

The Semantics of Χορή in Aeschylus

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Abstract

David Christian Anderson Wiltshire: The Semantics of $\chi\rho\eta$ in Aeschylus
(Under the direction of Peter M. Smith)

In this thesis I examine all uses of the word $\chi\rho\eta$ in the six certainly genuine plays of Aeschylus as well as in the *Prometheus Bound*. I argue that they fall naturally into two distinct groups: Type I, whose examples exhibit timelessly true proprieties and obligations, commonly known, and affecting all mortals equally; and Type II, which include specific truths about the future, affecting a particular, named person and known only to those with the relevant prophetic knowledge; these instances also assume a conception of the gods acting independently of (if not in fact at odds with) the source of necessity involved in the $\chi\rho\eta$ -statement. Examples of Type I can be found in all seven of these plays, but Type II uses are found almost solely in the *Prometheus Bound*.

omnibus qui me suis exemplis sapientiam clementiamque docuerunt atque docent

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Table

1. Frequency of Use of Ἀνάγκη, Δεῖ, and Χορή in the Seven Plays.....3

Introduction: Necessity in Aeschylus

The semantics of necessity in Greek literature is not a path well-trodden thus far in classical scholarship; a few publications exist, scattered here and there, which either make generalizing statements about the entire corpus of Greek literature¹ or focus specifically on one author without attempting to draw distinctions between the Greek vocabulary used,² and so I find myself, as I set out to investigate the semantic meaning and use of *χρή* in Aeschylus, largely without support to which I could refer my findings. Thus I have turned to the text in order to extrapolate for myself from the instances of each word a coherent understanding of the meaning and use of each; my primary tool in this study has been the texts themselves,³ although I am much indebted to and reliant upon the commentators.

Ancient Greek writers use a number of different expressions to communicate necessity or propriety: *χρή*, *δεῖ*, and *ἀνάγκη*, in addition to the periphrastic *-τέος* construction, *εἰκώς*, *πρέπει*, etc.; as all language is ultimately flexible and its users

¹ The best of these are Goodell (1914) and Benardete (1965). I am grateful to have the work of Redard (1953) as a reference, but his interpretation of *χρή* and its relatives rests primarily on the evidence from Homer, and he uses these categories as prescriptive toward the instances of later authors, often without explanation; he also seems to feel pressure to read *χρή* in a manner complementary to his reading of *χρηῖσθαι* (and other words; he explores the whole range of cognates). As Goodell notes, study of the etymologically related words is useful toward understanding the meaning of *χρή* only in the instances concerning oracular response; outside this context, the comparison is not helpful (94).

² For example, that of Rosaria Munson, "Ananke in Herodotus," *JHS* 2001, 30-50.

³ I cite the text of Aeschylus from Page's 1972 OCT.

responsive and adaptive, and as all these words share the semantic field for necessity, the precise use of any given one of these words (and thus the relationship between any given two) is a consideration of the genre, time period, and author in which the word occurs. This is especially true of the relationship between δεῖ and χροή, as from Homer on these two have very marked and measurable interactions with one another.

Therefore, in my examination of the meaning and use of χροή in Aeschylus I must consider the interaction of χροή with the rest, specifically δεῖ (and to a lesser extent, ἀνάγκη),⁴ so as to locate χροή within the range of semantic use by distinguishing it from the others.

First, let us discuss the frequency of the use of these words in the seven plays.⁵

⁴ Goodell 91: "The words χροή and δεῖ, with their inflectional and dialectic variations, are less definite and stable in their semantic range than the other Greek expressions for the general ideas of necessity, obligation, or propriety. Their semantic boundaries varied with the dialect, province of literature, and period." I will briefly discuss ἀνάγκη for the elucidation of χροή on account of the similar grammatical constructions and their character as substantives with a copulative often understood; they share the consideration of what the substantive is meant to signify.

⁵ I have compiled this table from the instances given in *Italie*; however, I do not consider all of them genuine. I will discuss *Septem* 1005, *Agamemnon* 573 and 1226, and *Prometheus* 606 and 970 in my appendix concerning the interpolated instances.

Table 1	Persae	Supplices	Agamemnon	Choephoroi	Eumenides	Septem	Prometheus ⁶
ἀνάγκη	254 293 569 587	440 478 1031	218 1071 726 902 1042	75 239 754	426 550		16 290 72 514 105 515 108 1052
δεῖ		390 407 417 450 765	343 567 598 848	548 582 668 672 879	94 829 264 519 591 826	203	9 86 870 875
χρή (including χρεῶν) ⁷	153 219 527 801 820	176 502 519 724 763 938 971 980	166 928 342 [1226] [573] 1368 580 1419 821 1429 879 1556 917 1658 922	203 297 907 930 (2)	708 1003	1 10 617 713 717 [1005]	3 [606] 772 100 630 930 103 640 [970] 183 659 996 183 703 1067 213 715 295 721 485 730

What strikes an observer perhaps most readily is the relative frequency of each word — relative, that is, both to that of the other words given and in each of the works, especially considering the length of each; the nine instances total in the 1077-line Persae pale

⁶ I will refer to the play commonly known as the *Prometheus Vincetus* or Πρωμηθεὺς Δεσμώτης simply as the *Prometheus*; I make no reference to the fragments of any other play which might have followed that play in the trilogy or which includes Prometheus and may have an Aeschylean authorship.

⁷ In the seven works taken together, there are eight total instances of χρεῶν: *Supplices* 502, *Supplices* 980, *Persae* 153, *Agamemnon* 922, *Choephoroi* 930, *Prometheus* 772, *Prometheus* 970, and *Prometheus* 996. Χρεῶν is in some sources listed separately from χρή, but as the former is a participial form of the latter, and as no semantic difference between the two has been proven (or suggested, to my knowledge), I will consider forms of χρεῶν to reflect the semantic meaning of χρή, and vice-versa.

against the twenty-four in the 1673-line *Agamemnon* and thirty-three in the 1093-line *Prometheus*. The historical implications of relative frequency I will discuss below, as I discuss the relationship between *δει* and *χρη*; it will suffice here to let the evidence suggest the difficulties in establishing as clear a standard of semantic meaning for *ἀνάγκη* and *δει* as we can for *χρη*, as each occurs only twenty-five times in the seven works. Indeed I chose *χρη* for my discussion on account of the relative wealth of examples from which to identify Aeschylus' use of the word.

I will briefly discuss Aeschylus' use of *ἀνάγκη* here, with the intention only of illustrating the wide range of use of the word and the difficulties in coming to terms with the sum of the instances as a coherent whole. I will argue that the general source of necessity coming from uses of *δει* is human-made law, and of *χρη*, cosmic or divine law, but that the source of the necessity behind a use of *ἀνάγκη* is physical compulsion, the threat of physical compulsion, or, explicitly, the fear of potential physical compulsion, and it is typically spoken of as a force working against the will of the speaker, with a tone of fear or regret (the other two are used with equanimity on the speaker's part).⁸ Indeed in the plural, and sometimes in the singular, *ἀνάγκη* means "chains" or "instruments of torture or bondage."⁹

⁸ For unhappiness on account of what is *ἀνάγκη*, see especially the instances at *Supplikes* 478, *Persae* 254 and 569, and *Agamemnon* 902.

⁹ E.g. *Supplikes* 1031, *Persae* 587, *Agamemnon* 218, 726, and 1071, *Eumenides* 426 and 550, and *Prometheus* 108, 514, and 1052.

A study of the use of δεῖ is more instructive for our purposes than a study of the use of ἀνάγκη, as δεῖ and χροή share between them a more closely related sphere of usage. We may observe the evolution of the relationship between them: δεῖ, which is nearly absent in Homer, eventually takes on virtually all of the semantic range of χροή, such that in Demosthenes it is used nearly five times as often as χροή, and Aristotle uses the two interchangeably, although χροή in Aristotle has a somewhat archaic flavor; by this time χροή had acquired a poetic charge, and its use was understood as reference to poetic themes and genres.¹⁰ One may infer from such evolution that making semantic distinctions between χροή and δεῖ is necessarily contingent upon considerations of time and genre; therefore I will describe my findings on the use of δεῖ in Aeschylus.

Aeschylus' choice of δεῖ over χροή at a given instance seems to be reliant upon either a strong context of human-made law (contrasted with divine law, as we shall see in my discussion of χροή) or the desire to use a grammatical construction appropriate to δεῖ but not χροή. The uses of δεῖ seem to fall naturally into discrete categories based on grammatical structure and meaning; the greatest distinction in grammatical structure lies between those uses with a complementary infinitive and corresponding subject accusative, etc. and those that take a genitive—not a genitive of quantity, as in πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν (Smyth § 1399) but what I will refer to as a genitive of lack (Smyth § 1400).

There are six such usages of δεῖ with a genitive in the seven plays: Agamemnon 848, Choephoroi 879, Eumenides 829, and Prometheus 86, 870, and 875 (recall that δεῖ occurs

¹⁰ See Goodell's article, especially 100-102.

θαρσοῦσι ναῶν ποιμένες παραυτικά. (764-767)

Δεῖ here merely expresses part of what is required in the process of putting a ship safely at anchor in a harbor; I imagine that if this were part of a technical handbook on managing a ship, δεῖ would be just as appropriately used.

The second most obvious category for uses of δεῖ is the rhetorical question including the word; this use is based upon the one use of δεῖ in the *Iliad*.¹² It is implied that such a question does not have a proper answer. The four instances of this type of δεῖ are at *Agamemnon* 567 and 598, and *Eumenides* 94, and 826. At *Agamemnon* 567, the Herald is describing to the Chorus the sufferings the Greeks experienced at Troy, when he says, “τί ταῦτα πενθεῖν δεῖ; παροίχεται πόνος.” He then encourages the Chorus to take heart in the fact that ultimately the Greeks prevailed. At *Agamemnon* 598, after Clytemnestra’s entrance into the scene, she says to the Herald, in order to preempt his going on at length, “καὶ νῦν τὰ μάσσω μὲν τί δεῖ σέ μοι λέγειν; / ἄνακτος αὐτοῦ πάντα πεύσομαι λόγον.” At *Eumenides* 94, Clytemnestra’s ghost chides the sleeping Furies with the sarcastic, “εὐδοιτ’ ἄν, ὡή, καὶ καθευδουσῶν τί δεῖ;” as in their sleep they are useless to her; at *Eumenides* 826, Athena states the obvious to the Furies when she says, “κὰγὼ πέποιθα Ζηνί, καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν;”

My next consideration for uses of δεῖ concerns the context of words and ideas in which the word for necessity occurs; this distinction of context is the most useful of the

¹² Benardete 286: “The single instance of δεῖ in Homer serves to isolate a use of δεῖ that χορή hardly ever usurps. Achilles says, τί δὲ δεῖ πολεμιζέμεναι Τρώεσσιν Ἀργείους (I 337). The implicit answer is that there is no need or necessity for the Greeks to fight the Trojans. δεῖ, accordingly, can only be used in direct questions with τί or πῶς if the question expects a negative answer. One cannot say τί δεῖ λέγειν; and imply that the one addressed should tell one what to say, but it can only mean that there is no more to say.”

Point by point Orestes lays out his interpretation of the dream to the Chorus, starting with κρῖνω (542), followed by a series of εἰ statements leading up to the conclusion which begins with δεῖ. One might argue that Orestes is using δεῖ to express the firmness of his resolve, but in this passage he is expressing the necessity of the occurrence of future events, justified only by his interpretation of the dream. (This context of δεῖ contrasts sharply with the use of χροή, regarding the same events, at Choephoroi 930.)

Before I considering semantic categories for χροή in Aeschylus, I will briefly discuss its etymology and function. As Frisk wrote it best, concerning χροή: “alle Etymologien ganz hypothetisch sind”;¹⁴ numerous relatives of the word exist in Greek, but little light can be shed as to its source.¹⁵ Χροή originally was a simple noun, generally considered neuter although left undeclined,¹⁶ occurring often with a form of the copulative, until for the present indicative ἐστί was omitted, and outside the present indicative the two melded together in form, producing forms such as χροῆν (χροή + ἦν) for the imperfect, the infinitive χροῆναι (χροή + εἶναι), and the indeclinable participle χροεών (χροή + ὄν) (Smyth § 793). It typically employs a complementary infinitive.

¹⁴ 1119.

¹⁵ “Χροή restant isolé comme nom-racine... Malgré les difficultés, le *gher- de lat. hortor, ombr. heriest « il voudra », et finalement χράζω, etc., reste la moins mauvaise étymologie.” Chantraine 1274-1275.

¹⁶ See among others Chantraine, 1272.

Chapter I: Type I Χορή in the *Supplices*, *Persae*, *Septem*, *Agamemnon*, *Choephoroi*, and *Eumenides*

The primary objective of this thesis is the description of the word χορή as it is used in the works of Aeschylus; I have interpreted its meaning through studies of every individual instance of the word, and therefore my description will manifest itself as a case by case study of the semantic meaning using the context of each to tease out the various understandings of the word and its meanings which inform them. I have grouped the instances into two basic categories: the instances in which χορή reflects a system of what I will call cosmic law (which I will refer to as Type I), and the instances which exhibit what I will call the Promethean use (Type II); as the majority of the instances fall into the former category, in the interests of space, I will pay particular attention to the aspect of Type I χορή which each best illustrates. When I discuss the Promethean use, I will explain my interpretation of its relationship to the cosmic law use before dealing with the instances in that category.

I have collected certain instances into the Type I category based on common features from which I have hypothesized a reference to this cosmic law (which I will describe below): a) a conception of the statement as eternally true and valid (i.e. its validity is not contingent upon a specific time frame); b) a conception of the statement as true of all individuals (in some cases, all who occupy certain roles; application is not restricted to one specific individual); c) a general linking of the Olympian gods with

what is *χρῆ*, whether as agents or generally as representatives thereof; and d) the status of the content as common knowledge (not limited to the speaker who informs his audience).

Because Type I *χρῆ*-statements are timeless, applicable to a great number of people (dependent only upon the role or intersection of roles of the subject), consonant with the position of the gods in terms of world view, and commonly known, I have extrapolated my conception of what is described as *χρῆ* in these instances to be cosmic law, the universal order which reinforces the continued stability of the universe. I conceive of these “laws” as a dense spider’s web, each thread constituting a rule by which an individual must live, the sum of the threads constituting the framework, the order, by which the universe continues to function and remain secure. The individuals within it cannot behave outside what is appropriate for them without transgressing one of these rules, and the propriety to which I refer is a moral and spiritual propriety (in contrast with *δεῖ* laws, which are set down by man). These *χρῆ*-statements are often repeated by other Greek authors and reflect the values of the culture; however, Aeschylus, as we will see, uses differing conceptions of what is *χρῆ* as a means of distinguishing characters, both between cultures (e.g. Persian vs. Greek) and between positions within Greek culture (e.g. Orestes and Clytemnestra).

To explain some terms I will use: the clause, whether declarative or interrogative, independent or dependent, which contains the word *χρῆ* and fulfills the expected grammatical usage (e.g. complementary infinitive, etc.) I will refer to as a “*χρῆ*-statement.” The *χρῆ*-statement, for the cosmic law instances, expresses one thread of

“what is *χρη*” – “what is *χρη*” is a broad category, circumscribed by the acts described using the word, which, taken collectively, establish the boundaries of the word’s general semantic meaning. As I examine each instance of the word, I will refer both to how it helps shape my understanding of what is *χρη* and to how it functions dramatically as a performative speech act; this aspect, including the speaker’s intention as well as the effect it has on the addressee, I will refer to as a “*χρη*-act.”¹⁷

First, I will discuss the breadth of application of a *χρη*-statement. All the Type I instances of *χρη* communicate codes of behavior which apply generally and are not limited to a given individual in a unique situation; some Type I *χρη*-statements apply equally to all, and some express obligations which are relevant only to those in a certain position or certain role. The statements which express the semantic meaning of *χρη* most generally (those which apply to all individuals equally, which I will refer to as “universal”) exist in pure form; as they have meaning independent of context, they are self-evident and self-contained. They provide the broadest base upon which to understand the more specific usages and set the standard from which the context of the “applied” instances are derivative.

¹⁷ I will largely refrain from translating the word *χρη* (and *χρη*-statements) because I believe that restricting the meaning of the word to that which can be expressed concisely in English undermines my goal and presents unnecessary difficulties in explanation. When I will translate the word, however, I will not translate it “it is necessary that” or “one must” or “one ought,” etc., as these English phrases do not address the source of such necessity. Rather, I will most often translate *χρη* as “it is appropriate that.” I believe that what is *χρη* is the sum of appropriate behavior relative to one’s role in the universe and society (cosmic law), and such behavior supports the continued stability of the universe and society.

The following instance, at *Agamemnon* 928, expresses one of the most widely-quoted tenets of Greek life, from Aeschylus' time:

καὶ τὸ μὴ κακῶς φρονεῖν
θεοῦ μέγιστον δῶρον. ὀλβίῃσι δὲ χρεῖ
βίον τελευτήσαντ' ἐν εὐεστοῖ φίλη.
εἰ πάντα δ' ὡς πράσσοιμ' ἄν, εὐθαρσῆς ἐγώ. (927-930)

This sentiment, that one must not judge a man fortunate until he has continued in such fortune until his death, in its universally applicable and widely-agreed upon status, sets a strong precedent for *χρη* communicating that which is universal in Greek thought—the presence of this idea in numerous places elsewhere in Greek literature speaks to Aeschylus' and his culture's acceptance of it as universal and timeless.¹⁸ Clytemnestra has just referred to the Greeks, “with deliberate malice,” as “blessed” (Thomson 32); with these lines *Agamemnon* rejects the epithet. This instance and the next are based upon the traditional view that the gods are jealous of any mortal who claims or seems to achieve more than what is appropriate; thus *χρη* here is virtually defined as humility for mortals before God, and the absence of subject for the infinitive underlines the lack of specification. The word is used here to express the position of mortal men vis-à-vis the gods; for more explicit examples of this, see the section below (page 44).

¹⁸ For a selection of these instances, see Radermacher, *Gnomon* XIV 1938, 296. The most memorable instance of this idea is, of course, at Herodotus 1.32.7: εἰ δὲ πρὸς τούτοισι ἔτι τελευτήσει τὸν βίον εὖ, οὗτος ἐκείνος τὸν σὺ ζητέεις, ὁ ὀλβιος κεκληῖσθαι ἄξιός ἐστι· πρὶν δ' ἄν τελευτήσῃ, ἐπισχεῖν μὴδὲ καλέειν κω ὀλβιον ἀλλ' εὐτυχέα; Radermacher emphasizes the difference between “rich” (εὐδαίμων) and “blessed” (ὀλβιος). Fraenkel gives another instance in which both *χρη* and *ὀλβίῃσι* appear: a fragment of Sophocles (588 N. = 646 P.), “οὐ *χρη* ποτ' εὖ πράσσοντος ὀλβίῃσι τύχας ἀνδρός, πρὶν αὐτῷ παντελῶς ἤδη βίος διεκπεραθῆι καὶ τελευτήσῃ βίον.” (Radt conjectures *δρόμον* as the final word in this sentence.)

Another example of the use of universal *χρή*-statements instructing humility on the part of men occurs at *Persae* 820:

τόσος γὰρ ἔσται πέλανος αἵματοσφαγῆς
πρὸς γῆ Πλαταιῶν Δωρίδος λόγχης ὕπο:
θῖνες νεκρῶν δὲ καὶ τριτοσπόρω γονῆ
ἄφωνα σημανοῦσιν ὄμμασιν βροτῶν
ὡς οὐχ ὑπέρφεν θνητὸν ὄντα *χρή* φρονεῖν· 820
ὑβρις γὰρ ἐξάνθοῦς' ἐκάρπωσεν στάχυν
ἄτης, ὅθεν πάγκλαυτον ἐξαμᾶ θέρος. (816-822)

In this instance, the appropriate behavior for mortals relative to the universe is characterized as the opposite of behavior which leads to chaos, *ἄτη*, *ὑβρις*, etc. Again the subject of the infinitive is left unstated, as this statement applies to all mortals equally.¹⁹ According to Darius in this passage, man's humility is a primary aspect of his relationship to the universe; as a transgression of what is *χρή* involves some upsetting of the order of the universe, it will have repercussions, and Darius precedes his *χρή*-statement with a gruesome description of the devastation caused by his son's refusal to abide by this knowledge. The effects of the transgression he takes to be a reminder to future generations: thus he characterizes the law broken as timeless, universally applicable and unchanging over the passage of time.

The previous examples provide an understanding of cosmic law *χρή* as signifying universal order and *χρή*-statements as communicating how best all mortals may behave in accordance with it; now I will move on to discuss other aspects, all of which inform each instance individually, some more obviously than others. In the

¹⁹ We see this statement again, with *χρή*, at the end of Sophocles' *Tereus* (θνητὴν δὲ φύσιν *χρή* θνητὰ φρονεῖν, Fr. 531 Nauck / 590 Radt).

following sections I will discuss a) the universal sentiment expressed with *χρη* as applied to individuals in specific situations, b) the relevance of the *χρη*-act to an understanding of the semantic meaning of the word, especially as it informs and describes the relationship between the speaker and addressee, and c) the function of the gods as agents or representatives of what is *χρη*.²⁰ A discussion of the following instance, at *Supplices* 724, provides an excellent introduction to these questions, as it is an example of universally applicable *χρη*, the use of *χρη* as an imperative speech act relating Danaüs to his daughters, as he is in a position of authority giving advice, and the close relationship between the reverence of the gods and what is *χρη*.

ἀλλ' ἡσύχως *χρη* καὶ σεσωφρονισμένως
πρὸς πρᾶγμα' ὀρώσας τῶνδε μὴ ἀμελεῖν θεῶν·
ἐγὼ δ' ἄρωγούς ξυνδίκους θ' ἤξω λαβῶν. (724- 726)

The idea that one must take thought and not neglect the gods is a part of the universal order; however, the circumstances prompting the *χρη*-statement show up within the statement itself (*πρὸς πρᾶγμα' ὀρώσας*) and remind the audience of the immediate circumstances, thus rendering the context of this statement not precisely the same as that of those discussed above. In these lines there is no tension between the characterization of the gods and what is *χρη*; the one reinforces the other.

Danaüs instructs his daughters as a *χρη*-act on how best to behave according to their role vis-à-vis the universe, in order to achieve the best outcome. Danaüs adopts the stance of one who, being older and more experienced, can give such advice to others;

²⁰ The nature of my topic and method contributes, I think, to some measure of unnecessary or unwanted repetition as I reiterate my findings. In the sections that follow, I discuss together the instances which illustrate each of these aspects best so as to limit repetition as much as possible.

although there is no second-person subject expressed for the infinitive, the emphatic “I” at the beginning of the next line implies a contrast; Danaüs is distinguishing himself from his daughters’ ignorance. Most Type I *χρη*-statements are directed by the speaker to one of a lower status than himself—this is to be expected, in that the laws which constitute Type I *χρη* are self-evident, and giving voice to them, informing another of them, requires the presumption on the part of the speaker that his audience is less knowledgeable than he. (*Χρη* is by nature appropriate behavior, so using the word in giving advice regarding correct behavior is apt, and such an example as this can perhaps be thought to set the rule.) I will later compare this power dynamic between speaker and addressee to that at *Persae* 219 and 527 in which Atossa and the Chorus give each other similar advice. The difference between this instance in the *Supplices* and those in the *Persae* is that the qualifications by which Atossa and the Chorus give each other advice are political position and status as counsel, respectively; here a father counsels his daughters, and if he is somewhat patronizing, we are scarcely surprised.²¹ The advice is impersonal; it is not meant to comfort.²²

This instance illustrates another of the major features of the Type I, cosmic law *χρη*-statement: its function of describing, expressing, or affecting the relationship between the speaker and addressee. The use of *χρη* by the speaker is very rarely merely

²¹ For an instance of *χρη* which occurs in a maxim, yet is between two individuals of the same status (in which the absent subject of the infinitive is surely “we”), see that at *Agamemnon* 1368 (σάφ’ εἰδότας *χρη* τῶνδε μυθεῖσθαι περί, / τὸ γὰρ τοπάζειν τοῦ σάφ’ εἰδέναι δίχα. 1368-1369); that Thomson quotes a very similar line from Demosthenes using *δει* (50.48: *δει γὰρ σε ἀκούσαντα ὀρθῶς βουλευσασθαι*). I take as evidence of the influence of epic (on epic vocabulary here, see Fraenkel 641) or the influence of the maxim quality of the *χρη*-statement.

²² Johansen and Whittle, 83.

descriptive of the world around him, but rather it is more often than not an imperative speech act directed at the addressee. Since what *χρη* represents is timeless, universal, and considered self-evident, *χρη* statements, while instructive, do not communicate new knowledge. As this is the case, it is all the more important to ask oneself when investigating instances of the word why a character should choose to make such a statement, what the character seeks to effect by its use, and what sort of commentary the existence of a *χρη*-statement in an exchange provides regarding the relationship of the speaker and addressee. For what is necessary and sufficiently agreed-upon as such among parties will not be stated; the statement (the act thereof) of what is “necessary” calls into question such necessity or indicates a difference in perspective and values between speaker and addressee.²³

In Aeschylus, a character does not use *χρη* to strengthen a declarative statement into a first-person imperative concerning what he or she feels to be important behavior for him / herself;²⁴ the word is used with imperative force only to refer to the action of another character which the speaker feels to be necessary. When a character uses *χρη* in the first person, he or she already acquiesces enough in the validity of the force of *χρη* to be in the process of carrying out the action described as *χρη* (cf. the instance at *Septem* 1). In *χρη*-statements in which *χρη* is instructive, the reader is given a glimpse of the power dynamic between the speaker and addressee, information not to be ignored in the

²³ Cf. Lyons (809): “The very fact of introducing ‘must’, ‘necessarily’, ‘certainly’, etc., into the utterance has the effect of making our commitment to the factuality of the proposition explicitly dependent upon our perhaps limited knowledge. There is no epistemically stronger statement than a categorical assertion.”

²⁴ The one exception might be *Eumenides* 1003; see discussion on that instance below (page 50).

interpretation of a given passage. However, although the power dynamic remains clear and stable, the word is not used only by a character with authority over another; on occasion the word is used in indirect question from a person of lower status to the higher, as a request for advice as to what is appropriate behavior; also *χρη* is used in statements in which a person of equal status gives strong (although polite) advice to another of equal status. However, the use of a *χρη*-statement necessarily brings tension / attention to the power dynamic between them, as the characters themselves are acknowledging it by their speech. The most basic form of the *χρη*-act manifests itself as one character politely or impolitely instructing another from a position of authority.

To begin our investigation of the function of *χρη*-statements as speech acts, we will examine the instance at *Supplices* 176, in which Danaüs comforts his daughters by advising proper behavior.

παῖδες, φρονεῖν *χρη*: ξὺν φρονοῦντι δ' ἦκετε
 πιστῶ γέροντι τῶδε ναυκλήρω πατρί.
 καὶ τὰπὶ χέρσου νῦν προμηθίαν λαβῶν
 αἰνῶ φυλάξαι τὰμ' ἔπη δελτουμένας. (176-179)

We can compare this instance to that at *Supplices* 724, discussed above, as the speaker and addressees are the same.²⁵ As a *χρη*-act line 176 functions as an imperative, and at the same time Danaüs is using *χρη* here to describe exactly what it is he is already doing

²⁵ Again, these means of interpreting each instance are not confined to any subset of the whole; if we reconsider the two instances discussed above, *Agamemnon* 928 and *Persae* 820, we see that in the former, Agamemnon is chiding Clytemnestra for her inappropriate comments, and as he is her king and husband in a society in which this relationship makes him a figure of authority, this is a typical use; in the latter, Darius is advising the Chorus, commenting on the human relationship to the divine as he has been summoned to do—appropriate not only because he has a knowledge of it unique among the characters present, but also because he is the deceased king, and this relationship of power that he has with his advisors is that which he had while alive, and it has endured past his death.

(φρονοῦντι): he sets himself as an example of doing what is *χρή* as not only their father but an older, wiser figure, someone who by experience has a better knowledge of what is *χρή*.²⁶ Ultimately he means, “it is appropriate to φρονεῖν: for you as well, by my example.” (That reference to himself, with the participle, might also be a form of self-flattery.) He goes on to give instructions on how to receive the people of Argos meekly and appropriately.

On φρονεῖν: Pope argues that in the later 5th century this word used absolutely could imply being wise, but the question which concerns us is how Aeschylus used the word absolutely; it occurs 28 times in Aeschylus, usually with a qualifying word (such as an adverb), to mean “to be disposed or minded in a certain way,” the “way” given by the qualifying word. In nine passages, however, it is used absolutely.²⁷ “The concept which would seem to explain all these occurrences is that of using one’s faculties as a grown-up human being,” he writes, and thus the word means “exercising one’s full

²⁶ Ryzman, in fact, makes the compelling argument that not only are the Danaids completely dependent upon their father for counsel, but he has raised them as such. She points out numerous instances in which the daughters defer to their father’s judgment (even above Pelasgus’!), and one of these is at *Supplikes* 971, in which the girls say that they will trust only their father’s advice on where it is *χρή* that they live, even after Pelasgus has offered safe haven (and he is confused by their response). Although she does not refer to the use or importance of *χρή* here, her statement, “[the Danaids’] inability to detach themselves and become individuals who can make their own decisions has most disturbing implications and consequences,” is well illustrated by the respective uses of *χρή* within this tragedy. (3-4) This is relevant to my argument in that this characterization of the Danaids is consistently borne out by the uses of *χρή* in this play; even with their own remarks, the Danaids position themselves on the lower end of the power differential implied with the use of a *χρή*-statement.

²⁷ At *Septem* 807, it is used to mean “being rational and avoiding panic;” Pope (108) thinks this is also the force of the word in two of its occurrences at the beginning of the *Supplikes* (176, 204). At *Eumenides* 115, it means “to wake up and be alert.” At *Choephoroi* 517, it is “a synonym for being alive.” At *Fr.* 677 (Mette) and *Agamemnon* 176, he says, it is “used for what men do or may do.”

adult faculties.” (108-109) He presents Choephoroi 753 to support his argument that these are adult faculties (i.e. infants do not have them).²⁸

Pope’s article is on the interpretation of Agamemnon 176, and ultimately his argument is that since φρονεῖν is not used absolutely in Aeschylus to mean “to be wise,” it does not do so in that instance. For my purposes, then, it follows that it also does not mean “to be wise” at Supplices 176. At any rate, χροή here functions as advice with the force of an imperative, and it is nonsensical for one to command another to “be wise.” The reference of φρονεῖν to adult human faculties supports the tone and use at Supplices 176 in that the Danaids’ father is exhorting them to do what he does, as an older member of society, and in the same passage he refers to himself with the participle of the verb. What is χροή in the Type I use is expected, appropriate behavior; when an individual uses it in giving advice, he does not ask more of the addressee than what is obviously possible in present time.

Before I discuss the use of χροή in direct questions, I must address the relationship between its use and that of δεῖ in Homer, which exerts pressure upon later authors’ use of the word in questions to such an extent that thereafter the use of δεῖ renders a question rhetorical. Conversely, then, a question using χροή should not be a rhetorical question (although they do exist, they are very rare), and when the use of χροή

²⁸ He cites Sophocles’ Ajax 554-555 and likens it to Prometheus 443-444 and 447-450 in order to show that the word does not simply mean a capacity for reasoning but also that for appreciating sorrow and joy, but neither of these, he neglects to note, has any bearing on the meaning in Aeschylus.

appears to be rhetorical, we would do well to inquire as to why the author chose *χρη* over *δει*.

τί σοι λέγειν *χρη* τοῦνομ'; ἐν χρόνῳ μαθῶν
εἴση σύ τ' αὐτὸς χοῖ ξυνέμποροι σέθεν.
ταύτας δ' ἐκούσας μὲν κατ' εὐνοίαν φρενῶν
ἄγοις ἄν, εἶπερ εὐσεβῆς πίθοι λόγος. (938- 941)

Consideration of the *χρη*-act's exposure of the relationship between speaker and addressee is again useful for the interpretation of the *χρη*-statement at *Supplices* 938. This passage is part of a verbal sparring match between the king of Argos and the herald of the Egyptians, who has come in order to bring back the daughters of Danaüs. The tone of this question is most telling: the herald in this exchange is proud, and he refuses to pay due respect to the ruler of the land into which he has come; the king of Argos is understandably indignant, and he reprimands the herald for the violence in his words and his lack of decorum (lines 912-915; 917). The herald displays a lack of concern toward the gods of Hellas, and the customs respected by the gods (line 917); he threatens to tear the Danaids away from the gods' sanctuary, and for this also the king rebukes him (line 927). In short, the herald shows himself before the king of Argos to be someone who renders himself by his actions worthy of no respect. In the speech leading up to this reply on the part of the king, the herald asked for the king's identity, ostensibly so that he might have better information for his own leaders; he phrases this request in terms of his duty and position (καὶ γὰρ πρόπει κήρυκ' ἀπαγγέλλειν τορῶς / ἕκαστα, lines 931-932), but then threatens the king with retribution in the form of war. Therefore it is quite appropriate for the king to reply with *τί σοι λέγειν χρη* τοῦνομ';—

the herald has justified his question (and his reasons for expecting an answer) in terms of what is appropriate for him, the herald, in his position, but he follows that by making an absurdly inappropriate (to his station) threat of war, to close an exchange in which he himself has behaved quite inappropriately, not only in terms of social graces, but also in terms of the humility appropriate before the divine. The king then replies here with, “How is it *χρή*, again, that I tell you my name?” i.e. “How am I obliged in order to treat you in the way that I should according to cosmic law, to tell you my name [considering the way you have acted toward me, and have not yourself done what was *χρή*]?” The force of context adequately explains the nature of *χρή* here as consonant with the others of Type I.

Next we shall examine a few *χρή*-statements whose speaker and addressee are of the same social status, beginning with that at *Persae* 219:

οὐ σε βουλόμεσθα, μήτερ, οὐτ' ἄγαν φοβεῖν λόγοις	215
οὔτε θαρσύνειν· θεοὺς δὲ προστροπαῖς ἰκνουμένη,	
εἴ τι φλαῦρον εἶδες, αἰτοῦ τῶνδ' ἀποτροπὴν τελεῖν,	
τὰ δ' ἀγάθ' ἐκτελεῖ γενέσθαι σοί τε καὶ τέκνω σέθεν	
καὶ πόλει φίλοις τε πᾶσι. δεύτερον δὲ <i>χρή</i> χοᾶς	
γῆ τε καὶ φθιτοῖς χέασθαι. πρευμενῶς δ' αἰτοῦ τάδε,	220
σὸν πόσιν Δαρεῖον, ὄνπερ φῆς ἰδεῖν κατ' εὐφρόνην,	
ἐσθλά σοι πέμπειν τέκνω τε γῆς ἔνερθεν ἐς φάος,	
τᾶμπαλιν δὲ τῶνδε γαίαι κάτοχα μαυροῦσθαι σκότῳ. (215-223)	

In these lines, the Chorus of Persian elders advise Atossa on what she personally ought to do next as both parties wait for news. That this *χρή*-statement has imperative force is evident from the imperatives which surround it in this speech, although this instance, along with the one given below, occurs in an exchange between two parties who conceive of each other, during this exchange, as equals. This is an example of a character

Atossa rephrases the Chorus' advice to her from lines 215-221 (εὐξασθαι θεοῖς, Γῆ τε καὶ φθιτοῖς, etc.) using the first person, thereby showing that she acquiesces in the validity of their request; she adds a *χρή*-statement and imperatives (παρηγορεῖτε, προπέμπετ' 530) of her own to indicate that which she believes it is best that the Chorus do. It is this couching of the *χρή*-statement among imperatives on both sides that demonstrates that Atossa and the Chorus consider themselves to be on equal terms. In this speech, Atossa agrees to follow the Chorus' advice from lines 215-221; she does so when she raises the ghost of Darius (619-622). Atossa charges the Chorus to escort Xerxes at 530, and finally, at line 1076, their words indicate that that they had planned to acquiesce. Not only does one party act with authority to advise the other but the addressee acquiesces by agreeing to do (and by doing) what is desired.

A figure in authority uses a *χρή*-statement to refer to advice also at Supplices 519, where Pelasgus speaks to the Chorus of Danaids regarding their father:

ἐγὼ δὲ λαοὺς συγκαλῶν ἐγχωρίους
 στείχω, τὸ κοινὸν ὡς ἂν εὐμενὲς τιθῶ·
 καὶ σὸν διδάξω πατέρα ποῖα *χρή* λέγειν.
 πρὸς ταῦτα μίμνε καὶ θεοὺς ἐγχωρίους 520
 λιταῖς παραιτοῦ τῶν σ' ἔρωσ ἔχει τυχεῖν. (517- 521)

This is an excellent example of one character in a position of authority informing another of what is *χρή* based on a supposed greater knowledge thereof. The object of διδάξω (519) is Danaüs, and it is surrounded by imperatives to the daughters; thus Pelasgus affirms that both the father and daughters are under his influence. They have come

seeking help from the people in Argos, and it is the right and position of Pelasgus, as the Argive king, to address his supplicants from a position of authority.²⁹

This instance also illustrates a conception of the gods as representing what is *χρή*; there is a parallel here between Pelasgus' advice for Danaüs (albeit reported indirectly) and that for the Danaids (and consider that they occupy the same space vis-à-vis Pelasgus and the Argives): one *χρή*-statement followed by imperatives urging the daughters to supplicate the gods. I take this emphasis on the gods to inform the use of *χρή* here.

στείχετ' αἰδοῖοι γέροντες πρὸς δόμους, πεπρωμένοις [τούσδε]
πρὶν παθεῖν εἴξαντες ὥρα· χρῆν τάδ' ὡς ἐπράξαμεν.
εἰ δέ τοι μόχθων γένοιτο τῶνδ' ἄλις, δεχοίμεθ' ἄν,
δαίμονος χηλῆ βαρεῖα δυστυχῶς πεπληγμένοι.³⁰ (1657- 1660)

At *Agamemnon* 1658 Clytemnestra breaks into the circular argument between the Chorus and Aegisthus at the end of the *Agamemnon*. The brevity and final position of the *χρή*-statement in this instance serve to strengthen its function as a *χρή*-act; Clytemnestra means to end the quarrel (and she does, with her next utterance, at lines 1672-1673; she also ends the play). The meaning behind the statement is straightforward: she and Aegisthus did what they had to do. However, Clytemnestra uses the overtones of

²⁹ What does Pelasgus consider the content of *ποῖα χρή λέγειν* to be (as he evidently has something concrete in mind)? Danaüs would not present his case in toto to the citizens; it is more likely that the king of Argos would do most of the talking, with Danaüs presenting a pitiful figure, supplicating not only their king but the Argive citizens as well. Therefore the primary relationship Danaüs and his daughters have to the people in this place is one of humility and supplication.

³⁰ This passage has been reconstructed and construed from a damaged manuscript tradition. For a description of the manuscript difficulties, see Fraenkel 794.

cosmic importance and her new position as queen now without a king (by far the most powerful individual in the scene) to end the discussion. The *χρή*-act here functions as part of her taking control of the situation, even if the content of the statement on its surface is descriptive.

What is *χρή* here is what is appropriate for a given person given his or her location within society, especially within the family. Clytemnestra's primary motivation in the murder of her husband was retribution for his murder of their daughter Iphigenia; therefore, when she refers to what is *χρή* for herself, she refers to that which is appropriate action for the mother of a murdered daughter. One might argue that Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon is directly opposed to the idea that what is *χρή* serves to uphold universal order, but from her perspective this act brings the sequence of events full circle to a restoration of balance.³¹ As is evident elsewhere, Clytemnestra's idea of what is *χρή* differs a great deal from what another character might regard as what is *χρή* (see especially *Choephoroi* 930); this difference, and Clytemnestra's prior adopting of "standard" ideas of what is *χρή* as she dissembles earlier in the play, is evidence of Aeschylus' masterful characterization of her through his manipulation of the use of the word.³²

³¹ And Clytemnestra certainly feels that what was *χρή* for her to do can be reconciled with a greater order; see her speech at 1566-1576.

³² One may choose to translate this instance as "we did what was fated" rather than "we did what was necessary"; then, however, one must answer why a given series of events was fated, what events in past time naturally forced these actions in present time. Such questions get at the source of the necessity, which is still the cosmic order of things.

Regarding this type of *χρῆ*-statement, an individual is only individual in Aeschylus insofar as he exists at the intersection of a number of discrete identities, and any given individual with the same roles and responsibilities would be subject to the same “rules.” So for example when at *Choephoroi* 907 Orestes says to Clytemnestra, “Sleep with [Aegisthus] in death, since you love him; but you hate the one it was *χρῆ* for you to love,” he refers to her transgression only in the context of a wife toward a husband; loving Agamemnon was *χρῆ* for her because she was his wife, and the necessity behind *χρῆ* applies to all wives equally.

The majority of Type I instances demonstrate the application of the universal sort of cosmic law to a given individual in a given situation; the basic meaning is not distinct from that in the universal category, but the context is more particular. These “applied” *χρῆ*-statements refer to the same set of laws concerning universal order; however, what is expected of an individual in order to conform with what is *χρῆ* in these instances is a reflection of that person’s own place in the world at the intersection of various identities. Each individual within a society has a different set of responsibilities and is subject to different expectations depending upon his or her class, history, profession, and position within the family unit; therefore some rules pertain to some individuals which have no bearing on others. Although a certain individual’s set of roles and responsibilities is not often repeated in a population, it is certainly not unique; as what is *χρῆ* for a person arises out of these roles, there is no personal, non-transferable *χρῆ*. I will begin this

discussion with Eteocles' speech at the beginning of the *Septem* in which he describes the behavior appropriate to various members of his community, depending on their role:

Κάδμου πολῖται, χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καίρια
 ὅστις φυλάσσει προῶγος ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως
 οἶακα νωμῶν, βλέφαρα μὴ κοιμῶν ὕπνω.
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πράξαιμεν, αἰτία θεοῦ:
 εἰ δ' αὖθ', ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, συμφορὰ τύχοι, 5
 Ἐτεοκλέης ἂν εἷς πολὺς κατὰ πτόλιν
 ὕμνοϊθ' ὑπ' ἀστῶν φροϊμίσις πολυρρόθοις
 οἰμώγμασίν θ', ὧν Ζεὺς ἀλεξητήριος
 ἐπώνυμος γένοιτο Καδμείων πόλει.
 ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ νῦν, καὶ τὸν ἐλλείποντ' ἔτι 10
 ἦβης ἀκμαίας καὶ τὸν ἔξηβον χρόνῳ,
 βλαστημὸν ἀλδαίνοντα σώματος πολύν,
 ὥραν τ' ἔχονθ' ἕκαστον ὥστε συμπρεπές,
 πόλει τ' ἀρήγειν καὶ θεῶν ἐγχωρίων
 βωμοῖσι, τιμᾶς μὴ ἔαλειφθῆναί ποτε: 15
 τέκνοις τε, Γῆ τε μητρὶ, φιλτάτη τροφῶ. (1-16)

Eteocles gives in the first *χρή*-statement what is appropriate for him, as ruler, to do in such a situation; in the *χρή*-statement in line 10, he describes what is appropriate for the citizens surrounding him, thus foreshadowing the contrast he will make throughout the play of his own allegiance to what he considers possible by human means and the Chorus' blind insistence on seeking recourse and protection from the divine. Eteocles does not outright disparage the capability of the divine element to protect his city, but he "generally adopts an attitude like 'Heaven helps those who help themselves!' " (Dawson 29-30). Thus he does not say anything that indicates that he thinks the Chorus' supplication will bring material or measurable aid on the war front (note how, at lines 5ff., Eteocles states that he alone will be blamed should things not turn out well).³³ The

³³ Cf. Podlecki (1964), especially 287-292.

We have seen the Chorus and Atossa negotiating the power dynamic of their relationship in previous examples; the elders here, at *Persae* 153, although they show a great deal of reverence at the queen's entrance, do not relate themselves specifically to her in terms of power with this *χρή*-statement (debase themselves); they state what is expected of all (*πάντας* 154): it is *χρή*, they say, that she be welcomed according to her status, and this is *χρή* because all are subject to her, in accordance with their position in society. This instance may even be interpreted as a third-person imperative to those present.

In order to appreciate Aeschylus' mastery of characterization not only of individuals but of whole cultures, it is important to note that the Chorus' language openly reveals their association of her with divinity (not only in this passage, but following: the wife and mother of gods, line 157); Aeschylus is depicting a culture whose members believed Darius had experienced apotheosis at death (and consistent with his portrayal in the conjuring of his divinity, and the prayers offered to him). In this passage, the Chorus treats Atossa (and to all appearances, they genuinely feel it) as though she were herself divine. Such usage is exactly parallel to the usages I will discuss in the next section, those instances of Type I *χρή* which situate the gods as "placeholders" or representatives of what is *χρή*. Compare the instances of Type I *χρή* in which Clytemnestra is the speaker: in these *χρή* represents not merely cosmic law, but necessity according to the perspective of the one making the statement. We can read the values of the speaker through what he or she calls *χρή*.

An analogy of humans to gods with a use of *χρή* occurs at *Supplices* 980:

ὦ παῖδες, Ἀργείοισιν εὐχέσθαι χρεῶν,
θύειν τε λείβειν θ', ὡς θεοῖς Ὀλυμπίοις,
σπονδάς, ἐπεὶ σωτῆρες οὐ διχορρόπως. (980-982)

Danaüs speaks to the Chorus of his daughters, after the king of Argos has promised his protection of them; he compares the status of the Argives as “saviors” to that of the gods, and thus by analogy his *χρη*-statement (which usually concerns behavior toward a divinity) indicates an appropriate course of action toward the Argives (it is not only the appearance of *χρεῶν* which has a sort of jarring effect, when used of action toward humans; the actions are named: offering prayers, sacrificing, offering libations). It is an analogy especially complimentary of the Argives, but more revealing of Aeschylus’ characterization of Egyptian culture.

At various points throughout the corpus we see *χρη*-statements in which the sense of *χρη* is tailored to the social position or occupation of the person indicated. An example of this occurs at *Septem* 1005, in which the herald claims that it is *χρη* for him to announce information; however, as that instance is likely interpolated, we may turn to that at *Septem* 717, in which Eteocles argues with the Chorus, giving the priorities of a soldier:

Chorus: νίκην γε μέντοι καὶ κακὴν τιμᾶ θεός.
Eteocles: οὐκ ἄνδρ' ὀπλίτην τοῦτο *χρη* στέργειν ἔπος. (716-717)

“It is not appropriate for a soldier-hero (in such capacity) to esteem that sentiment.”

Here Eteocles expresses that which is *χρη* for a rather narrowly defined group of people, fully aware that it contradicts the Chorus’ opinion. We have seen characters create tension between outlooks using *χρη*-statements before; Eteocles in this passage has

already displayed his disdain for the Chorus members, who would rather he not go to battle; he attempts to counter them with misogyny and condescension. Of course Aeschylus is aware that cosmic law is not always self-evident to various characters with differing goals and histories—that it is open to interpretation, depending on one’s values (the values of a culture are not monolithic, and only have such status as culture-values because they are to various high degrees agreed upon by the members of a culture). In this example the reader is presented with a conflict between two opinions of what is necessary—the Chorus expresses their opinion using the singular, undefined, and unspecified “god” as the arbiter of this, but their conception of the source of this necessity is the same as that of Eteocles in his response with *χρή*. (That he responds on their terms, with a differing opinion of the same type of sentiment, and uses the word *χρή*, is evidence of this.)³⁶

With this in mind, we may refer back to the characterization of Clytemnestra using her *χρή*-statements. The individual whose views of what is *χρή* differ most radically, and most provocatively, from the consensus of the others’ views is Clytemnestra in the *Agamemnon*; not only does she express views of what is *χρή* which are sometimes in direct conflict with others’ views, but she also herself makes *χρή*-statements whose values are mutually contradictory. She does this in the process of manipulating her addressee and concealing her real motives (*Agamemnon* 879, below;

³⁶ I do not mean to dwell at length on this, but it is not without merit to recognize that those individuals in this culture who make statements based on their view of cosmic law which are at odds with others’ views tend to be female, and their views tend to be ignored (by a society that does not privilege their opinion). It is also worthwhile to remember that the codes of behavior which support the stability of the universe are subjective, and they vary most obviously from culture to culture—but also, from subculture to subculture, individual to individual.

ὄς οὐ προτιμῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ βοτοῦ μόρον, 1415
μήλων φλεόντων εὐπόκοις νομεύμασιν,
ἔθυσεν αὐτοῦ παῖδα, φιλτάτην ἐμοὶ
ὠδῖν', ἐπωδὸν Θρηκίων ἀημάτων.
οὐ τοῦτον ἐκ γῆς τῆσδε χρῆν ζ' ἀνδρηλατεῖν,
μιασμαίων ἄποιν'; (1415-1420)

Here Clytemnestra refers to that which is *χρή* according to her own world view: since Agamemnon slaughtered his own daughter, he should have been driven out of the land. The two instances in which we see Clytemnestra's perspective through *χρή*-statements are here and at Agamemnon 1658 (above).

This statement also makes reference to the relationship between the speaker and the addressee; by the use of *χρή* with such a tone Clytemnestra takes the position of one of greater authority (as she is queen) informing those below her of what is *χρή*. The Chorus here is of advisers, but she exerts her authority over them (1420-1425). Fraenkel presents examples of λέγω δέ σοι and variants in which the speaker intends these words to sound harsh and to have a profound effect on the addressee and audience; the words also introduce statements in which the speaker appropriates power to himself.³⁸

Contrast this exchange (in tone, especially) with that between another queen and group of advisors, Atossa and the Chorus in the *Persae*; here, the two parties not only disagree as to what is *χρή* on account of the differences in loyalty and values between them, but they also merely bicker, pushing back and forth the blame for the act. Agamemnon predictably shares the Chorus' opinion as to what is *χρή*, and he takes exception to Clytemnestra's actions at line 917:

³⁸ 677. For *παρεσκευασμένης*, "prepared for battle," as indicating a threat, see Fraenkel 670.

Λήδας γένεθλον, δωμάτων ἐμῶν φύλαξ,
ἀπουσία μὲν εἶπας εἰκότως ἐμῆ·
μακρὰν γὰρ ἐξέτεινας· ἀλλ' ἐναισίμωσ
αἰνεῖν, παρ' ἄλλων χροῖ τόδ' ἔρχεσθαι γέρας. (914-917)

In this instance Agamemnon informs Clytemnestra that her speech is inappropriate, given her position in his household, as she has been unnecessarily obsequious.³⁹ In addition, with this response to her Agamemnon is distancing himself from barbarian practice (and thus χροῖ at this instance, to his mind, contrasts his own culture with that of others, to privilege his own), and he does so with an idea which is universally known to those around him.⁴⁰ He speaks in maxims here (cf. Fraenkel 416), sustaining the august appearance which he presents (also at lines 928-929, that man must not be judged happy until dead, using χροῖ). There is condescension in his tone here, not only in his refusal to be grouped with her but also in his associating her behavior with the more eastern practices which he himself disdains; at any rate we know from his reminding her of what is χροῖ that he is speaking from his position of authority, and as king, this

³⁹ Fraenkel (416) explains: “Clytemnestra is a member of his household, and it is not right for her, being in this position, to praise a master of the house.” (The emphasis is mine; this is a paraphrase of the scholiast’s explanation.) Fraenkel is not commenting on the use of χροῖ here relative to other uses; rather he is speaking only from a knowledge of Greek culture, but he hits the nail on the head when it comes to the sense behind the usage. He distinguishes between universal necessity, i.e. the things which it is imperative that all individuals do, and the type of necessity that is dependent upon a person’s place in society, and he gives a Pindar quotation (Fr. 181): ὁ γὰρ ἐξ οἴκου ποτὶ μῶμον ἔπαινος κίρνεται.

⁴⁰ On these actions being better suited to eastern societies, see Fraenkel at lines 918-921. On μακρὰν here: Fraenkel (414-415) says it is a phrase from everyday language and gives quotations from other authors with μακρὰν and τείνω; there is no noun to be supplied: to speak at length was an Ionian thing, and Argives spoke tersely.

Another example of a character disagreeing with Clytemnestra's opinions on what constitutes correct behavior while using a *χρή*-statement occurs at *Choephoroi* 907, where Orestes cites his mother's failure to behave appropriately as a wife:

καὶ ζῶντα γάρ νιν κρείσσον' ἠγήσω πατρός·
τούτῳ θανοῦσα ξυγκάθευδ', ἐπεὶ φιλεῖς
τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, ὃν δ' ἐχρῆν φιλεῖν στυγεῖς. (905-907)

The sequence of logic is important: "In death, sleep with [Aegisthus], since you love this man but you despise the one it was *χρή* for you to love." Orestes is punishing Clytemnestra for transgressing what he feels to be one of the laws which constitute what is *χρή*, and he conceives of what is *χρή* in terms of human relationships—in this instance, that of a wife's duty toward her husband. (It is tempting to read this instance of *χρή* as a reference to the same supernatural force to which Clytemnestra refers at line 910, with *μοῖρα*,⁴³ however, Orestes' own justification for his decision undermines this⁴⁴). It was *χρή*, he says, that she love Agamemnon, since she was married to him; the fact that she did not treat him with the appropriate respect does not detract from the necessity of doing so.

At this instance of *χρή* Orestes clearly conceives of the gods as representing (if not dispensing instructions as to) what is *χρή*; in the few lines directly before 907,

⁴³ When Clytemnestra at 910 says ἡ Μοῖρα τούτων, ὧ τέκνον, παραιτία, she counters his argument from propriety according to position by claiming that her own personal circumstances (in particular, the death of Iphigenia) exculpate her. Therefore, *μοῖρα* is quite another matter from *χρή* in the minds of Orestes and Clytemnestra; Orestes responds to line 910 (καὶ τόνδε τοίνυν Μοῖρ' ἐπόρσυνεν μόρον, 911) by conceding the point, as what is *μοῖρα* for a given individual has no bearing on what is *χρή*.

⁴⁴ Garvie (295) remarks on the sexual implications behind *ξυγκάθευδ'* in line 906; the sexual reference is surely indicative of Orestes' condescending and spiteful tone in this speech.

There is a significant difference in the levels of awareness between Clytemnestra and Orestes: she uses *χρῆ* to describe her own actions, even when by her previous use she has acknowledged that other conceptions of what is *χρῆ* exist; Orestes when he prepares to kill Clytemnestra neither conceives of what he is about to do as *χρῆ* nor attempts to justify the act with such an assertion. That he here acknowledges that what he is about to do is against *χρῆ* might be taken as problematic toward my understanding of the word—but the fact that one knows that one’s actions are against the natural order and will have repercussions does not always prevent him from following a chosen course of action. However, Orestes here experiences conflicting demands upon his behavior concerning what is *χρῆ* (he recognizes this before the audience at 899); he is forced to decide between his role as the son of his father and agent of Apollo and his position as his mother’s son. Either choice in such a situation would result in a performance and failure of what is *χρῆ*.⁴⁷ Such a choice to make is representative of the major questions of the trilogy, only to be resolved in the final play. What is *οὐ χρῆ*, according to Orestes, is Clytemnestra’s slaughter of Agamemnon, as he finds it more heinous that a woman should murder her husband than that a son should murder his

their obsequiousness is not intended to represent the norm. The content of the statement itself implies greater dependence on Danaüs than is natural (cf. Ryzman’s article), since the Danaids do not simply ask for the information they seek from Pelasgus, to whom they are presently speaking, information which he presumably would have.

⁴⁷ As far as I can tell, he has from the beginning shown an awareness that this course of action presents its own problems, but from such a matter-of-fact statement one cannot read his emotions. Garvie’s statement, “Orestes is not really expressing doubts about the rightness of the matricide,” (302) seems predicated on the idea that if he were, he would choose a different course of action.

mother—nevertheless, this statement reinforces that he finds both repugnant,⁴⁸ and his tone is regretful (and is strengthened by his hesitation in other scenes). The complicity of the supernatural in this scheme of what is *χρη* is indicated here (as often): the use follows hard on Orestes’ interpretation of Clytemnestra’s dream.

The instance at Agamemnon 1429 gives another example of a party using *χρη* to describe what Clytemnestra should suffer on account of her actions against her husband.⁴⁹ The Septem provides another set of mutually contradictory ideas of what constitutes *χρη*, those of Eteocles and the Chorus, whose differing outlooks also come from diverse priorities and values; at line 713 we observe the use of *χρη* in such a argument:

Chorus: *πιθοῦ γυναιξί, καίπερ οὐ στέργων ὄμως.*

Eteocles: *λέγοιτ’ ἄν ὦν ἄνη τις· οὐδὲ χρη μακράν.* (712-713)

“Don’t speak at length,” Eteocles says, using *χρη* to communicate the source of the necessity behind their silence, privileging his own interests; here the Chorus fears the stain of a brother’s death on their king’s hands, whereas Eteocles considers it is his duty to stand at the seventh gate and defend the city. However, if either side has any objective awareness of differing fundamental values (and what would cause these) as

⁴⁸ I consider the *variatio* in the form of *χρη* simply a matter of style, cf. Smyth §2714 on the fact that *χρη* can be negated by either *οὐ* or *μή*, meaning “must not.”

⁴⁹ Chorus to Clytemnestra:

*μεγαλόμητις εἶ, περίφρονα δ’ ἔλακες.
ὥσπερ οὖν φονολιβεῖ τύχα φρήν ἐπιμαίνεται,
λίπος ἐπ’ ὀμμάτων αἵματος εὖ πρόπει:
ἀτίετον ἔτι σὲ χρη στερομένην φίλων
τύμμα τύμματι τεῖσαι.* (Agamemnon 1426-1430)

the source of their quarrel, they do not show it. Eteocles acts and speaks according to what is *χρῆ* from his perspective, that of an adult male with responsibilities, a warrior-hero. The speech of the Chorus, then, directly detracts from the time he will have to support his side of the conflict, what it is *χρῆ* for him to do; therefore, he imagines that what it is *χρῆ* for them to do not only conforms to his idea of their duty in society, but also allows for him to do that which is *χρῆ* for him (he does not consider that their stake in the matter might demand otherwise). This instance of *χρῆ* is a *χρῆ*-act of the imperative sort; it reinforces the power dynamic between king and subjects, and since Eteocles is in a position to make policy, this use of *χρῆ* is a command. Hutchinson notes that these lines closely resemble those at 216f. and that the Chorus obeyed his order there; Eteocles, of course, does not heed the Chorus' request (159-160).

The source of obligation in many of the instances of “applied” *χρῆ* is not one's familial relationships but rather one's position within society. At *Eumenides* 708 a god is portrayed as representative of the universal order, creating policy thereafter to be regarded as *χρῆ*:

ταύτην μὲν ἐξέτειν' ἔμοις παραίνεσιν
 ἀστοῖσιν εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν: ὀρθοῦσθαι δὲ χρῆ
 καὶ ψῆφον αἴρειν καὶ διαγνῶναι δίκην
 αἰδουμένους τὸν ὄρκον. εἴρηται λόγος. (707-710)

Athena here decrees before the Chorus what will be appropriate behavior for those thereafter who find themselves in this station. Previously in this speech, she had said, “κλύοιτ' ἄν ἤδη θεσμόν, Ἀττικὸς λεώς, / πρώτας δίκας κρίνοντες αἵματος χυτοῦ. / ἔσται δὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν Αἰγέως στρατῶ / αἰεὶ δικαστῶν τοῦτο βουλευτήριον” (681-684;

she establishes the tribunal at 704-706). In the speech itself she counsels the citizens to remain in awe and fear of the majesty of the gods; she considers the court and form of government to be a set of strictures imposed upon mortals by the divine— artificial in appearance, but whose function is to uphold righteousness and natural order (σέβας, 690, will prevent ἀδικεῖν, 691, and ἑπιχραινόντων νόμους, 693, alike).⁵⁰ Athena uses the χροή-statement at this instance to relate this jury’s particular duty to the greater scheme in which they are functioning (and by both her action here and characterization of human duty, she links the gods with what is χροή). Although she does not continue to use χροή (indeed, this play has by far the fewest instances among all the works considered here), when she resumes her address of the Chorus and Apollo, Athena continues to refer to participants in the scene according to their duty within it: her own, at 734; the jurors whose duty it is to empty the urns, at 743; her exchange with the Chorus that follows is her attempt to convince them that it is right, as being Zeus’ will and in the best interests of all, that they receive reverence in return for bestowing natural blessings (906-912, 938-948) and those of social accord (976-987). As for this χροή-statement itself, she uses the present participle αἰδουμένουσ with “take” and “decide” to

⁵⁰ As for why this is not an occurrence of δεῖ: the characters are setting the precedent for human law, not following it; δεῖ is what is set down by man, and Athena is the agent here. Consider also the strong supernatural references, and the whole characterization of human society here: the gods are intervening because at this point in human history mortals have no means themselves of dealing with this.

make it known that the one action requires the context of the other.⁵¹ The traditional epithet of the Court of the Areopagus was σεμνόν.⁵²

Thus far we have seen both examples of *χρη*-statements occurring in maxims, whose content applies to all equally, and examples of *χρη*-statements whose application is limited by one's position, usually with reference to familial obligation, but is not unique to a given individual. Now I will discuss the relationship of that cosmic law, as expressed by Type I instances of *χρη*, to the gods, in the perspective of the speakers using the *χρη*-statement. One of the first attributes uniting instances of *χρη* is its tendency to describe the relationship of humans to the gods (as in *Persae* 820: οὐχ ὑπέρφειυ θνητὸν ὄντα *χρη* φρονεῖν): the word is very often used to indicate that appropriate human action involves showing reverence of or supplication to the gods, or more simply, divinity, in some way. One often finds the formula "it is *χρη* for [a mortal] to do [X regarding the gods]." This initially led me to believe that the primary function of *χρη* is describing appropriate human action toward the gods. This aspect of Type I *χρη* most clearly distinguishes it from the use of *δει* in Aeschylus, as what is *δει* nowhere instructs proper humility and action on the part of mortals relative to the gods.

⁵¹ And αἰδέομαι has primarily a religious connotation (i.e. reference to the gods, and not a general "respect"), in Aeschylus, at any rate: v. its appearance at *Supplices* 478, *Eumenides* 680, *Agamemnon* 362, *Choephoroi* 106, *Eumenides* 483, *Supplices* 641

⁵² Thomson (vol. 2, 219), he quotes Demosthenes, 23.65: πολλὰ μὲν δὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐστι τοιαῦθ' οἷ' οὐχ ἑτέρωθι, ἐν δ' οὖν ἰδιώτατον πάντων καὶ σεμνότατον, τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δικαστήριον, Suidas, Aeschines, and Isocrates.

The conception of the relationship between mortals and the gods is not straightforward; in some Type I instances in Aeschylus the gods are meant as representing this cosmic law. On occasion they are even depicted as enforcers or agents of what is *χρη*; in others, they are players who abide by it, as what is *χρη* is outside or above their authority. When the placeholder or agent relationship between the gods and what is *χρη* is explicitly expressed, the Olympians are rarely named; more often, we see “the gods” or “God” or simply “divinity” rather than named deities.⁵³ The synthesis (or implication thereof) of the Olympian gods, who have agency and consciousness, with what is *χρη* is not as simple as it may seem; it elevates them to something beyond themselves, as what is *χρη* includes standards of behavior for the (personalized) gods as well as humans.⁵⁴ I will contrast this with the relationship of the gods to what is *χρη* in the “Promethean” use (Type II), in which Zeus and what is *χρη* are at odds with one another.

I will begin by discussing instances in which the gods are invoked with the *χρη*-statement, in which *χρη* is used to describe the relationship between mortals and the

⁵³ Cf. Lloyd-Jones’ article, “Zeus in Aeschylus”; he gives an excellent discussion of the history of the subject in scholarship. However, as his argument tends toward the question of the authenticity of the *Prometheus* based on the characterization of Zeus, I will discuss the article more fully when I shall come to the instances of the *Prometheus* themselves.

⁵⁴ Griffith, who is, of course, writing from a focus on the *Prometheus*, discusses the trend of the relationship between “fate” and the gods from Homer on; he writes that in Homer the relationship between the gods and the Furies (whom he sees as carrying out the will of necessity) is left unspecified, but that thereafter there is a trend toward Zeus being subject to some sort of external law in Herodotus and Pindar; he uses *Supplices* 100-104 to contrast with them, as he translates, “everything of the gods is effortless; from where he (i.e. Zeus) sits, he carries out his will...” (1983: 17-18, footnote 49)

divine by describing the acts necessary for mortals to receive divine favor. I will then proceed to give examples in which this association between what is *χρη* and the Olympian gods is less apparent because it is less overtly stated. I will begin with the instance at *Supplices* 502:

στείχοιτ' ἄν, ἄνδρες· εὖ γὰρ ὁ ξένος λέγει.
ἠγγείσθε βωμοὺς ἀστικούς, θεῶν ἔδρας·
καὶ ξυμβολοῦσιν οὐ πολυστομεῖν χρεῶν
ναύτην ἄγοντας τόνδ' ἐφέστιον θεῶν. (500-503)

“Go forth, men,” Pelasgus orders, “and lead [Danaüs] to the altars and sanctuaries of the gods; it is *χρη* that you not speak long with those you meet in the road as you bring this traveler to be a suppliant of the gods.” This is ultimately a command from a king to his subjects, but it is also a reference to the necessity that they supplicate divinity: Danaüs displays his piety by approaching the altars as a suppliant, and it is *χρη* that Pelasgus’ own guards go assist him in this purpose. One might argue that the force of the *χρη*-statement has to do with the speed with which they do this rather than the fact that they do this; indeed, Pelasgus has mentioned the necessity of this speed before in his speech from 468-489 (αἰψ’ 481)—speed necessary to quell the ire of the citizens—but he will calm the citizens’ indignation using the same argument with which he had convinced himself: the necessity for fear and respect of the wrath of Zeus who protects suppliants. Pelasgus believes that when the citizens see the Danaids’ garlands brought in supplication to the altars of their own gods, they will recognize that Zeus must be respected, even if it should mean war. Therefore, the speed which is *χρη* here is speed by which Danaüs himself might more easily supplicate the gods, and Pelasgus and all

the citizens likewise through this act. Acknowledgment of the gods' power is also *χρη* for humans at Agamemnon 821:

καπνῶ δ' ἀλοῦσα νῦν ἔτ' εὖσημος πόλις.
ἄτης θύελλαι ζῶσι συνθνήσκουσα δὲ
σποδὸς προπέμπει πίονας πλούτου πνοάς. 820
τούτων θεοῖσι *χρη* πολύμνηστον χάριν
τίνειν, ἐπεὶπερ καὶ πάγας ὑπερκόπους
ἐφραξάμεσθα καὶ γυναικὸς οὔνεκα
πόλιν διημάθυνεν Ἀργεῖον δάκος,
ἵππου νεοσσός, ἀσπιδηφόρος λεώς, 825
πήδημ' ὀρούσας ἀμφὶ Πλειάδων δύσιν. (818-826)

“For these successes it is *χρη* that we show gratitude to the gods.” In this passage Agamemnon credits the gods with the Argive success in the Trojan War, and he uses *χρη* to describe the obligation of gratitude on the part of men. He has already mentioned the part they played at 811-812, and he refers back at 829 to his choice to acknowledge the gods first in this speech before addressing other matters (830-850); he will close this speech by declaring his intention to proceed immediately to the hearth to pay his respects (851-853). He clearly believes that the gods are responsible for the Greek victory; the reason the word *χρη* occurs only once in this passage is that only at 821 does he describe the relationship of men to gods rather than actions the gods have already taken. That Agamemnon conceives of the gods as dispensers of justice here who took counsel and decided upon the fall of Troy on account of Trojan indiscretion is evident from lines 813-816 (and his reference to *δίκη* at 810, 811, 812); he views the gods,

then, as not only deciding (ψήφους ἔθεντο 816) but enforcing what is “right,”⁵⁵ and he describes the mortal role in turn to be that of humility and gratitude.

The gods are not named; they are referred to simply as θεοῖσι (821); in the following instance, at line 580, the identity of the force responsible is equally vague (θεοῖς 578, but the singular Διός occurs at 582; the difference in number underlines the lack of specificity intended):

“Τροίαν ἐλόντες δὴ ποτ’ Ἀργείων στόλος
θεοῖς λάφυρα ταῦτα τοῖς καθ’ Ἑλλάδα
δόμοις ἐπασσάλευσαν ἀρχαῖον γάνος.”
τοιαῦτα χροῖ κλύοντας εὐλογεῖν πόλιν
καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς· καὶ χάρις τιμῆσεται
Διός τὸδ’ ἐκπράξασα. πάντ’ ἔχεις λόγον. (577-582)

Here the herald claims that the praise of the city itself and her generals will be the manifestation of gratitude to the gods which is necessary,⁵⁶ as though the city is somehow an extension of them. It is also important to note that the χροῖ-statement follows an exhortation to dedicate spoils to the gods, in thanks. The herald is primarily concerned by the victory; he feels that whatever sorrows and pains have been suffered, victory more than makes up for them, and this is all by the grace of Zeus. At any rate, the insistence here on praise, glory (γάνος 579), and positive gratitude, informs this entire speech. Perhaps Aeschylus wrote another χροῖ at line 573 (see discussion of that line in Appendix A), in this speech but preceding this instance, in which the herald

⁵⁵ Cf. Thomson on lines 819-820: “Troy with all her insolent wealth—the cause of her damnation—is conceived as a burnt sacrifice to Ἄτη.” The picture of the Trojans as receiving punishment for a moral flaw is also flattering to the Greeks.

⁵⁶ Cf. Fraenkel (583): “and the favour (or grace) of Zeus which has brought this to pass will be appreciated as it should be;” Smith (29) also refers to it as a “favor from Zeus.”

genuinely asks whether it is *χρῆ* that they not feel sorrow at misfortunes past; such a use of *χρῆ* would be consonant with that at line 580, as here he is framing his report, finally, with reference to Zeus, and therefore he feels it is inappropriate to grieve and appropriate only to feel gratitude. I do not include that instance here because I am convinced by Fraenkel's arguments (287) concerning the interpolation of these lines; I will discuss that instance in Appendix A.

The *χρῆ*-statement recommends appropriate behavior toward the gods again at line 342:

εἰ δ' εὖ σέβουσι τοὺς πολισσούχους θεοὺς
 τοὺς τῆς ἀλούσης γῆς θεῶν θ' ἰδρύματα,
 οὗ τ' ἅν ἐλόντες αὖθις ἀνθαλοῖεν ἄν. 340
 ἔρως δὲ μὴ τις πρότερον ἐμπίπτῃ στρατῶ
 πορθεῖν ἅ μὴ *χρῆ*, κέρδεσιν νικωμένους. (338-342)

Here Clytemnestra again conceals her opinion of what is *χρῆ* so as not to rouse the suspicion of the Chorus. Here she uses *χρῆ* in a manner consistent with the use of others in the play; she characterizes disrespecting and destroying the gods' shrines as *μὴ χρῆ*. Clytemnestra describes respecting the gods (εὖ σέβουσι) and preserving their holy places, appropriate behavior toward for mortals, as *χρῆ*, and she associates all kinds of negative fallout with lack of observance of what is *χρῆ* (she cannot know, at this point, that the Greeks have already committed such behavior).⁵⁷

Impiety as “not *χρῆ*” appears also at *Supplikes* 763, where the Danaids explain to their father their repugnance toward their would-be Egyptian captors:

⁵⁷ Πορθεῖν ἅ μὴ *χρῆ* will lead to ἀνθαλοῖεν, which, as Thomson (33) writes, is an expression proverbial for turning the tables, and the “note of warning is like the qualifications frequent in oracles and prophecies.”

ὥς καὶ ματαίων ἀνοσίων τε κνωδάλων
ἔχοντας ὀργάς, χροῖ φυλάσσεσθαι τάχος. (762-763)

The key word here is ἀνοσίων: it is χροῖ that they guard against these people because they have no regard for behaving respectfully and will not therefore treat the speakers appropriately (unprovoked violence, especially not in the context of war, is certainly not χροῖ). The context is a discussion between the Chorus and Danaüs concerning the daughters' fear of what might happen to them should the Egyptians kidnap them; one of the primary marks against the Egyptians, according to the Danaids, is that they do not respect altars any more than do birds (κόρακες ὥστε, βω- / μῶν ἀλέγοντες οὐδέν 751-752), do not respect the gods any more than "bold dogs, maddened with unholy rage" (περίφρονες δ' ἄγαν ἀνιέρω μένει / μεμαργωμένοι κυνοθρασεῖς, θεῶν/ οὐδέν ἐπαῖοντες 757-759) and they continue this analogy of Egyptians to animals without the civilized sense of humility up into these present lines. Although φυλάσσεσθαι without context may lead one to believe that the Danaids are primarily focused on their physical well-being and are afraid at the thought of the potential damage to their persons, their insistence on the "unholiness" of the Egyptians' demeanor and actions reveals that their concern rests therein. Also, Danaüs replies to 762-763 not by insisting that the Argives are formidable in battle (he has already mentioned this, at 746-747, and the Danaids have rejected the sentiment as unhelpful), but by advising his daughters not to neglect the gods, to seek both solace and refuge with them. After Danaüs' exit, they pray.

The basic function of a Type I χροῖ-statement, expressing appropriate behavior for an individual vis-à-vis the cosmos, typically relates mortals to the divine. A χροῖ-

statement directs appropriate behavior for a divinity at *Eumenides* 1003, where Athena states that she will close the events of the day by starting off the procession to lead the *Eumenides* to their new place of residence in Athens:

χαίρετε χϋμεῖς· προτέραν δ' ἐμὲ χροῖ
στείχειν θαλάμους ἀποδείξουσιν
πρὸς φῶς ἱερὸν τῶνδε προπομπῶν. (1003-1005)

This instance on its surface appears to be a special case for Type I, as here what is *χροῖ* is not only describing the action of a goddess, but is also being used by that goddess to describe her own action; it is not being used by a mortal to instruct appropriate (humble) action toward the gods for the benefit of another, and it is used with an expressed subject for the infinitive, in the first person. In Type II instances of *χροῖ*, however, the gods are characterized as struggling against what is *χροῖ*, and Athena here clearly intends to show herself as doing the opposite. In fact, she is here using *χροῖ* to express her humility and deference toward the other goddesses.

This is the only instance in Aeschylus of *χροῖ* used as a first-person imperative; however, although Athena expresses ἐμέ as the subject of the infinitive with *χροῖ*, she does not refer to herself alone. Rather she refers to the whole of the holy procession which is hers to lead, since she will show the location of their future abode (she knows the way, and she is able, as a representative of Zeus and what is *χροῖ*, a divinity on par with their divinity, to do so), but with 1005 she acknowledges those with her: in a note to his Loeb, Smyth (367) lists those in the procession as Athena, the Chorus, the Areopagites, torch-bearers, etc.

Ultimately this instance is typical of Type I in that it relates the gods to enacting, representing, and obeying the cosmic order expressed by *χρῆ*. The religious context continues after these lines: *ὑπὸ σεμνῶν σφαγίων* (1006); Sommerstein (274) conjectures that this is probably a black cow, and notes that finally, after “corrupted sacrifices” throughout the trilogy, the work ends on a pure one.

Chapter II: Problematic Type I Instances in Aeschylus

I have explained the most basic aspects of Type I $\chi\rho\eta$ and the $\chi\rho\eta$ -statements which exhibit them best; I will now explore the instances of the word which do not demonstrate the characteristic aspects of Type I $\chi\rho\eta$ as clearly as the preceding examples. $\chi\rho\eta$ in Aeschylus occurs within a condition four times (three times in the protasis; once in the apodosis). Such usage on its surface does not appear to have much in common with the Type I usages elsewhere in Aeschylus, in which $\chi\rho\eta$ appears to be universal, timeless, and self-evident, since use in the protasis of a condition implies that the speaker does not know whether something is $\chi\rho\eta$, and use in the apodosis might seem to imply that whether something is $\chi\rho\eta$ is contingent upon something else. This is problematic because by my understanding a character should not be doubting whether something is $\chi\rho\eta$, as these statements are well known to be valid, and the doubt comes across as indecision about the future. However, in this section I will show how these apparently troublesome instances exhibit the same features as of other Type I $\chi\rho\eta$ -statements; I will then explore how to reconcile them with what I consider to be the primary force of $\chi\rho\eta$ in the other Aeschylean instances.

The following instances of $\chi\rho\eta$ are intermediate between Type I and Type II, although I categorize them as part of Type I; the reference to the future which lends itself to the translation of "it is fated" for these instances is characteristic of the Type II instances, even though its presence in a condition satisfies expectations of Type I (in the

lack of certainty concerning the future). These intermediate instances also have reference to more specific situations and individuals than other Type I instances in which universal cosmic law is applied. After I have discussed these, I will give my interpretation of the Type I instances in the *Prometheus* before discussing the Type II category.

In two of these instances (*Persae* 801, *Agamemnon* 166), *χρη* occurs in the protasis of the condition (“if it is *χρη* that X occur”), producing statements that appear to express uncertainty about what is *χρη*; in these two no sense of “personal fate” is intended. The oracles, being oracles, necessarily have reference to events which have not yet taken place; however, that prediction of future events based on oracles, when used in conjunction with *χρη*, only occurs in a condition in Type I instances. The force of the uncertainty in these instances rests on whether it is *χρη* that the oracles be trusted, i.e. whether the oracles have divine provenance. The first is that at *Persae* 801:

Chorus: πῶς εἶπας; οὐ γὰρ πᾶν στρατεύμα βαρβάρων
περᾶ τὸν Ἑλλης πορθμὸν Εὐρώπης ἄπο;

Darius: παῦροι γε πολλῶν, εἴ τι πιστεῦσαι θεῶν 800
χρη θεσφάτοισιν, ἐς τὰ νῦν πεπραγμένα
βλέψαντα· συμβαίνει γὰρ οὐ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὔ.
κεῖπερ τάδ' ἐστί, πλήθος ἔκκριτον στρατοῦ
λείπει κενᾶισιν ἐλπίσιν πεπεισμένος. (798-804)

This passage follows that in which Darius has generally related the near-annihilation suffered by the Persians at the Greeks' hands; the statement made by him here founds the certainty of his prediction of future events on the validity of the assertion that it is *χρη* to put faith in the oracles of the gods. What is *χρη* in Type I instances is often linked

to the gods, whether it is represented through them or enacted by them; here Darius is conceived as questioning neither the authority of the gods nor their affiliation with what is *χρη*—rather, he asks here whether the oracles of the gods genuinely represent the gods’ opinions or will, and therefore whether the content of the oracles may be taken to be as self-evidently valid as what mortals know otherwise to be *χρη*.

Why might Darius ask this? It is not necessarily self-contradictory for it not to be *χρη* to trust in the oracles of the gods—not everything an individual says is absolutely representative of the way he or she thinks; in this instance Darius is affected by his vast disappointment in the turn of events. He has already expressed his disappointment with the sort of fulfillment which (likely) these same oracles have had, at lines 739-742, and by this point he is genuinely uncertain whether oracles can be trusted. In addition, his phrasing indicates that he believes that what is *χρη* is absolute, not that it is fallible: *συμβαίνει γὰρ οὐ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ' οὐ*. He means to put the “if” force of the condition on his own imperfect knowledge, given that they have failed him in the past, not the potential fallibility of what is *χρη*: he is expressing the situation from his own perspective as a mortal with imperfect knowledge.

Therefore, in this instance, as at *Choephoroi* 297 and *Septem* 617, the question is not whether the gods themselves can be associated with what is *χρη* but rather whether the oracles are reliable indications of the gods’ will, which is *χρη*. In the former, Orestes asks himself the direct question whether it is *χρη* to trust in these oracles.

τοιῶσδε χρησιμοῖς ἄρα χρη πεποιθέναι;
κεῖ μὴ πέποιθα, τοῦργον ἔστ' ἐργαστέον. (297-298)

Garvie (119) writes that here ἄρα is equivalent to ἄρ' οὐ, anticipating a “yes” response.⁵⁸

I believe this appeal for confirmation is rhetorical—not “rhetorical” in the sense of a rhetorical δεῖ, in which there is no appropriate or “correct” answer, and the intended effect is silence, but “rhetorical” in that Orestes considers that the answer to be so obvious that it need not even be spoken. He has already stated very passionately that he believes the oracle (and Apollo) will not desert him and will not fail in its intended course, punishing himself, Orestes, in the stead of those it commands him to take vengeance on, should he himself not do the job. With these two lines he closes discussion of one set of persuasive motivations and begins discussion of another, and so line 298 and those following form something of an anticlimax: after describing the consequences of disobeying Apollo in gruesome detail, he then goes on to add that he would feel grief, too, for his father, and that he would rather not be poor. At any rate here Orestes uses an interrogative rather than declarative χροή-statement to underscore what he believes to be the self-evident nature of its content: “don’t these oracles tell me to do what is χροή anyway?” Orestes must behave according to his role as son to a murdered father.

That Orestes doubts the validity of the oracles because of their status as oracles rather than reliably the will of God is apparent in his request for Zeus’ help in the speech

⁵⁸ He quotes Denniston (GP 46f.) as saying, “ἄρα ostensibly leaves the issue open to the person addressed, and the appeal for confirmation is the more confident because less obviously stressed.”

immediately prior; he knows the content of the oracles and nevertheless asks for Zeus' aid.⁵⁹

The question of whether the oracles have authority arises also at **Septem 617**, where Eteocles marvels at Amphiaraus' decision to fight:

δοκῶ μὲν οὖν σφε μηδὲ προσβαλεῖν πύλαις 615
οὐχ ὡς ἄθυμος οὐδὲ λήματος κάκη,
ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὡς σφε χρὴ τελευτῆσαι μάχη,
εἰ καρπὸς ἔσται θεσφάτοισι Λοξίου·
φιλεῖ δὲ σιγᾶν ἢ λέγειν τὰ καίρια. (615-619)

The weight of θεσφάτοισι (618) bears heavily on the sense of χρὴ here; LSJ give the primary meaning of θεσφατίζω as “prophesy,” and, with μόρος, “it is decreed that”; θέσφατα occurs nearly 40 times in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the majority of uses has to do with oracles predicting the death of an individual (see esp. Soph. OT 1175). Only a few coincide with a use of χρὴ,⁶⁰ and when a divinity is named in these authors, the divinity from whom the oracle comes, it is always Apollo. The oracles are characterized as having the power to compel actions, not merely predict them: in Euripides' IA, they are given as the source of the necessity for Iphigenia's death (529, 1268, 1468; also 498); the oracles also compel behavior on the part of mortals at Eur. IT 937 (Φοίβου κελευσθεὶς θεσφάτοις ἀφικόμην), IA 879, **Phoenissae 999**, and notably, the passage surrounding **Eumenides 594**. The reference to future time and individual “fate,” even if χρὴ would not be used here by the author if he felt the sense to demand

⁵⁹ Orestes does indeed believe in these oracles; the oracles to which he is referring are those coming from Apollo, that should Orestes not take his revenge upon his mother, he would suffer terribly. But, as he then says to himself, even if he does not believe in these oracles, he would still commit the deed on account of grief for his father and anger over his poverty.

⁶⁰ LSJ also list S. OC 1472 and 969, Od. 4.561, Pindar P.4.71, and Aristoph. Pax 1073.

something improper of the word, is palpable on account of the force imposed on the sentence by the use of θεσφάτοισι. We have seen that the mutually affirming relationship between what is χροή and the Olympian gods is one of the salient characteristics of Type I instances of χροή; perhaps the author felt its use appropriate here on account of Apollo's involvement. Although this usage is complicated, and drawing apart the sources of various parts of the semantic meaning is difficult, one is able to see features in common with Type I and hints of an evolution toward Type II.

DeVito writes that Eteocles and Amphiaraus share the belief that necessity is inescapable, but that despite this both are able to decide how to face what this necessity has dealt them; a submission to fate—especially relative to the pleas for escape, both literal and figurative (in prayers to the gods, for help)—is one of the most important motifs in the play characterizing Eteocles. Since Eteocles, however, is not the only one submitting to fate (cf. the Chorus' acceptance at line 263), the χροή at line 617 may be read as referring to more than simply Amphiaraus. This is certainly a Type I instance in that what is χροή is conceived of as coming from Apollo; Eteocles (and the Chorus, even before they submit, as shown by their attempt to change fate) conceives of it as “god-given fate” (cf. line 719). Another prime means of characterization—and, as DeVito notes, long argued (see esp. page 170)— is the tension between free will and “fate” causing action within the play; what is contained behind this χροή reflects this tension, in that Eteocles is not only remarking upon Amphiaraus' decision to pursue a course which will result in his death, but he is also likely aware that the future holds the same for him (at least, the parallels foreshadow it).

The meaning of *χρή* behind the instance at Agamemnon 166, in the “Hymn to Zeus,” is more complicated than the question over the oracles’ validity, but the context is that of strong deference to Zeus.

Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τόδ' αὖ- 160
 τῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ,
 τοῦτό νιν προσεννέπω.
 οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι
 πάντ' ἐπισταθμώμενος
 πλὴν Διός, εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος 165
 χρή βαλεῖν ἐτητύμως. (160-166)

Although here the Chorus appears to be uncertain and to separate the assigning of cause (to Zeus) and the need to do so (being *χρή*), Zeus here is not represented as distinct from what is *χρή*; as a speech act this *χρή*-statement is an appeal, directed to Zeus himself. In the hymn they conceive of him as listening, and they are asking him this very question (whether it is *χρή* to throw the burden from their hearts by attributing Iphigenia’s death to Zeus) by their hesitation—if it is indeed *χρή* to do so, then he will not be offended at their assigning the cause / blame to him; if it is not *χρή*, then they assign nothing.⁶¹ The Chorus of the Agamemnon as much as states that Zeus is the source of what they conceive to be cosmic law by enumerating some of its aspects which they associate with him: he is the leader in τὸ φρονεῖν (176), and he has established the law of πάθει μάθος (177-178). The context of such deference as this, together with an appeal to the gods in the form of a *χρή*-statement, occurs also at Choephoroi 203, in Electra’s speech to the Chorus:

⁶¹ Cf. Smith 15: “They shelter from impiety by not explicitly drawing this conclusion [that Zeus is responsible for Iphigenia’s death], although it is the only one they have left themselves, and further by implying that they would draw it only under compulsion.”

ἀλλ' εἰδότας μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς καλούμεθα,
οἷοισιν ἐν χειμῶσι ναυτίλων δίκην
στροβούμεθ'· εἰ δὲ χροῖ τυχεῖν σωτηρίας,
σμικροῦ γένοιτ' ἂν σπέρματος μέγας πυθμῆν. (201-204)

This instance of χροῖ, as χροῖ-act, functions as an appeal to the gods, those whom Electra conceives of as capable of effecting her desire. This χροῖ seems to be used, like that at Prometheus 485, as an auxiliary verb indicating the future tense with the implication of supernatural agency. The function of this speech act as an appeal and prayer foregrounds χροῖ with a context of divine concern and intervention, and it is assumed that the gods are the agents behind the “finding” of σωτηρίας, although the subject of the infinitive is not altogether clear.⁶²

⁶² So Garvie (95); on στροβούμεθα, he writes, “[it is] either a poetic plural (cf. 201), or the subject is Electra and those who are on her side.” All but two of the χροῖ-statements which I consider to be Type II have an expressed subject for the infinitive; I think the expression of the subject lends emphasis only. Nowhere in the *Supplices* or the *Choephoroi* is the subject expressed, and it is expressed in around half of the instances in the *Persae*, *Agamemnon*, and *Eumenides*; in the *Septem*, it tends toward expression, in that it is expressed every time Eteocles speaks. Smyth does not mention any trend or importance concerning the expression of the subject of the infinitive.

Chapter III: Type I $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ in the *Prometheus*

At this point I have discussed the features which unite Type I instances of $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ in the *Supplices*, *Septem*, *Persae*, *Agamemnon*, *Choephoroi*, and *Eumenides* and how the salient characteristics of any given use help to inform our interpretation of the others. Now I will move on to the Type I instances of $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ in the *Prometheus*.

As I began my study of each of the more than fifty instances of $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ in Aeschylus, I more and more noticed an issue fundamental to the explication of what is $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$: the conception of the status of the gods differs between the *Prometheus* and the other six plays, notably (and most importantly for our purposes here) in respect to the relationship between the characterizations and actions of divinities, specifically Zeus, and what is $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$. In the *Prometheus* the gods are often portrayed as subject to and struggling against what is $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ (i.e. they are not the representatives for cosmic law). This opposition requires that the two entities be distinct from one another, but it also diminishes the majesty and influence of the gods by implying some greater order, one they do not have the natural wisdom to obey (by contrast, consider Athena in the *Eumenides*). Perhaps the tendency of Type II instances to fall in the *Prometheus* rather than in the other six plays is contingent upon, or at least corresponds to, this view of the gods. The plot of the *Prometheus* is dependent upon the idea of an external order creating and enforcing change: Prometheus' main source of comfort is the knowledge that his present predicament cannot last forever, and the plot itself rests upon the

(potential) overthrow of Zeus.⁶³ Zeus cannot, therefore, *per se* represent what is *χρή*, and the relationship that the gods in general have to what is *χρή* in the other six plays, i.e. effecting or representing what is *χρή*, is untenable here.⁶⁴ Although this difference in representation is more evident in the Type II instances of *χρή* in this work, it also informs the Type I instances which I will discuss here. One of these is the first instance of *χρή* in the work, at line 3.

Χθονὸς μὲν ἐς τηλουρὸν ἤκομεν πέδον,
 Σκύθην ἐς οἶμον, ἄβατον εἰς ἐρημίαν.
 Ἥφαιστε, σοὶ δὲ *χρή* μέλειν ἐπιστολὰς
 ἄς σοι πατήρ ἐφεῖτο, τόνδε πρὸς πέτραις
 ὑψηλοκρήμυοις τὸν λεωργὸν ὀχμάσαι
 ἄδαμαντίνων δεσμῶν ἐν ἀρρήκτοις πέδαις. (1-6)

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⁶³ Inoue and Cohen, 26, on the closeness of characterization of Zeus and Prometheus in this play: “Their closeness arises out of the juxtaposition of their relationship to one another with their mutual relation to a cosmic order larger than both of them.” The question the authors discuss is that of whether Zeus in the *Prometheus* is the same as cosmic law; the article uses similarities of terminology characterizing each to posit a similar characterization (and a certain tension between the two, on account of this closeness); the authors consider *χρή* in the same category as *ἀνάγκη*, *μοῖρα*, *μόρσιμον*, and *πέπρωται* as denoting an “external standard” (28); they write (29), “Words denoting the necessity of Zeus are in reference to either his concrete tools or punishment (108, 1052) or to his commands (3, 16, 671). Prometheus, however, always attributes necessity to a force, external both to himself and to Zeus (except in reference to the latter’s concrete tools), and although he acknowledges a necessity to which he and Zeus are subject, controversy has arisen over Zeus’ relation to fate... The limited and narrow application of words of necessity to Zeus and Prometheus in contrast with the overwhelming repetition of words denoting a necessity outside both of them supports the interpretation that Zeus as well as Prometheus is subject to a larger cosmic order (whether or not this order is called fate).” The authors also discuss the sympathy of the other gods for Prometheus as further isolating Zeus: “The harmony of Prometheus with these forces and inhabitants of the cosmos underlines the fact that Zeus’ *ἀρμονία* (551), like his laws and justice, is self-contained and out of step with a larger *ἀρμονία* to which it must be reconciled.”

⁶⁴ Certainly the characterization of Zeus in the *Prometheus* outside what can be supposed from the uses of *χρή* is a necessary consideration, but an extensive discussion of his characterization is outside the scope of this thesis.

“It is *χρή* that you obey the commands given by Zeus” is a typical Type I *χρή*-statement, when taken out of context. Kratos in this passage attempts to nerve, or shame, Hephaistos into doing what he had been brought to do, to clamp Prometheus to the rock. It is necessary to obey the commands of Zeus, he says, although the things which Zeus commands here are less lofty than what upholds universal order elsewhere: here, one individual must chain another to a rock. (Elsewhere, although individuals like Orestes respond to others’ infractions of the cosmic law with punishment, the necessity behind those actions arises from the punisher’s own place within the universal order. Orestes did not act only to punish Clytemnestra, but rather, he considered his own position as the son to a murdered father to compel him; here neither Kratos nor Hephaistos has a stake in seeing the punishment done and they act only from fear of punishment for disobeying Zeus’ self-serving orders.) Hephaistos, in his reply, corrects Kratos’ use and makes clear what sort of necessity enjoins him:

πάντως δ’ἀνάγκη τῶνδέ μοι τόλμαν σχεθεῖν·
ἐξωριάζειν γὰρ πατρὸς λόγους βαρύ. (16-17)

Recall that *ἀνάγκη* often refers to physical compulsion; Hephaistos is compelled by the threat of physical retribution should he reject the commands of Zeus (who even in these lines is personified, distanced from an abstract order: he is self-aware and capable of *λόγους*).

The opposition of *χρή* and *ἀνάγκη*, in which the former is characterized as lofty and the latter as associated with Zeus, continues with the use at 103:

τὴν πεπρωμένην δὲ *χρή*

αἴσαν φέρειν ὡς ῥᾶστα, γιγνώσκονθ' ὅτι
τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἔστ' ἀδήριτον σθένος. (103-105)

This instance, in which Prometheus philosophizes to himself, resembles the universal Type I *χρή* in that it states, without subject for the infinitive, a code of behavior which is applicable to all. That it instructs correct behavior for individuals relative to *αἴσα* (which itself is one aspect of the universal order) is given by the indirect discourse clause: *χρή* here describes appropriate action in the face of events beyond one's control—therefore, as with numerous other instances of *χρή*, it relates the relationship of the speaker to the cosmos. However, note that the cosmic order, neither in its expression with *χρή* nor relationship to *αἴσα* or *ἀνάγκη* here, is identified with Zeus, and that whereas Type I universal statements express the proper action of all mortals, Prometheus is not mortal. If there were a subject for the infinitive here, we might expect that it would be the first person pronoun, and singular; it is unusual for a character in a Type I *χρή*-statement to use the word *χρή* in order to comfort himself or direct his own action.

Outside the Prometheus, proper respect towards the gods is a huge part of what is *χρή* for mortals; in this instance, however, Prometheus does not relate his acceptance of his “fate” with proper reverence of Zeus. I will discuss further the relationship between the gods and what is *χρή* in the Prometheus below (page 75).

A similar Type I instance of *χρή* in the Prometheus occurs at line 659, as Io describes to Prometheus what she and her father have already endured:

τοιῴσδε πάσας εὐφρόνας ὀνειράσι 655
συνειχόμεν δύστηνος, ἔστε δὴ πατρὶ

ἔτλην γεγωνεῖν νυκτίφοιτ' ὄνειρατα.
ὁ δ' ἔς τε Πυθῶ καπὶ Δωδώνης πυκνοῦς
θεοπρόπους ἴαλλεν, ὡς μάθοι τί χροῆ
δοῶντ' ἢ λέγοντα δαίμοσιν πράσσειν φίλα. (655-660)

“That one might learn what [it is necessary] to do or say to please the gods,” with its characterization of certain actions as both χροῆ and the will of divinity, reflects Type I instances in the other plays. It appears here that Io’s father consulted the oracles as to what is χροῆ, but characters are not portrayed as asking oracles for knowledge as to what is χροῆ in Type I instances in the other six plays; there, what is χροῆ is self-evident, and recall that the asking of what is χροῆ, as a χροῆ-act, is a means of characterization of the relationship between speaker and addressee. This resembles especially the interactions between the Chorus of Danaids and their father in the *Supplices*, in which Danaüs firmly establishes himself as the party more knowledgeable, more capable of telling what is χροῆ on account of his age and experience. Likewise, in the instance on its surface closest to this one in the *Prometheus*, at *Supplices* 519, the king of Argos asserts his authority and greater knowledge of his own culture when he says that he will instruct Danaüs as to what it is χροῆ for him to say in order to be best received by the Argive council. Thus one of the salient uses of χροῆ in Type I instances in the other six plays is establishing the authority of speaker and addressee relative to one another, and χροῆ is not used there toward the acquisition of information from the gods themselves.

Here, ultimately, the report of what is χροῆ is that Io must leave so that Zeus might sleep with her. Perhaps the most stunning feature of this instance of χροῆ is that what is χροῆ, the report that Io must leave, against her will, and to her own misery, is a

single command handed down which creates disorder. In the other six plays, what is $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ is not handed down as an imperative from a divinity only to serve his own purposes; here what is $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ undermines all normalcy in Io and her father's life. The cosmic law which $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ represents in the other six plays, it is true, serves primarily to describe the relationship between mortals and gods, but that is from the perspective of and for the continued stability of the human culture, and its primary tenet is humility, knowing one's place. Here it is $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ that Io allow Zeus to rape her.

In this instance, Prometheus states that he is about to gratify the Chorus' desire by foretelling for them the trials Io will suffer. His very meaning requires that *χρη* here refer to future events,⁶⁶ but the author's wording also brings attention to the contrast between present (*νῦν*) and future (*τὰ λοιπά*—the implication is there, even if "future" is not its immediate meaning here),⁶⁷ and past (Io's recently finished speech on the sufferings she has already endured) and future (what she will endure, which Prometheus is about to tell) as well. These sufferings will apply only to one, identified, individual; what is described as *χρη* here is not applicable to anyone else, as these are discrete acts (just as the discrete pieces of information desired in the indirect questions above) performed by one individual (Io) with no reference to universal order (and no application outside the immediate future of Io herself). *Χρη* in the other six plays has no explicit creator— no conscious mind which decides what is *χρη*— and in the *Prometheus* elsewhere it is ambiguous; but in this instance the agent of Io's sufferings is named: it is Hera.⁶⁸ It is rare enough indeed for a divinity to be named as enacting what is *χρη*, but

⁶⁶ The phrase *τὸ μέλλον* has a contextualizing force at *Prometheus* 213:

ἔμοι δὲ μήτηρ οὐχ ἅπαξ μόνον Θέμις
καὶ Γαῖα, πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφὴ μία,
τὸ μέλλον κραίνοιτο προυτεθεσπίκει,
ὡς οὐ κατ' ἰσχὺν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ καρτερόν
χρεῖη, δόλω δὲ τοὺς ὑπερσχόντας κρατεῖν. (209-213)

Prometheus, in this speech to the Chorus, does not imply any sort of moral superiority, and so all he means by his use of *χρη* is that "it would come to pass that," in the future; the distinction is one of time.

⁶⁷ The tension is even more palpable when we consider that at this instance, Prometheus is foretelling Io's struggles yet to come—both of them are in the middle of their agony, but the end is foreseeable for one but yet not for the other, the one doing the telling. (Long 248)

the context of this instance renders it more unusual; elsewhere, if a specific deity is intended as the agent, it is Zeus, but here, not only is it not Zeus, but it is Hera, acting against Zeus' wishes. There is no greater context or explanation for the source of or reasoning behind these sufferings for Io; they do not form any part of a higher order. Prometheus states explicitly that her experiences will be unpleasant ($\tilde{\alpha}\theta\lambda\omicron\nu, \tau\lambda\hat{\eta}\nu\alpha\iota$); in Type I instances, when a character suffers punishment described as $\chi\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$ (e.g. *Choephoroi* 930) it is in retribution for having committed something which is contrary to "cosmic law," but here Io has committed no such offense.

As a speech act, this use is purely descriptive; it is not at all a $\chi\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$ -act as in the Type I statements in that it is not an imperative of any kind. Io is the passive recipient here of what is $\chi\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$. On account of Prometheus' ability to foretell the future, the other characters in the play show general deference to him; however, the clear reference to the authority of the speaker in Type I instances stems from the obvious nature of the content of the $\chi\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$ -statement. In this instance, this knowledge belongs to Prometheus alone, and he is not reminding his audience of what is $\chi\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$, but rather, informing them.

Of course, this difference in use has not been appreciated by me alone; these instances of $\chi\omicron\rho\acute{\eta}$ (and others) have been translated as "it is fated that" for centuries; I am merely explicating the subconscious thought processes behind such a translation.⁶⁹ By using the phrase "it is fated that," I believe, an English speaker refers to a) a specific

⁶⁸ Of course, Zeus' lust caused all of this, but the divinity immediately responsible for this is Hera. Griffith (215) hesitates between the two in assigning agency.

⁶⁹ Cf. Griffith's identifications (1983, 225), or Italic's Latin translations (329).

event, necessarily in the future, for comparison with the present, and b) a certain individual or group of individuals, and c) supernatural agency. Translators have very often consciously or subconsciously perceived the difference between the cosmic law uses and the “Promethean” use and demonstrated this awareness through their translation.

Χρη in Type I instances usually describes a type of action, not a specific action; it has to do with a manner of comportment rather than discrete actions. In the following example, at Prometheus 100, the indirect question asks for a specific piece of information regarding the future of one individual alone.

δέρχθηθ' οἴαις αἰκείαισιν
 διακναιόμενος τὸν μυριετῆ
 χρόνον ἀθλεύσω·
 τοιόνδ' ὁ νέος ταγὸς μακάρων
 ἐξηῦρ' ἐπ' ἐμοὶ δεσμὸν ἀεικῆ. 95
 φεῦ φεῦ τὸ παρὸν τό τ' ἐπερχόμενον
 πῆμα στενάχω, πῆ ποτε μόχθων
 χρη τέρματα τῶνδ' ἐπιτεῖλαι. (93-100)

This instance readily brings to mind the instance at Suppliants 971 (the Chorus of Danaids: “we’ll ask our father regarding where it is χρη that we live”), but there are several distinctions we must keep in mind: Prometheus here is very much concerned by time (τὸ παρὸν τό τ' ἐπερχόμενον)—and he contrasts the present with hopeful change to come in the future (cf. Griffith 1983 104); the translation “it is fated” in English is the best expression of the tension between the two (as Harry translates it), whereas the Danaids do not consider time to be to be their adversary. Type I χρη statements are a means of characterizing the power dynamic between two individuals, and, as Ryzman argues,

this deference on the part of the Danaids is a primary feature of their characterization.

In this instance in the Prometheus, Prometheus is speaking alone on stage to himself, and he does not expect the knowledge of what is *χρή* to come from an authority figure. The instance at line 183, where the Chorus expresses their fear concerning Prometheus' fate, also recalls the Supplices 971:

ἐμὰς δὲ φρένας ἐρέθισε διάτορος φόβος,
δέδια δ' ἀμφὶ σαῖς τύχαις,
πᾶ ποτε τῶνδε πόνων
χρή σε τέρμα κέλσαντ' ἐσιδεῖν· ἀκίχητα γὰρ ἦθεα καὶ κέαρ
ἀπαράμυθον ἔχει Κρόνου παῖς. (181-185)

This instance brings such great attention to the contrast of present versus future action that “when?” is the main force of the indirect question, a question directed internally (*δέδια*), as Type II *χρή*-statements do not expect a response (note that, in interrogative Type I *χρή*-statements, the speaker considers it important, if not crucial, that he or she learn the answer, and correct behavior) and therefore do not position the speaker relative to another character in the play. Zeus' actions are in the present time (*ἔχει* 185); in Prometheus' response, in which he claims that Zeus will one day be mollified, he uses *ἔσται* (192). The Chorus conceives of the agent behind Prometheus' misery as Zeus directly (lines 160-167); the *χρή*-statement here refers to the time when Zeus' control will fail (as Prometheus has hinted to the Chorus at lines 171-172).

The tension between present and future is also clear in the *χρή*-statement at line 485, also between Prometheus and the Chorus:

τρόπους τε πολλοὺς μαντικῆς ἐστοίχισα
κάκρῖνα πρῶτος ἐξ ὄνειράτων ἂ χρή
ὑπαρ γενέσθαι, κληδόνας τε δυσκρίτους

485

ἐγνώρισ' αὐτοῖς ἐνοδίους τε συμβόλους·
γαμψωνύχων τε πτησιν οἰωνῶν σκεθρῶς
διώρισ', οἵτινές τε δεξιοὶ φύσιν
εὐωνύμους τε, καὶ δίαιταν ἦντινα
ἔχουσ' ἕκαστοι, καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τίνες
ἔχθραι τε καὶ στέργηθρα καὶ συνεδρία. (484-492)

490

Griffith translates 485-486 as, "I was the first to interpret from dreams what must happen during waking hours."⁷⁰ Whether or not we take the antecedent of ἄ to be "dreams," clearly the relative clause implies things that occur after the dreams themselves (and after the reading of them). I read "ὑπαρ" here as adverbial and indicating reality, and therefore: "I was the first to discern what of their dreams would become real while awake." The whole passage concerns the tension between the present and the future, since it details means of divination: the interpretation of dreams, how to read omens and signs, augury and the habits of birds, reading entrails, sacrifice, reading signs from flames. It must be in the context of futurity.

It is interesting that here in only one part of his speech does Prometheus mention the relationship to the gods of his teachings to men; as he describes sacrifices, he refers to the color that the bile must have in order to be pleasing to the gods, but he refers to performing a successful sacrifice as a "δυστέκμαρτον τέχνην" (497), and not with any greater relationship to the cosmos.

The following three instances of χροί, at 715, 721, and 730, are from that same speech of Prometheus as 703, directed to the Chorus and Io, advising Io on how her course will lead and how best to avoid unnecessary dangers.

⁷⁰ Griffith (1983) 174.

<p>Σκύθας δ' ἀφίξη νομάδας, οἱ πλεκτὰς στέγας πεδάρσοι ναίους' ἐπ' εὐκύκλοις ὄχοις, ἐκηβόλοις τόξοισιν ἐξηρτυμένοι οἷς μὴ πελάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀλιστόνοις πόδας χρίμπτουσα ῥαχίαισιν ἐκπερᾶν χθόνα. λαιᾶς δὲ χειρὸς οἱ σιδηροτέκτονες οικοῦσι Χάλυβες, οὓς φυλάξασθαί σε χρή. ἀνήμεροι γὰρ οὐδὲ πρόσπλατοι ξένοις. ἦξεις δ' Ὑβριστὴν ποταμὸν οὐ ψευδώνυμον· ὄν μὴ περάσης, οὐ γὰρ εὐβατος περᾶν, πρὶν ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸν Καύκασον μόλης, ὄρων ὑψιστον, ἔνθα ποταμὸς ἐκφυσᾷ μένος κροτάφων ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἀστρογείτονας δὲ χρή κορυφὰς ὑπερβάλλουσαν ἐς μεσημβρινήν βῆναι κέλευθον. (709-723)</p>	<p>710</p> <p>715</p> <p>720</p>
<p>ἰσθμὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐταῖς στενοπόροις λίμνης πύλαις Κιμμερικὸν ἦξεις, ὄν θραυσσπλάγχχνως σε χρή λιποῦσαν αὐλῶν' ἐκπερᾶν Μαιωτικόν. (729-731)</p>	<p>730</p>

These three instances are not descriptive like that at line 703; they are imperatives coming from one who rightfully adopts the tone of one more knowledgeable of such things. However, as at line 703, they refer to the actions of one individual in unique circumstances (of which only one other individual has knowledge). They are used not in addition to other imperatives but rather, it seems, in place thereof (the only morphological imperatives in this whole speech are at 707 and 718), and their reference to the future is clear by the future tense of the finite verbs around them (ἀφίξη 709, ἦξεις 717 and 724, etc.). Whereas in Type I instances, typically the χρή-statement is made spontaneously, as one character's corrective to or advice concerning the behavior of another (and barring that, the individual seeking advice conceives of it as positively affecting his or her situation) these three are requested, and only with hesitation.

Perhaps the main difference well illustrated by these between the “Promethean” use and the others in Aeschylus is that Io does not yet know the information being passed on to her. Neither does the Chorus, and if the audience has ever heard this information before, it is much too arcane to be readily accessible (contrast Agamemnon’s reminder to Clytemnestra that a man must not be judged fortunate until after death). In other instances in which one character is “informing” another, any person of authority could and likely would give the same advice; here, it is the especial province of Prometheus. Strangely enough, when Prometheus begins recounting his mother’s oracle of what remains to happen to Io, after her wanderings have come to an end, at lines 846ff., he does not use *χρή* at all.

The comparandum for a character using *χρή* to describe what must be done in order to keep safe physically is at *Supplices* 763 (762-763: *ὡς καὶ ματαίων ἀνοσίων τε κνωδάλων / ἔχοντας ὀργάς, χρή φυλάσσεσθαι τάχος*; cf. *Prometheus* 715-716 *οἰκοῦσι Χάλυβες, οὐς φυλάξασθαι σε χρή. / ἀνήμεροι γὰρ οὐδὲ πρόσπλατοι ξένοις*); however, at that instance the Egyptians are more intimidating on account of their lack of piety than their brute strength. Prometheus provides no justification for Io avoiding the Chalybes; in fact, he provides no explanation at all as to why Io must undergo these trials, except that Zeus ordained it, and Zeus is *βίαιος* (737). In the other plays, the gods represent that “north” to which the compass of *χρή* will always point; although Prometheus can never be accused of being unbiased, what Zeus asks of individuals in the *Prometheus* is always self-serving and usually creates disorder.

Prometheus dispenses information again, to Hermes, at line 966:

statement), Prometheus would not perceive it as genuine.⁷² The first lines of Prometheus' response indicate his surprise: ἔα· τί χροῖμα λεύσσω; καὶ σὺ δὴ πόνων ἐμῶν / ἦκεις ἐπόπτης; etc. (300-301)⁷³

As for reference to the future—γνώση (295) and ἐρεῖς (298) are both future, and the statement at 298-299 puts emphasis on the change of status between them to happen. This entire speech, after all, is an attempt at persuasion of Prometheus to regard Oceanus as a friend, even though this hasn't been the case in the past. What's more, in the end, Oceanus never truly holds up; his daughters do, however, and faithfully prove their friendship, at lines 1063ff. (Long 250)

The relationship between the Olympian gods and what is χροῖ differs greatly between the Type I and Type II instances; in the *Prometheus*, the gods, especially Zeus, are characterized as a power separate from what is χροῖ, and they represent and reinforce a sort of cosmic might which not only does not serve to uphold the stability of the universe, but seeks to undermine the cosmic necessity which is portrayed as ultimately governing them as well. In the following instance at line 930 we have a clear example of Zeus' characterization as separate from and struggling against what is χροῖ.⁷⁴

⁷² Griffith (1983, 142-143): "P. speaks as if he has not heard Ocean's address to him; and he takes no notice of the inquiry of 294-5."

⁷³ Oceanus will promise his friendship but ultimately does nothing; cf. Thomson 1979, 150: "Prometheus... has only to hint that Oceanus is endangering his own safety to send him home again."

⁷⁴ Almost certainly the source here with the most useful insights concerning the use of χροῖ in the *Prometheus* is Griffith, in his 1983 commentary on that work. Although he does not address the meaning or use of χροῖ in the other six works (as he is writing from the perspective that the *Prometheus* was not written by Aeschylus), he considers χροῖ in the *Prometheus* to refer to the same

Chorus: σὺ θην ἄ χροῖζεις, ταῦτ' ἐπιγλωσσᾶ Διός.
 Prometheus: ἄπερ τελεῖται, πρὸς δ' ἄ βούλομαι λέγω.
 Chorus: καὶ προσδοκᾶν χροῖ δεσπόσειν Ζηγός τινα;
 Prometheus: καὶ τῶνδ' ἄ γ' ἔξει δυσλοφωτέρους πόνους. (928-931)

In this passage Prometheus acknowledges the power Zeus holds over him but states explicitly that Zeus' power is potentially transient and susceptible to overthrow (926-927). Zeus cannot represent what transcends time and upholds the stability of the universe if his reign itself is unstable; what is χροῖ, then, in this passage, supercedes what Zeus represents.

Any contrast in a statement between the future and the present implies the prediction or expectation of change—hence the tension between a use of χροῖ referring to future time and the idea that what χροῖ represents is timeless. Prometheus' speech at 908-927 is full of future tense verbs. The Chorus in this passage counters what Prometheus says by insisting upon the impropriety of such statements and attempting to find a reason for which he would make such remarks; at line 928 they insist that it is only Prometheus' unhappiness at his present situation that causes him to harbor such negativity toward Zeus. He replies that yes, it is his desire that Zeus be brought down, but that he speaks "the things which will be accomplished." The future tense (τελεῖται) within that statement provokes the Chorus' reply: "is it χροῖ that we look out for one to put Zeus aside?" Indeed, Prometheus responds to them with ἔξει (931).⁷⁵

force as do μοῖρα and τὸ πεπρωμένον and that these words collectively identify an order greater than Zeus (see especially Griffith 1983, 17-18; also, Long's commentary at line 211). Griffith sees "external order" to be represented in this work by the personification of the Moirai and the Erinyes. (See also 180 and 225.)

⁷⁵ For another instance displaying these issues, see that at Prometheus 772:

At 1067 the Chorus refutes Hermes, who has asked them to step down, by affirming their friendship to Prometheus:

πῶς με κελεύεις κακότητ' ἀσκεῖν;
μετὰ τοῦδ' ὅ τι χροῖ πάσχειν ἐθέλω·
τοὺς προδότας γὰρ μισεῖν ἔμαθον,
κοῦκ ἔστι νόσος
τῆσδ' ἦντιν' ἀπέπτυσα μᾶλλον. (1066-1070)

Here the Chorus contrasts, by placement of the words and lines especially, what is χροῖ with κακότητ' ἀσκεῖν (1066) and τοὺς προδότας (1068), thus characterizing what is χροῖ as noble, worthy, and one may interpret it as “whatever it is right to suffer,” i.e.

“whatever it is appropriate that I suffer”; that they contrast “what is right” with betrayal indicates their feelings on the importance of their relationship with Prometheus, a relationship which is certainly predicated on their agreement with his politics. If this is the correct interpretation, it is further evidence that the gods in the *Prometheus* do not serve as representatives of cosmic law: the Chorus feel that Prometheus’ is the righteous path, and with him they contrast the actions and intentions of Zeus and Zeus’ minion Hermes himself (1064-1065; he is the “traitor” at 1068 and the “pest” at 1069). Χροῖ here signifies something not only more powerful but higher than Zeus himself. Plus, this response on the part of the Chorus was provoked by Hermes’ threat against them (Long 274); as Hermes is Zeus’ minion in this play, their refusal to do what he asks and instead do what is χροῖ marks a huge distinction between them in the Chorus’ perception.

Hermes’ response, at any rate, at lines 1071-1079, is a response not to “I am willing to

Io:	τίς οὖν ὁ λύσων ἐστὶν ἄκοντος Διός;
Prometheus:	τῶν σῶν τιν' αὐτὸν ἐγγόνων εἶναι χρεῶν.
Io:	πῶς εἶπας; ἢ ἴμὸς παῖς σ' ἀπαλλάξει κακῶν; (771-773)

suffer with [Prometheus] whatever will come,” (i.e. a simple reference to the future) but, rather, to “I am willing to suffer with him whatever is right”; his reply is that their self-righteousness and smugness will not serve as a shield to protect them from pain.

The commentary on interpersonal relationships which Type I uses give is helpful in evaluating other Type II instances as well; as an example, take that at line 630, in which Prometheus acquiesces in Io’s request:

Io: μή τοί με κρύψης τοῦθ’, ὅπερ μέλλω παθεῖν.
Prometheus: ἀλλ’ οὐ μεγάριω τοῦδέ τοῦ δωρήματος.
Io: τί δήτα μέλλεις μή οὐ γεγωνίσκειν τὸ πᾶν;
Prometheus: φθόνος μὲν οὐδεῖς, σὰς δ’ ὀκνῶ θράξαι φρένας.
Io: μή μου προκίδου μάσσον ὦν ἐμοὶ γλυκύ.
Prometheus: ἐπεὶ προθυμῆ, χροῆ λέγειν· ἄκουε δή. (625-630)

I include this instance here in order to discuss the speech act function of the *χρή*-statement as commentary to the relationship between the speaker and addressee, Prometheus and Io; not only is the flow of respect going in the opposite direction as might be supposed from the *χρή*-statement, but as discussed at line 640, in Type I *χρή*-statements the authority which is the source of the necessity comes from neither the speaker nor the addressee. It is true that what is *χρή* in a Type I *χρή*-statement often stems from the interpersonal relationships which demand certain behavior of those involved in them, and deference could be imagined as part of such behavior.⁷⁶

However, the relationship between Io and Prometheus is entirely unlike anything we have seen to cause this elsewhere; the “cosmic” expectation for deference is simply not there.

⁷⁶ Cf. Eteocles’ command to the Chorus at Septem 713, or Agamemnon’s gentle reproach of Clytemnestra at Agamemnon 917.

serves to characterize two parties in relationship to one another in terms of experience, knowledge, and power, and it is rather inconceivable that the Oceanids, who are not portrayed as having any sort of special status here, are meant to be characterized as a source of this relative to Io.⁷⁸ At any rate, *χρη* is not used in Type I instances to gratify another individual (or set of individuals) without reference to some larger context of propriety; when a *χρη*-act is an imperative, the speaker does not imply that his authority over the addressee is itself *χρη* and may be used toward any end he desires. The opposite is true: when a figure of authority invokes what is *χρη* in order to convince another to do something, he is implying that the source of the imperative comes from something much, much larger than the both of them.⁷⁹

Thus we have seen that *χρη* is used in these seven plays in two basic contexts: in the first, the necessity communicated by the word implies some concept of external, universal order, and what is “necessary” primarily deals with the behavior by which individuals conform to or uphold this order, often associated with “divinity” or the Olympian gods. In the second, the word describes events yet to come, and if it does communicate some external order, this order is characterized as conflicting with the wishes of the Olympians, particularly Zeus. I have not sought thus far to attempt to explain the source of this discrepancy or locate it within research on Aeschylus, but I believe that the starkness of contrast between the two types, combined with the fact that

⁷⁸ The Chorus of the *Prometheus* does not use the word as instructive, ever; they use it only twice, once in a direct question, at line 930, and once in an indirect question, at line 183.

⁷⁹ Cf. perhaps the Type I *χρη*-statements made by those whose authority is highest: Darius, at *Persae* 820, or Agamemnon, at *Agamemnon* 821 or 917.

the overwhelming majority of Type II instances are found in the *Prometheus*, lends itself to explanation by way of the discussion on the authorship of the *Prometheus* and whether it is genuinely Aeschylean. If I should consider my findings alone, I would hesitate to believe that a single author would use one rather standard type of context for a word connoting necessity predominantly in six works but use in great number an entirely different context and meaning in another. As several of the Type I instances appear to display a sort of $\chi\omicron\rho\eta$ intermediate between the two, it seems most likely to me that Type I and Type II are two ends of a short spectrum of context and meaning for $\chi\omicron\rho\eta$; if any given author felt that both ends were within his typical usage, we as readers would expect that the two (even with a dearth of intermediate uses) would be distributed evenly among the works. As the Type II instances fall almost solely in the *Prometheus*, however, I believe my findings are merely the newest addition to the growing evidence against an Aeschylean authorship for that work, as they indicate a use of the word which must have evolved over time from “intermediate” uses like the ones in the other six works. I favor a late date⁸⁰ for the writing of the *Prometheus*, as I believe that the evolution of thought and development of philosophical inquiry over the course of the fifth century B.C. must at least partially explain such a marked change for a word indicating necessity.⁸¹ I must admit, however, that I find the evidence presented over the past forty years or so against an Aeschylean authorship to be irresistibly compelling.

⁸⁰ For learned conjectures upon the date, see esp. Griffith 1977 (9-13), in which he concludes that the play was written between 479 and 415 B.C., and his conclusion at 252-254.

⁸¹ On sophistic and other influences upon the author of the *Prometheus*, see also Griffith 1977 207ff., esp. 217ff. On Zeus in the *Prometheus* vs. in Aeschylus, see Lloyd-Jones’ article (56), and

Two appendices follow. The first is a description of the five instances of $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ not mentioned here on account of credible evidence (and eminent scholars' beliefs) that they have been interpolated. The second is an effort to contextualize the findings given here by describing, in a rather less detailed manner, the usage of $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ in Pindar; if the differences between Type I and Type II $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ arise from temporal distance, there should be a strong correlation between the usage of $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ in Pindar and the Type I usage here, since Pindar was a close contemporary of Aeschylus. I believe the correlation exists, in fact, and in my appendix on the uses of $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ in Pindar I will show that these uses conform rather uniformly to the Type I use in Aeschylus, with no indication that Pindar conceives of $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}$ as referring to future time or individual knowledge.

especially his quotation of Schmid on 57: "He held that the presentation of Zeus in the other plays of Aeschylus was one so elevated, so advanced, and so profound that its author could not possibly have written the *Prometheus Vincetus*, with its very different picture." Lloyd-Jones returns to the question again on 65.

Appendix A: The Interpolated Instances

In the manuscript tradition of the seven plays considered here, there are five additional instances of *χρη*; I have omitted them from discussion thus far either because I am convinced that they are not the production of the original author or because I think that the strength of the arguments against their authenticity would detract from their use in the main body of my thesis. In this appendix I will for each instance briefly discuss the force of *χρη* as it would relate, if it should be genuine, to my findings, and direct my reader to the principal evidence against its authenticity.

First I will discuss the instance at *Septem* 1005:

δοκοῦντα καὶ δόξαντ' ἀπαγγέλλειν με χρη
δήμου προβούλοις τῆσδε Καδμείας πόλεως·
Ἐτεοκλέα μὲν τόνδ' ἐπ' εὐνοία χθονὸς
θάπτειν ἔδοξε γῆς φίλαις κατασκαφαῖς. (1005-1008)

“It is *χρη* that I announce” ... In this instance, the herald introduces himself by stating his purpose and task: he has come in order to announce Eteocles’ death and the events which have just taken place; he cites the source of his obligation in doing so as what is *χρη*, meaning that this task is how what is *χρη* devolves upon him, in his position as messenger. This is the applied use of *χρη*; just as at the beginning of this play, Eteocles describes the acts expected of him in his capacity as ruler as *χρη*, so here the messenger refers to the cosmic law which devolves onto one type of individual within one occupation or position.⁸² The herald accordingly makes a parallel between his duty and that of the *πρόβουλοι*; it is his to announce (*ἀπαγγέλλειν*) where it is theirs to decide

⁸² Also of this type are the instances at *Eumenides* 708 and *Persae* 527.

upon policy (δοκοῦντα καὶ δόξαντα).⁸³ The entire speech as well is a judgment on which actions are correct: Eteocles is considered honorable for his blamelessness towards the gods, whereas Polynices is to receive no burial on account of his guilt towards his ancestral gods (1024). Lest we forget the messenger's place in this speech, he reminds us at line 1018; lest we forget the Chorus', he reminds us at line 1031.

Very important, however, is the interaction between social custom or human decree and the reliance of such obligation on what is perceived to be divine mandate; such interaction produces what is *χρή*, as it is framed in terms of the divine. Hence comes the explanation of Eteocles' virtues and Polynices' faults, and hence the quarrel between Antigone and the Chorus which follows this passage; she refuses to reconcile the two and ignores the Chorus' protestations of the superior power of the state.

The arguments on the authenticity of the end of the *Septem* are extensive and convincing to me; see especially Lloyd-Jones,⁸⁴ Lupaş and Petre (281), Dawson (22-25), and Dawe.⁸⁵

At *Agamemnon* 1226 Cassandra describes for the Chorus her own position in the new world in which she finds herself:

ἐκ τῶνδε ποιναῶς φημι βουλευεῖν τινὰ
λέοντ' ἀναλκιν ἐν λέχει στρωφόμενον
οἰκουρόν, οἴμοι, τῶ μολόντι δεσπότη 1225

⁸³ Lloyd-Jones takes on the question of whether this is intended as a reference to the group in Athens in the late fifth century; Lupaş and Petre (282) write, on the interment of Polynices, "cet arrêt surprenant émane d'une autorité qui n'était pas mentionnée auparavant."

⁸⁴ Lloyd-Jones, Hugh. 1959. "The end of the Seven against Thebes." *CQ* N.S. 9: 80-115.

⁸⁵ *CQ* N.S. 17: 16-28, for the first edition; for the second, see the *Studies Presented to Denys Page*, 1978, 87-103.

ἐμῶ· φέρειν γὰρ χροῖ τὸ δούλιον ζυγόν.
νεῶν τ' ἄπαρχος Ἰλίου τ' ἀναστάτης
οὐκ οἶδεν οἶα γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνὸς
λείξασα κἀκτείναςα φαιδρὸν οὔς, δίκην
Ἄτης λαθραίου, τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ. (1223-1230)

This instance is also a classic Type I use in that what is χροῖ for Cassandra here is what is χροῖ for someone in her position, i.e. a female member of a city which has been sacked. Χροῖ here cannot have reference to future time, as she herself knows (and says) that she will not be enduring slavery for much longer. She is not prophesying the immediate future at this point in her conversation with the Chorus, as she portrays Agamemnon as a living being with some manner of comprehension or agency. In her speech beginning at 1256, she begins to consider both herself and Agamemnon as those who are directly about to fall (as at 1313-1314), who may as well already be dead; only there does she begin to talk about what will happen in the future (even if the direct future). From 1223-1230, she speaks of the present. If we should try to reconcile this instance with the prophecies of Prometheus, since both are capable of telling the future, we would have to account for the fact that whereas Prometheus uses χροῖ often, Cassandra uses it only here.⁸⁶

Fraenkel is convinced that line 1226 is interpolated, and he cites Campbell, A. Ludwig, and Herwerden as agreeing with him; the arguments against the authenticity of

⁸⁶ Cf. Fraenkel (563): "To tolerate 1226 is to assume that the prophetess, who in this whole section serves merely as the instrument for communicating a tremendous decree of destiny, could for a short moment forget the noble austerity of her bearing to cast a side-glance at her own affairs and, sighing like a sentimental girl, complain of her sad fate in terms of a commonplace maxim."

this line generally revolve around the type of sentiment expressed here and its relationship to the rest of Cassandra’s speech but include discussions of diction.⁸⁷

The next instance occurs in the midst of the herald’s strong unwillingness (and half-*praeteritio*) in telling the misfortunes which the Argives have suffered both at and in returning from Troy, at Agamemnon 571:

ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖσιν Ἀργείων στρατοῦ	[573]
νικᾶ τὸ κέρδος, πῆμα δ’ οὐκ ἀντιρρέπει.	[574]
τί τοὺς ἀναλωθέντας ἐν ψήφῳ λέγειν,	[570]
τὸν ζῶντα δ’ ἀλγεῖν χροῖ τύχης παλιγκότου;	[571]
καὶ πολλὰ χαίρειν ξυμφορὰς καταξιῶ,	[572]
ὡς κομπάσαι τῷδ’ εἰκὸς ἡλίου φάει	
ὑπὲρ θαλάσσης καὶ χθονὸς ποτωμένοις. (572-578)	

If this instance of *χροῖ* here is genuine, its use is appropriate for the same reasons it is eight lines later; the herald here, in his speech to the Chorus, reconciles the pain the army has experienced with the joy of safe return by choosing to focus on the latter. One might expect that the gravity of what he tells—death and war—would render a *δεῖ* in the place of this *χροῖ* cavalier and likely too unconcerned.⁸⁸ The herald makes a number of references to various forms of propriety in this passage; the differing words might imply distinction or might be *variatio* (*δεῖ* 567, *χροῖ* 571 and 580, *εἰκός* 575); see the discussion below.

In my discussion of the instance at 580, I came to the conclusion that the use of *χροῖ* is typical of Type I usage there on account of the herald’s feelings about man’s

⁸⁷ Campbell, A.Y. 1935. “Aeschylus’ Agamemnon 1223-1238 and Treacherous Monsters.” CQ 29: 25-36. Among other things, Campbell (27) calls this line “unnecessary, rapid, and intrusive to the subject matter of this context.”

⁸⁸ Thomson (51) notes that there is a repetition of contrast between the dead and the living in these lines and the lines preceding them.

relationship to the gods in general, and Zeus in particular; he argues that joy and gratitude are the appropriate response in the wake of what has befallen the army. Concerning this speech of the herald and Agamemnon's opening speech, Fraenkel writes, "The first speech of the Herald is a foil as well as a supplement to the great oration which Agamemnon delivers on entering the stage. The two opening prayers are parallel; so is the almost harsh use of juridical technicalities: the Herald employing terms of criminal law (534-538) and the king describing the high court of divine justice with details borrowed from Attic procedure (813 ff.). By this parallelism the profound contrast in temper and manners, in education and discretion is made the more striking. The Herald is jubilant with wild joy; the king is a model of perfect restraint." (294) It is important to note not only that both the herald and Agamemnon use *χαρή* in these speeches (and the word does not occur in the intervening lines), but also that their use of the word is the same, with the emphasis on gratitude.

In any discussion of this instance of *χαρή*, however, one must reconcile its appearance here with the use of *δεῖ* at line 567, earlier in the herald's speech (*τί ταῦτα πένθειν δεῖ; παροίχεται πόνος*), which is a typical use of the "rhetorical" *δεῖ*, borrowed, as we have seen, from the one instance of *δεῖ* in Homer. The instance of *χαρή* at 571 appears to rephrase this very question, and although *χαρή* rhetorical questions are not entirely absent from Greek, they are very rare. Certainly there is enough context of man's relationship to the divine to justify Aeschylus' use of *χαρή* at 571, but its appearance so close to a *δεῖ* rhetorical question, with the same content, lends its explanation to arguments of *variatio*.

Fraenkel discusses the arguments concerning 570-572, in debates which have been going on for centuries, on pages 286-287. To paraphrase him: certain scholars feel that they belong where they are (Bamberger, Ahrens); some delete them (Nägelsbach, Blaydes), and Wilamowitz himself deleted them before recanting in defense, in a 1927 article. Fraenkel himself believes that the insertion of these lines, with *χρή*, may have been caused by the appearance of *δεῖ* and the parallel meaning and structure.

There are two perhaps interpolated instances of *χρή* in the *Prometheus*, and most editors are so certain that the one at line 606 is not genuine that they do not include it in the body of the text. Page's text at these lines reads:

ἀλλά μοι τορῶς τέκμηρον ὅ τι μ' ἐπαμμένει
παθεῖν· τί μῆχαρ, ἢ τί φάρμακον νόσου;
δεῖξον εἴπερ οἶσθα. (605-607)

Io begs Prometheus to tell her what she will suffer, a context which would set up a Type II *χρή*-statement, if this were one, as it includes future time, a reference to an individual and a particular situation, and an individual dispensing discrete information to another. Smyth translates these lines as, "Oh make plain to me what misery it is my fate yet to suffer, what remedy there is, or what cure, of my affliction. Reveal it, if thou hast the knowledge." (269) *Μῆχαρ*, then, here, is "remedy;"⁸⁹ the alternative, which comes from the M manuscript, is "τί μὴ *χρή*," which would read, "what misery it is my fate yet to suffer, and what misery not to suffer."

The other possible interpolation from the *Prometheus*, and the last which I shall discuss, appears at line 970. All those discussed previously might be considered Type I

⁸⁹ *Μῆχαρ* was introduced by Elmsley.

instances, if they should prove to be genuine, but I believe that the following instance bears a greater resemblance to the other Type II instances in that work.

Hermes:	κρείσσον γὰρ οἶμαι τῆδε λατρεύειν πέτρα ἢ πατρὶ φῦναι Ζηνὶ πιστὸν ἄγγελον.
Prometheus:	τούτως ὑβρίζειν τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας χρεών.†
Hermes:	χλιδᾶν ἔοικας τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν. (968-971)

The *χρή*-statement at line 970 is general enough to have universal significance, but there is no humility in this statement, no awe of the supernatural. Indeed, Prometheus here is not suggesting human action toward the gods, but a god's action regarding himself, also a divine being, or, taken the other way (as there are differing opinions as to the grammatical function τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας serves), his own action toward a god. The statement seems to express the necessity of escalating disorder; if ὑβρίζοντας is the subject, the statement is entirely redundant; if it is the object, its tone is sarcastic and insulting, a justification of Prometheus' own bitter words, and such a tone is not typical of Type I uses of *χρή*. From the Chorus' words alone, it would be rather simple for the reader to imagine them as exhibiting some sort of deference to Prometheus' greater knowledge, but Prometheus himself does not play the part of the typical character in that role.

This passage is the subject of much debate among scholars, regarding the transmission of the text (see Griffith on line 970) and even the syntax expected. However, whether ὑβρίζοντας is the subject (Harry, Wilamowitz, Mazon, etc.), or object (Griffith) of ὑβρίζειν, such a statement does not have the gravity typical of the other instances of *χρή* outside the Prometheus.

Appendix B: Χρή in Pindar

In this appendix I will describe the usage of χρή in Pindar and demonstrate the close relationship it bears to that of the Type I χρή in Aeschylus. Δεῖ occurs only once in Pindar, at *Olympian* 6.28 (πρὸς Πιτάναν δὲ παρ' Εὐρώτα πόρον δεῖ σάμερον ἔλθειν ἐν ὤρᾳ). To explain the type of necessity indicated there, Goodell writes, "To indicate the subject of his song the poet adopts the figure of having a journey to make. The suggestion of moral obligation has no place in [δεῖ] till far later." (94) The necessity behind this δεῖ is explained as having a source very different from the necessity of the χρή in the previous line: the χρή-statement (χρή τοίνυν πύλας ὕμνων ἀναπιτνάμεν αὐταῖς. 28) is explained by the previous line and a half (στεφάνους ἐν Ὀλυμπία ἐπεὶ δέξαντο); it is χρή that one praise the family indicated, since they have won victories at Olympia.⁹⁰ The δεῖ-statement, however, explains the necessity behind the imperative at the beginning of the second strophe, in which the poet asks a Phintia to yoke some mules. The δεῖ is associated, then, with the mechanical act and refers to the objective behind that act; the source of necessity behind the χρή-statement is more remote. Although Pindar immediately thereafter launches into an excursus on various divine figures, he never returns to explain how this divinity relates to the obligation to go to Pitana on that day.

⁹⁰ For more on this, see fn. 97, below.

Forms of *χρη* (including *χρεών*) occur 31 times in what survives of Pindar's works.⁹¹ A great number of these occur in the form of "universal *χρη*" statements, notions echoed elsewhere in Greek literature, just as in Aeschylus.⁹² Pindar often expresses strong religious feeling through these statements; they typically exhort men towards a certain type of behavior, usually humility vis-à-vis the gods or vis-à-vis other men in order to preserve "cosmic" harmony. Consider the instance at *Pythian* 2.34, regarding Ixion and the warning against *ύβρις*:

αἱ δύο δ' ἀμπλακίαι 30
 φερέπονοι τελέθοντι· τὸ μὲν ἦρωσ ὅτι
 ἐμφύλιον αἶμα πρότιστος οὐκ ἄτερ τέχνας ἐπέμειξε θνατοῖς,
 ὅτι τε μεγαλοκευθέεσσιν ἔν ποτε θαλάμοις
 Διὸς ἄκοιτιν ἐπειρᾶτο. *χρη* δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὄρᾶν μέτρον. (30-34)⁹³

The poet uses Ixion here as an example of behavior which mortals must not copy; the *χρη*-statement is directed to all, equally, and it is represented as an injunction from the gods (21-24). The specific action to which this *χρη*-statement refers is given by the previous lines: not only had Ixion murdered his father-in-law, but he had attempted to sleep with Hera—both actions constitute egregiously inappropriate behavior, not least because he had been indebted to the Olympians and thus the order which they

⁹¹ For the list I have consulted Slater: *Olympian* 1.103, 6.4, 6.27, 8.74, 13.94; *Pythian* 2.34, 2.52, 2.88, 3.2, 3.59, 3.103, 4.1, 4.141, 4.271, 9.50; *Nemean* 1.25, 5.49, 7.44, 11.17, 11.47; *Isthmian* 1.43, 3.7, 3.8, 4.48, 8.15a, 8.16; and of the fragments, *Hymn* 42.4, *Paian* 6.96 and 52b.57, *Parth.* 94b.37 (=2.37), *Incert.* 234.3. This last I omit in my discussion because I feel there is not enough context to make an accurate assessment of Pindar's use.

⁹² For example, that at I.4.48, *χρη* δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ' ἀμαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν, or P. 4.271, *χρη* μαλακὰν χέρα προσβάλλοντα τρώμαν ἔλκεος ἀμφιπολεῖν.

⁹³ The text of Pindar from which I quote is that of Race's *Loebs* (1997).

represent. In Pindar the gods do not struggle against an order or power higher than themselves, as they do in the *Prometheus*; even in *Pythian 2* we see evidence of their omnipotence—phrased without specifying a particular god, but with merely a reference to divinity, at line 49 (θεὸς ἅπαν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδεσσι τέκμαρ ἀνύεται).⁹⁴

Humility as contentment with one’s own lot and the propriety of not hoping for that which is beyond one’s own station is expressed through universal *χρή*-statements at P. 3.59 and P. 3.103.

ἔτραπεν καὶ κείνον ἀγάνορι μισθῷ χρυσὸς ἐν χερσὶν φανείς
 ἄνδρ’ ἐκ θανάτου κομίσει
 ἤδη ἀλωκότα· χερσὶ δ’ ἄρα Κρονίων ῥίψαις δι’ ἀμφοῖν ἀμπνοῶν στέρνων κάθειλεν
 ὠκέως, αἶθων δὲ κεραυνὸς ἐνέσκιμψεν μόρον.
 χρή τὰ ἐοικότα παρ δαιμόνων μαστευέμεν θναταῖς φρασί
 γνόνα τὸ παρ ποδός, οἴας εἰμὲν αἴσας. 60

μή, φίλα ψυχά, βίον ἀθάνατον
 σπεῦδε, τὰν δ’ ἐμπρακτον ἄντλει μαχανάν. (P. 3.59: 55-62)

Here Pindar describes the fall of Asklepios, who had been accustomed to heal men’s wounds, but, as this passage relates, eventually became fond of the payment he was receiving for such services.⁹⁵ He performed a healing act (bringing back one from the dead) which was beyond his rights, thereby transgressing the gods’ (specifically, here, Zeus’) will.⁹⁶ Therefore Zeus punished him, and Pindar extracts from this anecdote a

⁹⁴ A similar maxim occurs at line 88: *χρή δὲ πρὸς θεὸν οὐκ ἐρίζειν*, in which line the “god” is characterized as that which must not be transgressed through deceit.

⁹⁵ On the propriety of not seeking deceitful gain, as at P.2.88, is at P.4.141. That one must do what is appropriate for his or her nature is at N.1.25., and similarly, that one must not seek gain beyond what is appropriate for himself is at N.11.47.

⁹⁶ This context of the indiscretion against the gods is necessary to understand the first use of *χρή* in this poem, at line 2, in which Pindar asks whether it is proper for him to wish that Cheiron

maxim concerning the need for a mortal to know his place, especially considering the vast gulf between the status of men and that of the gods. I believe that with οἴας εἰμὲν αἴσας (60) Pindar does not mean to refer to any individual's own future, but rather, the type of future which is possible for a mortal, given the relatively limited power at his disposal. This type of future possible is one in which a man cannot know what will befall him, and therefore he must regard the gods with appropriate awe, as expressed by the *χρή*-statement at line 103: εἰ δὲ νόω τις ἔχει θνατῶν ἀλαθείας ὀδόν, *χρή* πρὸς μακάρων / τυγχάνοντ' εὖ πασχέμεν. ἄλλοτε δ' ἀλλοῖαι πνοαί / ὑψιπετᾶν ἀνέμων. (103-105)

The source of propriety in still other *χρή*-statements is characterized as taking its force from its divine sanction / suggestion, but instead of indicating proper humility for mortals vis-à-vis the gods, these statements advise the appropriate behavior of men in their relationships with other men, especially in the giving of praise where praise is due, as the poet characterizes what is worthy of praise as individual excellence, though manifest in different ways. Pindar words these statements without specifying to whom they apply, but in them there is close connection with the *χρή*-statements in which

were still alive, a wish which he refers to as a prayer (εὐξασθαι 2). The same type of disclaimer comes at P. 9.50, in which Cheiron himself asks whether it is appropriate to instruct Apollo as to the future, considering Apollo is the god of prophecy. The *χρή* occurs in the question of propriety as to telling the future, regarding Cheiron's own relationship with an Olympian god; he does not use *χρή* when indicating the future he foretells.

Pindar describes what is *χρή* for himself, as a praise poet, as glorifying the subjects of his poetry.⁹⁷

The necessity of showing due appreciation for the achievements of other men appears at Isthmian 1.43:

εἰ δ' ἀρετᾶ κατάκειται πᾶσαν ὀργάν,
ἀμφότερον δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις,
χρή νιν εὐρόντεσσιν ἀγάνορα κόμπων
μὴ φθονεραῖσι φέρειν
γνώμαις· ἐπεὶ κούφα δόσις ἀνδρὶ σοφῶ 45
ἀντὶ μόχθων παντοδαπῶν ἔπος εἰπόντ' ἀγαθὸν ξυνὸν ὀρθῶσαι καλόν. (41-46)

In this instance the context indicates that Pindar is referring to himself, giving a maxim by way of explaining why it is appropriate that he himself should be praising Herodotus in such a way as he does.⁹⁸ He refers to this praise as *κέρδος ὑψιστον* at line 51. Indeed, with this maxim Pindar justifies his own praise as appropriate by indicating that all should be doing the same, especially as such praise benefits more than just the victor (*ξυνόν* 46). At lines 52-57 and 60-63 the poet cites the gods' help in Herodotus' victories;

⁹⁷ And not only to the addressees of the poems themselves; Pindar often refers his dedication to the excellence of an entire family to which he is indebted; cf the instance at Parth. 94b.37: "Neither for man nor woman, to whose offspring I am devoted, must I forget a fitting song." (Race) The connection of birth within a family or group to one's "destiny" or future excellence is often invoked by Pindar; I take this to be the primary force behind the sense at N. 5.49 ("it is *χρή* that a trainer of athletes come from Athens"), as throughout that poem Pindar cites birthplace and family as the source of and common thread behind a number of forms of excellence (see Πότμος δὲ κρίνει συγγενῆς ἔργων πέρι / πάντων 40-41).

⁹⁸ This is Bundy's *χρέος*-motive, the idea that the victor's excellence requires praise (and that praise seeks out deeds worthy of song). On these lines, Bundy writes that this instance of *χρή* is part of a series of pairs marking the *χρέος*-motive, but that "the entire structure depends on *χρή* (line 43), which issues a very much stronger imperative than do the other forms in which the *χρέος* motive is cast. The conditional clause of lines 39f. sets up the imperative *χρή φέρειν*, and the explanatory clause that follows justifies it in terms that repeat both the condition and the imperative." (57)

in Pindar victory and excellence come *deo volente*, and thus praise of the man is in part praise of the gods' works. As much is said at Isthmian 3.4-5:

Ζεῦ, μεγάλαι δ' ἄρεταὶ θνατοῖς ἔπονται
ἐκ σέθεν·

Therefore we will not be surprised that *χρη* occurs several lines below, in the same poem:

ζώει δὲ μάσσων ὄλβος ὀπιζομένων, πλαγίαις δὲ φρένεσσι
οὐχ ὁμῶς πάντα χρόνον θάλλων ὀμιλεῖ.

εὐκλέων δ' ἔργων ἄποινα χρη μὲν ὑμῆσαι τὸν ἐσλόν,
χρη δὲ κωμάζοντ' ἀγαναῖς χαρίτεσσι βαστάσαι. (5-8)

Two of the hallmarks of these universal instances are concision and self-containment; only a few lines of context are necessary to receive the effect.⁹⁹ I.3 is a poem of only twenty lines; this idea, that victory and moments of excellence come from the gods (notice here that it is Zeus who is named), and that therefore men should praise other men, is the main thrust of the poem. Although the context indicates that Pindar refers to himself and the speech act which is praise poetry, nevertheless the lack of expressed subject extends the necessity to all who hear these words. The poet invokes the audience explicitly at line 15 (ἴσ τε).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Bundy (56) writes that the repetition here of *χρη* is part of the dramatic effect: "The gnomic thought [that such great deeds must be praised] is subsequently brought closer to Melissos in the anaphoric *χρη* of lines 7f., and in line 9 he is introduced by name." On the function of the *χρη* motive here, the obligation which "determines the relationship between song and merit," see page 63.

¹⁰⁰ This same sort of injunction is given at N. 11.17, with the givers of the praise clearly expressed (ἀστῶν 17). On the necessity of praising one's ancestors on account of their hard work and perseverance (by which the gods were impressed), see Paian 52b.57. An instance of this type perhaps not as self-explanatory is that at Pythian 2.52:

Such examples illustrate the poet's exhortation to all citizens to join in praise of the victor, but rather more often he uses the *χρή*-statement to justify or explain the existence of the praise poem in which it occurs. Pindar often makes reference to himself in his poetry, regarding not only his relationship to the addressee of a given poem but also his function as praise poet, and a number of his *χρή*-statements in reference to himself concern that which is appropriate for one in this position rather than himself as an individual (as in, the necessity to which he refers has to do with function as poet and not with his personal life; it is transferable). As this use bears upon his status and role, I view them as similar to the "applied" *χρή* of Type I in Aeschylus in which the speaker considers something "necessary" on account of his or her position in society (cf. *Septem* 1), although I believe that here the poet means to imply that the source of the necessity for himself is the same as the source of the necessity for all to praise a given victor.

A typical example of this occurs at *Olympian* 1.103:

θεὸς ἅπαν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδεσσι τέκμαρ ἀνύεται,
θεός, ὃ καὶ πτερόεντ' αἰετὸν κίχρη, καὶ θαλασ-
σαῖον παραμείβεται
δελφίνα, καὶ ὑψιφρόνων τιν' ἔκαμψε βροτῶν,
ἑτέροισι δὲ κῦδος ἀγήραον παρέδωκ'. ἐμὲ δὲ χρεῶν
φεύγειν δάκος ἀδινὸν κακαγοριᾶν·
εἶδον γὰρ ἐκάς ἐὼν τὰ πόλλ' ἐν ἀμαχανία
ψογερόν Ἀρχίλοχον βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν
παινόμενον· (49-56)

However, notice that again, as in the previous instances, Pindar states himself as the subject of the infinitive, in the context of the (unspecified) god's omnipotence, particularly with reference to the giving of glory to men. In conjunction with other typical *χρή*-statements, as a corollary to the necessity of praise, Pindar has often remarked on the implied propriety of keeping one's mouth shut when one does not have something constructive to say. Here the order of weight between the statements is reversed: one must not blame; therefore, it is understood, one ought to praise. This is also the force behind the instance of *χρή* at *Fr.* 42.4.

ἐμὲ δε στεφανῶσαι

κεῖνον ἰππίῳ νόμῳ
 Αἰοληΐδι μολπᾷ
 χροῆ· πέποιθα δὲ ξένον
 μή τιν' ἀμφοτέρα καλῶν τε ἴδριν ἄμα καὶ δύναμιν κυριώτερον
 τῶν γε νῦν κλυταῖσι δαιδαλωσέμεν ὕμνων πτυχαῖς. (100-105)

Pindar goes on to say that “a god” (simply, θεός 106) is responsible for Hieron’s success, and he situates his own responsibility as poet as having part in the divine (109-112); indeed, the last two lines give Pindar’s aspirations for himself as poet. Another aspect of his responsibilities as praise poet is instructing others by his example; see that at *Olympian* 6.4:

Χρυσέας ὑποστάσαντες εὐτειχεῖ προθύρῳ θαλάμου
 κίονας ὡς ὅτε θαητὸν μέγαρον
 πάξομεν· ἀρχομένου δ' ἔργου πρόσωπον
 χροῆ θέμεν τηλαυγές. (1-4)

The “golden columns” to which he refers are metaphor for the poetic embellishment which will bring his own poetry attention, and thus, his subject renown; here it is χροῆ that Pindar do all he can to ensure that the victor will receive his due share of praise. That he expects others to follow his lead is evident from *ἄστῶν* (7).¹⁰¹

As in Aeschylus, so in Pindar sometimes the use of χροῆ is suitable on account of a more general context of divinity, as at *Isthmian* 8.16, where it is appropriate that one living in Thebes offer the “flower” of the Graces to Aegina (χροῆ δ' ἐν ἑπταπύλοισι Θήβαις τραφέντα / Αἰγίνα Χαρίτων ἄωτον προνέμειν) or *Nemean* 7.44 (ἐχροῆν δέ τιν'

¹⁰¹ Cf. Bundy: “Here the focus widens from a concrete simile defining the laudator’s attitude toward his subject to a gnomic generalization of that attitude... in χροῆ we observe the χροῆος motive: the laudator owes something to his subject.” (55) This type is represented faithfully enough at *O.* 6.27, *O.* 8.74, and *O.* 13.94.

ἔνδον ἄλσει παλαιάτω / Αἰακιδᾶν κρεόντων τὸ λοιπὸν ἔμμεναι / θεοῦ παρ’
 εὐτειχέα δόμον, ἥροϊαίς δὲ πομπαῖς / θεμισκόπον οἰκεῖν ἐόντα πολυθύτοις. 44-47). I
 suspect that the propriety of the latter stems from, as the poem emphasizes, the close
 relationship between Neoptolemus and Apollo. At Pythian 4.1 the poet exhorts the
 Muse to “stand next to” the victor, so that she may increase his fame (Σάμερον μὲν χορή
 σε παρ’ ἀνδρὶ φίλω / στᾶμεν... ὄφρα... αὔξης οὔρον ὕμνων 1-3).

There is one instance, in Paian 6, which Goodell,¹⁰² at least, considers of a
 different type of χορή (and indeed, somewhat closer to Type II in Aeschylus); I will
 explain my interpretation of this instance as a use of χορή consonant with the others we
 have seen in Pindar.

νέφεσσι δ’ ἐν χρυσέοις Ὀλύμπιοι-
 ο καὶ κορυφα[ῖσι]ν ἴζων
 μόρσιμ’ ἀνα[λ]ύεν Ζεὺς ὁ θεῶν σκοπὸς οὐ τόλ-
 μα· περὶ δ’ ὑψικόμῳ [Ἐ]λένα
 χοῆν ἄρα Πέργαμον εὐρὺ[ν] ἀ-
 ιστῶσαι σέλας αἰθομένου
 πυρός· (92-98)

Although a good amount of this paeon has been lost, I believe we may understand the
 context of this line well enough to compare this use of χορή to the others. What is “fated”
 in the statement prior to the χορή-statement is a reference to the lines prior, i.e. that Zeus
 could have saved Achilles a great amount of pain (πόνων 91) had he interfered with
 Apollo’s protection of Troy, but Zeus would not give Achilles an easier task than had

¹⁰² Goodell (94) says on this one, “In the new Paian 6.96... we meet χοῆν with the force of it was fated.” I assume that he thinks this on account of the content of the sentence prior to the χορή-statement.

been appointed to him. Any given historical event tempts with the translation “it is fated,” but here the statement that Troy would fall in flames is qualified by *περὶ δ’ ὑψικόμῳ [Ἐ]λένῃ* (95), which Race translates as “on account of” Helen; I see this as a reference to the breach of *xenia* on Paris’ part. If this was the poet’s intention, he writes that Troy fell on account of a breach of appropriate behavior, as a “cosmic” consequence. This use of *χρή* is not unlike that which occurs at Nemean 7.44, and although both have reference to “future” events, what is *χρή*, and the sort of penalty which will follow a breach of that which is *χρή*, is timeless even here. Notice that the poet employs the imperfect tense in both instances; at N. 7.44 it was piety, and in this paeon lack of regard for “cosmic law,” which in past time set off a predictable sequence of events. Recall that the Type II instances in the *Prometheus*, although they also refer to future time, refer to individual acts and events not predictable and not applicable to any other individual or situation.

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