The Semantics of Χρή in Aeschylus

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Classics.

Chapel Hill
2007

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Abstract

David Christian Anderson Wiltshire: The Semantics of χρή in Aeschylus
(Under the direction of Peter M. Smith)

In this thesis I examine all uses of the word χρή in the six certainly genuine plays of Aeschylus as well as in the Prometheus Bound. I argue that they fall naturally into two distinct groups: Type I, whose examples exhibit timelessly true proprieties and obligations, commonly known, and affecting all mortals equally; and Type II, which include specific truths about the future, affecting a particular, named person and known only to those with the relevant prophetic knowledge; these instances also assume a conception of the gods acting independently of (if not in fact at odds with) the source of necessity involved in the χρή-statement. Examples of Type I can be found in all seven of these plays, but Type II uses are found almost solely in the Prometheus Bound.
omnibus qui me suis exemplis sapientiam clementiamque docuerunt atque docent
Acknowledgments

If I were to name each individual to whom I am indebted for support and guidance over the course of the writing of this thesis and the work which has preceded it, I would easily double its length. Let it suffice in some poor way, then, that here I thank my advisor, Prof. Peter Smith, and his wife, Rebekah, for their warmth, attentiveness, and willingness to share their wisdom with me; my readers Prof. James O’Hara and Prof. William Race, for their faith in and patience with me and refusal to accept merely passing work; and my advisors from my years prior to Chapel Hill, Prof. Susan Wiltshire, Prof. Dan Solomon, and Dr. Kaye Warren, who inspired me with their own deep-seated love of classics and without whose careful attention and keen devotion I could not have come this far. I am grateful also to my fellow graduate students, in particular Arum Park, David Carlisle, and Christopher Polt, for kindly helping me to navigate years which would have been impossible without their leadership and friendship.
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1. Frequency of Use of Ἀνάγκη, Δεῖ, and Χρή in the Seven Plays...............................3
Introduction: Necessity in Aeschylus

The semantics of necessity in Greek literature is not a path well-trodden thus far in classical scholarship; a few publications exist, scattered here and there, which either make generalizing statements about the entire corpus of Greek literature\(^1\) or focus specifically on one author without attempting to draw distinctions between the Greek vocabulary used,\(^2\) and so I find myself, as I set out to investigate the semantic meaning and use of χρή in Aeschylus, largely without support to which I could refer my findings. Thus I have turned to the text in order to extrapolate for myself from the instances of each word a coherent understanding of the meaning and use of each; my primary tool in this study has been the texts themselves,\(^3\) although I am much indebted to and reliant upon the commentators.

Ancient Greek writers use a number of different expressions to communicate necessity or propriety: χρή, δεῖ, and ἀνάγκη, in addition to the periphrastic –τέος construction, εἰκώς, πρέπει, etc.; as all language is ultimately flexible and its users

\(^{1}\) The best of these are Goodell (1914) and Benardete (1965). I am grateful to have the work of Redard (1953) as a reference, but his interpretation of χρή and its relatives rests primarily on the evidence from Homer, and he uses these categories as prescriptive toward the instances of later authors, often without explanation; he also seems to feel pressure to read χρή in a manner complementary to his reading of χρῆσθαι (and other words; he explores the whole range of cognates). As Goodell notes, study of the etymologically related words is useful toward understanding the meaning of χρή only in the instances concerning oracular response; outside this context, the comparison is not helpful (94).

\(^{2}\) For example, that of Rosaria Munson, “Ananke in Herodotus,” *JHS* 2001, 30-50.

\(^{3}\) I cite the text of Aeschylus from Page’s 1972 OCT.
responsive and adaptive, and as all these words share the semantic field for necessity, the precise use of any given one of these words (and thus the relationship between any given two) is a consideration of the genre, time period, and author in which the word occurs. This is especially true of the relationship between δεῖ and χρή, as from Homer on these two have very marked and measurable interactions with one another. Therefore, in my examination of the meaning and use of χρή in Aeschylus I must consider the interaction of χρή with the rest, specifically δεῖ (and to a lesser extent, ἀνάγκη), so as to locate χρή within the range of semantic use by distinguishing it from the others.

First, let us discuss the frequency of the use of these words in the seven plays.4

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4 Goodell 91: “The words χρή and δεῖ, with their inflectional and dialectic variations, are less definite and stable in their semantic range than the other Greek expressions for the general ideas of necessity, obligation, or propriety. Their semantic boundaries varied with the dialect, province of literature, and period.” I will briefly discuss ἀνάγκη for the elucidation of χρή on account of the similar grammatical constructions and their character as substantives with a copulative often understood; they share the consideration of what the substantive is meant to signify.

5 I have compiled this table from the instances given in Italie; however, I do not consider all of them genuine. I will discuss Septem 1005, Agamemnon 573 and 1226, and Prometheus 606 and 970 in my appendix concerning the interpolated instances.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Persae</th>
<th>Supplices</th>
<th>Agamemnon</th>
<th>Choephoroi</th>
<th>Eumenides</th>
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What strikes an observer perhaps most readily is the relative frequency of each word—relative, that is, both to that of the other words given and in each of the works, especially considering the length of each; the nine instances total in the 1077-line \textit{Persae} pale

\[^{6}\] I will refer to the play commonly known as the \textit{Prometheus Vinctus} or Προμηθεὺς Δεσμώτης simply as the \textit{Prometheus}; I make no reference to the fragments of any other play which might have followed that play in the trilogy or which includes Prometheus and may have an Aeschylean authorship.

\[^{7}\] In the seven works taken together, there are eight total instances of \textit{χρεών}: \textit{Supplices} 502, \textit{Supplices} 980, \textit{Persae} 153, \textit{Agamemnon} 922, \textit{Choephoroi} 930, \textit{Prometheus} 772, \textit{Prometheus} 970, and \textit{Prometheus} 996. \textit{Χρεών} is in some sources listed separately from \textit{χρή}, but as the former is a participial form of the latter, and as no semantic difference between the two has been proven (or suggested, to my knowledge), I will consider forms of \textit{χρεών} to reflect the semantic meaning of \textit{χρή}, and vice-versa.
against the twenty-four in the 1673-line Agamemnon and thirty-three in the 1093-line Prometheus. The historical implications of relative frequency I will discuss below, as I discuss the relationship between δεῖ and χρή; it will suffice here to let the evidence suggest the difficulties in establishing as clear a standard of semantic meaning for ἀνάγκη and δεῖ as we can for χρή, as each occurs only twenty-five times in the seven works. Indeed I chose χρή for my discussion on account of the relative wealth of examples from which to identify Aeschylus’ use of the word.

I will briefly discuss Aeschylus’ use of ἀνάγκη here, with the intention only of illustrating the wide range of use of the word and the difficulties in coming to terms with the sum of the instances as a coherent whole. I will argue that the general source of necessity coming from uses of δεῖ is human-made law, and of χρή, cosmic or divine law, but that the source of the necessity behind a use of ἀνάγκη is physical compulsion, the threat of physical compulsion, or, explicitly, the fear of potential physical compulsion, and it is typically spoken of as a force working against the will of the speaker, with a tone of fear or regret (the other two are used with equanimity on the speaker’s part). 8 Indeed in the plural, and sometimes in the singular, ἀνάγκη means “chains” or “instruments of torture or bondage.” 9

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8 For unhappiness on account of what is ἀνάγκη, see especially the instances at Supplices 478, Persae 254 and 569, and Agamemnon 902.

A study of the use of δεῖ is more instructive for our purposes than a study of the
use of ἀνάγκη, as δεῖ and χρή share between them a more closely related sphere of
usage. We may observe the evolution of the relationship between them: δεῖ, which is
nearly absent in Homer, eventually takes on virtually all of the semantic range of χρή,
such that in Demosthenes it is used nearly five times as often as χρή; and Aristotle uses
the two interchangeably, although χρή in Aristotle has a somewhat archaic flavor; by
this time χρή had acquired a poetic charge, and its use was understood as reference to
poetic themes and genres. One may infer from such evolution that making semantic
distinctions between χρή and δεῖ is necessarily contingent upon considerations of time
and genre; therefore I will describe my findings on the use of δεῖ in Aeschylus.

Aeschylus’ choice of δεῖ over χρή at a given instance seems to be reliant upon
either a strong context of human-made law (contrasted with divine law, as we shall see
in my discussion of χρή) or the desire to use a grammatical construction appropriate to
δεῖ but not χρή. The uses of δεῖ seem to fall naturally into discrete categories based on
grammatical structure and meaning; the greatest distinction in grammatical structure
lies between those uses with a complementary infinitive and corresponding subject
accusative, etc. and those that take a genitive—not a genitive of quantity, as in πολλοῦ
δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν (Smyth § 1399) but what I will refer to as a genitive of lack (Smyth §
1400).

There are six such usages of δεῖ with a genitive in the seven plays: Agamemnon
848, Choephoroi 879, Eumenides 829, and Prometheus 86, 870, and 875 (recall that δεῖ occurs

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10 See Goodell’s article, especially 100-102.
only four times in the *Prometheus*). As to the nature of the necessity connoted by δεῖ in these instances— these six represent the range of meaning from simply stating “X is lacking toward the the doing of Y” toward “X is lacking toward the doing of Y, and both are desirable” to “X is lacking toward the doing of Y, and both are very desirable,” i.e. to the point of being, in the perspective of the speaker, necessary. That is to say, the use of δεῖ plus the genitive does not seem to commit the speaker to a certain way of feeling about the presence of X; it may be only an acknowledgment of the connection between the presence of X and its requirement toward the accomplishment of Y. On occasion this same idea is conveyed by using the accusative rather than the genitive, with the same idea of lack.\(^\text{11}\)

There are other instances of δεῖ which do not incorporate this “genitive of lack” but do associate the necessity as the requirement of the presence or occurrence of X in order for Y to occur. Oftentimes there is no emotion shown on the part of the speaker concerning this necessity; δεῖ merely communicates the logical connection between X and Y. Consider the instance at *Agamemnon* 343 (Clytemnestra to Chorus, in reference to the Greeks’ return home):

\[
\text{δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς οἴκους νοστίμου σωτηρίας,}
\text{kάμψαι διαύλου θάτερον κάλον πάλιν. (343-344)}
\]

Likewise, that at *Supplices* 765 (Danaüs to Chorus):

\[
\text{οὔτοι ταχεῖα ναυτικοῦ στρατοῦ στολῆ}
\text{οὔδ' ὅρμος, οὔ δεῖ πεισμάτων σωτήρια}
\text{ἐς γῆν ἐνεγκεῖν, οὔδ' ἐν ἀγκυρουχίαις}
\]

\(^{11}\) Smyth §1400 / 1562; this construction is rather rare. As an example, consider that at *Choephoroi* 668 (Clytemnestra to Orestes and Pylades, in greeting): ξένοι, λέγοιτ’ ἂν εἰ τι δεῖ.
Δεί here merely expresses part of what is required in the process of putting a ship safely at anchor in a harbor; I imagine that if this were part of a technical handbook on managing a ship, δεί would be just as appropriately used.

The second most obvious category for uses of δεί is the rhetorical question including the word; this use is based upon the one use of δεί in the Iliad. It is implied that such a question does not have a proper answer. The four instances of this type of δεί are at Agamemnon 567 and 598, and Eumenides 94, and 826. At Agamemnon 567, the Herald is describing to the Chorus the sufferings the Greeks experienced at Troy, when he says, “τί ταῦτα πενθεῖν δεί; παροίχεται πόνος;” He then encourages the Chorus to take heart in the fact that ultimately the Greeks prevailed. At Agamemnon 598, after Clytemnestra’s entrance into the scene, she says to the Herald, in order to preempt his going on at length, “καὶ νῦν τὰ μᾶσω μὲν τί δεί σέ μοι λέγειν; / ἀνακτὸς αὐτοῦ πάντα πεύσομαι λόγον.” At Eumenides 94, Clytemnestra’s ghost chides the sleeping Furies with the sarcastic, “εὕδοιτ’ ἄν, ὠή, καὶ καθευδουσῶν τί δεί;” as in their sleep they are useless to her; at Eumenides 826, Athena states the obvious to the Furies when she says, “κἀγὼ πέποιθα Ζηνί, καὶ τί δεί λέγειν;”

My next consideration for uses of δεί concerns the context of words and ideas in which the word for necessity occurs; this distinction of context is the most useful of the

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Note: 
12 Benardete 286: “The single instance of δεί in Homer serves to isolate a use of δεί that χρή hardly ever usurps. Achilles says, τί δὲ δεί πολεμιζέμεναι Τρώεσσιν Ἀργείους (I 337). The implicit answer is that there is no need or necessity for the Greeks to fight the Trojans. δεί, accordingly, can only be used in direct questions with τί or πῶς if the question expects a negative answer. One cannot say τί δεί λέγειν; and imply that the one addressed should tell one what to say, but it can only mean that there is no more to say.”
aspects of δεῖ for a full understanding of its distinction from χρή in Aeschylus. The necessity implied in δεῖ lies in the requirements and codes of conduct that humans set up for themselves, i.e. the necessity is no more profound than that in the laws and statutes present in human society (I don't mean to imply that these need to be codified as such). Very often explicit reference will be made to δίκη or νόμοι as the source of this necessity. An example of this is at Supplices 390 (δεῖ τοί σε φεύγειν κατὰ νόμους τοὺς οἴκοθεν); others are at Choephoroi 672, Supplices 407 and 417, and Eumenides 519 and 591.

This connection of δεῖ with νόμοι is felt rather strongly in Herodotus.  

Δεῖ is also used for the drawing of analogical conclusions; consider the following example, which also includes legal language, at Choephoroi 548, in which Orestes and the Chorus discuss Clytemnestra’s dream, as the Chorus explains the purpose behind the libations sent. Orestes then says:

κρίνω δὲ τοί νιν ὡστε συγκόλλως ἐχειν· ἐι γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν χῶρον ἐκλιπὼν ἔμοι οὐφίς. ἔπεμψα σπαργανηπλείζετο ἐκ μαστὸν ἀμφέχασκ’ ἐμὸς θρεπτήριον, ἐκρόμβῳ δ’ ἐμειξεν ἄμφως ἀμφετέρας, θανεῖν βιαίως· ἐκδρακοντωθεὶς δ’ ἐγὼ κτείνω νιν, ὡς τούνειρον ἐννέπει τόδε. (542-550)

13 Δεῖ as used to indicate the expectations of custom is apparent in 1.199.01 and 1.199.03, in which Herodotus discusses sacred prostitution among the Babylonians; concerning what it is expected of each woman to do, he writes, “ὁ δὲ δὴ αἴσχιστος τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ τοῖσι Βαβυλωνίσι ὅδε· δεῖ πᾶσαν γυναῖκα ἐπιχωρήσῃ ἰζομένην ἐς ἱρὸν Ἀφροδίτης ἁπάξ ἐν τῇ ζώῃ μιχθῆναι ἀνδρὶ ξείνῳ,” and of the man approaching her, “ἐμβαλόντα δὲ δεῖ εἰπεῖν τοσόνδε· ἐπικαλέω τοι τὴν θεὸν Μύλιττα.” The word is also used of the requirements of the Spartan cursus honorum at 1.067.05 and the propriety of seeing others naked in a given culture at 1.011.02-3.
Point by point Orestes lays out his interpretation of the dream to the Chorus, starting with κρίνω (542), followed by a series of εἰ statements leading up to the conclusion which begins with δεῖ. One might argue that Orestes is using δεῖ to express the firmness of his resolve, but in this passage he is expressing the necessity of the occurrence of future events, justified only by his interpretation of the dream. (This context of δεῖ contrasts sharply with the use of χρή, regarding the same events, at Choephoroi 930.)

Before I considering semantic categories for χρή in Aeschylus, I will briefly discuss its etymology and function. As Frisk wrote it best, concerning χρή: “alle Etymologien ganz hypothetisch sind”;

14 numerous relatives of the word exist in Greek, but little light can be shed as to its source.15 Χρή originally was a simple noun, generally considered neuter although left undelined,16 occurring often with a form of the copulative, until for the present indicative ἐστί was omitted, and outside the present indicative the two melded together in form, producing forms such as χρήν (χρή + ἦν) for the imperfect, the infinitive χρῆναι (χρή + εἶναι), and the indeclinable participle χρεών (χρή + ὄν) (Smyth § 793). It typically employs a complementary infinitive.

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14 1119.

15 “Χρή restant isolé comme nom-racine… Malgré les difficultés, le *gher- de lat. hortor, ombr. heriest « il voudra », et finalement χαίρω, etc., reste la moins mauvaise étymologie.” Chantraine 1274-1275.

16 See among others Chantraine, 1272.
Chapter I: Type I Χρή in the Supplices, Persae, Septem, Agamemnon, Choephoroi, and Eumenides

The primary objective of this thesis is the description of the word χρή as it is used in the works of Aeschylus; I have interpreted its meaning through studies of every individual instance of the word, and therefore my description will manifest itself as a case by case study of the semantic meaning using the context of each to tease out the various understandings of the word and its meanings which inform them. I have grouped the instances into two basic categories: the instances in which χρή reflects a system of what I will call cosmic law (which I will refer to as Type I), and the instances which exhibit what I will call the Promethean use (Type II); as the majority of the instances fall into the former category, in the interests of space, I will pay particular attention to the aspect of Type I χρή which each best illustrates. When I discuss the Promethean use, I will explain my interpretation of its relationship to the cosmic law use before dealing with the instances in that category.

I have collected certain instances into the Type I category based on common features from which I have hypothesized a reference to this cosmic law (which I will describe below): a) a conception of the statement as eternally true and valid (i.e. its validity is not contingent upon a specific time frame); b) a conception of the statement as true of all individuals (in some cases, all who occupy certain roles; application is not restricted to one specific individual); c) a general linking of the Olympian gods with
what is χρή, whether as agents or generally as representatives thereof; and d) the status of the content as common knowledge (not limited to the speaker who informs his audience).

Because Type I χρή-statements are timeless, applicable to a great number of people (dependent only upon the role or intersection of roles of the subject), consonant with the position of the gods in terms of world view, and commonly known, I have extrapolated my conception of what is described as χρή in these instances to be cosmic law, the universal order which reinforces the continued stability of the universe. I conceive of these “laws” as a dense spider’s web, each thread constituting a rule by which an individual must live, the sum of the threads constituting the framework, the order, by which the universe continues to function and remain secure. The individuals within it cannot behave outside what is appropriate for them without transgressing one of these rules, and the propriety to which I refer is a moral and spiritual propriety (in contrast with δεῖ laws, which are set down by man). These χρή-statements are often repeated by other Greek authors and reflect the values of the culture; however, Aeschylus, as we will see, uses differing conceptions of what is χρή as a means of distinguishing characters, both between cultures (e.g. Persian vs. Greek) and between positions within Greek culture (e.g. Orestes and Clytemnestra).

To explain some terms I will use: the clause, whether declarative or interrogative, independent or dependent, which contains the word χρή and fulfills the expected grammatical usage (e.g. complementary infinitive, etc.) I will refer to as a “χρή-statement.” The χρή-statement, for the cosmic law instances, expresses one thread of
“what is χρή”—“what is χρή” is a broad category, circumscribed by the acts described using the word, which, taken collectively, establish the boundaries of the word’s general semantic meaning. As I examine each instance of the word, I will refer both to how it helps shape my understanding of what is χρή and to how it functions dramatically as a performative speech act; this aspect, including the speaker’s intention as well as the effect it has on the addressee, I will refer to as a “χρή-act.”

First, I will discuss the breadth of application of a χρή-statement. All the Type I instances of χρή communicate codes of behavior which apply generally and are not limited to a given individual in a unique situation; some Type I χρή-statements apply equally to all, and some express obligations which are relevant only to those in a certain position or certain role. The statements which express the semantic meaning of χρή most generally (those which apply to all individuals equally, which I will refer to as “universal”) exist in pure form; as they have meaning independent of context, they are self-evident and self-contained. They provide the broadest base upon which to understand the more specific usages and set the standard from which the context of the “applied” instances are derivative.

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17 I will largely refrain from translating the word χρή (and χρή-statements) because I believe that restricting the meaning of the word to that which can be expressed concisely in English undermines my goal and presents unnecessary difficulties in explanation. When I will translate the word, however, I will not translate it “it is necessary that” or “one must” or “one ought,” etc., as these English phrases do not address the source of such necessity. Rather, I will most often translate χρή as “it is appropriate that.” I believe that what is χρή is the sum of appropriate behavior relative to one’s role in the universe and society (cosmic law), and such behavior supports the continued stability of the universe and society.
The following instance, at *Agamemnon* 928, expresses one of the most widely-quoted tenets of Greek life, from Aeschylus’ time:

καὶ τὸ μὴ κακῶς φρονεῖν
θεοῦ μέγιστον δῶρον. ὀλβίσαι δὲ χοῇ
βίον τελευτήσαντ’ ἐν εὐεστοὶ φίλῃ.
ei πάντα δ’ ὡς πράσσομι’ ἀν, εὐθαρσῆς ἐγώ. (927-930)

This sentiment, that one must not judge a man fortunate until he has continued in such fortune until his death, in its universally applicable and widely-agreed upon status, sets a strong precedent for χρή communicating that which is universal in Greek thought—the presence of this idea in numerous places elsewhere in Greek literature speaks to Aeschylus’ and his culture’s acceptance of it as universal and timeless.\(^{18}\) Clytemnestra has just referred to the Greeks, “with deliberate malice,” as “blessed” (Thomson 32); with these lines Agamemnon rejects the epithet. This instance and the next are based upon the traditional view that the gods are jealous of any mortal who claims or seems to achieve more than what is appropriate; thus χρή here is virtually defined as humility for mortals before God, and the absence of subject for the infinitive underlines the lack of specification. The word is used here to express the position of mortal men vis-à-vis the gods; for more explicit examples of this, see the section below (page 44).

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\(^{18}\) For a selection of these instances, see Radermacher, *Gnomon* XIV 1938, 296. The most memorable instance of this idea is, of course, at Herodotus 1.32.7: εἰ δέ πρὸς τούτοις ἐτί τελευτήσει τὸν βίον εὗ, οὕτως ἐκεῖνος τὸν σὺ ζητέεις, ὁ ὀλβίος κεκλήθηκαι ἀξίως ἐστιν, πρὶν δ’ ἀν τελευτήσῃ, ἐπισχεῖν μηδὲ καλέειν κω ὀλβιόν ἀλλ’ εὐτυχέα; Radermacher emphasizes the difference between “rich” (εὐδαίμων) and “blessed” (ὀλβίος). Fraenkel gives another instance in which both χρή and ὀλβίσαι appear: a fragment of Sophocles (588 N. = 646 P.), “οὐ χρή ποτ’ εὖ πράσσοντος ὀλβίσαι τύχας ἀνδρός, πρὶν αὐτῷ παντελῶς ἤδη βίος διεκπεραθῇ καὶ τελευτήσῃ βίον.” (Radt conjectures δρόμον as the final word in this sentence.)
Another example of the use of universal χρή-statements instructing humility on the part of men occurs at *Persae* 820:

τόσος γὰρ ἔσται πέλανος αἰματοσφαγής
πρὸς γῆ Πλαταιών Δωρίδος λόγχης ὑπὸ:
θίνες νεκρῶν δὲ καὶ τριτσπόρῳ γονῆ
ἀφώνα σημανοῦσιν ὄμμασιν βροτῶν
ὡς οὐχ ὑπέφευ θνητὸν ὀντα χρῆ φρονεῖν·
ὑβρίς γὰρ ἐξανθοῦς᾽ ἐκάρπωσεν στάχυν ἄτης, ὅθεν πάγκλαυτον ἐξαμᾶθε" ψύχος. (816-822)

In this instance, the appropriate behavior for mortals relative to the universe is characterized as the opposite of behavior which leads to chaos, ἄτη, ὑβρίς, etc. Again the subject of the infinitive is left unstated, as this statement applies to all mortals equally.\(^{19}\) According to Darius in this passage, man’s humility is a primary aspect of his relationship to the universe; as a transgression of what is χρή involves some upsetting of the order of the universe, it will have repercussions, and Darius precedes his χρή-statement with a gruesome description of the devastation caused by his son’s refusal to abide by this knowledge. The effects of the transgression he takes to be a reminder to future generations: thus he characterizes the law broken as timeless, universally applicable and unchanging over the passage of time.

The previous examples provide an understanding of cosmic law χρή as signifying universal order and χρή-statements as communicating how best all mortals may behave in accordance with it; now I will move on to discuss other aspects, all of which inform each instance individually, some more obviously than others. In the

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\(^{19}\) We see this statement again, with χρή, at the end of Sophocles’ *Tereus* (θνητὴν δὲ φύσιν χρῆ θνητὰ φρονεῖν, Fr. 531 Nauck / 590 Radt).
following sections I will discuss a) the universal sentiment expressed with χρή as applied to individuals in specific situations, b) the relevance of the χρή-act to an understanding of the semantic meaning of the word, especially as it informs and describes the relationship between the speaker and addressee, and c) the function of the gods as agents or representatives of what is χρή. A discussion of the following instance, at Supplices 724, provides an excellent introduction to these questions, as it is an example of universally applicable χρή, the use of χρή as an imperative speech act relating Danaüs to his daughters, as he is in a position of authority giving advice, and the close relationship between the reverence of the gods and what is χρή.

ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχως χρὴ καὶ σεσωφρονισμένως πρὸς πράγματ' ὁρώσας τῶνδε μὴ ἀμελεῖν θεῶν· ἐγὼ δὲ ἀρωγοὺς ξυνδίκους θ' ἥξω λαβών. (724–726)

The idea that one must take thought and not neglect the gods is a part of the universal order; however, the circumstances prompting the χρή-statement show up within the statement itself (πρὸς πράγματ' ὁρώσας) and remind the audience of the immediate circumstances, thus rendering the context of this statement not precisely the same as that of those discussed above. In these lines there is no tension between the characterization of the gods and what is χρή; the one reinforces the other.

Danaüs instructs his daughters as a χρή-act on how best to behave according to their role vis-à-vis the universe, in order to achieve the best outcome. Danaüs adopts the stance of one who, being older and more experienced, can give such advice to others;

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20 The nature of my topic and method contributes, I think, to some measure of unnecessary or unwanted repetition as I reiterate my findings. In the sections that follow, I discuss together the instances which illustrate each of these aspects best so as to limit repetition as much as possible.
although there is no second-person subject expressed for the infinitive, the emphatic “I” at the beginning of the next line implies a contrast; Danaüs is distinguishing himself from his daughters’ ignorance. Most Type I χρή-statements are directed by the speaker to one of a lower status than himself—this is to be expected, in that the laws which constitute Type I χρή are self-evident, and giving voice to them, informing another of them, requires the presumption on the part of the speaker that his audience is less knowledgeable than he. (Χρή is by nature appropriate behavior, so using the word in giving advice regarding correct behavior is apt, and such an example as this can perhaps be thought to set the rule.) I will later compare this power dynamic between speaker and addressee to that at *Persae* 219 and 527 in which Atossa and the Chorus give each other similar advice. The difference between this instance in the *Supplices* and those in the *Persae* is that the qualifications by which Atossa and the Chorus give each other advice are political position and status as counsel, respectively; here a father counsels his daughters, and if he is somewhat patronizing, we are scarcely surprised.\(^{21}\) The advice is impersonal; it is not meant to comfort.\(^{22}\)

This instance illustrates another of the major features of the Type I, cosmic law χρή-statement: its function of describing, expressing, or affecting the relationship between the speaker and addressee. The use of χρή by the speaker is very rarely merely

\(^{21}\) For an instance of χρή which occurs in a maxim, yet is between two individuals of the same status (in which the absent subject of the infinitive is surely “we”), see that at *Agamemnon* 1368 (σάφ᾽ εἰδότας χρὴ τῶνδε μυθεῖσθαι πέρι, / τὸ γὰρ τοπάζειν τοῦ σάφ᾽ εἰδέναι δίχα. 1368-1369); that Thomson quotes a very similar line from Demosthenes using δεῖ (50.48: δεῖ γὰρ σε ἀκούσαντα ὀρθῶς βουλεύσασθαι). I take as evidence of the influence of epic (on epic vocabulary here, see Fraenkel 641) or the influence of the maxim quality of the χρή-statement.

\(^{22}\) Johansen and Whittle, 83.
descriptive of the world around him, but rather it is more often than not an imperative speech act directed at the addressee. Since what χρή represents is timeless, universal, and considered self-evident, χρή statements, while instructive, do not communicate new knowledge. As this is the case, it is all the more important to ask oneself when investigating instances of the word why a character should choose to make such a statement, what the character seeks to effect by its use, and what sort of commentary the existence of a χρή-statement in an exchange provides regarding the relationship of the speaker and addressee. For what is necessary and sufficiently agreed-upon as such among parties will not be stated; the statement (the act thereof) of what is “necessary” calls into question such necessity or indicates a difference in perspective and values between speaker and addressee.23

In Aeschylus, a character does not use χρή to strengthen a declarative statement into a first-person imperative concerning what he or she feels to be important behavior for him/herself;24 the word is used with imperative force only to refer to the action of another character which the speaker feels to be necessary. When a character uses χρή in the first person, he or she already acquiesces enough in the validity of the force of χρή to be in the process of carrying out the action described as χρή (cf. the instance at Septem 1). In χρή-statements in which χρή is instructive, the reader is given a glimpse of the power dynamic between the speaker and addressee, information not to be ignored in the

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23 Cf. Lyons (809): “The very fact of introducing ‘must’, ‘necessarily’, ‘certainly’, etc., into the utterance has the effect of making our commitment to the factuality of the proposition explicitly dependent upon our perhaps limited knowledge. There is no epistemically stronger statement than a categorical assertion.”

24 The one exception might be Eumenides 1003; see discussion on that instance below (page 50).
interpretation of a given passage. However, although the power dynamic remains clear and stable, the word is not used only by a character with authority over another; on occasion the word is used in indirect question from a person of lower status to the higher, as a request for advice as to what is appropriate behavior; also χρή is used in statements in which a person of equal status gives strong (although polite) advice to another of equal status. However, the use of a χρή-statement necessarily brings tension / attention to the power dynamic between them, as the characters themselves are acknowledging it by their speech. The most basic form of the χρή-act manifests itself as one character politely or impolitely instructing another from a position of authority.

To begin our investigation of the function of χρή-statements as speech acts, we will examine the instance at Supplices 176, in which Danaüs comforts his daughters by advising proper behavior.

\[
\text{παίδες, φρονεῖν χρή· ξύν φρονούντι δ' ἢκετε πιστῷ γέροντι τῷδε ναυκλήρῳ πατρί. καὶ τάπι χέρσου νῦν προμηθίαν λαβὼν αἰνῶ φυλάξαι τἄμ' ἔπη δελτουμένας. (176-179)}
\]

We can compare this instance to that at Supplices 724, discussed above, as the speaker and addressees are the same. As a χρή-act line 176 functions as an imperative, and at the same time Danaüs is using χρή here to describe exactly what it is he is already doing.

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25 Again, these means of interpreting each instance are not confined to any subset of the whole; if we reconsider the two instances discussed above, Agamemnon 928 and Persae 820, we see that in the former, Agamemnon is chiding Clytemnestra for her inappropriate comments, and as he is her king and husband in a society in which this relationship makes him a figure of authority, this is a typical use; in the latter, Darius is advising the Chorus, commenting on the human relationship to the divine as he has been summoned to do—appropriate not only because he has a knowledge of it unique among the characters present, but also because he is the deceased king, and this relationship of power that he has with his advisors is that which he had while alive, and it has endured past his death.
(φρονοῦντι): he sets himself as an example of doing what is χρή as not only their father but an older, wiser figure, someone who by experience has a better knowledge of what is χρή.26 Ultimately he means, “it is appropriate to φρονεῖν: for you as well, by my example.” (That reference to himself, with the participle, might also be a form of self-flattery.) He goes on to give instructions on how to receive the people of Argos meekly and appropriately.

On φρονεῖν: Pope argues that in the later 5th century this word used absolutely could imply being wise, but the question which concerns us is how Aeschylus used the word absolutely; it occurs 28 times in Aeschylus, usually with a qualifying word (such as an adverb), to mean “to be disposed or minded in a certain way,” the “way” given by the qualifying word. In nine passages, however, it is used absolutely.27 “The concept which would seem to explain all these occurrences is that of using one’s faculties as a grown-up human being,” he writes, and thus the word means “exercising one’s full

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26 Ryzman, in fact, makes the compelling argument that not only are the Danaids completely dependent upon their father for counsel, but he has raised them as such. She points out numerous instances in which the daughters defer to their father’s judgment (even above Pelagus’!), and one of these is at Supplices 971, in which the girls say that they will trust only their father’s advice on where it is χρή that they live, even after Pelagus has offered safe haven (and he is confused by their response). Although she does not refer to the use or importance of χρή here, her statement, “[the Danaids’] inability to detach themselves and become individuals who can make their own decisions has most disturbing implications and consequences,” is well illustrated by the respective uses of χρή within this tragedy. (3-4) This is relevant to my argument in that this characterization of the Danaids is consistently borne out by the uses of χρή in this play; even with their own remarks, the Danaids position themselves on the lower end of the power differential implied with the use of a χρή-statement.

27 At Septem 807, it is used to mean “being rational and avoiding panic;” Pope (108) thinks this is also the force of the word in two of its occurrences at the beginning of the Supplices (176, 204). At Eumenides 115, it means “to wake up and be alert.” At Choephoroi 517, it is “a synonym for being alive.” At Fr. 677 (Mette) and Agamemnon 176, he says, it is “used for what men do or may do.”
adult faculties.” (108-109) He presents *Choephoroi* 753 to support his argument that these are adult faculties (i.e. infants do not have them).28

Pope’s article is on the interpretation of *Agamemnon* 176, and ultimately his argument is that since φρονεῖν is not used absolutely in Aeschylus to mean “to be wise,” it does not do so in that instance. For my purposes, then, it follows that it also does not mean “to be wise” at *Supplices* 176. At any rate, χρή here functions as advice with the force of an imperative, and it is nonsensical for one to command another to “be wise.” The reference of φρονεῖν to adult human faculties supports the tone and use at *Supplices* 176 in that the Danaids’ father is exhorting them to do what he does, as an older member of society, and in the same passage he refers to himself with the participle of the verb.

What is χρή in the Type I use is expected, appropriate behavior; when an individual uses it in giving advice, he does not ask more of the addressee than what is obviously possible in present time.

Before I discuss the use of χρή in direct questions, I must address the relationship between its use and that of δεῖ in Homer, which exerts pressure upon later authors’ use of the word in questions to such an extent that thereafter the use of δεῖ renders a question rhetorical. Conversely, then, a question using χρή should not be a rhetorical question (although they do exist, they are very rare), and when the use of χρή

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28 He cites Sophocles’ *Ajax* 554-555 and likens it to *Prometheus* 443-444 and 447-450 in order to show that the word does not simply mean a capacity for reasoning but also that for appreciating sorrow and joy, but neither of these, he neglects to note, has any bearing on the meaning in Aeschylus.
appears to be rhetorical, we would do well to inquire as to why the author chose χρή over δεῖ.

\begin{quote}

τί σοι λέγειν χρὴ τοὔνομ’; ἐν χρόνω μαθὼν
εἰσὶ σὺ τ’ αὐτός χοί ξυνέμποροι σέθεν.
ταύτας δ’ ἐκούσας μὲν κατ’ εὔνοιαν φρενῶν
ἄγοις ἄν, εἶπερ εὐσεβής πίθοι λόγος. (938-941)
\end{quote}

Consideration of the χρή-act’s exposure of the relationship between speaker and addressee is again useful for the interpretation of the χρή-statement at Supplices 938.

This passage is part of a verbal sparring match between the king of Argos and the herald of the Egyptians, who has come in order to bring back the daughters of Danaüs. The tone of this question is most telling: the herald in this exchange is proud, and he refuses to pay due respect to the ruler of the land into which he has come; the king of Argos is understandably indignant, and he reprimands the herald for the violence in his words and his lack of decorum (lines 912-915; 917). The herald displays a lack of concern toward the gods of Hellas, and the customs respected by the gods (line 917); he threatens to tear the Danaids away from the gods’ sanctuary, and for this also the king rebukes him (line 927). In short, the herald shows himself before the king of Argos to be someone who renders himself worthy of no respect. In the speech leading up to this reply on the part of the king, the herald asked for the king’s identity, ostensibly so that he might have better information for his own leaders; he phrases this request in terms of his duty and position (καὶ γὰρ πρέπει κήρυκ’ ἀπαγγέλλειν τορῶς / ἐκαστα, lines 931-932), but then threatens the king with retribution in the form of war. Therefore it is quite appropriate for the king to reply with τί σοι λέγειν χρὴ τοὔνομ’;—
the herald has justified his question (and his reasons for expecting an answer) in terms of what is appropriate for him, the herald, in his position, but he follows that by making an absurdly inappropriate (to his station) threat of war, to close an exchange in which he himself has behaved quite inappropriately, not only in terms of social graces, but also in terms of the humility appropriate before the divine. The king then replies here with, “How is it χρή, again, that I tell you my name?” i.e. “How am I obliged in order to treat you in the way that I should according to cosmic law, to tell you my name [considering the way you have acted toward me, and have not yourself done what was χρή]?” The force of context adequately explains the nature of χρή here as consonant with the others of Type I.

Next we shall examine a few χρή-statements whose speaker and addressee are of the same social status, beginning with that at Persae 219:

ου σε βουλόμεσθα, μήτερ, οὔτ᾽ ἀγαν φοβεῖν λόγοις οὔτε θαρσύνειν· θεούς δὲ προστροπαῖς ικνομένη, εἰ τοῖς φλαύροις εἰδες, αἰτοῦ τῶν ἄπωτοττην τελείου, τὰ δ᾽ ἄγαθ᾽ ἐκεῖλῇ γενέσθαι σοι τε καὶ τέκνῳ σέθεν καὶ πόλει φίλως τε πᾶσιν, δέντερον δὲ χρή χοὰς γῆ τε καὶ φθιτοῖς χέασθαι. πρευμενῶς δ᾽ αἰτοῦ τάδε, σόν τόσιν Δαρείου, ὄντερ φής ἱδίειν κατ᾽ εὐφρόνην, ἐσθλά σοι πέμπειν τέκνῳ τε γῆς ἔνερθεν ἐς φάος, τάμπαλιν δὲ τῶνδε γαίας κάτοχα μαυρούσθαι σκότῳ. (215-223)

In these lines, the Chorus of Persian elders advise Atossa on what she personally ought to do next as both parties wait for news. That this χρή-statement has imperative force is evident from the imperatives which surround it in this speech, although this instance, along with the one given below, occurs in an exchange between two parties who conceive of each other, during this exchange, as equals. This is an example of a character
in Aeschylus adopting the stance typical to the Type I χρή usages, i.e. of one of greater authority or experience, even when it does not reflect the power dynamic between them, in order to communicate the gravity of the advice given (it is otherwise meant politely; they show their respect with such terms as μῆτερ, at line 215). We know this using the other instances of χρή as points of reference, and we know also, having considered the references to divinity at other instances, that the addition of χρή to the phrase is natural, since in these lines Atossa receives advice on how she might best comport herself so as to “win” the favor of the cosmos (and here, the gods are represented as agents controlling the cosmos, as she is instructed to supplicate (line 216) and ask favor from them). The language itself, too, is that of religious supplication (ἱκνουμένη 216). The parallel structure and continuous context put the χρή-statement on the same level with the imperative statements around it, and the appearance of the word χρή boosts the tone of humility, reference to Atossa’s relationship to the gods; here the χρή-statement has the same force as αἰτοῦ.

The next example occurs not in Atossa’s direct response but several hundred lines later:

δομώς δ’, ἐπειδὴ τῇδ’ ἐκύρωσεν φάτις ύμῶν, θεοῖς μὲν πρῶτον εὐξασθαι θέλω, ἐπείτα γῆ τε και φθιτοῖς δωρήματα ἥξω λαβοῦσα πέλανον ἐξ οἴκων ἑμῶν, ἐπίσταμαι μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ ἐξειργασμένοις, ἀλλ’ ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν εἰ τι δὴ λῷον πέλοι. ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ ’πὶ τοῖσδε τοῖς πεπραγμένοις πιστοίσι πιστὰ ξυμφέρειν βουλεύματα. (521-528)
Atossa rephrases the Chorus’ advice to her from lines 215-221 (ἐὔξασθαι θεοῖς, Γῇ τε καὶ φθιτοῖς, etc.) using the first person, thereby showing that she acquiesces in the validity of their request; she adds a χρή-statement and imperatives (παρηγορεῖτε, προσέμπετ’ 530) of her own to indicate that which she believes it is best that the Chorus do. It is this couching of the χρή-statement among imperatives on both sides that demonstrates that Atossa and the Chorus consider themselves to be on equal terms. In this speech, Atossa agrees to follow the Chorus’ advice from lines 215-221; she does so when she raises the ghost of Darius (619-622). Atossa charges the Chorus to escort Xerxes at 530, and finally, at line 1076, their words indicate that they had planned to acquiesce. Not only does one party act with authority to advise the other but the addressee acquiesces by agreeing to do (and by doing) what is desired.

A figure in authority uses a χρή-statement to refer to advice also at Supplices 519, where Pelasgus speaks to the Chorus of Danaids regarding their father:

ἐγώ δὲ λαοὺς συγκαλῶν ἐγχωρίους στείχω, τὸ κοινόν ὡς ἀν εὔμενες τιθώ· καὶ σὸν διδάξω πατέρα ποία χρή λέγειν. πρὸς ταῦτα μίμνε καὶ θεοὺς ἐγχωρίους λιταῖς παραιτοῦ τῶν σ’ ἔρως ἔχει τυχεῖν. (517- 521)

This is an excellent example of one character in a position of authority informing another of what is χρή based on a supposed greater knowledge thereof. The object of διδάξω (519) is Danaüs, and it is surrounded by imperatives to the daughters; thus Pelasgus affirms that both the father and daughters are under his influence. They have come
seeking help from the people in Argos, and it is the right and position of Pelasgus, as the Argive king, to address his supplicants from a position of authority.  

This instance also illustrates a conception of the gods as representing what is χρή; there is a parallel here between Pelasgus’ advice for Danaüs (albeit reported indirectly) and that for the Danaids (and consider that they occupy the same space vis-à-vis Pelasgus and the Argives): one χρή-statement followed by imperatives urging the daughters to supplicate the gods. I take this emphasis on the gods to inform the use of χρή here.

At Agamemnon 1658 Clytemnestra breaks into the circular argument between the Chorus and Aegisthus at the end of the Agamemnon. The brevity and final position of the χρή-statement in this instance serve to strengthen its function as a χρή-act; Clytemnestra means to end the quarrel (and she does, with her next utterance, at lines 1672-1673; she also ends the play). The meaning behind the statement is straightforward: she and Aegisthus did what they had to do. However, Clytemnestra uses the overtones of

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29 What does Pelasgus consider the content of ποῖα χρὴ λέγειν to be (as he evidently has something concrete in mind)? Danaüs would not present his case in toto to the citizens; it is more likely that the king of Argos would do most of the talking, with Danaüs presenting a pitiful figure, supplicating not only their king but the Argive citizens as well. Therefore the primary relationship Danaüs and his daughters have to the people in this place is one of humility and supplication.

30 This passage has been reconstructed and construed from a damaged manuscript tradition. For a description of the manuscript difficulties, see Fraenkel 794.
cosmic importance and her new position as queen now without a king (by far the most powerful individual in the scene) to end the discussion. The χρή-act here functions as part of her taking control of the situation, even if the content of the statement on its surface is descriptive.

What is χρή here is what is appropriate for a given person given his or her location within society, especially within the family. Clytemnestra’s primary motivation in the murder of her husband was retribution for his murder of their daughter Iphigenia; therefore, when she refers to what is χρή for herself, she refers to that which is appropriate action for the mother of a murdered daughter. One might argue that Clytemnestra’s murder of Agamemnon is directly opposed to the idea that what is χρή serves to uphold universal order, but from her perspective this act brings the sequence of events full circle to a restoration of balance. As is evident elsewhere, Clytemnestra’s idea of what is χρή differs a great deal from what another character might regard as what is χρή (see especially Choephoroi 930); this difference, and Clytemnestra’s prior adopting of “standard” ideas of what is χρή as she dissembles earlier in the play, is evidence of Aeschylus’ masterful characterization of her through his manipulation of the use of the word.

31 And Clytemnestra certainly feels that what was χρή for her to do can be reconciled with a greater order; see her speech at 1566-1576.

32 One may choose to translate this instance as “we did what was fated” rather than “we did what was necessary”; then, however, one must answer why a given series of events was fated, what events in past time naturally forced these actions in present time. Such questions get at the source of the necessity, which is still the cosmic order of things.
Regarding this type of χρή-statement, an individual is only individual in Aeschylus insofar as he exists at the intersection of a number of discrete identities, and any given individual with the same roles and responsibilities would be subject to the same “rules.” So for example when at Choephoroi 907 Orestes says to Clytemnestra, “Sleep with [Aegisthus] in death, since you love him; but you hate the one it was χρή for you to love,” he refers to her transgression only in the context of a wife toward a husband; loving Agamemnon was χρή for her because she was his wife, and the necessity behind χρή applies to all wives equally.

The majority of Type I instances demonstrate the application of the universal sort of cosmic law to a given individual in a given situation; the basic meaning is not distinct from that in the universal category, but the context is more particular. These “applied” χρή-statements refer to the same set of laws concerning universal order; however, what is expected of an individual in order to conform with what is χρή in these instances is a reflection of that person’s own place in the world at the intersection of various identities. Each individual within a society has a different set of responsibilities and is subject to different expectations depending upon his or her class, history, profession, and position within the family unit; therefore some rules pertain to some individuals which have no bearing on others. Although a certain individual’s set of roles and responsibilities is not often repeated in a population, it is certainly not unique; as what is χρή for a person arises out of these roles, there is no personal, non-transferable χρή. I will begin this
Eteocles gives in the first χρή-statement what is appropriate for him, as ruler, to do in such a situation; in the χρή-statement in line 10, he describes what is appropriate for the citizens surrounding him, thus foreshadowing the contrast he will make throughout the play of his own allegiance to what he considers possible by human means and the Chorus’ blind insistence on seeking recourse and protection from the divine. Eteocles does not outright disparage the capability of the divine element to protect his city, but he “generally adopts an attitude like ‘Heaven helps those who help themselves!’ ” (Dawson 29-30). Thus he does not say anything that indicates that he thinks the Chorus’ supplication will bring material or measurable aid on the war front (note how, at lines 5ff., Eteocles states that he alone will be blamed should things not turn out well).³³ The

χρή at line 10 is a statement of what he feels is appropriate for the Chorus: it is respectful of the situation that those unable to fight supplicate the gods,\textsuperscript{34} even if he himself does not believe such action will effect anything material to his benefit (since lines 5-6 refer to the assigning of blame after the fact, I interpret line 4 as assigning praise in like manner). The two uses of χρή here—“in this situation, it is my duty to do x, and yours to do y”—are instructive for the characterization of Eteocles and indicate priorities which he will restate throughout the play. In describing those priorities, as Dawson notes (32), the order of πόλει and βωμοῖσι (lines 14-15) is important.

Thus these two instances are uses of χρή which describe what is appropriate for individuals based on their positions within society.\textsuperscript{35} Of course, this passage also reflects other aspects of Type I uses of the word: Eteocles’ advice to his citizens is a speech act from his position of authority, and that advice represents human supplication to the gods as χρή.

Action appropriate on account of relative position appears again at Persae 153:

\begin{verbatim}
ἀλλ' ἥδε θεῶν ἴσον ὀφθαλμοῖς
φάος ὁρμᾶτι μήτηρ βασιλέως,
βασίλεια δ' ἐμή· προσπίτνω·
καὶ προσφθόγγοις δὲ χρεὼν αὐτὴν
πάντας μύθοισι προσαυδᾶν.  (150-154)
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{34} See Rose (162-163) on the the constituency of Eteocles’ audience: he conceives that, based on the way Eteocles addresses those listening to his speech, these citizens represent three groups—the young, the old, and those of military age, but we must assume that this last group is participating in battle. Cf. the priest’s speech at the beginning of Sophocles’ OT.

\textsuperscript{35} Cf. Lupaş-Petre (7): “Le premier discours d’Étéocle définit d’emblée le rôle qui revient au roi dans la défense de la cité.”
We have seen the Chorus and Atossa negotiating the power dynamic of their relationship in previous examples; the elders here, at *Persae* 153, although they show a great deal of reverence at the queen’s entrance, do not relate themselves specifically to her in terms of power with this χρή-statement (debase themselves); they state what is expected of all (πάντας 154): it is χρή, they say, that she be welcomed according to her status, and this is χρή because all are subject to her, in accordance with their position in society. This instance may even be interpreted as a third-person imperative to those present.

In order to appreciate Aeschylus’ mastery of characterization not only of individuals but of whole cultures, it is important to note that the Chorus’ language openly reveals their association of her with divinity (not only in this passage, but following: the wife and mother of gods, line 157); Aeschylus is depicting a culture whose members believed Darius had experienced apotheosis at death (and consistent with his portrayal in the conjuring of his divinity, and the prayers offered to him). In this passage, the Chorus treats Atossa (and to all appearances, they genuinely feel it) as though she were herself divine. Such usage is exactly parallel to the usages I will discuss in the next section, those instances of Type I χρή which situate the gods as “placeholders” or representatives of what is χρή. Compare the instances of Type I χρή in which Clytemnestra is the speaker: in these χρή represents not merely cosmic law, but necessity according to the perspective of the one making the statement. We can read the values of the speaker through what he or she calls χρή.

An analogy of humans to gods with a use of χρή occurs at *Supplices* 980:
ὦ παίδες, Ἀργείοισιν εὐχεσθαι χρεών,
θύειν τε λείβειν θ’, ὡς θεοῖς Ολυμπίοις,
σπονδάς, ἐπεὶ σωτῆρες οὐ διχορρόπως.   (980-982)

Danaüs speaks to the Chorus of his daughters, after the king of Argos has promised his protection of them; he compares the status of the Argives as “saviors” to that of the gods, and thus by analogy his χρή-statement (which usually concerns behavior toward a divinity) indicates an appropriate course of action toward the Argives (it is not only the appearance of χρεών which has a sort of jarring effect, when used of action toward humans; the actions are named: offering prayers, sacrificing, offering libations). It is an analogy especially complimentary of the Argives, but more revealing of Aeschylus’ characterization of Egyptian culture.

At various points throughout the corpus we see χρή-statements in which the sense of χρή is tailored to the social position or occupation of the person indicated. An example of this occurs at Septem 1005, in which the herald claims that it is χρή for him to announce information; however, as that instance is likely interpolated, we may turn to that at Septem 717, in which Eteocles argues with the Chorus, giving the priorities of a soldier:

Chorus: νίκην γε μέντοι καὶ κακὴν τιμᾷ θεός.
Eteocles: οὐκ ἄνδρ᾽ ὁπλίτην τοῦτο χρὴ στέργειν ἔπος. (716-717)

“It is not appropriate for a soldier-hero (in such capacity) to esteem that sentiment.”

Here Eteocles expresses that which is χρή for a rather narrowly defined group of people, fully aware that it contradicts the Chorus’ opinion. We have seen characters create tension between outlooks using χρή-statements before; Eteocles in this passage has
already displayed his disdain for the Chorus members, who would rather he not go to battle; he attempts to counter them with misogyny and condescension. Of course Aeschylus is aware that cosmic law is not always self-evident to various characters with differing goals and histories—that it is open to interpretation, depending on one’s values (the values of a culture are not monolithic, and only have such status as culture-values because they are to various high degrees agreed upon by the members of a culture). In this example the reader is presented with a conflict between two opinions of what is necessary—the Chorus expresses their opinion using the singular, undefined, and unspecified “god” as the arbiter of this, but their conception of the source of this necessity is the same as that of Eteocles in his response with χρή. (That he responds on their terms, with a differing opinion of the same type of sentiment, and uses the word χρή, is evidence of this.)

With this in mind, we may refer back to the characterization of Clytemnestra using her χρή-statements. The individual whose views of what is χρή differ most radically, and most provocatively, from the consensus of the others’ views is Clytemnestra in the Agamemnon; not only does she express views of what is χρή which are sometimes in direct conflict with others’ views, but she also herself makes χρή-statements whose values are mutually contradictory. She does this in the process of manipulating her addressee and concealing her real motives (Agamemnon 879, below; 36

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36 I do not mean to dwell at length on this, but it is not without merit to recognize that those individuals in this culture who make statements based on their view of cosmic law which are at odds with others’ views tend to be female, and their views tend to be ignored (by a society that does not privilege their opinion). It is also worthwhile to remember that the codes of behavior which support the stability of the universe are subjective, and they vary most obviously from culture to culture—but also, from subculture to subculture, individual to individual.
33); she is not incapable of catering to someone else’s perspective on what is χρή. She is also not incapable of sarcasm with a genuine use of χρή (1556, below), a statement which shows her own self-awareness when it comes to use of the word and a high sensitivity to the values which underlie typical χρή-statements. Once she has killed Agamemnon and has no further use for dissembling, she reveals her own perspective on what is cosmically appropriate (1419, below; 1658).

As an example of Clytemnestra’s awareness of the priorities and views of χρή of those around her, consider her use at line 879:

τοιῶνδ᾽ ἔκατι κληρόνων παλιγκότων
πολλὰς ἄνωθεν ἀρτάνας ἐμῆς δέρης
ἐλυσαν ἄλλοι πρὸς βίαν λελημένης.
ἐκ τῶνδέ τοι παῖς ἐνθάδ᾽ οὐ παραστατεῖ,
ἐμῶν τε καὶ σῶν κύριος πιστωμάτων,
ὡς χρήν, Ὀρέστης; μηδὲ θαυμάσῃς τόδε. (874-879)

Clytemnestra uses χρή here because she is aware that Orestes’ presence at the homecoming of his father would be very much χρή in Agamemnon’s opinion. That she fills this speech with deceit needs no further proof here; her voicing of the word χρή only adds to the evidence, in that by its use she pretends to share Agamemnon’s values. She has already done this at line 342, when speaking to the Chorus; see below on page 49.37

The construction here, “as was appropriate,” is further proof of Type I χρή as predictable and transferable: the phrase implies that there is a broad base of reference as

37 Whether the action described as χρή was actually undertaken has no bearing on its propriety; Orestes was not there, but his presence was nevertheless appropriate. The necessity behind χρή is valid whether individuals observe it or not. Cf. Smyth § 1777: “The Greek usage simply states the obligation (propriety, possibility) as a fact which existed in the past (and may continue to exist in the present.”
to what is χρή on which she makes this statement. (It is no coincidence that Clytemnestra is the only character in Aeschylus to use χρή falsely AND to use a construction which implies that what is χρή is only a matter of general consensus; she has a heightened awareness that this is the case.) She will use the construction again at line 1556:

καὶ καταθάψομεν,
οὐχ ὑπὸ κλαυθμῶν τῶν ἐκ οἴκων,
ἀλλὰ Ἶφιγένειά νιν ἀσπασίως
θυγάτηρ, ὡς χρή,
πατέρ᾽ ἀντιάσασα πρὸς ὠκύπορον
πόρθμευμ᾽ ἄχεων
περὶ χεῖρε βαλοῦσα φιλήσει. (1553-1559)

Here Clytemnestra uses χρή with sarcasm; she makes a χρή-statement which both she and, she expects, her audience feel to be a total perversion of what is χρή. That her tone is sarcastic here is obvious both from content, i.e. the reversal of roles, that a daughter should be welcomed by her father (Fraenkel 735-736), and her wording: θυγάτηρ at the beginning of 1556, and πατέρ᾽ at the beginning of 1557 is meant to be jarring. I include the instances at line 879 and line 1556 in the section on the expectations of a person in a given station or familial position, since the previous instance concerned father and son, and this one father and daughter; here χρή is meant to refer to appropriate behavior in familial relationships.

After Clytemnestra has murdered Agamemnon, she has no further need to conceal her true feelings as to what constitutes appropriate behavior in fear of giving herself away. At Agamemnon 1419, she chastises the Chorus for not doing what was appropriate, to her mind (and values):
Here Clytemnestra refers to that which is χρή according to her own world view: since Agamemnon slaughtered his own daughter, he should have been driven out of the land. The two instances in which we see Clytemnestra’s perspective through χρή-statements are here and at Agamemnon 1658 (above).

This statement also makes reference to the relationship between the speaker and the addressee; by the use of χρή with such a tone Clytemnestra takes the position of one of greater authority (as she is queen) informing those below her of what is χρή. The Chorus here is of advisers, but she exerts her authority over them (1420-1425). Fraenkel presents examples of λέγω δέ σοι and variants in which the speaker intends these words to sound harsh and to have a profound effect on the addressee and audience; the words also introduce statements in which the speaker appropriates power to himself. 38

Contrast this exchange (in tone, especially) with that between another queen and group of advisors, Atossa and the Chorus in the Persae; here, the two parties not only disagree as to what is χρή on account of the differences in loyalty and values between them, but they also merely bicker, pushing back and forth the blame for the act. Agamemnon predictably shares the Chorus’ opinion as to what is χρή, and he takes exception to Clytemnestra’s actions at line 917:

38 677. For παρεσκευασμένης, “prepared for battle,” as indicating a threat, see Fraenkel 670.
Λήδας γένεθλον, δωμάτων ἐμῶν φύλαξ,
ἀπουσία μὲν εἶπας εἰκότως ἐμῇ·
μακρὰν γὰρ ἐξέτεινας· ἀλλ᾽ ἐναισίμως
αἰνεῖν, παρ᾽ ἄλλων χρή τὸδ᾽ ἐρχεσθαι γέρας. (914-917)
In this instance Agamemnon informs Clytemnestra that her speech is inappropriate,
given her position in his household, as she has been unnecessarily obsequious.\(^{39}\) In
addition, with this response to her Agamemnon is distancing himself from barbarian
practice (and thus χρή at this instance, to his mind, contrasts his own culture with that
of others, to privilege his own), and he does so with an idea which is universally known
to those around him.\(^{40}\) He speaks in maxims here (cf. Fraenkel 416), sustaining the
august appearance which he presents (also at lines 928-929, that man must not be judged
happy until dead, using χρή). There is condescension in his tone here, not only in his
refusal to be grouped with her but also in his associating her behavior with the more
eastern practices which he himself disdains; at any rate we know from his reminding her
of what is χρή that he is speaking from his position of authority, and as king, this

\(^{39}\) Fraenkel (416) explains: “Clytemnestra is a member of his household, and it is not right for her,
being in this position, to praise a master of the house.” (The emphasis is mine; this is a paraphrase
of the scholiast’s explanation.) Fraenkel is not commenting on the use of χρή here relative to
other uses; rather he is speaking only from a knowledge of Greek culture, but he hits the nail on
the head when it comes to the sense behind the usage. He distinguishes between universal
necessity, i.e. the things which it is imperative that all individuals do, and the type of necessity
that is dependent upon a person’s place in society, and he gives a Pindar quotation (Fr. 181): ὁ
γὰρ ἐξ οἴκου ποτὶ μῶμον ἐπαίνως κίρναται.

\(^{40}\) On these actions being better suited to eastern societies, see Fraenkel at lines 918-921. On
μακρὰν here: Fraenkel (414-415) says it is a phrase from everyday language and gives quotations
from other authors with μακρὰν and τείνω; there is no noun to be supplied: to speak at length
was an Ionian thing, and Argives spoke tersely.
statement is a χρή-act in that he expects it will be followed.\textsuperscript{41} (Compare \textit{Septem} 713, in which a king speaks to his subjects in very much the same tone.)

At the same time Agamemnon reveals that this speech is motivated by desire to respect the gods as best he may; his motivation for refusing Clytemnestra’s advances is that in those eastern societies such obeisance was shown to monarchs on account of their association with divinity, and he flatly rejects that such an association would be appropriate on his part (cf. at 925: \textit{λέγω κατ’ ἄνδρα, μὴ θεόν, σέβειν ἐμέ}). This whole speech is speculation on Agamemnon’s part on how best to respect and stand in relationship to the gods. Very shortly thereafter, at line 922, Agamemnon uses another χρή-statement with the same motivation:

\begin{quote}
καὶ τάλλα μὴ γυναικὸς ἐν τρόποις ἐμὲ ἄβρυνε, μὴ δὲ βαρβάρου φωτὸς δίκην χαμαιπετές βόαμα προσχάνης ἐμοὶ, μὴ δ’ εἴμαι στρώσασ’ ἐπίφθονον πόρον τιθεὶ’ θεοὺς τοῖσδε τιμαλφεῖν χρεών· ἐν ποικίλοις δὲ θνητὸν ὄντα κάλλειν βαίνειν ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἄνευ φόβου. (918-924)
\end{quote}

This statement is another general maxim and thus a good example of the universal context of some Type I χρή-statements: it makes no particular reference to the individuals involved, or even the situation at hand; it states a natural boundary of human action relative to divinity.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{41} Again, situated among imperatives: ἄβρυνε (919), μὴ προσχάνης, etc. He is taking the position of authority over her, informing her of what is χρή (and when she talks back to him, he grows annoyed). Fraenkel (417): “The triple ‘do not’ expresses strongly his reluctance.”

\textsuperscript{42} Fraenkel (417) writes that τιμαλφεῖν probably comes from the language of religious ceremonies.
Another example of a character disagreeing with Clytemnestra’s opinions on what constitutes correct behavior while using a χρή-statement occurs at Choephoroi 907, where Orestes cites his mother’s failure to behave appropriately as a wife:

καὶ ζῶντα γάρ νιν κρείσσον’ ἡγήσω πατρός·
tούτῳ θανοῦσα ξυγκάθευδ᾽, ἐπεὶ φιλεῖς
tὸν ἀνδρα τούτον, ὃν δ᾽ ἔχοιν φιλείν στυγεῖς. (905-907)

The sequence of logic is important: “In death, sleep with [Aegisthus], since you love this man but you despise the one it was χρή for you to love.” Orestes is punishing Clytemnestra for transgressing what he feels to be one of the laws which constitute what is χρή, and he conceives of what is χρή in terms of human relationships—in this instance, that of a wife’s duty toward her husband. (It is tempting to read this instance of χρή as a reference to the same supernatural force to which Clytemnestra refers at line 910, with μοῖρα; however, Orestes’ own justification for his decision undermines this. It was χρή, he says, that she love Agamemnon, since she was married to him; the fact that she did not treat him with the appropriate respect does not detract from the necessity of doing so.

At this instance of χρή Orestes clearly conceives of the gods as representing (if not dispensing instructions as to) what is χρή; in the few lines directly before 907,

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43 When Clytemnestra at 910 says ἡ Μοῖρα τούτων, ὁ τέκνον, παραιτία, she counters his argument from propriety according to position by claiming that her own personal circumstances (in particular, the death of Iphigenia) exculpate her. Therefore, μοῖρα is quite another matter from χρή in the minds of Orestes and Clytemnestra; Orestes responds to line 910 (καὶ τόνδε τοῖνυν Μοῖρ’ ἐπόρσυνεν μόρον, 911) by conceding the point, as what is μοῖρα for a given individual has no bearing on what is χρή.

44 Garvie (295) remarks on the sexual implications behind ξυγκάθευδ’ in line 906; the sexual reference is surely indicative of Orestes’ condescending and spiteful tone in this speech.
Orestes asks Pylades for advice, and the latter reminds him of the oracles of Apollo and Orestes’ own pledges to the god. Orestes quickly and wholeheartedly accepts this reminder of where his priorities should lie, and then he cites the behavior required by what is χρή to his mother, as an explanation of his actions; the two (god and χρή) are inextricably combined in Orestes’ mind. Thomson (176) cites Müller as calling Pylades a “monitor from Apollo.”

Twenty lines after this instance, at Choephoroi 930, Orestes accuses his mother in similar words:

\[\text{ἡ κάρτα μάντις οὐξ ὀνειράτων φόβος.} \]
\[\text{ἐκανες ὅν οὐ χρῆν, καὶ τὸ μὴ χρεὼν πάθε.} \] (929-930)

Orestes here refers again to Clytemnestra’s transgression of the codes of behavior for a wife towards her husband. Since she has flouted what is χρή in committing her act, he considers the only fit retribution to be retribution in kind (cf. the law of reciprocity: “the doer must suffer”). Of course, he admits with this statement that his own act is μὴ χρεὼν—and he hesitates (434-438; 297; 899) in fear over the correct course of behavior.46

45 Cf. Verrall (132), “He has come by divine command to see that vengeance is done.”

46 Orestes acknowledges correct behavior toward his mother by his hesitation, but the Danaids in the Supplices (as we have seen in the instance at line 176) treat their father with the utmost deference. Cf. the instance at line 971:

\[\text{πέμψον δὲ πρόφρων δεῦρ' ἡμέτερον} \]
\[\text{πατέρ' εὐθαρσῆ Δαναόν, πρόνοον} \]
\[\text{kai βουλαρχον. τοῦ γαρ προτέρα} \]
\[\text{μῆτις, ὅπου χρὴ δώματα ναίειν} \]
\[\text{kai τόπος εὔφρων.} \] (968-972)

Here the use of χρή by the Chorus is part of their characterization by the poet: the consideration of the proper respect due from a child to a parent is emphasized, although certainly in this play
There is a significant difference in the levels of awareness between Clytemnestra and Orestes: she uses χρή to describe her own actions, even when by her previous use she has acknowledged that other conceptions of what is χρή exist; Orestes when he prepares to kill Clytemnestra neither conceives of what he is about to do as χρή nor attempts to justify the act with such an assertion. That he here acknowledges that what he is about to do is against χρή might be taken as problematic toward my understanding of the word—but the fact that one knows that one’s actions are against the natural order and will have repercussions does not always prevent him from following a chosen course of action. However, Orestes here experiences conflicting demands upon his behavior concerning what is χρή (he recognizes this before the audience at 899); he is forced to decide between his role as the son of his father and agent of Apollo and his position as his mother’s son. Either choice in such a situation would result in a performance and failure of what is χρή. Such a choice to make is representative of the major questions of the trilogy, only to be resolved in the final play. What is οὐ χρή, according to Orestes, is Clytemnestra’s slaughter of Agamemnon, as he finds it more heinous that a woman should murder her husband than that a son should murder his

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47 As far as I can tell, he has from the beginning shown an awareness that this course of action presents its own problems, but from such a matter-of-fact statement one cannot read his emotions. Garvie’s statement, “Orestes is not really expressing doubts about the rightness of the matricide,” (302) seems predicated on the idea that if he were, he would choose a different course of action.
mother—nevertheless, this statement reinforces that he finds both repugnant, and his tone is regretful (and is strengthened by his hesitation in other scenes). The complicity of the supernatural in this scheme of what is χρή is indicated here (as often): the use follows hard on Orestes’ interpretation of Clytemnestra’s dream.

The instance at _Agamemnon_ 1429 gives another example of a party using χρή to describe what Clytemnestra should suffer on account of her husband. The _Septem_ provides another set of mutually contradictory ideas of what constitutes χρή, those of Eteocles and the Chorus, whose differing outlooks also come from diverse priorities and values; at line 713 we observe the use of χρή in such an argument:

Chorus: πιθοῦ γυναιξί, καίπερ οὐ στέργων ὅμως.  
Eteocles: λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν ὧν ἀνὴ τις: οὐδὲ χρὴ μακρὰν. (712-713)

“Don’t speak at length,” Eteocles says, using χρή to communicate the source of the necessity behind their silence, privileging his own interests; here the Chorus fears the stain of a brother’s death on their king’s hands, whereas Eteocles considers it is his duty to stand at the seventh gate and defend the city. However, if either side has any objective awareness of differing fundamental values (and what would cause these) as

48 I consider the variatio in the form of χρή simply a matter of style, cf. Smyth §2714 on the fact that χρή can be negated by either οὐ or μή, meaning “must not.”  

49 Chorus to Clytemnestra:

μεγαλόμητις εἶ, περίφρονα δ᾽ ἐλακε.  
ὡς περ οὖν φονολιβεί τύχα φρὴν ἐπιμαίνεται,  
λίπος ἐπ᾽ ὀμμάτων αἵματος εὖ πρέπει:  
ἀτίετον ἐτί σὲ χρή στερομέναν φίλον  
tύμμα τύμματι τεῖσαι.  (Agamemnon 1426-1430)
the source of their quarrel, they do not show it. Eteocles acts and speaks according to what is χρή from his perspective, that of an adult male with responsibilities, a warrior-hero. The speech of the Chorus, then, directly detracts from the time he will have to support his side of the conflict, what it is χρή for him to do; therefore, he imagines that what it is χρή for them to do not only conforms to his idea of their duty in society, but also allows for him to do that which is χρή for him (he does not consider that their stake in the matter might demand otherwise). This instance of χρή is a χρή-act of the imperative sort; it reinforces the power dynamic between king and subjects, and since Eteocles is in a position to make policy, this use of χρή is a command. Hutchinson notes that these lines closely resemble those at 216f. and that the Chorus obeyed his order there; Eteocles, of course, does not heed the Chorus’ request (159-160).

The source of obligation in many of the instances of “applied” χρή is not one’s familial relationships but rather one’s position within society. At Eumenides 708 a god is portrayed as representative of the universal order, creating policy thereafter to be regarded as χρή:

ταύτην μὲν ἐξέτειν᾽ ἐμοῖς παραίνεσιν ἀστοῖσιν εἰς τὸ λοιπόν: ὀρθοῦσθαι δὲ χρή 
καὶ ψῆφον αἴρειν καὶ διαγνῶναι δίκην ἀιδουμένους τὸν ὥρκον. εἴρηται λόγος. (707-710)

Athena here decrees before the Chorus what will be appropriate behavior for those thereafter who find themselves in this station. Previously in this speech, she had said, “κλύοιτ’ ἄν ἡδη θεσμόν, Ἀττικὸς λεώς, / πρῶτας δίκας κρίνοντες αἵματος χυτοῦ. / ἔσται δὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν Αἰγέως στρατῷ / αἰεὶ δικαστῶν τοῦτο βουλευτήριον” (681-684;
she establishes the tribunal at 704-706). In the speech itself she counsels the citizens to remain in awe and fear of the majesty of the gods; she considers the court and form of government to be a set of strictures imposed upon mortals by the divine—artificial in appearance, but whose function is to uphold righteousness and natural order (σέβας, 690, will prevent ἀδικεῖν, 691, and ἑπιχραινόντων νόμους, 693, alike).\(^{50}\) Athena uses the χρή-statement at this instance to relate this jury’s particular duty to the greater scheme in which they are functioning (and by both her action here and characterization of human duty, she links the gods with what is χρή). Although she does not continue to use χρή (indeed, this play has by far the fewest instances among all the works considered here), when she resumes her address of the Chorus and Apollo, Athena continues to refer to participants in the scene according to their duty within it: her own, at 734; the jurors whose duty it is to empty the urns, at 743; her exchange with the Chorus that follows is her attempt to convince them that it is right, as being Zeus’ will and in the best interests of all, that they receive reverence in return for bestowing natural blessings (906-912, 938-948) and those of social accord (976-987). As for this χρή-statement itself, she uses the present participle αἰδουμένους with “take” and “decide” to

\(^{50}\) As for why this is not an occurrence of δεῖ: the characters are setting the precedent for human law, not following it; δεῖ is what is set down by man, and Athena is the agent here. Consider also the strong supernatural references, and the whole characterization of human society here: the gods are intervening because at this point in human history mortals have no means themselves of dealing with this.
make it known that the one action requires the context of the other. The traditional epithet of the Court of the Areopagus was σεμνόν.

Thus far we have seen both examples of χρή-statements occurring in maxims, whose content applies to all equally, and examples of χρή-statements whose application is limited by one’s position, usually with reference to familial obligation, but is not unique to a given individual. Now I will discuss the relationship of that cosmic law, as expressed by Type I instances of χρή, to the gods, in the perspective of the speakers using the χρή-statement. One of the first attributes uniting instances of χρή is its tendency to describe the relationship of humans to the gods (as in Persae 820: οὐχ ὑπέρφευ θνητὸν ὄντα χρὴ φρονεῖν): the word is very often used to indicate that appropriate human action involves showing reverence of or supplication to the gods, or more simply, divinity, in some way. One often finds the formula “it is χρή for [a mortal] to do [X regarding the gods].” This initially led me to believe that the primary function of χρή is describing appropriate human action toward the gods. This aspect of Type I χρή most clearly distinguishes it from the use of δεῖ in Aeschylus, as what is δεῖ nowhere instructs proper humility and action on the part of mortals relative to the gods.

51 And αἰδέομαι has primarily a religious connotation (i.e. reference to the gods, and not a general “respect”), in Aeschylus, at any rate: v. its appearance at Supplices 478, Eumenides 680, Agamemnon 362, Choephoroi 106, Eumenides 483, Supplices 641.

52 Thomson (vol. 2, 219), he quotes Demosthenes, 23.65: πολλὰ μὲν δὴ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐστι τοιαῦθ’ οἷ’ οὐχ ἐτέρωθι, ἐν δ’ οὖν ἰδιώτατον πάντων καὶ σεμνότατον, τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δικαστήριον, Suidas, Aeschines, and Isocrates.
The conception of the relationship between mortals and the gods is not straightforward; in some Type I instances in Aeschylus the gods are meant as representing this cosmic law. On occasion they are even depicted as enforcers or agents of what is χρή; in others, they are players who abide by it, as what is χρή is outside or above their authority. When the placeholder or agent relationship between the gods and what is χρή is explicitly expressed, the Olympians are rarely named; more often, we see “the gods” or “God” or simply “divinity” rather than named deities.53 The synthesis (or implication thereof) of the Olympian gods, who have agency and consciousness, with what is χρή is not as simple as it may seem; it elevates them to something beyond themselves, as what is χρή includes standards of behavior for the (personalized) gods as well as humans.54 I will contrast this with the relationship of the gods to what is χρή in the “Promethean” use (Type II), in which Zeus and what is χρή are at odds with one another.

I will begin by discussing instances in which the gods are invoked with the χρή-statement, in which χρή is used to describe the relationship between mortals and the

53 Cf. Lloyd-Jones’ article, “Zeus in Aeschylus”; he gives an excellent discussion of the history of the subject in scholarship. However, as his argument tends toward the question of the authenticity of the Prometheus based on the characterization of Zeus, I will discuss the article more fully when I shall come to the instances of the Prometheus themselves.

54 Griffith, who is, of course, writing from a focus on the Prometheus, discusses the trend of the relationship between “fate” and the gods from Homer on; he writes that in Homer the relationship between the gods and the Furies (whom he sees as carrying out the will of necessity) is left unspecified, but that thereafter there is a trend toward Zeus being subject to some sort of external law in Herodotus and Pindar; he uses Suppllices 100-104 to contrast with them, as he translates, “everything of the gods is effortless; from where he (i.e. Zeus) sits, he carries out his will…” (1983: 17-18, footnote 49)
divine by describing the acts necessary for mortals to receive divine favor. I will then proceed to give examples in which this association between what is χρή and the Olympian gods is less apparent because it is less overtly stated. I will begin with the instance at *Supplices* 502:

\[\text{στείχοιτ' ἄν, ἄνδρες· εὖ γὰρ ὁ ξένος λέγει.} \\
\text{ἡγεῖσθε βωμοὺς ἀστικοὺς, θεῶν ἕδρας·} \\
\text{καὶ ἐυμβολοῦσιν οὐ πολυστομεῖν χρεὼν} \\
\text{ναύτην ἅγοντας τόνδ' ἐφέστιον θεῶν.} \]  

(500-503)

“Go forth, men,” Pelagrus orders, “and lead [Danaüs] to the altars and sanctuaries of the gods; it is χρή that you not speak long with those you meet in the road as you bring this traveler to be a suppliant of the gods.” This is ultimately a command from a king to his subjects, but it is also a reference to the necessity that they supplicate divinity: Danaüs displays his piety by approaching the altars as a suppliant, and it is χρή that Pelagrus’ own guards go assist him in this purpose. One might argue that the force of the χρή-statement has to do with the speed with which they do this rather than the fact that they do this; indeed, Pelagrus has mentioned the necessity of this speed before in his speech from 468-489 (αἵψ’ 481)—speed necessary to quell the ire of the citizens—but he will calm the citizens’ indignation using the same argument with which he had convinced himself: the necessity for fear and respect of the wrath of Zeus who protects suppliants. Pelagrus believes that when the citizens see the Danaids’ garlands brought in supplication to the altars of their own gods, they will recognize that Zeus must be respected, even if it should mean war. Therefore, the speed which is χρή here is speed by which Danaüs himself might more easily supplicate the gods, and Pelagrus and all
the citizens likewise through this act. Acknowledgment of the gods’ power is also χρή for humans at Agamemnon 821:

καπνῷ δ᾽ ἁλοῦσα νῦν ἔτ᾽ εὔσημος πόλις.
ἀτης θυελλὰς ζῶσι· συνθνῄσκουσα δὲ
σποδὸς προπέμπει πῖόνας πλούτου πνοάς.

τούτων θεοῖσι χρὴ πολύμνηστον χάριν
tύειν, ἐπείπερ καὶ πάγας υπερκόπους
ἐφραξάμεσθα καὶ γυναικὸς οὕνεκα
πόλιν δημάθυνεν Ἀργείων δάκος,
ἵππου νεοσσός, ἀσπιδηφόρος λεώς;

πῆδημ᾽ ὀρούσας ἀμφὶ Πλειάδων δύσιν. (818-826)

“For these successes it is χρή that we show gratitude to the gods.” In this passage Agamemnon credits the gods with the Argive success in the Trojan War, and he uses χρή to describe the obligation of gratitude on the part of men. He has already mentioned the part they played at 811-812, and he refers back at 829 to his choice to acknowledge the gods first in this speech before addressing other matters (830-850); he will close this speech by declaring his intention to proceed immediately to the hearth to pay his respects (851-853). He clearly believes that the gods are responsible for the Greek victory; the reason the word χρή occurs only once in this passage is that only at 821 does he describe the relationship of men to gods rather than actions the gods have already taken. That Agamemnon conceives of the gods as dispensers of justice here who took counsel and decided upon the fall of Troy on account of Trojan indiscretion is evident from lines 813-816 (and his reference to δίκη at 810, 811, 812); he views the gods,
then, as not only deciding (ψήφους ἔθεντο 816) but enforcing what is “right,”\textsuperscript{55} and he describes the mortal role in turn to be that of humility and gratitude.

The gods are not named; they are referred to simply as θεοῖσι (821); in the following instance, at line 580, the identity of the force responsible is equally vague (θεοῖς 578, but the singular Διός occurs at 582; the difference in number underlines the lack of specificity intended):

\begin{quotation}
“Τροίαιν ἑλόντες δὴ ποτ᾽ Ἀργείων στόλος θεοῖς λάφυρα ταῦτα τοῖς καθ᾽ Ἑλλάδα δόμοις ἐπασσάλευσαν ἀρχαίον γάνος.”
toιαῦτα χρὴ κλύοντας εὐλογεῖν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς· καὶ χάρις τιμήσεται Διὸς τὸδ᾽ ἐκπράξασα. πάντ᾽ ἔχεις λόγον. (577-582)
\end{quotation}

Here the herald claims that the praise of the city itself and her generals will be the manifestation of gratitude to the gods which is necessary,\textsuperscript{56} as though the city is somehow an extension of them. It is also important to note that the χρή-statement follows an exhortation to dedicate spoils to the gods, in thanks. The herald is primarily concerned by the victory; he feels that whatever sorrows and pains have been suffered, victory more than makes up for them, and this is all by the grace of Zeus. At any rate, the insistence here on praise, glory (γάνος 579), and positive gratitude, informs this entire speech. Perhaps Aeschylus wrote another χρή at line 573 (see discussion of that line in Appendix A), in this speech but preceding this instance, in which the herald

\textsuperscript{55} Cf. Thomson on lines 819-820: “Troy with all her insolent wealth—the cause of her damnation—is conceived as a burnt sacrifice to Ἀτη.” The picture of the Trojans as receiving punishment for a moral flaw is also flattering to the Greeks.

\textsuperscript{56} Cf. Fraenkel (583): “and the favour (or grace) of Zeus which has brought this to pass will be appreciated as it should be;” Smith (29) also refers to it as a “favor from Zeus.”
genuinely asks whether it is χρή that they not feel sorrow at misfortunes past; such a use of χρή would be consonant with that at line 580, as here he is framing his report, finally, with reference to Zeus, and therefore he feels it is inappropriate to grieve and appropriate only to feel gratitude. I do not include that instance here because I am convinced by Fraenkel’s arguments (287) concerning the interpolation of these lines; I will discuss that instance in Appendix A.

The χρή-statement recommends appropriate behavior toward the gods again at line 342:

εἰ δ’ εὖ σέβουσι τοὺς πολισσούχους θεοὺς
τοὺς τῆς ἁλούσης γῆς θεῶν θ᾽ ἱδρύματα,
οὐ τάν ἔλοντες αὖθις ἀνθαλοῖεν ἄν.
340
ἔρως δὲ μὴ τις πρότερον ἐμπίπτῃ στρατῷ
πορθείν ἀ μὴ χρή, κέρδεσιν νικωμένους. (338-342)

Here Clytemnestra again conceals her opinion of what is χρή so as not to rouse the suspicion of the Chorus. Here she uses χρή in a manner consistent with the use of others in the play; she characterizes disrespecting and destroying the gods’ shrines as μὴ χρή.

Clytemnestra describes respecting the gods (εὖ σέβουσι) and preserving their holy places, appropriate behavior toward for mortals, as χρή, and she associates all kinds of negative fallout with lack of observance of what is χρή (she cannot know, at this point, that the Greeks have already committed such behavior).57

Impiety as “not χρή” appears also at Supplices 763, where the Danaids explain to their father their repugnance toward their would-be Egyptian captors:

57 Πορθείν ἀ μὴ χρή will lead to ἀνθαλοῖεν, which, as Thomson (33) writes, is an expression proverbial for turning the tables, and the “note of warning is like the qualifications frequent in oracles and prophecies.”
The key word here is ἀνοσίων: it is χρή that they guard against these people because they have no regard for behaving respectfully and will not therefore treat the speakers appropriately (unprovoked violence, especially not in the context of war, is certainly not χρή). The context is a discussion between the Chorus and Danaüs concerning the daughters’ fear of what might happen to them should the Egyptians kidnap them; one of the primary marks against the Egyptians, according to the Danaids, is that they do not respect altars any more than do birds (κόρακες ὥστε, βω-/ μῶν ἀλέγοντες οὐδέν 751-752), do not respect the gods any more than “bold dogs, maddened with unholy rage” (περίφρονες δ’ ἄγαν ἀνιέρῳ μένει/ μεμαργωμένοι κυνοθρασεῖς, θεῶν/ οὐδέν ἐπαἴοντες 757-759) and they continue this analogy of Egyptians to animals without the civilized sense of humility up into these present lines. Although φυλάσσεσθαι without context may lead one to believe that the Danaids are primarily focused on their physical well-being and are afraid at the thought of the potential damage to their persons, their insistence on the “unholiness” of the Egyptians’ demeanor and actions reveals that their concern rests therein. Also, Danaüs replies to 762-763 not by insisting that the Argives are formidable in battle (he has already mentioned this, at 746-747, and the Danaids have rejected the sentiment as unhelpful), but by advising his daughters not to neglect the gods, to seek both solace and refuge with them. After Danaüs’ exit, they pray.

The basic function of a Type I χρή-statement, expressing appropriate behavior for an individual vis-à-vis the cosmos, typically relates mortals to the divine. A χρή-

50
statement directs appropriate behavior for a divinity at *Eumenides* 1003, where Athena
states that she will close the events of the day by starting off the procession to lead the
Eumenides to their new place of residence in Athens:

\[
\chiαίρετε χυμεῖς· προτέραν δ᾽ ἐμὲ χρὴ
στείχειν θαλάμους ἀποδείξουσαν
πρὸς φῶς ἱερὸν τῶνδε προπομπῶν. \text{(1003-1005)}
\]

This instance on its surface appears to be a special case for Type I, as here what is χρή is
not only describing the action of a goddess, but is also being used by that goddess to
describe her own action; it is not being used by a mortal to instruct appropriate
(humble) action toward the gods for the benefit of another, and it is used with an
expressed subject for the infinitive, in the first person. In Type II instances of χρή,
however, the gods are characterized as struggling against what is χρή, and Athena here
clearly intends to show herself as doing the opposite. In fact, she is here using χρή to
express her humility and deference toward the other goddesses.

This is the only instance in Aeschylus of χρή used as a first-person imperative;
however, although Athena expresses ἐμέ as the subject of the infinitive with χρή, she
does not refer to herself alone. Rather she refers to the whole of the holy procession
which is hers to lead, since she will show the location of their future abode (she knows
the way, and she is able, as a representative of Zeus and what is χρή, a divinity on par
with their divinity, to do so), but with 1005 she acknowledges those with her: in a note
to his Loeb, Smyth (367) lists those in the procession as Athena, the Chorus, the
Areopagites, torch-bearers, etc.
Ultimately this instance is typical of Type I in that it relates the gods to enacting, representing, and obeying the cosmic order expressed by χρή. The religious context continues after these lines: ύπὸ σεμνῶν σφαγίων (1006); Sommerstein (274) conjectures that this is probably a black cow, and notes that finally, after “corrupted sacrifices” throughout the trilogy, the work ends on a pure one.
Chapter II: Problematic Type I Instances in Aeschylus

I have explained the most basic aspects of Type I χρή and the χρή-statements which exhibit them best; I will now explore the instances of the word which do not demonstrate the characteristic aspects of Type I χρή as clearly as the preceding examples. Χρή in Aeschylus occurs within a condition four times (three times in the protasis; once in the apodosis). Such usage on its surface does not appear to have much in common with the Type I usages elsewhere in Aeschylus, in which χρή appears to be universal, timeless, and self-evident, since use in the protasis of a condition implies that the speaker does not know whether something is χρή, and use in the apodosis might seem to imply that whether something is χρή is contingent upon something else. This is problematic because by my understanding a character should not be doubting whether something is χρή, as these statements are well known to be valid, and the doubt comes across as indecision about the future. However, in this section I will show how these apparently troublesome instances exhibit the same features as of other Type I χρή-statements; I will then explore how to reconcile them with what I consider to be the primary force of χρή in the other Aeschylean instances.

The following instances of χρή are intermediate between Type I and Type II, although I categorize them as part of Type I; the reference to the future which lends itself to the translation of “it is fated” for these instances is characteristic of the Type II instances, even though its presence in a condition satisfies expectations of Type I (in the
lack of certainty concerning the future). These intermediate instances also have reference
to more specific situations and individuals than other Type I instances in which
universal cosmic law is applied. After I have discussed these, I will give my
interpretation of the Type I instances in the *Prometheus* before discussing the Type II
category.

In two of these instances (*Persae* 801, *Agamemnon* 166), χρή occurs in the protasis
of the condition (“if it is χρή that X occur”), producing statements that appear to express
uncertainty about what is χρή; in these two no sense of “personal fate” is intended. The
oracles, being oracles, necessarily have reference to events which have not yet taken
place; however, that prediction of future events based on oracles, when used in
conjunction with χρή, only occurs in a condition in Type I instances. The force of the
uncertainty in these instances rests on whether it is χρή that the oracles be trusted, i.e.
whether the oracles have divine provenance. The first is that at *Persae* 801:

**Chorus:** πῶς εἶπας; οὐ γὰρ πᾶν στράτευμα βαρβάρων
περά τὸν Ἕλλης πορθμὸν Εὐρώπης ἄπο;

**Darius:** παῦροι γε πολλῶν, εἰ τι πιστεύσαι θεῶν
χρή θεσφάτοιοιν, ἐς τὰ νῦν πεπραγμένα
βλέψαντας συμβαίνει γὰρ οὐ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ’ οὐ.
κείπερ τάδ’ ἐστί, πλῆθος ἐκκρίτων στρατοῦ
λείπει κενὰτις κεναῖσιν ἐλπίσιν πεπεισμένος. (798-804)

This passage follows that in which Darius has generally related the near-annihilation
suffered by the Persians at the Greeks’ hands; the statement made by him here founds
the certainty of his prediction of future events on the validity of the assertion that it is
χρή to put faith in the oracles of the gods. What is χρή in Type I instances is often linked
to the gods, whether it is represented through them or enacted by them; here Darius is
conceived as questioning neither the authority of the gods nor their affiliation with what
is χρή—rather, he asks here whether the oracles of the gods genuinely represent the
gods’ opinions or will, and therefore whether the content of the oracles may be taken to
be as self-evidently valid as what mortals know otherwise to be χρή.

Why might Darius ask this? It is not necessarily self-contradictory for it not to be
χρή to trust in the oracles of the gods—not everything an individual says is absolutely
representative of the way he or she thinks; in this instance Darius is affected by his vast
disappointment in the turn of events. He has already expressed his disappointment
with the sort of fulfillment which (likely) these same oracles have had, at lines 739-742,
and by this point he is genuinely uncertain whether oracles can be trusted. In addition,
his phrasing indicates that he believes that what is χρή is absolute, not that it is fallible:
συμβαίνει γὰρ οὐ τὰ μέν, τὰ δὲ οὐ. He means to put the “if” force of the condition on
his own imperfect knowledge, given that they have failed him in the past, not the
potential fallibility of what is χρή: he is expressing the situation from his own
perspective as a mortal with imperfect knowledge.

Therefore, in this instance, as at Choephoroi 297 and Septem 617, the question is not
whether the gods themselves can be associated with what is χρή but rather whether the
oracles are reliable indications of the gods’ will, which is χρή. In the former, Orestes
asks himself the direct question whether it is χρή to trust in these oracles.

τοιούτῳ χρησμοῖς ἀρχα χρή πεποιθέναι;
κεῖ μὴ πέποιθα, τούργον ἐστ᾽ ἐγχαστέον. (297-298)
Garvie (119) writes that here ἄρα is equivalent to ἄρ' οὐ, anticipating a “yes” response.\textsuperscript{58} I believe this appeal for confirmation is rhetorical—not “rhetorical” in the sense of a rhetorical δεῖ, in which there is no appropriate or “correct” answer, and the intended effect is silence, but “rhetorical” in that Orestes considers that the answer to be so obvious that it need not even be spoken. He has already stated very passionately that he believes the oracle (and Apollo) will not desert him and will not fail in its intended course, punishing himself, Orestes, in the stead of those it commands him to take vengeance on, should he himself not do the job. With these two lines he closes discussion of one set of persuasive motivations and begins discussion of another, and so line 298 and those following form something of an anticlimax: after describing the consequences of disobeying Apollo in gruesome detail, he then goes on to add that he would feel grief, too, for his father, and that he would rather not be poor. At any rate here Orestes uses an interrogative rather than declarative χρή-statement to underscore what he believes to be the self-evident nature of its content: “don’t these oracles tell me to do what is χρή anyway?” Orestes must behave according to his role as son to a murdered father.

That Orestes doubts the validity of the oracles because of their status as oracles rather than reliably the will of God is apparent in his request for Zeus’ help in the speech

\textsuperscript{58} He quotes Denniston (GP 46f.) as saying, “ἄρα ostensibly leaves the issue open to the person addressed, and the appeal for confirmation is the more confident because less obviously stressed.”
immediately prior; he knows the content of the oracles and nevertheless asks for Zeus’ aid.\(^{59}\)

The question of whether the oracles have authority arises also at *Septem* 617, where Eteocles marvels at Amphiaraus’ decision to fight:

\[
\text{δοκῶ μὲν οὖν σφε μηδὲ προσβαλεῖν τύλαις οὐχ ἡς ἀθυμος οὐδὲ λήματος κάκη, ἀλλ᾽ οἶδεν ὡς σφε χρὴ τελευτῆσαι μάχη, εἰ καρπὸς ἔσται θεσφάτοισι Λοξίου φιλεὶ δὲ σιγᾶν ἢ λέγειν τὰ καίρια. (615-619)}
\]

The weight of θεσφάτοισι (618) bears heavily on the sense of χρὴ here; LSJ give the primary meaning of θεσφατίζω as “prophesy,” and, with μόρος, “it is decreed that”; θέσφατα occurs nearly 40 times in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the majority of uses has to do with oracles predicting the death of an individual (see esp. Soph. OT 1175). Only a few coincide with a use of χρὴ\(^{60}\) and when a divinity is named in these authors, the divinity from whom the oracle comes, it is always Apollo. The oracles are characterized as having the power to compel actions, not merely predict them: in Euripides’ IA, they are given as the source of the necessity for Iphigenia’s death (529, 1268, 1468; also 498); the oracles also compel behavior on the part of mortals at Eur. IT 937 (Φοίβου κελευθεῖς θεσφάτοις ἀφικόμην), IA 879, *Phoenissae* 999, and notably, the passage surrounding *Eumenides* 594. The reference to future time and individual “fate,” even if χρὴ would not be used here by the author if he felt the sense to demand

\(^{59}\) Orestes does indeed believe in these oracles; the oracles to which he is referring are those coming from Apollo, that should Orestes not take his revenge upon his mother, he would suffer terribly. But, as he then says to himself, even if he does not believe in these oracles, he would still commit the deed on account of grief for his father and anger over his poverty.

\(^{60}\) LSJ also list S. OC 1472 and 969, Od. 4.561, Pindar P.4.71, and Aristoph. *Pax* 1073.
something improper of the word, is palpable on account of the force imposed on the sentence by the use of θεσφάτοις. We have seen that the mutually affirming relationship between what is χρή and the Olympian gods is one of the salient characteristics of Type I instances of χρή: perhaps the author felt its use appropriate here on account of Apollo’s involvement. Although this usage is complicated, and drawing apart the sources of various parts of the semantic meaning is difficult, one is able to see features in common with Type I and hints of an evolution toward Type II.

DeVito writes that Eteocles and Amphiaraus share the belief that necessity is inescapable, but that despite this both are able to decide how to face what this necessity has dealt them; a submission to fate—especially relative to the pleas for escape, both literal and figurative (in prayers to the gods, for help)—is one of the most important motifs in the play characterizing Eteocles. Since Eteocles, however, is not the only one submitting to fate (cf. the Chorus’ acceptance at line 263), the χρή at line 617 may be read as referring to more than simply Amphiaraus. This is certainly a Type I instance in that what is χρή is conceived of as coming from Apollo; Eteocles (and the Chorus, even before they submit, as shown by their attempt to change fate) conceives of it as “god-given fate” (cf. line 719). Another prime means of characterization—and, as DeVito notes, long argued (see esp. page 170)—is the tension between free will and “fate” causing action within the play; what is contained behind this χρή reflects this tension, in that Eteocles is not only remarking upon Amphiaraus’ decision to pursue a course which will result in his death, but he is also likely aware that the future holds the same for him (at least, the parallels foreshadow it).
The meaning of χρή behind the instance at *Agamemnon* 166, in the “Hymn to Zeus,” is more complicated than the question over the oracles’ validity, but the context is that of strong deference to Zeus.

Although here the Chorus appears to be uncertain and to separate the assigning of cause (to Zeus) and the need to do so (being χρή), Zeus here is not represented as distinct from what is χρή; as a speech act this χρή-statement is an appeal, directed to Zeus himself. In the hymn they conceive of him as listening, and they are asking him this very question (whether it is χρή to throw the burden from their hearts by attributing Iphigenia’s death to Zeus) by their hesitation—if it is indeed χρή to do so, then he will not be offended at their assigning the cause / blame to him; if it is not χρή, then they assign nothing.\(^{61}\) The Chorus of the *Agamemnon* as much as states that Zeus is the source of what they conceive to be cosmic law by enumerating some of its aspects which they associate with him: he is the leader in τὸ φρονεῖν (176), and he has established the law of πάθει μάθος (177-178). The context of such deference as this, together with an appeal to the gods in the form of a χρή-statement, occurs also at *Choephoroi* 203, in Electra’s speech to the Chorus:

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61 Cf. Smith 15: “They shelter from impiety by not explicitly drawing this conclusion [that Zeus is responsible for Iphigenia’s death], although it is the only one they have left themselves, and further by implying that they would draw it only under compulsion.”
This instance of χρή, as χρή-act, functions as an appeal to the gods, those whom Electra conceives of as capable of effecting her desire. This χρή seems to be used, like that at 

Prometheus 485, as an auxiliary verb indicating the future tense with the implication of supernatural agency. The function of this speech act as an appeal and prayer foregrounds χρή with a context of divine concern and intervention, and it is assumed that the gods are the agents behind the “finding” of σωτηρίας, although the subject of the infinitive is not altogether clear.62

62 So Garvie (95); on στροβούμεθα, he writes, “[it is] either a poetic plural (cf. 201), or the subject is Electra and those who are on her side.” All but two of the χρή-statements which I consider to be Type II have an expressed subject for the infinitive; I think the expression of the subject lends emphasis only. Nowhere in the Supplices or the Choephoroi is the subject expressed, and it is expressed in around half of the instances in the Persae, Agamemnon, and Eumenides; in the Septem, it tends toward expression, in that it is expressed every time Eteocles speaks. Smyth does not mention any trend or importance concerning the expression of the subject of the infinitive.
Chapter III: Type I χρή in the Prometheus

At this point I have discussed the features which unite Type I instances of χρή in the Supplices, Septem, Persae, Agamemnon, Choephoroi, and Eumenides and how the salient characteristics of any given use help to inform our interpretation of the others. Now I will move on to the Type I instances of χρή in the Prometheus.

As I began my study of each of the more than fifty instances of χρή in Aeschylus, I more and more noticed an issue fundamental to the explication of what is χρή: the conception of the status of the gods differs between the Prometheus and the other six plays, notably (and most importantly for our purposes here) in respect to the relationship between the characterizations and actions of divinities, specifically Zeus, and what is χρή. In the Prometheus the gods are often portrayed as subject to and struggling against what is χρή (i.e. they are not the representatives for cosmic law). This opposition requires that the two entities be distinct from one another, but it also diminishes the majesty and influence of the gods by implying some greater order, one they do not have the natural wisdom to obey (by contrast, consider Athena in the Eumenides). Perhaps the tendency of Type II instances to fall in the Prometheus rather than in the other six plays is contingent upon, or at least corresponds to, this view of the gods. The plot of the Prometheus is dependent upon the idea of an external order creating and enforcing change: Prometheus’ main source of comfort is the knowledge that his present predicament cannot last forever, and the plot itself rests upon the
Zeus cannot, therefore, *per se* represent what is χρή, and the relationship that the gods in general have to what is χρή in the other six plays, i.e. effecting or representing what is χρή, is untenable here. Although this difference in representation is more evident in the Type II instances of χρή in this work, it also informs the Type I instances which I will discuss here. One of these is the first instance of χρή in the work, at line 3.

Χθονὸς μὲν ἐς τηλουρὸν ἥκομεν πέδον,
Σκύθην ἐς οἷμον, ἄβατον εἰς ἑρημίαν.
Ἡραίοτε, σοὶ δὲ χρὴ μέλειν ἐπιστολὰς
ἀς σοι πατήρ ἐφεῖτο, τόνδε πρὸς πέτραις
ὑψηλοκημίων τὸν λεωρόγον ὁχμάσαι
ἀδαμαντίνων δεσμῶν ἐν ἀρρήκτοις πέδαις. (1-6)

Inoue and Cohen, 26, on the closeness of characterization of Zeus and Prometheus in this play: “Their closeness arises out of the juxtaposition of their relationship to one another with their mutual relation to a cosmic order larger than both of them.” The question the authors discuss is that of whether Zeus in the *Prometheus* is the same as cosmic law; the article uses similarities of terminology characterizing each to posit a similar characterization (and a certain tension between the two, on account of this closeness); the authors consider χρή in the same category as ἀνάγκη, μοῖρα, μόρσιμον, and πέπρωται as denoting an “external standard” (28); they write (29), “Words denoting the necessity of Zeus are in reference to either his concrete tools or punishment (108, 1052) or to his commands (3, 16, 671). Prometheus, however, always attributes necessity to a force, external both to himself and to Zeus (except in reference to the latter’s concrete tools), and although he acknowledges a necessity to which he and Zeus are subject, controversy has arisen over Zeus’ relation to fate... The limited and narrow application of words of necessity to Zeus and Prometheus in contrast with the overwhelming repetition of words denoting a necessity outside both of them supports the interpretation that Zeus as well as Prometheus is subject to a larger cosmic order (whether or not this order is called fate).” The authors also discuss the sympathy of the other gods for Prometheus as further isolating Zeus: “The harmony of Prometheus with these forces and inhabitants of the cosmos underlines the fact that Zeus’ ἁρμονία (551), like his laws and justice, is self-contained and out of step with a larger ἁρμονία to which it must be reconciled.”

Certainly the characterization of Zeus in the *Prometheus* outside what can be supposed from the uses of χρή is a necessary consideration, but an extensive discussion of his characterization is outside the scope of this thesis.
“It is χρή that you obey the commands given by Zeus” is a typical Type I χρή-statement, when taken out of context. Kratos in this passage attempts to nerve, or shame, Hephaistos into doing what he had been brought to do, to clamp Prometheus to the rock. It is necessary to obey the commands of Zeus, he says, although the things which Zeus commands here are less lofty than what upholds universal order elsewhere: here, one individual must chain another to a rock. (Elsewhere, although individuals like Orestes respond to others’ infractions of the cosmic law with punishment, the necessity behind those actions arises from the punisher’s own place within the universal order. Orestes did not act only to punish Clytemnestra, but rather, he considered his own position as the son to a murdered father to compel him; here neither Kratos nor Hephaistos has a stake in seeing the punishment done and they act only from fear of punishment for disobeying Zeus’ self-serving orders.) Hephaistos, in his reply, corrects Kratos’ use and makes clear what sort of necessity enjoins him:

πάντως δ’ἀνάγκη τώνδε μοι τόλμαν σχεθεῖν·
ἐξωριάζειν γὰρ πατρὸς λόγους βαρύ. (16-17)

Recall that ἀνάγκη often refers to physical compulsion; Hephaistos is compelled by the threat of physical retribution should he reject the commands of Zeus (who even in these lines is personified, distanced from an abstract order: he is self-aware and capable of λόγους).

The opposition of χρή and ἀνάγκη, in which the former is characterized as lofty and the latter as associated with Zeus, continues with the use at 103:

τὴν πεπρωμένην δὲ χρή
This instance, in which Prometheus philosophizes to himself, resembles the universal Type I χρή in that it states, without subject for the infinitive, a code of behavior which is applicable to all. That it instructs correct behavior for individuals relative to αἶσα (which itself is one aspect of the universal order) is given by the indirect discourse clause: χρή here describes appropriate action in the face of events beyond one’s control—therefore, as with numerous other instances of χρή, it relates the relationship of the speaker to the cosmos. However, note that the cosmic order, neither in its expression with χρή nor relationship to αἶσα or ἀνάγκη here, is identified with Zeus, and that whereas Type I universal statements express the proper action of all mortals, Prometheus is not mortal. If there were a subject for the infinitive here, we might expect that it would be the first person pronoun, and singular; it is unusual for a character in a Type I χρή-statement to use the word χρή in order to comfort himself or direct his own action.

Outside the Prometheus, proper respect towards the gods is a huge part of what is χρή for mortals; in this instance, however, Prometheus does not relate his acceptance of his “fate” with proper reverence of Zeus. I will discuss further the relationship between the gods and what is χρή in the Prometheus below (page 75).

A similar Type I instance of χρή in the Prometheus occurs at line 659, as Io describes to Prometheus what she and her father have already endured:
ἔτλην γεγωνεῖν νυκτίφοιτ᾽ ὀνείρατα.
ο ὁ δ᾽ ἔς τε Πυθὼ κατὶ Δωδώνης πυκνοὺς
θεοπρόπους ἴαλλεν, ὡς μάθοι τί χρή
dράντ᾽ ἣ λέγοντα δαίμοσιν πράσσειν φίλα. (655-660)

“That one might learn what [it is necessary] to do or say to please the gods,” with its characterization of certain actions as both χρή and the will of divinity, reflects Type I instances in the other plays. It appears here that Io’s father consulted the oracles as to what is χρή, but characters are not portrayed as asking oracles for knowledge as to what is χρή in Type I instances in the other six plays; there, what is χρή is self-evident, and recall that the asking of what is χρή, as a χρή-act, is a means of characterization of the relationship between speaker and addressee. This resembles especially the interactions between the Chorus of Danaids and their father in the Supplices, in which Danaüs firmly establishes himself as the party more knowledgeable, more capable of telling what is χρή on account of his age and experience. Likewise, in the instance on its surface closest to this one in the Prometheus, at Supplices 519, the king of Argos asserts his authority and greater knowledge of his own culture when he says that he will instruct Danaüs as to what it is χρή for him to say in order to be best received by the Argive council. Thus one of the salient uses of χρή in Type I instances in the other six plays is establishing the authority of speaker and addressee relative to one another, and χρή is not used there toward the acquisition of information from the gods themselves.

Here, ultimately, the report of what is χρή is that Io must leave so that Zeus might sleep with her. Perhaps the most stunning feature of this instance of χρή is that what is χρή, the report that Io must leave, against her will, and to her own misery, is a
single command handed down which creates disorder. In the other six plays, what is χρή is not handed down as an imperative from a divinity only to serve his own purposes; here what is χρή undermines all normalcy in Io and her father’s life. The cosmic law which χρή represents in the other six plays, it is true, serves primarily to describe the relationship between mortals and gods, but that is from the perspective of and for the continued stability of the human culture, and its primary tenet is humility, knowing one’s place. Here it is χρή that Io allow Zeus to rape her.
Chapter IV: Type II χρή in the Prometheus

Now I will discuss the Type II uses, to which, as they occur primarily in the Prometheus alone, I will refer also as the “Promethean” uses. This Promethean usage of χρή, in contrast to the cosmic law χρή, is characterized by its reference to a) future time, especially as distinguished from the present, b) a specific, named individual, c) a conception of the gods as acting independently of, if not at odds with, the source of necessity communicated by the χρή-statement, and d) specific knowledge known or predictable only to one individual (i.e. the one making the χρή-statement) within the scene. On account of the differences in context and meaning of χρή between the cosmic law and Promethean uses of χρή, the speech act function of χρή-statements also varies; the vast majority of Type I uses have imperative force and give specific information about the power dynamic and relationship between the speaker and addressee, but as I shall demonstrate, the same does not hold true concerning those of Type II.

A typical Type II usage occurs at line 703:

τὴν πρὶν γε χρείαν ἠνύσασθ᾽ ἐμοῦ πάρα
κούφως· μαθεῖν γὰρ τῆσδε πρῶτ᾽ ἔχοις
τὸν ἀμφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ἄθλον ἐξηγούμενης·
tὰ λοιπὰ νῦν ἀκούσαθ᾽, οία χρὴ πάθη
τλῆναι πρὸς Ἦρας τὴν νεάνιδα. (700-704)

65 Cf. Griffith 1983 (225) on his discussion of line 772.
In this instance, Prometheus states that he is about to gratify the Chorus’ desire by foretelling for them the trials Io will suffer. His very meaning requires that χρή here refer to future events, but the author’s wording also brings attention to the contrast between present (νῦν) and future (τὰ λοιπὰ— the implication is there, even if “future” is not its immediate meaning here), and past (Io’s recently finished speech on the sufferings she has already endured) and future (what she will endure, which Prometheus is about to tell) as well. These sufferings will apply only to one, identified, individual; what is described as χρή here is not applicable to anyone else, as these are discrete acts (just as the discrete pieces of information desired in the indirect questions above) performed by one individual (Io) with no reference to universal order (and no application outside the immediate future of Io herself). χρή in the other six plays has no explicit creator— no conscious mind which decides what is χρή— and in the Prometheus elsewhere it is ambiguous; but in this instance the agent of Io’s sufferings is named: it is Hera. It is rare enough indeed for a divinity to be named as enacting what is χρή, but

66 The phrase τὸ μέλλον has a contextualizing force at Prometheus 213:
empli de μήτηρ οὐχ ἀπεξ μόνον Θέμις
καὶ Γαῖα, πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφή μία,
τὸ μέλλον κραίνοιτο προυτεθεσπίκει,
ὡς οὐ κατ᾽ ἱσχὺν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ καρτερόν
χρείη, δόλῳ δὲ τοὺς ὑπερσχόντας κρατεῖν. (209-213)

Prometheus, in this speech to the Chorus, does not imply any sort of moral superiority, and so all he means by his use of χρή is that “it would come to pass that,” in the future; the distinction is one of time.

67 The tension is even more palpable when we consider that at this instance, Prometheus is foretelling Io’s struggles yet to come— both of them are in the middle of their agony, but the end is foreseeable for one but yet not for the other, the one doing the telling. (Long 248)
the context of this instance renders it more unusual; elsewhere, if a specific deity is intended as the agent, it is Zeus, but here, not only is it not Zeus, but it is Hera, acting against Zeus’ wishes. There is no greater context or explanation for the source of or reasoning behind these sufferings for Io; they do not form any part of a higher order.

Prometheus states explicitly that her experiences will be unpleasant (ἀθλον, τλῆναι); in Type I instances, when a character suffers punishment described as χόρη (e.g. Choephoroi 930) it is in retribution for having committed something which is contrary to “cosmic law,” but here Io has committed no such offense.

As a speech act, this use is purely descriptive; it is not at all a χόρη-act as in the Type I statements in that it is not an imperative of any kind. Io is the passive recipient here of what is χόρη. On account of Prometheus’ ability to foretell the future, the other characters in the play show general deference to him; however, the clear reference to the authority of the speaker in Type I instances stems from the obvious nature of the content of the χόρη-statement. In this instance, this knowledge belongs to Prometheus alone, and he is not reminding his audience of what is χόρη, but rather, informing them.

Of course, this difference in use has not been appreciated by me alone; these instances of χόρη (and others) have been translated as “it is fated that” for centuries; I am merely explicating the subconscious thought processes behind such a translation.69 By using the phrase “it is fated that,” I believe, an English speaker refers to a) a specific

\[\text{68} \text{ Of course, Zeus’ lust caused all of this, but the divinity immediately responsible for this is Hera. Griffith (215) hesitates between the two in assigning agency.}\]

\[\text{69} \text{ Cf. Griffith’s identifications (1983, 225), or Italie’s Latin translations (329).}\]
event, necessarily in the future, for comparison with the present, and b) a certain individual or group of individuals, and c) supernatural agency. Translators have very often consciously or subconsciously perceived the difference between the cosmic law uses and the “Promethean” use and demonstrated this awareness through their translation.

Χρή in Type I instances usually describes a type of action, not a specific action; it has to do with a manner of comportment rather than discrete actions. In the following example, at Prometheus 100, the indirect question asks for a specific piece of information regarding the future of one individual alone.

\[
dερ\chiο\theta\eta\nu \ ο\ι\αις \ α\ικε\ι\αι\σιν
\delta\αι̱κναιόμενος \ τον \ μυριετή
\ χρόνον \ άθλεύσω
\ τοιόνδε \ ο \ νέος \ ταγός \ μακάρων
\ εξη\υρ\' \ ἐπ' \ ἐμοί \ δεσμὸν \ άεική.
\ ϕε\υ \ ϕε\υ \ τό \ παρόν \ τό \ τ' \ ἐπερχόμενον
\ πῆμα \ στενάχω, \ πή \ ποτε \ μόχθων
\ χρή \ τέρματα \ τώνδε \ ἐπιτείλαι. \ (93-100)
\]

This instance readily brings to mind the instance at Supplices 971 (the Chorus of Danaids: “we’ll ask our father regarding where it is χρή that we live”), but there are several distinctions we must keep in mind: Prometheus here is very much concerned by time (τό παρόν τό τ’ἐπερχόμενον)—and he contrasts the present with hopeful change to come in the future (cf. Griffith 1983 104); the translation “it is fated” in English is the best expression of the tension between the two (as Harry translates it), whereas the Danaids do not consider time to be to be their adversary. Type I χρή statements are a means of characterizing the power dynamic between two individuals, and, as Ryzman argues,
this deference on the part of the Danaids is a primary feature of their characterization.

In this instance in the *Prometheus*, Prometheus is speaking alone on stage to himself, and he does not expect the *knowledge* of what is χρή to come from an authority figure. The instance at line 183, where the Chorus expresses their fear concerning Prometheus’ fate, also recalls the *Supplices* 971:

εμάς δὲ φρένας ἐρέθισε διάτορος φόβος,  
dέδια δ᾽ ἀμφί σαίς τύχαις,  
πά ποτε τῶν ἄμα τὸν πόνον  
χρή σε τέρμα κέλσαν ἐσιδεῖν· ἀκίχητα γὰρ ἤθεα καὶ κέαρ  
ἀπαράμυθον Κρόνου παίς. (181-185)

This instance brings such great attention to the contrast of present versus future action that “when?” is the main force of the indirect question, a question directed internally (δέδια), as Type II χρή-statements do not expect a response (note that, in interrogative Type I χρή-statements, the speaker considers it important, if not crucial, that he or she learn the answer, and correct behavior) and therefore do not position the speaker relative to another character in the play. Zeus’ actions are in the present time (ἔχει 185); in Prometheus’ response, in which he claims that Zeus will one day be mollified, he uses ἔσται (192). The Chorus conceives of the agent behind Prometheus’ misery as Zeus directly (lines 160-167); the χρή-statement here refers to the time when Zeus’ control will fail (as Prometheus has hinted to the Chorus at lines 171-172).

The tension between present and future is also clear in the χρή-statement at line 485, also between Prometheus and the Chorus:

τρόπους τε πολλοὺς μαντικῆς ἐστοίχισα  
κάκων πρῶτος εἶ ὀνειράτων ἃ χρή  
ὕπα γενέσθαι, κλῆσον τε ὑπὸ τοὺς

485
Griffith translates 485-486 as, “I was the first to interpret from dreams what must happen during waking hours.” Whether or not we take the antecedent of ἄ to be “dreams,” clearly the relative clause implies things that occur after the dreams themselves (and after the reading of them). I read “ὕπαρ” here as adverbial and indicating reality, and therefore: “I was the first to discern what of their dreams would become real while awake.” The whole passage concerns the tension between the present and the future, since it details means of divination: the interpretation of dreams, how to read omens and signs, augury and the habits of birds, reading entrails, sacrifice, reading signs from flames. It must be in the context of futurity.

It is interesting that here in only one part of his speech does Prometheus mention the relationship to the gods of his teachings to men; as he describes sacrifices, he refers to the color that the bile must have in order to be pleasing to the gods, but he refers to performing a successful sacrifice as a “δυστέκμαρτον τέχνην” (497), and not with any greater relationship to the cosmos.

The following three instances of χρή, at 715, 721, and 730, are from that same speech of Prometheus as 703, directed to the Chorus and Io, advising Io on how her course will lead and how best to avoid unnecessary dangers.

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Σκύθας δ᾽ ἀφίξῃ νομάδας, οἵ πλεκτὰς στέγας
πεδάρσιον ἐκπεράν χθόνα. 710

δοὺς τέξοντοι ἐξηρτυμένοι
οἷς μὴ πελάζειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁλιστόνοις πόδας
κροτάφων ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν. ἀστρογείτονας δὲ κορυφὰς ὑπερβάλλουσαν εἰς μεσημβρινὴν
κέλευθον. (709-723)

Άντιμεροι γὰρ οὐδὲ πρόσπλατοι ξένοις.

ἔξεις δ᾽ Ὕβριστὴν ποταμὸν οὐ ψευδώνυμον·
ὅν μὴ περάσῃς, οὐ γὰρ εὔβατος περάν,
πρὶν ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸν Καύκασον μόλις, ὄρων
ὑψιστὸν, ἐνθὰ ποταμὸς ἐκφυσᾷ μένος
κροτάφων ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν. ἀστρογείτονας δὲ χρή
κορυφὰς ὑπερβάλλουσαν εἰς μεσημβρινὴν
βῆναι κέλευθον. (729-731)

These three instances are not descriptive like that at line 703; they are imperatives
coming from one who rightfully adopts the tone of one more knowledgeable of such
things. However, as at line 703, they refer to the actions of one individual in unique
circumstances (of which only one other individual has knowledge). They are used not
in addition to other imperatives but rather, it seems, in place thereof (the only
morphological imperatives in this whole speech are at 707 and 718), and their reference
to the future is clear by the future tense of the finite verbs around them (ἀφίξῃ 709,
ήξεις 717 and 724, etc.). Whereas in Type I instances, typically the χρή-statement is
made spontaneously, as one character’s corrective to or advice concerning the behavior
of another (and barring that, the individual seeking advice conceives of it as positively
affecting his or her situation) these three are requested, and only with hesitation.
Perhaps the main difference well illustrated by these between the “Promethean”
use and the others in Aeschylus is that Io does not yet know the information being
passed on to her. Neither does the Chorus, and if the audience has ever heard this
information before, it is much too arcane to be readily accessible (contrast Agamemnon’s
reminder to Clytemnestra that a man must not be judged fortunate until after death). In
other instances in which one character is “informing” another, any person of authority
could and likely would give the same advice; here, it is the especial province of
Prometheus. Strangely enough, when Prometheus begins recounting his mother’s oracle
of what remains to happen to Io, after her wanderings have come to an end, at lines
846ff., he does not use χρή at all.

The comparandum for a character using χρή to describe what must be done in
order to keep safe physically is at Supplices 763 (762-763: ὡς καὶ ματαίων ἀνοσίων τε
κναδάλων / ἔχοντας ὀργάς, χρὴ φυλάσσεσθαι τάχος; cf. Prometheus 715-716 οἰκούσι
Χάλυβες, οὓς φυλάξασθαι σε χρή. / ἀνήμεροι γὰρ οὐδὲ πρόσπλατοι ξένοις);
however, at that instance the Egyptians are more intimidating on account of their lack of
piety than their brute strength. Prometheus provides no justification for Io avoiding the
Chalybes; in fact, he provides no explanation at all as to why Io must undergo these
trials, except that Zeus ordained it, and Zeus is βίαιος (737). In the other plays, the gods
represent that “north” to which the compass of χρή will always point; although
Prometheus can never be accused of being unbiased, what Zeus asks of individuals in
the Prometheus is always self-serving and usually creates disorder.

Prometheus dispenses information again, to Hermes, at line 966:
Not only is Prometheus here the sole possessor of the knowledge of what is χρή (and his words apply to one individual alone), but what is χρή here is so far removed from cosmic, timeless law, that what it indicates for the future does not, in the end, occur.

Although they are all divinities, nevertheless the individuals involved (Zeus, and that unspecified οὗ) have concrete identities in Prometheus’ mind, in a situation to which no universal truth is applicable.

At line 297, Oceanus requests a discrete piece of information from Prometheus, regarding his own situation:

In the other instances in which χρή is used in an indirect question of one requesting knowledge of what is χρή from another in a position of greater knowledge or authority, that asking, as a χρή-act, intentionally situates the speaker as of a lower status. If that were the case here, Oceanus would be deferring with genuine respect to Prometheus. However, the fact that Oceanus is a god, and free, and that Prometheus is also a divinity, but captive (even more galling because of his status), not to mention Prometheus’ response, indicate to us that if that deference were even implied (i.e. if this were a Type I

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71 Cf. Supplices 519 and 971.
The first lines of Prometheus' response indicate his surprise: ἔα· τί χρῆμα λεύσσω; καὶ σὺ δὴ πόνων ἐμῶν / ἥκεις ἐπόπτης; etc. (300-301)\textsuperscript{3}

As for reference to the future—γνώσῃ (295) and ἐρεῖς (298) are both future, and the statement at 298-299 puts emphasis on the change of status between them to happen. This entire speech, after all, is an attempt at persuasion of Prometheus to regard Oceanus as a friend, even though this hasn’t been the case in the past. What’s more, in the end, Oceanus never truly holds up; his daughters do, however, and faithfully prove their friendship, at lines 1063ff. (Long 250)

The relationship between the Olympian gods and what is χρῆ differs greatly between the Type I and Type II instances; in the Prometheus, the gods, especially Zeus, are characterized as a power separate from what is χρῆ, and they represent and reinforce a sort of cosmic might which not only does not serve to uphold the stability of the universe, but seeks to undermine the cosmic necessity which is portrayed as ultimately governing them as well. In the following instance at line 930 we have a clear example of Zeus’ characterization as separate from and struggling against what is χρῆ.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{3} Griffith (1983, 142-143): “P. speaks as if he has not heard Ocean’s address to him; and he takes no notice of the inquiry of 294-5.”

\textsuperscript{4} Almost certainly the source here with the most useful insights concerning the use of χρῆ in the Prometheus is Griffith, in his 1983 commentary on that work. Although he does not address the meaning or use of χρῆ in the other six works (as he is writing from the perspective that the Prometheus was not written by Aeschylus), he considers χρῆ in the Prometheus to refer to the same
In this passage Prometheus acknowledges the power Zeus holds over him but states explicitly that Zeus' power is potentially transient and susceptible to overthrow (926-927). Zeus cannot represent what transcends time and upholds the stability of the universe if his reign itself is unstable; what is χρή, then, in this passage, supercedes what Zeus represents.

Any contrast in a statement between the future and the present implies the prediction or expectation of change—hence the tension between a use of χρή referring to future time and the idea that what χρή represents is timeless. Prometheus' speech at 908-927 is full of future tense verbs. The Chorus in this passage counters what Prometheus says by insisting upon the impropriety of such statements and attempting to find a reason for which he would make such remarks; at line 928 they insist that it is only Prometheus' unhappiness at his present situation that causes him to harbor such negativity toward Zeus. He replies that yes, it is his desire that Zeus be brought down, but that he speaks "the things which will be accomplished." The future tense (τελεῖται) within that statement provokes the Chorus' reply: "is it χρή that we look out for one to put Zeus aside?" Indeed, Prometheus responds to them with ἔξει (931).

force as do μοῖρα and τὸ πεπρωμένον and that these words collectively identify an order greater than Zeus (see especially Griffith 1983, 17-18; also, Long's commentary at line 211). Griffith sees "external order" to be represented in this work by the personification of the Moirai and the Erinyes. (See also 180 and 225.)

75 For another instance displaying these issues, see that at Prometheus 772:
At 1067 the Chorus refutes Hermes, who has asked them to step down, by affirming their friendship to Prometheus:

πῶς με κελεύεις κακότητ᾽ ἀσκεῖν;  
μετὰ τοῦτο ὅ τι χρὴ πάσχειν ἐθέλω·  
τοὺς προδότας γάρ μισεῖν ἔμαθον,  
κοῦκ ἐστι νόσος  
tῆσδ᾽ ἦντιν ἀπέπτυσα μάλλον. (1066-1070)

Here the Chorus contrasts, by placement of the words and lines especially, what is χρή with κακότητ᾽ ἀσκεῖν (1066) and τοὺς προδότας (1068), thus characterizing what is χρή as noble, worthy, and one may interpret it as “whatever it is right to suffer,” i.e. “whatever it is appropriate that I suffer”; that they contrast “what is right” with betrayal indicates their feelings on the importance of their relationship with Prometheus, a relationship which is certainly predicated on their agreement with his politics. If this is the correct interpretation, it is further evidence that the gods in the Prometheus do not serve as representatives of cosmic law: the Chorus feel that Prometheus’ is the righteous path, and with him they contrast the actions and intentions of Zeus and Zeus’ minion Hermes himself (1064-1065; he is the “traitor” at 1068 and the “pest” at 1069). Χρή here signifies something not only more powerful but higher than Zeus himself. Plus, this response on the part of the Chorus was provoked by Hermes’ threat against them (Long 274); as Hermes is Zeus’ minion in this play, their refusal to do what he asks and instead do what is χρή marks a huge distinction between them in the Chorus’ perception.

Hermes’ response, at any rate, at lines 1071-1079, is a response not to “I am willing to

Io: τίς οὖν ὁ λύσων ἐστίν ἄκοντος Διός;  
Prometheus: τῶν σῶν τιν' αὐτόν ἐγγόνων εἶναι χρεῶν.  
Io: πῶς εἶπας; ἦ 'μος παῖς σ' ἀπαλλάξει κακῶν; (771-773)
suffer with [Prometheus] whatever will come,” (i.e. a simple reference to the future) but, rather, to “I am willing to suffer with him whatever is right”; his reply is that their self-righteousness and smugness will not serve as a shield to protect them from pain.

The commentary on interpersonal relationships which Type I uses give is helpful in evaluating other Type II instances as well; as an example, take that at line 630, in which Prometheus acquiesces in Io’s request:

Io: μή τοί με κρύψῃς τοῦθ᾽, ὅπερ μέλλω παθεῖν.
Prometheus: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μεγαίρω τοῦδε τοῦ δωρήματος.
Io: τί δὴτα μέλλεις μή οὗ γεγονίσκειν τὸ πάν;
Prometheus: φθόνος μὲν οὔ, σὰς δ᾽ ὀκνῶ θράξαι φρένας.
Io: μή μοι προκήδου μᾶς σον ἢμοι γλυκύ.
Prometheus: ἐπεὶ προκήδου, χρή λέγειν ἢκονε δῇ. (625-630)

I include this instance here in order to discuss the speech act function of the χρή-statement as commentary to the relationship between the speaker and addressee, Prometheus and Io; not only is the flow of respect going in the opposite direction as might be supposed from the χρή-statement, but as discussed at line 640, in Type I χρή-statements the authority which is the source of the necessity comes from neither the speaker nor the addressee. It is true that what is χρή in a Type I χρή-statement often stems from the interpersonal relationships which demand certain behavior of those involved in them, and deference could be imagined as part of such behavior.76 However, the relationship between Io and Prometheus is entirely unlike anything we have seen to cause this elsewhere; the “cosmic” expectation for deference is simply not there.

76 Cf. Eteocles’ command to the Chorus at Septem 713, or Agamemnon’s gentle reproach of Clytemnestra at Agamemnon 917.
It is appropriate to relate this instance back to those Type I instances somewhat intermediate between the two types, since what is χρή here is apparently dependent on the truth of the subordinate clause. In Type I instances, it is not typically used of such a narrowly defined situation, and it is not used as a first-person singular imperative; at the end of the *Eumenides* Athena intends a first person plural sense.\(^7\)

Io’s relationship to Prometheus is brought to bear again at line 640, where she responds to his exhortations of her to follow the Chorus’ requests for further information:

\[
\begin{align*}
oυκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως ὑμῖν ἀπιστῆσαι με χρή, & \quad 640 \\
\sigmaαφεὶ δὲ μύθῳ πᾶν ὄπερ προσχρῄζετε & \piευσεσθὲ καίτοι καὶ λέγους· \ αἰσχύνομαι \\
\thetaεόσσυτον χειμὼν καὶ διαφθορὰν & \mορφῆς, \ θεν μοι σχετλία προσέπτατο. \ (640-644)
\end{align*}
\]

I take Io to mean that considering her position vis-à-vis the Oceanids it would not be appropriate for her to refuse their request to hear the sufferings she has already endured. What has prompted this feeling on her part appears to be Prometheus’ reminder that the Oceanids are the siblings of her father, and according to familial affection and respect, she ought to gratify their desire. Their desire, however, is a perverse one: they take pleasure (631) in her agony, and it is agony, as she states that she would rather not tell her tale on account of her shame over her current appearance. Therefore, although what is χρή here is framed in terms of familial obligation, the characterization of the source of that obligation is not noble, much less positive, and not helpful toward preserving any sort of “cosmic” stability. In Type I instances, a χρή-act

\(^7\) Cf. *Agamemnon* 1226 in the appendix of interpolations.
serves to characterize two parties in relationship to one another in terms of experience, knowledge, and power, and it is rather inconceivable that the Oceanids, who are not portrayed as having any sort of special status here, are meant to be characterized as a source of this relative to Io.\textsuperscript{78} At any rate, χρή is not used in Type I instances to gratify another individual (or set of individuals) without reference to some larger context of propriety; when a χρή-act is an imperative, the speaker does not imply that his authority over the addressee is itself χρή and may be used toward any end he desires. The opposite is true: when a figure of authority invokes what is χρή in order to convince another to do something, he is implying that the source of the imperative comes from something much, much larger than the both of them.\textsuperscript{79}

Thus we have seen that χρή is used in these seven plays in two basic contexts: in the first, the necessity communicated by the word implies some concept of external, universal order, and what is “necessary” primarily deals with the behavior by which individuals conform to or uphold this order, often associated with “divinity” or the Olympian gods. In the second, the word describes events yet to come, and if it does communicate some external order, this order is characterized as conflicting with the wishes of the Olympians, particularly Zeus. I have not sought thus far to attempt to explain the source of this discrepancy or locate it within research on Aeschylus, but I believe that the starkness of contrast between the two types, combined with the fact that

\textsuperscript{78} The Chorus of the \textit{Prometheus} does not use the word as instructive, ever; they use it only twice, once in a direct question, at line 930, and once in an indirect question, at line 183.

\textsuperscript{79} Cf. perhaps the Type I χρή-statements made by those whose authority is highest: Darius, at \textit{Persae} 820, or Agamemnon, at \textit{Agamemnon} 821 or 917.
the overwhelming majority of Type II instances are found in the *Prometheus*, lends itself to explanation by way of the discussion on the authorship of the *Prometheus* and whether it is genuinely Aeschylean. If I should consider my findings alone, I would hesitate to believe that a single author would use one rather standard type of context for a word connoting necessity predominantly in six works but use in great number an entirely different context and meaning in another. As several of the Type I instances appear to display a sort of χρή intermediate between the two, it seems most likely to me that Type I and Type II are two ends of a short spectrum of context and meaning for χρή; if any given author felt that both ends were within his typical usage, we as readers would expect that the two (even with a dearth of intermediate uses) would be distributed evenly among the works. As the Type II instances fall almost solely in the *Prometheus*, however, I believe my findings are merely the newest addition to the growing evidence against an Aeschylean authorship for that work, as they indicate a use of the word which must have evolved over time from “intermediate” uses like the ones in the other six works. I favor a late date\textsuperscript{80} for the writing of the *Prometheus*, as I believe that the evolution of thought and development of philosophical inquiry over the course of the fifth century B.C. must at least partially explain such a marked change for a word indicating necessity.\textsuperscript{81} I must admit, however, that I find the evidence presented over the past forty years or so against an Aeschylean authorship to be irresistibly compelling.

\textsuperscript{80} For learned conjectures upon the date, see esp. Griffith 1977 (9-13), in which he concludes that the play was written between 479 and 415 B.C., and his conclusion at 252-254.

\textsuperscript{81} On sophistic and other influences upon the author of the *Prometheus*, see also Griffith 1977 207ff., esp. 217ff. On Zeus in the *Prometheus* vs. in Aeschylus, see Lloyd-Jones’ article (56), and
Two appendices follow. The first is a description of the five instances of χρή not mentioned here on account of credible evidence (and eminent scholars’ beliefs) that they have been interpolated. The second is an effort to contextualize the findings given here by describing, in a rather less detailed manner, the usage of χρή in Pindar; if the differences between Type I and Type II χρή arise from temporal distance, there should be a strong correlation between the usage of χρή in Pindar and the Type I usage here, since Pindar was a close contemporary of Aeschylus. I believe the correlation exists, in fact, and in my appendix on the uses of χρή in Pindar I will show that these uses conform rather uniformly to the Type I use in Aeschylus, with no indication that Pindar conceives of χρή as referring to future time or individual knowledge.

especially his quotation of Schmid on 57: “He held that the presentation of Zeus in the other plays of Aeschylus was one so elevated, so advanced, and so profound that its author could not possibly have written the Prometheus Vinctus, with its very different picture.” Lloyd-Jones returns to the question again on 65.
Appendix A: The Interpolated Instances

In the manuscript tradition of the seven plays considered here, there are five additional instances of χρή; I have omitted them from discussion thus far either because I am convinced that they are not the production of the original author or because I think that the strength of the arguments against their authenticity would detract from their use in the main body of my thesis. In this appendix I will for each instance briefly discuss the force of χρή as it would relate, if it should be genuine, to my findings, and direct my reader to the principal evidence against its authenticity.

First I will discuss the instance at Septem 1005:

δοκοῦντα καὶ δόξαντ᾽ ἀπαγγέλλειν με χρὴ
dήμου προβούλων τής τε Καδμείας πόλεως·
Ετεοκλέα μὲν τόνδ᾽ ἐπ᾽ εὐνοίᾳ χθονὸς
θάπτειν ἐδοξε γῆς φίλαις κατασκαφαῖς. (1005-1008)

“It is χρή that I announce”… In this instance, the herald introduces himself by stating his purpose and task: he has come in order to announce Eteocles’ death and the events which have just taken place; he cites the source of his obligation in doing so as what is χρή, meaning that this task is how what is χρή devolves upon him, in his position as messenger. This is the applied use of χρή, just as at the beginning of this play, Eteocles describes the acts expected of him in his capacity as ruler as χρή, so here the messenger refers to the cosmic law which devolves onto one type of individual within one occupation or position.\textsuperscript{82} The herald accordingly makes a parallel between his duty and that of the προβούλοι; it is his to announce (ἀπαγγέλλειν) where it is theirs to decide

\textsuperscript{82} Also of this type are the instances at Eumenides 708 and Persae 527.
upon policy (δοκοῦντα καὶ δόξαντα). The entire speech as well is a judgment on which actions are correct: Eteocles is considered honorable for his blamelessness towards the gods, whereas Polynices is to receive no burial on account of his guilt towards his ancestral gods (1024). Lest we forget the messenger’s place in this speech, he reminds us at line 1018; lest we forget the Chorus’, he reminds us at line 1031.

Very important, however, is the interaction between social custom or human decree and the reliance of such obligation on what is perceived to be divine mandate; such interaction produces what is χρή, as it is framed in terms of the divine. Hence comes the explanation of Eteocles’ virtues and Polynices’ faults, and hence the quarrel between Antigone and the Chorus which follows this passage; she refuses to reconcile the two and ignores the Chorus’ protestations of the superior power of the state.

The arguments on the authenticity of the end of the Septem are extensive and convincing to me; see especially Lloyd-Jones, Lupaş and Petre (281), Dawson (22-25), and Dawe.

At Agamemnon 1226 Cassandra describes for the Chorus her own position in the new world in which she finds herself:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ἐκ τῶνδε ποινὰς φημι βουλεύειν τινά λέοντ᾽ ἄναλκιν ἐν λέχει στρωφῶμεν όικουρόν, οίμοι, τῷ μολόντι δεσπότῃ}
\end{align*}
\]

1225

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83 Lloyd-Jones takes on the question of whether this is intended as a reference to the group in Athens in the late fifth century; Lupaş and Petre (282) write, on the interment of Polynices, “cet arrêt surprenant émane d’une autorité qui n’était pas mentionnée auparavant.”


85 CQ N.S. 17: 16-28, for the first edition; for the second, see the Studies Presented to Denys Page, 1978, 87-103.
This instance is also a classic Type I use in that what is χρή for Cassandra here is what is χρή for someone in her position, i.e. a female member of a city which has been sacked. Χρή here cannot have reference to future time, as she herself knows (and says) that she will not be enduring slavery for much longer. She is not prophesying the immediate future at this point in her conversation with the Chorus, as she portrays Agamemnon as a living being with some manner of comprehension or agency. In her speech beginning at 1256, she begins to consider both herself and Agamemnon as those who are directly about to fall (as at 1313-1314), who may as well already be dead; only there does she begin to talk about what will happen in the future (even if the direct future). From 1223-1230, she speaks of the present. If we should try to reconcile this instance with the prophecies of Prometheus, since both are capable of telling the future, we would have to account for the fact that whereas Prometheus uses χρή often, Cassandra uses it only here. 86

Fraenkel is convinced that line 1226 is interpolated, and he cites Campbell, A. Ludwig, and Herwerden as agreeing with him; the arguments against the authenticity of

86 Cf. Fraenkel (563): “To tolerate 1226 is to assume that the prophetess, who in this whole section serves merely as the instrument for communicating a tremendous decree of destiny, could for a short moment forget the noble austerity of her bearing to cast a side-glance at her own affairs and, sighing like a sentimental girl, complain of her sad fate in terms of a commonplace maxim.”
this line generally revolve around the type of sentiment expressed here and its relationship to the rest of Cassandra’s speech but include discussions of diction. The next instance occurs in the midst of the herald’s strong unwillingness (and half-praeteritio) in telling the misfortunes which the Argives have suffered both at and in returning from Troy, at Agamemnon 571:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖσιν Ἀργείων στρατοῦ} & \quad [573] \\
\text{νικᾷ τὸ κέρδος, πῆμα δ᾽ οὐκ ἀντιρρέπει.} & \quad [574] \\
\text{τί τοὺς ἀναλωθέντας ἐν ψήφῳ λέγειν,} & \quad [570] \\
\text{τὸν ζῶντα δ᾽ ἀλγεῖν χρὴ τύχης παλιγκότου;} & \quad [571] \\
\text{καὶ πολλὰ χαίρειν ξυμφορὰς καταξιῶ,} & \quad [572] \\
\text{ὡς κομπάσαι τῷδ᾽ εἰκὸς ἡλίου φάει} & \quad \text{(572-578)} \\
\text{ὑπὲρ θαλάσσης καὶ χθονὸς ποτωμένοις.}
\end{align*}
\]

If this instance of χρή here is genuine, its use is appropriate for the same reasons it is eight lines later; the herald here, in his speech to the Chorus, reconciles the pain the army has experienced with the joy of safe return by choosing to focus on the latter. One might expect that the gravity of what he tells—death and war—would render a δεῖ in the place of this χρή cavalier and likely too unconcerned. The herald makes a number of references to various forms of propriety in this passage; the differing words might imply distinction or might be variatio (δεῖ 567, χρή 571 and 580, εἰκός 575); see the discussion below.

In my discussion of the instance at 580, I came to the conclusion that the use of χρή is typical of Type I usage there on account of the herald’s feelings about man’s camp.

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87 Campbell, A.Y. 1935. “Aeschylus’ Agamemnon 1223-1238 and Treacherous Monsters.” CQ 29: 25-36. Among other things, Campbell (27) calls this line “unnecessary, vapid, and intrusive to the subject matter of this context.”

88 Thomson (51) notes that there is a repetition of contrast between the dead and the living in these lines and the lines preceding them.
relationship to the gods in general, and Zeus in particular; he argues that joy and
gratitude are the appropriate response in the wake of what has befallen the army.
Concerning this speech of the herald and Agamemnon’s opening speech, Fraenkel
writes, “The first speech of the Herald is a foil as well as a supplement to the great
oration which Agamemnon delivers on entering the stage. The two opening prayers are
parallel; so is the almost harsh use of juridical technicalities: the Herald employing terms
of criminal law (534-538) and the king describing the high court of divine justice with
details borrowed from Attic procedure (813 ff.). By this parallelism the profound
contrast in temper and manners, in education and discretion is made the more striking.
The Herald is jubilant with wild joy; the king is a model of perfect restraint.” (294) It is
important to note not only that both the herald and Agamemnon use χρή in these
speeches (and the word does not occur in the intervening lines), but also that their use of
the word is the same, with the emphasis on gratitude.

In any discussion of this instance of χρή, however, one must reconcile its
appearance here with the use of δεῖ at line 567, earlier in the herald’s speech (τί ταῦτα
πένθειν δεῖ; παροίχεται πόνος·), which is a typical use of the “rhetorical” δεῖ,
borrowed, as we have seen, from the one instance of δεῖ in Homer. The instance of χρή
at 571 appears to rephrase this very question, and although χρή rhetorical questions are
not entirely absent from Greek, they are very rare. Certainly there is enough context of
man’s relationship to the divine to justify Aeschylus’ use of χρή at 571, but its
appearance so close to a δεῖ rhetorical question, with the same content, lends its
explanation to arguments of variatio.
Fraenkel discusses the arguments concerning 570-572, in debates which have been going on for centuries, on pages 286-287. To paraphrase him: certain scholars feel that they belong where they are (Bamberger, Ahrens); some delete them (Nägelsbach, Blaydes), and Wilamowitz himself deleted them before recanting in defense, in a 1927 article. Fraenkel himself believes that the insertion of these lines, with χρή, may have been caused by the appearance of δεῖ and the parallel meaning and structure.

There are two perhaps interpolated instances of χρή in the *Prometheus*, and most editors are so certain that the one at line 606 is not genuine that they do not include it in the body of the text. Page’s text at these lines reads:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ἀλλά μοι τορῶς τέκμηρον ὅ τι μ’ ἐπαμένει} \\
\text{παθεῖν· τί μῆχαρ, ἢ τί φάρμακον νόσου;} \\
\text{δεῖξον εἴπερ οἶσθα. (605-607)}
\end{align*}
\]

Io begs Prometheus to tell her what she will suffer, a context which would set up a Type II χρή-statement, if this were one, as it includes future time, a reference to an individual and a particular situation, and an individual dispensing discrete information to another. Smyth translates these lines as, “Oh make plain to me what misery it is my fate yet to suffer, what remedy there is, or what cure, of my affliction. Reveal it, if thou hast the knowledge.” (269) Μῆχαρ, then, here, is “remedy;”\(^{89}\) the alternative, which comes from the M manuscript, is “τί μὴ χρή,” which would read, “what misery it is my fate yet to suffer, and what misery not to suffer.”

The other possible interpolation from the *Prometheus*, and the last which I shall discuss, appears at line 970. All those discussed previously might be considered Type I

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\(^{89}\) Μῆχαρ was introduced by Elmsley.
instances, if they should prove to be genuine, but I believe that the following instance bears a greater resemblance to the other Type II instances in that work.

Hermes:

κρεῖσσον γὰρ οἶμαι τῇδε λατρεύειν πέτρᾳ
ἡ πατρὶ φῦναι Ζηνὶ πιστὸν άγγελον.

Prometheus:

†

τούτως υβρίζειν τοὺς υβριζοντας χρεών.

Hermes:

χλιδᾶν ἔοικας τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασι.

(968-971)

The χρή-statement at line 970 is general enough to have universal significance, but there is no humility in this statement, no awe of the supernatural. Indeed, Prometheus here is not suggesting human action toward the gods, but a god’s action regarding himself, also a divine being, or, taken the other way (as there are differing opinions as to the grammatical function τοὺς υβριζοντας serves), his own action toward a god. The statement seems to express the necessity of escalating disorder; if υβριζοντας is the subject, the statement is entirely redundant; if it is the object, its tone is sarcastic and insulting, a justification of Prometheus’ own bitter words, and such a tone is not typical of Type I uses of χρή. From the Chorus’ words alone, it would be rather simple for the reader to imagine them as exhibiting some sort of deference to Prometheus’ greater knowledge, but Prometheus himself does not play the part of the typical character in that role.

This passage is the subject of much debate among scholars, regarding the transmission of the text (see Griffith on line 970) and even the syntax expected. However, whether υβριζοντας is the subject (Harry, Wilamowitz, Mazon, etc.), or object (Griffith) of υβριζειν, such a statement does not have the gravity typical of the other instances of χρή outside the Prometheus.
Appendix B: Χρή in Pindar

In this appendix I will describe the usage of χρή in Pindar and demonstrate the close relationship it bears to that of the Type I χρή in Aeschylus. Δεῖ occurs only once in Pindar, at Olympian 6.28 (πρὸς Πιτάναν δὲ παρ’ Εὐρώτα πόρον δεῖ σάμερον ἐλθεῖν ἐν ὥρᾳ·). To explain the type of necessity indicated there, Goodell writes, “To indicate the subject of his song the poet adopts the figure of having a journey to make. The suggestion of moral obligation has no place in [δεῖ] till far later.” (94) The necessity behind this δεῖ is explained as having a source very different from the necessity of the χρή in the previous line: the χρή-statement (χρὴ τοίνυν πύλας ὕμνων ἀναπιτνάμεν αὐτάις 28) is explained by the previous line and a half (στεφάνους ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ ἐπεὶ δέξαντο); it is χρή that one praise the family indicated, since they have won victories at Olympia. 90 The δεῖ-statement, however, explains the necessity behind the imperative at the beginning of the second strophe, in which the poet asks a Phintis to yoke some mules. The δεῖ is associated, then, with the mechanical act and refers to the objective behind that act; the source of necessity behind the χρή-statement is more remote. Although Pindar immediately thereafter launches into an excursus on various divine figures, he never returns to explain how this divinity relates to the obligation to go to Pitana on that day.

90 For more on this, see fn. 97, below.
Forms of χρή (including χρεών) occur 31 times in what survives of Pindar’s works. A great number of these occur in the form of “universal χρή” statements, notions echoed elsewhere in Greek literature, just as in Aeschylus. Pindar often expresses strong religious feeling through these statements; they typically exhort men towards a certain type of behavior, usually humility vis-à-vis the gods or vis-à-vis other men in order to preserve “cosmic” harmony. Consider the instance at Pythian 2.34, regarding Ixion and the warning against ὕβρις:

\[
\text{αἱ δύο δ' ἀμπλακίαι 30} \\
\text{φερέπονοι τελέθοντι τὸ μὲν ἲὼς ὅτι} \\
\text{ἐμφύλιον αἷμα πρώτιστος οὐκ ἄτερ τέχνας ἐπέμειξε θνατοῖς,} \\
\text{ὅτι τε μεγαλοκευθέεσσιν ἐν ποτε θαλάμοις} \\
\text{Διὸς ἀκοίτιν ἐπειρᾶτο. χρὴ δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὁρᾶν μέτρον. (30-34)\textsuperscript{93}}
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The poet uses Ixion here as an example of behavior which mortals must not copy; the χρή-statement is directed to all, equally, and it is represented as an injunction from the gods (21-24). The specific action to which this χρή-statement refers is given by the previous lines: not only had Ixion murdered his father-in-law, but he had attempted to sleep with Hera—both actions constitute egregiously inappropriate behavior, not least because he had been indebted to the Olympians and thus the order which they

\textsuperscript{91} For the list I have consulted Slater: Olympian 1.103, 6.4, 6.27, 8.74, 13.94; Pythian 2.34, 2.52, 2.88, 3.2, 3.59, 3.103, 4.1, 4.141, 4.271, 9.50; Nemean 1.25, 5.49, 7.44, 11.17, 11.47; Isthmian 1.43, 3.7, 3.8, 4.48, 8.15a, 8.16; and of the fragments, Hymn 42.4, Paian 6.96 and 52b.57, Parth. 94b.37 (=2.37), Incert. 234.3. This last I omit in my discussion because I feel there is not enough context to make an accurate assessment of Pindar’s use.

\textsuperscript{92} For example, that at I.4.48, χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ' ἀμαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν, or P. 4.271, χρὴ μαλακὰν χέρα προσβάλλοντα τρώμαν ἐλκεος ἀμφιπολεῖν.

\textsuperscript{93} The text of Pindar from which I quote is that of Race’s Loebs (1997).
represent. In Pindar the gods do not struggle against an order or power higher than
themselves, as they do in the Prometheus; even in Pythian 2 we see evidence of their
omnipotence—phrased without specifying a particular god, but with merely a reference
to divinity, at line 49 (θεὸς ἅπαν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδεσσι τέκμαρ ἀνύεται).

Humility as contentment with one’s own lot and the propriety of not hoping for
that which is beyond one’s own station is expressed through universal χρή-statements at
P. 3.59 and P. 3.103.

Here Pindar describes the fall of Asklepios, who had been accustomed to heal men’s
wounds, but, as this passage relates, eventually became fond of the payment he was
receiving for such services. He performed a healing act (bringing back one from the
dead) which was beyond his rights, thereby transgressing the gods’ (specifically, here,
Zeus’) will. Therefore Zeus punished him, and Pindar extracts from this anecdote a

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94 A similar maxim occurs at line 88: χρὴ δὲ πρὸς θεὸν οὐκ ἐρίζειν, in which line the “god” is
characterized as that which must not be transgressed through deceit.

95 On the propriety of not seeking deceitful gain, as at P.2.88, is at P.4.141. That one must do what
is appropriate for his or her nature is at N.1.25., and similarly, that one must not seek gain
beyond what is appropriate for himself is at N.11.47.

96 This context of the indiscretion against the gods is necessary to understand the first use of χρή
in this poem, at line 2, in which Pindar asks whether it is proper for him to wish that Cheiron

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maxim concerning the need for a mortal to know his place, especially considering the vast gulf between the status of men and that of the gods. I believe that with οἷς εἰμὲν αἴσας (60) Pindar does not mean to refer to any individual’s own future, but rather, the type of future which is possible for a mortal, given the relatively limited power at his disposal. This type of future possible is one in which a man cannot know what will befall him, and therefore he must regard the gods with appropriate awe, as expressed by the χρή-statement at line 103: εἰ δὲ νόῳ τις ἔχει θνατῶν ἀλαθείας ὁδόν, χρὴ πρὸς μακάρων / τυγχάνοντ’ εὑρίσκημεν. ἄλλοτε δ’ ἀλλοίαι πνοαὶ / ύψιπετᾶν ἰχνέων.

(103-105)

The source of propriety in still other χρή-statements is characterized as taking its force from its divine sanction/suggestion, but instead of indicating proper humility for mortals vis-à-vis the gods, these statements advise the appropriate behavior of men in their relationships with other men, especially in the giving of praise where praise is due, as the poet characterizes what is worthy of praise as individual excellence, though manifest in different ways. Pindar words these statements without specifying to whom they apply, but in them there is close connection with the χρή-statements in which

were still alive, a wish which he refers to as a prayer (εὐξασθαί 2). The same type of disclaimer comes at P. 9.50, in which Cheiron himself asks whether it is appropriate to instruct Apollo as to the future, considering Apollo is the god of prophecy. The χρή occurs in the question of propriety as to telling the future, regarding Cheiron’s own relationship with an Olympian god; he does not use χρή when indicating the future he foretells.
Pindar describes what is χρή for himself, as a praise poet, as glorifying the subjects of his poetry. The necessity of showing due appreciation for the achievements of other men appears at Isthmian 1.43:

εἰ δ᾿ ἀρετᾷ κατάκειται πᾶσαν ὀργάν,
ἀμφότεροι δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις,
χρή νὶν εὐφόρνεσσιν ἀγάνορα κόμπον
μὴ φθονεραῖσι φέρειν
γνώμαις· ἐπεὶ κούφα δόσις ἄνδρι σοφῷ  
ἀντὶ μόχθων παντοδαπῶν ἐπος εἰπόντ' ἀγαθὸν ξυνὸν ὀρθῶσαι καλὸν. (41-46)

In this instance the context indicates that Pindar is referring to himself, giving a maxim by way of explaining why it is appropriate that he himself should be praising Herodotus in such a way as he does. He refers to this praise as κέρδος ὕψιστον at line 51. Indeed, with this maxim Pindar justifies his own praise as appropriate by indicating that all should be doing the same, especially as such praise benefits more than just the victor (Ἐὐνόν 46). At lines 52-57 and 60-63 the poet cites the gods’ help in Herodotus’ victories;

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97 And not only to the addressees of the poems themselves; Pindar often refers his dedication to the excellence of an entire family to which he is indebted; cf the instance at Parth. 94b.37: “Neither for man nor woman, to whose offspring I am devoted, must I forget a fitting song.” (Race) The connection of birth within a family or group to one’s “destiny” or future excellence is often invoked by Pindar; I take this to be the primary force behind the sense at N. 5.49 (“it is χρή that a trainer of athletes come from Athens”), as throughout that poem Pindar cites birthplace and family as the source of and common thread behind a number of forms of excellence (see Πότμος δὲ κρίνει συγγενής ἔργων πέρι / πάντων 40-41).

98 This is Bundy’s χρέος-motive, the idea that the victor’s excellence requires praise (and that praise seeks out deeds worthy of song). On these lines, Bundy writes that this instance of χρή is part of a series of pairs marking the χρέος-motive, but that “the entire structure depends on χρη (line 43), which issues a very much stronger imperative than do the other forms in which the χρέος motive is cast. The conditional clause of lines 39f. sets up the imperative χρὴ φέρειν, and the explanatory clause that follows justifies it in terms that repeat both the condition and the imperative.” (57)
in Pindar victory and excellence come deo volente, and thus praise of the man is in part praise of the gods’ works. As much is said at *Isthmian* 3.4-5:

> Ζεύ, μεγάλαι δ’ ἀρεταὶ θνατοῖς ἑπονταὶ
> ἐκ σέθεν·

Therefore we will not be surprised that χρή occurs several lines below, in the same poem:

> ἡδὲ μάσσων ὀλβὸς ὀπίζομένων, πταγμαίως δὲ φρένεσσιν
> σφαῖραν ὀμῶν πάντα χρόνον ἰαλλων ὀμλεί.

> εὐκλέων δὲ ἔργων ἄποινα χρή μὲν ύμνησαι τὸν ἐσλόν,
> χρή δὲ κωμάζοντ’ ἀγαναῖς χαρίτεσσιν βαστάσαι. (5-8)

Two of the hallmarks of these universal instances are concision and self-containment; only a few lines of context are necessary to receive the effect. 

I.3 is a poem of only twenty lines; this idea, that victory and moments of excellence come from the gods (notice here that it is Zeus who is named), and that therefore men should praise other men, is the main thrust of the poem. Although the context indicates that Pindar refers to himself and the speech act which is praise poetry, nevertheless the lack of expressed subject extends the necessity to all who hear these words. The poet invokes the audience explicitly at line 15 (ἴστε).

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99 Bundy (56) writes that the repetition here of χρή is part of the dramatic effect: “The gnomic thought [that such great deeds must be praised] is subsequently brought closer to Melissos in the anaphoric χρή of lines 7f., and in line 9 he is introduced by name.” On the function of the χρέος motive here, the obligation which “determines the relationship between song and merit,” see page 63.

100 This same sort of injunction is given at N. 11.17, with the givers of the praise clearly expressed (ἀστῶν 17). On the necessity of praising one’s ancestors on account of their hard work and perseverance (by which the gods were impressed), see Paian 52b.57. An instance of this type perhaps not as self-explanatory is that at *Pythian* 2.52:
Such examples illustrate the poet’s exhortation to all citizens to join in praise of
the victor, but rather more often he uses the χρή-statement to justify or explain the
existence of the praise poem in which it occurs. Pindar often makes reference to himself
in his poetry, regarding not only his relationship to the addressee of a given poem but
also his function as praise poet, and a number of his χρή-statements in reference to
himself concern that which is appropriate for one in this position rather than himself as
an individual (as in, the necessity to which he refers has to do with function as poet and
not with his personal life; it is transferable). As this use bears upon his status and role, I
view them as similar to the “applied” χρή of Type I in Aeschylus in which the speaker
considers something “necessary” on account of his or her position in society (cf. Septem
1), although I believe that here the poet means to imply that the source of the necessity
for himself is the same as the source of the necessity for all to praise a given victor.

A typical example of this occurs at Olympian 1.103:

θεός ἄταν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδεσσι τέκμαρ ἀνύεται,
θεός, ὅ καὶ πτερόεντ’ αἰετὸν κίχε, καὶ θαλασ-
σαίον παραμείβεται
delphíná, kai ψυφρόνων tiv’ ekamψέ βροτόν,
ἐπέροισι δὲ κύδος ἀγήραον παρέδωκ’. ἐμὲ δὲ χρεών
φεύγειν δάκος ἀδινὸν κακαγοριάν
eidon γαρ ἑκὰς εὼν τὰ πόλλ’ ἐν ἀμαχανία
ψογερόν Ἀρχίλοχον βαιριόγοις ἐχθεσιν
πιαινόμενον’ (49-56)

However, notice that again, as in the previous instances, Pindar states himself as the subject of
the infinitive, in the context of the (unspecified) god’s omnipotence, particularly with reference to
the giving of glory to men. In conjunction with other typical χρή-statements, as a corollary to the
necessity of praise, Pindar has often remarked on the implied propriety of keeping one’s mouth
shut when one does not have something constructive to say. Here the order of weight between
the statements is reversed: one must not blame; therefore, it is understood, one ought to praise.
This is also the force behind the instance of χρή at Fr. 42.4.
Pindar goes on to say that “a god” (simply, θεός 106) is responsible for Hieron’s success, and he situates his own responsibility as poet as having part in the divine (109-112); indeed, the last two lines give Pindar’s aspirations for himself as poet. Another aspect of his responsibilities as praise poet is instructing others by his example; see that at Olympian 6.4:

Χρυσέας ύποστάσαντες εὐτειχεῖ προθύρῳ θαλάμου
κίονας ὡς ὅτε θαητὸν μέγαρον
πάξομεν· ἀρχομένου δ’ ἔργου πρόσωπον
χρὴ θέμεν τηλαυγές.   (1-4)

The “golden columns” to which he refers are metaphor for the poetic embellishment which will bring his own poetry attention, and thus, his subject renown; here it is χρὴ that Pindar do all he can to ensure that the victor will receive his due share of praise.

That he expects others to follow his lead is evident from ἀστῶν (7).101

As in Aeschylus, so in Pindar sometimes the use of χρὴ is suitable on account of a more general context of divinity, as at Isthmian 8.16, where it is appropriate that one living in Thebes offer the “flower” of the Graces to Aegina (χρὴ δ’ ἐν ἑπταπύλοισι Θήβαις τραφέντα / Αἰγίνᾳ Χαρίτων ἄωτον προνέμειν) or Nemean 7.44 (ἐχρῆν δὲ τιν’ Θήβαις τραφέντα / Αἰγίνᾳ Χαρίτων ἄωτον προνέμειν).

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101 Cf. Bundy: “Here the focus widens from a concrete simile defining the laudator’s attitude toward his subject to a gnomic generalization of that attitude... in χρὴ we observe the χρέος motive: the laudator owes something to his subject.” (55) This type is represented faithfully enough at O. 6.27, O. 8.74, and O. 13.94.
ἔνδον ἀλσεὶ παλαιτάτῳ / Αἰακιδᾶν κρεόντων τὸ λοιπὸν ἔμμεναι / θεοῦ παρ’
eὕτειχέα δόμον, ἡροίαις δὲ πομπαῖς / θεμισκόπον οἰκεῖν ἔόντα πολυθύτοις. 44-47). I
suspect that the propriety of the latter stems from, as the poem emphasizes, the close
relationship between Neoptolemus and Apollo. At *Pythian* 4.1 the poet exhorts the
Muse to “stand next to” the victor, so that she may increase his fame (Σάμερον μὲν χρή
σε παρ’ ἀνδρὶ φίλω / στὰμεν… ὄφρα… αὖξης οὖν ὕμνων 1-3).

There is one instance, in *Paian* 6, which Goodell,102 at least, considers of a
different type of χρή (and indeed, somewhat closer to Type II in Aeschylus); I will
explain my interpretation of this instance as a use of χρή consonant with the others we
have seen in Pindar.

Although a good amount of this paean has been lost, I believe we may understand the
context of this line well enough to compare this use of χρή to the others. What is “fated”
in the statement prior to the χρή-statement is a reference to the lines prior, i.e. that Zeus
could have saved Achilles a great amount of pain (πόνων 91) had he interfered with
Apollo’s protection of Troy, but Zeus would not give Achilles an easier task than had

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102 Goodell (94) says on this one, “In the new Paian 6.96… we meet χρῆν with the force of *it was fated*.” I assume that he thinks this on account of the content of the sentence prior to the χρή-statement.
been appointed to him. Any given historical event tempts with the translation “it is fated,” but here the statement that Troy would fall in flames is qualified by περὶ δ’ ύψικόμῳ Ε]λένα (95), which Race translates as “on account of” Helen; I see this as a reference to the breach of xenia on Paris’ part. If this was the poet’s intention, he writes that Troy fell on account of a breach of appropriate behavior, as a “cosmic” consequence. This use of χρή is not unlike that which occurs at Nemean 7.44, and although both have reference to “future” events, what is χρή, and the sort of penalty which will follow a breach of that which is χρή, is timeless even here. Notice that the poet employs the imperfect tense in both instances; at N. 7.44 it was piety, and in this paean lack of regard for “cosmic law,” which in past time set off a predictable sequence of events. Recall that the Type II instances in the Prometheus, although they also refer to future time, refer to individual acts and events not predictable and not applicable to any other individual or situation.
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My primary text for Aeschylus is the Aeschylus OCT, edited by Page (1972); for the fragments, Mette (1959) and Smyth’s Loeb with the fragments in an appendix by Lloyd-Jones (1963). In finding the instances of χρή I used the TLG online, from the university’s website, and Italie’s concordance (1964).

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