WITHIN AND WITHOUT: IDENTITY AND IMMIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN POLITICS

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Abstract

LISA COURTNEY FOX: Within and Without: Identity and Immigration in Contemporary European Politics.
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe.)

How do feelings of national identity shape the attitudes of Western Europeans toward immigrants and immigration policy? The three empirical studies presented in this dissertation explore this question.

The first study develops a typology of national identities and maps them onto the commonly-used left-right dimension of political positionality. Then, by using each type in a multivariate regression analysis, I show that each the identity types have a differential impact on attitudes toward immigrant groups and immigration policy. Finally, I also show that the salience of each type of identity varies between countries in Western Europe. This analysis uses the large-N, cross-national survey data from thirteen Western European countries polled by the International Social Survey Program in 2003. The results provide insight into reason why debates about national identity and sovereignty are almost entirely absent in some Western European countries political discourse, while hotly contested in others.

In the second study, the Netherlands is taken as a critical case study in the development of anti-immigrant attitudes. The data for this paper was drawn from two surveys, administered ten years apart: one administered in 1998 with the aid of the University of Utrecht, and my own survey in 2007. The shocking events that took place in the Netherlands during this decade were connected to the immigrant community either tangentially or directly. These unforeseeable events presented a natural experiment, making it possible to infer the impact of these events on attitudes toward immigrants.
I show that negative attitudes toward Muslims increased significantly between the two surveys.

The third paper adds an explicitly political dimension to the analysis of anti-immigrant sentiment. Using a multi-level model, I examine the relationship between strength of party cue and anti-immigrant sentiment. There is significant variation at the party level on this issue. The results show that political parties on the right have more coherent positions on immigration than parties on the left, and that the relationship between party cues and anti-immigrant sentiment is strong and significant: political cues do impact individual attitudes on this issue.
To my parents, Lynn and Elizabeth Fox, *sine quibus non.*
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Chapter 1

Introduction

How do feelings of national identity shape the attitudes of Western Europeans toward immigrants and immigration policy? The three empirical studies presented in this dissertation explore this question.

Over the course of building these theory-building projects, it has become clear that the formulation of a clear and precise definition of identity poses a difficult yet fundamentally important challenge. The persistent instability of this concept has led some scholars to the misguided conclusion that it should be modified or abandoned altogether. As we seek to understand political attitudes, however, the notion of identity reappears time and again.

The following three studies probe the original question on three different dimensions. Each dimension carries its own epistemic lineage; each contains a dialogue on the meaning of identity which rarely engages the other two traditions. And yet they all find themselves confronted by the same questions. How does one come to have feelings of identity—of sameness and commonality—with a particular group of people? How has the imaginary community of the nation come to be a constituent and consistent part of individual identity? Is national identity distinct from other forms of identity, and if so, how? The inherently political nature of national identity raises the questions of how,
and by whom, the boundaries of the national community are defined. Finally, how does this fit into the history and political institutions of Western European nations in the present day?

Each one of these questions has produced voluminous research and distinct fields of inquiry: identity theory, social identity theory, nationalism, immigration and migration studies, and a wide variety of analyses of European politics. I will not attempt to provide a comprehensive summary of the literature in each of these fields, but rather to show the essential connections between these theories and the ways I have approached this particular puzzle.

Theories of Identity

In their critical review of identity as a conceptual tool in social scientific analysis, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that the term identity has been used to represent a variety of concepts: identity as self-understanding and distinction; identity as a feeling of being a member of a community; identity as core, essential selfhood and identity as constructed, fragmented, and decidedly non-essential. Even advocates for the use of identity acknowledge that a state of definitional anarchy exists (Abdelal et al. 2006: 695). I argue that identities can be more clearly theorized by specifying their form, function, situation, and salience. Form can be used to describe both how an identity is formed as well as to specify the types of identity. Function is a way to understand the active part of an identity. Situation refers to the location of an identity in time: the ways in which identity is made possible by a particular set of historical and cultural circumstances. Salience is the process whereby an identity becomes important and influences cognition. Each of the papers in this thesis approaches the relationship between identity and attitudes toward immigration from a different perspective. Using the rubric above, the first paper considers the question from the angle of form: can
a clear conceptualization and measurement of identity types reveal interesting cross-national and cross-typical differences? The second paper can be seen as addressing questions of situation and salience by looking at the rising importance of national identity in the Dutch context due to a specific concatenation of events. The third paper examines anti-immigrant sentiment in the context of partisan political competition; this can be seen as both form (parties shaping attitudes) and function (whether this works well as a way to distinguish parties from one another).

Identity is a mode of perception that determines how one sees the world, what one considers important or relevant, and what is considered appropriate behavior. This mode of perception is formed through an ongoing process of socialization, whereby each person comes to understand the roles that are available to them, the behavior associated with those roles in particular situations, and the consequences of stepping outside the boundaries of acceptable behavior. In terms of the political life of a society, this process of socialization influences sometimes in contradictory ways our ideas of citizenship and its associated responsibilities (Conover, Crewe and Searing 2009). Change over time in any given society is especially notable in terms of social categories, which alter markedly over time which categories are relevant, who belongs to them, and what is expected of members of those groups. Though each individual is formed by the society into which she was born, not all individuals will conform to social expectations. They may develop a self-conception which is at odds with the larger society, and behave differently because of it. If others begin to do the same, this will aggregate over time to change the common-sensical understanding of the whole society and in turn, this new social framework will be communicated to the next generation, setting the parameters of the next round of social change (Durkheim 1895; Foucault 1977).¹

¹Though the original genesis of this conception of social change was rooted in biology rather than sociology. I was thinking about the way DNA replicates through making copies of itself; over the course of countless copies some mistakes are made: mutations of the genome. These mutations, if successful
So identity—self-conception and worldview—is the connection between the micro-level of individual belief and behavior and the macro-level of social/cultural and political institutions. Erik Erikson, the progenitor of recent identity studies, gracefully described identity as “a process located in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes the identity of these two identities” (1968: 22; italics in the original). No individual ever perfectly identifies (in the sense that identity also means to become one with, or to make the same as) with her society, and that mismatch between individual will and social convention is what makes social change not only possible but inevitable.

Yet this processional movement between individual and society is still not well understood. Linking the detailed, personal information gathered at the individual level with the aggregate, averaged information of the societal level is difficult. Social identity theory concerns itself with this intersecting level between individual and group. Through minimal group experiments, Henri Tajfel and his collaborators discerned some fundamental human needs: first, that individuals wish to think well of themselves, and that they also wish to distinguish themselves from others (Tajfel 1970; Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986). These two desires drive individuals to identify with a group quickly, the authors believed, because positive evaluations of the group translate to positive evaluations of oneself, and self-worth is also derived from the status of the in-group relative to other groups (Turner et al. 1987). In social identity theory, the presence of other groups is assumed, because groups only exist in relationship with (and in comparison to) other groups. Other groups are usually judged to be inferior to one’s own group in some way (in order to protect the positive self-evaluation gained through group membership). More recent

(i.e. proving an evolutionary advantage in some way), go on to spread throughout a population. It seems to me that concepts, or theories, work the same way.
work has suggested, though, that in-group identification does not inevitably result in
or rely upon the derogation of other groups (Brewer 1999; Brewer and Pierce 2005).

The minimal group experiments created group identity without affect. The groups
had no particular history, no narrative framework, no meaningful symbols, and so on.
The question is: when is a group just a group? And when is it something more? Is an
identity that is political in origin and functionsuch as national identitiesomehow distinct
from other collective understandings based on ethnicity, occupation, or religion? As
national narratives emerge, do people simply expand affective attachment from smaller,
kinship-based groups to the larger, more abstract group?

The National as Natural

Eric Hobsbawm (1992) argued that the construction of national identities was a de-
liberate action on the part of the ruling classes. As liberal democratic movements
became widespread, conceptions of legitimate authority were changing; legitimacy was
beginning to be understood as a function of popular consent. Hobsbawm theorized
that the ruling classes invented a national mythology, popularized it and standardized
it through state institutions such as the bureaucracy and the educational system, and
thereby maintained their power. Hobsbawm has a convincing argument, yet the decon-
struction of a process of building national identities is unsatisfying, since it still cannot
show how individuals come to internalize these identities so thoroughly. In short, is
it possible to differentiate between a bowling league and a nation-state as a source of
identity?

One way in which national identity may be seen as distinct from other social clas-
sifications is through its association with force. Weber classically defined the state as
that entity which has a monopoly on legitimate violence within its territorial borders.
Bourdieu (1985) later expanded Weber’s definition to include symbolic force. The state
has an effective monopoly on legitimate classifications,² and it may force recognition of those classifications by any or all members of the society. Therefore it could be said that national identity is a forceful identity in more ways than one, and in a way that other identities are not.

Political struggle is defined by this “inextricably theoretical and practical struggle for the power to conserve or transform the social world by conserving or transforming the categories through which it is perceived” (Bourdieu 1985: 729). Symbolic force begins with the classification and naming of groups a forceful act, imposing divisions. For Bourdieu, the ultimate aim of politics is the acquisition of enough power (social and economic capital) to name and classify with authority. The political identities that emerge from this struggle over categories are “among the most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics” (R. Smith 2004: 303). When a politician is talking about the nation, he is speaking of it as a timeless, natural entity, yet his speech is itself part of the ongoing political struggle over the meaning and boundaries that define the nation.

To return to the question raised by Hobsbawm’s work above, why do people identify with the imagined community (Anderson 1991) of the nation? National identity may function as any generic group identity would: as a source of differentiation, self-worth, and status. National identities give a sense of belonging to a community that existed prior to one’s birth and which will, one imagines, persist after one’s death. Though what it means to be Dutch or American changes over time, the power of the national myth (or the strength of the national identity) is measured by the degree to which Dutch-ness or American-ness seems immutable and natural.

²It should be noted that there is a categorical overlap between the imagined community of the nation and the institutional structure of the state. When someone identifies as an American one is not identifying with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Yet the institutions of the state support and perpetuate classification schemes that determine identity, which in turn shapes the ways in which one may appeal to the state for redress (opportunity structures).
Identities of Interest: Contemporary Europe

Elections in the European Union (EU) have been marked by the continuing emphasis on immigration and national sovereignty. This has primarily benefited parties of the right, and, in particular, those parties that are usually labeled the “far-right.” In the most recent European Parliamentary (EP) elections (2009), several anti-EU, anti-immigration parties significantly increased their vote share compared to the last EP election (in 2004). The Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) won 17% of the vote from the Netherlands; the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) garnered 17.7% of the vote, which was double that of the previous election; the Danish Peoples Party (DF) also doubled their previous vote share, winning 14% of the vote. These parties have renewed the idea of each nation as a historically unique community, one which is currently threatened by outsiders (immigrants and the EU). The success of these parties, at both domestic and European levels of government, illustrates that national identities still retain emotional resonance and relevance.

Upon the victory of the PVV in a local election last March, Geert Wilders—the party’s leader and one of the most controversial political actors in the Netherlands—proclaimed:

“We are going to be the biggest party in the country… The leftist elite still believes in multiculturalism, coddling criminals, a European super-state and high taxes. But the rest of the Netherlands thinks differently. That silent

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3This categorization, frequently repeated not only in the popular press but occasionally in academic work as well, neglects the differences between parties on the right. Most importantly, the parties that are gaining ground in European politics are populist in orientation, not authoritarian/fascist. The new populist-right parties combine tough anti-crime messages with a moderately pro-welfare state position, which cuts across traditional cleavages nicely and thereby broadens their appeal. Finally, both the DF and the PVV take strongly pro-Israel stances, which stands in marked contrast to the explicitly anti-Semitic view of older right-wing parties such as the Front National.

4The elections for local councils were held on March 3, 2010.
majority now has a voice.”

This quote nicely encapsulates many of the main themes of the populist right, an anti-elitist position that links multiculturalism (immigrants) to crime (immigrants who are criminals) to the European superstate (more elitists) in rapid succession. In the general elections in June, the PVV received the third-largest share of votes (15.5%) and gained an astonishing 15 seats over the last election, giving the PVV a total of 24 seats, and putting them in the position of kingmaker.

National identity is likely to continue to be a catalytic issue in European politics. The current economic crisis, if prolonged, will exacerbate tensions over national sovereignty, throw into sharp relief the disparities of wealth and resources among the member states, and stiffen resistance to further integration of the European Union. Identity is an issue that works for political parties at a time when not much else will; though they may be powerless over many of the forces at work in the global economy, they can give meaning to and mobilize national identity in ways that make the country (and thereby her citizens) unique and powerful.

Plan of the Thesis

In my first paper, I develop a typology of national identities, and then use each type in a multivariate regression in order to compare their impact on attitudes on immigration.

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6The liberal VVD was the top party with 20.4%, which translated to a gain of 9 seats for a total of 31, followed closely by the PvdA (Labor) who won 19.6% of the vote but lost 3 seats, leaving the PvdA with 30 seats.

7The PVV and the DF are similar in other interesting ways: both parties surged onto the political scene to become the third largest parties in their government becoming a kingmaker party who could determine a successful coalitional government. Both parties benefited from unexpected events: the DF gained in popularity following the intense conflict over cartoons depicting Mohammed that were published in Danish newspapers, and the PVV were the inheritors of Pim Fortuyns political legacy.
In addition, I investigate the extent to which types of identity differ across countries. This analysis uses the large-N, cross-national survey data from the 2003 International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the most recent year in which the ISSP administered a survey directly about identity. Thirteen Western European countries in the ISSP survey were used in the analysis. The results show the differential impact of identity types, first by comparing the correlations of each type with left-right positionality, and then comparing the impact of each type of identity in a country-by-country multivariate regression analysis of anti-immigrant sentiment.

In my second paper, I take up the Netherlands as a case study in the development of anti-immigrant attitudes. The data for this paper was drawn from two surveys, administered ten years apart: a survey done in 1998 with the aid of the University of Utrecht, and my own survey in 2007. The dramatic events that took place during this decade, including the assassination of two Dutch public figures, were connected to the immigrant community in the Netherlands either tangentially or directly. These unforeseeable events presented a natural experiment, making it possible to infer the impact of these events on attitudes toward immigrants. I show that negative attitudes toward Muslims increased significantly between the two surveys.

The third paper adds an explicitly political dimension to the analysis of anti-immigrant sentiment. Using a multi-level model, I examine the relationship between strength of party cue and anti-immigrant sentiment. The data came from two sources: individual-level data was drawn from the 2003 ISSP survey; measurements at the party level were drawn from Benoit and Lavers 2003 expert survey. There is significant variation at the party level on this issue. The results show that political parties on the right have more coherent positions on immigration than parties on the left. I also find that the relationship between party cues and anti-immigrant sentiment is strong and significant, showing that political cues do impact individual attitudes on this issue.
Chapter 2

Varieties of Nationalism: Types and Effect of National Identity in European Politics

Introduction

Recent work has shown that symbolic or abstract forms of identity can be as important in shaping peoples attitudes as concrete, material concerns are. This calls for a more systematic approach to identity, both as a concept and as a measure. I begin this paper by comparing ways in which national identity is measured in several large-N, cross-national surveys in Europe. I identify three forms of identification with the nation: proximate (feelings of closeness to ones community at various levels); prideful (pride in national accomplishments, past and present); and patricentric (an exclusionary sense of nationality that emphasizes the superiority of the respondents nation over other nations). Differentiating between these forms of identity will show that not all identities are equally useful in understanding attitudes or behavior.

In the European context, fringe parties on the right have recently been able to
capitalize on the power of symbolic national identity. Examining the distribution of different types of national identity across the left-right spectrum allows us to gain some insight into whether these parties are preaching to the choir (that is, successfully motivating their base) or are gaining votes by pulling from across the political spectrum. The impact of identity is further explored by looking at differences between countries in level and strength of the different identity types. Finally, the three different types of identity are used in a regression analysis as predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment.

2.1 The (Re)Emergence of National Identities in Europe

Western Europe was chosen as the context for this paper because of the resurgence of national identities as a dimension of contestation, a development which has been to varying degrees surprising and alarming to observers of European politics. In the aftermath of the Second World War, nationalism was seen as one of the root causes of conflict, a divisive and dangerous force. Then, too, the rapid social change of the 1960s and 1970s made national identity seem parochial and dated, the province of older generations and right-wing partisans. As the European Community morphed into the European Union, the possibility of transcending divisions between nations implicitly included the idea of the emergence of a pan-European identity. As observers of European politics well know, however, national identities have proved themselves to be quite durable after all, and have had a significant influence on political competition at both the national and European level.

During the tumultuous decades of the 1960s and 1970s, it became apparent that the social and political bedrock was shifting, and new theories and descriptions of political issues and action were required. The foremost theorist of this re-imagined
political space was Inglehart (1971; 1977; 1990), whose influential work hypothesized the emergence of a new system of values that would shape politics as older cleavage structures dissolved (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Inglehart argued that the material wealth of post-industrial societies would create populations whose concerns shifted from concrete matters (food, shelter) to abstract concerns (the environment, gender issues). The new social movements were expected to alter the dimensions of political contestation, shifting away from Lipset and Rokkans historical cleavages and inhabiting new areas of the political terrain.

An event concurrent with the rise of the welfare state and occurring as Inglehart, Lipset and Rokkan were theorizing political dimensionality has greatly influenced the political world of Western Europe. That event was the in-migration of tens of thousands of guest workers during the post-War labor shortage, as European economies (and the welfare states which depended upon them) expanded at a rapid pace. Immigrant labor was brought into Europe as a temporary solution, under the assumption that immigrants would eventually return to their country of origin. Even as it became clear that there were substantial and permanent minority populations in European countries, the understanding of what it meant to be really French or truly German did not expand to include these newcomers, and laws regarding naturalized citizenship often reflected this distinction.

Two points have become apparent in the time since Ingleharts work was published. The first is that many post-materialist social movements were actually about expression of individual identity (with the goal of self-actualization); the rise of identity politics. The second is that the post-materialist values that Inglehart identified were not uniformly embraced across the political spectrum. Post-materialist values were in some ways simply the expression of existing values through new issues. For example, the environmentalist movement built upon the lefts cosmopolitanism, universalism, and
anti-capitalism to make the case for responsibility that transcended borders and legislation that placed limits on the rights of private property owners. As Inglehart (1979) observed, many values of post-materialism were still associated with the left—that is, they had not transcended the left-right distinction but added detail to the left-hand side of the map. Taken together, these points lead to the conclusion that canny political actors on the right could take over the language of identity politics while promoting exclusionary identities.

What might be a working definition of this particular identity component, that of identifying with a nation? In very simple terms, to ascribe to a national identity is to have the feeling of belonging to a territorially bounded community with a shared history. It is also to internalize the characteristics of that community as part of one’s own individual identity. Identity considerations clearly point out the limitations of understanding political behavior as analogous to economic behavior. Identity is not a material thing which one may feel compelled to get, keep, and defend; when closely examined, any identity turns out to be imaginary. One would expect that such an intangible good could not compel people to action nor strongly color their attitudes. Yet it does: Hooghe and Marks (2004), for example, find that identity plays a significant role in respondents perspective on European integration, and Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007; also Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004) find national identity to be more predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes than cost-benefit types of economic considerations.

There are, however, more than adequate reasons why identity has not been used as a variable in rigorous research (see Brubaker and Cooper 2000 for a critical perspective on the uses of identity in the social sciences). It presents problems in terms of concept (it is not clearly defined nor is it used in the same way across disciplines or even within disciplines) and measurement. As I discuss in my chapter on anti-immigrant sentiment
in the Netherlands, the difficulty in systematically exploring identity, whether as a motivation for behavior or a predictor of attitudes, is that it is seamless and situational. Individuals usually move between different identities without requiring conscious cues to guide them. While identities are expressed in movement, the tools social science currently has to study identity are largely static. Survey questions are analogous to a snapshot, capturing (more or less clearly, with greater or lesser levels of detail and precision) a particular moment in time. A snapshot contains a great deal of information, but it can’t convey how people moved into the frame, nor how they will move out of it.

Abdelal et al. persuasively argue that identity-based research has become a sprawling subset of scholarship, which has in turn undermined the conceptual clarity of identity as a variable (2006: 695). The authors point out that one of the primary conceptual issues that has not been satisfactorily addressed in identity research is how to conceptualize and investigate different types of identity (2006: 696), a gap this paper directly addresses.

More precise definitions of identity types, and their relative strength and/or prevalence, should add some explanatory color to the snapshot. It should be emphasized that the concepts of identity developed here are necessarily limited by the questions typically asked about identity in surveys. Fine nuances of identity are unlikely to be captured by a survey, and it is difficult to say whether an entire survey on questions of nationalism does not in itself create a primed respondent who is more likely to rate issues of national identity as important. The aggregate-level data of surveys could lead to ecological fallacies, while individual-level narratives and anecdotes are difficult to generalize. Nonetheless, thoughtful approaches to the information already gathered, and the methods used to do so, can yield insights that may guide further research. In the following section I delineate the identity types to be used in this analysis: their sources, limitations, and related hypotheses. Specifically, I will demonstrate the utility
of distinguishing between different types of identity: first, by showing variation across the left-right scale and between countries; second, by testing the strength of association of each identity type with negative attitudes toward immigrant populations.

2.2 Three Types of National Identity

Is a strong feeling of national identity always dangerous or deleterious? Some political scientists have posited the necessity of national identity in order to create sustainable and stable political institutions and societies (Noelle-Neumann and Kocher 1987). Many of the post-colonial conflicts within and between African nations, for example, can be traced to the absence of national feeling and the prioritization of tribal identity over national identity. Social psychologists, on the other hand, have often emphasized the relationship between a positive evaluation of one's own group and the simultaneous devaluation or derogation of other groups (Tajfel 1970; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Brewer 1996), while others have sought to distinguish between constructive and destructive forms of national identity (Staub 1989). A central question of social identity theory is the ways in which groups are evaluated, compared and ranked. Different types of identity (as well as differing identity strengths or salience) would therefore be accompanied by specific modes of judgment, relative vs. absolute, for example, evaluating one's own nation vis-à-vis other nations as opposed to evaluating it according to a universal or abstract standard.

Recognizing the substantive importance of identity, a variety of questions intended to measure respondents identification with various groups and beliefs have been incorporated into a number of cross-national surveys. Surveys often mimic each other, as the designers of surveys will use previously administered surveys as templates. Ideally, this would lead to cross-survey comparisons of item responses; usually, it is simply a matter of continuing to use established measures that are presumed to be consistent.
Across the surveys I examined, the most commonly asked questions measure feelings of closeness to community, what is here called proximate identity. Respondents are asked to indicate how close they feel, on a scale that ranges from not close at all to extremely close, to different social units to which they belong (town, region, nation, continent). One might expect that feelings of closeness would be related to scale and would uniformly decline as the scale grew larger. Most people would feel close or very close to their town, slightly fewer would feel close to their region, fewer again for nation, and the least for continent (or largest group). This is almost accurate, but in this survey respondents felt equally close to their nation as to their town, while far fewer felt close to their region and only about half felt any kind of closeness at all with the largest group about which they were questioned. Questions about proximity, being both vague and benign, are likely to play a minimal role in an analysis. A public which is jaded about surveys and statistical studies (as most people in well developed countries tend to be, bombarded as they are with information gathered from such studies) will tend toward neutral attitudes (Knutson 1998). It requires provocative questions to overcome this kind of opinion inertia.

The second type of identity commonly measured in surveys is prideful identity. These questions ask the respondent to indicate their level of pride in the achievements of their country in various areas (for example, sports, the arts, level of democracy). As with questions about proximate identity, these questions are usually unobjectionable and therefore unlikely to invoke an emotional response on the part of the respondent. Indicating pride in national achievements does not in itself denigrate the achievements of other countries (see Brewer 2001), and the questions do not ask the respondent to place the achievements of their country in relation to other countries.
Patricentric identity is often referred to as “exclusionary” or simply “nationalist”\(^1\) identity, and this is the type of national identity that is most commonly found to be predictive of or correlative with certain attitudes. In the European context, it is often investigated as part of an analysis of far-right parties and their supporters. Patricentric identity indicates a deep attachment to particular conceptions or narratives about the character of the nation and its people, and, in addition, the belief in the superiority of the national character and way of life compared to other nations. Patricentric identity appears to be primarily defensive. People who score highly on this identity type are likely to be those people who respond to rhetorical strategies about the people (immigrants) or forces (globalization, Europeanization) that pose a threat to the imagined community (Anderson 1991) of the nation.

2.3 Identity and Political Dimensionality

The left-right continuum has been periodically reviewed (Abramson and Inglehart 1986; Inglehart 1971; Sharpf 1996), dismissed (Kitschelt 1994, Tarchi 1998), and reclaimed (Bobbio 1996; Knutsen 1998). As its critics have pointed out, it is a relic of history, based on seating in the French Parliament after the revolution; but beyond the anachronistic nature of the concept, critics of the scale further charge that it also tends to be employed without consideration of context and therefore lacks cross-national comparability. In an effort to address this issue, Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) were the first to study left-right self-placement in a comparative setting. Castles and Mair (1984) used expert survey data to develop a standardized left-right scale, which is still commonly employed.

\(^{1}\)In the social psychology literature, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) refer to negative (based on comparative evaluation) national identity as “nationalism” and positive national identity (based on absolute standards) as “patriotism.”
Dalton (1998) found that the left-right scale was not very important to most respondents but that they did still categorize themselves in this manner. Knutson (1995; 1997; 1998) found that left-right remains associated with secular-religious values, and is correlated with both economic and postmaterialist values. He also finds that people continue to be willing to place themselves on the left-right scale, but that more people are placing themselves in the center of the scale than previously. Knutson is agnostic about whether this means more people are actually moving to the center or if they are simply gaming the surveys in some way, either attempting to avoid a negative social response from the interviewer or simply seeking to finish the survey more quickly. In many surveys which are based on a variation of a Likert scale, the median response is Neither agree nor disagree, which might reflect a truly centrist or neutral of view, but might also be a default response on an issue which is not particularly important or interesting to the respondent (and thus one which they are not going to spend a great deal of time considering), or an unwillingness to proffer an honest opinion.

In their foundational work on the left-right scale, Castles and Mair (1984/1997) pointed to the fact that it was generally accepted that left-right differences between parties have major relevance for public policy outcomes (1997: 151) and that the degree of ideological polarization on this scale influenced the way party systems functioned (or failed to function). Some scholars have found that left-right placement correlates with attitudes on particular issues. Lahav (1997), surveying British Members of Parliament, found a relationship between left-right self-placement and attitudes on immigration and European integration. Hooghe et al., using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), found that it is possible to distinguish among certain kinds of policy positions that are constrained by Left/Right positioning (2002: 972), and in the case of attitudes towards continued European integration, parties of the far left and parties of the far
right are equally Euroskeptical\(^2\) (Marks and Wilson 1999; de Vries and Edwards 2009).\(^3\)

With the aim of establishing the utility of distinguishing types of identity when possible, I test them against a construct of political space—the left-right axis as well as against an issue around which there is a great deal of contestation currently—attitudes toward immigrants. I expect to find variation between countries in the correspondence of left-right self-placement and different types of identity. I also expect that, as earlier work has shown, patricentric or exclusionary identity will be strongly associated with anti-immigrant sentiment, and that the strength of this association will vary between countries.

### 2.4 Data: Sources and Measures

In developing this typology, I examined the way identity was measured in several well-regarded and frequently used surveys of the European population.

In addition to the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which is administered world-wide, there are two other cross-national surveys administered specifically in Europe: the European Values Survey (EVS) and the Eurobarometer. The standard Eurobarometer does have questions about identity, and they tend to be questions which would measure patricentric identity.\(^4\) Secondly, the Eurobarometer is often concerned

---

\(^2\) Though for distinct reasons: the extreme left fears that continued integration will erode the welfare state, diminish workers rights and decrease environmental regulation in short, that European integration is largely a project centered around free-market reforms. Right wing parties stake their opposition on defending national sovereignty and identity.

\(^3\) While these studies do offer support for the relevance of the left-right scale, it is also possible that left-right placement is more accurate and more meaningful for people who are politically engaged and informed (McLaren 2001). Expert surveys such as these, then, would tend to show a closer relationship between political self-identification and sets of particular attitudes than surveys of the general public. For example, the correlation between left-right positionality and support for European integration is quite low in this data: \(r=0.04\).

\(^4\) Some Eurobarometers have also had questions measuring attachment, which could be used to gauge proximate identity. Hooghe and Marks (2001), in fact, utilize these questions as a measure of
with Europe-wide issues rather than issues internal to each country, and the national level is still the primary stage on which contestation over immigration and national identity plays out. The EVS is an intriguing dataset, because it has the potential to link values and identity types, and thus give more insight into values that are constitutive of each identity type. Unfortunately, the EVS has few questions about identity, and those are only about the identity that we posit to be the weakest: proximate identity. Those questions that are asked in all three surveys are similar in wording, suggesting that they draw from the standard bank of questions asked by previous surveys (and that there has been relatively little innovation in the measurement of this concept). The ISSP is the only survey that offers enough data to support the development of a typology of national identity, and the questions asked in the ISSP group naturally into categories. For this reason, the ISSP is the best data set for the exploration of identity types, since it contains questions about more than one dimension and it can be shown whether responses to such questions reliably hang together. I use the data from the year in which the identity module was administered (2003).

2.5 Method and Analysis

Because each of the identity types was based on sets of questions, factor analysis was used to capture a latent dimension of the data within each set of items. Confirmatory factor analysis supported the claim that the sets of questions shared a sufficient amount of variance to justify the creation of new variables which are based on the latent commonality in the item sets. An alpha value above .70 among the items is generally considered sufficient shared variance. Proximate identity did not quite meet this

territorial identities in the EU. In the Eurobarometer taken closest in time to the ISSP survey, those questions were not asked.
threshold, but was close enough (0.65) to justify including it in the analysis.\textsuperscript{5} When the items were factored, only those factors with an eigenvalue greater than one were included in the created variables.\textsuperscript{6}

The factor scores for patricentric identity highlight the core values of this group. The highest factor loadings are the items about the importance of place of birth and ancestry. The lowest are the items on the importance of language and respecting the laws of the land. This is curious, first because in public debates there is often a great deal of importance placed on language as an indicator of membership in the national community. The low score of the importance of following the law is even more puzzling. From Adorno’s (1950) work on the authoritarian personality to current studies (van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005) that suggest a connection between a law-and-order mentality and anti-immigrant attitudes, emphasis on respect for the laws of the land has been seen as particularly characteristic of right-wing partisans. Here, however, we see that the emphasis is on traits that cannot be acquired: ones ancestry and ones place of birth, something that does not bode well for acceptance of assimilation-oriented policies.

Correlations allow for ambiguity about causality, which is appropriate for the relationship between left-right position and types of identity. At the aggregate level, the correlations between left-right self-placement and the four types of national identity are moderate. As expected, the correlation varies between the three types. The lowest correlation is between proximate identity and left-right (.09); the correlation jumps for prideful identity (.17) and patricentric identity is the high-water mark (.23). (Opinions about what constitutes significant correlation vary. While Cohens (1998) rule of thumb

\textsuperscript{5}The Cronbach’s alphas for each were: proximate identity, 0.65; prideful identity, 0.79; patricentric identity, 0.80.

\textsuperscript{6}Because factor loadings are sometimes informative in themselves, I have included all items in the appendix.
is often used in the behavioral sciences (i.e. \( r < 0.23 \) is low, \( 0.24 < r < 0.36 \) is medium, and \( r > 0.37 \) is high), one may also directly calculate a t-value (and thus a p-value) using the formula: 

\[
t = \frac{r}{\sqrt{1 - r^2}}/\sqrt{N - 2}.
\]

Using this formula, the correlations of 0.16, 0.17 and 0.23 are in fact significant at the \( p < 0.0001 \) level. This indicates that such a correlation is highly unlikely to be due to chance. Feelings of closeness to one's community do not seem to be localized on the left-right continuum. As levels of prideful and patricentric identity rise, however, the correlation coefficient grows larger, showing that there is a linear relationship between these identity types and movement from the left to the right of the political spectrum.

When the data is disaggregated, interesting differences between countries appear, supporting the hypothesis of between-country variation in identity types (see Table 5). In some countries all of the identity types correlate with right-wing position, while in others there is no correlation with any identity type. Then there are several countries in which only patricentric identity correlates with left-right. As expected, proximate identity has very little purchase in this analysis, with the lowest correlations overall of any of the identity types, while patricentric identity correlates strongly with left/right positionality in seven out of twelve countries. In Switzerland and Austria, all three identity types significantly correlate with left-right positionality. Conversely, there is virtually no correlation between left-right position and any identity type in Sweden and Finland. In fact, in the Swedish case the highest (though still weak) correlation, patricentric identity, has a negative sign (-0.11), so seemingly the more right-wing the respondent is on the left-right continuum in Sweden, the lower their level of patricentric identity.
Table 2.1: Pearson’s $r$ Correlations Between Left-Right Placement and Identity Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proximate</th>
<th>Prideful</th>
<th>Patricentric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Data from the ISSP 2003 survey, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archive.

Country names in bolded text indicate the presence of a far-right party in that country.
In some countries, national identity as a dimension of political contestation still maps onto the traditional left-right cleavages. Does the absence of correlation in other countries indicate the opening of new political dimensions? The behavior of political actors in those countries will reveal the answer to this question.

2.6 Identity Types and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

In my paper on anti-immigrant sentiment in the Netherlands, I found support for Sniderman and Hagendoorn’s (2007) argument that strong feelings of national identity superceded economic concerns in influencing attitudes toward immigrants. The identity typology allows for a more specific understanding of the relationship between identity and attitudes toward immigrants. The type of identity that is salient in a particular country and the manner in which it connects with the left/right dimension constrains whether and how political entrepreneurs, say political parties, exploit

“Immigration creates a considerable potential for the mobilization of the new cleavage in all six countries [that the authors examined]. In every one of them, the share of the foreign population is sufficiently large, and, even where it is relatively small, part of it is culturally sufficiently distinct to become highly visible and potentially threatening the fact that a large share of immigrants comes from a culturally quite different background constitutes a latent potential that is easily exploitable by political entrepreneurs bent on mobilizing those on the losers side of the new cleavage” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 34).

Political actors will exploit this space by emphasizing the themes that resonate with particularly strong (i.e. motivational) types of national identification. I expect that patricentric identity will be the most powerful variable associated with anti-immigrant
sentiment, with proximate identity the weakest. I further expect that this effect will differ significantly between countries.

I created a measure of anti-immigrant sentiment through factor analysis of seven items from the ISSP that indicated negative attitudes toward immigrants (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.79, minimum eigenvalue of 1). I then ran both bivariate and multivariate regression analysis for each identity type, with anti-immigrant sentiment as the dependent variable. The purpose of the bivariate regression was to isolate the influence of identity type specifically: how much variance was explained through identity alone? The multivariate regression included various control measures: left-right positionality, urban or rural location, education level, occupation, age and sex. In the general model, each type of identity was statistically significant, but varied in strength. Where proximate and prideful identity explained only 1-2% of the variance on anti-immigrant sentiment, respectively, patricentric identity by itself explained 24% of the variance. I expect a similar pattern on the individual country level, but with variation between countries. Specifically, I would expect that in countries with anti-immigrant/xenophobic parties (France, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands) patricentric identity will explain a larger amount of variance on anti-immigrant sentiment than it does in other countries. This proved to be the case. Patricentric identity was strongly associated with anti-immigrant sentiment in every country in the data, with positive and significant coefficients. Interestingly, the countries in which patricentric identity is a significant explanation of variance on anti-immigrant sentiment are also countries in which patricentric identity correlates with left-right positionality. In a next paper I will show that these are also the countries where political party cues have the strongest impact on immigrant attitudes. The results for prideful and proximate identity were mixed. Though both explained very little variance on anti-immigrant sentiment in

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7Defined as three categories: white-collar/management; skilled trades; unskilled work.
Table 2.2: Bivariate Regression of Identity Types on Anti-Immigrant Sentiment (AIS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Type</th>
<th>Beta Coefficient</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proximate</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>6130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prideful</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricentric</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.0001

Beta coefficient followed by cluster-corrected standard errors (in parentheses) and constant term.

Source: ISSP 2003 data, accessed through the ZACAT/GESIS archive.
Table 2.3: Multivariate Regression of Identity Types on AIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Type</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proximate Identity</td>
<td>0.083***</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Position</td>
<td>0.098***</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-Rural</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.103***</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.988***</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² 0.11

N 7473

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Type</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prideful Identity</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>0.075***</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Position</td>
<td>0.092***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-Rural</td>
<td>0.047***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.101***</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.974***</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² 0.09

N 5795

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Type</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patricentric Identity</td>
<td>0.411***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>0.050***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Position</td>
<td>0.065***</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-Rural</td>
<td>0.035***</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.940***</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.506***</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² 0.27

N 7145

***p<0.001

Source: ISSP 2003 data, accessed through the ZACAT/GESIS archive.
any country, proximate identity was significant and positive in most countries, whereas prideful identity was significant in only a few countries. Adding the control variables to the model also gave mixed results. In general, the only other variable which was significant in most of the cases was left-right positionality.
### Table 2.4: Multivariate Regression of Proximate Identity on AIS

**Multivariate Regression Analysis of Proximate Identity on Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, by Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proximate Identity</td>
<td>0.097*</td>
<td>0.137*</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
<td>0.061*</td>
<td>0.138*</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.113*</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.107*</td>
<td>0.224***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>0.093*</td>
<td>0.310***</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
<td>0.158**</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>-0.068*</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.092*</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.088**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Position</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>0.200***</td>
<td>0.100***</td>
<td>0.141***</td>
<td>0.095***</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.082***</td>
<td>0.152***</td>
<td>0.128***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-Rural</td>
<td>0.087**</td>
<td>0.107**</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.094**</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>0.014***</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.009**</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>-0.222*</td>
<td>-0.181***</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
<td>-0.170**</td>
<td>-0.145*</td>
<td>-0.242***</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.901***</td>
<td>-2.710***</td>
<td>-0.410**</td>
<td>-1.854</td>
<td>-1.050***</td>
<td>-0.528**</td>
<td>-0.358</td>
<td>-0.543*</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.911***</td>
<td>-1.548***</td>
<td>-0.881***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Source: ISSP 2003, accessed via the GESIS/ZACAT archive.
### Table 2.5: Multivariate Regression of Prideful Identity on AIS

*Multivariate Regression Analysis of Prideful Identity on Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, by Country*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=420</td>
<td>n=280</td>
<td>n=872</td>
<td>n=272</td>
<td>n=336</td>
<td>n=523</td>
<td>n=425</td>
<td>n=468</td>
<td>n=485</td>
<td>n=473</td>
<td>n=575</td>
<td>n=666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prideful Identity</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.129*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.134***</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>0.097*</td>
<td>0.279***</td>
<td>0.184***</td>
<td>0.121*</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.091**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
<td>0.182***</td>
<td>0.112***</td>
<td>0.129***</td>
<td>0.110***</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.074**</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.065**</td>
<td>0.145***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.076*</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.066**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-Rural</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>-0.323**</td>
<td>-0.152***</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>-0.216**</td>
<td>-0.194*</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>-0.171*</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.609**</td>
<td>-2.274***</td>
<td>-0.886***</td>
<td>-1.989***</td>
<td>-1.429***</td>
<td>-0.480***</td>
<td>-0.398</td>
<td>-0.461</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>-0.794**</td>
<td>-1.61***</td>
<td>-0.98***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Source: ISSP 2003, accessed via the GESIS/ZACAT archive.
Table 2.6: Multivariate Regression of Patricentric Identity on AIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Patricentric Identity</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Left-Right Position</th>
<th>Urban-Rural</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>0.322*** 0.610***</td>
<td>0.080*</td>
<td>0.035*</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>0.402***</td>
<td>0.247***</td>
<td>0.107***</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.25**</td>
<td>-1.64***</td>
<td>0.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>0.392***</td>
<td>0.095***</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.121**</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>0.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>0.538***</td>
<td>0.105*</td>
<td>0.098***</td>
<td>-0.093*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>-1.240***</td>
<td>0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>0.201***</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>-0.009*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>-0.422*</td>
<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>0.400***</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.046*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>-0.409</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>0.233***</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.053**</td>
<td>0.075*</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>-1.240***</td>
<td>0.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>0.437***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-1.000</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>0.482***</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-1.100</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>0.514***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-1.05***</td>
<td>0.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>0.464***</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.56***</td>
<td>0.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>853</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Source: ISSP 2003, accessed via the GESIS/ZACAT archive.
2.7 Conclusion and Future Research

In this paper I demonstrated the utility of differentiating between types of identity. Of the three types of national identity, only patricentric identity mapped onto the traditional left-right dimension though not in all countries. As expected, patricentric identity was the identity type most likely to be linked to anti-immigrant sentiment. The fact that the effect of each identity type varies between countries has implications for the political strategies adopted by parties in their domestic sphere. It also suggests one reason why national identity is actively debated in some countries and not in others. In this data, gathered in 2002 and 2003, we can already see the countries in which identity is most likely to become, or continue to be, a contested political space.

The three types of identity discussed in this paper were perforce limited by the instrument used to measure them. The possibility of developing more nuanced schemas remains wide open. Rather than turning immediately to cross-sectional data, scholars of identity would be well-served to carefully consider how best to approach the identity they wish to understand (I hope the rubric of form, function, situation and salience may be a useful starting point for inquiry). As Searing and Conover (2001) and Fearon (1999) suggest, paying attention to the everyday use of terms is a way into a particular web of context and meaning.

I suggest that there is another way of understanding identity which is difficult to discern through survey data. This identity might be called if following the alliterative pattern established here performative\(^8\): an identity which rests upon a conception of shared values and the appropriate behavior that follows from these values. In this understanding, assimilation would be revealed through their actions, i.e. as they perform the role of a citizen of the nation: their willingness to follow the law of the land, their

---

\(^8\)The concept of performative identity is adapted from the work of Judith Butler.
speech (particularly which language they speak, and how they speak it), and their manner of dress. Performative identity is active, both in the sense of the active perception and judgment of the viewer and the actions performed by the other person. At the same time, one cannot elide the fact that visibly different others are going to be rapidly and unconsciously sorted by the mind long before such information reaches the linear, rational, and verbal parts of the brain (Payne et al. 2009). Future surveys might allow some insight into this identity type through questions focusing on understood norms of behavior.⁹

2.8 Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Town/City</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County/Province</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/Nation</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continent</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.

⁹Or mixed method approaches: neuropsychologists have recently used fMRIs to investigate the neurological activity of a perceiver who sees a member of a group distinctly other to themselves, and found that different parts of the brain were activated depending on whether the person viewed was regarded as in-group.
Table 2.8: Factor Loadings: Prideful Identity

This set of questions is introduced the following way: “How proud are you of [Country] in each of the following...”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Its political influence in the world”</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Its economic achievements”</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The way democracy works”</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Its armed forces”</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Its scientific and technological achievements”</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Its history”</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Its fair and equal treatment of all groups”</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Its achievements in the arts”</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Its social security system”</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Its achievements in sports”</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.

Table 2.9: Factor Loadings: Patricentric Identity

The first seven items are introduced in the following way: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is...” The last three items ask the respondent to indicate how much they agree or disagree with the statement given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“To have been born in [Country]”</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“To have [Country Nationality] ancestry”</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“To have lived in [Country] for most of one’s life”</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“To be a citizen of [Country]”</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“To feel [Country Nationality]”</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“To speak [Country’s] language”</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“To respect [Country’s] political institutions and laws”</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like [Country Nationality]”</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Generally speaking, [Country] is better than other countries”</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I would rather be a citizen of [Country] than any other Country in the world”</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.
Table 4: Factor Loadings for Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

This set of questions is introduced in the following way: “There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [COUNTRY]. (By "immigrants" we mean people who come to settle in [COUNTRY]). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The government spends too much money assisting immigrants”</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Immigrants increase crime”</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Immigrants improve [Country’s] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures”*</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Immigrants are generally good for [Country’s] economy”*</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country]”</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“It is impossible for people who do not share [Country’s] customs and traditions to become fully [Country Nationality]”</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“[Country] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants”</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP 2003, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archives.
*Reverse scored
Chapter 3

The Dutch Dilemma: Evolving Attitudes Toward Immigrants in the Netherlands

Introduction

This paper examines attitudes towards immigrants and integration in the Netherlands with an eye towards a purported shift in public attitudes against the backdrop of a contentious decade that witnessed the rise of global tensions between the Islamic world and the West, the emergence of anti-immigrant parties in the Netherlands, and murders of two Dutch anti-immigrant politicians. Using survey data from two different time points bracketing this tumultuous period in the Netherlands (the first taken in 1998 and the second in 2007) I look for evidence that the Dutch have developed a more negative view of immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants, in that period of time. I begin with a discussion of some of the prevailing theories of anti-immigrant sentiment, move on to review the influential work done by Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2004) based on a large-scale 1998 survey of immigrant attitudes in the Netherlands, then
detail my own survey in 2007 in which I replicate several questions ten years hence. I discuss method, hypotheses, and the outcome of my analysis. I show that negative attitudes toward Muslims have indeed increased considerably.

3.1 The Curious Case of the Netherlands

Dutch politics has often been seen as quite dull, even soporific. The deliberative style fostered by consociationalism (Lijphart 1967) allows for plentiful debate, discussion, and negotiation all of which takes time, so the pace of Dutch politics is usually something less than breakneck. This is, no doubt, much of the reason the helter-skelter reshaping of the Dutch political scene since 2000 has drawn scholarly as well as popular attention.\(^1\) The issue on which the boundaries of political debate shifted the most was immigration policy. The Dutch shifted from an explicitly multiculturalist policy to an actively assimilationist policy within a few short years. A policy implemented in 2006, for instance, required all potential immigrants to the Netherlands to watch a video about “the Dutch way of life,” emphasizing the acceptance of homosexuality and equality of women in Dutch society.\(^2\) Searching for the causes of this volte-face, most observers light upon two dramatic, unprecedented and extremely public events: the rise of a charismatic and controversial politician, Pim Fortuyn, who voiced openly anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim opinions that were previously considered beyond the

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\(^1\)For example, Ian Buruma, a frequent contributor to the New Yorker, wrote a popular-press book about the murder of Theo van Gogh, as well as a number of articles in the New Yorker itself. Then, too, there are any number of articles along the lines of ”From the Left, A Call to End the Current Dutch Notion of Tolerance” (The New York Times, 11/29/2008) and ”The Dream of Multiculturalism is Over” (The New York Times, 08/23/2005).

\(^2\)This does not apply to all newcomers to Dutch society. Citizens of other EU member-states are exempt from this requirement, as are skilled workers and asylum seekers. Potential immigrants from the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Switzerland are also exempt.
pale of Dutch politics. Fortuyn was assassinated in 2002\(^3\) (by an animal rights activist) prior to the general election; his eponymous party went on to win 26 out of 150 seats in the Dutch Parliament, becoming the second-largest party. The electoral success of the party was short-lived, but Fortuyn almost entirely redrew the dimensions of the debates on immigrants and immigration policy in the Netherlands. The second obvious shock to the system was the assassination of Theo van Gogh, the Dutch filmmaker, in 2004. Van Gogh’s killer was a Muslim extremist, and the note he stabbed to van Gogh’s chest after the murder encapsulated the worst fears of the Dutch population about the immigrant communities in their midst.

The purpose of this extended introduction is to highlight the circumstances that make the Netherlands uniquely suitable for deepening our understanding of the waxing and waning of anti-immigrant sentiment. In the Dutch case, we are presented with a clear time frame within which social and political attitudes changed, and we have an idea of how things looked before and after that time period. This is as close to experimental conditions as social scientists can reasonably hope to get, an opportunity to test competing theories and infer causality with a bit more confidence than usual.

### 3.2 Two Theories of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

Theories about the development of anti-immigrant sentiment on an individual level tend to draw from two distinct fields. From the perspective of economics, anti-immigrant sentiment is explained by competition over scarce resources. This view rests implicitly on liberalism and the social contract theory which evolved from it. Rational, independent individuals perceive that there are advantages to be gained by joining a group:

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\(^3\)I was actually in Amsterdam on the day of Fortuyn’s killing; I bought several Dutch newspapers and spent the afternoon in a café cobbled together the story. That was the day I began to follow Dutch politics, out of pure curiosity and an inexplicable fascination with the Dutch people and culture (and certainly without any intention of writing a dissertation about it).
division of labor, increase in production of food and goods, and defense against a variety of threats. They consent to give up some degree of personal freedom in exchange for the benefits of being a member of the social group. Rather than competing mano a mano for scarce resources, then, people belong to a group which competes with other groups. Self-interest becomes embedded in group-interest, and, consequently, threats to the group become threats to the self. Anti-immigrant sentiment can be explained as a manifestation of this feeling of competition between groups, though the resources over which groups are competing may have become more abstract (jobs, first and foremost, but also welfare state benefits, public education, health care, and so on).

From the perspective of social psychology, feelings of group membership and preference for one's own group do not require conditions of scarcity or explicit calculations of benefit. Rather, through a series of experiments, it became apparent that individuals were evidently predisposed to attach themselves to a group whenever given the least opportunity to do so (Tajfel 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1981, 1986). The pre-eminent researchers in this field, Tajfel and Turner, note that: “Intergroup discrimination existed in conditions of minimal in-group affiliation, anonymity of group membership, absence of conflicts of interest, and absence of previous hostility between groups” (1981: 9). This suggests that humans are innately predisposed to join groups, whether or not there is a tangible benefit from doing so.

Political science has tended to support the economic view of anti-immigrant sentiment, finding that negative views on immigrants are more prevalent among people with lower education and in low-skill occupations, the losers of modernity and globalization (Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008). Presumably, immigrants will be entering the labor force at the bottom of the economic ladder, directly competing with the native workers for low-skill, low-wage jobs. Anti-immigrant sentiment is therefore understood as the response of a particular subset of the native population to a direct economic threat.
It follows that people with higher levels of education and with more occupational skills have lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, because they do not see immigrants as a threat to their economic survival (Kriesi et al. 2008; Christin 2004; Citrin et al. 1997).

In any case, it cannot be proved whether the egg of rationally choosing to belong to a group for survival preceded the chicken of always already being in a group. Rational or not, group identification is a way to cognitively simplify a complex world, one of many filters on the stream of consciousness. Once those filters are in place, an ongoing process of evaluation is taking place. Individuals are estimating their status within their own group, the status of their group compared to other groups, and seeking to feel positively about themselves through positive evaluation of the groups to which they belong (Brewer 1991; Brewer and Gardner 1996; Mummendy et al. 2001).

### 3.3 The Role of Threat and Fear

A feeling of “group-ness” is not inevitable, nor does it automatically assign a lower place to all other groups (Brewer 1999). Identities are situational, contextual, and relational, and part of human socialization is knowing what identity is appropriate or acceptable to others and at which times. It is only under specific conditions that the in-group is elevated at the cost of the out-group rather than an expression of membership in one or the other. Usually, we shift between identities seamlessly, without having to consciously choose which identity to enact at any given time. Threats (which is to say, the instigation of fear), even seemingly mild, result in shifting cognitive priorities. In experimental settings, fear is relatively easy to trigger and creates distinct repercussions in mood, attitude and behavior (Greenberg et al. 1990). This feeling of fear encompasses not only one’s own physical being, but also one’s symbolic identity. Where fear might be taken to mean merely fear for one’s physical survival, it is clear
that the feelings of fear can be activated by a wide variety of threats, including symbolic threats—
that is, threats to abstract notions (such as nationhood) that individuals have come to consider constituent parts of the self. We could go further, and say that calling identities parts of the self is still too material; it’s as if identities were accessories which one could add, remove, or rearrange at will. If we understand an identity as a mode of perception, a worldview which gives order and meaning and which may assuage our anxiety about death (Becker 1971, 1975), then anything that contradicts that worldview will provoke a defensive reaction (Kahan and Braman 2006).

A perceived threat to a meaningful identity tends to move that identity up into the realm of conscious choice and awareness. The boundaries of self are expanded, socially extended, so that a person’s self-concept is centered around being a good or representative member of the group (Brewer and Gardner 1996), and so that the well-being of the group becomes integrally tied to the sense of well-being of the individual. Because of this expanded self, this symbolic body politic, traumatic events such as 9/11 or the assassination of Theo van Gogh have an impact that is much greater than the number of people directly involved, particularly when they are continually reiterated by the media to which most people are constantly exposed.

### 3.4 The Netherlands: Bellweather of Change

Because the work of Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007; see also Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004) provided the foundation for the survey and research I conducted, I provide a brief synopsis of their research as an introductory framework for the data analyzed here. Sniderman and Hagendoorn chose the Netherlands as their case study for testing group conflict theory against social identity theory because of the historical (if perhaps apocryphal) tolerance of the Dutch, their explicit embrace of multiculturalism, and the rapid shift in policy following the assassination of Theo van Gogh. In
Sniderman and Hagendoorn hypothesize that a certain subset of the population may have a generalized readiness to perceive certain kinds of threats, such as threats to economic well-being, which, in turn, may influence social attitudes. Another way of putting this is: a certain proportion of any human population will be people who are inclined to be fearful or anxious more often than is necessary or normal. Sniderman et al. see this readiness to perceive threats as a predisposing factor (which may or may not be mitigated on an individual level by education, the amount and type of media to which they are exposed, their self esteem, or their economic status). These concerns may then be triggered to affect social attitudes by situational factors (situational triggers), such as a downturn in the economy. Sniderman et al. are interested in the interaction of such “predisposing factors” with “situational triggers” and their combined influence on attitudes towards ethnic minorities (2004: 36). To this end, they utilize several different techniques.

Part of the survey consisted of a coupling/decoupling experiment, the aim of which was to reveal predispositions to perceive threats to economic well-being and cultural identity. Half of the respondents were given questions in which a threat (“I am afraid of”) was paired with a cause of that threat (“because of ethnic minorities”). The
remaining respondents were asked the same questions, but with the reference to the cause, say ethnic minorities, omitted. They found that, as anticipated, When threat judgments are coupled with a reference to ethnic minorities, people who perceive themselves to be threatened in one way are markedly more likely to perceive themselves to be threatened in other ways (2004: 38). In addition to this test, the survey also contained an experiment designed to manipulate the salience of the issue of economic and cultural threats. In this experiment, respondents were asked about a hypothetical group of immigrants who were either highly educated and skilled or without education and skills, or who spoke Dutch fluently or didn’t speak Dutch at all. In other words, the respondents decide which of these is more important: economic integration, or cultural integration. It mattered far more to respondents that new immigrants fit in culturally than economically (2004: 42).

The authors also tried a priming experiment in which some subjects were given a cue about their membership in the Dutch national identity, and the others were primed as an individual. They find that the identity prime does have an effect. Among those respondents who were least likely to feel their culture was threatened (the low cultural threat condition) those who were primed for national identity were far more likely to agree that immigration should be made more difficult.

3.4.1 Situational Triggers Defined

In addition to testing various theories and experimenting with priming mechanisms, Sniderman and colleagues are searching for something elusive. They are attempting to locate the mechanism, or the moment, in which latent beliefs become overt attitudes. Under what conditions does anti-immigrant sentiment emerge? They are also trying to see the attitudinal shift of different subsets of the population: those who are continually mobilized against immigrants and those who may express anti-immigrant sentiment
under certain conditions (or after certain events).

My survey, almost a decade after the original survey, adds another snapshot of public opinion on these issues. The tenor of the public debate about immigrants, assimilation (or lack thereof) in the Netherlands has shifted significantly over the past decade or so, due in part to controversial politicians like Pim Fortuyn. The assassinations of Fortuyn and, later, Theo van Gogh; the death threats against public figures like Ayaan Hirsi Ali; the revelation of jihadist movements among Dutch-born Islamic youth: these acted as a series of shocks to the Dutch population, especially to that segment of the population which may have been passively anti-immigrant prior to these events. Events of this kind may spur an immediate, fearful, defensive response among the population, but it requires a narrative about these events, a continual and public remembering and reconstructing, to sustain a significant shift in attitudes. The Dutch media have kept the issues of immigration, integration and assimilation and their threat potential in the forefront of Dutch consciousness.

The time lapse between the University of Utrecht survey and my own, and the significant political events and media focus in the intervening decade, can be seen as a natural experiment. The attitudes expressed in the earlier survey can be conceived of as a measure of a pre-existing condition, while the events of the intervening ten years can be seen as situational triggers. The situational triggersthe events mentioned above as well as the attacks on the World Trade Center, the London and Madrid bombingsshould have increased the perception of cultural threat as well as increasing the number of respondents who consider this an important issue. Media coverage, as I discuss below, has played on the theme of cultural threat. The media in the Netherlands has taken diffuse social anxiety and focused it on Islamic immigrants in particular.
3.4.2 Mediated Opinion

The Dutch media actively reported on issues of immigration and assimilation throughout the 1990s, keeping the topic elevated in public discourse, especially after the assassinations of Fortuyn (although, as noted, Fortuyn was not killed by a Muslim extremist) and van Gogh (Vliegenthardt and Boomgaarden 2007).

Roggeband and Vliegenthardt (2007) conduct a comprehensive examination of both media and political coverage of issues of immigration and integration. They find that not only coverage of the issue itself increases over time, but also that the way the issue is framed shifts. The discourse on immigrants has shifted from what they term a multiculturalist frame to the frames of “Islam as threat” and “assimilationist.” They show a steady movement away from using the language of multiculturalism—in both political and media discourse—towards using language of threat, including language that suggests that immigrants are a “problematic group.” The frame used depends in part on the political composition of Parliament over time as well as external events.

The survey used by Sniderman and Hagendoorn is a comprehensive exploration of extant theories of anti-immigrant sentiment: items measuring feelings of fear and threat; levels of hostility toward other groups; amount of interaction with immigrant groups (social distance); feelings of Dutch-ness; self-esteem; and authoritarian values. Standard demographic questions about age, sex, education and economic status are also included. Since the 1998 survey was a general population sample while the 2007 survey was administered only to college students, two comparisons are required within the 1998 survey itself and then between the 1998 survey and the 2007 survey. That is, how do young, college educated respondents to the 1998 survey compare to the rest of the sample from that same year? This provides a baseline for the second comparison: between the young, college-educated subset from 1998 and its counterpart in 2007.

In their measures of global evaluations of Muslims, Sniderman and Hagendoorn
found that approximately 55% of respondents disagreed with the statement “Muslims have a lot to offer Dutch culture.” Their respondents split 50-50 on the question of whether “Western European and Muslim ways of life are irreconcilable.” And they also split almost evenly, with slightly more (53%) agreeing with the statement, “Most Muslims in the Netherlands respect other cultures” (2007: 23). Negative judgments of Muslims were, unsurprisingly, strongly correlated across items.

Table 3.1: Anti-Muslim Attitudes, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Muslim Attitudes in the General Population, 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Muslims have a lot to offer to Dutch culture.”</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“The Muslim way of life and that of Western Europeans are incompatible.”</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Most Muslims in the Netherlands respect other cultures.”</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Survey was conducted with the aid of the University of Utrecht. Data gathered 1997-1998. Data accessed through the Survey Documentation and Analysis (SDA) site maintained by the University of California, Berkeley.*
3.5 Vrije Universiteit, Spring 2007

My own subject pool was drawn from students at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. For accurate comparison of the two data sets, only subjects from a similar age range were kept in the earlier data. The under-30 cohort in 1998 were markedly more positive about Muslims than the general population, and, overall, they did not perceive the Dutch culture to be under threat. In the 1998 survey, the under-30 group showed marked agreement with positive statements of Dutch identity (e.g. “I am proud to be Dutch”). This strong sense of identity, however, was not correlated with high levels of feelings of threat or anti-Muslim or anti-immigrant sentiment. Most of the respondents disagreed with generalized, negative statements about Muslims and immigrants. Very few respondents had a feeling of cultural threat, even those who identified as right or center-right. The fact that the 2007 survey was composed of university students thereby creates a conservative experiment. It stacks the deck in favor of a null result, e.g. that attitudes toward immigrants have not become increasingly negative.

The survey I administered in the spring of 2007 was primarily focused on differences in attitudes which could plausibly have been affected by the shocking events that occurred in the meantime: views on immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants, levels of national identity, and perceptions of economic and/or cultural threat.

My sample size was 86, young (average age = 21), and well educated. Most of the respondents were single and without children, they all spoke Dutch fluently, and the language they heard most at home was Dutch. Most of them went to schools that were primarily native Dutch. The group was tilted slightly towards the left on the left/right political ideology scale not particularly surprising. Approximately 25% of the respondents identified as left, 25% as center-left, 25% as center, 14% percent identified as center right, and 3% as right. Having such a homogenous sample has the advantage of ensuring that the control group and the primed group are virtually identical on most
indicators. Having such a homogenous sample has the advantage of ensuring that the control group and the primed group are virtually identical on most indicators.

In addition to replicating items from the 1998 survey, questions from the International Social Survey Program and the European Social Survey were included. Some questions used a Likert scale, while other questions were more open-ended and sought to have the respondents discuss their everyday lives and experiences (for example, “What language do you most often hear in your neighborhood?”). Other questions sought to measure authoritarian attitudes, which have been correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment in the past (see Adorno et al. 1950).

I also administered an identity prime to half the sample, to see if subjects were responsive to nationalistic cues and if that response would correlate with certain attitudes towards immigration and/or out-groups. In line with the findings of social identity theory (Tajfel 1970) that people respond to slight invocations of group feeling, I experimented with a minimalist prime. I was attempting to elevate the respondents feelings of national identification. If subjects responded significantly to the minimal prime, they would arguably be much more likely to respond to an emotive, substantive prime, either an unusual event in the world or ongoing media framing and coverage of the subject.

Participants in the primed group read a statement which began: “God created the earth, but the Dutch created the Netherlands” and then went on to detail the engineering achievements of the Dutch in their ongoing battle against time and tide. (One might argue this prime could present some problems of interpretation. For one thing, in a survey which asks direct questions about religion and religious sentiment, introducing God into a nationalistic prime could have the effect of highlighting religion. However, this is a well known proverb and it actually points away from God as a creator.) The intention was to avoid an overt prime that would alert subjects to the intention of the
experiment, one which could potentially cause the respondents to respond in a reaction against the prime. Respondents in the control group read a news article about the launch of the largest passenger plane yet built. Both groups were told that they would be asked questions about these topics at the end of the experiment.

The priming condition did not have a measurable effect on either feelings of Dutch identity or threat to the Dutch nation. T-tests on both individual and indexed variables showed no statistically significant differences of means between the primed group and the control group.

Interestingly, the 1998 and 2007 samples varied on questions of identity and not necessarily in the expected direction. Because in my own survey the prime had no impact on identity, I was able to use the whole sample for comparison with the adjusted Sniderman and Hagendoorn sample. On these questions, the mean response (level of disagreement) to prompts such as “I am proud to be Dutch” and “I consider myself a typical Dutch person” increased. Put another way, levels of national identity actually dropped in this sample group between the two time points, complicating the picture of increasing feelings of national identity and increasingly negative views on out-groups moving in tandem.

3.5.1 Reinterpreting Support for Assimilatory Policies

Scholars have assumed that high levels of national identity correlate with anti-immigrant attitudes, and there is support for these claims. But it can also be argued that those people who take most pride in their way of life and their cultural values will place a high level of importance on immigrants agreeing with, and assimilating to, those values. This result was one of the strongest attitudinal results, with nearly 75% of the respondents agreeing with the statement, and a similar percentage (70%) agreeing that
Table 3.2: Dutch Identity: Two Samples Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dutch Identity in Comparison (Percentages)</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“I am often aware of being Dutch.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree/Agree</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree/Disagree</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I see myself as a typical Dutch person.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree/Agree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree/Disagree</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I am proud to be Dutch.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree/Agree</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree/Disagree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“If someone criticizes the Netherlands, it is as if they are criticizing me.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree/Agree</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree/Disagree</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1998 survey data adjusted for age and education level.
Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed through the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
immigrants must also learn Dutch. A majority (58%) of subjects disagreed with allowing Muslim students to opt out of certain activities, such as physical education, even if it conflicted with their beliefs.

This survey indicates that one may identify with a national group, tolerate (or at least, express tolerant attitudes toward) the diverse practices of other groups, and yet still desire immigrants to assimilate. Debates about immigrants often dichotomize these positions: either one is completely accepting of any practices in immigrant communities that can be attributed to culture, or one wants to forcibly assimilate all immigrants into the dominant culture. Instead, it may be helpful to see this as a differential attitude towards difference itself: some kinds of difference are more easily accepted than others. After all, if one largely agrees with the values and culture of one's own society, it follows that one would see no particular objection to asking others to assimilate to it. It also hints at the acceptance of the idea of one kind of behavior at home and another in the outside world: those differences which can be treated as private and centered on the homefor example, the food one cooks and eats, the music to which one listenscan be easily tolerated. Those things which impact the public sphere, on the other hand, such as language and obedience to the law of the land, are issues upon which people are less likely to be tolerant.

3.6 Increasing Intolerance: Attitudes Toward Muslims

Young and well-educated respondents are typically the most tolerant of any group. Having little to lose economically, they tend not to feel threatened financially or in their job prospects by immigrants. A university education tends to expose people to a diverse range of groups, leading to more tolerance. In the 2007 sample, for example, all
respondents had friends from other racial, religious and political backgrounds. Hiscox and Hainmueller (2007) found that elites across Europe are more cognizant of the benefits of immigration, and also share a skill-set that is transportable, giving them more mobility.

This is why a shift in attitude among this group is of particular interest. Simple percentages tell part of the story: not a dramatic shift from one end of the attitudinal spectrum to the other, but a shift across the center, with respondents moving toward a more negative assessment of Muslims. A dataset was created using only the questions from each survey that matched identically. The Sniderman and Hagendoorn survey was again controlled for age and education. Responses from the 2007 survey were coded into four response groups, from strongly disagree to strongly agree, to match the coding of the Sniderman and Hagendoorn survey. The percentages were calculated first with the no opinion responses included, and then again excluding these responses.

Some startling changes are immediately evident. Responses were drastically different on the item measuring feelings of cultural threat. In the corollary subset of the 1998 data, only 14% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “I am afraid the Dutch culture is increasingly threatened, while 67.4% strongly disagreed with that assessment. In the 2007 survey, the number of respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement dropped to 9.5% (or 12.7% when non-responses were dropped): a shift of between 54 and 57%. The two subgroups in the 1998 data both landed on the side of disagreement, as indicated by means of 3.5 and 2.8 (where 3 is disagree and 4 is strongly disagree). The 2007 data is a mirror image of the 1998 data, with both groups agreeing to feelings of cultural threat (means of 1.9 and 2.0, where 1 is strongly agree and 2 is agree). Comparisons of feelings of Dutch identity showed that respondents in 2007 were more likely to agree with statements about feelings of Dutch-ness than the
Table 3.3: Feelings of Cultural Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Threat (Percentages and Means)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Item: “I am afraid the Dutch culture is increasingly threatened.”</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sniderman &amp; Hagendoorn 1998, Age/Education Adjusted*</th>
<th>Widened education group**</th>
<th>VU 2007</th>
<th>With “no opinion” dropped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n</strong></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
<td>(1.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*With only university graduates included  **Including those who are in university but have not completed their degree. Standard deviations in parentheses following means; pairwise deletion of observations missing data.
Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed through the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
### Table 3.4: Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 1

#### Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 1 (Percentages and Means)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item: “Muslims have a lot to offer to Dutch culture.”</th>
<th>Sniderman &amp; Hagendoorn 1998, Age/Education Adjusted*</th>
<th>Widened education group**</th>
<th>VU 2007</th>
<th>With “no opinion” dropped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| n                                                     | 86                                                  | 166                       | 86      | 63                       |
| Mean                                                  | 2.0                                                 | 2.5                       | 2.3     | 2.5                      |

*With only university graduates included **Including those who are in university but have not completed their degree. Standard deviations in parentheses following means; pairwise deletion of observations missing data.

Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed through the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
### Table 3.5: Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item: “The Muslim way of life and that of Western Europeans are incompatible.”</th>
<th>Sniderman &amp; Hagendoorn 1998, Age/Education Adjusted*</th>
<th>Widened education group**</th>
<th>VU 2007</th>
<th>With “no opinion” dropped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| n | 86 | 130 | 86 | 60 |
| Mean | 3.1 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 1.5 |

*With only university graduates included **Including those who are in university but have not completed their degree. Standard deviations in parentheses following means; pairwise deletion of observations missing data.

Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed through the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
## Anti-Muslim Attitudes, Item 3 (Percentages and Means)

**Item:** “Most Muslims in the Netherlands respect other cultures.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sniderman &amp; Hagendoorn 1998, Age/Education Adjusted*</th>
<th>Widened education group**</th>
<th>VU 2007</th>
<th>With “no opinion” dropped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*With only university graduates included  **Including those who are in university but have not completed their degree. Standard deviations in parentheses following mean; pairwise deletion of observations missing data.

Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed through the SDA archives. 2007 VU data from author’s survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
earlier cohort. A pattern similar to the response on feelings of cultural threat is observable in responses to the item The Muslim way of life and that of Western Europeans are incompatible. Though a higher percentage (8.1%) of the young, educated group in 1998 strongly agreed with this item (in the 2007 sample, the percentage was 3.6/5.0%), the overall means show the two 1998 samples as disagreeing with the statement (3.1 each), while the 2007 subgroups both land on the side of agreement (1.6 and 1.5).

These differences are interesting, but are they truly significant? A dummy variable was created to separate the data by survey year. Paired t-tests were then run on each variable. On the item Most Muslims in the Netherlands respect other cultures we would expect to see that the mean would go down—that is, that respondents in the 2007 survey would be less likely to agree with this statement than respondents in the 1998 survey. In fact, the mean did drop from 2.7 (SD=1.4) in the 1998 sample to 2.0 (SD=0.79) in the 2007 sample, enough to eliminate the null hypothesis at the .05 level.

There was also a shift in response on the question of whether Muslims have a lot to offer to Dutch culture. The mean response to this question in 1998 was 2.5 (SD=1.0); in 2007, 2.3 (SD=1.0). Though this still shows most respondents agreeing with this statement, a positive assessment of the out-group, the difference between the means is again significant enough to eliminate the null hypothesis at the .05 level.

**Political (Dis)Engagement**

My study included questions about the level of political engagement of respondents. These questions were asked with a mind toward seeing if there was a kind of catalyst group for whom political issues, be they immigration or something else, had motivated them to become more active in politics. The answer appears to be no. The sample was not socially or politically active. Most do not belong to a study group, club or neighborhood organization. Only six of them contacted a politician in the last year,
and only one worked with a political party. Three-quarters did vote in the last election, about in line with the Dutch average. For most of them, levels of interest in politics remains the same over the last twelve months, or decreases. Only a quarter found that politics were becoming more interesting. Unfortunately, the group as a whole was so politically inactive that no conclusions could be drawn about those who did participate in political activity or their reasons for doing so. I found that left-right positionality did not correlate with either levels of national identification or negative attitudes towards immigrants.

### 3.7 Comparative Regression Analysis

Using some of the variables that were common to both surveys, I constructed two multivariate regression analyses of anti-Muslim attitudes on individual and collective threat variables, self-esteem items, and authoritarian values. This analysis mimics one done by Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004: 41; also see the appendix to their paper for question choice and wording), using the same items to measure collective cultural and economic threat, individual safety and economic threat, self-esteem, and authoritarian values. Their dependent variable is stereotype prejudice, a measure of hostility toward particular ethnic/minority groups. My dependent variable is anti-Muslim attitudes, derived from a factor analysis of five items in the survey which had to do with perception of Muslims (Cronbachs alpha=0.71 for the 1998 subset; 0.65 for the 2007 sample). The results cannot be exactly comparable because of this difference (also, Sniderman et al. included occupation and unemployment variables, which were less relevant to my sample of students). Nonetheless, as the authors of the previous study found that hostility toward one other group correlated strongly with hostility toward every other group, the dependent variables are tapping into the same dimension. The regression analysis done by Sniderman et al. found collective cultural threat,
Table 3.7: Multivariate Regression Analyses of Anti-Muslim Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998 (Subset)</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective Cultural Threat</strong></td>
<td>0.33**</td>
<td>0.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective Economic Threat</strong></td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Safety Threat</strong></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Economic Threat</strong></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self Esteem</strong></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian Values</strong></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-1.18*</td>
<td>-1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R-squared</strong></td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Note: 1998 survey data adjusted for age and education.

Sources: 1998 Sniderman and Hagendoorn/University of Utrecht data, accessed via the SDA archives. 2007 data from author's survey conducted at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, Spring 2007.
individual economic threat, and authoritarian attitudes to be significant indicators of stereotype prejudice (2004: 41-42). Collective cultural threat was also far and away the most significant variable in my analysis as well, both in the 1998 subgroup (beta coefficient: 0.33, and significant at the 0.01 level) and even more so for the 2007 sample (beta coefficient: 0.30 and significant at the 0.001 level). Neither individual economic threat nor self-esteem were significant in the model, while authoritarian values were significant only for the 2007 group (beta coefficient: 0.14, significant at the 0.05 level). In both the 1998 and 2007 samples, economic anxiety was generally very low—one of the advantages of youth and the insulated environment of the university.

3.8 Concluding Remarks

The rapid change in public opinion and government policy on immigrant communities in the Netherlands surprised many observers of Dutch politics. This shift was often attributed to the extraordinary events that occurred in a span of less than ten years. By taking a survey done in 1998 and replicating it nearly ten years later, I was able to show that these events did have an impact on political attitudes.

Both the 1998 and 2007 surveys indicate that younger and more educated members of society tend to be more tolerant than the society as a whole. However, even this particularly tolerant group is susceptible to events and media framing of out-groups in their society. We can see that, over time, even young and educated respondents in the Netherlands have grown increasingly uneasy about immigrants, particularly Muslims, in their society and the perception of threat has increased. The situational trigger worked through these most inauspicious circumstances. We can tentatively extrapolate from this that a larger sample size would show an even more pronounced shift among the general population. The results of the regression analyses emphatically show that
perceiving one's own group to be under threat increases levels of hostility toward members of other groups. Further, this anxiety about collective identity trumps economic threat and authoritarian values.

Finally, it is notable that this young and educated group has shifted in favor of assimilationist policies. In Sniderman and Hagendoorn's survey, there was very little support for statements such as Immigrants should behave like the Dutch and Immigration policy should be stricter (less than 25%). In my survey ten years later, more than two-thirds of the respondents agreed with the idea that immigrants must learn something about the Dutch way of life before they arrive, and there was near-unanimous agreement that immigrants should learn Dutch. Along with high levels of agreement to liberal values, these attitudes suggest a renewed commitment to "common-sense" Dutch values.
Chapter 4

Divisive and Effective: The Impact of Party Cues on Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Europe

In many European countries, anti-immigrant sentiment has become an issue that defines political competition. Political entrepreneurs (individuals who are able to create innovative or unexpected outcomes, often by adding a new dimension to the political space (Riker 1986; Schneider and Teske 1992)) have been able to exploit and expand upon feelings of fear and insecurity by presenting immigrants as the primary threat to the cultural integrity of the national community. By successfully framing immigration as an issue of shared values and beliefs (rather than racial or ethnic prejudice), political entrepreneurs have gradually moved the debate into the mainstream. As they have gained supporters by exploiting this issue, established parties have had to address it as well. In light of the ongoing importance of issues surrounding immigration, examining the connection between elite cues and public attitudes furthers our understanding of party strategy and political realignments in this contested political terrain.

In the following, I will present the relevant literature on the role of elite cues and
theories of the development of negative attitudes toward immigrants, and the hypotheses derived from this scholarship. I then detail the sources of data, operationalization of variables, and the hierarchical model used in the analysis, summarize the empirical findings based on this model, and conclude.

4.1 Mapping Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

Political divisions in European politics have traditionally been understood in terms of the left-right dimension (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Parties of the left have been associated with state intervention in markets, multiculturalist and cosmopolitan perspectives, and new politics issues such as environmental protection and animal rights. Parties of the right have been in favor of minimal state intervention in markets, nationalism and traditional/patriarchal values. While alternatives to the left-right schema have been suggested (Kriesi et al. 2008; Hooghe et al. 2002), there is evidence that left-right still structures political competition on many issues (Hooghe et al. 2002, 2005; Hix et al. 2005) and this is true of anti-immigrant sentiment, which is still primarily associated with the right-wing. Parties of the right and far-right, in particular emergent fringe parties (for example, the PVV in the Netherlands) have successfully capitalized on public anxiety about immigrant populations. Far-right parties have a high level of internal coherence about both the importance of issues of assimilation and immigration and their positions on these issues. They are in a position, therefore, to communicate a very clear and strong cue on anti-immigrant sentiment. Parties of the left and center are more muted in their responses. While they may see it as a highly salient issue, they are unable or unwilling to take the strong anti-immigration stance of the right-wing parties. This internal incoherence diffuses their message to the public, leaving voters to impute party position on immigration based on ideology or the policies supported by the party in the past. Recent elections at both the European and national levels
Table 4.1: Salience vs. Strength of Anti-Immigrant Cue

![Graph showing salience vs. strength of anti-immigrant cue]


have shown that a clear and coherent message, even if only on a single issue, can be surprisingly effective. Using a two-level hierarchical model, I show that strength of anti-immigrant cues given by party elites increases levels of anti-immigrant sentiment on the individual level.

4.1.1 Multi-Level Models

Multi-level models mimic a world in which individuals are situated in (nested in) groups of varying size, complexity, and influence. Proponents of multi-level analysis argue that a classical regression analysis treats differences between and within these nested clusters as nuisance rather than information (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005: 74). Multi-level models, on the other hand, try to explain variation in the dependent variable by including information from all levels of analysis in the model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). When investigating something like anti-immigrant sentiment, which is predicated upon the existence of multiple groups in a society, the utility of a multi-level model is clear. Anti-immigrant sentiment is an issue upon which we would expect to see variation at different levels of analysis: at the national level, influenced by conceptions...
of citizenship or number of immigrants; at the party level, where parties and political actors seeking to distinguish themselves vary considerably in their position and cueing; at the individual level, depending on socioeconomic factors.

4.2 Elite Cueing

Political elites have been shown to lead public opinion through their cues (Inglehart 1970; Zaller 1992); the way an issue is framed by elites or the media changes the way individuals consider the issue when constructing their opinions (Druckman 2001: 1042; on framing effects, see Riker 1986, Kinder and Herzog 1993, Sniderman 2000). Political elites may signal the position of a party on an issue as well as how important the issue is to the party and the public. Cues are one way that political actors have of claiming political space. If a party effectively brings an issue into the mainstream, that party has increased the salience of an issue and, simultaneously, clearly communicated its position on the (suddenly relevant) topic.

A considerable body of work has accumulated on the connection between elite cueing and public Euroskepticism (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Steenbergen, Edwards, de Vries 2007; de Vries and Edwards 2009) which have informed the development of this model. Anti-immigrant sentiment and Euroskepticism are in a sense sibling issues: both Euroskepticism and anti-immigrant sentiment have been successfully utilized by entrepreneurial parties to command media attention, shift the boundaries of political debate, and, most importantly, to win votes.¹ Furthermore, Euroskeptic and anti-immigrant parties play on the same themes: distrust of elites, defense of national sovereignty and the national community, and economic uncertainty.

¹Kriesi et al., for example, identify immigration and European integration as central to a new cultural axis of competition (2008: 13) and also see cultural issues as more influential than economic issues in structuring party positions (294).
For example, De Vries and Edwards (2009) demonstrate that in the case of Euroskepticism, the far-right and far-left parties which are most likely to promote Euroskeptic attitudes do so by presenting different rationales for Euroskepticism. Parties of the left appeal to economic/material concerns that European integration threatens the sustainability of the national welfare states, while Euroskeptic parties on the right emphasize the defense of the national community and national sovereignty against an encroaching power. The prevailing explanations of anti-immigrant sentiment are also divided between economic and cultural concerns.2 Extending the multilevel models employed in analyses of Euroskepticism to the influence of parties on anti-immigrant attitudes is a parsimonious progression.

This research adds to our understanding of cross-national variation in levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Partisan cueing on this issue is particularly influential because explicitly hostile positions toward immigrant populations are still controversial. The actors who say the most outrageous things about Muslims,3 or who introduce legislation banning burquas,4 are likely to garner media attention.

When mainstream parties converge on an issue, space is created for a party to challenge the status quo based on its status as outsider (Kriesi et al. 2008). Parties which already have a relatively small vote share have incentives to take risks. They can espouse controversial and original positions because they are usually not bound to historical ideological positions or traditional constituencies who might be alienated by a radical stance. They are also free to suggest policies that are impractical if not impossible, since they are unlikely to be in a position to implement such a policy at any time. In the meantime, they have amplified their cues and chosen frames through

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2I would expect the correlation at the individual level between Euroskeptic attitudes and anti-immigrant attitudes to be quite high.

3When Pim Fortuyn called Islam a backward culture, for example (de Volkskrant, 9 February 2002).

4As Geert Wilders did in 2005, though it did not pass; France enacted such a ban on 13 July 2010.
the media without cost.

The cues given by right-wing parties in Europe are effective because they are simple and coherent.\(^5\) They emphasize the common history and values of the nation (elevating the ingroup) while contrasting these values to those of another group (derogating the outgroup). These narratives take advantage of emotional and symbolic cues that are processed rapidly and often subconsciously, triggering what psychologists call implicit attitudes: associations that come to mind unintentionally, whose influence on thought and action may not be consciously recognized and can be difficult to control (Payne et al. 2009: in press).

The classical view of a voter is that of a rational individual who steps into the voting booth with a clear ordering of preferences that will maximize the benefit to that particular individual (Downs 1957; van der Brug et al. 2000). Ongoing research has shown, however, that this kind of utilitarian calculation is relatively rare. Instead, people use cognitive shortcuts whenever possible, relying upon gut feelings to quickly eliminate most options and then choosing from the remaining (Damasio 2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Political parties offer one way of editing information. Assuming that the voter feels reasonably well aligned with his party, following the lead of elites simplifies things considerably. The effect of party cues is emphasized in individuals who are cognitively mobilized—that is, paying attention to party positions (Inglehart 1970; Zaller 1990, 1991, 1992).

Anti-immigrant cueing should be particularly effective, because the parties broadcasting those cues are appealing to essential human needs and very basic systems of cognition. The human drive for social belonging considerably predates their capacity for abstract thought. Anti-immigrant parties will rely upon two primary cues: they

\(^5\)See van Leeuwen’s (2007) discussion of Geert Wilders’ language use, for example.
must define the boundaries of the group by identifying its value system (cultural worldview), uniqueness, and status. They then will portray this unique community as under siege, threatened by another group (with a different worldview and, therefore, with unintelligible motives and actions). Feelings of threat (Greenberg et al. 1990) and group identity (Tajfel 1970, 1979, 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986) arise with minimal stimuli in social psychology experiments. A cue which combines threat with feelings of group identity is likely to be quite powerful.6

The muted messages of the centrist parties will not usually be intended to arouse high levels of emotion. Mainstream parties must present the status quo as more or less acceptable, if for no other reason than that they are the actors to whom the status quo will be attributed. The status quo may be satisfying or acceptable, but it is rarely emotionally engaging. In proportional representation systems, governments are often formed through coalitions between parties which must rely on compromise in order to pass legislation and create policy. This makes it difficult for centrist parties to clearly articulate the ways in which they differ from each other.7 We will return to this point in our discussion of measuring party cues.

A word about the directionality of cueing (i.e. top-down, bottom-up, or reciprocal): anti-immigrant parties would contend that they are responding to public fears and concerns about immigrant populations in their country. In this case I am interested only in the cues from elites to public (top-down cueing). I would argue that parties broadcasting anti-immigrant cues are not directing them only at their partisans, but

6 In addition to the compelling story of a common enemy which threatens a common identity, the far-right also tends to emphasize a strongly anti-elitist message: a shadowy elitist “they” has hidden the truth and defied and manipulated the will of the people. By implication, this gives far-right parties the quality of authenticity and the virtue of truth-telling.

7 In consociational systems many of the policy decisions are made behind closed doors, encouraging moderation since compromise can be reached without any individual actor being portrayed as retreating from a publicly held position (and therefore being perceived as weak or indecisive) (Lijphart 1967).
are aiming at the broader electorate in the interests of altering the political agenda. More to the point, variation among parties themselves is of primary interest.

4.3 Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: Concept and Causes

“Anti-immigrant sentiment” is a broad term. It leaves unspecified whether one has an objection to every kind of immigrant or only against a particular group of immigrants (and immigrant is likely to be interpreted according to the immigrant group uppermost in the respondents mind). It does not necessarily differentiate between someone who feels slightly uneasy at the sight of women in burquas and someone who is ready to take up arms to defend the border. For the purposes of this paper, anti-immigrant sentiment will be understood as a generally negative predisposition toward immigrants which leads to support for restrictive immigration policies.

There are two predominant explanatory frameworks for anti-immigrant sentiment on the individual level. The first is a materialist approach, which focuses on competition for scarce resources. From this perspective, negative attitudes toward immigrants will be more likely if an individual feels she must compete against immigrants for jobs or other resources. The groups most likely to feel a direct economic threat from immigrant groups are those with fewer skills and less education (Christin 2004; Citrin et al. 1997; Hardin 1997). The second approach draws from studies of group identity and membership that demonstrate that individuals are motivated to positively evaluate a group to which they belong (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Brewer 1991, 1996, 1999; Brewer and Pierce 2005). This positive “ingroup” evaluation is often (though not always) accompanied by a correspondingly negative evaluation of groups to which an individual does not belong (Tajfel 1970; Brewer 1999). In light of this theory, negative attitudes toward immigrant groups depend upon the nature and level of an individuals identification with their own group. In the context of European politics, Hooghe and
Marks (2004) find that national identity influences attitudes toward European integration; Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) show that concerns over group identity may trump economic considerations in the formation of anti-immigrant sentiment (see also Sniderman et al. 2004). By reinvigorating national identities, right-wing parties have taken the ball from the left-wing identity politics of the 1960s and 1970s and run with it. The identity-based movements of the right are a mirror image of the postmaterialist identity groups of earlier generations.

While these theories tend to be presented in opposition to one another, they should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Indeed, as Bobo points out, “the melding of group identity, affect, and the interests in most real-world situations of racial stratification make the now conventional dichotomous opposition of realistic group conflict versus prejudice empirically nonsensical” (1999: 457). For example, left-wing opposition to the welfare state has been framed as an economic resources or group-conflict concern (Hooghe et al. 2002; de Vries and Edwards 2009) but welfare state entitlement programs often hinge upon ideas about who is deserving of support, and people tend to favor programs that benefit people they perceive to be like themselves (i.e. with whom they can identify).

Drawing on the theories and research presented above, I hypothesize the following: first, that a strong anti-immigrant cue from parties will be associated with higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment; that the presence of a right-wing party will shift the overall level of anti-immigrant sentiment; finally, that exclusionary national identity will correspond with more negative attitudes toward immigrants.

4.4 Data and Method

The individual level data in this model were drawn from the 2003 iteration of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The ISSP rotates modules on different
issues; 2003 was the most recent year they administered the module on national identity. For data on party position on immigration, I use information drawn from the 2003 party expert survey performed by Benoit and Laver.\textsuperscript{8}

I built a two-level model to measure variation in levels of anti-immigrant sentiment at the individual level and at the party level. Hierarchical linear models, as previously mentioned, allow the researcher to examine variation at different levels of society. Many models still treat social data as if it were completely pooled, with no grouping within groups. As Steenbergen and Jones (2002) note, this often has the effect of biasing the standard errors, resulting in over-estimating the significance levels of variables. Multilevel modeling can be thought of as a generalization of linear regression, wherein either intercepts or slopes or both are allowed to vary by group (Gelman 2007).

Our dependent variable in this model is anti-immigrant sentiment. The first hypothesis to be tested is that strong anti-immigrant cues from political parties will positively influence anti-immigrant sentiment on the individual level. The next hypothesis to be examined is the proposition that the presence of an extreme right-wing party will be positively related to anti-immigrant sentiment at the country level, since right-wing parties would be expected to introduce and maintain the issue in public debates. Finally, it is expected that exclusionary national identity will be positively related to anti-immigrant sentiment at the individual level.

### 4.5 Conception and Measurement of Variables

For the measurement of anti-immigrant sentiment, the dependent variable, I use a question from the ISSP that asks the respondents to agree or disagree with the statement

\textsuperscript{8}I had initially run the analysis with expert data from the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, aware of the potential problems with imputing party position backwards in time, but unaware of the existence of the earlier Benoit and Laver survey. The results were substantially the same; however, the presence of a right-wing party was not significant in the 2003 data but \textit{was} significant with the 2006 data.
“[Country]’s government should take stronger measures to exclude immigrants.” In the original survey, the scale ran from (1) “Strongly agree” to (5) “Strongly disagree.” I recoded this variable so that higher scores reflect higher anti-immigrant sentiment (i.e. so that a “5” score indicates the respondents strong agreement with this exclusionary statement) and created a dummy variable wherein the respondents who strongly agreed with this statement were coded 1 and all others, 0.

I measured the strength of a party’s anti-immigrant cue by integrating the expert means for each party in each country into the dataset. The experts surveyed by Benoit and Laver were asked to place their party on a scale from (0) “Strongly opposes tough immigration policy” to “Strongly favors tough immigration policy” (20). I collapsed this to the more common ten-point scale. In terms of party strategy, as discussed previously, parties of the far left and far right are more tightly clustered together than parties of the center (as measured by the deviation from the mean). Parties of the center-right family (Liberals, Conservatives, and Christian Democrats) had the most variation within each family. The parties that scored the highest (above 8) on the scale were unsurprising: the Front National and the UMF in France; Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands; the FP in Austria; True Finns in Finland; the Danish Peoples Party. All have made the defense of national culture and identity central to their campaigns. The opposite end of the scale was anchored by the Green parties across Europe, who consistently scored between 1 and 2 on the scale, and socialist parties, who were about the same. Social democratic parties tended to hover between 3 and 5, while Christian democratic parties were between 6 and 8.

Drawing from the econometric tradition, political scientists long attributed anti-immigrant sentiment to fear of increased competition for scarce resources: an economic cost-benefit calculation in a zero-sum game. This literature draws primarily from analyses of anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States (Citrin 1997) and, as McLaren
(1996) points out, this relationship between economic standing and anti-immigrant sentiment has not been replicated among the European public. Because the ISSP did not standardize income measurements across countries (and reported only the median income in local currency, not the distribution) I use their class measurement instead. Respondents were asked to rank themselves on a bottom (1) to top (10) scale. Responses to this question were normally distributed; the majority of respondents ranked themselves 5, 6, or 7.

Anti-immigrant sentiment can and does arise from perceived threats to symbolic institutions or “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991). In considering the relationship of anti-immigrant sentiment and identity, I follow Hooghe and Marks (2005) distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary forms of national identity. Inclusionary national identity is adaptive and expansive, allowing for the importance of national identity within the context of multiple sources of identity. Exclusionary national identity implies the triumph of national identity at the expense of other forms of identity, based on a comparative and relational system of judgment discussed elsewhere (Fox 2010). Based on the factor loadings of another analysis of this dataset, I used the item with the highest factor loading on (as I have termed it) patricentric identity, that is: “It is very important to have [nationality] ancestry.” Originally scaled from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”) I recoded it as a dummy variable, whereby 1 stands for strong agreement with this statement and 0 any lower level of agreement.

Education has consistently been shown to decrease negative attitudes towards immigrants and out-groups in general (Quillian 1995; Sniderman 2000; Kriesi et.al. 2008). This could be the effect of education on its own, which by exposing people to different cultures and ways of life increases understanding and tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989; Hiscox and Hainmueller 2007). It could also be that level of education coincides with economic security, so that the well-educated are less pre-disposed to feel that their
well-being is threatened by immigrants. The ISSP has country-specific measures of education which are not directly comparable, but it also has a general question that ranks the respondents level of education on a lowest-to-highest scale. Using the more general question, I created a dummy variable whereby the highest level of education achieved was coded 1, and the other levels, 0.\textsuperscript{9}

Since de Vries and Edwards (2009) found that “extreme right-wing” parties\textsuperscript{10} influenced the level of Euroskepticism at the national level, I hypothesized that the presence of an extreme right-wing party in a country would also increase the level of anti-immigrant sentiment. Along with their defense of the national community against the European Union, right-wing parties portray themselves as defenders of the national community against the invasion of immigrants as well. The highly vocal and visible presence of right-wing parties and politicians (for example, the current trial in the Netherlands of Geert Wilders of the PVV—the party that rose to fill the gap after the LPF collapsed for defaming a minority population) has increased the salience of this issue for all political parties. I operationalized as those which are more than one standard deviation away from the mean left-right position for each country. If a country does not have such a party, it is coded 0. The same parties that scored the highest on the anti-immigration scale above are the parties considered far right by this definition.

One structural variable considered, but ultimately not included in the model, is the proportion of immigrants in each country: would a larger proportion of immigrants result in increased attention to issues of immigration and/or a rise in exclusive national

\textsuperscript{9}I also ran the analysis with all levels of education included rather than using the dummy variable. The results were comparable.

\textsuperscript{10}Extreme right-wing is the term de Vries and Edwards use. The naming and definition of parties on the far right in Europe (extreme right, far right, new right, radical right) is actively contested. The label chosen may indicate an underlying ontology: that these parties are neo-fascist (as extreme right is used by Ignazi (1992), for example) or that the parties represent a new right movement which is based on populist rhetoric and which works within the existing institutions (cf. radical right in Givens (2004, 2005)).
identities? (Quillian 1995). Unfortunately, data on immigrant populations in Europe is extremely difficult to parse. Countries vary considerably in their definition of immigrant or “foreign” populations, and perception of immigrant population is notably unrelated to absolute numbers of immigrants (Citrin et.al. 1997). Using the information available through various sources (Eurostat and national statistics bureaus) I created a variable that ranked each country as having a low, medium, or high proportion of immigrants. This variable was not significant in any of the models in which it was included. This finding is supported by Citrin and Sides (2008): comparing determinants of attitudes towards immigrants in the United States and in Europe, they found that attitudes were unaffected by the number and composition of the foreign born population (even though respondents consistently overestimated the size of the foreign born population in their own country).

Finally, at the individual level, demographic control variables were added: the respondents sex (0 if male, 1 if female), and age. Including age controls for possible generational effects, though it has been found that political attitudes fluctuate over the course of a lifetime (Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz 1976; Krosnick 1988). I therefore do not expect age to be an important variable. As for gender, electoral research in the United States has found a distinct gender gap in levels of support for the Democratic party, suggesting that women hold more liberal attitudes than men (Wirls 1986; Mueller 1988; Conover 1988). Givens (2004) found that men were more likely to vote for radical right parties in Europe; though I believe the influence of sex will be slight, I expect that women will have lower lever levels of anti-immigrant sentiment than men.

4.6 Analysis

Having defined variables of interest at each level, it is necessary to determine whether there is significant variation in anti-immigrant sentiment at the party and individual
levels. To confirm that there is (and that, therefore, a multi-level model is preferable to a classical least squares estimation) an ANOVA is conducted on the anti-immigrant sentiment indicator. Both individual and party level variance components are significant, providing evidence for variation at both levels. The ANOVA also allows for the estimation of the ratio of the variance of each component to the total variation in the data, that is, the relative importance of each level. Since this data is sampled at the individual level, it is not surprising that most of the variance is explained at that level (Snijders and Bosker 1999)—67.5 percent \[1.026/(1.026 + 0.495*100]\]. 32.5 percent, \[0.494/(1.026 + 0.494)*100\] of explanatory variance is at the party level.

Table 2: Analysis of Variance

<table>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance Components</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Level</td>
<td>0.495**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td>1.026**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 x Log Likelihood</td>
<td>21019.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.001

Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Source: ISSP 2003 data accessed through GESIS/ZACAT archive.

The maximum likelihood estimates of the fixed effects and the variance components of the multi-level model are presented in Table 2. When the fitted model is compared to the null model (Table 2 to Table 1) the chi-squared statistic shows that the fitted model is a significant improvement over the null model: chi-squared=3973.92, df=7, p
0.001. This indicates that some of the predictors included in the model have non-zero values.

It is also possible to calculate the relative change in variance components between the fitted model and the null model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). Individual-level components are not impressive: the predictors explain only 1.6 \( \left[ \frac{1.026-1.01}{1.026} \right] \times 100 \) percent of the variation in anti-immigrant sentiment. The predictors at the party-level perform much better, accounting for 84\% \( \left[ \frac{0.495-0.269}{0.269} \right] \times 100 \) of the cross-national variance on anti-immigrant sentiment.\(^{11}\)

There is evidence in support of several hypotheses in the model. The first variable of interest, strength of party cue, was highly significant and positively related to anti-immigrant sentiment (0.15). Partisan elites do affect those in their party on this particular issue. There was no support for the corollary hypothesis that the presence of a right-wing party was related to an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment. The variable was statistically insignificant (at the 0.05 level) and the coefficient was in fact negative.

The model strongly supports the difference that level of education makes in levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Being highly educated decreased the level of anti-immigrant sentiment substantially (-0.34) and the variable was highly significant. (This was true whether the dummy variable for education was used or the original variable with all values included.)

The measure for exclusionary national identity positively correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment; this variable had the second-largest slope coefficient in the model (0.31) and was highly significant. This continues to support the theory of the importance of symbolic politics and the relationship between strong feelings of chauvinistic national identity and negative predispositions toward out-groups.

The weak measure from the ISSP for class, which I appropriated as a measure of

\(^{11}\)The “R-squared” for this model was 0.20
Table 4.3: A Multilevel Model of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Estimates</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.179***</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Educated</td>
<td>-0.344***</td>
<td>(0.374)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Self-Perception</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary National Identity</td>
<td>0.305***</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Party Cue</td>
<td>0.150***</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Right-Wing Party</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.061**</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance Components</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Level</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 x Log Likelihood</td>
<td>17045.692</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5935</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.001, ***p<.0001
Sources: ISSP 2003 data, accessed through the GESIS/ZACAT archive; Benoit and Laver 2003 Party Expert Survey.
economic security, was not impressive: 0.01 coefficient value and not significant. If we do believe in a correlation between being well-educated and higher levels of income, we could see the education variable as a kind of proxy for a better income variable, but we cannot tease out this relationship from this data. Finally, the demographic variables: being female does slightly decrease levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (-0.07), and both age and sex were significant, but with relatively negligible impact.

4.7 Concluding Discussion

This model contributes to the ongoing literature about the relationship of parties and public as well as the study of the causes of anti-immigrant sentiment. In it, we see the strong influence of party elites in cueing public attitudes, and we also find support for two of the most common explanations of anti-immigrant sentiment: high levels of exclusive national identity and lower levels of education contribute to a negative view of immigrants. Only a decade ago, McLaren examined the differing attitudes toward immigrants from E.U. member states and those from outside the E.U., arguing that there was more elite discussion and debate on these issues in countries with high levels of external (non-E.U.) immigration, and an absence of such elite debate in countries with lower levels of external immigration (2001: 91). This difference seems to have evaporated. Even in countries with fairly low levels of external immigration, party elites considered this issue highly salient. The elite-level data used here foreshadows the maneuvering that political parties have done since 2003 in order to define themselves and to delineate their territory on this issue. The economic crisis in Europe will, I believe, increase the appeal of political actors who provide simple, compelling narratives of history, belonging, and identity.
Bibliography


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