The Long-Term Consequences of Immigration Politics

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A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science.

Chapel Hill
2010

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Abstract

JAMES E. MONOGAN III: The Long-Term Consequences of Immigration Politics.
(Under the direction of George Rabinowitz.)

This dissertation studies the politics of immigration in the United States over the past two decades and presents three findings. First, it expands upon formal research on elections by considering competition in a dynamic environment of multiple elections. It shows that political parties generally will take an issue position closer to present electoral ideology, but they will move towards a position that may win in the future the more highly they value winning in the future and the less uncertain they are about election outcomes. Second, it asks what shaped immigration policy in the fifty states between 2005 and 2008 and shows that policy is affected primarily by electoral ideology, but also by legislative professionalism and state wealth. Surprisingly, party control of state offices has no effect on immigration policy beyond the consequences of ideology. Third, the dissertation demonstrates how the party identification of various demographic groups in California, Texas, and the United States as a whole moved after the gubernatorial campaigns of Pete Wilson and George W. Bush. Change point analyses of these data indicate that Wilson harmed the Republican coalition in California and the nation, while Bush helped the Texas Republican party. Further, Bush's presidency undid much of the harm Wilson brought on the Republican party among Hispanics.

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Chapter 1

The Puzzle

1.1   A Critical Issue

Immigration is an important issue in American politics because, as a nation of immigrants, the U.S. regularly sees new waves of immigration. With each wave, the nation has faced challenges of economic and cultural integration of the newcomers. Partially out of a need to address these challenges and partially out of opportunism on the part of elected politicians, immigration often is raised as a political issue in response to major surges of migrants.

For example, starting in the 1830s and up to the Civil War, the nation experienced an immigration surge, consisting primarily of Irish and German immigrants. Many people feared that the social change caused by this would threaten jobs and Anglo-Saxon culture. This fear was politicized, leading to the rise of the American Party, or Know-Nothings, which proposed policies such as prohibiting immigrants and Catholics from holding public office and extending the naturalization period from five to twenty-one years (Tindall and Shi 2004, 364-371). In the 1850s, the party gained tangible strength, which included the election of forty members of Congress in 1854 and drawing 21.6 percent of the popular presidential vote in 1856 behind former President Millard

Fillmore (Tindall and Shi 2004, 370 & A76).

Another substantial wave of immigration saw its peak in the first decade of the twentieth century, with new arrivals coming mostly from southern and eastern Europe. Again, nativism became an element of politics. Specifically, Henry Cabot Lodge pushed for the exclusion of illiterate newcomers. Further, Chinese immigration was banned in 1882—temporarily at first, but the ban was extended indefinitely in 1902 and was not repealed until 1943 (Tindall and Shi 2004, 682-688). Thus, past waves of new migrants have produced major political debates.

Today, America again sees a major wave of immigration. As Figure 1.1 shows, the number of new immigrants admitted annually has been on the rise since 1950.[1] The levels of new admissions at the start of the twenty-first century are comparable to those of the major wave at the start of the twentieth century. Figure 1.1 also shows that the number of illegal, deportable immigrants that have been apprehended is as high as it has been since this information was first recorded. What is also intriguing about recent immigration is that the largest numbers have come from Latin America and Asia. Specifically, of new legal admissions in 2008, 43.1 percent came from Latin America and 34.6 percent came from Asia (United States Department of Homeland Security 2009, Table 3).

The relatively high levels of immigration into the United States at present and the fact that this wave is producing a shift in the nation's demographic makeup imply that the current debates over the issue could be of historic importance. To better understand the politics of immigration at this time, then, this dissertation addresses three questions in turn: First, what should shape the behavior of elected officials on an issue for which the ideology of the public is changing over time? Second, what has shaped state-level policy adopted between 2005 and 2008? Finally, to what degree

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[1]The data in Figure 1.1 are from United States Department of Homeland Security (2009).

Figure 1.1: **Number of admitted legal immigrants and arrested illegal immigrants by year**

have differing strategies on immigration influenced party coalitions? The chapters in this dissertation answer each question in turn in the following ways:

1.1.1 Formal Model

To get a full sense of the strategic considerations elites face, I develop in Chapter 2 a game that represents the self-placement decisions facing parties. The game has two key features. First, it conceives of one of the two parties as advantaged. Including the advantage term as a key component of the model makes substantive sense because real elections often feature a party that is associated with some non-ideological consideration, like scandal or a good economy. Further, valence is known to produce interesting results like partisan ideological dispersion. Second, the game assumes an issue on which the median voter can be expected to move in a known direction over time. Such movement in public ideology seems more likely to apply to certain types of issues, rather than to overall ideology. Nevertheless, if elites have a strong reason to suspect that sentiment on an issue will change in the future, either because of demographic projections (as is the case with immigration) or emerging information (such as long term health care costs or environmental danger), then projected movement should serve as an important concern for strategy. The *a priori* intuition is that the advantaged party is in a better position to pursue long-term strategic behavior than the disadvantaged party, but how that works out in a formal setting needs to be determined.

As it turns out, the features of this model create complex, insoluble utility functions. Therefore, Chapter 2 finds solutions to the game and comparative statics through simulations. With a sense of which parameters influence behavior, and how they influence it, these results offer heuristic insight on what makes rational sense for parties to do when facing long versus short term trade-offs and can even yield expectations for empirically modeling elite behavior.

1.1.2   State Legislative Behavior

In Chapter 3, I seek to learn how strategic political considerations by elected officials shape policy on the immigration issue. To do this, I empirically analyze legislation in the fifty U.S. states from 2005 to 2008. Although politicians at the national level are often the subjects of attention in studies of elite behavior, state-level actors are potentially even more interesting for understanding elected politicians' strategies on an issue. Different states present different political environments, which means that the factors state-level actors consider in strategic decision-making can vary more than they do among national-level actors. In the case of immigration, then, there should be an abundance of legislators who determine that hostility to immigrants is a worthwhile strategy, while others favor a more friendly approach.

The states passed a substantial 537 immigration-related laws from 2005 to 2008. In Chapter 3, I model the overall tone of immigration policy in the states as a function of electoral ideology, legislative professionalism, state economy, institutional partisanship, and percent foreign born. Using structural equations with latent variables, I show that the prime predictors of policy outcomes are electoral ideology, legislative professionalism, and state wealth. These results imply that politicians are responsive to electoral desires, but are also more likely to be welcoming to immigrants if they are more career-oriented.

1.1.3   State-Level Partisanship

To test the presumption that politicizing immigration has long-term electoral consequences, Chapter 4 examines party identification in California, Texas, and the nation as a whole. California and Texas are desirable to study because they both have large and growing Latino populations, yet the Republican party has taken sharply different

stands on the immigration issue in the two states.[2] The contrast is clear in 1994, when Pete Wilson was re-elected governor in California atop the anti-immigrant platform of proposition 187, while George W. Bush, who took a conciliatory tone on immigration, was elected governor of Texas.

To test whether these different strategies actually had a differential influence on party coalitions, party identification by race is studied in each of the states with survey data both before and after 1994. This offers a critical test: If the over-time shift in Latino partisanship is essentially the same between California and Texas, then state-level party strategies do not have a substantial long-term effect as the electorate changes. However, if Californian Latinos show a stronger movement toward the Democratic party than Texas Latinos or Latinos across the nation, then perhaps elite behavior is having a consequence on party identification.

1.2   Long-Term Research Agenda

These three studies of the politics of immigration also fit into a broad, theoretical research agenda. In this agenda, I ask: What motivates elites' position-taking and rhetorical strategies? What are the consequences of this elite behavior on the electorate? The idea that politicians are single-minded seekers of re-election was most clearly voiced by Mayhew (1974), but also is important for Downs's (1957) theory of how parties choose their policy positions. The explanatory power of such a simple assumption has made "the electoral connection" arguably the most central axiom of research in American politics. Nevertheless, the view is excessively narrow. Fenno (1973), for instance, explains how members of Congress sought their committee assignments based

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[2]As of July 2006, Hispanics accounted for 35.9% of California's state population and 35.7% of Texas's (U.S. Census Bureau 2007, table 18). Another important quality of these states is that they are large enough to yield reasonable survey samples regularly, thereby making it possible to construct good time series of partisanship in each state by race.

on differing goals for what they hoped to accomplish with their committee work: be that influence over important policy, a desire to gain internal Congressional power, or the wish to secure benefits for the home district ahead of the next election. The motivation for re-election, however, is widely believed to hold the greatest weight because retaining office is essential to pursuing further policy or prestige.

The strategic behavior of election-seeking politicians spans across a variety of tools, including position-taking, rhetoric, and heresthetic.[3] The goals politicians have as office-holders should generally dictate which of these tools they choose to use and how they plan to use them in order to win re-election in a way that does not undermine their long-term purpose. For example, a politician desiring to enact his or her preference on a certain policy may rely heavily on a rhetorical strategy to persuade the public to support his or her position. On the other hand, a party that is consistently on the losing side of an issue may try to raise another dimension of the issue to build a more electable coalition—a heresthetic maneuver designed to change the way people think about the issue itself.

To get a broad sense of how politicians strategically use these tools, my long-term research agenda will study behavior on a wide array of issues. For example, the issue of health care will serve as part of this agenda because it falls into the less understood category of "hard" issues. In contrast to easy issues, which people can readily offer opinions on, hard issues are those for which some knowledge of this issue is required for a meaningful opinion (Carmines and Stimson 1989). For politicians who wish to influence policy on these issues, the dilemma is how to build a legislative coalition and gain support from a generally uninterested public that is unlikely to process or respond to proposals on complex policy. Future research will argue that health care offers an

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[3] "Heresthetic" being a term coined by Riker to describe politicians' attempts to manipulate the political world in their favor (Riker 1996). This contrasts from reacting with the best possible response to the given political world, as is presumed with position-taking and rhetoric.

interesting opportunity to study the heresthetic moves of politicians. In particular, I will argue that politicians needing to build a large coalition to enact policy will define an issue in wonkish terms, while opponents of new policy will define an issue with symbolism. Here, then, is an issue that will help to explain the behavior of policy-minded elites.

Hence, the larger, ongoing argument is that considering the electoral connection in a broader light can reveal more about the nature of strategic behavior among politicians and yield a better causal understanding of a wide range of actions elites regularly take than would a narrow view. Further, the kinds of behavior that make sense for one kind of issue may not make sense for another, even though politicians in each situation are election-minded. For each issue, the research goal will be to explain short term elite behavior, but in a context that incorporates the long-term consequences of strategic behavior. For example, do policy-minded politicians successfully implement their preferred programs regarding hard issues? Can mass-level partisanship shift as a consequence of the way one party raises a new issue?

1.2.1 Immigration in the Theoretical Paradigm

Immigration is a good issue to study in this broader research agenda because election-minded politicians must be mindful of their political futures and whether their present position on immigration might alienate them with a growing demographic group. Studying strategic elite behavior on immigration should speak to other issues for which public sentiment will change in a known way. America's growing Latino population implies that the distribution of immigration opinion is changing, but other issues may also have predictable movements in sentiment. The environment, for example, is an issue for which the problems of current policy are abundantly clear to experts. Hence, as the public learns more about the dangers of carbon emissions, the contamination

of potable water, and other environmental hazards, it only will become more pro-environmental. Hence, rational elites ought to take into consideration this anticipated electoral movement when they decide on their environmental policy positions, just as I maintain they should on their immigration positions. A second issue that can shift in an easily-anticipated direction over time is civil rights. Historically, as citizens become aware of injustices in society, the public becomes increasingly sympathetic to the wronged group and seek rectification of the wrong. Thus, politicians who face decisions about gay rights or English-only laws should recognize the historical trend that civil rights issues gradually gain public support, and they should plan accordingly. In all, public sentiment changes in an easily-predicted way on many issues, so understanding how politicians will behave when anticipating changing opinion bears importance.

A second reason to study elite behavior on immigration is it can lead to greater understanding of electoral coalition-building. Past research clearly shows how policy behavior among elites influences which constituencies will vote for them and that several actions, such as promoting wedge issues, are often taken for electoral gain.[4] Immigration is an issue that can mobilize constituencies such as nativists and Latinos, but when does it make strategic sense to do so? In all, this project ought to provide a clearer sense of the relationship between elected politicians and the mass public on an issue for which public sentiment can be expected to trend in a clear direction over time.

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[4]In particular, the party realignment literature considers a wide range of coalition-building behavior parties take (Aldrich 1983; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Layman 2001; Miller and Schofield 2003; Sundquist 1983).

Chapter 2

Strategic Party Placement with a Dynamic Electorate

2.1 Introduction

How do political parties place themselves ideologically if their behavior has contradictory short- and long-term electoral consequences? Strategic politicians are likely to consider how the world around them is changing and what their behavior means for future electoral prospects, but most of the formal literature on party competition in elections focuses on single-shot elections. Of the research that does consider repeated elections, much of it focuses on the policies politicians enact once in office, showing that in some cases policy-motivated parties or candidates will take divergent strategies.[1] Additionally, some studies consider how candidates should place themselves if they need to win a primary and a general election with a sticky issue position. Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) consider a version of this game that is soluble if the candidate has a prior belief about his or her opponent's issue position, while Coleman (1972) shows

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[1] For a review of the articles on policy-motivated candidates in repeated elections, see Osborne (1995, 285-288).

results when conditions occur that lead the candidate to worry only about winning the primary. This article adds a new perspective to strategic placement by considering how parties should place themselves when their positions are sticky and they compete in multiple general elections. Placing political parties in this context of multiple elections would facilitate understanding of the actions of forward-looking parties that simply want to win elections. This paper reports how rational parties should behave in this situation.

The model that I investigate has three essential features. First, the median voter in the electorate changes positions in a predictable way over two elections. Second, in the first of the two elections one of the parties has an advantage based on valence factors.[2] Third, the position the party adopts is fixed across the two elections. The model has two features that are common to spatial voting models. I assume that any issue based advantage that accrues to one party over the other is based on the relative proximity of the parties (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957). Voters prefer parties that are closer.[3] The model also allows for a discounting of the second election compared to the first. Utility in all cases derives from winning office rather than any intrinsic reward based on ideology.

The three potentially controversial features are all motivated by an interest in understanding rational behavior in a dynamic environment. The fact that the median changes in a predictable way is the driving element of the model. For this question to be interesting, parties must necessarily be constrained by past position. Certainly

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[2]Stokes defines a valence advantage as an issue that involves "the linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate" (1963, 373).

[3]See appendix 4.3 for similar results from the directional model of voter utility (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). The results are worth considering because much research shows that the proximity model fails to meet empirical expectations (Macdonald, Rabinowitz and Listhaug 1998; Rabinowitz 1978) or that empirical models cannot discern between the proximity and directional model (Lewis and King 2000).

there is ample evidence that parties do not change positions easily, at least in mass perception, and when they do it is often costly.[4] The final feature, valence advantage in the first election, is introduced to give the model empirical credibility and provide a natural rationale for party divergence: a significant body of research demonstrates how valence advantages can promote divergent strategies in party ideological self-placement (Adams, Merrill and Grofman 2005; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Groseclose 2001; Macdonald and Rabinowitz 1998; Schofield 2003). Thus, the goal is to present a meaningful, yet reasonable and tractable model for understanding the ideological motivation of parties in dynamic environments.

What is the best strategy for a party to take in these situations? Does the optimal strategy differ between a party with a valence advantage and one with a disadvantage? This article explains how rational parties should react to the strategic considerations of dynamic issues like these. Section 2.2 takes the assumptions just described, formally defines a deterministic model, and explains the results. Because a hard-to-interpret result emerges with the deterministic game, section 2.3 makes the case for a stochastic model and reports equilibrium behavior and comparative statics found through a simulation-based analysis. Finally, the substantive importance of the findings is discussed.

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[4]Noteworthy is that the American National Election Studies have been collecting data on the perceived positions of the Democratic and Republican parties on a limited number of issues since 1972, and these positions have been remarkably stable.

2.2 A Deterministic Model

To formalize the assumptions, for the first and second election the median voter, m_t, evaluates each of the parties as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_{m_t}(A) &= -(m_t - \theta_A)^2 + V_t \text{ where } [V_1 = V > 0, V_2 = 0] \qquad (2.1) \\
U_{m_t}(D) &= -(m_t - \theta_D)^2
\end{aligned}
$$

Here, U represents the utility a voter gets from a certain party winning the election. t is the time of the election (1 for present, 2 for future). The two parties the voter evaluates are an advantaged party (A) and a disadvantaged party (D). Because A is the advantaged party, the median voter in the first election (m_1) adds V, a positive and constant non-ideological utility, to his or her evaluation of A. Again, the assumption is that a valence advantage will not persist over time, so V is zero and the valence term drops out in the second election. Lastly, the utility of ideological proximity is the negative squared distance between the voter's ideal point and the position taken by each party; θ_A & θ_D represent the issue positions staked-out by the advantaged and disadvantaged party, respectively. In each of the elections, the median voter will elect the party from which it receives a higher utility.

The principal result is that there is only a pure strategy equilibrium if the valence advantage is so large in the first election that the advantaged party can adopt position m_2, the median voter's position in the second election, while still being assured of winning the first election. Figure 2.1 shows the intuition as to why this is the case. In each panel, the horizontal line represents issue space from liberal at left to conservative at right. θ_A & θ_D are the positions taken by each party and m_1 & m_2 are the ideal points of the median voters in the first and second election.[5] Panel 2.1(a) shows how

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[5]We can assume that zero is the midpoint between the two parties without loss of generality.

(a) No valence

A preferred | D preferred

θ_A θ_D

m_2 0 m_1

(b) Small valence

A preferred | D preferred

θ_A θ_D

m_2 0 m_1

(c) Large valence

A preferred | D preferred

θ_A θ_D

m_2 0 m_1

Figure 2.1: Division of voters by valence advantage

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voters in this space will make their decisions in the first election if there is no valence advantage. Since the bisector lies halfway between the two parties, anyone on the liberal side votes for A, and anyone on the conservative side votes for D. This is the case where vote choice is driven purely by proximity. Panel 2.1(b) shows the case when there is a valence advantage that is small relative to the difference between median ideal points. Because voters receive a constant, non-ideological utility from choosing A, some voters more proximate to D will actually choose A. In panel 2.1(b), any voter left of the vertical, dashed line chooses A over D.[6] As the next panel illustrates, holding the parties' positions constant, an increase in valence increases the advantaged party's vote share. In fact, panel 2.1(c) shows how voters divide in the first election when the valence is large relative to the movement over time of the median voter.[7] In this case the advantaged party can adopt the position of the second median voter, guaranteeing victory in the first election and no worse than a 50-50 chance in the second election. The disadvantaged party, with no chance in the first election, will also adopt the second median to ensure a 50-50 chance in that election. Neither party can do anything to improve its result in either election, which leads to observation 1:

Observation 1 *Whenever the valence advantage is large relative to movement in the median voter's ideal point, both parties will place themselves at the future median voter's ideal point.*[8]

Alternatively, in the case with a small valence relative to the movement in the

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Wherever the parties place themselves, simply adding a constant to the scale will not affect relative proximity. Having zero to be the midpoint simplifies the math.

[6]Any voter with an ideal point less than $\frac{V}{2(\theta_D - \theta_A)}$ will choose A. Hence, $\frac{V}{2(\theta_D - \theta_A)}$ defines the vertical, dashed line that separates the A and D voters.

[7]Specifically, when $V > (m_1 - m_2)^2$.

[8]Observations 1 & 2 are formally proved as propositions 1 & 2 in the appendix on formal derivaton of results.

median, party D can win the first election if party A positions itself to the optimal position for the second median. This is illustrated in panel 2.1(b). Party A will win the second election in this case, but by moving, it could win the first election. Since present elections are more valuable than future ones, A will move closer to m_1. But if A places itself closer to the first median voter, then D would like to move closer to m_2 to at least win the future election. But if D does this, A would like to move back to m_2 because it can win both elections there if D is close to m_2. D would be dissatisfied if both parties played close to m_2, so it would move back to its original position (m_1) to win the first election, completing a cycle of strategies. This logic of instability motivates observation 2:

Observation 2 *Whenever valence is small relative to the ideological movement of the median, there is no stable set of party positions.*[9]

2.3   A Stochastic Version of the Game

Since the deterministic game only has a pure strategy equilibrium if one party has a very large non-ideological advantage in the present election, the parties would have to take a mixed strategy to find an equilibrium. Since parties' issue positions are announced publicly to the voters, they are also highly visible to the opposing party. It therefore would be difficult to substantively interpret probabilistic party issue placement. This article will keep with the trend of other spatial research by focusing on pure strategy equilibria.[10]

In particular, this article looks for pure party strategies in a model where voters vote probabilistically. In fact, a number of studies show more stable equilibria for

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[9]Specifically, if $V \leq (m_1 - m_2)^2$.

[10]To illustrate the norm in the spatial literature, Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005) describe cases without a fixed point equilibrium as lacking an equilibrium.

probabilistic voting models than the often fragile results of deterministic voting models (Coughlin and Nitzan 1981; Ledyard 1984; McKelvey 1975; Wittman 1995). Probabilistic voting is possible if there is a stochastic element of utility. This notion is natural to politics because some last-minute news event or the way a candidate's campaign is perceived could influence voters' choices.[11] However, politicians cannot anticipate this effect ahead of time, so a random draw from a probability distribution is added to voters' utility from each party. The ultimate result is that the parties face uncertainty in the election outcome and can only hope to maximize their probability of winning an election. Nothing is guaranteed.

Under this model, the median voter in each election evaluates the parties as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_{m_t}(A) &= -(m_t - \theta_A)^2 + V_t + \epsilon_{At} \text{ where } [V_1 = V > 0, V_2 = 0] \qquad (2.2) \\
U_{m_t}(D) &= -(m_t - \theta_D)^2 + \epsilon_{Dt}
\end{aligned}
$$

The equations of 2.2 are the same as those of equation 2.1, with the addition that each ϵ represents utility coming from a stochastic draw from a probability distribution.[12] With probabilistic election results, parties' expected utilities become the sum of utilities from winning, weighted by the probability of winning. Solving for a closed-form solution with such utility functions is impossible.[13] Hence, the remainder of this article searches

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[11]Several studies offer justifications for probabilistic voting, including Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell (1990), Hinich (1977), & Hinich and Munger (1994). For a review, see Mueller (2003).

[12]Specifically, they are drawn from a standard Gumbel distribution. This distribution looks like a skewed normal and is chosen because the resulting probability that voter m_t will vote for a party in a given election has a standard logistic distribution.

[13]Specifically, party A's expected utility is $\Lambda_1(\theta_A, \theta_D) + \delta\Lambda_2(\theta_A, \theta_D)$, where δ is the value of the future election, and Λ_1 & Λ_2 are different logistic distribution functions. Solving for the maximum of this equation would require solving for the parties' behavior parameters in a sum of transcendental functions. This is algebraically impossible, so the game does not yield a closed-form equation for a party's optimal response. This problem would emerge with several probability distributions besides logistic, including the normal distribution.

for equilibria by following a growing trend of using computer simulations to analyze insoluble games.[14] In particular, this analysis searches for equilibria based on fixed values of the game's parameters.[15]

2.3.1 Results

The most surprising result of this stochastic model is that parties never diverge from each other. This contrasts from the aforementioned models of voting behavior with a valence advantage, which show that valence causes parties to take differing positions (Adams, Merrill and Grofman 2005; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Groseclose 2001; Macdonald and Rabinowitz 1998; Schofield 2003). It also is surprising because some of the literature on competition in repeated elections shows incentives for divergent positions (Alesina 1988; Harrington 1992). In fact, even though a general solution cannot be found to this game, it can be proved that the parties will match in any equilibrium. Intuitively, if the parties take different positions, then each party can improve its expected utility by moving towards the other party's position. Since there is an incentive for parties to change strategies when they do not match, we have the intuition behind observation 3:

Observation 3 *Any equilibrium is characterized by the feature that the parties will take the same issue stance, whatever that stance may be.*[16]

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[14]For an accessible introduction to the utility of analyzing games without an analytic solution, see Miller and Page (2007).

[15]For treatments manipulating the values of δ (future discount), V (valence advantage), and s (the logistic scale parameter), the behavior of both parties is varied from -1 to 1 in increments of 0.001. Considering this discrete strategy set, rather than a continuous strategy space, a program reports the Nash equilibrium for each treatment. Simulations were done in R 2.6.1 for Red Hat Linux on UNC's Emerald computing cluster (R Development Core Team 2008). The simulation code is available from the author; at the time of writing, example code can be found at `http://www.unc.edu/~monogan/research/variance_SIMULATIONS_1000.R`. The program should work for any version of R that includes the S4 class of objects.

[16]The formal proof in the appendix on formal derivation of results, called proposition 3, more

In addition to convergence, the simulations show that party behavior responds to the value of the future election and the amount of uncertainty parties face in electoral outcomes, but valence advantage only has a marginal effect. In particular, parties will converge to a position near the first election's median voter, but as the value that the parties place on the second election rises, approaching the value of the first election, the parties place themselves farther from the present median voter to be closer to the future median voter. Furthermore, the parties' position is more sensitive to the value of the future election when there is less variance in the stochastic element of voter utility, with the parties making bigger moves towards the future median voter for each increase in the discount parameter. Substantively, this means that the less uncertain parties are about election outcomes, the more they will play to win in the future. Lastly, a larger valence advantage leads parties to place themselves marginally closer to the future median voter, though the effect increases somewhat if the value of the future election (δ) is higher or if the variance of voters' stochastic utility is higher.

The Nash equilibria for all treatments are reported in table 2.1. Table 2.1 shows the equilibria as the variance of voters' stochastic utility terms, the discounting for the second election (δ), and the valence advantage (V) are varied. In all treatments, median voters' ideal points in each of the two elections (m_1 & m_2) are held constant. Each cell is the Nash equilibrium of the treatment resulting from the corresponding values of variance, discount (δ), and valence (V), first reporting the behavior of party A, then the behavior of D.

Notice that as the value of the future election (δ) increases, parties place themselves closer to the future median. Equilibrium positions range from the present median voter's ideal point (0.700, 0.700) whenever the future election has no value to a position

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specifically compares matching strategies to those in which a party diverges from the other party. It shows that whenever one party takes a position off of the other party's position, then the other party can force the first into a worse position than it would receive from matching.

Table 2.1: Nash Equilibria by Stochastic Variance, Discounting Factor, and Valence Advantage

Variance	Discount (δ)	Valence (V)			
		0.1	0.6	1.0	1.5
Large	0.0	0.700, 0.700	0.700, 0.700	0.700, 0.700	0.700, 0.700
	0.1	0.627, 0.627	0.621, 0.621	0.610, 0.610	0.585, 0.585
	0.5	0.423, 0.423	0.417, 0.417	0.389, 0.389	0.335, 0.335
	0.9	0.321, 0.321	0.303, 0.303	0.273, 0.273	0.219, 0.219
Medium	0.0	0.700, 0.700	0.700, 0.700	0.700, 0.700	0.700, 0.700
	0.1	0.515, 0.515	0.500, 0.500	0.479, 0.479	0.432, 0.432
	0.5	0.220, 0.220	0.203, 0.203	0.175, 0.175	0.128, 0.128
	0.9	0.116, 0.116	0.100, 0.100	0.080, 0.080	0.045, 0.045
Small	0.0	0.700, 0.700	0.700, 0.700	0.700, 0.700	0.700, 0.700
	0.1	0.400, 0.400	0.383, 0.383	0.354, 0.354	0.299, 0.299
	0.5	0.100, 0.100	0.087, 0.087	0.066, 0.066	0.033, 0.033
	0.9	0.025, 0.025	0.016, 0.016	0.002, 0.002	-0.020,-0.020

Note: Each cell entry lists θ_A, θ_D in the strategy profile of a simulated Nash equilibrium. $m_1 = 0.7$ & $m_2 = -0.1$. Large variance: $\sigma^2 = \pi^2/3$; medium variance: $\sigma^2 = \pi^2/27$; small variance: $\sigma^2 = \pi^2/108$.

that is closer to the future median voter than it is the present median voter (-0.020, -0.020) when the variance of voters' stochastic utility term is small, the future election is 90% as valuable as the present election, and there is a large valence advantage. Notice too that valence has little impact on the equilibrium. In any case when the second election has any value ($\delta > 0$), the parties place themselves a little closer to the future median as valence increases, and this effect gets bigger as the value of the second election increases. To a very slight degree, the effect of valence on equilibrium movement is greater in the higher variance case. Overall, though, valence does little to influence party behavior.

2.4 Conclusion

Although research has shown that some of this model's features, such as sequential elections and a valence advantage, lead parties to take different issue stances, this model with sticky party positions and probabilistic voting leads parties to adopt the same position. So for both the equilibrium case in the deterministic game and in all cases in the stochastic game, the traditional Hotelling-Downs result of party convergence in a single issue dimension holds, though the parties often match at an off-median position. The stochastic model also shows that the position at which parties match is closer to the future median voter the more certain the parties are about the outcome of the present election. When the variance of the stochastic utility term is large, leaving more to chance, the parties are more inclined to stay close to the present median. With a smaller stochastic variance or a larger valence advantage term, the outcome of the present election is more certain, so parties have more of an incentive to cheat towards the future median voter and influence the future election, which is decided strictly by ideology. This movement becomes even stronger when there is a greater reward for winning the future election, which emerges when the discounting factor increases.

So how might these results be applied to understanding real politics? Several issues are likely to fit the dynamic described in this game. One of these issues is immigration. Much anti-immigrant discourse has an anti-Latino feel to it. So even if some elites want to push a strict view on immigration without an anti-Latino message, prior discourse might make it difficult to separate ethnic considerations from the immigration issue. Taking a strong anti-immigrant stance might win over voters who hold an anti-Latino sentiment, and this strategy could make a substantial contribution to winning a plurality of voters in the short term. However, the growing Latino population, which will surely overtake the number of voters with anti-Latino sentiments, likely will react unfavorably to such a position in the long term. Immigration, therefore, provides an

example of an issue for which public ideology is changing on account of demographic change.

Another example is the environment, for which the problems of current policy are abundantly clear to experts. As the public learns more about the dangers of global warming, scarce potable water, and other environmental hazards, it can only become more pro-environmental. Rational elites might have short-term electoral success by arguing the merits of less green policies for jobs and businesses. However, they also ought to consider future electoral movement when they choose their environmental policy positions. For example, they might promote policies such as offshore drilling to fill petrol-based energy demands and thereby win popular support today. However, future voters who will be more aware of the consequences of carbon emissions likely will punish parties who have advocated such positions in the past. Therefore, the environment is an issue for which public ideology ought to change due to an information flow.

So what positions will candidates for office take on issues like immigration and the environment? To start, party institutions are more likely to be concerned with party prospects in future elections than individual candidates are. Therefore, in instances where parties have more levers of control over the issue stances adopted by their candidates, the positions ought to be more future-oriented than instances when parties have fewer control mechanisms over candidates. For example, places with stronger parties are more likely to have candidates who are welcoming on immigration and who favor environmental regulations. Since both parties ought to converge to the same position, we also would expect to see more policy action that is future-oriented in constituencies with stronger parties. Similarly, the equilibrium from the deterministic game showed that with a large valence advantage, parties ought to converge to a position favorable

to the future electorate, and the stochastic game showed a moderate increase in future-oriented position taking as valence advantage increases. Therefore, in elections where the leading candidate at the start of the election has a larger lead or when incumbents enter an election with an economy that is over- or underperforming to a great degree, we ought to see the candidates taking more future-oriented positions than in elections where the frontrunner has a smaller lead or economic growth is moderate.

A final use of this model would be to take a new look at optimal strategies ahead of primary elections. As the aforementioned literature on primaries notes, the structure of an election with primaries is similar to the game just considered: candidates want to win two elections, the median voter in a general election has a different ideal point from the median voter in a primary constituency, and candidates are likely stuck with the positions they take in the primaries because flip-flopping is not credible in the span of a few months.[17] So whether analyzing issues with clear trends in the electorate or primary politics, understanding the placement of sticky party positions can be useful for several real political questions.

Of course, models are inherently limited. The formal assumptions at best only modestly match real world dynamics. What models accomplish, however, is a means to analyze the fundamental strategic logic of a particular context—in this case party and candidate placement on issues that change in known directions.

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[17]The major change from this article's game would be that the winners of two separate elections would compete in a general election, but utility is only awarded for winning the general election.

Chapter 3

The Politics of Immigration Policy in the Fifty U.S. States from 2005-2008

Between 2005 and 2008, all fifty American states enacted at least one law on immigration, with 537 laws being enacted across all states. This flood of state-level action came at a time when immigrants from Asia and Latin America arrived at a steady pace, a large number of whom entered illegally. With the failure of proposed immigration reform in the U.S. Senate in 2007, an issue that substantially lends itself to resolution at the federal level remained largely unresolved. The states therefore were forced to cope with a large population of undocumented residents, providing social services to immigrants, and incorporating newcomers into the workforce. Immigration quickly emerged as a salient, important issue. On such an important issue, what shaped state-level

policy at this time?

3.1 Theory

The goal of this article is to understand the scope and tone of immigration policy from 2005-2008 and how state-level factors influenced these qualities. Since laws are made by legislators, thinking about legislators' actions is necessary to understand the process behind a state's overall policy. Therefore, this article considers how ambitious politicians will react to their environment when crafting policy related to immigration. This microtheory is used to develop hypotheses about how state-level attributes will influence state policy tone.

The state legislators and governors who enact new immigration laws must stand for re-election, so it stands to reason that they will enact legislation they feel is electorally viable. While many politicians who propose legislation on immigration are almost certainly concerned with making good policy, it is doubtful that even highly policy-motivated politicians are entirely insensitive to electoral fall-off. The most straightforward extension of the electoral connection is that lawmakers' behavior ought to reflect their constituents' desires, either because voters elect lawmakers of like-minded ideology or because officeholders pander to the ideological wishes of the public. Therefore, it is hypothesized that as the public opinion of a state becomes more liberal, immigration laws should be more welcoming in nature and less hostile towards new immigrants.[1] A finding consistent with this hypothesis would resemble the patterns in state policy found by research including Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993), the seminal work on

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[1]This theory naturally draws from Mayhew (1974), who made the most prominent case that legislators' behavior is based on the electoral connection. In terms of the ideological tone of immigration, Citrin et al. (1990) demonstrates that citizens' votes on California proposition 63 were primarily a function of political ideology and partisanship, ostensibly because this English-only policy is primarily symbolic. Therefore, electorally-sensitive politicians ought to respond to public ideology in the laws they create.

state opinion-policy congruence.

In addition to a direct relationship between opinion and policy, such as Erikson, Wright and McIver observed, opinion may affect policy indirectly through the partisanship of lawmakers. Although party lines on the immigration issue are not as clear as for several issues, Democratic officeholders are typically more immigrant-friendly than Republicans, who more commonly take harsh public stances on the issue.[2] If state-level officeholders advance the agenda of their respective parties' images, then Democratic governors and legislatures are more likely than Republicans to adopt immigration policy that is more welcoming in its overall tone. If conservative states are more likely to elect Republicans, while liberal states are more likely to elect Democrats, then public ideology can influence lawmakers' party, while party influences policy. Given the multiple ways public sentiment can influence policy, as well as prior research on its importance, ideology is *a priori* believed to be the most important influence on immigration policy. However, while immigration may behave similarly to other policy areas in this regard, the group politics associated with the immigration issue raises the potential for unique influences on the policy process.

For example, it is important to consider that a politically winning strategy on the issue at present may hurt candidates and parties in the future. How, for instance, should the size of the foreign-born population specifically—and ethnic minorities such as Latino and Asian Americans generally—influence what policies make electoral sense? On one hand, a large foreign-born population with a different racial or ethnic background from a group that forms an electoral majority allows politicians the opportunity to use the foreign-born group as scapegoats for a variety of social problems. By blaming such problems on the out-group (in the current immigration context, likely Latino or Asian

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[2]Fetzer (2006) analyzes a 2005 vote in the U.S. House of Representatives on a 700-mile border fence, and shows that Republican legislators were significantly more likely to vote in favor even when partialling-out for region, district demographics, and member characteristics.

Americans) and proposing policies to curb immigration or otherwise diminish the status of the out-group, politicians may garner support from the in-group (white voters, in most constituencies). This strategy would resemble the politics of racial threat that Key (1949) explains was used so prominently in the south. Several have argued that this group-based strategy was embraced by California Governor Pete Wilson in promoting proposition 187 in 1994 (Diamond 1996; Nicholson 2005; Whalen 2002). Although this strategy could make electoral sense in the short-run, Latinos and Asians are growing as a proportion of the population, so each group will represent a larger voting bloc in the future. By making policies that are hostile to immigrants now, candidates and parties risk being seen as anti-Latino or anti-Asian in the future. As legislators enact policy, when will they do so with an eye to the future and when will they be myopic? Further, what do these differences in legislative behavior mean for overall state policy?

Because the focus of this work is state-level, any assessment of time perspective must compare states where member legislators are more likely to be short-sighted to states where legislators are more likely to be far-sighted. Legislative professionalism is a predictor that ought to separate states in this way. Indeed, several studies have shown that legislative professionalism leads politicians to become more career-oriented: Berry, Berkman and Schneiderman (2000) argues that legislative professionalism provides incentives and capacity for members to pursue a long legislative career. For this reason, members of professional legislatures win re-election more frequently than members of non-professional legislatures, and their chances of success are less sensitive to external factors, such as coattail effects.

Additionally, Maestas (2000) argues that professional legislatures attract more members with progressive ambition, or the desire to advance to higher office in a long political career. Finally, Maestas, Maisel and Stone (2005) shows that members of professional state legislatures are significantly more likely to be recruited as candidates

for the U.S. Congress than those of less professional legislatures. All of which suggests that the time horizon for policy makers in states with professional legislatures is longer, so policy in these states ought to reflect longer-term electoral considerations.[3]

The economy of a state is another factor that may influence immigration policy because lawmakers might respond to the economic concerns of their constituents when adopting policy. To start, literature has shown that the economy is a crucial consideration in public opinion and policy about immigration (Alvarez and Butterfield 2000; Hopkins 2008; Martin 1990; Yohai 2007). As the state unemployment level increases, overall immigration policy ought to become more hostile as policy makers discourage adding new workers to a workforce that lacks jobs, which ought to resonate better with a large block of voters who need a job or fear they may lose their own.

On the other hand, with respect to the economy, the larger a state's per capita Gross State Product (GSP) is, the more welcoming state policy ought to be. State wealth can capture several possible influences on policy: First, in wealthier states, the state's median voter is less likely to hold a job that might be threatened by unskilled laborers. Second, wealthier states more easily can afford the welfare-related costs of new residents. Third, wealthier states may need to use new unskilled laborers for jobs that residents are unwilling to do. In all, then, welcoming immigration policy ought to be easier for lawmakers to sell to wealthier constituents, so policy should be more welcoming in wealthy states.

Lastly, it is worth considering how immigrants as a portion of the population may

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[3]An alternative argument might be that professionalism could have an effect that is conditional on ideology. This may be because long-term demographic shifts matter more among liberals or because responding to public ideology is more important to career-oriented politicians. In principle, this idea could be tested with an interaction between ideology and professionalism in the estimated model presented in the results section. However, due in part to the small number of observations, such a model failed to converge. It seems doubtful, anyway, that politicians of either party would be unconcerned with long-run demographic trends, if they desire a long career. Hence, a single main effect on professionalism ought to be a useful evaluation of politicians' timeline.

influence policy. From 2000 to 2006, the number of Hispanic or Latino Americans increased 25.5% (U.S. Census Bureau 2007, Table 8). Hence, several states have seen a marked rise in Hispanics both in sheer numbers and as a percentage of the population. Whenever a minority group grows like the Hispanic population has, it becomes salient to the public, which comes to interact socially and economically with the growing group and also sees new media reports on the changing demographic situation. While Hispanics have formed the largest group of newcomers in many places, there are also areas with large non-Hispanic foreign-born populations that are going to be more visible to the public, such as the Somali refugees in Minneapolis or the large Asian populations in several west coast cities. Considering the size of a state's foreign-born population offers a chance to understand how the size of large, newcoming minority populations influences the way states address the immigration issue.

The public attention that a growing foreign-born population attracts is certain to elicit a legislative response: Electorally, members should be inclined to enact new legislation that will be comforting to those who are threatened with the rise of the new group, but also may wish to create laws that will garner support from the growing block of new voters. Further, a growing population of foreign-born residents raises new policy needs that legislatures may need to address for pragmatic reasons. It is widely understood that illegal immigrants impose public costs on health care, incarceration, and education that outweigh any new revenues they create for the state (Clark et al. 1994). States with a large number of undocumented immigrants, then, will be likely to enact hostile laws that reduce these costs by denying benefits, seeking federal reimbursement, or assisting in deportation. But even legal immigrants pose a number of questions for lawmakers: How can newcomers be integrated into society? Should they receive the same level of public benefits as natural-born citizens? If legislatures address the needs of the state, then there likely will be more laws of both a welcoming and a

hostile tone in response to a larger foreign-born population: reducing costs associated with illegal immigrants requires more hostile laws, deciding how to issue public benefits to newcomers can be decided in either a generous or miserly way, and offering necessary naturalization services and basic provisions such as driving licenses for legal immigrants implies a greater number of welcoming laws.[4] Hence, the percent of a state population that is foreign born is likely to influence the amount of legislative activity dedicated to immigration and therefore is a reasonable control variable, but it is not clear that the tone of laws will shift in response to the size of this group.

3.2   Data and Method

The National Conference of State Legislatures gathered summaries of immigration laws.[5] To measure immigration policy in the fifty states, I counted laws that were enacted by each state between the years 2005 and 2008. Across this time frame, both the number of laws enacted and bills introduced rose annually until 2007, with the numbers dropping slightly in 2008. I coded each legislative action based on two factors: first whether the action had a welcoming or hostile tone towards immigrants and second on the scope of the action. The scope was coded onto a four-point scale: (1) symbolic, (2) affecting a small group of immigrants, (3) affecting many immigrants in a substantial way, and (4) directly affecting immigrants' ability to reside in a state.[6]

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[4]Hero and Preuhs (2007) shows that liberal states respond to immigration issues by adopting immigrant-friendly TANF laws; however, a tradeoff in policy must be achieved by lowering maximum cash benefits.

[5]See the appendix on data and analysis for a more complete source reference. Also, the example law synopses of the next paragraph are all based on the cited reports by NCSL.

[6]As a check on the coding scheme, a graduate student independently coded all of the 2008 laws (36.7% of the total) for comparison with the author's coding. For the binary tone of the law, Krippendorf's $\alpha = 0.789$, and for the ordinal scale of scope, $\alpha = 0.723$. Both exceed 0.7, indicating acceptable inter-coder reliability between the author and the second coder.

The following examples illustrate how legislative output is distributed into each of the four scope categories: First, an example legislative act receiving the lowest significance score due to its symbolic nature is a 2007 joint resolution by the Illinois legislature (HJR 27). The legislature expressed opposition to a federal law, the REAL ID Act of 2005, that required states to follow federal guidelines when issuing driving licenses and ID cards. Since the REAL ID Act was hostile towards immigrants, this oppositional resolution is welcoming to immigrants. At the same time, the resolution was merely a position-taking opportunity having no direct bearing on policy, so it is coded as a strictly symbolic act. Second, a law that has a substantive impact, but only for a limited number of immigrants, is a 2007 Michigan law (HB 4207—Act 19) that provides licensure to applicant nurses who are licensed in Canada. Third, a law having a substantial impact on a large number of immigrants is a 2008 Kansas law (SB 81) that requires persons to be U.S. citizens or legal immigrants and provide documentation of their status in order to qualify for Kansas's discretionary SCHIP program, thereby excluding illegal foreign-born children from this health care program. Lastly, an example of a law scored as having the highest substantive significance, as it directly affects immigrants' ability to reside in the state, is Colorado's 2006 law (SB 90) that requires all state and local law enforcement agencies to report suspected illegal immigrant arrestees to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).[7]

An overall distribution of state laws, by strength and tone, appears in Table 3.1. There is a greater number of welcoming laws than hostile, but welcoming laws are primarily symbolic or have a small impact, while stronger laws tend to be more hostile.

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[7]The appendix on coding rules describes more thoroughly the rules for placing each law into a category. In Table 3.1, the weights for each law are the integers in parentheses next to the row labels. Omnibus laws were broken-up such that each provision was coded as a separate law. The laws that were broken-up by provision are: Georgia SB 529 (year 2006) across eight provisions, Oklahoma HB 1804 (year 2007) across six provisions, North Carolina HB 2436 (year 2008) across two provisions, Missouri HB 1549 (year 2008) across nine provisions, South Carolina HB 4400 (year 2008) across sixteen provisions, and Utah SB 81 (year 2008) across nine provisions.

This strength disparity between welcoming and hostile laws arises because, compared with hostile states, welcoming states are putting a higher emphasis on symbolic laws and a lower emphasis on substantive laws.[8]

Table 3.1: Strength and Tone of State Immigration Laws in 2005-2008

Strength of law	Welcoming laws	Hostile laws	Total
(4) Impacts residence	1.63%	9.30%	10.93%
	(10)	(57)	(67)
(3) Large-scale effect	10.93%	13.54%	24.47%
	(67)	(83)	(150)
(2) Small-scale effect	22.84%	16.97%	39.80%
	(140)	(104)	(244)
(1) Symbolic	18.92%	5.87%	24.80%
	(116)	(36)	(152)
Total	54.32%	45.68%	100.00%
	(333)	(280)	(613)

Source: Author coding of NCSL records.
Cell entries are percent of total laws. Raw counts in parentheses.

3.2.1 Dependent Variable

The primary dependent variable in subsequent analysis is based on the direction and strength of adopted laws in each state. Specifically, the measure is a ratio of welcoming to hostile laws. The formula is presented in Equation 3.1:

$$\text{immigration policy} = \log \left(\frac{\sum \text{welcoming laws} + 1}{\sum \text{hostile laws} + 1} \right) \qquad (3.1)$$

The logged ratio has the benefit of showing where the preponderance of laws are. Positive values represent welcomeness to immigrants, negative values represent overall hostility to immigrants, and when the laws are perfectly balanced, the ratio is 1, and

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[8]The correlation between a logged ratio of welcoming to hostile laws (see Equation 3.1) against a logged ratio of symbolic to substantive laws is significantly positive at 0.249.

its log is 0.[9]

3.2.2   Explanatory Model

The primary predictor of state immigration policy is expected to be citizen ideology. This creates a need for an appropriate measure to ensure an accurate explanation of policy. There are three indices in common use: The first, which is most pervasive in state politics research, is to aggregate survey respondents' self-reported ideology by state. Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) created this measure using data from CBS/NYT polls, which they have updated through 2003. Since this data precedes the time frame under consideration, this paper measures self-reported ideology in the same way, but using the 2006 & 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.[10] A second common measure of subnational citizen ideology is presidential voting. The logic behind this index is that a state's vote share for the Democratic candidate should reveal the ideology of a state's median voter relative to the median voters of other states. An advantage of this approach is that it is based on the ideology of citizens who actually turn-out to vote. While this measure is more common in the study of congressional districts (i.e., Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001), it has been used in state-level studies also (i.e., Erikson and Wright 1980). A third measure is Berry et al.'s (1998) measure based on vote shares for congressional candidates. Since the ideology of candidates is not consistent from district to district, this measure weights the share of the vote for each candidate by the candidate's ideology, thereby allowing

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[9]The addition of one extra welcoming and one extra hostile law prevents any undefined ratios or logs. Also, each law in this measure is weighted by its score on the four-point scale presented in Table 3.1 and in the appendix on coding rules. The main findings of the analysis remain intact even if this measure is constructed with raw counts of laws (rather than weighted counts), using percentages (rather than ratios), and by adding 2 or 3 to the numerator and denominator (rather than 1).

[10]For more details on the data source, see the appendix on data and analysis. The correlation coefficient between this measure and a 1999-2003 aggregation of Erikson, Wright and McIver's data is 0.852.

for a cross-state comparison of the ideology of median voters. These three indices of citizen ideology are complementary but distinct. Rather than simply choose one of them, it makes sense to use the information from all three to capture ideology more effectively.

The appropriate method for best measuring this key covariate of ideology, as well as properly specifying its effect on immigration policy, is structural equations with latent variables. With this technique, a covariate such as ideology can be treated as a latent variable and measured with a minimum of error, which contrasts from regression models that assume perfect measurement. Indeed, in sociology, where structural models are more pervasive, a lot of attention is paid to measurement error (Bollen 1989). Though measurement error is often ignored in political science, the discipline faces many problems similar to those in sociology. Further, structural equations models create measures of fit, specifically, tests of whether the implied covariance matrix from the specified model differs significantly from the observed covariance matrix from the data. Hence, the model self-checks the adequacy of its specification, including the measurement specification, which offers greater confidence behind the empirical explanation of immigration policy.

Figure 3.1 shows the structural model, which is developed from the theoretical discussion. The figure conceptually presents what a latent variable is: As an unobserved covariate, citizen ideology causes the observed indicators of self-reported ideology, congressional voting, and presidential voting. (Hence, the direction of the arrows.) This assumption allows the estimation of citizen ideology through confirmatory factor analysis.[11]

Figure 3.1 also shows a full explanatory model of immigration policy. Consistent

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[11] As a technical point, the complete model displayed in Figure 3.1 is identified because it is recursive, or triangular, and the latent variable has three indicators (Bollen 1989, 95-98, 244).

Figure 3.1: Causal model of state immigration policy

with the theory, the figure shows that latent citizen ideology has a direct influence on policy tone. Further, citizen ideology also is assumed to shape the party control of state offices, which in turn can influence immigration policy. To complete the picture presented in Figure 3.1, the prior theoretical discussion asserts that percent foreign born, state wealth, percent unemployment, and legislative professionalism ought to directly influence policy. Therefore, all of these are included as exogenous predictors of immigration policy.[12]

The ability to model indirect as well as direct effects on an outcome—as is illustrated in Figure 3.1 with ideology having an independent influence on policy and an influence through officeholder partisanship—serves as a second key advantage of structural equations models. Only by estimating multiple equations, as this structural model does, can indirect effects be determined. Also, the aforementioned fit indices test whether this expanded causal specification is consistent with the data. In all, a structural model can more accurately measure a key covariate, citizen ideology, through confirmatory factor analysis, and it can consider not only direct effects on the outcome variable of immigration policy, but also indirect effects.

3.3 Results

The analytic results support the key expectations of what shapes immigration policy: The significant predictors are citizen ideology, legislative professionalism, and state wealth. However, the party affiliation of state officeholders, percent foreign born, and unemployment rate do not significantly influence immigration policy. Table 3.2 presents the unstandardized results, and Figure 3.2 shows the causal model with standardized

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[12]The descriptive statistics of the immigration policy measure, the three indicators of citizen ideology, and all of the directly measured covariates are reported in Table A.1 of the appendix on data and analysis.

Figure 3.2: Causal model of state immigration policy with standardized coefficients

coefficients.[13]

There is a strong and robust effect of citizen ideology on immigration policy. States with liberal electorates are significantly more likely to adopt a more welcoming tone on immigration. The result presented in Table 3.2 implies that a one point increase on this citizen ideology scale leads to a 6.1% expected increase in the ratio of welcoming to unwelcoming laws, holding all else constant.[14] Also, Figure 3.2 shows that ideology's

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[13]The structural equation model of Table 3.2 was also estimated using principal components analysis and OLS regression, and the findings still remained intact.

[14]Interpreting effects in terms of percentage increases is possible because the dependent variable is

Table 3.2: Structural Model of Net Immigration Policy Liberalism

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
Regression Model of Immigration Policy				
Citizen ideology	0.059	0.024	2.480	0.007
Democratic governor	-0.051	0.048	-1.060	0.145
Democratic lower chamber	-0.026	0.058	-0.450	0.327
Democratic upper chamber	-0.077	0.051	-1.506	0.066
% foreign born	-0.001	0.017	-0.031	0.488
Per capita gross state product	0.029	0.010	2.955	0.002
% unemployment	-0.068	0.084	-0.803	0.211
Legislative professionalism	1.928	1.075	1.794	0.037
Ordinal Probit of Gubernatorial Control				
Citizen ideology	0.036	0.028	1.316	0.094
Ordinal Probit of Lower Chamber Control				
Citizen ideology	0.160	0.033	4.814	0.000
Ordinal Probit of Upper Chamber Control				
Citizen ideology	0.169	0.035	4.847	0.000
Measurement Model of Citizen Ideology				
Self-reported ideology	1.000	—	—	—
Congressional voting	2.188	0.319	6.860	0.000
Presidential voting	1.055	0.168	6.296	0.000
$N = 50$				
$\chi^2_{df=11}$	16.104			
p-value	0.137			
CFI	0.925			
TLI	0.911			
RMSEA	0.096			
R^2 for immigration policy	0.593			

Note: Estimates are unstandardized coefficients computed with Mplus 5.2.

standardized coefficient of .590 is the largest of any predictor of immigration policy. This is a direct effect, which implies that ideology trumps partisanship as a determinant of policy.

There is also a clear effect of legislative professionalism on policy. More professional legislatures are significantly more likely to enact welcoming laws, which fits with the story that professional legislatures attract members with a longer career horizon. Since Squire's professionalism measure is based on proportions of legislative capacities compared to the U.S. Congress, an increase of 0.01 in this variable could be interpreted as a percentage point increase in professionalism. Based on Table 3.2, such an increase would result in a 1.9% increase on average in the ratio of welcoming to unwelcoming weighted laws, all else equal. Professionalism's standardized coefficient in Figure 3.2 is .425, which makes it the second strongest predictor of policy.

Another effect is that states with a higher per capita gross state product are significantly more likely to adopt a more welcoming tone on immigration. Table 3.2 indicates that for a $1,000 increase in per capita GSP, the expected ratio of welcoming to hostile weighted laws increases by 2.9%, *ceteris paribus*. Figure 3.2 reports a standardized coefficient of .358, which means that for a standard deviation increase in wealth, policy welcomingness increases by .358 of a standard deviation, all else equal.

The coefficients for percent foreign born and unemployment have negative signs, but they are not statistically discernible from zero. Surprisingly, the coefficients for party control of governorship, lower chamber, and upper chamber are all insignificant, and while not discernibly different from zero, they are incorrectly signed. There is simply no

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logged, so taking the exponential of an unstandardized coefficient provides a multiplicative factor by which the ratio of welcoming to unwelcoming laws increases (in this case 1.061). As for the latent citizen ideology variable, its scale is defined by Erikson, Wright and McIver's measure of electoral liberalism, so a one point increase on this scale is similar to a net percentage point increase in electoral liberalism. However, the variance of this latent variable is 27.34, which is larger than the variance of 9.39 for Erikson, Wright and McIver's measure.

evidence on the state level that Democratic legislatures or governors are more favorable to immigrants, or Republicans more hostile, once a control for state ideology is in place.

As a final point, when testing the adequacy of the overall model, the fit indices of Table 3.2 show that the causal structure drawn in the figures fits the data well. Specifically, the χ^2 test is insignificant, which means the implied covariance matrix (i.e., the covariance matrix from the estimated model) does not differ significantly from the actual observed covariance matrix. Additionally, the comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) exceed necessary thresholds of 0.9. The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is below 0.1 as it should be, and R^2 indicates that 59.3% of the variance in policy tone is explained. This model's good scores on these various measures is fairly unusual among structural equations models. Therefore, there is a lot of reason to be confident about this model's specification.

3.3.1 Cases

The absence of an effect of partisanship is surprising. Yet because public ideology has a strong influence on who officeholders are, party control of government and the ideology of the state's electorate will typically be consistent. Among the instances in which institutional partisanship and public ideology are incongruent, however, examining a few cases can be useful for illustrating the potential tension and how it is resolved. For example, Janet Napolitano, as a Democratic governor of Arizona, vetoed several laws which were hostile to immigrants, such as legislation to eliminate in-state tuition to illegal students and a bill to require local police to enforce immigration laws by arresting illegal immigrants. However, she also signed one of the toughest employment laws, which threatens to revoke the business licenses of companies hiring illegal workers (Savage 2008). On the one hand, many Democrats, including Barack Obama,

have favored employer penalties, which may be a plank offered to the Democratic constituency of low-wage workers. Alternatively, Napolitano may have taken this clearly anti-immigrant stance as a concession to the many conservative voters in Arizona after making pro-immigrant gestures with her prior vetoes. Similarly, five states enacted omnibus immigration laws that were designed to comprehensively address immigration. While Georgia was first in 2006 with a bill containing a mix of welcoming and harsh facets, Oklahoma in 2007 adopted a roundly anti-immigrant omnibus law, and Missouri, South Carolina and Utah followed Oklahoma's lead. It makes sense that a conservative state like Oklahoma might take the lead in advancing such thorough anti-immigrant policy, but it was a Democratic governor, Brad Henry, who signed the bill into law. These case studies offer further evidence that ideology outweighs party in state policy making.

Legislative professionalism also has a strong effect on immigration policy. While it is impossible to determine the precise cause of this state-level result, the finding is consistent with the argument that professional legislatures' policy is made by politicians who are looking into the political future and trying to curry favor among growing minority groups, such as Latino or Asian Americans. Further support for this theory emerges when considering George W. Bush's tone on immigration when he was governor of Texas. As a Republican governor in a conservative state, it might have been easy for him to push harsh immigration laws to please voters in his party and his state. However, Bush took a friendly approach towards Hispanics generally and the immigration issue specifically. Seeking immigrant support was a key part of the Bush-Rove strategy which was oriented to long-term Republican dominance (Hamburger and Wallsten 2006). Further, this trend has been continued by his Republican successor in Texas, Rick Perry, who also appears to have long-term political aspirations. Specifically, Perry chose to snub several members of his own party by publicly opposing

immigration policies such as building a wall along the Mexican border or restricting birthright citizenship (Brooks 2006).

3.4   Conclusion

This article offers an understanding of state action on immigration, especially in the face of federal inaction. The finding that public ideology drives policy is consistent with research on other policy areas (i.e., Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993) and suggests that while immigration might be unusually visible, it behaves fairly typically as a policy domain.

Interestingly, legislative professionalism and state wealth strongly shape immigration policy as well. With both variables, it is impossible to say precisely what the causal mechanism is that produces the significant relationship. The findings are consistent, however, with the electorally-motivated argument this article advances: If politicians in professional legislatures are more career-oriented, then there should be more welcoming legislation in these states, just as the analysis indicates. Also, the argument that politicians will have an easier time selling welcoming policy to wealthier constituents is consistent with the positive association between wealth and policy welcomingness.

Perhaps most surprisingly, though, is the insignificance of party control as a predictor of policy outcomes. Certainly, the considerations parties must face are complex: While Republicans might like to appeal to social conservatives by working to keep newcomers out of the nation, they also could help business interests by bringing in a supply of cheap new labor. At the same time, Democrats would like to appeal to racial and ethnic minorities by taking an inclusive tone on immigration law, but also could help their blue-collar constituency by keeping new laborers who might depress wages from entering the workforce. Hence, the group politics of immigration work against the likelihood that it will become a clearly partisan issue.

Chapter 4

Immigration Politics and Partisan Realignment

In 1994, a clear divide emerged within the Republican party regarding how best to deal with America's growing Latino population. On one hand, Pete Wilson made support of ballot Proposition 187—a measure to stop illegal immigrants from receiving services—a centerpiece of his campaign. With racially-charged television ads, his campaign is widely thought to have damaged Republicans' long-term prospects among Latino voters in California. However, George W. Bush simultaneously sought his first term as governor of Texas swearing-off the politics of racial threat. By instead addressing large Latino gatherings, where he spoke a little Spanish and argued that his education proposal could help Latinos, many believed Bush made inroads for Republicans among Latinos. Both Wilson and Bush won against strong opponents, albeit on the coattails of the Gingrich revolution. Accomplishing their short-term goals, to what degree did the different strategies have the expected effects in the long term? Further, which candidate, if either, had a bigger influence on the state and national partisan

landscape?

4.1   Background on the 1994 Elections

To understand how Bush and Wilson's campaign strategies influenced long-term partisanship, it is worthwhile to consider first how the campaigns played-out in the context of 1994. Starting with California, Pete Wilson had been elected in 1990 after a tight race with Dianne Feinstein. Taking office in 1991, he inherited a huge budget deficit.[1] Further, the national economy took a major downturn in the early 1990s, dealing Wilson a tough political hand. By the end of his first year in office, Wilson had already vetoed a bill funding English-language classes for immigrants and began to blame legal and illegal foreign immigrants for imposing disproportionate costs on the California state budget (Associated Press 1991; Reinhold 1991). After Bill Clinton was elected in 1992, Wilson trumpeted the fiscal stress caused by immigrants even more, blaming the federal government for mandating the distribution of benefits without providing funding. In 1993, he and the governors of Texas, Florida, New York, and Illinois petitioned Bill Clinton to reimburse the states for the costs created by undocumented immigrants (Weintraub 1993).

4.1.1   Pete Wilson's Re-election Bid

Perhaps because of the sour economy, Wilson started his re-election bid trailing challenger Kathleen Brown by over twenty percentage points in horserace polls (Wroe 2008, 82). Hence, his chances for re-election looked slim at first.

Meanwhile, Republican state Senator Dick Mountjoy, along with a committee of activists, proposed a ballot initiative entitled "Save Our State" that would outlaw the provision of state services to illegal immigrants (Wroe 2008, 56-61). However, late in

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[1]A $14.3 billion gap in his first year in office (Reinhold 1991).

the filing process, it looked as if the initiative, which the Secretary of State labeled Proposition 187, would not make the ballot due to a lack of signatures.[2] The California Republican Party decided to throw its support behind the measure, raising money to pay professional signature gatherers to push the proposition over the critical threshold (Nicholson 2005, 96-97). By aligning itself with the initiative, the Republican party set the stage for its candidates, including Wilson, to make Proposition 187 a centerpiece of the campaign.

Indeed, Wilson ran campaign advertisements which showed fuzzy footage of people crossing the border and a narrator saying: "They keep coming: two million illegal immigrants in California."[3] The ads closed with a frame urging voters to support both Wilson and Prop. 187. The racial priming of the ad was reminiscent that of George H.W. Bush's 1988 Willie Horton ad, in that both presumably won the votes of whites by invoking racial fear, much like the campaign practices Key described in the pre-Civil Rights Act South (Key 1949). Meanwhile, Kathleen Brown publicly opposed the initiative, offering a clear contrast from Wilson on the immigration issue.

Wilson's strategy seemed to work, as both he and Proposition 187 won, by 14.56 and 17.86 percentage points, respectively.[4] Thus, he overcame Brown's huge lead early in the campaign to win re-election. The exit poll in Table 4.1 indicates that Wilson won the white vote by a thirty percentage point margin, which carried him to victory. Hence, if Wilson embraced Prop. 187 with a goal of garnering white support, his winning coalition seemed to reflect that strategy.

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[2]To place an initiative on the ballot, California requires signatures from a number of voters equal to 5% of those who voted for governor in the previous election (California Secretary of State's Office: `http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/initiative_guide.htm`).

[3]Source: `http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oOf1PE8Kzng`

[4]Source: The California Secretary of State, `http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/election-results.htm` (accessed 27 November 2009). Wilson won 55.18%–40.62%; Proposition 187 won 58.93%–41.07%.

Table 4.1: Reported Votes Choice in 1994 California Gubernatorial, by Race

Vote Choice	Race				Total
	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	
Brown	35%	79%	73%	49%	43%
	(774)	(185)	(188)	(83)	(1230)
Wilson	65%	21%	27%	51%	57%
	(1454)	(49)	(71)	(86)	(1660)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(2228)	(234)	(259)	(169)	(2890)

Note: Cell entries are column percentages.
Survey weighted frequencies in parentheses.
Raw sample size prior to weighting: $N = 2934$

Although Wilson won in 1994, many have argued that his campaign damaged long-term Republican prospects in California by alienating the party from the growing Hispanic demographic (Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006; Diamond 1996; Nicholson 2005; Whalen 2002). In fact, even at the time, a number of prominent Republicans opposed Wilson's strategy: Bill Bennett and Jack Kemp argued that immigrants were good for the economy and would make great citizens due to their entrepreneurial spirit and religiosity. Further, Ralph Reed believed Latinos held conservative preferences on many social issues and in 1993 announced that the Christian Coalition would recruit Latino members (Diamond 1996). Hence, there seemed to be a sense among many Republicans that a more forward-looking strategy might be to embrace, rather than alienate, Hispanic voters.

4.1.2 George W. Bush's Bid for Governor

Another objection to Pete Wilson's anti-immigrant campaign strategy was raised after the election by Texas Governor-Elect George W. Bush. Bush stated that Prop. 187 would be wrong for Texas and argued that, although borders should be enforced, it was always worthwhile to provide services to children such as education regardless of their

origins (Hamburger and Wallsten 2006, 65-67). This argument was consistent with the campaign he had run in the prior year to earn his first elective office. Somewhat oddly, his Democratic opponent, Governor Ann Richards, had been one of Pete Wilson's co-petitioners in 1993 for federal reimbursement for the costs of immigration. Hence, party positions in the Texas gubernatorial were nearly a mirror image of those in California.

Much like Wilson, Bush faced an uphill challenge in his 1994 campaign. In summer 1994, incumbent Ann Richards led Bush in the two-party horse race 52.4% to 47.6%.[5] Unlike Wilson's strategy of campaigning on immigration, though, Bush chose education as his focus: promoting a policy similar to both Bill Clinton's policy as governor of Arkansas and the No Child Left Behind Act that Bush would sign as president. With education, Bush could promote a plan that appealed to conservatives, but on an issue traditionally associated with the Democratic party. Further, education allowed him to argue he had something to offer when speaking to minority voters without raising charged issues like affirmative action. Indeed, he made several campaign stops in principally Latino cities on the border with Mexico where he argued that his plan would be beneficial to heavily Latino schools (Hamburger and Wallsten 2006, 58-61).

Intriguingly, despite all of Bush's efforts to win-over minority voters, exit polls suggest that his electoral support did not differ substantially from Wilson's. Contrasting Tables 4.1 & 4.2, Wilson did better with every demographic group except for Hispanic voters, where the poll comparison suggests that Bush did merely one percentage point better than Wilson. In the short run, Bush's strategy of reaching-out to minority voters was less fruitful than Wilson's racially-charged campaign. Though both men won, Wilson's 14.56 point margin was much safer than Bush's 7.6 point margin.[6] Bush still

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[5]Source: The spring 1994 Texas Poll (see the appendix on partisanship data for source details).

[6]Source: The Texas Secretary of State, http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (accessed 27 November 2009). Bush won 53.47%–45.87%.

won his first term primarily with white support, but had a smaller share of it than his counterpart in California.

Table 4.2: Reported Votes Choice in 1994 Texas Gubernatorial, by Race

	Race				
Vote Choice	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Total
Richards	37%	85%	72%	66%	46%
	(444)	(126)	(145)	(10)	(725)
Bush	63%	15%	28%	34%	54%
	(763)	(23)	(57)	(5)	(848)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(1207)	(149)	(202)	(15)	(1573)

Note: Cell entries are column percentages.
Survey weighted frequencies in parentheses.
Raw sample size prior to weighting: $N = 1581$

## 4.2 The Long-Term Consequences for Parties and Candidates

Although Wilson was more immediately successful than Bush, evidence suggests that Bush's strategy yielded longer-term gains. Although Bush only won 28% of the Hispanic vote in 1994, he raised his share to 46% in his successful 1998 re-election bid. Meanwhile, California Republican Dan Lungren only garnered 22% of the Latino vote in his 1998 loss to Gray Davis, a decline even from Wilson's share (Khaligh 2002). Further, Bush went on to do well among Hispanic voters in his two presidential elections, increasing the Republican share of Hispanic votes for president for the first time since 1984, to 35% in 2000 and 44% in 2004 (Sanchez 2007, 166).

But besides the long-term consequences for particular personalities, did the behaviors of these two Republicans have unique effects for the overall party coalitions in their respective states and even nationwide? In other words, to what degree did these

campaigns have a lasting impact on voters' willingness to identify with one party or another? To assess the effects of these campaign strategies on party electoral coalitions, Figure 4.1 shows the time series of Republican and Democratic partisanship for all adults, whites, and Hispanics in California, Texas, and the United States. In each of the panels, the horizontal axis indicates time in years, and the vertical axis indicates the percentage of voters from a demographic identifying with the party. Each panel contains three lines: a solid line indicating the percentage of all voters identifying with the party, a dotted line indicating the percentage of Hispanic voters identifying with the party, and a dashed line indicating the percentage of white voters identifying with a party. The light vertical line in each panel represents 1994. Descriptively, the data fit the story of how various demographic groups would respond to the respective Republican campaign strategies.

In California (see panels 4.1(a) & 4.1(b)), the percentage of Hispanic Republicans starts trending downward—while the percentage of Hispanic Democrats quickly shoots upward—following Pete Wilson's re-election. In fact, the trends even seem to begin as early as 1991, when Wilson first began blaming immigrants for budgetary problems. Meanwhile, white partisanship appears to stay fairly stagnant throughout the post-1994 period, with a possible move towards the Democrats, albeit not as strongly as among Hispanics.

In Texas, the series are shorter (see panels 4.1(c) & 4.1(d)), but intriguingly show trends that differ substantially from California. In particular, the percentage of Hispanic Republicans trends upward after 1994, in contrast to the downward trend that happens in California and even, to a lesser extent, the entire nation (panel 4.1(e)). The percentage of Hispanic Democrats in Texas, meanwhile, remains fairly stagnant at this time, while in California and the U.S. as a whole (panel 4.1(f)), the percentage is shooting upward. Hence, the data descriptively suggest that Bush helped his party

(a) CA Republicans

(b) CA Democrats

(c) TX Republicans

(d) TX Democrats

(e) US Republicans

(f) US Democrats

Figure 4.1: Republican and Democratic identification among whites, Hispanics, and the overall adult population in California, Texas, and the United States

with Hispanic voters not only by making small inroads, but by avoiding catastrophes that befell his party in California and the rest of the nation. However, his party seemed to lose some net support among white voters, suggesting that his emphasis on gaining Hispanic voters may have come at some cost. Intriguingly, around 2000 when Bush enters the national political scene, the national trends reverse with a drop in Democratic identification, and a rise in Republican identification among Hispanic voters. Hence, if Wilson and Prop. 187 hurt Republicans nationally, Bush apparently reversed this.

4.2.1   Change Point Analysis

As a more formal evaluation of the observed changes in the data, I turn to change point analysis, which allows me to test whether the trend in each time series changes after 1994.[7] Figures 4.2–4.4 graph the expected trends from these change point models. In each panel of each figure, the horizontal axis again represents years, and the vertical axis again represents the percent of the demographic group identifying with the respective party. The solid line is the actual series of partisan identification while the dashed line is the forecasted trend from the changepoint model.

Figure 4.2 shows the results for Hispanic party identification in California, Texas, and the nation. In California, the Republicans were benefitting from an upward trend among Hispanic identifiers; however, this trend took a statistically significant downward turn after Wilson's re-election such that Republicans started losing Hispanic identifiers thereafter.[8] Conversely, the percentage of California Hispanics who identified as

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[7]An alternative method would be intervention analysis, as laid-out by (Box and Tiao 1975). Intervention analyses would be more conservative because they would control for an ARIMA noise model, reducing the opportunity for an intervention to have a significant effect. However, such models are restricted to estimating dynamic changes in the mean of a variable given its noise model (which may filter-out a trend), rather than modeling changes in the trend itself.

[8]More details on model estimates and the results of significance tests are presented in the appendix on partisanship data and change point analyses. The Chow test for every California series is significant, indicating that the trends in all California series changed after the 1994 election. However, the Chow

(a) CA Republicans

(b) CA Democrats

(c) TX Republicans

(d) TX Democrats

(e) US Republicans

(f) US Democrats

Figure 4.2: 1994 changepoint model for Hispanic Republican and Democratic identification in California, Texas, and the United States

Democrats dropped considerably from 1969 to 1994, yet Wilson's re-election prompted an immediate boost to Democratic identification followed by a substantially-moderated downward trend. Hence, Wilson's embrace of Proposition 187 appeared to stop the bleeding Democrats were experiencing among the Hispanic constituency.

Among Texas Hispanics, on the other hand, changes in the time trends are not statistically significant; however, the trends are interesting because they run contrary to what is observed in California and the nation as a whole. In particular, Democratic identification among Hispanics is significantly trending upward, but after 1994, it flattens-out and loses significance. This effect is opposite from California and the nation, each of which show a downward trend of Hispanic Democratic identification that is stopped with a jump (albeit in the U.S. the downward trend steepens around 2000). Further, the positive and significant trend in Texas Hispanic Republican identification becomes steeper after 1994. Though this steepening is not statistically significant, there is a clear contrast from the marked downturn among California Hispanic Republicanism.

Among white voters, Figure 4.3 shows that Republican identification was rising in Texas and California until it shifted to a downward trend after the 1994 election.[9] Similarly, Democratic identification was essentially flat prior to the 1994 election (with California's level down significantly from a high level in the seventies), but each state demonstrated a small positive trend afterward.[10] The interesting comparison is with

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test is only significant for one of the Texas series: white Democrats. This may be attributable to the shorter series in Texas (15 years) compared with California (37 years). For the United States data, all Republican series exhibit significant change points, as does the series for Hispanic Democratic identification. The series for white and total Democratic identification are not significant, however, which reflects the continuity observed in the trends.

[9]In California, this downturn is significant at any standard level, but in Texas the change is significant only at the 90% confidence level.

[10]This upturn among Texas white Democrats is the only effect among the Texas series that is significant at the 95% confidence level, and the change in California is also significant at this level.

(a) CA Republicans

(b) CA Democrats

(c) TX Republicans

(d) TX Democrats

(e) US Republicans

(f) US Democrats

Figure 4.3: 1994 changepoint model for white Republican and Democratic identification in California, Texas, and the United States

the national data, where Democratic identification has trended downward with no substantial change in 1994, and Republican identification spiked before 1994, but also saw a peak around 2006. Aside from the late national peak that does not occur in California (such data are unavailable for Texas) and California's Democratic rebound, the series are pretty similar. There does not appear, then, to be a clear, differential campaign influence on white voters across the states.

Finally, Figure 4.4 shows the trends for partisanship among the overall adult populations of each state. Consistent with the demographic breakdowns, panels 4.4(a) & 4.4(b) show that growth in the overall California Republican coalition was replaced with decay in the coalition after 1994, and long-term losses among Democratic identifiers were reversed into growth in identifiers in this time frame. With Texas, though, Figures 4.4(c) & 4.4(d) display upward trends for both parties that do not change much at the changepoint. If anything, Texas Republicanism saw a slight mean shift upward after 1994, while Democratic identification saw a slight downward shift, but the overall direction of movement remained the same. The most intriguing quality of Texas, then, is the absence of Republican losses, which is clearly present in California. Nationally, Republican identification saw a significant step up in the late 80s and early 90s, while Democratic identification saw a straight downward trend throughout the recorded series.

Besides the consequences these campaigns appear to have had at the state level, the national level demographic shifts in partisanship indicate the possibility that state-level officeholders can influence partisan coalitions to the degree that they gain national attention. For example, both California and the nation as a whole show a burst in Hispanic Democratic identification following 1994. In the percentage scale, though, California shows a bigger and more sustained growth. Since Prop. 187 and the California gubernatorial garnered so much national media attention, it seems likely that

(a) CA Republicans

(b) CA Democrats

(c) TX Republicans

(d) TX Democrats

(e) US Republicans

(f) US Democrats

Figure 4.4: 1994 changepoint model for overall adult Republican and Democratic identification in California, Texas, and the United States

the national Hispanic constituency responded to this information, though not as much as the California Hispanic constituency, for which Prop. 187 was far more salient. Yet, while Wilson's campaign had more national attention in 1994 than Bush's, we see that when Bush takes the national spotlight, he has a turn influencing the Republican coalition. The national growth in Hispanic Republican identifiers after 2000 is significant and descriptively resembles the Hispanic Republican growth in Texas after 1994.[11] Overall, the data and analyses indicate evident changes in mass partisanship, which are contingent on the messages received by party leaders. Further, these changes can be associated with particular state-level campaign strategies. However, all of these changes are fairly gradual over time, as prior research on party identification indicates (Campbell et al. 1960; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989).

4.3 Implications

Though it is possible that the observed effects for 1994 are caused by differing responses to the Clinton presidency or some other factor, the unique trends in the two states' data fit the story that partisan realignment can be a localized event. Much prior research on mass partisan changes focuses on national-level influence on the entire American electorate (Adams 1997; Brandt and Freeman 2009; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989; Sundquist 1983; Wolbrecht 2000). The evidence in these two cases, though, implies that governors do matter for partisan identification, to the degree that their behavior gains public attention. Consider each situation: As governor, Wilson appeared to produce a bigger partisan shift in his own state than Bush did in his state, and the

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[11]Analysis which adds a second changepoint following the 2000 election does not yield a significant effect for the Hispanic Democratic series, but it does for the Hispanic Republican series: $F_{2,25} = 13.746$ ($p < 0.001$).

Wilson effect in California appeared to emerge nationally as well. All of this makes sense given the heavier coverage of Wilson's campaign and Proposition 187. However, when Bush ran for president, thereby garnering national attention, his campaign took its turn in having an effect on national partisanship comparable to the local effect in Texas. Wilson seemed to make the bigger national splash because the backlash in 1994 produced significant changes in both the Hispanic Democratic and Republican series. Although Bush's influence on Hispanics was only seen in a significant upturn in 2000 among Republican identification without an effect on the Democratic coalition he still showed that Hispanic voters could be won-over for the Republican party.

Subnational leaders therefore should take note that their actions can have long-term consequences for their party as they craft electoral strategies. Though alienation seems to have a stronger effect in pushing people away and may yield quicker electoral benefits, the data here suggest that even a gubernatorial candidate has an ability to chip into a new demographic for a party. Hence, even the forward-looking politician's behavior should not be driven strictly by fear of losing voters, but can also be motivated by the potential for long-term rewards.

Appendix 1: Formal Derivation of the Game Theoretic Results

Propositions 1 & 2 formally demonstrate the results of the deterministic game, while proposition 3 focuses on the stochastic game. Proposition 1 proves the presence of an equilibrium in the deterministic game whenever valence is large relative to the ideological movement of the median voter (see observation 1). Proposition 2 shows why there is no equilibrium in the deterministic game whenever valence is small relative to the movement of the median voter (see observation 2). Finally, proposition 3 demonstrates that in any equilibrium for the stochastic game, the parties will match positions (see observation 3).

Proposition 1 *Under proximity voter utilities, when $V > (m_1 - m_2)^2$, it is a Nash equilibrium if the parties converge to the second median voter's ideal point.*

Proof If both parties play $\theta = m_2$, then A earns $1 + \frac{\delta}{2}$ for winning the first election and tying the second. D earns $\frac{\delta}{2}$ for tying the second. If either unilaterally defects, then it will lose the second election outright, diminishing utility by $\frac{\delta}{2}$, without gaining anything. This is because A will win the first election for $\theta_A = m_2$ regardless of the value of θ_D. Since neither party will defect, $\theta_A = \theta_D = m_2$ is a Nash equilibrium. □

Proposition 2 *Under proximity voter utilities, when $V \leq (m_1 - m_2)^2$, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.*

Proof D will win the first election if:

$$- (m_1 - \theta_D)^2 \; > \; -(m_1 - \theta_A)^2 + V$$
$$-\theta_D^2 + 2m_1\theta_D + (\theta_A^2 - 2m_1\theta_A - V) \; > \; 0 \tag{A.1}$$

Therefore, D's best response function is:

$$B_D(\theta_A): \qquad m_2 \le \theta_D < \theta_A \qquad \text{if } \theta_A \ge m_1 - \sqrt{V} \qquad (\text{A.2})$$

$$m_1 - \sqrt{(m_1 - \theta_A)^2 - V} < \theta_D \le m_1 \quad \text{if } \theta_A < m_1 - \sqrt{V}$$

This is because whenever $\theta_A \ge m_1 - \sqrt{V}$ party A has placed itself sufficiently close to m_1 that D cannot win the first election, so D will play for the second election (m_2). Whenever $\theta_A < m_1 - \sqrt{V}$, though, party D can win the first election by taking a position very close to m_1. Party A can win both elections, so its best response function is:

$$B_A(\theta_D): \quad m_1 - \sqrt{(m_1 - \theta_D)^2 + V} < \theta_A < \theta_D \quad \text{if } m_1 - \sqrt{(m_1 - \theta_D)^2 + V} \ge m_2$$

$$m_2 \le \theta_A < \theta_D \qquad \text{if } m_1 - \sqrt{(m_1 - \theta_D)^2 + V} < m_2$$

$$(\text{A.3})$$

Given these best response functions, there is no Nash equilibrium for the game when valence does not exceed the square of ideological movement. First for the case when $\theta_A \ge m_1 - \sqrt{V}$, for an equilibrium to exist the parties would have to play in a way such that $\theta_D < \theta_A$ and $\theta_D > \theta_A$. This is logically impossible, so both players cannot play a best response. Second, for the case when $\theta_A < m_1 - \sqrt{V}$, it can be shown that the parties would have to play such that $(m_1 - \theta_D)^2 < (m_1 - \theta_A)^2 - V$ and $(m_1 - \theta_D)^2 > (m_1 - \theta_A)^2 - V$, which is also logically impossible. Hence, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium whenever $V \le (m_1 - m_2)^2$. $\square$

Proposition 3 *For any Nash equilibrium of the stochastic game with proximity utilities, the two parties will match in their behavior ($\theta_A^* = \theta_D^*$).*

60

Proof Because this is a zerosum game, we can say that $(\theta_A^* = \theta_D, \theta_D^* = \theta_A)$ characterizes Nash equilibria if the following three **conditions** are true (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, proposition 22.2.c):

1. $\theta_A^* = \theta_D$ must be a maxminimizer for A.

2. $\theta_D^* = \theta_A$ must be a maxminimizer for D.

3. $\max\limits_{\theta_A} \min\limits_{\theta_D} EU_A(\theta_A, \theta_D) = \min\limits_{\theta_D} \max\limits_{\theta_A} EU_A(\theta_A, \theta_D)$

First, considering **condition 1**, is $\theta_A^* = \theta_D$ a maxminimizer for A? A's expected utility function is:

$$EU_A(\theta_A, \theta_D) = \Lambda\{-(m_1 - \theta_A)^2 + (m_1 - \theta_D)^2 + V\} + \delta\Lambda\{-(m_2 - \theta_A)^2 + (m_1 - \theta_D)^2\} \quad \text{(A.4)}$$

Where Λ represents the logistic distribution function. If $\theta_A^* = \theta_D$, then $EU_A(\theta_A^* = \theta_D, \theta_D) = \Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) = \Lambda(V) + \frac{\delta}{2}$ for any value of θ_D. If $\Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) \geq \min\limits_{\theta_D} EU_A(\theta_A, \theta_D)$ for any value of θ_A, then $\theta_A^* = \theta_D$ is a maxminimizer for A.

To determine whether this is true, we will represent any other strategy that A can take as $\theta_A' = \theta_D + \eta$, where η is the difference between θ_A & θ_D. It can be shown that A's expected utility for θ_A' is:

$$EU_A(\theta_A' = \theta_D + \eta, \theta_D) = \Lambda\{2m_1\eta - 2\theta_D\eta - \eta^2 + V\} + \delta\Lambda\{2m_2\eta - 2\theta_D\eta - \eta^2\} \quad \text{(A.5)}$$

So the key question is now whether $\Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) \geq \min\limits_{\theta_D} EU_A(\theta_A' = \theta_D + \eta, \theta_D)$ for all η. If $\eta > 0$, then D can minimize A's utility by choosing $\theta_D = 1$, but if $\eta < 0$, then D minimizes with $\theta_D = -1$.[12] Consider first the case where A plays a position more

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[12]$\eta = 0$ simply produces $\theta_A^* = \theta_D$, which all other strategies are being compared to.

conservative than D ($\eta > 0$). Substituting $\theta_D = 1$ yields:

$$\min_{\theta_D} EU_A(\theta'_A = \theta_D + \eta, \theta_D) = \Lambda\{2\eta(m_1 - 1) - \eta^2 + V\} + \delta\Lambda\{2\eta(m_2 - 1) - \eta^2\} \quad \text{(A.6)}$$

We know that this minimized utility is less than or equal to the utility when $\theta^*_A = \theta_D$ because each corresponding probability term is less than or equal to its counterpart from the equation $EU_A(\theta^*_A = \theta_D, \theta_D)$. Specifically, it can be shown that $\Lambda(V) \geq \Lambda\{2\eta(m_1-1)-\eta^2+V\}$ because $0 \geq 2\eta(m_1-1)-\eta^2$.[13] Second, $\Lambda(0) \geq \Lambda\{2\eta(m_2-1)-\eta^2\}$ because the logistic distribution function on the right side of the equation contains a negative term.[14] Therefore, for any $\eta > 0$:

$$\Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) \geq \Lambda\{2\eta(m_1 - 1) - \eta^2 + V\} + \delta\Lambda\{2\eta(m_2 - 1) - \eta^2\} \quad \text{(A.7)}$$

So for no positive η will A earn a better minimized utility than it gets by matching party D's position. Now consider the case when A plays a position more liberal than D ($\eta < 0$). Substituting $\theta_D = -1$:

$$\min_{\theta_D} EU_A(\theta'_A = \theta_D + \eta, \theta_D) = \Lambda\{2\eta(m_1 + 1) - \eta^2 + V\} + \delta\Lambda\{2\eta(m_2 + 1) - \eta^2\} \quad \text{(A.8)}$$

By a similar argument to the previous case, it can be shown that:

$$\Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) \geq \Lambda\{2\eta(m_1 + 1) - \eta^2 + V\} + \delta\Lambda\{2\eta(m_2 + 1) - \eta^2\} \quad \text{(A.9)}$$

Within each logistic distribution function on the right side of equation A.9, every term

---

[13]This relies on the fact that the policy space is defined as $\Theta = [-1, 1]$. Hence, $m_1 \leq 1$, which means that the first term is the product of a nonpositive number ($m_1 - 1$) and a positive number (2η). Since the second term subtracts a squared number, we know that both terms on the right are negative.

[14]Again, $m_2 \leq 1$ makes the first term the product of a nonpositive number and a positive number.

other than V (which is also part of the corresponding left-side term) is negative.[15] Between equations A.7 & A.9, we can conclude that $\Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) \geq \min_{\theta_D} EU_A(\theta'_A = \theta_D + \eta, \theta_D)$ for all η and therefore $\theta^*_A = \theta_D$ is a maxminimizer for party A.

Second, **condition 2** requires that $\theta^*_D = \theta_A$ be a maxminimizer for D. Given the zerosum nature of the game, this is equivalent to D choosing a strategy that minimizes the maximum utility that A can earn. If $\theta^*_D = \theta_A$, then party A earns $EU_A(\theta_A, \theta^*_D = \theta_A) = \Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) = \Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0)$ for any value of θ_A. If $\Lambda(V) + \dfrac{\delta}{2} \leq \max_{\theta_A} EU_A(\theta_A, \theta_D)$ for any value of θ_D, then $\theta^*_D = \theta_A$ is a maxminimizer for D.

Much as in the proof of the prior condition, we compare $\theta^*_D = \theta_A$ to $\tilde{\theta}_D = \theta_A + \zeta$ where ζ is the difference between θ_A & θ_D. Party A's expected utility when D plays $\tilde{\theta}_D$ is:

$$EU_A(\theta_A, \tilde{\theta}_D = \theta_A + \zeta) = \Lambda\{-2m_1\zeta + 2\theta_A\zeta + \zeta^2 + V\} + \delta\Lambda\{-2m_2\zeta + 2\theta_A\zeta + \zeta^2\} \quad \text{(A.10)}$$

If $\zeta > 0$, party A can maximize its utility by playing $\theta_A = 1$, but if $\zeta < 0$ party A can maximize its utility by playing $\theta_A = -1$. Consider first whether party D would want to play a strategy more conservative than party A ($\zeta > 0$). Substituting $\theta_A = 1$:

$$\Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) \leq \max_{\theta_A} EU_A(\theta_A, \tilde{\theta}_D) = \Lambda\{2\zeta(1 - m_1) + \zeta^2 + V\} + \delta\Lambda\{2\zeta(1 - m_2) + \zeta^2\}$$
$$\text{(A.11)}$$

Equation A.11 holds because each term within the logistic distribution functions on the far right side is nonnegative.[16] Therefore, party D would never like to play a more conservative position than party A since matching θ_A reduces A's maximum utility. Now consider whether party D would want to play a strategy more liberal than party

---

[15]This is because η is now negative and each term of the form $m_t + 1$ is now nonnegative since $m_t \geq -1$ to be in the policy space.

[16]Note again that $m_t \leq 1$.

A ($\zeta < 0$). Substituting $\theta_A = -1$:

$$\Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) \leq \max_{\theta_A} EU_A(\theta_A, \tilde{\theta}_D) = \Lambda\{-2\zeta(1 + m_1) + \zeta^2 + V\} + \delta\Lambda\{-2\zeta(1 + m_2) + \zeta^2\}$$

(A.12)

Again, all of the terms in the logistic distribution functions on the far right side are nonnegative because ζ is now negative and is subtracted from the equation. Therefore, the inequality relationship holds. Between equations A.11 & A.12, we can conclude that $\Lambda(V) + \delta\Lambda(0) \leq \max_{\theta_A} EU_A(\theta_A, \tilde{\theta}_D = \theta_A + \zeta)$ for all ζ and therefore $\theta_D^* = \theta_A$ is a maxminimizer for party D.

Finally, **condition 3** is trivial to demonstrate at this point. In proving the previous two conditions, we demonstrated first that $\max_{\theta_A} \min_{\theta_D} EU_A(\theta_A, \theta_D) = \Lambda(V) + \dfrac{\delta}{2}$, then that $\min_{\theta_D} \max_{\theta_A} EU_A(\theta_A, \theta_D) = \Lambda(V) + \dfrac{\delta}{2}$. Since these two quantities are the same, condition 3 is true. Therefore, all three conditions are satisfied for $\theta_A^* = \theta_D^*$ to characterize all Nash equilibria. $\square$

Appendix 2: The Placement Model with Directional Theory

In the directional model of voter utility, voters vote for candidates who are on the same side of policy space as themselves before they will vote for any candidate on the opposite side of the space (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Additionally, the more a politician emphasizes the symbolism of one side, the higher he or she will be rated by voters on that side and the lower he or she will be rated by voters on the other side. The unidimensional result with two parties is convergence to the outside bounds of the policy space, though candidates stop short of taking a position for which they could be labeled an extremist.[17]

Equation A.13 formalizes the way voters directionally evaluate parties:

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_{m_t}(A) &= m_t \times \theta_A + V_t \text{ where } [V_1 = V > 0, V_2 = 0] & \text{(A.13)} \\
U_{m_t}(D) &= m_t \times \theta_D
\end{aligned}
$$

Just as in equation 2.1, U is the voter's utility from a party, m_t is the median voter's ideal point at time $t \in \{1, 2\}$, θ is the party's position, and V is a constant non-ideological utility that the first median voter (m_1) adds to its evaluation of party A in the first election. The parameters are the same as with the proximity model. The main difference is that the voter's utility is a function of the product of his or her ideal point with the party's stated position, rather than the negative squared distance between the ideal point and party position.[18] For simplicity, party positions are restricted to the

---

[17]Several researchers have tried to combine the proximity and directional theories of electoral competition, typically by adding a new consideration to the proximity model. Namely, Adams, Merrill & Grofman add a discounting factor (2005), and Kedar adds a strategic compromise consideration (2005a; 2005b).

[18]We can use the simple product to capture ideological utility if we assume that zero is ideologically

policy space ($\theta \in \Theta = [-1, 1]$), and I assume that no position in this space would be considered extreme by voters. To keep the game interesting, the game assumes that the present median voter and the future median voter are on different sides of the issue. Without loss of generality, the present median voter is conservative ($m_1 > 0$) and the future median voter is liberal ($m_2 < 0$).

Much like the deterministic proximity-based game in the paper, there is only an equilibrium in a special case. Interestingly, the condition of the special case depends not on movement of the median, but whether the valence advantage is large relative to the present median voter's ideological extremity. If the advantaged party has a non-ideological advantage more than twice the ideal point of the present median voter, then party A will win the present election even if it takes a very liberal position that appeals to the future median voter. Therefore, both parties will take the most liberal possible positions when the valence advantage is large relative to the present median voter's ideal point, so they will tie in the future election. When valence is not big enough relative to the present median voter's ideal point, there is no pure strategy equilibrium because for any set of positions that the parties might take, one party would change its behavior in order to win or tie an additional election. The remainder of this subsection proves propositions 4 & 5, which formally demonstrate these ideas. Then subsection 4.3 considers a stochastic version of the directional game.

Proposition 4 *Under directional utilities, when $V > 2m_1$, it is a Nash equilibrium if the parties converge to the most liberal point in the policy space.*

Proof If both parties play $\theta = -1$, then A earns $1 + \frac{\delta}{2}$ for winning the first election and tying the second. D earns $\frac{\delta}{2}$ for tying the second. If either unilaterally defects, then it

---

neutral, negative numbers represent liberalism, and positive numbers represent conservatism. This product gives the voter positive utility for any party on the same side, negative utility for any party on the opposing side, and zero utility if either the voter or party is neutral on the issue. As either the voter or the party move further to an extreme, the absolute size of the voter's utility increases.

will lose the second election outright, diminishing utility by $\frac{\delta}{2}$, without gaining anything. This is because A will win the first election for $\theta_A = -1$ against any position D can take in the policy range $\theta_D \in [-1, 1]$. Since neither party will defect, $\theta_A = \theta_D = -1$ is a Nash equilibrium. $\square$

Proposition 5 *Under directional voter utilities, when $V \leq 2m_1$, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.*

Proof Under these circumstances, D will win the first election if:

$$
\begin{aligned}
m_1\theta_A + V &< m_1\theta_D \\
\theta_A + \frac{V}{m_1} &< \theta_D
\end{aligned}
\tag{A.14}
$$

Otherwise, A will win. Therefore, D's best response function is:

$$
B_D(\theta_A): \quad -1 \leq \theta_D < \theta_A \quad \text{if } \theta_A + \frac{V}{m_1} \geq 1 \tag{A.15}
$$
$$
\theta_A + \frac{V}{m_1} < \theta_D \leq 1 \quad \text{if } \theta_A + \frac{V}{m_1} < 1
$$

This is because whenever $\theta_A + \frac{V}{m_1} \geq 1$, party A has taken a sufficiently conservative position that the valence advantage will exceed any ideological advantage with voter m_1 that party D can edge out. In this case, D should play for the voter in the second election (m_2). Whenever $\theta_A + \frac{V}{m_1} < 1$, though, party D can win the more valuable first election by taking a position conservative enough to stimulate an ideological advantage with the first voter that exceeds the valence advantage.

On the other hand, party A can win both elections, so its best response function is:

$$
B_A(\theta_D): \quad \theta_D - \frac{V}{m_1} < \theta_A < \theta_D \quad \text{if } \theta_D - \frac{V}{m_1} \geq -1 \tag{A.16}
$$
$$
-1 \leq \theta_A < \theta_D \quad \text{if } \theta_D - \frac{V}{m_1} < -1
$$

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In order to win the second election, party A has to play something lower than θ_D. In order to simultaneously win the first election, though, A needs to be close enough to D that party D's ideological advantage with the first voter is smaller than A's valence advantage.

Given these best response functions, there is no Nash equilibrium for the game when valence does not exceed the ideological difference. First, in the case when $\theta_A + \frac{V}{m_1} \geq 1$, for an equilibrium to exist the parties would have to play in such a way that $\theta_D < \theta_A$ and $\theta_D > \theta_A$, which is impossible. Second, for an equilibrium to exist in the case when $\theta_A + \frac{V}{m_1} < 1$, the parties would have to play such that $\theta_A + \frac{V}{m_1} < \theta_D$ (i.e., $\theta_D - \frac{V}{m_1} > \theta_A$) and $\theta_D - \frac{V}{m_1} < \theta_A$, which is also impossible. Hence, there is no pure strategy equilibrium whenever $V \leq 2m_1$. $\square$

The Directional Model with Probabilistic Voting

Similar to the stochastic model with proximity utilities, this subsection presents a version of the game in which voters evaluate parties' issue positions directionally, but vote probabilistically. This is again created by adding a shock to voter utilities in the form of a random draw from a probability distribution:

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_{m_t}(A) &= m_t \times \theta_A + V_t + \epsilon_{At} \text{ where } [V_1 = V > 0, V_2 = 0] && \text{(A.17)} \\
U_{m_t}(D) &= m_t \times \theta_D + \epsilon_{Dt}
\end{aligned}
$$

Equation A.17 resembles equation A.13, with ϵ as a stochastic utility term. This game does not yield a closed-form solution, so I again ran simulations to determine the equilibria for fixed parameters.[19] In all treatments, both parties converge to the same

---

[19]The ϵ terms still have a Gumbel distribution, which means parties' expected utilities are a sum in which each term includes a logistic distribution. This creates the same insolubility problem from the stochastic proximity game.

extreme of the issue space, be it liberal or conservative. If the present median voter is more extreme in its position than the future median voter, then the parties always take the most extreme position on the side of the present median voter. If the future median voter is more extreme than the present median voter, then the results vary. For low values of the future election, the parties will take the most extreme position on the side of the present median voter. When the value of the future election reaches a certain level, the parties switch to taking the most extreme position on the side of the future median voter. Where the parties switch strategies depends on their level of uncertainty: as the variance of the voters' stochastic utility term decreases, the value of the future election that draws parties to the other side of the issue decreases. Hence, the effect that the value of the future has on party strategies is conditional on uncertainty and relative extremity of the present and future electorates.

Appendix 3: Policy Data and Analysis Notes

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Logged ratio of welcoming to hostile laws	0.02	0.45	-0.75	0.94
Self-reported ideology[†]	-15.11	9.39	-33.56	7.69
Congressional voting (Berry et al.)	52.55	15.34	25.53	90.53
Presidential voting (2004)	45.71	8.48	26.40	62.00
Democratic governor[‡]	2.02	1.86	0.00	4.00
Democratic lower chamber[‡]	2.18	1.83	0.00	4.00
Democratic upper chamber[‡]	2.10	1.88	0.00	4.00
% foreign born	8.09	6.04	1.10	27.20
Per capita gross state product[⋆]	35.96	6.43	24.08	57.84
% unemployment	5.07	1.08	3.33	7.90
Legislative professionalism (Squire)	0.18	0.12	0.03	0.63

Notes: $N = 50$. [†]Replicates the original measure from Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) using CCES data. [‡]Ordinal variable. [⋆]In thousands of dollars.

Estimates computed with R 2.9.0.

- Immigration laws enacted by states: The National Conference of State Legislatures

    2005: `http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/IMMIGStateLegisJuly06.htm` (Accessed 28 September 2007)

    2006: `http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/6ImmigEnactedLegis3.htm` (Accessed 27 March 2007)

    2007: `http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/2007immigrationfinal.htm` (Accessed 1 October 2008)

    2008: `http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/2008StateLegislationImmigration.htm` (Accessed 1 February 2009)

- State population in 2005: U.S. Census Bureau, `http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/SC-EST2005-04.html` (Accessed 13 October 2008)

- GDP by state for 2005-2007 (per capita calculated, then averaged): Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, `http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/` (Accessed 17 February 2009)

- State unemployment rate as a percent of workforce for 2005-2007 (averaged): Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, `http://www.bls.gov/LAU/` (Accessed 17 February 2009)

- Squire's index of legislative professionalism in 2003: Squire (2007)

- Party control of state legislatures and number of members of legislatures for 2005-2008: National Conference of State Legislatures, `http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/analysis.htm` (Accessed 18 February 2009)

- Gubernatorial partisanship for 2005-2008: National Governors Association, `http://www.nga.org/` (Accessed 17 February 2009)

- Self-reported citizen ideology in 2006 & 2008:

  - Ansolabehere, Stephen, COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY, 2006: COMMON CONTENT. [Computer File] Release 2: November 14, 2007. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer] `http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/commoncontent.html`

  - Ansolabehere, Stephen, COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY, 2008: COMMON CONTENT. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer]

  - Note: electoral ideology replicates the measure from Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993), which subtracts the percentage of self-identified conservatives from the percentage of self-identified liberals across both the 2006 & 2008 surveys.

- Citizen ideology measure described in Berry et al. (1998): `http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_files/page0005.htm` (Accessed 14 March 2009)

- 2004 presidential vote share: The Federal Election Commission, `http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/tables.pdf` (Accessed 18 February 2009)

Appendix 4: Coding Rules for Significance of Immigration Laws

(4) **Impacts residence:** Laws designed to directly affect the number of foreign-born residents in a state, typically illegal immigrants. This category includes laws that either commission state and local authorities to enforce federal immigration law or specifically snub federal law by refusing to report immigration status to federal authorities. Also, laws that open or close a choke point such as eligibility for driving licenses or employability. Should driving licenses be granted regardless of immigration status or should these be restricted? Can a worker or employer be severely punished, via jail or revocation of business license, if an illegal immigrant is hired? Is the state recruiting outside workers?

(3) **Large-scale effect:** Laws that create general incentives or disincentives for any immigrant who may enter a state. These include providing or restricting benefits for legal or illegal immigrants, including legislation regarding naturalization programs, worker's comp coverage, retirement, higher education funding, or bilingual provisions. This also includes smaller provisions in deportation, employment or licensing laws. Such smaller provisions may include requiring or restricting immigration status verification by employers, making small changes in ease of getting a driving license, and screening arrested persons for immigration status.

(2) **Small-scale effect:** Laws that create incentives or disincentives, but which likely will apply only to a small subgroup of potential immigrants, such as professionals from a specific field, those who may work for a public contractor, asylees, or trafficking victims. These laws might speak to job eligibility or benefit eligibility for the people in these small groups, or may penalize non-immigrants whose behavior

on behalf of these groups is outlawed (i.e., employers of illegal immigrants, traffickers, or smugglers). Also, laws related to matters less central to immigrants' lives, such as voting, professional licenses, gun licenses, property rights, and specified immigrant protection (such as regulating matchmaking services or notarios) fit here. Implementing laws also belong here (i.e., delivering federal funds or developing protocols to deliver services).

(1) Symbolic: Symbolic laws that make an issue statement to Congress, request another branch of government to take action, launch a study or task force, or affirm a principle (such as a commitment to cultural heritage, requesting that employers hire legal persons, or declaring English as a state's official language). Many of these symbolic measures are joint resolutions.

Appendix 5: Details on Partisanship Data and Change Point Analyses

Data Sources

- 1994 California and Texas exit polls: Voter News Service. Voter News Service General Election Exit Polls, 1994 [Computer file]. ICPSR06520-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2007-09-14. doi:10.3886/ICPSR06520, `http://icpsr.org` (Accessed 24 November 2009)

- California partisanship series: The Field Poll Cumulative File, 1956-2008, `http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/` (Accessed 30 June 2009)

- Texas partisanship series: The Texas Poll, 1984-1997, courtesy of the Public Policy Research Institute at Texas A&M University (via James Dyer and Allison Murphy) and the Office of Survey Research at the University of Texas (via O'Neil Provost).

- United States partisanship series:

  - Cumulative American National Election Study, 1948-2004, `http://www.electionstudies.org/` (Accessed 12 November 2009)

  - Cumulative General Social Survey, 1972-2008, `http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website/` (Accessed 12 November 2009)

Change Point Model Theory

For each partisanship series for each demographic group in California, Texas, and the United States, I specify the following model:

$$y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \beta_2 I_{1994} + \beta_3 t \times I_{1994} + \epsilon_t \qquad \text{(A.18)}$$

In equation A.18, y_t represents the proportion identifying with a party, t represents time, I_{1994} is a dummy equal to 0 for all years through 1994 and 1 for all years thereafter, and ϵ_t is a stochastic disturbance. This model specifies that partisanship is a linear trend over time, but the slope and intercept of the trend line shift after 1994. A Chow test of whether the change point alters the trend in y_t is simply an F-test of whether β_2 & β_3 are jointly significant (Chow 1960; Greene 2003, 130-131).

Change Point Results

The following tables show the estimated parameters from equation A.18 when applied to each series, along with the results of the Chow tests.

Table A.2: Hispanic Partisanship in California, Texas, and the United States, Changepoint Analysis

Input variable	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
California Democrats			
Intercept	0.746	0.019	0.000
Post-1994	-0.169	0.121	0.086
Time trend	-0.016	0.001	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.011	0.004	0.005
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.864$, Chow test: $F_{2,33} = 19.433$ $(p < 0.001)$			
California Republicans			
Intercept	0.111	0.016	0.000
Post-1994	0.181	0.106	0.049
Time trend	0.005	0.001	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.010	0.003	0.005
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.451$, Chow test: $F_{2,33} = 12.731$ $(p < 0.001)$			
Texas Democrats			
Intercept	0.365	0.040	0.000
Post-1994	0.121	0.376	0.377
Time trend	0.014	0.006	0.018
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.015	0.028	0.306
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.364$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 0.985$ $(p = 0.404)$			
Texas Republicans			
Intercept	0.152	0.012	0.000
Post-1994	-0.081	0.109	0.237
Time trend	0.004	0.002	0.032
Post-1994 × time trend	0.006	0.008	0.249
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.486$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 0.296$ $(p = 0.750)$			
United States Democrats			
Intercept	43.029	0.734	0.000
Post-1994	18.219	2.491	0.000
Time trend	-0.325	0.072	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.711	0.120	0.000
$N = 31$, $R^2 = 0.883$, Chow test: $F_{2,27} = 28.248$ $(p < 0.001)$			
United States Republicans			
Intercept	-1.538	0.354	0.000
Post-1994	-1.888	1.202	0.064
Time trend	0.135	0.035	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.020	0.058	0.363
$N = 31$, $R^2 = 0.562$, Chow test: $F_{2,27} = 4.607$ $(p = 0.019)$			

Table A.3: White Partisanship in California, Texas, and the United States, Changepoint Analysis

Input variable	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
California Democrats			
Intercept	0.496	0.013	0.000
Post-1994	-0.259	0.084	0.002
Time trend	-0.009	0.001	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.012	0.003	0.000
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.806$, Chow test: $F_{2,33} = 21.152$ ($p < 0.001$)			
California Republicans			
Intercept	0.337	0.013	0.000
Post-1994	0.139	0.082	0.051
Time trend	0.002	0.001	0.004
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.006	0.003	0.017
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.233$, Chow test: $F_{2,33} = 4.554$ ($p = 0.018$)			
Texas Democrats			
Intercept	0.276	0.011	0.000
Post-1994	-0.291	0.106	0.010
Time trend	-0.001	0.002	0.218
Post-1994 × time trend	0.023	0.008	0.008
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.424$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 4.050$ ($p = 0.048$)			
Texas Republicans			
Intercept	0.333	0.015	0.000
Post-1994	0.216	0.145	0.082
Time trend	0.006	0.002	0.011
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.015	0.011	0.091
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.672$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 1.178$ ($p = 0.344$)			
United States Democrats			
Intercept	46.072	0.349	0.000
Post-1994	-1.712	3.352	0.306
Time trend	-0.348	0.014	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.042	0.068	0.271
$N = 57$, $R^2 = 0.965$, Chow test: $F_{2,53} = 0.388$ ($p = 0.680$)			
United States Republicans			
Intercept	27.391	0.954	0.000
Post-1994	2.243	9.154	0.404
Time trend	0.050	0.039	0.103
Post-1994 × time trend	0.028	0.185	0.440
$N = 57$, $R^2 = 0.381$, Chow test: $F_{2,53} = 3.286$ ($p = 0.045$)			

Table A.4: Total Partisanship in California, Texas, and the United States, Changepoint Analysis

Input variable	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
California Democrats			
Intercept	0.665	0.021	0.000
Post-1994	-0.335	0.111	0.002
Time trend	-0.009	0.001	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.010	0.003	0.000
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.845$, Chow test: $F_{2,34} = 25.193$ ($p < 0.001$)			
California Republicans			
Intercept	0.293	0.023	0.000
Post-1994	0.188	0.125	0.071
Time trend	0.001	0.001	0.083
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.005	0.003	0.033
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.280$, Chow test: $F_{2,34} = 4.867$ ($p = 0.014$)			
Texas Democrats			
Intercept	0.307	0.020	0.000
Post-1994	-0.089	0.190	0.325
Time trend	0.004	0.003	0.126
Post-1994 × time trend	0.005	0.014	0.369
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.147$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 0.421$ ($p = 0.666$)			
Texas Republicans			
Intercept	0.284	0.013	0.000
Post-1994	0.042	0.121	0.368
Time trend	0.004	0.002	0.021
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.002	0.010	0.430
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.699$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 0.640$ ($p = 0.546$)			
United States Democrats			
Intercept	48.898	0.412	0.000
Post-1994	-1.098	3.959	0.392
Time trend	-0.292	0.017	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.023	0.080	0.386
$N = 57$, $R^2 = 0.934$, Chow test: $F_{2,53} = 0.045$ ($p = 0.956$)			
United States Republicans			
Intercept	27.724	0.957	0.000
Post-1994	6.052	9.182	0.256
Time trend	-0.085	0.039	0.017
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.040	0.186	0.415
$N = 57$, $R^2 = 0.137$, Chow test: $F_{2,53} = 4.192$ ($p = 0.020$)			

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