

AFFECTIVE INFLUENCES IN PERSON-ENVIRONMENT FIT THEORY:
EXPLORING THE ROLE OF AFFECT AS BOTH CAUSE AND OUTCOME OF P-E
FIT

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ABSTRACT

KANG YANG TREVOR YU: Affective Influences in Person-Environment fit Theory:
Exploring the Role of Affect as Both Cause and Outcome of P-E fit
(Under the direction of Jeffrey R. Edwards)

Person-environment (P-E) fit theory is a general framework that has been used extensively to understand thinking and behavior in organizations. However, recent research has highlighted several important issues that compromise our understanding of the P-E fit construct. First, it is widely-assumed that affect is only an outcome of P-E fit. Second, our understanding of the antecedents to P-E fit is severely limited. Third, the non-correspondence between objective and subjective fit components has typically not been accounted for. In a bid to address these issues, this paper presents an expanded model of P-E fit which argues for and explicates a more important role for work-based affect (i.e. moods, emotions, and affective attitudes that are experienced at work) in P-E fit theory. Two perspectives are presented to account for why work-based affect can be a cause of P-E fit. The second part of this project reports on an empirical study that was conducted to investigate the causal effect of work-based affect on P-E fit together with other key relationships proposed by the expanded theory of P-E fit.

To Shan and Fei, the inspirations of my life

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CHAPTER 1

THE P-E FIT CONCEPT

Person-Environment (P-E) fit has typically been defined as the *congruence, match, or similarity between the person and the environment* (Edwards, Caplan & Harrison, 1998; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005). Past research has established the existence of several types of fit. These include fit between the demands of the environment and abilities of the person (Dawis, 1992; Edwards, 1996), fit between individual needs and environmental supplies (Edwards & Harrison, 1993), and fit between organizational values and those of the individual (Cable & Judge, 1996; Chatman, 1991; O'Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991). A variety of positive outcomes have been linked to P-E fit, such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, psychological well-being, turnover, job performance, and citizenship behaviors (Cable & DeRue, 2002; Kristof, 1996; Kristof, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005; Verquer, Beehr & Wagner, 2003).

P-E fit theory

This project revisits person-environment (P-E) fit theory and embellishes it by highlighting the largely unexplored role of affect in P-E fit. This paper presents us with an improved understanding about P-E fit, particularly about the way that P-E fit judgments are made, and about the crucial role that affect plays in these judgments. A brief review of P-E fit theory is first presented before the role of affect in it is discussed.

As illustrated in figure 1, the traditional P-E fit model typically portrays the person (P) and environment (E) as objective and subjective constructs. The objective person

describes characteristics of the person that actually exist. On the other hand, the subjective person refers to the person's perception of his or her own characteristics and attributes (i.e. needs, wants, and values). The objective environment describes physical and social conditions that are independent from the person's perceptions, while the subjective environment refers to the nature of situations and contexts that are experienced and perceived by people (Caplan, 1987a; Edwards et al., 1998; Kristof, 1996). As illustrated in figure 1, P-E fit theory positions objective P and E as causes of their subjective counterparts. The strength of these causal relationships are subject to influence from factors such as social construction processes (Weick, 1979), perceptual biases and distortion (e.g., repression, denial), limited mental capabilities for the processing of information (March & Simon, 1958), and organizational structures and boundaries limiting access to objective information (Caplan, 1987b; Edwards et al., 1998; Harrison, 1978).

P-E fit theory highlights several different relationships that occur between subjective and objective P and E: First, *objective P-E fit* denotes fit between the objective person and the objective environment, whereas *subjective P-E fit* refers to the fit between the subjective person and subjective environment. As for relationships between objective and subjective counterparts, *contact with reality* describes the degree to which the subjective environment corresponds to the objective environment, whereas *accuracy of self-assessment* (also referred to as *accessibility of the self*; French, Rodgers & Cobb, 1974), represents correspondence between the objective person and subjective person (Edwards et al., 1998). Most contemporary treatments of P-E fit view subjective P-E fit as a mediator between objective fit and individual outcomes (Edwards et al., 1998; Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). This perspective follows from the common

understanding that perceptions of reality drive cognitive appraisals of and reactions to specific contexts and situations. Hence, subjective perceptions of P and E likely exert a stronger influence on individual outcomes like satisfaction and commitment compared to objective P and E. Thus, objective fit would only impact individual outcomes if a corresponding fit is perceived by individuals (Edwards et al., 1998; Kristof, 1996).

Issues with P-E fit theory

Assumption of a unidirectional relationship between fit and affect. Though it has been a popular topic of research in the past few decades, several important issues remain unaddressed with P-E fit theory. First, Most theorizing on P-E fit has focused on the causal relationship involving P-E fit leading to positive affective outcomes (Chatman, 1989; Dawis & Lofquist, 1984; Edwards et al., 1998). For instance, O'Reilly et al. (1991) argue that the concept of fit is based on the perspective that “positive responses will occur when individuals fit or match the requirements of a situation” (p. 489). Ideas such as this have invariably led to most empirical studies being framed according to this simplistic but widely accepted “fit leading to positive outcomes” paradigm (Kristof et al., 2005). This common assumption about the relationship between fit and affect constitutes an important issue in P-E fit research because it ignores previous evidence from other research areas that document the ability of affect to influence aspects of the objective and subjective person and environment. For instance, in his work on job satisfaction, Locke (1984) argues that the negative affect stemming from dissatisfaction with one’s job causes people to attempt to modify the source of their dissatisfaction by distorting their perceptions of the environment. Furthermore, cybernetic theories of stress and coping also argue that the negative affect that accompanies perceived discrepancies between the sensed environment and individual

attributes stimulates coping that can involve attempts to change person or environment attributes. Thus, the completeness of our understanding of person-environment fit is compromised if P-E fit research continues to focus only on the unidirectional causal relationship leading from fit to affective outcomes like satisfaction. Rather, a more comprehensive understanding of the nomological network of P-E fit might be achieved if the idea that affect can also cause P-E fit is explicitly considered in P-E fit research.

Antecedents of P-E fit. A second important remaining issue with P-E fit is the lack of understanding about the individual-level antecedents to P-E fit. While some research has focused on how organizational-level human resource policies such as recruitment, selection, and socialization can predict fit among newcomers (Chatman, 1991; Cable & Parsons, 2001; Kim, Cable & Kim, 2005; Kristof-Brown, 2000), little is known about individual level variables that may also influence P-E fit. Furthermore, the exact nature of the influence of organizational policies on P-E fit has also typically been obfuscated by the use of single index measures of fit. These problems stem from a relative lack of theory about the factors that influence objective and subjective components of P-E fit (Edwards et al., 2006; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). That is, referring to the general model of P-E fit in figure 1, P-E fit theory has typically not incorporated descriptions about what predicts objective E and P. Furthermore, aside from their objective counterparts, little is known about what other factors that might drive subjective E and P.

Non-correspondence between objective and subjective fit components Third, P-E research has also typically assumed that subjective perceptions of person (P) and environment (E) are only influenced by objective features of the P and E respectively (Caplan, 1987a; 1987b; Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). As a result, most

empirical research treats any non-correspondence between objective and subjective P and E as error or methodological nuisance. This ignores a vast amount past research which suggest that subjective perceptions of both the environment and the self can be influenced by factors such as the social context, cognitive reconstruction, decision-making biases (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Weick, 1979), and affective experience (Clore, Schwarz & Conway, 1994). Hence, we are left with limited knowledge about how fit judgments are actually made and how situational or personal variables can influence such judgments (Billsberry, Ambrosini, Moss-Jones & Marsh, 2005).

Overall, these three issues constitute a significant dearth in our understanding of the P-E fit construct. By delineating the role of affect in P-E fit theory, this paper attempts to address these issues, and in the process improve our understanding of P-E fit as a theoretical and psychological construct.

CHAPTER 2

WORK-BASED AFFECT

Defining work-based affect

Affect has typically referred to the moods and emotions that people experience (Russell, 1980). In the organizational sciences, affect can also refer to attitudes that contain affective components such as job satisfaction (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Cranny, Smith & Stone, 1992; Katzell, 1964; Locke, 1969; 1984). This paper therefore adopts the term “work-based affect” to refer to moods, emotions, and affective attitudes that are experienced at work. Special emphasis is paid to the term “work-based” because this paper focuses on the type of affect that is specifically either experienced at the workplace or towards work-based targets such as one’s job or organization. Work-based affect is caused by factors from both within the workplace and factors that are exogenous to the workplace. Exogenous or non work-based factors include individual disposition, namely positive and negative affectivity, and also recurring cycles of feelings over time. Work-based causes of affect consist of various phenomena that make up an individual’s work experience such as stressful events, leaders, work group characteristics, physical settings, and organizational rewards and punishments (Brief & Weiss, 2000; p. 287-292).

Work-based affect and current P-E fit research

Most theorizing on P-E fit has focused on the causal relationship involving P-E fit leading to positive outcomes. While various theoretical explanations may exist for this relationship, most of them rely on the key idea that “positive responses will occur when

individuals fit or match the requirements of a situation” (Diener, Larsen & Emmons, 1984; O’Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991; p. 489). For instance, the Theory of Work Adjustment posits that satisfaction follows from successful adjustments that bring individual attributes into correspondence with the environment (Bretz & Judge, 1994 Dawis & Lofquist, 1984). Many studies based on this generally accepted causal relationship have concluded that P-E fit leads to prominent attitudinal outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and organizational identification (Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown et al, 2005).

Notably, many of these common attitudinal outcomes of fit have significant affective components. Past research in their respective areas has argued for or observed the presence of affective components in job satisfaction (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Locke, 1984), organizational commitment (Allen & Meyer, 1990; 1996), and organizational identification (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; Harquail, 1998). Hence, these attitudes and their affective components may be described along the pleasantness-unpleasantness dimension, which underlies the structure of most affective experiences (Burke, Brief, George, Roberson & Webster, 1989; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Pleasantness is usually characterized by positive moods such as content, happy, pleased satisfied and warmhearted, while unpleasantness is commonly associated with feeling blue, grouchy, sad, sorry, and unhappy (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; p.221). Therefore, even though it is seldom mentioned explicitly, work-based affect has usually been treated as an important outcome of P-E fit in a considerable amount of empirical and theoretical research in P-E fit.

CHPATER 3

AN EXPANDED MODEL OF P-E FIT

The model presented in this paper integrates work-based affect into P-E fit theory. It is argued that the role of work-based affect in P-E fit theory should not just be constrained to that of an outcome of fit in the form of affective attitudes. Instead, work-based affect can also be a cause of P-E fit. This new expanded model of P-E fit theory is illustrated in figure 2. As can be seen in figure 2, subjective P-E fit mediates the effects of objective P-E fit on work-based affect, which is commonly observed in the form of attitudinal outcomes with affective components (e.g. job satisfaction). These relationships are consistent with the existing P-E fit theory illustrated in figure 1. Furthermore, work-based affect experienced at an earlier time logically influences work-based affect experienced at a later time. This relationship is in line with previous findings that affect experienced in the form of moods and emotions at an earlier time influenced affective attitudes (e.g. job satisfaction) that were assessed at a later time (Brief, Butcher & Roberson, 1995; Weiss, Nicholas & Daus, 1999). Perhaps most importantly, work-based affect is also represented as an antecedent of both objective and subjective forms of person (P) and environment (E). Hence, work-based affect influences subjective P and E both directly and indirectly, where its indirect effects are mediated by objective P and E.

Addressing highlighted issues in P-E fit theory

This expanded model of P-E fit is particularly useful because it helps us address the three issues in P-E fit that were highlighted earlier. First, explicitly incorporating work-

based affect into P-E theory provides theoretical rationale for why and how the person and environment components of objective and subjective fit are subject to affective influence. In doing so, the role of affect in P-E fit theory is expanded from just an outcome of P-E fit to also being a possible cause of P-E fit. Hence, the expanded model of P-E fit's emphasis on affect as both a cause and an outcome of fit, challenges future research to pay more attention to the issue of causality between P-E fit and affect.

Incorporating work-based affect as a cause of P-E fit also deals with the lack of knowledge about the antecedents to P-E fit. It is now widely accepted that work-based affect influences how people think and behave in organizational situations (Brief, 2001; Brief & Weiss; Forgas & George, 2001; George & Jones, 1997).

By outlining actual processes via which work-based affect impacts the objective and subjective components of P-E fit, this model presents theoretical evidence for an important individual level antecedent to P-E fit.

Last but not least, the current expanded model of P-E fit provides an alternative explanation for the non-correspondence between the objective and subjective forms of the person (P) and environment (E) by explaining how work-based affect can influence subjective perceptions of P and E over and above their objective counterparts. Up to this point, P-E fit theory has typically assumed that subjective perceptions of P and E emerge from a strictly cognitive process whereby objective P and E are their sole antecedents. This assumption is symptomatic of an overly-cognitive view of how judgments are made in actual organizational contexts (Brief, 2001). By explicating the role of affect as a cause of subjective P and E, the current expanded model provides a more realistic account of

nomological network of P-E fit in the potential affective hotbeds of today's organizational situations.

Since it constitutes a new development from the traditional P-E fit theory outlined in figure 1, the central role that work-based affect plays in the expanded model of P-E fit will now be explicated by presenting two perspectives that account for the causal relationships leading from work-based affect to P-E fit. The introduction of these two perspectives is accompanied by detailed literature reviews of past research that serve as the theoretical backbone of these two perspectives. Several general propositions based on the expanded model are then put forth to provide directions for further research. Finally, a study motivated by several of these propositions is presented.

CHAPTER 4

AFFECT AS A CAUSE OF P-E FIT

An affective-consistency perspective

The first perspective presented to account for affective influence on objective and subjective components of P-E fit is called *affective-consistency*. This perspective draws from theories of cognitive consistency and affective influence on social judgment. It proposes that individuals will adjust the environment (E) and person (P) in ways that are consistent with the work-based affect that they experience. Therefore, assuming positive affect is consistent with P-E fit, people experiencing positive work-based affect would adjust E and P so as to achieve fit between the two. This means that Paul, who is currently feeling happy about his job, would be inclined to perceive fit between his need for autonomy and the amount of autonomy that is supplied by his job in order to be consistent with his positive feelings toward his job. Conversely, since negative affect is associated with P-E misfit, people experiencing negative work-based affect would be motivated to have misfit between E and P. Thus, if Paul were to feel distressed about his job instead, he would be more likely to perceive that the amount of autonomy present in his job does *not* fit with the amount which he needs, so that he has consistency between P-E misfit and his negative feelings toward his job. As reflected in figure 2, work-based affect can influence both objective and subjective P-E fit through their respective E and P components. The above examples of Paul describe cases where a person cognitively distorts his perceptions of subjective E and P to be consistent with work-based affect. Alternatively, individuals

may also be motivated to manipulate their objective selves (P) and work environments (E) in order to have P-E fit to be consistent with their feelings. For instance, instead of cognitively distorting his perceptions of E and/or P, Paul could try to change the amount of autonomy that he needs (objective P), or negotiate with his supervisor to change the amount of autonomy that is currently in his job (objective E) so that his P-E fit is in line with work-based affect. The next section reviews the theory and research that underlies the affective consistency perspective.

Theoretical foundations

Affective primacy. The experience of affect makes up an essential component of individuals' work experiences (Forgas & George, 2001; George & Jones, 1997). The affective nature of work attitudes, moods, and emotions is central to the hypothesized causal relationship leading *from* work-based affect *to* P-E fit because evidence suggests that the experience of affect can precede cognition. According to Zajonc (1980; 1984), "objects need to be cognized minimally to arouse affect" (p. 154). It is thus possible that people can feel good about something such as a job or organization before they even know precisely what it is. Results from a large number of experimental studies indicate that people tend to selectively remember their affective reactions to various stimuli. Interestingly, this occurs even when they have no recollection of previous encounters with these stimuli, and also when they have no memory for the reasons underlying their feelings towards these stimuli (Bower & Forgas, 2001; Zajonc, 2000). Therefore, since judgments of self (P) and environment (E) typically require a certain amount of perceptual and cognitive encoding, individuals' experience of work-based affect may precede their judgments of P-E fit. In

other words, individual's experience of affect toward their jobs and organizations could precede their subjective experiences of person-job and person-environment fit.

Cognitive consistency. Another idea that is central to the affective-consistency perspective is that individuals are motivated to have consistency among attributes of the self (e.g. feelings, values, and attitudes) and behavior. Ideas about the desirability of cognitive consistency and the motivation to achieve it feature prominently in various early social psychological theories such as self-consistency theory (Lecky, 1945; 1968); balance theory (Heider, 1958), and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). The basic premise of self-consistency theory is that people's self concepts consist of an organized set of congruent self perceptions integrated into a coherent whole (Lecky, 1968). People are motivated to act in ways that are congruent with their understanding of themselves in order to maintain self-consistency (Elliot, 1986; p. 207-208). This preference for self-consistency is echoed in the organizational sciences by Korman (1970; 1976) who argues in his consistency theory of work behavior that individuals seek out behavioral roles that allow them to act in ways that are consistent with their self-images. Similarly, balance theory also posits that inconsistency among (a) a person's attitudes toward an object, (b) the perceived attitudes of a significant other toward the same object, and (c) the person's relationship with the significant other gives rise to an imbalanced state which engenders feelings of "tension" (Insko, 1981). This in turn produces a motivational drive to establish balance via either a change of attitude toward the object or a change of attitude toward the significant other (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Heider, 1958; Insko, 1981). Lastly, cognitive dissonance theory, perhaps the most widely known theory based upon the desirability of consistency, posits that incompatibility between cognitive and behavioral elements give

rise to a negative affective state for the perceiver. Perceivers are thus motivated to reduce this dissonance by engaging in some form of cognitive adjustment such as the changing of one's attitude (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Festinger, 1957).

Overall, theories of cognitive consistency suggest that individuals strive to maintain consistency among cognitions, feelings, and behaviors. Hence, affective primacy and cognitive consistency principles together imply that existing work-based affect, which as described above is a product of both organizational (e.g. work stress, leadership, and rewards and punishment) and non-organizational (e.g. dispositions, family events) factors, can not only be experienced prior to P-E fit, but also that it influences P-E fit through individuals' need to have consistency between affect and P-E fit. Therefore, Paul experiences happiness toward his job before he is aware of his P-E fit, and then tries to behave and/or think consistently about how well he fits into his environment. Two theoretical accounts that account for specific affective-consistency relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit are reviewed in the next section.

Mood congruency and associative network theory. The associative network theory of affect provides a conceptual framework for understanding the mechanisms that link affect and social cognition. This theory assumes that affective experiences can influence every step of the information processing sequence, from selective attention to certain information, to the encoding of that information, and its subsequent retrieval from memory (Bower, 1981; Bower & Forgas, 2001; Isen, Shalke, Clark & Karp, 1978). Associative networks depict specific affect and feelings as nodes located within an associative network, where beliefs and memories of certain behaviors, objects, situations, or events are linked to certain affective nodes. A node is aroused when a person encounters

a situation which elicits an affective response. The activation of the node in turn spreads activation to the variety of beliefs and memories to which it is connected within a network (Clark & Isen, 1982).

In the context of social judgments, associative networks explain mood-dependent retrieval where individuals would recall events that correspond to their current mood when they first encountered it (Bower, 1981). Perhaps more importantly, associative networks also explain mood-congruent processing, which occurs when people become selectively sensitized to take in and process information that agrees with current experienced affect (Bower & Forgas, 2001). Forgas and Bower (1987) demonstrated that people engage in deeper processing of mood-congruent information when they had participants read descriptions about target characteristics in an impression-formation experiment. They found that participants in happy moods spent a longer time reading and learning about positive characteristics. Later, these participants also remembered more positive and socially desirable traits associated with a target stranger. A parallel observation was made for participants in sad moods. These participants spent longer times reading about negative characteristics, and remembered more socially undesirable behaviors and traits associated with the target stranger. These results show that mood congruent information is subjected to more cognitive processing, which can lead to the generation of beliefs that are in line with one's affect.

With regards to P-E fit, mood congruency has also been specifically linked to both self-perceptions and perceptions of work environments. Past research that has demonstrated that self-based perceptions can be influenced by affective states and feelings (Forgas, Bower & Krantz, 1984; Sedikides, 1995). For example, research on the effects of affect on

self-perception indicates that positive affect emphasizes the positivity of self cognitions, while negative affect augments the negativity of self cognitions (Sedikides & Green, 2001). Similarly, affect has also been shown to influence perceptions of the work environment and job tasks in particular (Morgeson & Campion, 1997). Kraiger and colleagues found that individuals' affective states originating from outside the task influenced perceptions of their assigned tasks. In their study, participants who were induced with a positive mood rated their tasks to be higher in task feedback, skill variety, and task significance (Kraiger, Billings & Isen, 1989). Findings by Adler and colleagues (experiment 1) also suggest that cues concerning participants' task satisfaction can influence subsequent task perceptions. Specifically, subjects who were led to believe that they experienced more satisfaction towards a particular task proceeded to rate the task to be higher in autonomy, skill variety and task identity compared to subjects who believed they were less satisfied with the same task. Similar results were obtained when participants undertook the task in groups. Participants who believed they were more satisfied with the group task subsequently provided more positive ratings of the group atmosphere, physical environment, and other characteristics of the task compared to those who thought that they were less satisfied with the task (Adler, Skov & Salvemini, 1985).

The principles of mood congruency also underlie observations regarding the reciprocal relationship between job satisfaction and job perceptions (James & Jones, 1980; James & Tetrick, 1986; Mathieu, Hofmann & Farr, 1993). These studies employ mood-congruency reasoning to explain the ability of work-based affect in the form of job satisfaction to cause job perceptions. Specifically, they argue that positive feelings toward one's job can influence perceptions of the work environment by causing the individual to

(a) attend selectively to situational cues that serve to maintain or confirm existing levels of affect; (b) associate either desirable or undesirable attributes to a job that he or she already regards satisfying or dissatisfying; and (c) cognitively reconstruct contextual cues in order to increase the likelihood that they will be consistent with work-based affect (James, Hater, Gent & Bruni, 1978; James & Jones, 1980; p. 102-103). Work-based affect thus serves as a “cognitive filter” that causes people to perceive their work environments in ways that are consistent with experienced levels of satisfaction (James & Sells, 1981). In all, studies reviewed in this section indicate that work-based affect can influence self and job-based perceptions in a way so that they are consistent with how an individual feels about his or her job.

Mood-as-information. Aside from its influence on perceptions of self and the environment, experienced affect is also believed to inform individuals about the nature of their current psychological status or situation (Frijda, 1988). Specifically, positive affect signals that a situation is safe, which in turn implies that there is no threat to current goals, and that there is no danger of negative outcomes. In contrast, negative affect informs individuals that the current situation is problematic, and of the impending danger of negative outcomes (Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz, 1990). This implies that work-based affect can also serve to inform individuals about the desirability of their current work situation (Schwarz & Clore, 2003; Wyer & Carlston, 1979). This provides another alternative explanation for the causal influence of work-based affect on perceptions of the person and environment.

Based on the assumption of the informational value of affective states, the mood-as-information (MAI) hypothesis posits that individuals form evaluative judgments by using

their feelings as information (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2003). In doing so, they may misread feelings that were elicited by other causes as affective reactions to the object of judgment, resulting in more positive evaluations of the target object in the presence of positive rather than negative feelings. So even though Paul's current felt happiness towards his job is due to his recent promotion, in order to be consistent with his positive work-based affect, he may also infer that he fits well with his job by thinking that his job also satisfies his need for autonomy.

The MAI theory contrasts from associative network theory by proposing that information provided by feelings is only used in evaluative judgments if it is perceived to be relevant to the judgment at hand. To test hypotheses from this theory, researchers manipulated the perceived informational value of subjects' affective states in various studies (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, Servay, Kumpf, 1985). For instance, Schwarz and Clore (1983) studied the link between moods and evaluative judgment by having subjects rate how happy and satisfied they were with their lives either on rainy days or sunny days. It was assumed that subjects who were called on rainy days would be in bad moods and hence produce lower ratings on happiness and satisfaction compared to those who were called on sunny days. To manipulate the informational value that subjects placed on their respective moods, some subjects were also induced to attribute their mood to the weather by being asked the simple question: "By the way, how's the weather down there?" The intention was to have respondents link their momentary feelings to the weather, so that they would discount their current feelings as valid information when evaluating the quality of their lives. Results supported the MAI hypothesis by showing that subjects who were asked to evaluate their well-being on rainy days, and who were also induced to misattribute

their bad mood to the weather, reported being as happy and satisfied as subjects who were called on sunny days. In contrast, when the weather was not mentioned, the subjects who were called on rainy days reported being less happy and satisfied compared to subjects called on sunny days. Therefore, subjects who felt bad but attributed their feelings to an irrelevant source like the weather discounted their affective state in evaluating the quality of their lives. These findings would have been in contrast to ideas based on associative networks and mood-congruency, which would predict that people in bad moods would simply recall information that would lead to negative evaluations of well-being vice versa.

Therefore, the MAI hypothesis suggests that individuals first use their experienced work-based affect as information about whether they fit their environments. When Paul feels good about his job, he infers that fit also must exist between him (P) and elements of his job (E). Conversely, if he feels bad about his job, he would then infer that he does not fit with his job. Hence, instead of embarking on a detailed analysis of the attributes of P and E and how well they fit, individuals like Paul use their work-based affect to derive respective judgments of P and E and the fitting (or non-fitting) relationship between the two.

Evaluating affective-consistency perspective theories

Though they each posit different underlying psychological processes, a common theme for both associative network theory and the MAI hypothesis is that perceptions of P and E would be biased toward producing P-E fit that is consistent with current levels of work-based affect. According to associative network theory, work-based affect primes similarly valenced cognitions and memories about the self and the work environment. Similarly, the MAI hypothesis posits that unless they are given a reason to discount the

validity of their feelings at work as a source of information, individuals consider their current level of work-based affect when evaluating P-E fit. While these theories may present plausible explanations of why work-based affect should cause P-E fit, there are however several limitations to their ability to account for all the relationships presented in figure 2.

Isolated focus on person and environment perceptions. P-E fit relationships essentially consist of a three dimensional relationship between component measures of person (P) and environment (E) and an outcome like satisfaction (Edwards, 2002; Edwards & Parry, 1993). As such, investigations into P-E fit should consider jointly the relationships among P, E and a third variable, which is work-based affect in this case. Whereas the above theories can account for the influence of work-based affect on atomistic or separate judgments of person (P) and environment (E) respectively, little is known about its ability to predict affective influences on joint perceptions of P and E which together constitute subjective P-E fit. Studies utilizing mood congruency to explain reciprocal relationships between work-based affect and job perceptions typically do not explicitly account for the effects that person attributes can have on ratings of job perceptions (James & Jones, 1980; James & Tetrick, 1986; Mathieu et al., 1993). While these studies assume that individual characteristics such as needs, self-concepts, and beliefs are causally linked to job perceptions (James & Jones, 1980; p.103), they do not consider individual characteristics such as values and needs that are commensurate with the dimensions of work environment that are studied. This lack of use of commensurate P and E makes it impossible to study fitting relationships between person and environment attributes (Chatman, 1989; Edwards et al., 1998). On a similar note, the mood-as-information hypothesis only considers the

impact of affect on evaluative judgments of overall well-being. In doing so, they ignore the possibility that judgments of well-being can be influenced individual attributes such as values and needs, which are at the core of P-E fit theory (Edwards et al., 1998). Thus, by focusing on isolated relationships between affect and P and E respectively, the theories above provide an incomplete examination of the relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit. This is a serious limitation because it impedes our ability to analyze specific hypotheses regarding the *relative effects* of work-based affect on P and/or E components of fit, such as “under conditions of environmental uncertainty the relationship between work-based affect and E would be stronger compared to the relationship between affect and P”.

Joint nonlinear relationships. Following on, the affective-consistency perspective also cannot account for any joint nonlinear relationships between P, E, and work-based affect. While many functional forms may describe the relationship between P and E and affect, it is commonly assumed that the relationship between P-E fit and work-based affect is represented by a curvilinear relationship where positive outcomes are maximized when P and E are congruent with each other. This relationship is illustrated in figure 3. The horizontal axis represents various combinations of P and E, while the vertical axis represents work-based affect. Assuming that P is held constant at a moderate level, affect decreases as the environment deviates from P in either direction. Notice however that when E exceeds P, a negative relationship exists between E and affect. Conversely, in the region where E is less than P, there is a positive relationship between E and affect. It should thus be clear that there are two pieces of information that are required to predict the relationship between work-based affect and E. First, one has to know the level of P relative to E. Second, one also needs to know the form of the function that jointly relates P and E to

work-based affect, where in this case it is assumed to be a curvilinear relationship¹. With their isolated focus on relationships between affect and P and E respectively, theories underlining the affective-consistency perspective cannot facilitate investigation into relationships such as those mentioned above. Therefore, in order to facilitate investigations into the joint relationships between work-based affect and both E and P, the expanded theory of P-E fit in figure 2 positions work-based affect as a cause of both E and P constructs.

Relationships between affect and objective P and E. The theories reviewed above have also solely focused on the relationships between work-based affect and *perceptions* of subjective P and E. As such, their focus is constrained to only relationships between work-based affect and subjective P-E fit. This focus may prove overly restrictive because past research in other fields has established a link between affect and behaviors or attempts at altering one's current situation. For instance, past research has established a strong link between positive moods and helping behaviors (Adelman, 1972; Clark & Isen, 1982; Cunningham, Steinberg & Grev, 1980; Isen, Clark & Schwartz, 1976; Isen & Levin, 1972). Work-based affect in the form of job satisfaction is also viewed as a key antecedent to efforts aimed at improving one's organizational environment such as organizational citizenship behaviors (George & Brief, 1992; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine & Bachrach, 2000). Likewise, findings that work-based affect is closely tied to core aspects of the self like self-esteem, self-efficacy, emotional stability, and locus of control also suggest that affect can be causally linked to various attributes of the objective person (Hulin & Judge, 2003; Judge & Bono, 2001). These observations provide reason to believe that work-based

¹ Edwards et al. (1998) proposed the existence of three distinct forms of relationships (i.e. asymptotic, monotonic, and U-shaped) that describe the link between P-E fit and outcomes.

affect can be a cause of both objective and subjective P and E. Therefore, in the interest of providing a more comprehensive framework for testing relationships between work-based affect and objective and subjective P-E fit, the expanded model of P-E fit reflects affect to be a cause of both objective and subjective components of P-E fit.

Asymmetry in positive and negative affective influence. The theories covered so far have largely assumed that P-E fit would be biased in the same direction as experienced work-based affect. Hence, it follows that positive affect would influence P and E in a positive fitting direction, whereas negative affect would similarly result in misfit between P and E. Interestingly, this later proposition seems to run counter to ideas from research on stress and coping which posit that individuals react to negative feelings by seeking to minimize discrepancies or misfit between person and environment characteristics (Edwards, 1992; French et al., 1974). In fact, coping and defense, which are responses to stress aimed at improving objective and subjective fit, are viewed as key outcomes of P-E misfit (Edwards et al., 1998). For example, a coping response is initiated when John responds to misfit between his desired autonomy and that which is present in his job by negotiating with his supervisor for increased control over his personal work schedule. This idea that people respond to negative moods by seeking to improve their current situations parallels ideas from the mood-regulation literature which also suggest that people strive to maintain positive moods by engaging in thinking and/or behavior aimed at improving current feeling states (Larsen, 2000a; Larsen, 2000b; Morris & Reilly, 1987; Tice & Wallace, 2000). Therefore, both coping and mood-regulation literatures argue that negative affect causes people to seek out ways to improve their current situation. In a P-E fit context this can be achieved by attempting to improve either objective or subjective fit. Note that

this idea runs counter to the affective-consistency perspective, which contends that people in bad moods would simply end up thinking and behaving consistently with their negative mood, and thus perceive misfit between themselves and their environments. Hence, the fact that theories underlying the affective-consistency perspective do not account for the hedonistic motives just described may also constitute a limitation for consistency-based theories. This implies that relying on the affective-consistency perspective alone to adequately predict the relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit may be insufficient. Therefore, the next section presents an alternative *hedonistic* perspective which offers another explanation of how affect may cause P-E fit.

A hedonistic perspective

The second perspective that can account for work-based affect as a cause of P-E fit is termed the *hedonistic perspective*. This perspective encompasses ideas from job satisfaction, stress and coping, and mood regulation literatures, which are based on the assumption that people are motivated to feel good about their current situation. This leads them to seek to either change their current negative feelings to ones that are positive, or maintain the current positive moods that they are in (Larsen, 2000a; Morris & Reilly, 1987). Hence, there are two possible consequences when a person is experiencing negative work-based affect: First, perceptions of the self (P) or the environment (E) can be adjusted so that so that they appear to fit with one another. This is described by the relationship between work-based affect and subjective P and E in Figure 2. For example, George tries to deal with his unhappiness with his job by perceiving that his job actually provides him with the right amount of job security that he needs. Second, one can also respond to negative work-based affect by attempting to achieve objective P-E fit by either adapting aspects of

oneself (P) (i.e. developing certain types of skills, interests, or goals) to the environment, or changing aspects of one's work environment (E) (i.e. interacting more with similar co-workers, or choosing jobs that coincide with one's need for autonomy) to fit with personal attributes. In this case, George chooses to deal with his unhappiness by either changing the amount of security he requires (changing objective P) to match the amount that is currently provided by his job, or seeking to extend his current contract with his employer (changing objective E) to meet his need for more security. On the flip side, the hedonistic perspective also predicts that when positive work-based affect is being experienced, people would not be motivated to change their current P-E fit. Thus, since his positive work-based affect signals that he is already enjoying his current situation, George would make no attempt to change his P-E fit. In all, the hedonistic perspective posits that the relationships between work-based affect and objective and subjective P-E fit only exist when negative affect is experienced. The next few sections review the theoretical foundations of the hedonistic perspective.

Theoretical foundations

Hedonism as a basic goal. Maintaining a state of positive affect is widely assumed to be a basic and universal motivation for all humans. Much of our daily activities are geared toward avoiding or rectifying situations that make us feel bad, and similarly approaching or maintaining situations that make us feel good. This broad generalization of human routine can be attributed to a basic motive to feel or experience positive rather than negative affect either in the short or the long term (Larsen, 2000a).

The basic need to feel good has been well documented in research on mood regulation. It is now widely accepted that instead of being passive when it comes to

experiencing affect, people adopt various strategies to manage their affective states even without any external requirement to do so (Clark & Isen, 1982; Larsen, 2000a; 2000b; Morris & Reilly, 1987; Tice & Wallace, 2000). Mood regulation involves two basic processes: maintenance and modification (or repair). Maintenance takes place when people work to preserve a desired affective state (usually assumed to be positive affect) against influences that threaten a change in that state. In contrast, modification or repair seeks to change an emotional state perceived as inadequate in the direction of the desired affective state (Krohne, Pieper, Knoll & Breimer, 2002). Evidence on the hedonistic tendency can be drawn from research in mood regulation that has documented attempts at maintaining positive moods by avoiding situations or behaviors that are expected to be disruptive of pleasant mood (Morris & Reilly, 1987), or engaging strategies aimed at improving current negative moods (Clark & Isen, 1982). For instance, Cialdini, Darby & Vincent (1973) found that people chose to engage in benevolent helping behavior when they were put into situations which induced negative affect. They account for this finding by suggesting that the altruistic act of helping serves to provide relief for people in negative affective states.

Recent psychological research has started to pay more attention to what underlies happiness and optimal human functioning. Many contributors in a recent American Psychologist special issue on happiness, excellence, and optimal human functioning agree that obtaining and maintaining positive hedonic balance is a fundamental human goal (Buss, 2000; Larsen, 2000b). This view is aptly captured in Larsen's statement that: "the psychological system is in fact designed to produce and maintain a positive hedonic balance, other things being equal" (Larsen, 2000b; p. 219). Empirical support for the hedonistic motivation is available. Diener (2000) surveyed people from 42 different

countries around the world, asking them to rate the importance of various goals in their lives. Results suggest that happiness and life satisfaction were very important to most people, even in societies that are not fully westernized (i.e. Indonesia and Bahrain). Furthermore, respondents also reported thinking often about happiness and life satisfaction. Interestingly, only 6% of respondents rated money as more important than happiness. In addition, 69% rated happiness at the top of the 7-point importance scale (extraordinarily important), and only 1% claimed to have never thought about it. Correspondingly, 62% rated life satisfaction at the top of the importance scale, and only 2% reported never having thought about it. Coupled with results indicating that people are in happy moods most of the time, these results highlight the fact that feeling good is not only a frequent hedonic state (Diener & Diener, 1996; Diener, Larsen & Emmons, 1985; Diener, Larson, Levine & Emmons, 1985), but also that it is an important goal in the lives of most people (Larsen, 2000b).

The hedonistic principle is also very relevant to our current discussion about the relationship between work-based affect and P-E fit. Results gathered from wide-scale surveys suggest that more people tend to be more satisfied rather than dissatisfied with their jobs. Hence, most people hold a hedonic experience that is affectively positive when it comes to their jobs (Bowling, Beehr, Wagner & Libkuman, 2005; Büssing, Bissels, Fuchs & Perrar, 1999). These results are consistent with Diener and Diener's (1996) findings that most people are happy and satisfied with life domains such as work, marriage, health, and friendship, and their lives in general. The *hedonistic perspective* is thus based on the assumption that positive work-based affect is an important goal for people. Specifically, it suggests that people who are experiencing negative work-based affect try to improve their

current situation by thinking or behaving in ways that are targeted at improving or achieving P-E fit. In contrast, since positive work-based affect is a desirable state, people experiencing positive affect will not seek to change or act upon their P-E fit status. The logic behind this line of reasoning is evident in several well-established fields of research which will now be reviewed.

Responses to job satisfaction. Job satisfaction is widely viewed as an individual's affective reaction to his or her job (Locke, 1984). In fact, in his early work on job satisfaction, Locke (1969, p. 316) defines it as "a pleasurable emotional state". Based on this definition of job satisfaction as work-based affect, some have argued that work-based affect acts as a catalyst for cognitive and/or behavioral responses to one's job. According to Henne & Locke (1985), "job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are psychological states which allow for numerous and varied action alternatives" (p. 221). Such responses to work-based affect can either be psychological or behavioral. Psychological responses to negative work-based affect may include tolerance or focusing on valued aspects of the situation (i.e. "at least my employer pays me well"). People may also choose to withdraw psychologically by becoming passive or disinterested. On the other hand, behavioral responses may include planning to leave the job or spending less time on the job (Locke, 1984). This latter link between job dissatisfaction and behavioral withdrawal has garnered a significant amount of empirical support (Hanisch & Hulin, 1990; 1991; Hulin, 1991). The type of response that is enacted in response to dissatisfaction depends on the individual's perception of the job situation, available job alternatives, and his or her own abilities and aspirations. Whichever type of response is chosen could have important implications for not only work-based affect, but also overall mental and physical well-being (Henne &

Locke, 1985; Locke, 1984). In all, there is considerable evidence suggesting that negative work-based affect stimulates cognitive and behavioral responses aimed at improving experienced affect.

Perhaps the most well-known classification scheme for possible responses to work-based affect over the past two decades is presented by the EVLN model. Farrell (1983) developed and proposed a typology of four possible behavioral responses to dissatisfaction at work. Based on the initial work of Hirschman (1970), this typology consists of exit (E), voice (V), loyalty (L), and neglect (N) behaviors. *Exit* refers to leaving the organization, or thinking about quitting, and looking for another job. *Voice* refers to attempts at trying to change the situation by having one's opinion heard (i.e. suggesting solutions for problems or whistle blowing). *Loyalty* occurs by waiting patiently for things to improve, or trusting the organization to do the right thing. Lastly, *neglect* is characterized by behaviors such as chronic lateness or absenteeism. The EVLN framework further organizes these four response categories along two dimensions. Along the *constructive-destructive* dimension, voice and loyalty are considered behaviors that are constructive for maintaining the person-organization relationship, while exit and neglect are considered destructive for this relationship. Along the second *active-passive* dimension, voice and exit are active behaviors that deal directly with a problematic situation, whereas loyalty and neglect are considered passive behaviors (Farrell, 1983; Hagedoorn, Van Yperen, Van De Vliert & Buunk, 1999; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers & Mainous, 1988). Support for this framework has been evidenced in numerous studies (Farrell, 1983; Farrell & Rusbult, 1992; Leck & Saunders, 1992; Rusbult, et al., 1988; Rusbult & Lowery, 1985; Withey & Cooper, 1989). For instance, Rusbult and colleagues (1988) not only found that dissatisfaction (caused by

declining work conditions) was causally related to EVLN responses, but also that this relationship was moderated by variables such as personal investment and quality of job alternatives. Interestingly, it was also noticed that employees showed increasing intentions to engage in exit, voice, and neglect, with declining levels of loyalty, as a period of dissatisfaction unfolded.

Similar ideas from the EVLN framework can also be found in theories of job withdrawal and adaptation. These theories view withdrawal behaviors like voluntary absenteeism, lateness, voluntary turnover, and retirement as not only responses to negative work-based affect, but also attempts to reduce negative affect through various behavioral and cognitive mechanisms (Hulin, 1991; Rosse & Hulin, 1985). For instance, the model of employee adaptation (Rosse & Miller, 1984) posits that events at work trigger evaluations of the work situation. If this evaluation is affectively negative, several remedial strategies are considered. The strategy that is perceived to be the most useful under the present circumstances will be implemented. The individual then evaluates the effects of his or her response; if negative affect still persists the cycle is repeated, possibly with a different adaptive strategy. In support of these models, Rosse and Hulin (1985) report that intentions to quit, turnover, absenteeism, and attempts to change one's job were negatively related to job dissatisfaction among a longitudinal study of hospital employees. More importantly, the use of adaptive behaviors such as attempts at making positive changes to their job setting was found to have positive remedial effects for employee health and satisfaction. Overall, the EVLN framework and theories of job withdrawal and adaptation, suggest that negative work-based affect can motivate individuals to make changes to their actual or objective working environments.

Coping. Theories of coping, cybernetics, and mood regulation provide elucidating accounts of how people react to stressful situations. Together, these theories have the potential to contribute to our understanding of how and why individuals respond to work-based affect. Coping is “a complex, multidimensional process that is sensitive to the environment (i.e. its demands and resources), and to personality dispositions that influence the appraisal of stress and resources for coping” (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; p. 747). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) further highlight the integral roles of both the person and environment in the coping process by defining coping as the thoughts and behaviors that people employ to manage the internal and external demands of situations that are appraised as stressful. People therefore cope and respond actively to stressful forces that act upon them in order to avoid being harmed by life strains (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978).

Lazarus's transactional model is one of the most prominent theories about the coping process. It states that stress arises from interaction between the person and the environment (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). This cognitive-oriented theory focuses on the importance of two main types of appraisals in the coping process. Primary appraisal helps ascertain the significance of a particular situation by determining whether the transaction hinders or facilitates the individual's goals (Perrewé & Zellars, 1999; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Situations involving harm, loss, threat, or challenge to the individual's well-being are appraised as stressful (Lazarus, 1993). If primary appraisal determines that a situation is significant to the individual, it is followed by secondary appraisal, which involves the evaluation of coping alternatives with the goal of creating a less stressful situation. A third form of appraisal, *reappraisal*, then occurs after the initial coping attempt when the individual reassesses the state of the person-environment relationship. The coping process

ceases when the situation is resolved and no longer perceived to be stressful. Lazarus and colleagues have published a significant amount of research in support of the transactional model (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Such research has typically shown that people's evaluations of their well-being and their subsequent coping behavior influence the amount of psychological stress that is ultimately experienced (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Lazarus, 1993).

Lazarus' view of coping considers a variety of cognitive and behavioral responses that people use to manage stressful situations (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004). Early attempts at classifying different types of coping behavior gave rise to the popular categories of *problem-focused* and *emotion-focused* coping. *Problem-focused* coping refers to attempts at altering the person-environment relationship, while *emotion-focused* coping consists of attempts at regulating emotions that accompany the stressful experience (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Latack & Havlovic, 1992; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In the past two decades, many other classification schemes for coping functions have been proposed either as complements or alternatives to problem and emotion-focused categories (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Skinner, Edge, Altman & Sherwood, 2003). Among others, these include: Moos and Billings' (1982) introduction of appraisal focused coping, which refer to attempts at redefining the meaning of a situation via appraisal and reappraisal; and alloplastic versus autoplasic coping , which refer to coping directed at changing the environment as opposed to coping directed toward changing the self respectively (Perrez & Reicherts, 1992). This rapid proliferation of coping categories has led to increasing concern about the validity and conceptual clarity of these classification schemes (Latack & Havlovic, 1992; Skinner et al., 2003). Despite these concerns, it seems clear that coping

can involve both cognitive and behavioral attempts to influence both aspects of the self and environment. When applied to a P-E fit framework, this implies that coping behavior can involve efforts to change both subjective and objective P-E fit.

Cybernetics and control theory. Many of the main principles that underlie Lazarus's transactional model are similar to those that govern cybernetics or control theory (Edwards, 1992; Powers, 1978). Cybernetics, or control theory concerns the functioning of self-regulating systems (Ashby, 1966; Carver & Shier, 1982). The theory's main focus is on the *negative feedback loop*, which acts to minimize or discrepancies between aspects of the environment and relevant reference criteria (Edwards, 1992). As illustrated in figure 4, the *input function* senses the present situation. This perception is then evaluated against a relevant point of *reference* by the *comparator* mechanism. If a discrepancy is detected between the present state and the reference criteria, the *output function* is tasked with attempting to reduce or eliminate the discrepancy. This self-regulatory process may be initiated by a *disturbance* in the environment or a change in the reference criterion, which essentially creates the discrepancy (Edwards, 1992). Thus, the main purpose of the feedback system in cybernetics is to create and maintain the perception of a specific desired condition, which is whatever condition constitutes its reference criteria or standard of comparison (Carver & Scheier, 1982). Past research on cybernetics elaborate on this basic framework to include effects of the output function on the reference criterion (Campion & Lord, 1982) and causal relationships and hierarchical arrangements among multiple feedback loops (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1982; Powers, 1978). In the organizational sciences, this theory has also been used to predict relationships between goal setting, task

performance, feedback, and future goal setting (Campion & Lord, 1982; Hollenbeck, 1989; Phillips, Hollenbeck & Ilgen, 1996; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987).

The relevance of cybernetics to our current focus on relationships involving work-based affect and P-E fit is addressed specifically in Edwards' (1992) cybernetic theory of stress, coping, and well-being in organizations. This model views stress, coping, and well-being as key components of a cybernetic feedback loop. It essentially argues that stress, which is causally related to work-based affect and defined as the discrepancy between an individual's perceived state and desired state, leads to two types of outcomes: well-being and coping. More importantly, stress may indirectly activate coping, or "efforts to prevent or reduce the negative effects of stress on well-being" (p. 245), through its influence on well-being.

According to Edwards (1992), coping reduces stress and improves well-being in several ways: (a) First, coping can involve attempts to improve well-being directly such as meditation and relaxation (Newman & Beehr, 1979). Such curative methods correspond to the above-described category of emotion-focused coping, and are more likely to be employed when stressful discrepancies seem unsolvable (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). (b) Coping can also involve reducing the importance associated with the perceived source of stress. Such altering of desires and importance corresponds to previously conceived notions of appraisal-focused coping (Moos & Billings, 1982), and defense (Edwards et al., 1998). (c) Next, coping also consists of efforts to alter perceptions of the work environment. This entails altering the physical and social environment, social information, and the cognitive reconstruction of reality (i.e. problem-focused coping). This type of coping is especially relevant in the current P-E fit context because changing the physical and social

environment can also be viewed as attempts at altering the *objective* work environment. Similarly, activities that involve altering social information (i.e. deemphasizing negative information and seeking out new sources of information), and cognitive reconstruction (i.e. repressing, denying, or distorting negative aspects of the situation) are essentially attempts to directly modify perceptions of the *subjective* work environment. (d) People may also adopt a less proactive way of coping by trying to avoid a stressful situation. Such efforts may include directing one's attention away from a stressful discrepancy (Edwards, 1992; Edwards & Baglioni, 1993; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoeck, & Rosenthal, 1964). (e) The last mechanism via which coping influences stress is by adjusting desires to conform with perceptions of the situation, eliminating the stressful discrepancy in the process. Such activity is evidenced in attempts to adjust personal goals or standards in response to positive or negative feedback (Campion & Lord, 1982; Taylor, Fisher, Ilgen, 1984). Therefore, these various coping mechanisms suggest that coping may be directed toward changing both objective and subjective forms of the environment and person. Overall, this theory of stress and coping emphasizes the hedonistic perspective's point that work-based affect causes coping which can entail altering elements that make up objective and subjective P-E fit.

Evaluating hedonistic perspective theories

To recap, there are several important ideas that resonate strongly among the theories reviewed above that elucidate the ability of work-based affect to cause P-E fit. First, these theories commonly assume that individuals seek to achieve or maintain an ultimate desired state which is characterized by positive affect. Hence, situations characterized by negative affect initiate behavioral responses from people aimed at improving negative affect. The

theories also collectively suggest that responses to negative affect can be both cognitive and behavioral. Therefore, in response to negative work-based affect people can either change their subjective perceptions of the situation or take actual steps to change the situation. Furthermore, the person (P) and the environment (E) are two common targets for change during these cognitive and behavioral responses. This means that people respond to negative affect by either attempting to change aspects of themselves (i.e. wants and goals), or their social environments (i.e. jobs and organizations). The hedonistic perspective thus predicts that the experience of negative work-based affect would cause people to act on objective and/or subjective P and/or E, where they will try to adjust P and/or E so as to achieve the desirable situation of P-E fit. In contrast, people already experiencing positive work-based affect would not be motivated to take action to change their current desirable circumstances. Consequently, work-based affect will not be related to P-E fit when there is positive work-based affect.

Despite providing significant evidence for work-based affect to be antecedent to P-E fit, there are limitations to these theories' ability to account for all the relationships predicted by the expanded theory of P-E fit. Like theories linked to the affective-consistency perspective, the hedonistic theories reviewed above only account for the isolated influence of affect on either the person or the environment. As pointed out earlier, this is a serious shortcoming when it comes to P-E fit research because the concept of P-E fit is defined as a joint relationship between elements of both person and environment (Edwards et al., 1998; Kristof, 1996). Hence, predicting isolated relationships between affect and the person and environment respectively gives rise to a limited understanding of the relationship between work-based affect and fit. This problem appears especially evident

when we consider that coping responses to negative affect often simultaneously involve a whole repertoire of strategies that might target both the person and the environment (Skinner et al., 2003). Therefore, this limitation restricts our ability to examine the relative effects of work-based affect on person and environment attributes, which could differ according various situational and individual differences (Edwards, 1992). Lastly, as in the case of the affective-consistency perspective, only focusing on these isolated relationships which separate P and E also makes it impossible to account for joint nonlinear relationships between the person, the environment, and work-based affect (Edwards et al., 1998).

CHAPTER 5

PROPOSITIONS OF THE EXPANDED P-E FIT MODEL

Now that the theoretical basis for work-based affect as a cause of P-E fit has been discussed, ideas from the affective-consistency and hedonistic perspectives are distilled and presented in the form of propositions that are based on the expanded P-E fit model. It is hoped that these propositions would serve as a platform from which further research into P-E fit can be generated.

Affective-consistency perspective

The affective-consistency perspective argues that to be affectively consistent individuals who experience positive work-based affect would aim to have fit between themselves and their environments. Since P-E fit is the relationship between elements of the person (P) and the environment (E), individuals can achieve P-E fit by adapting subjective and/or objective P to be in line with their environment counterparts, changing the subjective and/or objective E to match person attributes, or adjusting both P and E simultaneously so that they converge into a fitting relationship.

Proposition 1: According to the affective-consistency perspective, when positive work-based affect is experienced, individuals will try to achieve P-E fit by (a) adjusting subjective and/or objective P to fit with the environment; (b) adjusting subjective and/or objective E to fit with person attributes; or (c) adjusting both subjective and/or objective P and E so that they come together into a fitting relationship.

A symmetric type of relationship is proposed for individuals experiencing negative work-based affect, who would try to achieve an affectively-consistent misfit between themselves and their environments.

Proposition 2: According to the affective-consistency perspective, when negative work-based affect is experienced, individuals will try to achieve P-E misfit by (a) adjusting subjective and/or objective P to create a discrepancy with the environment; (b) adjusting subjective and/or objective E to create a discrepancy with person attributes; or (c) adjusting both subjective and/or objective P and E so that they diverge from each other to form P-E misfit.

Hedonistic perspective

On the other hand, the hedonistic perspective argues that individuals are motivated to experience positive work-based affect. Hence, they are either content to remain in their current positive levels of affect, or deal with negative affect by changing certain aspects about their situation in order to achieve P-E fit.

Proposition 3: According to the hedonistic perspective, when positive work-based affect is experienced, there will be no relationship between work-based affect and P-E fit.

Proposition 4: According to the hedonistic perspective, when negative work-based affect is experienced, individuals will try to generate P-E fit by (a) adjusting subjective and/or objective P to fit with the environment; (b) adjusting subjective and/or objective E to fit with person attributes; or (c) adjusting both subjective and/or objective P and E so that they come together into a fitting relationship.

Determinants of affective influence on objective and subjective P-E fit

It should be apparent from the propositions presented above that there are several ways in which affect can cause individuals to change P-E fit. First, work-based affect can either influence subjective P-E fit directly, or it can also influence subjective P-E fit indirectly through its effect on objective P-E fit. Second, P-E fit consists of person (P) and environment (E) components, both of which are susceptible to affective influence according to the current P-E fit model. The next section presents a short discussion on the factors that influence when people attempt to change either objective or subjective P-E fit. Correspondingly, factors that should influence attempts to change either P or E components to P-E fit are also discussed.

Objective versus subjective P-E fit. Individual and environmental factors influence the individuals' propensity to directly change objective or subjective P-E fit. People with relevant abilities such as negotiation and conflict resolution skills should be more likely and able to act on objective P-E fit than others with lesser of these skills. Furthermore, those who are in leadership or influential positions within their organizations should also be more likely to change objective P-E fit because of their power and ability to control and enact changes in their work arrangements (Avolio, Sosik, Jung & Berson, 2003). Individual perceptions of controllability should also determine whether people act on objective or subjective elements of P-E fit (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Perrewé & Zellars, 1999). Situations that are perceived to be more controllable are more susceptible to changes in objective fit. Similarly, assuming the existence of hedonistic relationships, individuals with more coping efficacy (i.e. those who believe themselves to be capable of controlling a specific threatening situation) should also be more likely to try to change actual stressful situations (Bandura, 1986, 1997). Hence, these individuals should also be

more likely to attempt to change objective fit compared to those who have less coping efficacy.

Environmental factors like available job alternatives can also determine whether affective influence operates directly on objective or subjective P-E fit. If more job alternatives are available, individuals may be more proactive in attempting to change objective aspects of P-E fit because they can easily seek out alternative job environments as part of their attempts to change their situation (Henne & Locke, 1985; Locke, 1984; Rusbult et al., 1988). Organizational policies and barriers may also influence individuals' choice to act on objective or subjective fit (Edwards, 1992). A more bureaucratic organization with more levels of hierarchy and procedural red tape would make it more difficult for individuals to adjust objective P-E fit. Hence, people in such situations may be forced to rely more on cognitive strategies that influence subjective P-E fit. Leaders or supervisors who are more willing to work with their subordinates to effect change into their work environments (e.g. widening one's job scope to accommodate increased amounts of autonomy and variety), and even to subordinates' own attributes (e.g. providing additional training to enable them to take on increased skill demands), can also make changes to objective P-E fit more likely.

Person versus Environment. Though it has been documented in coping and cybernetics research that altering personal attributes like desires occur less frequently than changes in perceptions of the environment in general (Campion & Lord, 1982; Edwards, 1992; Taylor et al, 1984), certain individual and situation-based factors can still influence whether people respond to work-based affect by adjusting person (P) or environment (E) components of P-E fit. At the individual level, certain personality variables should

influence the relative likelihood of changing P or E. Individuals with an internal locus of control should be more likely to try to change their environments compared to those with external locus of control (Edwards, 1992). Conversely, people with a high degree of self-consciousness (i.e. tendency to direct attention towards aspects of the self) should be more willing and able to initiate changes to person attributes since people logically have to be aware of personal attributes before they can change them (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975; Fenigstein, 1979). Situational job and organizational factors could also influence individual's propensity to act on P or E. Stable job environments that are characterized by little uncertainty should be perceived to be less susceptible to adjustment. Thus, individuals would be less likely to seek to change E in such environments. Similarly, formalized and restrictive job environments where individuals are given little say over the structure and planning of their work also make changes in E less likely.

Conflicting predictions

One may also notice that the propositions offered based on the affective-consistency and hedonistic perspectives differ considerably from each other. According to the affective-consistency perspective, individuals who are experiencing positive work-based affect will work to achieve P-E fit by aligning E and P. Conversely, the hedonistic perspective argues that these same individuals will not act upon P-E fit. As for individuals who are experiencing negative work-based affect, the hedonistic perspective pictures individuals as active respondents to negative affect by seeking to achieve P-E fit by aligning E and P, while the affective-consistency perspective argues that the need to be consistent with one's feelings should lead to efforts to separate or misalign E and P to create P-E misfit. While only future research can shed light onto which of these two perspectives better account for

relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit, it is also possible that other factors outside the current P-E fit framework can influence which of these two perspectives prevail. The next section first presents a review of past research that might help resolve the conflicting predictions of these two perspectives. This review is followed by a discussion of the possible factors that might influence the prevalence of consistency or hedonistic relationships.

Resolving the consistency versus hedonism debate

Primacy of self-enhancement: Self consistency serves self enhancement. Similar debates have surfaced before previous research over the present issue of the contradictory predictions offered by consistency and hedonistic perspectives. Research in person perception and social evaluation suggests that hedonistic motives are primary to consistency motives, where consistency motives operate in order to serve overall hedonistic goals. Jones (1973) provides initial support for the primacy of hedonistic self-esteem enhancement over consistency motives. His review of 16 studies based on competing hypotheses from hedonistic self-enhancement and self-consistency theories concluded that hedonistic theories seemed to have stronger support compared to consistency theories. Furthermore, he also argued that studies that provided support for consistency motives could be accounted for within an expanded hedonistic framework where consistency-based behavior in fact served hedonistic goals. For instance, low self-evaluators might prefer similar consistent low evaluations from others if they perceive the risk of future social embarrassment from the exposure of the discrepancy between other's expectancies and their actual abilities. Findings by Elliott (1986) also support lend support to the primacy of hedonism over consistency. His findings suggest that people experiencing low self-esteem

prefer to change so that they can think better of themselves. This causes them to be less consistent. Conversely, people with high self-esteem have no need to change and hence prefer to remain consistent with their self concept.

On a similar note, some view cognitive consistency as a sub-goal that services an overarching hedonistic self-esteem regulatory mechanism. Most notably, Tesser and colleagues contend that cognitive consistency is one of several interchangeable mechanisms (the others being social comparison and self-affirmation) that can be used to regulate self-esteem (Tesser, 2000; Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell & Beach, 2000). According to them, threats to self-esteem that are manifested in the experience of negative affect cause one to engage in one or several self-esteem maintenance strategies. For instance, evidence indicates that a threat to the self that is brought about by cognitive dissonance can be reduced by a favorable social comparison outcome (Tesser, 2000 p. 294; Tesser et al., 2000). High dissonance participants who believed that they were outperformed by a comparison other on an unimportant task reported feeling closer to the comparison other than dissonance participants who thought that they were outperformed on an important task. This is consistent with predictions from social comparison and the self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) model in particular (Tesser, 1988), which suggests that being outperformed on an important task by a close other is particularly threatening. In contrast, being outperformed by a close other on an unimportant task allows one to bask in the reflected glory of the other's success (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman & Stone, 1976). The results of this study therefore suggest that cognitive consistency and social comparison processes represent different mechanisms that serve the same hedonistic goal of self-esteem maintenance.

Steele and Liu (1983) provide more evidence for the idea that the drive for consistency is just one of several mechanisms used to bolster self-esteem. They found that people who experienced cognitive dissonance and were also given the opportunity to self-affirm by increasing the salience of their economic and political orientation were less likely to engage in dissonance reduction by changing their attitudes than people who did not self-affirm. Hence, self-affirmation and cognitive dissonance seem to serve a unitary goal of regulating self-esteem and its accompanying affective experience. This view is consistent to that of those who view cognitive dissonance to be a threat to self-esteem (Aronson, 1992; Tesser et al., 2000; p. 1477). Overall, the ideas from past research discussed in this section suggest that there is reason to believe that hedonistic motives may also outweigh affective-consistency concerns in the realm of P-E fit theory.

Proposition 3: When compared against each other, hedonistic relationships prevail over affective-consistency relationships.

Boundary variables

Another way of resolving conflicting arguments posed by affective-consistency and hedonistic perspectives is by delineating boundary or moderator variables that influence the relative strength of each perspective (Dipboye, 1977). The discussion of boundary variables might prove fruitful in this case because individual and situational constraints have been known to influence the strength of both consistency and hedonistic drives. For instance, Hulin (1991) has argued that adaptive responses to dissatisfaction such as withdrawal behaviors are likely to be a function of personal and situational constraints (Hulin, 1991). Similarly, research has also pointed to individual and situational factors as key determinants of the drive to be consistent (Schwarz, 1990; Cialdini, Trost & Newsome,

1995). It is therefore plausible that both individual and situational boundary variables influence whether consistency or hedonistic arguments prevail in the current P-E fit model.

Preference for consistency. Individuals differ according to the degree in which they are “motivated toward cognitive consistency and will change their beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and actions to achieve it” (Cialdini, Trost & Newsome, 1995; p. 318). Recent research suggests that individuals differ according to their preference for consistency (PFC) or the tendency to respond to stimuli in a way that integrates and makes those stimuli consistent with existing variables (Brown, Asher & Cialdini, 2005; Cialdini et al., 1995; Newby-Clark, McGregor & Zanna, 2002). High-PFC individuals place considerable importance on existing attributes such as expectations, commitments, and choices. This leads them to assimilate new information or subsequent behavior to be consistent with their existing attributes. Low-PFC individuals, on the other hand, do not place too much importance on the implications of such existing attributes when deciding how to respond to new stimuli or situations. Thus, individuals with high-PFC would be more inclined to have their attitudes and perceptions fit with experienced work-based affect. As preference for consistency should not be related to individual ability or drive to regulate negative affect, we should expect the preference for consistency to influence the relative strength of consistency and hedonistic relationships.

Proposition 4: The preference for consistency will influence the relative strength of affective-consistency and hedonistic relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit such that affective-consistency relationships are stronger than hedonistic relationships for high-PFC individuals, while affective-consistency relationships are weaker than hedonistic relationships for low-PFC individuals.

Self-esteem. Another individual variable that may influence the relative strength of consistency and hedonistic arguments is self-esteem. Self-esteem (SE) is a component of the self-concept that has been defined in several ways (Rosenberg, 1979; Smith & Petty, 1995). Some theorists view SE as an individual's global evaluation of the self (Brown & Mankowski, 1993), while others suggest that SE is determined by the combination of one's evaluations of self-worth, which is in turn influenced by the perceived ability to achieve desired goals (Burke, 1983). Research on SE has typically found that in comparison to low-SE individuals, individuals with high-SE are not only more confident about their abilities, but also more confident that their efforts will lead to success (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990). These findings also translate to instances of coping and mood-regulation where self-esteem has been shown to be useful in predicting people's reactions to aversive events. Compared to people with high-SE, low-SE individuals have been shown to respond to aversive events with greater negative affect (e.g., Moreland & Sweeney, 1984), to react to negative feedback by overgeneralizing it to other aspects of their identities (e.g., Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989), to recall more negative thoughts when in negative moods (Smith & Perry, 1995), and to lower their self-evaluations (i.e. by engaging in self-depreciation) when placed in negative moods (Brown & Mankowski, 1993). Overall, research findings tend to suggest that individuals with high SE respond to negative situations more positively and proactively than low SE individuals (Smith & Petty, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Self-esteem therefore is a useful indicator of both ability and motivation to regulate negative affect (Smith & Petty, 1995). Consequently, hedonistic drives should be more dominant in high self-esteem people compared to those with low self-esteem. Interestingly, research has shown self esteem to have the opposite

effect on the drive for consistency. Steele and colleagues (1993) observed that individuals with high self-esteem (HSE) engaged in less rationalizing of a dissonant activity compared to their low self-esteem (LSE) counterparts. Hence, HSE individuals were less motivated to be consistent than LSE individuals.

Proposition 4: Self-esteem will influence the relative strength of affective-consistency and hedonistic relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit such that hedonistic relationships are stronger than affective-consistency relationships for high-SE individuals, while hedonistic relationships are weaker than affective-consistency relationships for low-PFC individuals.

Time constraints and cognitive demands. The relative strength of consistency and hedonistic relationships can also be influenced by situational variables. According to the mood-as-information hypothesis, people are more likely to base evaluative judgments on feelings-based information when time constraints or cognitive demands limit processing ability required to form a judgment (Schwarz, 1990). Time and cognitive demands strengthen affective-consistency relationships by causing individuals to (a) attend selectively to situational cues that either maintain or confirm existing levels of affect, (b) impute desirable/undesirable attributes to judgments that the individual already regards as satisfying/dissatisfying; and (c) cognitively restructure and redefine situational cues so that they will be consistent with work-based affect (James et al., 1978; James & Jones, 1980). Hence, when individuals are in situations that limit their ability to assess the nature of person and environment attributes, they would be more inclined to look to their affective experiences for information on the status of their P-E fit.

Following on, many of the cognitive processes that are central to the hedonistic perspective such as primary and secondary appraisal (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and the negative feedback loop (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Edwards, 1992) implicitly assume that the individual has the ability and motivation to engage in a series of mental processes that facilitate regulation processes. For instance, in Lazarus' transaction model, primary appraisal first requires a person to assess whether a particular situation hinders or facilitates his or her goals. This process is followed by secondary appraisal, which requires a more detailed assessment subsequent implementation of available coping alternatives. Thus, if we can assume that individuals tend to stay away from detailed mental processes when placed under situational and cognitive demands (Tversky, 1972; March & Simon, 1958), it is likely that time constraints and cognitive demands weaken hedonistic processes by hindering the above- mentioned cognitive processes. Hence, time and cognitive demands influence the relative strength of consistency and hedonistic relationships by making it more likely that individuals would engage in heuristic affective-consistency processes compared to more cognitively deliberate processes that characterize hedonistic relationships.

Proposition 5: Time and cognitive demands will influence the relative strength of affective-consistency and hedonistic relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit such that affective-consistency relationships are stronger than hedonistic relationships when time is limited or cognitive demands are high, while hedonistic relationships are stronger than affective-consistency relationships when time is unlimited or cognitive demands are low.

Temporal sequence

The view that affective-consistency processes may operate in a more heuristical way compared to more deliberate and rational hedonistic process may also suggest an alternative form of integration between these two perspectives: Both processes may be operating during different temporal points of a particular work experience. In other words, it could be the case where consistency relationships dominate the immediate or early reaction to affective experience because of their heuristic nature. Conversely, hedonistic processes might dominate once careful processing or coping strategies have time to develop. This view is consistent with past observations that time is required in order for mood repair processes to operate efficiently. Sedikides (1994) found evidence for such a relationship between consistency and hedonistic motives. Subjects in his research were assigned to sad, neutral, or happy moods, and then asked to describe themselves freely in writing. Consistency effects were observed when sad moods produced negative self-descriptions in the initial half of participants' self descriptions. However, these negative self-descriptions eventually gave way to more positive self-descriptions in the later part of participants' descriptions. Similar observations were made by Josephson and colleagues (1996), who examined whether mood repair was facilitated via the retrieval of memories. Participants in this study were assigned to a sad or neutral mood condition. After the mood induction, they were asked to recall 2 memories, rate their affective responses to these memories, and indicate why they chose the valence (i.e. positive versus negative) and order of the memories. Affective-consistency relationships were evidenced by the recalling of negative memories. These relationships were observed in 73% of participants in the sad mood condition who recalled negative first memories. Hedonistic relationships were subsequently observed in 53% of these participants, who proceeded to recall positive

thoughts for their second memory. Interestingly, when asked for a reason why they recalled these positive second memories, 68% of these participants indicated cited their desire to change their negative moods. In all, these findings suggest that consistency and hedonistic relationships may operate at different points in time following affective experiences (Krohne et al., 2002).

Proposition 6: Affective-consistency relationships dominate during the period immediately following an affective experience while hedonistic relationships grow stronger with the passage of time.

Summary and discussion

This paper has so far sought to present an improved model of P-E fit, where the role of work-based affect as an antecedent and cause of P-E fit is highlighted. Two perspectives were presented to account for the causal effect of work-based affect on P-E fit. The affective-consistency perspective posits that people would try to adjust P-E fit so that it is consistent with experienced work-based affect. Hence, those currently experiencing positive affect would try to adjust the person (P) and/or the environment (E) so as to achieve a similarly consistent desirable state of P-E fit between the two. Conversely, people who are experiencing negative affect would adjust P and/or E so as to have the P-E misfit that is consistent with their experienced negative affect. In contrast to the affective-consistency perspective, the hedonistic perspective predicts that negative work-based affect would cause people to attempt to change P and E so as to achieve the desirable state of P-E fit. However, it also predicts that no change to P-E fit would be observed among people who are already experiencing positive affect since they are already satisfied with their current situation.

By outlining the role of work-based affect in P-E fit theory, these perspectives help address three important issues which have hindered the advancement of P-E fit research. First, previous assumptions about the unidirectional relationship between fit and work-based affect are challenged. By explicating potential ways in which objective and subjective P-E fit can be subject to influence from work-based affect, the expanded P-E fit model presents researchers with new opportunities to investigate possible reciprocal and/or cyclical relationships involving affect and P-E fit. Second, by highlighting work-based affect's role as a cause of P-E fit, the present model also helps to address the lack of knowledge about the individual level antecedents to P-E fit. Therefore, research in P-E fit can now be positioned to facilitate more comprehensive investigations into both individual and situational level causes of P-E fit. Third, the current expanded P-E fit model also provides a theoretical basis for explaining how and why objective and subjective P-E fit may not correspond closely with each other. This model thus incorporates the theoretical weight of past findings of the affective causes behind subjective perceptions of individual and environmental attributes. It is hoped that the propositions generated from the expanded model of P-E fit would serve as a springboard for further research that addresses these issues that have plagued P-E fit research. The next section describes and reports on a study that is based on some of the new ideas that have been presented so far.

CHAPTER 6

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

The present study examines several of the key relationships that are proposed by the expanded P-E fit model illustrated in figure 2. Specifically, I investigate the key propositions that (a) work-based affect causes subjective environment (E) and person (P) perceptions, and that (b) fit between subjective E and P would lead to positive affective work attitudes. Hence, the model tested turns out to be a reduced form of the full model which was presented earlier in figure 2. This reduced model is illustrated in figure 5. The next section is devoted to the development of specific hypotheses regarding the relationships between the afore-mentioned constructs.

Relationships between work-based affect and E and P

The affective consistency and hedonistic perspectives lead to different predictions concerning the influence of work-based affect on the subjective environment (E) and person (P). As will be explained in the following discussion, these relationships are dependent on the relative levels of E and P. Therefore, hypotheses are presented here according to three relative levels of P and E (i.e. E greater than P, E less than P, and E equal to P). To illustrate these hypotheses, I have included graphs that depict the proposed relationships.

These hypotheses are also based on the overarching premise is that affect is greatest when P and E are equal, consistent with a parabolic relationship between P-E fit and work-based affect that is displayed in figure 3 (Edwards et al., 1998; Locke, 1976; Rice,

McFarlin, Hunt & Near, 1985)². As will be seen, the hypotheses contrast positive and negative work-based affect to neutral affect, distinctions that are important to the differing predictions yielded by the affective consistency and hedonistic perspectives.

Affective-consistency perspective

The affective consistency perspective argues that subjective E and P will be adjusted in ways that are consistent with work-based affect. This perspective leads to three sets of relationships linking work-based affect to subjective E and P that depend on whether E is greater than P, E is less than P, or E and P are equal.

When E is greater than P. In this case, when affect shifts from neutral to positive, subjective E will decrease and subjective P will increase, thereby increasing subjective P-E fit. These adjustments in subjective E and P are explained by the core premise of the affective consistency perspective, which asserts that people develop cognitions that are consistent with their affective experiences. Because positive affect is consistent with P-E fit, people who experience positive affect will subjectively skew E and P toward P-E fit, aligning them with their affective state. Conversely, when affect shifts from neutral to negative, subjective E will increase and subjective P will decrease, thereby decreasing subjective fit. As negative affect is consistent with P-E misfit, people who experience negative affect will align E and P with their affective state by subjectively skewing E and P toward P-E misfit. These relationships lead us to the following hypothesis when E is greater than P:

² In reality, many functional forms may relate the person and environment to affect (Edwards et al., 1998). For instance, Cable and Edwards (2004) found that 38% of need fulfillment P-E fit relationships were in fact asymptotic, where although outcomes like job satisfaction were maximized when P-E fit existed, people were not adversely affected when excess supplies (e.g. relationships and prestige) were offered by the organization. Therefore, while assuming a parabolic relationship between P, E and affect is consistent with most conventional ideas underlying P-E fit research, it should be noted that other functional forms exist and that any propositions based on a causal relationship linking work-based affect and P-E fit are dependent on the type of functional form assumed.

Hypothesis 1a. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E will be lower and subjective P will be higher. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, subjective E will be higher and subjective P will be lower.

These relationships are represented graphically in Figure 6. The vertical axis represents E and P on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, and the horizontal axis shows negative, neutral, and positive levels of affect. The graph indicates that, as affect increases from negative to positive, subjective E decreases while subjective P increases. These relationships represent attempts to increase subjective P-E fit as affect moves from negative to neutral to positive.

When E is less than P. We now consider the case where E is less than P. In this case, when affect shifts from neutral to positive, subjective E will increase and subjective P will decrease, thereby increasing subjective P-E fit. These adjustments in subjective E and P are again in line with the affective consistency perspective's assertion that people develop P-E fit cognitions that are consistent with their affective experiences. Since positive affect is consistent with P-E fit, people experiencing positive affect will subjectively adjust E and P toward P-E fit. Thus, allowing them to align E and P with their affective state. Conversely, when affect shifts from neutral to negative, subjective E will decrease and subjective P will increase, thereby decreasing subjective fit. Since negative affect is consistent with P-E misfit, people experiencing negative affect will try to align E and P with their affective state by subjectively adjusting E and P toward P-E misfit. These relationships lead us to the following hypothesis when E is less than P:

Hypothesis 1b. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E will be higher and subjective P will be lower. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, subjective E will be lower and subjective P will be higher.

These relationships are again represented graphically in figure 7. According to this figure, as affect increases from negative to positive, subjective E increases while subjective P decreases. Thus, these relationships illustrate attempts at increasing subjective P-E fit when affect shifts from negative to neutral to positive.

When E and P are equal. Finally, when E and P are equal, affect shifting from neutral to positive will not influence E and P. Since P-E fit already exists, any adjustments to subjective E and P cannot bring them closer. In contrast, affect shifting from neutral to negative will result in attempts to create misfit between subjective E and P. This can occur through one of two processes. One process would involve increasing subjective E and decreasing subjective P, creating subjective P-E misfit in which E is greater than P. An alternative process would entail decreasing E and increasing P, resulting in subjective P-E misfit where E is less than P. If we assume these two processes are equally likely to occur, then their effects on subjective E and P will cancel each other out on average, such that negative affect has no *net* effect on subjective E and P. Hence, the following hypotheses apply when E and P are equal:

Hypothesis 1c. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E and P will remain unchanged. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, subjective E and P will also remain unchanged.

Figure 8 depicts these relationships graphically. Lines E1 and P1 depict the scenario when affect shifts from neutral to negative where E increases and P is decreases. Similarly,

lines P1 and E2 illustrate the scenario under the same affect shift where E decreases and P increases instead. The net effect of these two relationships is represented by line E P. In all, the graph shows that E and P are unchanged when affect shifts from negative to neutral to positive. Table 1 summarizes hypothesized relationships based on the affective consistency perspective.

Hedonistic perspective

The hedonistic perspective argues that subjective E and P will be adjusted in ways that increase P-E fit when work-based affect is negative. This perspective also implies that positive work-based affect would not induce any action on E and P because hedonistic processes are triggered only by the experience of negative affect. Therefore, people already experiencing positive affect would have no incentive to change either E or P. Like the case of affective consistency relationships, this perspective involves three types of relationships linking affect to E and P that depend on whether E is greater than P, E is less than P, or E and P are equal.

When E is greater than P. In this case, when affect shifts from neutral to positive, subjective E will and P will not change, thereby also leaving subjective P-E fit unchanged. This non-effect is explained by the core premise of the hedonistic perspective, which asserts that people only adjust cognitions in response to negative affective experiences. Because people experiencing positive affect have no incentive to act upon their current circumstances, they will not change subjective E and P, thereby leaving P-E fit unchanged. Conversely, when affect shifts from neutral to negative, subjective E will decrease and subjective P will increase, thereby increasing subjective P-E fit. According to the hedonistic perspective, people seek to deal with negative affective experiences by

adjusting their cognitions so as to achieve subjective P-E fit. Therefore, people experiencing negative affect will subjectively skew E and P toward P-E fit. Hence, we have the following hypothesis when E is greater than P:

Hypothesis 2a. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E and P will remain unchanged. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, subjective E will be lower and subjective P will be higher.

These relationships are represented graphically in figure 9. The graph indicates that, as work-based affect increases from neutral to positive, there is no change in E and P. Hence, affect has no effect on P-E fit when positive affect is experienced. In contrast, when affect decreases from neutral to negative, subjective E decreases and subjective P increases. This latter relationship represents attempts to increase subjective P-E fit as affect moves from neutral to negative.

When E is less than P. Since the hedonistic perspective states that people are only motivated to adjust cognitions when experiencing negative affect, subjective E and P will remain unchanged when affect shifts from neutral to positive. In contrast, when affect shifts from neutral to negative, subjective E will increase and subjective P will decrease, thereby increasing subjective fit. These changes in E and P signify attempts to adjust cognitions to achieve P-E fit when negative affect is experienced. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis when E is less than P:

Hypothesis 2b. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E and P will remain unchanged. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, subjective E will be higher and subjective P will be lower.

These relationships are illustrated graphically in figures 18 to 20. As can be seen in the figure, E and P do not change as work-based affect increases from neutral to positive. This occurrence depicts a case where affect has no effect on P-E fit. On the other hand, when affect decreases from neutral to negative, subjective E increases and subjective P decreases. This latter relationship represents attempts to bring E and P in line and increase subjective P-E fit.

When E is equal to P. Lastly, when E is equal to P and affect shifts from neutral to positive, subjective E and P will not change. The reason for this relationship again lies in the hedonistic perspective's stance that people already experiencing positive affect have no incentive to change their current situation. Similarly, when affect shifts from neutral to negative, subjective E and P will also not change. This relationship occurs because any adjustments to E and P cannot increase subjective P-E fit any further as P-E fit already exists. Thus we have the following hypothesis when E is equal to P:

Hypothesis 2c. When affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E and P will remain unchanged. Analogously, when affect is negative rather than neutral, subjective E and P will also remain unchanged.

These relationships are represented graphically in figure 7c. The graph indicates that, as affect increases from negative to neutral to positive, there is no change in E and P. Table 2 summarizes hypotheses on the relationships between affect and subjective E and P proposed by the hedonistic perspective.

Relationships between E and P and affective work attitudes

For the relationships describing the effect of E and P on affective work attitudes (e.g. job satisfaction), it is assumed that work attitudes are maximized when subjective E

and P are equal, signifying subjective P-E fit. Once again, the effects of subjective E and P on work attitudes (e.g. job satisfaction) depend on whether E is greater than P, E is less than P, or E is equal to P.

When E is less than P. When E is less than P, the environment is perceived to provide supplies (E) that are inadequate or less than what the individual needs (P). Hence, increasing E increases P-E fit. This gives rise to a situation where individual needs are increasingly being fulfilled by the environment, hence leading to attitudinal outcomes that are increasingly positive (French, Caplan & Harrison, 1982; Edwards et al., 1998). Similarly, as P decreases, individual needs are increasingly being brought in line with current levels of E. This also leads to an increase in subjective P-E fit, which in turn increases work attitudes. Thus, we have the following hypotheses when E is less than P:

Hypothesis 3a. When E is less than P, affective work attitudes increase as E increases or P decreases.

When E is greater than P. According to P-E fit theory, there are actually three possible relationships that could exist when E exceeds P. Specifically, work attitudes could remain constant, increase, or decrease as E exceeds P. Which of these three relationships prevails is determined by the implications of excess supplies (E) for a particular job dimension on need fulfillment on other dimensions (Edwards et al., 1998). First, attitudes could remain constant as E exceeds P when excess E does not influence need fulfillment on other job dimensions. An example of this relationship exists when once employee benefits like health insurance are able to meet one's needs for health care costs, excess benefits of this kind would have little effect on need fulfillment on other dimensions. Hence, work attitudes remain unchanged beyond this satiation point. Next,

attitudes could also increase as E exceeds P when excess supplies on one dimension are used to fulfill needs on other dimensions. For instance, excess authority in one's job may present opportunities to put into effect changes in other areas of one's job, which can in turn fulfill other needs such as autonomy and variety. Lastly, attitudes can also decrease as E exceeds P when excess supplies on one dimension hamper the ability to fulfill needs on others. For instance, too much autonomy over one's work may interfere with one's need for guidance and supervision.

Drawing from ideas offered by the third set of relationships when E exceeds P, I chose to examine job dimensions which exhibit parabolic P-E fit relationships with work attitudes because they are consistent with the prevalent notion across fit research that outcomes are maximized only when P-E fit exists. Hence, excess E over P is associated with decreasing work attitudes on the dimensions that I have chosen³. Table 3 provides examples of how and why parabolic relationships can play out with respect to the three job facets that I am analyzing.

Considering the three job facets of interest, when E is greater than P, increasing subjective E creates a situation where environmental supplies (E) progressively exceed individual needs (P). As explained in table 3, we should expect work attitudes to decrease when environment supplies exceed individual needs. It thus follows that increasing environmental supplies when E is already greater than P exacerbates P-E misfit and decreases work attitudes. Similarly, decreasing P when E is greater than P can also decrease work attitudes. This relationship exists because decreasing P when E already exceeds P worsens P-E fit by driving E and P further apart. As subjective P-E fit decreases, work attitudes decrease accordingly. We are thus left with the following hypothesis:

³ Figure 3 contains a graphical representation of this relationship.

Hypothesis 3b. When E is greater than P, affective work attitudes decrease as E increases or P decreases.

Table 4 summarizes the hypotheses about relationships between E and P and affective work attitudes.

These relationships are represented graphically in figure 12. The vertical axis represents work attitudes on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, and the horizontal axes shows E and P on scale ranging from 1 to 5. The graph indicates that affective work attitudes increase as E and P converge.

Study context

The current experimental study was set within a job search paradigm. Participants from an undergraduate subject pool were guided through a series of activities that were designed to study attitudes toward jobs that were similar to those that they would apply to. Person-environment (P-E) fit was conceptualized as needs-supplies fit (Cable & Edwards, 2004), where fit was analyzed between what an individual wants in a job (P) and what is offered by a particular job (E).

CHAPTER 7

METHOD

Data Sample

One-hundred and fifty undergraduate business students from a large university in the Southeastern United States participated in this study. Participants were enrolled in an undergraduate organizational behavior class and were awarded credit for their participation. Participants were reasonably involved in the job search process with 35.3% reporting that they were currently searching for a job, and 45.3% reporting that they were searching for an internship.

Statistical Power

To ensure that the above number of participants were sufficient for this study, a statistical power analyses was conducted. For these analyses, I used data that was gathered from a previous research project on P-E fit by J. R. Edwards. Even though this data was gathered in a field setting, it contained variables that were similar to those that are involved in the current study such as perceived job preferences (subjective P), perceived job environment (subjective E), and job satisfaction. Since work-based affect was not specifically assessed as variable in this data set, job satisfaction was treated as a measure of generalized work-based affect. This assumption is reasonable because it is consistent with Locke's (1969) definition of job satisfaction as the affective reaction towards one's job (Locke, 1969). There is also considerable support for the view that job satisfaction contains a sizable affective component (Brief & Weiss, 2002).

In order to obtain effect sizes in the form of multiple correlations (R^2), I ran regression analyses based on models that resembled those that were to be analyzed in the current project. Specifically, models depicting the effect of work-based affect (job satisfaction) on subjective E, and the effect of work-based affect on subjective P were examined. Average R^2 effect sizes from these models were .24 and .08 for subjective E and P respectively. These effect sizes were then used to estimate the number of participants that would be required to obtain an acceptable statistical power value of .80. Using a power calculator software program (Lenth, 2006), results indicated that the minimum number of participants required for power of at least .80 was 41 and 127 for subjective E and P respectively. Since the current sample size of 150 for each trial exceeds the minimum requirements for adequate statistical power, this study had enough power to detect any hypothesized effects.

Procedure

This present study was conducted in an experiment setting using a computerized experiment software program (i.e. MediaLab). Participants were told that they were part of a study to investigate the effectiveness of a system called the Job Information System (JIS), a new system whose goal is to understand how job seekers respond to different types of job-related information. They were also told that the information gathered from this study would be used to help job seekers find suitable jobs where they would be successful.

Overview. The current study employed a 3 x 3 mixed factorial design in which work-based affect was manipulated as a between-person factor, while the objective job environment (E) was manipulated as a within-person factor. In the first step of the study, participants were induced with positive, negative, or neutral levels of work-based affect.

This affect induction was followed by the presentation of manipulated information on a hypothetical job. Finally, perceptions of the subjective job environment (E) (e.g. the amount of autonomy that was present in the job), personal job preferences (subjective P), and attitudes (e.g. intent to apply and anticipated satisfaction) toward the featured job were assessed. Since job information was manipulated as a within-person factor, participants received information on three different hypothetical jobs, each containing different levels of manipulated information on the job environment. In order to prevent induced affect from dissipating, each objective E manipulation was preceded by an affect induction. Therefore the three experimental steps: First the manipulation of affect, then the manipulation of objective E, and finally the assessment of job perceptions, personal preferences, and attitudes were repeated for each of three different hypothetical jobs. The following sections discuss these three experimental steps in more detail.

Affect manipulation. Participants began each study phase by reading a fictitious research report designed to induce positive, negative, or neutral affect about their own future job prospects. Affect was manipulated as a between-subject factor, so each individual participant received reports that were consistently all positive, all negative, or all neutral. Reports presented manipulated information about the relative standing of the participants' school compared to other schools in job-related areas such as earnings of graduates, career success (i.e. number of promotions and career satisfaction) of graduates, and school reputation among employers. Participants in positive affect conditions were presented with information that suggests that their school compares favorably against other schools, while participants in the negative affect condition were presented with information suggesting that their school compares poorly against other schools. Those in the neutral

condition read reports on irrelevant topics such as research projects that their school was involved in. After reading each article, participants were asked several questions regarding their feelings about their career prospects. These questions served as measures of work-based affect.

Job environment manipulation. The objective job environment was manipulated by providing participants with information on various hypothetical jobs. This manipulation is based on a social information processing paradigm (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), which posits that perceptions of jobs are influenced by social cues provided by sources from within a particular job environment (Weiss & Shaw, 1979; White & Mitchell, 1979). Participants were shown sets of fictitious comments from incumbents in three hypothetical jobs. They were told that these comments are from actual employees who are currently in these jobs, and were then asked to read through the comments because the experimenters were interested to know how they perceived certain aspects of these jobs. These job comments were actually designed to provide and manipulate information on certain job facets such as the amount of autonomy and variety present in the job, or the degree to which the job requires supervising other people's work. Thus, information on job facets were manipulated as a within-person factor, creating three different jobs that were supposedly high, moderate, or low in facets of variety, span of control, and autonomy. To convey information about these job facets, comments describing each featured job presented information about job responsibilities (i.e. assembling spreadsheets and analyzing financial information), work activities (i.e. communicating with peers and supervisors via telephone or in person), and the overall work environment (i.e. "It is very important to work with others in a team in the job"). For instance, a manipulation for a job

to be high in variety included comments describing various aspects of the job that appear to evidence undertaking many different roles and activities (e.g. “We are constantly being assigned to multiple projects simultaneously”).

To prevent confounds that might arise from order effects, a 3 X 3 Latin square (since there are 3 job facets being manipulated) was used to counterbalance the order in which information on the manipulated job facets was presented. Furthermore, manipulated job information on these three job facets were also presented together with filler information on other job facets such as security and altruism, so as to prevent participants from focusing too much on the manipulated dimensions, and to also make information on each featured job seem more comprehensive. The rationale behind the choosing of which job facets to manipulate, and which to use as filler information, is discussed in the “measures” section. Finally, to keep participants engaged in this exercise, we promised to reveal the identities of these jobs at the end of the study. Appendix A displays comments describing the three hypothetical jobs featured in this section.

Measurement. After having read information on a hypothetical job, participants were assessed on their perceptions of the job (subjective E), and their own personal job preferences (subjective P). In addition, participants also provided information on their attitudes toward the featured job. Attitudes that were assessed included projected job satisfaction (i.e. if they were an employee in that job), projected turnover intent (i.e. if they were an employee in that job), interest in applying for that job, overall perceptions of fit with the job, and satisfaction with autonomy, span of control, and variety facets of the job.

Pre-testing. This study was pre-tested to ensure that the manipulations and the experiment sequences worked as planned. Participants for this pre-testing exercise came from a different group of students at the same university where this study was conducted.

Measures

Work-based affect. Work-based affect was measured using affect markers from Russell's (1980) circumplex model of affect. After reading each affect-inducing article, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they were experiencing certain positive (i.e. happy, glad, delighted, satisfied, and pleased) and negative (i.e. miserable, frustrated, distressed, sad, and gloomy) emotions at the particular moment. Ratings were obtained using a 5-point Likert scale. These items were first rescaled to correspond to an overall affect scale that ranged from -4 to +4, where negative scores implied the experience of negative affect, positive scores represented the experience of positive affect, and the value 0 represented neutral affect. Scores from the ten emotions were then averaged to obtain an overall measure of work-based affect.

Job facets. The job environment was manipulated and measured on several different job facets that were prominent in past research on job design and work values (Cable & Edwards, 2004; Gay, Weiss, Hendel, Dawis & Lofquist, 1971; Hackman & Lawler, 1971; Pryor, 1983; Super, 1970). In order to ensure that all job facets involved in this study did not overlap too much with each other, previously unpublished data from J.R. Edwards on the Minnesota Importance Questionnaire (MIQ), Work Aspect Preference Scale (WAPS), and the Work Values Inventory (WVI) was first checked to ensure that correlations between these facets were not exceedingly high. Results from this check

revealed that all chosen facets were only modestly related with one another with the average correlation between them being .21.

In accordance with hypotheses 3, job facets that were both manipulated and measured were also chosen based on their expected relationships with affective work attitude outcomes such as job satisfaction. Specifically, facets where it could be reasonably assumed that outcomes were maximized when attributes of the environment (E) matched those of the person (P) were chosen. This process resulted in the selection of the three facets of autonomy, span of control (i.e. opportunities to manage people), and variety as variables that were first manipulated and then measured in this study. Consistent with a needs-supplies fit paradigm, subjective job environment (E) ratings were obtained by asking how much of a particular facet (e.g. “doing a variety of things”) was present in the featured job. Similarly, ratings of person needs (P) were obtained by asking how much of the particular job facet the respondent would like to have. Ratings of E and P were obtained using a 7-point Likert scale which ranged from 1 (“none at all”) to 7 (“a very great amount”). The exact items used to measure job facets are displayed in appendix B.

Job attitudes. Four different job outcomes were assessed. Keeping in line with the above cover story, participants were asked to rate each featured job by indicating their intent to apply, anticipated job and facet satisfaction, anticipated perceived needs-supplies fit, and anticipated turnover intent. Intent to apply (“I plan to exert a great deal of effort to get this job.”), anticipated job satisfaction (“In general, I would be satisfied with this job.”), facet satisfaction, and anticipated turnover intent (“I could see myself working in this job for many years.”) were measured using scales from (Edwards et al., 2006), whereas anticipated needs-supplies fit was measured using Cable and DeRue’s (2002)

perceived needs-supplies fit measure (“There is a good fit between what this job offers and what I am looking for in a job.”). Ratings of these job outcomes were obtained using a 7-point Likert scale.

Individual differences. For supplemental analyses, several individual difference measures were also assessed approximately six weeks prior to the study. Positive and negative affectivity was assessed using the PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Consistent with the measure used by Watson and colleagues (1988), ratings on this measure were obtained via a 5-point scale. Preference for consistency was assessed using the brief version of Cialdini et al’s (1995), which consisted of 9 items. Lastly, self-esteem was assessed using Rosenberg’s (1965) 10-item scale. Measures of self-esteem and preference for consistency were obtained using a 7-point Likert scale.

Analyses

Hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypotheses 1 and 2 deal with relationships between work-based affect and subjective E and P respectively. As highlighted during the hypotheses development, these relationships are dependent on the relative levels of E and P. Hence the general regression model used for these analyses is:

$$E = b_0 + b_1A + b_2W_1 + b_3AW_1 + b_4W_2 + b_5AW_2 + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (1)$$

$$P = b_0 + b_1A + b_2W_1 + b_3AW_1 + b_4W_2 + b_5AW_2 + e \quad (2)$$

where work-based affect is represented by A, and the two categorical variables W_1 and W_2 have been created to represent three distinct groups of relative E and P ($E > P$, $E = P$, and $E < P$) that correspond to the hypotheses to be tested. The objective environment is also controlled for by including ED_1 and ED_2 , which are dummy variables denoting the objective environment manipulation groups, in the model. Note that since this study was

unable to manipulate the objective person construct⁴, equation 2 did not control for the objective person.

A closer look at the simple slope equations illustrates how the above models facilitate the analysis of relationships between work-based affect and E and P for different groups of responses. If we let the omitted group be $E < P$, then $W_1 = 0$ and $W_2 = 0$ when $E < P$. Hence, the equation relating affect to E when $E < P$ is:

$$E = b_0 + b_1A + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (3)$$

Similarly, when $E > P$ and $W_1 = 0$, $W_2 = 1$, the equation relating affect and E is:

$$E = (b_0 + b_4) + (b_1 + b_5)A + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (4)$$

Lastly, when $E = P$ and $W_1 = 1$, $W_2 = 0$, the equation relating affect and E becomes:

$$E = (b_0 + b_2) + (b_1 + b_3)A + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (5)$$

Exactly the same relationships hold between affect and P, when P is the dependent variable in the above models.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 also predict different relationships when it comes to different levels of affect. For instance, hypothesis 2(a) states that “when affect is positive rather than neutral, subjective E and P will remain unchanged”, whereas “when affect is negative rather than neutral, subjective E will be lower and subjective P will be higher.” This hypothesis implies the presence of non-linear relationships between affect and E and P that are illustrated in the figures 7a and 7b. Therefore, an additional dummy variable (D) is required to model the non-linear relationships that are being proposed. Specifically, if we

⁴ Earlier designs of this study proposed manipulating personal job facet preferences via feedback on a bogus questionnaire. This plan was dropped because pre-testing results suggested that participants were generally suspicious about this manipulation procedure. Pre-testing results confirm this claim by suggesting that there were no meaningful differences between participants in different experimental conditions that attempted to manipulate P.

let A^* denote a neutral level of affect⁵, and assign D to be a dummy variable that equals 0 when $A \leq A^*$, and to equals 1 when $A > A^*$, incorporating D into equations 1 and 2 produces:

$$E = b_0 + b_1A + b_2AD + b_3W_1 + b_4AW_1 + b_5ADW_1 + b_6W_2 + b_7AW_2 + b_8ADW_2 + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (6)$$

$$P = b_0 + b_1A + b_2AD + b_3W_1 + b_4AW_1 + b_5ADW_1 + b_6W_2 + b_7AW_2 + b_8ADW_2 + e \quad (7)$$

The relationships between affect and the respective E and P outcomes are again more apparent when we look at the respective simple slopes for the different E relative to P groups.

When E exceeds P. When $E > P$ ($W_1 = 0, W_2 = 1$), the equations relating affect and E and P are:

$$E = (b_0 + b_6) + (b_1 + b_7)A + (b_2 + b_8)AD + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (8)$$

$$P = (b_0 + b_6) + (b_1 + b_7)A + (b_2 + b_8)AD + e \quad (9)$$

Furthermore, when affect is negative compared to the neutral level and $A \leq A^*$ ($D = 0$), the above equations simplify to:

$$E = (b_0 + b_6) + (b_1 + b_7)A + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (10)$$

$$P = (b_0 + b_6) + (b_1 + b_7)A + e \quad (11)$$

Therefore, to test the affective-consistency hypothesis that E will be *higher* when affect is negative rather than neutral (H1a) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_7)$ is negative in

⁵ For this study, the average level of affect for participants in the neutral affect manipulation condition was treated as the neutral value of affect. Thus the neutral affect value was .73 on a scale that ranged from -4 to +4. Since a value of “0” lies exactly at the midpoint of the 9-point affect scale, “0” could also logically represent a feasible value of neutral affect. Thus, all relevant analyses were repeated with “0” used as the neutral value of affect. Results from this latter set of analyses revealed few noticeable differences when compared to the original set of analyses.

equation 10. Similarly, to test the hedonistic hypothesis that E will be lower when affect is negative rather than neutral (H2a) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_7)$ is positive in equation 10. Correspondingly, to test the affective-consistency hypothesis that P will be *lower* when affect is negative rather than neutral (H1a) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_7)$ is positive in equation 11. On the other hand, testing the hypothesis that P will be higher when affect is negative rather than neutral (H2a) involves testing whether $(b_1 + b_7)$ is negative in equation 11.

Conversely, when affect is positive compared to the neutral level and $A > A^*$ ($D = 1$) equations 8 and 9 become:

$$E = (b_0 + b_6) + (b_1 + b_7 + b_2 + b_8)A + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (12)$$

$$P = (b_0 + b_6) + (b_1 + b_7 + b_2 + b_8)A + e \quad (13)$$

Hence, when affect is positive compared to the neutral level, testing the affective-consistency hypothesis that E will be lower when affect is positive (H1a) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_7 + b_2 + b_8)$ is negative in equation 12. Similarly, to test the hedonistic hypothesis that E will remain unchanged when affect is positive rather than neutral (H2a) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_7 + b_2 + b_8)$ is 0 in the same model. Likewise, testing the affective-consistency hypothesis that P will be higher when affect is positive rather than neutral (H1a) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_7 + b_2 + b_8)$ is positive in equation 13. Similarly, testing the hedonistic hypothesis that P will remain unchanged when affect is positive rather than neutral (H2a) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_7 + b_2 + b_8)$ is 0 in equation 13.

When E is equal to P. When E is equal to P ($W_1 = 1, W_2 = 0$), equations 6 and 7 reduce to:

$$E = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_4)A + (b_2 + b_5)AD + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (14)$$

$$P = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_4)A + (b_2 + b_5)AD + e \quad (15)$$

When affect is negative and $A \leq A^*$ ($D = 0$) the models depicting the relationship between affect and E and P respectively become:

$$E = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_4)A + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (16)$$

$$P = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_4)A + e \quad (17)$$

Consequently, to test whether E and P will remain unchanged when affect is negative rather than neutral (H1c & H2c) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_4)$ is 0. On the other hand, when affect is positive rather than neutral and $A > A^*$ ($D = 1$), equations 14 and 15 simplify to:

$$E = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_4 + b_2 + b_5)A + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (18)$$

$$P = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_4 + b_2 + b_5)A + e \quad (19)$$

Ergo, testing the hypothesis that E and P will remain unchanged when affect is positive rather than neutral (H1c & H2c) requires testing whether $(b_1 + b_4 + b_2 + b_5)$ is 0.

When E is less than P. When E is less than P ($W_1 = 0$, $W_2 = 0$), equations 6 and 7 become:

$$E = b_0 + b_1A + b_2AD + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (20)$$

$$P = b_0 + b_1A + b_2AD + e \quad (21)$$

When affect is negative compared the neutral value and $A \leq A^*$ ($D = 0$), the equations relating affect and E and P are:

$$E = b_0 + b_1A + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (22)$$

$$P = b_0 + b_1A + e \quad (23)$$

Therefore, to test the affective-consistency hypothesis that E will be *lower* when affect is negative rather than neutral (H1b) is to test whether b_1 is positive in equation 22. Similarly, to test the hedonistic hypothesis that E will be *higher* when affect is negative rather than neutral (H2b) is to test whether b_1 is negative in equation 22. Correspondingly, to test the

affective-consistency hypothesis that P will be *higher* when affect is negative rather than neutral (H1b) is to test whether b_1 is negative in equation 22. Similarly, to test the hedonistic hypothesis that P will be *lower* when affect is negative rather than neutral (H2b) is to test whether b_1 is positive in equation 22.

However, when affect is positive compared to the neutral level and $A > A^*$ ($D = 1$) equations 20 and 21 reduce to:

$$E = b_0 + (b_1 + b_2)A + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (24)$$

$$P = b_0 + (b_1 + b_2)A + e \quad (25)$$

In this case, to test whether E will be higher when affect is positive rather than neutral (H1b) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_2)$ is positive. In contrast, to test whether E will remain unchanged when affect is positive rather than neutral is to test whether $(b_1 + b_2)$ is 0 (H2b). Similarly, to test whether P will be lower when affect is positive rather than neutral (H1b) is to test whether $(b_1 + b_2)$ is negative. In contrast, to test whether P will remain unchanged when affect is positive rather than neutral is to test whether $(b_1 + b_2)$ is 0 (H2b).

Accounting for nested data structure. Since measures of affect, E, and P were obtained three times repeatedly for each participant, the current data set had a nested structure where repeated measures of affect, E, and P were nested within each participant. To account for the possible non-independence of observations, multilevel random coefficient (MRC) models (also known as hierarchical linear models) were employed in the current analyses (Bliese, 2002; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Hofmann, Griffin & Gavin, 2000). Hence, the general regression model represented by equations 6 and 7 was adapted to produce the following MRC model represented by level 1 and level 2 equations:

Level 1:

$$E = b_0 + b_1W_1 + b_2W_2 + b_3ED_1 + b_4ED_2 + r \quad (26)$$

Level 2:

$$b_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}A + \gamma_{02}AD + \mu_0 \quad (27)$$

$$b_1 = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}A + \gamma_{12}AD + \mu_1 \quad (28)$$

$$b_2 = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}A + \gamma_{22}AD + \mu_2 \quad (29)$$

$$b_3 = \gamma_{30} \quad (30)$$

$$b_4 = \gamma_{40} \quad (31)$$

The MRC model above takes into account the nested nature of the current dataset by allowing average levels of E (represented by b_0), and the relationships between different E-P groups and E (represented by b_1 and b_2) to vary both within and across individuals. These effects are reflected in the above model by modeling coefficients b_0 , b_1 , and b_2 in the level 2 model as random coefficients with both fixed effects (γ) (i.e. a parameter estimate that does not vary across individuals), and random effects (μ) whose variance represents between individual variance in the coefficient. Affect (A) and affect group (D) were conceptualized as level 2 variables since individuals were placed in manipulation groups that consistently received articles of the same valence (i.e. positive, negative, or neutral). Therefore, A and D were variables that were supposed to remain constant within individuals.

In contrast, variables W_1 and W_2 , which serve classification variables for different groups involving relative levels of E and P (i.e. $E > P$, $E = P$, and $E < P$) were modeled as level 1 variables because they are variables that were allowed to vary within individuals. Similarly, ED_1 and ED_2 were also modeled as level 1 variables since they are dummy variables controlling for the manipulated objective environment, which was also varied

within individuals. There was no random variance component in equations 30 and 31 because each individual received the same combination of the objective E manipulation. Substituting equations 27 to 31 into equation 26 yields the following reduced form equation:

$$E = (\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}A + \gamma_{02}AD + \gamma_{10}W_1 + \gamma_{11}AW_1 + \gamma_{12}ADW_1 + \gamma_{20}W_2 + \gamma_{21}AW_2 + \gamma_{22}ADW_2 + \gamma_{30}ED_1 + \gamma_{40}ED_2) + (\mu_0 + W_1\mu_1 + W_2\mu_2 + r) \quad (32)$$

where the terms in the first parentheses denote fixed effects, while the terms in the second parentheses denote random effects in the MRC model. Comparing equations 6 and 32 it should be apparent that the fixed effects coefficients $\gamma_{00}, \gamma_{01}, \gamma_{02}, \gamma_{10}, \gamma_{11}, \gamma_{12}, \gamma_{20}, \gamma_{21}, \gamma_{22}, \gamma_{30}$, and γ_{40} , correspond to coefficients b_0 to b_{10} in equation 6 respectively. Hence, significance tests on the fixed effects coefficients were used to evaluate support for hypotheses 1 and 2. Additionally, linear contrast statements were used in the SAS PROC MIXED program to conduct significance tests for hypotheses such as H2a, which involve linear combinations of coefficients (i.e. $b_1 + b_7$).

Hypotheses 3. Unlike hypotheses 1 and 2, hypothesis 3 is concerned with relationships between subjective E and P and work attitudes such as job and facet satisfaction, intent to apply, turnover intent, and perceived needs-supplies fit. Polynomial regression modeling was adopted as an analytical framework for hypothesis 3 (Edwards, 1995; Edwards & Parry, 1993). Based on this framework, the proposed functional form for the model of P-G fit is represented as:

$$Z = b_0 + b_1E + b_2P + b_3E^2 + b_4EP + b_5P^2 + e \quad (33)$$

where E represents subjective E, P represents subjective P, and Z is the predicted individual outcome. To take into account the nested nature of data, the present analyses incorporate

the polynomial regression in equation 33 within a multilevel random coefficient (MRC) model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Hofmann et al., 2000; Jansen & Kristof-Brown, 2005).

The set of random coefficient equations based on equation 33 are as follows:

Level 1 equation:

$$Z = b_0 + b_1E + b_3E^2 + r \quad (34)$$

Level 2 equations:

$$b_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}P + \gamma_{02}P^2 + \mu_0, \quad (35)$$

$$b_1 = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}P + \mu_1, \quad (36)$$

$$b_2 = \gamma_{20} + \mu_2, \quad (37)$$

The MRC model above takes into account the nested nature of the current dataset by allowing average levels of the job outcome Z (represented by b_0), and the relationships between E and Z (represented by b_1 and b_2) to vary both within and across individuals. These effects are reflected in the above model by modeling coefficients b_0 , b_1 , and b_2 in the level 2 model as a random coefficient with both fixed effects (γ) (i.e. a parameter estimate that does not vary across groups), and random effects (μ) whose variance represents between group variance in the coefficient. The subjective person (P) was conceptualized as a level 2 variable since ratings of P should not vary within the same individual. In contrast, the variable E was modeled as a level 1 variable because it is a variable that was manipulated and allowed to vary within individuals.

Consistent with previous fit research using polynomial regression modeling and HLM (Jansen & Kristof-Brown, 2005), analyses of P - E fit relationships predicted in hypotheses 3(a) to 3(c) were conducted by using response surface methodology (Edwards & Parry, 1993). Specifically, the significance of slopes and curvatures along lines of

interest such as $E=P$ and $E=-P$ were tested using linear contrasts in the SAS PROC MIXED program.

CHAPTER 8

RESULTS

Pre-testing

Results from pre-testing suggested that research reports successfully influenced how participants felt about their job prospects. To account for the nested nature of the data, manipulation checks were performed in a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) framework. Results indicated that participants in the three affect manipulation conditions differed significantly on how they felt about their career prospects ($F = 60.18, p < .01$). Pairwise comparisons suggest that participants who received reports containing positive information felt significantly more positively about their career prospects compared to those who read reports containing neutral ($p < .01$) and negative information ($p < .01$). Correspondingly, those who read reports containing negative information also felt significantly more negative ($p < .01$) about their career prospects than participants who read neutral and positive reports respectively ($p < .01$). Tables 5 and 6 display the means and results from pairwise tests of differences between means.

Results report in tables 7 and 8 also confirmed that manipulated information regarding job facets influenced how participants perceived almost all of the job facets that were featured in the study.⁶ Participants who read information suggesting that jobs were high in the manipulated facets (i.e. autonomy and span of control) perceived that jobs

⁶ The exception to this was the difference between groups that received moderate versus low levels of variety. To deal with this in the main study, wording of the job comments for these groups were slightly adjusted to emphasize the difference between moderate and low levels of variety in the featured jobs. Results from manipulation tests in the main study suggested that these adjustments were successful.

contained higher amounts of these facets compared to participants who read information suggesting moderate or low levels on the facets. Similarly, participants who received information describing moderate levels of the job facets also perceived that the jobs contained higher amounts of these facets compared to those who received information describing low levels of these facets. Overall, pre-testing participants indicated that their experiment experiences did not cause them to be suspicious about the overall goals of the study.

Main study

Manipulation checks. As in the case of pre-testing, manipulation checks suggest that affect manipulations successfully influenced how participants felt about their job prospects. HLM analyses were again used to account for the nested structure of the data. Results confirmed that participants in the three affect manipulation conditions differed significantly on work-based affect and how they felt about their career prospects ($F = 43.48, p < .01$). Pairwise comparisons between manipulation groups indicated that participants who read reports that presented positive information felt significantly more positive about their career prospects compared to those who read reports containing neutral and negative information. Similarly, those who read reports containing negative information also felt significantly more negatively about their career prospects compared to participants who read neutral and positive reports respectively. Tables 9 and 10 display the means and results from pairwise comparisons of the difference in means across affect manipulation groups.

Manipulation checks also verified the success of manipulations on job environments. Manipulated information on job facets influenced participants' perceptions

of the jobs that were featured in the study (i.e. $p < .01$ for omnibus tests for mean differences between groups on all job facets). Participants who were presented with information suggesting that jobs were high in the manipulated facets (i.e. autonomy, span of control, and variety) perceived that jobs possessed higher levels of these facets compared to participants who read information that implied moderate or low levels on the facets. Likewise, participants who were given information describing moderate levels of the job facets also perceived that the jobs exhibited higher amounts of these facets compared to those who received information that described low levels of these facets. Tables 11 and 12 respectively display means and results from pairwise comparisons of mean differences across manipulation groups. In all, results from these manipulation checks confirmed the success of manipulations employed in this study.

Correlations. Table 13 displays the correlations between the measured variables in this study as well as indices of internal reliability of each of these measures. Notably, work-based affect did not seem to be significantly correlated with E and P. However, affect was significantly related with each of the four work overall outcomes that were assessed (i.e. intent to apply, job satisfaction, perceived needs-supplies fit, and turnover intent), and facet satisfaction pertaining to span of control. The implications of these results for the hypothesized relationships will now be discussed.

Hypotheses 1a and 2a. Hypotheses 1a and 2a examine relationships based on the affective consistency and hedonistic perspectives respectively for the participant group where E exceeds P. Results from multilevel analyses of these relationships are displayed in tables 14 and 15. According to column 1 of table 15, there was little support for H1a and H2a for people who experienced negative affect. The only relationship that was supported

involved subjective P perceptions for variety, where people who experienced negative affect lowered the amount of variety that they wanted in their jobs. This observed relationship is in line with the affective-consistency prediction that people will adjust their perceived personal job wants toward P-E misfit in order to be consistent with the negative affect they experience.

H2a and hedonistic relationships were supported for participants who were experiencing positive affect (see column 2 of table 15). This support was evident for both E and P perceptions across all three job facets, except for the model relating affect and subjective E for span of control. Subjective E and P tended to remain unchanged when positive work-based affect was experienced. These results suggest that there was only support for the hedonistic perspective when positive work-based affect was experienced.

Hypotheses 1b and 2b. As seen in column 3 in table 15, there was no support for H1b and H2b for participants where E is less than P, and who experienced negative work-based affect. In contrast H2b was supported for those who experienced positive affect. Individuals who experienced positive affect were not inclined to adjust either perceptions of subjective E or P. The results reported in column 4 of table 15 suggest that this tendency to not react to positive affect occurred across all three job facets, and for both E and P. In all, these results suggest that affect did not influence individuals' perceptions of the subjective E and P when the job environment was perceived to offer less than what individuals wanted.

Hypotheses 1c and 2c. According to column 5 in table 15, when E is equal to P and affect is negative rather than neutral, there is support for the hypothesis that E and P will remain unchanged across all job facets except for perceptions of subjective E for span

of control, which decreased in response to negative affect. This unexpected result suggests that individuals with P-E fit wanted less span of control in their jobs when they experienced negative affect. When affect was positive rather than neutral, the hypothesis that E and P will remain unchanged (H2b) was supported for the facet of variety.⁷ Similarly, there was also no change in P perceptions of span of control when positive affect was experienced. Counter to what was hypothesized, positive affect caused people to perceive that there was more autonomy and span of control in the featured jobs. Furthermore, people also wanted more autonomy when they experienced positive affect. In conclusion, while there is no clear support for either affective-consistency or hedonistic perspectives in this set of analyses. It also seems that people who were already experiencing fit between subjective E and P changed their perceptions of E and P on certain job facets.

Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 deals with the effect of P-E fit on work attitudes such as intent to apply, job and facet satisfaction, turnover intent, and perceived needs-supplies (N-S) fit. Response surface methodology (Edwards & Parry, 1993) was used to analyze the various P-E fit relationships that encompass this set of hypotheses⁸.

To establish support for a P-E fit effect (H3), the shape of the surface along the line of misfit ($P = -E$) was first evaluated by testing linear combinations of coefficients from their respective polynomial regression models using linear contrasts in SAS PROC MIXED. These analyses specifically focused on $b_3 - b_4 + b_5$, which represents the surface

⁷ Analyses for H1 and H2 were repeated with positive and negative affect controlled for. Another set of analysis was based on data where responses were deleted from participants who strongly disagreed with the statements “The information presented in the reports influenced how I felt about my career prospects.” and “The featured job comments are effective at presenting information on the characteristics of Jobs A, B, and C.”, which resulted in responses from 19 participants being left out of the analyses. Results from these two sets of analyses yielded results that were not appreciably different from the results that are reported in this section.

⁸ Plots of these response surfaces are displayed in figure 13 to 17.

curvature along the $P = -E$ line, and $b_1 - b_2$, which represents the slope of the surface at the point $E = 0, P = 0$ ⁹. For H3 to be supported, it first has to be established that $b_1 - b_2$ does not differ from zero which, in combination with a negative value for $b_3 - b_4 + b_5$, indicates a symmetric downward curvature along the $P = -E$ line centered at the point $E = 0, P = 0$ ¹⁰. Second, it is also important to determine if the surface linking E and P to an individual outcome is rotated relative to the line of P-E fit ($P = E$) because a rotated surface implies that any support for P-E fit effect depends on absolute values of E and P (Edwards, 2007). Therefore, to test for surface rotation, analyses were repeated to see if the results obtained for surfaces along the $P = -E$ line of misfit still applied at lower and higher levels of both E and P. The original data was first rescaled to low and high levels by respectively subtracting and adding 1 unit from the already scale-centered values of E and P. Polynomial regression models were then re-estimated, and the significance of $b_1 - b_2$ and $b_3 - b_4 + b_5$ was evaluated again for the rescaled data. If there were no differences in results obtained between the original and rescaled data (at low and high levels of E and P), then it may be concluded that there is no significant rotation, thus adding support to H3a and H3b. Conversely, if there are differences in results between the original and rescaled data, then it may be concluded that surfaces are rotated relative to the line of P-E fit, and that H3a and H3b are not supported.

Results from the polynomial regressions reported in table 16, while table 17 displays results from the testing of linear combinations of coefficients. Columns 1 to 7 of table 17 indicate support for H3 for the relationships involving autonomy and all individual

⁹ For detailed discussions of response surface methodology see Edwards & Parry (1993) and Edwards (2002).

¹⁰ Since we would expect that turnover intent be minimized when P-E fit exists, a positive value for $b_3 - b_4 + b_5$ would be hypothesized instead of a negative one in the case of this dependent variable.

outcomes except for turnover intent. Therefore, when it was perceived that the amount of autonomy in a job environment (E) was less than the amount of autonomy that individuals would like to have (P), job satisfaction, facet satisfaction, intent to apply, and perceived needs-supplies (NS) fit all *increased* as E increased or P decreased. Similarly, when the perceived amount of autonomy (E) in a job was greater than the amount individuals would have liked (P), the same four outcomes *decreased* as E increased or P decreased. Summarizing, these results suggest that P-E fit effects were observed only for autonomy, and the individual outcomes of job satisfaction, facet satisfaction, intent to apply for the job, and perceived N-S fit.

As for span of control, results suggest the presence of significant downward curvature along the line of P-E misfit (denoted by $b_3 - b_4 + b_5$) across all dependent variables. However, the slope of the surface (denoted by $b_1 - b_2$) was also significantly negative for job satisfaction, facet satisfaction, and intent to apply outcomes. This implies that these outcomes were not maximized at the point of P-E fit. Instead, they were maximized at a point where person wants exceeded what was offered by a featured job. Furthermore, the shape of the surfaces along the line of P-E misfit involving span of control were different when compared to results obtained when the models were re-estimated at low and high values of E and P. This finding indicates that all surfaces involving span of control were rotated relative to the line of P-E fit. For instance, there was no significant slope along the line of misfit for the surface linking span of control and turnover intent at the original moderate levels of E and P (figure 16). However, results in column 1 of table 17 indicates that there is a negative slope along the line of misfit for low values of E and P, whereas corresponding numbers in column 5 signal the presence of a positive slope along

the line of misfit at high values of E and P. These comparisons point to a surface that is rotated relative to the line of P-E fit, and hence constitute evidence against the presence of a P-E fit effect.

Similar to results obtained for span of control, significant curvature along the line of P-E misfit was also observed across all outcomes for variety. Figures displayed in column 3 of table 17 also point toward the presence of positive (facet satisfaction and turnover intent) and negative (job satisfaction, intent to apply, and perceived N-S fit) slopes along the line of misfit. These results are evidence against a P-E fit effect because they imply that outcomes were not maximized when there was P-E fit. Instead, facet satisfaction was maximized when the amount offered by a job exceeded individual wants. Correspondingly, job satisfaction, intent to apply, turnover intent, and perceived N-S fit were maximized (or minimized in the case of turnover intent) when individual wants exceeded what a particular job environment could offer. Furthermore, comparisons with results obtained for low and high values for E and P, also indicate that surfaces for intent to apply, turnover intent, and perceived N-S fit were rotated relative to the line of P-E fit. In all, no P-E fit effects were found for span of control and variety. Hence there was no support for H3 when it came to these job facets.

According to Edwards (2002, 2007), it is also meaningful to examine the shape of the response surface along the line of P-E fit ($P = E$). Specifically, the linear combination $b_3 + b_4 + b_5$ represents the curvature of the surface along the line of P-E fit, while $b_1 + b_2$ represents the slope at the point $E = 0$ and $P = 0$. If the surface was flat along the P-E fit line, then $b_1 + b_2$ and $b_3 + b_4 + b_5$ should both equal zero. As reported in columns 8 and 9 of table 17, this condition was observed for the surfaces linking autonomy and variety to job

satisfaction and intent to apply. These results imply that job satisfaction and intent to apply do not vary with absolute amounts of subjective E and P for autonomy and variety. While this result is in line with the strict view of some classic fit research that outcomes are maximized as long as P-E fit exists, regardless of the magnitudes of E and P (French et al., 1982; Locke, 1976; Rice et al., 1985), others have argued more recently that the surface along the line of P-E fit need not necessarily be flat in order to conclude the existence of P-E fit effects (Edwards, 2007). For instance, more positive outcomes could result when both E and P are high than when both are low because wanting and attaining high levels of P and E respectively can also bring about a sense of self-actualization (Edwards & Rothbard, 1999). This would suggest that work attitudes could be higher when both E and P are high than when both are low. In the current analyses, a positive slope ($p < .01$) was obtained for the surface linking autonomy to facet satisfaction. This result suggests that satisfaction with autonomy was higher at high levels autonomy compared to lower levels of autonomy. Another positive slope ($p < .01$) was found for the surface linking variety to turnover intent, which implies that turnover intent was higher at higher levels of variety compared to lower levels of variety. It is also observed that the surface linking variety and perceived N-S fit had a negative slope ($p < .10$), which suggests that perceived N-S fit was actually lower at high levels of variety compared to lower levels of variety. The previous three conclusions could be readily made based on the direction of the slope along the P-E fit line because the slopes were not accompanied by any curvatures.

The presence of curvature along the line of P-E fit implies that the slopes along the P-E fit line varied according to the absolute levels of E and P. As reported in column 9 of table 17, there were several surfaces with significant curvatures. All of these curvatures

except for the one involving turnover intent as an outcome were positive, which suggests that the surfaces were curved upward. This observation implies that as E and P increased concurrently from relatively low levels, respective outcomes initially decreased and then increased as E and P reached relatively high levels. In contrast, downward curvatures were obtained for surfaces linking autonomy and span of control to turnover intent. Hence, turnover intent initially increased as E and P increased together from relatively low levels of E and P, and decreased as E and P reached relatively high levels.

Supplemental analyses

Results so far provide generally weak support for the affective-consistency and hedonistic relationships that were proposed to link work-based affect and E and P. In order to explore whether alternative relationships existed between affect and E and P, several additional exploratory analyses were conducted.

Alternative groups of relative E and P. As discussed earlier, hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that work-based affect is maximized when E and P are exactly equal. However, results from tests on the effect of P-E fit on job satisfaction, a variable with significant affective content (Locke, 1969; Brief & Weiss, 2002), suggest that satisfaction is not at its highest level when P-E fit exists. Since this finding violates a key assumption upon which earlier hypotheses about the influence of work-based affect on E and P are based on, additional analyses that account for the possibility that affect was being maximized at some point other than that of P-E fit were conducted. These supplemental analyses assumed that job satisfaction and its affective component could act as a proxy for relationships involving work-based affect and subjective E and P. It was first important to find out exactly where job satisfaction was being maximized along the surface

linking E and P to job satisfaction (see figures 9a to 9c). Determining the line where satisfaction was maximized involved calculating equations for the principal axis of the surface, which describes the overall orientation of the surface with respect to the E, P plane (Edwards, 2002). Specifically, the equation for the first principal axis ($P = p_{10} + p_{11}E$) was calculated using formulae from Edwards (2002; also see Edwards & Parry, 1993). Results from these analyses are reported in table 18. Data from individuals was then grouped into cases that fell either below or above the principal axis by creating a dummy variable. This dummy variable W_{pa} grouped responses according to whether $E < P^*$ or $E > P^*$, where P^* represents the equation of the principal axis $P^* = p_{10} + p_{11}E$. Hence, the following models describing the effect of work-based affect on E and P were estimated:

$$E = b_0 + b_1A + b_2AD + b_3W_{pa} + b_4AW_{pa} + b_5ADW_{pa} + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (38)$$

$$P = b_0 + b_1A + b_2AD + b_3W_{pa} + b_4AW_{pa} + b_5ADW_{pa} + e \quad (39)$$

where A denoted work-based affect, D was a dummy variable that denoted whether affect was above or below neutral level, and ED_1 and ED_2 were control variables for manipulated groups of objective E. The above model was derived from the original models in equations 6 and 7 by simply replacing the dummy variables W_1 and W_2 , which were based on relative values of E and P (i.e. $E > P$, $E = P$, and $E < P$), with a single dummy variable W_{pa} which was based on the current principal axis groupings. As in earlier analyses, HLM methods were also employed to account for the possible non-independence in the data.

Similar to earlier analyses for hypotheses 1 and 2, the current analyses facilitated the separate analysis of the relationships between work-based affect and subjective E and P according to the response's position relative to the principal axis, and whether affect was

more positive or negative compared to a neutral level. To facilitate the reporting and interpretation of results, findings are discussed according to simple slopes derived from equations 38 and 39.

Evaluating H1a and H2a and the relationship between affect and E, when $E > P^*$ ($W_{pa} = 1$) and affect is negative ($D = 0$), involves analyzing the following simple slope equation:

$$E = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_4)A + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (40)$$

$$P = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_4)A + e \quad (41)$$

The linear combination $b_1 + b_4$ represents the relationships between affect and both E and P in the above equations. Results from analyses based on these models are reported in column 1 of table 20. Only the relationship between work-based affect and perceptions of span of control for E was significant ($p < .10$). This result supports the affective-consistency perspective because people developed cognitions consistent with misfit and negative affect by perceiving that a job offered even more span of control when E already exceeded P^* .

When affect is positive ($D = 1$), the relationships between affect and E and P are represented by the following equations:

$$E = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_2 + b_4 + b_5)A + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (42)$$

$$P = (b_0 + b_3) + (b_1 + b_2 + b_4 + b_5)A + e \quad (43)$$

Thus, the linear combination $b_1 + b_2 + b_4 + b_5$ describes the influence of affect on E and P. According to results reported in column 2 of table 20, there was only support for the affective-consistency perspective (H1a) for the relationship between affect and subjective P in autonomy ($p < .05$). Individuals increased the amount of autonomy that they wanted in

their jobs towards the direction of P-E fit in order to be consistent with experienced positive affect. There was also support for hedonistic relationships and H2a. Specifically, individuals experiencing positive affect were not inclined to change subjective E for autonomy and variety. Similarly, the individuals also did not change subjective P for span of control and variety when positive affect was experienced. The lack of relationships between affect and E and P above constitute support for the hedonistic idea that people will only be inclined to change perceptions of E and P when negative affect is experienced.

Hypotheses 1b and 2b describe the effects of work-based affect on E and P when perceptions of what a job environment can offer (E) is less than what individuals (P) desire ($W_{pa} = 0$). When affect is negative ($D = 0$), the simple slope equations become:

$$E = b_0 + b_1A + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (44)$$

$$P = b_0 + b_1A + e \quad (45)$$

Therefore, b_1 denotes the effect of affect on E and P respectively in the above equations. From column 3 in table 20 one can see that there is only a significant relationship between affect and subjective P for span of control ($p < .05$). This negative relationship between affect and P is in line with the affective consistency perspective's prediction that people will attempt to achieve P-E misfit that is consistent with negative affect by wanting more span of control in their jobs when E is less than P. Conversely, when affect is positive ($D = 1$) the simple slope equations become:

$$E = b_0 + (b_1 + b_2)A + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (46)$$

$$P = b_0 + (b_1 + b_2)A + e \quad (47)$$

Now the linear combination $b_1 + b_2$ describes the relationship between affect and E and P.

As seen in column 4 of table 20, these relationships were mostly non-significant. This finding is in line with the hedonistic perspective's prediction that people will not be motivated to change E and P when already enjoying positive affect.

Overall, results from these supplementary analyses indicate that there is generally limited and mixed support for both affective-consistency and hedonistic relationships that were predicted. The little support that was observed for consistency relationships tended to be for span of control facet, and when negative affect was experienced. In contrast, hedonistic predictions were only supported when positive affect was experienced.

Curvilinear and linear affect relationships. It is possible that the piecewise relationships between affect and E and P originally proposed above were too restrictive, and that relationships between these concepts could exist in other functional forms instead. To this end, the data were re-analyzed to see if relationships between work-based affect and E and P could be described by more general curvilinear and linear forms. To accommodate this new set of analyses, equations 1 and 2 were adjusted to represent curvilinear relationships between affect and E and P. The new models linking affect and E and P are presented below in equations 48 and 49:

$$E = b_0 + b_1A + b_2A^2 + b_3W_1 + b_4AW_1 + b_5A^2W_1 + b_6W_2 + b_7AW_2 + b_8A^2W_2 + b_9ED_1 + b_{10}ED_2 + e \quad (48)$$

$$P = b_0 + b_1A + b_2A^2 + b_3W_1 + b_4AW_1 + b_5A^2W_1 + b_6W_2 + b_7AW_2 + b_8A^2W_2 + e \quad (49)$$

Consistent with earlier analyses, "A" represents work-based affect, whereas W_1 and W_2 are categorical variables that represent three distinct groups of relative E and P ($E > P$, $E =$

P, and $E < P$). Analyses for these models were again run in HLM to account for possible non-independence of observations.

An omnibus test for curvilinear affect relationships was first conducted on the two models above. This involved conducting joint significance tests on the three curvilinear affect terms (b_2 , b_5 , and b_8) in the above models. Results reported in table 22 indicate that there are significant curvilinear relationships relating affect to both E and P perceptions (both $p < .01$) for span of control. Specifically, for span of control, there was a significant curvilinear relationship linking affect to E ($p < .10$) when E exceeded P. In contrast, there was a curvilinear relationship between affect and P ($p < .01$) when E was less than P. Lastly, when P-E fit already existed ($E = P$) there were curvilinear relationships linking affect to *both* E and P (both $p < .01$). Therefore, it appears that when misfit between E and P exist (i.e. $E > P$ and $E < P$), individuals responded to any shift in affect away from a neutral level by increasing the degree of misfit which already exists between E and P. However, those who were already experiencing P-E fit ($P = E$) increased both E and P by relatively similar amounts in response to both positive and negative affect, as if to maintain fit between E and P. All these significant curvilinear relationships are depicted in figures 10a to 10c. As in the previous section of supplemental analyses, to account for the fact that affect may not be maximized along the line of P-E fit, these analyses were repeated where responses were grouped according to whether they fell above or below principal axes. Identical results were obtained where curvilinear relationships were observed linking affect to E and P (both $p < .10$) for span of control. Specifically, curvilinear relationships were observed between affect and E for responses that lay to the right of the principal axis ($E >$

P*), whereas curvilinear relationships were obtained linking affect and P for both $E > P^*$ and $E < P^*$ groups.

Since curvilinear relationships were not observed for the facets of autonomy and variety, additional analyses were conducted to probe if even simpler linear relationships existed between affect and E and P for these facets. These analyses involved estimating equations 50 and 51, which represent linear relationships between affect and E and P respectively¹¹.

$$E = b_0 + b_1A + b_2W_1 + b_3AW_1 + b_4W_2 + b_5AW_2 + b_6ED_1 + b_7ED_2 + e \quad (50)$$

$$P = b_0 + b_1A + b_2W_1 + b_3AW_1 + b_4W_2 + b_5AW_2 + e \quad (51)$$

As in the case of analyzing curvilinear relationships, an omnibus test of the linear affect terms b_1 , b_3 , and b_5 was first conducted. As shown in table 24, these omnibus tests indicate that there are significant linear relationships between affect and person (P) perceptions in autonomy ($p < .10$) and variety ($p < .05$). Tests on affect-based coefficients further suggest that positive linear relationships specifically existed between affect and P, when $E = P$ on both autonomy ($p < .05$) and variety ($p < .05$) facets. Thus, participants who were already experiencing $P=E$ fit wanted less autonomy and variety in their jobs as their experienced work-based affect shifted from neutral to negative. In contrast, when affect moved from neutral to positive, participants indicated that they wanted more autonomy and variety in their jobs. These results are represented graphically in figures 21 to 23. No significant linear relationships linking affect and E and P were detected when these analyses were repeated based on principal axis groupings.

In summary, results from these exploratory analyses indicate that curvilinear relationships exist between work-based affect and E and P for span of control. Individuals

¹¹ These analyses were also run using HLM.

perceived that a job offered higher amounts of span of control (E) when affect shifted in both positive and negative directions. The same curvilinear relationship was observed for subjective P, where people increased the amount of span of control that they desired as affect shifted away from the neutral level. Thus, it appears that shifts in work-based affect away from a neutral level cause people to react in the same way: by perceiving increasing amounts of span of control *and* also wanting more of span of control in their jobs. Linear relationships between work-based affect and the subjective person (P) were also observed for autonomy and variety. This relationship was apparent for people who were experiencing P-E fit, who responded to negative shifts in affect by decreasing the amount of autonomy and variety they wanted in their jobs. Correspondingly, positive shifts in affect initiated an increase in the amount of desired autonomy and variety. Hence, it appears that people respond to negative job-related feelings by wanting less of autonomy and variety, whereas positive feelings engender increased desired amounts of these job facets.

CHAPTER 9

DISCUSSION

The present study sought to investigate whether work-based affect could be both a cause and an outcome of P-E fit. Consistent with previous research in P-E fit, results showed that subjective E and P are linked to a variety of affective work attitudes such as job and facet satisfaction, intent to apply, and turnover intent. Results indicated that job satisfaction grew more positive as E increased or P decreased for autonomy, when the perceived environment (E) was less than individual wants (P). Correspondingly, when E exceeded P, job satisfaction grew more negative as E increased or P decreased in the same job facet. However, the set of hypothesized relationships which examined work-based affect as a cause of P-E fit received limited support. The only consistent support that was observed for these hypotheses was for the hedonistic assertion that people would not be motivated to change E and/or P when they experience positive affect. Perhaps the current hypotheses based on consistency and hedonistic perspectives may have proved to be too rigid for the types of relationships actually observed in this study. Exploratory analyses add some support to this argument by showing that work-based affect indeed influenced certain groups of participants in certain ways. Specifically, curvilinear relationships were detected between affect and E and P for span of control. Interestingly, people who were already experiencing misfit between E and P responded to any shifts in affect away from a neutral level by adjusting E or P in such a way so as to increase the degree of misfit between E and P. In contrast, when P-E fit already existed, people sought to maintain P-E fit by changing

E and P together in the same direction. Hence, it seems that any changes to E and P in response to affect depend on relative levels of E and P and whether P-E fit or misfit exists.

Work-based affect also influenced the amount of autonomy and variety that people wanted in their jobs. However, as opposed to the curvilinear relationships obtained for span of control, more straightforward linear effects were observed in this case. Negative shifts in affect were accompanied by decreases in desired autonomy and variety, whereas positive affect shifts induced increases in the amount desired for these two job facets. Aside from suggesting that personal wants for autonomy and variety may be malleable in response to changes in work-based affect, these results could also imply that people may be adjusting their wants downwards in response to negative affect so as to avoid being disappointed with the amount of autonomy and variety that a job offers. Correspondingly, perhaps people may also feel more comfortable increasing their desired amounts of autonomy and variety when they are experiencing positive affect because positive affect may induce a sense of optimism, and hence a willingness to desire more from one's job environment.

It should also be noted that this study exposed the consistency and hedonistic hypotheses to stringent tests that constituted high risks of falsification (Edwards, 2007). First, the experimental design that was employed successfully manipulated and measured specific variables that were of interest. Precise directional predictions were also made as to whether E and/or P should increase, decrease, or remain the same for similarly explicit ranges of work-based affect. By examining the relationships between work-based affect and both subjective E and P respectively, hypotheses were also made based on relationships that accurately represented the complex entity of P-E fit (Edwards, 1994; Edwards et al., 2006). Furthermore, established measures were employed, where most exhibited good

reliability¹². Last but not least, estimates also suggest that statistical power exceeded the commonly accepted benchmark of .80. Overall, considering the rigorous methodological standards that were employed in this study, the current results can be interpreted as falsifying evidence against ideas from consistency and hedonistic perspectives.

Limitations

There are several limitations to the above study that could have undermined efforts to examine hypothesized relationships, especially those linking work-based affect to subjective E and P. First, it is debatable whether the contrived experimental setting provided a situation realistic enough for the intricate psychological mechanisms of either consistency or hedonistic processes to operate. Participants could therefore not have had enough freedom and/or time to adjust perceptions of E and P in response to the affect manipulation. It may also be the case that the current job search context was not realistic enough for the operation of consistency or hedonistic processes. People may react more proactively to changes in work-based affect when they are already in a particular job as compared to if they were merely job seekers because they may have a larger vested interest in regulating or improving their current situation or feelings about a job. Thus, different relationships involving E and P might have been observed had affect been produced by real-life events or occurrences that had actual consequences for participants.

On a similar note, this study could have also suffered from the effects of a restricted range in manipulated work-based affect. Though manipulation checks confirmed that the participants in the three affect manipulation groups differed significantly from each other on the manipulated variable, it could still be argued that differences in affect across conditions were rather limited. For instance, according to table 10, the difference between

¹² See table 9 for reliability statistics.

mean levels of affect for positive and neutral manipulation groups was only .57, while the difference between negative and neutral groups was only slightly larger at .74. Considering that work-based affect was measured on a 9-point scale ranging from -4 to +4, these mean differences were substantively small. That being said, it is debatable whether observed results would have been significantly different had there been a larger variance in work-based affect. That is, unless it produces a phenomenologically different affective experience among participants, a larger variance on affect would presumably accentuate the relationships between affect and E and P that were observed in this study. Hence, it remains to be seen if a wider range of affect would produce relationships in line with those predicted by consistency or hedonistic perspectives.

The current study also did not take into account the influence of the objective person (P) when analyzing the relationship between work-based affect and subjective P. Original designs of this study had attempted to manipulate objective P via feedback from a bogus survey on job preferences. However, pre-testing results proved this method to be ineffective, and the plan to manipulate objective P was dropped. The omission of objective P is a shortcoming because subjective P should logically be influenced considerably by objective P. Hence, the inability to control for the effects of objective P on subjective P could have affected this study's ability to detect the effects of affect on subjective P that were above and beyond those of objective P.

Lastly, by focusing on needs-supplies (N-S) fit, this study only examined one of several types of P-E fit. Though recent theorizing on the relationships between P-E fit and outcomes has argued that N-S fit should be the most directly linked to affective constructs among various types of fit (Edwards & Shipp, 2007), previous research has also linked

other types of fit (e.g. values congruence and demands-abilities fit) to affective outcomes like job satisfaction. It thus remains to be seen if consistency or hedonistic relationships would be supported for these different types of P-E fit.

Future research

This section builds upon the above-mentioned limitations in the present study to suggest areas for further research that may help us investigate affective influences on P-E fit. As already alluded to above, consistency and hedonistic relationships between work-based affect and E and P might be more observable in actual real-life situations. It has been well-established that events or important happenings are key antecedents to work-based affect (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Therefore, future research would do well to investigate the impact of changes in work-based affect that has been precipitated by organizationally-relevant events on P-E fit. One such category of phenomena is organizational change. Previous research has reported that organizational change in the form of critical events such as downsizing (Wiesenfeld, Brockner & Martin, 1999), acquisitions (Vince, 2006; Scheck & Kinicki, 2000), and relocations (Fox & Krausz, 1987) can significantly influence work-based affect of employees involved. In turn, organizational change has also previously been linked to perceived changes in P-E fit (Caldwell, Herold & Fedor, 2004). It would therefore be interesting to see if the changes in work-based affect that accompany organizational change trigger responses to adjust E and P that are in line with the affective-consistency or hedonistic perspectives proposed in this paper.

Another category of affect-inducing phenomena that may be of interest to the current research paradigm is leadership. Leaders can influence the moods and emotions that their subordinates experience toward work through their behavior and displayed affect. For

instance, transformational leaders often utilize powerful emotions to arouse similar feelings among employees (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Similarly, the emotions that leaders display can also have a direct effect on the affective states of their surrounding audience (Lewis, 2000). This ability of leaders to influence work-based affect of their employees could have interesting implications for P-E fit and person-supervisor (P-S) fit in particular (Barrett, 1995; Tsui, Porter & Egan, 2002, Turban & Jones, 1988). Specifically, future research could investigate how subordinate emotions that are generated by their leaders impact P-S fit by studying the relationships between affect and the fit between perceptions of personal (P) and leader attributes (S).

Organizational rewards and punishments constitute another potential affect-laden situation where current relationships of interest can be studied. Though it should be intuitive that rewards (e.g. obtaining promotions and raises) and punishments (e.g. being written up for a rule infraction) perpetuate affective reactions among workers, empirical research linking such events to work-based affect has been surprisingly limited (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Future, research can thus not only fill this gap in knowledge, but also provide answers to questions about whether changes in work-based affect arising from such events impact the E and P components of person-job and/or person-organization fit.

Overall, though it could mean forgoing a significant amount of ability to infer causal relationships, future research may consider studying people and their reactions to work-based affect in more naturalistic work environments and specifically under the circumstances mentioned above. Such research can both help address issues regarding the restricted range of work-based affect, and also drastically increase the fidelity of affective experience by situating it in actual circumstances with real consequences.

The fact that this study investigated relationships between work-based affect and E and P that have seldom been assessed in previous P-E fit research also means that it is unclear as to whether the currently employed methods of analyses were adequate to assess complex relationships involving E and P as joint outcomes of work-based affect. Therefore future research might consider employing other research methods in field settings that complement survey methodology. For instance, compared to survey measures, investigational methods such as verbal protocol analyses might allow researchers to better probe and track the sophisticated thought sequences that might take place during consistency and/or hedonistic processes. Furthermore, experience sampling procedures (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Weiss et al., 1999) could also facilitate the closer monitoring of changes in work-based affect and the corresponding effect that these changes have on subjective E and P perceptions.

Future research can also explore alternative ways to measure the objective environment (E) construct. Instead of using perceptions from the individuals involved in the actual P-E fit judgments, ratings of the objective environment may be obtained from databases such as the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), or occupational databases like O*NET. Another option would be to make use of ratings from professional job analysts or experienced job incumbents like supervisors. The utility of this latter method was demonstrated when Caldwell and O'Reilly (1990) surveyed job experts and experienced job incumbents to obtain measures of objective job environments in their investigation of person-job (P-J) fit. Similarly, future research may also assess objective P using alternative information sources. Ratings of person attributes such as personality (Antonioni & Park, 2001) and emotional intelligence (Law, Wong & Song, 2004) has

frequently used ratings from peers and significant others. This strategy can also be employed in the current research program where ratings of objective P may be obtained from co-workers or significant others such as spouses or other family members. Having different rating sources also minimizes potential concerns about common-method bias, and aid in the investigation of affective-influences on subjective E and P over and above objective E and P.

Aside from facilitating the measurement of these constructs, a further advantage to obtaining third-party ratings of objective E and P is that it also allows one to probe if changes in work-based affect can also bring about changes in objective E and P. This study focused on subjective P-E fit by investigating how work-based affect influenced subjective perceptions of E and P. However, according to the current expanded model of P-E fit, work-based affect can also bring about changes in objective P-E fit. This ability of affect to cause changes in objective E and P is documented in both affective-consistency and hedonistic perspectives. For instance, consistency arguments point to the ability of positive affect to initiate affectively-consistent helping behaviors aimed at improving one's actual social environment (Isen et al., 1976; George & Brief, 1992). Likewise, cybernetic principles that underlie the hedonistic perspective also argue that individuals can respond to the negative affect brought about by a stressful discrepancy by altering their physical and social environments. Specifically, individuals might self-select out of their stressful environments by leaving their jobs. Furthermore, people can also respond to stress and negative affect by changing objective person attributes via the adjusting of personal goals or standards (Campion & Lord, 1982; Taylor, Fisher, Ilgen, 1984). Moreover, if we assume that objective E and P play very significant roles in determining their subjective

counterparts, it may be possible that any changes in subjective E and P must occur via objective E and P respectively. In other words, the influence of work-based affect on subjective E and P is mediated by objective E and P. This possibility was not evaluated in the present study because objective E was a manipulated variable, and objective P was left out altogether. Therefore, to gain a more complete understanding of relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit, future research should also examine how objective E and P are directly influenced by work-based affect

Further research should also explore the relationship between work-based affect and other types of P-E fit. Aside from the current needs-supplies paradigm, other prominent types of fit such as demands-abilities fit and values congruence have also been linked to affective attitudes and work-based affect (Cable & Edwards, 2004; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). For example, it could be assumed that in the case of value congruence fit, judgments of work values and organizational culture are more abstract and subject to perceptual biases compared to judgments of environment supplies. Thus, when P-E fit is analyzed as the fit between more ambiguous concepts like personal values and organizational culture (i.e. supplementary person-organization fit), perhaps people may be more apt to adjust their perceptions of the environment and organizational culture in response to changes in affect. Therefore, future research should explore whether relationships between affect and P-E fit exist when other types of P-E fit are examined.

Aside from examining relationships between work-based affect and P-E fit with other common types of P-E fit like values congruence and demands-abilities fit, other conceptualizations of P-E fit may also be explored. Correspondence or fit between individual performance (P) and goals (E) might be another type of P-E fit that might lend

itself nicely to research on affective-influence. Though past research in self-regulation and goal setting has examined how individuals manage the discrepancy between individual performance and goals, this research has largely focused on the impact of past performance and other individual differences (i.e. goal orientation and need for achievement) on the setting of future goals (Phillips, Hollenbeck & Ilgen, 1996; Phillips & Gully, 1997). Aside from ignoring the role of affect in causing performance and goals, such research focuses on goals that are set by the individual, not perceptions of goals that have already been set, which this paper argues can also be influenced by affect. Hence, for a hypothetical study based on the current expanded P-E fit model, the affective-consistency perspective would predict that positive shifts in affect would be accompanied by attempts to achieve fit between individual performance (P) and goals (E) that is consistent with positive affect. Correspondingly, negative shifts in affect would lead to changes in P and E so as to create a discrepancy between performance and goals because misfit is consistent with negative affect. On the other hand, the hedonistic perspective would predict that shifts toward positive affect would not influence P-E fit, while shifts toward negative affect would cause attempts to change performance and goals so as to achieve fit between the two. Adopting this person-goal conceptualization of fit would be quite viable for research in a field setting because information on goals and performance can be obtained or measured relatively easily. Objective goals can be readily obtained from organizational records in the form of performance standards or goals set by superiors, while performance data such as customer feedback and or supervisor performance ratings can be treated as measures of objective performance. Ratings of subjective E and P can then be measured from individual perceptions of their own performance and the objective goals that have already been set.

Future research and theory building may also consider other possible antecedents to P-E fit aside from work-based affect. Up to this point, the limited efforts to examine antecedents to fit have largely focused on broad organization-level policies such as recruitment, selection, and socialization of newcomers (Chatman, 1991; Cable & Parsons, 2001; Kim, Cable & Kim, 2005; Kristof, 1996). Perhaps future research may investigate other psychological variables and process that might be involved in causing judgments of P-E fit. For example, perceptions of subjective E and P on certain job facets could be driven by existing P-E fit (or misfit) on other job facets. In other words, when making judgments of subjective E and P on variety, individuals could be considering whether fit or misfit already exists on autonomy. If fit (misfit) already exists on autonomy, people may be prompted to be consistent and judge that fit (misfit) also exists between E and P on variety. In contrast, existing misfit on autonomy may also trigger regulatory process that are in line with the hedonistic perspective, and cause people to perceive P-E fit on variety in order to compensate for the misfit on autonomy.

Current results from this study may also point towards the existence of other types of relationships that might govern causal relationships leading from work-based affect to P-E fit. One such relationship might involve the tendency to have a set point of P-E fit, where any change in work-based affect and/or P-E fit initiates reactionary thoughts and behavior that are targeted at returning the individual back to his or her original P-E fit status. This idea is drawn from Landy's opponent process theory of job satisfaction (1978), which suggests that a state of hedonic neutrality exists for people, where any excursion from this state is accompanied by an attempt to bring work-based affect back to its original level. A similar phenomenon could occur in the context of P-E fit where each individual has his or

her own predetermined P-E fit status which he or she tries to maintain. Hence, any change in affect that impacts the current level of P-E fit would be met with attempts to bring P-E fit back to its original levels. The current study presents some initial evidence of such relationships, where any change to work-based affect away from a neutral level caused both E and P (for span of control) to increase concurrently for people who were already experiencing P-E fit. This means that people were reacting to changes to work-based affect by adjusting E and P in the same direction perhaps in order to return to their original status of P-E fit.

Lastly, the effect of work-based affect on expectations regarding job supplies and how those expectations impact job desires could also be explored. Current results indicate that people desired more autonomy and variety in their jobs as work-based affect increased from negative to positive (figures 11a and 11b). Since positive affect are associated with feelings of optimism (Marshall, Wortman, Kusulas, Hervig & Vickers, 1992; Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny & Fahey, 1998), these results could imply that as people feel more positive about their jobs their optimism causes them to expect more supplies from their job, which in turn leads them to increase desired amounts of certain job facets. Aside from findings that positive mood is associated with positive expectancies for individuals' futures (Segerstrom et al., 1998), emotions and affect have also been closely linked to individual wants and desires (Kavanagh, Andrade & May, 2005; Mehrabian & DeWetter, 1987). Furthermore, work-based affect in the form of job satisfaction has also been observed to impact the setting of personal desired goals (Locke, Cartledge & Knerr, 1970). These findings may suggest that work-based affect could have a direct and positive effect on

individual needs and the *person* component of P-E fit, where an increase in positive affect causes an increase in job-based desires.

Conclusion

While this investigation yielded limited support for the hypothesized relationships between work-based affect and the environment and person components of P-E fit. The existence of some curvilinear and linear relationships between affect and subjective E and P may suggest the existence of other forms of relationships between affect and E and P that are different from those initially proposed. This may serve as initial support for the general idea that work-based affect can also be a cause of P-E fit. Based on the preponderance and strength of previous theory regarding affective influences behind P-E fit, these results may still present hope for future research on the affect to fit relationship. It is my hope that this study has helped identify several fruitful avenues in terms of theorizing, research design, and methodology that may be used to further examine relationships involving work-based affect and P-E fit in the future.

Table 1. Hypotheses for relationships based on the affective-consistency perspective.

Hypothesis	Levels of E and P	Affect Shift from Neutral to Positive Mood	Affect Shift from Neutral to Negative Mood
1(a)	When E is greater than P	E decreases and P increases	E increases and P decreases
1(b)	When E is less than P	E increases and P decreases	E decreases and P increases
1(c)	When E is equal to P	No change in E and P	No change in E and P

Table 2. Hypotheses for relationships based on the hedonistic perspective.

Hypothesis	Levels of E and P	Affect Shift from Neutral to Positive Mood	Affect Shift from Neutral to Negative Mood
2(a)	When E is greater than P	No change in E and P	E decreases and P increases
2(b)	When E is less than P	No change in E and P	E increases and P decreases
2(c)	When E is equal to P	No change in E and P	No change in E and P

Table 3. Examples of parabolic relationships across job facets.

Dimension	Why excess E leads to decreased work attitudes
Variety	Excess variety on the job can interfere with one's needs to develop expertise in specific skills.
Span of Control (Management)	Excess opportunities to manage others can interfere with one's need to have communal relationships with coworkers.
Autonomy	Excess autonomy on the job can interfere with one's need for supervision and guidance.

Table 4. Hypotheses for effect of P-E fit on work attitudes.

Hypothesis	Levels of E and P	E increases and P decreases	E decreases and P increases
3(a)	When E is less than P	Work attitudes increases	Work attitudes decreases
3(b)	When E is greater than P	Work attitudes decreases	Work attitudes increases

Table 5. Pre-testing: Means for work-based affect.

Work-based Affect	Mean
Positive	1.43
Neutral	.80
Negative	-.82

Table 6. Pre-testing: Pairwise Comparisons based on HLM analyses.

Omnibus (F-value)	Pairwise Group Comparisons	Mean Difference
60.18**	Positive vs Neutral	.63**
	Positive vs Negative	2.25**
	Neutral vs Negative	1.62**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Table 7. Pre-testing: Descriptive statistics for environment perceptions.

	Job Facet (Environment) level	Mean
Variety	High	4.40
	Moderate	3.78
	Low	2.86
Span of Control	High	5.52
	Moderate	3.95
	Low	2.41
Autonomy	High	5.58
	Moderate	4.22
	Low	2.98

Table 8. Pre-testing: Pairwise Comparisons based on HLM analyses.

Dependent Variable	Omnibus (F-value)	Pairwise Group Comparisons	Mean Difference
Variety	9.98**	High vs Moderate	.62 [†]
		High vs Low	1.53**
		Moderate vs Low	.91
Span of Control	44.76***	High vs Moderate	1.57**
		High vs Low	3.11**
		Moderate vs Low	1.54**
Autonomy	37.54***	High vs Moderate	1.36**
		High vs Low	2.60**
		Moderate vs Low	1.25**

[†] $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Table 9. Manipulation checks: Descriptive statistics for work-based affect.

Work-based Affect	Mean
Positive	1.26
Neutral	.69
Negative	-.05

Table 10. Manipulation checks: Pairwise Comparisons based on HLM analyses.

Omnibus (F-value)	Pairwise Group Comparisons	Mean Difference
43.48**	Positive vs Neutral	.57**
	Positive vs Negative	1.31**
	Neutral vs Negative	.74**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Table 11. Means for environment perceptions.

Job Facet (Environment) level		Mean
Variety	High	5.62
	Moderate	3.28
	Low	2.87
Span of Control	High	5.09
	Moderate	4.14
	Low	2.44
Autonomy	High	5.29
	Moderate	4.32
	Low	3.23

Table 12. Pairwise comparisons based on HLM analyses.

Dependent Variable	Omnibus (F-value)	Pairwise Group Comparisons	Mean Difference
Variety	304.47**	High vs Moderate	2.34**
		High vs Low	2.75**
		Moderate vs Low	.41**
Span of Control	255.03**	High vs Moderate	.94**
		High vs Low	2.65**
		Moderate vs Low	1.71**
Autonomy	116.09**	High vs Moderate	.97**
		High vs Low	2.06**
		Moderate vs Low	1.09**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Table 13. Correlations and descriptive statistics.

	M	sd	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.
1. Affect	0.64	0.94	(.93)																	
Person Variables																				
2. Autonomy	5.38	0.81	.03	(.73)																
3. Span of Control	4.75	1.14	.07	.12	(.90)															
4. Variety	5.05	0.93	.02	.38	.18	(.78)														
Environment Variables																				
5. Autonomy	4.28	1.44	.06	.14	-.08	.06	(.86)													
6. Span of Control	3.89	1.50	.02	-.04	.23	.08	-.18	(.94)												
7. Variety	3.92	1.60	-.01	-.01	.08	.07	-.30	.12	(.92)											
Job Outcomes																				
8. Intent to Apply	4.19	1.16	.09	-.01	.02	-.11	.31	.01	.04	(.84)										
9. Job Satisfaction	4.15	1.27	.15	-.02	-.04	-.08	.36	.05	.06	.85	(.92)									
10. Perceived N-S fit	3.87	1.24	.09	-.04	-.07	-.11	.35	.04	.00	.86	.90	(.91)								
11. Turnover intent	4.33	1.11	-.13	.06	.07	.12	-.36	-.01	.10	-.60	-.69	-.71	(.79)							
Facet Satisfaction																				
12. Autonomy	4.75	1.53	.04	.14	-.07	.01	.63	-.18	-.10	.35	.40	.38	-.36	(.94)						
13. Span of Control	4.50	1.24	.10	.00	.26	.00	-.06	.43	.20	.25	.28	.23	-.19	.17	(.91)					
14. Variety	4.35	1.56	-.02	.00	.03	-.02	-.22	.00	.72	.18	.21	.16	-.07	.06	.28	(.93)				
Individual Differences																				
15. Positive Affectivity	3.60	0.59	.32	.12	.12	.03	.07	-.01	.03	.15	.13	.10	-.02	.05	.13	.06	(.87)			
16. Negative Affectivity	1.99	0.55	-.18	-.05	-.19	-.10	-.09	-.06	-.04	-.05	-.12	-.06	.06	-.04	-.10	-.11	-.20	(.83)		
17. Preference for Consistency	4.50	0.85	.01	-.03	.01	-.06	.06	.00	.00	.02	.01	.02	.00	.05	.03	.03	.16	-.13	(.86)	
18. Self-Esteem	5.61	0.67	.19	.08	.09	.04	.07	.01	.03	.12	.15	.11	-.10	.06	.07	.07	.61	-.47	.13	(.73)

Note. Correlations greater than or equal to .09 in absolute magnitude are significant at $p < .05$; correlations greater than or equal to .12 are significant at $p < .01$. Reliability estimates (Cronbach's alpha) are reported along the diagonal.

Table 14. Results from multilevel analyses of relationship between work-based affect and subjective E and subjective P

	Intercept	Aff	Aff*D	W ₁	Aff*W ₁	Aff*D*W ₁	W ₂	Aff*W ₂	Aff*D*W ₂	ED ₁	ED ₂
	b ₀	b ₁	b ₂	b ₃	b ₄	b ₅	b ₆	b ₇	b ₈	b ₉	b ₁₀
Environment											
Autonomy	3.84**	.11	-.13	1.10**	-.16	.46	1.63**	-.01	.19	-.70**	.54**
Span of Control	4.34**	.20	-.21	.54**	-.73**	1.15**	1.09**	-.20	.45	-.56**	-1.98**
Variety	2.79**	.09	-.19	1.22**	-.19	.21	1.34**	.07	.14	1.74**	.39**
Person											
Autonomy	5.45**	.03	-.09	-.28**	-.10	.47*	-.31*	.05	.14		
Span of Control	4.72**	-.29*	.36*	-.06	.13	.03	-.23	.36	-.34		
Variety	5.18**	-.09	.05	-.28 [†]	.41 [†]	-.12	-.43**	.45**	-.37 [†]		

Table 15. Results from significance tests of linear combinations of coefficients for H1 and H2.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Relationship with Affect	E>P (A ≤ A*)	E>P (A ≥ A*)	E<P (A ≤ A*)	E<P (A ≥ A*)	E=P (A ≤ A*)	E=P (A ≥ A*)
Hypotheses	H1a & H2a	H1a & H2a	H1b & H2b	H1b & H2b	H1c & H2c	H1c & H2c
Coefficients Involved	b ₁ +b ₇	b ₁ +b ₇ +b ₂ +b ₈	b ₁	b ₁ +b ₂	b ₁ +b ₄	b ₁ +b ₄ +b ₂ +b ₅
Environment						
Autonomy	.10	.16	.11	-.02	-.05	.28 [†]
Span of Control	-.01	.23 [†]	.20	-.01	-.53*	.42*
Variety	.16	.11	.09	-.10	-.10	-.08
Person						
Autonomy	.09	.13	.03	-.06	-.06	.31**
Span of Control	.07	.09	-.29	.07	-.16	.23
Variety	.36*	.04	-.09	-.04	.32	.25

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; [†] $p < .10$

Table 16. Polynomial regression analyses relationships between P-E fit and work attitude outcomes.

			Constant	E	P	E ²	E*P	P ²
DV	Job Facet	N	b ₀	b ₁	b ₂	b ₃	b ₄	b ₅
Job Satisfaction								
	Autonomy	450	4.24**	.09	-.06	-.03	.15**	-.01
	Span of Control	450	4.15**	-.10*	.14	.02	.20**	-.12**
	Variety	450	4.35**	-.27**	.20†	-.09**	.25**	-.11*
Facet Satisfaction								
	Autonomy	450	4.46**	.49**	.23	-.08**	.12**	-.03
	Span of Control	450	4.40**	.11**	.28**	-.06**	.29**	-.03
	Variety	450	4.51**	.44**	.00	-.04**	.22**	-.01
Intent to Apply								
	Autonomy	450	4.16**	.06	.08	-.01	.12**	-.05
	Span of Control	450	4.10**	-.10**	.13†	.03	.14**	-.07*
	Variety	450	4.38**	-.26**	.09	-.07**	.23**	-.08†
Turnover Intent								
	Autonomy	450	4.20**	-.13†	.21	-.02	-.10*	-.01
	Span of Control	450	4.35**	.05	-.04	-.05*	-.12**	.08**
	Variety	450	4.11**	.30**	-.03	.09**	-.18**	.04
Perceived N-S Fit								
	Autonomy	450	4.06**	.09	-.22	-.04	.14**	.03
	Span of Control	450	3.90**	-.07	.07	.02	.17**	-.10**
	Variety	450	4.14**	-.30**	.11	-.12**	.25**	-.07

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$

Table 17. Tests of linear combinations of coefficients for relationship between P-E fit and work attitude outcomes.

			Lines of P-E Misfit						Line of P-E Fit		
			Low		Moderate		High				
			P = -2-E		P = -E		P = 2-E		Same with Low and High Values?	P=E	
DV	Job Facet	N	b ₁ -b ₂	b ₃ -b ₄ +b ₅	b ₁ -b ₂	b ₃ -b ₄ +b ₅	b ₁ -b ₂	b ₃ -b ₄ +b ₅		b ₁ +b ₂	b ₃ +b ₄ +b ₅
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Job Satisfaction											
	Autonomy	450	-.12	-.20*	.15	-.20*	.18	-.20*	Yes	.03	.10
	Span of Control	450	.07	-.29*	-.24*	-.30**	-.53**	-.31**	No	.05	.10*
	Variety	450	-.41**	-.45**	-.47**	-.45**	-.47**	-.44**	Yes	-.07	.05
Facet Satisfaction											
	Autonomy	450	-.07	-.21*	.25	-.23**	.34	-.23**	Yes	.72**	.02
	Span of Control	450	-.21**	-.40**	-.17*	-.38**	-.08	-.34**	No	.39**	.20**
	Variety	450	.38**	-.31**	.44**	-.27**	.63**	-.23**	Yes	.44**	.17**
Intent to Apply											
	Autonomy	450	-.09	-.18*	-.03	-.19*	-.11	-.20**	Yes	.14	.05
	Span of Control	450	-.03	-.19**	-.23*	-.19**	-.42**	-.20**	No	.03	.10**
	Variety	450	-.33**	-.38**	-.35**	-.38**	-.34	-.37**	No	-.17	.08
Turnover Intent											
	Autonomy	450	-.31 [†]	.06	-.34 [†]	.06	-.33	.06	No	.08	-.13*
	Span of Control	450	-.18 [†]	.14**	.09	.15**	.36**	.15**	No	.01	-.08*
	Variety	450	.38**	.30**	.33**	.31**	.17	.27**	No	.27**	-.06
Perceived N-S Fit											
	Autonomy	450	-.04 [†]	-.14 [†]	.31	-.14 [†]	.44	-.14 [†]	Yes	-.13	.13 [†]
	Span of Control	450	.13	-.23**	-.14	-.25**	-.39**	-.25**	No	.00	.09*
	Variety	450	-.48**	-.43**	-.41**	-.43**	-.28	-.41**	No	-.19 [†]	.06

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; [†] $p < .10$

Table 18. Principal axis calculations for supplementary analyses.

Job Facet	DV	n	Stationary Points		Principle Axis	
			E_0	P_0	p_{10}	p_{11}
Autonomy	JS	450	.32	-.43	-.79	1.14
Span of Control	JS	450	-.11	.49	.55	.51
Variety	JS	450	.31	1.26	.98	.92

Table 19. Regression models based on principal axes grouping of responses.

		Intercept	Aff	Aff*D	W _{pa}	Aff*W _{pa}	Aff*D*W _{pa}	ED ₁	ED ₂
		b ₀	b ₁	b ₂	b ₃	b ₄	b ₅	b ₆	b ₇
Environment									
	Autonomy	3.99**	.08	-.02	.90**	.04	.11	-.86**	.87**
	Span of Control	3.55**	.14	-.14	1.55**	-.32 [†]	.44 [†]	-.82**	-1.53**
	Variety	3.01**	.09	-.29 [†]	.68**	.03	.31	2.26**	.39**
Person									
	Autonomy	5.49**	-.01	.00	-.55**	.05	.16		
	Span of Control	4.47**	-.44**	.52*	.26*	.32 [†]	-.29		
	Variety	5.13**	-.01	.02	-.45**	.26	-.20		

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; [†] $p < .10$

Table 20. Tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 based on principal axes grouping of responses.

		1	2	3	4
		E>P ($A \leq A^*$)	E>P ($A \geq A^*$)	E<P ($A \leq A^*$)	E<P ($A \geq A^*$)
		H1a & H2a	H1a & H2a	H1b & H2b	H1b & H2b
Coefficients		b_1+b_4	$b_1+b_4+b_2+b_5$	b_1	b_1+b_2
Environment					
	Autonomy	.12	.21	.08	.06
	Span of Control	-.18 [†]	.12 [†]	.14	.00
	Variety	.12	.14	.09	-.20
Person					
	Autonomy	.04	.20*	-.01	-.01
	Span of Control	-.13	.11	-.45**	.08
	Variety	.24	.06	-.01	.01

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; [†] $p < .10$

Table 21. Regression results from supplemental analyses of curvilinear regression model of E and P onto affect.

		Intercept	Aff	Aff ²	W ₁	Aff*W ₁	Aff ² *W ₁	W ₂	Aff*W ₂	Aff ² *W ₂	ED ₁	ED ₂
		b ₀	b ₁	b ₂	b ₃	b ₄	b ₅	b ₆	b ₇	b ₈	b ₉	b ₁₀
Environment												
	Autonomy	3.87**	.06	-.06	1.04**	.01	.23 [†]	1.64**	.08	.05	-.71**	.54**
	Span of Control	4.33**	.10	-.07	.53**	-.16	.40	1.02	-.08	.26*	-.54**	-1.97**
	Variety	2.74**	-.03	-.01	1.28**	-.06	.01	1.34**	.12	.06	1.75**	.39**
Person												
	Autonomy	5.42**	-.03	.00	-.28*	.12	.16 [†]	-.30*	.13	.03		
	Span of Control	4.66**	-.16 [†]	.20**	-.11	.16	.03	-.24 [†]	.18	-.11		
	Variety	5.19**	-.06	.01	-.27 [†]	.35*	-.05	-.44**	.26*	-.10		

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; [†] $p < .10$

Table 22. Tests for curvilinear relationships linking affect and E and P.

Curvilinear Affect Comparisons			E vs P Group		
			E > P	E = P	E < P
Diff in curvilinear A across groups			A ² coefficient	A ² coefficient	A ² coefficient
b ₂ , b ₅ , b ₈ (F-value)			b ₂ + b ₈	b ₂ + b ₅	b ₂
Environment					
	Autonomy	1.20	-.01	.17	-.06
	Span of Control	5.39**	.19 [†]	.33**	-.07
	Variety	1.07	.05	-.01	-.01
Person					
	Autonomy	1.30	.03	.16 [†]	.00
	Span of Control	4.12**	.08	.23**	.20**
	Variety	.48	-.09	-.04	.01

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; [†] $p < .10$

Table 23. Regression analyses from supplemental analyses of linear regression model of E and P onto affect.

		Intercept	A	W ₁	AW ₁	W ₂	AW ₂	ED ₁	ED ₂
		b ₀	b ₁	b ₂	b ₃	b ₄	b ₅	b ₆	b ₇
Environment									
	Autonomy	3.80**	.02	1.24**	.14	1.69**	.12	-.69**	.56**
	Span of Control	4.28**	.06	.94**	-.02	1.20**	.11	-.58**	-1.99**
	Variety	2.72**	-.04	1.28**	-.05	1.39**	.16	1.75**	.39**
Person									
	Autonomy	5.42**	-.03	-.14	.20*	-.27*	.14		
	Span of Control	4.83**	-.06	-.03	.13	-.30	.12		
	Variety	5.20**	-.06	-.31*	.33*	-.51*	.20*		

Table 24. Tests for linear relationships linking affect and E and P.

		Omnibus Linear Terms	E versus P Groups		
			E > P	E = P	E < P
			A coefficient	A coefficient	A coefficient
		b ₁ ,b ₃ ,b ₅ (F-value)	b ₁ + b ₅	b ₁ + b ₃	b ₁
Environment					
	Autonomy	1.07	.14	.17	.02
	Span of Control	1.15	.16	.03	.06
	Variety	.75	.12	-.09	-.04
Person					
	Autonomy	2.42 [†]	.12	.18*	-.03
	Span of Control	.73	.06	.08	-.06
	Variety	3.47*	.14	.27*	-.06

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; [†] $p < .10$

Figure 1. Person-environment fit theory.




Figure 2. An expanded model of Person-Environment fit.




Figure 3. Relationship between P-E fit and work-based affect.




Figure 4. Control theory and a negative feedback loop.




Figure 5. Model to be tested.




Figure 6. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the affective consistency perspective when E is more than P.




Figure 7. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the affective consistency perspective when E is less than P.




Figure 8. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the affective consistency perspective when E is equal to P.




Figure 9. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the hedonistic perspective when E is more than P.




Figure 10. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the hedonistic perspective when E is less than P.




Figure 11. Hypothesized relationships between affect and E and P based on the hedonistic perspective when E is equal to P.




Figure 12. Hypothesized relationship of effect of P-E fit on work attitudes.




Figure 13. Response surface plots with job satisfaction as a dependent variable.




Figure 14. Response surface plots with facet satisfaction as a dependent variable.




Figure 15. Response surface plots with intent to apply as a dependent variable.




Figure 16. Response surface plots with turnover intent as a dependent variable.




Figure 17. Response surface plots with perceived needs-supplies fit as a dependent variable.




Figure 18. Plots of curvilinear relationships between work-based affect and E and P for span of control ($E = P$).




Figure 19. Plot of curvilinear relationship between work-based affect and E for span of control ($E > P$).




Figure 20. Plot of curvilinear relationship between work-based affect and P for span of control ($E < P$).




Figure 21. Plot of linear relationship between work-based affect and P for autonomy.





Figure 22. Plot of linear relationship between work-based affect and P for variety.



Appendix A:

Job comments with manipulated information describing environments of three hypothetical jobs

Version 1: High Variety, Moderate Span of Control, Low Autonomy

(High Variety)

“Things move very fast. You just have to be on your toes all the time. Junior personnel have to pick up lots of different skills real fast. If not, we slow down the rest of the team. Deadlines come and go really quickly so it’s a huge challenge to manage your own time efficiently.”

Dave J

“We work in a situation where everyone gets a chance to play various roles in the team. I think the focus here is on getting people to be proficient in all areas of the business.”

Paul S

“There are lots of things we learn here that are not taught in school. There is the practical stuff like learning to work with people from very different functional backgrounds. And there is the technical stuff like learning to run prediction models for specific industries.”

Ryan G

(Moderate Security)

“I feel that the company makes a decent effort to make people feel as though their jobs are safe. But more can still be done.”

Ben K

“I don’t feel as if my job is in danger, even though occasionally people can be asked to leave over petty issues.”

Fran H

“The company operates soundly in a moderately stable industry. We have a mix of people who have been here for a long time and those to stay only for a few years.

Casey L

(Moderate Span of Control)

“Sometimes I am put in a position where I have to supervise the work of others I work with. I see these times as opportunities to develop my leadership potential.”

May Q

“My responsibilities occasionally include supervising a group of co-workers. At other times, I am pretty much responsible for my own deliverables.”

Rich T

“I have a few people report to me infrequently. Part of my job involves making sure my subordinates are carrying out their duties properly. However, they are able to take care of themselves at most times.”

Bud F

(Moderate Altruism)

“I get some opportunities to contribute to those who are needy in my job. They don’t come by very often, but at least they are something to look forward to”

Harry J

“We work quite closely with each other in teams. Which means sometimes you have to help each other out. However, this does not mean that you neglect your own responsibilities. ”

Trey B

“The environment here is rather community-based. At times, you see people assisting coworkers in their work and family. Then again some aspects of the job can cause you to be quite self-centered.”

Ronnie W

(Low Autonomy)

“People in my position don’t really get a huge say in about how things are run over here. I just do what my boss tells me to do.”

Gerry H

“The company seems pretty rigid in its procedures. We are encouraged to keep our heads down and follow the rules to a T.”

Ram J

“Every time I try to implement changes in the way my job is performed, I am met with lot of resistance from the management. This makes me feel powerless over how things are done over here.”

Evan T

Version 2: Moderate Variety, Low Span of Control, High Autonomy

(Moderate Variety)

“I feel that I had some opportunities to learn new and different things. That being said, it is a quite a huge corporation so sometimes you have to specialize in certain areas.”

Matt B

“The company does make an effort at times to rotate people across different job functions. However, this is very much dependent on where opportunities come up in different departments. Sometimes when things are slow, you can end up doing the same thing for months.”

Lamar R

“Sometimes I get the opportunity to apprentice under several different managers at one time. It helps minimize the monotony of doing the same thing over and over again.”

Marcel T

(Moderate Security)

“My job is quite essential to the overall business model of the company, so they make a decent effort to keep us happy and satisfied despite the uncertain business climate.”

Taylor W

“I don’t see things changing much around here in the short to medium term. Most of us are fairly certain we will be with the company for the next few years at least.”

Drew Q

“I feel moderately secure in this job. People come and go quite often, but at least I can get on with my work without having to worry much about whether I’ll be laid off.”

Ina S

(Low Span of Control)

“It’s a very democratic system here. Even people at our level don’t really supervise the work of people working under us.”

Wang L.

“The place has a flat hierarchy where supervisors lead by merely facilitating and making sure everyone has what he or she needs to get the work done.”

Judy D

“We work around in dispersed teams that are constantly changing. As such, there are no real chances to manage or be in charge of people.”

Tamika J

(Moderate Altruism)

“Our strong ties with the local community allow us to engage in pro-bono work from time to time. Nevertheless we still look out for our own economic interests.”

Jeff E

“My job sometimes requires me to get involved in charitable work. Though, this only happens when we are in-between assignments.”

Len S

“Some people here see it as one of their missions to add to the well-being of other people. However, several others are clearly only in it for the money.”

Kym G

(High Autonomy)

“I have a lot of latitude to decide how I do my work. This is the place for people who can work under very little structure and guidance.”

Troy G

“We have a very open decision-making process. I can determine how I choose to complete my tasks without having to seek permission from my supervisors.”

Tran V

“My input on how I would like to see my work done is really valued. More often than not, I end up being in charge of my own work processes and deliverables.”

Ray T

Version 3: Low Variety, High Span of Control, Moderate Autonomy

(Low Variety)

“We really emphasize being good at what we do. People around here are encouraged to concentrate on developing their expertise in a few core products.”

Jenn Y

“I have been assigned to the same project for 9 months. At times it is difficult not feel bored doing the same thing over and over again.”

Pat G

“The learning curve is quite steep at the beginning. You are expected to pick things up fast. After that, things become quite routine day in day out.”

Kathy P

(Moderate Security)

“Though things can be quite unpredictable here, we all feel that our jobs are relatively secure.”

Duane J

“People are let go rather often in this job. However, even with the speed of changes nowadays, I am reasonably confident that I’ll still be in this job five years from now.”

Mary T

“There are conflicting views about the long term prospects of this job. Some here think that their jobs will last forever. While others feel that we are only a year or so away from being retrenched.”

Kasey R

(High Span of Control)

“We have a well-established hierarchy that supports our business model. You probably would have several people reporting to you at one time.”

Kris T

“Good leaders are valued around here. Since you will be leading a group of subordinates most of the time, you have to be comfortable being in-charge of people.”

Danny F

“There are many opportunities to develop your leadership potential here. Management here really looks out for people who can manage their subordinates effectively.”

Craig H

(Moderate Altruism)

“In this job, it is quite fair to say that you should subscribe to the view that helping others is as important as helping yourself.”

Ray B

“I occasionally see people go out of their own way to assist those who require some help just to get by. I wish there would be more of such people around here.”

Hanley R

“This place gives me a decent amount of opportunities to carry out my passion of working with the disadvantaged. However, being charitable is hard considering that we also have to maintain a profitable business.”

Abe K

(Moderate Autonomy)

“My boss gives me some leeway to decide how my work gets done.”

Lance R

“For people in my position, I would say that there are a decent amount of opportunities to have our input to the way things are run over at our level.”

Becky H

“I am glad that from time to time I am able to structure my work in a way so that it suits me and my working style. I just have to make sure I stay in line with the generally accepted guidelines.”

Holly T

Appendix B:

Items Used to Measure Job Facets

Question stem:

How much is present in this job?

How much would you like?

Autonomy

Doing my work in your own way.

Determining the way your work is done.

Being able to make your own decisions.

Span of Control

Having subordinates report to you.

Being in charge of people.

Having people report to you as their boss.

Variety

Doing a variety of things.

Doing something different every day.

Doing many different things on the job.

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