STRATÊGOI AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF GREECE UNDER THE ANTIGONIDS

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History (Ancient).

Chapel Hill
2012

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ABSTRACT

ALEXANDER MICHAEL SEUFERT: Stratēgoi and the Administration of Greece under the Antigonids.
(Under the direction of Fred Naiden)

This thesis investigates the policies of the Antigonid Dynasty towards the poleis of its kingdom by examining the highest military office of the kingdom, the stratēgos. This work takes special care to mark the civic responsibilities of the office from the time of Antigonus Gonatas to the eventual conquest by Rome in order to elucidate the manner in which the Macedonians oversaw the difficult task of establishing and maintaining control over their subject cities. The thesis aims to show that the Antigonid kings sought to create a delicate balance between their own interests and the interests of the populace. In doing so, they were keen to take traditional sensibilities into account when governing over the poleis. Contrary to previous scholarship, this thesis shows that the Antigonids allowed local elections of military positions to take place, and did not suppress existing magistracies within subject cities.
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Abbreviations

Where possible, all inscriptions cited in this work follow the conventions used by the Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (SEG). In some cases, I have made minor variations to reflect common uses.


BE  Bulletin Épigraphique.


IG  Inscriptiones Graecae.


PAE  Praktika tes en Athenais Archaiologikes Hetaireias (Athens).

SEG  Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.


Introduction: the Problem of Antigonid Administration

The issue of Antigonid administration following the establishment of the kingdom in the early fourth century has been largely relegated to arguments regarding the level of interaction between the royal officials of Macedon and the individual poleis of Greece. Scholarship concerning the organizational structure under the Antigonids has long held that the epistatai were appointed as royal supervisory officials within the cities of Macedonia proper, while regional stratēgoi oversaw the newly acquired areas in the north and south.¹ In 1996, however, the work of Miltiades Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, fundamentally changed the study of Macedonian administration. A work that was over a decade in the making, *Institutions* has provided scholars with a plethora of inscriptions related to the offices of Antigonid Greece and brought a new understanding to the structure of the kingdom. In this regard, it is the most comprehensive study of Macedonian institutions. On top of dozens of other similar publications by Hatzopoulos and others, the work has allowed for a reevaluation of previous notions regarding third-century Greece under the Antigonid kings. In light of this new material, research into the Macedonian state has taken on new impetus. Since its publication, however, there has not been a thorough and comprehensive look at Antigonid stratēgoi and the role of high military command within the administration of Antigonid Greece. My work attempts to analyze new information that has

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¹ Holleaux 1897 believed that the Antigonids divided Greece into several regions, called stratēgia, over which a stratēgos ruled (p. 446). Similarly, Bengtson 1944 believed that stratēgoi were responsible for die Nebenlande (1944, pp. 317-30, 323-24); Beloch 1912 believed they were in neighboring regions as well: p. 1, 104; cf. Tarn 1969, pp. 194-96.
emerged regarding Antigonid organization, looking both at the old notions of regional
government and the new evidence concerning the role of local institutions in the organization
of the kingdom.

To date, Hermann Bengtson’s Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit (1944) is the
only work to deal exclusively with the question of the stratēgos as an administrator of the
Diadochic states. Though this study is a detailed and complete analysis of this office in the
Hellenistic period, the book is now most certainly out of date. Bengtson believed that the
Antigonid structure was based on a regional model in which the neighboring provinces of
Macedonia proper were under the control of a stratēgos at the head with several subordinate
officials beneath him. While more recent scholarship has tended to focus on the role of local
supervisory officials (epistatēs) within the poleis of the kingdom, little effort has been given
to the regional organization of the kingdom. In particular, the administration of southern
Greece has not received a comprehensive examination in some time. Given the plethora of
recently published inscriptions regarding the institutions of Macedonian Greece, a
reevaluation of the literary evidence in light of the new epigraphical finds will help to more
fruitfully assess the nature of the Antigonid king’s relationship with the numerous poleis
under his domain. Specifically, my study examines the use of military appointments in order
to determine the policy of the Macedonians towards their subjugated cities. Contrary to what
one might expect, the kings seem not have attempted outright military dominance as one
would initially glean from Philip V’s comment about the “fetters of Greece.” Instead,

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2 For the epistatēs and administration of cities, see: Hatzopoulos 1996, pp. 371-429; Hammond 1999 and 2000;
Errington 1999, pp. 229-38. For epistatēs with military command, see: Livy 44.12.2; 44.44.4. For the
relationship of city and king, see: Errington 2002.
policies of the Antigonid Kings gradually evolved to show keen awareness of their military presence in the city-states of Greece, a point often missed by literary sources.

After centuries of enjoying freedom and autonomy, the Greek poleis were now forced to abide by the will and desire of the Antigonids. For the Macedonian king, maintaining a sound relationship with the city-states was of crucial importance since, as the constant attempts by the Ptolemaic Kings show, the traditional poleis of Greece could be easily excited to rebellion. The traditional call of freedom and autonomy was still vital to the psyche and identity that defined them. Along the same lines, military glory was a significant means of obtaining honor and distinction that was so highly valued in the Greek world. Under the Antigonids, city-states no longer engaged in the constant warfare between themselves as they once had. This avenue from which individuals won glory and distinction was less viable to the citizens of these conquered cities. Macedonian hegemony not only affected the political sovereignty of the polis, but also the means by which individuals established themselves in their communities. One would imagine that the military distinction that had made the office of stratēgos important for winning renown was now severely reduced under the Antigonids. As a result, the office needed to adapt its role and place greater emphasis on the civic and local obligations of this official. As I will argue, this change was recognized and exploited by the kings as a means of maintaining a policy that was at once beneficial to themselves and cognizant of the sensibilities of the local community. The stratēgoi remained prominent local statesmen, as Chaniotis claims, only now the element of φιλοτιμία πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα was added as a necessary component of an honorable individual.³ In this sense, the thesis is as much about the social changes behind the

³ Chaniotis 2005, pp. 31-36.
adoption of civic duties by this official and its subsequent effect Antigonid policy as it is a contribution to the institutional history of the Macedonian state.

The acceptance of these city-states to Macedonian domination was no doubt a difficult one, as the constant rebellions from 330 to 262 illustrate. After nearly fifty years of unsuccessful attempts to hold these poleis, Antigonus Gonatas must have seen that a new approach was necessary. With a keen sense of the social importance of military glory, Antigonus was the first of the kings to recognize that outright military dominance was not the best means of maintaining Macedonian hegemony. By no sheer coincidence, he was also the first to successfully establish long-term, stable control over the Greek city-states. Behind his success, as I will argue, was a keen sense of the importance given to local military institutions. By looking at the office of stratēgos, a position which perhaps best represents this ideal, the administrative goals and policies of the Macedonian Kings will become more apparent. The Antigonids were careful to maintain these local institutions as a means of sustaining their own objectives with the polis.

The sources used in this work will consist of a blend of epigraphic and literary evidence. Given that there are no extant literary sources from the Macedonians, my work gives substantial weight to the information obtained through inscriptions. A distinct characteristic throughout the literary sources is their failure to understand the technical vocabulary employed by the Macedonian state (a problem seen in Plutarch, Livy, and Polybius). I seek to give the best definition for the term stratēgos from a close scrutiny and comparison of both epigraphical and literary evidence.

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4 I will argue this point throughout the work. For a treatment of Antigonus’ support of the Greek intellectuals, see: Tarn 1969, pp. 223-56; cf. Gabbert 1997 for a recent treatment of Antigonus from the epigraphic perspective.
My study begins by giving a brief description of the stratēgos under Philip and Alexander in order to provide some background to the development of this official and his role in the administration of Antigonid Greece. While the system prior to Antigonus Gonatas is a different situation altogether and outside of the scope of this work, it is, however, worth making a cursory summary of these events so as to give some idea of the general historical development of the position of stratēgos. An analysis of the office from 280 to 167 BCE then follows, specifically marking the evolution of the position from its solidification under Antigonus Gonatas in the early third century to the downfall of the kingdom. The thesis consists of three parts: the first examines the stratēgos in the southern regions of Greece, with particular focus on Corinth and Athens. The second is an examination of prevailing scholarly opinions regarding the stratēgos in Macedonia proper. Finally, there is a brief discussion of some outlying evidence of a stratēgos as an independent dynast in Asia Minor under the auspices of Philip V. The example illustrates the means in which the Antigonid Kings subjugated new territories. The thesis concludes by drawing some deductions about the Antigonid kingdom in light of this survey of evidence. In doing so, I hope to show that previously held notions about the role of the stratēgos in the Antigonid Kingdom as a royal official are, in most instances, misguided and that regional administration played a far less significant role in the governance of Antigonid territories than previously believed. Moreover, my work provides insight into the appointment of individuals to military positions, and shows that emphasis within the Antigonid kingdom was placed on local appointments and existing institutions, a notable policy of the kings.5

5 This has been a rather important issue in recent scholarship, see: Hatzopoulos 1996, pp. 372-96; cf. Hammond 1999 and 2000; Errington 2002.
The Stratēgos from Philip II to the Battle of Ipsus

The title of stratēgos can be seen as fitting into two broad categories: First, it has the traditional meaning of the Classical period as an ad hoc military position set for a specific task. These were local stratēgoi who acted as statesmen within their respective communities. In Athens, for instance, a democratically elected board of ten of these officials was responsible for the foreign policy of the city and the general conduct of any military affairs.\(^6\) The second meaning is that of the Macedonian imperialist model first used after Philip II’s conquest of Greece. Given that the Greeks lacked any vocabulary for regional governors (satrap was never fully adopted), the Macedonians used this term for officers who operated in a supervisory manner as provincial authorities in territories outside of Macedonia proper. This is particularly evident in regions of recent acquisition, where further military subjugation was needed more than administrative supervision. While the exact process is unknown, the position eventually coupled administrative duties with that of its prior military responsibilities and evolved into one of the more prominent offices of the Hellenistic period. This second meaning is the subject of the following section.

Several leading figures of the Diadochic period held the position of stratēgos. The first was Memnon, a Macedonian noble appointed by Philip for supervision over the territory of Thrace. While little is known about his time there, his position must have been secure

\(^6\) Stockton, pp. 31-2, 105-6.
enough for him to feel that he was able to challenge Antipater for primacy of Greece, a conflict that was eventually settled in 331. In order to maintain forward progress on his campaign, Alexander left stratēgoi behind to integrate regions in need of further military subjugation. Thus, there was a flourishing of individuals who possessed this title. Upon leaving on his campaign into Persia, Alexander left Antipater in charge of the affairs of Greece with the designation stratēgos tēs Europēs, the only specific term given to him in any of our sources. Similarly, Lysimachus was left in Thrace as stratēgos of the region, a position he would retain following the negotiations at Babylon and Triparadeisus and even up to his death at Corupedion in 281. Following the death of Alexander in 323, several of these figures each sought a stake in the newly expanded empire.

Since none possessed the hereditary legitimacy to obtain the title of basileus, the office of stratēgos was the preferred designation for the Diadochoi for nearly two decades. None of the inheritors of the kingdom of Alexander possessed the necessary status to assume the title of king, especially while the Argead bloodline still survived. The need to find a suitable designation to incorporate legitimacy through military power and maintain a cautious distance from the institution of basileus prompted several Diadochoi to take or retain the title of stratēgos. Unlike that of king or satrap, the office had no intrinsic geographic or hereditary limitations. Thus, it was the most adaptable and suitable designation for the Diadochoi to take at this time. While geographical qualification could certainly be placed on such a position (e.g. stratēgos epi tēn chōran), no such restrictions were inherent.

7 Diod. 17.62.5: Μέμνων γὰρ ὁ καθεσταμένος στρατηγὸς τῆς Θράκης.
with the title. Rather, the designation was a reflection of the expressing one’s might and right to rule through military might. Given the potential uncertainties of one’s right to assume the title basileus, stratēgos was perfectly suited since it expressed one’s authority through the only title that encompassed their source of legitimacy, military superiority.

It took nearly sixteen years after the death of Alexander for the designation of basileus to become acceptable to Macedonian sensibilities. Following his victory over the Ptolemaic forces at Salamis (Cyprus) in 307, Antigonus Monophthalmus was the first to take such a title, and his rivals quickly followed his example.9 His assumption of the role of king came only after years of holding the position of stratēgos tēs Asias, a designation also held by his main opponent, Eumenes.10 The implication is that the title indicated powers as fairly more substantial than that of a standard satrap, a term which encompassed a limited geographical scope. Richard Billows sees this transition, while important to the theoretical basis of Antigonus’ power, as somewhat meaningless in the practical exertion of influence.11 As he indicates, the Diadochoi acted with full authority over the administration of their territories, regardless of title. Whether there was any significant change in theoretical power or not, the assumption still holds that the office represented a specific meaning to the royal court. It was a matter of assuming a less offensive designation for the sensibilities of the Macedonians, who remained vital to Antigonus’ hope of further solidifying the empire of Alexander. The term stratēgos best fit his position at the time due to the military connotations that came with such an office. His assumption of the title is perhaps less

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9 Billows, pp. 155-62.

10 Arr. 1.19.3.

11 Billows 1990 p. 243: “Antigonos (and, as far as we can tell, the other Diadochoi) acted as ruler and owner of his territories with full authority to administer them as he saw fit.”
indicative of the overall meaning of the word as a regional commander since he could not take the designation of *basileus* without inflicting serious damage to his reputation with the Macedonian nobles, whose support was crucial. Antigonus needed to legitimize his position, but in the interim *stratēgos* represented an adequate middle ground, expressing both his independence and authority through military strength.

Inheriting what was essentially the satrapal system of the Achaemenid Empire, Antigonus appointed *stratēgoi* over the key provincial areas of his new, vast empire. In 317, Antigonus created the office of “*stratēgos* of the upper satrapies” in charge of several administrative districts of the former Persian Empire.\(^{12}\) Within the territories of the former Achaemenid East, the title became synonymous with that of a satrap. Antigonus, however, never fully implemented any long-term policy in Greece since constant warring took place with Cassander. In some instances, areas of particular strategic value came under the control of *stratēgoi*. Both Cassander and Antipater, for example, had *stratēgoi* in charge of the Peloponnesus.\(^{13}\) At some point, even Antigonus Gonatas, who was responsible for many of the administrative policies of the kingdom, held the position in southern Greece before inheriting the title of *basileus* after the capture and death of his father.\(^{14}\) In addition to the inheritors of Alexander, the title of *stratēgos* continued to be used to indicate a position responsible for military supervisor over regions in need of further conquest. Gradually, *stratēgoi* became

\(^{12}\) I have purposefully avoided a detailed discussion of Antigonus’ Asian territories because it is outside of my area of focus. For the administration of the Asian realm of Antigonus and its influence on the later Seleucid Empire, see: Billows 1990, pp. 237-85; Bengtson 1964, pp. 96-118.

\(^{13}\) For the *stratēgos* of the Peloponnese under Cassander, see: Diod. 19.63.1; 19.64. For Alexander, an officer of Antigonus, and the potential mention of a *stratēgia* as an administrative district: Diod. 19.66.

\(^{14}\) Bengston 1964, pp. 345-46.
settled in particular areas of sensitive strategic value, in which supervision over the garrisons
and forts helped to guarantee the successful maintenance of Macedonian dominance.
Stratēgoi of the Southern Regions

The issue of Antigonid administration in the southern regions of Greece is one that has not yet been adequately handled. A growing amount of scholarship has started to tackle the issue of Macedonian officials south of Thessaly and the policies behind the administration of the poleis in this area. As yet, however, no single work has examined the role of Macedonian military policies with the territories of these formerly independent city-states. For the Antigonids the task was no easy one since long-held notions of autonomia and eleutheria were ever present in the mindset of many of the cities, a factor with which the kings had to contend when creating policy. In regards to this, the following section attempts to elucidate some of the goals and methods used by the Antigonid kings to maintain their hegemony in the southern regions of Greece. Since Corinth and Athens were the primary loci of Macedonian administration in this region, this chapter will look primarily at these two cities.

The death of Antigonus Monophthalmus at the Battle of Ipsus in 301 threw Greece into a tumultuous state in which several prominent figures claimed supremacy. After the battle, undisputed control of Greece fell to Cassander, but he died shortly after in 297, at which point Demetrius was able to take over and eliminate the remaining Antipatrids. His constant warring, however, caused most regions to remain under continual dispute with his

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chief rivals, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Lysimachus of Thrace.\textsuperscript{16} As it was, Demetrius only ever controlled Macedon itself for six years before his retreat to Asia Minor and eventual capture by Seleucus Nicator in 286. Following the death of his father in 283, Antigonus Gonatas took control of the kingdom that was ravaged by all three of its rivals when he possessed little more than a few scattered coastal fortresses.\textsuperscript{17} As fickle as fortune had been with his father, Antigonus benefitted from a series of lucky strokes that eliminated the very contenders who had pressed Demetrius so fiercely. First, Lysimachus was killed at the Battle of Corupedion in 281, and Thrace was thrown into chaos following the death of Lysimachus and his son, Agathocles, two years earlier. The area fell to Ptolemy Ceraunus, Meleager, and eventually Antipater (Cassander’s son), with all were equally ineffective against the Celts. During this vacuum of power, Sosthenes, who had defended Thrace, was asked to be king by his army sometime in 281.\textsuperscript{18} He refused the title of king but retained that of a \textit{stratēgos} (\textit{dux}, in Latin), and kept the area safe from further deprivations until the Celts moved south. While the remainder of Sosthenes’ life is a mystery, Eusebius claims that he was a king for two years, at which point Antigonus finally gained a solid foothold and was declared king in 277, following his victory over the Celts at Lysimacheia. Before these events Antigonus’ territories largely consisted of the border and sea forts left to him by his father. Antigonus’ solidification was by no means secure, however, as Ptolemaeus and then King Pyrrhus himself were a thorn in the side of the Macedonian king until their deaths in 272. As uncontested king of Macedon, Antigonus could then begin the rigorous task of regaining the

\textsuperscript{16} Errington 1990, pp. 142-61.

\textsuperscript{17} Errington 1990, pp. 162-67.

territories lost at the capture and death of his father. Unlike Demetrius, however, Antigonus’ main concern was not military conquest. Instead, his focus seems to have been on establishing a secure and safe kingdom. The administrative system that had been so utterly destroyed over the past two decades could begin operating again after a gradual incorporation of the mainland sites.19

The elimination of rivals during this period of uncertainty allowed Antigonus to begin annexing territories and consolidating his control over mainland Greece, using the coastal forts as strongholds. The first attempt to reestablish this system was in southern Greece under Antigonus’ half-brother Craterus in charge of the garrison in Corinth. His position was perhaps commensurate to that of Antigonus and Pyrrhus, who served a few years earlier in Corinth as “stratēgoi for the common security.”20 Given the strategic significance and the uncertainties of the region, the control of the citadel of Corinth became the defining method of administration for this area, serving as one of the three fetters of Greece. Royal administration, however, remained relatively unobtrusive, and Macedonian concern for this region seems relegated simply to maintaining military dominance. In the Peloponnesus, the defining goal for the king was to hold the citadel of Corinth while allowing favorable political forces to remain in power in individual poleis.21 Beyond that, the administration of the southern regions seems to have been of decidedly little concern, with the main prerogative being the garrison. Having himself been the stratēgos in charge of Corinth and

19 William Tarn’s work on Antigonus Gonatas has the most comprehensive examination of his political reforms, but is quite dated (1913). For a more recent political biography of Antigonus, see: Gabbert 1997.

20 For the stratēgos in charge of the ‘common security’ and the administration of Corinth in the Diadochic period, see: Bengtson 1944, p. 165. For the inscription mentioned, see: IG IV² 1, 68.

21 Poly. 2.41.10; 9.29.6; cf. Errington 1990, pp. 237-38 for a discussion on the king’s concern for the southern regions.
Piraeus, Antigonus understood the strategic significance of these forts, which most likely explains the appointment of Craterus to this position in ca. 280. Direct control of the region seemed beyond the scope or desire of the king.

The sources for Craterus are scarce, so assumption must be kept to a minimum, but some basic duties of his position are evident. Plutarch says that Craterus had charge of his brother’s military and domestic affairs (ἐπὶ τὸ στρατηγεῖν καὶ οἰκουρεῖν), but gives no details as to the nature of this position and mentions him only as an example of fraternal loyalty.22 Further, Craterus had subordinate officials in Troizen and probably in Megara as well, both of which remained under direct Macedonian control.23 In each case officials were probably not civic, administrative figures (such as epistatēs), but phourarchoi, since their positions are mentioned specifically in context with a garrison. While the sources tend to highlight the military role of Craterus, there seems to have been little in the way of civic administrative duties for the officials in this area. As it was, Craterus was left to further conquer the regions south of Thessaly, while the king himself concentrated on regaining and solidifying his hold on Macedonia and the northern regions lost after the capture of his father. Given that Antigonus and Pyrrhus also held the position of stratēgos of the Peloponnesus, the prominence of Craterus’ role seems apparent. As Bengtson states, his position was essentially that of a co-regent, as it had been under Demetrius with Antigonus.24 The privity of this

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22 Plut. De frat. amor. 486A.

23 Eudamades of Troizen was a direct subordinate: Polyaenus Strat. 2.29 (s.v. Cleonymus); cf. Frontinus (3.6.7), who says that Cleonymus held the Troizenians as qui praesidio Crateri tenebantur.

24 Bengtson (1944, p. 347) assumes his title ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς κοινῆς φυλακῆς, as earlier mentioned of Pyrrhus and Gonatas, and this assumption is probably warranted: “Wie damals ein στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς κοινῆς φυλακῆς καταλειμμένος für die Zeit der Abwesenheit der Bundeshegemonie, der Könige Antigonos Monophthalmos und Demetrios Poliorketes, in Griechenland geboten hat, so erscheint jetzt, allerdings als ständiger Vertreter, ein regelrechter Vizekönig des Antigonos Gonatas, und zwar in der Person seines halbbruders Krateros, des Sohnes des Krateros und der Phila.”
station, then, is not indicative of Antigonid administration as a whole, but should be interpreted as a special appointment made only for individuals connected to the king by blood.

_Athens_

While Craterus had control over possessions south of Thessaly, circumstances there necessitated a change in the management of the area since matters remained uncertain in the Peloponnese for Antigonus. King Areus led a rejuvenated Sparta to war with the Macedonians backed by Ptolemy II, who now had control of the Aegean through an alliance with the Nesiotic League.²⁵ Aratus of Sicyon under a new Achaean League began to bother the allied tyrants of the region, while Athens had yet to come fully under Macedonian control.²⁶ Such events must have compelled Antigonus to place sole responsibility of the Peloponnese on Craterus and his son, Alexander, alleviating them of their duties in the Piraeus.²⁷ The situation in Attica now called for unique means of administration, and Antigonus would take care not to have a revolt on his hands. One eventually arose, however, when Alexander, most likely a _stratēgos_ like his father, rebelled against Antigonus after inheriting the position in 251, seeking his own claim to the throne.²⁸ Bengtson sees the revolt as a drastic change in the way the state was managed, though this system had probably

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²⁵ IG XII 7.506; cf. _SIG_² 390.

²⁶ Plut. _Arat._ 15.

²⁷ The honorary decree of Herakleitos, _stratēgos_ of the Piraeus, illustrates this point (appendix, n. 4). Alexander, however, does seem to have held Chalcis at the time of his revolt.

already began to change in the years leading up to the revolt of Alexander in the late 250s. When Alexander then broke off in *ca.* 251, he does not seem to have controlled the Piraeus, as shown by his employment of pirates from Eretria against Attica. Strategically, however, it makes little sense to leave the official in charge of both Chalcis and Corinth with an independent commander in Athens. Thus, it seems likely that this position was gradually relegated to just Corinth and the Peloponnese. Due to recent events, the situation of Attica began to take on a life of its own, and as a result the administration of the south began to adapt in years prior to the revolt of Alexander.

This change in the way that Athens was administered came in the 260s after the failed revolt of Athens in the so-called Chremonidian War. Prior to this conflict, however, the extent of Macedonian control in Attica has long been a matter of scholarly debate. The most recent conjectures assert that the Piraeus was held by an agent of the Macedonians, while the *astu* was in control of the Athenians themselves backed by Ptolemaic assistance. Following the defeat at the hands of the Macedonians in *ca.* 262, the existing apparatuses through which these areas were administrated fell to the king and his subordinates. The contentious garrison was once again placed on the Museion Hill, giving Antigonus a military presence within the heart of the city, all civic magistracies were suppressed, and Demetrius, grandson of Demetrius of Phaleron, was appointed as *thesmothetes* of the city.

The situation in the countryside is rather more difficult to glean from the existing evidence. However, a series of recently published inscriptions has shed much light on the

29 Bengston 1944, p. 361.

30 See Kralli 2000 and 2003 for a summation of the arguments.

31 Apollodorus, *FGrHist.* 244F44; Paus. 3.6.6; cf. Habicht 2003, pp. 52-55 and 1997, pp. 54, 153-54.
state of affairs following the conclusion of the Chremonidian War. While the magistracies within the city itself were suppressed, the military appointments within the countryside were evidently still in place. An inscription dedicated by the local community of isoteleis in Rhamnous to an agent of Antigonus, Apollodorus of Otrynys, is the first evidence of this Macedonian policy in the Attic countryside.\(^3\) The position to which Apollodorus was appointed was that of *stratēgos* in charge of the local garrison and the “district near the sea” (Line 7: ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν). While the *stratēgos* there was originally believed to be the first of such Macedonian officials in the countryside, a recently discovered inscription has shed light on the position held by Apollodorus in the years after Antigonus’ victory over Athens.\(^3\) It is now apparent that a *stratēgos* had been present in Rhamnous as early as 356/5, thereby disproving Bengston’s hypothesis that such a position was a creation of the Antigonids.\(^3\) Thus, the *stratēgia* of Rhamnous was an Athenian institution that had been in place since the mid-fourth century accompanied by an apparent segmentation of the countryside into administrative divisions.\(^3\) This discovery changes previously held notions about Antigonid involvement in the Attic demes, where direct interference in the existing civic institutions by the king is apparent. Whereas earlier appointments needed only the endorsement of the *demos*, royal Macedonian approval was now necessary: ἐπει[δὴ Ἀπολλόδωρος κ]ατασταθείς στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τε τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου καὶ [ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου]

\(^3\) Appendix, n. 2.

\(^3\) Appendix, n. 1.

\(^3\) Bengtson supposed that the *stratēgia* of Herakleitos was the first of such positions held by an agent of Gonatas, see: 1944, pp. 375-76. Recent evidence shows this is not the case.

\(^3\) The district mentioned in which these officials operated (*chōra paralia*) must have stretched from Rhamnous to Cape Sounion, at which point the *stratēgos* of the Piraeus was in charge (under the Antigonids). The division of the Attica countryside was probably made sometime around 413/2 after the fall of Decelea to the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War. See, Kralli 2006, pp. 546-51 for a detailed discussion of these *chōrai*. 
While this election may have been a mere formality, the incident shows that Antigonus was cautious not to upset the delicate dynamic between himself and the local populace. Such pretensions, however, were not always pushed aside since clear indications of the king’s control are evident (Lines 12-13: ἀκολούθως τῇ τοῦ | [βασιλέως προ]ιμέσει).

The decree of Apollodorus illustrates a tendency of the Macedonians to use existing appointments and positions filled with loyal citizens. Apollodorus himself was an Athenian from the Attic deme of Otrynys, suggesting that emphasis remained on local, not royal, appointees. Once he gained confidence in the population, Antigonus ceased his interference into the election of these stratēgoi. While the appointment of these officials did return to hands of the people, Ioanna Kralli finds reason to believe that a candidate’s standing with the Macedonians was now a requisite component of one’s selection and that the assembly must have taken such considerations into account when voting. While this claim is largely speculative, the supposition remains likely. At any rate, the appointment of an Athenian to the position shows Antigonus’ commitment to leave the administration of civic institutions in the hands of locals and to use existing systems whenever possible. However, the king could and would become involved in the selection of officials. Given the recent history of Athens, this should come as no surprise.

36 The restoration of ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου with the participle χειροτονηθείς seems very like; cf. IG II2 682.

37 For more information on the appointment of locals to positions in Attica, particularly that of the stratēgia and hipparchia, see Kralli 2003.

38 Kralli 2006, p. 556.
While the date of the honorific decree of Apollodorus remains uncertain, the conclusion of the most recent editor, Vasileos Petrakos, places it in the year 257/6.\(^{39}\) Despite such difficulties, the decree of Apollodorus almost certainly falls within the period shortly after the conclusion of the Chremonidian War, placing its date close to Antigonus’ grant of independence and the removal of the garrison from the Museion Hill in 255.\(^{40}\) This grant, however, was perhaps more ostentation than it was reality since not all apparatuses of Macedonian military control were removed. Thus, it seems that Antigonus’ goal in Attica was not to grant freedom back to the Athenians, but rather to maintenance his control over Athens through less overt policies.\(^{41}\) As a symbol of foreign occupation, the Macedonian garrison would have been a matter of contention to the Athenians, and especially dangerous for the Antigonids given the tendencies of the Ptolemies to incite trouble through declarations of freedom and autonomy. To combat this problem, Antigonus himself proclaimed liberty to Athens and removed most evidence of his presence in Attica, beyond control of the port of Piraeus. The use of local positions filled by individuals favorable to the Macedonians could very well be a key component of such policies.

Antigonus’ strategy helped to ease tension at a time of increased hostilities between Athens and Macedon, thereby allowing individuals to control the key administrative positions of local government for the king without the use of an overtly militaristic policy.

\(^{39}\) Both the start and end date of the Chremondean War is uncertain. See, for example: Gabbert 1987, pp. 230-35.

\(^{40}\) Euseb. Chron. (ed. Schoene 1866) 2.120: Ἀθηναίοις Ἀντίγονος τὴν ἑλευθερίαν ἔδωκεν. Habicht (2003, p. 53) believes the comments made by Plutarch (Arat. 34.4) and Pausanias (2.8.6) that the Macedonian garrisons were cleared from Rhamnous, the Eleusinian districts, and the astu of Athens (Museion Hill) in 255. Munychia, Salamis, Piraeus, and Sounion, however, remained in Antigonid possession for several more decades. The grant of freedom, then, was more ostensible than it was genuine.

\(^{41}\) Others have reached a similar conclusion. See, Errington 1990, p. 171; Habicht 2003, pp. 52-55.
Further illustrating the point is the grant of a tax exemption (δωρεά) secured by Apollodorus for the local community of metics who made up the garrison. Once again, the decree of Apollodorus makes it clear that such an appeals system existed between Macedonian subordinate officials and the local population. The system was one of appeasement, not heavy-handed dictatorship, and seems to fit with the goals of the garrison’s removal from the Museion Hill. Having been through the turbulent years of the 280s, Antigonus understood the strategic significance of the fortress of Piraeus, and knew that Athens could be held with this alone. Anything else, particularly a highly visible garrison, would have created unwanted trouble. Moreover, the inscription of Apollodorus exemplifies this gradual adaptation of civic powers by the stratēgos as a means of coping with the position’s loss of military prestige. Unwittingly or not, this change was exploited by the Antigonid policy in Attica.

Antigonus, as it seems, ceased making appointment to the stratēgia of Rhamnous after Apollodorus, but probably maintained a military presence in Attica itself.⁴² A decree from Rhamnous in honor of Dikaiarchos illustrates this point. As the document states, he was not selected for a specific office, such as stratēgos, but to a specific task: καὶ κατασταθεὶς μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς Ἀπολλωνίου ὑπὸ τὸ βασιλείος Ἀντιγόνου ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ φρουρίου (Lines 5-6).⁴³ That he was simply a phrourarchos, however, seems unlikely since the responsibilities of the garrison normally fell to the stratēgos of Rhamnous and sufficient evidence exists to show that this position continued after 255.⁴⁴ Moreover, having two commanders set to the same task would have been redundant. Later, Dikaiarchos was

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⁴² See, for instance, I. Rhamnountos II, n. 10, 11, and 14. Such appointments were made by the demos.

⁴³ Appendix, n. 3.

⁴⁴ Earlier restorations of the stone have only Demetrius, but more recent studies have shown that this cannot be the case (Appendix, n. 3).
responsible for the protection of the garrison in Panakton and the “other district” of Attica (τῆς ἄλλης χώρας τῆς Ἀττικῆς), a previously unspecified area. Under Demeterius II, Dikaiarchos was appointed to the arche of Eretria by the king himself. Likewise, his father, Apollonius, held a position in Eleusis, possibly that of stratēgos, after serving with his son in Rhamnous.45 Such positions were most likely held by specific selection of the king as well, like his first appointment, but no specific mention of this is made. Conspicuously absent, however, is any indication that such appointments were made by a vote of the demos. Moreover, while the decree itself dates to the mid-230s, some arguments have stated that all these appointments were made prior to 255.46 On the contrary, the sustained narrative of the inscription seems to indicate that these selections were made in succession up to the enactment of the decree. In other words, Dikaiarchos must have held some position in the Attic plain successively from the 250s until the 230s. Though details are scarce, their activity between these years seems to indicate that the king maintained a military presence through his agents, even after the ostensible grant of freedom in 255.

While the rest of Attica may have been made free, the Piraeus remained in the possession of an Antigonid official until the final expulsion of the Macedonians from Attica in 229. Original occupation of the port was made after the conclusion of the Lamian War in 322 and seems to have continued in much the same way up to the Chremonidean War. In his work on philosophers, Diogenes Laertius makes first mention of the commander there, a certain Hierokles in charge of Mounychia and Piraeus (Ἱεροκλῆς τῆς Μουνιχίας καὶ τῆς Πυραίας ἐχοντι καὶ

45 Tracy (2003, p. 20) argues that IG II² 1285 shows there was a stratēgos in Eleusis elected shortly after 256/5.

46 For the most recent discussion of Dikaiarchos and the date of his appointment, see Kralli (2006, pp. 49-51), who believes that all of the positions mentioned in relation to Dikaiarchos were made by a specific selection by the king, but does not take a stance on when these selections were made; cf. Habicht (2003, p. 53) who placed the appointments between 261-55; Before 255: Tracy 2003, p. 20.
τὸν Πειραιῶν. \textsuperscript{47} Gary Reger has shown that Hierokles held this position during or slightly before the Chremonidean War. \textsuperscript{48} While not specifically called by this title, Hierokles was most likely a \textit{stratēgos} since the areas he held resemble those of later attestations of these officials. Like the Museion Hill, the garrison in the Piraeus also seems to have been a matter of serious contention to the local population, with numerous attempts made for its expulsion. \textsuperscript{49}

Here too, Antigonid policies can be seen as undergoing changes to cope with the problems that arise from harsh control over such territories. A decree in honor of Herakleitos of Athmonia, dating approximately to the same year as Alexander’s revolt, confirms this point. \textsuperscript{50} Given that the decree specifically mentions the rebellion, Herakleitos’ appointment must predate this event (Lines 12-13: \textit{πολέμου γενομένου τοῦ περὶ Α|λέξανδρον}), and it is perhaps in this context that his appointment is most easily explained. His selection was made specifically to the position “in charge of the Piraeus and the other places administered with the Piraeus:” ύπὸ τ[[ό]δο βασιλέως στρατηγός ἐπὶ τοῦ Πε|ιραιέως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν | ταττομένων μετὰ τοῦ Πειραιέως (Lines 7-9). The ‘other places’ most likely refers to the adjacent coastal lands and Salamis since he also had control over the maintaince defensive walls there. \textsuperscript{51} Herakleitos is similarly honored in another surviving inscription by the people

\textsuperscript{47} Diog. Laert. 4.39.

\textsuperscript{48} Reger (1987, pp. 373-76) has convincingly argued that Diogenes’ statement should be dated to the middle of the war in the 260’s. Moreover, Diogenes mentions Antigonus’ victory over Ptolemy at Cos near the end of the conflict, further showing that his position should be attributed to the time of the Chremonidion War.

\textsuperscript{49} In particular, the attempt of Olympiodorus to take the Piraeus in 287 (Paus. 1.25.2; 26.3); Habicht 1997, pp. 124-35.

\textsuperscript{50} Appendix, n. 4.

\textsuperscript{51} Lines 11-12: τὸν τειχὸν τῶν ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ πεπτωκότων συνεπεμε[[λ]ήθη. The νῆσος here must refer to Salamis.
for his commemoration of King Antigonus’ victory over the Celts in 277. Like Apollodorus, Herakleitos was an active official from Athens who had shown a favorable attitude towards the Macedonians and was thus appointed by the king to an important local position. The policy of Antigonus was to employ those not only capable of conducting the duties required of them in such a position, but also in possession of φιλοτιμία πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. Such statements become increasingly more prevalent amongst accounts of these local military officials, showing the increasing need of the community to recognize both civic and royal obligations. From the king’s perspective, the issuance of grants and appointments appeased local leaders and their respective peoples, making their relationship one of mutual cooperation and benefit. The emphasis placed on this reciprocity is an indication that Antigonid policies were working.

When the Achaeans began inland raids on Attica in 239, Plutarch tells of a certain Diogenes, mentioned specifically in regard to the command of the garrison (ὁ μὲν τὸν Πειραιᾶ φρουρὸν). Ten years later, Diogenes remained in the same position and, upon the death of King Demetrius, is said to have abandoned Piraeus, Salamis, Munychia, and Sounion to Aratus for 150 talents. Given the territories mentioned, Bengtson thought Diogenes held the position of “Hauptstratege,” believing the position was analogous to what Craterus held in Corinth, but this assumption is completely without warrant. He based his

52 Appendix, n. 5.
53 For a discussion on Herakleitos’ possible origins, see: Taylor 1997, pp. 250-56.
54 See Kralli 2006 and 2000 for a detailed discussion on the relationship between the Macedonian King and Attic military officials.
56 Bengston 1944, pp. 380-81 where he cites Beloch 1912, p. 455.
assumption on the fact that the regions abandoned by Diogenes were comparable to “the areas administered with the Piraeus” of Herakleitos. Bengtson must have believed the areas of the south needed a supreme commander as they had had under Craterus, but this simply does not seem to have been the case. In the same passage, Plutarch specifically mentions a *stratēgos*, a certain Bithys, who defeated Aratus at Phylakia in the Argolid, but no mention is made of him as an administrative official in charge of the particular district. Similarly, he could not have been the *stratēgos* of Corinth since that was still in the hands of the Achaean League. In all likelihood, Bithys was simply a military commander set with the task of defending against the growing hostility of the Achaean League.

**Corinth**

The situation in Corinth is much more difficult to reconstruct, since no epigraphic material regarding the *stratēgoi* survives. After the death of Alexander and the end of his failed revolt in 245, territorial possessions of the Peloponnesus were given back to Antigonus by Alexander’s wife, Nicaea. Shortly thereafter, Corinth was soon lost again to Aratus in 243, and would not become an Antigonid possession until the war with Cleomenes forced Aratus to surrender to the Macedonian King in return for military assistance against Sparta in the 220s. Up to then, Antigonus’ possession of the south had relied on the citadel of Corinth as the locus of its administrative goals in the region, providing such a strong base for operations that intrusion into neighboring *poleis* could remain minimal. Only in Megara and Troizen, for instance, is there evidence of direct control.57 The remaining Peloponnesian cities were under the sway of the Antigonids, but little attempt was ever made to bring them

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57 For Megara, see: Stob. 40.9; For Troizen, see: Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.29.1 and Frontin. 3.6.7.
squarely into the Macedonian domain. Antigonus, as Polybius states, preferred to support friendly political factions within the cities, often tyrants.\textsuperscript{58} This statement is confirmed by Plutarch’s account of Aratus, who fought several of these tyrants before reestablishing the Achaean League. His capture of the acropolis at Corinth provides the opportunity to study the Antigonid system in the Peloponnese after Alexander. Once again a \textit{stratēgos} was put in charge of the operations there, but little hint is given in our sources that the position was as significant as it had been under Craterus.\textsuperscript{59}

Upon the second occupation of Corinth in 245, it seems that the fortress was under dual management. Polyaenus mentions Archelaus, the \textit{stratēgos}, and Persaeus, the philosopher and \textit{epistatēs}. Plutarch, however, seems to have difficulty with his terminology here, calling Archelaus both \textit{stratēgos} and ὁ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἠγεμόν. It seems doubtful, however, that Archelaus had anywhere near the power of that of his successors in Corinth. Pausanias, meanwhile, makes no mention of Archelaus, but describes Persaeus as ἐπὶ τῇ φρουρᾷ τεταγμένος; however, he has probably confused Persaeus with Theophrastus, the garrison commander. This interpretation seems plausible since in other accounts Persaeus was not killed by Aratus, but he was in Pausanias. Neither version seems entirely trustworthy. In all likelihood, one should take Persaeus as the \textit{epistatēs}, that is, the royal manager of the city’s affairs. Some dispute exists amongst scholars about whether the appointment of \textit{epistatai} was royal or local, but it seems reasonable here to assume that after the defection of Alexander Antigonus took the initiative to appoint someone whose trust was assured; or perhaps he broke up responsibilities amongst the three individuals. Still, it is quite

\textsuperscript{58} Poly. 2.41.10; cf. Errington 1990, p. 237.

\textsuperscript{59} Polyaenus \textit{Strat.} 6.5. Plut. \textit{Arat.} 18.1; 22.3; 23.4-5; Paus. 2.8.4; 7.8.3.
difficult to say what, if any, transformation took place at Corinth after Antigonus regained it from the wife of Alexander, Nicaea. Judging from the emphasis of our sources, Persaeus may have had primacy in Corinth, but this is possibly just a result of his fame and connection with the philosopher Zeno. If Persaeus’ apparent authority in the narrative is warranted, then perhaps civic administration had taken primacy over military, as both the officers, Theophrastus and Archelaus, seem to be subordinate. At any rate, at Corinth there was little time between Antigonus’ reestablishment of control in 245 and Aratus’ seizure in 243.

Then, after nearly two decades in the hands of the Achaean League, Corinth once again came into the Antigonid sphere when Aratus was forced to offer it back to Antigonus Doson in 224 as part of the negotiations for assistance against Cleomenes of Sparta. Thereafter, Macedonian control of the Peloponnese was increased. Mantinea was refounded as Antigoneia, and Macedonian garrisons were placed in Orchomenos, Heraia, and Corinth. Moreover, the so-called Hellenic League was founded with Antigonus at the top as hegemon. After his victory over Cleomenes at Sellasia in 222, Antigonus Doson put Brachyllas the Boiotian in a nonpermanent position in charge of Sparta.60

Once these affairs were settled in the Peloponnese, Antigonus departed to Macedonia after some Illyrian raids had disrupted Macedonia, leaving Taurion in charge of the Peloponnese.61 The language here is startlingly evocative of earlier such appointments for governors of the Peloponnese in the transitional period after Antigonus Monophthalmus. That Taurion was a stratēgos, however, remains uncertain since he was never explicitly

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61 Poly. 4.6.4: Ταυρίωνα τὸν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν Πελοπόννησῳ βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων ὑπ’ Ἀντιγόνου καταλειπμένων; cf. 4.87.1: ὁ δ’ Ἀπελλῆς οὐδαμός ἀφίστατο τῆς προθέσεως, ἀλλ’ ἀμα μὲν τὸν Ταυρίωνα τὸν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν Πελοπόννησῳ τεταγμένον διέβαλλεν. “Being left behind” is the exact wording used in earlier decrees for the stratēgos of the Peloponnesus.
called one. In fact, the only mention of his appointment is quite vague. Nevertheless, his position within the region may indicate an attempt at regional administration in the Peloponnese similar to what Antigonus Gonatas had with Craterus. Taurion evidently had control over virtually every aspect of governance in the region. He is seen playing a significant role in the Social War with the Aitolian League, providing military support from the south with the assistance of the Aratus and the Achaean League. Furthermore, his diplomatic duties were shown in the negotiations with the Aetolians for the establishment of peace in 217, when he was the lead representative of the embassy. In addition to his military control, he had say over financial matters, funding the fleet as they crossed the Isthmus. The trust shown by Philip V, who retained him in the Peloponnese upon Antigonus’ death, is undoubtedly significant.

Moreover, the fact that Taurion was the only official of Philip V given the oversight over a region seems to indicate the uniqueness of the Peloponnese in terms of administration. Apelles was to be left as guardian (epitropos), Leontius was the commander of the peltasts, Megaleus was the chief secretary, Alexander was the chief body guard, and Taurion was left in the Peloponnese. For the others, the duties were not regional administration, but specific tasks within the army and the royal court. This seems to show that there was a certain significance given to the affairs of the Peloponnese and not the others. As important as matters up in the north were (the Illyrians had just raided Macedonia where the Romans were also becoming more involved), it is quite surprising that a regional governor was left only for the southern districts and not others. Corinth, as it was, remained an integral part in the

62 Poly. 5.103.1.
63 Poly. 4.19.
64 Poly. 4.87.8-9.
control of the south under the Antigonids. Its primacy under Taurion and Craterus, however, should not suggest that such a system was indicative of Greece as a whole. These special royal appointments were anomalies in an otherwise localized administration.

Following Taurion, the administration of Corinth seems to have fallen to a number of lower magistrates, none of whom seem to have had the significance of either Taurion or Craterus. Livy mentions Androsthenes who was in charge of the local fort and its troops. Moreover, a certain Philokles is named, but only in connection with local affairs. The closest mention of any of these officials in regards to regional administration is when Philokles is called *qui Corintho Argisque praerat* in 198-197. As the latest evidence shows, the official in Corinth typically had far less control over the land south of Thessaly than has previously been believed. Moreover, the *stratēgos* of the Piraeus seems to have been independent of the commander in Corinth. As the decrees of Dikaiarchos and Apollodorus show, the local officials of a district could be appointed by the king and interact directly with him without an intermediary.

This evidence points to a more localized nature of Antigonid administration, and not the regional model that previous scholars have believed. The need for both political and military dominance in the southern regions of Greece was addressed by using the office of the *stratēgos* as a combined office of the two means of power. In Corinth, a gradual emphasis away from the regional model of governance under Craterus is evident. Taurion’s later appointment to the position is similarly not indicative of general administration of the south.

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65 Livy (32.23.5) uses *Corinthii dux Praesidii* and (33.14.1) *dux regius* to describe Androstenes. Bengtson 1944 believed he was a *phourarch* (p. 360).

66 He was called *regius praefectus* (Livy 32.16.12; 32.25.1), *praefectus urbis* (Livy 32.25; 40.5) and *qui Corintho Argisque praerat* (Livy 32.38.2).
In Attica, the situation was quite different. Here, the local *stratēgos* was retained over the royal one of the Macedonian king, a point only made clear by recent epigraphical evidence. This point typifies the methods of Antigonid administration in this area. The officers here gradually developed and inherited civic powers as a means of coping with the new realities of their position. While the exact relationship of these local officials with the king remains unclear, it is evident that they were able to deal with him directly and that appeals for benefits were heard. More recent scholarship has emphasized the local nature of Antigonid administration over the *poleis* of Greece, particularly in respect to the office of *epistatēs*.\(^\text{67}\) The evidence put forth above verifies such conclusions. It seems that true royal supervisory officials were rare and frequently only temporary. In general, Antigonid policy seemed to be sensitive to the cultural and social implications of maintaining tight control over the *poleis* through garrisons.

\(^{67}\) This is an important point when discussing the nature of Macedonian administration of the *poleis*. It has been discussed in great deal about other offices, but never the *stratēgos*: Errington 2002 and Hammond 1999.
Stratēgoi of the Northern Regions

Thus far, my discussion of stratēgoi has been focused on Attica and the Peloponnese, but the regions in the north always held a significant position for the king in terms of administration. Politically, the city-state tradition of southern Greece was much more strongly rooted in the south than in the north, where, due to the historical development of Macedon, the independence of the cities remained rather weak. As a result, problems of integration were not nearly as widespread as those in the south. As close as Macedon was to these areas, their protection became of utmost importance, especially given the evident frequency of raids conducted by the tribes north of Macedonia proper. It was, however, the location of both the king and the royal army, and thus Macedonian hegemony was far more secure. The area demanded less overt military intrusion than in the south. Nonetheless, the administration of the northern regions remained vital to the administrative goals of the kingdom. Prominence in these regions, however, seemed to remain with epistatēs, whether royal or local, and with traditional institutions in place before the Macedonian occupation. Antigonid administration thus relied on these very offices with minimal royal supervision and interference. Due to the close connection, loyalty in these regions was more assured and thus required less military intrusion.

Much of the evidence for stratēgoi in the northern regions comes from the opening lines of decrees and the initial pronouncements made for the issueing of the laws. Two
inscriptions, unpublished at the time of Bengston, reveal that local administration remained in several cities in the north (and Macedonia proper in particular). In Philippi, for instance, there was a board of *stratēgoi* responsible, in part, for recruitment of foreign mercenaries and the protection of theoric embassies for King Antigonus.  

Similarly, a council of *stratēgoi* in Cassandreia seems to have had legislative duties (Line 2: οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ νομοφύλακες ἑποτὶν), perhaps as a board to make motions for policies under the approval of the king (Line 10: κατὰ τὴν τοῦ βασίλεως βούλησιν) along with a board of local magistrates (*nomophylakes*). As in the south, the proper relationship between king and city is stressed as a matter of importance. Errington believed these officials were also responsible for policing and recruitment of mercenaries from the local districts, which explains the comment behind Philip V’s recruitment “from the cities.”

As Militiades Hatzopoulos has shown, however, these boards were not introduced by King Antigonus as part of constitutional reforms when the city came under Macedonian control in 285/4. Rather, such boards were part of an existing political framework within the city.

In two areas there is evidence for the *stratēgos* as an annual, eponymous office. First, an inscription from Moryllos dating to 208/7 seems to indicate a dating formula based on the local *stratēgia*. The inscription does this in two separate instances. The first was with the mention of the *strategia* of Demetrius, son of Sopatros (Lines 3-4: ἐπὶ τῆς Δημητρίου τοῦ

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68 Appendix, n. 6.

69 Appendix, n. 7 and 8: A similar body of *stratēgoi* is seen in Eretria, who, along with the *probouloi*, made several motions, see: *IG* XII, 9 199; 206; 208; 209; Lysimacheia: *Meletemata* 22, Epig. App. 3.

70 Errington 1990, pp. 229-31; cf. Livy 33.19.3.

71 Hatzopoulos 1993, pp. 575-84. In particular, Hatzopoulos has shown that neither the *stratēgoi* nor the *nomophylakes* operated at the detriment to the eponymous priest.

72 Appendix, n. 9.
Σωπάτρου στρατηγίας), and the second was with the strategia of Epinikos (Line 8: ἐπὶ τῆς Ἐπινίκου στρατηγίας), apparently years later. This evidence would seem to suggest an annual appointment for the stratēgoi in Macedonian proper, much like the archon of classical Athens. This point is further confirmed by the gymnasiarchic law of Beroia. The decree begins with dating formula peculiar to the city, stating “when Hippokrates, son of Nikokratos, was stratēgos” (Line 1: ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦντος Ἰπποκράτου τοῦ Νικοκράτου). While the appointment of these officials remains uncertain, it seems unlikely that they were appointees of the king. The annual nature of the office would seem to suggest an election by locals, but whether through council or assembly is unknown. It remains a possibility that the eponymous stratēgos, like the archons of Athens, was simply one of a board of these officials, but such information cannot be gleaned from the existing evidence. Additionally, the significant degree to which the dating formulae varied seems to indicate that traditional institutions remained even under Antigonid occupation. The kings, as it were, do not seem to have imposed any specific magistracies or dating formulae onto these cities. Local offices were preserved.

Following his defeat in 197 by Quintus Flamininus, Philip V gradually attempted to build up the territories that had once been under the control of the Macedonian king. While the treaty with the Romans confined him to the traditional boundaries of Macedonia, Philip attempted expansion into northern territories which were of little concern to the Romans. One of these areas was Paionia, where Bengston believed there was evidence to suggest that it was an administrative district under the supervision of a stratēgos. Livy makes mention of

73 Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 62.
74 Bengston 1944, p. 344.
Didas in Paonia in 184 who served the king as *ex praetoribus regiis unus qui Paeoniae praerat* and *Paeoniae praetor*.\(^{75}\) He is further connected with the assassination of Philip V’s son, Demetrius, in 181, and was seen again ten years later as a commander responsible for arming and deploying troops from the region. The prominence of Didas in Livy’s account comes from his connection with the assassination of Demetrius. Bengtson, who describes Didas’ position as “*vizekönigliche Stellung*”, believed that Didas was one in a line of succession of regional Paionian governors (whom he labels *stratēgoi*).\(^{76}\) On the contrary, he was more likely a prominent local figure who perhaps served the Paionians on a board of officials. Given the lack of temporal words in the passage, I take the term used here, *ex praetoribus regiis unus*, as an indication that Didas was one membr from a body of officials of unspecified number, rather than one from a line of successive governors. Thus, his identification as a regional governor is very unlikely.

Recently published inscriptions are quite illuminating about the administrative system of the northern regions, particularly Macedonia proper. Evident is a system of magistracies that seems to have functioned independently in each *polis*. While it remains unclear whether these officials were selected by royal appointment or local election, it is certain that *stratēgoi* were present within Upper Macedonia and not simply the regions of recent acquisition, as previous scholarship had assumed. The conclusion drawn from this analysis puts to rest Bengtson’s hypothesis that these officers were meant as regional governors outside the

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\(^{75}\) 40.21.9; 40.23.2; 42.51.5-6; Painoia: Poly. 5.97; the name Didas in these passages has often been misinterpreted as Derdas, a Macedonian name: Merker 1965, p. 38 n. 18 and pp. 51-53 for an analysis of Paionian-Macedonian relations; following Bengtson, he takes Didas to be a *stratēgos*; Bengston 1944, p. 344.

\(^{76}\) 1944, p. 341. Unlike Bengston, I fail to see *ex praetoribus regiis unus qui Paeoniae praerat* as an indication that he was a *stratēgos* acting as a regional governor for the Antigonids.
traditional boundaries, and were not present within Macedonia proper, as they most certainly were. On the contrary, the neighboring regions of Macedonia show a severe lack of uniformity in their magistracies. Priests, *epistatai*, *nomophylakes*, *agoranomoi*, and archons are among the offices attested in the epigraphic evidence as having served as chief officials of the various regions.\(^\text{77}\) Each *polis* in the north seems to have possessed its own unique council of magistrates, priests, or even, in some cases, a popular assembly.\(^\text{78}\) Given the most recent evidence, it seems misguided to think of northern Greece as divided up into administrative regions overseen by *stratēgoi*.

\(^{77}\) A detailed summation of these officials would be too long for the purposes of this thesis. Suffice it to say that, though similarities can be drawn, no two cities show a consistent pattern for which offices were the chief magistrates or even a common means of dating inscriptions. For the best discussion of this, see: Hatzopoulos 1996, pp. 127-65.

\(^{78}\) Errington 1990, pp. 229-38; For Hatzopoulos’ detailed discussion on Cassandreia, see: pp. 157-65; cf. his discussion on the historical development of Chalkidike from Cassander to Antigonus Gonatas, pp. 199-204.
The Stratēgos as an Independent Ruler

As stated in previous sections, one of the primary goals of the stratēgoi was to establish Macedonian dominance over recently conquered territories. While this seems to have been the case in a few examples, another separate case points to a somewhat different picture of the one seen up to this point. Thus far, the title of stratēgos had been granted to individuals who exercised power under an agreement with the Macedonian king and to those whose appointment was contingent upon him. The following example will show that the title of stratēgos could represent an individual who possessed sufficient control over a small region to exert power on a regional basis, but not enough to oppose the greater strength of the kings in the adjacent areas. That is, the individual was, or could be, a ruler of a small region who had his own claims to rule but came into peaceful agreement with the Macedonians through mutual cooperation. Caria, which had first been placed under the Antigonid sphere by an alliance with an independent stratēgos, shows evidence of the process whereby newly acquired territories gradually came under the supervision of civic officials from the local population.

One such individual is Olympichos of Caria. As an independent dynast in Asia Minor, Olympichos was first brought into the Antigonid sphere after Antigonos Doson sailed his fleet into southwest Anatolia in 227. Olympichos, who had earlier been a stratēgos of Seleucus in 235, retained the same role but came under Antigonid supervision shortly after
this campaign.\textsuperscript{79} The dearth of evidence, however, makes it necessary to conjecture about the circumstances behind this expedition. The only literary source for the time claims that the affair to be one of military conquest.\textsuperscript{80} This assumption, however, is perhaps not so accurate. A more likely explanation is that Antigonus traveled to Asia Minor as part of an arbitration expedition perhaps called by the Rhodians, Mylasians, or Iasians to cope with the growing hostility of Olympichos towards them.\textsuperscript{81} Why the king took on such a role, however, remains uncertain. But, it seems likely that he was attempting to exert more influence in the region against the growing expansion of Antiochus.

Surviving documents suggest that the primary role of the relationship between the king and Olympichos was one of adjudication. In a letter to Olympichos, Philip V issued orders regarding a problem that had arisen concerning the lands and sanctuary of Mylasa, about which Olympichos had written to Philip (τὴν παρὰ σοῦ ἐπιστολὴν ἀνέγνων ἣν ἐγεγράφεις). An inscription from the Rhodians shows the importance of Olympichos’ role in relation to the king of Macedon. Following an attack on Iasos in 220, the Rhodians stress a proper relationship for Olympichos with that of the king by making an appeal to the latter for a resolution of the problems.\textsuperscript{82} The letter emphasizes an appeal of the king’s orders (Line 78: ἀκολούθως τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπισταλεῖσιν). What right King Philip had in making commands for this instance is unclear, but his pronouncements do seem to have held some weight with both parties. However, the fact that Olympichos was able to conduct such activities in the first place shows his independence. The Macedonian king had some say over

\textsuperscript{79} Appendix, n. 10. He was also mentioned in honorary decrees as a stratēgos: Appendix, n. 11.

\textsuperscript{80} Trogus, \textit{Prologus} 28; cf. Poly. 20.5.11. Both make very brief mentions of the expedition.

\textsuperscript{81} This is the assumption of Errington 1990, pp. 178, 185.

\textsuperscript{82} Appendix, n. 12.
the foreign policy of the local ruler, but Olympichos was not obliged to have this decision approved beforehand. One can see from these documents that Olympichos held a subordinate position to that of Philip, though his role in administrative structure seems rather different from most officials mentioned thus far. This, too, explains Polybius’ description of him as a*

* dynastēs.* Once again, there was a tendency for the Antigonids to leave existing system in place once they came under their domain. This policy explains Olympichos’ title as *stratēgos.*

The date of Olympichos’ death and the end of Macedonian influence in Caria are uncertain, and only Philip’s campaign into Caria in 201 is known. As part of the concessions following the Second Macedonian War, the cities in Philip’s control are said to have been handed over to the Romans, including Caria (Cariaeque alias urbes quas Philippus tenuisset). Philip’s control, however, may not have been as solidly founded as one might assume from this statement. Just a few years prior, Philip had made an attempt to consolidate his control in Thrace, and inexplicably began a naval campaign in the Aegean areas surrounding Caria. The region remained in nominal control of Deinokrates who evidently had military command over the region. Bengtson interprets his title, *regius praefectus* as that of ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως στρατηγὸς, but the association between Livy’s use this term and the Greek title is uncertain. The mention of Deinocrates in a military context should not

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83 Poly. 5.90.1.
84 Livy 33.18.6.
85 Livy 33.18.6.
86 1944, pp. 370-72. Livy shows inconsistent use of technical terms for Greek offices. For dux regius as a *stratēgos,* see: Livy, 33.14.1; Menocrates and Antimachus in 44.24.9; Polyphantes and Menippus in 27.32.9-10. By contrast, *regius praefectus* is often used as the Greek equivalent of a commander of small forces, like an *epistatēs.* See: Livy, 31.27.6 for a *regius praefectus* involved in a minor skirmish; a similar official is described as being *cum modica manu* in 42.67.2.
immediately lead one to assume that he was a *stratēgos*. Other such officials mentioned in two inscriptions in the time of Philip’s occupation of Caria seem to have had military responsibilities. In an inscription dating to 198, a certain Asclepiades is honored by the *koinon* of the Panamarians for his dutiful service as *epistatēs* to King Philip, who had appointed him to the position.\(^{87}\) A military role for this office seems likely (Lines 9-11). Similarly, two brothers are mentioned in Herakleia as *epistatai* in service of an unspecified king, though the inscription’s date is uncertain. Some arguments, however, place it mostly likely in the time of Philip’s occupation of the region.\(^{88}\) What remains certain, however, is that when Caria came squarely into the Macedonian sphere, its administration after Olympichos’ death was conducted by means of royal representatives, not *stratēgoi*. The evidence here shows that areas traditionally under the auspices of a regional commander, as Olympichos was under Seleucus, gradually fell to the supervision of royal representatives. This example is instructive for the methods of administration employed by the Antigonid kings and the process of integrating neighboring territories into the Macedonian sphere. The *stratēgos* does not seem to have been a permanent institution for administration of the region.

\(^{87}\) Appendix, n. 13.

\(^{88}\) Appendix, n. 14.
The Administration of the Antigonid State

Traditional views regarding Antigonid administration hold that royal appointees, typically *epistatēs*, were placed in the individual cities of Macedonia proper, while the neighboring regions were controlled by a regional governor, a *stratēgos*. This thesis has shown that recent epigraphic finds in Macedonia proper and the north territories disprove such a notion. What remains undisputed is that boards of *stratēgoi* in Macedonia proper acted as local magistrates appointed perhaps for the purpose of recruitment and enforcement. To speak of regional *stratēgiai* in the north, and especially Upper Macedonia, is difficult. Within this region the administration of the kingdom remained with local boards of magistrates and eponymous officials. Within each city there was a local representative of the king, an *epistatēs*, who was responsible for overseeing the royal prerogatives within the city and making sure that any orders passed to him were executed according to the king’s will. In most cases, the *stratēgos* worked alongside the *epistatai* and the two were not mutually exclusive offices, as previous scholarship has stated. To think of Antigonid administration as local with royal oversight seems like the most likely and logical view. An over-encompassing organizational structure with *stratēgoi* at the heads of regional districts does not seem to be the case.

Moreover, the thesis has shown that the office of the *stratēgoi*, such as in Athens, were often existing institutions operating in administrative districts which the Antigonids

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89 Tarn, pp. 194-96; Bengtson 1944, pp. 317-30.
exploited. Thus, the office of the *stratēgos* was not an Antigonid creation, but an existing official usually operating in the function of a board and through local jurisdiction and appointment. Given the continuity seen with Macedonian administration, it is likely that most of these offices were in existence before the Macedonians brought them into their kingdom. Only in the cases of Corinth and Thrace can one speak of true Antigonid military governors. Even then, as in the case of Corinth, it seems difficult to see these individuals as permanent, administrative officials. Moreover, the term *stratēgia* is never used within any surviving Antigonid documents to describe a region or district, but only the office. It seems difficult to conceive of a uniform regional organization of the kingdom without making extraordinary assumptions in order to do so.

While more work needs to be done on the subject, the body of evidence presented here points to a more localized administrative system, even within offices of a military nature. The Antigonid kingdom was a variegated and multifarious state composed of dozens of city-states and villages, each with its own existing institutions and structures. These subordinate polities were then overseen not on a regional basis, but by supervisory officials tasked specifically with the duty of communicating the orders of the king. Military supervision seems to have been far less comprehensive than previously believed, even in the south. On the contrary, Antigonid military policies were much more sensitive to the local populations and their traditional institutions than one might expect from a cursory analysis. This is not to deny that the Macedonians were concerned with military supremacy, but merely to affirm that they sought to maintain it with the aid and use of local systems. In this regard, Antigonid policy was keenly aware of the sensitivities of the local communities and their sentiments regarding foreign occupation.
Appendix: Epigraphic Sources

1. Honorary Decree from Rhamnous (356/5 BCE)

This inscription was discovered in the Greek Archaeological Society’s excavations about two decades ago. The bibliography is thus somewhat limited.


1 [ὁ δὲϊνα τοῦ — —] μου Προσπάλτιος εἶπεν:
   [ἐπειδὴ Φυλοκλής] καὶ Διόδο[ὁ]ς χιλιαρχο[ν] [κ[α]-
   [τασταθέντες ὑπ]ό Διομ[ῆδον] [το]ῦ στρα[τη]-
   [τε φυλακῆς τοῦ φρουρίου κ[α]ὶ τοῦ στρατηγου]
   [καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν τῶν πολιτικῶν τῶν τα-
   [χθέντων μεθ’ ἐαυτῶν ἐν Ῥᾳμονοῦντι, πολ-
   [λῆν] ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι, διετέλεσαν]
10 [ἐγγ]οντες καὶ πράττοντες τὰ συμφ[εροντα]
   [ὑ]π[ε]ρ αὐτῶν, ἐνδεκάνεις τὴν εὖν[οια]
   [ἡν] ἕχουσι περὶ αὐτοῦς, ἀγαθεὶ τύχει [δεδό]-
   [τα]ὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπανέσασα Φιλ[οκλῆσ]α
15 [Π]ροκλέους Ἔκαληθεν, Διόδωρον Οίνο[στρά]-
   [το]ῦ Αναγιράσιον καὶ στεφανώσας ἐκ[άτερ]ον
   [αὐ]τῶν χρυσῷ στεφάνωι κατὰ τὸν νόμο[ν ἀρε]-
   [τῆς ἔνεκα καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἥν ἔχοντες [τυγχά]-
   [ν]ουσιν πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν Διομ[ῆδη]ν
   [κ]αὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας· ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψή-
20 [φ]ιομα ἐν στήλει λιθίνηι τοὺς ἀιρεθέντας
   [τὸν στρατιωτὸν καὶ στήησα ἐν Ῥᾳμονοῦντι ἐν
   [τῶ]ι ἵμηροι τοῦ Διονύσου, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀναγράφ[ην]
   [τῆς] στήλης καὶ τὴν ἀνάθεσιν δοῦναι τὸ ἀ[νά]-
24 [λων]α τοὺς στρατιώτα [ — — — — — — — — — — ]


2. Honorary Decree for Apollodorus from Rhamnous (258/57)

Due to the illegibility of the archon’s name, the date for this decree is largely based on historical grounds. Christian Habicht dates the inscription between 260 and 245. Luigi Moretti restores the archon date as either 244/3 (Kydonor) or 259/8 (Antiphon). The most recent editor of the inscription, Vasileos Petrakos, places the date at 256/5, the most likely date in light of recent discoveries.
3. Honorific Decree for Dikaiarchos from Rhamnous (235/4)


Line 8: the phrase ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου often accompanies the participle χειροτονηθέντες. See IG II² 682.

1 ἐπὶ Ἐκφάντου ἄρχοντος, ἐδοξῆν Ραμνουσίος, Ἐλεπίνικος
2 [Μ]ησισσίππος Ραμνουσίος ἐδοξῆν· ἐπεὶ δικαίαρχος πατρικίνι
3 [π]αρείλημα φύλιαν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τῶν Αθηναίων καὶ τὸ
4 κριόν τὸν Ραμνουσίν τατομέαν διαφυλάττει τὴν φυλι—
5 [α]ν, καὶ κατασταθεὶς μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς Απολλωνίου ὑπὸ τοῦ[δ]

in corona
[οι οἱ]κούντες
tῶν πολιτῶν
Ῥαμνοῦντι
Δικαιάρχον.

Line 6: [β]ασιλέως Δημητρίου'ου Roussel, but a new squeeze shows otherwise. See Pouillyoux.
4. Honorary Decree for Herakleitos (c. 250)


1 Χαρέδημου Ἑπιχαρίνου Κολωνήθηκεν εἰπεν Ἡρά-
κλεῖτος Ἀσκληπιάδου Αθηναῖος πρώτερον τε παρά τοί βα-
σιλεῖ Αντιχύνοι τεταγμένος διέτελε λέγον καὶ πράττ-
ων ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Σαλαμίνον δοὺς ὑπελάμβανεν συμ-
φέρειν καὶ τοῖς ιδίαι Σαλαμίνιον ἀφικνούμενος πρὸς τὸν
βασιλέα συμφιλιστικοῦμενον<ι>ς εἰς τὸ μὴθενὸς τῶν δυνατῶ-
ν ἃπρακτοὺς γενομένους ἀπέναι, καὶ γῶν καθεστηκὼς ὑπὸ τ-
[ο]ῦ βασιλέως στρατηγός ἐπὶ τὸ Πε<ν>αίεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
τατομέων μετὰ τοῦ Περαιάεως διατελεῖ πολλήν πρόνοιαν
ποιούμενος ὅπως ἂν μηθεν ἄδικημα γίνηται κατὰ τὴν χώρ-
[α], καὶ τῶν τειχῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ πεπτωκότων συνεπεμέ-
[2]<ν>ὶς ὅπως ἀνοικοδομηθεῖ, καὶ πολέμῳ γενομένου τοῦ περὶ Α-
λέξανδρον καὶ πειρατικών ἐκπλεύσεων ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπιμινίου
τὴν πάσαν πρόνοιαν ἐποιεῖτο τοῦ μηθὲν βλαβέρον γίνεσθαι π-
ερὶ τὴν χώραν, ἀκολούθους τὴν τούτων ἐκπλέωνας ποιούμεν-
ῶς τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως πρὸς τὸν δήμου αἰρέσει· ἐτὶ καὶ σῶματ-
ος ἄρτα[α]σθέντος ἐκ τῆς νῆσου καὶ ἐξαρχθέντος εἰς τοὺς ἑπεναντ-
[ίους] ἀνέσει[α]ν καὶ τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας ἐκολάσαν φανερ[ῶ]ν ποιῶν
[ὁτα]ς ἐπιτρέψει τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ χώ-
[ρᾳ, πε]ράχεται δὲ καὶ κοινῆ καὶ ἱδίαι χρείαν τοῦ βουλομένου Σαλ-
[αμίνι]ον καὶ τὰλλα πράττων διατελεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα Σαλαμί-
νος καὶ ἱδίαι καὶ κοινεῖ· ἀγαθὲ τύχη, δεδοχθα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Σα[λ]-


5. Honorary Decree from Kleruchies on Salamis for Herakleitos


1 [— — — — — — — — — — — καὶ ἀνανεωσμένον] τοῦ δήμ[ο]-

44
6. Decree from Philippi (243)


1

Φιλίππων.
ιερὸν· ύπέρ τῆς ἐκ Κώ θεωρίας, γνώμη τῆς ἐκκλησίας· ἐπειδὴ ἡ πόλις ἢ Κώιον κατὰ τὰ πάραμερα καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαντείαν τὸ ιερὸν τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ ἀπέσταλκεν ἄρχων Ἀριστόλογον Ζυμένδρων καὶ θεωρὸν μετ’ αὐτοῦ Μακαρέα Ἀράτου ἐπαγγέλλοντας τὴν τὴν θυσίαν τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐκχειρίαν, οὕτως ἐπέλθοντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὴν οἰκείατητα τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῇ πόλει τῇ Κώιον πρὸς τῇ πόλιν τὴν Φιλίππων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλέας Ἀντίγονον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνες καὶ Μακεδόνες ενεφάνισαν καὶ ἀνενεώσαντο, ἥξιον δὲ τὸ ιερὸν ἀσύλου εἶναι, ἀγαθὴ τύχη διδόσχα τῇ ἐκκλησία δεχέσθαι τῇ πόλιν τὴν τὴν ἐπαγγέλλαν τὴν τῶν Ἀσκληπιείων τῶν ἐν Κώι καὶ τῇ ἐκχειρίαν, καθάπερ ἐπαγγέλλουσιν οἱ θεωροὶ], ἐπαινεῖσαν <δ>·καὶ τῇ πόλιν τῆς Κώιον ἐπὶ ταῖς τιμαῖς αἷς συντελεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ εὐνοίᾳ τῇ τῇ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλέας Ἀντίγονον καὶ τῇ πόλιν τὴν Φιλίππων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας καὶ Μακεδόνας, δούναι δὲ καὶ τὸ ιερὸν τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ τὸ ἐν Κώι ἀσύλου, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ἀσύλευξι Ἀντίγονος προαιρεῖται, δοῦναι δὲ τὸν ταμίαν τοὺς θεωροὺς ύπέρ τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἕξιν ὅσον καὶ τοῖς τὰ Πόθια ἐπαγγέλλουσιν διδότας ἐν τοῖς νόμοις γέγրαπται, καλέσαι δὲ τοὺς θεωροὺς καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκ ὑπέρ τῆς πόλεως τὸν ἄρχοντα εἰς τὸ προτανείον· τὸν δὲ ταμίαν δοῦναι τοῖς ἄρχοντες ύπέρ ἐκατέρω αὐτῶν ἄρχοντος τὸ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου· ὅπως δ’ ἂν ἀσφαλῶς ἀποσταλῶς εἰς Νέαν Πόλιν, τοὺς στρατηγοὺς συμπέμα αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους <σ>·τριτιώτας τοὺς παρὰ τῇ πόλει μισθοφοροῦντας· εἶναι δὲ καὶ θεωροδόκον·

[τ]ῆς ἐκ Κώ παραγινομένης θεωρίας τὸν ὑποδεδεγμένον τῆς θεωρίας Ηρακλεόδωρον Ἀριστόλον. Τοὺς 13-4: Rigsby and the original editors restore <ei> να, but Hatzopoulos believes δίδωμι is correct on the basis of its alternative meaning of “concede.”
7. Decree from Kassandreia (276-240)


1 ὥρ’ ἵερεος Αντιλέ- οντος, Ὑπὲρβερεται[i]- ου πέντετη ἐπὶ δ[έ]- κα, οἱ στρατηγοὶ εἴπα[v]
5 ἐπειδὴ Δωρόθεος Δό- [ρ]ου Σελευκείας ἀνήρ ἀ- γαθὸς ὤν διατελεῖ π[έ]- ρι τὴν πόλιν τὴν Κα[σ]- σανδρέων καὶ τετυπ[μέ]- 10 [ν]ος παρὰ τῇ βασιλίσ[ῃ] [Φύα]ὶ τοῖς ἀφικνοῦμε[ὲ]- [νος] Κασσανδρ[έ]ο[v]
[-------------------]


8. Decree of Kassandreia (243): found on same stone as n. 6 above.


1 Κασσανδρέων. οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ νομοφυλάκες εἴπαν· ἐπειδὴ Ἰῃ παραγεγέννηται θεωροὶ πα- ρὰ τῆς Κώιων πόλεως ἐπαγγέλλοντες τὰ Ασκληπίεα καὶ τοὺς ἄγονας τοὺς συντελουμένους ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ ἀπολογίζονται τήν εἰνόν τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως, ἢν ἔχουσα διατελεῖ πρὸς τὴν μπαλέα Αν- τίγονον καὶ τὴν Κασσανδρέων πόλιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λουποὺς Μακέδονας πάντος, καὶ ἄξιοῦν τὸ ιερὸν τοῦ Ἀσκληπίου τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἀσυλον εἶναι, ἀγαθὸς τύχη δεδόχθαι τῇ βουλῇ δέχεσθαι τὴν ἐπανειλία τῶν Ἀσ- κληπίεων καὶ τοὺς ἄγονας καὶ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ εἶναι τὸ ιερὸν τοῦ Ἀσκληπι- οῦ ἀσυλον κατὰ τὴν του βασιλείας βουλῆσιν. ἐπαινέσαι δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Κώιων, διότι διατελεῖ πρόνοια ποιομένη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς συντελούμενοις καλὸς καὶ ἐνδόξος καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτὴ ἐννοου διαφυλάσσει πρὸς τοῖς μπαλέα Αντίγονον καὶ τὴν ἠμετέρων πόλιν καὶ Μακέδονας πάντος, δοῦναι δὲ τὸν ταμίαν τὸν παραγεγεγομένους ξένοις τὸ διάταγμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, καλέσαι δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀρχηγεῖτεν, τὸ δὲ ἀνάλομα τὸ εἰς ταύτα δοῦναι τὸν ταμίαν, οἷδε ἐπήγειρεν Ἀριστόλοχος Ζμένδρο- νος ἀρχιθέωρος. Μακαρεῖς Ἀράτου θεωρός. ἢ θυσία εἰς ἐνάτην σελήνην.
9. Decree from Moryllos (208/7)


1 [Ε]ύζενος Σάμου, Μένανδρος Ολωίχου,
Γιώκανορ Παραμόνου, οι άρχοντες επί[ν]·
ἐπεί Παράμονος Σαμαγόρου ἐπὶ τῆς
∆ημητρίου τοῦ Σωτάρου στρατηγίας
5 ἐπελθόν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐδεδόκει τῇ πόλει[ε]·
ὡς τε τ{ε}τε τι Ασκληπιάδι βοῶν ἀγελαίαν, ἐξ ἡς καὶ ἐκ
γενομένης ἐπιγονής πλείονος ἐν τοῖς πάντει
κ[α]ὶ δεκάτω ἐτει, <ἐπί> τῆς Ἐπινίκου στρατηγίας, ὀδ-
[ξ]όντος τῇ πόλει στεφάννασι αὐτόν θαλ-
λίνου στεφάνου, τοὺς τότε ἄρχοντας μὴ ἀναδεδω-
κέναι τὸ ψήφισμα διὰ τῶν ἴδιων γραμ[μ]ῶν ἀτον.
[ὅ]δε δόξα τής Μορρυλίου πόλει, ἐπεὶ πολιτε[ῦ]-
[τ]αι πρὸς αὐτοῦς ἀμεμειγμυητός, ἐπιδί-
[η]ὸς αὐτόν ἐν πάσιν τοῖς κατὰ κοινὸν ση[μ]ῶ-
[φ]έρουσιν, ἐπαινέον ταύτα τὸν καὶ στεφα[ῶ]-
[σ]α θαλλίνου στεφάνι, σταθήναι δὲ τὴν
[σ]τήλην δι’ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτωι
[τ]όπως τοῦ Ἀσκληπιείου, ὄπως καὶ ο[ι] λοιποὶ
[τ]ὸν πολιτῶν ἐνθέλλοντες ὡς ἄπονε-
15 μετά τις χάρις τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδράσι[ν]
παρορμώσιν πρὸς τὴν ὀμιῶν αἱρε[σί]ν, ἀπο-
σταλῇ δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα ε[ι]ς τὸν μνήμων
vacat ἐπεχειροτονήθη 'Ὑπερβερεταιών ιζ'.

Line 8: ἐπὶ Gauthier.

10. Fragmentary decree concerning Olympichos of Caria


1 [—]κορ ὄντος δὲ βουλῆ
[—] Πα[γ]ήμου προτέραι γνώ-
[μ]— ἱερ[ε]ως Δι[λ]ός Ὠς[ο]ν· ἐπεὶ δὲ Ὄλυ-
[π]χος — τοῦ βασιλέος Σελεύκου στρα-
5 [τηγάς — αἱρέσεως καὶ τοῦ προγό-
[νον — πολλῶν καὶ μεγά]λων; ἀγαθ[ῶν . κ.δ. . ]
[—]οτ[ . c.7 . . ]
[—]κεν[ . c.8 . . ]
[—]vacat[—]
[—]κρ. [ . . c.9 . . ]
11. Honorary decree mentioning Olympichos as strategos


a.1 [ἐπι]ειδῆ Διο[νυτάς καὶ Απολλάς — δια]τρίβοντες
[τῷ] Ὀλυμπίχοι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιστολογραφοῖοι πολλοῖς τῶν
πολιτῶν χρείας παρεισχῆται καὶ κοινῆ καὶ ἱδία μετὰ πάσης εὐνοί-
ας, πρόθυμοι τε εἰς εἰσὶν εἰς ἄπαντα τὰ συμφέροντα δεδόχθαι τῇ βουλῇ
καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις δεδόσθαι Διονυσίῳ καὶ Ἀπολλάιι πολιτείαι καὶ ἐνκτησίν
καὶ μετουσίαι πάντων καθ’ ἀ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὑπάρχης τάδε
[φυ]λήν καὶ συν[γ]ένασιν ἐ[δ]οξεῖ τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις συντελεῖσ-
[θαί] καθ’ ὅτι π[ρογέγραπται ἔ]λαχεν φυλῆς Ἐρεχθη[ίδος].

b.1 καὶ ἀναγράψω[ψ] τῷ ψῆφι[σ]μ[α — ἐλέσ]-
θαι δὲ καὶ πρεσβευ[τάς οὐ — ἀποδόθω]—
σουν αὐτοῖ καὶ [—]
προγεγενημέν[α φιλάνθρωπα —]
5 ἐδοξέ τῇ βου[λῇ καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις συντελείσθαι καθ’ ὅτι προγέγραπται]

12. Section of a fragmentary decree of Rhodes requesting help against Olympichos

(220/13)


—]μον πρόκοινον ποιήσασθαι τῇ[ῆς πόλεος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀποστειλαί πρὸς
45 [διαφορλάζαται αὐτοῖς τάς πόλιν ἔλευθέραν καὶ]
[—] ἱ]ασά]ων τοῦ λ[—]
[—] παρακάλεσα]ι αὐτόν [—]
[—] γ[—] ]]<—[ι[—]
50 [ἐλευθέρ]ραακ[ν<ν] καὶ α[ντόνομο]<μ> [ον —]
[—] τά ἀξιώμενα καὶ [—]
[—]ς εὐχαριστούντο[ν] ν[—]
[—] τόν γεγ[ε]ν[ημένον —]
—]ο[ν]<κ[α]<—
55 [δ]α[γγ]νο[ν]ταν — συν[—]
[—] γον[—] μα[—]
[—] κ[α]<[ι]<—
[—] π[αν α]ὐτω[—]
13. Honorary Decree for Asklepiades


1 ἑβασιλεύοντος Φύλιππου,
 ἐτοις τριτοῦ καὶ εἰκοστοῦ[δ.]
 Ξανθικοῦ ἐβδόμη, ἐπὶ σ[τεφα]-
 νηφόρου Ἀπόλλωνος [τὸ τρί]-
 τον, ἐκλήσιας κυρίας γενοῦ-
 μένης· ἔδεξε [Παναμαρέ]-
 ον τοῦ κοινών· ἐπεδήμη Ἀσκλη-
 πιάς Ασ[κληπιάδου]. Πει-
 μάτος [ἀποσταλείς ἐπί]-

5

10

στά[ης ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως]
Φιλ[πο]ν τής τε φυλακῆς
του [χωρίου καλῶς προέστη]
τη και συμφερόντως ύπέρ του
[του ιεροῦ ἐμ πάσι] τοῖς και-
[ρος καλῶς] φροντίζων [δια]-
[τετέλεκ]εν, και συνεισθέ[ν] 
τον τόν τειχῶν ύπο του
σεισμοῦ, ἐκτενῇ παρέχον αὐ-
τόν, ἐπεσκέψασεν πάντα,

ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλαν-
θρώπως κέρχηται και κοι-
νή πάσιν και ἰδίαι ἐκάστοι,
ἀκόλουθα πράσσον τῆς προ-
αιρέσει τοῦ βασιλέως Φι-
λίππου· ὅπως οὖν καὶ Πανα-
μαραῖς φαίνονται τιμῶ-
τες τούς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδράς·
ἀγαθή τύχη, δεδόχθαι
τοῖς κοινοῖς ἀρχαῖοι μὲν βα-
[
[σιλέα Φιλίππων ἐπη[νέσαι]]
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14. Honorary Decree for Apollonius (200-190)


1 [ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου θεοῦ [Ἀπόλλωνος] 
[τοῦ] τρ[ηθῆ] του μετὰ Δημήτριον Ἀπολλωνίου] 
[μή]νος Ἀρτεμισιώνος ἐκτη, προτάνει-
[ον] γνώμη· ἐπειδὴ Ἀπολλώνιος καὶ Φιλίππος 

5 Ἀπολλώνιοι [Καὶ]Λύμνοι[ο]ι τεταγμένοι[οι] ἔπιθη-
[sτάτα]τα[ι] ἐξ ὑμῖν τοῖς καὶ ἀρχαίοι διατ[λ]οῦσιν
τήν εὐνοοῦν παρ[εχόμενοι νοι] τοῖς [τῆς βασιλεί] 

9 τοῖς δήμοι …

Lines 9-11: Persson has further restorations, but the stone is severely fragmentary here.
Bibliography


