245/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).

\textsuperscript{159} Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der KMK, “Türkische Gastarbeiter in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; hier: Entsendung von Türkischen Volksschullehrern,” March 22, 1966, B 97, Bd. 308, PA AA.

\textsuperscript{160} 4. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses (1967).” As of 1967, the Turkish Government continued to support some efforts to support its citizens abroad, but also expended some pains to support German instruction in public schools in Turkey. In the first line were efforts to expand in German classes in

Only in 1968 did the Turkish state’s interest in the education and national identification of its nationals abroad truly begin to move beyond general advocacy, in part because of concerns regarding return amid growing internal unrest. Amid multiple boycotts and demonstrations, students in Turkey had “gotten their arms up” and, according to the West German Embassy’s Cultural Report on Turkey for 1968, “there was increased xenophobia directed particularly against American influence.” That sentiment was part of international movements against the Vietnam War and in protest of American Imperialism. According to the West German Embassy in Ankara, however, the students’ part in the unrest stemmed predominately from frustration due to limited seats in secondary and vocational institutions. The Turkish government promised some reforms, but given continued resource shortages, there was local and international skepticism over whether these would take place.\footnote{Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht für 1968 aus der Türkei” (Ankara: Auswärtige Amt, January 23, 1969), 1–2, B 97, Bd. 185, PA AA.} The government was still committed to developing the primary school track, which made commitment to secondary and technical schools, as well as college and university tracks, difficult. The population was exploding and rural to urban migration was straining the schools in the cities. Instead of building vocational schools, the Turkish state was still trying to fight illiteracy among the youth. Consequently, private colleges both of the teaching schools in Ankara and Istanbul, which trained German teachers for the mid level schools and the majority of those German teachers in the higher levels (Deutsche Botschaft Ankara, Groepper, and Kanzler, “4. Sitzung der Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturkommission in Berlin,” Bericht (Ankara, March 1, 1967), I, B 97, Bd. 308, PA AA).
and technical schools (particularly engineering schools) were “spreading like mushrooms on the ground,” alleviating only a small portion of the problem, and students were still in the streets.\footnote{Ibid., 2. Consequently, efforts to make German language instruction available in Turkey and continued interest in recruiting West German teachers continued to trump efforts to send Turkish teachers abroad (“5. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses,” 10).}

The 1968 Turkish student movements raised the question of schooling for emigrants among the Turkish press and politicians.\footnote{“Stellungnahme der türkischen Presse zu dem Ausgang der Gespräche der deutsch-türkischen Gemischten Kommission” (Ankara: Deutsche Botschaft Ankara, May 16, 1968), B 85, Bd. 771, PA AA.} In light of the local protests and widespread political unrest across Europe, Turkish politicians worried that the growing number of Turks abroad could incite more social unrest upon their return. Their fear centered in part around the possible exposure to new political ideals and the possibility of migrants becoming radical agitators.

Turkish politicians found it particularly worrisome that Turkish citizens abroad could come into contact with communist ideologies.\footnote{Not only was the communist party legal and thriving in countries like France and Italy (see Donald L. M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., \textit{Communism in Italy and France} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015)), but it was actually easier for a Turkish citizen in West Berlin to cross over to East Berlin for a West German citizen (Jennifer Miller, “Cold War Borders and Suspicious Persons: Turkish ‘Guest Workers’ Between East and West Berlin through the Eyes of the Stasi” (Berlin Porgram Summer Workshop: Germany Looks East, Berlin, 2013)).}

Alongside their political worries, many politicians and local schools had cultural and social concerns. As some migrants returned to Turkey, there were clear issues with their reintegration into Turkish society. Although different groups in Turkey disagreed on what Turkishness should be, the clear cultural and social distance between these re-migrants and the local population made the returnees stand out as foreign others regardless of their citizenship.\footnote{Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht für 1968 aus der Türkei,” 1–2.}
Yet, despite the Turkish Government’s active worries over its citizens abroad’ national identification, the state still had to address pressing concerns in Turkey.\(^{167}\)

With local concerns about and internal problems with education reform, it was not until 1971 that the Turkish government would make a concerted effort to both ensure the availability of mother tongue and cultural instruction for its citizens abroad and reexamine the possibility of private schools. After the March 1971 “coup by memorandum,” in which the Turkish military effectively demanded that Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel resign, the temporary military government and later civilian governments pursued some control over the education of its school age citizens abroad.\(^{168}\) With almost 60,000 schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship in West German schools and with increasing state control over school ideology in Turkey, the issue could no longer be put aside (see Table 3.3). That measure of control, however, focused on access to mother tongue and cultural instruction.\(^{169}\) With only some 50 Turkish teachers (25 provided by the Turkish Ministry of Education) available for those thousands of children, the Turkish Ministry of Education was “understandably of the opinion that the number is not sufficient.”\(^{170}\) The Turkish government wanted to work with the West German Ministries of Education on expanded recruitment.\(^{171}\)

\(^{167}\) Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für Gastarbeiterkinder in Deutschland.”

\(^{168}\) Ulus, The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey, 16–19.


\(^{170}\) Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für Gastarbeiterkinder in Deutschland.”

\(^{171}\) Auswärtige Amt to Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für Gastarbeiterkinder in Deutschland,” March 15, 1971, B 93, Bd. 747, PA AA.
Working on access to consular instruction, the Turkish government’s primary goal continued to be the integration of its citizens into West German schools. The Turkish Government did not address the education of its schoolchildren in the language of rights as Greece and Italy did. Instead, the focus was on needs and future advantages. The children should integrate into West German schools; they needed an education so that they could eventually participate in vocational programs. Until the end of the 1960s, the government rarely addressed its citizens abroad’s schooling in terms of identity or capacity for social participation. The state still wanted their citizens to be literate first and foremost – in any language – and secondly to be qualified to enter the labor market as skilled workers. To that end, private schools were not one of the Turkish Government’s primary goals and thus successive Ministers of Education dropped the issue.\textsuperscript{172} The negotiations between the two states would focus particularly on establishing class parameters, with particular attention paid to preparation classes for integrating newly arriving schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship into the West German school system.\textsuperscript{173}

Although the language the Turkish representatives employed differed from the Greek and Italian governments’, the Turkish government’s overarching goals were similar. The Turkish state combined political ideology with practical considerations to argue for the best possible treatment for its citizens. Because schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship came from the Turkish school system and had limited expectations from the school system, the Turkish government advocated what it saw as their best chances for a future. Not exactly equality of opportunity in either system, but something that would improve the children’s lots in Turkey, if


they returned, and thereby support the Turkish economy whether they remained in West Germany or returned to Turkey.

**Conclusion**

According to standard definitions of the right to education in the 1960s – or at least for the Council of Europe – all schoolchildren were supposed to be admitted into public schools on the same basis as host country nationals. All children needed to have access in order to have equality of opportunity in the technological age. Without equal chances in local schools, children would not have the same opportunities to participate in the labor market or to fulfill their personhood. The assumed need to include all children under school laws conflicted, however, with the role of public school as teaching children to be good citizens for migrant children, particularly for those who expected to return to their countries of citizenship. Depending on a child’s (or their guardian’s) future plans and the situation they came out of, varying solutions were necessary to attain these goals as best as possible.

The political expectations surrounding children with Greek and Turkish citizenship living in West Germany during the 1960s demonstrated the complication of defining equality of opportunity. For the successive Greek governments, the meaning of citizenship and national identification was connected to language and religion as well as the cultural and social capital disseminated through Greek public schools. Added to that, the structure of the Greek system meant that a German education was largely useless in Greece. In consequence, both for ideological and practical purposes, children needed a Greek education to be Greek and to operate in Greek society. In contrast, although the Turkish government and many Turkish citizens expected to someday return to Turkey, limited access to education in Turkey and a more flexible understanding of Turkishness meant that a German education was acceptable in either country.
Turkish identification and language mastery was supported, but not viewed as essential for future success.

In consequence, even as the West German Länder Education Administrations attempted to provide some level of equality of opportunity for all residents, there were different understandings of what that meant which differed partly according to citizenship. Regardless of personal preference, an Italian citizen had a right to permanent residence while Greek and Turkish citizens explicitly did not. Furthermore, the systems in the country of origin as well as the understanding of national identity played a role, influencing what a country of citizenship supported and what the migrants in West Germany wanted.

In 1970, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers declared that all children were entitled to an education “even under difficult circumstances,” which explicitly “include[ed] international migration.”¹ The Member States agreed that education was an inalienable, universal right, equally applicable to all. And, in order to ensure that right, the Council of Europe, alongside the United Nations, the International Bureau of Education, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), determined that the host country needed to be answerable for that right. With that decision in hand, the members of these organizations expected the host country to provide initiatives to enable equality of opportunity and to evaluate success based on scholastic performance in the host country’s school system.

The West German states agreed, in theory. Compulsory schooling laws across the FRG required all children with a local residence to attend school and granted parents and guardians the same rights as the ethno-national majority. The Länder Education Administrations did make some exception for “the children of guest workers,” encouraging consular instruction and even permitting some national private or supplementary schools, but by and large children with non-German citizenship were supposed to receive the same education as citizens. Furthermore, to help children integrate into the classroom when the number of non-German speakers in one class was too large for rapid integration (at least 15 in one grade level), school regulations across the

¹ In its November 1970 Resolutions (Committee of Ministers, “School Education for Children of Migrant Workers,” Resolution (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, November 27, 1970), Box 2443, Council of Europe.
country stipulated that children were supposed to have access to national preparatory classes as well as German language support in the schools. With regulations in place to meet the idealized goal of equality, members of the various West German Education Administrations felt the system was set.

Yet creating the regulations was only a first step. The Länder Education Administrations also had to provide the promised assistance for integration and cultural maintenance, far from a simple task. To even start, the Education Administrations had to enforce their compulsory schooling laws, ensuring that children with non-German citizenship attended school. Once they were in the classroom, the state had to provide teachers and teaching materials. Both proved difficult, first because of the unpredictability of the diverse migrant groups and second because of severe teacher and material shortages in the face of expanding local populations.

Adding to those difficulties, the entire conceptual framework behind the school system changed with a refashioned understanding of several terms that defined educational policy. One of the most important of these changes was that the international community, in response to larger global trends, redefined the concept of compulsory schooling to include secondary education for all children. This made new school reform programs necessary all over Western Europe. The West German Länder Education Administrations’ school initiatives that had been constructed to assist national groups of children with non-German citizenship in learning German were no longer sufficed, because “equal access” now referred to enrollment in higher levels of secondary schools as well as lower.²

² Include citation to that 1960s report from CE about goals of education (Secrétariat du Conseil de l’Europe, “The Council of Europe’s Educational Programme and the Resolutions of the Hamburg Conference,” Third Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, September 12, 1962), B 91, Bd. 111, PA AA.
Further complicating the situation, silence about the atrocities of the past during the post-
war years led to the social and political unrest across Europe that burst into the streets during the
late 1960s, casting a new light on the politics involved in consular instruction. The 1967 Greek
Junta, followed by the social and political unrest across Europe in 1968 and 1969, meant that the
politics of memory and the state were a major social concern. In West Germany, for example, the
social unrest was partly in response to Kurt Kiesinger’s tenure as West German Chancellor
between 1966 and 1969, as he was former Nazi.\(^3\) In response, thousands of youths took to the
streets, decrying the state’s complacency and the continued role of Nazi leaders in prominent
posts. Combined with multiple new trials of former Nazis and information on the abuse of the
Third Reich’s minority groups and foreign workers, public concern ignited over the schooling of
the new West German minority groups for the first time, particularly as an increasing percentage
of the ethno-national majority came into contact with them for the first time. The combination of
social unrest and public attention meant that consular instruction took on a new meaning, as
these classes were designed to maintain ties to fascist Greece, Spain, and Portugal or to an Italy
whose communist party received record-breaking numbers of votes.\(^4\)

At the same time, first economic stagnation in 1977/67 and then recession following the
1973 Oil Crisis placed political pressure onto host country governments, like the West German,
to encourage return migration. The debate over the permanency of the various West German
migrants was contentious, with some conservative governments (including in Bavaria and
Schleswig-Holstein) pushing for limitations on residency rights and forced rotation. Others,

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\(^3\) Kurt Georg Kiesinger was a lawyer and member of the CDU. During the Third Reich, he was a member of the
Foreign Office and ran radio programs. In 1958, he became Minister President of Baden-Württemberg, which office
he held until he became West German Chancellor on December 1, 1966 (Philipp Gassert, *Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 1904-1988: Kanzler zwischen den Zeiten* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006)).

\(^4\)
usually with Social Democratic governments, pushed to integrate West Germany’s migrant communities better and to provide more services. In September 1969, the first Social Democratic (in coalition with the Federal Democratic Party) led government under Chancellor Willi Brandt was elected. The new government’s agenda included educations reform. Yet, regarding the question of education for children with non-German citizenship, the Brandt administration took an ambivalent stance. In particular, when unemployment rose in connection with the first oil crisis, the Federal Government came under pressure. In response, the SPD-FDP government officially declared that West Germany was not a country of immigration.5 Such political statements might have eased the fears expressed in the media. They did not, however, reflect reality, particularly as the Federal Government eschewed forced rotation for migrant workers. As scholars like Klaus Bade and Hermann Korte have shown, with high rates of permanent immigration that outstripped emigration, West Germany was already in the early 1970s a country of immigration.6

Nevertheless, the economic crisis that had started in 1966/67 had an effect on migration. Although the overall number of migrants rose during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the total number of workers decreased. Due to family migration, however, the total number of non-German citizens in West German continued to rise. The overall number did dip between 1973 and 1975 in response to the complete Recruitment Stop in 1973, but the corresponding increase

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in Family Migration meant that by 1976 the total number of non-German citizens had grown once again.\textsuperscript{7}

The West German Education Administrations had to address each of these changes and concerns. They could not simply write regulations and sit back, but had to actively implement and revise their laws and policies. Social shifts and changes meant that \textit{Länder} Education Administrations’ regulations, which had reportedly filled their purpose from 1964 to 1966, were considered deficient by the end of the decade. With limited resources and only partial success so far, the \textit{Länder} Education Administrations asked what they could do and which groups they should concentrate on. If the focus was integration, just how equal were the non-nationals and how much should be expended on their education?

**Enforcing Compulsory Schooling and Complications with Promoting Integration**

The first step to enforcing equality of opportunity was requiring and enabling school attendance across the country. Yet, between 1967 and 1972, despite compulsory schooling laws, reports and rumors abounded (never with solid statistical support) about under-enrollment. Some, like the West German Federal Ministry for Science and Research, claimed that there were as many as “one in four school-age children” not attending school. Others thought that the number of children missing school was almost negligible. Regardless, West German police, concerned parent groups (both with and without German citizenship), and the relevant foreign consulates agreed that some portion of children were either playing truant or were not being registered at all. Educators and politicians speculated about possible reasons, several citing new migrant groups’ lack of information about the West German school system. Some expounded on

that claim, saying that the West German school system was simply too confusing for newly arrived migrants to understand (see Chart 3.1). Others, including the State Employment Center in South Bavaria, suggested that parents intending to return to their countries of origin “saw schooling in the Federal Republic as unnecessary … and instead kept school age youths home to care for younger siblings or to work.”

Whatever the reason for under-enrollment, the different players involved, from the Council of Europe to local parent groups, agreed that the issue needed to be addressed. They each felt that children living in West Germany needed schooling, even if they failed to agree on what that schooling should entail. Regardless of what education the children were supposed to have, part of compulsory education was forcing the children to attend. Yet, the West German state governments questioned the wisdom of compelling enrollment as they did with the local ethno-national majority from two sides in particular. First, forcing attendance could lead to international misunderstandings. Second, the Länder Education Administrations faced serious problems with providing the stipulated support (preparation classes and extra German instruction) that was supposed to enable them to fully participate. From teacher availability to

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financing, problems plagued the Länder governments’ ability to support school access.⁹ Lacking that support, the Education Administrations questioned the point of attendance at all.

An immediate difficulty with enforcing enrollment and providing the classes for integration was the exponential increase in schoolchildren with non-German citizenship (see Table 4.1). The West German Länder had designed preparatory classes and other support measures in the early and mid-1960s with the assumption that there would be a continual but small rise in the number of new migrant children.¹⁰ Yet, in the mid-1960s, due to rapid economic growth combined with a labor shortage, West German businesses “invited” increasing numbers of migrant laborers. As the West German government renewed their labor visas, these male and female workers brought or established families in the country.¹¹ In consequence, even as economic growth slowed first in 1966/67 with a European-wide economic stagnation and then with the 1973 Oil Crisis and recession, the number of children with non-German citizenship in West German schools swelled.¹² In those few short years, the Länder became home to hundreds of thousands of migrant school-age children, each entitled to a public education and support for participation (see Table 4.1). The West German school systems were simply unable to handle the influx.


¹⁰ With the exception of Bavaria, the West German education officials expected children living in the country for over one year to attend regular West German classes.

¹¹ Fore more on migration patterns, demographics, etc., see Rainer Münz, Wolfgang Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1999), 28–79.

Table 4.1: Schoolchildren (Total and “Foreign”) enrolled in General Education in the FRG, 1969 and 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>“Foreign”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preschool (Vorschule)</td>
<td>22,190</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Lower Secondary (Volkschule or Grund- und Hauptschule)</td>
<td>6,112,327</td>
<td>94,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Schools (Sonderschule)</td>
<td>290,846</td>
<td>1,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realschule</td>
<td>826,201</td>
<td>3,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnasium</td>
<td>1,352,065</td>
<td>10,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive (Gesamtschule)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational (Berufschule, full time)</td>
<td>1,625,091</td>
<td>9,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational (Berufschule, part time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,786,043</td>
<td>131,465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With thousands of new families migrating into and within the country throughout the school year, West German education officials debated how best to enforce compulsory schooling. Over the 1960s and 1970s, select minority communities (diasporas) usually in larger urban centers (famously Kreuzberg in Berlin) expanded to the point where some children were not exposed to any language but their mother tongue in their day-to-day lives. The German school featured as an increasingly important point of contact. To compel an education for West German citizens, the Länder governments’ practice was to arrest the negligent parent and or hand them over to the judicial system. The governments felt that it was inadvisable to do the

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13 KMK, “Der Schulbesuch ausländischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1965/66 - 1972/73: Allgemeinbildende Schulen” (Bundeseheitlichen Schulstatistik, 1974), B.1.1; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1975), 98–101; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1972), 73–76. Preschool attendance of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship not collected in 1969 and Vocational schooling not separated by full or part time. Note that for the “Total” in both year, several specialty school attendance numbers are included.
same with migrant minority groups. There was too much room for misunderstandings or mistakes. Not only did many parents possess limited German language knowledge, but guest worker families were highly mobile, often moving between cities without registering. Because compulsory schooling was tied to city registration, if a family did not file paperwork in their new place of residence the school boards did not know where a child actually was.

In order to avoid unpleasantness and to encourage parents to register their children without causing undue stress, the Länder governments and foreign consulates decided to work together to try educating the children’s parents about West German law and the organization of the school system. Beginning in 1967, the Länder Education Administrations produced leaflets explaining the legal and social importance of schooling in West Germany. In simple, un-illustrated, and bulleted fliers and pamphlets printed in multiple languages, the Education Administrations outlined the general parameters of local compulsory school laws and the structure of the lower secondary and vocational education systems. Handed out in schools, these fliers laid out the necessity of attendance and tried to explain its necessity for future job options.\textsuperscript{14} The foreign consulates in turn produced their own information for their consular teachers and, if the parents actually registered with the local consulate, spoke directly with parents about schooling. These officials laid out the children’s need to enroll in West German schools, particularly emphasizing the connection between preparatory classes and West German schools.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{15} Consolato d’Italia to Kultusministerium BW, November 6, 1967, EA 3/609 Bü 92, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. The Italian Consulate in Stuttgart sent around a letter instructing Italian teachers in Baden-Württemberg as to how to explain the school system. Sadly, I never found the letter.
Education for parents did not solve the problems with providing preparatory classes. Those classes were supposed to fulfill the states’ obligation to enable new migrant children access to the West German classroom by teaching them enough about the German school system to participate. Designed with two-thirds instruction in their mother tongue and one third in German, the classes were supposed to enable the students to learn German while not falling behind in their general education. West German educators expected that, after one year, the children should have mastered enough German to fully participate in West German schools. Yet, as the decade drew to a close, the Länder Education Administrations received continual reports from regional school boards that the preparatory classes were not working.

The classes themselves were not, however, necessarily the problem. Instead, failure can be attributed in part to limited funding and classroom space as well as a shortage of trained teachers and difficulties with planning. Each year, the Länder Ministries of Finance budgeted a set amount for consular teachers’ wages, based on the Education Administrations’ predictions on how many schoolchildren would need preparatory classes. Yet, as the number of school age children with non-German citizenship doubled in a few short years (see Table 4.1), the number of teachers needed frequently exceeded the money set aside for their salaries. For example, in 1968 (just after the 1967 stagnation) Baden-Württemberg ran into severe financial restraints. Unable to increase its budget, the Ministry of Education maintained the number of national preparatory classes from the previous year. Yet the Greek government alone requested seventy new preparatory classes. Unable to fulfill the request, the Ministry of Education suggested that

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16 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Länder Education Administrations developed individual regulations regarding preparatory classes, which, depending on the West German state, influenced or were based on the KMK’s 1964 Recommendations.
Greek (and Italian) teachers needed to organize their time more efficiently and increase class sizes.\(^{17}\)

In more serious efforts, Baden-Württemberg's Ministry of Education tried to address the material and teacher deficits by encouraging enrollment directly in West German regular classes, for which there was a larger budget. To the Greek Consulate’s dismay, the Ministry of Education insisted that all first- and second-year schoolchildren attend normal instruction, as dictated by state regulation. Young six- and seven-year-old children were supposed to be able to quickly pick up German through contact with local schoolchildren. If they had problems they could theoretically receive afterschool instruction in German (although there were rarely enough trained teachers to provide the instruction). The Ministry also limited national preparatory instruction up through the fifth grade on the grounds that the consular teachers usually only had training to that grade level.\(^{18}\)

Compounding local concerns, foreign consulates were often unable to keep up with new demands for teachers and materials. Not only was there a dearth of teachers in the countries of citizenship, in part due to extensive education reform, but most of the consular teachers were on short-term contracts and were only supposed to remain in West Germany for around two years. The countries of citizenship had to continually find new qualified teachers. Even the Greek state, which poured significant resources into its emigrants’ education and actually passed local laws to


\(^{18}\) As Baden-Württemberg required the sending county governments to pay for consular instruction, getting “foreign children” out of preparatory classes and into West German classroom instruction with afterschool consular instruction and German language instruction saved the state money.
try and guarantee sufficient teachers, often had difficulties supplying them. Teachers for instructing both in German and the children’s mother language were in particularly short supply in both West Germany and in the countries of origin.

As the 1960s drew to a close, the West German state Education Administrations received pushback from foreign consulates and from local politicians concerned about program efficacy and access to German language instruction. In October 1969, after visiting a national preparatory class in Haagen in Baden-Württemberg, the Italian Consulate expressed concern that, with 65 pupils of diverse ages, the class was overfilled. The Consulate argued that “such a high number of pupils could not lead to a positive experience” and would not enable “rapid integration into German school.” The Consulate requested that the class in Haagen – and others like it – be split in two (or more, by age-group) and the children provided more than the three hours of German language instruction a week they were currently receiving.

In theory, Baden-Württemberg's Ministry of Education agreed. The state's 1965 Regulation stipulated that newly arrived children should receive ten hours of weekly German instruction. In practice, however, the schools were unable to find the necessary bilingual

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21. For example, in December 1969, the School Office in Backnang reported that it needed additional support. They had 146 schoolchildren who could not participate in West German classes because of their language abilities. Yet, the Ministry of Education claimed that based on their reckoning, 52 of the school children could attend German school classes and only 127 needed preparatory classes, equaling only four new classes. It was alright with the Ministry for there to be 30 students or more in one class. The Ministry would refuse to split classes (Staatl. Schulamt Backnang, December 6, 1969, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart).


faculty. The problem was so widespread that in North Württemberg, where the highest concentration of foreigners in Baden-Württemberg lived, the regional school board complained that most children “only received two to three weekly hours of German instruction,” and sometimes no support at all. Both the foreign consulates and the local school boards concurred that this hardly sufficed to become competent enough in the language to join normal instruction within one year.\textsuperscript{24}

Even when there were enough teachers, inadequate learning materials for German instruction restricted programs designed to rapidly enable children to participate in regular instruction. While some country of citizenship governments sent their own German language materials (particularly Italy), these books’ contents focused on the relevant country’s cultural capital and were designed only for a single language group (i.e. Italian speakers). In the 1960s, those German-as-a-foreign-language books produced in West Germany were mostly aimed at adults.\textsuperscript{25} Expecting a high reading level or including content focusing on business and other issues, these books were usually inappropriate for children.\textsuperscript{26} Only in 1972 did the first schoolbooks for children, including "Komme bitte" by North Rhine-Westphalian publisher

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\textsuperscript{24} Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Staatliche Schulämter, “Vorbereitungsklassen für Kinder italienischer Gastarbeiter,” U II A 2111/246, (September 23, 1968), EA 3/609 Bü 70, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

\textsuperscript{25} It should be noted that teaching a subject like German as a foreign or second language in Germany was not a topic of concern until the late 1960s (Hans-Jürgen Krumm, Bernd Skibitzki, and Brigitte Sorger, “Entwicklungen von Deutsch als Fremdsprach in Deutschland nach 1945,” in ‘‘Deutsch als Fremd- und Zweitssprache: ein internationales Handbuch, ed. Hans-Jürgen Krumm et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 44–55).

\textsuperscript{26} The Münchner Verlag (Munich Publishers) did release some teaching materials in 1970, but reports from the Stuttgart school administrations were negative (“the grammatical concepts presupposed too much”) and the materials were not widely used (Stadt Stuttgart, Bürgermeisteramt, Kultur- und Schulreferent to Kultusministerium Baden-Württemberg and Hofsaß, “Unterrichtung ausländischer Kinder in deutschen Schulen,” May 22, 1970, EA 3/609 Bü 70, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart).
Hermann Schuh, appear for wide dissemination. Yet even then, only a limited number of teachers had been trained for their use.

Both North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg tried several short- and long-term fixes to teacher and material shortages. Searching for an immediate solution, the regional school board in North Württemberg gave permission for teachers without the prescribed qualifications to provide the instruction, including German teachers with Italian (or other) language skills or the consulates’ translators. Trying to shift the onus, both Länder Education Administrations also urged the relevant foreign consulates to only send consular teachers who had German language competence. That goal proved impossible, as none of the six major sending countries (including Italy, Greece, and Turkey) had enough qualified teachers who spoke German.

Invested in modern language acquisition, the Italian government attempted to comply by instituting summer training programs for further education. In 1967 they held a course for the German language teachers at the University of Urbino and in 1968 in Siena. There were further education courses in 1967 and 1968 in Monza, Caserta, Viareggio, and Rome for the Italian German teachers, in

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27 "Vorwärts" was also developed in NRW, while the Erdmann Verlag in Baden-Württemberg worked on some school material. For the Foreign Office’s review of the Erdmann-Verlag’s material, see Schmidt, “Beurteilung des vom Horst Erdmann Verlag, Tübingen, 1971 Herausgegebenen Audiovisuellen Unterrichtsprogramms für die Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer ‘Deutsch in Deutschland,’” Review (Bonn: Auswärtige Amt, 1972), B 93, Bd. 745, PA AA.


which 145 teachers took part, with more classes planned for the future. Nonetheless, there were still insufficient numbers from either Italy or the other major sending countries.

North Rhine-Westphalia decided to tackle the problem head on by providing German language support for new consular teachers. The Ministry of Education instituted the programs in part because of complaints within the West German schools about the difficulty of coordinating with newly arriving foreign teachers who were unfamiliar with North Rhine-Westphalia’s school system and could not communicate with the primary classroom teachers. To overcome this difficulty, the Ministry of Education directed the local school administrations in the five regions to offer foreign teachers audio-visual German lessons as well as to encourage working groups for the teachers to discuss their experiences and challenges. The Regional Presidents quickly responded positively to these programs, citing improved cooperation between the West German and consular teachers. They complained, however, that given the temporary nature of the consular teachers’ employment, the districts and schools continually had to train and acclimate replacement instructors.

In contrast, at the end of the 1960s, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education under Christian Democrat Wilhelm Hahn decided that the national preparatory classes were not

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30 “6. Sitzung der deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission zur Durchführung des zwischen Italien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland abgeschlossenen Kulturabkommens, Bonn, 3.-5. April 1968,” Protokoll (Bonn, April 5, 1968), 8–9, B 97, Bd. 270, PA AA.

31 Aachen was rolled into Cologne.


33 Wilhelm Hahn (1909-1996), a CDU politician and Lutheran theologian, served as Minister of Education in Baden-Württemberg between 1964-1978. He was initially appointed by Christian Democratic Kurt Georg Kiesinger, then Minister President of Baden-Württemberg (1958 to 1966), later West German Chancellor (1966 to 1969).
working at all and decided to replace them. Hahn claimed that this step was necessary, as he explained again and again in Baden-Württemberg’s Bundestag. He told the Members of Bundestag that, regardless of intent, an increasing number of migrants had already been in the country for over five years. Hence, in Hahn’s estimation, these so-called “foreign workers” had effectively become long-term residents, even if that was not their expressed intention. This meant that their children were to be treated the same as children with West German citizenship, who were entitled to support for rapid integration. Preparatory classes were not meeting that goal, often serving instead as private national schools. Hahn’s Ministry of Education decided to replace them with what they termed “international classes” instead. These international classes were to provide intensive German language instruction for same-age groups composed of different nationalities, thereby encouraging the children to learn quickly. Running 15 hours a week so as not to overwhelm pupils, the classes were supposed to enable newly-arrived schoolchildren to quickly transfer into the West German school system (which the preparatory classes had not been doing effectively).

Hahn’s experiment largely fell through due to continual complaints and demographic logistics. The West German school administration and ethnic-German parents expressed concerns about space and flooding regular classes with too many non-German citizens too quickly. With tens of thousands of schoolchildren floundering in West German schools in the early 1970s, the West German media and ethno-national majority began for the first time to take

an interest in their education. From the other side, foreign consulates (particularly the Greek) and some minority parent groups decried the cut-back in native language instruction. These foreign consulates and parent groups felt that the children had a right to preparatory classes, particularly with the restrictions on private schools. Despite these complaints, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education might have held course if not for the demographic spread of the various migrant groups. Many areas had minority groups from a single country of origin, meaning that international classes frequently became de-facto national classes regardless of the Ministry’s plans. Facing these difficulties, the Ministry grudgingly re-permitted national preparatory classes, but also began to plan a complete overhaul of the school initiatives available for the children of migrant workers.

The systems’ various deficits, from materials to teachers, meant that during the early 1970s, the hundreds of thousands of the new migrant children arriving in West Germany received irregular and often inadequate schooling. Even when they enrolled, limited German language training meant that they had trouble following lessons. Many migrant schoolchildren dropped out of school without completing their degrees or even attaining a minimal level of German language competency. The Education Administrations tried different immediate fixes, but as the intentions behind compulsory schooling shifted, many of the Länder Education

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36 Greece felt particularly strongly about this (Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der KMK, “Schulische Betreuung der Kinder türkischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” June 22, 1973, B 93, Bd. 860, PA AA).


38 Statistics about exactly how many were leaving the system (versus migrating) would not be systematically collected until the end of the 1970s.
Administrations decided to try rewriting their recommendations and policies. Whether or not the West German Education Administrations were to blame, the clear failure of the system raised questions about whether or not the Education Administrations were taking all the necessary steps to fulfill their obligations to children with non-German citizenship. Either way, the system had to change.

**Writing New Bars for Success and Encouraging Secondary Schooling**

The Länder Ministries of Education attempted to patch the gaps in their programs, not only because of deficits in material and personnel, but also because of a changing international consensus about what the right to education entailed. Tasked with tracking education developments and combatting inequality around the globe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) showcased those new norms in a 1969 paper on “educational opportunity for all.”\(^{39}\) This 1969 report, written for the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education’s sixth meeting in Paris, discussed the general trend toward the enrollment of all children in secondary school. The OECD then laid out how some European states (including West Germany) were reforming their systems to achieve that end, investing significantly in their secondary school systems.\(^{40}\) These states wanted to ensure equality and combat the problem of lower-ability and less-motivated groups dropping out or leaving early.\(^{41}\)

The OECD’s emphasis on the enrollment of all children in secondary school exemplifies an international change in the evaluation of scholastic success. Instead of viewing a state

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41 Ibid., 2–3.
education as leading toward general literacy, a key goal of primary schooling. Education Officials across Europe saw a clear need to provide children with additional instruction. During meetings of the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education and the Council of Europe, education officials claimed that their goals were both ensuring the right to an education guaranteeing a minimal standard of living, and enabling children to eventually join labor forces in search of increasingly skilled workers. The ministers argued that, because technology had changed the world and the labor market, national school systems needed to expand in order to reflect that. West German Education Administrations, politicians, and the media each agreed, as demonstrated in their rhetoric and in new policies created in the early 1970s.

That clear connection between compulsory education and labor meant that, by 1968, the European Community officially acknowledged the importance of including all children in local education systems in its Directive on freedom of movement. With a high rate of labor migration and international pressure for education reform, the members of the European Community agreed that guaranteeing equality in the labor market was meaningless without a primary and secondary school education. The West German representatives to the European Community, secure in their own efforts, agreed, including a line in the Declaration stipulating “the children of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in the territory of another Member State shall be admitted to that State's general educational, apprenticeship and


vocational training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of that State, if such children are residing in its territory.\(^{45}\) The Article fit within the sentiment of the period, demonstrating the assumption that integration was necessary for equality and that the host country was responsible for ensuring that equality of opportunity. In the European Community Member States’ opinion, that included full access and equal treatment.

Part of the reason for the West German government’s as well as the other members of the European Community and Council of Europe’s decision that the host country should be responsible was because of concerns for social order. With workers from “first-world and developing countries” moving across Europe, host country governments needed to ensure that an under-class did not develop within their borders. To protect their own internal order, they needed to ensure new migrants equality of opportunity, which included equal access to education.\(^{46}\) In consequence, by 1970, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers agreed that the host country – not the country of citizenship or an international community – was responsible for ensuring the right to education from entrance to completion. Part of that, as stated in the


Council’s 1970 Resolutions, was providing the support necessary for integration, which included enabling children to reach their secondary school certificates.47

The question of a developing lower or “ghetto” class was particularly important, as most of the European Community and Council of Europe Member States assumed that at least a portion of the migrants were permanent parts of their communities. Even if some migrant groups returned to their countries of citizenship, some would remain. In the majority of the both supranational groups’ member states, unlike in West Germany, migrant individuals had possible avenues for attaining citizenship. Furthermore, it was unclear how European Community membership would continue to evolve or how many countries would become members. With the 1968 directive on freedom of movement, it was already clear that those nationals of the Member States were supposed to be treated almost like citizens, raising the question of what citizenship actually meant.

The international community’s collective agreement that schoolchildren should not only enroll in but also complete secondary schooling directly impacted the Federal Republic’s valuation of scholastic achievement. During the period of the Grand Christian Democratic-Social Democratic Coalition (1966-1969), the conservative-social government under Chancellor Kiesinger had reformed the school system, in part with an eye toward encouraging the completion of higher levels of secondary schooling. Most West German Länder also removed fees for entry into the higher levels of secondary schools and greatly expanded the number of youths accepted.48 Under the new Social Democratic-Liberal government under Chancellor Brandt (1969-1974), the Federal Government and Länder poured money into education.49

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47 Committee of Ministers, “School Education for Children of Migrant Workers.”

48 In some Länder, particularly those under SPD leadership (e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse), educators argued that the tripartite system was antiquated and discriminatory. They claimed that the divide between the three
The rising benchmarks for the scholastic success of German children combined with international opinion influenced how the West German educational communities discussed goals for the schooling of migrant and foreign children. Like many of his colleagues, for example, Member of Baden-Württemberg’s Bundestag from Willi von Helden (1964 to 1972, SPD) expressed concern about the possible “ghettoization” of children and youths with foreign citizenship in 1969. He argued that these schoolchildren needed to “attend German schools and come out of the ghetto, in which they otherwise must live for their entire lives.” A few months later, Member of Bundestag Lothar Späth (CDU), Baden-Württemberg’s Minister President from 1978 to 1991, argued that children with non-German citizenship were not receiving enough exposure to German schools. Fearing inadequate integration, he claimed that mother


50 SPD Member Willi von Helden was a teacher as well as serving as a Member of the Baden-Württemberg Bundestag from 1964-1972.


tongue and cultural classes needed to be cut back. Like many of their colleagues across the political spectrum as well as many West German educators, both von Helden and Späth believed that without completing a full West German education, migrant children could not learn sufficient German. Without language skills, these children would be denied full participation in the labor market and society. Children with non-German citizenship would be forced to live apart from mainstream society in second-class communities. To preserve society, most West German politicians and educators agreed that all children, regardless of their nationality, needed to finish some version of compulsory secondary schooling.

What many politicians overlooked, but what disturbed educators, was the near-impossibility of migrant children completing secondary school degrees in their host countries. It was hard enough for children born and raised in the country. During a 1973 working group meeting on the “schooling and further instruction of children of foreign workers” in North Rhine-Westphalia, Franz Domhof, head of the Ministry of Education’s department for “the education of migrant workers’ children’s instruction in their mother tongue,” reminded the inter-ministerial group of that problem. Responding to concerns about the low percentage of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship completing their secondary school degrees, he pointed out that between 1971 and 1973 some 25 percent of German children never completed their

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54 During this period, the West German Federal and Länder governments worked together to alter the West German secondary system, including abolishing school fees for higher levels of secondary. For the Länder, ensuring the children’s right to education then necessitated the state guarantee the possibility of success through appropriate programs. For more on education reform, see Jürgen Oelkers, Reformpädagogik: Eine kritische Dogmengeschichte (Juventa-Verlag, 2005).

55 Everything in North Rhine-Westphalia that was done during Ministerialrat Domhof’s tenure regarding the schooling of children with foreign citizenship came back to him. See Franz Domhof, “Die Entwicklung des Unterrichts für ausländische Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Dissertation, Gesamthochsch., 1982).
certificates either. He acknowledged that there was a still a long way to go before equality was reached, as the percentage of children with non-German citizenship leaving school without their certifications was still considerable higher (851 of 1236 or almost 69 percent in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1969/70). Yet, as Domhof reminded his audience, of these schoolchildren, only approximately eight percent actually attended West German schools for between six and nine years (as of 1971).

Domhof’s emphasis on the duration for which these schoolchildren had been enrolled in the West German system stemmed from the structural difficulties that newly arriving migrant children had to face. Because of the West German system’s design, it was almost impossible to earn even a lower secondary school (Hauptschule) certificate with fewer than four years of instruction in the West German system. As many new arriving children immigrated to West Germany after they had completed compulsory schooling in their countries of origin (for Greece and Turkey around the age of twelve), these children had little chance to acquire the necessary accomplishments and rigid certifications. While the push to enable schoolchildren with non-German citizenship to achieve the same levels of scholastic achievement in the West German system as other children was admirable, it was also impractical – particularly when Länder support programs (e.g. preparatory classes) were designed only to enable general participation in the classroom.

On that basis, in the late 1960s some politicians and individuals, like Baden-Württemberg’s Gottfried Haase (a teacher and Social Democratic Member of Bundestag from

56 Furthermore, 40 percent of the schoolchildren in Gymnasium and Realschulen only reached the mid-level certificate (Mittlere Reife, equivalent to a high school diploma but not sufficient for entering university) in ten years of schooling (Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales des Landes NRW, “Sitzung des Arbeitskreises III ‘Schulische und weiterführende Ausbildung’ des Landesbeirats für ausländische Arbeitnehmer am 15. 1. 1973,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Düsseldorf, 1973), NW 670-142, Landesarchiv NRW).

1964-1980), suggested releasing youths with non-German citizenship from compulsory schooling during the traditional vocational school age (15 or 16 to 20 or 21, depending on Länder). In 1970, Christian Democrat Franz Gurk, Member of the Baden-Württemberg Bundestag from 1952 to 1972, suggested the same thing. After all, these politicians from across the political spectrum argued, what was the point? These children could never earn their secondary school certificates. Most of the Länder Education Administrations, however, rejected the idea. Under Christian Democrat Wilhelm Hahn’s leadership (Minister of Education in Baden-Württemberg between 1964 and 1978), the Ministry’s official stance was that “foreign guest workers should be treated the same as German workers.” After all, Hahn argued, the successful training of these youths was both “in the interest of the guest workers as well as the state of Baden-Württemberg.” Even if it was difficult, he claimed that it was important that the “guest worker youths” attend West German schools in order to – at the very least – receive the German language instruction to which they were entitled. Without any form of compulsory schooling, Hahn believed many of them would simply fall through the cracks.

58 Gottfried Haase (1923-2014) was a German politician and member of the SPD. He served as a member of Baden-Württemberg’s Bundestag from 1964-1980.


60 Under Baden-Württemberg School Law, youths were required to either attend three years of vocational training (Article 47 Paragraph 1) or finish the school year during which they turned 21 (Article 47 Paragraph 3). Youths with limited German language skills were to attend intensive German training. If there were not enough youths for a class, the youth could temporarily be freed until they achieved a sufficient language proficiency needed to participate in vocational training. Further release from compulsory schooling was not permissible, even if the youth had completed their vocational training in another country, such as Yugoslavia where compulsory vocational training ended with the eighteenth year (Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 5/1473: Stellungnahme des Kultusministeriums zu dem Antrag der Abg. Haase und Gen. (SPD) betr. Schulpflicht für jugendliche Gastarbeiter” (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, November 28, 1969); and Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 5/2860/I: Schriftliche
In an effort to overcome the discrepancy between West German nationals’ performance and that of children with non-German citizenship, the Länder and Federal Government implemented new initiatives for assisting children already enrolled in West German schools. Among them, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBW), controlled from 1969 to 1981 by the FDP-SPD coalition under Minister of Education Hans Leussink (1969-1972), used the 1970 International Year of Education to promote “Homework Help for Foreign Children.” UNESCO had determined in 1968 to establish 1970 as the “International Year of Education” in order “to mobilize energies and inspire initiatives in education and training.” Although most of the associated efforts worked toward promoting school initiatives for “developing countries,” the West German Federal Ministry of Education and Research felt that the schooling of its “guest worker groups” fell under the same rubric. With a tiny budget, the Federal Ministry of Education sent out brochures and pamphlets to encourage school administrators to establish local groups using volunteer labor (preferably the parents of children with German citizenship) to offer assistance with school homework. While the effects of the program were never clearly ascertained, it did prompt some Länder, such as North Rhine- 

Antwort des Kultusministeriums auf die Kleine Anfrage des Abg. Dr. Gurk (CDU) betr.: Berufsschulpflicht von Gastarbeiterinnen und Gastarbeitern” (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, September 15, 1970)).


Westphalia and Berlin, to institute regular programs for homework help. Initially, the local schools bore the bulk of the costs because of the structure of the German school system. Over the next decade, however, the Federal and Länder governments heavily subsidized the programs as the social and political importance of secondary school completion climbed.⁶⁴

With the right to education judged within the West German context, rather than in the terms of their countries of origin, the pressure to enable children to succeed necessitated an emphasis on integration. West German and European politicians felt that guaranteeing the right to education had little meaning without implementation, even if realization proved difficult. Having expended significant efforts to overcome discrimination in the system, the idea that systematic disadvantage still affected thousands of newly-arriving migrant children was antithetical to the education movements of the period. Children with non-German citizenship certainly and clearly could not – or at least should not – be disadvantaged in West Germany. But the West German Länder felt that inclusion under compulsory school law combined with preparatory classes and after-school instruction fulfilled their responsibility as host country to ensure equal treatment. Or it would, if only they had the funding and staff for full implementation.

**West German Uproar over School Teachers, Textbooks, and Foreign Relations**

Although native language and cultural instruction was not the West German Educational Administrations’ main goal in the early 1970s, it continued to be a vital component of education for non-citizens. Yet, despite a decade or more of support, between 1970 and 1973 newspapers across West Germany published stories about “the controversy over Greek teachers” and how

⁶⁴ Essentially intensive tutoring available to both “German” and “foreign” children, although in later years there would be money specifically earmarked for the “foreign” school children (Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulversuch ‘Silentien,’” Gemeinsames Amtsblatt des Kultusministeriums und des Ministeriums für Wissenschaft und Forschung des Landes NRW, July 7, 1971, 424).
“Anti-democratic imports [were] not tolerated.”⁶⁵ Bundestagarians from across the political spectrum expressed concern about the “foreign messages” disseminated within West German schools, possibly perverting innocent children. As Social Democratic Member of Bundestag Karl-Heinz Hansen inquired in 1970 (serving from 1969 to 1983), asking the Ministry of Education whether “the Federal Government [was] aware that Greek children of guest workers in German schools [were] taught from schoolbooks from the junta that distort history and glorify the dictatorship?”⁶⁶ He and other West German Federal Bundestagarians demanded that Länder and Federal Education Administrations provide information about the possibility of “anti-democratic messages” conveyed by foreign teachers or foreign textbooks.⁶⁷

Concerns over the content of schoolbooks non-coincidentally arose at the same time that it became clear that many of the new West German minority groups were not only permanent, but large. Additionally faced with a decline of job growth, some of the ethno-national German majority began worrying about the continued place of non-citizens in West German society. Responding to predominately conservative political pressure and the media, the Brdt’s administration took the stance that West Germany was not a country of immigration, even as many of the Länder Education Administrations argued that, regardless of political claims, West


Germany clearly was.68 The latter, after all, were concerned with success rates and the situation on the ground. Nonetheless, that split meant that, while many Education Administrations focused on integration, the internal political value of preparation for return climbed, increasing tensions between integration and cultural maintenance.

The minor uproar over school books from abroad ignited partly in response to concerns about how foreign governments – particularly the military government in Greece (1976 to 1974) – might be influencing children with foreign citizenship living in West Germany. Specifically, in 1969 the Greek military government recalled of the bulk of its teachers from abroad for “pedagogical reasons.”69 The Greek military government was concerned about what its citizens were learning.70 Trying to reignite the Greek Christian-democratic spirit, the military government actually viewed providing a traditional Greek national education as even more vital than its predecessors had.71 Concerned about its teachers’ politics, the Junta Government wanted to ensure that its teachers were not preaching against the state. In 1967, shortly after the coup, the new government required all of its civil servants (including teachers) to take loyalty oaths. These were the teachers to replace the ones in West Germany.


70 Sekretariat der KMK, “Vorbereitende Notizen für das deutsch-griechische Expertengespräch am 23. 3. 1976” (Bonn: KMK, March 1976), 2, B 93, Bd. 1154, PA AA.

When the Greek government tried to replace the Greek teachers stationed in West Germany, schools across North Rhine-Westphalia, where consular instruction was integrated into the local school system (more so than in Baden-Württemberg), expressed their concerns. The German teachers and school boards worried about what would happen to the Greek teachers upon their return to Greece. They asked North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education if the schools could keep them employed. Bound by their agreement with Greece and their own regulations stating that the Greek Ministry of Education was entitled to select consular teachers, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education told school leaders that they were welcome to keep the teachers in other positions, but they could not continue to teach consular classes.72

Added to that change, the new Social Democratic-Liberal coalition in charge of the Federal Government in West Germany stood against the Greek Military government. In the mid-1960s, the West German Grand Coalition government and Christian Conservative (CDU AND CSU) politicians had partly supported the Junta government as an anti-communist institution. The new Federal Government, in contrast, argued that the Junta government had connections to fascism.73 The spread of that political stance among the political left and, eventually, among the right as well, carried concerns about the classes’ messages into the Länder Bundestags and into the press.74 With particular frequency in 1970 and 1971, Federal and Länder SPD and CDU

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72 The Greek Legation would remind the various Foreign Office and Ministry of Education representatives, requesting that the West German administration keep the schools from hiring their own teachers (Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz, “Griechische Lehrer in den Ländern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Vermerk, (November 28, 1969), B 304/3735, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).

73 Nonetheless, the West German Foreign Office, which still included multiple former-Nazis within its ranks, tried to suppress migrants’ left-leaning political groups (Clarkson, Fragmented Fatherland, 126). For a discussion of the history of the (West) German Foreign Office during the Second World War through reform under Willy Brandt, see Eckart Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010).

Members of Bundestag, disturbed by the mere presence of possibly “‘junta-true Greek teachers,” repeatedly pointed to the possibility of “anti-democratic” content in the children’s instruction.75 Asking the Federal Ministry of Education whether “the Federal Government [was] aware that Greek children of guest workers in German schools [were] taught from schoolbooks from the junta that distort history and glorify the dictatorship,” these Bundestagarians questioned the legal basis for such instruction.76

Concerns over these textbooks reflected how citizenship was supposed to be defined for foreign citizens living in West Germany. These children were likely permanent residents, but they were citizens of another country without any realistic possibility of becoming German citizens.77 As these children and their education become a hot political and media issue, their place in West German society and their rights became a widely contested subject. The debate partly centered on minority rights, exploring the question of how foreign the children should be or how fully they should integrate in the name of individual rights and for the benefit of society. For West German politicians and educators, the question centered around the changing meaning of citizenship.

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Part of the controversy over consular instruction arose because of the political nature of education. The Federal Republic’s government claimed that considerations about the schooling of children with non-German citizenship focused on pedagogical concerns and was not a political matter. Yet, as John Dewey, Pierre Bourdieu, and countless other scholars before and after them have shown, education was (and is) inherently political. The goal of education may have been to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic, but the content of lessons and schoolbooks reflected a political agenda. Many state governments controlled textbook production directly, with Ministries of Education printing the materials (i.e. Greece and Turkey). Others, like West Germany and Italy, allowed private organizations to develop the materials but required state approval. These materials, from the first class upward, depicted government and civil society, described politics, and outlined the meaning of concepts like “family.” The books designed for use in social studies, first readers, and early history books had clear political connections, as they described a country’s founding fathers or mothers and celebrated national poets. School materials for chemistry or math were not as explicit, but sample exercises listed units in Deutsch Marks or Lira and provided exercises featuring the number of bullets used in military maneuvers. For migrants’ education, in turn, foreign relations and internal affairs played a direct influence in the perception of what was in the pedagogical interest of the children. Regardless of the Federal

78 Lederer, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der BRD” (Bonn: Auswärtige Amt, February 17, 1972), B 93, Bd. 745, PA AA; and Auswärtige Amt to Bundespressestelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,” March 7, 1972, B 93, Bd. 745, PA AA.

Republic’s government’s claims, decidedly political interests also influenced the shape of school initiatives as well as the willingness of any given group to fund the programs.\(^{80}\)

Although the West German and international Education Administrations were well aware of the cultural components of education, they nonetheless initially overlooked the centrality of discussions of civil participation, political parties, and voting in teaching citizenship (depending on the country). In consular instruction, schoolchildren with foreign citizenship in West Germany would, theoretically, learn not only what it meant to belong to a particular national ethnicity, but also about the political systems in which they were going to someday be active participants. Yet, some political stances or parties acceptable abroad were not socially acceptable or even legal in West Germany. In particular, the Federal Government had banned the Communist Party in 1956 and, of course, continued to denounce fascism and authoritarian regimes.\(^{81}\)

With the recall of Greek teachers, and worried about what a Greek authoritarian military government might teach its pupils, several West German politicians and education administrators wavered in their support of consular instruction. The fascist Spanish and Portuguese governments had signed agreements about cultural contact before sending teachers to West Germany, as had communist Yugoslavia.\(^{82}\) In contrast, the Greek government had undergone a transformation from a democratic to a military government that terrified many West German


\(^{82}\) For more on the cultural contracts, see collection 97 in PA AA.
politicians in the wake of social and student unrest in 1968.\textsuperscript{83} Added to that, there were a growing number of consular courses across the country, meaning that these possible messages received wider dissemination. In response, the West German public media, politicians, and school administrators demanded to know what foreign schoolbooks said and about foreign teachers’ lesson plans.\textsuperscript{84} In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the Cultural Committee debated whether, given that the foreign ministries of education from the so-called guest worker countries (including Greece) selected consular teachers, who were then often paid by the relevant West German state, it was possible that these teachers held divided loyalties.\textsuperscript{85} This split loyalty could lead them to try and undermine West German ideals and goals. To clear up the issue, some politicians on both the national and regional levels suggested that schoolteachers from foreign countries be required to take loyalty oaths, swearing their adherence to the West German constitution. They argued that if Greek or other foreign teachers received funding from the West German Ministries of Education, they needed to adhere to the sentiments expressed in the West German constitution.\textsuperscript{86}


\textsuperscript{86} For a selection of media responses, see “Auch Ausländer müssen Grundrecht achten,” \textit{Landespresse- und Informationsamt}, January 27, 1972; “NRW: Kein fremder Einfluss auf deutsche Schulen,” \textit{Landespresse- und Informationsamt}, February 8, 1972; “Antidemokratische importe nicht dulden”; and “Kontroverse um griechische
Several organizations and institutions sent the Education Administrations recommendations on how to combat anti-democratic messages. In 1972, the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB), in a letter representative of many of those recommendations, put forward a possible solution. The Union suggested instituting a rule that teachers not be permitted to be recalled by the relevant foreign government for basing their instructional message on the FRG’s constitution, but to allow dismissal for teaching anti-democratic materials. They further demanded that the Länder Education Administrations take an active part of the supervision, selection, and final acceptance of the teachers.

The Länder Educational Administrations already had the right to visit classes and examine textbooks. Yet they rarely had the staff with the language skills necessary to perform such reviews and “cases would be difficult to establish.” Furthermore, as the West German Foreign Office pointed out in October 1971 in a letter to all the Länder Ministers of Education, bilateral relationships with West Germany’s partner countries and preparation for return necessitated the continued employment of consular teachers. The teachers never would have to take loyalty oaths in West Germany. Nonetheless, to reassure local citizens and the Bundestag,

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87 Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, “DGB-Forderung unden zum Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,” DGB-Nachrichten-Dienst (Düsseldorf: Bundespressestelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, February 8, 1972), B 93, Bd. 745, PA AA.

88 Ibid.

89 Nonetheless their service under the West German school system did entail adherence to the West German Constitution and Basic Law See Deutscher Bundestag, “Drs. VI/3468.”

90 Kultusministerium NRW, “Erfahrungsbericht über den Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer” (Düsseldorf, July 20, 1973), NW 388-33, Landesarchiv NRW. I did not see any of these claims in the archives I visited, but it is possible they existed. See also Lederer, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der BRD”; and Auswärtige Amt to Bundespressestelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer.”

91 Kultusministerium NRW, “Erfahrungsbericht über den Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer.”
North Rhine-Westphalia’s Cultural Administration declared in 1972 that “foreign teachers misusing their positions to incite against a free democratic basic order would be released from their positions.”

While the Länder Educational Administrations could not monitor what teachers said in every class, they could examine the textbooks that the foreign Ministries of Culture sent to West Germany. Yet, as with the teachers, when the outcry against possible anti-democratic messages began in 1969 the Länder initially had no capacity to actually examine the books. Several began by analyzing the pictorial content, which was judged to contain nothing inappropriate, even if the images were often militaristic. With a general need across the country, the Kultusministerkonferenz’s Education Committee decided to take action and perform an in-depth examination of the materials. The KMK established a small committee, including representatives from Hesse, Schleswig Holstein, and North Rhine-Westphalia. The committee asked the Georg-Eckert Institute for International Schoolbook Research (GEI) to join, but Georg Eckert responded that the Schoolbook Institute did not have any staff capable of reading the necessary Greek. Eckert, an SPD member and historian from Braunschweig who had founded the institute in 1951, was nonetheless interested in “participating in a theoretical way.”

92 Ibid. Domhof would send a letter to the regional presidents telling them to alert him to any “anti-democratic, fascist propaganda material taught by Greek teachers,” but the problems raised were never more than minor (Kultusministerium NRW to Regierungspräsidenten, “Schulunterricht für Kinder griechischer Arbeitnehmer,” October 9, 1970, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW).

93 Georg Eckert (1912-1974), SPD member and historian from Braunschweig founded an institute for international schoolbook research in 1951 with the political nature of textbooks in mind. Later chair of the German UNESCO-Commission, Eckert promoted international cooperation in the understanding of history and hosted multiple bilateral and international schoolbook conferences. Seeking to promote peace, Eckert’s institute encouraged communication between different countries on textbook content and development. For information on the current state of the institution, see “Georg-Eckert-Institut – Leibniz-Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung,” October 21, 2013, http://www.gei.de/.

94 The “Arbeitssitzung von der Sacherständiggengruppe "Griechische Schulbücher"” met for the first time 27 May 1971 (Sekretariat der KMK, “Arbeitssitzung von der Sacherständiggengruppe ‘Griechische Schulbücher’” (KMK,
With no one inside the Länder Ministries of Culture capable of performing the analysis, North Rhine-Westphalia commissioned Principal Beckmann to examine the presentation of history, democracy, and politics in a Greek sixth-grade civics textbook. Beckmann, who had taught at a German School in Athens between 1957 and 1967, focused on the tone of the text. His report described the volume as naïve as well as highly nationalistic and Christo-Hellenic. From the first page onward, the book directed children to “celebrate their history” and told them how “the Greek national governments [had], in all its actions, the everlasting, immortal Helleno-Christian ideals in view.”

 Nonetheless, if more extreme than the West German committee preferred, Beckmann informed the committee that the book’s politics did not contravene West Germany’s Basic Law. The book celebrated democracy in theory, but claimed that democratic freedoms had to be limited as otherwise people would be unable to live together. The text also explicitly decried both communism and fascism, presenting the period from 1941 to 1949 as one of trials and repression, first from the Nazi hordes that invaded and then by the “Slavo-communisists.” The Communist Party was “illegal in our country as their entire ideology is anti-national.” While the book celebrated the Greek army that had heroically battled the Communist dictators, the textbook warned that “the Communist threat was not over, but continued to work in secret” and that “everything suggested that a communist storm [would] soon break out.” Though in West

May 27, 1972), B 304/2057/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). The GEI also did not have the time or resources to hire anyone.


96 Beckmann, “‘Erziehung des Bürgers’ (für Schüler der 6. Volksschulklasse) von Antonius Anreas Tsitimbas, Athen 1969, “ 1970, 143 N Zg. 2009/069, Nr. 179, NLA. The text included multiple descriptions of how “God gave freedom to people as a gift.” The children would also read “We Greeks must in our personal, familial, and social lives keep to the noble teachings of our church, with Christ as our guide and ruler of our beings.”
Germany Willi Brandt had embarked on Ostpolitik, the Communist Party was still illegal and Communism a threat – a stance which theoretically agreed with the Greek text.97

The communist threat the Greek texts warned about also concerned West German politicians and educators, which raised questions about Italian schoolbooks. Italian membership in the European Community overshadowed the majority of politicians’ concerns about the Italian government or possible lessons contravening the West German Federal and Länder constitutions. Nonetheless, particularly as social unrest grew in Italy during the “Years of Lead,” some West Germans worried about Italy’s Communist Party (PCI).98 The Communist Party was legal and quite alive within the Republic of Italy, and some politicians in Cold War West Germany found the specter of Communist revolution particularly frightening. As the Communist Party gained influence (earning over a quarter of the votes in the 1968 and 1972 elections), the Cold War West German governments and media occasionally voiced concern about the possibility of communist ideology affecting schoolchildren.99

Interestingly, West German politicians and educational administrators were not overly anxious about the political changes going on in Turkey with regards to schooling. There were those politicians and media groups in West Germany who did express their concerns vis-à-vis Turkish language materials. They worried that, given the military takeover in Turkey, the state schoolbooks could once again contain anti-democratic messages. But, in contrast to Greece’s

97 Ibid. For more on Brandt’s Ostpolitik, see for example Carole Fink and Bernd Schäfer, Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and Global Responses (Washington D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 2009).


99 The Italian state's investment did not necessarily mean that the various families and children with Italian citizenship were as invested in integrating and becoming part of a new, European citizenship. Indeed, many families sought – just as many Greek or Turkish families did – to maintain a strictly “Italian” identity and to this end used some of the preparatory classes (Vorbereitungsklassen and Übergangsklassen) as small Italian schools.
coup, in the early 1970s the Turkish military was largely considered a secular, anti-communist force reigning in political corruption. The fact that the military rapidly returned the government to secular control also contributed to a positive West German perception of Turkey’s successive coups. Furthermore, the GEI had a long-standing relationship with the Turkish Ministry of Culture and had been exchanging textbooks since the 1950s. Consequently, despite successive coups and government instability, West German politicians and educators were more concerned about unrest among the adult population than schoolbooks or teachers.

In the end, despite reservations, the Federal Government agreed with the Länder committee and judged the schoolbooks sent from the various foreign ministries of education acceptable, if nationalistic. In 1972, the Federal Bundestag and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution examined excerpted translations of the school materials for any conflicts with the West German Constitution, and the investigation revealed no “prosecutable offenses.” even if they had found problematic content, as the Federal Ministry of Education explained to concerned Bundestagarians, it would have only led to banned texts in the truly extreme cases. The Federal Government took the stance that “return [was] under no circumstances to be made more difficult.” The materials were “based on the curricula of the sending country, to be used for the schoolchildren of that country” which encouraged


101 Sekretariat der KMK, “Arbeitssitzung von Der Sacherständiggengruppe ‘Griechische Schulbücher.’”

102 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz.
reintegration. Banning them or restricting foreign teachers would impede return and were consequently to be accepted.

Regardless, many educators continued to express reservations about the texts even as they accepted the texts. Articulating the sentiment of his colleagues in 1971, Georg Eckert opined that foreign schoolbooks would necessarily “express the stance of repressive regimes.” Nonetheless, he also felt that it would be unwise to prohibit Greek-, Portuguese-, or Spanish-language textbooks. Always aware of pragmatic considerations, Eckert pointed out that it was unfeasible to quickly create new foreign language or German texts. Additionally, as the West German Foreign Office also warned, any changes would also affect West Germany’s bilateral relationships with other nations.

To handle the issue without causing an international crisis or preventing preparation for return, several West German groups decided to develop their own materials for the permanent minority communities, usually in collaboration with the relevant foreign consulates. Among others, with funding from the Länders Education Administrations, the Schoolbook Institute in Soest (North Rhine-Westphalia) started working on materials. In collaboration with Hesse and representatives from the relevant consulates, the Soest Schoolbook Institute eventually produced materials to be used in consular instruction as well as in primary and lower secondary education. Nonetheless, consular teachers continued to use materials from the countries of

103 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drs. VI/3468.”


105 See Hermann, “Prüfung Fremdsprachlicher Schulbücher Für Kinder Ausländischer Arbeitnehmer im Rahmen Der KMK” (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, October 19, 1979), B 304/3286, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
origin in native language and cultural courses for a number of years, particularly in the Länderein which the countries of citizenship paid for the bulk of the instruction (as in Baden-Württemberg).

The materials the Ländere funded could, however, only be employed in preparation classes or consular classes funded directly by the Ländere governments. Ländere such as Baden-Württemberg, which only subsidized consular classes, had no control over class content. Consular teachers in those Ländere usually continued to use textbooks from the relevant country of citizenship. Those state governments, however, also developed new instructional materials. Those materials also were improving by leaps and bounds as printing technology improved. New textbooks and exercise materials were printed on better paper, included more imagery, and employed new methodologies. But, with the exception of Bavaria, the Ländere would not regularly examine the material.106

The controversy over foreign textbooks highlights the contradictions and complications within West German official policy towards minority populations. Many individuals in government agreed that many, if not most, members of the various ethnic minority groups in the country were going to be permanent residents. That belief, combined with the individual right to an education, meant inclusion in West German schools on the same basis as host country nationals. Yet, pressure for return and the right to maintain minority identities meant that the schoolchildren should have access, at the least, to the consular instruction that explicitly taught children how to be foreign. Consequently, these complex pressures meant that the different Federal and Ländere governments encouraged West German residents – many of whom were born in the Federal Republic – to learn to be “foreign” or “non-German” despite the distaste of many conservative politicians for foreign influences in West German schools. In consequence, as

106 Ibid.
the 1970s progressed, children with non-German citizenship were increasingly pressured to complete a West German secondary school certificate while building a non-German identity, leading to further strains on the integrative measures in place.

**Citizenship Status and Equalizing Access from Primary through Secondary Schooling**

In line with those divided goals and the European Community’s 1968 Directive on freedom of movement, the *Kultusministerkonferenz* members agreed on and published a new set of Recommendations for the “instruction of the children of foreign workers” in December 1971.\(^{107}\) Claiming that “foreign schoolchildren had the same social and legal status as German schoolchildren,” the new Recommendations focused on facilitating school access. They outlined revised guidelines for preparing new migrant and minority children for integration into the West German classroom as well as for language maintenance.\(^{108}\) Even with that agreement, however, local laws and practices came into conflict with the assumption of equality. The different Education Administrations’ school initiatives specified specific communities or individuals for state support. Despite the rhetoric of inclusion, distinct groups were singled out for inclusion or exclusion.

The continued claims that all children should be covered or included under compulsory schooling laws at the international and local levels were contradicted by the laws in place. Their language limited their coverage, despite many of their authors’ intents to cover every child. For the West German governments, while discussing the education of foreign children generally, the laws usually only covered the children of migrant workers specifically. On the European

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Community level, restrictions in jurisdiction often meant that recommendations intended for all children usually specified European Community Member State nationals. Beyond those specifications, however, several governments, trying to provide the best education for the most number of schoolchildren, chose to focus on some groups and not others. Equality for all was limited by pragmatism, jurisdiction, and wording.

Even the Kultusministerkonferenz’s 1971 Recommendations, which promoted integration and equality, fell short of ensuring equal treatment without regard to background and citizenship. The KMK’s members felt that each Länder Education Administration implementing the 1964 Recommendations in different ways arguably led to inequalities. In addition, the KMK’s members wanted new Recommendations on education for guest worker children to meet contemporary needs. Deciding to standardize Länder efforts across the country, the KMK directed the Secretary of the Kultusministerkonferenz, Franz Domhof, to lead a sub-committee on the issue.109 As primary author of the eventual December 1971 Recommendations, he claimed that the KMK’s main goal regarding “foreign children and youths” was “to enable successful participation in German schools.” As such, new Recommendations were supposed to help “realize educational opportunities in the German school system.” The classes outlined in the regulations, however, were not for “foreign children,” but rather for “the children of foreign guest workers.” At the time, this diverse group constituted the majority of West Germany’s minority groups, but that stipulation meant that the small but slowly-growing groups from places like Japan or India were excluded.110


110 Those eight countries included Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia.
To promote the *Kultusministerkonferenz*’s goals and to respond to contemporary needs, the new 1971 Recommendations expanded on the 1964 version. The Recommendations promoted improved teaching materials for both German and native language textbooks and additional teacher training for foreign language instruction. In addition, the 1971 Recommendations provided suggestions for redesigning preparatory classes specifically to facilitate the transition into the West German classroom. Where previously the instruction had been divided into two-thirds and one-third, new guidelines pushed the integrational aspects of the programs by stipulating that consular teachers provide only half of the instruction. The other half, taught by a German teacher, focused on German language instruction. The guidelines also recommended that preparatory classes be taught in conjunction with local schools. Ideally, the guidelines suggested organizing the classes so that the children enrolled therein could take subjects like music (less dependent on language of instruction) with their age group in the regular classroom.111 “Thereby” Domhof claimed, “the beginnings of communication should successfully get off the ground and friendships develop between the German and foreign children,” thus avoiding “ghettoization.”112

The 1971 Recommendations did not exclude consular instruction, but relegated cultural maintenance to a secondary goal with reservations. The authors recommended integrating native language and cultural instruction directly into the classroom, as North Rhine-Westphalia had attempted to do, so that children would not be overburdened. The goal, however, was supposed

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111 An idea already being implemented in North Rhine-Westphalia.

to predominately be cultural maintenance, not necessarily preparation for reintegration upon return migration, unless those were the parents’ explicit goals.\textsuperscript{113}

Part of the 1971 Recommendations’ reserved support for reintegration preparation stemmed from several Education Administrations’ uncertainty over whether it was even possible to integrate and receive an education equal to the ethno-national majority if the children were also preparing for reintegration.\textsuperscript{114} According to these Education Administrations, including North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg’s Ministries of Education, children were reportedly overburdened by the “double goal” of integration and cultural maintenance. Pointing to regional school board reports, several of the Education Administrations’ representatives felt that extra consular instruction led to exhaustion, especially when preparing for return.\textsuperscript{115} Where most young children with West German citizenship had half-day schooling, with around eighteen hours of instruction, particularly in primary school, many children with non-German citizenship had an extra five hours. With permission for extra consular instruction in order to support return migration, some children with non-German citizenship, particularly those with Greek citizenship, often had upwards of 30 hours a week.\textsuperscript{116}

As all of its member states grappled with the question of defining and regulating equality of opportunity in the 1970s, the European Community became increasingly involved in the
question. Although the EC was limited in its jurisdiction to Member State Nationals, those individuals were entitled, based on the 1968 European Community Directive on freedom of movement (1612/68), to equal school access. The question of what that equal access meant would lead to a 1974 court case in the European Court of Justice that would influence the direction of the European Community as a whole.

The case, Danato Casagrande v. the City of Munich, was, on its surface, about whether state support for attending higher levels of secondary school could be offered only to host country citizens. The plaintiff, Casagrande Donato (born 29 December 1953), was a young Italian national who had migrated to Bavaria with his father, who had subsequently died. During the 1971/72 school year (at age 17/18), Casagrande attended the Fridtjof-Nansen-Realschule in Munich and applied for state support allocated for “youths [in higher levels of secondary school] without sufficient means.” While Casagrande had clear financial need, the Fridtjof-Nansen-Realschule denied his request, as the relevant Bavarian law specified “Germans, … stateless persons, or aliens benefiting from the right to asylum” as the intended recipients. Casagrande took the case to court, arguing that the law discriminated based on national background, thus contravening anti-discrimination treaties and EEC directive 1612/68 Article 12. In accepting the case, the European Court of Justice had to determine if Article 12 of Directive 1612/68 could be read as not only admittance to education “on the same basis as host country nationals,” but also

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“general measures intended to facilitate educational attendance.” On 11 February 1974, the Bavarian Administrative Court referred the case to the European Court of Justice.

While the European Court of Justice did not have jurisdiction over national law, it ruled based on EEC Treaty, Article 177 that it was within its rights to “supply the national court with the principles of interpretation arising from Community law” that could influence the assessment of national law. Furthermore, under the EEC Treaty, Article 189, the Court determined that all acts of institutions (regulations) had a “binding force regarding national authorities.” Finally, while the Court of Justice could not actually rule on Bavarian law, it was entitled to judge whether Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 referred to “measures relating to educational grants.” In many ways, the case was exploring the EEC’s reach into national culture and education, which was theoretically solely under the jurisdiction of the nation-state.

In examining the reach of Directive 1612/68 in 1974, the European Court of Justice had to decide what the Directive’s wording meant in practice. The Court decided that, as the host country was to “encourage all efforts to enable such children to attend courses” including secondary school classes “under the best possible conditions,” Article 12 applied to grants as well as general attendance. Funding, the judges felt, was a part of those conditions. On that basis,


121 Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt Munich, 1974 European Court Reports (European Court of Justice 1974).
in its final decision the European Court of Justice interpreted Article 12 of 1612/68 as “guaranteeing to the children in question equality with regard to all the rights arising from admission to Education.” Casagrande was entitled to the 70 Deutsch Marks a month.

What is particularly interesting about the Casagrande case is how it extended the reach of European Economic Community Directive 1612/68. In its formulation, the EEC Member State representatives had hardly imagined that it might be used to apply the EEC’s treaties on anti-discrimination beyond the labor force. Instead, having viewed education as important, the members had included Article 12 in part with an interest in family rights (in particular the right to reunification) and job training. The European Community’s member states claimed that “the right of freedom of movement, in order that it may be exercised, by objective standards, in freedom and dignity, requires ... that obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated, in particular as regards the worker’s right to be joined by his family and the conditions for the integration of the family into the host country.” As a prerequisite to vocational training, schooling was a part of that.

With the Casagrande decision, the European Court of Justice effectively included education under all of the various European Community treaties and protections. Previously, the ban on discrimination had only applied to employees who were mentioned in the treaties. With the Casagrande case (9/74), the European Court of Justice expanded the reach of the treaties.


123 Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt Munich, 1974 European Court Reports (European Court of Justice 1974).

124 At the time of that case (1974), education was not covered by the treaties (Ibid).
prohibition to persons not currently in the labor market. The ruling in 9/74 thus made discrimination against persons in the educational system illegal. Effectively, the Court sought to ensure the right to education.

The court decision was part of a move among the European Community’s six Member States in the early 1970s towards a “European model of culture correlating with European integration.” The six wanted to expand the Communities’ parameters from existence as a common market to a “much larger idea of the community” specifically including education. The European Community’s 1972 summit built on the idea, emphasizing the “human dimension of Community integration.” With that spirit, the EC decided to establish its first social action program and briefly explored the possibility of developing a European-wide model of education. While dropping any attempt to develop such a model when the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined in 1973, further meetings confirmed that there was “an interest in and need to establish cooperation in the field of national education and to deal with education problems at community level within that framework.” The education of the children of migrant workers was particularly important because of its association with ensuring equality for


126 The European Court of Justice’s case Angelo Alaimo v Préfet du Rhône (68/74) from 29 January 1974 reiterated the sentiment, declaring that “children of migrant workers who are nationals of a Member State and employed on the territory of another Member State to be treated in the same way as children of the nationals of that State as regards educational allowances and grants. See .” Commission of the European Communities, “Information on the Court of Justice of the European Communities. No. XVII. 403/X/75.E.”


128 See Ibid., 61–62. For more on the European Schools see, for example, collection B 90 Bd. 1188 in PA AA.

migrant workers and their families from Community Member states, who still made up a large portion of migrant workers.

The European Community’s expansion of its ban on discrimination to persons not yet in the labor market and its desire to function as a “much larger … community” demonstrated the changes in assumptions about what was local versus international. While each country theoretically had a right to self-determination, international opinion and law directly influenced how a state viewed its right to establish the parameters of a government’s relationship to its residents and citizens. As an inalienable right, it was no longer acceptable – either legally or socially – to provide different educational opportunities for citizens versus “foreigners.” As North Rhine-Westphalia and Berlin’s efforts demonstrate, however, that acceptability did not necessarily lead to all children having equal access in practice. Location and individual circumstances continued to shape a child’s choices.

Despite general agreement among the European Community and West German Education Administrations that all children needed equality of opportunity and access, in implementation actors often decided to concentrate resources on specific groups. Worried that the children would receive a “ghetto” education unless properly integrated, North Rhine-Westphalia’s SPD government responded to problems with preparatory classes by turning their focus to younger children.\footnote{In North Rhine-Westphalia, CDU and NPD politicians pointed to the rights of West German parents and teachers, but the SPD-government focused on concerns regarding the possible disadvantage of the children of migrant workers in the Federal Republic.} The Ministry of Education obliquely announced that there was little-to-no hope for older migrant children to succeed in the West German system.\footnote{Landtag NRW, “Drucksache 7/3137: Antwort der Landesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage 1052 der Abg. Doris Altewischer (CDU) betr.: Berufsschulpflichtige Ausländer” (Düsseldorf: Landtag NRW, October 12, 1973); and Landtag NRW, “Drucksache 7/2837: Antwort der Landesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage 1066 der Abg. van Nes Ziegler (SPD) betr.: Anteil ausländischer Schüler an Grund- und Hauptschulen des Landes” (Düsseldorf: Landtag NRW, June 27, 1973).}
children who did have a chance were those who were born in the country or migrated before they were seven or eight (well in time to prepare for secondary school). To facilitate these children’s educations and ensure their equality of opportunity led to Ministry support locally developed projects for pre-school and young school children. Among them, the state government financed the expansion of the Denkendorf Modell (named for the location of development), which promoted pre-school and young language acquisition.132

The Denkendorf Modell reflected the conclusions of the Council of Europe and Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education. The 1969 Meeting of the European-Ministers of Education focused largely on the nursery school and primary school in relation to the demands of educational opportunity for all. This conference put forward the idea of pre-school education being increasingly important in compensating for a child’s socio-economic background in an attempt to set them on equal footing. They specified that this was a particularly important issue for the “children of migrant worker” who “have special needs.”133

The City of Berlin took a different approach, concentrating within instead of across citizenship lines. Berlin's social democratic government placed the guarantee of equality of opportunity for children with West German citizenship above any claims of children with foreign citizenship. In some areas of the city, such as in Kreuzberg, the number of children with non-German citizenship had risen to the point where they began to reach upwards of 20 percent in local schools. Several Berlin politicians and the Education Administration feared that the ethno-

132 The 1973 Denkendorf Modell for Language Assistance was premised on the idea that the number of “foreign children” was growing, particularly with in country births. The specific problems of foreign children in German classes are obvious. They need to learn the language – and that as early as possible so that they may someday learn a vocation. See “Sprachhilfe für ausländische Kinder: Denkendorfer Modell,” Bericht über das erste Arbeitsjahr, (November 1973); and Gert Bürgel, “Intensive Bemühungen um Ausländer-Integration: Kein Getto in Denkendorf: Ein Nahziel: Hauptschulabschluß für die Kinder,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, September 13, 1975.

133 The other main topic was the educational needs of the “less academically gifted child” (“European-Ministers of Education - 6th Conference,” Education and Culture, no. 10 (Summer 1969): 3).
national majority’s education might be endangered as a teacher’s time could be taken up by new migrant children needs. On these grounds, the major political groups and local school boards debated the efficacy of the established measures. Some argued that allowing the children increased access to mother language instruction would better enable them to maintain cultural connections and also mean less time in West German schools, benefitting children with German citizenship.\textsuperscript{134}

In a controversial move the West Berlin government decided to cap the percentage of children with non-German citizenship allowed in any one regular classroom. Ostensibly for the benefit of both “German” and “foreign” schoolchildren, the Social Democratic Senator for Education, Gerd Löffler (Member of the Berlin \textit{Bundestag} from 1963-1990 and Senator for Education between 1970 and 1975)\textsuperscript{135} used studies claiming that foreign children “as a rule did not integrate successfully if there were more than 15 percent in a single class” to support his stance. To deal with the overflow, the state briefly considered bussing “in order to instruct the foreign schoolchildren in other schools” like the Americans did.\textsuperscript{136} The School Administrations only rarely employed that solution. Instead, the Senate decided that developing classes for only children with foreign citizenship (when regular classes reached up to 20 “percent foreign

\textsuperscript{134}Landtag von BW, “31. Sitzung des Landtags: Punkt 17 der Tagesordnung.” Neither North Rhine-Westphalia nor Baden-Württemberg seriously implemented the quota system, although they did encourage schools to limit the number of schoolchildren with non-German citizenship in any one class.

\textsuperscript{135}Löffler (1927-2004), who studied Education Research and Political Science, served as Senator für Wissenschaft und Kunst between 1975 and 1977. He was head of the \textit{Volkshochschule} Schöneberg until 1970.

schoolchildren”), regardless of their length of stay in Germany or linguistic competencies, to be a more appropriate course of action.\(^{137}\)

Even as the European Court of Justice decided in Casagrande’s favor, several of the European Community Member States were buckling down on new migration. Between 1973 and 1974, the EC Members States ended their programs for labor migration, tightening their borders in response to world-wide recession and the 1973 Oil Crisis. Throughout Europe, those changes would influence the tone of discussions on migrants’ places in their host countries and hence their education. The growing emphasis on migration would become central to the discussion and – in connection – minority rights and cultural maintenance would become paramount.

Nonetheless, as the Casagrande case also highlights, the question of higher levels of secondary school was becoming a marker of equality. Before the case, in West Germany the discussions on access and integration focused almost exclusively on primary and lower secondary schooling. After all, as Domhof pointed out to a meeting of the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministers in 1973, a high proportion of these children did not attend a West German school long enough to complete any secondary school certificate.\(^{138}\) Some children with non-German citizenship, however, did enroll in Realschule and Gymnasium (as depicted in Table 4.1). As the decade rolled on, that number rose, as did the assumption that part of equal opportunity was enrollment in high levels of secondary education as well as completion of a secondary school certificate.


Conclusion

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, most of the Länder Education Administrations, as well as the members of the European Community, agreed that education for all children was supposed to be equal. Part of that claim was rooted in the perception of human rights, but the galvanizing concern was the probable permanency of a large portion of the states’ new minority groups. Neither the host country nor country of citizenship governments wanted to develop an underclass through a “ghetto education.” The state governments had to decide what equal access meant and how different these groups remained.

The intent to educate all foreigners on the same basis as host country nationals was, however, still tied to the question of citizenship. Public education was supposed to teach young children how to be good citizens – the meaning of which differed depending on the form of the state government. Some West German educators and politicians had encouraged children to prepare for return. That suggested that the children were, in theory, learning a different kind of citizenship and social participation than children in West German schools. West German citizenship laws rarely allowed non-ethnic Germans to naturalize, but the prospect of permanent or long-term residents learning the citizenship standards for another state, possibly bringing in foreign influences, also did not sit well with many West German politicians. Without a legal reason to prevent them, the state had to, within certain parameters, permit those outside influences.

The legal ramifications of citizenship also influenced educational opportunity. European Community Directives and court decisions technically applied to Member State nationals. The West German Kultusministerkonferenz’s Recommendations, in turn, specified support for the children of foreign workers. Although the protections and guarantees of the associated
regulations and policies were often extended to other citizen groups, local communities and schools had no obligation to do so.

Even as the different local and foreign governments involved specified, equivocated, and temporized, the situation for the children of migrant workers did actually improve. As the system shifted and changed, as bars for success rose, state support made it easier for many individual children to reach higher levels of secondary schooling or even complete their certificates. Cases like Danato Casagrande v. the City of Munich expanded the definition of equality, ensuring that more children actually had a wider range of education opportunities.

In 1974, a Greek father appealed to the regional school administration in Cologne (North Rhine-Westphalia) for permission to place his son back in a Greek national preparatory class. The boy had already spent the legal maximum of two years in a preparatory class, after which his father had sent him to Greece to continue a Greek education. Wanting his son close, the father brought his son back to West Germany, but still intended for the entire family to someday return to Greece. On that basis, he requested permission for his son to continue past the time limit in preparatory class. North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education denied the father’s request, arguing that the boy’s residence in the Federal Republic was clearly of some duration and he needed to be prepared in the West German system as necessitated by West German law. Consular instruction would have to suffice for the boy’s national-cultural training.\(^1\)

Although the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education’s answer, that the child with a long duration of residence in West Germany needed to integrate, was standard at the time, the emphasis on minority rights began to shift after the 1973 Recruitment Stop. With the recession, political and social pressure mounted precipitously to encourage children and their families to return to their countries of origin. The 1973 Oil Crisis and subsequent Recruitment Stop influenced people’s attitudes, transforming the ethno-national majority’s perception of large minority groups as being economically beneficial to being an economic hindrance, a possible second class in a supposedly classless society. The Recruitment Stop was supposed to reduce the

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number of non-nationals in the country, and while it did briefly, by 1975 West Germany’s minority groups were again growing. This time, however, instead of predominately workers, the migrants were spouses and children as well as extended family members.

In consequence, the second goal from the Kultusministerkonferenz’s recommendations regarding the instruction of children of migrant workers, namely maintaining cultural connections, received increasing attention. Responding to the growth in families, political parties began to take sides in the debate on the arriving children’s education. Although there was continual dissention within the parties, the Social Democratic party claimed that the children of migrant workers needed to integrate and maintain their status as minorities, while the Christian Democrats pressed to encourage return. According to both foreign consulates and West German politicians, preparation for return migration meant that the children of migrant workers needed to be able to reintegrate smoothly into their parents’ countries of origin, including their school systems.

The entry of the public into the discussion and tension over return added additional elements of chaos to debates on the public schooling of the children of migrant workers. Although the Länder Education Administrations had been developing programs for non-nationals for two decades, for many the 1970s were a test period. Government administrations and schools ordered pilot programs and research into the issue. The Council of Europe and the European Community, in turn, set aside monies to support pilot programs encouraging both integration and mother language development. None of the actors, from state government to education researchers, had much information at hand. What was clear was that no matter how

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2 For a discussion of the major West German parties and their stance on immigration, see Beauftragter für die Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen, Bericht zur Ausländerpolitik (Bonn, 1984), 39–48; and Klaudia Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien: Akzeptanz und Abwehr von Migranten im Widerstreit in der Programmatik von SPD, FDP, den Grünen und CDU/CSU (Berlin: LIT, 2008).
many migrants left, a large minority would remain in West Germany as well as in other European host countries. And, while almost impossible to enforce, international minority rights law stipulated that minorities had the right to remain minorities and also to pass cultures, languages, and beliefs on to their children.3

The question of return was consequently tied together with the concept of national identity and minority rights, particularly in regards to the children and grandchildren of migrant groups born in the host countries. Yet, neither the different state governments involved nor the diverse minority groups agreed on what it meant to be a minority or the effect their status as minorities should have on education. Parent groups and the major sending country governments disagreed on the form new school initiatives should take, demanding programs to fit their specific interests. Stressing which aspects of their identities they thought vital to maintain, these groups put pressure on West German governments to create space for the development and maintenance of a national conscious, even as they constantly redefined what that identity entailed. Other parent and governmental groups felt that second- and third-generation children were, at their core, more “German” than “foreign,” begging the question of whether they should continue to be considered foreigners at all.

Greek Plans for Return Migration and new Bilingual School Programs

North Rhine-Westphalia’s school administrations continually received demands from parents passed on by local schools and District Presidents for permission to attend preparatory classes for longer than the approved one or two years. In 1975, several parent groups wrote directly to the Ministry of Education laying out their desire to maintain their cultural heritage. In the Greek Parent Committee of Dortmund’s 1975 memorandum, the members explained that, just because they were going to remain in West Germany for a long time, that did not mean that they wanted to integrate. “Greeks,” they explained, “have a long history of migration and always go home again.” In a move that many parent groups and governmental bodies used, the parents referenced international regulations and treaties, explaining that their desires “were not a nationalistic declaration” but in line with “UNESCO’s emphasis on the right to maintain national identity, peculiarities, and traditions,” which the “Kultusministerkonferenz’s decisions at least theoretically supported.” The few hours in Greek instruction, history, and religion planned were in no way sufficient to support national consciousness.4

Regardless of their future plans, many parents wanted to pass on their own cultures and languages to their children. For Greek parents who wanted to go back, the possibility of return made a Greek education important because of school certificate equivalency issues.5 As this example shows, even parents who did not plan to return to Greece imminently often wanted extensive access to consular instruction. These families argued that they had the right as minorities to maintain their mother tongue and culture, often citing international laws and


5 As discussed in Chapter 3.
Some parents wanted the local state to support those rights. After all, as one Greek parents group pointed out, they paid taxes in West Germany, which made the Federal Republic responsible for their welfare regardless of citizenship. According to these parents, those taxes, together with the possibility that – after return to Greece – they might come back again to West Germany, meant that the North Rhine-Westphalian government – not the Greek government – needed to grant their demands.⁷

For the West German Education Administrations, that appeal demanded consideration. The Recruitment Stop in November 1973 had been implemented with the intention of not only limiting new migration, but encouraging those workers and their families already in the country to leave.⁸ The Greek families demanding their cultural rights couched their requests not only in the language of international law, but also within a framework of West German political and economic aims.⁹ Most of the Länder Education Administrations preferred to facilitate integration, but they could not ignore the political and social pressures exerted by local and foreign governments as well as interested migrant and minority parent groups. That concern was particularly salient in light of new psychological research claiming that children would be healthier and perform better in school if they learned their native language and were not cut off from their cultural backgrounds.¹⁰ The Länder Education Administrations thus had to decide if

⁶ Discussed below.
⁷ The parents had had renewable residency permits (Förderung von griech. Arbeitnehmern in Düsseldorf and Ioannis Floros to Kultusminister NRW, November 20, 1974, NW 388-35, Landesarchiv NRW).
they wanted to implement new programs to facilitate return migration and just what was in the best interest of the child.

For the West German Greek diaspora in the mid- and late 1970s, the possibility of return and pendular migration was a real consideration, particularly with the fall of the Greek junta government in 1974. After the Polytechnic students’ uprising in Athens in 1973, the military government staged a referendum abolishing the monarchy and passed a new constitution in an attempt to institute a controlled democracy. But with Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in August 1974, the military government completely collapsed. A new referendum finally abolished the monarchy and a new constitution (11 June 1975) declared Greece a presidential Bundestagary democracy. The Third Hellenic Republic’s first government featured a liberal-conservative government under New Democratic Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, who served until 1980. With the return of democratic governance, West German residents with Greek

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13 Konstantinos G. Karamanlis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Γ. Καραμανλής 1907-1998) had already served as Prime Minister from 1955 to 1963 with the exception of a few months. He would also serve twice as President. In 1974 Karamanlis founded the New Democracy party, a main center-right party dedicated to “radical liberalism.” It became one of the two major parties, alongside the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Konstantinos was for legalizing the Communist Party in Greece and working to diffuse tensions with Turkey (George Doukas, “Party Elites and Democratization in Greece,” *Bundestagary Affairs* 46, no. 4 (1993): 506–16).
citizenship who had left for or remained abroad because of political concerns began returning. Many of them, however, went back and forth between the two countries (pendulum migration).¹⁴

Greek families and individuals returned to Greece for other reasons as well. Among these reasons were the continuing instability in the West German Economy and improvement in the Greek economy. “Some foreign workers,” as the North Rhine-Westphalia Ministry of Education claimed in 1976, planned to leave West Germany because the country “was experiencing economic instability.”¹⁵ Other families intended to go back someday, for retirement or to rejoin family. While not all parents agreed, for many, their future lay in Greece, which in their view necessitated a Greek education. Even for those Greek parents who did not intend to leave West Germany, however, it was still important to maintain their identity as “Greek.”¹⁶

Yet, although the rate of return migration had increased, both Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministries of Education emphasized that, regardless of “Greek claims of a rapid return,” the majority of Greek children had an extended residency in the country. In Baden-Württemberg, “only 5-10 percent of youths returned to their Greek home,” based on the Ministry of Education’s estimation in 1981, although “exact statistics were unavailable.” For Baden-Württemberg, this meant that the majority of the school age children and youths would remain in the country. In accordance, the Ministry claimed “the Greek parents’ wishes and reality were far apart.”¹⁷ Nonetheless, between 1973 and 1980, the total population with Greek

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¹⁶ As the Coordinating Committee for Foreign Workers from Altena (Koordinierungskreis für ausländische Arbeitnehmer von der Stadt Altena) pointed out on 11 March 1975.

citizenship in Baden-Württemberg would fall by 30 percent (1973 around 103,000 and in 1980 less than 74,000).\textsuperscript{18} The majority were settled, but a significant minority were in fact leaving. Furthermore, circular migration threw the clarity of the statistical analysis off, as some returned and were replaced by new migrants.

In addition, it is important to remember that not all parent groups with non-German citizenship wanted to maintain a strict allegiance to their cultural background. For example, the District President in Düsseldorf reported that, while Greek and to some extent Turkish parents “complicated the integration process for new schoolchildren,” the “Italians, Spanish and Yugoslavians” often fought enrollment in preparatory classes (one to two year classes separate from regular instruction). These parents “put great value on attendance in a German class” and were “generally happy to integrate.”\textsuperscript{19} For the latter groups, the District President in Düsseldorf and other North Rhine-Westphalian District Presidents were content with the short-form preparatory classes and the transfer after one (or two) years into regular German classes. For the groups with Greek and Turkish citizenship, however, the District Presidents felt new measures would not be amiss.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{19} The report from Detmold mentions that children with Yugoslav citizenship supposedly had some “mentality and language barriers,” but does not clarify.

\textsuperscript{20} Kultusminister NRW to die Regierungspräsidenten Arnserg, Detmold, Düsseldorf, Köln und Münster, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer; hier: Einschulung von ausländischen Schulanfängern,” Erlaß II A 3. 36-6/1 Nr. 4480/73 30-0/0, (November 5, 1973), NW 388-30, Landesarchiv NRW. North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education sent out a circular to its District Presidents at the end of 1973 about schoolchildren with foreign citizenship entering the first grade, to which they replied in early 1975. The District Presidents commented on some difficulties particularly for schools in which a high percentage of the “beginning class” was “foreign.”
The Länder Ministries of Education tried to respond to parental demands, political pressure, and their own preferences for integration through their school initiatives. In 1975, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education Administration, under SPD Minister of Education Jürgen Girgensohn (1970 to 1983), tried to make that apparent to a group of some 250 parents with Greek citizenship who marched on the Ministry’s doorstep on Saturday, 17 May 1975. After greeting the group, the Ministry’s representative laid out the Ministry’s official view of the school problems Greek children faced in North Rhine-Westphalia and described the state’s current measures. The Ministry representative explained that compulsory schooling laws required “children of Greek guest workers” to enroll in German schools. To facilitate that process, North Rhine-Westphalia offered preparatory classes, which featured instruction from a teacher from the child’s country of origin. In addition, the representative reassured the parents that all “children of foreign workers” who attended public primary or lower secondary schools were entitled to receive instruction “from a foreign teacher in their mother tongue as well as in geography,

21 Jürgen Girgensohn (1924-2007) was a teacher and German social democratic politician. He served from 1970 to 1983 as Minister of Education. During the war, he was part of the Waffen-SS. After the war, however, Girgensohn claimed to be influenced by the experience to become a pacifist and became a member of the German Quakers. During his tenure as Minister of Education, he pushed for the spread of Gesamtschulen.

22 Franz Domhof and Schüren, Ergebnisvermerk II A 4. 36-6/1 Nr. 1358/75 (Düsseldorf: Kultusministerium NRW, May 22, 1975), NW 388-35, Landesarchiv NRW; and Kultusministerium NRW, “Protestkundgebung am Samstag, dem 17. Mai 1975,” Z C - BD 14.03 (Düsseldorf, May 13, 1975), NW 388-35, Landesarchiv NRW. The Greek families filed to do the march in advance with the police. They expected some 500 participants. The day of, there were some 250 participants and 25 police officers placed around the location. The spokesperson for the Greek parent group, Ms. Renate Farmakidis, used a megaphone to read a resolution in both Greek and German. The Greek parent delegation then took the opportunity to verbally express their wishes on the schooling of their children that they had already (and often) sent to the Ministry of Education in writing. Franz Domhof, while having missed the actual event on account of illness, wrote the Greek Embassy in Bonn to inform them of their understanding of developments (Franz Domhof to Griechische Botschaft, Sektion für Schulfragen and Kotsmanidis, “Unterricht für Kinder griechischer Arbeitnehmer in Nordrhein-Westfalen,” May 27, 1975, NW 388-33, Landesarchiv NRW).

23 For a discussion of the stance of each of the relevant Länder on integration versus bilingual and Greek school classes, see Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen to Auswärtige Amt, Referat 620, “Deutsch-griechische Gespräche über die schulische Betreuung greekischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” March 10, 1977, B 93, Bd. 858, PA AA; and “Die griechisch-deutschen Expertengespräche am 2./3. März 1977 in Athen über die Erziehung der Kinder griechischer arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Ergebnisprotokoll, (October 20, 1977), B 93, Bd. 810, PA AA.
history, and the religion of their home” in order “not to lose their connection to their home language and culture.”

To address the demands for return, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry representative also described a new long-form bilingual class that North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education was developing with input from the Greek government, in order “to provide an answer to the individual wishes of the parents for the schooling of their children in view of a rapid return and reintegration into the home country.” Where staffing needs and prerequisites were met, the Ministry planned a six-year program for bilingual instruction featuring half of the instruction in German and half in the children’s native language. Classes would be based on the North Rhine-Westphalian curriculum with heavy emphasis on “country of origin-oriented instruction.” Those parents who wanted to integrate could continue enrolling their children in normal preparatory classes or directly in regular instruction, but those children with parents planning on returning to their countries of origin could soon attend these new bilingual classes.

Bavaria had already developed a set of programs for different groups of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship. First developed in 1973, the Bavarian Model’s three levels (A, B, and C) each included different combinations of German and native-language instruction, depending on their parents’ desire for West German or foreign school instruction. The idea behind the

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24 Bundestag’s answer to the Kleine Anfrage 1818.!!!

25 Domhof and Schüren.


Bavarian model was that the children’s parents should decide if they planned on staying or leaving. If parents planned on returning or felt strong ties to their national heritage, the children were to have access to longer cultural and language instruction in order to make return as easy as possible (Model C). Model A was on the opposite end, with the children provided with German instruction and integrated as quickly as possible with their West German contemporaries.28

The West German Foreign Office and the Greek government pushed the Bavarian Model, but most of the other Länder decided against direct implementation. Most of the Länder Education Administrations felt not only that the costs associated with such programs would be high, but also that they would lead to problems with integration and scholastic success in West Germany. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education, for example, felt that that carrying out such efforts beyond the primary school level would have serious detrimental effects.29 Under Christian Democrat Wilhelm Hahn (1964 to 1978), the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education continued to support integration with the argument that integration was the state’s responsibility.30 Furthermore, Hahn felt that the Bavarian model would make social connections between children with German and foreign citizenship difficult, as the non-German children would be isolated first in the schools and “surely later in society.” Those children who remained in West Germany despite their parents original intentions would not have the skills to successfully attend vocational school, as “the German language levels attained in addition to

28 Bayerischen Ministerrats, “Ausländerrecht: Grundlagen der Ausländerpolitik” (Munich, April 3, 1973), 4–5, StK 14798, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv.


native language instruction [was] usually not enough.” Attendance in these national schools would also make transfer into higher levels of secondary school (Realschulen or Gymnasien) impossible. Hahn laid out other practical considerations as well, including limited schoolroom space and extra material costs (school books, media for language instruction), not to mention the need for extra positions for “foreign teachers” and “German teachers” necessary “to ensure the care of the foreign schoolchildren.” Nonetheless, like North Rhine-Westphalia, several Länder Education Administrations eventually developed programs loosely comparable to the Bavarian.

Despite Hahn’s hesitations, there were multiple reasons for the new programs. Ministry dissatisfaction with the national preparatory classes combined with growing conservative political and public pressure, requests from some non-German parent groups, and new studies on migrant children’s mental health pushed Hahn and the Ministry to make concessions. An addition impetus, however, was the vastly divergent mother-tongue fluency of the children entering preparatory and consular instruction. In Baden-Württemberg, that was not an insignificant number. In 1976, Baden-Württemberg subsidized 1,788 consular courses attended by 39,142 schoolchildren with foreign citizenship (47 percent of the total 83,329). Those thousands of “foreign children,” because of West German citizenship laws, included children born in the country as well as new migrants. For many children, their native language was the language of their mother. Of these heritage speakers, many learned German first.


32 As discussed in Chapter 4.

33 The issue of “former guest workers and their families” had become a hot political topic. It was no longer possible for the Ministry of Education to disregard public opinion about the growing “threat of foreigners” (Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 6/7571: Stellungnahme des Kultusministeriums zu dem Antrag der Abd. Uhri und Gen. (CDU) betr. Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in unseren Schulen” (Stuttgart, April 18, 1975), EA 8/203 Bü 386,
In light of the situation, Hahn acknowledged a need for some new form of native language instruction in 1975, particularly in order to avoid overwhelming children or psychologically damaging them. Full mother-tongue classes, however, were for Hahn unacceptable. As a compromise, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry designed new long-form national “primary school classes for foreign children with a single language” for those children whose parents explicitly intended to return to their country or origin. To be taught primarily by consular teachers with support from German teachers, these classes were supposed to begin with a largely Greek curriculum but to add additional German instruction every year.³⁴

When the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education sent information about the pilot project to the consulates, the Greek Consulate expressed enthusiasm, the Turkish Ministry of Education general interest, and the Italian Consulate reservations. While some parents with Italian citizenship were interested, that interest was not extensive. Wide-spread Italian investment in programs encouraging return, never large, had diminished as new migration stabilized and enrollment in Italian preparatory programs dropped off generally. Most parents, their children born in the country, were concerned with integration. The Italian state, in turn, now emphasized school initiatives promoting German language acquisition and Italian as a second language.³⁵ In contrast, the Greek and Turkish Consulates, which handled higher rates of in-and-

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³⁵ Sekretariat der KMK, “Unterricht für Kinder italienischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Vorlage für das 1. deutsch-italienische Expertengespräch,” Vorlage (Bonn: KMK, 1978), B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA; and “1. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission für den Unterricht italienischer Schüler in der
out migration, wanted the long-form classes. The first to get off the ground, five Turkish first-year classes opened in 1975/76. These Turkish long-form classes balanced Turkish language, history, geography, and social sciences with six hours of German instruction in the first and second grades and ten in the third and fourth. In the later grades, part of the German instruction was supposed to be taken up with subjects like singing and handiwork alongside schoolchildren with German citizenship. Greek classes soon followed, but only after a delay caused by arguments over curricular balance (the Greek government wanted all math and science instruction in Greek). Early reports from the teachers (both foreign and German) were positive, despite some hiccups with coordination and teaching practices between local teachers and those sent from the relevant country of citizenship.

Greek parents in both Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia were skeptical about the new programs and worried about issues of equivalency, but the Greek Government expressed enthusiasm. After the fall of the military government, the Greek state had renewed its efforts to join the European Community. With its application under consideration and West Germany one of Greece’s main advocates, the Greek Government in no way wanted to strain its

Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. bis 24. Mai 1978 in Bonn,” Protokoll (Bonn, May 24, 1978), B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA.

36 With such quick acceptance, starting with the 1975/76 school-year, four schools (Heilbronn, Heilbronn, Ludwigsburg, and Bietigheim) opened classes for Turkish speaking children in the first class (Kultusministerium BW, “Sprechzeltel für den Herrn Minister für eine Sitzung des Ministerrats”).


38 Kultusministerium BW, “Sprechzeltel für den Herrn Minister für eine Sitzung des Ministerrats.”

relationship with the Federal Republic. Furthermore, the Greek state was implementing its own school reforms leading towards a greater compatibility with the German curriculum. Among other changes, Greece’s Minister of Education expanded compulsory schooling from six years to nine. In addition, the new government stipulated in the 1975 constitution that modern Greek (Demotic) was to be the sole language of education as of the 1977/78 school year, which simplified language instruction for Greek citizens abroad. As a consequence, the Greek Consulates praised these new developments and the new “Joint Expert Subcommittee on the Education of Greek children in the Federal Republic” began to work toward degree equivalency, agreeing in 1977 to recognize West German school certificates. In this environment, the Greek state emphasized the importance of heterogeneity, stressing multi-culturalism and the cultural compatibility of Greeks and Germans.

The Greek government could also express enthusiasm on account of the Kultusministerkonferenz’s new “revised agreement on the ‘Instruction of the Children of Foreign Workers’” from 8 April 1976. As unemployment in West Germany increased, many ethnic-German parents and public schools had criticized the 1971 Recommendations for downplaying

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41 Hanna-Renate Laurien and Chrysostomos Karapiperis, “Deutsch-griechische Gespräch über die schulische Betreuung der Kinder griechischer Wanderarbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, am 23. März 1976 in Bonn,” Protokoll (Bonn: Senator für Schulwesen, June 20, 1976), B 93, Bd. 1154, PA AA; and Auswärtige Amt, “Deutsch-griechische Expertengespräch über Fragen der schulischen Betreuung von Kindern griechischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Vermerk (Bonn: Auswärtige Amt, January 27, 1977), B 93, Bd. 858, PA AA. In a talk with the Greek Embassy in 1976, the Greek legates finally agreed that German school certificates should be accepted in Greece. Kultusminister NRW, “Information für griechische Eltern über Ziel, Organisation, Gestaltung und Bedeutung des Unterricht ihrer Kinder in Vorbereitungsklassen an den Grundschulen/Hauptschulen des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen,” Informationspapier (Düsseldorf: Kultusministerium NRW, January 7, 1977), NW 388-52, Landesarchiv NRW.

cultural maintenance in favor of integration. In response, the KMK reconvened its Working Group (led by North Rhine-Westphalia’s Franz Domhof) on the Instruction of Foreign Children. The new revisions were explicitly about “expanding on the suggestions for the improvement of the possibility for the maintenance and deepening of the children’s knowledge of their mother language.” The KMK’s stated “goal [was] to ease reintegration into the home [country’s] school system.” They were, however, “also designed to improve the reality of the educational chances of the foreign child in the German system.”

43

It was for these second- and third-generation children of migrant workers that conflict between integration and cultural maintenance was particularly noticeable because of the size of many minority communities. Some groups, such as in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, were large enough that second- and third-generation children sometimes grew up with little to no contact with their country of residence’s official language. Some children had their first exposure to that official language in preschools or the first grade. In short, “children with migrant backgrounds” entered local schools with vastly different levels of language skills and cultural knowledge, some speaking German fluently and others knowing hardly a word. Yet, as pressure for return mounted, many politicians and parent groups, including many Greeks, argued that it was their minority status that needed to be emphasized in order to encourage these children to someday return to their (parents’) countries of origin.

Toward those goals, the 1976 “revised agreement on the ‘Instruction of the Children of Foreign Workers’” made concessions to encourage mother tongue acquisition. The Recommendations specified that “the mother tongue of foreign schoolchildren living in the

To encourage native language acquisition, particularly among second generation schoolchildren with foreign citizenship, the Recommendations also urged the Länders to offer instruction in the children’s mother tongue as a second foreign language in order to encourage the children to learn their parents’ languages.45

For the Länders Education Administrations, the Kultusministerkonferenz’s “revised agreement on the ‘Instruction of the Children of Foreign Workers’” from 8 April 1976 represented their answer to combined demands from multiple sides. With requests coming from migrant and minority groups, a few of the sending countries (mostly Greece and Turkey), and political pressure at home, the question of return became a central goal for education. In the previous two decades, return had been a possibility and a consideration, but the primary goal for the West German Education Administrations (with the exception of Bavaria) had previously been integration. The emphasis on the children’s status as foreign citizens would now lead not only to additional opportunities for native language instruction, but contribute to pressure on the children to maintain a dual identity, whether or not they were born and raised in the country. Yet, that pressure to encourage these children to connect with their “foreign,” non-German identities would have repercussions, particularly in an age that did not accept hyphenated identities.

**The European Community and Education for Migrant Workers’ Children**

Although the West German Länders and other European governments tended to take an all-or-nothing approach to individual identity, the European Community and other supranational bodies stressed multiculturalism even as they pushed for return migration. Looking at continued

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45 The Turkish government was thrilled. See “Kommuniqué über das erste deutsch-türkische Expertengespräch über die schulische Betreuung türkischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Bonn am 2./3. November 1977,” Kommuniqué (Bonn, November 3, 1977), 4, B 93, Bd. 860, PA AA.
migration across the growing European Community (see Table 5.1), the Member States, including both longtime host and sending countries, stressed the value of diversity through its action plans and directives. The most famous of those was EC Directive 486/77 on the “Education of the Children of Migrant Workers” from July 1977. The work of a contentious two years, the Directive made it a legal requirement for European Community Member States to enable integration through local schools, while also providing support for mother tongue and cultural instruction as a secondary goal. Yet, reflecting the context of its publication, this directive, briefly lauded as a clear demonstration of EC support for minority rights, also promoted return migration.46

The European-wide changes in population movements, economic shifts, and expansions of the European Community, first in 1973 and then in the early 1980s, led the EC Member States to engage directly with the issue of education for the children of migrant workers.47 In contrast to their earlier conversations on integration and equal access, however, the mid-1970s debates expanded to explore the issue of identity and return migration in detail.48 Most European migration in the 1970s was still intra-European (see Table 5.1). These migrants – as Europeans – were supposed to become part of a diverse, multicultural European society. In contrast, the same politicians hoped that Third Country nations (not members of the European Community) would leave. As a result, the intra-European Community debates on education would revolve around who belonged, what their cultural identities should be, and the possibility of bicultural and


47 In 1973, Denmark, Great Britain, and Ireland ascended to the European Community. Several other countries had applications in or would soon (re)apply. Greece, for example, would reopen its application after the end of the Junta regime.

48 See the discussion of the 1612/68 Directive and the Casagrande case in Chapter 4.
multicultural identities.\textsuperscript{49} Claiming that their work was in the best interests of the children, political negotiations among the Member States resulted in the decision that host countries were responsible not only for welcome programs but also “in conjunction with the Member States of origin, [for] appropriate measures to promote the teaching of the mother tongue and of the culture of the country of origin.”\textsuperscript{50}


Table 5.1: Foreigners Residing in Selected European Countries by Country of Citizenship, 1960s – 1980s (in Thousands)\(^{51}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending Countries</th>
<th>Host Countries</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>W. Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>200.1</td>
<td>629.0</td>
<td>196.7</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>249.5</td>
<td>572.8</td>
<td>629.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>452.0</td>
<td>624.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>441.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>early 1970s</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>570.6</td>
<td>272.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>412.5</td>
<td>177.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>early 1970s</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>812.0</td>
<td>121.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>859.4</td>
<td>109.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>early 1970s</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>1,027.8</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>118.1</td>
<td>1,546.3</td>
<td>148.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>early 1970s</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>590.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>637.1</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>early 1970s</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>406.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>299.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>350.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>early 1970s</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>845.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>816.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>early 1970s</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>269.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>444.5</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>early 1970s</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>148.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>193.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>early 1960s</td>
<td>243.1</td>
<td>1,531.1</td>
<td>308.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>early 1970s</td>
<td>420.2</td>
<td>2,254.4</td>
<td>3,211.6</td>
<td>158.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,364.4</td>
<td>3,462.3</td>
<td>316.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part of the shift toward support for minorities and return was a result of the changing international environment. The Recruitment Stops in 1973/74 across North-Western Europe did not stop new migration, but inadvertently encouraged family and asylum migration from Third Countries. Their movement permanently changed the demographic makeup of the continent.\footnote{Klaus J. Bade, \textit{Migration in European History}, trans. Allison Brown (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 240–261; Moch, \textit{Moving Europeans}, 177–185; and Raika Espahangizi, “Migration and Urban Transformations: Frankfurt in the 1960s and 1970s,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary History} 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 183–208.} In contrast, those minority groups with European Community membership often remained stable. But, where labor migrants during the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s had been socially beneficial, new migrants in the 1970s and 1980s (particularly as asylum migration increased) were often viewed as drains on society, threatening a civilized European culture. These minority groups did not have the right to freedom of movement, and many, concerned that if they left they would be unable to return, chose to stay. It was these Third Country nationals that host countries within the European Community hoped would leave. Yet, the majority of these same politicians did not feel that they could deny social (and increasingly political) rights to those migrants and their children who did stay. After all, as Swiss author Max Frisch famously said, “We asked for workers and people came.”\footnote{Yannick Lemel and Heinz Herbert Noll, eds., \textit{Changing Structures of Inequality: A Comparative Perspective} (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2003), 288; and Doris Meissner, “Managing Migrations,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, no. 86 (April 1, 1992): 69.} With the resurgence of attention to the Second World War after 1968/69, it was contentious for a left-leaning government to suggest treating them otherwise.\footnote{Ulrich Herbert, \textit{A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1990: Seasonal Workers, Forced Laborers, Guest Workers}, trans. William Templer (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).}

The European Community politicians’ emphasis on acquiring cultural and lingual capital initially stemmed from humanitarian and economic considerations as well as concerns regarding
minority rights. Not all minority or foreign children (in West Germany those groups usually overlapped) were migrants, but many were second- and third-generation residents. Whatever the color of their passport, these children had often never left their “host country” or only visited their “country of origin.” Hence, the focus of their education was no longer always about integrating them into their “host” society. They were already part of it, had in fact been born into it. Given this demographic change, European Education Ministers and politicians asked if migrants’ children needed to learn and associate with cultural backgrounds “with which [their parents] arrived in the country.” After all, promoting diversity and multiculturalism often came into direct conflict with integration.

As the prioritization of return increased, European educators explored possibilities for overcoming the tension between preparing for return, maintaining minority identities, and integrating. Among the options they emphasized were bilingual or bi-cultural education. During the ad hoc Meeting of the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education in 1974, the Commission of the European Community argued that “bicultural education appear[ed] necessary, not only to enable the child to be re/integrated into the educational system and social


56 BMBW and Pressereferat, “Statement des Staatssekretärs des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Professor Dr. Reimut Jochimsen, bei der Pressekonferenz des Stifterverbandes am 22. Juni 1977 im Wissenschaftszentrum in Bonn” (Bonn, June 22, 1977), B 93, Bd. 857, PA AA.

and working life of his country of origin, but, above all, to make it possible for children living in a different cultural environment at school and at home to develop morally and intellectually in a normal manner.”

Even while throwing its weight behind bi-cultural instruction, the Commission of the European Community expressed concern about associated problems. The Experts on the Education of Migrant Workers’ Children worried that bi-cultural education would only benefit elites. Furthermore, the school syllabi were already overloaded, too many migrant children spoke dialects, there would be a need for too many different languages, and it was continually difficult to find qualified teachers. Nonetheless, these experts felt that the potential benefits – including the preservation of the “educative role of the family,” the cultural enrichment of the school environment, and the opening of the economy of the host country to other countries – all outweighed any problems.

The support for continuation of identification as members of national minorities across Europe on behalf of the Commission, psychologists, and educators stemmed not only from pressures to leave. Experts believed it vital to develop children’s identification with their parents’

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cultural background in order to avoid the potentially disastrous effects of displacement. Multiple academic studies demonstrated that instruction in languages other than their language of thought (*Denksprache*) could be detrimental if not carefully handled. According to these studies, educational initiatives needed to pay attention to the existing language barriers and the “not insignificant psychological difficulties arising from the change in milieu and leading to the desire for the connection to the home and a familiar human environment.” A lack of such instruction could also lead to familial rifts as children became distanced from their parents. For these reasons, Educational Administrations needed to support the possibility of reintegration in the “‘home’ [country of origin] school and education system.”

To avoid these problems, the European Community’s various bodies recommended several necessary steps and a series of “specific measures” for implementation in both the social and educational spheres between 1972 and 1975. Among them, the Council of the European Community adopted a series of Resolutions and Action Programs establishing support for education specifically including “the children of migrant workers,” with the goal of promoting employment and worker mobility. The Council’s 1974 Resolution allowed spending money from the European Social Fund (established in May 1960) on “migrant workers and members of

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62 There were five basic principles that the Commission of the European Community felt needed to be met. These included: a) entitlement to an education in accordance with the situation; b) special educational measures must assist its integration into the educational and social environment of the host country; c) the native tongue and culture must have their place in the school syllabus; d) it must remain possible for the child to be reintegrated into the educational system of its country of origin; and e) there can be no discrimination between the condition governing the education of nationals of Member States of the Community and those of non-member countries.

their families” including the “training and education of children.”\textsuperscript{64} Recommended measures included an increased number of “reception and adaption classes” between the ages of six and 16, improved teaching methods and materials, and “measures to permit teaching of native language and culture … where possible during normal school hours.”\textsuperscript{65}

Building on these prior steps, in 1975 the Italian representative to the European Community, with French support, pushed the development of some form of legally binding measures specifically about the schooling of foreign children.\textsuperscript{66} Officially, the directive would “improve the conditions of freedom of movement … particularly with regard to the problem of the reception and education of children” and promote “the equality of treatment for Community and non-Community workers” and their families.\textsuperscript{67} Focusing primarily on integration classes and language support, the second goal emphasized instruction in the children’s mother tongue and geography (a third promoted teacher training in relevant subjects and incorporation into regular instruction).\textsuperscript{68} While the other European Community Member States agreed that the Italian

\textsuperscript{64} Ibíd.

\textsuperscript{65} Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission,” 3. On of the Pilot Programs that the European Community was already considering funding was a training program for bilingual instructors – organizers (Italian-German). See “Pilot Schemes Preparatory to European Social Fund Interventions,” V/1446/74-E (Commission of the European Communities, 1974), Annex 1, Commission of the European Union. The fund was to be used for projects particularly associated with training.


representative’s suggestion was advisable, over the following two years they would volubly disagree on the actual wording of the legal measure. 69

Among disputes over wording and parameters, one of the ongoing issues the members of the European Community debated was who the directive should include. Several participants wanted the directive to cover all children of migrant or minority groups. 70 In fact, an early title for the directive was “Education for Migrant Children.” 71 For these participants, the directive was about promoting equality of education for all children. 72 Others felt that the directive should only pertain to European Community Member State nationals. This second group felt that the European Community had no jurisdiction over Third-Country nationals and, furthermore, were disinclined to commit to funding the necessary school initiatives. The Italian representative, a continued advocate for the directive generally, felt that it would never be passed with these

69 See also Hywel C. Jones to Schuster, Note, (November 28, 1974), BAC 64/1985 890, Commission of the European Union. Hywel Ceri Jones (UK) joined the European Commission as Head of Department for Education and Youth Policies in 1973. There, he was directly involved in developing Directive 486/77 and in launching ERASMUS, COMETT, TEMPUS, LINGUA, PETRA, FORCE and YOUTH FOR EUROPE.

70 Comité Economique et Social, “Summary Minutes of the First Meeting of the Study Group on the Education of Children of Migrant Workers (section for Social Questions) Held at the Committee’s Headquarters in Brussels, on 9 October 1975” (Brussels, October 29, 1975), 2–4, BAC 14/1989 43, Commission of the European Union; and Comité Economique et Social, “Procès-Verbal de la 101ème réunion de la section des affaires sociales, tenue à Bruxelles, au siège du Comité, le 15 janvier 1976” (Brussels: European Communities, February 11, 1976), 4, BAC 14/1989 43, Commission of the European Union. Among those involved in the discussion in 1975 were Mr. Robert Aitken (Great Britain), De Heer Bertrands (Belgie), Herrn Franz Domhof (West Germany), Egr. Signore Giuseppe Mario Filippone (Belgique), Mr. Seamas Holland (Ireland), M. Menri Hostert (Luxembourg), Herrn Dr. Hüfner (Max-Plank-Institut, West Germany), De Heer Lindenboom (Netherlands), Herrn Gerhart Mahler (Bavaria, FRG), Egr. Signore Giacinto Margiotta (Italy), Signorina E. Morin (Switzerland), Mr. Erik Odde (Dänemark), Mr. Tim Ottevanger (Great Britain), Mme Parvaux (France), M. R. Pichérot (France), M. L. Warzee (Belgium), Mr. I. Wight (Great Britain).


72 Linking the possible directive to the Helsinki Accords from 1975, the Economic and Social Committee applauded the possibility of extending the directive to both European Community and Third Country nationals both employed and unemployed. Comité Economique et Social, “Preliminary Draft Opinion of the Section for Social Questions on the Proposal for a Council Directive on the Education of the Children of Migrant Workers (Doc. COM(75) 390 Final)” (Brussels: European Communities, October 28, 1975), 7–8, BAC 14/1989 43, Commission of the European Union.

Another aspect of the debate on who the European Community’s Directive on the “Education of the Children of Migrant Workers” should cover regarded the use of “children of migrant workers” in the directive’s title. The Commission’s members discussed the possibility of using “foreign children” or “migrant children,” but ultimately decided to use the reference to “migrant workers,” in part because of the different Member States’ citizenship laws. The specification coincided with the European Community’s treaties’ focus on labor and resources, but it also tried to clarify who the states were responsible for supporting. With the different European Community’s Member States basing their citizenship laws on a broad spectrum (i.e. West German citizenship laws based predominately on \textit{jus sanguinis} and French laws on \textit{jus soli}), the legal categorization of “foreign children” would have encompassed different groups in
different countries. As it stood, while the implication was that these school programs should apply to all children, it did not encompass asylum seekers, refugees, illegal children, or necessarily local minority groups. Although civil and social rights were supposed to be universally applicable, children’s legal status and specific national or minority backgrounds influenced the expression of their rights.

While internal disputes about whom to include in the directive on the education of foreign children continued, the European Community pushed through a new Action Program in 1976. Building on the list of spheres of action for Community cooperation from the Council’s June 1974 Resolution, the new Action Program explicitly included both “the children of nationals of other Member States of the Communities and of non-member countries.” Without establishing any form of rule, regulation, or directive, the Program effectively reaffirmed the European Community’s educational goals. Through the Action Program the Ministers of the Member States first expressed their “willingness … to pursue and develop, on behalf of the nationals of other Member States of the Communities and of non-member countries, suitable measures to improve reception facilities for these children and to enable them to adapt to the host country’s school system and way of life.” In order to achieve this, Member States were supposed to develop their reception programs as well as to provide “more opportunities as appropriate for teaching these children their mother tongue and culture, if possible in school and in collaboration with the country of origin.” Later in the Program, the European Community Members emphasized equivalency, information exchange, and measures for “achieving equal opportunity

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for free access to all forms of education.” It was the intention of the Action Program to offer better facilities and materials for “education and training.”

Explaining the European Community’s multi-layered goals, however, was a difficult task. In West Germany Reimut Jochimsen (SPD), Secretary of State from the Federal Ministry of Education, had that task. In 1977, he tried to clarify the upcoming regulation for the West German press. While acknowledging the importance of cultural maintenance, he told them that “the preparation for eventual return [could] only play a limited role,” as “the primary goal [was] the attainment of the German language and a rapid integration into German schools.” But, he also emphasized that “foreign children and youths need[ed] a deeper knowledge of the language, history, and geography of their families’ countries of origin. It was desirable that they were familiar with the cultural background with which they arrived and which they must – for both themselves and their German peers – preserve and develop.” The end goal was, based on European Community recommendation and local aims, to develop a multicultural society.

When published, Directive 486/77 on the “Education of the Children of Migrant Workers” officially established the primary goals laid out in earlier resolutions and action programs as law. The Council of the European Community’ press release emphasized that the

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76 Not until after the February 1976 adoption of the first action programme would the Member State Ministers of Education be called “the council and the ministers for education meeting within the council” (European Commission and Luce Pépin, History of European Cooperation, 63–64).


78 Reimut Jochimsen (1933-1999) was a German economist and SPD politician. From 1973 to 1978 he served as Secretary of State for the Federal Ministry of Education. In he began service as the Minister für Wissenschaft und Forschung in North Rhine-Westphalia until 1980, when he became Minister für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Verkehr in that state. He would continue in various offices, including as member of the Bundesrat from 1978/1990, until 1993 (W. Habel, Wer ist wer?, 38th ed. (Schmidt - Römhild, 2000), 672).

79 Jochimsen explained “All [school] measures … should work toward raising German as well as foreign schoolchildren to be both leaders and participants in the same society” (BMBW and Pressereferat, “Statement des Staatssekretärs des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Professor Dr. Reimut Jochimsen, bei der Pressekonferenz des Stifterverbandes am 22. Juni 1977 im Wissenschaftszentrum in Bonn”).
directive’s purpose was to offer the “children of workers who are nationals of another Member State” free tuition for the purposes of facilitating their initial reception (including teaching) and adapting courses to the specific needs of individual children. The directive also made provisions for training the instructors who were supposed to actually do the teaching.\(^{80}\)

While not explicitly including Third-Country Nationals, the Council took “the opportunity to confirm its political resolve to ensure […] the Action Program for migrant workers and members of their [Third-Country Nationals] families …”\(^{81}\)

Despite building on earlier work, the European Community Member States’ implementation of the 1976 Action Plan and subsequent directive had a rocky beginning. The accession of Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Ireland to the European Community in 1973 introduced three new Member States, which were not necessarily on board with promoting a European conception of education or with the European Community’s foray into cultural politics. Not included under the various charters and treaties, education was essentially a gray area of legislation. Denmark, for one, took issue with that tentative legality and prevented the 1976 Action Plan and 1977 Directive’s full implementation while jurisdiction was being ironed out. Nonetheless, the Commission would set up a variety of conferences and seminars for the exchange of information and experiences.\(^{82}\) When the Commission actually began implementing

\(^{80}\) On the West German side, Mr. Herbert Ehrenberg (Federal Minister of Labor and Social Affairs) and Reinhard Strehlke (State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) participated (Council of the European Communities and John Morris, “451st Meeting of the Council - Social Affairs - Luxembourg, 28 June 1977,” Press Release (Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, June 28, 1977), 4, BAC 14/1989 44, Commission of the European Union).

\(^{81}\) Ibid.

the 1976 Action Plan in 1979, the Member States’ interpretations of the 1977 Directive diverged significantly as the different countries’ governments filtered the directive’s final wording (though not necessarily its background intentions) through their own political agendas.\(^8^3\)

Responses to the European Community Directive on the “Education of the Children of Migrant Workers” within the Federal Republic were varied. West German politicians’ and educators’ feelings about the development of the Directive reflected the diversity of the federate system. Baden-Württemberg’s CDU-FPD government detested European involvement in education, feeling that the European Community had no jurisdiction. For the SPD-FDP government in North Rhine-Westphalia, in contrast, the situation was influenced by their own Franz Domhof being sent as one of West Germany’s representatives to the Commission’s deliberations. The final Directive and resolutions would bear an unsurprising resemblance to North Rhine-Westphalia’s own regulations and guidelines.\(^8^4\) Regardless of their initial sentiments on the matter, once the directive passed, West Germany declared that its Länder were already fulfilling the stipulated requirements, although there was room for improvement.\(^8^5\) Given the directive’s similarities to the Kultusministerkonferenz’s 1971 and 1976 Recommendations, the announcement could hardly have been a surprise.

The West German Länder and the Italian, Greek, and occasionally Turkish governments would all take advantage of the 1977 Directive and associated 1976 Action Program to advocate for their arguments regarding the education of the “children of migrant workers.” Both the Italian

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and Greek (after accession in 1981) governments applied for their portion of the European Community’s Social Fund. The two also used Directive 486/77’s wording to advocate for their specific aims regarding West German education policy. The Italian government, for example, referred to the Directive constantly from its publication through the 1980s, pointing to the importance of European integration and the necessity of realizing the “philosophy of multiculturalism” and developing inter-cultural education. With Italian citizens abroad moving into the third generation and remaining relatively stable, the Italian state felt that these “Italians” needed to be simultaneously a part of both cultures (as it had since the 1960s). To facilitate a multicultural upbringing, the Italian government then supported “Italian” children’s access to instruction in both German (or French) and Italian, but also supported “German” children’s access to instruction in Italian. Multiculturalism and a European identity was, after all, supposed be applicable to all Member State nationals.

The nine members of the European Community were hardly alone in their increased emphasis on minority education and return. The worsening economic situation at the end of the 1970s and a political drift right saw groups like the Council of Europe continuing activities associated with the “Legal Status of Migrant Workers” and their education. On 24 November 1977, after the European Community had finalized the text of Directive 486/77, the Council of

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86 It is important to remember at this point that these children, while born and raised in West Germany by people born and raised in the Federal Republic, had little to no recourse to West German citizenship. Because their parents were Italian citizens and they had no right to any other citizenship, they were themselves considered Italian citizens under international law. Further complicating matters, many groups with Italian citizenship also practiced circular migration, frequently coming and going between the two countries.


88 Since 1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.
Europe published the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers. Articles 14 and 15 pertained to the education, schooling, training, and mother tongue instruction of migrant workers and their children. Article 15 read “The Contracting Parties concerned shall take actions by common accord to arrange, so far as practicable, for the migrant worker's children, special courses for the teaching of the migrant worker's mother tongue, to facilitate, inter alia, their return to their State of origin.”

While return migration was important to the European Community, multiculturalism was even more so. The Community was committed to diversity and equality of opportunity, which the Members of the Community felt could only be realized by requiring measures for integration, but also by providing the voluntary option for cultural maintenance. Cultural difference was supposed to be celebrated and encouraged in order for these children to lead fulfilling lives no matter where they lived. For the majority of the European Community Member States, however, that emphasis on cultural diversity focused specifically on other European groups. Although migration had already increased from North Africa (partly because of connections to decolonization), the representatives focused on cultural similarities within Europe. As the rate of migration from the former colonies and other countries increased, some European Community Member State governments increasingly questioned whether some migrant groups were capable of integration and if cultural intermingling was advisable.

The Turkish State, National Identity, and Religious Education

For the majority of the European Community Member States, multiculturalism was well and good to discuss in regards to other (and upcoming) Member State nationals. By 1977,

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however, the largest minority group in West Germany was the Turkish. In consequence, where earlier debates on integration had emphasized a multicultural group or even just the Italians, by the end of the 1970s, those discussions began to focus on the Turkish minority explicitly. The Turkish Government’s and some parents’ reorientation of their emphasis on “Turkishness” for schoolchildren in West Germany lent importance to that focus. For the Turkish (and West German) government, the presence of more than 200,000 schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship in 1974 in the Federal Republic drove home the permanence of a Turkish-German community. With so many schoolchildren abroad, the Turkish State felt it important that the children – the majority of whom held Turkish citizenship – identify as Turkish. Already stressing a specifically Turkish identity in Turkey, the Turkish government decided to extend their emphasis on Turkishness (as opposed to Western secularism) to its citizens abroad.

In contrast to the relative unity of the Greek government and parents on education goals, the Turkish government and many parents with Turkish citizenship disagreed on what schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship should learn. With the spread of primary education across Turkey, the government was able to promote a clearer idea of Turkishness. Nonetheless, many individuals with Turkish citizenship declined to follow the prescribed state vision. Some minority groups prioritized specific ethnic or other national identifications, viewing their status as Turkish citizens as a legal category rather than ethnic description. Ethnic Kurdish families.


with Turkish citizenship, for example, often preferred to emphasize their Kurdishness rather than identify as Turks.⁹³ Even within the ethnic Turkish majority, however, many disagreed on what children should learn in state schools. Many religiously conservative families, for example, felt that the secular Turkish state did not offer enough religious instruction either in Turkey or through consular instruction in West Germany.⁹⁴

In the 1970s, the Turkish government began a series of new measures to push a specifically Turkish identity on its heterogeneous population. Part of their efforts included turning from the West, including limiting West German influence in the Turkish cultural sphere.⁹⁵ This emphasis included limiting the autonomy of the German schools in Turkey and cutting back on the number of hours it was permissible to teach in German. Schooling in any minority language (limited foreign language instruction was acceptable) was already forbidden, as the government felt it might promote ethnic differences and posed a threat to a unified national identity. In the 1970s, among other measures, the Turkish Government shut down Kurdish publications, a move which eventually escalated in 1983 to a complete ban of any publications or broadcasts in languages other than Turkish in the country.⁹⁶

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Increasingly repressive policies against Turkey’s minority populations in Turkey combined with the European Recruitment Stops led to a significant change in the composition of the various Turkish minority groups in West Germany. In the 1960s, the Turkish labor migrants were among the best educated in Turkey. In the 1970s, family reunification increased the numbers of children and other non-workers (in part because of new difficulties in applications for West German work permits). In addition, internal conflict in Turkey (over issues ranging from political corruption, to school access, or conflict over ethnic identification) led to increased applications for asylum across Europe and particularly in West Germany, where asylum laws were particularly open.

The Turkish government’s push for “Turkishness” included among other things a shifting official stance on the place of religious education in the schools. Atatürk’s and subsequent administrations had supported a “secular Western-oriented national Turkish education system.” In the 1920s, state schools offered religious instruction in primary and secondary schools, but by the end of the 1930s religion had been removed from the curriculum entirely. That absence

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100 In an over-simplification, religious classes were removed from secondary schools in 1927 and primary schools in 1931. Nonetheless, in many rural areas, religious instruction remained in the curriculum until 1939 (Özgür H Çinar, “Compulsory Religious Education in Turkey,” Religion and Human Rights 8, no. 3 (2013): 225).
was heavily criticized during the transition from a one-party to a multi-party system (1946-1950) when religious education became a significant political and cultural issue. Some members of Bundestag argued that the state’s secular stance was leading the country’s youth toward degeneracy and promoting terrorist activities. To counter society’s moral collapse and the threat of communism, these politicians argued that compulsory religious education was necessary. In 1948/9, after prolonged political and cultural debates, the Kemalist social-democratic government decided to again offer religious education in primary schools. The classes were initially voluntary and, through the 1970s, only slowly expanded to cover all grades. In 1974, however, the state made “morality classes” (which were not supposed to be connected to religious instruction) compulsory.

The Turkish Government’s tentative investment in religious education meant that, until the 1970s, the state did not push the issue in West Germany. In response, particularly after the surge in family reunification, many parent groups and Islamic religious organizations began to establish after-school and weekend “Qur’an schools,” also called Hodschas. These schools were predominately designed as spaces for second-generation children to learn about the Qur’an and religious rites and practices. While every iteration of the classes was different, they were generally composed of a single-sex group of pupils and taught by a Turkish-speaking Imam.

101 Ibid., 225–226.

102 Religious instruction was reintroduced into middle schools in 1956 and high schools in 1967. In 1975, one hour of religious instruction was instituted in year four and five of primary school, one, two, and three of secondary school, and years one and two of high school. After 1961, religious education was written into the constitution with Paragraph 4 of Article 19 “Religious education and instruction is dependent on the wishes of the parents or the legally appointed guardians of minors” (Ibid., 226; Recep Kaymakcan, “Religious Education Culture in Modern Turkey,” in International Handbook of the Religious, Moral and Spiritual Dimensions in Education, ed. Marian de Souza et al. (Leiden: Springer Netherlands, 2006), 450; and Ismail Güven, “Education and Islam in Turkey,” in Education in Turkey, ed. Arnd-Michael Nohl, Arzu Akkoyunlu-Wigley, and Simon Wigley (Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2008)).

103 For a discussion of the experience of Koranschulen, see Sarah Thomsen Vierra, “At Home in Almanya: Turkish-German Space of Belonging in West Germany, 1961-1990” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at
The Turkish Government also had concerns about Qur’an Schools popping up around Turkey. Usually led by Imams without training from Turkish colleges, instructors often taught unapproved messages. In order to take control of Islamic instruction, and with increasingly conservative movements running through Turkish politics, Turkey expanded its offerings of religious instruction in the schools and opened more colleges for religious instructors. In the 1970s, primary school teachers also began receiving training for teaching Islamic instruction.\textsuperscript{104}

The West German media and many politicians pushed for restrictions on these classes. Many of the Länder, such as North Rhine-Westphalia, found them problematic, in part because of reports of bullying and the use of corporal punishment.\textsuperscript{105} Yet, as “clubs” and independent instruction separate from the West German school system, the West German Länder governments had little to no control over these courses. What they could do was refuse state support and deny permission to open the courses in regular schools. The Länder Education Administrations, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria, also encouraged the

\textsuperscript{104} For a summary of the education of religious teachers in Turkey, see Mustafa Koylu, “Religious Education in Modern Turkey,” in Change and Essence: Dialectical Relations Between Change and Continuity in the Turkish Intellectual Tradition, ed. Sinasi Gündüz and Cafer S. Yaran (Washington, D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2005), 45–64. For a brief history of religious instruction in Turkey, see Çinar, “Compulsory Religious Education in Turkey.”

Turkish government to include religious instruction during consular classes once the Turkish teachers had received training.¹⁰⁶

The Turkish state’s involvement in religious education made it easy for Baden-Württemberg’s government to deny the Islamic Community in Germany’s and the Islamic Center in Schwetzingen’s 1977 application (the first in Baden-Württemberg of its sort) to introduce Islamic instruction into the regular school day. Citing the Turkish Embassy in Bonn’s and the Turkish Consulate in Stuttgart’s disapproval of the Islamic Community’s activities, Baden-Württemberg’s Education Administration claimed it could not grant the request. Furthermore, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education (like North Rhine-Westphalia) had “heard that the Hodja or Imams outside of the Turkish state’s control” employed authoritarian styles of instruction, including the use of corporal punishment.¹⁰⁷

Despite the supposedly acceptable nature of the Turkish government’s version of religious education, official Turkish representatives’ efforts to add to consular courses by arranging weekend religious classes for their citizens were often stymied. In 1977, West Berlin’s Senator for Cultural Affairs initially began to work with the Turkish Consulate to offer religious instruction. To do so, the representative from the Senator for Cultural Affairs told the Consulate that they should develop an umbrella organization with no political agenda to which all of the different religious associations could belong. If such an umbrella institution could be set up and


if the state of Berlin had any money (always uncertain), then West Berlin would be willing to cover up to seventy-five percent of the costs associated with the instruction and learning materials, as they did with other religious groups.\textsuperscript{108} By 1978, the Consulate had organized such a community (the Association of Qur’an Teachers e.V. and the Association for the Establishment and Maintenance of an Islamic Cemetery and Mosque Berlin) with an associated Qur’an school.\textsuperscript{109} However, by then West Berlin refused to provide financial support due to “substantial allegations” from other \textit{Länder} (particularly about private Qur’an instruction in North Rhine-Westphalia). The city’s government did not feel it could “guarantee that ‘your association taught religion in an open, liberal spirit’” and denied funding. Frustrated, the Turkish Consulate wrote that it was “difficult to respond to allegations of bullying and corporal punishment,” but “investigations would be made.”\textsuperscript{110}

Even without reservations regarding the possible use of corporal punishment, it was unlikely any of the \textit{Länder} would have added Islamic religious instruction to the regular school day. Many West German politicians had difficulty accepting the idea of being home to a large non-Christian population. Baden-Württemberg’s 1953 Constitution explicitly stated that public schools were to take their form from the Christian Community, educating youths to live in “the spirit of Christian charity.”\textsuperscript{111} With documents like the Constitution backing them, many West


\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Vereinigung für die Lehre vom Qur’an e.V., Verein für die Errichtung und Pflege es islamischen Friedhofs und der Moschee Berlin.}


\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Artikel 15. (1) Die öffentlichen Volksschulen (Grund- und Hauptschulen) haben die Schulform der christlichen Gemeinschaftsschule nach den Grundsätzen und Bestimmungen, die am 9. Dezember 1951 in Baden für die Simultanschule mit christlichem Charakter gegolten haben.” See also Article 12 (1) “Die Jugend ist in Ehrfurcht vor
German citizens felt that a non-Christian religion was antithetical to the Federal Republic. There was a clear exception for the small Jewish community living in West Germany for obvious reasons, but Islam was not afforded the same consideration.¹¹²

Even if Islam had been socially acceptable to the ethno-national majority, the West German Education Administrations found its organization problematic. Unlike Catholicism, German Protestantism, or Greek Orthodoxy, Islam did not have a clear head or leading body with which the West German school administrations could work.¹¹³ The Turkish government applied to function as that head, but many Länder Education Administrations were concerned about what Turkish leadership for Islam in West Germany would mean for those Muslim schoolchildren with Moroccan or Tunisian (or other) citizenship. The West German Education Administrations felt that it was best to confine Turkish Islamic instruction to Turkish consular courses.¹¹⁴

As the Turkish government tried to take a more active role in the education of its citizens abroad, the state became vocally frustrated (as the Greek state had long been) with attempts to negotiate with the eleven Länder separately. In order to coordinate more effectively and to


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increase its influence on its nationals abroad, in 1976 the Turkish government agreed to form a “Joint Turkish-German Expert Commission on the Instruction of Turkish Schoolchildren in the Federal Republic” as a sub-group of the Bilateral German-Turkish Cultural Committee. The West German government had already formed similar commissions with the Yugoslav and Greek governments and would also reach out to the other “traditional sending countries” (Italy, Spain, and Portugal). Each of these joint expert commissions was supposed to meet every two years to discuss goals, concerns, and appropriate solutions for a specific national group. The West German and Turkish governments’ mutual sense of the pressing importance of the issue led to yearly meetings for the first six years.

During the joint expert meetings the Turkish Delegation would claim that a speedy integration into the West German school system was important, but, in contrast to earlier meetings of the Bilateral Cultural Commission, the delegation increasingly emphasized “maintaining [Turkish children’s] lingual and cultural identity.” Referring to both the Kultusministerkonferenz’s 8 April 1976 Recommendations and the relevant resolutions of the Council of Europe, they stressed the importance of identity “partially as an aspect of effective reintegration.” To achieve their goals, the Turkish government wanted to see “mother tongue


117 The Joint Turkish-German Expert Commission on the Instruction of Turkish Schoolchildren in the Federal Republic would meet yearly between 1977 and 1982 (six meetings) and then shift to a bi-yearly schedule.

instruction turned into a required subject for all Turkish children” during regular instruction.\textsuperscript{119} If this was not possible, the Turkish delegation asked the West German Ministries of Education “to take every effort to include as many Turkish children as possible in this instruction.”\textsuperscript{120} A year later, in 1978, the Turkish government revised their request, asking that, at the least, “Turkish” as a subject be allowed instead of “Turkish as a First Foreign Language” in lower secondary schools.\textsuperscript{121}

In response to the early requests regarding compulsory consular instruction, the West German side explained its limitations. Legally, the \textit{Länder} could not require Turkish instruction for any schoolchild in West Germany. Children with Turkish citizenship had the same rights as children with West German citizenship and as such could not be subjected to additional requirements, either in the form of after-school instruction or additional work during regular school hours. The West German Ministries of Education were willing to try for solutions to offer Turkish for children with Turkish citizenship instead of a first foreign language and to encourage consular instruction.\textsuperscript{122} But the West German educational administrations could not force children to develop or maintain Turkish identities. Legally, the choice to culturally identify as Turkish belonged to the children.

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\textsuperscript{119} See Hermann, “Besuch des türkischen Erziehungsministers Necdet Uğur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; hier: Gespräch des Präsidenten der KMK mit dem türkischen Erziehungsminister am 14. Mai 1979,” Sachstandsbericht (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, May 8, 1979), B 93, Bd. 861, PA AA.

\textsuperscript{120} “1. deutsch-türkische Expertengespräch (1977),” 3, 6.


\textsuperscript{122} “2. Tagung der deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission (1978).”
\end{flushleft}
Despite the Turkish Government’s efforts, not all of its citizens attended consular instruction or enrolled in native language classes. Particularly religious parents did not view the Islamic instruction offered by the Turkish government or the Länder as sufficient. Several groups either outright disagreed with the Turkish government’s teachings or felt they were unnecessary. As a result, even though consular classes now (usually) included Islamic instruction, many families continued to send their children to Qur’an Schools or simply did not have their children attend Islamic or Turkish instruction at all.123

The intensification of the Turkish government’s interest in consular instruction and contention over Qu’ran schools demonstrates two points: First, this development shows how foreign internal affairs often had a direct impact not only on German perceptions of whether schoolchildren should have consular teachers, but on the actual content of their consular instruction. Turkey’s internal politics, from educational development to policies on nationalism, affected the schoolchildren living abroad and who migrated during the 1970s. Their teacher education programs influenced the Länder’s willingness to work with Islamic instruction, even if only in consular courses.

Second, it is clear that despite emphasis on cultural diversity, there were some aspects of minority status that the West German governments and society were unwilling to embrace. While hesitant to outright deny access to instruction in any religion, local school administrations often viewed non-Christian religious instruction as antithetical to West German society and certainly a problem when considering a child’s “Germanness.” West German politicians would

use religious or other aspects of ethno-national identity to argue against naturalization and to emphasize the extreme foreignness of some individuals. These men and women would claim that Islamic education was indicative of cultural distance. There was a limit to cultural acceptance, even to promote return.

**Considering Citizenship and Schooling for National Minorities in West Germany**

For minority groups in West Germany, access to schools and identity politics depended not only on what the relevant foreign state’s government or parents wanted, but also on the acceptance of West German government and society. As more “foreign” children were born in West Germany (see Table 5.2), politicians and educators began discussing children with foreign citizenship’s probable “Germanness,” even as the West German media deplored the country’s future of overrun by foreigners. 124 As the fear of these foreign specters grew, Baden-Württemberg’s Christian Democratic Minister of Education Roman Herzog (1978-1980, later President of Germany) 125 pointed out that easing naturalization for second- and third-generation migrants would be the fastest way of reducing the numbers of non-citizens in the Federal Republic. 126 Yet, many politicians, particularly members of the CDU and CSU, asked whether


125 Roman Herzog (born 1934) was a German lawyer and CDU politician who served as President of Germany between 1994-1999. He began his political career in Rheinland-Pfalz under Helmut Kohl. He then served in the Government in Baden-Württemberg in the Ministry of Education under Lothar Späth (1978-1980) before becoming a Member of Bundestag and serving in the Office of the Ministry of the Interior (1980-1983). Ernst Benda then named him Vice-president and Chair of the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, where he became President upon Benda’s retirement in 1987 (until 1994).

126 Deutscher Bundestag, 83. Sitzung. Bonn, Donnerstag, den 4. Februar 1982 (Bonn, 1982), 4945. Dr. Herzog (Baden-Württemberg) points out that one could reduce the numbers of foreigners by naturalizing those second and third generation foreigners born – or at least migrated while young.
these German-born foreigners were in fact culturally German enough to be permitted to become German citizens.127

The debate over the “Germanness” of “foreigners” and considerations about changing naturalization laws fed into disagreements over how much normal public school versus consular instruction children with foreign citizenship should receive. Many politicians and educators alike viewed the Kultusministerkonferenz’s “double goal” as not only impractical, but actually disadvantageous to these children instead of helpful. North Rhine-Westphalia’s Educational Administration had expressed reservations in 1971 and, by the end of the decade, they – and others – felt sure.128 As Herzog explained in the Federal Bundestag in 1982, “We are deluded if we imagine that it is possible to teach tender six-year old children to simultaneously be German and remain Turkish. If you take this idea seriously, it would entail teaching an extra ten hours in the schools because they are Turkish and must learn German. They also needed separate Qur’an instruction,” which added to their burden.129

Part of the problem with addressing the identity and hence the education of these schoolchildren with foreign citizenship was precisely their citizenship status. Through the 1970s, West Germany was committed – along with most of the Council of Europe’s Member States – to


128 Kultusministerium NRW, Referat III A 5, “Problemkatalog im Zusammenhang in ausländischen Arbeitnehmern (AAN),” July 14, 1971, NW 353-123, Landesarchiv NRW.

129 Feeling that this position could not be maintained, Herzog advocated easing naturalization. Herzog did not feel that a hard line could be maintained when actually working with individuals. Claiming that the children were overwhelmed by too much instruction and feeling that the children could not expect in their “tender” youth to learn to straddle two cultures, he argued that the families should be asked to choose between integration and cultural maintenance when they first enrolled their child in school. Herzog also asked, “what about those who declined West German citizenship. Should they still be allowed in or to stay in the country?” Deutscher Bundestag, 83. Sitzung, 4945.
limiting cases of dual citizenship.\textsuperscript{130} As such, foreigners who were not German needed to maintain their connection to their country of citizenship, which in turn meant they needed cultural instruction. Yet, many of these children, growing up in West Germany, spoke German as their mother tongue. In addition, going through the West German school system, they acquired a decidedly “German” kind of cultural and social capital.

While hardly overt within debates about foreign citizens, the issue was different for European Community Member State and Third-Country nationals. By the end of the 1970s, the children of European Community Member State nationals, while unable to vote in federal elections, were supposed to otherwise possess rights almost on par with host country nationals. Their membership in the European Community was a sort of European citizenship, which West German politicians viewed as a complementary rather than conflicting identity. To be German was also to be European, which implied that other Europeans must have similarities to Germans.\textsuperscript{131} As the European Community expanded, welcoming Greece (1981) as well as Portugal and Spain (1986), the perception of who was European became tied to membership in the European Community (with clear exceptions, such as Switzerland). Many West German politicians and educators began feeling that children with citizenship from countries outside of the European Community had a greater cultural difference.

For children of parents with Third-Country citizenship, the issue was more complicated. By the end of the 1970s, just over 30 percent of the foreigners in West Germany had Turkish


citizenship, most of whom were Muslim.\footnote{Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1982), 66. For more on cultural difference, see Leonie Herwartz-Emden, Aufwachsen in heterogenen Sozialisationskontexten: Zur Bedeutung einer geschlechtergerechten interkulturellen Pädagogik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010). It is interesting to note that the Moroccan state applied for European Community membership in 1987, but was turned down on the grounds that it was not “European.” Turkey’s application (granted candidacy status in 1987, but was turned down on the grounds that it was not “European.” “Europeanness” are still under debate.}{132} For many West German politicians, not only was “Germanness” tied to a Christian identity, but, as the liberal Federal Minister of the Interior Gerhart Baum\footnote{Gerhard Baum (born 1932) was a lawyer and German politician in the FDP (which he joined in 1954). He served from 1972-1994 as a Member of the Bundestag from North Rhine-Westphalia. In 1972, he was appointed Bundestagary Secretary for the Ministry of the Interior under Chancellor Willy Brandt and then Helmut Schmidt until 1978, when he was named Minister of the Interior. In 1982 he stepped back with the other FDP Federal Ministers. He later worked for the United Nations.}{133} said in 1982, they had difficulties conceiving how “an individual who attended Qur’an School could possibly understand Germanness.”\footnote{Deutscher Bundestag, 83. Sitzung, 4904.}{134} Politicians like Baum felt that a dual-identity was not possible. “I have wondered” he told the West German Bundestag, “if it is possible for people to simultaneously straddle two cultures for a long time, to live and be raised in two societies. It might be acceptable for the first generation. But for the second and following generations who are and raised here, I see enormous difficulties.”\footnote{Ibid., 4905. The SPD/FDP had a bill to provide for the facilitation of the naturalization of that group of foreigners, which was to be discussed in the Bundesrat on 12 February.}{135} Yet, for men and woman like Baum, Islam did not fit into their conception of “Germanness,” leading to hesitation regarding the idea of permitting “foreigners” to legally become German.

According to many conservative politicians, the possibility of divided loyalties and identities meant that cases of dual-citizenship needed to be kept to a minimum.\footnote{Beauftragter für die Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen, Bericht zur Ausländerpolitik, 66.}{136} Among the Federal Government’s Foreign Office and Ministry of the Interior’s stated reasons for refusing to alter the West German citizenship law in 1978 was the perceived necessity of avoiding such
situations in accordance with the Council of Europe’s 1963 “Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality.”

In signing the 1963 Convention, the multiple members of the Council of Europe argued that “multiple nationalities [were] liable to cause difficulties” and in the interest of “greater unity between its members” sought to limit such instances, particularly with an eye toward military service.

Following that reasoning, in West Germany, while the children of parents who were refugees or stateless could choose to become citizens, second- and third-generation children of foreign workers had limited options (mainly marriage). They were, after all, already automatically entitled to their parents’ citizenship and supposedly did not need German citizenship. In addition, through the 1970s, the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Education continued to claim that the children’s residence was only temporarily, necessitating maintenance of their status as foreign citizens. In order to prepare for return and to not divide their identities, most of the Federal Ministries and Offices claimed it preferable for the children to avoid taking on a German identity regardless of the length of their residence in West Germany. The Federal Government argued that while local schools needed to encourage integration, initiatives supporting return were “just as important.” As the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education reported in 1977, referring to West German and European


138 Auswärtige Amt, “Schulische Betreuung der Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik,” zur Unterrichtung (Bonn, February 28, 1973), B 93, Bd. 746, PA AA.

Community policy, “voluntary mother tongue instruction is vital in the interest of enabling children to return to their homes and maintain their lingual and cultural identities as ethnic groups instead of forcing a conceivably ‘defective integration.’” But – in promoting return and the maintenance of a non-German identity – the Federal and Länder Governments effectively promoted the growth of minority communities. These foreigners needed to integrate, but not too much. At heart, at least, they needed to stay foreign.

The Federal Republic did make it easier for a select set of foreigners to naturalize in 1974. Specifically, the government determined that the foreign children of women with West German citizenship should be entitled to legal recognition as Germans. Where previously citizenship passed exclusively through the father, the 1974 changes permitted West German citizenship to pass through the mother as well. The contemporary push for gender equality clearly influenced the decision, but at the time the stated reason behind the alteration was the number of ethnic German mothers having children with fathers possessing foreign citizenship. While unmarried ethnic German women’s children could inherit their citizenship, the children of women married to foreign men could not (in 1971, 20 percent of Italian and seven percent of Turkish men in the country were married to German women). Hence, while born and raised in

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141 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 9/1629: Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Fraktionen der SPD und FDP betr. Ausländerpolitik.” France, for example, required a foreign citizen to live in the country for five years before becoming eligible to apply for citizenship. For a discussion of German identity and citizenship, see also Brett Klopp, *German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 40–44.

the Federal Republic, these women’s approximately 200,000 children were legally foreigners. As the number of these mixed marriages increased (an estimated 17-18,000 annually) and the public advocated greater gender equality, the West German government agreed to alter its laws to permit this group automatic West German citizenship, despite the prospect of dual citizenship.143

By 1975/76, it was clear that it was not only the children of ethnic German women that were being raised in West Germany. By the late 1970s, a substantial contribution to the increase in so-called foreigners came from live births in the country. According to the Social Democratic Party’s official stance, those live births made integration vital, as it indicated that in the coming years the percentage of legally foreign children in German schools would be growing. That was particularly important as the birth rate among West German citizens was sinking (between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, it fell from 2.5 percent to 1.5 percent).144 In comparison, government statistics showed comparatively high birthrates among West Germany’s foreign minority groups (see Table 5.2) – particularly those of Turkish origin.145 With every passing year, there would be proportionally more foreigners in West German schoolrooms, unless they could naturalize. As the situation stood, the Federal Ministry of the Interior predicted in the 1970s that, by 2030, West


143 Bundestag, “Drucksache 7/1880: Zweites Geesetz zur Änderung des Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes” (Bonn, March 26, 1974); and Washington Post Foreign Service, “W. Germany Alters Law on Citizenship,” The Washington Post, December 6, 1974. For a discussion of gender and equality in citizenship law, see Eli Nathans, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility and Nationalism (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 238–239. The Council of Europe also advocated these changes, leading to new Resolutions (including (77) 2) to “ensure the equality of conditions for both spouses” and permit children to hold the citizenship of the father as well as the mother. National legislation then promoted these changes (Council of Europe, “Second Protocol Amending the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality,” Explanatory Report 149 (Strasbourg, February 2, 1993)).

144 Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, “Die Lage der Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Dritter Familienbericht,” Unterrichtung (Bonn: Bundesregierung, August 20, 1979), 107.

145 Ibid., 160.
Germany would be home to over twelve million foreign citizens, most born in the country. The “foreigner problem,” the Ministry of the Interior announced, was not going to “melt away.”\textsuperscript{146} Instead, as several newspapers informed the West German public, ethnic “German children would soon be minorities.”\textsuperscript{147}


Responding to these claims in the media in the mid-1970s as well as to the visible increase of supposed foreigners in the schools, many ethnic German families bought into an ugly brand of xenophobic hysteria or, more commonly, participated in widespread acts of passive racism. ¹⁵⁰ Some groups with West German citizenship felt that children with foreign citizenship attending local schools were not and could never be German. Several West German politicians

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>W. Ger.</th>
<th>Non-Ger.</th>
<th>%</th>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>1,044.3</td>
<td>1,006.4</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>620.6</td>
<td>539.9</td>
<td>80.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>586.1</td>
<td>532.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>727.1</td>
<td>640.8</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>W. Ger.</th>
<th>Non-Ger.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>7,251.7</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>11,147.8</td>
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<td>187.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>12,410.3</td>
<td>11,954.3</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>6,121.3</td>
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¹⁴⁸ Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1993 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: Wiesbadener Graphische Betriebe GmbH, 1993), 74.

¹⁴⁹ KMK, “Der Schulbesuch ausländischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1965/66 - 1969/70: Allgemeinbildende Schulen” (Bundeseheitlichten Schulstatistik, 1972), B 93, Bd. 745, PA AA; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1968), 83; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1973), 75; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1978), 329; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1983), 345–346; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1988), 356–357; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: Wiesbadener Graphische Betriebe GmbH, 1992), 412. Numbers for 1990 include only the former West German Länder.

and West German parent groups stressed the point, arguing that these “foreigners” and “children of migrant workers” needed to be in their own classes in order to prevent any disadvantage from attaching to the children with West German citizenship (i.e. in Berlin). A few ethnic German parent groups, such as those in Lübeck in 1976, went so far as to strike in protest of the high percentages of “foreigners” in “their schools.”

To address the issue and to calm social unrest, the Federal Government tasked the Federal-Länder Commission (Bund-Länder-Kommission, BLK) with coordinating Federal and Länder efforts on foreign employment. The BLK focused on “family reunification, right to residency, future employment policies, and social integration as well as development of return migration.” While members from the Federal and Länder Ministries of Education did participate, headed by the Federal Ministry of Labor, the commission was more concerned with work and residency permits and naturalization than education. When they did mention schooling, the BLK’s reports ended up supporting the double goal. The authors stressed the importance of preschool, language training, and the completion of compulsory schooling (including vocational schooling) as aspects of successful integration. But they also assumed that native language

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152 Since 1969, federal authorities have had the right to a say in education planning as laid down in Article 91b of the Basic Law. The Bund-Länder-Kommission was established in 1970, but it was only in 1975 that “promotion of research was added to the Commission’s sphere of work.” See Christoph Führ, The German Education System since 1945: Outlines and Problems, trans. Iván Tapia (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1997), 41–45, http://www.eric.ed.gov.

instruction was absolutely necessary. Combining claims of the rights of the children to maintain their cultural connection with encouragement to return, the reports encouraged consular instruction.

While the 1976 Recommendations elevated the position of the children’s mother tongues and attempted to ease access to regular instruction, the language and cultural classes were still solely for foreign schoolchildren. The Recommendations effectively underlined the difference between children with West German and those with foreign citizenship, implying that while children should integrate, they were to maintain their own national identities. In the name of full integration and equal standing with schoolchildren with West German citizenship, the Italian government continued to push for changes to West German curricula to permit Italian in place of a foreign language, not only for Italians but also for Germans. In October 1979, the Kultusministerkonferenz acceded to their demands and added an addendum to the 1976 “Revised Agreement” to permit Italian instead of a required foreign language.154 Interestingly, they also specified that the language the “children of foreign workers” were entitled to in the schools was the relevant country of origin’s official language.155

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154 From the AK meeting in Bonn (Sekretariat der KMK, “Neufassung der Vereinbarung ‘Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,’” Beschluß der KMK, (October 26, 1979), B 93, Bd. 1154, PA AA).

155 In 1977, in response to both the BLK Recommendations as well as the EEC’s Directive, Berlin’s KMK representative suggested putting the KMK’s Working Group that developed the 1976 Recommendations back together. The other Länder officially agreed with the idea on 14 October 1977. The working group’s mandate included “in addition to the coordination of relevant discussions in the context of the European Community and Federal Government,” preparation discussions in “bilateral commissions with the sending countries” (i.e. Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey). The group would meet under its new mandate for the first time in 1978 under the leadership of Ministerialrat Gerhart Mahler from Bavaria, as Franz Domhof (North Rhine-Westphalia) was retiring. (Senator für Schulwesen Berlin and Schacht to Vorsitzende der Antschefskonferenz der KMK and Rüdiger, “Tagesordnung der nächsten Anttschefskonferenz,” July 28, 1977, B 304/3734, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).
As of the end of 1978, the socially liberal “Federal Government was not considering changing its citizenship laws” to enable the children of migrant workers to obtain citizenship. Instead, citing a need to prevent instances of dual citizenship, the Federal Government actively maintained its laws preventing second- and third-generation children with foreign citizenship from becoming nationals. The state thereby effectively maintained groups of people who were legally foreigners, despite going through the local education system from the first grade onwards and speaking German as their native language. According to the Federal-Länder Commission the continued limitations on naturalization were reasonable, as the Federal Republic was officially “not a country of immigration.”

156 See Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). There are many scholars who have pointed out the problematic simplicity of Brubaker’s argument, including Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürgerung und Ausschließung: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2001); and Annemarie Sammartino, “After Brubaker: Citizenship in Modern Germany, 1848 to Today,” German History 27, no. 4 (October 1, 2009): 583–99.

157 That difference in rights as well as social perceptions of difference led several West German politicians and interest groups to discuss the question of West German citizenship for children with non-German citizenship in the late 1970s and increasingly through the 1980s. On 3 November 1978, Federal MP Paul Laufs (CDU) from Baden-Württemberg submitted a question in Bundestag, asking if “the Federal Government was considering changing the Nationality Law of the German Empire and States (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes), which tied German citizenship to the principal jus soli, so that children of foreign workers born in the Federal Republic of Germany could apply when one of parents held the Right to Unlimited Residence (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) as outlined in § 8 Aliens Act (AuslG).” Reflecting the many interest groups’ claims that second- and third generation with non-German citizenship should be entitled to citizenship, Laufs asked “If yes, does the Federal Government also plan to ease naturalization for this group of people?” A week later, Bundestagary Secretary of State for the Federal Ministry of the Interior Andreas von Schoeler’s answered to the negative (Bundestag, “115. Sitzung, Bonn, Freitag, Den 10. November 1978,” Plenarprotokoll 8 (November 10, 1978): 9022A – 9022C).

Dr. Paul Laufs (born 22 June 1938) was a (West) German Engineer and CDU politician. From 1991-1993, he served as Bundestagary Secretary of State for the Federal Ministry for Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety and then from 1993-1997 the Federal Ministry for Post and Telecommunication. He joined the CDU in 1963 and served as Member of the Bundestag from 1976 to 2002.- Andreas von Schoeler (born 4 July 1948) served as Bundestagary Secretary of State for the Federal Ministry of the Interior from 1976-1982. From 1991-1995, he served as Lord Mayor of Frankfurt am Main. Trained as a lawyer, he joined the FDP at 18 but joined the SPD in 1982, after the dissolution of the socio-liberal government.
For Europe, the hyphenated identity had not yet become normalized.\textsuperscript{158} Children were supposed to adhere to their parent’s ethno-national identities even as they learned to operate in West German society. Permitting naturalization would have acknowledged the blurring of the connection between ethnicity and citizenship, which the West German Federal Government was not prepared to do for numerous political reasons. Nonetheless, by the end of the decade, ethnicity was a contested issue. In 1979, Christian Democrat Lothar Späth, now Baden-Württemberg’s Minister President, declared “we are a country of immigration.”\textsuperscript{159} Some migrants and politicians argued that many foreign citizens’ tenure in the country meant that they were, at least, entitled to German citizenship if not to being ethnically German.\textsuperscript{160}

Ethno-national identification became a contested issue, with some migrants and politicians arguing that many foreign citizens’ tenure in the country meant that they were now German. As it became increasingly obvious that the majority of foreigners were in fact permanent residents, many politicians vocally advocated for changing citizenship laws. In 1982, a coalition of SPD and FDP politicians introduced a new bill in the West German Bundestag for revising West German citizenship laws specifically with the intention of easing the citizenship process for second- or third-generation foreigners who were either born in or raised from a young age in the Federal Republic. As Hans-Eberhard Urbaniak (member of Bundestag between

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\textsuperscript{158} By hyphenated identity, I mean the combination of different identity labels, such as “Afro-Germans,” “German-Turks,” or “Turkish-Germans.” The hyphenated identity has itself become a contested issue as many feel that the word order prioritizes a single aspect of a rich identity.

\textsuperscript{159} Karl-Heinz Meier-Braun, \textit{Deutschland, Einwanderungsland} (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 46.

1970 and 2002) explained in 1982 on behalf of the Social Democratic Party, “we hold it to be extraordinarily important that a special offer of naturalization be extended to the entire young generation.” He claimed the Federal Government needed to “offer the voluntary step” and allow the youth to “make their own decision.”

Other, particularly conservative politicians part of the CDU or CSU, emphasized the right to remain foreign as an argument against easing naturalization barriers. For many Christian conservative politicians and not a few members of the Social Democrats, part of the difficulty was the idea of allowing individuals who had not wholeheartedly embraced Germanness to become citizens. It was not the government’s business, after all, Christian Democratic Member of Bundestag Alfred Dregger eloquently claimed, to Germanize migrants. Instead, according to Dregger, the West German government needed to continue “recognizing the efforts of foreigners to maintain their national identities.”

The Federal Government did ease naturalization laws in the 1980s, but did not extend birthright and continued to prohibit dual citizenship. Despite the changes, few foreigners would choose to follow the new paths to naturalization. The decision against naturalization was due to several factors. Many felt that the benefits of West German citizenship were not worth the cost

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161 Hans-Eberhard Urbaniak (born 1929) was a member of the SPD who served in the Federal Landestag from 1970 to 2002.

162 Deutscher Bundestag, 83. Sitzung, 4889.

163 Dr. Alfred Dregger (1920-2002) was a Christian Democratic politician. After serving in the Wehrmacht, he studied law, earning his doctorate in 1950. After a political career in Hesse, he served 1972 to 1998 in the Bundestag, during which he was Chairman of the CDU/CSU from 1982 to 1991. Dregger was known as an avid opponent of communism and was a member of the National-Conservative wing of the CDU, the Stahlhelm-Fraktion.

164 In contrast, the CDU’s Dr. Dregger argued that the young generation’s identity was too important. “As maintained in our constitution, we recognize the efforts of foreigners to maintain their national identities…We do not want to Germanize anyone. Who wants to become German can and should have the opportunity to do so. But,” he added, effectively separating “Germanness” from citizenship, “the CDU … rejected the claim to naturalization” (Deutscher Bundestag, 83. Sitzung. Bonn, Donnerstag, den 4. Februar 1982 (Bonn, 1982), 4895).
of giving up their original citizenship. For many European Community Member State nationals, they felt that the change did not make enough of a difference to make the paperwork worth it. For others, their countries of origin, like Turkey, had laws that prohibited non-citizens from inheriting or being buried in Turkey.\textsuperscript{165}

In consequence, and due to continued new migration, the rate of foreigners in West German increased, necessitating continued debates over the place of culture and language in the West German school system, particularly for second- and third-generation foreigners and children with migrant backgrounds. Essentially legislating the continued categorization of these children as foreign, the government felt honor bound – and legally bound under European Economic Community Directive 486/77 on the schooling of migrant workers’ children – to accommodate that status. While the socio-liberal government sought to improve the situation of its migrant population even as it denied the possibility of citizenship, it tried to satisfy the sentiment that all individuals were entitled to equality of opportunity and the right to an education. Hence, even as the children were supposed to integrate, their status as national minorities was legally and socially reinforced, meaning that they were theoretically supposed to learn to be different for their own mental health even as they were supposed to learn to be German.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The 1973 Oil Crisis and subsequent Recruitment Stops encouraged the West German and other European Community Member State governments to push native language and cultural instruction. For some politicians, parent groups, and other interested parties, that push was about

encouraging foreign ethno-national identification in order to encourage emigration to the country of citizenship. For other groups, their demands stemmed from a belief in the importance of multiculturalism and a celebration of diversity. That confluence of interest meant that, by the mid-1970s, there was widespread support for language and cultural classes.

Despite a rhetoric of inclusion, the different Education Administrations and state governments, including the West German, found that there were limits to what kind of diversity they were willing to support. Where some states, like the French, technically permitted different groups to become citizens after an elongated stay in the country, many West German politicians, frequently conservative, refused to consider groups like those with Turkish citizenship as potential Germans, in part because of their religious observations. With a largely all or nothing mentality regarding identity, if these groups could not be entirely German, they could not be legally German at all. In consequence, although there was significant support for alterations to West German citizenship laws from the Social Democratic and liberal parties, the proposed alterations that did go through were limited and largely unappealing.

As a result, state governments like the West German inadvertently supported the development of diasporas and minority groups within their borders. Officially encouraging schoolchildren with non-German citizenship to identify with their country of citizenship, the West German government pushed that foreign identity, often to the point of claiming that the children could never be local. In consequence, many groups took that message to heart, participating in consular instruction and stressing their foreign identities. Others, however, ignored official rhetoric and viewed themselves as German, or began to stress a hyphenated identity.
Towards the end of the 1970s, educational experts shocked the West German public with several reports about a supposed “lost generation” of “guest worker children” who had fallen through the cracks in the school system.\(^1\) The media picked up the subject, bemoaning the fact that 30-60 percent of children (or more) with foreign citizenship were leaving school without their certificates. Commentators expressed concern that many of these children were often “illiterate in two languages.”\(^2\) Dismay at low levels of school completion and rising unemployment turned heads, particularly as the number of “lost youths” rose dramatically in the mid and late 1970s.\(^3\) With the majority of children with foreign citizenship now born on West German soil, educators and politicians compared these schoolchildren to their West German counterparts and were dismayed at the results. Journalists reports of mass illiteracy in two

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languages fed into contemporary European-wide frustrations that their traditional school systems were simply not working.¹

Appalled by these reports and responding to voters’ concerns, politicians across the Länder and in the migrant and minority groups’ countries of citizenship, local and international media, and parents all sought to uncover the causes of this “catastrophe.”² The West German system was clearly failing these children, but what was the cause? These different actors placed the blame on different causes, with left leaning politicians, educators, and journalists assigning responsibility to citizenship laws (which usually limited naturalization to those with German paternity), intercultural miscommunication, and xenophobia. Right-wing politicians, in contrast, attributed these shortcomings to the influx of too many foreigners and the children’s cultural background. These groups argued that many children with non-German citizenship were simply too culturally different to succeed in the West German system. West German and European feminists, after two decades of struggle for gender equality, blamed continued gender discrimination and patriarchal familial structures in Catholic Italian, Spanish, and especially Islamic Turkish families.³


² Education and Culture in West Germany falls under Länder (the West German states) jurisdiction. While they coordinate their policies and maintain equivalency through the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, hereafter KMK or KMK), which was a voluntary body of the eleven West German Länder’s Ministries and Senators of Education.

These groups wanted to find an external cause for the problem because they felt that the West German state was at least partially responsible. Many of these children had been attending West German schools from the beginning of their compulsory schooling. Many non-German citizens were no longer migrants whose success or failure could be attributed to their countries of origins’ education systems. The West German state had a clear obligation to teach them to read, whatever external impediments (e.g. migration) might be involved. After all, at the very least, the right to education meant promoting literacy. Low levels of completion of secondary education needed to be rectified for the good of the West German state, as illiteracy was directly tied to human rights abuses, repression, and the failure of the state to equalize its residents’ access to schooling.

The debate about “lost” and “disadvantaged” children and youths was also a concern for the “traditional countries of origin” (Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portugal, and Yugoslavia). These governments expressed concerns regarding discrimination within the West German school systems and gender inequality in West German schools, worried about their citizens’ access to higher levels of secondary school, and questioned their placement in institutions for the learning-disabled. Part of their concern stemmed from the changing international perception of education. At the end of the 1970s, in the context of a declining economy after the first oil crisis, and amid increasing unemployment in Europe, secondary schooling was associated with bettering the labor market. In the 1950s and 1960s, UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the European Community had all pushed education as a tool to promote equality and opportunity. In contrast, during the 1970s, education administrators and politicians across Europe re-evaluated

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schools as a step on the way to employment. With fewer factory jobs available in either West Germany or in the various migrant and minority groups’ countries of citizenships’ post-industrial labor market, education beyond lower secondary school was increasingly important. Yet, the majority of non-German citizens never attended the supposedly mandatory vocational training, if they even completed secondary school at all.

The change in the public discourse not only reflected economic and social developments, but also revealed the increasing polarization of West German political culture in the 1970s. By the late 1970s, the debates on education in West German politics had become a heated ideological battlefield. If the SPD suggested something, its opponents in the CDU and CSU, demanded the opposite, and vice versa. With education under Ländere control, this division made the standardization of education policy on the federal level impossible. Instead, each of the Länder governments went its own way or chose specific partners to work with (e.g. the SPD controlled North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse or CDU/CSU controlled Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg).

As long as the Social Democratic-Liberal (SPD-FDP) government was in office (until 1982, when a no confidence vote forced Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to step down), the Federal and Länder governments took the stance that it was their duty to try and ensure equality of

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8 Chapter 5 discusses the limited options for naturalization under West German citizenship law. Out of the hundreds of thousands of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship born in West Germany, only a few thousand would become citizens. In consequence, “foreign children” were often born and raised their entire lives in West Germany.


opportunity despite children’s different backgrounds. After all, according to the ethos of the period, every child was supposed to have the same chances for success in the West German school system. With Article 3 of the Basic Law forbidding discrimination based on social background, the state made itself responsible for ensuring that the system did not promote inequality. To ensure that promised equality of educational opportunity for migrant and minority children, however, the causes of inequality needed to be addressed.

Separate but Equal? Citizenship in Scholastic Dis/advantage

In 1978, the SPD-FDP coalition government under Chancellor Schmidt declared that it would not alter West German citizenship law. This refusal to even create immigration laws, since the “Federal Republic was not a country of immigration,” relegated the legal place of non-nationals to a strange limbo between the dual, yet opposing, pressures to integrate and leave. Nonetheless, the Social Democratic-Liberal Federal Government acknowledged the permanent presence of its many minority groups and agreed with its major opponents in the West German Bundestag, the CDU and CSU, that the “potential for conflict” would persist if “the foreign population was not better integrated.” To address the issue, the Federal Government created the Office of the Commission for Foreigners in 1978.

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11 Helmut Schmidt, member of the SPD, was Chancellor of Germany from 1974 until 1982.


14 Ausländerbeauftragte. Like other West German ministries and offices, the exact name changed from time to time. The current title, emphasizing integration over foreignness, is Beauftragte für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, also Integrationsbeauftragte and Beauftragte für Migration und Integration.
for Foreigners (Ausländerbeauftragter) – was supposed to provide suggestions for “improving the situation of foreigners.” The Federal Government, however, allocated the new office only a small budget, preventing the Office from doing more than publishing occasional reports. In consequence, the Office had practically no influence.15

In his first report, the newly appointed Commissioner for Foreigners Heinz Kühn, an SPD member and former Minister-President of the North-Rhine-Westphalia state,16 argued that the legal differentiation between national groups created continued potential for conflict and perpetuated performance gaps. Kühn’s 1979 report, Position and Further Development of the Integration of Foreign Workers and their Families in the Federal Republic of Germany, further condemned existing practices as discriminatory. To achieve equality, Kühn claimed that it was necessary for residents with migrant backgrounds to become citizens.17 Difference needed to be eliminated and foreigners recognized as immigrants before they could become full participants in West German society. Part of the “full social integration” the report demanded was the “entire removal of all segregating measures in the school sector.” Attacking the Kultusministerkonferenz’s dual goals, Kühn claimed that more attention needed to be paid to


16 Heinz Kühn (SPD), previously the Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, was appointed as Ausländerbeauftragte by under Chancellor Schmidt in 1978 and retained the position until 1980. For more information on Kühn’s service as Ausländerbeauftragte, see Bernd Geiß and Bundesrepublik Beauftragter für die Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen, “Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten: Tätigkeitsbericht 1983 bis 1986” (Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, November 1986), 3.

17 Ibid., 10.
integration instead of cultural inheritance. To do so, schools needed to “intensify integrative measures for all children and youth, meaning those in preschool (Vorschule), school, and vocational training.” Without radical changes in policy and the extension of all political and social rights to foreign residents, success would continue to be limited.

It is difficult to evaluate the accuracy of Kühn’s claim regarding legal differentiation causing disadvantages. Kühn based his argument on reports demonstrating that continued emphasis on schoolchildren’s status as non-Germans contributed to wide-spread sentiment among the German ethnic majority and many minority communities that West German schools were not for children considered foreign. Studies both within the Federal Republic and outside the state further substantiated his case through interviews and various qualitative studies. While not necessarily claiming that naturalization laws needed to change, these historical and social science studies suggested that the continued othering of schoolchildren fostered a perception that

18 For more on the KMK and its dual goals, see Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism (New York: Praeger, 1978), 179–204.

19 Heinz Kühn, “Stand und Weiterentwicklung der Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Memorandum des Beauftragten der Bundesregierung” (Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, September 1979), 3–4, NW 670–70, Landesarchiv NRW.

20 Ibid., 3–4, 20. For a brief description of the Kühn Memorandum, see Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 245–246. Whether or not Kühn’s general indictment of both West German government and society caused his promotion, he was not long in his position as Advocate. In 1980 Liselotte Funcke, member of the FDP and longtime advocate for women’s rights, replaced him (Liselotte Funcke, “Notiz zum Gespräch mit dem türkischen Erziehungsmiister am 07. 09, 11.30 Uhr,” September 7, 1981, B 304/6178, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). Funcke, while fulfilling her role admirably given her limited funding, did not have a special interest in education. She did, however, promote “Freedom from discrimination and integration into society and the workplace in respect of the national, cultural, and religious individualities of the foreigner.”

the schools were “not for them,” which in turn created a sense of failure even before the children entered the classroom.\(^{21}\)

Kühn’s argument hinged on the practice of social othering, under which he explicitly included school programs singling out schoolchildren with foreign citizenship. An example of these was Berlin’s regulation of classroom segregation from 1970. Under a Social Democratic-Liberal government (1955-1981), Berlin’s Senate stipulated that no German classroom should have more than 20 percent of children with foreign citizenship, because contemporary studies claimed that higher concentrations of schoolchildren with non-German citizenship hindered integration.\(^{22}\) In order to avoid this problem in areas where communities of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship lived, the Senate for Education began a system of bussing in order to place children in schools outside of their local districts. The Kultusministerkonferenz’s 1976 recommendations supported the idea, suggesting that classes not exceed a concentration of foreign children higher than 20 percent. The expected remedy, however, was for schools to spread the children over multiple classes or local schools. Many of the Länder Education Administrations rejected the idea of purely foreign classes outside of the preparatory classes or national schools (described in Chapter 2 and 3) because they would, after all, lead to a “ghetto education” and permanent social isolation.\(^{23}\)

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23 Rist, Guestworkers in Germany, 193–201.
The Berlin government, under SPD-FDP leadership until 1981, chose not to follow Kühn’s 1979 recommendation to remove all differentiation and did not dismantle the 20 percent cap. And, with the election of a CDU-FDP government in 1981, the Berlin Senat under Major Richard Weizäcker (CDU) chose not change its policies. Instead, the new Christian Democratic Senator for Health and Social Affairs, Ulf Fink, defended the cap as crucial to Berlin’s efforts to “try and stop the development of ghettoization.”

Yet in areas in urban districts with higher concentrations of non-German pupils, schools struggled to cap classes at 20 percent of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship. Many new migrants opted to live in the same areas as previous co-nationals, leading to the formation of diasporas or “Little Turkeys” in the working class districts of Kreuzberg, Tiergarten, and Wedding. Schools in these districts often had a majority non-German population, meaning creating a classroom with eighty percent West German citizens could be difficult. While agreeing with the general sentiment that “integration [was] unthinkable without a school education,” Fink asked the West German Bundestag during a discussion of citizenship laws how “integration [should] be fully realized, if the proportion of foreigners at times reaches up to 80 percent of a starting first year class? Furthermore,” he added, “the absolute number of the foreign children in Berlin’s lower secondary schools in the 1982/83 school year would be larger than the number of German schoolchildren.” Given these conditions and aware of new regulations to be issued in following months, he warned that “bussing would no longer help.”


25 Ibid.
To solve the problem of bussing and high concentrations of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship, Berlin Christian Democratic Senator for Education Hanna Renate Laurien\(^{26}\) ordered in 1982 that no class with German schoolchildren could be composed of more than 30 percent foreign students. Extra foreign children would simply be placed together in a “pure foreigner class.” Laurien did permit an exception if all children with foreign citizenship had mastered German, at which time having 50 percent of them composing a German classroom was permissible.\(^{27}\) Otherwise, Laurien feared that Germans might “become a minority.” She believed that German children who lived in areas with higher percentages of foreigners already needed extra support. She claimed that placing children from the ethnic-German majority in classes with non-German citizens would only further disadvantage the ethnic-German majority. For Laurien and many others, the right of children with West German citizenship to equality of opportunity trumped the right to education for children with foreign citizenship.\(^{28}\)

The Berlin press reported that “several parents with foreign citizenship,” particularly with longer residency, argued that the Berlin Senate’s regulation was discriminatory. According to the media, these parents had raised their children in West Germany and the children spoke German

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\(^{26}\) Hanna Renate Laurien (1928-2010) was a CDU politician and convert to Catholicism (from Lutheranism at age 24). She served as Senator for School, Youth and Sports in Berlin from 1981 to 1989, when she had to resign. Laurien was elected President of the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin in 1991 (the first female to be so elected), in which capacity she served until 1995. She also served from 1967 to 2000 as the main committee member of the Central Committee of German Catholics (Zentralkomitees der deutschen Katholiken).


as their mother tongue. The parents agreed that it was fine to place children with limited German language skills in separate classes, but they maintained that children like theirs should not be placed in these “foreigner classes.” In an attempt to fight the Berlin Senate’s 1982 regulation, some parents simply removed their children from the schools in protest.

Parents of three Greek and Turkish children sued for the right to enroll their children in classes with German schoolchildren, but they lost their case. The Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) ruled that the Berlin Senate’s regulation was lawful, as “the Administration’s measures did not have as a goal the separation of German and foreign schoolchildren, but the creation of a good learning environment for everyone.” The court further ruled that the Berlin Senate’s “measures were to prevent xenophobia.” From the court’s perspective, the outcome of the classes and the possibility of discrimination were inconsequential. It was the Berlin Senate’s goal in creating the separate classes that made the

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30 One example is the Fritzlar-Homberg-Grundschule in Tiergarten: After bringing their children to the first few days of class, some parents removed their children and insisted instead on a common “deutsche Erstkläßler” (German first grade). The new rules actually raised the limits from 15 percent to 30-50 percent, depending on language competency. For the Fritzlar-Homberg-Grundschule, there were 24 “German” and 33 “foreign” schoolchildren registered. Given the rules, the school had created two classes, one with 24 German and 5 foreigners since the German children could not be separated and still maintain the legal limits. “Eltern schickten ihre Kinder nicht in Ausländerklasse,” Tagesspeigel, August 14, 1982.


difference. Laurien’s regulation and the court’s decision appalled multiple groups. One of these was the left-leaning Education and Science Workers' Union, which saw the ruling as a “dangerous decision” on the part of the court. It also offended those “German and foreign parents who strove for the integration of their children.” In addition, the union claimed that the ruling empowered the school administration to run roughshod over parents, teachers, and schoolchildren’s participation rights.

Whether or not the court correctly portrayed the Berlin Senate’s motivation, xenophobia remained a problem in the schools in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since the late 1960s, parents with West German citizenship had been filing complaints with the Länder Ministries of Education about their children having to attend schools with foreign children, Turks, and Muslims. But at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, an increasing number of West German citizens took exception, sometimes violently, with those they viewed as “taking their jobs” or moving into “German neighborhoods.” Many ethnic German parents opted to move out of neighborhoods with large minority populations. Some of these parents complained that schoolchildren with non-German citizenship took resources from German children and brought

33 It should be noted that many teachers in lower secondary education viewed the Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW) as a highly conservative, traditionalist union whose wage structures furthered any discrimination existent in the West German tripartite school system. For a discussion of the GEW, see Thomas Ellwein, “Die deutsche Gesellschaft und ihr Bildungswesen: Interessenartikulation und Bildungsdiskussion,” in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furek (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 97–100.

34 “Zahl der Asylbewerber sank um 55 Prozent: Seit Jahresbeginn nur noch knapp 4000 Anträge.”


down the quality of school education. Driven by these fears, as Christian Democratic Berlin
Senator Ulf Fink pointed out, the citizens of Berlin “ended up in one pot with the NPD…,”
saying: “the Turks must go.”

Senator of Education Laurien did not argue that the “Turks needed to go,” but she did
push for limiting the permissible age for family reunification to six and for the sake of improved
integration. Pointing to statistics on school successes, she claimed that anyone who still thought
that fourteen and 15 year olds should be allowed to migrate overlooked the fact that these youths
“could no longer reach their secondary school certificates” despite support measures. For those
children and youths of all ages already in the city, their parents needed to be convinced of the
importance of vocational training. Laurien argued this was vital, as foreign children already
made up around 25 percent of the school body overall (approximately 80,000 in Berlin) and
these children “needed to become the skilled labor of tomorrow.” Yet, despite these claims, the
CDU-FDP Berlin Senate cut funding for programs promoting integration and combating
illiteracy over the next three years.

37 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, founded in 1964, was an ultra-right wing party that many in
Germany and abroad view as a neo-Nazi party. Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 9/1629: Antwort der
Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Fraktionen der SPD und FDP betr. Ausländerpolitik,” 4919; and “Brief
von Mietern an Ihre Wohnungsbaugesellschaft ‘Neue Heimat,’” Der Tagesspiegel, October 10, 1979.

38 Family reunification is when a resident in one country (here West Germany) brings a family member (usually a
spouse or children) with foreign citizenship into the country. Because the European and German courts recognized
the right to be with family as a basic human right, the Federal Republic had to allow the immigration of immediate
family. In order to reduce migration, several West German politicians attempted to limit the meaning of family or
the age of acceptable migration. They also set a minimum limit for the length of marriage before a spouse could
migrate. For more discussion, see Klaus Barwig, Klaus Lörcher, and Christoph Schumacher, eds., Familiennachzug

39 Cornelsen, “Deutsche Kinder dürfen nicht Minderheit in Schulen werden: CDU-Politikerin Laurien widerspricht
ekatholischer Kirche: ‘Keine türkischen Kinder über sechs Jahre nachholen’”; “Frau Laurien für Begrenzung des
Zuzugs von Ausländerkindern: Hinweis auf Probleme der schulischen und beruflichen Bildung,” Tagesspiegel,
August 13, 1982; and “Laurien: Möglichst Jung: CDU-Politikern für frühe Nachreise von Türkenkindern,”
Volksblatt, August 13, 1982.

40 “Sie sind Analphabeten in zwei Sprachen’: Kreuzberger Türkischen ohne Integrationschancen / Lehrer an der
7. Grundschule: Der Senat spart am falschen Ende,” Volksblatt, September 21, 1982; and “Wir können hier nicht

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A central part of the Berlin Senate’s and other Länder Ministries of Educations’ concerns were the socio-economic background of Turks and other children of traditional guest worker groups. These children, often coming from working class families, were on occasion depicted by Christian-conservative West German politicians and the West German right-leaning tabloids as dangerous or criminal. They depicted the children as problem groups in need of support so as to avoid the development of second-class citizens exploiting the generosity of the welfare state. As former guest workers and their families comprised the largest contingent of non-Germans (particularly at the primary and lower secondary school levels), the very concept of “foreignness” took on a working class and negative connotation, becoming something to be viewed with suspicion. As the assumption that foreigners were working-class or unemployed took hold, politicians (as well as scholars) often overlooked the existence of non-German groups from higher socio-economic backgrounds or families, choosing to examine “foreigners” and “Germans” as essentialized categories.

In contrast, the same West German politicians viewed schoolchildren with Dutch and French citizenship as desirable additions to the school system. They regarded these youngsters as European and as part of the European Community, referring to them as “international” instead of “foreign” or even “migrant.” Even as some West German citizens demanded that “foreigners

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leave” Germany, the government expanded European Community student exchange programs. The Länder and Federal Ministries of Education actually actively sought to bring in more European, non-German schoolchildren – just those with socially acceptable backgrounds. Furthermore, those children from the Netherlands or France who resided in the country were more likely to attend higher levels of secondary school and live in areas with lower percentages of other groups with foreign citizenship. Unlike the children of working-class communities, these children represented the kind of diversity and multiculturalism the European Community was promoting.

The Socio-Economic Divide in West German Scholastic Performance

In 1981, the Federal Ministry of Education, under Social Democratic leadership, discussed the class divide in scholastic success generally, demonstrating that socio-economic background played a direct role. In the Ministry’s 1981 publication “Working Class Children in the Educational System,” the SPD Minister of Education Björn Engholm used over a decade of research to show that children from lower socio-economic backgrounds (e.g. the working class) generally performed significantly below the average of children from families of white-color employees and civil servants (Angestellten- und Beamtenfamilien). Engholm pointed out that the majority of children with non-German citizenship were “working class children too” with “ninety percent having working-class fathers” (no mention of mothers). Engholm emphasized

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44 Björn Engholm joined the SPD in 1962 and became a member of the Bundestag in 1969. He served as Minister of Education between 1981 and 1982. Between 1988 and 1993, he served as Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein. He was the successor to Social Democrat Jürgen Schmude, who was Minister of Education from 1978 until 1981, when he received an appointment as Minister of Justice.

45 In 1979, 9.5 percent of working-class children entered Gymnasium, while 49.6 percent of children of Beamte and 38.2 percent of children of Angestellte entered Gymnasium (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Arbeiterkinder im Bildungssystem, 11).
that, when directly compared with ethnically-German children from the same socio-economic group, the performance gap diminished significantly.46

Disadvantage in education as associated with class was controversial in the early 1980s in West Germany. With the abolition of the aristocracy and opposition to discrimination based on social class inscribed into the West German Basic Law, some contemporary scholars, like the liberal sociologist Helmut Schelsky, had claimed already in the 1950s that West Germany had developed into a “flattened middle-class society” (Mittelklassegesellschaft).47 Others, usually left or liberal scholars such as the political scientist Ralf Dahrendorf, argued that, while the West German Constitution promised equality, class divisions continued to act as a sharp social divide.48 Dahrendorf’s work exemplified the problem Pierre Bourdieu described in his work on French education: the West German school system served as a site that reinforced the socio-economic divide, even as West German educators attempted to provide programs to promote equality of opportunity.49 With the division implicitly based on cultural capital and style rather

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46 Ibid., 41.


48 See for example Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959). For a brief discussion of how some claimed that, in contrast to Britain, West Germany was a “classless society,” see Mary Fulbrook, A History of Germany 1918-2008: The Divided Nation (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 189–191. Ralph Gustav Dahrendorf, Baron Dahrendorf (1929-2009) was an influential political thinker, sociologist, and philosopher. Although initially in the SPD, he joined the FDP in 1967. In 1968, he was voted in as a MP for the BW Landestag, but moved in October 1969 to the Bundestag, which he in turn left in August 1970. Dahrendorf served briefly as a Bundestagary Secretary in the Foreign Office under Willy Brandt’s government (1969-1970), before moving to Brussels to serve as European Commissioner for External Relations and Trade (1970-1972) and then European Commissioner for Research, Science and Education (1973-1974). His later career was predominantly in England, where he became a member of the House of Lords in 1993 (until 2009) after a distinguished academic career.

than law, it was almost impossible to overcome class boundaries, as many lower-class individuals felt that the upper levels of secondary school were “not for them” and members of the wealthy and elite classes often strove to reinforce social divisions.50

Engholm and many liberal or leftist West German educators and politicians agreed that the West German tripartite secondary school system reified West German society’s class divisions.51 While the majority of school-age youths now attended secondary school, schoolchildren from lower socio-economic backgrounds were more likely to be placed in lower secondary schools (Hauptschule) than other children. As Engholm described in his report, that trend was true for the children of migrant workers as well. In some areas, such as in many West Berlin schools, that meant that lower secondary schools’ student bodies consisted of more foreign children than children with West German citizenship, while children with German citizenship enrolled in higher secondary (Realschulen and Gymnasien) and comprehensive schools (Gesamtschulen). According to Engholm, this class imbalance violated Article Three of the Basic Law and hence the state had a responsibility to rectify the situation.

Engholm clearly acknowledged the importance of national and ethnic background. The Federal Ministry of Education’s Report on Working Class Children demonstrated not only that


51 The tripartite school system included three levels of secondary schooling after primary school (grades 1–4 or 1–6, depending on the specific Länder). The lowest level of secondary school (Hauptschule) prepared children for unskilled and semi-skilled labor or led to vocational training. The higher levels of secondary school (Realschule and Gymnasium) led to higher levels of skilled labor or to university. Theoretically, teachers’ recommendations were supposed to be based on an individual child’s skill and merit. For a description of the West German school system, see Christoph Führ, The German Education System Since 1945, trans. Iván Tapia (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1997); and Hans Döbert, “Germany,” in The Education Systems of Europe, ed. Wolfgang Hörner et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 299–235.
socio-economic background had a direct impact on education, but also that the children’s (or their parents’) ethno-national background influenced their scholastic success. Furthermore, where many would have expected cultural difference to play a direct role and to see European Member State nationals perform better than others, Engholm showed that some groups – for example Greeks and Yugoslavians, who were not yet (technically) part of the European Community – successfully managed to navigate the school system. With 13.1 percent of children with Greek ancestry and 18.4 percent of children with Yugoslavian ancestry entering the Gymnasium, they appeared to have as much of a chance (or more) as ethnically-German children of entering higher levels of secondary schools (see Table 6.1). In contrast, only 6.1 and 3.7 percent of schoolchildren with Italian (who were specifically “European”) and Turkish citizenship respectively entered the Gymnasium.

Table 6.1: Rate of Transfer from Primary School to Secondary in Baden-Württemberg’s Tripartite School System at the End of the Fourth Grade in 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Lower Secondary (Hauptschule)</th>
<th>Realschule</th>
<th>Gymnasium</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Absolute Number of Children</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavian</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3,453</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Arbeiterkinder im Bildungssystem, 43–45.

53 Ibid., 42.

54 Ibid., 42; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1981).
In the 1981 report, the authors were careful to point out the difference in success between children arriving later in their school careers and those moving through the education system from the beginning (or from an early grade level). Chart 6.1 demonstrates that difference, depicting the proportions of children at the end of their primary schooling who are moving into the three different levels of West German secondary schools. These children were supposed to have a better chance of scholastic success than children who arrived after the age of 10 – which the chart above clearly supports.

To try to overcome this imbalance for schoolchildren with non-German citizenship, the West German Federal and Länder governments collaborated on several projects. Among their primary recommendations, the Federal Ministry of Education suggested that local communities provide “suitable preschool instruction.” The Ministry of Education’s call for increased early education for children with migrant backgrounds corresponded with general debates on the need for an extension of early childhood education for ethnic-German children. Many educators claimed that the half-day system needed to be extended to an all-day system and started at an earlier age. They claimed more time was needed in order to promote cognitive, lingual, and social learning skills and decrease the influence of family background. Educators and scholars argued that this intensive training would better prepare young children for the West German school system. For those children with non-German citizenship, early childhood education would

55 Grindel, Ausländerbeauftragte; and Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen, ed., Anregungen der Ausländerbeauftragten zur Novellierung des Ausländerrechts (Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, 1987). Churches and some civic groups provided programs as well. Local libraries set up homework programs and church groups set up preschools. Although hardly covering all children, it did alleviate some need even as some of the programs showcased the social divide between “German” and “foreign.”

56 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drs. 8/1703,” 47.

57 Ibid., 40.
expose them to West German language and culture in a school environment and increase the probability of successful integration (i.e. completion of a secondary school certificate, entrance into higher levels of secondary school, and future employment). Because of the high costs involved, and with early childhood, primary, and secondary education under state jurisdiction, Federal support for early schooling remained primarily at the level of rhetoric. The Federal Ministry of Education encouraged the provision of new spots and the training of more teachers in early childcare, but there was little that it could actually do without significant financial investment.

Several of the Länder tried to improve access to early childhood education. However, the costs of increasing the number of free spots were prohibitive. In addition, many parents belonging to West German minority groups were concerned about the possibility of schools trying to indoctrinate their children. For example, parents with Turkish citizenship expressed concern that their children would be given an explicitly Christian education. Since the two welfare organizations— the Catholic Caritas and the Protestant Diakonisches Werk – associated with the two largest West German churches ran 80 percent of all childcare (Krippen and Kindergarten), preschool (Vorschul) and afterschool (Hort) programs, the migrant parents’


concerns were understandable. Even without these ideological concerns, the attendance of children with foreign citizenship or working-class backgrounds was complicated by the expense. Parents had to pay for all forms of childcare based on their income. The Länder only offered a small number of free half-day preschool classes as part of the primary school system. Those factors all but prohibited the attendance of the very groups that the Federal and Länder Ministries of Education were at least rhetorically trying to reach. In consequence, children from groups with middle-class earning power usually filled those preschool spaces available.

In the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Federal Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (both under under Social Democratic Ministers) did partially finance some programs for homework help and German language instruction. The Ministries argued that extra-curricular activities were necessary to enable integration and to promote vocational training. The Ministries’ main programs included “German for Foreign Workers” and “Measures for Social and Employment Integration of Foreign Youths” (MSBE), introduced in 1976 and 1981 respectively. Targeted at schoolchildren who arrived

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60 Both church organizations opposed all-day childcare as a threat to the family. They requested and received state support, but rejected state control.

61 See Deutscher Bundestag, “Drs. 8/1703,” 40. Both North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg significantly increased their preschool spots not only with the idea of assisting “children with migrant backgrounds” to overcome the inherent disadvantage because their parents were not “German,” but also their class background. In 1976, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Labor made an effort to get all children places in preschool, including the children of foreign workers. By the end of the year, Baden-Württemberg offered almost one-third of the preschool spots in the Federal Republic, 15 percent of which went to the children of foreign workers (Kultusministerium BW, “Besuch Deutschen Kindergärten Durch Ausländische Kinder,” September 9, 1976, EA 8/203 Bü 388, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; “Hilfe für Ausländerkinder im deutschen Kindergarten,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, May 29, 1978; and Fridtjof Theegarten, “Erstmals im Land: Sonderkurse für Gastarbeiterkinder im Vorschulalter: Bambini lernen Deutsch,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, April 7, 1978).

62 In consequence, children from groups with middle-class earning power usually filled those halfday Kindergarten and preschool spaces available. Only a very small percentage was open all day. Their half-day structure was not helpful for working parents. For an in depth examination of the system, see {Citation}

after primary school, they were supposed to provide schoolchildren, particularly immigrants, a chance to overcome both social and work-related problems created by lack of certifications and diplomas. Due to the country’s federal structure the local Ministries of Labor and Education initially bore the brunt of the associated costs, but increasingly received substantial Federal subsidies “in order to increase offerings.” In 1980 alone, the Federal Government contributed over 12 million Deutsch Marks, the Federal Employment Agency 80 million, and the individual Länder over 6 million. These expenses resulted in some successes, at least in terms of participation. By September 1980, 12,900 foreign youths were taking part, and by November 1980 the number had jumped to 14,700 (25 percent of whom were women). Together, these programs were supposed to address the main hurdles to integration (language skills and preparation for the labor market) and scholastic success.

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64 Bundestag Secretary Engholm’s answer to a question from Member of Bundestag Würtz (SPD) on the view of the Federal Government on integrating more “children of foreign workers” into the German Berufsbildungssystem, see Deutscher Bundestag, Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages 8. Wahlperiode, Stenographische Bericht, Sitzung 197 (Jan. 18, 1980), 15788 C-D.


66 There were 121,000 youths with foreign citizenship between 15-18 and 150,700 between 19-23 in West Germany in 1978 (Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Berufsbildungsbericht 1981, 89; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1980), 66).

67 Grindel, Ausländerbeauftragte. It should be noted that “immigrant” here refers to individuals who have themselves gone through the migration experience. The children of migrants are here referred to as “children with foreign citizenship” or “children with migrant backgrounds.” The second term is highly contentious due to the Federal Republic of Germany’s current methods and guidelines for gathering statistics, which counts individuals with great-great grandparents who were Turkish citizens as still having migrant backgrounds while schoolchildren with grandparents who had French citizenship are not.
By 1980, the scholastic chances for children from all socio-economic and national backgrounds had in fact significantly improved when compared with 1970. As the Federal Ministry of Education’s report pointed out in 1981, “while in 1970 only about half of the six to 15 year-olds [with non-German citizenship] attended general schools,” seventy-five percent of the children were enrolled by 1978. Hence the measure for success in integration shifted from enrollment numbers to completion rates and entrance rates into higher levels of secondary schools in comparison with ethnic-German children in the same-aged cohort. These more ambitious standards shed light on new problems. Engholm would write in 1982 that “despite successes, equality of opportunities [had] not yet been realized,” especially in light of sustained under-enrollment in vocational training (only 122,194 of 217,900 children between 15 and 18 years of age in 1982 were enrolled in vocational training) and difficulties with job placement.

While, as Engholm stressed, socio-economic background influenced all children’s scholastic successes, it is not as clear how much of a role foreign citizenship played. Archival records and numerous political and media reports demonstrate that left-, center-, and right-wing parents who were part of the ethno-national German majority complained about their children having too many classmates with non-German citizenship. They argued that these foreign children had difficulties in the school system and that their children would be disadvantaged by association. Most parents did not complain about one or two children with foreign citizenship.

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and expressed enthusiasm if those one or two were from the United States or France. Yet, not infrequently, as larger groups of visibly non-ethnic-Germans moved into a particular school district, parents with German citizenship opted to change their residences. Combined with slogans painted on walls such as ‘Turks Out,’ it can be argued that this kind of behavior created a sense that children with foreign citizenship were unwelcome.

This is not to say that all neighborhood leaders or parents with West German citizenship complained. In some areas in Berlin and the other Länder local leaders even developed programs to promote intercultural interactions and integration. In conjunction with the relevant foreign legations, local communities would arrange German-Turkish or German-Italian days and weeks, during which times local groups could participate in celebrations of cultural diversity. Moreover, many of the Länder governments tried to promote a kind of multiculturalism. For example, in Berlin some local schools developed intercultural theater groups based in the schools.71 In North Rhine-Westphalia, the government committed significant resources to developing textbooks promoting multiculturalism or biculturalism. Baden-Württemberg, in turn, spent funds on opening more free preschool spots in order to appeal to families from lower socio-economic and particularly non-German backgrounds.

Nonetheless, looking at the case in Berlin, it is clear that the label and reality of “foreignness” did often lead to exclusion and isolation, despite many politicians’ explicit claims in favor of integration.72 Even unconsciously, the continued othering of children and the frequent emphasis not only on difference but on explicitly non-German difference did have an impact on


these children’s lives. Since the 1980s, numerous studies have been performed and anecdotal
evidence collected, demonstrating that, with or without policies explicitly segregating children
with foreign citizenship, many of these individuals felt that German society was rejecting them.73
Even many individuals with foreign citizenship who had felt integrated and had felt themselves
to be German began to feel explicitly othered and maligned under the actively anti-foreigner
policies of the Kohl government.74

The Italian Ethnic Minority and Special Schools for the Learning Disabled

In June 1978, the Italian teachers in South Baden sent a letter to both the Italian and West
German School Administrations to decry the “catastrophic and scandalous school situation of the
thousands of Italian children (of whom less than 30 percent reach their secondary school
certificates).” Condemning the high rates of “dual illiteracy” and limited native language
instruction, the teachers complained that “to solve the discriminating and embarrassing status of
the problem of foreign schoolchildren” West German teachers “transferred them en-masse into
special schools for the learning disabled.” The Italian teachers cited the most recent data from the
State Office in Stuttgart, which “reveal[ed] the shameful reality that, of 7,233 Italian
schoolchildren in South Baden, a full 2,541 are in special schools” (see Table 6.2 for Federal
statistics). To address the issue, these Italian teachers supported “the examination of all cases of
enrollment in schools for the learning disabled, in order to try and remove as many such children

73 Bernd Geiß, Bericht zur Ausländerbeschäftigung, Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die
Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und Ihrer Familienangehörigen (Bonn: Bundesrepublik Beauftragter
für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und Ihrer Familienangehörigen, 1986).

74 Irina Ludat, “Eine Frage der grösseren Angst,” Die Zeit, October 18, 1985; and Douglas B. Klusmeyer and
as possible.” They recommended the establishment of bilingual classes to alleviate the problem.\textsuperscript{75}

The situation of children with Italian citizenship highlights the role that ethno-cultural membership played in scholastic success and arguably-unintentional discrimination. Despite being considered European and supposedly more likely to succeed (as discussed above), children with Italian citizenship statistically did not perform well in the West German school system, begging the question as to why. To the frustration of the Italian government, they often left school before completing their secondary school certificates.\textsuperscript{76} It is highly probable that these children’s socio-economic status played a role in this trend. The majority of Italian citizens living in West Germany in the late 1970s had either themselves been part of the guest worker program that ended in 1973, or were the family members of laborers. Most of them came from Southern Italy, which had suffered from high unemployment in the 1950s, and often did not have familial traditions of enrollment in higher education or were small business owners who did not emphasize education.\textsuperscript{77} By the late 1970s, however, as the Italian government would point out, the second and third generations of Italian citizens were already entering West German schools.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} Italienische Lehrer im Süd-Baden to Ital./Deutsch Schulbehörde, June 9, 1978, EA 3/609 Bü 94, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. Interesting to note, that in order to solve the problem of preparation classes and illiteracy, the teachers supported bilingual education.

\textsuperscript{76} Migrants with Italian citizenship have a long history of labor and other migration to Germany as discussed in Chapter 2. For a discussion of migrant labor – including Italian citizens from the German Empire through West Germany, see Herbert, \textit{Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland}. Herbert argues that Germany – through its many permutations – had a long history of mistreating its foreign labor.


\textsuperscript{78} Ambasciata d’Italia, “Memorandum” (Bonn-Bad Godesberg, July 13, 1977), B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA; and Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Rom, “Schulunterricht für italienische Gastarbeiterkinder,” Sachstandsbericht (Rome: Auswärtige Amt, March 31, 1977), B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA.
Theoretically, they should have been as likely as West German working-class children to complete their secondary school certifications. Government statistics showed, however, that they performed significantly below expectations. Moreover, teachers across West Germany (particularly in Baden-Württemberg) referred more of these children to special schools (Sonderschulen) for the learning disabled (hereafter “special schools”) than any other ethno-national group. With a blatant discrepancy following national lines, the Italian government, consular teachers, and parent groups argued that there was a problem. Their citizens and children, they insisted, were not less intelligent than children with West German citizenship.

Addressing this “grave problem,” the Italian government and its representatives (as well as multiple other governments including Turkey) demanded an investigation of the situation. Insisting on better and more transparent screening divorced from language competency, the foreign governments requested permission to become involved in the referral process. As West German Educational Administrations claimed that language skills had no impact on the tests, multiple groups began to research the issue in order to find the cause and rectify the problem.

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80 This problem is not limited to Germany. For a recent discussion of the over-enrollment of Hispanic and Africa-American schoolchildren in US schools, see Beth Harry and Janette K. Klingner, Why Are so Many Minority Students in Special Education?: Understanding Race and Disability in Schools, 2nd ed. (New York: Teachers College Press, 2014).

81 “1. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission für den Unterricht italienischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. bis 24. Mai 1978 in Bonn,” Protokoll (Bonn, May 24, 1978), 9, B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA. The Italian state has spent considerable efforts to maintain a connection to émigrés. For a discussion of those efforts since the foundation of the Republic of Italy through the First World War, see Mark I. Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Harvard University Press, 2008).

Table 6.2: Total Schoolchildren and Schoolchildren with Italian Citizenship in Special Schools for the Disabled in the FRG, 1976-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Schoolchildren</th>
<th>Of These in Special Schools</th>
<th>Total children with Non-German Citizenship</th>
<th>Of These in Special Schools</th>
<th>Total Children with Italian Citizenship</th>
<th>Of These in Special Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>10,099,690</td>
<td>393,800</td>
<td>404,351</td>
<td>14,959</td>
<td>65,745</td>
<td>4,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9,903,800</td>
<td>398,176</td>
<td>434,503</td>
<td>18,098</td>
<td>57,933</td>
<td>5,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>9,677,000</td>
<td>398,015</td>
<td>486,265</td>
<td>21,094</td>
<td>70,441</td>
<td>5,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9,489,500</td>
<td>387,829</td>
<td>552,050</td>
<td>23,925</td>
<td>73,880</td>
<td>5,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9,186,400</td>
<td>370,700</td>
<td>637,073</td>
<td>27,819</td>
<td>76,229</td>
<td>6,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>8,865,500</td>
<td>354,300</td>
<td>697,128</td>
<td>31,929</td>
<td>79,559</td>
<td>6,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>8,472,100</td>
<td>337,000</td>
<td>723,296</td>
<td>36,353</td>
<td>78,337</td>
<td>6,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>8,042,600</td>
<td>319,300</td>
<td>712,660</td>
<td>39,455</td>
<td>74,449</td>
<td>6,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>7,590,400</td>
<td>301,900</td>
<td>667,589</td>
<td>39,364</td>
<td>70,885</td>
<td>5,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7,212,600</td>
<td>284,600</td>
<td>667,200</td>
<td>39,771</td>
<td>69,119</td>
<td>5,745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

West Germany developed special schools after the Second World War, when “the principle that disabled children [were] best assisted in institutions exclusively designed to meet their needs was established.” Their task was to “implement the handicapped child’s right to an education and upbringing in accordance with his or her ability and nature.” The classes in these schools were supposed to be smaller, providing extra support and individual attention for these children. Spanning both primary and secondary schooling, pupils could in theory earn their lower


84 In 1972, Recommendations 302-315 guided the development of the special school system. They have since been superseded by a series of Recommendations from 6 May 1994 (Christoph Führ, *The German Education System Since 1945*, trans. Iván Tapia (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1997), 164–166). The practice of developing special schools for the physically and learning disabled began before the Second World War, stemming from church initiatives. The were, however, restructured in the post-war period, in part because of problems with teaching and material shortages and poor treatment of those with supposed disabilities during the Third Reich. For more on the development of special schools, see Ellger-Rüttgart, “Entwicklung des Sonderschulwesens.”
(Hauptschule) or higher (Realschule) secondary school certificates. In most of the Länder, teachers referred schoolchildren to the schools at a rate of approximately one in 25 children (see Table 6.2). Teachers made referrals based on a battery of tests, usually by or before the fourth grade when schoolchildren started at one of the three levels of the tripartite secondary school system. Tests included a variety of intelligence, visual recognition, and aural recognition examinations. With an assortment of exams available, the test administrator selected his or her own preferred set. The administrator then reached a conclusion based on information drawn from the different tests. Referrals for transfer were explicitly not to be made solely on IQ, but rather based on what school the administrator thought would best meet the child’s individual needs.  

While these special schools might have been useful for some schoolchildren with learning disabilities, for others they were highly problematic, particularly as most special school pupils never completed any secondary school certifications. Those who did complete their certification often found the stigma of having attended a special school for the learning disabled impossible to overcome. As a result, many of these individuals were unable to find vocational school placement or embark on other paths to skilled labor. The Länder school administrations claimed that pupils in special schools could still find placement in the labor market, but in reality they were severely disadvantaged.

The West German Education Administrations and researchers had been debating these issues with special schools since the beginning of the 1970s in the context of their attempts to reform the West German education system. In 1973, the German Council of Education’s


Commission, a Federal and Länder body tasked with providing recommendations for the education system from 1966 and 1975, suggested that the Länder integrate special and regular instruction. The Länder educational administrations hesitated, but by 1977, the Kultusministerkonferenz began moving toward that suggestion. The KMK recommended ending segregated teaching in cases where children, particularly those with learning disabilities, could possibility participate successfully in primary and lower secondary schools. There were, after all, children with severe learning disabilities who did in fact benefit from the small classrooms and could not fully participate in a normal classroom.

Even as these debates were taking place, West German teachers were placing increasing numbers of foreign children in special schools, but were providing no extra support for the children once there. Technically, teachers were supposed to refer children with foreign citizenship to special schools on the same basis as children with West German citizenship. As the April 1976 Kultministerkonferenz Recommendations underlined, that decision was in no way supposed to be based on language capacity. The majority of pupils referred were among those born or raised in West Germany, but who supposedly had individual problems with linguistic comprehension, despite German being their mother tongue. Parents of these children, sometimes speaking no German themselves, often did not understand what was happening during the referral process, much less the potential future ramifications. Once foreigners were placed in

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87 The German Education Council (Deutscher Bildungsrat) was a body with an education commission and government commission designed to coordinate the development of the West German education system between 1965-1975. Their 1970 plan “paved the way” for the Bund-Länder-Kommission für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung’s (BLK, established in 1970) 1973 education plan that sought to adapt the FRG’s school system to international developments (Führ, The German Education System Since 1945, 61–63).

88 Ibid., 164–165.

special school, teachers there did not have the time to provide the one or two non-German schoolchildren with extra assistance. Some of the Ministries of Culture – including Baden-Wuerttemberg’s – felt that they “could not make recommendations for solutions as … the relevant teacher would only be implementing measures for a single schoolchild.”

In 1977, with a staggering eight percent (see Table 6.2) of their citizens referred to special schools across West Germany, the Italian government intensified its campaign to address the issue. In Baden-Württemberg, where the problem was the most severe (nine percent of Italian citizens referred) and where the highest number of Italian citizens lived, the Italian Vice Consul and his staff arranged multiple meetings with the local school boards and Ministry of Education. On an immediate level, the Italian Consulate wanted to be alerted when a child was going through tests prior to referral. The parents, the Italian legates argued, needed advocates and help to understand the system generally and the referral process specifically. With the Ministry of Culture assuring the Italian Consulates that language competency was not a criterion for referral, the Consulate requested permission to actively examine the system in order to figure out where the problem(s) lay.


Baden-Württemberg’s state government and its Regional School Boards cooperated with the Italian Legations, as would other Länder. In 1977, the Regional School Administration in Tübingen acknowledged the Vice Consul’s request and agreed to send the Consulate information about pupils being tested for referral, despite legal prohibitions on sharing student information. \(^93\) When the Italian Consulate in Freiburg asked the Regional School Board to examine the issue in 1978, the School Board organized a working group on the subject. When the Italian government raised the issue during the first meeting of the Joint Expert Italian-German Commission in May 1978, the West German and Italian delegations arranged a joint Italian-German Workshop of Special Education Experts (paid for by the West German Foreign Office) under the auspices of the University of Tübingen to address the cause(s) of the children’s disadvantages. \(^94\)

Over the course of 1978 and 1979, the results from these studies were slowly released. The South Baden Working Group, after meeting several times in 1978 with participants from the Italian Consulate, special schoolteachers, educational consultants (Bildungsberater), and school boards, issued a report in January 1979 on the working group’s conclusions. \(^95\) While suggesting that the schools’ “methods might not be up to contemporary psychological-diagnostic standards,” \(^96\) the working group felt that the cause of the over-enrollment was not actually the

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\(^93\) Ibid.

\(^94\) From both sides, it was expected that there would be 4-5 professionals as well as a representative from the Sekretariat der KMK to Auswärtige Amt, Referat 620, “Deutsch-italienisches Kulurabkommen - Gemischte Kommission zur Durchführung - Unterkommission für den Unterricht italienischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; hier: Expertentreffen für Fragen der Sonderschulerziehung italienischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Reisekosten der deutschen Teilnehmer,” November 13, 1978, B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA.

\(^95\) As of October 1978, the group met three times. Michel from the School Board in Freiburg authored the report (“Besprechung des Herrn Regierenden Bürgermeisters mit dem italienischen Botschafter Herrn Contucci und Herrn Generalkonsul Torella am 27. 1. 79,” Vermerk G 3 (Berlin: Senatskanzlei, January 29, 1979), 79, B 002 37880, Berlin Landesarchiv; and Oberschulamt Freiburg, “Arbeitsgruppe im Oberschulamt Freiburg,” (March 21, 1979), 1–3).

tests or poor language capacity as the foreign consulates had expected. Rather, while the working group acknowledged that children often failed the verbal portion of the tests, reports of school administrators and special schoolteachers made it clear that if early language examinations showed a child to not have the requisite German skills, the test was broken off in favor of other kinds of exams. What was important was that the final decision about referral rested primarily on the test administrator’s sense of the child’s best interest.\textsuperscript{97} In short, if the test administrator felt that the child needed special assistance, the child would be referred to special school.

The South Baden Working Group made a series of recommendations for improving the referral process for Italian and other foreign nationals. While language was not a deciding factor, the Working Group felt that it would be ideal if the tests were given in Italian. Furthermore, if there was a consideration of referral, the group suggested involving a native-language teacher as soon as possible in order to diminish any confusion between the parents and the school and to provide necessary explanations as well as to better understand the relations within a family and their mentality.\textsuperscript{98} While the second possibility was implemented, the first proved problematic, as equivalent material in the Italian language did not exist. At the time, Italy did not host comparable schools and hence had not developed the necessary materials.\textsuperscript{99}

The Italian government and Ministry of Education also differed from their West German counterparts in their definition of “learning disabilities,” creating a gap in communication between the Italian state and West German education officials. As became evident during the 1978 meeting of the Joint Expert Commission, the Italian government had a limited sense of

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 4–5.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
which children the West German school administrations might deem “backward,” “disabled,” or “disadvantaged.” The West German definition was considerably more inclusive than that of the Italian government, which viewed children with “learning disabilities” as having severe handicaps. In contrast, the West German test administrators focused on referring children who would “benefit” from smaller class sizes. According to Italian standards, many or the majority of those children referred to special schools in West Germany did not have learning disabilities at all.

Regardless of who qualified as learning disabled, the South Baden Working Group felt that altering the referral process for special schools would not actually remedy the situation. In their estimation “the high quota of special-school children among the children of foreign workers reflects foreign children’s inability to meet the demands of the normal German school.” To clarify, the Working Group specified that it “did not mean that [the children] have fundamentally lower intelligence,” but rather that their situation in the schools would not be improved by changes to the special school programs. The Working Group felt that the situation as a whole needed to be reviewed with reference to “foreign children’s abilities in normal German schools.” The problem was with integration into the entire school system, not just with over-enrollment in special schools.

For the Italian representatives in the South Baden Working Group, the problem did not stop there. They felt that the issue was not only the German school system, but was also

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100 See “1. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission (1978),” 10. In connection with the joint German-Italian expert commission regarding the education of the children of Italian workers, there was a meeting in Stuttgart regarding the instruction of children with Italian citizenship in the Federal Republic in special schools for the learning disabled (hereafter special schools). A delegation of Italian Experts would in particular visit special schools in Baden-Württemberg and discuss the methods and experiences with German Experts. See Hermann, “Deutsch-italienisches Kulturabkommen; hier: Deutsch-italienische Arbeitstagung von Sonderschulfachleuten am 7 - 9. 11. 1979 in Stuttgart,” Kurzbericht, (December 11, 1979), B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA.

101 Oberschulamt Freiburg, “Arbeitsgruppe im Oberschulamt Freiburg,” 5.
attributable to “socio-economic factors.” They argued that “the high correspondence between a child’s unsuccessful social situation and their transfer to special schools mirrored the unsatisfactory integration of many families of Italian workers” into West German society. The Italian representatives pointed out that children from these families were seldom sent to preschool for early training, leading to “continued linguistic difficulties … rendering integration in primary school impossible.” For the Italian representatives, it was this reason that “all too frequently led to enrollment in special schools.” Furthermore, the “frequent change of location of residence of the children and their families between Italy and Germany added another factor to the school failures.” A satisfactory solution for the special school problem was primarily to be found in improved integration for Italian workers (assurance of jobs, homes, etc.). For them, school problems could only be addressed by looking at wider social problems for “which a solution was desperately needed.”

The participants in the federally funded German-Italian Workshop of Special Education Specialists in November 1979 in Stuttgart came to different but overlapping conclusions. Dr. Poggio from the University of Tübingen presented the results of a year-long research project performed by local and Italian experts as well as a representative from the Regional School Administration in Tübingen. Over the previous year, the team had carried out a study examining 82 Italian schoolchildren’s referrals to special schools around Tübingen. They found that 50 percent of the transfers could have remained in normal classes. Interviewing the examiners, teachers, and children, the team’s researchers showed that “the reason for the high quota was the

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102 Ibid., 6.
103 “2. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission für den Unterricht italienischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Rom vom 06. - 08. Februar 1980,” Protokoll (Rome, February 8, 1980), 12, B 93, Bd. 1151, PA AA.
perception of socio-cultural and affective deficits.” As Prof. Angeleri, one of the Italian representatives, would report to the Italian Foreign Office, the German authorities’ tests were tailored specifically to the West German cultural environment and with German children in mind. Teachers in the West German classroom were reading these children’s facial expressions and gesticulations as indicative of mental retardation. These cultural miscommunications were particularly severe when it came to children whose families came from Southern Italy (and had similar problems in moves to Northern Italy).

The 1979 workshop suggested additional reasons for cultural miscommunications leading to over-enrollment. As the Italian consular teachers and Italian representatives in the South Baden Working Group had claimed in 1977 and 1978 respectively, class background impacted the selection. The difference between the percentages of Italian versus German children enrolled in special schools dropped when comparing children from similar working-class family backgrounds. Both the German and Italian delegations further agreed that the experience of migration caused “mental disturbance” (seelische Störung). They argued that not only did the language barrier make integration difficult, but that the transition from predominately rural communities in Italy to West German cities added a layer of confusion. Some parents also moved frequently within West Germany “on account of the EC member state nationals’ freedom of movement.” Furthermore, participants in the workshop suggested that the parents’ own

104 Ibid.

105 KMK, “Schulsituation italienischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Ilc 3 - 24327/8, (June 14, 1983), B 304/6253, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

106 Hermann, “Arbeitstagung von Sonderschulfachleuten.”
unfamiliarity with their new surroundings had a negative impact, to which the West German side added the frequent employment of both parents as an additional detriment.  

Fixing these issues proved challenging. Because individual teachers had the final recommendation their ingrained biases played a significant role. Yet, unconsciously reflecting social perceptions, teachers’ and psychologists’ assumptions of West German cultural superiority were difficult to alter through Ministry of Culture warnings. The problem was mitigated by the inclusion of Italian pedagogues in evaluation, which the KMK supported as a rule, and by allowing consulates to work as mediators between the teachers and parents. The Italian government and consular teachers further pushed the development of bilingual education. They argued that these classes would help work around German teachers’ biases by both celebrating Italian culture and including Italian teachers in the children’s education. Furthermore, they hoped classes taught in both German and Italian for schoolchildren with Italian citizenship would lessen

107 “2. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission (1980),” February 8, 1980, 11; and KMK, “Schulsituation italienischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” Herr Prof. Angeleri wrote a report for the Italian side and sent it to the Italian foreign minister. The workshop was evaluated differently by the Italian and West German sides. The Italian side demonstrated understanding for the difficulties faced by the West German school administrations. Moreover, the Italian side could “on the spot” be satisfied as to the high quality of West German education for the learning disabled.

108 Arguably, this demonstrates Pierre Bourdieu’s claim that any school system perpetuates symbolic violence as the system judges schoolchildren based on arbitrary values designed to validate the upper classes. The schools, and teachers in them, are unable or unwilling to move beyond their ingrained assumptions and devalue other cultural capital, usually unconsciously (Bourdieu, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture, 54–57; Popp, “Die sozialen Funktionen schulischer Bildung”; and Umut Erel, “Migrating Cultural Capital: Bourdieu in Migration Studies,” Sociology 44, no. 4 (2010): 642–60).

109 To try and address the issue, the KMK recommended that, as a rule, the referral process involve Italian pedagogues. KMK, “Schulsituation italienischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”; Schürmann, “Ausländische Kinder an Sonderschulen für Lernbehinderte,” Kleine Anfrage (Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, June 15, 1987); and “11. Tagung der gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am 21.-23. März 1990 in Berlin,” Kommuniké (Berlin, March 23, 1990), 18, B 304/7794, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
the negative effects of cultural displacement. The Italian government also continued to hope that bilingual schools would encourage West Germans to learn Italian as well.\textsuperscript{110}

While the Italian government and its legation had demonstrated a willingness to explore the problem of over-enrollment of children with Italian citizenship in special schools in 1978 and 1979, they were less forgiving of the problem in the 1980s and 1990s. In February 1980, during the Joint Expert Italian-German Commission’s second meeting, the Italian government expressed its horror at the continuing steep percentages of its citizens sent to special schools in comparison with West German citizens (7.9 compared to 4.0 percent, see Table 6.2). The Italian Government criticized the West German school administrations (particularly Baden-Württemberg) for the ongoing situation.\textsuperscript{111} The problem had not actually been solved.

Despite the inclusion of Italian teachers in the referral process and emphasis on bilingual education, the over-enrollment of schoolchildren with Italian citizenship in special schools for the learning disabled would continue to be an issue. After 1980, the topic would cease to be a matter of primary importance, subsumed under other pressing concerns. Nonetheless, in later bilateral meetings (West) German and Italian delegations would continue to discuss the

\textsuperscript{110} For a discussion of bilingual education, see Cristina Allemann-Ghionda and Saskia Pfeiffer, eds., \textit{Bildungserfolg, Migration und Zweisprachigkeit: Perspektiven für Forschung und Entwicklung}, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Frank & Timme GmbH, 2010).

\textsuperscript{111} “2. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission (1980),” February 8, 1980, 12–13. During the second meeting of the Joint Expert Italian-German Commission, both delegations agreed, that it would be useful to hold meetings frequently (perhaps yearly) and that the next meeting should look at a deep analysis of the topics of the Special Schools as well as the training of teachers and the transfer of youths from compulsory schools into their careers (“2. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission,” Communiqué (Bonn, February 8, 1980), B 93, Bd. 1151, PA AA). Nonetheless, due to Italian internal unrest and shift in focus, the Italian-German Commission would not meet again until 1989. Rather, representatives from the respective governments’ Ministries of Education and Consulates would meet either in an individual capacity or in association with one of the European Communities’ projects. In 1983, the German Ambassador in Rome, Bubenday, gave an interview discussing, among other points, Special Schools and the high number (in 1981/82 almost 8) of Italian school children attended (see Table 6.2) (KMK, “Schulsituation italienischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”).
matter. Even in 1992, the Italian Embassy would hang signs imploring parents to “save your children from special schools.” In contrast, for children with Turkish citizenship the issue of over-referrals would increase in importance over the mid-1980s, becoming a constant topic of discussion for multiple bilateral meetings and for concerned parents.

**Gender Discrimination and the Image of Turkish Girls with Headscarves**

In the 1970s, and increasingly into the 1980s, many West German politicians and the media emphasized gender as a cause of disadvantage for the Federal Republic’s migrant and minority groups in the West German school system. Yet, where the West German educational administrations were responsible for fixing disadvantages associated with class and citizenship, or discrimination based on ethno-national identity, the media and politicians laid gender discrimination at the door of migrant and minority families and their supposedly patriarchal households. As “foreigner” gradually became synonymous with “Turkish,” West German actors focused their attention on “Turkish girls,” particularly “headscarf girls” (*Kopftuchmädchen*).

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115 Interestingly, it still often is. When explaining that I study education for migrant groups after WWII in West Germany, the response is usually “so you meant the Turkish.”
Yet, as West German society and governmental institutions emphasized patriarchal oppression in Turkish households, they often disregarded continued gender disadvantages in the Federal Republic.

West German emphasis on gender discrimination and its effect on schoolchildren with foreign citizenship had changed significantly since the 1960s. In the 1960s and early 1970s, educators and politicians worried that families kept “older children, usually girls” at home to do housework and care for younger siblings instead of fulfilling their compulsory schooling requirements.  

News reports like Rolf Hartmann’s 4 June 1974 article in the *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* about how “girls [were] hit the hardest” and were “[being] kept from schools” were hardly unusual. While the number of these girls or boys remains unknown, foreign consulate reports and individual stories indicate that at least some children were kept home for similar reasons, particularly in families in which both parents were employed. The foreign embassies and local school administrations worked together to overcome the problem by educating parents about the importance and legality of compulsory schooling. And at that it was general schooling that mattered. Not until the early 1970s did scholars and politicians emphasize

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116 No one was certain how many children might be skipping school, a concern discussed in Chapter 4 (Bundesministerium für Familie und Jugend, “1. Jugendbericht: Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Lage der Jugend und über die Bestrebungen auf dem Gebiet der Jugendhilfe,” Unterrichtung (Bonn: Bonner Universitäts-Buckdruckerei, 1965); and Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, “Nr. 1456 des Abgeordneten Diepgen (CDU) über Schulbesuch ausländischer Jugendlicher” (Berlin, October 18, 1973)).


118 The Italian legations were particularly concerned about the issue of compulsory schooling and worked with the West German Federal and Länder government throughout the 1960s, discussed in Chapter 3, first to get the Länder to change their compulsory schooling laws to include non-German citizens and then to try and ensure that all of their citizens fulfilled their compulsory schooling requirements (for example, “3. Sitzung der deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission zur Durchführung des zwischen Italien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland abgeschlossenen Kulturabkommens, Rom, 23., 24. und 25. Januar 1963,” Protokoll (Rome, January 25, 1963), B 97, Bd. 197, PA AA).
vocational training for non-Germans. It would not be until the mid-1970s that they turned their attention explicitly to women with foreign citizenship’s labor and training.119

That change in focus came in part out of women’s rights activists and left-leaning politicians’ (and a few conservatives’) work to change West German society by promoting gender equality. In the mid-1970s, activists began to see success as women’s rights in West Germany expanded. Legislators changed multiple West German laws limiting women’s voices in the family and in the workplace (e.g. establishing women’s right to work without their husband’s explicit permission).120 Historian Monika Mattes argued that their efforts were directly tied to the existence of the recruited “guest worker women,” which challenged the image of the woman as a homemaker and inspired West German activists to demand unfettered access to the workforce.121 Whatever the cause, these female and male activists demanded that society take notice of the pervasive gender discrimination in West German and European society. In this newly sensitized environment, feminist activists, trying to root out any gender based discrimination, also turned to education, as well as to foreigners, guest workers, and particularly Turks.122


122 For a comparative European discussion of women with foreign citizenship – predominately migrants – and the difficulties they often faced, see de Troy, “The Specific Training Needs of Immigrant Women.” It was not only West German feminists who turned to “foreign women.” French activists did the same, as Joan Scott discussed in her book The Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
West German efforts to remedy gender-based discrimination both in and out of the schools emphasized women and girls specifically.\(^{123}\) Male individuals or sexual minorities with foreign citizenship were rarely discussed. When they did come into the conversation as subjects, men with foreign – and particularly Turkish – citizenship were often uncritically portrayed as aggressors keeping women down. School reports and the media painted boys, in turn, as patriarchs in training. Well-publicized reports of physical violence and honor killings added to that assumption in the West German ethnic majority’s imagination.\(^{124}\) Arguably, the stress on girls and women stemmed from the previous image of the immigrant, foreigner, and guest worker as male, despite the fact that one in three labor migrants had been female.\(^{125}\) Previously, minority women had almost exclusively appeared in tabloids and scholarly studies alike as part of a family, not as actors in their own right. Along the same lines, the schoolchild in West German discussions on education was usually depicted as a boy. These blind spots in combination frequently led politicians and scholars to overlook girls and women with foreign citizenship until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Scholars would need time, however, to publish any substantial studies. As late as 1984, Klaus Schweikert would write “in the Federal Republic of Germany there are approximately 2 million people about whom more or less nothing is known: immigrant girls and women.”\(^{126}\)


\(^{126}\) De Troy demonstrates that across Europe little attention was paid to female immigrants until 1975 (“The Specific Training Needs of Immigrant Women,” 3). Schweikert demonstrates in his bibliography on migrant women in West
As West German scholars began to explore the issue, political and media discussions of women and girls with foreign citizenship came to focus on the image of the “Turkish headscarf girl.” While representative of only a small slice of West German residents with Turkish citizenship, the picture was susceptible to photography. The iconographic image of an explicitly culturally-foreign girl became exoticized, standing in as an easy example of a foreign other. In tabloids like Bild or in weekly newsmagazine such as Der Spiegel, pictures of girls in headscarves or burkas began to appear and the headscarf became a symbol of male oppression and gender inequality. That perception was underscored by articles and reports on the arrival of mail-order brides, who were often illiterate. Increasingly West German politicians, educators, and feminists felt the need to save these allegedly unfortunate girls. They believed, as a principal in Baden-Württemberg argued in 1981, that these poor, oppressed “little headscarf girls” had their basic right to equality threatened in their own homes. Ignoring the diversity within the groups from West Germany, these politicians and educators overlooked the early secular movements and established families with Turkish citizenship who had lived in West Germany for more than a decade. They focused instead on newer arrivals and the groups of migrant from Germany “that little information can be found relating to this group and that questions relating to employment and vocational qualification problems are almost completely ignored” (Ibid., 35; and Klaus Schweikert, “Female Migrants in the Federal Republic of Germany” (Standing Conference on the Sociology of Further Education in Conjunction with Deutsche Gesellschaft, Berlin, 1984), 18–21). See also Monika Mattes, “Gastarbeiterinnen” in der Bundesrepublik: Anwerbepolitik, Migration und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005), 9–25.


128 Interestingly during the period, the Spiegel had an editor who was hyper-critical of Turkish culture and the possibility of gender discrimination. For a discussion of mail-order brides, see Andrea Baumgartner-Karabak, Die verkauften Bräute: Türkische Frauen zwischen Kreuzberg und Anatolien (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983).
Turkey who, whether on account of familial pressure or personal choice, wore physical symbols of their faith or ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{129}

The Turkish Government actually agreed that the headscarf was a problem. Pushing western modernity and secularism, the state had begun restricting the wearing of religious clothing in 1923. In 1934, the government explicitly banned the fez for men and the headscarf for women working in civil service (of which there were few).\textsuperscript{130} The ban was supposed to be a part of the push for women’s equality, a shaking off of the repressive traditions of the past. However, the headscarf remained a marginal concern in citizenship politics until the 1950s, when rural-to-urban migration brought a significant number of women to the cities who still covered their heads. Instead of abandoning the headscarf, many of these women became more religious, or at least adhered more closely to their understanding of traditional norms.\textsuperscript{131} In response, as the government tried to tighten control of Turkish culture in the early 1980s, it explicitly banned the headscarf.


In 2003 and 2004, there were two cases on the right of the state to regulate the use of the headscarf. The first was in the German Constitutional Court and the second in the European Court of Human Rights. For a discussion of these cases, see Skach, “Şahin v. Turkey. App. No. 44774/98; and ‘Teacher Headscarf.’ Case No. 2BvR 1436/02.”

Many individuals with Turkish citizenship in the Federal Republic came from outside of major urban centers, often hailing from Anatolia. Some arrived with limited prior education and adhered to conservative versions of Islam. With restrictions in labor migration imposed since 1973, many immigrants in the mid and late 1970s entering West Germany arrived as either part of the wave of family reunifications or as asylum seekers. Among these, some left Turkey for job prospects, applying for so-called “economic asylum.” But others made the trip to West Germany in order to escape cultural oppression or in search of religious freedom.

Responding to the large number of religiously-conservative families with Turkish citizenship in West Germany, the Turkish government tried to address the situation there as well. After reading a 1981 news report that Turkish girls sometimes wore headscarves in German schools, Müjgan Dericioglu, the new Educational Counsellor in the Turkish Embassy in Bonn, requested that the Kultusministerkonferenz forbid the use of the headscarf in West German schools. According to the Turkish government, “headscarves for religious reasons should [only] be worn in the mosque.” Despite the Turkish government’s support for banning the headscarf in West Germany, the Kultusministerkonferenz refused. At that time, as the General Secretary of the KMK told Dericioglu, the school administrations in West German did not regulate

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132 Anatolia was, at the time, a heavily agricultural region with under-developed social or state infrastructure in Eastern Turkey. Until recently, there was a high rate of illiteracy and limited state funding as the government concentrated on other social issues and projects. For a discussion of the development of Anatolia, see Uğur Üngör, The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). See also Education Committee, “Review of Educational Policy in Turkey: Examiners’ Report and Questions,” ED(87)2 (Paris: OECD, May 5, 1987), 1, OECD Archive.

133 For a discussion asylum seekers from Turkey across Europe, see Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe, 176–201.

schoolchildren’s clothing. The one major exception was for physical education, during which time schoolchildren were required to wear appropriate sports clothing.\textsuperscript{135}

Despite the ongoing public debate on the subject, actual evidence regarding gender discrimination from inside the families was difficult to evaluate. In 1981, a Federal Ministry of Education report on the “foreign girl in the German education system” claimed it could “not draw conclusions about foreign school girls’ school participation and educational expectations as available evidence was hardly quantifiable.”\textsuperscript{136} What West German school statistics did show was that girls were more likely to finish their school degrees than their male relatives, but less likely to start vocational training or find jobs.\textsuperscript{137} Despite lack of clear evidence, West German scholars, the media, and politicians placed such discrepancies at the door of parents and religious affiliations. They claimed that male members of these communities prevented their daughters, wives, and sisters from entering the work force.\textsuperscript{138} They usually overlooked West German foreigner laws (\textit{Ausländergesetze}) limiting new immigrants’ – often wives’ – access to work

\textsuperscript{135} Hermann, “Unterricht für türkische Schüler; hier: Antrittsbesuch der neuen Erziehungsräti an der türkischen Botschaft beim Generalsekretär der KMK.” The issue of clothing – particularly during swimming – became an issue for some few religiously conservative Muslim households (“Schwimmn auch für Türken Pflicht: Vater wollte Tochter nicht am Unterricht teilnehmen lassen - Geldbuße,” \textit{Tagesspiegel}, August 23, 1986). In 1986, the KMK’s subcommittee on foreign schoolchildren would address the issue directly. The majority of Länder agreed that it was better to allow parents to withdraw their children (usually daughters) from swimming instruction for religious reasons than to force them. There were not, after all, many such children (Sekretariat der KMK and Hermann, “25. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler,” Ergebnisschrift (Bonn: KMK, October 24, 1986), 28, B 304/7775, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). The issue of swimwear would again be raised in the KMK’s Sub Committee for Foreign Schoolchildren again in 1994 (Sekretariat der KMK and Lohmar, “56. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler,” Ergebnisschrift (Bonn: KMK, April 1994), 19, B 304/7776, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).

\textsuperscript{136} Christine Schmarsow, “Ausländische Mädchen im deutschen Bildungssystem: Eine unbekannte Gruppe” (Bonn: BMBW, 1982).

\textsuperscript{137} Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, \textit{Arbeiterkinder im Bildungssystem}.

permits. This restriction was part of the “housewifization” of many immigrant women, which reflected the idea that women with non-German citizenship were only in the country to act as mothers and wives of migrant men before returning to their countries of origin. Supposedly in the Federal Republic to serve as culture-bearers for their children, West German officials argued that they did not need any vocational training. They further ignored the fact that the same points could still be made about some girls with West German citizenship.

This is not to say that women’s rights activists or all left- or right-leaning politicians were unconcerned about the success of girls with West German citizenship or that they ignored girls with foreign citizenship. On the contrary, the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family, Women, and Health (hereafter Family Ministry) under Christian Democratic leadership expressed continued concern, committing support for research both on the situation of women and girls and to promote programs to combat the problem. As part of that research, the Family Ministry published its Sixth Youth Report in 1984 on “the improvement of equality of opportunity for girls in the Federal Republic.” The report argued that society’s organization still prevented the majority of women from working outside of traditional women’s spheres of employment and often from working at all. Even from the start, despite applying for diverse jobs and often

139 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 243–244; and Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, 92–93.


141 Between 1982 and 1985, CDU politician Heiner Geißler headed the Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (Family Ministry). Fellow party member Rita Süssmuth followed, serving from 1985 to 1988. From 1988 to 1998, Süssmuth served as President of the Bundestag and Ursula Lehr, also a CDU member, served as head of the Family Ministry until 1991.

142 The Family Ministry continued a series called the Youth Reports (Jugendbericht), which were researched and written by teams of experts on behalf of the Federal Government, usually focused on examining a one particularly pressing issue per report. Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familien, Frauen und Gesundheit, “6. Jugendbericht: Verbesserung der Chancengleichheit von Mädchen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Unterrichtung (Bonn: Bonner Universitäts-Buckdruckerei, February 15, 1984).
searching more intensively than their male counterparts, women had difficulties finding positions in vocational training (of which there were already too few). The *Youth Report* showed that, simply put, girls and women with West German citizenship still faced significant gender discrimination despite reforms removing legalized difference.

Yet the Federal Government’s statistics on education and labor depicting enrollment in vocational training, retraining, or continued training opportunities suggested that girls and women with West German citizenship had a clear advantage over migrants. As Schweikert pointed out in 1984, only five percent of female migrants had taken advantage of vocational training measures. Of the MSBE programs financed by the Federal Government or other basic vocational training measures, only 25 percent of the participants were women. Furthermore, less than one percent of “female migrant workers had used the retraining, continued training and on-the-job familiarization training opportunities on offer.” In contrast, men with foreign citizenship were 2.5 times more likely to take advantage of such opportunities, while women with German citizenship were three times more likely and men 4.5 times.\(^{143}\)

In the few pages that the 1984 *Youth Report* dedicated to girls with migrant backgrounds, the researchers argued that the reason for this discrepancy was because these girls and women not only faced the same disadvantages as girls and women with German citizenship, but also additional difficulties. The report suggested that these disadvantages stemmed from the families themselves as well as the migration process. Girls and women with foreign citizenship, the researchers felt, were not necessarily given the chance to succeed in the West German system as

many “girls of a marriageable age (between 15-25) were being sent back to their homes” or chose to leave West Germany. According to the Family Ministry, their families and their roles as migrants limited their chances in the West German labor market by ending their residence in West Germany just as these women would have entered vocational training, thereby skewing statistics.

Politicians like Hanna-Renate Laurien, the Berlin Senator of Education, also claimed that the problem lay with the families. In contrast, however, she argued that families with foreign citizenship did not understand the West German system or the value of participating in vocational training, and thus did not encourage or allow their children to enroll. According to Laurien, it needed to be made clearer to Turkish families how necessary “a vocational education was for their children, particularly for girls.”

Some Länder set up parent education campaigns to try and explain the necessity of participation, stressing the compulsory nature of vocational training for everyone, even immigrant schoolchildren arriving after completing their compulsory schooling in their countries of origin.

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144 “Female foreigners,” the Family Ministry argued, had an “average residency that was almost four years shorter than that of males.” To substantiate their claim, the Ministry pointed out that, of the total 1.9 million female foreigners in the Federal Republic in 1981, around 515,00 were under 16. From ages 0-15, the male/female ratio was 100/85. Between 15 and 25, the ratio sunk to 75 and then climbed between 25 and 30 up to 95 (Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familien, Frauen und Gesundheit, “6. Jugendbericht,” 12). In 1984, Gerhart Mahler (Bavaria), chair of the KMK’s Sub Committee for Foreign Schoolchildren published an article on “Turkish Children in the German Education System” (Gerhart Mahler, “Türkische Kinder im deutschen Bildungssystem,” in Das Europäische Bildungswesen im Vergleich: Türkei, ed. Wolfgang Eltrich (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Akad. für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, 1984), 97–118).


Quantifying the exact level of repression female schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship faced due to West German gender discrimination, on account of their status as national minorities, or because their families were unsupportive is well nigh impossible. Social pressure from both within and outside the family was often patriarchal in nature. The assumption of many West German teachers that Turkish and other foreign students were incapable of performing well in the system led to frustrations and disadvantage. Schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship were also referred at a high rate (around seven percent) to special schools for the learning disabled. Pendular and return migration further skewed the possible analysis of how many children chose to complete their education or continue into vocational schools.

Unable to establish a clear cause, in the early 1980s the Federal and Länder governments decided to solve the problem by establishing a series of pilot programs to integrate young people into the West German labor market. The limited data available suggested that seventeen percent of the participants in the federally-funded programs available to everyone were female. The Federal Ministry for Education and some of the Länder also financed a small selection of vocational training programs specifically for “immigrant women,” or young women with non-German citizenship (usually with a maximum of 10-90 participants). Focused on social need in areas with a large minority presence, many of these programs promoted training for preschool teachers, interpreters, or hospital workers. Yet, despite popularity and continued need, the funding for many of these programs would run out or be cut between 1983 and 1985 after the CDU/CSU-FDP government took over with Helmut Kohl as Chancellor. Kohl’s government initially argued against integration programs, claiming that the government should provide equality of opportunity by ensuring that the same programs were available to everyone, not by

\textbf{Conclusion}

For many educators and administrators, including the Social Democratic Federal Ministers of Education Jürgen Schmude (1978-1981) and Bjoern Engholm (1981-1982), the apparent discrimination against children with foreign citizenship meant that West German residents “with foreign backgrounds” required social support, specialized education, and assistance with employment.\footnote{For more on this topic, see \textit{Bundesarchiv}, collection B 138, folder 14276.} The men and women involved in integration debates made these claims regarding the needs of children with migrant backgrounds as a way to escape dire predictions about their “future chances.”\footnote{Heinz Kühn, “Stand und Weiterentwicklung der Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Memorandum des Beauftragten der Bundesregierung” (Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, September 1979), 24, NW 670-70, Landesarchiv NRW; and Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 8/1811: Antrag der Abg. Hasinger, et al. und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU betr.: Zukunftschancen der Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,” Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, May 17, 1978).} Governmental and expert reports warned of a time to come plagued by crime, a vanishing “German” people – defined only as those with ethnic-German ancestry – and endemic high unemployment unless \textit{something} was done.\footnote{In order to}
meet these needs and avoid the creation of an underclass of ghettoized and impoverished foreigners, politicians from all major parties agreed that “integration of those foreigners – in particular the children and youths – who live [in West Germany] needs to be improved,” and each major political party turned to education as a solution.\(^{153}\)

In the early 1980s, however, this initial fervor turned into a widespread concern that perhaps full integration was not possible at all. Even before Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1982, the West German media and several left, liberal, and right-wing politicians argued that the SPD and FDP’s attempts had failed. With the second oil crisis sparking further increases in unemployment, and turning the German ethnic majority’s sentiments against foreigners, Kohl was able to win the 1982 vote partly on an anti-immigrant platform. Kohl used public fears that an under-class of non-Germans was developing and concern that German culture was disappearing to take a tough stance against “guest workers and their families” as well as against asylum seekers and refugees.\(^ {154}\)

Once in office, Kohl’s government shifted the responsibility for education from the state to individual families. The international and most national communities had seen the state as being responsible for ensuring the availability of programs to even the scholastic playing field. In the early 1980s, however, Kohl’s conservative-liberal government claimed that it was the migrant families’ and families with migrant backgrounds’ responsibility for taking the opportunities that schools afforded everyone. It was their fault if they fell through the cracks, and

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it was not the state’s task to catch them. Part of that change was a reduction in funding and support for extra education programs, like homework help or support for vocational training.

The Federal Republic was not the only European government to take a conservative turn. Across the continent, partly in response to the decline in economic growth, conservative neoliberal governments took power. As a consequence, budgets for social programs were cut and support for educational expansions was withdrawn. Where the state had previously been held responsible for ensuring equality, many conservative governments argued against state interference. In the European Community, the sentiment turned against continued migration, moving the EC to become Fortress Europe.

Despite significant withdrawals of federal financial support, the CDU/CSU-FDP Federal Government coalition demanded some level of cultural assimilation into West German society. While this had long been the party’s stance, reports on domestic abuse, honor killings, and arranged marriages within minority communities demanded redress and heightened the perceived need for immediate integration.155 Muslim households were viewed as repressive familial structures that denied daughters their individual rights, while supporting only male children.156 Many conservative politicians argued that some level of integration, or preferably assimilation, was necessary to overcome these human rights abuses. As reports of this nature proliferated, federal ministries – including the Ministry of Education and the Family Ministry – emphasized the importance of schooling not only for the provision of opportunity and integration, but also as a way to save children – especially girls – from their conservative and fundamentalist families.


156 Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, 143–44.
On October 13, 1982, the new Chancellor Helmut Kohl delivered his first speech to the West German Bundestag titled “A Coalition of the Center: For a Policy of Renewal,” in which he presented the program of the newly elected CDU/CSU-FDP government. Building on his protectionist stance and campaign promises to halve the number of foreign citizens in West, he declared that he would limit new migration “precisely in the interest of the children, who have a right to their own family.” He went on to tell the Members of Bundestag that “the foreigners who would like to go back to their homeland must be assisted in doing so. Foreigners in Germany should be able to decide freely, but they must decide if they want to return to their country of stay here and integrate.”\(^1\) Local West German schools were supposed to provide classes to support either the one or the other.

At the end of the decade, however, the same Chancellor Kohl celebrated diversity within German society. In the preface of the Report '99: On the Situation of Foreign Employees and their Families – Survey and Perspectives for the 1990s, he explicitly advocated “respect,

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tolerance, and openness” between “we Germans … and our fellow foreign residents.” Schools were now supposed to promote and support multiculturalism, as well as teach students to celebrate the multiplicity of cultures and citizenships – and by extension identities – within society.

Both Kohl’s stance at the beginning of and at the end of the decade reflected major economic and political transformations in West Germany and Europe. At the beginning of that decade, West German politics reflected a conservative turn across the European Community Member States. As the 1981 Oil Crisis again led to a global recession, several governments, including the new CDU/CSU-FDP government of the Federal Republic, embraced a neo-liberal economic turn; they began cutting government spending and fell back on a rhetoric of “national homogeneity.” These conservative grabbed hold of the line in the European Community Directive 486/77 from 1977 on the education of the children of migrant workers promoting native language and cultural classes in support of return to suggest that non-nationals should return to their countries of citizenship or origin, thus removing the burden of their care from their host country.3

Support for programs for return migration in West Germany also stemmed from feelings that the school initiatives widely funded in the 1970s had failed. All of the money and effort poured into the schooling of children with non-German citizenship had, it seemed, failed to stem continued reports of the bilingual illiteracy of many schoolchildren, and thousands of youths (15

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to eighteen) with foreign citizenship failed to find spaces in vocational training programs. Some education researchers and officials argued that the Kultusministerkonferenz’s dual goals, promoted in the 1976 revisions to the Recommendations on the schooling of migrant workers’ children, were in fact a double burden, preventing children from either integrating or maintaining their cultural and lingual heritage. That feeling of failure contributed to demands that the children or their parents choose: either fully integrate into West German society or leave.

In contrast to the push for full assimilation or emigration by Christian conservatives, many politicians in the SPD and the new Green Party, founded in 1980 on a predominantly environmental platform, continued to support bi- and multiculturalism. They argued that West Germany had changed, and its society needed to acknowledge that the country was home to a multicultural society. In the end it was the idea multiculturalism that captured the larger public’s support during the mid- and late 1980s, partly in response of the failure of the Kohl administration to actually reduce the number of resident non-citizens. Yet, academics and various state politicians and representatives espoused a number of different versions of this concept, as historian Rita Chin has shown in her 2007 study on the guestworker questions in postwar Germany. Beyond the host county’s divisive definitions of inclusion and identity, however, the countries of citizenship continued to play a direct role in shaping their citizens’ identities and education options in countries like West Germany. Depending on the county of

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5 Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, 142.


7 Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, 192–194.
citizenship’s (e.g. Italy, Greece, or Turkey) specific internal circumstances, the governments supported different definitions of the term, reinforcing their own definitions of nationalism and identity.

The school programs created by the local Länder and foreign governments reflected their political goals and stances regarding the place of foreign citizens in West German society. Different states supported programs for return migration, bicultural education, or foreign language education depending on their stance on multiculturalism, integration, and belonging, as well as their financial flexibility. Over the decade, as governments altered their goals, European Community aims changed, and the political winds shifted, so too did support for different education programs.

**Pushing West Germany’s Minority Groups to Leave**

The European Council Directive 486/77 on the education of the children of migrant workers from July 1977 stipulated that host countries “offer [education in] the mother tongue and of the culture of the country of origin with a view principally to facilitating their possible reintegration into the Member State of origin.” This directive colored the development of school initiatives for migrant and minority children in West Europe for the following decade.⁸ Both host countries and country-of-citizenship governments designed and advocated education programs encouraging schoolchildren to return to their countries of citizenship. Arguments from politicians across the political spectrum supported this venture. In West Germany politicians from the CDU/CSU claimed that, without such classes, children were bound to remain. These children would be too disconnected from their (parents’) countries of origin, and thus incapable of easy

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assimilation. In contrast, politicians from the Green Party (including the Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz (AL)) and the SPD stressed long-established claims pointing to the importance of classes acknowledging the children’s cultural heritage. By learning their (grand-) parents’ cultures, the political Left, including the Social Democratic Party, argued that the children would have a choice regarding their futures. In this atmosphere, the Kohl government and most Länder Ministries of Education continued supporting programs for cultural training that had taken off in the 1960s and mid-1970s, but cut programs for integration. Working together with the country-of-citizenship governments, the West German Education Administrations also began developing courses specifically to promote return, both in West Germany and in the countries of citizenship.

The impetus behind the different political parties’ support for emigration stemmed in part from the economic crisis and the resulting strains of public funding. During the 1970s, the West German Federal Government under SPD-FDP leadership had increased social spending on the federal level as had the Länder governments. When unemployment jumped at the beginning of the 1980s in the context of the global recession, the state coffers were empty. Under the new

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9 In 1980, for example, Green party politicians in Baden-Württemberg used the political importance of return in order to support mother language and cultural classes. (Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien, 153). For more on the development of the Green party in West Germany before 1984, see Elim Papadakis, The Green Movement in West Germany, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2014). The Alternative Liste was political party in West Berlin that would eventually become part of the Green Party (Roger Karapin, iProtest Politics in Germany: Movements on the Left and Right Since the 1960s (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2009), 127).

10 Beauftragter für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und Ihrer Familienangehörigen, “Bericht zur Ausländerpolitik” (Bonn: Der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, March 19, 1984), 39–40; and Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien, 42–53.

11 During the economic ups and downs of the 1970s, the state budget declined and unemployment rose. Between 1975 and 1980, the percentage of unemployed workers had briefly sunk, but begun to climb steadily again. Then, between 1980 and 1981, the rate of unemployment jumped from 3.8 to 5.5 percent (the previous high in 1975 had been 4.7). Each one of those 1.2 million individuals, 168 thousand of whom had foreign citizenship (in 1980 889 thousand total, 107 foreign citizens), were supposed to receive support from the welfare state (Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch 1982, 106). See also Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen, and Stephen Castles, “Germany: Immigration and Social Exclusion in a Declining Welfare State,” in Migration,
conservative CDU/CSU-FDP Federal Government public policy took a neoliberal turn. The dual goal was to reduce the number of unemployed and to cut government spending for the unemployed. To reach this goal, Kohl’s administration pushed for a limitation of federal interventions, arguing that it could no longer support any “extras,” including education support programs. In following, the Federal Government withdrew most support for Länder projects. In order to handle unemployment, the Government attempted to decrease the number of foreign workers in the country alongside attempting to discourage married women, particularly mothers, from participating in the work force.\textsuperscript{12}

This neoliberal turn and emphasis on limited spending contributed to two changes regarding the federal stance on non-Germans’ place in the country. First, the Federal SDP-FDP coalition Government’s programs developed before 1982 were premised largely on future choice.\textsuperscript{13} Under the new CDU/CSU-FDP government, the administration demanded children and their parents make their decision to stay or go now, not later. The children, accordingly, needed to either fully integrate, adopting at least a minimum of “Germannness” or, preferably, leave the country for their country of citizenship.\textsuperscript{14} There would be no need to try and combine thouse goals as the choice, made in the immediate present, was a done deal. Second, where the old SPD-FDP Government had argued that the state was responsible for providing school measures to


\textsuperscript{14} Beauftragter für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und Ihrer Familienangehörigen, “Bericht Zur Ausländerpolitik,” 33–34.
equalize access and facilitate integration, the new CDU/CSU-FDP government claimed responsibility for these things lay with the families themselves. They, once again, could choose to integrate and take advantage of available resources, or they could leave. While Länder governments continued to express concern about integration, the Christian conservative Federal Government argued that it held little or no responsibility.\footnote{Herbert, \textit{Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland}, 244–248. Following neoliberal policies, the Kohl government did not advocate education for all, but rather schooling for those who had a legal entitlement. Groups like asylum seekers (discussed in Chapter 8) were systematically excluded.}

Part of the Kohl administration’s stance stemmed from its view of Germanness and certain minority groups. Many Christian conservative politicians felt that German culture needed to be protected and preserved from foreign influence.\footnote{Abadan-Unat, \textit{Turks in Europe}, 28; and Tietze, \textit{Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien}, 215.} They claimed that integration was impossible for many minority groups, and particularly for Turks. Turkish children were too foreign to ever be completely German. Why, then, should the government support integration? The same argument applied to culture-specific education, but with the addition that, while minority groups had every right to preserve their own cultures, it was far better (and easier) for them to do so in their own countries.\footnote{Bernd Geiss, \textit{Wehrpflicht für Ausländer und Doppelstaater}, 5th ed. (Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, 1989); and Chin, \textit{The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany}, 144–149.}

Accordingly, one of Kohl’s first measures at Chancellor once in office, in October 1982, was to try and establish a program to reduce the foreigner population in West German. With this initiative the CDU/CSU tried to keep its campaign promise to encourage foreign residents to leave.\footnote{Gerda Strack, “Rückkehr in die Heimat unterstützen,” \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, June 21, 1983.} Because of internal conflict between CDU/CSU and FDP, however, the government failed to develop its own program. Instead, it pulled out an abandoned plan from the previous
Federl Government under SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and implemented it, beginning in November 1983. The program, “Support for the Preparedness of Foreigners to Return,” permitted non-nationals to collect their social security if they moved back to their supposed home countries.\textsuperscript{19} To take advantage of the program, however, applicants had to formally apply by June 1984 with the intention to migrate by the end of September of the same year, which required non-German citizens to decide immediately.\textsuperscript{20} The program would be judged a failure, as the population of non-Germans did not in fact sink as much as the new CDU/CSU-FDP government had promised, but tens of thousands of individuals and families with non-German citizenship did leave.\textsuperscript{21}

Among those individuals with foreign citizenship who emigrated from West Germany were tens of thousands of children. With less assistance in the schools and increased social xenophobia, these schoolchildren decided to emigrate (often without their parents), either to pursue education opportunities in their countries of citizenship or to escape discrimination in West Germany.\textsuperscript{22} As part of that outflow, some 40,000 schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship


\textsuperscript{21} Rainer Münz, Wolfgang Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1999), 45. For some press on the program, see “Pirkl: 200 000 Türken werden heimkehren,” Die Welt, February 24, 1984; and “Rückkehrförderung / Positive Bilanz gezogen: Zahl der Anträge lag hinter den Erwartungen,” Handelsblatt, July 12, 1984.

\textsuperscript{22} Jan Skrobanek, “Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Identity and the (Re-) Ethnicisation of Youth with a Turkish Ethnic Background in Germany,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, no. 4 (April 1, 2009): 535–54; and
left the FRG between 1983 and 1984. In consequence, although the total number of schoolchildren with non-German citizenship in West German public schools continued to increase between 1979 and 1988, there was a brief period of decline in 1984-85 (see Table 7.1).

**Table 7.1: Number of Schoolchildren with Non-German Citizenship in West German Public Schools by Citizenship and Percent of Total, 1979–1988**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>W. German</th>
<th>Total Non-German</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9,394,554</td>
<td>8,842,504</td>
<td>552,050</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>73,880</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>49,210</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>252,476</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9,093,526</td>
<td>8,455,225</td>
<td>638,301</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>76,332</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>50,776</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>317,509</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>8,772,287</td>
<td>8,073,792</td>
<td>698,495</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>79,649</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>52,366</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>359,713</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>8,380,608</td>
<td>7,655,804</td>
<td>724,804</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>78,446</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>51,718</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>380,579</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>7,955,351</td>
<td>7,241,130</td>
<td>714,221</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>74,516</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>48,368</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>375,369</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>7,501,998</td>
<td>6,834,409</td>
<td>667,589</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>71,003</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>44,521</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>336,270</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7,128,190</td>
<td>6,460,990</td>
<td>667,200</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>69,136</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>41,495</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>331,592</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>6,954,895</td>
<td>6,270,425</td>
<td>684,470</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>69,380</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>38,609</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>335,953</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6,777,696</td>
<td>6,070,193</td>
<td>707,503</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>70,470</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>37,398</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>344,642</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6,707,376</td>
<td>5,970,169</td>
<td>737,207</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>71,662</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>37,534</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>353,317</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


23 KMK, *Ausländische Schüler und Schulabsolventen 1983 bis 1992*, vol. 128, Statistische Veröffentlichungen der KMK (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, 1994), 17; KMK (Germany), *Ausländische Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970 bis 1983*, Statistische Veröffentlichungen der KMK (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, 1984), 4. See also Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1990), 342; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1989), 351; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1990), 357; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1987), 349; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1988), 357; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1985), 357.
The decision to leave West Germany also depended on conditions in the country of citizenship. Because the economic and social situations in Greece, Spain, and Portugal had improved and these states had joined the European Community many families from these three countries opted to leave West Germany. Reflecting those decisions to return, the number of children with Greek citizenship in West Germany dropped (as did the total number of Spanish and Portuguese schoolchildren) by more than 1,000 a year until plateauing in 1986 at between 37,000 and 38,000. By contrast, the number of children in West Germany with Italian citizenship briefly increased at the beginning of the decade, before dropping and then stabilizing between 69,000 and 71,000. Despite the temporary decline, however, the overall number of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship living in West Germany rose over the 1980s until more than one in ten schoolchildren had non-German citizenship. That population growth was predominately due to an increase in the number of schoolchildren with Yugoslavian citizenship (see Table 8.1) and other “non-traditional minority groups,” as well as, after 1986, schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship. As historian Ulrich Herbert emphasized in his 2001 study Ausländerpolitik (Foreigner Policies), Kohl’s promises to reduce the number of non-Germans in West Germany remained unfulfilled.

For those who did choose to remain and for new migrants, the Kohl administration continued to pursue its neoliberal policies. The CDU/CSU-FDP Federal government continued to rhetorically support programs for German language instruction and vocational training. But, following its agenda, the Federal Government cut much of its financial support for the school

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24 It should be noted that part of the reason for the relatively stable number of schoolchildren was on account of minor, continual out- and in migration. Not all of the children year to year were the same, even if the majority were (Ulrich Herbert, Gesichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge (München: Beck, 2001), 251–258).

measures in place, such as the vocational training programs and the “measures for social and vocational integration of foreign youths” (MSBE) programs. Whereas in 1980 the SPD-FDP Federal Government had paid 12.3 million Deutsch Marks for the program, in 1986 the CDU/CSU-FDP government only paid 5.2 million (see Table 7.1).

The federal cuts of the 1980s hit programs for homework help particularly hard. The Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs had provided the bulk of the funding behind many of these programs in several of the Länder (including West Berlin). Consequently, it was a major blow when, in 1985, the Ministry announced that it would be tapering off its support and bringing financial help to an end in 1987. Many of the Länder Ministries of Education protested without regard to their political orientation. The Christian Democratic Senator for Schools in Berlin, Hanna Renate Laurien, for example, was dismayed. She wrote the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs to explain what an important role the classes played for both citizens and foreign nationals. Receiving apathetic responses from the Federal Government, the CDU-FDP Senate in Berlin and other Länder Education Administrations began a long process of budget review in an attempt to find monies to continue homework help programs. Regardless of these efforts, the Länder often did not have the budget to support these programs themselves. As a result, despite widespread protest, these programs were cut back or shut down.

Although the Kohl administration’s neoliberal policies pushed cuts in government spending, its emphasis on return migration led to the active support and funding of programs that facilitated this aim. Both the relevant foreign governments and the West German Ministries of

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26 For a description of the Maßnahmen zur sozialen und beruflichen Eingliederung ausländischer Jugendliche (MBSE) programs, see Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, ed., Berufsbildungsbericht 1981 (Bonn: Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, 1981), 75, 98. In 1980, the social democratic-liberal Federal government paid 12.3 million Deutsch Marks for the program. Ibid., 142; and Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Berufsbildungsbericht 1987 (Bad Honnef: Bock, 1987), 192. In 1985/86, 3,021 youths with foreign citizenship took part in the program, 1,039 youths fewer than the previous school year. 68.3 percent of those youths had Turkish citizenship (Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Berufsbildungsbericht 1981, 75).
Education felt the need to take action and help the children succeed in their country of citizenships’ school systems. On the side of the Länder Ministries of Educations, part of their motivation was the feeling of failure. Believing in their own system’s superiority and claiming that local education programs were supposed to enable smooth (re)integration, the emigrating schoolchildren’s difficulties represented a breakdown of the West German system. The countries of citizenships’ Ministries of Education, in turn, did not want unemployable citizens on their hands and hoped to take advantage of any skill sets developed West Germany. Because of overlapping interests, they collaborated with the West German government to develop integration programs to help foreign Germans integrate into unfamiliar school systems after emigration.

That concern was hardly new. The Greek Ministry of Education, for example, had been working to address the issue since the 1960s. At that time, the Greek government’s concerns had centered on secondary education and equivalency. That issue was largely solved in the mid-1970s when the Greek government recognized the German school certificate (discussed in Chapter 5). In consequence, in the 1980s the West German and foreign state’s Ministries of Education were able to turn towards resolving problems with vocational training and growing concern over the concept of belonging. During the exodus in the early 1980s, many left West Germany with the hope of finally fitting in. But West German residents with foreign citizenship,

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29 Although not always solved to everyone’s satisfaction. While secondary school certificates were now recognized, the level of recognition continued to be disputed. For example, the Greek and Italian governments argued that West Germany should view its secondary school certificate as the equivalent of the Realschule certificate rather than the lower secondary (“7. Sitzung der gemischten deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission vom 12. - 14. Dezember 1990 in Bonn,” Protokoll (Bonn, December 14, 1990), B 304/6120, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).
despite the West German ethno-national majority’s claims that they were foreign, clearly were
not quite “Italian,” “Greek,” or “Turkish” either. Upon arriving in their country of citizenship,
“returning” children, who had often been born and raised in Germany, frequently faced crises of
identity. Many children discovered that their knowledge base was almost entirely different than
that of their age cohort, leading to teasing and rejection on the grounds that they were
“German.”

In Turkey, the Ministry of Education developed “Anadolu schools” in Istanbul and
Ankara, as well as a few other cities, to try and assist the flood of schoolchildren returning to
Turkey in 1983/84 in response to the Kohl government’s anti-foreigner policies and pressure
from the ethno-national German majority to leave. When 40,000 schoolchildren arrived from
West Germany (see Table 7.1), the Turkish government struggled to accommodate them.
Expecting the pace to continue, the Turkish government expended significant efforts to ease their
transition, organizing schools and programs to support their language and cultural needs. To do
so, teachers in the Anadolu schools were supposed to provide instruction partly in German
(preferably given by teachers from Germany) and partly in Turkish (by local teachers) in order to
promote integration. The Turkish school system in the 1980s emphasized connection to the state
and cultural capital alongside the acquisition of reading, writing, and arithmetic.

(Ankara, April 24, 1987), B 304/6043, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Brian J.K. Miller, “İlk Ders İstiklal Marşı Oldu:
Anadolu Lise & Turkish National Identity, 1984-85” (38th Annual Social Science and History Association Meeting,
Chicago, November 24, 2013).

31 Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz, “Schulische Wiedereingliederung türkischer
Rückwandererkinder,” 612-600.65/1, (April 3, 1985), B 304/6181, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Turkish Ministry of
Education, “Vorschläge des türkischen Ministeriums für nationale Erziehung Jugend und Sport zur Verbesserung
der Chancengleichheit hinsichtlich der Integrationsmöglichkeiten türkischer Gastarbeiterkinder der 2. Generatin in
der BRD” (Mainz, June 1985), B 304/6181, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

32 Miller, “Anadolu Lise & Turkish National Identity.”
Investing in programs encouraging migration, the West German Federal and Länder governments agreed to assist the Turkish government in staffing and running the schools. Although assistance would begin only after a delay, in 1985 the West German Foreign Office and representatives from the Länder (including from the Kultusministerkonferenz), agreed to send seven German teachers to teach in Turkish schools and the Foreign Office agreed to cover their salaries and travel expenses out of their school fund.\(^\text{33}\)

Despite Turkey’s efforts and eventual West German assistance, integration was not always smooth and these programs only had limited success. The first and most basic hurdle was that, in moving to Turkey, schoolchildren from West German usually dispersed, with many moving to the countryside and away from the urban centers in which the Anadolu schools were established. Even in the urban centers where the Anadolu schools were located, there was not always have enough German teachers to actually provide the promised German language instruction. Added to that, both inside and outside of the Anadolu schools, many schoolchildren found the differences between the West German and Turkish systems overwhelming or their teachers and classmates less than appreciative of their cultural differences.\(^\text{34}\)

\(^{33}\) A further eighteen had already applied and the Foreign Office was vetting them (Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz, “Schulische Wiedereingliederung türkischer Rückwandererkinder”). The meeting was to discuss how the German side can help with the scholastic reintegration (schulische Wiedereingliederung) of Turkish children, who either with or without their parents have (re-) migrated from the FRG to Turkey.

The Council of Europe and UNESCO became involved with German teachers in Turkey and programs for helping reintegration. The Council of Europe gave the Sekretariat a yearly report for 1987/88 about a Pilot Program/class at the Anadolu Lisesi Kemal Yurtbili in Turkey funded by the Council of Europe. The program’s creators aimed to smoothly reintegrate schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship from the Federal Republic into the Turkish school system. Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz to Mitglieder des Ausschusses für ausländische Arbeitnehmer, “Unterricht für türkische Schüler...; hier: “Jahresbericht 1987/88 über eine Versuchsklasse des Europarates in der Türkei,” October 7, 1988, B 304/6180, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

North Rhine-Westphalia’s Minister of Culture, Social Democrat Hans Schwier\textsuperscript{35} heard about some of those difficulties first hand in 1986 during a trip to meet with the Turkish Minister of National Education, Youth, and Sports, Metin Emiroğlu.\textsuperscript{36} During that visit, Schwier went to see an Anadolu school.\textsuperscript{37} It was Republic Day (29 October), a national holiday during which normal classes were suspended in favor of poetry recitals and other activities. In honor of the foreign visit, the school had 300 uniformed school children – all returned from Germany – stand in rows to sing the national anthem and recite Atatürk sayings, including “Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the Nation.”\textsuperscript{38} After the recital, the children reported their perception of the manifold hurdles to integration in Turkey. They commented on the “hideous school uniforms,” “austere discipline,” “rote memorization without meaning or purpose,” and “continuous moral appeals” \textit{(Moralappelle)}. Furthermore, the pupils were instructed that the girls should not be seen too long with boys. According to Schwier’s report, which, granted, was biased in favor of the West German system, the pupils claimed that in Germany everything was totally different, freer. In the German ambassador’s report on the same visit, he emphasized that “the returned children had experienced a sympathetic and open system in Germany, but in Turkey had to (re-}

\textsuperscript{35} Hans Schwier was a West German SPD politician and pedagogue in North Rhine-Westphalia. He served as Minister of Research from 1980 to 1983 and Minister of Education from 1983 to 1995.

\textsuperscript{36} Metin Emiroğlu was a Turkish politician and jurist. He was a founding member of the Turkish Motherland Party (ANAP). He served as Minister of Education, Youth, and Sports from 1985 to 1987 under Turgut Özal, Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989. He succeeded Vehbi Dinçerler (ANAP) and was succeeded by two more ANAP Ministers in 1989 alone before Yıldırım Akbulut (1989-1991) took over as Prime Minister when Özal was elected President.

\textsuperscript{37} The visit ran between 27 October and 1 November. The first days was spent laying a wreath at the Ataturk Mausoleum and talking with the Turkish Minister of Education, among other activities. It should be noted that Republic Day is the day that the Turkish constitution was amended, the Ottoman Empire was officially disbanded, and Turkey became a Republic.

acclimatize to tight regulations.”

Without locally established cultural and social capital, these children faced difficulties associated with othering on account of their supposed Germanness. They, being neither from one group nor accepted in the other, had in fact become something new.

To some extent, the children returning from West Germany were actually lucky. These children, while facing problems with cultural capital, were often able to attend secondary schools. In contrast, many Turkish children in Turkey never had the chance. While the government had reached an overall eighty-percent literacy rate by 1985 and had ninety-eight percent enrollment in primary school (from grades one to five) in 1986, there was only a 54 percent enrollment in grades six to eight. With a decreasing budget and a population increase of approximately one million children a year, the Turkish Ministry of Education did not have the resources to expand secondary schooling, despite making it part of the standard curriculum.

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39 They supposedly told the West German delegation that for days the teachers had instructed them [their pupils] to relay only positive things about Turkey when their Turkish teachers were busy with Schwier (Ibid). Also of interest to the West German delegations and particularly the Foreign Office were the children’s claims of frustration that they were unable to maintain their German connections/heritage. Children in Turkey had a tight school schedule, with classes running from 8:30 in the morning until 4:30 in the afternoon. After release, they still had homework, making it difficult to visit the German Cultural Institute or to develop their German interests. Furthermore, many of their parents still lived in Germany and sometimes “the girls also had to take care of younger siblings,” as not everyone has relatives in Ankara. Furthermore, German visa restrictions made it difficult for the children to return to Germany in order to visit family.

40 Miller, “Anadolu Lise & Turkish National Identity.”


42 The literacy rate was highest in urban areas among men. Illiteracy, in turn, was higher in rural areas of the East and particularly among women. The budget for the Ministry of Education actually declined from 13.7 percent in 1970 to 11.1 percent in 1980 and 8.8 percent in 1986, less than half the amount sent on defense (Education Committee, “Review of Educational Policy in Turkey: Examiners’ Report and Questions,” ED(87)2 (Paris: OECD, May 5, 1987), 9–11, OECD Archive). The report was discussed during the 38th session of the OECD’s Education Committee with the Turkish delegation, headed by Metin Emiroğlu, Minister of National Education, Youth and Sports (Education Committee, “Summary Record of the 38th Session Held at the Château de La Muette, Paris from 1st to 3rd June 1987,” ED/M(87)1 (Paris: OECD, September 15, 1987), OECD Archive). For a discussion of the development of education and the Turkish state’s perception thereof, particularly in regards to the 1980 military coup, see Sam Kaplan, The Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 38, 173–216.
The schoolchildren arriving from Germany, then, while facing the personal trauma of learning a new system, often received extra support.

The severe limitations of the system in Turkey led the North Rhine-Westphalia’s Minister of Culture, Schwier, to make multiple recommendations for increasing support for the schoolchildren from Germany living in Turkey upon his return. He backed the request of the Turkish Minister of National Education, Youth, and Sports, Metin Emiroğlu, for more teachers and school materials, particularly for secondary schools and vocational training. He also suggested easing visa restrictions for the children, which the schoolchildren at the Anadolu school had requested. West German visa restrictions made it difficult for the children to return to Germany in order to visit family. It would be unfortunate, after all, if these children lost their connection to Germany. Their presence in Turkey would promote business and positive communication between the two countries, but only if their link to West Germany was not entirely severed.  

The Turkish government continued supporting the Anadolu schools and the West German Länder would send teachers and supplies. But the expected waves of thousands of returning schoolchildren did not materialize. Instead, as of 1990, there were (only) 2,884 schoolchildren enrolled in five Anadolu schools. Nonetheless, there were still concerns with those children’s futures. Although they numbered less than 3,000, there were still too many to all receive spots in the Turkish higher education system. Still developing their university and


vocational school programs, Turkey claimed that “despite rising school successes, the situation was still not satisfactorily solved” and requested further West German assistance.\textsuperscript{45}

Because of limited return migration to Turkey and continued immigration to West Germany, primarily through family reunification and asylum applicants, the Turkish and West German Ministries of Education stopped emphasizing programs for reintegration in Turkey in the mid-1980s. Instead, the Ministries of Education in both countries focused on cultural and language instruction for Turkish citizens living in the Federal Republic. The governments turned back to the programs developed in the 1960s and 1970s, expanding or altering the programs to meet new political aims.\textsuperscript{46}

The Kohl government’s failure to actually reduce the number of foreign citizens in West Germany, combined with massive social changes, contributed to a significant shift within government policy in the mid-1980s. One important factor that supported this shift was the recovery of the economy. As the economy began to pick up the number of unemployed plateaued before beginning to decline. Another factor was the changing political culture. The Green Party advocated minority rights and multiculturalism across West Germany since its founding in 1980. Its stance forced the other parties, including the SPD and the FDP, to reconsider the issue, particularly after the 1987 Federal elections in which the Green Party won 8.7 percent of the vote.\textsuperscript{47} The Greens’s policy was derived from new scholarship in the social scientists and history

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46} For a description of some specialized, local programs for schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship, see Sarah Thomsen Vierra, “At Home in Almanya: Turkish-German Space of Belonging in West Germany, 1961-1990” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2011); and Sarah Thomsen Vierra, “Learning to Belong: The Second Generation at School” (38th Annual Social Science and History Association Meeting, Chicago, November 24, 2013).

that demonstrated the long history of immigration to the German territories and the long-time multi-faceted and multi-ethnic nature of German society.\(^48\) Social support for ethno-centrism was diminishing and the myth of German cultural homogeneity was crumbling. By 1985/86, the conservative fervor to push minorities with foreign citizenship to emigrate diminished in favor of a discussion of multiculturalism.\(^49\)

New European Community and international pressure to emphasize layers of European and national identity added to that swing in political and social perceptions of multiculturalism and minority rights.\(^50\) This changing emphasis on ethnicity provided room for diversity under the “European” label. Instead of promoting a dual identity – either German or foreign – European community trends meant that the Federal and Länder governments began to promote interculturalism and multiculturalism.\(^51\) Three of the former guest worker states had, after all, joined the European Community, coming under the “European” label, in the beginning of the 1980s. This meant only half of the original eight states that had had bilateral labor agreements with the Federal Republic were not EC Member States. With the Treaty of Maastricht in


development (signed in 1992), the Federal Government wanted to push associated ideals of unity.

With the new (re)emphasis on multiculturalism, the West German Education Administrations determined that, because the different governments involved could not predict where children would eventually choose to live, the children should, if they wanted, learn to straddle both worlds. While at first glance that stance was similar to the Education Administrations’ aims from the 1960s and the Kultusministerkonferenz’s double goals, there was a significant difference. Whereas in the 1960s the intention was for children to be able to operate in either their country of residence or country of citizenship’s society, the goal in the 1980s was for the children to simply be both. The children were ethnically different, but they were at least partially German, or at least – some of them – European. The cultural capital and schooling learned in one country should therefore fit into the other.

Greek Bilingual Instruction and the Pressure for Return versus Multiculturalism

For the Greek ethno-national minority in West Germany, the pressure for return differed significantly from the Turkish. Even as the incoming Kohl government in the Federal Republic ran on a platform promising to reduce the overall number of foreigners in West Germany, in 1982 the Greek Embassy in Bonn announced that the Greek government had developed a “new [policy] direction” regarding its citizens abroad. Namely, the state “sought increased return migration to Greece.” Accordingly, the head of the Greek Embassy’s Educational Authority, argued that “Greek schools [in Germany] needed to prepare [children] for return” because

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eighty-two percent of “Greeks expressed a desire to return.” With this approach the new PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) government, under Andreas Papandreou, Greek President from 1981 to 1989, altered the course set under the previous conservative Prime Minister, Konstantinos G. Karamanlis.

With the West German Federal Government’s stance on emigration, the Greek government was able to move forward with its new policy direction. In the 1960s and 1970s the Länder governments had frequently denied the Greek government’s and diaspora’s requests for expanded Greek language instruction, partly on the grounds that it prevented integration. Residents in West Germany, most of the Länder Ministries of Education argued, whether citizens or not, needed to be able to succeed in the West German school system and labor market. In contrast, in the early 1980s, several of the Länder, governed by CDU-FDP or SPD-FDP coalitions, agreed that those Greek citizens committed to return should prepare, arguably even to the exclusion of inclusion. They viewed the choice to stay or go as an either/or and tried to provide programs for both.

In addition to practical considerations as the Greek diaspora in West German stabilized, the Greek government’s policy shift also reflected changes in the European Community. The

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53 Geogiovasilis claimed that “other than Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg is the state that does the most for Greek schoolchildren” (Ministerium für Kultus und Sport BW, Referat IV/2 / PrGr “A,” “Gespräch bei Herrn MR Jansen am 19. 03. 1982” (Stuttgart, March 19, 1982), EA 3/609 Bü 91/1, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart).

54 The Ministry of Education in Baden-Württemberg often made this claim, as did most of the KMK. Bavaria was more accommodating to the Greek government’s requests, as discussed in Chapter 3.


56 For more on Greece’s accession to and integration into the European Economic Community, see Iacovos Tsalicoglou, Negotiating for Entry: The Accession of Greece to the European Community (Aldershot: Dartmouth,
European Community had reached a consensus among its member states at the beginning of the decade to push multiculturalism and promote equivalency, exchange, and multiculturalism between the different Member States’ systems.\(^{57}\) Taking advantage of that shift, the Greek Government used the language of European Community Directive 486/77 on the education of migrant workers to argue that the Directive’s support for minority cultures established a schoolchild’s right to remain Greek in Germany. The Greek Ministry of Education pointed to the directive’s emphasis on the right of a minority group to try and straddle both worlds. The Greek state continued to argue that, as most of its citizens would return – and many were returning – to Greece, they needed a solid Greek education (a point which many Greek parents supported).\(^{58}\)

Technically, based on the 1976 (i.d.F. 1979) *Kultusministerkonferenz* recommendations on instruction for migrant workers’ children, schoolchildren from former guest worker countries were still entitled to receive support for both integration and native language and cultural classes. With their own regulations reflecting the KMK’s Recommendations still on the books, the Ministries of Education felt obligated to provide them.\(^{59}\) Consequently, despite Federal cutbacks, the *Länder* governments and their Education Administrations attempted to continue financing

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their various forms of consular courses, bilingual instruction, or private national schools. The spread of the courses, however, depended on local interest and the support of the relevant foreign government (as Table 7.2 demonstrates).

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60 With education still under Länder jurisdiction, the Länder governments and their Education Administrations were technically responsible for the situation on the ground. That responsibility was part of what prompted the Länder to try and keep programs running. Where the Federal Government’s overarching goal was both to push a conservative political agenda and placate the countries of origin in the interest of bi-national relations, the Länder Education Administrations had to deal with the situation on the ground in the neighborhoods and the schools. Bock and the Emiroglu would underline this point in 1987, when Emiroglu expressed frustration with having to work with the individual Länder while the Federal Government expressed approval of Turkish demands (“Besprechung zwischen dem türkischen Erziehungsminister und Herrn Staatssekretär Bock vom 19. bis 21. März 1987 in Berlin, unterzeichnet am 22. 3. 87,” Protokoll (Berlin: Senator für Schulwesen, Berufsausbildung und Sport, Berlin, March 22, 1987), 87, B 304/6043, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).

61 The kind of consular classes available and spread depended on the relevant states’ stance on nationalism, integration, and education generally, as is discussed below.
Table 7.2: Schoolchildren in Mother Language and Cultural Classes by Language in Primary (P) and Lower Secondary (LS) Schools, 1984/85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Language</th>
<th>BW</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>NRW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>P and SL</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>12,771</td>
<td>7,439</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>23,415</td>
<td>11,220</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>3,747</td>
<td>2,734</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>2,266</td>
<td>1,765</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>51,508</td>
<td>21,923</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbo-Croatian</td>
<td>25,485</td>
<td>15,603</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonian</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>290</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>133,745</td>
<td>60,974</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to a report to the West German Foreign Office in preparation for a series of Joint Expert meetings on the instruction of foreign citizens living in the Federal Republic, the Kultusministerkonferenz chart displaying the number of schoolchildren attending some form of native language and/or cultural instruction. Each of the Länder provided a different set of statistics based on their own form of support and collection. Despite the unreliability of those

62 The “P” stands for primary school; the “LS” for lower secondary school (Hauptschule). Each of the Länder Education Administrations collected their statistics differently and reported back to the KMK with different abbreviations and standards. This table reflects the KMK’s compiled table. For the complete table, see “Unterweisung in der Muttersprache und der heimatlichen Landeskunde unter der Verantwortung der Konsularbehörden des Herkunftslandes im Schuljahr 1984/85,” see Hermann, “9. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 1. - 3. Oktober 1986 in Berlin,” Vorbereitende Notizen und Unterlagen zur Tagesordnung (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, September 22, 1986), 4.1.3, B 304/6042, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1985, 349. It is not possible to provide reliable Federal wide totals as several Länder (i.e. Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein) did not provide the KMK with statistics regarding participation in 1985/86.

63 Although North Rhine-Westphalia allowed the Yugoslav government and citizens to setup and run different language classes, many of these children simply attended whatever classes were available, regardless of their own ethnic affiliation. Many of these children, in fact, identified simply as Yugoslavs and did not view themselves as Croatian or Serbian, etc. Other than NRW, the rest of the Länder usually listed these classes simply as “Yugosolv” rather than separating out the language groups.

statistics and the lack of information about which kinds of courses those numbers covered exactly, they nonetheless demonstrate the high number of children with foreign citizenship enrolled therein as well as the importance of location as a deciding factor behind whether or not the children would enroll. In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, where the Education Administration had partially integrated consular instruction into the regular school day and paid for the instruction, 71.4% of Turkish children enrolled in North Rhine-Westphalian schools participated. In contrast, in Berlin, where a high number of minority groups within the Turkish minority lived (e.g. Kurds), only 11.4% enrolled. In contrast, of the schoolchildren with Greek citizenship in the Federal Republic, approximately one in two schoolchildren attended some form of Greek instruction.

The basic structure of most consular courses continued in the form they had from the early 1960s. Usually stipulated to run five hours a week, the local Education Administration staffed these classes with teachers selected and sent by the country of citizenship governments (as discussed in Chapter 2). Five of the eleven Länder, including North Rhine-Westphalia, financed the courses, and hence had a measure of control over their content and organization. The other six, including Baden-Württemberg, provided varying levels of financial subsidies but viewed the consulates as having (almost) complete control of content and organization. Not all of the countries of citizenship opted to spend a significant amount of money on the courses and by no means did every member of the eight eligible minorities in West Germany choose to participate, as Table 7.2 shows. Of the national and language groups taking part in the native language and cultural instruction run by the sending countries’ consulates, schoolchildren with Greek citizenship were far more likely to participate in the consular course instruction.
Technically, consular courses were supposed to realize the right of minority groups to maintain or build a connection to their cultural or ethnic heritage. By the early 1980s, however, the classes were increasingly about creating a connection to the country of citizenship. Many of those courses, including those for students with Italian citizenship, were almost entirely for children born in West Germany. By no means was this true for every group. Thousands of migrants continued to arrive yearly from Turkey through the process of family reunification and as asylum seekers (see Table 7.1). Additionally, somewhat to the Länder Ministries of Education’s surprise (and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education’s displeasure), the Moroccan and Tunisian governments, both former guest worker countries, expressed an interest in the schooling of their citizens in West Germany and Arabic-language consular instruction. In consequence, consulates had to provide classes for children who were German with foreign citizenship as well as new immigrants. The cultural and linguistic differences between the children created difficulties for both the countries of citizenship and West Germany. The West Germany Education Administrations had to question what kind of information they should impart as part of the everyday curriculum and for whom.

Länder Education Administrations’ advocacy of some programs for cultural maintenance and integration did not, however, extend to all children with non-German citizenship. Schoolchildren with foreign citizenship who were not a part of one of those traditional guest worker countries did not have the right to similar courses. The West German Education

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66 NRW was home to the largest minority groups from Morocco and Tunisia. Because NRW’s Ministry of Education paid for consular courses, the state was highly annoyed at the idea of having to fund new sets of consular courses (Hermann, “10. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, September 1983), 18, B 304/7771, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).

Administrations felt a moral and legal responsibility to provide care for the descendants of groups associated with the former guest worker programs specifically. In contrast, new groups – frequently arriving as asylum applicants – were supposedly there by choice, regardless of their reason for migration or flight. On those grounds, the West German Education Administrations disclaimed a need to provide extra services. These groups were entitled to their basic rights, but not extras.

After 1981, West German residents with Greek citizenship had a right to state support because of their status as former guest workers (regardless of when an individual migrated), but also as European Community Member State nationals. With that status in mind, in the early 1980s the Länder Ministries of Education collaborated with the Greek government to restructure some of the education initiatives for Greek schoolchildren already in place and develop new materials. In CDU-FDP Baden-Württemberg, for example, the Ministry of Education worked with the Greek legation to expand Greek-language instruction in bilingual school programs, permitting Greek consular teachers in both primary and secondary schools to offer mathematics and the sciences. The Education Administrations also set up a bi-national committee to develop school materials, particularly for social studies, for those classes integrating the local and Greek curricula. In North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse, under SPD-FDP governments that at least rhetorically promoted biculturalism and bilingual education over return, the Ministries of

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69 Chapter 8 lays out the difference in state support for asylum applicants versus other kinds of migrants.

Education had begun collaborating with the Greek government to develop instructional materials since the 1970s. During the 1980s, the two Länder Education Administrations encouraged the other former guest worker countries to participate as well. These lessons and materials were supposed to reach audiences across West Germany.\textsuperscript{71}

Despite Länder and country-of-citizenship Education Administrations’ representatives’ agreement on the benefits of offering Turkish as a first foreign language, the implementation of the classes proved problematic. Among the chief concerns was the availability of school materials. Old materials usually targeted either schoolchildren in Turkey or newly arrived immigrant children. As the European Community Action Program from 1974 had stated, there were few to no good schoolbooks for native language instruction for the children of foreigners abroad (second and third generation). To rectify the problem, the Commission of the European Community encouraged the development of new schoolbooks taking the migrant experience into account (like the Greek). New materials were supposed to acknowledge the unique experience of minority schoolchildren – be they immigrants or children born in their countries of residence.\textsuperscript{72}

In the 1980s, because of local needs and with European Community support, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia worked with the Greek legations to develop school materials for children with Greek citizenship raised in West Germany. In these two Länder, the Ministries of Education had encouraged the integration of consular instruction into the standard school day during the 1960s and 1970s. They were consequently concerned about the conceptual integration of Greek and German subjects (e.g. history) and language lessons. With European Community


financial support, the two Länder worked with Greece to develop school materials between 1982 and 1986 for materials for schoolchildren with Greek citizenship living in West Germany. The materials were explicitly supposed to support schoolchildren with different levels of language skills and teach them to be Greek regardless of the length of their West German residence. In addition, the West German Länder and the Greek legation also worked to develop audio-visual materials and a student magazine. However, as the eleven Länder each permitted different kinds of Greek language instruction, the Länder and Greek Ministries of Education tried to make the school materials applicable for a range of courses, including consular instruction, bilingual instruction classes, and national schools.

The use and development of Baden-Württemberg’s bilingual classes exemplify both the different levels of Greek mother-tongue and cultural instruction as well as the changing focus of the classes over the 1980s. As mentioned in Chapter 5, many of the Länder designed long-form classes in the 1970s that were, essentially, bilingual instruction targeted at those families intending to return to their “home countries.” In these classes, those schoolchildren interested in returning to their country of citizenship or in maintaining their cultural heritage received instruction in both German and the country of citizenship’s state language. The standard course


construction for Baden-Württemberg in primary school (grades one through four) included nine hours of non-German instruction in language, geography, and history in comparison to the five weekly hours of (after-school) consular instruction (see Table 7.2 and 7.3). The rest of the standard curriculum – seventeen hours – was supposed to be offered in German. Theoretically, children transitioning into secondary school would then attend regular instruction in order to prepare for vocational training. Although available to all former guest-worker states, the Turkish and Greek governments were usually the two who organized classes.

Where the Turkish government accepted the nine hours of Turkish language and social studies instruction (as discussed in Chapter 5), the Greek government pushed for extended hours in Greek (see Table 7.3). Even in the late 1970s, when the Greek government claimed to support the either-remain-or-go choice Greek citizens in West Germany all faced, the Government still pushed additional Greek language instruction. The Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education was willing to make a few concessions, as its CDU-FDP government was among those bent on encouraging return migration. After the initial test-phase in 1977/78, Baden-Württemberg permitted Greek teachers in primary and secondary bilingual classes to teach the Greek language (instead of English), history and social studies, geography, and mathematics. German teachers oversaw the remaining subjects: German, physics and chemistry, biology, sports, music, the visual arts, shop, and economy. In July 1981, the Baden-Württemberg Education Administration

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75 The majority of the Länder, even those financing mother language and cultural instruction, considered still the classes consular instruction (Konsularunterricht) because of the countries of citizenships’ direct involvement.


77 Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien, 197–198, 211.
agreed with the Greek Consulate to add two hours of Greek-Orthodox religious instruction, for a total of eleven hours of Greek language instruction a week.\footnote{Seifert to Oberschulämter, “Allgemeine Hinweise und Empfehlungen zum Schulversuch; hier: Hauptschulen für griechische Schüler,” January 14, 1987, EA 3/609 B6 90/2, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.}

Table 7.3: Instructional Hours for Primary Bilingual Instruction in Baden-Württemberg for Schoolchildren with Turkish or Greek Citizenship, 1982\footnote{Oberschulamt Stuttgart, December 28, 1982, EA 3/609 Bü 92, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Greek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish/Greek</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art/Home Ec.*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra Support</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Art and Home Economics were, when possible, taught together with German schoolchildren. Italicsized subjects taught in the mother language.

In 1982, however, as part of the new Greek PASOK government’s shifts in policy direction, Geogiovasilis requested several alterations to Baden-Württemberg’s curricula for the bilingual classes. Geogiovasilis did not have a significant problem with primary schooling (grades one through four), although he felt that there was not enough Greek instruction. It was secondary instruction that he took issue with. In meetings with the Kultusministerkonferenz and the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education, he informed the German delegations that “it was common knowledge that lower secondary schools (Hauptschulen) took the pupils left over from
the Realschule and Gymnasium.” According to Geogiovasilis, the lower secondary curriculum “looked like busywork and not actually an intensive instructional program.” He claimed the laxity of the German school program caused schoolchildren migrating to Greece “enormous difficulties, as the Greek schools were comprehensive schools, which placed emphasis on rich educational material … through the end of the instruction period.” To rectify that qualitative difference, the West German secondary-school program for Greek citizens needed to be closer to the Greek curriculum, particularly in the sciences, as the Greek legation felt the Greek lyceum’s courses were vastly superior to the German.\textsuperscript{80}

Toward this end, Geogiovasilis recommended changing Baden-Württemberg’s bilingual classes to emphasize return to Greece over integration. He did acknowledge that, in the end, the parents had to choose whether to return or remain in West Germany.\textsuperscript{81} But he felt that families who planned to stay in West Germany could attend regular instruction and take after-school consular instruction. For children whose families intended to return to Greece, however, the Greek embassy recommended offering in primary school six hours of Greek language and religious instruction, three hours of social studies, and five hours of mathematics, for a total of fourteen hours of Greek language instruction. German instructors were then to offer six or seven hours of German language instruction, one to two hours of visual arts and textiles, one hour of music, and three hours of sports, for a total of eleven to fourteen hours. In lower secondary school (Hauptschule), Geogiovasilis wanted Baden-Württemberg to allow Greek teachers to give the chemistry and biology instruction. At the end of their secondary schooling, Greek citizens

\textsuperscript{80} Griechische Botschaft to Ministerium für Kultus und Sport BW, “Unterricht für Kinder griechischer Arbeitnehmer; hier: Muttersprachliche Modellklassen,” 923 (5.2), (March 31, 1982), EA 3/609 Bü 91/1, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

\textsuperscript{81} See Ministerium für Kultus und Sport BW and Referat IV/2 / PrGr “A,” “Gespräch bei Herrn MR Jansen am 19. 03. 1982.”
would then be able to take exams to receive an equivalency certificate for the Greek Lyceum. The goal, in part, was not only to enable a smooth integration during the school years, but also after the completion of secondary school.\textsuperscript{82}

Even as Baden-Württemberg and other Länder acceded to some of Greek government’s requests, they continued to emphasize the children’s ability to function in West Germany as well. Consequently, when the Greek Embassy’s Education Office and Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education agreed on a newly revised curriculum for both primary and (lower) secondary classes in June 1983 the state only made partial concessions. In response to the Embassy’s requests, Greek teachers were permitted to offer physics and chemistry. But Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education decided that social studies should be divided between Greek and German teachers in order to allow students to learn to operate in both systems. Under the new guidelines to West German school curricula, teachers now offered a new unit called “labor-economy-technology” ("Arbeits-Wirtschaft-Technik"), which schoolchildren needed in order to move toward vocational training.\textsuperscript{83}

Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education stressed the need to integrate again in 1985, as part of its own campaign to improve the local system and success rates. As part of Baden-Württemberg’s new rules regarding examination for lower secondary schools, the Ministry of Education stipulated that children attending national classes had to participate. The rules

\textsuperscript{82} The Greek Embassy was also taking steps to try and develop Greek private schools (Ergänzungsschule) and extra programs working toward the Lyceum in Berlin (for example, Griechische Botschaft Erziehungsabteilung to Berliner Verwaltungsamt, “Einrichtung einer griechischen Ergänzungsschule in Berlin; hier: Bereichtstellung von 13 Klassenräumen,” August 6, 1982, B Rep 002 23582, Landesarchiv Berlin; and Senator für Schulwesen, Berufsausbildung und Sport and Bath to Regierende Bürgermeister von Berlin, Senatskanzlei III C, “Griechisches Lyzeum in Berlin,” July 23, 1986, B 002 16867, Berlin Landesarchiv.).

included the caveat, however, that schoolchildren attending Greek (or other national) classes could take the exams in Greek instead of English as a first foreign language. Other subject examinations would also be given in the instructional language (be it Greek or German). The goal here, as the Ministry of Education emphasized, was to ensure that the schoolchildren who chose to remain in West Germany would not be cut out of the system. Instead, the Ministry of Education planned that schoolchildren with Greek citizenship would be able to choose between entering Baden-Württemberg’s vocational training programs or returning to Greece at any point in their schooling to continue their education there.\textsuperscript{84}

In the ongoing discussions about which topics should be taught in Greek versus German, religion became a point of contention at the end of the 1980s. Although one of the classes that most West German Education Administrations permitted in Greek, the Greek Orthodox Church announced that it preferred to have religious instruction taught in German. The Greek government, however, pushed for the instruction to be continued in Greek in order to provide the children more exposure to the language. Under (West) German law, the separation of church and state dictated that the approved religious authority had control over the development of the curriculum. In consequence, the \textit{Länder} Ministries of Education let the Patriarchy choose, permitting the relevant teachers to provide instruction in whatever language the Church promoted.\textsuperscript{85}

Although the Greek government continued to push extended Greek language instruction, it revised its stance on its foreign citizens’ schooling during Prime Minister Papandreou’s second term, from 1985 to 1989. In 1985, the Greek Democratic Socialist government joined the other

\textsuperscript{84} Seifert to Oberschulämter, “Allgemeine Hinweise und Empfehlungen zum Schulversuch; hier: Hauptschulen für griechische Schüler.”

European Community Member States in revitalizing European integration. A part of that revitalization included a push for secondary school and university equivalency and multiculturalism. Toward that end, the Greek government encouraged education policies, including bilingual programs, to promote flexibility across both systems. The Greek government also acknowledged and encouraged their citizens’ parents’ choice to participate in the West German system or to attend Greek schools.

Table 7.4: Enrollment in General Education by School Type and Citizenship in Thousands, 1982 and 1987\(^{87}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P+SL</td>
<td>4,501.00</td>
<td>3,921.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>319.3</td>
<td>283.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realschule</td>
<td>1,278.10</td>
<td>1,238.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnasium</td>
<td>2,050.50</td>
<td>2,002.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comp.</td>
<td>226.3</td>
<td>210.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,375.10</td>
<td>7,655.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many children, after all, regardless of their parents’ original intentions, stayed in West Germany, making a German schooling important. Without the appropriate West German lower

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\(^{87}\) The “P+H” stands for primary and lower secondary as Federal and most Länder level statistic bureaus had not yet begun to systematically separate the two for publication. Special schools are Sonderschulen and “Comp.” are Gesamtschulen. Evening schools are the combined number for evening Realschulen and Gymnasien (KMK, Ausländische Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970 bis 1983, 4, 18, 69, 82, 95, 109; KMK, Ausländische Schüler und Schulabsolventen 1983 bis 1992, 128:17, 37, 45, 53, 59, 63, 74, 83; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1985, 357; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990, 1990, 342; and Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, ed., Daten und Fakten zur Ausländersituation, (Bonn: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen, 1990), 22–24).
secondary school certification, placement in vocational schools was almost impossible.\textsuperscript{88} Although, despite those concerns, at that 1985 Joint Expert meeting on the schooling of children with Greek citizenship in West Germany the West German \textit{Länder} reported that ninety-two percent of youths with Greek citizenship looking for vocational school placement were able to find it. In addition, the overall number of schoolchildren with Greek citizenship had declined in primary and lower secondary school while the percentage of children attending higher secondary schools (\textit{Realschule and Gymnasium}) had risen (see Table 7.4).\textsuperscript{89}

To continue those positive developments and to make bilateral (or private) schools more palatable to minority communities (diaspora) abroad, the Greek government agreed to collaborate with the \textit{Länder} Education Administrations, working closely with both Social Democratic and Christian Democratic Parties (in North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse as well as Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria respectively). The goal was to enable schoolchildren to remain in the German system but \textit{be} ethnically Greek. To do so, the children were to receive enough of a German schooling to enable them to attend vocational schooling or university. They were, however, supposed to learn the Greek language and Greek culture, as well as be taught to identify as Greek. Toward that end, the 1985 Joint Meeting of experts agreed that the different \textit{Länder} offering bilingual classes (among them, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, and Rhineland-Pfalz) or extra mother-tongue instruction would work with the Greek government to develop new curricula incorporating both West German and Greek school material.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{88} Seifert to Oberschulämter, “Allgemeine Hinweise und Empfehlungen zum Schulversuch; hier: Hauptschulen für griechsiche Schüler.”

\textsuperscript{89} “5. Tagung der gemischten deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission (1985),” 2, 11.

\textsuperscript{90} Part of the reason for that increase was because many children tracked into lower secondary school returned to Greece to finish their education. (Ibid., 7–9; and Seifert to Oberschulämter, “Allgemeine Hinweise und Empfehlungen zum Schulversuch; hier: Hauptschulen für griechsiche Schüler”).
Accepting the continued residence of many of its citizens in West Germany, the Greek government relented in its pressure for the development of a solely Greek identity. “Greeks were important cultural bearers,” carrying a thousand years of European culture with them wherever they went. A Greek education in West Germany was, then, supposed to “raise young people from both countries [Germany and Greece] in their role as European citizens.” Both countries – country of citizenship and country of residence – agreed they had a “moral and political responsibility … to develop schooling for the third generation of migrant workers,” which was particularly important in light of the “expected mobility of people in Europe.”91 Return migration was tapering off and the Greek government came out in support of biculturalism. Greek citizens in West Germany, according to the Greek government, were to learn to be both Greek and German.

Nonetheless, the Greek state’s continued push for consular instruction and bilingual schools based on the “right to the mother language regardless of the parents’ desire to return.”92 The state argued that children needed to be able to function within the (West) German school system, but they still had a right to – and should – self-identify as Greek. To this end, the Greek state recommended making native language instruction compulsory for Greek citizens. The Länder declined to either compel Greek-language instruction or establish the schools the Greek state requested. But the Länder would continue to offer extra native language instruction (usually between seven and ten weekly hours, inclusive of two hours of religious instruction), even if they

generally refused to integrate these instructional hours into the normal school day, as Hesse had.\textsuperscript{93}

Even with that rejection of full acculturation, schoolchildren with Greek citizenship arguably succeeded in West German schools. Be it because of the Greek government’s push to ensure its citizens’ education, the value parents placed on scholastic success, or the children’s supposed Europeanness or cultural compatibility, by 1990 the Greek diaspora performed almost on par with the ethnic-German majority.\textsuperscript{94} Those successes became apparent in the rate of enrollment in higher levels of secondary schooling, vocational training, and universities, which were almost on par with the German ethno-national majority.\textsuperscript{95}

Those successes contributed to the Greek state’s continued promotion of the importance of Greek identity and culture along with the ability to be an ethno-national minority abroad. Multiculturalism continued to mean that Greeks should be Greek first and foremost. For many Greek parents, that definition fit with their own, as evidenced by the number of both German residents with Greek citizenship migrating to Greece over the 1980s as well as the number of parents who enrolled their children in either Greek consular instruction, bilingual instruction, or private schools.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 4–6. The Greek government argued that this instruction needed to be integrated into the West German school-day before noon in order to avoid overburdening the children. They additionally pointed out the problems for some schoolchildren associated with having to attend two schools. Some of the L\textsuperscript{änder} representatives – including the representative from Berlin – complained that weekly instructional classes were overrunning the permissible hours (eight in Berlin). Others, like Baden-Württemberg, simply declared that the Greek wishes could not be fulfilled.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 10–12.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 11. Despite the Greek governments efforts in West Germany, there were continued problems with reintegration into the Greek school system and society for some schoolchildren.

Turkish Instruction: National Identity, Language, and Islam

Although many ethnic Germans in West Germany in the early 1980s supported a multiculturalism that included residents with Turkish citizenship, many continued to draw a line at Turkish or other Muslim minority groups’ inclusion as German. The ethno-national majority’s widespread rejection of German residents with foreign citizenship had a long-lasting impact on how many Turkish citizens interpreted their own identities. Many individuals with Turkish citizenship decided that, if the West German state and ethnic majority was going to reject them, they would embrace an ethnically-Turkish and explicitly Muslim identity over a German.

In response to that situation, and because of shifting political and social circumstances in Turkey, the Turkish government took a more active stance in promoting a cultural connection to Turkey for children with Turkish citizenship, one that explicitly emphasized a Muslim Turkish identity. Similar to the Greek government, Turkish citizens were to maintain their ethnic-Turkish identities (or develop them) regardless of where they lived. Unlike the Greek government, however, the Turkish government expected the majority of its citizens to remain abroad. Consequently, even as the government highlighted a specific Turkish identity, the Turkish legations in West Germany stressed the need for Turkish citizens to enroll in and finish

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97 Abadan-Unat argues in the 2011 book that “by the 1980s, Turks were the most visible and numerous of Germany’s ethnic groups, making them a primary target of xenophobia” (Turks in Europe, 186). See also Stephan Lanz, “The German Sonderweg: Multiculturalism as ‘Racism with a Distance,’” in European Multiculturalism Revisited, ed. Alessandro Silj (London: Zed Books, 2010), 105–46.

secondary schooling. To achieve its goals, the Turkish government promoted a series of education initiatives for language and religious instruction in cooperation with different Ländere Education Administrations.99

Part of the Turkish government’s specific aims developed from the high rate of new migration, in contrast to groups with Italian and Greek citizenship (see Table 7.1). Although thousands of schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship were born in West Germany, the sharp rise in total number derived in part from to school-age individuals with Turkish citizenship migrating to West Germany through processes of family reunification or as asylum seekers.100 Many of these children and youths arrived during their schooling and enrolled directly in West German secondary schools (usually lower secondary).101 For those born in the country, many had at least one parent who had only recently arrived because of the high rate individuals in West Germany who decided to marry someone raised in Turkey. In consequence, where many Italian and Greek families entered the third generation, children of Turkish citizens were often first or second generation on at least one side.102

Trying to make it easier for immigrant youths to complete their secondary school certificates, the Turkish Embassy and delegations, as well as families with Turkish citizenship, requested permission to develop Turkish as a first foreign language class in West German


100 Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 69. Asylum discussed in Chapter 8.

101 For a discussion of continued migration to and from Turkey (Ibid., 156–158). It should be noted, however, that thousands of children with Turkish citizenship, or eligible for Turkish citizenship, were born in West Germany. In 1983, for example, 32,044 children were born in West Germany who had at least one parent with Turkish citizenship (2,113 had one parent with German citizenship and consequently could choose their national affiliation). See Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1986, 74.

102 Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe, 17–31; and Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 44–45.
The idea behind these programs was to enable newly arriving schoolchildren to continue taking Turkish language and cultural instruction. Furthermore, the Turkish legations and Länder Education Administrations felt that the course would enable schoolchildren to boost their grades. In addition, many politicians and families felt that it would be easier for the children to focus on learning German after arrival than both German and English. Moreover, as many Länder only offered consular instruction for primary school, Turkish as a first foreign language provided Turkish citizens considering returning to Turkey or simply with an interest in the language with an opportunity to learn and/or perfect their skills.

The Länder Ministries of Education and various foreign governments began discussing the possibility of offering Turkish (or other) native languages instead of the requisite first foreign language in the early 1970s. Only in response to requests from the Turkish legations and with reference to the high rate of family reunification in the late 1970s and 1980s, however, did the Länder Educational Administrations seriously discuss the issue and begin pilot programs.

Berlin’s first widespread (not pilot) programs got off the ground in 1980/81. By 1985/86, seven

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103 “3. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkische Kommission für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 10. - 12. 10. 1979 in Bonn,” Kommunique (Bonn, October 12, 1979), 1–2, B 93, Bd. 861, PA AA.


105 North Rhine-Westphalia first began discussing the possibility in the early 1970s and the Berlin’s Senator for Education started considering the issue in the late 1970s. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education officially permitted the instruction in Hauptschulen in 1980 (Kultusministerium BW to Oberschulämter, “Unterricht für ausländische Schüler an der Hauptschul; hier: Versuche mit türkisch anstelle von Englisch für türkische Schüler (IV-2-2111-4/195),” August 4, 1980, EA 3/609 Bü 106, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart). The Turkish Ministry of Education also urged the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education to include more cultural components as the children enrolled in these classes did not attend consular instruction.
Länder Education Administrations offered Turkish instead of English as a first foreign language.\textsuperscript{106}

The Länder Education Administrations decided to permit Turkish instead of English (or other first foreign languages) for multiple reasons. New research from within West Germany and Europe claimed that children learned foreign languages better if they had mastered their mother tongue.\textsuperscript{107} In addition, for Länder like Berlin (under the guidance of Christian Democratic Senator Hanna-Renate Laurien), programs for Turkish as a first foreign language fit into the Länder governments’ internal and foreign policy goals of promoting emigration and/or the maintenance of cultural connections.\textsuperscript{108} For Berlin schools, the population concentration also meant that many children ended up in what were essentially “pure foreigner classes.”\textsuperscript{109} In some schools, occasionally in Kreuzberg, children were not necessarily learning German, in part because, on occasion, the majority of the pupils in a single school spoke Turkish as a mother tongue. Offering the pupils a space to actually learn Turkish seemed advisable.

In Berlin, to achieve the state’s foreign and internal policy goals, the Senator for Education established a small working group in the early 1980s to design schoolbooks that

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{106} “7. Tagung der gemischte deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der BRD vom 11 – 13. 01. 1984 in Bonn,” Kommuniqué (Bonn, January 13, 1984), B 304/7794, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. In Berlin, there was an offering for Turkish instead of a First Foreign Language. Based on the Hamburg Agreement, that language would usually have been English, French, or Latin.

\textsuperscript{107} For a discussion of those theories and surrounding research, see Cristina Allemann-Ghionda, “Zweisprachigkeit und Bildungserfolg der Migrantenkinder vor dem Hintergrund europäischer Mehrsprachigkeit - Thesen und Forschungsbedarf,” in Bildungserfolg, Migration und Zweisprachigkeit: Perspektiven für Forschung und Entwicklung, ed. Saskia Pfeiffer and Cristina Allemann-Ghionda, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Frank & Timme GmbH, 2010), 23–44.

\textsuperscript{108} Instead of English, French, or Latin in Berlin.

specifically reflected the social and living conditions of children with Turkish citizenship. The working group, including Berlin officials as well as German and Turkish schoolteachers, however, felt that the problems facing immigrant and minority children were not only due to the lack of school materials but also to the inadequacy of traditional teaching techniques for this group of children. Minority children in West Germany had different language levels for German and had different kinds of schooling in their countries of citizenship, and thus needed different kinds of instruction. Consequently, the schoolbooks the working group developed not only contained new materials, but also provided a new method for teaching language, including extensive literary analysis.

The working group printed their first textbooks for the fifth and sixth grades in 1983 for testing, with final versions for grades five through nine released in 1985. In 1987, the project concluded with the publication of a 350-page teacher’s handbook. The end results were full sized books of some one hundred pages each. They were intentionally bright affairs with multiple pictures printed in six different colors of ink. Altogether, by the end of the project, Berlin and the series' authors produced over 1,000 pages of teaching and learning materials, both textbooks and handbooks. From the initial printing in 1983, the team intended to distribute and test the material

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110 Because of the commonality of this experience in Berlin, the Berlin Senate for Education decided to itself fund the development of schoolbooks specifically for these children, although the West German Federal Ministry of Education would end up providing the bulk of the funding for development (2/3 of the 400,000 DM by 1985) and the European Community would provide support through conferences and funding for translation after 1982/83. While the project was approved in 1978, it only began in 1980 due to funding and other concerns (Reid and Reich, eds., *Breaking the Boundaries*, 16–20).

in the Federal Republic, but also in other European countries, including the Netherlands, Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden.\textsuperscript{112}

The international reception from both Turkey and the European Community Member States was initially positive. While the European Community could not fund the materials’ development as Turkey was not a member of the EC, the European Community was explicitly interested in seeing what happened with the books. Toward that end, the European Community financed a 1985 conference in Berlin (the books for grades five to nine were in use and the tenth grade material and teaching book was in preparation) to present the books. The Commission of the European Community also supported translations for use in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Great Britain. At the conference, representatives would praise the books for providing a service that was greatly needed and filling a gaping hole.\textsuperscript{113}

Despite that positive reception, there were several difficulties with the materials’ actual use. Because these schoolbook programs partly re-conceptualized how language should be taught, working with the books necessitated additional teacher training, making them difficult for teachers and schools to use. The \textit{Länder} and Turkish Education Administrations disagreed among themselves to begin with over who should teach the classes; teachers from the children’s (parents’) countries of origin, or from West Germany. Either way, newly arriving Turkish teachers had to not only learn the West German school system, but also new teaching methods. On a rotation, new teachers had to be continually trained. In contrast, ethnic-German schoolteachers often did not speak Turkish, even if some \textit{Länder} required limited training on

\textsuperscript{112} Euan Reid and Hans H. Reich, \textit{Breaking the Boundaries: Migrant Workers’ Children in the EC} (Multilingual Matters, 1992), 16–17.

\textsuperscript{113} “Sutherland eröffnet EG-Kolloquium über Türkishe bücher,” \textit{Landespressedients Berlin}, October 14, 1985, 3; and Reid and Reich, \textit{Breaking the Boundaries}, 1991, 16–18.
how to teach “immigrant children” (by which they meant local and migrant children with foreign citizenship). The courses aimed at a “general introduction to the educational and social problems of migrants workers’ children and teaching in a multicultural environment, or at specialization (“German for foreigners”).” 114 Each of the Länder using the material eventually chose their own options, with Berlin importing teachers.

In addition, the Berlin Senator of Education faced significant difficulties with enrollment, as did the other Länder Education Administrations. The Berlin Senator of Education had expected one quarter or one third of the total secondary-school-age youths with Turkish citizenship in lower primary schools (Hauptschule) in Berlin to register, but only some 12.5% of the schoolchildren did. Between 1983 and 1985, interest in the programs hovered at only approximately 350 (of 2,540 in the 1985 school year) schoolchildren. From the Berlin side, members of the different political parties (SPD, CSU, Alternative Liste, and FDP) attributed the problem variously to the long distance to schools offering the classes and to limited information for the parents. 115 Furthermore, it was quickly discovered there were several vocational disadvantages to the programs, as many employment tracks required English competency. 116

114 European Communities, “Report from the Commission to the Council on Pilot Schemes Relating to Education of Migrant Workers’ Children” (Brussels, April 27, 1984), 28, http://aei.pitt.edu/3674/. The Turkish Ministry of Education was additionally concerned about the employment of Turkish teachers in West Germany. The state wanted increased control over those teachers and were particularly desirous of the right to recall consular teachers abroad particularly when suspected of disseminating anti-Turkish messages (Georg-Berndt Oschatz, “Reisebericht des Kultusministers von Niedersachsen, Türkei/Anara - Istanbul,” April 18, 1987, B 304/6043, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Entsendung türkischer Lehrer ins Ausland; hier: Vorbereitungskurse zur Nachrichtenbeschaffung über antitürkische Aktivitäten in den jeweiligen Gastländern,” 1949/87 (Ankara: Auswärtige Amt, October 9, 1987), B 304/6180, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).


The Senator for Education argued against those claims, declaring instead that the limited student interest stemmed from changing migration patterns and the shifting interests of the Turkish government. The Senate for Education pointed out that, as with the other West German minority groups, fluctuating migration patterns meant that there was less horizontal migration into the school system and more children with Turkish citizenship born in the country by the mid-1980s. Even traveling to another district for language instruction in Berlin only took 20 to 30 minutes on public transport. And, to overcome difficulties with vocational programs, which the Education Administrations claimed was not significant, the Senate for Education recommended establishing student working groups for English where necessary for the 1985/86 school year.117 What the representatives from the Senate for Education saw as the largest problem by 1987 was the Turkish government.

In 1987, the Turkish Ministry of Education expressed dissatisfaction with the materials.118 Initially, the Turkish legations had praised the school materials, but they became increasing critical of the volumes. The Turkish Ministry of Education’s representatives would inform Christian Democrat Georg-Berndt Oschatz,119 Minister of Education in Lower Saxony, during a trip to Turkey in April 1987 that the materials published in West Germany, particularly those in use in Berlin, did “not reflect the requirements of the Turkish side in respect to the

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119 Georg-Berndt Oschatz was a West German Christian Democratic politician and administrative official. He served as Minister of Education in Lower Saxony from 1982 to 1987. From 1987 to his retirement in 2002, he served as Director of the Bundesrat.
presentation of modern Turkey (possessing anti-Turkish passages and inaccuracies).” Oschatz reported back to the Kultusministeronferenz Subcommittee on Foreign Children that the Turkish government wanted “instructional materials that lead Turkish children toward national identification and to the discovery of a personal Turkish identity.” As the Berlin Senator for Education had touted the impetus behind the books as promoting the possibility of return, it agreed to halt production of the books until they could be reviewed.

The Turkish government also dismissed its support for the new textbooks because, by 1987, the state turned toward supporting classes in Turkish in place of a second foreign language instead of the first. Studies and developmental programs showed that children taking Turkish as a first foreign language had difficulties with further advancement. Several vocational programs as well as university tracks required a minimum level of English achievement. Therefore, in line with the Turkish government’s emphasis on vocational training, the Turkish government changed its emphasis for Turkish instruction in secondary schooling.

Part of the changing concern for the Turkish Ministry of Education was the increased connection of Turkish national identity with religion. In September 1980, responding to escalating violence between conservative and left-leaning political groups (often serving as

120 The Turkish Minister of Education used the occasion of Oschatz’s visit as to pass on its opinions regarding the Berlin Material (Oschatz, “Reisebericht des Kultusministers von Niedersachsen, Türkei/Anara - Istanbul”).

121 Auswärtige Amt, Referat 203, “Ankara-Besuch des niedersächsischen Kultusministers Oschatz (14.-16. 4. 1987)”; and Reid and Reich, Breaking the Boundaries, 1992, 18. Evidently, the book for the 10th class included a joke that the Turkish government found distasteful.

122 Laurien to Vorsitzenden der F.D.P.-Fraktion im Abggeordnetenhaus and Rasch, “Modellversuch ‘Entwicklung von Lernmaterialien für Türkisch anstelle der 1. Fremdsprache.’”

proxies for US and Soviet interests), the Turkish military staged another coup. After taking control of the government, which it only relinquished in December 1983, the military instituted a series of major education reforms designed to prevent, as Sam Kaplan would describe in his 2005 book “the consolidation of distinct identities that threatened to fragment the nation into a polity riddled with division.” As part of those reforms, in July 1981 the President of Turkey, Bülent Ulusu, a retired Admiral from the Turkish Navy, announced the decision of the Military Security Council in Erzurum to change school law, making Islamic instruction compulsory in primary and secondary school.

The new policies directly influenced how the Turkish government tried to shape instruction in West Germany. Previously, in joint expert meetings of the “West German-Turkish committee on the instruction of Turkish children in West Germany” the Turkish delegations had supported some Islamic religious instruction. Now, with all children with Turkish citizenship to participate in religious instruction as a central part of their civics instruction in classes on “Religion and Morals,” the state stepped up its campaign to provide its citizens abroad similar instruction. As the Turkish delegations explained to the West Germans in the sixth meeting of the expert commission in 1982, “Islamic religious instruction was of great meaning as part of

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125 Kaplan, *The Pedagogical State*, 44.

Turkish culture.” Claiming the importance of religious instruction for identity development, the Turkish legation suggested making the classes compulsory, as they were in Turkey. 

The West Germans negated the idea of compulsory Islamic instruction on legal grounds (as it had regarding Greek consular instruction), but several of the Länder governments had approved adding Islamic instruction to consular instruction in the 1970s. Now, with active pressure from the Turkish government to spread Islamic instruction and a growing number of children identifying as Muslim across the country, however, the Länder had to reconsider permitting relevant classes during standard instruction. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war shortly thereafter, however, the Länder governments viewed Islam as threatening, even revolutionary in tone. Concerned that providing Islamic religious instruction might encourage children to rebel or disregard West German law, the Kultusministerkonferenz established a subcommittee on Islamic religious instruction to examine the question in the early 1980s. Meeting five times between 1983 and 1984, the group discussed the compatibility of Islam and West Germany, as well as issues like the language of instruction, the possibility of opening the instruction up in public schools, and the acceptability of providing the instruction to non-Turkish citizens.


128 Ibid.

129 As discussed in Chapter 5.

130 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 260.

Even as the *Kultusministerkonferenz*’s group was meeting, the Turkish military turned the government back over to the people. Halil Turgut Özal, who had acted as deputy Prime Minister under Ulusu between 1980 and 1982, was elected Prime Minister, serving between December 1983 and October 1989. Under Özal’s leadership, as he was a devout Muslim, the government continued the trend to permit expanding freedom of religious expression in Turkey as well as promoted religious instruction in the schools. His party, the center-right neoliberal Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, abbreviated ANAVATAN (formerly ANAP)), and other religious politicians also took on the idea of national unity in order to challenge secular foundations of the state’s school system. Promoting that unity, the Turkish pedagogical state took an increasing interest in its citizens abroad, emphasizing the importance of its citizens’ schooling as the schoolchildren as their number in West Germany climbed past 350,000 (the total population with Turkish citizenship living in West Germany surpassed 1.5 million).

The KMK’s subcommittee on Islamic instruction did not know the complexities of the situation in Turkey, but they were interested in whether it was culturally or legally acceptable to allow the Turkish government to make Islamic instruction more available to its citizens – or even all Muslims – in schools in West Germany. As such, they approached the question from the point of view of legal permissibility in Germany, trying to decide if Islam was compatible with German culture. If it was, the committee had to address concerns over what orthodox Islam permitted, and what the Turkish government in particular wanted. To address the compatibility

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132 Halil Turgut Özal (1927-1993) was elected President of Turkey in 1989, in which capacity he served until his death in 1993.


134 Ibid., 56.

between Islam and German society, the committee invited Tilman Nagel, a German Orientalist and expert in Islamic studies, to report on the issue of “compatibility between Islam and the [West German] Basic Law” to the KMK’s committee in September and again in November 1983. Navel argued that Islamic law directed Muslims living in a non-Islamic state to follow local law and to carry out personal observances, but not to obey Islamic law (Sharia law). Based on his depiction of Islam, the KMK’s subcommittee determined that German schools could, theoretically, offer Islam without contravening the West German Basic Law. Furthermore, the committee felt that, as proselytizing was relatively unsuccessful, it was no danger.  

Although the KMK’s subcommittee decided that Islamic instruction could in theory be offered in West German schools, they could not reach a consensus on what form that instruction could or should take. Addressing language was perhaps the easiest of the committee’s tasks. They determined that Islamic instruction could in theory be provided in German instead of Arabic (it was also provided in Turkish, after all). But, as had been a problem for West German Education Administrations in the 1970s, there was no international Islamic group that could unquestionably act as interlocutor with the state and limited Islamic training in German universities. The Turkish government offered to fulfill that position, as it did in Turkey. Yet, the KMK’s committee felt that, with increasing numbers of citizens from Morocco and Tunisia in West Germany, as well as other groups adhering to Islam, offering Turkish Islamic instruction in the schools would be inappropriate. Unable to agree if Islam should be allowed in schools...

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138 Some of the West German ethno-national majority felt it needed to prevent the Turkish government from developing Turkish Empire in Germany. For a discussion of the continued islamization of the Turkish government, see Ersin Kalaycioğlu, “Justice and Development Party at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of the
without a clear university track producing teachers or a clear head of the faith, the KMK’s committee recommended relying on the individual Education Authorities’ discretion.\textsuperscript{139}

Even as the KMK’s committee reached its decision, the Turkish state would make it easier for the \textit{Länder} Education Administrations to work with it in regards to religious instruction in the mid-and late 1980s. In 1984 the Presidency of Religious Affairs (\textit{Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı}, or \textit{Diyanet}) in Turkey founded the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (\textit{Diyanet İşleri Türk-Islam Birliği}, abbreviated DİTİB) with headquarters in Cologne. The \textit{Länder} Education Administrations consented to work with DİTİB as a contact to further develop some form of standardized Turkish Islamic religious instruction for consular instruction.\textsuperscript{140} That agreement did not, however, lead to opening Islamic instruction in public schools or to allow non-Turkish citizens to attend.\textsuperscript{141}

Not all of the \textit{Länder} Education Administrations were apprehensive about Islamic instruction. In 1984, the Berlin government permitted Islamic religious (or “religious ethics grounded in Islam”) instruction for one to two hours a week as part of Turkish consular instruction, as North Rhine-Westphalia had done in the 1970s. For the Berlin Senate for Education under Senator Laurien the question of Islamic instruction was an issue of right.\textsuperscript{142}

\begin{footnotes}


\footnote{Interestingly, Berlin was only one of two Länder, the other Bremen, that did not list religious instruction as a constitutional guarantee (\textit{Verfassungsgebot}). See “8. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission (1985),” 10.}
\end{footnotes}
Namely, the right of the schoolchild was to receive religious instruction. Laurien, a devoted Catholic, felt that the separation between church and state meant that the state should ensure religious instruction was not against the Basic Law, but the relevant religious associations should determine the content.\footnote{Hanna-Renate Laurien, “Auszug aus einem Vortrag von Senatorin Laurien bei der Katholischen Akademie in Munich am 25. September 1982” (Munich, 1982).} In following, the Berlin Senate required the Turkish General Consulate be answerable and that the instructional content not contradict the Federal Republic’s Basic Law.\footnote{To Türkische Generalkonsulat, Berlin, “Religiöse Betreuung türkischer Schüler,” January 28, 1984, 23740, Landesarchiv Berlin; and “8. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission (1985),” 10–13.} Convinced of its importance, in 1984 Senator of Education Laurien went as far as to write the Turkish General Consulate to tell them that if they had any problems organizing the classes they were to inform her as soon as possible so she could provide support.\footnote{To Türkische Generalkonsulat, Berlin, “Religiöse Betreuung türkischer Schüler.”}

As the decade progressed, the Turkish legations pressed for additional Islamic instruction. In June 1985, the Turkish delegation to a Joint Expert Commission on the instruction of Turkish schoolchildren in West Germany Meeting again argued for the construction of obligatory Islamic religious instruction for Turkish school children. This time, however, the Turkish delegation hoped to see two weekly instructional hours in Turkish included in the pre-noon period in public schools. The delegation wanted the instruction to be imparted by teachers trained in Turkey. For the curriculum and materials the Turkish delegation recommended the \textit{Länder} use what the North Rhine-Westphalian team (from the Soest Institute) was developing in collaboration with a Turkish representative.\footnote{8. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission (1985),” 10–13; Sekretariat der KMK, “Gespräch zwischen dem Präsidenten der KMK und dem türkischen Erziehungminister,” Vorbereitende Notiz (KMK, June 14, 1985), B 304/6181, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Auswärtige Amt, Referat 203, “Ankara-Besuch des niedersächsischen Kultusministers Oschatz (14.-16. 4. 1987).”}
Despite hopes, the Soest Institutes materials, part of a series the teaching materials funded by the North Rhine-Westphalian and Hessian Ministries of Education for teaching children with non-German citizenship, were not available until the end of the decade.\(^\text{147}\) Even then, representatives from North Rhine-Westphalia, presenting the text to the Kultusministerkonferenz’s Sub-Committee for Foreign Children in September 1988, discussed the limitations of the materials, telling the committee that the materials were only relevant for Turkish schoolchildren. It was impossible, the group told the subcommittee, to develop material for general “orthodox Islamic religious instruction … given the multiplicity of Islamic organizations and groups, some of which had opposing viewpoints.”\(^\text{148}\) The North Rhine-Westphalian representatives were right about the multiplicity of positions. In 1982 in Berlin alone, among the Muslim population, there were 90 percent Sunni and 10 percent Shi’a Muslims. Within these groups, there were further divisions, like the traditional Süleymanli-Movement and the Islamist fundamentalists associated with the National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi, MSP) under Necmettin Erbakan.\(^\text{149}\) The progress of the 1980s only brought further diversification as asylum seekers and other migrants, including a growing numbers of Kurds and Alevites, arrived.\(^\text{150}\)

Neither the West German Education Administrations nor the Turkish government supported multiculturalism within the diverse Turkish minority groups. The Turkish government


\(^{148}\) Ibid.


was in the middle of a concentrated effort to bring about cultural unification and/or homogenization in Turkey. The West German Education Administrations, in turn, wanted to be able to work with a single Turkish minority group instead of a multiplicity. They argued, perhaps understandably, that if they supported every group, there would never be an end to the number. In consequence, both sets of governments and Education Administrations supported a specific brand of both Islamic instruction and Turkish-language and cultural classes, outright denying certain groups the permission, or even the right, to maintain their own cultures within a public setting like the school. Multiculturalism was good in as far as it encouraged the Turkish state’s definition of Turkishness. It became questionable when discussed in regards to the minority groups holding Turkish citizenship.\textsuperscript{151}

**Interculturalism, a European Identity, and Italian Language Courses**

The Italian government’s efforts to influence West German education policy demonstrates the mix of individual aims connected with European rhetoric in the early and mid-1980s. For the Italian state, the longevity of the Italian diaspora’s residence in West Germany combined with the promotion of a European identity shaped the government’s arguments. As the Italian ambassador pointed out in a 1982 keynote address at the University Würzburg, there was some continued pendulum migration, but the “number [of Italian citizens in West Germany] was relatively constant and it [was] clear that these people [were] going to remain.” With the goal of “preparing the third generation to enter school,” the Ambassador wanted to see children with Italian citizenship acknowledged as part of the European Community – meaning on par with West German citizens. The Ambassador claimed that it was therefore “very important that they

learn the German language as early as possible,” but also that they care for and maintain contact to their culture – particularly through Italian instruction. These children were supposed to embrace their European heritage and learn – either through attending West German classes and consular instruction or in bilingual European schools – to be a mix of German and Italian.

The Italian government’s hopes of promoting an intercultural identity for its citizens continued to reflect European Community aims across the 1980s. The Community, which stagnated briefly in the early 1980s as the Member States negotiated just how involved the Community should become in areas beyond labor, moved again toward integration and collaboration in the mid- and late 1980s (as mentioned above). The Italian government would play an influential role in that shift and develop its own school initiatives, materials, and policies in line with those EC trends. Yet, even as it promoted multiculturalism, its citizens did not necessarily reap the benefits of those policies as they continued to struggle academically.

Like the West German government, the Italian government underwent a significant shift in its politics over the 1980s. The 1983 Italian election saw socialist Bettino Craxi become Prime Minister, succeeding Christian Democrat Amintore Fanfani. Craxi, who served from 1983 to 1987, was the first Socialist Prime Minister in Italian history. In office longer than any other

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152 Italian Ambassador, “Schulpolitische Vorstellung der italienischen Seite für ihre Landsleute in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Eröffnungsrede (Würzburg, July 9, 1982), B 304/6253, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

153 Hermann, “Ergebnisniederschrift über die 10. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 7 September 1983 in Bonn,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, September 7, 1983), 16, B 304/7771, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. There were also problems between the Italian and German Education Administrations regarding the treatment of Italian teachers in West Germany. Italienisches Gesetz Nr. 604 vom 25. August 1982 über die Zuweisung von Staatsbeamten für schulische und kulturelle Institutionen im Ausland (talked about in the meeting of the 10. Meeting of the UA).

154 Bettino Craxi (born 1934) became general secretary of the Socialist party in July 1976 and played a role in unifying a divisive group. After becoming premier in 1983, his government would institute an austerity budget in order to improve the economy. He survived until April 1987 and remained head of the Socialist party until February 1993. Amintore Fanfani (1908-1999), influential member of the Christian Democratic Party, served five times as Prime Minister, including from December 1982 to August 1983 and from April 1987 to July 1987 (Lentz, Heads of States and Governments Since 1945, 441, 446).
Prime Minister to that date, scholars frequently view Craxi’s tenure as one of recovery and stability. Education reform would, however, only be piecemeal under Craxi’s leadership, although the state did succeed in introducing significant reform to the curriculum in 1985. What would change significantly would be the state’s success in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{155}

Craxi’s successes in the European Community demonstrates that improvement. He had already shown a commitment to the development of European integration and during his leadership in Italy, he reaffirmed that stance, championing Eurosocialism.\textsuperscript{156} In 1985, the Italian state under Craxi took the presidency of the European Community. He and his Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti pushed for the inclusion of Portugal and Spain in the Community and reinforced political integration.\textsuperscript{157} Part of that emphasis was to quash the French plan to create a two-tiered layer of inclusion for EC Membership, but it was also in order to ensure the equality of the Italian state’s citizens abroad. Those citizens had been flexing their political muscles, becoming a political force on their own. Responding to pressure from the various Italian diasporas across the world, the state created a range of agencies in order to encourage and maintain ties to emigrant communities. The Committees of Italians Abroad, established in 1985, acted as advisory boards to the Italian consulates in order to protect the rights of those citizens.\textsuperscript{158}


Responding to those citizens’ demands, the Italian state would again focus on Italian instruction and cultural education in places like West Germany after years of only partial engagement.\(^{159}\)

Because the Italian state was finally steadily advocating its education goals and trends in favor of European integration, as well as due to West Germany’s own political situation, in the mid-1980s the West German School Administrations acceded to Italian requests. The longevity of the diaspora’s residence in West Germany and their relationship to the European Community also influenced the West German Education Administrations’ willingness to work with them. At the same time, as West Germany celebrated an “Italy Day” in June 1986, in Munich the President of the *Kultusministerkonferenz*, Social Democratic Senator of Education in Bremen, Horst Werner Francke,\(^{160}\) gave a speech on the change in education for schoolchildren with Italian citizenship in West Germany since the publication of the KMK’s 1976 decision regarding the double goals. One of the main differences Francke emphasized was that many of the foreign children living in 1986 West Germany had been born there, were attending kindergarten, and were entering regular instruction alongside ethnic-German schoolchildren. Instead of maintaining their mother tongue, these children (with Italian citizenship) spoke German and had to learn Italian. According to Francke, these changes meant that the Education Administrations now needed to think about the “place of Italian language and culture in the German curriculum and how it should be taught.” Francke claimed that the West German community should

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\(^{159}\) Part of that piecemeal engagement was on account of government instability and high rates of turnover in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As demonstrated by the suspension of the joint expert committee on the instruction of children with Italian citizenship after the second meeting in 1980.

\(^{160}\) Horst Werner Francke (1932-2004) was a West German educator and SPD Senator of Education in Bremen from 1983 to 1990.
celebrate “Italian school children in West German as being comfortable in two member states.” In light of European Community aims, he depicted the situation as a positive development.161

While the Italian diaspora in West Germany did stabilize (after a sharp decrease in 1983 and 1984, see Table 7.1), by no means did all families with Italian citizenship intend to stay. Some parents with Italian citizenship even stressed their intention to someday return to Italy. In 1980, for example, a group of “Italian parents from bilingual schools” sent a letter to the Bavarian Ministry of Education to express thanks for native language instruction offerings. They agreed that, while many “Italian parents [did] indeed plan on remaining in West Germany” (60 percent enrolled in German schools in Bavaria), some parents, including the authors of the letter, “plan[ned] on returning to Italy.” For this very reason, they informed the Ministry, they had their children attend bilingual schools and wanted the Ministry to continue the classes. They knew that some people argued that the bilingual instruction hurt their children’s chances in the West German school system, but they felt the people who complained did not fully understand the situation. Without the classes, the parents “knew that their children would not have a chance in the Italian system upon their return.”162 Consequently, the parents liked the courses and declared that they were even willing to send their children longer distances to take part.

The Italian government disagreed that the children had no chance in the Italian system, but, acknowledging the difficulties of return, did establish some return programs in areas seeing high migration. Toward that end, the Italian government established programs for return in

161 KMK and Präsender, “Entwicklung und Perspektiven des Unterrichts für italienischsche Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Italienische Tagung “schulische Eingliederung und soziale Integration,” Munich, June 7, 1986). Italian government issues with Article 17 of the VO (EWG) 1408/71 June 7, 1986.

Palermo and some additional locations. The Foreign Office would encourage such support as returning children had skills that, theoretically, would benefit both countries. Besides, as the Italian government pointed out, training children to operate in both counties theoretically fulfilled part of the European Community and Council of Europe’s goals for international communication and cultural exchange.

Yet, responding to the Committees of Italians Abroad, the government’s main focus was on its citizens still abroad in West Germany and other European countries and not those returning. In continual bilateral meetings, and during sessions of the European Community, the Italian government proclaimed its interest in both promoting a European culture and improving Italy’s cultural (and general) reputation across Europe. Toward that end, under the auspices of the European Community, the Italian Government collaborated with other European states to develop new school initiatives and school materials for its citizens living abroad. First with the French and then West German Ministries of Education, the Italian government created two schoolbook series called *Tra Noi*. With the materials resulting from the schoolbook project, the involved governments aimed to serve both children learning Italian as a second language and those with heritage language skills. The Italian government also supported the schoolbook program specifically with an eye toward promoting the “philosophy of multiculturalism” and pushing a European identity that equally combined the Italian ethno-national identity with other ethnic affiliations, setting them on par. With Italian citizens abroad moving into the third generation and remaining relatively stable, the Italian state claimed (as it had almost continually

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163 See, for example, the “Cooperativa Turistica ‘Vacanze Alternative’” in Partinico (Konsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Palermo to Auswärtige Amt, Referat 600, “Cooperativa Turistica ‘Vancaze Alternativa’ in Partinico; hier: Sechsjähriges Bestehen,” April 15, 1986, B 304/7788, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).

164 Ibid.

from the 1960s) that these Italians needed to be simultaneously a part of both their heritage and country of residence cultures. Multiculturalism and a European identity was, after all, supposed be applicable to all Member State nationals.

The Tra Noi working groups designed their school materials to disseminate the Italian language and Italian and European culture to children who spoke French or German as a mother tongue. Aiming at children needing or wanting to learn Italian, even if they already had Italian citizenship, the Italian government advocated opening up classes using the new materials to all children. European integration, after all, dictated that all children – not only minority groups – learn to internalize a European identity in and out of the school. Toward that end, the European Community actually redefined the entire concept of migration as a social and legal category. Member State nationals who had previously been labeled “migrant workers,” such as those who had moved from Italy to West Germany for work, were now simply “Europeans” taking part in inter-European movement. They – outside of Federal voting – were supposed to be just like someone from Berlin moving to Cologne for a new job. The Italian government used the same argument to claim that its effort to spread Italian language classes in Germany should be

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166 It is important to remember at this point that these children, while born and raised in West Germany by people born and raised in the Federal Republic had little to no recourse to West German citizenship. Because their parents were Italian citizens and they had no right to any other citizenship, they were themselves considered Italian citizens under international law. Many groups with Italian citizenship also practiced circular migration, frequently coming and going between the two countries.


168 The European Community funded the development of a schoolbook for the children of Italian citizens. Because the majority of schoolchildren with Italian citizenship were third generation (some second, some fourth), the Italian government argued that the older materials available were no long applicable. Instead, they wanted materials available that could be used for children with Italian citizenship who spoke no Italian as well as those who possessed some knowledge as heritage speakers (Reid and Reich, Breaking the Boundaries, 1991, 38–40). Funded with money associated with the 1976 Action Programme and in association with the 1977 directive.
seen in the light of standard cultural politics. It was just a “normal discussion” about wanting to see a state language taught as part of the regular curriculum in order to encourage the relationship between the two countries and teach the children that the other country was wonderful. The goal of language instruction was not supposed to only be to help migrant children, but also promote language instruction and cultural understanding.

With that aim, in 1986, during the visit of the President of the Kultusministerkonferenz, Bremen Senator Francke, to Italy, as well as in later meetings, the Italian delegation stressed that “it [was] of great importance that the Italian instruction for the children of foreign workers take place in the course of the regular instruction in German schools.” The 1979 changes to the 1976 KMK Recommendations on the instruction of migrant workers’ children already permitted Italian instead of English as a first foreign language in primary and lower secondary for Italian citizens. But, the Italian government argued, Italian should also be offered as a third language option in upper secondary schools (Realschule and Gymnasium) and comprehensive schools (Gesamtschule) alongside (usually) French or Latin. Furthermore, both country of residence and country of citizenship governments should promote student exchanges and partnerships. While not explicitly stated, what the Italian government wanted to see was its citizens and culture on

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169 A lot emphasis on exchange of students and personnel (teachers, etc.) to support the relationship between the Germany and Italian states (“13. Sitzung der Ständigen Gemischten Kommission zur Durchführung des Kulturabkommens zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Italienischen Republik,” Protokoll (Rome, 1986), B 304/7788, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).


172 As discussed in Chapter 5. See “Merkblatt: Der ausländische Fremdsprachenassistent: Rechte und Pflichten (Beschluß der KMK vom 11. 3. 1976),” June 20, 1979.
par with the other European Community Member State nationals, such as France or the Netherlands, with which the Federal Republic had vibrant exchange programs and school partnerships.  

The West German Education Administrations by and large responded positively to Italian requests. Where in the 1960s, the Italian legations’ desire to expand Italian language offerings and open up consular instruction to both Italian and West German citizens had been shot down (as discussed in Chapter 2), in the 1980s the West German Länder agreed, both on account of demographic changes and in response to new European Community goals. Not only were some new bilingual schools set up in North Rhine-Westphalia, Berlin, and Bavaria (as well as in some other locations), but the West German Education Administrations also consented to opening up the new Tra Noi classes to West German schoolchildren. Much to the Italian legations’ delight, the classes became so popular among ethnic-German children in some areas that they were attended by “seventy to ninety percent German schoolchildren.” For the West German Education Administrations, this counted as a problem, as they continued to differentiate between appropriate instruction for German citizens and foreigners. As the intention behind the classes was to reach schoolchildren with Italian citizenship, the Länder representatives in the Kultusministerkonferenz felt that the courses were not ideal for German citizens. Furthermore, if the classes were to be dominated by children with German citizenship they needed different sources of financing. Nonetheless, the Länder Education Administrations appreciated how the

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courses worked within the framework of the European Community’s goals for intercultural education.\footnote{Hermann, “28. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 16–18.}

Although the Italian government was pleased with the development of the classes, it would remain frustrated throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s with the performance of its citizens in West German schools. The Italian ethno-national minority group in West Germany, while fully benefitting from perceptions of it as as European, after decades of migration to the FRG still did not perform well in the West German school system (see Table 7.4). Whether due to continued othering by West German officials, socio-economic differences, or choices made by individual Italian citizens, schoolchildren with Italian citizenship continued to be overrepresented in special schools for the learning disabled and lower primary schools. The discrepancy was so clear that, by the end of the decade, the Italian government pushed to reinstitute the Joint Expert Committee on the instruction of children with Italian citizenship living in (West) Germany.\footnote{“3. Tagung des Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission für die Schulbildung italienischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” February 20, 1990, B 93, Bd. 1151, PA AA. For a 2010 analysis of the bilingual offerings in Germany, see Rosella Benati, “Anmerkungen zu zweisprachigen Angeboten (Deutsch-Italienisch) in Deutschland unter Berücksichtigung von Evaluation,” in Bildungserfolg, Migration und Zweisprachigkeit: Perspektiven für Forschung und Entwicklung, ed. Saskia Pfeiffer and Cristina Allemann-Ghionda, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Frank & Timme GmbH, 2010), 93–102.}

The Italian government’s push for a European identity and cultural exchange became a central part of the European Community’s agenda in the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of the transition to the European Union. The Members of the European Community were reforming the supranational institution, reshaping what it stood for and what programs it financed. Where previously diversity between the European members was encouraged, now the Member States lauded “European unity.” But, for the European Community, divergent education systems
continued to be a major stumbling block to promoting labor and cultural exchange. To overcome that barrier, the European Community Member States emphasized and aggressively promoted further degree equivalency as well as modern language acquisition. New European Community school initiatives and higher education programs like SOCRATES, EURYDICE, and ERASMUS explicitly encouraged travel abroad, inter-European Community communication, and youth exchanges.\(^{176}\) Where cultural exchange had previously rested on migrant workers and art programs, it now became a norm to promote temporary exchange programs and inter-European Community collaboration. Furthermore, any Member State national was supposed to be able to travel anywhere within the EC and integrate smoothly, because integration was – theoretically – largely unnecessary due to a shared European culture. Movement between the countries was no longer supposed to be migration, but simply “intra-European movement.”\(^{177}\)

The programs successfully encouraged collaboration and exchange between European Community Member States, but also diminished support for Third Country nationals. Specifically available for Member State nationals, the programs had the inadvertent effect of excluding European Community residents with so-called Third Country citizenship. Furthermore, European languages were increasingly accessible as part of the normal (secondary) school curriculums in many European states, meaning that native language instruction was less pressing.\(^{178}\) Hence, supporting “us,” the EC ostracized “them,” even through programs designed to support diversity. Moving toward the infamous “Fortress Europe,” the European Community

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\(^{176}\) For more information on the development of these programs, see European Commission and Luce Pépin, *History of European Cooperation*, 108–130; and Gori, *Towards an EU Right to Education*, 105–131.


Member States also agreed to tighten immigration policies. Increasingly, the EC limited support for Third Country nationals, promoting its members over the foreign other.179

With the change in migration patterns and international focus there was a sense that the European Community Directive 77/496/EEC on the “Education of the Children of Migrant Workers” from 1977, supposedly never having succeeded in its aims, was now obsolete.180 Part of the Directive’s alleged failure was on account of its rootedness in a period of mass family reunification and new migration. Member State approval had partly been based on encouragement for return migration. Yet, while return – and often circular – migration to other European Community Member States was high, those individuals with Third Country (non-EC) citizenship were less likely to leave.181 Instead, these groups often put down roots, becoming permanent residents (and often citizens) in their countries of residence, although they frequently faced continued xenophobia and othering.182 Furthermore, these minority groups’ children were increasingly born in-country, meaning that pressure to “return to their countries of origin” (now

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179 European Bundestag, “The Teaching of Immigrants in the European Union,” 43. For a discussion of how Fortress Europe interacted with the “ultra-politics of symbols” see Kaya, Islam, Migration and Integration, 14–24.

180 Discussed in Chapter 5. European Bundestag, “The Teaching of Immigrants in the European Union,” 43; and Gori, Towards an EU Right to Education, fn on 215. There were some flurries of attempts to update or change 486/77/EEC, but each of these was frustrated. West Germany declined to support the re-drafting the agenda. The sense of obsoletion meant less emphasis, which in turn led to less funding particularly as new EC projects focused on integration fell away in favor of other initiatives.

181 Circular migration is the pattern of migration when, while one individual “returns” to their country or origin, another individual takes their place. Circular migration is often difficult – sometimes impossible – to measure as “foreign” population often appears to remain stable or fluctuate only slightly based on total numbers. For an discussion of circular migration, see Anna Triandafyllidou, ed., Circular Migration Between Europe and Its Neighbourhood: Choice or Necessity? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1–2.

questioned as they originated from within host country borders) diminished and with it interest in promoting programs to enable a “smooth reintegration.”¹⁸³

The European Community also felt that the other international organizations involved with human rights and education could support Third Country Nationals. The Organization for European Cooperation and Development and the Council of Europe, among others, were (and continue to be) involved in education research, particularly for migrant and minority groups. For example, in June 1968, the OECD established the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) in Paris. Over the 1980s, the group increasingly worked to support the exchange of information on education and school initiatives in Europe (and beyond). Toward that goal, among other projects, CERI carried out a study between 1982 to 1986 on “Education and Cultural and Linguistic Pluralism,” as part of which they published a report on immigrants’ children at school.¹⁸⁴ The Council of Europe, in turn, continued to finance projects promoting equality of opportunity, particularly for migrant groups and in countries with high youth unemployment or limited job training.

Responding to international changes, in the late 1980s the Commission of the European Community cut support for the “schooling of the children of migrant workers,” reducing it to

¹⁸³ European Bundestag, “The Teaching of Immigrants in the European Union,” 43. By 1988, the Commission assembling the report laid out the unequal implementation across the Community. Because of the phrasing of the Directive, there was little that the Community could actually do regarding punitive measures against those avoiding implementation. Nonetheless, the continued use of the directive both in West Germany and by countries of citizenship continued to underline its impact as rhetorical tool, even if its weight as a legal device was limited. See also Commission of the European Communities, “Report on the Implementation in the Member States of Directive 77/486/EEC on the Education of the Children of Migrant Workers” (Brussels, January 3, 1989); and Sekretariat and Hermann, “39. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 18. Mai 1989 in Stuttgart,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: KMK, June 15, 1989), B 304/7775, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

almost nothing by 1989. 185 The emphasis on ensuring/enabling equality diminished in favor of program implementation. As of 1990, the Commission decided to discontinue all national or local projects, focusing instead on investing in Community networks and exchanges. 186 Hence, some of the funding cuts included in the programs for Greek schoolbook development as well as consular instruction. As from the beginning, the Commission only financed the development of education programs, as it felt its duty in regards to the named education initiatives had been fulfilled. 187 Furthermore, many of the projects that had previously been covered by general funds for “migrant workers’ children” or “intercultural education” now fell under the purview of one of the established (named) European Community education programs (i.e. Lingua). 188 In the early 1990s, in response to the planned European Community border changes and new treaties (i.e. the Treaty of Maastricht), programs for children of guest workers and intercultural education would again be funded, but hardly with the same emphasis or level of financial support. 189

Alongside promoting exchange and equivalency, at the end of the decade the European Community also stressed a bicultural, bilingual form of education that promoted European


188 Lingua, a program for promoting the dissemination of the European Community Member State official languages (predominately in secondary school) in order to promote the vocational training and university exchange programs, was folded into SOCRETES in the 1990s (European Commission and Luce Pépin, History of European Cooperation, 122–124). The Member State representatives further argued that there was no clear solution for supporting bicultural education and intercultural education, but the meaning thereof was simply an opening door for a discussion of intercultural education. See Marianne Krüger-Potratz, Interkulturelle Bildung: Eine Einführung (New York: Waxmann, 2005).

Citizenship. Happy with that shift, in 1988 the Greek government joined the Italian in promoting the idea of a European education. In 1990, a Greek delegation would claim that its goal for its citizens abroad was the “bilingual and bicultural education of Greek children in the framework of European unity.” For the Greek government, that continued to mean, however, an identity for its nationals as explicitly Greek. The Italian state rhetorically emphasized the same goals as the Greek, but the Italian government continued to encourage an intercultural form of identity. What both of these forms of multiculturalism stressed and what a bicultural education entailed, which the Commission of the European Community encouraged, was the development of a European form of citizenship that encompassed the different layers of identification. A prescribed form of global citizenship, European Community citizenship education stressed diversity and internal compatibility, which often left the question of how Third Country citizens or ethno-national minority groups fit into that society up in the air.

Yet, despite the European Community’s official support for migrant and minority integration and a multi- or bicultural identity, in West Germany in the late 1980s European Community Member State nationals were still legally non-German and mostly labeled as “foreign.” Within West Germany, some areas, like Berlin, continued to cap classes and put European Community Member State nationals in pure foreigner classes. They were still

194 Discussed in Chapter 6. Interestingly, Italy would also have difficulties during the 1970s and 1980s developing its own Foreigner Policies as Italy became a country of immigration in its own right (Stefano Allievi, “Multiculturalism in Italy: The Missing Model,” in European Multiculturalism Revisited, ed. Alessandro Silj (London: Zed Books, 2010), 147–80).
legally foreign despite claims of European unity and long-term residence. That perceived foreignness, in turn, meant that, like Third Country nationals (e.g. Turkish citizens), the state continued to other them, influencing their rights and social inclusion. Instead of counting second- or third-generation children as locals, officials like the Berlin Senator for Health and Social Affairs would generally claim in 1988 that “guest worker families, even those who have lived in Berlin more than 20 years, have maintained their cultural values and norms despite their long stays.”

**Conclusion**

By the end of the decade, across West Germany and Europe there was a widespread push for multiculturalism and the word was “in every mouth,” as journalist Elisa Klapheck wrote in an 1989 article for the *Tageszeitung* in Berlin. As, however, Klapheck went on to explain, the meaning of the term was heavily debated. In West Germany, the different Länder governments, foreign advocates, and the Education Administrations, as well as the public media, each suggested a different understanding. In Länder with predominately SPD or Green governments, the trend was to discuss multiculturalism as biculturalism or interculturalism, creating a mix of new identities across cultures. In contrast, Länder with predominately CDU governments (CSU in Bavaria), multiculturalism was often understood to imply diversity, with each group maintaining their own culture.

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The definitions of the term across Europe reflected those cultural and political divisions and different experiences. The Greek government used the term “multiculturalism” to justify a separation between the minority and majority cultures. The European Community’s Directive 486/77 on the education of the children of migrant workers was thus legal permission for a minority group to retain its specific ethnic attributes while being allowed to succeed in the ethno-national majority’s society. In contrast, the Italian government pushed an intercultural form of multiculturalism. What the Italian government stressed was a cross between two or more cultures.

All of the variations of those definitions were arguably accurate. Yet, the multiculturalism the Italian, Greek, and Turkish (as well as other countries of citizenship) governments advocated was a state-sponsored and state-controlled version of identity and culture. These states, and West Germany, wanted the relevant individuals’ culture and identity to reflect their approved definitions. The Education Administrations involved carefully designed the classes for dissemination.198

For the West German Federal and Länder governments, as well as the ethno-national majority, that support was a step towards inclusion instead of rejection.199 Although the movement would be slow and depended on the exact location in the Federal Republic, many of the varied long-term minorities began to see themselves as at home. The ethnic-German majority, in turn, began to see these permanent foreign citizens as at least partly German. While


199 Kaya, Islam, Migration and Integration, 39–61.
still not common, the hyphenated identity (i.e. Turkish-German) was also slowly making its way through (West) German society.²⁰⁰

Yet, although the acceptance of some forms of multiculturalism became more common among the ethno-national majority, the minority groups, and the governments involved, the concept introduced new problems even as it solved others. Arguing that multiculturalism allowed for diversity and a heterogeneous society, many actors involved felt that state-sponsored multiculturalism fixed problems with discrimination. To an extent, that was true. Just as true, however, was that state-sponsored multiculturalism ossified the boundaries of what a select set of cultures were supposed to be and entail. For the West German majority, West German Muslims were Turkish citizens and, for most involved, Turkish citizens were Turks. Setting those parameters meant that groups like the Kurds and the Alevi had to struggle for recognition and permission to maintain their own cultural capital. Establishing a multiplicity of “us” still excluded thousands of people as “them.”²⁰¹


In 1987, the government in Hungary loosened its border restrictions, allowing thousands from the Eastern bloc to apply for travel visas and leave the country with legal permission. During the Cold War, many of the communist Central, Eastern, and Southeastern states had refused to permit their citizens to migrate. In May 1989 Hungary opened its boarder completely, creating a hole in the Iron Curtain. In response to the Hungarian policy in the context of the general political change in the Soviet policy, other communist states also opened their borders for emigration between 1987 and 1989. Many individuals were understandably concerned about the potentially temporary character of this opportunity. Consequently, hundreds of thousands chose to move away from their former homes in the East. Some were fleeing at the first available opportunity. Other individuals opted to leave because they were concerned about the future. Still others were worried about possible changes in (West) German citizenship laws as the Federal Republic began to take steps to prevent or limit the number of both returning ethnic Germans and asylum seekers, especially after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989, the (re)unification of the two Germanys, and the collapse of the Soviet system.

At the same time, internal conflicts and wars in places like Turkey and Yugoslavia led to mass emigration. In Turkey the “low level war” between the Turkish government and the suppressed Kurdish minority that had started in the 1970s gained intensity when the Kurdistan
Workers Parts (PKK) announced a Kurdish uprising August 1984. In Yugoslavia the increasing ethnic conflicts during the 1980s became increasingly violent at the end of the decade and developed into a series of full-fledged wars on the Balkan in 1991. That violent disintegration of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia resulted in the founding nine states.

As a result immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia with varied ethnicities, already the largest citizenship groups, exploded. The states of origin had had bilateral labor agreements with West Germany during the guest worker era, meaning that their citizens had right to extra support programs in West Germany. The new wave of immigrants, however, often claimed entry as asylum seekers instead of through family reunification. In 1988 their numbers reached 14,873 from Turkey (including Kurds) and 20,812 from Yugoslavia (see Table 8.2). Despite being co-nationals, the legal differentiation between these new and established groups meant different rights. The issue became particularly contentious, as many of these groups pointed out that they were ethnic minorities, not part of their country of origin’s ethno-national majority.

Whatever their specific reasons, first dozens and then hundreds of thousands of migrants flooded into the Federal Republic between 1987 and 1992. Some were immediately eligible for (West) German citizenship because they counted as “ethnic Germans” (202,673 in 1988, see

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Table 8.1) while others arrived as asylum seekers claiming political or ethnic persecution or escaping war (103,076 in 1988, see Table 8.2). The majority of asylum seekers hailed from within Europe, often coming from similar countries of origin as those migrants entitled to German citizenship. This combination of migrants, together with challenges to old conceptions of “national” and “ethnic” identity, raised new questions for the West German Federal and Länder governments. They were forced to reconsider different legal groups’ rights and the appropriateness of programs for their integration or acknowledgment of their cultural heritage.

The Länder Ministries of Education’s reconsideration of schooling for new migrant groups reignited debates over what the right to education meant for foreign nationals. In the 1950s, they had decided that the right to education, as a positive right, meant that the government had to take action. In a federated system, the Länder had to guarantee access to schools by including all children under compulsory schooling laws regardless of their country of citizenship (as discussed in Chapter 1). The local municipalities had to make sure that this right was realized. In the 1960s and 1970s, the West German Ministries of Education additionally viewed the state as responsible for enabling all children equal education opportunities in the local school system. This necessitated integration programs for foreign nationals (see Chapters 2 through 4).

The Ministries of Education and Education Research also further brought the right to education together with minority rights, and claimed that children needed instruction in their mother tongue, as full literacy in their first language was supposed to both psychologically and scholastically benefit the child (see Chapter 5). By the early 1980s, in short, the right to education entailed inclusion under compulsory schooling laws, equality of education opportunities, and access to native language instruction.
The late 1980s waves of migration forced the Länder Ministries of Education to reconsider their definition of the right to education, as well as practices and guidelines for the instruction of foreign nationals and migrant schoolchildren. Between 1987 and 1992, the Länder representatives in the Kultusministerkonferenz’s “Subcommittee on the Instruction of Foreign Schoolchildren” on the instruction of foreign children argued over how to handle the new groups. Debating their ethical and legal obligations, the Länder representatives questioned whether the different groups of ethno-national German migrants, asylum seekers, and established ethno-national minority groups should be treated the same or differently. Their answers were dependent on their resources, the size of the groups, and the ethno-national German majority’s perception of a group’s right to be in Germany.

Returning Ethnic Germans and Reunification

In August 1988, the CDU Senator for Education, Vocational Training, and Sports, Hanna-Renate Laurien, announced that there were around 2,500 recently arrived ethnic-German children (Aussiedlerkinder) in Berlin schools. Around two-thirds of these migrant children attended Berlin primary schools, and one-third enrolled in secondary schools. The Senator expected another 400–500 in the following weeks. Laurien wanted to take the opportunity to “thank all of the teachers and staff working toward the integration of these German youths from abroad.” She went on to “wish the school children and teachers every success in their work.”

Ethnic-German migrant children with German citizenship may have technically been welcome in the FRG, but their arrival in large numbers challenged norms already under scrutiny for three reasons in particular. First, as many of the newly arriving ethnic-German children spoke

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little or no German, many education officials debated whether the established integration programs were appropriate. Second, their language competency and cultural associations raised questions about what their rights should be. Third, the presence of the thousands of children only connected to Germany through a distant past raised questions about the connection between ethnicity and citizenship. Limited German language knowledge and clear cultural differences between these new migrants and the ethnic-German majority born in the country raised questions about their “Germanness.”

The challenge here was that, unlike *soi-disant* “foreign” children, migrant ethnic-German children were legally – and socially – entitled to citizenship and hence equal educational opportunities on the same basis as the ethnic-German children born in the Federal Republic. The Länder Ministries of Education had been working to ensure equal opportunities on a minor scale since the Federal Republic’s founding in 1949 (as discussed in chapter 1). Toward that end, in 1977 the *Kultusministerkonferenz* agreed on a set of “Recommendations regarding Returning Germans” emphasizing rapid integration and establishing school initiatives to ensure their right to education. Based on those recommendations, the individual Länder decreed that schools needed to place migrant ethnic-German children directly in the regular classroom and provide them with an extra ten hours of extra German instruction per week. For those few children possessing limited German knowledge, schools were supposed to provide intensive German

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6 Ibid.

language support classes.⁸ As ethnic Germans, however, the Länder Ministries of Education assumed that the children would already be culturally German. In theory, the arrival of new migrants would in no way dilute the ill-defined ideal “Germanness.”⁹ Even if migrant ethnic-German children did need the more intensive German classes, arrivals usually spread across the Federal Republic. The small groups facilitated integration and prevented strain on individual school systems.

Table 8.1: Ethno-national German (Aussiedler) Migration to West Germany, 1968-1992¹⁰

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Soviet Sphere</th>
<th>(Former) Yugoslavia</th>
<th>School Age (6-18)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>48,170</td>
<td>30,355</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>7,674</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>37,925</td>
<td>19,122</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>6,635</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>36,459</td>
<td>17,455</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>38,968</td>
<td>22,075</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>6,303</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>42,788</td>
<td>27,188</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>7,108</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>78,523</td>
<td>48,419</td>
<td>14,488</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>14,217</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>202,673</td>
<td>140,226</td>
<td>47,572</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>38,990</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>377,055</td>
<td>250,340</td>
<td>98,134</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td>63,718</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>397,075</td>
<td>113,253</td>
<td>147,455</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>66,905</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>221,995</td>
<td>40,129</td>
<td>147,320</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>47,843</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>230,565</td>
<td>17,742</td>
<td>195,576</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>56,738</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁸ Landespressedienst aus dem Senat, “Aussiedlerkinder an Berliner Schulen Willkommen.”

⁹ What the “German” culture included or entailed beyond lingual affinity was never clearly established, yet many conservative politicians and mass media outlets decried the dilution thereof. For a discussion of what is meant to be “German” and “legislating national identity,” see Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, eds., “Chapter 4: What Is a German?” in Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955-2005 (Berkley: University of California Press, 2007), 149–92. For a discussion of reunification and West German understanding of “foreignness,” see Jarausch, After Hitler, 214–263. For a discussion of how reunification influenced “foreigner policies,” see Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 286–307.

¹⁰ Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1990), 73; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1993 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: Wiesbadener Graphische Betriebe GmbH, 1993), 92.
The opening borders as of 1987 meant, however, that the trickle of “returning Germans” became a flood, straining the systems in place. As Table 8.1 shows, approximately 18 percent of newly arriving ethnic Germans migrants were school-age children, meaning that 38,990 children were entitled to places in public school in 1988 followed by an additional 63,718 in 1988. The sharp increase in new migration from Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, particularly from Poland and the other countries of the Soviet Bloc, meant that many of these migrants spoke common languages. Moving in larger groups, they frequently wished to maintain their common linguistic or cultural affiliations instead of assimilating into their new surroundings. As part of that desire, several individuals expressed the wish to have the children not only learn German but also to maintain their mother tongues (i.e. Polish or Russian).

The increase in total numbers combined with their foreign language and cultural affiliations forced the Länder Education Authorities’ representatives in the Kultusministerkonferenz to reconsider the question of instruction for migrant ethnic-German schoolchildren. As German citizens, these schoolchildren were supposed to integrate quickly and fully. Yet, their own desire for language instruction, combined with a new emphasis within the European Community on the importance of modern foreign-language acquisition (discussed in Chapter 7), meant that the Länder Ministries of Education could not simply brush aside the request for non-German native language instruction. The issue was further compounded by resentment inside West Germany against these migrants’ arrival. The local administrators complained about costs associated with integration and xenophobia turned against ethnic-

11 Give or take three percent.

German children.\textsuperscript{13} The media in turn started debating whether these groups legitimately counted as “German” even possessing German citizenship. The combination of public and political sentiment led to a new debate over the questions what defined German citizenship rights.

One challenge that the arriving ethnic-German schoolchildren’s “Germanness” posed was the question about the difference between this migrant group and other new groups – particularly asylum seekers arriving from Poland, Russia, and other Eastern European countries. In 1988, the KMK’s “Subcommittee on the Instruction of Foreign Schoolchildren” debated whether the similarities between the groups should influence their schooling. Because of their ethnocultural similarities, some members of this subcommittee suggested including new asylum seekers and returning ethnic-Germans in the same integration classes. Both returning ethnic-German schoolchildren and asylum seekers, after all, theoretically had the same right to education. Furthermore, with the same language competency and culture, both groups of migrants needed German lessons in order to be able to participate fully in the West German classroom. The representatives from the city-states Berlin and Hamburg, however, immediately vetoed the possibility, pointing to the legal difference between the two groups.\textsuperscript{14} Both groups might have the right to education, but law and \textit{Länder} regulations did not view them as identical. Migrant ethnic-German children were not subject to class caps or quotas for “foreigners.” \textit{Länder} law

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\textsuperscript{14} Hermann, “35. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 2. September 1988 in München,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz, September 26, 1988), 2–5, B 304/7775, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. The UAausLS addressed this topic both because of the similarity of concerns between this group and “foreign children” and because within their \textit{Länder}, these representatives were being given the task anyhow. Their decision to look at the issue was officially supported when the \textit{Amtschefskonferenz} (110. Meeting on 8/9 September 1988) turned to the SchA (277th Meeting 22/23 September 1998), which asked the UAausLS to look at the issue of what to do with this group (Hermann, “36. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 14. Oktober 1988 in Frankfurt,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz, November 10, 1988), 2–3, B 304/7775, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).
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also decidedly included these German citizens under compulsory school laws, unlike asylum seekers.\textsuperscript{15}

The Kultusministerkonferenz’s Subcommittee also briefly considered handling migrant ethnic Germans under the revised KMK “Guidelines for the Instruction of the Children of Migrant Workers” from April 1976. The children’s and their parents’ desire for their children to maintain their mother tongue (predominately Polish or Russian) and European Community’s emphasis on foreign language acquisition meant that the KMK ideally should support their continued language competency. Toward that end, the KMK’s “Subcommittee on the Instruction of Foreign Schoolchildren” discussed several possibilities. It considered placing ethnic German children in something similar to national preparatory classes with Polish or Russian as the main language of instruction, and debated the possibility of establishing Polish or Russian in place of a first or second mother tongue class, much like the various programs that had been implemented in the early 1980s for schoolchildren with Turkish (or other) citizenship.\textsuperscript{16}

Ethnic-German migrants’ rights as German citizens meant, however, that they were not legally recognized as “minority groups” and hence not entitled to minority rights. According to the West German Federal Government’s viewpoint, newly arriving ethnic-German citizens’ mother tongue was German, even if they did not speak the language. While the Länder Ministries of Education were obligated to provide extra German language instruction and other support programs, Polish or Russian (or other) instruction was not guaranteed. Schools could opt


\textsuperscript{16} Hermann, “35. Sitzung des USAusIS,” 2–5.
to offer other languages, but, as German citizens, the children were only entitled to German (and English in secondary schools) language instruction.

On the other hand, the European Community’s emphasis on international relations and the opening borders in the East turned the Federal Government’s attention to the possible economic benefits of having citizens skilled in languages like Polish. Consequently, the Länder Ministries of Education determined to support the children’s maintenance of their foreign language skills. While clarifying that ethnic-German children did not fall under the “Guidelines for the Instruction of the Children of Migrant Workers,” the KMK’s Subcommittee recommended some acknowledgment of their language skills. The Subcommittee’s members recommended that the Länder Ministries of Education use for two approaches: First, that schools offer Polish or Russian as a first foreign language; second, in accordance with European Community developments, the Ministries should develop tests to acknowledge language competency.

Several Länder Ministries of Education followed the two recommendations and eventually offered Russian- and Polish-language classes in addition to providing intensive German instruction. Berlin even decided to offer Russian as a first foreign language instead of English. Yet the Berlin Senate for Education continued to differentiate between German citizens and foreigners, limiting attendance to ethnic-German children and denying it to schoolchildren with Russian citizenship. Other Länder, like North Rhine-Westphalia, where 42,000 recently arrived ethnic-German children attended school during the 1988/89 school year, offered both

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Russian and Polish. Schools provided these programs either as after-school instruction or in place of the first foreign language.\(^{19}\)

Regardless of government intentions, the biggest obstacle to providing either integration classes or mother language courses was limited resources. Unprepared to handle the unexpected mass migration, the Länder Ministries of Education did not have the requisite teaching materials, personnel, or funds to implement their regulated programs. To alleviate these difficulties, the CDU/CSU-FDP Federal Government promised assistance, but the monies were neither immediately forthcoming nor sufficient.\(^{20}\) For some programs, such as providing Russian or Polish in place of a first foreign language, interested parent groups stepped in to provide funding. That did not, however, solve personnel problems. Unlike classes for ethno-national minorities, the Länder governments could not draw on foreign reserves of teachers. The Ministries of Education needed local teachers and materials for regular instruction as well as for new integration courses, language classes, and homework help programs (precisely those cut two years before).

Through the end of the decade, material and personnel shortages persisted as new migrants continued to arrive en masse. While Berlin Senator Hanna-Renate Laurien welcomed those 2,500 migrant German children already in the city, the Senate of Education’s resources were already strained. To accommodate these new children, the Senate arranged for an additional

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\(^{19}\) Kultusminister NRW, Antwort der Landesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage 1648 des Abgeordneten Wickel F.D.P. Über Schulische Integration von Aussiedlerkindern (Düsseldorf: Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen, May 26, 1989). The NRW schools hired 1900 extra teachers for normal instruction and 400 for support classes.

111 teaching positions for German language and regular instruction.\textsuperscript{21} But when new arrivals far outstripped the expected 400 to 500 new schoolchildren, these were simply not enough teachers. As new migration did not stop or even plateau between 1988 and 1990 (see Table 8.1), Berlin and the other \textit{Länder} had enormous difficulties accommodating the new children.\textsuperscript{22}

According to some scholars, the flood of ethnic-German migration was one of the reasons reunification happened as quickly as it did. While many of the ethnic-German migrants traveled from Poland, Russia, and other Eastern European states, some hailed from East Germany. The West German ethno-national majority did not want to have to pay for and accommodate the thousands of co-nationals arriving monthly. In their turn, many individuals in the GDR wanted the material comforts capitalism afforded. While it is difficult to determine exactly to what extent the demands of migration and the reintegration of ethnic Germans played, in 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic unified as a single state.\textsuperscript{23}

Unification shook the foundations of what it meant to be German. Regardless of continued claims of ethnic similarity, forty years of different schooling, governance, and food had an impact on culture. However great or slight the difference, many “Ossies” and “Wessies” (informal terms for people born East and West Germany respectively) claimed that there was a difference. Moreover, the West German Federal and \textit{Länder} governments’ legal and cultural definitions of “Germanness” had to change because of its claim that all East Germans, as ethnic


\textsuperscript{23} The populations of West and East Germany were approximately sixty-three and sixteen million respectively. For a discussion of German (re) unification, see Konrad Hugo Jarausch, \textit{The Rush to German Unity} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, \textit{Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories} (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2003), 221–245.
Germans, were entitled to (West) German citizenship. Unification resolved the question of the GDR’s citizens’ place in the Federal Republic, it obviated a political need to maintain the connection between ethnicity and citizenship.

For the people living in the former East Germany, unification challenged their conception of “Germanness,” not only by changing citizenship status but also by increasing the ethnic diversity in the five Länder. Prior to unification, the East German population had been comparatively homogenous. Although the government of the German Democratic Republic had recruited migrant labor from other communist states, it had maintained relatively strict provisions in their guest-worker agreements regarding families and children. To prevent immigration through family reunification, the East German state avoided accepting married migrant laborers. If female migrant workers became pregnant while in the GDR, the government often deported them. Nonetheless, some ethno-national minority groups, the largest possessing Vietnamese or Mozambican citizenship, did establish families.

To handle the politically acceptable ethno-national minority groups that did live in East Germany, the East German government had developed a few special school programs. Upon arrival in the GDR, Cuban families had to participate in classes on communism to ensure that they internalized the correct communist ideology. For diplomats, the GDR set up a special school in which the children received intensive German instruction for three to six months as

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25 For more on Cuban migration to East Germany, see Yamilé Lena Pérez Naranjo, “Cuban Migration in Germany” (Ph.D., Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, 2014).
well as some subject lessons. The state also established separate Soviet schools for the children of the members of the Soviet army. In contrast, the state placed children of the Vietnamese or Mozambican ethno-national minorities into East German schools on an individual basis.\(^{26}\)

After unification, however, as the waves of ethnic-German migrants and asylum seekers continued to arrive in Germany from Poland, Russia, and other Central and Eastern European states, the new East German \textit{Länder} had to incorporate them, just like the West.\(^{27}\) With the extension of the West German Basic Law to the former East, the Federal Republic’s asylum provisions and citizenship laws now applied across the entire country. Adjusting to comparatively large groups of immigrants, the former Eastern \textit{Länder} slowly began implementing the various integration and cultural programs established in the West.\(^{28}\)

As the waves of ethnic-German migration from Eastern Europe continued after reunification, an increasing number of ethnic-Germans in both parts of the unified FRG expressed resentment towards the new arrivals. Many private and public individuals argued that these new immigrants were not truly German. Official reports noted increasing instances of bullying in and out of schools.\(^{29}\) In 1991, North Rhine-Westphalia’s representative to the KMK’s “Subcommittee on the Instruction of Foreign Schoolchildren” would, for example, report that

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\(^{26}\) Buried under other issues, the question of language programs for children of former migrant workers or foreign citizens did not become a major concern in the five Eastern states until the mid-1990s. The five Länder did, however, become involved in debates over how to handle asylum seekers and returning ethnic Germans.

\(^{27}\) Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAausIS,” 2.

\(^{28}\) Buried under other issues, the question of language programs for children of former migrant workers or foreign citizens did not become a major concern in the five Eastern states until the mid-1990s. The five Länder did, however, become involved in debates over how to handle asylum seekers and returning ethnic Germans.

\(^{29}\) An interesting component of the research for this project was the number of individuals living across Germany who informed me about their own experiences with migrant German or minority classmates in the schools after hearing about the topic of my dissertation. The frequency of stories told about children chased down streets, oracized in the schoolroom, or mocked on the playground will likely not surprise given the number of official reports on the subject. There were, however, also stories about exciting American schoolchildren or French exchange students.
Polish language speakers had a poor reputation within the local population, although Russian seemed to be accepted. Schoolchildren who were members of the German majority often treated Polish-speaking German children as unwanted foreigners and the children faced obvious discrimination. Actively taking Polish as a first foreign language in place of English at times led to being targeted, as German-speaking Germans viewed participation in the courses as a rejection of German culture. Other Länder representatives, particularly from the Eastern Länder like Brandenburg, claimed that language reputation was a non-issue. Polish language offerings were well received and acceptance was “as high as the Western European languages.” Here the GDR tradition to teach Russian as the first foreign language in its schools might have helped.30

Regardless of the level of local acceptance, participation in these programs created a barrier to scholastic achievement. Schoolchildren enrolled in Russian or Polish instead of English faced the same difficulties as children with Turkish citizenship enrolled in Turkish instead of English (see Chapter 7). Namely, these children quickly found themselves cut off from many vocational training opportunities and often university entrance. In order to ensure their equality of opportunity, the Länder had to establish English Language Assistance initiatives for youths wanting to enter a vocational programs or university tracks for which English was obligatory. But not all children had access, and those who did often felt overburdened by the extra instruction.31

Tension over who counted as “German,” combined with the long-term residence of foreign nationals, placed the relationship between citizenship and ethnicity under scrutiny. The idea that arriving ethnic-German children could be “German” while culturally and linguistically

dissimilar to their other “German” classmates caused concern especially among Christian conservative German politicians and in more right-wing popular media about the “pollution of German cultural identity”.32 The situation further highlighted contradictions in the perception of who was “German” with regards to citizenship, paternity, and culture. Some SPD and Green politicians criticized the traditional ethnic definition of German citizenship. They advocated change, because many newly arriving “Germans” were arguably no more “ethnically German” than “foreign” asylum seekers or other migrants.33 The CDU/CSU-FDP Federal Government responded to this debate with a revision of the citizenship laws in 1990 and restricted the number of individuals who could claim “ethnic German” status.34 Only individuals from the former Soviet Union had “an unconditional claim to immigration to Germany.” Furthermore, citizenship could now only be granted when the necessary paperwork was provided and an applicant demonstrated “knowledge of the German language.”

The new citizenship laws also further opened citizenship to members of the established ethno-national minorities. There had been some few adjustments to citizenship laws in the previous years, opening up some possibilities for becoming German. But, prior to the new citizenship laws, few non-German citizens had opted to renounce their citizenship in favor of


naturalization. Many European Community Member State nationals saw only limited benefits to changing their legal status. Other foreign minority groups demurred in part because of restrictions regarding dual citizenship and legal complications with the other country involved (i.e. inheritance rights). The new laws stipulated that youths between 16 and 23 who had lived at least eight years in Germany and attended school in the country could apply for naturalization. Adult foreigners who had lived for at least 15 years in Germany (around 40 percent of foreign citizens) were also entitled to apply for citizenship regardless of their economic standing.

The revised citizenship laws did not settle the question of “Germanness” even as the laws opened up the category. Instead, European Union developments, naturalization, and continued migration put a strain on the connections between citizenship, ethnic identification, and mother tongue. To some extent, those changes severed the connection between nationality and ethnicity as it became increasingly common for ethnic Germans to move to other parts of Europe even as immigrant continued. Furthermore, the plurality of native languages made it almost impossible for any state to offer all of them. Those changes to ethnicity and citizenship in turn complicated the concept of the right to education, turning the Länder Ministries of Education’s focus toward supposedly useful state languages rather than native languages. In consequence, while a group needed to have the right to their mother tongue, they no longer had even semi-guaranteed access to any but the official state languages.


37 For a discussion of the “naturalization of foreigners” in the 1990s and additional technicalities of citizenship, see Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, *Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven*, 124–132.
The Right to Native Language for Kurdish Ethnic Minorities

Part of the Länder’s reconceptualization of the right to native language instruction for minorities developed out of the demands of larger minority groups’ requests for mother tongue instruction. Among these efforts, in 1987, Wolfgang Wieland and Sevim Çelebi-Gottschlich brought a motion to the Berlin House of Representatives.38 Both belonged to Alternative Liste, the Green Party in West Berlin. Reflecting the Green Party’s stance across West Germany, the two AL members argued that Kurdish children should receive language instruction in their Kurdish mother tongue in West Berlin public schools. According to the two MPs, the Senate needed to provide Kurdish in public schools because “the right to the mother tongue is a universal human right” as “confirmed in the Helsinki Accords” from 1975.39 Citing sociological and educational studies from the era as well as West Berlin teachers’ reports, Wieland and Çelebi-Gottschlich argued that mother tongue instruction was necessary for the cognitive, emotional, and social development of the child. They supported their demands for Kurdish classes by pointing to the Turkish state’s prohibition on the dissemination of materials or instruction in the Kurdish language, the lack of options in West Berlin, and to the over-proportional enrollment of Kurdish immigrants in schools for the disabled (Sonderschulen). Wieland and Çelebi-Gottschlich further claimed that the children born in West Germany to Kurdish immigrants from Turkey were “overburdened by confrontation with Turkish in the


schools,” after learning Kurdish in their parents’ homes as their mother tongue and German in their surroundings.  

The right to mother tongue instruction for non-ethno-national minority groups sat at the crux of the question about Kurdish language instruction. While national identification continued to be important as a legal category, public discourse was moving away from a focus on national minorities in favor of ethnic minorities. People were increasingly understood as individuals who participated in local cultural and ethnic groups rather than necessarily acting as representatives of the country to which they held citizenship. As this outlook pervaded international discussions of migration, West German politicians and education administrations began asking how the right to education and its trappings (particularly mother tongue and cultural instruction) should be extended to children from non-national minority groups (i.e. Kurds or Albanians).

Part of the shift away from a specifically national minority group in favor of ethnic minorities was due to the growing question of who could be part of a national minority and what such membership entailed. Within West Germany, intermarriage, “German” return migration, and the naturalization of previously foreign individuals all influenced assumptions of what it meant to be German. The dubious “Germanness” of many Germans and supposed “Germanness” of foreign citizens put the connection between ethnicity and nationality into

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41 As did the identification of permanent foreign citizens as (at least partly) “German.” While still not common, the hyphenated identity (i.e. Turkish-German) was also slowly making its way through (West) German society. For more information on plural or hyphenated identities and Germany, see Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner, eds., The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity, and Community, Postcolonial Encounters (London: Zed Books, 1997), 167–206; Ayhan Kaya, “Citizenship and the Hyphenated Germans: German-Turks,” in Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences, ed. Emin Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduyuğlu (New York: Routledge, 2005).
question. Some people – both in the mass media and among academic scholars – argued that the nation and “nationality” were constructed categories and the nation was nothing more than an “imagined community.” They criticized post-war policies and practices that had followed a short tradition of assumed German ethnic superiority and emphasis on a supposedly real German ethnicity. This tradition, amplified by Nazi Germany, had led to an artificial concept of national homogenization. Now the German state and society needed to move to a concept of national identity and citizenship that allowed heterogeneity and recognized ethnic diversity.

Acknowledging the heterogeneity of national groups threw the validity of the Länder Ministries of Education’s programs for mother tongue and cultural instruction into question. These courses were supposed to ensure the child’s right, as an individual, to education and self-actualization as well as her/his rights as a member of a minority by enabling the child to learn the language and culture of her/his parents. Yet the Kultusministerkonferenz’s 1976 “Recommendations on Instruction for Migrant Workers’ Children” only guaranteed the offer of state languages – and then only from former guest worker countries. Accepting (as was long known) that not all children spoke the official state language of their ((grand-) parent’s) countries of origin, the Länder Ministries of Education questioned if they were actually offering

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42 It should be noted that this is almost exclusively true among European groups or groups popularized in the media. Groups from Africa, Asia, etc., were usually viewed a national minorities (i.e. “Chinese” or “Kenyan”) or even continental minorities (i.e. “African” or “Asian”).

43 Among other studies, Benedict Anderson’s influential 1982 Imagined Communities explored the development of the concept of the “nation” and “nationalism” (Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed (London: Verso, 2006)).

44 Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürgernd und Ausschiessen: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).

appropriate support or truly ensuring the children’s rights to education, to their native language, and as minorities.

In the mid-1980s, the individual Länder’s Educational Administrations in West Germany began extensive discussions about whether to treat foreign ethnic minorities differently from foreign national minorities. The debates developed out of international trends, but also from non-national foreign minority groups’ requests, first for recognition as official minorities and then for state assistance with language and cultural classes.\textsuperscript{46} When, in 1987 and 1988, Green Party (including the Alternative Liste) politicians like Wieland Çelebi-Gottschlich submitted requests in several Ländere (including Berlin, Bavaria, and Lower Saxony) that mother tongue instruction be extended to all minority groups in the country (i.e. Kurds and Indians), the Ländere were already considering the issue.\textsuperscript{47}

The Ländere Education Administrations approached the issue primarily from two directions. The first was the consideration of whether national groups other than the “traditional guest worker countries” should be supported in West German public schools.\textsuperscript{48} The April 1976 KMK “Recommendations on Instruction for Migrant Workers’ Children” specified that the Ländere would support the official state languages of the former guest worker countries. Ländere recognition of a group as an official minority did not guarantee state support.\textsuperscript{49} While

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{46} Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAausIS.” Before those 1992 alterations, the question of which national minorities should be covered again became an issue, in part because of the reframing of the question of which countries constituted guest worker countries.


\textsuperscript{48} Former “guest worker” countries, meaning those which had had official bilateral labor agreements with the Federal Republic, included Italy, Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

\textsuperscript{49} Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAausIS.”
\end{flushright}
recognizing other national minority groups, most of the Länder maintained their intention of only financing former guest worker countries in public schools. On this basis, the individual Länder denied requests for state support for Indian or Japanese language instruction. Hesse did offer religious instruction in Armenian but had no plans to provide any other sort of offering.50

The second direction the Länder Education Administrations approached the accommodation of ethnic minorities from was to ask what language and cultural associations it was acceptable to teach minority groups from the former guest worker countries. Many migrants from the former guest worker countries did not personally identify as members of their country of origin’s majority. Furthermore, groups like the Kurds, who frequently had Turkish citizenship, were known to be repressed minorities in their countries of origin. Public media informed the West German majority that the internal cultural conflicts in Turkey prevented Kurds from freely practicing their own culture. A 1983 Turkish law “Concerning Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other Than Turkish” dictated that they could not publish in Kurdish. Suffering from severe repression, the Kurds in Turkey had formed groups like the PKK and the country was embroiled in armed conflict, particularly in the Southeast. Unlike for members of a national majority, these children could not go back to Turkey if they wanted to learn to be members of their ethnic groups.51

The most famous example of these discussions centered on West Berlin’s Kurdish minority with Turkish citizenship. Technically, schoolchildren in West Berlin had the right to be schooled in their respective native language regardless of ancestry or residency status. In 1986,  

50 In NRW, the Cultural Administration had already decided to continue to provide mother-language and cultural instruction only to the children from former guest worker countries.

51 Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Violations of Free Expression in Turkey, 1999. Law 2932 “Concerning Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other Than Turkish” was lifted in 1991. While Kurdish publications were then legal, broadcasting was still prohibited. For more on the PKK, see Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007).
the Senate officially acknowledged that “the Kurdish belong to a people (Volk) with their own culture and language.”\textsuperscript{52} Nonetheless, while schools across the city offered Turkish from the first grade through secondary school completion certificates, the West Berlin Senate for Education did not support any Kurdish instruction. Some individual schools offered their own programs, but they were not standard or guaranteed.\textsuperscript{53}

Despite theoretical support for minority rights, West Berlin’s Senate for Education denied Wieland and Çelebi-Gottschlich’s 1987 request to support Kurdish in public schools. The CDU-FDP Senate argued “the Turkish Kurds in Berlin came as Turkish citizens.”\textsuperscript{54} As such, they would be offered the same support programs as their fellow citizens. The Senate’s answer was largely premised on the Consulate’s funding of the language and cultural classes. In Berlin, the relevant foreign consulates were responsible for providing extra native language classes outside of regular school instruction and for ensuring the children’s right to their native language. Hence, if the Turkish General Consulate did not choose to offer language instruction in Kurdish, then the Senator of Education decided instruction in Kurdish would have to be offered at their parents’ own initiative.\textsuperscript{55} West Berlin would by no means deny them their right to Kurdish language instruction, but the city was not going to pick up the tab when their funds were already limited.

As of 1992, the \textit{Länder} were still split on the issue of a moral right to native language versus state language instruction. Largely because of financial expediency, however, most

\begin{footnotesize}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{53} Hermann, “40. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 8. September 1989 in Bonn,” 23–24.}


\footnote{\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.}
\end{footnotesize}
decided to continue only offering mother tongue and cultural instruction in the official state languages. The SPD-FDP government in Bremen alone decided to offer Kurdish instruction in its schools as of 1 February 1992, with teaching materials produced in Sweden. With a 1991 order, Lower Saxony opened the possibility of Kurdish language instruction but did not actually offer any classes. Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland-Pfalz each explicitly declared that they neither intended to offer Kurdish native language classes nor provide financial support for any instruction other than official state languages.

Children with foreign citizenship either born in the Federal Republic or migrating through processes of family reunification clearly fell under compulsory schooling laws. Yet, the Federal Republic’s Länder’s governments claimed that the right to education included the right to native language instruction. Based on their practices, the Länder governments felt that their role in ensuring the children’s right to an education extended only as far as providing access to the regular classroom. Frequently basing their decisions on the limitations of their budgets, as the Länder Ministries of Education argued that they could not do more. The Ministry of Education representatives continued to express obligation to minority groups from former guest-worker countries on account of their sense of responsibility for the fact that these groups were in the

56 The classes were supposed to open their doors on 1 August 1993 at the latest.


country at all. Added to that, in five of the Länder the relevant foreign states paid for and staffed the courses. The Länder Ministries of Education felt free to agree rhetorically that other minority groups had the right to education in their mother languages. In contrast to the 1970s, however, the Ministries viewed their role as lack of prevention if families set the classes up themselves rather than offering them.

Compulsory Schooling for the Children of Asylum Seekers

Just like ethnic-German migrants and children with foreign citizenship born in the Federal Republic of Germany or entering through processes of family reunification, schoolchildren migrating to the Federal Republic as asylum seekers had a right to education. According to West German law, all children supposedly had a right to education. For asylum seekers, the right to education as well as to cultural and language maintenance was further protected under the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Act and the 1989 Convention on the Right of the Child. Yet in practice, just like for other migrant groups, asylum groups’ legal status and specific group members influenced what form that right to education took in practice. In this case, the right to education did not necessarily extend to inclusion under compulsory schooling laws.

After the Second World War, West German asylum law was one of most inclusive among the European states on account of its Nazi past. Inscribed into the 1949 Constitution, the


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Basic Law, asylum seekers had to be admitted into the country and allowed to apply.\textsuperscript{60} Over the following decades, asylum seekers from across the world, but particularly Europe, chose to seek refuge in West Germany. Some hoped to find a better economic situations, but the majority were trying to escape life-threatening situations. Some asylum seekers’ applications were rejected, often because of quota limitations, but the Federal Republic’s asylum law dictated that an individual could not be sent back to an area in which they could be endangered. In consequence, thousands of individuals were permitted to stay in the country despite their applications’ formal rejection.\textsuperscript{61}

Initially, asylum seekers accounted for a minimal proportion of the overall migration to the Federal Republic (see Table 8.2). Over the course of the 1970s, however, an increasing number of people began taking advantage of West Germany’s liberal asylum procedures. Improved methods of travel also meant that applicants arrived from further abroad. The majority of asylum applicants, like those escaping the Vietnam War, still sought a better life as they tried to escape life-threatening situations. Others, however, used asylum law to circumvent increasingly restrictive family reunification policies. These migrants, often from the former guest worker countries like Turkey, entered the country as asylum seekers and used the long application processing periods to join families or find jobs. Increasingly noticeable, the ethnic-German majority complained about an imagined strain on resources and possible ethnic

\textsuperscript{60} See section one on West German Basic Rights, Bundesministerium der Justiz, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn, 1949), 1–49, http://heinonline.org.

pollution. Some claimed that the majority of asylum seekers were “economic migrants” who were not actually in danger in their countries of origin.\textsuperscript{62}

In response, the Federal Government tried to restrict the number of asylum seekers entering the country. The Government could not prevent entry, as the right to asylum was inscribed into the Basic Law. In order to curb immigration, beginning under SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974 to 1982) and continuing under CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982 to 1998), the Federal and Länder governments instituted legal restrictions to make asylum seekers’ lives harder. The Federal and Länder governments severely curtailed personal freedoms and rights. While particularly restrictive in those Länder with conservative CDU/CSU-FDP governments, even the SPD-FDP Länder, which rhetorically supported diversity and asylum rights, also checked the rights of asylum seekers. Among the Länder governments’ measures, they restricted asylum seekers freedom of movement and access to work. They hoped that by making asylum in West Germany unpalatable, fewer asylum seekers would come.\textsuperscript{63} These policies led to a temporary decline in the total number of asylum seekers between 1980 and 1983 and again between 1986 and 1987 (see Table 8.2).\textsuperscript{64}


Table 8.2: Asylum Applicants by Region of Origin (Total and Percentage of Total), 1980–1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Selected European Asylum Applicants:</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>(Former) Yugosl.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>107,818</td>
<td>8,339</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>65,809</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>57,913</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>49,391</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>21,169</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>9,901</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>6,302</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>37,423</td>
<td>6,885</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>15,264</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>6,630</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>3,688</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>19,737</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>6,589</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>35,278</td>
<td>5,868</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>11,553</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>4,240</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>4,180</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>73,832</td>
<td>8,093</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>18,174</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>6,672</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7,528</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>99,650</td>
<td>9,486</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>25,164</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>10,981</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8,693</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>57,379</td>
<td>3,568</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>36,629</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>15,194</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>11,426</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>4,713</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>103,076</td>
<td>6,548</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>71,416</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>29,023</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>14,873</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>20,812</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>121,318</td>
<td>12,479</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>73,387</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>26,092</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>20,020</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19,423</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>193,063</td>
<td>24,210</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>101,631</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>9,155</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>22,082</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>22,114</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>256,112</td>
<td>36,949</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>166,662</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>4,448</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>23,877</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>74,854</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>438,191</td>
<td>67,408</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>310,529</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>4,212</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>28,327</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>122,666</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite those restrictions, many groups viewed a circumscribed life in Germany as safer than the situation in their countries of origin. Through most of the 1980s, the majority of asylum seekers originated within Europe, as Table 8.2 shows. The composition of those “Europeans” would, however, shift over the decade. As discussed, an increasing number came from the former Yugoslavia. In addition, between 1987 and 1989, even as migrant ethnic Germans flooded West German schools, Polish asylum seekers also made the journey, making up between twenty and thirty percent of the total number of asylum applicants. While these total numbers

65 Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990, 59; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1993 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 73. “African” asylum applicants included Afghanistan, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka as the largest countries of origin. “Europe” includes Turkey, Poland, and the (former) Yugoslavia as well as multiple other states.

66 “Yugoslavia” includes Croatia (1992: 1,024); Slovenia (1992: 50); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992: 6,197); and as well as former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which each became independent states in 1992 or 1993. Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1993 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 73.
were not nearly as high as those for the ethnic Germans (48,419 in 1987; 140,226 in 1988; and 250,340 in 1989 from Poland (see Table 8.1), the clear similarities between these migrant groups and those entering as Germans or through processes of family reunification led to question of whether these groups should be treated differently or not.\textsuperscript{67}

Through most of the 1980s, the majority of asylum seekers originated within Europe, as Table 8.2 shows. The composition of those “Europeans” would, however, shift over the decade. As stated, an increasing number came from the former Yugoslavia, particularly after the various Balkan Wars began in 1991. In addition, between 1987 and 1989, even as migrant ethnic Germans flooded West German schools, Polish asylum seekers also made the journey, making up between 20 and 30 percent of the total number of asylum applicants. While these total numbers were not nearly as high as those for the ethnic Germans (48,419 in 1987; 140,226 in 1988; and 250,340 in 1989 from Poland (see Table 8.1), the clear similarities between these migrant groups and those entering as Germans or through processes of family reunification led to question of whether these groups should be treated differently or not.

In contrast, only a relatively small portion of asylum seekers came from Africa (7.7 percent in 1980 and 11 percent in 1985). Even then, official statistics were misleading, as the Federal Republic of Germany included Afghanistan, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka under “Africa.”\textsuperscript{68} Regardless of their point of origin in Africa or the Middle East, the West German authorities treated these groups (as well as those from Turkey, despite their official label as “European”) as “others.”


\textsuperscript{68} I have no idea why the Federal Republic’s officially statistics include these countries as “African.”
As the proportion of migrants from “Africa” increased to 12.5 percent of the overall total in 1990 (24,210 of 193,063) and continued to grow, parts of the ethnic-German majority population reacted poorly and a mostly right-wing minority sometimes violently. It was here that the effect of the 1990 unification pronounced itself loudly. Asylum policy dictated that the state spread asylum seekers across the country in order to limit the burden of any one location. Placing asylum seekers in the former Eastern Länder as well as the former Western Länder brought many East Germans into contact with “non-European foreigners” for the first time. Coming from diverse cultural backgrounds, these groups of migrants were often visibly different from the ethnic-German majority and targeted by right-wing extremists. In August 1992, in Rostock-Lichtenhagen in Mecklenburg, the problem was thrown into stark relief during four days of rioting involving groups of hundreds of right-wing extremists. During the riots, participants burnt down an asylum center while thousands of their neighbors stood by cheering.69

Restricting locations where asylum seekers could live and/or placing them in centers not only gave right-wing extremists a concentrated target but it also directly affected asylum seekers’ access to education.70 Laws and regulations regarding the right to residence combined with compulsory schooling laws limited children’s access to public schools as well as programs for mother language or cultural maintenance. The majority of the Länder had worded their compulsory schooling laws to cover any children with legal or common residence (“gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt”) in the area. The legal phrase was, however, ambiguous, and left the

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status of some groups unclear. In several Länder, the Ministries of Education were uncertain as to whether or not (and which) specific groups of asylum seekers’ children were included. Because of that legal ambiguity, the majority of the Länder had only partial coverage, if any. Some children, including many asylum seekers and those sans papiers (without papers), simply fell through the cracks.

In the late 1980s, only two of the eleven West German Länder, Hesse and Lower Saxony, clearly included some asylum children under their compulsory schooling laws. Lower Saxony’s rules indirectly included parts of this heterogeneous group by specifying that any children who had their legal residence for at least five days in the state were covered. The Hesse Ministry of the Interior, in contrast, explicitly included asylum seekers who applied for asylum at the Regional Municipality under compulsory schooling law for the duration of the proceedings as of 1980. Those children in refugee camps, however, were not to be included. In consequence, both Länder, while including more asylum seekers under compulsory schooling law than the other Länder, still only instituted partial coverage.

The issue of asylum seekers’ explicit inclusion under compulsory schooling laws had been raised through the 1960s and 1970s, but usually brushed aside, in part because it affected

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71 KMK, “Ergebnis einer Umfrage in den einzelnen Budnesländern zur Schulpflicht für Kinder von Asylbewerbern” (KMK, 1990), B 304/7773, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. In Hesse, those children in refugee camps did not fall under compulsory schooling.

72 There was also a problem of under-age refugee children living alone. Hesse recommended creating a nation-wide program to place these children in occupational programs (Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, “Drucksache 11/158: Situation unbegleiteter minderjähriger Ausländer/innen in Berlin” (Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, February 21, 1991)).

too few children or was considered unimportant. For example, when the question was raised regarding the “boat people” from Vietnam in the 1970s, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministries of the Interior and Education agreed that the trauma experienced by children or families applying for asylum negated any need for schooling. These children had already undergone horrific experiences in their places of origin, followed by the shock of migration. There was, according to these Ministries, no need to immediately force these children to begin attending schools in a strange country and subject them to the suffering associated with learning a new school system. Particularly when it was unclear that these children would remain in West Germany.\(^\text{74}\)

In addition, the establishment of asylum in (West) Germany promoted confusion regarding the children’s exact legal status, which added to the problem of ensuring the right to education.\(^\text{75}\) As the Berlin government described in 1986 (and the KMK agreed), there were three clear groups of children of asylum seekers. The first, around twelve percent, were those whose applications had officially been accepted. This group had a clear right to residency in West Germany and (usually) fell under compulsory schooling laws. But the picture became muddied with the second group: those who were as of yet unrecognized. Within this group, there were children who would likely remain only two to three or up to six weeks in a refugee camp. The Berlin government felt that these children should not fall under compulsory schooling requirements. But this group also included children of asylum seekers who, on account of quota distributions, sometimes had to wait up to two years for processing. The third group made the situation even more complicated. This group, the largest at approximately seventy percent,


included those asylum seekers whose asylum applications had been denied, but whose residency in West Germany was permitted for “humanitarian reasons.” These individuals were allowed to remain in Berlin or the other Länder for up to eight years and were not (usually) actively deported thereafter.76

As the number of asylum seekers rose in the mid-1980s, the Länder Ministries of Education re-addressed the issue of compulsory schooling in response to political and social outcry as well as internal concerns. It was one thing to allow a few dozen or even a hundred to stay out of school, but thousands of children? Politicians, particularly from the Green Party, raised concerns about the asylum seekers’ equal treatment and school care.77 For example, over 1986 and 1987 members of the Alternative Liste in West Berlin requested information from the CDU-FDP Senate about the equal treatment and school care of the children of asylum seekers, pointing out that these children had the right to education. The Berlin Senator for Education consistently responded that measures were being taken, citing numbers of teachers hired and classes opened. Changes to compulsory education were not immediately on the agenda.78

The Länder were divided on the advisability of changing their individual laws to extend coverage to asylum seekers. Many Länder Ministries of Education felt that inclusion might lead to legal difficulties, such as with liabilities.79 Others argued for partial coverage. Baden-Württemberg’s CDU-controlled Ministry of Education, for example, supported the idea of

76 Ibid.


compulsory schooling specifically for those children who remained despite the rejection of their asylum application. SPD-governed North Rhine-Westphalia briefly moved in that direction, claiming that private groups (including the churches) could no longer carry associated costs on account of the significant increase. Similarly, Bavaria, governed by the CSU, extended its compulsory schooling specifically to its center for asylum seekers in Zirndorf, which had its own primary and lower secondary school (*Volksschule*).\(^80\) Regardless of their individual decisions, by 1989 each of those Länder Ministries of Education without clear compulsory schooling laws agreed to (usually) permit voluntary school attendance on the grounds that “something needed to be done for the children.”\(^81\)

The question of the right to education for asylum seekers and equal education access included the issue of support and integration programs. Addressing the issue in 1988, the *Kultusministerkonferenz’s “Subcommittee on Instruction for Foreign Schoolchildren*” debated how best to serve this legal group. As discussed above, representatives briefly considered putting asylum children from Eastern Europe in the same classes as ethnic-German migrants, a possibility which was quickly vetoed. Representatives decided instead that including asylum children under regulations for “equal integration help” and the support programs outlined in the KMK’s 1976 Recommendations would be a better fit.\(^82\) The Subcommittee’s members agreed that asylum children would benefit from German and mother tongue instruction, when

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\(^80\) KMK, “Ergebnis einer Umfrage in den einzelnen Bundesländern zur Schulpflicht für Kinder von Asylbewerbern.”

\(^81\) *Ibid.*

\(^82\) For more on “gleichen Eingliederungshilfen,” see Hermann, “35. Sitzung des USAuslS,” 2–3. Namely, in the revision of the guidelines for the “Instruction for the Children of Foreign Workers” from 8 April 1976 (with revisions in 1979) for the children of foreign workers is planned. For this group, the regulations for equal integration assistance (*Eingliederungshilfen*) and support-programs were of more relevance. Yet, in contrast to ethnic German migrants, as asylum seekers, these groups’ continued residence was often in question. In addition, these children’s education in their countries of origin could not be equated.
convenient. Nonetheless, while the Subcommittee felt that asylum seekers were supposed to be
treated on an equal basis with other ethno-national minority schoolchildren, asylum children’s
legal status resulted in a sharp differentiation in treatment.

For those asylum seekers who did fall under compulsory schooling laws, the Länder Ministries of Education theoretically agreed to provide German language training and access to integration programs. After all, the Länder’s understanding of the right to education demanded integration support in order to enable asylum seekers to attend (West) German schools, as did the United Nation’s Refugee Act. Despite the KMK’s Subcommittee-proposed extension of the KMK’s 1976 Recommendation’s programs to asylum seekers, however, asylum seekers seldom had full access. Even when the Länder Ministries of Education stipulated that specific groups were supposed to receive German language support, there were significant difficulties in the provision of it. Insufficient funding and materials compounded the already complicated legal situation. It was not uncommon that Länder dictated that the children’s attendance “could be postponed for half a year on account of adverse conditions” (i.e. limited teachers).

When agreeing that the children should receive native language support, the Subcommittee’s representatives approached these children paradoxically as a single, if “very heterogeneous group.” They quickly found that their diversity complicated the provision of native language and cultural instruction. Asylum groups spoke dozens of languages, meaning that the Länder needed teachers trained in those languages already in Germany as they could hardly request that the country of origin send teachers. Furthermore, despite the United Nation’s Refugee Act stipulating that asylum seekers and refugees receive cultural support, the Länder usually only even tried to provide measures for cultural maintenance to groups with citizenship

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in former guest worker countries. This contingent was hardly insignificant. Together, citizens from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia made up over 30 percent of the total asylum seekers (and had since 1987).\textsuperscript{84} Groups from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey – once in possession of some sort of legal residency – were theoretically entitled to receive instruction in the official language and culture of their country of origin in public schools on the same basis as their fellow citizens. But these two diverse groups were not the majority of asylum seekers and that majority usually only received cultural assistance from private groups, if anything. Lower Saxony and Sachsen-Anhalt did include Croatian children in compulsory schooling instruction, but the other \textit{Länder} only accepted them into schools for “humanitarian reasons.”\textsuperscript{85}

Even when the \textit{Länder} governments were willing, the mandated dispersal of asylum families throughout the country led to difficulties achieving the minimums necessary for setting up support classes.\textsuperscript{86} Several \textit{Länder}, like North Rhine-Westphalia, tried to offload responsibility, encouraging private associations and groups to establish educational programs.\textsuperscript{87} Some \textit{Länder}, like Berlin (governed by a SPD and AL coalition between 1989 and 1991), arguing that programs for cultural instruction were advisable in order to ease return for larger groups, agreed to establish voluntary extra programs. These voluntary extra programs, however, were only established upon parental application, necessitating the asylum seekers’ familiarity

\textsuperscript{84} With the exception of 1990.


\textsuperscript{86} In some Länder, this was intentional (Herbert, \textit{Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland}, 286–307).

\textsuperscript{87} Hermann, “26. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 9–10. Walter (NRW) pointed out that many of the responsible parties were not prepared to support the costs of the voluntary school attendance of this growing number of children. For this reason, in NRW there was a tendency to move toward including specific groups of asylum seekers under compulsory schooling law.
with Berlin law.\textsuperscript{88} Given that the majority of their guardians were unaware of the possibility, that stipulation was paramount to denial.

Responding to the growth of new migration through asylum, some of the \textit{Länder} did eventually change their compulsory schooling laws in the early 1990s. As of 1 January 1991, Berlin’s new compulsory schooling law came into effect, establishing a legal basis for the inclusion of asylum seekers. Bavaria also changed its laws to include the children of asylum seekers. In contrast, Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland-Pfalz did not rewrite their school laws, continuing to permit asylum children’s enrollment “for humanitarian reasons” on a voluntary basis.\textsuperscript{89} Lower Saxony still included most children under its compulsory schooling laws, but reported that the children of asylum seekers in asylum homes did not fall under compulsory schooling.\textsuperscript{90}

Nonetheless, many migrant schoolchildren with refugee status continued to receive mixed treatment across Germany. For example, the \textit{Länder} Ministries of Education agreed in 1992 that the 1,600-1,800 refugee children from Bosnia-Herzegovina arriving on rescue transports should be encouraged to integrate, as the duration of their residency in the Federal

\textsuperscript{88} While acceptance into schools for younger schoolchildren was possible, youths 16 years of age or older faced often-insurmountable difficulties. Because of their status, these youths could rarely take part in vocational programs or any other relevant measures, such as those provided by the MBSE (KMK, “Ergebnis einer Umfrage in den einzelnen Budnesländern zur Schulpflicht für Kinder von Asylbewerbern”; and Senatsverwaltung für Schule, Berufsbildung und Sport, “Ausführungsvoorschriften über den Unterricht für Ausländische: Kinder und Jugendliche,” \textit{Dienstblatt des Senats von Berlin, Teil III, Wissenschaft und Kunst, Schulwesen}, no. 11 (May 24, 1984)).

\textsuperscript{89} For more on the specific school laws, see Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAausIS,” 5. In Bremen, asylum children now fell under compulsory schooling law as soon as it was clear that they would be remaining in the state. Schleswig Holstein had also changed its laws to include asylum children in its new school laws as of 1 January 1990.

\textsuperscript{90} Lohmar, “51. Sitzung des UAausIS,” 10–11. Among the new members of the Sub-Committee, Mecklenburg-Vorpommerns reports that the children of asylum seekers had a right, but not requirement to attend school. In Sachsen Anhalt the children could on request. In January 1993, Sachsen-Anhalt would start the process of redoing their compulsory schooling law, see Lohmar, “52. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 20./21. Januar 1992 im Sport- und Kongresszentrum, 1992 Berlin,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, March 2, 1993), Pt. 10.6, B 304/7776, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
Republic was uncertain. But across the country material support was grossly insufficient. In addition, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein were the only Länder in which they were included under compulsory schooling. In Lower Saxony, they tried to handle the situation by gathering the children together for instruction, placing them in primary schools, lower secondary schools (Hauptschule), or in comprehensive schools (Gesamtschule), but classes were generally overfull. At least these children received some immediate support, more than in most of the other Länder.91

Part of the problem was that compulsory schooling still only came into effect (and general school attendance was only possible) after the children had been assigned to a municipality for temporary residence. Several Länder (including Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, Bremen, Hesse, and Rhineland-Pfalz) reported in 1992 that those children of asylum seekers housed in central, short-term residences were not receiving an education as they were not officially registered in the community.92 Even though Berlin placed asylum seekers and their children immediately into “transitional residences,”93 the Berlin Senator for Education reported in 1992 that school attendance was irregular.94 Even with legal and supposedly humanitarian provisions, there continued to be administrative as well as material problems with broader inclusion in schools and the guarantee of the right to education.

91 Lohmar, “51. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 23. There were two groups, one that arrived with Hhilfstransporten – including Bosnian refugees applying for asylum.

92 Lohmar, “50. Sitzung des UAauslS,” Pt. 11.4. Rhineland-Pfalz (and Sachsen) reported that also in some of the collective centers, some level of instruction was being offered (Ibid., Pt. 11.3). In accordance with the local Landesmeldegesetzes.


The Länder’s emphasis on official papers and legal status combined with limited resources meant that thousands of children of asylum seekers did not receive the education to which they were supposedly entitled. International law dictated that the children have access to schools and that the right to an education meant inclusion under compulsory schooling laws. Local interpretations of the right to an education agreed. Yet, Länder and Federal efforts to discourage asylum seekers from entering or remaining in the country led to hundreds or thousands of children positioned outside of school laws. The severe limitations on where asylum seekers could live as well as what employment they could engage in often resulted in a legal status where families could not register with local cities and consequently did not fall under the relevant school laws. Further lack of resources meant that those Länder and cities willing to create programs for these children often (necessarily) delayed implementation, resulting in months (or longer) without any access to schools.95

Instead of reforming practices of exclusion, the Federal Republic revised its constitution in 1993 with its so-called Asylum Compromise. The changes, negotiated between the ruling CDU/CSU-FDP government and the SPD (the main opposition), abolished unconditional access to asylum procedure. As of 1993, asylum seekers from “safe third states” could be deported without a hearing. Furthermore, applicants from countries the Federal Republic deemed “free of persecution” were subjected to a simplified asylum procedure that usually meant cases were immediately rejected and subjected the asylum seeker to possible deportation. As a result, the number of asylum seekers arriving yearly did drop, but the care of those permitted to stay did not necessarily improve.96

95 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 286–307.

The changes to asylum law and continued restrictions on asylum seekers’ access to schools reflected trends across the European Union. With the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and later developments, the European Union began to regulate asylum collectively, making entry more difficult. For those school-age asylum seekers who did make it into the country and were not immediately deported, most of the EU Member States’ laws extended the right to education for foreigners generally. The realization of that right for asylum seekers and refugees, however, was often written into the books but not actually implemented. As in the Federal Republic, the reasons varied. Some argued that the children should not be compelled to attend school for humanitarian reasons. Others simply did not have the materials to implement the guaranteed support classes. Yet, during the 1950s and later discussions of what the right to education meant, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Community (now European Union) and local groups all agreed that the realization of the right to education required compulsory schooling. The discrepancy between claims and practice begs the question of


whether German practices actually denied this group of children the right to education instead of ensuring it.\textsuperscript{100}

State-Language Instruction and the Breakdown of Yugoslavia

Even as the \textit{Länder} reconfirmed their commitment to offering only official state-language instruction to former guest worker countries’ citizens in public schools, their resolve was tested. In particular, the slow dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Balkan Wars brought up several issues for the \textit{Länder} regarding the proper schooling of the approximately 130,000 former Yugoslav citizens within their borders (see Table 8.3). As the old communist state splintered and new state governments formed, the individual \textit{Länder} and Federal Government asked each other how they were supposed to interact with these new government entities and the individuals whose citizenship status was in flux. Should a foreign state – such as Croatia – be permitted to send teachers if that state had not yet been officially recognized by the Federal government? Were these states, once part of a guest worker country, even entitled to have foreign language and native language instruction in public schools? Furthermore, what about those foreign citizens who did not necessarily belong to the new states’ ethnic majority, particularly in light of the violence shocking the world? Unsurprisingly, the answers to these questions depended on the individual \textit{Länder} (in regards to the programs they had in place as well as their leadership) and the specific ethnic and/or national group in question.

Yugoslavia had had a complicated cultural relationship with West Germany as a guest worker country. As a communist state, the Federal Republic had been wary of signing a bilateral

labor treaty and then cultural agreement. Nonetheless, it did both in the late 1960s. Over the next decades, the two states would create multiple two and three-year programs outlining their cultural relationship. In 1974, as part of that cultural exchange, the two countries agreed to meet almost yearly to discuss the school instruction of children with Yugoslav citizenship living in West Germany. For both countries, the issue was pressing, as by the end of the 1970s Yugoslavian citizens made up the second largest national group in West Germany (see Table 8.3 for 1985-1992).\(^{101}\)

As a guest worker country, the children of Yugoslav citizens were entitled to receive mother tongue and cultural instruction in West German public schools. But, from the beginning, the acknowledged heterogeneity of the Yugoslav population raised complications for West German school authorities in setting up the classes. Many individuals did, in fact, understand themselves as ‘Yugoslav,’ but others viewed themselves as ‘Croatian,’ ‘Serbian,’ etc. Yet, these labels did not necessarily mean that members the specific groups spoke the same languages or wanted their children to learn them. In the 1970s, the Yugoslav consular classes that were eventually established provided different language instruction depending on the makeup of a specific immigrant group, parental preference, and available teachers from Yugoslavia (see Table 7.2). The children in the classes were often “mixed,” coming from households speaking Croatian, Serbian, or both (or another language altogether).\(^{102}\) Because of the languages’

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\(^{102}\) Auswärtige Amt, “Deutsch-jugoslawische Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Fragen der Beschulung jugoslawischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.”
similarities, this solution was usually viewed as perfectly acceptable by the educational authorities as well as the parents involved.

As the Yugoslav state began to shatter at the end of the 1980s, however, the question arose of what was to happen to these teachers and classes, particularly as the affected children in West German schools numbered approximately one hundred thousand (see Table 8.3). When the Greek government had collapsed in 1967 and then again in 1974, its new governments had still understood themselves to be “Greek,” as had new Spanish and Portuguese governments in the late 1970s. Here, in contrast, there was no one entity replacing the Yugoslav government, but first a whittling away and then disintegration into nine state entities. Contestation over borders and national belonging turned vicious, as both ethnic and national identification became politically contentious.  

Table 8.3: Children in the West German Länder Schools by Citizenship, 1985-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Portuguese</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Yugosl.</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>667,200</td>
<td>41,495</td>
<td>69,136</td>
<td>12,157</td>
<td>20,047</td>
<td>331,592</td>
<td>85,148</td>
<td>107,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>684,470</td>
<td>38,609</td>
<td>69,380</td>
<td>11,682</td>
<td>18,909</td>
<td>335,953</td>
<td>89,090</td>
<td>120,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>707,503</td>
<td>37,398</td>
<td>70,470</td>
<td>11,667</td>
<td>17,804</td>
<td>344,642</td>
<td>93,039</td>
<td>132,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>760,259</td>
<td>38,024</td>
<td>71,751</td>
<td>11,249</td>
<td>15,815</td>
<td>358,496</td>
<td>102,942</td>
<td>161,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>779,662</td>
<td>37,063</td>
<td>71,225</td>
<td>11,069</td>
<td>14,439</td>
<td>363,206</td>
<td>102,527</td>
<td>180,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>799,875</td>
<td>37,347</td>
<td>70,257</td>
<td>10,973</td>
<td>13,315</td>
<td>360,912</td>
<td>107,670</td>
<td>199,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>837,014</td>
<td>37,404</td>
<td>69,148</td>
<td>10,942</td>
<td>12,223</td>
<td>359,609</td>
<td>131,808</td>
<td>215,880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In West Germany, the changes to (the former) Yugoslav state had important repercussions on the schoolchildren’s access to mother tongue classes. In 1990, the Yugoslav Embassy and representatives from the Croatian government met with the Bavarian Ministry of Culture—as well as with Baden-Württemberg and Hesse—about the instruction of children with “Croatian ancestry” in native language and culture by Croatian teachers. For the German Länder, the answer to accepting teachers was not a simple diplomatic concern, particularly as the country had not been recognized (but likely would be) and any answer would be extended to Slovenia as well. But then, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia already offered Croatian instruction, which they planned to continue. Berlin, in turn, agreed to establish a Croatian private school, which was to open its doors on 1 October 1990.

In April 1992, the Federal Republic of Germany recognized the Croatian and Slovenian states, which made the Länder Education Administrations’ relationships with their governments easier. The Länder expressed their willingness to begin or continue offering the relevant official state languages. Baden-Württemberg was prepared to contribute to children with Croatian or Slovenian citizenship’s educations as dictated by Baden-Württemberg’s current rules. Berlin promised no financial support, but did agree to provide rooms at no charge (as per its standard agreements). In contrast, North Rhine-Westphalia (along with Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and

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Rhineland-Pfalz) each declared that they would provide instruction in the languages the parents of “the children with Yugoslav ancestry” preferred, regardless of current citizenship status.\textsuperscript{108}

North Rhine-Westphalia’s decision contravened the KMK and individual Ministries of Educations’ guidelines. Technically, only citizens of a specific nation-state were supposed to attend that state’s consular courses. As the decisions over the Kurdish language had shown, those courses were only supposed to be offered in the official language of state. Even though neither the state representatives from Slovenia or Croatia raised concerns, in 1992 the representative for Hesse, Jungblut, raised the issue of which children should attend consular instruction, pointing out that there were multiple ways to define a group.\textsuperscript{109} For children from the former Yugoslavia, labels could be given based on national citizenship or language group. As the lines between them did not fall clearly, Jungblut felt that the only children who should attend consular instruction were those children who belonged to both groups (legal and linguistic). It might be unfortunate, but the remaining children were simply to fall through the cracks.\textsuperscript{110}

Adding difficulties to the provision of native language and cultural instruction for minority children in the Federal Republic, the viciousness of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia led to the 1992 UN Embargo (Resolution 757). The Embargo dictated that no monies could be given to the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”\textsuperscript{111} The Länder

\textsuperscript{108} Children from other former-Yugoslav territories received different treatment than those children with Croatian or Slovenian citizenship. Albanian instruction, for example, for children was almost categorically denied (Lohmar, “50. Sitzung des UAausIS,” 6–8). It was decided that in the Ländern in which children with Yugoslav ancestry – irrespective of their citizenship – based on the desire of the parents and the possibilities based on available resources, are instructed partly in homogenen (usually Croatian), and partly in heterogenious groups.

\textsuperscript{109} Gerd Jungblut, who would publish multiple articles on the issue of multicultural and intercultural education, was the representative for Hesse.

\textsuperscript{110} Lohmar, “51. Sitzung des UAausIS,” 10–12.

were forced to ask about the legality of continued financing of native language classes for those Länder that generally gave grants to the relevant consulates for running the instruction (i.e. Baden-Württemberg). It was much less of an issue for those Länder who had taken control of the courses in the 1960s. After consulting with various lawyers, the Kultusministerkonferenz determined that Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein could continue giving the relevant Consulates and Embassies subsidies for the schoolchildren’s instruction in Germany, as the Embargo’s language forbade giving support to officials in Yugoslavia, but not to Yugoslavian officials abroad. According to the Länder, it was important that these schoolchildren already in Germany not have their rights removed because of the Embargo on the country abroad.112

The question of how to identify and deal with the schoolchildren who had possessed citizenship from the former Yugoslavia and had citizenship from one of the successor states demonstrates the continued importance of national identification and citizenship. Despite the West German emphasis on ethnic, religious, and other minority categorization, the Federal Republic continued to grant rights depending on their specific legal categorization. Their willingness to fund native language and cultural instruction depended, in part, on the foreign state’s willingness to emphasize a specific language and cultural capital. For many politicians, the ambiguity of national identification was unacceptable. To receive state support in Germany, children needed to be all or nothing.

Conclusion

Between 1987 and 1992 new immigrants came predominantly from countries outside of the European Community, often arriving as asylum seekers. In the mid-1970s, the majority of the EC Member States argued that Third Country nationals should be treated the same as Member State nationals. By the end of the 1980s, in contrast, supporters of that argument numbered far fewer, in part because of that change in migration patterns. The conservative stance of many European Community Member State nationals exacerbated that balance, as those conservative governments argued against providing any extra services. Instead of funding school initiatives with the goal of reaching all children, EC Member State nationals or not, the European Community emphasized program development only for Member State Nationals. The European Community did, however, encourage its member states to support multilingualism, in part because of easier exchange but also to encourage economic development. That encouragement combined with its promotion of compatible national identification under the rubric of “European” led to a de-emphasis on national identity.

An acceptance of Europeanness combined with obvious diversity within specific ethno-national groups, including the German, led the Länder Ministries of Education to acknowledge the existence of regional and minority identifications instead of only national ones. Acknowledging that many foreign nationals were not part of the ethnic majority of the country of origin paved the way toward recognition that a child’s mother tongue might not be a state language. Given that part of the question here is if the children themselves identify with the language in the so-called “native language classes.” The KMK acknowledged the political and

social importance of the terminology and questioned its use, particularly as national languages do not necessarily reflect a child’s own family practices (see, for example, Yugoslavia).

Changes in migration across the European Community and West Germany led, in part, to the question – once again – of whether Germany was a country of immigration. The members of the Ministries of Education, working on the issue of foreign children, argued that the Federal Republic was clearly and unequivocally a country of immigration. They further agreed that the size of the country’s minority groups meant that “mother tongue” instruction needed to be a normal part of the instruction for ethnic minorities. The different Ministries of Education, however, were unsure how to address the issue, given “political connotations.” And, unsurprisingly, implementation posed an issue.

Yet, even as the Länder representatives argued that native language instruction was vital, they treated ethnic-German migrants, asylum seekers, and established ethno-national minority groups differently. While discussing new German migrants, the Länder Ministries of Education emphasized integration. For established groups specifically from former guest worker countries, the Länder agreed that these children were entitled to and should receive support for native language instruction – but only as a state language – and some integration classes were necessary. For asylum seekers, however, the Länder debated whether they should bring some under compulsory schooling laws at all. While the government claimed that all children should have equal educational opportunities, as soon as any specific groups were mentioned, that equality fell apart. Looking at groups of ethnic Germans, foreign citizens, and asylum seekers, the Ministers of Education did not pretend to treat children equally. Depending on their legal status in the country, they received different forms of support and had different rights. Not

equality of opportunity. Education administrations and state officials rationalized different
treatment and implementation of programs to ensure equality of opportunity for diverse groups.
All children might have a right to an equal education, but resources were limited, and someone
was going to get cut.115

To some extent, the (West) German Ministries of Education’s stance was premised on the
assumption that someone else would take care of the question of morality. The existence of the
European Community and the Council of Europe, as well as other institutions, in some ways
lightened the local load. As long as these institutions listed Germany as possessing a good record
in comparison to other Member States, the majority of the West German Ministries decided they
did not have to significantly revise their stances. Particularly not when the Italian and Greek
governments hesitated to provide any support at all for their new waves of migrants.116 By
mostly fulfilling directives established ten or more years prior, the comparison implied that
(West) Germany was doing a good job.

Citizenship status continued to influence the realization of the right to education and
equality of opportunity. Some Länder rules still subjected foreign children to caps on the
acceptable percentage of non-Germans in regular instruction. Furthermore, studies began to
show that teachers were less likely to promote foreign or minority pupils into higher levels of
secondary school than visibly ethnic-German children. While hardly policy, these practices
contributed to discrepancies in access. Where officials determined that the children of the
different groups of migrants belonged influenced what their rights were and under what

115 For an excellent discussion of “the school education of the children of minorities” from 1989-1999 in Germany
laid out by the individual Länder, see Ingrid Gogolin, Ursula Neumann, and Lutz-Rainer Reuter, eds., Schulbildung

116 For a discussion of the measures other European Community Member States implemented for their migrant and
conditions they could exercise them. The legal categorization of the different children meant that their exact rights changed, regardless of the idea that human rights were individual rights and should be ensured for each.
CONCLUSION: MIGRATION AND EDUCATION

In West Germany and across Europe, 65 years of debates and policies have not provided a single, clear-cut answer to the question of how to guarantee the right to education for all children or best educate migrant children. Instead, the question continues to be regularly revived and reconsidered with the arrival of new migrant groups. The repeated explorations of the issue over the last decades have suggested divergent problems and proposed different solutions, from consular, preparatory, and special support classes for mother language and cultural instruction or integration to teacher training and curriculum development – depending on the aims and agenda.

What can this interdisciplinary and transnational study, combining the history of migration and education research with a discourse and public policy analysis, contributes to the many earlier explorations by politicians, education experts and other parties involved? What then, does looking at 40 years of school policies and programs for migrant children in West Germany between 1949 and 1992 demonstrate if not continual failure? Foremost, I argue that it shows that access to education is dependent on the importance of the form of migration and the migrant's citizenship status. Demonstrating that claim, I will lay out four points to take from this dissertation, showing that while there has not been unqualified success, there have been some improvements to the situation.

My first claim is the most obvious: new groups with new concerns continue to migrate, making a single fix to the “problem of education for migrants” impossible. As of 1997, the
European Bundestag has argued that there is no way to entirely stop migration. Even with the establishment of “Fortress Europe,” new migrant groups, be they labor migrants, asylum seekers, or people who migrate for other reasons, continue to travel across state boundaries. The individuals in each group arrive with their own diverse cultures, religions, and languages as well as concerns and hopes regarding their futures. In consequence, there cannot be a single, perfect solution to education for every past, present, and future migrant group. What is feasible is the establishment of regulations setting out a framework for schooling in order to enable an Educational Administration to act quickly to meet new groups’ needs.

Second, this project demonstrates the tension between legal status and the right to education. Ideally, promoting Universal Human Rights means that all children have the right to education. Over half a century of international collaboration defines that universal right as meaning that all children have a right to a primary or basic education and should have access to secondary schooling. For European Union Member State governments, all children should have the same access to schooling, regardless of their ancestry, citizenship, socio-economic status, gender, or any other factor. The German state too, claims that children have a right to equality of opportunity and therefore all children should have full access to all levels of the education system. Because education is a positive right, all children have to be compelled to attend, meaning universal inclusion under compulsory schooling law.

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Yet while European directives and the German Basic Law have anti-discrimination clauses about ancestry, gender, and socio-economic divides, those clauses do not have stipulations preventing discrimination based on legal status or the possession of paperwork. That gap leaves room for German and European Union directives and policies that prohibit, indirectly, access to schools based on specific citizenship status and form of migration. One example, which this project only briefly addresses, are asylum seekers and undocumented or stateless children. Their situation was and continues to be bleak. Because of immigration laws and quotas, many undocumented or irregular migrants, arriving without state approved paperwork, were and are either unable or afraid to register with local city offices meaning they did and do not possess residency and, in turn, their children were and are sometimes barred from attending schools. That issue of residency also continues to prohibit the education of school age asylum seekers. Asylum children, if they were and are included under compulsory schooling law at all, often could and cannot register as local residents while living in camps or temporary housing, which, again, prevents their school enrollment.

Less blatantly discriminatory, German compulsory schooling laws do cover those migrant children who arrive(d) with approved paperwork, but that inclusion does and does not necessarily mean that they received and receive the same education as either the ethno-national majority or even each other. On the surface these children fell and fall under the same compulsory schooling laws and were and are entitled to the same education. They were and are required to attend public schools and enroll in one of the levels of the segregated secondary school system, which includes a variety of school forms, including Realschulen and comprehensive schools to the Gymnasium. Depending on their citizenship status, place of origin, and legal relationship to the European Union, however, these children have access to different
programs and school initiatives. European Union Member State nationals, for example, have the right to enroll in a variety of exchange and language programs run through the European Union SOCRATES Program, introduced in 1994, and other initiatives. Third country nationals (non-EU Member State nationals), in contrast, are excluded from these initiatives unless the country of citizenship government is a candidate country. Not only are they ineligible for many European Union-funded programs, but their citizenship status often prevents them from participating in local exchanges that would violate their terms of residence or require reentry.

In Germany specifically, the differentiation in legal status also provides room for segregation and social othering. Citizenship and legal status not only influence migrant children’s right and access to education, but also how a government views their right to state support. On a basic level, local Education Administrations, like those in Berlin, use legal difference to separate children into classes based on their citizenship status (i.e. German or non-German). These “pure foreigner classes” are not designed to assist supposed non-German children (often born and raised in Germany), but instead support German children. The Berlin Senator for Education continues to argue that while all children have a right to education, German citizens have more of a claim to state resources.

Adding to that challenge, local Education Administrations, like those in Berlin, the economic and social composition of neighborhoods and a rise of private schools, for which parents often have to pay a school fee, creates further segregation in public schools. The schools in neighborhoods with predominately ethnic-German school children from wealthier

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families often receive better resources. Families with children attending these schools usually assume the children will be tracked into higher levels of secondary schools. In contrast, areas with less money and/or higher minority populations frequently receive less money. Ethnic Germans and many affluent migrant or minority parents often try to move away from the later neighborhoods in acts of what is considered passive discrimination to ensure that their children have supposedly better opportunities. Interestingly, however, ethnic German children are more likely to be transitioned into upper levels of secondary school if they attend schools with large non-German populations.\(^5\)

Furthermore, on a conceptual level, partly because of West Germany’s exclusive citizenship laws and partly due to pressure of the countries of citizenship, for decades the Federal Republic was invested in promoting identification of migrant groups as foreign nationals in order to encourage their return to their country of origin. This official othering and emphasis on residents with non-German citizenship as supposed foreigners led the Ländere to encourage consular classes only partly with an eye towards minority rights. While that right to be a minority should be lauded, the associated sentiment of rejection by the ethno-national majority creates problems with the schooling of migrant children. This policy slowly changed, as this study has shown, since the mid-1980s. But even now that certain children with migrant backgrounds can naturalize, the continued feeling of rejection among – particularly those who are visibly different – minority groups leads to the perception that public services, like schools, are “not for them.”\(^6\)

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My third point regards what the involved foreign governments and minority groups see as appropriate schooling. Countries like (West) Germany do not develop their school laws or educational initiatives in isolation. Some country of citizenship governments are explicitly interested in their foreign citizens' and/or nationals’ education. Many of these governments actively advocate for and invest in their foreign citizens’ schooling because they want their citizens to continue to feel a connection in order to promote financial remittances or encourage eventual return. Other states in the European Union view their foreign nationals as representatives, whose residence abroad influences their international relationships.

The specific perception of nationality and the meaning of citizenship influences a country of citizenship’s participation in its foreign citizens’ education, often dictating what kind of programs the government is willing to advocate and fund. The three West German Länder governments I looked at – Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and West Berlin – exemplify some of those differences also seen between other European Union Member States and non-EU countries from which workers migrate(d). To start with, the Italian government has almost continually since the 1960s pushed identification as both Italian and European. In the 1960s and subsequent decades, Italian state ministers and legates pointed out that being European and part of the European Community almost certainly meant that the bulk of its emigrants were going to remain in their chosen countries of residence – not, however, as migrants but as residents of the European Community. While this identity meant that the children should integrate and become part of local society, it did not necessitate divorcing them from their Italian heritage. Instead, the children were supposed to integrate their experiences in Germany and identify as Italians within a “European” intercultural framework. Not only were Italian children supposed to embrace both, but so were children with German citizenship. After all, the
Italian legations asked, were not both groups of citizens European Community Member State nationals? That trend persists, with the Italian government continuing to support some bilingual schools and after-school language programs.

The Greek Government, in contrast, usually promotes a specifically Greek identity for its citizens. Following a long tradition of establishing diasporas abroad, the Greek government argued between the 1950s and 1980s that its citizens needed access to a full Greek education in order to enable them to be Greek. This was particularly important as, for the bulk of the 40 years under examination in this study, the Greek Government claimed that all of its citizens would someday return to Greece. Even after the state joined the European Community in 1981, the Greek Government claimed that its citizens were Greek first and foremost. For the Greek state, European multiculturalism, in contrast to interculturalism, meant that Greek citizens had the right to continue to be Greek abroad. The Greek government did acknowledge, however, that some of its citizens might not return and hence needed to integrate. Yet even then, the state argued that those citizens who planned to someday return needed access to Greek national private schools. Only the recent economic crisis forced the Greek government to close those schools’ doors.7

The Turkish government initially pushed integration into the West German system in order to promote literacy and participation in the West German labor market. Only in the 1970s and 1980s, when the government in Turkey began to reform its education system and promote turkification, did the Turkish state begin to avidly push a nationalist agenda for its citizens abroad. Following that trajectory, the government initially encouraged integration classes over programs to teach national association. By the time the state decided to push nationalism, a large portion of its school-age foreign citizens were born in Germany, although many continued to

7 Stella Tsolakidou, “Cuts in Operational Costs and Personnel in Greek Schools Abroad,” Greek Reporter, October 25, 2011.
migrate as secondary-school-age children. To promote national identification for both groups, the German and Turkish governments encouraged and often funded Turkish as a first or second foreign language (instead of English) for those older children alongside supporting the usual after-school classes in Turkish culture, history, geography, and religion. Some Turkish legations pushed for private schools, but the issue was usually submerged under more pressing concerns. Nonetheless, in 2010, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan argued that Turkey’s citizens in Germany should have access to Turkish schools, a demand German Chancellor Angela Merkel denied, instead favoring policy promoting integration.8

The important point drawn from the comparison between these three country of citizenship governments’ goals and kinds of programs advocated is twofold. On the one hand, their efforts shaped West German school initiatives for foreign citizens. On the other, these state governments’ willingness to fund specific kinds of programs and make demands on their nationals behalf influenced the choices of their citizens abroad. Without Italian state advocacy, it is unlikely that Italian would be offered in German secondary schools. In turn, Greek private schools cannot survive without Greek state funding. The country of citizen governments then have a direct impact on the kinds of choices their citizens can make. Those choices, in turn, emphasize the difference between the groups, setting them each apart from one other and from the German ethno-national majority. They also promote a sense of community within the groups, promoting nationalism and teaching a form of citizenship that the children might not have otherwise either felt or subscribed to.

My fourth point relates to the school initiatives in West Germany, be they funded locally or by the country of citizenship, and the difficulty of actually defining scholastic success. Partly

in response to international and the country of citizenships’ individual demands (particularly from Italy, Greece, and Turkey as some of the primary countries of citizenship), the West German Educational Administrations designed multiple programs beginning in the 1950s which combined their own goals with those of the relevant foreign states. While implementation differed across the Länder, most of the local Education Administrations offer both integration and consular courses. Among the consular classes, the Länder Education Administrations usually permitted five to ten hours of instruction, during which teachers from the relevant country of citizenship taught language, history, geography, and religion. These classes could, however, only be offered in public schools when the citizenship group in question were so-called guest worker children. Most other minority groups had to form private clubs if they wanted to offer similar instruction for their children. For guest worker children, many of the Länder Education Administrations also encouraged the development of national preparation classes, which were supposed to prepare children to either return to their country of citizenship after a brief stay or integrate into West German schools. After 1970, however, several Education Administrations began switching almost entirely to German intensive integration classes for all children with foreign citizenship, which are still available in a revised form. In addition, the Länder Education Administrations also offered some German language support for children with non-German citizenship enrolled in West German schools.

The combination of both cultural and integration classes offered between the 1960s and 1980s reflected German and European political understanding regarding how migrant and minority children should be educated. On the one hand, promoting the right to education and social order, host country governments wanted minority children to be able to integrate into their societies. To do so, the children needed a standard education (whatever that may be) alongside
local residents. But, in the name of minority rights and arguing that many children would emigrate further or return to their countries of citizenship, the German Federal Government and many Länder governments claimed that the child’s best interest dictated a need for cultural and language classes preparing them to leave. The European Community and most of the governments of the migrant’s countries of citizenships supported this policy. As a result, the majority of the Länder Education Administrations did try, following local regulations, to ensure children had classes to permit both integration and cultural maintenance.

Any measure of success was, however, stymied by the social and political context. Even when trying, the Länder Education Administrations’ efforts were obstructed by social perceptions of identity, material considerations, changing political goals both in Germany and abroad, as well as by shifting definitions of what the right to education entailed. First, the double goal of integration while maintaining their connection to their country of citizenship was a problem, not because either goal was wrong, but because of the social assumption that those two aims were at odds. In the ethno-national majority’s perception between the 1950s and 2000s (and for some today), an individual had to be either German or non-German. Most German – and many European – politicians and educators did not view a combined or hyphenated identity for children with non-German citizenship as possible, making it difficult for children to bridge that gap.

Even without the psychological frustrations, material considerations often meant that even offering the promised classes was unfeasible. In the 1950s and 1960s, West German Education Administrations had a continual shortage of trained personnel to teach the classes they had agreed to offer. Even when there were teachers, the materials (textbooks and workbooks) for lessons frequently did not exist, or there was a lack of space and funding. Today, there are
usually educational materials available, but space and personnel shortages persist, particularly within the first year of any new group’s arrival. The result is that many children often have to wait weeks or months to see the inside of a school. When they are admitted, classes are often overfull or there are material shortages.⁹

Shifting international and local understandings of compulsory school also makes it difficult to ensure access to the appropriate kind of education. At the beginning of the 1950s, compulsory schooling in Germany technically included secondary schooling, but it was not uncommon for children to leave school without completing their school certificates. By the 1960s, however, the Council of Europe pushed secondary schooling for all children, arguing that an individual could not have equal chances in their later lives without it. Technology had irrevocably changed the labor market and without secondary schooling, most vocational tracks would be unavailable. That changing understanding of a minimum education strained programs for integration. The integration classes developed in the 1950s were designed to teach children basic literacy and mathematics, but did not enable migrant children to complete secondary school. In the 1950s, that was completely acceptable as preparation for blue-collar labor. By the end of the 1960s, when secondary school had become an integral part of compulsory schooling, that bar for success meant dropping out was unacceptable. Success in the school system was contingent on completing the secondary school certificate and entrance into vocational training. Hence, the 1950s and 1960s integration programs were, by 1970s standards, abject failures.

The perception of failure was further complicated by continually shifting opinions on the state’s role in education. In the 1950s, the state was responsible for not preventing access to education, but was hardly required to ensure that every supposedly foreign child under its care

actually received equal rights. By the end of the 1960s, in contrast, various advocacy groups and supranational organizations argued that the state’s job was to ensure equal rights extended to everyone. In that mindset, a government was responsible for providing the necessary programs to realize equality. In response, several Länder governments in West Germany implemented in the 1960s and early 1970s diverse pilot projects to try to discover the perfect solution for how to integrate migrants. The global financial recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, however, combined with the perception of a failure of the earlier policy, contributed to ongoing disputes over equal education. As conservative parties took control of many European governments in the 1980s, including the West German, they concluded that state was only responsible for providing the same programs for all children – the children were responsible for taking those programs and succeeding within them.

Judging the Länder Education Administrations’ actions based on their contemporary definitions of education equality and stated goals, implementation still did not usually reflect the stated ideals of a given time period. Indeed, the programs were often successful in keeping migrant and minority schoolchildren off the streets. But integrative programs only rarely prepared these children to “fully participate” in the normal West German classroom and they usually failed at setting children on a supposedly equal level with West German schoolchildren. Furthermore, no matter what local or international law stipulated regarding the right to mother language instruction or intensive German language instruction, the point was often moot without the necessary resources to realize Länder regulations.

The understanding of state responsibility for ensuring equal education access also depended on the specific group in question and the role of the host country in their arrival. For the Federal Republic, the assumption in the 1940s and 1950s that the state had to compensate for
the Nazi past led the Federal Government and the Länder governments to support cultural programs and school access for DPs and some ethnic refugee groups from Eastern Europe. In the 1960s and 1970s, the invitations extended for migrant labor meant that West Germany was responsible for the social care of those workers and their families. The legacy of that responsibility and regulations written into the School Laws of the Länder sustained that accountability. For other migrant groups like asylum seekers (e.g. children from what is now Albania), however, the West German Länder denied any responsibility for their education beyond basic integration classes. That approach has persisted, meaning that the German state views itself responsible for returning citizens and even European Union Member State nationals, but less so for asylum seekers.

Regardless of disappointing levels of success and only partial implementation, some success is still better than none. In the end, it is better to try than to ignore the problems. The result of doing nothing is abject failure. A majority of the children in the system may have been crushed by it, but some thrived. For some individuals with migrant backgrounds, like German Greens politician Cem Özdemir or movie director Fatih Akın, the programs were instrumental. A minimum then, of what can be done, is to provide full access to schooling for all children, regardless of their legal status in the country or possession of documentation.
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