

**DEFINING THE WEST GERMAN SOLDIER:
MILITARY, MASCULINITY AND SOCIETY IN WEST GERMANY, 1945–1989**

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ABSTRACT

Friederike Bruehoefener: Defining the West German Soldier:
Military, Masculinity, and Society in West Germany, 1945-1989
(under the direction of Karen Hagemann)

This dissertation traces the emergence and development of concepts of military masculinity in West Germany in the four decades after the end of World War II. Between 1945 and 1989, representatives of the military, members of all major political parties, numerous social and protests groups as well as the media, repeatedly negotiated the function, constitution, and self-image of the West German military and its soldiers. When the *Bundeswehr* was established in 1955, it reinvigorated debates over contested concepts of military masculinity, understood as a set of mental, physical, and behavioral traits typical or significant for men serving in the armed forces. Contemporaries expressed competing ideas about what it meant to be a man in military uniform through their negotiations of soldiers' rights and duties as well as their attempts to regulate their lives inside and outside of the barracks.

By studying these discourses and policies at the intersection of the military, parliamentary politics, and civil society, this dissertation makes two important contributions. First, it shows that military masculinities are not only the result of military necessities and political agenda. They are also defined by changing cultural beliefs, social expectations and broader international developments. Second, it reveals that a gradual but important shift occurred in West Germany between the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. While traditional military values lost influence outside of the military, civilian norms and values became more important for the way society defined military masculinity.

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INTRODUCTION

In May 1955, Wolf Graf von Baudissin gave a lecture, titled “Our Duty to Defend” (*Unsere Verteidigungspflicht*), during a meeting of the Protestant Working Committee of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU). Baudissin was one of the most influential thinkers working on the establishment of the new West German armed forces—the *Bundeswehr*¹—in the 1950s. Following the defeat of the Nazi regime in May 1945, the victorious allies had pursued a rigorous agenda stipulating the complete demilitarization of Germany. Yet, increasing Cold War tensions soon led to a change in direction. Following the division of Germany, the western powers agreed in 1950 to foster the establishment of West German armed forces.² Joining the *Amt Blank*—the precursor of the West German Ministry of Defense—in 1951, Baudissin and his colleagues developed a novel concept of military leadership that would become the official guiding principle of the *Bundeswehr*. Aimed at conflating citizen’s rights with military demands, the concept, which was termed *Innere Führung* (Inner Guidance),³ promoted a new type of soldier, the *Bürger in Uniform* (citizen in uniform).⁴

¹ The West German military was only named *Bundeswehr* in February 1956. Beforehand contemporaries oftentimes used the term *Wehrmacht* when talking about the new armed forces. Yet, since this term refers to the German army between 1935 and 1945, I am using the term *Bundeswehr* to talk about the West German military. If contemporaries use the term *Wehrmacht* to talk about the West German *Bundeswehr*, an explanation will be given.

² Gerhard Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943–1955: Internationale Auseinandersetzungen um die Rolle der Deutschen in Europa* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1967).

³ Since the term *Innere Führung* is difficult to translate, I use the German original in order to avoid misconception. For the problem of translation, see Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 44–45 (especially footnote 50).

Giving his speech against the background of the ongoing rearmament process, Baudissin addressed the status of the *Bürger in Uniform*. Distancing himself from previous military traditions, he argued against the notion that soldiers had to follow only military laws and could thus enjoy “timeless autonomy.”⁵ Instead, Baudissin stated, “the soldier is the child of his times and member of this people [*Volk*], just like any other citizen.”⁶ For him it was essential that soldierly life remained part of the “overall order” of society.⁷ He thus insisted that the rights and duties of civilian law applied to the soldier as much as they applied to every other citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

In May 1955, Baudissin presented these principles in the hope, but without the certainty, that they would become reality. With today’s hindsight, it can be argued that his notion of the soldier as a “child of his times” did bear great meaning in the years to come, albeit in many different ways. The decision to rearm the Federal Republic represented a major shift in geopolitics, but it also posed a challenge to countless West Germans who had to come to terms

⁴ Due to the different concepts of citizen in uniform, which developed in the first half of the nineteenth century, I use the original German term *Bürger in Uniform* in order to talk about the West German concept. For the different concepts see, Ute Frevert, “Das jakobinische Modell: Allgemeine Wehrpflicht und Nationsbildung in Preußen-Deutschland,” in *Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Ute Frevert (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1997), 17–47. For a discussion about whether Baudissin was the only “father” of the *Innere Führung*, see Dieter Krüger and Kerstin Wiese, “Zwischen Militärreform und Wehrpropaganda Wolf Graf von Baudissin im Amt Blank,” in *Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907 bis 1993*, ed. Rudolf Schlaffer and Wolfgang Schmidt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 99–126.

⁵ Wolf Graf von Baudissin, “Unsere Verteidigungspflicht,” Presentation, 8 May 1955. Baudissin Dokumentationszentrum, folder: 55,8–2/1. See also, Wolf Graf von Baudissin, “Soldat in der offenen Gesellschaft: Der Staatsbürger in Uniform – Erziehungspflichten der Armee,” in *Armee gegen den Krieg: Wert und Wirkung der Bundeswehr*, ed. Wolfram von Raven (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1966), 268–306. For a discussion of the “autonomy” that previous German armies enjoyed see, Andreas Dietz, *Das Primat der Politik in kaiserlicher Armee, Reichwehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

with the idea of sending once again large numbers of men to the barracks. Having experienced total war and defeat, and having gone through a process of denazification and demilitarization, this was not an easy undertaking for many.⁸ As a result, rearmament sparked immediate debates that persisted even after the official formation of the *Bundeswehr* on November 12, 1955. In the following three decades, members of all major parties, military representatives, activists of different social movements, church groups, the labor unions, and the media—in short, large segments of West German society—continually negotiated what it meant to serve in the *Bundeswehr*.

Crucial for the repeated attempts to define the ideal West German soldier were his sex and gender. From the outset, armed military service in the *Bundeswehr* was conceived as a duty limited to heterosexual men.⁹ Although it was constantly challenged, this gendered construction greatly influenced how West Germans formulated soldierly ideals. While negotiating important aspects such as the *Bundeswehr*'s combat readiness, the soldiers' legal rights and duties, or while sketching soldiers' lives inside and outside of the barracks, contemporaries expressed a multitude of competing notions of military masculinity—understood as sets of mental, physical, and behavioral traits seen as typical of or desirable in men serving in the armed forces.

⁸ For a discussion of postwar Germany's living conditions and mentalities see, Jörg Echternkamp, *Nach dem Krieg: Alltagsnot, Neuorientierung und die Last der Vergangenheit, 1945–1949* (Zürich: Pendo, 2003). For a recent discussion on how much the United States' occupation influenced this development, see Nawyn, Kathleen J., "'Striking at the roots of German Militarism': Efforts to Demilitarize German society and Culture in American-occupied Württemberg-Baden, 1945-1949," Ph.D. diss. The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2008. See further Kristen Dolan, "Isolating Nazism: Civilian Internment in American Occupied Germany, 1944–1950." PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2013.

⁹ For literature on the exclusion of women see Swantje Kraake, *Frauen zur Bundeswehr: Analyse und Verlauf einer Diskussion* (Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1992). For the exclusion of gay men see Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Vermerk Rechtsprechung der Wehrdienstgerichte Nr. 21/61, VR II 6," 18 July 1961. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg (hereafter: BArch F), BW 1/115011.

These masculine concepts are at the center of this dissertation. Looking at the ways that West Germans negotiated the image, role, and function of the *Bundeswehr*, the following study focuses on the concepts of military masculinity that pervaded these debates. It identifies which notions of military masculinity contemporaries employed after the end of World War II and traces why and how these ideas changed over time. Doing so, this dissertation *first* analyzes which individuals and social groups, by voicing particular ideas of military masculinity, shaped the discourse on the image and role of the *Bundeswehr* and its soldiers in different time periods. *Second*, the study asks which different and conflicting concepts of military masculinity these groups and individuals formulated, and how these oftentimes contrarian concepts influenced each other. *Third*, it investigates which social, cultural, and political factors—both national and international—shaped this discourse.

Tracing the construction and development of military masculinities, this gendered perspective sheds new light on the changing relations between West German society and the military, because contested concepts of military masculinity represent above all struggles over national identities, social norms, and values as well as military and political agendas.¹⁰ The focus on military masculinities is hence ideal to show that *Bundeswehr* soldiers and officers—as discursive objects—were indeed men of their times. Soldierly ideals did not represent timeless, static constructions. On the contrary, the man in uniform was the object and product of interlinked negotiations taking place between military experts, representatives of the leading political parties, and members of civil society. Ideas that were formulated inside the Ministry of Defense and documented in military regulations, guidelines, and public statements compelled

¹⁰ For this argument see for example, Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2004), 1.

different members of the parliament, extra-parliamentary protest groups, the media, and ‘ordinary’ citizens to react—affirmatively or antagonistically. In turn, arguments about the qualities and behavior of *Bundeswehr* soldiers and officers made in the realms of civil society and parliamentary politics impinged on ideas voiced within of the Ministry of Defense and forced the military to react as well.

Of course, the negotiations did not take place in a vacuum. Both international and national developments greatly influenced how West German society negotiated military masculinities in different periods. First, the politics of the Cold War were decisive in shaping how parliamentarians, military representatives, and extra-parliamentary agents sought to delineate the masculine traits of their troops. With the *Bundeswehr* being solely defined as a defensive force, a recurrent object of contestation was the question of what mental and behavioral traits West German soldiers had to possess in order to defend West Germany against possible attacks from the Soviet Union.¹¹ In addition to addressing issues such as physical prowess, contemporaries considered soldiers’ sexual behavior as vital to the *Bundeswehr*’s defensive mission. Second, the memory of Prussian military tradition and practices and, above all, its catastrophic power during the Third Reich, functioned as a foil against which contemporaries formulated soldierly ideals.¹² Heated debates unfolded, for instance, over the question of whether the moral code of the German Army of the German Empire could function as a role model for the marital lives of *Bundeswehr* officers and soldiers. Finally, changing

¹¹ See for example, Michael Geyer, “Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons”, in *Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 376–408.

¹² See Frank Pauli, *Wehrmachtsoffiziere in der Bundeswehr: Das kriegsgediente Offizierkorps der Bundeswehr und die Innere Führung 1955 bis 1970* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010).

domestic cultural and social currents shaped how West Germans evaluated the masculine image of soldiers and officers. In the four decades following the end of World War II, many West Germans changed their attitudes towards military service, war, and peace and continuously re-evaluated, for example, the meaning of religious principles, the role of men and women in society, and the values that should underpin the process of child-rearing.¹³ As social norms and values shifted over time, so did the ways that contemporaries evaluated the masculine traits of the West German soldier.

In addition to these three important factors, the negotiation of military masculinities evolved around the constant question about the extent to which soldiers and officers could be allowed to be children of their times. How and to what extent could one align military demands, customs, and laws with the claims and privileges of a civilian life? By developing the concept of the *Innere Führung* and the model of the *Bürger in Uniform*, Wolf Graf von Baudissin sought to bridge this divide. This “balancing act” (*Spagat*),¹⁴ as historian Ute Frevert has called it, continued to shape almost every debate about the position and function of the *Bundeswehr* and its soldiers that took place in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The constant struggle over the extent to which West German soldiers had to submit their rights and freedoms, which they enjoyed as civilians, to the necessities and customs of military life and service was also at the heart of the negotiations of masculine concepts.

¹³ On the issue of changing values, see Ulrich Herbert, ed., *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002); Klaus Naumann, “Heldentum und Friedensmacht: Militärische und Zivile Werte im 20. Jahrhundert,” in *Alte Werte – Neue Werte Schlaglichter des Wertewandels*, ed. Andreas Rödder and Wolfgang Elz (Götting: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 150–156.

¹⁴ The term is used in the original German version of Ute Frevert studies on military conscription in Germany. See Ute Frevert, *Die Kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland* (Munich: Beck, 2001), 335.

Analyzing these negotiations, this dissertation argues furthermore that following World War II a gradual shift occurred, which foregrounded the changing rules and norms of civilian life. In terms of the *Bürger in Uniform*, the soldier's status as a male citizen of the Federal Republic who enjoyed certain rights and privileges became more important than military demands that were attached to the status of wearing a uniform. As ideals and norms associated with the military became less valuable to larger segments of society,¹⁵ the ever-changing civilian norms and values became more important for how contemporaries defined the ideal West German man in military uniform. To be sure, the *Bundeswehr* was not turned into a civilian institution in which soldiers were allowed the exact same freedoms as their civilian counterparts. Upon entering the barracks, West German men were subject to a particular set of regulations. Moreover, the exclusion of women and gay men was not challenged fundamentally until the dawn of the twenty-first century.¹⁶ Yet, even though it was proposed repeatedly, neither the idea that West German society should conform to military norms, nor the claim that the *Bundeswehr* had to be shielded against civilian influences (re)gained a foothold. Instead, calls for the *Bundeswehr* to adapt to extra-military ideals and values grew louder.

¹⁵ For this argument see for example Konrad H. Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

¹⁶ In January 2000 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) judged that the general exclusion of women from military service violated Basic Law See, Jens Rainer Ahrens, “Verzögerte Anpassung und Radikaler Wandel: Zum parlamentarischen Diskurs über Frauen in den Streitkräften seit Gründung der Bundeswehr,” in *Frauen im Militär: Empirische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Integration von Frauen in die Streitkräfte*, ed. Jens-Rainer Ahrens, Maja Apelt, and Christiane Bender (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 32–41. At the same time, military laws were changed fundamentally that homosexuality would no longer be a reason for being discriminated against—for example, not being promoted.

1. Historiography

Seeking to shed light on this gradual shift by analyzing the development of military masculinities at the intersection of the military apparatus, parliamentary politics, and civil society, this dissertation engages different strands of historiography. First, it seeks to contribute to scholarly work that has studied the extent to which (West) German society underwent a fundamental change of attitude after 1945.¹⁷ Historians such as Thomas Kühne suggest that beginning with the end of World War II, West Germans increasingly refrained from cherishing military norms and from accepting the military as a positive symbol of national prowess.¹⁸ In addition to continuous protests against nuclear weapons, this shift was reflected in the ways that West Germans judged conscientious objectors. While conscientious objectors were still frowned upon and called “wussies” in the 1950s and early 1960s, alternative civilian service (*Zivildienst*) had gained recognition by the 1970s as a valuable educational institution for young men.¹⁹ Without ignoring the significance of conscientious objection, the following study contributes to this historiography by bringing into focus the societal debates surrounding the masculine image of the more than 5,701,387 men who served in the West German military until 1989. It shows that the change in social custom and values was by no means a linear, but rather a contested development.

¹⁷ Jarausch, *After Hitler*.

¹⁸ Thomas Kühne, “‘Friedenskultur’, Zeitgeschichte und Historische Friedensforschung,” in *Von der Kriegskultur zur Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit 1945*, ed. Thomas Kühne (Münster: Lit, 2000), 13–33; Wolfram Wette, “Kann man aus der Geschichte lernen? Historische Friedensforschung,” in *Friedens- und Konfliktforschung in Deutschland: Eine Bestandsaufnahme*, ed. Ulrich Eckern et al (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2004), 83–97. For this argument from a European and *longue durée* perspective, see James J. Seehan, *Where Have all the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008).

¹⁹ H. J. Bartjes, “Der Zivildienst als die Modernere ‘Schule der Nation’?” in *Von der Kriegskultur zur Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit 1945*, ed. Thomas Kühne (Münster: Lit, 2000), 130–145. See further, H. J. Bartjes, *Der Zivildienst als Sozialisationsinstanz* (Weinheim: Juventa, 1996).

Tracing this crooked history, my dissertation further engages with the work of historians who have analyzed the recurring military and parliamentary disputes about the image, role, and function of the armed forces.²⁰ From very early on, studies have analyzed the controversies that accompanied the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* in the 1950s and the creation a new type of soldier.²¹ For instance, Detlef Bald, one of the leading historians in the field, argues that initial attempts to formulate new guidelines and decrees, which would build the basis of the new military, were saturated with both “democratic postulates” and conservative, traditionalist recommendations. Due to this Janus-faced framework, West Germany witnessed recurring debates about military traditions that were overshadowed by the legacy of the most recent military history of Germany.²²

Moving beyond the formation period of the armed forces, scholars have eagerly studied whether the ideals of the *Bürger in Uniform* and the *Innere Führung* were upheld or whether the *Bundeswehr* returned to the military ideals of its predecessors: the *Reichswehr* and *Wehrmacht*.²³

²⁰ See the most comprehensive works, Lutz Köllner, ed., *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, Bd. 2, *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989); Hans Ehlert, ed., *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, Bd. 3, *Die NATO-Option* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993). See also: Hans-Jochim Harder and Norbert Wiggershaus, *Tradition und Reform in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr* (Herford: Mittler, 1985). For the political debates see further, Dietrich Wagner, *FDP und Wiederbewaffnung: Die Wehrpolitische Orientierung der Liberalen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1955* (Boppard: Boldt, 1978); Gordon D. Drummond, *The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949-1960: The Case Against Rearmament* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982).

²¹ See in particular the anthologies, Hilmar Linnenkamp and Dieter S. Lutz, eds., *Innere Führung: Zum Gedenken an Wolf Graf von Baudissin* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995); Rudolf Schlaffer, ed., *Wolf Graf von Baudissin, 1907-1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung* (Munich Oldenbourg, 2007). See further, Angelika Dörfler-Dierken, *Graf von Baudissin: Als Mensch hinter den Waffen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006).

²² Detlef Bald, “Bundeswehr und Gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch 1968: Die Widerstände des Militärs in Unna gegen die Demokratisierung”, *Westfälische Forschungen* 48 (1998): 297-309.

²³ Abenheim, *Reforging*; Martin Kutz, “Militär und Gesellschaft im Deutschland der Nachkriegszeit (1946-1995),” in *Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Ute Frevert (Stuttgart: Klett, 1997), 277-312. Detlef Bald, *Die Bundeswehr: Eine kritische Geschichte 1955-2005* (Munich: Beck, 2005), 10. See further, Detlef Bald,

Scholars emphasize that the value and meaning of the *Bundeswehr*'s leadership concepts were constantly challenged. Given the importance that the military as a "school of the nation" assumed in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century German history, they stress the repeated disputes about whether and to what extent the *Innere Führung* should imply an educational task (*Erziehungsauftrag*) or whether it should be geared entirely towards combat training.²⁴ Although recent studies emphasize that these disputes were also influenced by West Germany's changing male youth culture,²⁵ they rarely explore the full meaning of this history and generally ignore the gender ideals that underscored the debates.

This omission is most likely due to the perception, common among some traditional military historians of the *Bundeswehr*, that the two categories—soldier and man—are naturally congruent. Since soldiers' male sex is considered a natural given, it does not need to be analyzed systematically.²⁶ However, this oversight first ignores the historical processes that led to the creation of the *Bundeswehr* as a "men's society." Second, it overlooks the extent to which notions of masculinity influenced the *Bundeswehr*'s self-representations, its structures, customs,

Johann Klotz, and Wolfram Wette, *Mythos Wehrmacht: Nachkriegsdebatten und Traditionspflege* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2001).

²⁴ See for example: Kai Uwe Bormann, "Als 'Schule der Nation' überfordert: Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur Erziehung der Soldaten in der Aufbauphase der Bundeswehr," in *Reform, Reorganisation, Transformation: Zum Wandel in deutschen Streitkräften von den preußischen Heeresreformen bis zur Transformation der Bundeswehr*, ed. Karl-Heinz Lutz, Martin Rink and Marcus von Salisch (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010), 345–368; Kai Uwe Bormann, "Erziehung des Soldaten: Herzstück der Inneren Führung," in *Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907–1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung*, ed. Rudolf J. Schlaffer and Wolfgang Schmidt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 111–126; Detlef Bald, "Bundeswehr und Gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch 1968: Die Widerstände des Militärs in Unna gegen die Demokratisierung," *Westfälische Forschungen* 48 (1998): 297–309.

²⁵ See for example Frank Nögler, *Der gewollte Soldat und sein Wandel: Personelle Rüstung und Innere Führung in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr 1956 bis 1964/65* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010).

²⁶ For this observation in general see Karen Hagemann, "Military, War, and the Mainstreams: Gendering Modern German Military History," in *Gendering Modern German History: Rewriting Historiography*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Jean H. Quataert (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 63–85.

and norms. The significance becomes clear in the few military studies that discuss the masculine self-image of the military. For instance, Thorsten Loch's historical study, which analyzes the advertisement campaigns of the *Bundeswehr*, argues that most brochures or placards portrayed a "post heroic" soldierly image.²⁷ Yet, Loch also shows that in contrast to the neutral ads of the 1950s, the military developed a successful advertisement campaign in the 1960s and 1970s that pictured soldiers as charming "model boys" (*Musterknaben*) with manly-erotic charisma. While Loch thus shows that masculine images played a vital role in the ways that the Ministry of Defense wanted to present the *Bundeswehr*, he does not explore the broader historical context of these representations.

Seeking to show that military masculinities were the result of interlinked debates taking place at the arena of parliamentary politics, the military, and civil society, this project builds not only on Loch's work, but also engages with studies that focus on the developments within civil society. Scholarship focusing on the different social and protest movements, which developed in West Germany between the 1940s and 1980s, reveals that the *Bundeswehr*'s role and self-image was not only negotiated behind barracks fences or in governmental offices.²⁸ Focusing on West

²⁷ Thorsten Loch, *Das Gesicht der Bundeswehr: Kommunikationsstrategien in der Freiwilligenwerbung der Bundeswehr 1965–1989* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008). See further, Thorsten Loch, "Soldatenbilder im Wandel: Die Nachwuchswerbung der Bundeswehr in Werbeanzeigen," in *Visual History. Ein Studienbuch*, ed. Gerhard Paul (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 265–282. See also Klus Naumman, "Schlachtfeld und Geselligkeit: Die ständische Bürgerlichkeit des Bundeswehroffiziers," in *Bürgertum nach 1945*, ed. Manfred Hettling and Bernd Ulrich (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005), 310–346. For the argument of a post-heroic area see Herfried Münkler, *Der Wandel des Kriegs: Von der Symmetrie zur Asymmetrie* (Baden-Baden: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2006).

²⁸ Holger Nehring, *Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945–1970* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Alice H. Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movement since 1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Josef Janning, Hans-Josef Legrand, Helmut Zander, and Ulrich Albrecht, eds., *Friedensbewegung, Entwicklungen und Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Europa und den USA* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1987); Karl A. Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der Außerparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960–1970* (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 1977).

Germany's rearmament, for instance, researchers emphasize that the energetic opposition of various protest and peace groups was greatly influenced by the gendered perception of the *Bundeswehr* and military service.²⁹ Looking further into the 1960s and early 1970s,³⁰ studies stress, on the one hand, that the cultural and social changes that gripped society during this period, impinged greatly on internal military discussion and decision-making processes.³¹ On the other, scholars reveal that extra-parliamentary protest and social groups paid close attention to military practices and evaluated them very differently.³²

Scholarship that studies the late 1970s and early 1980s shows, moreover, that disputes about the masculine complexion of the *Bundeswehr* and its soldiers intensified due to the rising tensions of the Cold War. Historians such as Belinda Davis observe, for instance, that the early 1980s witnessed an increasing rhetoric, which explicitly denounced war and military service as products of and breeding grounds for excessively aggressive "guys" (*Macker*) and "gunmen"

²⁹ Martin Werner, *Die "Ohne mich"-Bewegung: Die bundesdeutsche Friedensbewegung im deutsch-deutschen Kalten Krieg (1949–1955)* (Münster: Münster Verl, 2006); Eckart Dietzelbinger, *Die westdeutsche Friedensbewegung 1948 bis 1955: Die Protestaktionen gegen die Remilitarisierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1984); Klaus-Jürgen Bremm, "Wehrhaft wider Willen? Die Debatte um die Bewaffnung Westdeutschlands in den fünfziger Jahren," in *Entschieden für Frieden: 50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955–2005*, ed. Klaus-Jürgen Bremm, Hans-Hubertus Mack and Martin Rink (Freiburg: Rombach, 2005), 283–297.

³⁰ For general overviews, see Boris Spornol, *Notstand der Demokratie: Der Protest gegen die Notstandsgesetze und die Frage der NS-Vergangenheit* (Essen: Klartext, 2008); Ute Kätzel, "Geschlecht, Gewalt und Pazifismus: 1968 und die Anti-Vietnamkriegsbewegung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung*, ed. Jennifer Davy, Karen Hagemann, and Ute Kätzel (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 222–243.

³¹ Nicole Tidemann, "Lange Männerhaare als Jugendkulturelles Zeichen nach 1945," in *Haar tragen: Eine kulturwissenschaftliche Annäherung*, ed. Christian Janecke (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004); Angelika Dörfler Dieken, "Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968 für die Innere Führung," in *Zurückgestutzt, Sinnentleert, Unverstanden: Die Innere Führung der Bundeswehr*, ed. Detlef Bald (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 65–84.

³² Patrick Bernhard, *Zivildienst zwischen Reform und Revolte: Eine bundesdeutsche Institution im gesellschaftlichen Wandel, 1961–1982* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 131; Patrick Bernhard "An der 'Friedensfront': Die APO, der Zivildienst und der gesellschaftliche Aufbruch der sechziger Jahre," in *Wo "1968" liegt: Reform und Revolte in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik*, ed. Christina von Hodenberg and Detlef Siegfried (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2006), 164–200.

(*Flintenkerle*).³³ Building on these studies, this dissertation shows that the masculine concepts, which were formulated by groups and individuals within civil society, responded to and, in turn, informed opinions articulated by politicians of West Germany's primary parties and by leading representatives of the *Bundeswehr*.

By exploring these dynamics, this dissertation engages above all studies focusing on the history of gender and masculinity in West Germany. Feminist scholars have argued since the early 1990s that the successful functioning of the military as an institution depends on the acceptance of shared masculine ideals.³⁴ Focusing mainly on the subjectivity of soldiers, Ruth Seifert, the leading German scholar in the field, stress that the military is an ideal site to observe the construction of masculinity, because the institution itself is defined as "masculine" as are military values and habitual norms. Masculine concepts, however, also respond to and are informed by different social and cultural structures and beliefs. The ways in which soldierly masculinity is fashioned are not only expressions of military demands, but of societal expectations.³⁵

³³ Belinda Davis, "'Women's Strength and Crazy Male Power': Gendered Language in the West German Peace Movement of the 1980s," in *Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung*, ed. Jennifer Davy, Karen Hagemann and Ute Kätzel (Essen: Klartext: 2005), 244–265. See further Susanne Schregel, *Der Atomkrieg vor der Wohnungstür: Eine Politikgeschichte der neuen Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik 1970–1985* (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 2011).

³⁴ See for example, Monika Szczepaniak, *Militärische Männlichkeiten in Deutschland und Österreich im Umfeld des Großen Krieges: Konstruktionen und Dekonstruktionen* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011); Joshua Goldstein, *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 252. See further, Frank J. Barrett, "Die Konstruktion hegemonialer Männlichkeit in Organisationen: Das Beispiel der US-Marine," *Soziale Konstruktionen: Militär und Geschlechterverhältnis*, ed. Christine Eifle and Ruth Seifert (Münster: Dampfboot, 1996), 71–91.

³⁵ Ruth Seifert, *Militär-Kultur-Identität: Individualisierung, Geschlechterverhältnisse und die soziale Konstruktion des Soldaten* (Bremen: Edition Temme, 1995). See further Ruth Seifert, *Individualisierungsprozesse, Geschlechterverhältnisse und die soziale Konstruktion des Soldaten. Eine theoretische und empirische Studie zur soldatischen Subjektivität und zu ihrer Wechselwirkung mit der Gesellschaft* (Munich: SOWI, 1993).

Yet, as indicated above, this early call by feminist scholars has not translated into an increased analytical focus on the concepts of military masculinities—their construction, their contested nature, and their change over time—in West Germany. Indeed, the last decades witnessed the publication of numerous studies analyzing the relation between concepts masculinity, war and the military in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Germany. These studies argue that masculine ideals influenced and in turn represented the formulation of national identities as well as social and political agendas.³⁶ Despite these fruitful results, only a few studies have explored history of military masculinities in postwar West Germany. Looking at West Germany, Ute Frevert argues that with the end of World War II the belief in military service as a “school of the nation” and a paragon for socially accepted and heroic masculine behavior began to vanish.³⁷ Indeed, while in the early 1950s a great majority still perceived the military as a “good pedagogical institution” for young men, by the 1970s, Frevert argues, West Germans had largely come to negate the significance of the military as a valuable “school of the nation.” While Frevert’s study highlights major developments that took place after 1945, it lacks

³⁶ For the early nineteenth century see for example, Karen Hagemann, *Männlicher Muth und Deutsche Ehre: Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2002); Karen Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor’: Nation, War and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising against Napoleon,” *Central European History*, 30 (1997), 187–220. For the Wilhelmine Empire see Marcus Funck, “Ready for War? Conceptions of Military Manliness in the Prusso-German Officers Corps before the First World War,” in *Home/Front. The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth Century Germany*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), 43–67; Thomas Rohrkrämer, “Das Militär als Männerbund? Männlichkeit im Deutschen Kaiserreich,” *Westfälische Forschungen* 45 (1995): 169–187.

³⁷ Frevert, *Nation in Barracks*. See also, Ute Frevert. “Heldentum und Opferwille, Ordnung und Disziplin: Militärische Werte in der zivilen Gesellschaft,” in *Alte Werte – Neue Werte: Schlaglichter des Wertewandels*, ed. Andreas Rödder and Wolfgang Elz (Götting: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 139–150. Ute Frevert, “Das Militär als Schule der Männlichkeiten,” in *Männlichkeiten und Moderne: Geschlecht in den Wissenskulturen um 1900*, ed. Ulrike Brunotte (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2008), 57–75. See also Kutz, “Militär und Gesellschaft.”

the depth—as she notes herself³⁸—to explain all the struggles and contingencies that shaped this history.

Seeking to provide the necessary depth, this dissertation contributes to the multitude of studies by gender and cultural historians who have paid special attention to the emergence of new masculine concepts after the end of World War II. These studies point to the fact that concepts of military masculinity responded to non-military norms and values. Highlighting that the sociopolitical reconstruction of Germany took place also along gendered lines, historian Robert G. Moeller stresses for instance that returning POWs were fashioned as loving, gentle family men due to changed attitudes towards military values and norms.³⁹ These new masculine concepts corresponded, as Frank Biess argues, “precisely to the tamed militarism of the new West German army and its ideal soldier as the ‘citizen in uniform’.”⁴⁰

Culture and gender studies show, moreover, that masculine ideals expressed in the realm of civil society were formulated in relation or contrast to military ideals and expectations. Looking at ideals of parenting and parenthood in the 1950s and 1960s, scholar Till von Rahden points to a shift away from including military customs and values in the daily education of

³⁸ Frevert, *Nation in Barracks*, 7.

³⁹ Robert G. Moeller, “‘The Last Soldiers of the Great War’ and Tales of Family Reunions in the Federal Republic of Germany,” *Signs* 24 (1998), 129–145; Robert G. Moeller, “Heimkehr ins Vaterland: Die Remaskulinisierung Westdeutschlands in den fünfziger Jahren,” *Militär-geschichtliche Zeitung* (60) 2001, 403–436; Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

⁴⁰ See for example Frank Biess, “Survivors of Totalitarianism: Returning POWs and the Reconstruction of Masculine Citizenship in West Germany, 1945–1955,” in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 57–82, here 72; Frank Biess, *Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 43. See further Uta Poiger, “A New, ‘Western’ Hero? Reconstructing German Masculinity in the 1950s,” *Signs* 24 (1998): 147–162; Uta Poiger, “Rebels with a Cause? American Popular Culture, the 1956 Youth Riots and the New Conceptions of Masculinity in East and West Germany,” in *American Impact on Postwar Germany*, ed. Reiner Pommerin (New York: Berghahn Books, 1995), 93–124.

children, especially boys.⁴¹ The development of new masculine ideals in contrast or in relation to military norms and values continued well into the 1970s. Focusing on the extra-parliamentary protests and the changing youth culture, historians emphasize that the style of West Germany's "bums" and hippies" was seen as provocation and as a threat to military ideals.⁴² Building upon these studies, this dissertation answers these scholars' call to conduct more research on the emergence and transformation of concepts of masculinity after 1945.⁴³

2. Theory and Method

In order to contribute to recent scholarship, this study draws on the methodological approaches of discourse analysis, recent works on civil society, gender history, the history of masculinities, and the history of sexuality. Looking at historical changes and cultural differences, historians have come to analyze masculinities not only in terms of identity formation, but also as discursive constructs.⁴⁴ Yet, scholarly understanding of what a "discourse" is and how it should be

⁴¹ Till van Rahden, "Religion, Vaterschaft und die Suche nach Demokratie in der Frühen Bundesrepublik," in *Ehe, Familie, Verwandtschaft: Vergesellschaftung in Religion und sozialer Lebenswelt*, ed. Andreas Holzem and Ines Weber (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 437–458. See also, Paul Betts, "Manners, Morality, and Civilization: Reflections on Postwar Germany Etiquette Books," in *Histories of the Aftermath. The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe*, ed. Frank Biess and Robert G. Moeller (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 196–214; Kasper Maase, "'Lässig' kontra 'zackig': Nachkriegsjugend und Männlichkeit in Geschlechtergeschichtlicher Perspektive," in *Sag mir, wo die Mädchen sind: Beiträge zur Geschlechtergeschichte der Jugend*, ed. Benninghaus, Christina and Kerstin Kohtz (Köln: Böhlau, 1999), 79–101.

⁴² See Detlef Siegfried, "White Negro: The Fascination of the Authentic in the West German Counter Culture of the 1960s," in *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s*, ed. Belinda Davis, Wilfried Mausbach, Martin Klimke, and Carla MacDougall (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 191–214.

⁴³ Richard Bessel, "Was bleibt vom Krieg? Deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte(n) aus geschlechtlicher Perspektive: Eine Einführung," *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitung* 60 (2001): 297–305.

⁴⁴ For early approaches see Thomas Kühne, "Männergeschichte als Geschlechtergeschichte," in *Männergeschichte – Geschlechtergeschichte: Männlichkeit im Wandel der Moderne* (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 1996), 7–30, here 8. See also, Thomas Kühne, "Frieden, Krieg und Ambivalenz: Historische Friedensforschung als Geschlechterforschung," in *Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als*

analyzed differs widely across disciplines. Even though I do not dare to solve the question discussed by numerous scholars of how “discourse,” “subjectivity,” “agency,” and “experience” are related,⁴⁵ this study is based on the understanding that the individuals and social groups who participate in the negotiations of masculine concepts are not an undefined discursive mass. Instead, I acknowledge—to use Roger Chartier’s words—the “inventive capacities of individuals and communities” that are limited, nonetheless, by certain “constraints, norms and convention.”⁴⁶ This understanding allows for the critical analysis of discursive contributions by political parties and parliamentarians, military representatives and experts, as well as by different extra-parliamentary groups that shaped civil society. To this effect, this study does not analyze the self-perception and identity formation of individual soldiers, but explores the ways that society at large talked about the *Bundeswehr* and the West German soldier.⁴⁷

Following this understanding, my study furthermore employs recent scholarship on civil society. The last decade has witnessed a new debate about how “civil society” can be defined and how it—if at all—can be used as methodological concept. Approaches and proposals generally evolve around three definitions: the “field-logical,” the “action-logical,” and the

Geschlechterforschung, ed. Jennifer Davy, Karen Hagemann and Ute Kätzel (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 55–72. See further John Tosh, “What Should Historians do with Masculinity,” *History Workshop Journal* 38 (1994): 179–202, reprinted with minor revisions in John Tosh, *Manliness and Masculinity in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Essays on Gender, Family, and Empire* (London: Pearson Longman, 2005), 29–58.

⁴⁵ For a discussion of this problem, see Kathleen Canning, “Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing Discourse and Experience,” *Signs* (1994): 368–404, reprinted in: Kathleen Canning, *Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class & Citizenship* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2006).

⁴⁶ Roger Chartier, *On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 20.

⁴⁷ See for this argument the introductions by Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and John Horne, in: *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History* (Manchester and New York: Berg, 2004). See further, Karen Hagemann, *Männlicher Muth*, 63–65.

“normative.”⁴⁸ Notwithstanding the caveats and problems associated with any of these approaches, the following analysis follows the “action-logical” definition of civil society to acknowledge the discursive powers of groups and actors that generally functioned outside the realm of parliamentary politics and the military apparatus. To be sure, this threefold division is somewhat arbitrary, because the boundaries between the different realms are not fixed, but permeable. Moreover, the individuals and groups who act in either arena not only change over time, but they also cross the boundaries.⁴⁹ Yet, this triad is nonetheless useful, because it allows me to acknowledge the context within and the background against which individuals and groups expressed their opinions. It enables me to analyze how different social and protest movements as well as the media influenced the negotiations of military masculinities.⁵⁰ Thus, this study can reveal how different concepts of military masculinity that were formulated by leading parliamentarians, military commands, and extra-parliamentary activists influenced each other.

Seeking to map the interlinked discursive development of military masculinities in West Germany after 1945, this study surely approaches a difficult topic. Scholars working in the field of historical masculinity studies have emphasized that the workings of masculine concepts that are considered “normal,” are very often difficult to grasp. They are located, as Martina Kessel

⁴⁸ For a discussion of the different definitions of civil society see, Karen Hagemann, “Civil Society Gendered: Rethinking Theories and Practices,” in *Civil Society and Gender Justice. Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Karen Hagemann, Sonya Michel and Gunilla Budde (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 17–42; Jürgen Kocka, “Civil Society from a Historical Perspective,” *European Review* 12 (2004): 65–79. See also the anthology by John Keane, ed., *Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006).

⁴⁹ For a critical discussion, see Hagemann, “Civil Society Gendered.”

⁵⁰ Karl Christian Führer, Knut Hickethier, and Axel Schildt, “Öffentlichkeit, Medien, Geschichte,” *AfS* 41 (2001): 1–38.

puts it, “everywhere and nowhere.”⁵¹ Accepted notions of masculinity appear as such a universal and self-evident category that their existence and dominance in historical sources are often hard to detect. Scholars looking for these masculinities frequently encounter a “discursive emptiness.”⁵² To a certain extent, this holds true for concepts of military masculinity. If the male sex of the soldier is viewed as natural, his masculinity becomes almost indistinct in a muddle of soldierly qualities.

In order to overcome the ‘threat’ of this discursive emptiness this dissertation first employs gender as the most important category of historical analysis. This approach enables the exploration of how masculine ideals are constructed and change. Following historian Joan W. Scott, I understand gender as both an important subject of investigation and as a method of doing research that can illuminate a whole range of social cleavages and cultural practices. Gender is not only a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, but also a primary means of signifying relationships of power.⁵³ As Scott has emphasized, gender as a methodology is mainly about asking historical questions: “[I]t is above all an invitation to think critically about how the meanings of sexed bodies are produced, deployed, and changed.”⁵⁴

⁵¹ Martina Kessel, “Heterogene Männlichkeit: Skizzen zur gegenwärtigen Geschlechterforschung,” in *Handbuch der Kulturwissenschaften*, Vol. 3: *Themen und Tendenzen*, ed. Friedrich Jaeger et al (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2004), 372–384, here 376.

⁵² See Franz X. Eder, *Kultur der Begierde: Eine Geschichte der Sexualität* (Munich: Beck, 2002), 27. For this discussion see also Martin Lücke, *Männlichkeit in Unordnung. Homosexualität und männliche Prostitution in Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 2008), 13–14.

⁵³ See as a classical text: J.W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” reprinted in *Gender and the Politics of History*, ed. idem (New York, 1988), 28–50. For a more recent debate see, “AHR Forum: Revisiting “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *The American Historical Review* 113 (2008), 1344–1430.

⁵⁴ J.W. Scott, “Unanswered Questions,” in: *AHR Forum*, 1422–1430.

While applying this dynamic concept of gender, this study also engages with the extensive literature on the history of masculinity. In her path-breaking study *Masculinities*, Raewyn Connell argues for the existence of multiple masculinities that are related to each other in a hierarchy of power.⁵⁵ At the top resides what Connell calls a “hegemonic masculinity,” against which other—competing or compliant—masculinities are measured and subordinated: “At any given time, one form of masculinity rather than others is culturally exalted.”⁵⁶ In view of this hierarchy, Connell and other scholars emphasize that masculinity almost never functions as a category on its own, detached from other factors. On the contrary, competing masculine concepts and the position they achieve in the hierarchy are informed by and related to other categories of difference such as class, race, religion, age, and sexuality.⁵⁷

Despite its shortcomings,⁵⁸ Connell’s approach is useful, for it prevents seeing concepts of military masculinity as monolithic entities.⁵⁹ Looking at the military, for instance, it is important to consider the masculine traits associated with officers in contrast and relation to the qualities ascribed to young draftees. The understanding that one masculine ideal is defined by

⁵⁵ R. Connell, *Masculinities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 77.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ For the discussion of the construction of a specific masculinity in relation to other masculine variations see also Jürgen Martschukat and Olaf Stieglitz, “Männigfaltigkeit: Perspektiven einer historischen Männlichkeitsforschung,” *Werkstatt Geschichte* 29 (2001): 4–7.

⁵⁸ Scholars have highlighted, for instance, that Connell, on the one hand, does not pay enough attention to the histories of individual masculinity formations and, on the other, overemphasizes the importance of patriarchy. For a critique of Connell’s concept see: John Tosh, “Hegemonic Masculinity and the History of Gender” in *Masculinities in Politics and War*, ed. Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh (Manchester and New York: Berg, 2004), 41–58. See also, Lücke, *Männlichkeit*, 38–45.

⁵⁹ See for example the articles in Paul Higate, *Military Masculinities: Identity and State* (Westport: Praeger, 2003). See further: Szczepaniak, *Militärische Männlichkeiten*.

other masculine variations furthermore points to the relation between military masculinities and the characteristics ascribed to men who—for various reasons—do not do not serve in the armed forces. By addressing, for example, the attributes associated with men who were excluded from compulsory military service or prohibited from serving, this dissertation is able to discern how contemporaries envisioned the ideal West German soldier. To this effect, ‘normal’ or ideal notions of masculinity are defined from the margins.⁶⁰

In addition to the ‘masculine other’, scholarship has highlighted moreover that masculinities are oftentimes, though not inevitably, constructed in relation or in contrast to women and concepts of femininity.⁶¹ Even though femininities are not the main focus of this dissertation, they play a very important role in the analysis. Women—as women, mothers, significant others, sexual partners, or soldiers—and the qualities ascribed to them functioned as an important parameter that contemporaries used to talk about the ideal male *Bürger in Uniform*.⁶² While discussing, for instance, the roles of wives and mothers, contemporaries formulated not only concepts of femininity; they also defined the West German man in uniform. Thus, by acknowledging how contemporaries discussed women’s relation to the military, this dissertation is able to plumb concepts of military masculinity.

In this respect, my dissertation further draws on the history of sexuality, because the masculine concepts that contemporaries formulated also invoked notions of male sexuality. Like

⁶⁰ Lücke, *Männlichkeit*, 38–45.

⁶¹ For the relational character of femininity and masculinity, see as an early approach Kühne, “Männergeschichte als Geschlechtergeschichte,” 11. For a critique see, Claudia Opitz-Belakhal, “‘Krise der Männlichkeit’: Ein nützliches Konzept der Geschlechtergeschichte,” *L’Homme* 19 (2008): 31–49, here 31.

⁶² See, Irene Stoehr, “Phalanx der Frauen? Wiederaufrüstung und Weiblichkeit in Westdeutschland 1950–1957,” in *Soziale Konstruktion: Militär und Geschlechterverhältnis*, ed. Christine Eifler and Ruth Seifert (Münster: Dampfboot, 1999), 187–204.

concepts of masculinity, this study approaches sexuality as a discursive construct. Instead of considering sexuality to be a naturally given fact, it is important to examine the ways in which a particular “sexual nature” is ascribed to and expected from the historical subject; in this case the West German soldiers and officers.⁶³ As discussed above, the *Bundeswehr* was conceived as a homosocial, yet strictly heterosexual “men’s society” from the outset. This construction caused many contemporaries, who took an eager interest in the *Bundeswehr*, to address the sexual behavior and desires of men and pondered how military would affect soldiers’ sexuality. Influenced by the social, cultural, and political circumstances that surrounded them, West Germans attached specific meaning to the sexual desires and behavior of *Bundeswehr* troops. It led, for example, to repeated disputes that brought not only women as the sexual other, but also homosexuality and “the homosexual” into the limelight.

3. Sources

An exploration into the emergence and development of concepts of military masculinities at the link between parliamentary politics, the military, and civil society, requires the analysis of a broad variety of primary sources. Following the proposed methodological triad, the analysis must *first* gauge concepts and ideas that were formulated within the halls of the Ministry of Defense and the *Bundeswehr* leadership. For this part of the analysis, sources housed in the federal archives in Freiburg (Germany) are paramount. This repository houses not only the records of the Department for the Preparation of the West German Defense Contribution (*Deutsche*

⁶³ Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 105. For a discussion of masculinity and sexuality see also Lücke, *Männlichkeit*. For the relation between military and sexuality see for example, Angelika Tramitz, “Nach dem Zapfenstreich: Anmerkungen zur Sexualität des Offiziers,” in *Willensmenschen: Über Deutsche Offiziere*, ed. Ursula Breymayer et al (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), 211–226.

Dienststellen zur Vorbereitung der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, BW9), but also the papers of the Minister of Defense (*Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*, BW I), the Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff and General Staff of the Armed Forces (Generalinspekteur und Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, BW 2) and the Center *Innere Führung* (BW 11 II). The minutes of staff meetings, memos, notes, external and internal correspondence, but also unpublished internal studies, military regulations, and decrees, reveal how the *Bundeswehr* leadership and military experts working in the Ministry of Defense conceived of the function and image of the *Bundeswehr* and the West German soldier. In addition to published documents such as speeches, handbooks, and regulations these archival have not only enabled me to trace how military experts and representatives negotiated among each other, but they reveal how the *Bundeswehr* leadership reacted to masculine ideals that were formulated in the West German parliament and in civil society.

In order to successfully shed light on the ways that West German political parties and parliamentarians sought to define the *Bundeswehr* and its soldiers throughout the years, the Federal Archive in Bonn and the different political archives are vitally important. In addition to the documents of the parties' *Bundestag* factions, which contain the minutes of meetings and correspondence, the party archives of CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD, and *Die Grünen* also house the papers of security and defense committees that negotiated issues relating to the *Bundeswehr*. Moving beyond the internal documentation of the individual parties, the records of the West German parliament provide the necessary insights into the ways parliamentarians negotiated the image of the West German soldier and formulated diverse notions of military masculinity. In addition to the negotiations of the *Bundestag*, for example, I have also gauged the minutes of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense—which are partly published, but mainly housed in

Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestags (Parliamentary Archive of the German Bundestag).

In addition to shedding light on how the military experts of different political parties talked about the *Bundeswehr* behind closed doors, these records also reveal how the image of the West German soldier were negotiated by *Bundeswehr* representatives and the parliament. After all, military and civilian representatives of the Ministry of Defense were constant participants.

Turning *finally* to the realm of civil society, the analysis of mainstream newspapers and magazines such as *Der Spiegel*, *DIE ZEIT*, *Die Welt*, and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, was important to gauge the prevailing opinions, major perspectives, and trends. Upon identifying individuals and groups that predominantly participated in the negotiations about the function and image of the *Bundeswehr*, I studied magazines and journals, brochures and leaflets of influential extra-parliamentary—including different peace, student and women's organization—organizations at the Archive Social Movements (*Archiv Soziale Bewegungen*) and the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (*Institut für Sozialforschungen*). In addition to examining the records of the German Confederation of Labor Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, or *DGB*), I investigated the records at the *Central Archive of the Protestant Church* (*Zentral Archiv der Evangelischen Kirche*) and the Archive of the Military Bishop of the Catholic Church (*Archiv des Katholischen Militärbischofs*) in order to understand how labor unions as well as the Catholic and the Protestant churches sought to participate in the definition of the *Bundeswehr* and its soldiers. Moreover, these archives as well as the different party archives and the military archive in Freiburg were vital to a grasp of how not only organized groups, but also 'ordinary' West Germans conceived of the West German man in military uniform. The records at these various repositories contain letters, requests, and commentaries that citizens and organized groups sent to their political and religious representatives, the military leadership, and the

government in order to voice their opinions about the *Bundeswehr*. In sum, the combined analysis of published and archival sources as enabled me to trace how West German society as a whole negotiated concepts of military masculinity between the 1940s and 1980s.

4. Organization

In order to reveal the developments of the concepts of military masculinity, this dissertation proceeds chronologically. Based on my analysis of primary and secondary sources, I have identified specific periods during which concepts of military masculinity were most intensively negotiated. Functioning as a prelude, the first part—“A Postwar Project: The Demilitarization of Occupied West Germany, 1945–1948”—analyzes the emergence of new masculine ideals at the end of World War II. Following a discussion of Allied demilitarization and re-education procedures, it shows how Germans living mainly in the Western occupation zones reevaluated the relation between military, civil society, and masculinity. While arguing that many Germans bid farewell to the military and military success as symbols of national prowess, on the one hand, and to soldierly qualities as the epitome of manliness, on the other, this part also emphasizes that the belief that military service would have positive effects on young men's character did prevail in large segments of society.⁶⁴ These competing ideas were important for the subsequent negotiations.

The second part “Defining the New Soldier: Debates about Military Masculinity before the Rearmament of the FRG, 1949–1954” analyzes the masculine concepts that emerged during the negotiations surrounding the European Defense Community (EDC). While participating in

⁶⁴ See, Jörg Echternkamp, “Arbeit am Mythos: Soldatengenerationen der Wehrmacht im Urteil der west- und ostdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft,” in *Nachkrieg in Deutschland*, ed. Klaus Naumann (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2001), 421–443

the international negotiations, members of the *Amt Blank* and government officials assembled to carve out the rules and regulations that would define not only the European, but also the West German soldier.⁶⁵ This process first and foremost resulted in the gendered definition of military service. Agreeing that only men, not women could be compelled to serve, they set out to define the behavioral and mental traits of the future soldiers. Influenced by vociferous anti-rearmament protests that swept the Federal Republic in the early 1950s, the soldierly image that emerged during this period was a hybrid. Seeking to overcome the legacy of the Nazi regime and World War II, contemporaries were eager to create a military that would fit the new democratic and peaceful ideals of the Federal Republic. However, since the new armed forces were supposed to also function as a bulwark against the Communist East, negotiations seesawed between the thoroughly trained soldiers who would bravely defend West Germany and Europe, on the one hand, and as a restrained *Bürger in Uniform*, who was a loving family man, on the other.

The subsequent third part “Expectations and Experience: The Discourse on Soldier’s Social and Moral Standards during the Formation Period of the Bundeswehr, 1955–1964” focuses on the debates that erupted after the resolution to rearm West Germany in the context of NATO. Following the decision to establish the *Bundeswehr* as national armed forces and implement a draft, tens of thousands of young men were called up for service. This development triggered new debates about the social ramifications of military life. Although many West Germans maintained that the military could inculcate men with socially acceptable, domestic qualities, a parallel discourse developed, which questioned the social value of military life and, instead, cautioned that a barracked all-male institution had the potential to negatively influence the sexual and social behavior of young men. Eager to establish and maintain good relations

⁶⁵ See for example Nögler, *Der gewollte Soldat*, 32–36.

between civil society and the military, this part argues that government officials, parliamentarians of all primary parties, and military experts stressed that the soldiers had to embrace the ideal of monogamous Christian family breadwinner.

As the fourth part “Between Left-Wing Rejection and Right-Wing Critique: The Changing Image of the *Bundeswehrsoldat*, 1964–1976” shows, the efforts to guide the soldiers’ sexual and social behavior were significant for the disputes that erupted in the mid-1960s. During this period, the Federal Republic witnessed almost a “counter revolution” of conservative *Bundeswehr* generals who argued that the military and West German society as a whole had to embrace to the image of men as born defenders and the soldier as a hardened fighter.⁶⁶ These calls for a new soldierly ideal collided, however, with arguments of the extra-parliamentary protestors who were unsettled by the establishment of Chancellor Kiesinger’s Grand Coalition in 1966. Fearing that the Federal Republic was turning into an authoritarian, fascist state, the majority of activists cautioned that the *Bundeswehr* produced violent male behavior, which would eventually endangered the peace and stability of West Germany. This multifold criticism fundamentally influenced parliamentary politics. Above all, this part shows, Willy Brandt’s Social-Liberal Coalition instated a series of measures that represented a direct response to different lines of argument. As a result, the West German soldier of the 1970s was posited as a critical and reflective thinker who served in the *Bundeswehr* to protect the peace and stability of West Germany and Western Europe.

The fifth and final part, “Challenged Military Manliness: The Quest for a New Man in Uniform, 1977–1989” focuses in particular on the late 1970s to early/mid-1980s.⁶⁷ During this

⁶⁶ Abenheim, *Reforging*.

⁶⁷ This limitation is in part due to the fact that German regulations prohibit researchers to access archival material that is less than thirty years old. While the Ministry of Defense graciously lifted some restrictions, for example, this

time, the masculine image of West German soldier came under fire yet again; this time a growing number of leftist intellectuals, peace activists, and women's groups who complained that the *Bundeswehr* was a destructive force that not only endangered West Germany's peace and stability, but that also produced violent notions of masculinity. This understanding came to the fore, first, following the proposal by government officials in 1978 to recruit women as soldiers. Second, the question of whether gay men should be allowed to serve in the *Bundeswehr* instigated more debates. In particular, the discharge of General Günter Kießling, the Commander of NATO land forces and deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, due to allegations that he was gay caused a public outcry.⁶⁸ At a time when peace activists protested NATO's double track decision, Kießling's discharge was seen as the result of a homophobic and hyper-masculine military culture that had to be changed.

By closely examining these periods, this dissertation sheds light on the emergence and development of concepts of military masculinity during the four decades following the end of World War II. Slightly revising Wolf Graf von Baudissin's 1955 dictum, the following analysis shows that the West German soldier was certainly a man of his times, because the function and image of the *Bundeswehr* were discussed at the intersection of the military, parliamentary politics, and civil society. As such, the concepts of military masculinity that contemporaries formulated and that were reflected in parliamentary politics as well as in military guidelines and regulations, are not solely the product of governmental demands and military necessities. They were also formed by the claims formulated in civil society by individuals and groups. Because of

one they did not. However, the intensity with which contemporaries debated masculine concepts certainly peaked in the early/mid-1980s and would not be trumped until the unification of the two Germanys.

⁶⁸ Thomas Ramge, *Die großen Polit-Skandale: Eine andere Geschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2003), 180–197.

these interactions and influences, the image of the *Bundeswehr* and the West German soldiers and officers changed over time; preventing military ideals and customs from becoming decisive for civil society.

PART I
A POSTWAR PROJECT: THE DEMILITARIZATION OF OCCUPIED WEST
GERMANY, 1945-1948

During the first days of May 1945, the “total war” that Adolf Hitler and the Nazis had inflicted upon Europe ended with the total defeat of National Socialist Germany. After more than five and a half years of unprecedented brutal warfare, Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command signed Germany’s unconditional surrender. While Jodl’s signature in Reims on May 7 and the second capitulation ceremony in Berlin on May 9 officially documented the collapse of the Nationalist Socialist regime, the total defeat of Nazi Germany was visible throughout the entire country and all previously occupied regions. Devastated landscapes, mountains of rubble, piles of corpses, wounded civilians and soldiers, as well as the increasing presence of victorious enemy forces, made it unmistakably clear to Germans that their country had lost the war.⁶⁹

In addition to the physical destruction, the subsequent dissolution of the German state and the Allied occupation left Germans in no doubt that they had been utterly defeated. Immediately following the capitulation, the victorious allies set about establishing comprehensive occupation regimes that they had already begun to plan in the summer of 1941. In August 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill resolved that Germany, upon its

⁶⁹ This is not to suggest that the end of the Second World War was swift. On the contrary, the collapse of Nazi Germany occurred at different times and in different circumstances. The ways in which Germans experienced the shift from war to postwar varied widely, depending on their status (civilian or soldiers), their geographical location, the ferocity of previous fighting as well as their age and gender. On the question of the transition from war to postwar, see for example Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945: From War to Peace* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 140. See also Edward Norman Peterson, *The Many Faces of Defeat: The German People's Experience in 1945* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1990).

defeat, was to be disarmed permanently. Two years later at the Tehran Conference, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed that Germany's demilitarization should include dismantling its industrial capacity to make war. This vision of a postwar Germany entirely stripped of its ability to wage war culminated at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 and the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, where the "Big Three" vowed not only to demilitarize, denazify, decentralize and to dissolve the big industrial cartels. They also declared to introduce democratic self-government. To realize this vision, the victorious powers, now joined by France, divided Germany into four occupation zones, and implemented specific programs that aimed at the implementation of the five Ds: Germany's demilitarization, denazification, decentralization, decartelization, and democratization.⁷⁰

Historians, political scientists, and sociologists have written extensively on the total defeat of Nazi Germany and the subsequent Allied occupation. Much of this scholarship focuses on the logistics and politics of the occupation within the context of the Cold War.⁷¹ In addition, cultural and political historians have analyzed the Allies' motives for demilitarizing Germany and their use of cultural and social practices to promote a more thorough process of

⁷⁰ For extracts from the report on the Potsdam Conference, see Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., *Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945–1954* (London: OUP, 1955), 40–50. For a comprehensive overview see Wolfgang Benz, *Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung 1945–1949/55* (Berlin: Akademie, 1999).

⁷¹ For an overview of Allied occupation, see Benz, *Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung*. See also Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995). For the French occupation, see Klaus Dietmar Henke, *Politische Säuberung unter französischer Besatzung: Die Entnazifizierung in Württemberg-Hohenzollern* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981). For the British occupation politics see for example Ian D. Turner, ed., *Reconstruction of Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945–1955* (New York: Berg Publisher, 1989). For the Sowjet occupation, see for example Damian van Melis, *Entnazifizierung in Mecklenburg Vorpommern: Herrschaft und Verwaltung, 1945–1948* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999); Helga A Welsh, *Revolutionärer Wandel auf Befehl? Entnazifizierungs- und Personalpolitik in Thüringen und Sachsen (1945–1948)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989).

democratization.⁷² Intrigued by the idea of a German *Sonderweg* (special path) after 1945—a path that led from an excessively militarized, war-prone country to a society of peace-loving conscientious objectors that would abandon the draft entirely in 2010—scholars have also sought to measure the extent to which the experience of total defeat and Allied occupation influenced and changed German society.⁷³ To better understand how the unprecedented brutality of the war and Allied occupation reshaped German mentality, scholars have paid attention to the ways Germans in the western occupation zones dealt with returning prisoners of war, regarded military systems and customs and reacted to the Allied demilitarization policies.⁷⁴

Utilizing this literature, this section analyzes how the turmoil of the last months of the war and the Allied occupation enabled both conflicting and complementary attitudes toward war and the military—its representatives, its customs and its values—to evolve. These developments are of vital importance for understanding how West Germans reacted to the idea of rearmament, the eventual establishment of the *Bundeswehr* and the introduction of universal male conscription in the 1950s. The complex attitudes that emerged during the last months of the war and the early years of occupation reached far beyond the early debates surrounding the

⁷² See James F. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation in American-Occupied Germany* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). See further, Heide Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Dolan, “Isolating Nazism.” For the French efforts see for example the article by Angelika Ruge-Schatz, “Grundprobleme der Kulturpolitik in der Französischen Besatzungszone,” in *Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone, 1945–1949*, ed. Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1983), 91–110. For British efforts see for example, Friedhelm Boll, *Auf der Suche nach Demokratie: Britische und Deutsche Jugendinitiativen in Niedersachsen nach 1945* (Bonn: Dietz, 1994).

⁷³ For the argument that the attitude of many Germans changed dramatically during the last days of the war and during the early postwar years, see Jarausch, *After Hitler* who also includes a discussion of East Germany in his analysis. See also Kühne, “‘Friedenskultur,’” 13–33; Wette, “Kann man aus der Geschichte lernen?,” 83–97.

⁷⁴ See for example, Biess, *Homecomings*; Moeller, “The Last Soldiers”; Moeller, “Heimkehr ins Vaterland”; Geyer, “Cold War Angst”; Elizabeth Heineman, “The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany’s ‘Crisis Years’ and West German National Identity,” *American Historical Review* 101 (1996): 354–395.

Bundeswehr. They would influence the ways in which West Germans debated and redefined ideals of military masculinity in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In order to obtain a fuller understanding of the meaning of the recurring debates about the masculine complexion of the *Bundeswehr* and the masculine traits of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers and officers, those notions must be analyzed in relation to the early years of the postwar occupation.

This part thus begins by discussing the agenda of the occupation forces and the ways in which the Western Allies sought both to demilitarize Germany and to “re-educate”⁷⁵ the Germans. In a second step, it examines German responses to “total defeat” and the occupation programs focusing in particular on how contemporaries assessed the meaning of warfare and the value of the military. Looking at different active social groups—including veterans, youth groups, and women’s associations—as well as opinion polls, this second part shows that, while overall West Germans changed their perceptions about waging war, their attitudes towards military service and soldiering remained ambivalent.

1. Allied Plans and Policies to Demilitarize Postwar Germany

During the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin laid down their plans for a defeated postwar Germany:

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff [...] remove and destroy all military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that shall be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift justice and [...] remove all

⁷⁵ According to James F. Tent, Allied postwar planners coined the term “reeducation” while the Second World War was still in full swing. During the first two postwar years, the term shifted from reeducation to reorientation, because the first was perceived as too limited and one-dimensional. See Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, 254.

Nazi and militarist influence from public office and from all cultural and economic life of the German people.⁷⁶

The prime motive behind this ambitious agenda was the firm belief that German militarism, especially Prussian militarism, was the major reason for the outbreak of World War II. Addressing the House of Commons two years earlier, in September 1943, Churchill had argued that “Nazi tyranny” and “Prussian Militarism” were the two “main elements” that influenced German life.⁷⁷ The Prime Minister’s belief was shared by many. It was an “a priori assumption” that influenced the agenda of President Roosevelt, many governmental debates in Britain, France, and the United States, as well as the final occupation planning of these powers.⁷⁸

The speeches, debates and documents that laid down Allied occupation policies lacked, however, a coherent definition of what “militarism” was and what a German “militarist” actually looked like. While discussing the military history of Germany and the peculiarities of the “German people,” US representatives, for instance, did not rely on a single conception of militarism. Members of the US government, such as Secretary of State Cordell Hull, frequently equated militarism with aggression, meaning that Germany was a war-prone country always preparing for or engaged in war.⁷⁹ Seeking to identify German “militarists,” American, British

⁷⁶ Quoted in Bessel, *Germany 1945*, 279–280. For a detailed assessment of the Yalta Conference see Benz, *Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung*, 81–119.

⁷⁷ Charles Eade, ed., *Onwards to Victory: War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill C.H., M.P. 1943* (London, 1944), 204.

⁷⁸ See Nawyn, ““Striking at the Roots,” 47. For a discussion of these images in the French case see Willis, *The French in Germany*, 92–95. For the British perspective, see Keith Robbins, *Present and Past: British Images of Germany in the First Half of the Twentieth Century and Their Historical Legacy* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 1999); and Robert Cooper, “The Myth of Prussia,” in *Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations*, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (New York: Berghan Books, 1998), 223–234.

⁷⁹ Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 53. See also Dolan, “Isolating Nazism,” 34–42.

and French postwar planners settled on those who had actively promoted, prepared and directed World War II.⁸⁰ Although this very broad definition included media barons, industrialists, political administrators, teachers, and journalists, Allied forces focused primarily on elites within the German armed forces. Many US officials, as well as their British and French counterparts, associated militarism with Prussia and the German officer corps. Seen as the ultimate personification of German militarism, officials stressed in particular the dominance of Prussian Junkers—aristocratic families holding large portions of land east of the Elbe River—in the German armed forces.⁸¹ According to government officials and influential intellectuals, the Prussian Junkers and with them most of military's higher command had developed a “military mentality” that transgressed all legitimate military thinking and fueled National Socialism. In light of this perception, it was only logical for the Western Allies to insist on the disarmament of the entire German military and especially the German General Staff. Speaking in front of the US congress in September 1943, President Roosevelt addressed the politicians in this spirit. He claimed not only that Hitler and all Nazis had to be defeated, but that the “war-breeding gangs of militarists must be rooted out of Germany—and out of Japan—if we are to have any real assurance of future peace [...]”⁸² Consequently, following the defeat of Nazi Germany, former

⁸⁰ See OMNGUS, Research Branch, Information Control Division, German Militarism: A Study of Militaristic Tendencies In Germany Today as Revealed by The Attitude of Opinion Leaders, Special Report Nr. 7, 12 February 1948, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, ICD, Box 17, F: German Militarism and Re-militarization.

⁸¹ Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 56–65. See also James M. Diehl, *The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 55–57. For the French view of the Junkers, see Ruge-Schatz, “Grundprobleme der Kulturpolitik,” 93. See also Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 10.

⁸² U.S. Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945–1946* (Washington, 1947), 2.

German career officers would face the heaviest charges at the hands of the Allied occupation forces.

Nevertheless, the Allies were not only concerned about the “militaristic thinking” of high-ranking Nazis or the influential officer corps. American, British and French postwar planners also believed that “militaristic thinking” pervaded German society. Indeed, it was the militaristic mentality of German society as a whole that had enabled the military establishment to maintain its influence for so long and allowed Hitler to pursue his destructive war.⁸³ As a result, government officials of all Allied powers concluded that the mere removal of all high-ranking officers and the disarmament of all armed forces would not suffice. If the Allies wanted to eliminate Nazism and German militarism once and for all and ensure long-term peace, they had to deal with the entire German nation, not just its elites.⁸⁴

This ambitious agenda, however, did not translate immediately into the comprehensive social and cultural programs. In the case of the Soviet Union and France, concerns about the countries’ own recovery, security and demands for reparations prevailed at first. Because the Soviet Union and France had suffered major invasions at the hands of Germany, Joseph Stalin and Charles de Gaulle were eager to re-assert the power of their respective countries and ensure that Germany could never again wage war against its neighbors.⁸⁵ Given the utter destructiveness of World War II, the reconstruction of France and Russia was, not surprisingly, deemed more

⁸³ Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 53. For the British perception of Prussian militarism, see Keith Robbins, *Present and Past*. For the French perspective, see Willis, *The French in Germany*, 92–95.

⁸⁴ See Diehl, *The Thanks of the Fatherland*, 55–58.

⁸⁵ See Willis, *The French in Germany*. For the Soviet Union, see Bessel, *Germany 1945*, 294. See also Betina Blessing, *The Antifascist Classroom: Denazification in Soviet-occupied Germany, 1945–1949* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and Timothy R. Vogt, *Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany: Brandenburg, 1945–1948* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

important than the re-education and thus reconstruction of the defeated Germany. Due to this political agenda, the idea of Germany's reeducation and reorientation played at first a minor role in French and Soviet policy, even though some French intellectual and political leaders had developed plans to convert Germany into "civilized" country, taking the French as an example.⁸⁶

The British and US governments likewise did not lack political hardliners who put Germany's reeducation and reorientation last and primarily aimed for a politics of revenge. Most famously US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau produced the rigid "Morgenthau Plan," which envisioned a deindustrialized, agrarian post-war Germany. Morgenthau's British counterpart was the Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the British Government between 1938 and 1941, Robert Gilbert Vansittart, who referred to the Germans as a "race of hooligans."⁸⁷ Toward the end of the war, however, it was Winston Churchill who proclaimed that the Germans "combine in the most deadly manner the qualities of the warrior and slave."⁸⁸ Emphasizing that the "German people" had "twice in our lifetime, and also three times in that of our fathers [...] plunged the world into their wars of expansion and aggression," Churchill demanded that harsh measures be taken to prevent any future German resurgence.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ See Bessel, *Germany 1945*, 288–293. See also Willis, *The French in Germany*.

⁸⁷ Quoted in Bessel, *Germany 1945*, 285.

⁸⁸ Eade, *Onwards to Victory*, 204.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

The De-militarization and Re-Orientation Policies of the Western Allies during the First Postwar Years

Despite these aggressive statements, Britain's as well as American long-term perspectives came to focus on the "re-education" and "re-orientation" of the German society as well as the reform of Germany's political structures. This agenda was mainly due to the experience of World War I and the interwar period. Since plans to keep Germany from waging another war by eradicating its "physical ability to commit acts of aggression" had failed after 1918, Allied planners came to agree that this time they also had to succeed in destroying Germany's aggressive "spirit."⁹⁰ Moreover, the continuing tensions between the Western powers and the Soviets, which already complicated wartime planning, led the Western Allies to consider the Western parts of Germany as potential allies. Yet, in order to form such an alliance, the German mentality and politics needed to be altered.

Before the British, French or American occupation forces could introduce specific programs to advance their agenda of "re-education" and "re-orientation," however, they first needed to address more urgent problems, which stemmed both from the transition from war to postwar and from fighting to occupation. Upon their arrival and victory in Germany, Allied commanders faced extraordinary logistical problems ranging from the handling of wounded and displaced people, clearing rubble, establishing a functioning administrative system and, above all, ensuring the security of the Allied troops. In particular, the establishment of security represented a major challenge given the massive number of German soldiers and the weapons that were still in their hands. By the end of the war, nearly 10 million soldiers were still serving

⁹⁰ Quoted in Naywn, "Striking at the Roots," 96–98 [underlined in the original]. See also Pauline Elkes, "Wartime Images of Germany and the Genesis of British Occupation Policy," in *The Cultural Legacy of the British Occupation in Germany: The London Symposium*, ed. Alan Bance (Stuttgart: Akademischer Verlag, 1997), 37–66. For the USA, see Henke, *Die Amerikanische Besetzung*, 71–76.

in the *Wehrmacht*. Apart from the question of how to guard, shelter, and feed so many people, the problem of disarmament seemed to be even more urgent. In order to ensure security for their own troops and simultaneously transform the physical landscape of Germany from that of a war-waging nation to a defeated and demilitarized country, bunkers, launching sites for rockets, anti-aircraft positions, and mine fields had to be destroyed, and the soldiers had to be disarmed.⁹¹ These security concerns also influenced the internment of large segments of West German society. Determined to detain Nazi ideologues, supporters, and affiliates, members of the military General Staff and High Command, members of paramilitary organizations such as the *Sturmabteilung* (SA) and *Schutzstaffel* (SS); and leaders of the Hitler Youth, League for German Girls, and Labor Front, Allied forces established a net of military and civilian internment camps.⁹²

While the physical demilitarization of Germany was underway, Allied policy makers initiated directives that tackled almost every aspect of German social life.⁹³ One of the first steps occupation officials took was the banning of military uniforms. Even though members of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) had initially refrained from banning military uniforms due to the shortage of proper clothing in postwar Germany, in July of 1945 the Allied Control Council (ACC) issued new directives that explicitly prohibited the wearing of military uniforms, thus changing the symbolic meaning of military clothing. Moreover, German

⁹¹ The Americans alone collected some 46 million bullets, 82,000 rifles and pistols, 24 million artillery shells, 709,000 hand grenades, and 148,000 landmines as well as 34,000 rockets, 1,842 ships and 420 airplanes. These numbers are taken from Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 27.

⁹² For a recent analysis of American civilian internment camps, see Dolan, "Isolating Nazism."

⁹³ As this chapter cannot offer a comprehensive account of all the campaigns the Allied forces set into motion, it focuses on those that relate most clearly to the West German rearmament debate in the 1950s and the debates about the West German soldier in the following decades.

soldiers were forced to take off their military medals, badges or any National Socialist insignia.⁹⁴ The reason Allied officials chose to ban military clothing and decoration was, as historian Konrad H. Jarausch has phrased it, their ambition to break entirely “the defeated population’s emotional bond to the military.”⁹⁵ Since members of SHAEF, the ACC and US President Roosevelt saw the uniforms as tailored symbols of Prussian militarism, they had to be removed. Recognizing, moreover, that postwar Germany would be a “society of women,”⁹⁶ Allied postwar planners worried about the effect uniforms could have on Germany’s female population. Due to the common belief that Germans, and especially German women, were fond of hardened men in wrinkle-free uniforms with shiny buttons and decorative braids, Allied officials were certain that they had to ban military clothing as one of the first steps in changing the German attitudes toward the military.⁹⁷

In addition, Allied officials also considered the display of German and especially Nazi flags as well as the notorious “*Sieg heil*” salutation to be offensive. Thus American policymakers soon banned the display and the saluting of military and of Nazi flags, the playing of military

⁹⁴ Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 313–320.

⁹⁵ Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 29.

⁹⁶ US officials reported already in 1944 that German women would outnumber their men due to the effects of the war. See Marianne Zepp, *Redefining Germany: Reeducation, Staatsbürgerschaft und Frauenpolitik im US-amerikanisch besetzten Nachkriegsdeutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 79. A census conducted in 1946 would show a “woman surplus” of 7 million. See Elizabeth Heineman, *What Difference Does a Husband Make: Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 210.

⁹⁷ In “An Exploratory Study of Militarism,” members of the research branch of the Information Control Review noted: “The observation, frequent among outside observers, that German women with their love for heroes and uniforms have helped to foster militarism was made by only a small number of [German] respondents.” See Information Control Review, Research Branch, Information Control Division, Political Analysis and Public Opinion, Review No. 32, Period ending 16 Aug 1947. RG 260, OMGUS, Record of the Executive Officer, Box 458 folder 109 (or 3/429–1).

music or anthems, as well as the performance of military parades and formations, a procedure welcomed by some German reporters.⁹⁸ During the first weeks of the occupation, Allied troops also began to rename streets and places and to tear down suspicious street signs. In occupied Germany, there would be, of course, no place for a *Adolf-Hitler-Straße* (Adolf-Hitler-Street) or even for a *Hindenburgbrücke* (Hindenburg Bridge).⁹⁹ From the public streets and places Allied occupation forces also descended upon museums and libraries and inspected drawers, file cabinets and bookshelves in order to confiscate and destroy Nazi propaganda, militaristic literature and military training manuals. The Allied forces thus sought not only to change the physical and cultural landscape of Germany, but also to alter social life and cultural symbols of National Socialism and German military tradition.¹⁰⁰

The purging of Germany's social and cultural institutions went hand in hand with the reorientation of specific social groups such as Germany's youth. Traveling through Germany as a correspondent for the official army magazine, *Army Talk*, in the summer and fall of 1945, journalist Julian Bach noted that "Young people under nineteen are consistently more Nazi-minded than their elders, young girls more Nazi minded than young boys [...]."¹⁰¹ Bach was not alone in arguing that young men and women had been swayed the most by the preaching of the Nazi regime. American, British and French postwar planners agreed that if Germany was to be re-oriented towards democracy, they needed to focus first and foremost on the German youth.

⁹⁸ "Eine Demontage die wir wollen," *Lübecker Freie Presse*, September 6, 1947. RG 260 OMGUS, Records of the Office of Military Government Bavaria, Records of the Information Division, Box 165.

⁹⁹ Nawyn, "Striking at the Roots."

¹⁰⁰ Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 29.

¹⁰¹ Julian Bach, *America's Germany: An Account of the Occupation* (New York: Random House, 1946), 248.

Even though they were not aware of all the details concerning Nazi youth education and indoctrination, wartime policymakers knew that the great majority of German youngsters had been indoctrinated according to National Socialist's ideals and had undergone paramilitary training.¹⁰² Arguing that "man is the product of his environment," Raymond Schmittlein, head of the French Directorate of Public Education, insisted, for example, that the German youth had to be placed and educated in a completely different learning environment.¹⁰³ Consequently, government officials first set out to purge German schools of any and all militaristic and Nazi influence: Tainted personnel would be dismissed, school curricula and lesson plans changed and suspicious textbooks removed from the shelves and, if need be, students' book bags.¹⁰⁴ Second, Allied directives targeted schools' athletic programs. To ensure that Germans, and especially German juveniles, would never again form an emotional bond to the military, the ACC issued an order to close all clubs, associations or schools that were connected to the military or fostered military training. After dissolving the veterans' association in August, ACC officials banned all athletic activities that in any way resembled paramilitary training.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² For a discussion of National Socialist training of young people see Thomas Kühne, *Belonging and Genocide: Hitler's Community, 1918–1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 43–47.

¹⁰³ Quoted in Willis, *The French in Germany*, 165–166. See also Ruge-Schatz, "Grundprobleme der Kulturpolitik in der Französischen Zone."

¹⁰⁴ Brian M. Puaca highlights that American officials had already vetted 5 million texts and approved them for usage by the end of 1945. See Brian M. Puaca, *Learning Democracy: Education Reform in West Germany, 1945–1965* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 50.

¹⁰⁵ Those activities included flying, fencing or target shooting. See Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 29. For the Allied Control Council Law No. 8 "Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training" from 30 November 1945, see Oppen, *Documents of Germany*, 90–91. For the American perspective on education and youth, see Nawyn, "Striking at the Roots," 420–484.

Whereas the question of how to deal with the German youth seemed unambiguous, the same would not hold true in the case of German women. As mentioned above, Allied officials recognized already in 1944 that—whenever they would finally defeat Germany—German women would far outnumber German men and that the occupation forces would have to reckon with this imbalance. However, officials and others did not agree on whether German women would pose a threat to Germany’s democratic reconstruction. Whereas observers such as journalist Julian Bach and some government officials noted that women had been—in comparison to men—especially prone to Nazism and were still very receptive to military customs and values,¹⁰⁶ others perceived German women as apolitical and not as prone to Nazism as men.¹⁰⁷ Despite these frictions, the Allies soon began to promote special women’s magazines and radio programs, implement cultural exchange programs, and “encourage women to play a part in Local Government and Public Service.”¹⁰⁸ In their effort to reeducate and stir Germans in the direction of democratic self-government, the Allies sought to get women involved in this political process too.

By targeting particular social groups and institutions, the West Allies implemented comprehensive demilitarization and re-orientation programs that fundamentally shaped West German attitudes towards military service and war. The presence of Allied forces and the

¹⁰⁶ See Bach, *America’s Germany*, 248.

¹⁰⁷ See, Kathrin Meyer, *Entnazifizierung von Frauen: Die Internierungslager der US-Zone Deutschlands, 1945–1952* (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), 41–47.

¹⁰⁸ As a branch of the Education Office, the British government created a special Women’s Affairs Section already in spring of 1946. See, Christl Ziegler, *Lernziel Demokratie: Politische Frauenbildung in der britischen und amerikanischen Besatzungszone 1945–1949* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1997), 15. The US government followed in March 1948 with the establishment of a Women’s Affairs Section. See Zepp, *Redefining Germany*, 84–233.

comprehensive attempts to eradicate German Nazism and military greatly influenced the ways negotiated rearmament in the following years.

2. Conflicting Attitudes towards War and the Military in Postwar West Germany

However, Allied postwar programs were not the only events, however, that influenced (West) German attitudes. For many Germans—soldiers and civilians alike—the moment of evaluating their own military zeal and the rightness of the war came even before the victorious allies fully established their demilitarization and reorientation programs. Seeking to understand how World War II and especially its traumatic end shaped Germany's postwar society, historians emphasize the bloodbath of the final four months. After the Wehrmacht had fought successful battles and tormented enemy soldiers and the civilian population of occupied territory with unimaginable forms of violence, by 1945 the tide had turned decisively. As historian Richard Bessel has pointed out, “never has there been a killing frenzy to match what occurred in Germany at the beginning of 1945.”¹⁰⁹ Between January and April 1945, the German *Wehrmacht* lost almost 1,5 million soldiers and auxiliaries. Stressing the intensity of the killing, Bessel argues that the fighting that took place at the end of the war left an indelible mark on German soldiers and civilians who experienced and survived it.

Despite the increasing brutality and the devastating losses during the last month of the war, many of the almost 10 million men and women who were still serving in May 1945 continued to fight.¹¹⁰ They did so for very different reasons. While some still believed in the

¹⁰⁹ Bessel, *Germany 1945*, 11.

¹¹⁰ See, Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 27. Among the nearly 17 million soldiers fighting in World War II, about 400,000 were German Red Cross (DRK) nurses and nurses' aides. Almost 1 million women served as female Wehrmacht auxiliaries (*Wehrmachtshelferinnen*) or as female aerial defense auxiliaries (*Reichsluftschutzshelferinnen*). At the end of the Second World War, there was at least one woman for every twenty male soldiers in the German armed forces.

National Socialist cause and thought that Germany could still win the war, many soldiers—especially on the Eastern Front—would not stop fighting out of sheer fear of what would happen to the mainly female German population if the Russians were to win and occupy Germany. Especially during the last months of the war, the Nazi propaganda machine flooded Germany with horrific imagery of “subhumane” and “animalistic” Russians who would rape every German woman they could get their hands on, and murder innocent elder people and children.¹¹¹ Other soldiers, however, simply tried to hold the lines because of the draconian measures that leading Wehrmacht and SS officers employed to keep men from deserting. To ensure that every German man continued to fight to the death for the *Reich* and *Führer*, the regime sent “death squads” to the front lines that were empowered to execute *Wehrmacht* soldiers who seemed to have deserted or lost their units. German men who abandoned their position thus had more to fear from their own regime than from the enemy.¹¹²

Yet, historians emphasize that the draconian measures used by the Wehrmacht leadership could not avert the chaos that marked the last weeks of the German armed forces. Since most of the last battles fought in the European theater of World War II took place within Germany, it became easier for *Wehrmacht* soldiers to leave their units. Even though many soldiers would still cling to their military outfit, hundreds chose to change their uniforms into civilian dresses and

For these numbers and a discussion of the history of these women, the historiography and memory, see Karen Hagemann, “Mobilizing Women for War: The History, Historiography, and Memory of German Women’s War Service in the Two World Wars,” *Journal of Military History*, 75: 3 (October 2011): 1055–1093.

¹¹¹ See Atina Grossmann, “A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers,” in *West Germany Under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era*, ed. Robert G. Moeller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 33–52.

¹¹² See Richard Bessel, *Nazism and War* (New York: Modern Library, 2006), 175–177. These measures greatly trumped the “shock therapy” that medical Wehrmacht personnel used to “heal” “psychotic” patients in field hospitals. For this digression see Svenja Goltermann, *Die Gesellschaft der Überlebenden: Deutsche Kriegsheimkehrer und ihre Gewalterfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Dt. Verl.-Anst, 2009), 181–189.

melt into a civilian population that spoke the same language and oftentimes encouraged the eagerness with which many soldiers would renounce their military duties.¹¹³ In the fall of 1944 and the spring of 1945, when the lines of the *Wehrmacht* were crumbling and World War II was fought at the doorsteps of most German homes, civilians and soldiers alike lost their conception of warfare as a symbol of national superiority, if they had not done so before. The war had turned into a horrendous nightmare.¹¹⁴ Told mainly by women, the civilian tales of suffering at the end of the war included the horrors of air raids that destroyed houses, farms, and livestock. According to rough estimates, by the end of the war 20–30 percent of the houses in the western part of Germany had been lost.¹¹⁵ In addition, German women who survived bombings, starvation, and expulsion still had good reasons to fear enemy forces. For many German women and girls living in the east, the end of World War II came in the form of sexual violence.¹¹⁶ Given the deprivations and violence of the war, civilians understandably did not want the last stand of the Third Reich to be in their own backyards. Writing on April 30, 1945 about the last fights in Deisendorf, a village near Lake Constance, Private Karl Jering noted in his diary that he was pressured to “immediately put on civilian clothes,” because the village was now “an open

¹¹³ Bessel, *Germany 1945*, 43.

¹¹⁴ See Jörg Echternkamp, *Kriegsschauplatz Deutschland 1945: Leben in Angst – Hoffnung auf Frieden: Feldpost aus der Heimat und von der Front* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 57–76.

¹¹⁵ Echternkamp, *Nach dem Krieg*, 19–20.

¹¹⁶ Historians estimate that around 2 million women living in Germany experienced sexual violence at the hands of enemy soldiers during the last weeks of the war and the first postwar months. Most of this violence happened in the eastern parts of Germany. See Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 60–140. See also Grossmann, “A Question of Silence;” Heineman, “The Hour of the Women.” For cases involving US soldiers, see Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands*, 201.

city and all soldiers had to leave immediately.”¹¹⁷ Whereas *Wehrmacht* soldiers had once stood as the shining heroes of the Third Reich, during the final month of the war many civilians saw them as a threat to a more peaceful defeat and postwar life.

The willingness with which many soldiers, especially those of the lower ranks, abandoned their military uniforms continued after the official end of the war. Numerous accounts by former *Wehrmacht* soldiers attest to the great relief many men felt when they were finally able to take off their uniforms.¹¹⁸ Interviewed by the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* in January 1946, a returning POW complained about the difficulties he had in obtaining civilian clothing. Eager to get rid of his uniform he lamented, “I had no yearning for tails, a tuxedo, no, only for—finally, after six years—getting out of the uniform and putting on something civilian-like.”¹¹⁹ As historian Kathleen Nawyn explains, many German soldiers eagerly embraced their new civilian life for numerous reasons. As mentioned above, multiple directives and bans were implemented following the Allies’ victory that rendered the wearing of military uniforms impossible. Second, for *Wehrmacht* soldiers and officers, who had to fear Allied internment and prosecution, donning civilian clothing was a welcome disguise. Third, after six years of war, the now ragged, tattered, and dirty uniforms represented not only Germany’s defeat, but also the defeat of the individual soldier who wore it. For many soldiers, their uniforms stood as physical reminders of the war and defeat they wanted to forget. Fourth, in contrast to soldiers and officers who had volunteered for military service, the identity of thousands of draftees was not shaped primarily by military life.

¹¹⁷ Karl Jering, *Überleben und Neubeginn: Aus dem Tagebuch eines Deutschen 1945/46* (Munich: Olzog, 1979), 14.

¹¹⁸ Documented experiences of returning female auxiliaries and discussions thereof are rare. See Biess, *Homecomings*, 60; Hagemann, “Mobilizing Women.”

¹¹⁹ “Der gescheiterte Zivilist,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, January 19, 1946, quoted and translated in Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 314.

Hence, many did not lament the loss of their military life and clothing, but were happy to return to families and civilian careers.¹²⁰

Although numerous, especially lower-rank soldiers were happy to hide, mothball or destroy their uniforms and, with them, all memories of the lost war, this would not hold true for many officers who had joined the ranks voluntarily and had made the military their profession. Among the more than 10 million POWs that the Allied forces interned at the end of the war were numerous high-ranking officers and also members of the former German general staff.¹²¹ Subject to different treatment than enlisted men, most general staff officers ranking from captain to colonel underwent careful screening during their internment. They would then be discharged of their POW status, and either moved to civilian internment camps or—in case of alleged war criminals and witnesses—to Dachau and Nuremberg.¹²² Those high-ranking officers who were not put on trial usually returned home after two years, stripped of their status and majestic aura. Often ill, injured and dressed in the same ragged uniforms as enlisted men, many high-ranking officers were but mere shadows of their former selves. Despite the experience of barbarous warfare, total defeat and, in many cases, harsh internment, some officers refused to relinquish their uniforms, as they saw no need to dissociate themselves from their former lives and military

¹²⁰ Ibid., 314–315.

¹²¹ According to Frank Biess, at the end of the war, roughly 11 million men were in Allied captivity. While almost all of the POWs in Western captivity returned by the end of 1948, by early 1950 some 30 000 were still in Soviet camps. See Biess, *Homecomings*, 45; Thomas Kühne, *Kameradschaft: Die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 209–210. Stating that the victorious Allies held almost 9 million men captive in the summer and fall of 1945, Elizabeth Heineman points out that about 40 percent of them were married. By the end of 1945, almost half had returned to their homes, followed by about 2 million in 1946 and 1 million in 1947. See, Heineman, *What Difference Does a Husband Make*, 118.

¹²² Being located in the American zone, the responsible American military personnel held trials at Dachau between November 1945 and August 1948. For some times the Dachau trials ran parallel to the Nuremberg trials, which were held by the Allied Forces and ended already ended in 1946.

careers. In contrast to many Wehrmacht draftees, most of these officers thought of soldiering as their profession and not as a temporary occupation. During the glorious days of the Third Reich, the military had offered these men a comfortable life that not only brought financial benefits, but also heightened social status. Now stripped of their former privileges and imprisoned, ex-officers found themselves in a miserable situation. Not surprisingly, many left the internment camps bitter and resentful of the treatment they experienced at the hands of the Allied forces.¹²³

Compounding their discontent were, on the one hand, various allied directives that targeted former Wehrmacht, SS, SA, and Gestapo personnel and, on the other, their reception by the German civilian population. Eager to weaken the social status of Germany's military elites and to prevent them from regaining strength, the Allies enacted directives—above all the ACC's Law No. 34 from August 20, 1946—that made illegal all veterans organizations and all other military and “quasi-military” groups as well as associations that were considered keeping militarism alive. The law moreover confiscated the financial assets of veterans and veteran associations, proscribed the preferential treatment of former military personnel over civilians, and prohibited the restoration of a military pension following previous German models.¹²⁴ In addition to being deprived of their social status, former *Wehrmacht* personnel now had to make their way to the public welfare centers (*Führsorgeämter*).¹²⁵ For many married and family men this fate entailed the inability to function as the traditional male supporter and breadwinner of their family.

¹²³ For the situation of career soldiers and officers in postwar Germany see Manig, *Die Politik der Ehre*, 46–85.

¹²⁴ Ibid; Nawyen, “Striking at the Roots,” 263–264.

¹²⁵ For a discussion of pensions and the amnesty law of 1949, see Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

Anti-War and Anti-Military Attitudes in Postwar West Germany

Upon returning home during the early postwar years, many former high-ranking officers, and enlisted men also encountered a society that questioned the achievements of the German military.¹²⁶ To be sure, numerous news reports and photographs depicting returning POWs bear witness to the warm welcome former soldiers received from families and friends. After month of worrying about the whereabouts of family members who fought at the front,¹²⁷ many Germans were just relieved that their sons, brothers and husbands were alive and had returned home.¹²⁸ Yet, whereas German society welcomed back its men, it did not necessarily welcome back its soldiers. Believing that something had changed in postwar Germany, the American journalist Julian Bach remarked, for instance, “unlike 1919, the returning German soldier has been greeted, not as ‘hero’ with flowers thrown in his path as he marched home [...] but as an ‘unfortunate fool’ as he comes home straggling in off a crowded train in a half destroyed station.”¹²⁹ The cold welcome at bombed-out train stations was intensified by hostile attitudes towards military symbols. Ignoring the severe lack of proper civilian clothing and fabrics, some civilians criticized men who returned home and continued to wear their uniform.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Kühne, *Kameradschaft*, 225.

¹²⁷ Anxieties about the whereabouts of family members fighting at the front are a recurring marker of letters written to the front especially during the last months of the war. See Echternkamp, *Kriegsschauplatz Deutschland*.

¹²⁸ Most of the contemporary reports as well as the literature on returning POWs focus on the overwhelming number of male soldiers. For the captivity of women and their return, see Biess, *Homecomings*, 60.

¹²⁹ Bach, *America's Germany*, 291. For Bach's account see also Naywn, “Striking at the Roots,” 123.

¹³⁰ Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 315.

In many families the profound joy of welcoming back fathers, husbands, and sons were also soon overshadowed by the daily hardships of living in a defeated, war-torn country and by the physical and mental suffering of individual men. While they had greatly anticipated the return of their loved-ones, many German women soon learned that returning soldiers were not able to provide the hoped-for support, stability and authority. Instead, many war veterans were soon considered an additional burden.¹³¹ Thus, for many veteran families, the war and men's military service did not pay off in the ways that the National Socialist regime had promised for so long.

This profound change of attitude was not only visible at train stations all over Germany. Based on data collected between April 26, 1946 and August 4, 1947, OMGUS representatives reported that 96 percent of the people interviewed rejected the statement "Only by war can the human spirit be glorified," while 94 percent agreed with the statement "War does not pay off."¹³² This profound "No More War!" (*Nie wieder Krieg!*) attitude that had been characteristic of the peace movement during the Weimar Republic¹³³ was also reflected in public statements by important political leaders. During a founding ceremony of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in southern Wurttemberg on February 10, 1946, Carlo Schmid, a leading member of the party,

¹³¹ For different family narratives see Sibylle Meier and Eva Schulz, *Von Liebe sprach damals keiner: Familienalltag in der Nachkriegszeit* (Munich: Beck, 1985); Heineman, *What Difference Does a Husband Make*, 108–136.

¹³² OMGUS had interviewed, 7479 people living in the American Zone. See Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 187.

¹³³ See Gottfried Niedhart, "'So viel Anfang war noch nie' oder 'Das Leben und nichts anderes' – deutsche Nachkriegszeiten im Vergleich," in *Lernen aus dem Krieg: Deutsche Nachkriegszeiten 1918–1945*, ed. Gottfried Niedhart and Dieter Riesenberger (Munich: Beck, 1992), 11–38.

proclaimed that he never again wanted “to send our sons into the barracks.”¹³⁴ Even if Germany was to become the battlefield in yet another war, Schmid declared, he did not want German people to participate: “ [...] well, then we will cease to exist knowing that it was not *us* who committed and encouraged the crime.”¹³⁵ For Schmid, the possibility of Germany, that is German men, causing or even participating in yet another war, was unthinkable.

As Schmid rejected any attempt to draft young men once again for the military and send them off to battle, he voiced an opinion that would find its most vivid expression in author Wolfgang Borchert’s 1947 “This is our manifesto.” The manifesto—published with his famous story *Draußen vor der Tür* (The Men Outside)—represented a clear statement against war and military service in which Borchert criticized the idea of war as an expression of superb manliness:

Virile (*männlicher*) song of men – did no one hear the children bawling away
their fear of purple maw of the guns?
Heroic song of men – did they not hear the hearts, sobbing when they sang
upidee, the grimy, the crusty, the bearded, the lousy?¹³⁶

Insisting that the war had made German men neither “hard” nor “rough,”¹³⁷ Borchert challenged the belief propagated in nineteenth-century and Nazi Germany that only military service could

¹³⁴ Quoted in Theo Sommer, “Wiederbewaffnung und Verteidigungspolitik,” in *Die Zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland—Eine Bilanz*, ed. Richard Löwenthal und Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1974), 580–603, here 583.

¹³⁵ Ibid., italics in the original. See also, Abenheim, *Reforging*, 43.

¹³⁶ Wolfgang Borchert, *The Man Outside*, transl. by David Porter (New York: Calder & Boyars, 1952), 249.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

turn men into “real” men who would prove their superiority on the battlefield.¹³⁸ In light of the millions of deaths and the hundreds of thousands of wounded soldiers returning home, many Germans bid farewell to war as a measure of national superiority made visible by men of outstanding martial and manly qualities.

In addition to literary works, the extent to which many, especially younger Germans had changed their attitude towards military service and war became clear in the arguments surrounding the creation of constitutions for the new federal states (*Länder*). As mentioned above, the defeat of National Socialist Germany entailed the dissolution of the German *Reich*. In reaction to the politics of the Soviet Union and eager to establish a federal democratic government, the Western Allies began to reconstruct and establish new federal states in 1946. This process entailed the development of state constitutions that began in the American zone in 1946. Three of the first *Länder* to receive constitutions were Bavaria, Hessen, and Württemberg-Baden.¹³⁹ The contents of the state constitutions differed greatly with respect to war and military service. The Bavarian constitution of 1947, for instance, codified the right of every male “state citizen” (*Staatsbürger*) to refuse to render “war service.”¹⁴⁰ In addition to showing that the possibility of a new war was thinkable, the provision bears witness to the understanding that if Germany would participate in yet another war, West German men should have the right to object to military service.

¹³⁸ For the relation of warfare and ideals of manliness during the Anti-Napoleonic Wars see, Karen Hagemann, *Männlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre*, 271–350. For imperial Germany, see Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation*, 228–345. For the 20th century see further, George L. Mosse, *The Image of Men: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Frank Werner, “‘Hart müssen wir hier draußen sein:’ Soldatische Männlichkeit im Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1944,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 34 (2008): 5–40.

¹³⁹ Martin Löhnig, *Zwischenzeit: Rechtsgeschichte der Besatzungsjahre* (Regenstauf: Gietl, 2011).

¹⁴⁰ Stefan Appelius, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland: Die Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft 1945–1968*, vol. 1 (Aachen: G.Mainz, 1999).

In contrast, Württemberg-Baden's constitution did not include such a right.¹⁴¹ In the fall of 1947, the Württemberg-Baden's constitution and state parliament (*Landestag*) in Stuttgart came under fire because of this shortcoming. Unsettled by the growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies to which both parties reacted by increasing their military presence in central Europe, German adolescents became greatly concerned about the probability of a new war. Recognizing that West Germany's youth, especially adolescent males, would be the first to be sent to the frontlines of this new war, Stuttgart's youth parliament—representing roughly 37,000 organized young people—asked the legislators to amend the state's constitution in such a way that no one could be forced to serve in the military—either by bearing arms or in any auxiliary capacity.¹⁴² Following intense negotiations, in April 1948 the state parliament accepted a law stating that “No one shall be forced to render war service with arms.”¹⁴³ Although the terminology used was gender neutral, the parliamentary debates showed that most participants thought mainly of men when discussing the right to object to military service. A member of the Christian Democratic Union opposed the youth parliament's request by arguing in parliament that if the law was approved, the defense of the “fatherland” would be left to “old hags and spinsters”—an eventuality the CDU politician did not support.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ Günter Hahnenfeld, *Kriegsdienstverweigerung* (Hamburg and Berlin: Decker, 1966), 16.

¹⁴² See Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 489.

¹⁴³ For this debate see, Kathleen J. Nawyn, “Banning The Soldier Hero: American Regulations, German Youth, and Changing Ideals of Manhood in Occupied Württemberg-Baden, 1945–1949.” In *Gender and the Long Postwar: The United States and the two Germanys, 1945–1989*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Sonya Michel (Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2014), forthcoming.

¹⁴⁴ “Lex Giesela: Nie wieder...,” *Der Spiegel*, May 1, 1948, 6–7.

By expressing their unwillingness to serve in any military capacity, Stuttgart's youth parliament put an official spin on a general attitude that pervaded many youth groups across the country. The declaration "We are all sick and tired of being soldiers,"¹⁴⁵ as recorded by US government officials in September 1948, was an attitude held by hundreds of young men. The refusal to become a soldier once again was eagerly expressed by organized youth members of the labor unions. Although the Confederation of German Trade Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB*), founded on October 12, 1949 and representing nearly 5 million members, would come to support rearmament in the 1950s, the regional labor unions and many of their industrial branches established in 1946 and 1947 in all four Allied zones, were much less sympathetic. In the late 1940s, the Hessian Youth Executive Board of the Industrial Union of Chemistry, Paper, and Ceramic declared for example that they did not intend to "march into death" for "cheap cheers of praise" or "cheap medals."¹⁴⁶ The group thus rejected the glorification of soldiering and warfare that prevailed in Nazi and Imperial Germany.

The critical attitude of the union's youth can be explained by the experiences many young people in their late teens had undergone during the last years of World War II and during the first years of Allied occupation. Their traumatic experiences during the *Endkampf* (final battle) at the front and home front—for example, as part of the *Volkssturm*—help to explain the postwar reluctance of young men even to think about armed forces and military service.¹⁴⁷ Even

¹⁴⁵ Intelligence Report, 29 September 48, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, OMGWB, Box 548, F: 400.1 Intelligence Activities (Weekly Intel. Reports) Karlsruhe 1948 [2]; Intelligence Report, 22 September 48.

¹⁴⁶ Wolfgang Kraushaar, *Die Protest-Chronik 1949–1959: Eine illustrierte Geschichte von Bewegung, Widerstand und Utopie*, vol. 1, 1949–1952 (Hamburg: Rogner & Bernhard, 1996), 165.

¹⁴⁷ Historians estimate that beginning in the summer of 1944 the average number of deaths amounted to 200,000 per month. For the month of August, war claimed the life 350,000 soldiers due to the collapse of the eastern front. See Andreas Kunz, "Junge Soldaten in der Wehrmacht: Struktur- und organisationsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen," in

though signs of the Third Reich's inevitable defeat were already visible along the front lines in late summer 1944, surrender was not an option for the National Socialist leadership. Accepting only total victory or total defeat, the Nazis began accepting volunteers as young as sixteen years old. Thus by 1945 the war had claimed the lives of approximately 462,000 young men born between 1925 and 1929.¹⁴⁸ Added to the death toll of the young soldiers was a high number of civilian casualties, because those who had escaped recruitment and stayed home were, in many cases, not better off. While working in war industries and enduring food shortages, children and adolescents could not escape the omnipresence of death. As the lines of the *Wehrmacht* began crumbling, their lives were ruled more and more by starvation, forced evacuations, lack of housing, horror stories about advancing enemy troops, frightful nights in air raid shelters, as well as the loss of friends and family members.¹⁴⁹

In light of these experiences, the union's youth executive board seems to have expressed the opinion of many young men and women of their generation, when it maintained that instead of going to war, they wanted to "live and work for ourselves, for our families and our country."¹⁵⁰ Supported by other youth organizations such as the social-democratic organization Socialist Youth of Germany, the Falcons (*Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands – Die Falken*), which was re-founded in April 1947, the adolescents rejected the notion of gaining honor and

Junge Soldaten im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Kriegserfahrungen als Lebenserfahrungen, ed. Ulrich Herrmann and Rolf-Dieter Müller (Weinheim: Juventa Verlag, 2010), 81–112.

¹⁴⁸ While the *Wehrmacht* and the Armed-SS had begun to accept volunteers as young as sixteen years in the spring of 1944, on 5 March 1945 the leadership officially extended conscription to those born in 1929. See *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ See Echternkamp, *Nach dem Krieg*; Bessel, *Germany 1945*.

¹⁵⁰ Kraushaar, *Die Protest-Chronik*, Vol. 1, 165.

praise by participating in war. Instead of fighting for their families on the front line, young men sought to support and protect their families by entering the civilian work force.¹⁵¹

Most importantly, this strong emphasis on the right to refuse any form of military service also accompanied the drafting of West Germany's constitution, the Basic Law. Following the meeting of constitutional experts at former Herrenchiemsee Abbey in Bavaria, the Parliamentary Council, consisting of 70 state delegates, convened in the fall of 1948 to deliberate the first draft of the Basic Law. During the meeting of the main committee, the leading politician of the Communist Party, Heinz Renner, petitioned that the Basic Law should grant "every citizen" the right to refuse conscription.¹⁵² By proposing an article that would govern the right to refuse military service, Renner could feel certain that he had the support of many peace activists. The members of the Parliamentary Council had received petitions from citizens and social groups who wanted not only to affirm their longing for peace, but also to ensure that the right to refuse military service was included in the Basic Law.¹⁵³ Among the groups who petitioned were the Berliner Women's League 1947 (*Berliner Frauenbund 1947*) and the German Peace Society (*Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*, DFG). Originally founded in 1892, the DFG—as one of the leading peace organizations—was reestablished in 1945. Assuming that only male citizens would be threatened by a military draft, the DFG maintained that the constitution should explicitly grant

¹⁵¹ See, Dietzfelbinger, *Die Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*.

¹⁵² "Sechste Sitzung des Hauptausschusses," 19 November 1948, in *Der Parlamentarische Rat 1948–1949: Akten und Protokolle*, Vol. 14, *Hauptausschuß*, (Munich: Boldt im Oldenbourg-Verl., 2009), 169–205.

¹⁵³ See "Ausschuss für Grundsatzfragen," 27 October 1948, in *Der Parlamentarische Rat, 1948–1949: Akten und Protokolle*, Vol. 5, *Ausschuß für Grundsatzfragen*, eds. Eberhard Pikart und Wolfram Werner (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1993), 417.

every German the right to refuse war or military service of any kind, “without fearing any negative repercussion for his own person, his family and his fortune.”¹⁵⁴

Renner’s petition was not only supported by extra-parliamentary groups, but also by the SPD-politician Fritz Eberhard, against whom the Nazis had issued an arrest warrant because he was a member of the International Socialist Militant League (*Internationale Sozialistische Kampfbund*).¹⁵⁵ Despite his support, the Social Democratic proposal, which was discussed on December 3, 1948, was rather limited. It stated that “[n]o one may be forced against his conscience to render armed war service” (*Kriegsdienst mit der Waffe*).¹⁵⁶ According the SPD representatives only members of small religious groups—including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mennonites or Quakers—that had already born witness to their “true conscience” during the reign of the National Socialists could make use of this right.¹⁵⁷ This meant that according to the SPD proposal only a small number of people who had followed their religious beliefs and refused military service despite the terror and pressure of the Nazi regime would be allowed to refuse armed war service in the future.

While the politicians thus stated that they had learned their lessons from World War II, their decision to restrict the right to refuse “war service” was also influenced by the growing tensions of the Cold War. Given the communist threat, Eberhard and others also argued that in order for the future West Germany to defend itself only a limited group of people could be

¹⁵⁴ “Ausschuss für Grundsatzfragen,” 27 October 1948, 422, f27.

¹⁵⁵ “Sechste Sitzung des Hauptausschusses,” 19 November 1948, 180.

¹⁵⁶ See *Der Parlamentarische Rat*, Vol. 5, *Ausschuß für Grundsatzfragen*, 518.

¹⁵⁷ For the debate, see Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 27–33.

allowed to become conscientious objectors.¹⁵⁸ For SPD-politicians Georg-August Zinn, who would become the prime minister of Hessen in 1950, the proposed article should above all not enable “quitters” (*Drückeberger*) from refusing to fulfill their military duty.¹⁵⁹ By seeking to prevent the anticipated “abuse” of the article, Zinn employed a gendered stereotype that Nazi propaganda had exploited extensively during World War II and that still bore significant meaning in postwar Germany. Men who refused to participate in battle and fight alongside his comrades until the end were spurned as cowards or quitters.¹⁶⁰

In contrast to the SPD politicians who wanted to include the right to refuse war service in the Basic Law, the FDP politician Theodor Heuss, who would become the first president of the Federal Republic in 1949, refused the proposal point-blank. Anticipating that militarists might see him as one of their own, while pacifists would scorn him as a “reactionary,” Heuss cautioned against a “mass-wearing of conscience”¹⁶¹ (*Abnutzung des Gewissens*) if the SPD’s proposal would be put into action. He maintained that members of the above mentioned religious groups could still render some form of military service without weapons.¹⁶² Yet, Theodor Heuss’ argument would not bear fruit for his parliamentary colleagues did not believe that Germans would abuse the right to refuse armed war service. Thus, in the end, the Basic Law that would take effect on 23 May 1949 included the right to object military service: Article 4, Sub-clause 3

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ *Der Parlamentarische Rat*, Vol. 5, *Auschuß für Grundsatzfragen*, 420.

¹⁶⁰ Kühne, *Kameradschaft*, 84.

¹⁶¹ “Dreiundvierzigste Sitzung des Hauptausschusses,” 18 January 1949, 1325–1326.

¹⁶² Ibid.

stated that “[n]o one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service as an armed combatant. Full particulars are regulated by federal Law.”¹⁶³

Continuing Positive Perceptions of Military Service

Notwithstanding the legal codification of conscientious objection, the unambiguous results of opinion polls and the dismissive attitude of peace activists, women’s associations, and Christian, socialist and union-based youth groups, Germany’s early postwar attitude toward war, military service, and soldiering would prove to be far more complex. For instance, these sentiments were not shared by many former Nazis and *Wehrmacht* members who held officer ranks. Moreover, in light of the rising Cold War tensions, conservative politicians in the CDU and its sister party, the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (*Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern*, CSU) became more and more concerned about the anti-military and anti-war attitudes. Seeking to come to terms with Germany’s military past, others tried to differentiate between the atrocities of the NS-State and its political and military leaders and the performance of the ordinary *Wehrmacht* soldiers and officers.

This complexity of conflicting attitudes becomes apparent, for example, in the reactions of the German public to the Nuremberg war crime trials that began in November of 1945. In the course of the individual trials, the interrogation of leading *Wehrmacht* officers and the results of the hearings made the headlines of German newspapers, thereby informing the public of the

¹⁶³ For the translation of the original German text see “The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany,” reprinted in John F. Golay, *The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 217–223.

findings.¹⁶⁴ Even though the prosecutors at the German denazification tribunals declared the vast majority of officers to be innocent of war crimes, postwar rhetoric still labeled them as potential militarists. Following the perceived “dishonorable” treatment during Allied internment, the Nuremberg tribunals stirred anger and indignation among many officers as they claimed that the Allies had singled them out for unjust punishment and defamation. In contrast to enraged officers, many Germans seemed to have ignored the Nuremberg Proceedings.¹⁶⁵ They were either preoccupied with the devastation of their own lives or simply chose to ignore unpleasant facts about their past. Others, glad to have escaped blame, expressed satisfaction that responsible members of the Nazi leadership were being tried. After all, the trials suggested that the majority had only “followed orders from above.” Guilt and responsibility for all atrocities of the Third Reich were delegated to the political and military leadership of the NS state.¹⁶⁶

This attitude allowed conservative-minded Germans as well as former officers and soldiers to portray the German *Wehrmacht* as ensnared and manipulated by the National Socialist regime. As a result, a specific ideal of German *Soldatentum* (soldierdome) emerged from the trials intact. As historian Jörg Echternkamp points out, one of the results of the war crime trials was a distinction between the misguided National Socialist soldier, on the one hand, and timeless, positive soldierly values on the other. Looking at the licensed press in occupied West Germany, Echternkamp argues that in the wake of the trials journalists, politicians and former *Wehrmacht* soldiers sought to defend the honor of what they believed to be a “true” and

¹⁶⁴ Jörg Echternkamp, “Wut auf die Wehrmacht? Vom Bild der deutschen Soldaten in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit,” in *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität – Sonderausgabe*, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 1058–1080.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

“normal” soldier.¹⁶⁷ This kind of soldier was not only characterized by many as a “nice guy” (*feiner Kerl*), but he was said to embody timeless values such as honor, discipline, vigor and chivalry. The National Socialists, the argument went, had, however, hijacked and corrupted the ideal of the true, honorable soldier and turned it into the perverted version of the *Kommisskopf*.¹⁶⁸

In addition to distinguishing the “true” and honorable soldier from the Nationalist Socialist sort, conservative contemporaries eagerly drew a distinction between *Soldatentum* and militarism. Writing in 1947, Gottfried Hansen, the former *Wehrmacht* Admiral and now functionary of the newly founded German veteran associations,¹⁶⁹ stated that “[m]ilitarism is a political lesson.” For him militarism was identical with a brutal, bellicose policy of an ideologically misguided state like the Third Reich. In contrast, he defined *Soldatentum* as “a conception of duty, of absolute human virtues like love of country and loyalty, obedience and bravery.”¹⁷⁰ While such a distinction was often made by former soldiers such as Hansen for self-serving purposes, it was not limited to veterans. Studies conducted by Allied research officials indicate that many others in post-war Germany, especially so-called “opinion leaders,” supported this distinction too. To learn more about their beliefs, OMGUS interviewed, in the fall and

¹⁶⁷ Echternkamp, “Arbeit am Mythos,” 437. See further Kühne, *Kameradschaft*, 230–231.

¹⁶⁸ *Kommisskopf* is a difficult term to translate. This pejorative term is used to describe a soldier who embodies military values and customs in a negative way. A *Kommisskopf* is generally associated with slavish obedience, the lack of individual, critical thinking and overtly harsh drill. Echternkamp, “Arbeit am Mythos,” 441.

¹⁶⁹ Gottfried Hansen was also one of the most active former *Wehrmacht* generals who fought for the “rights” of former soldiers and against decrees such as ACC’s Law No. 34. See Manig, *Die Politik der Ehre*, 93–98.

¹⁷⁰ Quoted and translated in Lockenour, *Soldiers as Citizens*, 14. For the history of the concept of militarism and its critics, see Werner Conze and Michael Geyer, “Militarismus,” in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978), 1–47.

summer of 1947, approximately 200 people, including public officials, representatives of various political parties, church representatives, educators, publishers as well as “representatives of labor, business and other professions” in the four zones. Based on these interviews OMGUS officials reported in early 1948 that these “opinion leaders” exhibited a “strong tendency [...] to differentiate between militarism—which was usually condemned—and *Soldatentum*, for which the majority expressed anything from toleration to admiration.”¹⁷¹ According to the results of an *Information Control Review, Political Analysis and Public Opinion*, most respondents had moreover described militarism as an attitude “characterized by an exaggeration of the healthy and natural instinct of defense, and a distortion and overemphasis of genuine soldierdom.”¹⁷² According to this formulation, being a soldier and having armed forces was not only seen as a natural instinct of any society and therefore normal, but also inherently good and beneficial.

While the ideal of a “genuine” *Soldatentum* hence survived the total defeat of the German armies, it was not the only such ideal to survive the war. Intrigued by the German state of mind, OGMUS officials had furthermore developed a questionnaire for the interviewed “opinion leaders” that focused among other things on the issue of “military education as a form of character building.”¹⁷³ According to the general results of the questionnaire, the majority stated that Germany’s postwar youth needed to be taught “discipline, order and respect for society.”¹⁷⁴ The report quoted leading figures such as Berlin based Protestant Otto Dilschneider, a member

¹⁷¹ OMGUS, “German Militarism,” 2.

¹⁷² “Information Control Review, Political Analysis and Public Opinion, Review No. 32, Period ending 16 Aug 1947, 2, in: NRAR, RG 260, OMGUS, Record of the Executive Officer, Box 458 folder 109 (or 3/429-1).

¹⁷³ OMGUS, “German Militarism,” 3.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

of the Church Council of the Old-Prussian Union (*Kirchenleitung der Evangelischen Kirche der altpreußischen Union*) and the 1945-founded Cultural Association for the Renewal of Germany (*Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands*),¹⁷⁵ who argued that conscription could have positive effects on German male youth. Linking military and Christian duty, he also asserted that a “man must learn to bear arms as well as his cross.”¹⁷⁶ Dilschneider expressed the conviction both that military service was a duty that men, and especially Christian men, had to carry, and also that military service would have positive effects on the behavior and character of young men. This traditional belief reached back to the era of the Anti-Napoleonic Wars. The implementation of “universal conscription” for young men in Prussia in 1813 and 1814 entailed not only a close link between military service and civic rights, but also the conception of military service as a *rite of passage* from boyhood to manhood.¹⁷⁷

In contrast to this opinion, however, the OMGUS report on “German militarism” further stated that the majority of interviewees had expressed opinions similar to that of the Bavarian deputy prime minister, Joseph Müller, who had been imprisoned by the Nazis as a member of the Catholic resistance in Bavaria. Surviving the concentration camps of Buchenwald and Flossenbürg, he was the first elected leader of the CSU in 1945. Two years after the end of World War II, Müller believed that military training could indeed inculcate young men with positive virtues such as “love of order, cleanliness, respect for duty, and a sense of group

¹⁷⁵ See Martin Broszat, Hermann Weber, and Gerhard Braas, *SBZ-Handbuch: Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre Führungskräfte in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945–1949* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 715.

¹⁷⁶ OMGUS, “German Militarism,” 4.

¹⁷⁷ For the controversial implementation of “universal conscription” as well the linkage of military service with civic rights and manliness see Hagemann, *Männlicher Muth*, 84–92 and 304–350.

feeling.”¹⁷⁸ Yet, while he clearly valued these characteristics, he further insisted that they could also be developed by “less dangerous methods.”¹⁷⁹ In light of the Second World War, the report noted, the majority of respondents “considered the dangers of nascent militarism too great” to permit the reintroduction of military service in order to train and educate young Germans.¹⁸⁰ While the conviction that military service could inculcate in young men valuable and socially acceptable traits thus survived the world wars, it did not do so without suffering damage. Although German “opinion leaders” in 1947 were clearly able to imagine the reintroduction of military service in some form, they feared that the use of military training as an educational tool could result in a recurrence of German (or rather Prussian) militarism, which could again engulf Germany in the catastrophe of war.

Conclusion

To be sure, the limited results of OMGUS questionnaires and studies from 1947 should not be generalized. Yet, if analyzed together with Germans’ reactions to the Nuremberg trials, they shed light on important continuities that run counter to the general process of physical and mental demilitarization. Without doubt, in the light of total war and defeat, an overwhelming majority of Germans who had previously heralded governments’ military ambitions began to regard warfare as a horrendous nightmare. Instead of offering men the ultimate possibility to prove their manliness, for most Germans war had now been transformed into an event that would leave behind innumerable corpses as well as crippled and embittered veterans. Hence, most Germans

¹⁷⁸ OMGUS, “German Militarism,” 3.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

wanted never again to see the establishment of German armed forces or Germany's involvement into any kind of war. Yet neither military values nor the concept of *Soldatentum* were irrecoverable. Contemporaries continued to believe in a timeless and beneficial soldierly virtue, free of National Socialist ideology and militarism that existed independently of political circumstances. Seeing military service as a duty generally fulfilled by men, many Germans were certain that the military was one of many institutions that could inculcate socially accepted manly qualities. Although these ideas might seem inconsequential, they would both complicate West Germany's rearmament process in the 1950s and enable West Germans to accept the introduction of universal male conscription.

PART II:
DEFINING THE NEW SOLDIER: DEBATES ABOUT MILITARY MASCULINITY
BEFORE THE REARMAMENT OF THE FRG, 1949–1954

In December 1948, it seemed as if American, British, and French postwar planners had struggled in vain. Allied occupation forces already evaluated their efforts to reeducate the West German population while the individual demilitarization and democratization programs were still underway. Writing about various kinds of social gatherings in and around the southern town of Heidelberg, US officials noted that the “American Military Government has not succeeded in convincing the Germans that war and militarism are evil.”¹⁸¹ After all, the observers reported, some Germans were already demanding the establishment of a new German army and stated that they would gladly don another set of military uniforms. Yet, a few months later, in April 1949, another OMGUS intelligence report indicated that German men had no intentions of fighting another war:

Much has been heard about preventing Germany from waging an aggressive war in the future. Judging from the reactions obtained from these plain people who walk the streets anonymously and who must do all the real fighting when a war actually presents itself, it will be difficult to get Germany to fight even a defensive war. The plain man on the street has had enough of war. He is tired of it, afraid of it, and wants nothing more to do with it.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Intelligence Report, 23 Dec 48, Dec 48, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, OMGWB, Box 458, F: Weekly Intelligence Reports. 4 Nov. 48 to 27 Jan. 49 Vol. IV. Quoted in Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots,” 486.

¹⁸² Intelligence Report, 24 Mar 49, NA, RG 260, OMGUS, Box 458, F: Weekly Intelligence Reports. 3 Feb. 49 to 28 Aug. 49 Vol. V.

In contrast to the previous observation, this report suggested that “ordinary” Germans had learned their lessons and that Allied officials had succeeded in eradicating Germans’ military zeal.

These contradictory observations, which indicated that Germans harbored conflicting attitudes towards war and soldiering, puzzled not only US officials who had been assigned to implement West Germany’s complete demilitarization. They also complicated the work of the Allied and West German officials who sought to respond to the growing Cold War tensions by putting West Germans back into military uniforms. The relationship between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union was already strained at the end of World War II, because both parties had very different ideas about how to handle defeated Germany. But in the late 1940s disagreements grew to outright hostilities. Following conflicts in the Allied Control Council and the beginning of the Berlin Blockade in the summer of 1948, United States officials began debating secretly the option of including West Germany in a joint Western defense effort. As international relations continued to deteriorate in the early 1950s, secret considerations turned into public deliberations. By 1952, the United States, Britain, and France, together with the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and Italy openly supported the establishment of a West German contingent in the context of a European Defense Community (EDC).¹⁸³

These decisions represented not only an extraordinary turn in international geopolitics. Following a period that was marked by total war and defeat, complete demilitarization and democratic reorientation, the decision also posed an enormous challenge to the entire West German society. Given Germans’ contentious attitudes, the possible need for West German

¹⁸³ Norbert Wiggershaus, “Die Entscheidung für einen Westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag 1950,” in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, ed. Roland G. Foester et al, vol. 1, *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevnplan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982), 325–402.

troops stirred immediate public reactions and, in most cases, outright protest. Already worried about the rising global tensions, several leftist youth groups, liberal women's associations, and Christian peace activists continued to express strong anti-war and anti-military sentiments.¹⁸⁴ Others however, especially several veterans' associations and conservative youth groups, did not reject rearmament. They only rejected it as long as former *Wehrmacht* personnel were still being "defamed" and detained by the Allies.¹⁸⁵

Inside the parliamentary halls and governmental offices of the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany, the idea of rearming the country led to several debates of unprecedented vehemence. Whereas the first chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, and the small majority of his governing coalitions¹⁸⁶ embraced the idea of West German armed forces, his political opponents—most notably, the KPD and the SPD—keenly rejected it.¹⁸⁷ The conflict of opinions stemmed not only from the political convictions of individual politicians and factions, but also from the different lessons parliamentarians had learned during and after World War II, their interpretation of Soviet power and politics, and their attitude towards the establishment of a joint European Defense Community.

¹⁸⁴ For an early, but still standard study see, Dietzfelbinger, *Die Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*. See also, Werner, *Die Ohne-Mich-Bewegung*.

¹⁸⁵ Manig, *Politik der Ehre*; Lockenour, *Soldiers as Citizens*.

¹⁸⁶ Konrad Adenauer's first coalition from 1949 to 1953 was composed of CDU/CSU, FDP and DP (German Party). After the second federal elections, the CDU/CSU formed a coalition with the FDP, DP, and the All-German Bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights (GB/BHE).

¹⁸⁷ Roland G. Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte der Sicherheit Westdeutschlands," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, ed. Roland G. Foerster et al, vol. 1, *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevanplan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982), 403–576. See further Hans-Erich Volkmann, "Die Innenpolitische Dimension Adenauerscher Sicherheitspolitik in der EVG-Phase," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, ed. Lutz Köllner et al, vol 2, *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 235–604, see especially 330–462. For the different political parties see, Drummond, *The German Social Democrats in Opposition*; Wagner, *FDP und Wiederbewaffnung*.

Finally, the quarrels between the military experts—including former *Reichswehr* and *Wehrmacht* officers—whom Adenauer appointed to hash out the details of West Germany's rearmament were just as fierce. Responding to the disagreements between the different political parties and the extra-parliamentary protests, the military experts struggled to outline the contours of a new West German soldier that would be distinct from its predecessors. These disputes were especially intense because the plans focused on a West German contingent that would be part of a European defense force and not on an autonomous, national military.¹⁸⁸ Consequently, the establishment of a West German contingent and the search for a new type of soldier developed into a process that would occupy all parts of society and divide the young Federal Republic.

In light of their vehemence and importance, the early stages of West Germany's rearmament debate have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Focusing on the political negotiations, studies highlight how the rising tensions of the Cold War complicated West Germany's quest for new soldiers.¹⁸⁹ On the national level, studies have analyzed the controversies that erupted as government officials and military experts sought to craft blueprints for the new West German troops. The findings of these studies have been enriched by analyses of the protest organized against the rearmament policy.¹⁹⁰ These are important studies, but their

¹⁸⁸ Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte," 403–575.

¹⁸⁹ Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung*. See also one of the earliest works, Gunther Mai, *Westliche Sicherheitspolitik im kalten Krieg: Der Korea-Krieg und die deutsche Wiederbewaffnung 1950* (Boppard: Boldt 1977); Rolf Steininger, *Wiederbewaffnung: Die Entscheidung für einen westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag. Adenauer und die Westmächte 1950* (Erlangen: Straube Verlag, 1989); Abenheim, *Reforging*.

¹⁹⁰ See one of the first collection of primary sources, Institut für Staatslehre und Politik Mainz, ed., *Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Staatslehre und Politik e.V. Mainz*, vol. 4, *Der deutsche Soldat in der Armee von morgen: Wehrverfassung, Wehrsystem, Inneres Gefüge* (Munich: Isar Verlag, 1954); Ernst Zander, *Die Kampagne gegen die Remilitarisierung in Deutschland* (London: Verlag Contemporary Press, n.d.). See further, Dietzfelbinger, *Die Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*; Ingeborg Nödinger, *Frauen gegen Wiederaufrüstung: Der Demokratische Frauenbund Westdeutschland im antimilitaristischen Widerstand (1950 bis 1957)* (Frankfurt, a. M: Verlag Marxistische Blätter, 1983).

insights could have been even greater if they had included the results of recent scholarship that focuses on the cultural and gender history of the early postwar period.¹⁹¹ Historians such as Robert G. Moeller argue that the ways in which Germans coped with the aftermath of World War II involved the re-negotiation of social norms, family structures, and gender roles. In particular, the ideal of the “complete” nuclear family was part and parcel of West Germany’s postwar reconstruction.¹⁹² Rejecting notions of a highly militarized and aggressive masculinity that had dominated the Nazi era, this ideal centered on the image of West German men as “tamed” breadwinners.¹⁹³

Closely examining these strands of the literature, this part pays close attention to the gendered definition of military service. The conviction that military service was a man’s first and foremost duty was widespread and shaped the rhetoric of extra-parliamentary protests as well as the parliamentary debates and legal decisions. However, this conviction was not yet set in stone. Although women’s military service was quickly ruled out, it constituted a conscious and real choice that contemporaries, and especially the legislature, had to make. Moreover, the decision to limit military service to the male population influenced the ways in which military experts

¹⁹¹ The late 1990s and early 2000s saw the publications of numerous studies that focused in particular on the cultural and social history of postwar Germany. See for instance, Hanna Schissler, ed., *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Robert G. Moeller, ed., *West Germany Under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). For an earlier anthology focusing on social history and economics see, Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, ed., *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn: Dietz, 1993).

¹⁹² See, Robert G. Moeller, “The Last Soldiers of the Great”; Moeller, *War Stories*; Biess, *Homecomings*. See further, Susan Jeffords, “The ‘Remasculinization’ of Germany in the 1950s: Discussion,” *Signs*, 24 (1998): 163–169.

¹⁹³ Uta Poiger, “A New, ‘Western’ Hero,” 147–162. See also, Frank Biess, “Men of Reconstruction, the Reconstruction of Men: Returning POWs in East and West Germany,” in *Home/Front. The Military, War, and Gender in Twentieth Century Germany*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stephanie Schüler-Springorum (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), 335–358. Frank Biess, “‘Pioneers of a New Germany’ Returning POWs from the Soviet Union and the Making of East German Citizens, 1945–1950,” *Central European History* 32 (1999): 143–180.

delineated the rights and duties of the future West German and, by extension, West European soldier. Paying attention to this construction is important because it reveals how the definition of the West German man in uniform was shaped by international currents as well as by national evolving social and cultural norms. Specific ideas of femininity and masculinity were among the most important of these norms. Those ideas guided extra-parliamentary activists, parliamentarians, government officials, and military experts in their reexamination of men's social and military roles in the postwar world.

In order to trace the processes that led to this gendered construction of military service, the following pages first offer a brief description of the international negotiations that established the overall framework of the rearmament debate. The subsequent pages analyze opinion polls and the most outspoken and influential extra-parliamentary groups in order to reveal the conflicting opinions about rearmament, war and military service that permeated civil society. In a third step, this part turns to the debates taking place in the *Bundestag* and the related committees during which military service was defined and codified as a man's duty. Finally, this part discusses the initial struggles of the personnel working for the *Amt Blank*—the predecessor of the West German Ministry of Defense—to sketch a blueprint for the West German man in uniform they judged suitable for the Federal Republic and Western Europe.

1. The Cold War, International Politics and Allied Plans for the Rearmament of the FRG

Early disagreements between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union about Germany's postwar future developed, by the late 1940s, into outright hostilities. In particular, the question whether a common political and economic system should be introduced led to serious discord. Agitated by the efforts of the Western Allies to unite their occupation zones economically and politically, the Soviet Union claimed that the United States, France and Britain did not intend to continue the

joint four-power collaboration. Thus, the Soviet government discontinued its participation in the Allied Control Council in March 1948. Simultaneously, American and British military and political experts noticed alarming signs that military-style organizations were being established in the Soviet occupation zone. Having reorganized and increased their border police from 3,778 men at the end of 1947 to more than 9,000 in April 1948, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) on 3 July 1948 ordered the creation of barracked police units (*kasernierte Bereitschaften*). The Western Allies' concerns heightened even more in June 1948, when the Soviet Union began blockading West Berlin. In an attempt to gain greater and possibly full control over the entire city, the Soviet Union blocked Western Allies' railway and road access to the sector of Berlin that was under Western control.¹⁹⁴

Given this development, military and political experts in the United States began pondering the option of including those parts of Germany that were under the control of Britain, France and the US in a combined Western defense effort. Experts such as the political scientist Carl J. Friedrich, an advisor to General Clay, argued that an independent state could not survive without its own defense forces. Given the imminent threat from the east, Friedrich was joined by various Allied generals who considered Germany's rearmament to be a military necessity: If the Rhine River was to become once again a front line, it would only hold if it was supported by "German men" whose martial skills were "among the highest in the world."¹⁹⁵ Even Charles De Gaulle, who in 1945 was still seeking ways to prevent Germany from invading France ever

¹⁹⁴ See Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung*, 221–224; Norbert Wiggershaus, "Von Potsdam zum Plevan-Plan: Deutschland in der Internationalen Konfrontation," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945–1956*, ed. Roland G. Foerster et al, vol. 1, *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevan-Plan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982), 1–118, here especially 88–99.

¹⁹⁵ Quoted in David C. Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 37.

again, believed that his country and the rest of Western Europe could not be protected without German forces.

To be sure, this is not to suggest that Allied military leaders were enthusiastic about the possible return of the German *Pikelhaube* or *Stahlhelm*. Even after the formation of the two Germanys in May and October 1949, the idea of rearming a former enemy remained a very sensitive topic. British, French and US politicians repeatedly announced that they had no intention whatsoever of allowing the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany to establish armed forces. For instance, shortly after Chancellor Konrad Adenauer announced in an interview with the Ohio-based *Cleveland Plain Dealer* in December 1949 that his government was willing to contribute to a Western defense effort, the Western Allies ordered a new decree to eliminate militarism in Germany.¹⁹⁶ By doing so, they reaffirmed the Petersburg Agreement of November 1949, which ordered the Federal Republic to remain demilitarized and to prevent the reestablishment of armed forces of any kind.¹⁹⁷

The contents of the American statements changed considerably, however, after 25 June 1950, when North Korean troops—supported by Soviet soldiers—invaded South Korea. Since American leaders were now certain that the Soviet Union would employ military force to achieve its goals, Washington began to advocate openly that West Germany participate in a European defense effort.¹⁹⁸ Even though the French Premier, René Pleven, already in October 1950

¹⁹⁶ For reactions to Adenauer's statement, see *Ibid.*, 46.

¹⁹⁷ Wiggershaus, "Die Entscheidung," 329.

¹⁹⁸ German troops were not to exceed the strength of a battalion. See, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg, "Die Planung des Verteidigungsbeitrages der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Rahmen der EVG," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, ed. Lutz Köllner et al, vol. 2, *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 607–756, especially 609n10.

proposed to rearm the Federal Republic in the context of a joint European defense effort, the implantation of a modified version of his plan require nearly two years. On 26 May 1952, the Federal Republic and the three Western allies signed the General Treaty, which would end Germany's status of occupation and grant it rights as a sovereign state. On the following day, Italy, the Benelux nations, France, and the Federal Republic signed the treaty that instituted the creation of the European Defense Committee (EDC) to which the Federal Republic would contribute.¹⁹⁹ Instead of envisioning a national, autonomous West Germany military, however, the treaty aimed to establish a West German contingent that would be closely embedded in supranational structures and report to the European Command instead of a national government.

In the wake of this agreement, representatives of all six countries descended upon Paris to negotiate the details of a joint European defense force. These negotiations came to an abrupt halt on 30 August 1954, however, when the French Assembly rejected the EDC and West Germany's participation in it.²⁰⁰ Yet, until the French *Non!*, the plan to rearm West Germany as part of the European Defense Community formed the context in which West Germans debated the prospect of new armed forces and sought to define a new type of German soldier.

¹⁹⁹ For a detailed discussion of these developments see Klaus A. Maier, "Die Internationalen Auseinandersetzungen um die Westintegration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und um ihre Bewaffnung im Rahmen der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, ed. Lutz Köllner et al, vol. 2 *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 1–234.

²⁰⁰ See Ibid. See also, Kevin Ruane, *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defense, 1950-55* (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

2. Attitudes towards the Western Defense Plans and Rearmament in West German Society

With the remnants of World War II still conspicuous throughout the entire country, the German population on both sides of the Iron Curtain carefully observed the diplomatic moves of the Soviet Union and the Western powers. As soon as the first rumors about the potential re-establishment of a West German military force entered international communications channels, West German media eagerly conveyed the news to its readers and listeners. The news that a West German military force could soon become reality not only shocked those who wrote newspaper headlines and radio reports, but unsettled large strata of society and prompted individuals as well as larger organizations to take a stand.

Within weeks, the scattered local and regional peace activism that had dominated the late 1940s developed into a broad, “spontaneous movement”²⁰¹ against the rearmament plans. Although the activism that erupted in the first weeks of 1950 was soon widely referred to as the *Ohne-Mich* movement (literally: “Without me”),²⁰² the protesters were a variegated crowd. The demonstrations against West Germany’s rearmament encompassed peace activists from all strata of society, including many members of the KPD and SPD, socialist and communist youth

²⁰¹ Dietzfelbinger, *Die Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*, 72. See further, Holger Nehring, *Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945–1970* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 63–86.

²⁰² Eager to make it clear that they did not want West Germany to contribute to a Western defense force and that they themselves would not participate in any such plans, a great number of protesters employed the slogans “Ohne Mich” or “Ohne Uns” (“Without us”) in their pamphlets and on their placards. See Dietzfelbinger, *Die westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*, 72. The term is oftentimes used to speak about the entire protest movement, including anti-war and peace protesters.

groups, sub-divisions of the Confederation of Trade Unions, numerous women's organizations, many members of the Protestant Church, and some Catholics.²⁰³

These groups' diverse anti-military and anti-war sentiments conflicted with the views of many others who did not reject rearmament wholeheartedly or even supported it. Among those who embraced Adenauer's security and military politics were conservative student and youth groups associated with the governing parties as well as with the leadership of the Catholic Church in West Germany.²⁰⁴ Although representatives of veteran associations were convinced that the "free countries" in the West had to defend themselves, they maintained that the Federal Republic would contribute to a European defense effort only if the Western allies lifted the obloquy they inflicted on former Wehrmacht soldiers.²⁰⁵ While these conflicting opinions represented to some extent a continuation of previous arguments, the plan to establish a West German contingent as part of a Western European defense force heightened the tensions.

West German Anti-Military and Anti-War Sentiments as Reflected in Opinion Polls

Opinion polls are an especially valuable tool to plumb West German opinions about the establishment of West German troops, military service and warfare. In addition to the Western Allies, who continued their careful observation of German attitudes, the Adenauer government commissioned numerous surveys. While these surveys clearly indicate the concerns of the

²⁰³ For a general discussion of peace initiatives in West Germany see Wolfram Wette, "Friedensinitiativen in der Frühzeit des Kalten Krieges (1945–1955)," in *Alternativen zur Wiederbewaffnung: Friedenskonzeptionen in West Deutschland 1945–1955*, ed. Detlef Bald and Wolfram Wette (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2008), 9–23.

²⁰⁴ Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Katholizismus und Wiederbewaffnung: Die Haltung der deutschen Katholiken gegenüber der Wehrfrage 1948–1955* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1981).

²⁰⁵ Manig, *Frage der Ehre*.

entities that commissioned and conducted them, analyzed carefully they also shed light on the myriad of West German citizens' views and the development of those views over time.

A great number of polls conducted in the last months of 1949 and during the early 1950s reveal a deep aversion against establishing a West German military force. Already in mid- and late-December 1949, the US Allied High Commission interviewed 1,500 Germans living in the American zone, 250 in Berlin and 150 in Bremen. The High Commission for Occupied Germany (HICOG) reported that, when asked if they favored rearmament, 71% of the interviewees in the US zone, 67% in Bremen and 50% in Berlin answered in the negative.²⁰⁶ The numerical differences between, on the one hand, the US zone and Bremen and, on the other, Berlin can be explained by the fact that Berliners had firsthand experience with the immediate tensions of the Cold War. Most likely, the Berlin Blockade showed many Berliners how fast the Cold War could become hot and how vulnerable a West German state would be without a defensive force.²⁰⁷ The results of HICOG's survey furthermore matched the outcome of an opinion poll conducted by one of the leading German market research institutes, EMNID, during the months of December 1949 and January 1950. Presupposing that future West German troops would all be men, EMNID reported that "75 percent of West Germans" rejected the idea of "becoming a soldier" or seeing their sons or husbands becoming soldiers again.²⁰⁸

Respondents who rejected the idea of putting West German men into a new set of uniforms did so for various reasons. First, having just experienced total war and defeat, many

²⁰⁶ See, NRAR RG 306 – a1 1005 "German Attitude Towards the Army and Militarism," report no. 9, 17 March 1950, HICOG 9.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ EMNID Opinion Poll "75 Prozent der Westdeutschen lehnen es ab Soldat zu werden," (December 1949/January 1950). Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BArch K), B 145 /1568.

respondents linked the establishment of new troops to the horrors of warfare. Interviewees noted, for instance, that “any rearmament leads to war;” “armies mean war and war means hardship and distress,” “people should no longer be killed in combat,” and “military forces have never brought anything good to Germany.”²⁰⁹ Having forgotten neither the cruelty of World War II nor the hardship of the early postwar years, an overwhelming majority of Germans did not intend to send new cohorts of men to the battlefields. Second, some respondents rejected rearmament not because of pacifist sentiments, but because of “national if not outright nationalist attitudes.”²¹⁰ Complaining that the Western Allies had treated Germans “like criminals,” a middle-aged man working in a coalmine expressed no intention of “playing soldier again.”²¹¹ By rejecting the idea of participating in a pan-European army and, simultaneously, arguing that the Western Allies had “defamed” Germans, interviewees continued to express the nationalist sentiments that emerged almost immediately after May 1945. Third, the rejection of becoming the Allies’ henchman was closely connected to the commonly expressed attitude that the Federal Republic and the West German society was not worth fighting for. Lamenting moral decay, young men and war veterans alike stated that they had no intention of defending the “thousand naked legs” printed in the illustrated press, the “Negro-Samba-Boogie-Woogie-Roar,” or “women’s boxing.”²¹² According to such nationalist and conservative judgments, a society that

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ See Geyer, “Cold War Angst,” 379. See also Karl A. Otto, “Der Widerstand gegen die Wiederbewaffnung in der Bundesrepublik: Motivstruktur und politisch-organisatorische Ansätze,” *Unsere Bundeswehr? Zum 25jährigen Bestehen einer umstrittenen Institution*, ed. Rainer Steinweg (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), 52–105.

²¹¹ EMNID Opinion Poll “75 Prozent.”

²¹² Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach (hereafter IfD), Opinion Poll “Die Stimmung im Bundesgebiet,” October 1951. BArch K, B 145/4221. See also, Letter to Konrad Adenauer by G.R., 1 February 1952. Bundesmilitärarchiv Freiburg (hereafter BArch F), BW II/1246.

would value a culture that turned racial and gender boundaries upside down was not worth fighting for. As they thus deprecated American culture and despised its influence in postwar Germany, the interviewees voiced an opinion that was quite common during the postwar years, especially among the West German middle-class. For many “high-brow” German critics, American culture was nothing more than trivial, commercial, and overly sexual.²¹³

At a first glance, these results suggest that West German citizens by and large rejected the establishment of a West German military force in the context of a European Defense Force. Yet, West Germany’s postwar attitudes toward rearmament were far more complex than that. In addition to fluctuating over time, the results of other surveys implied that West Germans would not refuse *any* type of rearmament. For instance, in February 1952—the month during which the West German *Bundestag* convened to debate the issue of rearmament in lengthy and widely broadcast sessions—more interviewees voted for than against the establishment of an “*independent German army*.”²¹⁴ In October 1952 and March 1953, the results reversed, however, only to change again in August 1953.

In addition to being influenced by the national political climate, international developments caused these fluctuations as well. While, as Michael Geyer points out, the Korean War did not influence the results significantly, the East German uprising in 1953 certainly did. As Soviet troops crushed the protest of East German workers, West Germans reacted

²¹³ The history of “Americanization” and anti-American sentiments has attracted a great deal of interesting scholarship. For a discussion of West and East German attitudes towards American culture and, in particular, Rock’n’Roll and Jazz, see Poiger, *Jazz, Rock and Rebels*, 43–46. See also Jost Hermand, “Resisting Boogie-Woogie, Abstract Expressionism, and Pop Art: German Highbrow Objections to the Import of ‘American’ Forms of Culture, 1945–1960,” in *Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945*, ed. Alexander Stephan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 67–77.

²¹⁴ In October 1950, *Allensbach* asked “Are you for or against the formation of an independent army?” See Geyer, “Cold War Angst,” 381. [Italics added, FB]

accordingly: almost 50 percent of the respondents to *Allensbach's* survey were in favor of establishing a West German army and less than 40 percent voted against it.²¹⁵ The Soviet use of force in nearby East Germany led more West Germans to acknowledge their need for protection and inclined more of them to favor the establishment of a West German military force.

If West German attitudes toward rearmament in general were diverse, so were their opinions of military service. Assuming that West German men would by and large make up the West German force, US pollsters closely observed men's attitudes. On 6 July 1951, one year after the beginning of the Korean War, HICOG published a survey titled "Current Thinking On West German Defense Participation." HICOG had asked 347 men if they would participate in a West European army. According to the results only 3 percent of the respondents who would be eligible for military service indicated that they would serve voluntarily, while 70 percent replied that they would serve only if drafted, and 20 percent said they would refuse any service.²¹⁶ Although the low rate of men who indicated that they would join the ranks voluntarily suggests a widespread rejection of military service, it is important to notice that the majority of men indicated that they would not ignore a draft call and would fulfill their military "duty."

To complicate the picture even more, it is worth looking at the minority of people who did not wholeheartedly reject rearmament and favored compulsory military service. In contrast to the 75 percent of respondents who reject military service, EMNID reported in its January 1950 survey that "only" 63 percent of the people interviewed rejected the idea of compulsory military service. Emphasizing that the respondents did not harbor any "bellicose sentiments," EMNID

²¹⁵ Ibid., 380–381.

²¹⁶ NRAR RG 306 – a1 1005 "Current Thinking On West German Defense Participation," HICOG 88. While 57 percent indicated they were undecided. Michael Geyer, "Cold War Angst."

reported that they wanted to see “the educational [*erzieherisch*] value of having a military preserved.”²¹⁷ Whereas the EMNID survey did not explain what *erzieherisch* meant, both HICOG officials and the *Allensbach Institute* expanded on this issue. *Allensbach Institute* noted in October 1951 that housewives, workers, farmers and veterans, who were in favor of the draft, responded that “being a soldier” had always been a good *Erziehung* because it taught men, and especially young men, “discipline”, “orderliness”, and “civility.”²¹⁸ Viewing military service as a man’s task, respondents thus believed that the military would provide young men with qualities that were valued far beyond the barracks. Interviewed by EMNID in the early 1950s, many West German parents indicated that teaching their children discipline, love of orderliness and diligence was one of their main parenting goals.²¹⁹ As long as military service was thought of as an institution that would fulfill a social function and not as an instrument for waging another war, a number of West Germans attributed some positive meaning to it.

Arguing, moreover, that military training and service “hadn’t harmed anyone” (*hat noch keinem geschadet*), for a few West Germans military service even represented an opportunity to

²¹⁷ EMNID Opinion Poll, “75 Prozent.” The term *Erziehung* is impossible to translate. The German language differentiates between *Erziehung* und *Bildung*, which both translate into English as education. While *Bildung* generally refers to the formal, institutional transfer of knowledge in the context of schools or universities, the term *Erziehung* furthermore implicates the inculcation of social rules, norms and expectations. While these norms and values could be taught by outside people such as teachers, the term is mainly associated with parenting, upbringing and the educational obligation of parents. See, Wolfgang Hörner, Barbara Drinck, and Solveijg Jobst, *Bildung, Erziehung, Sozialisation: Grundbegriffe der Erziehungswissenschaft* (Stuttgart: UTB, 2008).

²¹⁸ IfD, Opinion poll “Die Stimmung im Bundesgebiet,” October 1951; NRAR RG 306 – a1 1005, “German Attitudes Towards an Army and Military Training,” HICOG 9. See also letter by Alicia Witthauer to the *Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk*, quoted in Sören Philipps, *Die Frage der Wiederbewaffnung: Im Hörfunkprogramm des Nordwestdeutschen und Süddeutschen Rundfunks von 1949 bis 1955/56* (Berlin: Weißensee-Verlag, 2004), 335.

²¹⁹ Annemarie Meister, “Musterkinder, Heldenjungen und Muttermädchen: Von der Kontinuität der Kinheitsbilder vor und nach 1945,” in *Vom Trümmerkind zum Teenager*, ed. Doris Foitzik (Bremen: Edition Temme, 1992), 58–72.

turn boys and average men into “hardened” real men.²²⁰ This particular form of “remasculinization,”²²¹ seemed especially important since the experience of war and the turmoil of the early postwar years had challenged the traditional gender order, and this imbalance had not been adjusted yet. In December 1951, an eighty years old war veteran wrote to the first Federal President of Germany, Theodor Heuss, maintaining that the military had the capability of restoring the blurred boundaries between men and women. Stating that “in his days” he and his comrades had been released from military service “as men,” the veteran advocated compulsory military service because it would restore among other things “the difference between the female and the male sex, with respect to the hair cut.”²²² Although, the veteran referred only to the haircut, his letter highlights the trouble many West Germans expressed respecting the changed postwar gender relations. As war and postwar had blurred the lines between men’s and women’s traditional roles in society, some contemporaries looked to the military as a way to correct this perceived error.

This letter and the detailed results of various opinion polls indicate that in early postwar West Germany a positive evaluation of military service, which focused on the military’s educational function, lingered on. While some groups sought to defend a positive, timeless image of soldiering, others expressed the belief that military service could still serve a valuable educational function. These convictions stood, however, in clear contrast to negative opinions

²²⁰ IfD, Opinion Poll, “Die Stimmung im Bundesgebiet,” October 1951.

²²¹ Moeller, “The ‘Remasculinization,’” 101–106.

²²² Christian G. to Federal President Theodor Heuss, 3 December 1951. BArch K, B 122/2227. Annemarie Meister argues that the proper haircut for boys and girls was important in educational literature during the 1950s, as one author wrote that “a curly hair or longer hair” was not proper for boys (*bubenhafte Jungen*). Meister, “Musterkinder,” 64.

that the majority of interviewees expressed. Although the devastation of World War II and the harsh postwar conditions had not turned West Germans into wholehearted pacifists, many had already bid farewell to the notion that military service and war could serve as measures of national superiority.

Early Protest against West Germany's Rearmament

The dismissive attitude that these opinion polls reflect corresponded with sentiments expressed by members of the peace and *Ohne Mich* movement. As indicated above, concerned citizens and a great number of individual protest groups organized rallies all over Germany, distributed pamphlets, and mailed agitated letters to leading politicians as soon as news about the possible establishment of West German armed forces broke. Beginning in early 1950, the protests of the *Ohne Mich* movement intensified during the next two years.²²³ The organizational diversity of this movement reflects the array of reasons protesters opposed rearmament. Still troubled by the destruction of World War II, leading members of the Protestant Church as well as countless activists such as the German Peace Society sought to promote peaceful cooperation. Other activists such as the communist youth organization Free German Youth (*Freie Deutsche Jugend*, FDJ) were greatly influenced by the East German government. Since West Germany would not be allowed to establish autonomous troops, but would be integrated in a Western European army that would increase the German-German divide, they feared that West German soldiers would be nothing more than henchmen of the Western allies.²²⁴

²²³ Dietzfelbinger, *Die westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*, 77–78; Lutz Hoeth, *Die Wiederbewaffnung Deutschlands in den Jahren 1945–1958 und die Haltung der Evangelischen Kirche* (Norderstedt: Book on Demand, 2008).

²²⁴ Dietzfelbinger, *Die Westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*, 82–84; Volkmann, “Die Innenpolitische Dimension,” 572.

Despite their differing reasons, protesters were united in their vision that, the establishment of armed forces would have severe consequences not only for the Federal Republic, but also for the West German men and their families who would have to don military uniforms. The focus on the gendered construction of military service is nowhere clearer than among the West German women who participated in anti-rearmament protests. Historians such as Florence Hervé and Irene Stoehr stress that women represented some of the most active and most influential peace protesters in the late 1940s and early 1950s.²²⁵ Women raised their voices both individually and as members of special women's organizations. The groups involved in organized demonstrations included most notably the West German section of the World Organization of Mothers of All Nations, WOMAN (*Weltorganisation der Mütter aller Nationen*) and the West German wing of the Democratic Women's League of Germany (*Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschland, DFD*), that were both founded in 1947. Their protest was joined in 1952 by the West German Women's Peace Movement (*Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung, WFFB*). Representing tens of thousands of women,²²⁶ these three groups organized numerous conferences and street rallies, wrote letters to leading politicians, and distributed thousands of leaflets.²²⁷

²²⁵ Florence Hervé, "Fast Vergessen- die Frauenfriedensbewegung in der BRD," auf <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/gender/frauenbewegung/35283/friedensfrauen-im-westen>; Ute Gerhard, "'Anything but a Suffragette!' Women's Politics in Germany after 1945: A Movement of Women," in *When the War Was Over: Women, War, and Peace in Europe, 1940–1956*, ed. Claire Duchén and Irene Bandhauer-Schoffmann (London: Leicester University Press, 2000), 161–175.

²²⁶ Exact membership numbers are difficult to come by. In view of the International Women's Day on March 8, 1980, 60,000 women attended various celebratory events across West Germany. See, Nördinger, *Frauen gegen Wiederaufrüstung*.

²²⁷ Stoehr, "Phalanx der Frauen"; Irene Stoehr, "Cold War Communities: Women's Peace Politics in Postwar Germany," in *Homefront: The military, War, and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), 311–333; Klaus-Jörg Ruhl, *Frauen in der Nachkriegszeit, 1945–1963* (Munich: DT. Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988).

Central to the protest of WOMAN, the DFD, and the WFFB was the distinction between military politics and war as a *man*-made undertaking and women as bearers of new life. Drawing extensively on the image of women as the more peaceful sex, female activists argued that they had to act “for the sake of life and peace [especially] if the governing men were not able to do so.”²²⁸ During the Women’s Peace Congress in Munich on 30 September 1950, the attending 1,000 female delegates embraced a manifest which stated that women should ask their men “not to work for war,” to teach their sons about conscientious objection, and to raise their sons and daughters in a spirit of peace and friendship.²²⁹ To this effect women also condemned centuries-old rhetoric that had focused on women’s patriotic duties. In 1952, for instance, members of the WFFB announced that they did not intend once again to become the “mothers of heroes” (*Heldenmütter*) who would celebrate the “heroic death” (*Heldentod*) of their sons in battle. This language, which dated back to the period of the Anti-Napoleonic Wars (1813-15)²³⁰ and was exploited extensively during the Nazi period, was judged inappropriate in light of the horrors of World War II. According to the activists, women and men had to work together peacefully to prevent the remilitarization of Germany and the outbreak of another war.

²²⁸ “Frieden auf Erden,” Einladungskarte zur Morgenfeier, printed in Anne-Marie Holenstein, *Frauen machen Frieden: Lesebuch für Grossmütter, Mütter und Töchter* (Burckhardthaus: Laetare Verlag, 1982). See also Stoehr, “Frieden als Frauenaufgabe? Diskurse über Frieden und Geschlecht in der bundesdeutschen Friedensbewegung der 1950er Jahre,” in *Frieden, Gewalt, Geschlecht: Friedens-und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung*, ed. Jennifer Davie, Karen Hagemann and Ute Kätzler (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2005), 184–205, here 187.

²²⁹ Quoted in Nördinger, *Frauen gegen Wiederaufrüstung*, 53–54.

²³⁰ Ingrid Schöll, “Frauenprotest gegen Wiederbewaffnung,” in *Perlon-Zeit: Wie die Frauen ihr Wirtschaftswunder erlebten*, ed. Angela Delille and Andrea Grohn (Berlin: Elefanten-Press, 1985), 82–91. For a discussion of the term *Heldenmütter* or soldiers’ wives who would motivate and sacrifice their husbands and sons for the fight against Napoleon’s armies, see Karen Hagemann, “Heldenmütter, Kriegerbräute, und Amazonen: Entwürfe ‘patriotischer’ Weiblichkeit zur Zeit der Befreiungskriege,” in *Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Ute Frevert (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1997), 174–200.

This idea was reinforced by the division of Germany. The existence of an East and West Germany was anathema to many activists and the call for unification dominated many of their protests. The WFFB, DFD, and many other protestors emphasized that Germany's division had not only cut a country in half, but had also separated entire families. As a result, activists worried that West German men would soon have to fight against their East German relatives on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Yet, instead of seeing their "sons" meeting on the battlefields of Europe, women maintained that mothers wanted their men and boys to be reunited and able to "shake hands."²³¹ Therefore, the WFFB and DFD demanded that West German men in leadership positions communicate with the "German men of the 'other Germany'" to reunite the two German halves and prevent a "brothers' war"²³²

The protest against rearmament and men's military service also included a discussion of men's roles in society. On 21 December 1949, the *Südwestdeutscher Rundfunk* (South-West German Radio Broadcast) broadcast a show that tackled the question "Shall there be soldiers again?"²³³ During the show, the host asked the widow of a church minister, who also had lost her brother in World War II, about her opinion. Agitated by the idea of a new German army, the widow responded: "At the very thought that my adolescent sons have also to wear the grey coat and endure everything that is connected with it, I would like to cry out and shout: No, and once again no!"²³⁴ In light of the signing of the General Treaty in 1952, the South-West German

²³¹ Frauen für den Frieden. Westdeutsche Frauen-Friedensbewegung (Rundbrief) No. 2, 15 April 1952, 9, quoted in Holenstein, *Frauen machen Frieden*. See also, Stoehr, "Friede als Frauenaufgabe," 199.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Philipps, *Die Frage der Wiederbewaffnung*, 216–218.

²³⁴ Quoted in Ibid, 216.

Radio Broadcast further received several letters stressing that “every rational and motherly woman” and “every responsible human being” could only oppose rearmament.²³⁵ Maintaining that “men belong to their families,”²³⁶ women bid farewell to the notion so dominant during the early twentieth century that a man’s true purpose lay in heroically defending his home and fatherland on the battlefield. Emphasizing that men’s main function was to support and “complete” their families as husbands and fathers, women tap a line of argument that was prevalent in postwar West Germany. As scholars such as Elizabeth Heineman and Robert G. Moeller highlight, the reconstruction of West German male-breadwinner families was part and parcel of West Germany’s postwar reconstruction as a whole.²³⁷ The quest for “complete families” was at the heart of West German identity politics in the early postwar decades. The conception of such “complete families” significantly influenced the debate about rearmament.

This focus on the social roles of men and the gendered character of military service was not limited to women’s protests. It also influenced the arguments of other activists, most notably the movement for a nation-wide plebiscite. In January 1951, the “Congress Against Remilitarization” took place in Essen, a town in the Ruhr area of North Rhine-Westphalia. This

²³⁵ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 334. The emphasis on women’s role as mothers was not only present in women’s writing. The *Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung* (West German Women’s Peace Movement) produced a poster against rearmament and for “negotiations and understanding” stating: “Women and Mothers! Remember the horrors of the past war!” A reprint of the poster is available online at: http://www.hdg.de/lemo/objekte/pict/JahreDesAufbausInOstUndWest_plakatFrauenUndMuetter/index.html (last accessed: 21 October 2013).

²³⁶ IfD, Opinion Poll, “Die Stimmung im Bundesgebiet,” Oktober 1951. BArch K, B 145/4221.

²³⁷ On the notion of the “complete family” in postwar West Germany see, Elizabeth Heinemann, “Complete Families, Half Families, No Families at All: Female-headed Households and the Reconstruction of the Family in the Early Federal Republic,” *Central European History* 20 (1996): 19–61; Heinemann, *What Difference Does a Husband Make: Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 214; Robert G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 196.

event was organized by the Committee of Fighters for Peace in West Germany (*Komitee der Kämpfer für den Frieden in Westdeutschland* or *Westdeutsches Friedenskomitee*). Founded in May 1949, the committee was intended to be a pan-German organization, but its structures and work were heavily influenced by the East German Socialist Unity Party Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland*, SED).²³⁸ During the congress, a diverse group of 1,700 delegates²³⁹ expressed their deep concerns for the “well-being of our *Vaterland*.”²⁴⁰ Maintaining that foreign powers were forcing the German people to prepare for a “third world war”, the congress’ manifest referred to the German fear that soon all “men fit for military service” would be recruited as a result of the war-mongering.²⁴¹ Eager to prevent these fears from becoming reality, the delegates called for a referendum.

In their advertisement for the plebiscite, activists sought to address all Germans: “men and women, boys and girls, workers, farmers, middle class persons [*Mittelständler*], civil servants, artists and scientists” were asked to object to rearmament.²⁴² To leave no doubt about the severity of the issue, the gendered construction of military service and relations between

²³⁸ Michael Lemke, *Einheit oder Sozialismus? Die Deutschlandpolitik der SED 1949–1961* (Wien: Böhlau, 2001), 54

²³⁹ Despite the communist influence the delegates were a potpourri of activists, including officers and major generals, representatives of craftsman guilds and trade associations, church ministers, authors, artists, and cultural managers as well as doctors, bank managers, farmers and forest wardens. See, Zander, *Die Kampagne*.

²⁴⁰ Quoted in Dietzelbringer, *Die westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*, 96. [Italics added, FB.]

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² See pamphlet “An alle die Frieden wollen!,” Komitee der Kämpfer für den Frieden in Westdeutschland, April/May 1950, AdsD, Sammlung Flugblätter und Flugschriften, 6/FLBL003011, online at: http://archiv2.fes.de/objekt_start.fau?prj=fes&dm=Flugschriften&ref=2762 (last accessed: 13 July 2013).

“women and mothers” and “their men and sons” received special attention.²⁴³ Pamphlets and leaflets invoked the suffering of women during World War II who had been worried sick about their brothers, sons, and husbands who had been sent off to the front lines. Although these documents reinforced a traditional gendered image of warfare and military service, they simultaneously reversed the rhetoric of men acting as defenders and women as needing protection. According to the subcommittee working on the plebiscite, women in postwar West Germany had to protect and safeguard their men against the demands of the state. In their appeal, the committee called on their fellow citizens to “help women and mothers to defend the lives of their husbands and sons!”²⁴⁴ Before and during World War II, German men went to war characterized as heroic defenders of the German fatherland and its female population. In postwar West Germany, women rallied against rearmament in order to keep their men off the battlefields.

According to the organizers, millions of West Germans agreed with their arguments. To be sure, the Adenauer government prohibited the referendum, arguing that it was controlled by the SED and represented an attack on the “free democratic basic order.”²⁴⁵ Yet supported by leading church representatives and former government officials, the organizers were able to collect an astounding number of votes. Taking into account the possibility of double votes and voter fraud, between four and eight million people opposed the establishment of a new military force, a number large enough to suggest that the majority of West Germans were against rearmament.²⁴⁶

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Reprinted in Dietzfelbinger, *Die westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*, 444–445.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ For a discussion of this referendum, see Jarausch, *After Hitler*.

The Supporters of a New West German Military

Although results of the referendum were impressive and the anti-rearmament protests widespread, these sentiments were neither unanimous nor universal. As the opinion polls already indicated, West German attitudes towards the re-establishment of a military force were much more diverse. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, several conservative journalists, student and youth organizations, and veterans associations raised their voices in favor of a West German armed force.

Two of the youth and student organizations that sought to influence Adenauer's security politics as well as the establishment of new armed forces were the Young Union (*Junge Union*), which was associated with the governing CDU, and the student society of the FDP, the Liberal Student League Germany (*Liberale Studentenbund Deutschland*, LSD). Although the Young Union and the LSD generally followed their parties' agenda and supported the idea of rearming West Germany, they did so with reservations. Although members of the Young Union, the LSD and other youth organizations believed that rearmament was necessary in order to protect "free" Western Europe and the Federal Republic against Communism, they also fear expressed anxiety about a renascent German militarism. For instance, in November 1950 the weekly newspaper *DIE ZEIT* published an article titled "Youth on Rearmament" written by a young student. In contrast to the many youth groups that protested Adenauer's politics in the streets of German cities, this student argued that the "young generation of today is certainly convinced that Bolshevism can only be successfully opposed in the long run through the use of arms."²⁴⁷ Yet, despite being aware of the Russian threat, most of his contemporaries spoke of rearmament "only

²⁴⁷ "Jugend zur Aufrüstung," *DIE ZEIT*, November 16, 1950, translated by Thomas Dunlap, GHI Documents, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3044&language=english (last accessed: 13 October 2013).

with great displeasure.”²⁴⁸ This refusal, the student maintained, was not only informed by pacifism, but also by a certain mistrust of the older generation. Adolescents were especially suspicious of the “mess-hall lingo and barracks-yard jargon” of former soldiers, who believed that governmental leadership had to smell “a shot of [gun] powder” in order to be effective.²⁴⁹ Arguing that the “old style” drill was ineffective, the student was sure that the German youth wanted “the military, also in Germany, to finally assume a civilian character.”²⁵⁰ As he criticized former German armies for having adhered to harmful practices, the student expressed the common sentiment that if West Germany was to rearm, the new military had to be started from scratch.

As the negotiations about the establishment of West German armed forces continued and the necessary international treaties were signed, these kinds of concerns resulted in clearly formulated demands and eager attempts to influence the political decision-making process.²⁵¹ In 1952, the LSD published the pamphlet “Citizen—Army—State: The Demands of the Liberal Student League Germany regarding a Future Military Constitution.”²⁵² Supporting the idea of rearmament, the group formulated clear ideas about the future West German soldier. Central to the groups’ claim was the image of the “citizen soldier” (*Bürgersoldat*) who was not only part of his military unit, but also member of society. Even though the LSD considered the army to be “a

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ See Genschel, *Wehrreform*, 29–32.

²⁵² “Bürger – Armee – Staat: Die Forderung des Liberalen Studentenbundes Deutschlands zu einer künftigen Wehrverfassung,” Bonn 1952. Archiv des Liberalismus, 9.32: Verteidigung, 1660.

first-rate educational factor” (*Erziehungsfaktor*), it maintained that the training of the European armed forces must not begin with the “breaking” of the recruit’s personality.²⁵³ Only if young recruits could continue to develop their own character and become mature citizens, would the “rigor of the physical and military training” fulfill its purpose. Along with several other more conservative student and youth groups that supported rearmament, the LSD believed that a rigorously trained West German army was necessary to defend Western Europe against the Russians. Fearing, however, that rearmament could lead to the revival of previous harmful German military practices, a new relation between the military services and society needed to be established. According to the students’ postwar understanding, West German men in military uniform were citizens first and soldiers second.

The students’ criticism of the older generation and previous military practices clearly vexed another important group that conditionally supported rearmament: veterans’ associations and former high-ranking officers. Former officers, who supported Adenauer’s military and security policies, tied their support for rearmament to the acquittal of the German soldier. In December 1950, Gottfried Hansen, chairman of the League of former Wehrmacht members who, along with their dependents, were entitled to state benefits (*Bund versorgungsberechtigter ehemaliger Wehrmachtsangehöriger und deren Hinterbliebenen*) complained about the “slandorous” behavior in a letter to Harry S. Truman, Dean Acheson, and other statesmen. Agreeing that “the occident and furthermore the United States” had to defend its freedom against any threat from the East, Hansen maintained that German men who were imbued with the “soldierly ethos of duty” had to contribute to this defense effort.²⁵⁴ Yet, Hansen argued that

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Letter from Gottfried Hansen, Christmas 1950. BArch K, B 122/ 630. See also, Lockenour, *Soldiers as Citizens*, 14.

German men could never develop the necessary ethos and defend “the occident” against the east as long as their “comrades, who only fulfilled their soldierly duty” were still held captive by those “people with whose sons they should fight together for freedom and peace of the world.”²⁵⁵ The European Defense Community could only be successful, according to Hansen, if all soldiers were treated equally.

Whereas Hansen’s positive appraisal of soldiering ran counter to the opinion of many lower-rank soldiers who returned from World War II disenchanted,²⁵⁶ it reverberated with many high-ranking officers. Reacting to the student’s article in *DIE ZEIT*, Sven von Mitzlaff, who by his own account had served as a recruit instructor, platoon leader, squadron leader, and as a member of the general staff of the Wehrmacht, wrote an agitated letter to the editor. Having evaluated his own service, Mitzlaff concluded that neither “depersonalization” nor “mess-hall lingo and barracks-yard jargon” had been characteristic of his military training.²⁵⁷ While Mitzlaff obviously sought to defend not only the German military but his own life choices, his statement was seconded by many other Wehrmacht veterans.²⁵⁸ As plans for West Germany’s rearmament progressed, daily newspapers, magazines and specialized journals published comments by former Wehrmacht personnel, who argued that German military training had always been shaped by men who valued “personal responsibility” and “trust,” but opposed “blind obedience” and

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ See Geyer, “Cold War Angst,” 387–388.

²⁵⁷ Letter to the editor, “Erlebnis und Kritik,” *DIE ZEIT*, December 7, 1950, 9. It is likely that Sven von Mitzlaff was a lieutenant colonel of the 8. SS-Kavallerie-Division “Florian Geyer”.

²⁵⁸ Letter to the editor, “Erlebnis und Kritik,” *DIE ZEIT*, December 7, 1950, 9

“abuse.”²⁵⁹ Convinced that German armies had always been composed of men with superior masculine qualities, veterans affirmed their belief in a timeless and inherently good ideal of soldiering.²⁶⁰

Although their efforts have been especially well documented and analyzed, veterans and youth groups were not the only organizations that sought to get involved in the debate about West Germany’s rearmament. As noted above, women’s groups also tried to influence the public discussion. Although most vehemently opposed rearmament, a few women’s groups viewed rearmament as an opportunity. One was the German Federation of Working Women (*Deutscher Verband Berufstätiger Frauen*), which viewed rearmament as an employment opportunity for women. On March 6, 1954, Hildegard Kienzle-Weinmann, its vice president, met with representatives of the *Amt Blank* to discuss women’s participation in the personnel build-up of the European Defense Community.²⁶¹ Originally founded in 1931, the federation had reconstituted itself after World War II, seeking to improve the rights and conditions of working women. Kienzle-Weinmann wanted to ensure that women’s employment in the EDC would receive due consideration. During the meeting, the representatives of the *Amt Blank* and vice president agreed that women—“if they were equally qualified”—could be employed as office workers, but certainly not in positions that would require “direct contact with the troops.”²⁶² In

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ See Genschel, *Wehrreform*, 176.

²⁶¹ Vermerk, z.d.A., III/4-III-Z-2, 6 March 1954. BArch F, BW 9/1930, 34.

²⁶² Ibid.

light of this agreement, the record of this meeting concluded that the EDC would most likely offer “fewer employment opportunities than the Federal Mail Service.”²⁶³

Even though the majority of the West German population opposed rearmament, an analysis of opinion polls and the public disputes that occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s reveals a multitude of opinions about war, armed forces, and military service. West German society in the early 1950s was neither wholeheartedly pacifistic nor bellicose. Despite a variety of opinions, the majority shared a clearly gendered vision of military service and the new armed forces. Assuming that West German men would be sent to serve in the EDC, postwar West Germans’ concerns focused especially on the effects a new armed forces would have not only on society as a whole but on West German men in particular.

3. Parliamentary Disputes about the Rearmament of the FRG

While the conflicting opinions that West Germans expressed in newspaper articles and radio shows, pamphlets, leaflets, and on the streets, were reacting to national and international security politics, those opinions in turn significantly shaped parliamentary discussions and decision-making processes. Above all, they represented a challenge to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his government. Adenauer was an eager but tactical advocate of rearmament. Even before taking office, the chancellor had met with former Wehrmacht soldiers to discuss West Germany’s security and military situation.²⁶⁴ Once elected, he was careful at first not openly to express his willingness to contribute to a Western defense effort. This changed after some months. In his

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Adenauer sought, for instance, the advice of Lieutenant General a.D. Hans Speidel, who had been a protégé of Colonel General Ludwig Beck, the army chief of staff who resigned over the Czech crisis of 1938

interview with the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* in December 1949, Adenauer emphasized publicly, for the first time, the Allies' responsibility to protect the newly founded Republic or to make arrangements that would enable the FRG to protect itself. While rejecting the idea of independent, national armed forces, the chancellor favored the establishment of a West German contingent as part of a West European defense force under European leadership.²⁶⁵

This interview had a huge impact. For Adenauer's West German opponents, the chancellor's approbation of the possibility of establishing a West German contingent came as a surprise, because two years earlier Adenauer had wholeheartedly embraced the complete demilitarization of Germany. Advocating the destruction of all war industries, he even imagined that in terms of international law Germany "could be neutralized like Switzerland."²⁶⁶ Even a few weeks before the interview with the US newspaper, the chancellor had assured his critics that he opposed the idea of putting West German men into uniform.²⁶⁷ Until his interview with the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, contemporaries thus believed that Konrad Adenauer would be the chancellor of a demilitarized, if not an entirely neutralized Federal Republic.

Debates about the Introduction of a West German Army in the Bundestag

Given this situation, Adenauer's bold statements not only offended the former Western allies, they also troubled his opponents and even some of his political allies. Since many of Adenauer's critics were members of the West German parliament, the chancellor needed to appeal to the

²⁶⁵ Large, *Germans to the Front*, 54.

²⁶⁶ Quoted in Ingeborg Küster and Elly Steinmann, "Die Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung (WFFB)," in *Die Geschichte der deutschen Frauenbewegung*, ed. Florence Herve et al (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein verlag, 1987), 224–234.

²⁶⁷ Dietzelbringer, *Die westdeutsche Friedensbewegung*, 50.

Bundestag. The legislative power to approve rearmament rested with this institution, and Adenauer's party had failed to achieve an absolute majority in the first national elections in August 1949. Seeking to appease his international and national critics, Adenauer emphasized that he had "emphatically repudiated" the idea of West Germany's rearmament. During his address to the Bundestag on 16 December 1949, he maintained that he had at best considered the deployment of a West German contingent within the context of a "European Confederation."²⁶⁸

One year later, having received the support of the Western Allies, the chancellor's views were quite different. During a meeting of the *Bundestag* in November 1950, Adenauer made it clear that he viewed the establishment of armed forces as a natural right that every state—including the Federal Republic—possessed. In light of the Korean War, he insisted that it was imperative for the FRG to make use of this right to protect itself against Soviet Russia. If West Germans did not want to surrender their lives and freedom to the yoke of the USSR, the Federal Republic had to establish an armed force. If West Germany failed to defend itself, the chancellor maintained, the Federal Republic would be integrated into the "Soviet-Russian sphere of power" and the "German people" would have to endure "slavery and exploitation."²⁶⁹ A similar depiction of Russia and the "Russian threat" had been used by National Socialist propaganda to ensure that *Wehrmacht* soldiers would hold the line. In the context of the Cold War, the image of the brutal Russian would function as an argument to prepare West Germans for rearmament.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages* (Bonn: Universitäts-Buchdruckerei Gebr. Scheur) (hereafter: VDB), Deutscher Bundestag, 24. Sitzung, 16 December 1949, 734–735.

²⁶⁹ VDB, Deutscher Bundestag, 98. Sitzung, 8 November 1950, 3566. See further, Large, *Germans to the Front*, 156.

²⁷⁰ See, Wolfram Wette, "Das Rußlandbild in der NS-Propaganda: Ein Problemaufriß," in *Das Rußlandbild im Dritten Reich*, ed. Hans-Erich Volkmann (Cologne: Böhlau, 1994), 55–78; Thilo Stenzel, *Das Rußlandbild des 'kleinen Mannes': Gesellschaftliche Prägung und Fremdwahrnehmung in Feldpostbriefen aus dem Ostfeldzug (1941–1944/45)* (Munich: Osteuropa Institut, 1998).

Defending his push for West German troops, Adenauer's speech also illustrated the government's ideas about who would bear the main responsibility for taking up arms. Rehashing the brutal behavior of the Soviet soldiers towards "poor, defenseless" men and women at the end of World War II, he argued that defending his "home and freedom" against any threat from the east was "imperative" for every "reasonable" male citizen.²⁷¹ In making these claims, Adenauer could feel certain that he would have the support of the extremely right-wing German Imperial Party (*Deutsche Reichspartei*, DRP). For the DRP politician Heinrich Leuchtgens, rearmament was above all a question of national self-preservation and identity. "For a man who thinks nationally," he argued, it was self-evident that West Germany needed to establish powerful armed forces in order to keep "the Russians" from attacking. He "who loves freedom, who loves his fatherland and who loves his people," the politician maintained, "must also defend it against any threat."²⁷² For both Leuchtgens and Adenauer, the task of becoming soldiers in order to defend the Federal Republic was reserved for West German men.

This understanding was shared and elaborated by Richard Jaeger, a jurist who had joined the SA at the age of 20 in 1933 and now led the state executive committee of the CDU's Bavarian sister-party, the CSU.²⁷³ During the *Bundestag* debate on 8 February 1952, Jaeger pondered the ways in which West Germany's rearmament could be achieved. He supported the idea that every male citizen should fulfill his "duty of self-defense" (*Notwehrpflicht*).

²⁷¹ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 98. Sitzung, 8 November 1950, 3566. See further, Uta Poiger, "Krise der Männlichkeit. Remasculinisation in beiden deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaften," in *Nachkrieg in Deutschland*, ed. Klaus Naumann (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS, 2001), 227–263.

²⁷² VDB, Deutscher Bundestag, 98. Sitzung, 8 November 1950, 3600.

²⁷³ Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien e.V. (ed.), *M.d.B. – Die Volksvertretung 1946–1972*, 555, online at: <http://www.kgparl.de/online-volksvertretung/online-mdb.html> (last accessed: 22 January 2010).

Emphasizing the defensive role of a new West German force, Jaeger added that the “duty of a *paterfamilias* to defend his wife and children” could be equated with the duty of the “younger generation” that would have to endure military conscription in order to defend “their mothers, their sisters, their brides ...”²⁷⁴ against any army coming from the communist east. While assigning women to the domestic sphere of home and family, Jaeger and his Christian-conservative colleagues, most of whom were Catholics, evoked the traditional image of the man as the “forceful protector” of that sphere.²⁷⁵ This powerful traditional image of the family, headed by a male protector and breadwinner, as the nucleus of West German society and state permeated the government’s quest for rearmament.

Notwithstanding the support of the German Imperial Party, Adenauer’s and Jaeger’s speeches were aggressive because they needed to respond to three major sources of opposition. First, the Adenauer government was reacting to the dissenting votes of peace activists and members of the *Ohne Mich* movement. One of the parliamentarians of the *Bundestag* who responded to women’s concerns was CDU politician Aenne Brauksiepe, a member of the Catholic Women’s League.²⁷⁶ In a speech in February 1952, she addressed in particular the concerns of the women protesting outside of the *Bundestag*. According to Brauksiepe, many women were against the establishment of armed forces because they feared that rearmament would destroy their families. Therefore, she maintained, the government should highlight social politics that would demonstrate that rearmament would not destroy the traditional family. In

²⁷⁴ VDB, *Der Deutsche Bundestag*, 191. Sitzung, 8 February 1952, 8178. [Italics added, FB]

²⁷⁵ Ibid. For discussion of this image in postwar Germany, see Richard Bessel, “Was bleibt vom Krieg,” 298. For family policies, see Heinemann, *What Difference Does a Husband Make*.

²⁷⁶ Christiane Kuller, *Familienpolitik im föderativen Sozialstaat: Die Formierung eines Politikfeldes in der Bundesrepublik 1949–1975* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), 90–91.

Brauksiepe's view, the Adenauer government needed to emphasize that their policies were rooted in the "unswerving belief" that the family was of "indestructible value" to society. Only then, she asserted, would women be willing to send their sons and husbands once again to the barracks.²⁷⁷

Although Brauksiepe insisted that her colleagues had to take the concerns of West German women seriously, she also reminded her fellow citizens that West Germany's defense was no longer just a national issue. Arguing for rearmament, she argued that West German men and women were bound in an "emergency community" (*Notgemeinschaft*) with the men and women of other Western countries. Consequently, Brauksiepe maintained, West Germans would need to make sacrifices in order to maintain peace.²⁷⁸ The plan to establish a West German force that would not be autonomous but integrated instead into a West European defense force hence functioned as an important argument for the government's policy.

Adenauer had to react not only to the *Ohne Mich* protestors but to opposition within the ranks of his own party and coalition. Although a many CDU members favored rearmament, there were dissenters. The disputes among members of the governing parties were exemplified by Gustav Heinemann's resignation as Minister of Interior in October 1950; he left the CDU 1952.²⁷⁹ From 1949 to 1955, Heinemann was the president of the all-German Synod of the Protestant Churches of Germany and was among the founders of the German Protestant Church Congress (*Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag*), a congress of the Protestant laity. His

²⁷⁷ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 191. Sitzung, 8 February 1952, 8166–8168.

²⁷⁸ Ibid. For a discussion of the parliamentary struggle over West Germany's rearmament, see Volkmann, "Die Innenpolitische Dimension," 235–444.

²⁷⁹ Large, *Germans to the front*, 74–77. See also, Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte," 520–521.

resignation and his subsequent role as a leader of the *Ohne Mich* movement was, however, only the tip of the iceberg. Adenauer's advocacy for rearmament and the ways in which he pursued his agenda caused great resentment not only among members of his own party but also among the Free Democrats.²⁸⁰ In addition to demanding the establishment of an autonomous national military, the FDP considered the "rehabilitation" of the older generations of German soldiers a prerequisite for rearmament. Yet, even though the FDP disagreed with many of Adenauer's ideas and would remain divided over particular details of rearmament, the majority of liberal politicians endorsed the chancellor's overall plan to establish an armed force, insisting that it was a right every state possessed. Moreover, the Free Democrats agreed with Adenauer and Jaeger that it was every man's duty to defend the Federal Republic and all its inhabitants.²⁸¹

The FDP's call for rearmament was also grounded in the hope that new armed forces would serve a social function. In an internal report distributed in January 1953, the Free Democrats stressed the educational value of military service. The document argued that young men could gain "technical skills" and simultaneously form a "strong personality" during military training.²⁸² In tune with their overall political focus, the FDP hoped that young men would leave the *Bundeswehr* as "masters of the machine," who would be valuable in the labor market.²⁸³ In an increasingly technological army, the party maintained, young men would learn skills that would not only enable them to fight and win wars but to succeed in the civilian workforce.

²⁸⁰ For internal factions, see Ibid, 521–522.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Rundschreiben der Freien Demokratischen Partei, January 10, 1953. Archiv des Liberalismus, Bundespartei, Fachausschuss Verteidigung 904: Protokolle.

²⁸³ Ibid. For this depiction see also Loch, *Das Gesicht der Bundeswehr*, 175.

While Adenauer was able to keep his governing coalition in check, the opposing parties were not to be persuaded, representing a third source of opposition. One of the first female parliamentarians who went to the lectern and opposed Adenauer's agenda was the chairwoman of the catholic Center Party (*Zentrumspartei*) and peace activists, Helene Wessel, one of the founders of the Emergency Group for Peace in Europe (*Notgemeinschaft für den Frieden in Europa*). Responding to Adenauer's initial statement in December 1949, Wessel declared that her party would "strongly oppose any form of remilitarization."²⁸⁴ By defending her party's decision, Wessel first argued that it was precisely the captivity of former *Wehrmacht* soldiers that forbade rearmament. Criticizing the treatment German soldiers at the hands of the occupying powers, she maintained that no other defeated country had ever been "dragged through dung" as Germany had after 1945.²⁸⁵

In addition to using the "victimhood" or German soldiers as leverage, Helene Wessel also pointed to the numerous protests staged by women. Maintaining close ties with the women's peace movement, she emphatically reminded the members of the *Bundestag* that "women detest war."²⁸⁶ Portraying women as the peaceful sex, Wessel argued that women's longing for peace was a major reason war should be outlawed. Taking the youth protests against rearmament into account, Wessel also maintained that German youth had "already experienced the misery of the

²⁸⁴ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 24. Sitzung, 16 December 1949, 740–741. In addition to being chairwoman of the Center Party, Wessel was closely connected to the Mothers' Movement that opposed West Germany's rearmament. Cf. Stoehr, "Cold War Communities," 326. For Wessel's political biography and her stance on rearmament see also, Elisabeth Friese, *Helene Wessel (1898–1969): Von der Zentrumspartei zur Sozialdemokratie* (Essen: Klartext, 1993), 147–154.

²⁸⁵ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 24. Sitzung, 16 December 1949, 740–741.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

battle fields and made too many sacrifices.” Thus, she deemed it impossible to expect any young German men “to lose more years as soldiers.”²⁸⁷

Wessel’s opposition to the government’s policies was applauded by her own party and by the SPD, of which she would become a member in 1957.²⁸⁸ Even though leading figures among the Social Democrats did not absolutely reject the idea of a national armed force, many of them objected to the ways in which the conservative government sought to implement rearmament.²⁸⁹ Erich Ollenhauer, the deputy leader and later chairman of the party, stressed that Social Democrats declined to consider rearmament under the present circumstances. Ollenhauer, who would join *Paulskirchen* movement against rearmament in 1955, was especially disgruntled by what he considered Adenauer’s overreaching use of the power of his office. The chancellor of the Federal Republic, he maintained, could not legally consider rearmament without consulting the other branches of government.²⁹⁰ Furthermore, in November 1950, Kurt Schumacher, first leader of the Social Democratic party after 1945, claimed that the chancellor’s and his coalition’s emphasis on the defense of “woman and child and house and farm” was mere propaganda.²⁹¹ He

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ After the Center Party ceased to exist in 1953, Wessel was an elected representative of the All-German People’s Party (*Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei, GVP*), which she and Gustav Heinemann founded. After this party’s dissolution, Wessel joined the SPD. Cf. Stoehr, “Cold War Communities,” 333n58.

²⁸⁹ For the SPD’s position see Drummond, *The German Social Democrats in Opposition*. See also Ulrike Wasmuht, “Friedensbewegungen: Vom traditionellen Pazifismus zu neuen politischen Bewegungen,” in *Der Kalte Krieg: Vorspiel zum Frieden?*, ed. Arnold Sywottek (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1994), 128–139; Adam Seipp, “A Reasonable ‘Yes’: The Social Democrats and West German Rearmament, 1945–1956,” in *Rearming Germany*, ed. James S. Corum (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 55–70.

²⁹⁰ See the statements by Erich Ollenhauer from March 19, 1953 (Document 160) and Fritz Erler from 1952 (Document 159), printed in Christoph Buttnerwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie: Krieg und Frieden* (Heilbronn: Distel Verlag, 1984), 280–284.

²⁹¹ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 98. Sitzung, 8 November 1950, 3569.

cautioned that justifying rearmament by appealing to the emotion of fear would be counterproductive. Schumacher's argument against rearmament was informed by West Germany's postwar status of conditional sovereignty as codified by the Occupation Statute of Germany, and he demanded that the Federal Republic become an equal partner with the Allies, rather than just their auxiliaries.²⁹² Moreover, Schumacher and his fellow party members argued that West Germany's ill-considered rearmament would lead hinder Germany's unification.²⁹³

In addition to the SPD, the KPD proved to be one of the most outspoken critics of the rearmament agenda until the party was banned in 1956. Reacting to the extra-parliamentary protests of women's groups, Max Reimann, chairman of the party, demanded that the government discontinue its pursuit of rearmament because the tears of the "children and mothers," who had lost their husbands and sons in the "fascist raid" had not yet dried.²⁹⁴ In addition to the continued suffering of German women, the KPD presented various other reasons for opposing rearmament. Exploiting the widespread protests that continued on the streets of West German towns and cities, the KPD attacked the Allied occupation in order to support their claims. Without mentioning the Soviet occupation of East Germany, KPD politician Friedrich Rische denounced the former Western Allies as "foreign masters" who kept the Federal Republic occupied. Because the West German boys and girls had seen enough horrors during and

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ See the party's action programs from 1952 and 1954: "Aktionsprogramm der SPD, beschlossen auf dem Dortmunder Parteitag am 28. September 1952, erweitert auf dem Westberliner Parteitag am 24. Juli 1954," Christoph Butterwegge and Heinz-Gerd Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie: Krieg und Frieden* (Heilbronn: Distel Verlag, 1984), 278–279.

²⁹⁴ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 24. Sitzung, 16 December 1949, 737.

immediately after the war, Rische maintained, they should not be forced to “yield their own blood for foreign powers.”²⁹⁵

Given the various competing party lines and personal opinions, the questions of whether, how and why the Federal Republic should be allowed to establish military troops remained contested territory and influenced subsequent debates about amendments to the Basic Law.

The Amendment of the West German Basic Law

In light of parliamentary opposition and strong anti-militarization protests outside the *Bundestag*, it seemed unlikely that the chancellor would be able to persist in his effort to establish a West German armed force. The elections of 1953, however, disabused Adenauer’s severest critics of any notions of him changing his agenda. Receiving even more votes than in the first elections in 1949, the CDU celebrated a stunning victory.²⁹⁶ Adenauer’s new center-right coalition enjoyed a two-thirds majority and was able to pursue its rearmament plans without any problems. This change was necessary because, as noted earlier, the original version, promulgated in 1948, included neither an article that would govern military policies nor an article that would empower the government to introduce any form of military service.

In December 1953, the CDU/CSU and the FDP introduced competing bills to correct these omissions.²⁹⁷ The two proposals called for the amendment of Article 32a, Sub-Clause 2

²⁹⁵ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 98. Sitzung, 8 November 1950, 3594.

²⁹⁶ For a discussion of this result in relation to public opinion, see Geyer, “Cold War Angst.”

²⁹⁷ Entwurf eines Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes, Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU, GB/BHE, DP, 4 Dezember 1953, Drucksache 124, Deutschbundestag Drucksachen, Bd. 26. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes, Antrag der Fraktion der FDP, Drucksache 125. While building the governing coalition together, the two proposals resulted from of disagreement abouton how and to what extent the Basic Law should be altered. See, Volkmann, “Die Innenpolitische Dimension,” 433.

that would, if ratified, read: “Military Service can be introduced through federal law.” The proposals were debated by the Committee for Judiciary and Constitutional Law and the Committee for Questions of European Security in early 1954. Even though the committees were composed of members of the governing parties and the opposition, the parliamentarians immediately agreed on one fundamental idea: compulsory military service (*Wehrpflicht*) was a duty that rested solely with the Federal Republic’s male citizens. Military service, as Karl Weber, a CDU politician and trained lawyer, declared during a meeting of the Federal Law Committee on 9 February 1954, “traditionally never referred to women” but was always limited to men. Without being specific, he justified this opinion on the grounds of women’s and men’s “fundamentally different nature.”²⁹⁸ Tradition and the perceived difference between the two sexes yielded this gendered understanding of military service.

In addition to the perceived “natural” differences between women and men, Germany’s most recent history functioned as an important disincentive to rearmament. The National Socialist leadership had mobilized more than 500,000 women for auxiliary service in the *Wehrmacht* between 1939 and 1945 and thus broken the tradition to which Weber was referring. Understandably, West German politicians did not want to follow in Hitler’s footsteps.²⁹⁹ Appalled by the idea of recruiting “young girls” once again as anti-aircraft-axillaries, Adolf Arndt, parliamentary secretary and legal expert for the SPD, declared that he did not want to see women “armed as riflewomen” (*Flintenweiber*).³⁰⁰ Referring to *Flintenweiber*, the SPD

²⁹⁸ Der Deutsche Bundestag, Protokoll der 16. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrecht, 9 February 1954,” 64–65. For this debate see also, Swantje Kraake, *Frauen zur Bundeswehr: Analyse und Verlauf einer Diskussion* (Frankfurt a. M.: P. Lang, 1992), 52.

²⁹⁹ Hagemann, “Mobilizing Women for War,” 1055–1093.

³⁰⁰ Protokoll der 16. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrecht, 9 February 1954, 65.

politician used an image that emerged in the literature of German World War I veterans who joined the paramilitary and anti-communist *Freikorps* (Free Corps) during the 1918/19 revolution. In their memoirs and diaries, *Freikorps* members stylized themselves as Germany's defenders against the Bolshevik "red floods" and "rifle-women."³⁰¹ During World War II, the National Socialist leadership employed this imagery in their propaganda to denounce the Soviet Union in general and, particularly, their military practices, which systematically included women in the army. Continuing to decry the military service of women, Adolf Arndt used the image of the *Flintenweiber* as a warning against the revival of militarism, Nazism and communism. According to him and many other parliamentarians, women's armed military service was a sign that the state had become totalitarian and militaristic.

The "ample experiences"³⁰² from World War II even prompted West German politicians to contradict the conviction of the former Western Allies. Maintaining that the Adenauer government supported only the recruitment of men, CDU politician Helene Weber argued that she did not want to follow the "unfortunate" example of the United States or England, both of which had enlisted women for various forms of military service.³⁰³ Embracing this position wholeheartedly, Theodor Blank, deputy to the chancellor for questions relating to the increase of

³⁰¹ See Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies*, vol. 1, *Women, Floods, Bodies, History* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 70–108.

³⁰² Protokoll der 16. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrecht, 9 February 1954, 16.

³⁰³ Ibid. During World War II, numerous women had joined the various branches of the US military to help the war effort. After heated debates, US President Truman signed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act in June 1948. This legislative move allowed women to enlist in the army, navy and marine corps. The bill was, however, very restrictive as it limited the number of women who could enlist (2 percent of all enlisted personnel) and the number of commissioned and warrant women officers (10 percent of all women). See Michaela Hampf, *Release a Man for Combat: The Women's Army Corps during World War II* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010), 90–91. In Great Britain, the parliament introduced a bill on November 20, 1946, which enabled women to enlist voluntarily in the women's auxiliary service. Lucy Noaks, *Women in the British Army: War and the Gentle Sex, 1907–1948* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 146.

allied troops (*Beauftragten des Bundeskanzlers für die mit der Vermehrung der alliierten Truppen zusammenhängenden Fragen*), argued that women's recruitment would not help Europe. Having been appointed in October 1950, Blank and his staff were—at first covertly—responsible for planning West Germany's defense contribution and rearmament. If the European countries, Blank maintained, with the support of the United States, “would be unable to defend themselves,” it would be impossible to defend the “fatherland” with armed forces composed female auxiliaries.³⁰⁴ Indeed, the chancellor's deputy stated that he would not object to female service entirely, as long it was done on a voluntary basis and without weapons. Nonetheless, he hoped that the parliamentarians would formulate specific regulations against female recruitment. Such a formulation, Blank argued, would give him a great advantage during negotiations about the European Defense Community. If the Basic Law was amended accordingly, he and his staff could argue that the recruitment of women was unconstitutional.³⁰⁵ As Blank's statement shows, the desire to preclude women's access to armed military service and thus clearly to define postwar West German gender norms, even prompted government officials to reject the practices of other democracies.

Notwithstanding this agreement across party lines, the codification of military service as a duty incumbent only upon men proved to be difficult to enforce. As FDP politician, Marie-Elisabeth Lüders put it, the parliamentarians could not solely consider the “safeguard of women.” According to Lüders, who had worked for the Ministry of War in 1916, the

³⁰⁴ Der Deutsche Bundestag, Stenographisches Protokoll der 7. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit, 22 February 1954, printed in Brundo Thoß, ed., *Der Bundestagsausschuss für Verteidigung: Der Ausschuss für Fragen der Europäischen Sicherheit, Januar 1953 bis Juli 1954* (Düsseldorf, 2010).

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

parliamentarians also had “every reason to think of the men”³⁰⁶ who would be obligated to take up arms. This raised a question about equal treatment of the sexes. During the meeting on February 9, 1954, Adolf Arndt triggered a debate about Article 3, Sub-clause 2 of the Basic Law, which stated that “men and women are equal.”³⁰⁷ Even though the SPD-politician also opposed the recruitment of women, he warned that the parliamentarians had to deal with the “problem of equality before the law.”³⁰⁸

Arndt’s focus on Article 3 was most likely prompted by contemporary arguments against the idea that military service was solely a man’s duty. While West Germany’s rearmament was debated in the *Bundestag* in 1952, a lawyer mailed three letters to Arndt maintaining that limiting military service to men had become obsolete and illegal. Forcing only West Germany’s male population to render military service would discriminate against men by favoring women.³⁰⁹ Ignoring the many disadvantages that both West German single and married women faced in the workforce,³¹⁰ the lawyer argued that women would have an unfair advantage on the job market. In addition, the lawyer claimed that Germany’s most recent history had shown that the exclusion

³⁰⁶ Protokoll der 16. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrecht, 9 February 1954, 72. Born 1878, Lüders became the chief of the war office's central bureau for women's labor in 1916. Following World War I, she joined the German Democratic Part (DDP) and became a member of the *Reichstag*, where she fought for the equality of women. See, Ute Daniel, *The War from Within: German Working-Class Women in the First World War* (New York: Berg Publishers, 1997), 75.

³⁰⁷ For a history of the article and its surrounding debates see, Barbara Böttger, *Das Recht auf Gleichheit und Differenz: Elisabeth Selbert und der Kampf der Frauen um Art. 3.2* (Münster: Dampfboot, 1990); Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood*, 196.

³⁰⁸ Protokoll der 16. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrecht, 9 February 1954, 65.

³⁰⁹ Karl H. to Adolf Arndt, 22 January 1952, Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (hereafter: AdsD), Bonn, SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, 2/BTFA000013 Parlamentarische Geschäftsführung Adolf Arndt.

³¹⁰ See, Christine von Oertzen, *The Pleasure of a Surplus Income: Part-time Work, Gender Politics, and Social Change in West Germany, 1955–1969* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Erica Carther, *How German is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1997).

of women could no longer be justified on the basis of their “bodily and psychologically peculiarities.”³¹¹ On the contrary, according to the letter, women had proven their physical capabilities during the gruesome last months of the war and the early postwar years.

In his replies to the lawyer, Arndt argued that stressing women’s qualities in the present situation would be “psychologically incomprehensible” for many contemporaries.³¹² Without giving much detailed information, the SPD politician maintained that for “the man on the street” it would appear self-evident that in this case men and women “had to be treated unequally.”³¹³ Even though Arndt did not change his mind in the years to come, he repeatedly pointed to the problem of equality during the parliamentary committee meetings. He cautioned that young men would feel that they were not being treated as women’s equals. If only men had to serve in the armed forces, they could lose valuable time for vocational training and then face disadvantages on the job market.³¹⁴ According to Arndt, the civilian careers of men and the reconstruction of the complete male breadwinner family should not be jeopardized by the introduction of compulsory military service.

Trying to counter Arndt’s concerns, which were quite common in postwar Europe,³¹⁵ CDU member Helene Weber, vice-chairwoman of the Catholic Women’s League and leader of

³¹¹ Karl H. to Adolf Arndt from, 22 January 1952.

³¹² Letter from Adolf Arndt, processed by Dr. Hennis, 26 March 1952, AdsD, 2/BTFA000013, SPD Bundestagsfraktion Parlamentarische Geschäftsführung, Adolf Arndt.

³¹³ Letter from Adolf Arndt, 28 March 1952, AdsD, 2/BTFA000013 SPD Bundestagsfraktion Parlamentarische Geschäftsführung Adolf Arndt.

³¹⁴ Protokoll der 16. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrecht, 9 February 1954, 65.

³¹⁵ When the British parliament debated women’s voluntary enlistment into the military in 1946, some members of the Labor Party argued that while male recruits were asked to make sacrifices, women were given an unfair advantage on the job market. See, Noakes, *Women in the British Army*, 146.

CDU/CSU's Women's Union, recalled an earlier CDU statement about the equality of men and women. She declared that in this case her faction and party wished to interpret Article 3 in a way that equality for women meant "something different" than for men.³¹⁶ Endorsing Weber's argument, FDP politician Marie Elisabeth Lüders further stated that the question of whether women should be recruited or not "had nothing to do with the question of equality before the law."³¹⁷ Maintaining that "men are no not women" and "women are not men," she cautioned that "equality" should not be confused with "leveling" (*Gleichmacherei*). Because women "could not handle weapons," and men "could not handle babies," she argued that military service had to be limited to men.³¹⁸

By claiming that "handling weapons" was a talent only men possessed, Lüders could feel confident that she would have the support all her colleagues. Given how negatively parliamentarians viewed women's military service—as exemplified in the discussion of the *Flintenweiber*—Lüders did not encounter opposition. Even though parliamentarians were unable to formulate a precise definition of what constituted a weapon, they agreed that armed military service (*Dienst an der Waffe*) was above all a man's task.³¹⁹ Instead of armed service, parliamentarians such as Hans Jochim Merkat, a member of the conservative DB or German Party, stated that women could be employed in military jobs that "usually" had been exercised by women and that would "match women's character." For Merkat, these appropriate jobs were

³¹⁶ Protokoll der 16. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrecht, 9 February 1954, 65.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid, 64–65. See further, Hagemann, "Mobilizing Women for War."

³¹⁹ Protokoll der 16. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrecht, 9 February 1954, 68.

mainly auxiliary positions in the “kitchen, nursing, office” or “administering” soldiers’ clothing.³²⁰ If women wanted to work in the military voluntarily as nurses, kitchen help, or cleaning ladies, the parliamentarians did not object. Considering, however, that during a “total war” every citizen would be needed to help defending his or her “fatherland,” the committee members accepted the idea that women could be recruited for “compulsory service” if international developments demanded it.³²¹

Following the committee’s repeated consideration and the *Bundestag*’s approval, the amended Basic Law finally stated that the regulation of “foreign affairs as well as defense, including military service of men aged eighteen and the protection of the civilian society” rested solely with the federal government.³²² Based on the perceived difference between the sexes and the experience of World War II, West German parliamentarians clearly defined compulsory military service as a man’s duty and thus cemented traditional gender norms that portrayed men as the protectors of home, country, and the female sphere.

4. Debates in the *Amt Blank* about the “*Staatsbürger in Uniform*” and the European Defense Community

The military future of West Germany was not solely defined and decided in the realm of the *Bundestag* and its parliamentary subcommittees. Long before West German parliamentarians agreed on the codification of military service, Konrad Adenauer had already used his power as chancellor to create the Center for Service to the Homeland (*Zentrale für Heimatdienst*, ZfH) in

³²⁰ Ibid., 66.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² “Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes vom 26. März 1954,” *Bundesgesetzblatt*, 1/6, March 27, 1954, 54.

the spring/summer of 1950. The ZfH functioned covertly as the office for former Wehrmacht General Gerhard von Schwerin, who had been in charge of various panzer divisions during World War II. Adenauer commissioned Schwerin to deliberate the details of West Germany's potential defense contribution and the nature of a future West German military force.

In October 1950, the *Zentrale für Heimatdienst* invited fifteen men who had served in the *Wehrmacht* and were deemed “untainted” by the NS State to the Cloister Himmerod near the capital of Bonn.³²³ Among the men who attended the meeting were the former General of the Infantry, Herman Foertsch,³²⁴ Hans Speidel, who served as Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Adolf Heusinger, who briefly served as the Chief of the General Staff of the Army in World War II, the former Captain with the General Staff, Wolf Graf von Baudissin, and the staff-officer Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg. Convening for three days, the group discussed the international preconditions that had to be fulfilled before the Federal Republic could establish a military force, made organizational proposals, and developed guidelines for the troops' military training.

Likewise, the group discussed the “ethical and moral principles” that should shape the life and work of future West German soldiers. Because of serious disagreement among the participants, the final memorandum—the *Himmeroder Denkschrift*—tackled the question of the soldier's image, duty, and education only briefly. The document stated that the Federal Republic

³²³ See, Pauli, *Wehrmachtoffiziere*; Abenheim, *Reforging*, 52.

³²⁴ His participation was controversial, since he had participated in the formulation of the *Führereid* (Hitler Oath) in 1934. Instead of pledging loyalty to a constitution, the German *Wehrmacht* would pledge personal loyalty to Hitler. See Sebastian Conrad, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation: Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan, 1945–1960* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), 250–255.

had to create a “fundamentally new” type of soldier and devise a new “inner structure”³²⁵ that would guide military life. Given “Europe’s current state of emergency,” the memorandum acknowledged that West German soldiers could not serve or fight only for a national cause, but for all Western Europe. Yet since this progressive notion was hotly contested during the meeting, the memorandum also cautioned that future soldiers should always combine their obligation toward “Europe’s goods and ideals” with a “healthy” portion of love for their fatherland.”³²⁶

The conflicting ideas outlined in the *Himmeroder Denkschrift* functioned as an important basis for subsequent discussions both in Bonn and Paris. As stated earlier, the chancellor appointed CDU politician Theodor Blank as his deputy for questions relating to the increase of allied troops. But this job title was a façade. Until becoming the official Ministry for Defense in 1955, the *Amt Blank* was charged with planning and implementing West Germany’s defense contribution.³²⁷ In addition to the discussions and planning that took place in Bonn, officials of the *Amt* had to travel to Paris in order to negotiate the future structure of the EDC with delegates of the other European powers.

A document especially significant for delineating the future West European and West German soldier was known as the *discipline générale*. If sanctioned and implemented, the European *discipline générale* would have stipulated the rights and duties of all troops

³²⁵ The *Himmeroder Denkschrift* is reprinted in Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg and Norbert Wiggershaus, “Die Himmeroder Denkschrift vom Oktober 1950,” *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen* 1 (1977): 135–206.

³²⁶ Abenheim, *Reforging*, 53. See also Thomas Vogel, “The Himmerod Memorandum and the Beginning of the West German Security Policy,” in *Rearming Germany*, ed. James S. Corum (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 3–28.

³²⁷ For a history of the Amt Blank, see Montecue J. Lowry, *The Forge of West German Rearmament: Theodor Blank and the Amt Blank* (Frankfurt a. M.: P. Lang 1990). See also, Georg Meier, “Zur Frage der Personellen Auswahl bei der Vorbereitung eines Westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrages, 1950–1956,” in *Das deutsche Offizierskorps 1860–1960*, ed. Hans Hubert Hofmann (Boppard: Boldt, 1980), 351–365.

participating in the European Defense Community.³²⁸ Even though the EDC eventually failed and drafts of the *discipline générale* vanished into various European desk drawers, the Paris negotiations along with the discussion taking place in the *Amt Blank* shed light on how West German officials sought to define military service as a man's duty. In addition, the *discipline générale* also shows that the formulation of masculine concepts were not only shaped by the international context of the Cold War and European integration, but also by the experience of two world wars and West Germany's postwar attempts to reconstruct life and society in the wake of total war and defeat.

Defining the New West German Man in Military Uniform

Analyzing the beginning of West Germany's rearmament, scholars have paid close attention to the workings of the *Amt Blank* and especially to the sub-division *Innere Führung*. Initially founded as a sub-division responsible for the development of a concept of the inner structure of the future armed forces, the staff assigned to this office was predominantly in charge of sketching the contours of the new West German soldier and redefining the ideals of military education and training. Although he was considered an outsider by many, Wolf Graf von Baudissin was very influential in the subdivision *Innere Führung*. Having participated in the meetings at Cloister Himmerod, the former Wehrmacht Captain joined the *Amt Blank* in May 1951, where he worked closely with Johann-Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg, and Ulrich de Maizière, a former General Staff Officer with the Supreme High Command of the *Wehrmacht*.³²⁹

³²⁸ See Genschel, *Wehrreform*.

³²⁹ See in general the anthology, Rudolf J. Schlaffer and Wolfgang Schmidt, *Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907–1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007). See further Detlef Bald, "Graf Baudissin und die Reform des deutschen Militär", in: *Innere Führung: Zum Gedenken an Wolf Graf von Baudissin*, ed. Hilmar Linnenkamp and Dieter S. Lutz (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1995), 19–53.

Although their proposals were contested *ab initio*, their ideas and definitions would form the guiding principles of the West German armed forces.

Eager to prevent Germany's recent military history from repeating itself, Baudissin, Kielmansegg, and Maizière were convinced that the Federal Republic had to create a new type of soldier and fundamentally rethink the military's inner structure. Therefore they developed a tripartite image of the new soldier and citizen, which was based on the understanding that women's armed service would violate "moral law" (*das Sittengesetz*)³³⁰ and that only West German men would be drafted to serve as soldiers in the European Defense Community. This new soldier should be a man who would be a "good state citizen," (*guter Staatsbürger*), "free man" (*freier Mensch*), and "full-fledged" soldier.

If men's task was to defend both Europe and his "German home and family," the military had to become an integral part of the Federal Republic. Otherwise the new West German military would follow the deterrent example of the *Reichswehr* during the Weimar era and become a "state within the state."³³¹ Baudissin and his colleagues were convinced that the "dangerous dualism" between soldier and citizen had to be abolished, because the West German soldier would otherwise be unable to "stand his ground at the inner front of the Cold War" in a "manly" manner (*seinen Mann stehen*).³³² Since the future West German soldier would be obliged to defend the Federal Republic and Western Europe against the totalitarian regime of the Soviet

³³⁰ Vermerk, III/1/4-III-Z2, "Wehrpflicht der Frau: Vorläufige Stellungnahme," 20 August 1953. BAArch F, BW 9/1930, 20–25.

³³¹ See, Wilfried von Bredow, *Demokratie und Streitkräfte: Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), 60.

³³² Speech by Baudissin "Die Soziale Eingliederung des künftigen Berufssoldaten," printed in Wolf Graf von Baudissin, *Nie wieder Sieg: Programmatische Schriften, 1951–1981*, ed. Cornelia Bührle and Claus von Rosen (Munich: Piper 1982).

Union and an ideology that was based on denying “personal values” and “total submission of the individual,” they believed it imperative that the West German soldier become part of the democratic and pluralistic system he was supposed to defend.³³³ Both previous German military traditions and the ideological subjugation of individuality in the Soviet Union were the “other” against which officials sought to define the new West German soldier.

The idea that the soldier should be a “good state citizen” was closely connected to the second conviction, the notion that the soldier should also be a “free man.” In June 1953, Adolf Heusinger, who became the chief of the *Amt Blank*’s military office in 1952, Baudissin and Kielmansegg presented their plans to the parliamentary Committee for Questions of European Defense. In addition to granting soldiers certain political rights, they explained, the future military should ensure the development of each soldier’s personality, limited only by the boundaries of “military discipline and confidentiality.”³³⁴ Referring to the *Reichswehr* in the years between “1920 and 1930”, Heusinger complained that many of its soldiers were so eager to fit in and fulfill their troops’ expectations that they rarely had the chance to develop their own personality. Inferring that this had led to the success of the Third Reich, the former *Wehrmacht* general maintained that future West German troops should be trained in a way that would enable even a man perceived by his comrades as a “weirdo” to thrive.³³⁵

Notwithstanding the claim that future serviceman should participate in society and politics as other good citizens do, military planners also insisted that the new soldiers become

³³³ Der Deutsche Bundestag, Stenographisches Protokoll der 34. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit, 10 June 1953, printed in Bruno Thoß (ed.), *Der Bundestagsausschuss für Verteidigung: Der Ausschuss für Fragen der Europäischen Sicherheit, Januar 1953 bis Juli 1954* (Düsseldorf, 2010), 405–434.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Ibid.

“full-fledged” soldiers, thoroughly drilled and trained. This belief rested on the assumption that the future citizens in uniforms would soon be obliged to move to the battle field. Although scientific developments made it likely that future wars would be fought with atomic weapons, military experts as well as parliamentarians still anticipated that the West German soldier would engage in front-line battle against Russian soldiers. In order for the future soldier to defend Europe, his fatherland West Germany, and his home, he would need to combat the “rigor of the East” (*Härte des Ostens*).³³⁶ Although Heusinger’s argument was based on the perceived military strength and superiority of the Soviets in Eastern Europe, it was also influenced by the stereotypical image of “the Russian,” and in particular the image of the barbaric Red Army soldier. This image also motivated German forces at the end of World War II.³³⁷ This image, which pervaded many discussions in the *Amt Blank*, was elaborated by former General of the Artillery, Friedrich-Wilhelm Hauck³³⁸ during a conference for former soldiers organized at the Protestant Academy in Bad Boll near Stuttgart, in 1952. In his speech Hauck claimed that the soldier of the Red Army was “fanaticized, disciplined, tough” and “indifferent to casualties.”³³⁹ Moreover, Hauck maintained, the Red Army’s command displayed an exceptional “ruthlessness

³³⁶ Stenographisches Protokoll der 34. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit, 10 June 1953.

³³⁷ On Nazi propaganda at the Eastern front see, Christina Morina, *Legacies of Stalingrad: Remembering the Eastern Front in Germany Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 18–25.

³³⁸ Born 1897 in Breslau, Hauck served in World War I and II. He was appointed General of the Artillery on 20 April 1945 before being captured in Italy on 2 May 1945. He was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross in June 1944 in order to recognize his “extreme battlefield bravery and successful military leadership.”

³³⁹ Minutes, “3. Soldatentagung, in der Evangelischen Akademie Bad Boll,” 9–12 October 1952, 2. Archiv der Evangelischen Akademie Bad Boll.

against everything human.”³⁴⁰ Because of this pejorative and alarming image of the Soviet soldier, officials argued that West German soldiers needed to be trained with the utmost rigor.

Moreover, the pervasive image of the Red Army soldier allowed West German officials to deduce the behavior that would be expected from the future West German man in uniform. Presenting his “Thoughts about the Image of the Soldier” during the conference in Bad Boll in 1953, Wolf Graf von Baudissin warned against the “mechanical-totalitarian” soldier that had fought on both the German and on the Russian side of World War II. According to him, this type of serviceman was characterized by “blind obedience,” by the dissolution of any “sense of community,” and by “barbarism.”³⁴¹ If the Federal Republic used this model for its own army, Baudissin argued, West Germany would surrender itself to the East. Instead, the West German man in uniform needed to be imbued with humane as well as Christian values and display “chivalrous” behavior” (*ritterlich*).³⁴²

Arguing that an officer could always turn into a “director of mass murder” if he ignored the importance of common humanity,³⁴³ Baudissin and his supporters agreed that the West German soldier should be inspired by a “reverence for life” and the awareness that he had to “help the helpless,” which meant women, children, and the elderly.³⁴⁴ Influenced by the “total”

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid., 5. For a history of these images see, Hagemann, *Männlicher Muth*, 306–331.

³⁴² Minutes, “Sachverständigentagung in der Akademie Bundesfinanzschule Siegburg, Thema: Leitsätze für die Erziehung in den zukünftigen Streitkräften,” 25 and 26 September 1953. See further, Angelika Dörfler-Dierken, “Ethische Fundamente der Inneren Führung: Zur Aktualität von Baudissins Leitgedanken,” *SOWI-News* 2 (2005): 5–8.

³⁴³ Minutes, “Sachverständigentagung,” 25 and 26 September 1953.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 17.

warfare that had dominated World War II and by the perception of barbaric enemy troops, West German planners such as Baudissin sought to define the West German and, by extension, the European man as an effective soldier who would at the same time be bound by “moral and chivalrous” behavior.³⁴⁵

The West German Soldier between “Manneszucht” and Discipline

The agenda of the *Amt Blank* to develop an army of men who would simultaneously be restrained, “full-fledged” soldiers, “free men,” and “good state citizens” was quite ambitious, because it represented—as Ute Frevert has termed it— a “splits” (*Spagat*).³⁴⁶ The *Amt Blank*’s idea meant that the future West German man in uniform needed to be morally, physically, and intellectually the inhabitant of two spheres: both the military and civilian society. The proposals made by Baudissin, Kielmansegg, and Maizière were, however, forcefully contested, for they necessitated the reevaluation of military traditions, laws, and practices. First, the proponents of the new soldierly image had to face the criticism of other staff members working at the *Amt Blank*. Many conservative and traditionalist military experts opposed a far-reaching overhaul of military traditions. Second, determined to discuss their agenda with a broader public, members of the *Amt Blank* had to wrestle with the ideas and comments of the politicians, theologians, and sociologists who attended several meetings and workshops. Finally, the question of which rules and guidelines future soldiers should follow was debated not only on a national level. Employees of the *Amt Blank* had also to consider the debates about the European Defense Community, which were taking place in Paris.

³⁴⁵ For the West German delegation pressing this in Paris, see “G1/1 (T)/ Paris, Betr.: Coutume de guerre,” 15 May 1953. BArch F, BW 9/533, 258.

³⁴⁶ Frevert, *Kasernierte Nation*, 335.

Beginning in the fall of 1951, representatives of Italy, Benelux, France, and the Federal Republic convened in Paris to discuss the details of the European Defense Committee. The German delegation consisted of fifteen former officers. In the *Amt Blank*, the special task force “S” chaired by Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg was in charge of all issues relating to the EVG conference. Presiding over all the issues, however, was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁴⁷ In addition to the technicalities of strategies and tactics, the *discipline générale* was one of the major issues that the representatives needed to negotiate and formulate.³⁴⁸ These negotiations proved to be complicated, for the liberalizing idea of the *Amt Blank* met some resistance in Paris. Eager to establish an efficient West European army, British and French military leaders hoped that the German planners would display once again their “well-known talent” to establish the kind of armed forces they had come to dislike, though those forces had been admired in previous wars. The West German delegation had no intention, however, of meeting these expectations. On the contrary, when the French presented their draft of the European discipline code, Theodor Blank was alarmed because he thought that the draft “was worse than anything the Nazis had tried to do.”³⁴⁹ Consequently, many of the German delegates’ proposals surprised the other delegations.

One of the many contested aspects of the *discipline générale* was the very term discipline. In Paris, the West German delegation soon came to recognize that the French and the Italian representatives sought to introduce a formal form of discipline, to which the West

³⁴⁷ See, Meier-Dörnberg, “Die Planung des Verteidigungsbeitrages,” 673.

³⁴⁸ The German delegation translated the *discipline générale* as “Inneres Gefüge.”

³⁴⁹ Large, *Germans to the Front*, 99. See also the complaint by *Der Spiegel* that the USA wanted only “tough, tough, extra-tough” German soldiers. “EVG-Divisionen: Hart, hart, extra hart,” *Der Spiegel*, November 19, 1952, 17.

German delegates referred to as *Manneszucht* (literally: man's discipline).³⁵⁰ While the gendered term *Manneszucht*, which implied the notion of chastisement or punishment, was clearly understood as a form of military discipline and subordination, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the two terms—*Manneszucht* and discipline—were often used complementarily.³⁵¹ In addition to the notion of obeying military orders, the term *Manneszucht* had also moral implications. According to one of the leading German lexicons, upholding *Manneszucht* was especially important if “morally questionable elements” were rife among the soldiers.³⁵² The use and exaggeration of the term *Manneszucht* was at its peak during the terror under the Nazi regime. Deserters in particular were sentenced to death because they violated military *Manneszucht*.³⁵³

This understanding of discipline, however, contradicted the conviction of many staff members of the *Amt Blank*. In 1953, for instance, Baudissin emphasized that a distinction needed to be made between an “outer”—as favored by the French and Italians—and an “inner” discipline. Promoting soldierly ideals, Baudissin argued that coerced discipline or *Manneszucht* would not be sufficient anymore. Instead of forcing external discipline onto the soldier, he

³⁵⁰ It is oftentimes used synonymously and translated as “military discipline” and the soldiers’ absolute subordination to military order. See, David R. Snyder, *Sex Crimes under the Wehrmacht* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 22.

³⁵¹ For instance, while addressing imperial soldiers at Wilhelmshaven on 4 March 1901, Emperor Wilhelm II stated: “Soldiers! You are traveling to a foreign land that has experienced [...] what German discipline, German bravery, and German *Manneszucht* mean.” See, Friedrich Everling, ed., *Kaiserworte* (Berlin: Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1907), 222.

³⁵² See *Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon*, Vol. 9 (Leipzig, 1907), 41–43.

³⁵³ See, Kristina Brümmer-Pauly, *Desertion im Recht des Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin: Berlin Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006), 168–174.

himself would be obliged to develop an “inner discipline,” an “inner mental attitude.”³⁵⁴ According to Baudissin, this “inner discipline” would develop if the soldier recognized that he had to submit himself to the “demands of the community” without, however, abandoning his “personal sense of responsibility.” Only if the future soldier could develop this kind of discipline would he become an effective fighter. Such a sense of responsibility would also make him immune to “emotional crudeness” and passive acceptance.³⁵⁵

Not everybody supported Baudissin’s concept of the *Staatsbürger in Uniform* and his ideas about military discipline and practices.³⁵⁶ In particular, many conservative Wehrmacht veterans—inside and outside the *Amt Blank*—took offence and soon ridiculed the new military ideals as “Inner Strangulation” (*Inneres Gewürge*).³⁵⁷ One of the earliest and most militant critics of the new soldierly concept was Bogislaw von Bonin. After serving as the chief of various Panzerkorps, he became Chief of the Operational Branch of the Army General Staff in 1944. Allowing Army Group A to retreat from Warsaw in January 1945, Bonin disobeyed a direct order of Adolf Hitler, for which he was imprisoned in the concentration camps of Flossenbürg and Dachau. Joining the *Amt Blank* in 1952, Bonin became the advocate of traditional *Wehrmacht* practices and soon criticized Baudissin and Kielmansegg, going so far as to call them

³⁵⁴ Protokoll der Zweiten Gutachtertagung über die Probleme der Discipline Générale in der Akademischen Bundesfinanzschule Siegburg, 6 and 7 June 1953, 15. BArch F, N 717/461.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ See for example notes taken by Heinz Karst about his discussion with Undersecretary Ernst Wirmer, 22 January 1954. BArch F, N 717/2 Tagebuch.

³⁵⁷ Claus Freiherr von Rosen, “Erfolg oder Scheitern der Inneren Führung aus Sicht von Wolf Graf von Baudissin,” *Wolf Graf von Baudissin, 1907–1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung* ed. Rudolf Schlaffer and Wolfgang Schmidt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 203–233.

“dreamers” (*Traumtänzer*).³⁵⁸ Since future West German troops would have to confront the armed forces of the Soviet Union, Bonin believed that the virtues of the old *Wehrmacht* had to be revived and traditional notions of *Manneszucht* upheld. While he was seeking to put as many obstacles as possible in the paths of Baudissin and Kielmansegg, Bonin himself was forced eventually to resign. Following numerous internal quarrels and complaints, which received a lot of press coverage, Bonin left the *Amt Blank* in 1953.

Despite his dismissal, Bonin could be certain to have the support of other former *Wehrmacht* generals such as Georg von Sodenstern, who was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross for battlefield bravery in 1940. Like Bonin, Sodenstern believed in a timeless ideal of soldiering that combined the “metaphysical” qualities of “undying manliness” (*Ewigmännlichen*) and “primordial ferocity” (*Urkämpferischen*). Seeing officers as the keepers of Germany’s “most magnificent possession, its manliness” as well as its defenders against the Soviet Union, he consequently dismissed the “citizen soldier” as a “suicidal” concept that would endanger the Federal Republic.³⁵⁹ Instead, West German needed to produce valuable “fighters” if they wanted to win any battle. According to Bonin and Sodenstern, who represented only two of Baudissin’s numerous opponents, the soldier’s combat readiness and value was grounded in his superior masculinity. Based on this understanding, many military experts argued vehemently against Baudissin’s “crazy and special ideals” (*Spinnereien und Sondereinfällen*), that is against his ideal of the *Innere Führung* and the *Staatsbürger in Uniform*.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸ Krüger and Wiese, “Zwischen Militärreform und Wehrpropaganda,” 99–126.

³⁵⁹ Georg von Sodenstern, “Bürgersoldaten?,” *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 6 (1952): 241–254.

³⁶⁰ Genschel, *Wehrreform*, 178–180.

In addition to countering the criticism of former *Wehrmacht* generals, Baudissin and his colleagues had to defend their ideas during many meetings the *Amt* organized to involve a broader public in the military reforms.³⁶¹ One of these events was an expert conference the *Amt Blank* held on June 6 and 7, 1953 to discuss “problems” related to the European *discipline générale*. Debating the right form of discipline to which European troops should adhere, one of the invited guests, Professor Hartmann,³⁶² expressed displeasure with the wording of the code. Lamenting that the draft did not include “valued” soldierly qualities such as bravery or courage, he argued that the code implied that all that was necessary for a good army was that it be well drilled.³⁶³ Instead, the professor maintained that the code should “discuss discipline in terms of *Manneszucht* or the order that must be maintained.” He stated that the “soldierly mind” would understand that *Manneszucht* was necessary to turn the troops into an “orderly, forceful whole.”³⁶⁴ For Hartmann, the term *Manneszucht* clearly bore moral implications that would ensure military effectiveness.

Hartmann’s argument was supported by another academic commentator, university professor Erich Rothacker.³⁶⁵ Arguing that the term discipline (*Disziplin*) was useless, because it

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² So far I have been unable to obtain any information about him. Documents that discuss the conferences and mention Prof. Hartmann’s contribution specify neither his full name nor his profession.

³⁶³ Minutes, Zweite Gutachtertagung über die Probleme der Discipline Générale in der Akademischen Bundesfinanzschule Siegburg,” 6 and 7 June 1953. BArch F, N 717/461.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Born 1888, Erich Rothacker studied philosophy, psychology, history, art history, biology, and other disciplines. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Tübingen in 1911. He taught philosophy and psychology. He joined the NSDAP in March 1933. As member of the Ministry for Propaganda, he was involved in the burning of books in 1933.

was a “foreign word” that soldiers would be unable to understand, Rothacker lamented that the *discipline générale* did not refer to terms such as “bravery,” “decisiveness,” “self-control” and “self-discipline” (*Selbstzucht*). For him, it was of the utmost importance that the Parisian *discipline générale* include the notion of *Zucht* (discipline/chastisement). Directly connecting these attributes to the soldiers’ sex, he maintained that the discipline code needed to refer to manliness (*Mannhaftigkeit*) “and everything that is connected to it,” because manliness “had been regarded at all times as something valuable.”³⁶⁶ Thus, Rothacker explicitly linked effective military discipline to exceptional manly attitudes and behavior.

Although the argument that *Manneszucht* was essential to a successful military force flourished in Bonn and Brussels, proponents of the new approach to military training were not to be deterred. Responding to Rothacker and Hartmann, Baudissin maintained that *Manneszucht* was not an appropriate word to use. Although he had asserted earlier that manliness was an essential “prerequisite” for future soldiers, Baudissin insisted that *Manneszucht* was not discipline future soldiers should display. During the expert conference in Siegburg in 1953, he first of all maintained that *Manneszucht* was a “hackneyed” term unsuitable to present conditions. Baudissin and his colleagues hence favored a form of discipline that would match their tripartite concept of the future West German soldier.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁶ According to nineteenth century usage, the substantive *Mannhaftigkeit* and the adjective *mannhaftig* focused on a man’s gender. A man’s *Mannhaftigkeit* depended on his “moral qualities,” such as being brave, determined and forceful. See, Friedrich Wilhelm Genthe, *Handwörterbuch deutscher Synonymen, oder, Erklärung der in der deutschen Sprache vorkommenden ähnlich und gleichbedeutenden (sinnverwandten) Wörter* (Eisleben: Reichardt, 1834), 252.

³⁶⁷ Minutes, “Zweite Gutachtertagung über die Probleme der Discipline Générale,” 15.

Debating the Discipline Générale and the Marriage Decree

The problem of defining a pan-European military discipline that would not hinder West German plans to implement a new soldierly ideal proved especially difficult during discussion of individual articles of the *discipline générale* that were to regulate the soldier's life inside and outside the barracks. One feature of the *discipline générale* that was up for debate was the question of whether European soldiers should be required to obtain a permit before entering into marriage. This aspect of the Parisian negotiations has been generally overlooked by historians, who have focused more on debates about the soldiers' political rights and about how soldiers should be punished if they broke the law.³⁶⁸ Yet the arguments over marriage illuminate not only the complicated process of creating a pan-European defense force. They also shed light on the centrality of the concept of the family in West German discourse and the way specific family values influenced the debates about rearmament.

Early drafts of the European disciplinary code that circulated in the summer months of 1952 included the rule that officers on active duty, non-commissioned officers, and men (*Mannschaften*) who had been recruited for active service could only marry if they had received written approval from the military authorities.³⁶⁹ An internal preliminary comment, which circulated within the *Amt Blank* in late July 1952, stated that an obligation to obtain a marriage permit was "absurd," because marriage was a "private affair" and restrictions would violate the

³⁶⁸ See for example, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg, "Die Planung des Verteidigungsbeitrages der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Rahmen der EVG," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, ed. Lutz Köllner et al, vol 2, *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 684.

³⁶⁹ Transcription "Commite Interim AIRE De La Conference Pour L'Organisation de la communante Europeanne de defense, Paris," 17 July 1952. BArch F, BW 9/ 532, 314. The articles referring to a marriage decree varied. The marriage decree was debated as part of the "civic and political rights and duties of the soldier," and as part of the "outward appearance of discipline."

“personal freedoms” of the soldier.³⁷⁰ Despite this rejection of a marriage decree, the official response of the West German delegation considered the possibility of having professional soldiers report their marriage plans three months in advance. “Armed forces,” the West German delegation stated, “had considerable interest in selection of wives of their soldiers, because the human effectiveness of the individual [soldier] also depended on the mental attitude of his wife [...]”³⁷¹ Consequently, if the commander decided that a woman was not “law-abiding” and impeccable in her “moral behavior” (*sittlich und kriminell einwandfrei*), he could and should inform the soldier about his findings and emphasize that his marriage would most likely call his future employment “considerably” into question.³⁷²

The difference between the two statements resulted, first, from the West German delegation’s effort to simplify their negotiations with representatives of the other European countries. Whereas the West German delegation expressed doubts about a possible marriage decree, delegations from other countries seemed eager to include such a decree in the discipline code.³⁷³ Second, the discrepancy arose from conflicting opinions among the *Amt Blank*’s own legal and military experts. Since the delegations in Paris disagreed, the question of marriage remained on the international agenda and thus required more internal consideration. Meeting in

³⁷⁰ “Vorläufige Stellungnahme zu dem französischen Vorschlag über die äußere Form der Disziplin,” 21 July 1952. BArch F, BW 9/532, 353 and 363.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² “Stellungnahme der deutschen. Delegation zu dem französischen Vorschlag über die äußere Form der Disziplin,” n.d. [July 1952]. BArch F, BW 9/532, 385.

³⁷³ An internal comment on the disciplinary code stated that “[t]he other delegations are unanimously convinced that a marriage decree is necessary for professional soldiers and volunteers on prolonged service in order to prevent them from doing the wrong things.” See Bemerkung zu dem Pariser Entwurf der Disziplinarordnung, 18 November 1952. BArch F, BW 9/668a.

February and March 1953, West German officials discussed possible “regulations of marriage.” Contrary to the first preliminary comment, the experts discussed the matter on the basis of a legal statement which emphasized that a military marriage decree would not violate the West German Basic Law. According to the statement, a marriage decree would neither violate Article 2 (development of the individual) of the Basic Law nor the constitutionally protected “institution of marriage.”³⁷⁴ Deliberating whether a soldier’s private life as an individual had to comply with “official requirements,” the experts tackled both the situation of young volunteers and recruits and possible regulations for professional soldiers.

The situation of young soldiers was negotiated in two meetings, which were attended by military attaché Werner Kaminski, Ambassador Hellmuth Roth, and the former Captain and the chief deputy of the office of *Innere Führung*, Heinz Karst, amongst others.³⁷⁵ The participants in these meetings voiced concern about what they called “early marriages.” Because of the horrific effects of World War II, the protocol stated, many young people wanted to marry early because they were searching for some kind of “domesticity,” which they had all been missing for a long time.³⁷⁶ Yet the legal and military experts viewed this search for “domesticity” as something that would distract men from becoming real soldiers. Even though West German men were expected to join the military in order to defend their fatherland, family and home, discussants argued that a family could represent a “mental burden,” which could prevent the soldier from becoming part of

³⁷⁴ The assumption was based on the legal opinion of Prof. Köttren. BArch F, BW 9/537, 62.

³⁷⁵ Minutes “Diskussionsabend ‘Thema Heiratsordnung,’” 10 March 1953. BArch F, BW 9/537, 71.

³⁷⁶ Minutes “Diskussionsabend ‘Thema Heiratsordnung,’” 24 February 1953. BArch F, BW 9/537, 66. Given the format of the minutes, it is impossible to pin the different ideas to the individual participants.

the “military community.”³⁷⁷ If soldiers married too early, the protocol stated, they would run the risk of developing neither an *esprit de corps* nor a “will to serve” (*Einsatzwille*). Maintaining furthermore that military service represented the final stage of a man’s *Erziehung*, some experts believed that becoming a husband first would put this important stage of education and training in jeopardy.³⁷⁸

Whereas the discussants favored a marriage decree based on their understanding of military necessity, eventually the legal experts and military representatives agreed that, at least for recruits, no marriage decree should be introduced. The reasons the discussants refrained from voting for a marriage decree were twofold. First, some discussants raised the concern that limiting the soldier’s “personal freedoms” by limiting his freedom to marry whomever he chooses would violate an essential feature of the concept of the *Staatsbürger in Uniform*.³⁷⁹ The second reason discussants rejected the idea of a marriage decree concerned “children born out of wedlock.”³⁸⁰ Maintaining that children should be born not to single mothers, but into families, some discussants stressed that a soldier, whose “girl” was expecting a child, should always be granted the possibility of marrying her. In light of this pressing matter and in the absence of “imperative military necessities,” the protocol concluded that the military should refrain from introducing a marriage decree for recruits.³⁸¹

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 66–67.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Minutes “Diskussionsabend ‘Thema Heiratsordnung,’” 10 March 1953, 71.

³⁸⁰ Ibid, 72.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

The marriage of professional soldiers was, however, another issue, discussed at length during an evening meeting on May 22, 1953. According to the protocol, discussants favored a marriage decree for professional soldiers because they believed that in a “men’s society” such as the military it was important that a man who chose to become a professional soldier develop a “mindset” entirely focused on his work.³⁸² Developing this mindset was important because it would not only determine his effectiveness but also indicate his position within this “men’s society.”³⁸³ A professional soldier could only act as a superior to young soldiers, the protocol stated, if he established the right attitude. In addition to impeding a man’s position as a superior, an unwise marriage could hinder soldiers from effectively juggling the demands of their military and civilian lives. According to the protocol, some discussants believed that the military had first to form the character of a soldier and turn him into a mature man before he could be both husband and soldier.³⁸⁴ Although the protocol noted that some discussants had objected to this line of argument because they believed that a woman could influence the soldiers’ education in a positive way, the final draft included at least some form of marriage restriction.³⁸⁵

Even though the experts expressed conflicting opinions respecting the marriage of young soldiers and professional soldiers, both strands of argument were based on the idea that some women would be inappropriate as soldiers’ wives. According to the protocols, military and legal experts deemed it necessary to discuss criteria that future wives would be obliged to fulfill.

³⁸² Minutes “Diskussionsabend ‘Thema Heiratsordnung,’” 16 March 1953. BArch F, BW 9/537, 85.

³⁸³ Ibid., 85

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ The protocol stated three options: 1. a general ban; 2. conditional recruitment in which case applicants had to pledge not to marry for a certain time period; 3. declaration of agreement that in case a soldier got married before he was 25, he would agree to resign. See, Ibid., 88.

Defining such criteria, however, proved to be a delicate matter. One of the early drafts of the EVG's discipline code had demanded rather vaguely that a superior's "refusal of the contract of marriage" could only be motivated by "serious reasons" and not by "considerations of class, fortune or social situation."³⁸⁶ As discussions proceeded, West German officials remained vague in their attempts to formulate minimum standards or requirements that soldiers' wives had to fulfill. Some officials believed that not only the soldiers' own "character and conduct" should be elite, but their wives' should be too. Yet the officials proved unable to specify what particular qualities they had in mind. According to the protocol of the meeting on March 16, 1953, "social qualities" or "level of education" could not be used as benchmarks. Instead, only the "most primitive requirements" could be applied to decide whether a woman was acceptable. The document, however, did not specify the exact content of these "primitive" prerequisites. It only stated that the discussants found those requirements important to prevent "undesirable influences" from entering the military.³⁸⁷

Notwithstanding this vagueness, the idea that some women were better suited for becoming soldiers' wives than others was debated not only within the context of the European discipline code. The idea also guided the social conventions of the *Amt Blank* during these years. In fact, the internal records of the *Amt Blank* can shed light on what the "most primitive requirements" were. The manners and behavior of wives were noted, for instance, by Heinz Karst. Reporting on August 27, 1953 that Gerhard G.³⁸⁸ and his wife had paid him a visit, Heinz

³⁸⁶ "Projet de réponse a la section inter armées personnel sur le règlement de discipline générale," 31 October 1952, BArch F, BW 9/531, 141.

³⁸⁷ Ibid. 89.

³⁸⁸ Note by Heinz Karst, 27 August 1953, BArch, N 717/1.

Karst remarked that G.'s wife was an "especially nice, educated woman whose entire habitus speaks for her husband."³⁸⁹ By declaring that G.'s wife was a worthy companion to her husband, Heinz Karst not only expressed expectations members of the *Amt Blank* valued; he was also in tune with the social conventions that guided bourgeois society.³⁹⁰ Expecting women to be the proper and well-behaved companions of their husbands, women who did not meet these norms were harshly criticized. In contrast to his positive judgment about G.'s wife, seven months later Karst criticized a member of the West German delegation to Paris. Referring to reports of his colleagues, he noted that the marriage of the man in question was not "happy" and that his wife moved around Bonn "quite flamboyantly and depraved."³⁹¹ According to Karst, the social and professional standing of a man in military uniform depended as much on the behavior of his wife as on his own judgment and behavior.

Notwithstanding the continuing, widespread belief that the soldier's reputation depended on the quality of his marriage and the behavior of his wife, the terms of the military delegations' debates about a marriage decree changed in 1953. In light of the conflicting opinions on the matter, in late spring drafts of the discipline code asserted that with respect to certain "areas of public life" the soldier had to follow the regulations of his home country.³⁹² This transferred onto the national level the question of whether the future man in uniform could choose whatever

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ See for example, Dagmar Herzog, *Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 193.

³⁹¹ Note by Heinz Karst, 6 March 1954. BArch F, N 717/2.

³⁹² An early draft of the statement from 5 May 1953 included the phrase "areas of public life, especially with respect to suffrage and marriage." BArch F, BW 9/533, 27.

woman he preferred. On the national level, however, the marriage decree was not much debated, except on a few occasions, in the Committee for Questions of European Defense.

On May 21, 1953, the Committee for Questions of European Defense met to discuss a draft of the Volunteer Law and how it would relate to individual articles of the Basic Law. In this context, the committee members discussed Article 2, Subsection 1 of the Basic Law, which guaranteed the “development of the individual” (*Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit*), and tackled the issue of marriage regulations. At that time, committee chairman, CSU politician, and future Minister of Defense, Franz Joseph Strauß informed his colleagues that the “contract of the European Defense Committee” would not include any measures that would regulate or limit soldiers’ marital freedoms. He announced that the Adenauer government did not intend to implement any restrictions.³⁹³

Notwithstanding this affirmation, the sheer mention of a marriage decree upset the opposition. SPD politician Fritz Erler, who was—according to the protocol— especially disgruntled, expressed his hope that for the *Amt Blank* “the development of the individual” meant “something more than just marriage.”³⁹⁴ For members of the SPD, the question of whether soldiers needed the approval of their superiors before they could get married was a sensitive topic, because it touched more basic laws than Article 2. Internal proceedings show that for the SPD the question of a marriage decree was also related to Article 6 of the Basic Law, which stated that the Federal Republic of Germany granted constitutional protection to the institution of

³⁹³ Protocol of the Committee for Questions of European Defense meeting on 21 May 1953, printed in Bruno Thoß (ed.), *Der Bundestagsausschuss für Verteidigung: Der Ausschuss für Fragen der Europäischen Sicherheit, Januar 1953 bis Juli 1954* (Düsseldorf, 2010), 365.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

marriage and family.³⁹⁵ According to the Social Democrats, a restriction of marriage would violate this basic right.³⁹⁶ If the future West German soldier was supposed to be a good citizen and free man, the SPD maintained, he should also be encouraged to be husband and father at the same time. Parliamentarian Helmut Schmidt argued that officers “should have the nerve also to push a baby stroller, as is common in the United States army.”³⁹⁷ While this documentation shows that the political discourse of the early 1950s that focused on reconstruction of the “complete” male breadwinner clearly influenced how contemporaries judged military legislation, Helmut Schmidt’s vehemence can also be read as a reaction to his time as a *Wehrmacht* officer in the 1940s. In order to marry his partner Loki Glaser in 1942 he had to get permission from his military superior.³⁹⁸

The question of which path the European *discipline générale* should take and whether servicemen should be allowed to marry whomever they chose was taken off the table in August of 1954, however, when the French national assembly withdrew their support of the European Defense committee. The French *Non!* put an end to the western attempts to create a European defense force in which Germany would participate . In reaction to the decision of the French national assembly, representatives of Belgium, Canada, Italy, France, Luxembourg, the

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Memo of the party executive’s security committee, 8 May 1954. AdSD, Nachlass Ollenhauer, Mappe 391, Sicherheitsausschuss des Parteivorstandes der SPD.

³⁹⁷ Der Deutsche Bundestag, “Kurzprotokoll der 32. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit, 21 May 1953,” printed in Thoß, *Der Bundestagsausschuss für Verteidigung*. The tenth edition of *The Officer’s Guide* for the US army stated that “there are longstanding Army taboos against an officer in uniform pushing a baby carriage [...] while in uniform on the street, and the carrying of an umbrella.” See, *The Officer’s Guide: A Ready Reference on Customs and Correct Procedures Which Pertain to Commissioned Officers of the Army of the United States* (Harrisburg: Military Service Pub, 1944), 315.

³⁹⁸ Helmut Schmidt and Loki Schmidt, *Kindheit und Jugend unter Hitler* (Munich: Pantheon Verlag, 2012).

Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany met in Paris and London, in September and October respectively, to determine West Germany's status. One of many results of the two conferences was that West Germany would join NATO and be allowed to establish a 500,000-man conscription army.

Conclusion

Despite this abrupt rift, the issues that contemporaries discussed in the late 1940s and early 1950s would prove fundamental for all subsequent discussions about the West German military and the masculinity of West German soldiers and officers. The debates about the Federal Republic's contribution to the European Defense Community cemented not only the gendered construction of military service but also the traditional social gender norms. Received ideas about men's and women's natural social roles and attitudes toward the military practices of different totalitarian regimes determined that compulsory and voluntary armed military service would be limited to men. In postwar West Germany men had to act as the defenders both of Western Europe and the Federal Republic, whereas women, as mothers, wives, sisters, and girlfriends, were assigned to the domestic sphere. Thus, the debate about rearmament cemented traditional gender relations. This definition influenced the protests of *Ohne Mich* activists, permeated the debates in the *Bundestag* and related committees, and influenced legislative decisions pertaining to the amendment of the Basic Law as well as the ways in which the West German delegation negotiated the laws of the EDC.

The qualities that contemporaries consequently attributed to and required from the future West German man in uniform were influenced by both national and international currents. The masculine image that extra-parliamentary activists, government officials, and representatives

engaged with alternated between full-fledged soldiers of the traditional “manly” sort on the one hand, and gentle, restrained family men on the other. As scholars have pointed out, the reconstruction of postwar West German society focused heavily on the ideal of the male breadwinner family. This ideal influenced the actions of peace activists who sought to prevent rearmament and keep West German families united by protecting West German husbands, sons, and fathers from being drafted for military service. It also shaped the rhetoric of the Adenauer government: While equating men’s military service with the duties that men had to fulfill as heads of their families and households, the government was eager to put to rest any fear that rearmament would put West German men and their families at risk. Finally, seeking to devise a blueprint for the future troops, representatives of the *Amt Blank* had to discuss soldiers’ rights and duties, including their right to marry.

As contemporaries discussed the West German soldier as an integral part of their families and, by extension, of society, the Soviet threat loomed large. Convinced that the European Defense Community would need to face Russia’s Red army in battle, the Soviet soldier functioned as a bogey against which the West German and Western European man was defined. The West German man in uniform should be able to withstand the Russian threat not only through combat strength, but also through superior mental and behavioral capacities. The West German soldier was envisioned as simultaneously a gentle person and a vigorous combatant.

PART III
**EXPECTATIONS AND EXPERIENCE: THE DISCOURSE ON SOLDIER'S SOCIAL
AND MORAL STANDARDS DURING THE FORMATION PERIOD OF THE
BUNDESWEHR, 1955–1964**

As stated above, the plan to establish a European Defense Community (EDC) was up for debate in the French assembly in August 1954. The main point of contestation was the participation of West Germany. After heated debates during which opponents of the plan reminded their colleagues that France was about to ally with the Germans who “invaded us in 1792, in 1814, in 1815, in 1914 and in 1940,”³⁹⁹ the parliamentarians voted 319 to 264 against the EDC. The vote upset not only the international leadership, including President Eisenhower and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. It also necessitated a rethinking of the ways in which West Germany could be integrated into a Western defense force and function as a bulwark against the Communist East. A possible alternative was discussed only a month later. In September and October 1954, representatives of the Benelux, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in London to determine the future of the Federal Republic. After rather brief negotiations, the different parties agreed that West Germany should be integrated into NATO.⁴⁰⁰

Following the negotiations in London, representatives met again in the French capital at the end of October to sign the Paris Treaty. In addition to regulating the Federal Republic's

³⁹⁹ Quoted in Large, *Germans to the Front*, 212.

⁴⁰⁰ For a discussion of the transition from the EDC to NATO, see Bruno Thoß, “Der Beitritt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur WEU und NATO im Spannungsfeld von Blockbildung und Entspannung (1954–1956),” in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, ed. Hans G. Ehlert et al, vol. 3, *Die NATO-Option* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 1–234.

integration into NATO, the document included a so-called General Treaty that codified the Federal Republic's qualified sovereignty and ended its occupation status. Moreover, instead of a contingent that would be put under European command, the Federal Republic was to establish national armed forces that—following the proposal of the Adenauer government—would consist of twelve divisions and 500,000 men by 1958.⁴⁰¹ This goal was to be achieved by accepting voluntary conscription in order to establish a functioning officer corps and by introducing compulsory military service for men age 18 and older.⁴⁰² Despite heated debates between Adenauer's governing coalition and the opposition, the *Bundestag* eventually ratified the Paris Treaty in February 1955. Consequently, the Federal Republic gained its sovereignty on May 5, 1955 and joined NATO officially on May 9, 1955.

In the wake of these agreements the first 1,000 volunteers entered the barracks in the cities of Andernach (army), Nörvenich (air force) and Wilhelmshaven (navy) in January 1956. Fifteen months later, on April 1, 1957, the first cohort of draftees followed. As this beginning suggests, the ambitious goal to have a 500,000 men strong military at the end of 1958 was not reached.⁴⁰³ The government revised its plans already in March 1956 and the *Bundeswehr* counted just 170,562 men in November 1958. Only in 1965 did the *Bundeswehr* reach the

⁴⁰¹ For the military planning, see Christian Greiner, "Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO, 1954–1957," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, ed. Hans G. Ehlert et al., vol. 3, *Die NATO-Option* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 563–850, here 570–602.

⁴⁰² The argument that compulsory military service was a necessity developed already in the early 1950s. However, in light of the widespread sentiment against rearmament, the Adenauer government sought to keep this necessity purposefully under the radar. Hans Ehlert, "Innenpolitische Auseinandersetzungen um die Pariser Verträge und die Wehrverfassung 1954 bis 1956," in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, ed. Hans Gotthard Ehlert et al., Vol. 3, *Die NATO-Option* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 430–432. See also Wolfgang Schmidt, *Integration und Wandel: Die Infrastruktur der Streitkräfte als Faktor sozioökonomischer Modernisierung in der Bundesrepublik 1955–1975* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), 23–27.

⁴⁰³ See Nägler, *Der gewollte Soldat*, 291–292.

strength of 449,800 men and the last of 12 divisions was put under NATO control. This was the final step that officially concluded the formation period of the *Bundeswehr*.⁴⁰⁴

Notwithstanding the slow progress, the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* as a national defense force and the implementation of compulsory military service triggered a new wave of disputes, because West Germans continued to express conflicting opinions about rearmament.⁴⁰⁵ Points of contention were numerous. Given the target size of the *Bundeswehr*—which exceeded for example the strength of the German *Reichswehr* during peacetime (1919–1935)⁴⁰⁶—discussions erupted about the possible social implication of recruiting such a large number of men. Women’s organizations, religious youth groups, welfare workers, citizens living near military structures as well as government-critical newspapers became increasingly concerned with the possible negative effects that military life could have on young men’s social and sexual behavior. In contrast, a considerable number of school principals, parents, enthusiastic veterans, and conservative news outlets continued to propagate the idea that military training could inculcate young men with socially acceptable manners and turn them into citizens who would improve the social fabric of the FRG. While disputing this issue, contemporaries also disagreed about the methods military commanders should employ to train young recruits. In contrast to supporters of the *Innere Führung*, some conservative journalists and *Wehrmacht* veterans called for stern discipline and traditional drill practices.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁴ Not until the mid-1970s was the initial proposal of 500,000 men almost reached. See Schmidt, *Integration und Wandel*, 26–27; Nögler, *Der gewollte Soldat*, 2.

⁴⁰⁵ Bremm, “Wehrhaft wider Willen,” 283–297.

⁴⁰⁶ In comparison, the Versailles treaty limited the *Reichswehr* (1919–1935) to 100,000 men.

⁴⁰⁷ Bremm, “Wehrhaft wider Willen.”

The public's preoccupation with the potential positive and negative effects of military life immediately concerned the conservative Adenauer government, members of the *Bundestag*, and the military leadership. Eager to turn the *Bundeswehr*'s establishment into a success story, the government sought to capitalize the positive sentiments, while at the same time seeking to counter any concerns that could jeopardize its realization. Fervent to ensure positive relations between the troops and society, military commanders and employees of the Ministry for Defense furthermore devised numerous regulations, decrees, and handbooks that explicitly targeted soldiers' social and sexual behavior. The goal of these efforts was to inculcate recruits with social ideals and manners that were agreeable to a broad public.

This struggle over the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* and the implementation of conscription was, however, more than an attempt to shape West German military politics. It was also a continuing struggle to define the social and moral boundaries of West German society. Scholars working on West German postwar history have long departed from the view that the Adenauer era was a lethargic period with already rigidly defined principles.⁴⁰⁸ They highlight instead that the 1950s and early 1960s were a period during which contemporaries eagerly negotiated moral norms and social values.⁴⁰⁹ Continuing to consider the heterosexual Christian male-breadwinner family as the backbone of a functioning democracy, the Adenauer

⁴⁰⁸ See, Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, "'Reconstruction' and 'Modernization': West German Social History during the 1950s," in *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era*, ed. Robert G. Moeller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 413–443; Arnold Sywottek, "Wege in die 50er Jahre," in *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre*, ed. Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1998), 13–39. For a discussion on periodization, see Konrad Jarausch, "Critical Memory and Civil Society: The Impact of the 1960s on German Debates about the Past," in *Coping With the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955–1975*, ed. Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 11–30.

⁴⁰⁹ Dagmar Herzog, *Sex after Fascism*; Uta Poiger, "Rock 'n' Roll, Female Sexuality, and the Cold War Battle over German Identities," *Journal of Modern History* 68 (September 1996): 577–616; Ibid. "A New 'Western' Hero?"

government, conservative church representatives, and welfare workers ventured to strengthen this family ideal against liberal counter-narratives and in contrast to the family politics of the GDR.⁴¹⁰ Amidst this process, the recruitment of the first cohorts of men offered West Germans another important way to negotiate not only socially acceptable male behavior, but also specific gender relations that every young man should embrace upon entering the barracks. Following the dominant discourse, disputes over the military centered on the soldiers and officers as heterosexual, monogamous men who were or aspired to become the head of a nuclear family.

In order to shed light on this history, this part first turns to the parliamentary negotiations of compulsory military service, for they cemented the gender of the West German soldiers and officers. From there, it discusses contemporary reactions to the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* as a national conscription army by analyzing opinion polls and media reports as well as critical statements by individual citizens, religious and social welfare groups. Finally, this part addresses the different ways in which government officials, members of all leading parties as well as the military command sought to counter the public's concerns about the social behavior of the West German troops.

⁴¹⁰ Heineman, *What Difference Does a Husband Make?*, 122; Moeller, "Reconstructing the Family in Reconstructing Germany: Women and Social Policy in the Federal Republic, 1949–1955," in *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society and Culture in the Adenauer Era*, ed. Robert G. Moeller (Ann Arbor, 1997), 109–133. For family politics of the Catholic Church that greatly influenced the Rhenish-Catholic Adenauer government, see Lukas Rölli-Alkemper, *Familie im Wiederaufbau: Katholizismus und bürgerliches Familienideal in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1965* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000).

1. Parliamentary Negotiations over the Ideal of the *Bundeswehr* Soldier

The international agreements of the mid-1950s required a new legal framework that would regulate the workings and function of the West German troops. One major issue was, without question, the regulation of conscription. In the summer of 1955, the *Bundestag* and the responsible parliamentary committees began negotiating the necessary amendments to the Basic Law as well as the *Freiwilligengesetz* (Law Governing the Legal Status of Volunteers), which was soon replaced by *Soldatengesetz* (Law Governing the Legal Status of Soldiers), and the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* (Law Governing the Recruitment of Men for Compulsory Military Service).

At the beginning of the negotiations, Theodor Blank informed the *Bundestag* about the government's agenda. According to the minister, the government planned to introduce compulsory military service "in times of peace" for men between the age of eighteen and forty-five.⁴¹¹ Men would be drafted for a period of eighteen-month basic military service (*Grundwehrdienst*) at the age of twenty and, on occasion, called back for temporary military exercises (*Wehrübungen*).⁴¹² In the "case of emergency" (*Ernstfall*), however, the government reserved the right to make men's military service permanent. Although the minister did not use the word "war," it was clear that an armed conflict between the newly declared Warsaw Pact, on the one side, and the United States and its NATO partners, on the other, would lead to the extension of compulsory military service.⁴¹³ At the same time, the proposals also stipulated that a

⁴¹¹ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 92. Sitzung, 27 June 1955, 5216. See further, Ehlert, "Innenpolitische Auseinandersetzungen."

⁴¹² VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 92. Sitzung, 27 June 1955, 5217.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

man's conscience and social responsibilities could curtail the demands of the state. In addition to keeping the constitutional right to apply for conscientious objection, the government considered measures to free or exempt men from military service if their recruitment would interfere significantly with their health, education, and practical training, or their personal life.⁴¹⁴

By outlining the scope of compulsory military service, Blank addressed issues that would lead to lengthy and intense *Bundestag* sessions.⁴¹⁵ The negotiations of the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* were especially fierce, because parliamentarians' opinions were not solely defined by whether they belonged to Adenauer's governing coalition or to the opposition. To be sure, continuing to challenge Adenauer's security and military politics, the oppositional Social Democrats objected to the introduction of the compulsory military service. Yet, over the course of the debates, the FDP and the All-German Bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights (GB/BHE) turned into renegade coalition partners. Even though the FDP generally supported the idea of compulsory military service for men, they did not approve of the ways in which Chancellor Adenauer and his supporters pursued their political agenda. Criticizing Adenauer and his ministers, the FDP politician Erich Mende stated, for example, that the government should have prepared the reading of the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* more carefully, because this law would encroach upon a "German man's life and liberty" like no other law had done before.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ The deliberations of the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* span three sessions. The second session, for instance, lasted sixteen hours. According to SPD politician Alfred Bazille, fourteen parliamentarians had to seek medical assistance due to circulatory disorder and cardiac insufficiency. See VDB, *Der Deutsche Bundestag*, 159. Sitzung, 6. Juli 1956, 8830. See also, Ehlert, "Innenpolitische Auseinandersetzungen," 532.

⁴¹⁶ VDB, *Der Deutsche Bundestag*, 143. Sitzung, 4 May 1956, 7517.

Since the negotiations of the laws were truly intense, they have received a lot of scholarly attention. While military and political scholars have, for example, addressed the quarrels over the length of compulsory military service—eighteen, fifteen, or twelve months—feminist historians have stressed the exclusion of women from military service.⁴¹⁷ Given the horrific treatment of men who refused to serve, scholars have furthermore highlighted the novel status of conscientious objectors and the exemption of clerics as one of the most important aspects of the rearmament debate.⁴¹⁸ Building upon this scholarship, the following analysis stresses that the introduction of compulsory military service also led to the reinforcement of West Germany's postwar gender order, which cemented men's role as the protector of the West German home and family and assigned women to the sphere that needed protection. Although this division was quickly defined, negotiations about men's duties were contested, for the difficult question that parliamentarians had to answer was whether a man—as husband, father or son—had to protect his home and family by joining the armed forces or by staying home and working for the family's livelihood.

Bundestag Debates about the Exclusion of Women from Military Service

Even though West Germany's Basic Law already codified the exclusion of women from military service, the changing circumstances of West Germany's rearmament triggered new debates about how compulsory military service needed to be limited to men.⁴¹⁹ The arguments that

⁴¹⁷ See, Janßen, *Frauen ans Gewehr*; Kraake, *Frauen zur Bundeswehr*. See also: Franz W. Seidler, *Frauen zu den Waffen? Marketenderinnen, Helferinnen, Soldatinnen* (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998), 206–223.

⁴¹⁸ Bernhard, *Zivildienst*.

⁴¹⁹ See Ahrens, “Verzögerte Anpassung,” 32–45. See further Kraake, *Frauen*.

parliamentarians put forth in the mid-1950s resembled those of the early debates. Speaking for the Adenauer government, the CSU politician and chairman of the Committee for Defense, Richard Jaeger, emphasized once more that military service as a “moral duty” that every West German male citizen had to fulfill.⁴²⁰ Referring to the fact that the West German military was established solely as a defensive force, he argued in 1956 that it was the duty of the “German Volk” to defend itself against a “Soviet-Russian attack.”⁴²¹ Although a private male citizen (*Privatmann*) was not obliged to defend himself against an attack and could choose to be killed, Jaeger maintained that this freedom did not apply to a “paterfamilias” who was responsible for his wife and children.⁴²² Similar to the early 1950s, CDU/CSU politicians argued that men were responsible for defending West Germany, their homes and families against any threats from the East.

The experience and memories of the Third Reich continued to play an important role as well. Portraying a gender order in which women needed protection and men provided this protection, Jaeger also made it clear that a reversal of this order was unacceptable. In June 1955, he maintained that the national socialist League of German Girls (*Bund Deutscher Mädel, BDM*) marching in lockstep epitomized the “triumph of militarism and the perversion of true soldierhood” (*Soldatentum*).⁴²³ For Jaeger, organizing women in a military fashion like the Nazis represented a deviation from the ways in which both normal non-militarized societies and

⁴²⁰ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 143. Sitzung, 4 May 1956.

⁴²¹ Ibid., 38. [italics added, FB].

⁴²² Protokoll des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 102. Sitzung, 23 June 1956, 37. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, A1/50-Prot. 102.

⁴²³ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 93. Sitzung, 28 June 1955, 5228.

ordinary militaries functioned. In societies that had not been consumed by the workings of militarism the female sphere and military practices were unrelated.

In arguing that women should not serve in the West German armed forces, Jaeger could be certain that he had the continuing support of his colleagues. Even though the amendments of the Basic Law as well as the passing of the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* were controversial, representatives of all parties still agreed that military duties—especially the bearing of arms—did not apply to women. For instance, FDP politician Marie-Elisabeth Lüders and CDU politician Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt argued that in order to prevent women from serving in the armed forces their constitutional rights could be curtailed. Albeit the Basic Law allowed women “to choose their occupation, place of work and place of education freely,” the two parliamentarians maintained that in the case of armed military service this freedom had its limits.⁴²⁴ Although Lüders and Schwarzhaupt were eagerly fighting for women’s “equality within marriage and the family” during this period,⁴²⁵ they did not advocate for an unlimited form of gender equality. In the case of national defense, they contended, some of the rights and duties stipulated by the Basic Law should apply to men only in order for the state to protect its female citizens.

The SPD did not challenge the CDU/CSU and FDP’s eagerness to bar women from compulsory and armed military service. For example, Reinhold Rehs, who had commanded the Air Raid Warning Service of the German-occupied city of Danzig from 1944 to 1945, argued that if the Federal Republic decided to recruit women for service in the armed forces it would

⁴²⁴ Protokoll der 106. Sitzung des 16. Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrechts, 6 Februar 1956, 7 and 9. On Lüders’ position see, Irene Stoehr, “Frauenerwerbsarbeit als Kriegsfall. Marie-Elisabeth Lüders: Variationen eines Lebensthemas,” in *Frauen arbeiten: Weibliche Erwerbstätigkeit in Ost- und Westdeutschland nach 1945*, ed. Gunilla-Friederike Budde (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997), 62–77.

⁴²⁵ For the debates about women’s equality within marriage and family life see, Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood*, 76–108.

eventually take the same ideological path the German Democratic Republic had taken.⁴²⁶ Although the GDR did not introduce compulsory military service until 1962, the SED had already incorporated the notion of pre-military education into the state's Youth Law. In 1952, the SED also founded the Society for Sport and Technique (*Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik*), which offered military sport exercises for both girls and boys so that they would be prepared for military service.⁴²⁷ Most likely aware of these developments, Rehs and others agreed that the Federal Republic had the "moral" obligation to distinguish themselves from the GDR and exempt women from military service.⁴²⁸

As a result, the amended Basic Law of 1956 as well as the different laws that governed military service stipulated that compulsory military service and, above all, armed military service applied to men only.⁴²⁹ Recruiting women for duties that would help the Federal Republic to defend itself against any external or internal threats was only thinkable if these duties could be fulfilled outside of the realm of the troops and without weapons. Beginning in 1957, for instance, parliamentarians repeatedly discussed the shortfalls of the medical service. In light of the Suez Crisis (1956/57), the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in November 1956, and the Hungarian Revolution of October/November 1956, members of the Committee for Defense pondered the conscription of women as First Aid personnel in order to provide care for the civilian population

⁴²⁶ Protokoll der 106. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrechts, 6 February 1956, 6.

⁴²⁷ See, Christian Sachse, "'Disziplin muss geübt werden!'" Zur Geschichte und pädagogischen Praxis der Wehrerziehung in der DDR," in *Unter dem Deckel der Diktatur: Soziale und kulturelle Aspekte des DDR-Alltags*, ed. Lothar Mertens (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003), 137–164.

⁴²⁸ Protokoll der 106. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrechts, 6 February 1956, 6.

⁴²⁹ The amendments to the *Grundgesetz* that the *Bundestag* passed on March 6, 1956 read: "Women must not be committed through law to render service in the organization of the armed forces. On no account may they be employed for armed military service."

in case of an emergency.⁴³⁰ After all, “taking care” of other people was considered suitable for women and a task that corresponded with their skills.⁴³¹

This understanding was underlined once more in the early 1960s, due to the beginning negotiations of new emergency laws. Accompanied by intense protest inside and outside of the *Bundestag*, the Adenauer government introduced emergency laws that would be included in the Basic Law.⁴³² Proposed in 1958, 1960 and 1962, the laws would have greatly extended the powers of the executive and enabled the conscription of women for civilian duties (*Notdienstgesetz*). In this context, Adenauer’s government also considered the deployment of women as nurses, civil air raid protection personnel, telephone operators, and mechanics in order to free men to fight and to strengthen civil defense.⁴³³ While the proposals were disputed intensively, one constitutional provision was not challenged: by and large, all political parties continued to agree that compulsory military service and, above all, armed military service applied to men only and was, under no circumstances, to be extended to women.⁴³⁴

⁴³⁰ Stenographisches Protokoll der 155. Sitzung für Verteidigung, 10 April 1957. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, A1/50-Prot. 102.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Stenographisches Protokoll der 101. Sitzung für Verteidigung, 8 December 1960. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, A1/50-Prot. 102.

⁴³³ Janßen, *Frauen ans Gewehr*. For the extent of this planning, see Bundesminister für Verteidigung/ FÜ B VI 1 to Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff, FÜ B IV, “Aufstellung einer weiblichen Hilfsorganisation,” 28 July 1958. BArch F, BW I/56 712.

⁴³⁴ Stenographisches Protokoll der 101. Sitzung für Verteidigung, 8 December 1960.

Parliamentary Debates about the Limitations of Compulsory Military Service for Men

While the implementation of the *Wehrpflicht* thus cemented once more a traditional gender order, it also prompted disputes about whether military service should be compulsory for all eligible West German men as soon as they turned eighteen. As scholars have pointed out, the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* caused new discussions about the status of conscientious objectors as well as the exemption of clerics and students.⁴³⁵ Moreover, members of the *Bundestag* concerned themselves with the status of orphans and young men who were the last-living male members of their families, on the one hand, and the treatment of GDR refugees and men whose close relatives lived in East Germany, on the other.

Despite the consensus that parliamentarians reached with respect to the “women’s problem,”⁴³⁶ the negotiations of this ‘men’s problem’ were not as easy. To be sure, the governments’ draft of the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* included a number of reasons for which men could be exempt from military service or could defer their recruitment. First, men could be spared from military service temporarily if their recruitment would jeopardize the well-being and maintenance of their families, especially their “needy parents.” Second, the draft envisioned the deferment of military duty if a draftee was indispensable for the continuing maintenance of his parents’ business. Underlining the importance of men’s role as the breadwinners of their families, the government sought to support families by considering their economic situation.

⁴³⁵ Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg, “Auseinandersetzungen um die Einführung des Wehrpflicht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in *Die Wehrpflicht: Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärische Wirkung* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), 107–118. See also Jutta Weitzdörfer-Henk, “Warum brauchen wir eine Wehrpflicht?” Wehrpflichtdebatten im Weimarer Reichstag und im Deutschen Reich,” in *Reform, Reorganisation, Transformation: Zum Wandel in deutschen Streitkräften von den preussischen Heeresreformen bis zur Transformation der Bundeswehr*, ed Karl-Heinz Lutz, Martin Rink, Marcus von Salisch (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2010), 295–315.

⁴³⁶ Protokoll der 90. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Rechtswesen und Verfassungsrecht, 5 December 1955, 13.

Third, the government's draft allowed for the deferment or exemption of men who had family ties in the GDR. While recruits could apply for deferment if their service would present a particular hardship to first-degree relations, the proposal also stipulated that people who migrated into the Federal Republic would be liable to military service after one year.

According to members of the SPD, however, the government's draft was insufficient, for it considered neither the horrors of World War II nor the division of Germany fully.⁴³⁷ To that effect, the Social Democrats introduced a counterproposal. First, they wanted to ensure the exemption of male orphans whose parents (one or both) had died due to "war damages" such as injuries sustained during hostilities and military actions or because of violent measures used by the National Socialist regime.⁴³⁸ Second, the SPD wanted to allow young men whose first-degree relatives lived in "Soviet occupied Germany"—including East Berlin—to be able to request the deferment of their recruitment.⁴³⁹

Although the faction of the FDP supported the SPD's ideas, the party initially introduced its own counterproposal, which went beyond that of the Social Democrats.⁴⁴⁰ Whereas the SPD proposed to only defer the recruitment of draftees who had close relatives living in East Germany, the Free Democrats sought to completely exempt these men. In addition, the Free

⁴³⁷ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, Umdruck 723.

⁴³⁸ While the SPD's definition of "war damages" was based on the Paragraph 5 of the 1956 Federal War Victims Relief Act (*Gesetz über die Versorgung der Opfer des Krieges* or *Bundesversorgungsgesetz, BVG*), the 1956 Federal Compensation Law (*Bundesentschädigungsgesetz*) formed the basis party's definition of people who were persecuted by the Nazis.

⁴³⁹ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, Umdruck 723, Änderungsantrag der Fraktion der SPD zur zweiten Beratung, 8648.

⁴⁴⁰ For the agreements between the two parties see the comments by SPD politician Helmut Bazille and FDP politician Erich Mende in VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, 8607.

Democrats proposed that draftees “of whom all brothers or, if no brothers existed, all sisters, or, if no siblings existed, whose father had died as a result of damages as defined by § 1 of the Federal War Victims Relief Act”⁴⁴¹ could be exempt from military service upon application. In this way it went beyond the SPD’s proposal that focused solely on orphans

Both the SPD and the FDP justified their counter-proposals by emphasizing the ideal of the unified German family. Focusing on the GDR, FDP politician and member of the party’s national board, Herta Ilk, argued that the government’s proposal would put unbearable hardship onto families that were divided by the Iron Curtain.⁴⁴² She feared above all that, if the Federal Republic recruited young men whose families lived in the GDR, the East German regime would mostly likely pressure and punish the soldiers’ families based on the idea of family liability (*Sippenhaft*). Stating that her party was “deeply committed” to Article 6 of the Basic Law, which dictated that marriage and family enjoyed the state’s special protection, Ilk maintained that the FDP would not support any actions that jeopardized “the relationship between parents and their children.”⁴⁴³

Ilk’s argument was seconded by the SPD. The party’s military expert Fritz Ehler reasoned that the introduction of compulsory military service would lead to an even greater divide between the FRG and the GDR, because it would tear apart many more families.⁴⁴⁴ Ehler’s colleague Louise Schroeder from West Berlin urged the Adenauer government to

⁴⁴¹ Änderungsantrag der Fraktion der FDP zur zweiten Beratung des Entwurfs eines Wehrpflichtgesetzes, VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, 86447.

⁴⁴² Ibid., 8613.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 8614.

⁴⁴⁴ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 143. Sitzung, 4 May 1956, 7498.

consider the suffering of East German mothers who had one son in the GDR and one in the Federal Republic. If the *Bundestag* passed the *Wehrpflichtgesetz*, she argued, one son would be drafted into the West German armed forces, while the other would be pressured to join the National People's Army.⁴⁴⁵ Emphasizing once more the threat of a "brothers' war,"⁴⁴⁶ the SPD parliamentarians were eager to prevent the introduction of compulsory military service.

The mutual support expressed by SPD and FDP politicians applied also to the status of orphans and men who were the last living sons of their families. The parties agreed for two main reasons. Focusing first on World War II, the FDP politician Elisabeth Lüders and SPD representative Helmut Bazille reminded their fellow parliamentarians that many German families had lost "five, six, seven or more sons"⁴⁴⁷ during the war. In addition, many young men had been exposed to endless misery during the immediate postwar years.⁴⁴⁸ These German families, Bazille concluded, had suffered enough and hence deserved some compensation. Second, both parties worried about the threat that future wars would pose to orphans and families who had but one male member. For instance, SPD politician Alfred Gleisner argued that his party wanted to spare last sons and male orphans in order to preserve families' "name and bloodline" (*im Namen und im Blut erhalten*).⁴⁴⁹ This conviction was seconded by FDP politician Erich Mende. He declared in July 1956 that his party sought to preserve "the last remaining substance" of West

⁴⁴⁵ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, 8618.

⁴⁴⁶ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 143. Sitzung, 4 May 1956, 7499. For the gender and military politics of the GDR, see Christine Eifler, "Gender and the Military in East Germany: Defense Policies and the Woman Question in the GDR," in *Women and Death 2: Warlike Women in the German Literary and Cultural Imagination since 1500*, ed. Sarah Colvin and Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly (Rochester and New York: Camden House, 2009), 209–225.

⁴⁴⁷ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 159. Sitzung, 6 July 1956, 8831–8832.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 8631.

⁴⁴⁹ 100. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 21. June 1956, 29. PA-DBT, Bestand 3119, A 1/50-Prot. 100.

German families. In unison, the SPD and FDP thus underlined their point of view, which stressed the survival and unity of families above men's military duty.

Although the proposals of the Free Democrats and the Social Democrats were furthermore supported by GB/BHE, which was like the FDP part of Adenauer's governing coalition,⁴⁵⁰ the CDU/CSU faction energetically rejected the counter-proposals for various reasons. During the *Bundestag* negotiations, CDU politicians argued that the exemptions and deferments stipulated in the government's proposal were sufficient to tackle the hardship of certain groups of men.⁴⁵¹ Focusing on the GDR, Ernst Majonica maintained that the Federal Republic could not spare any young people who had left East Germany. Since roughly 180,000 young people had moved to West Germany between 1953 and 1956, he argued, the Federal Republic would lose 100,000 soldiers if the government did not recruit all able-bodied male immigrants.⁴⁵² Moreover, the CDU/CSU did not want to completely exempt young men who had close personal ties to the GDR, because the party judged such a provision to be unfair. Portraying the Federal Republic as a free state that was only building an army "to protect peace," Majonica and his colleagues contended that refugees from the Soviet zone (*Zonenflüchtling*) should be treated as "Germans among Germans" and "equal citizens with the same rights and duties."⁴⁵³ Allowing adolescents coming from the East to enjoy all the rights the Federal Republic had to

⁴⁵⁰ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, 8619.

⁴⁵¹ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 159. Sitzung, 7 July 1956, 8871.

⁴⁵² Young men formed indeed the strongest group of migrants coming from East Germany. See, Helge Heidemeyer, *Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR 1945/1949–1961* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1994), 50.

⁴⁵³ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, 8617.

offer without imposing the same duties that West German men had to fulfill would leave the German male youth divided.⁴⁵⁴

In addition to rejecting the SPD's and FDP's proposals respecting refugees from the GDR, CDU/CSU politicians had different ideas about how to deal with war-torn families and their last sons. Former colonel of the German General Staff, Fritz Berendsen, who functioned as one of the CDU's military experts, criticized the SPD and the FDP for failing to distinguish between military service (*Wehrdienst*) and war service (*Kriegsdienst*).⁴⁵⁵ According to him, the purpose of the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* was not to wage war, but to enable the Federal Republic to defend itself. Unlike war service, he informed the *Bundestag*, military training was no more dangerous than "skiing in the mountains", "underground mining" or "driving a car."⁴⁵⁶ Instead of being dangerous, Berendsen found military basic training immensely useful, for it enabled West German men to defend themselves and their loved-ones.⁴⁵⁷ If the FDP and the SPD truly wanted to protect families' last sons, he contended, they should prevent men from obtaining a driver's license.

However, against the background of internal government documents Berendsen's argument reads to some extent like a pretext. Preparing for the *Bundestag* negotiations about the *Wehrpflichtgesetz*, Chancellor Adenauer asked the Ministry of Defense which kind of questions the opposition would most likely ask. Anticipating the request to exempt orphans and the last

⁴⁵⁴ VDB, 159. Sitzung, 7 July 1956, 8867–8868. See also the support expressed by Hasso von Manteuffel, a former FDP politician who now spoke for the Free People's Party (*Freie Volkspartei*, FVP), Ibid, 8798–8799.

⁴⁵⁵ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, 8615.

⁴⁵⁶ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 159. Sitzung 7 July 1956, 8770–8771.

⁴⁵⁷ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 157. Sitzung, 4 July 1956, 8615.

living sons of war victims, the ministry's stated that such an exemption was impossible. Statistics for the year 1955 indicated that 468,000 half-orphans lived within federal territory and fifty-two percent, roughly 290,000 of them were young men. Given these numbers, the ministry judged an exemption of these men unsustainable and instead suggested a "sparring" employment in the rear.⁴⁵⁸ Since the government was still planning to produce an army of 500,000 men, giving 290,000 young men the option of not being recruited for military service seemed out of the question.

Given these calculations, the Adenauer government was willing to make only small concessions. For the third reading of the *Wehrpflichtgesetz*, the CDU/CSU faction introduced an amendment to the proposed law that would exempt draftees of whom "all brothers, or if no brothers existed, all sisters" had died due to war damages or because of national socialist persecution. In contrast to the proposal brought forth by the SPD and the FDP, this document did not mention any parents. Thus, male orphans would not be exempt. Whereas the SPD thus opposed this amendment as well, the FDP eventually accepted the government's draft of the law. Although the final version curtailed their own proposal, the party viewed it as the only way to have the law acknowledge the "heavy sacrifices" of Germany families.⁴⁵⁹

The exemption of half- and full-orphans parents would only be recognized in 1960 when the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* was amended for the first time. On November 24, 1959 the government introduced a law to change the *Wehrpflichtgesetz*. Although a major part of the negotiation focused on the state's attempt to recruit former Wehrmacht soldiers who were born in 1922 as

⁴⁵⁸ Schreiben an den Herrn Staatssekretär des Bundeskanzleramtes Bonn, 5 July 1956. BArch K, B 136 / 1020.

⁴⁵⁹ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 159. Sitzung, 7 July 1956, 8863.

well as on the treatment of students and trainees,⁴⁶⁰ the Social Democrats once again proposed the exemptions of orphans and half-orphans whose father, mother, or both of their parents had died due to war damages and who had no siblings.⁴⁶¹ Arguing that the Basic Law granted marriage and families special protection, the Social Democrats maintained that the state could not draft the only son of a war widow whose husband “fell” in combat shortly after their marriage. Given the family’s war sacrifice, SPD politician Bazille once again argued, the state could not expose this family to the risk of having its “last male blood carrier” (*Blutsträger*) killed during military service.⁴⁶²

In 1959, the proposal of the SPD now divided the CDU/CSU parliamentarians. CDU politician Georg Kliesing rejected the proposal stating that the regulation would entail the “preferential treatment of the one-child-marriage and the discrimination of families with many children.”⁴⁶³ The equal treatment of women who had only one child and those who had raised more than one was not to his liking. According to Kliesing, raising one son was much easier than raising many. Having therefore enjoyed an easier life, war widows who had only one son did not deserve such benefits.⁴⁶⁴ Given these contingencies, he preferred the rejection of the SPD’s

⁴⁶⁰ Detlef Bald, “Kriegskultur und Friedensmentalität der militärischen Elite in den neunziger Jahren,” in *Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907 – 1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung*, ed. Rudolf J. Schlaffer and Wolfgang Schmidt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 110–127.

⁴⁶¹ The SPD’s intention coincided with recommendation of the Committee of Interior. Following the request of the non-profit German Association of Invalids, War Bereaved and Social Retiree (*Verband der Kriegsbeschädigten, Kriegshinterbliebenen und Sozialrentner Deutschlands, E.V.*), the Committee of Interior debated the amendment of paragraph eleven on March 6, 1960 and issued a proposal to the Committee of Defense that was very similar to the one introduced by the SPD. Stenographisches Protokoll der 84. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 12 May 1960, 6. See also the short protocol of the Committee of Interior’s meeting at: BA-MA, Freiburg, BW 1/ 91 062.

⁴⁶² Stenographisches Protokoll der 84. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 12 May 1960, 7.

⁴⁶³ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

proposal, in particular since the government already refrained from drafting widows' only sons even though the law did not stipulate it.⁴⁶⁵

Other CDU politicians, such as Johann Peter Josten and Hellmuth Heye however, agreed in part with the SPD. The two men approved the proposal to make the exemption of war widows' only sons official.⁴⁶⁶ Although the two politicians wanted to take the "emotional burden" of nescience from these women, their support of the SPD's proposal cannot be attributed simply to a sudden sympathy for widows' suffering and hardship. Rather, the CDU's partial change of position was also due to the understanding that in 1965—twenty years after the end of World War II—the issue of supporting war widows would become obsolete. Concerned about the *Bundeswehr*'s effectiveness, Heye maintained that the passing of the SPD's proposal would not lead to a "weakening of the troops," since now it would only affect a small number of war windows and their sons.⁴⁶⁷

The subsequent passing of the amendment and the ways in which the *Bundestag* debated the implementation of compulsory military beforehand shows how parliamentarians negotiated military and family politics in the aftermath of World War II and in light of the looming Cold War tensions. The implementation of *Wehrpflicht* for men aged between 18 and 45 raised the question of whether men should ensure their families' survival and well-being by becoming well-trained soldiers or by becoming male breadwinners and family men.

⁴⁶⁵ According to Assistant Secretary General Albert Klas, the ministry generally refrained from drafting the last living sons of war widows despite the lack of official, legal regulation. See, BArch F, BW 1/ 91 062. This practice was confirmed by Assistant Secretary General Ernst Wirmer during the meeting of the Committee of Defense. See, Stenographisches Protokoll der 84. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 12 May 1960, 8.

⁴⁶⁶ See, *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

2. New Disputes about Compulsory Military Service in West German Society

The parliamentary debates that preceded the implementation of compulsory military service were carefully observed by a broad public. After all, interest in West Germany's rearmament did not fortify its intensity after the international decisions to make the Federal Republic part of NATO were reached. Between 1956 and 1964, the major research institutes *Allensbach* and EMNID continued to gauge people's opinions about the *Bundeswehr*, while a growing number of newspapers, magazines and radio stations commented on every detail of rearmament, including the legislative process, the establishment of a military infrastructure, the recruitment of the first soldiers as well as the life in the garrisons and surrounding cities. Eager to influence West German military politics and governmental decisions, peace activists, religious organizations, youth and women's groups sustained a constant flow of letters and commentaries that were sent to members of the *Bundestag*, the Adenauer government, and representatives of the Ministry of Defense.⁴⁶⁸

While these documents show that West German society by and large came to terms with the *Bundeswehr*'s existence, this is not to say that protest against rearmament ceased to exist. Without question, peace activists and pacifists continued their protests against rearmament. However, the widespread protests against Adenauer's military politics that dominated the early 1950s, shifted to quarrels over the nature and function of the new armed forces. Instead of disputing whether the Federal Republic should establish armed forces, contemporaries became more concerned with the "how" of rearmament. In addition to disagreeing, for example, whether

⁴⁶⁸ Bremm, "Wehrhaft wider Willen."

the *Bundeswehr* should be equipped with nuclear weapons,⁴⁶⁹ concerned citizen as well as youth, welfare, religious and women's organization focused on the men who were recruited during the formation period of the *Bundestag*. Considering both officers and soldiers, they pondered whether West German men possessed the qualities to join the *Bundeswehr* and, in turn, how military life and training would influence their character and behavior.

Attitudes towards the Bundeswehr and Compulsory Military Service in Civil Society

The establishment of the *Bundeswehr* as national armed forces and the implementation of universal conscription for men shaped the opinion surveys conducted by EMNID and *Allensbach* between 1955 and 1964. While the institutes added new sets of inquiry to their catalog, the ways in which interviewees responded to more traditional questions differed from the answers of the late-1940s and early 1950s. As Michael Geyer emphasizes, already in December 1956 had “the large majority of opponents to rearmament in 1950–51 [...] turned into a sizable minority.”⁴⁷⁰ Influenced by international developments, interviewees began to accept the existence of the *Bundeswehr*. In the summer of 1956, *Allensbach* repeatedly asked 2000 people⁴⁷¹ whether they thought it was good or bad that West Germany had already begun building a new German army. In June 1956, 31 percent responded that they thought it was a good idea, whereas 47 percent

⁴⁶⁹ Geyer, “Cold War Angst”; Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*; Thomas, *Protest Movements*, 31–36; Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 40–41.

⁴⁷⁰ Geyer, “Cold War Angst,” 380. See also, Otto, “Der Widerstand gegen die Wiederbewaffnung der Bundesrepublik,” 63.

⁴⁷¹ Allensbach asked 2000 persons older than 18 years, excluding people living the Saar area but including West Berlin. See, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung*, ed. Elisabeth Noelle (Allensbach am Boden: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1957), XLV.

disagreed.⁴⁷² Following the Hungarian Uprising in October and November 1956, which Soviet forces crushed brutally, results looked different: slightly more than 50 percent of people interviewed were now in favor of forming of a new army. And, they continued to be so. Opinion polls conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s show that general support for the *Bundeswehr* stabilized on an average level of slightly more than 50 percent.⁴⁷³

However, this change did not mean that West Germans now joyfully donned military uniforms to readily defend the Federal Republic against any threats from the East. Even though a substantial number of West Germans reconsidered their initial opposition to rearmament in light of the heightening tensions of the Cold War, the number of critics remained strong. Opinion surveys conducted in the early 1960s show that about 30 percent of interviewees still objected to the military, whereas 20 percent remained undecided.⁴⁷⁴ As these results indicate, West German attitudes towards the *Bundeswehr* remained ambiguous throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The ambiguity ran deep, because West Germans also expressed disparate opinions about voluntary and compulsory military service. In February 1956, 43 percent of 1000 interviewees responded that they would not advise somebody to become a professional soldier and only 16 percent said they would recommend it without any reservations.⁴⁷⁵ This solid rejection of voluntary service did not result in any strong support for a draft, however. Questioned whether

⁴⁷² 22 percent were undecided. See Ibid. 296.

⁴⁷³ Geyer, "Cold War Angst," 381.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ 11 percent responded "it depends" (without indication on what it depends) and 16 percent were undecided. See, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung* (1957), 297.

they would prefer an army composed of “specialists” who had joined the ranks voluntary or an army in which “everybody has to serve,” 44 percent of the interviewees were in favor of compulsory military service, whereas 37 percent voted for a professional army and 19 percent were undecided.⁴⁷⁶ Only if asked the right question, did interviewees support compulsory military service more strongly: in March 1956 *Allensbach* asked West Germans whether they thought that “every young man who is fit for military service” should be drafted. The question, which invoked a sense of equal treatment and responsibility, produced somewhat clearer margins: 51 percent supported the idea, whereas 31 voted against it and 18 percent were undecided.⁴⁷⁷ Notwithstanding this result, it was not before 1963 that conditional support for any kind of military service—that is, accepting military service as a necessary duty—reached the 40 percent mark.⁴⁷⁸ Although West Germans slowly came to accept the *Bundeswehr*’s existence, becoming part of the troops of was an entirely different bargain.

In addition to these overall trends, the research institutes itemized their reports and thus they reveal somewhat unsurprising, yet for the overall discussion significant results. Above all, young men (age group 16–29), who would predominantly be affected by military service, continued to express reservations against any form of conscription. Asked whether they preferred a professional army or universal conscription, only 38 percent of the young men voted for compulsory military service, whereas 51 percent preferred a professional army.⁴⁷⁹ However, the

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid, 303.

⁴⁷⁸ The number of interviewees who supported conscription unconditionally remained at a low 10 percent. See, Geyer, “Cold War Angst,” 387.

⁴⁷⁹ 10 percent were undecided. See, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung* (1957), 301.

majority of young men did not intend to volunteer. In July 1956, *Allensbach* asked 1066 young men who were born between 1929 and 1939 if they would volunteer to serve in the *Bundeswehr* for a period of eighteen months. The answer was almost unanimous: 79 percent responded that they would not volunteer.⁴⁸⁰

According to the polls, young men did not want to serve for two main reasons: on the one hand they cited a general “dislike for the military” as well as general opposition to rearmament and, on the other, occupational reasons. To be sure, several respondents indicated that the only reason that could tempt young men to enlist was the belief that they would learn useful technical skills while serving in the armed forces.⁴⁸¹ Yet, the majority of interviewees indicated that they viewed military service as a disruption of their civilian career path.⁴⁸² This understanding was accompanied by a rather dismissive attitude toward volunteers. Asked why they thought anybody would join the armed forces voluntarily, a sizable majority of young men responded: because “he wants to be a professional soldier” or “he is keen to do it,” “because he doesn’t want to work, he is work-shy” or “he is unhappy with his job, because he is unemployed.”⁴⁸³ In an economy that was booming—the so-called *Wirtschaftswunder*—and allowed for various civilian career paths,

⁴⁸⁰ 12 percent would, 6 percent said “it depends” and 3 percent were undecided. Ibid, 153. See also Harry Neyer, *Wie hast Du’s mit der Bundeswehr? Meinungen und Argumente der betroffenen Generation: Die Ansicht der Experten* (Munich: List Verlag, 1963), 115–117.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., 152.

⁴⁸² Ibid., 155.

⁴⁸³ Ibid., 157.

military service seemed to be an obstacle and only a valuable option for those who were not able to succeed in postwar Germany's flourishing labor force.⁴⁸⁴

Given these findings, it does not come as a surprise that the *Bundeswehr* faced enormous recruitment problems from the very beginning. The entire formation period of the *Bundeswehr* was defined by a lack of young volunteers.⁴⁸⁵ This would not hold true, however, for the young men who were drafted into the armed forces in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Few protested the draft call by applying to become conscientious objectors. According to historians, this particular compliance was due to, first, the limited knowledge about the constitutional right to object to military service and the daunting application process.⁴⁸⁶ Second, the sense of responsibility and obligation discussed above could have influenced young draftee's decisions as well. Third, reports by government officials indicate that young men living in remote areas and small villages without any cultural institutions such as movie theaters viewed the *Bundeswehr* as means of escape and occupational advancement.⁴⁸⁷ Finally, a variety of sources from the late 1950s show that a considerable number of West Germans continued to believe in the military as a school of proper masculinity and thus could not wait to send their sons to the barracks.⁴⁸⁸ Although these

⁴⁸⁴ For West Germany's postwar economic boom and youth mentality see Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten: Freizeit, Massenmedien und 'Zeitgeist' in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre* (Hamburg: Christians, 1995), 43–47.

⁴⁸⁵ Nögler, *Der gewollte Soldat*, 343–350.

⁴⁸⁶ Bernhard, *Zivildienst*; Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation*; Nögler, *Der gewollte Soldat*.

⁴⁸⁷ See for example, Report "Einsatz der MOBILWERBUNG in den Regierungsbezirken Osnabrück, Oldenburg, Aurich, Land Niedersachsen," February 2–15, 1955. BArch K, B 145/812.

⁴⁸⁸ According to an *Allensbach* survey conducted in mid-1956, 55 percent of the interviewees—both men and women—maintained that even in "peaceful times when a military wasn't really needed" compulsory service was good, because it could be used "to educate [*erziehen*] young people."⁴⁸⁸ 35 percent thought "it was not necessary" and 10 percent were undecided. See, *Jahrbuch Öffentliche Meinung* (1957), 307. See further "Aufzeichnung des Referts III/, Frauen und Wehfragen," 6 June 1956. BArch K, B 145/864. See also, Frevert, *Die Kasernierte Nation*.

layers of social pressure seem to not have been strong enough to turn young men into volunteers, they help explain why the implementation of compulsory military service was met with little resistance.

As these results indicate, West Germans neither rejoiced in the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* as a national defense force, nor expressed profound animosity. To be sure, the value of volunteering for military service was universally questioned and compulsory military service was hardly celebrated. Yet, in the context of the growing Cold War tensions, the existence of the *Bundeswehr* was accepted increasingly.

Media Reports about the Establishment of the Bundeswehr and the First Cohorts of Recruits

The ambiguous opinions and reservations that the surveys reflect were also a topic of discussion in the West German mainstream media. The establishment of the *Bundeswehr* and the implementation of compulsory military service was comprehensively documented by all major outlets including the conservative daily newspapers *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt*, the social-liberal weekly *DIE ZEIT*, as well by the government-critical, left-leaning monthly magazine *Der Spiegel*. The papers meticulously covered the international decision making process, the subsequent disputes in the *Bundestag*, the workings of the *Amt Blank* as well as the population's reaction to rearmament.

One set of events that received a great deal of attention in the late 1950s were the different ceremonies, during which the first volunteers were sworn in, and the arrivals of the first cohorts of recruits at the barracks' gates. Reporting about these events, many papers were eager to gauge whether the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* marked the beginning of a new era or a militaristic relapse to the times of the *Reichswehr* and *Wehrmacht*. For instance, writing in *Die Welt*, which by and large favored rearmament, Hellmuth Brennecke reported about the major

ceremony on November 12, 1955, during which the first 101 volunteers were sworn in. The author observed that the ceremony was not accompanied by any cheers of “hurray”, music, or any kind of anthem; not even the German Song (*Deutschlandlied*) was played.⁴⁸⁹ For Brennecke and many other reporters, the lack of grandeur and excitement signaled a new beginning.

To underline this impression, papers paid close attention to the ceremonies’ participants, both the recruits as well as the onlookers. Writing about the first navy volunteers who arrived in the city of Wilhelmshaven in January 1956, the Hamburg-based weekly *DIE ZEIT* stated that “the whole atmosphere has changed. And it is not just because of the misty air that all the voices sound damped.”⁴⁹⁰ According to the article “[n]o soldiers’ eyes were shining; no heels were snapped together.” Referring most likely to the excitement that accompanied the outbreak of World War I, the paper stated: “It was not the exodus of enthusiastic volunteers.”⁴⁹¹ Given this lack of “pathos,” *DIE ZEIT* concluded that the new troops were certainly influenced by civil standards. A great achievement, which the reporter attributed to the “ten years of civil life” West Germany had experienced after the end of World War II.

Even though such ‘satisfactory’ reports about the *Bundeswehr*’s civilian outlook continued to be published well into the early 1960s, their declarations were limited by critical comments about the young men who were recruited for military service. In August 1957, only a few months after the first recruits had entered the barracks, *Die Welt* published an article by the

⁴⁸⁹ Hellmuth Brennecke, “12. November 1955: Verpflichtung ohne Hymne und Musik,” *Die Welt*, November, 14 1955, 12.

⁴⁹⁰ “Soldaten, Matrosen, Staatsbürger,” *DIE ZEIT*, January 12, 1956, 2. See also, Kurt Becker, “Die ersten zehntausend,” *Die Welt*, April 1, 1957, 1–2; “Die neuen Rekruten in der Ausbildung: Fünfhundert ungediente Freiwillige in die Kassen von Adernach eingerückt,” *FAZ*, January 3, 1957, 1.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid. See also, “Der erste Tag in der Kaserne: 9733 Rekruten der Bundeswehr eingerückt/Heiße Wurst und Tee mit Rum,” *FAZ*, April 2, 1957, 4.

journalist and military historian Walter Görnitz. In his article, Görnitz compared young men who had been called up for service to those who had not been, or not yet.⁴⁹² Although he too maintained that the young recruits who were joining the *Bundeswehr* lacked the desired “pathos”, the journalist restricted his critique by arguing that the adolescent men who donned military uniforms generally exhibited more admirable features. In comparison to “the youth in the jazz cellars and casinos,” he maintained, young recruits were not perfect either, but they were “steadier, more determined.”⁴⁹³

Görnitz’s assessment was by no means the only analysis of West Germany’s male youth and rearmament. As soon as the proposals to implement compulsory military service were made, the Federal Republic witnessed an increased interest in the situation and character of “today’s youth.”⁴⁹⁴ In addition to emphasizing that West Germany’s young men were by and large unwilling to serve, commentators complained about their behavior and mental qualities. Sending his ideas about the “military-psychological” (*wehrpsychologische*) preparation of the youth to the *Amt Blank* in 1955, a resident of Berlin-Charlottenburg maintained that West Germany’s young men lacked “a sense of responsibility [...] sense of honor, dutifulness, [...] and self-discipline.”⁴⁹⁵ These shortcomings, the man and others stated, were the result of the total collapse of ideals after 1945, the absence of fathers and the overall “bleak childhood” many young people

⁴⁹² Walter Görnitz “Fähnrich im Atomzeitalter,” *Die Welt*, 1 August 1957, 2.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Alf M. to the Ministry for Defense, September 20, 1955. BArch F, BW II/1284.

⁴⁹⁵ See also, Heinz Stuckmann, “Was macht ein Soldat mit der freien Zeit,” *DIE ZEIT*, November 13, 1958, 27. See further, Friedrich Weltz, *Wie steht es um die Bundeswehr? Eine Dokumentation des Stern* (Hamburg: H. Nannen, 1963), 23–25.

endured during the early postwar years.⁴⁹⁶ Consequently, if the government wanted rearmament to be successful, the letter writer maintained, everybody had to try to change the youth's mind and prepare it psychologically for military life.⁴⁹⁷

The concern that something was amiss with West Germany's male youth was widespread and not limited to the implementation of conscription. Rather, it was part of a broader social discourse. Uta Poiger argues, for instance, that widespread concerns about West Germany's youth culture began to emerge in the early 1950s and expanded in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Influenced by sociologists such as Helmut Schelsky, many contemporaries argued that the Federal Republic's postwar youth was more "skeptical" than previous generations. They were suspicious of their parents' generation, ideas of national grandeur, and anything military.⁴⁹⁸ In this context, conservative government officials, church groups, the media and social-conservative citizens became especially concerned with the so-called *Halbstarken* (literally: half-strong). Well into the early 1960s this term was used for groups of "unruly" youngsters who drove around town on their mopeds and "loitered" in the streets while listening to the newest U.S. music hits and imitating American movie idols such as James Dean. For "orderly" West Germans, the behavior of such "twist-boys"⁴⁹⁹ was unacceptable and considered a threat not only to the successful functioning of the armed forces, but also to society as a whole.

⁴⁹⁶ B.B. to Wolf Graf von Baudissin, June 8, 1956. BArch F, N 717/19.

⁴⁹⁷ Alf M. to the Ministry for Defense, September 20, 1955. BArch F, BW II/1284.

⁴⁹⁸ Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels*; Ibid, "American Music, Cold War Liberalism, and German identities," in *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan*, ed. Heide Fehrenbach and Uta Poiger (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 127–147.

⁴⁹⁹ Sigrid G. to the Minister of Defense, April 24, 1963. BArch F, BW II/20 217.

The prevalent misgivings about West Germany's male youth in conjunction with the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* were certainly grist to the mill of papers such as the left-liberal magazine *Der Spiegel*, which repeatedly questioned the politics of Chancellor Adenauer and his administration. In 1956, the magazine published a piece about the town of Fürstenau in Lower Saxony. According to *Der Spiegel* the residents were not entirely happy about the prospect of becoming a garrison city. Above all, aldermen were quoted saying that many of the young men, who would be drafted into the *Bundeswehr*, did not exhibit the "steadiness" that conformed to the "aspired soldierly representation in public."⁵⁰⁰ While questioning the behavior of young men, the local officials also feared that the town would soon face an increase in "shady business," because the *Bundeswehr* as a men's society would attract prostitutes.⁵⁰¹

In writing about Fürstenau, *Der Spiegel* as well as other government-critical papers publicized a particular set of concerns that occupied many town officials and citizens living near military structures in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The establishments of military bases and barracks across the Federal Republic were in several instances accompanied by complaints of mayors or aldermen about possible "floods" of prostitutes.⁵⁰² Their complaints joined a loud choir of moralizers who sought to define West German behavior by fulminating against extramarital sex, prostitution, contraception, and pornographic literature. Although prostitution

⁵⁰⁰ "Garnisationspläne: Umfrage am Biertisch," *Der Spiegel*, November 26, 1956, 22. See also, "Liebe Leser," *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, August 25, 1956, 2.

⁵⁰¹ "Garnisationspläne."

⁵⁰² See "Invasion der leichten Mädchen: 100,000 Prostituierte überschwemmen Westdeutschland," *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, August 1, 1959, 16. See also the petition sent to the CDU by the magistrate of the small town of Sontra in Hessen, 11 November 1964. Archiv der Christlichen Partei Deutschland, CDU Bundestagfraktion, Arbeitskreis V: Auswärtiges, Verteidigung, 08-006, 012/2 (Korrespondenzen). For a discussion of garrison towns and cities as being at a special moral risk, see Schmidt, *Integration und Wandel*, 205, 364–365; Sybille Steinbacher, *Wie der Sex nach Deutschland kam: Der Kampf um Sittlichkeit und Anstand in der frühen Bundesrepublik* (Munich: Siedler, 2011), 89.

was not illegal in the 1950s, it was considered a “violation of morality.” At a time when the violent death of Frankfurt’s high-class call girl Rosemarie Nitribitt in 1957 made national headlines and,⁵⁰³ it does not come as a surprise that the prospect of prostitutes settling in close proximity to *Bundeswehr* establishments was unnerving to many “proper” citizens.

Given the questionable reputation of West Germany’s male youth, some contemporaries even cautioned that West German recruits could pose a moral threat to “proper” young women.⁵⁰⁴ This concern becomes especially visible in the article “The Girl and The Soldiers” that the widely read women’s magazine *Brigitte* published in 1961.⁵⁰⁵ The two-page article was written in response to numerous letters that the editor had received and as an advice for young women about how they should deal with young men in uniform. According to the article’s author, young soldiers’ behavior towards women was indeed problematic. Quoting the famous French psychologist Gustav Le Bon, *Brigitte* argued that upon entering the military young men became part of a crowd (*Teil einer Masse*) that was exclusively male. Expressing common contemporary fears of the “masses” and “massification,”⁵⁰⁶ the article continued that young

⁵⁰³ For a discussion of Nitribitt and the perceived threat of “sexually active single women,” Heineman, *What Difference*, 232–234. See also, Volker Berghahn, “Recasting Bourgeois Germany,” in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 326–340.

⁵⁰⁴ See for example official diary entry about the preparation for a meeting between Minister of Defense, Theodor Blank, and a women’s group in BArch F, N 717/ 3. See also the exchange between representatives of the Protestant Church about plans to build an airfield near the town of Großsachsenheim in Baden-Württemberg in 1956. The clerics feared, that they would have to close its ecclesiastic girl’s gymnasium, because “of the noise and the soldiers.” Evangelisches Zentral Archiv Berlin (hereafter: EZB) Bevollmächtigter des Rates der EKD am Sitz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, 87/142. See further, Schmidt, *Integration und Wandel*.

⁵⁰⁵ “Das Mädchen und die Soldaten,” *Brigitte* 14 (1961): 70–71. See also, Frevert, *Kasernierte Nation*, 348.

⁵⁰⁶ Berghahn, “Recasting Bourgeois Germany.” See further, Axel Schildt, *Konservatismus in Deutschland: Von den Anfängen im 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 211–252.

recruits would “all the sudden see themselves as men” and “develop the desire to be recognized as men” by other men, but especially by women.⁵⁰⁷ Consequently, life in an all-male mass organization could lead to some unrestrained social and sexual behavior. Thus, *Brigitte* cautioned, young women should not fall for soldiers’ adventurous tales and romantic overtures.⁵⁰⁸

Concerns about the qualities and the behavior of young recruits continued well into the 1960s and were accompanied by debates about the training methods, the *Bundeswehr* should employ in order to deal with “unruly” youngsters.⁵⁰⁹ Whereas some commentators argued that *Halbstarke* in the *Bundeswehr* needed to be trained with modern educational methods, others believed that strict military discipline would do these young men good.⁵¹⁰ The concerns about the young men’s questionable qualities culminated following a magazine article by the former *Wehrmacht* Admiral and acting Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Armed Forces, Hellmuth Heye. In the summer of 1964, Heye published a series of articles in the illustrated magazine *Quick* in which he warned that the *Bundeswehr* was about to become “a state within a state.”⁵¹¹ Heye was agitated by the death of a nineteen-year-old recruit who was stationed in the city of Nagold. On July 25, 1963, the recruit suffered a heat stroke during a long march and died one

⁵⁰⁷ “Das Mädchen und die Soldaten.”

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ Ursula Rütt, “Die eingengten Männer: Man drischt wieder fleißig Phrasen,” *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, October 23, 195; Werner Höfer, “Schoßkind und Sorgenkind der Armee,” *DIE ZEIT*, July 3, 1964, 20.

⁵¹⁰ Luise S. to Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauß, November 6, 1961. BArch F, BWII/20217 Sigrid G. to Minister of Defense, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, 24 April 1963. BArch F, BW II/20217

⁵¹¹ See *In Sorge um die Bundeswehr*, Dokumentationsreihe Quick-Berichte, 2 (Munich: Martens, 1964), 13.

week later. The subsequent court hearing revealed extraordinary harsh drill exercises that were practiced by the commanding officers. In this context, Heye stated that the Federal Republic was engaged in an “enormous process of change [...] from an industrialized to a consumer society.”⁵¹² He believed that the *Bundeswehr* leadership as well as the government did not recognize this change and instead continued as always.⁵¹³ For the ombudsman, this ignorance was particularly troublesome, because *Bundeswehr* commanders trained their troops with harsh, antiquated, and undemocratic methods.⁵¹⁴

In addition to incurring the hatred of military commanders and politicians who took offense and thought Heye’s critique was directed at them,⁵¹⁵ the caused a media echo and prompted concerned citizens to send letters to Heye and Kai-Uwe von Hassel, the acting Minister of Defense (1963–1966). In addition to debating which kind of training methods *Bundeswehr* commanders should employ, Heye’s criticism caused concerned citizens to comment on the qualities of West Germany’s young men.⁵¹⁶ The conflict showed that a number of West Germans were upset by the current “Americanized” youth culture and young men’s unwillingness to serve. Some of Heye’s harshest critics complained that West Germany’s youth, especially “the *Halbstarken* and those in leather jackets,” had not enjoyed a proper up-bringing and were often

⁵¹² Ibid.

⁵¹³ *In Sorge um die Bundeswehr*, 13. See also, John Zimmermann, *Ulrich de Maizière: General der Bonner Republik, 1912–2006* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 258–266; Schlaffer, *Der Wehrbeauftragte*, 160–180.

⁵¹⁴ Ulrich Simon, *Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft: Das Ringen um die Innere Führung* (Hamburg: Decker, 1980), 62–63.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ *Weh’ dem der weiterdenkt! Eine Dokumentation zu Heyes “In Sorge um die Bundeswehr,”* ed. Heinrich Emde (Munich: Alexander, 1964). See also Christina von Hodenberg, *Konsens und Krise: Eine Geschichte der westdeutschen Medienöffentlichkeit, 1945–1973* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006), 232–244.

delinquent, or had gone to ruin.⁵¹⁷ Asking whether Heye would want to train these “twist-boys” himself, one letter writer concluded that adolescent recruits had to be trained strictly (*eisern erziehen*).⁵¹⁸ Although more moderate critics such as a school rector informed Heye that “today’s youth is not bad, just different,” they still stressed that young men had experience no or simply the wrong kind of *Erziehung* at home. They had witnessed the defamation of German soldiers after 1945, and were blinded by the ruling “mentality of prosperity” (*Wohlstandsgeist*).⁵¹⁹ Since the younger generation had not experienced much democracy or “true human values,” Heye’s critics maintained, the military faced an immense challenge and needed to adopt strict discipline, obedience, and drill practices; methods that stood in clear contrast to the ideals of Baudissin’s *Innere Führung*.

As this media debate as well as the articles by *Brigitte*, *Die Welt* and *Der Spiegel* indicate the formation period of the *Bundeswehr* was defined by public disputes about whether the military was a school of proper masculinity or breeding ground for socially unacceptable male behavior and improper relations between the sexes. Influenced by the contemporary discourse about the “Americanization” of West German culture as well as the *Halbstarken* problem, a broad public paid close attention to the young men who entered the barracks in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Wondering whether West Germany’s young men were able to become proper *Bundeswehr* soldiers, contemporaries also pondered which for of training methods military commanders should employ.

⁵¹⁷ Adolf L. to Excellenz Herrn Vizeadmiral Heye, June 22, 1964, in BW II/ 20 217.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

⁵¹⁹ J. S. to Herrn Wehrbeauftragten Vizeadmiral a.D. Hellmuth Heye, June 18, 1964, BW II/ 20 217.

Anxieties of Religious and Welfare Organizations about the Moral of the new Soldiers

The assumption that military life and service could affect young men negatively occupied not only West Germany's mainstream press and concerned citizen living in close proximity to military structures. With the question of whether the Federal Republic would establish armed forces answered, the issue also concerned church officials and religious groups, conservative women's organization, and welfare workers. Eager to influence the ways in which the *Bundeswehr* was established, groups issued memoranda, sent letters to government representatives, and held workshops to discuss the issue.

One of the groups that addresses the possible positive and negative effects of military life was the League of the German Catholic Youth (*Bund der Deutschen Katholischen Jugend*), which functioned as the umbrella organization for Catholic children and youth groups throughout the Federal Republic. Being re-founded after the end of World War II, the league soon counted more than 1 Million members.⁵²⁰ Following a general meeting in 1955, the league developed a comprehensive action plan in order to prepare a support network for young catholic recruits.⁵²¹ This document shows that even though the group supported the establishment of the *Bundeswehr*, it argued that military life "naturally" entailed many risks. In addition to cautioning against the emergence of "soldierly virtues as the measure of all things, the glorification of war [...], heroism and heroic death," the league also pictured the military as an institution in which

⁵²⁰ For a discussion of the *Bund der Deutschen Katholischen Jugend* see, Volkmann, "Die Innenpolitische Dimension," 574–575. See also, Institut für Staatslehre und Politik e.V. Mainz, ed., *Der Deutsche Soldat in der Armee von morgen: Wehrverfassung, Wehrsystem, Inneres Gefüge* (Munich: Isar Verlag, 1954), 129–144.

⁵²¹ Der Bund der Deutschen Katholischen Jugend, "Aktionsplan für die Vorbereitung und Betreuung junger Katholiken in den deutschen Verteidigungsstreitkräften," 1955. BArch F, BW II / 1327. For church groups as the most vocal critics of a "decay of the manners" in the 1950s and 1960s, see Dagmar Herzog, "Desperately Seeking Normality: Sex and Marriage in the Wake of War," in *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s*, ed. Richard Bessel and Richard Schumann (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 161–192, here: 176.

men could fall victim to a lifestyle that instead of fostering “decency,” would lead to “debauchery.”⁵²² Without being very explicit, the organization worried that a conscription army could create a basis for male behavior that would eventually endanger the value system of the Federal Republic. As a result the League of the German Catholic Youth urged the Adenauer government to pay close attention to the social and moral situation of young recruits.

Whereas the Catholic Youth did not discuss the matter at length, the Working Group for Youth Care and Welfare (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Jugendpflege und Jugendfürsorge*), which operated on a federal level, did. Meeting in Cologne in 1955, the group discussed the issue of “Youth Protection and Wehrmacht” (*Jugendschutz und Wehrmacht*).⁵²³ A final report of the meeting detailed various perils that its members associated with military service. One of their concerns was the excessive consumption of alcohol and tobacco. Even though the working group considered smoking and drinking to be typical “attributes of comradely etiquette,”⁵²⁴ it claimed that these habits represented a threat to the soldier’s safety and the army’s effective functioning. In the context of the Cold War, the Working Group was especially concerned about the threat of espionage. After all, the “enemy” could deposit alcohol (*Beutealkohol*) somewhere in order to trap soldiers.⁵²⁵ Accordingly, the working group argued that soldiers’ consumption of alcohol had to be carefully regulated.

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ As previously discussed, the term *Bundeswehr* was only introduced in the spring of 1956. Thus many contemporaries used the term *Wehrmacht* or *Streitkräfte* (armed forces) to refer to the new West German military. See, Sitzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Jugendpflege und Jugendfürsorge – Aktion Jugendschutz, April 18-19, 1955. DGB-Archiv, AdsD, DGB-Bundesvorstand, Abteilung Jugend, 5/DGAU000447.

⁵²⁴ Ibid. The excessive consumption of alcohol was a common feature in complaints about military service. See for example, letter by Gerhard O. to Theodor Blank, June 7, 1955. BArch F, BW II/ 1246.

⁵²⁵ “Sitzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Jugendpflege und Jugendfürsorge – Aktion Jugendschutz.”

Moreover, the Working Group worried about the possible sexual behavior of future soldiers. First, the final report cautioned against the emergence of homosexuality among the troops. Although the report did not elaborate on the issue, the fact that “sodomy between men” was still outlawed by the West German Criminal Code⁵²⁶ suggests that the Working Group feared the appearance of unlawful sexual behavior that would disturb the troops. Second, the welfare workers worried like so many others about prostitution. Judging prostitution unsuitable for West German soldiers and officers, the Working Group cautioned against the recurrence of *Wehrmacht* brothels.⁵²⁷ During World War II, the military leadership had set up several hundred of brothels across occupied Europe in order to serve the needs of German troops.⁵²⁸ Although the final report did not specify the extent to which the usage of brothels by the German *Wehrmacht* was discussed during the meeting, the mention of the issue shows at least that the Working Group was eager to ensure that the future West German troops would also distance themselves sexually from the *Wehrmacht*.

The anxieties expressed by both Working Group for Youth Care and Welfare and League of the German Catholic Youth were rooted in the homosocial living conditions of young conscripts. Since military service was to apply to men only, the two groups like so many of their contemporaries discussed the *Bundeswehr* as a “men’s society.” For the Working Group, this all-

⁵²⁶ In 1935, the National Socialists tightened the law greatly and introduce more extensive and harsher punishments. Without complaints by the Western Allies, West Germany retained the 1935 version of § 175. See Clayton J. Whisnant, *Male Homosexuality in West Germany: Between Persecution and Freedom, 1945–69* (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2012).

⁵²⁷ “Sitzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Jugendpflege und Jugendfürsorge – Aktion Jugendschutz.”

⁵²⁸ For *Wehrmacht*’s sexual politics see Annette E. Timm, “Sex with a Purpose: Prostitution, Venereal Disease, and Militarized Masculinity in the Third Reich,” in *Sexuality and German Fascism*, ed. Dagmar Herzog (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 223–255. For brothels see for example, Insa Meinen, *Wehrmacht und Prostitution während des Zweiten Weltkriegs im Besetzten Frankreich* (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2002). For concerns about the military and prostitution see Frevert, “Das Militär als Schule der Männlichkeiten,” 57–75.

male organization naturally entailed certain perils. Given the government's proposals, the welfare professionals recognized that young men would generally begin their basic military service at the age of twenty. Having firm ideas about men's sexual developments, the welfare professionals concluded that conscripts would enter the army while being in their "sexually most active age."⁵²⁹ This was especially troubling because of the military's living conditions. In contrast to other "men's society" like the police, young recruits would live in barracks, detached from other civilians for a major part of their military service. Realizing that most garrisons were established in rather remote areas or at the peripheries of cities and towns, the welfare workers and others warned that recruits would have limited contact to the "normal population"—male and female civilians—even in their leisure time.⁵³⁰ According to the Working Group, quartering sexually active men in this way and detaching them from their friends, family and loved ones would soon lead to "improper behavior" that had the potential of disrupting the social fabric of the Federal Republic.⁵³¹ As a result, welfare workers, religious groups and other concerned citizens urged government to carefully observe and regulate recruits life inside and outside of the barracks.

As the documents of welfare professionals and religious groups as well as the media discussion show, the West German reservations against the *Wehrpflicht* was diverse. Although West Germans increasingly accepted the *Bundeswehr*'s existence, with the first male recruits entering the barracks, discussions of the possible negative and positive negatives of military

⁵²⁹ "Sitzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Jugendpflege und Jugendfürsorge – Aktion Jugendschutz." For the exact military regulations, see H.W. Napp, ed., *Wehrpflichtgesetz: Textausgabe mit Erläuterungen* (Lübeck and Hamburg, 1956), 9 and 13.

⁵³⁰ "Sitzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Jugendpflege und Jugendfürsorge – Aktion Jugendschutz."

⁵³¹ "Aufbau der Bundeswehr wird zu einer Tragikkomödie," *NRZ*, September 13, 1956. See further, Annual Report 1958 by Military Bishop Mundt. EZB, Bestand 2 Kirchenamt, fol 41 26.

service increased. While some West Germans continued to consider the military as a school of proper masculinity, others contented that the *Bundeswehr* could foster improper male behavior.

3. Governmental Concerns and Parliamentary Debates about Soldiers' Social and Sexual Behavior

The diverse opinions that West Germans expressed about the implementation of compulsory military service, the first cohorts of young men who entered the barracks, as well as about the possible negative and positive effects of military life greatly influenced the workings of the Adenauer government and concerned many members of the *Bundestag* in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Determined to turn the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* into a success story, the Adenauer government paid close attention to and acted upon the results of opinion polls, media reports, and commentaries by individual citizens, welfare workers, and religious groups. While eagerly trying to capitalize the positive sentiments, the members of the government also sought to counter any concerns that could jeopardize rearmament.

Analyzing the reactions and action of government representatives shows that the ways in which the Adenauer government conceived of military service and the West German man in uniform were shaped, on the one hand, by the context of the Cold War and, on the other, by the national discourse on proper male behavior and morals. It reveals that the ideal of the West German man in military uniform depended greatly on his ability to live a proper, family life.

Early Attempts by the Adenauer Government to Promote Compulsory Military Service

As discussed above, relevant laws to implement voluntary and compulsory military service were passed in the *Bundestag* in 1955 and 1956. The opinion surveys conducted by *Allensbach* and *EMNID* during this time indicated, however, that the majority of the West German population

would not embrace the government's agenda gladly. Although most interviewees seemed to have come to terms with the inevitable establishment of the *Bundeswehr*, many of them were less eager to send West German men to the barracks.

Given this well-documented reluctance, the Adenauer administration published a memorandum already in 1956 to promote the *Wehrpflicht*. The document, which the SPD emphatically criticized as unacceptable propaganda, listed several reasons for why the Federal Republic needed armed forces and to draft men for military service. It first and foremost emphasized that new armed forces and conscription were necessary due to the tensions of the Cold War, which—according to the memorandum—threatened West Germany's security and endangered peace in Central Europe. Moreover, the memorandum stressed that introducing compulsory military service would have positive effects on society. Focusing on the young men who would be recruited, the text stated that the armed forces could offer “valuable training for life” by fostering comradeship and physical fitness.⁵³² As Ute Frevert has suggested, this part of the memorandum was an attempt to both counter any doubts about the new armed forces and to sell compulsory military service by focusing on the military as a valuable educational institution.⁵³³ Since opinion surveys, newspaper commentaries, and letters sent to the Ministry of Defense indicated that a considerable number of West Germans still viewed military service as a period during which young men could learn desirable social traits, selling compulsory military as “training for life” seemed to be a good strategy. Yet the wording was not so plain as to suggest that the government wanted to reinstall the armed forces as a school of the nation and benchmark for society.

⁵³² Presseamt und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Warum brauchen wir die Wehrpflicht? Eine Denkschrift der Bundesregierung* (Bonn, 1956).

⁵³³ Frevert, *Kasernierte Nation*.

In addition, the attempts to promote the *Wehrpflicht* focused on documented unwillingness of young German men to take up arms in order to defend their home and country. CSU politician Richard Jaeger, for example, addressed the issue during the negotiations of the Volunteer Law in June 1955. While debating the details of the law, Jaeger informed his audience that the younger generation was “hostile towards and skeptical of ideologies and any form of pathos.”⁵³⁴ Moreover, he observed, many young men harbored far-reaching reservations against any form of military service. Yet, instead of harshly criticizing young men for their reservations, for Jaeger and other CDU/CSU politicians this behavior and skepticism was a “sign for a growing mental autonomy.”⁵³⁵ Looking back at his own generation, Hellmut Heye observed that young men of the postwar era developed doubts at an age when “we still exhibited too much uncritical enthusiasm and blind faith in authority.”⁵³⁶ Consequently, Jaeger and Heye argued that West German men should not be incited to join the armed forces because of blind zeal. Instead, West German men should develop an “ethos of freedom” and serve in the *Bundeswehr* earnestly and soberly.⁵³⁷ After all, the new military was not established to showcase West German prowess, but to defend the West and the Federal Republic’s free democratic order.

While pointing to the fact that the *Bundeswehr* was established as defensive force against possible attacks from the East, the politicians’ declarations can also be read as one of the government’s early attempts to reframe the youth’s reluctance in a way that was advantageous for

⁵³⁴ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 93. Sitzung, 28 June 1955, 5226.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ Ibid., 5226 and 5229. See also Poiger, “Rebels with a Cause?,” 93–124.

the government's rearmament plans. Since scolding young men for not wanting to join the military was not acceptable in postwar West Germany, the government had to show understanding while at the same time trying to change young men's minds.

Parliamentary Concerns about the Moral and Sexual Misconduct of Young Recruits

Of course, the perceived nationwide "unwillingness to serve" (*Wehrunwille*) was not the only problem the Adenauer government needed to tackle. Since complaints about the socially and sexually questionable behavior of soldiers and officers were visible in newspaper articles, reports by welfare worker and religious groups, as well as letters by individual citizen, members of the government were eager to tackle this issue as well. In particular, government representatives seated in the Committee for Defense addressed the problem the quite openly and pondered ways to solve it.

One of the first parliamentarians to report complications was Willy Reichstein, who was a military doctor by training and a representative of the All-German Bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights party. In 1957, he described his visit to the Munster Training Area (*Munsterlager*) that was located in the idyllic, but sparsely—except for sheep—populated region of the Lüneburg Heath. According to Reichstein, the greatest complaint made by the commanding officers, military doctors, and married soldiers, who served at *Munsterlager*, was the lack of housing for soldiers' families. In particular, soldiers who had been sent to the military base from other parts of Germany were frustrated, for they were unable to visit their families.⁵³⁸ This situation was aggravated, Reichstein informed his colleagues, since the city of Hamburg—

⁵³⁸ Stenographisches Protokoll des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 22 May 1957, 13. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, A1/50-Prot. 102.

which was roughly fifty kilometers away—sent undesired remedies for this malaise. At a time when prostitution occupied the minds of many parliamentarians seated in the *Bundestag*,⁵³⁹ Reichstein warned that every weekend “special trains with ‘slightly easy girls’” arrived from the Hanseatic city, causing a reduced will even among married soldiers to visit their families on the weekends.⁵⁴⁰

Reichstein’s concern about the ill-advised living conditions and the resulting immoral behavior were second by the CDU politician Georg Kliesing. During a meeting of the Committee for Defense in October 1959, Kliesing complained about the fact that the *Bundeswehr* did not station all soldiers with their compatriots, but all across the Federal Republic. If soldiers were wrested away from their friends and families, Kliesing maintained, their morals would certainly be in danger.⁵⁴¹ For the CDU politicians this situation was especially troublesome given the practice of the National Socialist regime. According to him, the Nazi regime had skillfully used the “control of licentiousness” to reach their political goals. One way in which the Nazis had induced controlled dissoluteness was, according to the CDU politician, by stationing young men away from their compatriots, friends, and family.⁵⁴² Expressing the common belief that the Nazi regime had been defined by loose sexual morals from which the Federal Republic had to distance

⁵³⁹ See for example Elisabeth Lüders’ speech about the sexual depravation of young girls and the threat of prostitution, VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 73. Sitzung, 10 June 1959, 3899–3928.

⁵⁴⁰ Stenographisches Protokoll des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 22 May 1957, 13.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid., 43

⁵⁴² Ibid., 43.

itself,⁵⁴³ Kliesing argued that the *Bundeswehr* could not follow the National Socialists' example of sexual permissiveness and deviance.

For some CDU/CSU politicians the questionable sexual behavior of young men was, however, not solely caused by their living conditions. For his colleague, Paul Bausch, uprooting soldiers socially was not the only problem. According to Bausch, it was also the result of the masculine and sexual ideals that *Bundeswehr* soldiers and especially the officer corps nourished. Reporting about a visit he had paid to a garrison in Baden-Württemberg, Bausch argued that many *Bundeswehr* soldiers and officers acted on the assumption that "the soldier needed extramarital sex, he has to seek it, he has to have it."⁵⁴⁴ Due to this particular understanding of manly sexual behavior, the CDU politician concluded, prostitutes represented a welcomed avocation.

The concerns that Bausch expressed, were certainly not limited to the governing parties. They also concerned the parliamentary opposition. Although the Social Democrats had opposed Adenauer's rearmament plans—including the establishment of the *Bundeswehr* as a national conscription army in 1956—the party officially changed course in the late 1950s. In 1959, the Social Democrats approved a new party program—the Godesberg Program—that officially documented the party's "affirmation of national defense."⁵⁴⁵ This change in politics was triggered, on the one hand, by the SPD's repeated electoral defeats in 1949, 1953, and 1957 and, on the other, by a new generation of aspiring politicians who wanted to change the course of their

⁵⁴³ Herzog, *Sex After Fascism*.

⁵⁴⁴ Stenographisches Protokoll des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 22 May 1957, 43.

⁵⁴⁵ Manfred Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik: Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 1999), 377.

party. Interested in shaping West Germany's military politics and seeking to improve the *Bundeswehr*'s overall situation, the party participated eagerly in debates that focused on the soldiers' social and sexual behavior.

In 1959, for instance, SPD politician Hans Merten agreed with Kliesing that the non-compatriotic stationing bore many risks. However, he also contended that even if the military stationed soldiers with their compatriots, their moral was still in danger.⁵⁴⁶ Since many garrisons lacked canteens, pubs, or lounges, soldiers were in dire need of places where they could socialize properly. Reporting about a military base in Hessen, Merten stated that soldiers had to walk a couple of miles to their canteen. This arrangement was highly problematic, he assured his colleagues, because prostitutes had already settled along the way. As a result of this practice, the Hamburg-based SPD politician Helmut Schmidt complaint, many soldiers who entered the barracks as "virgins" (*unberührt*), would "indulge in what welfare records call 'promiscuous behavior'" instead of striving for a healthy, monogamous relationship.⁵⁴⁷

As Social Democrats, like their CDU counterparts, were hence concerned about soldiers' contact to prostitutes, they also lamented the lack of "proper" women near military establishments. In October 1960, for instance, the SPD faction of the *Bundestag* circulated a memo that listed a "catalog of sorrows." This list included among other things "desert garrisons" that were surrounded only by small "villages of maybe 800 souls."⁵⁴⁸ According to the SPD, such

⁵⁴⁶ Stenographisches Protokoll des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 14 October 1959, 39.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid. 36. For common contemporary concerns about young people's sexual behavior, see Paul Nolte, *Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft: Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Beck, 2000), 229.

⁵⁴⁸ Vermerk, AK VIII, Betr.: Sorgen-Katalog der Soldaten der Bundeswehr, Bonn, 25 October 1960. Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie, SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, 2/BTFA0000499. See also the memo by Wolfgang Schult regarding "'Easy girls' and soldiers," October 9, 1961. AdsS, SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, 2/BTFA0000499.

small and isolated villages were oftentimes overburdened with the sheer quantity of soldiers. Without offering a detailed interpretation or explanation, the memo stated that in these situations the “ratio of marriageable girls to soldiers is 1:100.”⁵⁴⁹ In accordance with members of the governing coalition, the SPD believed that military service should under no circumstances endanger the well-being of soldiers’ families, impede a young man’s marital prospects, or tempt soldiers to seek improper extramarital sex.

In light of the severity and sensitive nature of this problem,⁵⁵⁰ members of the Committee for Defense looked to the Catholic and Protestant Churches for help. In 1957, the two state churches signed individual contracts with the Federal Republic, which provided for the offering of pastoral care and spiritual guidance in the context of the armed forces (*Militärseelsorge*).⁵⁵¹ One form of religious guidance that military chaplains would offer was the teaching and discussion of “life skills” in a semi-classroom setting (*Lebenskundlicher Unterricht*). Negotiating the format and goals of these lessons in February 1956, members of the Adenauer government as well as the opposition already agreed that:

There are certain delicate issues, the relationship between man and woman and whatnot and we thought a theologian would be best suited to talk about this with the young people. We did not know who else we could entrust with this issue.⁵⁵²

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Herbert Kruse, *Kirche und militärische Erziehung: Der lebenskundliche Unterricht in der Bundeswehr im Zusammenhang mit der Gesamterziehung des Soldaten* (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1983)

⁵⁵² Comment by Hans Merten, Abschrift des Protokolls der 74. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 8 February 1956, in BArch F, BW 35/ 3, Lebenskundlicher Unterricht.

Since neither the governing coalition nor the opposition wanted to leave “delicate issues” to chance or rely on the “self-regulation of the military,”⁵⁵³ the churches’ offerings became a welcomed and central framework in which the social and sexual behavior of young soldiers was discussed.

The willingness with which parliamentarians consulted the churches was, however, not only motivated by the social well-being of soldiers and positive public relations. In the case of the Adenauer administration, the decision to offer soldiers guidance in matters of sexuality was also motivated by the international tensions of the Cold War. Representatives of the Catholic Church already noted in the mid-1950s that the state, the churches, and the soldiers had very different interests with respect to the *Militärseelsorge*. According to a memo, the churches were interested in the issue because of its “religious, dogmatic and moral content,” while soldiers were in want of entertainment as well as “orientation amid the chaos of opinions and views.”⁵⁵⁴ The Federal Republic as a state expected, in contrast, not only support in the area of military and personal education, but also an “ideological ‘orientation’” (*weltanschauliche Ausrichtung*), “morale,” and “immunization against Bolshevism.”⁵⁵⁵ With respect to the state’s interest, the church’s interpretation was proven correct by leading representatives of the government. During a meeting of the Committee of Defense, Richard Jaeger and Georg Kliesing agreed that only

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ “Grundsätze für die konfessionelle Lebenskunde.” Archiv des Katholischen Militärbischofs Berlin, Aktz. 36-15-06-61, Akte “Die Themen des Lebenskundlichen Unterrichts, 1956–1957.” See also the draft of “Lebenskundlicher Unterricht im Rahmen der Aufgaben des Militärseelsorgers,” 15 June 1953. BArch F, BW 9 3570 Fü B I 381-32-007, Soldatentagung Siegburg, 1953 and. 1954, 9.

⁵⁵⁵ “Grundsätze für die konfessionelle Lebenskunde.”

soldiers who came from a “functioning” home and who had been raised as faithful Catholics or Protestants would be able to withstand “the chaos of Bolshevism.”⁵⁵⁶

Given issue’s significance, the Adenauer government and the opposition were very interested in the workings of the *Militärseelsorge*. In 1959, three years after the first volunteers had entered the barracks, Military Vicar-General Georg Werthmann of the Catholic Church and Military Superintendent Friedrich Hoffmann of the Protestant Church presented an overview to the Committee for Defense. During this meeting, Military Vicar-General Werthmann confirmed the parliamentarians’ concerns. According to him, young soldiers did not think about fundamental questions such as the “atomic bomb,” but they were more concerned with the job market, girls and sexual adventures.⁵⁵⁷ Notwithstanding such problematic interests, Werthmann and his colleague were happy to report that the Ministry of Defense had already produced special reading material to guide the soldiers. According to Werthmann and Hofmann, the Ministry of Defense graciously supported the production of a booklet titled *Soldier and Love*, which was written by the Swiss neurologist and marriage counselor, Theodor Bovet.⁵⁵⁸ In light of the perceived urgency of the topic, the Ministry of Defense had ordered more than ten thousand special copies of the publication and gave a copy to as many soldiers as possible.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁶ 75. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 18 February 1960.

⁵⁵⁷ Stenographisches Protokoll des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 14 October 1959, 34 and 48. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, A1/50-Prot. 102.

⁵⁵⁸ See, Theodor Bovet, *Soldat und Liebe: Sonderdruck für Soldaten der Bundeswehr* (Tübingen: Katzmann Verlag, 1959), 7.

⁵⁵⁹ Stenographisches Protokoll des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 14 October 1959, 31 and 37. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, A1/50-Prot. 102.

This booklet was an illustrated guide designed to lead soldiers and officers to a heterosexual, monogamous life as a Christian family man. According to *Soldier and Love*, living this kind of life was not only vital to the effective functioning of the armed forces, but also necessary to prevent a “state of emergency” in West German families. The final section of the booklet—“Is Our Military Armor Enough?,”—stated, for instance, that the Federal Republic was not only threatened by an external military enemy, but even more so by “disrupted families” and “the shaking of the family home.”⁵⁶⁰ One internal enemy that threatened West German families was, according to *Soldier and Love*, the girls and women who “besieged the barracks after hours.”⁵⁶¹ Warning that the “fruits,” which these women offered, were “rotten and upset the stomach,” the booklet urged *Bundeswehr* soldiers to search for “true love.”⁵⁶² Of course, this kind of love could only be found in matrimony. Depicting the image of a smiling man embracing a woman who was holding a toddler in her arm, the text emphasized that the soldier should seek a marriage wherein the woman “was the heart and— independent of the equality before the law—the man was the head.”⁵⁶³ Reaffirming the ideal of the monogamous male-breadwinner family, the booklet concluded that only this kind of love and family could protect the Federal Republic against internal enemies (prostitutes) and external enemies (Bolshevism).

Although the booklet represented an explicit and comprehensive instrument to guide soldiers into the safe haven of marriage, for some parliamentarians and church representatives

⁵⁶⁰ See, Bovet, *Soldat und Liebe*, 33–34.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., 20.

⁵⁶² Ibid., 24.

⁵⁶³ Ibid.

this was not enough. Following Helmut Schmidt's suggestions, the Catholic Academy in Hohenheim and Protestant Academy in Bad Boll collaboratively organized a soldiers' conference in June 1960 that was attended by sixty participants, including members of the Committee of Defense, members of the Ministry of Defense, officers, medical officers, military chaplains, and pedagogues.⁵⁶⁴

The majority of the conference focused on the situation of the young men in barracks. Even though the participants agreed that a "distinctive men's society" such as the *Bundeswehr* greatly influenced the behavior of young men, they concluded that a "special sexual crisis situation" did not exist.⁵⁶⁵ Nonetheless, the sexual education of the young soldiers was of the utmost importance to the participants, because they considered national security and soldiers' sexuality to be closely connected. According to the final conference report, "subversive powers" (*staatsfeindliche Mächte*) could cause young soldiers to doubt the function of the *Bundeswehr* and question whether the Federal Republic was worth fighting for.⁵⁶⁶ This was problematic, the report stated, because a soldier could be driven into a "misusage of sexuality" if he did not feel that he was part of his *Volk*. Only if he was convinced that his service was worthwhile would the young man remain "sexually grounded."⁵⁶⁷ Consequently, conference participants agreed that

⁵⁶⁴ Memo, 2 November 1959. Evangelische Akademie Bad Boll, Archiv, Akten der Abteilung für Soldatenfragen, fold. 1. For the role that representatives of the academy in Bad Boll played in elaborating and documenting the interplay among the former officers' concerns for Germany, their self-image and the public debate over European Union, see Lockenour, *Soldiers as Citizens*, 128. Final report about the conference "Soldat und Liebe," June 9-11, 1960, 3rd draft. Evangelische Akademie Bad Boll, Archiv, Akten der Abteilung für Soldatenfragen, Nr. 3 Soldatentagungen, Nr. 48 Soldat und Liebe. While the folder in the archive at Bad Boll includes different drafts of the report, a final version of the report can also be found in AsdD, Helmut Schmidt Archiv, 1/HSSAA008076.

⁵⁶⁵ Final report about the conference "Soldat und Liebe."

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid., 5.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

sexual education had to be part of the soldier's overall training and education, because the "willingness to serve, to discipline and order" and rejection of promiscuity were essential characteristics of a "true soldier."⁵⁶⁸

Like others before, the final conference report stated that greatest problem still to be solved was prostitution. Even though the report stressed that West German soldiers usually did not frequent prostitutes, it still agonized about the sheer number of prostitutes registered in various garrison cities. For instance, small town of Baumholder in Rhineland-Palatinate not only hosted 800 prostitutes, but that the service of these women was also directed by a "syndicate of pleasures."⁵⁶⁹ Yet, the report noted that the high numbers were not caused by *Bundeswehr*, but by the Americans. According to historian Maria Höhn, U.S. occupation forces had turned the older *Wehrmacht* barracks into one of their biggest garrisons. The presence of thousands of U.S. soldiers spurred the town's economy, including its nightlife. The number of prostitutes that frequented and worked around the city caused not only numerous lurid press reports, but also led government representatives to call Baumholder a "moral disaster area."⁵⁷⁰

Seeing the detachment of West German soldiers from prostitutes as a form of "counterintelligence," the conference participants noted several remedies. Similar to the booklet *Soldier and Love*, the report stated that soldiers should be encouraged to follow a Christian life style and value family life. In order to achieve this goal, the participants agreed that the

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., 7.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid, 7. 5,150 residents lived in Baumholder at the time. See the statistics of census bureau, <http://www.infothek.statistik.rlp.de/neu/MeineHeimat/zeitreihe.aspx?l=3&id=3537&key=0713401005&kmaid=563&zmaid=820&topic=4095&subject=20> (last accessed: 6 January 2013).

⁵⁷⁰ Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2002), 118–121.

Bundeswehr should pay more attention to the location and the infrastructure of garrisons as well as to the daily curfew soldiers had to obey. These aspects would ensure that the young soldiers were kept away from prostitutes and, instead, have increased contact with proper women, including their mothers who they could visit regularly on the weekends.⁵⁷¹ Another way to ensure the *Bundeswehr*'s moral character was a more careful recruitment of soldiers. Above all, the report indicated, men who had a record of sexual misdemeanor—including homosexuality and exhibitionism—should not be recruited.⁵⁷² In addition to careful recruitment practices, the report noted also that “tough and versatile” training was useful. A challenging education and training was seen as a way to increase the self-esteem of a soldier and make him immune to sexual temptations. Such training could also be more punitive, for the report noted without much further explanation that “sexual swanks” could be exposed through tough training.⁵⁷³

While these measures were listed only briefly, conference participants looked above all to leading and older officers to influence young soldiers. According to the report, officers played an essential role in turning young recruits into “responsible and happy citizens” (*Bürger*) who were able to deal properly with sexual issues.⁵⁷⁴ Above all, officers needed to influence recruits by exemplifying appropriate behavior toward women. The manners of commanding officers had to be guided by chivalry and respect.⁵⁷⁵ In addition, if officers' wives were “motherly women,” they

⁵⁷¹ Final report about the conference “Soldat und Liebe.”

⁵⁷² Ibid.

⁵⁷³ Ibid., 19.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

should either live with their husbands on the military base or occasionally pick up their husbands—together with their children—after work. Such examples, the report concluded, would help young men to realize that “only true marriage [...] like God intended it, could satisfy the need for security.”⁵⁷⁶ Imbued with Christian family values, the report thus made the heterosexual family with children the ultimate goal.

The fact that members of the Committee for Defense participated in this conference and appreciated the publication of *Soldier and Love* shows that the social and sexual behavior of young *Bundeswehr* recruits was not a minor concern. Like welfare workers, citizens living near garrisons, and church groups, parliamentarians too worried about young men’s “dissolute” behavior. In the context of the Cold War and in light of the sexual politics of the Nazi period, the Adenauer government and members of the opposition agreed that the problem needed to be tackled by urging soldiers and officers to strive for the ideal of the complete breadwinner family.

4. Military Attempts to Regulate the Behavior of the New *Staatsbürger in Uniform*

The publication of the booklet *Soldier and Love* and the conference of the same name furthermore demonstrate that the social and sexual behavior of *Bundeswehr* recruits concerned not only members of the Committee for Defense and government officials. Beginning in 1957, the issue was also addressed on different levels within the Ministry of Defense, by the *Bundeswehr*’s highest-ranking military commanders, including the Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff, and by commanders of military bases and districts. While the military command devised official instructions and regulations, the Ministry published decrees and educational booklets that addressed the social life in the armed forces.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid., 10.

Analyzed together, these documents show that the public concerns about the behavior of men in uniform greatly influenced the formative period of the *Bundeswehr*. To be sure, military training was shaped by the goal to establish a well-functioning army that would be able to help defend Western Europe and West Germany. Yet, eager to show the *Bundeswehr* in the best light possible, military leadership also sought to imbue the troops with qualities that were socially accepted. In response to Cold War tensions and the national moral discourse, these attempts focused on the masculine image of soldiers and officers as heterosexual men who were committed to their military duties and aspired to the bourgeoisie life of a well-respected husbands and family man.

Bundeswehr Efforts to Identify and Deal with the “Improper” Behavior of Young Recruits

Military attempts to detect questionable social and sexual behavior began as soon the first volunteers and draftees made their way to the barracks in 1956 and 1957 respectively. Already in 1957, the Ministry of Defense published a small booklet with the title *The First Hours: Advices for how to deal with Recruits during the First Days*.⁵⁷⁷ This booklet was the first volume of the important official series *Schriftenreihe Innere Führung*. The overall purpose of this series was to inform the troops about the meaning of the *Innere Führung* and the new ideal of the *Staatsbürger in Uniform*. Divided into different thematic sub-series, the serial *Erziehung* explained not only the overall concepts, but also offered advice for commanding officers on what to expect from young recruits and how to deal with them.

⁵⁷⁷ *Die Ersten Stunden: Hinweise für den Umgang mit Rekruten in den ersten Tagen*, ed. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung (Bonn: s.n., 1957), 17.

Published in the sub-series *Erziehung*, the booklet *The First Hours* was written to inform commanding officers about the new generation of draftees. Influenced by sociological studies of the period, the text emphasized that West Germany's youth "thought soberly, skeptically, and critically".⁵⁷⁸ Consequently, commanders should avoid "pathos" and speeches about the greatness of German soldiering.⁵⁷⁹ Whereas the booklet considered this to be a positive development, the subsection "Character, Style, and Perils of Today's Youth," *The First Hours* alerted its readers to important problems. One of them was the absence of working parents from the home. While a working mother deprived her sons of important "motherly love" and a "sense of security," absent fathers represented a lack of orientation.⁵⁸⁰ Because many fathers had to leave home to go to work, the booklet stated, many young men did neither experience fatherly discipline nor witnessed their fathers' occupational achievements. Instead of copying their father's occupational success, young men hence followed the housework of their mothers and "in fact lived their childhoods like little girls."⁵⁸¹

While pointing out that parents who worked outside the home prevented many young men from living a life appropriate to their sex, the booklet also warned against the increasing sexualization of West Germany's male youth. According to *The First Hours* young men in the 1950s matured physically much faster and hit puberty at a much younger age because of the improving living standards. This was problematic because, on the one hand, young men's

⁵⁷⁸ For the influence of Helmut Schelsky see Nägler, *Der gewollte Soldat*.

⁵⁷⁹ *Die Ersten Stunden*, 17.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*

mental maturity did not follow suit and, on the other, West Germany's "moral boundaries," that for so long had regulated the relations between the sexes, were disappearing.⁵⁸² As a result, young men were not only exposed to "the sexual" much earlier, but they were also "defenseless" against any external temptations.⁵⁸³ Arguing that West Germany's entertainment industry was geared towards "the sexual, the criminal, and the sentimental," the booklet stated that young men were downright "attacked" by the "flood of enticing, askew, and false impressions."⁵⁸⁴ As *The First Hours* thus echoed many contemporary moralizers, who decried the "sexualization" of West German society,⁵⁸⁵ it predicted that the new cohorts of draftees would, in all likelihood, not only act differently than previous generations of recruits, but also needed different treatment.

The problems that *The First Hours* addressed were even more emphasized in the seventh volume of the sub-series: *Difficult Young Soldiers: Advice for Detection and Education*. Published in 1961, the booklet's content was devised by leading psychoanalyst Alexander Mitscherlich. Like *Die First Hours*, this booklet informed its readership—"older and [...] experienced superiors"⁵⁸⁶—about the *Bundeswehr*'s "problem children" who suffered from

⁵⁸² Ibid., 28.

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid., 29.

⁵⁸⁵ See, Herzog, *Sex after Fascism*; Poiger, *Krise der Männlichkeit*, 228–235.

⁵⁸⁶ *Schwierige Junge Soldaten: Hinweise zum Erkennen und Erziehen*, ed. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung (Bonn: s.n., 1961), 4 and 8. See also, Kai Uwe Bormann, "Als 'Schule der Nation' überfordert: Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur Erziehung des Soldaten in der Aufbauphase der Bundeswehr," in *Reform, Reorganisation, Transformation: Zum Wandel in deutschen Streitkräften von den preussischen Heeresreformen bis zur Transformation der Bundeswehr*, ed. Karl-Heinz Lutz, Martin Rink, and Marcus von Salisch (Munich: Oldebourg 2010), 345–367.

absent working parents and accelerated physical maturity.⁵⁸⁷ Addressing moreover “special perils,” *Difficult Young Soldiers* warned that soldiers with “weak characters” were prone to excessive alcohol consumption and could easily be tempted by the wrong women.⁵⁸⁸ More problematic than too much alcohol were, however, suicide attempts of weak-minded recruits as well as “sexual aberrations” like male homosexuality. For *Difficult Young Soldiers*, which discussed homosexuality even before it tackled soldiers’ suicides and traffic violations, this sexual behavior was problematic, because it was not only outlawed in West Germany, but also because gay men “sexually target” other men and thus disrupted the troops’ morale.⁵⁸⁹

If *Difficult Young Soldiers* and *The First Hours* only predicted possible problems, military commanders all over the Federal Republic soon faced them. Internal correspondence between the leading generals and the legal advisor of the 6th military district in Bavaria show, for example, that the command was concerned about how to deal with soldiers who visited “louche streets and bars.”⁵⁹⁰ Working together with vice squads in Munich, the military police recognized that soldiers visited places, which normally would be avoided by “proper citizens,” because they were frequented by “prostitutes,” “souteneurs” (pimps), “homosexuals,” and “other

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., 8–15. For Mitscherlich’s interpretation of West Germany’s postwar families, see Tobias Freimüller, “‘Selbstvergewisserung in therapeutischer Absicht’: Alexander Mitscherlich und die ‘vaterlose Gesellschaft’ der Bundesrepublik,” in “Mütterliche Macht und väterliche Autorität: Elternbilder im deutschen Diskurs,” ed. José Brunner, *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* 36 (2008): 182–196.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid., 21–25.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., 25.

⁵⁹⁰ Writing by a legal adviser to a commander on March 17, 1958. BAArch F, BW 1/316384. See also the internal correspondence about the possible legal and disciplinary dealing with prostitution, in BA-MA, BW II/20 222. See also the report by Heinz Karst about the continuing problems at Munsterlager. According to Karst, the commanding officer of the base sent all soldiers home for an entire weekend in order to detach them from the “seduction in Munsterlager.” See, Stenographisches Protokoll des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 14 October 1959, 40. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, A1/50-Prot. 102.

asocial elements”.⁵⁹¹ Seeking legal advice on how to deal with these issues without violating soldiers’ personal rights, the commanders stated that this behavior unacceptable. By possibly engaging in sexual activities with prostitutes and gay men, the report noted, soldiers endangered their own health and, thus, their ability to serve. Moreover, they also damaged the “reputation of the *Bundeswehr* in public.” In addition to jeopardizing the *Bundeswehr*’s combat readiness, the commanding officers emphasized, conscripts who behaved improperly would jeopardize the “trust of the population.”⁵⁹²

Military Strategies to Guide and Regulate the Social and Sexual Behavior of the Troops

Given that perils appeared to be numerous, soldierly misconduct rampant and the implications of both significant, the *Bundeswehr*’s high command and the Ministry for Defense tried its utmost to control and solve them. As discussed above, the chosen strategies included the publications of booklets such as *Soldat und Liebe* as well as the help of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in form of *Militärseelsorge*. In addition to these measures, the late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed the publication of several regulations and guidelines as well as court cases that targeted the social and sexual behavior of the *Bundeswehr* troops. The formation period was thus defined by a comprehensive attempt to define the morals of the troops in a way that they would meet the military goals of the government and the social expectations of society. While many of these measures addressed all soldiers, a number of them specially targeted professional soldiers and the officer corps, because high-ranking, experienced officers were deemed vital for maintain the *Bundeswehr*’s manner and morals. As living examples and through training practices, older

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

officers could ensure their subordinates' proper behavior and thus uphold the *Bundeswehr's* prestige.

The cornerstone for this role was laid very early. In light of Germany's disastrous past, the Himmerod Memorandum written in 1950 stated that the men who wanted to join the ranks and assume commanding positions had to be carefully selected. This initial suggestion became, after long discussion, reality in 1955, when the *Bundestag* sanctioned the establishment of the Acceptance Organization (*Annahmeorganization*) and the Personal Screening Board (*Personalgutachterausschuss*, PGA). Whereas the Acceptance Organization was responsible for the selection of all volunteers—independent of rank—who had or had not served in previous German armies, the PGA screened the officers of the rank colonel and higher. Having received more than 200,000 applications, the two organizations began the screening in fall of 1955.⁵⁹³

The examination was divided into different sections, beginning with a discussion of the applicant's resume. The questions tackled issues such as ethical warfare, military justice, the chain of command, the relation between the military and politics, and the concept of unconditional loyalty.⁵⁹⁴ Even though little is known about the actual proceedings of the interviews because those files were destroyed, the guidelines, which formed the basis of the screening, offer insight into the demands applicants had to meet. In order to ascertain whether an applicant was “qualified and mentally ready” for becoming a West German officer, the PGA

⁵⁹³ For the workings and problems of the PGA and the Acceptance Organization, see Georg Meyer, “Zur Inneren Entwicklung der Bundeswehr bis 1960/61,” in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, ed. Hans G. Ehlert et al, vol. 3, *Die NATO-Option* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 851–1162, here 1034–1077. See also, Abenheim, *Reforging*, 136–150, Pauli, *Wehrmachtsoffiziere*, 131–147.

⁵⁹⁴ For the format of the qualifying examination of the Acceptance Organization see Pauli, *Wehrmachtsoffiziere*, 133–135. Of all the various topics tackled during the interview, questions regarding the attempt of leading *Wehrmacht* officers, who had sworn an oath of allegiance to Hitler, to assassinate him on July 20, 1944.

explored men's previous military experience.⁵⁹⁵ In addition to requiring characteristics such as responsibility, truthfulness, and courage, the applicant had to show a good sense of camaraderie, "empathy and care." Most likely against the background of the trial against hundreds of former Wehrmacht POWs, who were charged with maltreating their comrades during Allied imprisonment—the so-called *Kameradenschinder* trials—the guidelines stressed that "during imprisonment, the applicant must not have harmed the camaraderie and the reputation of the German soldier."⁵⁹⁶

In addition, the applicant's interactions with civilians had to be impeccable as well. The guidelines for selecting professional soldiers and soldiers who would serve for a fixed period of time stated that candidates' behavior during war had to be infused with "chivalry towards women" and with the "readiness to help the weak and the helpless."⁵⁹⁷ By specifying these characteristics, the guidelines reflected the ideal of the *Bürger in Uniform*. In light of the brutality that had marked World War II, military reformers such as Wolf Graf von Baudissin were eager to make chivalry the benchmark for the West German soldier. Stating that "chivalry is not sign of weakness but a superior mental and intellectual attitude," guidelines and laws such as the *Soldatengesetz* further emphasized that "the occidental tradition [...] demanded above all the protection of all that is unprotected and defenseless."⁵⁹⁸ Therefore the Christian soldier had

⁵⁹⁵ Anweisungen für die Auswahl der Berufssoldaten und Soldaten auf Zeit. BArch F, BW 27/ 32.

⁵⁹⁶ Richtlinien für die Prüfung der persönlichen Eignung der Soldaten vom Oberstleutnant einschließlich abwärts." BArch Freiburg, BW 27/ 29. For the trials see Frank Biess, *Homecomings*, 154–167.

⁵⁹⁷ Anweisungen für die Auswahl der Berufssoldaten und Soldaten auf Zeit. BArch F, BW 27/ 32.

⁵⁹⁸ Rechte und Pflichten des Soldaten. Baudissin Dokumentationstelle, Ordner Vorschriften u.a. Merkblätter 1956.

to protect not only women, children, old folks, the injured and the weak, but also the defenseless enemy against the “raw violence” of warfare.⁵⁹⁹

Moving beyond a man’s conduct during war, the guidelines further specified that successful candidates “should have stood the test of life after war,” especially during the first hunger years following 1945. The chances of being considered for employment rose if an applicant had tried to find a “reputable occupation” and be integrated into “the civic work life” (*bürgerliches Berufsleben*). Despite the harsh postwar living conditions, applicants had to show furthermore that their financial situation was in order and that they did not live beyond their means.⁶⁰⁰ It was, however, not only the applicants’ financial means that had to be orderly; his family life had to be as well. Without going into too much detail, the guidelines stated that in case an applicant and his wife lived apart or were divorced, the screening board had to investigate the “applicant’s behavior” more carefully.

The precise meaning of investigating the applicant’s behavior becomes apparent in several newspapers and the records of the Ministry for Defense. Restating the details of the PGA guidelines in October 1955, the local newspaper *Lübecker Nachrichten* criticized that Ministry for Defense requested court materials in case of a divorce. Although the newspaper agreed that an applicant’s family life had to be in order, he maintained that the review of divorce proceedings represented an unreasonable intrusion into a person’s privacy.⁶⁰¹ Notwithstanding

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁰ Anweisungen für die Auswahl der Berufssoldaten und Soldaten auf Zeit. BArch F, BW 27/ 32.

⁶⁰¹ “Richtlinie oder Tugendfibel?,” *Lübecker Nachrichten*, October 15, 1955; “Neue Wehrmacht eine Armee von Musterknaben: ‘Zügellosigkeit im Genuß macht Soldaten ungeeignet’,” *Abendpost*, October 15, 1955; “Richtlinien für die Auswahl der Freiwilligen,” *Ulmener Nachrichten*, October 15, 1955; “Ritterliche Soldaten für die neue Wehrmacht,” *Hamburger Abendblatt*, October 15, 1955; “Charackterfeste Soldaten gesucht,” *Badische Zeitung*, October 15, 1955. BArch F, BW 27/ 32.

the critical reception, the PGA requested divorce proceeding and the Ministry for Defense continued this practice over the course of the formative period of the *Bundeswehr*.⁶⁰²

The reason for why the Ministry for Defense wanted to see the proceedings was to gauge the circumstances behind the divorce. Though sources from the mid-1950s are not available, the records of military courts from the late 1950s and early 1960s show that several soldiers and officers were charged with adultery, oftentimes in combination with a “breach of duty.” For example, already in December 1957—less than a year after the first recruits entered the barracks—a court penalized an officer for having “an adulterous affair with a prostitute,” who accompanied him during business trips and to whom he had disclosed official secrets. According to the verdict, the culprit did not only ignore his duty to serve West Germany “loyally,” but his behavior also violated Article 17, Sub-Clause 2 of the *Soldatengesetz* that required him to act in a manner that would not harm the reputation of the armed forces.⁶⁰³

If the selection of the first volunteers set the stage for defining the social and moral standards of the *Bundeswehr*, the establishment of the first garrisons in the late 1950s triggered a new wave of directives and regulations. One of the most contested was the *Heiratserlaß* (Marriage Decree) that the Ministry of Defense under the aegis of the conservative CSU politician Franz Josef Strauß, issued on February 15, 1958.⁶⁰⁴ Having succeeded Theodor Blank as Minister of Defense in October 1956, Strauß welcomed regulations and advice books that embraced military and social values that had been accepted during the times of the

⁶⁰² “Bundeswehr verlangt Scheidungsakten,” *DIE ZEIT*, December 26, 1957, 1. See also a directive issued by the Ministry for Defense in November 1959, BArch F, BW I/ 66 188.

⁶⁰³ VR II 6 – Az . 25-01-50-00, August 8, 1960. BArch F, BW I/66148.

⁶⁰⁴ “Heirat des Soldaten,” in *Ministerialblatt des Bundesministers für Verteidigung*, February 15, 1958, 95–96.

Reichswehr.⁶⁰⁵ Although Strauß had assured his parliamentary colleagues in 1953 that the Federal Republic would any marriage restrictions, in 1958 the plan looked different.

Resembling to some extent the restrictions that members of the *Amt Blank* had negotiated in the context of the European *discipline générale*, the decree stated that soldiers could get married like any other citizen and without needing the permission of their superiors. However, the *Heiratserlaß* also cautioned that the soldier's obligation to live a life that did not damage the reputation of the *Bundeswehr* also applied to his marriage.⁶⁰⁶ According to the decree, living an impeccable life meant first that soldiers should not contract debts that could become a burden to their marriage and family. Second, the *Heiratserlaß* advised professional soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers against marrying during the first five years of service, because life during this time was generally determined by extensive work hours, relocations, and barracked living conditions. These issues, the decree warned, could endanger the important coalescence of married couples. Third, the soldier should only choose a woman who had an "undisputed reputation," whose family was "respectable" and who did not have any contacts to "subversive circles" (*staatsfeindliche Kreise*).⁶⁰⁷ The soldier's choice of a proper wife was certainly the most important point of the decree, because only in this case did the decree emphasize possible professional consequences: if a soldier or officer chose to marry a woman who "lived a scandalous or immoral life" or endangered the security of the Federal Republic through her actions, the decree warned, he had to anticipate official consequences. In particular,

⁶⁰⁵ Detlef Bald, "Kämpfe um die Dominanz des Militärischen," in *Mythos Wehrmacht: Nachkriegsdebatten und Traditionspflege*, ed. Detlef Bald, Johannes Klotz, and Wolfram Wette (Berlin: Aufbau Taschebuch Verlag, 2001), 17–65, here: 36.

⁶⁰⁶ "Heirat des Soldaten," 95.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.

an imprudent marriage could put into questions officers' soldierly skills and aptitude to function as a superior.⁶⁰⁸

Although the majority of employees in the Ministry of Defense accepted the intention to advise soldiers in matters of marriage,⁶⁰⁹ the decree was highly criticized by government-critical newspapers and by several parliamentarians. In March 1958, the SPD politicians Karl Wilhelm Berkhan and Karl Wienand questioned the ministry's intention behind the marriage decree during a meeting of the Committee of Defense.⁶¹⁰ The Social Democrats were particularly concerned about the ministry's suggestion that soldiers should marry only women with an irreproachable reputation. For SPD, the decree's formulation was too close to the marriage permits required by the Wehrmacht in the 1930s and 1940s.⁶¹¹ During a session of the *Bundestag*, SPD politician Helmut Schmidt warned once again that the marriage decree could become a political measure that would enable the *Bundeswehr* to not only revive a sense of honor special and limited to the military profession (*Standesehre*), but also to exclude undesirable groups and individuals such as "communists" and "alcoholics."⁶¹² While Social Democrats like Schmidt thought it necessary that the military tried to influence young recruits'

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁹ Even Wolf Graf von Baudissin, for example, did not criticize the decree stating that the ministry had issues it because it would resolve any ambiguity in the matter. Diary Entry, 9 February 1958. BArch F, N 717 Nachlass Baudissin, Tagebuch fol. 10.

⁶¹⁰ Stenographisches Protokoll der 12. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Verteidigung, 19 March 1958, 10–12. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, A1/50-Prot. 102.

⁶¹¹ Copies of the marriage permit from April 1, 1936 and May 7, 1941 are located in BArch F, BW II/ 3940.

⁶¹² Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestag, 73. Sitzung, 10 June 1959. Parlamentsarchiv Berlin, Bestand 3119, A1/50-Prot. 102

sexual behavior, regulating soldiers' private and marital life through decrees that bore resemblance to *Reichswehr* and *Wehrmacht* laws was a whole different bargain.

Schmidt's concerns were not unfounded. Between 1959 and 1964, the Ministry of Defense under the leadership of Franz Joseph Strauß and his successor Kai Uwe von Hassel sought to influence the behavior of soldiers and officers in a comprehensive, strict, and conservative way.⁶¹³ In 1959, for instance, the Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff, Adolf Heusinger, released guidelines devised for commanders and official use only. These pieces of advice included a small, but explicit section regarding soldiers' virtuous and proper behavior. Tackling the issue of alcohol consumption, the document noted that some soldiers mistakenly thought that the excessive consumption of alcohol was a manly act.⁶¹⁴ While accepting occasional drinking in informal settings, the guidelines stated that excessive drinking was anything but a practice that would recommend a man. Arguing moreover that a process of "sexualization" had begun to take place in the army, Heusinger criticized the use of what he perceived as overly aggressive language and "dirty jokes."⁶¹⁵ This way of conversing was unacceptable, he argued, because it revealed the verbal "immaturity and squalidness" (*Unreife und Unsauberkeit*) of the soldiers and officers who used them.⁶¹⁶ For Heusinger, this behavior

⁶¹³ See the note Minister of Defense/Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff, IV B 2 Tgb. No. 25/57, "Richtlinien für die Erziehung des Offizierkorps," 15 June 1957. BArch F, BW 11-II/106.

⁶¹⁴ Richtlinien für die Erziehung 1959/60. BArch F, BW 1/ 66477. See also the communication between the office of the Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff/ German Defense Staff and the press office, Fü B I 3 to P I 1, "Alkoholmißbrauch in der Bundeswehr," November 7, 1963. BW I/65800.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

was particularly inappropriate for commanding officers who should act as a good example for their subordinates.

This demand that especially high-ranking and older officers should set a good example for their subordinates eventually culminated in comprehensive studies and one particular booklet. Following the distribution of an internal communique with the title *Social Life of the Officer Corps* in 1958,⁶¹⁷ a group of young staff officers and captains put together a comprehensive internal study entitled *Style and Form of the Officer Corps*.⁶¹⁸ These documents formed the basis for the comprehensive etiquette book *Style and Form: Advices for Education and Self-Education*, which the ministry eventually published in 1965.⁶¹⁹

In sharp contrast to the ideals of *Bürger in Uniform*, the internal study and communique stressed that the *Bundeswehr* needed an officer corps with “elite characteristics”.⁶²⁰ Advocates of this idea such as General Heinz Karst argued that the *Bundeswehr* required a special compendium that would consider the peculiarities of military life. Although he had worked alongside Wolf Graf von Baudissin in the office *Innere Führung* in the early 1950s, over the course of the late 1950s and the 1960s Karst became an outspoken critic of Baudissin and his concept of the *Bürger in Uniform*. In doing so he joined a number of *Bundeswehr* commanders who dismissed the ideals of the *Innere Führung* and instead returned to routine drill practices in

⁶¹⁷ See Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Fü B I 4, “Betr.: Geselliges Leben im Offizierkorps,” 30 December 1958. BAArch 11-II/106. See also a draft of the study *Stil und Formen des Offizierkorps* from October 1963 in BW 11-II/106. See further Klaus Naumman, “Schlachtfeld und Geselligkeit, 329.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid., 324.

⁶¹⁹ *Stil und Formen: Hinweise für Erziehung und Selbsterziehung*, ed. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Bonn, 1965).

⁶²⁰ Naumman, “Schlachtfeld und Geselligkeit,” 310–346.

order to produce “fearless fighters.”⁶²¹ Believing that the *Bürger in Uniform* was a useless concept and the military reforms of the 1950s made the *Bundeswehr* soft, they demanded soldiers’ complete obedience and utter discipline.⁶²² While propagating more rigorous and traditional training methods, Karst also maintained that being a soldier was a job *sui generis* and stated “that the officer corps needed more definite manners than a civilian.”⁶²³

Informed by this kind of reasoning, young staff officers and captains argued that if the officer corps of the *Bundeswehr* followed superior manners, society would accept the armed forces more easily and the officer corps’ superior manner could function as a benchmark for society. This attempt to turn the *Bundeswehr*’s officer corps into a “school of the nation” was, however, rejected not only by representatives of the Ministry of Defense who wanted to counter the demands of conservative *Bundeswehr* commanders and who did not want to give the impression that the *Bundeswehr* was becoming an elite institution. According to Brigadier General Wolfgang Köstlin of the office *Innere Führung*, the plan was also rejected by several *Bundeswehr* inspectors and commanding generals, who thought that the teachings of regular etiquette books could be easily transferred into the military sphere.⁶²⁴

⁶²¹ Abenheim, *Reforging*, 144.

⁶²² The dictum used by critics of the *Innere Führung* was “soft wave” (*weiche Welle*). See Bormann, “Als ‘Schule der Nation’ überfordert,” 355. See also, Heinz Karst, *Das Bild des Soldaten: Versuch eines Umrisses* (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1964). See further, Zimmermann, *Ulrich de Maizièrre*, 260–266; Nägler, *Der gewollte Soldat*, 32–36.

⁶²³ Bormann, “Als ‘Schule der Nation’ überfordert,” 324–325.

⁶²⁴ Letter regarding “Stil- und Formfragen in der Bundeswehr, 5, February 1964. BArch F, BM 1/266. See also Naumann, “Schlachtfeld und Geselligkeit,” 323.

Despite this high-ranking opposition, *Style and Form* was eventually published.⁶²⁵ According to the preface, however, the Ministry of Defense did not publish the booklet to establish an exclusive set of manners that was only binding for soldiers. Instead, the author sought to offer an addition to the style and etiquette books that were already available on the regular book market.⁶²⁶ And indeed, *Style and Form* lacked explicit phrases or wording that would suggest the image of the officer corps as an elitist institution disconnected from the civilian world. Yet, booklet blended bourgeoisie norms common in other etiquette books with demands and expectations specific to the military.⁶²⁷ The West German soldier, and above all the officer corps, had to adhere to superior manners and customs. As such *Style and Form* represented a renunciation of the Baudissin's concept of the *Innere Führung*, which did not want to infer with soldiers' and officers' private life in such an invasive manner.

Though advertised as a valuable reading for the entire "soldierly community," *Style and Form* addressed above all senior and junior officers, because of their responsibilities as leaders, trainers and educators.⁶²⁸ Reminding the military readership that a soldier was not only a "citizen of a democratic, constitutional state," but also a "public servant" (*Staatsdiener*), the booklet stated that "a soldier does not let anybody exceed him in terms of civility and propriety."⁶²⁹ In more than fifty pages *Style and Form* offered the officers a detailed description of areas in which

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

⁶²⁶ *Stil und Formen*, 3–4. See Naumann, "Schlachtfeld und Geselligkeit," 330.

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ *Stil und Formen*, 4.

⁶²⁹ Ibid., 15. See also Naumann, "Schlachtfeld und Geselligkeit," 333.

they had to reign supreme. With the help of several ironic caricatures, the booklet tackled topics such the soldier's general appearance and demeanor, his behavior while on duty and in public as well as rules that had to be observed during social gatherings.

Central to the soldier's superior manners was the way in which he treated respectable women. While the booklet does not mention any "improper" women, it stated that act as a "cavalier" and help "ladies and other people who deserve respect."⁶³⁰ In order to act "chivalrous" towards respectable people, officers were even allowed to temper with their strictly regulated appearance. According to the author of *Style and Form*, the military uniform was "a visible sign of the soldierly community" and the expression of both a particular way of life and a man's inner disposition.⁶³¹ Whereas an open collar or an umbrella hanging from an officer's arm was seen as generally unacceptable, the booklet stated that soldiers and officers were permitted to carry an "open umbrella for a lady."⁶³² *Style and Form* thus attached great meaning to military uniforms, portraying men who wore *Bundeswehr* uniforms as distinct from the rest of West German society. This clearly defined and superior image could only be distorted in favor of chivalrous behavior towards women.

The treatment of respectable of women was furthermore connected to the ways in which *Style and Form* discussed the family. Echoing the intention of *Soldier and Love*, the regulations of the *Personalgutachterausschuss*, and the wording of the *Heiratserlaß*, the booklet stated that officers and soldiers should make sure that their bank account was balanced, because financial

⁶³⁰ *Stil und Formen*, 38.

⁶³¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁶³² *Ibid.*, 12.

“excess is not a sign of brilliancy or manliness, but of weakness.”⁶³³ An accurate bank account was furthermore considered vital for a “harmonious family life” and the fruitful interaction with comrades. Arguing that the “happy marriages” of superiors could have “educational effects” (*erzieherisch wirken*) on young officers and soldiers, the booklet discussed how officers could achieve these marriages. First of all, *Style and Form* noted, like many other texts before, that officers should choose their wives carefully. In addition to being able to keep secrets and understand the occupational problems of their husbands, officers’ wives—the booklet noted—should be capable of keeping the house stylish and sedate, while not living beyond the family’s means. This would among other things ensure a happy family life that could also function as a good example for younger officers and soldiers.⁶³⁴ Emphasizing traditional gender norms, *Style and Form* fitted neatly into the social discourse of the 1950s and early 1960s that focused on the male-breadwinner family. At the same time, the *Bundeswehr* was portrayed a community with superior manners. Although *Style and Form* did not explicitly describe soldiering as job *sui generis*, its production sheds light on the conservative shift that took place in the Ministry of Defense and the *Bundeswehr* in the late 1950s and early 1960s and that represented a renunciation of the *Innere Führung*.

Conclusion

The establishment of the *Bundeswehr* as a national defense force that would protect the Federal Republic against any threats from the East cemented traditional gender norms. Since compulsory military service was defined as a masculine undertaking, women were assigned to

⁶³³ Ibid., 34–35.

⁶³⁴ Ibid., 49–51.

the extra-military and domestic sphere of the family and household. In the context of the Cold War, this sphere was seen as particularly threatened by possible attacks and thus men in military uniform were above all stylized as the defenders of the West German home and family.

Given the exclusion of women from military service, the *Bundeswehr* was soon discussed as a men's society. Whereas some journalists, mothers, schoolteachers, and enthusiastic veterans continued to see the military as a palladium of ideal masculinity, concerned citizens, religious groups, and welfare workers argued that the military could foster improper sexual and social behavior. Even before the first men were recruited, contemporaries fretted about the emergence of homosexuality and prostitution. With the establishment of the first units these concerns grew more intense, because the shortage of "proper" women seemed to be counterbalanced by a surplus of "prostitutes."

Since these concerns were widespread and their implications significant. They were soon addressed by members of the government and the political opposition as well as by the Ministry of Defense and the *Bundeswehr*'s high-ranking officers. After all, any form of social and sexual debauchery was seen as a threat to soldiers' health, to the effective functioning of the troops, and to the West German families that the *Bundeswehr* was supposed to protect. In the context of the Cold War, soldiers who engaged in improper sexual activities hence endangered the well-being and safety of the Federal Republic.

While parliamentarians discussed the issue in internal communiques, at conferences, and during sessions of the Committee for Defense, the Ministry of Defense and the *Bundeswehr*'s leadership published a volley of guidelines, regulations, and decrees that tackled the social and sexual behavior of the troops. Influenced by a broader national discourse that sought to define the moral and social boundaries of the Federal Republic, the discussions and publications framed

matrimony and family as the ultimate remedy against promiscuity, prostitution, and homosexuality. As he was recruited to defend the state, homes, and families, the West German man in uniform was urged to aspire to the impeccable life of a married family man who was devoted to his wife and children.

PART IV
LEFT-WING REJECTION AND RIGHT-WING CRITIQUE: THE IMAGE OF THE
***BUNDESWEHRSOLDAT*, 1964-1976**

Beginning in the mid-1960s, the image of the *Bundeswehrsoldat* as a heterosexual man who was both a merciful, restrained soldier and a devout head of his nuclear family came under new and heavy fire. On the one hand, this was due to the rise of the extra-parliamentary opposition or APO, a protest movement of “liberal, left-liberal, social democratic, or socialist organizations, coalitions and individuals engaged in oppositional activity outside the parliamentary process that took a critical stance toward the parliamentary system, parliamentary parties, and government policy.”⁶³⁵ The APO started as a movement against Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger’s Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP and its push for new Emergency Laws (*Notstandgesetze*). Eventually passed on May 30, 1968, the *Notstandgesetze* added new emergency clauses to the Basic Law, which enabled the government to act in crises such as natural disasters, uprisings or war.

On the other, the criticism came from a conservative surge among leading officers and generals, politicians and public intellectuals who were at odds with the far-reaching military

⁶³⁵ Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2003), 7–8. For the development of the “New Left” and student activism see, Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, “Kritische Theorie and Neue Linke,” in *1968: Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft*, ed. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 168–187; Pavel A. Richter, “Die Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1966 bis 1968,” in *1968: Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft*, ed. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 35–55. See also, Michael Schmidtke, *Der Aufbruch der jungen Intelligenz: Die 68er Jahre in der Bundesrepublik und den USA* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003). Following the recent work of Andrew Oppenheimer, my usage of the term includes also pacifists and peace activists. See Andrew Oppenheimer, “Conflicts of Solidarity: Nuclear Weapons, Liberation Movements and the Politics of Peace in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945–1975.” Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2010.

reforms of the 1950s. Lingering tensions within the Ministry of Defense and the *Bundeswehr* boiled over in the so-called “Crisis of the Generals” in 1966. In August, three generals— Air Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Werner Panitzki, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Heinrich Trettner, and Major General Günther Pape —resigned because they detested how civil-military hierarchies were structured within the Ministry of Defense.⁶³⁶ The resignation of the generals was, however, only the prelude to a much longer conflict within the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, West German society witnessed a series of statements by high-ranking, older generals and a younger generation of officers who called for an overhaul of existing military customs, norms, and values as well as West Germany’s political and social system.⁶³⁷

One of their major claims was that the *Bundeswehr* did not possess the combat strength necessary to halt an attack initiated by the Soviet Union. Arguing that previous military reforms and especially the ideal of the *Staatsbürger in Uniform* had “softened” the *Bundeswehr*, members of the general staff such as Inspector of the Army and Lieutenant General, Albert Schnez, demanded less parliamentary control. Irritated, moreover, by West Germany’s changing youth culture and the intensifying extra-parliamentary protest, they called for a return to the soldierly image of the hardened “fighter” (*Kämpfer*). Although a number of liberal-minded military experts vehemently opposed these statements, a considerable number of younger

⁶³⁶ See Abenheim, *Reforging*, 233–234.

⁶³⁷ Simon, *Integration der Bundeswehr*, 113. See further, Kutz, *Deutsche Soldaten*, 206–214; Kutz, *Reform und Restauration*, 98; Bald, “Bundeswehr und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch,” 297–309.

officers, veterans, conservative politicians, and journalists supported the conservative agenda and the masculine ideals it propagated.⁶³⁸

This conservative shift alarmed extra-parliamentary activists who were dissatisfied with the political system and the agenda of the Grand Coalition.⁶³⁹ Possessing 90 percent of the *Bundestag* mandates, Kiesinger's government was able to pass the highly controversial Emergency Laws, which also provided for the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* on West German soil in case of domestic unrest. The ratification of the law caused great uproar, because it first coincided with electoral victories of the ultra-right wing National Party of Germany (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* or NPD) as well as the death of student Benno Ohnesorg during APO demonstrations against the visit of the Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in June 1967. Stating that the Grand Coalition passed laws that resembled Nazi legislation, activists argued the Federal Republic was becoming a fascist state and that the *Bundeswehr* was the government's willing instrument to implement its authoritarian agenda.⁶⁴⁰

Different groups including left-liberal intellectuals and students such as the Socialist German Student Union (*Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* or SDS) drove this extra-parliamentary opposition. Founded in 1946, the SDS had been the collegiate branch of the SPD. After the Social Democrats embraced rearmament, however, tensions arose, leading to a split

⁶³⁸ Bald, "Kämpfe um die Dominanz des Militärischen," 17–65.

⁶³⁹ Sven Reichardt, "Die Große und Sozialliberale Koalition (1966–1974)," in *Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: Ein Handbuch*, ed. Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus, 2008), 71–92.

⁶⁴⁰ Kristina Schulz, "Studentische Bewegungen und Protestkampagnen," in *Die Sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: Ein Handbuch* (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 2008), 417–446. See also, Martin Klimke, "The Struggle Continues: Revisiting the German Sixties," *The Sixties* 2 (2008): 247–257; Belinda Davis, "New Leftists and West Germany: Fascism, Violence, and the Public Sphere, 1967–1974," in *Coping With the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955–1975*, ed. Philipp Gassert and Alan E Steinweis (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 211–237.

between the two groups. In addition, the politics of the Grand Coalition infuriated pacifists and peace activists such as the German section of the War Resisters' International (*Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner*, IK) and the Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament (*Kampagne für Demokratie und Abrüstung*). In 1963, the Easter March Campaign (*Ostermarschbewegung*) against anti-nuclear weapons, which had started in the 1950s, adopted the name Campaign for Disarmament (*Kampagne für Abrüstung*) and expanded it in 1968 to Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament.⁶⁴¹ The groups' critique that the Kiesinger's government represented a threat to peace and stability was seconded by representatives of different labor unions as well as Catholic and Protestant clergy. Having already been active in the 1950s, the organization pushed the churches' leadership to revisit their theological doctrines and to develop a more critical stance on military service. Finally, activists of the growing women's movement like the Action Council for the Liberation of Women (*Aktionsrat zur Befreiung der Frauen*) and members of the slowly growing gay-rights movement, which protested the continuing discrimination of gay men, continued the struggle against the established political system and the politics of the Grand Coalition.⁶⁴²

The politics of Kiesinger's government and the conservative military surge, however, were not the only developments that caused APO activists to challenge the political and military system. On the international stage, the escalation of the Vietnam War under the presidency of

⁶⁴¹ For a history of the different groups and the fusion of the individual groups in the late 1960s, see Appelius, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland*; further, Michael Schneider, *Demokratie in Gefahr? Der Konflikt um die Notstandsgesetze, Sozialdemokratie, Gewerkschaften und intellektueller Protest (1958–1968)* (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1986).

⁶⁴² For the different foci and arguments of extra-parliamentary peace activists, see Seeliger, *Die Außerparlamentarische Opposition*. See also, Andreas Buro, "Friedensbewegung," in *Die Sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: Ein Handbuch*, ed. Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht (Frankfurt a.M. and New York: Campus, 2008), 267–291; Ute Gerhard, "Frauenbewegung," in *Die Sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: Ein Handbuch*, ed. Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 2008), 187–217.

Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) and the anti-colonial struggles in Africa and Asia helped trigger the intensification of protests in the 1960s. Joining the international movement against the Vietnam War and supporting the freedom struggle of colonized countries, protesters challenged the politics of the “First World,” including those of the Federal Republic. Seeking to stop Western imperialism activists developed a multitude of strategies, which also included protests against and the “infiltration” of the *Bundeswehr*.⁶⁴³

On the national level, the activism that gripped West Germany in the mid-1960s was both catalyst and expression of a development that involved the entire society.⁶⁴⁴ Influenced by the *Wirtschaftswunder* of the 1950s, West Germany witnessed a gradual change of social norms and values that affected all areas of life including religion, sexuality, gender roles, family relations, education, and the military. For a growing number of West Germans, this change meant a farewell to ideals such as strict discipline, obedience, devout religiousness, and heterosexual monogamy.⁶⁴⁵ Viewing the *Bundeswehr* as a palladium of these values, activists criticized the West German soldier also as a symbol of passé ideals of masculinity.

The escalation of both the military controversy and the APO protest in the late 1960s, which resulted in skyrocketing numbers of men refusing to serve in the *Bundeswehr*,⁶⁴⁶ affected

⁶⁴³ Claus Leggewie, “A Laboratory of Postindustrial Society: Reassessing the 1960s in Germany,” in 1968: *The World Transformed*, ed. Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 277–294; Andrew Oppenheimer, “Extraparliamentary Entanglements: Framing Peace in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945–1974,” in *Protest Beyond Borders: Contentious Politics in Europe since 1945*, ed. Hara Kouki and Eduardo Romanos (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 15–31.

⁶⁴⁴ See the debated study Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). For a critical discussion of the scope and depth of this shift and the analysis of 1970s sociologists of this shift see, Detlef Siegfried, *Time is on My Side: Konsum und Politik in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur der 60er Jahre* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 51–59.

⁶⁴⁵ See Ibid, 51–52; Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 416.

⁶⁴⁶ See Ibid.

not only Kiesinger's Grand coalition. It also determined the politics of Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social-Liberal Coalition of SPD and FDP that came to power in 1969. In addition to compelling representatives of all primary parties to restate their opinions about the role of the armed forces, members Brandt's coalition realized that military reforms were inevitable. As a result, Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber, who served as the first social democratic Ministers of Defense from 1969-1972 and 1972-1978 respectively, implemented a series of measures that changed the masculine image of the West German soldier.⁶⁴⁷

Central to this development was once again the question of what function the armed forces should fulfill. In light of the national and international tensions, the political discourse reaffirmed the image of the *Bundeswehr* as a "peace-keeping" force that would protect the Federal Republic. Although parliamentarians argued that male activists and conscientious objectors endangered West Germany's security and stability, the Social-Liberal Coalition also enacted new regulations that sought to accommodate the changing ideals of West Germany's young men. While reaffirming the importance of compulsory military service for men, West German government officials were eager to portray the *Bundeswehr* in a way that made being a soldier more palatable to the men of the 1960s.⁶⁴⁸

In order to illuminate the competing concepts of masculinity that APO activists as well as conservative *Bundeswehr* generals propagated and how these effected West German politics, this part details first the critique and ideas of men such as Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez. In a second step, it gauges the debates taking place in civil society, including the complete political

⁶⁴⁷ See Kurt Fischer, "Schmidt, Leber, Apel: Die Ära der Sozialdemokratischen Verteidigungsminister," in *Vom Kalten Krieg zur Deutschen Einheit: Analysen und Zeitzeugenberichte zur deutschen Militärgeschichte, 1945 bis 1995*, ed. Bruno Thoß (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 193–222.

⁶⁴⁸ Abenheim, *Reforging*, 233.

spectrum from the conservatives to the far Left. Finally, this part analyzes how Willy Brandt's Social Democratic government reacted to the multilayered criticism by seeking to redefine the image of the West German man in uniform.

1. Military Disputes about the Role and Function of the Armed Forces and the Contested Ideal of the Soldier

In August 1966, West Germany witnessed what many contemporaries soon considered a revolt, if not a coup, against the civilian control of the armed forces. In August, three generals—Werner Panitzki, Heinrich Trettner, and Günther Pape—resigned, because they detested the structure of the civil-military hierarchy within the Ministry of Defense. Already disgruntled by the fact that the position of the *Bundeswehr* Chief of Staff had been subordinated to the civilian Undersecretary of Defense,⁶⁴⁹ they took offense at the “Union Decree.” On August 1, 1966, the Ministry of Defense issued a decree that gave soldiers the right to join a union. To be sure, soldiers could already join and be represented by the *Bundeswehrverband* (*Bundeswehr* Association). Founded in 1956 by military personnel, the *Bundeswehrverband* received support from the Ministry of Defense and thus held the monopoly in West German barracks. Yet, this domination broke in 1966 due to the protest of the Union for Public Service, Transportation, and Traffic (*Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr* or ÖTV). The generals took the passing of the “Union Decree” as another sign for unjustified and unnecessary civilian interference.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁹ See *Ibid.*, 233–234.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

The resignation of the three men represented both a first culmination and a prelude to a much longer conflict, which some scholars have called a conservative “counter revolution” within the Ministry of Defense and the *Bundeswehr*.⁶⁵¹ Over the course of the 1960s, several high-ranking, older generals including Heinz Karst and Army Chief of Staff Albert Schnez publicly called for the overhaul of existing military customs, norms, and values. The generals’ demands for more military autonomy was seconded by a number of younger officers, most notably thirty “Captains of Unna” who argued that West Germany had to once again embrace the value of the “fighting man.”⁶⁵² Openly denouncing the military reforms of the 1950s—including the principles of the *Innere Führung* and the *Staatsbürger in Uniform*—they called for a different type of man who should serve in the *Bundeswehr*. In doing so, they not only closely linked combat readiness, masculinity, and sexuality, but they also argued that the very nature and behavior of West German men had to be geared towards military functionality.

Conservative Military Demands for a Return to the Soldierly Ideal of the “Fighter”

Central to the generals’ conservative “counter revolution” was General Heinz Karst. As addressed in Part II and III, Karst had worked alongside Wolf Graf von Baudissin in the *Innere Führung* office in the early 1950s. However, over the course of the late 1950s and especially in the early 1960s, the two men developed very different ideas about military leadership, training, and soldiers’ rights, turning Karst into a critic of the 1950s military reforms. Stating that being as soldier was a job *sui generis*, which demanded not only superior manners and devout patriotism

⁶⁵¹ Simon, *Integration*, 113. See further, Kutz, *Deutsche Soldaten*, 206–214; Kutz, *Reform und Restauration*, 98; Detlef Bald, “Bundeswehr und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch”; Ibid., “Die Militärreform,” 341–353.

⁶⁵² Bald, “Bundeswehr und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch.”

(*Vaterlandstreue*), but also utmost discipline and obedience, he demanded the rethinking of military traditions and practices.⁶⁵³ After he commanded the 32nd Armored Infantry Division between 1963 and 1967, Karst was appointed General for Education of the Army (*General des Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen des Heeres*). During his time as infantry commander and General for Education, he leveled some of the harshest and most publicized criticism against the *Innere Führung* and the *Staatsbürger in Uniform*. In unison with other commanders he called once more and much more vociferous for the soldierly ideal of the “fighter.”

For instance, the wake of the resignation of Panitzki, Trettner, and Pape, Karst felt “compelled to render an account of where we [military superiors] stand in state and society.”⁶⁵⁴ His assessment was anything but uplifting, dissatisfied with the military leadership and with West German society. In 1967 and 1968, Karst issued several statements in which he criticized the *Bundeswehr*’s “lassitude of peacetime army training.”⁶⁵⁵ Condemning the premise that the *Bundeswehr* was established solely as a defensive force, he argued that the military’s function was to fight and win battles. Thus, Karst demanded once more the return to “realistic” training methods, which would prepare soldiers for the harshness of war. This form of training was especially necessary, he claimed, because West Germany’s economic success—the *Wirtschaftswunder*—had “urbanized” and weakened young men. According to him, realistic battle simulations would make up for this shortcoming by advancing young men’s knowledge

⁶⁵³ Bald, “Kämpfen um die Dominanz des Militärischen”; Nägler, *Der gewollte Soldat*, 32–36.

⁶⁵⁴ Quoted and translated in Abenheim, *Reforging*, 240.

⁶⁵⁵ Quoted and translated in *Ibid.*, 241.

about nature and by bolstering their physical fitness. Subsequently, young West German men would become better soldiers who could defeat Soviet troops in battle.⁶⁵⁶

Since other high-ranking military commanders such as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General Hans Hellmuth Grashey, who publicly denounced the *Innere Führung* as a “mask,”⁶⁵⁷ seconded Karst’s resentment, the Grand Coalition’s Minister of Defense, Gerhard Schröder, and Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Ulrich de Maizière, thought it necessary to act. They ordered their service chiefs to prepare suggestions for how to reform the inner structure of the *Bundeswehr*. Submitting their proposals in 1969, the air force and navy leadership made unspectacular suggestions. Those of the army were, however, quite drastic. Under the aegis of the Army Chief of Staff Albert Schnez, six generals—among them Heinz Karst—compiled “Thoughts on Improving the Internal Order of the Army.”⁶⁵⁸ Though classified as “secret,” the document was leaked to the press in December 1969 and the so-called “Schnez Study” caused a storm of protest.

The document was controversial because it reiterated not only some of Karst’s previous claims, but also moved well beyond them. In sharp contrast to the dominant parliamentary discourse that defined the *Bundeswehr* as a defensive force with the purpose of preserving peace in Central Europe, the authors maintained that it was not the military’s task to prevent war. This

⁶⁵⁶ Heinrich Karst, “Die Verkannte Armee,” *Hochland: Zeitschrift für alle Gebiete des Wissens und der schönen Künste*, 60/1 (October/November 1967): 14–35; Karst, *Bild des Soldaten*. See also Simon, *Integration*, 43. Abenheim, *Reforging*, 240–241.

⁶⁵⁷ Nägler, *Der gewollte Soldat*, 141. See also Zimmermann, *Ulrich de Maizière*, 362–396;

⁶⁵⁸ The study is printed in Klaus Heßler, *Militär, Gehorsam, Meinung: Dokumente zur Diskussion in der Bundeswehr* (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1971), 50–91.

duty lay with the political leadership.⁶⁵⁹ The *Bundeswehr*'s main purpose was to either keep foreign powers from attacking or, if deterrence did not work, fight and win any possible conflict.⁶⁶⁰ Along with redefining the *Bundeswehr*'s function, Schnez also wanted the West German armed forces to be recognized as a "community of combat, fate, and emergency" (*Kampf-, Schicksal- und Notgemeinschaft*).⁶⁶¹ Employing terminology that was wide-spread during the Third Reich, the Schnez Study further emphasized that being a soldier was a job *sui generis*, which entailed a particular set of virtues such as "bravery," "justice," "camaraderie," the "willingness to make sacrifices," and "discipline."⁶⁶² Thus, the Schnez Study stood in sharp contrast to *Innere Führung* and the *Staatsbürger in Uniform*, which bid farewell to the notion that soldiering was a special and particularly valuable profession.

Yet, according to the authors of the Schnez Study, the *Bundeswehr* was far from being this superior military force. The shortcoming was due to major problems within the Ministry of Defense. According to the study, the ministry had an overly "sluggish" administration that prevented military commanders from being "flexible," "independent" and from making "quick decisions."⁶⁶³ Military superiors were unable to establish the necessary discipline among their

⁶⁵⁹ The question of who drafted the study is an object of scholarly debate. Schnez commissioned six generals, one of which was Heinz Karst. Although contemporaries have blamed Karst for being the mastermind behind the study, scholars have expressed doubts about this theory and Karst has disclaimed responsibility. See Simon, *Integration*, 65.

⁶⁶⁰ "Gedanken zur Verbesserung der Inneren Ordnung," in *Militär, Gehorsam, Meinung: Dokumente zur Diskussion in der Bundeswehr*, ed. Klaus Heßler (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1971), 50–91.

⁶⁶¹ "Gedanken zur Verbesserung der Inneren Führung von Albert Schnez vom Mai 1969," in *Militär, Gehorsam, Meinung: Dokumente zur Diskussion in der Bundeswehr*, ed. Klaus Heßler (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1971), 38–49. See also, "Ich halte mich für einen Modernen General: SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit dem Inspekteur des Heeres, Generalleutnant Albert Schnez, *Der Spiegel*, May 1970, 68–74.

⁶⁶² "Gedanken zur Verbesserung der Inneren Ordnung," 57–58.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*

troops, because the current regulations were too complex and not based on discipline and obedience. Instead military leadership relied on men's "voluntariness" and own "insights." Thus, the Study concluded, the *Bundeswehr* was not an "assiduous army" and had gained the reputation for being an "army of bums."⁶⁶⁴

As the word "bums" indicates, the generals also faulted West Germany's young men for the *Bundeswehr*'s inadequacies. Albert Schnez argued, for instance, that the young men who entered the barracks in the 1960s did not possess any superior qualities. To be sure, he stated, many young men had a positive attitude towards "family," "community," "nation" and "duty."⁶⁶⁵ After all, men went to battle to defend their "fatherland," wives, and children. However, for most young men, these qualities were underdeveloped, if not in danger of being totally lost. Similar to Karst, Schnez argued that this was because many West Germans only valued the *Bundeswehr* as an institution that would inculcate young men with socially acceptable, domestic manners. Consequently, young men entered the military without a respectable canon of values.⁶⁶⁶ Moreover, the Schnez Study stated that a considerable number of young men embraced a dangerous "utopian pacifism," which undermined the "basic order of obedience and authority" and eventually "military morale."⁶⁶⁷ Finally, the army generals blamed West Germany's "growing prosperity" and "urbanization" for the young men's weakness. Like Karst, the Schnez

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid., 61.

⁶⁶⁵ "Ein Persönliches Verhältnis zur Waffe: Gedanken des Inspektors des Heeres zur Inneren Führung der Bundes," *FAZ*, 18 Dezember 1969, 20, printed in *Militär, Gehorsam, Meinung: Dokumente zur Diskussion in der Bundeswehr*, ed. Klaus Heßler (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1971), 38–49. See also transcription of an interview that Heinz Karst gave during a workshop on December 6, 1969. BArch F, BW 1/ 22102.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ "Gedanken zur Verbesserung der Inneren Ordnung," 57–58. See also, "Gedanken zur Inneren Führung," 39.

Study stated that West Germany's "affluent society" had made men too soft to meet the demands of "wartime reality."⁶⁶⁸

While this criticism represented another direct attack on the *Innere Führung* and the ideal of the *Bürger in Uniform*, the generals also responded to the geo-political developments of the 1960s. In 1966, the United States began reducing its number of troops in Central Europe—including West Germany—because of the Vietnam War. Shifting their focus to Asia, the United States pushed its European allies to adapt the strategy of "flexible response" that considered not only the possibility of conventional, but also of atomic warfare.⁶⁶⁹ Two years later, the United States' redeployment of troops appeared especially troublesome. When Eastern Bloc armies invaded Czechoslovakia in late August 1968 to stop the Prague Spring, the likelihood of another war on European soil seemed to increase exponentially.

In addition, the Schnez Study represented a reaction to the social and cultural changes that had gripped West German society in the 1960s.⁶⁷⁰ Economic, social, and political changes, which had begun to unfold in the 1950s, accelerated in the early 1960s, causing contemporaries to describe the Federal Republic as a "new society."⁶⁷¹ Because of the *Wirtschaftswunder*, many

⁶⁶⁸ "Gedanken zur Inneren Führung," 45.

⁶⁶⁹ Abenheim, *Reforging*, 231–233.

⁶⁷⁰ Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers, "Einleitung," in *Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften*, ed. Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers (Hamburg: Christians, 2000), 1–20. See also, Reichardt, "Die Große und Sozialliberale Koalition"; Christina von Hodenberg and Detlef Siegfried, "Reform und Revolte: 1968 und die langen sechziger Jahre in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik," in *Wo '1968' liegt: Reform und Revolte in der Bundesrepublik*, ed. Christina von Hodenberg and Detlef Siegfried (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 7–14.

⁶⁷¹ Axel Schidt, "Materieller Wohlstand, Pragmatische Politik, Kulturelle Umbrüche: Die 60er Jahre in der Bundesrepublik," in *Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften*, ed. Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers (Hamburg: Christians, 2000), 21–53.

West Germans enjoyed a range of completely new commodities stretching from kitchen appliances such as refrigerators to consumer electronics like televisions. Moreover, the material prosperity combined with changing labor market policies,⁶⁷² allowed for the expansion of leisure time activities: if televisions, radios, and clubs furthered the developments of new music and dance scenes, then the spread of the automobile and air travel provided means for a new form of “mass tourism.”⁶⁷³

These structural changes also entailed the development of new cultural and social norms, opinions, and ideals.⁶⁷⁴ Although scholars still debate the depth and scope of this development, they agree with sociologist Helmut Klage’s claim that values, which built on the acceptance of traditional authorities, became less important, whereas values that pertained to individual self-realization and autonomy flourished.⁶⁷⁵ This change affected all areas of life. For instance, the number of West Germans who attributed great significance to values such as strict discipline, obedience, and self-restraint declined over the course of the long 1960s. To be sure, West Germans did not abandon these qualities immediately and entirely;⁶⁷⁶ but “independence” and “free will” became the educational goals for a growing number of parents and a younger

⁶⁷² The working hours per week sank between 1955 and 1969 from 49.8 to 44.9. Compare, Schildt, “Materieller Wohlstand,” 28.

⁶⁷³ Ibid. 29–33. For a discussion of consumption and consumerism for twentieth-century German history, see Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 269–314.

⁶⁷⁴ See Siegfried, *Time is on My Side*, 51–59.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid., 51–52; Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 206.

⁶⁷⁶ Klage, *Werteorientierung*, 41–45.

generation of men and women increasingly extolled them.⁶⁷⁷ In the late 1960s and early 1970s, for example, mothers and fathers sent letters to the Ministry of Defense stating that they did not raise their children to become “proud soldiers” and “war criminal[s]” without any self-determination. Instead, they wanted their sons to become peace-loving and “mature” (*mündig*) “citizen of the world.”⁶⁷⁸

This change also influenced how young men viewed military duty. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the numbers of men who applied for conscientious objector status rose continuously.⁶⁷⁹ While the number of men registered eligible for military service increased from 263,000 to 390,000 between 1965 and 1969, the total number of men filing for conscientious objection rose from 3,437 to 14,420. This represented an increase from 1,3 percent to 3,7 percent. Although this trend did not yet pose any structural challenges to the *Bundeswehr*, the situation was nonetheless problematic as the number of soldiers who filed for conscientious objection rose. Between 1967 and 1968, the number quadrupled from 871 to 3,495. Simultaneously, the number of volunteers plummeted. If the *Bundeswehr* had already had difficulty recruiting enough volunteers in the early 1960s, then the situation only intensified over the course of the decade.⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷⁷ Siegfried, *Time is on My Side*, 52. See also, Rahden, “Religion, Vaterschaft;” Patrick Bernhard, “Lieber ‘Zivi’ als zum ‘Bund’: Zum Wertewandel unter den jungen Wehrpflichtigen seit den 1960er Jahren,” in *Perspektiven der Inneren Führung: Zur Gesellschaftlichen Integration der Bundeswehr*, ed. Ulrich von Hagen and Björn Kilian (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010), 12–26.

⁶⁷⁸ Letters quoted in Bernhardt, *Zivildienst*, 213–214. See also, Patrick Bernhard, “Von ‘Drückebergern’ zu ‘Helden des Alltags’: Zur Geschichte der Wehrdienstverweigerung in der Bundesrepublik, 1945–1990,” in *Ich dien’ nicht! Wehrdienstverweigerung in der Geschichte*, ed. Christian Th. Müller and Dierk Walter (Berlin: Winter Industries, 2008), 127–163.

⁶⁷⁹ Bernhard, *Zivildienst*. See also EMNID Befragung zur Wehrpflicht, from April 1969. BArch F, BW I/114 720.

⁶⁸⁰ Kutz, *Deutsche Soldaten*, 203–205; Matthias Jopp, *Militär und Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 1983), 28–30.

Greatly unsettled by the development, the army generals proposed a number of changes. The fundamental principle that guided these proposals was that society and the entire political apparatus had to be geared towards the effective functioning of the armed forces.⁶⁸¹ In order for the *Bundeswehr* to win “total wars,” young men had to become “physically and psychologically tough fighter[s].” Linking combat readiness to men’s self-identity, the Schnez Study argued that West Germany’s male citizens had to feel “like the born defender[s] of [their] country.”⁶⁸² To achieve this goal, the generals demanded not only harsher disciplinary punishments, but also the restriction of Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law, which granted the right to oppose military service.⁶⁸³ Challenging the very existence of this constitutional right, Schnez and others argued that conscientious objection would allow men to “undermine military morale.”⁶⁸⁴

In order to improve the *Bundeswehr*’s combat strength further, the Schnez Study called for new forms of military training. Closely connecting combat readiness and masculinity, Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez thought it necessary to avoid any “feminine” training methods. Under no circumstance, they stated, could the relationship between superiors and their soldiers resemble the way women took care of children. Instead of acting like a “nanny,” the Schnez Study emphasized, military commanders had to treat their soldiers “like men” if they wanted to train them successfully.⁶⁸⁵ Declaring that “being a soldier is tough” and that war demanded “a whole

⁶⁸¹ “Gedanken zur Verbesserung der Inneren Ordnung,” 74–75. See also Abenheim, *Reforging*, 245.

⁶⁸² “Gedanken zur Verbesserung der Inneren Ordnung,” 52. The same wording can be found in Karst, “Die Verkannte Armee.”

⁶⁸³ “Gedanken zur Verbesserung der Inneren Ordnung,” 65–67.

⁶⁸⁴ The study used the term *Wehrkraftzersetzung*, which had been introduced by the National Socialist in the late 1930s.

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

man” the document called for the expansion of routine combat drills in order to teach young men to be “hard on themselves” and to achieve the necessary physical strength.⁶⁸⁶

Seeking to ensure that inferior feminine characteristics and behavior did not infiltrate the *Bundeswehr*, the generals further argued that the family life of soldiers and officers had to be regulated carefully. In 1966, the Ministry of Defense commissioned psychologist Rudolf Warnke to study whether or not being a *Bundeswehr* officer was a job like any other.⁶⁸⁷ Developed in cooperation with Heinz Karst, the study was published in 1970.⁶⁸⁸ Warnke concluded that an officer “generally” enjoyed the same rights like any other male citizen, but that the “extent of his duties were definitely greater.”⁶⁸⁹ This fact, the publication stated, became especially apparent in the “‘wife and marriage’ Complex.” Continuing a line of argument developed in the late 1950s due to the perceived sexual misconduct of *Bundeswehr* soldiers, the study stated that while “fidelity in marriage was only a moral imperative for the members of [most] professions, it represented a constant obligation for officers.”⁶⁹⁰

The study further informed its readership that “some unwritten laws” defined officers’ private and marital life. Although there were no regulations in place that enforced precise restrictions, “different forms of ‘social control’”⁶⁹¹ still regulated the soldiers’ life. According to

⁶⁸⁶ “Gedanken zur Verbesserung der Inneren Ordnung,” 86.

⁶⁸⁷ Wehrsoziologische Untersuchungen im Auftrag des BMVg, ‘Der Offizier im Truppendienst,’ Band II: Zum Berufsbild des Offiziers, Bezug: Staatssekretär, Org 1 – Az 10-02-05-10 March 6, 1966. BArch F, BW I / 25 439.

⁶⁸⁸ Rudolf Warnke and Udo Fleischhauer, *Der Offizier im Truppendienst (I): Eine Einführung in die Untersuchungsreihe: Der Offizier in der Bundeswehr* (Bonn-Beul: Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 1970).

⁶⁸⁹ “Wehrsoziologische Untersuchungen im Auftrag des BMVg, ‘Der Offizier im Truppendienst’, 57.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid. See also, “Schultz vermisst Weiterentwicklung der Inneren Führung,” *FAZ*, March 19, 1971.

⁶⁹¹ “Wehrsoziologische Untersuchungen im Auftrag des BMVg, hier: ‘Der Offizier im Truppendienst’, 57.

the document, 66 percent of *Bundeswehr* commanders and 44 percent of company commanders were in favor of setting a minimum age at which officers could get married. Whereas the majority of younger officers were against the introduction of marriage restrictions, representatives of an older generation of commanders were willing to move well beyond the ministerial Marriage Decree of 1958, which had only issued recommendations and suggestions.⁶⁹² Although West German men were supposed to join the *Bundeswehr* to defend their homes and families, commanders in favor of more restrictions argued they should not become preoccupied with marital life, because it would represent an obstacle to military camaraderie and thus military effectiveness.⁶⁹³

While they thus wanted to regulate the troops' marital life more strictly, Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez also emphasized that *Bundeswehr* officers and soldiers should not fall for the sexual temptations of modern society. In an interview with *Der Spiegel* in 1970, Schnez repeated his critique of West Germany's affluence by complaining that many contemporaries "abandon themselves to pleasures without any restraint."⁶⁹⁴ Responding to various kinds of critiques—including leftist intellectuals' claim that totalitarian states such as the Third Reich had been sexually repressive—the general stated that he was neither a "puritan" nor as "prudish as some totalitarian states."⁶⁹⁵ Yet, he claimed that pin-up girls in soldiers' lockers and "sex movies" in barrack theaters could definitely undermine the military combat strength. After all, he argued, the

⁶⁹². Ibid., 59.

⁶⁹³ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁴ "Ich halte mich für einen modernen General," 74.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

history of Rome provided ample evidence for the demand that soldiers should lead cautious sex lives. Even though Schnez did not expand on the issue during the interview, he was most likely referring to the hypothesis that the Roman Empire fell because of pervasive decadence.⁶⁹⁶

Military Arguments against the Conservative Shift within the Bundeswehr

The generals' redefinition of the *Bundeswehr* as a community of fate and combat, which should be composed of "tough fighters" who had to follow a particular moral codex, was by no means the only position that military representatives assumed between the mid-1960s and early 1970s. To be sure, thirty company commanders of the 7th *Panzergrenadier* division in Unna, near the West German city of Dortmund, repeated Karst and Schnez's argument almost verbatim in December 1970s. Unsettled by the establishment of Willy Brandt's Social-Liberal coalition and Helmut Schmidt as the new Minister of Defense, the "Captains of Unna" too called very publicly for the supremacy of the military as a fighting force.⁶⁹⁷ Yet, conservative "counter revolution" triggered a number of opposing responses. In addition to a group of eight lieutenants, who wrote a widely circulated paper against the Schnez Study in January 1970s, active and retired generals and officers such as Wolf Graf von Baudissin opposed the conservative demands.⁶⁹⁸ On the one hand, critics of Karst, Schnez, and the "Captains of Unna," still believed in the ideals of the

⁶⁹⁶ Edward Gibbon, who published *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* already in the nineteenth century, argued that among other things decadence and questionable moral ideals had contributed to the fall of the Roman Empire. His ideas were still widely accepted in the mid- to late-20th Century.

⁶⁹⁷ "Niederschrift der Ergebnisse einer Arbeitstagung von Hauptleuten (Kompaniechefs) der 7. Panzergrenadier-Division im Dezember 1970," printed in Klaus Heßler, *Militär, Gehorsam, Meinung: Dokumente zur Diskussion in der Bundeswehr* (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1971), 115–130. See also, Zimmermann, *Ulrich de Maizièr*e, 250–251.

⁶⁹⁸ "'Der Leutnant 1970' von achten Leutnanten vom Dezember 1969," printed in Klaus Heßler, *Militär, Gehorsam, Meinung: Dokumente zur Diskussion in der Bundeswehr* (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1971), 92–101.

Innere Führung. On the other, the cultural developments that changed West German society in the 1960s did not seem them. Openly denouncing the conservative proposals, opponents voiced different ideas' about the *Bundeswehr*'s true purpose and the very nature of soldiering. In doing so, they invoked competing notions of military masculinity.

Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez's statements represented an attack on the *Innere Führung*, directly challenging Wolf von Baudissin. Consequently, Baudissin, who retired from active service in 1967 and immediately joined the Social Democratic Party, received a great deal of attention. In addition to being interviewed by several newspapers, Baudissin also gave several talks in which he addressed the conservative military surge. In July 1968, for example, he spoke at the Kirchberg Monastery in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Entitled "The Soldier's Contribution to Peacekeeping," the talk represented a direct response to the demands voiced by Heinz Karst and other generals.⁶⁹⁹ Baudissin worried that both leading military commanders and a "considerable part of society" viewed being a soldier as job *sui generis* and as a duty that deserved special obeisance. They clung, he stated, to the "feudal" image of the soldier as an "'eternal' figure" and consequently considered any restrictions or critique as a "sacrilege and attack on the 'estate'."⁷⁰⁰

Baudissin denounced this attitude as unsuitable for modern armies and repudiated the claim that young men needed to be more nature-oriented. Criticizing the soldierly image of the "nature-boy," he declared that the *Wirtschaftswunder* and too much "rationality and modern technique" did not endanger soldiers' combat readiness.⁷⁰¹ Given the technical advancements of

⁶⁹⁹ Presentation by Wolf Graf von Baudissin "Der Beitrag des Soldaten zum Dienst am Frieden," Kloster Kirchberg, 29 July 1968. BAArch F, Nachlass Baudissin N742/ 325. See also, "Der Leutnant 1970", in *Heßler, Militär – Gehorsam – Meinung*, 92–101.

⁷⁰⁰ "Der Beitrag des Soldaten zum Dienst am Frieden".

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

both the military and society, Baudissin maintained that this argument was outdated. Questioning the masculine image that defined Karst and Schnez's claims, Baudissin furthermore faulted the *Bundeswehr* leadership for interfering too much with soldiers' private life. Aware of the claims that *Bundeswehr* soldiers and officers had to follow a special moral code, he complained that even soldiers' families were expected to meet certain moral standards, which were irrelevant to the soldiers' military and societal performance. According to Baudissin, the only reason for postulating such a "moral purism," which created an "elitist self-image" was the self-interest of the soldierly "estate."⁷⁰² For him, the claim that *Bundeswehr* officers and soldiers had to follow a particular set of moral and social rules bore the danger of isolating the military from the rest of West German society.

Several officers and generals seconded Baudissin's rebukes in various forms. Two of the most elaborate examples were the academic works of First Lieutenant Reserve and student of sociology, Wido Mosen. As a student of Theodor Adorno and Ludwig Friedeburg, Mosen was a leading member of the Frankfurt-based Military-Political University Group (*Wehrpolitische Hochschulgruppe*). This university group considered the existence of the *Bundeswehr* a necessity and wanted to inform other students about security and military politics.⁷⁰³ Yet, instead of just promoting West Germany's military politics, Mosen sought to foster critical analyses.⁷⁰⁴ His

⁷⁰² Ibid. For a moderate assessment of the discussion see, Eberhard Wagemann, "Soldat, ein Beruf wie jeder andere?," *Wehrkunde: Zeitschrift für alle Wehrfragen* (January 1971): 2–8.

⁷⁰³ "Wehrpolitik: Im Séparée," *Der Spiegel*, September 1, 1965, 60–61. See also, Dietmar Schössler, "Der Ring Wehrpolitischer Hochschulgruppen," in *Strategie und Wissenschaft: Zweites Wehrwissenschaftliches Diskussionsforum zwischen Wissenschaftlern, Politikern, Militärs und Studenten am 10./11. Juli 1965 in Würzburg*, ed. Institut für Wehrrecht der Universität Würzburg/Ring Wehrpolitischer Hochschulgruppen (Würzburg, 1965), 60–62.

⁷⁰⁴ "Wehrpolitik: Im Séparée."

eagerness to reflect on the *Bundeswehr* becomes apparent in his two monographs *A Military Sociology: Technical and Authority Problems in Modern Armies* and *Bundeswehr: Elite of the Nation?* that he published in 1967 and 1970 respectively. To be sure, in the last chapter of *A Military Sociology*, Mosen criticized the *Innere Führung*, calling it a “flimsy” ideology.⁷⁰⁵ Yet, he did not want to abolish it completely. Influenced by the 1966 “crisis of the generals,” he maintained that without this concept the *Bundeswehr* could become the “laboratory” of “authoritarian” leaders who believed their right to rule and command was not only a political necessity, but “ordained by god and nature.”⁷⁰⁶

Mosen’s concerns about the conservative surge among military leaders greatly increased in the late 1960s. In his 1970 monograph *Bundeswehr: Elite of the Nation?*, he argued that many West German soldiers and officers considered themselves above civil society and the parliament.⁷⁰⁷ One central element of this “elitist” mindset was the “mythical idealization” of “genuine soldierdome” (*genuines Soldatentum*) that demanded particular qualities and virtues.⁷⁰⁸ According to Mosen, this myth rested on particular concepts of femininity and masculinity. Representing the first gender analysis of the West German military, *Bundeswehr: Elite of the Nation?* stressed that proponents of military elitism encourage the exclusion of women from

⁷⁰⁵ Wido Mosen, *Eine Militärsoziologie: Technische und Autoritätsprobleme in Modernen Armeen* (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1967), 117. Whereas the majority of chapters address the topic of military sociology in general, the last chapter addresses only the *Bundeswehr* and the *Innere Führung*.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid., 135.

⁷⁰⁷ Wido Mosen, *Bundeswehr: Elite der Nation? Determinanten und Funktionen elitärer Selbsteinschätzungen von Bundeswehrsoldaten* (Neuwied und Berlin: Luchterhand, 1970), 21. For reactions see for example, Wolf Graf von Baudissin, “Mythos als Ersatzbelohnung,” *Der Spiegel*, May 11, 1970, 211; Walter Jablonsky, “Bundeswehr: Elite der Nation? Bemerkungen zu einem Buch von Wido Mosen,” *Wehrkunde: Zeitschrift für alle Wehrfragen*, January 1971, 38–42.

⁷⁰⁸ Mosen, *Bundeswehr*, 46.

armed services, because they considered a woman to be less than a man and thus a lesser human being.⁷⁰⁹ Since women were not men, they lacked the necessary “manliness” that enabled soldiers “to endure the physical vigor” of military life.⁷¹⁰ As a result, the exclusion of women allowed for the development of a particular military culture in which “manliness” was one of the soldiers’ most important virtues. Addressing the claims of Albert Schnez and other generals, Mosen furthermore stressed that a “hate against all civilizing comfort” fueled this ideal of “manliness.” Proponents of the idea that soldiering was a job *sui generis*, he continued, praised the ideal of the “hardened fighter” who was “blessed with sturdy manliness” as the guarantor of military combat strength and as the “showpiece of the human species.”⁷¹¹

Though his monographs represent one of the most elaborate analyses of the arguments made by Heinz Karst and others, Mosen, and Baudissin, were seconded by acting officers and generals. In 1970, the Lieutenant General Gerd Schmückle, who served at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Brussels and advanced to the position of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe in 1978 as the first German to hold the post, also criticized the ways that Albert Schnez and other conservative generals linked combat strength and sexuality. In 1970, Schmückle argued that the *Bundeswehr*’ combat strength depended on the military leadership, technical-organizational preconditions, and the morale of the troops.⁷¹² In order to ensure a good morale, the Lieutenant General argued that soldiers had to be sure of their

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid., 122–123.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid., 123.

⁷¹¹ Ibid., 124.

⁷¹² Gerd Schmückle and Walter Deinzer, “Kampfkraft,” *Wehrkunde: Zeitschrift für alle Wehrfragen*, July 1970, 359–362. See also Gerd Schmückle, *Kommiß a.D.* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1971).

mission. Arguing against the equation of morale and “martial virtues,” Schmückle criticized the ways in which some military commanders linked “combat strength” to the “contentment” of the troops. In particular, he opposed the idea that effects of an “affluent society” such as an increased appreciation of consumption or even “the sex wave” would result in a reduced combat morale.⁷¹³ As he thus joined the contemporary debate about the social benefits and drawbacks of West Germany’s economic success, Schmückle opposed the arguments that materialism, consumption, and urbanization had turned West German men soft.

This line of argument was also taken up by Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Jürgen Schreiber who in 1970 published an article in the military magazine *Truppenpraxis*. Founded by the Darmstadt publisher *Wehr und Wissen*, *Truppenpraxis* soon received financial support from the Ministry of Defense. Because of this support, the ministry reserved the right to censor the magazine’s content.⁷¹⁴ Schreiber, whose article the Ministry of Defense sanctioned, argued that “parts of the older [...] generation” still held on to values of previous centuries.⁷¹⁵ Yet, he wrote, since the *Bundeswehr* was neither the *Reichswehr* nor the *Wehrmacht*, the commanders therefore had to think in a more “liberal and modern” Way. For him, this meant bidding farewell to the conviction that officers in uniform should not carry shopping bags or push a baby stroller.⁷¹⁶ As *Staatsbürger in Uniform*, soldiers and officers should be able to enjoy the same social life as a West German man in plainclothes.

⁷¹³ Schmückle and Deinzer, “Kampfkraft,” 360.

⁷¹⁴ “Expansive Gedanken: Bundeswehr,” *Der Spiegel*, April 27, 1960, 25–26.

⁷¹⁵ Jürgen Schreiber, “So etwas tut ein Offizier nicht!”, *Truppenpraxis* 12 (1970), 907–908.

⁷¹⁶ Schreiber, “So etwas tut ein Offizier nicht!”

Although he upheld the ideal that the West German soldiers should be also responsible and devout family men, he cautioned that his article should not be taken as an excuse for “sloppy appearances.”⁷¹⁷ Men who served in the *Bundeswehr*, he cautioned, should be careful not to identify with the “bums and scallywags” that dominated the current West German youth culture. Instead, they should always display the “proper, clean [and] educated” behavior that defined every respectable man employed in the civilian workforce.⁷¹⁸ While he disagreed with Schnez’s and Karst’s ideas, Schreiber also made it clear that *Bundeswehr* soldiers and officers should not look like male “hippies” and “beatniks” who defined the youth sub-cultures in France, England, the United State and West Germany in the 1960s.⁷¹⁹ Instead, they should follow the masculine ideal of the clean cut, hard-working middle-class man.

In publishing his opinion, Schreiber—like Baudissin, Mosen, and Schmückle — challenged the conservative attempt to redefine the *Bundeswehr*’s function and to abandon the ideals of the *Innere Führung* and the *Staatsbürger in Uniform*. Representing a variety of opposing opinions, they also questioned the masculine ideals that Heinz Karst and other generals propagated. As they continued to value the military reforms of the 1950s, they argued vehemently against the return to the soldierly image of the hardened “fighter.” Being also less irritated by the cultural changed that altered West German society in the 1960s, they did not believe that West German men had to fundamentally change their habits and thinking.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid.

⁷¹⁸ Ibid., 907.

⁷¹⁹ Tidemann, “Lange Männerhaare,” 251–264.

Combat Strength, Masculinity, and Sexuality: Military Attempts to Regulate Homosexuality

Notwithstanding these fundamental disagreements about the function of the *Bundeswehr*, the adversaries had one important point in common. The disputes about the problems of the *Bundeswehr* were largely based on the assumption that West German soldiers and officers were heterosexual men. The ways in which military representatives discussed the linkage between combat strength, masculinity, and sexuality were built on the premise that the armed forces were a homosocial, yet strictly heterosexual men's society.

As already discussed in Part II, this understanding was addressed, but rarely challenged, during the formation period of the *Bundeswehr*. The continuing silence was due to Paragraphs 175, 175a and 175b of the West German Criminal Code (*Strafgesetzbuch* or *StGB*), which penalized "fornication" (*Unzucht*) and "severe fornication" (*schwere Unzucht*) between men. Following the introduction of Paragraph 175 into the Criminal Code of the German Empire (*Reichsstrafgesetzbuch*) of 1871, the Nazi regime had tightened the law and introduced new sub-clauses in 1935. Although the victorious allies set out to repeal all Nazi legislation, this particular set of laws remained on the books.⁷²⁰ Since the West German Criminal Code continued to punish homosexual intercourse or any activities between men that resembled intercourse, the question of how to deal with homosexuality among the troops left little room for interpretation and thus rarely represented an issue for contestation.

This changed, however, in the course of the Great Reform of the Criminal Code (*Große Strachfrechtsreform*). Already in 1954, the Adenauer government initiated the revision of the

⁷²⁰ Whisnant, *Male Homosexuality*. Christian Schäfer, *Widernatürliche Unzucht, § 175, 175a, 175b, 182 a.F. StGB: Reformdiskussion und Gesetzgebung seit 1945* (Berlin: BWV Verlag, 2006); Robert G. Moeller, "'The Homosexual Man Is a 'Man,' the Homosexual Woman Is a 'Woman': Sex, Society, and the Law in Postwar West Germany,'" *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 4, No. 3, Special Issue, Part 2: Lesbian and Gay Histories (1994): 395–429.

Criminal Code. In 1962, government-appointed Great Criminal Law Commission, which was composed of renowned law professors, judges, and parliamentarians, introduced a new draft of the law (called *E1962*). Its content functioned as the basis for all legal and parliamentary negotiations until the first revision of the Criminal Code in 1969. These negotiations were intense, because the draft was restrictive. For instance, the Commission favored the criminalization of pornography, adultery, and “fornication” between men. *E1962* called for the continuing punishment of “a man who commits coitus-like acts with another man,” “a man over the age of 21 who fornicates with a man under the age of 21” as well as for men who were over the age of 18 and who fornicated with men who were under the age of 21.⁷²¹

The Commission’s final report stated that the criminalization of male homosexuality had to be maintained because the “overwhelming majority of the German population sees sexual relations between men as a contemptible aberration that is likely to subvert the character and destroy moral feelings.”⁷²² For many conservative members of the Commission, gay men represented a “degradation of the Volk” (*die Entartung des Volkes*) and “a danger to our youth.”⁷²³ As they thus employed terminology borrowed from the Third Reich, members of the Commission also cautioned that gay men were already “tightly organized” (*straff organisiert*) and as such could “penetrate men’s organizations such as the Bundeswehr, police, the state system, and the building industry.”⁷²⁴

⁷²¹ Schäfer, *Widernatürliche Unzucht*, 169–179.

⁷²² Quoted and translated in Herzog, *Sex after Fascism*, 129–130.

⁷²³ Quoted in Schäfer, *Widernatürliche Unzucht*, 173.

⁷²⁴ Transcript, Eichholzer Tagung “Strafrechtsreform,” 4. Sitzung,” September 14-29, 1962. BArch, Koblenz, B 141/ 82 162.

The Commission's interpretation of public opinion was both right and wrong. It was correct in stating that the majority of West German society despised male homosexuality. To be sure, throughout the 1960s, West Germans became more comfortable with different forms of families life and changing heterosexual roles and activities. Yet, the so-called "sexual revolution" did not benefit gay men. As Robert G. Moeller shows, West Germans in 1969 still believed that male homosexuality was appalling and that gay men were more despicable than female prostitutes.⁷²⁵ However, the Commission missed the point in stating that this aversion translated into a comprehensive demand for the complete and utter penalization of male homosexuality.⁷²⁶ In 1963, for example, the renowned philosopher and sociologist Theodor Adorno published an article in the widely circulated anthology *Sexuality and Crime: Comments on the Reform of the Criminal Code*. Although he railed against the "repulsive homosexual paragraph," he also depicted gay men as "frequently neurotic" and the product of an unresolved oedipal complex and "extreme identification with the mother."⁷²⁷ In his views, Adorno echoed many contemporaries' belief that homosexuality was not a crime "but a faulty attitude."⁷²⁸

Following the establishment of the Grand Coalition, leading politicians seconded this early extra-parliamentary opposition. One of them was the SPD-politician and newly appointed Minister of Justice, Gustav Heinemann. In an interview with the left-wing magazine *Der Spiegel*

⁷²⁵ Moeller, "The Homosexual Man Is a 'Man.'"

⁷²⁶ Clayton, *Male Homosexuality*, 197. See further, Robert G. Moeller, "Private Acts, Public Anxieties, and the Fight to Decriminalize Male Homosexuality in West Germany" *Feminist Studies* 36 (2010): 528–552.

⁷²⁷ Fritz Bauer et al, eds., *Sexualität und Verbrechen: Beiträge zur Strafrechtsreform* (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1963). See further, Schäfer, 'Widernatürliche Unzucht', 179–184

⁷²⁸ "Schuld ohne Strafe? Spiegel-Gespräch mit Bundesjustizminister Dr. Dr. Gustav W. Heinemann," *Der Spiegel*, April 10, 1967, 44–50. See also Hans Peter Bull, "Helfen Strafen gegen Dekadenz?," *DIE ZEIT*, September 20, 1968, 65.

in 1967, Heinemann argued for the decriminalization of “simple homosexuality,”⁷²⁹ which referred to sexual acts or coitus-like acts between consenting adult men. For the minister, the prosecution of adult men who voluntarily engaged in sexual or sex-like acts was unjust, because female homosexuality was not considered a crime.⁷³⁰ Indeed, neither the 1871 Criminal Code of the German Empire nor the current West German Criminal Code outlawed female homosexuality. Given this strong opposition, the reform of the Criminal Code changed directions. Shortly after Heinemann’s critique, 16 leading German and Swiss jurists proposed an alternative draft of the Criminal Code that not only abandoned the criminalization of “simple homosexuality.” It also wanted to prosecute ‘only’ men who engaged in sexual act a minor “between the age of 14 and 18.”⁷³¹

This turnaround upset officials working in the Ministry of Defense. Since the Special Reform Committee invited various governmental authorities to make suggestions, the ministry’s legal experts formulated several alternative drafts of Paragraph 175. All of these drafts proposed the continuing criminalization of male homosexuality in the context of the armed forces. For example, one proposal stipulated that *Bundeswehr* soldiers who “fornicated with other soldiers during military service or within enclosed military bases” or “fornicated” with their subordinates could be punished with up to five years in prison.⁷³² Based on these proposals, the Ministry of Defense officially requested the continuing prosecution of “fornication” if committed by men

⁷²⁹ See, “Schuld ohne Strafe?”

⁷³⁰ Ibid.

⁷³¹ Schäfer, ‘*Widernatürliche Unzucht*’, 17–48.

⁷³² See different draft proposals in BArch F, BW I/ 187212.

between the ages of 16 and 21. In addition, it demanded a special sub-clause that addressed “fornication” between military superiors and the lower ranks.⁷³³

The ministry’s proposal was based on the common conviction that male homosexuality endangered the effective functioning of the military. Representatives of the office “Inner and Social Situation of the Armed Forces” (*Innere and Soziale Situation der Streitkräfte*), for instance, were concerned that soldiers and officers, whose homosexual activities were uncovered, would face a “grave loss of authority and trustworthiness.”⁷³⁴ This would be problematic, the officials argued, because it endangered the troops’ “cleanliness,” “order,” and “discipline.”⁷³⁵ Describing homosexuality as “perverted” and “contemptuous,”⁷³⁶ the Office of the Inner and Social Situation of the Armed Forces thus stated that heterosexual soldiers would not accept their gay comrades.

The Ministry’s demand that a new Paragraph 175 should contain sub-clauses that would explicitly address the *Bundeswehr* received only limited parliamentary support. On February 13, 1969, the Committee of Defense of the *Bundestag* met to deliberate the ministry’s proposal. Whereas all nine attending CDU politicians voted for the special restriction, arguing “homosexuality would poison the climate,” the eleven attending representatives of the SPD and

⁷³³ Schäfer, ‘*Widernatürliche Unzucht*’, 143–145.

⁷³⁴ Fü S I 3, Schreiben an alle Kommandeure und Dienststellenleiter, 7 August 1969. BArch Freiburg, BW 1/131876. Bernhard Fleckenstein, *Homosexuality and Military Service in Germany*, SOWI Arbeitspapier 84 (Munich, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 1993).

⁷³⁵ “Fü S I 3, Schreiben an alle Kommandeure und Dienststellenleiter,” 7 August 1969.

⁷³⁶ Ibid.

FDP voted against the provision.⁷³⁷ Yet, the SPD and FDP did not oppose the provision because they thought that gay soldiers did not need to be prosecuted. On the contrary, they agreed with the CDU that homosexuality in the military had to be “confronted.” They voted against it, first, because they feared that a special law addressing the *Bundeswehr* would “mostly likely stir public uproar. [...] The public might get the impression that they are many more homosexuals in the Bundeswehr than in the rest of society.”⁷³⁸ The FDP and SPD were thus concerned about the image of the armed forces if a special law would pass the *Bundestag*. Second, the SPD politicians opposed the proposal because it could “defame a particular minority [...] and there is no evidence that gay soldiers achieve less than other soldiers.”⁷³⁹

Since parliamentarians, military, and legal experts agreed that homosexuality in the armed forces needed to be prosecuted in order to preserve the *Bundeswehr*’s functionality, but that no special sub-clause should be added, the First Law to Reform the Criminal Code, which the *Bundestag* passed in 1969, did not explicitly refer to men serving in the armed forces. However, in order to make sure that the “threat of punishment” was upheld for young men who were eligible for military service, the Special Reform Committee adopted the proposal to penalize sexual or sex-like acts between a man who was older than 18 and a man who was younger than 21.

Amid the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s, the idea that the *Bundeswehr* was a homosocial yet strictly heterosexual men’s society was upheld. Although conservative and

⁷³⁷ VR II 7, Schreiben an den Herrn Staatssekretär betreff ‘Sexualstrafrecht, hier Sprechzettel für die Sitzung des Verteidigungsausschusses, 14 March 1969. BArch Freiburg, BW 1/187212.

⁷³⁸ Ibid. See also, “Neues Sexualrecht für die Truppe,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, February 14, 1969, 2.

⁷³⁹ Ibid.

liberal military leaders disputed the masculine qualities that West German men and soldiers should possess in order to turn the *Bundeswehr* into a full-fledged military force, the different opinions focused predominantly on heterosexual men and their relation to women. Although military leaders, government officials, and parliamentary wanted to early avoid the impression that the *Bundeswehr* was granted special rights, heterosexuality was considered vital for the effective functioning of the armed forces.

2. Controversies about Image of the *Bundeswehrsoldat* in West German Civil Society

The military controversy that erupted in 1966, the obvious conservative surge among leading army generals as well as the military calls for the continuing criminalization of male homosexuality attracted a great deal of attention. The statements by Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez resonated not only with several *Bundeswehr* representatives and conservative politicians, but also with a number of *Wehrmacht* veterans and conservative journalists. Contemporaries who applauded the generals in newspaper articles and by sending supportive letters to the Ministry of Defense generally agreed that the *Bundeswehr* was far from being a respectable military force. In addition to blaming the military reforms of the 1950s, supporters of the conservative “counter revolution” agreed that West German recruits who entered the barracks in the 1960s and early 1970s defied any ideal of superb German soldiering, which they valued above all else. Veterans and conservative journalists such as Hans-Georg von Studnitz of the highly influential Protestant-Christian newspaper *Christ und die Welt* took offence at the cultural changes that gradually transformed West German society in the 1960s. They too complained that young men

adhered to masculine ideals that were neither beneficial to the Federal Republic nor to the *Bundeswehr*.⁷⁴⁰

In sharp contrast, the generals' claim that the entire social and political system needed to be geared towards military functionality greatly disturbed the growing extra-parliamentary opposition. Activists such the Federation of War Resisters and the German Peace Society, who carried their 1950s protests into the next decade, considered the conservative military "counter revolution" as another sign that the Federal Republic of Germany was becoming an authoritarian and aggressive state without a left-liberal, social democratic opposition. APO activists of the "New Left" echoed their concerns. The Socialist German Student Union, for example, was unsettled not only by the formation of the Grand Coalition and the electoral success of the NPD, but also by the escalation of the Vietnam War. Arguing that West Germany's state apparatus was becoming totalitarian and anti-democratic, members of APO regarded the military as a willing tool that would aid the political establishment's implementation of a restrictive agenda at home and join the imperialistic powers like the United States.⁷⁴¹

In their fight against the *Bundeswehr* and the stalled political system, intellectual critics, students, and peace activists adopted various forms of protest. These forms of oppositions ranged from claims to infiltrate the *Bundeswehr* and destroy it from within to demonstrations in front of military bases to the distribution of pamphlets to the publication of academic monographs. Presenting various reasons for why the political and military system had to be overthrown, or at least radically altered, APO activists responded directly to the conservative military "counter

⁷⁴⁰ Abenheim, *Reforging*, 237–239.

⁷⁴¹ Bernard, "An der 'Friedensfront'"; Partick Bernhard, "Make Love not War! Die APO, der Zivildienst und die Sozialliberale Koalition," in *Reform und Revolte: Politischer und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vor und nach 1968*, ed. Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011), 11–30.

revolution” and the masculine ideals that men such as Albert Schnez proposed. Seeking different ways to battle challenge the political system and to battle the *Bundeswehr*, activists and left-leaning intellectuals emphasized that military service produced violent male behavior that was closely linked to specific norms of masculinity and sexuality.

As a result, competing notions of masculinity saturated the controversy that surrounded the *Bundeswehr* between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s. Responding to the military “counter revolution” and to each other, conservative journalists, veterans, left-wing intellectuals, student protestors and peace activists negotiated not only the *Bundeswehr*’s function and its right to exist, but also debated the armed forces as an institution that required and produced certain types of masculinity and sexuality.

Conservative Criticism of the Bundeswehr and West Germany’s “Affluent Society” Society

The conviction that the *Bundeswehr* ridiculed Germany’s longstanding tradition of superior soldiering was not limited to conservative members of the army command. Such ideas resonated with *Wehrmacht* veterans and conservative journalists who wished to return to military and societal ideals of the pre-1945 period. This becomes especially apparent in the widely read book *Rescue the Bundeswehr!* by Hans-Georg von Studnitz.⁷⁴² First published in 1967, two more editions of the book were produced in the same year alone. Born 1907, Studnitz had been a press officer at the foreign office during the Second World War.⁷⁴³ After the war, he worked as journalist for newspapers such as *Die ZEIT* and the regional *Flensburger Tagesblatt*. In 1961, he

⁷⁴² See, Hans-Georg von Studnitz, *Rettet die Bundeswehr!* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1967).

⁷⁴³ See, Nils Asmussen, “Hans-Georg von Studnitz: Ein Konservativer Journalist im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik,” *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte* 45 (1997): 75–119.

became the deputy editor-in-chief of the highly influential, conservative-protestant newspaper *Christ und die Welt*.

In *Rescue the Bundeswehr!*, Studnitz not only echoed Karst's complaints, but also proposed some ideas that were repeated in the Schnez Study. His words were much more drastic and metaphorical, however. According to Studnitz, the *Bundeswehr* needed to be rescued, because West Germans disdained anything related to the military.⁷⁴⁴ The *Bundeswehr*, he wrote, resembled a reluctantly accepted "fruit of the womb" (*Leibesfrucht*)⁷⁴⁵ that nobody wanted to keep or raise.⁷⁴⁶ Equating West German troops to "unwanted" fetuses or children, Studnitz demanded the return to the "great military traditions of the German Volk." For him, this this meant the return to the glorification of soldierly virtues such as "obedience," "camaraderie until death," "responsibility for subordinates" and "patriotism."⁷⁴⁷

As he thus scolded West German society, the journalist also condemned the *Innere Führung*. In this attack, he juxtaposed competing notions of masculinity. Belittling Wolf Baudissin as a "noble appearance and sympathetic dreamer," Studnitz criticized that the military reforms of the 1950s had diminished the reputation and combat strength of the *Bundeswehr*. The "apocalyptic nature" of the atomic era, he explained, demanded "ultimate toughness from soldiers" and utmost "*Manneszucht*" (strict and manly discipline).⁷⁴⁸ Even though Studnitz

⁷⁴⁴ Studnitz, *Rettet die Bundeswehr*, 9.

⁷⁴⁵ "Fruit of the womb" was a commonly used term to refer to a fetus or unborn child. Until 1970, for example, Paragraph 218 of the West German Criminal Code, which dealt with abortion, used the term.

⁷⁴⁶ Studnitz, *Rettet die Bundeswehr*, 168. For a discussion of Studnitz see also Abenheim, *Reforging*, 237–239.

⁷⁴⁷ Studnitz, *Rettet die Bundeswehr*, 168.

⁷⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 166.

acknowledged the existence of atomic weapons, *Rescue the Bundeswehr!* still envisioned future wars as prolonged battles taking place on European soil between traditionally trained and equipped armies.⁷⁴⁹ Yet, the *Bundeswehr* was not able to win any of these battles, because the military reforms that led to an excessive civilian control of the armed forces.

According to Studnitz, this excessive control became especially visible in the ways the *Bundeswehr* dealt with complaints registered by married soldiers and officers. Referring to the 1950s debates about how military life endangered the well-being of West German families, the journalist was appalled by demands that officers, whose wives were pregnant, should be transferred from one military base to another in order to be near their families. Quite vividly, he complained that the *Bundeswehr* was becoming a “rest center for mothers” in which soldiers’ deployment depended on “gynecological considerations.”⁷⁵⁰ If the *Bundeswehr* as an all-male institution was to fulfill its function, it needed to be protected from any hindering civilian, and above all, against any feminine influences. In clear contrast to the official rhetoric that had portrayed the West German soldier as a devout family man, Studnitz wanted to make sure that West German men in uniform were dedicated only to their military life.

Moreover, Studnitz—like Karst and Schnez—linked the *Bundeswehr*’s dire situation to the deficiencies of West Germany’s “affluent society.” In particular, West Germany’s male students were not to the journalist’s liking. They did not display the masculine behavior he expected from them. Reacting to West Germany’s student culture and burgeoning APO protests, Studnitz lamented that male students did not live lives worth living, because they were

⁷⁴⁹ See for example his chapter “*Ist der Krieg denkbar?*” (“Is war thinkable?”).

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid. 104. For a discussion of officers’ relocation see, Schmidt, *Integration und Wandel*, 395. For a discussion of degradation of everything feminine see, Bartjes, “Zivildienst,” 130.

dominated by materialistic-feminine ideals of pleasure as well as a lack of patriotism and religiosity.⁷⁵¹ In addition to producing academic publications of inferior “housemaid-standard,” West Germany’s male students were only interested in “condoms and anti-baby pills” as well as texts that encouraged them to “leave the church [and] shirk their military service.”⁷⁵² Praising in turn the old fraternity (*Burschenschaften*) cultures “of heavy swords and beer steins,” Studnitz argued that the life of male students should be defined by physical endurance, simplicity, and devoutness. Men who embraced these qualities would not only elevate West German society, but also make for a military that possessed the combat strength necessary to fight off Soviet forces.⁷⁵³

Although his call for a new *Bundeswehr* and for new masculine ideals was drastic and figurative, Studnitz was not alone in his resentment. For instance, in the mid-1960s complaints about the appearance of *Bundeswehr* soldiers increased.⁷⁵⁴ Concerned contemporaries complained that the West German man in military uniform defied every description. Instead of representing “strict discipline, obedience, [...] as well as inner and outer cleanliness,” one critic wrote, young men discredited the entire *Bundeswehr* with their “slouched posture,” their long hair, and unshaved faces.⁷⁵⁵ The main reasons for this complaint were the hundreds of men who brought the fashion ideals of a changing youth culture into the barracks. Over the course of the

⁷⁵¹ Studnitz, *Rettet die Bundeswehr!*, 46

⁷⁵² Ibid.

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁴ Tidemann, “Lange Männerhaare.”

⁷⁵⁵ Fritz C. to Minister of Defense Helmut Schmidt, 17 January 1970. AdsD, 1/HSAA005334.

1960s, a new hairstyle became increasingly fashionable in different youth sub-cultures around the world. In France, England, the United States, and West Germany, male “hippies,” “beatniks” and “bums” (*Gammler*) bid farewell to the traditional routine of clippers, scissors, and hairdressers and let their hair and beards grow. For many APO activists like Rainer Langhans, who was a member of the famous *Kommune 1*, their “flowing manes” represented bodily expressions of their protest against the repressive West German “establishment” which, in their view, cherished a shorthaired “idol of masculinity”.⁷⁵⁶

The protest did not miss the mark. In the wake of the radicalization of the extra-parliamentary protests, young men’s fashion statements aggravated a number of conservative West Germans for whom short or flattop haircuts, which did not cover the ears and were cut low in the neck, still represented the standard.⁷⁵⁷ Since the latest hair fashion soon spread through the *Bundeswehr* it caused even greater uproar. Men who identified themselves as veterans of the two world wars seemed to have been particularly eager to point out the questionable appearance of young soldiers. Arguing that a respectable West German soldier had to appear neat—that is, a properly trimmed scalp and no facial hair—these men complained that *Bundeswehr* soldiers “run around scruffy, [with] long sideburns and no accurate haircut [and] some even look like bums.”⁷⁵⁸ Expressing their frustration about the many young soldiers who just “bummed

⁷⁵⁶ See Herbert Stubenrauch, “Hippies, Gammler und Blumenkinder,” *Zivil* 13 (February 2, 1968): 14–15; Dieter Bott, “Diese Haare passen unter keinen Helm,” *Zivil* 13 (February 2, 1968): 15. For a discussion of men’s hairstyle in the 1960s see, Tidemann, “Lange Männerhaare.” See further, Aribert Reimann, “Zwischen Machismo und Coolness: Männlichkeit und Emotion in der westdeutschen ‘Kulturrevolution’ der 1960er und 1970er Jahre,” in *Die Präsenz der Gefühle: Männlichkeit und Emotion in der Moderne* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), 229–253.

⁷⁵⁷ Opinion Poll “Men’s Haircuts,” printed in *Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung, 1968–1973*, ed. Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann (Allensbach and Bonn: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1974), 158.

⁷⁵⁸ Bruno S. to Helmut Schmidt, 4 April 1971, AdsD, Helmut Schmidt Archiv, 1 HSAA005696. See similar letter by Johann V., 27 March 1971, AdsD, Helmut Schmidt Archiv, 1 HSAA005696.

around,” letter writers complained that the *Bundeswehr* was not a school of proper masculinity anymore.⁷⁵⁹ Whereas the “German Landser” had once been the “epitome of cleanliness and Manneszucht,” the *Bundeswehr* soldier had become a symbol for lacking discipline and filthiness.⁷⁶⁰

As this discussion shows, the “military counter revolution,” found supporters in civil society. Critics like Hans-Georg Studnitz were convinced that the *Bundeswehr* was in a desperate state because of the 1950s military reforms and the changing West German male youth culture. Arguing that the effective functioning required orderly, disciplined, and hardened men, whose determination and strength was visible in their outward appearance, they called for a fundamental change of West German (youth) culture and for implementation of particular notions of masculinity.

Left-Wing Critique against Conservative Military Politics and the Bundeswehr in the mid-1960s

The widely publicized demands of military leaders such as Heinz Karst and journalists like Heinz-Georg Studnitz enraged West German pacifists and peace activists who carried their 1950s anti-military protests into the next decade. In their analysis of the development of pacifism in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1945 and 1975, historians Andrew Oppenheimer and Holger Nehring argue that pacifists and peace activists in the 1960s moved well beyond the themes of nuclear weapons and the “the social origins of militarism.” Influenced by the

⁷⁵⁹ F. Carl to Helmut Schmidt, 15 February 1971, ACPD, Arbeitskreis V: Auswärtiges, Verteidigung, Bestand: 08 – 006, sig. 014/1.

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid. “Was feines,” *Der Spiegel* 53 (December 1971): 51–52. See also, “Bärte: Vorteil beim Sprung,” *Der Spiegel*, March 16, 1970, 60–61; “Wenn Schütze Meier Bart trägt,” *Kieler Nachrichten*, January 1971, 1. Helmut Schmidt, Privat Archiv, Hamburg, Zeitungsausschnittsammlung.

continuing anti-colonial freedom struggles and the escalation of the Vietnam War, activists focused increasingly on the totalitarian and repressive nature of Western societies.⁷⁶¹

The function of individual military apparatuses was central to their assessment of states as diverse as the Soviet Union, the United States, South Africa, and both Germanys. For leading peace activists such as the influential Herbert Stubenrauch, who was the chairman of the Federation of War Service Resisters (*Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer*) from 1962 to 1966 and the co-founder of the Socialist Teachers League (*Sozialistischer Lehrbund*), military institutions such as the *Bundeswehr* were the instruments of states' external aggression as well as internal, social repression.⁷⁶² Presenting his ideas as early as 1964, he argued that the closed sphere of the barracks enabled repressive, totalitarian states such as the Federal Republic to bereave men of their individuality and mold them into "interchangeable victim-murderer-objects."⁷⁶³ Instead of being the masters of their own autonomous life, men became both the victims and perpetrators of state-sanctioned violence.

Identifying the mechanisms of totalitarian states, Stubenrauch and other activists who published articles in magazines such *Zivil* and *Courage* furthermore linked military and state violence with masculinity and sexuality. While *Zivil* was the monthly publication of the Federation of War Service Resisters, *Courage* (today: *Zivil-Courage*) was the magazine of the German Peace Society. In doing so, they developed a counter narrative that accused the military

⁷⁶¹ Oppenheimer, "Conflicts of Solidarity," 236; Nehring, *Politics of Security*. See also Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 104–110.

⁷⁶² See for example, "Schlechte Noten," *Der Spiegel*, April 15, 1968, 74–77. He further maintained numerous contacts to the student movement. See Bernhard, *Zivilidienst*, 126.

⁷⁶³ Herbert Stubenrauch, "Revolutionärer oder spießbürgerlicher Pazifismus?," *Zivil*, December 1964, 122–124, cited and translated in Oppenheimer, "Conflicts of Solidarity," 237.

and political system of producing outdated notions of masculinity. Writing in *Zivil* in late 1966, Stubenrauch contended that totalitarian states such as the Third Reich and the Federal Republic were guilty of persecuting “all forms of life that deviate from the dubious norms of the ‘healthy Volksempfinden.’”⁷⁶⁴ He thus directly attacked the ongoing reform of the West German Criminal Code, which demanded the continuing criminalization of male homosexuality and adultery. Stubenrauch argued that regimes and governments resorted to this form of oppression, because “sinners” who developed a “bad conscience” were less likely to protest against governmental politics. To maintain these conditions, governments propagated and implemented restrictive moral norms in all areas of society to which it had access. One of these areas was the military.⁷⁶⁵ According to Stubenrauch, military apparatuses like the *Bundeswehr* were the perfect tool for authoritarian governments for propagating their masculine ideals and sexual values.

In denouncing the Federal Republic as a totalitarian government whose approach to sexuality differed little from that of the Third Reich, Stubenrauch’s argument is representative of the ways many leftist intellectuals and activists judged the sexual mores of both the Nazi regime and West Germany. In the early- and mid-1960s, the world witnessed a second wave of trials against Nazi perpetrators. Following Adolf Eichmann’s trial and execution in 1961-62, the so-called Frankfurt Auschwitz trials took place between 1963 and 1968. The trials caused many younger West Germans to question the (wrong-) doings of their parents’ generation.⁷⁶⁶ This

⁷⁶⁴ Herbert Stubenrauch, “Sittlichkeit, Gewalt, Sexualität,” *Zivil*, November 1966, 118–119, quoted and translated in Oppenheimer, “Conflicts of Solidarity,” 245. See also, R. B., “Mensch gegen Mensch,” *Courage* 4 (September/October 1967): 3.

⁷⁶⁵ Stubenrauch, “Sittlichkeit, Gewalt, Sexualität.”

⁷⁶⁶ Herzog, *Sex after Fascism*, 141. See also, Detlef Siegfried, “Zwischen Aufarbeitung und Schlußstrich: Der Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten 1958 bis 1969,” in *Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften*, ed. Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl C. Lammers (Hamburg: Hans Christians Verlag, 2000), 77–113. See also Konrad H. Jarausch, “Critical Memory and Civil

coming-to-terms with Germany's national socialist past coincided with the "sexual revolution" that swept West Germany and other European countries in the 1960s. As discussed before, the liberalizing tendencies of the sexual revolution led to a growing acceptance of sexual activities that took place outside of the traditional heterosexual norms of marital monogamy and reproduction.⁷⁶⁷ Moreover, they caused a revisiting of the sexual norms that defined the Third Reich and the early Federal Republic. Based on the readings of the Austrian psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957), a number of activists interpreted the Third Reich as a "sex-hostile" regime and the Holocaust as the result of this sexual repression. Having experienced their childhood and teenage years—the 1950s—as sexually and socially restrictive, the many New Left activists furthermore viewed the Adenauer era as a continuation of Nazi norms. In order to prevent the recurrence of fascism, activists and intellectuals propagated what they considered a "free and healthy" approach to sexuality.⁷⁶⁸

As Stubenrauch's article already suggests, the theories that described the Adenauer era as sexually repressive also influenced the ways left-wing critics discussed military life in the *Bundeswehr*. Between March and May 1966, the Hamburg-based, leftist magazine *Konkret*, which became an important mouthpiece of the student movement in the late 1960s, published a series of three articles that discussed how the military dealt with the social and sexual needs of

Society: The Impact of the 1960s on German Debates about the Past," in *Coping With The Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955–1975*, ed. Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 11–30.

⁷⁶⁷ Herzog, *Sex after Fascism*; Dagmar Herzog, "The Sexual Revolution and the Legacy of the Nazi Past," in *Coping With The Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955–1975*, ed. Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 161–175.

⁷⁶⁸ Herzog, *Sex after Fascism*, 156.

its soldiers.⁷⁶⁹ Repeating the common conviction that young men joined the ranks while being in their sexually most active age, the author Hannes-Peter Lehmann, who also worked as a respected political journalist for the leading illustrated magazine *Stern*, argued that men would naturally seek contact “with the other sex.”⁷⁷⁰ According to him, life in a barracked men’s society such as the *Bundeswehr* could aggravate this behavior, because sexual intercourse offered soldiers a form of relaxation, entertainment, or “reassurance of their manhood” amid harsh military training.⁷⁷¹

Implying that most men in the military were heterosexual, Lehmann only briefly addressed the issue homosexuality in the military by contrasting it with the way that the *Bundeswehr* treated women. He emphasized that although West German society had—unlike other European countries—adopted the sentiment “Never Again Female Soldiers!,” the military was eager to employ women as kitchen workers and secretaries.⁷⁷² Whereas the *Bundeswehr* was thus open to female civic employment, Lehmann argued, it was eager to weed out all “men with feminine sentience” (*feminin empfindenden Herren*), because gay men were considered “unfit” (*untauglich*) for service. Yet, in comparison to the considerable number of officers who were ostracized by court-martials before and during the First World War, the author stated, cases in

⁷⁶⁹ For a study on the history of *Konkret* see, Fredrik Obermaier, *Sex, Kommerz und Revolution: Vom Aufstieg und Untergang der Zeitschrift “Konkret”* (1957–1973) (Marburg: Tectum-Verlag, 2011).

⁷⁷⁰ Hannes-Peter Lehmann, “Soldat und Liebe” *Konkret*, March 1966, 10–14.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid., „Sex in der BU-WE,“ *Konkret*, May 1966, 19–21.

⁷⁷² See also Hannes-Peter Lehmann, “Soldat und Liebe,” *Konkret*, May 1966, 19–21, here 19.

which gay soldiers in the *Bundeswehr* had been exposed were rather rare. Thus, he concluded, homosexuality represented “hardly a noteworthy problem” for the armed forces.⁷⁷³

According to him, the way the *Bundeswehr* treated soldiers’ heterosexual activities was much more problematic. Even though West German commanders would not follow the example of their *Wehrmacht* predecessors and take their men on regimented trips to a brothel, Lehmann argued, West German men in military uniform would still “seek enjoyment” and oftentimes find it in the arms of “amateur-prostitutes.”⁷⁷⁴ Identifying—as many before him—an increased need for sexual intercourse as a natural by-product of military service, Lehmann argued further that the military leadership was not able to deal with the situation properly. The major reason for this incapacity was, according to his interpretation, the *Bundeswehr*’s “suppression of sexual driving forces” (*Unterdrückung sexueller Triebkräfte*).⁷⁷⁵

Referencing the renowned Austrian founding father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, Lehmann argued that this form of suppression was apparent in the double standards that defined the customs and practices of the *Bundeswehr*. Analyzing military publications such as the booklet *Soldat und Liebe*, Lehmann criticized that the official guidelines only envisioned the soldier as a devout Catholic family man who would only choose a “lady” as the mother of his children. To be sure, Lehman’s article suggests that he was in favor of a happy monogamous family life. Yet, he argued that by focusing on an outmoded Christian-bourgeois ideal, the military leadership ignored young men’s acceptable urges to satisfy their sexual desires through

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid., “Sex in der BU-WE,” *Konkret*, April 1966, 15–18.

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid., “Soldat und Liebe,” March 1966, 11.

practices like “onanism” or “erotic surges of the imagination”⁷⁷⁶ By emphasizing sexual practices—masturbation—that many contemporaries still frowned upon, Lehmann suggested that the West German military needed to rethink its approach to sexuality.⁷⁷⁷

While Lehmann thus denounced the *Bundeswehr*’s official approach as outdated, he also criticized the military’s daily practices. In contrast to the “naïve” military publications, the author argued, the actual drill practices of military commanders ruthlessly combined subordination with the threat of sexual humiliation. According to Lehmann, military commanders would not only tolerate images of pin-up girls in the soldiers’ locker, but daily military training was most often influenced by the “bawdiest sexual swinishness” (*unflätigsten Schweinereien sexueller Art*), because drill instructors did not follow the rules of the etiquette books. Men who did not meet the instructors’ requirements had to endure insults that characterized them as lesser, effeminate men.⁷⁷⁸ Because of this obvious double standard, the author concluded that young men who needed help and guidance were left alone with their problems or faced ill-treatment. In order to overcome this problem, the *Bundeswehr* needed to rethink its approach to sexuality fundamentally.⁷⁷⁹ Similar to Stubenrauch, Lehmann’s articles exemplify the criticism that denounced postwar West Germany as sexually repressive and influenced the ways liberal and left-wing intellectuals and critics evaluated the customs of the

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁷ Herman Korte, *Eine Gesellschaft im Aufbruch: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den sechziger Jahren* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), 87. See further, Herzog, *Sex after Fascism*, 115.

⁷⁷⁸ Lehmann, “Soldat und Liebe,” March 1966, 13. See also “Den Fahneid geleistet,” *Courage*, 5, May 1967, 11.

⁷⁷⁹ Lehmann, “Soldat und Liebe,” 13.

Bundeswehr. The armed forces represented a state institution that fostered and practiced unhealthy approaches to male sexuality.

APO's "Battle" Against the Bundeswehr's "Repressive and Violent" Masculine Culture in the late 1960s and early 1970s

The criticism that peace activists and intellectuals of the "New Left" leveled at the *Bundeswehr* in the mid-1960s intensified greatly between 1968 and 1972 as the extra-parliamentary opposition radicalized.⁷⁸⁰ As Patrick Bernhard shows, a number of APO organizations took up the "battle against the *Bundeswehr*" and military service during those years.⁷⁸¹ Peace activists like the Campaign for Democracy and Demilitarization and the German Peace Union (*Deutsche Friedens Union* or DFU), which had roughly 300,000 members in 1968,⁷⁸² were joined by organizations such as the SDS and the Social Democratic University Union (*Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund* or SHB), and a number of smaller associations.⁷⁸³ Even though the groups had very different political motives, pursued diverse agendas, and oftentimes disliked and fought against each other, together they upheld the extra-parliamentary protests against the political system and the *Bundeswehr*.

⁷⁸⁰ Thomas, *Protest Movements*, 107–123.

⁷⁸¹ Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 124.

⁷⁸² Andreas Buro, "Die Entstehung der Ostermarschbewegung als Beispiel für die Entfaltung von Massenlernprozessen," *Friedensanalysen für Theorie und Praxis: Vierteljahresschrift für Erziehung, Politik und Wissenschaft* 4 (1977), 50–78, here: 60.

⁷⁸³ Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 124.

Due to their diverse agendas and convictions, APO groups pursued different methods of protest, which built on different notions of masculinity.⁷⁸⁴ For instance, in contrast to groups such as the German section of the War Resisters' International, whose members called on West German men to file for conscientious objection as soon as they received the draft call, SDS activists, like the prominent leader of the student movement, Rudi Dutschke, disagreed. In March 1968, Dutschke called on his fellow male activists who were truly "strong enough" to enter the military as recruits to "weaken" the *Bundeswehr* from within.⁷⁸⁵ Such forms of protests would not only destroy the military apparatus eventually, but male activists could also advance their martial abilities and learn combat strategies, which would allow them to support, for instance, the liberation struggles of colonized countries.⁷⁸⁶ Although this approach found increasing male support in several groups of the radical Left, it was primarily discussed internally.

Much more common than the call for the infiltration of the *Bundeswehr*, however, were demonstrations in front of barrack gates and the distribution of pamphlets. One of the smaller APO groups that chose this form of protest was the Circle of Critical Soldiers of the Rheingau Barracks Lorch (*Kreis kritischer Soldaten der Rheingau-Kaserne Lorch*). In June 1969, the Circle circulated a widely recognized pamphlet with the title "Sexual Training is better than Combat Training."⁷⁸⁷ In this particular pamphlet, the Circle lamented that military life would

⁷⁸⁴ For different strategies see "Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer in der War Resisters' International e.V., Rundschreiben V5/1968," 5 June 1968. APO-Archiv S BRD und Ausland, Frieden VKZ 1964–1982, fol. 283. See further, *Rührt Euch! Über den antimilitaristischen Kampf in der Bundeswehr*, ed. Gerhard Armanski, Peter Ramin and Geogr Richter (Berlin: Rotbuch, 1976); "Verstopfte Gewehre," *Der Spiegel*, January 13, 1969, 50–55. For a description of actions within the barracks, see also Pauli, *Wehrmachtsoffiziere*, 313–318.

⁷⁸⁵ Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 121.

⁷⁸⁶ Bartjes, "Der Zivildienst"; Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 196–205.

⁷⁸⁷ "APO Aktuell: Aktuelle Informationen zu einem aktuellen Thema," AdsD, 2/BTFA001866. See also, Bernard, *Zivildienst*, 131–132.

negatively influence the sexual prospects of young soldiers. Using explicit language, the Circle stated that young men would generally join the ranks at “an age of blooming sexuality.”⁷⁸⁸ Yet, instead of enjoying their prime, young men would become “impotent.” If young men already experienced troubles with satisfying their “natural sexual needs” outside of the barracks due to the lack of “prudent contraception,” the pamphlet specified, the situation would become even “shittier” as soon as they entered the barracks.⁷⁸⁹ In denouncing the ways in which both West German society as a whole and the *Bundeswehr* in particular dealt with male sexuality, the pamphlet represented a common rhetorical strategy against military service and the *Bundeswehr*.

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Contemporaries who were angered by the way that the *Bundeswehr* treated gay men also employed this line of argument. In October 1970, Klaus-Peter T.—a young student—wrote several letters to the Ministry of Defense stating that the continuing discrimination of gay men in society and the *Bundeswehr* was a “disgrace.”⁷⁹¹ Arguing that in Germany “minorities such as Jews, gypsies and homosexuals have always been tortured through psychological and physical terror,” he emphasized that West German legislation represented a continuation of anti-gay legislation that had dominated Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi Germany. In writing to the Ministry of Defense, Helmut Schmidt, he hoped to convince the minister “to put an end to the pogrom

⁷⁸⁸ “APO Aktuell.”

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁰ Although the pamphlet does not specify the kind of contraption, the Circle is most likely referring to condoms and the pill, which were—with limitations—available to a broader public. For the distribution of condoms and the pill in the 1960s, see Herzog, *Sex after Fascism*; Steinabcher, *Wie der Sex nach Deutschland kam*; Elizabeth Heinemann, *Before Porn Was Legal: The Erotica Empire of Beate Uhse* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 106–107.

⁷⁹¹ Klaus-Peter T. to Helmut Schmidt, October 16, 1970. AdsD, Helmut Schmidt Archiv, 1/HSAA005504.

atmosphere” and special laws that discriminated against homosexuals.⁷⁹² Although complaints like Klaus-Peter T.’s represent a rare discovery, his letter shows the extent to which critics of the *Bundeswehr* denounced the military’s handling of sexuality.

Such rebukes were oftentimes accompanied by concerns about the violent male behavior that military life produced. In 1969, for example, the Cologne section of the extra-parliamentary group Republican Club (*Republikanische Club* RC) distributed a short leaflet that juxtaposed violent notions of military masculinity with an irenic ideal of masculinity. With the first RC established in 1967 by leading left-wing intellectuals like the editor and author Hans Magnus Enzensberger, roughly 60 clubs with about 20,000 organized members had spread across West Germany by 1969.⁷⁹³ Like the Circle of Critical Soldiers’ pamphlet, the RC leaflet informed girls that if their boyfriends went into the *Bundeswehr* they would not be forced “to visit brothels.” Thus, girlfriends did not need to worry about infidelity. However, the leaflet stated that the military leadership would force them “to practice killing.”⁷⁹⁴ As a result, the “tenderness” that girls had experienced at the hands of their boyfriends would soon turn into “brutality.” “Girl,” the leaflet warned, “if your boyfriend goes to the *Bundeswehr*, then they could order him to shoot at his friends, siblings and at you!”⁷⁹⁵ As it thus juxtaposed a sensitive civilian masculinity of a loving boyfriend with a violent military masculinity, the leaflet assumed that its female readership would want to prevent this vision from becoming reality. Using slogans from the

⁷⁹² Ibid.

⁷⁹³ Timothy Scott Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties: The Anti-Authoritarian Revolt, 1962–1978* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 69; Schmidt, *Der Aufbruch*, 130.

⁷⁹⁴ The pamphlet is documented in several archives. See for example, “Letter by the Parliamentary Manager to the CDU/CSU’s parliamentary faction, 27 June 1969. ACDP, 08-001, CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 376/1.

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid.

American peace protests against the Vietnam War, it asked the “girl” to remember that “[L]ove is always better than war.”⁷⁹⁶

This kind of criticism was not only directed at daily military practices, but also at *Bundeswehr* advertisements. As Thorsten Loch shows, the marketing material of the Ministry of Defense explicitly emphasized the masculine nature of military service and the soldiers’ manliness.⁷⁹⁷ The campaigns that were successful between 1966 and 1968 stressed that military service was a man’s duty. Stating that “men are not always soldiers, but soldiers are always men,”⁷⁹⁸ brochures emphasized that soldierly qualities such as “reason, vigor, and bravery” were inherently male.⁷⁹⁹ Building on this premise, posters and brochures further depicted military service as an “adventure” and sporting exercise that offered men the possibility to prove themselves and their manliness (“*In der Bundeswehr stehen Männer ihren Mann*”).⁸⁰⁰

For left-wing critics, this advertisement was a cunning attempt of the Minister of Defense to disguise the true function of the armed forces and the violent behavior it produced. In 1970, Fritz Vilmar, a functionary of the Industrial Union of Metalworkers and chair of the Frankfurt Conscientious Objectors, attacked the masculine image depicted in military advertisement. Referencing some of the slogans quoted above, Vilmar stated that the *Bundeswehr* was looking

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid. See also, Bernhard, “Make Love not war!,” 11–87.

⁷⁹⁷ Loch, *Das Gesicht der Bundeswehr*, 225–237.

⁷⁹⁸ Advertisement for officers and noncommissioned officers, circa 1967, reprinted in Loch, *Das Gesicht der Bundeswehr*.

⁷⁹⁹ Advertisement for officers and noncommissioned officers, circa 1968, reprinted in Loch, *Das Gesicht der Bundeswehr*.

⁸⁰⁰ Advertisement *In Wagnis und Können zeigt sich der Mann*, printed in Loch, *Das Gesicht der Bundeswehr*. See also the coupon *Männer, Mut, Mach 2-Piloten* that offered men “interesting duties” and the chance to practice “developments for the future” if they joined the military, printed in *DIE ZEIT*, December 1968, 57.

for “true, tough men, with highest soldierly virtues; upright men who happily wear their uniforms as ‘honorary gowns’.”⁸⁰¹ Yet, according to him, the posters and flyers were highly misleading: if lured into the armed forces, the chair continued, men would have their “independent thinking” replaced by “obedience” and immediately “learn how to kill.”⁸⁰² Echoing the arguments of activists like Herbert Stubenrauch, Vilmar too criticized the military for changing men from self-determined, critical beings into docile killers.⁸⁰³

As this analysis shows, notions of military masculinity and sexuality played a vital role in extra-parliamentary protest against the *Bundeswehr* and the military leadership. The argument that the *Bundeswehr* produced violent notions of masculinity, which supported the repressive governmental system, but hurt society, was vital for APO’s battle against the *Bundeswehr*. Whereas some activist were eager to utilize for their own battle against the *Bundeswehr*, the West German political system and Western Imperials, peace and pacifist vehemently opposed these notions, arguing that they would destroy family relations, personal relationships and, eventually the entire society. While the statements by Heinz Karst, Albert Schnez, and Hans Georg von Studniz were clearly influenced by the escalating APO protests, extra-parliamentary activists also reacted to the conservative *Bundeswehr* generals, journalists, and veterans.

⁸⁰¹ Fritz Vilmar, “Dein Recht – den Kriegsdienst zu verweigern,” in *Jugend Gegen Kriegsdienst: Pfingsten 1970*, ed. Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft Vereinigte Kriegsdienstgegner. Archiv Soziale Bewegungen, Freiburg, Bro 4.0.2.103.

⁸⁰² Ibid.

⁸⁰³ See also the article by Rainer Voß who criticized that military advertisement wrongly portrayed military service as “manly,” “adventurous,” and “romantic.” Rainer Voß, “Bis 20,” *DIE ZEIT*, December 10, 1971, 56. See further, Erwin Kuhn, “Mehr Informationen über die Soldaten,” *DIE ZEIT*, January 7, 1972, 40; “Solche Männer hat die Bundeswehr: Eine fiktive Anzeige,” *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, January 24, 1969, 13. See also, “*Es ist so schön, Soldat zu sein ...*”: Eine freundschaftspädagogische Ausstellung, Schloß Hohentübingen,” September 24–October 31, 1976, ed. Arbeitsgruppe Friedensforschung am Institut für Politikwissenschaften der Universität Tübingen. Archiv Soziale Bewegungen, Freiburg, Bestand Friedensbewegung, 4.0.1.2.

3. Parliamentary Responses to the Left- and Rightwing Attacks on the Bundeswehr

The multifold ways in which pacifists, peace activists, “New Left” intellectuals, conservative journalists, as well as conservative and liberal military experts disputed the function and image of the *Bundeswehr* greatly affected parliamentary politics. It influenced the two coalitions that governed the Federal Republic between 1966 and 1974. Following Konrad Adenauer’s departure and Ludwig Erhard’s three-year chancellorship, Kurt Georg Kiesinger became the chancellor of the Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD in the fall of 1966. In 1969, the Grand Coalition was succeeded by Willy Brandt’s social-liberal coalition of SPD and FDP, which left the CDU/CSU—for the first time since the founding of the Republic—the role of opposition party.

Central to the military politics of the Grand Coalition were *Notstandsgesetzgebung*. Negotiated since the late 1950s, these laws—as discussed above—extended the function of the *Bundeswehr*, because they provided for the deployment of the armed forces on West German soil if internal or external enemies threatened the Federal Republic. In addition, the new legislation reaffirmed the gendered nature of military service, leaving men with the sole duty of defending the Federal Republic with arms. But, whereas the radicalization of the extra-parliamentary opposition seemed to justify the passing of the Emergency Laws, the skyrocketing numbers of conscientious objectors questioned whether the *Bundeswehr* would be able to even serve its purpose. In response to this dilemma, representatives of all leading primary parties felt compelled to restate their opinion about the function of the *Bundeswehr* and men’s military duties. This impulse was even stronger following the statements by Heinz Karst, Helmut Grashey, and Albert Schnez. Their demands for military supremacy, caused CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP politicians to negotiate once again the true purpose of the *Bundeswehr*. While they

reemphasized the function of the *Bundeswehr* as a “peace force,” *Bundestag* delegates also made it clear that conscientious objectors endangered the peace and security of the Federal Republic.

In addition to sparking intense debates in the *Bundestag*, the extra-parliamentary protests forced Willy Brandt’s Social-Liberal Coalition to rethink West Germany’s military service. Under the aegis of the two Ministers of Defense, Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber, the government advanced the rewriting of military regulations and handbooks. Moreover, the government instated several commissions to analyze West Germany’s military policies. Publishing its findings between 1970 and 1972, the commission proposed measures that fundamentally altered the nature of military service in West Germany and the masculine image of the West German man in military uniform.⁸⁰⁴ As a result, the military politics of the Social Liberal Coalition re-envisioned the West German man in military uniform as an educated, reflective soldier whose foremost function was to promote West Germany’s and Europe’s peace and stability.

Parliamentary Debates about Compulsory Military Service

As discussed above, the *Bundestag* had negotiated the implementation of new emergency laws already in the late 1950s. However, the initial drafts of these new laws were unable to secure the necessary majority of votes in the *Bundestag*. Considering Emergency Laws a necessity, the Grand Coalition under Chancellor Kiesinger introduced a new draft in 1967 to amend the Basic Law.⁸⁰⁵ The extent and nature of the proposed changes caused an unparalleled uproar among left-wing intellectual and activists who feared that West Germany was on a path to a new

⁸⁰⁴ Bald, “Bundeswehr und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch,” 305.

⁸⁰⁵ Janßen, *Frauen ans Gewehr*, 31–37.

“Enabling Act.”⁸⁰⁶ Despite, and to a certain extent because of, the extra-parliamentary riots, the Grand Coalition—enjoying the required two-thirds majority—passed law the in June 1968.⁸⁰⁷ One of the many critical aspects of the new laws was the redefinition of the military’s function as a defensive force. The amended Article 87 stated that the *Bundeswehr* could be deployed in a “case of defense or tension” if the free democratic order or the existence of the Federal Republic was in danger. If the strength of the police or the Federal Boarder Guard did not suffice, military forces could be ordered to control traffic and support the “protection of civil objects and the combating of organized and militarized [*militärisch bewaffnet*] insurgents.”⁸⁰⁸

Furthermore, the argument that West Germany needed to increase its defenses involved the extension of every citizen’s duty to partake in the protection of the Federal Republic. The new Emergency Laws amended Article 12 of the Basic Law that regulated citizens’ right to choose their profession and workplace freely. While maintaining the right to become a conscientious objector—guaranteed by Article 4 of the Basic Law—a new sub-clause was added, which stated that men who were eighteen years or older could be compelled to fulfil additional service duties. According to another new sub-clause, men who you did not render such services or services as conscientious objectors, could be recruited for defensive services such as the protection of the civilian population if a “state of defense” was declared.⁸⁰⁹ The amended Article

⁸⁰⁶ See Schauer, *Notstand der Demokratie*. See further, Wolfgang Kraushaar, “Die Furcht vor einem ‘neuen 33’: Protest gegen die Notstandsgesetzgebung,” in *Streit um den Staat: Intellektuelle Debatten in der Bundesrepublik 1960–1980*, ed. Dominik Geppert and Jens Hacke (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 135–150.

⁸⁰⁷ See “Siebzehntes Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes vom 24. Juni 1968,” *Bundesgesetzblatt*, June 27, 1968, 709–713.

⁸⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 709.

⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 710. See further, Ahrens, “Verzögerte Anpassung,” 33–34.

12 of the Basic Law extended women's duties as well. Against vehement criticism from the FDP, the Grand Coalition voted for the introduction of compulsory service for women. If the Federal Republic was unable to recruit enough female volunteers for civilian medical or recovery service in "stationary sickbays," the government could compel women who were between eighteen and fifty-five years old to render these services.⁸¹⁰ However, the expansion of female duties was still limited. While women should take care of the sick and wounded "behind the lines," participating in combat was out of the question. The 1968 emergency laws restated that under no circumstances could women be required to render military services with arms.⁸¹¹

As the new Emergence Laws expanded the function of the *Bundeswehr* and simultaneously reaffirmed the gendered nature of military service, the aggravating left-wing activism troubled the Grand Coalition. Representatives from the CDU/CSU and SPD agreed that the widespread protests and the skyrocketing numbers of conscientious objectors posed a threat to the free, democratic order of the Federal Republic. Before he became chancellor of the Social-Liberal Coalition, Chancellor Brandt addressed the extensive extra-parliamentary demonstrations against the Emergency Laws in May 1968. For the SPD-politicians, APO protests were an expression of the "uneasiness of the younger generation."⁸¹² Over the years, he maintained, young men and women had come to "distrust" state institutions such as the *Bundeswehr* and

⁸¹⁰ "Siebzehntes Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes vom 24. Juni 1968," 710.

⁸¹¹ Ruth Seifert, "Weibliche Soldaten: Die Grenzen des Geschlechts und die Grenzen der Nation," in *Frauen im Militär: Empirische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Integration von Frauen in die Streitkräfte*, ed. Jen Rainer Ahrens et. al. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 2005), 230–241. See further Ahrens, "Verzögerte Anpassung," 34.

⁸¹² VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 178. Sitzung, 30 March 1968, in *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestag*, 9625–9631.

developed a particular “democratic sensitivity.”⁸¹³ Although he was sympathetic to these feelings, Brandt faulted organized, radical forces within society for using these sentiments and the extra-parliamentary protests to foster people’s “indifference to life.”⁸¹⁴ According to Brandt, the function of the new emergency legislation and, by extension the *Bundeswehr*, was to preserve the wellbeing of the Federal Republic and Western Europe.

Agreeing with the Chancellor, Gustav Heinemann explicitly criticized the growing number of men who refused military service. While he had been the Minister of Justice during the Grand Coalition, Heinemann became the Federal President in 1969. In his inaugural speech in July, he lamented that many men abused the basic right to resist military service.⁸¹⁵ Although, he stated, that he had always advocated men’s right to resist military service on religious grounds or grounds of conscience, Heinemann maintained that especially male activists abused this right “with levity” in their battle against state order and institutions.⁸¹⁶ Thus, instead of defending the right and freedom that Article 4 of the Basic Law granted, Heinemann concluded that activists actually endangered it. This behavior was especially troublesome for SPD politicians, because it undermined the true purpose of the *Bundeswehr*. Over the years, statements by leading politicians, military representatives as well as members of the churches had redefined the

⁸¹³ Ibid., 9629

⁸¹⁴ Ibid., 9630.

⁸¹⁵ Gustav Heinemann’s speech “Der Frieden ist der Ernstfall” from July 1, 1969, VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 13664 is also printed in printed in *Zwei Staaten, eine Nation: Deutsche Geschichte 1955–1970*, ed. Christoph Kleßmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 548–550. An English translation can be found on German Historical Institute, *German History in Documents and Images*, at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=169 (last accessed: 13 November 2013). See further Dieter E. Kilian, *Politik und Militär in Deutschland: Die Bundespräsidenten und Bundeskanzler und ihre Beziehung zu Soldatentum und Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles Verlag, 2011), 92–114.

⁸¹⁶ Heinemann, “Der Frieden ist der Ernstfall.”

function of the armed forces. The rhetoric that surrounded the *Bundeswehr* focused on the military and the soldiers as guarantors of peace and stability. Instead of fighting wars, the *Bundeswehr*'s function was to maintain peace.⁸¹⁷

This emphasis increased also due to claims made by Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez. In his inaugural address in which he criticized leftist activists for abusing the right to refuse military service, Heinemann also rebuked the notion that the *Bundeswehr*'s main function was to win wars. He stated that the first obligation of every state, institution and citizen was to "serve peace." Bidding farewell to what he had learned in school during the 1910s and 1920s, the Federal President stated, "[w]ar is not the quintessential emergency in which a man has to prove himself."⁸¹⁸ On the contrary, the Federal President argued that "peace" was the situation "in which we all have to prove ourselves."⁸¹⁹ According to this line of argument, men who refused to fulfill their military duty for—in the view of leading parliamentarians—no good reason endangered West Germany's ability to protect peace.

In light of this nuisance, some representatives of the Grand Coalition did not show as much understanding for conscientious objectors, which led to a rift within the party. While discussing the ways in which West German men could apply for conscientious objection, the parliamentarians who faulted activists more harshly were two military experts of the SPD, Helmut Schmidt and Werner Buchstaller.⁸²⁰ In June 1969, Buchstaller repeated the criticism that

⁸¹⁷ Ibid. See also, Bernhard, "von 'Drückebergern'," 142.

⁸¹⁸ Heinemann, "Der Frieden ist der Ernstfall," 548–550.

⁸¹⁹ Ibid. See also, Bald, "Die Militärreform in der 'Ära Brandt'," 344.

⁸²⁰ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 244. Sitzung, 27 June 1969, 13610. See also Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 243.

many men abused the right to file for conscientious objection. Indeed, he maintained that he did not want to curtail this right. However, he also claimed that Article 4 of the Basic Law must not be used as a “pretext for shirking [...] and subversive actions” against the *Bundeswehr*. Arguing that such actions endangered the successful functioning of the armed forces, he consequently demanded that men should remember to fulfill their “civic duty.”⁸²¹

Buchstaller’s arguments against the APO were very much in line with the CDU/CSU and even with the FDP. Supported by FDP politician Fritz-Rudolf Schulz, Minister of Defense for the Grand Coalition, Gerhard Schröder, maintained that a country’s ability to defend itself depended on not only the allocation of military machinery, but also the population’s “will to defend itself.”⁸²² In West Germany, Schröder stated, this will was hardly noticeable. According to the CDU politician Friedrich Zimmermann, this lack of willingness became especially apparent in the widespread tendency among young men to “chicken out of military service.”⁸²³ Like Buchstaller, Zimmermann and other Christian Democrats implied that “whole” men, who were strong, brave and willing, would not object to serve in the armed forces.

As they thus questioned men’s willingness to fulfill their military duty, CDU politicians agreed with their SPD colleagues that many resisters were steered by radical forces within the extra-parliamentary opposition.⁸²⁴ In June 1969, CDU politician and expert in international politics, Egon Klepsch, cautioned his colleagues against the written products of the APO’s

⁸²¹ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 244. Sitzung, 27 June 1969, 13610.

⁸²² Ibid., 13612–13615.

⁸²³ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 4. Dezember 1968, 10849. See also Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 149.

⁸²⁴ See speech by Defense Minister Gerhard Schröder, VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 200. Sitzung, 29 November 1968, 10784. See also Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 150.

“invidious botch kitchen”⁸²⁵ (*Sudelküche*). Addressing left-wing claims that military service produced violent male behavior, Klepsch maintained that activists sought to undermine the *Bundeswehr* by portraying soldiers as men who “steamrolled women” and “split skulls.”⁸²⁶ Despite the conservative surge among *Bundeswehr* generals, he argued that this criticism was by no means justified, because the *Bundeswehr* represented a “loyal and reliable army.”⁸²⁷ Thus, it deserved “more gratitude and respect.”⁸²⁸

Even though politicians emphasized the importance of men’s military service, SPD parliamentarians were especially careful not to give the impression that they wanted to reinstate the *Bundeswehr* as a “school of the nation” for young men. This becomes obvious in the reactions to a speech that the chancellor of the Grand Coalition, Kurt Georg Kiesinger held in June 1969. Four months before the next parliamentary election, Kiesinger spoke at the annual meeting of the *Bundeswehr* Association in Bad Godesberg. Delivering his speech to an audience of soldiers and officers, he called the *Innere Führung* and the *Staatsbürger in Uniform* ‘old clichés’ in need of revision.⁸²⁹ In addition, the chancellor hoped that the *Bundeswehr* would “become a great school of the nation for our young people” who would help to protect West Germany’s “external and internal” peace.⁸³⁰ Although he portrayed the military as a guarantor of

⁸²⁵ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 244. Sitzung, 27 June 1969, 13606.

⁸²⁶ Ibid. A reprint of the pamphlet “*Krieg ist ein gutes Geschäft, Investiere in dein Leben!*” (War is a good business, Invest in your Life!) to which Klepsch is most likely referring can be found in Gerhard Baumann, *Der Soldat zwischen revoltierender Jugend und Establishment* (Pfaffenhofen/ Ilm: Iltgau Verlag, 1969), 99.

⁸²⁷ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 244. Sitzung, 27 June 1969, 13606

⁸²⁸ Ibid.

⁸²⁹ Excerpts of Kiesinger’s speech are quoted in *DIE ZEIT*, 27 June 1969, 8.

⁸³⁰ Ibid.

peace, Kiesinger also depicted military service as a *rite de passage* that would turn boys into admirable men.⁸³¹

Kiesinger's characterization of the *Bundeswehr* as a school of masculinity caused a journalistic outcry as well as an intense parliamentary debate.⁸³² Since it coincided with the claims of Albert Schnez and other generals, Kiesinger faced criticism from FDP-politicians who denounced the chancellor as one of those "schoolmasters," or rather know-it-alls who always called for heroism, even though they had never served in the armed forces.⁸³³ Members of his coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, also expressed dissatisfaction with Kiesinger's words. Especially Werner Buchstaller rebuked Kiesinger's notion that military service represented a rite of passage that turned West German men into "whole men" (*ganze Männer*). Instead of this outdated notion, Buchstaller maintained, men who served in the *Bundeswehr* had to be "good soldiers and democrats," but nothing more.⁸³⁴

Although other SPD politicians such as Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan and Helmut Schmidt agreed with Buchstaller, their criticism of Kiesinger was rather reserved as long as they were part of the Grand Coalition.⁸³⁵ Yet, in his inaugural address on 28 October 1969, the new chancellor Willy Brandt implicitly rebuked his predecessor. In his speech, Brandt outlined his new government's agenda. In this context, the new chancellor stated that he would gear his coalition's

⁸³¹ Ibid.

⁸³² VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag,, 244. Sitzung, 27 June 1969, 1309–1360.

⁸³³ Comment by FDP chairman Walter Scheel quoted in "Erzieher und Arzt des Volkes: Zitate über die 'Schule der Nation'," *Der Spiegel*, 30 June 1969, 33.

⁸³⁴ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag,, 244. Sitzung, 27 June 1969, 1309–1360.

⁸³⁵ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 244. Sitzung, 27 June 1969, 1365.

educational politics towards the raising of “critical, judicious citizens.” Maintaining, “The only school of the nation is the school,” Brandt indicated that it was not the military’s role to raise such citizens.⁸³⁶ As he thus positioned himself in opposition to Kiesinger, Brandt’s statement also emphasized the SPD’s stance on the function of the *Bundeswehr*. The armed forces’ role was to protect West Germany’s security, peace and stability, but not produce “whole men.”

The ways in which West German parliamentarians reacted to Kiesinger’s speech bespeak the intensity with which contemporaries discussed military service in the late 1960s. Both the conservative “counter revolution” within the *Bundeswehr* and the escalating APO activism promoted representatives of all primary parties to reemphasize the value and meaning of military service. In reaction to the claims made by Albert Schnez and other, leading parliamentarians stressed once more that the *Bundeswehr* was a defensive force with the purpose of preserving peace. Responding, however, to the increasing numbers of conscientious objectors and APO’s battle against the *Bundeswehr*, the government portrayed these “obstreperous” young men as a threat to West Germany’s peace, stability, and security.

Expanding the Function of the Armed Forces and Changing the Image of the West German Soldier

In addition to influencing parliamentary debates, the escalation of the extra-parliamentary protest as well as the reactionary criticism of leading West German generals continued to influence parliamentary and military politics well into the 1970s. The obvious division of society left Willy Brandt’s Social-Liberal Coalition, which took office in September 1969, in no doubt that West

⁸³⁶ *Die großen Regierungserklärungen der deutschen Bundeskanzler von Adenauer bis Schmidt*, ed. Klaus von Beyme (Munich and Vienna: Hanser, 1979), 251–281.

Germany's military politics and structures had to be changed.⁸³⁷ The most decisive factors in the reform of military policies in the years between 1970 and 1974 were the first social-democratic Minister of Defense, Helmut Schmidt, and his successor Georg Leber. Although some decisions to change certain military regulations had already been made while the Grand Coalition was still in office, the two SPD-politicians implemented a number of measures that fundamentally changed the function and image of the *Bundeswehr*. In redefining the image of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers and officers, Helmut Schmidt and Leber were clearly reacting to both the left-wing and right-wing criticism.

This change becomes visible, for example, in the decision to devise a Central Service Regulation that would fully explain the concepts of the *Innere Führung* and *Staatsbürger in Uniform*. The Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Armed Forces and CDU-politician, Matthias Hoogen had already suggested in 1968-69 that the fundamental concepts had to be explained once more and in more detail.⁸³⁸ His proposal to rewrite of the *Handbuch Innere Führung* (Handbook Inner Guidance) accordingly was accepted by the *Bundestag* in June 1969. Following the formation of the social-liberal coalition, Helmut Schmidt pushed the plan to explain once again the leadership principle of the *Bundeswehr*. However, instead of revising and republishing the *Handbuch*, the Ministry of Defense stopped its production and instead published the Central Service Regulation 10/1 *Hilfen für die Innere Führung*. As a type of “persistent command” and guiding principle, the regulation was far more binding than the suggestions and assistance

⁸³⁷ Detlef Bald, “Bundeswehr und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch,” 297–309. See also, Bald, “Militärreform,” 346–347.

⁸³⁸ Dörfler-Dierken, “Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968,” 65–84. See also Gerhard Baumann, *Der Soldat zwischen revolvierender Jugend und Establishment*. With a preface by Matthias Hoogen, Wehrbeauftragter des Deutschen Bundestages (Pfaffenhofen a.d. Ilm: Ilmgauer Verlag, 1969).

compiled in the previous handbook. It also trumped many of the other already existing military regulations.⁸³⁹

The Central Service Regulation, which Georg Leber put into effect in September 1972, reemphasized some of the points that Social Democrats had stressed in the *Bundestag* debates. Restating the *Bundeswehr*'s "defensive function," Central Service Regulation highlighted the illegality of a "war of aggression" and stressed that the soldiers' main function was "to secure peace, which society wants and needs for its own development."⁸⁴⁰ Instead of portraying military service as a duty related to warfare, the regulation furthermore stated quite explicitly that the soldiers' "service is peace service" (*Friedensdienst*).⁸⁴¹ Even though Helmut Schmidt had not urged Albert Schnez and Heinz Karst to resign from their posts, the regulation stood in clear opposition to their claims that the main purpose of the *Bundeswehr* was to win battles and wars.⁸⁴²

In addition to emphasizing "peace" as guiding principle around which military service revolved, Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber also stressed that the *Bundeswehr* had to keep up with the times and the changing West German society.⁸⁴³ Accordingly, the Central Service Regulation embraced a set of values that had become increasingly accepted throughout broad strata of West German society: individuality, personal freedom, and participation. Although the

⁸³⁹ Ibid., 73–74.

⁸⁴⁰ ZDv 10/1, "Hilfen für die Innere Führung," Sonderdruck für die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Bundeswehr, (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Oktober 1972).

⁸⁴¹ Dörfler-Dierken, "Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968," 73–74.

⁸⁴² Fischer, "Schmidt, Leber, Apel," 197.

⁸⁴³ Bald, "Die Militärreform in der 'Ära Brandt,'" 347.

military reforms of the 1950s had foregrounded these values already, in light of the right-wing critique the regulation reemphasized them. Stating that the Federal Republic was defined by “a multitude of interests, opinions, values and objectives,” the regulation specified that the *Bundeswehr*—as part of this society—had to embrace these values as well. In order for conflicts of opinions and interests to be resolved “nonviolently,” members of the armed forces also had to be poised to embrace “rationality,” “compromise” and “democratic decision making” as their guiding principles.⁸⁴⁴ In this context, the regulations stressed that discussion and obedience were not mutually exclusive, but necessary for the successful functioning of a military whose young recruits had grown up in a “plural” society.⁸⁴⁵

The argument that the values of society were decisive for the workings of the armed forces also entailed the claim that the military had to adjust its job descriptions as well as its training and educational courses to meet the demands of that society.⁸⁴⁶ In order to find ways to achieve this goal, the Social-Liberal Coalition instated three commissions in 1970. In addition to a Force Structure Commission and a Personnel Structure Commission, the government established a Commission for Education under the aegis of political scientist Thomas Ellwein.⁸⁴⁷ The Commission for Education as well as the other two groups submitted their findings and

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid.,

⁸⁴⁵ Dörfler-Dierken, “Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968,” 74–76.

⁸⁴⁶ Bald, “Die Militärreform in der ‘Ära Brandt,’” 347.

⁸⁴⁷ For the individual reports see, *Die Wehrstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Analyse und Optionen*, ed. Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung (Bonn, 1972/73); *Wehrgerechtigkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bericht der Wehrstruktur-Kommission an die Bundesregierung*, ed. Wehrstrukturkommission der Bundesregierung (Bonn 1971); *Die Personalstruktur der Streitkräfte. Bericht der Personalstrukturkommission*, ed. Personalstrukturkommission des Bundesministers für Verteidigung (Bonn, 1971); *Neuordnung der Ausbildung und Bildung in der Bundeswehr. Gutachten der Bildungskommission an den Bundesminister der Verteidigung* (Bonn, 1971).

suggestions in 1971 and 1972, which resulted in more than a hundred provisions that expanded the nature of military service and re-envisioned the image of the West German soldier.⁸⁴⁸

The major proposals submitted by Ellwein's commission followed both Willy Brandt's credo "dare more democracy" and Helmut Schmidt's goal to align the *Bundeswehr* with an ever-changing West German society. Supporting the demand for a "democratization" of the armed forces, the commission suggested the establishment of military universities for officers.⁸⁴⁹ The commission's report stated, that university training would allow officers not only to gain a "broad basic education," but would also allow them to learn individual responsibility, theory, "critical thinking," "mental flexibility" and "creativity."⁸⁵⁰ According to the report, these skills would enable men to be effective soldiers. Moreover, men would also profit from their military training well beyond the barracks doors. If officers enjoyed an academic education, they could use their knowledge as civilians when they retired from active duty.⁸⁵¹

To be sure, the educational reforms were not only intended to benefit the men who served in the armed forces. Given that male graduates from high school graduate were most reluctant to serve in the military, as they preferred studying at a university, the Education Commission argued that by offering young men the option of pursuing an academic career while simultaneously becoming an officer, the *Bundeswehr* would become an attractive career

⁸⁴⁸ Kutz, "Militär und Gesellschaft," 295.

⁸⁴⁹ Kutz, *Reform und Restauration*, 103–147.

⁸⁵⁰ Jopp, *Militär und Gesellschaft*, 65.

⁸⁵¹ Bald, "Die Militärreform," 347.

option.⁸⁵² If the government improved the military's educational system, more young men would be willing to volunteer for military service.⁸⁵³ While thus trying to re-integrate the *Bundeswehr* into a much-changed society and to make military service more attractive for young men, the proposal of the educational reform certainly portrayed the West German officer more as "academic[s] in uniform." This image of the *Bundeswehr* officer as university-trained, critical thinkers stood in clear contrast to the ideas of conservative generals such as Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez who called for the return to the soldier as a "nature-boy" who did not need to critically reflect on his doing and did not need to concern himself with too much technique.

Moreover, the attempts to make military service more attractive for West Germany's young men and to prevent the numbers of conscientious objectors from skyrocketing involved the "fashion" of the armed forces. As discussed above, the late 1960s witnessed the recruitment of more and more longhaired and bearded West German soldiers who were unwilling to sacrifice their hair for the *Bundeswehr*. While the Grand Coalition's Minister of Defense, Gerhard Schröder, had issued instructions, which prohibited beards and "shoulder-length or otherwise feminine looking hair style," because they impaired "the clean and neat appearance of the soldier,"⁸⁵⁴ Helmut Schmidt chose another argument against it. In contrast to his predecessor, Schmidt considered the question of soldierly hairstyle to be an issue of military security as well

⁸⁵² Jopp, *Militär und Gesellschaft*, 45. See further, Bernhard, "Von 'Drückebergen,'" 138; Bald, "Die Militärreform in der 'Ära Brandt,'" 341–353.

⁸⁵³ Jopp, *Militär und Gesellschaft*, 50.

⁸⁵⁴ See G-1 Hinweis quoted in *Die Bundeswehr in Staat und Gesellschaft, Jahresbericht 1970 des Wehrbeauftragten des Deutschen Bundestages* (vorleget am 1. März 1971 von Fritz Rudolf Schultz), ed. Presse- und Informationszentrum des Dt. Bundestages (Bonn, 1971), 12. See further, Dörfler-Dierken, "Die Bedeutung," 65–84.

as the soldiers' individual freedom to follow the "general taste."⁸⁵⁵ As he sought to reform the military, Schmidt issued the so-called "hair and beard decree" or "hairnet decree" in February 1971. While the decree henceforth permitted soldiers to wear long hair as long as they kept it well and clean, it also stated that servicemen "whose work and safety might be impaired through their hairstyle must wear a hairnet."⁸⁵⁶

This decision caused uproar among military commanders and in mainstream newspapers and magazines. Conservative newspapers *FAZ* and *Die Welt* harshly criticized Helmut Schmidt's decision as an affront against military ideals and values. The *FAZ* published an article by Adelbert Weinstein who railed against the newly introduced hairnets as a "womanish prop" (*weibische Requisite*) that had turned the West German armed forces into "military caricature."⁸⁵⁷ Weinstein's assessment was seconded by Gerd Scharnhorst who denounced in *Die Welt am Sonntag* that the West German soldier was an *enfant terrible* who left law-abiding West Germans angered or amused.⁸⁵⁸ According to his observation, the "core of these troops is soft" and the *Bundeswehr* could not produce any form of "deterrence" with "this type of men."⁸⁵⁹ On the contrary, Scharnhorst lamented, the "seemingly licentious young men in tatty uniforms"

⁸⁵⁵ "Interview mit Helmut Schmidt," *Stern*, April 25, 1971. See further, Dörfler-Dierken, "Die Bedeutung."

⁸⁵⁶ Schlaffer, *Der Wehrbeauftragte*, 224.

⁸⁵⁷ Adelbert Weinstein, "Die Bundeswehr und ihre Papiertiger: Soldatische Existenz heute," *FAZ*, November 11, 1971, 2.

⁸⁵⁸ Gerd Scharnhorst, "Bundeswehr – Keiner verbietet die zottelige Haartracht," *Welt am Sonntag*, April 16, 1972, 2.

⁸⁵⁹ Weinstein, "Die Bundeswehr."

suggested that the Bundeswehr was nothing more than a “defeated, demoralized group in retreat.”⁸⁶⁰

Although one can assume that the aggressive criticism against longhaired soldiers and Helmut Schmidt’s “hair and beard decree” influenced the minister to issue a revised version of the decree in 1972 that required soldiers had to cut their hair so that it neither touched their uniform or collar nor covered their ears.⁸⁶¹ Yet, the official justification for the revision of the decree did not mention the strong opposition, nor did it mention that soldiers’ hair had caused trouble on an international stage.⁸⁶² Instead, Schmidt cited hygienic and health problems. According to the statement, shortly after the introduction of the hairnets, military officials began registering an increase of lice, skin problems and infections among the troops.⁸⁶³ Given these health hazards, Schmidt decided that the soldiers had to cut their hair short once again.⁸⁶⁴

Although Schmidt eventually bent to “health hazards” and conservative criticism, his initial reaction shows that he and Leber were eager to make concessions to the changing *Zeitgeist*. Yet, the concessions were limited. This becomes apparent in the reforms of the law that regulated alternative civilian service (*Zivildienstgesetz*). Because of the skyrocketing numbers of men who applied to become conscientious objectors, Willy Brandt’s Social-Liberal Coalition

⁸⁶⁰ Scharnhorst, “Bundeswehr.”

⁸⁶¹ *Die Bundeswehr in Staat und Gesellschaft*, 11–15.

⁸⁶² According to the military attachés in London and Paris, French and British commanders expressed on various occasions a lack of understanding for the “wild hair growths” of West German marines. See Anlage 18, betr. Haar- und Barttracht, hier: Auszüge aus Attaché-Berichten. BArch F, BM 1/ 6867.

⁸⁶³ “Weinend auf der Stube,” *Der Spiegel*, May 22, 1972, 79–80; “Die Truppe ist schlampig und verdreckt,” *Der Spiegel*, March 13, 1972, 36–41. See further, Dörfler-Dierken, “Die Bedeutung des Jahres 1968.”

⁸⁶⁴ “Schere bei Fuß,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 17, 1972, 1.

renegotiated how long conscientious objectors had to “serve” and how their reasons to refuse military service could be evaluated properly. During these negotiations, Helmut Schmidt argued that civilian service should take longer than military service in order to cull “fake conscientious objectors.”⁸⁶⁵ Moreover, Georg Leber stated that conscientious objection should only represent an “exceptional case” (*Ausnahmefall*).⁸⁶⁶ Due to their interference, *Zivildienst* was extended to 16-18 months during Willy Brandt’s chancellorship, whereas military service only lasted 15 months.

Furthermore, the limited willingness of Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber to keep up with social change is evident in the ways the Ministry of Defense addressed the soldiers’ social and sexual behavior. To be sure, the ministers countered the conservative claims of military commanders who argued that officers and soldiers’ family and marital life had to be regulated strictly. In 1974, the Ministry of Defense annulled the Marriage Decree of 1958, against which Helmut Schmidt had already railed as a young parliamentarian in the 1950s. The Marriage Decree that had advised *Bundeswehr* officers and soldiers to choose their wives carefully did not fit the reforms of the two SPD Ministers of Defense.⁸⁶⁷ Yet, these concessions did not extend to gay men. As discussed above, 1969 saw the passing of the First Law to Reform the Criminal Code, which continued the criminalization of “fornication” with underage men. Paragraph 175 of the revised Criminal Code stated, for instance, that a “man over the age of 18 who fornicates—as the passive or as the active partner—with another man under the age of 21,” could be punished

⁸⁶⁵ Quoted in Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 261.

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid. 295.

⁸⁶⁷ “Heirat von Soldaten,” *Ministerialblatt des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung*, 5 July 1974, 162. See also, “Väter werden nicht mehr eingezogen: Verteidigungsminister nimmt Rücksicht auf junge Familien und Truppe,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, April 12, 1973, 1.

with up to 5 years imprisonment. This particular sub-clause received as “Lex Bundeswehr” much criticism because legal and medical experts as well as a slowly growing number of gay-rights activists criticized “that the legislator wants to smuggle the highly controversial special right for the Bundeswehr [into the law] without causing much furor.”⁸⁶⁸

This criticism greatly influenced the continuing reform process. In 1970, the new Social-Liberal Coalition set out to revise the Criminal Code and Paragraph 175 once more. The subsequent negotiations were defined above all by the notion that Paragraph 175 created inequality between heterosexual and homosexual citizens, which could not be justified. Bidding farewell to the notion that the Criminal Code had to preserve West Germany’s decency and morality, the members of the Special Reform Committee could not find a valid reason for why homosexual men between the ages 18 and 21 had to be treated differently than heterosexual men. As a result, Paragraph 175 of the Fourth Law to Reform the Criminal Code, which the *Bundestag* passed in late 1973, ‘only’ stipulated that “a man over the age of 18 who engages—passively or actively—in sexual acts with another man under the age of 18 will be punished with imprisonment of up to five years.” While the Reform Committee thus continued the argument that young men’s sexual development needed special protection, they did not believe that the West German Criminal Code should make any special concessions to the *Bundeswehr*.

In the Ministry of Defense, this development caused some frowns. During the negotiations, Helmut Schmidt and his Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Defense, Johannes Birckholtz, cautioned against the radical revision of Paragraph 175, stating that it would entail great problems for the armed forces.⁸⁶⁹ In arguing that male homosexuality needed

⁸⁶⁸ Helmut Ostermeyer, “Ist der neue § 175 StGB verfassungswidrig?,” *Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik* (1969), 154.

⁸⁶⁹ “Vermerk VR II 7, Betreff: Homosexuelle Handlungen von Soldaten der Bundeswehr,” 27 April 1971. BArch F, BW 1/187216.

to be criminalized for the sake of the *Bundeswehr*, Schmidt and Birckholtz seconded statements by the Chief of Staff of the *Bundeswehr*, General Ulrich de Maizière, who agreed that “homosexual activities” between soldiers in the context of the armed forces needed to be punished.⁸⁷⁰ As a result, the Ministry of Defense emphasized argued “soldiers’ same sex activities” could still represent “malfeasance” (*Dienstvergehen*), even though it was not considered a crime outside of the *Bundeswehr*.⁸⁷¹ Whereas the Ministry of Defense adapted society’s changing attitudes towards marriage and family, this liberalization process did not extend to the treatment of gay men. Thus the comprehensive military reforms of the early 1970s defined the West German soldier and officer as an educated, critical, reflective heterosexual young man.

Conclusion

Over the course of the long 1960s, contemporaries intensely debated the image and function of the *Bundeswehr* and its soldiers. Beginning in the mid-1960s, West German society witnessed a conservative military “counter revolution.” Enraged by what they believed to be an overburdening civilian control of the armed forces, conservative generals such as Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez called for more military autonomy and the reestablishment of the *Bundeswehr* as community of fate and combat. Maintaining that parliamentary politics and society should be geared towards the effective functioning of the armed forces, they demanded the social valorization of martial masculinities and the return to the soldierly ideal of the “fighter.”

⁸⁷⁰ Vermerk, VR II 7, 17 January 1969. BArch F, BW 1/187216.

⁸⁷¹ Schreiben von VR IV 1 an IPZ betreff “Dokumentation der Zeitschrift ‘Das andere Magazin’ über die Behandlung der Homophilen in der BW,” 29 September 1970. BA-MA Freiburg, BW1/131874.

Since this “counter revolution” coincided with the formation of the Grand Coalition, which pursued the passing of the *Notstandsgesetzgebung*, and the electoral victories of the right-wing NPD, a growing number of pacifists, peace activists, leftist intellectuals, and student protesters questioned the *Bundeswehr*’s function as a guarantor of peace and stability. Fearing that the Federal Republic was becoming a fascist and oppressive state, APO activists took to the streets of West German cities, demonstrated in front of barrack fences, organized sit-ins, and distributed numerous pamphlets and leaflets. Because they considered the *Bundeswehr* to be the prime instrument of the government’s implementation of oppressive agendas, left-wing protests against the *Bundeswehr* focused on the ways that military service and life would influence the behavior and thinking of men who served. For the majority of activists and intellectuals, the *Bundeswehr* produced violent male behavior that endangered the peace and stability of West German society.

The multifold criticism fundamentally influenced parliamentary politics in that all major parties felt the need to restate their attitude towards military service. Above all, Willy Brandt’s Social-Liberal Coalition instated a series of measures that represented a direct response to different lines of argument. As parliamentarians declared that the primary function of the *Bundeswehr* was the protection of West Germany’s stability, freedom and peace, all major parties were eager to emphasize the importance of the compulsory military service. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Defense under the aegis of Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber, fundamentally altered image of the soldier and the nature of military service by educational system. Seeking to adapt to West Germany’s changing male youth culture and APO protests, the numerous reforms that the two Ministers of Defense initiated, redefined the West German man in uniform as a critical and reflective thinker who served in the *Bundeswehr* to protect the peace

and stability of West Germany and Western Europe. This image was built on the notion that the *Bundeswehr* was a homosocial, yet strictly heterosexual men's society, and gay men were not invited to participate in the military's defensive function. Whereas the Social-Liberal Coalition instated a number of liberal educational ideas, they did not extend all the way to the *Bundeswehr*.

PART V
CHALLENGED MILITARY MANLINESS: THE QUEST FOR A NEW MAN IN
UNIFORM, 1977-1989

In the summer of 1977, the West German anarchist-pacifist magazine *graswurzelrevolution* published an article entitled “*Männlichkeit und Gewalt*” (“Masculinity and Violence”).⁸⁷² The authors were the co-founders of the pacifist Movement for a New Society (MNS), George Lakey and Bruce Kokopelli. This U.S.-based network was committed to the principle of nonviolence and played a key role in American social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. While the article had originally been published by the pacifist magazine *WIN*, the editors of *graswurzelrevolution* thought that the text was important and translated it. In the article, the authors argued that “the battle for a world without wars” had to involve the dissolution of patriarchy, militarism and “the military state.”⁸⁷³ According to Kokopelli and Lakey, military violence and patriarchy were closely intertwined, because they both entailed a masculine ideal that built upon “the oppression of women and homosexuals.”⁸⁷⁴ Thus, pacifists and peace activists had to challenge the military state and patriarchy in order to achieve a state of complete non-violence.

⁸⁷² Bruce Kokopelli and George Lakey, “Militär und Gewalt,” *graswurzelrevolution* 30/31 (Summer 1977): 1. Archiv des Instituts für Sozialforschungen, Hamburg, A-ZG-0074.

⁸⁷³ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid.

In closely linking masculinity, patriarchy, and violence in their agenda to establish peace, the authors addressed issues that would dominate West German disputes surrounding the *Bundeswehr* between the late-1970s and mid-1980s. Beginning in 1977/78, the masculine culture of the *Bundeswehr* and the image of the West German soldier were negotiated in novel ways. During this time, the Federal Republic witnessed once again debates about whether military service was still a truly masculine endeavor or whether women could serve as soldiers too. The topic reoccurred because the Social-Liberal Coalition of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt anticipated a recruitment crisis. Unsettled by the fact that the number of babies born in West Germany was declining since the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Defense feared that the *Bundeswehr* would soon be unable to draft enough young men. Between 1978 and 1982, leading military and government officials such as the SPD-politician and Minister of Defense, Hans Apel, proposed the recruitment women for military service in order to circumvent any possible problems.⁸⁷⁵

These suggestions caused a stir for three main reasons. First of all, they faced a great deal of parliamentary resistance. Above all, the majority of SPD parliamentarians refused the idea of their colleague. Notwithstanding some dissenting opinions, almost all CDU/CSU politicians rejected the call for female soldiers as well. In the wake of the federal elections in 1983, which put Helmut Kohls' conservative coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP into office, opposition was furthermore voiced by the newly created left-wing, ecological party *Die Grünen* (the Greens). Rejecting women's recruitment wholeheartedly, *Die Grünen* stood, however, in opposition to the FDP. Even though a fair number of Free Democrats opposed female soldiers too, the party was more open to the idea of recruiting women into the *Bundeswehr*.⁸⁷⁶

⁸⁷⁵ Ahrens, "Verzögerte Anpassung und radikaler Wandel."

⁸⁷⁶ Kraake, *Frauen zur Bundeswehr*.

Second, the proposals coincided with an article by Alice Schwarzer, the editor of the newly founded, popular feminist magazine, *Emma*. Spearheading the protests against Paragraph 218 of the Criminal Code, which penalized abortions, Schwarzer had become one of the leading activists of West Germany's New Women's Movement in the early 1970s. In June 1978, Schwarzer argued in *Emma* that if women wanted to be fully emancipated they had to serve in the *Bundeswehr* alongside men.⁸⁷⁷ The fact that the West German Minister of Defense and the figurehead of the women's movement pondered the recruitment of women triggered a controversy that was largely dominated by feminist activists.⁸⁷⁸ For example, representatives of the autonomous wing of the women's movement such as the editor of the feminist magazine *Courage*, Sibylle Plogstedt, disagreed with Schwarzer, arguing that the recruitment would result in more discrimination and violence against women.

Third, this activism intensified due to escalating Cold War tensions. On December 12, 1979, NATO's double track decision offered the Warsaw Pact the mutual limitation of nuclear missiles combined with the threat that if negotiations failed, NATO would deploy a new generation of nuclear rockets in Europe. Since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan only 13 days later, the politics of détente came to an end and NATO began preparing for the stationing of its new weaponry.⁸⁷⁹ Because some rockets were to be stationed on West German soil, NATO's

⁸⁷⁷ Alice Schwarzer, "Frauen ins Militär?," *Emma* June 1978, online at <http://www.emma.de/hefte/ausgaben-1978/juni-1978/frauen-ins-militaer/> (last accessed: 1 February 2013).

⁸⁷⁸ For the women's movement in general, see Gerhard, "Frauenbewegung"; Lentz, *Die Neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland*. For the development of women's movement and the discussion of military politics, see Davis, "The Gender of War and Peace," 83–114; Patricia Melzer, "Frauen gegen Imperialismus und Patriarchat zerschlagen den Herrschaftsapparat": Autonome Frauen, linksradikaler feministischer Protest und Gewalt in Deutschland," in 'All We Ever Wanted...' *Eine Kulturgeschichte Europäischer Protestbewegungen der 1980er Jahre*, ed. Hanno Balz and Jan-Henrik Friedrichs (Berlin: Dietz, 2012), 157–177.

⁸⁷⁹ Bernd Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg, 1947-1991: Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters* (Munich: Beck, 2007) 402.

plans caused an unparalleled explosion of peace activism. Between 1980 and 1984, more than two million women and men organized protest marches, mass gatherings, and sit-ins in order to challenge the international decision and West Germany's involvement in the arms race. The protest, which was driven by a union of church representatives, labor unions, peace activists, and women's groups as well as members of the SPD and *Die Grünen*, culminated in demonstrations in the capital of Bonn in 1982, where more than 400,000 people protested.⁸⁸⁰ This activism also influenced the discussion about female soldiers and led to an outpouring of newspaper articles, pamphlets, and monographs, which portrayed the military as place where women would fall victim to men's aggression and violence.

The opposing views focused largely on two interrelated questions. On the one hand, the proposals to recruit women caused contemporaries to reconsider whether military service should remain limited to men, because of their particular mental and physical qualities. On the other hand, the issue led to new arguments about female emancipation. West German parliamentarians, feminist activists, and peace protesters disputed whether military service would result in women's complete emancipation or if it would only add to the discrimination and violence against women. As they addressed the gendered nature of military service and war, the

⁸⁸⁰ For a joint discussion of NATO's double-track treaty and the West German peace movement, see Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Herman Wentker, eds., *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011). For the expansion of the peace movement see further Karl-Werner Brand, Detlef Büsser, and Dieter Rucht, *Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft: Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 1986), 206; Josef Janning, "Die neue Friedensbewegung 1980-1986", in *Friedensbewegung: Entwicklungen und Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Europa und den USA*, ed. Josef Janning, Hans Josef Legrand and Helmut Zander (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1987), 36–53, 36; Dieter Rucht, *Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen: Deutschland, Frankreich und USA im Vergleich* (Frankfurt a.M. and New York: Campus, 1994), 445.

different interest groups delineated competing concepts of femininity and masculinity that evolved around the antipodes of peace/ irenic/feminine and war/violent/masculine.⁸⁸¹

The two foci—the gendered nature of military service, on the one hand, and military service as means of female emancipation, on the other—were moreover central to new discussions about how the *Bundeswehr* dealt with gay soldiers and officers. Beginning in 1977, the question occupied the broader public as well as the *Bundeswehr* and the *Bundestag*. This was due to a rapidly growing number of gay rights activists and a few gay *Bundeswehr* officers who voiced their opinions against the continuing criminalization of gay men in society and the armed forces.⁸⁸² At the beginning, the topic received only limited attention in pacifist newspapers like *Der Spiegel*, magazines such as *Rosa* that were related to the gay-rights movement, and left-wing mainstream publications such as *Der Spiegel*. This changed slightly during the federal elections in 1980 and 1983. Eager to improve the status of West Germany’s gay men, the Free Democratic Party and *Die Grünen* campaigned for the complete abolishment of Paragraph 175 of the Criminal Code, arguing that it unjustly discriminated against one social group.⁸⁸³

The attention paid to the issue of male homosexuality skyrocketed, however, following the establishment of Helmut Kohl’s conservative coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP. In December 1983, the newly appointed minister of Defense, Manfred Wörner, forced the Commander of

⁸⁸¹ Davis, “The Gender of War and Peace,” 83–114.

⁸⁸² See for example, Kraushaar, *Protest-Chronik*; Dietmar Kreutzer, *Chronik der Schwulen: 80* (Hamburg: Männerschwarm, 2008); Jens Dobler und Harald Rimmele, “Schwulenbewegung,” in *Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: Ein Handbuch* (Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus, 2008), 541–556. See also, Bernhard Rosenkranz and Gottfried Lorenz, *Hamburg auf anderen Wegen: Die Geschichte des schwulen Lebens in der Hansestadt* (Hamburg: Himmelstürmer, 2012).

⁸⁸³ Schäfer, ‘Widernatürliche Unzucht’, 241–242. See further, Andreas Pretzel and Volker Weiß, “Die Schwulenbewegung der 70er Jahre: Annäherungen an ein legendäres Jahrzehnt,” in *Rosa Radikale: Die Schwulenbewegung der 1970er Jahre*, ed Andreas Pretzel and Volker Weiß (Hamburg: Männerschwarm Verlag, 2012), 9–28.

NATO land forces and deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (DSACEUR), General Günter Kießling, to retire early. Basing his decision on reports by the West German Counterintelligence Service, which accused Kießling of being gay and therefore presented him as a security risk, Wörner hoped to discharge the General without any publicity.⁸⁸⁴ Yet, this did not happen. The issue quickly made headlines due to investigative journalism and because Kießling pressed charges for libel and slander.⁸⁸⁵

In addition to calling into question the workings of the West German Counterintelligence Service, the so-called “Wörner-Kießling Affair” led to new debates about male homosexuality in the *Bundeswehr*. Whereas Helmut Kohl’s coalition government was eager to avoid any further discussion, the opposition—*Die Grünen* in particular—addressed the issue vehemently during several sessions of the *Bundestag*, criticizing that the affair had damaged the situation of gay men greatly. The Greens’ reproach of Wörner’s actions was echoed by various left-leaning newspapers who were critical of the government, including *Die ZEIT* and *Der Spiegel*, as well as by gay-rights publications such as the magazine *Rosa*. In addition to this avalanche of media reports, the scandal prompted a considerable number of citizens to voice their opinion by sending letters to newspaper editors as well as Manfred Wörner, Günter Kießling, and Helmut Kohl.⁸⁸⁶ In contrast to the reasoning of the Ministry of Defense and the Counterintelligence Service, the majority of West Germans maintained that the way that military treated gay men in uniform was

⁸⁸⁴ Ramage, *Die Großen Polit-Skandale*, 180–197. See also, Klaus Storkmann, “‘Ein widerwärtiges Schmierenstück’: Die Wörner-Kießling-Affäre,” *Militärgeschichte: Zeitschrift für historische Bildung* 4 (2013): 18–21.

⁸⁸⁵ Der Deutsche Bundestag, “Beschlüßempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsausschusses (12. Ausschuß) als 1. Untersuchungsausschuß nach Artikel 45a Ab. 2 des Grundgesetzes,” Drucksache 10/1604, 13 June 1984, 1–99.

⁸⁸⁶ Ramage, *Die Großen Polit-Skandale*, 180–197.

unjust, because gay men possessed the psychological and physical qualities that allowed them to act as military superiors.

In conjunction with the debates about female soldiers, the issue of gay men in the *Bundeswehr* led to new attempts to define the West German soldier—in particular, his masculinity and sexuality. Since the inception of the *Bundeswehr* in the early 1950s and despite repeated quarrels, manliness and heterosexuality had been the explicit and implicit markers of the West German soldier. The new push for gay men and women in military uniforms challenged this dominant construction once more. Influenced by international developments as well as the changing political, social, and cultural landscape of the Federal Republic, contemporaries reconsidered whether the effective functioning of the *Bundeswehr* depended on soldiers' sex and sexuality, whether West German soldiers had to be heterosexual men.

In order to shed light on this development, this part first turns to the ministerial and military debates that took place between the late-1970s and mid-1980s to show how members of the Ministry of Defense and military commanders discussed both female soldiers and male homosexuality in the armed forces. In a second step, this part turns to the parliamentary debates and the ways in which West Germany's primary parties discussed the two issues. Finally, the chapter addresses the ways in which members of the New Women's Movement and the growing peace movement reacted to the parliamentary and military debates as well as the mainstream press tackled the issue.

1. Disputes about Female and Gay Soldiers in the *Bundeswehr* and the Ministry of Defense

Beginning in the mid- to late 1970s, West Germany witnessed a new round of military debates that evolved around the *Bundeswehr* and the image of the West German soldier. One of these disputes erupted during the government of Helmut Schmidt's Social-Liberal coalition of SPD

and FDP and was caused by the Minister of Defense, Hans Apel, and the Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Armed Forces, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan. In 1978 and 1979, the two politicians made headlines by pondering the military recruitment of women in order to avert an anticipated and much feared recruitment crisis. Since Apel's and Berkhan's considerations were furthermore seconded by the government-appointed *Kommission für Langzeitplanung der Bundeswehr* in 1982, the proposals prompted critical discussions among military commanders.⁸⁸⁷ In addition to internal deliberations, military personnel and experts addressed the issue in military journals, press interviews, and speeches. Although these different sources show that military representatives were generally able to conceive the idea of granting women some access to positions within the military, they still wanted to set specific boundaries. Stating that they did not want to see women in combat positions fighting alongside men, military commanders such as the Chief of Staff reaffirmed the image that only men could be compelled to engage in combat.⁸⁸⁸

Whereas military officials thus implied that women needed to be saved from the true scope and extent of military service, this argument was reversed in the case of gay soldiers. As discussed in Part IV, Paragraph 175 of the West German Criminal Code was fundamentally revised in the early 1970s. In contrast to its predecessors, the 1973 version of Paragraph 175 'only' stipulated punishment for men older than 18 years who engaged in "sexual acts" with men who were younger than 18 years. Due to these legal changes, the armed forces witnessed a slow revision of military regulations with respect to homosexuality in the mid- to late-1970s. Whereas new regulations stipulated that gay men could become soldiers under certain conditions, military commanders and military officials still believed that male homosexuality was a "sexual

⁸⁸⁷ Ahrens, "Verzögerte Anpassung und radikaler Wandel."

⁸⁸⁸ "Im Manne sträubt sich alles," *DIE ZEIT*, February 21, 1986, 71.

abnormality,” which would eventually threaten the *Bundeswehr*’s combat readiness. As a result, different groups within the *Bundeswehr* and the military administrative apparatus were eager to prevent gay men from receiving promotions and becoming military superiors.

This particular understanding of male homosexuality became especially apparent in the investigations that led the Minister of Defense, Manfred Wörner, to release the *Bundeswehr* General Günter Kießling, into early retirement in December 1983. The investigations by the Office for the Security of the *Bundeswehr* (*Amt für Sicherheit der Bundeswehr*, or ASBw) and Military Counterintelligence Service (*Amt für den Militärischen Abschirmdienst* or MAD)⁸⁸⁹ were defined by the understanding that gay men pursued their “abnormal sexual desires” in ways that rendered them unable to act as military superiors. Whereas military commanders were able to conceive of women in the armed forces, homosexuality still represented a threat to military leaders. Men’s heterosexuality was considered vital the effective functioning of the *Bundeswehr* and national security.

Military Debates about the Recruitment of Women for the Bundeswehr

In the mid- to late 1970s, government officials of Helmut Schmidt’s Social-Liberal Coalition became increasingly concerned about the *Bundeswehr*’s abilities to recruit enough abled-bodied men for basic military training. As discussed in Part IV, the number of men who decided to become conscientious objectors rose steeply in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although

⁸⁸⁹ The West German counterintelligence service was called *Amt für Sicherheit der Bundeswehr* until 1984. Because of the scandal, the counterintelligence service was restricted and received a new name: *Amt für den Militärischen Abschirmdienst* or MAD. See Kirsten Schmalbach, “Administrativer Verfassungsschutz: Bürger unter Beobachtung,” in *Wehrhafte Demokratie: Beiträge über die Regelungen zum Schutze der freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung*, ed. Markus Thiel (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 415–445, here: 426.

numbers remained high throughout the 1970s,⁸⁹⁰ the development did not pose a threat to the *Bundeswehr*, because the number of registered able-bodied men continued to exceed military demands. Yet, in 1978 and 1979, these prospects looked quite different. According to the official interpretation, the malaise was caused by the declining birthrate. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Federal Republic witnessed a steady increase in the number of babies born each year. In 1964, the year that West Germany's birthrate spiked, 1,357,304 babies—698,046 of them boys—were born (live births). After that, the birthrate for both girls and boys declined relentlessly. In 1978, the numbers had dropped to 808 619 babies; 409,749 of them male.⁸⁹¹ Although the birthrate remained relatively steady afterwards, an increase was not in sight. This development, to which contemporaries soon referred to as the *Pillenknick*, because the declining birthrate coincided with the increasing availability of birth-control pills,⁸⁹² military experts predicted that *Bundeswehr* would soon face severe problems.

In order to prevent a recruitment crisis, government officials pondered different remedies. One of the most controversial measures was proposed in 1978. Following the almost unnoticed decision of SPD-politician and Minister of Defense (1972-1978), George Leber, to grant female volunteers access to the *Bundeswehr*'s Medical Corps as doctors and pharmacists with officers'

⁸⁹⁰ Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 206.

⁸⁹¹ For a statistic see "Bevölkerung: Geborene und Gestorbene," ed. Statistisches Bundesamt: <https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Indikatoren/LangeReihen/Bevoelkerung/lrbev04.html> (Last accessed: January 20, 2014).

⁸⁹² In contrast to contemporary perception, scholars emphasize a multitude of interrelated reasons that caused the birthrate to decline. See for example, Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, *Demographischer Wandel und Familienförderung* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011); Charlotte Höhn, "Bevölkerungsentwicklung und demographische Herausforderung," in *Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Vergleich*, ed. Stefan Hradil and Stefan Immerfall (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1997), 71–95. See further, Dagmar Herzog, "Between Coitus and Commodification: Young West German Women and the Impact of the Pill," in *Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980*, ed. Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 261–286.

rank,⁸⁹³ his successor Hans Apel, made headlines by considering the recruitment of “girls and women” into almost all areas of the *Bundeswehr*.⁸⁹⁴ In 1979, the minister was second by the SPD-politician and Parliamentary Ombudsman for the Armed Forces, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan, who lamented that “ten years from now” the *Bundeswehr* would suffer from a shortage of draftees.⁸⁹⁵ In light of this plight, Berkhan thought it likely that in about ten years “the Bundestag [...] has to consider an amendment to the Basic Law so that women too could be trained with weapons.”⁸⁹⁶

Given that the *Bundeswehr*’s faced also enormous financial problems, the Ministry of Defense appointed the Commission for Long-term Planning of the Bundeswehr. Composed of sixteen *Bundeswehr* commanders and government officials—including generals, undersecretaries, and service chiefs—the commission estimated in 1982 that the *Bundeswehr* would soon be lacking soldiers: 200,000 soldiers per birth cohort until 1995.⁸⁹⁷ In order to compensate this development, the Commission pondered different solutions. In addition to deliberating over an extension of the time that male draftees spent in the armed forces and the recruitment of “foreigners” (*Ausländer*) who had lived in Germany for some time and proved

⁸⁹³ See Bea Wildt, “Wir sagen: Nein! Unterrichtserfahrung zum Thema ‘Frauen in der Bundeswehr,’” *Die Frauen in der Geschichte*, vol. 5, ‘*Das Schicksal Deutschlands liegt in der Hand seiner Frauen*’: *Frauen in der Deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte*, ed. Anna-Elisabeth Freier and Annette Kuhn (Düsseldorf: Schwamm, 1984), 445–469.

⁸⁹⁴ “Amazonen-Armee?,” *DIE ZEIT*, September 22, 1978, 1.

⁸⁹⁵ “Bundeswehr: Dummes Zeug,” *Der Spiegel*, August 27, 1979, 32–34.

⁸⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹⁷ “Die Vorneverteidigung wird schwieriger werden,” *CDU-Dokumentation*, August 19, 1982, 1–8.

themselves loyal, recruiting female volunteers seemed another viable option.⁸⁹⁸ Similar to the Minister of Defense's first proposal, the Commission suggested that vacant staff position should be filled with women.⁸⁹⁹

Although the Ministry of Defense considered the recruitment of women as a remedy against structural problems, Hans Apel also praised women's military service as a way to "break up the last bastion of men."⁹⁰⁰ According to him, the recruitment of women into the armed forces represented another steppingstone for women's emancipation and equal treatment. In doing so, the Minister of Defense was clearly influenced by the feminist activist Alice Schwarzer, who argued for women's service in the *Bundeswehr*. Although she expressed her utter averseness to military service and the military apparatus, she nonetheless stated that female recruitment was vital to women's complete emancipation.⁹⁰¹ Although their attitudes towards military service and the *Bundeswehr* differed, the arguments presented by Schwarzer and Apel were similar.

Notwithstanding Apel's eagerness, the ministry wanted to ensure that women's advances into the "the last bastion of men" were voluntary. For Apel, women's roles and function in society did not allow the government to draft women into the military. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ministry received hundreds of letters asking about women's military service. In January 1979, for example, Apel received a letter from a middle school girl who thought it unjust that only young men were forced to render military service. In response to this letter, he

⁸⁹⁸ See Ekkehard Lippert and Tjarck Rössler, "Weibliche Soldaten für die Bundeswehr? Zur öffentlichen Diskussion eines Personalproblems," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B8 (1981): 15–21.

⁸⁹⁹ Fieseler and Ladwig, "Women and the Peace Movement," 62.

⁹⁰⁰ Kraake, *Frauen*, 177–178;

⁹⁰¹ Schwarzer, "Frauen in die Bundeswehr?," *Emma* 6 (1978): 5. See also Lenz, *Die Neue Frauenbewegung*, 817–823.

addressed women's "double burden" and how it put women at a disadvantage: "Being a mother and pursuing very often at the same time a profession is a double-role that women and girls have to carry."⁹⁰² In light of this lot, he considered it "unjust" to burden women with even more "troubles"⁹⁰³ and, consequently, he did not want to introduce compulsory military service for women.

In addition to not wanting to draft women into the armed forces, the minister did not dare to consider women as part of combat units handling weapons and killing combatants. For Apel and his staff, using weapons violated women's nature. This becomes clear in some of the ministry's internal documents. Before mailing an official response, the staff of the Minister of Defense generally devised several drafts. These drafts had to be rubber-stamped before an official letter could be sent out. Many of the initial drafts indicate that Apel and his staff believed that military service with weapons conformed neither to women's "feminine nature" because of the "physical burden," nor to "the woman's dignity."⁹⁰⁴ In their view, carrying weapons, engaging in combat, and thus killing an opponent were activities that only a man should endure.

Interestingly, however, many of the final letters that the ministry eventually sent out omitted this understanding. For example, the ministry received another letter in July 1979 asking why compulsory military service applied to men only. The ministry's official letter informed the addressee that the Basic Law prohibited women's compulsory and armed military service. The official letter assured its reader that "this decision had nothing to do with discrimination; at least

⁹⁰² Monika B. to Hans Apel, 19 January 1979 and Apel's response, 6 February 1979. BArch F, BW I/113868.

⁹⁰³ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁴ See for example drafts of letters in response to a letter by Iris B., 6 and 9 July 1979. BArch F, BW I/113868.

this is evident in the debates about the issue that took place back then.”⁹⁰⁵ The fact that the ministry was careful not to address issues such as women’s nature or dignity explicitly in their official responses suggest that they were greatly influenced by the heated extra-parliamentary debates about women’s role and status in society. Eager to not say anything that critics of the *Bundeswehr* could hold against them, invoking the Basic Law and the legal debates of the 1940s and 50s seemed to represent a safe bet for the Ministry of Defense.

As the case of Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan shows, this was a wise decision. Initially, the SPD-politicians and Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Armed Forces had pondered the revision of the Basic Law so that women could be recruited for armed military service. After all, Article 12 of the Basic Law stated that women could not be compelled to render service in the armed forces and prohibited women’s employment for armed military service. Berkhan’s deliberations triggered a public outcry. In addition to numerous television reports and newspaper articles, peace activists and women’s groups immediately rallied against his proposal.⁹⁰⁶ Although women could join the military voluntary and the *Bundeswehr* accepted women as secretaries and kitchen helps as well as doctors and pharmacists in the medical corps, women’s armed military service was out of the questions. The outcry was so overwhelming that the Ombudsman soon

⁹⁰⁵ See the final letter that was sent to Iris B., 13 July 1979. BArch F, BW I/113868. In 1978, the ministry still sent more letters stating that armed military service was against “the woman’s dignity.” See for example, letter to C. P., 26 October 1978. BArch F, BW I/114692.

⁹⁰⁶ Achim Schneider, “Politische und gesellschaftliche Aspekte einer generellen Öffnung der deutschen Streitkräfte für weibliche Soldaten,” in *Frauen im militärischen Waffendienst: Rechtliche, politische, soziologische und militärische Aspekte des Einsatzes von Frauen in den Streitkräften unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Deutschen Bundeswehr und des Österreichischen Bundesheers*, ed. Armin Steinkamm (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), 340–391.

retracted his statement, qualifying that he himself did not want to change the Basic Law, but that it might become necessary if the government planned to recruit women.⁹⁰⁷

The proposals issued by Hans Apel, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan, and the Commission for Long-Term Planning prompted several *Bundeswehr* commanders to voice their opinion. One of them was General Jürgen Brandt. After serving as the West German military representative in NATO's Military Committee in Brussels, he returned to Bonn in 1978 to serve as the *Bundeswehr*'s Chief of Staff until his retirement in 1983. In an interview with *Der Spiegel* in October 1979, Brandt embraced the idea of recruiting more female staff into the armed forces.⁹⁰⁸ In addition to justifying his opinion with the positive experience, he had had with the female doctors and pharmacists in the medical corps, Brandt emphasized that other European armies had successfully recruited women into their armed forces and the *Bundeswehr* should follow suit.

Notwithstanding his openness, the Chief of Staff did not want to see women serving in the same capacity as men did. To be sure, Brandt accepted the idea of “nice looking” female medical officers who took care of their male comrades and thus conformed to the traditional feminine roles as caretakers. Yet he did not support the idea that women should be trained to use weapons or should be deployed in military combat missions. Unable to “give rational reasons” for his opinion,⁹⁰⁹ the Chief of Staff stated in 1979 and again in 1982 that he was “too

⁹⁰⁷ “Bundeswehr: Dummes Zeug.”

⁹⁰⁸ “Auch ein Putzmittel wird General genannt: Generalinspekteur Jürgen Brandt über den Zustand der Bundeswehr,” *Der Spiegel*, October 1, 1979, 36–49. See also, Beate Fieseler and Ulrike Ladwig, “Women and the Peace Movement in the Federal Republic,” *Frontiers* 8 (1985): 59–64.

⁹⁰⁹ “Wir brauchen weibliche Offiziere,” *Hamburger Abendblatt*, June 28, 1982. Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie, SPD-Parteivorstand, 2/PVAD000024.

antiquated” to imagine women killing other people in battle. He experienced, as he stated, “an emotional barrier” in this respect.⁹¹⁰

This split opinion was representative of many *Bundeswehr* representatives who addressed the issues in lengthy journal articles and interviews. In 1984, for example, the semi-official and scientific military journal *Europäische Wehrkunde: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* published an article by Captain Lieutenant Peter Rösch, who had studied at the *Bundeswehr* University in Hamburg. According to Rösch, women would most certainly be efficient soldiers even if their “physical strength” did not equal that of men. After all, he maintained, many of the positions and assignments in modern armies did not require extraordinary bodily strength.⁹¹¹ Thus, modern warfare and modern military apparatuses enabled military experts to consider the recruitment of women whom they otherwise would have considered unfit for military service.

In addition to addressing the physical abilities contemporaries traditionally associated with male soldiers, Rösch also tackled the mental and intellectual qualities that the military deemed important. In his article, he maintained that women generally put a great deal of emphasis on “community” and “solidarity.”⁹¹² In the context of the military these traits were named differently. In the *Bundeswehr* and other armies, they were valued as a form of camaraderie or esprit de corps. Whereas women generally possessed these qualities, the Captain Lieutenant argued, men focused generally more on “individuality” and their “personal

⁹¹⁰ “Auch ein Putzmittel wird General genannt”; “Wir brauchen weibliche Offiziere.”

⁹¹¹ Peter Rösch, “Die Frau in Uniform: Weder ‘Flintenweib’ noch ‘Venus militaris’,” *Europäische Wehrkunde* 11 (1984): 634–638.

⁹¹² Ibid.

advantage.”⁹¹³ Consequently, one of first lesson that military superiors had to teach new male recruits was a lesson in camaraderie. In the case of female recruits, he concluded, this would not be necessary. In contrast to predominant descriptions that defined camaraderie as traditionally and exclusively masculine, Rösch described group cohesion as a feminine trait, which allowed him to consider women as effective soldiers.⁹¹⁴

In spite of these advantages, military commentators also saw various reasons for why female soldiers could prove to be a challenge. In 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Dieter Farwick, a close aide to the newly appointed CDU Minister of Defense Klaus Wörner, discussed the pros and cons of female soldiers. According to him, women were less as desirable soldiers because of West Germany’s traditional gender roles.⁹¹⁵ In his analysis, Farwick questioned whether the male partners of female soldiers would be willing to understand the demands of the military. “Will he change his civilian workplace,” Farwick asked, “in order to follow her?”⁹¹⁶ To be sure, he argued, such problems existed already for male soldiers and officers. After all, more and more women joined the civilian labor force and were unwilling to follow their male partners. Yet because of the ways that society defined the roles of men and women, the “occupational advancement of the man still takes precedence over the contributing female partner”

⁹¹³ Ibid.

⁹¹⁴ For a discussion of “masculine” and “feminine” connotations of camaraderie in the *Wehrmacht*, see Thomas Kühne, “Kameradschaft – ‘Das Beste im Leben eines Mannes’: Die Deutschen Soldaten des Zweiten Weltkriegs in erfahrungs- und geschlechtergeschichtlicher Perspektive,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996): 504–529.

⁹¹⁵ Dieter Farwick, “Wenn Vater und Mutter Soldaten sind,” *Europäische Wehrkunde* 2 (1983): 66–70.

⁹¹⁶ Ibid.

(*mitarbeitende Partnerin*).⁹¹⁷ Emphasizing that families in which men were the main breadwinner still represented the West German standard, he concluded that female soldier were less reliable.⁹¹⁸ In contrast to previous discussions, Farwick's argument was not based on an interpretation of women's nature and dignity. Influenced by the contemporary political debates about motherhood and women's role in society, he considered women's social roles that society attributed to them.

Only a few commanding officers moved beyond this argument. In 1983, Colonel Jannsjörn Boës sent a letter to the editors of *Europäische Wehrkunde* arguing that female soldiers were a necessity. Boës, who had worked in the Ministry of Defense under the aegis Hans Apel, maintained that the *Bundeswehr* had to recruit women if it did not want to shrink in size.⁹¹⁹ He reiterated the arguments of Apel, Berkhan and the Commission for Long-Term Planning, the Colonel and added that the heightened tensions between NATO and the Soviet Bloc Federal left the government without a choice. If Chancellor Kohl's government did not recruit women, Boës maintained, the *Bundeswehr* would no longer be able to function as deterrent. Although he thus argued that the Cold War demanded female soldiers,⁹²⁰ he cautioned that it was unreasonable to recruit women immediately. After all, the Basic Law still prohibited women's armed services

⁹¹⁷ Ibid. For the development of the male-breadwinner model in West Germany see for example, Kolbe, *Elternschaft*, 376–394; Ursula Münch, *Familienpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Maßnahmen, Defizite, Organisation familienpolitischer Staatstätigkeit* (Freiburg: Lambertus, 1990); Bettina Paetzold, *“Eines ist zu wenig, beides macht zufrieden”: Die Vereinbarkeit von Mutterschaft und Berufstätigkeit* (Bielefeld: Kleine, 1996). For earlier decades see: Oertzen, *The Pleasure of the Surplus Income*.

⁹¹⁸ Farwick, “Wenn Vater und Mutter.”

⁹¹⁹ Hannsjörn Boës, Oberst, Kdr PzGrenBrig 31, Oldenburg, Respond to Dieter Farwaick, Oberstlt. i. G., “Wenn Vater und Mutter Soldaten sind,” *Europäische Wehrkunde* 2 (1983): 181.

⁹²⁰ Ibid.

even “for self-protection.”⁹²¹ In conclusion, he argued for changing the Basic Law so that female soldiers could defend themselves.⁹²²

Boës’ and other statements bear testimony to the willingness of some military commanders to consider women in military uniforms. However, even these considerations had their limits. Whereas military leaders could envision female soldiers and officers, they refrained from considering women in arms and as members of combat units.⁹²³ Although a few acknowledged that women could be attacked in any position and should therefore be able to defend themselves, such a scenario was described in rather passive terms. The active part of using weapons in order to fight back and kill enemy forces was still considered a masculine act. Thus, the masculine image of the West German soldiers was only challenged marginally. A far more threatening challenge seem to have been the demand of an equal inclusion of gay soldiers and officers.

Gay Soldiers and Officers in the Bundeswehr: Debates and Policies

Similar to the discussions about female soldiers, the ways in which military commanders considered gay soldiers changed too. But, these changes were even more limited. As stated before, Paragraph 175 of the West German Criminal Code was fundamentally revised in 1973. It now stated that ‘only’ men who were older than eighteen years and engaged—actively or passively—in “sexual activities” with men who were younger than eighteen years could be

⁹²¹ Ibid.

⁹²² Ibid.

⁹²³ Ahrens, “Verzögerte Anpassung.”

punished with up to five years in prison.⁹²⁴ Although the revision of the Criminal Code drastically reduced the threat of punishment for gay men, this liberalization did not extend to the *Bundeswehr*. Given that high-ranking officials in the early-1970s still considered homosexuality to be an “abnormality” that, if not sanctioned, would endanger the effective functioning of the *Bundeswehr*, military regulations still stipulated that gay men should be barred from serving in the armed forces. One of the regulations was the Central Service Regulation 46/1 (*ZDv 46/1*), which structured, for example, the ways in which medical examination of draftees were conducted in order to determine whether they were fit for military service.⁹²⁵ The versions of the *ZDv 46/1* that were printed between 1970 and 1972 still classified homosexuality as a personality trait that could render a man permanently unfit for military service (*dauernd untauglich*). The *ZDv 46/1* of August 1971, for example, listed “severe psychopathy (also sexual perversion, lack of sociability, alcoholism...)” as reasons for a man’s disqualification.⁹²⁶

Over the course of the mid- to late-1970s *ZDv 46/1* was revised, however. In contrast to the previous editions, Section Five—“Assessment of Mental Capability”—of the new 1977 *ZDv 46/1* included a lengthy discussion of homosexuality. To be sure, the new regulation still associated homosexuality with “neurosis” and “psychopathy,” just like previous versions had done. Yet according to the new edition, homosexuality did not necessarily render a man unfit for

⁹²⁴ See Part IV.

⁹²⁵ *ZDv 46/1: Bestimmung für die Durchführung der ärztlichen Untersuchung bei der Musterung von Wehrpflichtigen, Annahme, Einstellung und Entlassung von Soldaten (Tauglichkeitsbestimmungen)*, ed. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung: Inspektion des Sanitäts- und Gesundheitswesens I 5, March 1977. BArch F, BWD 3/251.

⁹²⁶ *ZDv 46/1 Bestimmungen für die Durchführung der ärztlichen Untersuchung bei der Musterung von Wehrpflichtigen - Annahme, Einstellung und Entlassung von Soldaten*, ed. BMVg Bundesministerium für Verteidigung: Inspektion des Sanitäts- und Gesundheitswesens I 5, August 1981. BArch F, BWD 3/251.

service. It was not important, the regulation noted, whether a soldier actually ‘suffered’ from such conditions as long as he was “adaptable,” “efficient,” able to work in a team and able to work under pressure and in stressful situations.⁹²⁷ It “matters little if a man had on occasion same-sex contacts,” the regulation specified. It was more important for the medical examiner to investigate if a man “is able to integrate himself into a men’s society despite his sexual abnormality.”⁹²⁸ The medical examiner should assume a “sexual deviation” and declare a man unfit for service only if the patient was driven by his “abnormal sexuality” and not able to live among other men.⁹²⁹ Even though military regulations still considered male homosexuality “abnormal,” this was no longer a reason to exclude men from basic military training.

This assessment would not hold true, however, for officers. Between 1976 and 1979, the Federal Administrative Court’s First Senate responsible for issues relating to military service rendered judgments, which stated that “homosexual dispositions” would preclude the promotion of “a military superior—notably of an officer.”⁹³⁰ The 1979 verdict came about, because a plaintiff, who wanted to promote the emancipation of gay men and did not accept the argument that gay men could not be military superiors, sought to bring about a court decision. The senate’s verdicts were influenced by three major considerations. Headed by Federal Judge Jürgen Saalman, who had been appointed to the position in 1972, the senate explained first that gay men could not function as military superiors because they viewed their subordinates as “possible

⁹²⁷ ZDv 46/1: *Bestimmung für die Durchführung der ärztlichen Untersuchung*, March 1977, 279/1.

⁹²⁸ Ibid.

⁹²⁹ Ibid.

⁹³⁰ Beschluss des Bundeswehrwaltungsgerichts, 1. Wehrdienstsenat vom 25.10.1979 – 1 WB 113/78, *NJW* 21 (1980). BArch F, BW 1/115011.

sexual partners.” Attributing to gay men a greater sex drive than heterosexual men, the senate maintained that officers’ behavior towards their subalterns could be “influenced by unobjective, namely sexual motives.”⁹³¹ Second, the senate maintained that if the homosexual tendencies of a military superior became known, this could lead to “gossip” and “suspicions,” because “in men’s societies such as the *Bundeswehr* homosexuality is predominantly not accepted.”⁹³² However, the senate saw no reason for the military to counteract such an attitude. An attempt to foster the emancipation of gay men, the judges cautioned, would eventually “weaken the combat strength of the troops and thus compromise their defense mission.”⁹³³ Finally, the Federal Administrative Court’s First Senate was displeased with the petitioner’s decision to report his homosexual tendencies in an attempt to “publicly” promote the emancipation of homosexuals.” Without giving any further information, the verdict stated that the man’s “blatant exhibition” of his homosexuality was unacceptable.⁹³⁴

Notwithstanding these decisions, the treatment of gay officers was not always consistent as the case of the gay Captain Michael L. shows. Born in 1944, L. had joined the *Bundeswehr* voluntarily at the age of 17. Being eager and apt, he became the youngest Staff Sergeant of the army only 4 years later.⁹³⁵ Since the spring of 1974, he served as a company commander and

⁹³¹ Ibid.

⁹³² Ibid.

⁹³³ Ibid.

⁹³⁴ Ibid.

⁹³⁵ See “Berufliches,” *Der Spiegel*, July 6, 1981, 176. While the draft applied only to men who were eighteen years and older, the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* stipulated that men who were seventeen years and older could volunteer for military service.

was responsible for the basic training of so-called *ABC-Abwehrsoldaten*.⁹³⁶ According to a 1979 evaluation of the company, Michael L. was a “resolute, strong-willed officer.”⁹³⁷ More importantly, the evaluation stated that the captain possessed “natural authority,” was “comradely” and “thus fully accepted by the [soldierly] community.”⁹³⁸ Michael L. thus represented a fully integrated, successful functioning military superior who was accepted by his equals and subordinates.

Despite his success, L. requested in December 1979 to be treated at the military hospital in Hamburg and retire from active duty. According to his statement, his condition was caused by the “Minister of Defense’s attitude towards homosexuals” and the continuing unclear status of gay soldiers and officers.⁹³⁹ Although sources do not clearly show to what extent his sexual preferences were known prior to 1979, he revealed his homosexuality to his military superior and the medical examiner that year.⁹⁴⁰ At first, L.’s retirement request was not granted. Following the necessary medical examination, the responsible doctor concluded in February 1980 that he was “fully fit” for military service. Due to this decision, which stood in stark contrast to the verdict of the Federal Administrative Court’s First Senate from October 1979, Michael L. was sent back to lead his company.⁹⁴¹

⁹³⁶ The term refers to military personnel responsible for defensive measures against an attack with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (NBC).

⁹³⁷ Evaluation from August 1979. BArch BW 1/ 115011.

⁹³⁸ Ibid.

⁹³⁹ Michael L., “Stellungnahme zu der Absicht des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, mich zur Ruhe zu setzten,” 22 June 1981. BArch F, BW 1, fol. 115011, 3.

⁹⁴⁰ Michael L., “Stellungnahme zu der Absicht,” 3.

⁹⁴¹ Ibid.

By L.'s own account, the very different evaluation of homosexuality in the *Bundeswehr* caused his health to decline further and he was eventually sent back to the hospital. This time, his brigade's commander questioned whether the gay captain was truly fit for active service and requested a second medical examination.⁹⁴² Written in September 1980—only 7 months after the first examination—the second report marked him “permanently unfit for service.”⁹⁴³ Since this decision was “significant” for Michael L.'s career, the military's staff department arranged for a “decisive expert opinion” (*Obergutachten*) and the captain was transferred to the military hospital in Koblenz in January 1981.⁹⁴⁴ For L., the result of this decisive examination was shattering. The responsible medic at the military hospital diagnosed the captain with “psychopathy” and “neurotic aberration” (depressive neurosis).⁹⁴⁵ These were the two medical conditions that *ZDv 46/I* associated with homosexuality and listed as conditions that would render a man unfit for military service. Because of this expert opinion, the Ministry of Defense sent Michael L. into early retirement in the summer of 1981.

Although the captain himself had requested his retirement in 1979, he probably did not aspire to leave the *Bundeswehr* classified as a neurotic psychopath. Released from duty, the Michael L. expanded his advocacy for gay rights. While he had already tried to call attention to the discrimination against gay men in the West German armed forces during the months he was

⁹⁴² Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, P II 5, 7 Januar 1981. BArch F, BW 1, fol. 115011.

⁹⁴³ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁵ Michael L., “Stellungnahme zu der Absicht,” 8 and 11.

examined in Hamburg and Koblenz,⁹⁴⁶ he became more active in the wake of his retirement. First, he joined the FDP, because the Free Democrats were one of the only primary parties in the late 1970s that had argued for the complete elimination of Paragraph 175 and had shown interest in Michael L.'s case.⁹⁴⁷ Second, the former captain, together with other activists, initiated a counseling service for gay soldiers and their families. The support service was associated with the newly founded, registered society Independent Homosexual Alternative (*Unabhängige Homosexuelle Alternative e.V.*). One of its first initiatives was to open the *magnus hirschfeld centrum* in Hamburg, a culture and counseling center, which started its work in July 1982.⁹⁴⁸

As Michael L.'s case shows, a few years after the revision of Paragraph 175 in the early 1970s, the *Bundeswehr* had to deal increasingly with the issue of gay military superiors. Although military regulations stipulated that gay men could—under certain conditions—be recruited for basic military service, this decision did not apply to military superiors. Attributing gay men with an unrestrained sex drive military, legal, and medical officials argued that gay superiors would weaken the *Bundeswehr*'s combat readiness and strength. According to the military leadership and administration, men's heterosexuality was vital for the *Bundeswehr*'s ability to fulfil its function. Thus, the West German officer was defined as a heterosexual man. This was even more so the case for generals as the debate about the so-called "Wörner-Kießling-Affair" in the *Bundeswehr* demonstrates.

⁹⁴⁶ See his letter to the Ministry of Defense's official weekly newspaper for the armed forces, *Bundeswehr aktuell*, 1 October 1980. BArch F, BW 1, 115137.

⁹⁴⁷ Michael L., "Stellungnahme zu der Absicht," 8 and 11.

⁹⁴⁸ Brochure "Die UHA bietet an: Streitkräfte Betreuung", o. D. Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, Petra Kelly Archiv. Akte A - Petra Kelly 146.

A Gay General? The Wörner-Kießling-Affair in Military and Ministerial Perception

The conviction that men's heterosexuality was fundamental to the effective functioning of the military apparatus, became even more apparent in one of the biggest scandals that rocked the Federal Republic only a few months after Helmut Kohl's coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP had taken office in 1983: the Wörner-Kießling-Affair. As stated above, the newly Minister of Defense, Manfred Wörner, forced General Günter Kießling in December 1983 to retire early due to reports from the West Germany's Counter Intelligence Service that accused Kießling of being gay. Having served as the Commander of NATO's Headquarters Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (HQ LANDJUT) since 1979, Kießling became Commander of NATO land forces and deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (DSACEUR) in 1982.

The incident turned into a scandal, because the West German media soon reported about it and Kießling—who was enraged allegations and the ways in which the Minister of Defense handled his case—pressed charges for libel and slander. As a result of these actions, the Committee for Defense of the West German *Bundestag* was constituted as an inquiry committee to investigate the matter. The proceedings of the committee as well as the investigations that followed Kießling's decision to press charges shed light not only on the questionable workings of West Germany's counter intelligence service, but also revealed the different ways in which military and civilian personnel in the Ministry of Defense viewed and judged the sexual orientation of high-ranking military commanders who possessed a high security clearance.

According to the records of the inquiry committee, investigations into Kießling's life began because of talks between the Deputy Chairman of the Employee Committee at the Ministry of Defense, Werner Karrasch, and two staff members of Office for the Security of the Bundeswehr—Artur Waldmann and Manfred Schmidt-Trenck—on July 27, 1983. Although the

topic of discussion was Waldmann's promotion, the three men addressed rumors about General Kießling's sexual orientation. According to the conversation, "Kießling had been seen holding hands with a Colonel and that the Supreme Commander of NATO General Rogers did not receive [Kießling] because of his homosexual disposition."⁹⁴⁹ Having seemingly a good deal of knowledge about the case, the men also stated that in contrast to this gossip a recent medical examination of Kießling had not produced any proof in this regard.⁹⁵⁰

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the lack of medical "proof" was lacking, the meeting prompted Artur Waldmann to report to his supervisor at the Office for the Security of the Bundeswehr, Colonel Schröder. In consultation with his superior, Waldman requested an investigation, because "homosexuality is as a matter of fact a security risk."⁹⁵¹ According to the safety guidelines of the Ministry of the Interior, security risks were "circumstances that prohibit entrusting a [...] person with security sensitive functions for reasons of national security [...]."⁹⁵² Counted among the long lists of security risks were "grave mental and emotional disorders," "alcoholism and drug addiction," "compulsive gambling" and "abnormal sexual disposition."⁹⁵³ Since the *Bundeswehr* viewed homosexuality as abnormal, it represented a threat that needed to be scrutinized.

⁹⁴⁹ "Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsausschusses," 16.

⁹⁵⁰ Unterlagen der Staatsanwaltschaft Bonn, Bl. 1, Bd. I d.A. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte STA Bonn, Anzeige Kießling.

⁹⁵¹ "Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsausschusses," 17.

⁹⁵² ZDv 2/30 VS-NfD. Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, B II.1., Die Grünen im Bundestag, 2.1.13 Abgeordneter Norbert Mann, Sig. 3252.

⁹⁵³ Ibid.

In August 1983, the West German counterintelligence service called the police headquarters in Cologne to investigate, because Kießling had “two addresses in Cologne during the 1970s” and “was known in Cologne’s homosexual scene.”⁹⁵⁴ Equipped with a picture of Kießling, police officers began their investigations on September 5 and 6. They visited two taverns: *Café Würstchen* and *Tom Tom*. According to the final report of the parliamentary inquiry commission, the barkeeper of *Café Würstchen* indicated that he remembered the man in the picture, “but had not seen him since ten or twelve years.”⁹⁵⁵ Subsequently, the police went to the *Tom Tom* where they spent about 5 to 10 minutes.⁹⁵⁶ Whereas the owner of *Tom Tom* did not recognize Kießling, a bartender maintained that the person in the picture was a frequent visitor who answered to the name of Günter and worked for the *Bundeswehr*.⁹⁵⁷ Within a day, the police officers reported to their superior and to the ASBw.

In the days to come, the initial findings of the police became much more incriminating form. In a first report, the Counter Intelligence Service stated that at *Café Würstchen* Kießling had been “positively identified as ‘Günter from the Bundeswehr’” who had been a “good guest twelve years earlier, but had rarely been visiting in the last years.”⁹⁵⁸ Concerning the second tavern—*Tom Tom*—the report noted that the staff identified Kießling as well: “To this day,

⁹⁵⁴ See Unterlagen der Staatsanwaltschaft, Bl. 2, Hefter ASBw, 9. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte STA Bonn, Anzeige Kießling.

⁹⁵⁵ “Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsausschusses,” 16–20.

⁹⁵⁶ Unterlagen der Staatsanwaltschaft, Bl. 2., Hefter ASBw, 13. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte STA Bonn, Anzeige Kießling.

⁹⁵⁷ “Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsausschusses (12. Ausschuß) als 1. Untersuchungsausschuß nach Artikel 45a Ab. 2 des Grundgesetzes,” 16–20.

⁹⁵⁸ Ibid.

Günter frequents [the *Tom Tom*] monthly and has contact with young hustlers for money.”⁹⁵⁹ In sharp contrast to police findings, these statements portrayed Günter Kießling not only as a regular visitor of gay bars, but also as a person who would pay to have sexual intercourse with young men.

The newly appointed Minister of Defense, Manfred Wörner received this information in September 14, 1983 and immediately summoned a meeting with Kießling. Greatly unsettled by the investigations, Kießling refuted the information and gave the minister his “word of honor” that he was not gay.⁹⁶⁰ Following the discussions and a few days respite, the men decided that Kießling would retire as planned on March 31, 1984. Since Kießling was scheduled for hospitalization, Kießling and Wörner agreed that he would refrain from resuming service until his retirement, citing his health as the reason. In addition, Wörner instructed the head of the *ASBw* to stop all investigations.⁹⁶¹

If Wörner’s decision suggested that the case was closed, this was not the case for two major reasons. First, the West German press began to investigate the issue, because reporters in Brussels were intrigued by the general’s prolonged absences and the scope of his illness.⁹⁶² Second, the tenured State Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, Joachim Hiehle, returned to his post on November 2, 1983 after some medical leave. In contrast to Wörner, Hiehle did not

⁹⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁶¹ Ibid., 20.

⁹⁶² Ibid. 20–21.

approve of the idea to stop the investigation.⁹⁶³ According to Hiehle, the arrangement was not in line with the current security regulations and he immediately warned Wörner that he—as the Minister of Defense—could encounter great problems if this became public.⁹⁶⁴ Consequently, he advised that the responsible staff should conclude the security check as initially planned.

Although Wörner followed Hiehle's advice, the *ASBw* did not continue the investigations. Because of the case's delicate nature, the head of the *ASBw*, Helmut Behrendt, had reservations about the plan to treat Kießling like "any other soldiers."⁹⁶⁵ Consequently, no new investigations were instigated. Instead, Artur Waldmann dictated a final report on December 6, which affirmed that Kießling was "doubtlessly" gay and listed various reasons for why his behavior was unacceptable. According to the final report, the ways in which the general pursued "his abnormal sexual disposition" showed "that he is not qualified to be a superior." Waldmann maintained that "his contacts to the hustler/criminal scene [...] call into question his personal integrity and official reliability and trustworthiness."⁹⁶⁶ In contrast to the initial police report, this final version reinforced the statement that General Kießling frequented the "criminal" gay scene and participated in homosexual prostitution. Moreover, the report addressed the full meaning of homosexuality as a security concern. In light of the increased tensions between NATO and the Soviet Bloc in the early 1980s, the Waldmann argued that "homosexuals are target subjects of enemy intelligence services." Since homosexuality was not only ostracized, but

⁹⁶³ Ibid. 21. See also, Rolf Zundel, "Der unbarmherzige Samariter: Wie ein General zu einer Sache wurde," *DIE ZEIT*, March 23, 1984, 5.

⁹⁶⁴ "Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsausschusses (12. Ausschuß) als 1. Untersuchungsausschuß nach Artikel 45a Ab. 2 des Grundgesetzes," 20–21.

⁹⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid., 22.

also outlawed by the West German military, gay officers and soldiers who kept their sexual desire and practices a secret open to blackmail and other enemy activity. Consequently, gay men who served in the *Bundeswehr* and possessed a high security clearance represented a great national security risk.

Interestingly, however, the report also listed one way in which Kießling's alleged homosexuality could have been tolerated. According to Waldmann, the security concerns could have been deferred if "Dr. K lived in a relationship similar to marriage with another homosexual and this person had no security relevant qualities." Yet since Günter Kießling was "apparently promiscuous and up to now unwilling to provide concrete verifiable information" he represented a security risk.⁹⁶⁷ Waldman's assertion that Kießling would not represent a security threat if he lived in a publicly known, monogamous relationship with another man is important. It shows that in the early 1980s gay men had no chance of making a career in the West German armed forces. After all, military jurisdiction as enforced by the Federal Administrative Court's First Senate stated that gay men were not fit to become military superiors. If Kießling had been gay and lived in a monogamous relationship, he would never have been able to keep his position as a high-ranking general. Counterintelligence officers would not have considered him a security threat, but would most likely have dismissed him as a military superior. Either way, Kießling would have been sent into early retirement.

And that is what happened. Based on Waldmann's final report, State Secretary Hiehle requested another meeting with Manfred Wörner during which he recommended that Kießling be sent into early retirement on December 31, 1983. In addition, he thought it necessary to ensure that the General neither returned to his office in Brussels nor was granted any access to classified

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid. 23.

material.⁹⁶⁸ Convinced by Hiehle, Wörner contacted Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the federal cabinet to inform them of his decision and plans. After Kohl and the federal cabinet sanctioned Wörner's decision, Hiehle handed Kießling—in the absence of Wörner—his discharge papers on December 23, 1984.

Outraged and frustrated by the allegations and the ways the Ministry of Defense handled his case, Günter Kießling filed a motion at the Ministry of Defense to institute disciplinary proceedings against him in order to fully clarify the allegations. This request required the Ministry of Defense—and not the West German Counter Intelligence Service—to investigate whether Kießling had done anything that violated the *Bundeswehr's* disciplinary code. Responsible for this type of issue, the Staff Department P II 5 and Department for Investigation of Special Cases began their investigation immediately on December 23, 1983, by questioning Kießling's staff in Brussels as well as Chief of Staff General Altenburg.⁹⁶⁹ Reporting about their findings on January 14, 1984 the two departments stated that they had found no evidence that proved either Kießling's homosexuality or his "contacts to infamous milieus."⁹⁷⁰

By the time the Staff Department P II 5 and Department for Investigation of Special Cases presented their findings, the affair was already all over the news.⁹⁷¹ Given the abundant press coverage, which alarmed the West German *Bundestag* and caused parliamentarians from all parties to demand "complete clarification," Wörner was in a precarious situation. As a result,

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid. 26.

⁹⁶⁹ Ibid. 30.

⁹⁷⁰ Ibid., 30–31.

⁹⁷¹ Ibid. 14.

he met with Cologne's Criminal Police, who had conducted the initial investigations in Cologne in late 1983. This meeting revealed that the final report that Waldmann had produced on December 6, 1983 was incorrect. Since both the police officers and the findings of the Staff Department P II 5 and Department for Investigation of Special Cases underlined the clear lack of evidence to justify the actions against Kießling, the Minister of Defense found himself in an even more tenuous situation. In order to find the necessary proof, Wörner agreed to a series of interviews with new witnesses. Since the story was all over the news, the investigating criminal police had no trouble finding new witness who were willing to testify that Kießling was a known guest in Cologne's gay scene.⁹⁷²

Hearing in the news about the new suspicious witnesses and the fact that Manfred Wörner was willing to talk to them, Günter Kießling "lost faith" in the Minister of Defense. He was not convinced anymore that Wörner conducted its investigations "objectively," but speculated that the minister only wanted to find some kind of proof to support his false allegations.⁹⁷³ In reaction, Kießling pressed criminal charges on January 16, 1984 against a person unknown for libel and slander. The investigations that followed reemphasized the ways that staff members of the counterintelligence service accepted vague suspicions and reports, turned them into irrevocable proof and advised Kießling's removal from office.

Given the revelations that all the allegations against Kießling were based on rumors, the extensive press coverage, and the proceedings of the parliamentary inquiry committee, Wörner eventually met with Chancellor Helmut Kohl not only to inform him about the developments, but

⁹⁷² Ibid. 31–32.

⁹⁷³ Ibid., 33. See also Unterlagen der Staatsanwaltschaft, Bl. 1, Bd. 1 d.A. Barch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte: STA Bonn, Anzeige Kießling.

also to offer his resignation, which Kohl refused.⁹⁷⁴ In a letter to Kießling, Wörner moreover apologized for his actions and stated that he would ask the Federal President of West Germany to reappoint Kießling. The General accepted Wörner's offer and apology, and the Minister of Defense handed him his reappointment on February 1, 1984. Almost two months later, Kießling retired with all honors as initially planned on March 31, 1984.

Notwithstanding Kießling's reinstatement, the investigating into his private life as well as case of Michael L. show, male homosexuality in the armed forces was an important and controversial topic in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The two cases show that military representatives and government officials working in the Ministry of Defense and in the West German Counterintelligence Service considered gay military superiors as a threat not only to the *Bundeswehr's* functioning, but also to West Germany's national security. Although recruitment regulations in the late 1970s stipulated that gay men could be recruited if they were able to fit into the all-male, homosocial environment of the *Bundeswehr*, this would not hold true for military superiors, especially those with a high security clearance. Gay officers were seen a security risk, because they had to hide their sexuality and could thus become the targets of blackmail and enemy espionage. In the realm of military and national security, heterosexuality represented a fundamental requirement for military superiors.

⁹⁷⁴ "Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Verteidigungsausschusses (12. Ausschuß) als 1. Untersuchungsausschuß nach Artikel 45a Ab. 2 des Grundgesetzes," 34.

2. Party Controversies over Women and Gay Men in the *Bundeswehr*

The ways in which the Ministry of Defense and the *Bundeswehr* addressed the issue of gay generals and officers as well as the proposals to recruit women for military service in order to prevent an anticipated recruitment crisis also caused intense parliamentary debates between the late 1970s and mid-1980s. First, the proposals made by Hans Apel, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan, and the *Kommission für Langzeitplanung der Bundeswehr* stirred disputes among West Germany's primary parties. The reactions were strong, because parliamentarians disagreed greatly, and the friction did not run along party lines. Countering Apel and Berkhan, several politicians of the SPD, CDU, and FDP argued that the recruitment of women would result not only in new forms of discrimination against women, but also in the remilitarization of the entire West German society. In contrast, parliamentarians who supported the idea maintained that female recruitment would foster women's emancipation and avert any structural problems for the *Bundeswehr*.

The question of whether military service represented a possibility for underprivileged groups to achieve emancipation also influenced the discussions of male homosexuality in the armed forces, which gained new political importance in the early 1980s. This was largely due to the electoral campaigns of the FDP in 1980 and *Die Grünen* in 1983. Spurred by the extra-parliamentary gay-rights movement, the two parties campaigned for the complete decriminalization of male homosexuality and thus for the abolition of Paragraph 175 of the West German Criminal Code. Whereas these attempts did not cause any stir, this changed after Manfred Wörner sent Günter Kießling, into early retirement. While this move resulted in intense debates about the working of the West German Counter Intelligence Service, it also caused new negotiations about the discrimination of gay men in the armed forces. Even though the government and the *Bundestag* addressed the two topics separately, the question of whether the

Bundeswehr should recruit women and gay men evolved around similar issues. Both questions caused parliamentarians to reconsider the whether military positions and functions required *Bundeswehr* soldiers and officers to be heterosexual men who possessed specific masculine qualities.

Political Debates about the Recruitment of Women for Military Service

The proposals by Hans Apel, Karl-Wilhelm Berkhan and the Commission for Long-Term planning prompted numerous responses from all primary parties.⁹⁷⁵ In contrast to the Minister of Defense and the Ombudsman, a considerable number of female politicians such as the Vice President of the *Bundestag*, Annemarie Renger, and Herta Däubler-Gmelin, who became the chair of the *Bundestag*'s Judiciary Committee in 1980, vehemently opposed the proposals. The two parliamentarians viewed the recruitment of women into the armed forces as another step towards the "militarization" of the entire society.⁹⁷⁶ Referring to the practices of "the Nazi system and other regimes," Renger maintained that women's exclusion from military service should be "part of our civilization."⁹⁷⁷ The Vice President of the *Bundestag*, born in 1919 and part of an older generation, thus continued a line of argument that had begun to develop after World War II due to West Germany's rearmament. Looking back into Germany's violent past and beyond the Iron Curtain, West German parliamentarians had argued against female soldiers

⁹⁷⁵ Schneider, "Politische und gesellschaftliche Aspekte," 340–391.

⁹⁷⁶ Cited in Kraake, *Frauen*, 118. See also Astrid Albrecht-Heide and Utemaria Bujewski, *Militärdienst für Frauen?* (Frankfurt a.M. and New York: Campus, 1982), 156.

⁹⁷⁷ Annemarie Renger cited in *Frauen und Bundeswehr: Dokumentation des Seminars der Friedrich-`Naumann-Stiftung in der Theodor-Heuss-Akademie 'Frauen und Bundeswehr, eine allgemeine Bürgerpflicht für Männer und Frauen?'* Gumpersbach, 3.-5. Juli 1981, ed. Monika Hildegard Fassbender-Ilge and Monica Wolsky (St. Augustin: Liberal, 1983), 177.

in order to distinguish the Federal Republic from the Nazi regime and from East Germany. For Renger, this principle still held true.

In addition to the fear that West Germany would become a militarized regime, some female SPD-parliamentarians such as the former high school teacher Brigitte Traupe opposed Apel and Berkhan, stating that the ombudsman and the minister only wanted to “fill the gap.”⁹⁷⁸ Arguing that they would only become “makeshifts,” Traupe complained that women in uniform would never enjoy equal rights and duties, because the *Bundeswehr* command would assign women only to “supportive functions.” Although men could fulfill these supportive functions just as well, the SPD-politician maintained, they would cede them to women, because they were unpleasant or boring.⁹⁷⁹ As she countered the argument that women’s recruitment would represent another step towards equality between the sexes, the parliamentarian asserted that military service would only add to the “already existing discrimination of women.”⁹⁸⁰

As these examples indicate, Apel’s and Berkhan’s proposal were refuted by the SPD.⁹⁸¹ Since the Social Democrats were united in this position, the party’s attitude would not change over the course of the early 1980s. For instance, three years after the 1983 elections that put Helmut Kohl’s coalition of CDU/CSU and FPD into office, the SPD reaffirmed this position. During the official 1986 party congress in Nuremburg, the Social Democrats penned an official

⁹⁷⁸ Brigitte Traupe, “Zur Position der SPD,” cited in *Frauen und Bundeswehr: Dokumentation des Seminars der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung in der Theodor-Heuss-Akademie ‘Frauen und Bundeswehr, eine allgemeine Bürgerpflicht für Männer und Frauen?’ Gammersbach, 3.-5. Juli 1981*, ed. Monika Hildegard Fassbender-Ilge and Monica Wolsky (St. Augustin: Liberal, 1983), 95–98.

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁰ Kraake, *Frauen*, 118–121.

⁹⁸¹ Albrecht-Heide and Bujewski, *Militärdienst*, 153–156.

statement. The resolution that would define the party's peace and security politics for years to come stated clearly that the Social Democrats "reject the recruitment of women as soldiers."⁹⁸² By SPD definition, the West German soldier was and remained a man.

Similar to the SPD, the majority of CDU/CSU politicians also repudiated the recruitment of women for military service. For instance, a number of parliamentarians such as the leader of the CDU's Women's Union, Helga Wex, argued that women should be allowed to join the armed forces voluntarily, especially if it would avert the *Bundeswehr's* recruitment crisis.⁹⁸³ Yet, according to her and the majority of her colleagues, compulsory military service was out of the question. Women, Wex argued, already contributed to society by "giving birth and by raising children" and these contributions did not "rank behind the military service of men."⁹⁸⁴ Countering the arguments that women should contribute to society in the same ways as men, Wex's standpoint resembled the party's family and social politics. Emphasizing the "soft power" of family and motherhood, CDU/CSU continuously stressed women's role in the family and as mothers.⁹⁸⁵ In this context, Wex and Heiner Geißler, who became the Minister for Youth, Family and Health in 1983, also disapproved of women's weapon training. After all, women as armed combatants contradicted their vision of women as caretaking child-bearers.⁹⁸⁶

⁹⁸² Ibid., 11.

⁹⁸³ Kraake, *Frauen*, 110–111; Lippert and Rössler, "Weibliche Soldaten."

⁹⁸⁴ Helga Wex in *Anhaltspunkte 3* (1983), printed in *Frauen und Bundeswehr: Dokumentation des Seminars der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung in der Theodor-Heuss-Akademie 'Frauen und Bundeswehr, eine allgemeine Bürgerpflicht für Männer und Frauen?' Gammersbach, 3.-5. Juli 1981*, ed. Monika Hildegard Fassbender-Ilge and Monica Wolsky (St. Augustin: Liberal, 1983), 195.

⁹⁸⁵ See for example, Wiebke Kolbe, *Elternschaft im Wohlfahrtsstaat: Schweden und die Bundesrepublik im Vergleich 1945–2000* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus 2000), 292.

⁹⁸⁶ Kraake, *Frauen*, 110–111.

A small faction of CDU/CSU politicians argued, however, for women's usage of weapons. Although the CSU-politician and member of the *Bundestag*'s Committee for Defense, Ursula Krone-Appuhn, did not want to draft women into the armed forces either, she nevertheless maintained that if women joined the military voluntarily, they should learn how to use weapons.⁹⁸⁷ For Krone-Appuhn, who trained at the military base in Munsterlager for a week in order to experience military service firsthand,⁹⁸⁸ history—and especially World War II—provided ample evidence that women were able to operate heavy weaponry.⁹⁸⁹ Whereas the Third Reich functioned as an argument for SPD politicians to oppose women's recruitment, she cited World War II as an argument in favor of female soldiers.

In contrast to Krone-Appuhn, the negative attitude that CDU/CSU politicians expressed became and remained the parties' main line of argument for years to come. After the 1983 elections, for instance, Chancellor Helmut Kohl criticized the agitation over the *Pillenknick* and the predicted recruitment crisis. Brushing aside the politics of his Social Democratic predecessors, he deemed it unnecessary to consider female soldiers. Although the new chancellor and his staff in the Ministry of Defense were certainly concerned about the future of the West German armed forces, recruiting women as soldiers did not represent the right answer.⁹⁹⁰

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid., 112. Ursula Krone-Appuhn and Peter-Kurt Würzbach, "Frauen in die Bundeswehr?," printed in *Frauen und Bundeswehr: Dokumentation des Seminars der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung in der Theodor-Heuss-Akademie 'Frauen und Bundeswehr, eine allgemeine Bürgerpflicht für Männer und Frauen?'* Gummersbach, 3.-5. Juli 1981, ed. Monika Hildegard Fassbender-Ilge and Monica Wolsky (St. Augustin: Liberal, 1983), 190–192.

⁹⁸⁸ "Personalien: Ursula Krone-Appuhn," *Der Spiegel* 18, May 3, 1982, 250.

⁹⁸⁹ Kraake, *Frauen*, 112.

⁹⁹⁰ "Bundeswehr: Schöne Pläne," *Der Spiegel*, September 15, 1986, 36–40, Margrit Gerste, Karin Hempel-Soos and Viola Roggenkamp, "Ende der Schonzeit," *DIE ZEIT*, June 3, 1983, 11. See further, Schneider, "Politische und gesellschaftliche Aspekte."

In contrast to the SPD and the CDU/CSU, the FDP was more open to the idea of recruiting women for military service. Already in 1980, the party published a Position Paper about Foreign and Security Politics (*Grundsatzpapier zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*), which stated that women should be granted greater access to the armed forces.⁹⁹¹ Although the FDP did not call for female draftees, the document argued that opening the gates for women who wanted to serve voluntarily in the *Bundeswehr* was “equality’s demand.”⁹⁹² According to Ursula Seiler-Albring, who entered the *Bundestag* in 1983, women should have the right to pursue the same “career models as men” and consequently be allowed to serve in the military.⁹⁹³ Focusing on the West German labor market and economic situation, many of the Free Democrats like Seiler-Albring approached the issue of female soldiers in terms of employment policies and opportunities.

For the majority of the FDP, however, having the same career options did not mean fulfilling the same duties. For Free Democrats like the former Vice President of the *Bundestag* (1969-1972), Liselotte Funcke, drafting women into the *Bundeswehr* was unthinkable, because military service involved the act of killing. Seizing the slogan “equal, but not the same,” Funcke stated that “women are destined to give life” and thus could not be compelled to serve and possibly kill. Maintaining that only men could be required to serve and kill, Funcke too employed arguments that had defined the parliamentary debates of the early 1950s. During the negotiations of West Germany’s rearmament, the leading FDP politician Marie-Elisabeth Lüders

⁹⁹¹ Kraake, *Frauen*, 124. See further, Andreas Kramer, *Die FDP und die äußere Sicherheit: Zum Wandel der sicherheitspolitischen Konzeption der Partei von 1966 bis 1982* (Bonn: Holos Verlag, 1995).

⁹⁹² Kraake, *Frauen*, 125.

⁹⁹³ Ibid.

argued vehemently that only men, not women could be compelled to serve and handle weapons.

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In the early 1980s, a few FDP politicians embraced women's armed military service more eagerly. In 1980, Gisela Nischelsky, a younger party delegate from Bremen, stated in *Neue Bonner Depesche* that women's exclusion was based on outdated gender norms.⁹⁹⁵ To be sure, Nischelsky, who became the head of Bremen's branch of the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (*Technisches Hilfswerk*, or THW) in 1982, rejected compulsory service for women too. Yet she criticized her contemporaries who argued entirely against women's military service because they "feared for the glory of manliness and heroism."⁹⁹⁶ Terms such as "bravery, courage, endurance, intelligence, [...] and strength," she maintained, "cannot be classified as gender specific." Criticizing traditional notions of masculinity and femininity, the FDP delegate concluded that there was no reason to exclude women from the *Bundeswehr*.⁹⁹⁷ Moreover, she asserted that in case of an attack were forced to "defend life and limb" just like men.⁹⁹⁸ Thus, for Nischelsky serving in the armed forces represented an opportunity for women to defend themselves.

⁹⁹⁴ See Part II of this dissertation.

⁹⁹⁵ Gisela Nischelsky, "Für den Freiwilligen Dienst der Frauen," *Neue Bonner Depesche* 2/80, printed in *Frauen und Bundeswehr: Dokumentation des Seminars der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung in der Theodor-Heuss-Akademie 'Frauen und Bundeswehr, eine allgemeine Bürgerpflicht für Männer und Frauen?'* Gummersbach, 3.-5. Juli 1981, ed. Monika Hildegard Fassbender-Ilge and Monica Wolsky (St. Augustin: Liberal, 1983), 169. See also Albrecht-Heide and Bujewski, *Militärdienst*, 158–159.

⁹⁹⁶ Nischelsky, "Für den Freiwilligen Dienst der Frauen."

⁹⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁸ Ibid.

Eventually, the Free Democratic Party adopted Nischelsky's line of argument.⁹⁹⁹ By 1984, leading FDP politicians even argued that if women joined the armed forces they should be granted the status of combatants and be trained in how to use weapons. Although he still opposed women's military armed service, Jürgen Möllemann, who became the FDP's chairman in 1984,¹⁰⁰⁰ came to embrace the idea. The nature of modern warfare, the politician stated, rendered any arguments against women's armed services unrealistic.¹⁰⁰¹ It was this understanding that the Free Democrats would eventually adopt during their federal party convention in September 1987. The final resolution emphasized that women should be able to join the *Bundeswehr* "voluntarily and on equal terms, in other words with weapons."¹⁰⁰²

As they argued for women's armed military service, the FDP stood in clear opposition to *Die Grünen* who entered the *Bundestag* following the elections in 1983. Emerging from West Germany's extra-parliamentary and peace activism, a major component of the party's platform was the complete mental and physical demilitarization of West German society, the circumvention of future wars, and the establishment of world peace. In this context, *Die Grünen* considered the recruitment of female soldiers not as a steppingstone for women, but as another

⁹⁹⁹ "Im Manne sträubt sich alles: Die FDP brachte das Thema wieder auf den Tisch: Frauen in die Bundeswehr," *DIE ZEIT*, February 26, 1986, 71.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Jürgen Möllemann, "Frauen sollen keinen Waffendienst leisten," *Neue Bonner Depesche* 2/80, printed in *Frauen und Bundeswehr: Dokumentation des Seminars der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung in der Theodor-Heuss-Akademie 'Frauen und Bundeswehr, eine allgemeine Bürgerpflicht für Männer und Frauen?'* Gummersbach, 3.-5. Juli 1981, ed. Monika Hildegard Fassbender-Ilge and Monica Wolsky (St. Augustin: Liberal, 1983), 169.

¹⁰⁰¹ Kraake, *Frauen*, 126.

¹⁰⁰² *Ibid.*, 127.

step toward the complete militarization of society.¹⁰⁰³ The party's chairwoman and co-founder Petra Kelley argued, for instance, that West German women already "suffered" from a number of duties: "We give birth to and raise children, we produce cannon fodder, we preserve the family [...] and we carry the threefold, oftentimes fourfold burden of household, partnership, family and work."¹⁰⁰⁴ In contrast to women's duties as mothers, wives, and homemakers, Kelly stated, men did not have to carry so many burdens. Consequently, the politician asked her audiences if the government had made any plans that would compel men "to raise their children" and take on "household chores."¹⁰⁰⁵ While focusing on the women's military service, the figurehead of *Die Grünen* questioned traditional gender relations and the gender division of labor that still defined the Federal Republic.

Given this agenda, the party had every reason to portray the *Bundeswehr* as a place for women's "pseudo-emancipation" and female military service as a "continuing militarization of society."¹⁰⁰⁶ In order to fight this battle *Die Grünen* eventually published an argumentation aid in 1988. The document entitled *Neither Uniform Jacket nor Nurse's Dress: Against further Militarization of Women and Compulsory Service* included Kelly's arguments and moved well

¹⁰⁰³ Die Grünen, *Das Bundesprogramm*, 1980, http://www.boell.de/downloads/publikationen/1980_001_Grundsatzprogramm_Die_Gruenen.pdf (Last accessed: 1 February 2013).

¹⁰⁰⁴ Petra Kelly quoted in *Frauen und Bundeswehr: Dokumentation des Seminars der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung in der Theodor-Heuss-Akademie 'Frauen und Bundeswehr, eine allgemeine Bürgerpflicht für Männer und Frauen?'* Gummersbach, 3.-5. Juli 1981, ed. Monika Hildegard Fassbender-Ilge and Monica Wolsky (St. Augustin: Liberal, 1983), 197

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Kraake, *Frauen*, 129.

beyond the party's 1980 platform.¹⁰⁰⁷ The 1988 argumentation aid would represent the party's position well into the 1990s.

In arguing against the recruitment of women for armed military service, *Die Grünen* like the majority of West German parliamentarians reaffirmed the notion that only men could be compelled to render military service. Although most parties did not object to women who wanted to serve voluntarily and without weapons, the SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, and above all *Die Grünen* still maintained that combat and the act of killing was only suitable for men. As such, the notion that the West German soldier was by and large a man was confirmed, even though the contours of this definition were not as clear as they had been in previous decades.

Parliamentary Discussions about the Treatment of Gay Soldiers and Officers

At the same time, that West German politician were reaffirming the *Bundeswehr* was by and large a "men's society," the sexual orientation of the West German soldier became the object of yet another debate. During the electoral campaigns of 1980 and 1983, the FDP and *Die Grünen* addressed Paragraph 175 of the West German Criminal Code and the continuing criminalization of male homosexuality.¹⁰⁰⁸ In doing so they responded to the demands of the gay rights movement, which had greatly expanded its activism after the reform of the Criminal Code in 1973. In addition to a growing number of publications that documented the lives of gay men and

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ruth Kühn and Mechthild Jansen, *Weder Waffenrock noch Schwesternkleid: Gegen weitere Militarisierung von Frauen und allgemeine Dienstpflicht*, ed. Die Grünen im Bundestag und Die Grünen, Bundesgeschäftsstelle, AK Frauenpolitik, AG Frieden, Abrüstung, Internationales (Bonn: Die Grünen Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 1988).

¹⁰⁰⁸ Schäfer, 'Widernatürliche Unzucht,' 242. Ralf Dose, "Der § 175 in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949 bis heute), in *Die Geschichte des § 175: Strafrecht gegen Homosexuelle; Katalog zur Ausstellung in Berlin und in Frankfurt am Main 1990*, ed. Freunde eines Schwulen Museums in Berlin e.V. (Berlin: Rosa Winkel, 1990), 122–143.

women in West Germany and other parts of the world, the reforms also prompted new and stronger activism for the complete abolishment of Paragraph 175.¹⁰⁰⁹

Responding to these cultural changes and the new activism, a number of FDP parliamentarians and party delegates demanded the complete repeal of Paragraph 175 and the emancipation of gay men. For the FDP's chairman, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who served as the Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1974 and 1982, abolishing Paragraph 175 was a vital step towards the "legal and social equality of homosexuals."¹⁰¹⁰ Moreover, the FDP's 1980 party platform stated that "same-sex partners have the right to live together without discrimination." In order to achieve this goal, the party program stated that Paragraph 175 of the West German Criminal Code had to be eliminated.¹⁰¹¹ In order pursue this agenda, FDP members organized several conferences and workshops that addressed male homosexuality. In addition to forming a "Working Group on Homosexuality," the FDP's parliamentary group organized a hearing in 1981 that reemphasized the need for revising the Criminal Code.¹⁰¹²

It was in this context that the Free Democrats tackled the issue of gay soldiers. On June 13 and 14, 1981, the Hamburg regional office of the *Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung*—the party's

¹⁰⁰⁹ See for example, Kramp and Sölle, "§175"; Hans Georg Stümke and Rudi Finkler, *Rosa Winkel, rosa Listen: Homosexuelle und 'Gesundes Volksempfinden' von Auschwitz bis heute* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1981); Elmar Kaushaar, *Hundert Jahre Schwul: Eine Revue* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1997); Erik N. Jensen, "The Pink Triangle and Political Consciousness: Gay, Lesbians and the Memory of Nazi Persecution," in *Sexuality and German Fascism*, ed. Dagmar Herzog (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 319–349.

¹⁰¹⁰ Quoted in Stümke and Finkler, *Rosa Winkel*, 405.

¹⁰¹¹ "Wahlprogramm der Freien Demokratischen Partei für die Bundestagswahlen am 5. Oktober 1980. Beschlossen vom a.o. Parteitag in Freiburg, am 7. Juni 1980, printed in § 175, ed. Renate Augstein and Hans-Jürgen Beerfeltz (Bonn: Liberal, 1981), 63.

¹⁰¹² "Homosexuelle: Schwul mit Zwölf," *Der Spiegel*, June 15, 1981, 52–53. The text of the hearing is printed § 175, ed. Renate Augstein and Hans-Jürgen Beerfeltz (Bonn: Liberal, 1981), 175–184.

foundation—held a seminar addressing “Homosexuals at the Workplace” (*Homosexuelle am Arbeitsplatz*). During the seminar, participants analyzed the situation of gay men and women in the media, military, schools, churches, and unions. The participants also discussed “Homosexuals in the Bundeswehr” and developed a 12-point catalogue of demands that focused on delineation of clear regulations and the education of military psychiatrists and medics, military ministers as well as the different ranks of commanding officers.¹⁰¹³ In addition to calling for the “integration,” equal treatment, and protection of gay soldiers against harassment, the catalogue demanded that gay officers should have the same career options as their heterosexual comrades and should be considered equally for promotion. After all, the catalogue stipulated that there were “no known surveys about if and how the service performance of homosexuals differs from those of heterosexuals.”¹⁰¹⁴

However, not all FDP-parliamentarians supported the party’s official stance on gay rights. For instance, Hans Arnold Engelhard, who would become Minister of Justice in 1982, and Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, who served as a Minister of State in the German Foreign Office from 1977 to 1982, opposed the complete abolition of Paragraph 175. Stating in 1980 that “I would like to save the young men from the old men,” Hamm-Brücher like many of her contemporaries associated homosexuality with pederasty, and thought it necessary to prosecute men who were older than 18 years and who engaged in sexual acts with men who were younger than 18.¹⁰¹⁵ For

¹⁰¹³ Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Landesbüro Hamburg, “Presseerklärung: Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung gegen Diskriminierung von Homosexuellen,” from June 15, 1982, printed in § 175, ed. Renate Augstein and Hans-Jürgen Beerfeltz (Bonn: Liberal, 1981), 68–69.

¹⁰¹⁴ Ibid., 69. See also, VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, Fragestunde, June 24, 1981; VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, Fragestunde, 24 June 1981; and VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, Drucksache 8/3235, October 4, 1979.

¹⁰¹⁵ Kaushaar, *Hundert Jahre*, 180.

the politician, keeping Paragraph 175 on the books was a question of child protection. Arguing that boys should have the right to develop their heterosexual orientation without any disruption, Hamm-Bücher and others maintained that underage men needed to be shielded from homosexual men until they had sexually matured.

Given her opinion, Hildegard Hamm-Brücher must have been satisfied when the FDP increasingly abandoned its vehement argument for the emancipation of gay men in the early 1980s. This change was mainly due to the party's role as a coalition partner. Even though leading SPD-politicians such as Gustav Heinemann had pushed for the decriminalization of sexual acts between consenting adult men in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the party was unwilling to move beyond the 1973 reforms of the Criminal Code. To be sure, SPD-politicians like the former chancellor Willy Brandt continued to advocate for the complete decriminalization of male homosexuality.¹⁰¹⁶ In addition, members of the SPD's youth organization, the Young Socialists in the SPD (*Jungsozialisten in der SPD*) founded the Working Group of Gay Social Democrats (*Arbeitskreis schwuler Sozialdemokraten*), which continued to fight against the discrimination of gay men.¹⁰¹⁷ Yet, a considerable number of party leaders were less inclined to support gay-rights. One of them was Helmut Schmidt, who had succeeded Brandt as chancellor in 1974. While negotiating a possible coalition with the FDP after the federal elections in 1980, Helmut Schmidt rebuked some of Genscher's claims. During the negotiations, the FDP-politician promoted the abolition of Paragraph 175, reminding Schmidt of the persecution of gay men

¹⁰¹⁶ Dose, "Der § 175," 136–140.

¹⁰¹⁷ See the lengthy report in *Gay Journal*, December 1980, 4–6, printed in § 175, ed. Renate Augstein and Hans-Jürgen Beerfeltz (Bonn: Liberal, 1981), 195–196.

during the National Socialists regime. Schmidt refused, however, stating that he was not the “chancellor of the homosexuals.”¹⁰¹⁸

One reason that Schmidt was against the complete decriminalization of homosexuality was his understanding of child protection. Like many others, he argued that if Paragraph 175 was completely abolished, “homosexuality between adults and teenagers” would be exempt from punishment.¹⁰¹⁹ For Schmidt, this was not acceptable. In addition to his argument about child protection, we can also speculate that the chancellor’s position was informed by the situation of the *Bundeswehr*. After all, during his time as Minister of Defense, Schmidt had opposed the decriminalization of male homosexuality maintaining that it would endanger the combat readiness of the *Bundeswehr*. As a result of these convictions, Schmidt informed Genscher that the FDP would have to look for another coalition partner if they wanted to pursue their agenda to decriminalize male homosexuality completely. Eager to continue the coalition, the FDP stopped arguing for the abolition of Paragraph 175.¹⁰²⁰

The collapse of Helmut Schmidt’s chancellorship in the fall of 1982 and the establishment of Helmut Kohl’s conservative coalition in 1983 did not change this situation, because the majority of CDU and CSU politicians did not want to decriminalize male homosexuality either. To be sure, members of the *Junge Union*—the political youth organization

¹⁰¹⁸ “Homosexuelle: Schwul mit Zwölf,” *Der Spiegel*, June 15, 1981, 52–53. See also, *Andreas Heilmann, Normalität auf Bewährung: Outings in der Politik und die Konstruktion homosexueller Männlichkeit* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2011), 175; Franz X. Eder, *Kultur der Begierde: Eine Geschichte der Sexualität* (Munich: Beck, 2009), 230.

¹⁰¹⁹ Stümke and Finkler, *Rosa Winkel*, 400.

¹⁰²⁰ “Homosexuelle: Schwul mit Zwölf.” See also, “Aus warmer Hand,” *Der Spiegel*, April 26, 1993, 71–73.

of CDU/CSU—supported the abolition of Paragraph 175.¹⁰²¹ In contrast to this younger cohort of politicians, the majority of older party members rejected the idea. For instance, leading representatives of the CSU such as 68-years old Franz Joseph Strauß, who had ran for the chancellorship against Helmut Schmidt in 1980, were in favor of the existing Paragraph 175. Associating “homosexual relations” with “evil” (*das Böse*),¹⁰²² Strauß stated that Paragraph 175 needed to remain on the books, for it would guarantee the “undisturbed sexual development” of minors.¹⁰²³ Like Helmut Schmidt and the FDP-politician Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, the CSU-politician implied that the heterosexual development of young men under the age of 18 should not “disturbed” by any homosexual influences. As a result of these rebukes, the FDP did not resume its advocacy for the complete decriminalization of male homosexuality.

The only party that vehemently argued for the repeal of Paragraph 175 was *Die Grünen*. Before gaining enough votes to enter the *Bundestag* in 1983, the Greens addressed the issue in their first party platform in 1980. The party program asserted that the “findings of modern sexual science” showed that “homosexuality and heterosexuality are equal expressions of human sexuality.”¹⁰²⁴ Therefore, the unequal treatment of homosexual and heterosexual relationships had to stop. As a result, *Die Grünen* recommended the abolition of Paragraph 175 of the Criminal Code and also argued for an amendment of Article 3, Sub-Section 3 of the Basic Law. This section of the Basic Law stated that “Nobody shall be favored or discriminated against

¹⁰²¹ Stümke and Finkler, *Rosa Winkel*, 402.

¹⁰²² Ibid. See also Schäfer, “Widernatürliche Unzucht,” 242.

¹⁰²³ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁴ Die Grünen, *Das Bundesprogramm*, n.d. 1980, https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/assets/boell.de/images/download_de/publikationen/1980_001_Grundsatzprogramm_Die_Gruenen.pdf

because of his sex, his descent, his race, his language, his home [*Heimat*] and origin, his beliefs, his religious or political views.”¹⁰²⁵ Given their political agenda, *Die Grünen* wished to alter the section in a way that it would read, “nobody shall be favored or discriminated against because of his sex, his sexual orientation [...]”¹⁰²⁶

Although *Die Grünen* thus argued vehemently for the equal treatment of gay men, their arguments had little impact. In addition to joining the *Bundestag* only in 1983, their agenda had few supporters outside of the party. Even though the FDP addressed the issue of gay men in the *Bundeswehr* and society, the SPD as well as the CDU/CSU showed little to no interest in negotiating the issue and moving beyond the 1973 reform of Paragraph 175. Their ambivalent position became evident in the parliamentary debate of the Wörner-Kießling-Affair.

Conflicts over the Wörner-Kießling-Affair in the Bundestag

The ways in which West German parties addressed the issue of gay men in the late 1970s and early 1980s greatly influenced the ways they reacted to the Wörner-Kießling-Affair. The scandal became the topic of several *Bundestag* sessions and the Committee for Defense of the West German *Bundestag* was constituted as an inquiry committee in late January 1984 to investigate the matter. During the subsequent debates, *Die Grünen* addressed the issue of homosexuality in the armed forces above all others.¹⁰²⁷ The party’s Parliamentary Secretary and former APO-activist, Joschka Fischer tackled the situation of gay men in both society and the military. In a widely publicized speech on February 8, 1984, Fischer suggested that Wörner and his staff

¹⁰²⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁷ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 47. Sitzung, Fragestunde, 19 January, 1984, 3372–3380.

believed that the *Bundeswehr*'s role as a "deterrent," depended on the manliness of the West German soldier.¹⁰²⁸ A gay general such as Kießling did not fit Wörner's image of "hardened, virile masculinity." Luckily for the *Bundeswehr*, Fischer contended, Manfred Wörner, was a manly man who delighted in the *Bundeswehr* as a "men's society."¹⁰²⁹ As he thus used rhetoric that was common among APO and peace activists who protested against the *Bundeswehr* in the 1970s and 1980s, Fischer concluded that Wörner's actions were not only motivated by his affinity for the, but also by a particular ideal of masculinity.¹⁰³⁰

While Fischer thus ridiculed Wörner, the party also condemned the minister's actions because they had harmed not only Günter Kießling, but also "all [...] same-sex lovers" (*gleichgeschlechtlich Liebende*) in West Germany. Based on the party's platform, Fischer and his colleague, the retired Major General Gert Bastian, criticized the ministry for wrongly associating homosexuality with "criminal" activities. This connection, Bastian stated in June 1984, caused a "moral devastation [...] for all homosexuals"¹⁰³¹ and increased prejudices against "a minority in need of protection."¹⁰³² As *Die Grünen* hence second the claims of gay-rights activists, Joschka Fischer reminded his fellow parliamentarians of the "tens of thousands of homosexuals who were murdered, [...] tortured and imprisoned" in Nazi concentration camps. Faulting the Helmut

¹⁰²⁸ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 52. Sitzung, 8 February 1984, 3695.

¹⁰²⁹ Ibid, 3696.

¹⁰³⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰³¹ Ibid.

¹⁰³² VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 77. Sitzung, 28 June 1984, 5877.

Kohl's coalition for not changing its politics towards gay men,¹⁰³³ the *Die Grünen* maintained that the politics of the current government presented a continuation of Nazi policies.

In contrast to *Die Grünen*, the SPD, FDP, and the CDU/CSU were less eager to address the role male homosexuality had played in Wörner's decision to send Kießling into early retirement. Instead, the other parties focused almost exclusively on the workings and wrongdoings of the West German Counterintelligence Service. Deeming the overhaul of the *Amt für Sicherheit der Bundeswehr* more important, the SPD rarely addressed the issue during the *Bundestag* sessions. To be sure, politicians such as Willy Brandt, who had a long standing record of supporting gay rights, complained that the affair had led to a skewed image of gay men. Contemporaries who did not consider homosexuality a crime, the former chancellor stated, were depicted as if they embraced the "criminal milieu of young hustlers."¹⁰³⁴ In doing so, Brandt reacted to the widespread belief that Kießling was not only gay, but that he had also engaged in same-sex prostitution with underage men. Although he agreed that same-sex prostitution, which involved young men, was unacceptable, Brandt drew a clear line between these activities and male homosexuality in general.

Whereas Brandt continued to argue for the integration of gay men into society, his colleague Horst Jungmann, who had previously worked as Inspector for the Armed Forces Administration Department (*Regierungsinspektor der Bundeswehrverwaltung*), described male homosexuality as "an abnormal sexual disposition."¹⁰³⁵ Although he stated that homosexuality should not be viewed as a security threat, he furthermore faulted *Die Grünen* for focusing too

¹⁰³³ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 52. Sitzung, 8 February 1984, 3696.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid., 3688.

¹⁰³⁵ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 77. Sitzung, 28 June 28, 1984, 5674.

much on homosexuality. According to him, the commission that investigated the scandal should scrutinize the workings the Counterintelligence Service, because it clearly violated the fundamental rights and freedom of every West German soldiers.¹⁰³⁶ For Jungmann, the problem was not limited to the stigmatization of gay men in the armed forces, but included the ways in which Kießling's private life had been investigated.

Similar to the SPD, the issue of homosexuality and the role it played in Manfred Wörner's decision to remove Kießling was generally absent from statements made by representatives of Helmut Kohl's government. Given that Manfred Wörner and Helmut Kohl were at the center of the scandal, it does not come as a surprise that the CDU/CSU did not tackle issue of homosexuality. After all, government officials were not very eager to address any aspect of the Wörner-Kießling-Affair. For instance, on February 10, 1984, a parliamentarian of *Die Grünen*, Antje Vollmer, asked during a session of the *Bundestag* what Helmut Kohl's government intended to do in order to "recoup [...] the damage done to the honor and reputation of the homosexual citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany."¹⁰³⁷ Responding to the inquiry, the CDU politician and Parliamentary State Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, Peter Kurt Würzbach regretted the ways in which the scandal had progressed. Without giving any further explanation, he stated that "for those citizens it would be probably best if the topic would not been discussed in such a matter any longer."¹⁰³⁸ Although he thus admitted that the Wörner-Kießling-Affair damaged the reputation of gay men, his short answer can also be read as an

¹⁰³⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁷ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, Anlagen zum Stenographischen Bericht, 54. Sitzung, 10 February 1984, Anlage 3, 3897.

¹⁰³⁸ Ibid.

indicator that the Ministry of Defense and Helmut Kohl's government did not want to continue any discussions in this regard.

The ways in which the affair unfolded and the fact that homosexuality was at the center of it, also put the FDP in a difficult position. As discussed above, until 1982 leading representatives of the Free Democratic Party had pressed for the abolition of Paragraph 175. In the wake of forming a coalition with the CDU/CSU, however, the issue was soon swept under the rug. Thus, instead of criticizing the government and especially the Ministry of Defense for the ways in which it dealt with gay men in the *Bundeswehr*, the Free Democrats likewise focused instead on the general workings of the Office for the Security of the *Bundeswehr*. Yet, shortly after the inquiry commission published its proceedings in June 1984, the FDP-parliamentarian Uwe Ronneburger stated that the Free Democrats demanded new laws that would clearly regulate the workings of the West German Counterintelligence Service in order to insure the "protection of personal privacy." In addition, the Free Democrats demanded a revision of the security guidelines so that they would neither "discriminate against minorities" nor create potential reasons for "blackmail."¹⁰³⁹ Thus, without naming it explicitly, the FDP wanted to ensure that male homosexuality was erased from the list of security threats.

Notwithstanding this claim, West German politicians addressed the issue of male homosexuality in the society and *Bundeswehr* only implicitly. Although parliamentarians such as Willy Brandt, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and *Die Grünen* called for the abolition of Paragraph 175, their demands found little acceptance. Since the majority of SPD, FDP, and CDU/CSU wanted to keep Paragraph 175 on the books in order to ensure young men's heterosexual development, little efforts were made to publicly and explicitly address the situation of male

¹⁰³⁹ VDB, Der Deutsche Bundestag, 77. Sitzung, 28 June 28, 1984, 5665.

homosexuality in the armed forces. This also did not change much during the scandal. Except for the vehemence of *Die Grünen*, the other primary party showed little interest in addressing the situation of gay men in society and the in the armed forces.

3. The Debate about the Military Service of Gay Men and Women in West German Society

In addition to triggering new parliamentary debates, the question of whether gay men and women should be recruited for military service attracted a great deal of attention in civil society. First, the different arguments for the recruitment into all areas of the *Bundeswehr* upset large numbers of peace activists, leftist intellectuals, and members of the autonomous wing of the women's movement. Voicing strong opposition, they argued that the recruitment of women would not lead to female emancipation, but to more violence against women. Agitated by NATO's double track, which stipulated the stationing of nuclear weapons on European soil, activists moreover reemphasized the standpoint that the recruitment of women would lead not only violence against women, but also to the militarization of the Federal Republic.¹⁰⁴⁰

Simultaneously, but initially more quietly, the situation of gay men who served in the *Bundeswehr* as officers or soldiers became an object of contestation as well. Paying close attention to cases such as the one of Captain Michael L., leftist intellectuals, gay rights activists, and peace activists criticized military legislation as an aggravation of discriminatory practices. This initial interest skyrocketed over the course of the Wörner-Kießling-Affair in 1984. Given the weight and meaning of the affair, male homosexuality in the armed forces was now discussed by a broader public. In addition to mainstream newspapers such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*

¹⁰⁴⁰ Davis, "The Gender of War and Peace." See also, Susanne Schregel, *Der Atomkrieg vor der Wohnungstür: Eine Politikgeschichte der neuen Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik 1970-1985* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2011).

Zeitung, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Der Spiegel* or *Die ZEIT*, concerned citizens send letters to editors, their political representatives, and to Günter Kießling and Manfred Wörner. In light of the liberalization of Paragraph 175, commentators overwhelmingly discussed the treatment of General Kießling as another sign that the *Bundeswehr* clung to outdated notion of aggressive heteronormativity. Arguing that male homosexuality was not “faulty,” contemporaries also raised the question of whether the emancipation and civic rights of gay citizens could be sacrificed for West Germany’s national security.

Female and Male Soldiers and the Gendered Nature of Military Service in Feminist and Pacifist Debates

“Now, if I were a man, I would be a conscientious objector too,” wrote Alice Schwarzer in *Emma* in June 1978.¹⁰⁴¹ Military customs and practices had shocked her when she was still a little girl. Yet, she had learned over the years that weapons and power were closely related. Instead of allowing women to serve in the *Bundeswehr*, she maintained, society and government sent women home to the kitchen propagating the idea that a country’s “defense and fighting” were naturally a man’s domain.¹⁰⁴² Even though history revealed that women could be “just as militant as men,” women were excluded from an important center of power. The result of this exclusion, Schwarzer summarized, was, on the one hand, “the solidification of the male craze” (*Männlichkeitswahn*) through military service and, on the other, the consolidation of women’s

¹⁰⁴¹ Schwarzer, “Frauen ins Militär?” See also, Lentz, *Die Neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland*, 817–823.

¹⁰⁴² Schwarzer, “Frauen ins Militär?”

helplessness and dependency.¹⁰⁴³ Consequently, she demanded that women be granted access to all centers of powers, including the military.

In conjunction with the deliberations of Hans Apel and Karl Wilhelm Berkhan, Schwarzer's article came as a bombshell. Responses were—to use the words of historian Belinda Davis—"immediate and extended, intense and conflicted."¹⁰⁴⁴ Members of the New Women's Movement who did not share Schwarzer's idea of complete and utter equality voiced the harshest and most comprehensive criticism. Contrary to contemporary perceptions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the New Women's Movement that had emerged in the late-1960s was far from crumbling. Over course of the 1970s, diverse blocks and groups formed within the New Women's Movement that expressed different, but related opinions about the meaning of emancipation and feminism as well as the goals and strategies of the Women's Movement.¹⁰⁴⁵ During this time, the New Women's Movement increased its literary output and their number of campaigns. As a result, the movement's impact spiked in the late 1970s and early 1980s.¹⁰⁴⁶

The extensive scope of feminist activism was closely related to the burgeoning peace movement, even though from the start this relationship was not an easy one.¹⁰⁴⁷ The peace

¹⁰⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Davis, "The Gender of War and Peace," 105. See also a revised version of this article: Belinda Davis, "'Women's Strength Against Their Crazy Male Power': Gendered Language in the West German Peace Movement of the 1980s," in *Frieden - Gewalt - Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung*, ed. Jennifer. A. Davy, Karen Hagemann, and Ute Kätzel (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 244–265. See further Richard L. Johnson, "The New West German Peace Movement: Male Dominance or Feminist Nonviolence," *Women in German Yearbook: Feminist Studies in German Literature & Culture* 1 (1985): 135–162.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Gerhard, "Frauenbewegung"; Lenz, *Die Neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland*, 28–32 and 499–501.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Ibid, 31.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Davis, "The Gender of War and Peace," 99; Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 151–210.

movement of the early 1980s was impressive not only because its size, but also because it drew in and built upon multiple strata of society. The decision to station medium-range missiles on West German soil brought together groups as diverse as the ecological and anti-nuclear movement, nuclear scientists, the Protestant Church, the German Communist Party, and members of the New Women's Movement.¹⁰⁴⁸ In the context of these protests, the *Bundeswehr* and the proposal to grant women greater access to the military remained a prime object of resistance.

One group that contradicted Schwarzer, Apel, and Berkhan were the authors of *Emma's* feminist 'rival', the magazine *Courage*. Founded in 1976, *Courage* functioned as the mouthpiece of the autonomous, leftist, and mainly academic wing of the New Women's Movement. In 1980, one of the cofounders of *Courage*, Sibylle Plogstedt, responded to Schwarzer by arguing that military service would not help women to become more emancipated, independent and less subjected to male violence. Analyzing the situation of female soldiers in the United States, Plogstedt maintained that women's recruitment would lead to a continuation of physical violence against women. After all, she stated, "physical assaults" and "harassment" were common practice in military barracks.¹⁰⁴⁹ Portraying the military as a place where women would experience violence at the hands of men, Plogstedt suggested that the struggle over women's recruitment represented a continuation of the feminist battle against "violence against women," which had become a prime concern of the New Women's Movement in the mid-1970s.¹⁰⁵⁰ The

¹⁰⁴⁸ Davis, "The Gender of War and Peace," 99.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Sibylle Plogstedt, "Kontra Frauen ins Militär: Es muss Schluss sein mit den Kriegen!," *Emma*, December 1980, at: <http://www.emma.de/hefte/ausgaben-1980/dezember-1980/kontra-frauen-ins-militaer> (Last accessed: 10 January 2013). See also, Helke Sander, "Über Beziehungen zwischen Liebesverhältnissen und Mittelstreckenraketen," *Courage*, April 1980, 16–29.

¹⁰⁵⁰ See Lenz, *Die Neue Frauenbewegung*, 765. See also Albrecht-Heide and Bujewski, *Militärdienst*, 167.

proposals to recruit women raised the question of how to prevent violence against women in a state-run, male dominated, quasi-public, yet separate militarized sphere. The answer that feminists such as Plogstedt gave was to keep women out of the *Bundeswehr*.¹⁰⁵¹

The issue of state-sanctioned male violence led some activists to argue that female recruits would become the symbols of West German patriarchy. For the much-traveled feminist and pacifist author of the *graswurzelrevolution*, Bernadette Ridard, the *Bundeswehr* facilitated militarism and reinforced patriarchal structures. While serving in the armed forces, men had access to the tools of powers: weapons and state-sanctioned violence. This, the activist stated, reaffirmed the conviction that “violence and power” were inherently “masculine.”¹⁰⁵² Asserting that human interactions were generally defined by the “right of the mighty,” Ridard argued that the equation of power with masculinity put women into a subordinate position. For her, this meant that the military was structured around the same principles that patriarchy was built upon.¹⁰⁵³ Given this obvious connection and the fact that feminist had sought to fight patriarchy for so long, she could not understand why some feminists wanted to get into the barracks. After all, she maintained, the *Bundeswehr* was a “school of the nation” where self-determination and common responsibility did not exist. By drafting cohorts of young men into this “school,” the government allowed military principles such as hierarchy, orders, obedience and the willingness to wage war to spread through society. If women were recruited too, Ridard argued, this trend

¹⁰⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵² Bernadette Ridard, “Militärisch-Emanzipatorischer Komplex,” *graswurzelrevolution* 41 (1979): 12–14.

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid. See also Abenteuer, Technik, Männlichkeit: Eine kritische Durchsicht der inforpost, Karlsruhe 1981. ASB, Bestand Friedensbewegung, 4.0.1.10.

would certainly accelerate.¹⁰⁵⁴ In addition to upholding patriarchal structures, the recruitment of women would foster the militarization of society.

As Ridard's example shows, opponents of Schwarzer, Berkhan and Apel focused not only on how military service would affect female recruits, but also on what happened to men who served. Many women who became active in the peace and women's movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s also foregrounded the brutalization and dehumanization that their husbands and brothers, or other family members, had experienced during military service.¹⁰⁵⁵ The early 1980s saw the production of several anthologies that peace and feminist activist published in order to foster their cause.¹⁰⁵⁶ According to these anthologies, older women who joined the protests recalled the mutilated and broken men who returned after World War II, while younger generations of women emphasized the experiences of their male friends who had served in the *Bundeswehr*. In these stories, military service was not depicted as a rite of passage that turned boys into real men, but rather as an institution that "humiliated" and "dehumanized" men and as result created "hate" and "barbarity."¹⁰⁵⁷ Given these prospects, opponents of female

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ibid. See also Karin Hempel-Soos, "Karbölmäuschen und Stöpselmädchen: Frauen in die Bundeswehr – kein Vorschlag zur Gleichberechtigung," *DIE ZEIT*, July 9, 1982, 37.

¹⁰⁵⁵ "Stimmen betroffener Frauen" in Elisabeth Burmeister, ed., *Frauen machen Frieden: Lesebuch für Großmütter, Mütter und Töchter mit einem Vorwort von Anne-Marie Holenstein* (Berlin: Laetare, 1981).

¹⁰⁵⁶ See Ibid. See also Eva Quistorp, ed., *Frauen für den Frieden: Analysen, Dokumente und Aktionen aus der Friedensbewegung* (Bensheim: Pädextra-Verlag, 1982).

¹⁰⁵⁷ "Stimmen betroffener Frauen." See also Letter to the editor by Martin Goldstein, in *DIE ZEIT*, November 20, 1981. See also the letter to the editor by Dieter Weber who questioned which reasons and rights entitled states and societies to force men to kill. See Letter to the editor by Dieter Weber in reaction to "Frauen in die Bundeswehr: Her mit der Flinte!," in *DIE ZEIT*, June 18, 1982, 58.

military service stated that women should not join the *Bundeswehr* thinking they would achieve full emancipation. Rather men should “emancipate themselves” and refuse to serve.¹⁰⁵⁸

The discussion among peace and feminist activists also led to new scholarship that explicitly analyzed the links between violence, military service, and masculinity. One example for this new scholarship is Hanne Birckenbach, who is now a professor for Peace and Conflict Studies at the Justus-Liebig-University in Germany. In the 1970s and 1980s, Birckenbach was actively involved in the burgeoning peace and feminist activism.¹⁰⁵⁹ In addition to publishing articles and commentaries in the leftist, worker’s self-managed newspaper *die Tageszeitung (Taz)*, Birckenbach wrote her 1986 study *With a Bad Conscience – The Willingness of Adolescents to Render Military Service*. The “starting point” for the study, Birckenbach stated in her introduction, was her “astonishment about the extent to which young men were willing to render military service.”¹⁰⁶⁰ In 1982, polls by the *Institute for Applied Social Science* revealed that, despite the continuously increasing number of conscientious objectors and the growing peace activism, two-thirds of young men, who were between 16 and 18 years old, were still willing to render military service.¹⁰⁶¹ The author’s research hence focused on the “psychosocial developments that allowed the capitalistic and democratic industrial societies to cling to the

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Hanne Birckenbach, “Die politik- und sozialwissenschaftliche Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung: Anfänge - Erfolge - Perspektiven,” in *Frieden - Gewalt - Geschlecht: Friedens- und Konfliktforschung als Geschlechterforschung*, ed. Karen Hagemann, Jennifer Davy und Ute Kätzel (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 73–95.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, *Mit schlechtem Gewissen – Wehrdienstbereitschaft von Jugendlichen: Zur Empirie der psychosozialen Vermittlung von Militär und Gesellschaft* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985), 9.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid., 10.

continuous existence of big military apparatuses, even though bourgeoisie reasoning had long-since discerned them as nonproductive, harmful, dangerous and obsolete.”¹⁰⁶²

Analyzing the writings by and interviews with 381 boys and 241 girls, Birckenbach argued that young men who were willing to serve were nonetheless against the war and expressed reservations against military service.¹⁰⁶³ In order to overcome this division, Birckenbach’s subjects used several mechanisms that built upon specific notions of masculinity. According to the researcher, young men focused, on the one hand, on the nuclear nature of modern war, which rendered any kind behavior—both military service and conscientious objection—inadequate and thus enabled them to repress any notion of a “culpable participation in war.”¹⁰⁶⁴ On the other, Birckenbach stated, her interview partners ignored the “absurdity” and fatality of warfare by focusing on war as a stage for the “imaginative enactment of traditional masculinity.”¹⁰⁶⁵ This traditional concept of masculinity built upon the notion that military service had always been a male prerogative, because men possessed all the physical and mental features necessary to fight, defend and govern.¹⁰⁶⁶ If a young man thus passed the military’s medical examination, he could rest assured that he possessed valued masculine traits. In this

¹⁰⁶² Ibid.

¹⁰⁶³ Ibid., 229.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ibid. 230.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Ibid., 176.

context, combat then functioned as an activity that could affirm his seemingly superior masculinity.¹⁰⁶⁷

However, this understanding did not equal the traditional notion of military combat as the area in which men could stand the test of manliness. According to Birkenbach, the majority of the interviewees linked military service and masculinity with the demands of their civilian work and private life.¹⁰⁶⁸ Viewing military life as a positive challenge and not as a form of disfranchisement, the interviewees expected that military service would equip them with the masculine traits they needed to prevail and succeed in the civilian work force.¹⁰⁶⁹ Hence military service did not represent a gateway for the young men to succeed on the battle fields of Europe, but in the civilian working force of West Germany.

As Birkenbach's research interests and findings show, the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed new and intense debates about the nature of military service and the image of the West German soldier. Prompted by the numerous proposals that the *Bundeswehr* should open its gates to female soldiers and by the exploding new peace activism, activists disputed whether military service and war were inherently masculine or whether women should be recruited as well. Whereas some feminists such as Alice Schwarzer argued that military service would allow women to become emancipated, her opponents argued that female soldiers would soon lead to new forms of oppression and violence against women. While thus discussing the *Bundeswehr* as a palladium of state-sanctioned violence and patriarchy, some activists argued once more that military service brutalized and deprived men. Protesting for a more just and peaceful world, the

¹⁰⁶⁷ Ibid., 172.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ibid., 181–182, 230–233.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Ibid., 321.

feminist and peace activists of the late-1970s and early-1980s wholeheartedly rejected the military apparatus arguing that neither men nor women should serve in the *Bundeswehr*.

Gay Soldiers and the Wörner-Kießling-Affair in the Public Debate

The ways in which feminist and peace activists disputed the recruitment of women for military service bore some similarities to the ways that contemporaries debated the situation of gay soldiers and officers. Following the reform of the Criminal Code in 1969 and 1973, the living situation of gay men in the Federal Republic remained a controversially debated issue. This was due first of all to the blossoming gay rights movement. Although proponents of gay rights had demanded and fought for emancipation in earlier years, the far-reaching decriminalization of male homosexuality in the late 1960s and early 1970s opened up new spaces for protest and demands.¹⁰⁷⁰ While members of the gay community expanded their activism, they found advocates among the political parties. As discussed earlier, members of the Free Democratic Party ensured that gay rights and emancipation remained part of the political discourse in the late 1970s by fighting for the complete abolishment of Paragraph 175. In addition to the FDP's albeit short-lived eagerness, the press was certainly a third factor that prevented the topic from sinking into oblivion. The situation, status, and activism of the gay-liberation movement as well as the push of some political parties in favor of gay rights filled the pages of local, regional, and national newspapers.¹⁰⁷¹

¹⁰⁷⁰ See for example Kreutzer, *Chronik der Schwulen*; Dobler und Rimmele, "Schwulenbewegung," 541–556; Whisnant, *Male Homosexuality*, 204–212; Schäfer, *Widernatürliche Unzucht*, 239–247.

¹⁰⁷¹ Kraushaar, *Protest-Chronik*.

Amid the increasing interest in the lives of gay men (and women) in the Federal Republic, the ways that the *Bundeswehr* treated gay men attracted growing attention as well. In 1979, for example, *Der Spiegel* reported about the practice of the West German police to spy on and registered gay men on so-called “pink lists.”¹⁰⁷² Beginning in the 1950s, the West German police stored the information about special bars and convicted gay men—including pictures and finger prints—in an extensive system of note cards. Dating back the mid-nineteenth century, gay-rights activists in the 1970s soon referred to these cards as *rosa Listen* (pink lists) in memory of the pink triangles that gay men had to wear in Nazi concentration camps.¹⁰⁷³ Documenting the life and hardship of gay men, the magazine also informed its readers that “West Germany’s homosexuals have to face occupational bans [only] in exceptional cases.” One of the few cases, *Der Spiegel* noted, was the *Bundeswehr*. Criticizing military practices, the magazine rightly stated that gay men could not become officers, because considered “disruptive factor[s]” and thus were prohibited to become officers.”¹⁰⁷⁴

In addition to sporadic articles in the West German mainstream press, pacifist publications such as *Rosa* or *Schwuchtel: Eine Zeitung der Schwulenbewegung*, which were closely related to the West German gay-rights movement, addressed the issue as well.¹⁰⁷⁵ While the individual publications addressed the topic for various different reasons, the majority of

¹⁰⁷² See, “Der San.-St. Uffz. verfiel der Sinnlichkeit,” *Der Spiegel* 83, August 13, 1979, 58–62.

¹⁰⁷³ Whisnant, *Male Homosexuality*; Stürmke und Finkler, *Rosa Winkel, rosa Listen*.

¹⁰⁷⁴ “Der San.-St. Uffz. verfiel der Sinnlichkeit,”

¹⁰⁷⁵ See for example, Tommi Dera, “Manneszucht,” *Schwuchtel – Eine Zeitung der Schwulenbewegung* 5 (1976). For a development of gay magazines and newspapers see also, Dietmar Kreuzer, “Eine Chronik mit Ausblick: Die 1980er Jahre in Spiegel der Presse,” in *Zwischen Autonomie und Integration: Schwule Politik und Schwulenbewegung in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren*, ed. Andreas Pretzel and Volker Weiß (Hamburg: Männerschwarm Verlag, 2013), 23–33.

articles viewed anti-gay sentiments, on the one hand, as indicative for the entire West German society and, on the other, the result of a particular military male culture. In 1977, the newly founded magazine *Rosa* published an article entitled “The Gay Officer,” which argued that anti-gay sentiments were the result of a particular masculine culture that permeated the *Bundeswehr*. The author of the article asserted that “all the intolerances, all the mistakes, which also exist in the rest of society, surfaces much more” in the *Bundeswehr*, for it was a “mere men’s society.”¹⁰⁷⁶ In addition to viewing military practices as just one example of the discrimination gays had to face throughout the country, for the gay magazine, the anti-gay sentiments that permeated the *Bundeswehr* were the result of a particular male culture.

This argument was seconded by the pacifist magazine *graswurzelrevolution* that turned towards the topic, because it viewed the *Bundeswehr*’s discrimination against gay men as evidence of its militaristic tendencies.¹⁰⁷⁷ The magazine stated that gay men faced a great deal of problems in both military and civilian service. Focusing on the *Budneswehr*, the magazine maintained in 1980 that the situation for gay men was “very often insufferable.”¹⁰⁷⁸ In reaction to the 1979 verdict of the Federal Administrative Court’s First Senate’s that gay men were generally neither welcomed nor accepted by heterosexual comrades, the magazine asserted that this insufferable situation stemmed from the constant reprisals that gay men had to face in this “super-men’s world” (*Supermännerwelt*).¹⁰⁷⁹

¹⁰⁷⁶ “Ein Schwuler Offizier,” *Rosa* 7 (January 1977): 20–22. See also, Tommi Dera, “Manneszucht,” *Schwuchtel: Eine Zeitung der Schwulenbewegung* 5 (1976).

¹⁰⁷⁷ “Schwule ins Militär? Therapie gefällig?,” *graswurzelrevolution* 36 (February/March 1980): 38.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Ibid.

By arguing that military discrimination against gay men was the result of a military culture that favored vigorous heterosexual masculinity, the discussion by *Rosa* and *graswurzelrevolution* bore great resemblance to the ways that the leftist press addressed the issue of female soldiers. Rejecting women's recruitment for military service, left-wing activist and journalists portrayed the military as a hyper-masculine and overly aggressive institution in which women would not find expected emancipatory deliverance, but discrimination and oppression. If women would suffer from the *Bundeswehr*'s hyper-masculine culture as soon as they entered the barracks, gay men in uniform already did.

The two arguments—that *Bundeswehr* practices were indicative of both a particular military culture and the entire society—continued well into the 1980s and underlined the discussion that accompanied the Wörner-Kießling Affair. Commenting on the reasons for why Wörner had send Kießling into early retirement, Thomas Trempnau—an author and eager critic of NATO's arms build-up in the early 1980s—complained that the scandal represented an “attack on homosexuality” as a whole.¹⁰⁸⁰ Writing in the pacifist magazine *antimilitarismus information*, which enjoyed a circulation of roughly 3,500 copies, Trempnau argued that a gay general was only considered a security threat because homosexuality still offended the “healthy popular sentiment” (*gesunde Volksempfinden*). By using the term *gesundes Volksempfinden*, Trempnau implied the continuation of Nazi ideology. When reforming the Criminal Code in 1935, the National Socialist regime introduced the term into the legal text and provided their judges with almost absolute discretion.¹⁰⁸¹ Since the “defamation of homosexuals” defined the

¹⁰⁸⁰ Thomas Trempnau, “Wörner: Ein Sicherheitsrisiko,” *antimilitarismus information*, 14/3 (March 1984): III-3–III-4. See also Roland Exner, Letter to the Editor, *FAZ* (21 January 1984).

¹⁰⁸¹ Bernd Mertens, *Rechtsetzung im Nationalsozialismus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 103. See also, Lothar Gruchmann, *Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933–1940: Anpassung und Unterwerfung in der Ära Gürtner* (Munich:

educational measures of many families, schools and academia, Thomas Trempnau was not surprised that military superiors could not expect “the ‘necessary respect’ from their subordinates.”¹⁰⁸² In light of this problem, he maintained that it was time to “counteract the discriminatory behavior against gays and dispel prejudices.” Yet, since scandal seemed to be “another indicator for the moral change” that defined the politics’ of Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s conservative government, Trempnau was not convinced that the situation of gay men would improve anytime soon.¹⁰⁸³

The ways in which the Wörner-Kießling-Affair unfolded led to an increased interest in the situation of gay men in the *Bundeswehr*. Male homosexuality was no longer a topic that only filled the pages of pacifist magazines and publications related to the gay rights movement. The affair triggered not only a volley of television shows and newspaper articles, but it also caused numerous contemporaries—of German and foreign nationalities—to send letters to newspaper editors or to the main participants of the affair: Günter Kießling, Manfred Wörner, and Helmut Kohl. Between January and May 1984, Kießling alone received more than 2,000 letters. Analyzed together the press coverage and letters show that the Wörner-Kießling Affair and the role homosexuality played in it offered contemporaries an opportunity to discuss not only military practices and customs, but also the politics of the new CDU/CSU government as well as the ‘moral compass’ of the West German society.

Oldenbourg, 1988); Gerhard Werle, *Justiz-Strafrecht und polizeiliche Verbrechensbekämpfung im Dritten Reich* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989).

¹⁰⁸² Trempnau, “Wörner.”

¹⁰⁸³ Ibid.

Focusing on the affair, the left-leaning press such as *Die ZEIT* criticized the ways in which the Ministry of Defense, the *Bundeswehr*, and the counterintelligence service dealt with male homosexuality was unacceptable. Authors such as Bernd Nitzschke, who was an assistant lecturer in the department for psychotherapy at the University Düsseldorf, complained that the Ministry of Defense sought to fight a “homemade crime.”¹⁰⁸⁴ If the Ministry of Defense had not declared homosexuality a “security threat,” the affair would never have happened. Moreover, he maintained that the action of the minister and his counterintelligence service represented a return to the morality and “the muff of the 1950s.” Arguing that Wörner and his experts could only think in two categories—“the good, the normal, and the just,” on the one hand, and “the evil, the bad, and the abnormal” on the other—he concluded that the workings of the ministry were defined by extreme paranoia.¹⁰⁸⁵

Yet, it was not only the leftwing press that challenged the chancellor’s politics. Both Helmut Kohl and Manfred Wörner received numerous letters that questioned the moral beliefs that apparently underpinned the government’s politics. Outraged by what had happened to Kießling, a 63-years old man from an old aristocratic family sent an angry letter to Helmut Kohl asking the chancellor whether he or his Minister of Defense had “heard anything about the conventions on human rights.”¹⁰⁸⁶ In addition to stating that the government had violated Kießling’s rights, the letter writer also pointed out that the action of the Counterintelligence Service and the Minister of Defense belittled the reform of the West German Criminal Code.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Bernd Nitzschke, “Der Mann als Frau,” *DIE ZEIT*, March 2, 1984, 37.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Jörg B. to Helmut Kohl, 2 February 1984. Barch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Briefe mit Durchschlag von Briefen an Kohl, Wörner, usw. Skandal.

Thus, he did not only demanded for the “ostracism of homosexuality” to stop, but he also expressed a sense of shame. Informing the chancellor that his ancestors were once part of Germany’s government and “held high military positions,” the letter writer stated: “I am ashamed for the government and I am ashamed for the country.”¹⁰⁸⁷

The sense that Helmut Kohl’s government had acted in a distasteful and unworthy manner even caused contemporaries who did not see themselves as gay-rights advocates to state their opinions. On January 27, a woman sent a letter Wörner to inform him that she was shocked by his “way to discredit people in public.”¹⁰⁸⁸ While asserting that she was neither gay “nor do I speak up for these people in any particular way,” the woman wanted to remind Wörner that “we live in a society in which these people are recognized completely and with all rights [...]”¹⁰⁸⁹ The woman’s attitude was exemplary of several letters that contemporaries mailed during these days. Although the majority of correspondents ignored the issue or expressed some form of indifference towards homosexuality, they nonetheless were enraged by the actions of counterintelligence service and the Minister of Defense.

For a number of letter writers, the affair not only reflected badly on the government, but also reflected badly on the norms of the West German society. On January 17, 1984 a woman wrote to Kießling informing him that “[t]he father of my daughter was a soldier too” and that she therefore knew that it was common for military superiors to be “affectionate.”¹⁰⁹⁰ Yet to “label

¹⁰⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Getrud S to Manfred Wörner, 27 January 27 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Briefe mit Durchschlag von Briefen an Kohl, Wörner, usw. Skandal.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Adelheid L. to Günter Kießling, 17 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Postpaket: Skandal Zuschriften.

somebody as homosexual” just because he did not always behave like the “inapproachable” superior was “very humiliating,” the woman stated.¹⁰⁹¹ Drawing a line between ‘normal’ affectionate camaraderie in a homosocial environment and homosexual behavior, the woman also maintained that Kießling had suffered all the injustice because of his marital status. “If one is quiet, and single at that [*alleinstehend*], one already gives enough reason for imprudent tattle.”¹⁰⁹² If the general had married, the woman was sure, he would not have to deal with such humiliation: “[B]eing married seems to be the standard in our modern times.” In addition to addressing male homosexuality, the scandal represented an opportunity for contemporaries to criticize the contemporary focus on heterosexual marriage and family as the ideal way of life.¹⁰⁹³

Addressing the seemingly wrong-headed moral compass of the Federal Republic, few correspondents furthermore emphasized the wrongdoings of heterosexual men and the security threat that women in the *Bundeswehr* could pose. Focusing on the political realm, a female letter writer sought to assure Kießling that even if he was gay, he could never pose as much of a threat as “some of the superior figures who amuse themselves with call girls and ‘hostesses’ during or after so-called party festivities” (*Parteifeiern*).¹⁰⁹⁴ According to them, such heterosexual liaisons posed a particular threat, because some of these “female persons” could be systematically deployed as spies.¹⁰⁹⁵ “[I]t should be historically well known,” stated another letter writer, “that

¹⁰⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹² Ibid.

¹⁰⁹³ Heindrun E. to Günter Kießling, 17 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Postpaket: Skandal Zuschriften.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Margot B. to Günter Kießling, 13 January 1984, BArch, Nachlass Kießling, Postpaket: Skandal Zuschriften, Nachlass.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Else A. to Professor Dr. Bedeker, 23 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Briefe mit Durchschlag von Briefen an Kohl, Wörner, usw. Skandal.

99,9 % of all spy affairs [...] did not arise because of homosexually oriented people, but—in defiance of all bourgeois stereotypes—because of heterosexually oriented people.”¹⁰⁹⁶ In light of this situation, some contemporaries came to the radical conclusion that only “eunuchs” should serve as military superiors and receive the highest security clearance.¹⁰⁹⁷ This way, all the troubles that resulted from human sexuality could be avoided. As this letter shows, some West Germans did not agree with official arguments that gay men posed a greater threat to the *Bundeswehr* and national security.

Notwithstanding this wholehearted criticism, a few contemporaries expressed the conviction that gay men should not be allowed to serve as military superiors. “A general, who resides over an army of ‘male creatures,’” wrote a female reader to the editors of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, “should be above all suspicions of homosexuality.”¹⁰⁹⁸ Yet such public announcements were rare and among the more than 2,000 letters that Kießling received only one stands out as harsh and critical. The general received an anonymous and undated letter from an “old German woman” asking Kießling why he was not ashamed of himself. Stating that in the past “a decent officer would have taken the pistol,” the woman was obviously convinced that an officer who was or had been accused of being gay would put an end to his obvious shame by committing suicide.¹⁰⁹⁹

¹⁰⁹⁶ Gottfried R. to Günter Kießling, 28 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Postpaket: Skandal Zuschriften, Nachlass.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Dr. Friedrich Biedermann, *FAZ*, 26 January 1984, 6. See also the letter to the editor in *Stern*. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Skandal Zeitschnittssammlung Teil 2 (January 26-August 7, 1984).

¹⁰⁹⁸ Gudrun Schäfer, letter to the editor, *FAZ*, January 20, 1984, 9.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Anonyms and undated letter. BArch, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Briefe mit Durchschlag von Briefen an Kohl, Wörner, usw. Skandal.

The women's harsh letter points moreover to an issue that the scandal also brought to the fore: the question of military honor and camaraderie. The fact that the Minister of Defense had eventually disregarded Günter Kießling's word of honor became a topic of intense dispute. The general, Wörner, and Kohl received numerous letters from Kießling's companions, friends, veterans, and active military personnel, who were dismayed at how Wörner treated one of his highest generals. For many it was unbelievable that the Minister of Defense "didn't give a damn about" his general's word of honor and instead believed "untested suspicions and allegations, testimonies from young hustlers and shady characters."¹¹⁰⁰ On January 12, 1984 Kießling received another letter from a "seriously war disabled" veteran who—"as a man"—felt the need to assert to the general that "you have proven yourself a true soldier" and that he was not without support: "There are still soldiers who savor a word of honor [...]." The envelope also included a copy of another letter that the man had mailed to Manfred Wörner. In this letter, the former "front-line soldier" argued that the Minister of Defense had not only insulted "the man" and "general," but also the entire "officer's caste and all men of the Bundeswehr."¹¹⁰¹

The reason why a considerable number of men who had served in the *Bundeswehr* or in previous German armies, were so enraged about the issue of Wörner's disregard for Kießling's affirmations was the meaning and weight that an officer's word of honor had carried over centuries. According to numerous military guides, an officer's word of honor had "absolute

¹¹⁰⁰ Hermann F. to Manfred Wörner, 12 January 1984. BArch Kießling Nachlass, Akte Korrespondenz nach Skandal: Zuschriften von Soldaten & Ehemaligen Soldaten. See also, Dr. Paul Simas, letter to the Editor, *FAZ* 24, January 28, 1984, 24.

¹¹⁰¹ Bernd L., to Günter Kießling, 30 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Brief emit Durchschlag von Briefen an Kohl, Wörner usw. Skandal.

validity” and had to be strictly upheld.¹¹⁰² If a man departed from his word only a little, the author maintained, he could no longer be an officer. In 1984, this understanding of honor still bore meaning. Many male correspondents who sent letters to Wörner and Kießling expressed a strong understanding of social hierarchies and ranks. For them, nightclub owners and hustlers presented by definition the dregs of society and could not be trusted. A *Bundeswehr* general, in contrast, was trustworthy and high on the social ladder.¹¹⁰³ Consequently, Kießling’s words were supposed to count much more than those of barkeepers and hustlers. Yet since Wörner had obviously ignored Kießling’s asseveration, several letter writers thought that the minister had harmed the *Bundeswehr* and questioned his qualifications to keep his position.

In contrast, contemporaries who did not believe that officers occupied a special position energetically refuted the opinion of these letter writers. In light of the 1950s military reforms that had introduced the *Staatsbürger in Uniform*, one man complained that it was not possible to on the one hand “abolish the monarchy whose first—and preferred servants were officers and, on the other, to concede special status to officers in a democracy and in which no citizens enjoys special privileges.”¹¹⁰⁴ If the current government wanted to uphold the principles of the 1950s military reforms and not move back to the military ideals of the nineteenth century, Günter Kießling’s word of honor could not carry a special weight and meaning.

¹¹⁰² See for example Julius von Wickedede, *Die Rechte und Pflichten des Offiziers: Leitfaden für junge Männer, welche sich dem Offiziersstande gewidmet haben oder noch widmen wollen* (Stuttgart: Hallberger, 1857), 51–52.

¹¹⁰³ Hermann F. to Manfred Wörner, 12 January 1984. BArch F, Nachlass Kießling, Akte Brief emit Durchschlag von Briefen an Kohl, Wörner usw. Skandal.

¹¹⁰⁴ A. von Kalm, letter to the Editor, *Die Welt*, January 27, 1984, 6. See also, Friedrich Karl Fromme, “Überbleibsel einer Affäre,” *FAZ*, February 2 1984, 1; Walter Görlitz, “Mut zur eigenen Meinung,” *Die Welt* 19, January 23, 1984, 2.

Similar to the disputes about the recruitment of women, the Wörner-Kießling-Affair led to new negotiations about the function of the *Bundeswehr* and the image of the West German soldier. The two controversies led contemporaries to address not only military practices, but also the gender and the sexual orientation of the West German soldier. As the above discussion shows, the *Bundeswehr* represented a palladium of outdated and overly aggressive notions of masculinity. While this caused many peace and women's activists to oppose the recruitment of women, it also led to claims that the *Bundeswehr* had to overcome its homophobia and accept gay soldiers, officers, and generals.

Conclusion

In the late 1970s and early 1980, the gendered nature of military service as well as the masculinity and sexuality of the West German soldier were disputed in an unprecedented scope and manner. First, official consideration and the push to recruit female soldiers into the *Bundeswehr* triggered nation-wide discussions about whether military service—especially military service with weapons—was still a masculine duty or whether women could be effective soldiers too. Coinciding with increased activism by members of the New Women's Movement and a burgeoning peace movement, which developed as a reaction to the rising tensions of the Cold War, contemporaries focused on whether military service would represent a steppingstone of emancipation for women or as a gateway to female oppression and complete social militarization.

In contrast to earlier decades—especially the negotiations of West Germany's rearmament—the image of the West German woman in military uniform was generally thinkable and more broadly discussed. Yet, similar to the debates in the 1950s, the conviction that only men should be compelled to render compulsory and armed military service was still wide spread.

Although women were accepted in *Bundeswehr* cantinas, as secretaries, and as doctors and pharmacists, the idea that women could be trained and fight alongside men was not thinkable. Compulsory and armed military service was still against women's nature and constitution. The proposal to recruit, or even draft, women for regular military service was not only refuted by peace and feminist activists, but also by the majority of the West German parliamentary. As a result, women in the 1980s did not enter the barracks in the same capacities as men did.

In addition to discussing the sex and gender of the *Bundeswehr* soldier, contemporaries discussed once more soldiers' and officers' sexuality. Despite the reform of the Criminal Code in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the West German military apparatus upheld the notion that the ideal *Bundeswehr* soldier was heterosexual. Indeed, regulations stipulated that gay men could—under certain conditions—be eligible for service, which Yet they could never serve as military superiors or occupy commanding positions. Over the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s—especially in the wake of the Wörner-Kießling-Affair a number of contemporaries questioned this understanding. Asking the *Bundeswehr* to stop their discriminatory practices, numerous contemporaries called for the emancipation of gay men in the realm of the military. For members of the peace movement and gay rights activists, military practices were indicative of a discriminatory male culture, which had to be changed.

CONCLUSION

MILITARY, MASCULINITY, AND SOCIETY IN WEST GERMANY

“What’s wrong with the unified Germans? Are they really all slackers, sissies, softened by 40 years of peace in Central Europe?” asked the weekly newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* in February 1991.¹¹⁰⁵ The magazine felt compelled to address this question because of the overwhelming pacifism it sensed among Germans. While peace activists took to the streets of German towns and cities during the first weeks of 1991, an increasing number of German men filed applications for conscientious objection. The numbers of applications jumped from 74,309 in 1990 to 150,722 in 1991. This represented an increase from 15,5 percent to 30,7 percent of the men registered eligible for military service.¹¹⁰⁶ This steep rise also included a growing number of active soldiers who decided that they did not want to serve in a military that was about to go war. Whereas 2,641 soldiers applied for conscientious objection in 1990, 4,576 did so in 1991.¹¹⁰⁷

The events that triggered this behavior were the First Gulf War and Operation Desert Storm. On January 17, 1991, coalition forces from thirty-four nations led by the United States waged war against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The war planning in Washington also envisaged the deployment of *Bundeswehr* troops. In addition to dispatching a fleet of airplanes to protect US bombers, proposals stipulated the

¹¹⁰⁵ “Den Ernstfall nicht wagen,” *Der Spiegel*, February 11, 1991, 18–26.

¹¹⁰⁶ In 1990, 509,000 men were registered eligible for military service. In 1991, that number had shrunk to 491,000. In the years to follow, numbers remained steady. In 1992, 133,856 or 31 percent out of 432,000 men registered filed for conscientious objection. See Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 416.

¹¹⁰⁷ Ibid. See also, Seifert, *Militär, Kultur, Identität*, 95.

deployment of German *Tornado* fighter aircrafts to the Turkish border with Iraq to support Turkey's fighting units. Whereas Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government was eager to comply with Washington's ideas, most Germans—as the protests and refusal to serve show—were not.

According to *Der Spiegel*, the reason for Germans' unwillingness to participate in a war was to be found in the history of the (West) German armed forces: the *Bundeswehr*. Ignoring the developments in East Germany, the newsmagazine stated, that over the years the *Bundeswehr* had been defined as a defense and peace force. Following the credo of former Chancellor Willy Brandt—"Peace is the Challenge"—*Bundeswehr* soldiers had only learned how to fight so that they did not have to go to war.¹¹⁰⁸ Consequently, West German men in military uniform had been trained in "work and adventure, camaraderie and mutual support."¹¹⁰⁹ Despite the attempts of conservative traditionalists to rehabilitate the image of the "forceful fighter," West Germans had come to see the military as a peaceful "training school" for young men. Hence, the *Bundeswehr* fit neatly into a society which had by and large bid farewell to values such as "manly bravery and honor, fatherland and courage."¹¹¹⁰ As much as this understanding of military service was therefore homemade, *Der Spiegel* determined, it was also caused by West Germany's integration into NATO. The Western Alliance and the role of the United States as Europe's watchdog had enabled West Germans to believe that they were thoroughly protected and that they did not need to prepare for their defense, let alone war.¹¹¹¹

¹¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 22.

¹¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹¹⁰ Ibid., 26.

¹¹¹¹ Ibid.

As the findings of this dissertation show, the interpretation of *Der Spiegel* was not wrong. To be sure, the fact that the newsmagazine drew its conclusion in 1991 without acknowledging East Germany and the National People's Army (*Nationale Volksarmee*, or NVA) is problematic. In the wake of Germany's unification, the NVA was demobilized. While the majority of the remaining 36,000 NVA officers and non-commissioned officers were discharged, 3,200 men were absorbed into the *Bundeswehr*. Yet, with respect to the West German side of the story, *Der Spiegel* points to important developments that took place in the four decades following the end of World War II.

Themes and Trends, 1945–1989

From their very inception, the West German armed forces were defined as a defense force. The international agreements of the early postwar years and the West German constitution permitted the deployment of *Bundeswehr* troops only if the Federal Republic was under attack and defensive actions became necessary. This definition was due to different interlinked circumstances. In addition to representing a reaction to the devastating experience of German aggression during World War II, Cold War tensions and the division of Germany contributed to this development as well. The discord between NATO and the Soviet Union enabled the portrayal of the *Bundeswehr* as a bulwark against the Communist threat and as the protector of the “free” West. Embracing this image, the West German government under the auspice of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer eagerly depicted the *Bundeswehr* as a guarantor of peace in order to distinguish the Federal Republic from its East German counterpart.¹¹¹²

¹¹¹² Large, *Germans to the Front*, 74–77.

In the following decades, this definition gained more footholds. Upon becoming the chancellor of West Germany's first Social-Liberal Coalition in 1969, Willy Brandt declared not only that the Federal Republic had to "dare more democracy," but also that war was not the event during which men, societies, and nations had to prove themselves. The challenge that West German society and the *Bundeswehr* had to meet was the establishment and preservation of peace. While setting the tone of his chancellorship, Willy Brandt was able to make these statements because the Federal Republic had neither experienced an enemy attack nor had it been deploying troops abroad like its European neighbors, who had been engaged in anti-colonial freedom struggles.¹¹¹³

While the definition of the *Bundeswehr* as a defensive peace force was hence due to West Germany's international position, Willy Brandt and his government also reacted to the tumultuous 1960s. Following the resignation of several *Bundeswehr* generals in the mid-1960s, the Federal Republic witnessed a series of statements issued by conservative *Bundeswehr* commanders who called for a repurposing of the military. Distancing themselves from the rhetoric of the 1950s, men such Heinz Karst and Albert Schnez argued that the preservation of peace was the task of the political leadership. The purpose of the *Bundeswehr* was to function as a deterrent and, if deterrence did not work, to fight and win wars. These claims collided, however, with the opinions and ideals of extra-parliamentary activists who were unsettled by the negotiations and ultimate passing of the *Notstandsgesetze* in 1968. Arguing that the Federal Republic was becoming an authoritarian state, APO activists also sought to battle the West German military apparatus. Due to this multifold criticism, the Social-Liberal Coalition

¹¹¹³ Kutz, *Reform und Restauration*, 103–147.

developed new military policies and regulations that reemphasized the military's role as a defensive, peacekeeping force.¹¹¹⁴

This credo, which stuck despite repeated attacks, also enabled the development and the perpetuation of a new soldierly image. Already the initial plans to rearm West Germany in the context of the European Defense Community (EDC) required government officials and military experts to conceptualize an ideal image of the West German soldier. They had to delineate both the duties that servicemen had to fulfill and the rights they could enjoy. Notwithstanding his role as an outsider in the *Amt Blank* and the Ministry of Defense, Wolf Graf von Baudissin's work was crucial for the development of the *Innere Führung* and *Bürger in Uniform*. Developed to break new ground, these concepts aimed at conflating citizen's rights with military demands. Although they were criticized *ab initio* and by different groups inside and outside of the Ministry of Defense, the *Innere Führung* and the *Bürger in Uniform* became the guiding principles of the West German military.¹¹¹⁵

Anticipating that West German soldiers would have to engage in a defensive battle with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact at one point, the *Bürger in Uniform* was defined as a full-fledged soldier. But, in order to distinguish West German troops from the atrocities committed by previous German armies and from the "ruthless" behavior of Soviet troops, Baudissin and his colleagues maintained that the *Bürger in Uniform* had to be a fully trained, yet restrained and merciful soldier. Moving beyond battlefield behavior, the new ideal also portrayed the West German soldier as a "free man" and "good state citizen." In the context of the Cold War, defending the Federal Republic and Western Europe against the totalitarian Soviet regime also

¹¹¹⁴ Bald, "Die Militärreform," 347.

¹¹¹⁵ Frevert, *Kasernierte Nation*, 335.

required that West German troops had to withstand an ideology that was based on “denying personal values” and the “total submission of the individual.” Proponents of the *Bürger in Uniform* and the *Innere Führung* thus believed it imperative that the West German soldier became part of the democratic and pluralistic system he was supposed to defend. West German troops had to be—as much as possible—integrated into the democratic structure and the social fabric of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The initial definitions of the West German military as a defensive force as well as the conceptualization of the *Bundeswehr* soldier as a *Bürger in Uniform* furthermore invoked particular concepts of military masculinity. From the very beginning, government and military officials made every effort to ensure that only West German men could be compelled to serve in the armed forces. In particular, women had to be kept away from armed military service and the state-sanctioned act of killing. Although women were allowed to serve voluntarily and gained greater access to the ranks and files of the *Bundeswehr* over next decades, this particular limitation was never lifted. Since the *Bundeswehr* was defined as a defensive force, this gendered construction of military service labeled the acts of defending and protecting as masculine. Although women’s recruitment for civil defense and auxiliary measures considered repeatedly, the spheres and values that needed protection were defined predominantly feminine.

By limiting armed military service to men and assigning women to the sphere in need of protection, the Federal Republic continued a tradition that developed in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe. Beginning with France’s *levée en masse* in 1793, European powers resorted to mass conscription of young men to fight the wars during the age of revolution. In Prussia and elsewhere, this form of mass mobilization led to patriotic discourses that “evolved around the idea that men were duty-bound as citizens, fathers, and brothers to defend their

families, homes, and country.”¹¹¹⁶ As part of this process, women were assigned to the domestic/private sphere where they were supposed to loyally perform their patriotic duties as mothers and wives. The Prussian nation was defined as a valorous “*Volk family*,” in which all members had to fulfill their duties according to “rank, gender, age, and marital status.”¹¹¹⁷

In postwar West Germany, the gendered division of military service and the soldierly ideal of the *Bürger in Uniform* closely linked masculinity and family ideals as well. As scholars have emphasized, West Germany’s reconstruction involved the re-negotiation family structures and gender roles. Central to this process was the ideal of “complete” nuclear family, which was based on the gendered division of the male breadwinner and the female homemaker.¹¹¹⁸ This social construct greatly influenced the ways contemporaries negotiated the ideal West German soldier. In the context of the Cold War, the West German government in the 1950s and early 1960s deemed it essential that the *Bürger in Uniform* was not only a soldier, but also a heterosexual man who pursued the life of a faithful family breadwinner. Digressions from this path were seen as threats to the Federal Republic’s ability to defend itself against the Soviet Union and the temptations of Communist ideology.

In the following decades, this definition would not forfeit meaning. The attempts of conservative *Bundeswehr* generals, *Wehrmacht* veterans, and journalists in the 1960s and early 1970s to countermand the military reforms of the 1950s involved the redefinition of masculine qualities. In order for the *Bundeswehr* to fulfill its mission as a fighting force, they argued, the

¹¹¹⁶ Karen Hagemann, “The Military and Masculinity: Gendering the History of the French Wars, 1792-1815,” in *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1815*, ed. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 336–337.

¹¹¹⁷ Hagemann, “Military, War, and the Mainstream,” 69.

¹¹¹⁸ Moeller, “The Last Soldiers.”

masculine sphere of the military had to be detached entirely from the feminine domestic sphere. Upon entering the barracks, West German men had to be completely absorbed into the military—its ideals and customs—in order to protect their families, home, and country. While critics like Albert Schnez thus called for the return to hardened, martial masculinities, the *Bundeswehr* eagerly continued to declare gay men unfit for military service. Reaffirming the heterosexuality of West German soldiers, military and government officials argued that gay men would endanger the *Bundeswehr*'s group cohesion and thus its combat readiness.

This conception of ideal military masculinities collided, however, with the convictions of extra-parliamentary protesters who took the streets in the late 1960s and early 1970s to rally against the political system and the military apparatus. In their battle against the *Bundeswehr*, APO groups formulated a variety of competing concepts of military masculinity. Whereas some leading leftist intellectuals argued that APO activists should enter the *Bundeswehr* as recruits to destroy the system from within, the majority maintained that military service produced overly aggressive forms of male behavior—including pernicious ideals of sexuality—that would endanger the social fabric of the Federal Republic of Germany. Calling on men to resist military service and to embrace irenic notions of masculinity, most extra-parliamentary actions, pamphlets, and placards also invoked the image of the West German soldier as a heterosexual man. Only a limited, yet growing number of activists addressed the ostracism of gay men as another symbol for the military's destructive ideals of masculinity.¹¹¹⁹

In addition to prompting the West German government under Willy Brandt to reaffirm the role of the *Bundeswehr* as a defensive force, this protest also caused the redefinition of soldierly ideals. Reacting to both leftist and right-wing criticism, government planning and

¹¹¹⁹ Bernhard, *Zivildienst*, 196–206.

changes emphasized the image of the West German soldier as a reflective and critical thinker who served in the *Bundeswehr* to protect the peace and stability of the Federal Republic and Western Europe. This image built once more on the notion that the *Bundeswehr* was a homosocial, yet strictly heterosexual men's society. Although the government countered conservative demands for the stricter separation of the masculine military and the feminine civilian sphere by lifting marriage regulations, gay men were still not invited to participate in the *Bundeswehr*'s defensive function. To be sure, gay men were considered fit for basic military service, if they were did not display their "homosexual tendencies" and were able to integrate themselves into the military men's society. Yet receiving a promotion and becoming a military superior was not possible. Though challenged, the initial gendered construction of military service and national defense remained intact.

Since the conviction that West Germany's military and armed defense rested mainly on the shoulders of its heterosexual, male population was upheld, it figured greatly in the disputes that surrounded the *Bundeswehr* in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The considerations of government officials to recruit women into the *Bundeswehr* for regular military service triggered a new debate about whether only men could be compelled to rendered armed military service and thus perform the act of state-sanctioned killing. Although women gained access to the *Bundeswehr*'s medical corps as doctors and pharmacists, and female volunteers in military uniform were generally thinkable, scenarios in which West German women would drafted into the *Bundeswehr*, bear arms, and fight at the front to defend the Federal Republic were not. Likewise, the Wörner-Kießling-Affair that shook West Germany in 1984 reaffirmed the notion that armed military service was rendered predominantly by heterosexual men. To be sure, the public discussion that ensued clearly shows that large segments of society generally tolerated

homosexuality, even in the military. But, this would not hold true for the *Bundeswehr* and the politics of Helmut Kohl's government. Although gay men were accepted as soldiers as long as they did not display their homosexuality and could function in a barracked men's society, the actions of the West German government showed that gay men were considered unfit to serve as military commanders and possess high security clearance. In times of Cold War espionage and NATO's double-track decision, homosexuality was depicted as a security threat that would endanger West Germany's ability to defend itself. Even though the image of the West German soldier had been repeatedly negotiated, the gendered nature of military service that was also built on specific notions of sexuality was not challenged. As the internal discussions surrounding Kießling show, the dominant military discourse still portrayed the "normal" military commander as a heterosexual man.

For scholars working in the fields of modern military and gender history, these findings are important because they underscore the argument that the successful establishment and functioning of modern armed forces rest heavily on the gendered construction of the military sphere and military service. West Germany's rearmament led to a clear gendered distinction between the military as an all-male entity that was separate from and responsible for the protection of the civilian sphere of home and family. Although this construction was repeatedly questioned, it was never seriously challenged. As a result, the *Bundeswehr* became both quantitatively and qualitatively an institution that was predicated on masculinity. Masculinity as a discursive construct became a natural marker of the West German soldier.¹¹²⁰

This process was perpetuated, however, by various forces in society and by specific historical circumstances. As this dissertation shows, the negotiation of military masculinities in

¹¹²⁰ Seifert, *Militär, Kultur, Identität*, 95.

West Germany took place at the cross-section of parliamentary politics, the military apparatus, and civil society. First, they were the result of demands made by the changing political leadership. Reacting to national and international currents, West German government officials and parliamentarians formulated masculine ideals that corresponded to their political agenda and convictions. Second, West German concepts of military masculinity were defined by military representatives and experts. Depending on the national and international scenarios at hand, military leaders postulated masculine ideals that they believed to be essential to the effective functioning and combat readiness of the *Bundeswehr*. Finally, various individuals and groups in civil society partook in the process of attributing specific mental, physical, and behavioral traits to the men serving in the *Bundeswehr*. Hinging on the groups' political interest and opinion about the military, these attributes corresponded or competed with the masculine ideals formulated in realm of the military and parliamentary politics. As the *Bundeswehr* constantly negotiated and evaluated, the West German armed forces remained part of the constantly evolving West German society and the soldier and officers remained men of their times.

In tracing the development of military masculinities at the intersection of parliamentary politics, the military apparatus, and civil society, the findings of this dissertation are ultimately an essential supplement to the literature, which seeks to gauge how West Germans distanced themselves from the military and militarism, and embarked on a path towards civilization or recivilization.¹¹²¹ If Bonn was not Weimar—to use Fritz René Allemann's dictum—the *Bundeswehr* was neither the *Reichswehr* nor the *Wehrmacht*. To be sure, the *Bundeswehr* was not turned into an institution in which men enjoyed the same rights and freedoms as their civilian counterparts. Moreover, West German society witnessed repeated attempts to turn the

¹¹²¹ Jarausch, *After Hitler*, 44–45.

Bundeswehr into an institution that reigned supreme above parliamentary politics and civil society. In this context, conservative military commanders, parliamentarians, and ‘ordinary’ citizen sought to define the *Bundeswehr* as a fighting force and the *Bundeswehr* as hardened and fearless fighter. Even though these counter arguments were persistent and upheld by certain conservative groups, they could not seriously challenge the dominant narrative that portrayed the *Bundeswehr* as defensive force, which would not wage war and only protect peace.

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Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (AdsD),

HSAA Archiv Helmut Schmidt im AdsD

BTF SPD-Bundestagsfraktion

PVAD SPD Parteivorstand

Nachlass Ollenhauer

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