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Dominik
Berger
Author
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Mental Fragmentation
My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing.
Spring 2018
2018
Philosophy
eng
Master of Arts
Thesis
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Degree granting institution
Philosophy
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Carla
Merino-Rajme
Thesis advisor
Alex
Worsnip
Thesis advisor
text
Dominik
Berger
Author
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Mental Fragmentation
My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing.
Spring 2018
2018
Philosophy
eng
Master of Arts
Thesis
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Degree granting institution
Philosophy
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Carla
Merino-Rajme
Thesis advisor
Alex
Worsnip
Thesis advisor
text
Dominik
Berger
Author
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Mental Fragmentation
My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing.
Spring 2018
2018
Philosophy
eng
Master of Arts
Thesis
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Degree granting institution
Philosophy
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Carla
Merino-Rajme
Thesis advisor
Alex
Worsnip
Thesis advisor
text
Dominik
Berger
Author
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Mental Fragmentation
My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing.
Spring 2018
2018
Philosophy
eng
Master of Arts
Thesis
Philosophy
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Carla
Merino-Rajme
Thesis advisor
Alex
Worsnip
Thesis advisor
text
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Degree granting institution
Dominik
Berger
Creator
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Mental Fragmentation
My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing.
Philosophy
eng
Master of Arts
Masters Thesis
Philosophy
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Carla
Merino-Rajme
Thesis advisor
Alex
Worsnip
Thesis advisor
text
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Degree granting institution
2018
2018-05
Dominik
Berger
Author
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Mental Fragmentation
My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing.
Spring 2018
2018
Philosophy
eng
Master of Arts
Thesis
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Degree granting institution
Philosophy
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Carla
Merino-Rajme
Thesis advisor
Alex
Worsnip
Thesis advisor
text
Dominik
Berger
Creator
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Mental Fragmentation
My goal in this paper is to offer an account of mental fragmentation. I start out by considering the different phenomena that the notion of mental fragmentation has been used to explain. Then I consider and reject an account of mental fragmentation that is found quite often in the literature, namely that mental fragmentation is what allows an agent to have incoherent attitudes of a certain kind, on the grounds that this account can’t explain all the phenomena usually connected to mental fragmentation. In particular, this popular account can’t explain why it is that agents who have incoherent beliefs and are mentally fragmented appear to be less irrational for holding the incoherent beliefs than agents who are not fragmented. I will ultimately argue that this can only be explained if we regard mental fragmentation as the result of certain structural features of an agent’s cognitive processing.
2018-05
2018
Philosophy
eng
Master of Arts
Masters Thesis
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Degree granting institution
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Carla
Merino-Rajme
Thesis advisor
Alex
Worsnip
Thesis advisor
text
Berger_unc_0153M_17637.pdf
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2020-06-13T00:00:00
2018-04-06T16:33:48Z
proquest
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