

PROGRAMMATIC AND NON-PROGRAMMATIC PARTY-VOTER LINKAGES IN TWO  
INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTY SYSTEMS: CHILE AND URUGUAY IN COMPARATIVE  
PERSPECTIVE

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## **ABSTRACT**

JUAN PABLO LUNA FARIÑA: Programmatic and Non-Programmatic Voter Linkages in Two Institutionalized Party Systems: Chile and Uruguay in Comparative Perspective  
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber)

Failures in political representation are a key hindrance to the quality of democracy in Latin America, and the degree to which parties link to voters on a programmatic basis is crucial for the quality of representation. This dissertation analyzes the nature of party-voter linkages in two highly institutionalized party-systems of the region: Chile and Uruguay. Both cases should produce high-quality representation given certain important preconditions: partisan capacities, democratic contestation opportunities, and potential for grievance mobilization. However, this work shows that even in these best case scenarios the possibilities for structuring programmatic representation in contemporary Latin America are low.

I explain differences in political representation through a framework of conjunctural causation that incorporates the long-term evolution of social and state structures into the analysis of party-systems and party-voter linkage configurations. Performing a multi-level comparison combining survey research and extensive fieldwork in paired-sample districts representing divergent causal configurations, I explain predominant linkage configurations in each country and district.

My evidence shows that: a) while in the 1990s programmatic linkages have weakened in Chile, they have strengthened in Uruguay; b) significant levels of socioeconomic segmentation of programmatic linkages exist in Chile with upper classes linking to parties according to their

programmatic preferences, while low-educated voters present extreme programmatic confusion and a combination of alienation from politics and instances of strongly localized, non-partisan (personalized), and non-programmatic linkages with candidates (financed by private-sector contributions, illegal municipal contracting, or focalized social policy); c) in Uruguay, economic crises have weakened traditional parties' clientelistic machines, reinforcing discontent with both parties and generating the opportunity for the leftwing Frente Amplio to grow by programmatically opposing neoliberal reforms; d) nonetheless, in a relatively favorable systemic context, a weaker pattern of segmented linkage strategies also emerged in Uruguay. Institutional and elite-centered analyses have predominated in the literature on political representation.

The main theoretical contribution of this work is to bring society and informal institutions 'back in' to the analysis. This provides a more comprehensive understanding of the complex combination of variables that interact --usually over a long period of time-- to cause different patterns of "representation" in a given society.

To Karina for her endless patience, understanding, and support.

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## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **The Quality of Political Representation in Latin America**

Since the mid 1980s, formal democratic rule has endured and political contestation is relatively open in Latin America. At the same time, however, the mechanisms of political representation have weakened and political parties are among the least legitimized political institutions in the region (Hagopian 1998; Garretón 2000; PNUD 2004). Facing this scenario, some authors have directly argued that Latin American democracies are stable today precisely because they fail to represent the interests of subordinated sectors in society, which face important organizational challenges in the wake of the transition from the state-centered model of development consolidated around import-substitution industrialization (ISI) to a market-centered model epitomized in the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus (Huber and Stephens 1999; Cavarozzi et al 2003). Therefore, a paradox lies at the center of contemporary Latin American democracies. Precisely when politics should play a fundamental role in integrating an increasingly fragmented and segmented society, politics loses its meaning and centrality, hurting the legitimacy (and eventually, the stability) of democratic rule and weakening parties' capacity to represent societal interests and build relatively stable and consistent support bases and policy-making coalitions (Lechner 1998). Closing the circle, the distributive results produced by flawed (or socially skewed) political representation would reinforce this "low-quality" equilibrium.

In this respect, the Chilean case is illuminating given the simultaneous presence of a highly institutionalized party-system governing a stable economy that functions in a context of increasing levels of citizen's ideological and political disengagement and alienation (Hunneus 1998; Siavelis

1999; Riquelme Segovia 1999; Montes et al 2000).<sup>1</sup> As claimed by Linz and Stepan (1996) among others, this obviously relates to highly constraining institutional factors and the electoral system inherited from the dictatorship led by General Pinochet. However, in this dissertation I claim that this outcome is fundamentally driven by the mutation of party-voter linkages in post-transitional Chile which results from economic restructuring and political decentralization, social fragmentation and the decline of collective actors in society, the rise of media-politics, and the decreasing room for parties to compete programmatically on some salient policy-divides.

As a counter-case, the also highly institutionalized party-system of Uruguay has escaped the “curse” affecting other systems that shared in the past similar levels of institutionalization and non-programmatic linking between parties and society (e.g. Venezuela, Colombia, and to a lesser extent Costa Rica) and those in which popular discontent combined with economic malaise hindered political parties and democratic institutions (e.g. Perú, Argentina, Bolivia). Indeed, in spite of a sharp recent economic decline, the case presents the highest levels of support for political parties in the region and its party-system has gained programmatic-structure through the representation of distributive conflicts generated by the processes of ISI-dismantling and the implementation of neoliberal reforms. The gradual electoral development of the leftist party Frente Amplio (FA) has been instrumental in that respect. Yet, while confronting tight policy-making restrictions, the recently elected FA now faces the challenge of representing in government a truly heterogeneous social base that is crossed by internal conflicts of interests and which has, as a lowest common denominator, the discontent with the traditional parties that governed the country for the last 175 years.

In this context, it is necessary to ask: How well are political parties able to articulate and represent salient societal interests in contemporary Latin American societies? To what extent do

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<sup>1</sup>For instance, whereas more than 40% of the Chilean electorate does not align today with the left-right scale, consolidating a steady upward trend (CEP 2004), the figures for Uruguay, a country with similar levels of institutionalization and socioeconomic development have remained constant around 9% for the last decade (Zuasnabar 2004). Similar comparisons can be drawn on the basis of electoral turnout and blank-voting in both systems.

they provide channels for political debate in society? How is programmatic representation distributed across different societal groups? Do partisan ideologies make a difference? And finally, what factors trigger or hinder programmatic representation through political parties?

In spite of the importance of such questions, recent research on Latin American party-systems has been scarce and faces important shortcomings in addressing those questions.

In this work, I propose to bring “society back in” to the analysis of political representation in the region, which has been recently dominated by institutional accounts that fail to successfully explain the observed variance in the levels of programmatic party-system structuring both between (Kitschelt et al forthcoming) and within (this dissertation) cases. In this project, socio-structural variables are addressed by looking at the long-term political economy of both party-systems and by analyzing the contemporary effects of social-structures and the organization of societal interest (at different levels of aggregation) on the nature of programmatic and non-programmatic linking between parties and voters. The interaction between those factors, the societal availability of specific resources for structuring programmatic (salient conflicts in society that can be mobilized by parties to attract specific constituencies) and non-programmatic (patronage and clientelistic resources, the capacity to provide public goods at the local level) party-voter linkages, specific partisan strategies, and intervening institutional factors will determine the nature of political representation in a given system or electoral circumscription. In this respect, the logic of my causal argument is not additive, but conjunctural.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, in the context of contemporary Latin American societies, the influence of the media in campaigns should also be considered in the analysis of political representation. Although in some cases the increasing importance of the media might have helped politicians to establish programmatic appeals to voters, in others it might have helped to consolidate personalized media-leaderships, bypassing (and therefore, weakening) organic partisan structures. Furthermore, if access to the media (as to other campaign resources) is not equally distributed between different political parties, the fairness of the electoral game can be

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<sup>2</sup>For a discussion of both see Ragin (1987 and 2000).

seriously distorted producing important externalities in terms of the societal distribution of access to programmatic-representation.

The next two sections present an overview of extant research on political representation and on Latin American party-systems, identifying the specific methodological and theoretical deficits that this project seeks to tackle. Then, a definition (both theoretical and operational) of the quality of representation is offered along with the rationale for operationalizing this concept by comparatively looking at the nature of party-voter linkages between national cases and within cases at different socioeconomic levels and across districts. That section also sets forth a set of a conjunctural explanatory framework for predicting the nature of party-voter linkages under different competitive scenarios. Subsequently, the overall methodological design of this dissertation is presented along with an explanation of the logic driving case selection and hypotheses testing. Finally, the structure of the dissertation is outlined.

### The Study of Political Representation

Two main approaches characterize the study of political representation: 1) the “votes-seats” paradigm and 2) the “substantive representation” paradigm (Powell 2004). Cox’s *Making Votes Count* (1997) and Lijphart’s *Patterns of Democracy* (1999) are archetypical illustrations of the former. These studies analyze how votes translate into seats, given certain electoral rules and party-system structures (which, at least partially, are endogenous to those electoral arrangements), and how those structures shape regime outcomes.

As for the latter, in the comparative politics literature, the “issue congruence” paradigm analyzes the issue correspondence between the electorate and its party representatives across a set of salient policy dimensions (Powell 2004). This paradigm has been greatly influenced by the “responsible party government” model of representation. According to that model, voters

(principals) choose between parties (agents) offering alternative policy packages on the basis of their substantive preferences (see e.g. Dalton 1985, Converse and Pierce 1986, Thomassen 1994, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Adams 2001).

The interest on substantive policy representation can be traced back to Miller and Stokes' 1963 article: *Constituency Influence in Congress*. Comparing mass issue positions across different US districts with the policy positions of each district's Congress representatives, Miller and Stokes assessed the degree of constituency control over Congress. One of the fundamental problems in this literature, already acknowledged by Miller and Stokes' seminal work, is the gap between citizen's relatively unstructured and frequently inconsistent policy preferences and those of their representatives, characterized by higher levels of information, structure, and consistency. Miller and Stokes' analysis demonstrated that given the specific characteristics of an issue domain (e.g. salience and complexity) politicians could either follow citizen's preferences or engage in issue-leadership. Miller and Stokes compared elite and mass issue positions across three different policy-domains (in which they reported different results, in terms of interaction patterns between the constituency and its Congressional representative).

On the cognitive requisites for the responsive party model to apply, recent research has stressed the crucial role that political parties play in simplifying complex issue spaces in order to facilitate elector's decisions (Aldrich 1995). Further evidence has been provided on the use of ideological constructs as cognitive shortcuts representing (and simplifying) a multidimensional array of substantive policy preferences (Hinnich and Munger 1994). Stokes's (1999) article on "policy switches" and her more recent research on popular support for neoliberal reforms in Latin America (Stokes 2001) also suggests that, at least in low structured party-systems, voter's preferences might be endogenously determined by policy results. In other words, competition would be almost exclusively centered on retrospectively judged policy results (goals), instead of based on policy instruments (means).

Along with a rich research tradition, Miller and Stokes' article also stimulated several methodological and substantive criticisms. On the former, Achen (1978) criticized the use of correlation coefficients in measuring the representational connections between masses and elites. Achen advocated the use of multiple measures in order to assess both the absolute distance between the positions of masses and elites ("proximity" and "centrality") and the extent to which our knowledge of each party's constituency positions allowed the prediction of their party representatives. On the latter, Weissberg (1978) showed that Miller and Stokes' measures of "dyadic" representation, which focused on the relationship between district constituencies and their congressional representatives, could significantly downplay situations of "collective" representation between the whole citizenry and the national legislature.

Following this critique, the comparative research tradition on substantive representation focused almost exclusively on political representation by political parties (instead of each district's representative), which came to be seen as the appropriate agents of representation. However, the focus on political parties and their constituencies has not produced yet a reasonable model in order to estimate "collective" or aggregate representation in the national legislature (Powell 2004).

After two decades of single case studies of political representation (e.g. Irwin and Thomassen 1975, Farah 1980, Converse and Pierce 1986, McAlister 1991, Matthews and Valen 1999), this research program witnessed the "explosion of comparative representation studies in 1999-2000" (Powell 2004) with the publication of explicitly cross-national comparative analyses (Miller et al 1999, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Toká 1999; and Powell 2000). These works tried to analyze the "effects of system-level features, such as party systems, election rules, and historical context on issue representation" (Powell 2004). This research project concurs with the substantive representation approach and as discussed below, seeks to fill existing gaps in the literature on comparative issue-congruence with a multi-level comparative analysis of Chile and Uruguay.

## Political Parties, Representation, and the Quality of Democracy in Latin America

Recent developments in countries such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Bolivia suggest that anti-party electoral movements can be extremely effective in reaching office, but face important challenges at the time of shaping stable policy-coalitions. Furthermore, once in office, successful electoral movements and parties that draw on popular discontent with reforms and corruption to contest elections, face growing challenges at the time of fulfilling their pre-electoral promises (Stokes 2001). The iteration between highly popular electoral movements that successfully oppose unpopular governments and then quickly become illegitimate once in office, reinforces the vicious circle of low partisan institutionalization and democratic weakness in the region.

The combination of these situations leads to a puzzle. In Latin America, formal democratic rule has endured and some institutional improvements regarding scholars' new standards have been accomplished (see Hartlyn 2002). At the same time; however, as noted above, the mechanisms of political representation have weakened and political parties are the least legitimized political institutions in the region (Hagopian 1998; Garreton 2000; PNUD 2004).

The socio-structural changes produced by the social and economic repercussions of the "debt crisis" and the need to implement market-oriented reforms during the 1980s and 1990s complicated the scenario for democratic consolidation in Latin America. With a few partial exceptions, poverty has increased in the region during the 1990s and Latin American societies are today less egalitarian and more socially polarized and fragmented than they were in the early 1980s (Katzman 2002).

Historically, the balance of power existing between social classes has significantly influenced democratic politics (Rueschemeyer et al 1992) and it is therefore expected to affect the quality of political representation in a given country. The existence of more balanced social structures will be more conducive to better qualities of representation, basically as a result of two complementary mechanisms.

First, more egalitarian social structures contribute to solve collective action dilemmas, particularly on the part of subordinated classes who seek to improve their situation via incremental improvements acting through representative parties and other secondary associations. Strong oligarchic regimes acting on unequal social structures deter those mechanisms, relying on political repression if needed. The modernization process resulting from capitalist development has also helped to solve collective action dilemmas by fostering urbanization, education, and higher rates of worker's concentration in the workplace. The richness of associative life given by the organization of social and political interests in secondary associations is a fundamental trait of democratic polities (Putnam 1993). Those secondary associations provide invaluable channels of communication between political parties and civil society, facilitating the development of representative relations, providing organizational resources, and when necessary, providing civil society with more leverage in influencing, controlling, and (eventually) penalizing their political representatives. In other words, the articulation and organization of civil society increases the "voice" and eventually, the "exit" options of the subordinated classes. Unorganized and fragmented societies lead towards the "resignation" of the popular sectors, as they become easier to control and to co-opt by non-representative parties, which usually rely on clientelism. "Resignation" is defined by Acuña (1995) as the result of a situation in which the "voice" is unheard and "exit" options are closed. Acuña assimilates this situation to that of the Latin American marginalized and excluded sectors, in the post-transitional period. In this respect, it is important to note that structural adjustment policies and their social consequences have had a negative impact on the ability of subordinated classes to organize and mobilize. Additionally, if not an exclusively Latin American phenomena (Putnam 1999), the increasing levels of social fragmentation and inequality and the current reduction of the public sphere, will have an undeniably negative impact on the quality of representation of the popular sectors. That is particularly likely in the context of already segmented and polarized societies like the ones that characterize the region.

Second, greater social equality correlates with a less skewed distribution of educational opportunities, which not only provide channels for upward mobility, but also increase the general level of political sophistication of the population. One of the resulting consequences of higher levels of political awareness and sophistication is precisely the organization of civil society discussed above. However, political sophistication also provides greater incentives for political parties and their constituencies to communicate on programmatic grounds, contributing to higher levels of ideological coherence and consistency, usually reinforced by organizational mechanisms partially designed to preserve those commitments.

As the new social movements that many scholars thought would help to democratize Latin American societies have rapidly disappeared or weakened in the aftermath of the transitions to democracy, in socially fragmented societies, the lack of strong political parties with the capacity to represent salient socio-political conflicts hinders the cycles of responsiveness and accountability that characterize stable democratic governance. Although low-quality equilibriums can be enduring, without such cycles, the quality of democracy and its long-term sustainability are endangered.

Briefly stated, the quality of political representation critically affects three crucial dimensions of the regime. First, it influences the resilience and longevity of democracy by: a) shaping the degree of support and satisfaction with democracy as practiced in one's country (Linz and Stepan 1996); b) significantly affecting the patterns of citizens' participation (voter turnout, citizens' propensity to engage in protest and civil strife); and c) influencing the degree of political polarization in the party system, which might lead, for instance to, the rise of anti-system parties and movements (Sartori 1976) or to the breakdown of democracy (in combination with the institutional characteristics of presidentialism, Valenzuela 1994).

Second, if elites and citizens are coherently linked on the basis of programmatic commitments, the essential cycles of responsiveness and accountability that characterize consolidated democracies are created and reinforced (Kitschelt et al 1999). In this respect, the party

acts as a guarantee of the policy commitments of its candidates, enhancing the transparency and predictability of voters' choice (Hinnich and Munger 1994). The process of coalition-building is also facilitated when parties are ideologically coherent and disciplined. And in the context of relatively decent levels of party competition, the system of checks and balances is reinforced, creating guarantees for the enforcement of the rule of law and the prevention (and eventual prosecution) of corruption. When parties organize around well-defined programmatic commitments, the efficacy and efficiency of state action is also enhanced by the provision of well-institutionalized mechanisms for selecting officials (Sartori 1976; Sani and Sartori 1983; Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Hagopian 1998; Mainwaring 1998). Arguably then, state structures and capacities derive, in part, from the nature of the party-system and its interface with society.

Third, the nature of political representation affects the policy-making process and its outcomes. For instance, the nature of economic stabilization programs (controlling for the severity and type of economic crisis) and the extent of economic and social inequality in a democratic society is contingent on the access of subordinated classes to channels of political representation (Huber et.al.. 1999; Huber and Stephens 1999; Boix 2003).

However, in spite of its importance, the quality of political representation has not received much scholarly attention in the democratization debate on Latin America. Multiple single case studies on different parties or party-systems were performed elsewhere in the region (e.g. Garretón 1988; Coppedge 1994; Siavelis 1997; Mainwaring 1999; Levitsky 2003) and currently provide a wealth of important insights to the study of political representation in contemporary Latin America. However, their exclusive single case focus hinders the chances for hypothesis testing and generalization on the factors that drive or hinder the articulation of programmatically-oriented party-systems with the capacity to efficiently canalize societal interests providing the basic mechanisms for democratic accountability to occur. While the two most comprehensive comparative accounts on the path-dependent trajectories of Latin American political systems provide useful historical and analytic background, they were not framed explicitly to address the

contemporary nature of political representation in the region (Collier and Collier 1991; Rueschemeyer et al 1992). Finally, recently published comparative edited volumes (e.g. Diamond et al 1999; Cavarozzi and Abal Medina 2002; Domínguez and Shifter 2003) either lack systematic comparisons between country-cases and/or do not specifically address political representation issues.

Meanwhile, O'Donnell's (1994) description of "delegative democracies" as regimes in which a *neohobbesian* pattern of representation arose, Hagopian's (1998 and 2002) exploratory assessment on the crisis of political parties and its relationship with economic reforms, and Stokes' (2001) account of "policy switches" and "mandates" are notable exceptions. Two explicitly comparative volumes by Kenneth Roberts and Kitschelt et al will fill an important gap in the literature; however, they also present important limitations.

In turn, due to its exclusive focus on party system institutionalization, the mainstream comparative analysis of contemporary Latin American party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) provides an unsatisfactory account of the quality of political representation. Mainwaring and Scully classify Latin American party-systems in three categories: *institutionalized party-systems* (Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, and Argentina), *hegemonic party-systems in transition* (Mexico and Paraguay), and *inchoate party-systems* (Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador). This work overlooks the fact that institutionalized party systems can be structured on the basis of different kinds of linkages between a party and its constituency (e.g. ideological commitments vs. particularistic exchanges or charismatic leaderships). Systems structured around different linkages, can be equally enduring and stable, but their quality and long-term prospects (especially in the context of economic and social decline) are substantively different. Recent events seem to confirm this assertion as many of these party-systems have evolved rapidly after Mainwaring and Scully's volume was published. If change and fluidity are not strange in the context of inchoate party-systems, they are seemingly striking in the context of institutionalized party-systems, such as those of Venezuela, Argentina, and Mexico (Coppedge 1998 and 2001).

Therefore, although I will consider party-system institutionalization as a necessary condition for programmatic linking to occur in a system, it is also necessary to transcend the focus on institutionalization in order to account for different patterns of political representation and their dynamic evolution.

Even though it is an important antecedent for this project, the recent assessment on the extent of issue-congruence in nine Latin American countries presented in Luna and Zechmeister (2005) has two fundamental shortcomings. First, it is not dynamic and therefore, it only captures a single moment in time 1997-1998. Given the fluidity of Latin American party-systems such approach is obviously limited. Second, the authors only look at the aggregate level, without accounting for social heterogeneity (in terms of age, gender, socioeconomic status, or regional and ethnic background of constituents) in the access of citizens to programmatic representation. Both shortcomings are shared with the two book projects currently under way (Roberts *forthcoming* and Kitschelt et.al. *forthcoming*).

In short, the research on Latin American party politics has two basic methodological limitations: a) an exclusive focus on the national level (aggregate analyses by country) and b) an almost exclusive reliance either on cross-national survey analysis or qualitative single-case studies. The combination of these two features, tends to obscure three crucial factors: 1) different sectors of the population within a country can have very different access to channels of representation, 2) different political parties can pursue widely divergent electoral and organizational strategies within each system, and 3) the same political party, facing different strategic situations, can pursue divergent representational schemes for different sectors of the population. This research project seeks to address such shortcomings by focusing on the comparative nature (and determinants) of programmatic-linkages between parties and their (socially heterogeneous) voters in Chile and Uruguay.

## The Logic of Case Selection and Research Design

Though for different historical reasons both Chile and Uruguay can be thought today as “best case scenarios” for programmatic representation to occur in Latin America (Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Kitschelt et al forthcoming). Indeed, such countries have two of the most institutionalized party systems in the region and, in terms of ideological scope, both party systems present alternatives all along the left-right spectrum, sharing comparable aggregate levels of political representation. These cases also share comparable levels of human development and a similar position in the global economy. However, they differ sharply in terms of the independent variables that I want to test as possible causal factors driving the quality of representation in the region: a) divergent party-system historical trajectories in terms of the nature of party-voter linkages in the past; b) divergent scope and nature of market-oriented and state structure reforms in both countries; and c) very different electoral institutions (proportionality of electoral rules, district sizes, concurrency of elections, and the configuration of partisan lists). Moreover the combination of comparative and cross-sectional analyses in both cases and across districts within and between cases will allow me to observe the relative existence of representation gaps between different social groups in society. This will provide the opportunity to test the influence of diverging socio-structural configurations (socioeconomic levels and the scope and strength of organized interests groups in society) on the nature and distribution of partisan representation in society. While such socio-structural configurations and their influence in shaping partisan competition within each case derive from the long-term and path-dependent patterns of party-competition in the system (variable a above) and from the political economy of ISI dismantling (variable b above), they are independent from electoral rules which remain constant across districts in each individual case.

In sum, this research design will enable me to analyze the specific role that socio-structural factors play in shaping the nature of political representation in a system vis-à-vis institutional variables that have been more commonly used to explain such outcomes and which, according to recent research, lack explanatory leverage in accounting for the currently observed variance in the

levels of programmatic partisan structuration in Latin American party-systems (Kitschelt et al *forthcoming*). Therefore, by attempting to bring “society back in” to the analysis of political representation in the region, this project sheds light into the eventual causal dynamics explaining the overall levels of programmatic linking observed in two of the most institutionalized party systems of the region and the social distribution of such linkages across different sectors of society. The latter could eventually illuminate the policy-making logics that drive the different patterns that are also observed between both cases in terms of the levels of partisan and electoral alienation and the distributive outcomes (e.g. income inequality) produced by each post-authoritarian regime (O’Donnell 1998; CEPAL various years).

In short, this unique combination of factors makes the comparison of Chile and Uruguay extremely interesting and illuminating, as the analysis of the causal factors that foster or hinder political representation within cases that are conceived as “best cases scenarios” for programmatic representation to occur will provide fundamental theoretical insights to the analysis of less institutionalized party systems in the region’s “dual societies.”

The methodological design of this project is specially framed in order to overcome the two methodological limitations identified in current research on political representation in Latin America, e.g. the lack of studies that account for the dynamic evolution and voter heterogeneity of political linkages and the absence of simultaneously quantitative and qualitative (case-study) comparative surveys on the nature of parties and party-competition.

To transcend those limitations I propose to: a) improve the measurement of multivariate programmatic issue-congruence on the basis of elite and mass surveys explicitly incorporating a dynamic (diachronic) view and the analysis of social heterogeneity (approximated through a segmented analysis by educational levels) regarding the cross-sectional distribution of programmatic linking; and b) pursue an in-depth analysis based on qualitative and ethnographic fieldwork in five Chilean congressional districts (comprising 12 municipalities) and seven Uruguayan districts and municipalities. Taken together, both components tackle three of the

pending tasks on the analysis of comparative issue-congruence recently identified in the literature review by Powell (2004), namely: the scarcity of simultaneously dynamic and comparative issue-congruence studies, the analysis of multi-dimensional issue-congruence, and the study of the non-programmatic counterparts of observed issue-congruence levels in a particular case.

The first component of this research project is based on the statistical analysis of available survey research (the third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey of the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor and a parallel survey applied in Uruguay in 2002, and the first and second waves of the *Encuesta de Elites Parlamentarias de América Latina* of the *Universidad de Salamanca*).

Such analyses are developed on the basis of a triangulation of citizen and party representative issue-positions on a set of relevant programmatic dimensions that include preferences on: 1) social policy, 2) economic development strategy, 3) political regime, and 4) value and moral predispositions. As two roughly contemporary replications are available on each of the questionnaires, this allowed me to perform a valid set of cross-temporal, cross-national, and cross-sectional comparisons. The specific methodology applied in order to generate those comparisons is based on the use of descriptive analyses and a set of multivariate techniques that include: factor analysis, hierarchical cluster analysis and the computation of Euclidean distance matrixes, correspondence analysis, and logistic regressions. This methodology is fully described in Chapters 5, 6 and in Appendix II.

The second component of the project is based on extensive fieldwork at the district level, enabling the use of a quasi-experimental research design to analyze how in the context of a given national situation (aggregate programmatic linking, historical trajectory, and institutional framework) district level configurations shape the nature of party-voter linkages. In each case (Chile and Uruguay) I have selected Congressional districts that represent all the empirically available combinations of the independent variables and provide a very complete sample in order to systematically test the research hypotheses.

Drawing on this second element, I will also analyze the nature of successful partisan adaptation to the emerging configuration of programmatic and non-programmatic linkages observed in each country. As extant literature argues, beyond demand-side explanations, partisan adaptation (supply) is crucial in order to account for the electoral success of a specific party in a system (Kitschelt 1989; Kitschelt 1994; Levitsky 2003). In turn, those explanations should deal with relative partisan endowments in terms of campaign resources (which can range from intangible programmatic affinities with the *median voter* in a given moment to the deployment of very tangible campaign resources in the field). However, it is also necessary to analyze the organizational features that turn feasible in a concrete competitive scenario the pursuit of an optimal (vote-maximizing) competitive strategy (Panebianco 1988; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Kitschelt 1994).

#### Dissertation Outline and an Overview of the Argument

The next chapter presents a more elaborated linkage-type classification discussing specific empirical instances in Latin America. In the same chapter, I also present a stylized analytical framework to predict the level of programmatic linking (opposed to non-programmatic linking) in a given system, on the basis of the conjunctural configuration of *opportunities*, *capacities*, and the *potential for successfully mobilizing grievances*. I extend this framework to party-voter linkages at the local level, as well. Finally, the chapter discusses the applicability of *critical juncture path-dependence* to understand the current nature of political representation in the region based on the analysis of political *cleavages* as originally conceived in Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) classic work. This discussion concludes by favoring a *soft-path-dependent* approach focused on a more dynamic analysis of constant causes driving specific competitive configurations on salient *programmatic divides*.

Chapters 3 and 4 present a long-term analysis of the evolution of the Chilean and Uruguayan party-systems, on the basis of such type of path-dependent argument. In each case the

original configuration of the party-system and party-voter linkages is contrasted with the one emerging from ISI development, stagnation, and its dismantling. The political economy of such dismantling is considered key in shaping the particular configuration of *capacities* and *grievance mobilization potential* observed in each system in the post-transitional period. On the basis of this analysis specific hypotheses for each case are derived, predicting that the relatively high levels of programmatic linking observed in Chile in the pre-authoritarian period are progressively receding, while Uruguayan parties are moving away from clientelistic mobilization and increasingly competing on programmatic divides. More specifically, expectations are derived for three theoretically defined programmatic divides: state/market, democratic/authoritarian, and religious/secular (or moral predispositions). While the first of those divides is expected to lead programmatic alignments in Uruguay, the second is predicted to be the central focus of programmatic competition in Chile.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 test such expectations on the basis of the quantitative analysis of parties and voters programmatic stances and issue-congruence in each system, analyzing their diachronic evolution and the levels of programmatic-structuring heterogeneity across different educational cross-sections of partisan voters. While Chilean elites and the highly educated voters of the Concertación and the Alianza continue to display significant levels of partisan divergence on the three divides (after a period of programmatic diffusion), low-educated Chilean voters show comparatively high levels of programmatic “confusion” feeding significant levels of internal programmatic heterogeneity within partisan bases. Additionally, increasing levels of partisan alienation are found in the system. On the basis of these results it is possible to conclude that while highly educated voters link on programmatic bases to their partisan representatives, lower classes in Chilean society establish non-programmatic linkages with their “representatives.” The evidence for Uruguay points to the opposite result, as programmatic linking between parties and voters increases over time (particularly between 1988 and 1996) and partisan electorates align consistently on the state-market divide. Nonetheless, competition in the system is presided by a bi

polar logic of opposition between the left (statist) and the elites and voters of both traditional parties (relatively more pro-market) who form an “ideological family.”

Drawing on these insights on the nature, extent, and distribution of programmatic linking in each system, chapters 8 and 10 analyze the parallel evolution of non-programmatic linking in Chile and Uruguay on the basis of fieldwork evidence in selected districts. These chapters evaluate how in the context of a given national configuration, district characteristics shape the nature of party-voter linkages in each case. In turn, chapters 9 and 11 discuss the electoral strategies and organizational characteristics of the parties that had been recently most successful in electoral races in each country: the Unión Demócrata Independiente in Chile and the Frente Amplio in Uruguay. In spite of their opposite ideological leanings, both parties have adapted efficiently to the evolving nature of party competition in their respective political systems by combining programmatic appeals to upper-sectors of society (and middle sectors in the case of FA) and developing territorial structures on the basis of non-programmatic linkages with lower-class voters (particularistic side-payments financed through private-sector donations in the case of UDI; brokerage and social organizational development at the neighborhood level in the case of FA). These adaptations have helped both parties reap significant electoral yields in recent years.

Finally, chapter 12 presents an overview of the argument and concludes by drawing implications for each case and for the study of the quality of political representation in the region.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **EXPLAINING PROGRAMMATIC LINKAGES AND PARTISAN COMPETITION PATTERNS**

#### Introduction

The next two chapters present a historical narrative on the nature and evolution of partisan competition in Chile and Uruguay analyzing the extent and nature of cleavage mobilization in each country and how it evolved from independence to the present day. This is not an exhaustive account, but it highlights specific historical junctures that are crucial to formulating hypotheses about the current patterns of programmatic competition at work in each system.

Specifically, I will discuss the divergent historical evolution of both party-systems (Collier and Collier 1991; Dix 1989; Roberts forthcoming; Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens 1992) and its manifestation in clearly distinct pre-authoritarian characteristics (Collier and Collier 1991; Dix 1989) and divergent experiences under the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that ruled both societies from the early 1970s to the late 1980s (Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; Stepan 1984). These diverse experiences make different adaptation strategies in the context of the demise of ISI particularly salient (Castiglioni 2005; Filgueira and Filgueira 1997a; Filgueira and Filgueira 1997b; Roberts 2002; Roberts forthcoming; Roberts 1998).

This chapter frames the historical narrative by elaborating on the characteristics of voter-representative linkages (an operational proxy for the dependent variable) and its theorized determinants in the long and short-run. In this regard, I first present a general set of hypotheses and then a stylized causal framework that explains different party-voter linkage strategies by focusing on the interaction between *capacities*, *opportunities*, and *grievance mobilization potential*. This framework borrows from the insights of Kitschelt et.al. (forthcoming), which

lend more parsimony to the hypothesized causal relationships that are first presented in my general set of hypotheses. I also discuss the “critical juncture” model in order to propose an alternative (soft) path-dependent approach, to explain the nature of representative linkages in both countries. Finally, to avoid “conceptual stretching,” the last section provides a theoretical and empirical definition of issue-divisions that can eventually become the basis for partisan mobilization and competition in programmatically-oriented systems, setting the basis for their empirical analysis in Part II of this work.

### The Quality of Representation: Definition, Operationalization, and Research Hypotheses

In this dissertation, the quality of representation in a given system is defined as: *the extent to which political parties have well-structured and stable ideological commitments that constitute the basis for: a) the link between the party and its constituency; b) the electoral competition among parties; and c) the policy making process.* This definition considers political parties as the main representative agents in a democratic polity and seeks to capture three fundamental dimensions that lie beneath our understanding of political representation.

First, it accounts for *mandate* representation or the degree of party *responsiveness* to the preferences of its constituency (Dalton 1985; Iversen 1994a; Iversen 1994b; Powell 1982; Powell 1989; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999b; Ranney 1962). For this to take place, responsible party government requires at least three additional conditions implied by the definition: 1) policy divergence among the parties contesting the election; 2) policy stability on the part of the parties contesting the election; and 3) policy voting on the part of the electorate (Adams 2001).

Second, by considering the policy-making process, this definition incorporates the notion of *accountability representation*, which takes place when 1) voters act retrospectively, voting to retain the incumbent party only when that party acts in their best interest; and 2) the incumbent party selects policies in order to be reelected (Alesina 1988; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999a; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999b).

Finally, the definition explicitly acknowledges the organizational factors that trigger *mandate* and *accountability* representation. For instance, the degrees to which parties mobilize activists and devise intra-organizational decision-making mechanisms are central components of this organizational dimension. It should be noted, however, that not every organizational articulation leads to programmatic representation. On the contrary, clientelistic machines could be extraordinarily organizationally developed, while at the same time, detrimental for the quality of (universalistic) political representation by parties.<sup>3</sup> Complementarily, the core organizational cadres of a political party may well be unrepresentative of the voter. Finally, it is also possible to think of alternative situations in which reasonable aggregate representation at the national level lacks its organizational counterpart at the district level.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, it is necessary to account for both the strength of the link between a political party and its constituency and the nature of that link –e.g. programmatic vs. clientelistic (Kitschelt 2000).

Simply put, parties can either relate to voters on the basis of indirect exchanges around programmatic platforms, relate to voters directly through particularistic exchanges, or in any intermediate combination of both. Drawing on this basic definition, I present below a more elaborated typology of linkage-types introducing scenarios in which individual candidates have preeminence over partisan organizations in structuring representation in a particular system.

On explanatory grounds, this work departs from the two classic explanations of clientelism (or more generally, non-programmatic linking), namely: the culturalist and the developmental thesis. Whereas the former explains clientelism as a permanent trait of certain cultures, the latter sees clientelism as a political arrangement that corresponds to traditional societies as opposed to modern ones. Both explanations have proved unsatisfactory (Piattoni

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<sup>3</sup>Piattoni (2001) argues on the need to overcome our normative bias against clientelism. She sees clientelism as a form of interest representation which acts as a “a counterbalance to rigid and often clogged institutional channels”. According to her, current conditions in Europe (globalization, European integration, and the increase of particularistic politics), might favor the resurgence and resilience of clientelism, which in turn could help to stabilize contemporary European democracies. Nonetheless, even if clientelism is assessed in terms of normatively neutral criteria, it seems clear that, when widespread, it is conducive to political co-optation and democracy is significantly devalued.

<sup>4</sup>That is the argument presented by Chibber (2001) for India, Spain and Algeria, where in the absence of dense associational life, political cleavages were created from above (instead of emerging from societal divisions), on the basis of the strategic policy competition of parties at the state or national level.

2001; Shefter 1994). Departing from these traditional views and following the lead of Shefter and Piattoni, I seek to explain the different types of representation defined above as the result of given exchange relations between voters and politicians, which can in turn be explained by the strategic considerations of both.

What constrains those strategic options on the part of politicians (supply) and voters (demand)? According to the following general hypothesis, those strategic options can be understood on the basis of a combination of structural, historic-institutional, and agency-related factors.

**Hypothesis:** The divergent patterns of representation across systems can be explained on the basis of the interaction between: a) the historical development of each party-system and its legacies (experience with democracy, the degree of institutionalization of the party system, the relationship between interests groups and parties, the configuration of partisan identities and subcultures); b) the political economy of structural reforms and its impact on state structures, decentralization, and the resulting room for parties to articulate alternative policy-packages to represent divergent societal interests; c) the level of interest aggregation in society, resulting from a combination of a and b; d) agency on the part of each party (determined both by its ideological and organizational imprints and by the party's relative access to media and other campaign resources); and e) the mediating influence that electoral institutions exert on factors a, c, and d.

The following hypotheses translate the macro-logic implicit in the previous statement to the district level and state directional relations between the independent variables and the quality of political representation.

**Hypothesis 1:** All things being equal, different social structures will produce significant impacts on the quality of political representation at the district level. Programmatic representation will tend to be less in highly socially fragmented districts, those populated by poor and marginalized sectors, and those characterized by low

levels of human capital, since in such contexts the presence of organized societal groups structured around high-levels of interests aggregation (and therefore, programmatically oriented) and/or the provision of public goods is less likely.

**Hypothesis 2:** All things being equal, in those systems and districts where the extent of public sector participation is higher, we should expect less programmatic linking resulting from the higher availability of clientelistic and patronage resources.

**Hypothesis 3:** All things being equal, political parties will have a stronger incentive to engage in ideological representation when the competitiveness of the system and district are high. Additionally, if the opposition is moderately successful in challenging the incumbent in ideological terms and/or the incumbent becomes increasingly unable (due to economic inefficiency) to satisfy its clients, the quality of ideological representation might improve.

**Hypothesis 4:** All things being equal, the specific ideology of the party will have an impact on its representational strategies. Given their doctrinaire and organizational profiles, parties on the left will tend to engage more in programmatic representation than those on the right.<sup>5</sup>

#### The Determinants of Programmatic Linkages

During the 1990s, the Chilean and Uruguayan party systems exhibited the highest levels of programmatic structure in Latin America. In both cases, this outcome is driven by the interaction of long and short term causal factors that yielded at that particular moment (1997-8) a series of *opportunities, capacities, and potential for successfully mobilizing grievances*

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<sup>5</sup>See Janda and King (1985) for a supporting argument and empirical evidence on this statement

(salient interest conflicts) that enabled programmatic linking between voters and parties (Kitschelt et.al. forthcoming).<sup>6</sup>

In the explanatory framework proposed by Kitschelt et al, programmatic linking between parties and constituents is only one among multiple possible linkage-strategies. We are most likely to observe programmatic linking when capacities and resources tied to socio-structural and historico-institutional factors provide incentives to construct partisan organizations centered on programmatic linkages and the pursuit of collective goods (as opposed to particularistic side-payments), when grievances (predominantly economic/distributive conflicts) provide incentives for organizations to mobilize for/against the status quo in society, and when opportunities (e.g. institutionalized democratic contestation over time) are present.<sup>7</sup>

According to Kitschelt et al (forthcoming) the emergence of programmatic linkages can be thought of as one of the possible results of a set of nested games, assuming fixed preferences (office-seeking maximization) on the supply side (political entrepreneurs).<sup>8</sup> First, there is a principal-agent game played between voters (principals) and politicians (agents). This principal-agent relation is structured around different levels of aggregation depending on the interaction between the level and nature of organization of collective interests in society and the degree to which politicians have access to private goods and subsidies that can be discretionally allocated (Verdier 1995). Theoretically, electoral institutions can also affect politicians' choice to pursue a "personal-vote" as opposed to one based on collective interests (Carey and Shugart 1995).<sup>9</sup> When structural conditions favor higher levels of interest aggregation (*capacities*),

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<sup>6</sup>See Kitschelt et al (forthcoming) for an analytic framework centered on capacities, opportunities, and grievances. This section draws substantially on this framework. The notion of capacities, opportunities, and grievances draws on the literature on political psychology and was applied by Zechmeister (2003) to explain individual-level outcomes. However, it can also be directly traced to the literature on social mobilization (e.g. McAdam et.al. 2001), in which in a given structural setting social movements emerge (or not) as a consequence of the interaction between grievances, opportunities, and resources (capacities).

<sup>7</sup>Kitschelt et.al. *forthcoming*.

<sup>8</sup>However, ambitious office-seeking politicians are allowed to switch their strategies to adapt to environmental shocks. See Kitschelt et al *forthcoming* for an expanded discussion of this analytical strategy.

programmatic coordination is likely. Therefore, the presence of organized interests groups seeking the provision of collective benefits and who are able to guarantee political parties an “appealing” constituency, provides incentives for parties to focus on higher levels of aggregation. In addition, augmenting the electoral relevance of the median voter, higher levels of electoral contestation would tend to increase the centrality of redistributive policies structured at high levels of aggregation, centered on the provision of collective goods.

However, the availability of resources to be discretionary allocated as individual side-payments or club-goods could also significantly affect the level of aggregation of party-voter linkages, dynamically interacting with the previous factors. For instance, there are highly-competitive systems in which only some parties (typically those in government) have massive access to resources that can be individually allocated. In those systems, the opposition has strong incentives to foster programmatic linkages with its constituents, eventually challenging the status-quo and forcing --especially under situations of crisis—an incremental systemic change. Alternatively, in a system where virtually all mainstream parties enjoy parallel access to those resources, strong inertias exist even in spite of the high fiscal irrationality entailed but that systemic linkage-strategy. In these cases, the rapid implosion of the party-system becomes more likely. As argued below, while the cases of Brazil and Uruguay approach the first scenario, Venezuela illustrates the latter. Finally, together with the availability and eventual partisan distribution of clientelistic side-payments, the social distribution of organizational capacity of interests groups and collective actors, also has important implications for parties’ and candidates’ strategizing.

However, even when structural and competitive conditions promote the pursuit of programmatic-linkages, the consolidation of such a strategy also requires a set of “successful” iterations in subsequent elections over time (*opportunities*), in which programmatic commitments are nurtured and fulfilled. In other words, programmatic commitments become

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<sup>9</sup>However, recent evidence for Latin America challenges straight causal inferences linking electoral rules to linkage strategies (see e.g. chapters by Hawkins and Morgernstern and Luna and Zechmeister in Kitschelt et al *forthcoming*).

credible and established (or erode), through the functioning of several cycles of democratic accountability.

This implies that office-seeking politicians in programmatic-prone systems must solve subsequent collective action and coordination dilemmas in order to create and sustain programmatically-committed partisan organizations that can compete through the mobilization and representation of conflictive social interests (*grievances*). Aldrich (1995) presents a detailed elaboration of the dilemmas involved in the process of party-creation and maintenance. Briefly put, these organizations select, socialize, and bring together office-seeking politicians with similar programmatic agendas, which are then enforced through organizational mechanisms in order to maintain party-platform commitments. For their part, political parties provide an efficient vehicle for ambitious politicians by pooling symbolic and economic resources to be deployed in campaigns, maintaining a reputation, and providing a party-label that voters can use as cognitive shortcuts as efficient links to parties based on their policy preferences (Zechmeister 2003; Hinnich and Munger 1994). These shortcuts are essential if we conceive of voters as “rational information misers” who most likely lack tightly structured belief systems (Campbell et.al. 1967; Converse 1964) and for whom it is irrational to become fully acquainted with complex party manifestos.

This set of complex interactions among voters, office-seeking politicians, and parties occur inter-temporally. Therefore, both parties' ability to compete over extended periods of time and their chance to promote and (while in office) pursue alternative policy-packages (in accordance to their redistributive stances around salient *grievances*) strengthens (or erodes) the conditions for programmatic linkages. At this point, it is worth noting that *grievance* mobilization is partly endogenous to partisan strategies.<sup>10</sup> Arguably, exogenous conditions (both institutional and socioeconomic) certainly widen or restrict the room for such mobilization to occur. For instance, in contemporary Latin America, the development of ISI until the 1970s and the current stage reached by each country in the transition from the “state-

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<sup>10</sup>This implies the need to further elaborate this theoretical framework in the future. I thank Evelyne Huber for extremely useful comments and suggestions on this topic.

centered sociopolitical matrix” to the “market-centered” one (Cavarozzi et.al. 2003) provide differing potential for grievance mobilization in a system. In another vein, the economic prescriptions and conditionalities of international financial institutions and the consolidation of a system of regime competition for attracting investment in the global economy also constrain policy-choices today. However, as discussed for the Chilean case (Chapter 3), beyond structural and institutional constraints (transitional legacies institutionalized in the 1980 Constitution) the leaders of the governing Concertación seem to have chosen to deflect distributive *grievance mobilization* in the country (see e.g. Castiglioni 2005). For this reason, I have decided to redefine *grievance mobilization* as *the potential for successfully mobilizing grievances*, with “success” defined as functional for attracting the electoral favor of voters that engage in such strategy. Defined in this way, grievance mobilization becomes partly endogenous to partisan and candidate strategies but it also remains conditioned by exogenous factors. In short, it is endogenous in so far as it depends on an educational function performed by political parties or candidates (e.g. on their choice to use a given issue or programmatic divide to appeal to voters and differentiate themselves from other parties). It is exogenous, however, in so far as the probability that the issue can be successfully resolved by political action is shaped by external constraints, such as economic or institutional factors. In turn, that probability shapes the incentives faced by politicians when deciding whether or not to attempt mobilization on a given *grievance*. Indeed, when those attempts are made, such probability would also influence the usefulness of the issue in building an electoral constituency for the party or candidate. For instance, if a given party campaigns on an issue, gets elected on such basis, and once in office, fails to provide what it has promised, it is likely that it will face a decline on its electoral support. Moreover, it is also likely that subsequent attempts at mobilizing such grievance (and eventually, programmatic linking as a whole) will get subsequently discouraged. Conversely, if successful mobilization is achieved, it is likely that other parties and candidates in the system will (re)align on the issue and contribute to further politicize it.

As suggested in Table 2.1, only when opportunities, capacities, and the potential for successfully mobilizing grievances are simultaneously present in a system are parties likely to

solve these dilemmas by seeking to establish, develop, and nurture programmatic linkages with their voters.

Table 2.1 summarizes the configurations of opportunities, capacities, and potential for successfully mobilizing grievances that yield the four ideal types of principal-agent relations discussed so far: 1) programmatic linkages involving both a partisan and a programmatic component; 2) partisan linkages lacking a programmatic component; 3) programmatic linkages lacking a partisan component; and 4) personalized linkages lacking both a programmatic and a partisan linkage. The third type has restricted empirical instances, with the early experience of the Estado Novo in Brazil under Getulio Vargas as a proximate case, which then rapidly evolved to an authoritarian regime under state corporatism.

For the sake of simplicity, linkage strategies are treated here as systemic qualities. The thrust of the argument is that they can be applied at the party level and that they evolve dynamically and dialectically. However, as I argue extensively in chapters 4 and 5 and Parts II and III, at a single point in time, there exists significant heterogeneity within each party-system and within each party (when relating to different constituencies or while competing in the context of divergent socio-structural or competitive configurations) in terms of the specific linkage-strategies that predominate.

**Table 2.1:**

**A dynamic typology of ideal-types of linkage strategies based on the interaction between successful grievance mobilization potential, opportunities, and capacities**

	Programmatic Linkages and eventual dynamic accountability through inter-temporally consistent programmatic and partisan linkages (1)	Non- programmatic linkages (clientelism &/or partisan subcultures) (2)	Non-Partisan linkages, eventual retrospective accountability (3)	Non-programmatic and non-partisan linkages, eventual retrospective accountability (4)
Opportunities	Democratic contestation and inclusion over the medium run, relative policy alternatives on salient policy-arenas	Democratic contestation and inclusion over the medium run + relative policy alternatives on salient policy-arenas	Democratic contestation and inclusion, relative policy alternatives on salient policy-arenas	Democratic contestation and inclusion, relative policy alternatives on salient policy-arenas
Capacities	Institutionalized party-system and strong (relatively autonomous) civil society organizations	Institutionalized party-system, segmented and fragmented civil society, usually strong partisan subcultures	Weak parties, substituted by functional organizations in corporatist arrangements, otherwise, segmented and fragmented civil society	Weak parties, substituted by pragmatic electoral coalitions of personalities
Potential for Successful Partisan Mobilization of Grievances	Politically mobilized through parties	Parties as cross-sections of society	Sometimes mobilized, but not through parties	Mobilized through issue-oriented and performance oriented campaigns
<i>Transitional sub-type</i>	Programmatic linkages on unsustainable policy platforms, until parties erode their support basis or until a successful realignment takes place (1b)	Becoming instable under sustained economic or governance (corruption, stalemate) crises (2b)	Becoming instable under sustained economic or governance (corruption, stalemate) crises or turning increasingly authoritarian under state-corporatism (3b)	Becoming instable when purely valence competition prevails under sustained economic or governance (corruption, stalemate) crises (4b)

As stated above, it is important to analyze these configurations inter-temporally.

Although further elaboration is needed, I will provide a tentative framework to situate my two cases in comparative perspective sketching temporal dynamics to demonstrate their analytical importance. In an iterative fashion, Table 2.2 presents a typology of linkage-strategies based on

the interaction of party-mobilized grievances, capacities (institutionalized parties and the presence of a relatively autonomous and organized civil society) and opportunities (democratic contestation and room for policy divergence) evaluating the presence of feasible alternative policy packages on salient conflicts and the presence of “political-switches” over time (Stokes 2001).

When opportunities are constrained due to limited policy-alternatives, a transitional scenario (b) is derived. These scenarios are considered transitional since they do not provide the basis for Nash equilibriums in the medium-run.

As seen in Table 22, programmatic linking between principals (voters) and agents (political entrepreneurs) is only one of several possible ideal-type outcomes that result from the simultaneous presence of opportunities, capacities, and a high potential for successfully mobilizing grievances. The table also provides a glance into the eventual inter-temporal dynamics at play, to which I return below. There is near scholarly consensus that of all the party systems in Latin America, Chile’s came closest to the ideal-type of programmatic linkages (I), particularly from the late 1950s and until the 1970s (Dix 1989; Scully 1992). The breakdown of democracy in Chile suggests that programmatic linkages may breed excessive societal polarization that can lead to decisional stalemate and a systemic crisis.<sup>11</sup>

As I will argue below, in the post-authoritarian period, partisan organizations have weakened in Chile and programmatic linkages have been partially replaced by non-programmatic linkages and non-partisan representation. In turn, the de-mobilization of distributive grievances and institutionally-induced policy constraints have alienated a significant fraction of the electorate (Posner 1999; Siavelis 1999).

Scenario I can be contrasted with those in which capacities are present as parties are institutionalized in a context of democratic contestation and inclusion, but in which grievances are not mobilized along party lines (II, IIb). In both of these scenarios, principal and agents lack incentives to aggregate interest and coordinate on policy/ideological platforms. In these cases, programmatic-linkages are replaced by particularistic side payments. This outcome has an

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<sup>11</sup>Of course this is not to say that democracy felt in Chile as a result of “excessive” programmatic linking.

elective affinity with party organizations that represent vertical cross-sections of the population and in which autonomous (from the party-system) and strong civic organizations are rare. However, the presence of strong sub-cultures furnishes resilient partisan identities usually springing from the legacy of a violent past (Collier and Collier 1991; Hartlyn 1988).

During the twentieth century, Colombia and Uruguay provide the best illustration of this scenario (II), with Venezuela under the partyarchy and Costa Rica after 1948 as two proximate cases. Whereas in Venezuela Acción Democrática (AD) developed strong partisan attachments in its pursuit of an ambitious reformist agenda during the Trienio, both AD and COPEI increasingly became catch-all organizations under the “*punto fijo*” arrangement and shared access to oil revenues and the state apparatus to develop clientelistic encapsulation at the grassroots. In Costa Rica, the partisan identities emerging from the civil war in 1948 became consolidated thanks to the development of a strong welfare state that reduced the salience of distributive struggles and provided the basis for the Partido de Liberación Nacional’s (PLN) strength until the 1980s. In the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) also represented a wide cross-section of the population and was also able to foster strong partisan identities and loyalties partially on the basis of clientelistic side-payments. But this regime had extremely limited contestation (approaching scenario 0) and relied heavily on corporatist controls and selective repression (approaching scenario III). While, this type of linkages is associated with comparatively very high levels of party-system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), in the long-run, such party systems risk destabilization due to policy constraints. Such constraints are both exogenous (changing patterns of capitalist accumulation and development in the world economy since the 1970s) and endogenous (economic irrationality of the linkage-strategy and surmounting social discontent, budget constraints, and political challenges from outsiders).

While Costa Rica provides the best scenario of party-system adaptation and relative continuity in spite of the emergence of challengers since the 1980s, Venezuela (moving to scenario III) and Mexico (moving apart from scenarios 0 and III) illustrate the presence of significant disruptions during the 1990s. Meanwhile, Colombia combines continuity in the

party-system with significant anti-systemic challenges and an increasing loss of sovereignty. Furthermore, during the 1990s the party system fragmented in the wake of electoral reforms and began evolving towards what I call scenario IVb.

Having gone through a Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regime in the 1970s and early 1980s, Uruguay has witnessed the reconstitution of both traditional parties, in combination with a increasing growth of an anti-reformist left. The extent of state-expansion in the pre-authoritarian period and the progressive erosion of Blanco and Colorado partisan identities (resulting from increasing discontent during a long-term socioeconomic decline) provided the basis for the organization of civil society and the emergence of programmatic competition between the traditional block and the left since the early 1990s, progressively moving closer to scenario I.

Meanwhile, the scenario III represents an ideal type in which a non-partisan mobilization of social-groups is present. This configuration is empirically rare and becomes extremely volatile during economic malaise and/or increasing societal mobilization (scenario IIIb). Again, the Estado Novo in Vargas' Brazil constitutes an empirical instance that then evolved rapidly into an authoritarian regime under state corporatism.

Under populist/charismatic mobilization, weak partisan organizations and a fragmented civil society are replaced by a direct attachment with the leader. In the long-run, these systems may evolve towards the second scenario developing strong partisan subcultures and/or clientelistic networks. The cases of the Peronist party in Argentina (PJ), the PRI in Mexico, and more recently, the cases of Cambio 90 in Peru (C90), and the Chavista movement in Venezuela approximate this pattern. The latter two, together with the post-Menem Peronist Party have usually been characterized as neo-populist movements, combining strong leaderships with a heterogeneous social base and the reliance on particularistic side-payments in order to gain the allegiance of subordinated sectors (Roberts 1998).

Alternatively, populist leaders can seek to develop corporatist arrangements by putting in place strong functional organizations (and frequently "official" parties) that are hierarchically structured from above and tied to the state. In Latin America, this type of linkage

had an elective affinity with ISI since it required a broad and heterogeneous social base to function. During the stagnation of ISI those broad coalitions were broken and could not be reconstituted. The case of Perón in Argentina is the prototypic example of this type of arrangement. However, corporatist administrations tend to approach semi-authoritarian characteristics by limiting contestation and resorting to over repression of the opposition when it became radicalized due to redistributive struggles that arose during the stagnation and collapse of ISI.

**Table 2.2:**

**A dynamic typology of ideal-types of linkage strategies based on the interaction between successful grievance mobilization potential, opportunities, and capacities**

Grievances (mobilized?)						
	Yes			No		
Opportunities (present?)						
Capacities (present?)	Yes	No (limited contestation and/or inclusion)	No (limited policy alternatives)	Yes	No (limited contestation and/or inclusion)	No (limited policy alternatives)
Yes	Programmatic Linkages (eventually + dynamic accountability) (I)	Non-democratic setting (0)	Programmatic Linkages --> Policy-constrains/ switching/--> Decaying capacities at t+1 or partisan realignment and reconfiguration? (Ib)	Non-programmatic linkages (clientelism &/or partisan subcultures) (II)	Non-democratic setting (0)	Non- programmatic linkages (clientelism &/or partisan subcultures) --> stable/instable depending on economic/ governance performance (IIb)
No	Non-Partisan Linkages: Populist/ Charismatic/ Corporatist/ Technocratic (III)	Non-democratic setting (0)	Non-Partisan Linkages: Populist/ Charismatic/ Corporatist/ Technocratic stable/instable depending on economic/ governance performance (IIIb)	Non-Partisan Valence competition: Personalized/ Local clientelistic or brokerage networks/ Political marketing/ Retrospective evaluations (IV)	Non-democratic setting (0)	Non-Partisan (Pure)Valence competition: Personalized/ Local clientelistic or brokerage networks/ Political marketing/ Retrospective evaluations stable/instable depending on economic/ governance performance(IVb)

As the extreme cases of Menem, Fujimori, and Salinas show, technocratic delegation might be an alternative source of legitimacy for this type of linkage during the “neoliberal era”. Interestingly, some analysts have argued that the Chilean case under the governments of the Concertación also approximates this scenario of technocratic delegation as partisan attachments progressively fade away (Huneus 1998; Moulian 1997). Indeed, from a long-term perspective it can be argued that the Chilean party-system was frequently subjected to this type of anti-partisan challenge during the twentieth century, both under the leadership of Carlos Ibáñez (populist) and Jorge Alessandri (technocratic).<sup>12</sup>

Finally, the fourth scenario is defined by the absence of both partisan and grievance mobilization and presents an elective affinity with weak social organizations and relatively small district sizes or decentralized polities. In this scenario, personalized candidacies are promoted either on the basis of candidate-centered clientelistic or brokerage networks and/or on the basis of political marketing strategies drawing on specific issues or candidate traits. When policy-alternatives are restricted, pure valence competition takes place and candidates are judged on the basis of their perceived capacity to implement consensual policy preferences (scenario IVb). Finally, when past performances are available and open to public scrutiny they provide a complementary basis (retrospective evaluations) for anchoring a judgment on each candidate’s ability to govern.

As argued in the following two chapters for the cases of Chile and Uruguay, liberalizing and decentralizing reforms combined with increasing budget constraints at the central state-level, have contributed to the weakening of national partisan organizations, thereby strengthening local leaders’ access to private and/or municipally supplied resources for patronage and clientelism. In the medium-run, these transformations weaken party-organizations and reduce the opportunities for programmatic-linking; particularly in a context in which capacities (collective organizations in civil society) are also weak.

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<sup>12</sup>I substantiate this claim in Chapter 3. The long-term tradition of high technocratic penetration of the Chilean state is documented in Biglaiser (2002).

Although it is a case with important idiosyncrasies that challenge strict classifications, recent evidence shows that the Brazilian system might be transitioning in the opposite direction (from a II/IV scenario to I), e.g. moving away from a linkage strategy centered on (decentralized and fragmented) personalistic parties and progressively acquiring greater levels of programmatic structuration.<sup>13</sup> The pattern of fragmentation and personalism that dominated Brazilian politics both before and after the centralizing attempts subsequently pursued by Vargas and the Armed Forces when implementing ISI might have receded due to the increasing level of centralized class-mobilization resulting from ISI's demise, popular discontent with the explosion of the "Brazilian miracle", and the rise of the PT. In turn, both the PT and the recently elected Frente Amplio in Uruguay confront the challenge of sustaining their electoral platforms and the allegiance of their heterogeneous social bases in the context of highly constrained policy-making options (approaching scenario Ib). If unsuccessful in that respect, the long-term process of partisan development (capacities) that enabled programmatic linkages in these systems in recent elections could eventually be rapidly rolled-back.

In short, this framework may explain the comparatively high aggregate levels of programmatic structuring found in Chile and Uruguay by the late 1990s and helps address why these two party systems managed to provide relatively consistent principal-agent policy alignments along partisan lines (scenario I) while other party systems in the region did not.

In terms of *capacities*, both countries shared relatively high levels of social development and diversification. These factors are essential to promote the organization and political mobilization of collective actors and for creating strong incentives for political entrepreneurs to structure representation at higher levels of aggregation (Piattoni 2001; Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens 1992; Verdier 1995). The presence of institutionalized and historically enduring political parties that succeeded in representing societal interests over relatively long-periods of democratic governance also generated a relatively greater endowment for both countries in terms of *opportunities*. As politicians were able to draw on those institutions, they were able to put in place and enforce credible programmatic commitments in

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<sup>13</sup>See Hagopian 2002.

the post-authoritarian democracies (Kitschelt et.al. forthcoming; Valenzuela 1992). Finally, Chile and Uruguay witnessed relatively high levels of ISI during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. As suggested by Kitschelt et al, although the height of ISI might trigger incentives for non-programmatic linking resulting from increased political discretion to redistribute state subsidies and rents to different constituencies, both the initiation and the demise of ISI bring distributive struggles center stage. During ISI implementation, the balance of power shifts from sectors benefiting from import-export economic models to urban and industrial constituencies. Meanwhile, ISI's stagnation and the subsequent attempts to dismantle and substitute it for a market-centered model of development create instances of significant sociopolitical polarization triggered by the exclusion of previously incorporated sectors of the population (O'Donnell 1979). As a result, ISI's emergence and demise potentially create *grievances* that political parties can successfully build on to compete by representing distinctive social interests involved in a highly salient redistributive conflict.

In short, this shows that when *capacities*, *opportunities*, and a *high potential for successfully mobilizing grievances* are simultaneously present the likelihood of programmatic linkages increases. In turn, once in place, *capacities*, *opportunities*, and *successful grievance mobilization potential* will relate to each other interactively given the socio-structurally determined environment in which they take place. In particular, the potential for successfully mobilizing grievances is evolving quite dynamically in contemporary Latin America, conditioning the emergence or decay of programmatic structures.

For instance, in spite of enjoying a similar endowment in terms of *opportunities* and *capacities* for programmatic linking than the one observed in Chile, non-programmatic linkages predominated in Uruguay until relatively recent times. This outcome results from two principal factors fully explored in Chapter 3. The lack of strong party-mobilized grievances resulting from the country's long-term pattern of socioeconomic development and the persistent logic of partisan competition structured around the particularistic distribution of state resources to lubricate encompassing clientelistic and patronage networks that consolidated at the turn of the XX century. Only after a four-decade economic decline did the fiscal stress become

unsustainable and both traditional parties pursued reformist agendas. At that point, the redistributive conflict gained centrality and gradually provided the basis for an increasing ideological competition between the left (who started mobilizing the losers of economic reforms) and the Blanco and Colorado party.

In Chile in turn, the relatively high levels of class conflict and political polarization of the late 1960s and early 1970s provided a wider legitimacy base for a coup coalition to suppress attempts to incorporate rural and urban lower classes socially and politically in order to protect the interests of upper-middle classes and elites (Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens 1992; Scully 1992). In this context, the Chilean bureaucratic-authoritarian regime enjoyed greater levels of autonomy and relative legitimacy which became essential in their effort to reshape the patterns of party competition in the post-transitional system. To a significant degree, the economic and constitutional reforms introduced by Pinochet also reduced the room for successful grievance mobilization inducing a political consensus around the new economic model.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, in spite of the increasing levels of poverty and inequality observed in the country as a result of the economic adjustment pursued by Pinochet; the processes of social fragmentation (declining capacities), the constitutional enactment of important constraints on policy-making (declining opportunities), and the self-moderation of both the left and the right (declining grievance mobilization potential) further reduced the salience of socioeconomic conflicts in structuring partisan competition (Mainwaring and Torcal 2003; Roberts 1998). Simultaneously, a new competitive divide splitting the pro-Pinochet camp from that of the opposition to his regime became the central dimension of competition in the post-transitional part-system. Nonetheless, as argued below, this emerging political divide has progressively become orthogonal with respect to the socio-economic one and it is primarily oriented towards the past becoming an identification divide. Although partisans of both camps still structure their political preferences on the basis of identifying parties with an “authoritarian” (or Pro-Pinochet camp) and a “democratic” camp, the policy content of the divide has eroded. Not surprisingly,

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<sup>14</sup>See Hagopian (2002) for a similar argument and supporting evidence.

this strategy has failed to successfully mobilize newer generations and weakly politically socialized voters.

As this comparative analysis shows, linkage strategies evolve dynamically in the region, resulting from the interaction of long-term configurations and short-term factors. As well, the patterns of change over-time are frequently divergent. Beyond the extent of programmatic linking present in the system, it is also necessary to analyze and explain the nature of the competitive divides that provide the substance on which parties construct their programmatic appeals (e.g. class, moral, or regime divides).

#### Distinguishing three analytical levels in the analysis of representation in “dual” societies

When parties compete in highly unequal and socially fragmented societies, programmatic linking is likely to be unequally distributed among different socioeconomic groups. As a result, it is not only necessary to account both for the extent and nature of programmatic linking currently taking place in each party-system, but also for the social distribution of programmatic-linkage opportunities in each society. Variance in these respects results from the strategic options that political parties pursue when competing to maximize their electoral return in the context of constraints induced by socio-structural and historical-institutional factors, as well as a given distribution of policy/value preferences and campaign resources.

Therefore, in order to complement the theoretical framework developed on the basis of *capacities*, *opportunities*, and the *potential for successfully mobilizing grievances* it is necessary to identify at least three levels at which it is possible to distinguish programmatically from non-programmatically oriented political party strategies. Although these levels are interrelated, party-voter linkages only concern one of them. However, the three are extremely relevant in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the quality of political representation currently available in the region. Therefore, each one of them is reflected in my methodological strategy to analyze the nature of political representation in Chile and Uruguay. First, it is necessary to analyze existing differences regarding the programmatic commitments

of party elites, which can have divergent degrees of elaboration, but which essentially concern how political parties align along the left-right dimension and its substantive policy-correlates in each system. Independent of their relevance for party-voter linkages, these programmatic predispositions have important implications for the analysis of policy-making and the internal politics of partisan groups in a given system. Second, it is also necessary to analyze the different structure of the configuration of their social base. In other words, we need to know to what extent political parties recruit electoral support from a predominantly homogenous or heterogeneous social base and whether different parties in the system have a different profile in terms of their social base configuration. Particularly in the cases of parties with socially heterogeneous electoral coalitions it is then necessary to account for the nature of the programmatic preferences of each significant segment of such coalitions. This is important to avoid a “sociological” fallacy like the one described by Sartori (1969). Finally, the nature of the appeals that parties use (linkage strategies) vis-à-vis different groups of their supporters should be accounted for.

My empirical analysis will show that important differences exist within each case regarding these three levels. For instance, parties with very different programmatic profiles (first level), have similar socially heterogeneous electoral base configurations (second level), and rely on a combination of programmatic linkages (third level) to supporters with higher levels of education while using non-programmatic appeals to supporters at lower socio-economic levels.

To account for each level, I will first (in Chapter 5) analyze the ideological profiles of partisan elites and their electoral bases segmented on the basis of their educational levels. This will allow me to analyze level 1, while getting a first approximation to level 2. In Chapters 6 and 7, I will test the extent to which partisan elites and voters (once again distinguishing among different educational levels in the electorate) link on the basis of programmatic appeals (level 3). In turn, Chapters 8 and 10 will analyze the nature of party-voter linkages at the local level in districts with differing socio-structural and competitive configurations. Drawing on a different methodological strategy (fieldwork interviews) this will complement the assessments regarding

levels 2 and 3 made in the previous three chapters on the basis of survey analyses. Finally, Chapters 9 and 11 will present a comprehensive overview of the electoral strategies and tactics of the two most successful parties in each system in the most recent elections. In so doing, both chapters will complete the analytical strategy seeking to provide an integrated account of the interplay between these three levels.

### The Nature of the Argument: Critical Junctures, Path-Dependence, and Programmatic Competition

Since (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) seminal work on cleavage formation and partisan competition in Western European countries the analysis of party-systems seeks to account for the origin of genetic cleavages, their nature, and the evolution of programmatic competition across time on the basis of path dependent trajectories usually determined by the resolution of a set of historical critical junctures. To explain partisan alignments and patterns of party competition in the 1960s, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) proposed to focus on the institutional outcomes of three critical junctures: the protestant reform, the process of nation-state-formation, and the industrial revolution. They claimed that the socio-political alignments resulting from the resolution of the conflicts spurred by these crucial historical events became institutionalized and contributed to structure partisan competition in the twentieth century in a (strong) path-dependent fashion. In Stinchcombe's (1968) terms, the alignments emerging at the critical juncture (historical cause) yielded a set of structural and institutional incentives (constant causes) that reinforced the status-quo, providing successful parties the capacity to encapsulate their respective social constituencies on the basis of their historical alignment on the three consecutive junctures.

In Chile and following Lipset and Rokkan's lead, Scully (1992) has suggestively reconstructed and explained the trajectory of the Chilean party-system (and its center) on the basis of three critical-junctures: the liberal-conservative conflict on Church privileges, the incorporation of urban middle and lower classes by centrist and left parties, and the

incorporation of the rural proletariat by seeking to erode the system of clientelistic co-optation traditionally run by landowners in the countryside.

In the context of their ambitious cross-national comparison, Collier and Collier (1991) developed a path-dependent model to explain not only partisan alignments but also, and more fundamentally, regime outcomes in Latin America during the twentieth century. In this case, they proposed to consider the patterns of “labor incorporation” in the early twentieth century as the key “critical juncture” shaping future political developments in each country by putting in place a set of institutions that considerably constrained subsequent innovations through lock-in effects. In their own words, a critical juncture is: “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinctive ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis), and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (Collier and Collier 1991, p.782). Socio-structural factors are not underestimated in this framework, the Colliers argue, as those elements are introduced in the analysis as “antecedent conditions” and dominate the causal mechanisms that lead to the configuration of a cleavage. However, once the critical juncture takes place, altering the characteristics of the precedent political arrangement and creating its legacy, the political sphere gains relative autonomy from socio-structural factors:

The pattern of links between socioeconomic change and politics that best summarizes our analysis is one in which a major economic and social transformation (such as this earlier period of export-led growth) sets into motion processes of political change (such as the incorporation period and its legacy), which later achieve a certain margin of autonomy in relation to the socioeconomic context. Thus, though the emergence of distinct types of incorporation reflected prior socioeconomic and political differences among countries, the subsequent dynamics derived to a significant extent from the political logic of incorporation itself. (Collier and Collier 1991, p. 770).

In this sense, critical juncture path dependence resembles a “punctuated-equilibrium” model, in which a period of significant indeterminacy (critical juncture) is followed by a period of institutionally induced stability analytically suppressing “constant causes” as causal mechanisms (Spruyt 1994).

Elaborating on the notion of critical juncture path dependency, Hartlyn (2001) identifies a set of conditions to be fulfilled by this type of argument:

First, they must explain why a particular period is indeed a ‘critical juncture,’ a choice point at which ‘enduring institutions and structures are created, and the range of outcomes is narrowed

significantly.’ Second, they must justify why the choice point they select is actually the key one as opposed to others, and why the range of outcomes is narrowed by decisions made during that period than by ongoing (“constant”) causes. Third, they have a number of difficult comparative-historical decisions to make, categorizing periods and determining which cases are similar enough to be lumped together in contrast to others. (Hartlyn 2001, p. 163)

Although Collier and Collier’s argument could also be criticized in light of the third challenge (regarding their construction of country-pairs), the first and second challenges identified by Hartlyn (2001) eventually point to more fundamental weaknesses. In particular, to validate the account offered by the Colliers it would be necessary to probe that the critical juncture was not merely an important event in a more complex and far-reaching path-dependent causal chain in which structural, politico-institutional, and international factors were complexly entangled and mutually embedded, not only before the resolution of the critical juncture but also, and more fundamentally, in its aftermath.

As I will seek to demonstrate in the two case analyses that follow, a pattern of continuity (as well as significant transformations) can be identified between the antecedent conditions and the legacy of the critical juncture. Those continuities, as well as the changes, can be explained by the continuous interplay of socio-structural and institutional factors (“constant causes”), as well as exogenous shocks and constraints. In turn, the presence of significant continuity linking antecedent conditions with legacies, suggests that the critical juncture, although important and influential, was less critical than assumed. In short, in spite of its analytical elegance and parsimony, a critical juncture path dependent explanation is likely to provide a constrained (and at least partially misleading) explanation, in particular if applied to predict contemporary cleavage mobilization. As I argue below, the very nature (continuous dynamic evolution and lack of “freezing”) of contemporary political alignments in the party-systems of both capitalist advanced countries and the developing world, turn Lipset and Rokkan’s model unsuitable to analyze post-industrial and developing societies.

In Europe, party-systems have “defrosted” and new and significantly more fluid patterns of partisan competition have emerged (Katz and Mair 1995; Kitschelt 1994). Although potentially attributable to a still unresolved critical juncture, such fluidity and indeterminacy is

crucially linked to the socio-structural transformations that capitalist-advanced societies underwent since the 1970s. In this context, the increasing levels of social segmentation and individualization reduce the likelihood of the institutionalization of stable sociopolitical alignments, like the ones described by Lipset and Rokkan for the golden era of capitalist advanced societies. However, by pursuing programmatic re-alignment in order to re-craft winning coalitions on the basis of new social coalitions, European parties are still able to represent evolving but still more stable interests. Notwithstanding, even in institutionalized and affluent democratic polities political alignments are today more dynamic and fluid than a critical juncture approach would lead us to assume.

In their conclusion, the Colliers aptly contemplated the emergence of a “new critical juncture” in Latin America. This emerging critical juncture was the result of (re)democratization in the context of the demise of ISI and the reorganization of global capital, the growth of the informal sector and of middle classes, and the decline of the peasantry. According to their framework, both the erosion of the legacies of the first “critical juncture” and the challenges posed by the emerging socio-structural and international conditions would make room for relatively un-constrained (though structurally-driven) agency. In this sense, Collier and Collier (1991) rightly anticipated the significant degree of turmoil that those transformations would bring about in the party-systems of the region (Coppedge 1998; Hagopian 1998; Roberts and Wibbels 1999). However, even more so than in Europe, those social transformations significantly reduce the likelihood for the emergence of stable sociopolitical alignments, given the current constraints in policy-making, the relatively small endowments in terms of *capacities* and *opportunities* that party-systems of the region have, and especially, the high levels of social inequality and fragmentation that characterize these societies (Roberts 1998). To be sure, the reasons that explain the greater (transitory?) levels of programmatic structure observed circa 1997-1998 in Chile and Uruguay respond to exceptional –though divergent– patterns in the region.

Furthermore, in Latin America and with the partial exception of Chile (1920-1973) social-cleavage mobilization and stable political alignments have been relatively weak in

comparison with the European case. This outcome has been attributed to the higher levels of social inequality and fragmentation observed in the region. Additionally, economic dependency also tended to hinder the articulation of viable and stable political coalitions (Dix 1989). Indeed, along with international factors, the unbalanced distribution of class-power that generally translated into resilient alliances between the economic elites, the state, and the military explains the bleak democratic experience of the region (Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens 1992).

Therefore, the most-institutionalized party-systems of the region did not tend to be structured around consistent policy coalitions representing a socially well defined constituency. Instead, those party-systems were institutionalized on the basis of non-programmatic linkages developed to attract a cross-class constituency (thus, protecting elite interests) and eventually contributed to foster the emergence of strong partisan sub-cultures that provided an additional source –in general an antecedent one-- for medium-term stability (Hartlyn 1988). Importantly, in Uruguay, this configuration was combined with relatively high levels of ISI that were, nonetheless, significantly circumscribed to the industrialization of agricultural products, the expansion of the “welfare state”, and encompassing economic protectionism.

As argued below, Chile’s historical exceptionalism helps to explain the continuity of an (attenuated) pattern of programmatic linking. Meanwhile, Uruguay’s recent trajectory and its experience with ISI explains the emergence of politically mobilized *grievances*, which coupled with pre-existing *opportunities* and *capacities* made feasible the emergence of programmatic-linking in a system previously dominated by non-programmatic ones party-voter relations. These incentive configurations are continuously evolving and signal the direction of change in each party-system. Their dialectical transformation in relation to socio-structural and institutional variables, along with exogenous constraints, expose the inadequacies of a critical-juncture argument to such continuous transformations and the underlying factors that drive them.

Therefore, having argued that critical juncture causal models are inadequate for studying the current nature of partisan competition in Latin America, I propose to frame the

explanation of the extent, nature, and social distribution of current cleavage mobilization in Chile and Uruguay on the basis of a “soft” version of path-dependence. In this respect, my explanation significantly departs from that of Roberts (*forthcoming*). An example of an attenuated version of path-dependence is found in Huber and Stephens (2001) explanation of the expansion and retrenchment of welfare states. This explanation combines the (continuous) effect of power distribution configurations with those of institutional legacies:

Our view is between these two polar types [critical juncture path dependence vs. uniform causal effects over time]. Welfare state developments were not locked in by the early 1960s; later periods of government did matter and sustained changes in the patterns of partisan government could have substantial effects on welfare state regimes. On the other hand, our four mechanisms, particularly the ratchet effect and policy legacies, do imply more path dependency than the uniform effects theories hypothesize. As each policy is put into place it transforms the distribution of preferences; as the regime increasingly entrenches itself, it transforms the universe of actors. The economic and political costs of moving to another regime become greater; and conversely the returns of staying on the same track become greater. (Huber and Stephens 2001)

In the path-dependent account that follows “historical causes” and the institutions that they engendered are analyzed in relation to four theoretically decisive periods: the historical configuration of the party system, the pre-authoritarian arrangement, the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, and the transition to democracy. However, such variables are considered in combination and interaction with socio-structural factors that persistently contributed to reshape power distribution in each society, gaining as a result, a central explanatory role.

Although perhaps less parsimonious and elegant, this type of analytical model offers as compensation a greater level of internal validity. In other words, while methodologically self-conscious and systematic, this model provides greater levels of flexibility to seek a more complete explanation without forcing a homogenous causal mechanism on each case. Indeed, as argued below, the current difference observed between the patterns of partisan competition in Chile and Uruguay is partially caused by the relative scope, timing and pace of the transition to a market-oriented model in each case. Chile’s highly disruptive authoritarian regime (1973-1989) with the capacity to institutionalize and lock-in its preferences makes a punctuated-equilibrium causal mechanism empirically sound to explain partisan alignments on programmatic preferences in contemporary Chile. However, even though Uruguay also went

through a similar bureaucratic-authoritarian regime during roughly the same period (1973-1984), it was far less disruptive. Instead, current political alignments can be interpreted as the result of a long-term interplay between structural and institutional factors that yielded an incremental and slow-moving process that started in the 1950s and that eventually hit a threshold in the mid 1990s.<sup>15</sup>

Table 2.3 offers a first glance into the long-term evolution of both countries and their party-systems. In turn, table 2.4 presents details on the predicted configuration of opportunities, capacities, and potential for successfully mobilizing grievances in each system on the basis of those long-term configurations and dynamics. The next two chapters are devoted to elaborate on how such evolution relates to the theorized contemporary nature of party-voter linkages in each system.

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<sup>15</sup>See Pierson (2003) for an illustrative discussion of different types of causal mechanisms on the basis of temporal configurations.

**Table 2.3:**

**Long-term evolution of Chile and Uruguay in selected socio-political and economic indicators**

Variable	Chile	Uruguay
<b>Long-term political configuration and trajectory</b>		
Duration of democracy in the country weighted according to restrictions on political inclusion and conflict (1945-1998) <sup>16</sup>	27.25	44.0
Historical strength of labor <sup>17</sup>	High: Mineral Enclave and Landed upper classes	Medium: Temperate agriculture + early urbanization
Historical sequence of labor incorporation according to Collier and Collier (1991). Continues in the next four rows <sup>18</sup>	Very strong oligarchy until 1920, strong conservative-liberal cleavage, Church remaining strong.	Weaker oligarchy that was divided along partisan lines (Blancos and Colorados), weaker conservative-liberal divide and consolidation of early secularization after 1909. Split between political power and economic power. Tradition of co-operation pacts between both parties, providing the basis for both the incorporation of labor and its limitations (1904-1930)
Agent and type of incorporation	State: depolitization and control, paternalist benefits, repression of left (1920-1931)	Traditional Political Parties: Clientelist electoral mobilization, significant benefits to labor, toleration of weak left (1930-1945)
Post-Incorporation Stage	Aborted populism, failed attempt of creating a cross-class political center, labor affiliated to radical opposition parties or increasingly radicalized (1945-1960)	Reinforcement of traditional bi-partisanship on the basis of wide electoral base, labor progressively affiliated with left but enduring “labor-schizophrenia” (1945-1960)

<sup>16</sup>Source: Kitschelt et al (forthcoming), computed on the basis of Rueschemeyer et al (1992: pp.162). Each year of *full democracy* is added as 1, each year of restrictive inclusion is count as .75, and each year of restricted conflict counts as .5. If restrictions existed both in terms of franchise and conflict, each year counts as .25.

<sup>17</sup>Source: Kitschelt et al (forthcoming) computed on the basis of Rueschemeyer et al (1992: chapter five).

<sup>18</sup>Source: Collier and Collier (1991: pp. 747-53).

**Table 2.3 (cont.):**

Incorporation's Aftermath	Polarized multi-party system → increasing social and political polarization coupled with decisional stalemate (because of minority status of presidents due to partisan polarization and the consolidation of three partisan blocks), government increasingly moving left (1946-1964).	Electoral stability with increasing social conflict. Pacts between traditional parties and first instance of alternation in presidential office in 1958 as a first symptom of increasing discontent. Left starting to grow in electoral and union arenas, consolidating an electoral front in 1966 and creating Frente Amplio in 1971 (1960-1973)
Party-system characteristics in the pre-authoritarian stage	Three third's system with parties competing both on ideological grounds (class-based cleavage) and around the articulation of patronage networks (center-periphery), alternating on state control. Significant role of political center as arbiter. Increasing level of ideological polarization in the wake of ISI's exhaustion. Left reaching government by electoral means and pursuing a "democratic transition to democracy" on the basis of extremely weak congressional support and increasing opposition –national and international. <sup>19</sup>	Political parties cooperating in government and sharing access to state resources to feed patronage and clientelistic networks, in the context of increasing fiscal constraints and a sustained economic crisis since the end of the Korean War. Relatively fractionalized parties (leading to Congressional deadlocks) and increasing sociopolitical polarization (leftist insurgency and rightist turn on the governing fraction of the Colorado Party). Frente Amplio obtaining 18% in 1971 elections. <sup>20</sup>
Political outcome in the early 1970s	Wide-base coup-coalition (including sectors of the middle-class) leading to military coup in 1973 and the implantation of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (1973-1989). First ("successful") neoliberal experiment, radically reshaping economy and society.	Military coup and implantation of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (1973-1984) with weak social support base and a primary focus on repression and control of left ("sheriff" style), unsuccessful in pursuing radical reshaping of socioeconomic model, except for trade and financial openness. Considered as an "authoritarian parenthesis." <sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Sources: Gil (1966); Scully (1992 and 1995); Valenzuela (1977 and 1995).

<sup>20</sup>Source: González (1991).

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

**Table 2.3 (cont.):**

<b>Transition and post-authoritarian political system</b>		
Transitional Mode <sup>22</sup>	Pacted-transition with strong Armed Forces institutionalizing pervasive authoritarian enclaves in the 1980's Constitution. Authoritarian enclaves still plainly operational.	Pacted-transition with relatively weaker Armed Forces imposing electoral restrictions, but limited to the first election.
Governing Block/Opposition in the post-transition	Concertación de Partidos Por la Demcoracia (center-left)/Alianza Por Chile (right)	Colorados and Blancos (center-right)/Frente Amplio (center-left)
Institutionalization + Incorporation Level of the current party-system in the LA context <sup>23</sup>	High (11.5)	High (11.5)
Average electoral volatility in the LA context (1980-1998) <sup>24</sup>	Intermediate to low (15.3)	Low (12.2)
Electoral System	Majoritarian and disproportional (binominal), introducing strong incentives for the creation of electoral pacts and tending to generate a tie at the district level. <sup>25</sup> Strong incentives for centralization of power in party-hierarchies, however potentially weakened by high levels of decentralization and relatively small electoral circumscriptions.	Proportional Representation + Double-Simultaneous Vote. System that provides incentives for the consolidation of "electoral cooperatives", inducing high levels of internal fractionalization and reducing incentives for centralization of power within parties. <sup>26</sup> Big district size in Montevideo (capital city, M approximately=40) and Canelones (metropolitan area, M approximately=14) and small in the remaining 17 districts (M=1, 2, or 3) District sizes are allocated for each election on the basis of the districted distribution of vote registers.

<sup>22</sup>Source: Linz and Stepan (1996).

<sup>23</sup>Source: Mainwaring and Scully (1995). The index has a minimum of 4.5 (Peru) and a maximum of 11.5 (Uruguay and Chile).

<sup>24</sup>Source: Mainwaring and Scully (1995). The index has a minimum of 10.3 (Costa Rica) and a maximum of 47.3 (Peru).

<sup>25</sup>See Navia (2003).

<sup>26</sup>See Morgenstern (2001).

**Table 2.3 (cont.):**

Level of left-right structure independently from its substantive policy content (1998) <sup>27</sup>	High 3.86	Intermediate 2.64
Relative strength of leftist parties in Congress. <sup>28</sup>	Medium (PPD, PS)	High (Frente Amplio)
Effective Number of Parties (1998) <sup>29</sup>	5.11	3.33
Principal deficit of post-transitional democracy	Authoritarian enclaves (electoral system, life-term appointed senators, military autonomy), subordination of political projects and platforms to pacts, rapidly increasing level of political alienation and growing abstention rates in significant sectors of the electorate. <sup>30</sup>	Decisional stalemate between mild neo-liberal reformist block in office (traditional parties consolidating an “ideological family”) and the left. Corporatist adjustment generating skewed distribution of costs and benefits of reform, specially damaging unorganized sectors of society. Increasing social discontent.
Principal virtue of post-transitional democracy	Moderation, governance, stability. <sup>31</sup>	Social inclusion and “cushion” capacity through reform moderation as a result of tie between traditional parties and a veto coalition of ISI-beneficiaries + Frente Amplio. The left (Frente Amplio) acting as a intra-systemic contention mechanism for increasing social discontent. <sup>32</sup>

<sup>27</sup>Source: Zechmeister (2001). The index has a minimum of 1.2 (Costa Rica) and a maximum of 3.86 (Chile).

<sup>28</sup>Source: Kitschelt et al (forthcoming), computed on the basis of Zechmeister (2001).

<sup>29</sup>Source: Kitschelt et al (forthcoming).

<sup>30</sup>Garretón (1988); Flisfisch (1985); Fuentes (1999).

<sup>31</sup>Siavelis (1999). Siavelis does not consider this as a structural trait of the emerging party-system, but just as a temporary outcome of the transition.

<sup>32</sup>González (1991); Filgueira and Papadopolus (1996).

**Table 2.3 (cont.):**

<b>Economic model and adjustment patterns</b>		
Type of social incorporation under ISI <sup>33</sup>	Stratified –corporatist- Universalism	Stratified –corporatist- Universalism
Recent development strategy <sup>34</sup>	Neo-liberal implemented under BA and continued under Concertación (center-left pact) complemented by targeted social policy.	Significant trade and financial liberalization (particularly under BA), but corporatist-adjustment pattern on other areas (privatization and social policy) similar of those of continental-european welfare states as a result of strong policy-feedback and increased political competition due to Frente Amplio's electoral sustained growth.
Levels of economic liberalization (1985-1995) and liberalization effort for the same period (difference between starting and ending level). <sup>35</sup>	.671 (1985 still under Pinochet) .843 (1995) .172 (difference)	.815 (1985, already democratized) .891 (1995) .076 (difference)
Presence of orthodox stabilization plans and hyperinflationary crises <sup>36</sup>	No	No

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<sup>33</sup> Filgueira (1999).

<sup>34</sup> Following Kaztman's (2002) interpretation.

<sup>35</sup> Morley and Pettinato (1999).

<sup>36</sup> Garretón (1988); Drake and Jaksic (1999); Moulián (1997); Filgueira and Papadopolus (1996); Filgueira and Morães (1999).

**Table 2.3 (cont.):**

Agent that implements reforms <sup>37</sup>	<p>“Successful” Armed Forces</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>_ Privatization</li> <li>_ Pension and Health Reform</li> <li>_ Trade Liberalization</li> <li>_ Labor Liberalization</li> <li>_ Decentralizing reforms</li> <li>_ Private contracts to provide infrastructure</li> </ul>	<p>“Unsuccessful” Armed Forces. Colorado and Blanco governments seek to introduce additional reforms (pension system, education, gradual state apparatus reforms, unsuccessful privatization attempts), but under a gradual and “cushioned” logic, given the strength of policy-feedback in the system and the availability of veto-institutions (direct democracy) that favor blockade, particularly in the context of increasing electoral competition and ideological mobilization on the state-market divide.</p>
Main characterization of reforms.	<p>Concertación’s governments introduces some correctives (social expenditures + specific focalized social policy, financial market controls to promote productive investment and constrain capital flows in the wake of external shocks) and continues with the reformist agenda (labor deregulation, increasing trade openness and bilateral and regional trade agreements). Economic growth during the 1990s, with significant slow-down since 1997-1998, partially eroding the (legitimacy) and consensual support for the economic model and explaining to a certain degree, the increasing electoral growth of the Alianza Por Chile (right). Economic growth recently resumed. “Unsuccessful” or Non-Reformist Armed Forces<sup>38</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>_ Commercial and Financial Liberalization</li> <li>_ Labor Deregulation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>_ Absence of Privatization of Public Enterprises and Utility companies.</li> <li>_ Hybrid Pension System (Public-Private Mix, with a transitional system protecting current pension beneficiaries).</li> <li>_ Centralized Social Policy Programs, but with increasing role of NGOs and Municipal Governments.</li> <li>_ Private contracts to provide infrastructure</li> </ul> <p>Inconsistent policy-combination during the 1990s, sustained through an overvalued currency, stimulating imports and hurting local producers (increasing unemployment and deindustrialization). After Brazil’s devaluation in 1998 this produces a deep economic recession leading to the financial collapse and harsh balance of payments crisis in 2002.</p>

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> See Castiglioni (2005) for evidence on the Armed Forces unwillingness to pursue state and social policy reform in Uruguay.

**Table 2.3 (cont.):**

Main agent opposed to neoliberal reform and ideological hegemony on economic model. <sup>39</sup>	Communist Party (without Congressional representation and an electoral base of approximately 5-7%) and orthodox (but minority) sectors of the Socialist Party. New economic model legitimated on the basis of economic growth and relatively uncontested.	Frente Amplio and a veto coalition of ISI beneficiaries encompassing public employees, pension beneficiaries, and unions (over-representing the public sector). New economic model consensually opposed on the basis of statist and redistributive tradition ( <i>Batllismo</i> ), reinterpreted and represented by Frente Amplio as both traditional parties are forced to pursue structural adjustment from office in the context of recurrent fiscal deficits.
<b>Recent socio-economic trends</b>		
% of public sector and industrial employment over total non-agricultural employment and difference between 1990 and 1999. <sup>40</sup>	Public sector: 7.2 % (+.2%) Industry: 18.6% (-11.9%)	Public sector: 17.1% (-3%) Industry: 16% (-7.1%)
Weberian State Index		
Per capita GDP 1999 <sup>41</sup>	8370	8280
Percent Change in GDP per cápita (1990-1998) <sup>42</sup>	+5.7%	+3%
Real wages in 1997 (1980=base 100) <sup>43</sup>	102.3	40.8
Unemployment increase for the period 1991-2000 (1991= base 100) <sup>44</sup>	114.6%	150.6%

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Kaztman (2002).

<sup>41</sup>Source: Kitschelt et al (forthcoming) on the basis of World Bank reports.

<sup>42</sup>Source: Roberts (2002).

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Kaztman (2002).

**Table 2.3 (cont.):**

Income inequality (ratio between mean per capita income of the 10% richer households and mean per capita income of 40% households at the bottom of income distribution 1990, 1999). <sup>45</sup>	18.2% 18.7%	9.4% 8.8%
Index of open unemployment by years of formal education in 1998. (1990=base 100) <sup>46</sup>	0-9 years: 128% 10-12 years: 110% 13 y + years: 112%  Absolute unemployment level  Average 1990=8.7% Average 1998=10.1%	0-9 years: 134% 10-12 years: 118% 13 y + years: 115%  Absolute unemployment level  Average 1990=7.2% Average 1998=8.3%
Index of social lack of social protection. % of total workers in the city (Santiago and Montevideo) working without social protection in 1998, by years of formal education (1990=base 100) <sup>47</sup>	0-9 years: 145% 10-12 years: 121% 13 y + years: 142%  Absolute levels of workers without social protection  Average 1990=11.8% Average 1998=15.8%	0-9 years: 110% 10-12 years: 107% 13 y + years: 88%  Absolute levels of workers without social protection  Average 1990=51.5% Average 1998=54.1%
Relative strength of labor (late 1990s). <sup>48</sup>	Intermediate 12.7% (1997)	Intermediate 12% (1994)
Union –density index <sup>49</sup>	Medium	High

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Percentage of unionized economically active population, Roberts and Wibbels (1999).

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

**Table 2.4:**  
**General Patterns Predicted for Each Case**

	Chile	Uruguay
Opportunities	High but constrained	High
Capacities	Declining	Maintained
Potential for Successful Partisan Mobilization of Grievances	Declining except for retrospective regime divide	Increasing class (economic model) mobilization

#### Defining and measuring programmatic linkages

As noted in Kitschelt et al (forthcoming), the literature on partisan competition relies on a set of poorly defined concepts, which are usually treated as synonyms (e.g.: cleavages, dimensions, and divides). For the sake of clarity, the discussion of both cases and their empirical treatment will analyze how different potential issue-divisions map (or not) into partisan alignments and/or different socioeconomic groups.

Although it is conceptually misleading to infer the configuration of a political-cleavage from the sole presence of social-divisions (Sartori 1969), in Western Europe, political entrepreneurs banked on salient social divisions (pillars) to structure stable systems of representation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). These systems of representations were stabilized around a set of divisions that came to be known as political cleavages, signaling the presence of enduring socio-political alignments in the long-term. However, both the contemporary erosion of political cleavages in advanced-capitalist democracies and the historical weakness of cleavage systems in Latin America (Dix 1989) make the term “political cleavages” inappropriate in Latin America.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that while the erosion of cleavage systems in Europe relates to increasing rates of social mobility and diversification, the social heterogeneity and fragmentation of the popular sector in Latin America has hindered the articulation of stable political cleavages even when significant degrees of social “entrapment” remain extremely resilient. Therefore, a more appropriate concept is required, particularly to analyze contemporary alignments in Latin American party-systems.

While also signaling significant divisions in society, issue-divisions (or divides) are less stable and can eventually be fluid or transitional, providing an adequate alternative to the more widely used concept of “political cleavages.” If members and voters of different parties hold clearly defined and distinct issue-positions in a given (and salient) issue or issue-bundle, we can then assume the presence of “mandate representation” or “responsible party-government” in the system. Mandate representation captures the degree of party correspondence to the preferences of its constituency (Converse and Pierce 1986; Dalton 1985; Iversen 1994a; Iversen 1994b; Powell 1982; Powell 1989; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999b; Ranney 1962; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Thomassen 1994). Three conditions are central to the description of a “responsible party government: 1) policy divergence among the parties contesting the election; 2) policy stability on the part of the parties contesting the election; and 3) policy voting on the part of the electorate (Adams 2001). The subset of all possible issue-divisions in which we observe high issue-congruence can be seen conceived as the competitive issue-divisions or divides that structure programmatic competition in the system.

The degree in which the party-systems of Chile and Uruguay fulfill these three conditions in a widely defined set of issues and the characteristics of the specific divides in which congruence is present in each system, constitute the gist of the first three empirical chapters. To analyze the evolution of party-voter programmatic linkages in post-transitional Chile and Uruguay, a diachronic analysis of issue-congruence is also presented. While chapters 4 and 5 analyze the evolution of three theoretically defined divides (clerical/anti-clerical, regime, and state/market) for which I present a set of hypothesis in the concluding section of chapters 2 and 3; Chapter 6 analyzes the degree of congruence between voters and their representatives on a set of eleven policy-related issues. Issue-congruence is measured not only in terms of mean partisan placements, but also by evaluating the external divisiveness of each issue and the internal coherence of each party on each issue.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **THE EVOLUTION OF PARTY-VOTER LINKAGES IN CHILE**

This chapter presents a path-dependent narrative on party-base linkages in Chile and puts forth a set of hypotheses to predict the current level, nature, and contents of programmatic and non-programmatic linking in the Chilean party-system.

#### **The Nature of Programmatic Linkages in the Post-Transitional Period**

Historically, Chile's party-system can be identified as the most proximate case in Latin America to type I (programmatic linkages) as defined in Chapter 2. Additionally, the historical party-system of Chile also relied on and built up strong partisan subcultures, developing encompassing partisan organizations that connected the national leadership with its local followers through efficient patronage and clientelistic networks based on the distribution of state-resources (approaching type II: non-programmatic partisan linkages).

However, the configuration of the post-transition party system has been radically reshaped by the legacies of the "revolutionary epoch" (1964-89) and Pinochet's "victorious" regime. Although continuities are more obvious regarding other aspects of the party-system (format, electoral volatility, survival of historical parties, see e.g. Valenzuela and Scully 1997), party-society relations and the nature of party-voter linkages seem to have been drastically transformed.

The socioeconomic divide (or "class cleavage") that used to structure partisan competition in terms of programmatic linkages has lost centrality to a regime divide. The mobilizational capacity of this divide has been limited, while alienating non-politically socialized voters and the young. As a cross-cutting and less salient cleavage, the religious divide that cuts across the two

mainstream partisan coalitions that currently structure party-competition in the system cannot become a surrogate for the socioeconomic or regime divides. In short, although programmatic differences are still present at the elite level and condition policy-making in Congress both regarding the class and religious divides (see e.g. Blofield 2006 and Davila 2005), they have lost centrality in the electoral arena.

Lacking substantial programmatic content, party-voter linkages are structured around candidate-reputations on the basis of personalized, non-programmatic linkages between politicians and their constituents. Although this is not new in the system, its interaction with shrinking programmatic differences and the scarcity of centrally- allocated resources, reinforces the weakening of partisan organizations. Therefore, I hypothesize that whereas before patronage and clientelism used to reinforce partisan structures and sub-cultures (and the programmatic stances of its leaders) inducing party-discipline, in the post-transitional period and in the context of state reform, social fragmentation, and decentralization they will tend to produce the opposite result.

Finally, the scarcity of resources to finance campaigns, the lack of serious electoral finance regulations, and the programmatic collusion of parties regarding the socioeconomic model would set strong incentives in place for parties (and individual candidates) to pursue a dual representational strategy by extracting economic resources (in exchange for ideological representation) from their “vote-poor/resource-rich constituents” to get the vote of their “vote-rich/resource-poor constituents.”<sup>50</sup>

As a result of this hypothesized trajectory, I claim that the Chilean party-system is processing a transition from its historical configuration (approaching a combination of types I and II), to type IV (non-partisan valence competition, especially regarding Congressional and Municipal contests). In presidential races, where a relatively higher level of interest aggregation is feasible and campaigns are predominantly played on the national media, political candidates could

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<sup>50</sup>For a theoretical elaboration of this scenario see Kitschelt et al *forthcoming*.

eventually choose to mobilize “conjunctural grievances”, approaching type III (“populist/charismatic non-partisan linkages”).

Both the socio-structural legacies of drastic market reforms under Pinochet (among others, the weakening of subordinated sectors’ capacities to articulate coherent collective action and find viable representatives in the party-system and the “uncontested” legitimacy of the economic model) and the institutional legacies of that regime (among others, the electoral system and its implication for parties’ strategically “collusive” behavior; decentralization coupled with the shrinkage of centrally allocated state-resources; and the protection of the centerpieces of the economic model through constitutional supra-majority requisites) contribute to this outcome.

Contradicting early predictions that discarded a significant transformation of programmatic competition in the post-transitional system (Valenzuela and Scully 1997; Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986; Valenzuela 1999; Scully 1992), I suggest that both the class and the religious divide have lost salience as competitive divides in the post-transitional Chilean system. In their place, a new divide has formed that pits “authoritarian” or “Pro-Pinochet” attitudes against “democratic” ones. Although *strictu sensu* this might not be a competitive divide, it operates, at least, as a strong basis for political identification either with the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (comprising, among others, the Christian-Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, the Party for Democracy, and the Radical Party) or the Alianza Por Chile (dominated by National Renovation and the UDI). Those two partisan alliances consolidated as the two dominant coalitions that structured party-competition in the post-transitional party system under the application of the electoral binominal system.

As a result, increasing evidence shows that the class-cleavage upon which parties competed and developed programmatic linkages to constituents in the pre-authoritarian period has been replaced by a “political cleavage” structured from above and revolving around regime issues (Hagopian 2002; Mainwaring and Torcal 2003; Ortega 2004). This substitution is also consistent with the processes of renovation and ideological moderation that Chilean political parties of the left

and the right went through during the transition, both as a result of international and national events (Roberts 1992; Posner 1999; Siavelis 1999). In other words, in the context of shrinking opportunities to develop and compete on a socioeconomic divide, Chilean elites seemed to have successfully activated a regime divide centered on the democratic-authoritarian question, mobilizing support on the basis of the deep political divide that emerged under the Unión Popular (UP) and that became consolidated with the authoritarian regime of Pinochet. Therefore, Chilean parties and especially the center-left coalition Concertación seemed to have adapted to the new structural conditions triggered by the dismantling of the state-centric socio-political matrix on the wake of the debt crisis of the 1980s, subsequent structural adjustment reforms, and the authoritarian enclaves that restricted the room for alternative cleavage mobilization institutionalized in the new Constitution (Garretón 1988; Fuentes 1999; Siavelis 1999).

In the aftermath of neoliberal reforms and the socio-structural transformations occurred since the 1970s, Chilean political leaders seemed to have successfully made-up for the incapacity to represent the socioeconomic cleavage, maintaining a firm ideological linkage to their constituents on the basis of regime issues. However, this emerging cleavage runs across class-lines, partially explaining the blurring of the previously stronger patterns of class-voting registered in pre-1973 Chile (Mainwaring and Torcal 2003; Ortega 2004) and the progressive weakening of Chilean parties “in the electorate.”

On the basis of the historical sequence described in this chapter, Figure 3.1 presents a tentative scheme for predicting the current nature of programmatic divides in the Chilean system. Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 derive the implications of such narrative for the configuration of *opportunities, capacities, and the potential for successfully mobilizing grievances* in contemporary Chile.

First, regarding the religious cleavage I expect a salient but “messy” religious/secular divide. The fuzziness of such divide derives from the presence of secular and religious parties within the ranks of center and right, or in terms of the post-transitional pacts, both within

Concertación (Christian-Democratic Party –DC- vs. Partido Por la Democracia –PPD-, Socialist Party –PS-, and the Radical Party –RP) and within the Alianza (Unión Demócrata Independiente –UDI- vs. Renovación Nacional). As a result, in spite of its historical salience in Chilean society, this particular divide has not been strongly translated into consistent partisan alignments and should be relatively orthogonal to other competitive divides (Mainwaring and Torcal 2003), with the partial exception of secular leftist parties. Thus, the fragmentation of the Catholic/secular cleavage has maintained the conservative status quo.

Second, in spite of Chile's pre-authoritarian tradition of comparatively strong class-based patterns of partisan competition, the strength of the class-based cleavage is likely to be undermined by a series of factors: the political and economic effects of Pinochet's bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, the strong legitimacy of market reforms nurtured by economic growth, the renovation of the Chilean left (Roberts 1992), the existing constraints regarding economic policy-making (Hagopian 2002), the subsequent operation of three Concertación's governments in such context, and the increasing growth of the populist right in traditional strongholds of the Chilean left in the popular sectors. Indeed, the increasing alienation and disaffection (Oxhorn 1995; Posner 1999) of previous voters of the left as a result of Concertación's mixed record in translating economic growth into social results (particularly in terms of reducing the high levels of inequality observed in Chile) should also reduce the likelihood of maintaining a consistent class-based electoral alignment. Indeed, recent analysis of electoral behavior supports this hypothesis (Mainwaring and Torcal 2003). In this context, the Communist Party (PC) has been the strongest dissident voice arguing against the economic model, but has failed to adapt to the new institutional environment, remaining a testimonial, orthodox party.

Third, the extent of political polarization and the consolidation of a relatively broad coup coalition under Allende gave rise to a democratic/authoritarian divide that was then consolidated under Pinochet's regime. Particularly in this second stage, as well as progressively during the post-transition to democracy, this divide gained centrality as the main divide splitting camps between a

pro-democratic Concertación and a pro-Pinochet Alianza. Arguably, during the post-transition both blocks increasingly consolidated cross-class alliances, reducing the likelihood of the emergence of a consistent alignment between an authoritarian/neoliberal camp on the right and a democratic/social-democratic camp on the left.

In that scenario, the centrality of this divide should decrease over time as the alignments inherited from the authoritarian past (particularly if inconsistent with other potential competitive divides) should gradually motivate a diminishing fraction of the Chilean electorate that still maintains strong emotional and cultural attachments either to the authoritarian or the democratic camp. The right faces increasing incentives to reduce the salience of the divide, particularly in the wake of Pinochet's detention in London in 1998 and subsequent judiciary decisions against him in Chile. The new evidence that relates the former dictator's personal economic fortune to privatization bribes and other serious irregularities illuminated by the "Riggs" case in 2002 and 2003 have further diminished the right's willingness to rally around the cleavage. Therefore, the evidence on the economic corruption of the regime has turned it virtually "indefensible" even for those who tolerated and even praised Pinochet's human right violations as a necessary instrument to put the country back on track after the Marxist threat.

**Figure 3.1:**

**Explaining the nature and evolution of competitive political divides in Chile**





Figure 3.1 (cont.)

Attempt at democratic transition to Socialist economy -->

First Neoliberal Experiment --> Encompassing far-reaching structural adjustment and liberalizing policies.

Debt Crisis --> Resuming \$ Growth --> Capitalism with a human face?



**Table 3.1:****Evolution of *opportunities* in Chile**

Democratic Contestation	Yes, with authoritarian enclaves
Democratic Contestation in the long-run	Yes
Electoral Participation	Historically restricted and low, declining after peak in 1989-1990
Policy-opportunities	Constrained, authoritarian enclaves and consensual policy-making dominating (Left in government)
<b>Balance</b>	Yes, constrained

**Table 3.2:****Evolution of *capacities* in Chile**

Civic organizations (long-term)	Strong and mobilized (particularly since the 1960s), tied to hierarchical party-brokerage (particularistic and pork) networks
Civic organizations in the post-transition	Declining, politically demobilized, plus structural reforms
Party-system institutionalization	High
Partisan sub-cultures	Historically Mild, declining in post-transitional period
Strength of machine politics	Historically Strong-Centralized, weak and decentralized in post-transitional period
<b>Balance</b>	Declining

**Table 3.3:**

**Evolution of *Potential for Successful Partisan Mobilization of Grievances* around three divides in Chile**

Class mobilization (long-term)	Historically high, since 1920s-1930s
Class mobilization in the post-transition	Declining, uncontested economic model pursued and institutionally locked-in by the military. Focus on compensatory social policy increasingly advocated by the right in the opposition
Regime divide (long-term)	Weak but with serious anti-partisan cycles in the 1930s and 1950s
Regime divide in the post-transition	Very strong
Clerical divide (long-term)	High, first cleavage emerging in the 1860s
Clerical divide in the post-transition	Declining, secularization plus split of the clerical camp in both the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia and the Alianza Por Chile
<b>Balance</b>	Class: Declining Regime: Strong (especially for older generations) Clerical: Declining or inconsistent alignments

Overall, and as a corollary of this evolution, one should predict that Chilean parties today enjoy fewer opportunities, capacities, and potential for successfully mobilizing salient grievances to compete on programmatic linkages than in the past, consolidating greater incentives for the development of non-ideological linkages between parties and voters.

As Angell (2003) has recently argued, strictly limiting the comparison of the emerging post-transitional party-system to the immediate pre-authoritarian period (1964-1973) is misleading, given the abnormal rates of polarization and political mobilization that preceded the coup. Therefore, the rest of this chapter presents a selective historical narrative on the evolution of partisan alignments in Chile to identify the long and short-term determinants of this emerging configuration. In the following pages I analyze four general periods (the original party-system, the pre-authoritarian party-system, the authoritarian period, and the post-transitional party-system), following a periodization based on Moulián (1985), whose structural focus provides an adequate

perspective in order to understand the role played by political parties when mediating between state and society at different developmental stages.<sup>51</sup> Before proceeding, however, I present a general overview on the historical characterization of the system.

### A General Characterization of the Chilean Party-System

The Chilean party-system has received widespread academic attention and has become (almost) consensually characterized as one of the most stable, institutionalized, and ideologically structured party-systems in Latin America (Gil 1966; Valenzuela 1977 and 1995; Garretón 1989; Dix 1991; Scully 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Siavelis 1999; Roberts *forthcoming*). This ideological structure has been described as the result of a sequence of three critical junctures that contributed to tighten the system along the secular/religious cleavage from 1860 to 1920, the urban class cleavage from 1921-1958, and the rural class cleavage from 1958-1973 (Scully 1992; Scully 1995; Valenzuela 1999). The political alignments created by this three conflicts helped to fill the Chilean party-system with programmatic contents. However, Chilean political parties did not only compete ideologically on the basis of religious and class appeals, but also constituted cultural and organizational “pillars” through which society was organized and collective (especially local) interests were channeled and represented (Valenzuela 1977; Scully 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Roberts *forthcoming*). In this context, Chilean parties also became the “brokers” that linked society with the state and constituted the “backbone” of the pre-authoritarian socio-political matrix penetrating every aspect of society to overshadow interest groups, trade-unions, social movements, and community organizations (Gil 1966; Angell 1972; Valenzuela 1977; Garretón 1988; Valenzuela 1999).

Except for the process of radicalization and polarization that extended from the mid 1960s to the 1973 military coup and that was preceded by two movements led by “anti-party” political

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<sup>51</sup>However, Moulian’s historical demarcations are virtually parallel to those proposed by Gil (1967), Valenzuela (1977 and elsewhere), and Scully (1992 and 1995).

figures (Carlos Ibáñez 1952-1958 and Jorge Alessandri 1958-1964), the 20<sup>th</sup> century party-system has also been characterized as one in which a system of “political compromise” predominated as a result of a tradition of coalition-rule and elite cooperation, facilitated in turn, by the presence of a moderate political center (Moulián 1985; Scully 1992). The division of the electorate in roughly “equal thirds” and the relatively high levels of state-autonomy *vis-à-vis* individual parties, reinforced the centrality of electoral contestation and promoted both competition (particularly in local and congressional elections), coalition making (in presidential elections) and compromise (Scully 1992; Valenzuela 1977 and 1999). This scenario allowed parties to extract resources from the center in order to develop encompassing national organizations centered on vertical patronage and clientelistic networks that redistributed the “nitrate rents” to the periphery (Valenzuela 1977). With a few partial exceptions (1891 and the late 1920s) this party-system was instrumental in keeping constitutional rule in place from 1830 until the military coup of 1973. As argued in chapter 1, this bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (1973-1989) introduced crucial discontinuities in the Chilean political system which has made a lasting impact on post-transitional party-politics.

### The Historical Evolution of the Chilean Party-System

In this section I describe the main features of the traditional party-system of Chile in order to set the basis for assessing the extent and implications of the recent transformation hypothesized above.

#### *From Independence (1810) to the Consolidation of State Power and Oligarchic Rule (1830-1860)*

Chile’s independence struggle stands out in Latin America due to its “easy” and early resolution, yielding a relatively homogeneous rural oligarchy that did not suffer the devastation of long-drawn independence and post-independence wars that expanded through the vast majority of Spanish America (Rueschemeyer et al 1992). The rapid expansion of the nitrate sector provided the basis for a quick consolidation of the Chilean state on the basis of mineral-exports taxes. This

meant that the state was not dependent on property taxes and thus, became increasingly autonomous from the landed-elite (Valenzuela 1999). Indeed, Moulian characterizes this period by a fracture between the economic power in the hands of the traditional and conservative landed oligarchy and the political power in the hands of liberal elites. Until the 1830s, the period was punctuated by political turmoil and an extreme dependence on the qualities of the presidential leadership (Moulián 1985; Valenzuela 1999).

However, the galvanization of the elites and the emergence of national unity in the aftermath of the war against Peru and Bolivia following the death of Diego Portales in 1829, further contributed to political stability, strengthening an “elitist regime led by prominent personalities” and centered around a strong presidency (Moulián 1985). However, even in the context of a strongly presidential and *censitaire* regime, local elections became an important arena in which dissident notables could ally to defeat the incumbent government on the basis of an electoral system comprising a single-ballot, simple plurality, and winner take-all formula (Scully 1992). Suffrage was restricted to literate males in possession of capital or land and over twenty-five years of age (twenty-one if married).<sup>52</sup> This contributed to put in place a comparatively premature system of institutionalized electoral contestation among elites. In this context, the Constitutional reforms pursued in 1840 by Manuel Bulnes, Chile’s first national hero, strengthened that system of democratic contestation and compromise. Among Bulnes’ reforms, two stand out as crucial (Valenzuela 1977 and 1999). First, Bulnes engineered put in place a system of checks-and-balances to increase presidential accountability to the legislature, as well as congressional and judicial independence. Second, Bulnes created a National Guard composed of civilians that increasingly developed close ties to state patronage. This weakened the military by precluding the emergence of a prototypical conservative coalition (landowning elites, the church, and the military) that opposed democratic openings elsewhere in the region (Rueschemeyer et al 1992). Conversely, the National

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<sup>52</sup>Scully (1992).

Guard provided the state with further autonomy from the landed oligarchy, thus avoiding a strong center-periphery cleavage (Valenzuela 1977).

The sevenfold increase of tax revenues (1830-1860) from the export-import growth based on nitrates and wheat provided the foundations for a rapid development of an autonomous (liberal/Jacobin) civil service actively seeking to promote state expansion by developing public infrastructure, schools, and civil registries (Scully 1992; Valenzuela 1999). According to Moulián (1985) this process progressively fractured the “aristocratic circle”, yielding a split between liberal and conservative elites. As suggested by the coup attempts taking place between 1851 and 1859, this split rendered unworkable the “inelastic” system based on a strong presidency, thus opening the way for a system of compromise based on a stronger parliament built to accommodate different interests. As Scully’s (1992) analysis demonstrates, this split was also fundamental in creating the first ideological divide that came to structure party-competition in Chile until the 1920s.

#### *The Conservative-Liberal Cleavage and the Strengthening of Congress (1860-1891)*

State expansion and the advance of the secularization process (particularly in the countryside) under liberal leaderships contributed to alienate conservative elites tied to the Catholic Church. In this context, and in what came to be called the *sacristan controversy*, the Society of Friends of the Country (to be soon transformed into the Conservative party) formed to defend the autonomy of the Church challenged by secular state authority led by President Manuel Montt and his interior minister Antonio Varas (Scully 1992). Montt and his allies formed a proto-political party called the Montt-Varistas. However, at the same time, liberal political elites inspired in the French movement of 1848, already alienated from Montt’s government, created the Liberal party (Scully 1992; Valenzuela 1977). In spite of their ideological differences in the clerical/anticlerical divide, Liberals and Conservatives merged forces to form an electoral coalition to oppose the Montt-Varista government. This movement, however, alienated committed anti-clericals in the Liberal party, who decided to split, creating the Radical Party (Scully 1992). Opposition along the

religious cleavage generated three lasting ideologically-based parties from 1857-1861: the Radicals (anticlerical), the Liberals (moderate), and the Conservatives (clerical).

When combined with previous features of the political system, such as the state's relative autonomy from the landed upper classes, the state's monopoly over the National Guard, and the official intervention of government in local elections, the consolidation of these ideological blocs had important implications for the subsequent development of the Chilean political system (Valenzuela 1977; Moulián 1985). First, it deterred armed challenges against state authority, providing at the same time, room for accommodation in a legislative body that was ideologically divided and in which the executive faced an organized opposition (Scully 1992). Second, this weakened presidential authority and enforced congressional checks on the executive, paving the way for coalitional and transactional politics. Third, but very importantly, these patterns of political conflict and cooperation provided incentives for Conservative elites (allied with the Radicals) to push for electoral reforms in order to improve their electoral chances, particularly in the rural sectors in which the *hacienda* system was (and will continue to be) intact. In 1874 and under the Conservative congressional leadership of José Irarrázabal, Radicals and Conservatives, together with ideological liberals, allied to push for electoral reforms in the system. In sharp contrast with other countries in the region, while those reforms were opposed by the Liberal government, the Catholic Church supported them because in order to enhance the strength of the Conservatives in the government

On the basis of the same type of congressional transactions that yielded important secularizing reforms (e.g. the press law, the law allowing the construction of secular cemeteries, and the institutionalization of the civil marriage) significant constitutional reforms were passed in 1874. These reforms restricted the presidential term from six to five years, constrained the veto power of the executive branch, and removed the property and income requirements placed on suffrage, a reform that tripled the franchise from 50,000 voters in 1872 (1.3% of adult population)

to 150.000 voters (3.9%) in 1874.<sup>53</sup> In addition, the oversight of municipal elections was transferred from the central government to a committee of local authorities comprised by the largest taxpayers in each locality. Obviously, this was instrumental in securing the Conservative electoral strength in the countryside, and stabilized support for the party even in the wake of increasing rates of modernization. Last but not least, the system of a complete list for the election of deputies was replaced by a cumulative vote mechanism in which voters could cast one vote for each contested seat and for any candidate. As Scully (1995) convincingly argues, this particular reform:

Reinforced the propensity for pact making within the party system. Through the use of pacts, a given party faction could support another in a constituency where the other was stronger, thereby avoiding direct confrontation. From 1875 until the presidential election of 1920, all parties channeled their behavior through either the Liberal Alliance, anchored in the anticlerical Radical party, or the Conservative Coalition, centered around the clerical Conservatives. These two grand political families provided for an alternation in power between clericals and anticlericals. The centrist Liberals remained uncommitted, joining first their preferred alliance partner, the Liberal Alliance, then the Coalition, and back again. (Scully 1995, pp. 104-5)

Nevertheless, the executive exerted strong control over elections and the central state became further strengthened and autonomous after the victory in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) which granted Chile the mineral rich northern territories. These spoils of war ballooned customs taxes to nearly 70% of state and set the stage for further modernization without modifying the traditional agricultural structures. In the context of increasing central state strength, President José Manuel Balmaceda (1886-1891) engaged in a spiraling conflict with Congress, finally deciding to adopt the national budget by decree (Valenzuela 1999). As a result, a civil war broke between Congress and the President, the former supported by the navy and the latter supported by the army. After his defeat in 1891 Balmaceda committed suicide. In short, the victory of Congress in the 1891 civil war prevented a return of strong presidential powers a turn, inaugurating the Parliamentary Republic (Moulián 1985).

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<sup>53</sup>Gil 1967; Valenzuela 1977 and 1999; Scully 1992.

### *The Parliamentary Republic (1891-1920)*

The thirty-year period of stable parliamentary government inaugurated in 1891 has crucial implications for understanding later developments in the party-system. As Valenzuela plainly puts it:

The center of gravity of the political system shifted from the executive to the legislature, from the capital to local areas, and from state officials and their agents to local party leaders and political brokers. Politics became an elaborate log-rolling game centered in Congress, in which national resources were divided for the benefit of local constituents. Democratization, implied by these changes, had important effects on the political system. With the expansion of suffrage and local control of elections, parliamentary parties expanded beyond the confines of congressional corridors and became national networks with grassroots organizations. (Valenzuela 1999, pp. 198)

In short, congressional fragmentation made possible a “balanced” distribution of the nitrate rents among oligarchic sectors, in accordance to their political power, contributing to further strengthening encompassing political machines and “privatizing” the state (Moulián 1985).

The development of a “compromise state” in the political arena was concomitant with the transformation of the social structure of Chilean society. In particular, the rapid process of urbanization, the moderate industrialization in the cities, and the emergence of a militant working class in the mining zones were to have a significant impact in reshaping the party-system on the basis of a class-based cleavage. As early as 1887 a progressive faction within the Radical party led by Valentín Letelier argued on the need to start addressing the social question and split to form the Democratic Party (Scully 1992). The Democratic Party was relatively short lived (1887-1910) because its reformist character was not attractive to an increasingly radicalized working class movement. The “red week” of 1905 and the Iquique massacre in 1907 granted further legitimacy to the international ideological influences that circulated through urban zones.

Additionally, the electoral development of another party seeking to mobilize the working class was made virtually impossible because the largest taxpayers controlled the electoral registries (Rueschemeyer et.al. 1992). However, its immediate success in achieving congressional representation as an outsider via the organization and mobilization of the working class (through

mutual aid societies) as well as capturing the vote of urban service sectors served as a demonstration effect proving the relative openness of the parliamentary system to newcomers. As Moulián (1985) argues, the high degree of parliamentarization of the system functioned as an efficient co-optative mechanism, reducing the costs of tolerating dissidents.

Although functional in the short-run, this permeability of the system also contributed to obscure two Achilles' heels of the *Parliamentary Republic*: the un-addressed –but critical—social question and the need to reorient the development model in the wake of export-import crisis (Moulián 1985). Both factors would become crucial in the emergence of the first anti-systemic challenge and the consolidation of the class cleavage in the 1920-1932 period, during the long-lasting nitrate crisis that started to unfold in 1917 with the invention of artificial nitrates, later aggravated by the worldwide crisis of 1929. This crisis and the lack of response from a political elite that had become “paralyzed”, promoted further criticisms from both sides of the aisle. Whereas Conservatives complained about the corruption and inefficiency of the parliamentary arrangement, Radicals and Democratic Party leaders protested against the incapacity of the system to address the emerging social question.

#### *The First Anti-Systemic Challenge and the Emergence of the Class- cleavage (1920-1932)*

In 1920 Arturo Alessandri was elected president as a candidate of the Liberal Alliance. Several characteristics distinguished Alessandri from his predecessors. First, he was a *caudillo* from the interior and though he emerged from within the establishment, he introduced an anti-oligarchic discourse (Moulián 1985). Second, although he belonged to the Liberal Party, his populist rhetoric and his proposals for social reform were closed to those of the Radical Party and the Democratic Party who were seeking to mobilize urban sectors and the working class (Scully 1992). Third, to carry out these proposals, Alessandri did not adhere to the political norms of the Parliamentary Republic and became an activist president confronting a contentious congressional opposition (Valenzuela 1999).

Put on the defensive, conservative forces in congress successfully blocked executive initiatives that lead to a complete governmental stalemate that lasted until 1924, when a group of junior military officials broke into the congressional galleries pressing for reforms. Alessandri fled into exile leaving the country in the hands of a military junta, which for the first time in more than a hundred years closed Congress down and took direct control of the presidency.

In 1925, however, Alessandri was brought back to complete his term and was able to approve a new constitution that reinstated some power for the executive branch and put in place legislation to regulate labor relations (to satisfy industrial interests tied to conservatives and facilitating state-control of unions to accommodate Liberal's interests). In other words, the new constitution included a corporatist attempt to co-opt the working class movement. However, this attempt failed in part due to the already extensive mobilization and organization of the working class by the Marxist left, which then intensified during the 1920s and 1930s (Collier and Collier 1991). Additionally, the new constitution put in place a modified D'Hondt proportional representation formula triggering an atomization of the party-system in subsequent elections (Scully 1992). Then, Alessandri transferred power to his elected successor, Emiliano Figueroa. Nevertheless, from 1924 to 1932 Chile suffered a period of significant instability in which five military coups took place.

In 1927, Figueroa resigned and his War Minister, Colonel Carlos Ibañez, was elected with broad support from all major parties. Ibañez's election was thought to be a timely solution to the anti-party sentiment, given his "nonpolitical" character and technocratic-authoritarian style (Valenzuela 1999). Ibañez concentrated power in the executive and resorted to emergency measures to dismantle opposition forces, exiling leaders from virtually all political persuasions and repressing labor (Valenzuela 1999; Scully 1992). According to Moulián, Ibañez's "bonapartist" period of conservative modernization could be explained both by the increasing weakness of the elites and the even weaker organization of the working class.

However, in the context of growing opposition strengthened by the harsh economic crisis triggered by the Great Depression, Ibáñez's government fell in 1931. It is important to note that given Chile's relatively high integration to and dependence on the world economy, the depression had especially devastating consequences for the country. For more than a year after Ibáñez's fall, a series of attempts to consolidate a stable government coalition failed, including a thirteen-day Socialist Republic, which in spite of its flaws, illustrated the need to politically articulate the popular sectors (serving as a role-model for the series of popular fronts emerging in 1938) and provided a seemingly viable alternative to the communist road to socialism offered by the Communist Party and its predecessor. In 1920 the Socialist Workers' Party was founded (Moulián 1985). In addition, Marxist working-class mobilization during the 1930s contributed to unify the non-Communist left, leaving in place significant organizational residua (Scully 1992).

Resulting from working-class mobilization by parties of the left and with the progressive erosion of the clerical/anticlerical divide, an urban class cleavage came to dominate Chilean politics until the mid 1960s (Scully 1992). In this new axis of competition, the Marxist parties of the left (Communist and Socialists) opposed Conservatives and Liberals who in spite of their differences regarding the religious divide, defended similar interests on the class cleavage. Meanwhile, the anticlerical and anti-oligarchic Radical party engaged more flexible positions regarding the class divide and became the pivot of the post-1932 party-system (Scully 1992).

Although in the presidential election of 1932 Alessandri was reelected, the party-system had significantly changed. As a result of those changes, Alessandri now came to represent the center-right block, which in 1932 was opposed by a viable (and therefore electorally oriented) leftist block that had already received close to a third of the vote (Drake 1978; Scully 1995). As the Socialist candidate Marmaduke Grove stated in 1933: "I am not talking about taking power by storm, but about preparing ourselves to conquer power the same way the bourgeois parties do."<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Cited by Scully 1995, pp. 109.

The incorporation of lower classes into the system of representation (in spite of the restricted franchise that lasted until the 1970s) set the basis for the consolidation of a “complete” party-system that became exceptional in Latin America and that closely resembled those of Western European countries.<sup>55</sup> In this period, Chilean political parties became “the backbone” of society, constituting cultural and associational pillars and monopolizing the access and redistribution of state resources. Valenzuela clearly synthesizes the conventional wisdom on the characteristics of Chile’s middle-century party-system, which will be then contrasted to those of the contemporary one:

By the 1930s, with the rise of Marxist parties at a time of electoral expansion, the Chilean party system, in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s terms, had become complete. In addition to the traditional conservative and liberal parties that had emerged from church-state cleavages in the early nineteenth century, and the Radical Party that had developed later in that century out of similar divisions, communist and socialist parties had now developed in response to a growing class cleavage. The only party to emerge after the 1930s, the Christian Democratic Party, was an offshoot of the Conservative Party and sought to address social and economic issues from the vantage point of reform Catholicism. Yet, this ‘complete’ system was characterized by sharp social polarization in which the organized electorate was divided almost equally among the three political tendencies. Although numerous small parties appeared after 1932, the six major parties continued to dominate politics, commanding over 80 percent of the vote by the 1960s. Elections and politics became a national “sport,” as parties became so deeply ingrained in the nation’s social fabric that Chileans would refer to a Radical or a Communist or a Christian Democratic “subculture.” Parties helped to structure people’s friendships and social life. Partisan affiliation continued to be reinforced by both class and religion, so that Christian Democratic elites were more likely to go to Catholic schools and universities and come from upper-middle class backgrounds, while Socialist elites went to public schools and state universities and came from lower-middle class background. Communist strength was heavily concentrated in mining communities and industrial areas, Christian Democrats appealed to middle-class and women voters, while the right retained support in rural Chile. The major parties framed political options not only in municipal and congressional elections but also in private and secondary associations [...] It is crucial to stress that there were not giants in the Chilean political system [...] ...no coalition, let alone party, received over 50 percent of the vote, with the exception of the 1965 congressional race when the Christian Democrats benefited from defections from the right. This pattern of support had clear implications for the functioning of Chile’s presidential system. (Valenzuela 1999, pp.201-3).<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> According to Gil’s estimates the original Chilean electorate, which was relatively high for nineteenth century standards, grew only marginally during the twentieth century going from 4.6% in 1876 to 6.9% in 1915 to 7.2% in 1918 and to 11.6% in 1953. Indeed, as Rueschemeyer et al (1992) argue, the electoral franchise in Chile was severely restricted not only due to the continuous exclusion of women and illiterates, but also as a result of procedural failures that neglected the secret vote for the rural population until the reforms introduced in 1958. I come back to this below.

<sup>56</sup> Below I will introduce some caveats regarding this traditional characterization of the pre-authoritarian party-system following the lead of Montes et al (2003).

In this context, presidents needed to build governing coalitions not only for the purpose of getting elected, but coalitions were crucial for governing once elected. The reliance on these coalitions for presidential elections increased the importance of non-presidential elections (congressional and local) in order for parties to show their strength and obtain better bargaining positions (Valenzuela 1977). Taking part in coalitions and congressional agreements provided partisan leaders access to “pork” in order to maintain vertical organizations expanding from congress to the most remote municipalities. At the same time, parties also centralized authority by requiring its members to obtain the party’s authorization or *pase* to enter into a coalitional agreement (Valenzuela 1977). The electoral competitiveness of the system kept this system functioning, while the relative autonomy of public institutions and the relatively openness of representative arenas granted everyone a chance (Valenzuela 1999). As a result, a complex system of representation involving both electoral and ideological competition, as well as encompassing coalition-making and patronage became substantially ingrained in Chilean society.

Therefore, political compromise, flexibility, and the respect for political institutions, became compatible with a highly competitive –and programmatically structured– party-system (Valenzuela 1999). This (idealistic) portrayal, however, needs to be closely scrutinized. To that end, I decided to split this historical period (1935-1973) in two stages, following the lead of Moulian’s (1985) periodization. According to Moulián, whereas the party system of the 1940s was characterized by partisan pluralism structured in two coalitions that contributed to reduce polarization, the party system of the 1960s continued to be multi-party but lacked a bi-polar arrangement. This crucial difference is consistent with the existence of a pragmatic and pivoting center in the 1940s and the presence of a double-center (until 1965) which progressively became rigid and inflexible under Christian-Democratic hegemony (Moulián 1985, see also Scully 1992). Aldunate’s (1985) electoral analysis supports this claim by showing the presence of two distinct partisan cycles in the period, the first dominated by the Radical party and the second punctuated by the emergence and flashing growth of the Christian Democratic party. In between these cycles, we

find the decline of support for political parties and Ibañez's return to the presidency –once again on the basis of an anti-party platform. As I will argue below, these recurrent cycles of anti-partisan politics usually overlooked represent some important weaknesses that were already present in the seemingly strong party-system of mid-century Chile.

*Centrist (bipolar) Politics and the Radical Dominated System (1935-1952)*

In 1936 with the formation of the Popular Front (Radical party with the Communist and Socialist parties), and even more decisively in 1938 with the presidential victory of Radical party's Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a new political cycle was inaugurated. Once again, mainstream parties of the left, center, and right concentrated electoral support. Partisan plurality in the electoral arena was coupled with a bi-polar configuration that yielded a center-left and a center-right coalition articulated by a mobile and pendular center with the ability of striking a compromise by negotiating with the left and the right. The Radicals, as a reformist, statist, and secular party that had successfully mobilized middle-classes set the imprint of the times by becoming the central coalitional broker in that system. What is more, the recently incorporated working-class parties were committed to the system exchanging "demand moderation" for their political integration (entering the *give and take* compromise system) and the very gradual pursuit of reforms in favor of the urban working-classes (Drake 1978; Moulián 1985; Scully 1992). In short, the Popular Front was viable due to the moderation of Marxist parties and the movement of the Radicals to the center-left. Additionally, the ("balanced") access to state resources through congressional bargaining contributed to institutionalize parties' political machines by feeding an encompassing center-periphery brokerage network.

While facing a visible electoral decline due to the mobilization of urban sectors by secular parties of the left and the center, the right was still able to maintain its strongholds in the rural areas. Those electoral bastions created space for congressional maneuvering and negotiation for both Liberals and Conservatives. This situation also contributed to political compromise and

gradualism by providing the right a way to protect and defend its interests in Congress, particularly by blocking reforms that would weaken the landed-oligarchy. In a nutshell, the strong congressional representation of the right had as a positive externality: the stability of the system. At the same time, however, it also translated into significant restrictions regarding the reformist agenda of the Popular Front. As Scully argues:

The tacit political agreement of which the Popular Front rested was a twofold commitment on the part of the left to moderate demands from urban working-class constituencies and keep the countryside socially and politically quiescent, in exchange for working-class participation in government and the continued legality of the Communist party. (Scully 1995, pp. 111)

Policy-wise, this was an era of “reforms within capitalism” in which the state fostered ISI and social policy expansion, once again, on the basis of the tax revenues generated by mineral exports. However, it is important to note that industrialization was primarily carried on by private interests allied with the state, therefore, without alienating business interests.

As a result of continuity (in the countryside) and change (in the urban centers and particularly Santiago) the reforms pursued by the Popular Front were “incomplete” leading to a “hybrid of stagnation and modernity” (Moulián 1985). In this respect, and given the limited extension of the franchise, the political system yielded a combination of the hacienda system and agricultural backwardness with industrial growth; the increase of urbanization (due to rural-urban migration) and the growth of middle-sectors with urban marginality; the expansion of the health and education systems with persistent regional inequalities. Even though the process of industrialization put forth more pressures (through labor migration to the cities) on the backward agricultural sector, the power of the congressional delegation of the right and the interpenetration of the landed-oligarchy of foreign interests exploiting mineral resources were crucial in blocking reformist attempts both in the countryside and in terms of the national control of natural resources (Moulián 1985). Meanwhile, both leftist parties were emphasizing the effort to organize the urban proletariat. Finally, the Radical party also represented small agricultural producers and therefore opposed unionization attempts at the country side. Given its urban-middle-class base, the Radicals

also opposed further openings in the electoral franchise, which could weaken its privileged electoral position. Although the Popular Front provided mid-term stability, the contradictions it entailed would prove destabilizing in the context of the Cold War.

Benefiting from the prerogatives for labor organization incorporated in 1931's Labor Code, the Marxist parties (and particularly the Communists) became increasingly successful in mobilizing and gathering electoral support from the urban proletariat (Scully 1995). By the end of WWII, this electoral growth was also fostered by the growing discontent with Radical governments and the stalemated processes of industrialization and social reform (Scully 1995). With the splintering of the Socialist party from the electoral coalition that had elected Radical Gabriel González Videla as president in 1946 and the increasing radicalization of the Communist Party progressively unwilling to moderate its working-class agenda and pursuing new mobilization attempts in the countryside, political compromise in the center-left became unlikely (Scully 1995). Impressed with significant Communist electoral inroads in the 1947 municipal elections and under pressure from the right and the U.S., González Videla definitively turned to the right dismantling the Popular Front (expelling the Communist from the government coalition) and approving more restrictive legislation regarding rural unionization in 1947. In 1948, the government banned the Communist party under the Law for the Defense of Democracy approved with congressional support from the Liberals and the largest fraction of the Conservatives and resorted to harsh military repression to suppress union mobilization and strikes protesting the ban (Scully 1995). The stage for a new anti-systemic challenge was set.

### *The Second Anti-Systemic Challenge (1952-1964)*

Discontent with both the stagnation of the modernization process led by the Radicals and with the party's pragmatism and opportunism as the pivot of a "state of compromise" increasingly associated with pork-barrel and clientelism, paved the way for Carlos Ibáñez return to presidential office in the elections of 1952 supported by a loose coalition of the Agrarian Labor party, the

Popular Socialist party, and the banned Communists (Scully 1995). Promising to “‘sweep’ narrow and archaic party interests out of government” and to do away with the “selfishness of political parties,” Ibáñez obtained a 46.8% victory in the electoral contest of 1952.<sup>57</sup> In 1953 in turn, Ibáñez won important victories in the congressional elections.

Once again, Ibáñez represented a project of “modernization from above” on the basis of a charismatic leadership and a populist appeal. However, the social and political fragmentation produced by the previous process of constrained modernization, rapidly contributed to erode Ibáñez’s social and congressional support bases (Moulián 1985). Increasing inflationary pressures and balance of payments problems triggered Ibáñez’s switch from populism to austerity and further social discontent (Moulián 1985; Scully 1992).

However, as clearly argued both by Moulián and Scully, the Ibañista period produced long-lasting political impacts that are crucial in understanding subsequent events in the 1960s and 1970s. In the first place, the election of 1952 marked the outset of the electoral decline of rightist political parties in Chile (Liberals and Conservatives) which went from an average of 42% per commune in 1949 to 25.3% in 1953.<sup>58</sup> This decline had a second peak in 1967 (reaching 12.5%) when Christian Democrats became the major party in the system (Scully 1995). Whereas women’s suffrage in 1949 is likely to have cushioned rightist decline, both parties lost their hegemony in the countryside. Second, the election also marked the initial decline of the Radicals. Therefore, this election can be interpreted as a significant instance of traditional party’s decline and party-system deinstitutionalization. Indeed, as Scully reports, twenty-five partisan organizations competed in the 1953 congressional elections, with nineteen achieving parliamentary representation. Third, the parties of the left formed the Popular Action Front (FRAP) and led by the more orthodox Socialist party banned future alliances with “bourgeois” parties to avoid repeating the experience of the Popular Front. As a result, since 1952, both leftist parties refused to enter coalitions with the center

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<sup>57</sup>Scully 1995, pp. 115.d and Moulián 1985, pp. 80.

<sup>58</sup>Scully 1995, pp. 115.

and filled their own presidential candidates in subsequent Workers Fronts. This strategic switch also contributed to polarize the system in the years to come (Moulián 1985, Scully 1992). Fourth, facing meager electoral returns (2.9%) the National Falange formed an alliance with the Conservative Social Christians (the Christian Social Federation), setting the ground for the creation of the Christian Democratic party in 1957. Finally, Ibáñez enacted two very significant pieces of legislation, legalizing the Communist party in 1952 and introducing a set of electoral reforms in 1958. These reforms banned provincial electoral pacts eliminating a crucial instrument for the electoral alliances that had contributed to strengthened partisan collaboration under the “estado de compromiso” (Valenzuela 1977; Moulián 1985). Additionally, the introduction of the *cédula única* (practically impeding party-bosses to learn the preferences of each elector from their use of different *cédulas* for each list of candidates) meant the introduction of the secret ballot for the first time (see Scully 1992). This had crucial implications particularly for voters in the country-side, also contributing to weaken the parties of the right. Furthermore, the traditional alliance of rightist parties with the Church and the Military had also deteriorated over the period (Moulián 1985). On the one hand, the traditional weakness of the military *vis-à-vis* the National Guard and the emergence of progressive leaderships within the ranks of the Military since the 1920s (Ibáñez in the late 1920s and 1950s and Grove in the 1930s) had already fostered rightist distrust in the Military. On the other hand, the emergence of a Christian reformist party at the center in 1957 broke the representative monopoly of religious values that the right had established since the unfolding of the first critical juncture a century before.

Paradoxically, when the right was becoming weaker, Jorge Alessandri, son of Arturo and candidate of the right for the presidential election of 1958, was able to defeat Salvador Allende (of the FRAP) and won the presidency with a slight plurality of 31.2%. This outcome epitomized the emerging nature of party-competition in the system, inaugurating a new partisan cycle in which the Christian Democratic Party would soon become a critical actor. The resurgence of electoral support for traditional parties (and the Christian Democratic party) was coupled with the progressive but

sustained increase in electoral participation resulting from the enfranchisement of women in 1949 and the organization and mobilization efforts pursued by parties of the left and the center (especially the Christian Democratic party seeking to mobilize middle-sectors and peasants). Meanwhile, departing from Ibañez's "populist" style, Alessandri's government represented a failed ("technocratic") attempt to solve the socioeconomic stalemate created by Chile's incomplete modernization (Moulián 1985).

### *Polarizing Politics and the Breakdown of Democratic Rule (1964-1973)*

As a result of the historical developments discussed above, the party-system of the 1960s was dominated by a confrontational logic of "todos contra todos" in which left, center, and right became increasingly isolated (Moulián 1985). This outcome was coupled with increasing levels of social organization and mobilization, as well as clearer patterns of class voting (Aldunate 1985; Scully 1992), and signaled significant transformations in each political block.

The right became weaker and progressively lost its "defensive capacity" in Congress; therefore strengthening non-democratic attitudes and tactics. Meanwhile, the left became more politically unified and under the influence of the Cuban revolution (coupled with disenchantment with the experience of the Popular Front) refused alliances with the center and departed from its gradualist tradition increasingly conceiving a "popular government" as the precursor of a transition to a socialist economy (Moulián 1985). Centrist politics were characterized by declining support for the Radicals and the booming popularity of the Christian Democrats. Thus, the political midpoint was dominated by an inflexible and double-center until the watershed election of 1965. Since 1965, the Christian Democratic Party attempted to pursue its project of "democratic deepening" by trying to consolidate its position as the dominant party. In the context of increasing polarization and congressional fragmentation, the hegemonic aspiration of the Christian Democratic Party further contributed to stalemate the system.

The Christian Democratic Party could be depicted as a catch-all, cross-class alliance. However, it is necessary to stress that it developed as a predominantly middle-strata party that was able to provide a consistent ideological message by seeking to pursue an “alternative to capitalism” (or to the contradictions of Chilean capitalism described above) on the basis of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church (Moulián 1985). Therefore, the Christian Democratic Party represented a cross-class alliance unified by the goal of constructing a third-way alternative both to capitalism and socialism. This ideological orientation resonated well with the Chilean electorate and granted the party the ability to gather support from previous voters of the Radical party, especially in the main urban areas. The recently enfranchised women also provided a crucial source of electoral support for the party whose clerical but reformist character provided a compelling platform for this constituency. This party was the only one that actively engaged in recruiting women by sponsoring “*Centros de Madres*” (Mother’s Centers) at the grassroots. In addition, the Christian Democratic party was able to penetrate the traditional strongholds of the Chilean right and started receiving the support of small (but primarily landed) peasants (Scully 1992). Meanwhile, the left began to mobilize predominantly landless peasants in their effort to construct a working-class alliance which also included the urban working classes and traditional strongholds in mining areas.

Together with the reforms of 1958, the efforts of center and the left in the countryside finally paid off in the congressional election of 1961 in which the rightist block failed, for the first time, to gather at least a third of the seats (Scully 1992). Whereas the Christian Democrats were able to out-perform their clerical “colleagues” of the right, the unified left competing under the FRAP label obtained the largest plurality in the election with 27.5% of the vote. Confronting these results, in the context of a sustained decline, and under the demonstration-effect of a congressional by-election held in Curicó (a traditional conservative stronghold) in 1964 to replace a dead incumbent deputy and in which the FRAP won the election and the Christian Democrats strongly outperformed the right, Liberals and Conservatives decided to support the candidacy of Eduardo Frei in 1964 to avoid an otherwise likely victory of the FRAP (Scully 1992).

Frei's Christian Democratic platform of a "revolution in liberty" sought to consolidate a "middle-road" in Chile and became a suitable match for the Alliance of Progress, eager to turn the country into a showcase of democratic reform able to provide a viable alternative to communism. In this context, the US provided extensive funding for Frei's electoral campaign and post-electoral investment for the strengthening of the party's social base (Valenzuela 1999).

After successfully winning the election, Frei allied with the left to approve the agrarian reform, as well as with the right in order to enact the "Chileanization" of copper. At the same time however, the increasing executive control over budget decisions institutionalized through the constitutional reforms of 1958 were efficiently used by Christian Democratic technocrats to significantly reduce the room for patronage in the system. Therefore, in the absence of patronage resources that could stimulate pragmatic negotiations and legislative log-rolling (Valenzuela 1999), such restrictions on budget appropriations translated into an increasingly confrontational game in congress. Furthermore, Christian-Democratic hegemonic pretensions also contributed to quickly alienate its contenders from right and left. On the right, Frei's attempts at deepening capitalist production relations in the countryside faced the harsh opposition of large landowners who benefited from pre-capitalist agricultural production structures. Furthermore, government sponsored attempts to foster rural unionization, along with the introduction of a new property tax on land, triggered rightist discontent and ended up with the breakdown of the center-right electoral alliance that had elected Frei. Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution and while facing Christian Democrat's attempt at mobilizing the working class, the left (and especially the Socialist Party) further radicalized. In the end, and in spite of its ambitious scope, Frei's economic project for Chile's "revolution in liberty" delivered less than promised, contributing to increased popular dissatisfaction and systemic polarization.

Finally, confronting declining opportunities for political pragmatism and a new hegemonic center, the bulk of the Radical Party decided to support Unión Popular presidential candidate Salvador Allende in the forthcoming election of 1970 (Valenzuela 1999). On the other side of the

spectrum, the right wanted to avoid repeating the “historical sacrifice” of 1964 and therefore decided to fill back its own presidential candidate: Jorge Alessandri (Moulián 1985). Finally, unwilling to become the “new face of the right”, Christian Democrats also decided to run their own presidential candidate: Radomiro Tomic (Moulián 1985).

Since no candidate succeeded in obtaining an absolute majority, the election was decided in Congress, where a post-election coalition between the Unión Popular and the Christian Democrats was struck to confirm Allende. Paradoxically, the socialist candidate reached the presidency, despite obtaining even less votes (%) than in the previous election (1964). In turn, Alessandri and Tomic respectively obtained 34.9 and 27.8%.

The strengthening of the “revolutionary pole” within the Socialist Party pushed the Unión Popular government further to the left (Moulián 1985). Once in office and in spite of flimsy congressional support, Allende sought to promote a “democratic transition to socialism”, actively pursuing corporate expropriations and nationalizations. The government also promoted ambitious redistributive policies, including extensive price controls and wage increases that in the medium run triggered a harsh inflationary spiral. Meanwhile, threatened by Allende’s policies and enjoying active US support, conservative sectors and upper middle-classes launched a series of sabotage and scare tactics to “make the economy scream” and in so doing, erode Allende’s support base for the congressional elections of 1973. In spite of this campaign and the presence of mounting economic problems, the opposition that now actively included the Christian Democratic Party, failed to obtain the required two-thirds of congressional seats to impeach Allende. This outcome spoiled the strategy of constitutionally removing Allende, setting the scene for the violent “solution” of Chile’s political stalemate. In the context of increasing political polarization and subsequent failed attempts at reconstituting political compromise in the system, the armed forces became increasingly politicized and started plotting the coup of the 11<sup>th</sup> of September of 1973 with the active support of the US and the explicit consent (if not encouragement) of a significant share of Chile’s upper and middle sectors (Valenzuela 1999; see also Linz and Valenzuela 1994).

### *The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Period (1973-1989)*

During this period, the bases for the critical reshaping of party-voter linkages seen in Chile's post-transitional system were introduced through economic reform, political repression, and institutional engineering.

Chile's authoritarian government is usually characterized as an instance of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, as defined by O'Donnell (1979) in his seminal work. However, given its high degree of personalization in the figure of General Pinochet and the progressive consolidation of a "one man rule", the political structure of the regime resembled more closely previous (traditional) authoritarian governments in the region (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986; Garretón 1988). Notwithstanding, in terms of its goals and achievements in reformatting Chile's economic structures as well as some of its sociopolitical counterparts, Pinochet's regime was probably the most "successful" bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in the Southern Cone. In this sense, the regime fully expressed the "reactive" (repressive) and "foundational" phases of this type of authoritarianism (Garretón 1988). For that reason, from 1973 to 1989, Chile witnessed a socioeconomic revolution and a firm attempt to reshape traditional Chilean politics. The latter sought to do away with parties and "los señores políticos", evolving towards an exclusionary state-corporatist system of representation and eventually to a "modern", tutelary, and protected "democracy."<sup>59</sup> According to Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986):

The cardinal objective of the regenerative project of the Chilean military junta is to do away with the traditional party system. There is a consensus in government circles that this can be accomplished directly through repressive measures and the creation of new intermediary organizations purged of party influence, and indirectly through significant transformations in the economy and society. (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986, p.191)

Although the political facet of Pinochet's project failed to achieve its most ambitious objectives, it still contributed to produce important discontinuities regarding the historical

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<sup>59</sup>Cited in Scully (1992). The expression was frequently used by Pinochet in direct reference to the "political class" and "la politiquería", which were blamed for the country's problems and descent into chaos in the pre-1973 period. The corporatist political project was directly influenced by the ideology of Jaime Guzmán, a close advisor of Pinochet, who then founded the Unión Demócrata Independiente in 1983 (see Cristi 2000).

configuration of Chilean politics and the country's party-system. This was also aided by the socioeconomic transformations brought about by the BA's economic policies. With the advantage of hindsight, it is now possible to challenge the fervently optimistic assertion that Valenzuela and Valenzuela put forth in 1986, on the basis of the historical strength of "generative cleavages" in the system, party's strong penetration of the social fabric, and their capacity to survive repression:

The Chilean military will fail to create alternative structural arrangements and the necessary fundamental changes in allegiance patterns in civil society to ensure the perpetuation of the authoritarian coalition once and if democracy is restored.

[...]the polarization of public self-identifications in Spain increased significantly once the political system freely permitted the formation of party organizations and the dissemination of ideological and programmatic messages. This experience would be repeated in the Chilean case. (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986, pp. 187-205)

Contradicting this expectation, contemporary evidence renders more support to Drake and Jaskic's (1991) identification of the first post-authoritarian election in 1989 as a *critical* one, confirming the significant electoral realignment taking place in the system and which had already been suggested by the results of the 1988 plebiscite.

The explanation for Pinochet's greater leverage in transforming politics and society when compared with his counterparts elsewhere in the Southern Cone is contested and manifold.<sup>60</sup> Valenzuela (1986 and 1999) explained this outcome as the logical corollary of the gradual but steady consolidation of Pinochet's "one man rule", which further concentrated power in the dictator's closest and loyal circle of collaborators, providing this group greater level of isolation from corporatist interests than its colleagues governing through collegiate Military Juntas elsewhere in the Southern Cone.

According to Garretón (1988), the depth of the economic and political "crisis of origin" yielded a greater intensity of political polarization and mobilization, leading to a tacit "consensus for termination" that placed the Armed Forces at center stage enjoying a relatively broad base of social and political support. The at least tacit support that the coup coalition received from the

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<sup>60</sup>See Castiglioni 2005 for an explicit and systematic account of the differences between this regime and the Uruguayan one in terms of policy-making processes regarding social-policy.

political right, the Christian-Democratic Party, and upper and upper-middle sectors of society generated, according to Garretón (1988), a series of important implications. First, it helps to explain the range, depth, and, duration of the repressive activities of the regime. Second, it provided the regime with a stronger “mandate” for pursuing a crucial reshaping and normalization of the “ill-conceived” body-politic and for an ambitious economic restructuring. Finally, the Christian Democratic Party’s tacit approval of the coup then translated into significant problems for consolidating a unified opposition to the regime, once this party became gradually alienated from Pinochet’s government.

In turn, Silva (1996) stresses the important role played by the inclusion of different sets of “capitalists coalitions” in the policy-making process that characterized the three main phases of Pinochet’s economic policy, arguing that the representation of those coalitions by Pinochet’s government was more fundamental than the “greatest threat from below” felt by Chilean upper sectors, in causing their homogenous and consistent allegiance to that regime. Although in those policy-coalitions, financial interests’ representatives and export-oriented sectors predominated over local-market industrial producers, Pinochet was still better able than his counterparts elsewhere to gain the allegiance of Chilean capitalists through their direct or indirect inclusion in subsequent economic policy-making coalitions. As a result, Chile’s capitalist class and its allies on the political right consistently supported the dictator, significantly affecting the timing and nature of the democratic transition and its aftermath. Indeed, when the economic crisis hit harder in 1983 and a significant share of Chilean enterprises went bankrupt Pinochet’s re-crafting of his policy-making coalition and the pursuit of more pragmatic neoliberal policies allowed him to maintain a firm grasp within the economic and political right. In this context, the Christian Democratic Party’s attempt to attract support from the right to seek an early democratization by allying with conservative sectors while excluding the left (known as the Alianza Democrática initiative) failed to develop. The firm allegiance of the right also made possible for Pinochet to follow the timetable for the transition set in the Constitution of 1980. That Constitution was crafted by the authoritarian

regime and introduced crucial authoritarian enclaves that contribute to the institutionalization of the emerging system of interaction between the state and capital consolidated under the authoritarian regime (Silva 1996). Furthermore, as argued below, those authoritarian enclaves continue to constrain the functioning of Chile's democratic regime today.

Finally, according to Martínez and Díaz (1996), since 1964 and until 1990, Chile lived through a "revolutionary epoch" in which three revolutions were attempted and only the last one became successful and fully institutionalized, significantly transforming the nature of the pre-1964 system. Importantly, Pinochet's successful (neoliberal) revolution had those attempted by Frei and Allende as important prerequisites. In particular, Frei's nationalizations and the "chilenization" of copper and agrarian reform, as well as Allende's further nationalization and confiscation of large industrial and rural properties, turned crucial for the reshaping of Chile's business and landed classes under Pinochet's privatizing and re-privatizing reforms. Although Pinochet would have probably avoided the expropriation of US based copper companies during his regime, the maintenance of copper exploitation in the hands of the Chilean state enabled by Frei's and Allende's nationalization policies, provided Pinochet with a huge asset that contributed more than 10 billion dollars to the budget since 1985 and which therefore became fundamental in coping with the acute balance of payment problems that Latin American economies entered into since 1982 (Martínez and Díaz 1996).

The process of agrarian reform initiated under Frei and continued and deepened during Allende, destroyed the old latifundio system without creating a substitute. This provided Pinochet with autonomy from the landed interests, historically represented by the Conservative Party. Combined with the extensive repression of the peasant movement launched by the authoritarian regime, this yielded a demobilization of the main social actors in the countryside. A new market for land emerged in the rural sector with Pinochet's only partial return of expropriated land to its historical owners and with the distribution of land to smallholders that did not have access to credit and technology and were therefore quickly forced to sell. This in turn led to the consolidation of a

new business-oriented class in the countryside, which replaced the semi-feudal system that prevailed until 1964 by one of capitalist accumulation that enhanced the competitive capacity of medium-size agricultural businesses (Martínez and Díaz 1996). Arguably, as a result of this “revolutionary epoch” the social bases of Chile’s historical sociopolitical arrangement were removed one by one, leading to significant room for further transformations in the post-transitional period. To illustrate the extent of this “revolutionary epoch” in Chile, Table 3.4 presents evidence on the evolution of state-ownership of business from 1970 to 1980.

**Table 3.4:**

**Total Enterprises and Banks under government control in Chile (1970-1980)**

	1970	1973	1980
Total number of enterprises and banks under government control	46	479	24

Source: Own construction on the basis of data reported by Vergara (1986, p. 90)

*Main Stages of the Authoritarian Regime and its Economic Project*

Following Drake and Jaskic’s (1991) periodization, the regime had two primary phases. From 1973 to 1981, the “reactive” and “foundational” moments reached their climax with significant temporal overlapping. Politically, both accompanied the steady strengthening of Pinochet’s leadership within the Junta and the consolidation of his personalized rule. The “reactive” component was fully expressed in the extensive and harsh repression of political and social activists of the left and center-left. The “elimination” of the left was conceived as a crucial prerequisite for the later progression of the foundational political project.

Economically, the agenda was punctuated by two massive economic recessions, with the first extending between 1974 and 1975 and the second reaching its peak in 1982 and 1983 (Martínez and Díaz 1996). Although the regime lacked a clear and well-structured plan, its connections with orthodox technocrats, its insularity from corporatist interests in society

(reinforced by the consolidation of Pinochet's leadership within the Junta), and the easy access to external credit in the 1976-1981 period, paved the way for a drastic neoliberal restructuring of the economy and the Chilean welfare state starting in 1975 (see Castiglioni 2005). During the first two years of the BA, fixed-asset interests producing for the local market but that were internationally competitive dominated the economic policy-making coalition, leaving non-competitive and locally oriented interests in a secondary place (Silva 1996). The latter were the main obstacles for economic restructuring, but were still accommodated within a relatively "porous" BA, leading to a gradual economic liberalization of the economy (Silva 1996).

However, after the recession of 1975 hit hard in the Chilean economy, the door was open for a radical and orthodox neoliberal restructuring of the Chilean system (see e.g. Foxley 1986; Vergara 1986; Silva 1996; and Martínez and Dáz 1996). In this case, a narrower core coalition of capitalist interest merged with a group of orthodox technocrats (Chicago-boys) and pushed for radical neoliberal reform. Both the "coup within the coup" that concentrated power in Pinochet's hands in detriment of the Junta isolating policy-makers from traditional business-elites and landowners, as well as the sharp increase of international liquidity resulting from the first oil-price hike, boosted this project (Silva 1996).

The reforms encompassed extensive trade liberalization, the removal of state controls on strategic markets, the first wave of privatizations of public enterprises, and a significant decline in public spending. Table 3.5 illustrates the scope and pace of liberalizing reforms. Although these reforms clearly hindered inward-oriented producers and favored the financial sector over productive enterprises, Pinochet's tight alliance with the Chicago-boys and their capacity to "discipline" and arbitrate between all capitalist interests, provided the dictator with greater policy-making leeway than his counterparts elsewhere (Martínez and Díaz 1996).

Therefore, liberalizing reforms were implemented more radically and consistently (without significant reversal) than in Argentina and Uruguay, where power was less unified in the presidency, veto-players constrained viable policy-options, and the regime did not enjoy from the

unconditional allegiance of the core of the capitalist class (Martínez and Díaz 1996; Castiglioni 2005).

**Table 3.5:**

**Rate of public investment in relation to the GDP and per capita social spending**

Year	Public Investment over GDP	Per capita social spending, 1970=100 total
1974	10.0	91.7
1975	6.9	74.9
1976	5.1	71.2
1977	4.9	78.7
1978	3.9	79
1979	3.9	82.8

Source: Vergara (1986).

Resulting from the new economic scenario, from 1975 to 1981 imported goods flooded the economy (quadrupling its share in six years) due to the combination of an overvalued peso and the extensive commercial liberalization of the economy (Martínez and Díaz 1996). This contributed further to a process of deindustrialization and to the “rationalization” of Chile’s primary sector. Coupled with privatization and the reduction of fiscal spending in the public sector, deindustrialization led to increasing levels of structural unemployment and poverty. As reported by Díaz and Martínez (1996), by 1982 more than half (53.3%) of the country’s labor force was either unemployed, in emergency work, or in the informal sector. However, during this period and until the early 1980s, the opposition remained fragmented and divided over the past, failing to confront the regime. While massive social demonstrations broke out in 1982 and 1983, the political opposition of Pinochet would remain fragmented until the late 1980s.

Still, the radical reformist era lasted until the economic crisis got plainly manifested in the harsh recessions of 1982 and 1983. In a way, the oil-shocks and their socioeconomic implications in Chile, contributed to break-down the Chicago-boy policy-making coalition, leading to a new period of pragmatic reform articulated by a broader set of capitalist interests.

As Martínez and Díaz (1996) put it:

The crisis in the foundational project left the regime with no mission other than political survival according to the pattern of institutionalization set forth in the Constitution of 1980 and defensive adaptation to the new situation created by the economic crisis. Thus the regime was simultaneously attempting to maintain certain essential features of the economic model while undermining its coherence by the responses made to pressures from the regime's coalition of support and from society in general. The dominant core of the state government was not replaced; rather, the pattern of Pinochet's personalized power was reinforced. (p. 161)

In this context, the lack of liquidity enhanced the centrality of fixed-asset producers in the system, with internationalists remaining in the dominant position regarding domestic market producers (Silva 1996). However, only when these sectors threatened Pinochet to join the opposition merging the Alianza Democrática proposed by the Christian-Democrats in the wake of the social protests of 1983, the dictator opened state institutions to the members of this "pragmatic neoliberal coalition", who started to actively participate in policy-making since then. Pinochet's strategy and the failure of the Alianza Democrática attempt to push for early democratization by forging a center-right democratic coalition that excluded the left produced important implications for the transition and its aftermath. As Silva (1996) puts it:

Their loyalty to the dictatorship helped shape the process and outcome of Chile's political transition. It allowed the military government to overcome the political crisis of 1983-1986 and to follow the timetable and conditions set by the authoritarian regime's Constitution of 1980. This, along with other factors, contributed to the retention by Chile's new democracy of the system of interaction between capital and the state developed during the final years of the dictatorship." (p. 25)

While keeping the fundamentals of previous orthodox reforms, after 1983 the government implemented a more pragmatic approach that contributed to economic growth through the development of a more dynamic export-based economy. In this period, the state resumed tighter control of strategic markets and macroeconomic variables (trade, interest and exchange rates, minimum wages, agricultural prices, and public tariffs) in order to favor the export sector. For instance, following subsequent devaluations of the peso, tariffs were selectively raised from an average of 10% in 1982 to 25% in 1985, falling back to nearly 15% in 1990 (Martínez and Díaz 1996). The government proceeded to embark on a second wave of privatizations under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement to cut fiscal deficits. With the same objective, it also

implemented ambitious market-oriented reforms in both the social security and the health system. Finally, further labor flexibility and greater obstacles for labor organization were pushed forth, especially after 1975. Although these policies led to sustained growth in the industrial and agricultural sectors (at an average of more than 6% from 1983 to 1990) and a significant reduction of unemployment (reaching only 6% in 1990), they also yielded significant social costs (with poverty exceeding 40% in 1990) and important socioeconomic transformations. For instance, while industrial employment grew from 350.000 in 1982 to nearly 840.000 in 1993, labor relations and welfare provisions were radically transformed regarding the pre-1973 period (Martínez and Díaz 1996; Castiglioni 2005). And whereas average unemployment fluctuated between 5 and 7% in the 1960s, it reached an average of 19.5% under Pinochet's regime. Furthermore, employment declined steadily in highly unionized sectors and had a relative increase in the financial, commercial, service, and informal sectors, in which unionization is more difficult and rare. The combination of these changes with labor flexibilization and high unemployment led unionization levels in the 1980s to fall to one third of 1973 levels. Consequently, the Chilean union movement was "weaker, poorer, and politically impotent to a degree that recalled the harsh days of the 1930s."<sup>61</sup> Meanwhile, in spite of impressive economic growth, real wages were in 1988, 10% less than those registered in 1970 (Scully 1992).

In the countryside, the effects of economic reforms and political repression were equally destructive as in the urban sectors, with a steady decline of real wages, the virtual disappearance of the landed-peasantry (which migrated to urban city-slums), and a 80% reduction of peasant unionization compared to the period before the coup (Scully 1992). In summary, during the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, the society went through a process of increasing concentration of income and power in the upper sectors (particularly those tied to financial interests and then to the emergent export-based economy). According to Martínez and Díaz (1996), resulting from

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<sup>61</sup>These figures are provided by Scully (1992) on the basis of Angell (1989, p.9) and Campero and Cortazar (1988, p. 40). The quotation is cited by Scully (1992) and corresponds to Angell (1989, p.2).

Pinochet's economic reforms, resources were heavily transferred from the state to large capital, from wages to profits, from locally oriented firms to export-oriented companies, and from social classes to political elites. Whereas the traditional social bases of the political right in Chile (large landowners and locally oriented industrial producers) were hindered by Pinochet's economic policies, a new capitalist class emerged in the financial and export-based sectors, providing the dictator with a loyal "social base." As claimed by Silva (1996), these socioeconomic mutations would have important implications for understanding Chile's transition to democracy and its aftermath. Moreover, this emerging socioeconomic configuration was consolidated under the three center-left Concertación governments that followed the transition to democracy, proving that Pinochet's led reforms and its socio-structural and institutional legacies had a crucial impact on Chile's current politics and society.

The consistent reduction of poverty (from more than 38.6% of the population in 1990 to 18.8% in 2004) accomplished by three subsequent Concertación's governments through focalized social programs and a 10% increase in social expenditures/GDP from 1990 to 2000, constitutes a noteworthy exception (see CEPAL various years). In spite of this and consistently with the consolidation of the new social matrix, income inequality remained virtually constant in Chile from 1990 to 2004 (CEPAL various years). As well, being one of the less unequal societies in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, since the 1980s Chile became one of the most unequal societies in the region (Moulián 1997).

Politically, the "pragmatic economic phase" of the regime had its counterpart in what Drake and Jaskic (1991) identify as a second moment of Pinochet's rule, characterized as the "crisis of the dictatorship." This period ranged from 1981 to 1988. Once again, diverging from its counterparts elsewhere, the military regime was able to withstand the economic crisis of the early 1980s and a persistent wave of social protests in 1983, which were nonetheless important for catalyzing the subsequent democratic transition. Nonetheless, although the opposition started to organize after the events of 1982-1983, it remained fragmented and failed to develop a unified

front against the dictatorship until the late 1980s. While the Christian Democratic Party became more active under the protection of the Church which provided a shelter for social organization, mobilization on the left was weak due to repression, exile, and internal dissent on the interpretation of the Unidad Popular experience and the strategic debates over how to better confront the dictatorship. The majority of the right remained aligned with the authoritarian regime. Therefore, Pinochet remained powerful enough to follow his own timetable for a transition to democracy.

### *The Pace and Nature of the Transition to Democracy*

In 1980 and through a highly questionable plebiscite, a new Constitution was approved for the country and became the keystone in setting the pace and nature of Chile's transition to democracy. Arguably, the fragmentation and weakness of the political opposition to the regime and the relatively high support rate of the dictator among upper and middle-classes who in spite of economic hardship preferred "order" to "democratic chaos" also contributed to Pinochet's capacity to follow his own timetable for democratization.

The 1980 Constitution, which until today sets the basis for the institutional framework of Chile's contemporary democracy, sought to establish a "modern and protected democracy", placing the Armed Forces as the ultimate guarantors of the nation's institutions (Valenzuela 1999). As well, the Constitution permanently banned leftist political groups and ideologies and established significant limits to institutional expressions of popular sovereignty, providing the National Security Council with the power to replace any governmental authority if they believed the institutional order or national security were threatened (Valenzuela 1999). Additionally, the Constitution established the non-popular election of one third of the Senate to be nominated by other authorities, created a strong presidency, and, as argued below, put in place an electoral system that significantly contributed to shape the nature of party-competition in the post-transitional period (see e.g. Siavelis 1999 and Navia 2003).

The Constitution “approved” in 1980, also provided for a plebiscite to take place in 1988 in which the commanders of the Armed Forces would pick a candidate to be ratified as President for an eight-year term in office (Valenzuela 1999). Pinochet, who had by then consolidated his “one man rule”, was obviously not banned from being chosen as a candidate. Indeed, in 1988 after withstanding the recession and social protests of 1982-1983 and enjoying the eventual benefits of sustained economic growth since 1985, Pinochet was indeed “nominated” as the candidate of the Armed Forces to preside over the country for eight-more years.

As the only standing bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in the region and under international and internal pressures to celebrate a clean and fair contest, Pinochet’s new term in office was subjected to the citizenship in late 1988. Having the plebiscite as a crucial catalyst, the democratic opposition to the regime finally coalesced, leading a successful campaign to oppose the electoral propaganda of the Armed Forces and to defeat the regime on “its own terms” (Garretón 1988). To the surprised of many, in the context of high electoral turnout (92% of the eligible population), the “No” option supported by the opposition obtained 52% of the votes, while Pinochet obtained the remaining 40%. Although a small and pro-democratic right reappeared in 1988, Pinochet, campaigning on economic growth, still enjoyed the substantial support of capitalist and business interest.

As shown by Varas (1991), whereas those who voted for the opposition did so on the basis of dissatisfaction with the economy and the disapproval of Pinochet’s human rights violations and authoritarian rule, those who supported the dictator privileged the “order and tranquility” brought by the regime, as well as economic growth (see Table 3.6). Also, a 30% of those who voted in favor of extending Pinochet’s rule manifested a personal allegiance to his leadership. In a nutshell, although the dictator was ultimately defeated in the plebiscite, he was still able to gather a significant share of loyal support, which was justified on the basis of his political and economic achievements, and voters’ personal allegiance to Pinochet. This fact illuminates the significant

realignment that took place in the Chilean system under the “revolutionary epoch” from 1964 to 1989 and the relative strengthening of the previously decaying right in the post-Pinochet era.

**Table 3.6:**  
**Citizen’s justifications for their vote in the 1988 plebiscite**

Reasons for No vote		Reasons for Yes vote	
Economic situation	72%	Order and tranquility	49%
Human Rights	57%	Economic situation	38%
Disapproval of Pinochet’s Government	39%	Pinochet Himself	30%
Return to democracy	21%	Anti-communism or anti-UP	16%
		Democracy	3%

Source: Reported by Varas (1991) on the basis of a public opinion poll.

The 1988 plebiscite results derailed the dictatorship’s plans for a delayed democratic transition and cleared the way for negotiations between the regime and the opposition leading to the presidential and congressional elections of 1989 (Valenzuela 1999). In those negotiations, the democratic opposition (with the exception of the Communist Party) “exchanged” their acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the 1980 Constitution in return for fifty-four constitutional amendments that would tone down the most salient anti-democratic features of that institutional framework (Valenzuela 1999). Among other modifications, the membership of the National Security Council was enlarged; establishing parity between military and civilian members. Nevertheless, its role was downgraded to an advisory one and the bans on political parties (including membership and leadership restrictions) were removed. Finally, the weight of non-elected senators was reduced from 33% to 25% of the chamber, the oversight role of the senate was strengthened, the size of qualified majorities required for amendments was reduced, and the president was made unable to dissolve the lower chamber of congress (Valenzuela 1999; see also Siavelis 1999). These constitutional amendments were popularly ratified on July 30 of 1989 by 85.7% of the citizenry. However, important “authoritarian enclaves” remained in place, conditioning the post-transitional system (Garretón 1988; Siavelis 1999; Navia 2003).

Finally, in December 14 of 1989, presidential elections were held and Patricio Alwyn of the Christian Democratic Party was elected with 55.2% of the share. Alwyn represented the center-left Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia comprising sixteen political parties, which was created for opposing Pinochet in 1988. The dominant parties within Concertación were the Christian Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, the Radical Party, and the new Partido por la Democracia which originated as a splinter from the Socialist Party (see below). Hernán Büchi, an former minister of finance of Pinochet, obtained 29.4% of the vote representing the rightist coalition, dominated by Renovación Nacional and UDI. Finally, Javier Errázuriz, an independent center-right candidate, obtained 15.4% of the share. Although this electoral victory provided Pinochet's opposition with a majority in both congressional chambers, it did not translate into Concertación's control of the Senate due to the presence of non-elected senators designated by the outgoing authoritarian-regime.

#### *The Evolution of the Opposition to Pinochet and its Implications for the Emerging Party-System*

Beyond apparent continuities, the party-system that emerged from the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime significantly diverged from the pre-authoritarian one. As put by Drake and Jaskic (1999):

The three party clusters still prevailed by the end of the 1980s, although with altered nomenclature and electoral portions [...] However those seeming political continuities masked profound changes that evolved during the long apprenticeship of redemocratization. For example, the right developed recalcitrant authoritarian elements, the Christian Democrats and "renovated" Socialist hammered out new understandings on a temperate reform agenda, and the traditionally gradualist Communists endorsed more radical strategies [...] At least for the moment, one legacy of the authoritarian years was a stronger right, an enduring center, and a weaker left." (p. 11-14)

Although later developments under the new democratic regime also shaped the nature of the party-system and partisan competition in Chile, the different paths followed by each party cluster during the dictatorship generated contributed to produce important disruptions. While in this section I briefly describe those different paths, the next section elaborates more directly on the

implications that the socio-structural and institutional transformations implemented under Pinochet's dictatorship had for post-transitional party-competition.

Although the mass protests of 1983 implied the resurrection of the social opposition to Pinochet's regime, the social movement (in particular labor and shanty-town dwellers) became significantly more autonomous from the political parties under authoritarianism. That autonomy contributed to the disarticulation of the "backbone" of the pre-1973 system and resulted from the combination of the political repression of parties and from the socio-structural transformations occurred under that regime (Garretón 1988; Drake and Jaskic 1991). On top of that, the general mistrust of party politics and the low degree of popular recognition for parties and multipartyism (see e.g. Aldunate 1985) enhanced the autonomy of the social movement and posed a fundamental challenge for partisan elites who were used to operate in the context of overlapping social and political alignments (see Garretón 1988 and 1991). Although the role of the Catholic Church in providing an institutional space for the organization of the social movement would later provide a competitive edge to the Christian-Democratic Party, the party's role in the violent end of the UP would pose a significant hurdle at the time of coordinating and leading a unified democratic opposition to Pinochet. Indeed, according to Garretón (1991) opposition parties faced three interrelated challenges. First, they needed to reconstitute their relationship with their social bases which became more autonomous and fragmented. Second, they needed to internally reconstitute the political parties that were disarticulated as a result of repression, clandestine functioning, and political exile. Third, different parties needed to coordinate a unified front to oppose Pinochet. These tasks would prove elusive due to the presence of internal factionalization within parties and mutual distrusts between parties of the left and the Christian-Democratic Party. To understand those difficulties and some of the features of the emerging party-system, it is necessary to analyze the mutations that took place within each partisan cluster.

On the right, already in the 1960s, the main currents had unified in the National Party which progressively became more authoritarian. Immediately after the military coup this party

“auto-dissolved” and entered into a permanent recess under a government decree, merging the authoritarian regime. Both the Radical Democrats (a conservative offspring of the Radical Party) and the fascist Fatherland and Liberty followed the same steps, merging with the military regime and with some of its former leaders taking part in government (see Garretón 1988; Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986; and Hunneus 2003). The “group of the 24” constituted an exception to this rule, as they choose not to participate in government and together with members of the Christian Democratic Party sought to propose an alternative constitution to that finally approved in 1980. Another group of rightist leaders constituted a “semi-opposition” within the regime, but were still willing to participate in government and state institutions (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986). Finally, in 1983 a group of Chicago-boys allied under the leadership of Jaime Guzmán to create the Unión Demócrata Independiente, which rapidly became more influential than National Advance, an offspring of Fatherland and Liberty.

In 1987, the more traditional rightist groups with the exception of the National Party coalesced into a new party named National Renovation. The UDI was expelled from this organization due to its tight linkages with Pinochet which would arguably hinder the electoral prospects of National Renovation in the event of democratization. However, while some members of National Renovation tacitly supported the “No” option, many of its members and leaders openly or implicitly opted for supporting Pinochet. Both National Renovation and the UDI would become the most popular parties within the right in the post-transition to democracy. Finally, although the organizations of the Chilean political right were not maintained during the dictatorship, in general, the economic policies of the regime tended to fulfill the agenda of the right. However, the effects of the economic policies pursued by Pinochet and his civilian allies contributed to the reshaping of the social bases of these parties, with financial interests and export-oriented producers becoming dominant over the traditional land-owning elites that prevailed in the post-1973 right.

In the center, once legalized under the political party law of 1983, the most centrist faction within the Christian Democratic Party resumed its leadership, seeking alliances with other centrist

parties (like the Radical Party) and pushing forth the center-left Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Garretón 1988). The situation of the party was somewhat uncomfortable, as it could on the one side benefit from its relation with the church and its role as the semi-legal public opposition to the regime, but should also carry the weight of having supported the coup as an unavoidable corollary of the UP, though never accepting the authoritarian interpretation of the 1973 crisis as being one of “regime and society” (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986; Valenzuela 1999). Benefiting from a lesser degree of political repression at the hands of the regime and suffering less from the political exile of its members than parties of the left, the Christian-Democratic Party never accepted the recess decreed by government and sought to maintain its partisan organization and embarked on a process of leadership renovation, particularly after the death of Eduardo Frei in 1982 (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986). Indeed, even when the regime decided to dissolve all parties due to permanent violations of the recess, the party still managed to fill in organizational spaces in civil society, especially aided by its relationship with the church. In short, the party managed to play an important opposition role during the regime, which then translated into relatively high levels of popularity and organizational development (Garretón 1988). Although two internal factions competed within the party, the one opposing the pursuit of a Christian-Democratic “own [center right] path” and promoting an alliance with the center-left prevailed, paved the way for the construction of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia and the consolidation of the Christian Democrats as the most organized and better structured national party in the post-transitional period (Garretón 1988).

The left, in turn, constituted the focus of Pinochet’s repression and suffered from a high degree of dispersion of the militants that managed to escape the regime. As a result, the bulk of the political dynamics of the left took place in exile. This particularly applies to the Socialist Party, which lacked a unified national leadership and was broken into two mainstream factions (the Almeyda and Altamirano factions). These factions were divided over a range of issues concerning the evaluation of the UP experience, the need for renovation and a reevaluation of political

democracy, and the role of the Leninist strategy within the party. These factions also differed in their support for a “coalition for change” to be eventually crafted through an alliance with the center (Garretón 1988; Roberts 1998). Several internal currents finally unified around two socialist parties, named after their General Secretaries. The Nuñez Socialist Party (emerging from the Almeyda faction) had gone through a deeper renovation process and favored more fervently alliances with the center. Meanwhile, the Almeyda Socialist Party held a more orthodox stance and favored the traditional alliance with the Communist Party. With the 1988 plebiscite acting as a catalyst for reunification, the PS decided to abandon insurreccional strategies against Pinochet and to take part of a center-left coalition with the progressive center. However, the two socialist parties pursued different legalization strategies. On the one hand, the Nuñez Socialist Party created the Party for Democracy, in conjunction with other small leftist groups and some center and center-right figures and independents (Garretón 1988). This party became very popular during the campaign for the plebiscite and although it was dominated by the Nuñez Socialists, it was clear that it had greater electoral potential than the Socialist Party on its own, gathering the allegiance of young people, renovated leftists and center-leftists, and former Christian-Democrats who perceived that party as being too traditional and ideological (Garretón 1988).

In turn, the Almeyda Socialists joined the Communist Party, the Christian Left, and other smaller groups to create the Broad Party of the Socialist Left (PAIS). The PAIS registered as a political party by the end of 1988, illustrating the emergence of two lefts within the left: a renovated and an orthodox one (Roberts 1998). The PAIS finally broke down and the Almeyda Socialists joined the Concertación as the Socialist Party in 1989.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party developed a clandestine organization during the dictatorship and was better able to resist repression, enjoying a greater insertion in the popular sectors that started to organize and mobilize against the regime in the early 1980s (Garretón 1989; Oxhorn 1995). However, a split also developed between its most traditional and pragmatic leadership and the one living in exile under the strong influence of Moscow (Roberts 1998). Until

1980 the party maintained its gradualist standpoint and opposed insurrectionary practices, blaming the UP for the occurrence of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (Garretón 1988). However, under the critique of the USSR and its own exiled members who opposed the lack of a military strategy to confront Pinochet, the Communist Party finally opted for using “all forms of struggle” to challenge the dictator (Garretón 1988; Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986; Roberts 1998). In this context, the party got closer to the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and created its own revolutionary militia, the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front. Although this change moved the party away from its traditional constituency in the labor movement, it resonated well with the student and shanty-town dweller movements that were mobilizing and protesting in the streets against the regime, though they lacked a consistent ideological framework (Garretón 1988).

While the opposition decided to confront the regime within its own institutional framework, a deeper division emerged within the PC. Although the party finally decided to support the “No” vote in the plebiscite, its dual nature as insurrectionary and “systemic” party was accentuated in the post-plebiscite scenario (Garretón 1988). In that context, the MRPF became autonomous, while small dissident sectors with pro-renovation postures withdrew from the party (Roberts 1996). Although this produced a strong internal debate within the party, the conflict was not resolved by the creation of the PAIS. Ultimately, the Communist Party failed to join the Concertación and became increasingly isolated in the post-transitional system, both due to the highly constraining electoral system and its own failure to adapt (Roberts 1998).

Finally, the Humanist Party emerged from the dictatorship as the only one lacking pre-1973 relatives, resembling more closely a “new social movement” than a traditional political party (Garretón 1988). The Humanists, who have since then played a very marginal role in the system, lacked a clearly defined ideology but framed themselves as a leftist, green, feminist, and pacifist party (Garretón 1988).

In a way, the exclusion of the Communist Party, along with the renovation (“social democratization”) of the Socialist camp, provided the emergent Concertación de Partidos por la

Democracia the opportunity to assure the political and economic right that the essentials of the market reforms would remain in place. Arguably, this reassurance was important in advancing democratization. However, as Drake and Jaskic claim (1991), it also posed a fundamental dilemma for upcoming Concertación's governments:

The new civilian government will face the dilemma of how to maintain the essentials of the free-market model to placate the upper class while addressing accumulated social demands from the underprivileged majority (p. 7).

### The Post-Transitional Party-System (1990-2004) and the Contemporary Configuration of Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages

In this section I discuss the emerging configuration hypothesized in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 on the basis of post-transitional politics in the context of the institutional and socioeconomic legacies inherited from Pinochet's regime and Chile's transition to democracy. In the post-transition to democracy and in a regional context in which parties and party-systems went through serious disruptions in several countries, the Chilean system continues to be an exception in terms of its relatively high levels of electoral continuity and partisan strength (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Hagopian 1998; Stokes 1999). Indeed, in line with their previous predictions, Valenzuela and Scully (1997) have argued that an impressive degree of continuity existed in the system by comparing the local vote for major political parties in 1967 and 1992 (see also Valenzuela 1991 and Scully 1992).<sup>62</sup> This seems particularly remarkable given the socioeconomic transformation of Chilean society, the strength of political repression directed against partisan organization during Pinochet's regime, and the reach of the institutional reforms introduced in the 1980's Constitution.

According to Munck and Bosworth (1998):

This positive reading of Chile's current party-politics is grounded in three trends: continuity in terms of the tripartite nature of the party-system, continuity in terms of the institutionalized nature of parties, and change in terms of the previous pattern of ideological polarization. (p.473)

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<sup>62</sup>The interpretation of this results, however, has been challenged by Montes et al (2000) and by the recent evidence presented in Mainwaring and Torcal (2003), Ortega (2004), and Altman (2004) suggesting important discontinuities in the social base of Chilean political parties. I come back to this below.

Therefore, political parties in Chile seem to have successfully adapted to the institutional and socio-structural constraints that have shaped electoral competition in the post-transitional period (Roberts 1992; Mainwaring and Torcal 2003), positioning this party-system as a positive and noteworthy exception in Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Stokes 1999; Hagopian 1998).

This successful process of strategic adaptation and ideological moderation has fostered pragmatism and has contributed to Chile's "model" transition to democracy. This transition combines neoliberal reform with a consensual system of political negotiation and compromise, structured around two political coalitions: a center-left (Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia) and a center-right (Alianza Por Chile). The strong incentives and restrictive conditions introduced by the Chilean "binomial" electoral system helped to keep these two coalitions in place.<sup>63</sup>

However, as Montes, Mainwaring, and Ortega (2000) argue, as a result of the seminal scholarship on the Chilean party-system:

Several orthodoxies have emerged in this literature: that Chilean parties are strong, that the party systems have been divided into three roughly equal parts, and that they have been relatively stable."<sup>64</sup> This also implies a great deal of continuity bridging the pre-authoritarian party-system with the one that emerged in the post-transitional period [...] (Notwithstanding), these orthodoxies are not completely wrong, but they need to be qualified. The dominant view that Chilean parties are strong has been overstated. They have been strong in some respects and for some periods, but not in others. Parties have traditionally dominated mechanisms of representation in Chile's democratic periods, overshadowing unions, social movements, and other forms of representation. Party penetration in the electorate, however, has not been powerful. Parties have appeared and disappeared with frequency, and most parties have been relatively weak organizationally. More so than is the case in Uruguay, Venezuela from 1958 until the 1990s, Costa Rica or most of Western Europe, Chile's democratic periods have allowed space for anti-party populist to develop successful

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<sup>63</sup>The peculiar Chilean electoral system combines a district magnitude of two with a d'Hondt formula of proportional representation. As a result, to gain the two seats in a district, a party or pact needs to receive twice as many votes as its closest competitor. As a result of the relative high number of parties, the system introduces strong incentives for parties to create and compete on the basis of electoral pacts. Additionally, although the center-right coalition was forecasted to vote roughly around forty per cent (on the basis of the degree of support for Pinochet regime in the 1980 Constitutional Plebiscite), the system guarantees an equivalent Congressional representation for both coalitions. This institutional system was secured by the introduction of supra-majorities requisite for any significant reform. This fostered a system of consensus and compromise and precluded the possibility of Constitutional reform in spite of general dissatisfaction with the system. See Allamand (1999); Siavelis (1999); Fuentes (1999); and Navia (2003).

<sup>64</sup>Montes et al (2000, pp. 795).

political careers, including capturing the presidency. Some prominent scholars have suggested that since at least the 1930s Chile's party-systems have been divided into three roughly equal large ideological blocs –left, centre, and right—and that this division should be the basis for party system analysis in Chile. This conceptualization of the party system is somewhat misleading. Although both party systems have had a significant left, centre and right since 1932, the vote share of these three large ideological blocs has fluctuated widely. The literature has suggested that the Chilean party systems have been quite stable, but the 1932-73 system was more unstable than has usually been acknowledged. Electoral volatility was consistently high, which is inconsistent with the view of a highly stable system. Moreover, the format of the party system (the number of parties) varied widely over time in a non-linear fashion [...] Our very use of the plural 'systems' suggests a key point, namely, that the systems of 1932-73 and 1988-2000 differ to a sufficient extent that it is sensible to think of them as distinct. (p. 795-796)

Concurring with this claim, I hypothesize that significant disruptions have taken place in the post-transitional party-system. In my view, the evolution of programmatic party-voter linkages in the post-transitional period contributes to the explanation of the relative weakness of the parties “in the electorate”, as well as other emergent features of the system like the increasing levels of political apathy and social discontent with politics and parties (see e.g. Hunneus 1998; Valenzuela 1999; Posner 1999 and 2004). The increasing disentanglement between voters and parties (not necessarily, candidates), has important implications for understanding Chile's current deficits in terms of the political representation of subordinated sectors of society. Paradoxically, those deficits, as well as party's separation from increasingly fragmented and disorganized societal interests, contribute to explain the notable stability and institutionalization of the post-transitional system.<sup>65</sup>

In terms of programmatic linkages, the socioeconomic divide (or “class cleavage”) that used to structure partisan competition has lost centrality and has been substituted by a regime divide, which faces limitations in mobilizing non-politically socialized voters and the young. Additionally, the religious divide runs across the two mainstream partisan coalitions that currently structure party-competition in the system, reducing its potential to become a surrogate for the socioeconomic or regime divides.

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<sup>65</sup>See Munck and Bosworth (1998) for a similar assessment.

Although important programmatic differences might still be present at the elite level and might significantly condition policy-making in Congress both regarding the class and religious divides (see e.g. Blofield 2006 and Davila 2005), they have clearly lost centrality in the electoral arena, connecting voters and parties.

In this context, while politically socialized voters remained consistently split between a “democratic” (represented by the center-left Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia) and an “authoritarian” camp (represented by the rightist Alianza por Chile), less politically engaged voters either further alienated from politics (especially the younger generations and the poor) or entered pragmatic problem-solving networks at the local level. This is consistent with the steady increased of independent voters in the system and with the decreasing levels of electoral turnout, non-registrants, and ballot-spoilers (see e.g. Riquelme Segovia 1999; Valenzuela 1999; Carlin 2004).

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **THE EVOLUTION OF PARTY-VOTER LINKAGES IN URUGUAY**

This chapter uses a path-dependent explanation to derive hypotheses about the current level, nature, and characteristics of programmatic linkages in Uruguay. Given the relatively little scholarship available on this party-system (with the partial exception of the 1904-1920 period), the treatment of the case goes into somewhat further detail than that of the preceding chapter.<sup>56</sup>

#### The nature of programmatic linkages in the post-transitional period

In Uruguay, a weaker and delayed colonial implantation coupled with an economic base centered on non-labor-intensive agriculture reduced the salience of the traditional conservative coalition that dominated other Latin American societies (landowners, the military, and the church). Additionally, the long struggle for implanting state sovereignty during the 19<sup>TH</sup> century, and the rapid eruption of caudillo wars after independence undermined the economic base of the landed oligarchy and contributed to produce partisan armies that would later constitute the basis for solidifying enduring political sub-cultures. In spite of their past confrontations, both traditional parties also built a long-tradition of co-participation in government.

The lack of ethnic cleavages, the historical weakness of the Church and conservative forces in the country, and the rapid suffrage expansion at the turn of the century pushing dominant parties to rapidly incorporate the mass electorate through the expansion of the state-apparatus (given the small size of the internal market and an economy based on low-labor intensive agriculture and commerce), the enactment of social legislation, and the creation of powerful clientelistic machines,

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<sup>56</sup>See González (1995) for a comprehensive literature review on the Uruguayan party-system.

all contribute to an explanation of the weakness of ideological mobilization in the system. This does not imply that important ideological differences were lacking between Uruguayan parties and their internal currents or fractions. Indeed, both internal and inter-party programmatic differences were stark during several periods of Uruguayan history. However, as argued below, those divergent stances did not provide a strong basis for developing party-voter linkages, which were instead forged around a combination of strong partisan subcultures and clientelism and patronage. The strength of traditional partisan identities, rooted in the civil wars of the XIX century, also explains the meager success of third party challengers and merger (“fusionista”) attempts led by urban city intellectuals alienated from caudillo confrontations, fractionalization, and the lack of ideological consistency in the system.

In this context, facilitated also by rapid urbanization (produced by rural unemployment) and immigration, *batllismo* emerged as a relatively early modernization project that socially and politically included subordinated sectors through the expansion of the state apparatus and a premature democratic enfranchisement. As opposed to the Chilean case (and other Latin American cases), the incorporation of lower-classes was pursued within Uruguay’s two traditional parties: the Colorado Party (PC) and the Blanco Party (PB). Progressively, both parties “colonized” the state-apparatus and became the crucial brokers between society and the political system. Made feasible by the war bonanza of agricultural exports, these mediations consolidated into a “system of compromise” in which most social sectors and interests could get accommodated without producing major distributive trade-offs.

However, the decline of the export-sector, the incapacity to modernize agricultural production, and the expanding size of the state used as tacit unemployment insurance by both traditional parties, set the limits for the long-term viability of the batllista project, which nonetheless, became nearly hegemonic in political discourse. Although in the traditional system party fractions and political parties had significantly different ideological and programmatic stances, those were not the center for partisan competition. As demonstrated by the governing

experiences of the *herrerista-ruralista* (1958-1962) and the *Unión Blanca Democrática* (UBD, 1962-1966) *colegiados*, and later by Lacalle's (1990-1995) and Jorge Batlle's (2000-2005) governments, the "inertia" of the system even broke the arm of its most vocal opponents.

When the economic crisis hit after the end of the Korean War (1955), discontent became the engine of change in the system. This triggered alternation first between party fractions, then between traditional parties, and finally ended up increasing levels of sociopolitical polarization, encompassing the emergence of a powerful leftist urban-guerrilla (the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Tupamaros) and the involvement of the Armed Forces in political repression. Meanwhile, in 1971 a new leftist coalition party was created: the Frente Amplio (FA). In the context of a sustained economic crisis, a strengthened president (after the constitutional reform of 1966) began to clash with a progressively fragmented Congress, yielding a decisional deadlock in the wake of surmounting socio-political polarization. The stalemate was finally broken by a military coup in June, 1973. However, in contrast to the Chilean case, the support base for the coup rapidly eroded and the military was incapable (and even unwilling) of disrupting the major characteristics of the Uruguayan socio-political compromise. This process yielded a weaker and rapidly eroding regime divide for post-transitional politics.

With the resumption of democratic politics the main features of the traditional system were restored. However, facing a growing and powerful leftist opposition and confronting increasing public deficits and inflationary pressures, both traditional parties embarked on reformist agendas. The fiscal crisis of the state also limited the scope for reproducing loyalties on the basis of traditional clientelistic and patronage appeals, which became increasingly inefficient for competing with a leftist party that had appropriated the defense of *batllismo* and was able to mobilize discontent against *neoliberal* reformers.

Although the Uruguayan party system lacked a strong advocate for neoliberal reform in spite of the specter of a crumbling economy and increasing international pressure, once in office the traditional parties embarked on gradual attempts at state-reform. Given the omnipresence of

batllista or statist/redistributive ideology and significant policy feedback from ISI, these reforms were, not surprisingly, extremely unpopular. In this context, Frente Amplio gave political expression to a “veto-coalition” of ISI beneficiaries while at the same time, drawing on a reinterpretation of *batllismo* to attract votes from the sectors that became increasingly alienated from the traditional system in the wake the “happy Uruguay” crisis. Ideologically, this coalition put forth a statist platform advocating and enacting legislation (through the use of direct democracy mechanisms to roll-back reformist legislation in favor of the status-quo (strong state intervention in the domestic economy). Additionally, while the two traditional parties faced surmounting popular discontent and managed increasingly constraining budgets in order to maintain their clientelistic political machines, Frente Amplio was able to gradually become the most popular political party in the country. The strength of the *frenteamplista* subculture solidified through exile and resistance to the repression and persecution during the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, combined with the loosening of Blanco and Colorado’s partisan identities, provided further room for the transformation of the party-system.

This dynamic, coupled with electoral results and the constitutional reform of 1996, crystallized two ideological families competing for votes based on programmatic appeals along the state-market divide. Those two “ideological families” consolidated a bi-polar logic of competition among three significant parties: the Blancos, the Colorados, and Frente Amplio.

From this trajectory I hypothesize that the state-market divide has gained centrality in structuring partisan competition in the system, yielding a transition of citizen-elite linkages from scenario II (non- programmatic linkages -clientelism &/or partisan subcultures) to scenario I as defined in Chapter 2. As suggested in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, this transition relates to the increasing mobilization of (distributive) *grievances* produced by the political economy of dismantling ISI (*or batllismo*) in the post-transitional period. Meanwhile, as a result of the country’s historical trajectory, both the religious/secular and the democratic/authoritarian divides should not play a major role in structuring political competition in the system. In short, in the

context of a relatively secular and pro-democratic society, the state/market divide constitutes the only viable source—at least among the competitive divides for which we have available evidence—for ideological mobilization in the aftermath of Uruguay’s transition to democracy. In short, compared to the trajectory described for Chile in Chapter 3, Uruguay represents the opposite scenario, in which a traditionally clientelistic and non-ideological system evolved towards more consistent patterns of programmatic mobilization around the state/market divide.

Figure 4.1, in turn, presents a sketch of the historical overview discussed in this chapter and its implications for the consolidation of programmatic divides as basis for partisan competition.

**Table 4.1:**  
**Evolution of opportunities in Uruguay**

Democratic Constestation	Yes, partial since 1984 complete since 1989
Democratic Contestation in the long-run	Yes
Electoral Participation	Historically high, maintained
Policy-opportunities	Constrained (fiscal deficit and debt), but highly contested (Left in the opposition)
<b>Balance</b>	Yes

**Table 4.2:****Evolution of *capacities* in Uruguay**


Civic organizations (long-term)	Weak, horizontal (particularistic) party-brokerage networks
Civic organizations in the post-transition	Dual (stratified) development: Increasing organization and political mobilization (left) of ISI beneficiaries, declining capacity of private-sectors and poor due to (segmented) neoliberal reforms
Party-system institutionalization	High
Partisan sub-cultures	Historically Strong, Bi-polarizing in the post-transitional period (Left Vs. Traditional Parties)
Strength of machine politics	Historically Strong-Centralized, mild and mix of central and decentralized allocation (gradually decaying for traditional parties, gradually growing for left) in post-transitional period
<b>Balance</b>	Maintenance and increasing autonomy of civic society

**Table 4.3:****Evolution of *Potential for Successful Partisan Mobilization of Grievances* around three divides in Uruguay**

Class mobilization (long-term)	Low, cross-class partisan coalitions
Class mobilization in the post-transition	Increasing, highly contested economic model under reformist attempts through institutionalized democracy
Regime divide (long-term)	Extremely weak without anti-partisan cycles since the 1930s. Until 1989, Marxist-Leninist fractions of the Left
Regime divide in the post-transition	Weak
Clerical divide (long-term)	Historically low, rapid secularization, both parties as vertical cuts of society
Clerical divide in the post-transition	Weak
<b>Balance</b>	Class: Increasing Regime: Very Weak/Declining Clerical: Weak/Adscriptive

**Figure 4.1:**

**Explaining the nature and evolution of competitive political divides in Uruguay**



### A General Characterization of the Uruguayan Party-System

The Uruguayan case stands out in the region not only for being the country that lived the most years under a democratic regime during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but also because of the stability of its party system. In this sense, Uruguay and Colombia were the two countries that had two and only two dominant political parties during the entire 20<sup>th</sup> century (Buquet 2000; Rial 1983).

As in the Chilean case, political parties and politics became central in Uruguayan society, constituting a *partidocracia* ingrained in very stable and pervasive partisan subcultures (Caetano, Rilla and Pérez 1989). In this way, parties eclipsed other societal organizations and “colonized” the state, gained exclusivity in articulating, channeling, and arbitrating societal interests (Real de Azúa 1984; Rama 1987; Panizza 1989). However, the Uruguayan system evolved in a very distinct manner over the long run.

Both Uruguayan parties emerged from a military confrontation known as the “Batalla de Carpintería” in 1836, eight years after independence and six years after the approval of the country’s first constitution. Party identities would then be consolidated in an extremely violent civil-war that lasted for twelve years (1839-1851). In the Uruguayan case, political parties constituted cross-sectional cuts of society and established links with constituents by combining resilient partisan identities with an expanding system of clientelistic side-payments and state patronage. Both traditional parties were internally fractionalized, constituting “rather loose coalitions of factions” that were able to “accommodate individuals who support all kinds of ideas, even the most disparate among them...thus, the case of the coexistence of two opposing groups [fractions belonging to rival parties] both professing, however, exactly the same ideals.”<sup>67</sup> This led many observers to put into question the existence of a truly bipartisan system in the country,

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<sup>67</sup>The first quote is from González (1995, p.142) and the second corresponds to Julio Martínez Lamas (1946) and is cited in González (1995, p.142).

claiming instead, that Uruguay had a multi-party system hidden behind a two-party façade (see e.g. Lindahl 1962; Sartori 1976; Errandonea 1989).<sup>68</sup>

However, as extensively argued by González (1995):

Factions within the same party may be ideologically very different, whereas the parties themselves may on the whole exhibit little difference; hence, it is said, we actually have two coalitions of parties. This is not necessarily so, however. On the one hand, the argument is self-defeating. For if it were correct, why do we not have the “right” coalitions—that is, coalitions formed by parties with little ideological distance among them—instead of the “wrong” ones that occur in fact? On the other hand, the observed state of affairs may well be expected when two large catchall parties (in Kirchheimer’s sense) compete against each other. But the idea of both traditional parties as catchall parties has been long established, even if this has not always been explicitly recognized. Early observers, like Luis Melián Lafinur and Ariosto González, described these parties as unprincipled, with few ideological differences, or as non-ideological vote-maximizers; both writers lamented, as Kirchheimer did, this deideologization of politics [...] (p.143).

Notwithstanding, the high fractionalization of Uruguayan parties and the patterns of cross-collaboration of fractions from different parties at certain points in time, suggests the need to balance both extreme characterizations. In this sense, Rial’s description of both traditional parties as “confederations of parties” might be more adequate for a nuanced understanding of the Uruguayan party-system (1984). Still, it needs to be complemented to account for the fact that both “confederations” were held together by deep-rooted political traditions that turned each party or confederation into “meaningful (identity) units”, configured on the basis of a sequence of historical and systematic antagonisms (Pérez 1984). Of course this is not inconsistent with internal ideological crisscrossing as the nature of citizen-elite linkages in the traditional system which was not fundamentally driven by consistent programmatic appeals.

According to González (1991): “Uruguay has had two major *parties*, Blancos and Colorados, since the nineteenth century; these parties competed within a two-party *format* until the mid sixties, and under democratic governments they defined a two-party *system* most of the time.” Although the emergence of the leftist coalition Frente Amplio in 1971 challenged the traditional system and contributed to transform it significantly after the transition to democracy, changes were less dramatic and more gradual than those seen elsewhere in the region. And if we trace back the

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<sup>68</sup>See González 1995 for a critical appraisal and review of this literature.

parties' origin to the confrontations between rural caudillos in the post-independence years, both traditional parties managed to adapt and survive for more than 170 years, maintaining the presidency until the recent election of 2004, and remain significant players in the system until today.

Therefore, until 1971, both traditional parties managed to obtain together more than 90% of the votes, successfully frustrating the entry of challenger parties into the political arena. Indeed, throughout the country's democratic history and by the 1960s, only a handful of non-traditional parties had reached congressional representation: the Union Liberal (founded in 1855), the Partido Radical (founded in 1873), the Partido Constitucional (founded in 1880), the Socialist Party (founded at the turn of the century and leading to the creation of the Communist Party in 1921 after an internal split), and the Unión Cívica (founded in 1910 and leading to the creation of the Christian Democratic Party in 1960 after a split from its left-wing).

This traditional system was powerfully reinforced by Uruguayan electoral institutions, which combined a single plurality system for electing the president, with a PR system for Congress. However, the centrifugal effects of PR were contained by a system of concurrent elections and the use of a Double -Simultaneous-Vote (DVS) institute since 1910, which became the electoral masterpiece ensuring continuity in the system<sup>69</sup>:

The DSV means that voters vote at the same time for a party and for a specific set of candidates within the party, though they have to select lists –which cannot be modified—from among those presented by the rival fractions within each party. Once they choose the party, they have as many options as there are lists presented by the party. An obvious consequence of voting for a party is that split tickets are not allowed. The party that obtains a plurality of votes is the winner; the winner of a plurality within that party becomes president. Since 1934, finally, all elections occur at the same time. This simultaneity obviously reinforced the effects of the ban on split tickets. [...] the DSV provides the stimulus and is reinforced by PR, which assures that it is not necessary to get the first prize to stay in the race; a modest electoral success is enough to provide some important posts for the top leadership of the fraction or subfraction, which in turn may “trickle-down” to their lesser associates. As a result, this system continuously creates new challengers to the established leaders who, if moderately successful, will become leaders of new fractions or subfractions. In organizational terms the crucial point is that the system allows the would-be leader to skip one step in the party hierarchy, opening a parallel, competitive candidacy or set of candidacies. Within certain limits, the most important party leaders cannot oppose this state of affairs. They gain little

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<sup>69</sup>For a recent revision and elaboration on the incentives derived from Uruguayan electoral institutions see Morgenstern 2001.

attempting to “discipline.” If they deny the new splinter group the use of the party’s name and symbols, they risk a loss of votes that, in view of the competition, could be decisive. It follows that in the long run the expected trend is toward a greater number of candidacies. (González 1995, p.146-7)

Electoral institutions and the flexibility inherent in a relatively highly fractionalized system allowed the traditional party-system to endure and resist subsequent challenges brought about first by socioeconomic modernization followed by stagnation in the post-World War II period (Rial 1984).

By the mid-1950s, the system witnessed increasing levels of stress triggered by social discontent derived from economic stagnation. Before ending up with the emergence of Frente Amplio as a third significant actor in the system in the election of 1971 and with the later instauration of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in 1973, the traditional party-system witnessed an unprecedented cycle of alternation between both traditional parties (with the Blanco Party gaining the election for the first time in 1958) and a steady increase in the internal fractionalization of both parties.

Whereas from 1925 to 1931 the number of lower chamber electoral lists averaged 143, for the 1946-1971 period that figure went to 314, reaching its peak in 1971 with 590 lower chamber lists (see González 1995). Nonetheless, other authors claim that fractionalization and its real impact have been greatly exaggerated by the empirical focus on lists contesting the elections instead of those effectively winning congressional seats (see Buquet, Chasquetti, and Moraes 1998).

The electoral results of the first election following the authoritarian “parenthesis,” closely resembled those of 1971, consolidating a system of “two-parties-and-a-half.”<sup>70</sup> Since then, with the gradual but sustained growth of the left and the persistent but slow-paced decline of both traditional parties, the system became one of “moderate pluralism,” with three significant actors (both traditional parties and the left). In this regard, I depart from González (1991 and 1995) characterization of the Nuevo Espacio (NE) as a relevant (and significantly different) actor in the

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<sup>70</sup>The expressions are in González 1991 and 1995.

system. The NE emerged in 1989 as a splinter of the Frente Amplio, representing a center-left moderate option (opposed to more orthodox Marxist parties) that had gathered the greatest plurality within the party in 1984. In my view, the Frente Amplio also went through a process of internal fractionalization, progressively becoming a “catch-all” party by encompassing fractions with widely different ideological orientations (see Chapter 11). Indeed, recent evidence shows that while the mainstream groups of both Colorados and Blancos have progressively converged into two-relevant fractions, Frente Amplio’s fractionalization has increased reaching an average of five relevant internal units (Piñeiro 2004). Thus, the creation of the NE represents the initial stress triggered by that process of internal diversification that contributed substantially to the electoral expansion of the party (see articles in Lanzaro 2004). Moreover, the unsuccessful trajectory of that splinter (a fraction of which ended up merging the Colorado party in 1994, with the rest of the party unsuccessfully contesting the election in 1999 and then returning to Frente Amplio under the Nueva Mayoría pact in 2004) acted as a demonstration effect inhibiting other significant splinters from FA since 1989.

In terms of its format and given Colorado’s predominance (from 1868 to 1958), some observers have considered the Uruguayan system as one of a “predominant party-system within a two-party format” (Sartori 1967). However, as noted by González, real electoral guarantees were only introduced with the approval of the 1917 Constitution. Besides, from 1934 to 1942, although headed by a Colorado leader, the country lived under an authoritarian regime. Therefore, while democratic guarantees were provided (from 1918 to 1933 and from 1942 to 1971) the Colorado party was not as predominant as the party’s control of non-democratic governments would suggest. The arrival of the Blanco Party into office in 1958 and its permanence until 1966 supports the characterization of the system as a competitive two-party system. Since the late 1960s the Uruguayan party-system progressively evolved from a two-party system to a system of “two-parties-and-a-half” and then, since 1989 to a three-party system. As I will argue below, however, the current system is structured around two-ideological families competing on the state-market

divide. The first of those families is composed of by the two traditional parties and the second is composed of the coalition of left and center-left parties recently institutionalized as the Nueva Mayoría. While electoral turnover and alternation in government became more frequent in the system, fractionalization increased on the left and remained significant –though less important than in the pre-authoritarian period-- among the traditional parties.

### The Historical Evolution of the Uruguayan Party-System

In this section I describe the main features of Uruguay's traditional party system in order to lay a foundation from which to assess the extent of and the implications of the recent transformation hypothesized above.

#### *Nineteenth-Century Uruguay and the Origins of the Traditional Party-System (1830-1904)*<sup>71</sup>

As strongly suggested in the scholarship of Carlos Real de Azúa and others, the resilience of the traditional system and both partisan subcultures, along with the consolidation of both parties as cross-sectional cuts of societies can only be explained in reference to the patterns of socioeconomic and political development in 19<sup>th</sup>-century Uruguay.<sup>72</sup>

Montevideo's historic rivalry with the seaport of Buenos Aires, which was given a greater administrative and commercial role under the Spanish domain, yielded a relatively weak commercial class in the future capital of the country. At the same time, Montevideo remained in the hands of the Spanish crown until relatively late (1814), with the revolution and post-independence conflicts taking place in the countryside and in some instances "against the city" (Real de Azúa 1984).

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<sup>71</sup>For a still compelling analysis of partisan politics in the 19<sup>th</sup> century see: Pivel Devoto (1943).

<sup>72</sup>See also Caetano and Rilla 1984 and 2004; Rama 1987; Caetano, Rilla and Pérez 1989; Pérez 1984; Panizza 1990; González 1991 and 1995; Rueschemeyer et.al. 1992; and Filgueira 1995).

Uruguay's independence came as the result of British intervention in the Río de la Plata, given Britain's ambition to create a "buffer" independent state between the economic and political powers of Brazil and Argentina. In a tri-partite agreement signed in Rio de Janeiro in August 1828, Britain, Argentina, and Brazil granted Uruguay's independence with the latter two retaining the power to provide the final approval for the Constitution of the new country and to intervene in the event of a civil war. This fact exemplifies once again, the openness of the country and its emerging political currents regarding international influences and interests.

Uruguay and Argentina shared an economy based on extensive cattle-ranching which makes both cases diverge from the regional pattern of enclave economies based on the labor-intensive exploitation of tropical agriculture or mineral riches (Rueschemeyer et al 1992). In Uruguay, land confiscations and redistribution during the Artiguista period and frequent land-property turnovers and appropriations under the sultanistic Luso-Brazilian domination that lasted until 1828 made land property more volatile. Finally, once independence was achieved in 1828, civil wars between rural *caudillos* erupted and destroyed more of the productive structure than in the more politically stable Argentine countryside.

The fragility of land-property rights and the economic devastation produced by continuous revolutionary uprisings translated into the formation of a relatively weak economic elite. The delayed consolidation of cattle-ranching compared to that of Argentina is epitomized by the installation of meat-processing plants in Uruguay twenty-years after their emergence in the neighboring country. As a result of this late development, the conspicuous alliance between landowners and urban industrial and commercial sectors that dominated Argentinean economy did not consolidate in Uruguay.<sup>73</sup> In turn, an ostensible antagonism between rural and urban upper-sectors punctuated the development of Uruguayan economy.

Politically, the power of the elite was also flawed. On the one hand, given the geopolitical characteristics of the country and the resulting high amount of influence enjoyed by foreign

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<sup>73</sup>See O'Donnell (1997) for an argument on Argentina.

interests that sought to forge alliances with opposing factions of the Uruguayan elite, immediately after independence that group was divided among several possible political projects for the country.<sup>74</sup> While under Rosas (and in particular after 1829) the Argentinean elite were able to build a political compromise with rural caudillos “subjecting” the countryside to the liberal political project of Buenos Aires’ landowning and commercial elite, until 1904 rural caudillos were able to challenge state sovereignty and Montevideo’s political authorities. Indeed, during the “great civil war” (1839-1951) the country had officially two governments (one controlling Montevideo and the other the rest of the territory), insurrectionary movements were extremely frequent until the final consolidation of state power (initiated under the military rule of Latorre in the late 1870s and 1880s) at the turn of the century. The continuous confrontation between the capital city (and seaport) and a scarcely populated but “incontrollable” countryside, yielded according to Real de Azúa, a different political compromise than the one observed in Argentina.

This compromise was characterized by the absence of hegemonic *caudillos* at the provincial level and by the divided incorporation of the leading economic class into two political bands led by political *caudillos* that played a mediation role. Those charismatic leaderships became progressively instrumental in vertically aggregating the interests of a wide cross-section of the population (from the dominant sectors to rural workers, from the military and the intellectual elite to social *lumpen*). The dominant sectors were then forced to negotiate their interests within these cross-class political conglomerates. Although similar in their ideological orientation and scope, the unification projects of Roca (1880-1886) in Argentina and Latorre’s dictatorship in Uruguay (1880-1886) represented different social bases. Whereas the former embodied the project of a unified conservative oligarchy seeking peace and order for business and was able to reach office

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<sup>74</sup> These projects ranged from a reconstruction of the imperial relationship with Spain to an annexation with Brazil, including the incorporation to Argentinean federalism or a merger with a group of center-eastern provinces of that federation into a new independent political unit. These divergent projects and Uruguayan political leaders’ rapid alignment with different foreign interests weakened the political capacity of the elite to forge a hegemonic project for the country.

through election, the latter originated after a military uprising and did not enjoy the uniform support of the economic elite (Real de Azúa 1984).

The superposition of personal ambition and rivalries with the influence of different ideological leanings and (mild) social cleavages (unitarian vs. federalist, Jacobins vs. traditional, city vs. countryside, commercial vs. agricultural, ins vs. outs), as well as divergent alignments with the extremely influential regional and European foreign powers, helped to consolidate those two vertical political conglomerates as the Colorado and Blanco parties. The Great War which was initiated by the forceful removal of constitutional President José Manuel Oribe (from the Blanco party) by Fructuoso Rivera (a Colorado leader who had been the first constitutional president of the country), consolidated both parties' identities. Oribe subsequently allied with Juan Manuel de Rosas (Buenos Aires governor) in the conflict between *unitarios* and *federales* and kept Montevideo under siege for more than ten years, controlling the countryside from what came to be known as the "government of Cerrito." Meanwhile, the Colorados governed Montevideo ("government of the defense") and forged an alliance with General Manuel Urquiza and the Brazilian state.

European powers were quickly involved in the war. First the French (1838-1842) and then the British (1843-1850), contributed to secure Montevideo's position at the sea. Concurrently, French and Italian legionaries (under the leadership of Giuseppe Garibaldi) contributed in defending the city from the Blanco siege. This imbued the city (and therefore, the Colorados) with a liberal and pro-European spirit, further reinforced by the influence of massive European migration into Montevideo. At the same time, the Blancos who controlled the countryside were more antagonistic to European influence and developed a more nationalist and conservative stance. However, it is worth stressing that these were general ideological orientations which became more or less salient during different periods and under different internal alignments of party-fractions. The war ended in 1851 with a declaration that stressed that there "have not been winners or losers"

emerging from the armed conflict, a much needed stand for political reconciliation and for the unification of a country that has been divided during twelve years.

After the “great civil war” and with the subsequent failure of fusionist attempts led by urban *doctores* alienated by the destructiveness of civil wars between two political bands that “lacked” any substantial programmatic difference<sup>75</sup>, both parties became two powerful socialization centers in society and contributed to create strong partisan subcultures on the basis of “blood-brotherhoods.” The presence of those subcultures explains the resilience of traditional party attachments until recent times, along with partisan flexibility and adaptability facilitated by electoral rules.

At least since 1865 and until 1919, the Colorado Party approximated the ideal type of a “dominant party”, controlling the national government and the military and frequently relying on electoral fraud to avoid the access of the Blanco Party to the main national office. This legitimated civil wars and revolutions against Colorado governments as the only possible way for the Blanco Party to achieve power. Early in the country’s history, such revolutionary attempts were also instrumental in yielding government co-participation pacts. For instance, after the *Revolución de las Lanzas* (1870-1872), the Blanco Party gained access to a third of the twelve regional governments in the interior, through a distribution quota pact with the government of Colorado president Tomás Gomensoro. At that time, to control the regional government was to secure the electoral outcomes for Congress (Pivel Devoto 1942).

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<sup>75</sup>For instance, Andrés Martínez Lamas, a Colorado claimed in 1855: “What do represent those Blancos and Colorados? They represent the misfortunes of the country, the necessity of foreign interventions, the disrepute of the country, the bankruptcy with all its bitter humiliations, personal hatreds, passions, miseries. What is what divides to a Blanco of a Colorado today? I ask it to the most enthusiastic, and the most enthusiastic will not be able to show a single national interest to me, a single social idea, a single moral idea, a single thought of government in that division.”(in Pivel Devoto 1994: 237. translated in Altman *unpublished manuscript*). This failed attempt yielded the creation of the *Liga de los Doctores*, whose objectives crumbled after the celebration, in 1956, of the *Pacto de la Unión* between the Colorado *caudillo* Venancio Flores and the Blanco *caudillo* Manuel Oribe. This pact recognized the need for mutual acknowledgment of both parties and their legitimacy and established a cooperation agreement. However, the very nature of the pact also consecrated the existence of two-distinct and powerful political traditions in Uruguay.

Although the consolidation of state power in the late XIX century turned the revolutionary way to power less feasible, the great popular following achieved by both parties and the virtual division of the country in two halves, contributed to the progressive institutionalization of a long tradition of partisan pacts and cooperation agreements between both camps. Therefore, although partisan divisions were severe and persisting on the emotional level, they were subsequently coupled with ideological flexibility within both traditional subcultures and with a rich tradition of political cooperation and power-sharing that developed over the years to come. Thus, while a “supra-constitutional” agreement ultimately guaranteed the Colorados control of an increasingly modernized military apparatus and blocked the Blanco’s access to presidential office for over a century. Power-sharing agreements (originally conceded in exchange for the abandonment of revolutionary uprisings in the countryside) gave the Blanco party access to very important state-offices. That agreement through which the minority party would get six of the nineteen departmental governments was maintained during the first militarist period under Latorre and renovated after the Blanco revolution of 1897. As documented by Rial (1984, pp. 22, footnote 20), since 1872, Blancos had access to a minority distribution quota of regional governors (departmental police chiefs) which were directly appointed by the president under the 1830 Constitution.

However, the consolidation of the state’s military capacity weakened the traditional *de-facto* diarchy that existed in the country, leading to a period of Colorado party-government under the powerful leadership of Battle. In 1903, President Batlle unilaterally appointed the *Police Chiefs* of the six departments allocated to the Blancos in the pact of 1897, triggering another revolutionary uprising in the name of co-participation and cleaner electoral procedures. Although this revolution was defeated in 1904, it also made clear the need for a constitutional reform that could better accommodate the political reality of the country. That reform, considered a critical instrument for the democratization of the country, came in 1917.

Whereas Batlle's original proposal was highly detrimental to the interests of the Blanco Party, it did not succeed in achieving the needed political support as a result of the internal fracture of the Colorado party in 1913 and Blanco's electoral recovery.<sup>76</sup> This increased the bargaining power of Blancos who supported a new Constitution for the country in exchange for co-participation in government. This led to the approval of a formula of proportional representation for congressional elections and the inclusion of the minority power in the collegial branch of the two-headed executive created by the new Constitution. Then, in 1931, an agreement between a Colorado fraction and a Blanco fraction led to the first institutional provision that established co-participation in a state-company. Under the dictatorship of Terra and with the approval of a new Constitution in 1934, a fixed 50/50 allocation of senate seats to the two majoritarian fractions of each party and the allocation of certain ministries to the Blanco party further consolidated this system. Once democratic politics resumed, the Constitution of 1942 replaced the fixed allocation of senate seats by a proportional representation formula. Finally, in the Constitution of 1952 and with the creation of a single-headed executive led by a nine-member organ, co-participation was once again fully expressed.<sup>77</sup> The Constitution stated that the executive would have to be formed with six members of the majority party (one of which could come from the second most popular fraction of the party given a significant electoral support for that fraction) and three from the second party (the first two members should be allocated to the majority fraction and the latter to the second most important fraction of the party). This Constitution also institutionalized the formula of the "3 and 2" for the five-member directories of every public enterprise. Although the nine-member executive was suppressed in the Constitutional reform of 1966 (which reintegrated the presidency at the top

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<sup>76</sup>The draft originally proposed by Batlle created collegial executive organ of nine members, which would be renovated one-by-one on a yearly basis. In practical terms, this meant that the Blanco Party would need to win five elections in a row to gain full control of the executive.

<sup>77</sup>Whereas the first Constitution of 1918 established a bi-headed executive with a President (in charge of internal security and external relations) and an Administrative Council (with nine members and in charge of all "secondary" state activities), that of 1952 substituted the presidency (re-established in the Constitutions of 1933 and 1942) with a single-headed collegiate executive of nine members (the National Government Council), six representing the most voted party and three representing the second-most voted party.

of a single-headed executive), the formula of the “3 and 2” was maintained, providing both parties a great deal of room for accessing the public bureaucracy.

In short, the consolidation of two strong and highly divisive partisan subcultures constituting cross-sections of the population and rapidly encompassing a mass-popular following, the virtual impossibility of one camp to definitely subject the other until the early XX century, and the progressive celebration of inter-party pacts to share power and govern the country, constitute central long-term configurations to understand the subsequent political evolution of the Uruguayan party-system. As argued above, such configurations were the byproducts of the economic and geopolitical base of the country and their implications in terms of the sociopolitical weakness of the economic elite. Those originating characteristics also contribute to an explanation of the absence of the prototypical conservative coalition (landowners, the military, and the Church) that pursued the unification and centralization of power in other Latin American countries. It also explains the attenuation of the export-led growth model that led to a relatively weaker articulation of the economic linkage between the local elite and foreign economic powers that characterized enclave economies elsewhere and that were instrumental in strengthening the conservative coalition in other parts of the region.

In terms of their social bases, the prototypical configuration of both parties was based on the charismatic leadership of rural caudillos, which enjoyed the support of urban “doctores” who progressively gained control of administrative tasks. As well, both the emerging urban bourgeoisie and rural landowners were (dividedly) inserted within each party. For this reason, the weakness of class-based political organizations is another long-term determinant of Uruguayan political development.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>78</sup>For instance, in 1910, Luis Alberto de Herrera, who would later become the leader of the mainstream fraction of the Blanco Party until his death in 1959, unsuccessfully advocated the creation of a political alliance of rural landlords (Rial 1984). Meanwhile, in 1919 the Unión Democrática, a party that sought to directly represent commerce, industry, and finance sectors, and landlords, only obtained 655 votes (Rial 1984). Therefore, while important pressure groups were subsequently created in the country, their actions were not partisan, but oriented towards direct pressure on the bureaucratic structure of the government and

Finally, in terms of their ideological leanings, the Colorados were similar to other Latin American liberal parties, with cosmopolitan, urban-centered, and anti-church orientations (González 1995). The Blancos in turn, became more conservative, representing another “half” of the country. However, both represented cross-sections of society and occupied a wide range of the ideological spectrum. The enduring internal cleavage that divided Blancos (*caudillos*) from Nacionalistas (doctors) within the Blanco Party until recent times epitomizes the cross-class alliance that each of both parties had.

In short, the absence of strong ethnic or rural-urban classes, as well as the weakness of the Church and conservative interests in society, made a bi-partisan configuration sufficient to represent the “ins” and “outs” of the system (González 1995, p.145).

During the 19<sup>th</sup> century these parties lacked virtually any kind of formal structure and were heavily dependent on *caudillista* leadership. The absence of clean electoral procedures until 1919 and the pervasiveness of electoral fraud during the XIX century, consolidated the participation of partisan militias in the context of civil wars as the main political activity with massive political engagement. At the turn of the century, this relatively early engagement of mass followers in party politics would facilitate their incorporation through suffrage expansion and electoral participation. Furthermore, at the turn of the century the characteristics of the Uruguayan partisan space would also allow for the relatively easy incorporation of the new social sectors (urban middle classes) created by the processes of modernization, urbanization, and mass European immigration. In other

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eventually, on “congenial” fractions of both traditional parties. According to Rial’s historical reconstruction the oldest organization was the Chamber of Commerce (Cámara Nacional de Comercio) created in 1867 to represent the import-commerce and bankers. In 1872 the Uruguayan Rural Association (Asociación Rural del Uruguay) was created to push forth enclosures, the incorporation of breeding technologies, and the expulsion of exceeding labor to the cities. In 1893, the Chamber of Exporters (Cámara Mercantil de Productos del País) was founded. In 1916, the Rural Federation (Federación Rural) was created to represent more politicized landowners who opposed Batlle in 1916 and supported Terra’s coup in 1933. At the same time, sponsored by Batlle’s government and as a counteroffensive, the National Commission for Rural Advancement (Comisión Nacional de Fomento Rural) was created to represent small landholders and farmers. After a flawed attempt in 1879-1880, the Industrial Uruguayan Union (Unión Industrial Uruguaya) finally emerged in 1893 and later became Uruguay’s Chamber of Industry (Cámara de Industrias del Uruguay). Although these organizations continue to exist today and became effective in extracting concessions from the state the parties and their fractions consolidated as the central actors and arbiters of the system. See Rial (1984, p.14, footnotes 6 and 7) and Caetano, Rilla, and Pérez 1989.

words, whereas in neighboring countries new partisan vehicles would have to be created to represent the interests of those emerging sectors (e.g. the Radical Party in Argentina or the Democratic Party in Chile), Uruguayan parties were able to absorb and socialize these social strata in the pre-existing partisan sub-cultures.

For the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it is possible to conclude that two orthogonal axes defined the partisan space: the opposition between doctors and rural *caudillos* and the opposition between Colorado and Blanco subcultures.<sup>79</sup> Three broad generalizations can be made about electoral procedures in this period: the existence of a pervasive climate of un-rule of law, government intervention and interference in electoral procedures and direct fraud, and citizens' indifference regarding elections (Pivel Devoto 1942). These patterns would be radically reshaped during the first two decades of the XX century.

#### *Batllismo and its imprint in the system (1904-1920)*

Accumulating on the legacies of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, this period set the basis for the socioeconomic and political development of the country in the XX century, establishing a sociopolitical "compromise" and an enduring pattern of relationships among the traditional parties, the state, and society. Additionally, it helped to shape the predominant ideological orientations that that continue to influence Uruguayans today.

Between 1896 and 1910 Uruguay suffered a significant political and military crisis, which followed the economic and financial crisis that originated in the last two decades of the XIX century. As argued by Caetano and Rilla (2003), as a result of such a critical conjuncture, both traditional parties went through a significant transformation in terms of their leadership and doctrine. While in the Blanco party *caudillista* leadership reemerged challenging the city "*doctores*" who were engaged in co-participation with the Colorado government and leading the insurrections of 1897 and 1904, in the governing Colorado party a new political figure emerged

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<sup>79</sup>See Altman (*unpublished manuscript*) for an argument on these lines.

from within the city-elite, that of José Batlle y Ordoñez. Creating a lively political press vehicle (*El Día*), Batlle opposed the governing style of his party (doctoral co-participation) and was able to “popularize” political debate. In 1903, Batlle was appointed President by the Senate for the 1903-1907 period, the first of his two (non-consecutive) terms in office.<sup>80</sup>

After the Colorado government victory against the Blanco caudillo Aparicio Saravia who led the last two important armed insurrections in the countryside (1897 and 1904), Uruguay entered into a period of significant social and political modernization.<sup>81</sup> This period and its heritage were modeled by Batlle’s leadership and would continue to shape partisan politics in Uruguay until very recent times. Arguably, the insertion of Batlle’s project within one of the two traditional political subcultures in the country was a prerequisite for its later development.

During this period and over the course of the following two decades, the country consolidated as an egalitarian society governed by an interventionist state focused on income redistribution. This was deemed necessary to create what Batlle denominated “a model country,” inspired in the example of small Scandinavian democracies. In an increasingly urbanized society, the state acquired control of a widely extended public sector, including financial institutions, trains, seaports, electric energy, and oil refinery and distribution. Later on, urban transport, fisheries, the complete railroad system, air commercial navigation, and a wide-ranging education system (secular, with free universal access to all three levels, and mandatory primary education) followed. Finally, a set of very progressive labor and wage legislation, a complementary set of pro-industrial and agricultural economic and fiscal policies, and the gradual consolidation of an almost universal (corporatist) pension system completed the cycle of social modernization and state expansion under

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<sup>80</sup>In 1907, President Williman, a close collaborator of Batlle was appointed. Finally, in 1911, Batlle came back to Presidential office for another four year term.

<sup>81</sup>A later insurrection in 1910 was rapidly crushed by the government.

Battle's leadership.<sup>82</sup> The failure to significantly modify the patterns of extensive (*latifundista*) cattle-ranching and the overall structure of the agrarian sector constitutes the main barrier confronted by the *batllista* model (Barrán and Nahum 1967 and 1979).

In terms of social modernization, the most significant innovations relate to the secularization of society, with the definitive separation of state and church and the creation of a non-confessional public educational system that rapidly expanded at the three levels incorporating geographical distant units with the creation of a system of rural schools and departmental high-schools.<sup>83</sup> Secularization also reached family relations, with the progressive introduction of divorce provisions (first in 1907 for "serious" cases: prostitution, violence, adultery, and fights; then in 1912 incorporating the sole will of the wife as sufficient cause). In terms of labor relations, the government introduced significant legislation to level the playing field between labor and capital, restricting the workday to eight hours and protecting (and even promoting) the right of workers to strike. In this area, the government positively evaluated the role of "union agitators," contributing to moderate and electorally co-opt the significant influence that the anarchist movement had gained in the region, in particular due to massive Spanish and Italian immigration (Rama 1989).<sup>84</sup> Finally, through the construction and expansion of an ambitious "welfare state," the *batllista* project sought to forge a society dominated by "modern middle-classes" and oriented towards income redistribution, as opposed to inherited social status epitomized by the figures of traditional elites and landowners.

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<sup>82</sup>See, Barran y Nahum (1967, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986); Filgueira (1995); Lindhal (1962); Panizza (1990); Rama (1989); Real de Azúa (1984); and Vanger (1963 and 1980) for a detailed description of this period.

<sup>83</sup>See Vanger (1963); Lindhal (1962); and Rama (1989) for a detailed account. For instance, whereas in the 1893-98 period 29.1% of the population lacked any sort of formal education by 1923-28 that figured was reduced to 7.2% and later reached 5.4% in 1929-33. Reported in Rama 1989, p. 39, footnote 14. According to the evidence described by the author, the process was one of gradual incorporation, particularly in higher levels of education, given the still lack of penetration of the rural sector and the relatively high impact of drop-out in the lower sectors of society.

<sup>84</sup>Once again, the differences with Argentina are very significant in this respect.

Ideologically, Batlle's project was rooted in a combination of social and democratic radicalism, a deeply ingrained secularism and Jacobinism, and a humanist orientation. This ideological cluster found its correlate in a very weak nationalist exaltation (left to the Blanco party) and a decidedly pacifist internationalism (Real de Azúa 1984, pp. 44-5). Although "*batllismo*" pursued an ambitious redistributive project, it is important to stress that it was not a socialist one, neither did it challenge private property, nor fail did it doubt to exalt the virtues of liberal democracy.<sup>85</sup>

Politically, Uruguayan democracy was born in this period. The Blanco defeat in 1904 and the death of its most prominent revolutionary *caudillo*, finally provided the state (and the Colorado party backed-up by a predominantly Colorado official army) the monopoly of coercion and the territorial control of the country through the directly appointed Departmental Police Chiefs in each Uruguayan administrative division. However, Blanco electoral abstention during the period and until 1910 stimulated further concessions for electoral transparency and co-participation, particularly during the presidential term headed by President Williman. Among others, these provisions included the instauration of the secrecy of the vote for the Constitutional Assembly elected in 1916. Since 1918, with the instauration of a direct and simple plurality election for the President and a significant expansion of suffrage (extending the secret vote to all males over 18, including illiterates), the basis for the electoral contestation of *mass* parties were established. Whereas by 1916 the enfranchised population was almost a fifth of the male electorate (18.5%), by 1931 electoral registries included 80% of males older than 18 (considering immigrants). With respect to the native male population over 18, the proportion of effective voters reached an average

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<sup>85</sup>To illustrate this point, it is worth transcribing the words of Juan José Serrato, a Minister of the government, when defending the creation of a State Insurance Company in 1911: "If we understand socialism as the improvement of the living conditions of the working class, seeking to elevate their culture, their existence means, and their human dignity; if the attempt at creating a more rational distribution of riches in society is socialist; if the attempt at defending and promoting that great economic value called men and without which there is no progress is deemed as socialist, then, this project is completely socialist. But, if for socialism or for socialist immediate aspiration we understand the disappearance of individual property, if for socialism we understand the socialization of all means of production, I say then, that this project is not inspired in the socialist school." First transcribed in Vanger (1963), then reproduced by Rama (1989, p. 31, footnote 7).

of 80% over the 1920s.<sup>86</sup> Therefore, as shown by González's comparison with Chile, the suffrage figures reached by Uruguay by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century were only achieved in Chile forty-years later.

According to González (1995), the consolidation of mass politics contributed to significantly transform Uruguayan traditional parties. Both parties evolved from an original configuration close to the ideal-type of "parties of notables" with restricted mass following (except for the influence of the charismatic leaderships of *caudillos* over rural partisan militias) to a rapid consolidation as *mass-electoral* parties. In line with Kirchheimer's hypothesis, while pursuing this transition both parties became *catch-all* institutions and witnessed an increasing level of internal fractionalization. This process was obviously aided by the additional electoral rules subsequently introduced in the system. First, since 1910, the use of closed-lists and the institute of the double-simultaneous-vote were introduced. Second, since 1918, proportional representation was introduced for the election of both congressional chambers. Finally, since 1934 and until 1999, concurrent elections were celebrated for executive, congressional, and local electoral posts. In the Constitutional Reform of 1966 (which re-established a one-person executive with expanded prerogatives), the tenure period was extended from four to five years. Operating on this institutional context, both traditional parties were able to obtain 90% of the vote from 1918 and until the mid 1960s. During this period and until 1973, the Blancos were in office from 1959 to 1966, with the Colorado party heading the executive the rest of the time (González 1995).

Meanwhile, under the 1917 Constitution, the instauration of a complex system of partial renovation for the Administration Council, the President, the Senate, and the Lower Chamber translated into the celebration of 11 national elections during a period of 15 years. The electoral parity between both parties and the rapid integration of mass electorates into regular and relatively clean electoral procedures contributed to legitimate the system and provided a powerful deterrent for revolutionary uprisings (Rama 1989). Additionally, combined with the incentives shaped by

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<sup>86</sup>The figures are from González (1995) and Rama (1989). Rama in turn, bases his estimates on Franco (1984).

electoral rules, the similar electoral weight of both parties further contributed to greater fractionalization and the progressive “colonization” of the expanding state apparatus by political parties and their fractions (Panizza 1990; see also Real de Azúa 1984; Rama 1989; and González 1995). Given the aggregate similarity of both parties’ electoral strength, intra-party bargaining between fractional leaders and each party’s hierarchy (national leaders) gained a central role. Through this bargaining, party-fractions committed the much needed electoral support to the leaders of the party contesting for positions at the top (the Presidency, the Council, and the Senate) in exchange for proportionally distributed side-payments (usually through their participation in the state-apparatus which provided access to patronage and clientelistic resources to feed their constituencies) according to their electoral mark-up. This process of intra-party bargaining and fractional competition produced, as a positive externality, high turnout rates and the early development of clean electoral procedures (as fractions needed to clearly show -up their leaders the amount of their contribution to the party). However, as discussed in the following sections, the exacerbation of these practices in the years to come would also yield less positive externalities.

Before closing this overview of the period it is worth stressing that the “*batllista*” project was not developed in response to emerging social mobilization by middle and lower classes. Instead, analysts concur with a diagnostic that highlights Batlle’s “anticipation of social and political demands” (Vanger 1963; Real de Azúa 1984; Rama 1989; Panizza 1990; and Filgueira 1995). However, as argued above, without neglecting the role of elite agency, it is also important to stress the relatively “favourable” socio-structural conditions that Batlle inherited from the 19<sup>TH</sup> century. Operating in this context, the *batllista* project was successful in incorporating and politically socializing (into the traditional political structures) subordinated sectors of society and the sizable group of recently arrived immigrants. In turn, although the rural landowners were able to successfully block land reform and put a halt on Batlle’s most ambitious reformist attempts – mainly operating through the conservative fractions of the Colorado and Blanco party--, they lacked the required leverage to hinder the redistribution of agricultural rents to the financing of the

incipient “welfare state.” Even when confronted to an unfavorable political project that was able to govern the country for almost two decades, the traditional oligarchy failed to develop a powerful opposition and only acted defensively, confirming once again the historical flaw in its political power (Real de Azúa 1984).

However, the impossibility to challenge the economic structure in the countryside imposed severe limits on the expansion and long-term sustainability of the modernization project which would later stall in spite of its social and political achievements. The stringency of such limits was aggravated by a weak industrial impulse (with the exception of meat-processing plants) hindered by the continuity of traditional productive structures in the countryside and aggravated by the small internal market available for high-scale industrial production.

In such a structural context, *batllismo* successfully pursued social and political modernization, state expansion, and the successful civic integration of subordinated sectors, quickly legitimizing the emergent democracy and its main actors: both traditional political parties. In this sense, it is important to stress the integration of the Blanco party to electoral politics (after the revolutionary failures of 1897 and 1904) and its integration in government through co-participation practices. However, this virtuous short-term equilibrium would then be pressured by the stagnation of easy ISI and the increasing inflation of popular demands initially caused by a sustained process of rural-urban migration.

Confronted with this emerging scenario, political elites from both parties contributed to create what Real de Azúa defines as a “system of compromise” through which both parties consolidated as mediators between state and society distributed particularistic concessions and drafted “mitigating” legislation to protect “all created interests,” irrespectively of their form of political articulation and functionality to the overall social system (Real de Azúa 1984, p. 52-54).<sup>87</sup> The high permeability of the system and the professionalism acquired by party machines in

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<sup>87</sup>The working of such system is conspicuously described in Lindhal (1962), Rama (1989), and Panizza (1990).

channeling all sorts of social demands, contributed to enhanced the centrality and legitimacy of parties in the political system. Obviously, however, this “system of compromise” would prove economically unsustainable in the long-run, explaining the gradual but progressive erosion of traditional party-loyalties after 1955. In terms of Rama (1989), the system progressively degenerated into a “hyper-integrated” society that became immobile when confronting the crisis of its own development model. In a similar vein, Panizza (1990) argues that parties’ colonization of the state apparatus and the expansion of the particularistic representation of growing social demands terminated with any existing room for state autonomy, also leading to a paralysis and the final collapse of the system.

These later developments, to which I come back below, were also facilitated by the consolidation of a “conservative” mood in Uruguay’s public opinion. According to Real de Azúa, by the end of the *batllista* period, Uruguayans had already accumulated sufficient collective achievements, later crystallized in an exultant national pride that lead them to claim that “*there was nothing like Uruguay*” and that the country was “the Latin American Switzerland.” In the years to come and in spite of the consistent evidence on the weaknesses of the Uruguayan model, this social imagery proved resilient, also contributing to reinforce the system of compromise inherited from the *batllista* period. Central in this imagery was the credo that everyone could get accommodated and that there were not significant trade-offs implied in trying to improve each sector’s socioeconomic conditions. The state became the privileged arena of interest intermediation among all social sectors. Meanwhile, the parties (and their fractions) which progressively “colonized” the state, became the predominant (and virtually exclusive) brokers between state and society.

Since 1920 and partially in response to the emergence of *batllismo*, a new strong political leadership, that of Luis Alberto de Herrera developed within the Blanco Party. The development of *herrerismo* in confrontation with *batllismo*, along with some of Herrera’s own ideological leanings, set the basis for the main programmatic orientations of this emergent political organization. Therefore, *herrerismo* harshly opposed the expansion of the state and of the tax system advocating

the primacy of civil society and its organizations (mainly rural producers), developed a radical rural and popular orientation, was untrusting of immigrants and the expansion of universal social and educational policies, and adhered to democracy and republicanism in its concrete political practice in spite of its temporal sympathy for fascism and its more permanent support for the regime of Franco in Spain (Caetano and Rilla 2003). Also in terms of international politics, Herrera was untrusting of Europe and the USA and advocated an approach of “concentric circles” for the orientation of Uruguayan foreign policies.

*The halt of reformism and the first authoritarian coup against democracy (1920-1944)*

In this period, important internal conflicts emerged and crystallized within both traditional parties as a result of the alignments emerging for and against *batllismo* and the first authoritarian coup after democratic politics had been established since 1919.

The confrontation between both camps was centered on the debate about Batlle’s proposal to substitute the presidency for a collegial nine member organism whose members would be renovated yearly on a one-by-one basis.

Colorado President Feliciano Viera’s (1915-1919) famous “halt” of reformist policies and the Blanco’s victory in the election for the Constitutional Assembly of 1916 signaled that the system was ready to withstand a significant change of course. Still, although the alliance of the Blanco majority with the Riversista minority of the Colorado party predominated in the Constitutional Assembly, the *batllista* fraction under the personal leadership of former president Batlle was still able to negotiate some concessions, of which the creation of a bi-headed executive including a collegial nine-member organ was the most notorious one. Finally, although the constitutional election was extremely heated and controversial and in spite of the eventual confrontation between a Congress with *batllista* majority and a Constitutional Assembly dominated by the opposition, the system proved resilient (at least until 1933).

During this period, strong internal political alignments would consolidate within each of the two traditional parties. In 1925, resulting from the temporal electoral withdrawal of a Colorado fraction from that party formula (the “vieristas”, led by former President Viera who split *batllismo* in his conflict with Batlle in 1919), the Blanco Party (*herrerismo* in particular) was able to win a majority in the National Administration Council and was therefore able to control a half of the executive branch. Herrera’s increasing power within his party and the confrontation with doctoral *principistas* from the city, produced growing levels of stress that ended up in the break-up of the party with the excision of the Partido Nacional Independiente. Independents, with a more clearly defined “doctoral style,” were tied with international finance and business and rejected Herrera’s foreign policy views. Moreover, they advocated a radical anti-personalism that clashed with Herrera’s hegemonic leadership pretensions (Caetano and Rilla 2003). As well, after Batlle’s death in 1929, succession fights led to internal splits in the Colorado Party and within *batllismo* between a fraction led by Batlle’s sons (César and Lorenzo) and Gabriel Terra. These internal developments would produce long-standing divisions within both traditional parties, with the *herrerista* vs. *non-herrerista* confrontation within the Blanco Parties (until re-unification in 1958) and the opposition between *batllistas* vs. *conservative anti-batllista* fractions within the Colorado Party.

According to Rial (1984), from 1916 to 1933 the political system worked consensually on the basis of a shared agreement between both parties and their fractions in the exercise of government action. However, with the economic depression, the Uruguayan model entered into a deep crisis that led, even *batllistas*, to acknowledge the need for a sharp reduction of wages and pensions. The socio-political tensions associated with this conjuncture led to a (self)coup in 1933 led by President Gabriel Terra and conducted by some fractions of both traditional parties (four *non-batllista* fractions of the Colorado Party and the mainstream fraction of the Blanco Party: the *Herrerismo*) with the support of business and rural interest groups and against other fractions of

both the Colorado and Blanco Party (the “pure” *batllistas* and the “*Independent nacionalistas*”) who would then decide to vote outside their party.

While Terra was in the Presidency, Herrera’s boycott of the elections for the National Council of Administration and the alliance between “pure *batllistas*” and the independent Blancos (or Nationalists) gave the latter the chance to enter the National Council of Administration. Controlling a minority of the Council and confronting therefore the need to negotiate with an extremely fractionalized party-system, Terra (“pushed” by Herrera) dissolved Congress and the Council and established a dictatorial rule. The coup was not resisted by the opposition and was civil, as the military remained uninvolved in the matter.

It is also worth noting that in spite of the political repression of the opposition (led by a subordinated police force) and its political persecution, Terra’s regime originated amidst important fractions of the traditional parties and never developed an anti-party rhetoric as other contemporary regimes in the region. In a way, although partisan activities were affected by the dictatorial rule, parties’ existence and legitimacy was not challenged by the regime (Caetano and Rilla 2003). Moreover, the dictatorship contributed to the crystallization of internal alignments that would prove long-lasting for fractional politics. These alignments reproduced the confrontations between pro-regime vs. anti-regime fractions, which were also divided in terms of their electoral participation during the regime (the opposition promoted electoral abstention until 1942) and a neutral vs. pro-allied posture regarding the WWII. In this context, the parties continued to exert a great deal of influence. Indeed, according to some observers, it is even possible to argue that the excluded (and abstensionist) fractions of both parties were able to maintain some of their access to clientelistic resources given their importance in adjudicating the election of 1938 between two Terrista candidacies, those of Baldomir and Blanco Acevedo (Rial 1984). Once the abstention of *batllistas* ended in 1942, that fraction resumed the internal leadership of the party defeating both Baldomiristas and Blanco-Acevedistas.

In terms of policy, the dictatorship did not produce sharp discontinuities with the previous democratic governments. Indeed, the non-labor-intensive agro-export model continued with its correlates of exceeding labor-supply migrating into the cities. Under the influence of Keynesianism, *batllista* policy-making deepened during the period, including the implementation of exchange rate and import control and the establishment of significant trade-barriers (Rial 1984). Given its political base in civil society, the regime avoided irritant labor legislation like the initiatives for the establishment of minimum wages, unemployment insurance, and the cooperative management and distribution of business profits in the private sector promoted by *batllismo* (Rial 1984). However, “welfare state” provisions were expanded (especially in Montevideo) in other policy areas, promoting early retirement by expanding pension benefits in order to reduce unemployment, and improving the public provision of health, housing, and food programs (Rial 1984).

In 1942, under the strong international influence of the World War II and confronting a persisting veto-power by the *Herreristas* in the Senate, President Baldomir pursued what came to be known as the “*golpe bueno*” (or positive coup), reintegrating the excluded fractions from both parties into the system of co-participation. This was done through the substitution of the fixed 15/15 composition of the Senate for a system of proportional representation. With the exception of the *Herreristas*, all other significant political fractions were re-accommodated into the system in preparation for the plebiscite that approved the Constitution of 1942 re-stabilizing democratic rule in the country. The plebiscite was positive, with the *Herreristas* as the only fraction promoting a negative vote. In spite of its defeat, this dissident fraction continued to actively participate in democratic politics in the immediate aftermath of democratic resumption. What is more, president elect Amézaga from *batllismo*, who did not have the need to build an inter-party coalition given the margin of his victory, still decided to form one with significant fractions of the Blanco party in order to contribute to political reconciliation (Altman *unpublished*; Caetano and Rilla 1984).

*Neo-Batllismo: A mild populist attempt and its limits (1945-1958)*

Once again, important realignments occurred during this period within both traditional parties. In the Colorado party, the *batllista* fraction resumed its influence and attempted a return to the original model but in a socioeconomic model punctuated by the beginning of a long-standing economic crisis that exacerbated the negative externalities of such a model. In the Blanco party, both in the city and in the countryside, two new electoral movements emerged and allied with *herreristas* which provided, together with the return of *independents* to the party, the basis for the electoral victory of the party in the elections of 1958.

The “positive coup”, the constitutional reform of 1942, and the strident victory of *batllistas* in the national elections celebrated in November of that same year provided the basis for a period that came to be known as *neo-batllismo* given its ambition to restore the essentials of the pre-1933 model. This objective was initially facilitated by the economic bonanza produced by the rise of agricultural exports during WWII and later, until 1955 during the Korean-War.

Whereas economic structures remained substantially unchanged, new social provisions targeted at the lower sectors of society signaled a “populist” intonation of Uruguayan politics in which every significant partisan fraction participated. This was conspicuously illustrated by the approval in 1943 (and almost without any sizeable congressional opposition) of previously resisted minimum wage regulations, as well as the creation of family-assistance packages targeted at poor families, and the creation of unemployment insurance for seasonable activities. Additionally, the water and sewage system and the entire railroad structure (previously-owned by the British) were nationalized, state-owned airline and fishing companies were created, and a public-transportation system was implemented in Montevideo to substitute the British tramway system (Rial 1984).

This renewed expansion of the state-sector provided further basis for the expansion of clientelism in the system and for the consolidation of the political “compromise” that characterized since the early 1900s Uruguayan politics. As stated above, many observers identify this period with the emergence of a “populist” style of leadership basically incarnated in the figure of Luis Batlle

Berres, a nephew of José Batlle y Ordoñez who became President in 1947 after the death of Tomás Berreta, his running-mate in the presidential formula for the elections of 1946. In spite of not having being directly elected as president, Luis Batlle's charisma and personality granted him an important degree of popularity.

However, even if Uruguay's economic policy and leadership style resembled those of contemporary populist regimes in the region (especially those of Perón, Vargas, and Ibañez), it is important to stress the attenuation of the "populist" pattern in several significant dimensions (Real de Azúa 1984). First, as mentioned, the new pattern of political mobilization was incorporated within the structure of the traditional two-party system. In this sense, Luis Batlle was closer than any of his counterparts elsewhere to the parties and the party-system. Indeed, he was a genuine product of the party-system and never developed an anti-party rhetoric. Second, although redistributive policies to the lower classes were important during this period, an open confrontation between lower classes and higher strata did not take place. Instead, once again, the system of compromise was reinforced on the basis of the export-earnings produced by the war. Rhetorically, this period was framed as a return to classical *batllismo*, instead of as a funding and radically different project as Peronism in Argentina and Trabalhismo in Brazil. Indeed, as Rama has put it, the motto of this period was to "imitate their own model." Finally, the populist leader was strongly committed to the liberal and radical tradition, as well as laicism. Therefore, the country also escaped the anti-liberal, authoritarian, and in some cases fascist trends seen in other contemporary populisms.

Fractionalism also continued to be one of the main features of the system and would once again trigger significant political developments. During this period and precisely around 1950, two enduring internal currents would crystallize within the Colorado Party, splitting *batllismo* (or the List "15") from a more conservative and less populist sector, known as the List "14", which was led by Batlle's sons César and Lorenzo Batlle Pacheco. Meanwhile, the followers of dictator Terra would get predominantly reintegrated within List 15. Since the mid-1960s and in the early 1970s,

the List 14 group would lead the party and from the Presidency, contribute to the military-coup of 1973. List 15, in turn, would resume its influence after the transition to democracy, providing three elected presidents from that original fraction in five elections (1984-2004). The fraction was later divided over a confrontation on the presidential nomination for the 1989 election yielding two powerful organizations (the Foro Batllista led by Julio Ma. Sanguinetti and the Lista 15 led by Jorge Batlle) that dominated the party, especially after the death of Jorge Pacheco Areco, the conservative leader of the Unión Colorada y Batllista (originally List 14).

Within the Blanco Party, the Colorado split facilitated the political reintegration of *Herreristas*, who inspired by the will of limiting the presidential power of Luis Batlle joined List 14 in an alliance to pass a new constitutional reform. This constitution, applied since 1952, reintroduced the figure of a collegial executive of nine members. However, this time the figure of the presidency was dissolved within the Council, creating a single-headed nine-member executive that came to be known as the “Colegiado Integral,” composed by six members of the majority party and three from the minority one. As well, the Constitution also introduced the formula of the “3 and 2” for all directories of public enterprises and institutions.

According to Rial (1984), the successful resurgence of *Herreristas* was facilitated by its electoral growth, fundamentally triggered by the populist leadership of Fernández Crespo in Montevideo, a populist leader that built a powerful clientelistic and patronage machine reaching every neighborhood of the city. Quite tellingly, Fernández Crespo used the “List 51”, which reversed the numbers of the sector of the Colorado Party that his political style was “emulating” (List 15).

In 1958, Fernández Crespo headed a dissident sector within the party (opposing *Herreristas* and their new political allies: the *Ruralistas*) and was able to gather the support of the majority of *Independent nacionalistas*, who had been voting outside the party-label since 1933. The *Ruralistas* were led by Benito Nardone, a popular radio commentator of agricultural issues, who became extremely popular in the countryside especially mobilizing rural middle-classes and small

producers that had split from the Federación Rural to create the shortlived Liga Federal de Acción Ruralista. Although this group did not survive the death of its leader, it provides the first instance in which an interest group, allied with a political fraction, was able to make significant electoral inroads. However, given their alliance with *Herreristas*, *Ruralistas* never constituted a fraction on their own, and it is therefore impossible to assess precisely how big their electoral contribution to the Blanco victory in 1958 was (Rial 1984). The reincorporation of the independents to the party, together with the electoral dynamism provided by the emergence of the *ruralistas* in the countryside and the List 51 in Montevideo, yielded the basis for the very significant electoral turnaround of 1958. For the first time since 1925, the Blanco Party was able to defeat the Colorados. Additionally, for the first time since 1864, the Colorado Party lost the control of the state. However, this was only a matter of degree, given the solidly established and now fully constitutionally backed co-participation procedures that ruled the relationship between both parties (Rial 1984).

In 1954, the Colorado Party won a sizable majority. However, political fragmentation had grown and Batlle pursued tough negotiations in order to insure governability. According to Batlle, his fraction was forced to “beg for the support of [other] Colorados to govern” (in Nahum et.al.. 1991, p. 115). And this bargain came at a high cost as five ministers, five presidencies of public companies, and several other offices were given to the political opponents of Batlle (Altman *unpublished*). After the congressional interpellation of a minister from List 15 carried by a senator from List 14, that agreement was broken and the government was left without the needed majorities to pass any significant legislation in the context of a steady economic decline.

Therefore, the Colorado setback of 1958 was not only the result of political developments. Since 1955, with the end of the Korean War, the economy entered a period of stagflation with a steady decline of industrial output and real wages and the increase of unemployment. This also triggered a period of intensified union-mobilization, particularly in the public sector, which was symptomatic of emerging difficulties in maintaining a redistributive policy after the bonanza

produced by the wars. Indeed, already in 1952, the government relied on the implantation of extraordinary security measures (Medidas Prontas de Seguridad, a “soft” state of siege in the Uruguayan Constitution) to confront public employee strikes in March and September (Rial 1984). However, until the late 1960s when the influence of the Communist Party became more hegemonic, the union movement remained split between the unions led by that party and others under the influence of anarchist, socialists, and traditional-party unionists who mobilized in favor of economic benefits, but who lacked major organic partisan ties.<sup>88</sup>

Table 4 presents an overview of electoral results since 1942. In this table, one can appreciate the significance of the Blanco victory in 1958 and 1962. The table also shows the break-up of the two-party system by a sustained and permanent growth of the left since 1962, especially the Frente Amplio and the Nuevo Espacio, which emerged in 1989 from the most moderate fraction of the Frente Amplio.<sup>89</sup> Before analyzing these latter developments, however, it is important to briefly describe the sociopolitical process witnessed in the country after the first significant alternation of the century.

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<sup>88</sup>In Chapter 11 I come back to the more contemporary developments witnessed in the Uruguayan labor-movement and its relationship with the evolution of Frente Amplio. For a historical reconstruction of the union-movement in Uruguay see Errandonea and Costábile 1969; Lanzaro 1986, and et al 2004).

<sup>89</sup>Table 1 shows the electoral performance of these two parties, as well as the one of other parties since 1942. It is worth beginning in 1942 because of the fact that electoral rules have been stabilized since then, which makes the outcomes strictly comparable.

**Table 4.4:**  
**Electoral Results (%) in Uruguay: 1942-1999**

	Colorado Party	Blanco Party	Catholics	Marxists	Frente Amplio	Nuevo Espacio	Others	Total
1942	57.2	34.5	4.3	4.1			0	100
1946	46.3	40.4	5.2	7.2			0.8	100
1950	52.3	38.3	4.4	4.4			0.6	100
1954	50.5	38.9	5.0	5.5			0	100
1958	37.7	49.7	3.7	6.2			2.7	100
1962	44.5	46.5	3.0	5.8			0.1	100
1966	49.3	40.3	3.0	6.6			0.7	100
1971	41.0	40.2			18.3		0.6	100
1984	30.3	35.0	2.4		21.3		0.0	100
1989	30.3	38.9			21.2	9.0	0.6	100
1994	32.3	31.2			30.6	5.2	0.7	100
1999	32.7	22.2	0.2		40.3	4.6		100
2004	10.4	34.3			50.7		2.5	100

Source: Buquet, (2000) and Corte Electoral (2004)

*The New Colegiado, Alternation, and the Blanco Governments (1958-1966)*

In this period, the combination of popular discontent and government alternation consolidated as a long-term traits that began to punctuate Uruguayan partisan politics. In short, the socio-political outcomes of this period epitomize two leading traits of post-bonanza party politics in Uruguay. First, both major political parties reacted to the crisis by reinforcing their reliance on clientelism and patronage as a way to contain discontent and maintain their electoral share. Second, in spite of that, the electorate started to seek alternatives, shifting their electoral support between and within parties.

The new Blanco government led an economic stabilization attempt to control inflation and resume growth under the auspices of the country's first agreement with the IMF. At the same time, however, the Blanco Government embarked on the creation of the *Comisión de Inversiones y Desarrollo Económico* (CIDE), a project to diagnose and propose structural solutions to the Uruguayan crisis under the strong influence of *desarrollismo* and the "*Corriente Cepalina*." (Garcé 2002).

Although some trade and exchange-rate liberalization measures were implemented with mixed-success, other policy-decisions helped undermine the consistency of the economic plan. By the same token, although some of the measures implemented by the Blanco Party benefited the agro-exporting sector, the political pressure exerted by urban sectors on the government hindered the consistency of such a redistributive attempt (Rama 1989). In particular, as the Blanco Party needed to retain office in 1962, the country witnessed a sharp increase in fiscal spending in the eve of the electoral year. Although this was and continued to be the norm in the system (see Aboal and Moraes 2003), 1962 shows a historical peak in terms of the incorporation of new workers to the public sector. In the same year, there was also a sizable increase of real wages and pensions (Rial 1984). This fact, along with the electoral victory of the Blanco Party in 1962, proves the resilience of the traditional system of generating and reproducing electoral support on the basis of clientelism and patronage. Moreover if we take into account the original programmatic orientation of the *herrerista* coalition.

The increasing reliance on clientelism and patronage and their inefficiency in containing discontent (epitomized by increasing vote shifts between fractions and parties) came together in what Aguiar conceptualized as the emergence of a “re-compensatory” logic of political competition and electoral support. According to Aguiar (1984), the Uruguayan state, originally conceived as a rational-legal apparatus, had progressively evolved to a pattern of “recompense legitimacy” which aggravated the economic crisis in the short and medium run (Aguiar 1984). Additionally, as education and urbanization increased in the period 1958-1973, so did the labor supply, but this increase was not matched by a corresponding increase in economic development; instead, the increasing labor supply became a central social problem, as Uruguayan families struggled to maintain their previous levels of consumption. The growth of open unemployment juxtaposed with high consumption expectations contributed to set a situation of high anomic tension. In this context, political candidates began to be evaluated by their capacity of particularistic demand recompense. This imposed serious limitations on the capacity of the government in order to

manage medium and long-term demands. It also forced both parties to promise more than they could deliver, thereby pushing inflationary pressures upwards (Aguiar 1984). For instance, taking a specific electoral year (1967) as example, Aguilar demonstrates that after the election of 1966 and before leaving office the Blanco Party appointed 2612 new public workers (that number represented 1.2% of the total public employment in the country at that time). In turn, immediately after coming into office, the Colorado Party appointed 7233 new public workers (a 3.39% of total public sector employment), yielding a total increase of 4.6% in one electoral year (Aguiar 1984, p. 14-16). Available data also suggests that the same pattern applies to the brokerage of pension benefits (especially to those that were non-contributive).<sup>90</sup>

However, the growth of expectations and the systematic inability of the political elite in meeting such demands ended by enhancing social discontent and political polarization. Electorally this translated into a continuous “chastening vote” (“*voto castigo*”) to the incumbent in the period 1942-1999 (Altman, Cardarello, and Garcé 1999). In this period, the only instance in which the incumbent party increased its votes was in the 1950 election, when the “optimist” vision of the country was still prevalent. On average, from 1942 to 1999, the incumbent party has lost roughly 6 percent of its national electoral support in the presidential election following its victory, and the specific faction of the President has also suffered in terms of the internal distribution of votes in the subsequent election losing an average of 3.6 percent.<sup>91</sup>

These processes had their counterpart in civil society with the creation in the mid-1960s of the first national union federation, the Central Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT), under the leadership of the Communist Party. Beginning in 1963, the urban-guerrilla Movimiento de

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<sup>90</sup>For empirical evidence on the role of clientelism and patronage in disbursing both public employment and pension benefits see e.g. Rama (1971); Fa Robaina (1972); Solari (1983); Aguilar (1984); and Filgueira (1995).

<sup>91</sup>In 1999, the incumbent party regained office, which could be interpreted as a reversion of this pattern. However, two caveats immediately arise. First, electoral rules were changed and their influence in shaping that result is undeniable. Second, the candidate that won the Colorado party primaries and then became elected president was the leader of a different faction from that of the incumbent. Indeed, both factions have been involved in struggles with each other, struggles that were not only “symbolic” and functional to a process of differentiation, but also on specific policy preferences.

Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros began to organize and strike following a *foquista* orientation under the influence of the revolutionary writings of Régis Debray. Politically, the left started to unify in preparation for the elections of 1966. While the Socialist Party sought to construct the Unión Popular (a popular front allying with progressive splinters of both traditional parties and other non-communist leftist organizations), the Communist party also implemented a “front” strategy and ran under the eloquent party-label of FIdel (Frente Izquierda de Liberación). In spite of intense negotiations between both fronts, unification for the election of 1966 was not achieved and the FIdel outperformed the Unión Popular by a wide margin. As described below, under the motto of “unity without exclusions,” both organizations (along with others) will converge in 1971 in the creation of the Frente Amplio. In a way, these and subsequent developments broke one of the fundamental basis of the “political compromise” forged by *batllismo* and reinforced by *neo-batllismo* in which workers did not participate on a class basis, but as citizens of the *batllista* state and clients of both traditional parties (Panizza 1990, p. 98).

After its close electoral victory in 1962, the Blanco Party and its new majoritarian fraction, the Unión Blanca Democrática, predominantly constructed on the heritage of Independent Nationalists, continued leading the Colegiado Integral. Although in its original discourse this fraction stressed the need to “moralize” and rationalize politics against state expansion, a new leadership generation influenced by *desarrollismo*, favored a growing ideological opening, leading the UBD to push forth and draw on the CIDE for its own process of ideological renewal (Caetano and Rilla 2003).

However, while in office the UBD confronted the consequences of the high fiscal deficit triggered by pre-electoral spending and economic stagnation and a changing international environment, which acted as powerful constraints on public policy. Those consequences reached their climax in 1965 with the rupture of the financial system, an unstoppable inflationary spiral, and a two-month suspension of the foreign exchange market as the government (facing a stalemate) decided whether or not to devalue the peso (Rial 1984).

In this context, both traditional parties resorted to another classical feature of Uruguayan politics that had proved instrumental in the past in locking-in and protecting what Aguiar aptly called “refractory bi-partidism” (Aguiar 1984). Namely, they proposed a new constitutional reform, reestablishing a single-headed executive power with reinforced institutional capacity to try to overcome decisional gridlocks. Although four reforms were proposed, all of them coincided in the need to elect a president with governing capacity. However, as the coup of 1973 would soon demonstrate, this time “the proven formula” would prove extremely inadequate or at least, insufficient in coping with the increasing levels of socioeconomic and political polarization of the years to come. The reform also extended the presidential term from four to five years and created new institutions (like the Office for Planning and Budget and the Central Bank) in an attempt to rationalize the state. However, this new institutional framework was not accompanied by any consistent plan at reforming the essentials of the Uruguayan socioeconomic arrangement and its crisis. Notwithstanding, the promise to substitute the system of “generalized government irresponsibility” produced by the multi-member executive and co-participation among an increasing number of partisan fractions for one in which presidential accountability could be clearly established, was sufficient to provide enough popular support for the constitutional plebiscite (Solari 1983).

#### *Political Polarization and the advent of authoritarianism (1967-1973)*

During this period, political polarization increased and the system witnessed the emergence of the first non-traditional party that was able to make significant inroads in the election of 1971. Additionally, important realignments occurred once again within both traditional parties, which will punctuated the transition and post-transition to democracy. For the sake of comparison, it is also possible to observe important differences in terms of the political process driving the emergence of the *bureaucratic-authoritarian* regime and the coup coalition that supported it. This

has important implications for understanding the differences between this regime and its outcomes and the one led by Pinochet in Chile.

The emergent pattern of alternation in office brought the Colorado Party back into office in 1967, under the new Constitution. At this point, however, it was the time of the List 14. Gral. Oscar Gestido, the elected president, died soon after taking office and without having time to implement his proposed “conciliatory policies.” His successor was Jorge Pacheco Areco, who privileged repression over conciliation. Already in 1968 and confronting increasing levels of sociopolitical conflict and a highly active guerrilla movement, the government resorted to the *Medidas Prontas de Seguridad*, which were not abandoned (except for short-lived exceptional periods) until 1984. Later on, in 1972 and already under the presidency of José María Bordaberry, subsequent constitutionally approved measures declared the “State of Internal War” and reinforced the repressive capacity of the regime suspending civil and political rights.

Following Nardone’s path, Pacheco’s government (1967-1972) can be interpreted as a second (and eminently successful) attempt at conservative populist mediation in Uruguay the country, this time seeking to consolidate presidential power and to bypass traditional partisan mediation structures (Panizza 1990). Not in vain, Pacheco once declared that he was “alone with his people” (“Estoy solo con mi pueblo”) and directly appointed representatives from conservative interest groups into his cabinet (Caetano and Rilla 2003). The fight against insurgency and the pursuit of rational economic policies and administration (in opposition to partisan mismanagement and clientelism) provided Pacheco a legitimating discourse in his attempt at populist mobilization. In this sense, Pacheco built his popularity around his personal opposition to the Tupamaros and distancing himself from other Colorado currents, and in general, to other (“corrupt and inefficient”) Uruguayan politicians who were framed as responsible for the crisis (see Panizza 1990, chapter 6).

Policy-wise, in the first years of his administration, Pacheco implemented currency devaluations and several wage freezes, favoring agricultural producers and clearly affecting workers’ living standards. In 1969 and 1970, these policies yielded a timid economic recovery that

upset ten years of continuous economic decline. However, confronting a new election and pursuing the chance of re-election, Pacheco's switched gears in 1971, implementing a sizable real wage increase financed through the expansion of the monetary base. Once again, although this granted a new electoral victory for the party and Pacheco's fraction, it also triggered post-electoral inflation (reaching 70% in 1972) and a sharp decline of the GDP (Panizza 1990).

During this period, catalyzed by the opposition to Pacheco but accumulating strength over previous coalitional attempts, the Frente Amplio was created, emerging from the 1971 elections as a prominent third party in the system. In a way, the creation of the Frente Amplio (which includes Communists, Socialists, Christian-democrats, sectors splitting from the two traditional parties, and leftist independents) in 1971, transformed a two-party system into a multiparty one. Along these lines, and following Sartori's classic categorization, several authors since then have portrayed the Uruguayan party-system as one of "moderate pluralism" (González 1991; Mieres 1994; Buquet 2000). As discussed below, that configuration was maintained after the military dictatorship which ruled the country between 1973 and 1984. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, the democratic reinstallation of 1984 also reinstalled the same "party-system" that showed-up in the elections of 1971 before the authoritarian "parenthesis" (González 1991).

The creation of FA, its explicit association with the union and student movement, and the implicit support that the party (though with the opposition of many of its component fractions) received from the Tupamaros, contributed to the polarization of the 1971 election between both traditional parties (especially the leading conservative fraction of the Colorado party implicitly supported by the Armed Forces and business and rural interests groups) and the left (Rial 1984; Rama 1987). According to Rial's classification, depicted in Table 5, the comparison of the electoral support for fractions with different ideological predispositions in the elections of 1966 and 1971 clearly illustrates the ideological polarization of the system between "conservative forces" and "reformists" and "anti-systemic" actors (Rial 1984). This ideological polarization was obscured,

however, by the combination of fractions with very different ideological leanings within one of the three mainstream parties that contested the 1971 election.

**Table 4.2:**  
**Ideological Orientations and Electoral Support of Partisan Fractions in 1966 and 1971**

Election	Conservatives	Centrists	Reformists	Anti-system
1966	27.2	53.0	13.2	6.6
1971	37.8	14.6	29.6	18.0

Source: Rial (1984)

Additionally, as reported by Rama, the opposition between democracy and authoritarianism that such confrontation implied acquired different meanings in different contexts. While in the countryside the Frente Amplio was seen as representing an authoritarian option given the participation of the Communist Party and the implicit support it received from the MLN-T, the reelection candidacy of Pacheco Areco to the presidency was seen (even by *batllistas* within the Colorado Party) as a turn towards open authoritarianism (Rama 1987, p. 153). At this point, it is worth noting that although the Constitution did not allow the reelection of the incumbent president, Pacheco promoted a plebiscite to make it possible. That plebiscite was held concurrently with the presidential election. Therefore, Juan María Bordaberry ran as a surrogate candidate in case Pacheco did not obtain the votes for the constitutional reform. Although the results were contested by the Blanco Party which alleged that the government had incurred in massive electoral fraud, the Colorado Party won the election but Pacheco's proposed reelection reform did not pass. Therefore, in 1972, Bordaberry became president. Since that year, the fight against the insurgency was directly conducted by the Armed Forces which gained increasing influence in government, until June 27 of 1973, when Bordaberry dissolved Congress and established a coup. Bordaberry, who had been a *ruralista* and was elected senator by the Blanco Party, now ran for presidential office in the Colorado Party. This extremely rare political career for a Uruguayan politician is quite telling of the new president's dismissal of political parties and as it would shortly become evident, for liberal politics (Caetano and Rilla 2003). Quite clearly, the coup of 1973 was carried explicitly against the

political parties, seen by Bordaberry and the Armed Forces, as the ones directly responsible for the political crisis of the country.

Before analyzing the authoritarian period, it is necessary to account for the processes of internal renovation pursued both by the Blanco Party, which translated into the weakening of its most conservative sectors, and the emergence of a powerful leadership. Combined with the strengthening of the conservative Colorado fractions (also aided by the entrance of its most progressive *batllista* fraction, the List 99, into Frente Amplio), this change provided the basis for a significant realignment between both traditional parties that would have important implications for the analysis of the transition to democracy and its aftermath.

The failure of the UBD in office and the death of the major historical leaders of the party in the early 1960s, would set the basis for the “renewing synthesis” successfully pursued by Wilson Ferreira Aldunate since 1964 (Caetano and Rilla 2003). Combining a centrist and manifestly reformist agenda (based on a synthesis of the long-term proposals of CIDE and short-term specific responses to the socio-political conjuncture) with strong political appeals to the Blanco tradition, Ferreira was able to combine renovation and tradition in a new political fraction known as “Movimiento Por la Patria” in which important political leaders of both the UBD and *herrerismo* converged even with some groups coming from the moderate left (Caetano and Rilla 2003). In 1971, allied with two other fractions (the Movimiento Nacional de Rocha and Divisa Blanca), Ferreira “successfully” contested the elections of 1971 by doubling the votes of Gral. Aguerrondo, his conservative internal opponent. Besides, Ferreira became the most popular candidate in the election, consolidating his leadership within a more unified Blanco party. However, due to the DVS and by only one percent of the electorate, Ferreira lost the election to Bordaberry, whose party (adding up all fractions) was marginally more popular than the Blanco.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>According to Ferreira and his followers, nonetheless, such difference was produced by electoral fraud in favor of the PC.

Finally, within the Colorado Party, parallel developments occurred in the List 15. After the death of Luis Batlle, his son Jorge developed a new leadership that was conducive to a significant ideological renovation of *batllismo*, which became plainly influential in the post-transitional period. In what some come to see as a “parricide impulse”, Jorge Batlle presided a doctrinaire renovation of that fraction that consolidated in a proposal to dismantle *batllismo* (“desbatllistizar”) creating an open economy which was rhetorically coupled with the *batllista* inspiration of creating an “open society”, in an attempt to hinder the appropriation of the *batllista* tradition by other sectors of the Colorado Party (first by Pachequismo and List 14 in their populist/clientelistic appeal to lower classes, then by Foro Batllista which converged around the leadership of Julio María Sanguinetti splitting from List 15 in 1989) and the Frente Amplio. As argued below, Batlle’s renovation attempt and his confrontation with Sanguinetti punctuated the internal politics of the party in the post-transition to democracy.

#### *The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime and the Transition to Democracy (1973-1984)*

As in the Chilean case, the political economy of market reforms is fundamental to understanding the potential for successful grievance mobilization in the contemporary party-system. However, differing from that case, in Uruguay market reforms were delayed and transferred to the new democratic regime inaugurated in 1984. For this reason, reformist attempts and their socio-political counterparts are discussed in a separate section below following a brief sketch of the main political events occurring during the BA and the transition to democracy..

Diverging from the Chilean case, the Uruguayan bureaucratic-authoritarian regime was less influential in shaping post-transitional politics and in refurbishing the nature of partisan competition and the party-system (Rial 1984; Caetano and Rilla 2003; González 1991 and 1995). This fact is epitomized by the resumption of democratic elections in 1984 (although with punctual candidate proscriptions and other restrictions) under the Constitution of 1967. It is also plainly manifested in the “restoration” of the two-and-a-half-party-system of 1971 in 1984, after the

“authoritarian parenthesis” (see Table 1).<sup>93</sup> And although it enjoyed sizable autonomy from civil society resulting from political repression, the strength of technocratic roles tied to transnational financial capital and promotion of neoliberal reforms were less prominent than in the cases of Argentina and Chile. Although Alejandro Vegh Villegas, a neoliberal civil economist, was appointed as finance minister in order to satisfy the international community, he did not enjoy the leverage of his Chilean colleagues (Gillespie 1986). Therefore, although the military regime pursued significant trade and financial liberalizations, it did not attempt to reform the state and the social-policy system inherited from its predecessors. As strongly suggested by Castiglioni’s careful reconstruction of social policy-making during the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, substantial reforms were hindered by the dispersion of state power (which contrasts sharply with that achieved by Pinochet) and by the ideological influence of *batllismo* within the military apparatus (Castiglioni 2005). Such influence crystallized into a variant of the National Security Doctrine that conceived social development (instead of pure repression and economic restructuring) as the remedy for subversion, which had been also facilitated by “bad” and “corrupt” political leadership (Castiglioni 2005). The rule by the military as an institution, which included a highly decentralized and dispersed allocation of authority, a periodical rotation of Generals appointed to the presidency, and the automatic retirement of officers who reached retirement-age, also sapped power from the BA regime in the long run (Caetano and Rilla 2003, Castiglioni 2005).

During its first years in office (1973-1975) the military’s general goal was to de-mobilize civil society and political parties, especially focusing on the repression and extermination of the left. In short, this was seen as a “commissarial dictatorship” and both the government and opposition perceived it as an emergency situation not aimed at refunding the political system of the country (Caetano and Rilla 2003, González 1991).

As with other significant programmatic divides in Uruguay, the regime divide ran within both traditional parties. Frente Amplio, in turn, uniformly opposed the regime. The Colorado Party,

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<sup>93</sup>The expressions are from Caetano and Rilla (2003) and González (1991).

and in particular it's most popular fraction in 1971 (List 14 headed by Pacheco and Bordaberry) supported the coup and provided technical staff to the military regime. Meanwhile, List 15 and *batllismo* opposed the regime. In the Blanco Party the situation was different. While the Blanco minority supported the regime (led by Gral. Aguerrondo), the *ferreiristas* openly opposed it, engaging in a strong international campaign to denounce human rights violations. Given the repression of the left, the Blanco Party and his exiled leader, Wilson Ferreira, became then the most vocal representatives of the opposition to the regime (González 1995).

Once the situation was “under control,” a second stage of the regime began in an attempt to create a new political society for the country (1975-1980). The decision to consolidate the regime led to increased repression from 1975 and 1978, ending-up with Uruguay as the country with the highest rate of political prisoners per capita in the world (SERPAJ 1989). This foundational project sought to do away with traditional parties and speculated on the creation of a party representing the regime, known as Partido del Proceso. In so doing, according to Caetano and Rilla (2003), the military ignored the centrality of parties in Uruguayan society. However, the Junta did not overlook the fact that any significant attempt at political reform would need to be ratified through a popular plebiscite. Therefore, in 1980 and in an unprecedented procedure at the time, the military submitted their foundational project to the popular will. The plebiscite occurred in a context of “structural fraud,” given the lack of room for developing an opposition campaign. However, respecting the civic tradition of the country, the votes were counted fairly and the results carried a spectacular defeat of the military project (Gillespie 1986; González 1991). While in 1971 the pro-regime fractions of both traditional parties gathered 37% of the vote, in the context of repression and structural fraud, the military was only able to obtain 6% more in this plebiscite.

As with other cases, the defeat of the military opened the way for a democratic transition (Huntington 1991). The political parties contributed to that result by mounting an underground campaign seeking to counteract the fear of repression. Departing from the Chilean case, all significant fractions took a stand on the plebiscite, forming an almost monolithic opposition to the

regime. The results demonstrated once again the strength of the party system in society and proved impossible to legitimize a system that did away with political parties.

Acknowledging its failure, the military junta initiated a transitional process (1980-1984) which ended with the elections of 1984. After its electoral defeat the military took one year to sketch a transitional plan, deciding to hold concurrent primary elections for parties in 1982 (excluding the Frente Amplio) and a national election in 1984.

In the primary elections of 1982, in a context of a harsh economic and balance of payment crisis, and with an electoral turnout of 60% of the electorate, the fractions representing the opposition to the military regime gathered 70% of the vote within the Colorado Party and 76% of the Blanco Party (González 1995). Therefore, the 43% of support for the military obtained in the 1980 Plebiscite quickly came down to 20%. Meanwhile, Frente Amplio's leadership asked for a blank-vote to its supporters in order to "mark" its votes, but partially due to communication failures and tactical errors, this strategy proved inefficient.

After the 1982 elections, formal negotiations between the elected party-authorities and the Junta began in what came to be known as the *Pacto del Club Naval*. In this sense, Uruguay represents a clear instance of a pactured democratic transition. In the negotiations, a "weakened" military junta (confronting political defeat and economic chaos) conceded all but two conditions. First, they illegalized Wilson Ferreira's participation in the election. Second, they temporarily limited the capacity of the new civilian government to modify the top leadership of the Armed Forces as its discretion (Gillespie 1986).

The banning of its main leader triggered Blancos' withdrawal from the negotiations. Acknowledging the legitimacy problems that this withdrawal would entail for the transitional pact, the military was forced to accept the Frente Amplio as a legitimate political party in the negotiations (Gillespie 1986). The condition imposed in exchange for the legalization of the party was the proscription of its most radical fractions (which ran under modified *lemas*) and the banning of Gral. Líber Seregni, FA's historical leader, from participation in the 1984 election. However,

while Ferreira remained imprisoned until after the election, Seregni was allowed to campaign actively.

Once the results were known, the victory of the Colorado Party was accepted by both Seregni and Ferreira. President Sanguinetti's decision of amnestying all political prisoners without exclusions, symbolized the relatively rapid resumption of civil control over the country (González 1995). In spite of its length, the following citation provides a nice overview of the electoral strategy pursued by each party and the "restorative" character of the 1984 election:

The 1984 national elections showed that at the party level at least, the military regime had essentially frozen the political state of affairs resulting from the 1971 elections; Pedersen's index of net electoral volatility from 1971 to 1984 was 5.2, well below the Uruguayan average from 1942 to 1984 to 7.1. That freezing effect was clearly visible in the composition of the new legislature as well. The triumph of the Colorados restored the status quo ante. This time the Frente won 21 percent of the national vote and consolidated its position as runner-up in Montevideo. It still was the "half", though slightly larger, of the new two-and-a-half-party system. Looking *inside* the parties provides finer detail. First, the defeat of the military and its political friends was even greater than in 1980 and 1982. Within the Blancos they practically disappeared: they were not able to elect a single representative. Within the Colorados they obtained less than a quarter of the votes of the party. On the whole, the pro-military 43 percent of the vote in 1980, which had decreased to 23 percent by 1982, had by 1984 fallen to 11 percent. The Colorados won an essentially anti-military election because they won all the pro-military votes; otherwise, they would have lost to the Blancos [...] The election proved that the population wanted to get rid of the military, but not at any price: the people wanted peace as well. The victorious Colorado leadership, correctly gasping this mood, made their constant campaign theme and slogan "peaceful change," *el cambio en paz*." It was the centrepiece of their success. The Blancos did not ask for war, but their radical opposition to the military before the election, their emphasis on justice, and the complex situation resulting from their main leader's imprisonment made many doubt whether an eventual Blanco victory could bring peace.(González 1995 p. 155 -7).


#### The Post-Transitional System (1984-2004)

During this period the most relevant transformations for analyzing the patterns of contemporary partisan competition occurred, triggering a transition from non-programmatic linkages between voters and parties to a system that became increasingly tensioned by the programmatic competition of two ideological families (the traditional parties vs. the left). Popular discontent with government also continued to be a long-term trait of the system. As the main transformations seen during this period are intrinsically related to the political economy of attempted market-reforms, I will devote a specific section below to discuss those reforms. Here, I offer an overview of the main political events of the period.

Until March 2005 when the Frente Amplio was appointed into the presidential office, the party-system of Uruguay witnessed a process of alternation between three Colorado and a Blanco president. Nonetheless, this Colorado and Blanco dominance until 2004, must not obscure the fact that the most prominent change occurring in the party-system since 1984 (indeed, since 1971), was the continuous growth of the left's electoral support and, consequently, the continuous loss of votes by the traditional parties. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon. In Chapter 11, a full exploration of the electoral growth of FA and its causes is presented.

**Figure 4.1:**

**Electoral support for “traditional” parties and “challenger” parties (1942-2004)**



Source: Adapted from Buquet (2000).

The first elected president after democratic restoration was Julio María Sanguinetti, the winner of the 1984 elections for the Colorado Party. His government had to confront two basic tasks. First, he had to assure a peaceful transition to democracy and to consolidate the democratic regime. Second, he needed to tackle the long-term socioeconomic problems that were troubling Uruguayan society. In the first respect, many analysts concluded that his tenure was successful, particularly after the solution of the issue of Human Rights violations during the dictatorship,

through the approval of an amnesty law for the military officers involved in those violations (González 1995). That law was drafted by a group close to Wilson Ferreira, the Blanco leader, who was determined to support the government and provide governability. In 1987, when the efforts of Human Rights groups seemed worthless, the left mobilized intensively against the law approved in 1986 by both traditional parties and participated in a campaign to collect enough citizen signatures to force a binding plebiscite to decide whether the law should be kept or removed. Although the plebiscite results finally favored the law (backing up the decision of Blancos and Colorados), this plebiscite produced two important externalities for the left. First, it contributed to the completion of its process of “traditionalization,” through which the party progressively acquired what the other two had inherited as a legacy from the armed confrontations of the 19<sup>TH</sup> century (Caetano and Rilla 1995; Gallardo 1995; Queirolo 1999). Second, it proved that the direct democracy instruments included in the Constitution could be used effectively for opposing legislation and mobilizing popular support.

In terms of policy-making, Sanguinetti promoted a government of “national intonation” seeking to construct a broad alliance and including not only the Blancos, but also the Frente Amplio in over-sight roles. However, the intonation was brief and inflationary pressures resumed, with inflation reaching an annual average of 100%. According to data presented in González (1995), by the end of 1988 13% of Montevideo’s adult population thought the country was improving, 55% perceived it as stagnated, and 31% as declining. In turn, by 1989, presidential approval was below 20%.

In this context, alternation between the Colorado and Blanco parties seemed the most likely outcome of that year’s election. However, in 1988, Wilson Ferreira died, leaving a new succession problem open. This time, Luis Alberto Lacalle, Herrera’s grandson, quickly consolidated his candidacy over those of Carlos Julio Pereira (from the MNR) and Alberto Zumarán, former presidential candidate in 1984 for the *wilsonismo*. This young leadership was built around a renovated *herrerismo* that had pivoted around *wilsonismo* since 1985 with a dialectical mechanism

of proximity and distance (Caetano and Rilla 2003). Lacalle also built his career on the basis of a continuous face to face work in the interior, setting up a powerful political apparatus with local referents in every town and village that then got the chance to consolidate from the head of the state.

Two other significant political events occurred in 1989 within both Frente Amplio and the List 15 caused by leadership contests over the presidential candidacy. Within Frente Amplio, the most popular sector in the election of 1984, the moderate list 99 (originally formed by progressive splinters from List 15 in 1971), abandoned FA to create a new center-left party: the Nuevo Espacio. According to González (1995) this confirmed the existence of two lefts, the most radical one where the Marxist-Leninist parties dominated, and a more moderate one represented by the List 99. Within the original List 15, competing since 1984 under the label *Batllismo Unido*, Jorge Batlle challenged Sanguinetti's nomination of Enrique Tarigo, his vice-president, for the 1989 election. This conflict led to a very heated primary won by Batlle, who then lost the national election to the Blanco candidate, Lacalle. After this internal confrontation, the *Batllismo Unido* split between the Sanguinetti-led *Foro Batllista* and the List 15 headed by Batlle. Programmatically, the *Foro Batllista* had a social-democratic leaning and the List 15 deepened its liberal stand. Organizationally, the former was able to develop another powerful political apparatus on the basis of the distribution of central and local state-resources, while the List 15 was organized through informal networks coalescing around the figure of Jorge Batlle. Together with that of *herrerismo*, the political apparatus of the *foristas* represented the best organized and most efficient political organizations for the reproduction of political support on the basis of pork, patronage, and clientelism. This gave both organizations a great deal of political leverage in the post-transitional period, particularly until 1999.

Finally, in the elections of 1989 and in spite of the split, Frente Amplio was able to retain its 1984 support. Together with Nuevo Espacio, non-traditional parties gathered this time 30% of the share. More importantly, Frente Amplio succeeded in winning the municipal government of

Montevideo, the capital city, with 48% of electoral support consolidating as the traditional urban geographic base of the party. In this election and during his term as Governor, the figure of Tabaré Vázquez consolidated within Frente Amplio, progressively challenging Liber Seregni, the historical leader of the leftist coalition and other emergent leaderships, like those of Danilo Astori and Mariano Arana.

Lacalle's government started with a call for a "National Coincidence," which once again proved short-lived. The inter-party agreement was vague and did not include, as in 1984, the participation of the opposition in Ministerial positions. Growing inflation and declining real wages led to a sharp-decline of the President's popularity ratings in six months, achieving the same levels than those shown by Sanguinetti at the end of his term. During his first years in office, Lacalle promoted liberalizing and privatizing measures, crystallized in the Ley de Empresas Públicas approved in Congress. However, this law was challenged by a referendum promoted by state-unions and Frente Amplio and then supported by *Foro Batllista*. In December of 1992, the citizenry rejected the law leaving the government without one of its main policy platforms. Additionally, during this period, five proposals to reform the pension system were introduced, with all of them, failing to crystallize in a consensual agreement.

Meanwhile, resulting from his governing style in Montevideo, Tabaré Vázquez consolidated as a highly popular leader, becoming a central player for the election of 1994. In those elections, Sanguinetti from the Colorado party succeeded in winning his second presidential election, while Frente Amplio was re-elected to the Municipal Government of Montevideo. However, at the presidential level, this time the electorate was divided in almost equal thirds, with the Colorado Party obtaining 32.3%, the Blanco Party 31.2%, and Frente Amplio 30.6%. This electoral outcome catalyzed the creation of a stronger traditional-party coalition after the election.

Frente Amplio's "almost victory" provoked a fundamental watershed on the country's recent history, increasing the perceived costs of losing office for both traditional parties. While before 1994, losing office meant that the other traditional party would win but without a majority,

now the implications were far more drastic as both traditional parties would be left out of office. Historically, both traditional parties shared access to the state and were therefore able to distribute patronage and pork on that basis. If neither the Blanco nor the Colorado party were in office, the very sources of both traditional parties' electoral loyalties would be seriously hindered. As seen before, from an historical standpoint, co-participation was, indeed, more widespread than party-government in the country. However, there is a qualitative shift from co-participation towards coalitional rule. Filgueira and Filgueira (1997) have convincingly argued that the incentive structure for the usual "free rider strategy" of these parties have substantially changed in 1995. Such strategy was conducive to frequent decisional stalemates and allowed the traditional party in the opposition to benefit from the votes lost by the incumbent. Moreover, co-participation practices were mostly based on pork distribution, not frequently tied as this time, to an explicit reformist agenda. Interestingly, the coalition between the two traditional parties arose when the growth of the left substantially brought into question their capacity to maintain the presidential office. In this scenario and together with other significant reforms (social security and education) both traditional parties promoted changing the electoral rules from a simple plurality election to a runoff electoral system, closing the door on an immediate electoral victory of the left. Thus, in spite of their shrinking electoral support, a second-round electoral alliance between both parties would imply the need for the left to get more than 50% of the vote on its own, in order to gain the presidential office.

It is worth noting that the results of that plebiscite were extremely close, as the position favoring the reform gathered 50.45% of electoral support, against a 49.55% gathered by the opposition. As usual, the runoff provision was to be used if none of the parties succeed in gathering more than 50% of the votes. The rationale behind the establishment of this new instance seems clear, as its most important justification was to prevent the victory of the left. Although it implies a counterfactual, it seems extremely plausible to think that without having changed the rules, the Frente Amplio would have won the 1999 election, as it obtained almost 40% of the votes in the

first round (Buquet 2000). The constitutional reform also included the celebration of party-primaries, a provision requiring unique candidacies in each party, and the removal of the DSV in the Senate. The inclusion of this set of additional provisions in the reform, seen as positive steps removing some of the sources of traditional parties' flexibility and adaptation capacity, moved Danilo Astori and Liber Seregni from the Frente Amplio to favor the reform openly contesting Tabaré Vázquez's stance. This fact fueled important degrees of internal dissent in the party that ended up with Seregni's resignation to the presidency of Frente Amplio and the strengthening of Tabaré Vázquez's leadership.

After the approval of this and social-policy reforms, the Blanco-Colorado coalition was supported until the end of Sanguinetti's term by Alberto Volonté, the most popular Blanco candidate in the election of 1994. Within his party, Volonté competed against Lacalle's candidate Juan Andrés Ramírez on the basis of the popularity of his leader who was perceived as the successful manager of the public electricity company and a rhetorical strategy to combine modern *herrerismo* (identified with Lacalle's renovating leadership of this fraction) and an emotional connection with *ferreirismo* and the MNR (the other significant fraction within the party at that time).

In my view, this coalition produced another crucial externality: the consolidation of a bipolar logic of (programmatic) competition structured around a traditional-party family and a leftist family, composed of the Frente Amplio and Nuevo Espacio.<sup>94</sup> Both "ideological families" have consistently clustered together in subsequent critical events during the years, especially under the electoral processes of 1999-2000 and 2000-2004. Meanwhile, the only antecedent of cross-family alliances took place during the campaign leading to the Public Enterprises referendum (1992) in which the leading faction of the Colorado party opposed the Blanco party establishing an implicit alliance with the Frente Amplio. However, at this time, traditional parties were still free-riding and

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<sup>94</sup>Julio Sanguinetti, the country's President at that time, crafted the term "ideological family." See Moreira (2000) for a complete review of the debate and another supporting rationale for conceptualizing party-competition in this way.

the alliance was neither formally established, nor informally recognized. Figure 1 represents the electoral evolution of both partisan families in the 1942-2004 period, considering the Blanco and Colorado parties as the “traditional family” and the left and other minor parties as “challengers.”

By no means would this imply that each party profile, identity, and tradition will vanish in the wake of this new bipolar configuration. While perhaps a first reading of this outcome would suggest that the new institutional device would strengthen post-electoral coalition formation and discipline, an overlooked fact suggests exactly the opposite. In order to gain office a traditional party only had to have a bigger share than the other in the first round. As it was unthinkable that the other traditional party would then shift its vote to the left and given vote share distribution among the three parties, office was secured. Thus, while in one sense coalitions should have become more stable, other forces and logics pushed exactly in the opposite direction. The end result was a coalition in which neither partner wanted to stand out with unpopular measures. Meanwhile, the left partially withdrew from the policy arena (canalizing opposition sponsoring direct democracy rebuttals of reformist legislation) and left the murky coalition to pursue its shy reformist attempts. Furthermore, although both traditional parties have recently observed a process of bifractionalization which might reduce the costs of forming a congressional coalition (Buquet 1998), the same nature of party fractions (pragmatic and univocally electorally driven) together with the increase in the levels of partisan competition in the context of sustained public alienation from government is consistent with deficit inflation and significantly reduce the room for consolidating stable coalitions especially after the third year of the presidential term (Chasquetti and Moraes 2000). In short, a presidential term observes two typical cycles, one of cooperation (in which an “automatic” majority exists in Congress due to the coalitional agreements struck by fraction-leaders –usually outside Congress) and one of conflict (due to coalitional breakdown). The political economy of traditional parties’ reformist attempts is fully described in the next section.

In 1999 and for the first time since the transition, the same party was able to maintain the presidency. Although Frente Amplio won the first electoral round, the coalition of Blancos and

Colorados was able to defeat the left in the presidential runoff. This time, after successfully contesting the primary against *foristas*, it was Batlle's and List 15 turn. Although Lacalle successfully won the Blanco primary on the basis of his political apparatus (defeating an adversarial Juan Andrés Ramírez who competed on the basis of corruption charges against Lacalle and Volonté), his candidacy was fatally wounded as a result of that process of internal competition. This led to an historical defeat of the Blanco Party, which only obtained 22% of the vote. Within Frente Amplio, the primary between Vázquez and Astori confirmed once again the absolute primacy of the former in the fight for leading the leftist coalition. The Nuevo Espacio contested the election on its own, obtaining half of its original support, and quickly allied with Frente Amplio after the first round.

Once it arrived into presidential office in 2000, Batlle (as well as the Blanco Luis Alberto Lacalle in 1989) confronted the challenge of sticking to his reformist agenda while seeking to generate a congressional majority and reproduce electoral support on the basis of traditional means (resorting once again to clientelism and patronage). In 2002 and 2003, the country lived its harshest economic crisis ever, which, politically, paved the way for a comfortable victory of the Nueva Mayoría (composed by the Frente Amplio/Encuentro Progresista and the Nuevo Espacio). In November 2004, Frente Amplio arrived into presidential office in the first round, gathering 50.7% of the share. Meanwhile, Jorge Larrañaga who had triumphed over Lacalle in the Blanco primary obtained 34.3%. This time, the Colorado party hit an all-time low, obtaining only 10.5% of the national vote.

### *The political economy of market-reforms*

As in the Chilean case, the political economy of market-reforms is crucial to understanding current partisan alignments. Diverging from that case, significant market-reforms in Uruguay were attempted under democratic governments and faced consistent opposition from a veto-coalition politically represented by the left, which reaped important electoral benefits by mobilizing popular

discontent. The hypothesized new logic of programmatic partisan competition emerging in the system is based in this pattern of electoral mobilization.

In Uruguay, the substitutive model was comparatively extensive and was developed prior to most other Latin American ISI regimes. Political incorporation was pursued through two clientelistic parties (Colorado and Blanco) that shared access to state resources in order to lubricate extensive patronage networks primarily based on the distribution of state jobs and pension benefits. Resulting from its aforementioned historical trajectory, Uruguay is a case in which significant groups of the population were still entitled to substantive “ISI benefits” after re-democratization. This fact progressively contributed to the mobilization of redistributive grievances which were politically mobilized, yielding greater levels of programmatic linking in recent times.

#### Patterns of party-competition

Several specific long-term features of the Uruguayan party system, combined with more recent developments, conditioned policy-making coalitions and the patterns of partisan competition in the post-transitional period.

First, in Uruguay, *elective office* was not traditionally valued as a *policy-seeking* instrument, but rather as a source of patronage or pork, as a mean to enhance the public visibility of its occupant, or as sheer employment. In the post-transitional period, the space for *policy seeking* became narrower as an electoral overload took over the system, increasing the perceived costs of loosing office and the manifest reality of having lost votes.

Second, Aldrich (1995) defines political parties as endogenous institutions crafted to solve three interrelated collective-action dilemmas faced by political entrepreneurs (pooling and providing resources for those who want to run for office, distributing scarce elective and non-elective offices among ambitious politicians, and generating a common platform by coordinating policy proposals to simplify decision-making by government and by the electorate). Drawing on

that definition, it is possible to argue that Uruguayan parties are especially able to solve the first and second dilemmas but not the third. As a result we observe catchall parties composed of a significant number of party fractions frequently created around prominent personalities (“caudillos”) with a proven capacity to mobilize support from society, but in general lacking divergent (intra and inter party) policy and issue positions. To overcome high party fractionalization, the processes of coalition building are governed not by policy agreements but by the allocation of patronage resources (office, state resources, and access to State administrators) to coalitional partners.

Third, the availability of direct democracy institutions to foster and oppose legislation by binding popular initiatives emerged as a key institutional feature that enable the leftist “veto coalition” to affect policy-making, either by promoting former post derogation or by forcing former ante moderation of policy proposals. The electoral power of this “veto coalition” and the pervasiveness of the statist matrix also entrenched in the two-traditional parties (mainly in the *Foro Batllista*) prevented the emergence of strong advocates for structural reforms. And those who emerged were subsequently penalized at the ballot box. In other words, diverging from their Latin American neighbors, Uruguayan citizens and elites, while critical of the state in general, remain loyal to a statist ideology and opposed to market oriented solutions that dismantle universal social services and privatize public utility companies<sup>95</sup>

In this context, during the four presidential terms that followed the transition to democracy, both traditional parties alternated in office (1985-1989: Colorado Party, 1989-1994: Blanco Party, 1995-2000-2005: Colorado Party). During the last two periods and to counteract the effects of decreasing electoral margins –and Congressional support-- both parties put in place stable government coalitions. Due to mounting fiscal deficits and increasing IFI conditionalities, such

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<sup>95</sup>In recent surveys in Latin America Uruguayans systematically score higher than their peers in the region when asked about state ownership of enterprises and state administration of social services. On average 80% of the people asked in Uruguay, in a set that includes water, electricity, telecommunications, education and social security, answered that they prefer state ownership or at the most mixed ownership with state predominance (Latinobarómetro 2004).

coalitions embarked on a neoliberal reformist agenda. Policy-wise, reformist attempts included several (unsuccessful) privatization attempts (particularly during the Blanco government 1989-1994) as well as education and social security reforms (1995-2000). More recently (2000-2005), there were some unsuccessful attempts to associate public enterprises with private capital in the public oil and telephone industries.

In the context of a representative democracy that escaped the patterns of “hyper-presidentialism” and “delegation” that expanded through the region in the 1990s, different organizations of ISI beneficiaries allied with FA and extensively relied on congressional representation and direct democracy mechanisms (binding direct democracy consultations that can be promoted through popular initiative either to promote or remove legislation) to block reforms (Filgueira and Filgueira 1997). In short, Uruguay became a clear example of the efficient operation of “policy-feedback” mechanisms and institutional veto-points to protect welfare beneficiaries (especially pension beneficiaries) and public employees.

Furthermore, the ideological realignment of both traditional parties in the post-transitional period allowed FA to develop an efficient ideological appeal to defend the *batllista* matrix against reformist attempts. Today, an active state fostering industrialization and promoting redistribution through universal social policy (*batllismo*) is popularly seen as key in resurrecting the “Latin American Switzerland” of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Indeed, as the effects of the sustained (but gradual) economic crisis that began shortly after WWII gained visibility, *batllismo* became the predominant ideological orientation of a Uruguayan electorate that started to look forward to the past. Today, according to a comparative survey, the Uruguayan electorate is the most “statist” of Latin America as only 37% of the population (compared to a regional average of 57%) believes that a market economy was the best option for the country.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>Latinobarómetro 2002.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **THE NATURE AND CONTENT OF PROGRAMMATIC DIVIDES IN CHILE AND URUGUAY**

#### Introduction

Which competitive divides drive partisan competition in Chile and Uruguay and how has programmatic mobilization evolved in both countries during the post-transitional period? This chapter seeks to provide a first cut in answering both questions, presenting survey evidence for how well the ideological profiles of congressional representatives match those of the parties to which they belong and the voters whom they represent. This first glance is then complemented, in the following two chapters, by looking at issue-congruence between partisan elites and voters in each system. The comparative and diachronic design I apply in these three chapters and its focus on both voters and elites complement previous research on elites (Hagopian 2002; Alcántara Sáez and Luna 2004) and synchronic (Moreno 1999; Zechmeister 2001; Rosas 2001; Luna and Zechmeister 2005) or single-case studies on Latin American electorates (Mainwaring and Torcal 2003). It is important to stress and clarify at the outset that at the citizen level the evidence is based on responses by party identifiers, and therefore, moderate and strong partisan supporters which especially in context of high citizen alienation with parties might not represent the universe of the voting population.

In this chapter, I present evidence that shows that while the Chilean system is structured around the regime divide, the Uruguayan system has moved from a situation of non-programmatic structuration to one in which the state-market divide consistently splits camps between both traditional parties (taken together, as a partisan “family”) and the Frente Amplio. Additionally,

when educational cross-sections of the electorate are considered, the evidence confirms the existence of increasing levels of programmatic divergence within the electoral bases of Chilean parties, with lower classes favoring greater levels of state intervention and more educated voters and elites favoring market allocation (independently of partisan affiliation). This situation correlates with an increasing level of electoral alienation and partisan dealignment in the Chilean case. Finally, I also show that from a comparative point of view (both at the elite and citizen levels), Chilean parties are on average more pro-market, religious, and assign lower levels of legitimacy to democracy than their Uruguayan counterparts.

My analytical strategy is based on a series of cross-national and case-specific confirmatory factor analyses extracted to test the empirical configuration of three potential competitive divides: regime, moral/religious values, and state/market. Such factors are then use to map the distribution of partisan groups and the internal coherence of partisan placements at both levels: elites and voters. In this respect, I am applying a similar methodology to that applied by, among others, Barnes and Kaase (1979); Inglehart (1984); Dalton (1988, chap. 7); Kitschelt (1994); Kitschelt et al (1999). Drawing on the third wave of the World Values Survey, Moreno (1999) analyzed six Latin American cases from a comparative perspective. He concluded that in contemporary Latin America, the regime (democratic/authoritarian) divide was the preeminent one in providing programmatic structure to the region's party-systems. As shown below, a diachronic and more detailed analysis of the Chilean and Uruguayan cases suggests that such conclusion should be qualified as systems evolve dynamically and as regime divides might face limitations in mobilizing voters and elites when the transitional period is left behind.

Additionally, given my interest in the societal distribution of linkage-strategies, I will present evidence of the internal ideological cohesiveness of partisan groups segmented on the basis of their educational levels (as a proxy for socioeconomic status). Therefore, the analysis provides

some insights on the current distribution (equity) and availability of partisan ideological linkages in each society, for citizen groups with different educational backgrounds.<sup>97</sup>

The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief methodological description of the analytical strategy. Subsequently, the evolution of left-right identifications and their correlation with the three programmatic divides is presented, along with a brief discussion of its possible effects on democratic citizenship. Then, a series of programmatic mappings based on cross-national and case-specific factor analyses both for elites and voters are presented. Finally, a brief conclusion is put forth.

### Methods

To provide a comparative and diachronic analysis of both systems, I applied a series of confirmatory factor analyses on data available for congressional elites representing the 1993-1997/1997-2001 legislatures in Chile and the 1995-1999/2000-2005 legislatures in Uruguay. For both countries the data corresponds to the Encuesta de Elites Parlamentarias of the Universidad de Salamanca and the surveys were applied in 1994 and 1998 in Chile, and 1996 and 2001 in Uruguay. The same methodology was then replicated for electorates in 1988, 1996, 2000 (Chile) and 1988, 1996, and 2002 (Uruguay). The first of those datasets corresponds to the Projeto Cone Sul (Universidade de Campinas), which surveyed political attitudes on the basis of an identical questionnaire in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay during 1988. The second dataset was constructed on the basis of the Third Wave of the World Value Survey, which was applied in both countries during 1996. Finally, while the 2000 data for Chile corresponds to the Fourth Wave of the same survey, the data for Uruguay was collected as part of the project Estudio de Valores-Uruguay 2002. Although independent from the WVS, this project replicates most of the questions

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<sup>97</sup>Each sample was split in three educational groups. In those cases in which a variable measuring the years of education attained by the interviewee was available, I constructed terciles. When such a variable was not available and educational levels were provided, three levels were kept: primary education (complete and incomplete), secondary education (complete and incomplete), and university education (complete and incomplete).

included in the WVS. The six samples are representative of the urban population in each country and were selected on the basis of a random multi-level (clustered) sampling procedure.

For each survey, a set of questions covering the three divides was included in the factor analysis.<sup>98</sup> Both for elite surveys and those based on the WVS and its replication in Uruguay, eight variables were included in the factor analyses. Although there are some scalar variations in Uruguay's survey for 2002, the rest of the datasets provide a comparable set of questions. In these surveys (1996, 2000, and 2002) the degree of preferred state intervention to provide for those in need (social policy) and to increase equality in society (as opposed to state withdrawal to promote competition) were imputed to represent the state/market divide. In 1996, a question on the ownership of public enterprises was available and was therefore added to this set. In the case of the Projeto Cono Sul, five items measuring the degree of preferred state intervention in the economy, education, health, public transport, and the financial system were included. A second set of questions covers moral and religious issues, reflecting respondent's preferences on abortion and divorce legislation. When these questions were not available (Projeto Cono Sul), an item on church attendance was included, together with an assessment on the importance of the Catholic Church in society. Finally, to reflect the regime divide two indicators were used one measuring democratic legitimacy and the other measuring the eventual tradeoffs of democracy in terms of social and economic "disorder." Additionally, a question on the importance of enhancing popular participation in government was also added to the set, without a specific prior on its eventual association with the three theoretically expected divides.

With the general exceptions of the Communist Party in Chile and the Nuevo Espacio in Uruguay, the number of observations available for every cross-section of party identifiers by education-terciles is greater than 20 cases.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>98</sup>See Appendix I for factor analysis extraction results and structure matrices.

Drawing on the identical nature of the questionnaires applied in both countries at the elite level and in 1988 and 1996 at the citizen level, I computed both country-specific and cross-national factors. While the former are adequate to understand the ideological competition dynamics that predominates in one system, the latter is particularly helpful in making comparative assessments on the relative strength of each divides in each case. Additionally, they might also point to the existence of cross-national partisan blocks sharing a similar ideological profile. Unfortunately, the lack of strictly comparable scales in the measures for 2000 and 2002 hinders the construction of cross-national factors for this period.

For each factor analysis I limited the extraction to three principal components and applied a Varimax rotation for interpreting the results and a regression method for computing factor scores for each case.<sup>100</sup> Mean scores and standard deviations were then obtained for each relevant group, constructed on the basis of partisan affiliation at the congressional level and declared vote-intention and three levels of education at the voter level.<sup>101</sup> In most of the extractions the three theorized underlying dimensions were clearly defined as orthogonal factors within overall solutions that reproduced at least 50% of the total variance involved in the correlation matrix.<sup>102</sup>

In the absence of independent salience measures and to assess the amount of partisan polarization in each competitive divide, I ran a series of ANOVA procedures (complemented through a Bonferroni test) to identify pairs of parties whose means were significantly different in a given factor. These measures will provide a proxy for the relative importance of each divide in every measure and will identify those factors in which parties present sufficient internal

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<sup>99</sup>When this is not so, the discussion of results should be careful (as for the Communist Party and Nuevo Espacio). In the interest of full disclosure, number of cases lower for a specific party/education group is reported in footnotes.

<sup>100</sup>Structure Matrices for each of these factor analyses can be consulted in Appendix I.

<sup>101</sup>While in the case of the Projeto Cone Sul these levels were pre-defined and it was not possible to reconstruct the original measure (the variable distinguish between those who had finished or attended primary, secondary, or tertiary education), terciles of the variable measuring the years of formal education for each individual were computed for the rest of the datasets.

<sup>102</sup>Extraction results are also available in Appendix I.

consistency and external divergence to produce significant results. To facilitate the display and interpretation of factor results, I have constructed bi-dimensional scatter-grams plotting each partisan group involved in each one of the extractions. In addition, I have computed symmetrical matrixes to display the pairwise ANOVA results based on Bonferroni tests at a .05 confidence level. Finally, through bar charts, I will also report the amount of polarization observed in each system and the standard deviations of partisan placements for each divide in every cross-national measurement instance. Focusing on descriptive analyses, the next section provides a first glance into the data.

#### Left-Right Polarization and Substantive Programmatic Associations

In this section I provide a first approximation to the nature and evolution of partisan programmatic alignments by looking at left-right self-identification of voters and elites, seeking to offer a general introduction to the more detailed analyses presented below.

Given the availability of two roughly comparable surveys for the pre-authoritarian period (1964 in Chile and 1966 in Uruguay) I first compare the level of left-right polarization observed in both systems. Unfortunately, these surveys were applied to a sample of university students in both countries and therefore do not represent the overall population and are inadequate in terms of drawing inferences beyond this sample. However, their comparative analysis across cases is still meaningful. Then, I present evidence for 1988, 1996, and 2000 for Chile and 2002 for Uruguay on the basis of the available data from Projeto Cono Sul, WVS (third and fourth wave), and its replication in Uruguay. Finally, for each of these surveys I computed Pearson correlations between left-right self-identifications and the three factors representing moral, regime, and state-market divides. To account for voter heterogeneity, I computed the same correlation coefficients for the most and the least educated groups of voters in each country.

Table 5.1 presents partisan self-identification figures for Chilean and Uruguayan University Students in the mid 1960s. It is worth noting that the scale applied in Uruguay ranged

from 1 to 5, diverging from the usual 1 to 10 scale applied in the rest of available surveys.<sup>103</sup> The table reveals a significantly greater level of ideological polarization in the Chilean system, with a difference of 5.3 points (in a 1-10 scale) between the most leftist (Communist Party) and the most rightist partisan group (Conservatives). In the Uruguayan case, the spread of self-identifications is significantly lower (1.4 in a 1-5 scale) even among university students, who can theoretically be expected to be more politicized than “normal” citizens.

**Table 5.1:**

**Left-Right self-placement and polarization of university students in pre-authoritarian Chile and Uruguay**

<b><u>Students Chile</u></b>	L-R self-placement Mean (Std. Dev.) Scale: 1-10
<b>Socialist</b>	2.7 (.1)
<b>Communist</b>	1.7 (.7)
<b>FRAP</b>	2.2 (.8)
<b>Radicals</b>	4.1 (1.2)
<b>Christian Democrats</b>	4.15 (1.2)
<b>Liberals</b>	6.2 (1.3)
<b>Conservatives</b>	7 (.6)
<b>Diff. between extreme left and right parties</b>	7-1.7=5.3
<b><u>Students Uruguay</u></b>	L-R self-placement, relative to those of other students, Mean (Std. Dev.), Scale: 1-5
<b>Blanco</b>	3.6 (.8)
<b>Colorado</b>	3.3 (.9)
<b>Christian Democrat</b>	3.1 (.9)
<b>Socialist</b>	2.8(.8)
<b>Communist</b>	2.2 (1)
<b>Diff. between extreme left and right parties</b>	3.6-2.2=1.4*2=2.8

Source: Own construction on the basis of University Student Surveys available through the ROPER Center.

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<sup>103</sup>For this reason, to compensate for this scalar discrepancy I am duplicating the amount of polarization identified in the case. Obviously, this is not optimal, but it is the only reasonable solution that can be applied ex-post.

Table 5.2 presents the results obtained for 1988, 1996, and 2000-02, considering a sample representative of the entire population. Confirming its pre-authoritarian configuration, the Uruguayan case presents a much lower level of left-right spread (.18 over a ten-point scale) than the Chilean system (4.49). Whereas the latter seems to be relatively stable (with a peak of 5.63 in 1996), the Uruguayan system shows a tangible upward trend, reaching 2.83 in 1996 and 4.47 in 2002. This increasing level of polarization is explained by the movement of both traditional parties to the right and of Frente Amplio to the left. Additionally, the switch between Blancos and Colorados regarding the pre-authoritarian configuration reflects the changing alignments described in Chapter 4 during the pre-authoritarian period and the transition to democracy. Finally, especially in Chile, leftist parties show lower levels of internal dispersion regarding left-right self-placements.

**Table 5.2:**


**Evolution of Left-Right self-placements and polarization in post-transitional Chile and Uruguay**

<b>Chile</b>	1988	1996	2000	<b>Uruguay</b>	1988	1996	2002
<b>UDI</b>	7,34 (2,2)	7.24 (2.1)	7.36 (2.1)	<b>Colorado</b>	5,06 (2,5)	7.39 (1.9)	7.53 (2.2)
<b>RN</b>	7,00 (2,0)	7.23 (1.7)	7.48 (2)	<b>Blanco</b>	4,93 (2,4)	7.01 (1.7)	7.05 (2.6)
<b>PDC</b>	5,32 (1,9)	5.28 (1.53)	4.93 (1.7)	<b>Nue vo Esp acio</b>		5.05 (1.7)	4.22 (1.6)
<b>PPD</b>	4,61 (1,7)	4.54 (1.6)	4.32 (1.6)	<b>Frente Amplio</b>	4,88 (2,4)	4.56 (1.8)	3.06 (2.11)
<b>PS</b>	3,58 (2,0)	3.79 (1.7)	3.25 (1.4)				
<b>PC-FPMR</b>	2,85 (2,0)	1.61 (1.4)	2.72 (1.8)				
<b>Total</b>	5,46 (2,2)	5.24 (2.1)	5.19 (2.3)	<b>Total</b>	4.9 (2,4)	5.5 (2.5)	4.24 (2.9)
<b>Diff. between extreme left and right parties</b>	7.34- 2.85=4. 49	7.24- 1.61=5.6 3	7.48- 2.72=4.7 6	<b>Diff. between extreme left and right parties</b>	5.06- 4.88=.1 8	7.39- 4.56=2.8 3	7.53- 3.06=4.4 7

Source: Own construction on the basis of Proyecto Cono Sur, WVS, and Estudio de Valores Uruguay 2002.


Although the figures for the Chilean case suggest a great deal of continuity it is important to qualify such a reading of the evidence. Indeed, as shown in Chart 5.1, since 1994 (when national urban surveys became available on a regular basis), the percentage of independents and those who choose not to align in the left-right scale has significantly increased, except for three downward peaks that coincide with the electoral years of 1997 (legislative), 1999 (presidential), and 2001 (legislative). Notwithstanding, the comparison of Chilean “non-identifiers” to their Uruguayan pairs reveals the magnitude of this change in post-electoral Chile. Whereas in such case this group of the electorate has fluctuated between a minimum annual average of 24% in 1997 and a maximum of 45.5% of survey respondents in 2003, comparable figures for Uruguay fluctuate from a maximum of 14% in 1994 to a minimum of 6% in 2002. These figures are also consistent with those reported by Segovia (2005) in which more than 40% of the Chilean electorate does not identify with any political party.

**Chart 5.1:**



Source: Chile based on CEP survey reports for urban samples. I am reporting annual averages constructed on the basis of all the available surveys for each year (the range goes from 1 to 3). The category represents those that declare themselves as independents and those who refuse to align in the left-right scale. In Uruguay the data represents those who do not respond to the ideological self-identification question.

Chart 5.2:



Source: Payne et al 2002

As shown in Chart 5.2, the increasing ideological de-alignment of the Chilean citizenry correlates with a downward trend in terms of electoral turnout in both presidential and congressional contests. In addition, blank and invalid voting has grown in that country during the post-transitional period. That phenomenon is particular acute in congressional elections which show a peak of invalid and blank-voting of 17.75% in 2001. Meanwhile the same figures for Uruguay reveal a pattern of stability at significantly lower levels, always remaining below 5% with turnout exceeding 94% of registered voters in every election.

Therefore, on the basis of this additional information it is possible to conclude that although partisan self-identifications and polarization remain stable in Chile, the percentage of the population that identifies with parties and the left-right scale has decreased significantly since the transition to democracy. In addition, such decrease parallels that of registered and valid voters in Chilean elections, affecting in particular the younger generations of the electorate (Riquelme Segovia 1999).

To complete this preliminary analysis of both systems, Table 5.3 presents the correlations between the left-right scale and the three extracted factors for each country (specific factors) in each of the available survey (both at the mass and elite level). For citizen surveys, the table also

reports specific correlation coefficients for the most and the least educated sectors of the population, and computes the size of the gap between both.

**Table 5.3:**  
**Correlations between left-right self-placements and three programmatic divides**

	<b>Regime</b>	<b>Moral</b>	<b>State-Market</b>
<b>Bases 1988 Chile</b>	.62 (L→Dem) LE: .63 HE: .75 GapLE/HE= .12	.17 (L→Sec) LE: .22. HE: .2 GapLE/HE= +.02	.08 (L→St) LE: .09. HE: .42 GapLE/HE= .33
<b>Bases 1996 Chile</b>	.28 (L→Dem) LE: .14 HE: .18 Gap LE/HE=.04	.06 (L→Sec) LE: .09 (bad sign) HE: .15 Gap LE/HE=.26	.11 (L→St) LE: .08 HE: .27 Gap LE/HE=.19
<b>Bases 2000 Chile</b>	.27 (L→Dem) LE: .24 HE: .26 GapLE/HE= .02	.13 (L→Sec) LE: .14 HE: .17 Gap LE/HE= .03	.11 (L→St) LE: .07 HE: .18 Gap LE/HE= .11
<b>Bases 1988 Uruguay</b>	.52 (L→ Dem) LE: .55 HE: .51 GapLE/HE=+.04	.53 (L→Sec) LE: .45 HE: .46 GapLE/HE= .01	.03 (L→St) LE: .02 HE: .14 GapLE/HE= .12
<b>Bases 1996 Uruguay</b>	.19 (L→Dem) LE: .05 HE: .19 Gap LE/HE=.14	.28 (L→Sec) LE: .14 HE: .31 Gap LE/HE=.17	.19 (L→St) LE: .11 HE: .29 Gap LE/HE=.18
<b>Bases 2002 Uruguay</b>	.02 (L→Dem) LE: .15 HE: .14 GapLE/HE=+.01	.15 (L→Sec) LE: .04 HE: .2 Gap LE/HE=.16	.22 (L→St) LE: .19 HE: .3 Gap LE/HE=.11
<b>Elites 1997 Chile</b>	.43 (L→Dem)	.35 (L→Sec)	.35 (L→St)
<b>Elites 2001 Chile</b>	.24 (L→Dem)	.6 (L→Sec)	.38 (L→St)
<b>Elites 1997 Uruguay</b>	No variance, all democratic	(+State Intervention in \$) .47 (L→Sec)	(+ Dem. Leg.) .34 (L→St/Auth.)
<b>Elites 2001 Uruguay</b>	.29 (L → Dem)	.38 (L→Sec)	.29 (L→St)

Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cono Sul, WVS, and Estudio de Valores Uruguay 2002.

In 1988 the regime divide is strongly correlated with the left-right scale in Chile, with pro-democratic stances coinciding with positions at the left and center-left and vice versa. Taking the entire population as a whole, the moral divide is the second highly correlated factor, showing the lowest gap between most and least educated voters. Finally, the state-market divide is clearly correlated in the highly educated cross-section of the population, but it is not significantly

correlated with left-right positions in both the general public and the low educated group. For this reason, the gap regarding this divide is the greatest one.

In Uruguay, a similar configuration can be observed in 1988, with the regime and the moral divides being the ones that are more strongly correlated with left-right positions. These divides also show relatively small gaps between different cross-sections of the population. In this case, the correlation between the state-market divide and ideological self-positioning is even lower than in the Chilean case, which also is reflected in the weak correlation found for the most educated voters. This finding suggests that in 1988, partisan alignments did not strongly map onto different policy predispositions regarding the state-market divide in the country. Whereas the alignments in the moral divide tend to reflect a greater rate of religious voters in the bases of both traditional parties (without strong policy implications), the strength of the regime divide seems to reflect the temporal salience of transitional issues in the country. The temporal nature of such alignments is confirmed by the progressive decay of the correlation between the regime divide and left-right identifications as the transition is left behind. This fact represents a significant departure from the Chilean case in which the democratic-authoritarian split continues to correlate quite closely with left-right positions in later surveys.

Nevertheless, both in 1996 and 2000, the correlation coefficients obtained for Chile are lower than those seen in 1988 (both in the regime and moral divides). Meanwhile, the observed gaps between most and least educated voters are greater in the moral and state-market divides than in the regime divide, which seems to confirm the greater salience of the latter. In the last measure available (2000), the registered gap for the state-market divide is significantly greater than the ones corresponding to the other two factors.

Meanwhile, in Uruguay it is possible to observe a progressive strengthening of the correlation between the state-market divide and ideological placements, starting at .08 in 1988 and finishing at a low/moderate correlation of .22 in 2002. It is worth noting that this is the highest registered correlation for Uruguay in 2002, followed by the moral divide (.15) and then by the

democratic-authoritarian one (.02). In this case it is also possible to observe a significant gap between groups with different educational levels.

The picture is somewhat different at the elite level. In general, higher degrees of consistency between elite placements and substantive ideological stances are found. This is particularly so in Chile, where the regime divide shows the greatest correlation with left-right positions in 1997. In 2001, in turn, the regime divide recedes to the third place, with the moral-religious divide gaining primacy, followed by the state-market factor. At least at the elite level and likely as a result of Pinochet's image erosion within the Chilean right since 1998, the regime divide seems to be eroding.

In Uruguay, elites were uniformly pro-democratic in 1997 and a "dirty" factor combining secularism with preferences for a high degree of state intervention in the economy obtained the greatest correlation with the left-right scale. This factor, was followed closely by the one representing the remaining components of the theorized state-market divide. In 2001, the moral divide exhibits a strong correlation with the left-right self-identification of congressional representatives. However, as shown below through cross-national comparisons, the relative importance of both divides (moral and regime) is lower in Uruguay than in Chile. However, it is worth stressing that, especially at the elite level, the state-market conflict seems to have weakened in Uruguay after a peak circa 1996-1997, when the conflict over the privatization of state-owned enterprises came to the forefront of political debate.

## Cross-National Partisan Alignments in Three Ideological Divides: Elite Alignments<sup>104</sup>

### *1993-1997 and 1995-2000 Legislatures*

For the first measure available at the congressional level (1994 in Chile and 1996 in Uruguay), the three factors obtained reproduced 61% of the original variance. The first factor (23%) is a combination of the state-market divide and the question on popular participation in government. In this case, those who prefer greater levels of state intervention in the economy and society also present more participatory views on democracy. In this factor, the Chilean system is slightly placed towards the market/elitist pole. While in the first case, UDI and RN are the parties with more pro-market and elitist views, FA in Uruguay is the most statist and pro-participatory party. As shown in Table 5.4, which displays the Bonferroni results obtained for the ANOVA, the DC, the PPD, the PS, the PC, and the PN do not present significantly different means on the factor. Meanwhile, UDI and RN have significantly different views of those of the PS's, PPD's and FA's elites. Meanwhile, FA also has a significantly more statist and participatory view than the PC and the PB.

The second and third factors extracted recovered around 13% of the original variance each, one representing the moral divide and the other the regime one. In the case of the latter a clear cut between national systems is found, as the parties of the Alianza Por Chile (especially the UDI) have significantly different means (representing more authoritarian views) with the rest of the parties (Table 5.4). Although the remaining Chilean parties have non-significantly different means as opposed to their Uruguayan counterparts, UDI's position "moves" the Chilean mean to the "authoritarian" side. A similar configuration is seen in the moral divide, with UDI, RN, and the DC

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<sup>104</sup>In the Maps I present in this chapter (as well as in Chapters 6 and 7), each party is identified through the following acronym: Christian-Democratic Party (DC), Socialist Party (PS), Party for Democracy (PPD), Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), National Renovation (RN), Communist Party (PCchi), Colorado Party (PC), Blanco Party (PN), Nuevo Espacio (NE), and Frente Amplio (FA). While the last four parties correspond to the Uruguayan party system, the first six parties compete in the Chilean one. Finally, in country-specific maps, where partisan/education cross-sections of the electorate are mapped, the assigned partisan acronym is either followed by a "he" (highly educated), a "me" (middle-educated), or "le" (low-educated) according to the corresponding educational cross-section.

gravitating towards the religious/conservative extreme and the rest of the parties (both Uruguayan and Chilean) presenting more secular profiles. This is particularly clear in the cases of leftist parties in both countries, such as the PS, the PPD, and FA.

To synthesize these partisan placements, Map 5.1 presents partisan alignments in the state-market and regime divides. Map 5.2 substitutes the regime divide for the religious/secular one. Both graphs make clear that the UDI in Chile and FA in Uruguay present the most clearly defined (and opposed) profiles, with the former showing more authoritarian, pro-market, and conservative views, and the latter with a clearly defined statist and secular stand. In both divides, the PS and the PPD are placed relatively close to the FA.

**Table 5.4:**

**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Congressional Elites Crossnational Factors (First Wave)**

State-Market (+participation)	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	fa	pc	pn
dc	x							
rn	*	x						
udi	*		x					
ppd	-	*	*	x				
ps	-	*	*	-	x			
fa	-	*	*	-	-	x		
pc	-	-	-	-	-	*	x	
pn	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	x
Regime	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	fa	pc	pn
dc	x							
rn	*	x						
udi	*	-	x					
ppd	-	-	*	x				
ps	-	-	*	-	x			
fa	-	-	*	-	-	x		
pc	-	*	*	-	-	-	x	
pn	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	x
Moral	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	fa	pc	pn
dc	x							
rn	-	x						
udi	-	-	x					
ppd	*	-	*	x				
ps	*	-	-	-	x			
fa	*	*	*	-	-	x		
pc	*	*	*	-	-	-	x	
pn	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	x

\* Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Chart 5.3 in turn, compares the relative degree of polarization present in each system and across the three divides. Polarization is simply defined as the difference between the parties with most extreme positions in each factor. As shown in this graph, the Chilean system presents a greater level of polarization across the three divide s. In turn, in the Uruguayan case, the only factor that presents similar levels to those obtained for Chile is the one representing the state-market divide.

Finally, as shown in Chart 5.4, which reports the standard deviations of partisan placements (total and across factors), Uruguay presents relatively greater levels of overall internal


partisan coherence. This is so, in particular regarding the regime divide. Party-wise, RN, the PS, and the DC are the parties with greater levels of internal divergence. Meanwhile, the UDI, the PPD, FA, and the PC (particularly in the regime divide) are the parties with lower levels of internal dissent.

Map 5.1:




Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Map 5.2:




Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Chart 5.3:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas

Chart 5.4:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

### 1997-2001 and 2000-2005 Legislatures

For the second wave of the congressional elite survey (Chile: 1998 and Uruguay: 2001), I also obtained three clearly defined factors. The first of those factors represents the state-market divide (coupled once again with views about popular participation in government) and accounts for 23% of the original variance. In turn, the second (20%) and third (15%) factors subsequently represent the moral and regime divides.

As reported in Table 5.5, the number of significant differences between partisan pairs is less than the one obtained for the previous legislatures. Indeed, although different mean placements are evident (in line with the alignments reported for the previous legislature) no significant differences were found in the regime divide. In terms of the moral divide, partisan alignments seem to be stable, with the UDI presenting significantly more conservative views than all other parties in the sample with the exception of RN. In turn, RN also has significantly more conservative views than the PS, the PC, and the FA (which is also significantly less conservative than the DC). Within the Uruguayan system, no significant differences were found in this factor.

Additionally, considering the state-market divide, the number of pair wise significant differences declined from 10 to 6. In this case, FA is the party that concentrates most of significant differences with other parties given its statist/participatory stance. In this regard the party is placed apart from the UDI, RN, and both Uruguayan traditional parties. Meanwhile, the PPD is significantly less pro-market/elitist than the UDI and the PB.

Map 5.3 presents the distribution of partisan means on both factors for which significant different means were found. Map 5.4, in turn, plots party positions on the state/market divide against those on the regime divide. In Map 5.3 it is possible to see that while on the state/market divide national means are equivalent, on the moral divide, Uruguayan parties (with the partial exception of the PN and joined by the PS) show a clearly defined secular profile. Meanwhile, UDI and then RN have both a clearly defined pro-market and religious stance. Whereas in Chile parties align in a diagonal that combines both axes of competition, Uruguayan parties only seem to compete on the state-market divide. In terms of mean partisan positions, it is possible to argue that polarization regarding that divide has grown in Uruguay in this period.

**Table 5.5:**


**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Congressional Elite Crossnational Factors (Second Wave)**

State-Market	dc	m	Udi	ppd	ps	fa	pc	pn
dc	x							
rn	-	x						
udi	-	-	x					
ppd	-	-	*	x				
ps	-	-	-	-	x			
fa	-	*	*	-	-	x		
pc	-	-	-	-	-	*	x	
pn	-	-	-	*	-	*	-	x
Regime	dc	m	udi	ppd	ps	fa	pc	pn
dc	x							
rn	-	x						
udi	-	-	x					
ppd	-	-	-	x				
ps	-	-	-	-	x			
fa	-	-	-	-	-	x		
pc	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	
pn	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x
Moral	dc	m	udi	ppd	ps	fa	pc	pn
dc	x							
rn	-	x						
udi	*	-	x					
ppd	-	-	*	x				
ps	-	*	*	-	x			
fa	*	*	*	-	-	x		
pc	-	*	*	-	-	-	x	
pn	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	x

\* Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Map 5.3:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.


Map 5.4:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.


Indeed, differing from the situation reported for the first legislatures, while it continues to present lower levels of polarization in the regime and moral divides, the Uruguayan system shows greater amounts of partisan divergence in the state-market divide than that of Chile (Chart 5.5). This also translates into greater levels of internal partisan divergences, particularly within the PN. Meanwhile, RN continues to be the party with greater levels of internal divergence (Chart 5.6).

Chart 5.5:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Chart 5.6:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Summing up, it can be stated that at the elite level, while the rest of the parties are close to the center of the distribution, UDI and RN on one side and the FA on the other represent the two extreme positions in each system, with the former two aligning more decisively with the pro-market/authoritarian/religious configuration and the latter positioning itself as a statist secular party. Therefore, on the basis of these cross-national alignments it would be possible to conclude that while Uruguayan parties compete towards the center-left, the Chilean system competes towards the center-right. Additionally, it seems possible to assert that the moral and regime divides are less polarizing in the Uruguayan system.

## Cross-National Partisan Alignments in Three Ideological Divides: Party-Identifiers Alignments

1988

The cross-national factor extraction for 1988 produced three clearly defined factors that together account for 51% of the original variance. The first factor represents the state/market divide (24.2%); the second corresponds to the religious/secular divide (13.6%); and the third accounts for attitudes regarding the regime divide (13.5%).

Table 5.6 presents the ANOVA results, which show a significant split between Uruguayan and Chilean parties in the state/market and religious/secular divide, without finding internal splits among the parties that constitute each system. Indeed, even in the case of the religious divide the voters of the Communist Party of Chile have a more conservative stance than the voters of both Uruguayan traditional parties. In terms of the state-market divide, the voters of Uruguayan parties are significantly more pro-state than their Chilean counterparts, among which, no significant differences are found. Meanwhile, RN and UDI hold a significantly different (authoritarian) position regarding all other parties in the sample in the regime divide, holding more pro-authoritarian views.

Map 5.5 displays the results obtained when plotting dimensions one and two. In this case, a clear divide exists between both countries with the bases of all Chilean parties being significantly more religious than their Uruguayan counterparts. Map 5.6 in turn, presents the results obtained for factors 1 and 3. The distribution of parties in both dimensions shows the configuration of two clearly defined partisan groups with opposing ideological profiles: the Uruguayan parties (democratic and statist) lying in the top-left quadrant and the Chilean right (authoritarian and pro-market). Meanwhile, the Communist Party and the parties from Concertación (the DC, PS, and the PPD) are positioned on the democratic side, but present mean-scores that are close to a neutral point on the state-market factor. In this general context, the Socialist Party is relatively closer to the Uruguayan parties (statist) and the rest of the center and left Chilean parties, are closer to the Chilean right (UDI and RN).

**Table 5.6:**


**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Cross-National Citizen Surveys 1988 (First Wave)**

State-Market	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchile	fa	pc	pn
dc	x								
rn	-	x							
udi	-	-	x						
ppd	-	-	-	x					
ps	-	-	-	-	x				
pcchile	-	-	-	-	-	x			
fa	*	*	*	*	-	-	x		
pc	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	x	
pn	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	x
Regime	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchile	fa	pc	pn
dc	x								
rn	*	x							
udi	*	-	x						
ppd	-	*	*	x					
ps	-	*	*	-	x				
pcchile	-	*	*	-	-	x			
fa	-	*	*	-	-	-	x		
pc	-	*	*	-	-	-	-	x	
pn	-	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	x
Moral	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchile	fa	pc	pn
dc	X								
rn	-	x							
udi	-	-	x						
ppd	-	-	-	x					
ps	-	-	-	-	x				
pchile	-	-	-	-	-	x			
fa	*	*	*	*	*	*	x		
pc	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	x	
pn	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	x

Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul.

Map 5.5:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul.


Map 5.6:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul.

On the basis of this evidence it is possible to assert that while all Uruguayan parties present a statist/democratic/secular profile without major differences in each of these divides, Chilean parties seem to hold different stances particularly in terms of the regime divide, which produces a consistent split between the parties of Concertación and the PC and those of the Alianza. Additionally, as shown in Chart 5.7, the Chilean system consistently presents greater levels of polarization in all three divides.


**Chart 5.7:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul.

While the observed overall levels of electorate's internal divergence are similar in both systems, Chilean parties are internally less coherent in the most contested divides: state-market and regime. Meanwhile, the Uruguayan parties present higher levels of inconsistency in the secular/religious divide. Considering individual parties, the electoral base of the UDI and that of the PCChile, are the most internally diverse.

**Chart 5.8:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul.

1996

In 1996, the three cross-national factors extracted accounted for 52% of the original variance, with the religious/secular divide being the first component obtained (19.4%). The regime divide (16.6%) and the state/market divide (16.1%) followed. The item that measures the degree of support for more popular participation in government is highly correlated with the second divide and it is associated in the expected direction (authoritarian views correlate with more elitist views).

Regarding this competitive dimension, the split between the Chilean right (RN and UDI) and the rest of the parties remains as clear as it was in 1988. This is confirmed by the ANOVA results displayed in Table 5.7. Meanwhile, two leftist parties deviate from the rest in the state/market divide (FA and the Chilean Communist Party). Whereas FA supporters present a moderate statist position, the electorate of the Chilean party gets positioned in a more radical stance. However, as shown in Table 5.7, the only significant differences in this divide are obtained between FA and both Uruguayan traditional parties. This suggests that the Chilean system has relatively lower levels of ideological structure on this dimension, given the increasing level of internal divergence in the electorates of these parties. Finally, although the four Uruguayan parties are consistently more secular than their Chilean counterparts, the Uruguayan left (FA and NE) holds more favorable views on abortion and divorce. Arguably, the chance of substituting the questions on religiosity by concrete attitudes on moral issues increases partisan divergence (also observed in the ANOVA results) within the Uruguayan system.

As shown in Chart 9, with the exception of the moral divide (in which the Chilean electorate is more homogenously conservative), Chilean voters show higher levels of polarization in the observed divides. However, if the voters of the Communist Party are excluded (this is a minor party that has subsequently failed to obtain Congressional representation given the restrictive effects of the electoral system), the polarization of the system is reduced drastically, especially concerning the state-market divide. Indeed, after the exclusion of the PCChi, the Uruguayan system doubles the amount of polarization seen in Chile in that divide.

**Table 5.7:**


**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Cross-National Ciitizen Surveys 1996 (Second Wave)**

State-Market	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	fa	pc	pn	pchi	ne
dc	x									
rn	-	X								
udi	-	-	x							
ppd	-	-	-	x						
ps	-	-	-	-	x					
fa	-	-	-	*	-	x				
pc	-	-	-	-	-	*	x			
pn	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	x		
pchi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	
ne	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x
Regime	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	fa	pc	pn	pchi	ne
dc	x									
rn	*	x								
udi	*	-	x							
ppd	-	*	*	x						
ps	-	*	*	-	x					
fa	-	*	*	-	-	x				
pc	-	*	-	-	-	*	x			
pn	-	*	*	-	-	-	-	x		
pchi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	
ne	-	*	*	-	-	-	*	-	-	x
Moral	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	fa	pc	pn	pchi	ne
dc	x									
rn	-	x								
udi	-	-	x							
ppd	-	-	-	x						
ps	-	-	-	-	x					
fa	*	*	*	*	*	x				
pc	*	-	-	-	-	*	x			
pn	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	x		
pchi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	
ne	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	-	x

Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave.

**Map 5.7:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave


**Map 5.8:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave


In this case, and with the exception of the regime divide, the Uruguayan system is the one that present greater levels of internal partisan divergence. Likely, the increasing levels of programmatic tension seen in the system at this time (see below) relate to higher levels of internal stress and turmoil. A similar argument could be made for Chilean parties at the outset of the transition to democracy. While both traditional parties and the NE are the ones that present greater levels of internal dissent in Uruguay, in Chile, the DC and the PS (with the exception of the moral divide) have the least internally coherent electorate.

**Chart 5.9:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave

**Chart 5.10:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave

## Elite and Mass Country Specific Factors and Voter Heterogeneity: Chile

### *National Congressional-Elite Alignments in Chile*

In this section I will review the country-specific factors obtained for Chile both at the elite and citizen level, for the different measures available.

In 1994, at the elite level, the first factor extracted is a combination between the moral divide and congress-member attitudes towards privatization (with more conservative views

coinciding with privatizing attitudes). This factor represents 24% of the original variance. As shown in Table 5.8, the PPD and the PS have significantly different means from those of the UDI, RN, and the DC.

The second factor extracted (22%) combines regime legitimacy and attitudes towards popular participation in government. In this case, only the UDI and the DC have significantly different means, with the former taking a more authoritarian and elitist stance.

**Table 5.8:**  
**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Elite Survey, Chile 1994**

State/Mkt	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps
dc	x				
rn	*	x			
udi	-	-	x		
ppd	-	-	-	x	
ps	-	-	-	-	x
Regime+Participation	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps
dc	x				
rn	-	x			
udi	*	-	x		
ppd	-	-	-	x	
ps	-	-	-	-	x
Moral+Priv	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps
dc	x				
rn	-	x			
udi	-	-	x		
ppd	*	*	*	x	
ps	*	*	*	-	x

Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Finally, the third factor extracted (21%) represents the state/market divide (with the exception of privatization). Once again, only one significant difference is found, this time between the DC and RN, with the latter favoring less intervention in the economy and social policy.

As shown in Maps 5.9 and 5.10, clear partisan alignments are identifiable in Chile at the elite level. Whereas the PS and the PPD consistently appear nearby each other with a secular and statist view, the UDI has a clearly defined conservative/authoritarian/pro-market profile. While sharing similar stances in the market/state divide, RN has relatively more secular and democratic


stances than the UDI. Finally, DC’s congress-members are the ones with a clearly defined pro-democratic and statist view, while maintaining a relative conservative stance on the religious/secular divide.

Map 5.9:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Map 5.10:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Although with some changes in the nature of factors extracted and the internal alignments within Concertación, the basic configuration of the system is confirmed in the solution obtained for 1998. In this case, the preference on the extent of popular participation in government merges the

religious/secular divide with more conservative responses correlating with less participatory views. As shown in Table 5.9, the PS has significantly different means from those of the DC, RN, and the UDI on the religious/secular divide. Additionally, the means of the PPD and the DC also differ significantly from that of the UDI, which is the party displaying more conservative and elitist attitudes. This first factor reproduces 22% of the original variance. The second factor extracted accounts for 20% of such variance and represents the regime divide together with preferences on privatization. However, in this case, none of the party pairs registers a significant different mean. Finally, in the state/market divide which was extracted as a third factor (18%), the PPD has significantly more statist views than the ones hold by the DC, RN, and the UDI.

**Table 5.9:**

**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Elite Survey, Chile 1998**

State/Mkt	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps
dc	x				
rn	-	x			
udi	-	-	x		
ppd	*	*	*	x	
ps	-	-	-	-	x
Regime+Priv	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps
dc	x				
rn	-	x			
udi	-	-	x		
ppd	-	-	-	x	
ps	-	-	-	-	x
Moral+Participation	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps
dc	x				
rn	-	x			
udi	*	-	x		
ppd	-	-	*	x	
ps	*	*	*	-	x


Means are sig. diff. (.05).

Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

As shown in Map 5.11, the regime divide is the one that most clearly divides the parties of Concertación and Alianza, with the former group providing greater legitimacy to democratic politics. And in spite of its religious character, the DC has a more secular (and participatory view)


than the parties of the Alianza and lies in between them and its Concertación partners, of which the PS is the one with the most secular profile. Finally, partisan alignments in the state/market divide are less structured around electoral coalitions. Although the UDI and PPD show significantly different levels of preference for state intervention in the economy and society, RN and the DC (followed by the PS) have similar preferences in this regard (Map 5.12).

Map 5.11:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

Map 5.12:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

*National Party-Identifiers Alignments and Social Heterogeneity of Programmatic Preferences in  
Chile 1988-2000*

The country-specific factors obtained for Chile in 1988 (50.8% of original variance) confirm the characterization based on the cross-national results. In the first place, as shown in Table 5.10, the only divide in which Chilean parties stand on significantly different positions is the democratic/authoritarian one (12.5%). Both in the state/market divide (20.7%) and in the secular/religious divide (10.7%), Chilean parties hold statistically similar positions. Finally, the analysis of partisan groups according to their levels of education shows important degrees of internal divergence, especially on the less salient divides.<sup>105</sup>

In the state/market dimension, the most educated voters of the PC and PS as well as the less educated voters of RN and UDI are the more statist groups. Strikingly, the most educated voters of both rightist parties are the ones who hold the most pro-market stances, which points to an important degree of internal divergence. However, on the regime divide, the bases of RN and UDI are homogeneously pro-authoritarian.

Finally, respondents with lower levels of education are also homogeneously more religious independently from their partisan sympathy, consolidating a situation in which Chilean parties present important internal degrees of divergence on both non-salient divides. On the basis of this information, it is possible to conclude that even at the outset of Chile's democratic transition to democracy the only active ideological divide was the democratic/authoritarian divide.

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<sup>105</sup>This analysis is tentative given that the overrepresentation of DC supporters in the sample produces low Ns for the rest of the parties (between 60 and 4 cases), when partisan electorates are segmented on the basis of educational levels.


**Table 5.10:**

**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Citizen Survey, Chile 1988**

State/Market	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchi
dc	x					
m	-	x				
udi	-	-	x			
ppd	-	-	-	x		
ps	-	-	-	-	x	
pchi	-	-	-	-	-	x
Regime	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	Pchi
dc	x					
m	*	x				
udi	*	-	x			
ppd	-	*	*	x		
ps	-	*	*	-	x	
pchi	-	*	*	-	-	x
Moral	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchi
dc	x					
m	-	x				
udi	-	-	x			
ppd	-	-	-	x		
ps	-	-	-	-	x	
pchi	*	-	-	-	-	x


Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul.  
Means are sig. diff. (.05).

**Map 5.13:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul.

**Map 5.14:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Proyecto Cone Sul.

In 1996, the country-specific factors extracted for Chile are consistent with the competitive configuration observed in 1988. Once again, the regime divide (16.7%) is the one that produces the greatest split between partisan groups, producing a clear and significant distinction between the parties of Concertación and those of the Alianza (Table 5.11).

Meanwhile, in a context of comparatively high levels of moral conservatism (regarding the Uruguayan case), Chilean parties do not polarize on the religious/secular divide. Once again this divide runs within each party, splitting less educated voters (religious) from middle and highly educated partisans (secular). In this case, the Communist Party is placed on a more secular position and presents significantly different means than those of other parties, with the exception of the PS (Map 5.15).

**Table 5.11:**


**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Citizen Survey, Chile 1996**

State/Market	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchi
dc	x					
rn	-	x				
udi	-	-	x			
ppd	-	-	-	x		
ps	-	-	-	-	x	
pchi	*	*	*	*	-	x
Regime	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchi
dc	x					
rn	*	x				
udi	*	-	x			
ppd	-	*	*	x		
ps	-	*	*	-	x	
pchi	-	*	*	-	-	x
Moral	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchi
dc	x					
rn	-	x				
udi	-	-	x			
ppd	-	-	-	x		
ps	-	-	-	-	x	
pchi	-	-	-	-	-	x

Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave

**Map 5.15:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave

**Map 5.16:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave

Finally, the Communist Party demonstrates a different and internally consistent (statist) profile in the state/market divide (16.5%), matched only by the higher educated voters of RN. Indeed, analyzing the internal distribution of ideological preferences on each party, it becomes apparent that highly-educated voters of every party are more pro-market than their less-educated fellow partisans.<sup>106</sup> While the PPD provides the only partial exception to this rule the cases of the DC, UDI, and RN provide the clearest instances of such internal distribution of preferences. As these distinct preferences cut-across parties and electoral pacts, a “sociological” division regarding state/market issues does not get consistently represented by the party system. Additionally, it is worth noting that the most educated voters of RN and the less educated voters of UDI present less authoritarian preferences than their partners within Alianza’s group. This either implies that these voters have “moved” towards the center or that these parties are currently recruiting voters that might have been lost by the Concertación. In general, the patterns of ideological competition observed in Chile during 2002 resemble those just described for 1996. In other words, neither the

<sup>106</sup>In this case, the Ns for the low-educated UDI (6) voters and the high-educated RN (11) voters are low. Therefore, the assertions related to these groups are tentative.

state/market divide (19.2%) nor the religious/secular divide (19.9%) produce a significant split between the electorates of different Chilean parties (Table 5.12).

**Table 5.12:**

**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Citizen Survey, Chile 2000**

State-Market	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchi
dc	x					
rn	-	x				
udi	-	-	x			
ppd	-	-	-	x		
ps	-	-	-	-	x	
pchi	-	-	-	-	-	x
Regime	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchi
dc	x					
rn	*	x				
udi	*	-	x			
ppd	-	*	*	x		
ps	-	*	*	-	x	
pchi	-	*	*	-	-	x
Rel/Elit-Sec/Part	dc	rn	udi	ppd	ps	pchi
dc	x					
rn	-	x				
udi	-	-	x			
ppd	-	-	-	x		
ps	*	-	-	-	x	
pchi	*	*	*	*	-	x

Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Fourth Wave.

In this case, the item on popular participation in government is associated with the religious factor (more secular views correlate with participatory stances). However, except for the voters of the Communist Party (secular and pro-participation), the electorates of Chilean parties are indistinguishable on this basis.

Furthermore, the articulation of a “sociological” divide around state/market issues identified in 1996 gets consolidated in 2000 as low educated voters tend to consistently stand for more state intervention in the economy (Maps 5.17 and 5.18). This is particularly striking in the case of UDI, whose low-educated bases, while continuing to be authoritarian, present a similar stance than those of the Communist Party and the lesser-educated bases of the PPD and PS in the


state/market divide. Meanwhile, the most consistent pro-market segments of the electorate are represented by the highly and moderately educated voters of UDI and RN, followed closely by the most educated voters of the PPD and PS. Once again, the regime divide (18.5%) provides the only basis for distinguishing both camps on the basis of their ideological predispositions (Map 5.18).

Map 5.17:



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave

Map 5.18:



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave

## Elite and Mass Country Specific Factors and Voter Heterogeneity: Uruguay

### *National congressional-elite alignments in Uruguay*

In 1998 and at the elite level, the first two factors extracted combine components of the three theoretically expected ones. The first factor accounts for 22% of the original variance and represents a combination of attitudes towards privatization, social policy, and democratic legitimacy. Pro-market attitudes assign slightly lower levels of legitimacy to democracy. In turn, the second factor extracted (18%) is a combination of the moral divide with preferences on state intervention in the economy and society. More secular profiles coincide with more statist ones. Finally, the third factor (14%) essentially reproduces the amount of desired popular participation in government. As shown in Table 5.13, the only factor in which significant partisan placements are found is the first one, with FA taking more statist stances. As shown in Map 5.19, those preferences coincide with a relatively more secular profile. It is important to note that in this Map, both traditional parties lay close by and NE is closer to them than to FA. Finally, whereas the PC, the NE, and FA prefer similar levels of popular participation in government, the PN (at that time in presidential office and trying to pursue economic reforms that were recently opposed by the FA, NE, and the Foro Batllista through a popular plebiscite) clearly prefers a lower degree of popular involvement in government.

**Table 5.13:**

**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Elite Survey, Uruguay 1998**


State-Market (Demleg)	fa	pc	pn
fa	x		
pc	*	x	
pn	*	-	x
Rel-Sec (+State Intervention)	fa	pc	pn
fa	x		
pc	-	x	
pn	-	-	x
Popular Participation	fa	pc	pn
fa	x		
pc	-	x	
pn	-	-	x

Not enough cases to include NE

Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

**Map 5.19:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

**Map 5.20:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

In 2001 one of the regime variables needed to be excluded given the absolute lack of variance in the congressional sample (every congress-member was in complete agreement with the pro-democratic statement). The first factor extracted was once again the state-market divide (coupled by the preference on popular participation in government), accounting this time for 25% of the original variance. The second factor extracted (22%) represents the moral divide. Finally, the third factor (20%) is highly correlated with two variables that present low levels of elite dissent in Uruguay: the other indicator used for democratic legitimacy and the preference on privatization. At this point in time, given the amount of public opposition to privatizing reform attempts, none of the political parties strongly (and openly) favored the privatization of public enterprises. Except for a significant difference between the more secular elites of FA and the more religious ones of the PN, the state-market divide (plus popular participation in government) is the only one that provides the basis for significant differences between FA and both traditional parties. Once again, the latter are placed nearby to each other with the only (non-significant) exception of the religious divide (Maps 5.21 and 5.22). Notably, the elites of NE are placed very close to the traditional party “family”, at the other side of the programmatic spectrum from FA.

**Table 5.14:**

**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Elite Survey, Uruguay 2001**


State-Mkt+Participation	fa	pc	pn	ne
fa	x			
pc	*	x		
pn	*	-	x	
ne	-	-	-	x
Privatization/Democratic - Statist/Authoritarian	fa	pc	pn	ne
fa	x			
pc	-	x		
pn	-	-	x	
ne	-	-	-	x
Religious-Secular	fa	pc	pn	ne
fa	x			
pc	-	x		
pn	*	-	x	
ne	-	-	-	x

Variable on democratic tradeoffs in terms of order and economic growth excluded due to lack of variance.

Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

**Map 5.21:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

**Map 5.22:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Elites Latinoamericanas.

### *National Party-Identifiers Alignments and Social Heterogeneity of Programmatic Preferences in Uruguay*

The three factors obtained for Uruguay in 1988 reproduce 46% of the original variance. The first factor represents the state/market divide and accounts for 20.2%; the second factor (religious/secular) reproduces a 13.2%; and the regime divide was recovered by a third factor replicating a 12.5% of the original variance. As apparent in Maps 5.23 and 5.24, the three Uruguayan parties lay very close to the origin of both graphs. In other words, this means that none of the three divides splits camps between these parties' electorates. This assertion is confirmed by the lack of significant ANOVA results in each of the three divides (Table 5.15). In short, the Uruguayan electorate seems to be homogenously democratic, statist, and secular. Furthermore, the analysis of educational groups clearly suggests that each one of these divides cuts across each party as low educated voters (independently of their partisan preference) are somewhat more authoritarian, statist, and religious.

**Table 5.15:**


**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Citizen Survey, Uruguay 1988**

State-Market	fa	pc	pn	ne
Fa	x			
pc	-	x		
pn	-	-	x	
Regime	fa	pc	pn	Ne
fa	x			
pc	-	x		
pn	-	-	x	
Moral	fa	pc	pn	Ne
fa	x			
pc	-	x		
pn	-	-	x	

Means are sig. diff. (.05).

Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul


**Map 5.23:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul

M

Map 5.24:




Source: Own construction on the basis of Projeto Cone Sul

The evidence obtained for Uruguay in 1996 points to the presence of important discontinuities in the patterns of partisan competition in the system. In the state/market divide (16.4%), while the leftist parties (FA and NE) maintain traditional statist stances, the voters of both traditional parties pursue realignment and move towards pro-market positions. This is particularly evident for the most educated voters of the PC and the PN, which present a noticeable degree of internal stratification of pro-market attitudes along educational levels. Instead, *frenteampelistas* present a more unified statist stance. Even within a pro-democratic context (in comparison with that observed in Chile), Map 5.25 displays an important level of polarization around the regime divide (15.7%), with leftist voters assuming relatively more democratic positions than supporters of both traditional parties. I ran a complementary ANOVA on each of the variables that loaded high on this factor. This analysis confirms that although democratic legitimacy is uncontested in the system, leftist voters tend to assign more importance to popular participation in government and do not identify a trade-off between democracy and economic efficiency. Finally, on the issues of abortion and divorce (religious/secular, 19.3%) the voters of the traditional parties tend to be more conservative than those of Frente Amplio. The ANOVA results confirm the visual inference from

the maps registering significant differences between FA and both traditional parties in the three divides.


Additionally, NE obtains significant ANOVA coefficients with both traditional parties in the moral divide and with the PC in the regime one. Finally, the voters of the PC are significantly less conservative than those of the PN.

**Map 5.25:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave

**Map 5.26:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of WVS Third Wave

**Table 5.16:****Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Citizen Survey, Uruguay 1996**

State-Market	fa	pc	pn	ne
fa	x			
pc	*	x		
pn	*	-	x	
ne	-	-	-	x
Regime	fa	pc	pn	ne
fa	x			
pc	*	x		
pn	*	-	x	
ne	-	*	-	x
Religious/Secular	fa	pc	pn	ne
fa	x			
pc	*	x		
pn	*	*	x	
ne	-	*	*	x

Means are sig. diff. (.05).

Source: Own construction on the basis of Proyecto Cone Sul

The increasing levels of polarization observed in 1996 seem to have receded in 2002. Indeed, as in 1988, Table 5.17 suggests that the voters of both traditional Uruguayan parties did not hold significantly different ideological stances either on the regime divide (15.3%) or on the religious/secular one (20%) in 2002. However, the FA maintains (together with NE) a statist profile, which is coupled with a consistent pro-market stance of the voters of both traditional parties. In short, whereas Blancos and Colorados seem to have consolidated as an ideological family and display very similar profiles in the pro-reform side of the state/market divide, the left has consolidated as a party-family whose voters are consistently more statist and oppose to neoliberal reforms. Additionally, the decreasing level of polarization observed in the system is consistent with a pattern of centripetal competition between both partisan families. Finally, in this case, we do not find the transversal stratification of pro-market attitudes seen in Chile.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>107</sup>The total N for Nuevo Espacio is 5. For this reason, the estimates for this party are unreliable.

**Table 5.17:**


**Bonferroni post-hoc ANOVA test for Citizen Survey, Uruguay 2002**

State-Market	fa	pc	pn	ne
fa	x			
pc	*	x		
pn	*	-	x	
ne	-	*	*	x
Regime	fa	pc	pn	ne
fa	x			
pc	-	x		
pn	-	-	x	
ne	-	-	-	x
Rel/Elit-Sec/Part	fa	pc	pn	ne
fa	x			
pc	-	x		
pn	-	-	x	
ne	-	-	-	x

Means are sig. diff. (.05).


Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Valores Uruguay 2002.

**Map 5.27:**



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Valores Uruguay 2002.

Map 5.28:



Source: Own construction on the basis of Encuesta de Valores Uruguay 2002.

#### Predicting Partisan Coalitions on the Basis of Programmatic Divides

To complement and confirm the results of the factor analyses presented in the previous sections, I ran a series of four logistic regression models, two for the electorates of each country. In these regressions I seek to predict the intended vote for a partisan pact (Concertación vs. Alianza in Chile) or family (Left vs. Traditional Parties in Uruguay) on the basis of the three factors representing the moral, regime, and state/market divides. As well, I also controlled for left-right self-identifications and the educational level of the respondents. To capture the dynamic evolution of both systems, the first two series of models were run for the 1988 datasets and the latter two for the most recent available surveys in each country (2000 in Chile and 2002 in Uruguay).

Table 5.18 displays the obtained results for Chile in 1988. Both the regime and the state-market divide obtain highly significant coefficients that resist the inclusion of education (also significant) in the model. The comparison of odd ratios clearly suggests that the regime divide is by far the best predictor of intended vote for Concertación or the Alianza. Finally, when the left-right self-identification of respondents is included, the coefficient for the state-market divide loses its statistical significance. Table 5.19, in turn, displays the results obtained for Chile in 2000. Although the overall results are similar, this time once education is included in the model the only

significant programmatic divide is the regime one. This outcome confirms the transversal distribution of preferences in the state-market divide, with most educated voters consistently preferring less state intervention in spite of their partisan affiliation, and low educated voters taking opposite stances also independently of their partisan choices. It is also worth mentioning that even though the regime divide continues to obtain the most influential odd ratio; its size is considerably small this time.

**Table 5.18:**

**Chile 1988**

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Moral	.8	.85	.78	
State/Market	.71 (***)	.76 (*)	.8	
Regime	4.38 (***)	6.01 (***)	4.43 (***)	5.97 (***)
Education		.24 (***)	.25 (***)	.23 (***)
Left      Right Self- Placement			.78 (***)	
N	860	855	855	855
Log Likelihood	-203.65013	-180.28444	-175.76287	-182.99994
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.25	.33	.34	.31

Dependent Variable: 1=Would Vote for Concertación Party, 0=Would Vote for Alianza Party  
Reported coefficients are Odds Ratios (\*=.05, \*\*=.01, \*\*\*=.005)

**Table 5.19:**

**Chile 2000**

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Moral	1.0	1.2	.8	
State/Market	.79 (*)	.81	.8	
Regime (+Participation)	.32 (***)	.29 (***)	.38 (***)	.38 (***)
Education		.6 (***)	.63 (***)	.58 (***)
Left      Right Self- Placement			.000 (***)	.000 (***)
N	564	595	563	564
Log Likelihood	-293.09061	-284.4796	-188.07545	-190.00694
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.19	.21	.45	.44

Dependent Variable: 1=Would Vote for Concertación Party, 0=Would Vote for Alianza Party  
Reported coefficients are Odds Ratios (\*=.05, \*\*=.01, \*\*\*=.005)

As shown in Table 5.20, in 1988 none of the programmatic divides had a significant effect on the vote choice of Uruguayan citizens. The same applies to education and left-right identification, pointing to the absence of tangible programmatic or “sociological” class alignments in the system. However, the situation was very different in 2002 (Table 5.21). This time, both the state/market and the moral/popular participation divides obtained significant coefficients that resisted the inclusion of education in the models. The overall fit of these regressions is similar to that obtained for Chile. Finally, whereas the state/market divide continues to be a significant predictor of vote choice (obtaining a similar odd ratio than in the previous models) the variance explained by the moral/participation divide is best explained by the ideological self-identification of voters.

**Table 5.20:**

**Uruguay 1988**

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Moral	1.07	1.06	1.07
State/Market	.86	.84	.84
Regime	.97	1.02	1.01
Education		1.16	1.16
Left      Right Self- Placement			1.00
N	653	637	637
Log Likelihood	-435.9122	-423.15474	-423.15398
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.00	.00	.00

Dependent Variable: 1=Would Vote for Frente Amplio, 0=Would Vote for either Traditional Party  
Reported coefficients are Odds Ratios (\*=.05, \*\*=.01, \*\*\*=.005)

**Table 5.21:****Uruguay 2002**

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Modal 4
Moral (Participation)	1.39 (***)	1.27 (*)	1.16	
State/Market	.5 (***)	.52 (***)	.59 (**)	.6 (**)
Regime	.97	1.05	.91	
Education		1.47 (**)	1.22	
Left Right Self-Placement			.00 (***)	.00 (***)
N	420	391	359	388
Log Likelihood	-229.02367	-208.82834	-116.77645	-126.51921
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.09	.10	.45	.46

Dependent Variable: 1=Would Vote for Frente Amplio, 0=Would Vote for either Traditional Party  
 Reported coefficients are Odds Ratios (\*=.05, \*\*=.01, \*\*\*=.005)

**Summing up**

On the basis of the cross-national comparisons it is possible to conclude that the Chilean electorate, while segmented around the regime divide, is relatively less statist and secular than its Uruguayan counterpart. Meanwhile, democratic legitimacy is not contested in the latter case.

Additionally, I will claim that especially at the voter-level both party-systems have moved in opposite directions during the post-transitional period. Whereas the Chilean system evolved from class-based ideological competition to a system where ideological divergence has shrunk (with the exception of the regime divide), the Uruguayan system has evolved from a pattern of non-ideological competition during the first years of democratic recovery to one in which the state/market divide has recently become central in configuring two ideological families. Although partisan alignments are clear in both cases configuring two relatively well-defined partisan families in each system (the Concertación vs. the Alianza in Chile & the FA vs. the Traditional Parties in Uruguay), particularly at the voter level, Uruguayan parties tend to present higher levels of internal coherence than Chilean parties which stand out for their significant levels of internal ideological divergence (particularly but not exclusively on the state/market and moral divides) among voters

with different socioeconomic levels (measured through levels of education). This claim was also confirmed by a set of regression analyses.

As a result, whereas the Chilean system has increasingly evolved to a pattern of reduced programmatic linking between partisan elites (that maintain certain programmatic structure) and their bases (which lack very well defined programmatic preferences and only align relatively well with the regime divide), the Uruguayan party that lacked any type of programmatic structuring at the outset of the transition has progressively gained it with the competition of FA and both traditional parties on the state/market divide. Arguably, the Chilean linkage strategy “transition” correlates with increasing levels of voter alienation (blank votes, electoral abstention, and partisan dealignment) in the system. Hence, the overall empirical results are consistent with the expectations developed on the basis of a path-dependent analysis of the historical trajectory of each party system. This evidence confirms previous findings with respect to the Chilean electorate (Mainwaring and Torcal 2003) and for partisan leaders in each system (Hagopian 2001; Alcántara Sáez and Luna 2004).

However, two caveats apply. At least for the moment, the regime divide still separates camps in Chile between the voters of leftist and rightist political parties. Thus, only when supplemental evidence becomes available would it be possible to assert that today’s unique active ideological divide is clearly fading away in Chile, explaining the renewed centrality of non-ideological partisan linkages and the high levels of political alienation observed in the system. Meanwhile, the Communist Party continues to be a testament of the ideological polarization of the past.

Additionally, the Uruguayan case presented higher levels of polarization in 1996 than in 2002. As in 1996, partisan competition seemed to encompass other attitudes beyond the state/market dimension, such as views on democratic participation, the economic trade-offs of democratic politics, and moral issues. Although the basic distribution of the parties in each divide is stable after 1996, mean partisan positions on the regime and religious divide were not

significantly different in 2002. This situation might be explained by a process of moderation and centripetal competition (particularly on the part of Frente Amplio) after an initial period of political polarization in the context of the first serious reformist attempts (privatization of public enterprises and pension reform) pursued by the traditional parties under Lacalle's government (1990-1995). Those attempts were coupled by FA reliance on direct democracy mechanisms both to "veto" reforms and to try to enact "defensive" legislation. In particular, this argument is well-suited to explain the observed polarization around issues of democratic governance in which the voters of both traditional parties adhered to more elitist stances, opting for restricting popular participation in government.

In this chapter I have analyzed the configuration and distribution of partisan groups across three general programmatic divides without attempting to explore the degree of congruence between elite and mass programmatic stances. However, as argued in Chapter 2, programmatic structuring at both levels is only a pre-condition for the existence of programmatic linking, as under certain competitive scenarios parties can choose to downplay their divergences in order to compete for office and voters can choose to vote on the basis of non-programmatic linkages independently from their substantive preferences. It does not necessarily follow then that the relative levels of programmatic structuration seen in this chapter in both systems translate into consistent linking between parties and voters across ideological dimensions. Additionally, particularly in the Chilean case, we have already observed important levels of heterogeneity regarding the policy-preferences of partisan electorates. This might point to the presence of a clearly segmented linkage strategy in which parties chose to programmatically represent a fraction of its constituency, linking to other fractions on an alternative strategy.

In the next two chapters, I turn to an explicit analysis of issue-congruence in both systems on the basis of a set individual issues for which comparable data at both levels is available.

**CHAPTER VI**  
**ISSUE-CONGRUENCE AND THE HETEROGENEITY OF PROGRAMMATIC**  
**PREFERENCES OF PARTY ELECTORATES IN CHILE**

Introduction

In a democracy, programmatic representation can be defined as the extent to which party officials are responsive to the preferences of their electorates. This type of representation has been termed *mandate* or *issue* representation; it captures the degree of party correspondence to the preferences of its constituency (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Iversen 1994a and 1994b; Powell 1989 and 1982; Converse and Pierce 1986; Dalton 1985; Ranney 1962). Also called “responsible party government,” three conditions are central to its description: 1) policy divergence among the parties contesting the election; 2) policy stability on the part of the parties contesting the election; and 3) policy voting on the part of the electorate (Adams, 2001). The “issue congruence” paradigm describes and seeks to explain the degree to which parties and voters coordinate around their preferences on a given set of salient policy dimensions (Powell 2004).

In this chapter I present an overview of issue-congruence and parties’ electoral bases programmatic heterogeneity in Chile, drawing on available evidence for two periods: 1994-1996 and 1998-2000. However, given data limitations described in the next section, this should be taken as an exploratory exercise. Further replication with more appropriate data is necessary in the future.

The next chapter replicates the same analysis for the Uruguayan case and closes with a comparative portrayal of both systems from such a perspective. This chapter and Appendix II describe the methodological strategy I follow in order to map multi-dimensional issue-congruence

and voter heterogeneity in both systems. Additionally, this chapter describes the results obtained for Chile.

In substantive terms, the evidence I present in this chapter suggests that particularly along the regime divide, the Concertación and the Alianza map distinctively. Along the other two divides, it is possible to observe an internal split in the Concertación with the DC taking center-positions between the PS and the PPD and the parties of the right (UDI and RN). Drawing on the findings of Chapter 4, it is possible to conclude tentatively that in Chile, those alignments are substantially driven by the regime divide and by weaker associations with the state-market and moral divides (particularly at the elite level). Indeed, the regime divide is the one that shows the highest levels of issue-congruence across both periods considered, with the state-market divide obtaining the second greatest level, and the moral divide obtaining the lowest one. Notwithstanding, to fully account for representation in this system it is necessary to recall once again that an increasing number of Chileans refuse to align on such programmatic macro-dimension and/or do not align with political parties.

From a diachronic perspective it is possible to conclude that after a period of higher programmatic diffusion in the mid-1990s, the Chilean system seemed to regain greater structure. On the basis of the qualitative evidence presented in Chapter 7, this can be interpreted as a result of the impact of the economic slowdown suffered by the country in the late 1990s. For the first time, a recession put into question the economic model and allowed parties of the left (particularly at the elite level) to make greater emphasis on the need for increasing state regulation of the economy. Additionally, the system was also re-tensioned after Pinochet's detention in London during 1998, which revitalized the political identification of both main political camps in Chilean politics. Overall, this also translates into higher degrees of congruence regarding moral issues and those pertaining to the state-market divide. Nonetheless, it is necessary to stress that all the issues pertaining to the latter divide failed to produce simultaneously significantly different partisan positioning at the elite and voter levels. Concurrently, this is the divide (along with environmental

issues) along which the greatest gap between different educational cross-sections of the electorate are observed. Meanwhile, the regime divide seems to have marginally lost salience but continues to show a high degree of partisan-placement congruence across all cross-sections of the electorate.

At the congressional-elite level, this greater level of programmatic structure correlates to increasing polarization between the party with the most distinct programmatic profile at the right (the UDI) and the PS (at the left). The consolidation of the UDI (see chapter 9) as the mainstream opposition party drawing on discontent from corruption scandals and the economic slow-down and the nomination of PS-PPD's Ricardo Lagos as the presidential candidate of the Concertación to contest the 1999 national election with UDI's Joaquín Lavín coincide with such trend. Indeed, for the first time since the transition, Lagos's nomination produced a "leftist shift" within the Concertación, which until then was (at least symbolically) dominated by the DC. Alternatively, it could also be argued that the progressive withdrawal of a significant fraction of the electorate in Chile (arguably a less politically engaged and socialized group) could also have acted as a "purifying" mechanism through which those who continue to identify with parties and programmatic stances show greater levels of programmatic consistency, obscuring significant dealignment and alienation when the system is considered in its totality.

Indeed, beyond the greater level of polarization witnessed between the elites of the UDI and the PS in the later period, the system presents a centripetal pattern of competition, with voters from all parties collapsing towards the center of the programmatic spectrum and a lower degree of differentiation between voters from both electoral pacts. This observation is confirmed by the fact that both the elites of UDI and the PS are the ones that present the highest distance from their least educated voters. This is also evident when all the components of the system are accounted for, as all partisan groups of Chilean congressional representatives are closer to other elites and to the electoral bases of other parties than to the closest cross-section of their own voters. Consequently, comparing with the figures obtained for Uruguay (chapter 6), less distance between partisan elites and the electoral bases of other parties is observed in this system.

This evidence points to a central substantive implication for the analysis of party-voter linkages in Chile. In this respect, a seemingly paradoxical result is obtained. While increasingly programmatic politics are apparently taking place at the elite level; those partisan elites confront greater difficulties in communicating these positions to their electorates and in carrying those supporters along on such basis. Those difficulties are especially salient when relating to voters with lower levels of education. Furthermore, on the basis of the evidence presented in chapter 4 it is possible to conclude that so far, elites' increasing levels of programmatic divergence do not seem to provide enough incentives for alienated voters to identify with parties and/or return to the electoral arena. As further elaborated in subsequent chapters, this configuration is precisely what opens the way for the seemingly paradoxical coexistence of programmatic politics between partisan elites and highly-educated voters and non-programmatic linkages predominating between the same partisan elites and the less educated and lower social strata that identify with parties. In this context, and on the basis of the information presented in this chapter, it is possible to conclude that the recent electoral success of the PPD (in the Congressional elections of 1997) and the UDI (in 1999-2001) correlated with a high degree of heterogeneity in those parties' electoral bases. Therefore, parties that were simultaneously able to develop programmatic-linkages with highly educated voters and non-programmatic appeals to attract less-educated voters were able to make substantial electoral inroads in the post-transitional system.

## Methods

To map the degree of “perfect” issue representation present in a given polity, a researcher would need to design or obtain a dataset that complies with the following criteria: a) a set of issues that exhausts the salient dimensions of political competition in the system while excluding irrelevant (noisy) dimensions of political competition in the system;<sup>109</sup> b) a set of identical indicators (including survey timing) that measures issue-preferences on each dimension on each

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<sup>109</sup>To comply with this assumption issue-salience estimations should be available.

desired analytical level (e.g. party congressional leaders, party activists, party members, voters); c) a sufficiently large sample (N) to establish significant comparisons between different cross-sections of the electorate (e.g. beyond partisanship, once could compare by education levels, class, gender, political interest and/or efficacy, etc.), and d) it is also highly recommended to use standardized scales across issues in order to assure equal weighting to each issue (Clausen 1998). Finally, if one is interested in mapping the diachronic evolution of partisan competition on ideological linkages, the researcher should have access to a set of comparable measures across time and at both levels.

With these pieces of information at hand, one can assign relative importance to issues and map how partisan representatives and party voters align across measurement scales based on the same metric and question reactive. However, when salience measures are not available, the relative importance of each issue is difficult to assert. In addition, when issue-questions are heterogeneous either in terms of question formulation, metric, or both “perfect issue-congruence” cannot be measured as different metrics or question-wording across levels could lead to misleading inferences.<sup>110</sup>

Unfortunately, for Chile and Uruguay (and probably for others in Latin America) neither identical questionnaires nor independent salience measures are available. Facing these important constraints, the evidence I present in this and the following chapter draws on the (imperfect) data currently available, constructed on the basis of triangulating roughly concurrent data from the World Value Survey and the Encuesta de Valores 2002 (Uruguay) and the Latin America Congressional Representatives Survey conducted by the Universidad de Salamanca. Although the nature of the data hinders the analysis of “perfect issue-congruence” we can still observe the relative placement of congressional representatives and voters on a given set of issues analyzing the degree of “ordinal” congruence across both levels (“relative issue-congruence”).

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<sup>110</sup>See Appendix II for a definition and discussion of perfect and relative issue congruence. See also Kitschelt et al 1999.

**Table 6.1:**

**Pairs of questions constructed to reflect underlying issues to map relative issue-congruence on the basis of WVS (Third Wave) and Salamanca Legislators Survey (First Wave)\***

Constructed Issue, label, and coding.	WVS Third Wave Original → Re-codification (Chilean /Uruguay Voters 1996)	WVS Fourth Wave Original → Re-codification (Chilean Voters 2000)	Encuesta de Valores Uruguay 2002 (Values Survey Uruguay 2002) → Re-codification (Uruguayan Voters 2002) Unavailable	Salamanca Elite Survey, First Wave Original → Re-codification (Chile -1994-, Uruguay Elites 1996)	Salamanca Elite Survey, Second Wave Original → Re-codification (Chile -1998-, Uruguay Elites 2001)
Privatization= <b>PRIVATIZATION</b> (lower values → private ownership)	V126, Wording: How would you place your views on this scale? 1) Private ownership of business and industry should be increased/10) Government ownership of business and industry should be decreased. V126 → PRIVATI= (V126/10)	V142, Same as in WVS Third Wave V142 → PRIVATI= (V142/10)		P42 and P43, Wording: Currently, which of the following statements best represents your attitude towards [state industry (P42)/public services (P43)]? 1) Total privatization, 2) Privatization of low-profitable enterprises, 3) Keep key strategic sectors in the public domain, 4) Keep things as they are now (option not read but accepted if respondent spontaneously suggests it), 5) Keep every industry and service in the public domain. P42+P43 →PRIVATI= (P42+P43)/10	P42 and P43, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave P42+P43 →PRIVATI= (P42+P43)/10

**Table 6.1 (cont.)**

Left-Right <b>LEFTRIGHT</b> (lower values →left)	V123, Wording: In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? 1) Left/ 10)Right. V123 → LEFTRIGHT= (123/10)	V139, Same as in WVS Third Wave V139→ LEFTRIGHT= (139/10)	V41, Same as in WVS Third Wave V41 → LEFTRIGHT= (41/10)	P67, Wording: As you know, when people talk about politics they usually refer to “left” and “right.” Here you have a scale with positions from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right). In which of these positions would you place yourself according to your political ideals. P67→ LEFTRIGHT= (P67/10)	P67, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave P67→ LEFTRIGHT= (P67/10)
Divorce <b>DIVORCE</b> (lower values → against)	V200, Wording: Please tell me for the following statement (divorce) whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card (scale from 1=Never justifiable/10=Always Justifiable). V200→DIVORCE= (V200)/10	V211, Same as in WVS Third Wave. V211→DIVORCE= (V211)/10	V61_9, Same wording than in WVS 3, but using a 5-point scale where 1=Never justifiable and 5=Always Justifiable. V61_9→ DIVORCE= (V61_9)/5	P73, Wording: Which is your personal opinion on divorce: 1) totally supports it, 3) only supports it under specific circumstances, 5) totally against it. P73 → DIVORCE= [P73rec= (1=5) (5=1) (3=3) → (P73rec)/5]	P73, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave P73 → DIVORCE= [P73rec= (1=5) (5=1) (3=3) → (P73rec)/5]

**Table 6.1 (cont.)**

<p>Abortion <b>ABORTION</b> (lower values → against)</p>	<p>V199, Wording: Please tell me for the following statement (abortion) whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card (scale from 1=Never justifiable/10=Always Justifiable). V199→ABORTION=(V199)/10</p>	<p>V210, Same as in WVS Third Wave. V210→DIVORCE=(V210)/10</p>	<p>V61_8, Same wording than in WVS 3 but using a 5-point scale where 1=Never justifiable and 5=Always Justifiable. V61_8→ABORTION=(V61_8)/5</p>	<p>P74, Wording: Which is your personal opinion on abortion? 1) totally supports it, 3) only supports it under specific circumstances, 5) totally against it. P74 → ABORTION=[P74rec= (1=5) (5=1) (3=3) → (P74rec)/5]</p>	<p>P74, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave P74 → DIVORCE=[P74rec= (1=5) (5=1) (3=3) → (P74rec)/5]</p>
<p>Corruption <b>CORRUPTION</b> (lower values → no perceived corruption)</p>	<p>V213, Wording: How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country? 1) Almost no public officials are engaged in it, 4) Almost all public officials are engaged in it. V213→CORRUPT=[V213rec= (1=4, 4=1, 2=3, 3=2)→V213rec/4]</p>	<p>Unavailable</p>	<p>Unavailable</p>	<p>P37a15, Wording: I will now cite certain problems that are frequent in many countries. Would you please tell me how important each of these problems (corruption) currently is in your country? 1) Very unimportant, 2) Unimportant, 3) More or less important, 4) Important, 5) Very Important. P37a15 → CORRUPT=(P37a15/5)</p>	<p>P37a15, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave, but using a 4-point scale where: 1) Very unimportant and 5) Very Important. P37a15 → CORRUPT=(P37a15/4)</p>

**Table 6.1 (cont.)**

Democratic Legitimacy <b>DEMLEG</b> (lower values → more legitimacy)	V163, Wording: I am going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you: 1) strongly agree, 2) agree, 3) disagree, 4) strongly disagree (Statement: Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government). V163→DEMLEG=V163/4	V172, Same as in WVS Third Wave. V172→DEMLEG=V172/4	V45_b, Same as in WVS Third Wave. V45_b→DEMLEG=V45_b	P3a, Wording: Even in a context of economic crisis and political instability, to what extent do you agree that democracy is always preferable to any other political regime? 1) strongly agree, 2) agree, 3) disagree, 4) strongly disagree. P37a →DEMLEG=(P3a/4)	P3a, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave, but using a 2-point scale where: 1) Agrees and 2) Disagrees. P37a →DEMLEG=(P3a/2)
Democracy is preferable even in the context of economic crisis and disorder <b>DEMLEGII</b> (lower values → more legitimacy)	V160, Wording: I am going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you: 1) strongly agree, 2) agree, 3) disagree, 4) strongly disagree (Statements, V160: In democracy the economic system runs badly; v162: Democracies aren't good at maintaining order) → V160rec and V162 rec (1=4, 4=1, 2=3, 3=2), DEMLEGII=(V160rec+v162rec)/8	V169 and V171, Same as in WVS Third Wave. V160rec and V162 rec (1=4, 4=1, 2=3, 3=2), DEMLEGII=(V169rec+v171rec)/8	P45e and P45f, Same as in WVS Third Wave. P45erec and P45frec (1=4, 4=1, 2=3, 3=2) DEMLEGII=(P45erec+p45frec)/8	P3a 1, Wording: In a context of economic crisis and political instability, to what extent do you agree with the statement that democracy is always preferable to other regimes? 1) strongly agree, 2) agree, 3) disagree, 4) strongly disagree → DEMLEGII=P3a/4	P3_1, Wording: With which of the following statements do you agree more: 1) Democracy is always preferable to other regimes, 2) In a context of economic crisis and political instability an authoritarian regime might be preferable to democracy → DEMLEGII=P3_1/2

**Table 6.1 (cont.)**

State intervention to de-commodify <b>INTESTA</b> (lower values →minimal intervention)	V125, Wording: How would you place your views on this scale? 1) Incomes should be made more equal/10) We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort. V125→INTESTA=[V125rec (1=10, 2=9, 3=8, 4=7, 5=6, 6=5, 7=4, 8=3, 9=2, 10=1)→(V125rec)/10]	V141, Same as in WVS Third Wave. V141→INTESTA=[V141rec (1=10, 2=9, 3=8, 4=7, 5=6, 6=5, 7=4, 8=3, 9=2, 10=1)→(V141rec)/10]	P42, Same as in WVS Third Wave. P42 →INTESTA=[V42rec (1=10, 2=9, 3=8, 4=7, 5=6, 6=5, 7=4, 8=3, 9=2, 10=1)→(V42rec)/10]	P35a03, P35a06, P35a08 and P35a02, Wording: In general, how much intervention do you think the state should have in each of the following activities? 1) minimum intervention, 5) maximum intervention. (Activities: P35a03 housing policy, P35a06 (social security), P35a08 (unemployment insurance), P35a02 (primary education). P35a03, P35a06, P35a08 and P35a02→INTESTA=[(P35a03+P35a06+P35a08+P35a02)/20]	P35a03, P35a06, P35a08 and P35a02. Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave, but using a 4-point scale in reverse order where: 1) maximum intervention and 4) minimum intervention. P35a03, P35a06, P35a08 and P35a02→INTESTA=[P35a03re P35a06re, P35a08re, P35a02re (1=4, 4=1, 2=3, 3=2)], →(P35a03re+P35a06re+P35a08re+P35a02re)/16
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**Table 6.1 (cont.)**

<p>Social Policy <b>POLSOC</b> (lower values →maximum intervention)</p>	<p>V127, Wording: How would you place your views on this scale? 1) The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for/10) People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. V127 → POLSOC= (v127/10)</p>	<p>V143, Same as in WVS Third Wave. V143 → POLSOC= (v143/10)</p>	<p>P42a2, Wording: Which of these statements better represents your views regarding the type of society this country should aspire to consolidate in the future? 1) a society with an extensive welfare state and with high levels of taxation, 2) a society with low taxes in which individual seeks to provide for itself. P42a2 → POLSOC=(P42a2/2)</p>	<p>P35a10, Wording: In general, how much intervention do you think the state should have in each of the following activities? 1) minimum intervention, 5) maximum intervention. (Activity: Cover the basic needs of every citizen) →POLSOC=P35a10 rec(1=5, 2=4, 3=3, 4=2, 5=1) → (P35a10re)/5</p>	<p>P35a10, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave, but using a 4-point scale in reverse order where: 1) minimum intervention and 4) maximum intervention. →POLSOC=(P35a10)/5</p>
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**Table 6.1 (cont.)**

<p>Importance of fighting inflation  <b>INFLATION</b>  (lower values → very important)</p>	<p>V237c, Wording: I will read you some goals which different people consider more or less important for this country. Could you please tell me how important you consider each of one of these goals to be: would you say it is 1) very important, 2) important, 3) not very important, 4) not important at all (Statement: V237c: Fighting rising prices).  V237c →  INFLATION=(V237c/4)</p>	<p>Unavailable</p>	<p>P37. If you had to choose one of the following goals, which one seems more important to you? 1) Maintain social order, 2) Give people more say in government decisions, 3) Fight against rising prices, 4) Protect the right of expression.  A new variable was created (INFLATION) assigning a value of 0 when option 3 is chosen and a value of 1 when option 3 is not chosen.</p>	<p>P37a01, Wording: I will now cite certain problems that are frequent in many countries. Would you please tell me what level of importance each of these problems (inflation) currently has in your country? 1) high importance, 2) important, 3) middle importance, 4) low importance, 5) very low importance.  P37a15 →  INFLATION  =(P37a01/5)</p>	<p>P35a01, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave, but using a 4-point scale.  P37a15 →  INFLATION  =(P37a01/4)</p>
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**Table 6.1 (cont.)**

<p>Importance of giving people a say in government  <b>MORESAY</b>  (lower values → very important)</p>	<p>V237b, Wording: I will read you some goals which different people consider more or less important for this country. Could you please tell me how important you consider each of one of these goals to be: would you say it is 1) very important, 2) important, 3) not very important, 4) not important at all (Statement: V237b: Giving people more say in important government decisions). V237b → <math>\text{MORESAY} = (\text{V237b}/4)</math></p>	<p>V120, Wording: In your opinion, which of the following objectives is the most important one for this country in the coming years: 1) a high-rate of economic growth, 2) assure that the country has a strong army, 3) try to increase the level of popular participation in government, 4) improve our cities and countryside. A new variable was created (<b>MORESAY</b>) assigning a value of 0 when option 3 is chosen and a value of 1 when option 3 is not chosen.</p>	<p>P37. If you had to choose one of the following goals, which one seems more important to you? 1) Maintain social order, 2) Give people more say in government decisions, 3) Fight against rising prices, 4) Protect the right of expression. A new variable was created (<b>MORESAY</b>) assigning a value of 0 when option 2 is chosen and a value of 1 when option 3 is not chosen.</p>	<p>P37a10, Wording: I will now cite certain problems that are frequent in many countries. Would you please tell me what level of importance each of these problems (democratization of political life and institutions) currently has in your country? 1) high importance, 2) important, 3) middle importance, 4) low importance, 5) very low importance. P37a10 → <math>\text{MORESAY} = (\text{P37a10}/5)</math>.</p>	<p>P35a10, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave, but using a 4-point scale. P35a10 → <math>\text{MORESAY} = (\text{P35a10}/4)</math></p>
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**Table 6.1 (cont.)**

Importance of environmental policy <b>ENVIRONM</b> (lower values → very important)	V41, Wording: Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view: 1) Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs, 2) Economic growth and creating jobs should be top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent. V41 → ENVIRONM = (V41/2)	V36, Same as in WVS Third Wave. V36 → ENVIRONM = (V36/2)	P10, Same as in WVS Third Wave. P10 → ENVIRONM = (VP10/2)	P37a13, Wording: I will now cite certain problems that are frequent in many countries. Would you please tell me what level of importance each of these problems (the environment) currently has in your country? 1) high importance, 2) important, 3) middle importance, 4) low importance, 5) very low importance. P37a13 → ENVIRONM = (P37a13/5).	P37a13, Same as in Salamanca Elite Survey First Wave, but using a 4-point scale. P35a10 → MORESAY = (P37a13/4)
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\*Labels in caps identify notation to be used in maps. Shaded columns correspond to the data analyzed for the first period, white columns correspond to the data analyzed for the second period.

Replicating the methodology used in Luna and Zechmeister (2005) on the basis of a set of questions from the Latinobarometer 1998, I first proceeded to match issue-position questions applied to voters and congressional representatives in each case. Table 6.1 presents details on question wording and the processes of question matching and metric transformation pursued here in order to create comparable issue items at each level. The assumption that guided the matching process is that beyond wording differences, the specific questions administered at each level relate to a shared underlying ideological predisposition or political attitude that can be matched across levels.<sup>111</sup> To facilitate analytic comparisons, all the variables were standardized to a 0-1 range.

#### *Mapping single-issue congruence*

To provide a first glance at the data, issue-congruence graphs are displayed for each period and issue. On the basis of this information and seeking a more systematic analysis of issue-congruence, I replicated the analytical strategy applied in Luna and Zechmeister (2005) for analyzing similar data. This strategy is based on the combination of two criteria: a) the existing congruence between partisan placements at the elite and base levels and b) the presence of significant differences between the mean positioning of different partisan groups at each level. As stated by the authors:

A critical decision for our analysis was how exactly to measure representation. In all studies, this decision substantially hinges on the conceptual definition of representation subscribed to by the researchers. In our case, in accord with our earlier discussion, we adhere to the “issue congruence” approach, which analyzes the correspondence between the electorate and its party representatives across a set of salient policy dimensions (Powell, 2001).<sup>112</sup> In examining issue congruence between party elites and party electorates, two basic features of their position-taking were of primary importance to us: first, on a given issue, do party electorates and party elites “line up” in the same order? and, second, are elites offering clear and distinct alternatives and/or are party electorates distinguished from one another on that issue?

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<sup>111</sup> Whenever this assumption seemed risky, the decision was not to include the issue in the dataset.

<sup>112</sup> Although two subsequent measures are available, it is important to recognize that this still is probably not sufficient in order to measure accountability representation, where the incumbent party selects policies unconstrained by party platforms or promises and voters act retrospectively, retaining the incumbent party only when that party or politician delivers good output (Alesina, 1988; Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin, 1999; Stokes, 1999). In addition, it is also difficult to assess whether the political elite follow or reflect citizens’ preferences or engage in issue-leadership (Miller and Stokes, 1963; see also Hurley and Hill 2001 and Page and Shapiro, 1983).

Our initial step consisted of measuring these two components (ordering and divides) [...] We first measured the degree of coherence in the ordering of party supporters/members by the correlation between the mean placements of the party electorates and the mean placements of party legislators. Following Achen's (1978, 1977) methodological suggestions and the basics of Kitschelt et.al.'s (1999) empirical strategy, we analyzed the consistency of elite and mass mean positions on each issue by computing correlation and regression coefficients. Given that the regression and correlation analysis results were highly consistent, we rely primarily on the latter [...] (Therefore,) we first measured the degree of coherence in the ordering of party supporters/members by the correlation between the mean placements of the party electorates and the mean placements of party legislators. We reduced the correlation results into three categories: a strong positive correlation ( $r > 0.50$ ), a weak correlation ( $-0.50 < r < 0.50$ ), and a strong negative correlation ( $r < -0.50$ ). Second, we used ANOVA analyses to create four potential categories for the second component: significant elite divide and significant mass divide; significant elite divide but no significant mass divide; no significant elite divide but significant mass divide; and, no significant elite nor mass divide. (ANOVA analyses, and the supplemental Bonferroni tests we ran, using the means and standard deviations we obtained for each party, at each level and on each issue, allowed us to assess whether mean placements are significantly different. For example, if the analyses detect any significant difference of means among party supporters, we consider that a case of Mass Divide.) Due to the small sample sizes, we use a significance cut-off of  $p$  less than 0.10. Combining our two measures yields 12 categories with which to describe each issue. The resulting 3 x 4 chart looks as follows:

Chart 1. Representation Types

		CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ELITE AND MASS PARTISAN MEAN POSITIONS		
		$r > .50$	$-.50 < r < .50$	$r < -.50$
<b>SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE S WITHIN ELITE AND/OR MASS PARTISAN POSITIONS?</b>	<b>Y/Y</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>
	<b>Y/N</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>
	<b>N/Y</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11</b>
	<b>N/N</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>

In examining the different categories identified by our chart, we had to ask ourselves, what combination of results (described by our two measures) indicates "good" or "bad" issue representation? In other words, our next step was to assess the degree of representation indicated by each category in the above chart. We began by recognizing that the upper-left and upper-right corners indicate the furthest extremes. That is, where there are clear, significant divides among elite and mass positions *and* a strong, positive correlation between the elite and mass mean positions, we have a case of strong representation *success* (upper-left cell; cell 1). In contrast, where there are clear partisan divides among the elites and the masses *and* where there is a strong, negative correlation between the elite and mass mean positions, we have a case of strong representation *failure* (upper-right cell; cell 9). In other words, party elites and party supporters are taking distinct stances, but party supporters are linking to party elites that hold exactly contrary positions.

Looking at the first column, where there is a strong, positive correlation between the ordering of elite and mass mean party positions, we consider that each row is a progressively weaker case of representation. That is, if party elites and masses are arrayed in essentially the same order, but there

is no significant divide among the masses, then that (cell 2) is a slightly weaker case than found in the upper-left cell. On the other hand, because we believe representation hinges significantly on clear signals sent by elites and because elites have higher levels of political sophistication and should otherwise be able to exhibit greater coherence on an issue, representation is a bit weaker in the case where there is a significant mass divide but no significant elite divide (cell 3). Finally, where elite and mass partisans are arrayed in a consistent ordering, but there are no significant divides registered among the party means for either group, we consider that there is some, but very minimal level of representation on that issue (cell 4).

The second column is less straight-forward (cells 5-8). On the one hand, if there are significant divides among elites and/or masses, but not a consistent ordering, this may indicate a state of flux in which the *potential* for strong representation exists. On the other hand, we cannot be certain of the direction the party system is likely to take from this middle column – that is, whether it is likely to move toward strong representation success or failure. We are therefore left with the consideration that these cells represent ambiguous representation outcomes.

Finally, the third column is close to a mirror opposite of the first column. As already indicated, the upper-right cell shows a case of strong representation failure (cell 9). The lower-right cell is clearly a case of poor representation (cell 12), but less so than the cells above it because of the fact that neither the elites nor masses take significantly different stances on the issue. This cell might reflect issues that are simply not salient among voters or party elites. Where there is a significant divide among masses, but not elites, and a strong, negative correlation, we consider this a relatively worse case of representation than where there is a significant divide among elite, but not masses and a strong, negative correlation. Our rationale here is that it should be more difficult to detect a significant divide among the masses than elites (given the lower levels of political sophistication, for example); and, therefore, if there are clear partisan divides among the masses, but elites are arrayed in the wrong direction and not taking clear positions, this then is a stronger case of representation failure (cell 11; the voters are expressing differences that are not matched by the elites) than when there are partisan differences among the elites that are not reflected among the masses (cell 10).

Chart 2. Representation Scheme for Scoring Issues

		CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ELITE AND MASS PARTISAN MEAN POSITIONS		
		$r > .50; b > 1.00$	$-.50 < r < .50$	$r < -.50$
<b>SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES WITHIN ELITE AND/OR MASS PARTISAN POSITIONS?</b>	<b>Y/Y</b>	<b>2.0 (STRONG REP. SUCCESS)</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>-2.0 (STRONG REP. FAILURE)</b>
	<b>Y/N</b>	<b>1.5 (WEAKER REP. SUCCESS)</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>-1.0 (POTENTIAL REP. FAILURE)</b>
	<b>N/Y</b>	<b>1.0 (STILL WEAKER REP. SUCCESS)</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>-1.5 (POTENTIAL STRONG REP. FAILURE)</b>
	<b>N/N</b>	<b>0.5 (WEAKEST REPRESENTATI ON)</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>-0.5 (POTENTIAL REP. FAILURE)</b>

Our third step was to assign values to each cell that reflect the above assessments. We opted to have these values range from 2.0 to -2.0. Chart 2 shows the values we assigned to each cell. Clearly, there is some degree of bluntness, and some room for error, in our method of assigning values to these cells. To check the robustness of our results, we considered several other scoring systems. The different schemes all considered the first column to indicate some, descending level of representation success, and the last column to indicate different levels of representation failure. These schemes differed mainly according to whether we assigned some non-zero value to the cells in the middle column and/or made slight changes to the lower three cells in the first and last columns. Table 2 shows the distribution of the cases (issues) across the twelve cells. As the table shows, the majority of the cases fall into the first column, and relatively few cases fall into the first three cells of the second and third columns. Likely as a result of the distribution of cases, the alternative scoring schemes we attempted did not produce significantly different results (the correlation between the results of any two schemes we found reasonable and tested was above 0.90 in every case).<sup>113</sup>

Given my interest in accounting for issue-congruence heterogeneity, I applied this strategy both for aggregate partisan placements at each level (citizens and elites) and for the two extreme groups on the educational ladder (“low educated” voters that had at most completed primary education and “highly educated” voters who had at least attended a year of college). On this basis I computed representation scores (adding up the partial scores obtained by each group in each issue and dividing that amount per the number of available issues) both for the general population and for these two sub-samples. Additionally, I decided to compute partial scores for groups of issues representing a particular programmatic divide. The classification of issues is shown in Table 6.2. On top of the three already familiar divides, I created an additional one representing “governance” issues. The fifth divide is a residual category that comprises issues that do not fit well in the others. Whereas the left-right self-identification of voters and leaders is considered for the computation of the overall representation score (achieving the maximum possible value in both countries for both measures and every educational level), it was explicitly excluded from the construction of partial issue bundles.

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<sup>113</sup>Luna and Zechmeister (2005), pages 402-406.

**Table 6.2:**

**Classification of individual issues into programmatic divides**

Regime	Moral	State-Market	Governance	Other Issues	Overall Representation Score
Demleg1 Demleg2	Abortion Divorce	Privatization Intesta PolSoc	Corruption Moresay	Inflation Environment	All substantive issues + Left - Right Self-Placements

*Mapping multidimensional issue- congruence*

Although theoretically desirable, effective ways of assessing the extent and nature of multi-dimensional issue-congruence are still lacking in the literature (Powell 2004). In Appendix II, I present a descriptive methodological strategy centered on Correspondence Analysis (CA) to tackle that deficit. Such technique provides a way to explore the nature of ideological representation and competition in a given party system by constructing a simple-to-interpret map on the basis of a multi-dimensional set of issues.

Furthermore, CA provides three complementary features: a) an exploration of the dimensionality of the set of issues and a consistent reduction of that set into two or three dimensions; b) the possibility to use supplementary points to map other groupings of interest (small parties, socio-demographic groups, functional categories, partisan alignments in a previous or subsequent time period) or less salient issues without altering the inertia of the constructed dimensions; and c) given a large enough sample, the ability to split partisan groups (or other relevant subjects) into multiple subcategories among which issue-congruence can be traced and analyzed.

Drawing on the second of those features, one-way ANOVA analyses with issues as dependent variables and partisan groups as factors were used to select a subset of issues in which

partisan placements differed significantly, leaving other issues as supplementary points.<sup>114</sup> Additionally, given their small sample sizes and the lack of congressional representatives for the Communist Party in Chile, I also decided to treat that party and the NE (in Uruguay) as supplementary points.<sup>115</sup>

As fully described in Appendix II, CA also provides the opportunity to work with ordinal rankings which is ideal for treating heterogeneous issue-questions across levels. Therefore, ordinal rankings were computed for each variable (separately) at each specific level (e.g. three educational cross-sections of voters and congressional leaders).<sup>116</sup> The rationale justifying these transformations is straightforward. If both original variables reflect similar underlying attitudes on a salient issue, independently from stochastic variations in terms of question wording and metric, and under a situation in which ideological linkages predominate, the voters and their corresponding party leaders should obtain similar rankings on the issue.

The most relevant results of CA are the bi-dimensional maps it produces.<sup>117</sup> This maps display the relative placements of research subjects (in this case, partisan elites and voters) in a multidimensional issue-space. Those subjects that are placed in proximate positions share a similar profile in terms of the issue-space. Likewise, partisan components that are placed the farthest apart are those with most distinct profiles in such space.

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<sup>114</sup>The F-statistic of the ANOVA test would be significant if within group variance (inside a partisan group) is significantly lower than that observed between groups (different partisan groups). In this case I used a .05 threshold to adjudicate results. This ANOVA results are the same reported below in Table 3.

<sup>115</sup>For further discussion on supplementary points see Appendix II.

<sup>116</sup>The tables corresponding to each CA presented in this and the following Chapter are also displayed in Appendix II. When ties between cases existed in the original variables, the mean of corresponding ranking positions was imputed to both cases.

<sup>117</sup>Note that the chi-square test is not relevant for this type of CA. See Clausen (1998).

### *Assessing Partisan Heterogeneity*

Finally, to conclude on the internal heterogeneity of partisan programmatic preferences, I decided to compute proximity matrices between each partisan element (voters from all educational cross-sections and congress-members). This was done by drawing on a Euclidean distance measure and by inputting all ordinal issue-positions as the criteria for analyzing distances between partisan components. While complete dissimilarity matrices are included in Appendix II, in this and the following chapter I report a summary table for each case based on partisan elites' distances with other relevant groups.

#### Single Issue-Congruence in Chile

Table 6.3 displays the summary results obtained for Chile regarding single-issue-congruence.<sup>118</sup> As shown in that Table, in 1994-1996, four of the twelve issues obtained the maximum representation score of 2. Whereas the first of those issues is the left-right macro-dimension, the other three are concentrated in the state-market (privatization and intesta) and regime divides (demlegII). Additionally, two other issues obtained positive scores: demlegI (also corresponding to the regime divide) and moresay (governance). In these six issues, it is possible to observe significant partisan divergence (at least at one level) and relatively consistent placements of elites and masses. Nonetheless, as shown in figures 6.1-6.12, the programmatic spread of elites is systematically greater than the one observed at the mass level, with the exceptions of the left-right dimension and demlegI.

Meanwhile, one of the issues representing the moral divide (divorce) is the one that obtained the lowest representation score (-1.5), with the remaining five issues representing intermediate situations (scoring 0).

Additionally, it is worth noting that with the exception of moral issues and the degree of preferred state intervention in the economy to correct for income differentials (where the elites of

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<sup>118</sup>Detailed tables for each issue are provided in Appendix II.

the DC appear relatively closer to the parties of the Alianza), both partisan blocks (the Concertación and the Alianza) configure distinctively (figures 6.1-6.12).

Figure 6.1:




Figure 6.2:




Figure 6.3:




Figure 6.4:




Figure 6.5:




Figure 6.6:




Figure 6.7:




Figure 6.8:




Figure 6.9:




Figure 6.10:




Figure 6.11:




Figure 6.12:




Table 6.3:

## Issue-Congruence Scores for Chile 1994-1996/1998-2000\*

Issue	Chile			
Left-Right	Significant Differences <sup>B</sup>	R	#Pairwise differences <sup>A</sup>	Representation Scenario
Elites 1	PS-UDI/RN/PDC* PPD-RN/UDI*		5	
Elites 2	PS-UDI/RN/PDC/PPD* PPD-RN/UDI/PS* UDI-PS/PPD/PDC/RN* PDC-PS/RN/UDI*		9	
CAP	PC-PS/PPD/PDC/UDI/RN* PS-PC/PDC/UDI/RN* PS-PPD# PPD-PC/PDC/UDI/RN* UDI-PC/PS/PDC/PPD RN-PC/PS/PDC/PPD	.99	7	2
Electorates 2	UDI-PDC/RN/PS/PPD/PC* PDC-UDI/RN/PS/PPD/PC* RN-PDC/UDI/PPD/PS/PC* PPD-PDC/RN/UDI/PS/PC* PS-PDC/UDI/RN/PPD/PC* PC-PDC/RN/UDI/PS/PPD*	.97	10	2
Electorates 1 LE	UDI-PS/PC/PPD* PPD-RN# RN-PS/PC*	.99	3	2
Electorates 1 HE	UDI/RN-PDC/PPD/PS/PC* PDC/UDI-RN-PS-PC* PS-UDI/RN/PDC* PC-UDI/RN/PDC/PPD*	.98	10	2
Electorates 2 LE	UDI/RN-PDC/PPD/PS/PC* PDC/UDI-RN-PS-PC* PS-UDI/RN/PDC* PC-UDI/RN/PDC/PPD*	.96	10	2
Electorates 2 HE	UDI/RN-PDC/PPD/PC* UDI/RN-PS* PS-PDC*	.95	8	2
<b>DemlegI</b>				
Elites 1	No		0	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	UDI/RN-PPD/PDC* PS-RN*	.88	5	1
Electorates 2	UDI/RN-PPD/PDC/PS* PPD-PC* PC-RN#	.17	6	0
Electorates 1 LE	No	.55	0	.5
Electorates 1 HE	No	.94	0	.5
Electorates 2 LE	UDI/RN-PS/PPD/PDC*	.14	6	0
Electorates 2 HE	UDI/RN-PPD/PDC* RN-PS* UDI-PS#	.26	5	0

Table 6.3 (cont.)

<b>DemlegII</b>				
Elites 1	UDI-PDC/PS/PPD*		3	
Elites 2	RN-DC*		1	
Electorates 1	UDI/RN-PPD/PC* UDI/RN-PS/PDC#	.85	2	2
Electorates 2	UDI-RN/PPD-PDC-PS-PC*	.99	4	2
Electorates 1 LE	No	.17	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	UDI-PPD*/PCD#	.95	1	2
Electorates 2 LE	UDI-RN/PDC-PS-PPD* PC-RN*	.98	4	2
Electorates 2 HE	UDI-RN/PDC-PS-PPD* PC-RN/UDI*	.95	4	2
<b>Moresay</b>				
Elites 1	DC-UDI/RN*		2	
Elites 2	DC-UDI* PPD-UDI*/RN# PS-UDI/RN*		4	
Electorates 1	No	.59	0	1.5
Electorates 2	PPD-RN*	.85	1	2
Electorates 1 LE	No	-0.00	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	No	.53	0	1.5
Electorates 2 LE	No	.57	0	1.5
Electorates 2 HE	No	.93	0	1.5
<b>Corruption</b>				
Elites 1	No		0	
Elites 2	DC-RN*		1	
Electorates 1	No	.34	0	0
Electorates 1 LE	No	-.17	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	No	-.64	0	-.5
<b>Inflation</b>				
Elites 1	RN-DC*		1	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	No	-.34	0	0
Electorates 1 LE	No	.37	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	No	.84	0	1.5

Table 6.3 (cont.)

<b>Privatization</b>				
Elites 1	RN/UDI-PPD/PDC/PS*		6	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	PC-UDI* PC-PPD/PDC#	.73	0	2
Electorates 2	PS-PDC/UDI/RN/PPD/PC*	.90	4	1
Electorates 1 LE	No	.96	0	2
Electorates 1 HE	No	.6	0	2
Electorates 2 LE	PS-PPD*	.36	1	0
Electorates 2 HE	No	.93	0	.5
<b>Inteesta</b>				
Elites 1	RN-DC* PPD-RN*/UDI#		2	
Elites 2	PPD/PS-UDI*		2	
Electorates 1	PC/PDC-UDI#	.56	0	2
Electorates 2	No	.66	0	1.5
Electorates 1 LE	No	-.32	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	UDI-PDC*	.89	1	2
Electorates 2 LE	No	-.34	0	0
Electorates 2 HE	No	.73	0	1.5
<b>Polisoc</b>				
Elites 1	UDI/RN-PDC/PPD/PS*		6	
Elites 2	UDI-PDC* PS-UDI* PPD-UDI*RN#		3	
Electorates 1	No	.14	0	0
Electorates 2	No	.71	0	1.5
Electorates 1 LE	No	-.58	0	-1.5
Electorates 1 HE	No	.9	0	1.5
Electorates 2 LE	No	.6	0	1.5
Electorates 2 HE	No	.66	0	1.5

Table 6.3 (cont.)

<b>Divorce</b>				
Elites 1	PPD-UDI/PDC/RN* PS-UDI/RN* UDI-PDC* RN-UDI/PPD/PS#		6	
Elites 2	UDI-DC/PS/PPD* UDI-RN#		3	
Electorates 1	No	-.94	0	-1.5
Electorates 2	PS-RN*	.24	1	0
Electorates 1 LE	No	.45	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	No	.48	0	0
Electorates 2 LE	No	.62	0	1.5
Electorates 2 HE	No	.51	0	1.5
<b>Abortion</b>				
Elites 1	PS/PPS-UDI/PDC/RN*		6	
Elites 2	PS-UDI/RN/PDC* PPD-RN*		4	
Electorates 1	No	.25	0	0
Electorates 2	PC-PDC/UDI/RN/PPD/PS*	.58	0	2
Electorates 1 LE	No	-.88	0	-1.5
Electorates 1 HE	No	.6	0	1.5
Electorates 2 LE	No	.8	0	1.5
Electorates 2 HE	PC-PDC/UDI/RN/PPD/PS*	-.1	0	0
<b>Environment</b>				
Elites 1	No		0	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	No	.42	0	0
Electorates 2	No	-.44	0	0
Electorates 1 LE	PPD-RN#	.46		0
Electorates 1 HE	No	0	0	0
Electorates 2 LE	PPD-UDI*	-.75	1	-2
Electorates 2 HE	No	.53	0	2

**\*Notation:** A-B\* = A and B hold a significant difference at .05; A-B/C# =A holds a significant difference with B and C at .10, the means B and C in the given issue are not significantly different; A-B\*/C# =A holds a significant difference with B at .05 and a significant difference with C at .10

When comparing the scores obtained for the most-and the least-educated cross-sections of the electorate in 1994-1996 the three possible configurations are empirically represented. In one issue (corruption), the low educated cross-sections obtain a marginally greater representation score (+.5). Meanwhile, in five other issues both educational groups obtain the same score: left-right (2), demlegI (.5), privatization (2), divorce (0), and environment (0). Finally, in the remaining six issues we observe a gap between the levels of issue-congruence obtained for both cross-sections in favor of the most educated group: demlegII (-2), moresay (-1.5), inflation (-1.5), intesta (-2), socpol (-3), and abortion (-3).

In 1998-2000 the situation improves significantly. This time, in none of the ten available issues were negative scores obtained. Meanwhile, only three issues obtained a neutral scoring of 0: demlegI, divorce, and environment. The remaining six items present positive scorings, with a slight reduction of the representation scores obtained for the previous period in two issues corresponding to the state-market divide (privatization and intesta) and slight improvements in the other component of such divide (socpol), abortion, and moresay. The optimal scoring observed in 1994-1996 for the left-right scale and demlegII were obtained once again. Concurrently, the figures corresponding to those two issues (see figures 1-12) continue to show the greatest spread at the voter level suggesting that ideological self-identification and democratic legitimacy (regime divide) are the ones in which divergence and congruence are simultaneously present in this system. Although similar divergence levels are observed for the issue of privatization in 1998-2000, it is worth noting that in this case none significant differences were observed through the Bonferroni tests, which suggests that the internal consistency of partisan mean placements is less in such issue.

Improvements are also tangible in terms of the existing gap between different cross-sections of the electorate. In the majority of the issues, low-educated voters obtained the same score as their most educated counterparts: left-right, demlegI, demlegII, moresay, polsoc, and divorce. Additionally, the consistency of issue-placements regarding abortion is significantly greater for the less-educated sectors of society (+1.5). Finally, in privatization (+.5), intesta (+1.5),

and environment (+4) highly educated voters have more consistent placements regarding their partisan representatives than those of their low-educated partisan partners.

To close this overview of single-issue-congruence in Chile, Table 6.4 presents summary information contrasting overall representation scores with those obtained for each of the previously defined programmatic divides.<sup>119</sup> Additionally, this table also displays the scores obtained by the most and the least educated cross-sections of the Chilean electorate.

**Table 6.4:**

**Summary Representation Scores (Overall and per Programmatic-Divides) by Educational Levels**

	Regime	State-Market	Moral	Governance (Moresay/Corruption)	Other Issues (Environment/ Inflation)	<b>Overall Representation Score</b>
<b>1994-1996</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-.75</b>	<b>.75</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>.44</b>
1994-1996 LE	.25	-.13	-.75	0	0	-.17
1994-1996 HE	1.25	.78	.75	.75	.75	.74
<b>1998-2000</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1.2</b>
1998-2000 LE	1	.75	1.5	1.5	-2	.65
1998-2000 HE	1	1.75	.75	1.5	2	1.25
<b>Grand Totals</b>	<b>1.25</b>	<b>.65</b>	<b>.125</b>	<b>1.372</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>.82</b>

Source: Table 4.

First, comparing the overall scores it is possible to confirm that Chile obtains a substantially higher score in 1998-2000 than in 1994-1996. Additionally, that result comes together with a decreasing gap between the scores obtained by the low and high educated groups of the electorate. Yet, the scores obtained by the most educated voters are still significantly greater (+.6) than those assigned to their less educated counterparts. Second, improvements are seen in three of the five divides, with the moral one (+1.75) taking the biggest step up witnessing the greatest step up, followed by the state-market bundle (+1.3), and governance issues (+1.25). In turn, a mild decline is observed in the regime divide (-.5).

<sup>119</sup>Each of these scores was computed by adding the partial scores obtained for each issues pertaining to each divide and dividing the result of that summation by the number of issues considered.

While the greatest gap between both educational cross-sections is obtained for the residual divide category (-4), the second greatest gap is obtained for the state-market divide. Additionally it is important to note that for the three issues that compose such divide, at least at one level significant differences are missing either between the electorates or the leaders of political parties. For instance, while the voters of the PS hold significantly different positions regarding privatization than most other parties in the system, elite placements are not sufficiently divergent and internally consistent to produce parallel results at the congressional level. The opposite holds true for the other two issues of the state-market divide, in which, despite significantly divergent alignments in Congress, do not map onto consistent voter stances.

Meanwhile, no gap is observed in the regime and governance divides. The first of those divides also shows the greatest inter-temporal consistency and the greater number of pairwise significant differences in the electorate, with the only exception of the left-right dimension (with which, as shown in the previous chapter, it is highly correlated). Finally, low-educated sectors show higher levels of issue-congruence than their most-educated counterparts along the moral divide.

### Multidimensional Issue-Congruence in Chile

In this section I present the results obtained through Correspondence Analyses applied to analyze the variance contained in two-way tables reproducing ordinal rankings for each partisan group in each of the available issues. At this point, it is worth recalling that although it might downplay severe situations of ideological cartelization by neglecting issues in which parties do not represent a latent (but important) ideological divide, I decided to include only those issues in which partisan groups passed significant F-tests at both levels.<sup>120</sup> On the basis of this restrictive criterion,

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<sup>120</sup>See Kazt and Mair (1995) for a conceptual discussion on the concept of party-cartels. Obviously, a situation of “polarizing-trusteeship” could also be go unseen as a consequence of these restrictions (see Kitschelt et al 1999, for a definition of the concept). However, if this technique is used as a complement to univariate mappings these risks are considerably minimized.

it is possible to constrain the mapping to currently active issues for which at least some partisan groups stand on different ideological positions. The proposed solution also mitigates the effects of introducing spurious rankings in the procedure, as “surviving” rankings represent variables in which significant variance existed, making those rankings meaningful.

The option of supplementary rows and columns was used in these analyses in order to represent those issues that did not produce significant ANOVAS at both levels and parties with small electorates and small or non-existent congressional representation (the Communist Party in Chile and NE in Uruguay). To facilitate the visualization and interpretation of results, partisan groups pertaining to the same party are linked together by superimposed multicolored lines.

The first map (Map 6.1), which represents approximately 96% of the original information provides the basis for the analysis of partisan alignments in 1994-1996. In this case, the first dimension accounts for a high proportion of the total variance (78%). However, it is important to note that significant F tests were only obtained for four issues.<sup>121</sup> Notwithstanding, excluded issues do not significantly deviate from the extracted dimensions.

The map demonstrates that the regime divide is active and significantly overlaps with left-right self-positioning, as rightist voters and leaders tend to hold more authoritarian views than those that characterize their leftist counterparts. Additionally, Chilean leftists tend to favor higher levels of state intervention to reduce the income differential and oppose privatization.

Whereas the two electoral coalitions that have structured post-transitional Chilean politics show up distinctively on the map, it is also true that a centripetal pattern of partisan competition predominates in the system.<sup>122</sup> Additionally, within Concertación there seems to be an internal split among the PS on one side and the PPD and the DC on the other. Indeed, this split fundamentally

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<sup>121</sup> This can either represent a simpler ideological competition structure or the restriction of overall ideological representation in the system. However, the absence of independent issue-salience measures makes it impossible to adjudicate this contention.

<sup>122</sup> Both observations are extremely consistent with the conventional wisdom on the contemporary dynamics of partisan politics in Chile (for instance, see Siavelis 1999).


drives the second dimension extracted, with the PS sticking more closely to a traditional leftist stance, especially because its leaders and supporters tend to oppose privatization more harshly than other Concertación parties. And while they are relatively closer to their fellow Concertacionistas, PS leaders take an intermediate position regarding democratic legitimacy lying in between the (more authoritarian) right and the (more democratic) center and center-left. Except for the voters of the Communist Party, who consistently place themselves on the left/democratic/statist pole, PS voters position themselves more to the left than other partisan groups. The PPD in turn, a “post-modern”, “catch-all”, and explicitly democratic party formed from a splinter of PS leaders seeking to renew the traditional Chilean left, lies in the center-left part of the map. This evidence is consistent with the existence of a renovated center-left (PPD), a partially renovated traditional left (PS), and a non-renovated Communist Party (PCChile).<sup>123</sup> Among Concertación parties, the PPD is the party that presents the greater distance between its voters and congressional representatives, something that is consistent with its “catch-all” strategy. In turn, the PDC occupies the center of the map and presents (followed by the PS) the highest level of convergence between both levels.

Although graphically represented towards the left, both Alianza parties lie close together in a position consistent with rightist self-placements, more authoritarian stances on the regime divide, and pro-market ideas. Whereas the congressional representatives of both parties are superimposed on the map, UDI voters appear significantly to the right of both parties. Meanwhile, the more liberal (and relatively less authoritarian) voters of RN are positioned closer to the center.


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<sup>123</sup>See Roberts (1998) for an analysis of the divergent trajectories pursued by the Chilean left in the transitional and post-transitional period.

**Map 6.1:**



Map6.2:



Map 6.2 displays the results obtained for Chile in 1998-2000. Once again the solution is virtually one-dimensional with the first axis accounting for 87% of a 97% of the total variance explained. In this case, five issues obtained significant ANOVAS at both levels and were therefore included as active columns in the solution (divorce, abortion, moresay, leftright, and demlegII). The issue of environmental politics and the three pertaining to the state-market divide failed to obtain significant F coefficients and were included as supplementary columns. The latter group is nonetheless closely aligned with the first dimension of the solution in which parties with more leftist profiles as well as pro-democratic preferences, liberal stances on the moral divide, and more participatory views of democracy are placed towards the right of the horizontal axis of the map.

In terms of partisan placements, it is possible to observe some interesting patterns. Within the Concertación, the PS continues to show a more leftist profile at both the voter and elite levels, being followed in this respect by the PPD (especially at the elite level). The voters of the Communist Party represent the second most leftist group in the map, seemingly moderating their 1994-1996 stance. In turn, the DC seems to “split” from its Concertación partners and is placed at the center of the programmatic axis, being spatially closer to the parties of the Alianza than to the PS. Additionally, followed by the PPD, the DC is the party that shows the greatest distance between its elites and its electorate (when this is taken as a whole). Indeed, the voters of the DC have similar profiles to the elites of the UDI, while the same holds for the voters of PPD and the congressional representatives of the DC. Finally, within the Alianza, the elites and voters of RN and the congressional representatives of the UDI are cluster to the left of the horizontal dimension. The voters of the UDI, in turn, lie at the center of the map relatively closer to the elites of the DC than to those of their own party.

In sum, while a comparison of partisan alignments at the elite level between both periods could suggest the existence of a greater degree of polarization in the system (with the DC reassuming its centrist historical position in between left and right), at the voter level, at least, similar levels of programmatic diffusion are found. Indeed, with the exception of the voters of the

DC, the voters of all other parties are placed in more centrist positions than their congressional representatives, usually occupying positions closer to the elites of other parties than their own.

Having analyzed these simpler maps, it is now possible to turn to an extended version in which the electorates of each party are classified according to three educational terciles. Taking education as a proxy for socioeconomic status, it is therefore possible to analyze the level of ideological heterogeneity that voters of different parties present.


Map 6.3 corresponds to the obtained results for Chile in 1994-1996. Although the basic structure of the dimensions is maintained, virtually all the parties present relatively high degrees of internal variance causing a significant overlapping of the partisan (and coalitional) spaces. Furthermore, the map strongly suggests a weak ideological differentiation between both electoral pacts. This can be explained as a consequence of both the moderation of the left (which evolves towards a “third way” stance) and the adaptation of the right which has slowly become less authoritarian. Both processes converge in the consolidation of a centripetal competitive dynamic substantially driven by “cultural identities” that divide the camps according to pro and anti Pinochet sentiments (Siavelis 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal 2003; Ortega 2003). Notably, the two parties with less clearly defined ideological profiles (the PPD and RN) are the ones that present the largest partisan spaces.

Furthermore, whereas highly educated voters for the two leftist parties (PPD and PS) lie closer to their leaders, the congressional representatives of DC have a similar ideological profile of their mid-educated voters. On the right, partisan leaders are positioned roughly equidistant from the various cross-sections of their constituencies. However, the less educated voters of RN and the more educated voters of UDI take the most distinct political stances (right, authoritarian, pro-market), contrasting with political preferences held by the voters of the PCom and the leaders and most educated voters of the PS and the PPD. Meanwhile, the less educated voters of the UDI sit very close to the center of the map and nearby PPD and DC voters. Notably, the UDI has recently gathered the largest electoral plurality (2001) by attracting alienated voters from the Concertación

on the basis of a moderate discourse and the development of non-ideological linkages in Chile's poorest districts (San Francisco 2003, Barozet 2003, Chapter 10).

Although in a context of relatively higher elite differentiation, virtually the same configuration in terms of the spread of partisan groups (both in the left and the right) is obtained for 1998-2000 (Map 6.4). This observation is confirmed when computing and analyzing the proximity matrixes between partisan groups for all the available issues at each time-period.

**Map.6.3:**



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### Programmatic Partisan Heterogeneity in Chile

To confirm the preliminary assessment based on CA, I decided to compute proximity matrixes between all partisan elements on the basis of all available issues for every period and country. To facilitate the comparability of these results, Euclidean distances were rescaled to a 0-1 range, with greater values signaling greater distances among partisan elements and coefficients approaching 0 representing proximate cases in the multidimensional set of issues. Complete symmetric dissimilarity matrixes are displayed in Appendix II. Here, in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, summary results are displayed for each period. The distance between partisan elites, their electoral bases, and other elites are the subject of these comparisons.

As shown in the first column of Table 6.5, the parties of Concertación had a slightly greater overall distance with their electoral bases in 1994-1996, with the PPD displaying the greatest coefficient of all Chilean parties (.22). Meanwhile, the UDI is the party with the most distinct profile at the elite level (column 2). Except for RN, the most distant electoral bases regarding partisan elites were the least educated ones (column 4) with the PPD (.37) and the PS (.32) showing the greatest distance in the sample. Conversely, the most educated bases of RN, the PS, and the PPD were the ones placed closer by their congressional representatives. Both the mid-educated bases of the DC and those of the UDI were the ones that presented the most similar profile to their partisan elites (column 3). From column 5, it is possible to infer a high degree of superposition on the programmatic preferences of different partisan electorates in the system. Indeed, all partisan elites lie somewhat closer to a base of another party than their average distance with their own bases (displayed in column 1). Additionally it is worth noting that the most educated voters of the DC and the least educated ones of the PPD cross partisan “pact-lines” and lay close to UDI congressional elites. Although such crossings are not observed at the elite level (column 6), it is important to stress that all elite groups are closer to at least one of the congressional representatives of their coalitional allies than to their most proximate electoral base.

**Table 6.5:****Proximities between Partisan Elements in 1994-1996: Summary Results**

	Average Distance with Bases	Average distance with Other Elites	Most Proximate Base	Most Different base	Most Proximate base from other party	Most Proximate Elite
DC	.2	.26	.13 (ME)	.21 (LE)	.18 (pcme)	.1 (PPD)
RN	.18	.26	.16 (HE)	.19 (ME)	.04 (udime)	.09 (UDI)
UDI	.17	.37	.11 (ME)	.28 (LE)	.17 (dche) .18 (ppdle).	.09 (RN)
PPD	.22	.24	.12 (HE)	.37 (LE)	.08 (pcme)	.08 (PS)
PS	.2	.29	.09 (HE)	.32 (LE)	.1 (pcme)	.08 (PPD)
Totals	.19	.28	.12	.27	.11	.09

**Table 6.6:****Proximities between Partisan Elements in 1998-2000: Summary Results**

	Average Distance with Bases	Average distance with Other Elites	Most Proximate Base	Most Different base	Most Proximate base from other	Most Proximate Elite
DC	.11	.17	.07 (LE)	.13 (ME,HE)	.06 (ppdme)	.09 (PPD)
RN	.11	.28	.08 (LE)	.13 (ME)	.06 (udime)	.1 (UDI)
UDI	.23	.36	.11 (HE)	.45 (LE)	.1 (rnhe)	.1 (RN)
PPD	.14	.28	.10 (HE)	.19 (ME)	.11 (pshe)	.09 (DC)
PS	.23	.36	.19 (HE)	.29 (ME)	.04 (pcme)	.17 (PPD)
Totals	.16	.29	.11	.24	.07	.11

Although the same configuration is virtually maintained in the second period, it is important to note some important divergences. First, while the overall distance between voters and partisan elites is slightly reduced in this period (-.03), the distance between partisan elites grows marginally (+.02). Second, the UDI and then the PS are the parties that recruit votes from a programmatically more heterogeneous electorate (column 1). The congressional representatives of both parties are the ones that are placed the farthest apart from those of other parties and from each other, being the ones that provide a greater level of polarization to the system. The case of the UDI is particularly salient in terms of the large distance that stands between partisan elites from their low-educated constituency (.45, in column 4). Third, while in this case the least educated voters of RN and the DC are the ones that are placed closer by their congressional representatives, the most educated voters of the PPD, the PS, and the UDI are the ones that share a most similar

programmatic profile with their congressional representatives. Although no cross partisan “pact lines” alignments are observed in this period, virtually all partisan elites continue to present a profile that is most similar to the electoral base of at least one other party (column 5). The PPD is the only exception in this respect.

Comparing the average distances obtained in each column to those displayed in Table 6.6 it is possible to make a preliminary inference on the dynamic evolution of partisan programmatic profiles in this system. As suggested by such comparison and in the context of relatively small changes, while distances between partisan elites have increased, the distance between parties and their electoral bases have decreased. However, the greatest distance reduction (-.04) is observed in column 5 which reports the average distance between partisan elites and the closest electoral base of other parties. Overall, this means that while slightly greater divergence is observed at the elite level (particularly punctuated by the competition between the UDI and the PS), at the electoral level the system collapses towards the center of the spectrum, making programmatic linking less feasible.

After analyzing comparative evidence for Uruguay, this preliminary assessment is revisited in the next chapter.

**CHAPTER VII**  
**ISSUE-CONGRUENCE AND THE HETEROGENEITY OF PROGRAMMATIC**  
**PREFERENCES OF PARTY ELECTORATES IN URUGUAY**

Introduction

Focusing on the Uruguayan case, this chapter presents a parallel empirical analysis of that offered in chapter 5 for Chile. The final section of this chapter offers a comparative analysis of both cases on the basis of the evidence presented below, as well as that discussed in chapters 4 and 5. That section also draws implications for the analysis of non-programmatic linkages and partisan strategies in both countries in the next four chapters.

The evidence confirms that in Uruguay, two partisan families consolidated during the 1990s drawing on the conflicts sprung from market-reform attempts. Those families are defined by the programmatic opposition of the leftist FA and both traditional parties. The latter does not hold significant differences between their programmatic stances. Instead a crossing is observed between the elites of the PC and PN (with the PC presenting a more centrist profile, particularly under the influence of Foro Batllista) and their bases (a more rightist stand than those of the PN). Although an important gap between low-educated and high-educated voters is also found in this case regarding the state-market divide, the gap is significantly smaller than the one observed in Chile. In short, this means that the room for establishing programmatic linkages with constituents (even the least educated ones) has arguably increased in the country.

At the partisan levels, the theorized “party-family” configuration is observed, with the FA presenting the internally most consistent programmatic stances and the most differentiated profile. Meanwhile, the PC and the PN sit close to each other and present significant crossings between

their partisan components. Over time and arguably pushed by the logic of partisan competition in the system, both traditional parties seem to have programmatically moved away from their less educated electoral bases. Meanwhile, after reaching a highpoint of polarization in the mid-1990s, FA seems to have moderated its programmatic stance seeking to compete to the center of the spectrum and approaching (drawing on social discontent with reforms and its defense of batllismo) the fractions of the electorate that were “abandoned” by the traditional parties (this dynamic evolution is the object of Chapters 9 and 10).

#### Single Issue-Congruence in Uruguay

As shown in Table 7.1, like in the Chilean case, four issues obtained the maximum representation score in the first period (1996). Again, the left-right self-placement is the issue question that displays the greatest structure, partisan spread, and congruence (Table 7.1 and Figures 7.1-7.12). In this case, attitudes towards corruption, the provision of social policy, and the preferred degree of state intervention in the economy are the ones that obtain perfect representation scores in 1996. Additionally, positive scores (1.5) were also obtained for environmental policy. In all these issues and in a context of moderate spread, it is possible to observe a consistent placement of FA on one side of the issue and both traditional parties (usually overlapping) at the other side. Meanwhile, the NE aligns stochastically with one or the other group, merging with FA on corruption and environment, taking positions closer to the traditional parties in terms of social policy, or simply lying in between both groups (left-right, *intesta*). Interestingly, in both issues pertaining to the state-market divide the elites of NE are positioned closer to the traditional parties, with their voters taking intermediate positions. The figures also display a slightly greater general spread of voter groups (with the exception of issues contained in the regime divide and inflation) in the substantive issues than the one observed in Chile in the previous chapter.

**Figure 7.1:**




Figure 7.2:




Figure 7.3:




Figure 7.4:




Figure 7.5:




Figure 7.6:




Figure 7.7:




Figure 7.8:




Figure 7.9:




Figure 7.10:




Figure 7.11:




Figure 7.12:




Table 7.1:

## Summary Statistics on Issue Congruence Per Issue and Overall\*

Issue	Uruguay			
Left-Right	Significant Differences <sup>B</sup>	R	#Pairwise differences <sup>A</sup>	Representation Scenario
Elites 1	FA-PC/PN*		2	
Elites 2	FA-PC/PN/NE*		3	
Electorates 1	FA-PC/PN* FA - NE* NE-PC/PN*	0.95	5	2
Electorates 2	FA-PC/PN* FA - NE* NE-PC/PN*	0.92	5	2
Electorates 1 LE	FA/NE-PC/PN*	0.97	4	2
Electorates 1 HE	FA-PC/PN* FA - NE* NE-PC/PN*	0.99	5	2
Electorates 2 LE	FA-PC/PN*	0.90	2	2
Electorates 2 HE	FA/NE-PC/PN*	0.82	4	2
<b>DemlegI</b>				
Elites 1	FA-PC/PN*		2	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	No	-0.6	0	-1.5
Electorates 2	No	0.63	0	1
Electorates 1 LE	No	-0.88	0	-1.5
Electorates 1 HE	No	0.51	0	1.5
Electorates 2 LE	No	0.57	0	1
Electorates 2 HE	No	0.8	0	1
<b>DemlegII</b>				
Elites 1	No		0	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	FA-PC/PN* NE-PC#	-0.45	2	0
Electorates 2	No	n/a	0	n/a
Electorates 1 LE	No	0.17	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	No	-0.74	0	-.5
Electorates 2 LE	No	n/a	0	n/a
Electorates 2 HE	No	n/a	0	n/a

Table 7.1 (cont.)

<b>Moresay</b>				
Elites 1	No		0	
Elites 2	FA-PC* FA-NE#		1	
Electorates 1	FA-PC/PN* NE-PC*	0.37	3	0
Electorates 2	FA-PC/PN*	0	2	0
Electorates 1 LE	No	0.2	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	PC-PN/FA/NE*	0.4	3	0
Electorates 2 LE	FA-PC/PN#	-0.44	0	0
Electorates 2 HE	FA-PC*	-0.28	1	0
<b>Corruption</b>				
Elites 1	FA-PC/PN*		2	
Elites 2	FA-PC/PN NE-PC#		0	
Electorates 1	FA-PC/PN* NE-PC*	0.91	3	2
Electorates 1 LE	FA-PN* NE/PN#	0.91	1	2
Electorates 1 HE	FA-PN*	0.56	1	2
<b>Inflation</b>				
Elites 1	PN-PC/FA*		2	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	No	0.1	0	0
Electorates 2	No	0.76		.5
Electorates 1 LE	No	0.47	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	PC/PN*	0.59	0	2
Electorates 2 LE	No	0.56	0	.5
Electorates 2 HE	No	0.79	0	.5
<b>Privatization</b>				
Elites 1	FA-PC/PN*		2	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	FA-PC*	0.32	1	0
Electorates 1 LE	No	-0.82	0	-.5
Electorates 1 HE	No	0.83	0	.5

Table 7.1 (cont.)

<b>Inteesta</b>				
Elites 1	FA-PC/PN*		2	
Elites 2	FA-PC/PN*		2	
Electorates 1	FA-PN*	0.82	1	2
Electorates 2	FA/NEPC*	0.65	2	2
Electorates 1 LE	No	0.14	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	FA-PC*	0.55	1	2
Electorates 2 LE	FA-PC#	0.53	0	1.5
Electorates 2 HE	FA-PN*	0.69	1	2
<b>PolSOC</b>				
Elites 1	FA-PC/PN*		2	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	FA-PC* FA-PN#	0.93	1	2
Electorates 2	FA-PC*	0.8	1	1
Electorates 1 LE	No	0.71	0	1.5
Electorates 1 HE	PC-FA*	0.87	1	2
Electorates 2 LE	FA-PC#	0.26	0	0
Electorates 2 HE	No	0.87	0	.5
<b>Divorce</b>				
Elites 1	No		0	
Elites 2	No		0	
Electorates 1	NE/FA-PC/PN*	-0.22	4	0
Electorates 2	FA-PC/PN*	-0.65	2	-1
Electorates 1 LE	No	-0.14	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	FA-PC/PN*	-0.01	2	0
Electorates 2 LE	FA-PC*	-0.57	1	-1
Electorates 2 HE	FA-PN*	0.1	1	0

Table 7.1 (cont.)

<b>Abortion</b>				
Elites 1	PN-PC/FA*		2	
Elites 2	PN-PC/FA*		2	
Electorates 1	NE/FA-PC/PN*	0.46	4	0
Electorates 2	FA-PC*	0.35	1	0
Electorates 1 LE	No	-0.01	0	0
Electorates 1 HE	FA-PC/PN*	0.56	2	2
Electorates 2 LE	No	0.02	0	0
Electorates 2 HE	FA-PN*	0.71	1	2
<b>Environment</b>				
Elites 1	FA-PC*		1	
Elites 2	FA-PC*		1	
Electorates 1	No	0.89	0	1.5
Electorates 2	No	-0.14	0	0
Electorates 1 LE	No	0.62	0	1.5
Electorates 1 HE	No	0.25	0	0
Electorates 2 LE	No	0.48	0	0
Electorates 2 HE	No	0.75	0	-1.5

**\*Notation:** A-B\* = A and B hold a significant difference at .05; A-B/C# = A holds a significant difference with B and C at .10, the means B and C in the given issue are not significantly different; A-B\*/C# = A holds a significant difference with B at .05 and a significant difference with C at .10

Meanwhile, negative scores are only obtained for demlegI (-1.5), in which congruence is low and significant elite divides (caused by the mild influence of Marxist-Leninist views on democracy within some fractions of the FA, which slightly move the average of the party towards the non-democratic pole), do not correspond with homogenous pro-democratic views in the electorate. Neutral scores (0) are obtained in all other issues.

Again, when comparing the scores obtained for the most and the least educated cross-sections of the electorate in 1996 the three possible configurations are empirically represented. As in Chile, in only one issue (environment, +1.5) a positive gap benefiting low-educated voters is observed. Meanwhile, negative gaps were obtained for the following seven issues: demlegI (-3), demlegII (-.5), inflation (-2), privatization (-1), intesta (-2), polsoc (-.5), and abortion (-2). Finally, in the remaining four issues, representation levels are equivalent across educational groups.

Unfortunately, the set of issues was significantly reduced in 2000-2002, due to the absence of a question on privatization in the citizen survey and the lack of variance regarding demlegII at the elite level (all partisan elites monolithically aligned with the most pro-democratic attitude). With this caveat in mind and from a diachronic point of view, it is possible to conclude that representation scores do not improve significantly over time. Indeed, a small decrease (.05) is observed in the overall score (Table 2). Nonetheless, as in 1996, only one issue (divorce in this period) obtains negative scores. Meanwhile, as scores remained stable in four issues (left-right, moresay, intesta, and abortion), they improved in two of them (inflation, demlegI). Finally, declining scores were observed in socpol (-1), environment (-1.5), and divorce (-1).

Notwithstanding, some relative improvements are seen in terms of the representation gaps of voters with different levels of education. First, in five issues the gaps observed in 1996 are maintained (left-right, moresay, polsoc, abortion, and environment), with the latter presenting once again a positive gap in favor of low educated voters (+1.5). Second, improvements regarding the representation of low educated voters are observed in demlegI (+2.5), inflation (+.5), and intesta (+1.5). Finally, only the issue of divorce took a step back (-1).

Table 7.2 provides a systematic comparison of the results obtained for each period. As anticipated in the previous analysis, the overall representation score obtained for 2000-2002 is marginally lower (.05) than the one registered in 1996. Nonetheless, the gap between low-educated and highly-educated voters recedes more significantly (-.26), declining from .71 in 1996 to .45 in 2000-2002.

Focusing the analysis at the level of divides it is possible to observe that while representation scores are lower in 2000-2002 for the moral (-.5), governance (-1), and residual divides (-.5), improvements are visible both in the regime divide (+1.75) and the state-market divide (.17). In both of such divides, the gap between least-educated and their most-educated counterparts is tangibly bridged.

**Table 7.2:**

**Summary Representation Scores (Over all and per Programmatic-Divides) by Educational Levels**

	Regime	State-Market	Moral	Governance (Moresay/Corruption)	Other Issues (Environment/Inflation)	Overall Representation Score
<b>1996</b>	<b>-.75</b>	<b>1.33</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.75</b>	<b>.66</b>
1996 LE	-.75	.33	0	1	.75	.41
1996 HE	.5	1.5	1	1	1	1.12
<b>2000-2002</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>-.5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>.25</b>	<b>.61</b>
2000-2002 LE	1	.91	-.5	0	.25	.32
2000-2002 HE	1	1.25	1	0	-.5	.77
<b>Grand Totals</b>	<b>.125</b>	<b>1.415</b>	<b>-.25</b>	<b>.5</b>	<b>.5</b>	<b>.635</b>

Source: Table 1.

### Multidimensional Issue-Congruence in Uruguay

In 1996, six issues were apt to be included as active columns in the CA procedure: left-right, corruption, abortion, intesta, privatization, intesta, and polsoc. Therefore, none of the variables representing the regime divide reached the conditions to be included and were mapped as supplementary points. Additionally, the information for voters and leaders of the NE was imputed as supplementary rows.

Map 7.1 presents the results obtained for aggregate partisan groups in 1996. The first dimension extracted accounts for nearly 85% of the total variance contained in the table. The second dimension in turn, represents the remaining variance, approximately 11%. Therefore, the bi-dimensional graphical representation of the table replicates 96% of the original information and consequently, the focus of the analysis should be especially centered on that first dimension. Additionally, none of the “discarded” issues deviate from the horizontal axis.

Inferring from the distribution of the issues in the space, we can conclude that the first and most relevant dimension is driven by left-right self-identification (left-right) and preferences on the degree of state intervention to reduce the income differential, with leftist voters preferring a greater degree of state intervention than their rightist counterparts. And whereas leftist voters and leaders also tend to favor the legalization of abortion and a greater level of provision of social policy, they tend to oppose privatization and perceive a greater level of political corruption in the system. The opposite applies to those voters and legislators that place themselves more to the right.

A short examination of the evidence suggests that the voters and leaders of the leftist Frente Amplio (FA) lie close together towards the left/statist/secular extreme. Although with a greater distance between both levels, the opposite holds for the Blanco Party (PN). Notably, the Partido Colorado (PC) lies in the center of the map, but closer to the PN than to the FA. Indeed, whereas the voters of the PN are more moderate than their leaders, the opposite holds for PC supporters.<sup>124</sup> Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the system is structured around the opposition between FA and both traditional parties, which share a similar ideological profile.

On the basis of this information it is also possible to conclude that ideological linkages are stronger in the FA and that this party is the one presenting the more distinctive ideological profile in the system. Meanwhile, although ideologically they lie relatively nearby, it is possible to conclude that the then governing PC (and to a lesser extent its coalitional partner: the PN) at least partially needed to rely on other linkage strategies to differentiate their electoral offer.

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<sup>124</sup>This is a particularity already described by several scholars (Gonzalez 1991; Moreira 2000; Altman 2001).

Additionally, whereas the bases of the PC perceive higher degrees of corruption in the system, favor less spending in social policy and hold a more conservative view on abortion, they tend to oppose privatization more than their counterparts in the Blanco Party's base.<sup>125</sup> This distinction is what drives the second dimension.


Finally, the NE sits in the center of the ideological spectrum, but its leaders perceive greater levels of corruption in the system and hold more conservative views on abortion. This is consistent with the minority status of the party and the Christian-Democratic origin of a significant fraction of its leadership.

Map 7.2 displays the results obtained for Uruguay in the second period for which information is available 2000-2002. This time, four issues are included as active columns in the solution, with the remaining five issues acting as supplementary points, as well as the voters and elites of NE. Overall, the two-dimensional solution reproduces 91% of the original variance, with the first dimension dominating the solution and accounting for 84% of such variance. Greater values in this horizontal axis represent more rightist, pro-market, moral conservative and elitist programmatic stances.


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<sup>125</sup> Although seemingly counterintuitive, Colorado's relatively higher levels of perceived corruption are consistent with the very prominent corruption scandals that broke out in 1996 against the former Blanco government that ended in 1995.


Map7.1:




Map 7.2:



Map7.3:



**Map.7.4:**



Whereas the FA sits towards the left of the graph, both traditional parties are positioned towards the rightist pole, with the elites of the PN being the ones positioned more to the right. In turn, the voters of the PC are closer to the congress-members of the PN than to their own partisan representatives. This crossing and superposition of partisan spaces seems to confirm the consolidation of a traditional party family on the right to compete with an ever-consolidating party family on the left. Finally, while the elites of NE share a similar profile with those of the PC, their voters are placed closest to the elites of FA. This might explain why, in spite of their own programmatic preferences and facing declining electoral returns, the mainstream leaders of NE decided to join FA for the election of 2004 through the Nueva Mayoría alliance. The next two maps display the obtained results by splitting partisan identifiers by education-level terciles.

At both time points (1996 and 2000-2002), the issues, dimensions, and variance explained by each component remained virtually unchanged from the simpler solution. A quick glance at Map 7.3 corroborates the previous statement on the greater ideological cohesiveness of FA as the congressional leaders of the party stand between the least and most educated poles of party supporters. Interestingly, both traditional parties present greater internal divergence; and whereas the leaders of the PC lay close to their less educated voters, the opposite holds for the PB. Nonetheless, superposition between partisan elites and voters from different parties is not observed (as in Chile) in 1996. However, in 2000-2002, greater (though still slight) superposition is seen between both traditional parties. Meanwhile, FA continues to show the greatest level of internal consistency and NE shows up as the party with the greatest distance between its elites and bases from a programmatic standpoint (Map 7.4).

#### Programmatic Partisan Heterogeneity in Uruguay.

Table 7.3 shows the proximity results obtained for Uruguayan parties in 1996. As it becomes clear in column 1 of the table, the FA is the party that has the lowest average distance

with its electoral bases. Contrastingly, the NE shows a high average distance with its bases, exceeding by far the greatest coefficient obtained for every other party in both countries.

When the distance between partisan elites is considered (column 2) those of FA appear as the most distant from other congressional partisan groups. FA elites also show a distinctive pattern in terms of their programmatic distance with their most proximate (column 3) and most distant (column 4) electoral bases, as well as with other partisan elites (column 6). Quite tellingly, the leaders of the party are closer to their most distant electoral bases than traditional parties to their closest base. This once again confirms the distinctiveness of FA's programmatic profile and its higher degree of internal consistency in the system. While both traditional parties show an intermediate configuration, the NE was the less consistent party in 1996.

While the middle-educated bases of the NE are the non-FA group closest to the programmatic stance of FA's congressional representatives (column 5), the elites of NE lie closer to those of the PN. Meanwhile, the elites of both traditional parties are the ones who show the lowest pairwise distance between themselves.

**Table 7.3:**

**Proximities between Partisan Elements in 1996: Summary Results**

	Average Distance with Bases	Average distance with Other Elites	Most Proximate Base	Most Different base	Most Proximate base from other	Most Proximate Elite
FA	.06	.63	.004 (HE)	.09 (LE)	.16 (neme)	.52 (PC)
PC	.18	.41	.14(ME)	.22 (LE)	.06 (pnhele)	.25 (PN)
PN	.17	.46	.13 (HE)	.23 (ME)	.02 (pnle)	.25 (PC)
NE	.32	.49	.28 (HE)	.36 (LE)	.29 (pnme/fale)	.39 (PN)
Totals	.18	.50	.14	.22	.13	.35

As shown in Table 7.4, the fundamentals of the description just presented for 1996 are maintained in 2000-2002. However, some divergent trends are worth mentioning. First, the average distances between parties and voters seem to have increased, as well as the average distance between partisan elites. FA continues to be an exception in the first regard and also shows once

again, the most distinctive programmatic profile in the system. Additionally, although the average distance between partisan elites and their most proximate bases is essentially maintained, it is important to mention that the average distance between elites and their most different bases seems to have increased in the system. This trend is driven by the two traditional parties and NE all of which increase their distance to the least educated sectors of their electorate. Although the distance between FA's elites and the most proximate base from other party significantly widens (more than duplicating the coefficient observed in 1996), their distance with other partisan elites is reduced. This time, the leaders of NE are the ones that have the closest profile to those of FA. Meanwhile, the distance between the leaders of both traditional parties is significantly less, obtaining the same coefficient observed in 1996.

**Table 7.4:**

**Proximities between Partisan Elements in 2000-2002: Summary Results**

	Average Distance with Bases	Average distance with Other Elites	Most Proximate Base	Most Different base	Most Proximate base from other	Most Proximate Elite
FA	.04	.69	.05 (ME)	.06 (HE)	.41 (pcme)	.43 (NE)
PC	.24	.54	.14 (HE)	.31 (LE)	.08 (pnme)	.25 (PN)
PN	.31	.51	.13 (HE)	.41(LE)	.16 (pche)	.25 (PC)
NE	.34	.48	.28 (HE)	.41 (LE)	.17(pche)	.43 (FA)
Totals	.23	.56	.15	.29	.2	.34

A comparative overview of programmatic linking in both systems

In both cases it is possible to find clear and consistent partisan alignments on the left-right dimension. On the basis of those alignments it is possible to identify two mainstream clusters of parties in each system.

In Chile, particularly along the regime divide, the Concertación and the Alianza mapped distinctively. For the other two divides, it is possible to observe an internal split in the Concertación with the DC taking center positions between the PS and the PPD and the parties of the right (UDI and RN). Drawing on the findings of Chapter 4, it is possible to conclude that in

Chile, those alignments are substantially driven by the regime divide and by weaker associations with the state-market and moral divides (particularly at the elite level). This coincides with the issue-congruence analyses presented in Chapter 5. Indeed, when the average score obtained by each divide in both periods is considered the regime divide is the one that shows the highest score (1.25), with the state-market divide obtaining the second highest score (.65) and the moral divide obtaining the lowest one (.125). Notably, among issues not pertaining to the three theoretically defined divides, governance issues also obtained an excellent score (1.37). Notwithstanding, to fully account for representation in this system it is necessary to recall once again that an increasing number of Chileans refuse to align on such programmatic macro-dimension and/or do not align with political parties.

From a diachronic perspective and drawing on the findings presented in the previous chapter, it is possible to conclude that after a period of higher programmatic diffusion in the mid-1990s, the Chilean system seemed to regain greater structure. This translates into higher degrees of congruence regarding moral issues and those pertaining to the state-market divide. Nonetheless, it is necessary to stress that all the issues pertaining to the latter divide failed to produce simultaneously significantly different partisan positioning at the elite and voter levels. Concurrently, this is the divide (along with environmental issues) upon which the greatest gap between different educational cross-sections of the electorate are observed. Meanwhile, the regime divide seems to have lost only marginal salience, while continuing to show a high degree of partisan placements congruence across all cross-sections of the electorate.

At the congressional-elite level, this greater level of programmatic structure correlates to increasing polarization between the party with the most distinct programmatic profile at the right (the UDI) and the PS (at the left). Taking the timing of both surveys (1998-2000) into account it is possible to speculate on the possible causes of such dynamic. Both surveys correspond to a period in which five important developments occurred in Chilean society: a) the impact of the Asian crisis in the economy triggering the first significant economic slow-down after the transition to

democracy, which contributed to challenge the hegemonic view on the merits of the “Chilean model” within Concertación ranks; b) Pinochet’s detention in London, which rekindled the opposition between both partisan blocks with the governing DC being subjected to pressures both from the left and the right; c) the eruption of corruption scandals especially affecting Concertación local governments and the Ministry of Public Works; d) the consolidation of the UDI (see chapter 9) as the mainstream opposition party drawing on discontent from corruption and the economic slow-down; and the e) nomination of PS-PPD’s Ricardo Lagos as the presidential candidate of the Concertación to contest the 1999 national election with UDI’s Joaquín Lavín. Alternatively, it could also be argued that the progressive withdrawal of a significant fraction of the electorate in Chile (arguably a less politically engaged and socialized group) could also have acted as a “purifying” mechanism through which those who continue to identify with parties and programmatic stances show greater levels of programmatic consistency, obscuring significant dealignment and alienation when the system is considered in its totality.

Indeed, beyond the greater level of polarization witnessed between the elites of the UDI and the PS in the later period, the system presents a centripetal pattern of competition, with voters from all parties collapsing towards the center of the programmatic spectrum and a lower degree of differentiation between voters from both electoral pacts. This observation is confirmed by the fact that both the elites of UDI (.45) and the PS (.29) are the parties that present the highest distance with their less educated voters. This is also evident when all the components of the system are accounted for since all partisan groups of Chilean congressional representatives are closer to other elites and to the electoral bases of other parties than to the closest cross-section of their own voters. Consequently, comparing with the figures obtained for Uruguay, less distance between partisan elites and the electoral bases of other parties is observed in this system.

Finally, considering the PPD (in the Congressional elections of 1997) and the UDI (in 1999-2001) as the recently two most successful parties in the system, it is possible to conclude that such success correlated with a high degree of heterogeneity in their electoral bases. This has

important implications for the nature of political competition in the system to which I come back in Chapters 7, 9, and the conclusion.

In Uruguay, two partisan families consolidated during the 1990s drawing on the conflicts sprung from market-reform attempts. Those families are defined by the programmatic opposition of the leftist FA and both traditional parties. The latter do not hold significant differences between their programmatic stances and present a crossing between the elites of the PC and PN (with the PC presenting a more centrist profile, particularly under the influence of Foro Batllista) and their bases (a more rightist stand than those of the PN).

Left-right self-placements are fundamentally driven by the state market divide, with higher levels of programmatic structure achieved circa the mid 1990s. This is epitomized by the high representation score (the highest between both cases) obtained by the state-market divide when the two measures are accounted for (1.41). In turn, all other issue-divides present weak representation scores (regime: .125, moral: -.25, governance: .5, other issues: .5) and reduce the representation totals obtained for the country in each period (.66 and .61). These findings are consistent with those of Chapter 4, in which the state-market divide was the only source of significantly divergent partisan placements in the system. Indeed, in a context of a somewhat higher spread in other issue-bundles (and a slightly greater number of issues in which significantly different partisan placements are observed), none of the regime issues succeed in obtaining significant ANOVAS simultaneously at both levels. This signals a significant departure within the Chilean case in which such failure was obtained for state-market issues. Finally, although an important gap between low-educated and high-educated voters is also found in Uruguay regarding the state-market divide (-.34), it is significantly lower than the one observed in Chile (-1).

At the partisan levels, the theorized “party-family” configuration is observed, with the FA presenting the internally most consistent programmatic stances and the most differentiated profile. Meanwhile, the PC and the PN sit close to each other and present significant crossings between their partisan components.

Over time, and arguably pushed by the logic of partisan competition in the system, both traditional parties seem to have moved programmatically away from their less educated electoral bases. Meanwhile, after reaching a highpoint of polarization in the mid-1990s, FA seems to have moderated its programmatic stance seeking to compete towards the center of the spectrum and approaching (drawing on social discontent with reforms and its defense of *batllismo*) the fractions of the electorate that were “abandoned” by the traditional parties (this dynamic evolution is the object of Chapters 9 and 10).

Finally, NE appears as a highly heterogeneous party that in 1999 faced a 50% decline of its already small electoral base. Although regarding the most salient dimension of competition in the system (the state-market divide) the congressional representatives of this party had a more proximate profile than those of the traditional parties, their electoral base progressively converged towards that of FA. In this context, and in preparation for the elections of 2004, the party joined FA in the Nueva Mayoría electoral coalition. As described below, this was also functional to the process of moderation and diversification (both from a programmatic and from a social-base perspective) that contributed to FA’s recent electoral success.

## CHAPTER VIII

### NON-PROGRAMMATIC LINKAGES IN CHILE: A DISTRICT-LEVEL EXPLORATION

#### Introduction

In this chapter I present evidence on the recent evolution of non-programmatic linkages in Chile, explicitly framed as the counterpart of the evolution of programmatic-linkages (and its causal determinants) described in previous chapters. In this case, as well as in the following two chapters on Uruguay, I rely on qualitative evidence proceeding from fieldwork research on five electoral districts and twelve municipalities of Greater Santiago. The different socioeconomic and political characteristics of these electoral circumscriptions and the relatively small size and high social homogeneity of Chilean districts turns this intentionally-selected sample into a feasible proxy for contemporary urban politics in Chile.<sup>126</sup> The evidence was collected in three rounds (2001, 2002, and 2003) of semi-structured interviews with relevant political and societal figures in each district, including: a) successful and unsuccessful candidates; b) current and past legislators, mayors, and local council-members; c) leaders of community organizations; and d) key informants (party strategists and representatives from partisan think-tanks or congressional delegations, school teachers, priests, etc.).

Constituency-service, patronage, and brokerage networks are nothing new in Chilean politics. Indeed, plenty of convincing evidence shows that they played a vital role in institutionalizing the pre-authoritarian party-system (Valenzuela 1977; Garretón 1988; Valenzuela

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<sup>126</sup>Complementary research in three municipalities (one urban and two rural) of the southern X Region of the country was used to control for Urban-Rural and regional differences. Although similar phenomena to the ones described here were found in this district (57), the sample is not sufficient to make valid inferences about rural areas. Future research will address this limitation, expanding the sample to the northern and center regions of the country.

1999; Borzutsky 2002). Notwithstanding, the articulation of these networks has gone through dramatic transformations in the post-transitional period as a result of market reforms and decentralization and municipal reform. These reforms had very practical implications on how parties organize and compete for electoral office today.

The evidence points to a significant transformation of local politics in Chile during the post-transitional period punctuated by a dual configuration that combines programmatic -linking in the upper sectors of society and increasing levels of personalization, municipalization, and mercantilization of non-programmatic linkages in the lower sectors. These mutations have important implications at different analytic levels (e.g. partisan competition, internal party-politics, and municipal governance). Overall, such transformation produces significant consequences for the logics of party-competition in the system (some of which are explored in the next chapter) and for the consolidation of a socially-segmented pattern of political representation. The latter and its implications for the redistributive nature of policy-outputs are addressed in the conclusion.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents a brief discussion on the nature of non-programmatic linkages in the pre-1973 system. Then, a general characterization of the emerging nature of those linkages is presented, followed by a schematic comparative analysis of districts and municipalities with different socioeconomic and political characteristics and trajectories. This section presents more evidence on the specific nature of non-programmatic linkages in poor districts and draws implications for: a) the type and level of brokerage networks emerging in the system, b) municipal governance, and c) internal party-politics. In turn, the next chapter analyzes the strategy of the UDI, the party that was recently best able to reap benefits from the competitive configuration derived from the particular (segmented) combination of programmatic and non-programmatic linking observed in post-transitional Chile.

### Non-Programmatic Linkages in Pre-Authoritarian Chile

To avoid the fallacy of idealizing the pre-1973 system (Angell 2003) and to provide a nuanced account of disruptions and continuities, it is worth recalling once again, the particular combination of programmatic and non-programmatic linkages that characterized pre-authoritarian Chile beginning in the 1920s.

During that period, political parties not only filled in candidates at all administrative levels, but also constituted powerful organizational pillars in society affecting all levels of social and cultural life. Additionally, party organizations were in charge of encapsulating social groups and disseminating partisan subcultures and programmatic stances throughout the Chilean territory. As put by Valenzuela (1999):

[By the 1960s] elections and politics became a national “sport,” as parties became so deeply ingrained in the nation’s social fabric that Chileans would refer to a Radical or a Communist or a Christian Democratic “subculture.” Parties helped to structure people’s friendships and social life. Partisan affiliation continued to be reinforced by both class and religion, so that Christian Democratic elites were more likely to go to Catholic schools and universities and come from upper-middle class backgrounds, while Socialist elites went to public schools and state universities and came from lower-middle class background. Communist strength was heavily concentrated in mining communities and industrial areas, Christian Democrats appealed to middle-class and women voters, while the right retained support in rural Chile. The major parties framed political options not only in municipal and congressional elections but also in private and secondary associations. (p.202).

As extensively discussed below, both partisan subcultures and territorial organizations have been dramatically weakened in Chile. Indeed, independent candidates that neglect or choose to downplay their partisan affinities seem to enjoy a competitive edge over ostracized (party) “politicians.”

Additionally, the pre-authoritarian system was punctuated by an important degree of partisan turnover and competitiveness usually triggered by the combination of popular and interest groups’ dissatisfaction with incumbents and the resort of the latter to clientelistic side-payments made in the hope of co-opting those social groups. Congressional bargaining determined the distribution of subsidies (to interest groups) and pork (to electoral circumscriptions):

The lack of a clear clustering of clientelistic ties created an internally unstable political system in which parties could not maintain their strength for a long period of time since they could not satisfy

the expectations of all the groups co-opted by the party. Dissatisfaction with the behavior of the victorious party prompted groups to move elsewhere within the political organization in search of better luck, creating a constant political turnover. Distinctive to the Chilean party-system was a combination of ideology and clientelism. Ideology gave each party a program and a blue-print to solve all the problems of society; these programs were reproduced in all the party organizations. Clientelism gave the parties their political support. The best example of the combination of ideological and clientelistic commitments was provided by the parties of the left which, at the rhetorical level, paid due respect to Marxist ideology and the notions of class structure and revolution, while at the political level pursued the same clientelistic, co-optive practices of other parties. Clientelistic politics were reflected in the legislative process, which by the end of the period had become almost widely entirely devoted to the solution of particular problems, the concession of special benefits, or exemptions to social obligations. (Borzutzky 2002, p.26)

Today, the interplay between majoritarian and disproportional electoral rules, decentralization and state reform, the balance of executive and legislative powers, and the significant socio-structural transformations occurred in Chile yields a substantially different game. On the one hand, strong incumbency advantages have developed (especially at the local and congressional level) limiting electoral turnover and competitiveness. On the other hand, congressional bargaining lost its role in redistributing clientelistic side-payments, pork, and patronage resources. This shift resulted from decentralization, which in turn has allowed municipal governments to gain more autonomy and expand their jurisdiction, particularly in terms of the provision of crucial policies like education and health. Additionally, state-reform has reduced the amount of resources available for patronage and clientelism at the central level. In turn, the great degree of executive dominance over policy-making (see Siavelis 1999) has shifted relevant decision-making to that branch of government and in particular, to executive agencies in charge of focalized social programs (e.g. housing programs, projects administered by FOSIS, the Ministerio de Planificación, and the Chile Solidario Program, along with other more specialized agencies like the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer). These programs provide direct funding to social projects of both municipalities and community organizations (many times with the direct or advisory involvement of local NGOs) on a competitive basis. While during “good times” these programs serve as a source of legitimation and approval for incumbent executive leaders, they sharply reduce the access of congressional leaders and local opposition activist to state-supplied patronage and

clientelistic resources. Finally, at the societal level, these transformations correlate with higher levels of social fragmentation and “localization.” Whereas before organized interest groups exerted pressure over parties and congress-members, today that bargaining is exerted by smaller groups (usually representing “one street block interests”) at the municipal level. In spite of their similar interest configuration, those groups are also forced to compete against each other for municipal and state funded social programs, reinforcing the trend towards greater societal fragmentation and isolation. Overall, as argued below, these transformations reduced the aggregation level of representation in the Chilean system, particularly in the poorest districts.

Finally, although less dramatic, discontinuities are also found in terms of the configuration of the social bases of Chilean political parties. According to Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986):

[Before 1973] though the left in Chile drew more on working-class sectors, and the parties of the center and right had strong support among middle-and upper-class elements, all Chilean parties had heterogeneous bases of support and drew the bulk of their voters from the poorer sectors of society. In Portes’ sample the Christian Democratic Party received as much support from low-income elements as did the Communists and Socialists. The National Party always relied on the rural poor for much of its voting support. Conversely, other surveys have noted that certain categories of professionals and middle level managers were more likely to support the left than the right. Aggregate data analyses yield similar results. An examination of the socioeconomic correlates of the vote for Chile’s parties reveals that with the exception of the Communist party, with strong roots in mining areas, only a small percentage of the variance in party voting was explained by economic or occupational variables. (p.197)<sup>127</sup>

Today, the social bases of Chilean political parties continue to be heterogeneous. Indeed, it is even possible to claim that such heterogeneity has increased (Mainwaring and Torcal 2003). However, this fact relates to different causes from the ones at play in the pre-authoritarian system. The increasing personalization and municipalization of electoral contests obviously translates into less stable support bases for political parties. Additionally, the decreasing levels of interest aggregation in society reduce the room for partisan encapsulation of different societal groups either on the basis of programmatic appeals or on the basis of side-payments framed at a higher level of aggregation. Moreover, the poorer sectors of society continue to be “pivotal” in elections. However, parties (and individual candidates) have developed different capacities to attract this

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<sup>127</sup>The authors refer to Portes (1971 and 1972).

electorate, a fraction of which (particularly the young) has withdrawn from electoral politics or has alienated from Concertación's governments. Meanwhile, higher sectors of society continue to structure their political preferences on the basis of the left-right dimension and its substantive counterparts (primordially, the regime divide), with the economic elite consistently favoring the parties of the Alianza por Chile. In this context, recent evidence shows that while the electorate of Concertación concentrates in middle-income municipalities, the voters of the Alianza proceed from both extremes of the economic ladder (Altman 2004). As argued in the next chapter, the "dual" character of the right's social coalition finds its counterpart in a partisan strategy that combines programmatic linking with higher income constituents with non-programmatic appeals directed at lower income voters. In spite of state-funding shrinkage and their exclusion from the executive branch, Alianza's reliance on municipal governments and private donations by its affluent voters provided the basis for effectively competing in lower income districts. Finally, as suggested in the comparative analysis presented below, beyond economic variables and candidate-strategies, relevant degrees of path-dependence contribute to the emergence of three-ideal district types: rightist "ghettos", leftist "ghettos", and competitive circumscriptions.

#### Programmatic Linkages, Societal Changes, and the Overall Nature of Non-Programmatic Linkages in Contemporary Chile

The configuration of non-programmatic linkages partially derives from the competitive scenario regarding programmatic linkages in a given system. Therefore, it is first important to draw some general implications from the evidence presented in chapters 4 and 5.

While the economic model (represented by the state-market divide) is relatively uncontested in Chile, the moral divide cuts across the two relevant partisan coalitions, losing its potential for consistently mobilizing popular support. As a result, although partisan elite differences exist, the space for electoral competition on the basis of programmatic differentiation on both divides is constrained. In short, the absence of significant partisan divides on salient

economic issues in the post-transition to democracy reduced the importance of programmatic party-voter linkages in the system (Roberts 1996; Mainwaring and Torcal 2003; Hagopian 2004). This state of affairs is conspicuously epitomized in the statements of two prominent Concertación leaders:

[...] in these (social policy) issues, I never felt constrained by the right. We [the Concertación] do not want a public, state run, bankrupt system. And this is not only due to financial aspects. Conceptually, many of us want to open spaces for the civil society [...] It is not that the right has blocked us, in some things it has, but in others we did not want things to change [...] Frankly, (if the right would not have control of the Senate) I do not believe things would have been different in the economic and social realms. In the political realm absolutely, we would have had another Constitution, without designated senators [...] Look, I already stopped blaming it (the right), even though, within the context of a public speech, one might say 'this is the right's fault!' (cited in Castiglioni 2005, p. 105, interviewed by Castiglioni 1999).

There are not ideological differences between us and the right, the economic model is the same. The only differences that remain are cultural we just come from different political cultures. (PPD leader, Jorge Schaulsohn).<sup>128</sup>

Along the same lines, an UDI strategist explains some of the problems that this phenomenon of partisan collusion around market liberalism might create for the right:

The Concertación has defended the (economic) model so well that people who used to make money in Chile, are now making more money, and those who were sunk, are still sunk. The gap they wanted to bridge is still there and they were able to keep the model in place without creating major social unrest. This is so clear that now I am afraid that we will not be able to keep the economic support from business people. (Eugenio González, Lavin's campaign advisor and UDI activist, personal interview, 2003).

Beyond programmatic collusion around the economic model, institutional constraints introduced in the 1980 Constitution also play an important role, especially in the views of more "orthodox" leftist leaders of the Concertación:

The culture of consensus is so strong that every reform needs to be negotiated behind closed doors. And once you reach a consensus, then legislators raise their hands. This makes political conflict between parties with different positions invisible to the public, which translates into a lack of legitimacy of the system. Besides, the congressional tie produced by the binomial system, the extreme concentration of legislative initiative in the executive, and the need of qualified majorities for virtually every reform you want to carry through, prompts the executive to hold or withdraw legislation for which it is known that consensus is not obtainable. This stalemates the system,

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<sup>128</sup>Speech to a group of leftist university students in a leadership seminar sponsored by Fundación Chile 21. Santiago, October 2003.

hinders government initiatives, and further contributes to delegitimize politics and politicians. (Carolina Tohá, PPD congressional candidate, personal interview, 2001).

Poverty is not solved with the improvement of an indicator, it is quality of life. But the people who see politics technocratically and who practice politics in the media do not understand that we need to stop talking about indexes and start caring about people's everyday realities. Therefore, what you obtain is an increasing separation between the political system and civil society, which results from the fictitious tie generated by the binomial system and the progressive consolidation of media-representation. Let me switch perspectives. If Lavín had been elected in 2000, how would he have handled the crisis we have today [2003]? We would be in Argentina 2001. Lagos avoided that, only because he can still rely on a relatively organic Concertación, on a state system that is somewhat less corrupt than that of Argentina, and a somewhat more flexible political system. But I think we are heading in that direction. (Ignacio Balbontín, former DC congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

This competitive configuration has important implications for voters representing different socioeconomic cross-sections of the electorate. As partisan leaders and highly politicized voters identify on the regime divide (which still remains salient for these groups), lower classes and younger generations feel “unrepresented” by the party-system. This triggers two different phenomena. Those who have a tradition of leftist political socialization, a history of political involvement, and a strong ideological background increasingly feel alienated from the Concertación and abstain from participating in party-politics. Alternatively, they continue to support the PC, which gathers a significant amount of its small basis of support by canalizing systemic discontent (Siavelis 1999). As two Santiago shanty-town dwellers state:

They (the Concertación) promised that happiness would arrive. And it never did. [...] It is sad, but I have to admit for instance that we had better health-care with Pinochet than with the Concertación [...] They just forgot about us. I am a leftist, my husband was the one who organized this “toma” (land take-over), and I used to organize food distribution in this block under Allende. So, I am a leftist and I will keep on voting left, but I will not fool anyone else. I can organize people, fifty, sixty women in two or three hours. But, what for? I will not fool anyone else, even my kids are not registered to vote. And if I could, I would withdraw from the register. I do not know how to act. My only chance to get an improvement is by winning the lottery. Now we will have a national demonstration, we will go to the streets, and something has to change. (Margarita Cofre, *pobladora* from *Lo Hermida* in Peñalolén, personal interview, 2003).<sup>129</sup>

Today, we have our arms crossed because no one gives us a project. We think they (the municipal government) are chastening us [...] And we think we do not gain much from mobilizing and striking. They won't show up anyway. In other sectors they reach neighborhood organizations, they provide information, and they fund social activities. Here, they just promise you things during campaigns. Lily Pérez came to my sector once. She came offering stuff to a school but never showed up again. People don't like her, they even throw stones at her. We have a history of social

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<sup>129</sup>See Oxhorn (1995) and Posner (1996) for similar evidence.

struggle. We were harshly repressed by the right. We don't like the right. Carlos Montes can reach some people in the district because he is a leftist and has a big structure of neighborhood activists working with him. But he does not reach the sector either. Look, we are from the poorest sectors, we have a right to social projects, but they don't come. Then, we don't vote. It is like that, they don't come, we don't vote [...] The Communist Party is death. Look, in my sector all the people are convinced that no politician, no politician at all, will solve their problems. And therefore, no one participates. And the youth are bored; they are tired, and angry. They prefer to engage in drugs, alcohol, and gangs. They don't support anyone. (Communal leader from the *Nueva La Habana* land-takeover in *La Florida*, personal interview, 2003).

Alternatively, even in sectors that suffered from intense repression under the military regime (usually land-takeovers in poor neighborhoods) social "entrapment," the (social) distance between congressional candidates that come to the district from the upper-income neighborhoods during campaigns, and municipal clientelism also contribute to reinforce the status-quo. In these cases, local political figures (typically Mayors) with a capacity (real or perceived) to discretionally disburse basic subsistence goods in exchange for electoral support enjoy important incumbency advantages:

Once, a group of ladies from Peñalolén invited me to a meeting to have tea with them. And they told me: "We know you and we really esteem you a lot. But we are not voting for you. You know why? Because once the campaign is over you will go. And if something happens here [e.g. a flooding], we cannot go. We depend on them (the Municipal government) and therefore, we need to take care of ourselves." They stated it very clearly and in a straightforward way. And that showed me that fear still conditions their behavior and that clientelism is efficient in that context. (Carmén Lazo, former PS congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

In turn, poor voters that lack political socialization (particularly the youth) or a strong ideological imprint that sets them "culturally" apart from one partisan camp or the other, either also abstain or rely on non-programmatic linkages with parties and candidates. As a result, non-programmatic party-voter linkages became key in seducing the pivotal "voto blando" ("soft vote") who began to switch parties on the basis of candidate traits and/or the provision of private goods. In this context, the penetration of mass media and the influence of business interests on political campaigns gained center stage.

There is a profound discontinuity between the first of us who were elected to Congress in 1989, the majority of which had been active in politics before the coup, and those who came later around 1997, 1998 [...] We, the leaders of Concertación, were worried about stabilizing democracy and did not realize that the most negative facets of globalization were exerting a devastating influence on Chilean politics. I am referring to the brutal mercantilization of politics in which you see an

increasingly distorted relationship between money, business, and politics, and the growing influence of media in political life. Both phenomena are closely related in Chile. The structure of mass-media implies that they cannot subsist without support from businessmen, who in turn have a direct relationship with the political right. Therefore, the right has the hegemonic control of written and audiovisual media. In that context they can put a smiling clown on the screen or anyone else with high probabilities of getting him elected on the basis of continued propaganda. On top of that, the mercantilization of politics and political competition between candidates led to escalating campaign costs. Elections today are not about ideology or political projects. They are focused on short-term things, in giving away stuff. It is very paternalistic. For us it is impossible to compete with this, because they have better access to private funding. And you have Mayors offering projects to our local referents. They offer them to lead projects and many of them, to feel closer to the Mayor or to do stuff for their people, forget about their political role, downplaying ideological positions. You have like a symbiosis. And the same happens at the level of deputies and senators. In *La Moneda* (the executive) they are also collaborating with them, with projects and so forth. I don't understand what is happening to our people. They feel good about dealing with the right, particularly in media debates. If they are in the media, that's fine. And to be competitive you need to be in the media, incredible things are happening within the Concertación. For instance, we can have a confidential meeting with a handful of Concertación leaders to discuss a given topic. The next day, a complete coverage of the meeting appears in the media, even with details on how people were seated around the table. What's that? Given that we do not control the media; our own guys use that information to exchange it for media appearances. This is very destructive. (Ignacio Balbontín, former DC congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

In this context, those parties that succeed in setting up a mixture of a national image-umbrella constructed on the media and through popular candidates with a system of local-networks at the base (usually structured around municipal government's political machines or with access to executive-sponsored targeted programs) obtain an important competitive edge in campaigns.

I would say that what you need is a mix. I don't think you can present local figures, particularly in poor districts. They won't do well, even if they are the most legitimate and honest guys in the world. However, you can't ignore them. You need to have a mix. You need to set up a mass-media story with some general projection, particularly for congressional or presidential elections. That's what we had when Frei was elected. And then, you need to insert local leaders within your congressional candidate's campaign showing them that you, as a congress-member, will get them connected to the political system, that you will be an efficient connection for them. And for sure, you need legitimate local networks for that. The Mayors are essential in that respect. You cannot work outside those structures. For many people, the municipality, their church, and their sport club are their only reality. That's their life. And if you forget that, you are lost. Therefore, you need media, you need churches, you need clubs, and you need to connect them to municipal or governmental projects and programs. (Tonás Jocelyn-Holt, former DC congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Notwithstanding, as discussed in the next section, important degrees of district heterogeneity exist in the system, making different recipes for this mix work better or worse in a given socioeconomic and institutional context. Additionally, the very logic of partisan competition in the system tends to hinder the simultaneous development of both components: a consistent and

popular (partisan) national umbrella and efficient local networks at the base. This is illustrated below when drawing implications of this competitive dynamic for parties as organizations. Finally, as suggested by the analysis presented in the next Chapter, at least at the outset, some parties (especially the UDI) were “genetically” designed to adjust better than others to the emerging competitive context.

### Decentralization and District Heterogeneity in Metropolitan Santiago

The comparison between districts and municipalities with different socio-structural and political trajectories illuminates the presence of important levels of heterogeneity in terms of the configuration of representation linkages between politicians and their voters. Indeed, given the great degree of social segmentation observed in Chilean municipalities, it is frequent to observe that successful (re-elected) legislators that operate in heterogeneous districts tend to develop highly segmented fieldwork strategies to relate with their constituents.

Poor people need you more frequently, at every moment. They need you every time they need to survive, because they have all doors closed to them. They don't know where to go, how to do things. They don't get the paperwork done; they need medical exams, the need to place a child in a given school [...] And that's where we come in. Many times we do the same as the municipality and obviously, they also ask the other congress-member to solve the problem, too. But the important thing is to solve the problem, not who does it. The truth is that the greatest benefit from being a deputy is that you can pick up the phone and ask: Can we solve this? This should not be like this, but it is how the system works. And people come to us. We have the municipality divided in sectors and I have local referents in every one of them. Therefore, if I cannot be in touch with every one of them, I have this network to rely on. Peñalolén has the greatest concentration of everyday work for us. And it is the most enjoyable one, because there you realize that people need you. In La Reina, we don't attract anybody's attention. Nothing happens. Perhaps, if there is a specific issue they call you and want you to be there. For instance, the other day they called because they did not like certain garbage cans that the municipality had installed. But those are problems that you can solve very easily. [...] (for instance you go) to the media and asked for a solution. That's all you have to do" (María Angélica Cristi, former Mayor of Peñalolén and RN congress-member, currently an UDI congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Table 8.1 describes the socio-structural characteristics and political trajectories of the five congressional districts (comprising 12 municipalities) in which this fieldwork research took place. Based on this table and drawing on fieldwork results, I present an idealtype classification of districts. Table 8.2 in turn, provides a closer look at the extraordinary socioeconomic and budgetary

differences (after redistributive transfers between rich and poor municipalities are considered) that exist today between two municipal governments placed at each extreme of the socioeconomic ladder. Quite conspicuously, the poorest municipalities in Chile need to satisfy a significantly greater number of social demands (particularly in terms of the provision of education and health care) on the basis of a very restrictive tax base and drawing on inter-municipal transfers that are far from bridging their budgetary gap. For instance, whereas San Ramón has almost 30% of its population below the poverty line and has an annual per capita budget of less than 7 dollars, the population of Vitacura (0.1% of which is defined as poor) enjoys an annual budget allocation of 38.5 dollars. Impressively, these figures are taken after considering resource redistribution from high-income municipalities to low-income ones. The table also provides a glance into educational policy, one of the crucial social programs currently administered by Chilean municipalities. However, to fully make sense of the indicators displayed in the table, it is necessary to have a brief digression into the characteristics of decentralizing reforms pursued by the government of Pinochet. Those reforms have very practical implications on how parties organize and compete for electoral office today.

Although much scholarly attention on institutional factors has focused on the effects of the binomial electoral system and the appointment of non-elected Senators in the Chilean Congress, the municipal reform put forth by Pinochet's regime has also produced far-reaching discontinuities regarding the pre-1973 period.<sup>130</sup> Whereas before local authorities lacked autonomy and relied on hierarchical relations structured along party lines to control scarce state resources (Valenzuela 1977), municipalities and regional governments gained substantial autonomy through the decentralization process forged by Pinochet (Rehren 1999).<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> See Rehren 1990 for a suggestive analysis and a historical account of municipal politics and reform in pre and post-authoritarian Chile.

<sup>131</sup> For instance, taking 1975 as a baseline (100), municipal income reached 439 by 1982. Similarly, whereas for the pre-1973 period the size of central government increased from 100 to 452 (1960-1965) and the size of municipal governments only reached an index of 193 for the same period, between 1975 and 1983 the size of municipal governments increased by 1.528. At the same time, the role of the central government only went from a baseline index of 100 to an index of 123. Figures based on the estimates presented by Rehren (1990) on the evolution of municipal and national government budgets. Additionally, by 1982 a significant share of all public education and health services were also decentralized to the municipal level turning Municipalities into a crucial actor in the provision of two key social policies. At the same time, the role of the central government only went from a baseline index of 100 to an index of 123. Figures based on the estimates presented by Rehren (1990) on the evolution of municipal and national government budgets. Additionally, by 1982 a significant share of all public education and health services were also decentralized to the municipal level turning Municipalities into a crucial actor in the provision of two key social policies.

**Table 8.1:**

**District Characterization, Political Trajectory, Party Strategy, and Recent Electoral Outcomes\***

<b>District and Mayoralties</b>	<b>Average Human-Development Index 2000</b>	<b>Average poverty in 2000</b>	<b>Political Trajectory</b>	<b>Leftist Tradition. Vote for the Popular Union in 1973</b>	<b>Vote for Lavín in 2000, first round</b>	<b>Vote for the Alianza Por Chile in 2001 Congressional elections</b>
18 Cerro Navia/ Lo Prado Quinta/ Normal	.72 CN=.69	15.3% CN=24%	Hegemonic Concertación	Yes, Communist and Socialist Parties, some DC 47.9% QN	40.2%	28.4%
23 Las Condes/ Vitacura/ Lo Barnechea	.90 LB=.88	1.2% LC & LB=1.8%	Hegemonic Alianza	No 24.15% LC	70.8%	70.7%
24 Peñalolén/ La Reina	.81 P=.75	10.3% P=17.6%	Competitive	Yes, in popular sectors of P. Also, popular DC Mayor in LR until retirement in 2004 33.7% LR	48.4%	47.2%
26 La Florida	.80	7.6%	Historically Concertación, turning competitive. UDI in Municipal office since 2000	Yes, particularly in land-takeovers, but also, becoming conservative due to upward social mobility in middle-strata 47.2%	43.8%	40.1%
27 La Cisterna/ El Bosque/ San Ramón	.74 SR=.71	17.8% EB=26%	Historically Concertación, with rapid growth of UDI, particularly in congressional elections	Yes, Communist and Socialist Parties 46.6%	48.6%	45.4%

\*Source: PNUD (2001); Servicio Electoral, and personal interviews and fieldwork during 2002-2003.

**Table 8.2:****A comparative glance at two municipalities operating in extreme social contexts**

Municipality	San Ramón	Vitacura
Municipal area	6.5 sq.km	28.2 sq.km.
% of people under poverty line in the municipality	29.80%	0.10%
Population	86.000	102.029
% of urban and industrial soil	100%	66%
Budget, including redistributive transfers.	4.553.306	21.965.905
Budget per capita (in U\$S dollars)	\$6.85	\$38.50
Enrollment in municipal education	9.319	2.716
Amount of municipal support for social and cultural programs	97.153	623.443
Ratio: student per teacher	25.2	18.1
Number of municipal educational centers	218	4
Number of municipal educational centers actually own by the municipality	13	2
Average years of education of the population	9.2	14.3
% of scores PPA scores 450 or above	21%	67%

Source: SINIM on the bases of 2002 Municipal Data provided by the SUBDERE

In the aftermath of the state's shrinking and decentralization, local authorities became less and less dependent on national authorities. Although the regional governments and intendancies (directly appointed by the central government) remain key for the redistribution of resources from the national to the municipal level, both the predominance of technocratic criteria for assigning those resources and the amount of resources already available at the municipal level gave local partisan actors a great deal of room for autonomy.

Given such autonomy and discretion in assigning resources, local authorities (and particularly the Mayor), are seen as potential competitors by the district's Deputies. Although council members are usually asked for help during congressional campaigns by their party's candidates, they are becoming gradually more cynical about this: "People from the wealthy

neighborhoods who only come here to ask for help with campaigns and then forget about you until the next election.”<sup>132</sup> The level of electoral divergence (particularly within pacts) between Congressional elections and Municipal contests is symptomatic of this process of detachment and personalization, which in turn becomes functional in order to compete in the context of mass alienation from political parties.

In short, the financial autonomy of Mayors has also contributed to the development of a schism between local candidates and those who run for national office. In other words, the centralized and hierarchically structured partisan networks that were functional in keeping each party strong and in line at the local level seems to be weakening. Although Posner (1999) has argued that political parties were able to maintain their local structures and regain control of local politics since the return to democracy by centralizing candidate selection and subjecting local candidates to the requisites imposed by centrally stroked pacts, my evidence points to a gradual but increasing detachment between local party actors at the municipal level and national partisan authorities. Indeed, the tendency of several Concertación local candidates to break with centrally negotiated pacts partially explains the success of rightist candidates and their ability to obtain numerous mayor positions in previous municipal contests.<sup>133</sup> It is worth mentioning, however, that the recent change in electoral institutions might disrupt the trends described here. Until 2004 mayors were usually elected by the Municipal Council among its own members (as it was infrequent that one single candidate would gather the required thirty-five per cent of the votes to be appointed mayor).<sup>134</sup> The mechanism for Municipal Elections changed in 2004 and for the first time, directly elected Mayors running on independent lists from those of Council Members were

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<sup>132</sup>Based on personal interview with council member Pedro Vega, *El Bosque*.

<sup>133</sup>Based on a set of thirty interviews with local council members and mayors.

<sup>134</sup>See Posner (1996) for a complete description of the mechanism. The mechanism for Municipal Elections has been recently changed and for the first time, the Municipal elections to be held in 2004 will generate directly elected Mayors. This change has important implications for parties' strategy and according to my evidence will contribute in recentralizing power at the central partisan level.

elected that year. Preliminary evidence indicates that this change had important implications for parties' strategy and contributed to recentralize power at the national level for mayor nominations, especially in highly salient and visible municipalities. Also, by forcing national pacts to coordinate nominations in order to maximize electoral returns, the system benefited the Concertación which previously had a harder time in disciplining local activists.

A crucial feature of the military-era decentralization reform, which has endured up to the moment and that will certainly continue to operate in the future, is the central role assigned to the Mayor. In short, the Mayor tends to behave as “a feudal lord”, usually “neglecting and ignoring council members” and “claiming credit for everything that happens in the municipality.”<sup>135</sup> As a result, a strong incumbency advantage has developed, triggering further personalization at the local level (Huneus 1998).

The observed level of linkage-strategy heterogeneity (even within the same district between different municipalities) is also a by-product of those reforms and of the different social structures in which political linkages are established. The next section provides an assessment of such variance and its causes.

#### Non-Programmatic Linkages in Three District Ideal-Types<sup>136</sup>

The classification I present in this section is based on the interaction between the socio-structural characteristics of the districts and municipalities and their political trajectory. Table 3 provides a schematic comparison of the districts in which this research took place. This table shows the existing variance between the district's structural and competitive characteristics, the specific tactic pursued by UDI and Concertación candidates, and the resulting electoral penetration of the UDI, both in local and congressional elections and in the presidential contest of 2000, taken as a

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<sup>135</sup>Based on interviews with council member Alejandro Sepúlveda (UDI) from El Bosque and council member and former Mayor Manuel Arzola (PPD) from San Ramón.

<sup>136</sup>Electoral returns discussed in this section were obtained from the historical database of the Servicio Electoral, which can be accessed online through [www.interior.gub.cl](http://www.interior.gub.cl)

proxy of the recent political leaning of each district. In Chapter 9, I come back to this table in order to analyze UDI's recent electoral success in recent elections.

As discussed below, both socio-structural factors and the specific political trajectories of the districts are inter-correlated and together yield the particular combination of programmatic and non-programmatic linkages observed in each case. Within the latter group, different linkage styles (or, paraphrasing Richard Fenno's classic, *homestyles*) predominate in districts pertaining to different. The first type corresponds to higher-income municipalities in which programmatic-linking predominate and campaigns are fundamentally played on the media. The second and third types correspond to medium, medium-low and low income municipalities, historically identified with the left, which differ in terms of their current degrees of social heterogeneity. The second type is less heterogeneous and presents lower levels of social welfare and higher amounts of social fragmentation. In this type, non-programmatic linking predominates and candidates from both partisan camps need to engage in extensive patronage and clientelistic transactions in order to attract voters. For this reason, in spite of the leftist tradition of the districts, the UDI has been able to make some electoral inroads by fully engaging in this type of relationship with constituents, especially drawing on the presence of popular mayors appointed by Pinochet during the dictatorship. The third type, in turn, corresponds to municipalities that were historically similar to the ones pertaining to the second group. Nonetheless, in recent years, these municipalities have received an inflow of medium and medium-high income residents and have witnessed an important development of infrastructure and facilities. As well, resulting from this trajectory, they usually present higher levels of interest group organization and mobilization (particularly La Florida). As a result, they present a combination of the patterns seen in both previous types, with a segment of the electorate voting on programmatic appeals (middle-high sectors) and middle-low and low social sectors engaging in non-programmatic linking with candidates competing on community-service and clientelistic side-payments.

**Table 8.3:**

**District Configuration, Partisan Strategies, and UDFs Electoral Performance\***

<b>District and Mayoralties</b>	<b>UDI's strategy</b>	<b>Linkage substitution by Concertación</b>	<b>RN strength</b>	<b>UDI Mayors in the District</b>	<b>Vote in 1997 Congressional elections</b>	<b>Vote Lavín 2000, for in first round</b>	<b>Vote in 2001 Congressional elections</b>	<b>District Type</b>
18 Cerro Navia/ Lo Prado Quinta/ Normal	National Inertia, Media, not investing resources or highly valued candidates.	Yes, especially in CN through personalized leadership by Girardi and municipal machines	Low, Declining	No	11.4% Alianza=16.6 %	40.2%	23.5% Alianza=28.4 %	II
23 Las Condes/ Vitacura/ Lo Barnechea	National Inertia, Media, using LC municipality as showcase	No	High, particularly in V & LB	Yes, LC	34.9% Alianza=66 %	70.8%	44.7% Alianza=70.7 %	I
24 Peñalolén/ La Reina	National Inertia in LR, Media. Waiting for RN Congress Member to go for Senate in Peñalolén. Investing in young formation	No, until 2004 in Peñalolén's Municipal election with intensive fieldwork activity by Orrego (DC's elected mayor).	High in both	No	2.35% Alianza=53.2 %	48.4%	9.2% Alianza=47.2 %	Peñalolén III La Reina I

**Table 8.3 (cont.)**

26 La Florida	Waiting for RN Congress Member to go for Senate. Investing in young formation and using municipal machine as platform	Yes, Carlos Montes in the Socialist Party, articulating an extensive fieldwork network of community service and cultural activities. However, strong internal confrontations in 2000 leading to defeat at municipal level	High for Congress	Yes, since 2000	1.4% Alianza=32%	43.8%	3.4% Alianza=40.1 %	III
27 La Cisterna/ El Bosque/ San Ramón	Using LC as platform to expand to other municipalities, intensive fieldwork activities	Yes, particularly in EB, with municipal programs and personalized leadership. Not for Congress	Low, UDI hegemonic within Alianza, especially for Congress	Yes, until 2004 in LC	37.4% Alianza=42.2 %	48.6%	42.5% Alianza=45.4 %	II

\*Source: PNUD (2001); Servicio Electoral, and personal interviews and fieldwork during 2002-2003.

In short, the political configurations observed in this set of districts conforms to the currently observed distribution of political support across the socioeconomic ladder at the municipal level, with rightist candidates performing well in the upper and lower sectors and Concertación gathering support in middle strata (Altman 2004).

Anticipating the major trends identified in Chilean districts it is possible to state that upper-sectors approach politics primordially through the media and are influenced by their alignment regarding national currents represented by the Concertación and the Alianza. In turn, in socially organized middle-low sectors, community service constitutes an important base for political support both for congressional candidates and municipal ones. Meanwhile, lower sectors present a combination of political alienation and clientelistic co-optation at lower levels of interest aggregation. Municipal machines provide local candidates, independently from their political party, a crucial resource for advancing their career. However, the social heterogeneity of society and the related higher or lower rates of competitiveness of electoral contest at the municipal level, condition the chances of consolidating strong incumbency advantages. For instance, this distinguishes the third district type identified in which incumbency advantages are weaker. Regarding partisan differences, the right combines public opinion and media campaigning to renew the support of the wealthiest electorate, they invest resources to personally connect with poor voters on the basis of clientelistic transactions and constituency service. In this regard, the comparison between Carlos Montes and Maria Angélica Cristi and Lily Pérez suggests that rightist candidates seem to spend more during campaigns and have a relatively weaker permanent territorial structure in the municipalities. The Concertación has been successful when it was able to draw on the leftist tradition present in these municipalities to craft new personalized and local leaderships working around a combination of constituency-service and clientelism. This is what I labeled a successful process of “linkage-substitution” by Concertación’s leaders. When one or both elements were absent, new candidates could draw on national currents (e.g. the strength of the DC in the first years after the transition; the explosion of PPD in 1997) and on the leftist tradition of

these districts to win a Congressional or Municipal seat, offering to substitute an increasingly unpopular Concertación incumbent. However, in the absence of a effective strategy of “linkage substitution”, electoral return declined sharply (as in the case of the DC in Peñalolén). In this context, the cases of Carlos Montes of the PS and Guido Girardi of the PPD represent successful substitution strategies. In the case of Montes, his strategy is focused on investing resources in the organization of civil society and constituency-services. However, this strategy is less effective when relating to the lowest socioeconomic tier of society. Guirardi in turn, combines extremely frequent media addresses on contentious issues and an intensive fieldwork presence which is accompanied by the Municipal administration head by his sister in Cerro Navia.

#### *Upper-income sectors: “Rightist Ghettos”*

Higher-income districts (represented in the sample by District 23 and the Municipality of La Reina within District 24) are characterized by the absence of politicians developing fieldwork activities. Indeed, these districts are described by congress-members as “public opinion” ones. Additionally, with the partial exception of La Reina at the municipal level (resulting from the presence of a historical and very popular DC Mayor until 2004), this group of municipalities present the highest levels of support for the Alianza in Metropolitan Santiago, with this political pact being virtually always able to “double” the Concertación in congressional campaigns. This allows the pact to get both congressional seats while distributing the municipalities of Vitacura, Lo Barnechea, and Las Condes between the UDI and RN.

While national campaigns are played on the media on the basis of partisan labels and programmatic appeals, at the municipal level, mayors focus on the provision of public goods comprising infrastructure improvements, the development of green areas, public security, and waste disposal. Social programs in health and education are less salient in these districts, as the majority of the population has access and relies on private sector supply.

The following statements by an UDI Deputy and an opposition council member of Vitacura summarize the political dynamics at play in these municipalities:

The district (23) is a very peculiar one. It is likely the one in the country that is most heavily influenced by a public opinion. That is, 90% of the people who lives there is not expecting me to solve a specific problem for them. Nor are they expecting me to visit their home, give them something, or solve a social problem for them. What they expect is that I represent their opinions in the media. And that in congress I vote like they would if they were in my seat. Therefore, it is a district with almost no fieldwork activity. I only did fieldwork in the poor sectors that we still have here, like in Coñn and Cerro 18 in Lo Barnechea. But that was it. And as an economist, what I do is to appear frequently on the media speaking about those topics that are interesting and important for my electors. And the rest comes from their identification with the UDI, which represented the hard core of the Pinochet-supporters vote. These are the people that see the UDI as some kind of perpetuator of the military regime's heritage. That's the basis of our strength in this district. And I have the joy that in my district rightist supporters are a lot and that I don't have to convince them, I don't need to speak to them. So I have the time to focus on the others. (Julio Dittborn, UDI congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

The right has political capital in this district that is immovable. They can get a 70% of the vote, they might get down to 68% or up to 71%, but that's all. In the Council we have always been 5 against 1. And they don't really care what happens here. There are some needy sectors in the municipality, like that of Los Castaños. They are not in extreme poverty, but they are poor. It is very funny! People complain: "They are constructing towers in front of our homes. How long are we going to stand this?" And then, the Mayor gets 69% of the vote! People think that because they live in Vitacura, they should vote for the right. It is absurd. We tried to talk to the people, we tried to organize them. However, electoral results are stable. They are fundamentalists [...] The difference is the economic power we have in these municipalities, the tax base. And there is no clientelism here. We invest in infrastructure, squares, schools. And in campaigns they virtually do nothing. They just go to sectors where they know they don't have a secure vote and spend some time there. Look, in the Lo Curro sector, in which you only have mansions of very powerful people, they had a meeting a month ago and invited the Mayor and the Council to talk about a certain topic. And the only one that goes is me. They don't care. Indeed, only two of the five council members live here. All the others, as well as the Mayor, live in La Dehesa (an even wealthier Municipality). So, after that meeting they give thanks to you, they cheer you, and bla bla bla. But you know they won't vote for you. Because they don't vote for individual candidates, they don't vote for people, they vote for party labels. And even if they don't actively engage in politics, they vote with extraordinary discipline (Sergio Hernández, DC council-member of the Municipality of Vitacura, personal interview, 2003).

#### *Lower-Income Sectors Without Available Territories: "Leftist Ghettos" and Pinochet's Successful*

##### *Mayors in Congress*

Districts 18 and 27 present the lowest aggregate indexes of Human Development and the greater percentages of people below the poverty line. These districts and the municipalities they comprise (with the exception of Quinta Normal) originated at least partially from land-takeovers under the auspices of leftist groups (predominantly the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria) and from the "relocation" plans pursued by Pinochet through which *pobladores* that inhabited

higher-income municipalities were forcefully relocated to metropolitan Santiago suburbia. The leftist tradition of these districts is epitomized by the relatively high level of electoral support obtained by the Unión Popular in 1973, only comparable to the one shown by La Florida.

Diverging from other municipalities with similar originating characteristics included in the sample (more prominently Peñalolén, but also La Florida in terms of its social structure in lower-income sectors), these municipalities (Cerro Navia, Lo Prado, Quinta Normal, La Cisterna, El Bosque, and San Ramón) lack significant space for the development of real state and urbanization projects. The lack of available territories for such projects implies that the social-structure of the districts have changed less dramatically than those of Peñalolén and La Florida, which have recently received an inflow of middle and upper-middle professional and business sectors as a result of urban expansion and the successful development of more affordable housing than in the traditional upper-class neighborhoods. This incoming population not only broadens the tax base providing better resources to municipalities, but also provides a more solid foundation for the electoral growth of the right. In this sense, although poverty indexes have been reduced, they did not witness any major socio-structural developments in the post-transition to democracy. In this respect, they are similar to other popular municipalities such as La Granja, La Pintana, San Miguel, and San Bernardo.

In District 18, the Concertación has been able to hold a hegemonic position regarding congressional elections, winning both electoral seats available. The election of 1989 in which a representative from RN was elected to congress constitutes the only exception to this rule. At the municipal level, the Concertación has also been nearly hegemonic, with the PPD and the DC obtaining the greatest electoral favor and RN obtaining twice (1996 and 2000) the municipality of Quinta Normal.

The leadership of Guido Girardi of the PPD (synergized with that of his sister, the Mayor of Cerro Navia) explains the extraordinary performance of the Concertación. Indeed, Girardi climbed from 42.7% in 1993 to 66% in 1997 (obtaining 72% in Cerro Navia). Although his

electoral support declined in 2001 (to 58.4% at the district level), it was still sufficient to double the Alianza in spite of the meager support obtained by the second most popular candidate within Concertación (6.4%). In this context, Carlos Olivares from the DC has been elected to congress in the last two elections obtaining less than 7% in each of them. Nonetheless, the Alianza has made important electoral inroads in this district climbing from a 16.6% in the congressional elections of 1997 to a 28.4% in those of 2001. Additionally, illustrating relatively high levels of electoral turnover and the weak relationship existing between elections at different levels of government the presidential candidacy of Lavín obtained 40.2% in 2000.

Meanwhile, in District 27, each partisan pact obtained one of the congressional district representatives in all post-transitional elections, with the exception of that of 1989 in which the parties of Concertación (DC and PS) doubled those of the Alianza. However, since the incursion of Iván Moreira, the former Pinochet appointed Mayor of La Cisterna as congressional candidate in 1993; each one of the pacts obtained one legislator. While Moreira has continued to run obtaining each time a greater fraction of the electorate (28% in 1993, 37% in 1997, and 42% in 2001), the PS lost its “traditional” seat in the district and has been replaced by a DC representative: Eliana Caravall. Within Concertación the percentage obtained by the candidate gathering the greatest plurality went down from 35% in 1989 to 24% in 2001. The same applies to the second plurality of the Concertación, which declined from 26% to 19%. At the municipal level, Mayor Sadi Melo from the PS has been elected in El Bosque since 1992, subsequently obtaining 12% in 1992, 28% in 1996, 30% in 2000, and 47% in 2004 under the new electoral system. In San Ramón, DC’s Pedro Islas was also able to get continuously reelected after coming into office in 1997 with 19%, to substitute the first elected Mayor in 1992 that also pertained to the DC. In the last election, Islas obtained 41% of the votes. Finally, in La Cisterna, an “older” municipality with less land-takeovers and a greater influence of commercial (and some industrial) enterprises, more alternation is observed. In this case, the DC obtained the municipal government in 1993 and 1996. In 2000, the UDI arrived in office benefiting from an internal split within Concertación’s council members.

However, in 2004, a PPD mayor recovered the municipality for the center-left pact. Finally, in the presidential elections of 2001, Joaquín Lavín of the UDI obtained almost 49% of the valid vote. Once again, together with the rising popularity of Iván Moreira in spite of the district's tradition and the patterns of municipal incumbency, this fact signals the presence of high volatility between elections framed at different levels.

Indeed, differing from higher-income municipalities, party-voters are scarce in both districts and electoral fortunes seem to depend on personalized leaderships pursuing intense fieldwork activities focused on low levels of interest aggregation (personal and club-goods). In short, in the context of interest group fragmentation and pressing social needs, politicians have increasingly faced incentives to develop particularistic and problem-solving networks through which they exchange contingent political support for the satisfaction of voter's immediate needs.<sup>137</sup>

Thus, politicians who are able to pay a household's utility bills during the campaign period, or distribute TV sets, food boxes, equipment for a neighborhood soccer club, or give away a cake for a Bingo organized by a *Centro de Madres* (Mother's Center) or Junta de Vecinos (Neighborhood Council) on a regular basis, are becoming increasingly successful in this type of district.<sup>138</sup> During congressional campaigns, these politicians hire unemployed people to paint the neighborhood walls (and then protect the walls they painted) and pay around 60 dollars for each banner that is shown on a house's door. In short, politicians who have personal contact with members of poor communities develop a competitive advantage over more distant candidates, who lack the opportunity to compete on redistributive ideological platforms.<sup>139</sup> In this context, municipal governments constitute extremely privileged political machines. As Espinoza (1999) argues, the municipality has increasingly become the focus of poor people's lives. At the same

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<sup>137</sup>See Scott (1985) for a suggestive interpretation of the nature and the rationale that backs up these exchanges.

<sup>138</sup>Based on a set of thirty interviews with local council members and former and current Congress-Members.

<sup>139</sup>Personal interview with Osvaldo Silva (congressional candidate from RN in district 27).

time, structural reform and the transformation of local politics have complicated the organization of popular sectors in order to pursue solutions to their most fundamental problems. Therefore, as suggested by the following testimonies, candidates who are able to be “in the field” offering the most in terms of satisfying immediate needs are the ones who increasingly tend to succeed at the polls.

He (Iván Moreira) goes and visits people; he knocks at the door and says that the deputy wants to see how you are doing. He works in the district. He can miss a Congress appointment, but he does not miss any chance to be with the people here. He works for the vote and he is campaigning all day during the four years. That is what he does. He is not a good Congress-Member; he does not know anything about laws; he did not even finish school, but he is there. For instance, the evangelical sector is very important in the district and he goes to every important ceremony at every church. The same happens with soccer clubs. He is everywhere kissing old ladies and no other candidate does that. [...] He is a clown; people have fun with him, but also votes for him. Everyone here talks about him. Did he divorce? How much weight did he lose? That is what people gossip about here. (Osvaldo Silva, congressional candidate from RN in district 27, personal interview, 2003).

There are congress-members that get municipalized. And those are the ones that perform well in these districts. Because they take care of people’s everyday problems, which is what these people really care about. Those are the ones that get the greater electoral returns. (José Antonio Cavedo, former Mayor and current council-member of San Ramón, personal interview, 2003).

Today, a great proportion of Chilean politics resides in a group of personalities that are able to construct a special nexus with the community. Here (district 18), Girardi is very strong in that respect. And I know him well; he is a good congress-member. But, where is the key? In these municipalities you don’t have organized political movements, you only have individual persons. And that’s a risk. Many times the community is attracted by personalities and not by parties or programs. The politician that used to come to party meetings to talk about national issues no longer exists. Both Girardis are impressive political phenomena here. But that does not mean that my party, the PPD, is strong in this district. If they go, PPD is done in this district. Votes are personally tied to them; they don’t belong to the PPD. And that is bad. It weakens the party base, the social network, which no longer exists. And the fragmentation and isolation it promotes, reinforces this political logic. [...] Council Members are placed within a Chinese shoe here due to the new political culture that is emerging from the practice of giving stuff away. If I, as a council-member, don’t give you a cake for a bingo, I am out. It is perverse. People now want you to give them stuff without any kind of effort or organizational counterpart on their side. They don’t get organized; they just come here and ask you to give them different things. And my party is falling into a sick paternalism from which there is no way out. Unfortunately, I now perceive that there are vast sectors of the left that feel good about this system. And therefore, people think we are the same thing. They are right; we are doing the same thing. If we don’t get rid of mass-media guys and “cosismo” there is no future for the PPD. (Jorge Villar, president of PPD’s distrital representation in District 18, personal interview, 2003).<sup>140</sup>

In this district there is not a clear cut that socially defines my electorate. If they know you, they might vote for you. You need to have a strong body, because you need to be everywhere and go anywhere in the district at any moment. This is like what has happened with religion. The evangelicals are there all day, they live with them, and they are growing and displacing the Catholic Church which is more distant. They need to feel you close. If you are not there, they just discard

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<sup>140</sup>“Cosismo” refers to the politics of giving away stuff (“cosas”), which epitomizes in the eyes of Concertación’s activists the political strategy of the UDI.

you. And I also need to be in Congress supporting the Government. My competitor does not need to be there and has a lot of resources to spend. I don't show up in TV and do not have enough money to spend it giving away stuff, so I have to walk the district and be here all the time to try to keep my seat. (Eliana Caravall, DC congress-member in District 27, personal interview, 2003).

At the Municipal level, the same logic of competition applies, independently from the Mayor's political affiliation and catalyzed by her central political role and the power of municipal "machines":

She (the PPD Mayor) is with the people. If there is a woman crying because something bad happened to her, she is there giving her a hug. She cares for the people and feels good helping them. She does a great job, not only taking care of people's feelings, but also seeking solutions for their problems. She tries to provide solutions all the time, she is everywhere. (Isabel Mathus, DC council-member of the Municipality of Cerro Navia, personal interview, 2003).

Finally, the importance of candidate familiarity with the district is similar in these municipalities to that observed in rural localities and interior cities. Indeed, though for different personal reasons, both the Girardi family and Iván Moreira are considered "locals" by these districts inhabitants.

While Girardi profits from continuous TV appearances (usually leading specific popular protests in the streets or formulating denunciations on a controversial topic), his family has had personal ties with the district for fifty years. Additionally, he manages to be permanently present in the district (in part drawing on Cerro Navia's municipality), even when that means that he needs to have "a siren on his car, to go from Valparaíso (where congress is located) to the district, whenever that's necessary." Besides, his "easy media protest" style (sometimes used against Concertación's government decisions) leads people in the district to identify him as a "leftist."<sup>141</sup> In turn, while that identification resonates well with the district's popular culture, it does not seem to conflict with PPD's doctrinaire commitments: "I don't want to have a doctrine, because it boxes me in, it ties me down. I prefer having principles and values...I am in a party with principles and values, that has the capacity to be pragmatic."<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>141</sup>Personal interviews with PPD informants, as well as a personal interview with Girardi (2003).

Meanwhile, Iván Moreira does not appear so frequently in the media. However, he identified with the district (especially in La Cisterna) during the military regime and has a personal (popular) style that synergizes his tireless fieldwork activities. Indeed, in spite of his electoral success and due to such style, top leaders of the UDI dislike Moreira.<sup>143</sup>

Here (in Quinta Normal) for instance, a structure, an image like the one of Iván Moreira would work extraordinarily well. It is not like before that party activism mattered, when they got together to learn the doctrine, to play the drum, to wear the same t-shirt. That no longer exists today. Now people want different things. They feel attracted by a candidate, by her personality, her intelligence, but above everything, by her work in popular communities. We like those candidates that do not wear a tie and that if needed, sit on the floor to eat with the shanty-town dweller. We like candidates who seed trees in public squares. We like candidates that hang together and talk to drug-addicts and alcoholics. That's the candidate that people like, in this and in every popular district. And until we get rid of rich candidates that come here from elsewhere in the upper-neighborhoods we are lost. Here, we had a candidate that arrived in a Mercedes Benz. And she got mad at me when I told her that by doing that she won't get far. Even if it is an old Mercedes, people here know a Mercedes and what it means. You cannot arrive here with a bodyguard. Still, she spent a lot of money and we were close. But you should be like us, speak like us. Candidates should be very acquainted with the district. (Oscar Mendoza, UDI council-member in Quinta Normal personal interview, 2003).

In both cases, their personal ties with their districts and their particular political styles provide both Moreira and Girardi an important competitive edge. As a result of the competitive dynamics predominating in this type of district, office-seeking politicians from all camps face strong incentives to compete on this basis (constituency-service and clientelism) for the support of an increasingly ideologically "alienated" or dealigned electorate.<sup>144</sup> Beyond ideological shrinking, the crucial socio-structural and institutional transformations implemented by the authoritarian regime are functional in maintaining this new equilibrium and reducing the *capacities* present in the system. In particular, that reduction results from the greater levels of social fragmentation and decomposition of collective actors, which is coupled with a greater level of disconnection from the social movement regarding the party system.

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<sup>142</sup>Guido Girardi, cited in Plumb (1998).

<sup>143</sup>Personal interviews with UDI's leaders.

<sup>144</sup>These competitive pressures were seemingly felt more strongly by opposition candidates, given that Concertación candidates could still get a job in a state agency.

In turn, politicians who do not deliver goods and services, or who do not think it is appropriate to engage in this new political style, get chastised at the polls. This transformation was especially detrimental to DC candidates, who lack a means of differentiating themselves ideologically from sectors of the right, particularly given the party's current departure from its own tradition of intense organizational encapsulation at the grassroots level.<sup>145</sup>

When interviewing former legislators who were extremely successful in the 1989 election, but were then voted-out after one or two Congressional sessions, one systematically comes across statements like these:

My job was to legislate and propose general laws. I was even voted as the "Best Congress-member" by fellow deputies. But people in my district did not understand that they went with the guy that was able to pay more utility bills during campaigns. (Sergio Elgueta, former DC congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

I was a public opinion congress-member. I was oriented towards the national public and took on technically very complex issues with zero electoral sex appeal. Therefore, I was not a low-profile congress-member, but I had a very different strategy from the one had by my district colleagues, who relied on very extensive local networks. I did not engage in constituency-service. [...] I did not get into the 'politics' of being a Congress-member. I did not run a district office nor did I use the district visiting week. What for? If people will not vote for me because I did not buy t-shirts for the soccer club that is their problem. [...] I was very skeptical of local politics. Chilean municipalities do not function well. I am skeptical of that way of doing politics. Local networks and municipalities function like small feudal organizations, with increasing levels of corruption. And if you denounce that, you are in trouble. The system now works like Peronism in the 1950s. And if you try to spoil that, you would obviously be in trouble. (Tomás Jocelyn Holt, former DC congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

In a word, it is important to stress once again that party-voter linkages primarily depend on personal ties between candidates and electors, making parties and party-labels less important. Indeed, party-labels can even constitute a hindrance, particularly if politicians can still manage to provide for their constituents in spite of the lack of partisan affiliation:

I am amazed. As an independent candidate, I am entering places where I had never been. People that used to throw stones at me and that sent me to hell as an UDI candidate are now calling me to go and visit them. I don't know if this will make me loose the support from strong supporters of Pinochet, that's my only concern. [...] My work entails direct contact with people, to be trusted, I do not promise anything, I just tell people the truth. My Council stipend is spent on prizes for bingos, sports tournaments, and the overall functioning of my office. Three times a week I go to the municipality, apart from other days in which you have to attend birthday parties or any type of

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<sup>145</sup>This is one of the reasons why the DC has been the party that suffered the most in the electoral arena, providing the room for UDI's electoral inroads (see Joignant and Navia 2003).

social event. And there I have a team of four persons, well connected to the Social and Public Works Departments of the Municipality, as well as judicial offices tied to the community. This way I can process demands, offer legal orientation, medical consultations, complaints regarding the municipal government, and so forth. (José Antonio Cavedo, former Mayor and current council-member of San Ramón, personal interview, 2003).

*Middle and Lower-Income Sectors with Available Territories: Heterogeneous Societies and Segmented Political Strategies*

Both Peñalolén and La Florida (a district in itself) were in the past low and medium-low income municipalities with significant presence of rural settlements. During the 1960s and 1970s both municipalities witnessed extensive left-takeovers and the progressive expansion of middle-class housing resulting from Metropolitan Santiago's growth. In recent times, the majority of the subsisting rural properties have been parceled out to construct real estate enterprises that progressively attracted professional and middle-upper classes to both municipalities. As a result, both municipalities present high degrees of social heterogeneity. In particular, La Florida is usually portrayed as a "sample of Chilean society", composed of middle-low, middle, and middle-high social strata. Although probably with some exaggeration, a former legislator from district 24 illustrates the political implications of the recent changes observed in Peñalolén's society:

I entered politics when the ones that had political power were the ladies that went to the street shop to buy, after a catholic ceremony, carrying a rosary in their hands. Today, that power is in the hands of a middle class guy, fat, who spends the weekend in the southern sector of Santiago, dissatisfied and angry, washing his car, with the cell phone ringing by his side, with a baby in the backseat and his wife asking him what time are they going to go to the mall. That guy is highly indebted and the next day he will get up very early because he has to drive 40 minutes to work. The week will pass and the next weekend, he will repeat the same routine. That guy is a neurotic. (Tomás Jocelyn Holt, former DC congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Historically, the Catholic Church (through the Holly Cross congregation and the Vicaría de la Solidaridad) exerted a lasting influence in Peñalolén, contributing to social organization and mobilization, particularly during the transition to democracy. These organizations provided an important base of support for the DC, especially during the first years of the post-transition to democracy. Additionally, the left had significant strength particularly in territories that were occupied through land-takeovers. Those territories suffered from intense repression during the

dictatorship. In spite of this originating configuration, the political trajectory of the municipality in the post-transition to democracy was punctuated by Pinochet's creation of the Municipality of Peñalolén, assigned to María Angélica Cristi. During the dictatorship and drawing on municipal resources, Cristi was able to develop a very powerful clientelistic apparatus focused on the "paternalistic" provision of basic goods to the poorest sectors of the district. In this respect, her "horseback visits during a flooding in winter nights to check if everything was "OK" are still remembered in Peñalolén's *poblaciones*.<sup>146</sup> On this basis, Cristi was able to get a congressional seat representing RN in the elections of 1989, obtaining 30.5% of Peñalolén's votes (against a 33% obtained by a candidate of the Partido Humanista). This electoral share was then expanded to 36.8% in 1993 and to 50.8% in 1997, on the basis of a continuous presence in the district. In this sense, Cristi's leadership is similar to that observed for other successful candidates operating in low-income communities. In 2001, Cristi's support rate declined to 39% resulting from the combination of UDI's incursion in the district (under the influence of Joaquín Lavín increasing popularity) and the emergence of a new candidate (from the PPD) challenging both incumbent representatives who were suffering the effects of popular disenchantment in the context of a sharp economic slowdown.<sup>147</sup> In 2003, Cristi abandoned RN and merged with the UDI.

The Concertación (particularly the DC) drew on its historical strength in the district to maintain a very significant electoral support rate. In the elections of 1993 and 1997, Tomás Jocelyn-Holt obtained 36.8% and 21.5% of the share running under the DC label. In those two elections, PS candidates also obtained significant rates of electoral support (18% in 1993 and 12.2% in 1997). Finally, in 2001, Jocelyn-Holt's electoral support decreased even more, reaching a 12.8%. According to Jocelyn-Holt's self-critique, his declining support rate resides on his refusal to engage in "local politics." His seat was taken by Enrique Accorsi, a PPD representative that was

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<sup>146</sup>Interviews with Margarita Cofre and the youth group Buenos Días América.

<sup>147</sup>This explanation was offered by Cristi herself and then cross-checked on the basis of the set of interviews I had with Peñalolén's political activists and candidates.

new to the district and obtained 34% of the share. His campaign focused on “renovation” within Concertación and rather intense fieldwork campaign activities.

On the municipal level, the first elections were won by a candidate of the DC, which triumphed Carlos Alarcón (Cristi’s Municipal Secretary during the dictatorship) obtaining 15.1% of the vote against a 12.35%. However, after a corruption scandal in the Municipality, Alarcón won the 1996 election against DC candidate Claudio Orrego, obtaining 24.5% against a 21.8%. Impressively, Alarcón was able to confirm his seat in 2000 with 57% of the vote, against a DC candidate that only obtained 14.5%. Finally, in 2004, Orrego came back and on the basis of a very aggressive campaign combining intensive fieldwork and media (including an internet campaign to raise resources among a “network of friends”) won the Mayoral seat against Alarcón by a margin of 2% (48% against 46%). In spite of Alarcón’s close relationship with Cristi, the evidence points to the existence of two parallel and relatively independent political machines in the district: the congressional office and the municipal government. This fact is consistent with an increasing personal rivalry between both politicians (given Alarcon’s presumed congressional aspirations) which was synthesized in the former Mayor’s decision to stay within RN. Illustrating the relative strength of the Alianza in this district, the presidential candidacy of Lavín obtained 47.7% of the preferences in 1999.

In spite of being similar to Peñalolén in other respects, La Florida is consensually characterized as a municipality having a strong and active civil society, with communal organizations playing a greater role than in other districts. Additionally, this municipality had a stronger leftist tradition than Peñalolén and constituted a “harder” place for military-appointed Mayors to develop a political career after democratic resumption. At the same time, military repression (especially in land-takeovers) contributed to strengthen the leftist imprint of the district. In spite of significant changes described below, this original configuration is still reflected today in the 43.8% support obtained by the candidacy of Lavín in 1999 (the second lowest in the sample).

In the aftermath of the transition to democracy, two strong leaderships consolidated in the district. According to a former DC Congress-Member, until 2000 “two-political apparatuses dominated local politics, that of Carlos Montes (a PS congress-member) and that of Mayor Gonzalo Duarte (from the DC).”<sup>148</sup> This fact turned Duarte and Montes’ help crucial for other Concertación’s leaders to run successfully in La Florida.<sup>149</sup> In 1989, Montes obtained 35.8% of the share and an independent candidate got 21.2%. Meanwhile, in the Congressional elections of 1993, Montes obtained 32.6% of the share and Mariana Alwyn, from the DC, got 32.9%. This was possible, by a combination of “Duarte’s support” and the national trend favoring the DC at that time.<sup>150</sup> However, in 1997, a new leadership emerged on the right, that of Lily Pérez of RN. Pérez, a former council member that obtained .05% less than Duarte in the Municipal elections of 1992, was able to obtain the second largest plurality (30.8%) for congress in 1993. Montes, in turn, climbed to 40% in 1997, further consolidating his leadership in 2001 when he was able to gather 51% of the share, followed by Pérez who was reelected with a 36.7% .

According to both successful congress-members, their presence in the district working with social organizations is crucial for their electoral fortunes. In this case, the significance of organized civil society seems more important than in more socially fragmented popular districts, in which personalized clientelistic transactions seem more frequent. In spite of this, whereas Montes “social network” is far more extensive and permanent than that of Pérez, the latter benefits from the recent social transformations witnessed in the district and the consolidation of a public opinion vote (favoring a moderate right) that they brought about.

I always bet on middle strata, particularly those close to the DC who are very receptive to a rightist but more liberal discourse. And some sectors of the left are also permeable to that platform. The strategy I used to reach those sectors was personal proximity. I did an immense door to door fieldwork during my campaign which was very complicated because I was opposing the entire government, represented both by Duarte and Montes. I had many visits, many meetings with groups of people to discuss focalized topics, particularly on social policy. [...] I have a district office but I

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<sup>148</sup>Mariana Alwyn. Personal interview 2003.

<sup>149</sup>Ibid.

<sup>150</sup>Ibid.

do not get involve in local problems as Montes does. I have seven people working with me in an open office in which we try to support social organizations. For instance, I taught training workshops for women, we support theater activities for children, and so forth. Montes, in turn has a tremendous support from the national executive. In 2001, a campaign year, the Interior Ministry approved him projects that nearly amounted for U\$S 160.000, to invest in social programs and activities. I did not get one project approved. But I am happy, because people vote for me because they identify with me, not because I do a particular favor to them. I have a stable core of voters of around 30% and they don't vote for me on ideological grounds. We did a survey and they like me because they think I am intelligent, courageous, modern, and worked a lot. I thought that being a woman was a factor, but it did not appear as important. I think 98% of my vote is personal, because the right as a political current is really weak here. We still have grown but this is a leftist municipality. Nonetheless, their political preference is changing, as it is shown by the last election. This is now a more polarized municipality, in which personal factors exert a very important impact. Montes does not get that support only because he is a leftist, we also benefits from his personal ties with the district. His family always lived there and at the beginning I was framed there as a 'blond rich kid from Las Condes.' [...] I would say that social capital works here. The key here is to stay in the district during the four years and that's why you can have a more economic campaign in the election year. You have to visit people and organizations all the time, and I do that during my district week every month. That is, you don't arrive in La Florida and win the election only with a good campaign in which you spend lots of money. It does not work like that. The UDI won the last municipal election (2000) because the image erosion of Duarte was too high at that point and he suffered from a chasbtening vote, also tied to the national decline of the DC and the economic crisis. In such scenario, Pablo (Zalaquett), who was an unknown, came as the candidate of Lavín and he was able to win. (Lily Pérez, former RN Council-Member and current Congress-Member of La Florida, personal interview 2003).

In a world of vulnerability and ambivalence people trust in a political style of closeness based on certain values. A style of dialogue is what explains my success. But it is also a style that allows people to grow, to develop, it is not clientelistic. It is based on making people organize around their collective objectives. And although that is difficult to accomplish, we try hard to do that. Here there are two political apparatuses, the Municipality and my Congressional Office, where we run a Cultural Center, an NGO. We can't compete with the Municipality on resources because they even have their own TV channel, so we compete on quality. (Investing in culture is important) because here in Chile the most significant political players are congress-members and Mayors. The parties had lost a lot and they will not recover that in the short run. They lost the vehicles of socialization and it takes time to reconstruct that. We cannot assume that people is already socialized and that we just need to invest in publicity. But it is difficult to get this message across. In the PS they frequently interpret what I do as anti-party, because they think this is focused on me. And indeed, I am not a classical party builder; I don't invest in developing party activists and *cuadros*. But I am a modern party builder, promoting cultural phenomena and when possible, using that as an opportunity to increase political socialization and engagement. But cultural activities, social activities, should come first. This assumes an open mind. Political parties in Chile do not grow because they are tied to an elitist and old structure that has lost connection with the social reality. We, as Concertación, need to invest in the cultural war. The right has been able to install in society all the basic concepts they represent: the market, the economy, consumption. That has transformed society and we need to fight this war. The economic crisis now has given us the opportunity to dispute the model a bit more because the hegemonic rightist ideology that predominated here until 1998 was based on sustained economic growth. Now, we have the chance to at least debate to what extent we need the state to intervene in certain areas. Before, that dispute was foreclosed, not only due to economic growth but also due to the effect of media [...] Mine is not an apparatus, it is a social network. It is a group of people who shares these values and tries to maintain the network. This network informs, gathers information, and seeks solutions by talking to the government. Then, it is an enthusiastic social network and it is a series of initiatives that tries to provide people access to knowledge, so they can think for themselves and find a solution. The resources we invest here come from my stipend as a congress-member and our participation in the competitive funds offered by the Presidency. And sometimes, we also try to engage the Municipality, because this should be a public apparatus. I do

not campaign during campaigns. That is what my everyday work during all my life grants me. I just continue my work. But people also gets more motivated and work double, so if I usually have 400 or 500 people working with me permanently, that number is doubled during campaigns. And you spend more, in propaganda, in sound-equipment, etc. In that respect, we spend nearly four times more than normally. (Carlos Montes, current congress-member of La Florida, personal interview 2003).

The value and “exceptionality” of Montes leadership is consistently recognized by other relevant political operators in the district, almost independently from their partisan affiliation. For instance, a DC council-member states:

Carlos Montes is an exception. He is serious, intelligent, committed, and has been able to simultaneously develop great performances both in Congress and in the district. But he is an exception. He has time, a supportive family, and long-time roots in the district. On that basis he constructed a great social network and he is able to gather a transversal vote, from all sectors of society and even from the right. The people do not vote for the PS, they vote for him. And he does not make any distinction when helping people, he tries to solve everyone’s problems even if he knows they are not voting for him. [...] His incapacity to develop new leaderships is probably his main deficiency. (Antonio Brandau, DC council-member of the Municipality of La Florida, personal interview, 2003).

However, while Montes has been able to develop a strong following in middle, low-middle, and some sectors of the lower classes in La Florida, he faces important challenges when trying to engage some of the poorest *poblaciones* of the district with his political style. Those problems are parallel to those confronted by other politicians when trying to gather the support of alienated and socially fragmented lower classes.

In Los Copihues (a población) we have more activists and we got some projects, particularly because we had the intelligence of working with several groups at a time. If you only work with one or two, the others boycott you and the project sinks. However, in Sector 1, we face a very dramatic situation. It is an extremely poor sector and has a strong leadership of a MIR activist whom we could never work with. Then, I work with sporting clubs, and so on, but I cannot work with other social organizations. Indeed, she has worked better with Duarte than with me, even if Duarte is a DC. He supported her in concrete things. And with the people that live in the district we face popular rejection of government, which is very strong particularly in communist voters. It is a very complicated mix of extreme poverty and social deterioration, coupled with a high level of ‘old style’ politization. The issue of the land-takeover is still too fresh. Therefore, it is very difficult to establish a connection with them. We have not found a way of working with them. They have a lot of problems, they confront an extreme process of social deterioration, and they have lots of anger, drugs, and violence. And even if they are ideologically closer to us, that level of social fragmentation and deterioration turns them into a fertile field for the UDI. And as we do not operate by giving away things, it is very difficult to work with them. Additionally, at a macro level, we confront another problem. What is our political project, as leftists, for these social sectors? Do we have one? Therefore, even the Communist Party is declining. You would expect them to vote for the PC, but no (Carlos Montes, current congress-member of La Florida, personal interview, 2003).

At the Municipal level and until 2000, politics was dominated by Gonzalo Duarte from the DC, the first elected Mayor in 1992. While he obtained 30% in 1992, he climbed to 32.3% in 1996 and 37% in 2000. However, the 2000 increase was not enough and Duarte was replaced by Pablo Zalaquett of the UDI who obtained 42.6% in that year. Zalaquett would later regain his seat in 2004 with 47.9%, with a Socialist candidate affiliated with Montes obtaining the second plurality (46.55%).

According to close collaborators of Duarte, his defeat in 2000 can be explained by three converging trends: a) the image erosion of the DC both at the national and local levels and the corresponding rise of the UDI in a context in which people “were seeking for a change”; b) the lack of a political communication strategy that would have allowed the Municipality to communicate better with the population, “explaining technocratic criteria and stressing the need to concentrate resources in those in need;” and c) the internal conflict within the Concertación in municipal elections and the confrontation between candidates of the DC.<sup>151</sup> Additionally, from this perspective, the electoral loss is blamed on people who do not directly depend on the municipality, namely: middle and upper-middle classes recently arrived in La Florida and who have a “public opinion approach” to politics.<sup>152</sup> Therefore, at least partially resulting from its socio-structural configuration this district type presents a combination of the logics observed in the two previously discussed types.

### Some Implications and Overarching Trends

In short, the weakening of state-patronage in the aftermath of liberalizing reforms, the “localization” of politics and the increasing centrality of municipal governments resulting from decentralization and state reform, and the increasing importance of media in campaigns; transformed the nature of non-programmatic linkages in the system. In turn, such transformation

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<sup>151</sup>Interview with Antonio Brandau, DC council member in La Florida.

<sup>152</sup>Ibid.

contributed to loosen national and programmatically oriented partisan organizations, turning parties into pragmatic coalitions of office-seeking politicians. This does not mean that significant divisions do not exist among partisan elites from different parties, but it translates into a segmented popular access to political representation. The emerging system has important and interrelated implications on least at three levels: a) the nature of brokerage networks in the system, b) the characteristics observed in local governance, and c) the effects the emerging system produces at the level of partisan structures. Personalization and the increasing role of private funds in financing campaigns are two transversal trends that get manifested in each of these three implications. Overall, the socially segmented linkage strategy observed today in Chile also translates into socially skewed access to political representation and eventually contributes to reinforce social inequalities. Furthermore, it also contributes to foreclose the entry into the political arena of candidates who lack financial resources to finance their campaigns, reinforcing the “elitist” character of the system.

### *The emerging nature of brokerage networks*

Whereas before partisan networks articulated encompassing brokerage structures that linked center and periphery and were functional in reproducing organic partisan ties and popular loyalties, today those networks have atomized. On the one hand, local authorities have gained leverage and autonomy, particularly from congressional representatives.

Today Mayors are the principal brokers in the system. And the deputy has been stripped of that. And if you analyze today the cases of corruption that involved congress-members, it is clear that what they were trying to do was to replicate the old logic of mediation. The Letelier (Juan Pablo) case in the PS is a clear example of that. I was careful with that, I tried to spend less in my campaign and that created my serious problems with other leaders. I'll give you an example. In the district we have highly contaminant high-tension towers. We tried to organize people to ask for the removal of those towers. There are two ways of closing negotiations with the electric company. Either you push, without concessions, until the towers are removed or you dismantle the movement if the company gives you a hand with your campaign. That's the difference. And in this competitive scenario we are walking towards the end of democracy and the rise of populism. And I rather abstain from further political participation if those are the prevailing conditions. (Ignacio Balbontín, former DC congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

In the municipality what you find is clientelism. And this is independent from political parties, it happens everywhere. However, until 2000, if the DC Mayor found an organization that did not work

with him, he did not exclude it, but just helped it less. Now with the UDI what you have is an effort to dismantle opposition groups by neglecting funds and creating new pro-UDI organizations. And that is possible to do because all power is concentrated in the Mayor. And citizens are the clients and consumers of what the Mayor does and the resources he distributes. Mayor's relation with community is to transform it in an electoral and personal feud. I wish people were more active, with greater chances of taking decisions for themselves. But that does not happen here, because the same logic of the system reinforces such trend. From the Mayor's point of view, the best scenario is that in which people come one by one to ask for help in the Municipality. (Nicanor Herrera, RN council-member of the Municipality of La Florida, personal interview, 2003).

On the other hand, although centrally allocated resources still reach the local level, partisan organizations have lost their central brokerage role:

This (center-periphery resource allocation) is done via state institutions, which centralized resources and reach the masses through specific programs administered by state foment institutions or financial and credit organizations either public or private. Therefore, the system is administered centrally, usually on the basis of *caudillismo*, too; but not partisan *caudillismo*. You need to remember that party-structures were destroyed; they are dead in every party with the only exception of the UDI. Furthermore, it is unthinkable that political parties that have been in government during more than ten years, distributing executive positions, embassy positions, and so forth, can be able to maintain their structures. (Carolina Tohá, PPD congressional-candidate, personal interview, 2001).

Party leaders do not care about the base; exceptionally they need them as electoral activists in a given moment. But, today, if you don't have activists, you pay for them. Traditional activists disappeared and partisan networks are cut. [...] Local governments have strengthened. Yet, they are local machines. And congress-members only go down to the district for campaigns. The other day someone was telling me: 'We need to rebuild the foundations of our political networks'. And you can do that sending resources from the state to the municipal level. But at the municipal level it seems that the capacity to use those resources adequately is lacking. They control health and education, but they lack any type of technical capacity. And they function on the basis of very petit mentalities. (Ignacio Balbontín, former DC congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Local leaders in turn begun to rely on the private sector or communal organizations to seek resources they can provide to their constituents. For instance:

We need to be solving problems here, on a daily basis and with whichever resources we can have access to. For instance, the other day a guy called me telling me that they had a death in the family and that they need to get some cheap way of transporting the family to the cemetery. So, I called a guy who has a small van and works in an evangelical church [contrasting to the Catholic Church which essentially operates at the elite level lobbying for general interests, evangelical congregations are extremely active at the local level, seeking benefits to improve their local settlements and to organize activities in the neighborhood] which I had helped before. And on that basis I was able to get them a very favorable fare to hire the van and solve their problem. (Isabel Mathus, DC council-member of the Municipality of Cerro Navia, personal interview, 2003).

### *Emergent Trends in Local Governance*

Major administrative irregularities are becoming extremely common, especially in the poorest districts where the vote is increasingly driven by particularistic and personal exchanges between candidates and electors (Rehren 1999).<sup>153</sup> For instance, as a result of decentralization and outsourcing, Mayors have greater discretion in contracting out private companies in order to provide services to the Municipality. Lately, given the scarcity of state resources the connections between politicians, private business, and even drug-trafficking gangs are gaining importance in order to secure resources for political campaigns in exchange for economic benefits and protection.<sup>154</sup> According to Rehren and Guzmán's (1998) estimation, 51% of the corruption allegations at the Municipal level correspond to illegal contracting forged to favor private enterprises that are sometimes owned by the Mayor or his family. This explains why Chilean Municipalities have begun to be seen by bureaucrats of oversight agencies as "the most shameful and corrupt institutions of the Chilean state."<sup>155</sup>

Garbage-processing contracts, for instance, are a source of tremendous corruption. We cannot control that, it is very difficult. There are plenty of areas in which we cannot control spending and there is something like a municipal underworld in which it is very difficult to enter, independently of their party. They get together and defend their own interests. For instance, the Mayor of El Bosque [PS] seems to have a deal with the UDI congress-member. Within municipal terrains protected by metal bars and locks, publicity for the Mayor shows up during municipal campaigns. In congressional campaigns, in that same wall, you can see the propaganda of the UDI without anyone touching it. Therefore, something wrong is happening there. (José Antonio Cavedo, former Mayor and current council-member of San Ramón, personal interview, 2003).

Strikingly, as Rehren and Guzmán (1998) report, only beyond an "intolerable" threshold of two corruption scandals, will the Mayor lose electoral support. Moderate corruption, on the other hand, tends to correlate with an improved electoral performance of the Mayor.

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<sup>153</sup>Based on data provided by the Contraloría General de la Nación.

<sup>154</sup>Based on interviews in several municipalities (El Bosque, San Ramón, Cerro Navia, La Cisterna) with key informants. May-October 2003.

<sup>155</sup> Interview with two officers of the División Municipalidades of the Contraloría General de la Nación.

Diverging from what Posner (1996) reports for an earlier period, my findings suggest that particularly in the poorest districts of Greater Santiago, candidate selection and post-electoral pacts struck by council members in order to elect a Mayor are increasingly guided by personal negotiations between those elected council members and the to-be Mayor. These pacts usually cut across party lines (and sometimes even electoral alliances) and are negotiated on the basis of access to the Municipal machine in order to advance a personal career.<sup>156</sup> After all, lacking significant contact with partisan national leaders, local activists and candidates need to turn to the Mayor and to other opposition activists in the municipality to strike deals and secure their access to the resources needed to successfully run for local office. This collusive political structure at the local level not only strengthens the Mayor, but it also hinders the process of administrative oversight by the Municipal Council, as Council members can be “easily bought” by the Mayor.<sup>157</sup> This is particularly so when an internal split exists between council members of the same party or pact, due to election campaign confrontation.

In the municipal elections of Quinta Normal, Concertación’s break up made possible RN’s victory. That break up comes from an internal split within the DC, in which one of the council-members gave the RN guy the votes to become Mayor. There are lots of fights here, personal rivalries that relate to access to power and a lack of ethics. And that screws up everything here. [...] We have even brought community organizations here, to ask them to support us and denounce these situations. But they are there for the photo and the only thing they care about is getting more funds, so they go to the Mayor. (Jorge Villar, president of PPD’s distrital representation in District 18, personal interview 2003).

However, when the Mayor is too weak as a result of the fragmentation of the Municipal Council or the presence of a cohesive partisan opposition block, council members tend to denounce administrative irregularities in order to force turnover and have the opportunity to appoint one of their own.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Based on interviews with Council-Members in five electoral districts and with two officers of the División Municipalidades of the Contraloría General de la Nación.

<sup>157</sup> Based on interviews with Council-Members in five electoral districts and with two officers of the División Municipalidades of the Contraloría General de la Nación.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

### *Partisan Organizations*

The emerging system poses fundamental challenges for the survival of organic ties within political parties. Indeed, political parties are becoming rather loose coalitions of office-seeking individuals who usually compete for developing a personal career on the basis of their access to the media (in higher-income municipalities) or constituency-service and clientelism fed through municipal machines, private donations and personal fortunes, and state-funded programs to which access is assigned on the basis of competitive processes. The increasing personalization of political linkages and the growing split between local and national political structures (resulting from state-reform and decentralization, in the context of declining grievances to mobilize programmatic-linkages) accounts for that result. This diagnosis seems to be confirmed by agents operating at different political levels and across the main political currents, many of whom feel nostalgic when witnessing the consolidation of the current scenario.

I think parties have not understood that unfortunately this is not the time of parties. It is neither the time of the people. You need to reconstruct society piece by piece, with very small and concrete projects. Each one trying to generate a bit more integrative social dynamics and hopefully a lot of them would be targeted at disputing the cultural war with the right. But you cannot restructure parties. If you talk about parties, people don't show up. They participate in open, plural activities [...] Therefore, partisan structures are today oriented towards control over creation and innovation, in a context in which if you don't move on you perish. Parties are close and restrictive organizations formed by small elite groups that still see themselves as vanguards. And the government has also failed. They have a technocratic approach which is very far from social reality. We still think in a society that no longer exists, instead of working to reconstruct the most basic social ties that were destroyed. Our project seeks that, but it has been neglected within the PS. [...] Unfortunately, my votes are my votes. At most, I think some of my votes will stay within Concertación. It is sad, but it is like that. If I decided to run for a Senate seat, for instance, I do not think those votes are transferable to another PS candidate, even though I have people working at the Council with me. But, if for example my son were to run, independently of his quality as a candidate and politician he has an edge for being my son and carrying my last name. (Carlos Montes, current congress-member of La Florida, personal interview, 2003).

The same occurs with candidates of the right:

The moment she quit RN to join UDI, RN disappeared in the district at the congressional level. We keep the vote at the municipal level, because we have the mayor and he has developed his own support base. [...] The vote here is personal, no one is voting for parties anymore. (Sergio Guerra, RN Council-Member of the Municipality of Peñalolén, personal interview, 2003).

This state of affairs feeds increasing levels of cynicism, internal conflict, and anti-party attitudes at different levels:

This is the only country in the world in which I see a group of people that want to show politics as something it is not. You need to try to dignify politics in a different way, not with this ambulatory circus of personalities that has totally injured the system. (Tomás Jocelyn Holt, former DC Congress Member, personal interview, 2003).

We decided to use the motto: 'Socialist like Allende' to create a contradiction, because the other PS candidate in the municipality is a liberal social-democrat. And I try to represent the Marxist current in the party. Because lately, candidates only put their name, they don't show the PS label in their campaigns. And they hide it, because they think it will hinder them. [...] The PS today is a confederation and once you enter, you should know that everything you do has to be done on the basis of your own effort, with your own resources, with what you can obtain for you. Indeed, many times we have more contact with local Communist activists than with our own activists and leaders, they don't show up. Here, candidates are used to pay for campaigns and "activists" expect you to pay for their service. The Communist party is the only one in which people work without being paid. Indeed, the others even pay you for displaying a poster in your window or to paint your wall. Here no one works for a political idea anymore. (Jaime Ahumada, former municipal-council candidate for the PS in Cerro Navia, personal interview, 2003).

Today I work as an independent with some ties to RN, but I am a community worker, I got rid of my political skin. People believe in me because of what I do for them, not because of what the party does. The deputy does not show up, she has her offices, her apparatus, and then comes for the campaign, but that's it. Every party is facing enormous challenges here. (Nicanor Herrera, RN council-member of the Municipality of La Florida, personal interview, 2003).

The moment you have strong figures, you are hurting the functioning of parties. They block those who can later challenge them. Here, we are in Girardi's district and we are PPD. But we don't support him. We are old, we have a political trajectory, we are not at war with him, but we don't agree and support what he does. He respects us and knows that we work on a different logic. So, we just work independently from each other. He does not depend on us for the campaign; we don't depend on him to support our humble communal committee. And obviously, we could not afford to support an alternative candidate. People like him; he has the same problem as other prominent figures. They are successful; they have a great image outside the party, but no one likes them inside the party. They are not people that are working for the party. (Jorge Villar, president of PPD's distrital representation in District 18, personal interview, 2003).

Before, candidacies were decided organically. You did not represent your desire and ambitions, but those of the party. Your merits within the party were the ones that merited your nomination, which was done by election at the basis. That happened at all levels. Today, congress-members are the owners of their seat; they negotiate with other parties, but not within. From time to time they have a meeting, get the bases together and give some explanations. But they say exactly the contrary to what they end up doing. The truth is that the PS is today a party of managers dedicated exclusively to defend the President at every cost, in every possible aspect. And as you don't give the bases a voice, they are disenchanted and go away. (Carmén Lazo, former PS congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

I think today many of these leaderships are beginning to work a bit as mercenaries. And parties do not have the capacity to take issues. They don't take issue with anything. You can see congress-members taking issues, but parties, as political parties, never. You don't have a party making a proposal together in Congress, supporting a unified and collective motion. As politics is today so harshly oriented towards individual personality, a congress-member that has a good idea about

something prefers to present it individually instead of sharing it with the party. [...] Parties today contain a variety of leaderships, some interesting, some with new proposals, some doing well...And that's what the citizens perceive, more and more what we have is confrontational groups of leaders that hang together to defend their individual interests. For instance, take a look at partisan meeting agendas: How much time is spent on discussing congressional quotas or positions in government and how much time is spent on reaching specific programmatic proposals or collective positions on a given topic? The situation becomes tremendously clear. (Carolina Tohá, PPD's congressional candidate, personal interview, 2001).

The divergence between these statements and the ones opening this chapter on the functioning of the pre-authoritarian period provide a nice illustration of the dramatic transformations that non-programmatic linkages (and other accompanying phenomena) have witnessed in contemporary Chile. Against this backdrop, the next chapter describes how the UDI has been able to profit more from the emerging combination of programmatic and non-programmatic linkages that consolidated after the Chilean transition to democracy and its more general implications for politics and partisan organizations in such country.

**CHAPTER IX**  
**SUCCESSFUL PARTISAN ADAPTATION IN CHILE: THE CASE OF THE UNIÓN**  
**DEMÓCRATA INDEPENDIENTE (UDI)**

This chapter presents an overview of the main characteristics of the party that has recently gathered more votes in Chilean congressional elections (2001) and that shows the most significant upward trend in electoral support. This success (and its limits) is explained through the analysis of UDI's electoral tactic and strategy taken as the gist of partisan adaptation to the current competitive structure of the system.

**The UDI**

Ironically, the development of the UDI as a successful political party is intrinsically tied with the emergence of “anti-party” and “anti-political” movement in the late 1960s. The UDI originated in 1983 as the political expression of the “Movimiento Gremial” founded in 1966 by Jaime Guzmán in the Universidad Católica. That movement aimed to eradicate Marxism from Chilean society by creating a mechanism of vertical and complete representation to blur class and functional organizational divides and “de-politicize” Chilean society.

The movement was inspired by Spanish corporatism under Franco and stressed the need to circumscribe the role of politics and parties. In Chile, this meant the need to recraft politics promoting the organization of independent groups representing specific interests in society while weakening (traditional) political parties, and especially the Marxist left (Cristi 2000). Thus, the movement attempted to break with the “old scheme that used to identify the right with the rich and the left with the poor” seeking to eliminate the “class struggle that has contributed to cause more

poverty for those in greater need.”<sup>159</sup> At the same time, however, the movement received special allegiance from business interests in the private sector (Huneus 2001). Organizationally the UDI originated as a very homogenous, hierarchically organized movement of urban university students, who were tightly and personally attached to Guzmán’s leadership and *gremialista* vision (Joignant and Navia 2003).

Once Pinochet came to power, Jaime Guzmán and a significant number of “gremialistas” became close collaborators of his authoritarian regime. At that time, state retrenchment under neoliberal reforms created an elective affinity between the Chicago Boys that collaborated with Pinochet and the proto-party which advocated the restriction of state involvement in society, with the exception of the promotion of moral and religious values. Through their involvement in government, the *gremialistas* pursued two central objectives. First, they sought to guarantee the success of that regime, contributing in attempts to institutionalize the legacy of Pinochet’s rule. Second, given the failure of the traditional right in containing the electoral advance of the left before 1973 they worked to construct a new party that became the main political force in the country in the event of redemocratization (Huneus 2001). The successful accomplishment of this second task, facilitated by electoral engineering in the crafting of the 1980 Constitution by Guzmán and his group, would imply a crucial safeguard for Pinochet’s legacy after the inevitable (though, ideally restricted) democratization that UDI’s leaders anticipated (Huneus 2001).<sup>160</sup>

To accomplish those objectives, Guzmán and his group created an “apolitical” public service organization committed to stripping the left of its electoral base in Chile’s shantytowns, successfully working within the authoritarian regime to appropriate state-resources that were then used to build its support in the popular sectors (Huneus 2001). UDI’s work in the National Youth Secretariat (SNJ), in the Office for National Planning, and in the mayoralties of numerous local

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<sup>159</sup>See Joignant and Navia (2003) and Barozet (2003). See <http://www.udi.cl> for official documents and speeches by party leaders.

<sup>160</sup>For a complete historical reconstruction of the party’s history and characteristics see Huneus (2001). See also Cristi (2000).

governments became essential in providing resources for the construction of a powerful network of interest intermediation that was instrumental in promoting and expanding “*gremialismo*” among the poor (Huneus 2001; Morales and Burgueño 2001). Therefore, since its inception within the authoritarian regime, UDI has pursued a strategy that gradually crystallized into a vehicle for *neopopulist* mobilization in the late 1990s. However, that strategy increasingly relied on private donor contributions and political marketing strategies focused on the achievements of UDI-run municipal governments.

Resulting from this historical trajectory, the UDI combines a “popular orientation” with the elitist and religious origin of both its historical and current leadership. The latter is tied with the urban business class and the financial sector, both of which flourished under the economic “miracle” of the late 1980s. The party is currently led by a generation of university students that were taught by Guzmán and who took part in the activities of the SNJ. Its trajectory and composition explain UDI’s particular ideological positioning in the system. As defined by a current UDI leader:

Ideologically the UDI has a triple profile that makes it unique and that has helped us to gather votes. It is a popular party, it is a Christian party, and it is an economic (pro-market liberalism) party. And those three conditions together are lacking in the rest of the parties. With the Socialist Party for instance we could share the popular side, but we clearly do not share the same position in the other two dimensions. With the PPD we share the popular orientation, but we approach it differently. Whereas they focus on easy protest through the media, we approach it through social commitment. On the economic dimension I think we agree with the most liberal PPD. But they lack the Christian character. With the DC we have the most similar profile, because they originally had a popular orientation. That is why we are getting their votes now as they have abandoned that grassroots work to become a party of intellectuals [...] Finally, RN historically originates as an oligarchic party. So, they are not as popular as we are and although we share a similar economic stand, I think they do not care as much as we do about moral and religious values. (José Uriarte, congressional-candidate in 2001, personal interview, 2003).

Despite Guzman’s assassination by a radical leftist group in 1991, the party managed to survive and grow following the legacy and inspiration of its martyr. In the presidential runoff of 2000 the party’s presidential candidate obtained 47.7% of the vote (championing for the first time the historical support rate of right-wing candidates and the pro-Pinochet vote in the 1988 plebiscite). In the congressional elections of 2001, the party became Chile’s most voted party

obtaining 25.2% of the vote. Finally, although the Alianza por Chile (formed by UDI and Renovación Nacional) recently lost 2% in the Municipal election of 2004, UDI still managed to grow by 4% within the right electoral pact.

As shown in table 9.1, all other relevant parties in the system lost electoral support in congressional elections from 1989 to 2001. During the same period, UDI's support base doubled. Both in 2000 and 2001, this electoral advance was fundamental in reducing the historical gap existing between Concertación and the Alianza. In terms of national expansion, the UDI went from filling congressional candidates in 30 districts in 1989 to a high of 54 districts in 2001, successfully electing 57% of its congressional candidates (Navia forthcoming).

Although the DC still remains the most voted at the Municipal level, UDI has also witnessed a steady electoral development at this level moving from less than 4% in 1996 to almost 20% in 2004. As both figures suggest, UDI's electoral development has implications at two levels. First, explaining the electoral advance of the Alianza at the systemic level. Second, granting the UDI a dominant position within the rightist pact.

**Table 9.1:**

**Congressional (1989-2001) and Municipal Election (2004) results per Electoral Pact and Mainstream Parties \***

	Congressional Elections				Municipal Elections			
<b>Main Electoral Pacts</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2004 Average</b>
Concertación	51.50%	55.40%	50.51%	47.90%	53.30%	52.13%	52.13%	46.35%
Alianza	34.18%	36.68%	36.26%	44.27%	29.67%	32.47%	40.09%	38.12%
<b>Main Political Parties</b>								
<b>Concertación</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2004 Average</b>
Christian Democratic Party	25.99%	27.12%	22.98%	18.92%	28.93%	26.03%	21.62%	20.90%
Socialist Party	10.40%	11.93%	11.05%	10.00%	8.53%	10.70%	11.28%	11.41%
Party for Democracy		11.84%	12.55%	12.73%	9.21%	11.71%	11.41%	8.23%
<b>Alianza</b>								
Unión Demócrata Independiente	9.82%	12.11%	14.45%	25.18%	10.19%	3.36%	15.97%	19%
Renovación Nacional	18.28%	16.31%	16.77%	13.77%	13.44%	13.60%	15.54%	14.97%
<b>Other Parties</b>								
Communist Party	4.38%	4.99%	6.88%	5.22%	6.55%	5.09%	3.24%	3.93%

\*Source: Servicio Electoral

### Explaining UDI's Electoral Growth

In recent times, a series of alternative explanations have been offered to explain UDI's electoral growth.<sup>161</sup> Through the comparative analysis of the party's overarching electoral strategy and its tactics in five electoral districts of Santiago, this section presents evidence on several interrelated factors that explain such growth, namely: a) the moderation of the party's image; b) the consolidation of a national leadership; c) the progressive expansion of an umbrella-like national political organization that combines high media exposure with a pervasive grassroots clientelistic network; d) UDI's greater capacity to attract and motivate new supporters, activists, and candidates; e) UDI's greater capacity to attract and centrally allocate campaign resources; and f) UDI's higher level of internal discipline and ideological (religious) motivation.

#### *Lavín and the emergence and expansion of the "Popular Party"*

The successful development of a strong national structure centered on its presidential candidate and the crafting of a new and more moderate image for the party partially explain UDI's electoral growth. This moderation included the detachment of the party from Pinochet legacy of human rights violations, without neglecting "[his] success in transforming the Chilean economy and putting a halt to Marxism."<sup>162</sup> Indeed, one of the central claims that one hears in UDI's youth formation seminars is that the participation of *gremialistas* in the military government was key for the successful implementation of economic reform, but also for the "moderation" of the repression and human rights violations pursued by Pinochet. This process of moderation was also pursued by demanding that the government provide better social protection for the poor and unemployed,

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<sup>161</sup> See e.g. Huneus (1998); Pollack (1999); Huneus (2001); Barozet (2003); San Francisco (2003); and Joignant and Navia (2003).

<sup>162</sup> Memo: "20 preguntas a un gremialista" and participant observation of a youth formation seminar in La Florida, July 2003.

particularly after the economic crisis hit in 1997. Finally, UDI's rhetorical swing was symbolized by its new self-proclamation as "The Popular Party."<sup>163</sup>

Lavín's leadership was developed around an "anti-politics" campaign on the premise of "taking care of common people's everyday problems" instead of discussing technical and distant issues.<sup>164</sup> This strategy was extremely functional in the context of mass alienation with Concertación's government and its "technocratic, elitist, and [in some cases] corrupt" style.

As three UDI activists claim:

Lavín was able to install the vision that politicians needed to stop talking about their usual topics and quit fighting about who would get a ministry or an embassy. Instead, he claimed that politicians should be caring about the people's real and concrete problems, which by the way are the problems that depend on the Mayor's job. People do not understand when you talk about Constitutional reform, foreign policy, or educational reform. They want you to pave their road and improve public lighting. (Juan José Jara, congressional-candidate in 2001, personal interview, 2003).

Beyond party A, B, C..., they are able to see Lavín's personal virtues. He is charming, he is human, he cares about people's problems, and he is not messing around and discussing like these dummies from Concertación, who every day manage to set up a disgusting spectacle. He is a positive guy. (José Uriarte, congressional-candidate in 2001, personal interview, 2003).

Society wants facts, they are tired of words. They want the squares to be for the people who play sports. With these things you win votes. And then, you need to match people's hopes for constructing a better community and a better country in the near future. And today, that's Joaquín Lavín: change. (Oscar Mendoza, UDI's council-member in Quinta Normal, personal interview 2003).

Operationally, this campaign took advantage of Lavín's high visibility as the "innovative" Mayor of Las Condes, a high-income Santiago municipality. Lavín was perceived as having created a new model of political management that allowed him to address "real problems" and foster "participation" in the policy-making process. "People's real problems" is a far reaching definition that ranges from putting in place a private security municipal service and programs devised to promote youth sport and cultural activities, to fighting Las Condes environmental pollution by "watering" clouds with an airplane seeking to produce rain. The operational definition of "participation" is also a tricky one as it makes reference to the massive use of public opinion

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<sup>163</sup>UDI adopted this new slogan since July 2002. See [www.udi.cl](http://www.udi.cl)

<sup>164</sup>Barozet (2003).

studies to survey people's preferences and devise policies and media addresses on that basis. In his most recent political endeavor as Mayor of the Santiago municipality, Lavín has continued with this approach, complementing it by devising some policies especially targeted to show UDI's understanding of poor people's problems; developing for instance, a municipal program to provide daycare to poor families. Once again the range of strategies in this respect is wide. During the summer, Lavín built a beach (popularly known as "La Playa de Lavín") on the Mapocho River to provide poor people staying in Santiago during the summer with an opportunity to go to the beach. This "innovative" and "close to the people" style centered on UDI's management of mayoralties obviously brought extensive media attention and publicity, at the same time that major corruption scandals broke out in several mayoralties run by Concertación. On top of UDI's already privileged relationship with the media, this has provided the party with an opportunity to strengthen candidates' "name recognition" and "credit claiming" abilities.<sup>165</sup> Indeed, as a key party strategist claims: "Lavín has been an example in terms of using the media." However, "we knew that after seeing you on TV, people need to touch you, they want to see you in their place, and not only the month before Election Day."<sup>166</sup>

Therefore, for the presidential campaign the UDI organized an extensive fieldwork campaign running a "town by town" tour along each Chilean province, going four times from North to South of the country. This tour was heavily supported by modern political marketing techniques, including targeted radio addresses and telephone calls anticipating Lavín's visit to each and every town. The radio speeches tackled specific issues that, according to public opinion surveys and key informants (Congress and Local Council members, as well as UDI's Mayors),

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<sup>165</sup>Personal interview with Eugenio González 2003. See Mayhew (1974) for a discusión of "name recognition" and "credit claiming." Indeed, this strategy has served as demonstration effect to lower-level leaders. As a volunteer assistant to an UDI Mayor claims: The key is not only to do things, but to publicize the stuff you do. At the beginning he (the Mayor) did not get this point. He was doing good things, but he did not take advantage of them. Now, he realized that going to the media and printing a banner or a flyer is almost as important as doing stuff. You have to be like a chicken, first deliver an egg and then shout aloud so everyone realizes you did. (Rodrigo Bordachar, UDI activists in La Florida, personal interview, 2003).

<sup>166</sup>Personal interview with Eugenio González 2003.

were salient for the local community. As a result of this strategy, Lavín's crew put together a registry of 3000 local radio stations to deliver political addresses in a "segmented" and "low cost" way.<sup>167</sup> Additionally, the day before the UDI caravan was scheduled to visit a town or village, Lavín would make "personal" phone calls to invite town dwellers to the central square to meet him in person to discuss their problems.<sup>168</sup> To develop this strategy, Lavín recorded 300 different audio tapes and shot and autographed an average of 2000 Polaroids a day during political rallies.<sup>169</sup>

In sum, given the success of Lavín's campaign and the UDI's increasing popularity, the party was able to develop an umbrella-like national leadership centered on Joaquín Lavín. This was crucial to promote new candidates in congressional districts and municipalities in which UDI did not have a substantial electoral presence before.<sup>170</sup> It was also critical for developing a competitive advantage over RN, its Alianza Por Chile partner which traditionally was stronger.

As a former RN candidate states: "authority has important effects on disadvantaged people's behavior. They say: 'I voted for Lavín. Lavín supports him. I will vote for him'".<sup>171</sup> In this context, the "photo with Lavín" became crucial in the Alianza congressional and municipal campaigns and the value of Lavín's endorsement was efficiently used by the party to negotiate better conditions for their own candidates and to increase its legislative share by attracting non-UDI candidates to their ranks. Indeed, previous members of RN who wanted to enjoy the "advantages of being an UDI" without having to be subjected to the internal strains that UDI's growing hegemony generated within RN ranks increasingly joined *gremialismo*.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>167</sup>Ibid.

<sup>168</sup>Ibid.

<sup>169</sup>Interviews with Eugenio González (2003) and José Luis Uriarte (2003).

<sup>170</sup>The municipal elections of La Florida and Nuñoa are a case in point, as well as UDI's expansion through the south of the country traditionally dominated by RN.

<sup>171</sup>Interview with Osvaldo Silva (2003).

Additionally, the photo with Lavín was crucial for the new candidates that the party started to fill in districts in which it lacked significant presence. For instance a new UDI candidate for Congress states: "My votes were 100% Lavín votes. There is no question about it. No one knew me in the district. The only thing they knew about me was that I was endorsed by Lavín. And if they were untrusting of traditional politicians and liked Lavín, they voted for me."<sup>173</sup>

As a DC leader puts it:

I think that with this moderation, the UDI begins to separate from the most important cleavage that Chilean politics had at the moment, that of democrats against authoritarians. They have escaped from Pinochet; they have declared themselves Popular Party, without any kind of shyness they are now talking about Human Rights issues. So, it is not only that they have developed fieldwork presence drawing on the increasing mercantilization and mercenaryization of politics. It is also that they have done extremely well designed communicational work. (Ignacio Balbontín, former DC congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Whereas today the permanence and stability of the party's social network continues to provide the UDI with a sizeable partisan electorate (11%, which is similar to the ones of the PS and the DC) and will likely be pivotal in district level races, the erosion of the national umbrella hindered by the decreasing popularity of Joaquín Lavín explains the expected electoral decline of the UDI in the forthcoming elections of 2005. Additionally, the emergence of Sebastián Piñera's candidacy in RN as a center-right liberal ("democratic") has also weakened the UDI *vis-à-vis* its Alianza partner. Indeed, vote intention for RN has increased from 8 to 15% since that candidacy was announced. In short, in a context of resumed and strong economic growth, heavy investment in public infrastructure, and the full maturation of Lagos' focalized social policy program (Chile Solidario), Lavín's request for change has lost ground. Besides, the "permanent campaign" of the candidate during Lagos' term and his still recent support for Pinochet who has now suffered from further image erosion as a result of the Riggs case and corruption accusations has clearly saturated the public. Indeed, today 35% of Chileans have a negative or very negative evaluation of the

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<sup>172</sup>Interview with Maria Angélica Cristi (2003). The internal strains between *transfugas* (rightist hardliners that were sympathetic to UDI) and RN's liberal wing represented by the party's national leadership launched a pervasive internal crisis in RN.

<sup>173</sup>Interview with Jose Luis Uriarte.

candidate, while positive evaluations fell from 63% in 2003 to 40% in 2005. In the same lines, whereas in 2003 44% of Chileans thought that Lavín would be the next president of the country compared to 9% that thought the next president would be Bachelet, today 14% of survey respondents feel that way compared to 63% that see Bachelet as the most likely winner in December's presidential race. The great popularity achieved by President Lagos in a context of economic growth and the emergence of Michelle Bachelet's leadership under the president's support, explains the current level of predicted electoral support for the PS and for Concertación, which is the most likely to get elected in 2005. Indeed, whereas Frei's approval rate was 28% in the wake of the 1999 elections providing a stable ground for an opposition campaign to make significant electoral advances, today Lagos is approved by 61% of Chileans and 69% of them have a positive or very positive evaluation of Bachelet (CEP 2005). However, whereas their identity as Concertación members provide both Lagos and "Michelle" with a stable support base, it is worth mentioning that switching voter allegiance is likely to be explained as individual support for the Lagos' government and "Michelle" (and the parallel decline of their most persistent opponent: Joaquín Lavín) instead of being directly caused by a rising popularity of their partisan "vehicles" (PS-PPD). Indeed, whereas vote intention for Michelle Bachelet was 46% in July 2005, vote intention for all the parties of Concertación (including the Radical Party and the DC) was 40%, with the PPD obtaining a 16% and the PS an 11% (CEP 2005).

#### *UDI's internal politics*

Internal discipline is another key factor for understanding UDI's electoral success. The party is comparatively much more internally disciplined and hierarchically organized than other Chilean mainstream parties. This internal discipline is explained by the cultural homogeneity and the personal ties that bind UDI's national leadership together.<sup>174</sup> The party's religious commitment, which is also linked to Guzman's apostolic approach and vision, provides party activists and

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<sup>174</sup>Joignant and Navia (2003).

leaders with a mystique and unity that are instrumental in pursuing the party's "crusade", sticking to a strict internal hierarchy.

You know that you are working with a group of friends and that they will not spoil you. Within UDI we do not have factions, we do not have elections. We have a democratic orientation, but we do not have elections. We trust our leaders; they were personally formed by Guzmán, who was an exceptional human being and an exemplary catholic. He formed this party by getting our leaders together at the University when they were young. These guys got together every Wednesday to talk about God, to talk about the importance of being a committed Christian. (José Uriarte, congressional-candidate in 2001, personal interview, 2003).

This higher degree of internal discipline provides party leaders with mechanisms to centralize decision-making (usually guided by survey analysis) avoiding internal conflicts and increasing the efficiency of allocated resources:

My wife worked as a Congressional candidate for six months and then the day before she was taken out of the list as a result of the pact they made with Angélica Cristi. It was obviously good for the party so my wife just came home silently, without making any public statements as would be the case in other parties. Here, if you have to head home you just say: 'It is not my moment, I will go home'. If they call you: 'It is my moment, I will go work'. We are extremely disciplined because we know that those who are at the top know their job and we should trust them. (Eugenio González, Lavin's campaign advisor and UDI activist, personal interview, 2003).

In turn, the higher degree of internal commitment that exists within UDI's rank and file also makes the party better able to overcome the increasing split between local and national leaders that has tended to weaken other Chilean parties.

As a result, UDI's Council members are frequently found to be working more closely with their district's Congress-Member, which in turn enables the party to maintain a permanent and firm grasp at the neighborhood level. In short, whereas other parties increasingly became "archipelagos of individual personalities" the UDI was still able to coordinate around the party's overarching goal of winning presidential office.<sup>175</sup>

#### *Privileged access to campaign resources and media*

Given the absence of any serious campaign finance regulations, UDI's unique ability to secure and administer financial resources through its links to the private sector has provided the

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<sup>175</sup>This image was used by a PPD's legislative advisor to describe the internal situation of Concertación's parties during an informal conversation. Valparaíso 2003.

party an additional competitive advantage. This is particularly so since rival parties that used to rely on the state apparatus to sustain patronage and clientelistic networks have been stripped of that privilege in the wake of retrenchment and reform. As a result, UDI was able to develop a double-advantage. On the one hand it was an opposition party and was able to draw support from public discontent. On the other hand, due to its greater access to private financing, UDI was able to develop and “feed” an increasingly encompassing social network that works as a political machine in Chile’s popular sectors. This rare combination imposes harsh competitive pressures, even on incumbent rival candidates. This partially explains the increasing use of Municipal governments either directly as political machines or indirectly to extract economic resources from private companies through irregular contracting to finance campaigns.<sup>176</sup>

Their advantage is based on money. He (the UDI congress -member) has complained to me, once he told me: “I got them used to this and now they are costing me a lot.” If he has to give out a reward for a lottery he does not send a set of kitchen utensils as I would do. He sends a brand-new top brand bicycle. And therefore, every organization wants him to be their godfather. Because he gives people better stuff. But that is not paid for out of his pocket. That’s paid by his friend’s donations, by businessmen, by people who benefited while he was the Mayor. For instance, here you have plots of land that were sold very cheaply by the municipality and in which, in spite of being against the urban regulations, you now see industrial settlements. Who is the owner of the biggest publicity banners in the district, which are crucial for campaigns? It is a guy that obtained those locations by committing those banners to the electoral campaigns of the right. (Eliana Caravall, DC congress-member in District 27, personal interview, 2003).

Additionally, its high degree of centralization has also allowed UDI to allocate campaign resources more efficiently. Diverging from other parties in which each candidate tends to seek his or her own campaign resources, UDI’s national leadership is able to decide where to spend on the basis of an analysis of each candidate’s strategic situation in the district and its capacity to obtain its own funding.<sup>177</sup>

Running in District 23 [Lo Barnechea, Las Condes, and Vitacura] I received zero funding from the UDI. I am considered as a candidate with access to his own resources. Therefore, the party focalizes

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<sup>176</sup>Interview with Osvaldo Silva (2003) and evidence from Contraloría General de la Nación. This rationale was systematically confirmed by several local council members on their interviews and by Concertación Congress-Members who systematically complained about UDI’s greater economic capacity. My participant observation also confirms the greater visibility of clientelistic resources (e.g. food boxes) in UDI’s congressional and municipal committees.

<sup>177</sup>For a generic description of campaign finances see Rehren (1999).

all its resources in promoting candidates in regions, in the poorest sectors, where it is much more difficult to obtain resources locally. (Julio Dittborn, UDI congress-member, personal interview, 2003)

Therefore, UDI's financial competitive edge is not only a product of the greater amount of resources that the party is able to obtain due to its privileged relationship with business and the media, but it also results from UDI's efficient allocation of campaign resources to maximize its electoral return. This greater coordination also helps to unify and align local campaigns with those carried out at the national level, harmonizing overarching strategies, issues, and marketing material. Independently from this centralized allocation (mainly based on business and contributions to the party), each candidate is free to seek and spend resources on their own.

*Movement Building: Recruitment and training of UDI's social activists and leaders*

The UDI's superior capacity for central coordination together with its ability to involve young ("social") activists has also helped the party to extend its electoral appeal and organizational penetration of society to districts in which the party previously lacked influence. For instance, by selecting young candidates to run in districts in which UDI did not have a chance of winning office given the presence of strong RN candidates who would carry Alianza Por Chile's votes, the party was able to put in place youth organizations that are now starting to generate organizational residual and that will become crucial in future elections, particularly if current RN incumbents decide to seek other offices.

However, the UDI also approaches youth formation in a different way, which is consistent with *gremialismo's* aim of depoliticizing society's intermediate organizations:

We already had too much politics in Chile, look what happened in the 1970s. Politics should be kept at a minimum; we need to have a handful of youth working in political sphere, but they should be good. We do not want to be filled up with politicized masses, because then you have internal problems, people fight. What we want to create is an environment in which youths that want to participate in society solving problems for the people can do it and that is also a way in which you can attract young people that are not interested in party-politics. [...] We do that by creating groups that work on social assistance, they are not political. [...] One thing we are doing now is to send those interested in getting into politics to live with a host family in a given shanty-town for two or three months. It is a way to let them grow acquainted with how poor people live in Chile and to realize what the problems are. And we seek a host family through a Council member or an UDI

activist in which they have someone of the same age of the guy we send. So he or she can act as a foster brother or sister and introduce his or her friends to the guy we send. So we also try to foster personal relations there and to get the locals involved too [...] At another level, since 2000 we are getting together with top young professionals who had never been in contact with UDI before. And we try to get them involved in public service. They are apolitical and that is good, we just want them to get involved in public service and we talk with them about the example of people like Guzmán and other Christian leaders. We ask them to help us to draft legislative proposals and we keep their names in a file because we will need them for Lavín's government. Through this mechanism we have already collected over 3000 young professionals' names, who have participated in this kind of meetings. (Juan José Jara, congressional-candidate in 2001, personal interview, 2003).

Indeed, UDI massively incorporates "social activists" that are able to develop fieldwork activities.

The experience I have had in UDI with the unorganized popular sectors is one in which the personal relation is built on the basis of a shared cause. In UDI they teach us that if there is a flood for instance, on top of going there and giving a packet of rice to the lady, I should be able to put my boots on and help her remove the water from her house. And if I do that, the relationship is built. And that relationship is what we seek to create, beyond the fact that I could for instance buy the mattress that the flood messed up and give it to her. The fact of the matter is that today in Chile, RN is the party that buys the mattress and gives it away and UDI is the party that helps getting that mattress on the floor. [...] The great activity we have today is that we have been able to create a relationship with the popular sectors, a personal relationship that is much more important than having a cultural or ideological tie. That is the kind of relationship we seek to create and that is why we do that well in the popular sectors. That was Guzmán's vision and we are proud because we are accomplishing it. And it is important to understand the difference between short-term and long-term commitment. You can pay someone's bill in a campaign and that will probably get you elected. But it will not get you reelected. As a first approach that could work, but then you have to build personal relationships with the people, you need to be there. Do you know how did I organize my campaign? I went to a neighborhood open market and talked to people. And they would for instance complain about security and drug-gangs in a given block. So I asked them if I could spend the night with them in their house to see for myself. I spent my whole campaign sleeping in shanty-towns. They were amazed that a guy from Las Condes, a University guy who was running for Congress, was willing to spend the night with them. The day after I stayed at the house they went around telling every one that a candidate has stayed with them. Now I try to keep going. Every once and awhile I pay a visit to those who received me and to those who I choose to stay with. I go and see how they are doing and see if there is anything I could help with, I call the congress members or the Mayor and try to help. And that is what people ask you to do as they just want you to be there. In my campaign I was surprised. They ask me to come back as if I had been elected. And although I was not elected, I still go. (José Uriarte, congressional-candidate in 2001, personal interview, 2003).

At the same time, the UDI handpicks a small group of individuals for the inherent political activity. The elitist character of this selection process, which is shared by other political parties in the system, is clearly illustrated by the words of a committed UDI council-member that works in Quinta Normal:

Here I work with my own resources; I have to take money out of my salary to make a professional campaign. And I did not do that for me, I did it for the party to have some communal representation here. Nonetheless, until today I never heard them saying: "It is great that today you are representing

the party in Quinta Normal.” In districts like this you need to draw on a local, that’s why we can’t improve here. I have worked all my life for the UDI. RN is now tempting me to switch and go with them, but I won’t. I am faithful to the UDI. I am a founder, I participated with Jaime Guzmán. And although they had treated me badly, I won’t quit. They never supported me, I relied on the support of my good friends who make USD 200 a month. But we need more support to get farther, especially to counteract what the Mayor is able to do; he is campaigning all year round, everyday. They invested in congressional candidates from outside. Although marketing and money certainly helped a lot, we lacked a candidate with more local networks. They don’t seem to get my message. I am poor; I am Oscar Mendoza, a public employee. I don’t have a last name with political reputation, without an economic background. And alone, I cannot do more. This is not an UDI problem, this is a social problem. They can’t stand seeing a *negro chico*, poor, unattractive, like me reaching a political office in what they think it is a middle-income municipality. They don’t stand seeing a *poblador* showing up as the neighborhood server. But I will persist. And if one day they send me a good candidate, I will be there to support him. If not, I will continue to be a council member with 1800 votes, trying to help people. I still consider myself a winner. They told me I would get a hundred votes and I got 1833. (Oscar Mendoza, UDI council-member in Quinta Normal. Personal interview 2003).

Consistently, the young activists who are selected by the party to play an intrinsically political role share similar social profiles and experiences and whenever possible have run for Congress soon after turning 21 years old (the minimum age required to run for this office), without receiving virtually any financial help from the party and in districts where it was clear that they would lose.<sup>178</sup>

This practice produces two basic results for UDI. First, these young leaders are now expected to move on and either run with additional support from the party in more competitive districts or take part as staff in UDI’s municipal governments (and eventually in the national government). Second, following many of these campaigns, youth groups were created and are now engaging in leadership development activities and *social service*, creating a much broader support base for future electoral initiatives. This is precisely what happened in La Florida and to a lesser extent in Peñalolén:

I started working with Jarita, when he ran for Congress. We supported him and we had fun, but we knew it was a lost campaign. Now, he has gone but we have created a youth group that is called “Corporación Jóvenes de la Florida” through which we try to help Mayor Zalaquet and to get more support for the party here [...] We are doing good and since I work in a technical school as academic advisor I am in contact with many youngsters from the municipality, which helps to recruit new guys [...] We are now preparing a fieldwork activity with university students who are in

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<sup>178</sup>They are recruited from top private and catholic universities (usually from Law departments) and have been sent to pursue internships both in Washington DC’s *Leadership Institute* and in the Universidad de Navarra in Spain. Interviews with Juan José Jara and José Uriarte.

medical, dental, and law schools. We get together, ask our families and some friends that work in different companies to help us get food or medicine stocks and then we organize an operation in a shanty-town. For instance, we have now put together thirty food boxes for the next operation. And as they did not identify us as a political group we were even able to infiltrate the political structure of Carlos Montes [a very popular PS deputy] to coordinate with the neighborhood organizations and get the logistics done [...] We go for the weekend and try to be with the people and help them by offering legal assistance, free medical and dental attention, even haircuts [...] On the background of the medical receipt or the legal file we just have a photograph of the Mayor and a logotype of our organization. That is it [...] It is fun and we feel good servicing the community. [...] Now we are receiving many youths from RN. Do you know how they teach youths about poverty in RN? They show movies to them. We go and just get our feet in the mud. And it is different, it feels different, and creates a different relationship with the people. Building a play-ground for poor children with the people from the neighborhood is great. You know that it will get destroyed in two days and that they will steal everything that you put there in a minute, but the human relationship you create is worth it. (Rodrigo Bordachar, UDI activists in La Florida, personal interview, 2003).

This “commitment to public service” not only differentiates UDI youngsters, but it is also central to the day to day work of incumbent deputies, council members, and mayors who receive and process a wide range of demands (from local organizations and individuals) on a regular basis:

In the popular sectors we expect our Council members and Mayors to go where the problems are. They need to keep their feet well into the mud. And in terms of territorial structure, we realized that one must maintain at least one activist in each zone to keep track of the problems and seek solutions. Then, when election time comes, you have a structure that is dormant there but that you can mobilize very easily. (Eugenio González, Lavin's campaign advisor and UDI activist, personal interview, 2003).

We help people, we listen to people, and we are here. We are workaholics. The deputy is here (at UDI's District Congressional Office), every week, every Monday of the year he meets with 40 or 50 people in this office and seeks a solution to their problems. Everyday of the week, they know council members are here or at their office at the municipality. So they know we are here and that they can bring their problems to us. And if we cannot find a solution we just tell them, but we listen to them. We do not hide, we do not over promise, and we are direct. [...] They come here with all sort of problems. Today two people came to ask help in refinancing utility and municipal debts. And we can help with that, we either talk to the municipality to get a plan for them, or help them pay some of what they owe to the electricity or water company. And it is not because we run this municipality. We can usually get the same in El Bosque or San Ramón (where the mayors are from Concertación), you just need to talk to people and they frequently understand. Then we had a lady that came because she could not pay school fees for her kid. [...] So I called the school, spoke to the director and asked him to give her a grace period. Then you have many people coming and asking for jobs, but we do not have jobs to offer. What we do is to show them how to put together a resume and lend them a computer to do it. Then, they can give us the resume and we will file it. We have business people that help and if we know of someone who is hiring, we send them the resumes we have. Or we ask the Congress-Member to write a recommendation letter for them. So, they hopefully will get a job. [...] Then you have the soccer clubs and the mother's centers, and all sorts of community organizations. They are always asking for stuff, equipment, prizes, and so on (the office walls are completely filled up with framed thankful notes and plaques from social organizations). And you have to give them things because they mobilize people. These organizations are important in the neighborhood. And then, every council member tries to offer some kind of social service in his or her community. For instance, Mora in San Ramón has now set up a soup-kitchen with help from five anonymous businessmen. So he can feed children when they do not go to school. I have a friend who is a dentist that gives free attention once a week in different

parts of the district. That is how we work, all day, all year round. We have learned to work like that from our congressmen, who gave us the opportunity to work with him and run for the council. That is what we do. That is UDI's style. (Aléx Alarcón, UDI council-member of La Cisterna, personal interview, 2003).

Although it is true that all council members receive many demands a day, it is usually the case that UDI's council members receive the most requests and are seen by the community as the most responsive and as those who "give away more."<sup>179</sup> In sum, UDI's most intensive and systematic "fieldwork" in the popular districts creates a fundamental synergy with the party's ability to develop an umbrella organization and leadership throughout the media and becomes fundamental in getting the electoral support of "soft voters." As succinctly put by a PPD activist:

The UDI has learned to work with the traditional methodology of the Chilean Communist Party and has empowered that framework with its access to financial resources. Let me tell you a story. In the last campaign we had so many UDI graffiti in the district that we could not afford to buy paint to compete with that. So we just devoted our resources to erase with white paint what they had painted the night before and will paint again in one or two days. It was impressive. (Jorge Villar, president of PPD's distrital representation in District 18, personal interview, 2003).

#### District Level Comparison and Linkage Substitution in the Concertación

The analysis presented in this section is based on the preliminary discussion offered in Table 8.3 in the previous chapter. First it is worth noting that in every district, even in those in which the center-left is strong in local and congressional elections, the presidential candidacy of Lavín always obtained more votes than the Alianza in other electoral contests. This obviously implies that the construction of a popular national candidacy was a crucial complement for UDI's going-pork/going local strategy.

Furthermore, the table highlights two factors that seem to explain UDI's divergent rate of success in reaching the electorate. First, the presence of "successful" mayors appointed by Pinochet at the outset of municipal reform was important in fostering the political careers of current UDI deputies in the new democratic regime. However, military appointed mayors tended to do well in newly created municipalities that lacked a history of leftist social organization at the local level (La

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<sup>179</sup>Participant observation El Bosque, Cerro Navia and San Ramón, and personal interviews with Margarita Cofre (2003) and Osvaldo Silva (2003).

Cisterna is a case in point, as well as Peñalolén to a lesser extent). In contrast, where significant leftist mobilization and grassroots organizations were important in fostering a communal identity, military appointees and UDI candidates have been less successful (Cerro Navia, San Ramón, El Bosque, and La Florida to a lesser extent). Nonetheless, the most successful Concertación political candidates in those districts have built on this leftist tradition to forge non-ideological linkages with their constituents, in order to make-up for the declining return of programmatic-linkage attempts.

The presence of successful instances of “linkage substitution” by Concertación candidates is a second important variable in explaining electoral divergence among popular districts. Where a charismatic, populist, and personalized relationship with constituents (e.g. PPD representative Girardi in Cerro Navia) or an efficient *community service* political machine on the basis of municipal governments (San Ramón, El Bosque, Cerro Navia, Quinta Normal) or a congressional district office (Carlos Montes in La Florida) was developed by Concertación leaders, UDI (not Lavín!) was significantly less successful.

Finally, in higher income communities like Las Condes, Vitacura, Lo Barnechea, and La Reina, the vote continues to be tightly structured and electoral campaigns are played on the media, because:

Those guys do not like campaigns. You should not bother them, you should not paint much. They like a clean municipality and good services. That is what mayors should provide. And then, for the campaign, congress-members and mayors should get out on the media and talk about national themes, big themes, economic themes. Taxes are very important for those sectors and addressing those issues is how you get a name for yourself. Still, even if we run a clown in that district [23] we would get him elected by a great margin. (Eugenio González, Lavín's campaign advisor and UDI activist, personal interview, 2003).

The next two chapters present a parallel overview of the evolution of non-programmatic linkages in Uruguay and the electoral strategy of Frente Amplio, currently the most popular party in the system.

## **CHAPTER X**

### **NON-PROGRAMMATIC LINKAGES IN URUGUAY**

#### Introduction

In this chapter I present evidence on the recent evolution of non-programmatic linkages in Uruguay, explicitly framed as the counterpart of the evolution of programmatic-linkages (and its causal determinants) described in previous chapters. In this case, I also rely on qualitative evidence proceeding from fieldwork research on seven electoral districts, applying the same sampling criteria and interview structure than that used for Chile.

In Uruguay, those seven congressional districts correspond also to the jurisdictions of seven municipal governments. Montevideo, the capital city of the country, is one of those districts and concentrates 43% of the total population (1.3 million people) and 60% of the nation's GDP and elects almost 50% of all lower-chamber congressional representatives. Nonetheless, geographically, Montevideo is the smallest political circumscription in the country. Canelones (a significant fraction of whose territory comprises the metropolitan area of Montevideo) was also included in the sample and is the second largest Municipality, electing approximately 25% of lower-chamber congress-members to represent 450.600 inhabitants. The remaining five selected districts were San José (also in the metropolitan area of Montevideo and with a population of 96.200 people), the center-north Tacuarembó (the geographically largest district in the country with a population of 84,600 people), the western Salto (118.100 inhabitants) and Paysandú (110.000 inhabitants) both of which border Argentina, and the northern Artigas, bordering Brazil and with a total population of 75.100. As shown in Table 10.1, these districts combine different configurations

in terms of their overall socioeconomic indicators, economic production, financial standing, and weight of central state transfers in municipal income.<sup>180</sup>

Nonetheless, differing from the Chilean case, all such districts comprise more social heterogeneity than the one observed in that case. Although local Human Development Indexes are not available in this case, the comparison between indexes of educational capital of households among zones corresponding to the same district illustrates such internal heterogeneity. Additionally, the country shows less socially segmented patterns of political behavior, with national trends affecting local politics more directly than in the other case. For this reason, it is difficult to establish clear-cut distinctions at the district level and a parallel analysis to that presented for Chile would require a much more detailed analysis of specific zones within districts. To complicate matters more, electoral return data segmented by geographical zones within districts is incomplete and not as reliable as in Chile. Nonetheless, drawing on such data, the next chapter presents a characterization of the geographical evolution of Frente Amplio's vote (compared to those of other parties) in different zones of Montevideo, characterized by having clearly distinct socio-structural characteristics. In this chapter, in turn, I present a general overview of the evolution of non-programmatic linkages in the system, without drawing systematic comparisons between districts and municipalities. However, whenever possible (when patterns are sufficiently clear and segmented to make valid inferences) I draw basic distinctions between municipalities in which different trends are observed. Below, I also compare district's recent electoral evolution and present a tentative typology of district types, discussing general implications of the observed patterns of non-programmatic linking in municipal governments.

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<sup>180</sup>In this last regard it is important to note the budgetary discrimination that Blanco and Colorado governments have exerted against FA's municipal government of Montevideo.

Table 10.1:

## District Characterization, Political Trajectory, Party Strategy, and Recent Electoral Outcomes\*

<b>District and Mayoralties</b> (Localities included in fieldwork activities, but which do not conform an electoral district)	<b>Average Human-Development Index 1998</b>	<b>Average number of people in poverty in 2002</b>	<b>Average Educational Capital of Households</b> (Average years of education of household inhabitants of age 20 or older)	<b>Population/Percentage Urban Population</b>	<b>GDP (annual, in dollars)</b>	<b>Central Government Transfers/Total Municipal Income (Average 1990-1997) (Michelin 1999)</b>	<b>Municipal Debt/GDP 1997 (Michelin 1999)</b>	<b>% of Expenditures in Wages (Michelin 1999)</b>
<b>Montevideo</b> Casavalle La Teja Barrio Sur Malvín-Carrasco Pocitos	.861 n/a n/a n/a n/a	22.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a	n/a 6.14 7.87 10.01 10.88 11.84	1.344.839/ 97%	10.858.162	2.8%	n/a	51.5%
<b>Canelones</b> San Jacinto Canelones Ciudad de la Costa	.832 n/a n/a n/a	17% n/a n/a n/a	n/a 5.7 7.4 9.4	443.053/ 87%	1.319.049	15.8%	1.88%	54%
<b>San José</b> San José de Mayo Delta El Tigre y Villas	.825 n/a n/a	22% n/a n/a	n/a 7.0 5.9	96.664/ 78%	369.507	17.8%	.24%	42.5%
<b>Tacuarembó</b>	.808	31%	7.2	84.919/ 80.5%	381.205	20.1%	1.62%	44%
<b>Paysandú</b>	.825	32%	7.7	111.509/ 90%	550.767	15.5%	.86%	46%
<b>Artigas</b> Bella Unión	.793 n/a	42%	7.4 7.1	75.059/ 89%	270.012	22.7%	3.03%	60%
<b>Salto</b>	.804	34%	7.5	117.597/ 88.5%	462.783	15.6%	1.11%	51%

\*Source: UNDP 1999, Veiga and Rivoir 2002, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, and Kaztman 1999.

**Table 10.2:**

**Electoral Results in Selected Districts, Congressional and Municipal (1984-2004 Elections)**

Year	1984			1989			1994		
Party	PC	PB	FA	PC	PB	FA	PC	PB	FA
Montevideo	36.0	27.0	33.7	25.0	26.6	34.5	26.6	21.1	44.1
Canelones	45.4	36.8	15.8	33.1	41.2	16.7	34.8	30.9	27.9
Artigas	55.1	38.3	6.1	44.5	46.2	5.1	43.3	42.1	13.5
Salto	50.7	37.6	10.2	36.1	49.6	8.5	41.8	35.0	20.9
Paysandu	41.5	42.1	14.5	31.9	51.4	10.4	32.4	37.6	27.3
San Jose	37.8	45.5	10.9	26.3	55.9	10.4	30.5	43.9	20.3
Tacuarembó	44.1	46.3	8.0	35.9	54.1	6.6	33.6	50.4	13.4
Year	1999			2004					
Party	PC (Municipal)	PB (Municipal)	FA (Municipal)	PC (Municipal)	PB (Municipal)	FA (Municipal)			
Montevideo	29.8 (28.1)	12.3 (11.7)	50.1(58.2)	8,2 (25.8)	24,5 (9.9)	61,3 (58.5)			
Canelones	31.9 (45.6)	21.2 (13.3)	37.8 (40.1)	9,2(6.3)	32,5(26.5)	53,2 (61.2)			
Artigas	38.9 (58.5)	32.4 (26.3)	21.6 (15.4)	16,9 (22.4)	48,5 (39.8)	32,1 (35.3)			
Salto	36.9 (41.5)	24.7 (36.1)	30.3 (20.7)	14,3 (21.2)	39,1(36.3)	43,4 (39.1)			
Paysandu	26.2 (18.7)	24.2 (43.1)	39.7 (37.3)	6,1 (6)	45,6 (43.3)	45,3 (47.4)			
San Jose	29.1 (6.3)	32.4 (72.5)	29.7 (20.4)	9,8 (2.8)	43,4 (59.5)	42,8 (33.3)			
Tacuarembó	30.5 (13.7)	39.4 (71.4)	21.2 (14.4)	12.1(4.4)	52(71.4)	32,6(21.7)			

\*Source: Albornoz, Alberto. (various years) and Corte Electoral Elecciones: Eleccion de Gobiernos Nacionales y Departamentales, Resultados y Proclamaciones. Camara de Representantes, Montevideo.

**Table 10.3:**

**Electoral Trajectory and Current Configuration of Selected Uruguayan Districts**

	Most Frequently Elected Parties to Local Office 1942-2000	Recent Political Trajectory	Most penalized party in Municipal Elections, regarding national elections (2004-05)/Less voted party in Local elections PB (-14.6)/PB(9.9)	Party-System Configuration in 1999 and 2004. Congressional (Municipal Elections)  Predominant Party (Predominant Party)	Party Elected to Municipal Office in 2004
Montevideo	PC (8), FA (1)	Hegemonic FA			FA
Canelones	PC (9), PB (3)	Competitive	PB(-6)/PC(6.3)	Competitive with Emergent Predominance of FA (Same pattern)	FA
Artigas	PC (12)	Hegemonic PC	PB(-8.7)/PC(22.4)	Competitive (Predominant Party, turning competitive)	PB
Salto	PC (9), PB (3)	Hegemonic PC	FA(-4.3)/PC(21.1)	Competitive (Same)	FA
Paysandu	PC (8), PB (4)	Competitive	PB(-2.3)/PC(6)	Neo-bipartidism (Same)	FA
San Jose	PB (8), PC (4)	Hegemonic PB	FA(-9.5)/PC(2.8)	Neo-bipartidism (Predominant Party)	PB
Tacuarembó	PB (8), PC (4)	Hegemonic PB	FA(-10.9)/PC(4.4)	Neo-bipartidism (Predominant Party)	PB

Source: Own Construction on the basis of Table 2, ICP (2000)

Tables 10.2 and 10.3 illustrate the political trajectory of each circumscription drawing on electoral results at the district level. Separated results for Municipal elections are displayed for the last two periods, when (as a result of 1996's Constitutional Reform) concurrent and closed list elections were substituted by non-concurrent ones. Table 3 presents a characterization of the districts' emerging party-systems. Although more convergence is observed in this case between national and local results, both tables illustrate the scope of "denationalization" observed in each district and the sample's maximization of divergent political and competitive trajectories of competitive scenarios.

The size of the population covered by this intentional sample and the degrees of internal variance observed in Uruguayan districts (both rural and urban areas of such districts were covered) turn this sample into a reliable proxy for making inferences on the overall Uruguayan population. Interviews took place during 2002 and 2003.

Compared to the Chilean case, recent transformations in the patterns of non-programmatic linkages are less dramatic. However, important disruptions are also observed in this case, this time in conjunction with the consolidation of programmatic-competition between two ideological families on the state-market divide and the progressive erosion of the state's capacity to reproduce the wealth of clientelistic side-payments that used to feed partisan (and fractional) political machines both in the pre-authoritarian period and until the early 1990s (Rama 1987, Panizza 1990). The evidence I present here suggests that, as theoretically claimed by Filgueira et al 2003, since the mid 1990s the traditional system of clientelistic mediation has suffered from three interrelated transformations: a) a recession of clientelism in the system, b) a mutation of non-programmatic linkage strategies and the nature of the goods used for those linkages, and c) a concentration of clientelism at the municipal level, where significant incumbency advantages have developed. The net result of these trends yields an apparently similar outcome to that observed in Chile in terms of the skewed social distribution of representation in the system, with lower sectors of society engaging in non-programmatic linkages with parties, while middle and upper sectors vote

programmatically. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that this seemingly convergent result was reached due to different reasons and on the basis of a divergent trajectory than in Chile. As a result, the representation gap between voters situated at different extremes of the socioeconomic ladder is less in Uruguay than in the Chilean case. Additionally, when comparisons are drawn between both partisan families, the nationalization of electoral trends at different levels (presidential, congressional, and municipal) is significantly greater than in the Chilean case. This is clearly due to the efficient channelling by Frente Amplio of social discontent with both traditional parties in all social strata and the political framing of the sources of such discontent as a consequence of neoliberal reforms against *batllismo*, which provides a wider base for programmatic-linking across all levels of the electorate. The comparatively higher levels of interest group strength present in the system and in particularly in middle and middle-low sectors (mainly around coalitions of ISI beneficiaries) also contributed to raise the level of interest aggregation and the structuring of party-voter linkages in the system. Lower levels of popular alienation with politics and parties are a positive externality of such process. Additionally, the persistence of strong political traditions in the country also provides parties with an important capital to avoid the degree of personalization and partisan dealignment observed in the Chilean system. In this context, although both traditional parties have increasingly relied on partially paid political activists during campaigns, independents and “mercenaries” are still a rare specimen in Uruguay. Indeed, the case of FA (discussed in next chapter) highlights the importance of a very powerful and vocational network of partisan activists working in every locality of the country. In this respect, the party’s ability to “control” almost

every channel of political socialization in society (very prominently, the educational system and the cultural *intelligencia*) increases the salience of the “frenteamplista” tradition. The competition between both traditional parties and the left has also provided the former with the opportunity to renew and reaffirm their political identities. Furthermore, the fiscal crisis of the Uruguayan state and the weaker development of the private sector in the economy decreased the room for the

creation of particularistic side-payments in the system. Therefore, though probably growing, the importance of private-sector donations for campaigns and their leverage in terms of distorting the fairness of the electoral game is undoubtedly less than the one described for Chile.

The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a general characterization of the emerging nature of non-programmatic linkages in Uruguay. On such basis, the final section of this chapter discusses some implications and advances a preliminary typology of district patterns. In turn, the next chapter analyzes the strategy of the FA, the party that was recently able to reap more benefits from the competitive configuration derived from the evolution of party-voter linkages in the system.

#### The evolution of non-programmatic linkages in post-transitional Uruguay

In their recent work on the characteristics of the Uruguayan state in the twentieth century Filgueira et al (2003) claim that since the early 1990s clientelism has suffered from three interrelated transformations in Uruguay: a recession, a mutation, and a refuge at the municipal level. With some caveats introduced below, my evidence supports this basic thesis and further illuminates both the scope of each transformation and the underlying causal mechanisms triggering them.

This emerging configuration can be compared to the one emerging from the development and consolidation of the *batllista* socio-political arrangement already described in Chapter 3, in which partisan fractions from both traditional parties and independently of their programmatic stances, competed by establishing vertical patronage and clientelistic networks based on the exchange of electoral support for state-supplied goods (especially the central state and public enterprises). Whereas organized interest-groups were also active and effective in extracting state subsidies, it is worth mentioning that clientelistic networks included a truly cross-sectional (and horizontal) cut of Uruguayan society. Meanwhile, political careers and access to the state-machine were contingent on each *agrupación* (sectional partisan committees) and fraction electoral markup

and their consequent leverage in negotiating their alignment in terms of district and national internal currents of the party. In this context, very salient political traditions divided the camps between both traditional parties and sectional committees (“clubs políticos”) became the most significant agents of political socialization and brokerage, having a continuous presence in every locality. Today, political clubs from both traditional parties are rare in Uruguayan neighborhoods and they are only seen during electoral campaigns.

As put by two Colorado congress-members:

My party has lost its territorial organization. Leaders have not worried about maintaining a modern political structure for the party, which could allow a working framework to directly connect with the people. We do not have a strong base structure; we just have a traditional organization that gets quickly organized during electoral periods. But we do not have something that helps us to connect on a regular basis with our party bases, with our activists. And individual efforts by different members of the party are not sufficient in that respect. (Ronald Pais, Colorado congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

We do not form activists; we do not work with the youth. I am the only one doing that in my List (List 15), now the executive committee of the party decided to have some courses for young people, but this is the first time since I have memory. Political careers here are of two types. One, independently of your personal virtues, you can do well with a political last name. Two, some of us advanced, others not, by working ourselves up through political activism. But it is difficult. We are now organizing women meetings every month and we have regional meetings three or four times a year. We have political and labor workshops and the oldest among us try to form new activists. Last month in Rocha, we were 1500 women. But we are the only ones in the party doing something like that, and when leaders want to have a political act they need to call us. They don’t have that following now. (Glenda Rondán, Colorado congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Political brokerage has atomized and it is now exerted by local (and individual) referents, usually tied to municipal governments or a congress-member. A successful Blanco congress-member working on the tradition of *herrerismo* and who has one of the best developed political structures in Canelones states:

Our day to day work is much harder than during campaigns. In campaigns you have fireworks, noise, barbeques, acts, and emotive discourses. The day to day work is much more complicated as you always face the temptation to lay back, to let days go by. And you cannot do that. I am always in contact with 190 or 200 local social referents that I have distributed all over the district, which thankfully are able to fulfill a social mission. With pray I can now say that in the neighborhood Artigas in Sauce there is one commission and its president works for us; if there is people working on the CAIF Centers (focalized community and NGO sponsored pre-schooling and childcare for poor families), we have for sure someone from our organization inserted in that group; in school commissions we have someone; in housing cooperatives some members work for us. Therefore, we have people well inserted in the social network and those are the ones I work with. I cannot go to Soca and tell them what is happening in their place. They need to tell me and I need to seek solutions for them. That’s how it works. I am their “carry-boy”, that’s your job if you are a young congress-member. And then we have 52 strictly political referents in the district. And fortunately, all

of them are amateur. I do not pay, although many people do. This is something you need to do with your heart; otherwise, politics would be death. Those 52 are distributed throughout the district, some working in family houses, others even paying to rent a small local. And I do fieldwork visits with them all the time and if they have a problem, anytime, they have a direct line with me. We also have a group of professional friends who help us offer professional services that people cannot afford. We have two lawyers, two specialists in paperwork requirements for obtaining pensions, an agronomic-engineer that helps small producers, a psychologist. Finally, when the state failed, we have also tried to substitute it. In Paso Carrasco, a friend who is a physician proposed to build up a primary health clinic. Another friend who works in a pharmaceutical laboratory hands out free-medicine samples. We even had one activist who was a carpenter and he crafted all the necessary furniture. And now, when the state clinic of Monterrey was shut down, we provide for the community with our own health clinic. (Luis Lacalle Pou, Blanco congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Nonetheless, this type of personalized fieldwork structure is still rarely found within traditional parties, which cannot usually compete with the powerful territorial apparatus of Frente Amplio. In line with the party's ideological profile, FA's congress-members (particularly those of Montevideo and metropolitan areas) usually highlight their role as party-members, seeking to reduce the scope of personalization of their political linking with constituents. In addition, FA members usually highlight the role of social organizations and the importance of "promising a change" instead of providing material incentives to people:

We need to make a distinction. I think there is a clear difference between my party, the Socialist Party, and the traditional ones. They campaign during elections and then, each one of their candidates campaign on a personal basis, setting up a political apparatus for her. My party is not like that, we select candidates in a congress, democratically. And then, once we have the list, we work for the list, all together. This does not mean that we are not human beings and that we are better known in certain social spheres in which we, as individuals, work more frequently [...] We help people trying to provide answers to them, but what we need to try is getting close to those places (shanty-towns) by stimulating people's organization around their common problems. Clientelism comes with political paternalism and we need to break that up. Today, the "poor credential" is not helpful; today, I do not solve anything by handing out eight ceiling pieces per family. People need to organize collectively to have electricity, water, and a better road. That way you build consciousness. (Artigas Melgarejo, FA congress-member, personal interview, 2003)

We would not have any chance of campaigning on clientelism, we do not have much to offer to people. What we can do is to feed a hope that we need to construct among many of us. And that hope of collectively bringing change to our society is what we take to our meetings. It is undeniable that you always need to participate in meetings in which people is asking you to solve their particular problems, that's ingrained in Uruguayan society. I won't tell you that I do not receive those demands. And when I can, if it is reasonable, I try to help, because many times you have unnecessary unfulfilled needs, either due to bureaucratic problems or due to people's lack of knowledge of formal procedures. But 80% of particular demands relate to job posts, and we cannot help with that. [...] Our political party has a neighborhood organization to which one permanently relates, either because they invite you, because they require your presence or either because you stop by during our monthly visits. And although they call you to address a specific problem, you always need to steal them some minutes to talk about the common good, about general things that are happening in the country and how, we as a political party, are interpreting those things and what we are trying to do to improve the situation. And many times during those meetings you find out new

things. Stuff you were ignorant about and we need to run to the office, find out, and try to address that. So, it is extremely enriching for us, too. (Victor Rossi, FA congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

### *The recession of non-programmatic linkages in the system*

The recession of non-programmatic linkages in the system is driven by a series of historical events analyzed in depth in chapter 3. Here, I provide a stylized account of the most fundamental historical processes that yielded that outcome and present evidence that confirms the decaying role of non-programmatic linking in the system taken as a whole.

Although the military regime originated in part from the crisis of the *batllista* model of development and the traditional structures of political mediation based on the supply of subsidies and individual benefits on a horizontal and universal basis, it was not pivotal in terms of transforming the traditional system. Indeed, even though this regime introduced a temporal break from those structures, limiting its full reconstitution in the post-transitional period, it did not pursue structural or institutional reforms (like those applied by Pinochet in Chile) that could hinder the restoration of old practices. Furthermore, that regime contributed to legitimate the virtues of Uruguayan democracy and the system of compromise originating with *batllismo*.

In this context, it is possible to claim that both economic and political variables are the principal driving forces behind that recession.

Regarding the former, the successive and persisting economic crises suffered by the country since the late 1950s and the increasing levels of fiscal deficit have on the one hand contributed to delegitimize the traditional system on the view of *patrons* (both traditional parties occupying the executive), confronting since the transition to democracy significant international pressures to reform state structures and pursue economic liberalization. On the other hand, the economic downturn has also fed popular discontent with government and with reformist projects attempted by the government. In addition, confronting surmounting fiscal deficits and international pressures, the government has invested in the modernization and rationalization of state enterprises and the introduction of new information technologies in the public bureaucracy. Some of those

state reforms (like the instauration of a system of digital labor history for administering pension benefits and the modernization of state enterprises) have restricted the stock of available goods that were the object of traditional clientelistic transactions like the distribution of pension benefits (usually non-contributive) and the activation of administrative shortcuts (through the operation of party-activists working in every state-agency) to obtain, for instance, a telephone or electricity line (Fá Robaina 1972; Rama 1987; Panizza 1990; Rius 2003). In this respect, for instance, whereas today telephone connections are granted in less than a week, until the 1980s the average speed of connections was greater than two years for telephone lines.

I started distributing telephones (telephone lines). And I do not know if that helped me or not for the elections, but what I can tell you today is that before I could respond to that demand. Today, I face innumerable demands that I cannot respond to. We used to have pensions, water and electricity connections, public employment, free bus tickets...What happens is that Uruguayans are very clientelistic. And today, the problem is that we have many demands and we lack the ability to respond. Everywhere in the world citizens demand more welfare, and there are two ways of interpreting that. You can see it as personal and individual welfare, or you can see it as greater collective welfare. The problem is that today, we cannot provide neither of those. We are in a transition between a paternalistic state that provided for everyone and a liberal model in which everyone needs to be creative, inventive, and able to provide for itself. And in this transition we encounter a huge economic crisis. Then, what we have is a line of people that still thinks that we can provide for them, while we can't and at the same time, we cannot claim that the country is improving, because people are suffering a lot. (Jaime Trobo, Blanco congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Before you had other things, like telephones, pensions, water connections, housing credits, etc. [...] We even had the police chief, so if people had to move from one house to another, we could use the Police truck to assist them [...] Therefore, even if you did not have the local government, your presence was continuous in the district. Today we don't have anything like that. (Domingo Ramos, Colorado local activist, personal interview, 2003).

Furthermore, politicians have also tied their hands by establishing in 1995 the prohibition to hire permanent employees in the central state apparatus for ten years (Law 16.127). Although renewable temporal contracts were subsequently used to hire employees in the central administration (Schick 2003), these contracts were not frequently accessible to be used in hiring unskilled workers, limiting therefore, the room for patronage development in the central bureaucracy. In this regard, virtually all congress-members point to job demands as the most pressing ones and frequently rely on their connections with private businessmen (including FA's

Congress-members) in order to seek employment for their constituents. Nonetheless, the job supply always falls short.

People fundamentally ask for jobs and I have a list to deal with this. But I am honest with them, I tell them that my own son, who is 30 and has finished high-school has been unemployed during the last 4 years. Anyway, I put them on a list and ask them exactly what they specialize on. If they are car-drivers, I list them as car-drivers and so on. So, when a business guy comes, as now when they come because we are discussing the budget, I ask them if they have any job opening available and show them my list. In this moment we have an average of fourteen people coming every week to ask for jobs and in more than two years I think I was able to solve three problems. That's the situation. (Artigas Melgarejo, FA congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Finally, the penetration of mass-media and survey research in Uruguayan society, in the context of increasing levels of programmatic competition, has granted national leaders a greater capacity to bypass territorial partisan networks that from an instrumental point of view became increasingly expensive to maintain in the wake of the fiscal crisis of the state. As discussed below, this fact has important implications for the weakening of the partisan networks of both traditional parties and their decreasing capacity to offer a wide political menu in every electoral instance and at every territorial level.

Indeed, partially deriving from the reduction of the available stock of goods for establishing non-programmatic linkages with constituents (but also resulting from institutional incentives introduced in the 1996 Constitution), both traditional parties have witnessed a process of bi-fractionalization, which translates into a reduction of the historically high levels of internal competition observed in both parties (Piñeiro 2004).

Even though I am *herrerista*, I know that the hegemony of *Herrerismo* has hurted the party. We have always been a party of many candidates, three, four, or even more. And last time, we came to the national election with only one candidate and after a primary that had left many injuries open. The Blancos do not like to vote like that. They like many candidates, the Blanco Independiente and the *Herrerista* are different. They like different candidates and those differences benefit the party's electoral performance. (Juan Creceri, Blanco local activist, personal interview, 2003).

At this stage and given the nature of Uruguayan political parties, it is important to provide a brief portrayal of the implications of this realignment for the most relevant party fractions of both traditional parties (a parallel analysis of FA is offered in the next chapter). Within the Colorado Party and since 1989, two main internal currents consolidated: the *Foro Batllista* led by Sanguinetti

and the Lista 15 led by Jorge Batlle. Whereas the former represents continuity with *batllismo*'s social-democratic imprint and draw, in the post-transition to democracy, on an important patronage and clientelistic network; the later presents a liberal programmatic stance and works around less formalized and stable support networks.

We have the same origin and therefore, our organizations are similar. But they are a bit closer to communism; they have a social-democratic smell. Therefore, they press a bit more with the use of the state and that's why they do so well in using municipal governments to maintain their political machines. They have not lost any municipality in recent times because they have a very well developed political structure. (Hugo Cortis, political advisor of a Colorado congress-member, personal interview, 2003)

Within the Blanco Party, *Herrerismo*, led by Lacalle, has been able to overshadow (during the 1990s) the *Wilsonista* current, which has now been revitalized by the emergence of new leaderships in the interior of the country drawing on electorally successful performances at the Municipal level, sustained through a combination of public goods provision and the resort to traditional clientelistic practices (the leadership of Jorge Larrañaga in Paysandú and Eber Da Rosa in Tacuarembó are two cases in point). Meanwhile, whereas policy-wise *herrerismo* represents the most consistently liberal party-fraction in the country, it has built important support-bases working around networks of local referents with access to the state apparatus. Given the characteristics of the Uruguayan electoral system, territorial structures are also fundamental in campaigns in order to distribute fraction lists. In many cases, within a given party, the vote is decided by the availability of lists to voters and/or the presence of those local references in one list or another.

Nonetheless, with the last economic crisis of 2001, the two most prominent national political apparatuses have been severely weakened.

As both a Colorado (*Foro Batllista*) and a Blanco (*Herrerismo*) local leader state:

They have discouraged the little ants. We are little, but we are the ones gathering votes for them. Before, every weekend, I went out to the countryside, to little towns, to talk to the people. Today, I don't do it anymore. I have maintained the friendship with the people, but we cannot sacrifice friends for politics. We cannot go out and promise what we don't have. We don't have anything now. So, we set up the list with a group of friends who had a good economic situation, so we did not have to promise anything. If someone came and ask for something, we just told them that we did not have anything to give. The only thing we promised was to try to force an internal change in the party. (Hubaré Aliano, Colorado local activist, personal interview, 2003).

The political power in Montevideo is forgetting us. And that's a terrible mistake. We cannot be connected only when they need us for the elections, there has to be a better way of staying in touch. That's the tradition of *herrerismo*, that's why we were so strong. Now, national leaders have disappeared and that hurts the party. This time they did not provide political offices to us. Let's say two or three offices in the state, anything somewhere. In the committee you have people working all year round and they are the ones keeping the presence of the party alive here. Then, when elections come they benefit from that. But when we go there, they shut the door on your face. And if the party has no reciprocity with us, we cannot provide for the people. Then, how can I go and ask them for their vote? (Juan Creceri, Blanco local activist, personal interview, 2003).

Paradoxically, the weakening of party territorial structures enhanced the need of individual congress-members to stay personally in the field. This is particularly important for non-Metropolitan congress-members, which face specific constituent demands that cannot be addressed through the media. Along these lines, a Colorado congress-member points to the changes brought about by the increasing restriction of clientelistic side-payments in the system:

New opportunities had been created. You have to get to the ground from the heights and be close to the people. Talk to them, give them opinions, and inform them. Before the congress-member visit every location once a year, at most. And then, people had to go to your office, stand on a line, and present their demands to you. Some congress-member feel threatened by the impossibility of getting on the phone and solve people's problems, but they don't realize that they need to relate to people on new grounds. I came from a small town and when I was a child, you rarely saw a congress-member in the field. Today, everyone is there doing different things. (Jorge Duque, Colorado congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Politically, the emergence and later consolidation of FA, and its continuous electoral growth can be seen as fundamental causal explanations for the decreasing overall importance of non-programmatic-linking in the system. On the one hand, lacking access to state-resources (at least until 1989 with its arrival into the Mayoralty of Montevideo) this party needed to rely on alternative linkage strategies to efficiently compete with Blancos and Colorados. FA's traditionalization, the party's control of crucial socialization vehicles in society, and its ideological positioning as the defender of *batllismo* against reformist attempts yielded both strong partisan identifications and a programmatic basis to compete with Blancos and Colorados, while increasingly attracting dissatisfied voters to its ranks (these processes are described in further detail in the next chapter). On the other hand, the growing levels of electoral volatility in the system and

FA's systematic growth in every election fostered increasing levels of cynicism on the virtues of clientelism in the eye of traditional party leaders:

For traditional parties clientelism has been a total disaster. Every public employee seems to have been appointed by Frente Amplio. During my political life, I might have placed, for different reasons, about six hundred people. Of those, I am sure that no one is voting for me. They are all leftist now. We put them there and six months after they turn leftist. What a puzzle? Like every communist, they are traitors. They tell you they will support you, but you won't ever see them back once they got their post. Since the transition, I have placed a few people. (Hugo Cortis, political advisor of a Colorado congress-member, personal interview 2003)

We talk to everyone, we try to help everyone, but we know we are eating many frogs. You know they don't vote for you. Still, we try to seek solutions to them. (Jorge Duque, Colorado congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

People forget easily. The people I helped the most, the one I put in the best places have abandoned me. The most needed, the ones you listened to but could not provide a definitive solution, are the most loyal ones. (Domingo Ramos, Colorado local activist, personal interview, 2003).

In this context, and as shown in Chapters 4 and 6, the left and the traditional party family realigned around *batllismo*, starting to compete programmatically on the state-market divide. Both the programmatic tensioning of the system and the increasing organization of ISI-beneficiary groups (especially pension beneficiaries and union-members) lobbying in Congress and resorting to direct democracy mechanisms to promote or oppose legislation, has contributed to rise the level of interest aggregation in society. Meanwhile, private sector workers and business interests have increasingly pushed for further market-reforms, together with international financial institutions. Therefore, these trends have contributed to make individual clientelistic transactions less salient for a significant fraction of the Uruguayan population, particularly in middle and upper sectors of society. Meanwhile, non-programmatic linking has changed its nature and has increasingly sought refuge at the municipal level.

#### *The Mutation and (Municipal) Refuge of Non-programmatic Linkages*

Both the processes of social fragmentation and disintegration in most vulnerable sectors of society triggered by long-term economic decline and the increasing assumption by municipal governments of functions traditionally exerted by the Central Administration (very prominently,

the provision of focalized social assistance to marginalized sectors of society living on the basis of subsistence economy or the informal sector) contributed to the changing nature of non-programmatic linkages in the system.<sup>181</sup> Although also frequently confronting important fiscal deficits and massive debts with other public institutions (very prominently the pension system and electricity, water, and phone providers), Uruguayan municipal governments still retain relatively important degrees of autonomy, maintaining for instance the possibility of developing (“attenuated”) state patronage. Indeed, a Frente Amplio congress-member recognizes the social role that municipalities now need to fulfill, when confronting the greatest economic crisis in the country’s history and the financial collapse of the state:

They are facing severe (budgetary) cuts and the central government has not transferred resources to them. Hospitals are national and only a few municipalities have primary health clinics. They cannot invest in infrastructure, which depends on the Ministry of Public Works that lacks resources. Before the Banco Hipotecario and the Housing Ministry financed housing construction and you also had housing cooperatives. Today, that’s all dead. So, I don’t know if I would not be doing the same thing they are doing these days. Like the Mayor of Lavalleja, a great guy. He has cleaning jobs to hand out in the municipality and has created a rotation system in which one time the housewife, one time the husband, one time their children get those jobs. So, he has many families depending on the Municipality. But you need to understand; in the interior you have basically three job sources, productive facilities are closed. Then, either they go to the police, the army, or the municipality. So, although rotation is not as clean as we do it in Montevideo where we draft people, it is also a good way of generating some economic dynamism in the local economy. (Margarita Percovich, FA congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Especially when confronting atomized and impoverished social-structures and low-levels of electoral competitiveness, the relative autonomy that municipalities still maintain provides important leverage to develop encompassing clientelistic encapsulation. Indeed, municipal governments usually become “infernal (political) machines” in the context of political campaigns. This is illustrated in the dialogue between two Colorado local leaders of Tacuarembó:

HA: With Sanguinetti, in 1985, we had the opportunity to gain the municipality. It was incredible; people came here to ask for the list. You did not even need to convince them. But we failed to select a good candidate here, and he did not work [...] And they got the Mayoralty, the Hospital, everything. From then on, we have declined year after year [...]

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<sup>181</sup> See Narbondo and Ramos (2001) for evidence on the greater autonomy gained by municipal governments during the last twenty-years. Oroño (2004) presents preliminary evidence on municipal spending on social assistance, identifying a distinctive pattern between Montevideo (with greater expenditures) and the interior, which the author assigns to the influence of partisan effects on social policy provision. However, this claim needs to be further tested given the presence of only one case (with important idiosyncrasies) that has variation in the independent variable.

DR: Things are crystal clear. Even an idiot would have a basement of 2000 votes if he runs the municipality, because at least, 2000 owe you favors [...]

HA: Look at the last campaign. Within the Blanco Party, Alianza Nacional (the fraction of the Mayor, Eber Da Rosa) defeated the Herrerismo in the primaries of May 1999, by 4000 votes. Then, Da Rosa renounced for the campaign and the vice-Mayor gets his seat. Right away he went from Alianza Nacional and struck a deal with the Herrerismo. Drawing on the Municipal machine, in three months, they almost discounted the difference and won the election...

DR: If the election had been a week later they would have won it [...]

HA: Do you know why they failed? Because they did not have a guy organizing the social service of the Municipality, distributing building blocks, ceiling pieces, food, in an organized manner. Their logistics failed. They were distributing stuff over night. It was like in the dictatorship, you heard trucks going up and down, all night. And that season, it rained a lot and they could not deliver as many things as they have planned for. Eight-hundred social service orders were not distributed. And with those eight hundred orders, at least you can get a hundred votes. And they lost by a hundred. Otherwise, they would have won. Do you know what they did? They deliver building blocks as if they were birthday cakes [...]

DR: Everyone does, tomorrow Pepito gets the Mayoralty and Pepito will do it.

HA: Municipalities are vote-creating machines here. That's it.

(Hubaré Aliano and Domingo Ramos, Colorado local activists, personal interview, 2003).

In the context of pressing social needs, social service offices became the focus of municipal clientelism and in some instances provided the basis for the development of new political careers in the district:

This office has almost 400 employees and manages a total annual budget of 3.5 million dollars, not in money, but in terms of resources. We have different sections here that range from municipal garages to different workshops (carpenters, mechanics, and municipal press). We also control wage disposal, the potable water service, which is freely distributed in trucks to poor people, and so on. We also control the direction of hygiene and food control. And finally we have the social development department through which we run disinfection campaigns, cleaning campaigns against rats and other pests, the health service, including more than 70 primary health centers all around the district, food supply structured around a numerous network of municipal soup-kitchens and childcare centers, and the distribution of food boxes that are sent by INDA (the national government) and that we distribute here in cooperation with NGOs. [...] We never take into consideration the partisan affiliation of our beneficiaries. If they need help and if they qualify, they get what they are entitled to, even if we know that they are leftist. Of course, the fact of being working in the neighborhoods every day, managing these resources, helps in that many people see me as an important referent. If people see that you are there, with your feet in the mud, they identify with you and that creates a linkage. (Daniel Alcieri, Social Department Chair of Paysandu's Municipality. Personal interview 2003).

We are now focused on solving the emergency we are facing these days and we have a team of people working on these topics in a permanent way. We are taking care of primary health, with four decentralized clinics and the Hospital. We have also implemented a decentralized service to practice medical exams in the neighborhoods, so people do not have to move from their homes. And then we work with neighborhood commissions to try to satisfy the basic needs they have. Today everything is concentrated in food supplies. That's what they most ask for. And we organize the distribution of food boxes, organize soup-kitchens, and distribute clothes and milk. It is a very tough job. I receive around 25 people a day asking for help, either because they are unemployed, ill, or face an extreme economic situation. In those cases we sent a social assistant and compile a priority list. And when things arrive, if something arrives, we distribute according to that list. Finally, if we have a flooding or a tornado, we ask the government for help and develop intensive fieldwork campaigns to survey

people needs, trying to seek a solution for them. (Darley Bizcarra, Social Department Director, Municipality of Artigas, personal interview, 2003).

Beyond strictly clientelistic deals, the Mayor, given the centrality of its role in the district, can also bank on the provision of basic public goods for developing electoral support.

The reality is that the Municipality not only works for maintaining a political machine. That's relative. Mayors have much more importance in the interior than in Montevideo, because they are the ones that do or fail to do stuff. The national government, from the perspective of people from the interior, is unimportant. Fifteen, twenty investors might worry about what happens with the national governments. People care about what the Mayor does. And today, it is false that you can win the election handing out jobs. In Salto the voting population is 80,000; in Artigas it is 45,000. And you cannot have 45,000 municipal employees. Today, what drives elections is the action of the guy that has the power. And that guy, in the interior, is the Mayor. People look at him and see how the guy reacts to different conjunctures and how well he provides for the department. And even if the national government through a given ministry invests in the department, everyone thinks it is because of the Mayor. Being the Mayor is great. You have the power; you can capitalize on what others do for your department; and you can always blame the national governments for your failures. (Hugo Cortis, political advisor of a Colorado congress-member, personal interview 2003).

Nonetheless, politicians who work in socially heterogeneous districts are able to draw finer distinctions between the effectiveness of public good provision at the local level in fostering incumbents' electoral support. These distinctions clearly illustrate the segmentation of linkage strategies observed in the case, between voters.

In certain zones you have people with higher cultural levels, where you have an enormous incidence of Montevideo, and therefore, where the opposition has a better show up. It is very difficult to deal with them. Indeed, many of the people who now live in Ciudad de la Costa came from Montevideo and are used to certain living standards in terms of urban development and basic infrastructural services. They came seeking peace and a better quality of life, but now have encountered important infrastructural problems. And no matter what you do, they are dissatisfied. Look in other places of the district you build up a road of 1500 meters and everyone is happy. In Ciudad de la Costa you can invest millions of dollars and everyone is against you. They vote on the basis of what they see on the media. But, you just fix some holes in the road and the people from rural areas or small towns in the interior will be thankful to you all their lives. (Jorge Duque, Colorado congress-member. Personal interview 2003).

In addition to the socio-structural characteristics of the population, the size of the private sector (and the corresponding weight of the municipal government in the local economy) also has an important impact on political behavior and the extent to which programmatic-linkages are feasible.

We analyzed this on the basis of Census data and we reached the conclusion that in Artigas, 80% of the families depend on income coming from public sources, either national or municipal. In Bella

Unión, the proportion was reversed, with only 20% living from direct or indirect state transfers. And political behavior correlates with that; the left does well where people are not dependent on the state. You cannot develop a classical leftist strategy where people are fearful of the power holder. And that happens when they depend on them for their jobs. Here, the Municipality was not paying employer's contributions to the pension system. That is money from the employees that was illegally appropriated by the Municipality, hindering their future pension. Indeed, they even lost access to credit because they showed up as debtors. We publicly denounce this situation asking municipal employees to support a legal claim against the Mayor. We have 1200, 1300 employees in this Municipality. Do you know how many of them signed out? Eleven. In Bella Unión people is more able to resist and that facilitates our task of ideological and political formation." (Omar Alvez, FA's local activist, personal interview 2003).

In sum, converging with the trends observed in Chile, municipal governments have gained importance in forging non-programmatic linkages between (lower class) voters and parties in Uruguay, with Mayors dominating local politics and obtaining an important incumbency advantage (limited in this case by the prohibition of the Mayor's second consecutive reelection). Like in Chile, this translates into a strengthening of Mayors vis-à-vis congress-members, who have lost brokerage opportunities with the impoverishment and fiscal stress faced by the central state. In this respect, important differences exist between congress-members from Montevideo and its metropolitan area and those of the interior of the country.

I think that a deputy can be three things: a representative, a deputy, and a congress-member. And I think it is necessary to combine all three things. When parties are strong and coherent, those three functions can be fulfilled by different people, but when they are not; all three functions need to be partially fulfilled by each one of us. And representation today has two main ways of expression in this country. One thing is the deputy representing the department of Tacuarembó and a very different thing is the one representing Montevideo or highly populated zones. The later does not need to be in the district and does not engage in representing individuals, because you cannot represent all that mass of people individually. The only common topics you can grasp are national themes and therefore you need to be on the media addressing those. So, the deputy from Montevideo is more a congress-member and less a territorial deputy and I, as a congress-member from Montevideo, do not really know who are my voters. And although I might have the vanity of thinking that 2000 or 3000 voters vote for the list because they like me personally, I know they are voting the list. In the interior, the opposite is true. (Jaime Trobo, Blanco congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Although the weight of the private sector in the economy is still much lower in Uruguay than in Chile, private companies have also begun to provide goods that congress-members and municipal political brokers can then (seek to) exchange for votes. In this case, however, business interests do not articulate a hegemonic group consistently pushing for a specific programmatic agenda (as in Chile, where they can be seen as the *de facto* protectors of the status-quo), but

support political parties (usually homogenously) to enhance their opportunities to obtain public concessions or protect their particular business interest from damaging legislation.<sup>182</sup> Therefore, it is possible to claim that a dual-system for the distribution of non-programmatic linkages also emerged in Uruguay, on the basis of goods provided by business elites which were supplied by political activists to poor voters. However, in this case, the system did not translate into skewed access to programmatic -linkages, as it cuts transversally across all major political parties. On this basis, it is now possible to further elaborate on the emerging logic of non-programmatic linking currently present in Uruguay.

#### *The current nature of non-programmatic linkages in Uruguay*

This section draws further implications from the preceding analysis and provides a summary of the main transformations of non-programmatic linkages in the country. Whenever distinctive patterns were observed between districts and within zones pertaining to the same districts, a comparative statement is offered.

First, it is possible to claim that with the emergence of programmatic linking in the system, non-programmatic linkages between parties and individual voters (or small locations or organizations) are punctuated by an important transformation at the level of *patrons*. In this context, local leaders operating with municipal machines or within decentralized networks of bureaucratic brokerage have gained centrality, displacing the traditional political committees of Blancos and Colorados.

Second, the presence of municipal governments operating in the context of poor and fragmented civil societies correlates with a greater presence of non-programmatic linking, especially in the forms of clientelism at lower levels of interest aggregation (usually at the individual level) and municipal patronage (frequently in the form of temporary or seasonal hiring). In this respect, for instance, the municipality of Artigas provides the clearest example of such

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<sup>182</sup>On the basis of interviews with congress-members from three-major parties.

political logic, which has granted the Colorado Party the total hegemony in Municipal contests until 2005, when a Blanco Mayor was appointed for the first time ever. The frequent occurrence of flooding in the poorest neighborhoods of the city of Artigas, provides, according to key informants, a renewable source for this type of linking on the basis of emergency funds and goods sent by the central government.<sup>183</sup> In the interior of Canelones a similar configuration is observed, this time drawing on bureaucratic brokerage and municipal patronage. In this respect, after the municipal transition between a Colorado Mayor that had been elected four times in that district (Tabaré Hackenbruck) and the recently elected Frente Amplio's Mayor, striking discoveries were made.<sup>184</sup> For instance, in the locality of Santa Lucía, fifteen municipal employees (with both permanent and temporal contracts) were hired to drive a single truck that did not run during the last two years due to the lack of tires. Moreover, in the small town of Tala, three employees were hired as "elevator operators" in a municipal office that lacked any type of elevator. In Artigas, the municipality also draws on temporal fifteen-day hiring (popularly known as *quincenas*) alternating between different supporter "families" in order to provide for their constituents without completely overloading the system. Although important in reproducing electoral support in depressed social contexts in which state employment becomes one of the only survival sources available, these practices are less effective in areas with higher levels of socioeconomic development and civil society organization. In this respect, the case of the city of Bella Unión, a more dynamic industrial pole in which private companies and productive cooperatives used to industrially process sugar cane and other agricultural products, provides an example of the limits of those electoral strategies. Situated within the municipality of Artigas, that city has shown a distinctive electoral behavior characterized by a greater strength of the opposition (both Blanco and FA) and greater levels of competition. In turn, the metropolitan areas of Canelones present a similar electoral behavior to the neighboring Montevideo and a greater orientation towards programmatic-linking. Furthermore, the comparison

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<sup>183</sup>Interviews with council members Omar Alvez (FA) and Raúl Jiménez (Blanco Party), Artigas (2003).

<sup>184</sup>Based on a personal conversation with Martín Less 2005.

between Paysandú (another industrial pole in the country) and Salto (a municipality in which the service sector has gained increasing centrality due to the development of tourism) on the one hand, and Artigas and the interior localities of Canelones on the other, provides further support for the claim. It is worth noting that the economic crisis of 2001-2003 influenced the irrationality of both municipalities' economic management, which in turn contributed to the historical defeat of incumbents. In the case of Hackenbruck, the electoral decline of the Colorado Party (beyond national trends) and the economic breakdown of the municipality also relates to the open confrontation between the Mayor and the inhabitants of the metropolitan Ciudad de la Costa caused by the Mayors' refusal to invest resources to improve the basic infrastructure of that area, which was followed by neighbors' decision to quit paying municipal taxes. Although the sample is small, it is worth noting that both of these municipalities (together with that of Salto) were administered by the Foro Batllista. Both municipalities show the greatest number of municipal employees per capita and the greatest levels of fiscal deficit in the sample (Michelin 1999).

Third, it is possible to claim that non-programmatic linkages in Uruguay have incrementally moved from a system in which state patronage and pensions were central to one in which clientelistic relations predominate, with political brokers exchanging specific favors for votes. Military and Police recruitment (in which congress-members regularly extract positions from the corresponding Ministries), temporal contracting in the central state apparatus, and the systems of municipal patronage are general exceptions to that trend.

Fourth, with the increasing restriction regarding traditionally exchanged goods in clientelistic deals, a change is observed in the type of political favors offered by patrons. Although some "classics" endure (e.g. distribution of construction materials, bureaucratic brokerage in state agencies to obtain specific documentation, individual tax breaks, housing, state-bank loans, construction authorizations, rural road infrastructure, and connections to sewage and potable water) in a context of great fiscal restrictions and pressing social demands new types of clientelistic goods have emerged: food packages, soup-kitchen services administered by partisan brokers, free legal

consulting (usually preparing paperwork or providing information on the adequate bureaucratic or administrative way of obtaining documents, etc.), medical and dental revisions, brokerage involving private sector enterprises (ranging from employment posts to the provision of free bus tickets to urban centers, equipment for schools, or the provision of free lunches to a school delegation from the district), state contracts and concessions, and (*de jure* or *de facto*) tax breaks

Fifth, the goods currently exchanged in non-programmatic linkages are less durable in comparison to traditional ones, like public employment or pensions. This translates into a weaker political adhesion on the basis of non-programmatic linking and an also weaker capacity of patrons in over-sighting the implicit contract in the clientelistic pact. Although both patrons and clients usually display a low level of satisfaction regarding the current electoral return (according to one interviewee from a traditional party an approximate 7 to 1 rate exists between favors made and votes obtained) and tangible benefits obtained in exchange of vote promises, patrons find difficulty in successfully developing higher level interest aggregation strategies in the poorest sectors of society.<sup>185</sup> The provision of public goods at the neighborhood or local level (constituency service) is a partial exception in this regard, as they have also gained salience in poor areas of the country. For instance, they entail the development of regularization plans for shanty-town settlements, the connection of public utilities in irregular settlements, the installation of primary-attention health clinics, and successful lobby to install nutritional services and schools in those areas. The operation of FA in the periphery of Montevideo is at least partially based on this type of provision.

Sixth, the concentration of traditional individual clientelism at the municipal level correlates with the strengthening of Mayors, which have progressively gained a hegemonic role as the primary political figures in the district. The existence of an “automatic majority” in the legislative branch at the municipal level (as elected Mayors are automatically provided with the majority of the Municipal Council) reinforces the personalization of electoral politics at this level, promoting important incumbency advantages for Mayors. For instance, between 1984 and 2000,

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<sup>185</sup>Personal interview with Domingo Ramos and Hubaré Aliano (2003).

65% of Mayors attempting reelection were successful. The Blanco Party (76%) and FA (100%, but only in Montevideo) present the highest success rates, with the Colorado party successfully reelecting 44% of incumbents. Meanwhile, 53% of former Mayors attempting non-consecutive reelection also succeed. This time, the Colorado Party (57%) shows a greater level of success *vis-à-vis* the Blanco Party (44%), which can tentatively be explained by the relatively higher levels of internal discipline existing in the former at the municipal level.<sup>186</sup> In this respect, whereas important Colorado leaders are still able to keep their leadership positions even if they abandon office (the cases of Hackenbruck in Canelones and Malaquina in Salto), in the Blanco Party it is more usual to observe that (usually low profile) close collaborators of the Mayor who were appointed when the incumbent faced the prohibition of pursuing two consecutive reelections then sought to develop their own electoral movement competing in future elections with their previous “political father” (the cases of Da Rosa in Tacuarembó, Lamas in Paysandú, and Cerdeña in San José are concrete instances). Indeed, both in Tacuarembó and San José, the 2000 election was polarized between two candidates (the current Mayor and the former) pertaining to the Blanco Party, with Colorado and FA (strategic) voters and significant Colorado district leaders (openly in San José and covertly in Tacuarembó) supporting one candidacy or the other in exchange for later participation in the municipal government.<sup>187</sup> Such partisan crossings at the local level parallel those observed in Chilean municipalities. Moreover, in the context of relatively low levels of electoral competition in the district, municipal governments tend to evolve towards a neo-feudal type of political leadership. Contrastingly, congress-members have lost centrality in the provision

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<sup>186</sup>These figures were computed on the basis of information presented by Magri (2000), considering the universe of Uruguayan municipalities. pp. 167-168.

<sup>187</sup>This was possible due to the separation in 1996 of municipal and national elections. As shown in Table 10.1, in 2000, FA was the party that suffered the most from this separation, given its historical weakness in the interior of the country. Furthermore, FA’s statutory banning of multiple municipal candidacies hindered the party’s chances of presenting a diverse menu as the one offered by both traditional parties which were allowed to present two or three municipal candidates (in the latter case, resorting to a constitutional interpretation of the electoral law). In 2004, FA abandoned this tradition and filled multiples candidacies, particularly in competitive districts (not in Montevideo where the party is hegemonic and to a lesser extent in districts where electoral success was not likely).

of goods through non-programmatic linkages given their declining capacity to extract resources from the central apparatus. Meanwhile, the executive directors of public utility enterprises that had the capacity to invest directly in improving the infrastructure in their home-districts were able to foster their political careers.

As in Chile, the transformation of the traditional pattern of non-programmatic exchanges between parties and voters has important implications for internal party-politics and partisan organizations. In this case, the constitutional reform of 1996 also had an important impact on this regard. The next section, briefly explores such implications.

### Some Implications and Overarching Trends

#### *Towards National-Local dealignment?*

Although more incipient and less clearly than in the Chilean case, a trend towards the de-nationalization of elections was observed in Uruguay, particularly in 1999-2000, with local electoral contests presenting diverging trends from national elections in some districts. Specifically, whereas the Blanco and Colorado parties benefited from such trend, the FA lost some of the electoral support it received in the presidential election (Guerrini 2000; Magri 2000). This can be explained by the separation of national and local elections, the consolidation of strong local leaderships, and the progressive popular disenchantment with national ones. In this context, Mayors gained autonomy and were better able to decide whether or not it was convenient for them to “put their apparatuses at play” for the national election. This trend was strengthened by the constitutional provision that established unique presidential candidates for every party contesting the election. In cases where supporting a national presidential candidacy seemed openly inconvenient to a local leader given the presidential candidate’s low likelihood of winning office and the Mayor’s alignment with a different fraction from the one that had won the primary (and presidential nomination) of their party (e.g. the case of Larrañaga in Paysandú, Da Rosa in Tacuarembó, or Cerdeña in San José), Mayors did not decisively help national leaders in their

campaigns. After the first round, covert negotiations between local and national activists of both traditional parties also took place. For instance, in San José, Juan Ciruchí a former and extremely popular *herrerista* mayor with a great personal following in the district exchanged his support for the candidacy of Colorado Jorge Batlle in the presidential runoff for Lista 15 support in his electoral battle against his former Municipal Secretary and incumbent Mayor: Cerdeña.<sup>188</sup>

In 2005 however, likely following the national wave favoring FA, the levels of national local divergence were lower, granting the left eight Mayoralties (five previously held by the Blanco Party and three corresponding to the Colorado one), with first time electoral victories in municipal contests outside Montevideo. In turn, while the Colorado Party was only able to win (maintain) one Mayoralty, the Blanco Party obtained ten.

### *Patterns of Local Governance in Uruguayan Municipalities*


Although Uruguayan Mayors are more dependent on national transfers than their Chilean counterparts, the political strengthening of Mayors *vis-à-vis* national leaders have provided the former significant political leverage. Apparently, during the post-transition to democracy this translated into growing budgetary allocations at the municipal level (see Graph 10.1) and important levels of administrative “indulgency” and executive bailouts regarding municipal deficits (see Graph 2), debts with public enterprises and the pension system, and administrative irregularities. Nonetheless, as shown in Graph 10.2, important variance exists among different municipalities.

Regarding administrative irregularities and converging once again to the trends observed in Chile, oversight agencies have increasingly pointed to the occurrence of irregular contracting between private companies and some municipal governments (particularly those of Artigas and Canelones, within my sample). However, those agencies lack coercive capacity according to Uruguayan legislation. Due to “automatic majorities”, local legislatures also lack legal means to impeach Mayors.

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<sup>188</sup>Interviews with Juan Chiruchí, Miguel Zunino, and Jorge Cerdeña in San José (2003).

Graph 10.1:




Source: Filgueira et al (2002), Figure 3

Interestingly, both Artigas and Canelones, two municipalities in which patronage continues to be a source for non-programmatic linkages present the greater levels of fiscal deficit in the sample. San José, at the other extreme, is the Municipality that has the lowest rate of public employees per capita (Michelin 1999) and spends relatively less in wages (followed by the other two municipalities governed by the PB until 2005, Tacuarembó and Paysandú).

However, also in these cases, important incumbency advantages developed. In San José, one of the most consistent and durable local leaderships consolidated around Juan Chiruchí. This leadership is explained by a segmented strategy that combines the provision of public goods (including the lowest levels of municipal taxation in the country) particularly in the city of San José, a strategy of attracting (international) private investment to the municipality frequently communicating (and according to local sources, “exaggerating”) successful outcomes through public opinion appearances in the national media, and traditional *herrerista* politics (decentralized

clientelism and brokerage) in rural and poor areas of the district.<sup>189</sup> A similar strategy was traditionally applied in Salto by List 1 of the Foro Batllista, drawing in this place in a decentralized structure of more than a hundred neighborhood councils. Those councils were defined as “non-partisan”, but were directly sponsored by the Municipality which relied on them to survey popular demands and distribute material benefits to each (preeminently the most needed) neighborhood. At the same time, List 1 also had a permanently opened political club to receive individual demands, then canalized through the municipality, a pattern that is usually observed in virtually all municipal administrations.<sup>190</sup> Finally, in recent times, Mayor Malaquina consolidated as a national leader of the Foro Batllista, on the basis of public opinion appearances that highlighted the efficiency of the Municipal government of Salto *vis-à-vis* other municipalities.

**Graph 10.2:**



Source: Tribunal de Cuentas del Uruguay, Memoria Anual 2002

<sup>189</sup>Based on a series of interviews with district informants and political actors.

<sup>190</sup>Ibid.

The two-non *herrerista* Blanco Mayoralties included in the sample (Paysandú and Tacuarembó) present similar levels of linkage strategy segmentation on the part of incumbents, with strong Mayoral leaderships developing in both cases. On the one hand, the leadership style of Eber Da Rosa in Tacuarembó is similar to the one observed in the case of Chiruchí in San José. In this case, however, the Mayors' fraction is not hegemonic at the municipal level as those of Chiruchí in San José (*herrerismo*) and Paysandú's mayors (*Alianza Nacional*). Nonetheless, the intense electoral competition between two Blanco political machines (that of the Mayor and the one from *herrerismo* consolidated around the leadership of former Mayor Chiesa) provides the party a great electoral advantage regarding other contestants, as sympathizers of other parties, knowing that the outcome will depend on the internal dispute in the PB, vote strategically. On the other hand, although also similar to those leaderships, both of Paysandú's recent Mayors (Jorge Larrañaga and Diego Lamas) needed to confront greater levels of labor-union strength and conflict, especially with the sustained decay of industrial production witnessed in the district during the 1990s. Resulting from this trend, for instance, Paysandú is one of the districts that suffered the most from massive international emigration by the late 1990s (INE, 2005). Confronting this scenario and FA's growing strength, both Mayors opted by implanting a social-pact strategy, cooperating with unions, providing FA's activists some roles in the municipal executive, and vocally opposing the national government's economic policy. Although this strategy was efficient in 2000 to "cushion" FA's growth at the municipal level, it felt short in 2005, when the electoral development of the left had reached its peak. Combined with national trends and a district's particular characteristics, these governance styles have contributed to redefine the local party systems observed in each district.

*Ideological Families and the Re-Crafting of Local Party-Systems: A Tentative Characterization of District Types in Uruguay*

As shown in Table 10.3 above, Uruguayan districts still present divergent and evolving patterns of local partisan competition. In some districts, one party has become nearly predominant in the system (FA in Montevideo and likely Canelones, PB in San José and Tacuarembó). In others, traditionally hegemonic forces have lost strength yielding competitive scenarios (Artigas, Salto, and Paysandú), usually structured around a new bi-polar logic of competition between one traditional party (representing the traditional partisan family) and FA (Salto and Paysandú). Still, in other districts, the PB has been able to resist FA's sustained growth, maintaining and even consolidating its predominance at the expense of the Colorado Party, which has virtually disappeared in both districts (especially in local elections). In these cases, the PB has emerged as the only viable representative of the traditional party family. A brief comparative analysis of recent developments sheds light on the causal factors driving these three general trends.

The Colorado Party was traditionally hegemonic in Artigas and Salto, and to a lesser extent in Canelones (with the exception of 1989 when the national trend favoring the PB was too strong) and Montevideo (until 1989). Nonetheless, all these districts have recently witnessed significant alterations in their electoral patterns.

In Montevideo, FA became nearly a hegemonic party, obtaining both in congressional and local elections with around 60% of the vote. As the currently most resilient and significant stronghold of FA, the case of Montevideo is further discussed in the next chapter. In the interior, it suffices to indicate that this party has been especially able to grow in more economically developed localities (see relative GDP per capita in Table 1), in urban populations, and in social structures generally considered to have a greater presence of organized societal interests and/or a greater level of "public opinion vote" (Paysandú, Salto, the Ciudad de la Costa and other metropolitan areas of Canelones, and Bella Unión in Artigas).

In Canelones, the PC was able to stay in office until 2004. However, it did so in a context of increasing competitiveness (tighter at the congressional level) punctuated by FA's sustained electoral growth. In 2004 and 2005, the PC lost more than 20% in national elections and more than 35% in municipal ones and was finally defeated by FA which obtained, drawing on the internal (but "friendly") competition of two popular candidates a very sizable majority. The collapse of the PC in one of its traditional strongholds is explained both by national and local trends. Nationally, the decline of the party (resulting from increasing discontent with government after the economic crisis of 2001-2002) and the national consolidation of FA contribute to explain the electoral result observed in 2004-2005. Locally, the bankruptcy and inefficiency of the municipal government and the persisting accusations of widespread corruption by the opposition (including Lista 15 of the PC) and the by the municipal labor union have also contributed to this result.<sup>191</sup> Indeed, the Mayor of Canelones showed up as the worst evaluated politician in the country, with less than 5% of the population approving his government (RADAR, 2004). In Artigas, the decline of the PC relates to similar causes. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, both municipalities are the ones showing the greater levels of debt and the ones that relied more heavily on direct patronage (Table 1, % of expenditures spent on wages).

Though still able to maintain a greater municipal share in Salto than in the national elections, the PC also lost that district, in which it had also been nearly hegemonic in the past. In this case, economic problems were far less salient in the municipal government than in the cases of Artigas and Canelones (see Table 1) and the Mayor was generally considered as an efficient one.<sup>192</sup> The national trend favoring FA was locally catalyzed by the candidacy of a popular congress-member of that party and was further strengthened by two local factors. The economic crisis hindered the articulation of the very extensive network of neighborhood organizations sponsored by the municipality (and List 1 of Foro Batllista) in order to survey popular demands and

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<sup>191</sup>Personal interview with FA congress-member José Mahía.

<sup>192</sup>Zuasnábar 2004.

redistribute pork to every location.<sup>193</sup> Furthermore, the inability of a generally well-reputed Mayor to run for a second subsequent reelection also created succession problems within List 1 of Foro Batllista and weakened the support for the party in upper sectors of society.

Traditional (San José and Tacuarembó, since 1958) or recently consolidated (Paysandú, since 1989) Blanco strongholds have been more resistant to change than their Colorado counterparts. The combination of strong local leaderships drawing on a segmented strategy (brokerage and pork in poor and rural communities, public goods and public opinion in upper sectors of society) to generate and reproduce electoral support by municipal incumbents has proved decisive in reformatting partisan competition between Blanco incumbents and the left. Judging from the information presented in Table 1, these three administrations seem to have relied less than their Colorado counterparts on direct patronage and tend to present lower levels of municipal debt (especially in San José and Paysandú). Nonetheless, in Paysandú, a historical industrial pole in the country (currently depressed) with significant presence of labor unions, FA enjoyed better opportunities to grow and finally reached office in 2005.

*The weakening of traditional party brokerage networks vis-à-vis Frente Amplio's*

In the context of the structural limits in which traditional parties function today in Uruguay and unfolding from the preceding transformations in terms of the logics of political intermediation in the system, the articulation of traditional party's (fractional) apparatuses have also suffered important mutations. Although discontinuities are not as striking as those observed in Chile, some generic trends can be drawn.

On the one hand, in competitive contexts characterized by hegemonic leaderships at the local level and national leaders' incapacity to deliver the goods needed to sustain their local structures, partisan brokers aligned with an opposition fraction (from the other traditional party)

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<sup>193</sup>Personal interview with Daniel Sosa, Colorado local activist in Salto (2003).

have either shot-down their organizations (at least in the inter-electoral period) or crossed party-lines to strike deals with local authorities seeking access to such resources.

The Municipality has given us some things. Their political style is to use the Municipality to get our vote in the council, and we need to engage in that in order to get some stuff to maintain our organization. Other Blancos do not like that. They think we need to maintain a distance with the Colorados. I think we should do it, it is the way we can help people. If we do not win at the national level, if we do not have nothing at the municipal level, that's the only way we can help people and maintain our organization. (Juan Creceri, Blanco local activist, personal interview, 2003)

Both behaviors obviously hamper the articulation of traditional party territorial organizations. Furthermore, catalyzed by the incentives introduced by the temporal separation of municipal and national elections they have particularly hindered the Blancos and Colorados. Within each party, higher levels of brokers' discontent are found in those fractions that drew more heavily on extensive territorial networks: the *Herrerismo* and the *Foro Batllista*.

On the other hand, facing increasing constraints and growing pressure from local brokers, national leaders have tended to lose contact with part of their networks, prioritizing "relatively cheap" local leaders with access to their own financing sources.

National leaders are important in various facets. First, they provide economic resources. Let's look at the situation in this district. They confront a very strong PB, very consolidated at the district level, which will be very difficult to strip from that position. Then, within the PC what you need to look for are very popular candidates, with a great popular following. That's difficult here, because we lack those, the ones we had are gone. So, the national leaders of the PC look at Tacuarembó and find that situation. And they wonder who is going to pay for this? More now that campaigns cost a fortune, any senate or deputy list costs a lot. Here, they have a person with great economic power, with a political career, with a political group functioning, so the answer is easy. They bet everything to that person and support her. She does not create problems for them, they don't have to spend on her, and they already have a political base they can draw on. But now they are seeing that they will lose her congressional-seat, because the Colorado Party is declining even further as we and many other small groups are no longer working. So, they are coming back, some senators came to meet us to see how they could solve this problem. And we always came down to the same conclusion. We are willing to work, of course. We are more than willing to work. But, what are they willing to give us? As a result what you have is a political conflict between small groups that collect the necessary votes for the deputy to get elected and that congress-member and the national leaders. Those small groups are dispersed today, they don't have economic grounds for working, and they lack national support. In front of us you have congress-member Montaner, with great economic power, a continuous fieldwork throughout the district, because we recognize that she works a lot, and with power in Montevideo because if someone gives us something she goes screaming at them complaining about that. And they don't want to have to invest here, so they don't want problems and they continue to support her. It is a vicious circle from which we do not know how to get out. (Domingo Ramos, Colorado local activist, personal interview, 2003).

Similar arguments are found also in the discourse of Blanco activists confronting similar strategic situations. In this way, it is possible to claim that traditional parties have gone through a process of oligarchization, restricting the historically high levels of internal diversity that characterized each partisan offer and deterring wider participatory processes within parties. Concurrently, the partial elimination in 1996 of the DSV for the congressional lower-chamber (which did away with the “electoral cooperatives” in which district *sub-lemas* could accumulate votes by adding up those obtained by a great number of lists representing local *agrupaciones*) also introduced higher constraints at the time of keeping the classic “electoral *rastrillos*” (catch-all partisan offer) open.

Meanwhile, although also facing declining rates of organic participation in base committees (*Comités de Base*) which form the territorial structure of FA, the party still presents a significantly more developed and efficient decentralized network.

We have hundreds of committees and several zonal coordinators. Therefore, you can easily connect to the people in a direct and personal way. We are in contact with people in every neighborhood, even the poorest ones. I am talking about problematic neighborhoods, ghettos. And we go there and talk to the people. And the bond is ideological, because we talk about general things. Of course you have clientelism, too, but that's exceptional. That structure we have is highly profitable from an electoral point of view. So, it is not only about ideas, it is also about political efficiency. In the left, we do not have paid political activists. Many of my colleagues from the traditional parties have told me: ‘You do not know how much I envy your free labor.’ That's the importance of activist. But what happens is that to have activists, you need to have political leaders that communicate ideals, illusions. They need to know that people close to them, like them, is able to engage in the political arena and enjoy electoral victories or defeat. However, traditional leaders have concentrated things so much, and I am talking about Sanguinetti, Batlle, Lacalle, that they have discouraged their activists. They have extraordinarily well-prepared people but they don't let anyone speak out because they are fearful of losing their positions. (Carlos Pita, FA congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Therefore, the importance of symbolic and ideological factors for FA's activists and their frequent engagement in concrete opposition activities (like massive signature collections to push for a plebiscite or referendum) has provided the party with a “cheap” way of maintaining that structure mobilized, even in spite of lacking access to state resources with the exception of Montevideo. In the capital, the process of decentralization and the pursuit of focalized social policy at the local level (installing health centers and soup kitchens, financing cultural activities, etc.) has

created, at least as an externality, important degrees of synergy between FA's government and the party's electoral advance (this is further explained in the next chapter).<sup>194</sup> In general, coupled with the relative collapse of traditional party structures, the greater capacity of FA activism is one of the factors that explain its electoral growth particularly in sectors of the electorate that previously related to parties on the basis of clientelistic side-payments.

Our (Colorado) congress-members always make the same mistake. They come here (a Montevideo's shanty-town) four months before the election, promising things and giving away stuff. People say we steal and that we do not fulfill our promises, and I am afraid that is true. [...] Sometimes they send me a truck with stuff, and I just call the people and tell them to get it. But they are not here. [...] They come here wearing suits and the kids look at them like saying: 'I will rob you everything.' [...] Frente Amplio does it differently, they do not engage in clientelism. They are here all the time, they wear and talk to people like we talk everyday. They engage the youth in music, in parties, in painting walls, in sports. My own children go with them, because they tell me it is fun. They get together, they play the drum, they drink wine, and they have fun. And I let them go because I prefer that to have them smoking pot in the corner all day round (Elida López, Colorado local activist, personal interview, 2003).

I think in Montevideo, decentralization was crucial. [...] For the first time, particularly the people in the periphery felt that they had a voice, that their proposals could be heard. And that paid-off in electoral times. We don't know how much that effect will last because now you have important degrees of disenchantment because we need to improve their autonomy and capacity of doing things. Still, we have an ethical credit. People see that we have been there and even those more resistant to change and those more critical of us are beginning to say: 'These have not stolen yet. Let's try with these guys.' [...] even beyond administrative management, decentralization also provided the basis for organizing women groups, cultural activities, youth groups, which have a tremendous social richness. (Margarita Percovich, FA congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

In these zones (Montevideo's shanty-towns), decentralization means that you have opened a state office, a window through which people can take their problems and deal with the administration, in places where the state was inexistent before. (Daniel Gómez, Secretary of a Local Council in Montevideo, personal interview, 2003).

Nonetheless, as argued in the following chapter, FA's electoral tactics and strategy have also acquired in this process some traditional systemic features.

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<sup>194</sup>Decentralization in Montevideo basically entailed a process of bureaucratic de-concentration, with the creation of a decentralized network of communal centers, which nonetheless lack decisional capacity. The communal centers are run by a Secretary directly appointed by the Mayor and zonal councils that work as advisory bodies and are directly elected by the people. Especially in poor zones of the capital, local council members are the most active political brokers in the area (particularly in the traditional parties), usually seeking to push forth a solution for their constituents' interests through a very complicated bureaucratic structure. On the basis of a series of interviews with local-council members 2003. For a detailed analysis of decentralization in Montevideo, see Veneziano (2003).

## **CHAPTER XI**

### **SUCCESSFUL PARTISAN ADAPTATION IN URUGUAY: THE CASE OF FRENTE AMPLIO**

“This campaign (2004) is one of the easiest ones that we have had [...]. You just need to step in the corner and ask: ‘Who is responsible for this mess?’ Then you start distributing printed ballots in the street. [...] Today, FA is the hope of the poor, of business people, and of the rural sector.” Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro in Página 12, 13 September 2004.

#### **Introduction**

This chapter presents an overview of the main characteristics of the party that has recently won the presidential election in Uruguay (2004). This success is explained through the analysis of the party’s electoral tactics and strategies which are a case of partisan adaptation to the current competitive structure predominating in the Uruguayan system. The successful story of FA illustrates the extent to which party-voter linkages have changed in the country, and how FA has converged to systemic features. The most salient factors in this convergence include the development of extremely influential charismatic leaderships (especially those of Tabaré Vázquez and José Mujica), the progressive moderation and widening of the electoral offer of the party (including in 2005 multiple candidacies in the interior), and the increasing assumption of brokerage roles by the territorial activists of the party. In terms of novelties, the evolution of the party suggests that success can be interpreted as the result of a particular combination of the party’s programmatic linking with middle and upper social strata and a complex intertwining of personality-based, community service-oriented linkages, and localized efforts to raise the level of social organization and political awareness of lower class constituencies. Public discontent along with the concurrent erosion of the traditional mechanisms of non-programmatic linking has

significantly facilitated these tasks, granting the party a sizable and cross-sectional support base in 2004.

### Frente Amplio's Historical Trajectory

#### *Origin and historical development*

Frente Amplio (FA) was created in 1971 as a coalition of five factions that included Communists, Socialists, Christian-democrats, sectors splitting from both traditional parties, and leftist independents. The new party would compete with two catch-all organizations that had dominated Uruguayan politics since the 19<sup>TH</sup> century –in part as a result of the incentives introduced by electoral institutions centered on the Double-Simultaneous Vote mechanism.<sup>195</sup> Today, FA is the most resilient example of a leftist popular front in Latin America comprised of 16 factions, with 5 to 10 of them being relevant in the electoral arena during the post-transitional period (Piñeiro 2004). FA has also crafted broader electoral alliances with splinters from the traditional parties creating the Encuentro Progresista in 1994 and the Nueva Mayoría in 2004. The latter was functional in providing a way-back into the party for the Partido Por el Gobierno del Pueblo (99) faction, which in 1989 left FA to create the Nuevo Espacio after having obtained the largest plurality within the party in the election of 1984.

In terms of its historical social base, FA was created in the context of an institutionalized and pluralist party-system and in the presence of an already autonomous labor movement. Nonetheless, the influence of the Communist Party within the party led to the development of a “marxist-leninist” strategy in relation to labor (Moreira 2000), while the Socialist Party historically enjoyed a great deal of influence in the student movement and intellectual strata. Therefore, FA historically developed as a Leninist vanguard evolving into a labor mass-party, with a relatively weak capacity to encapsulate non-working class subordinated sectors that were co-opted through the clientelistic machines of Blancos and Colorados.

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<sup>195</sup>Combined with proportional representation the DSV stimulates the emergence of a small number of highly fractionalized parties or “catch-all electoral cooperatives.” See Morgenstern (2001).

The historical “brotherhood” of FA and the union movement is clearly manifested in the party’s adoption of the union peak-organization’s platform as the keystone of its historical programmatic bases (1971-1994), the continuous interaction between union and party leaders, and the use of the union movement as a transmission belt for the party. However, since the crisis of the Communist party in 1991, different factions of FA increasingly started to compete for the control of the labor base, which thus gained autonomy and gradually became to be seen as “radicalized” *vis-à-vis* a party that started to move to the center. Today, several factions of the party are represented and compete within the labor and student movements, which since the early 1990’s, grew progressively more autonomous breaking with the historical pattern set under the Communist hegemony. Although the historical “brotherhood” of the party and the labor movement remains, the emerging configuration yields a greater degree of uncertainty and carries a greater potential for conflict. Indeed, the harsh confrontation witnessed in 2002 and 2003 between the FA led municipal government of Montevideo and the municipal-employees’ union suggests that the labor movement might become a significant challenge for a government of FA (Doglio, Senatore, and Yaffé 2004). In spite of these recent developments, it is worth noting that the party still draws on extensive support from the organized labor movement. Yet, it also grew stronger precisely when the economic model in which labor was incorporated stagnated and collapsed.

### *Electoral Growth*

Since its creation in 1971 and especially after 1989, the FA gradually became the most voted party in the country (see Table 11.1). Several factors explain this process of gradual but sustained electoral growth.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> For a comprehensive reconstruction and complete bibliographical references see the works in Lanzaro (2004). See also Mallo and Moreira (2000).

**Table 11.1:**  
**Electoral Results 1942-1999 (in percent)**

	Colorado Party	Blanco Party	Catholics	Marxists	Frente Amplio	Nuevo Espacio	Others	Total
1942	57.2	34.5	4.3	4.1			0	100
1946	46.3	40.4	5.2	7.2			0.8	100
1950	52.3	38.3	4.4	4.4			0.6	100
1954	50.5	38.9	5.0	5.5			0	100
1958	37.7	49.7	3.7	6.2			2.7	100
1962	44.5	46.5	3.0	5.8			0.1	100
1966	49.3	40.3	3.0	6.6			0.7	100
1971	41.0	40.2			18.3		0.6	100
1984	30.3	35.0	2.4		21.3		0.0	100
1989	30.3	38.9			21.2	9.0	0.6	100
1994	32.3	31.2			30.6	5.2	0.7	100
1999	32.7	22.2	0.2		40.3	4.6		100
2004	10.4	34.3			50.7		2.5	100

Source: Buquet (2000) and Corte Electoral (2004).

On the supply-side, the party has consistently moderated its ideological position, appropriating the symbols of Batllismo while linking them to a social-democratic platform. On the same basis, the party articulated a consistent opposition to the reforms propelled by the traditional parties. Furthermore, the fifteen-year municipal government experience in Montevideo (extensively supported at the polls in 1995 and 1999) was instrumental in fostering FA's electoral growth at least in two fronts. On the one hand, it contributed to moderate both the image and platform of the party, providing at the same time, much needed governmental experience to its leaders. On the other hand, the administrative decentralization process implemented by the municipal government enabled the party to develop a "close to the people" administration. At least as an externality, the Community Zonal Centers created by this reform (CCZ) have contributed to set in place a decentralized and very powerful political machine; particularly in the poorest neighborhoods of the city.

Finally, the renovation of the party's top leadership through the appointment of the popular former Mayor of Montevideo, Tabaré Vázquez, as presidential candidate since 1994 and the pursuit

of electoral alliances with moderate political groups splitting from the Blanco Party in 1994 (FA-Encuentro Progresista) and the Nuevo Espacio, the Blanco Party, and the Colorado Party in 2004 (FA-Encuentro Progresista-Nueva Mayoría) have also contributed to moderation and electoral growth. These electoral alliances provided FA's leadership with greater autonomy from the traditional (and more ideological) rank and file by enabling Vázquez to bypass the complex institutions that regulate internal politics.<sup>197</sup> As in other cases<sup>198</sup> this greater level of autonomy and flexibility fostered a process of successful adaptation in the electoral arena. In other words, those alliances contributed to moderate the image and programmatic platform of the party and paved the way for a transition from a Marxist-Leninist mass-party to a professional-electoral party that became increasingly catch-all.

However, in spite of its comparatively high (and expanding) degrees of factionalization (Piñeiro and Yaffé 2004), FA was able to maintain relatively high levels of internal programmatic coherence (see e.g. Ruíz-Rodríguez 2003) by systematically opposing the government and defending Batllismo. Additionally, in spite of its increasing “electoral orientation”, the party managed to maintain a comparatively bigger and more vibrant militant apparatus in the streets than those of the traditional parties. That apparatus was usually engaged between elections in subsequent attempts to use direct democracy institutions to block the reformist legislation enacted by the Blanco and Colorado coalition.

On the demand side, FA's growth relates to the successful development of a strong partisan subculture, to demographics, and to public discontent with the state of affairs.

First, whereas the Blanco and Colorado identities are rooted in the civil wars of the 19<sup>TH</sup> century, the FA's “epic” is centered around popular opposition to the military regime, which focused its repression on the party's activists. FA's “appropriation” and reinterpretation of Batllismo and its “control” of virtually key vehicles of political socialization have also contributed

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<sup>197</sup>For a description of these institutions see Caetano et.al. (2003).

<sup>198</sup>See e.g. Kitschelt 1994 and Levitsky 2003.

to the process of creating a strong partisan subculture (Caetano and Rilla 1995; Lanzaro 1997). The relative strength of this emergent identity is indicated by the greater “reproduction rates” of “frente amplismo” given a much stronger trend to transmit partisan identity from parents to children than that registered for traditional parties, thus enabling the party to have a greater supporter retention rate than those of traditional parties (see Moreira 2000).

Second, the left finds its supporters among the younger generations, highly-educated strata, in the urban areas, among the active population, and in the more dynamic economic areas of the country (Moreira 2000). With the partial exception of age (as the Uruguayan population is aging rapidly) the net demographic trends in the country contribute to the “inertial” growth of FA’s constituency. Besides, the age exception is neutralized by the party’s greater capacity to reproduce and retain supporters.

Finally, the party has also benefited extensively from social discontent with the traditional parties’ governments and policies. Particularly in recent times, the economic crisis has had a direct and an indirect impact on electoral behavior. On the one hand, discontented voters have become alienated from governing parties as a result of economic decay. Although this process reflects a slow historical trend that began in the mid-1950s when Uruguayans started to seek change by switching between factions of the traditional parties leading to significant alternation between those parties and their most prominent internal currents, the crisis of 2001-2002 contributed to catalyze it. On the other hand, the fiscal crisis of the Uruguayan state has substantially hindered the ability of both traditional political parties to feed their political machines. As a result, voters, as well as intermediate activists and even some fraction leaders who then decided to join FA, have become alienated from both parties. This has contributed to “liberate” vast sectors of the population from traditional clientelistic pacts, given patron’s inability to deliver private goods to their constituencies and local leaders.

This complex historical trajectory explains the gradual but sustained growth of FA’s support base (from 18.3% in 1971 to 50.7% in 2004) in the context of an institutionalized two-party

system. Today and in the aftermath of liberalizing reforms, a factionalized FA confronts the challenge of representing an increasingly fragmented constituency, while articulating a viable alternative to neoliberalism.

#### Electoral Tactics and Growth of the New Electoral Constituency of the Left

As a result of the electoral trajectory described above, FA currently gathers significant electoral support in middle and upper strata that were attracted to the party as a result of their discontent with both traditional parties. The FA has also grown extensively among informal sector workers, while simultaneously continuing to support ties with its historical constituency. In this section, I present some overarching features of the electoral tactic of the party and those of the two most successful factions in the new electoral constituency of the left: Asamblea Uruguay (AU) and the Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP).

From a tactical point of view, three overarching features explain FA's recent electoral growth. First, FA has progressively adopted more flexible electoral tactics abandoning traditional Marxist-Leninist schemes and adopting some systemic characteristics of Uruguayan parties.

Second, the party has been increasingly able to develop national (and local) leaders with a moderate profile and with the capacity to expand the electoral offer of the party (internally competing and cooperating among themselves) to the center without alienating traditional leftist voters. Today, the most prominent leaders are Tabaré Vázquez, Danilo Astori (AU), Mariano Arana (Vertiente Artiguista), and José Mujica (MPP).<sup>199</sup>

Third, diverging from the traditional parties and in spite of the decreasing levels of militancy in the FA's rank and file, the party still has a broader and more active militant apparatus, which has been continuously mobilized around the subsequent direct democracy initiatives (first on Human Rights and then on subsequent state reform attempts) and participation in the periodic activities of political committees, which are efficiently distributed in an encompassing territorial

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<sup>199</sup>See Zuasnábar 2004.

structure. Importantly, this apparatus is composed of “locals” in every town and neighborhood. In Montevideo, and particularly in the poorest districts, this structure is synergized with the operation of Municipal Government’s CZC through which the decentralization process was implemented. In these sectors of the population, the CZCs replicate the way in which municipal governments of Blancos and Colorados function in the interior, as they became privileged centers of intermediation (usually the only available to the population in the district) between the state apparatus, political leaders, and citizens. At least as an externality of the decentralization process, the creation of this political structure has been instrumental both in moderating the image of the party and in providing the opportunity to resolve people’s problems while channelling discontent by establishing linkages between the current situation and the options pursued by the traditional parties in office. Significantly, this political structure was developed at the same time that the clientelistic apparatuses of both traditional parties atrophied as a result of the economic crisis.

In the words of a Colorado Congress-member:

I worked a lot in the periphery, in the poor neighborhoods. There, we focused on social actions. Specifically, we set up primary health care clinics and soup-kitchens and worked to improve security. We did this alone and also with the help of some local NGOs. However, when the election came I realized that my work did not exactly coincide with my votes. Indeed, I had more votes in places I had never been than in the periphery. Therefore, I realized that today the Colorado vote in Montevideo is primarily a public opinion vote, not what is usually called a “clientelistic” vote. The sectors that we used to relate with on those bases are now voting for FA. Today we have lost our base organizations, we only have now a traditional but intermittent organization that gets quickly mobilized during election times [...] In contrast, FA has a great activist militancy which is much cheaper to maintain. (Ronald Pais, Colorado congress-member, personal interview, 2003).

Therefore, whereas FA was able to strengthen its territorial structure by complementing symbolic and ideological mobilization with the provision of public and private goods at the local level to former constituents of the traditional parties, those parties have increasingly lost access to state resources to feed their patronage networks. Furthermore, as a result of decreasing resources, both parties (and especially the Colorados) have increasingly suffered a process of “oligarchization”, hindering the renovation of party leadership. In other words, the fiscal crisis of the state reduced the room for lubricating extensive patronage machines. This phenomenon also

prompted party leaders to ally with economically powerful caudillos that were able to provide financial resources for campaign activities. However, this also weakened the capacity of traditional parties to maintain active partisan apparatuses and extensive and internally diverse caudillo networks. Conversely, leadership diversity and moderation have provided FA increasing opportunities to configure a catch-all coalition capable of benefiting the most from public discontent.

In this general context, AU and the MPP can be identified as the two factions that had made the greatest inroads within the new constituency of the Uruguayan left.

#### *Asamblea Uruguay's organization and electoral tactic*

The tactic of AU is structured around the figure of its leader Danilo Astori, who contested the 1999 primary with Vázquez and who has recently been appointed as the Finance Minister of FA's government. Astori has been consensually characterized as a moderate economist who has aligned against the rest of FA in key issues such as the Constitutional Reform of 1996 and the recent plebiscite on the association of the Uruguayan oil company with the private sector (2003). Although these moderate positions generated a great deal of conflict with Astori's FA colleagues, they have also consolidated his leadership, particularly among the country's high and middle strata who had previously voted for the traditional parties and are now switching sides to join FA. In a nutshell, Astori has contributed to reduce the "costs of entry" to FA for previous supporters of the traditional parties seduced by a classical "third-way" platform frequently exposed in national media.

Additionally, particularly in the interior of the country, AU has developed a network of local leaders (usually physicians, veterinarians, and school teachers) who operate in a similar way as local referents of the traditional parties, articulating problem-solving networks for particularistic needs.

We had to revise many traditional conceptions of the left. We have learned a lot from the traditional parties and we are currently doing things that we used to underrate. We now have a structure of local leaders, each one of them *caudillo* in his place, working with a team of lawyers, physicians, and so forth, trying to help people to solve their most immediate needs. (José Mahía, FA congressman, personal interview, 2003).

According to a local *caudillo* of AU who ran as congressional candidate representing his fraction and who currently holds a position as a local council member, they “try to do everything” from helping someone to get a driver’s license to pressuring in the Food Institute (INDA) to contribute with a soup-kitchen and helping organize a housing cooperative. After “you do something, you have to show up and tell them you did it.” Finally, when the fact of being an opposition party hinders the articulation of a solution (e.g. when they “request a job or just money”), “[they] tell them: ‘Look, we know we cannot get you this. This can be resolved by these guys [Colorado local officials] who are the ones in control. So, go with them and then you just vote for us.’ We are clear about that.”<sup>200</sup> These local structures also allow AU to gather support from lower class voters, particularly in the interior of the country, where the revolutionary history of the MPP still scares some citizens.

#### *Movimiento de Participación Popular’s organization and electoral tactic*

The case of the MPP is more complex and reflects the tensions and contradictions that FA itself faces as a result of its own electoral growth. This is due to the consolidation of this sector as “fashionable” and as “entry gate” for new voters from all social strata to FA. The characteristics of these new electoral supporters, however, contrast sharply with those of MPP founders and current “hardliner” militants who carry the heritage of the MLN-Tupamaros. Indeed, the MPP has already suffered a fracture with the splinter of the Corriente de Izquierda, a radical group also originating in the MLN and the 26 de Marzo (the fraction that originally constituted the “legal arm” of the MLN within FA). Even the self-critique that MPP’s leaders propose stresses the difficulty in abandoning

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<sup>200</sup>Personal Interview with Artigas Reina, AU’s local activist in Artigas (2002).

practices that are extremely efficient in gathering electoral support but which contradict the doctrine of the organization and might eventually backfire in the medium and long run.<sup>201</sup>

The doctrine and strategy of the MPP can be sketched around four basic notions:

First, the fraction is organized around a “bottom-up” conception inspired in the tradition of the MLN, considering popular participation and organization as the fundamental building block of political action. According to this notion, “winning elections is not winning power, because power is constructed from below.”<sup>202</sup>

Second, the organization is a “movement”, without an organic partisan structure. Different organizational manifestations ranging from NGOs and high-quality research institutes (to help in devising policy alternatives and providing technically skilled cadres) to rural unionization experiences, from the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros to the Blanco and Colorado columns converge and interact in this heterogeneous movement.

Third, given the social structure of contemporary Uruguay, the MPP consciously pursues a cross-class strategy as opposed to a classical Leninist approach limited to the working-class.

Finally, in tactical terms, the MPP is extremely pragmatic and open. Although this is compatible with the strategic vision and with the “movementist” organization, this pragmatism does not always help to construct power from below. The justification for this tactic is the need to help the FA to get into office in 2005, in order to push for a much needed change. In the words of José Mujica, the most prominent figure of the MPP: “If necessary to grasp power, I would hug a snake.”<sup>203</sup>

Tensions and contradictions arise when this doctrine is compared with evidence on the causes of MPPs recent consolidation as the most important fraction of FA. Without a doubt, the fundamental reason for the MPP’s success is the consolidation of the charismatic leadership of José

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<sup>201</sup>Personal Interviews with Nora Castro (2002) and Ernesto Agazzi (2002), Congress-members of the MPP.

<sup>202</sup>Personal Interview with Ernesto Agazzi (2002).

<sup>203</sup>Radio El Espectador, March 3, 2004.

Mujica. Indeed, according to a recent public opinion poll, 70% of the supporters of the MPP are strictly tied to the leadership of Mujica and only 9% of current MPP identifiers would continue to vote for this faction if Mujica left.<sup>204</sup> Today for instance, poor people visit his office to “ask for the blessing of this secular priest”, youngsters “see him as a grandfather” and “people from the countryside, as well as union leaders” as one of their own.<sup>205</sup> In general, supporters and (even) opponents recognize a series of qualities that explain Mujica’s astonishing popularity.

First, “he speaks clearly, like common people, in basic Spanish” and “he is able to interpret people’s feelings.”<sup>206</sup> Second, he is “outstanding in terms of his austerity, his social and political commitment, and his moral convictions”, “has risked his life [as a member of the guerrilla and as a ransom political prisoner of the military] to pursue his ideals”, and in spite of being a Senator, “he lives like the poor.”<sup>207</sup> The interviews with MPP leaders and activists plainly confirm the centrality of Mujica’s leadership in fostering the movement’s flashing popularity. For this same reason, the political direction of the MPP has mixed emotions on the “Mujica phenomenon.” On the one hand, his leadership has brought people to the movement who would not have arrived otherwise. On the other hand, popular adherence to Mujica’s charismatic leadership contradicts the doctrine of the MPP. Therefore, whereas some MPP leaders consider Mujica’s leadership “a necessary evil” and a “double-edged sword”, others see the arrival of new voters as an opportunity to start developing a more consistent political organization by trying to modify “political cultures” inherited from a clientelistic past.<sup>208</sup> In this context, the arrival of unemployed workers with a history of union militancy in Montevideo’s expanding shanty-towns is also seen as an opportunity to contribute to articulate and organize lower classes.

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<sup>204</sup>See *Crónicas* 03-05-2004.

<sup>205</sup>Personal Interviews with Congress-Members of the MPP.

<sup>206</sup>Personal Interview with a group of MPP supporters in Bella Unión 2002.

<sup>207</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>208</sup>Personal Interviews with Congress-Members and leaders of the MPP.

Moreover, Mujica's leadership is sustained with a continuous presence on the national media, as well as an extensive network of local radio stations that the MPP has put together. This network has been essential in reaching the interior and the countryside, where a significant fraction of the emerging MPP constituency resides. However, these radio addresses are accompanied in every community with very significant activity by local activists of the MPP. Today, the territorial structure of the MPP and the number of activists continuously outnumber those of other FA fractions virtually in every community or social organization.<sup>209</sup> Complementarily, drawing on his popularity, Mujica and other leaders of the MPP continuously tour the country, holding "mateadas" (public gatherings to share a mate drink and talk about current social and political issues) in every locality, contributing to strengthen popular support for the movement. Attendance at "mateadas" ranges from 5 to 10 people in small villages to 2000 or more people in public squares in Montevideo.

Programmatically, the MPP has focused on the idea of creating a "productive country" articulated around agricultural exports (supporting a significant modernization and technological revolution in the sector) and industrialization. As a symbol of its commitment to with the productive country, the MPP has recently launched its electoral campaign in an empty building that was home to an important industry in a prototypical working class neighborhood of Montevideo: La Teja.

Another key element explaining MPPs electoral growth is the pursuit of broad alliances with other sectors of the left and more importantly, with splinters from both traditional parties. In this context, the MPP has recently created the Espacio 609, formed by a Blanco and a Colorado "column."<sup>210</sup> These "columns" were not directly integrated into the MPP, but work within the

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<sup>209</sup>Personal Interviews with Congress-Members and activists of the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Vertiente Artiguista, and Asamblea Uruguay (2002).

<sup>210</sup>A "column" is similar to the "agrupaciones" which are prototypical of traditional parties and can be seen as a group within a faction that usually presents independent lists to the lower-chamber and local elections. In

movement as autonomous political organizations formed by splinters from both traditional parties. This political space seeks to provide a “home” for those (including traditional parties’ caudillos) that were discontent with the traditional parties and, attracted by Mujica’s leadership, have decided to join the train. The columns provide a space in which their political traditions and modes of operation are respected and in which the old traditions of Blancos and Colorados are reinterpreted. As one congress-member of the MPP explained:

They [the traditional caudillos who entered the columns] have a different way of doing politics. They go door to door talking about the family, personal stuff, and then, very timidly, they say something about politics and ask for the vote. And we cannot ask them to change all of a sudden [...] We usually have someone acting as a bridge [a traditional caudillo that had decided to join the column] and then we go and we try, very slowly, to talk to them. We reach the Blancos with a “ruralist” and “Artiguist” discourse. And they also like our rebellious past as “Tupamaros”, because that is the root of Blanco identity (in XIX century revolutions against Colorado governments). Meanwhile, we reach the Colorados talking about the old Battle. However, if you tell them about Marx and Lenin, forget it. You are done. But, we have the common heritage of a republican and atheist society in which public education and civic and social rights are sacred, and that’s set in stone. That’s batllismo. And today FA’s platform is batllista, so they approach us without major prejudices. Don’t be fooled; it is not the same to have seven different discourses, than having several languages. What you have to look for is a way, something in common, to communicate with the people. And we can do that. Also, we don’t know yet how a FA government will be and that provides a ray of hope against the proven options (traditional parties). Finally, we have a different style. Others within FA incriminate people for having voted for the Colorados. They tell them: ‘You voted for them. Now, you have to endure it’. That’s not the way. You can give people the opportunity to acknowledge that they were mistaken in the past without being so rude. (Lucía Topolansky, MPP congress-member, personal interview, 2002).

Eloquently, the MPP not only grows pursuing this strategy, but also transforms itself. Indeed, like the FA, the logic of political competition in the country and the need to attract support from the increasingly fragmented and deprived popular sectors forces both to assume key systemic characteristics.

#### The recent transformation of the FA’s social base

This section presents evidence on the recent transformation of FA’s social base by replicating Mieres’ (1994) methodology to analyze the partisan and socio-demographic distribution of the vote in 26 Montevideo zones for the 1984 and 1989 elections. Although this methodological

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the case of the MPP the congressional list was unified but the columns still represent independent political groups that come together in the Espacio 609.

strategy entails the risk of incurring several concatenated ecological fallacies, it provides the best available estimation on the evolution of electoral behavior by geographical units. Unfortunately, data for the most recent election it is not yet available.

Table 11.2 presents the spearman correlation matrix corresponding to the level of FA vote share per zone in each election since 1984. Significant correlation coefficients were only obtained for the elections of 1984 and 1989. This fact indicates that there were two significant (and seemingly uncorrelated) disruptions on the patterns of voting behavior per zone in the elections of 1994 and 1999, after the first two terms in which the FA governed the capital city. Quite notably, in 1994 the party was able to capture traditional clientelistic strongholds of the Colorado party in Montevideo's periphery. This trend continued in 1999, but registered exponential growth of the FA in these sectors of the population. Likely as a result of the decentralization process implemented by the party and the territorial penetration of the periphery, the FA was able to set up a powerful political apparatus that became functional in "getting close to the people, accompanying its torments [as a result of governments' policies], and trying to help whenever possible [with decentralized social programs: e.g. health care and soup kitchens]."<sup>211</sup>

**Table 11.2:**  
**R-Spearman between FA's levels of supports across 26 electoral zones 1984-1999**

		1989	1994	1999
1984	Correlation	.905	.278	.325
	Sig.	.000	.188	.121
	N	24	24	24
1989	Correlation		.201	.095
	Sig.		.345	.658
	N		24	24
1994	Correlation			.116
	Sig.			.590
	N			24

Source: Constructed on the basis of Corte Electoral and Mieres (1994)

<sup>211</sup> Personal Interview with Margarita Percovich (2002).

To illustrate this fact, Table 11.3 presents a typology of FA's vote by an index of the socio-structural conditions and human capital of each zone.<sup>212</sup> The typology combines terciles of FA's vote in 1999 by zone with terciles of pace of FA's growth by zone in the 1984-1999 period. As seen in the table, 75% of the zones that rank in the lowest tercile of social-structural characteristics and human capital, are classified high both in terms of the level of vote for FA in 1999 and in terms of the pace of electoral change. Meanwhile, electoral evolution in the middle and upper sectors has been significantly more gradual.

**Table 11.3:**

**Type of FA vote Evolution by Social Structure Index**

Taxonomy of FA vote Evolution (Level in 1999/Rate of Growth 1984-1999)	Social Structure Index			Total
	Low	Medium	High	
Low/Low		37.5%	50.0%	29.2%
Low/Medium		12.5%		4.2%
Medium/Low			12.5%	4.2%
Medium/Medium	12.5%	37.5%	25.0%	25.0%
Medium/High			12.5%	4.2%
High/Medium	12.5%			4.2%
High/High	75.0%	12.5%		29.2%
N	8	8	8	24
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Constructed on the basis of Corte Electoral and Kaztman et al (1999).

A more detailed and diachronic analysis by zone confirms this interpretation. For example, in 1989 (as well as in 1984) the leftist party fared particularly well in the traditional union stronghold of La Teja and in middle and high social strata. However, in 1999 (following a trend inaugurated in 1995 after the first 5 years of FA's municipal government inauguration), the FA's support "exploded" in the periphery of the city, which is characterized by the lowest levels of human welfare. The growth rate is also particularly high in socially depressed zones. For instance,

<sup>212</sup> The index was created by computing a factor analysis on 19 socio-demographic variables reported by Kaztman (1999). All these variables are associated with a unique underlying dimension that I denominated "social-structural index", for which I created terciles.

whereas in Jacinto Vera (middle strata) and in Buceo (higher strata) the party grew from approximately 26% in 1984 to 53% in 1999, in Lezica and Mellilla (mid-low and lower strata) it went from 21% in 1984 to 71% in the same period. In short, the neighborhoods in which FA is currently gathering higher levels of support are those characterized both by their low levels of human development and their historical ties with the clientelistic base of the Colorado Party (especially its most rightist fractions) in Montevideo.

Finally, Table 11.4 presents the factional distribution of FA's vote. To simplify the analysis I only report the results for four significant fractions in 1999: the Communist Party (CP), the Socialist Party (SP), the MPP, and AU. While the first two factions represent traditional Marxist-Leninist elements of the party, the MPP and AU are relatively new factions, the former originating from the Tupamaro urban guerrilla movement of the 1960s and the latter from a pro-renovation splinter of the CP after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. As shown in the Table, the CP and the SP fare especially well in low and middle sectors. Additionally, already in 1999 the SP had significantly penetrated the lower sectors. This can be explained, at least in part, by the association of the increasingly popular Tabaré Vázquez with this particular fraction of FA. Meanwhile, the MPP had a cross-class constituency in 1999, performing relatively alike on each sector of the population. The MPP recently obtained the biggest plurality within FA in the 2004 presidential and legislative election (29.2% followed by AU with 17.6% and the SP with 14.8) and according to available survey analyses it is the most successful faction in gathering support from previous voters of the SP and from voters of both traditional parties. Furthermore, although the MPP has been able to maintain its cross-class recruitment, it has been especially able to gather support from the lower sectors of the population and from voters residing outside Montevideo and in the countryside, which also represent traditional strongholds of Blancos and Colorados. Finally, resulting from its ability to draw support in high and middle strata because of its moderate (reformist) stance, AU has the opposite distribution of votes than the one seen for both Marxist-Leninist factions.

**Table 11.4:**

**Internal distribution of votes in FA by social structure index (1999)**

Social Structure Index	1001 (CP)	90 (SP)	2121 (AU)	609 (MPP)
Low	7.82	29.51	16.88	17.20
Mid	6.45	27.59	19.47	17.24
High	4.96	22.89	22.37	17.00
Total	6.41	26.66	19.57	17.15

Cells represent the mean proportion of votes obtained by the fractions in the zones representing each social stratum. Source: Constructed on the basis of Corte Electoral and Kaztman et al (1999) .

**Electoral tactic, growth, and internal conflict**

As a corollary of their successful trajectory, both the MPP and FA as a whole have turned progressively more diverse. This has both organizational and ideological implications. For instance, a FA's activist lays out the organizational dilemma as follows:

It is reasonable that people realize that the left is the political future of this country. Therefore, people are coming from everywhere. And to win the election, that's fine. But what are we going to do afterwards? The militants that we have in the committees and who drive the internal politics of the party are totally worthless. They have been a militant for thirty years, everyday, going to the committee, collecting signatures, campaigning. They now want some compensation and you will need to give them some positions. And that will be a mess. And the old sympathizers that we have in society are all against Frente Amplio's current leadership, due to previous (internal) conflicts. Those people today are skeptical, unsure/ uneasy. However, you need those. They are your pillars in society and they have technical capacity. But if you take them, the others will be infuriated. The same applies for electoral alliances. You have people who are now merging with you under the Nueva Mayoría (NM), obviously seeking office. So, to gain at most an extra 3% of the electorate you are stripping your historical supporters of those positions and giving them away to a guy that the day before yesterday was your enemy." (David Rabinowitz, FA local activist, personal interview, 2003).

Programmatic differences are also present. For instance, in contrast to the great majority of FA and its labor base, Astori supported the association of strategic public enterprises with private capital, the promotion of macroeconomic policies to foster foreign investment, and an active engagement with international financial institutions to negotiate reforms on the basis of macroeconomic stability. In this context, the Minister of Finance has publicly opposed the statement issued by the President of the Pension System Administration (Banco de Previsión Social) on the need to reverse the pension reform passed in 1996, which partially privatize the "pay

as you go system” instituting individual accounts administered by private investment companies. Complementarily, while the SP General Secretary stated that FA needed to rollback capitalism and move towards socialism, José Mujica claimed that what Uruguay really needed was a “serious [uncorrupted] capitalism.”<sup>213</sup> At the same time, however, the MPP has consistently advocated a return to “economic protectionism” to strengthen the economy’s internal market.

Despite these differences, since the 2004 election FA has portrayed an image of internal unity, supporting Tabaré Vázquez’s decisions and nominations before his inauguration. Additionally, the most radical groups within FA (Corriente de Izquierda and 26 de Marzo) did not succeed in obtaining congressional seats and though influential within the party and in some labor-unions, the factions have been successfully excluded from the process of government formation. Programmatically, the mainstream factions of the party have at least agreed on the need to: a) strengthen the strategic role of the state, b) develop an Emergency Plan to attack the social crisis of the country, c) restore collective bargaining between business and labor in order to reinvigorate the industrial and agricultural sectors, d) lead a transparent and austere administration being strict on corruption, and e) promote more popular participation in government.

In the conclusion I use a comparative perspective to derive further implications from FA’s successful development in a context where the nature of programmatic and non-programmatic linkages in the country is in flux.

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<sup>213</sup>Búsqueda, 01-08-2004.

## CHAPTER XII

### CONCLUSION

In this chapter I present a summary of the main arguments and findings presented in this work. Additionally, I close by drawing out the broader methodological and substantive implications my argument holds for the quality of democracy and representation and pointing to potentially fruitful avenues of future research.

#### Main Arguments and Findings

##### *Theoretical Framework and General Expectations on Case Configurations*

In this section I present an overview of the main arguments and empirical evidence discussed in this work. On the basis of this overview, the next section attempts to make a more systematic comparison between the configurations and distribution of programmatic and non-programmatic party-voter linkages in Chile and Uruguay.

In Chapter 1 I identified two basic methodological limitations of extant research on political representation in Latin America: a) an exclusive focus on the national level (aggregate analyses by country) and b) an almost exclusive reliance either on cross-national survey analysis or qualitative single-case studies. The combination of these two features tends to obscure three crucial facts: 1) different sectors of the population within a country can have very different access to channels of representation, 2) different political parties can and do pursue widely divergent electoral and organizational strategies within each system, and 3) that the same political party, facing different strategic situations, can pursue divergent representational schemes for different sectors of the population. In this work I sought to address those shortcomings by focusing on the

comparative nature (and determinants) of programmatic-linkages between parties and their (socially heterogeneous) voters in Chile and Uruguay. These cases have been selected because they combine relatively similar (high) levels of party-system institutionalization in the region with divergent long-term patterns in terms of party-voter linkages in society, widely divergent political economies of market and institutional reforms (including decentralization), and diverse electoral rules both at the congressional and municipal levels. Moreover, on the basis of this case selection, my research design included comparative and cross-sectional analyses in both cases and across districts within and between cases. This allowed me to observe the relative existence of representation gaps between different social groups in society and political parties to test the influence of diverging socio-structural configurations (socioeconomic levels and scope and strength of organized interests groups in society) on the nature and distribution of partisan representation in society. Furthermore, I claimed that patterns of conjunctural causation needed to be applied in the analysis of party-voter linkages, “chemically” addressing the interactive effects of socio-structural variables, historical legacies and trajectories, institutional factors, and partisan strategies.

Regarding the comparative literature on programmatic party-voter linkages, I proposed to improve the measurement of multivariate programmatic issue-congruence on the basis of elite and mass surveys explicitly incorporating a dynamic (diachronic) view and the analysis of social heterogeneity (approximated through a segmented analysis by educational levels) regarding the cross-sectional distribution of programmatic linking. The application of correspondence analyses and a triangulation of factor analyses and proximity matrixes between different party constituents and their congressional representatives were also used to construct a multi-dimensional assessment of issue-congruence and its distribution across different educational cross-sections of the electorate. Additionally, I combined quantitative assessments on issue-congruence (as an empirical proxy for analyzing programmatic-linkages) with an in-depth analysis based on qualitative and ethnographic fieldwork in five Chilean congressional districts (comprising 12 municipalities) and seven

Uruguayan districts and municipalities. That fieldwork was especially helpful in identifying the current patterns and distribution of non-programmatic linkages in each system and the organizational features and tactic of the most successful party in each system.

In Chapter 2 I presented a theoretical classification of linkage types (developed around a comparative analysis of Latin American cases) and I proposed a set of five general and complementary hypotheses on the specific determinants of party-voter linkages. Below, I propose a brief discussion of the observed evolution of linkage types in Chile and Uruguay by evaluating the merits of each hypothesis on the basis of the empirical evidence that I have discussed in chapters 5 to 11. Chapter 2 also presented a stylized analytical framework to predict the level of programmatic linking (opposed to non-programmatic linking) based on the configuration of *opportunities* (democratic contestation and inclusion over the medium run, relative policy alternatives on salient policy-arenas), *capacities* (presence of strong and relatively autonomous civil society organizations), and the *potential for successful grievance mobilization* (on salient programmatic divides) in a given system. From there, I adapted the framework as a heuristic tool to analyze party-voter linkages at the local level.

For the Chilean case, this framework generated the expectation of historically high *opportunities* that were constrained with the resumption of democracy under the institutional structure created by the 1980 Constitution. Those restrictions, along with the weakening of organized societal groups resulting both from military repression and economic restructuring and political decentralization, yielded a decline in terms of the available capacities in the system. This was reinforced by leftist and Christian-Democratic leaders' progressive withdrawal from participation in communal and civil society organizations in the post-transition. In turn, though as an externality of highly constraining electoral rules (particularly in terms of the costs of entry that new parties face when confronting a collusive behavior of established parties conforming to stable coalitions) the institutionalization of Chile's party-system seems comparatively high, the penetration and strength of parties *in the electorate* decayed substantially. In this respect, it is worth

mentioning once again the high degree of popular alienation from politics observed today in the country. Finally, with the exception of a retrospective regime divide, *the potential for successful grievance mobilization* has declined in the system (both as a result of politicians' and parties' strategies and as an outcome of structural constraints). On the one hand, regarding socioeconomic and distributive conflicts, both the moderation of the left and the current restrictions of policy-making reduced the room for party-voter linkages on this basis. In this last respect, Pinochet's early and authoritarian dismantling of ISI and Chile's successful rates of economic growth trimmed down the potential for political mobilization on these grounds. This was especially true from 1990 until 1998, after which point an economic crisis reopened space for moderate partisan divergence vis-à-vis the "Chilean model." Meanwhile, whereas potentially important as an alternative basis for party-voter linkages in a society that has seen a strong religious cleavage in the past, the moral divide does not consistently align with the two partisan coalitions defined by the opposition between "pro-the Pinochet/authoritarian" (Alianza Por Chile) and "pro-democratic" (Concertación) camps. In short, although the presence of the DC within the Concertación and of the liberal sectors of RN within the Alianza affect policy-making in Congress and crystallize in tangible internal alignments within each camp, the moral divide still lacks the capacity to provide an alternative party-voter linkage source. This is aggravated by the social stratification of voter preferences observed almost in every party, in which lower classes are homogenously more conservative than their most educated co-partisans (Chapters 5 and 6).

In turn, I predicted that in Uruguay's post-transition to democracy *opportunities* were still high given the country's resumption of its long-term experience with democracy and partisan contestation, without facing formal policy-constraints. Yet, through the mid-1990s, policy-making was constrained *de facto* by surmounting levels of fiscal stress and external pressures to pursue significant economic reforms. Reticently, traditional parties embarked on timid attempts of institutional reforms facing the opposition of the left. The lack of substantial structural and institutional reforms during the military dictatorship also translated into socio-structural continuity

yielding the maintenance of capacities, both in terms of partisan institutionalization and penetration of the electorate and the organizational strength of societal interests. Indeed, in this last respect, it is possible to claim that the attempts of reforming the ISI model under a democratic regime that avoided the features of hyper-presidentialism that punctuated processes of reform elsewhere in the region, also strengthened interest groups representing ISI-beneficiaries. Those groups allied with FA and mobilized (usually drawing on direct democracy mechanisms) against reforms that were seen as fundamental challenges to the *batllista* socio-political matrix. Nonetheless, it is worth recalling that non-organized subordinated sectors of society usually paid the price of the corporatist pattern of adjustment observed since the mid-1995, suffering further downward mobility and a process of social fragmentation. Therefore, while upper and middle organized sectors of society organized and began linking to parties on programmatic grounds, lower and unorganized sectors continued to link to parties in traditional non-programmatic ways. Nonetheless, social discontent with economic deterioration and the decreasing capacity of both traditional parties to provide to those constituencies also opened the way for greater levels of interest aggregation in such social sectors. Finally, FA's gradual electoral advancement and its opposition role against coalitional Colorado and Blanco governments provided the basis for a fundamental realignment in the system which began to structure around a bi-polar logic of competition between a traditional party family and the left. The mobilization of distributive *grievances* motivated by structural reforms and the economic crisis provided the substantive programmatic contents for partisan competition in the system. In this way, while both the historically weak regime and moral divides continued to be marginal in the system, the also traditionally weak class divide gained strength with the programmatic alignments due to the competition of both partisan families on the state/market divide in the wake of ISI's final crisis.

Finally, chapter 2 also discussed the applicability of *critical juncture path-dependence* to understand the current nature of political representation in the region based on the analysis of political *cleavages* as originally conceived in Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) classic work. This

discussion concluded by favoring a *soft-path-dependent* approach focused on a more dynamic analysis of constant causes driving specific competitive configurations on salient *programmatic divides*. In other words, I have argued that given the nature of contemporary social structures in Latin America and the historical development of the region's party system, the analysis of party-voter linkages should allow for more dynamism than the one present in critical juncture accounts.

### *Programmatic Linkages in Chile: Historical Patterns and Post-Transitional Trends*

Chapter 3 presented a historical narrative on the long-term evolution of the Chilean party-system from a soft-path-dependent perspective. The narrative provides a detailed illustration of the long-term causal mechanisms that set the patterns of *opportunities*, *capacities*, and the *potential for successful grievance mobilization* that I had predicted for this case. The chapter also provides a basis for comparing the historical and pre-authoritarian configuration of the system to its current nature, and also to the ones observed in Uruguay. In this respect, it is necessary to highlight that Chile has historically been considered as the party-system in the region that best approximated a Western European system, combining relatively high levels of programmatic structuring and party competition around the religious/secular and class divides, with the presence of strong partisan subcultures in society, organized societal interests with strong bargaining capacity in Congress (given their organizational capacities and the presence of important rates of electoral competitiveness and turnover), and a system of center-periphery distribution of "pork" and patronage resources based on congressional bargaining, log-rolling, and parties' territorial strength. Historically, however, the system worked on a highly restrictive franchise and in the context of massive electoral fraud and clientelism (*co-hecho*) in the countryside, which allowed conservative sectors to protect their economic interest in congress, despite of the processes of economic modernization observed in other economic spheres. The pressure to socially and economically incorporate subordinated sectors increased the levels of socio-political polarization in the system during the 1960s and 1970s, that eventually gave way to a military coup against the Popular Union

led by Salvador Allende. The drastic economic and institutional reforms launched by Pinochet's authoritarian regime against the pro-ISI policies of the Frei and Allende administrations produced crucial economic and political discontinuities. First, economic power was heavily transferred from the state and from industrial settlements producing for the local market to financial and service sectors. Furthermore, large-landowners who were victims of land expropriations under the DC and Popular Union only partially recovered their lands, the rest of which was progressively bought by an entrepreneurial class that pursued agricultural modernization and provided the basis for the development of a new export sector for the economy. Although, hurt by these policies, traditional conservative groups still supported Pinochet who was seen as the one who saved Chile from socialism under Allende. Meanwhile, the popular sectors were heavily repressed by the Military regime and their interest organizations suffered extensively from such repression and from their members' exile and imprisonment. The new labor code implemented by the regime, as well as political decentralization and the increasing levels of socio-structural fragmentation, triggered by the social costs of economic reforms hindered the re-articulation of those interests groups in the aftermath of the transition to democracy. Indeed, while those societal organizations were fundamental in mobilizing against the dictatorship, they progressively faded away after the Concertación reached office in 1990. This was particularly important due to Concertación's progressive retraction from societal organization and mobilization at the base once it came to office in 1989.

Second, Pinochet's regime also introduced institutional guarantees to protect the enacted reforms through a highly disproportional electoral system (that systematically favored the coalition of minority parties: the Alianza por Chile), the appointment for life of senators directly designed by Pinochet, and supra-majority requirement for passing major pieces of legislation in congress. Together with the moderation and political learning of leftist leaders (who now begun to favor a "culture of consensus" to avoid the polarizing trends of the past) and the increasing legitimacy that the relatively high levels of economic growth granted the "economic model" consolidated during

Pinochet, those institutional anchors significantly constrained the room for policy divergence on the socioeconomic model (state-market divide).

In short, although representing a minority of the population, conservative sectors were able to protect their economic stakes in the context of the newly inaugurated system under the 1980 Constitution. Meanwhile, given its own organizational weakness and Concertación's new government role, the popular sectors were virtually excluded from the system of political representation (though increasingly becoming the target of focalized social policy) without challenging the stability of the post-authoritarian regime and that of the economic model. As a corollary of this evolution the state-market divide was predicted to become a weak basis for programmatic-linking between parties and voters and a source of discontent among popular sectors that supported leftist and Concertación's parties before 1973 and in 1989, and which progressively de-aligned or became alienated from those parties (and eventually, from politics) given Concertación's *continuista* policy-making. Conversely, as a legacy of the polarization and political confrontations that divided Chile in the past during the country's "revolutionary epoch," the regime divide was expected to continue splitting camps and structuring the political preferences of voters (especially those with higher levels of political socialization). Finally, although potentially very salient due to the historical strength of conservative groups in Chilean society and the presence of a secular left in the governing coalition, the activation of consistent programmatic-linking on the religious/secular divide is currently restricted given the positioning of the religious DC within Concertación and of the most liberal factions of RN within the Alianza.

In Chapters 5 and 6 I provided survey based evidence in order to test this set of expectations about the nature and societal distribution of programmatic-linkages in Chile and its evolution over time in the post-transitional period. In Chapter 5 I have shown that although the distribution of left-right identification suggested a great deal of continuity in the electorate, the percentage of independents and those who choose not to align in the left-right scale has significantly increased in the country. The comparison of Chilean "non-identifiers" to their

Uruguayan counterparts revealed the magnitude of this change in post-transitional Chile, where non-ideological identifiers fluctuated between 24% of survey respondents in 1997 to 45.5% of them in 2003. These figures are consistent with those available for electoral abstentions and blank and invalid voting and also with those reported by Segovia (2005) on the existence of a 40% of respondents that claim to be “independent” or refuse to identify with any political party. Indeed, this data is also consistent with the observation of increasing number of independent candidates (or those deflecting their partisan identification) in the districts. Performing cross-national and case specific confirmatory factor analyses, Chapter 5 also provided evidence on the distribution of partisan electorates and leaders on three potential competitive divides: regime, moral/religious values, and state/market. On the basis of factor scores I first computed correlations between each divide and the left-right scale, showing that at the electoral level the regime divide (followed by the moral one) was the one most highly correlated with left-right positioning. Meanwhile, the observed gaps between most- and least-educated voters were shown to be greater in the moral and state-market divides than in the regime divide, which seems to confirm the greater salience of the latter. In the last measure available (2000), the registered gap for the state-market divide is significantly greater than the ones corresponding to the other two factors. Finally, analyzing the distribution of partisan groups in each factor and predicting vote preferences (for the Concertación and the Alianza) on the basis of a set of logistic regressions, I have further shown that the Chilean system is still primarily structured around the regime divide. Furthermore, when educational cross-sections of the electorate are considered, the evidence confirms the existence of increasing levels of programmatic divergence within the electoral bases of Chilean parties, with lower classes favoring greater levels of state intervention and more educated voters and elites favoring market allocation (independently of partisan affiliation). This configuration is consistent with the expectations derived from the historical narrative presented in Chapter 3. Converging also with the expectations derived from my path-dependent historical analysis, I have also shown that from a comparative point of view (both at the elite and citizen levels), Chilean parties were on average more pro-

market, religious, and assigned lower levels of legitimacy to democracy than their Uruguayan cousins.

Chapter 6 also presented the evidence obtained in reference to issue-congruence in post-transitional Chile, seeking to complement the preliminary assessment presented in Chapter 5.

First, the evidence confirmed the centrality of the regime divide in structuring consistent party-voter linkages in Chile. Indeed, the regime divide was the one that obtained the highest issue-congruence score, with the state-market divide obtaining the second highest score and the moral divide obtaining the lowest one. This confirms the difficulty that Chilean parties face in establishing programmatic linkages on the latter divide, in spite of the correlation observed in the previous chapter between left-right self-placements and moral attitudes. From a diachronic perspective the evidence suggested that after a period of higher programmatic diffusion in the mid-1990s, the Chilean system seemed to have regained some structure. This translates into higher degrees of congruence regarding moral issues and those pertaining to the state-market divide. Nonetheless, it is necessary to stress that all the issues pertaining to the latter divide failed to produce simultaneously significantly different partisan positioning at the elite and voter levels. Concurrently, this is the divide for which the greatest gaps between different educational cross-sections of the electorate are observed. Meanwhile, the regime divide seems to have marginally lost salience but continues to show a high degree of partisan-placement congruence across all cross-sections of the electorate. The divergent results obtained for low-educated voters in different divides also imply that this sector of the citizenry can indeed relate programmatically to parties and do not just present “random” and rather unstructured political attitudes.

At the congressional-elite level, the greatest level of programmatic structure observed in recent times correlates to increasing polarization between the party with the most distinct programmatic profile at the right (the UDI) and the PS (at the left). Arguably, this outcome resulted from the re-polarization of the system triggered by the events taking place in Chile at that time (very prominently: the economic crisis and moderate de-legitimation of the economic model,

Pinochet's detention in London, the eruption of corruption scandals affecting Concertación's leaders, the consolidation of the UDI as the mainstream opposition party, and the "leftist switch" occurring within the Concertación with the nomination of Ricardo Lagos from the PS-PPD for the presidential election of 1999). Complementarily, I have also argued that the progressive withdrawal of a significant fraction of the electorate in Chile (arguably a less politically engaged and socialized group) could also have acted as a "purifying" mechanism through which those who continue to identify with parties and programmatic stances show greater levels of programmatic consistency, obscuring significant dealignment and alienation within the system at large.

Indeed, beyond the greater level of polarization witnessed between the elites of the UDI and the PS in the latter period, the system presents a centripetal pattern of competition, with voters from all parties collapsing towards the center of the programmatic spectrum and a lower degree of differentiation between voters from both electoral pacts. This observation was confirmed in the analysis of proximity matrixes which showed that both the elites of the UDI and the PS were the ones presenting the highest distance with their least-educated voters. Additionally, when all the components of the system were accounted for, all partisan groups of Chilean congressional representatives appeared closer to other elites and to the electoral bases of other parties than to the closest cross-section of their own voters. This finding suggests that in spite of the observed repolarization of the elite system in 1998-2000, the process of programmatic collapse has (at least for the moment) not receded. In short, the empirical analysis of programmatic linkages in Chile confirmed the general expectations derived from the configuration of opportunities, capacities, and the potential for successful grievance mobilization observed in the system as a result of its long-term historical evolution. In this respect it is important to highlight the socially segmented pattern observed in Chile in terms of the distribution of programmatic linkages in society. My evidence clearly shows that whereas elites and upper sectors of society still link programmatically to parties (at least in reference to a retrospective regime divide), lower sectors of society are not represented on such basis. This outcome correlates with the decreasing room for competition on the

state/market divide, the inconsistent alignment of parties and coalitions on moral issues, and the impressive levels of partisan and electoral alienation that the system currently shows.

### *Non-Programmatic Linkages in Post-Transitional Chile*

In Chapter 8 I drew on my qualitative fieldwork in seven Chilean districts to present a parallel analysis on the evolution and current configuration of non-programmatic linkages. The evidence I presented in that chapter points to a significant transformation punctuated by a dual configuration that combines programmatic-linking in the upper sectors of society and increasing levels of personalization (candidate-centered linkages, frequently deflecting partisan identities and affiliations), municipalization (a strengthening of Mayors vis-à-vis congress-members and the consolidation of municipal machines personally tied to incumbents and progressively detached from national leaders and parties), and mercantilization (increasing influence of paid activists and media; growing influence of private sector in providing resources for patronage, clientelism, and constituency-service at the local level) of non-programmatic linkages in the lower sectors of society. According to the observed configurations across districts I built three types of districts in which different patterns predominated.

The first type corresponded to higher-income municipalities in which programmatic-linking predominated and campaigns were fundamentally played on the media. The second and third types corresponded to medium, medium-low and low income municipalities, historically identified with the left, which differed in terms of their current degrees of social heterogeneity. The second type was less heterogeneous and presented lower levels of social welfare and higher amounts of social fragmentation. In this type, non-programmatic linking predominated and candidates from both partisan camps needed to engage in extensive patronage and clientelistic transactions in order to attract voters. For this reason, in spite of the leftist tradition of the districts, the UDI has been able to make some electoral inroads by fully engaging in this type of relationship with constituents, especially drawing on the presence of popular Mayors appointed by Pinochet

during the dictatorship. The third type, in turn, corresponded to municipalities that were historically similar to the ones pertaining to the second group. Nonetheless, in recent years, these municipalities have received an inflow of medium and medium-high income residents and have witnessed an important development of infrastructure and facilities. Moreover, they usually presented higher levels of interest group organization and mobilization (particularly La Florida). As a result, they displayed a combination of the patterns seen in both previous types, with a segment of the electorate voting on programmatic appeals (middle-high sectors) and middle-low and low social sectors engaging in non-programmatic linking with candidates competing on community-service and clientelistic side-payments. In short, the political configurations observed in this set of districts conforms to the currently observed distribution of political support across the socioeconomic ladder at the municipal level, with rightist candidates performing well in the upper and lower sectors and Concertación gathering support in middle strata (Altman 2004).

The transformations observed in this chapter resulted from a combination of the predominant patterns of programmatic-linking in the system with the effects of political decentralization, state reforms, and the weakening and segmentation of societal organizations oriented towards greater levels of interest aggregation. Furthermore, the increasing role of the media in providing visibility to individual candidates has also been decisive. These mutations have important implications at different analytic levels. Overall, they have helped to loosen nationally- and programmatically-oriented partisan organizations, turning parties into pragmatic and decentralized coalitions of office-seeking politicians. This does not mean that significant divisions do not exist among partisan elites from different parties, but it translates into a segmented popular access to political representation. Additionally, whereas before 1973 partisan networks articulated encompassing brokerage structures that linked center and periphery and were functional in reproducing organic partisan ties and popular loyalties, those networks have atomized today and parties have lost their central role as brokers and collective representation agents.

Local leaders in turn begun to rely on the private sector or municipal administrations to seek resources they can provide to their constituents. This has been accompanied by a growing influence of business interests in politics and by enhanced corruption and administrative irregularities at the local level. Parties have also been weakened as individual candidates compete for developing a personal career on the basis of their access to the media (in higher-income municipalities) or constituency-service and clientelism feed trough municipal machines, private donations and personal fortunes, and state-funded programs to which access is assigned on the basis of competitive processes. The increasing personalization of political linkages and the growing split between local and national political structures (resulting from state-reform and decentralization, in the context of declining potential for successful grievance mobilization to craft programmatic-linkages) accounts for that result.

#### *Partisan Adaptation in Chile: The Case of UDI*

Chapter 9 analyzes the case of the UDI, the political party that up to the most recent elections has shown the most successful adaptation to the emerging system of party competition in Chile, obtaining a significant upward trend in electoral support. It has done so by maintaining a firm grasp and expanding its share vis-à-vis RN in the traditional constituency of the right, while at the same time, capturing a significant share in Chile's poorest districts. According to the evidence presented in Chapter 9, the success of the party resides in the successful development of a *neopopulist* strategy combining the construction of a national leadership through the media and political marketing with the penetration at the local level on the basis of its greater capacity to recruit, organize, and provide for its activists and followers. Although initially financed through the use of state resources during Pinochet's regime, UDI's clientelistic networks turned to be increasingly financed by private contributions, given the party's privileged relationship with business interests and the media. Although the level of leadership strategic autonomy shown by the UDI was crucial in efficiently adapting to different regime and competitive conjunctures, since its

origins the party has been extremely disciplined and cohesive. This allowed the UDI to centralize and strategically allocate campaign resources in districts in which it had high chances of winning or maintaining office. Meanwhile, competing parties increasingly became “cooperatives” of office-seeking politicians, loosening cohesion and reducing their capacity to strategically coordinate electoral strategies. The UDI has been especially successful in a context in which several corruption scandals broke out involving Concertación’s incumbents and in the midst of the economic recession that hit the country in the late 1990s. In that conjuncture, the party benefits extensively from being the major opposition party, while commanding at the same time, the control of private resources to be invested in clientelistic politics. This strategy was also facilitated by the decreasing salience of programmatic-linkages for structuring party competition in the Chilean system and the increasing personalization and municipalization of electoral contests, brought about by state reform and decentralization, the ideological renovation of the Chilean left, and the impact on Concertación’s governments of the highly constraining institutional framework set in by Pinochet in the 1980 Constitution. At the local level, the UDI performed particularly well in wealthy districts ideologically and solidly aligned with the right and in poor districts in which its candidates ran a “successful” municipal administration under Pinochet, building efficient political machines that then became instrumental in contesting democratic elections. However, UDI’s success rate also depended on the presence of successful instances of “linkage-substitution” by Concertación candidates. When those candidates also adapted and started to compete on non-programmatic linkage strategies with their constituents, the UDI was substantially less successful at the local and congressional level. However, in every district, the candidacy of Lavín still managed to get more votes than expected from the party’s (and Alianza) district share, showing that personal allegiance to local and congressional candidates does not automatically translate into consistent voting at the national level.

As candidate-centered parties elsewhere, the UDI currently faces strong challenges from its competitors who benefited from the “overdosing” produced by the party’s excessive reliance on

Lavin's mass-media leadership and the erosion of his image after more than six years of continuous exposure opposing the most popular president in Chile's recorded history. As well, UDI's competitors have adapted to compete on a candidate-based presidential campaign.

In more abstract terms, the successful development of UDI illustrates the emergence of an explicit dual representational strategy implemented by extracting economic resources (in exchange for ideological representation) from their "vote-poor/resource-rich constituents" to get the vote of their "vote-rich/resource-poor constituents." This dual linkage strategy is consistent with the patterns of programmatic and non-programmatic linking observed in the system and translates into socially skewed access to political representation, eventually contributing to reinforce social inequalities.

#### *Programmatic Linkages in Uruguay: Historical Patterns and Post-Transitional Trends*

In Chapter 4 I presented a path-dependent characterization of the long-term evolution of programmatic linkages in Uruguay, to substantiate the predictions anticipated in Chapter 2 on the configuration of opportunities, capacities, and the potential for successful grievance mobilization in this case. Regarding the historical configuration of the case and its pre-authoritarian party-system it is important to stress that although parties and party fractions presented divergent ideological leanings, party-voter linkages were dominated by non-programmatic contents.

The lack of ethnic cleavages, the historical weakness of the Church and conservative forces in the country, and the rapid suffrage expansion that occurred at the turn of the century pushing dominant parties to rapidly incorporate mass electorates through the expansion of the state-apparatus (given the small size of the internal market and an economy based on low-labor intensive agriculture and commerce), the enactment of social legislation, and the creation of powerful clientelistic machines. These factors contribute to a concise explanation of the weakness of ideological mobilization in the system. Additionally, two strong partisan sub-cultures emanating from the "blood brotherhoods" created by the civil wars of the 19<sup>TH</sup> century also provided strong

partisan allegiances that extended through all social sectors in the country. Therefore, both traditional parties constituted cross-sections of society solidified around very resilient partisan subcultures and identities. Therefore, this case historically diverges from the Chilean one both in terms of the timing and type of incorporation of subordinated sectors, which in Uruguay were incorporated early but through non-ideological political mobilization.

A system of compromise emerged from this original configuration in which both traditional parties (and their fractions) shared access to state resources and competed by distributing patronage and clientelistic side-payments to their constituents across the social ladder. Meanwhile, hindered by the restrictive electoral institutions governing elections and also by the legitimacy acquired by the traditional system of compromise and its social outcomes, challenger parties did not succeed in making any significant electoral inroads in the system.

However, the decline of the export-sector, the incapacity to modernize agricultural production, and the expanding size of the state used as tacit unemployment insurance by both traditional parties, set the limits for the long-term viability of this project, which nonetheless, became nearly hegemonic in political discourse.

When the economic crisis hit after the end of the Korean War, discontent became the engine of change in the system. This triggered alternation first between party fractions of the Colorado Party, then between traditional parties. However, the very effects of increased partisan and fractional competition in the context of economic stagnation and the reduced room for state autonomy further increased the inertia within the system. In the context of decreasing living standards and growing popular discontent, the labor movement progressively gained autonomy from both traditional parties and through the 1960s different popular front attempts were implemented by mainstream leftist parties. Both processes converged in 1971 in the creation of Frente Amplio, a political coalition of Marxist-Leninist parties, Christian-Democratic fractions, and progressive splinters from the Blanco and Colorado. For the first time in the country's history, a

non-traditional party confronted Blancos and Colorados by taking advantage of the DVS provision, being able to gather more than 20% of the electoral share.

Finally, through the 1960s and 1970s the increasing levels of sociopolitical polarization also yielded the emergence of a powerful leftist urban-guerrilla movement (the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Tupamaros) and the involvement of the Armed Forces in political repression. In the context of a sustained economic crisis, a strengthened president (after the constitutional reform of 1966) began to clash with a progressively fragmented Congress, ending in a decisional deadlock in the wake of surmounting socio-political polarization. The stalemate was finally broken by a military coup in June 1973. However, differing once again from the Chilean case, the support base for the coup rapidly eroded and the military were incapable (and even unwilling) of disrupting the major characteristics of the Uruguayan socio-political compromise beyond the implementation of significant trade and commerce liberalizations. In 1980, a new constitutional project drafted by the Military was defeated in a popular plebiscite, opening the way for a transition to democracy.

In sum, this case presents a weaker and rapidly eroding regime divide for post-transitional politics. Meanwhile, the eventual tasks of structural and economic reform were postponed, transferring them to post-transitional governments. In this way, once again in contrast to the Chilean case the potential for mobilizing distributive grievances after democratization was not restricted in Uruguay. With the resumption of democratic politics, the main features of the traditional system were restored. However, facing a growing and powerful leftist opposition and confronting increasing public deficits and inflationary pressures, both traditional parties embarked on a reformist agenda. The fiscal crisis of the state also limited the scope for reproducing loyalties on the basis of traditional clientelistic and patronage appeals, which became increasingly inefficient for competing with a leftist party that had appropriated the defense of *batllismo* and was able to mobilize discontent against *neoliberal* reformers. Although the Uruguayan party system lacks a strong advocate for neoliberal reform in spite of the specter of a crumbling economy and increasing international pressure, the traditional parties in office embarked on gradual attempts at state reform,

which were extremely unpopular as a result of an omnipresent *batllista* (statist/redistributist) ideology and significant policy-feedback from ISI. In this context, Frente Amplio gave political expression to a “veto-coalition” of ISI beneficiaries, while at the same time, it drew on a reinterpretation of *batllismo* to attract the vote of the sectors that became increasingly alienated from the traditional system in the wake of “happy Uruguay’s” crisis. Ideologically, this coalition put forth a statist platform advocating and enacting legislation (through the use of direct democracy mechanisms to oppose and withdraw reformist legislation) in favor of the status-quo (strong state intervention in the domestic economy). Additionally, while the two traditional parties faced surmounting popular discontent and managed increasingly constraining budgets in order to maintain their clientelistic political machines, Frente Amplio was able to gradually become the most popular political party in the country. The strength of the *frenteamplista* subculture was solidified by exile and resistance to the repression and persecution of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, combined with the loosening of Blanco and Colorado’s identities, provided further room for the strengthening of FA’s partisan identities vis-à-vis traditional parties. This dynamic, coupled with electoral results and the constitutional reform of 1996 crystallized in the consolidation of two ideological families that started to compete for the vote on programmatic appeals structured around the state-market divide. Those two “ideological families” consolidated a bi-polar logic of competition among three significant parties: the Blancos, the Colorados, and Frente Amplio. Meanwhile, the lack of salient societal conflicts on both the regime and religious divide turned the distributive struggle around the state-market divide as the one exclusively dominating such competition.

In Chapters 5 and 7 I presented survey based evidence in order to test this set of expectations, performing a parallel analysis to the one applied in Chile. In Uruguay, I have shown that both in the pre-authoritarian period and also in 1988, partisan divergence on left-right identifications and the three theoretically defined divides was significantly lower than the one observed in Chile. Indeed, even in 1988, none of the competitive divides registered significant

differences in the positioning of partisan elites and voters of the three major parties in the system, and correlations between programmatic stances and left-right positions were particularly weak in the state-market divide, especially in the low-educated sectors but also in upper-sectors of society. In short, the Uruguayan electorate in 1988 seemed to be homogenously democratic, statist, and secular, thereby limiting the opportunities for parties to employ programmatic linkages. Furthermore, the analysis of educational groups clearly suggested that each of these divides cuts across each party as low educated voters (independently of their partisan preference) were somewhat more authoritarian, statist, and religious. This confirmed the weakness of programmatic linkages in the country and seemingly contradicted the expectations I drew on the basis of post-transitional politics. However, the evidence presented for Uruguay in 1996 pointed to the presence of important discontinuities in the patterns of partisan competition in the system. In the state/market divide while the leftist parties (FA and NE) maintained traditional statist stances, the voters of both traditional parties pursued realignment and moved towards pro-market positions. This is particularly evident for the most educated voters of the PC and the PN, which presented a noticeable degree of internal stratification of pro-market attitudes along educational levels. Instead, Frente Amplio presented a more unified statist stance. Therefore, the FA maintained (together with NE) a statist profile, which was coupled with a consistent pro-market stance of the voters of both traditional parties. In short, whereas Blancos and Colorados seemed to have consolidated as an ideological family and displayed very similar profiles in the pro-reform side of the state/market divide, the left consolidated as a party-family whose voters were consistently more statist and opposed reforms. In this case, I did not find the transversal stratification of pro-market attitudes observed in Chile. Meanwhile, similar evidence was obtained in 2000-2002, while failing to obtain consistent results across levels for the other two divides. Indeed, logistic regression analysis showed that voters' stances on the state-market divide were powerful predictors of vote choice between the left and the traditional parties.

On this basis I concluded that whereas the Chilean system had increasingly evolved to a pattern of reduced programmatic linking between partisan elites (that maintained certain programmatic structure) and their bases (which lacked very well defined programmatic preferences and only aligned relatively well in the regime divide), the Uruguayan party system that lacked any type of programmatic structuring at the outset of the transition has progressively gained it with the competition of FA and both traditional parties on the state/market divide. Arguably, the Chilean linkage strategy “transition” correlates with increasing levels of voter alienation (blank votes, electoral abstention, and partisan dealignment) that are not seen in Uruguay, where participation levels and valid voting have virtually remained constant throughout the period.

In Chapter 7 I presented further empirical evidence on programmatic issue-congruence in Uruguay. The evidence confirmed that two partisan families consolidated during the 1990s drawing on the conflicts that sprang from market-reform attempts. Those families were defined by the programmatic opposition of the leftist FA and both traditional parties. The latter, did not hold significant differences between their programmatic stances and presented a crossing between the elites of the PC and PN (with the PC presenting a more centrist profile, particularly under the influence of Foro Batllista) and their bases (a more rightist stand than those of the PN). Although an important gap between low-educated and highly-educated voters was also found in this case regarding the state-market divide, that gap was significantly lower than the one observed in Chile. In short, this meant that the room for establishing programmatic linkages with constituents (even the less educated ones) had arguably increased in Uruguay.

In short, the theorized “party-family” configuration was observed, with the FA presenting the internally most consistent programmatic stances and the most differentiated profile. Meanwhile, the PC and the PN sat close to each other and presented significant crossings between their partisan components. Over time and arguably pushed by the logic of partisan competition in the system, both traditional parties seemed to have programmatically moved away from their less educated electoral bases. Meanwhile, after reaching a highpoint of polarization in the mid-1990s, FA seems

to have moderated its programmatic stance seeking to compete to the center of the spectrum and approaching (drawing on social discontent with reforms and its defense of *batllismo*) the fractions of the electorate that were “abandoned” by the traditional parties.

Quite tellingly, the leaders of the party were closer to their most distant electoral bases than traditional parties to their closest base. This once again confirmed the distinctiveness of FA programmatic profile and its higher degree of internal consistency in the system. While both traditional parties show an intermediate configuration, the NE was found to be the less internally consistent party.

#### *Non-Programmatic Linkages in Post-Transitional Uruguay*

Chapter 10 presented the obtained evidence on non-programmatic linkages in Uruguay. Although less critical than the transformations observed in Chile, important disruptions were observed springing from the fiscal crisis of the state, the growth of FA and the changing patterns of programmatic competition observed in the case, and the effects of the Constitutional reform of 1996. Such trends critically hindered the maintenance of both traditional party’s political machines and their capacity to satisfy a wide range of intermediate political leaders that were crucial in keeping in place both party’s territorial structures and their capacity to offer a wide electoral menu in elections. National leaders’ growing incapacity to feed their territorial machines has lead to an oligarchization within traditional parties, as only those leaders with personal economic power or a established and self-reinforced personal field structure could compete efficiently in the emerging electoral scenario. These processes have also limited contestation within both traditional parties, inhibiting the growth and consolidation of renovating leaderships that were so important in the past for renewing the electoral appeal of both parties.

In general, the evidence I presented in Chapter 10 suggests that, since the mid 1990s the traditional system of clientelistic mediation has suffered from three interrelated transformations: a) a recession of clientelism in the system (particularly in middle and upper sectors of society who

increasingly became “programmatic” voters), b) a mutation of non-programmatic linkage strategies (from political clubs to decentralized networks of brokers working around congress-members or municipal bureaucracies) and a mutation of the nature of the goods used for those linkages (from more durable goods like patronage and pensions to bureaucratic brokerage and specific handouts), and c) a concentration of clientelism at the municipal level, where significant incumbency advantages have developed and clientelism has sought refuge, once again, particularly in lower sectors of society who also became the target of municipal focalized social programs and temporal employment mechanisms.

The net result of these trends yields an apparently similar outcome to that observed in Chile in terms of the skewed social distribution of representation in the system, with lower sectors of society engaging in non-programmatic linkages with parties, while middle and upper sectors vote programmatically. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize some divergences. First, the representation gap between voters situated at different extremes of the socioeconomic ladder is less in Uruguay than in Chile, as shown both by the evidence presented on the basis of survey analyses and fieldwork research. Consistently, when comparisons are drawn between both partisan families, the nationalization of electoral trends at different levels (presidential, congressional, and municipal) is significantly greater than in the Chilean case. Very prominently, this is so because of the efficient canalization of social discontent with both traditional parties that FA has been able to pursue in all social strata (including lower classes) and the political framing of the sources of such discontent as a consequence of neoliberal reforms against *batllismo*, which provides a wider base for programmatic-linking across all levels of the electorate. The comparatively higher levels of interest group strength present in the system and in particularly in middle and middle-low sectors (mainly around coalitions of ISI beneficiaries) also contributed to raise the level of interest aggregation and the structuring of party-voter linkages in the system. Lower levels of popular alienation with politics and parties are a positive externality of such process. Additionally, the persistence of strong political traditions and partisan subcultures in the country also provided

parties with important capital to avoid the degree of personalization and partisan dealignment observed in the Chilean system; therefore, independents and “mercenaries” are still a rare specimen in Uruguay. Furthermore, the competition between both traditional parties and the left has also provided the former with the opportunity to renew and reaffirm their political identities. Additionally, the fiscal crisis of the Uruguayan state and the weaker development of the private sector in the economy decreased the room for the creation of particularistic side-payments in the system. Therefore, though probably growing, the importance of private-sector donations for campaigns and their leverage in terms of distorting the fairness of the electoral game is undoubtedly less than the one described for Chile, especially because business-interests are not clearly identified with one partisan camp or another and tend to provide funding to parties in a more balanced way.

Finally, in spite of the greater level of national/local congruence in elections, the bi-polar logic of competition predominating in the system and the increasing importance (and autonomy after 1996) of municipal governments in the country has consolidated into different district competitive configurations. In some districts, one party has become nearly predominant in the system. In others, traditionally hegemonic forces have lost strength yielding competitive scenarios, usually structured around a new bi-polar logic of competition between one traditional party (representing the traditional partisan family) and FA. Still, in other districts, the PB has been able to resist FA’s sustained growth, maintaining and even consolidating its predominance at the expense of the Colorado Party, which has virtually disappeared in those districts (especially in local elections). In these cases, the PB has emerged as the only viable representative of the traditional party family. While FA has been especially successful in metropolitan districts and those presenting higher levels of economic development and urbanization, traditional parties have been able to resist FA’s growth in less socially developed districts (and zones within districts) in which municipal machines provide one of the only subsistence sources available to the population. In this context, however, PB’s Mayoralties have been seemingly better able to continue to provide public

goods to the population (avoiding massive municipal debts and deficits) than the PC, thereby retaining the electoral favor of less particularistic-oriented voters in the district.

### *Partisan Adaptation in Uruguay: The Case of FA*

Chapter 11 analyzed the case of FA as another successful partisan adaptation instance. Such adaptation combined both continuity (with traditional currents in Uruguay's party system) and change in terms of systemic currents. Regarding the former, the development of extremely influential charismatic leaderships (especially those of Tabaré Vázquez and José Mujica), the progressive moderation and widening of the electoral offer of the party (including in 2005 multiple candidacies in the interior), and the increasing assumption of brokerage roles and particularistic problem-solving by the territorial activists of the party are among the most salient. In terms of change, the story of the party suggests that success can be interpreted as the result of a particular combination of its programmatic linking with middle and upper social strata and a complex intertwining of personality-based, community service-oriented linkages, and localized efforts to raise the level of social organization and political awareness of lower class constituencies. In this last regard, the case of FA highlights the importance of developing a very powerful and vocational network of partisan activists working in every locality of the country, precisely when traditional partisan structures have atrophied. In this respect, the party's ability to "control" almost every channel of political socialization in society (very prominently, the educational system and the cultural *intelligencia*) and has helped to increase the salience of the "frenteamplista" tradition and partisan identification. However, the success of the party has also been significantly aided by the scope of public discontent with both traditional parties which granted this opposition party a sizable and cross-sectional support base.

In short, as an opposition party, FA succeed in articulating a successful electoral strategy that gradually allowed the party to grow in sectors of the population that historically supported the traditional parties, without alienating its traditional leftist constituency. Since its creation in 1971

and especially after 1989, FA followed a pathway from a Marxist-Leninist mass-party to an electoral-professional one, pursuing an increasingly catch-all strategy while still providing consistent opposition to neoliberal reforms and canalizing social discontent with other parties in the system.

#### Comparative Analysis of both cases: similarities and differences

Motivated by a revision of the empirical support obtained for the general hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, this section presents a brief comparative analysis of both cases.

#### *The Determinants of Cross-National Divergence*

**Hypothesis:** The divergent patterns of representation across systems can be explained on the basis of the interaction between: a) the historical development of each party-system and its legacies (experience with democracy, the degree of institutionalization of the party system, the relationship between interests groups and parties, the configuration of partisan identities and subcultures); b) the political economy of structural reforms and its impact on state structures, decentralization, and the resulting room for parties to articulate alternative policy-packages to represent divergent societal interests; c) the level of interest aggregation in society, resulting from a combination of a and b; d) agency on the part of each party (determined both by its ideological and organizational imprints and by the party's relative access to media and other campaign resources); and e) the mediating influence that electoral institutions exert on factors a, c, and d.

Although both cases represent instances of institutionalized party-systems working in the context of relatively durable democracies, the historical reconstruction of their divergent trajectories in the long-run has shown how their different long-term trajectory still affects the patterns of representation observed in each system today, in interaction with contemporary variables. In this regard, I have tried to demonstrate how Chile's decreasing levels of

programmatic-linking and Uruguay's transition from a system dominated by clientelism and patronage to one in which the competition on the socioeconomic divide has gained predominance relate to each country's path-dependent political economy trajectories. For instance, the current patterns of programmatic and non-programmatic linking observed in Chile cannot be explained without accounting for the massive disruptions lived by the country and its party-system during its "revolutionary epoch" and especially, during Pinochet's regime. Meanwhile, Uruguay's increasing levels of programmatic linking can only be explained by the far-reaching implications that the crisis of *batllismo* has created in the system over the last five decades. The relative strength of traditional partisan subcultures, the capacity of both parties to adapt to a changing scenario, and FA's sustained but very gradual electoral advance, have also proved fundamental in "cushioning" the effects of the country's socioeconomic crisis on the party system, escaping the highly disruptive and rapid processes of deinstitutionalization observed in other countries of the region and enabling greater levels of programmatic consistency today.

Closer in time, the divergent political economies of ISI dismantling observed in each case are clearly related to the current opportunities to establish programmatic linkages that parties face in each system. It is possible to hypothesize that the effects of state reform on the availability of subsidies and particularistic side-payments to political entrepreneurs could have acted as a deterrent to the establishment of non-programmatic linkages between parties and their constituents. However, the evidence I have presented for Chile seems to contradict such statement. Although the number and leverage of intermediate organizations that used to lobby in Congress to obtain specific "club goods" in the pre-1973 system has declined drastically (business and labor groups, organizations of pension beneficiaries, etc.), it is clear that non-programmatic linkages have not receded in the country and that, especially in the poorest sectors of society, they have increased. This increase is now primarily financed through private funding, given business-interests' increasing role in the economy and the growing stakes they hold regarding public sector concessions and contracts. In a way, the shrinkage of state direct intervention in the economy has

relatively strengthened both the political leverage and the capacity to produce profits on the part of private sector companies, weakening at the same time, the political leverage of the popular sectors. Coupled with territorial decentralization, labor flexibilization, and political repression during the dictatorship, this has also translated into the segmentation and fragmentation of popular sector organizations, which today lack the capacity to structure consistent collective action to link with parties on higher levels of interest aggregation. Finally, even if higher levels of programmatic linking were possible regarding the protection of economic interests on the part of subordinated sectors, Pinochet's reforms and their institutional protection through the 1980 Constitution have evidently restricted the room for partisan programmatic divergence on the state-market divide and consistent coalitional placements on the moral divide.

In Uruguay in turn, the weakness of major structural reforms and the increasing levels of fiscal stress have put redistributive struggles between ISI-beneficiaries and the government (along with an internationally-oriented private sector and IFIs) at center stage. Policy-feedback mechanisms and the processing of reforms under an institutionalized democratic regime have provided such groups important incentives to avoid collective action dilemmas that might preclude organization. Indeed, the very creation of the CNT (national labor union convention) in the 1960s and FA in the 1970s shows how, in the context of the crisis of the economic development model, subordinated sectors progressively gained autonomy from the system of clientelistic co-optation that predominated in the country. In this context, non-programmatic linkages became concentrated in lower and unorganized sectors of society. However, even in those sectors, social discontent with economic events and traditional parties' decreasing capacity to provide at the individual level increasingly enabled the electoral advance of FA, which lacked (with the exception of post-1989 Montevideo) the capacity to provide traditionally clientelistic side-payments.

Meanwhile, in both cases, in the absence of strong partisan and territorial organizations and in the context of the consolidation of individualistic life styles, the increasing role of the media in

campaigns has allowed consistent programmatic linking on the part of highly educated sectors of society. Particularly in Chile, the same cannot be said, however, of less-educated voters.

Within these divergent socio-structural contexts and historical conjunctures, the institutional framework established by the electoral system and rules, also shaped the collective quality of political representation. Accordingly, Chile's institutional framework is more detrimental than the Uruguayan one for the collective quality of representation given: a) its higher disproportionality in translating votes into seats (and therefore, electoral majorities incapacity to mark a clearly distinctive profile in the context of supra-majority requirements), b) the smaller district sizes that predominate in the system (and the consequent personalization of partisan lists), and c) the relatively high amounts of political decentralization present in the system. While nationally the incentives introduced by the binomial system reduce the scope for mobilizing societal conflicts at higher levels of interest aggregation, at the local level, the allowance of permanent reelection by incumbent mayors triggers the creation of strong incumbency advantages that can reduce the scope for programmatic linking, reinforcing the emergence of neo-feudal and corrupt governance styles in the context of personalization and weak administrative oversight. The increasing national-local de-alignment apparently consolidating in Uruguay after the electoral reform of 1996 seems to confirm this causal link. As well, the comparison between congressmembers' *homestyles* according to the district size (Montevideo and Canelones vs. the rest) suggests that other things being equal, the former have greater incentives to become constituency-servants and clientelistic brokers than the latter, which tend to stress their roles as party and list members and who essentially campaign (usually on the basis of fractional messages and leaders) on the media.

Finally, as demonstrated by UDI's and FA's successful stories, in the context of an evolving environment of competition, some parties are genetically better prepared to compete in the emerging scenario. Such adaptation capacity is also path-dependent and relates to organizational features and the party's access to campaign resources. The latter can either be

intangible (e.g. specific ideological predispositions and programmatic stances that match well with the public's preferences in a given conjuncture) or tangible (e.g. economic resources and/or partisan organizations to develop non-programmatic linkages with constituents or privileged access to the media). Both components seem necessary, as well as the development of a popular national leader, to succeed in both systems.

### *The Determinants of Sub-National Divergence*

In Chapter 2, I presented four general hypotheses regarding the determinants of political representation at the district level, measured through the predominant type of party-voter linkages:

**Hypothesis 1:** All things being equal, different social structures will produce significant impacts on the quality of political representation at the district level. Programmatic representation will tend to be less in highly socially fragmented districts, those populated by poor and marginalized sectors, and those characterized by low levels of human capital, since in such contexts the presence of organized societal groups structured around high-levels of interests aggregation (and therefore, programmatically oriented) and/or the provision of public goods is less likely.

**Hypothesis 2:** All things being equal, in those systems and districts where the extent of public sector participation is higher, we should expect less programmatic linking resulting from the higher availability of clientelistic and patronage resources.

**Hypothesis 3:** All things being equal, political parties will have a stronger incentive to engage in ideological representation when the competitiveness of the system and district are high. Additionally, if the opposition is moderately successful in challenging the incumbent in ideological terms and/or the incumbent becomes increasingly unable (due to economic inefficiency) to satisfy its clients, the quality of ideological representation might improve.

**Hypothesis 4:** All things being equal, the specific ideology of the party will have an impact on its representational strategies. Given their doctrinaire and organizational profiles, parties on the left will tend to engage more in programmatic representation than those on the right.<sup>214</sup>

The first of these hypotheses was confirmed in the analyses of both cases. Indeed, even within the same district or municipality (especially in Uruguay) a strong pattern of segmentation in the nature of party-voter linkages exists with non-programmatic linkages framed at very low levels of interest aggregation predominating in areas in which social capital is lower and societal fragmentation is high. In this respect, the presence of communal and societal organization (or its legacy) acts as a crucial significant variable, distinguishing among cases with similar levels of human development but which are able to obtain relatively more universalistic representation. The cases of La Florida in Chile and Bella Unión and Paysandú in Uruguay are clear examples of such a path. This also works at a micro level, when individuals with past participation in labor or other civic organizations suffered from downward social mobility and arrived in socially fragmented zones. Particularly in the case of Uruguay, those individuals have been instrumental in fostering micro-organizations at the base, which then connect to political parties through constituency-service, usually framing programmatic preferences, too. On the other hand, the presence of organized crime and massive insecurity in poor neighborhoods of both countries decreases the chance of building communal organizations of this type. Finally, it is worth stressing that in Chile, poor districts with high levels of marginality but with strong communal organizations and programmatic orientations (usually emerging from MIR and Communist *Tomas* in the 1960s and 1970s) present a trend towards political disengagement and withdrawal given their alienation from Concertación's government. Such organizations have frequently related to municipal or congressional apparatuses on a non-programmatic and anomic way.

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<sup>214</sup> See Janda and King (1985) for a supporting argument and empirical evidence on this statement.

Regarding the second of my district-level hypotheses, it is important to stress that the direction of causation is somewhat reversed from the one posited at the national level, where both the emergence and dismantling of ISI under processes of democratic contestation were seen as powerful incentives for the programmatic tensioning of national party-systems. However, it is important to note, precisely, that these distributive struggles are created by the expansion and retraction of state's role in the economy, but not in the heyday of ISI. Moreover, at the district level and especially given the governance styles that predominate in the context of weak social structures (*neo-feudal* patterns), the size of the public sector is predicted to produce negative externalities on the quality of representation.

The evidence obtained confirms such prediction only in the case of Uruguay. Indeed, in such case, those districts and areas of districts in which the economic weight of the municipality was higher tend to present more instances of non-programmatic linking with society at lower levels of interest-aggregation involving individuals (usually hired to work or receiving handouts) or business (receiving contracts from the municipality in a non-competitive basis). Furthermore, higher levels of municipal presence (obviously tied to weak industrialization and modernization of society) also correlated with the conditions elaborated in the previous hypothesis as the ones more conducive to low quality of representation. Indeed, precisely where the municipality is stronger economically, it is also possible to observe lower levels of organized collective actors in society.

Although poor Chilean districts (especially those pertaining to non-socially-heterogeneous districts) present a similar configuration than the one observed in such districts in Uruguay, the role of the municipality (especially of those run by the Concertación) as the privileged provider of clientelistic and patronage resources is challenged by the presence of political activists in the opposition with equivalent access to privately funded resources. That is, in the context of a full-fledged market economy lacking strict campaign-finance regulations and in which certain parties enjoy privileged access to business, the role of the state as the exclusive provider of those resources is lower. Paradoxically, then, higher rates of local competition are feasible in such context.

However, such competition becomes increasingly centered on non-programmatic linkages and those in charge of the Municipality face greater incentives to use that institution in order to compete with the opposition. This is the logic driving the corruption scandals on illegal contracting and administrative irregularities that broke out around 1999-2000 in Mayoralties of the Concertación.

The logic of competition just described above challenges the first statement on my third district-level hypothesis. In short, if the opposition has access to resources through which it can compete on non-programmatic linkages, the hypothesized causal link does not hold. However, *ceteris paribus*, incumbents facing greater levels of opposition challenges and a tight fiscal situation face a greater incentive to focus on the provision of public goods in order to compete more efficiently. This is the case of heterogeneous popular districts in Chile and of those governed by the PB in Uruguay, where more efficient governments emerged (reducing direct patronage and focusing on the provision of public goods to constituents to contain the advance of FA). However, the municipal administrations of Colorado's Mayors in Artigas and Canelones do not fit this pattern. In such cases, however, it is likely that the national trend against that party hurt their district representatives. Furthermore, in the case of Canelones, where the Colorado party faced a monumental collapse, the economic irrationality of the municipal administration was such that the capacity to steer the course was foreclosed. Moreover, the demographic trends predominating in the district gave metropolitan areas (more nationally and programmatically oriented) a progressive greater predominance, which ended up favoring FA. Finally, the Uruguayan case shows that where the opposition is able to compete programmatically with some success, incumbents face increasing incentives to realign and compete on such basis, particularly when facing structural limits on their conventional linkage-strategies.

To evaluate the fourth and last hypothesis, it is worth comparing the cases of the UDI and FA as two successful parties with polar opposite ideological origins and with similar electoral strategies and tactics. First, both parties benefited substantially from their opposition role against an

unpopular incumbent and drew support by developing a popular leadership at the national level and an encompassing territorial organization at the local level, drawing (also in the case of the religiously committed UDI's leadership) on an expanding activist network. However, while the Uruguayan left became progressively fractionalized in order to contain a widening electoral menu, the UDI stuck to a very homogenous and vertical organization. Whereas within FA's internal fractions and in its national council party bases benefited from significant degrees of political leverage, UDI's decision style was characterized as elitist and closed to party bases, which are only evoked in partisan rallies and election campaigns. Additionally, whereas FA's leaders stress, at least at the level of political discourse, the need to foster societal organization at the base, the UDI focused on "de-politization" and on "solving people's most immediate needs" through social assistance (which matches well with the party's religious profile). Finally, whereas UDI substantially draws on paid mercenaries and a combination of clientelism, patronage and constituency service for political campaigns, FA can still draw on its relatively wide activist base in society to run substantially cheaper (but at least equally efficient) campaigns, focusing on delivering programmatic messages along with the provision of brokerage services, constituency-service (especially via targeted social policy provisions at the neighborhood level in Montevideo), and the participation of its activists in communal projects. Therefore, the dual representation pattern run by the UDI is not observed in the case of FA. In short, it still seems possible to assert that parties of the left tend to develop organizational structures that have greater functionality in linking programmatically with its constituents, independently from the electoral return of such organizational patterns. Indeed, the case of Carlos Montes in La Florida is another instance in which a leftist leader sought to pursue a successful linkage substitution strategy by trying to (re)build societal and communal organizations. However, in the Chilean case, those strategies are no longer found within leftist parties as organizations, but only at the level of specific individual politicians usually socialized in pre-1973 Marxist-Leninist parties.

## Implications

To close, I speculate on the broader implications of the argument and empirical evidence I presented in this work. First, I lay out methodological implications. Then, I discuss the possible implications about the current quality of democracy in the region that a comparative analysis of both cases (framed in a broader regional comparison) suggests. Then, I set forth some speculations about the quality of democracy and representation in the future. To close, I speculate on eventual avenues for future research in the topic.

### *Methodological Implications*

Since Converse's (1964) and Miller et.al. (1967) pioneering studies, it has been argued that citizens' belief systems lack major structure (for later elaborations and discussion see e.g. Zaller 1992; Lupia 1998). This work, as many other recent examples in the literature on representation, has extensively drawn on public opinion surveys on citizens' policy preferences on a diverse and sometimes complex set of issues. Moreover, I have systematically compared those preferences along the educational ladder. However, if voters (especially, low-educated) lacked firmly structured policy preferences as suggested by Converse's hypothesis, the results I have presented when showing the weakness of low-educated voters' programmatic orientations might well be interpreted as a methodological artifact produced by citizens' incapacity to consistently relate to parties programmatically given their lack of political sophistication. Although I shall not plainly discard this possibility (e.g. representation gaps were observed in both countries favoring those voters with greater levels of education), my comparative analysis of both cases also demonstrates that lower-classes present different levels of consistence (therefore, belief structure) across cases (higher in Uruguay than in Chile), within cases across issues (higher in the regime divide in Chile and in the state-market divide in Uruguay), and between individual party constituencies (e.g. FA's vs. those of both Uruguayan traditional parties). In other words, my analysis demonstrates that when analyzing low-educated citizen's preferences we are not just analyzing stochastic "noise."

Ultimately, the existence or lack of consistent and discernible preferences on their part depends on the incentives that parties face in terms of seeking to establish programmatic linkages with that segment of the electorate. Taken as constant causes, those incentives evolve dynamically inducing either a de- structuring or structuring of programmatic linkages between parties and subordinated sectors in society.

In a broader methodological vein, my analysis of the recent trajectories of party-voter linkages in each case point to the usefulness of approaching this dependent variable on the basis of a dynamic perspective focused on constant causes; resulting from the lack of freezing that party systems (especially those in Latin America) confront today. Additionally, those analyses shall benefit extensively from accounts that deal with the synchronic heterogeneity of party-voter linkages between different cross-sections of the electorate, between districts, and between specific parties.

Additionally, I have argued in favor of approaching the study of political representation through a configurational pattern of causation that accounts for: a) long-term party-system and political economy trajectories, b) present socio-structural conditions in society (e.g. especially those that contribute to the emergence of social organizations that push to raise the level of interest aggregation in society), c) state structures and broad institutional characteristics (e.g. type of center-local governance patterns), d) electoral institutions, e) and parties' ideological profiles, organizational patterns, and "resource extraction" capacities (either material or symbolic bases for constructing party-voter linkages, access to media, etc.). In this work and through a combination of a general comparative analysis performed across cases, within-case comparisons across districts, and (less explicitly) across-case district comparisons, I sought to demonstrate that only a configurational analysis of these factors can yield a rich account of the current levels of representation observed in a given national or local party-system. In this respect, each compared case represents a specific configuration that translates into a divergent evolution and present availability of programmatic representation. Therefore, a controlled comparison of cases

(assimilating the logic of a quasi-experimental design) should be applied in order to make valid causal inferences on the nature of party-voter linkages in a given party-system.

*Implications for the quality of democracy*

“A competitive market economy can be justified sociologically and politically as the best way to reduce the impact of nepotistic networks. The wider the scope of market forces, the less room there will be for rent-seeking by elites with privileged access to state power and resources.”

Seymour Martin Lipset, 1993 APSA Presidential Address.

As suggested in the epigraph, it is possible to argue that the structural reforms that took place in the region can help, by restricting the room for state patronage and clientelism, to enhance the likelihood of programmatic linking in Latin America. A similar argument can be made (and it is usually made) about decentralization, which would enhance the quality of governance and the provision of public goods at the local level by bringing government closer to the people and their everyday realities.

However, taking Chile as a “best-case scenario” (given its combination of high levels of structural reform with the historical legacy of an institutionalized and already programmatically-oriented party system) it is possible to challenge both statements. As shown here, today Chile presents a segmented pattern (dual representation) in terms of citizens’ access to programmatic representation. In this case, when the “right” social-structures were absent, both the effects of structural reforms and decentralization contributed to the consolidation of non-programmatic linking between parties and voters and the emergence of neo-feudal patterns of local governance. Moreover, state reforms did not restrict the room for patronage and the provision of clientelistic side-payments-- they have just contributed to change its nature and main beneficiaries (those with access to greater quantities of privately-provided goods or those with access to public institutions that can engage in irregular contracting with the private sector to extract resources and finance campaigns).

However, in spite of these massive transformations, it is striking that Chile's party system format has changed so little, continuing to show comparatively high levels of institutionalization; supporting, therefore, highly optimistic appraisals on the country's combination of structural reforms and democratic stability and quality. In another instance of conjunctural causation such outcome needs to be explained by (and is partly an artifact of) the combination of three main factors: a) the political disarticulation, co-optation, and/or withdrawal of the "losers" of the distributive game (which become "invisible" to the processes of policy-making; thus, contributing to the maintenance of the socioeconomic status-quo and the stability of the regime), b) the legitimacy that economic growth continues to provide to Chile's economic model in spite of comparatively very high levels of inequality and poverty, and c) the presence of highly constraining institutions that set high entry barriers to newcomers that cannot challenge the two established partisan alliances in spite of growing popular discontent with politics and parties.

The Uruguayan case provides another instance to test the hypothesized relationship between structural reforms and the nature of programmatic linking. Indeed, in this case, in line with such hypothesis, the decrease in patronage and clientelistic resources generated by the fiscal crisis of the state and subsequent reforms correlated with increasing levels of programmatic linking in the party-system. In this way, a system that was dominated by non-programmatic linkages became increasingly programmatically oriented as state crisis and reform advanced. Nonetheless, observed in a broader comparative perspective to consider other cases with similar original configurations, the Uruguayan pattern appears exceptional. Indeed, in other cases, the erosion of historical parties' capacity to provide non-programmatic side-payments to their constituents either conducted to party-system collapse (e.g. Venezuela), increasing voter alienation (e.g. Colombia and Costa Rica), or re-crafted patterns of non-programmatic co-optation by incumbents (e.g. Perú and Argentina, Venezuela under Chávez). What distinguishes Uruguay is that in this case, the different social coalitions of ISI beneficiaries and their tacit alliance with FA, systematically helped to contain popular discontent, enhancing, at the same time, the levels of interest aggregation in society and the

significance of programmatic linkages for party-competition in the system. Moreover, the presence of still strong traditional partisan subcultures and the gradual nature of reforms (and economic decay) cushioned electoral de-alignment and provided the basis for a programmatic realignment through which allowed FA became the interpreter of *batllismo*. Such realignment allowed FA to induce relatively high levels of programmatic linking with poor constituents on the basis of opposing incumbents (and their policy-choices) both in the media and in the field. Therefore, the divergent pattern observed in Uruguay relates to a specific causal configuration produced by the combination of: a) the existence of a well-institutionalized and “uncontaminated” party with an already developed friendship with interest-groups, territorial organization, consolidated leadership, programmatic appeal, and governing experience at the municipal level; operating in a context in which the influence of private campaign funding is relatively low, decaying state finance of resources for building non-programmatic linkages, and strong partisan subcultures consolidated a new bipolar logic of competition between party families). This combination, however, is unusual, particularly in cases of less institutionalized party systems in which popular discontent and economic distress have had an extremely disruptive influence over such systems. Overall, the Uruguayan story suggests that the causal mechanisms at play are rather complex and cannot be understood on the basis of a linear relationship between structural reforms and the nature of party-voter linkages (and more generally, the quality of democracy).

Moreover, by restricting the scope of state intervention in society and by localizing the articulation of collective action, structural reforms and decentralization might have also reduced politicians’ ability to compete on broad redistributive agendas. Given the high salience of economic and distributive issues in the region and the seemingly increasing levels of interest groups atomization and fragmentation (produced e.g. by the growth of the informal and service sector vis-à-vis the industrial and public sectors), party’s decreasing capacity to compete on the state-market divide and to craft relatively stable social coalitions on such a basis could significantly restrict the room for overall partisan competition in the historically most salient policy divide in the

region. Especially when successful opposition parties reach office drawing on social discontent with reforms and, once in office, implement those same reforms, the effects of such restriction of policy-making alternatives can be (and have been in several countries in the region) highly disruptive for the party-system. Although it is worth stressing that other issues could eventually make up for the lack of policy divergence on the state-market divide (e.g. moral and religious issues, ethnic cleavages, governance issues, public security, etc.), it is also important to draw the broader implications that current restrictions might have for the quality of democracy in the region.

In the context of highly income inequality, existing policy constraints and social organizations' atomization can paradoxically helped to stabilize democracy in the short and medium run by reducing the room for the programmatic representation of subordinated sectors in society. However, such reduction also translates into a low-quality equilibrium eventually characterized by: a) popular alienation from politics and parties, b) the reinforcement of trends consolidating a segmented access to public goods in society by stimulating the emergence of high-income and low-income ghettos (those sectors who can pay for privately provided goods enjoy greater quality; those who cannot pay for them and fail to articulate collective organizations to protect public goods face a decreasing quality of such provisions and, therefore, social welfare), c) the consolidation of dual-representation strategies and the resulting reinforcement of society's already skewed distributive patterns, and resulting from the combination of the previous factors, d) decreasing levels of stateness in sizable territories of the country that frequently become centers of illegal and mafia-group activities and where state and democratic institutions do not reach the population. For this same reason, although they might help to introduce positive incentives, institutional innovation (e.g. campaign finance regulations and better administrative oversight procedures) needs to confront the challenge of becoming more than just death letter. In the same vein, crime and violence have increasingly become a major problems in Latin American societies. The way in which upper-sectors of society react in the future regarding this issue can either forge a new sociopolitical scenario (yielding redistributive policy-agreements to attack the social causes of

insecurity and violence) or aggravate the situation in the long-run (if “strong hand” measures are privileged). Unfortunately, the high levels of social fragmentation that characterize these societies today and the current trends of political representation observed here make this second scenario more plausible.

In short, even if the current representation status quo in the region provides stability to democracy and policy-making, if “losers” cannot be politically reintegrated through viable channels of representation, the current equilibrium might turn unsustainable in the future. As the recent protests waves that have recently brought down previously popularly supported governments in Bolivia and Ecuador illustrate, political stability is not assured either. Indeed, those massive (and spasmodic) political movements face the arduous challenge of structuring stable and viable policymaking coalitions once the leaders they support reach office.

### *The future*

In this work I have argued that especially where social fragmentation is high and policy-options are restricted, cleavage mobilization (like the one described in Lipset and Rokkan) or simply, consistent divide competition, cannot be stabilized. This opens two alternative and tentative scenarios for the region: a) a pendular pattern in which periods of non-programmatic linking are succeeded by periods of increased programmatic-linking and vice versa, on the basis of candidate-centered media appeals to winners and losers of economic outcomes (retrospective voting and accountability representation), the occurrence of corruption scandals, or specific instances of nationalist or ethnic mobilization; b) a progressive erosion of the remaining instances of programmatic linking and a consolidation of low-quality of representation across the board. In my view, this will depend on the specific configurations observed in each case and especially on long-term factors. If parties are legitimate actors in society and have stable organizations and partisan identities that can serve as the basis for strategic realignment, the first scenario is more likely. However, in cases where those conditions are lacking (unfortunately, in the great majority of Latin

America) the second scenario is more likely to consolidate, further reducing the quality of democratic governance in the region.

As for the two cases analyzed in this work, each party-system faces specific challenges in the near future. In Uruguay, the successful FA now confronts the task of satisfying an extremely heterogeneous social coalition which has discontent with previous governments as a minimum common denominator. However, FA's social coalition is crossed by important internal contradictions generated by the coexistence of different constituencies with opposing interests within the electoral bases of the party (e.g. public employees vs. poor citizens in the informal sector). Moreover, the party is now in charge of a very delicate economic conjuncture which increases the leverage of IFIs' prescriptions vis-à-vis economic management, further limiting the room for policy divergence regarding previous governments. Will FA be able to satisfy its different constituencies in this situation; can the strong *frenteamplista* identity still provide the basis for renewing electoral support; can the party draw on its brother-ship with the social movement to lead a process of socially concerted policies, successfully managing the current policy trade-offs it faces? These are obviously open questions and FA's fate is not foreshadowed or over-determined. However, it is interesting to speculate on the eventual implications of a pessimistic scenario: Will the traditional parties be able to reconfigure their electoral appeal in opposition to FA? If not, once every partisan option available has been tested in government, how far would the country be from other Latin American cases that have recently suffered from rapid party-system de-institutionalization?

In Chile, the Concertación is likely heading towards its fourth consecutive government. Indeed, current survey research systematically indicates that Michelle Bachelet will be elected president by a wide electoral margin, facing a divided Alianza Por Chile (split between the candidacies of Joaquín Lavín and Sebastián Piñera). In this context, Bachelet has promised to bring substantial renovation to La Moneda and has recently begun to stress redistributive issues (e.g. the need to increase taxes to upper-sectors in order to invest more in public education and target

inequality) in her campaign addresses. Indeed, the candidate's charm is likely to reside in her capacity to renovate the political platform of Concertación, offering "something new" to the electorate. The political "death" of Pinochet (and his closest allies) after the Riggs case, the elimination of Military's appointed Senators, the presence of a divided right in Congress (which might translate into better opportunities to craft cross-pact policy coalitions), and the likely retirement of the "transition's generation" within Concertación, turn Bachelet's promised change more feasible, particularly in the context of resumed and likely sustained economic growth. Therefore, this state of affairs provides Bachelet and the Concertación a significant opportunity to re-craft a new social-political compromise in the country. Whether such opportunity is taken (or neglected) will likely be highly consequential for disrupting (or deepening) the current trends observed in Chile's party-system. Obviously, this also remains as an open question.

#### *Tentative avenues for future research*

Two future extensions of this project seem especially appropriate.

First, it would be interesting to analyze a broader set of cases, seeking to widen the empirical instances in which the hypotheses and findings of this research are evaluated. Especially, I think it will be interesting to seek not only for intra-regional cases, but also, to extend the analysis in order to incorporate cross-regional comparisons. Moreover, given the conjunctural causation model applied here, this would also provide better opportunities to fully specify and analyze (perhaps more explicitly, e.g. by applying a *fuzzy set* model) theoretically interesting causal configurations that could yield a more definitive and abstract take on the specific ("necessary and sufficient") conditions in which programmatic representation takes place.

Second, given the alleged fluidity of current party-voter linkage configurations, it would also be extremely interesting to extend this analysis over time in order to capture the diachronic dynamic.

Although less directly related to this project, this research suggests some interesting follow-up questions for further research in the future. For instance, it would be interesting to explore “policy-output” as an additional and certainly fundamental link in the representation “chain,” considering not only party-voter linkages but also how “constraining” linkage strategies are for policymaking in Congress or other elected offices. In this vein, it might also be interesting to compare more systematically how different linkage strategies translate into divergent governance patterns (especially at the local level) and the crafting, functioning, and substantive production of congressional policymaking coalitions. Additionally, it would be fruitful to explore the divergent nature of state apparatuses (and state’s technocratic autonomy) in each country and their relationship with the nature of partisan competition and representation on the one hand, and with policy output on the other. Moreover, the “responsible party-government” analysis of representation offered here could be nicely complemented by an account of “accountability” or retrospective representation based on the public’s evaluation of government action. Finally, the increasing importance of media in campaigns suggests that scholars need to consider this factor more systematically in studies of representation in the future. For instance, it would be interesting to collect systematic information on parties’ access to media outlets, and how such access differs across cases and within cases across parties.

## **APPENDIX I**

## Elite Factor Analyses

### Cross-National Factor Analyses: First Wave

#### KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.715
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	237.197
	df	28
	Sig.	.000

#### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
POLSOC	-.773		-.212
INTEESTA	.735		
PRIVATI	.627	-.233	.243
LEGITIM	.132	.826	-.151
DEMECDES	-.280	.728	-.106
ABORTION	.361	-.169	.754
DIVORCE	.292	-.397	.731
MORESAY	-.466	.407	.560

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

#### Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.060	25.756	25.756
2	1.622	20.270	46.026
3	1.557	19.467	65.493

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

## Chile's Factor Analyses: First Wave

### KMO and Bartlett's Test<sup>a</sup>

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.764
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	150.036
	df	28
	Sig.	.000

a. Only cases for which uruguay = 4 are used in the analysis phase.

### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a,b</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
ABORTION	.875		.139
DIVORCE	.810	-.330	
PRIVATI	.591	-.245	.353
LEGITIM	-.115	.844	
DEMECDES	-.166	.792	-.223
MORESAY	-.181	.419	-.335
INTEESTA			.868
POLSOC	-.307	.146	-.780

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

- a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
- b. Only cases for which uruguay = 4 are used in the analysis phase.

### Total Variance Explained<sup>a</sup>

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.941	24.258	24.258
2	1.713	21.414	45.672
3	1.672	20.902	66.573

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

- a. Only cases for which uruguay = 4 are used in the analysis phase.

## Uruguay's Factor Analyses: First Wave

### KMO and Bartlett's Test<sup>a</sup>

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.			.565
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square		43.805
	df		28
	Sig.		.029

a. Only cases for which uruguay = 34 are used in the analysis phase.

### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a,b</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
PRIVATI	.788		
LEGITIM	.718		
POLSOC	-.671	-.372	
ABORTION	.103	.679	
DIVORCE		.631	.123
INTEESTA	.254	.588	-.496
DEMECDES	-.310	.391	.387
MORESAY			.858

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

- a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
- b. Only cases for which uruguay = 34 are used in the analysis phase.

### Total Variance Explained<sup>f</sup>

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.762	22.029	22.029
2	1.502	18.773	40.802
3	1.157	14.461	55.263

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

- a. Only cases for which uruguay = 34 are used in the analysis phase.

## Cross-National Factor Analyses: Second Wave

### KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.608
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	121.137
	df	28
	Sig.	.000

### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
POLSOC	-.797		
INTEESTA	.786		-.228
MORESAY	-.531	-.271	-.214
PRIVATI	.496	.262	
DIVORCE	.113	.791	
ABORTION	.157	.790	
LEGITIM		.159	.871
DEMECDES	-.140	-.403	.608

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

### Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.840	23.006	23.006
2	1.590	19.874	42.880
3	1.237	15.465	58.344

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

## Chile's Factor Analyses: Second Wave

### KMO and Bartlett's Test<sup>a</sup>

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.			.578
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square		75.332
	df		28
	Sig.		.000

a. Only cases for which chile = 3 are used in the analysis phase.

### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a,b</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
ABORTION	.758		
MORESAY	-.744	.200	
DIVORCE	.721		
LEGITIM	.175	.750	.119
DEMECDES	-.193	.693	
PRIVATI	.233	-.557	-.167
POLSOC	-.117		.894
INTEESTA		-.438	-.751

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.

b. Only cases for which chile = 3 are used in the analysis phase.

### Total Variance Explained<sup>f</sup>

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.788	22.344	22.344
2	1.596	19.945	42.289
3	1.422	17.772	60.061

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. Only cases for which chile = 3 are used in the analysis phase.

## Uruguay's Factor Analyses: Second Wave

### KMO and Bartlett's Test<sup>a</sup>

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.559
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	59.333
	df	21
	Sig.	.000

a. Only cases for which chile = 33 are used in the analysis phase.

### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a,b</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
POLSOC	.832		
INTEESTA	-.734	.379	
MORESAY	.679	.133	-.300
ABORTION		.856	.181
DIVORCE	-.149	.744	
LEGITIM		.245	.816
PRIVATI	-.169		.800

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

- a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
- b. Only cases for which chile = 33 are used in the analysis phase.

### Total Variance Explained<sup>f</sup>

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.745	24.926	24.926
2	1.518	21.684	46.610
3	1.435	20.506	67.116

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

- a. Only cases for which chile = 33 are used in the analysis phase.

## Voters Factor Analyses

### Cross-National Factor Analyses: 1988

#### KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.723
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	3114.695
	df	45
	Sig.	.000

#### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN TRANSPORTE	.732		
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN ECON	.678		
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN EDUC	.622		
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN SALUD	.618	.127	-.161
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN BANCOS	.582	-.128	.119
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN MEDIOS COM.	.563	-.200	.192
IMPORTANCIA IGLESIA RELIGION		.806 .791	
PELIGROS. DE DEMOC			.802
REGIMEN DE GOBIERNO			-.783

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

#### Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.422	24.221	24.221
2	1.358	13.584	37.805
3	1.348	13.476	51.281

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

## Chile's Factor Analyses: 1988

### KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.716
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	3032.363
	df	55
	Sig.	.000

### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN TRANSPORTE	.738		
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN ECON	.688		
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN EDUC	.646		
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN SALUD	.643		
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN BANCOS	.642	.110	
EFICIENCIA GOB. MILITAR		.826	
PELIGROS. DE DEMOC		.777	
REGIMEN DE GOBIERNO		-.624	
AUTOIDENTIFICACION IDEOLOGICA		-.621	-.132
RELIGION		.128	.800
IMPORTANCIA IGLESIA		-.155	.711

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.

### Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.282	20.741	20.741
2	2.126	19.325	40.067
3	1.184	10.765	50.831

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

## Uruguay's Factor Analyses: 1988

### KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.654
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	841.067
	df	55
	Sig.	.000

### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN TRANSP	.702		
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN ECON.	.700	.104	.127
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN SALUD	.672		.274
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN MEDIOS COM	.642		-.104
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN EDUC	.592		-.196
PROFESA RELIGION		.783	
IMPORTANCIA DE LA IGLESIA		.709	
PELIGROS DE DEMOCRACIA		.135	-.723
REGIMEN DE GOBIERNO PREFERIBLE	-.103		.612
AUTOIDENTIFICACION IDEOLOGICA		-.525	.530
PARTICIPACION ESTATAL EN BANCOS			-.230

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

### Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.219	20.174	20.174
2	1.457	13.241	33.415
3	1.376	12.507	45.922

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

## Cross-National Factor Analyses: 1996

### KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.550
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	928.115
	df	28
	Sig.	.000

### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
ABORTION	.872		
DIVORCE	.862		
LEGITIM		.757	
DEMECDES		.637	
MORESAY		.535	-.114
POLSOC	-.148		-.753
INTEESTA	-.108	-.155	.706
PRIVATI		.146	.455

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

### Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.550	19.379	19.379
2	1.331	16.640	36.018
3	1.296	16.197	52.215

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

## Chile's Factor Analyses: 1996

### KMO and Bartlett's Test<sup>a</sup>

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.523
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	427.724
	df	28
	Sig.	.000

a. Only cases for which nation = chile are used in the analysis phase.

**Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a,b</sup>**

	Component		
	1	2	3
ABORTION	.862		
DIVORCE	.828	-.110	
LEGITIM		.798	
DEMECDES		.628	.111
MORESAY	-.237	.497	
POLSOC	-.135		-.763
INTEESTA		-.138	.689
PRIVATI		.149	.486

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

b. Only cases for which nation = chile are used in the analysis phase.

**Total Variance Explained<sup>d</sup>**

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.513	18.909	18.909
2	1.332	16.648	35.557
3	1.323	16.535	52.092

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. Only cases for which nation = chile are used in the analysis phase.

### Uruguay's Factor Analyses: 1996

**KMO and Bartlett's Test<sup>a</sup>**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.535
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	403.778
	df	28
	Sig.	.000

a. Only cases for which nation = uruguay are used in the analysis phase.

**Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a,b</sup>**

	Component		
	1	2	3
DIVORCE	.859		
ABORTION	.856		
POLSOC		-.755	
INTEESTA	-.154	.725	
PRIVATI	.148	.397	
LEGITIM			.716
DEMECDES	-.148		.703
MORESAY		-.216	.480

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

b. Only cases for which nation = uruguay are used in the analysis phase.

**Total Variance Explained<sup>d</sup>**

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.545	19.312	19.312
2	1.309	16.363	35.675
3	1.256	15.696	51.370

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. Only cases for which nation = uruguay are used in the analysis phase.

## Cross-National Factor Analyses: 2000-02

**KMO and Bartlett's Test**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.546
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	705.155
	df	21
	Sig.	.000

**Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>**

	Component		
	1	2	3
ABORTION	.767	.139	
DIVORCE	.758	.101	
MORESAY	-.476	.174	.145
INTEESTA	.174	-.793	
POLSOC	.289	.743	
LEGITIM		-.152	.772
DEMECEDES		.163	.743

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

**Total Variance Explained**

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.511	21.582	21.582
2	1.289	18.420	40.002
3	1.174	16.778	56.781

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

### Chile's Factor Analyses: 2000

**KMO and Bartlett's Test<sup>a</sup>**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.523
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	402.729
	df	21
	Sig.	.000

a. Only cases for which PAIS = Chile are used in the analysis phase.

**Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a,b</sup>**

	Component		
	1	2	3
DIVORCE	.787		
ABORTION	.760		
MORESAY	-.438		.153
POLSOC		.816	
INTEESTA		-.810	
DEMECDES			.804
LEGITIM		.120	.783

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

b. Only cases for which PAIS = Chile are used in the analysis phase.

**Total Variance Explained<sup>f</sup>**

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.398	19.966	19.966
2	1.348	19.255	39.221
3	1.295	18.506	57.726

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. Only cases for which PAIS = Chile are used in the analysis phase.

## Uruguay's Factor Analyses: 2002

**KMO and Bartlett's Test<sup>a</sup>**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.532
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	143.631
	df	21
	Sig.	.000

a. Only cases for which PAIS = Uruguay are used in the analysis phase.

**Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a,b</sup>**

	Component		
	1	2	3
ABORTION	.795		
DIVORCE	.785		
INTEESTA		-.720	
POLSOC		.706	
MORESAY	-.230	.366	.364
DEMECDES	-.173		.711
LEGITIM	.264		.653

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

b. Only cases for which PAIS = Uruguay are used in the analysis phase.

**Total Variance Explained<sup>f</sup>**

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.401	20.010	20.010
2	1.163	16.615	36.625
3	1.071	15.306	51.931

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. Only cases for which PAIS = Uruguay are used in the analysis phase.

## **APPENDIX II**

Although infrequently found in the Anglo-Saxon research tradition, CA constitutes an extremely popular analytical method in French social science (see Benzécri et.al. 1973). This flexible descriptive technique was originally devised to graphically represent complex contingency tables in order to facilitate the visualization of the underlying structure of the data by projecting row and column profiles (relative frequencies) in a bi-dimensional plot (bi-plot). This exploratory technique does not depend on any underlying theoretical distribution and therefore, it has been usually characterized as a “model-free” method that does not impose any restrictions on the data.<sup>216</sup> In short, correspondence analysis describes the existing relationship between the categories of two discrete variables in a contingency table. Such categories will be represented in a low-dimensional space (usually bi-dimensional) that aims to replicate as much as possible of the original variance contained in the table.<sup>217</sup> Whereas categories with similar distributions in the extracted dimensions will lay spatially close to one another, those with dissimilar profiles will sit further apart. Additionally, the technique allows the depiction of “supplementary points” which can be represented in the bi-dimensional space, without contributing to the extraction and inertia of each dimension.

The original technique devised for contingency tables was then extended to large two-way tables, allowing the simultaneous analysis of several variables (and categories) drawn from a wide array of survey questions. Bourdieu’s analytical strategy in *Distinction* (1984) is a benchmark application of this technique in order to describe a “social map” that depicts the empirical relationship between occupational strata and a large set of preferences, attitudes, and consumption styles. When variable-matching is plausible, this technique maps the relative position of different

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<sup>215</sup>This section draws extensively on Clausen (1998).

<sup>216</sup>Therefore, if the researcher seeks to test causal statements, it is important to confirm the obtained results using more stringent confirmatory techniques like confirmatory factor analyses or log-linear models.

<sup>217</sup>In other words, CA pursues a similar objective as principal-components extractions in factor analysis.

subjects of interests (on the basis of aggregate information eventually proceeding from several populations and samples) on a multidimensional set of latent-variables.<sup>218</sup>

This variant of CA is extremely popular within marketing analyses of brand positioning with respect to a set of relevant product attributes. These “market” or “brand” maps are constructed on the basis of a set of questions in which respondents assign different scores to different brands on a set of product attributes. The results from these questions are then compiled into a table in which each brand (in rows) obtains an average score (mean) on each relevant attribute (in columns). Once this two-way table is constructed, CA analysis can generate a map in which brands with similar “branding” profiles (defined through their perceived attributes) appear close to one another while those with dissimilar profiles appear distant from one another.

I propose that the same rationale and methodology could be applied to map multidimensional issue-congruence, with issues replacing product attributes and partisan groups (e.g. congressional leaders and voters) replacing brands. This map is constructed on the basis of a table containing partisan positions on a set of issues, like the one presented in Table AII-1.

Given the great flexibility of CA, table cells can either represent partisan means (which could optionally be rounded to the most proximate integer) on each issue or a simple ordinal ranking of mean partisan positions. If the researcher possesses homogeneous issue-questions across levels (e.g. voters and leaders) the first situation is adequate to measure “perfect issue-congruence” as described in Kitschelt et.al. (1999). However, when issue-questions are heterogeneous in this respect (either in terms of question formulation, metric, or both), the researcher should construct reasonable pairs of questions measuring a similar underlying issue at each level. In this scenario, “perfect issue-congruence” cannot be measured as different metrics or question-wording across levels could lead to misleading conclusions. However, if plausible variable matching is possible it may be useful to construct ordinal rankings of responses for each level in order to visualize the

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<sup>218</sup>In this particular aspect, CA offers similar features as those available in INDSCAL Multi-Dimensional Scaling.

extent to which parties and electorates achieve a situation of “relative issue-congruence” (Kitschelt et.al. 1999).

**Table AII-1:**

**An exemplary input table for mapping issue-congruence through CA**

Partisan Groups/Issues	Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 3	Issue 4	Issue 5	Issue 6	Issue 7	Issue 8	Issue 9	Issue 10
Party A's voters	1	3	7	5	4	8	10	1	1	2
Party A's leaders	1	3	7	5	4	8	10	1	1	2
Party B's voters	2	1	1	2	3	1	2	4	5	1
Party B's leaders	4	5	6	4	5	6	2	5	6	4
Party C's voters	5	5	1	4	6	3	1	5	6	7
Party C's leaders	2	1	1	2	3	1	2	4	5	1
Party D's voters	1	3	5	6	7	9	9	1	10	10
Party D's leaders	5	5	1	4	6	3	1	5	6	7
Party E's voters	2	1	1	2	3	1	2	4	5	1
Party E's leaders	1	3	5	6	7	9	9	1	10	10

Note: The distribution of values is random and does not represent a real dataset.

Visually, perfect/relative issue-congruence, or “ideological representation”, would be obtained when partisan groups fall close to their corresponding party elites.<sup>219</sup> Conversely, “ideological cartelization” occurs when party elites cluster together but are spatially distant from their supporters. Whereas Figure AII-1 represents the first theoretical scenario, Figure AII-2 represents the latter. Both graphs assume two relevant competitive dimensions or issue-bundles. In substantive terms, while the first scenario is consisting with a significant degree of party/voter coordination around ideological or issue positions, in the second scenario parties and their


<sup>219</sup>See Kitschelt et al, 1999 for a theoretical discussion of different scenarios on issue-representation.

constituents should coordinate on the basis of alternative linkages (e.g. clientelism, pork distribution, candidate or partisan images and traditions, etc.).

The next section compares the ideal data configurations required to take full advantage of this methodology with the characteristics of the dataset used here, which was not specifically designed to fulfill that ideal.

**Figure AII-1:**


**Theoretical perfect issue-congruence with 5 parties competing on a two-dimensional setting**



A= Party A's voters and leaders  
 B= Party B's voters and leaders  
 C= Party C's voters and leaders  
 D= Party D's voters and leaders  
 E= Party E's voters and leaders

**Figure AII-2:**

**Theoretical ideological-cartelization (in dimension y) with 5 parties competing on a two-dimensional setting**



1= Parties A, B, C, D, and E leaders  
2= Parties A, B, C, D, and E voters

**Data:**

To map the degree of “perfect” issue representation present in a given polity, a researcher would need to design or obtain a dataset that complies with the following criteria: a) a set of issues that exhausts the salient dimensions of political competition in the system while excluding irrelevant (noisy) dimensions of political competition in the system;<sup>220</sup> b) a set of identical indicators (including survey timing) that measures issue-preferences on each dimension on each desired analytical level (e.g. party congressional leaders, party activists, party members, voters); c) a sufficiently large sample (N) to establish significant comparisons between different cross-sections of the electorate (e.g. beyond partisanship, one could compare by education levels, class, gender, political interest and/or efficacy, etc., and d) it is also highly recommended to use standardized scales across issues in order to assure equal weighting to each issue (Clausen 1998). Finally, if

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<sup>220</sup>To comply with this issue-salience estimations should be available.

interested in mapping the diachronic evolution of partisan competition on ideological linkages, the researcher should have access to a set of comparable measures across time and at both levels.

Unfortunately, the data currently at hand do not simultaneously fulfill these requirements. However, keeping these requirements in mind *ad hoc* research designs can be developed in order to measure perfect multi-dimensional issue congruence in the future. Meanwhile, I propose to exemplify the virtues of this analytical device working on a sub-optimal data set, constructed on the basis of triangulating roughly concurrent data from the third wave of the World Value Survey (1995-1997) and the Latin America Congressional Representatives Survey conducted by the Universidad de Salamanca (1997).

A process of question matching and metric transformation was pursued to create comparable issue items at each level. The assumption that guided the matching process is that beyond wording differences, the specific questions administered at each level relate to a shared underlying ideological predisposition or political attitude.<sup>221</sup>

After the pairs were created and the variables standardized to a 0-1 variation range, ordinal rankings were computed for each variable (separately) at each specific level (e.g. voters and congressional leaders).<sup>222</sup> The rationale justifying these transformations is straightforward. If both original variables reflect similar underlying attitudes on a salient issue, independently from stochastic variations in terms of question wording and metric, and under a situation in which ideological linkages predominate, the voters and their corresponding party leaders should obtain similar rankings on the issue. Operationally, this would indicate a situation of relative ideological independence.

In spite of its advantages, the comparison between the values assigned to each case in tables AII-3 and AII-4 illustrate the fact that the use of rankings also has an important drawback. In

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<sup>221</sup>Whenever this assumption seemed risky, the decision was not to include the issue in the dataset.

<sup>222</sup>When ties between cases existed in the original variables, the mean of corresponding ranking positions was imputed to both cases.

short, depending on the nature of original distances in partisan groups' means on each issue, the rankings can either amplify or downplay the extent of partisan polarization on a given issue. In other words, lacking subsequent transformations, small differences in a non-polarizing issue would weight the same as significant differences on a critical ideological domain. Furthermore, the lack of salience measures complicates the task of selecting the set of issues to be used for mapping ideological linkages in a system. Additionally, the flexibility and "model-free" nature of CA also impose as a counterpart the need to conduct a careful and well-informed variable-selection procedure.

One-way ANOVA analyses with issues as dependent variables and partisan groups as factors may tentatively resolve both problems described above as well as guide issue-selection. Applying this technique in each original (disaggregated) dataset, it is possible to identify those issues in which at least two parties have a significantly different mean, controlling for stochastic variation.<sup>223</sup>

After running these analyses for congressional leaders and their voters (both grouped in terms of their partisan affiliation --congress members-- or declared vote intention --voters--) it is possible to establish comparisons across levels. On this basis, we can then decide which issues should be included in the CA procedure.

Although it might downplay severe situations of ideological cartelization by neglecting issues in which parties do not represent a latent (but important) ideological divide, I decided to include only those issues in which partisan groups passed significant F-tests in both levels.<sup>224</sup> On the basis of this restrictive criterion, it is possible to constrain the mapping to currently active

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<sup>223</sup>The F-statistic of the ANOVA test would be significant if within group variance (inside a partisan group) is significantly lower than that observed between groups (different partisan groups). In this case I used a .05 threshold to adjudicate results but given that the F-test is highly sensitive to degrees of freedom variations, researchers working with smaller number of cases (particularly for elites where response consistence is expected to be higher) could eventually turn to less stringent criteria. Although they are not included here, ANOVA results are also available under request and can be posted on the author's webpage.

<sup>224</sup>Obviously, a situation of "polarizing-trusteeship" could also be go unseen as a consequence of these restrictions (see Kitschelt et al 1999, for a definition of the concept). However, if this technique is used as a complement to univariate mappings these risks are considerably minimized.

issues for which at least some partisan groups stand on different ideological positions. The proposed solution also mitigates the effects of introducing spurious rankings in the procedure, as “surviving” rankings represent variables in which significant variance existed, making those rankings meaningful.

The reduction in the number of available issues (particularly in context of extreme scarcity) is an obvious downside of this criterion. However, as CA allows the inclusion of supplementary rows and columns, it is still possible to map discarded issues without introducing significant biases. Finally, but also relying on the capacity to map supplementary rows, I decided to represent the relative positions of parties for which the number of observations was small.<sup>225</sup>

Tables AII-2 to AII-5 present the multiple response tables constructed on the basis of the available information and the transformations explained in table AII-1 and in the text. The data cells correspond to level-specific (party, level –voters and congress members- and educational terciles) ordinal rankings of issue-positions. However, tables AII-2 to AII-5 also include the original level-specific means to assist on the interpretation and judgment of CA outcomes. The maps presented in Chapters 6 and 7 were generated by using each ranking table (AII-2 to AII-5) as input matrix on the CA procedure included in XLSTAT.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>225</sup>Although not imputed in the procedure, the number of observations for each partisan group is detailed in tables A1-A4. The parties that I decided to represent as supplementary rows were the Nuevo Espacio (NE) in Uruguay and the Communist Party (PCOM) in Chile. Whereas the NE only had three congressional representatives and nine survey respondents declaring a favorable vote intention, the PCOM did not have congressional representatives and only had fifteen respondents stating that they would vote for the party if elections were held at that time.

<sup>226</sup>Tables A1-A4 are displayed in the appendix. XLSTAT is a set of statistical macros that run under Microsoft Excel. This allows the program to draw on Excel’s graphical capabilities and data management flexibility. Similar procedures that generate equivalent results are available through most statistical packages, with SPSS (Categories) being a popular alternative in spite of some drawbacks (see Clausen 1998). More information and documentation on XLSTAT can be downloaded from [www.xlstat.com](http://www.xlstat.com)

Table AII-2:

Aggregate party data for Chile, first wave \*

	leftright	divorce	abortion	corruption	intesta	polSOC	inflation	moresay	environm	legitim	privati	N
UDI	0.64	0.2	0.2	0.38	0.71	0.96	0.7	0.9	0.44	0.43	0.27	10
PPD	0.36	0.82	0.56	0.53	0.89	0.67	0.71	0.71	0.4	0.25	0.56	11
RN	0.66	0.47	0.29	0.45	0.7	0.84	0.83	0.85	0.41	0.33	0.36	22
PDC	0.45	0.56	0.28	0.53	0.83	0.67	0.62	0.51	0.33	0.26	0.55	30
PS	0.32	0.74	0.6	0.59	0.82	0.63	0.77	0.63	0.36	0.29	0.65	14
Udi	0.72	0.39	0.17	0.61	0.5	0.46	0.32	0.35	0.72	0.52	0.51	62
Ppd	0.45	0.5	0.21	0.61	0.54	0.44	0.33	0.34	0.75	0.42	0.59	123
Rn	0.72	0.43	0.27	0.59	0.52	0.47	0.3	0.35	0.67	0.54	0.61	63
Pdc	0.53	0.44	0.2	0.62	0.62	0.45	0.31	0.33	0.69	0.43	0.59	216
Ps	0.38	0.52	0.23	0.62	0.62	0.48	0.31	0.28	0.61	0.44	0.62	68
Pchi	0.16	0.55	0.31	0.6	0.74	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.58	0.38	0.79	15
ANOVA	*	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	*	*	
CA data	<b>leftright</b>	<b>intesta</b>	<b>legitim</b>	<b>privati</b>	<b>corruption</b>	<b>polSOC</b>	<b>inflation</b>	<b>moresay</b>	<b>environm</b>	<b>divorce</b>	<b>abortion</b>	
<b>PDC</b>	3	4	2	3	3	2	1	1	1	3	2	
<b>RN</b>	5	1	4	2	2	4	5	4	4	2	3	
<b>UDI</b>	4	2	5	1	1	5	2	5	5	1	1	
<b>PPD</b>	2	5	1	4	4	3	3	3	3	5	4	
<b>PS</b>	1	3	3	5	5	1	4	2	2	4	5	
<b>udi</b>	6	1	5	1	4	4	4	4	5	1	1	
<b>ppd</b>	3	3	2	2	3	2	5	3	6	4	3	
<b>rn</b>	5	2	6	4	1	5	1	5	3	2	5	
<b>pdc</b>	4	5	3	3	6	3	2	2	4	3	2	
<b>ps</b>	2	4	4	5	5	6	3	1	2	5	4	
<b>pchi</b>	1	6	1	6	2	1	6	6	1	6	6	

\*Labels in bold correspond to rows and columns imputed to the CA analysis.

Table AII-3:

Cross-sectional (education) party data for Chile, first wave\*

	leftright	divorce	abortion	corruption	intesta	polSOC	inflation	moresay	environm	legitim	privati	N
udile	0.72	0.33	0.16	0.6	0.63	0.4	0.31	0.31	0.72	0.55	0.55	24
ppdle	0.42	0.53	0.19	0.6	0.6	0.38	0.28	0.32	0.79	0.38	0.65	31
rnle	0.73	0.47	0.27	0.57	0.57	0.45	0.26	0.34	0.61	0.52	0.53	23
pdcle	0.53	0.37	0.17	0.61	0.68	0.43	0.3	0.33	0.67	0.43	0.65	86
psle	0.41	0.4	0.16	0.61	0.6	0.51	0.31	0.29	0.6	0.41	0.65	32
udime	0.68	0.39	0.24	0.54	0.51	0.38	0.31	0.3	0.81	0.5	0.48	14
ppdme	0.49	0.55	0.22	0.56	0.54	0.42	0.32	0.38	0.7	0.43	0.57	46
rnme	0.72	0.42	0.29	0.56	0.55	0.43	0.28	0.36	0.81	0.59	0.7	26
pdcm	0.53	0.49	0.21	0.62	0.6	0.47	0.3	0.32	0.72	0.43	0.59	67
psme	0.39	0.61	0.26	0.63	0.66	0.44	0.32	0.28	0.63	0.51	0.58	17
udihe	0.75	0.43	0.15	0.67	0.37	0.58	0.34	0.4	0.67	0.48	0.5	23
ppdhe	0.43	0.42	0.2	0.66	0.52	0.5	0.35	0.32	0.77	0.44	0.57	45
rnhe	0.73	0.41	0.25	0.67	0.33	0.6	0.41	0.32	0.55	0.48	0.58	13
pdche	0.52	0.46	0.24	0.64	0.57	0.45	0.32	0.33	0.71	0.44	0.5	63
pshe	0.32	0.64	0.32	0.63	0.59	0.47	0.31	0.28	0.59	0.44	0.63	18
CA data	<b>leftright</b>	<b>intesta</b>	<b>legitim</b>	<b>privati</b>	<b>corruption</b>	<b>polSOC</b>	<b>inflation</b>	<b>moresay</b>	<b>environm</b>	<b>divorce</b>	<b>abortion</b>	
<b>PDC</b>	3	4	2	3	3	2	1	1	1	3	2	
<b>RN</b>	5	1	4	2	2	4	5	4	4	2	3	
<b>UDI</b>	4	2	5	1	1	5	2	5	5	1	1	
<b>PPD</b>	2	5	1	4	4	3	3	3	3	5	4	
<b>PS</b>	1	3	3	5	5	1	4	2	2	4	5	
<b>udile</b>	5	4	6	2	2	3	4.5	2	5	1	2	
<b>ppdle</b>	3	3	2	4	3	2	2	3	6	5	4	
<b>rnle</b>	6	1	5	1	1	5	1	5	3	4	5	
<b>pdcle</b>	4	5	4	5	5	4	3	4	4	2	3	
<b>psle</b>	2	2	3	3	4	6	4.5	1	2	3	1	
<b>udime</b>	5	1	3.5	1	2	2	4	3	6	1	3	
<b>ppdme</b>	3	2	2	2	4	3	6	6	3	5	2	
<b>rnme</b>	6	3	6	5	3	4	2	5	5	2	6	
<b>pdcm</b>	4	4	1	4	5	6	3	4	4	4	1	

**Table AII-3 (cont.)**

<b>psme</b>	2	5	5	3	6	5	5	2	2	6	5
<b>udihe</b>	6	2	5	1	6	5	4	5	3.5	3	1
<b>ppdhe</b>	3	3	2	3	4	4	5	2	6	2	2
<b>rnhe</b>	5	1	6	4	5	6	6	3	1	1	4
<b>pshe</b>	2	5	4	5	2	3	1	1	2	5	5
pchi	1	6	1	6	2	1	6	6	1	6	6

\*Labels in bold correspond to rows and columns imputed to the CA analysis.

Table AII-4:

## Aggregate party data for Uruguay, first wave \*

	leftright	divorce	abortion	corruption	polsoc	inflation	moresay	environm	legitim	intesta	privati	N
FA	0.3	0.98	0.82	0.46	0.45	0.67	0.78	0.47	0.28	0.93	0.65	25
PC	0.49	0.89	0.71	0.67	0.72	0.66	0.84	0.67	0.25	0.81	0.5	22
PN	0.5	0.93	0.51	0.65	0.71	0.48	0.85	0.6	0.27	0.75	0.49	22
NE	0.43	1	0.6	0.45	0.75	0.5	0.85	0.4	0.25	0.8	0.6	4
fa	0.36	0.73	0.5	0.58	0.33	0.3	0.29	0.62	0.39	0.64	0.6	295
pc	0.74	0.53	0.29	0.65	0.47	0.3	0.34	0.68	0.41	0.56	0.54	190
pn	0.7	0.53	0.3	0.69	0.41	0.29	0.33	0.69	0.4	0.54	0.52	160
ne	0.51	0.69	0.46	0.58	0.44	0.28	0.28	0.6	0.38	0.57	0.52	56
ANOVA	*	-	*	*	*	-	*	-	-	*	*	
CA data	<b>leftright</b>	<b>abortion</b>	<b>corruption</b>	<b>Polsoc</b>	<b>intesta</b>	<b>privati</b>	divorce	inflation	moresay	environm	legitim	
<b>FA</b>	1	4	2	1	4	4	3	4	1	2	4	
<b>PC</b>	3	3	4	3	3	2	1	3	2	4	1.5	
<b>PN</b>	4	1	3	2	1	1	2	1	3	3	3	
<b>fa</b>	1	4	1	1	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	
<b>pc</b>	4	1	3	4	2	3	2	3	4	3	4	
<b>pn</b>	3	2	4	2	1	1	1	2	3	4	3	
NE	2	2	1	4	2	3	4	2	4	1	1.5	
ne	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	1	1	1	1	

\*Labels in bold correspond to rows and columns imputed to the CA analysis.

Table AII-5:

## Cross-sectional (education) party data for Uruguay, first wave

1995-00	leftright	divorce	abortion	corruption	polsoc	inflation	moresay	environm	legitim	intesta	privati	n
Fale	0.4	0.64	0.34	0.57	0.35	0.3	0.29	0.66	0.38	0.63	0.59	71
Pcle	0.79	0.54	0.28	0.65	0.44	0.28	0.33	0.68	0.42	0.6	0.58	106
pnle	0.74	0.52	0.28	0.69	0.39	0.3	0.34	0.75	0.42	0.59	0.54	82
fame	0.37	0.7	0.5	0.56	0.3	0.31	0.31	0.65	0.39	0.66	0.6	97
pcme	0.67	0.52	0.27	0.64	0.47	0.29	0.33	0.68	0.43	0.59	0.52	50
pnme	0.66	0.56	0.31	0.64	0.32	0.29	0.33	0.65	0.4	0.55	0.52	40
fahe	0.32	0.8	0.59	0.59	0.35	0.29	0.27	0.59	0.39	0.63	0.62	127
pche	0.68	0.54	0.38	0.68	0.54	0.34	0.38	0.66	0.39	0.4	0.5	33
pnhe	0.67	0.51	0.34	0.74	0.54	0.28	0.3	0.61	0.36	0.45	0.47	38
CA data	<b>leftright</b>	<b>abortion</b>	<b>corruption</b>	<b>polsoc</b>	<b>intesta</b>	<b>privati</b>	divorce	inflation	moresay	environm	legitim	
<b>FA</b>	1	4	2	1	4	4	3	4	1	2	4	
<b>PC</b>	3	3	4	3	3	2	1	3	2	4	1.5	
<b>PN</b>	4	1	3	2	1	1	2	1	3	3	3	
<b>pcle</b>	4	2	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	
<b>pnle</b>	3	1	4	2	1	2	1	4	4	4	2	
<b>fale</b>	1	3	2	1	3	4	3	3	2	1	1	
<b>pcme</b>	4	1	3	4	3	1	1	3	3	4	4	
<b>pnme</b>	3	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	4	3	2	
<b>fame</b>	1	3	1	1	4	4	4	4	2	2	1	
<b>pche</b>	4	2	3	4	1	2	2	4	4	4	3	
<b>pnhe</b>	3	1	4	3	2	1	1	2	3	2	2	
<b>fahe</b>	1	4	1	1	4	4	4	3	2	1	4	
NE	2	2	1	4	2	3	4	2	4	1	1.5	
ne	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	1	1	1	1	

\*Labels in bold correspond to rows and columns imputed to the CA analysis.

**Table AII-6: Proximity Matrices, Chile First Wave**

Case	1:DCEL	2:DCLE	3:DCME	4:DCHE	5:RNEL	6:RNLE	7:RNME	8:RNHE	9:UDIEL	10:UDILE	11:UDIME	12:UDIHE
1:DCEL		0.21	0.13	0.15	0.33	0.47	0.61	0.49	0.43	0.30	0.37	0.55
2:DCLE	0.21		0.00	0.07	0.18	0.26	0.34	0.21	0.29	0.22	0.24	0.19
3:DCME	0.13	0.00		0.03	0.12	0.28	0.34	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.15	0.16
4:DCHE	0.15	0.07	0.03		0.10	0.20	0.33	0.36	0.17	0.08	0.14	0.22
5:RNEL	0.33	0.18	0.12	0.10		0.18	0.19	0.16	0.09	0.22	0.04	0.10
6:RNLE	0.47	0.26	0.28	0.20	0.18		0.25	0.31	0.36	0.29	0.33	0.30
7:RNME	0.61	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.19	0.25		0.38	0.19	0.30	0.36	0.28
8:RNHE	0.49	0.21	0.20	0.36	0.16	0.31	0.38		0.39	0.53	0.23	0.17
9:UDIEL	0.43	0.29	0.22	0.17	0.09	0.36	0.19	0.39		0.28	0.11	0.13
10:UDILE	0.30	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.22	0.29	0.30	0.53	0.28		0.26	0.35
11:UDIME	0.37	0.24	0.15	0.14	0.04	0.33	0.36	0.23	0.11	0.26		0.08
12:UDIHE	0.55	0.19	0.16	0.22	0.10	0.30	0.28	0.17	0.13	0.35	0.08	
13:PPDEL	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.31	0.32	0.56	0.50	0.48	0.29	0.41	0.55
14:PPDLE	0.27	0.27	0.13	0.19	0.19	0.56	0.34	0.40	0.18	0.30	0.24	0.28
15:PPDME	0.44	0.23	0.19	0.13	0.18	0.28	0.45	0.52	0.36	0.36	0.32	0.37
16:PPDHE	0.20	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.14	0.42	0.46	0.36	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.30
17:PSEL	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.21	0.33	0.37	0.57	0.37	0.58	0.34	0.41	0.56
18:PSLE	0.29	0.20	0.19	0.27	0.20	0.46	0.40	0.33	0.31	0.49	0.29	0.42
19:PSME	0.22	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.35	0.30	0.63	0.29	0.49	0.37	0.42	0.41
20:PSHE	0.18	0.24	0.26	0.20	0.39	0.30	0.42	0.55	0.54	0.22	0.50	0.67
21:PCLE	0.39	0.32	0.30	0.35	0.56	0.53	0.95	0.60	0.84	0.73	0.61	0.76
22:PCME	0.18	0.34	0.35	0.36	0.65	0.63	0.84	0.75	0.89	0.49	0.77	1.00
23:PCHE	0.37	0.46	0.43	0.34	0.64	0.55	0.72	0.98	0.76	0.59	0.81	0.99
This is a dissimilarity matrix												

Table AII-6 (cont.)

Case	13:PPDEL	14:PPDLE	15:PPDME	16:PPDHE	17:PSEL	18:PSLE	19:PSME	20:PSHE	21:PCLE	22:PCME	23:PCHE
1:DCEL	0.10	0.27	0.44	0.20	0.18	0.29	0.22	0.18	0.39	0.18	0.37
2:DCLE	0.12	0.27	0.23		0.19	0.20	0.08	0.24	0.32	0.34	0.46
3:DCME	0.12	0.13	0.19	0.06	0.17	0.19	0.13	0.26	0.30	0.35	0.43
4:DCHE	0.09	0.19	0.13	0.08	0.21	0.27	0.17	0.20	0.35	0.36	0.34
5:RNEL	0.31	0.19	0.18	0.14	0.33	0.20	0.35	0.39	0.56	0.65	0.64
6:RNLE	0.32	0.56	0.28	0.42	0.37	0.46	0.30	0.30	0.53	0.63	0.55
7:RNME	0.56	0.34	0.45	0.46	0.57	0.40	0.63	0.42	0.95	0.84	0.72
8:RNHE	0.50	0.40	0.52	0.36	0.37	0.33	0.29	0.55	0.60	0.75	0.98
9:UDIEL	0.48	0.18	0.36	0.28	0.58	0.31	0.49	0.54	0.84	0.89	0.76
10:UDILE	0.29	0.30	0.36	0.24	0.34	0.49	0.37	0.22	0.73	0.49	0.59
11:UDIME	0.41	0.24	0.32	0.22	0.41	0.29	0.42	0.50	0.61	0.77	0.81
12:UDIHE	0.55	0.28	0.37	0.30	0.56	0.42	0.41	0.67	0.76	1.00	0.99
13:PPDEL		0.37	0.17	0.12	0.08	0.25	0.14	0.10	0.13	0.08	0.12
14:PPDLE	0.37		0.34	0.19	0.34	0.39	0.48	0.46	0.66	0.60	0.62
15:PPDME	0.17	0.34		0.14	0.28	0.33	0.39	0.39	0.29	0.52	0.30
16:PPDHE	0.12	0.19	0.14		0.21	0.15	0.23	0.32	0.40	0.37	0.46
17:PSEL	0.08	0.34	0.28	0.21		0.32	0.20	0.09	0.17	0.10	0.30
18:PSLE	0.25	0.39	0.33	0.15	0.32		0.32	0.33	0.51	0.47	0.53
19:PSME	0.14	0.48	0.39	0.23	0.20	0.32		0.25	0.32	0.33	0.53
20:PSHE	0.10	0.46	0.39	0.32	0.09	0.33	0.25		0.39	0.11	0.24
21:PCLE	0.13	0.66	0.29	0.40	0.17	0.51	0.32	0.39		0.24	0.23
22:PCME	0.08	0.60	0.52	0.37	0.10	0.47	0.33	0.11	0.24		0.19
23:PCHE	0.12	0.62	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.53	0.53	0.24	0.23	0.19	
This is a dissimilarity matrix											

**Table AII-7: Proximity Matrices, Chile Second Wave**

Case	1:DCEL	2:PPDEL	3:PSEL	4:RNEL	5:UDIEL	6:DCLE	7:PCLE	8:PPDLE	9:PSLE	10:RNLE	11:UDILE	12:DCME
1:DCEL		0.09	0.20	0.17	0.21	0.07	0.32	0.12	0.14	0.30	0.29	0.13
2:PPDEL	0.09		0.17	0.36	0.49	0.19	0.34	0.13	0.17	0.64	0.37	0.24
3:PSEL	0.20	0.17		0.40	0.67	0.19	0.51	0.37	0.20	0.62	0.25	0.51
4:RNEL	0.17	0.36	0.40		0.10	0.11	0.55	0.33	0.39	0.08	0.21	0.21
5:UDIEL	0.21	0.49	0.67	0.10		0.21	0.46	0.37	0.50	0.11	0.45	0.25
6:DCLE	0.07	0.19	0.19	0.11	0.21		0.48	0.25	0.18	0.20	0.19	0.26
7:PCLE	0.32	0.34	0.51	0.55	0.46	0.48		0.56	0.51	0.75	0.61	0.38
8:PPDLE	0.12	0.13	0.37	0.33	0.37	0.25	0.56		0.31	0.56	0.56	0.31
9:PSLE	0.14	0.17	0.20	0.39	0.50	0.18	0.51	0.31		0.47	0.27	0.33
10:RNLE	0.30	0.64	0.61	0.08	0.11	0.20	0.75	0.56	0.47		0.25	0.35
11:UDILE	0.28	0.37	0.25	0.21	0.45	0.19	0.61	0.56	0.27	0.25		0.33
12:DCME	0.13	0.24	0.51	0.21	0.25	0.26	0.38	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.33	
13:PCME	0.30	0.16	0.04	0.63	0.90	0.33	0.49	0.44	0.24	0.89	0.36	0.60
14:PPDME	0.06	0.20	0.31	0.26	0.20	0.15	0.23	0.20	0.28	0.38	0.42	0.25
15:PSME	0.13	0.26	0.29	0.38	0.40	0.15	0.45	0.39	0.05	0.41	0.35	0.33
16:RNME	0.34	0.54	0.51	0.13	0.23	0.24	0.70	0.49	0.38	0.11	0.18	0.41
17:UDIME	0.27	0.45	0.47	0.06	0.13	0.15	0.64	0.41	0.46	0.10	0.22	0.37
18:DCHE	0.13	0.21	0.42	0.13	0.24	0.18	0.47	0.28	0.38	0.32	0.29	0.05
19:PCHE	0.35	0.21	0.05	0.70	1	0.38	0.61	0.52	0.25	0.95	0.38	0.64
20:PPDHE	0.02	0.10	0.17	0.17	0.24	0.03	0.39	0.18	0.07	0.27	0.22	0.19
21:PSHE	0.06	0.11	0.19	0.31	0.42	0.16	0.42	0.15	0.11	0.46	0.32	0.23
22:RNHE	0.35	0.63	0.64	0.12	0.10	0.27	0.53	0.60	0.53	0.06	0.25	0.36
23:UDIHE	0.32	0.59	0.65	0.24	0.11	0.27	0.50	0.52	0.40	0.16	0.41	0.46
This is a dissimilarity matrix												

Table AII-7 (cont.)

Case	13:PCME	14:PPDME	15:PSME	16:RNME	17:UDIME	18:DCHE	19:PCHE	20:PPDHE	21:PSHE	22:RNHE	23:UDIHE
1:DCEL	0.30	0.06	0.13	0.34	0.27	0.13	0.35	0.02	0.07	0.35	0.32
2:PPDEL	0.16	0.20	0.26	0.54	0.45	0.21	0.21	0.10	0.12	0.63	0.59
3:PSEL	0.04	0.31	0.29	0.51	0.47	0.42	0.05	0.17	0.19	0.64	0.65
4:RNEL	0.63	0.26	0.38	0.13	0.06	0.13	0.70	0.17	0.31	0.12	0.24
5:UDIEL	0.89	0.20	0.40	0.23	0.13	0.24	1	0.24	0.42	0.10	0.11
6:DCLE	0.33	0.15	0.15	0.24	0.15	0.18	0.38	0.03	0.17	0.27	0.27
7:PCLE	0.49	0.23	0.45	0.70	0.64	0.47	0.61	0.39	0.42	0.53	0.50
8:PPDLE	0.45	0.19	0.39	0.49	0.41	0.28	0.52	0.18	0.15	0.60	0.53
9:PSLE	0.24	0.28	0.05	0.38	0.46	0.38	0.25	0.07	0.11	0.53	0.40
10:RNLE	0.89	0.38	0.41	0.11	0.10	0.32	0.95	0.27	0.46	0.06	0.16
11:UDILE	0.36	0.42	0.35	0.18	0.22	0.29	0.38	0.22	0.32	0.25	0.41
12:DCME	0.59	0.25	0.33	0.41	0.37	0.05	0.65	0.19	0.23	0.36	0.46
13:PCME		0.41	0.37	0.71	0.69	0.55	0	0.27	0.23	0.87	0.85
14:PPDME	0.41		0.20	0.46	0.35	0.24	0.50	0.13	0.16	0.35	0.28
15:PSME	0.37	0.20		0.42	0.48	0.39	0.40	0.08	0.14	0.47	0.32
16:RNME	0.71	0.46	0.42		0.10	0.41	0.76	0.27	0.39	0.09	0.17
17:UDIME	0.69	0.35	0.48	0.10		0.27	0.76	0.22	0.46	0.09	0.18
18:DCHE	0.55	0.24	0.39	0.41	0.27		0.61	0.17	0.28	0.37	0.50
19:PCHE	0	0.50	0.40	0.76	0.76	0.61		0.31	0.27	0.95	0.95
20:PPDHE	0.27	0.13	0.08	0.27	0.22	0.17	0.31		0.10	0.32	0.27
21:PSHE	0.23	0.16	0.14	0.39	0.46	0.28	0.27	0.10		0.52	0.48
22:RNHE	0.87	0.35	0.47	0.09	0.09	0.37	0.95	0.32	0.52		0.08
23:UDIHE	0.85	0.28	0.32	0.17	0.18	0.49	0.95	0.27	0.48	0.08	
This is a dissimilarity matrix											

**Table AII-8: Proximity Matrices, Uruguay First Wave**

Case	1:FAEI	2:NEEI	3:PCEI	4:PNEI	5:FAHE	6:NEHE	7:PCHE	8:PNHE	9:FALE	10:NELE	11:PCLE	12:PNLE	13:FAME	14:NEME	15:PCME	16:PNME
1:FAEI		0.63	0.52	0.7	0	0.4	0.81	0.6	0.1	0.45	0.8	0.51	0.07	0.16	0.8	0.78
2:NEEI	0.6		0.46	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.36	0.3	0.3	0.36	0.36	0.42	0.41	0.33	0.4	0.3
3:PCEI	0.5	0.46		0.2	0.7	0.2	0.19	0.1	0.4	0.47	0.22	0.06	0.52	0.44	0.1	0.09
4:PNEI	0.7	0.39	0.25		0.7	0.2	0.29	0.1	0.6	0.62	0.02	0.15	0.65	0.34	0.1	0.23
5:FAHE	0	0.47	0.74	0.7		0.4	1	0.7	0.1	0.37	0.79	0.73	0.08	0	1	0.92
6:NEHE	0.4	0.28	0.2	0.2	0.4		0.57	0.4	0.2	0.54	0.27	0.27	0.22	0.33	0.3	0.43
7:PCHE	0.8	0.36	0.19	0.3	1	0.6		0.3	0.7	0.7	0.14	0.17	0.86	0.68	0.1	0.08
8:PNHE	0.6	0.33	0.06	0.1	0.7	0.4	0.3		0.5	0.4	0.29	0.06	0.59	0.35	0.2	0.06
9:FALE	0.1	0.3	0.44	0.6	0.1	0.2	0.73	0.5		0.63	0.59	0.4	0.06	0.21	0.7	0.49
10:NELE	0.4	0.36	0.47	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.6		0.78	0.71	0.44	0.21	0.7	0.65
11:PCLE	0.8	0.36	0.22	0	0.8	0.3	0.14	0.3	0.6	0.78		0.25	0.81	0.41	0	0.22
12:PNLE	0.5	0.42	0.06	0.1	0.7	0.3	0.17	0.1	0.4	0.71	0.25		0.43	0.54	0.1	0.13
13:FAME	0.1	0.41	0.52	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.86	0.6	0.1	0.44	0.81	0.43		0.27	0.8	0.78
14:NEME	0.2	0.33	0.44	0.3	0	0.3	0.68	0.3	0.2	0.21	0.41	0.54	0.27		0.7	0.57
15:PCME	0.8	0.41	0.14	0.1	1	0.3	0.13	0.2	0.7	0.7	0.05	0.14	0.83	0.65		0.27
16:PNME	0.8	0.3	0.09	0.2	0.9	0.4	0.08	0.1	0.5	0.65	0.22	0.13	0.78	0.57	0.3	
This is a dissimilarity matrix																

**Table AII-9: Proximity Matrices, Uruguay Second Wave**

Case	1:FAEI	2:NEEI	3:PCEI	4:PNEI	5:FAHE	6:NEHE	7:PCHE	8:PNHE	9:FALE	10:NELE	11:PCLE	12:PNLE	13:FAME	14:NEME	15:PCME	16:PNME
1:FAEI		0.43	0.90	0.75	0.07	0.45	0.52	0.92	0.05	0.84	0.69	0.43	0.01	0.83	0.41	0.69
2:NEEI	0.43		0.47	0.53	0.51	0.29	0.16	0.35	0.37	0.41	0.21	0.36	0.34	0.31	0.27	0.37
3:PCEI	0.9	0.47		0.25	0.61	0.65	0.14	0.11	0.49	0.65	0.32	0.10	0.60	0.55	0.25	0.08
4:PNEI	0.75	0.53	0.25		0.48	0.65	0.16	0.13	0.32	0.43	0.30	0.41	0.46	0.39	0.17	0.38
5:FAHE	0.07	0.51	0.61	0.48		0.66	0.45	0.70	0.06	0.71	0.65	0.30	0.09	0.72	0.39	0.47
6:NEHE	0.45	0.29	0.65	0.65	0.66		0.61	0.91	0.38	0.60	0.58	0.54	0.48	0.71	0.36	0.48
7:PCHE	0.52	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.45	0.61		0.054	0.29	0.56	0.04	0.14	0.23	0.46	0.04	0.24
8:PNHE	0.93	0.35	0.11	0.13	0.7	0.91	0.05		0.52	0.47	0.26	0.33	0.62	0.21	0.34	0.34
9:FALE	0.05	0.37	0.49	0.32	0.06	0.38	0.29	0.52		0.67	0.57	0.18	0.02	0.41	0.22	0.58
10:NELE	0.84	0.41	0.65	0.43	0.71	0.60	0.56	0.47	0.67		0.84	1	0.60	0.35	0.79	0.58
11:PCLE	0.69	0.21	0.31	0.30	0.65	0.58	0.04	0.25	0.56	0.84		0.30	0.52	0.77	0	0.22
12:PNLE	0.43	0.36	0.10	0.41	0.3	0.54	0.14	0.33	0.18	1	0.30		0.33	0.61	0.15	0.20
13:FAME	0.01	0.34	0.60	0.46	0.09	0.48	0.23	0.62	0.02	0.60	0.52	0.33		0.71	0.22	0.60
14:NEME	0.83	0.31	0.55	0.39	0.72	0.71	0.46	0.21	0.41	0.35	0.77	0.61	0.71		0.73	0.77
15:PCME	0.41	0.27	0.25	0.17	0.39	0.36	0.04	0.34	0.22	0.79	0	0.15	0.22	0.73		0.27
16:PNME	0.69	0.37	0.08	0.38	0.47	0.48	0.24	0.34	0.58	0.58	0.22	0.20	0.608	0.77	0.27	
This is a dissimilarity matrix																

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