ingest cdrApp 2018-06-13T15:14:44.663Z 51cd2fe2-3fd7-401f-a923-a97bc3db68a2 modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2018-06-13T15:41:08.653Z Setting exclusive relation addDatastream MD_TECHNICAL fedoraAdmin 2018-06-13T15:41:09.229Z Adding technical metadata derived by FITS addDatastream MD_FULL_TEXT fedoraAdmin 2018-06-13T15:41:32.470Z Adding full text metadata extracted by Apache Tika modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2018-06-13T15:41:33.181Z Setting exclusive relation modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-07-16T21:32:55.793Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-07-18T17:06:40.812Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-08-22T15:49:35.514Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-09-28T18:37:22.851Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-10-12T17:27:35.274Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2019-03-22T20:48:59.036Z Dominik Berger Author Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Mental Fragmentation My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing. Spring 2018 2018 Philosophy eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Ram Neta Thesis advisor Carla Merino-Rajme Thesis advisor Alex Worsnip Thesis advisor text Dominik Berger Author Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Mental Fragmentation My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing. Spring 2018 2018 Philosophy eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Ram Neta Thesis advisor Carla Merino-Rajme Thesis advisor Alex Worsnip Thesis advisor text Dominik Berger Author Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Mental Fragmentation My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing. Spring 2018 2018 Philosophy eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Ram Neta Thesis advisor Carla Merino-Rajme Thesis advisor Alex Worsnip Thesis advisor text Dominik Berger Author Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Mental Fragmentation My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing. Spring 2018 2018 Philosophy eng Master of Arts Thesis Philosophy Ram Neta Thesis advisor Carla Merino-Rajme Thesis advisor Alex Worsnip Thesis advisor text University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Degree granting institution Dominik Berger Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Mental Fragmentation My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing. Philosophy eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis Philosophy Ram Neta Thesis advisor Carla Merino-Rajme Thesis advisor Alex Worsnip Thesis advisor text University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Degree granting institution 2018 2018-05 Dominik Berger Author Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Mental Fragmentation My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing. Spring 2018 2018 Philosophy eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Ram Neta Thesis advisor Carla Merino-Rajme Thesis advisor Alex Worsnip Thesis advisor text Dominik Berger Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Mental Fragmentation My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing. 2018-05 2018 Philosophy eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Ram Neta Thesis advisor Carla Merino-Rajme Thesis advisor Alex Worsnip Thesis advisor text Berger_unc_0153M_17637.pdf uuid:696a0b8f-f83b-44d6-89ce-1d2532db0528 2020-06-13T00:00:00 2018-04-06T16:33:48Z proquest application/pdf 202403