RECONCILING FAMILY AND WORK:
The West German Gendered Division of Labor and Women’s Emancipation, 1960s to 1980s

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ABSTRACT

SARAH E. SUMMERS: Reconciling Family and Work: The West German Gendered Division of Labor and Women’s Emancipation, 1960s – 1980s
(Under the direction of Karen Hagemann and Konrad H. Jarausch)

While most Western European countries moved towards family policies that supported a “dual earner” family model in the 1970s, the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany clung much longer to a male breadwinner/female homemaker family model in a “modernized” version that allowed mothers to earn a supplementary income through part-time work. This model continued to inform family policies despite an intense public debate that began in the 1960s over the “women’s question” and a more equal division of labor in the family, economy, and society. The main aim of this project is thus to explore the factors that contributed to the continuing importance of the “male breadwinner/female homemaker-supplementary earner” family model.

This project comes to two conclusions regarding the persistence of this model. First, through case studies on The Nanny Project (Tagesmütter Projekt), Maternal Leave Policy (Mutterschaftsurlaub), and “Childrearing Money” (Erziehungsgeld), I conclude none of these three laws seriously questioned the male-breadwinner family model that had informed family policy since the 1950s. Rather, policy makers supported the stay at home care of mothers, except in cases of economic necessity, on the assumption that the best possible care for a small child was by its mother at home.

Second, this dissertation challenges the “autonomous” definition of the “New
Women’s Movement” in West Germany by exploring the role of West German feminists, women’s trade union activists, and female politicians throughout the drafting process of each law. I posit that rifts among women were created by fears of association with East German family politics and communism in the major parties and the trade unions, an anti-institutional autonomous women’s movement fueled by critiques of the Federal Republic’s Nazi past, and a hyper-politicization of family politics around democratic and Christian principles by the CDU/CSU beginning in the 1950s. These ideological divisions among female activists hindered the creation of a unified front that would compel the government to question the male-breadwinner family model. Ultimately, the efforts of these women reinforced, rather than changed, inherent conceptualizations of the family.
To my family
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ix

LIST OF FIGURES....................................................................................................x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................................xi

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................1

II. AGITATING FOR THE RIGHT TO FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT: 
    WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND THE GENDERED DIVISION OF LABOR........26
       Demographic and Social Changes for West German Women, 1950s–1980s....31
       Mothers are Political Too: The Autonomous Women’s Movement..........41
       The Private in Politics: Female Activism in the Political Parties..............66
       Balancing Family and Work: DGB Women’s Debates and Politics..........89

III. “THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS:” THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE 
    TAGESMÜTTER MODELLPROJEKT, 1971-1980........................................99
       The Family Ministry and the Origins of the Tagesmütter 
       Modellprojekt, 1972-1974........................................................................103
       Reluctant Acceptance? Reactions to the Tagesmütter 
       Modellprojekt, 1972-1974........................................................................122
       The DJI’s Results and Political Suggestions, 1974-1980.......................139
       Reaction to the Project Results, 1978-1980.............................................149

IV. A STEP FORWARD? THE MANY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SPD 
    MATERNAL LEAVE POLICY, 1978 – 1980.............................................161
       The Mutterschaftsurlaub Proposal and its Origins.................................165
       Reactions to the Mutterschaftsurlaubgesetz............................................178
LIST OF TABLES

Table

1.1 Women’s Employment 1950–1989 ................................................................. 32

1.2 Employment Rate of Mothers in West Germany, 1950–1980
    (in % of cohort) ................................................................................................. 33

1.3 Weekly Work Hours of Women, 1961–1986 (in % of total
    female workforce) ............................................................................................... 35

1.4 Top Ten Professions for Women and Men, 1980 .............................................. 36

1.5 Participation in Full-time Education by Age and Gender ................................. 37

1.6 Unemployment Rate in West Germany, 1978–1982 ....................................... 38

1.7 Female Membership of SPD and CDU, 1932-1980 ........................................... 67

1.8 DGB Female Membership, 1950-1980 ............................................................. 90

2.1 Childcare for Zero- to Six-year-old Children in the FRG
    and GDR, 1955-1989 (in percent of coverage) .................................................. 114

2.2 Overview of the Social Status Indicators of the Tagesmütter
    Families and Parents .......................................................................................... 143

4.1 Birthrate Developments in West Germany, 1950-1980 .................................... 220
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Flier reproduced in Helke Sander, “Mütter sind politische Personen,”
*Courage* vol. 3, 1978, 38. 44
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (Archive for Christian Democratic Politics)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AdsD</td>
<td>Archiv der sozialen Demokratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKE</td>
<td>Arbeitskreis Emanzipation (Working Committee for Emancipation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AsF</td>
<td>Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratische Frauen (Working Group of Social Democratic Women)</td>
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<td>BAK</td>
<td>Bundesarchiv Koblenz (Federal Archive Koblenz)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMFa</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Familienfragen (Federal Ministry for Family Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMFJ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Familie und Jugend (Federal Ministry for Family and Youth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMJFG</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie, und Gesundheit (Federal Ministry for Youth, Family, and Health)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union of Bavaria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFI</td>
<td>Demokratische Fraueninitiative (Democratic Women’s Initiative)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGB</td>
<td>Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Union Federation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DJI</td>
<td>Deutsches Jugend Institut (German Youth Institute)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFBIZ</td>
<td>Frauenforschungs-, bildungs- und informationszentrum e.V. (Women’s Research, Education and Information Center)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG-Metall</td>
<td>Industrie-Gewerkschaft Metall (Metal Worker’s Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>SDS</td>
<td>Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (Socialist German Student Federation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGB</td>
<td>Sozialgesetzbuch (Civil Code)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFB</td>
<td>Sozialistische Frauenbund West Berlin (Socialist Women’s Union West Berlin)</td>
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INTRODUCTION

When the current German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) family minister Kristina Schröder returned from maternity leave in September 2011, the thirty-four-year-old employed mother wasted no time by promoting a “new” family policy initiative called Betreuungsgeld (caregiving money).¹ The federal government would pay 150 euros monthly to families in which a parent cared for a child between the ages of one and three rather than sending him or her to government-run childcare. The German press criticized the minister for reversing the trend of childcare infrastructure development (government-funded childcare centers and nannies) promoted by her predecessor, Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), which encouraged mothers to return to employment a year after the birth of their child.² In addition to condemning the proposal’s reinforcement of the stay-at-home care of children by their mothers, journalists such as Hans Monath and Parvin Sadigh at the left liberal weekly newspaper Die Zeit cited studies arguing that early childhood education broke the cycle of

¹ As will become clear later, Betreuungsgeld is very similar to the CDU initiative Erziehungsgeld (upbringing money) first proposed in the mid-1970s in which a parent was paid a care giving stipend.

poverty in low income households and promoted the integration of children from immigrant families.³

While one may expect more sympathy for working parents from the family minister, Melanie Mühl, a journalist for the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), disagrees. Mühl criticized Schröder’s attempts to present her family as “very normal” to the press as “absolutely absurd,” stating:

The life of the Schröders [Schröder’s husband is the Parliamentary State Secretary for the Ministry of the Interior] plays out in a world that normal citizens never encounter, even though both mother and father work around the clock. Out of this Kristina Schröder could point an unpolished gaze at the everyday problems from the perspective of her new family life. Only she does not.”⁴

Schröder’s disconnectedness with the everyday issues of balancing family and employment may lie in the fact that families where both parents work full time are not typical in Germany. A 2006 study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported that in 2004, 31.2 percent of mothers with a child under the age of three and 42.3 percent of mothers with a child under the age of six were employed. Most of these women worked part-time, accounting for 37 percent of the female labor force.⁵ One reason for this trend is the limited childcare options available for children under the age of three. In 2007, childcare coverage for children under the age of three averaged 15.5 percent—9.9 percent coverage for children in the old West German states and 41 percent in the former East


German states, prompting the then family minister Ursula von der Leyen to announce an initiative to triple coverage by 2013.\(^6\) Furthermore, the majority of childcare options for children under six, as well as elementary schools, only operate half day.\(^7\)

From a historical perspective, *Betreuungsgeld* is family policy-as-usual for the CDU, and the debate over whether family policy should promote dual earner households or the stay-at-home care of children is hardly new in the Federal Republic of Germany. This debate reached a peak in the mid-1970s when the CDU proposed its first family policy designed to reconcile family and work, *Erziehungsgeld*, a stipend paid to parents (mostly mothers) who stayed at home to care for their children under three. *Erziehungsgeld* was just one aspect of an intense debate in West Germany beginning in the late 1960s over the desirable gendered division of labor in family, economy, and society. Several groups demanded (more) equality between women and men, including the autonomous women’s movement as well as women and men in the trade unions and political parties. Research and publications by certain political scientists, sociologists, and feminists further supported these claims, while the *Frauenfrage* (women’s question or issue) became a hot topic in the media.

The rise of the women’s movement in West Germany in 1968 certainly played a role in instigating the debate over gender roles. However, the debate was also a reaction to major

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demographic changes occurring in West Germany (and other Western European countries and the United States) regarding women’s employment, education, and the family. While the middle-class male-breadwinner household had certainly been the cultural ideal since the nineteenth century, this cultural norm became a social reality on the widest scale in 1950s West Germany. The Economic Miracle provided the financial stability for many wives to stay home with their families. Employment rates of women were much lower in the 1950s than in the Weimar Republic. Furthermore, trade unions and government officials promoted the male-breadwinner status of family men as a suitable replacement for the military masculinity promoted by pre-World War Two Germany.  

Beginning in the 1960s, labor shortages, better educational opportunities for women, and individual desire for employment on the part of women resulted in a gradual increase in female employment, especially mothers (although actual employment percentages did not equal the Weimar Republic until the 1970s). Women born in the Federal Republic were better educated than their mothers at both the university level and in job training. Starting in the 1960s, facing labor shortages, government officials and trade unions cooperated in the development of part-time employment for mothers as a compromise between their obligations to the family and their desire for employment. Rather than promote the full-time employment of women and mothers, West Germany began its guest worker program.  

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11 Monika Mattes, “Gastarbeiterinnen” in der Bundesrepublik: Anwerbepolitik, Migration und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren (Frankfurt am Main ; New York: Campus, 2005).
now modernized “male-breadwinner/female homemaker and part-time earner” family model began to influence all levels of West German politics and society.¹²

With the rise of the West German women’s movement, the election of the reform minded social liberal coalition into the majority, and an intensified debate over the women’s question, the 1970s represented a potential window of opportunity for reforming family policy toward promoting a more equitable gendered division of labor. Yet changes were minor and mostly discursive. This project aims to explore the causes of this disparity by focusing on the development of debate and policy centered on reconciling family and work from the 1960s through the 1980s. Four lines of inquiry form my analysis. First, what groups and individuals advocated changes in the gendered division of labor and worked towards reforming the relationship between family and work for parents? Second, what vision of the gendered division of labor did these different groups and individuals promote and how did they attempt to achieve their aims? What similarities and differences existed? Third, how did other members of the political parties, trade unions, autonomous women's movement, and the press respond to their assertions and activities? Fourth, what social policy, aimed at better reconciling family and work, resulted from the actions and interactions of these different groups and their wider organizations? What changes and continuities in conceptions of the gendered division of labor and means by which to balance family and work did these policies represent?

In order to answer these questions, this project is organized around case studies of one federal research program and two federal laws passed in the 1970s and 1980s that

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¹² This term is widely used in sociological literature. See Daly, *Contemporary Family Policy*; BMFSFJ, *Familie*. 
claimed to support a better reconciliation of family and work for mothers (and parents): The *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* (The Nanny Project), *Mutterschaftsurlaub* (Maternal Leave Policy), and *Erziehungsgeld* (Upbringing Money). Each policy represented a different approach by West Germany’s political parties—the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and CDU. The *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* began as a research study conducted by the Federal Family Ministry beginning in 1972 under the SPD family minister Katharina Focke. The ministry financed the care of children under the age of three by nannies in their home. Next, the *Mutterschaftsurlaub*, passed in 1979 by the SPD majority-led government, subsidized employment leave for new mothers for six months. Finally, *Erziehungsgeld* was the main family policy initiative of the CDU, drafted into law in 1985. Similar to the maternal leave policy, the law offered a federal subsidy to whichever parent stayed home to care for the child in the first year—in this case, regardless of the parent’s employment status before the child’s birth. Comparison of the different policy solutions and their development, I argue, reveals that the political parties did not seriously question the male-breadwinner family model that had informed family policy since the 1950s. Rather, policy makers supported the stay-at-home care of children by their mothers, except in cases of economic necessity, on the assumption that the best possible care for a small child was by its mother at home.

Since the challenge to the male-breadwinner model emanated mostly from women active in both traditional and non-traditional politics, this project also concerns itself with the role of West German feminists, women’s activists, and female politicians throughout the drafting process. I posit that the political and ideological differences between the various groups of active women in West Germany contributed to the failure to develop
comprehensive policies aimed at easing the burden of balancing family and employment. In other European countries such as Sweden, more developed welfare policies came to fruition through a coalition of women active in different sectors of society.¹³ In West Germany, however, fears of association with East German family politics and communism, an anti-institutional autonomous women’s movement fueled by criticism of the Federal Republic’s Nazi past, and a hyper-politicization of family politics around democratic and Christian principles by the CDU beginning in the 1950s created severe rifts among women and prevented coalition building around progressive social policy.

**Historiography**

By exploring the role of women’s activism in policy developments in the 1960s through the 1980s, the topic of this dissertation carves out a new direction in the study of West German women, but that nonetheless draws on existing literature focusing on the West German women’s movement beginning in the late 1960s, women in trade unions and political parties, and the intersection of women’s employment and family policy.

Scholars began analyzing the West German women’s movement almost since its inception, including, until recently, those who themselves participated in the movement.¹⁴

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The result is a scholarship that associates this movement with autonomous groups and individuals. Ute Gerhard defines “autonomous” in this context as “individual self-determination and the institutional independence from the heretofore political forms and organizations,” a definition similar to those of Gisela Notz and Myra Marx Feree. Recent works by Kristina Schulz and Elisabeth Zellmer establish a much more diverse narrative of West German feminism compared to previous scholarship. I argue, however, that in order to fully understand the broader implications of the women’s movement for society, politics, and culture, the narrative must include a much wider range of spaces of women’s activism, including the trade unions and political parties, in addition to grass roots organizing.


Furthermore, this dissertation expands our understanding of the role of female politicians in the development and implementation of federal policy from the late 1960s onward. This project moves beyond the biographical methodologies that have dominated the study of female parliamentary and party activities, exemplified by Brigit Meyer’s 1997 book *Frauen im Männerbund: Politikerinnen in Führungspositionen von der Nachkriegszeit bis Heute* and Gisela Notz’s publications on SPD female parliamentarians: *Frauen in der Mannschaft: Sozialdemokratinnen im Parlamentarischen Rat und im Deutschen Bundestag 1948/49–1957* and *Mehr als bunte Tupfen im Bonner Männerclub: Sozialdemokratinnen im Deutschen Bundestag 1957–1969*. Despite their limitations, these texts challenge the conception of women’s de-politicization following the Third Reich and World War Two.

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while reminding readers of continuities in women’s political activities from the Weimar Republic.

Notable exceptions to the biographical approach are Wolfgang Pausch’s *Die Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Frauenorganisationen* and Sarah Elise Wiliarty’s *The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany: Bringing Women to the Party.* Pausch provides an in-depth institutional history of the postwar development of the women’s organizations in the SPD, with a particular focus on the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Frauen* (Working Group of Social Democratic Women or AsF) that formed in 1973. He argues that “we cannot think of the New Women’s Movement without the autonomous women’s groups,” nonetheless, “the women of the social-liberation coalition [the SPD-FDP parliamentary coalition] were responsible for the parliamentary implementation” of feminist aims such as the changes in the abortion law and the liberalization of divorce law. Furthermore, Pausch posits a much more differentiated view of feminism in West Germany, arguing that feminism and women’s activism resided wherever women strived to improve their situation, including in the AsF.

While Pausch argues for a broad definition of the women’s movement, Wiliarty’s work stress the important role of conservative female politicians in the development of family policy in West Germany. Focusing on the role of CDU women in shaping work-family policy, abortion policy, and participation policy, she argues “to understand the politics

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of gender in Germany, we must understand the actions of the CDU."\textsuperscript{22} The mobilization of women in the CDU exemplifies Wiliarty’s true focus of her work, to explain the internal structures of the CDU and how it effectively mobilizes its different interest groups using a “corporatist catch-all party model.” Therefore, her monograph does not place the CDU Frauenvereinigung (CDU Women’s Association) in the broader perspective of federal policy development and the women’s movement. Nonetheless, her work contributes to our understanding of the development of Erziehungsgeld as the CDU’s main family policy goal and the strong voice exercised by CDU women within their party. Together Wiliarty and Pausch emphasize the inclusion of both left- and right-wing female politicians as historical actors in the history of the development of family policy in West Germany.

The literature on the topic of family policy and female employment analyzes the paradoxical change and stagnation in the gendered division of labor that functioned as one cause for the growth of a strong women’s movement in West Germany in the late 1960s. The existing literature can be organized around two key themes. First, scholars have analyzed the dominant male-breadwinner/female homemaker (and later part-time earner) family model and its influence not only on social policy and patterns of female paid labor in West Germany from the 1950s onward. On this theme, Robert Moeller’s \textit{Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany}, remains a seminal work since its publication in 1993. Moeller argues:

\begin{quote}
Woman as real or potential mother was at the center of debates over how state policy could mandate what employers might not otherwise do – tailor the workplace to women’s nature. This was the one arena where state policy attempted directly to regulate women’s wage work in the fifties.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{22} Wiliarty, \textit{The CDU and the Politics of Gender}, 15.

Using the example of the discussion surrounding the *Mutterschutzgesetz* (maternity protection), Moeller demonstrates how policy discussion in the 1950s viewed women as both reproductive and productive labor; “recognizing equal rights was completely consistent with acknowledging that women and men were different” in the minds of the discussants.\(^{24}\) His work reveals the connections between constructions of gender and family and political developments.\(^{25}\) Lukas Rölli-Allkemper’s *Familie im Wiederaufbau: Katholizismus und bürgerliches Familienideal in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1965* analyzes the role of the influential Catholic Church in the development of conceptualizations of the family in the 1950s. Rölli-Allkemper argues that the CDU/CSU’s position upholding the male-breadwinner gendered division of labor in family politics can be linked to the family minister Franz-Josef Würmeling, a staunch Catholic.\(^{26}\)

Scholars on West German family policy also emphasize the long-term persistence of the modernized male-breadwinner model in West Germany in comparative and local studies. Wiebke Kolbe’s study *Elternschaft in Wohlfahrtstaat: Schweden und die Bundesrepublik im Vergleich 1945–2000* compares the conception of parenthood in family policy in West Germany and Sweden in the postwar. She finds that until the 1970s, the language of family

\(^{24}\) Ibid, 147.


\(^{26}\) Till von Rahden has also recently argued that while the male-breadwinner status of fathers was upheld in the 1950s, public discussion and judicial rulings worked towards reducing patriarchal authority in the family in favor of equal power for both parents, especially over decisions involving their children. See Till van Rahden, “Demokratie und väterliche Autorität: Das Karlsruher “Stichentscheid” – Urteil von 1959 in der politischen Kultur der frühen Bundesrepublik,” *Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History Online Ausgabe* 2 (2005): 1-10.
policy emphasized the mother as the primary care giver in the family, a similar trajectory as Sweden. By the 1980s, West Germany family policy shifted to include fathers, but only at a discursive level. While Sweden’s family policy beginning in the 1970s both discursively and structurally promoted a dual earner household, West Germany’s family policy in practice continued to promote the modernized male-breadwinner model.27

Christiane Kuller’s *Familienpolitik im föderativen Sozialstaat* also emphasizes paradoxes inherent in conceptions of the gendered division of labor in family policy from 1945 to 1975. Focusing on the interactions between state officials in Bavaria and federal politicians, Kuller argues that conflicts of authority between the two groups regarding family policy led to its uneven development.28 This study builds on Kolbe’s long-term and comparative study and Kuller’s case study by broadening the federal policy development to include the media, trade unions, politicians, and women’s groups to emphasize the contestation, but eventual normalization, of the modernized male-breadwinner model in West German family policy.

Although there exists a consensus in the literature that political, economic, and social institutions upheld the modernized male-breadwinner gendered division of labor in West Germany beginning in the 1950s, the second key theme in the literature on female employment explores the 1960s as a transitional decade in mentalities toward and structures of female employment, especially the employment of mothers. The book *Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am Zuverdienen: Geschlechterpolitik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Westdeutschland 1948–1969* by Christine von Oertzen, published in 1999, is the most

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27 Kolbe, *Elternschaft*.

influential work on the development of female labor policies. She contends that this change came through an expansion of the part-time labor force of women driven both by married women’s and mothers’ increased desire to work and by the necessary response by politicians to market forces. Ute Frevert’s research acknowledges that mothers in particular and West German society in general no longer viewed employment as incompatible with familial obligations. Nevertheless, the literature also indicates the limits of such developments. For instance, Karen Hagemann’s work on the time politics of childcare argues the modernization of the male-breadwinner family model did not call into question the West German conception of the gendered division of labor. Instead, politicians and trade union members used the development of part-time employment for women in the 1960s to block measures to that would allow full-time employment of mothers, since part-time work was seen as a satisfactory solution to fulfilling women’s desire for paid work while maintaining their duties in the family.

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29 This development is further supported by Merith Niehuss’s statistical analysis in Merith Niehuss, Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft: Studien zur Strukturgeschichte der Familie in Westdeutschland 1945-1960 (Göttingen; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001). Here she argues that the employment of married women increased more than any other group of women between 1945-1960.

30 Frevert argues that this was partially due to the fact that women were having children sooner, yet not having as many, so women were younger when they were done with the caretaking of their children. See Frevert, “Umbruch,” 645-46.

The historiography on West German women’s activism and political participation, family policy, and female employment does make clear that the paradox of change and stagnation in the “women’s questions” seemed to be very developed in West Germany by the 1980s. Change took place, but not to the same degree as in other Western European countries. This seems to be one reason why the goals of family policy are still contested and debated in Germany today.32

Methodology and Sources

To contribute to our understanding of this paradox, this project is organized around case studies of policies aimed at reconciling family and employment for parents from proposal to implementation in the 1970s and 1980s. The decision to focus specifically on the issue of family and employment derives from feminist scholarship on the gendered division of labor and the family. This scholarship incorporates the women’s movement’s critique of biologically-determined gender roles and employment opportunities, arguing instead that the gendered division of labor is a social construction and social relationship.33 While these concepts originated in the subject of this dissertation, they nonetheless provide important guidance in the interpretation of sources. Barbara Duden and Karin Hausen, two forerunners of feminist scholarship in West Germany, offer two interrelated definitions of the gendered division of labor. First, the “technical-material” gendered division of labor refers to the assignment of skills, tasks, and wages based on their designation as either masculine or


33 Ilse Lenz, Die neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland: Abschied vom kleinen Unterschied: eine Quellensammlung, 1. Aufl. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 151.
In this project, the gendered division of labor is not a fixed concept, despite numerous studies that demonstrate the hegemony of the male-breadwinner/female homemaker family model—and its consequent modernization to allow mothers’ part-time work—until the late 1950s in social and state institutions in West Germany.\(^{37}\) Rather, it considers the assertions of groups and individuals who attempted to challenge the dominant conceptions of the gendered division of labor as a path to achieving female emancipation. This project examines the 1960s through the mid 1980s as a time of debate and contestation over how to organize the division of labor between men and women in West Germany, especially the issue of balancing paid work outside the home and family. The family must play a significant role in any work that focuses on the gendered division of labor. As Louise Tilly and Joan W. Scott argue, conceptualizations of familial obligations and social and cultural conceptions of women’s roles in the home strongly impact the work patterns of women.\(^{38}\) In order to understand constructions of the gendered division of labor by different parties and their consequences on social practice, one must identify what roles are specifically designated for individual family members. Family policies centered on reconciling family and employment offer an excellent point of intersection between cultural constructs, social practice, and the family.

Explanations of why family policy does or does not change require a broad understanding of economic, social, and political developments and cultural contexts. The West German debates over gender roles, the employment of mothers, and family policy

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coinciding with long term trends in the development of women’s employment and education indicate the period of the 1970s and 1980s was a window of opportunity for reform in family policy, yet several interwoven factors help explain why West German family policy did not develop a conception of the dual earner household. In the introduction to their 2011 edited volume *Children, Families, and States: Time Policies of Childcare, Preschool, and Primary Education in Europe*, Karen Hagemann, Konrad Jarausch, and Cristina Allemann-Ghionda provide a framework to analyze family policy developments. The concept of path dependency figures prominently in their methodology. Developed by Paul Pierson, path dependency stresses that political patterns become increasingly difficult to change over time and with repetition due to the “increased material and cultural costs of change.” Reform then requires dramatic economic, social, and political pressures.

Hagemann, Jarausch, and Allemann-Ghionda argue circumstances that promote or hinder reform include:

1. The legal and institutional foundations of childcare and the education system.
2. The economic and labor market situation, the financial strength of the state, and the system of funding childcare services and schools.
3. Demographic development of society and the population policy of the state.
4. The dominant cultural concepts (and competing ideas) of childcare and schooling.
5. The hegemonic concept of the gender order.
6. The structure of the overall political system, the specific political constellation, and the ability of different interest groups to assert their position in the normative debate over questions of childcare and schooling.40

This project focuses on the last issue by exploring the interplay between the West German women’s movement and the development of family policy. However, the other factors cannot

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40 Ibid., 14-15.
be ignored in the analysis. Those who advocated for family policy reforms contended with an ever deepening recession beginning with the oil shocks in 1973, new scientific research by pediatricians and child psychologists that further reinforced standing cultural conceptions of mothers as the best caregivers, and a dramatic birthrate decline that became apparent by the end of the 1970s. All of these issues justified the return of mothers to the home full time in the eyes of many politicians and trade union members. To accommodate the multitude of factors, each case study involves analysis at four different, but interrelated, levels, demonstrating that West German family policy activists operated within a wider context that shaped the political discourse over the family.

The “actor level” focuses on activists who advocated a change in the gendered division of labor, their interactions with each other, and with their colleagues. In order to present a more complete narrative of the women’s movement, analysis includes not only autonomous feminists, but other grassroots activists and those who work in the traditional institutions—trade unions and political parties. The publications of the sociology- and political science-based Research Network on Gender, Politics, and the State (RNGS) provide a broader conceptualization of feminism to bridge the institutional/non-institutional divide. They include in their definition of feminism any organization “that had the object of improving the status of women…whether or not these organizations proclaimed themselves feminist.” Furthermore, Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur argue that “an ideology, policy, organization, or activity is feminist to the extent that it has the purpose of improving the status of women as a group and undermining patterns of gender hierarchy.”

Sources at this level derive from the individuals, groups, and organizations that comprised the women’s movement. Internal organizational documents, such as pamphlets, grey materials, and meeting protocols and minutes, as well as published sources, provide insight into internal debates over issues that may or may not have been part of the wider discussion on the issue of reconciling family and work and the gendered division of labor. Published sources, in particular magazines and newspapers published by the organizations and various women’s groups, are integral to any study on the West German women’s movement. These mediums were vital in the communication and debate between individuals and groups. By analyzing these published sources, we can attain a better understanding of both the most important debates and the important issues for the individual groups. The analysis of these sources examines the extent to which their activities and debates supported or hindered developments in policies that would better reconcile family and work for parents.

In the exploration of these individuals and groups, I will avoid using the term “New Women’s Movement” in favor of more specific designations such as “autonomous women’s movement” or organization names, unless used by the historical actors themselves. To emphasize the importance of generation in the women’s movement, I situate all mentioned activists with their birth year.

The “discursive level” will look at the debate between these varying groups within the communicative public sphere, focusing specifically on the press. Nancy Fraser argues for the existence of a multiplicity of publics beyond Jürgen Habermas’s “bourgeois masculinist” sphere outlined in the seminal work The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, of which the press represents just one of several.42 While the public sphere is connected to civil

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42 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, 1st MIT Press pbk. ed, Studies in contemporary German social thought (Cambridge, Mass:
society, it is a distinct realm where the press transmits information and cultivates public opinion, but also fulfills other cultural and entertainment functions, such as creating meaning, navigating emotion, and conveying values.\textsuperscript{43} It does not copy societal processes, but is a site where historical events and trends are interpreted.\textsuperscript{44} Using newspaper and magazine publications representing a diversity of political leanings, the press functions in this project as another site of debates over the gendered division of labor and family policy. The press not only formulates opinion, but also acts as a facilitator and interpreter of ideas between historical actors. The sources at this level include the left leaning magazines \textit{Stern} and \textit{Der Spiegel}, the left liberal newspapers \textit{Die Zeit} and \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau}, and the more conservative newspapers \textit{Die Welt} and \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}. In addition to selecting publications with varying political leanings, these magazines and newspapers were also selected for their national perspective and distribution.

The “actor” and “discursive” levels contribute to the development and implementation of policy, which is the focus of the “policy level.” Using \textit{Bundestag}, \textit{Bundesrat}, and Federal Ministry documentation, I analyze the policy proposals and negotiations at the Federal level from initial discussions within the political parties and trade unions until its establishment as policy. Sources analyzed follow this process. First transcripts from the National Party Congresses, meeting protocols, policy statements, and press releases from the CDU and SPD illuminate the development of proposals within the


\textsuperscript{44}Jörg Requate, “Öffentlichkeit und Medien als Gegenstände historischer Analyse,” \textit{Geschichte und Gesellschaft} 5 (1999): 9
political parties. While the German Trade Union Federation was not a political body, as an important lobby in the West German government, the same sources illuminate policy discussion within the DGB. Second, Bundestag printed materials (Drucksache), transcripts from parliamentary debates, and protocols and transcripts of individual Bundestag committee meetings relate the parliamentary process, the important issues in parliamentary committees and debates on the floor of the Bundestag, and changes over time in the policy proposals. This analysis will determine the conceptualizations of the gendered division of labor found in the proposals by comparing the language of the bill with the structure of the policy (for instance, the implications of how much money is offered to parents or which parent is allowed access under the proposal). Also important is evaluating the factors, such as political ideology, that influenced whether a party or politicians supported or opposed a proposal.

Finally, the “government level” analyzes the interaction of these various actors, ideas, strategies, and policy proposals with important developments in the political history of the West German government. This level of analysis is not based in separate sources, rather refers to the importance of political context in the evaluation of the primary documents. The time frame of this project spans threes different eras in the West German government, each with its own character and concerns. 1966 to 1974 was marked by reform and continued economic prosperity, first with the Grand Coalition between the political parties, then with the social liberal coalition under SPD chancellor Willy Brandt. The economic recession and the pragmatic leadership of SPD chancellor Helmut Schmidt defined the years 1974 to 1982. Finally, 1982 to 1989 saw the return of the CDU/CSU to the political majority under Helmut
Kohl. Any analysis of political debate over policy must take these meta-factors into consideration.

Finally, I did not conceive of this project with a comparative framework, but I nonetheless found it useful to provide a comparison with specific policies in Sweden and France, considered two of the most progressive nations in the area of family policy by the end of the 1970s, and Britain, considered more on par with West Germany. This serves to place West German family policy in a wider European context, without detracting from the deep nationally specific historical analysis conducted in this project.

**Organization**

Chapter one introduces the aims and strategies of the various women’s activists who form the foundation of this dissertation. It demonstrates that the autonomous women’s movement did indeed participate in an extensive debate over the issues of the gendered division of labor in the family and the reconciliation of family and employment for mothers. Furthermore, the chapter establishes a more complete narrative of the West German woman’s movement by including women in the political parties and trade unions.

Chapter two delves into the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* from 1972 until 1978. Organizers of the project in the Federal Ministry of Youth, Family, and Health aimed first to debunk popularized scientific connections between employed mothers and stunted socialization in early childhood, and second to further develop solutions to ease the double-

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45 For a more extensive explanation of the particulars of the periodization and the character of each political era, see the recent volumes Edgar Wolfrum, *Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, 1st ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006); Andreas Wirsching, *Abschied vom Provisorium, 1982-1990*, 1st ed. (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006); Eckart Conze, *Die Suche nach Sicherheit: eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1949 bis in die Gegenwart*, 1st ed. (München: Siedler, 2009).
burden of employed mothers who needed to work out of financial necessity. The project instigated an ideological debate between a broad spectrum of West German citizens—including medical professionals, politicians, feminists, and trade union members—over the best strategies for upbringing children under the age of three and the issue of reconciling family and employment. Despite the intensity of the debate, it represented a limited step towards achieving equitable gendered division of labor for West German citizens as it was directed towards low-income families.

In contrast to a federal initiative that was aimed at supporting the continued employed of mothers, the next two case studies focus on solutions that subsidized the stay-at-home care of children by their mothers. Chapter three discusses the 1978 Mutterschaftsurlaub proposal from the SPD/FDP coalition. At first glance, the family policy seemed to represent the fruition of a popular goal among women’s activists, especially among women in the trade unions and the SPD. However, these same women voiced discontent that the policy proposal excluded fathers, thereby reinforcing the conception of mothers as the sole caregivers. This criticism was short-lived as leaders in the DGB and SPD women’s organizations rallied their female members to support the bill as a first step towards achieving a parental leave policy. Furthermore, investigation into the motives of the SPD/FDP faction reveal the policy served the austerity measures needed to combat the ever worsening recession; the fact that only 50 percent of mothers returned to the workforce suggested a maternal leave policy would free up more jobs for other West Germans.

Finally, chapter four focuses on the dominant CDU/CSU family political initiative of the 1970s and 1980s: Erziehungsgeld. The policy of subsidizing childcare for all parents, though not implemented until the 1986 after the election of the CDU/CSU into power in
1982, remained a popular option for reconciling family and employment, one supported by scholars connected to the federal government through the authorship of the Second and Third Family Reports of 1975 and 1978 respectively. Furthermore, the policy exposes the power of the CDU Frauenvereinigung within the CDU; Erziehungsgeld was conceived of and lobbied successfully by the Frauenvereinigung in cooperation with other lobby groups within the CDU. The birthrate decline of the late 1970s also contributed significantly to the popularization of the proposal among certain influential individuals and groups in West Germany by causing a conservative turn in conceptions of family policy.
CHAPTER ONE

Agitating for the Right to Family and Employment: Women’s Activism and the Gendered Division of Labor

In 1978, members of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratische Frauen (Working Group of Social Democratic Women or AsF), the women’s caucus within the West German Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), reached out to members of the West German feminist press and autonomous women’s groups. This initiation of collaboration resulted in several meetings between the politicians and autonomous feminist groups from April 1978 until November 1979. Certainly, some autonomous feminists objected to working with female politicians who represented “male,” patriarchal institutions. Gunild Feigenwinter (b. 1940), a German national, scholar, and editor of the Basel-based feminist magazine Die Hexen Presse (The Witches Press) responded, “We must get straight that there can be no rights for one-third of the population, mothers and children, within a male party and a party program conceptualized for men.”1 But other radical feminists hesitantly acknowledged the potential in working together toward feminist aims. For instance, the Frauenforum in Munich believed that “we need the solidarity of all women in order to improve the role of women in politics and their situation in West German society.”2 The initiatives nonetheless collapsed in

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1 AdsD/SPD-PV/Referat Frauen/9619/ “Letter Feigenwinter to Parteivorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei”
Throughout this chapter, I will be providing the birth years for the activists mentioned because generation played an important role in the activities and positions of women.

2 Ibid, “Frauenforum Letter to AsF Bundesvorstand”
late 1979 after the SPD press service published an article unauthorized by the AsF that harshly criticized the feminist journalist and magazine editor Alice Schwarzer. The article irreparably severed ties between the AsF and the autonomous women’s groups, as the incident only confirmed autonomous feminist’s suspicions regarding women working within “patriarchal” institutions.

Yet, despite these almost two years of consistent cooperation, the historiography of the “New Women’s Movement” in West Germany rarely ever mentions such direct interaction. Furthermore, scholars focus on a set group of initiatives, including the abortion rights campaign, the women’s centers and autonomous subculture, and the campaign to fight violence against women, ignoring issues such as the “mother question.”3 Such omissions are a product of a narrow definition of the West German women’s movement as an exclusively autonomous feminist movement.4 The feminist sociologist Ute Gerhard (b. 1939) defines autonomy as “an individual self-determination and institutional independence from the heretofore forms of political forms and organization” and the “most important indicator of the New Women’s Movement.”5 The American sociologist Myra Marx Ferree (b. 1949),


while referencing the existence of socialist and liberal feminism in West Germany, nonetheless argues that “‘feminist’ refers primarily to the radical feminist strain” and that “‘the autonomous women’s movement’ is the term used most frequently.”

This narrow perspective on the movement for women’s emancipation can be attributed to the involvement of many of the first scholars of the movement in the autonomous feminist movement. As Gerhard comments, “the relationship between research on women and the women’s movement as a current state of research is particularly close and therefore also complicated as it surrenders itself to the common goals of emancipation and the known partisanship of the female researchers.” Therefore, the personal activism of the researchers impacted their scholarly perspective. The result is a state of research that, until very recently, rarely interrogated the wide scope of emancipatory activity by women in West Germany from the late 1960s until the 1980s.

Returning back to the 1970s, we find that the early histories of the women’s movement written around 1978 as feminists began assessing a decade’s worth of activism, emphasized the diversity of the movement and the contestation over defining the movement. While the journalist and author Renate Wiggershaus (b. 1945) in her 1979 Geschichte der

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7 Gerhard, “Westdeutsche Frauenbewegung,” 42.

Frauen und der Frauenbewegung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der Deutschen Demokratische Republik nach 1945 includes pre-1968 women’s movements in West and East Germany, post-1968 she concentrates solely on the “autonomous” or “self-sufficient and organizationally independent” feminist activities and media for her chapter on West German feminism beginning in the late 1960s. In contrast, the journalist and author Lottemi Doormann (b. 1943) introduces a broader understanding of West German feminism in her compilation Keiner schiebt uns weg, published in 1979. Doormann broadly defines the New Women’s Movement to include “autonomous” women but also those active in “extra-parliamentary” or “citizen initiatives” directed towards and run by women. Doormann’s particular perspective was influenced by her involvement in the Demokratische Fraueninitiative (Democratic Women’s Initiative or DFI) founded in 1975 by a group of women who felt the initiatives organized by most autonomous women’s groups were too limited in scope. While the DFI identified as autonomous because they did not associate with any particular established organization or political party, they nonetheless sought to improve relations among feminist groups and “to bring our program to established organizations, parties, and parliament through versatile activities.”

Publications by a new generation of scholars acknowledge and analyze the existence of various strains of feminism in West Germany. Kristina Schulz’s (b. 1971) Lange Atem der Provokation from 2002 categorizes several types of feminism in West Germany in the 1970s.

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10 Doormann, Keiner schiebt uns weg, 13.

11 Quoted in ibid., 64.
Furthermore, using a case study of feminist activity in Munich in the 1970s, Elisabeth Zellmer’s (b. 1977) 2011 monograph Töchter der Revolte? challenges the autonomous definition of the women’s movement. However, both monographs focus on non-institutional women’s activism. This study on West German feminists and activists contributes to this growing trend, but by offering an alternative, critical narrative that includes women’s activists and feminists in the political parties and trade unions. This project further challenges the established historiography by focusing on the issues of motherhood, reconciling family and work, and the gendered division of labor. Only through a broader definition of feminist activists and through understanding the debates and contestation over motherhood and employment can we better understand feminists’ role in the development of West German family policy in the 1970s and 1980s. I argue that in the case of West Germany, rifts among women were created by fears of association with East German family politics and communism in the major parties and the trade unions, an anti-institutional autonomous women’s movement fueled by critiques of the Federal Republic’s Nazi past, and a hyper-politicization of family politics around democratic and Christian principles by the CDU/CSU beginning in the 1950s. These ideological divisions among female activists hindered the creation of a unified front that would compel the government to question the male-breadwinner family model.

This chapter begins by outlining important demographic trends in women’s employment, education, and family planning that impacted the development of debates in the

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12 Schulz, Der lange Atem; Zellmer, Töchter der Revolte?.

13 The women’s movement successfully challenged the association of work with employment, instead positing that work encompassed the unpaid labor of women in the household. In most cases, I focus on reconciliation of family and employment, yet I use work to denote instances where activists included the issues of housework and housewives in the discussion.
1970s and 1980s. Second, the chapter shapes the debates over motherhood and reconciling family and work in the autonomous women’s movement, women’s organizations in the political parties, and finally the DGB women’s division.

I. Demographic and Social Changes for West German Women, 1950s–1980s

The debate over gender roles and reconciling family and work in the 1970s and 1980s was not the product solely of the developing women’s movement. Rather the debate, and the women’s movement itself, emerged due to the culmination of long-term trends in women’s employment and education, which also complicated balancing the desire for employment and for children for women. Scholars on female employment in West Germany agree that long-term developments suggest a narrative of contradictions. On the one hand, the women’s employment grew steadily beginning in the 1950s due to increased participation of married women and mothers. Furthermore, due to education reforms started in the 1960s, women were better educated. On the other hand, a highly gendered division of labor in employment and job training, wage differentiation, and the proliferation of part-time work for mothers suggest the continued importance of a “male-breadwinner/female homemaker” and later “female part-time earner” division of labor in the organization of gender relations in the home and in the economy.14

The raw number of women employed in West Germany rose gradually from 1950 to 1989, with a slight drop-off between 1965 and 1970 due to a recession in 1967 and 1968 (see

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table 1.1). In comparison, the labor market participation of women aged 15 to 65 in 1925 was around 48 to 50 percent, a number not reached again until 1976.\textsuperscript{15} One can then begin to visualize the importance and validation of the male-breadwinner family model in 1950s West Germany. This model became the dominate organization of gender roles due to influence of the Catholic Church and the simultaneous development of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), backed by the Soviet Union, which empowered the conservative agenda of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total in 1,000</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Labor Force</th>
<th>Percentage of Women Aged 15-65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>7,267</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>8,050</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>9,088</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>9,785</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>9,412</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>9,760</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9,528</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9,829</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>9,658</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>10,794</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Jahrbüch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Maier, “Zwischenarbeitsmarkt,” 259.

Christian Democratic Party in West Germany.\textsuperscript{16} In the Cold War context, the idealization of the male-breadwinner model supposedly functioned as a bulwark against the GDR working mother, who was perceived to destroy the family.\textsuperscript{17} Such policies also became necessary due

\textsuperscript{15} Hausen, “Frauenerwerbstätigkeit und erwerbstätige Frauen. Anmerkung zur historischen Forschung,” 31.


\textsuperscript{17} Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 78.
to the demobilization and reintegration of the defeated *Wehrmacht* into society. Employment, and with it the promise of the role of breadwinner, “was a central element of transforming former soldiers and POWs into postwar citizens.”18 With the discrediting after its defeat of the ideal of militarized masculinity dominant in the Third Reich, officials started to propagate a “domestic, civil” masculinity, emphasizing male authority in families through the male-breadwinner status of men.19 Therefore, the majority of women employed in the early 1950s tended to be young, single women, war widows, or divorcees.20

This pattern changed quickly as more married women and mothers took up employment beginning in the late 1950s (see table 1.2).21 Mentalities toward the employment of mothers shifted as women, especially married women, articulated more and more a desire to work outside the home. This happened ironically when the economy reached a point where

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Mothers</th>
<th>Married Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children Under 18</td>
<td>Children Under 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


19 Ibid.

20 Maier, “Zwischenarbeitsmarkt,” 258.

even most working-class families could financially sustain a gendered division of labor that followed the male-breadwinner model. Women not only accepted employment as compatible with their familial obligations, but societal opinions about wives and mothers working outside the home shifted due to labor shortages. 

The closing of the border by the GDR in 1961, which stopped the emigration of a well-educated workforce from the East, and the crisis of the FRG education system, which did not produce enough qualified employees, resulted in a cumulative shortage of labor. Rather than promote the full-time employment of West German women and mothers, as in countries such as Sweden, West Germany recruited male and female migrant workers (Gastarbeiter), while institutionalizing female part-time work among its own populace (see table 1.3). In addition to fulfilling an economic need, government officials, labor organizations, and confessional groups viewed part-time work as a means of accommodating

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the wants of married women without compromising their role in the family.\textsuperscript{24} By the late 1960s, the overall discourse shifted: a more modernized family model that nonetheless propagated the male-breadwinner/female homemaker and part-time earner family became more and more influential in politics and the media.

\textbf{Table 1.3 Weekly Work Hours of Women, 1961–1986 (in % of total female workforce)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under 15</th>
<th>15-24</th>
<th>25 to 40</th>
<th>40 or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 21</td>
<td>21-39</td>
<td>40-42</td>
<td>43 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978*</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982*</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986*</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source: Statistisches Jahrbüch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Maier, “Zwischen Arbeitsmarkt,” 270.}

\textsuperscript{a} Hours divided in 40-41 and 42 or more for the years 1978, 1982, and 1986.

While overall employment of women continued to rise from the 1950s onward, structural characteristics of the West German labor market also demonstrated contradictory trends. The transition of the West German economy from agriculture and manufacturing to a service economy benefitted women at a basic level, as women transitioned into these careers much earlier than men.\textsuperscript{25} At the beginning of the 1980s, women still occupied more than half of the office and sales workforce. Nonetheless, these transitions were still wrought with continued and visible labor market gender segregation into the 1980s, both in career choices among women, their options, and in career advancement opportunities (see table 1.4).\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} Oertzen, “Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust,” 99.

\textsuperscript{25} Maier, “Zwischen Arbeitsmarkt,” 262-266.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 266-268.
Scholars agree that continued difficulties in access to advanced vocational training for women as well as the recession that began in the late 1970s just as the most-educated female cohort was ready to enter the labor market, to name just a few factors, resulted in the persistence of gendered labor market segregation until the end of the 1980s despite successful efforts to better educate West German women. Education reform and expansion began en masse in the 1960s after the launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 caused much questioning of whether the West Germany could match the technological and scientific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.4 Top Ten Professions for Women and Men, 1980</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Profession</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Office Workers and Assistants</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Specialized Health Worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Cleaning</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Book Keeping and Data Processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Social Services Related</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Teachers</td>
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<td>8. Unskilled Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Agricultural Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Banking and Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Office Workers and Assistants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Metal Worker/ Lock Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ground Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Contractor/Entrepreneur/Accountant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Electrician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Unskilled Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mechanic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


27 Kolinsky, Women in West Germany, 117–118.
innovation of the Soviet Union. Critics of the system recognized the educational disadvantages experienced by women and the working class. Therefore, by the end of the 1980s women could expect equality of education to men (see table 1.5).\textsuperscript{28}

**Table 1.5** Participation in full-time education by age and gender

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{a} Age sixteen is the last year of basic compulsory schooling. Students continue with vocational training, either part-time with apprenticeships or in full-time vocational schools. Others remain full-time students in preparation for university.

Transitioning women from educational opportunity to the job market continued to be a difficult process. The range of vocational opportunities for women and their preferences changed little between the 1950s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{29} For instance, in 1984 three out of four girls were concentrated in just twenty (out of a possible 412) job-training programs. This trend was further reinforced by the limited access of women to highly desired apprenticeship programs under what was known as the dual system. In this system, apprentices worked under contract with employers while attending vocational school part time. Employers played


a partial but significant role in the acceptance rates of women. Employers tended to earmark about half of the spots for men, one quarter for women, and one quarter for both sexes.\textsuperscript{30}

The economic recession brought on by the oil shocks of the 1970s also negatively impacted access for women to advanced vocational training and employment opportunities in general. On the one hand, the baby boom generation entered the work force, resulting in fiercer competition for apprenticeships and jobs. On the other hand, the economic slowdown reduced available positions. Between 1970 and 1985, 2.2 million manufacturing and 1 million agricultural jobs disappeared, replaced by only 1.2 million jobs in the expanding tertiary sector.\textsuperscript{31} The result was the highest unemployment rate in West Germany since before the Economic Miracle, a burden born unequally by women until 1982 (see table 1.6).

### Table 1.6 Unemployment Rate in West Germany, 1978–1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>388,504</td>
<td>475,739</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>316,875</td>
<td>419,815</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>368,502</td>
<td>454,199</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>616,329</td>
<td>640,069</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>982,410</td>
<td>836,228</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*

While employment became a norm in the life planning of most West German women, the conflict between employment and the desire for children continued. Statistics demonstrate that women continued to shoulder the primary burden of childcare.\textsuperscript{32} The decision to have children often led to mothers foregoing employment altogether or an

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 117.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 118.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 157.
employment cycle punctuated by career breaks for childrearing. Over time, however, the percentage of mothers returning to work after childbirth increased while the duration of career breaks decreased (see table 1.2). In the 1950s, mothers who returned to work did so after an average fifteen-year break. By the 1980s, this decreased by half.\footnote{Ibid., 155; For how different family leave policies affected women’s leave patterns, see Karin Gottschall and Katherine Bird, “Family Leave Policies and Labor Market Segregation,” \textit{The Review of Policy Research} 20, no. 1 (March 2003): 115–134.}

When contemplating their desire to return to work, mothers considered their education, the time elapsed since her last period of employment, and her age. However, following through depended on the age of and the type of employment to which she would return. This was due to cultural conceptions of proper childrearing practices and its impact on the childcare and educational system in West Germany. Since the \textit{Kaiserreich}, half-day childcare and education had been the norm, both to alleviate the financial burden of the state, and because proponents of the bourgeois male-breadwinner family model argued that the family best performed childrearing duties and that mothers were the ideal educators.\footnote{Karen Hagemann, “Between Ideology and Economy: The ‘Time Politics’ of Child Care and Public Education in the Two Germanys,” \textit{Social Politics} 13, no. 2 (2006): 231.} This division between the role of state-run schools in providing education and the function of the home in providing socialization and childrearing continued well into the 1970s and 1980s.

cultural perceptions (in addition to financial considerations) resulted in the proliferation of half-day Kindergartens for children aged three to six, and half-day education beginning at the Grundschule (elementary school) level.\(^{36}\) State-funded childcare was and continues to be almost non-existent for children under three. In 1970 there were only enough spots in state-funded care for 1.3 percent of all children under three. In 1980, the coverage only increased by 0.2 percent.\(^ {37}\) However, in response to the increased part-time employment of mothers beginning in the 1960s, childcare for children aged three to six expanded greatly, reaching 66 percent coverage in 1970 and 79 percent in 1980.\(^ {38}\) Nonetheless, the limited childcare opportunities for children under the age of three and the half-day model of the West German education system severely impacted the employment decisions of mothers. By the 1980s, employment was an important step in the life planning of most West German women, regardless of social class. Yet economic and cultural factors, as well as the realities of childcare, continued to influence the labor market participation of women.\(^ {39}\) These forces catalyzed the debates over the gendered division of labor and the reconciliation of family and work that ensued in the 1970s and 1980s.


\(^{37}\) Jürgen Reyer and Heidrun Kleine, Die Kinderkrippe in Deutschland: Sozialgeschichte einer umstrittenen Einrichtung (Freiburg im Breisgau: Lambertus, 1997), 159.


II. “Mothers are Political Too”: The Autonomous Women’s Movement

On September 13, 1968, Helke Sander, the co-founder of the West Berlin-based Aktionsrat der Befreiung der Frauen (Action Council for the Emancipation of Women), gave a speech at the national delegation conference of the Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (Socialist German Student Federation or SDS). Sander chastised the student organization for reinforcing the bourgeois gendered separation of public and private spheres; the women stayed home to care for children or performed menial tasks, while the men participated in discussion groups and protested on the street.\(^{40}\) When the president of the SDS Hans-Jürgen Krahl followed Sander on the podium, he did not acknowledge Sander’s speech. In anger, attendee Sigrid Rügen hurled a tomato at Krahl in protest. Both scholars and participants alike designate Rügen’s action as informal start of the women’s movement in West Germany.

While the aspiring feminist groups quickly added “new” to their title, in reality they joined Germany’s rich tradition of women’s organizing and activism since the mid-nineteenth century. The women of the 1970s shared similar debates as their predecessors over the role of employment in achieving women’s emancipation and the employment status of housewives, and they fought for equal pay for women, better job training, and the improved socio-economic status of mothers.\(^{41}\) The middle-class movement even began a

\(^{40}\) Speech reproduced in Notz, “Die Auswirkung der Studentenbewegung auf die Frauenbewegung.”

*Kindergarten* movement aimed at aiding working-class families.\(^{42}\) Both middle-class and social democratic women’s activists connected their charitable work and interest in the well-being of working-class families to their own struggle for better education and employment rights for young women.\(^{43}\) Yet, as this section will show, despite the clear historical roots of many of the debates of the 1970s, the “new” activists, at least at first, had little to no knowledge of their predecessors. The break of National Socialism and World War Two, along with a lack of knowledge available of the history of their movement and a generational conflict with their mothers, contributed to an understanding of themselves as advocating a new vision of gender roles and women’s rights.

*The Mother Question in the Early Autonomous Movement, 1968–1972*

Sander’s speech exemplified the early movement’s deliberation not only on the “women’s question,” but also the “mother question”—how could mothers balance increased public participation with childcare duties? The *Aktionsrat* appeared in January 1968 at the Free University in West Berlin, declaring in an advertisement for their first meeting, “We have grown envious and sad…because our individual attempts to bring together study, love, and kids have wasted away…”\(^{44}\) Original organizers included Marianne Herzog, who would later join the infamous terrorist group the Red Army Faction, Sigfrid Fronus, the first president of the General Student Committee at the Free University West Berlin, and Sander.


\(^{44}\) FFBIZ Archiv/Berlin/A/Rep. 400/20. Aktionsrat(2)/Berlin/Folder Handapp. Träger I/4
All were active in the New Left movements of the 1960s, but were increasingly aware of the unequal treatment of women, especially mothers, by their male comrades. They began as an informal discussion group focusing on the available texts on the women’s question—such as Simone de Beauvoir’s *Second Sex*, Betty Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique*, and August Bebel’s *Women in Socialism*.45

While the women who comprised the group came from different personal and theoretical backgrounds, the intense focus on the “mother question” stemmed directly from the presence of Sander (b. 1937). As a film student, activist, and single mother, she experienced firsthand the difficulties in balancing work, parenting, activism, and education. When she became pregnant with her son, she married the father and moved to Finland, giving up her studies. After working as a director in the Finnish theater scene and on television, she left her husband and returned to West Berlin with her son. Through her studies at the newly-founded Berlin Film Academy, Sander became interested in the leftist politics of her fellow students. She moved into one of the first *Wohngemeinschaften* (apartment sharing communities), which helped solve her issues with finding an apartment as a single mother and eased the issue of childcare. Eventually she joined the SDS.46

Her personal experience directly influenced her feminist theory. She criticized the economic and emotional dependencies of women on the family and husband. In a document from February 1968 disseminated among *Aktionsrat* members, she reflected on her choices and conflicts as a married woman and mother. She attributed her decision to retreat from her studies to raise her child to a “separated upbringing” in which, she explained, “from when I

45 FFBIZ Archiv/Berlin/A/Rep. 400/20. Aktionsrat(1)/Berlin/Folder 1/”Literature Hinweise zur Emanzipation”

was very small I was trained to do housework and thereby can do it much better than men.” Even more troubling to Sander was that her anger toward her situation “had no societal relevance whatsoever.” To change these perceptions, she advocated a recasting of the social and cultural image of mothers from housewives who were isolated in the private sphere to independent women who happened to be mothers, free to follow their own pursuits. This, she argued, would end the cycle of homemaking into which she herself felt pressured. She promoted inquiry into the situation of women on four fronts in order to achieve this goal: “The relationship between men and women, anti-authoritarian upbringing, the economic situation and the increasing conflict of the double burden, and the failure of previous revolutions.”

But Sander and her colleagues did not view themselves as part of the middle-class women’s movement that accepted rather than challenged biological differences between men and women. Rather they attacked capitalism as the root of inequalities against women. The Aktionsrat reasoned capitalism created a double role for women as unpaid reproducers in the home and as cheap labor in the workforce. A First of May demonstration advertisement (Fig. 1) exemplified the Aktionsrat’s connection of capitalism to the plight of women and


48 FFBIZ Archiv/Berlin/A/Rep. 400/20. Aktionsrat(2)/Berlin/Folder Handapp. Träger I/7, 1

49 Ibid, 3.

50 Evans, The Feminist Movement in Germany, 1894-1933; Allen, Feminism and Motherhood in Germany, 1800-1914.

51 FFBIZ Archiv/Berlin/A/Rep. 400/20. Aktionsrat(1)/Berlin/Folder 1/ “Selbstverständnis der Aktionsrats zur Befreiung der Frauen”; For an explanation of Marxist Feminism in the early autonomous women’s movement, see Lottemi Doormann, Keiner schiebt uns Weg, 43-49.
mothers. The headline reads “Capitalism hurts men and women…but women more.” The cartoon depicts the effects of the double burden and double standard on the lives of married women and mothers. It begins with the husband earning more for the same work than his wife. Moving to the private sphere of the home, the cartoonist contrasts images of the father reading the newspaper and watching sexualized, idyllic images of women on the television with drawings of the mother performing housework alongside crying and fighting children. The tension created by the disparities between the roles of father and mother comes to a head in the final two cells. The father finds his wife undesirable and his exhausted wife breaks down, declaring that she can no longer continue with her present roles and that something must change in her situation. While the Aktionsrat declared capitalism the culprit, the cartoon clearly delineated the factors at stake for these women—unequal gendered divisions of labor.

Figure 1 Flier reproduced in Helke Sander, “Mütter sind politische Personen,” Courage vol. 3, 1978, 38.

in the workplace and the home, the double burden of mothers, and their emotional effects on women.

The Aktionsrat found an immediate solution to the negative effects of capitalism on women in better childcare methods and access. Thus the Kinderlädenbewegung (store front childcare movement) was born. Groups of women began renting out cheap store fronts all across West Berlin and outfitting them with a mix of private and public funds (while they were opposed to intervention by the state, due to their meager means they were forced to accept funds from the city government). In most cases, the mothers could not afford an early childhood educator so they took turns caring for the children, mostly on a part-time basis.53

The Kinderläden removed many ideological and practical barriers for these activist mothers. On the ideological level, the Aktionsrat expressed extreme mistrust of state-run Kindergärten, arguing that they propagated a “hierarchical structure” and “authoritarian relationships,” which they connected to their parent’s generation’s relationship with the Third Reich.54 Instead, they wanted to “emancipate” children from their mothers by alternating caregivers.55 Furthermore, they viewed the Kinderläden as an emancipatory space that provided mothers the time and opportunity reflect on their own situation as women away from the isolation of the home. On a practical level, the Kinderläden provided (part-time) childcare that allowed mothers to attend classes or go to work, even if participants alternated


54 FFBIZ Archiv/Berlin/A/Rep. 400/20. Aktionsrat(2)/Berlin/Folder Handapp. Träger I/30. Dagmar Herzog argues in Sex After Faschism that this accusation against their parent’s generation was in fact a backlash against the conservatism of the immediate post-war rather than the sexual politics in the Third Reich. In addition, her monograph goes into further detail of how Kinderläden and anti-authoritarian pedagogy was designed and the politics behind it. See Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

working in the daycare. The small number of available state financed *Kindergärten* spots necessitated creating their own childcare options. In 1970, the state funded only enough Kindergarten spots for 38 percent of West German children aged three through six. The situation was direr for children under the age of three. In 1970, there were only enough *Kinderkrippe* spots to accommodate 0.4 percent of all children aged one through three in West Germany or 4 percent of children with employed mothers.\(^{56}\)

Aspirations took a different course in practice when the *Kinderläden* activists allowed fathers and other interested men to participate in the project. Autonomy was not so far entrenched in these early years as to deny the participation of men. The *Aktionsrat* members thought the addition of men to the organization and everyday operations of the Store Front Day Care would promote the active participation of fathers in the upbringing of their children.\(^{57}\) Despite a desire for an open forum to discuss gender roles and the family, members of the *Aktionsrat* soon felt the emancipatory goals of their project slip away as anti-authoritarian socialization became the main focus. *Kinder im Kollektiv (Children in Collective)*, a book published by the Central Council of Socialist *Kinderläden*, shows this shift as early as September 1969. Here, the writers located the origins of the movement in a critique of the bourgeois family (rather than feminist emancipatory goals) that they believed propagated the authoritarian tendencies found in West German society. By ending the

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isolation of all members of the family unit, the Central Committee aimed to stem the tide of perceived authoritarianism in post-National Socialist West Germany.\textsuperscript{58}

While the Kinderläden Movement broke new ground in forms of socialization and educational practices, the original Kinderläden despaired that the project did not fulfill their emancipatory goals. The Aktionsrat members concluded that the presence of men without clearly defining their role resulted in the reproduction of gender roles and hierarchies “which we wanted to abolish through the Kinderläden.”\textsuperscript{59} The Aktionsrat felt that the men discussed childcare theoretically while women facilitated much of the actual childcare work. At the same time, the importance of anti-authoritarian socialization for Aktionsrat members also cannot be denied. Despite the tensions that existed, many women continued to participate in the movement and work closely with the Central Council.\textsuperscript{60}

Tensions over the aims of the Kinderlädenbewegung were not the only problems within the group. The Sozialistische Frauenbund West Berlin (Socialist Women’s Union West Berlin or SFB) formed in 1968 out of Aktionsrat der Befreiung der Frau. More interested in trade union organizing than working in Kinderläden, the group pointed to capitalism as the source of women’s oppression. The group rejected the assertion that socialism would inherently achieve emancipation, deciding “the struggle to change the societal relations of production must be waged in tandem with the fight for women’s


\textsuperscript{59} FFBIZ Archiv/Berlin/A/Rep. 400/20. Aktionsrat(1)/Berlin/Folder I/”Arbeitspapier,” 5

equality.” To achieve these aims, in contrast to autonomous feminists, many members participated in the trade unions and the SPD, meeting separately in the SFB to ensure that their positions developed independent of the larger organizations.

As the Aktionsrat crumbled, the “mother question” became a significant basis of activism in Munich. Hannelore Mabry (b. 1930) founded the Münchener Frauenforum (Munich Women’s Forum) in December 1971. Mabry’s politicization around the mother question stemmed from similar forces as those affecting Sander in West Berlin. Also a single mother, Mabry attempted to balance employment, activism, and motherhood, complicated even further by the constant discrimination she experienced as a single mother. Before becoming politically active, Mabry studied acting and worked for several years on the stage, on television, and as a voice actor for both radio and film dubbing. After two divorces, she raised her daughter alone and began her university education at the age of thirty-eight. Like many leftist activists in the 1960s and 1970s, she studied sociology. Her thesis focused on the uneven representation of women in parliament and the unequal gendered division of labor in the family, topics that directly influenced her activist goals.

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63 Zellmer, Töchter der Revolte?, 136.

64 Elisabeth Zellmer, “‘Danke für die Blumen, Rechte wären uns Lieber!’: Das Frauenforum München e.V. 1971 Bis 1975,” in Lieschen Müller wird Politisch: Geschlecht, Staat, und Partizipation Im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Elisabeth Zellmer, Christine Hinkel, and Nicole Kramer (München: R. Oldenbourg, 2009), 122. Mabry’s position on the state of party politics for women were published in the book Hannelore Mabry, Unkraut ins Parlament: die Bedeutung weiblicher parlamentarischer Arbeit für die Emanzipation der Frau (Lollar über Gießen: Achenbach, 1974).
In her role as the organization’s founder and president, between 1971 and 1975 she set the political agenda of the Frauenforum. In a 1972 speech, Mabry defined the focus of the organization as:

1) The problem and special strain of employed mothers in this society—with which I have been confronted for the past eighteen years
2) The scientific analysis of the situation and role of women in politics.

To which she added:

That I focused in particular on the so-called ‘Women’s Question’ in my university studies—that was influenced by the fact that I began my studies at the age of 36, after I experienced and observed in practice the discrimination of women in the family, in the job market, and in tax, work, and family law.65

In addition, the members of the Frauenforum were committed “to improving the societal responsibility for the rights of children.” They called for the “realization of a scientifically directed public relief, care, and upbringing of children.” These initiatives, they argued, should be paid by lawmakers.66

While Sander and Mabry both politicized the double burden of mothers, the secondary status of women in the family, and the need for childcare solutions, Mabry’s strategy differed greatly, exemplifying the heterogeneity of feminist organizing and tactics. In contrast to the Aktionsrat, the members of the Frauenforum structured their organization with a central committee rather than a non-hierarchical network of women. Their strategy also looked beyond their own organization. They utilized their magazine Information of the Frauenforum Munich to foster networks with other women’s groups in West Germany. Furthermore, the Frauenforum viewed itself as a lobbying organization and sought direct


66 Ibid.
contact with many regional and federal politicians, hosting forums on feminist issues with politicians. Mabry also penned countless letters to politicians, criticizing their policies and suggesting new courses of action. Finally, the members of the Frauenforum believed that women’s emancipation involved the participation of men and maintained a male membership of about 10 percent.\(^{67}\)

By 1975, Frauenforum events such as discussion evening were attended by on average seventy people, while their demonstrations could be attended by upwards of five thousand participants. The circulation of *Information of the Frauenforum Munich* reached a circulation of around seven thousand copies.\(^{68}\) The members of the Frauenforum increasingly butted heads with Mabry’s leadership style and in 1975 asked Mabry to leave due to her “dominant” leadership and “hierarchical” structuring of the organization. Mabry, however, maintained an ever-present voice in West German feminist circles, going on to edit and author countless articles for her journal *Der Feminist*. Beginning in 1976, she even attempted to create a West German Women’s Party.

*Feminists and the West German Press, 1970–1980*

The removal of Mabry hardly marked a denouement in autonomous debates over the question of reconciling family and work and the gendered division of labor in the home. On the other hand, 1975 did mark a structural change in autonomous organizing. From 1972–1975, the autonomous feminists witnessed an unprecedented and never repeated unity under a common goal – the dissolution of §218, the law criminalizing abortion. The movement

\(^{67}\) Zellmer, “Danke für die Blumen,” 120–21.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 121.
attained a victory with the 1975 *Fristenlösung* (term resolution) in which the Bundestag approved abortions within the first three months of pregnancy. However, the constitutional court deemed the act unlawful. While legal abortion continued to be an important issue among feminists, the court’s decision instigated a phase of reorientation where activists more clearly articulated their ideological and strategic differences. The diversity that developed created “something for everyone,” although this also resulted in more intense ideological conflicts and debates compared to the singularity of cause that characterized the abortion campaign. A new generation within the movement also emerged. The radicalization of women around the issue of abortion, the wider use of the pill, and the explosion of women in post-secondary education brought many younger, unmarried, and childless women into the autonomous movement. These women created a feminist subculture of bars, cafes, bookstores, and information centers as part of their feminist strategy.

A significant growth in the feminist press beginning in the mid-1970s made possible the intensity of debate. *Courage* based in West Berlin and *Emma* based in Cologne became the two most influential publications, both of which circulated at the national level. The creation and management of the two magazines contrasted greatly. Unemployed female academics and students established *Courage*, one of the earliest feminist magazines, in 1976. The organization and decision-making process reflected the collective strategies of other autonomous feminist groups. With no editor-in-chief or other positions of hierarchy, all those involved in the magazine’s publication maintained equal say in the selection of articles, themes for the issues, and in the day-to-day organization of the magazine. The founders of

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*Courage* considered the magazine for the autonomous movement; the staff rarely solicited articles, rather selected articles based on general trends in submitted letters and articles. The pages of *Courage* became a forum for information on initiatives. By the end of the 1970s, the magazine circulated around fifty-five thousand copies per issue.\(^{70}\)

The West German feminist journalist Alice Schwarzer (b. 1942) conceived of *Emma*, as a political magazine for women written by professional journalists. Schwarzer rose to name recognition through the publication of a series of articles in the illustrated weekly *Stern* in which hundreds of women, including famous actresses and other notables, publicly confessed their abortions.\(^{71}\) Her 1976 book *Der kleine Unterschied und seinen grossen Folgen* (*The Little Difference and its Large Consequences*) also became an international best seller.\(^{72}\) *Emma* appeared on newsstands on January 26, 1977 with an initial printing of two hundred thousand copies. However, her magazine elicited controversy from the start. Both *Courage* and the anarchist feminist journal *Die Schwarze Botin* encouraged their readers to boycott the magazine. Their staffs opposed the commercial appearance of the magazine and believed the publisher Gruner & Jahr financed and managed the magazine.\(^{73}\)

While Gruner & Jahr took charge of distribution, in reality Schwarzer financed *Emma* through a combination of Schwarzer’s profits from *Der kleine Unterschied*, loans from co-workers and


sympathizers, and preorders. To this day, sales finance the magazine. Of all the feminist publications, *Emma* became the most well known to the general West German public. For politicians, trade unionists, and other groups, the positions argued by Schwarzer and her colleagues represented the positions of West German feminists in general, a situation reinforced through Schwarzer’s many television appearances. Alice Schwarzer became the face of West German feminism, yet a contentious figure within the autonomous women’s movement.

While *Courage* and *Emma* enjoyed national recognition and distribution, several regionally-focused feminist newspapers and magazines also appeared. For example, German national Gunild Feigenwinter founded *Die Hexenpresse* (The Witches Press) in Switzerland in 1972, making it the first autonomous feminist publication. Also of importance was the *Frankfurter Frauenblatt* (Frankfurt Women’s Paper), founded in 1978. The founders hoped to provide a centralized space for discussion of important feminist issues and advertisement of events in Frankfurt in order to foster cooperation.

The dissemination of feminist ideas was not limited to publications by autonomous feminists. The presence of feminist journalists in more mainstream magazines—the women’s lifestyle magazine *Brigitte* and the illustrated weekly *Stern*—also supports the existence of a much wider movement for women’s emancipation. In fact, it predates the emergence of a press run by members of the autonomous women’s movement. *Brigitte* began as a magazine geared towards the interests of “modern” West German women in 1954. It covered fashion, relationships, culture, women’s health, and other pertinent topics. During the 1950s and

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1960s, the magazine’s coverage focused on the middle-class housewife and reinforced the dominant social understanding of biologically inherent gender difference. This changed in the late 1960s as West Germany’s young women became more interested in their individuality away from home and family and critical of traditional gender roles. By the early 1970s, the magazine politicized around feminist issues such as gender discrimination, abortion rights, the political integration of women, and socioeconomic issues of lower-class women.76 While the coverage of political topics became more diverse, Brigitte still appealed to the reader as a consumer through its fashion columns, to name one example. Brigitte continues as the largest women’s magazine in Germany with a print of over eight hundred thousand per issue and a readership of around 3.6 million.

The weekly-illustrated magazine Stern, founded in 1948, reported on diverse range of issues including politics, culture, science, and travel. Beginning in the early 1970s, Stern employed a small but influential cohort of feminist journalists centered around Christine Heide who reported on issues relevant to women. Ironically, this was the same magazine that came under fire by the writers of Emma and other feminists in 1978 for its objectification of women by frequently adorning its cover and pages with naked women.77 Nonetheless, Stern became an important, more mainstream space for feminist issues beginning with the famous “We have had an abortion” articles written by Alice Schwarzer herself.78 Heide, a socialist feminist, reported frequently on workplace and employment issues for women, while others


77 “Frauen kämpfen um ihre Meschenwürde” Emma no. 8, 1978, 6-17.

78 Schwarzer, “Wir haben abgetrieben.”
challenged gender stereotypes and reported on discrimination against women in West Germany.\(^79\)

\((Re)\)conceptualizing Motherhood and the Gendered Division of Labor, 1975–1980

The feminist press became a battleground for the debates of the autonomous movement in the mid to late 1970s. This included the Mütterbewegung (Mother Movement) and the Lohn für Hausarbeit movement (Wages for Housework). One such theorist who focused on the political, economic, and social inequalities of mothers was Gunild Feigenwinter. In 1976, Feigenwinter published her Manifest der Mütter (“Manifesto of Mothers”), portions of which were re-printed in Courage, which articulated her disapproval of the wider movement’s failure to support political action centered on issues related to mothers and children.\(^80\) Her criticisms exemplified not only the hard-felt tensions that existed among feminists over the question of motherhood, but also the fluidity of autonomous feminism. While Feigenwinter did not see the use of working with politicians, she nonetheless argued that feminist activism as practiced would not serve mothers and children. The newly forming Mütterbewegung aimed to deconstruct the “cult of motherhood” (Muttermythos), an aim of many feminists, not by rejecting motherhood and marriage

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outright, but by exposing the social realities and inequalities of mothers and working towards a personally defined relationship between mother and child.\textsuperscript{81}

Feigenwinter’s diatribe attacked the movement on several levels, but at the heart of her criticism was a sense that most feminists did not think realistically when it came to their stances on marriage and family. Feminists “have assaulted the institution of marriage since the beginning of the second movement,” she argued, yet “we need to make clear what the social alternative for mothers and children should look like and their full constitutional and social security.”\textsuperscript{82} Without consideration of the economic and social situation of mothers in society, Feigenwinter felt the movement was “regressive” and misplaced in thinking that “ignoring the mother question” meant freedom from the burdens of the economic, social, and cultural consequences of birthing children.\textsuperscript{83}

In addition to finding fault in some feminists’ position on marriage, Feigenwinter also argued against critiques of motherhood as ideology. She wrote, “To reduce motherhood to an ideology and to portray it as a product of patriarchal propaganda means first of all no difference between forced and wished motherhood.”\textsuperscript{84} According to Feigenwinter, autonomous feminists were no better than the society that portrayed motherhood as an ideology and biological imperative. Rather than focusing on the social realities of motherhood that contradict perception, Feigenwinter criticized non-mothers for attempting to define the relationship between mother and child without experiencing motherhood

\textsuperscript{81} Lenz, \textit{Die neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland}, 179–182.

\textsuperscript{82} Feigenwinter, “Manifest der Mütter,” 16.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 19.
themselves and forcing mothers to “take shame in their better instincts.”\textsuperscript{85} For Feigenwinter, and others in the \textit{Mütterbewegung}, emancipation included the freedom to experience self-growth for both mother and child, rather than emancipate mothers from children and an ideological notion of motherhood.

According to Feigenwinter, the success of the movement in general depended on the politicization of the mother question and more unification among women. She argued “a structure-less, anti-authoritarian, un-hierarchical [movement] is not able to fight…against patriarchy.”\textsuperscript{86} But more organization among women was not enough. Like many activists of the \textit{Mütterbewegung}, she felt that “patriarchy lets its last ideological mask fall in the moment women direct political demands at the fathers.”\textsuperscript{87} Emancipation could only succeed with men taking more responsibilities in the home, especially with the care of children.

While Feigenwinter’s text aimed to raise awareness of the everyday plight of mothers and the downfalls of a women’s movement that ignored the mother question, the second strain of the \textit{Mütterbewegung} attempted to “demand self-determination over the birthing process and relationship with the child,” including active participation in the birth process, nursing, and the care of the child.\textsuperscript{88} For instance, breastfeeding became a political statement. \textit{Courage} in particular became a forum for the \textit{Mütterbewegung} and their politicization of the biology of motherhood. In 1978 the magazine published an article titled, “Stillen als Kampfmitte” (“Nursing as a Political Protest”) in which the authors connected the

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{88} Lenz, \textit{Die neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland}, 181.
tabooization of nursing with the second-rate status of women in West German society.\textsuperscript{89} They advocated the inclusion of nursing in discussions of upbringing and the employment of women since “nursing makes mothers dependent.”\textsuperscript{90} Because West German society frowned upon public nursing, the authors argued “nursing is a privilege...for women who have time.”\textsuperscript{91} To better ensure the independence of nursing mothers, the article suggested a maternal leave of at least one year, mother-friendly places of work, and an increase in the distribution of information on nursing.\textsuperscript{92}

The organizers of the 1978 \textit{Sommeruniversität von und für Frauen} (Summer University for and by Women) confirmed the importance of the debate over motherhood with the topic of the meeting: “Women and Mothers.” The Summer Universities began as a project by female instructors and assistants at the Freie Universität Berlin. The organizers aimed to change the gendered power hierarchies of the university, scholarship, and society by organizing summer conferences around feminist debates.\textsuperscript{93} The strategy of organizing conferences and seminars outside of the university structure mirrored such organizing in the United States with the reestablishment of the Berkshire Conferences for feminist historians in

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\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{92} While it is questionable if such a line of thinking aided the deconstruction of the \textit{Muttermythos}, this strain of the \textit{Mütterbewegung} shows striking similarity to feminist discourses on sexuality, reproduction, and medicineoccurring at the same time. For examples, see Lenz, \textit{Die neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland}, 99–146.

\textsuperscript{93} Dagmar Zimmerman, “Ein neuer Muttermythos?” in Doorman, \textit{Keiner schiebt uns Weg}, 86.
\end{flushright}
1978. The Summer University thus provided one of the few centralized national forums for debate among feminists from across West Germany.94

The Summer University illuminated the intensity of the deliberation over the feasibility of a feminist theory based on motherhood. A member of the Sozialistische Frauenbund West Berlin published a critical essay on the new “myth” of motherhood. The author did not so much condemn those who advocated a change to the double burden and harsh economic realities of working-class and single women, which coincided with the SFB’s own political stance. Her focus, rather, was on the women who politicized pregnancy and the birth process. She disagreed with the movement for defining the private sphere as a space of production—housework, giving birth, etc. By doing this, the author argued that these feminists turned “the retreat to the traditional feminine private sphere into political action.”95 Three negative consequences would result from this form of politics. First, “a debate over the upbringing of children in this society remarkably is not taking place.”96 Second, this form of feminist activism “attempts to make women belong to one class” and makes pivotal the conditioning of women to the life of a housewife. Third, “changes in society will no longer be determined socially, but solely as a reformation of one’s own life.”97 She concluded that this bürgerliche (middle class) feminism was hardly political, but


95 Zimmerman, “Ein neuer Muttermythos?,” 234.

96 Ibid, 234.

97 Ibid, 237.
rather an expression of resignation. “Despite women’s wish for emancipation they do not want to find themselves contradicting traditional women’s roles.”

In this debate over how the private could become political, she criticized the *Lohn für Hausarbeit* movement (Wages for Housework) as a prime example of unacceptable feminist politics in practice. The movement called for the payment of a wage to housewives in order to improve the status of women’s unpaid work in the home. In the history of West German feminism, the Wages for Housework movement accomplished very little in practical value. However, as the article suggested, it set off a passionate discussion over the definition of work, the gendered division of labor in the home, the best means by which to reconcile family and work for mothers, and the role of employment in the emancipation of women. The recession set off by the first oil shock further intensified the debate, especially since the work shortage affected women disproportionately.

The right to equal pay for equal work and an end to the gendered division of labor in the workforce were important issues in the autonomous movement, especially among socialist feminists. But the *Lohn für Hausarbeit* questioned whether employment, or production, ensured women’s emancipation. Inspired by Silvia Federici and the Italian movement, the *Lohn für Hausarbeit* movement emerged in 1976 with groups in West Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt, and Bochum. Activists in the movement argued that West German feminists needed to put forth a new political economy of the household that took into account the unpaid labor of women. A major debate over the functionality of a feminist theory not based in employment occurred at the second Summer University in 1977.

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98 Ibid., 237.

Hannelore Schröder (b. 1935), a member of the *Lohn für Hausarbeit* movement who completed her dissertation in political science in 1975, presented a paper at the Summer University she argued Marxism ignored women’s unpaid work and favored paid wage labor. Schröder contended the most important production for society took place in the home: the birthing and upbringing of children. This work was necessary for the reproduction of future producers—work almost entirely carried out by women.\(^\text{100}\) By naming this reproduction rather than production, Schröder claimed that Marx downplayed the important role of women in society. Men on the one hand benefitted from the housework of women to aid in their production in the public sphere. Women on the other hand took on both the role of housewife and wage laborer. To change this system, Schröder argued that one should question not only capitalism (a stab at socialist feminists), but the importance of the male-breadwinner model and its influence on the labor and property relationships in the home and within a marriage.\(^\text{101}\)

The positions of the *Lohn für Hausarbeit* movement were more complicated than a simple glorification of the housewife role. Their motivations were rooted in a pessimism over the job market, and the lack of action on the part of the state to alleviate women’s unequal status in the workforce and the social realities of mothers. Gisela Bock further articulated this position.\(^\text{102}\) Bock, a German historian and in the late 1970s a research assistant at the Freie Universität Berlin, combined her feminist engagement with scholarship, pioneering the

\(^{100}\) Ibid, 108.

\(^{101}\) Ibid, 114.

historical study of women’s housework in the historical essay “Labor of Love—Love as Labor: On the Genesis of Housework in Capitalism” with sociologist Barbara Duden for the previous women’s Summer University in 1976.\textsuperscript{103}

Bock argued that the “glorification” of qualified employment in the women’s movement ignored realities: men continued to dominate the workforce and women’s reproductive capacities prevented promotion. Furthermore, Bock posited that fighting for equal work opportunities for women did not encompasses the needs of every woman.\textsuperscript{104} Therefore, she described how the \textit{Lohn für Hausarbeit} initiative would function—in the form of a subsidy from the government through an increase in already existing welfare programs.\textsuperscript{105} But this change, she argued, could only happen by altering basic inequalities in the welfare system that guaranteed “a vicious circle of dependency,” “poverty for single mothers, poverty and discrimination for Lesbians, overworking of the double burdened…in essence: new dependencies, new housework.”\textsuperscript{106} By focusing the state’s attention toward the work of women in the home, the Wages for Housework Movement hoped for welfare state practices that would no longer discriminate against women, especially single mothers. Secondly, and more importantly, members of the movement advocated this wage as only the first step in improving all childcare options.\textsuperscript{107}


\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 212-13.

\textsuperscript{105} Gisela Bock “Berliner Gruppe ‘Frauen für Lohn für Hausarbeit” in Doorman, \textit{Keiner scheibt}, 140.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid, 140-141.

\textsuperscript{107} FFBIZ Archiv/Berlin/A/ Rep. 400 /BRD 17.2C.5 Lohn für Hausarbeit
Criticism abounded in reaction to the Wages for Housework proposal. Despite the accusation of the *Lohn für Hausarbeit* movement that the wider feminist movement valued only employment as a means of achieving emancipation, critics focused their attacks on the isolation of housewives the proposal would reinforce. Roswitha Burgard focused on the psychological effects of Wages for Housework on the housewife influenced by the “problem with no name” first argued by Betty Friedan in *The Feminine Mystique*.108 Burgard contended that the pressure to have children and the isolation of housewives promoted serious psychological and psychosomatic sicknesses in women. Such symptoms prevented housewives from becoming good mothers because they had “no real acknowledgment, no adequate discussion, stimulus, and have no perspective.”109 For Burgard, the Wages for Housework campaign did not take into account the effects of housework on women that would not change even with acknowledgement of the worth of housework in society.

While the *Sozialistische Frauen Bund* certainly supported employment as a path to emancipation, the group argued that the Wages for Housework Movement prevented the politicization that comes through work force participation. Financial independence was not the only issue. The SFB believed that revolutionary change, and thereby the complete emancipation of women, could only occur through the societal incorporation of and the ensuing collectivization of women in the work force.110 The initiative prevented any questioning and discussion over male-breadwinner/female-homemaker model. “Wages for

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109 Ibid, 220.

110 Sozialistisch Frauenbund “Wir wollen keinen Lohn für die Hausarbeit” in Sommeruniversität für Frauen, *Frauen als bezahlte*, 129-140.
Housework means then the concrete coercion [for women] to marry and have children.”\textsuperscript{111} The continuation of woman’s isolation in the home prevented women from experiencing personal development that could only occur with cooperative relationships and production.\textsuperscript{112} By encouraging housework, the Wages for Housework movement prevented the politicization of women collectively in the public sphere.

Alice Schwarzer also criticized the initiative in a May 1977 article in \textit{Emma}.\textsuperscript{113} Schwarzer contended “such a flat economic analysis doesn’t solve the problem.”\textsuperscript{114} In lieu of the Wages for Housework Movement, Schwarzer advocated ending the double burden of women by other means, such as the “refusal of the self-evident competency of women for house and children,” men taking over half of the housework and child care, society taking over house and child duties through initiatives such as full-day schools, and a change in the nature of housework. For instance, instead of women performing household duties themselves, Schwarzer (perhaps unrealistically) suggested the creation of clubs where women could clean their houses together.\textsuperscript{115}

The call for increased government intervention on the issue of childcare and women’s work foreshadowed the emergence of greater institutional involvement of feminists in academia, political parties, and trade unions by the turn of the decade. The creation of the Green Party and its integration into West German parliamentary politics in 1983 resulted in

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, 130.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, 136.
\textsuperscript{113} Alice Schwarzer, "Hausfraulohn?," \textit{Emma} May 1977, 3.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
the institutionalization of the New Left, including many feminists. But even before the Green Party, many feminists already straddled the institutional/civil society divide in the 1970s through their involvement in political parties and trade unions. In fact, women active in these more traditional institutions also initiated similar debates over childcare, motherhood, and the gendered division of labor.

III. The Private in Politics: Female Activists in the Political Parties

The increased political activity of women in West Germany in the 1970s was not limited to autonomous tactics. Statistics demonstrate that in the 1970s, the female membership of West Germany’s main political parties, the SPD and CDU, witnessed a dramatic increase (see table 1.7). The growing importance of women and women’s issues to each party’s electoral successes was not lost on the SPD and CDU’s national committees, prompting the reorganization and greater inclusion of the AsF and the CDU Frauenvereinigung in the decision making process. Furthermore, both female organizations used the opportunity to further their policy agenda within the party. The importance of and activism towards women’s emancipation was certainly not limited to the autonomous women’s movement. Yet like their contemporaries on the ground, the definition of and means by which to achieve “emancipation” became a point of contention between women both within and between the SPD and CDU. The issues of the gendered division of labor and reconciling family and employment exemplified the divisions between women in political parties.
Table 1.7 Female Membership of SPD and CDU, 1932-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SPD # of Members</th>
<th>SPD % of Total Membership</th>
<th>CDU # of Members</th>
<th>CDU % of Total Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>230,331</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>121,385</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>114,829</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>122,942</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>123,565</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>143,016</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>39,459</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>192,555</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>93,100</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>227,800</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>145,597</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


aStatistic from 1979.

Between the SPD and Feminism: The Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Frauen

The SPD retained a strong female presence since the Kaiserreich after the Kaiser repealed the ban on women’s membership in political parties in 1908. By the beginning of World War One, women comprised 16.1 percent of the SPD, or almost 175,000 people. By the rise of National Socialism in 1933, women encompassed 22.8 percent of the SPD membership or 230,331 people (see table 1.7). The participation of women would not reach such a scale again until the late 1970s.

Unlike the other political parties that would emerge immediately following the war, the SPD benefitted from a core group of party members who had survived the war and could draw upon a long practiced but dormant system of organization at both the national and local levels. The three most important SPD federal bodies from largest to smallest in size were the biennial Parteitag (Convention), the Vorstand (Executive), and the Präsidium (Presidium).
The most powerful of the three, the *Parteitag* conveined every two years with representatives from local, regional, and federal chapters. The convention provided programmatic stimulus and direction for the party by voting on resolutions submitted by local and regional branches of the SPD. In essence, the *Parteitag* produced a forum for direct democracy used in particular by minority groups within the party to advocate their agendas.\(^{116}\)

The convention also elected thirty-two out of the thirty-six members of the *Vorstand* (the unelected members were the chairman of the SPD, the two deputy chairmen, and the party treasurer). The responsibilities of the Executive included dictating basic party policies and programs, fielding issues of party organization and personnel matters, and discussing more specific domestic and foreign policy matters.\(^{117}\) Finally, the eleven members of the *Präsidium* comprised the party chairman, two deputy chairmen, the Bundestag faction leader, the party secretary, and treasurer. The Executive appointed the other five members. The Presidium set political and organizational guidelines and decided specifics regarding party guidelines, resolution content, intraparty questions, the scheduling of party conventions, budgetary matters, and strategies for election campaigns. Unlike the relatively equal representation of more left-leaning members of the SPD in the *Vorstand* and *Parteitag*, the center and conservative factions more successfully placed their representatives in the *Presidium*, directly influencing the political agendas sought by the party in the Bundestag.\(^{118}\)

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\(^{117}\) Ibid., 20–21.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., 19.
The SPD held its first party congress of the postwar era in Hannover in May 1946. The party elected to establish a women’s office in the party Executive headed by Herta Gotthelf (b. 1902), who survived the war in England and acted as the editor of SPD women’s journal *Die Genossin* before 1933.\(^\text{119}\) The founding of the *Zentrale Ausschuss für Frauenfragen* (Central Committee for Women’s Questions) followed in 1947. This national committee, which met at most four times a year, took on the responsibilities of most of the national women’s organizing, including preparing suggestions for the party congresses, organizing the women’s conferences, and working on actual federal policy such as marriage reform.\(^\text{120}\) The women’s congresses were also an important aspect of women’s work in the SPD, although scholars argue that the conferences functioned more as information sessions rather than true policy building endeavors in the early years.\(^\text{121}\)

Before 1970, SPD women played at best a marginal role both in the focus and creation of the political agenda of the SPD.\(^\text{122}\) Their numbers remained low. In 1946, women constituted just 15.4 percent of the party. This would peak at 19.1 percent in 1950, but slowly began dipping throughout the 1950s and especially in the 1960s. Furthermore, the SPD solidified the conception of women solely as wives and mothers with the Godesberger

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\(^{119}\) Wolfgang Pausch, *Die Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Frauenorganisationen: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit innerparteilicher Gleichberechtigungsstrategien in der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Aufgezeigt am Beispiel der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialdemokratischer Frauen* (Frankfurt am Main: W. Pausch, 1985), 96.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., 121.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., 120.

\(^{122}\) Ibid., 97–98; Gisela Notz, *Frauen in der Mannschaft: Sozialdemokratinnen im parlamentarischen Rat und im deutschen Bundestag 1948/49 Bis 1957: Mit 26 Biographien* (Bonn, 2003), 41–45.
Programm in 1959. Nonetheless, in the 1950s a small group of female parliamentarians worked tirelessly at the federal level towards equality for women, a move supported by the party. The policy discussion of these SPD women focused on the equality of women with men through changes in the Civil Code and Basic Law, an important debate during the establishment of the Federal Republic. Elisabeth Selbert (b. 1896), a lawyer who maintained illegal ties to her Social Democratic colleagues during the Third Reich even while her husband was deemed an “enemy of the state,” became the SPD’s most vocal advocate of women’s equality in the new constitution. In keeping with the SPD’s tradition of advocating for women’s rights (even while in practice this goal conflicted with male worker’s desire to protect their status in the job market), the SPD put its full weight behind the addition of a statement of equality to the Basic Law. The conservative opposition disagreed with the wording, arguing the language challenged the “natural” differences between men and women. The party succeeded and the final draft of the Basic Law passed in 1949 included “Men and women shall have equal rights.”

Selbert and her female colleagues who supported the inclusion of a statement of equality in the Basic Law hoped the constitutional right of equality would positively inform the revising of the Civil Code, a document dating back to 1900. The Basic Law Article 117 stipulated that the government finalize all revisions by March 31, 1953. This did not happen, prompting the delegates to pass an extension to 1957 with final implementation in 1958. One

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123 The Godesberger Programm represented the SPD’s shift away from socialist positions to a party of the people or Volkspartei. Basic Programm of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Bonn: the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 1959.


125 Ibid., 46.
of the most hotly contested articles was §1356, which obligated women to care for their families before seeking employment outside the home. That the final draft of the revised Civil Code still included this article spoke to one of the basic tensions of West Germany’s legal code: the law considered men and women equal, but women’s principle identity was as wife and mother. Politicians in both the SPD and CDU contended motherhood needed protection just as much as women’s equality.\textsuperscript{126} §1356 would not be altered until almost twenty years later. Reforming the civil code remained an important aim of SPD women (and many CDU women), as well as equal wages for equal work and the economic and social security of women and children.\textsuperscript{127}

The appointment of Annemarie Renger (b. 1919) to presidency of the Women’s Committee and Elfriede Eilers (b. 1921) as her representative in 1966 marked a transition in the postwar history of women in the SPD and lead to the establishment of the AsF in 1973. Annemarie Renger grew up in a Social Democratic family in Berlin, where her father was a carpenter, SPD politician, and executive director of the Zentralkommission für Arbeitsport (Central Committee for Workers' Sports). Renger entered party politics by working as the private secretary and close confidant of the SPD leader Kurt Schumacher from 1946 until his death in 1952. In 1953 she was elected to the Bundestag and in 1972 she became the first woman to hold the position of Bundestag president.\textsuperscript{128} Eilers, the future AsF president, came from a traditional Social Democratic and trade union family from Bielefeld. She entered the Bundestag in 1957 and quickly gained a reputation as a women’s advocate. In the 1960s, she

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} Pausch, \textit{Die Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Frauenorganisationen}.
\textsuperscript{128} http://www.fes.de/archiv/adsd_neu/inhalt/nachlass/nachlass_r/renger-an.htm accessed October 2, 2011.
\end{flushright}
worked on several of the special women’s committees. In addition, she collaborated with health minister Käte Strobel on her family planning campaign and was an early proponent of abortion reform.129

Together, Renger and Eilers instituted several organizational changes in order to convince the party of the inherent worth of women’s issues and alter the public image of the SPD as a men’s party.130 First, they established a Bundesfrauenausschuss (Federal Women’s Committee) with an executive body that comprised of representatives from different regional organizations.131 Second, the party executive absorbed the Zentrale Ausschuss. Third, the SPD Executive invited fifteen persons from outside the party to join a Beirat für Frauenpolitik (Advisory Committee for Women’s Politics).

Their next step involved actively capitalizing on the growing momentum of feminist grass roots activism. At the 1970 SPD Federal Women’s Conference, the delegations elected to form a working group to create a platform for women’s political issues. Through the program, Eilers and her colleagues hoped to attract the “agitated generation of younger women,” while representing the norms and values of women that in general did not support the SPD, but agreed with their stance on women’s issues.132 With the ever-growing presence of young women, many of who held ties to autonomous groups, in the party and the

129 Interview with Elfriede Eilers in Renate Lepsius, Frauenpolitik als Beruf: Gespräche mit SPD-Parlamentarierinnen (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1987), 87–89.


131 Ibid.

important role of women in the SPD’s electoral success in 1972, the SPD leadership agreed that the party needed to seriously discuss and accept women’s issues as legitimate claims. The result was the creation of the AsF.

This event coincided with the influx of the younger generation that the SPD were attempting to bring into the party, most of whom joined the Junge Sozialdemokraten (Young Social Democrats or Jusos), the youth organization in the party. The demographic changes resulted in an almost immediate conflict between the older and younger generations of female members. The generational tensions resulted from two main differences. First, the older generation of women tended to agree with the assertion that mother should only seek employment in cases of economic necessity, while younger members argued for measures that would allow the employment of all mothers. Second, the younger generation were less concerned with family policy that would be associated with East Germany’s policy. They did not want the Soviet Union, but still felt inspired by Marxist theories due to involvement in the student movement and feminist groups.

Tensions first surfaced at the constituting AsF Federal Conference in Ludwigshafen in 1973 where members elected Elfriede Eilers as the group’s first president. Eiler’s history of advocating women’s politics made her an obvious choice, but the younger AsF members also put forth Herta Däubler-Gmelin (b. 1943) of Baden-Württemburg as a candidate.

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133 The CDU had effectively turned out the female vote since the establishment of the Federal Republic. However, in the 1972 election, the SPD had clearly won over the female electorate. In the 1969 election, the male/female ratio for the CDU was 40.6%/50.6% and 45.6%/40.4% for the SPD. In the 1972 election, the ratio was 43%/46% for the CDU and 46.8%/45.7% for the SPD. The CDU success in elections in the 1950s and 1960s could be attributed to their “women’s bonus,” the higher ration of female to male voters. Sarah Elise Wiliarty, The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany: Bringing Women to the Party (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 81.

134 Pausch, Die Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratischen Frauenorganisationen, 149–150.
Däubler-Gmelin came from an entirely different pedigree than Eilers. She came from a liberal family in Tübingen, where her father was mayor for several years. She eventually studied law at the Free University in West Berlin in the 1960s and participated in the student movement. Only thirty years of age at the Ludwigshafen congress, she represented the young “left” female party members against the older, “establishment” members. Influenced by their experience in the New Left and the feminist movements, these younger members criticized the older for working too long with the patriarchal male leadership. Eilers won her bid for AsF president by approximately three-fifths of the vote, but the election marked the beginning of generational conflicts within the AsF throughout the 1970s.

Tensions came to a head during the revision process of the new family policy statement of the SPD. In 1970, the SPD formed a commission to write a new policy, the draft of which it presented at the 1973 Party Conference in Hannover. The newly formed AsF, however, voiced criticism and concern because the platform did not include “an analysis of the situation of individual members of the family.” The AsF expressed the unanimous opinion that the draft failed to account for the particular circumstances and needs of mothers. In response to these critical remarks, the leadership resolved to allow the AsF to revise the platform in time for the Mannheim Party Congress in 1975.

In the interim, a group of female Jusos formed the Arbeitskreis Emanzipation (Working Committee for Emancipation or AKE). Not wanting to ostracize the new SPD

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135 Interview with Elfriede Eilers in Lepsius, Frauenpolitik als Beruf, 94–95.; Interview with Herta Däubler-Gmelin in Ibid., 272-280.

136 AdsD/SPD-PV/Referat Frauen/10429/ “SPD und die Familienpolitik-Daten-Fakten-Informationen, 1”

137 Pausch, Die Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Frauenorganisationen, 172.
members and believing a compromise could be reached between all female SPD members, Eilers reached out to the AKE for proposals to be discussed at the 1974 AsF Family Policy Conference.\textsuperscript{138} The younger members advocated family policy, such as the expansion of full-day childcare, that allowed all mothers who desired employment to pursue work outside of the home. However, the AKE’s suggestions worried the older, more conservative AsF members who only supported employment of mothers, in particular of children under the age of three, in cases on financial need, a position supported by the SPD \textit{Präsidium} and \textit{Vorstand}. A generational divide was developing over the issue of employed mothers. Anni Jensen, a member of the AsF central committee and of the older generation of SPD women, voiced her concern and frustration in a letter to the SPD \textit{Bundesgeschäftsführer} (party manager) Holger Börner. She warned “the traditional ‘left’ districts will try, through proposals before and during the conference, to bring Marxist approaches to our family politics.”\textsuperscript{139} She criticized the younger members for advocating qualified employment of women “in lieu of motherhood” and “de-privatization” of child rearing through government childcare, especially for children under the age of three. Jensen intimated that the female members of the SPD Bundestag faction were concerned enough to suggest canceling the family policy conference.\textsuperscript{140}

While Jensen’s fears did reflect a more conservative viewpoint towards family policy, there existed other mitigating factors influencing the opinions of the older generation of politicians. Throughout the years of the divided Germany, the SPD proceeded cautiously

\textsuperscript{138} Interview with Elfriede Eilers in Lepsius, \textit{Frauenpolitik als Beruf}, 96.

\textsuperscript{139} AdsD/SPD-PV/Referat Frauen/10322

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
with a family policy that supported the employment of mothers. Since the founding of the Federal Republic, the CDU had constructed the male-breadwinner family as the bulwark of democracy against the socialist East Germany, which encouraged dual-earner households in order to fulfill its ideological and economic goals regarding production.\footnote{Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 79.} The rhetoric continued to hold great political weight well into the 1970s despite the social liberal coalition’s emphasis on reform. Psychological and medical research that demonstrated developmental issues in infants and toddlers of employed mothers further reinforced this position.\footnote{See chapter two.} Therefore, the CDU held considerable political capital that allowed it to spin any suggestions for family policy.

That the CDU could use the statements made by the younger AsF members to their advantage was not lost on Eilers. Years later in an interview with fellow SPD party legislator Renate Lepsius, Eilers explained the concern among AsF and party leadership over the political implications of the positions of younger members:

But this proposal did not remain internally within the party, but landed through whatever channels at the CDU. Since this point Dr [Helga] Wex [of the CDU] has always tried again and again in her speeches to connect the SPD and myself with the demand for the absolute employment of women and the destruction of families. That is the outcome of such papers. The proposals insinuated that all women could only find their self-worth in their career, including women who work out of material and not emancipatory motives and therein cannot see their liberation. It was an elitist document and was tied in with Clara Zetkin’s form of class warfare. It revitalized ideas that social democratic women’s politics had not represented since the Weimar Republic, and most certainly not in the postwar era.\footnote{Interview with Elfriede Eilers in Lepsius, Frauenpolitik als Beruf, 96. Beginning in the Weimar Republic, the party and its female members began moving away from a definition of emancipation tied to employment, or production, instead focusing on the women’s specific involvement in reproduction in the home as the basis of emancipation. This stance was further reinforced with the SPD’s postwar transition into a middle class, reform party with the Godesberger Programm in 1957. See Karen Hagemann, Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik:}
Despite contestation over the family policy statement, the conference did produce a cohesive statement. The issues of reconciling family and work and the gendered division of labor in the home figured prominently in the document’s position. The AsF criticized the uneven chances for men and women in the workforce and the influence of traditional expectations of mothers in the home in that division. In addition, it acknowledged that the traditional gendered division of labor contradicted the realities of many families, especially in cases where mothers needed to work out of financial necessity. Finally, the AsF criticized previous suggestions for creating freedom of choice for mothers, arguing that the “choice between family and employment has proven to be an effective instrument to bind women and men to their traditional roles.”

Based on these reproaches, the AsF felt that SPD family policies should “achieve conditions for men, women, and children that make possible for them to recognize their individual and societal interests, to represent them, and to change their situation.” They called for the right of women to employment through job training, opportunities for promotion, and social security. The AsF reasoned that “the employment of women should not be seen as a necessary evil, rather it must be recognized as an important means for self-realization. It gives women material independence, social contact, more recognition—also in the family…”

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144 AdsD/SPD-PV/Referat Frauen/ 10322/ “Ergebnis der Familienpolitischen Konferenz“

145 Ibid, 12.

146 Ibid
Finally, the AsF proposed that family policies should aim to overcome the gender-specific division of labor in the family by encouraging husbands and fathers to take a more involved role in the home. This change, they argued, would take pressure off of men as sole breadwinners and women as sole caretakers of the home and children.\textsuperscript{147} The AsF proposed a two-fold solution to achieving this balance between work and family: reduction in the length of the working day and the expansion of public childcare options, especially for children in the zero to three age range. The AsF reasoned that a reduction and/or more flexibility in work hours would be an effective means for creating a more family-friendly workplace and aiding parents in balancing their various responsibilities. Consequently, public childcare options should balance the psychological and educational needs of children through qualified teachers and caretakers, while offering full-day care and flexible opening hours to help parents during their specific work shifts.\textsuperscript{148} The final official product of the AsF’s Family Policy Conference did not directly connect emancipation to paid employment, and it rejected the “Marxist” proposals of the left AsF members. Yet it still supported the right of women and mothers to employment while acknowledging the personal benefits of employment outside the home for women in a way that would possibly be more accepting to party leadership.

Throughout the 1970s, members of the AsF active in parliament helped legislate legal changes for women in the SPD-run government. The SPD passed the \textit{Fristenlösung} in 1975, allowing women to terminate pregnancies up until the end of the first trimester (although the constitutional court deemed the proposal unconstitutional the following year), and

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, 12-13.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, 13.
successfully ratified a new Marriage and Family Law in 1977 that significantly liberalized West German divorce law. Most importantly, the law also altered the wording of §1356 of the Civil Code, the statute that codified the wife’s obligations to her home and family before seeking paid work. The role of women and women’s issues in the wider party still remained an issue of considerable consternation among AsF members throughout the 1970s. For example, in November 1975 at a two-day meeting of the AsF Federal Committee attended by the party president Willy Brandt, the AsF leadership chided the SPD leadership for merely acknowledging their family policy statement at the party congress without actually approving the document as promised.149

The growing tension between the AsF and SPD leadership perhaps prompted the AsF’s decision to reach out to feminists and autonomous women’s groups in 1978. The president of AsF Hamburg Christa Randzio-Plath (b. 1940) suggested the AsF would benefit from learning the process of politicizing personal experience, even if the self-help group model was not compatible with party politics. Randzio-Plath also recognized a commonality of cause in the issues of “the societal help for childcare, discrimination of employed women, and the discrimination of women in the media and advertising.”150 The Federal Committee invited the socialist feminist Jutta Menschik (b. 1944) to give a speech on feminism in West Germany on January 21, 1978. A Tagesseminar on November 22, 1978 and the “AsF Seminar with Feminists and Autonomous Women’s Groups” on November 23 and 24, 1979

149 AdsD/SPD Parteivorstand/Referat Frauen/10405/“Unkorrigiertes Protokoll des Bundesvorstands der ASF vom 30.10 bis 2.11.1975 (Klasurtagung) im Gästehaus der Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Bonn-Venusberg”

followed this information session. Autonomous feminists reciprocated by inviting representatives of the AsF a tribunal against §218 in Frankfurt am Main.

The experiences at these meetings disenchanted both groups and ruined any hopes of future collaboration. The AsF perceived that many of the autonomous feminists were grossly misinformed about the activities of the AsF towards women’s issues. For instance, president of AsF Bonn and writer Karin Hempel-Soos (b. 1939) recalled that many autonomous feminists believed that the SPD voted against the Fristenlösung in 1975, either ignoring or “repressing” that the constitutional court, not the Bundestag, had deemed the proposal unconstitutional. Furthermore, the AsF resented the equation of their organization with the entirety of the SPD party.

The movement to boycott the 1980 election led by Alice Schwarzer and Emma also complicated relations. The AsF answered with a campaign entitled “Wahlboycott—nein Danke!” (Election Boycott—No Thank You!) and “Frauen wählen SPD” (Women Vote for the SPD) which included brochures, stickers, and buttons. But the SPD press service magazine also published a defamatory article by Mona Steffen-Funken about Alice Schwarzer titled “Alice Schwarzer—die Ziege als Gärtnerin” (“Alice Schwarzer – the Goat

151 Asfd/SPD Parteivorstand/Referat Frauen/10404/ “Beschlussprotokoll der Sitzung des Bundesausschusses der AsF am 21 Januar 1978”


153 Ibid., 111–112.


as Gardener”) that used the occasion of the election boycott to accuse Schwarzer of commercializing the women’s question and sexual politics.\textsuperscript{156} Steffen-Funken was a former member of the SDS and Frankfurter Weiberrat who was working for the SPD executive committee’s women’s division at the time. Considering Steffen-Funken’s background, the article reflected the critical position of many autonomous feminists towards Alice Schwarzer and \textit{Emma} now appearing in an SPD sponsored publication.

Steffen-Funken wrote and published the article independently of the AsF, and the organization attempted to distance itself from the document with an apology by second in command Ursula Pausch-Gruber (b. 1933). In addition, the AsF published a critical reaction to the article, declaring that the sentiments were “unjustified” and “contradict[ed] the basic political convictions of the AsF executive committee.”\textsuperscript{157} Despite this, many autonomous feminists responded “the attack by the SPD is a slap in the face, not just for \textit{Emma} and Alice, but for all women who in the past year hoped despite everything for the possibility to begin a dialogue and a critical and altering debate.”\textsuperscript{158} AsF women who supported the collaboration reacted to the abrupt and antagonistic break with anger and disgust. A few members even left the party because the unauthorized pamphlet led them to believe that the decision to work with the autonomous feminists was merely a political tactic.\textsuperscript{159} Later attempts to contact autonomous women’s groups after a cooling off period amounted to nothing. For the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Alice Schwarzer-\textit{Die Ziege als Gärtnerin} (PPP 10.9.1980) in Alice Schwarzer, \textit{Das Emma-Buch} (München, 1981), 185–189.
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Stellungnahme des Bundesvorstandes der AsF zu dem Artikel “Alice Schwarzer, die Ziege als Gärtnerin.” Quoted in Pausch, \textit{Die Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratischen Frauenorganisationen}, 225.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Schwarzer, \textit{Das Emma-Buch}, 195.
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Pausch, \textit{Die Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratischen Frauenorganisationen}, 224.
\end{itemize}
autonomous feminists, the whole incident merely confirmed their judgment of women working in political institutions.

The eventual standoff between autonomous women’s groups and the AsF began with the potential for collaboration. The AsF and autonomous feminists were beginning to recognize that common issues existed between them. The AsF’s programmatic statements of the mid-1970s demonstrated a political organization willing to take on the issues of childcare, employment discrimination against women, and abortion rights, issues advocated in many of the autonomous women’s groups. The writing of these statements revealed that right, left, and moderate leanings existed within the AsF, yet the showdown over the family policy statement did not seem to deter later efforts to reach out to autonomous feminists. Some realized that the benefits of collaboration would outweigh their differences in strategy. Yet, the meltdown in relations reflected the tense situation created by their ideological positions. The integration of feminists into the party beginning in the early 1970s meant that the integration of their political stances would inevitably follow, leading to Steffen-Funken’s critical article. Despite attempts at distancing themselves from the article, the AsF nonetheless seemed to embody the autonomous feminist’s criticism of party politics. Therefore, the one article was enough to cut ties.

Modern Mothers: The CDU Frauenvereinigung

The story of the postwar development of the CDU Frauenvereinigung followed similar patterns as that of the AsF. In the immediate postwar period, the CDU women formally organized much quicker than the CDU party as a whole. The female party members established the Frauenarbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU (Women’s Working Group of the
CDU/CSU) on May 1, 1948 in Frankfurt, almost two years before the formal creation of the CDU. The regional and local organization progressed to a national one as women wanted to ensure that they would contribute to the handling of women’s issues in the establishment of the new party and state.\textsuperscript{160} With the constitution of the CDU in 1950, the party reorganized the Working Group into the \textit{Bundesfrauenausschuss der CDU} (Federal Women’s Committee) in September 1951.\textsuperscript{161} The Committee aimed to increase female representation within the party, although the members found the organizational structure of the party precluded any real power within the CDU since their status as committee status excluded them from a position in the CDU governing bodies. This changed when the CDU rewrote its statues in 1956 and 1957. The party promoted the women’s organization to an official association (\textit{Vereinigung}), thereby granting the chairs of the CDU \textit{Frauenvereinigung} seats on the party’s executive council and a permanent place in the decision making process.\textsuperscript{162}

Despite the reorganization, from 1958 until 1969 the \textit{Frauenvereinigung} exercised little power within the party for two reasons. First, the CDU had no difficulties attracting the female electorate in the 1950s and 1960s, therefore it felt no pressure to take seriously the aims of the party’s female members. Second, the CDU \textit{Frauenvereinigung} gave the impression of disunity on certain issues.\textsuperscript{163} The starkest example of this was the debate over the establishment of the Civil Code in the early 1950s. The Bundestag debated over how to


\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 96–97; Wiliarty, \textit{The CDU and the Politics of Gender}, 74–75.

\textsuperscript{163} Wiliarty, \textit{The CDU and the Politics of Gender}, 75.
best harmonize the Civil Code, which had not been significantly updated since 1900, with the new Basic Law.\textsuperscript{164} The CDU women held two private forums on the issue.\textsuperscript{165} Eventually, the CDU women never came to a consensus vote due to disagreement over the power of husbands and fathers in the family. On the one hand, many women agreed with the desire of the party to legislate the “natural hierarchy” in the family with the father exercising more power over the mother. Others felt the Civil Code should ensure the equality of parents and spouses and even worked in cross-party organizations to the disproval of the CDU.\textsuperscript{166}

Similar to circumstances for women in the SPD, the late 1960s and early 1970s marked a transitional period for the CDU Frauenvereinigung that led to the organization garnering greater political power in the CDU. First, the CDU showed significant losses in the female vote in the 1969 election.\textsuperscript{167} Second, as described above, the female party membership increased dramatically in the 1970s. Third, the women’s movement on the ground provided the conditions for the CDU Frauenvereinigung to address issues raised by the movement, albeit as a counter-image to the feminists. Fourth, the CDU Frauenvereinigung elected Dr. Helga Wex (b.1924) to president in 1971.\textsuperscript{168}

Wex grew up in a Social Democratic family. Her father was a Prussian officer in World War One and took up teaching after the war, eventually working as a rector at a Volksschule. Her mother was a well-respected trade instructor who had ties to the women’s

\textsuperscript{164} Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 66, 92–93.

\textsuperscript{165} Holz, Zwischen Tradition und Emanzipation, 155.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 165; Wiliarty, The CDU and the Politics of Gender, 76.

\textsuperscript{167} See fn. 85.

\textsuperscript{168} Wiliarty, The CDU and the Politics of Gender, 81.
movement through Gertrud Bäumer. After completing a dissertation in German literature, working in publishing throughout the 1950s, and marrying, Wex joined the CDU in 1961 despite her Social Democratic roots.\textsuperscript{169} She gravitated towards the CDU because she valued the relationship between religion and politics and the CDU seemed to successfully bring together Protestants and Catholics.\textsuperscript{170}

Wex aggressively engaged the party in women’s and family politics. Her writings emphasized the equal treatment of employed and unemployed mothers, and fiercely advocated partnership between men and women. Her viewpoints represented the group of women the CDU wanted to attract—the “modern” middle class housewife\textsuperscript{171} and part-time earner who may not have sought employment, but agreed somewhat with the notion of women’s emancipation.\textsuperscript{172} At the same time, Wex’s position reinforced, rather than challenged, the CDU’s position on the family as an important site of social development for children that should be publicly supported in a way that would not interfere with the vital role of parents in raising their children, a position of the party since the 1950s.\textsuperscript{173}

She explained her position in a 1973 article published in \textit{Die Neue Ordnung}, an academic journal that focused on confessional topics. According to Wex, the primary goal of

\textsuperscript{169} http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.9748/ accessed October 2, 2011.

\textsuperscript{170} Helga Wex, “Partnership heisst, dass Mann und Frau sich in ihrem Eigenwert Anerkennen,” Frauen und Politik, 1986, 5.

\textsuperscript{171} Middle class in Germany does not necessarily refer to an economic group. Rather, it can be divided into distinct groups such as the university educated bürgerliche professional class or the lower middle class, Mittelstand, of small and medium sized shopkeepers and business owners. Both were target constituents for the CDU.

\textsuperscript{172} Wiliarty, The CDU and the Politics of Gender, 83.

\textsuperscript{173} See Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 65-66.
“the modern woman” was “to build a triangle out of the family, the obligation to rear children, and the right to find self-realization through employment.” Women’s policy thereby should better harmonize the tension between these three impulses. However, the upbringing of children played a more important role in Wex’s politics, certainly before the employment of mothers. This position could be seen in Wex’s consistency with her party’s emphasis on childrearing. Her position exemplified the influenced of the “newest scientific findings” that validated “the first years of a person’s life are vital for his or her social relationships and world view.” Based on these findings, Wex argued “the role of parents as caregivers of their children is irreplaceable.” Any solution that reconciled the public and private for women could not sacrifice the vital role of parents in the upbringing of children.

Wex suggested a stronger role of fathers in the home and social policy measures could reconcile family, childrearing, and employment. First, she implored parents to practice the partnership family. She argued, “The changing role of women—and men—in society makes possible a new understanding of family that is influenced by partnership and a heightened sense of mutual responsibility.” Second, this new partnership would benefit from the establishment of social security for women who abstained from employment to care for their children and an Erziehungsgeld (upbringing money) to be paid to a parent who took

175 Ibid., 271.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., 270.
up childrearing as their primary responsibility. These measures would end the public/private tension because it would ensure “that a woman does not work solely out of financial conditions.” On the other hand, Wex argued this partnership should not deviate from the “separate but equal” biology of men and women and the roles men and women play in the family, another important concept in the CDU’s perception of the gender order.

Helga Wex’s stance on women’s issues and the family set the tone for the Frauenvereinigung’s Dortmunder Programm of 1975. The Dortmunder Programm, the organization’s basic program, laid out their conceptualization of and strategies towards achieving equality and partnership between the sexes and reform in family politics. In general, the Frauenvereinigung promoted a conception of gender relations in politics, society, and the family that recognized the independence of women, but without losing sight of the biological differences between men and women and the important role of the family in childrearing. Partnership was unabashedly the central concept of the document. Whether in the family, workforce, or politics, the CDU women argued that men and women “must carry mutual responsibility.” Similarly to the SPD women, the right for partners to decide the gendered division of labor in the home figured prominently in their statement. They advocated for changes to §1356 and desired to improve the status of housewives. The CDU women argued that “the income of one or both spouses is a family income regardless of the

178 Ibid., 272.

179 Ibid., 274.

180 ACDP/IV-300-069/2/CDU Frauenvereinigung “Grundsätze”, 4.

division of duties...in that way one assures that the activities in the home is seen equal to employment.” ^182 They also supported a pension for housewives independent of their husbands.

In the area of childrearing, the Frauenvereinigung argued the CDU should support the decisions made by parents, whether public childcare or parental upbringing, “the principle of self-help.” ^183 The CDU women suggested extensive improvements in information centers and outreach clinics, while increasing the number of Kindergarten spots for children over the age of three. For children under the age of three, the CDU women advocated Erziehungsgeld to be paid to the parent who would take on the childcare duties full time instead of employment. Finally, the CDU women desired to improve the reconciliation of family and work by promoting more flexible hours for public childcare, job protection for new mothers who took leave to care for their child, and increased part-time employment. ^184

While a “modernization” of Christian Democratic principles towards the family and the gender order informed the Frauenvereinigung’s stance, the SPD as a political opponent also played an important role. The CDU Frauenvereinigung, and the CDU in general, built its family policy stance on the accusation that the SPD only supported the employed woman/mother. At the Eighth Delegation Conference of the CDU Frauenvereinigung in March 1973, Dr. Helga Wex argued the SPD’s focus resulted in the “total discrimination of

^182 Ibid., 20.

^183 Ibid., 21.

^184 Ibid.
the housewife and the breakdown of the family.”\textsuperscript{185} She attacked the SPD-led government of “misusing women for the assertion of ideological concepts,” in other words, Marxism. Wex criticized the Jusos in particular for connecting women’s emancipation to the “rhetoric of class warfare and revolution.”\textsuperscript{186}

Wex’s clear distancing from the SPD revealed the particular point of ideological contention between the CDU and SPD women throughout the 1970s and 1980s: how far was either group willing to go to support the employment of mothers, especially mothers of children under the age of three? The answer to this question proved to be the deciding point between the politics for women and the family advocated by women in the political parties. As the historian Gisela Notz observes about West German female politicians, “The differences in political outlooks was and is just as expansive as by the men of the different political parties. Back then it was not just about opposing key words about the family, but also political outlooks.”\textsuperscript{187}

### IV. Balancing Family and Work: DGB Women’s Debates and Politics

“The Problems of Women are the Problems of Society!” declared the women’s division of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (Confederation of German Trade Unions or DGB) in 1973. After decades of attempting to convince their male colleagues of the importance of women’s issues to the trade union cause, female DGB members began going

\textsuperscript{185} ACDP/IV-003-069/2/ “Reden der Vorsitzenden der Frauenvereinigung der CDU zur Vorlage des Rechenschaftsberichts von Dr. Helga Wex,” 9.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{187} Notz, \textit{Mehr als bunte Tupfen}, 38.
on the offensive. Similar to the SPD and CDU, the umbrella organization of West German trade unions witnessed an increase in female participation in the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1979, female membership increased by five hundred thousand people and went from 15 percent of all members to 19.7 percent (see table 1.8). Angelika Lippe argues that this surge correlated to the expansion of women’s employment since the 1950s, the unequal unemployment rates of women during the recession, and neo-Marxist-inspired interest in trade union activism stemming from the student protest movements.188 However, the structure of the DGB and the inclusion of seventeen unions with varying political and religious affiliations heightened internal divisions among DGB women.189 These factors influenced the positions that they passed on to the wider union congresses, particularly regarding the issue of how to best reconcile family and employment for mothers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of Women</th>
<th>% of Total DGB Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>892,039</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,047,805</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,093,607</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,030,185</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,027,150</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,313,021</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,596,274</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1.8 DGB Female Membership, 1950-1980*


The *Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund* was founded in October 1949 to eliminate feuding between the reestablished unions in the postwar era. It did not include all unions, but it

188 Angelika Lippe, *Gewerkschaftliche Frauenarbeit: Parallelität ihrer Probleme in Frankreich und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949-1979)* (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1983), 119–120.

189 The DGB had 17 member unions in the 1970s. Today, the number is 8.
helped remove discord caused by differing political tendencies.\textsuperscript{190} The three most powerful bodies in the DGB were the \textit{Bundeskongress} (Federal Congress), \textit{Bundesausschuss} (Federal Committee), and the \textit{Bundesvorstand} (Federal Executive Committee). The \textit{Bundeskongress} met every three years and was comprised of delegates from each of the individual trade unions. The most powerful organ within the DGB, the congress would set the agenda and make important decisions. The \textit{Bundesausschuss} was the leading body in the years between the congresses. The committee consisted of about one hundred members including the leaders of the individual trade unions, a representative from the \textit{Bundesvorstand}, and the leaders of the regional DGB executive committees. They executed the congress’s decisions. Finally, the chairmen of the individual unions and a nine-person federal management team formed the \textit{Bundesvorstand}. Their responsibilities following through with the interests of the DGB both internally and publically as decided at the DGB congresses.\textsuperscript{191}

The women’s division mirrored the federal organization of the DGB. The women organized a federal women’s congress every three years. Several female representatives from each trade union attended this conference, the most contentious of all meetings of DGB female members because it was the largest meeting of delegates from the individual unions representing drastically different political interests. Unlike the wider DGB congresses, however, the women’s congress did not wield as much power. The women’s congress resolved policy suggestions that representing the interests of that they would then passed on to the wider DGB congress for deliberation. The directors of the regional DGB women’s divisions also comprised a federal committee or \textit{Bundesausschuss}. The

\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Da haben wir uns alle schrecklich geirrt-- : die Geschichte der gewerkschaftlichen Frauenarbeit im Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund von 1945 bis 1960} (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1993), 87.

\textsuperscript{191} Michael Schneider, \textit{A Brief History of the German Trade Unions} (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz,, 1991), 242–243.
Frauenbundesausschuss’s responsibilities included assessing the situation of employed women and coordinating the work of the female DGB members. Residing at the head of the DGB’s women’s division was the Bundesvorstand (Federal Executive). Furthermore, the women’s division was organized into three thematic committees: Women, which handled general women’s issues in the family, factories, and government positions, Job Training, and Education.

The constituting congress of the DGB in 1949 set as the division’s primary function to represent the interests of employed women and to implement the DGB’s directives towards employed women. More specifically, the division secured the right of employment for women, promoted the equal wages for equal work, and advocated for employment and social protection for women. Similar to women in the political parties, DGB women needed to balance their aims towards employed women with the interests of the DGB as a whole.

From the early 1950s until the mid-1960s, the DGB women faced many difficulties in promoting “women’s specific” demands within the trade unions; most trade union officials argued that women’s issues were private issues, while the DGB concerned themselves with the public working world. This deflection away from women’s issues was due in part to the emphasis on the male breadwinner in the 1950s and the internalization of the housewife and mother role by many of the female DGB members, in particular the younger generation.

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192 Lippe, Gewerkschaftliche Frauenarbeit, 51–52.

193 Ibid., 51.

194 Ibid.

195 Ibid., 102.
In contrast, women active in the Weimar Republic viewed employment as an important aspect of their self-identity and many of the older women were war widows who needed to work out of necessity to support themselves and their children. Younger women who became politicized after the war began to see employment more and more as an activity with a time limit. Once they had their first child, they did not likely return to employment unless out of financial need. As Mechthild Kopel argues, these women on the one hand saw themselves as wives and mothers and on the other hand believed women should strive for economic independence. Kopel relates, “Internally in the DGB this allowed the opportunity for their male colleagues to mobilize their wavering opinion against them.” Thus the housewife and mother became the prioritized ideal for women.

This led to limited voice and power among women during the DGB federal congresses. Women participated unevenly as delegates at the congresses. Between 1949 and 1966, women at best comprised 6.6 percent of the delegates (1959) and at worst 2.9 percent (1949). On average, 4 to 5 percent of the delegates were women, despite women comprising 14 to 16 percent of the total membership of the DGB. Furthermore, the women’s division could not even submit suggestions until 1956 and never with a guarantee that their suggestions would be accepted. Women from the time recall a strict division of labor existed between men and women. Women were expected to work in behind-the-scenes roles, such as


\[197\] Ibid., 41.

\[198\] Ibid., 87.
completing the office work, while men worked on the “grosse Politik” such as policy making.\footnote{199}{Ibid., 74.}

The female DGB members nonetheless actively worked to formulate their own demands that would form the foundation for their policy suggestions for the years to come. Equal wages for equal work remained a cornerstone of their political agenda, as well as promoting better education and job training for women. Finally, easing the double burden of employed mothers became an important staple to their policy suggestions. In the 1950s, the DGB women pushed for a \textit{Hausarbeitstag} (House Working Day), one day a month where women could attend to household duties. They also stressed the importance of more part-time positions for women and developed a concept of a maternal leave policy in 1958.\footnote{200}{Ibid., 45–59.; For the history of the \textit{Hausarbeitstag}, see Carola Sachse, \textit{Der Hausarbeitstag: Gerechtigkeit und Gleichberechtigung in Ost und West, 1939-1994} (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002).}

As the number of employed women increased along with a stronger desire to pursue employment, the DGB became more aware of the social and political importance of the women’s question and women’s specific demands.\footnote{201}{Lippe, \textit{Gewerkschaftliche Frauenarbeit}, 103.} Between 1965 and 1975, women’s employment increased around 10 percent across the board for women aged twenty to fifty-five. By 1985, it had increased by 20 percent from 1965. This resulted in an increased presence of younger women in the DGB.

Maria Weber (b. 1919) and Irmgard Blättel (b. 1929) led the DGB women into this new phase of activism in the 1970s and 1980s. Weber held the position of the president of the DGB \textit{Frauenabteilung} from 1956 until 1972, after which she advocated women’s issues as
vice president of the DGB. Born into the Catholic working class milieu in Gelsenkirchen, she worked for several years as a tailor and then later at a chemical factory during World War Two. After the end of the war, she joined the trade union IG Chemie, Papier, Keramik in her hometown and quickly rose through the ranks. In 1969, she also joined the CDU party and was very active in the party’s social policy committee. Blättel replaced Weber as president of the Frauenabteilung in 1972. Born to a construction worker father in Elz/Westerwald, Blättel apprenticed as a bookbinder and entered trade union activities through IG Metall in 1955. Also a member of the CDU, Blättel refocused the Frauenabteilung’s energies on issues concerning workplace and family policies, as well as social security law.

Reconciliation between family and employment continued as a core focus for DGB women in the early 1970s. The DGB Frauenabteilung finalized their program to “reconcile employment, family, and society” at the 1974 Federal Women’s Conference. The proposal established several solutions for achieving a better harmonization for the double-burdened employed mother. First and foremost, the DGB women promoted a paid parental leave “for either mothers or fathers” for the first eighteen months after the birth of the child, a policy advocated by the DGB women since the late 1950s. Furthermore, they called for the creation of more Kindergärten for children aged three through six with full-day operating hours, as well as full-day schools. Finally, they demanded more flexible working hours for

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202 Lippe, Gewerkschaftliche Frauenarbeit, 48-9.

203 http://www.fes.de/archiv/adsd_neu/inhalt/nachlass/nachlass_w/weber-ma.htm accessed October 2, 2011


parents and better services both for parents caring for sick children and in order to promote the welfare of families, such as improved medicinal care, childcare, and recreational infrastructure.\textsuperscript{206}

The DGB women also promoted part-time work as a viable option for balancing family and work, a measure they had also supported since the 1960s, even while they admitted part-time employment was undesirable under other circumstances.\textsuperscript{207} With the oil shock recession of the 1970s disproportionately affecting West German women, the DGB women found themselves in the position of defending employed women as equal employees and rejecting the suggestions to turn full-time positions into part-time positions as a means of maintaining the West German employment rate. While the \textit{Bundesfrauenausschuss} argued, “Full-time positions must not be changed into part-time positions,” nonetheless “a large group of colleagues are dependent on a shorter daily work shift in order to reconcile their employment and familial duties.”\textsuperscript{208}

Yet while the \textit{Frauenabteilung} and the female DGB members agreed and voted on supporting greater reconciliation of the spheres of family and employment, the diversity of opinions among women from the various individual trade unions lead to very heated debates over specific policy, as we will see in the following chapters. In general, however, these debates over family policy stemmed from similar forces as within the SPD—the influx of young feminists into trade union activity, in particular into the IG Metall union, clashing with

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{207} Oertzen

\textsuperscript{208} AdsD/DGB Archiv/Frauen Abteilung /4019/ “Niederschrift über die Sitzung des DGB-Bundesfrauenausschusses am 3.8. und 5.8.1977”; See also AdsD/DGB Archiv/Frauen Abteilung /4022/ “Niederschrift über die Sitzung des DGB-Bundesfrauenausschusses am 19/20.3.1979”
women with more moderate and conservative political stances towards the family. The debates tended to erupt in reaction to specific policies suggested by the West German federal government and political parties and not specifics of the DGB women’s own policy platforms. As future chapters will demonstrate, debates focused on the extent to which policies such as the Tagesmutter Modellprojekt or Erziehungsgeld challenged or supported their own bid for a maternal policy and how far the DGB women were willing to compromise in order to ensure the successful implementation of the policy platform.

IV. Conclusion

The debates over the gendered division of labor and the reconciliation of family and work among female activists in the autonomous women’s movement, political parties, and trade unions in West Germany reveal the widespread efforts to improve the social, political, and economic situation of women and mothers in the Federal Republic from the late 1960s onward. From the conservative to the most left ends of the political spectrum, women active in grass roots initiative and in the more traditional political institutions invigorated a long-standing dialogue over the women’s question.

Comparison of the different individual’s and groups’ theoretical and policy positions also uncovers a universal desire to alleviate the tensions between public and private, between familial obligations and employment/public engagement for the women of West Germany. Yet, the differing solutions and strategies for ending the double burden revealed ideological and generational differences between female activists in West Germany. Autonomous
feminists who focused on the “mother question” advocated similar solutions to the AsF, in particular more full-day childcare from infancy to primary school. Even autonomous feminist such as Gunild Feigenwinter, members of the AsF, and the CDU Frauenvereinigung could agree that the double burden would be alleviated by more partnership in the family. Yet, attempts at collaboration between autonomous feminists and the AsF fell through based on ideological differences in whether or not “male” political parties could successful implement changes for women, and fundamental differences of opinion about election boycotts. Although the CDU Frauenvereinigung was able to mobilize female CDU members based on the activities of autonomous women, the CDU women wanted nothing to with feminism and vice versa. Despite some noted commonality of opinions, the extreme divisiveness of female activists working both within and outside institutions would have a profound effect on their ability to influence the family policy decisions of the 1970s and 1980s.
CHAPTER TWO

“The Lesser of Two Evils:” The Controversy over the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt, 1971–1980

In August 1973, the concerned citizen Ingeborg Unterspann penned a letter to the federal minister of Youth, Family, and Health Katharina Focke of the SPD in response to the recent announcement that the ministry was organizing a Tagesmütter Modellprojekt (Nanny Model Project). She expressed excitement over the ministry’s new initiative to expand public childcare options for children under the age of three, especially since her town Sennenstadt did little to provide childcare. Her letter described how the lack of childcare options played a direct role in her decision to give up employment after the birth of her son. She argued that she belonged “to the emancipated women who are attached to their occupation, but, despite this desire, do not want to pass on having a family.”

1 Inadequate childcare made this an either/or decision. Despite the step forward she felt that the project represented, Unterspann nonetheless expressed concerns that such a project would be in vain without also expanding full day options for Kindergarten and primary school education, as she witnessed in the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland. Without these reforms, mothers who wished to work would still face the dilemma of finding care for their children.

1 BArch K 189/6128, pg.150 Letter from Ingeborg Unterspann 3.8.1973

2 Ibid. In West Germany, the majority of state funded Kindergärten, daycares for children aged 3-6, were half day.
Unterspann’s letter represented the desires of a new generation of career-oriented mothers to continue their employment after childbirth, a desire translated into political action by some sections of the autonomous women’s movement. However, the project also withstood intense criticism from conservative politicians and scientists who argued that children mothers best raised their children until the age of three. In an article in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the influential conservative pediatrician Johannes Pechstein argued that for newborns and toddlers aged zero to three, “inadequate individualized care and upbringing in the first years…can lead to profound damage in the entire process of child development.” Furthermore, he connected the employment of mothers to the “crisis of the family,” contending that the experience of childrearing should be the primary focus of parents, not finding self-worth through employment.3

The positions of Unterspann and Pechstein indicate that the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* stood in the center of an ideological debate over how the Federal Republic should react to demographic changes in women’s employment. On one side, some members of the autonomous women’s movement and left activists contended that the idea of state-subsidized nanny care represented a step forward, but at the expense of isolating nannies and children in the bourgeois private sphere, exploiting the situation of housewives, and blocking further childcare reforms. On the other side, conservative medical experts, politicians, and women’s activists cited “new” medical research that supported the long-held position of the CDU/CSU that mothers best cared for children under the age of three.

This debate over the best childrearing practices certainly was not new, but occurred in the context of rising employment of mothers and a strong radical feminist movement that

challenged gender norms. Faced with labor shortages and a ready and willing female labor forces, France and Sweden opted for an intense restructuring of their childcare system for children under the age of three. In France, the number of children aged two in the preschool system doubled between 1970 and 1980, from 18 percent to 36 percent. In the same time frame, the number of crèche (childcare centers for children under the age of three), increased by 176 percent.4 Between 1975 and 1980 in Sweden, the number of enrolled one- to two-year-olds doubled from 16 percent to 31 percent.5 Britain, on the other hand, experienced a similar development of half-day care as West Germany due to an emphasis on the male-breadwinner/female homemaker (later part time earner) model, a non-interventionist position on childcare, and economic forces that hindered further development.6 While West Germany did very little to expand care for children under three, it did expand Kindergarten services for children aged three to six in the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1980, the degree of coverage of children in the three to six age range increased from 38 percent to 79 percent. However, West German policy makers viewed these measures part of education reform rather than childcare policy, and most of these spots were half-day.7


The Family Ministry project began in 1974 as a research study into a new form of childcare directed toward infants and toddlers of employed mothers who could not stop working after the birth of their child. The ministry and cooperating state and local governments paid stay-at-home mothers with their own children a meager, untaxed wage to care for an addition two or three children in their home. By April 1977, about 167 Tagesmütter tended around 250 children. After initial basic training, the nannies also attended weekly group meetings with other nannies in their community to share their experiences, problem solve, and learn about new childcare techniques. The Deutsches Jugendinstitut (German Youth Institute or DJI) based in Munich observed the development of the children and interviewed parents and nannies, reporting their findings in several Family Ministry publications. After federal funding of the project ended in 1978, the idea continued in only a limited fashion as a childcare method throughout the 1980s through citizen initiative groups and minor local government support. However, Tagesmutter care gained popularity again in the 1990s with changes in the Sozialgesetzbuch (Civil Code or SGB) VIII. Currently, most families opt to utilize the parental leave and Erziehungsgeld (upbringing money) provisions for the first three years of the child’s life. Provision for the stay-at-home care of children under the age of three is the norm. Yet of the 2 million children under the age of three in Germany, around 36,400 Tagesmütter and Tagesväter (male nannies) care for around 60,000 children under the age of three as of March 2011. In general,

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8 Arbeitsgruppe Tagesmütter, *Das Modellprojekt Tagesmütter - Erfahrungen und Perspektiven* (München: Juventa, 1977), 75.

the coverage rate of care for children aged zero to three is only around 8 percent.\textsuperscript{10} The fact that the Federal Office for Statistics reported in 2008 that around 20 percent of children under the age of three visit some kind of daily care suggests that most childcare occurs informally.\textsuperscript{11}

Despite the level of controversy elicited by the \textit{Tagesmütter} project and its ongoing relevance in the family policy structures of Germany, scholars rarely mentioned the project in the literature on West German family policy. The few pages devoted to the project are mostly descriptive in nature.\textsuperscript{12} Yet, of all the federal family policies analyzed in the following chapters, this project was the only to promote the care of children outside the home. Therefore, it provides an illustrative case study into the limits of the federal government’s abilities, and even desire, to promote the reconciliation of family and work for women in the 1970s through childcare outside the home.

This chapter argues that at best, the project represented a partial development towards a family policy that supported dual earner households—a compromise between powerful conservative ideologies regarding early childhood socialization supported by scientific research, and the wants and desires of employed mothers who represented real demographic shifts in West Germany. It was the embodiment of both the continuity and change in the conceptualization of the gendered division of labor in West Germany. Outspoken segments of the autonomous women’s movement and middle-class feminists reinforced the partial


\textsuperscript{11} Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, "Im März."

development of the *Tagesmütter* project in prominent feminist publications such as *Emma*, *Courage*, and *Brigitte*. It even garnered support from some CDU women. Focusing on the benefits for *Tagesmütter*, these groups and individuals saw the new position as a means of achieving emancipation for housewives, while solving the problem of underfunded and undesired care in the *Kinderkrippe* (nursery schools for children under three). The support from politically active women ensured the continuation of this form of care after the end of federal financing. This support of a project only partially comprehensive, as well as the strong opposition from conservative politicians and SPD politicians who only supported the employment of mothers when financially necessary, limited the scope of the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt*.

The first section of this chapter introduces the Family Ministry, outlines the development of the project, and discusses the Family Ministry’s debates with the scientific community. The second section looks at the responses from the CDU/CSU parliamentary faction, as well as responses from women’s groups within the CDU and SPD, the press, and the women’s division in the DGB. The third section focuses on the final research results, while the final section discusses the reactions to the result by the CDU/CSU and the autonomous women’s movement.


In the mid-1980s, Katharina Focke was traveling from Strasbourg to Cologne when she was recognized by a group of pediatricians on their way back from a conference. Focke related, “They engaged me in an aggressive discussion of the *Tagesmütttermödell*. They were convinced that I wanted to rip children from the arms of their mothers, during which I only
wanted to help mothers of small children in particularly difficult situations.”

The incident on the train years after the completion of the project reflected the still-existing tensions that informed the scope of the project. Initial discussions within the Family Ministry indicated the potential to develop a project accessible to all employed mothers, not just those who needed to work out of financial need. However, between 1972 and the publication of the finalized guidelines in 1974, several factors lead to compromises on the scope of the project. On the one hand, it became clear that the Family Ministry could not completely abandon older conceptions of early-childhood socialization, despite their attempt to disprove the older scientific research. Furthermore, despite retaining her own retinue of scientists who promoted new developments in child socialization, Focke felt increasing public pressure to abandon her project. This pressure came from conservative child psychologists, sociologists, and pediatric doctors, all of whose opinions fueled the arguments of conservative politicians and members of their own party.

*The Origins and Conflicts of the West German Family Ministry, 1950s–1970s*

CDU chancellor Konrad Adenauer founded the Bundesministerium für Familienfragen (Federal Ministry for Family Affairs or BMFa) in 1953 under the pretext of concern for the birthrate in the Federal Republic. Before 1953, family policy matters were spread across the different ministries, since issues regarding the family were usually

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integrated into other policy matters such as employment and health. However, Adenauer believed that the family needed special focus because an increase in the birthrate could only be achieved through the “strengthening of the family and through this, strengthening the desire to have children.”

From its inception, the ability of the BMFa to influence family policy required a negotiating between the personality of the family minister, the conception of the role of the family ministry by the ministry’s officials, the importance of the family in the agenda to the majority coalition, and the willingness of state governments to implement family policy. The tenure from 1953 to 1962 of the first family minister, Franz-Joseph Wuermeling, established many of these precedents. Wuermeling contended with continued entrenchment of family policy issues in other ministries, making him dependent on his colleagues in the cabinet to push through his initiatives. Based on these experiences, he strategized that the Family Ministry should coordinate family-related policies with the other ministries, rather than advocate a separate agenda. The power of the ministry was strengthened somewhat by the addition of a youth division in 1957, becoming the Bundesministerium für Familien- und Jugendfragen (Federal Ministry for Family and Youth Affairs or BMFJ).

Wuermeling not set the precedent of a symbolic Family Ministry as a “symbolic” institution, but also established a strong confessional relationship between the ministry and

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15 Ursula Münch, Familienpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Massnahmen, Defizite, Organisation familienpolitischer Staatstätigkeit (Freiburg im Breisgau: Lambertus, 1990), 206.

16 Ibid., 210.

17 Ibid., 209.
religious family organizations. When Wuermeling established the *Wissenschaftliche Beirat* (Scientific Advisory Council), he invited experts also involved in confessional family organizations, such as the *Familienbund der deutschen Katholiken* (Family Council of German Catholics) and the *Evangelische Aktionsgemeinschaft für Familienfragen* (Protestant Working Group for Family Questions), to serve on the council. Important officials within the ministry also shared his connections to Catholic family organizations. Max Wingen, who provided consistency in the ministry as an official from 1959 until 1979, also served as an executive member of the *Familienbund der deutschen Katholiken*.

With the election of the Social-Liberal (SPD/FDP) Coalition in 1969, the size of the new chancellor’s cabinet came under scrutiny by the SPD’s coalition partner the FDP. The new SPD chancellor Willy Brandt pledged to reduce the cabinet size by four ministers with the BMFJ on the short list. However, Brandt saw an opportunity for the ministry to realize the new government’s goals of social reform. As a result, he saved the ministry by merging the BMFJ with the Ministry of Health, thereby creating the *Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie, und Gesundheit* (Federal Ministry for Youth, Family, and Health or BMJFG). Brandt named the former health minister Käte Strobel to the post, a move that would temporarily ensure the importance of the ministry in Brandt’s cabinet. Working with a chancellor who saw the value of the ministry in his party’s agenda, Strobel effectively

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20 Ibid., 92–93.

21 Münch, *Familienpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 230.
demonstrated the significance of family policy initiatives by embedding the family into other social issues. Strobel also initiated a process of secularization within her ministry by taking on issues of sexuality as a health issue, forcing the health and family divisions to work closer together (as there was a greater confessional concentration in the family ministry), and promoting a “rational” family policy. Yet the momentum ended in 1972 when Strobel left her position due to health concerns of her husband and her old age.22

This led in 1972 to the appointment of Katharina Focke (b.1922), the minister responsible for the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt*. A native of Bonn, Focke’s father was a publicist and her mother a doctor. In 1931 she moved to Switzerland with her father due to his Jewish heritage but returned to Germany in 1946.23 She completed a PhD in political science in Hamburg in 1954. Her career before 1972 focused mainly on European politics; from 1961 until 1969, she directed the *Bildungswerk Europäische Politik* (Educational Institute for European Politics), now the *Institut für Europäische Politik* (Institute for European Politics), in Cologne, a foundation that focuses on policy development and education of the European integration process. She joined the SPD in 1964 and entered the Bundestag in 1969, where she took over the post of Bundestag undersecretary in the chancellor’s department focusing on issues related to the EU and Europe.24

Focke initially did not want to accept the Family Ministry post. As a politician focusing on European issues, she maintained few domestic contacts. She also disliked her “token female” status. But she nonetheless took the job as an opportunity to further her

22 Ibid., 230–232.

23 Interview with Katharina Focke in Lepsius, *Frauenpolitik Als Beruf*, 119.

political career. Her reluctance and lack of political influence were not the only barriers to the successful implementation of a family policy agenda. The new SPD chancellor Helmut Schmidt, elected in 1974, showed little concern for family policy in a conservative fiscal environment created by the first oil shock recession. Furthermore, Focke met resistance from other ministers, in particular Walter Arendt, the labor minister. Focke required Arendt’s support to make headway on the issue of reconciliation of family and employment for women. But he was known to be against such measures and could always rally the worker wings of the SPD and in some cases the trade unions against any cause he deemed unfit.

Financial instability also resulted in resistance at the state and local level to the implementation of “costly” family, youth, and health initiatives. Therefore, model projects like the Tagesmütt Medellprojekt the strategy Focke used to circumvent an anti-family policy political culture.

Chancellor Schmidt replaced Focke in 1976 with Antje Huber (b. 1924), a tax and financial expert. With the ever-increasing importance of austerity in government spending, Schmidt desired a family minister willing to work with a reduced budget. While Huber oversaw a financial makeover of the ministry, she still encountered difficulties enacting family policy measures, although she was instrumental in creating a women’s division within the ministry. According to Ursula Münch, the difficulties of Focke and Huber highlighted

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26 Münch, Familienpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 235.


28 Münch, Familienpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 238.
the contradictions in the reform policies of the SPD. She argues “the discrepancy between claim and reality were more visible than in the conservative governments.”

The Introduction of the Tagesmütter Project

In 1972, Dr. Arno Kosmale, the director of the family division of the BMJFG, published an article co-authored with his research associates Heine Henke and Christa Spindler in the left leaning journal *Theorie und Praxis der sozialen Arbeit* (*Theory and Praxis of Social Work*) titled, “Berufstätige Mütter – ‘Mütter als Beruf’ (Employed Mothers – Motherhood as Employment). The authors proposed a government funded “Tagespflegemutter” (“daily care mother”) as a form of childcare for children under the age of three in cases where both parents “wanted or were forced” [italics added] to work after the birth of a child. This phrasing indicated the intention of broad access for all children of employed mothers, both those who had to and those who wanted to work outside the home.

The authors justified this recognizable change in the perception of family policy with new research into child development and socialization that rejected the very powerful motherly deprivation thesis. The British psychologist and psychiatrist John Bowlby coined this phrase in his 1951 work *Maternal Care and Mental Health*, translated into German in the early 1970s. Based on his research into children raised in orphanages, he argued that

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29 Ibid., 237.


insufficient contact between mother and child in the first years of a child’s life could lead to developmental problems in character growth and mental health. While Bowlby conducted his original research on homeless and orphaned children in the aftermath of World War Two, when West German researchers adopted the concept in the early 1970s, they connected absent mothers to employed mothers. The Munich-based pediatricians Theodor Hellbrügge and Johannes Pechstein, both members of conservative Catholic organizations, popularized the thesis and worked aggressively to alert the public to what they believed were the negative effects of young mothers seeking employment outside the home in the first three years of a child’s life. The publications were so popular that the motherly deprivation thesis was a widely held belief in West Germany by the mid-1970s. However, the late publication of Bowlby’s work into German meant that similar debates had already occurred in the United States and other countries like Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s, and by the 1970s, the theory had either been modified or replaced.

Sociological, psychological, and pediatric medical research in (West) Germany connected the employment of mothers to negative child development since the nineteenth century. Before the 1960s, researchers contended employed mothers damaged their children by violating the “natural” gender order. By failing to conform to feminine biological

32 Bowlby, *Maternal Care and Mental Health*, 12.


imperatives, mothers harmed their children.\textsuperscript{36} This changed with the adoption of the maternal deprivation theory. Now, researchers argue hard occurred directly from the situation of employment and the absences caused by employment. The biological imperative of congruent gender roles was replaced by the biological imperative of the mother-child relationship.\textsuperscript{37}

Kosmale, Henke, and Spindler at the Family Ministry rejected the concept of motherly deprivation, however, in favor of new studies that demonstrated the benefits of exposure “to different answers and worldviews [that] can become an incentive for comprehensive learning.”\textsuperscript{38} This new direction in early childhood scientific research on socialization could be found in the studies of the psychologist Dr. Ursula Lehr (b. 1930).\textsuperscript{39} Dr. Lehr joined the \textit{wissenschaftliche Beirat} of the BMJFG in 1972 while holding several academic positions in the Bonn-Cologne area. She would go on to join the CDU in 1986 and was appointed to the position of federal minister of Youth, Family, Women, and Health in 1988. Her seminal work \textit{Die Bedeutung der Familie im Sozialisationsprozess (The Meaning of the Family in the Socialization Process)}, first published in 1970 through the ministry, argued that success in child development depended on variables beyond the role of the mother in upbringing.\textsuperscript{40} Lehr was part of a broader new movement in early childhood


\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 126.

\textsuperscript{38} Henke, 140.

\textsuperscript{39} Ursula Lehr, \textit{Die Rolle der Mutter in der sozialisation des Kindes}, Praxis Der Sozialpsychologie ; Bd. 3. (Darmstadt: Steinkopff, 1974).

socialization theories. This movement turned to the literature on anti-authoritarian child development, created by the members of the anti-authoritarian Store Front Daycare movement described in chapter one, as well as research conducted on the successful collective childcare methods of Kibbutzim in Israel.\footnote{The seminal volume on new research on early childhood socialization was Friedhelm Neidhardt, \textit{Frühkindliche Sozialisation: Theorien und Analysen} (Stuttgart: Enke, 1975); For further background on anti-authoritarian childcare see Dagmar Herzog, \textit{Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany} (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005); Heide Berndt, “Zu den politischen Motiven bei der Grundung erster Anti-authoritärer Kinderladen,” \textit{Auschwitz und die Padagogik} (1995): 231-250.} Yvonne Schütze attributes the polarization in conceptualizations of proper early childhood upbringing to the women’s movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. She argues, “The scientists—from an ideological standpoint—either leaned in the direction of the New Women’s Movement or retreated to the critics (Mahners) [of the New Women’s Movement].”\footnote{Schütze, “Mütterliche Erwerbstätigkeit,” 126-27.}

In addition to rejecting the motherly deprivation thesis, Kosmale, Henke, and Spindler contended \textit{Tagespflegemütter} ensured the optimal chance of successful development for children by guaranteeing individualized upbringing not found in the state funded \textit{Kinderkrippe}.\footnote{Henke, 141.} The socialization process would be more successful if childcare methods fit their needs more directly.

Why did a government body reject reforming a government institution in favor of creating an entirely new option? Due to the belief that children under the age of three needed their mothers, the \textit{Kinderkrippe} existed as a contested institution, seen as a solution only in circumstances of extreme necessity. For this reason, federal, state, and local authorities were
not willing to finance a large undertaking as many states did with *Kindergärten* i for children aged three to six in the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{44} Obtaining a spot in a *Kinderkrippe* was also extremely difficult. First, by 1975, *Kinderkrippe* could only accommodate 4 to 4.5 percent of children with employed mothers (see table 2.1). Furthermore, officials did not consider employment as a demonstration of need for married mothers.\textsuperscript{45} As a result, a high percentage of children in *Kinderkrippe* came from single mother households—whether because of divorce, the death of a spouse, or a child born out of wedlock. Many middle class mothers actually gave up employment despite wanting to continue because they considered

\textbf{Table 2.1} Childcare for zero- to six-year-old children in the FRG and GDR, 1955-1989 (in percent of coverage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ages</th>
<th>0-3</th>
<th>3-6</th>
<th>0-3</th>
<th>3-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1.6\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{a} Reflects data taken in 1986.

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\textsuperscript{45} Reyer and Kleine, *Die Kinderkrippe in Deutschland*, 159, 162.
Kinderkrippe detrimental to the well-being of their children. Children of employed mothers who could not obtain a spot faced, as one BMJFG report called, “abenteuerliche Betreuungskarriere” (adventurous childcare careers) by the age of three, referring to the constant shuffling as mothers sought childcare from alternative sources.

Henke and his colleagues’ call for individualized care by a Tagespflegemutter, while promoting the employment of mothers, nonetheless reflected an internalization of the ideological premises they desired to disprove. The 1974 final project outline only focused on the children of mothers who worked out of necessity and in no way sought to bring more mothers into the work force. The guidelines stated very clearly, “The carrying out of the model project should … not act as a means to put more mothers to work.”

While the ideological underpinnings to the project precluded its accessibility for all employed mothers, the reluctance to encourage employment of mothers could have also reflected the poor reception by the federal employment minister of measures that would reconcile family and employment for women. This tenuous relationship, as well as the limited funds for the project, meant that the ministry would not consider the position of Tagesmutter a Beruf (career) with the requisite training and benefits. The Family Ministry would instead pay Tagesmütter, usually mothers with children of their own, to care for an additional two to three children in their homes. Their salary hinged upon the number of children: 325 DM for one child, 525 DM for two, and 630 DM for three. An additional 130 DM was paid per full day charge. In comparison to the average income of women in West

46 Ibid., 158.
47 Ibid., 159.
48 BArch K 189/6116/Bd. 1, pg. 133
Germany, 1200 DM in 1973, this wage was the equivalent of pocket money.\(^4^9\) The hours of care reflected the work hours of the parents, not a pre-determined time. The *Tagesmütter* would receive mandatory training arranged through local *Volkshochschule* (adult education center). In addition, the *Tagesmütter* would be required to attend weekly meetings with other local nannies. These meetings, facilitated by the pedagogical expert assigned to their area, provided a forum to discuss problems and follow up on their training. The low salary and lack of *Beruf* status implied that *Tagesmütter* would participate more out of social obligation than any desire to earn an independent income. The project depended on employing middle-class housewives with children whose income would be supplemental to their husbands’.

Because Focke and her aides considered the second goal of the project to provide evidence to contradict the motherly deprivation thesis, the project also contained a research component. Researchers from the *Deutsches Jugendinstitut* in Munich would observe the test sites in various West German cities to analyze the effects of non-parental care on children and determine if and to what extent a *Tagesmütter* model was capable of providing the same quality of socialization as the family.\(^5^0\) The researchers conducted several interviews with the children, parents, and *Tagesmütter*, observed the weekly meetings, recorded play sessions with children and the *Tagesmütter*, and analyzed the data on the overall progress of the program. This study “would be the secure basis for the planning and obtaining of future upbringing forms of early childhood socialization.”\(^5^1\) Researchers would focus specifically on the children’s “physical, mental, and social development, behavioral patterns, the

\(^{4^9}\) “Erwerbstätigkeit,” *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1975.

\(^{5^0}\) BArch K 189/6123/Bd. 1, pg.193.

\(^{5^1}\) Ibid., 36.
cognitive and speech capabilities." 52 They also expressed interest in studying the relationships between parents and nannies, as well as collecting much needed “data on the configuration of the family and its possible changes as a consequence of the employment of women and the partial upbringing of children outside of their biological family.”53

**Debating motherly deprivation**

By rejecting the motherly deprivation thesis and arranging for the care of infants and toddlers outside the home, the Family Ministry inserted itself into an ongoing debate over the best socialization methods for young children. This resulted in the ministry receiving critical essays and letters from Johannes Pechstein and Theodore Hellbrügge themselves, as well as their colleague Dr. Bernhard Hassenstein. As the debates with conservative psychologists, biologists, and pediatric doctors wore on, they revealed the strong interrelation between scientific arguments concerning child development and one’s stance on the gendered division of labor in the home. Furthermore, the debate demonstrates that conservative scientists connected any attempts to aid in the reconciliation of family and work for employed mothers, even those who needed to work, to criticism of women’s emancipation and feminism.

In September 1973 Dr. Bernhard Hassenstein, professor of behavioral biology from the Biologisches Institut I der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg, addressed a three-page letter to Minister Focke. His letter illuminated the strong connections between the motherly deprivation thesis and attacks on feminism. He argued that this “[w]ish of mothers or rather the married couples stands in opposition to the right of the child to care from their

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52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.
parents” and forcefully posited that “there is no greater interference in the equal chances of a single person . . . for success than through deficiencies in care during the first year of life.”\(^\text{54}\) The needs of the child outweighed the desires of parents. In fact, he contended emancipation harmed children, commenting that “a win [for emancipation] . . . does not remotely balance the risk of harming a person for an eighty year lifespan.”\(^\text{55}\) He utilized concerns over early childhood socialization to attack the employment of mothers and the emancipatory strivings of women.

Dr. Gerd Biermann, an influential pediatric doctor and expert in psychoanalysis, even attempted to formulate an alternative definition of emancipation. In a 1974 article in *Fortschritte der Medizin (Advancements in Medicine)* published by the conservative Springer Publishing House, Biermann pointed to the constant back and forth between the child’s biological mother and the *Tagesmutter* as the most problematic aspect of *Tagesmütter*. This process would lead to “an early crisis of identity” for the children and feelings “full of guilt” on the part of the mothers. Competition between the mother and *Tagesmutter* would result in “jealous tension” that would never be resolved.\(^\text{56}\) In the section titled “Emancipation of Women,” he described the *Tagesmütter* program as “an all too easy way to do away with mother’s obligation to children.”\(^\text{57}\) He concluded with his own definition of emancipation:

\(^{54}\text{Ibid., 62-63.}\)

\(^{55}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{56}\text{Gerd Biermann, “Probleme um die ‘Tagesmutter’,” *Fortschritt der Medizin* 92, no. 25 (1974): 964.}\)

\(^{57}\text{Ibid., 964.}\)
“the self-realization of women through a partnership with men and a satisfying experience in their role as mother.”

In response, Katharina Focke denied any emancipatory intentions in her project. Her reply to the letter written by Dr. Hassenstein clarified that the main focus of her project was not enabling the employment of more mothers, but rather “a contribution to the solution of the problems of the prerequisites for development, logistics, and care of the children of employed mothers.”

The pressing issue was not providing childcare so more mothers could go to work outside the home, but to provide an equal chance for healthy development for children of parents who worked full time.

Ursula Lehr’s article in the popular science magazine *Psychologie Heute (Psychology Today)* took on the criticism from her discipline more forcefully. She started by attacking her colleagues’ previous attempts at discussion on the topic, arguing that “full emotions are often executed with evoked pathos and pseudoscientific opinions.” Lehr illustrated the connections between ideology and research by deconstructing a study conducted between 1952 and 1955 on six thousand German children. The data set contained children aged four to nine of employed and unemployed mothers. Schreiner evaluated the children based on 72 criteria, and in all the data he could find only one difference—ten-year-old daughters of employed mothers were more reserved than those of unemployed mothers. Schreiner used this result to condemn employed mothers.

58 Ibid.

59 BArch K 189/6116/Bd. I, pg. 65.


61 Ibid., 54.
Lehr’s article also elaborated on the research that existed in 1974 to contradict the motherly deprivation thesis. Beyond her own research, Lehr related the research investigating child development in the Kibbutzim in Israel by the Canadian developmental psychologist Mary Ainsworth. Lehr summarized Ainsworth’s findings, stating “Kibbutz children who only saw their parents two hours a day still developed a similar emotional attachment to their parents as children raised by their families.”\(^{62}\) The successful upbringing of a child, claimed Lehr, depended more on the qualifications of the caregiver than biological connection. As shown in her own research, employment of mothers was just one factor of many that could determine the successful socialization of the child. She concluded with a direct appeal for the right of mothers to employment. Lehr, an employed mother of two sons, reasoned that “this is about the self-evident right to work, to employment, as a means of encouraging the self-development of women. This has nothing to do with the false understanding of emancipation—a term used frivolously by specific circles.”\(^{63}\)

Despite attempts by Lehr and Focke to provide scientific evidence proving that their study was a valuable pursuit and would not harm children, keeping important figures such as Hassenstein, Pechstein, and Hellbrügge at bay proved impossible. The outpouring of negative opinion from the conservative medical and psychology community in the press and in her mailbox led Minister Focke to call an Expert Symposium, held in July 1974. Among those present were researchers representing new concepts of early childhood socialization, such as Dr. Rita Süßmuth, Dr. Lehr, Dr. Hans Thomae (Lehr’s dissertation advisor), and Ludwig Liegle of the Institut für Erziehungswissenschaften (Institute for Upbringing Studies) at the

\(^{62}\) Ibid.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 56.
University of Tübingen. Süssmuth (b. 1937), a member of the CDU, would serve as family minister from 1985-1988. The research of both Süssmuth and Lehr pointed to members of the Conservative CDU who were more willing to deviate from their party’s stance on family policy. Liegle was an expert on collective childcare in the Soviet Union and on the Israeli Kibbutzim.  

The participants wages their debate over the best socialization of children under the age of three through empirical research studies reflecting the ideological underpinnings of the participants. Johannes Pechstein depicted East Germany’s promotion of the dual-earner household in their family policy in a negative light, further demonstrating the connections between the male-breadwinner family model, scientific research, and anticommunism. Pechstein argued:

> We must see this fact [the favorable view of the dramatic increase in employed mothers] clearly, because for example in the GDR they have built an army of crèches that today offers care for sixty times more children than in our case. We must consider this tendency towards external upbringing for young children through all the experiences that are laid before us and fight it in both the scientific and political arenas.

His reference to family policy in the GDR was subtle, but nonetheless the implication was clear. Increasing employment of mothers would result in the care of children by persons other than their parents en masse. The data of West German researchers declared this form of care harmful. He not only promoted the care of stay-at-home

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65 BArch K 189/6149/Fold. 13, pg. 11. Between 1970 and 1975, the percentage of children 0-3 who attended *Tageskrippe* in the GDR increased from 29,1% to 50,8%. In West Germany, the percentage increased from .7% to 1.4% between 1970 and 1975. Reyer and Kleine, *Die Kinderkrippe in Deutschland*, 159. See table 2.1.
mothers, but in so doing invoked the male-breadwinner family model as a bulwark against the dual-earner household officially promoted in East Germany.

As Süßmuth, Lehr, Thomae, and Liegle countered with alternative scientific perspectives on upbringing by persons other than parents, referring to the same studies used in Lehr’s article in *Psychologie Heute*, the emotional nature of the discussion became noticeable, to the point where Focke needed to intervene to remind the scientists to keep a certain level of decorum.66 It took the outside observer Dr. Hans Strotzka, a psychotherapist from the University of Vienna, to articulate the origins of the emotional (and circular) discussion:

“… [O]n the one hand, there is the feeling that the current influence of the nuclear family is absolute and upbringing through this family by the unemployed mother is the ideal for socialization. And on the other hand…are those who say that the emancipation of women as time goes on makes childrearing intolerable when women have to pass on a career on grounds of their obligations as spouses and mothers. They believe one must develop societal solutions to help women exercise a free choice . . . I believe the differences are merely ideological.”67

Despite Strotzka creating the opportunity to discuss the related issues of gender roles and the desires of parents, the heated debated continued in the same vein. The level of emotion in the discussion indicated that the symposium did little to change the minds of the critics of the program and further reinforced the polarization of research on the subject of early childhood socialization. This was a debate, however, that would not remain in the confines of the academic community and the family ministry.

II. Reluctant Acceptance? Reactions to the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt, 1972–1974*

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66 Ibid, pg. 41.

67 Ibid., 49-50.
The Politics of Tagesmütter

The importance of the scientific debate surrounding the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* revealed itself in the role it played in the discussion of the project in the Bundestag, within the CDU *Frauenvereinigung* and AsF, and in the press. The CDU/CSU Bundestag faction and the CDU party used the scientific research by Pechstein and Hellbrügge to criticize the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* and support their own family policy suggestions. But exceptions emerged within the parties’ women’s groups, who defended their stance by focusing instead on the practical implications of the project for employed women. The discussion revealed the more left elements of the CDU *Frauenvereinigung* and AsF.

As a project of the BMJFG, the proposal required a vetting process in the Bundestag. The majority status of the SPD assured the approval of the project. However, the CDU/CSU and SPD/FDP nonetheless engaged in a debate over the most desirable family policy for children under the age of three. During this debate, the CDU was in the process of revising its platform, resulting in the Mannheim Declaration in 1975. The document called for more partnership between the sexes in the home and in society. Nonetheless, the CDU’s family policy platform continued to advocate the care of stay-at-home mothers for the first three years of the child’s life.  

In order to use scientific claims to its advantage, the CDU forged a close working relationship with Johannes Pechstein and Theodore Hellbrügge. The research figured prominently in the “Kleine Anfrage” (small questionnaire) presented to the SPD/FDP Faction in March 1974 that questioned the guidelines for the project. This

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68 See chapter four.

69 Ibid.

70 BT-Dr. 7/1797.
inquiry cast doubt on the scientific foundations of the project, posing concerns such as “How can the federal government be sure that these children will not develop psychological deficiencies that could be a disadvantage for their development?” and “In the creation of this project, did the federal government evaluate all relevant sociological, psychological, psycho-analytical, medicinal, and pedagogical literature concerning early childhood socialization?”

The questions functioned to promote the CDU/CSU’s own stance on socialization for children aged zero to three, rather than to realistically obtain more information from the SPD/FDP faction. Considering the quantity of information disseminated by the Family Ministry, the questions attempted to point to holes in the reasoning of the SPD and ministry.

As expected, the response by the SPD/FDP faction through Minister Focke simply reiterated much of what had already been presented in previous reports. For the CDU/CSU faction, the answers offered the opportunity to further criticize the project, disparage the SPD, and promote its own solution for the care of children under the age of three: Erziehungsgeld. In her response to the SPD’s answers through the CDU press service, Helga Wex, acting in her capacity as a member of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction, criticized the response for not naming more scientists who supported the federal ministry’s arguments beyond Ursula Lehr. Without a significant quantity of available research, Wex concluded that “these [financial] contributions would better ensure that the family is placed in a position where one can take the family’s upbringing duty seriously,” if the government redirected funds to Erziehungsgeld.72

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71 Ibid., 1.
72 ACDP/IV/003/067/3 CDU Pressemitteilung 4.11.1974
The scientific research also became the basis of debate when the CDU/CSU and SPD/FDP coalitions met face to face in a meeting of the Bundestag Committee for Youth, Family, and Health on October 16, 1974. The CDU/CSU members again pushed for Erziehungsgeld and condemned the SPD for not responding to or heeding the advice of the conservative psychologists and pediatricians. The representative from the Family Ministry replied that “[m]any critics of the experiment Tagesmütter start with the incorrect assumption that there exists a scientifically proved connection between the employment of mothers and the appearance of deprivation [in the child].”73 Despite the ongoing heated debate over gender roles through research results, the SPD/FDP most effectively argued against the Erziehungsgeld by demonstrating the project was more economically feasible.74 The economy and spending continued to play a subtle but important role in family policy negotiations.

The divisions along party lines in response to the proposed project is not surprising considering the SPD and CDU’s opposing visions of family policy. Yet the responses of the CDU and SPD’s women’s groups indicated a broader spectrum of opinion towards family policy within the parties. The Frauenvereinigung and AsF publically stood by the decisions of their party executives and Bundestag factions, yet challenged conceptions of family policy within the confines of the party. It should be noted that the CDU Frauenvereinigung in fact conceived of and pushed for Erziehungsgeld. But this did not prevent the organization from supporting the Tagesmutter Modellprojekt as a means of emancipating housewives, an important platform for the organization. A 1973 Frau und Politik article argued that “the


74 Ibid.
problem of reconciling employment and children can be solved, and the work of housewives would increase in value.”75 The author also supported the measure for reducing the isolation of the nuclear family in the private sphere. That is not to say that the CDU Frauenvereinigung did not have some hesitations toward the project, but they avoided the issue of the psychological effects on children. The article recycled the statement made by Helga Wex discussed above, but took out references to the motherly deprivation research. Now Wex’s response focused on practical issues to consider, such as whether or not the apartment would have enough room for play. She also questioned whether or not the Tagesmutter program would result in the neglect of other established forms of childcare especially care by the family. The CDU Frauenvereinigung supported the program, as a way for housewives to seek employment, but nonetheless viewed this form of care the second best solution to the child’s own mother.76

What the Frauenvereinigung did like about the project demonstrated willingness to compromise out of concern for mothers. It pointed to the convenience of the form of care, such as the time flexibility and the close proximity to home. For the Tagesmütter themselves, they could care for their own children while earning a wage. Furthermore, they showed concern for single mothers, arguing that the “Mother-Child bond would remain” for single mothers since “they will not have to put their children in a home.”77 For the CDU Frauenvereinigung, the Tagesmütter project helped promote its vision of emancipation that included housewives. In matters of emancipation, gender roles, and the gendered division of


76 Ibid.

labor, the CDU Frauenvereinigung was willing to take a more radical stance than the party leadership, even while they supported the overall party’s more restricted vision of gender roles in the party programs.

The CDU women expressed more support than the Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Frauen, demonstrating that the AsF tended to lean more to the left on the issue of family policy. At the AsF Family Policy conference in December 1974, the female SPD members revised the party’s description of the Tagesmütter Projekt. The AsF’s rewrite expressed a hesitancy over whether or not the project could reconcile the tension between “the right of the child to satisfactory upbringing though the family and other forms outside the home” and “the employment rights of women.” On the one hand, the project provided a situation that was similar to the family, while the Tagesmütter themselves would experience public awareness, increased worth in society, and financial security. On the other hand, the AsF disliked that the project diverted funds from the support of already existing childcare methods such as Kindergärten and Kinderkrippe. To ensure the ministry would provide equal attention to these other childcare institutions, the group suggested the ministry also conduct a Modellprojekt on these other forms of care. Not wanting to create too much tension with party leaders, the AsF concluded that it would hold off final judgment until the DJI filed the results.

The debate over the Tagesmutter Modellprojekt in the Bundestag and in women’s groups in the political parties revealed the role of political ideology in informing stances on family policy initiatives. The CDU/CSU faction rejected the program based on long standing notions of biologically separate but equal gender roles and Catholic beliefs of the importance

78 AdsD/SPD/Referat Frauen/10323/ “Gegenüberstellung der Forderungen,” pg. 11.
of the mother in the upbringing of children, positions which were now backed by “new” scientific research. However, right and left female politicians internally dissented against their respective party’s stance on the project based on their own viewpoint on the family and gender roles that tended to be more to the left than their party’s. Nonetheless, they neither aggressively pushed their beliefs, nor did the parties heed their arguments, out of the necessity of party unity.

Protecting Employed Mothers

The reaction by the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund Bundesfrauensausschuss illustrates the limits in popularity of the ministry’s project, especially among politically left-leaning women. The program created a new form of employment for women with social insurance rights and helped reconcile family and employment for mothers. Female trade unionists in general considered the project a step in the wrong direction, both in the employment status of Tagesmütter and the gendered division of labor in the home that the project promoted. Their reaction can be attributed both to their political agenda established in the 1960s and the fact they represented the interests of employed women.

As with most policy discussions in the DGB women’s division, there existed a divide between the executive committee deliberations and the Congress debates, the latter offering more diversity of opinion due to the participation of a wide range of delegates from trade unions with varied political leanings. The first deliberations over the Tagesmütter Projekt by the DGB Bundesfrauenausschuss in August 1973 reflected initial conflicting reactions to the project. On the one hand, it welcomed the new Tagesmutter position as a means of “tackling
the deficiency of care options for children of employed parents.”79 But as the meeting continued, the positive mood ended as members discussed the conflict of interest between the project and their own viewpoints regarding family and employment policy. First, as trade union members, they could not support the Tagesmutter as a new form of employment without its consideration as a new government-recognized Beruf. The DGB women required that Tagesmütter receive extensive job training and social insurance beyond that proposed by the Family Ministry. Furthermore, they argued that Tagesmütter should receive the same standing, education, and pay as the Kinderpflegerin and Erzieherin who ran the other public childcare options.80 To support the proposed status of the Tagesmütter would, in their eyes, only reinforce the second-class citizen status of women in the work force.

While the DGB federal women’s executive committee expressed a willingness to wait and see if the Tagesmütter program would deliver on the issue of employment, their main fear from the start related to their own attempts to lobby for a maternal leave policy for over a decade. As early as the August 1973 meeting, the Bundesfrauenausschuss concluded that they would not support the Tagesmütter initiative “in order that the request for maternal leave in the first 18 months after the birth would not be called into question.”81 At a two-day meeting between Minister Focke and the DGB Bundesfrauenausschuss on January 31 and February 1, 1974, Focke acknowledged that the Sonderurlaub (maternal leave policy) would be a huge stumbling block in gaining the support for her project from the DGB women’s committee. In her opening remarks, Focke emphasized that the Tagesmutter would be just

79 AdsD/DGB Bundesvorstand/Referat Frauen/4012/Sitzungen/”Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Bundesfrauenausschusses des DGB am 9./10.8.73,” pg.4.

80 Ibid., 5.

81 AdsD/DGB Bundesvorstand/Referat Frauen/4012/”Sitzung Bundesfrauenausschuss 9./10.8.1973”
one of several possibilities in improving public support of childcare, including the Sonderurlaub. In a conciliatory move, Focke encouraged the DGB women to draft a “concrete proposal” for such a policy.82 The move proved effective for the time being as long as Focke delivered on her promise to take the maternal leave policy more seriously. The DGB women’s committee agreed to form closer contacts with the DJI to help inform the development of the project.

But by the end of 1974, the DGB women’s division voted to withhold their support entirely. What caused this departure from their “wait and see” attitude? The points of contention with the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt emerged at the Eighth Federal Women’s Conference in 1974, where the women’s division passed the decisive vote. The majority of delegates rejected the proposal either based on their agenda for a maternal leave policy, or that the structure of the project discouraged women’s emancipation. Karin Marckwald of IG Metall, which tended to be the most radical women’s trade union group, criticized the Tagesmütter Modellprogramm on the grounds it was a private solution to the public question of reconciling family and employment. By caring for children in her own home, the structure of the program reinforced the isolation of the stay-at-home mother, i.e. the Tagesmutter, in the bourgeois nuclear family.83 Therefore, the program “hindered the emancipation of women” by limiting her activities to the private sphere and barring her access to emancipation through public action. Second, the program isolated children in the private sphere. Marckwald argued “upbringing is no private endeavor, but a public one.”84 By

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83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.
contending that childrearing should occur collectively outside the home, Marckwald expressed her fear that the project would divert funds and attention away from public childcare options like *Kinderkrippen* and *Kindergärten*.

The DGB women hardly expressed a unified stance on the project, however. Opening up the discussion to the entirety of the DGB female representatives revealed the diversity of opinions, ideologies, and circumstances among the large numbers of women not on the executive committee. The supporters of the *Tagesmütter* initiative focused on the opportunities the project created for working mothers. For instance, Inge Liebig from IG Chemie, Papier und Keramik, speaking for the Bavarian committee, implored the conference delegates to rethink their reactions to the project. Based on the particular circumstances of her state and the workers she represented, she argued that the location of many of the factories of her union in rural areas afforded little childcare opportunities for the women who comprised 70 percent of the ceramic industry and their children. Their location in Bavaria further hindered their access to childcare, since “the possibilities to create *Kindergärten* and *Kinderkrippen* are not there because of the financial situation.” In the face of few other options, Liebig implored her fellow trade union comrades to “not torpedo the project, but rather do everything possible to ensure the people carry out model projects in order to collect experience. Nothing else is meant with this model than that.”

However, the desire to uphold the DGB women’s agenda and feminist stances regarding the public/private divide took precedence over regional disparities in childcare.

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Emancipated Housewives or Underdeveloped Children? The West German Press Debates

85 Ibid., 230-231.
The *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* also sparked debate over gender roles, the gendered division of labor, and childrearing in the West German press, resulting in three narratives of the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt*. First, feminist journalists at the women’s lifestyle magazine *Brigitte* and the weekly illustrated magazine *Stern* emphasized the emancipatory aspects of project both for the *Tagesmütter* and employed West German mothers. The second narrative, found in the more left leaning press such as the magazine *Der Spiegel*, countered the motherly deprivation thesis by exposing its readership to the newer research represented by Ursula Lehr and then used these studies to criticize the government for not improving already existing childcare institutions. The final narrative supported the findings of the motherly deprivation thesis, using the studies to support the care by a stay-at-home mother and male-breadwinner family model. The liberal press such as *Die Zeit* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* were the progenitors of this position in the West German press.

The voice of the middle-class woman could be found in the women’s lifestyle magazine *Brigitte* and the weekly-illustrated magazine *Stern*. Focke received her greatest support for the *Tagesmütter Projekt* in the press from the women’s lifestyle magazine *Brigitte*. With its January 1973 article “Wir fordern einen neuen Beruf: Tagesmütter” (We Demand a New Job: Nanny), the magazine chronicled the success of *Tagesmüttern* in Sweden in order to advocate a similar program in West Germany. In contrast to the Henke, Kosmale, and Spinder article and the family ministry’s proposal, however, *Brigitte* gave the project a more emancipatory interpretation and promoted the project as a means of balancing family and employment—both for the *Tagesmütter* and the parents of the children. Comparatively the job of *Tagesmutter* in Sweden went well beyond the project in West

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Germany, suggesting that Brigitte journalists desired professional status for Tagesmütter in West Germany. Sonja Pape illustrated how Anita Koirhonen, a Swedish Tagesmutter, earned the equivalent of 1600 DM per month caring for four children, a salary “she did not earn as a dry goods saleswoman.” In addition, Pape described the position of Tagesmutter as a good employment opportunity for “women who stay home because of their children, since they can earn their own wage, health and disability insurance, and retirement.”

Not only would the Tagesmutter herself be able to earn an independent income while caring for her own children, Pape argued this type of childcare would eliminate two common criticisms that led many middle-class mothers to give up employment after the birth of their children: that there were insufficient Kindergärten and Kinderkrippe spots and the options that did exist were harmful for the children, for example because of overcrowding. In contrast to Sweden’s family policy that fully supported dual earner households, Pape condemned the West German system for providing day care centers where “the caregivers are not trained,” the parents must pay a large sum out of pocket in comparison to their income, and “the caregivers work as if paid under the table—they receive no health, disability, or retirement insurance and no paid vacation.” Pape concluded, “The job of Tagesmütter would not only be a quick way out of our Kindergarten misery—but also a comparatively well-priced solution.”

87 Ibid, 53.
88 Ibid, 49.
89 Ibid, 51.
90 Ibid, 52.
91 Ibid.
Brigitte went to great lengths to support the adoption of the program. In August 1973, the magazine published positive responses from their readers about the project. The petition-like mass publication of responses gave the impression of widespread support among their readers. The respondents, from a middle-class milieu, reacted positively to the chance to be employed again. Irmgard Wagner from Koblenz commented, “Regardless I would really like to have a career again (and earn money and have my own social insurance).”\footnote{92 “Wir brauchen Tagesmütter Sofort!,” Brigitte, August 8, 1973, 178.} If criticism existed against the project, this would not have been the forum for publication. The magazine also invited journalists and prominent Bielefeld (where their office was located) politicians from all political parties for a “working conference” moderated by the Brigitte journalist Sonja Pape.\footnote{93 “Sie wollen schnell handeln,” Brigitte, 1973.} The goal for the meeting was to “consider what resources and means are necessary to implement the job of Tagesmutter in their particular situation.”\footnote{94 Ibid., 64.} In doing so, the magazine bridged the gap between journalism and lobbying.

The weekly-illustrated magazine Stern also supported the initiative. Their endorsement of the program coincided with their support of women’s emancipation and both autonomous and institutional strategies to that end. Rather than engage in the scholarly discussion, Stern focused on the experiences of the Tagesmütter and the employed mothers they helped. In June 1974, Christine Heide, the most prominent of the Stern female journalists, interviewed the Tagesmutter Doris Lohe and the mothers of her two charges. Lohe, a mother of two, enjoyed the extra 650 DM per month. The youngest son of Regina Rehbock, divorced mother of three, found relief from the bullying he experienced at the
private *Kindergarten* he attended. With the help of the program, the student Annette Odendahl could continue her studies. Heide used the positive experiences to contradict the political and scientific discussion, to which she argued, “Their voices are drowned out by the chorus of excited mothers.”95 But Heide also revealed the assumptions influencing her support of the program at the end of her article. When weighing the options before mothers, Heide argued, “For a child it is absolutely better to be raised in a family environment than in a home or *Kinderkrippe*” but *Tagesmütter* was the cheaper option for children whose parents already work.96

The coverage of the weekly news magazine *Der Spiegel* represented a second, further left narrative of the *Modellprojekt*. The magazine supported new research on early childhood socialization and embraced the anti-authoritarian childcare movement of the early 1970s, thereby supporting the position that children developed the best through collective childrearing outside of any home.97 In April 1974, by exposing perceived contradictions in the Family Ministry’s plans and reporting on the newer literature regarding early childhood socialization, *Der Spiegel* called for more childcare options outside of the home. *Der Spiegel’s* reporting of the debate over the project emphasized the contradiction inherent in the ministry’s support of public childcare options for children over the age of three such as *Kindergarten*, but not for children under the age of three, exposing the Family Ministry’s continued hesitancy to public childcare for children under the age of three. *Spiegel* quoted the project’s guidelines that argued that already existing institutions for children three and under

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96 Ibid., 80.

would harm the child more than *Tagesmütter.* What really sparked the criticism from the magazine, however, was Minister Focke’s further suggestion that at the age of three, children can be easily transitioned into *Kindergärten,* a public option.

A later article in *Der Spiegel* demonstrated that the magazine supported newer findings on early childhood socialization outside of the care of the child’s parents and a “third way” of collective childrearing. This was the only article in the press that took the research that contradicted Hassenstein and Pechstein seriously, as well as made suggestions that included a federal- and state-funded system of care for children under the age of three outside of the home. The article attempted to unearth the other side of the scientific debate concerning child rearing and the mother-child bond. Many researchers, argued *Der Spiegel,* proved that bonds could be created with “multiple mothers” and the quality of these bonds was more important than the quantity of contact with the mother in the successful upbringing of children. The article explained the ignorance towards this literature to an “idealization of the mother role” among the supporters of the motherly deprivation thesis. *Der Spiegel* instead showed support for a “third way” in child rearing based on the collective upbringing of Israeli Kibbutz model (also emphasized by Lehr in the previous *Der Spiegel* article). The magazine called it “another possibility for families with small children.”

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99 Ibid., 49.

100 “Kinder in der Krippe,” *Der Spiegel,* June 24, 1974, 110.

101 Ibid., 110.

102 Ibid.
For the most part, however, the many left liberal mainstream newspapers expressed the third narrative in the West German press: outright disagreement with the project based on the motherly deprivation thesis. These articles also offered further proof that this battle concerned not only the upbringing of children, but also gender roles and women’s emancipation. Therefore, the scientific evidence behind motherly deprivation became the support for a particular view of gender roles. Dr. Erwin Lausch, a science contributor for *Die Zeit* in the 1970s, criticized the *Tagesmütter* project as “a solution of striking simplicity to the difficult question of female emancipation.” The housewives who cared for their children “can become members of a protected profession” and the working mothers “who do not wish or cannot care intensively for their children” can seek employment outside the home.103 Considering that the project guidelines did not even mentioned the issue of emancipation of women, the comment and even condemnation of the project through the issue of women’s emancipation points to the connection made by those opposed to the project between mothers’ desire to work and the new scientific research concerning the socialization of children. And in these cases, proponents of Pechstein and Hellbrügges findings considered emancipation of women in contradiction to the needs of the child; Lausch argued, “What many women enjoy is not necessarily also good for the children.”104

The motherly deprivation thesis permeated Lausch’s opinions. He expressed concern over “the shuttling [of children] between two entirely different and separate areas,” concerns also expressed by the pediatric specialists.105 But more than just citing these studies, which

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104 Ibid, 53.

105 Ibid.
the press and government discussed extensively, Lausch criticized the role of the family ministry in this process. Rather than provide opportunities for working class mothers to continue to work, Lausch argued that a better pursuit for the ministry would be to ensure consistent caregiving by informing parents of the dangers of changing caregivers on the development of their child. “Information is not everything,” wrote Lausch, “but it is the basis for all further initiatives to protect small children and future citizens.”

The non-academic forum of the press also allowed Pechstein himself to draw more explicit connections between gender roles and his research. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, a left-centrist newspaper based in Munich, commissioned an article by Pechstein for its *Gesellschaft und Familie* (Society and Family) section. He criticized what he felt were the new priorities of young families in the 1970s, stating, “The commitment of young parents to the employment of mothers as a means of self-fulfillment and not to their children as a source of experience as parents strengthens the crisis of the family.” This was not just a plea for the male-breadwinner family model, however. Pechstein clearly supported the long-standing German cultural understanding of the role of the family in the upbringing of the child. Quoting the Frankfurt School philosopher Max Horkheimer from his 1947 article “Autorität und Familie in der Gegenwart” (Authority and Family in the Present), Pechstein suggested that women sacrificed their children’s sense of security through “their restricted admittance into the economic world of men.” This feeling of security, according to the Horkheimer, allowed children to develop independently. The notion of “independent development”

106 Ibid.

107 Pechstein, “Das Projekt Tagesmütter.”

108 Ibid.
referred to the German separation of Bildung (education) and Socialization (socialization). According to this conception, education occurs in the schools run by the state, while the family provides the development skills for children to function in society.\(^\text{109}\) Pechstein, who from the beginning of his research focused on the issue of socialization of children, reminded his readers “the ‘education’ of people that enables a community occurs very rarely in the educational institutions of this society as in the … chastised ‘nuclear family.’”\(^\text{110}\)

Analysis of the press coverage of the Tagemütter Modellprojekt reveals that this was the forum for a small, but outspoken group of West German feminists who supported the project. These women created more meaning for the project beyond the Ministry’s goal of equalizing the socialization of children of employed mothers: it was also emancipatory for the housewives who would become Tagesmütter. Because their conceptualization of Tagesmütter as a career, the journalists also held higher expectations for benefits and status of the new form of employment, which contradicted the Ministry’s understanding of their status. Furthermore, *Der Spiegel* provided a forum for those who desired more infrastructure development of state funded Kinderkrippe. In most cases, however, the press mirrored the political debates.

**III. The DJI’s Results and Political Suggestions, 1974–1980**

“The children in the model project exhibited a consistently better level of development” declared the Arbeitsgruppe Tagesmütter (Working Group Tagesmütter) of the DJI in its 1977 midterm report of the project. The group rejected the arguments of the

\(^{\text{109}}\) This understanding of the separation of family and education formed the basis for the development of the German half-day education system. See Hagemann, “Between Ideology and Economy: The ‘Time Politics’ of Child Care and Public Education in the Two Germanys”; Hagemann, “Ganztagsschule.”

\(^{\text{110}}\) Pechstein, “Das Projekt Tagesmütter.”
naysayers, reporting that contrary to doubts, “thanks to the intensive care, we have made gains and even counterbalanced the partially considerable deficits in development of the children in the project.”111 Despite the initial jubilation at the halfway point, the final report published in 1980 was much more contradictory in tone. The results mirrored the compromises that influenced the structure and justification of the project, attempting to avoid controversy by walking a fine line between supporting the employment and emancipation of mothers and resisting attempts to incite supporters of the motherly deprivation thesis. The research results thereby supported a “modernized” male-breadwinner, female homemaker/part-time earner gendered division of labor.

**Regional Cooperation During the Tagesmütter Project**

After the publication of the project guidelines, the DJI and Family Ministry began setting up project groups in cities and regions across West Germany. The cooperation of state and local authorities for both bureaucratic and, more importantly, financial support strongly influenced the choices in location. Yet, regional governments experienced just as much division over the project, and many state and regional authorities expressed dissent and ambivalence towards participating. Of particular note were the critical essays written on behalf of the Jugendamt (Youth Affairs Office) in Bielefeld and the city of West Berlin. The Jugendamt in Bielefeld, the office in charge of facilitating childcare, denied support of the project on grounds that the project promoted a false definition of women’s emancipation, i.e. emancipation through employment, and that it contradicted all the existing literature that

condemned multiple caregivers. On the other side of the political spectrum, West Berlin decided to abstain from the project on the grounds that it detracted from already established childcare facilities. Demonstrating more progressive understandings of child socialization and women’s emancipation, the planning group within the city’s office of the senator for Family, Youth, and Sport demonstrated concern for the isolation of children in the nuclear family and the negative effects of the fixation of children on one caregiver. They also conveyed more interest in promoting women’s emancipation through public childcare options.

Despite some negative reactions from state and local authorities, the family ministry did find cooperating locations. In regions where local authorities could not or would not make their infrastructure available, Focke called upon local citizen groups to organize the project. With the announcement of the project in the press in 1973, citizen groups devoted to personally solving the members’ childcare issues wrote to Focke declaring their interest in participating in the ministry’s program. The outpouring of support meant that not only did Focke not only already have positive support for her project from select groups of parents, but the Family Ministry and the local authorities could rely on an already-existing infrastructure to accommodate the model project. In the end, project groups were set up in areas of the West German states of Baden-Württemberg (Göppingen, Reutlingen, and Stuttgart), Bayern (Erlangen, Unterpsaffenhofen-Germering, and Landkreis Wunsiedel), Niedersachsen (Hannover, Holzminden, and Wilhelmshaven), Nordrhein-Westfalen (Lüdenscheid), and

112 BArch K 189/6117, pgs. 111-112.


114 BArch K 189/6134, pgs. 48-54.
Hessen (Kassel/Baunatal). The Jugendämte in Erlangen, Holzminden, Stuttgart, and Wilhelmshaven administered the project, while registered Tagesmütter groups and independent social charities supervised the project in the other areas.\textsuperscript{115}

\textit{Experiences during the Project}

By 1978, these local groups collectively supported 420 children of 400 couples and single parents, 200 Tagesmütter, 13 “substitute” Tagesmütter, and 22 pedagogical consultants.\textsuperscript{116} Not surprising considering the targeted group of the project, there existed some income and social disparities between the Tagesmütter and the parents of the children being cared for (see table 2.2). Because of the meager wages offered to Tagesmütter, this group stemmed mostly from male-breadwinner families. These women tended to be of German nationality, their household income was overwhelmingly above 1,000 DM per month, and their husbands’ careers were at a higher level than the parents of the children under their care. In other words, the majority of Tagesmütter stemmed from the middle class, mostly the lower middle class. On the other hand, the parents came mostly from working-class families, with a higher percentage of single parents and immigrants. While the income of the Tagesmütter households was evenly split between less than 1500 DM a month and more than 1500 DM, 75 percent of the parents had a monthly income less than 1500 DM. In contrast, the Tagesmütter and the mothers demonstrated marginal educational disparities. Five times more of the mothers graduated with an Abitur or university entrance diploma.

\textsuperscript{115} Arbeitsgruppe Tagesmütter, \textit{Modellprojekt}, 75–76.

Table 2.2 Overview of the Social Status Indicators of the *Tagesmütter* Families and Parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parents</th>
<th>Tagesmütter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Situation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Parent</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income of Husband/Father</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;1,000 DM</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001-1,500 DM</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,501-2,000 DM</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,001-3,000 DM</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Career Status of Husband/Father</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower (<em>niedrig</em>)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle (<em>mittel</em>)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (<em>höher</em>)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education of Mother</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkschule</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mittelschule</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abitur</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Arbeitsgruppe Tagesmütter, Modellprojekt, 77.*

* The career status is classified based on education and status of position. Lower indicates no or semi-skilled labor, while high refers to a white collar profession and at the very least a *Hochschulabschluss*, at best a university degree.

In the final report published in 1980, the DJI researchers attributed conflicts between parents and *Tagesmütter* (the major factor determining the successful socialization of the children) to class-based cultural differences between the parents and the internal emotional conflicts of the employed mothers caused by cultural norms that indicated they should forego employment to stay home with their children.

Despite the standing argument by academic representatives from the Family Ministry that other factors besides just the employment of mothers played an integral role in the
development of young children, the final report still focused heavily on the role of employment in determining the quality of care received by children. But in an interesting twist, the major influence on development was not the fact that the mother was employed, but how the mother felt towards employment. The researchers posited a correlation between their feelings towards employment and the quality of care for the child. Based on their required surveys, the project researchers determined that 50 percent of the working mothers enjoyed employment, while around 25 percent of them disliked employment all together. The final 25 percent occupied a broad spectrum of feelings. The researchers found that problems arose when “feelings of guilt” towards their children manifested from their dislike of employment. Dislike for employment formed the most among the women who had to work and/or worked in undesirable sectors such as factory work.

Problems also derived from what the researchers termed “inner contradictions” and “Normenkonflikt” (conflict of norms). The mothers felt uncertainty based on the fact that their status as employed mothers conflicted with social and cultural norms regarding motherhood. This uncertainty was a result of the paradox between working “because of the [financial and emotional] positive benefits” and the stress caused by contradictory public opinion and family policy decisions. This contradiction strained their positive career identity, an important criteria for the adjustment of the child to care by another person.

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118 Ibid., 158.
119 Ibid., 159.
120 Ibid., 160.
121 Ibid., 160.
According to the DJI researchers, the emotional conflicts damaged the mother’s relationship with the Tagesmütter. Uncertainty in the employed mother lead to more confrontations and distancing between the caregiver and mother, especially since the employed mother in this situation could often feel jealousy towards the Tagesmütter. While none of the researchers maintained that the parents and Tagesmütter must be close friends, they did make clear that tension could impact the development of the child. They did not need to have a close relationship, but sympathy was important, as well as an “authentic closeness that neither side overstrained.”

The researchers also argued that the Tagesmütter’s own cultural perceptions towards the employment of mothers further injured the relationship with parents. Even though many of the Tagesmütter were technically employed through the program, some did not accept the fact that the employed mothers did not give up employment for their children, in particular the mothers who did not work out of financial need. For instance, the researchers recorded one of the Tagesmütter expressing, “In principle I wish that that mothers stay home with their children in circumstances where it is not necessary to work.”

The Arbeitsgruppe Tagesmütter also attributed the negative opinions towards the employment of mothers to the tension between why the Tagesmütter took up the position and the increased stress of balancing employment and familial obligations. The reasons for participating in the program differed for the Tagesmütter versus the mothers. Three-fourths of the Tagesmütter decided to stay home because they felt care by the mother was the best

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122 Ibid., 228.
123 Ibid., 163.
124 Ibid., 101–103.
option for their children. Nonetheless, the researchers found that their motivation for joining the project lay in a feeling that they did not need to resign to being the “self-sacrificing, self-sufficient mother,” but rather could become active in the public sphere, “protect upbringing in the family…while exposing its weaknesses,” and supporting a “third way” for women’s emancipation.\textsuperscript{125} But the most common explanation given by these women was to end their isolation.\textsuperscript{126} The researchers found that over half of the Tagesmütter did find their participation to be a self-reflective experience, mostly for the Tagesmütter under the age of forty with small children. Contact with employed mothers “provoked the Tagesmütter to rethink and even questions their own understanding of gender roles.”\textsuperscript{127} The portrayal of Tagesmütter in this regard was much different than the employed mothers. Perhaps because many of the participating parents had to work or because the researchers themselves felt that these women had attained emancipation simply by being employed, the researchers rarely mentioned the term emancipation in regards to the mothers of the children.

While the Tagesmütter joined the project for other reasons than financial need and for the most part enjoyed some form of personal development, the issue of reconciling their work as Tagesmütter with their obligations in the home and to their children became a very prominent point of contention, a problem often blamed on the parents of the children.\textsuperscript{128} The majority of the Tagesmütter found the time constraints of watching another child for long periods of time placed too much of a strain on their family’s lifestyle and their family in

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 107.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 109.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 135.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 116.
general. These concerns resulted in the Tagesmütter determining the schedule of care of the children in contradiction to the guidelines of the project. The initial guidelines stated that the Tagesmütter would care for the children during the mother’s work shifts, rather than during a pre-determined time. Thereby mothers who worked odd hours, such as nurses, would have full access to childcare. However, Tagesmütter began demanding time constraints from the organizers and mothers and time issues became the largest cause of conflict between Tagesmütter and parents.  

Despite such emphasis on these conflicts in the closing report, the designation of 57 percent of the children as “well developed” suggests that some good relationships developed between parents and Tagesmütter. Furthermore, the issues of the 18 percent determined to have special development problems and the 25 percent determined to show the beginnings of socialization problems (such as aggressiveness, problems concentrating, and disinterest) were not attributed to the model project. The DJI wrote, “In that the delineated unfavorable developments in different attributes of the participants in the Tagesmüttermodell are not found with any more frequency as in children of stay-at-home mothers, we can determine that the reported problems cannot be attributed to the conditions of care.”  

The Conflicts of Cultural Norms and Suggestions for the Future

It would be strange if popular opinion and norms regarding the care of children under the age of three did not play a role in the relationships between parents and Tagesmütter and their respective identities towards employment and the role as mothers. But these norms in  

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129 Ibid., 112–117.  
130 Ibid., 54.
the end also affected the suggestions and results of the project as presented by the *Arbeitsgruppe Tagesmütter*. Despite setting out to disprove the motherly deprivation thesis, the group seemed less prepared to offer a program that challenged the male-breadwinner/female homemaker and part-time earner gendered division of labor. While the model project accommodated both the part-time and full-time work hours of employed mothers, the researchers recommended part-time employment for mothers as the best option. The group argued,

> It has become clear that for mothers and children that part-time employment presents the more favorable possibility for development. Furthermore, this is deliberated by the majority of the employed mothers as an alternative, and also desired by a large portion of the housewives. That means increased effort must be undertaken to convince employers to establish attractive and qualified part-time employment positions.\(^{131}\)

This chapter previously argued that the researchers working with the family ministry were only willing to go so far in their suggestions for childcare that also reconciled family and work for mothers because they themselves still held some of these cultural values; this suggestion could also be attributed to the ideological beliefs of the researchers. But context also played a role in the decision to suggest more part-time employment as a compromise between the socialization of the child and the desire for employment for the mothers. By 1980, family policy had taken on a decidedly more conservative tone than in the early 1970s. The administration under Willy Brandt, which lasted until 1974, was more receptive to reform, especially on the issue of family policy and women’s employment. By the end of the decade, however, the CDU had regained its stronghold in the arena of family policy. The political climate did not lend itself to making bold statements of reform.

\(^{131}\) Ibid., 18.
IV. Reaction to the Project Results, 1978–1980

The Family Ministry’s direct involvement in the project was no longer possible after 1978 due to funding issues. Because of established guidelines in funding childcare and educational options, it was up to the individual states to take over funding of *Tagesmüttern*. With the data collected and presented to the public, the project achieved some success. But reactions to the project were mixed. The shift in favor of the CDU/CSU’s conception of family policy signified that it did not need to support such a measure, and the ideological battle continued in the federal government. The press, with a few exceptions, remained conspicuously silent on the issue of the future of *Tagesmütter* as a form of childcare. The trade unions busied themselves working on the soon-to-be-passed maternal leave policy. In contrast the project garnered very public support from influential feminist publications, which helped guarantee its future.

*Federal Discussion and Federal Action*

The discussion in the Bundestag changed little after 1978. By the end of the decade, the SPD lost much of its political capital on the issue of family policy despite remaining the leader of the parliamentary majority. This change resulted from the emergence of the birthrate crisis in the late 1970s. The use of the birth control pill and the family policy that forced women to choose between pursuing a career and raising a family began to reflect in the birthrate. Policy makers responded with a call for family policy measures that would increase the worth of the family and ease the ability for mothers to stay home to raise their children—for the implementation of *Erziehungsgeld*. The SPD and Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt also put most of their focus on economic issues rather than family policy as a result of the oil shock recession.

Due to these changes in political climate, the CDU/CSU continued to discredit the findings of the Tagesmütter project, while the SPD and the family ministry did their best to defend them. Between December 1978 and December 1981, the two factions engaged in a minor back and forth parliamentary discussion during question and answer meetings of the Bundestag. At first, the SPD emphasized the positive results of the project and field questions to the family ministry representative in parliament, Fred Zander, which allow him to discuss the future of the Tagesmütter form of childcare. When asked in December 1978 what the federal government could do with the results to help children of employed or single employed parents, Zander answered with a change in the federal Jugendhilferecht law (Youth Health and Welfare Law) and the implementation of a new Modellprojekt. However, the ability for the family ministry and Bundestag to continue funding and organizing Tagesmütter as a form of childcare were limited because of the role of the states in implementing family policy.

Nonetheless, the SPD and family ministry now had more evidence at their disposal, evidence Zander attempted to convey to parliament. But as the DJI published its results, the CDU/CSU faction attempted to discredit the results by finding loopholes and accusing researchers of ignoring questions related to the mother-child bond—the answers to which would prove a biological bond existed between mother and child and was therefore a necessary component of the child’s development. In a May 1980 question and answer session,

132 BT-Drs. 08/2365; BT-Drs. 08/3899

the CDU/CSU attempted to undermine the DJI’s results in order to keep alive the argument that mothers were the best caregivers for young children. The CDU/CSU asked first if, based on the evidence, the federal government was of the opinion that childrearing by the child’s mother and Tagesmütter was equal and that mothers could use Tagesmütter to raise their children without damaging their development. The faction also asked, why did the researchers refrain from observing parent-child interactions “in order to make clear the differences in the social and emotional components between the Tagesmütter Modell and familial socialization?”

Zander’s answer implied that the CDU/CSU simplified the results and the research effort that went into the study. While not arguing that any form of care outside the home was equivalent to parental upbringing, Zander pointed out the project proved that “day care is pedagogically appropriate form of care for small children…when it is supported by intensive guidance and pedagogical group work.” Zander concluded by reiterating what the ministry had contended since the early 1970s: “In the improvement of the offering of day care spots for small children, the federal government does not see any encouragement of the employment of mothers, rather a chance to help families by bringing the upbringing of children and employment together in greater harmony.”

The return of these ideological debates reinforced the political nature of family policy in West Germany. The existence of federally funded research that called into question the results of doctors such as Pechstein, Hassenstein, and Hellbrügge resulted in a never ending

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134 BT-Drs. 8/4023, pg. 16


136 Ibid.
debate in which both sides could now draw on scientific research to support their claims. For the CDU to admit otherwise would have detracted from their own advocacy of an *Erziehungsgeld* subsidy for mothers of children three and under and given the SPD the power in the realm of family policy. Politically this would have undermined the CDU/CSU as they were planning their return to power in the 1982 election.

Despite the continuing resistance from the CDU/CSU faction towards the idea of non-parental care during early childhood, the family ministry was able to establish an organization that would ensure the continuation of care through the *Tagesmütter*. Rather than pay *Tagesmütter* directly, the family ministry established the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Tagesmütter—Bundesverband für Eltern, Pflegeeltern und Tagesmütter* (Nanny Working Group – Federal Organization for Parents, Caregivers, and Nannies), now the *Bundesverband für Kindertagespflege* (Federal Organization for Daily Childcare). The *Bundesverband* was a federal umbrella organization consisting of regional offices that facilitated the education of *Tagesmütter* and the pairing of families with day care services.

“The women are emancipating themselves!”

Support for the project from the CDU/CSU was perhaps never a possibility. But the results of the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* convinced some individuals and groups from the autonomous women’s movement. The autonomous feminists rarely discussed the project before 1977. Most of the major feminist magazines did not exist before the late 1970s, and before 1975, the central issue of activism was the campaign to reform §218, the law
criminalizing abortion. Nonetheless, a few lent their opinion, even if their arguments remained within their small circle of activists. In March 1973, the Sozialistische-Feministische Aktion – Köln (The Socialist Feminist Action—Cologne) published a critical reaction to the Tagesmütter project in their journal Emancipation Frauen Argument. The group’s opinion towards the initiative reflected their socialist-feminist views. They criticized the government for neglecting the already established public options in favor of the less expensive Tagesmütter Modell. By doing so, they argued, “not only are the traditional family structures reinforced, but added to the motherly and parental roles is the new role of Tagesmütter.”

The Sozialistische-Feministische Aktion – Köln thereby viewed the Tagesmütter project as a means of privatizing childcare, an activity they called a public and societal duty. Although the project was publically funded, caring for children in the home by another mother simply reinforced the role of women as mothers and caregivers, rather than enabling the emancipation of women (and children) through employment and political activity.

The change of heart by some autonomous feminists can be attributed to the rise of the Mütterbewegung in the years after the start of the project (discussed in chapter one). For some self-proclaimed feminists, reinforcing the mother as caretaker role no longer shook their political beliefs. The connection between the Mütterbewegung and support for Tagesmütter could best be seen at the third Sommeruniversität von und für Frauen (Summer University by and for Women) in 1978, the topic of which was “Frauen und Mütter” (women and mothers). Here, science and feminism merged as Jutta Stich, member of the DJI’s Arbeitsgruppe Tagesmütter presented the results of surveys filled out by Tagesmüttern.

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participating in the study.\textsuperscript{138} While the family ministry initially rejected any claims of promoting emancipation in the guidelines for the project and the study, Stich purposefully presented the results in a way that would appeal to her audience at the Sommeruniversität. She mainly focused on the mothers, her target audience, demonstrating that in reality the role of Tagesmütter was far more emancipatory than anyone anticipated.

Stich focused primarily on undermining the most vitriolic argument waged against the project from autonomous feminists — the fact that the project isolated mothers in the private sphere. On the contrary, Stich conveyed that the women “became even more politically engaged,” mostly due to the mandatory weekly meetings between Tagesmütter in their area.\textsuperscript{139} In other words, the women were in fact not isolated and in the process became more self-confident and aware as a result of their engagement with government officials and other women in the same circumstance as themselves. But despite their own strivings for participation in the public sphere and for more meaning in their role as housewives (in other words, emancipation), Stich also recognized that the Tagesmüttern acculturated strong feelings towards employed mothers. Two-thirds of the Tagesmüttern interviewed still believed that a mother should only seek employment when absolutely necessary. Stich attributed this worldview to the fact that the Tagesmüttern overwhelmingly came from the middle class.

The experiential evidence from the Tagesmütter Projekt proved to be very convincing for certain segments of the autonomous women’s movement. The fact that Tagesmütter

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\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 204.
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attended weekly meetings convinced many that the nannies were in fact not isolated mothers. The women’s magazine *Emma* conveyed enthusiasm about the results, devoting two articles in their April 1978 issue to the topic. In an opinion piece, the magazine related that it supported the project because politicians on the whole neglected the issue of childcare, especially for children under the age of three. The article also communicated the impression that *Emma* would have remained critical of the project if not for the “surprising” results: “the *Tagesmütter* are emancipating themselves.”¹⁴⁰ First, the author Friederike Münch supported the program from the perspective of the mothers because, “they have suddenly a career” complete with job training courses, a wage, and a circle of colleagues they meet with. “Now with their own money and self-consciousness they have an entirely different frame of mind.”¹⁴¹ Most important to Münch, that new frame of mind came replete with the women “reflecting on their situation,” discussing “paid and unpaid work, obligations for men and women, and the gendered division of labor in the home.”¹⁴²

But while Münch overwhelmingly praised the new form of childcare, she also imparted some thoughts for the future. With local, state, and federal officials remaining on the fence about whether or not they would finance *Tagesmütter* further, Münch encouraged those who were willing to continue their work for much less money or none at all to hold their ground. “Here we have the danger that the work capabilities of women will be exploited.”¹⁴³ Therefore, for Münch, payment for the work and the working groups


¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.
prevented the care of other children from reinforcing gender stereotypes. That being said, she condemned officials for steering Tagemütter away from calling their work a “Beruf” in the traditional sense. Seeing the gender inequalities in such a move, Münch asked “Would this have outraged them if they were dealing with Tagesväter? Why aren’t there any?”

Franziska Frey’s following article in Emma’s April 1978 issue focused on the experiences during the project. Emma’s writers seemed convinced that the continued financing of the project depended on transmitting the thoughts of the participants. While in many ways Frey’s article repeated statements made by Stich, she used experiential evidence from a specific group of Tagesmütter. Frey’s article also expanded on two points: first, the changed relationships between husbands and Tagesmütter wives, and second, the advantages of this form of childcare for immigrant women, especially Turkish women.

While the results did not necessarily convince conservative politicians to abandon their notions of the best upbringing practices for small children, the results did further sway feminists of a middle-class socioeconomic status. The results further reinforced the project as an acceptable compromise between values regarding the care of children and the emancipation of housewives in certain circles.

V. Conclusion

At the conclusion of the project Udo Fiebig, the chairman of the SPD parliamentary faction in the Committee for Youth, Family, and Health, remarked in a press release to his party, “The model project Tagesmütter has directed attention to the increased necessity for

144 Ibid.

outside care for children under the age of three. Related to this is the problem of the general living conditions of families, the employment of mothers, the position of children, and our understanding of youth, family, and social policy.”

The initial controversy and response to the final results of the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* indicated that this would be a difficult task in the face of such insurmountable ideological divisions regarding the best form of upbringing for children under the age of three. Furthermore, these decisions regarding the best form of care exacted authority on the gendered division of labor promoted by the *Tagesmütter* project—and any other proposed family policy. In this case, the end result supported a male-breadwinner/female part-time earner gendered division of labor.

But why did this happen? In the case of the *Tagesmütter* project, the Family Ministry attempted to refute, and to some extent succeeded in challenging, the very powerful motherly deprivation thesis. The argument that employed mothers disrupted the healthy development and socialization of children under the age of three provided a guiding point in the creation of family policy in the postwar years. In creating the *Tagesmütter* project, the Family Ministry did exhibit progressive ideas towards the different forms of upbringing for children under the age of three. The problem lay in the execution of the form of care outside the home. First, this form of care closely mirrored upbringing by a stay-at-home mother. The preference for this type of care over reform of the already-established public options points to the fact that the Family Ministry officials still supported the mother as the best caregiver. Second, the Family Ministry attempted to compromise with the academics, politicians, journalists, and others who favored the motherly deprivation thesis and only focused on the children of

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mothers who had to seek employment, severely limiting the ability of the program to reconcile family and employment for all employed parents.

The discussion in the trade unions, the press, political parties, and even among autonomous feminists demonstrated that this compromise did not work. For those who believed the motherly deprivation literature, it was still a step too far. It did not matter if the only children being care for were those of mothers who had to work or if the Tagesmütter very closely resembled care by stay-at-home mothers. The “biological” connection and “bond” between mother and child proved to be the deciding factor for many in this group. In addition, the CDU party and the CDU/CSU faction had political stakes in the success of the motherly deprivation thesis. Fashioning themselves as the antithesis of the SPD, which was the party of the employed mother, and supporting the motherly deprivation thesis meant the success of their own family policy suggestion, Erziehungsgeld.

On the other end of the political spectrum, for feminists in the autonomous movement, in the trade unions, and even for some in the political parties, the Tagesmütter program did not accomplish enough to ensure the reconciliation of family and paid work for mothers. The most important issue for this camp was the situation of Tagesmütter. Receiving payment for remaining in their home to raise additional children seemed to too much like reinforcement of the mother role of women. In addition, they felt the program continued to isolate women in the private sphere. But there was also an additional political agenda for women in the trade unions. Fighting for a maternal leave policy since the 1960s, they argued that supporting the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt would detract from their own political platform.

But in the middle of this debate, there was also a small but very public group of middle-class self-proclaimed feminists who wholeheartedly supported the project, perhaps
not entirely at first, but certainly by the end. This group also focused on the benefits for the Tagesmütter as a chance for emancipation for middle-class housewives. By supporting the project in the more mainstream feminist publications Emma and Courage, they gave the project an air of feminist credibility, even if their opinions differed drastically for the more radical feminist groups. But this group of women would also form the foundation of active women who would keep the form of care going at the regional level.

Tagesmütter continued in the 1980s, but on a very small scale and with little public funding. The BMJFG helped found the politically and confessionally neutral Bundesverband für Kindertagespflege e.V. (Federal Organization for Daily Child Care) in 1978 in Kassel, but the organization was designed to facilitate childcare independently from political institutions. Similar local organizations were established in the late 1970s as well, most of which still exist.147 Tagesmütter care, now also called Kindertagespflege (child daycare), finally received a considerable political boost with the rewriting of the Sozialgesetzbuch (Social Law Book or SGB) Article VIII in 1991. The reformulation of the previous Jugendwohlfahrtsgebetz (Youth Welfare Law) emphasized the government’s commitment to care of children outside the home in order to “promote the development of self-dependency and community responsibility in children,” “to support and expand the upbringing and education abilities of the family,” and “thereby help parents to better reconcile employment and upbringing duties.”148

147 See for example Tagesmütter e.V. http://www.tagesmuetter-verein.de/ueber-uns.htm (accessed January 2, 2012)

By 2008, Germany’s population included 2,050,800 children under the age of three. 364,200 of these children attended some form of care outside of the home. Of those children, 86,000 children were being cared for by around 36,400 Tagesmütter or Tagesväter. Furthermore, Kindertagespflege received a considerable boost from SPD Family Minister Ursula von der Leyen in 2008 with her Aktionsprogramm Kindertagespflege. With the help of a grant of twenty million euros from the European Social Funds (ESF), von der Leyen initiated her own project with the goal of increasing publically supported care for children under the age of three to 35 percent by 2013, an increase of 15 percent. The current CDU Family Minister, Kristina Schröder, continues with von der Leyen’s program.
CHAPTER THREE

Uli Hoffmann, father of newborn Hanna, reacted to the newly-enacted Maternal Leave Policy in 1979 by stating, “There are many men who want a better relationship with their child and a different relationship with their wife. For all of us [the Maternal Leave Policy] is a setback. I consider it discrimination that as a man I am cut off through a simple law when it comes to care of children.”¹ Hoffmann became the subject of some press coverage in 1979 after his friend and lawyer Klaus Bertelsmann filed a petition with the West German constitutional court objecting to the exclusion of fathers from a parental leave law. Because his wife earned more than him as a teacher, the couple decided that it would be more beneficial for him to stay home after her state-mandated health leave concluded. But in order to do so, he took unpaid leave from his employment.²

The Hoffmann’s case became the lens through which the press conveyed one of the strongest critiques against the Mutterschaftsurlaubgesetz (maternal leave law) of May 1979: the exclusion of fathers. On the one hand, for many West German female trade union activists and Social Democratic politicians, the implementation of a maternal leave policy had been a goal for decades. When the Federal Republic of Germany ratified the


bill, the federal government seemed to have fulfilled their wishes and taken a considerable step towards women’s emancipation and a better reconciliation of family and work. In the process, West Germany joined the host of other Western European nations, such as France, Sweden, and Finland, that were passing similar or updating already established policies in the 1970s in response to the growing workforce participation of mothers. West German employed mothers could now anticipate six months of leave with a payment of up to 750 DM monthly and the security of knowing their job would be waiting for them when they returned.

On the other hand, the same female activists and politicians who supported the idea of a leave policy expressed extreme displeasure over the final result. Many protested the exclusion of fathers, while others felt that a provision that promoted the care of children by stay-at-home mothers without simultaneously improving publically-funded childcare for children under three merely reinforced the male-breadwinner gendered division of labor. The West German federal government could now boast its own maternal leave policy (the only federal policy enacted under the social liberal coalition aimed at reconciling family and work in the 1970s), a marked improvement over the Mutterschutz (maternity protection) that existed before. But it was a contested success in West Germany and not necessarily on par with the policies of other European countries at that time, except Britain. Like the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt, it represented the pattern of both change and stagnation in SPD family policy.

First, the leave was only available to mothers. Second, it came without the extension of other childcare options for children under the age of three, thereby only delaying the childcare dilemma facing employed mothers. Third, the SPD/FDP coalition that passed this bill chose to justify its implementation in terms of biological essentialism, maintaining that
the mother, as opposed to the father, deserved the extended leave to reduce the double burden of balancing childcare and employment while recovering from childbirth. In the 1970s, France, Sweden, and Britain also expanded their parental leave policies. Sweden’s policy developed to include fathers. France also expanded their maternal leave provisions, although not to include fathers. Nonetheless, the policy did far less to promote a male breadwinner family model as the policy also coincided with France’s expansion of full day childcare for children under the age of three. Like in West Germany, British policy makers made no attempt to extend provisions to fathers and also did little to expand full day childcare. In the spectrum of European parental leave provisions, West Germany and Britain fared far worse than Sweden and France.

Wiebke Kolbe analyzes the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* in her monograph *Elternschaft in Wohlfahrtsstaat: Schweden und die Bundesrepublik im Vergleich 1945-2000*. Kolbe provides a long-term comparative perspective on the development of conceptualizations of parenthood and the related issue of the gendered division of labor in West German and Swedish family policy. She concludes that despite the developing trend towards viewing parenthood as a partnership between parents, the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* of the late 1970s meant “the

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confirmation of the status quo of the reconciliation of the reproductive capacities of women, motherhood, and employment. On the other hand, it institutionalized the reform of the double burden and the sole responsibility of mothers for the care of small children.\textsuperscript{6} In addition, she argues that the debate over the maternal leave provided an opportunity for both the SPD/FDP and CDU/CSU to solidify their stances on family policy going into the 1980s.\textsuperscript{7}

This chapter adds a more detailed analysis of the debate surrounding the proposal within the political parties and trade unions, particularly among the institutional women’s groups, in the press, and autonomous feminist groups. When placed in the wider context, one finds that the proposal received little support outside of the SPD’s own ranks, and even then younger members of the AsF were willing to publically denounce the policy in the press. The proposal was not enough for many autonomous feminists and a younger generation of leftist activists; it reinforced the status quo too much. On the other hand, the CDU/CSU, including the CDU Frauenvereinigung, rejected the proposal in favor of their own policy suggestion of Erziehungsgeld (upbringing money) which would provided a subsidy to a parent caregiver (mother or father) regardless of employment status before birth to stay home with the newborn. Occupying the middle ground was the older generation of female politicians and trade union activists willing to compromise for an improvement in policy for employed women. These women adopted a position that simultaneously supported the policy and called for future improvements. The debate and contestation over the Mutterschaftsurlaub and its implementation revealed that the government would only go so far as to promote a “moderate” vision of women’s emancipation.

\textsuperscript{6} Kolbe,\textit{ Elternschaft}, 321.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 324.
This chapter begins by contextualizing the 1978 *Mutterschaftsurlaub* proposal within already-existing female worker protection laws in (West) Germany, demonstrating that there were few differences between the actual law that was passed and its previous inceptions in West Germany. Part two analyzes the reactions to the law by the CDU, women’s organizations, autonomous feminists, and the press, elucidating both the contested nature of the proposal and the factors that allowed its acceptance in the Bundestag.

**I. The *Mutterschaftsurlaub* Proposal and its Origins**

When the social liberal coalition drafted its proposal for a federally-mandated maternity leave for young employed mothers, it made the decision to expand the already existing *Mutterschutz* law, an employment protection law for mothers, rather than draft a new family policy. By focusing on employment issues rather than broader family policy, the social liberal coalition hoped to separate the debate over the new maternal leave policy from the “motherly deprivation” discourse surrounding family policy. But in their attempts to diminish the controversy over the law and its price tag, the SPD and FDP re-opened another equally problematic discourse that used biological essentialism to restrict the employment of mothers and reinforce the male-breadwinner status of men at a time of rising unemployment rates. While the SPD and FDP argued that the revised law would help reconcile family and work for mothers, they did so with a tactic that had served to reinforce a male-breadwinner gendered division of labor in the family and a segregated workforce since the *Kaiserreich*.
Female Worker’s Protection in (West) Germany Before 1978

The historian Karin Hausen argues in an essay on employment policy towards women in the Kaiserreich and Weimar Republic that “social policy from the beginning has structurally anchored different opportunities for men and women, as well as short and long term privileges for the male gender in social policy.” From 1878 onward, the Mutterschutz aimed to protect mother and child from unhealthy work conditions in the name of increasing birthrates and improving the health of the nation. Throughout the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic, the employed mother and the tensions between employment and the care of her household and children became increasingly associated with the crises of birthrates and the biological health of the nation. Reformers, social hygienists, population scientists, doctors, feminists, politicians, and economists entered into a discussion about the best means to alleviate the burdens of pregnant workers. The means by which German reformers attempted to dissipate those risks reinforced male-breadwinner privilege both in the work place and in the home, a precedent in German social policy that would continue for the next century.

While a three-week pregnancy leave was made into law in 1878, the first extensive Mutterschutz was legislated in 1891 within the Worker’s Protection Acts, part of Kaiser


Wilhelm II’s New Course. In general, the Worker’s Protection Acts aimed to improve the
conditions on the factory floor, requiring, among other things, that employers improve
ventilation and air quality and provide more safety mechanisms for equipment. But the bill
also contained several measures aimed towards women and youth. Kathleen Canning argues,
“Although the object of the revised code of 1891 was the regulation of factory working
conditions, many of its individual measures pertaining to women and youth blurred the
boundaries between factory and family.”¹¹

The new worker protection laws were aimed at both male and female workers, yet the
differences between the new policies for men versus women revealed the gender politics at
play. On the one hand, policy towards women focused on restrictions—for example, work
hours were limited to 11 hours for women over the age of sixteen and a midday break was
required. In addition, the law distinguished between mothers and single women. Women who
also had a household to care for received an extra half hour during their midday break in
order to attend to their households, as well as the additional Mutterschutz. This pregnancy
protection entailed a required four-week break after the birth of the child with a
compensation of 50 percent of the female worker’s wages. The law had several drawbacks,
however. Since most women were employed in the agricultural and small business sector, the
majority of employed women in Germany did not have access to provisions designated solely
for female factory labor. In addition, of the women who could claim a pregnancy leave, few
actually took advantage of the policy since most could not afford to take a 50 percent pay
cut.¹²

¹¹ Canning, Languages of Labor, 138.

¹² Sabine Schmitt, Der Arbeiterinnenschutz im deutschen Kaiserreich: zur Konstruktion der schutzbedürftigen
Arbeiterin (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1995), 98–99; Canning, Languages of Labor, 140–142.
Male workers, on the other hand, were changed from “object to subject” as the new law improved the political rights of men.\textsuperscript{13} It restricted the right to quit and the right to strike, but instituted elected workers’ committees in each factory, and generally placed no restrictions on working hours. The new law established organs of representation and association, thereby providing male workers the ability to contend for their own rights, while restrictions were placed on women without the necessary channels to challenge those limitations.\textsuperscript{14} This distinction cemented a gender-segregated job market and the conceptualization of women as a “reserve army” as women were now being reduced to their primary designated role as housewife and mother.\textsuperscript{15}

The fact that most women did not take advantage of the policy did not stop government officials and politicians from revising the law in ways that failed to increase accessibility through to the end of the Kaisserreich and into the Weimar Republic. In 1908, the time of leave was increased to two weeks before the due date and six weeks after the birth. In 1927, the time of leave before birth was increased to six weeks. In addition, the female workers were entitled to job protection during the time of their absence from their position, as well as an extra half hour break per workday for the first six months after birth.\textsuperscript{16} But it wasn’t until 1929 that compensation was increased to 75 percent of their wage, allowing more, but not many, female factory workers to take the leave.

\textsuperscript{13} Canning, \textit{Languages of Labor}, 141.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 141–142.

\textsuperscript{15} See Suzanne Rouette, \textit{Sozialpolitik als Geschlechterpolitik: die Regulierung der Frauenarbeit nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg} (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1993), 14–21; Matzner-Vogel, “Schwangerschaft und Fabrikarbeit.”

The National Socialists saw little need to improve upon the existing policy, at least in the early years of the regime. A leave that “encouraged” the continued employment of the mother after the birth of the child contradicted their ideological beliefs. But beginning in 1942, the necessities of a wartime economy dictated otherwise. The regime expanded mother protection laws as an incentive to encourage mothers into the labor force. When compared to the state of the policy by the end of the Weimar Republic, the National Socialist Mutterschutz law seemed progressive, but only as it applied to “racially superior” Aryan women. The coverage was extended to women in the agricultural sector, and women were assured a compensation of one hundred percent of their wages during their leave.17

The Allies suspended the Mutterschutz payments after the end of the war due to their National Socialist origin and because they were an impossible policy to keep in place with the social insurance system severely weakened by war. However, the reestablishment of a law directed towards protecting mothers became an important policy discussion during the early years of the Federal Republic of Germany. Gone were the nationalistic, pro-natalist, and social hygienic tropes, completely discredited by the radical policies of the Third Reich. Rather, the return of the Mutterschutz must be seen through the backdrop of the (re)establishment of the male-breadwinner gendered division of labor. After the discrediting of a German masculinity based on militarization, the male breadwinner became the standard for masculinity. Women were allowed in “male” jobs so long as they were necessary. But the return of POWs from the East meant that large numbers of West German men now stood

ready to take their new role as heads of household.\textsuperscript{18} Sociological literature further reinforced the male-breadwinner gendered division of labor by advocating that the “traditional” nuclear family would heal the West German family destroyed by over a decade of National Socialist intervention and propaganda. Furthermore, the CDU/CSU promoted the private, nuclear family would act as a bulwark for their new democratic society against their new East German socialist enemy.\textsuperscript{19}

Therefore early West German reformers felt no qualms about legislating a policy that tied women to the home and their family (§1356) and that espoused differences in biology and gender roles between men and women. As the historian Robert G. Moeller has argued, “For social policy-makers, concerns about women’s work for wages outside the home were always directly linked to conceptions of women’s place within the home. Protective legislation . . . spared women from certain kinds of work in order to save them for work of a different sort.”\textsuperscript{20} The 1952 Mutterschutzgesetz thereby continued the legislative precedent of creating separate policy for female workers based on both biological and social assumptions that women who bore children would also be their primary caregiver. The 1952 law, however, further expanded gains made in the 1942 legislation. In addition to continuing coverage to agricultural workers, domestic workers were also now included, although without a similar job protection.

\textit{The Mutterschaftsurlaub Proposal of 1979}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{20} Ibid., 154.
\end{thebibliography}
The proposal brought before the Bundestag in early 1979 continued the historical precedent of reinforcing the male breadwinner gendered division of labor in the home and workplace through biological terms. But the introduction of the Mutterschaftsurlaubgesetz by the social liberal coalition seemed to contradict legislative reforms made in the 1970s regarding women’s reproductive rights and the gendered division of labor in the home. While the West German constitutional court would eventually reverse the reform in February 1975, in 1974 the social liberal-dominated government narrowly decriminalized abortion for the first trimester.\(^{21}\) Furthermore, the Bundestag revised §1356, the Civil Code statute that obligated women to their household first, as part of their revision of family and marriage law, in 1977. Partners could now determine their own gendered division of labor in the home. Both had the right to employment and both were responsible for the duties in household.\(^{22}\)

However, the maternal leave policy revived old discourses of women’s health and called into question developments made in the conception of the family as a partnership in the upbringing of children. It was certainly a step forward in the sense that the West German government had previously offered little in the way of subsidies or childcare for reconciling family and work for parents of infants and toddlers. But the proposal asked to extend the Mutterschutzgesetz, rather than create a new family policy that could then include fathers and parents of adoptive children. The proposal offered a six-month leave for employed women after the birth of their child, extending the existing six weeks before and eight weeks after pregnancy break from employment. During this time, the young mother would be paid up to 750 DM monthly, depending on her income before taking leave. 750 DM was nowhere near


\(^{22}\) Kolbe, *Elternschaft*. 

171
the average monthly earnings for women in 1979, which were 1700 DM for industrial workers and 2170 DM for women working white-collar jobs in industry and trade.\textsuperscript{23} The federal government would be solely responsible for the payment of the stipend until 1981 and it would be administered through federal employment insurance agencies. During that time, the mother would not be able to work, but her job would remain secure. In addition, the mother would maintain all her insurance and retirement benefits. Mothers were also entitled to the benefits as long as they still met the requirements for unemployment insurance by the birth.\textsuperscript{24}

In many ways, for the SPD the \textit{Mutterchaftsurlaub} functioned as a “concrete answer” to the CDU/CSU’s proposal for \textit{Erziehungs geld}, a foundational policy suggestion in CDU/CSU family policy. Elfriede Eilers explained in September 1978 in the daily report of the Bundestag faction, “The amount from which the opposition are going for, namely 300 DM, would only be good for pocket money,” highlighting the benefit of the 750 DM provision depending on salary. Furthermore, Eilers argued that someone who complains that “employed women are favored only makes apparent how unserious these individuals took earlier arguments of the double and triple burdens of mothers.” For Eilers, “this is not about whether employment or housework are of equal value—the way the CDU/CSU unduly simplifies the situation—but is about what infants must do without care by their mother in their first months.”\textsuperscript{25} Nonetheless, an interview in 1987 with SPD representative Anke Fuchs (b. 1937), who in the late 1970s was the representative of the Federal Ministry of Labor and

\textsuperscript{23} “Erwerbstätigkeit,” \textit{Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland}, 1981.

\textsuperscript{24} BT-Drs. 8/2613 “Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung eines Mutterschaftsurlaubs,” 1-2, 9-10.

Social Affairs, suggested that the CDU/CSU controlled Bundesrat would have immediately struck down any suggestions for a parental leave and immediately implemented *Familiengeld* (family money) in its stead. The social liberal coalition needed the confidence of the Bundesrat because their majority of only eleven delegates in the Bundestag was not enough to pass the bill alone. The compromise was a *Mutterschaftsurlaub* with a job guarantee.\(^26\)

In extending the *Mutterschutz*, rather than enacting an entirely new family policy, the SPD also hoped to avoid the “motherly deprivation” debate experienced during the *Tagesmutter Modellprojekt*. In justifying the addition of a maternal leave, the SPD argued the double burden experienced by employed mothers slowed the recovery of her health after childbirth. Mothers required an additional four months because “in this time, her full productivity has not entirely returned.” Therefore, the aim of the bill was to unburden the mother of her double duties in the time during which “she may need more protection.”\(^27\) But concerns for the child also played an important role in the justification for the extension, concerns usually expressed in family policy.\(^28\) For the drafters of the bill, this relief from the double burden would occur “during the particularly important first phases of life of the child.”\(^29\) Was this a family policy in disguise?

The development of the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* policy within the SPD demonstrates that the party first conceived it as a family policy measure. At the 1975 SPD family policy

\(^{26}\) Interview with Anke Fuchs in Renate Lepsius, *Frauenpolitik als Beruf: Gespräche mit SPD-Parlamentarierinnen* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1987), 249.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 1.


\(^{29}\) BT-Drs. 8/2613, 1.
conference, the party discussed the proposal for a leave policy to be included in their upcoming party program, the *Orientierungsrahmen ‘85*. The SPD ideally desired an eighteen month to three year employment leave for the “uninterrupted” care of the child. The time frame was clearly a reflection of their adherence to the belief that the parent was the best caregiver for the child until the age of three, a debate also important to the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt*. But rather than advocating a complete removal of the parent from the workforce, the party hoped to find a way that “the parents are not disadvantaged in the area of insurance rights” and “at the end of this time, the parent can easily be reintegrated into employment in way that is not an unreasonable disadvantage.”\(^{30}\) The party concluded that it needed to find “realistic solutions” since the costs for such an undertaking would be astronomical.\(^{31}\)

A 1978 draft that circulated throughout the political parties and trade unions revealed that this “realistic solution” would come through the extension of an existing employment policy, *Mutterschutz*, rather than implementing a new policy. Government finances were a very important topic by 1979. Difficult foreign trade conditions due to a floating exchange rate against the dollar, growing inflation, and higher energy costs due to the oil shock led to a West German economy crippled under a trend of jobless growth and a crisis in the financing of the West German welfare state.\(^{32}\) As Eckart Conze has argued, “The Federal Republic was


\(^{31}\) Ibid.

treading in dangerous waters.” The extension of a pure employment policy that biologically could only apply to women had the effect of limiting the leave to employed mothers and thereby slashing the budget by excluding subsidies for fathers, adoptive parents, and even stay-at-home mothers (a group that received equal attention in CDU/CSU policy). Expanding the Mutterschutz was a distinct advantage since new trends in the conceptualization of the marriage as a partnership, especially in the area of childrearing, would have to have resulted in a policy that applied to both parents in order to be politically viable. If others questioned the exclusion of fathers, adoptive parents, or stay-at-home mothers (which they inevitably did), the SPD could justify its proposal in terms of budget, but also the fact that Mutterschutz as a rule only focused on employed mothers.

Other economic factors also influenced the focus on employed mothers. The recession affected men and women in the job market differently. In 1979, while women comprised around 37 percent of the West German workforce, they made up a disproportionate 53 percent of the unemployed. Insufficient education and training could not completely account for this disparity; women were transitioning to the service sector like the rest of the West German workers. The high unemployment rate of women could be attributed to cultural conceptions of the female worker in West Germany as much as structural changes in the West German economy, conceptions that played a major role in the formulation and justification of the Mutterschaftsurlaubsgesetz.

33 Eckart Conze, Die Suche nach Sicherheit: eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1949 bis in die Gegenwart, 1. Aufl. (München: Siedler, 2009), 471.

34 “Erwerbstätigkeit.”

Employed mothers had not been regarded in positive terms since the foundation of the Federal Republic and even before 1945. Before World War Two, male factory workers, trade unionists, and politicians considered married women and mothers who sought employment “double earners,” women who did not need to work since their husbands ostensible earned an income to support their family. After 1945, the concept of the “double earner” was mostly replaced with the *Rabenmütter* (“Raven mothers”): women who put their own economic interests before their child and neglected their duties to their children. Part-time work became much more acceptable in the 1960s for mothers and married women as West Germany faced a labor shortage, yet the government only seemed to support the employment of mothers in times of economic necessity and only at the level of part-time earner. Mothers were considered more of a “reserve army” than equal and permanent members of the West German workforce.

This conception of employed mothers coupled with the high rate of unemployment meant that the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* was just as much about removing mothers from the workforce as it was about giving new mothers a respite from employment for health reasons. Connecting the policy to the employment issues, the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* was included as part of a 1978 employment provision package. Policy makers further implied that the

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36 For the Kaiserreich, see fn 7-13. For the Weimar Republic, see fn 14-16.


maternal leave would lead to additional employment when the drafters contended that an additional benefit of the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* was the chance for the “employment of temporary workers.”\(^{40}\) That one of the aims was to remove some workers from the workforce could also be seen in the fact that the implementation of the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* came without any extension of childcare outside the home for children under the age of three. While employed mothers could return to their secured position after six months of leave, the leave simply delayed the difficult relationship between employment and child rearing. Because of the difficulties in balancing employment and a young family, most mothers simply decided not to return to work or did so after a more extensive career break. By the early 1980s, only 16 percent of West German women with children continued employment without a break. When their children reached preschool or *Kindergarten* age (ages three through six), 34 percent of women in nuclear families sought employment, compared to 45 percent of single mothers, widows, and divorcees.\(^{41}\) This spoke to the increased availability of childcare for children over the age of three in West Germany by the end of the 1970s.\(^{42}\) All told, of all mothers who would eventually return to paid employment (around 40 percent), the average career break was eight years (down by almost half since the 1950s). And most of these women returned to work through part-time positions.\(^{43}\)

Several factors seemed to have mitigated the scope of the policy. At the very base level, SPD politicians decided that an *Elternurlaub* (parental leave) would never pass the

\(^{40}\) BT. Drs. 8/2613, 9.


\(^{42}\) See chapter two.

CDU/CSU dominated Bundesrat, in particular because it would have been too similar to Erziehungsgeld or Familiengeld. Second, the looming economic crisis was a cause, or at least an excuse, to limit the proposal to employed mothers, rather than both parents. Furthermore, evidence suggests that SPD politicians viewed the Mutterschaftsurlaub as a solution to unemployment in West Germany. Finally, by expanding the Mutterschutz rather than implementing a new family policy, the SPD could attempt to avoid the “motherly deprivation” debate and criticism that so defined the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt. The creation of the Mutterschaftsurlaub demonstrated the close relationship between economic, employment, and ideological concerns in the implementation of family policy. But at the same time, it was a policy that aided in the reconciliation of family and employment for young mothers where barely anything existed before.

II. Reactions to the Mutterschaftsurlaubgesetz

The debate over the maternal leave policy that ensued in the Bundestag, among the women’s organizations, autonomous feminists, and the press revealed the ideological divisions over family policy in West Germany. Similarities existed in the critiques of the policy—in particular the exclusion of fathers—yet the aims and political ideologies of these individuals’ and groups’ critiques created cleavages. For the institutional women’s organization in the SPD and DGB in particular, the policy posed conflict. On the one hand, the proposal did not satisfy their political aims. On the other, they could not deny that a maternal leave subsidy was a beneficial step forward for employed mothers on the issue of reconciling family and work.
The Parliamentary Debates

The debate over Mutterschaftsurlaub cannot be removed from the ongoing tensions over family policy between the CDU and SPD that intensified in 1979 as a result of the upcoming 1980 election. By 1979, the general panic over dramatically decreasing birthrates had reached a fever pitch and the CDU hoped to use their family policy stance to win votes. While this campaign strategy ultimately did little to shift the balance of power in the election, the CDU’s Erziehungsgeld policy did gain greater saliency in public discourse.44

In accordance with its strategy, in March 1979 the CDU/CSU opposition submitted its proposal for a new Familiengeld. The bill sought a provision of 400 DM monthly to be paid to either parent for the care of their newborn for the first year and a half of the child’s life. The stipend would be paid regardless of the parent’s employment status before the birth of the child.45 The proposal was simply the CDU/CSU’s 1974 Erziehungsgeld proposal under a new title, but it reflected the opposing views of family policy that influenced the CDU/CSU’s criticism towards the new Mutterschaftsurlaub: it included stay-at-home mothers, it encouraged the parent to be home during the “most important” first eighteen months of a child’s life, and it extended benefits to fathers as well.46 It did not, however, contain a clause ensuring employment security.

From January until May of 1979, Bundesrat and Bundestag politicians discussed the feasibility of a maternal leave policy versus a Familiengeld in parliamentary sessions and

44 See for instance the Third Family Report published by academics associated with the West German Family Ministry in 1979. BT-Drs. 8/3120.
45 BT-Drs. 8/2650, 2.
46 Ibid. For CDU family policy in the 1970s, see Unsere Politik für Deutschland. Mannheimer Erklärung and “Gleichberechtigung im Alltag: Das Programm der CDU für die Frau in Familie und Gesellschaft” (CDU Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 1975).
committees. These discussions exposed that the SPD’s attempts to avoid the “motherly deprivation” debate, and debates over family policy in general, were little more than futile. In order to further support their family policy proposal, the CDU/CSU coalition argued that the maternal leave was in fact family policy in origin, rather than employment policy. At a January 31, 1979 meeting of the Committee for Labor and Social Affairs, several Bundesrat representatives from the CDU pointed out that “despite the framework of job protection regulation, it does not actually deal with worker protection, rather a family policy regulation.”\(^{47}\) By establishing the “true” context for the maternal leave policy, the CDU/CSU waged a debate based on competing ideologies regarding family policy, a front where the SPD was more vulnerable to attack for supporting the further employment of mothers of small children. In other words, the CDU/CSU could now frame the debate in terms of the “motherly deprivation” thesis.

Consequently, the best care for children under the age of three became an important point of contention. CDU Bundestag representative Heinrich Franke, the head of the CDU/CSU faction’s working group on social policy, criticized the six-month time frame of the *Mutterschaftsurlaub*, contending “the first three years of a child’s life are particularly important for the development of the child. It must be the goal of society that the child is raised in the association of the home, in the security of the family.”\(^{48}\) The ideal parent for this responsibility was “primarily the mother.”\(^{49}\) Therefore, Franke and his party preferred a


\(^{49}\) Ibid.
policy that would subsidize stay-at-home care by the mother for a period longer than six months.

Also important to the family policy strategy of the CDU/CSU politicians was the support of housewives, a group the CDU/CSU claimed the SPD had neglected in favor of supporting employed mothers. By excluding housewives from family policy, argued the CDU in various policy statements throughout the 1970s, the SPD did not create a freedom of choice for mothers between remaining employed or staying home to care for their children.\(^{50}\)

CDU/CSU Bundesrat politicians further argued that the subsidy should be extended to mothers regardless of employment status because otherwise “women will be strongly encouraged to return to employment so that they could receive more subsidies in the event of the birth of more children.”\(^{51}\) In other words, mothers would be forced into returning to work in order to receive any kind of financial benefit for future children.

As the CDU attempted to modernize its party in the early 1970s, this choice between employment and staying home with their children became the CDU’s own definition of emancipation, reinforcing the party’s support from the modernized housewives of West Germany.\(^{52}\) Subsequently, the CDU/CSU politicians further denounced the SPD for discriminating against housewives. An advisory opinion by the CDU-dominated Bundesrat included in the draft of the proposal that circulated in the Bundestag a suggestion that future drafts should include housewives since “they already gave up employment in the interest of

\(^{50}\) Wahlfreiheit was an important concept related to CDU/CSU family policy, even if the only choice the party was willing to support was the stay-at-home care of children under the age of three. See Kolbe, Elternschaft, 191-195, 304-310; Christiane Eckstein, Geschlechtergerechte Familienpolitik: Wahlfreiheit als Leitbild für die Arbeitsteilung in der Familie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2009).

\(^{51}\) BT Dr. 8/2613, Anlage 2 “Stellungnahme des Bundesrates,” 17.

\(^{52}\) See chapter four.
their children” and “have already accepted the financial drawbacks” of staying home. The CSU Bundestag representative Stefan Höpfinger, who would also later chair the Bundestag Committee for Youth, Family, and Health and serve as the parliamentary state secretary for the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs, also argued this point before the Bundestag in March 1979. He added that the proposal demonstrated “how little the government recognizes the family as an association and how marginal it ranks upbringing activities and the activities of housewives.”

The CDU/CSU purported that mothers who did devote themselves to their children did so at great cost to their financial security and therefore should be compensated. Research on women’s employment habits in the late 1970s and early 1980s contradicted this notion, however. These studies suggested that the higher their family’s income (i.e. their husband’s salary), the less likely the mothers of young children were to seek employment. When the family income was 1250 DM or less, 65 percent of mothers with small children were employed. In households with higher incomes, 2000 DM or more, only 16 percent of mothers of small children were employed, while only 25 percent of married women total sought employment. This argument by the CDU/CSU then seems to stem more from their advocacy for subsidies for large families, harkening to the party’s Catholic affiliations, as well as their representation of its middle-class constituency.


While the neglect of housewives that resulted from *Mutterschaftsurlaub* seemed central to the stance of the CDU/CSU representatives, the SPD was most vulnerable to attack for the neglect of fathers in the proposal, both from the conservative opposition and from within their own ranks. In addition to demanding the inclusion of stay-at-home mothers, the Bundesrat on the whole also strongly suggested to the Bundestag that fathers also be included, arguing that treating parents differently had no grounds for support. First, they cited studies that supported a consistent caregiver, not necessarily the mother, for infants and toddlers, and second, they argued that the double burden of mothers would also be reduced if fathers cared for their children.\(^56\) While the sentiment was the most agreed upon critique of the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* law, at the same time the CDU’s own proposal for *Erziehungsgeld* and *Familiengeld* frequently cited that “mostly the mother” would benefit from the subsidies.\(^57\)

This was a weakness that even SPD representatives were willing to admit, as expressed by Renate Lepsius (b. 1927) during the Bundestag debate on March 15, 1979. Lepsius, member of the Bundestag Committee for Labor and Social Affairs, as well as a leading member in the AsF, was born into a *Bildungsbürgertum* (educated middle class), politically engaged family in Berlin. Her father was a director of a Gymnasium and a strong supporter of the Weimar Constitution. After surviving the war, she went on to write her dissertation in history and by 1956 she had joined the SPD, despite her parents joining the CDU. She married a sociologist in 1958 and became politically active as a housewife while living in Munich. She was a member of the Bundestag from 1972 until 1987, where she

\(^{56}\) “Stellungnahme des Bundesrates,” 17.

\(^{57}\) See BT-Drs. 07/2031.
played an important role in the reform of §218, the Marriage and Family Law, and the implementation of the Mutterschaftsurlaub.\(^{58}\) During the Bundestag debate in March 1979, she simultaneously admitted her party’s potential mistake in neglecting fathers while attempting to save face. She conveyed that the inclusion of fathers “would have made clear the responsibilities of the father in the upbringing of children and would have conformed to the task sharing partnership practiced more seriously in young marriages.”\(^{59}\) Lepsius nonetheless described the access for fathers as “a wish” due to economic restraints, thereby justifying the contradiction to the reform of §1356 (the civil code statute that obligated wives to their duties in the home), which Lepsius helped enact. Lepsius attempted to circumnavigate this agreed-upon weakness by stating that this proposal was only the first step. In the future, the SPD would work towards expanding access to employment leave.

In response, the CDU attempted to argue in favor of the benefits of spending more on family policy in tough economic times, especially since their own proposal for Familiengeld cost much more than the SPD’s Mutterschaftsurlaub and the CDU was the strongest opponent to SPD fiscal policy. But for a political party that was openly attacking the economic policy of the SPD in general, arguing for the economic benefits of a more expensive family policy required some “creative” thinking. Because of the strong consensus that existed in the 1970s that the increased employment of women had a negative impact on the birthrate, CDU representative Franke chose to connect the economic issue to the issue of

\(^{58}\) Interview with Renate Lepsius in Lepsius, Frauenpolitik als Beruf, 214–235.

the declining birthrate. The CDU took the stance that families would decide to have more children if the government took steps to better the circumstances of motherhood through subsidies to all mothers regardless of employment status. *Familiengeld* would thus positively affect the West German economy. Franke quoted an economic report from the federal bank that stated that the declining birth rate “could have a negative effect on the dynamic of private consumption, at any rate on the quantity of consumption of wares and services.”

Investing in family policy, in other words, was an investment in consumption and the future of the West German economy.

A more substantial economic concern related to the job guarantee. At a March 1979 meeting of the Committee on Labor and Social Affairs, a debate over the feasibility of the job guarantee reinforced that the maternal leave policy was closely related to the high unemployment rate and the conception of mothers as reserve workers. The FDP representative Dieter-Julius Cronenberg, who would later serve as the vice president of the Bundestag, expressed reservations with the addition of the job guarantee, an opinion supported by the CDU/CSU faction representatives Franke and Roswitha Verhülsdonk (b. 1927), who had been the deputy president of the CDU *Frauenvereinigung* since 1977. The FDP, while a coalition partner with the SPD, nonetheless stood for free market policy and business deregulation, which explains Cronenberg’s critique of this aspect of the proposal.

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62 As we will see in the next chapter, such pro-natalist economic solutions were widely attacked in the press and elsewhere.

63 Parliamentsarchiv. 8 WP Ausschuss für Arbeit und Sozialordnung Nr. 11, 58 Sitzung, 16 März 1979.
Furthermore, Cronenberg, along with Franke and Verhülsdonk, expressed concerned that the job protection could actually be used as an excuse not to hire women. Employers would assume that female job candidates would eventually get pregnant, take their leave, and leave the employer with a gap in his workforce. On the other hand, the SPD representative Egon Lutz argued that the gendered segregation of the West German labor market actually would work in their favor, “because it is usually not possible to replace female with male laborers.” Instead, employers would replace the leave takers with temporary female workers.\(^{64}\)

*Institutional Women*

How did female politicians and political groups react to the proposal? Women in the SPD and DGB in particular had been advocating a maternal leave policy since the early 1960s. But both the AsF and DGB women’s executives admitted the contradictions between the proposal and their own aims for a leave policy. But very little outrage over the policy is evident outside of the confines of the party. Women in both the SPD and DGB were forced to weigh their own aims against the fact that this law was a step in the right direction, and the results did not necessarily lead to a unified front against a policy that clearly defied their own beliefs on the topic of parental leave. In the case of the CDU *Frauenvereinigung*, there was no second guessing its party’s stance. They stood firmly behind *Erziehungsgeld* as an alternative to the *Mutterschaftsurlaub*.

Initial reactions towards the proposal in the DGB women’s division and AsF were not positive. A maternal, and then parental, leave policy had been a central aspect of the DGB

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\(^{64}\) Ibid., 9. According to research by the Bundesminister für Forschung und Technologie in 1983, men were more engaged in production, repairs, and maintenance, while women were more involved in trading and office work, regardless of the classification or name of the job. Kolinsky, *Women in Contemporary Germany*, 162-63.
women’s family policy platform beginning in 1958. What began as a desire for a six-month, unpaid extension of the *Mutter*schutzgesetz evolved over the 1960s and 1970s to gradually include eighteen months of leave with a subsidy paid for by public funds and the option for either parent to take the leave. These points served as the basis of their critique against the proposal, but the executive committee was also attuned to the financial and structural repercussions of the proposal on employed women. Reacting to a 1978 draft of the law provided by the SPD, the DGB women’s executive responded by first and foremost recommending a subsidy based on percentage of income—68 percent, the equivalent of unemployment benefits, noting that a subsidy of *up to* 750 DM was not a sufficient enough income replacement to make taking the leave financially feasible for many working class women. In addition, the DGB women’s executive included fathers in its proposal, at least granting the option for a decision between partners.

Finally, the demands of the DGB women’s division for a parental leave policy was part of a larger program to better the reconciliation of family and work for working mothers. Understanding that the *Mutter*schaf*tsurlaub* only delayed a decision that would require employed mothers to either deal with the difficulty of finding childcare or to stay home with their children, the organization demanded more *Kindergärten* spots for children aged three and older with more full-day school options. They did not mention public options for

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65 AdsD/DGB Bundesvorstand/Abteilung Frauen/4051 “Mutter*schutz Schriftverkehr”

66 AdsD/DGB Bundesvorstand/Referat Frauen/4012 “Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Bundesfrauenausschusses des DGB am 9./10.8.73”, 5.

67 AdsD/DGB Bundesvorstand/Referat Frauen/ 4021 “Niederschrift über die Sitzung des DGB-Bundesfrauenausschusses am 14.11.1978”

68 Ibid.
children under the age of three, meaning employed mothers might still need to take a break from employment for a year or two, but the DGB women demanded that this employment break and the decision to rear children and remain employed would not harm their return to the workforce, nor their chances at full-time employment.

The AsF also did not react positively towards the proposal. The women’s contingent in the party found the actions of its party executive contradictory. They were members of the party that, in the past three years, had pushed through a law decriminalizing abortion and changed the antiquated §1356 to allow for families to decide the gendered division of labor in the home. Yet the proposal of their party for a Mutterschaftsurlaub did not follow the spirit of partnership in the newly reformulated §1356. The AsF drafted a letter to the party executive stating, “This is a family policy, not a job market or population policy, question. The AsF demands the implementation of a parental leave, as it was agree upon at many federal party congresses.”69 The AsF planned to mount an offensive within their party, with the trade unions, and with other women’s organizations.70 It is perhaps not surprising that soon after, the AsF attempted to form a coalition with autonomous feminist groups and individuals. Furthermore, in the few articles that did make it to press, the discontent among the AsF was also reported in the newspapers. Frankfurter Rundschau quoted Herta Däubler-Gmelin, the unofficial leader of the younger generation of AsF members, criticizing the proposal in an article in the Frankfurter Rundschau, discussed in the next section.71 The relationship between women’s unemployment and the Mutterschaftsurlaub was of particular


70 Ibid.

71 Renate Faeber, “Wo sind denn nun eigentlich die Väter geblieben?,” Frankfurter Rundschau, April 7, 1979, 5.
interest to Däubler-Gmelin; she had published a book on women’s employment in West Germany the previous year.\footnote{Herta Däubler-Gmelin, \textit{Frauenarbeitslosigkeit: oder, Reserve zurück an den Herd!}, Orig.-Ausg. (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1977).}

Yet at the same time, prominent members like Renate Lepsius attempted to convince the AsF that supporting the \textit{Mutterschaftsurlaub} in the name of actually passing a law that would benefit working mothers “would not mean a loss of political credibility.”\footnote{Anke Fuchs interview in Lepsius, \textit{Frauenpolitik als Beruf}, 254.} In this context, her articles in the SPD press service in August and October 1978 can be seen as attempts to rally the AsF around the maternal leave bill. Her strategy was to simultaneously point out the merits of the law, as well as its flaws. On the one hand she praised the federal cabinet for attempting to push through a policy that to this point “had given many politicians a nervous shock.” Nonetheless she deemed the policy a “half way step” to a leave policy for working parents. She argued that future drafts should include fathers because “only such a policy conforms to the principles of partnership in §1356 and the reciprocal obligation to support the family.” Furthermore, Lepsius did not support the validity of the economic arguments for the exclusion of fathers because “partners must decide themselves who will take the parental leave in the amount of 750 DM and who will not.”\footnote{Dr. Renate Lepsius, “Auf dem halbem Weg zum Babyjahr” in \textit{Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst} vol. 33 (30. August 1978), 4.} Lepsius took the lead in showing the AsF that they could support and critique the proposal at the same time, hoping that this space for criticism would bring the AsF on board.

A similar debate occurred within the DGB women’s division. The DGB women’s executive also saw itself in the difficult position between demanding a law that completely

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conformed to its wants and supporting an already-existing proposal that was more likely to pass. When deliberating the extent of their demands regarding to the Mutterschaftsurlaub proposal, the particular issue of adding fathers became the central issue. Elfriede Hoffmann, the women’s representative on the DGB federal executive board, wondered if the inclusion of fathers would require too many changes in other laws and whether it would perhaps be better to just leave the policy as a change in the Mutterschutzgesetz. Besides which, she argued, “At a discussion with gynecologists it came out that two-thirds of all women are diagnosed as being sick after the end of the [eight week] Mutterfrist.” In the end, Irmgard Blättel, DGB Frauenabteilung president, announced the consensus the committee had reached—“to quietly [emphasis original] demand for the inclusion of fathers.”

For the CDU Frauenvereinigung, the Mutterschaftsurlaub represented a challenge from its political opponents. Erziehungsgeld was not just the preferred CDU family policy, it was a policy conceived of and lobbied for by the CDU women’s organization. Helga Wex was instrumental in mobilizing CDU members around the proposal in 1973 and 1974. Because of the CDU Frauenvereinigung’s emotional investment in Erziehungsgeld, which also reflected the CDU’s stance on women’s and family politics, it was of no surprise the CDU women did not break ranks as they did with the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt. In a 1980 Frau und Politik article, Annelies Klug argued that “the Maternal Leave discriminates against all housewives and mothers who are not employed, also single mothers and those

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76 Ibid. For biographies on Hoffmann and Blättel, see chapter one.

who work in family businesses. The result is that since July 1, 1979, there are two classes of mothers.”  

*Autonomous Feminists*

Autonomous feminists who chose to react to the proposal did not make any quiet demands as suggested by the DGB women’s executive. In a 1978 *Emma* article, feminist journalist Claudia Pinl declared, “With around one billion marks, the federal government cements a maxim from the Stone Age: fathers take care of the family—mothers belong to their children.”  

Pinl’s criticism against the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* found consensus among autonomous feminists. Women active in feminist groups outside of the traditional institutions resented the government’s, including female politicians’, attempts to offer a maternal leave policy to employed women that reinforced the maternal stereotype of women and inextricably linked biology to gender roles. For these groups and individuals, the maternal leave was yet another example of the “father state” that relegated women to the home. Their critique operated at all levels of society, from the home to politics to the economy.

A maternal or parental leave policy was not a widespread demand among autonomous feminists, even for those who advocated the issue of reconciling family and employment for mothers. The issue was discussed at a 1972 federal women’s conference that brought together various autonomous women’s groups, mostly around the protest against §218. In a working group discussion centered on the topic “The Function of the Family in Society,” the group presented a “leave of absence from employment after the birth of a child for mothers

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or fathers (Babyjahr)” as just one of several means by which to achieve “the emancipation of women and a change in the family.”

Even with the growing popularity of the Mütterbewegung (mother movement) by the end of the 1970s, the individuals and groups who became vocal over the bill did so with a voice of opposition.⁸⁰ For journalists working within the feminist press, the majority expressed disbelief that the true intentions of the bill reflected a concern for the health of mothers and the reconciliation of family and work. For them, the law had more to do with the economic crisis and the unemployment rate. At the Frankfurt Frauenblatt, the journalists argued that the policy revealed that in the minds of policy makers:

> The foreseeable total disposability of women will remedy the crisis situation in the economy. She will earn more in guaranteeing the continuance of the nuclear family and the conservation of the status quo. In this way initiatives friendly for women and children are politically abused.⁸¹

A 1979 statement by women’s groups from Hamburg in the magazine Courage reflected a similar sentiment. “The federal government” argued the women’s groups, “has concluded a law that clears 264, 000 women from the job market yearly.”⁸² This was a result of the fact that there existed little other support after the six-month leave. As Claudia Pinl argued, mothers would just stay home rather than return to work. “And so disappears finally the unemployed women from the statistics, and in the job market there are again jobs for the male breadwinner.”⁸³

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⁸⁰ See chapter one for more information on the Mütterbewegung.


Structural issues in the proposal further indicated to the feminist journalists that there were other intentions besides helping reconcile family and work for employed mothers. The most voiced criticism was the fact that fathers were excluded from the right to paid leave, a criticism similar to those expressed in the federal government. The magazine Emma focused on this issue at great length in comparison to the other feminist magazines and journals. For the magazine, the issue went beyond a more equitable gendered division of labor in the home. The fact that fathers were excluded was a sign that politicians were out of touch with trends of actual young families. Emma advocated its position by focusing on the case of the Hoffmanns, a young couple that made the decision for the father to stay home with their newborn daughter. This decision required that he take an unpaid leave from employment while his wife (who made more than him per month), a teacher, would continue working. Emma focused specifically on this couple because with the help of a lawyer friend, Klaus Bertelsmann, their objections to the Mutterschaftsurlaub were being taken before the constitutional court.84

 Granted, the Hoffmanns were an exceptional couple. While they did eventually marry, both had reservations about the institution. Both had left-leaning backgrounds. He was active in the trade unions, and even after the birth of their daughter, they decided to remain living in their Wohngemeinschaft or apartment commune (which also might explain how they could live off of her teacher’s salary). Nonetheless, they became the face of the argument to include fathers.85 The dismay over the exclusion of fathers became one of the


85 The Hoffmann’s case was also reported in the mainstream press. See for example Margit Gerste, “Vater sein dagegen sehr,” Die Zeit, August 3, 1979.
most widespread criticisms in the feminist press. For Claudia Pinl, the SPD proposal was even more damning since it ignored the AsF proposal for an inclusive parental leave policy. Besides which, “The employment risks in this society that are inevitably linked to the birth of a child should be shared by both men and women.”\(^{86}\) For the women at the *Frankfurter Frauenblatt*, the law discouraged any feeling of responsibility on the part of fathers for the upbringing duties and responsibilities of their children.\(^{87}\)

Another issue of contention was the amount of the stipend, an issue also raised by the DGB female members. This was a concern expressed primarily in the *Frankfurter Frauenblatt* and *Courage*. In the *Frauenblatt*, the concern was mostly for single mothers. The author Thea Vogel argued that “750 DM hardly suffices to guarantee the living expenses for mother and child” when the mother is the sole breadwinner. The representatives for the *Frauenzentrum Neuss* and *Feministischer Mütter* in *Courage* went so far as to suggest that each family be guaranteed at least 2000 DM per month to be paid equally from the employer and government; not coincidentally, this sum was the threshold that studies observed allowed for the most number wives to remain at home. The high price tag would ensure the equal treatment of women and men.

But many of the feminist journalists felt that the repercussions of the proposal were not just that women would be tied even more to the home. Women, especially young women, would have difficulties finding and maintaining employment if the employer thought there was a risk of pregnancy. This was actually a fear expressed by the CDU/CSU opposition and some members of the FDP. In the words of Claudia Pinl, “Ask yourself what employer will

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\(^{86}\) Pinl, “Gefährlicher Mutterschutz,” 29.

now be prepared to place women in a position of some responsibility when her retreat into
the family is preprogrammed by the state.”  

For Pinl and the politicians who expressed
similar fears, a maternal leave policy would impact hiring practices. But the issue for Pinl
was not the temporary loss of an employee that could not be permanently replaced. It was the
fact that the policy dictated so specifically the end result—the leave would be taken by a
female and she would perhaps not even return.

That a policy could so obviously reinforce the male-breadwinner/female homemaker
gendered division of labor opened up another question among some of the feminist
journalists—was the AsF protecting women’s interests? The journalists had mixed responses
to the role of SPD female politicians in the creation of the proposal. On the one hand, Susann
von Paczensky’s article on the Hoffmanns claimed, “Some SPD women have protested
heavily against the measure because it forces women back into traditional roles.”  

But others were less forgiving, reinforcing the autonomous/institutional divide between feminist
activists. Claudia Pinl not surprisingly was the most critical, drawing a line between herself
and the AsF. It was a moment “for female politicians in the parties and parliament to
substantiate on what side they stand.”  
The *Frankfurter Frauenblatt* portrayed SPD women
as a political tool of Chancellor Schmidt, “summoning them to see the family again as a
place of feminine fulfillment.”  

For some, the actions of the AsF strengthened the belief that

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89 von Paczensky, “Auch ich will Mutterschaftsurlaub,” 8.

90 Pinl, “Gefährlicher Mutterschutz.”

91 Vogel, “Mutterschaftsurlaub.”
women working with the traditional institutions reinforced and supported the existing patriarchy.

*The Press*

The discord over the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* did not elude the West German press, especially among those with a left-of-center stance. *Der Spiegel, Die Zeit,* and *Frankfurter Rundschau* emphasized the contradiction and conflict over the course of family policy that the debates over the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* brought to the surface. The conflict meant much more than typical squabbling between political factions. These publications interpreted the negative reactions as a sign of weakness in the SPD’s family policy, a problem made direr by the impending election.

Of the press coverage in the more leftist press, articles in *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel* particularly stood out for the level of opinion—primarily criticism—they expressed. Renate Faerber’s article in *Frankfurter Rundschau* did not hold back in examining the critiques from both the right and left. In many ways, the objections from the CDU/CSU were perhaps not surprising. But her articulation of criticism from the left, and even working women themselves, painted the proposal in a negative light. Faerber emphasized in particular the negative workplace perception of the proposal both in terms of the employed mother’s colleagues and her employer. An interview with a nurse revealed, “From the perspective of women and mothers this is a good solution. But as a colleague it could mean that I could end

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92 Renate Faeber, “Wo sind denn nun eigentlich die Väter geblieben?,” *Frankfurter Rundschau,* April 7, 1979, 5.
up holding down her post for six weeks before hand, a half year afterwards in addition to time off for illness and vacation.” 93

The question of small businesses—both from the perspective of the owner and the self-employed woman—also arose. Faebër expressed uncertainty over how small businesses with few employees would be able to manage during a six month leave, especially since temporary help was difficult to come by. In addition, Faebër criticized the fact that the law did not apply to self-employed women “even though their income is usually no higher than wage earners.” 94

But most problematic in the opinion of Faebër was the extent to which the law demonstrated the contradictions in the SPD’s discursive promotion of a more equitable gendered division of labor in the home and their implementation of a policy that clearly promoted the stay-at-home care of infants and toddlers by mothers. In a brochure produced by the federal press office, she found pictures of fathers caring for their newborns, arguing that the new Marriage and Family Law made it possible for parents to decide the division of labor in the home. Yet, Faerber concluded the article by arguing, “In practice it is more like the mother changes the diapers and father is employed. He will only be caring for his child on the weekends like before.” 95

A subsequent Der Spiegel article argued that the implications for this division, especially between right and left Social Democrats, could play out in the CDU’s favor in the coming 1980 election. The journalist acknowledged that the CDU turned the family, an

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.
“evergreen from the fifties,” into a hot button election topic. Yet, “the divisions within the party in power are apparent.” This, argued Der Spiegel, only helped to make the concern for the “holy family” an increasingly combative topic. Even more problematic in the eyes of Der Spiegel was the idea that the reform-minded SPD members felt they could still get the upper hand over the CDU without taking the wide range of concerns into consideration.

The intentional openness of the left liberal press about the wide-ranging criticisms against the proposal, as well as their own criticisms, translated into coverage in the conservative press that essentially stepped back and let the conflict speak for itself. The discord was a disadvantage for the SPD, not the CDU. The front-page article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in May 1979 simply looked at both sides of the debate without offering any overt commentary. That the SPD could not reign in even those with whom they usually met with agreement left an indelible scar on the public image of SPD family policy.

III. Conclusion

The fact that the Mutterschaftsurlaub was passed into law in the end speaks volumes about the importance of the ruling faction in influencing the focus and implementation of family policy in West Germany. The economic situation and the SPD’s own focus on aiding employed mothers, rather than all mothers, directly impacted the fact that the subsidy was for


97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

employed mothers, not fathers or adoptive parents. When it comes to the connection between
gender relations and family policy, similar to the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt, the
Mutterschaftsurlaub represented the change and stagnation under the social liberal coalition;
it was, in the words of Renate Lepsius, a “half way step.”

This change and stagnation in the law met criticism from leftist women. For many
women, the law both predetermined and assumed a male breadwinner division of labor in the
home. By extending an already existing mother protection law, the leave was limited to
mothers, thus determining beforehand the parent that would stay home to care for the young
child if the family wanted to benefit from the subsidy. But the amount of the subsidy by no
means sufficiently replaced the salary of the employed woman, as emphasized by the DGB
women’s division and autonomous feminists. An amount of up to 750 DM only totaled a
small portion of their income. In addition, feminist journalist argued that the intent of the
policy was to encourage women to stay home with their child after the end of the maternity
leave. With few options for care outside of the home, young working mothers faced a
dilemma after the birth of their child.

Conservatives, on the other hand, criticized the fact that only employed mothers could
receive the subsidized leave. The CDU, acting on behalf of their middle class constituents,
argued that the policy created two classes of mothers—the employed mother and the
housewife. If women were to truly exercise a free choice between employment and
motherhood, both roles would have to be subsidized. Furthermore, the CDU emphasized the
exclusion of fathers from the proposal, despite their own policy proposals that emphasized
the role of mother as sole-caregiver who would forgo employment for her family. In arguing
that fathers could just as easily take up the caregiver role, the conservatives actually held a position similar to many autonomous feminists and female activists.

Despite these similarities, each opinion regarding the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* was fraught with ideological divisions that prevented any unified action against the proposal. The CDU/CSU pointed to the exclusion of fathers to highlight the perceived superiority of their *Erziehungsgeld* or *Familiengeld* proposals, which included provisions for fathers and stay-at-home mothers. Furthermore, various autonomous feminists interpreted the reaction of the AsF differently. Nonetheless, in the end many AsF and DGB female members decided to only “quietly” protest the exclusion of fathers. Despite reinforcing the care of children by stay-at-home mothers, the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* was nonetheless a provision that had not existed previously that would help many employed mothers. They would support the policy now with the aim of improvements in the future.

The *Mutterschaftsurlaub* was never successfully amended to include fathers and adoptive parents. In 1983, the feminist author and journalist Viola Roggenkamp wrote, “The Federal Republic of Germany has not fulfilled some of the European Union’s requirements for equal rights. Not because it forgot, but because it just does not think about it. In the view of the EU Commission, mothers or fathers are entitled to the *Mutterschaftsurlaub*.”100 Four years after the implementation of the maternal leave policy, it was clear that West Germany would not attempt to revise the law to include fathers. This move, argued Roggenkamp, meant that West Germany would remain behind Europe-wide standards in childcare and the gendered division of labor. This lack of revision was mostly due to a dramatic political change. When Roggenkamp criticized the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* in 1983, the CDU/CSU

coalition was in its second year in power after regaining its parliamentary majority in 1982.

By 1986, the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* had been replaced by *Erziehungsgeld*. 
CHAPTER FOUR

The Meaning of Women’s Work: *Erziehungsgeld*, CDU Family Policy, and “Freedom of Choice” for Mothers

In 1988, two years after the CDU/CSU passed *Erziehungsgeld* into law in 1986, the journalist Eugen Kugler chronicled his ten-month parental leave in an article for *Die Zeit*. Unlike the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* passed in 1979 by the SPD/FDP coalition, *Erziehungsgeld* was available to either parent. His wife was still a student and it fell on him to take parental leave. Kugler admitted that fathers taking advantage of the new law was more an exception than the rule. By the late 1980s only 1.4 percent of fathers took a break from employment to care for their newborn while their partner continued working. When Kugler mentioned that he was taking over care of their two young children and more household duties for ten months, male friends responded, “I would also like to do this with our young children, but in my situation it is not so easy.” The most common hindrance to taking leave: men earned on average more than women, and their households could not withstand the temporary pay cut. In addition, some older men argued that Kugler’s care would never replace that of his spouse’s. Kugler found his time at home as a *Hausmann* interesting and eye opening; in particular, he gained more insight into “the little recognized work of a housewife or husband.” In the end he playfully recommended the experience to fathers, also

acknowledging that it was hardly an easy break from employment. “It is the one time in one’s life where one can really get a crisp tan. I recommend a full day residence at the sandbox or wading pool. Basically an upbringing ‘vacation,’ like the name says.”

Through his own experience with Erziehungsgeld, Kugler highlighted the paradoxes of the new law. Unlike Mutterschaftsurlaub, it was offered to fathers, but in most cases families could not afford to have the father’s income be replaced by a modest stipend for ten months. However, this was just one of many aspects of the proposal that would garner scrutiny beginning in 1974 when Erziehungsgeld emerged as a CDU family policy initiative. The CDU/CSU drafted the policy into law in January 1986 after the faction regained a parliamentary majority in 1982, and it remains a central part of Germany’s family policy today. Since its earliest iteration in the 1970s, the proposal stipulated a subsidy or transfer payment paid to a parent (usually the mother) to support the full-time care of children by their parents. Unlike the Mutterschaftsurlaub, Erziehungsgeld was for all parents regardless of their employment the status prior to the birth of the child. The proposal did evolve between 1975 and 1986, however. Taking a cue from the maternal leave policy passed in 1979, the CDU added a guarantee of return to employment after parental leave to the proposal.

Because of the continuing importance of Erziehungsgeld in federal policy, sociologists, political scientists, and historians have critically evaluated the bill and its effects. Sociologists Karin Gottschall and Katherine Byrd focus on the impact of a family policy of transfer payments on behavior patterns among young mothers. Their research reveals that paying parents to raise their children leads to “baby breaks” from employment and general

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2 Ibid.
labor market exclusion for young mothers. Policy structures, coupled with social pressure and norms, reinforce the male-breadwinner gendered division of labor. Political scientists working on comparative welfare states, such as Mary Daly, also agree that *Erziehungsgeld* reflects the continuing influence of the male-breadwinner family model in Germany. In addition, their comparative lens shows how the family policy situation in Germany is in some ways the “unique” in comparison to the rest of Europe. However, their research rarely delves into the question of why the male-breadwinner remained important in West Germany. Finally, *Erziehungsgeld* figures prominently in Wiebke Kolbe’s *Elternschaft im Wohlfahrtsstaat: Schweden und die Bundesrepublik im Vergleich 1945-2000*. Her work argues that the initiative suited the party’s pro-natalism in reaction to declining birthrates and to the SPD’s movement to decriminalize abortion, as well as fit the suggestions of scientists who supported the “motherly deprivation” thesis.

While *Erziehungsgeld* certainly met the CDU’s ideological requirements for family policy, the viability of *Erziehungsgeld* also stemmed from the fact that it was developed and then successfully lobbied for by the CDU *Frauenvereinigung* (CDU Women’s Committee).

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unlike the Mutterschaftsurlaub that garnered only hesitant support from women in the SPD ranks. The policy stemmed from CDU women, which, along with the eligibility of fathers and nonworking mothers for subsidies, lent legitimacy to the CDU’s family policy initiative as an important option for balancing family and work for young parents. Furthermore, the CDU associated the policy with a conservative understanding of emancipation that seemed more acceptable to many West Germans.

Broader reactions to the policy, including by the press, government-affiliated academics, and women’s organizations in the political parties and trade unions also demonstrate that while Erziehungsgeld received extensive criticism for its cost as well as criticism from the left for including housewives, it was difficult to find dissention that seriously challenged the assumptions of Erziehungsgeld outside of the autonomous women’s movement and some further left individuals. In particular, the dramatic birthrate decline visible by the end of the 1970s lent significant additional credence to Erziehungsgeld. Supporters argued that the financial incentive of Erziehungsgeld, as well as its positive support of the upbringing role of parents, would lend itself to dramatic increases in the number of West German babies.

This chapter will examine this process of contestation and affirmation in three steps. First, it will focus on the debates over the gendered division of labor in the home during the period of reform in the CDU party and its position as the opposition during the social liberal coalition. Based on the increased activity of the CDU women and the need to attract new voters, the new party platforms in the 1970s adapted notions of partnership between the sexes at all levels of society. The party reconciled partnership with the socialization role of mothers through their own conservative definitions of emancipation. Second, this chapter will analyze
reaction to the *Erziehungsgeld* proposal by academics, the SPD, the institutional women’s organizations, autonomous feminists, and the press. This analysis reveals that strong objection to the law seemed to only emanate from a small but vocal group of autonomous feminists. Other criticisms did not challenge the assumptions behind the law, merely its cost. Finally, this chapter will conclude by evaluating the final proposal accepted by the Bundestag in 1986, demonstrating how it reinforced a male-breadwinner gendered division of labor.

I. *Erziehungsgeld* and the CDU During the Social Liberal Coalition, 1973–1978

*Erziehungsgeld* was not the CDU’s first experience with family subsidies; in the 1950s, the CDU government was instrumental in passing *Kindergeld* (child money), a subsidy paid through the father’s wage to families with three or more children. The CDU argued that the subsidy would help the financial insecurities of large (Catholic) families, discourage mothers from seeking wage labor in order to stay home and perform their essential role of rearing children, and hopefully encourage families to have more children. The debate over *Erziehungsgeld* in the 1970s and 1980s continued many of these tropes, but the context changed. Now *Erziehungsgeld* was part and parcel of a “modernizing” reform effort in the CDU that included supporting the modern, emancipated middle-class housewife and mother.

*The CDU Frauenvereinigung, Partnership, and the Reinvigoration of the CDU*

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“The New Social Question is not a question of method, but first and foremost a question of changing consciousness and political courage,” wrote Heiner Geißler, member of the Rheinland-Pfalz Landtag and president of the CDU Federal Committee for Social Politics, in his compendium to the CDU Mannheim Declaration of 1975. The declaration marked a shift in the CDU’s engagement with the changing economic, social, and cultural situation of the Federal Republic since the 1950s. As several CDU historians argue, it was precisely the CDU’s inability to evolve in the 1960s contributed to the loss of their majority position in the Federal Government in the election of 1968. Therefore, in the early 1970s, the CDU stood at a crossroads with its party agenda. The election of Karl Carsten in May 1973 to the position of Bundestag faction leader, as well as the emergence of Helmut Kohl as chairman of the CDU, tipped the scales in favor of reform within the party. This reform involved a less authoritarian appearance through a democratic restructuring of the internal party hierarchy and an appeal to a wider variety of voters, including a direct call to the younger generation of constituents in the Federal Republic. While the CDU in the 1970s was technically the minority party in the federal government, the historian Frank Bösch argues that their loss sparked a process of revitalization, laying the foundations for their eventual reemergence as the majority leader in the 1980s.


9 Kleinmann.


Politics of women and the family played a central role in this reform process, with *Erziehungsgeld* becoming one of the party’s central initiatives for family politics. The CDU saw its most dramatic electoral losses in the 1972 election, even more so than in the 1969 election in which the social liberal coalition gained its parliamentary majority. In no small way this resulted from the loss of the CDU’s “women bonus” as the SPD became more attractive to the younger female electorate. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, women constituted a larger percentage than men of the CDU vote. In 1969, this bonus was 10 percent. It dropped to 3 percent for the 1972 election. In addition to the need to bring women back to the CDU, the CDU Frauenvereinigung formed a strong coalition within the party with internal organizations that represented other groups with whom the CDU fared poorly in the 1972 election: the CDU Youth Union, led by Matthias Wissmann, and the CDU Social Committees, representing among other things workers interests, led by Norbert Blüm.

The Frauenvereinigung was able to use its power to influence policy platforms in the mid-1970s. In 1973, the party executive established the Kommission Frauen (Women’s Commission), charged with formulating a program for both the Bundestag faction and the entire party. The committee, however, did not ghettoize women’s issues among women;

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13 Wiliarty, *The CDU and the Politics of Gender*, 89.

14 ACDP IV-003-067/3 „Ergebnisprotokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung des Vorstands am 1.6.1973 in Bonn,“ 3.
instead it staffed the committee with an equal number of men and women. Included were members of the Bundestag such as Johannes Müller and Ursula Benedix, members of the CDU Frauenvereinigung such as Dr. Helga Wex and Roswitha Verhülslondon, and members of the Bundesrat such as Dr. Renate Hellwig.

The discussion and suggestions the commission produced coincided with the Frauenvereinigung’s goal of equalizing the social standing of employed mothers and housewives, as well as promoting the definition of emancipation as a choice between the two. However, in practice its focus tended more towards improving the lot of stay-at-home mothers and housewives. The commission’s particular desire to appeal to the urban, middle-class, modern housewife could be seen in its main suggestion—a Partnerrente (spousal pension) for women who had kept house and raised their children rather than seeking employment. By July 1974, however, the commission also committed to equality for female workers through a better reconciliation between family and their working lives. Despite normally shying away from strict family politics, the committee did support Erziehungsgeld.

The influence of Wex and the Frauenvereinigung was also apparent at the CDU Family Policy Conference in October 1974. The conference was attended by a large number of party members and included speeches by Helmut Kohl, Heinrich Geissler, Johannes Pechstein, and Wex, whose speech departed from the more ideological and psychological aspects of the family discussed in the speeches of her party colleagues. Wex focused on the “real issues” confronting families and their individual members. Throughout the speech, she placed Erziehungsgeld within a larger framework of changes in the realities of families—specifically, increased numbers of working mothers—and advocated for policy which reflected the individual wants and needs of all members of the family, not just the children.
She argued, “The guarantee function for the individuals (the child, the woman, the elderly) must be expanded and cultivated. That is the first and foremost duty of family policy.”

In particular, Wex reminded her CDU colleagues that many more chances and opportunities awaited women outside of the family. Employment especially, she emphasized, “has become a means for self-discovery and development: even if it must also be viewed critically in that employment is often dictated by material needs.” She argued that the partnership within the family was required to overcome the double burden caused by women’s desire to work outside the home. Wex demanded more commitment on the part of her colleagues. She declared:

The social reality – the double burden of women, discrimination against women whose activities involve the house and the family, the disadvantage for employed women that women are paid less for comparable jobs, an ever existing multi-layered uneasy reconciliation between family and the job market – all make clear, that a change in these circumstances requires more than a ‘declaration of partnership.’

Therefore, Erziehungsgeld, in the minds of Wex and her fellow Frauenvereinigung members, was just one measure in a host of ideas that would help alleviate the existing tensions between the upbringing role of the family and employment. By paying to remove the need for employment, Wex argued Erziehungsgeld “will create situations for families to fulfill their child-rearing duty.” It alleviated these tensions

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16 Ibid, 10

17 Ibid, 11.

18 Ibid, 19.
by removing the economic burden that forced women into employment, but it neglected the possibility that the mother would want to work.

Because of the advocacy work of Wex, the CDU included *Erziehungs geld* (and *Partnerrente*) in the Mannheim Declaration, finalized at the 23rd Federal Party Conference June 23-25, 1975. The discussion on women and the family emphasized the party’s attempt to appeal to changing conceptions of the family and the gendered division of labor in the home, while maintaining its traditional rural and religious female base. We can see this trend in the “The New Social Question” platform that set out to aid socially weak and unorganized groups such as retirees, the unemployed, and women—a platform that would appeal to some of the groups that voted in the lowest numbers for the CDU in 1972.

The CDU argued that that the equality of the sexes must be realized and maintained, a position that did not change with the reforms. What was new, however, was the fact that the CDU now acknowledged that women could work in the home and seek employment, of course as long as it did not affect her childrearing duties. The CDU related:

> The equality of man and woman in all facets of life should be achieved. At the same time, the position of women is so formulated that she is discriminated against socially, economically, and in society, whether she is active primarily in the family or at a job.

Thus the CDU declared its attempt to alleviate barriers to the achievement of equality between the sexes.

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20 “Mannheim,” 115.
In regard to the family as a political subject, however, the party maintained its understanding of the function of the family established in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{21} There was nothing new in its declaration that the family “is, as a living- and upbringing-community [Gemeinschaft], one of the most important places of individual security and purpose.”\textsuperscript{22} The party perceived a decline in the family, leading to “a gradual increase in the bodily and psychological dysfunctions in children, youth, and adults.”\textsuperscript{23} The CDU proclaimed that interventions by the state and society weakened the family, an obvious critique of SPD family policy and a reference to Nazi family policy. With this idea in mind, the CDU declared its principal function as “the strengthening of the family, and where possible, the provision of support in order to fulfill its duties,” including Erziehungsgeld.\textsuperscript{24}

The CDU continued to promote a new gendered division of labor in the home while maintaining a traditional understanding of the family in its platform for women from 1975 entitled “Equality in Everyday Life: The Program of the CDU for Women in Family and Society.” Not surprisingly, the writers chose first to position themselves against the SPD, arguing that the SPD did not toe a clear line in regard to women. The writers criticized the SPD for calling for the “achieve[ment] of employment of all women, by which they believe they can solve the problem between employment and family.”\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, they attacked

\textsuperscript{21} For the political understanding of the family in West Germany, and its Catholic influences, in the 1950s see: Moeller, Protecting Motherhood; Lukas Rölli-Alkemper, Familie im Wiederaufbau: Katholizismus und bürgerliches Familienideal in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1965 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000).

\textsuperscript{22} “Mannheim,” 114.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 115.

\textsuperscript{25} “Gleichberechtigung im Alltag: Das Programm der CDU für die Frau in Familie und Gesellschaft” (CDU Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 1975), 4.
the more radical beliefs of the SPD’s Young Socialists, who construed “the problems of women as part of the basic contradictions between capital and work” and suggested that, “by removing this contradiction through the establishment of a socialist society, the problems will solve themselves.”

Moreover, the party accused the SPD leadership of supporting women’s freedom of choice in order to “placate the public…copying the CDU,” suggesting that a sole emphasis on employed mothers was their true nature. By distancing its policies from the SPD, the CDU thereby attempted to establish itself as the true women’s party with a clear agenda. The role of the SPD in the document reminds us that the CDU’s politics towards women had the dual purpose of justifying its own stance and offering a clear alternative to the SPD.

In order to appeal to, and thereby retain the support of, the middle-class housewife, “Equality in Everyday Life” continued by incorporating the Frauenvereinigung’s emphasis on partnership as the means to achieve equality between the sexes. The CDU defined partnership as the same right and chance to individual development, the freedom of choice between and the equality of worth of employment and family, the bridging of the educational and job training gaps between men and women, the ending of the mentality of women as the “double earner,” and the equal access to social insurance through pensions for those who cared for their children in lieu of work. Furthermore, the authors argued that a “free choice

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid, 4-7.
is only possible when the different spheres of activity (household and the working world) are equally valued.”

When it came to the family section of the platform, however, the initiatives unevenly emphasized the family and housework side of this “freedom of choice.” The CDU argued that the SPD only aimed to help working mothers, thus justifying its focus on the “unappreciated” housewife. In order to “balance” SPD policy, the CDU put forth Erziehungsgeld for the first three years of a child’s life, as well as calling for the extension of half-day, with some full-day, Kindergärten and Kinderkrippen. While the platform writers did suggest more and better Kinderkrippen, they argued “non-familial arrangements for children under the age of three should only be utilized in cases of extreme need.”

In fact, there seemed to be contention among factions of the CDU as to how far one could take the role of partnership and emancipation in family politics. In a 1975 an article written by the minister of social policy, health, and sport of Rheinland-Pfalz, Dr. Heinrich Geissler, in the scholarly Zeitschrift für Sozialreform (Journal for Social Reform), the future family minister’s stance on partnership and emancipation of women did not go nearly as far as the platform above. Geissler argued that partnership “means that authority in the family does not automatically rest in the hands of one person, mostly the father.” Instead, authority

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29 Ibid, 6.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

rests in the “example of the collective life.”\textsuperscript{33} Rather than calling for the harmonization of the individuality of members of the family with their responsibilities, the rest of his discussion of the gendered division of labor in the family emphasized the primacy of children and their care. First, Geissler included the child in his definition of partnership, arguing, “The child is no object in the family and their upbringing should not be carried out under the point of view that accommodates the world of adults.”\textsuperscript{34} In other words, Geissler felt the needs of the child outweighed the individuality of the parents. Second, Geissler did \textit{not} define emancipation as the right of women to choose between employment and the right to stay home, as promoted by his fellow female party members. Instead, he argued that emancipation involved ensuring that “society and the state recognize the upbringing duties of the family” and “the elimination of the societal, legal, and social discrimination of the childrearing role of women.”\textsuperscript{35} Geissler’s article suggests that there were some elements within the CDU that were less willing to apply the CDU’s declared new stances on partnership and female emancipation when it came to the interests of the family and the child.

The efforts of the CDU to include women in the party agenda seemed to mostly satisfy Wex by 1975. A meeting took place between Wex, Helmut Kohl, and the CDU Bundestag representatives in late 1975. On the one hand Wex warned of the effects of neglecting women: “All the efforts of the last year are worthless, if in the last months before

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 645.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 646.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
the election the accent of a ‘misogynistic CDU/CSU’ is brought into play.”36 “The Union,” cautioned Wex, “will either win the 1976 election with women or lose without them.”37

On the other hand, Wex’s report detailed an improvement in the situation of women within the party itself, especially in regard to the political agenda. Finally, and more importantly, Wex recognized that the true sign of their increased success was the doubling of the female membership by the mid-1970s, with women now comprising 20 percent of the overall membership of the CDU (similar to the increase in female membership in the SPD and DGB).38 Wex, however, expressed disappointment that their successes caused no reaction from the SPD. Kohl, Wex, and the other attendees at the meeting concluded that the CDU should target the bürgerliche orientierte (middle class-oriented) women of the small but significant liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) who might agree with the CDU on social issues. Also, “Although the FDP cannot win a direct mandate…the deployment of many [emphasis original] female candidates can convey the appearance of female friendliness.”39

In addition, Wex proposed that achieving stronger female membership and participation depended on a more visible representation of CDU women in the Bundestag and a better advocacy of the interests of women in the party. It seemed that while the party willingly integrated women’s issues into their political goals, it fell short in practicing partnership in the nomination and election of women to leadership positions.


37 Ibid.


Erziehungsgeld Proposal of 1975

The efforts of Wex and the CDU Frauenvereinigung came to fruition in April 1974 when the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction submitted a proposal for an Erziehungsgeld law. Despite the fact that the CDU Frauenvereinigung’s conservative vision of women’s emancipation provided the impetus for the CDU’s adoption of Erziehungsgeld, the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction justified the proposal as a reaction to the SPD’s attempts at redrafting §218 and as a reinforcement of the CDU’s “Protection of Unborn Children” program. The faction argued that Erziehungsgeld “works against the economic need that can become a motive for abortion.”

The CDU/CSU’s justification for the bill also demonstrated a desire to support the upbringing role of mothers through “the creation of equal chances for all children, especially during the first year of life, to ensure a quality upbringing and care through their parents.”

Perhaps in order to maintain the support of more conservative CDU/CSU members who might withdraw their support if the proposal was rationalized in terms of women’s emancipation, the faction framed Erziehungsgeld as an opportunity “for society to honor [the family’s] upbringing activities.”

The CDU/CSU Bundestag faction suggested that a base sum of 300 DM per month should be paid to the parent who would remain home with the child for the first three years with the amount decreasing as the income of the family rose. For single parents, Erziehungsgeld would supplement what income they could receive from other welfare programs, totaling 1100 DM monthly. The government would support the stay-at-home

40 BT-Drs. 7/2031. For an in depth analysis of the proposal, see Kolbe, Elternschaft, 175–193.

41 BT-Dr. 7/2031, 5.

42 Ibid.
parent regardless of employment status before the birth of the child. Finally, either parent could theoretically receive *Erziehungsgeld*. However, the proposed law did little to ensure an equal access for children across class lines and primarily benefitted the party’s main constituency—the middle class. The 300 DM sum hardly allowed fathers, the main breadwinners, to take extended leave from employment. While the 1100 DM was on par with or was more than monthly earnings of around 60 percent of employed women, 300 DM hardly reflected the income of even most employed women.43 The small amount of the stipend would make extended employment leave difficult for low-income nuclear families, who relied on the incomes of both parents to make ends meet. That ostensibly middle-class families could survive on such a small supplement to the father’s income speaks to the class politics at play on the part of the CDU.

Similarly, despite attempts to use gender-neutral terminology—*Elternteil* (parent) rather than mother or father—in order to give the pretense of choice to the parents, the writers of the proposal admitted several times that the parent taking advantage of the stipend would more than likely be the mother. The faction argued, “the special help through the *Erziehungsgeld* should be an equalizer for the economic and social disadvantages of the family, where a parent—*usually the mother* [italics added]—dedicates themselves fully to the care and upbringing of the child.”44 Even in the language of the bill, the CDU/CSU consciously reinforced the concept of mother as child-rearer, even while the CDU *Frauenvereinigung* and the party platforms called for more partnership in the home.

43 “Erwerbstätigkeit,” *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1975.

44 BT-Dr. 7/2031, 5.
II. The Birthrate Decline and Reactions to Erziehungsgeld, 1975–1981

Because West Germany had over a decade to discuss and debate Erziehungsgeld as a viable family policy initiative, opinions changed over time due to transformations in context. West Germany’s economic situation was certainly an ever-present source of criticism toward such an expensive proposal. The press questioned the CDU’s fiscal responsibility, while the SPD consistently argued that its proposals should be implemented instead, simply because they cost less. In the Second Family Report of 1975, academics affiliated with the Family Ministry published what was hailed as a very progressive vision of a family policy future that better reconciled family and work for parents. The authors of the report certainly suggested Erziehungsgeld, but it was just one policy suggestion among many that also included increasing childcare options outside of the home.

The noticeable decline in birthrates in West Germany instigated a widespread discussion over family policy in a new context. Between 1960 and 1980, the annual birthrate declined by 340,000 births: in 1960, the birthrate was 968,629; by 1970, it had dropped to 810,808; and by 1980, the recorded births were 620,657 (see table 4.1). While, as the reasoning behind the creation of the Federal Family Ministry indicates, the birthrate had been a major concern among politicians in the Federal Republic, the dramatic decrease between 1970 and 1980 in particular set off a firestorm of concern. The fear over declining birthrates gave new traction to Erziehungsgeld as a family policy initiative. Experts, such as those tasked with the Third Family Report, as well as those interviewed for articles in all of the

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major news publications, connected the declining birthrate to the increasing employment of mothers. The Third Family report and the CDU/CSU’s new *Erziehungsgeld* proposal of 1978, *Familiengeld*, instigated yet another heated Bundestag debate over the best family policy, this time under the guise of birthrate decline rather than socialization for children under the age of three.\(^{46}\)

**Table 4.1** Birthrate Developments in West Germany, 1950-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total # of Births</th>
<th>Average # of Children Per Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>812,835</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>968,629</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>810,808</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>620,657</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**The Second and Third Family Reports**

Influential support for *Erziehungsgeld* came from the Second and Third Family Reports, published in 1975 and 1979 respectively in conjunction with the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family, and Health.\(^{47}\) The Bundestag commissioned the First Family Report in 1965 (published in 1968). The family report served two functions: to provide information to the federal government and parliament on the status of the West German family and offer suggestions for legislation, and to support the family policy agenda of the government in power. Though the appointed academics compiled, analyzed, and produced the reports with

\(^{46}\) The DGB women’s division and AsF do not figure prominently in this section due to the fact that until this point, they were concerned with the implementation of the *Mutterschaftsurlaub*. Their opinions towards *Erziehungsgeld* were covered in full detail in chapter three.

\(^{47}\) BT-Drs. 7/3502 *Familie und Sozialisation: Leistungen und Leistungsgrenzen der Familie hinsichtlich des Erziehungs- und Bildungsprozesses der jungen Generation.*
an air of independence, the government chose the topic and the means of presentation. After finishing, parliament members would comment on and debate the results.48

Käte Strobel, the SPD family minister before Focke, organized the committee for the Second Family Report in 1970, less than a year after the social liberal coalition took over the federal government from the Grand Coalition. Strobel wanted to distance the creation of family policy from the “romantic ideologues” whose construction of the family hinged on social and cultural critiques, as well as the “revolutionary model of the anti-family” propagated by the New Left (as represented in the Store Front Daycare Movement). Instead, she argued for a “rational family policy” that reflected the realities of family in West Germany and provided clear solutions and goals.49 Instead of a report akin to those published by the CDU governments of the 1950s and 1960s that focused on protecting the family, the Second Family Report would focus on the family’s contribution to society. The official title was *Family and Socialization: Activities and Limits of the Family Concerning the Upbringing and Education Process of the Younger Generation*.

Leading the committee of scholars for the report published in 1975 was Friedhelm Neidhardt, the influential sociologist who was on the forefront of a new understanding of early childhood socialization and participated in the debates over the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt*. Other members of the committee included Ursula Lehr, who worked with Minister Focke on the *Tagesmütter* project, and Franz Pöggler, an active Catholic and a noted professor of pedagogy focusing on the education of parents. Government officials and


49 Strobel quoted in Ibid., 119.
journalists considered the report forward-thinking because it took the employment of mothers seriously, and many of its suggestions for reconciling family and work for parents included options outside of the home for children under the age of three, without the usual caveat that parents should only utilize these options in cases of extreme need.50

At the same time, the more conservative affiliations of the committee members were also evident, and the members suggested Erziehungsgeld as an important means of ending the double-burden for employed mothers. The experts problematized the situation of mothers who worked both outside and inside the home, depicting the two roles for mothers as constantly in conflict with each other. They even went so far as to explain that this presented parents with the choice of “if the family henceforth honors their own opportunities for socialization or if they miss it.”51 Erziehungsgeld, according to the family report committee, would help to alleviate that choice for mothers. “Because … the not often wished double-burden compromises the social atmosphere of the family and damages the socialization of children,” began the report, “the commissions sees [Erziehungsgeld] as one of the possible ways of reducing the problem, to at least partially free women through payment from the coercion of contributing to the household income.”52 The parent was considered the more desirable means of socialization for young children under the age of three, which in some ways ruled out the possibility that women might seek employment out of desire rather than just need.

50 Ibid.

51 BT-Dr. 7/3502, 65.

52 Ibid, 137.
Why would a document essentially commissioned and organized by the social liberal government so blatantly support the opposition’s family policy? The social liberal administration’s stance on familial socialization—parents first, public childcare in cases of necessity—in some ways created an environment where *Erziehungsgeld* would be an acceptable family policy suggestion by a quasi-independent, government directed research committee. At the same time, the fact that *Erziehungsgeld* was a CDU/CSU policy dictated that the administration distance itself from the suggestion. The comment by the administration used fiscal reasoning to accomplish this. The opinion read, “The question remains open if the financial allocation can be sustained long term by the economic situation.” Furthermore, the administration questioned whether “state-funded upbringing money will alone solve the problem of early childhood socialization…initiatives towards facilities that work together with the upbringing activities of the family should not be excluded when parents are willing, but not in the position, to fully engage in their socialization function.”53

At least the government could fall back on the very progressive nature of the report.

This was not the case with the Third Family Report, in which the birthrate decline clearly validated conservative family policy. The report, commissioned in 1975 by then family minister Katharina Focke and published in 1979, set as its agenda a general overview of the situation of the family in West Germany. Willi Albers, professor of macroeconomics, led the committee, which included Rosmarie von Schweitzer, an expert in family and consumer sciences, and Rita Süssmuth, who along with Lehr supported the family ministry’s *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt*. The general overview of the situation of families in West Germany included socioeconomic status and family and population. The report severely

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53 BT-Dr. 7/3502 – “Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung,” X.
problematized the employment of mothers, arguing that the decision of couples to have children was negatively influenced by both the desire and need for mothers to seek employment. The authors therefore blamed the employment of mothers and the problem of the double burden for the declining birthrate. Rather than again supporting several different familial and public childcare options as in the Second Family Report, Albers and his committee touted *Erziehungsgeld* as the sole solution to the double burden of mothers given the “crisis” of birthrate decline. This decision to support the stay-at-home care of children by their mothers seemed even more problematic in light of the revision of §1356, passed in 1977 during the deliberations on the report and well before its publication, that allowed for the gendered division of labor to be a private decision between partners, rather than a state-mandated male-breadwinner family model.

The committee did debate these results, however. Internal meeting protocols reveal that Rita Süssmuth and Rosemarie Schweitzer protested early versions of the report on the grounds that it portrayed the employment of women, especially mothers, in too negative a light. Rather, the two experts argued, the employment of women and mothers must be considered a “social fact”; women “must have the freedom to choose whether they enter employment or not,” and the committee “must discuss alternative main family policy initiatives.”54 Schweitzer added, “Society does not think about how we can solve the problem of the double role of mothers.”

The response by Albers to this complaint further reinforces the connection between the birthrate issue and the family report’s suggestion of *Erziehungsgeld*. On the one hand, Albers admitted that on the whole “the commission has justifiable arguments against

54 BArch K 189/15753, Bd. III, pg. 7.
Erziehungsgeld.” However, he argued that in light of the birth rate decrease, “the commission must argue for Erziehungsgeld.” Erziehungsgeld was perhaps not the most effective means for balancing family and work for women and mothers, but wholly necessary given the birthrate issue. Süssmuth, despite being well-known through the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt debates as someone who supported diverse upbringing methods for children, nonetheless added that the report should also justify Erziehungsgeld in terms of the right of parents to rear their own children. Albers further qualified the committee’s decision in a statement in the final published report. The decision to argue for Erziehungsgeld, he explained, partially stemmed from the success of similar initiatives in other countries (referring to the pronatal politics of France and East Germany). Furthermore, Albers pointed out that one could not ignore that more women working led to decisions to have fewer children or none at all.

The final report cemented a negative image of employed mothers in conjunction with the birthrate decline. Rather than potentially harm the socialization of their young children, as was the discourse concerning the family before 1978, employment was seen as a negative factor in the decision to have children in the first place. Gerd-Rüdiger Rückert of the Federal Institute for Population Research in Wiesbaden, a federal institution founded by the BMJFG’s Wissenschaftliche Beirat in the early 1970s, was responsible for the section of the report devoted to the relationship between family and population statistics. Rückert argued

55 BArch K 189/15752, pg. 5.
56 Ibid., 8.
that the decision to have children “is an alternative that stands in competition with other factors such as individual freedom.”\textsuperscript{58} This desire for individual freedom referenced women, thereby placing the weight of the decision to have children solely on women’s shoulders. Rückert concluded that, “the difficulties that a married couple expects related to children are weighed against the happiness of the child:

- In many cases the young woman must relinquish employment; free time and mobility are reduced.
- When a woman gives up her employment, it reduces the family income at the same time expenditures appear for the child.
- When a mother is employed, she is strained in many ways. Men do not meet such challenges in his area of life. In this way every mother—not just those in fatherless families—is a “single mother.”
- The family is accompanied by a hostile attitude of society towards children.”\textsuperscript{59}

Finally, Rückert related the cultural factors that influence the decision for women to have children. “The awareness that the life of a woman comes to fruition in a special way when she has a child is not questioned by moderate feminists [in particular the Mutterbewegung]. Motherhood is not disposed with, but rather the patriarchal conception of motherhood. This does not lead to an alternative to marriage, but rather a change in the relationship between man and women in marriage and family.”\textsuperscript{60} Rückert expressed awareness that advocating pronatalist policy brought with it negative associations with West Germany’s National Socialist past. But he felt that a pronatalist policy could be legitimated in circumstances where it “does not forcibly regulate the decisions of spouses.” He concluded by criticizing

\textsuperscript{58} BT-Drs. 8/3120, 44.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 44-45.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 44.
the social liberal coalition for not understanding and acting on the long term negative effects of the birthrate decline on West German politics and economy.

The committee members felt that “a reduction of the conflict situation of employed mothers” and “improving the position of the housewife” would provide solutions to the birthrate issue, solutions that had not changed since the 1950s. The committee felt that Erziehungsgeld reduced tensions between family and work in a way that would help parents have the children they desired. Unlike in the Second Family Report, however, here the committee only suggested Erziehungsgeld as the means by which to reconcile family and work for mothers. The committee found the initiative desirable because “the familial role of upbringing would be recognized by society,” “a conditional compensation for the renunciation of the earnings of one spouse—from experience the housewife—would be paid,” and in addition “the economic considerations of the working women would be lessened as she temporarily relinquishes her employment in favor of her small child.”

Erziehungsgeld: A Viable SPD Alternative?

While the Erziehungsgeld proposal marked the official declaration of an essential element of CDU family policy, the fact that the social liberal coalition held the parliamentary majority meant that this move also demonstrated alternatives and action to its party base. The SPD at the time was focused on the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt and on slowly developing the
“Baby Year” parental leave as its family policy program (which would evolve into the Mutterschaftsurlaub). Therefore, no parliamentary debate occurred concerning the proposal. Rather the SPD generally dismissed further discussion of the proposal based on its cost. In a letter to the state secretary for the Federal Family Ministry Karl Fred Zander, SPD state secretary for the Federal Finance Ministry Karl Hähser commented, “For the next year we are no longer capable of implementing new federal initiatives that have budgets of one billion or more. We should also refrain from arousing expectations for an aim in this direction.”

The proposal was rescinded by the CDU in 1975.

The publication of the Third Family Report and the rise of the birthrate issue provided the CDU with new confidence in its arguments for Erziehungsgeld. Despite attempts to distance itself from the family report, it was clear that the SPD could not escape the association. Publication of the Third Family Report coincided with the CDU/CSU proposed “Family Money” (Familien geld) bill—really Erziehungsgeld under a new guise—in March 1979 in response to the proposed Mutterschaftsurlaub. Therefore the Bundestag placed both Familien geld and the Third Family Report on the same discussion docket on January 24, 1980 (conspicuously well after the SPD/FDP coalition passed the Mutterschaftsurlaub in the Bundestag). The debate revealed that the issue of the declining birthrate, while important at the time, led to the rehashing of old debates and old suggestions for family policy between

65 BArch K 189/15743, Bd. VII “Letter from Staatssekretär beim Bundesminister der Finanzen Karl Haehser to Staatssekretär BMJFG Karl Fred Zander”

the SPD and CDU, and demonstrated that the birthrate decline had become an issue of ideological division between the two parties.

Federal minister for Youth, Family, and Health Antje Huber began the January 1980 session by summarizing the government’s reaction to the report. Huber had the difficult task of distancing her government from the report that promoted the positions of the opposition, despite the fact that the SPD/FDP government bore the responsibility for the topic and results. Huber particularly focused on the issue of population development. To contradict Rückert’s section of the report, Huber cited another committee member, Dr. Hermann Schubnell, a professor of population science at the University of Mainz. She mentioned that at an academic conference, he argued that the dire reports of West Germany’s population decline were a “scientifically supported speculation. A population decline,” he said, “would lead to a relaxation and humanization of our everyday lives.”67 Huber emphasized what she regarded as the more serious findings in the report, the “conflicted situation of mothers.”68 Her deflection toward the double burden of mothers served to validate her own party’s family policy passed in the previous year, Mutterschaftsurlaub, which singled out employed mothers.

Huber explained that the report did not necessarily point to a need for Erziehungsgeld. She stated, “I have much sympathy for the financial burden of young families that have to take care of one or more children. Nonetheless state financial help should not be connected to the obligation to give up employment for this sum [500 DM] with all the insecurity of no employment guarantee.” Again, her statement justified Mutterschaftsurlaub over the

67 Ibid., 15823.

68 Ibid.
Familiengeld proposal of the opposition. For Huber, the fact that mothers would need to give up their employment with no guarantee of a return did not result in freedom of choice for mothers. “It is more so an attempt to buy employment from women.”

Helga Wex responded to Huber on behalf of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction, addressing the entire direction of the government’s family policy rather than just the family report or her faction’s family policy initiative. As FDP Bundestag representative Norbert Eimer, a member of the Committee on Youth, Family, Women, and Health, remarked, “With the beginning of the speech from Ms. Wex I thought: The election in the area of family policy has begun.” The forum of the Bundestag debate gave the opposition ample opportunity to make their play for the 1980 election. While Huber attempted to distance the Family Report from SPD policy, Wex made sure to remind all present that the report endorsed Erziehungsgeld as a family policy. She welcomed “the request by the experts towards the implementation of Erziehungsgeld. With Erziehungsgeld an instrument will be created—one that we have supported since 1975—that ensures the social and material recognition of the family.” Furthermore, Wex argued that the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction had the support of the West German people to implement Erziehungsgeld. Throughout the Bundestag debate, the faction cited a welfare study conducted by the Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences. Between the Third Family Report and the welfare study, the CDU/CSU exhibited confidence that surveys and research further supported their policy initiatives.

69 Ibid., 15824.

70 Ibid., 15835.

71 Ibid., 15286.
Internally, the SPD demonstrated that it was closer than its public image suggested to contemplating *Erziehungsgeld*. Around the same time Huber declared that the Third Family Report was “misused for party policy disputes,” the SPD party executive and Bundestag faction commissioned the SPD’s working group “Social Policy Program” to draft potential platform talking points for the 1980 election. The group suggested the implementation of an *Erziehungsgeld* for “mothers (and also fathers)…for the time of early childhood upbringing…when she relinquishes employment.”\(^72\) The authors vaguely distinguished their proposal from *Erziehungsgeld* by arguing, “Such a model was favored by the CDU under the name of ‘Familiengeld.’ This name is however not appropriate, because the initiative should not apply to all families, but only those who fill a certain role.”\(^73\) In the actual discussion of the proposal, however, the working group members sounded surprisingly similar to the CDU/CSU; they declared that there was no “feasible alternative to the reconciliation of family and work in the early childhood phase.”\(^74\) The SPD’s *Erziehungsgeld*, rather than providing a means to reconcile family and work, was “a general financial honoring of the role of the spouse rearing the children.”\(^75\) Not only did they emphasize moving away from the concept of reconciling family and work in their family politics, they supported the proposal precisely because “the traditional image of gender roles would be conserved

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\(^73\) Ibid, 12-13

\(^74\) Ibid.

\(^75\) Ibid.
through Erziehungs geld.”\textsuperscript{76} The discussion never left the meeting, but it demonstrated the existence of more conservative tendencies in the SPD.

The AsF never debated Erziehungs geld outside of the context of Mutterschaftsurlaub, with one exception. In reaction to the Third Family Report and clear signs of conservatism towards family policy in its party, the AsF called its own press conference to make known its own opinions known on the new directions in family politics. The organization made clear that it was against:

- A re-ideologization of the discussion about family and children; the attempt to blame the employment of mothers on the disappointing situation of children;
- The defamation of the equality of families as ‘a return-to-nature women’s emancipation’ or ‘emancipation hysteria’; the implementation of a Erziehungs geld that would be the first step towards ‘mothers in service of the state’ . . . a disparagement of reforms that guarantee women and children more rights; an uncertainty present in society that a reduction in birth rates would harm our system of social benefits.\textsuperscript{77}

What most angered the AsF, however, was its own party’s silence in the face of a strong offensive.

\textit{The Skeptical Press}

Similar to responses to Mutterschaftsurlaub, Erziehungs geld received little positive treatment in the press. Initial reactions in 1974 and 1975 focused on the economic impact, in light of the first oil shock recession, much like the responses from the SPD. \textit{Die Welt} journalist Albert Müller’s coverage of the 1974 Family Politics Conference ended with a

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

commentary on the proceedings and on the CDU’s new direction. “For reasons of financing are such plans hardly achievable. Regardless, the family politicians only signify the direction.” Müller admitted that the family had changed both in form and constitution, “but the transformation is not going so far as the family will be abolished. It remains essential.” Müller, in other words, argued that while family politics was an important issue given the new social questions, solutions should not put the already-shaky welfare state in jeopardy.

Similar responses appeared in the pages of Die Zeit in the mid-1970s as the CDU announced its new initiatives towards the “New Social Question.” Dieter Fiel in 1974 argued the CDU politicians “have shown up to this point little understanding for the economy. They propose from the federal government responsibilities that would almost double the financial deficit in Bonn.” For Heinz Michaels in 1975, it was a question of helping “unproductive” members of society—those who did not contribute financially in a time of economic uncertainty. Michaels suggested that social politics could only be financed through a zero sum game—“should one group receive something, the other must receive less.” If the CDU wanted to finance initiatives for “unproductive” members of society while maintaining benefits for those who contributed to the tax base, Michaels argued that it would also have to concentrate on economic growth. The journalist’s criticisms reflected a general fear among

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79 Ibid.


economic liberals over the West German economy in general and government spending in particular.

While the intensifying of the birthrate issue beginning in 1978 brought greater confidence towards Erziehungsgeld in the CDU, the change in discourse did not change the press’s negative response. Publications across the political spectrum expressed skepticism as to whether or not Erziehungsgeld was the actual solution to the birthrate issue. The right-leaning press connected the birthrate decline to psychological and cultural factors to which money was not a solution. In the case of the left liberal press, Erziehungsgeld was not perceived as responding to the actual socioeconomic needs of West German families.

FAZ and Die Welt took the birthrate decline very seriously. Their articles aimed to inform the public of the various causes as well as formulate possible solutions. Axel Schnorbus in FAZ, while laying out a very diverse account of the causes of the declining birthrate that included changing gender roles of women, focused primarily on the financial burden of large families acting as a deterrent for couples deciding to have more children. He argued, “We live in a consumer society…to that end the cost of children has rapidly increased in the past few years, more so than all other household expenses.”

Nonetheless, Schnorbus disagreed with financial solutions such as Kindergeld and Erziehungsgeld, finding that there was no clear evidence that similar solutions in France had resulted in the increasing birthrate there. “No one can discern if the population would not have also risen without economic efforts.” Instead, Schnorbus indicated that the “climate” of the family was much


83 Ibid.
more important in influencing decisions to have children, disconnecting socioeconomic issues with the psychological.

Joachim Neander at *Die Welt* also preferred psychological explanations over financial, although he briefly brought attention to the influence of the housing size and cost in the decision for couples to have children. He lent the most attention to what he regarded as the “too little recognized question: how many people in the Federal Republic want to have children but do not have any?”84 Neander’s answer also did not look at socioeconomic factors, but rather at the issue of infertility, arguing that couples tried to have more children, but were trying to late or had undergone sterilization procedures they later regretted. The almost irreverent look into fertility boiled down to one answer: women were not getting pregnant for psychological reasons. “Stress and fear of the future that are felt by many couples are manipulated by so many that they wish to have more children, but do not have any.”85 Society’s concentration on the negative aspects of children adversely impacted fertility in women. Both articles suggested that a rejection of consumerism as a way of life in favor of values that promoted the family would improve the birthrate.

This desire for a return to a “long forgotten” valuation of the family could also be seen in an article in *Frankfurt Rundschau*, but not without criticism towards *Erziehungsgeld* for not taking the employment of mothers seriously. The author, Heike Mundzeck, concluded that “the more members a family has, the more the feeling of camaraderie and togetherness can grow. Here is the chance for the rediscovery of a form of living that is worth more than

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85 Ibid.
material goods,” echoing the arguments of many politicians.86 Mundzeck also argued, “In the search for private happiness we must keep the social conditions in view.” For Mundzeck, *Erziehungsgeld* did not serve the social issues that experts believed contributed to the declining birthrate in the Federal Republic. Her analysis centered on the *Modellversuch Erziehungsgeld* (Model Project Upbringing Money) conducted in the West German state of Niedersachsen. She related that the majority of women who decided to take the eighteen-month stipend without a job guarantee were lower-level clerical and factory workers “with inadequate education and who have worked few attractive positions.” For these women, “the financially supported and ideologically underpinned recall to the trusted home” is a result of a “job market in which they for years urgently asked for and that today has nothing more to offer. And so the return home to kitchen and nursery is a compromise.”87 Mundzeck felt that the *Mutterschaftsurlaub* was a step in the right direction because of the job guarantee, but admitted that even it had faults, considering that the 750 DM stipend could not attract women who earned more nor single mothers for whom the amount would hardly pay the bills.

Mundzeck preferred a two-pronged approach to the problem. First, “before everything more tolerance, not only from parents, but also from...those who no longer remember what it means to be a children in a world of norms and limitations, that only adults, and not always even those adults, exercise.” Add this to the related feelings of guilt on the part of employed mothers who believe they neglect their household obligations, and “who can blame young couples to go the direction of the minimal rebellion and only decide to have


87 Ibid.
one child?” Second, Mundzeck suggested, “pediatricians and psychologists with their campaign against every form of caregiving outside the home for small children account for why mothers may not express multiple critiques.” She suggested that the Tagesmütter Modellprojekt was an example of the right direction for solutions. “Here is a basic approach that will give mothers the confidence to have that second or third child. The possibility for qualified care outside the home—at first through Tagesmütter or small groups, later with Kindergarten and concluding with full day schools—can parents be induced to decide to have more than one child.”

An anonymous article published in Die Zeit in January 1979 further reinforced this sentiment. The journalist found Erziehungsgeld problematic precisely because it failed to acknowledge the employment of mothers, arguing that the “naïve state propaganda with the goal to work against the current trends in the nuclear family won’t do much good.” Highlighting the effects of the measure on the gains women had made throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the author commented, “One also cannot buy back emancipation from women through Kindergeld.” In other words, the author suggested that the solution to the birthrate issue did not come by “pushing women back to the nursery who want to be employed.” Instead, “both possibilities must be made more attractive: the housewife as well as the employment of mothers.”

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

Autonomous Feminist Responses

The response to *Erziehungsgeld* in the mid- to late-1970s among groups and individuals in the autonomous feminist movement was diverse. On the one hand, as analyzed in chapter one, a group of autonomous feminists advocated Wages for Housework. Faced with high unemployment among women, the devaluation of housewives, and a pessimism that reform could occur in the male-dominated workforce in West Germany, Gisela Bock, Hannelore Schröder, and others advocated a government subsidy for stay-at-home mothers. Similar to the CDU’s *Frauenvereinigung*, the Wages for Housework movement argued that placing a monetary value on housework would increase the worth of housework and childrearing into “productive” work. Nonetheless, members of the Wages for Housework movement distinguished their initiative from *Erziehungsgeld*, arguing that Wages for Housework was only a first step in improving all childcare options to better reconcile family and work for parents. Furthermore, Wages for Housework was an employment, not a family, policy initiative. It was not an issue of improving the socialization of children, but rather the employment status of mothers.91

Other members of the feminist press recognized that *Erziehungsgeld* reinforced the male-breadwinner family model. Claudia Pinl, writing from the perspective of a feminist involved in the trade union movement, argued, “Women may, should, yes must be employed, if the labor pool is scant in an economic boom…if on the other hand employment is scarce, like now, the mother back in the home is ideal.”92 For Pinl, the economic story of *Erziehungsgeld* was the CDU’s desire to shore up “jobs for family men (*Familienväter*)”—to

91 See chapter one, pgs.

maintain the male-breadwinner status of fathers by removing the mothers from the job market. However, Pinl implicated not just the CDU in her article. Pinl accused the SPD Presidium, which she argued supported *Erziehungs geld*, and the AsF women who promoted a maternal leave policy to be the same as the CDU members who suggested *Erziehungs geld*. Pinl fired at the politicians, “the male parties would love to send women back in the home.”

Pinl’s critique of the gendered division of labor that the bill promoted continued when she deconstructed the ability of fathers to have access to leave policies. She asked, “Which German man today is ready to enter into a ‘Babyjahr’?” Pinl cited the “cosmetic” job guarantee as the major hindrance. “Every interruption impairs the employment chances. That we know from experience.” Pinl concluded that *Erziehungs geld* did allow for the recognition of the “family performed work, above all child upbringing.” But she felt that this appreciation should not “nail down the housewife and mother roles.”

### III. *Erziehungs geld Becomes Law, 1985–1986*

Despite the criticism from the press and the autonomous women’s movement, polls in the early 1980s suggested that the West German public would be more supportive of

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93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.
Erziehungsgeld. A 1982 Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Polls survey showed that 82 percent of persons polled believed that women should either pause employment or give it up all together with the birth of a child. Demonstrating the importance of the majority government in West Germany in influencing family policy, Erziehungsgeld became law in 1986 after the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition gained the majority position in the Bundestag after the 1982 election. While it was still clearly a family policy that reflected CDU pronatalist sensibilities and conceptualizations of the family, the new proposal was visibly connected more to the issue of reconciling family and work for employed mothers. Most importantly, taking a cue from the social liberal coalition’s Mutterschaftsurlaub, the proposal now included a job guarantee for parents who wished to return to work after the subsidy concluded. The question remains, however: did this change represent a new understanding towards reconciling family and work for parents, the gendered division of labor in the home, and a true “freedom of choice” for mothers?

1985 Essen Party Congress and Women’s Politics in the CDU

It is important to note that despite the fact that Erziehungsgeld had been an important aspect of CDU family policy since the 1975, discussions towards enacting it as law did not begin until three years after the CDU/CSU was elected into power. A major turning point in the Erziehungsgeld proposal was the March 1985 Party Congress in Essen. It was here that the CDU decided to pass Erziehungsgeld into law by the end of 1986. This particular party congress was unique in that it was devoted entirely to women’s issues—the main objective was to draft the party platform “Guidelines of the CDU for a New Partnership between Man

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and Woman.” The concentration on women’s issues meant that more delegates than usual were female. In addition, the conference marked the emergence of new female up-and-comers in the CDU—Ursula Lehr, Rita Süßmuth, who had just been nominated to the post of federal family minister and would take over the presidency of the Frauenvereinigung the following year, and Renate Hellwig (b. 1940). Hellwig became active in the CDU at the state level in the early 1970s, holding social policy positions in both Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz. After her election to the Bundestag in 1980, she quickly earned a name for herself through her standoff with CDA president Norbert Blüm in the West German press over his conservative overtures towards family policy at the 1981 CDA congress and through newspaper articles.99 Despite this temporary break in the coalition between the Junge Union, the CDA, and the Frauenvereinigung at the beginning of the decade, Blüm had reinitiated this relationship by the Essen party congress and became a staunch supporter of the job guarantee provision.

Essen also marked a change in the discourses and justification of Erziehungsgeld by the CDU. It went from a family policy rooted in the party’s anti-abortion stance and specific understanding of early childhood socialization to a policy firmly justified as a measure to reconcile family and work for parents. This shift helps explain the addition of a job guarantee to the policy proposal. Female delegates in the morning forums devoted to the topics of “Women in Employment and Family” and “Women in Professional Life” asserted the importance of employment in the life of women and mothers and the desire for better reconciliation of family and work through Erziehungsgeld with a job guarantee, part-time

work, and the better reintroduction of mothers into the workforce after pauses to care for their children.\textsuperscript{100} No one challenged the sanctity of the family or the importance of support for housewives, but the conversation emphasized both the desire and sometimes necessity of employment among mothers. Ursula Lehr commented that staying home as housewives and mothers occurred “only for a very specific life phase today.”\textsuperscript{101} The housewife and regional CDU member Ursula Körtner added that a woman works “because she enjoys the activity and wants contact with other people.”\textsuperscript{102} Some delegates, in particular from the \textit{Ring Christlich Demokratischer Studenten} (Ciricle of Christian Democratic Students or RCDS), also challenged the CDU’s emphasis on the nuclear family. Dagmar Bange from the RCDS asked the CDU to at the very least “tolerate non-marriage partnerships” because “young partnerships are based in other demands, other requirements, other ideas.”\textsuperscript{103} Others such as Ute Otzen from the RCDS and Gabriele Wülker, a professor emeritus with three children, advocated for more support for single mothers.\textsuperscript{104}

What was most striking was the extent to which the conversation was devoid of the issue of early childhood socialization. The \textit{only} speaker to advocate for a three-year subsidy, vice president of the German Family Association Lore Dehnen, did not make the argument based on the issue of socialization, but because “no one is there to care for the child—


\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 339.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 346.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 328.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 343, 351.
unfortunately grandmothers are not an option for everyone,” referencing the poor childcare options for children under three in the Federal Republic.\textsuperscript{105} The well-being of children was certainly an important aspect of the conversation. But unlike conversations over the issue of reconciling family and work for parents in the 1970s in the CDU, socialization under the age of three did not enter the discussion in such an overt fashion.

The job guarantee nonetheless became an important point of contention over the \textit{Erziehungsgeld} proposal. The protest against the job guarantee came mostly from members of the \textit{Mittelstand} (middle class small business owners) committee in the CDU. The president of the \textit{Mittelstandsverein}, Gerhard Zeitel, an economist with ties to the West German banking industry, conveyed the potential difficulties for small businesses if they were to be required to reserve a position for up to a year. “The legal regulation would disturb the desired and very much praised economic flexibility of the middle -class entrepreneur.”\textsuperscript{106} Furthermore, Zeitel expressed another issue, one that was also mentioned during the debate over the \textit{Mutterschaftsurlaub} in 1979—the job guarantee would harm the employment potential for young women. Susanne Rahardt (b. 1953), a member of the Hamburg Parliament and the first woman to hold the position of president of a regional \textit{Junge Union} chapter, also agreed with Zeitel’s statement. She argued, “When a young woman and a young man apply for the same qualified position, with this risk the preference will be with the man.”\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 359.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 188.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 195.
Members of the CDU also criticized the job guarantee in the context of unemployment in West Germany. Between 1980 and 1984, the unemployment rate in West Germany jumped from 3 to 8 percent.\textsuperscript{108} Heinrich Weiss referenced this economic turn in his response to the job guarantee. Weiss was president of the Economic Council of the CDU, a committee focused on employer interests and promoting a social market economy. It was considered the more conservative counterweight to the employee-driven CDA. Weiss argued that it was not easy to find twelve-month short-term qualified employees, particularly in regions with better job markets, simply because most qualified workers would not be interested in entering a short-term contract. In essence, the job guarantee would leave holes in the workforce that could not easily be filled, thus furthering the unemployment problem.

As Gerd Scheffold, member of the Bünd der Selbständigen (Organization of Self-Employed), another Mittelstand organization, concluded, “The two are separable. Erziehungsgeld will show results, and we can eliminate the job guarantee.”\textsuperscript{109}

The response from the supporters of the job guarantee demonstrates the extent to which the CDU Frauenvereinigung’s relationship with the CDA and Junge Union proved invaluable. Indeed, throughout the debate, delegates from these two organizations were almost the only ones to support its inclusion. Christoph Böhr argued before the entire congress, “This demand can only be realized when we bring ourselves to give these young mothers the security that they will again find themselves in their employment after they alone and exclusively have cared for their child.”\textsuperscript{110} Furthermore, Böhr emphasized the extreme

\textsuperscript{108} “Erwerbstätigkeit,” Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1981.

\textsuperscript{109} Protokoll 33. Bundesparteitag 20./22. März Essen, 193.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 191.
difficulties of young mothers to secure employment after leaving the job market for a year. Norbert Blüm justified the job guarantee in the name of freedom of choice for mothers. He argued that the response to the SPD’s Mutterschaftsurlaub, which only focused on employed mothers, could not “be an Erziehungsgeld that employed mothers cannot use. It is in the sense of our best tradition to strive for the equality between employed mothers and housewives.” In addition, Blüm mentioned the job guarantees for other groups such as soldiers and employment councils.\textsuperscript{111} While more conservative voices still existed in the CDU, Erziehungsgeld with a job guarantee represented at the very least a further discursive shift in the CDU’s conception of family policy.

\textit{The Erziehungsgeld Proposal of 1985}

While the structure of the family policy changed only slightly from the Erziehungsgeld proposal of 1975, the language of the bill proposed in 1985 suggested that Erziehungsgeld was now a measure concerned with reconciling family and work for parents. This is not surprising given the additional issues now related to the employment of mothers. I argue, however, that the language of the bill also related to the problem the CDU was having in maintaining the group it sought as a constituency beginning in the 1970s: the modern, emancipated, at least part-time employed, middle-class woman. The newspaper \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau} phrased the problem as “the difficulties of the CDU with emancipation.”\textsuperscript{112}

As the CDU took office in 1982, an Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Polling survey determined that when it came to “the protection of families with children,” the

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 200.

\textsuperscript{112} “Mannheim und die Schwierigkeiten der CDU mit der Emanzipation,” \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, October 12, 1981, 3.
majority of persons polled believed that the CDU/CSU performed better in this area. However, when it came to “achieving the equality of women in all areas of life,” the SPD won the confidence of those surveyed over the CDU/CSU.\footnote{Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., \textit{Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie}, vol. 8 (Wien: Verlag F. Molden), 1983: 262.} The \textit{Erziehungsgeld} law that Chancellor Kohl and his government proposed in 1985, justified in terms of reconciling family and work for parents, thereby reflected two shifts. First, it addressed the need to deal with the employment of mothers due to the birthrate. Second, the CDU required change in the language of the bill to reflect the critiques from women. However, merely changing the language was in many ways enough to placate the female CDU politicians, since they did not question the idea of subsidizing the stay-at-home care of children. The authors of the proposal set as their goal “the creation of more freedom of choice for mother and father between their activities for the family and employment.”\footnote{BT-Drs. 10/3792,1.} The writers also argued that the \textit{Erziehungsgeld}, unlike the \textit{Mutterschaftsurlaub}, “incorporates … all mothers and also the fathers.”\footnote{Ibid.}

In fact, the wider West German public would have supported \textit{Erziehungsgeld} as a family politics measure. As previously described opinion polls indicated, the German public overwhelmingly supported the idea of women pausing employment or giving it up altogether after the birth of a child.\footnote{\textit{Allensbacher}, 473.} The justification section of the proposal therefore still emphasized that \textit{Erziehungsgeld} made possible the “dedication of one parent to the care and
upbringing of the child in the first stages of life which are decisive for their later development.”

Nonetheless, there were some slight changes in the bill. The proposal this time raised the Erziehungsgeld amount to 600 DM per month regardless of income for the first six months. It should be noted, however, that the sum still did not effectively replace the typical male wage. In April 1986, 64 percent of men earned 1800 DM or more per month. For the last six months, the Erziehungsgeld would be adjusted according to income, but it was still a subsidy paid to a parent to care for their child for the first year of the child’s life.

There were, however, a few important new additions. First, this bill came with an additional Erziehungsurlaub (parental leave clause)—ostensibly to replace the Mutterschaftsurlaub—for working members of the family who wished to stay home during the time they received Erziehungsgeld. While both parents could receive Erziehungsgeld, the Erziehungsurlaub was only available when both parents worked. Second, in the case where one parent would take leave from employment, the proposal offered job protection and the possibility for part-time work (for mothers after the twelve-week Mutterschutz time frame) so that parents could “ease the later return in the work and occupational life and [could] through that still carry out the decision commit to the development of the child in the particularly important years.” Third, the CDU proposal offered the opportunity for parents to split the parental leave and Erziehungsgeld, “a considerable step in the direction of more equality in

117 10/3792, 1.


119 10/3972, 15.
the family. More fathers wish to take an active part in the upbringing of the children in the family.”

In Defense of Working Mothers—The AsF and DGB Women’s Division

The SPD women’s response to the new Erziehungsgeld proposal was mired in the CDU’s rescinding of the Mutterschaftsurlaub a few years prior and the counter-introduction of the Elternurlaub to the Erziehungsgeld. First and foremost, the AsF worried about the contention within the CDU concerning whether or not to guarantee the jobs of women on Erziehungsurlaub, a protection included in the lost Mutterschaftsurlaub. Dr. Renate Lepsius commented in the SPD press service, “Erziehungsgeld without job security is worthless. Erziehungsgeld which strikes the eight months of job security of the Mutterschaftsurlaub, is a naked sneer at employed women.” Inge Wettig-Danielmeier (b. 1936), the vice president of the AsF, agreed with Lepsius, arguing that the bill “only makes sense with an unrestricted and statutorily instated guarantee to retain the job after a one year break in employment.”

For Wettig-Danielmeier, the fact that the CDU might doubt the importance of the job-security clause pointed to “a good example of how the legitimate interests of women can be instrumentalized for very different political goals,” mainly the “self-evident” belief that mothers should give up employment to raise their children. Wetting-Danielmeier suggested instead that in order to truly bring employment and raising children into harmony for

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120 Ibid, 16.
121 Dr. Renate Lepsius, “Erziehungsgeld oder Erziehungsurlaub,” Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst March 5, 1985, 2
employed mothers required first that any initiative should compensate the mother’s income up to 75 percent of their wages, and second that their position would be secure for their return.

The DGB *Frauenausschuss*, as representatives for employed women, did not support *Erziehungs geld* either. In several responses to the proposal between 1983 and 1985, the DGB women criticized the intentions behind the proposal, the conflation of the situation of housewives and employed mothers, and the proposed stipend amount. In her April 1985 article for the DGB Women’s Division’s magazine *Frauen und Arbeit*, DGB *Frauenausschuss* member Helga Tölle argued that *Erziehungs geld* could not function as a replacement for maternal or parental leave. The intention of the former lay in honoring the upbringing role of parents while the latter “pays for giving up employment outside the home for a set time period in the interest of caring for one’s children (and also for the social interest of the health of the mother).”

Tölle argued that this could not be extended to non-employed mothers because they were not employed.

Moreover, Tölle disagreed with CDU politicians (in particular the family minister Süßmuth) who argued that “there exists no difference in collection of facts (*Tatbestände*), but an injustice in the form of the unequal treatment of employed and unemployed mothers after the birth of the child.” Tölle adamantly disagreed, arguing that treating parents the same in actuality leads to different treatment because the parents live under different circumstances. Tölle cited the example that paying parents the same amount across the board paid parents for the same activity of raising children, but 600 DM meant a supplement to

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124 Ibid., 2.
household income in circumstances where the mother did not work before the birth and a severe reduction in household income in circumstances where the mother did work beforehand.\footnote{125}

Tölle, and the DGB in general, rejected the elimination of the Mutterschaftsurlaub. Instead, they argued that Mutterschaftsurlaub should remain as an employment policy and be extended to include fathers. The stipend should be based on income for full-time employees (a measure they demonstrated was included in parental leave policies in other European countries) and the government should provide a supplemental sum for part-time employed mothers so they would not lose their positions outright. Erziehungsgeld would then be regulated as a family policy measure similar to Kindergeld so that parents could be equally financially “honored” for birthing children without discriminating against employed mothers.

\textit{Autonomous Feminists}

Annemarie Mennel in the magazine \textit{Emma} conveyed her doubts about whether the bill treated employed and unemployed mothers equally. Mennel deemed Erziehungsgeld a “real gift,” a “state wage to have children” for unemployed mothers, while single mothers had to give up their employment or reduce to a twenty-hour week in order to receive the money from the government. According to Mennel, wage earners would fare the worst because “they would lose with the new law the six months maternal leave with pay and their job security.”\footnote{126} Under the new law, they would receive the requisite Mutterschutz for the first few months of Erziehungsgeld, but then they would either have to take

\footnote{125}Ibid. \footnote{126}Annemarie Mennel, “Erziehungsgeld oder: Wie Vater Staat die Mütter erziehen will,” \textit{Emma} 1985 Nr. 9, 6.
Erziehungsurlaub or work part time. The point of her comparison was to show that there existed no risk for housewives in Erziehungsgeld—it only added to their incomes—while the bill subjected employed women to more potential risks through a reduced income and no job security during leave. “The only choice which remains is either to take the Erziehungsgeld or be reduced to social assistance through part-time work.”127 The new bill, according to Mennel, “created three classes of mothers.”128

In a 1986 article “Erziehungsgeld: Wages for Housework as a Strategy for Conservative Politics?” in Beiträge zur feministischen Theorie und Praxis (Articles on Feminist Theory and Praxis), Kathrin Braun, Elisabeth C. Kremer, and Beate Leddin addressed two topics: first, how Erziehungsgeld, coupled with a new law designed to create more flexibility in the job market, worked against the employment of women, and second, whether or not there was a connection between the Wages for Housework movement of the 1970s and the CDU’s proposal for Erziehungsgeld. The authors argued that “behind the noise about the death of the German people lies the insecurity that women are now stronger on the job market and their sacrifice for the family is no longer certain.” 129 Together, Erziehungsgeld, which favored the stay at home care of mothers, and the 1985 Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz (Employment Promotion Law), which attempted to lower unemployment through short-term contracts, “opened the opportunity for employers…to create two unprotected part-time positions out of one protected full-time position.” Braun,

127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
Kremer, and Leddin attempted to uncover the unfavorable results for women in the job market that resulted from policies instituted in the name of higher birthrates.

Rather than just problematize CDU policy within the framework of Christian democratic ideology, the authors suggested “the men of the CDU have conceived how they can make their answers to demands from the women’s movement pragmatically enforceable both economically and for the entire society.” In other words, the authors saw a direct line from the Wages for Housework Movement to Erziehungsgeld. Braun and her coauthors stated very clearly the difference in aim between the two initiatives: Wages for Housework did not aim to reward the reproductive work of women, but rather politicize the private sphere as a means of ending the “patriarchal division of labor and capitalistic society.”

West German feminists entered into a heated debate over the proposal, as documented in chapter one; however, the authors wondered if feminists themselves “with this argumentation in the end prepared the way for the ideological rebirth of feminine productive fortitude and qualities for the conservative feminism of the parties in power, who both conceptually and practically corrupt our feminist beliefs with their Erziehungsgeld and ‘Babyjahr’?”

The authors expressed concern for the future of emancipation for women if strategies were polarized, if the gendered conflict continued to be constructed by the CDU as being between women (housewives versus employed mothers) rather than women working together to end patriarchy. The result was that “women would continue to reconcile family and work and

130 Ibid., 97.

131 Ibid., 100.
remain ready as double workers: as a flexible reserve army for the job market and as unpaid houseworkers.”

**Conclusion**

The final law passed in November 1985 did not deviate much from the original proposal of that September, despite the continuing debate and suggestions for alternative formulations. The amount—600 DM per month—remained the same and both parents were eligible after the three-month Mutterschutz requirement. Also saved was the job protection for the parent who took leave to care for the child. Exceptions, however, could be made in the case of part-time employment either if parents reduced their hours or when parents utilized the *Erziehungsgeld* provision without *Erziehungsurlaub*.

Despite rhetorically representing a more equitable gender division of labor in the home, the bill’s structure supported a male-breadwinner/female part-time earner gendered division of labor. The initiative emerged from a period of CDU revitalization in the 1970s that included promotion of more partnership in the home in order to appeal to the newly-modernized and -emancipated middle-class woman. However, by 1989, only 1.4 percent of fathers took advantage of the *Erziehungsgeld* provision, with 70 percent of those men being unemployed prior to the birth of the child. The provision also negatively affected single

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132 Ibid., 101.

133 “Gesetz über die Gewährung von Erziehungsgeld und Erziehungsurlaub (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz – BerzGG)” Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 58 (1985), 2154-2163.

parents. Because the stipend was capped at 600 DM, if the parent could not cover their living expenses with part-time work of nineteen hours a week, they would have to rely on social assistance.

This chapter has also demonstrated that Erziehungsgeld received intense criticism from autonomous women’s groups and in the press. How did the proposal pass despite this criticism? First and foremost, the CDU women, not a male dominated leadership, devised and then lobbied for this family policy. The CDU women did not want to seriously challenge the conceptualization of the family and the role of parents in the upbringing of the child. Furthermore, the CDU women discussed the proposal within the concept of a conservative definition of emancipation. Second, despite a few anomalies radiating from the West German press, as well as general critiques from the autonomous feminists that could largely be ignored by the CDU as too far left, most criticism of the policy centered on its financing, rather than its reinforcement of the male-breadwinner model. Third, experts associated with the Federal Family Ministry and well as other academics connected declining birthrates with increases in female employment. The fact that a committee of experts guided by the social liberal coalition nonetheless advocated Erziehungsgeld as the solution lent considerable confidence to the CDU in their family policy strategy. So despite considerable contestation against Erziehungsgeld, the CDU was able to successfully pass the measure in 1986.
CONCLUSIONS

The West German Women’s Movement and Family Policy

In their 1999 book *States, Markets, Families*, the sociologists Julia O’Connor, Ann Shola Orloff, and Sheila Shaver defended the importance of the study of the modern welfare state because welfare states:

have been so important in translating the demands of feminist movements and women citizens (and their allies among men) interested in greater gender equality into material social changes and support for the cultural transformations associated with women’s entry into the public spheres of work and politics.¹

Was this the case in West Germany? Only partially so. On the one hand, the politicians who implemented the *Tagesmutter Modellprojekt*, *Mutterschafturlaub*, and even *Erziehungsgeld* recognized the need to alleviate the double burden of employed mothers and offer new possibilities for working mothers to reconcile family and work where few had existed before. On the other hand, the measures reinforced the “male-breadwinner/female-homemaker and part-time earner” gendered division of labor in the home, rather than putting West Germany on the path towards supporting dual-earner households, as was the case in Sweden and France.²


This project argues that this pattern occurred due in part to a lack of coalition among female activists that resulted from strong ideological divisions, even when—at least rhetorically—individuals, groups, and organizations espoused similar goals. While it is difficult to surmise what the outcome would have been with greater coalition building, what is certain a window of opportunity for reform presented itself at the time that women’s activists did not full utilize. Instead, prevailing cultural concepts of childrearing, the economic situation of the 1970s and 1980s, and demographic shifts in birthrates all played an overwhelming role in the perception of the demands of family policy activists and their ability to implement their aims. As this dissertation was arranged by case studies, this conclusion will return to the questions stated in the introduction to tease out the broader arguments.

Advocating Change

(West) Germany has a long tradition of women’s movements dating back to the Kaiserreich, including female activism from within the trade unions and political parties (even while women did not have the vote until the foundation of the Weimar Republic in 1919).³ The experiences of the Third Reich and World War Two, as well as the low

employment rate of women, depoliticized a significant portion of West Germans in comparison to pre-1933. The rise of West German autonomous feminism in the late 1960s, the drastic increase in women’s employment to pre-war levels, and the significant betterment of the education of women resulted in their politicization and the reinvigoration of long established women’s institutional and non-institutional activism. While women were organizing at a grassroots level in ever larger numbers, female membership in the political parties and trade unions increased by the hundreds of thousands and leaders saw the opportunity to advocate for issues related to women.⁴ Annemarie Renger and Elfriede Eilers streamlined the SPD women’s organizations into the AsF. Reform allowed CDU women to successfully lobby for greater power within the party through coalitions with other CDU interest groups. Finally, the DGB took greater notice of women’s issues, even passing a measure that made the long-advocated Sonderurlaub a mission for the entire federation.⁵

The (re)-politicization of West German women resulted in a very lively debate over motherhood, the gendered division of labor, and the reconciliation of family and work.⁶ The

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plethora of solutions and strategies mirrored the diversity of the movement. Groups and individuals associated with the autonomous women’s movement such as the *Aktionsrat der Befreiung der Frau*, the *Frauenforum*, and Gunild Feigenwinter advocated a completely new conception of mothers as individuals, the equal participation of fathers in childrearing duties, and childcare solutions outside the home. Yet, the *Aktionsrat* proceeded by acting outside the intervention of the state, and Feigenwinter openly rejected any collaboration with female politicians in the SPD. The *Frauen Forum* took a different approach, functioning as a kind of lobbying group for feminist interests with local and federal politicians, but the organization was an exception rather than a rule.

Women in the SPD and DGB espoused similar goals in the 1970s regarding the importance of employment in the life course of women and of enacting policies to better reconcile family and work for parents. Programmatic statements emphasized the improvement of childcare outside of the home, particularly full-day options, and parental leave policies to help young parents while ensuring their employment position upon their return to work. For the SPD women, the extension of childcare included children under the age of three; they argued for instance that the *Tagesmütter Modellprojekt* should become a permanent institution. The DGB women, on the other hand, emphasized expanding *Kindergärten* for children aged three to six. They were hesitant, however, to support any


9 Zellmer, “Danke für die Blumen,” 120–121.

family policy beyond a parental leave for children under the age of three, lest it jeopardized their long-standing advocacy for such a measure. The programmatic statements of both organizations indicated their desire to foster the development of a wide range of government programs to aid in the reconciliation of family and work.\textsuperscript{11}

These platforms, however, belied internal divisions within the different women’s organizations, in particular the AsF and DGB Women’s Division. In the AsF, generational conflicts between young Jusos and the older generation of female politicians created complicated relationships, which affected their ability to press the SPD leadership to follow through on their family platform. The new, younger members argued that the older generation of female politicians were corrupted by their years of collaboration with the male leadership, while the older generation in some cases supported the stay-at-home care of children under the age of three by their mothers and worried about the communist associations of supporting the employment of mothers.\textsuperscript{12} In the DGB, the presence of trade unions that represented a wide spectrum of confessional and political affiliations created massive debates at the important Federal Women’s Congresses held every three years.

In contrast, the CDU \textit{Frauenvereinigung}, representing a much sought after constituency after the 1972 election, was able to create and utilize a powerful coalition within the party, one that successfully advocated for \textit{Erziehungsgeld} as the CDU’s main family policy proposal.\textsuperscript{13} The CDU \textit{Frauenvereinigung}, attempting to appeal to the modern middle-


\textsuperscript{13} Wiliarty, \textit{The CDU and the Politics of Gender}, 89.
class housewife, emphasized the equality of housewives with employed mothers. Supporting rather than challenging its party’s conservative stance on family policy, the CDU Frauenvereinigung sought its own definition of women’s emancipation as a choice for mothers between employment and staying at home, believing radical feminists and social democratic women defined emancipation solely through employment. Partnership was vital to the CDU’s understanding of gender relations, but childrearing took precedence over the individual wants of the parents.14

Responses

The responses by the wider autonomous women’s movement, the political parties, and the DGB to challenges from women’s activists in support of a better reconciliation of family and work demonstrate the interconnection between West German family policy, cultural perceptions of gender roles and childrearing practices, economic forces, and West German demographic changes. This was even true among the activists themselves. If autonomous feminists rejected those who advocated a theory of emancipation centered around the mother question, it was perhaps because they saw little challenge to the gender order in their solutions. For instance, the Wages for Housework movement argued for a stipend to be funded by the government to pay for the housework of wives and mothers. The movement had a strong presence in the feminist magazine Courage, but for Alice Schwarzer and members of the socialist women’s movement (to name a few) the proposal did not

significantly challenge the dominant gender role of women as housewives and caregivers.\(^\text{15}\)

The \textit{Kinderlädenbewegung} proved unsustainable as a long-term practical solution to childcare. The half-day hours of operation mirrored that of state-funded childcare and collaborations with men reinforced dominant conceptions of the gendered division of labor with women taking over most of the care of the children. In fact, the anti-authoritarian and anti-institutional strategies of many of the autonomous feminists precluded any serious engagement with politicians and state-funded childcare institutions.

While advocates of solutions to better reconciling family and work met with resistance among autonomous feminists for not doing enough to challenge the male-breadwinner model, women in the SPD and DGB contended with the association of employed mothers with communist family policy and cultural perceptions of mothers as the best caregivers, further reinforced by scientific research. Communism was an “ever present other” in the discussion over family policy. While politicians and trade union activists may not have always explicitly stated the influence of fears of association with East German family policy in their policy decisions, the implication always loomed. The role of mother as the best caregiver was further reinforced by the “motherly deprivation” thesis, best exemplified in the discussion concerning the \textit{Tagesmütter Modellprojekt}. Politicians across the political spectrum internalized the perception that parents in the home best socialized children. Those who attempted to challenge that argument, such as those affiliated with the family ministry in the early to mid-1970s, met strong resistance by Catholic-affiliated

members of their professions, most notably Johannes Pechstein, Theodore Hellbrügge, and Berhard Hassenstein. These three researchers maintained close ties with the CDU and strongly advocated Erziehungsgeld. But even the researchers who challenged the “motherly deprivation” thesis later demonstrated their own support of parents as sole caregivers in the Third Family Report.

Even if politicians and others were willing to consider reform in conceptions of the gendered division of labor and best upbringing practices for infants and toddlers, in their opinion the oil shock recessions of the mid- to late-1970s and subsequent unemployment put into question the government’s funding of expensive family policy and any policy that would allow more women to enter the workforce. Budget concerns were used by the SPD to deflect CDU family policy suggestions and partially explain why the SPD, CDU, and DGB leadership ultimately put their weight behind family policy measures that encouraged temporary employment leave for mothers to care for young children. Members of the press questioned the expense of paying out millions of deutsche marks to families, yet politicians and trade union members publicly demonstrated their awareness that over 50 percent of young mothers who took maternal leave ultimately did not return to employment, thus

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17 BT-Drs. 8/3120


By the early 1980s, the issue of West Germany’s declining birthrate posed another threat that sent perceptions of family policy into a conservative tailspin. The press and feminist journalists again seemed skeptical that encouraging higher birthrates through measures such as \textit{Erziehungs geld} would work—either because the cost did not outweigh the benefit or because journalists and feminists argued that supporting the employment of mothers, not sending them home, was the solution.\footnote{Claudia Pinl. “Erziehungsgeld – ja oder nein?” \textit{Emma} Nr. 8 1977, 23.; “Ein Freijahr für die Mutter,” \textit{Die Zeit} January 12, 1979. Accessed October 8, 2010, http://www.zeit.de/1979/03/Ein-Freijahr-fuer-die-Mutter.} Yet the clear connection between declining birthrates and the increasing employment of women seemed to further encourage family policy solutions among politicians that unburdened mothers by supporting the stay-at-home care of young children.

\textit{Policy Outcomes}

All of these factors, a lack of coalition building among West German women, confrontation with communism, established cultural perceptions of childrearing, economic downturn and transition, and population politics resulted in family policy that represented only a partial change. Rhetorically, the policies discussed in this project represented a step forward in conceptions of gender roles in the family and provided a tangible benefit for
parents where few existed before. Yet in practice the benefits still encouraged mothers to care for their children instead of going to work.21

The Tagesmütter Modellprojekt was the only family policy provision to support the employment of mothers with young children. Yet it was hardly conceived of as a widespread solution, rather a means of ensuring proper socialization of children of mothers who needed to seek paid employment out of financial necessity. In other words, it was a ‘worst case scenario’ resolution that did not challenge the male-breadwinner gendered division of labor. Middle-class women and some autonomous feminists supported Tagesmütter as a profession for stay-at-home mothers, yet it was hardly considered a full-fledged career with requisite pay and insurance benefits (unlike in Sweden).22 The program essentially provided pocket money for nannies under the guise of women’s emancipation. Despite these drawbacks, of all the policies discussed in this project, it was the one that moved furthest towards supporting dual-earner households.23

The maternal leave policy, the only to be considered an employment policy as well as family policy, and Erziehungsgeld both encouraged reconciling family and work, but without allowing freedom of choice between employment and staying home, and mostly only for mothers. The meager financial incentive (750 DM and 600 DM per month respectively) did not offer a significant enough income replacement to allow fathers as the primary breadwinner to take a “baby break.” Thus, mothers took advantage of the subsidy and in many cases did not return to work. Furthermore, opting to return to work was complicated by

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21 See also Kolbe, Elternschaft.


23 See chapter two.
the fact that few additional options existed for children under the age of three. By 1980, *Kinderkrippe* could only accommodate up to 4.5 percent of all West German children under the age of three. By contrast, in East Germany and France, who also offered childrearing subsidies similar to *Erziehungsgeld*, coverage was 40 percent and 36 percent respectively. Parental leave with a job guarantee merely postponed the decision between family and employment. (Part time) employment became more of a possibility after children turned three. By 1980, coverage for three to six year olds jumped to 79 percent, though most facilities were only open half-day.

The history of West Germany’s family policy and the continuity of its character point to three larger lessons regarding the importance of the state in codifying gender equity, the importance of historical actors in a welfare state, and the significance of gender politics. As O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver argued at the beginning of this conclusion, the welfare state and legal system are instrumental in making feminist demands a concrete reality. From suffrage to reproductive rights to family policy, the state carries the legitimacy to codify gender equity at every level of society. To find the importance of the state in prescribing social practice in (West) Germany one need not look any further than family policy. Family policy in the 1970s, 1980s, and now continues to impact the life course and employment

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24 Jürgen Reyer and Heidrun Kleine, *Die Kinderkrippe in Deutschland: Sozialgeschichte einer umstrittenen Einrichtung* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Lambertus, 1997).


habits of women, dictating if a women decides to have children, how many she decides to have, and her type of career.\textsuperscript{27} The case study of the West German welfare state forces us to consider not only whether or not a country has a welfare state, but the significance of the type of welfare state and its impact on its citizens.

The power of the welfare state points to the fact that it is difficult to enact long-term changes without directly confronting the welfare state. This was the missed opportunity for autonomous feminists, women active in political parties, and trade union female activists. The lessons from Sweden and even the CDU women demonstrate that actors do have a say in the creation of the welfare state. The problems arise when those who argue for gender equity in the welfare state cannot set aside ideological differences to push for change. The elements for a more drastic reform in family policy existed in the women’s movement, yet tensions over strategy proved that finding a single voice would be too difficult. The opposite was true in Sweden. Women both inside the government, in trade unions, and in grassroots organizing found a commonality of cause in implementing welfare policies that would translate into mothers having no barriers to pursuing full time employment.\textsuperscript{28} Without a significant challenge to the “male-breadwinner/female homemaker and part-time earner” division of labor reinforced by West German family policy, West German policy makers continued to enact provisions supporting this gendered division of labor in society.

Finally, the debate over family policy in West Germany also points to the overall importance of gender politics, not just as a means to advocate for gender equality, but also its


\textsuperscript{28} Kolbe, \textit{Elternschaft}; Naumann, “Child Care and Feminism in West Germany and Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s.”
importance in reinforcing gender norms. As the case of West Germany demonstrates, West German politicians, trade union activists, journalists, academics, and female activists analyzed significant political, economic, and demographic changes through the lens of gender and its particular impact on the family. Direct confrontation with communism, rising unemployment, and birthrate decline (to name just a few examples) all gave participants in the debate over family policy pause to consider the events’ impacts on the family. This project is yet another important example of how gender norms, gender relations, and the family are not relegated to the private sphere, but are political concepts discussed in the public arena.
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