

Becoming Each Other? Trends of Convergence in the Strategic Cultures of NATO and ESDP

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, Concentration TransAtlantic Studies.

Chapel Hill
2011

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ABSTRACT

Daniel J. Nikolits: *Becoming Each Other? Trends of Convergence in the Strategic Cultures of NATO and ESDP*
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson)

Strategic culture is a constructivist concept that seeks to understand and explain a security community's actions based upon the collective, identity-driven norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior regarding the pursuit of their security and defense goals. This thesis looks at the strategic cultures of NATO and the ESDP over the last decade. It seeks to place both organizations within matrices to visually represent their respective strategic cultures, and then to compare the trends in their evolution over that timeframe through three case studies of missions where both organizations participated. It finds that, not only are the strategic cultures of both organizations broadening in scope and reach, but they are also converging toward each other. This suggests that mission overlap between them might occur with greater frequency in the future, presenting challenges but also greater opportunity for cooperation between them.

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INTRODUCTION

One of the vital duties of a state is to assure the defense of its territory and the security of its people. In response to events of the 20th century, the leaders in North America and Europe determined that the most effective way to achieve these ends was through a military alliance that would shield their countries from the threats they saw just beyond their borders. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the product of this belief, and it has endured as one of the most important and successful links in the transatlantic relationship. Yet by the end of the century, in an effort to create a more autonomous and capable European security identity, the European Union (EU) announced and launched its separate, joint-security institution, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)¹.

At the beginning of the 21st century, these two organizations exist in a global security environment that is different than half a century ago. Having been granted some authority as arbiters of their members' military capabilities, NATO and the EU have the complex and complicated task of determining when, where and how to utilize these defense forces to provide security. Observers and theorists may look at power capabilities (neorealism) or institutional structures (neoliberal institutionalism) to explain how these organizations decide to answer these questions, but there are also intangible factors such as norms, values, and ideas that influence the degree and frequency with which military force is used. The concept of 'strategic culture' has been developed to describe the unique ideational conditions that

¹ With the ratification and entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the ESDP was re-launched and renamed as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). For the purposes of this thesis, the institution will be referred to as ESDP, as it was under that heading that all of the missions described here operated.

influence an actor's perception of its security, its role in the world and the necessary and proper conditions for the use of force within or beyond its borders.

This thesis aims to provide a description of the ways in which the strategic cultures of NATO and the EU, via ESDP, have evolved over the past decade, and to ask how these changes may affect the operational relationship between the two organizations. Being able to track any divergence in their strategic cultures may help to identify potential challenges for future cooperation. On the other hand, strategic cultures that are converging may suggest a reduction in obstacles to cooperation in future military missions. Such concerns are relevant, given the formalized interdependence of NATO and the EU regarding available resources, as one would hope that those who more similarly internalize security threats in the world and the means with which to address them would make for better partners.

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: STRATEGIC CULTURE

The development of the term ‘strategic culture’ and its use in modern security and defense policy research began with Snyder’s work in the late 1970s on Soviet nuclear strategic-thinking, which he argued needed to be framed as a culturally-based “set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns” by military elites.² His charge was that rationalism and game theory in international relations were limited at times in their use, as the theories assumed that all actors conceptualized the world based on the same logic and perspective and would therefore behave in a uniformly predictable manner. This was not a denial of the explanatory worth of material-based theories, but an introduction of ideational structures into security and defense descriptions that would allow for a more complete understanding of a nation’s strategic behavior.

The theory would start to flourish in the literature following its adoption by constructivist authors in a series of works beginning in the mid-1990s. The focus of this generation of scholars was to outline the elements of culture in a way that would allow for more meaningful analytical research. Constructivism takes into account the socializing structures in which actors exist, including norms, societal values, beliefs, and ideas on state behavior, as the context for identity formation.³ This identity builds a set of parameters that define for the actor the bounds of appropriateness and helps to set out what options for behavior are not only available, but permissible as well. In debates on security and defense

² Quoted in Landis, 2005, p. 2

³ Ibid., p. 3

policy analysis, these non-material elements outline the strategic culture that then act as an intervening variable in explaining the options and choices for behavior of states or international organizations.⁴

One may sum up the concept with the definition of strategic culture as “comprising the socially transmitted, identity-driven norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals.”⁵ The meaning of norms in the above definition is described as the social facts that delineate an actor’s identity and the bounds of appropriate behavior. They are deeply held and collectively accepted within an actor’s social realm, thus should not be viewed as fleeting or easily changed.⁶ The values and norms for security and defense within a community of actors will be apparent through the pattern of actions and discourse surrounding their attempt to meet their security needs. While the behavior of an actor at a singular moment or in a singular action may not reveal much regarding their strategic culture, repeated actions taken over time will begin to expose those characteristics of a security and defense policy that an actor views as necessary and appropriate.

The norms and ideological structures of a political community are socialized through complex cognitive processes over time, and it should be assumed that they are not transitory concepts but have some permanency. Indeed, a concept of malleable and short-lived culture would have little use. However, this does not mean that strategic cultures are entirely static

⁴ Meyer, 2004

⁵ Meyer, 2005, p. 528

⁶ Meyer, 2004, p. 4

and do not change at all. The literature describes three mechanisms for social learning that may allow for the long-term change in direction of an actor's security policy. The first is a change in the perception of security threats. The disappearance or transformation of such threats may not cause the immediate abandonment of any defense adaptations that developed to meet the threat. However it will erode the necessity and value of those adaptations, which over time may open up the community to new policies. A second mechanism comes from the normative influences that arise from the socializing effects of collective interaction within new decision-making institutions. When some actors find that their ideas and beliefs are incoherent with the norms of the majority, they will often soften or give up their positions to align themselves with the thinking of their new community. A third mechanism for social learning occurs more rapidly than the two described above, and may be described as the reaction to intense crises that act as 'formative moments.' When events occur that directly challenge the values of a security community or a situation arises that puts multiple values in conflict with each other, and if these events are powerful enough to be made aware in the collective consciousness, long held beliefs for the use of defense and security forces may change to reconcile with a new reality.⁷

Such communities must not be limited to only nation-states as central actors. The definition of strategic culture is flexible in setting the boundaries of a security community and can also be applied to include much broader and more inclusive groups. By defining the bounds of the community as a supranational or international institution, such as the ESDP or NATO, it is possible to speak of and analyze 'institutional strategic culture,' which can be said to operate under the same principles as one would expect for a national strategic culture.

⁷ Meyer, 2005, pp. 532-542

Toje finds it entirely appropriate to adapt strategic culture to an institution for multiple reasons. First, the concept is ‘non-deterministic’ and ‘dynamic’ enough that it can be applied to non-state actors, that is, institutions. Second, the term is not exclusive, and can be used to describe the multiple and overlapping strategic cultures that may exist. Finally, it links ‘strategic means’ with ‘political ends,’ that is, it provides a yardstick whereby the degree to which security ideas, norms and values, as expressed through strategic discourse, are reflected in patterns of behavior.⁸

⁸ Toje, 2009, p. 9

II. SIGNIFICANCE IN CHARTING STRATEGIC CULTURE

For two decades now, since the original *raison d'être* of NATO dissipated, a debate has been on-going as to what the Alliance should become. This debate was amplified with the development of the ESDP, which left many wondering if the EU had created a partner or competitor to NATO. The comparison of their respective strategic cultures can be beneficial to these debates by providing some clarification in two ways. First, by determining the changes in strategic culture for one institution, it can be used to better understand how the members of that institution comprehend its purpose. The normative and ideational trends regarding the intent and proper use of military force, and how these have been expressed in mission choice, can suggest what mission-types are possible and likely to be chosen in the future. While it may remain valid to question the focus or effectiveness of an institution, understanding its strategic culture will help to define the bounds in which its members will determine the appropriateness of future action.

Second, when the strategic cultures are compared alongside one another, the degree to which they converge or diverge can be used to understand how the institutions may interact with one another, especially when operating in the same theater of engagement. This is especially relevant for NATO and the ESDP, due to the interdependency of the organizations and the compliment of resources they share. Divergence in the strategic cultures of NATO and the ESDP may signify greater inter-institutional conflict, and be evidence for validating the opinions of those who see a growing rift in trans-Atlantic security relations. While on the other hand, their convergence may represent opportunities for greater coordination and

cooperation in future missions. In this way, then, the changes that have occurred over the past decade to their strategic cultures are relevant for describing the prospects for effective operational interaction between them. These changes are outlined briefly below along their normative and ideational elements. In subsequent sections, these evolutionary changes will be described in greater detail in the context of case missions from the last ten years.

Normative evolution for military action

NATO was created as the prime defense alliance for its members during the Cold War. Yet in the years since, while maintaining this core function, NATO has adopted more proactive norms for its forces in ensuring the broader global security of its members. The case studies that follow suggest NATO is willing to use its forces more readily, frequently, and for ends other than the defense of Alliance territory. Similarly, over the past decade the military capabilities of the ESDP and the norms regarding their use, conceived to confront crises at earlier and more manageable stages, have also trended toward more active engagement. Even in contexts where the EU is deploying military forces as a part of a multi-faceted political and economic approach, over the last decade the EU has become more willing to confront security threats at earlier stages.

While more assertive in deploying forces abroad, the ends NATO has sought through these missions have been less broad than the EU. With greater regularity over the last ten years, NATO has used its military instruments to assist in stabilizing conflicts and to provide security by confronting situations in greatest conflict with the international community's values of rights. For the EU, the motivating ends for the use of force are largely the same as for NATO. However, additional emphasis has always been placed on having the missions be an element of a larger, integrated effort working toward not only the security, but also the

prosperity and development of these conflict regions. Therefore, while NATO's security ends are aimed at human security, the EU places more emphasis on the values of freedom, good governance, and economic sustainability that greater security can provide.

Ideational evolution for military action

As a defense organization, NATO had maintained a very limited operating area that was focused on ensuring the security and territorial integrity of its members. Following Kosovo, and especially after the September 11th attacks, the perception by NATO as to where the most pressing threats to the security of its members shifted to "out-of-area." The prevailing view of the Alliance has become that threats would more often than not necessitate action beyond the borders of the members, as the case studies will suggest. For the ESDP, one of its founding aims was to ensure a stable, secure and friendly zone on the borders of the EU, so there has been less of an ideological barrier in attending to threats outside the peripheries of the Union. However, the EU has also stated its ambitions "to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world."⁹ With the aim of making "an impact on a global scale," the EU has made clear that it does not view itself as a regional security actor only.¹⁰ In its willingness to address new and distant threats over the last decade, the ESDP has drawn on a unique and ever expanding range of instruments, including greater utilization of its military capabilities, to manage the EU's widening perception of security threats. In so doing, the EU has adopted a more active security role and has given

⁹ European Council, 2003b, p. 1

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 14

itself the tasks of being "ready to shape events" around the globe, as well as becoming "more effective and visible around the world."¹¹

¹¹ European Council, 2008b, p. 2

III. METHODOLOGY

This article focuses on comparing the institutional strategic cultures of the ESDP and NATO by looking at the actions and strategic actors involved in articulating their respective security and defense policies. In the first two sections, the institutional histories, relevant documents, and strategic development of NATO and ESDP through the 1990s and into the early 2000s will be reviewed in order to frame the strategic cultures of the two organizations at the beginning of this decade. Based upon Meyer's definition of strategic culture above, the reviews will outline the strategic ideas and norms that articulate the respective security and defense goals of the EU and NATO. Then, adapting and applying the normative and ideational matrices proposed by Meyer¹² and developed by Wilke¹³, the strategic cultures of the EU and NATO will be graphed alongside each other.

[FIGURE 1]

[FIGURE 2]

The normative matrix utilizes one axis of a continuum of positions reflecting the desired ends of military action, ranging between the imposition of values on one extreme to projecting a powerful security image on the other, as well as an axis reflecting the continuum of normative attitudes regarding the appropriate use of military force, ranging from pacifistic refusal of the use of force to open aggression at the extremes. The ideational matrix reflects the actor's perception for the necessary scope of military force. One axis reflects where, in

¹² Meyer, 2004, pp. 6-7

¹³ Wilke, 2007, pp. 25-29

proximity to itself, the actor perceives the source of the most pressing threats to be, ranging from narrow threats residing within the borders of its members to wide threats as existing globally in new and distant theaters of engagement. The other axis reflects the degree to which military operations should be unilaterally or multilaterally undertaken. These graphs are not meant to be definitive, but to allow for a visual placement of strategic culture elements relative to one another, which can be used for comparison again later.

In proposing an analysis of a security community's strategic culture, it is relevant to ask on what kind of documentation the analysis will be based. First are the operational decisions taken by the actor, that is, the type of mission chosen and the selected means and ends deemed appropriate regarding it. As stated above, strategic culture frames and ranks the possible behavioral options for an actor. The ultimate actions carried out in mission selection may not be the only possible options available for the security community, but having been determined to be the most appropriate and desired actions to take, they can be seen as an expression of the bounds of the mainstream, collectively held values and norms of the group.

While it would be inappropriate to apply the normative and ideational characteristics surrounding an action in reflexively explaining the decision for that same action, it is possible to place those elements that underpin strategic culture within a range of potential means, ends and perceived threats on a continuum, such as with the matrices above. By then looking at multiple cases within a given period in time, it may be possible to outline established patterns in decision-making outcomes that help to describe the accepted used of force and limits to security and defense measures. In viewing actions as containing the elements of strategic culture, the established patterns that are inferred can be used to compare the bounds of how one organization views the use of force in security and defense relative to

another, how these accepted views may be changing, and provide insight into how future missions may be determined and by what means carried out.

A more subtle tracking of a community's strategic culture be found within the constructive language usage and deliberation process surrounding a mission. One may utilize the discourse of the community, patterns of speech and repeated messages of the polity to ascertain "the way in which challenges and threats are identified by particular actors, [and incorporate] the recommendations they assert for attempting to deal with them."¹⁴ While the concept of strategic culture acknowledges a role for publics and society in the (re)creation and propagation of norms and values, it is valid and beneficial to focus studies on discourse on the languages of what Howard describes as "political subjectivities" to articulate these collective norms.¹⁵ Rogers describes these relevant "securitizing actors" as officials, academics, and politicians, that is, those members of the community with the authority to issue statements relevant to the formation of security and defense policies.¹⁶ Lock is even more straightforward, stating that the study of strategic culture "demands the analysis of the discourse of the politics of strategy."¹⁷ To him, texts worth analyzing include any relevant to the discourse and development of strategy for the political community of study. In sifting through the many positions within a given debate, the most dominant and mutually held ideas and beliefs will be propagated, reflecting the culture in which security actions are decided upon and carried out.

¹⁴ Rogers, 2009, p. 836

¹⁵ Howard, 2004

¹⁶ Rogers, 2009, p. 837

¹⁷ Lock, 2010, p. 702

The goals of this project are not only to describe and compare the changes in the strategic cultures of NATO and the ESDP, but also to track how their strategic cultures might affect the operational relations between them. Ideal missions to use for case studies, therefore, would be those where the two organizations operated in the same theater, allowing for comparison. Since 2003, NATO and the ESDP have engaged in 37 combined operations around the world, of which they operated in the same theater 8 times.¹⁸ From these missions, three military operations have been chosen as case studies for this thesis: first, conflict management operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; second, support missions to AMIS in Darfur; and third, anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, these cases occurred spaced throughout the past decade, which allows for longitudinal changes to be noted. Also, the missions operated in areas that may not have been as heavily stressed publicly as other missions over the same timeframe. This may have lessened (although not eliminated) the outside pressure and scrutiny upon the organizations in making their decisions in pursuing their security goals, and therefore makes the notable elements of those decisions more pertinent for the project at hand.

Based upon these case studies, the elements of strategic culture described above will be again reviewed and the results graphed against the original 'baseline' strategic cultures on the normative and ideational matrices. Comparing these results will reveal the directions in which the respective strategic cultures of the EU and NATO have been trending over the past decade. The decision by an international institution to deploy military force, it should be noted, is made based on a complex set of justifications, and an institution's strategic culture, while not rapidly changed, is always being acted upon. Providing analysis, therefore, is sometimes like aiming at a moving target. Due to acknowledged limitations within this

¹⁸ NATO, 2010a; European Council, 2011

thesis, it would be imprecise to suggest that the final set of graphs presented should be interpreted as pinpoint, definitive results. Rather, they should be seen as outlining the trends for the directions that the respective strategic cultures have developed over the last decade.

IV. OUTLINING THE ‘BASELINE’ STRATEGIC CULTURES

In order to view the changes in strategic culture over the last decade, we must first have a sense of where NATO and the ESDP were at the beginning of that timeframe. The following overviews will present the normative and ideational undercurrents within the organizations around the turn of this century, in order to place them within the matrices on the beliefs regarding military force.

NATO

During its first 40 years of existence, NATO evolved as a mutual defense alliance to guard its members’ territory against the threat of invasion. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the perceptions of such direct threats to Western Europe dissipated, and many observers began questioning NATO’s future relevance and necessity. While its purpose remained a point of contention, NATO proved to be the most effective institution available in dealing with the unforeseen conflicts that broke out over the decade. During the Persian Gulf War in 1990 and then again as Yugoslavia broke apart through civil war, the Alliance showed its enduring worth with its ability to organize coalitions and help restore stability.¹⁹ The repeated security crises of the decade in proximity to, but outside, the borders of NATO proved to be a series of formative moments for the Alliance in its perception of threats. A process of normative evolution and redefinition began

¹⁹ Medcalf, 2008, p. 52

taking place within NATO, effecting decisions such as the one taken in June 1992, for example, to send alliance troops ‘out-of-area’ for the first time.²⁰

The next major crisis that arose on European soil, the Serbian aggression against Kosovar Albanians, would prove to be even more of a formative moment for NATO. The conflict in Kosovo reinforced for many the idea that, going forward, the most pressing security threats requiring military intervention would take place externally rather than internally and require more active engagement. Many began to argue that NATO needed to “go out-of-area” as needed, or simply “go out of business.”²¹ Rhetorically, at this time, the purview of NATO was becoming an expanded “Euro-Atlantic area,” which many saw as recognition of the need to address conflicts and concerns “outside or on the periphery of alliance territory.”²² Yet, a complete conversion did not occur within NATO to reorient the focus of its security missions. Strong dissenting views that emphasized the primacy of NATO as a defense-oriented institution were reflected in the sometimes ambiguous wording evident in the 1999 Strategic Concept. Still, language referring to undertaking “new activities” for the “wider security” of the Euro-Atlantic region testifies to the fact that, while dissenters still sought to maintain its purpose as a defense alliance for its members, an ‘out-of-area’ outlook for NATO was becoming accepted.²³

NATO’s response to the crisis in Kosovo was also significant in how it demonstrated the members’ willingness to use military force not only defensively, but also to proactively engage in regional conflicts to hinder them from turning into direct security threats. Such

²⁰ Ibid., p. 62

²¹ Lugar, 1993

²² Boland, 1999, p. 27

²³ Medcalf, 2008, p. 97-99

engagement was not met without controversy, however, even within NATO, suggesting that these decisions were not yet fixed norms, but rather in flux. During the campaign that began in March 1999, NATO relied primarily on tactical air strikes and precision technology over ground troops. Some members criticized this approach for being indiscriminately destructive, however ground forces were sent in only after open hostilities had ended to keep the peace. NATO's intervention against Serbia was also controversial with the international community. While ultimatums had come from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), no resolution authorizing the use of military force against Serbia had been passed by the body. This was problematic because legal norms of the international community assert that actions "involving the threat or use of armed force and undertaken without the mandate...of the Security Council...remain in breach of international law."²⁴ Despite the lack of a UNSC Resolution, NATO proceeded with its campaign of "sustained military action outside NATO territory against a sovereign state."²⁵ NATO members thus viewed the proactive use of military force beyond its boundaries and without international sanction as appropriate in times of necessity, revealing the shift that had taken place away from its self-image as a defense-only alliance.

The European Union

For the European Union, too, the experience of the Balkan conflicts proved to be a formative moment in the development of a more autonomous European security and defense structure. Though the 1993 adoption of the Maastricht Treaty established the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy, it neither provided nor created new

²⁴ Sima, 1993, p. 3

²⁵ Solana, 1999, p. 117

European military institutions. Rather, it recognized the Western European Union as the mechanism through which the driving principles of European military action, the Petersberg Tasks, were to be implemented, and sought to embed a more pronounced European Security and Defense Identity within the structure of NATO. In this way, EU coalitions could call upon ‘separable but not separate’ resources to carry out its own missions, but not require the creation of more robust EU military forces or threaten relations with the US.

European military dependence on NATO during the Kosovo air strikes convinced leaders on the continent that more than an identity was necessary for Europeans to ensure their own security. The St-Malo declaration in December 1998 solidified positions for “the ability for autonomous action, backed by a credible military force” and provided the support needed to launch the European Security and Defense Policy.²⁶ The institutional merging of the WEU into the EU, and the transformation of ESDI to ESDP came into effect at the Cologne Summit in June 1999. The agreement to develop more robust institutions for the EU implies that a European willingness to deploy military force had taken shape in the supranational realm. The new institutions and organizational hierarchies were set up to increase the ability of Europe to provide its own security needs, but they were directed at undeclared threats, and conceptualized for dealing with military conflicts such as those occurring in the Balkans.²⁷ Since its creation, then, the ESDP has been oriented more fully toward external action than NATO at the time.

The decision-making power and oversight of ESDP ultimately rests with the European Council, guiding the development of common positions through a policy of

²⁶ Institute for Security Studies, 2001, p. 8

²⁷ Grevi et al., 2009, p. 14

unanimity. However, this policy proved to be a challenge for decisive and cohesive action, as witnessed most acutely during the Iraq crisis in 2002-2003. In response to the divisive political positions held across Europe, and at the request of High Representative Solana, the Council authorized the drafting of the European Security Strategy to better define the common strategic position of the EU. The final draft of the document, approved in December 2003, can be interpreted as the attempt to define the EU's common threats and security interests, and can be used as a way to map the developing strategic culture guiding ESDP, contemporaneous with when the EU was undertaking its first missions, both civilian and military.

The ESS recognizes that while the European integration project has created a more secure, prosperous and free continent, the challenges of the future are different than those of the past. The pressing threats facing Europe are perceived as globalized and multi-faceted, and in confronting these threats, “the first line of defense will often be abroad.”²⁸ To meet these challenges, the ESS calls for the development of “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention,” and emphasizes a doctrine of active “preventive engagement” that will respond to potentially destabilizing situations before greater conflicts and humanitarian emergencies arise.²⁹ Military intervention will be undertaken when necessary, but a broader spectrum of instruments providing for civilian crisis management must be available to meet the many complex elements of new threats to the Union. The ESS also emphasizes the need for “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international

²⁸ European Council, 2003b, p. 7

²⁹ Ibid., p. 11

order,” declaring that no nation can meet its security needs alone.³⁰ Yet, while principles of global partnerships and multilateralism are seen as the underpinnings of a peaceful Europe, the ultimate ends of international stability remain the security of Europe and its citizens.

Using these descriptions, we can now place NATO and the ESDP along the normative and ideational matrices.

[FIGURE 3]

Coming out of the debates of what the post-Cold War focus of NATO should be, the Alliance was divided in terms of broadening the focus of addressing security threats. Many believed NATO should remain focused on territorial defense. The conflicts in the Balkans proved for others that preventative action to keep regional conflicts from escalating was a legitimate role for NATO. The inexact language of the 1999 Strategic Concept satisfied both sides, but showed that there was support for a larger NATO security role. In any event, the ends of any action remained the provision of a zone of security for its members. The ESDP had been created in the wake of the Balkan wars and, more so than NATO, was designed to address security concerns for EU members at an earlier stage. The many EU instruments had the intent of preventing open conflict from intensifying, and military intervention was counted among the possible instruments. The ESDP also operates with the guidelines of the Petersberg Task, adopting for its missions ends based beyond territorial integrity, incorporating an ideology of human rights that places it closer toward the values end of the normative spectrum of security than NATO.

[FIGURE 4]

³⁰ Ibid., p. 9

For its first 40 years, NATO's primary threat was invasion close to home and operated with the narrow perception of countering the aggressor that existed on the eastern flank of its members. This changed due to the events of the 1990's, but while NATO members began to view new threats outside the borders, the extent beyond the borders remained limited. The focus of ensuring territorial integrity expanded, but only to the near proximity. The ESDP arrived with a slightly larger purview. The EU sought to maintain stability and security in the general neighborhood of the Union, but also allowed the flexibility to deploy missions to address broader security threats that may have less direct effect on EU territories. Regarding security cooperation, both NATO and the ESDP relied on forces of coalitions. But while NATO operated with coalitions that rotated based upon mission need and member resources, the ESDP devised plans for standing forces that would be deployed rapidly when needed and seemed intent on utilizing such a mechanism, assuming all missions would have unanimous support, over ad-hoc coalition building.

V. CASES

Conflict management in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

Soon after the creation of the ESDP, but before the attacks on September 11th, both NATO and the EU had been notably shifting their conceptions of what constituted a security threat that required and legitimated the use of their respective military forces. In the FYROM, nearly a decade of imposed peace by UN Peacekeeping forces was disrupted following the NATO airstrikes against Serbia. Overwhelmed with the crisis on their border and an influx of refugees, long standing tensions between the Macedonian state and its ethnic Albanian minority were exacerbated and broke out into open conflict in 2001. Uniting under the National Liberation Army (UÇK), in early March 2001 Albanian rebels attacked Macedonian forces in a village near the Kosovo border and maintained an armed presence that threatened to become a new ethnic conflict.³¹ In response, NATO KFOR troops stationed in Kosovo were deployed to the Kosovo-Macedonia border in order to seal it and prevent the ethnic Albanians there from supporting to UÇK with soldiers and military supplies, but NATO refrained from direct military intervention.

Political efforts to quell the situation were made by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and EU High Representative Solana through ‘shuttle diplomacy’ in Brussels and Skopje: the EU utilized its leverage of conditionality through the recently signed Stability and Association Agreement to restrain the Macedonian government, while NATO took advantage of its legitimacy as an ally of the ethnic Albanians to get the UÇK to agree to a

³¹ Mace, 2004, p 475

ceasefire.³² Negotiations successfully brokered the Ohrid Framework Agreement on August 13, which imposed a ceasefire on both sides, recognized the FYROM as a single, multi-ethnic state, and ensured the equal representation of ethnic Albanians within the state and civic institutions.³³

As KFOR troops were engaged in Kosovo when fighting broke out and prevailing military and political logic was that the two conflicts were causally linked, FYROM became part of NATO's de facto theater of action.³⁴ However, the Alliance's hesitancy to engage militarily is evidence of the internal debate of the appropriateness of 'out of area' missions and the desire not to become entrenched in another Kosovo-style campaign. NATO was heavily criticized³⁵ for the way it begrudgingly, it seemed, entered the conflict, admittedly taking a stance that was "not pro-active, but reactive" to realities on the ground.³⁶ However, NATO's leadership recognized the legitimate security threats the conflict presented and, as before, that they were the only organization with the capabilities to provide stability and security and prevent another war. This, and NATO's desire to maintain their credibility with the international community following Kosovo, convinced the Alliance to send forces into Macedonia, on the conditions that they were requested by the Macedonian government to assist and "after a durable ceasefire and a political agreement [were] in place."³⁷ In mid-

³² Sköld & Riggle, 2001, p. 3

³³ Mace, 2004, p. 477-478

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Karon, 2001

³⁶ Sköld & Riggle, 2001, p. 1

³⁷ Ibid.

August, NATO began Operation Essential Harvest, sending a mediating force to arbitrate the initial terms of the ceasefire.

Essential Harvest's primary mission over its 30-day mandate was the collection of 3,300 voluntarily-surrendered weapons from the UÇK, carried out by a relatively small military force of 3,500 NATO troops.³⁸ These troops were primarily seen as political confidence builders for the two sides of the conflict, as the total number of weapons collected amounted to fewer than 3 percent of the estimated cache held by the rebels, but did effectively project an image of stability.³⁹ At the conclusion of the mission, and upon the appeal of the Macedonian government and the United Nations, NATO re-authorized the presence of its troops with Operation Amber Fox to provide security to political monitors and act as a liaison force. Due to the improving security conditions in FRYOM and to the uncertainty following the September 11th attacks, the force size was reduced to 800 troops. However, the further authorization of NATO forces with Amber Fox and then its subsequent replacement with Operation Allied Harmony, emphasize the full commitment "to the stabilization process" that NATO had taken on in an 'out of area' country, further marking the shift NATO was taking away from a territorial-defense-only Alliance.⁴⁰

Over this time, there was a growing eagerness by European leaders to utilize the available, although yet untested, military capabilities of the ESDP. Meeting in Barcelona in March 2002, the European Council declared its readiness and "availability to take responsibility...for an operation to follow that currently undertaken by NATO in FYROM."⁴¹

³⁸ By comparison, there were 50,000 NATO-led KFOR troops operating in Kosovo at that time.

³⁹ Liotta & Jebb, 2002, p. 100

⁴⁰ Mace, 2004, p. 481

⁴¹ Monaco, 2002, p. 1

Before a transition would occur, questions remained about resources provided by the not-yet finalized Berlin-Plus framework, as well as if NATO would be willing to hand over the mission to their potential security rival in the EU.⁴² The EU believed they had significant grounds to take over the mission: all three of the missions under the NATO heading were composed principally of European soldiers and officers; the EU had been operating in FYROM as the major political arbiter, utilizing its dual leverage of economic incentives and accession promises, to ensure implementation of the peace accords; and most emphatically, this was the type of military mission within the European neighborhood that the ESDP was designed for. On this foundation, following the Berlin-Plus breakthrough in December 2002, both sides prepared for the transition to the first ESDP military operation: Concordia.

The Joint Action announcement by the European Council on 27 January 2003 began with an enthusiastic endorsement of “the readiness of the European Union to conduct a military operation,” continuing to provide the stable and secure environment necessary for the ongoing implementation of the Framework Agreement.⁴³ With the official launch of the mission on 31 March, the EU force of 350 troops entered the FYROM to take up its security mission. While this was recognized as the first military mission undertaken by ESDP, the Council reinforced that it operated in a context multiple tools the EU was utilizing in the region to reinforce “a broad approach with activities to address the whole range of rule of law aspects.”⁴⁴ In this way, the EU was both launching and testing the capabilities of its multi-level approach to dealing with security in its neighborhood.

⁴² Monoco, 2002, p. 1

⁴³ European Council, 2003a

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Having both assessed the situation as requiring a strategic need to send security forces, NATO and the ESDP had to deal with confusing and muddled command structures. The transfer of operational control from NATO to the EU was completed quickly, as Concordia leadership was ‘double-hatted’ and integrated into both NATO and EU structures. The EU Operational Commander, for example, was NATO’s Deputy SACEUR General Rainer Feist. Also, Operation Headquarters for the ESDP mission were set up within NATO facilities. Yet, these arrangements proved, paradoxically, to make for a cumbersome communications chain, and information sharing between the two institutions was at times deficient among different units in the field.⁴⁵ There were also difficulties in clearly delineating between missions, as NATO maintained a presence in Skopje through Senior Civilian and Military Representatives to assist the government with security reforms.⁴⁶ Despite the confusing arrangement, however, general assessments were that overall on the ground EU-NATO cooperation was successful.⁴⁷

The Berlin-Plus chain of command structure, on the other hand, proved a barrier to the successful coordination of civil and military instruments. Complex flows of information between relevant actors and strict delineation of Concordia as a military mission prevented coherent coordination with the EU political mission in FYROM. Having launched hurriedly and attaching itself closely to NATO’s missions, the EU effectively compartmentalized itself and hindered effective leveraging of all its civilian instruments, which had proven to be useful during the crisis negotiations in 2001.⁴⁸ The missions in FYROM displayed the

⁴⁵ Gross, 2009, p. 177

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Mace, 2004, p. 483

⁴⁸ Gross, 2009, p. 179

potential for cooperation between the EU and NATO when rhetorical ambitions, strategic priorities and mission outcomes could be negotiated, but also the many communication and control difficulties that arise when it is judged to be a necessity to conduct parallel operations.

Support missions to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – Darfur

A starker example of the broadening views of NATO and the EU in utilizing their military capabilities for global security and stability missions can be seen in the response to the crisis in Sudan. When fighting broke out in Sudan's western province of Darfur in February 2003, it began as politically motivated attacks by rebel groups who claimed the central government was oppressing and marginalizing the black Sudanese in the region. The government in Khartoum responded by sending the military and the Arab Janjaweed militia to suppress the rebels. The intra-Sudanese conflict quickly escalated along ethnic lines, and grievous assaults were carried out against civilian villages in Darfur. Within a few months, hundreds of thousands of Darfurians were dead, upwards of two million civilians were internally displaced in camps, and another 200,000 had fled as refugees into neighboring Chad.⁴⁹

Joint efforts by the international community in negotiating with all sides in the conflict produced the N'Djamena cease fire agreement that was signed on 8 April 2004. The agreement had little effect on the actions of the militias on the ground, however, and the conflict and attacks against civilians continued. In July 2004, the African Union (AU) made the decision to deploy a civilian protection and observation force to Darfur, named AMIS. Although it was the first AU mission of its kind and had limited resources, AMIS patrols

⁴⁹ Medcalf, 2009, p. 149

found some success where they operated. It was determined by the AU in late April 2005 to therefore double the size of the forces, and to include the addition of civilian police and military observers.⁵⁰

Though AMIS had the support of UNSC Resolution 1590, the possibilities of direct assistance of the UN through a peace operation within Sudan were limited due to a refusal of consent by Sudan's government.⁵¹ Instead, Chairman of the Commission of the African Union, Oumar Konaré, made direct appeals to the EU, which had already been involved politically and financially in peace negotiations, and to NATO, upon the suggestion of US Secretary of State Rice. He requested assistance with AU troop transport capabilities, AU personnel training, and logistical support, such as communications.⁵² As both organizations had been approached by the AU, discussions began as to whether assistance would be delivered via a NATO- or ESDP-led mission. Having gained confidence in the capabilities of the ESDP, EU leaders pushed for its institutions to have the primary coordinating role, placing NATO in an adjunct position. An equally strong push was made by NATO for the lead role in operations, and as one senior official reflected, what began as "a discussion on mandates and the future role of the organizations" became "competition and jealousy" between two squabbling and mistrustful bureaucracies.⁵³

It was not immediately clear what effect the public "beauty contest" would have on end results, but it was apparent that this operation would be run differently than those preceding. On 26 May 2005, the EU announced a consolidated assistance package in support

⁵⁰ Cazelles, 2007, pp. 19-20

⁵¹ Franke, 2009, p. 256

⁵² Medcalf, 2009, p. 150

⁵³ SR Haavisto, quoted in European Council, 2005, p. 33

of AMIS operations. The North Atlantic Council followed suit and agreed on 9 June to offer NATO's support to the mission. In the end, it was decided that the EU and NATO would work in conjunction with one another, reporting to an AU-led military cell, making the missions to support AMIS the first time that NATO and the EU worked together in a military mission, outside the framework of Berlin-Plus.⁵⁴

For the EU, seeking stability in Africa had been a principle of EU foreign policy, stretching back to its earliest treaties. Within the 1957 Treaty of Rome, provisions were made to supply financing and aid through European Development Funds to African countries, a policy expanded in the 1975 Lome Convention and affirmed in the 2000 Cotonou ACP-EU agreement. This latter accord fundamentally reconstituted and broadened the political and economic relations between Africa and Europe to include promises of security provisions in times of need, stating among other articles, that the partners "shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution."⁵⁵ This implies that the EU views itself as a security partner with Africa. While the Cotonou agreement does not explicitly state direct military assistance will be delivered, in the context of Darfur, the EU determined it to be appropriate to deploy its military capabilities in what had become a humanitarian crisis.

This self-image of being a partner for stability and security on the African continent has also been reinforced through the EU's ties with the African Union. Rather than focus solely on development aid, the EU has incorporated an 'African Ownership' policy, an approach that requires the EU to work effectively with "other countries and the United

⁵⁴ Dombey, 2005

⁵⁵ Cotonou, 2000, Article 11

Nations [to help] enhance African institutional capacities and closely cooperate with them.”⁵⁶ It requires that the EU provide support when requested, but that in African matters the AU is recognized as the primary institution. As the situation in Darfur worsened, the EU formalized this stance in the Action Plan for ESDP stating that it acted based upon “full respect for African ownership,” but “upon requests by African partners, the EU stands ready to consider other forms of support that fall within the realm of ESDP.”⁵⁷ In close coordination with the UN, the EU had already been utilizing its full-range of diplomatic instruments since early 2003. In addition to funding various agencies to assist with the negotiations for the N’Djamena agreement, the EU also appointed two senior diplomats to coordinate the measures taken by the EU with other institutions. Financially, the EU also allocated more than €1 billion toward the Darfur crisis, splitting that amount between humanitarian aid and direct support for AMIS through the African Peace Facility funding instrument.⁵⁸ But after the 2003 cease fire failed and the 2004 agreement went unheeded by militia forces, the 2004 Action Plan committed the EU to supporting African forces on the African continent with its own military instruments, becoming the official ESDP civilian-military mission on 18 July 2005.

For NATO, the decision to meet the request by the AU for assistance with AMIS can be described as being predicated on the steadily increasing self-perception by the Alliance that it should play a leading role within international security operations. Despite never having deployed a mission to Africa and lacking the historical relations with the continent

⁵⁶ HR Solana, quoted in Cazelles, 2007, p 10

⁵⁷ European Council, 2004, Introduction

⁵⁸ Franke, 2009, pp. 257-258

that the EU had, Alliance officials did not feel that this precluded NATO from engaging in Sudan.⁵⁹ Supporters regarded NATO as “the premier transatlantic organization for political, economic, and military coordination and action,” and as such the response to this crisis should be organized through its network of institutions.⁶⁰ Participation and partnership through NATO was the preferred method for some to face the challenges of the institution as it began to embrace its new understanding of a comprehensive approach to security.⁶¹ Seeking to “preserve its position as the first instance for consultation on security issues,”⁶² NATO had come to see responding to humanitarian crises, especially those viewed as ‘genocide,’ as being in its interest for the security of its members, regardless where these conflicts occurred.

Having both made the determination that they possessed the mandate to lead the organization of the support mission, and despite common mission perspectives, the EU and NATO were unable to reach any common position regarding planning and command structures. Operations were never discussed at the political level between the EU and NATO, nor were there any discussions between the ESDP’s Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council.⁶³ Contrary to the rhetorical emphasis on both sides to avoid a duplication of efforts “to ensure maximum complementarity [*sic*] and effectiveness,”⁶⁴ NATO and the EU wound up dispatching two separate expert teams to

⁵⁹ INSS, 2008, p. 7

⁶⁰ Lieberman, 2006

⁶¹ Hofman, 2009, p. 48

⁶² Jung, 2006

⁶³ Touzovskaia, 2006, p. 251

⁶⁴ de Hoop Scheffer, 2005

manage their respective support missions. Both reported to the AU's Darfur Integrated Task Force in Ethiopia, yet the NATO team operated through SHAPE in Belgium, while the EU operations were directed through the European Airlift Center in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. Among other difficulties, this created challenges of increased transaction costs for the AU, whose officers had to deal with the duplication of liaison work it created.

Despite nearly identical outlooks on the support missions in Sudan, the outcomes of ESDP and NATO actions revealed some of the bureaucratic and political obstructions that come from the overlap created by similar strategic cultures. As before, most such barriers were overcome largely through on-the-ground efforts of the deployed ESDP and NATO staffs, and further improvement was made following the opening of a joint EU-NATO Headquarters in Ethiopia.⁶⁵ While most of the political challenges were also resolved by the end of the missions in December 2007, many observers still criticize the mal-coordination that hampered efforts during a crisis, hoping that between the organizations, the lessons learned prevents a repeat of unnecessary competition in the future.⁶⁶

Anti-Piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden

As security threats continue to become globalized, both organizations have come to understand their roles as military forces as being evermore a mandate to address international security concerns, such as those off Somalia's coast. As a result of a ruined economy caused by an entrenched civil war, since at least 2005 there has been a steady increase in piracy acts off the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden. Nearly 15 percent of the world's global cargo ships use this relatively narrow passage on their way to or from the Suez Canal, making the

⁶⁵ Touzovskaia, 2006, p. 253

⁶⁶ Franke, 2009, p. 262

successful hijacking and ransoming of a trade vessel a lucrative venture.⁶⁷ Piracy in the waters off Somalia became highly visible in 2008, with nearly half of such incidents in the world occurring there, exposing dangers to more than just the disruption of international trade, such as illegal arms smuggling and potential environmental catastrophe.⁶⁸

Yet most vulnerable are the daily-arriving humanitarian vessels, including the food and aid provided through the UN World Food Programme (WFP).⁶⁹ Due to the impact on so many of the interests of the international community, but especially due to the interference of its aid mission, throughout 2008 the UNSC passed a series of resolutions on the matter, and in September, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made a request calling for nations and relevant international organizations, including NATO and the EU, to provide security for WFP and other vulnerable commercial transport in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa.⁷⁰

That same month, the Secretaries General of the UN and NATO had met, somewhat controversially, to sign a joint declaration formalizing a mutual intent to establish for the first time a relationship between the organizations for closer consultation and cooperation.⁷¹ NATO responded quickly to the UN's request, and deployed their naval forces for an entirely novel mission. Never before had NATO deployed in such a capacity or to this region. Given the mandate to use force when necessary, both from the NAC and UNSC, NATO declared itself emphatically to be "committed to assist in fighting this scourge, in full respect of

⁶⁷ BBC News, 2008

⁶⁸ Helly, 2009, p. 394

⁶⁹ BBC News, 2008

⁷⁰ See UNSC Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846

⁷¹ Harsch & Varwick, 2009, p. 9

relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.” By mid-October they had launched Operation Allied Provider, sending half of the naval vessels from the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) to the Gulf.⁷²

Allied Provider took on a robust mandate for NATO that signaled the Alliance’s acceptance of missions focusing on proactive, preventative global security measures on the high seas. The mission in the Gulf of Aden also marked a shift for NATO in adopting a more far-reaching view of suitable pre-emptive security measures and the fostering of global security partnerships. With the increase of piracy incidents in the region, NATO deployed Operation Allied Protector in March 2009. In August that year, the NAC reauthorized the Alliance’s mandate in the region with Operation Ocean Shield. With these missions, it developed “a more distinctive NATO role based on...a more comprehensive approach to counter-piracy.”⁷³ With the acceptance of an enhanced directive, NATO forces have the additional task of assisting states that seek to build or develop their own capacity to combat piracy in the region. This new, additional mandate, as well as the continuing presence of its forces in the Gulf waters, shows that NATO has committed to a policy of prolonged naval engagement with a strong emphasis on crisis management instruments far from the traditional Atlantic region it has operated in the past. Additionally, it has worked to build stronger partnerships through their operations with non-NATO actors, as demonstrated by recent hosting of Russian officers aboard a NATO ship to share information and discuss opportunities for collaboration between the vessels.⁷⁴

⁷² NATO Final Communiqué, 2008, Article 10

⁷³ NATO, 2009b

⁷⁴ NATO, 2011

While NATO's operation was in a region well 'out of area' for the organization, it had long maintained naval capabilities. The EU, on the other hand, had until this time largely ignored the idea of naval operations for ESDP. The decision to undertake Operation Atalanta in December 2008 was a significant step in the development of military capacity for the EU. Authorized to "contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy" by means of broad military force when necessary, Atalanta was in effect a continuation of NATO's engagement in the region.⁷⁵ Atalanta established a standing fleet of a twelve ships, drawn from the resources of 19 member states, which were to be deployed in four month rotations and accompanied by Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft.⁷⁶

Through Atalanta, the EU has enlarged its basket of instruments as a military actor, yet what separates this mission from NATO's is its incorporation as part of the ongoing multidimensional presence the EU had already established in Somalia since early 2007. While the tactical operations of Atalanta are aimed at deterring piracy, the overall strategy of the EU is to address "the root causes of the phenomenon" with Somalia itself.⁷⁷ Early into the campaign, HR Solana stated that Atalanta's success should be built upon "longer term durable solutions for stability in Somalia and the region – both at sea and on land."⁷⁸ As the EU has worked to expand the military capabilities of ESDP, it has also leveraged its other mechanisms to promote security and stability. Along with the various diplomatic, political and security engagements the EU has undertaken, it has also financed upwards of €350

⁷⁵ European Council, 2008a

⁷⁶ Helly, 2009, pp. 395-396

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ European Council, Summer 2009 Newsletter, p. 15

million through the European Development Fund and other humanitarian initiatives there.⁷⁹

The European Parliament has also taken a strong and critical stance on Atalanta to ensure that it is utilized as an instrument to help deal with the situation on the ground that reinforces other EU civil-society initiatives.⁸⁰

Both NATO and the EU recognize the threat piracy poses to international trade and security on the open waters of the oceans, and both view such preventative missions abroad as appropriate theaters for their military forces. The expansive territory to patrol and increasing piracy incidents that justify both missions have so far undercut any overt competition with one another. Nonetheless, there remains a sense of duplication of missions between the EU and NATO that belies a lack of coordination, which prevents the more effective and efficient completion of missions where both have strong strategic inclinations to engage. For one, both missions draw upon the same collection of resources.⁸¹ At times there have been double assignment of vessels to the two missions, such as when Germany assigned to Atalanta a ship that had been within NATO's SNMG resources.⁸² Additionally, there is confusion for the ships from the overlapping member nations regarding their command structures and mandate parameters. The EU, for example, allows vessels to switch from EU to national operational command, granting them mandates a la carte regarding the

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Siad, et al., 2007; Vainio, 2008

⁸¹ Thulstrup, 2010, p. 91, notes that that Italy, Greece, Spain and the Netherlands contribute to both missions. Interestingly, Norway and Croatia, both of whom are NATO members but not currently EU member states, have participated in the effort through the EU.

⁸² NATO, 2009a

use of force. This leads to ambiguity in terms of coherency for the EU mission, and makes unclear which international legal frameworks at times apply.⁸³

As with prior missions when the EU and NATO have operated within the same theater, a result of similar security assessments coming from their comparable strategic cultures, many duplication issues have developed despite stated efforts to prevent them. Most have been addressed through close communication and cooperation by the forces deployed, even as direct coordination between organizations remains lacking. For example, the “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia” was set up in early 2009 and acts as a contact point for 45 participating nations and organizations, including NATO and the EU.⁸⁴ The EU has also set up a secure web-portal through its Operational Headquarters that allows the distribution of news and information regarding pirate activity in the region.⁸⁵ Despite these notable efforts, arguably preventable functional conflicts continue to arise between the two organizations. Given the trends in strategic culture for NATO and the EU over the last decade, it would seem this is a pattern that will continue.

⁸³ Helly, 2009, p. 397

⁸⁴ Thulstrup, 2010, p. 91

⁸⁵ Helly, 2010, p. 396

VI. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS

Studies focusing on strategic culture differ in that they try to enrich the understanding of a security community's actions not by focusing on its material interests, but instead on trying to explain the role and appropriate parameters for using military force that the actor internalizes for itself. In attempting to forecast potential future mission types for an actor, then, does emphasizing an institution's strategic culture suggest that it will respond *only* to those security threats and carry out *only* those missions that have characteristics corresponding to where its strategic culture falls among the normative and ideational elements described in this thesis? Taken to the extreme, no it does not. Strategic culture does, however, help explain the bounds of appropriate (re)action for a security community. In that way, it can be used as a marker to help judges the realm of possibility and the likelihood of certain actions over others. While powerful concomitant variables may force an institution to act in a way contrary to what a model of its strategic culture might suggest, it would be a deviation of degree and not a complete reversal in behavior. An actor that is adverse to preemptive engagement, for example, will not overnight become a belligerent, or vice versa. In comparing the strategic cultures of two institutions and their internally set boundaries for action, it may prove useful in helping to understand and explain the operational relationship between them. Let us then turn to NATO and the EU.

Over the past decade, the strategic cultures of the EU and NATO have not only been widening in scope and reach, but they have been converging as well. Both institutions are moving away from cultures that center on defensive responses to security threats, toward

those that focus on more proactive global security roles. If the trends seen here continue into the future, the two organizations will likely keep moving toward resembling one another in their outlooks on global security. Such an outcome is not wholly unexpected, given the significant overlap of membership between the two organizations. Their similar interests would translate into similar perceptions of security threats and the means to address them. That the EU and NATO have similar strategic cultures today, therefore, is not as significant as the trends over the past ten years which have gotten them to such a point.

[FIGURE 5]

On the normative matrix, there has not been much change for either institution regarding their norms on the ends of military force. The ESDP was designed to operate along the guidelines of the Petersberg Tasks and its military missions over the last decade have had strong elements of serving human rights interests as well as European interests. NATO has shifted in this direction as well. While intervention in Macedonia was predicated on concerns of a spillover conflict at NATO's territorial edge, the more recent missions in Sudan and off Somalia have dealt less with territorial integrity and more with stabilizing crises of human suffering. More significant is the shift in aggression for both institutions. While both institutions carried out "reactive" missions in Macedonia and to some extent in Sudan, events of the decade have made it so that both NATO and the ESDP have taken on strong preventative roles. With their collective anti-piracy measures, they have both proved equally committed in utilizing pre-emptive force to counter potential hijackings. The significant difference between them is the effort of the EU to coordinate these military efforts with other diplomatic, political and economic instruments to undercut the root causes of a conflict, instruments which NATO lacks.

[FIGURE 6]

On the ideation matrix, NATO and the ESDP have aligned themselves together in recognizing and internalizing that the most pertinent security threats for the future are likely to be novel engagements taking place in distant theaters. Over the decade, both NATO and the ESDP have sent forces well outside the ‘Euro-Atlantic area,’ including on the African continent and to the Indian Ocean. This goes along with the more preventative role both have taken on, as in the global security realm, engaging and preventing threats means meeting them where they occur. Additionally, NATO has moved more toward operating as a part of the larger, international security community, taking steps toward formalizing relations with other international organizations like the UN, as well as responding to calls from the international community to support multilateral efforts. The ESDP also has committed itself to multilateral missions, but interestingly has relied more on forging coalitions of EU members on a mission by mission basis, as opposed to readily deploying their standby forces, even after these groups became operational.

From the figures it can be said the EU has developed a basic strategic mindset that is in line with its ambitions as a global security actor. However, it is really NATO that has undergone the more dramatic transformation over the past decade, recognizing new security threats to its members and repositioning itself as a much more global actor. The Alliance has also become more willing to use its strong military capabilities to respond to more crises that are humanitarian in character, even developing their own nascent crisis management resources to draw upon. Concerns and conflicts between NATO and ESDP may, therefore, have less to do with the EU attempting to co-opt missions from NATO, and have more to do

with the opposite: NATO is changing and broadening the scope of its strategic culture to match that of the EU!

What functional conflicts, then, do the converging strategic cultures of the two organizations bring to operations? Directly, the difficulties for EU and NATO forces working together in the field seems to have little to do with their respective strategic cultures, and more to do with the inability of the political leadership to decide which organization has primacy for a given mission. The forces 'on-the-ground' appear to find ways to cooperate and collaborate, despite whatever bureaucratic infighting might occur above them. However, the convergence of strategic cultures makes it seem that such difficulties will not disappear anytime soon. It is more likely that similar difficulties to those experienced over the past decade, arising due to the operation of parallel missions between the organizations, will continue to occur. In FYROM, having both EU and NATO forces operating there created command confusion, with the Macedonian government at times unsure who had authority. In supporting AMIS, a humanitarian crisis turned into a competition that affected the efficiency of both missions. With Somalia, laudable collaboration is an offshoot of the unnecessary duplication of efforts. Potential future command confusion, competition and duplication could be remedied with a clearer system to decide when or where NATO and the EU should operate security missions. But the unpredictable elements of conflict and the mechanisms already in place make this unlikely.

So it would seem that as the strategic cultures of NATO and the EU continue to converge and the global security roles they have determined for themselves continue to overlap, increased communication and closer collaboration will remain a challenge, but still the best formula for a more secure future.

APPENDIX A: FIGURES 1 – 6

Figure 1: Normative matrix of armed force


Norms on the ends of armed force	Cultural colonialism					
	Democracy and freedom					
	Human rights					
	Territorial integrity					
	Hegemonic position					
		Total refusal of force	Defense of territory	Prevention	Pre-emption	Open aggression
		Norms on the means/ role of armed force				

Figure 2: Ideational matrix of threat-perception and cooperation


Threat-perception	New/ Distant threats					
	Alliance and coalition security and territorial integrity					
	National security and territorial integrity					
		Neutral or isolationist	Peripheral contributions	Ad-hoc coalitions	Standing force (e.g., NRF, B(Gs))	Full integration
		Security-/defense-policy cooperation				

Figure 3: NATO and ESDP on the normative matrix of armed force




Figure 4: NATO and ESDP on the ideational matrix of threat-perception and cooperation




Figure 5: Trends in NATO and ESDP strategic culture on the normative matrix of armed force





Figure 6: Trends in NATO and ESDP strategic culture on the ideational matrix of threat-perception and cooperation



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