

MASS MEDIA'S AGENDA SETTING FUNCTION IN THE AGE OF  
GLOBALIZATION:  
A MULTI-NATIONAL AGENDA-SETTING TEST

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## **ABSTRACT**

**YING ROSELYN DU: Mass Media's Agenda-Setting Function in the Age of  
Globalization: A Multi-National Agenda-Setting Test  
(Under the direction of Donald Shaw)**

This dissertation explores mass media's agenda-setting function in a context of increased globalization to determine whether the theory, which was built upon intra-nation environments, functions in the global setting. The study matches public agendas with media agendas to investigate agenda-setting effects in 11 countries worldwide. It also compares media agendas across countries, both at the object level and the attribute level, to consider whether inter-nation intermedia influence exists.

The results suggest a general pattern of the agenda-setting function of mass media in the countries examined. The study finds evidence of inter-nation intermedia influence and thus presents a new way to look at the intermedia agenda-setting relationship – moving this research from comparisons within a local area to cross-national intermedia comparisons.

Moreover, this study explores for evidence of directional inter-nation intermedia agenda-setting, presuming that the media of the pivotal and powerful West have stronger influence on their non-Western counterparts than vice versa. Due to the lack of evidence found, the study cannot argue a general causality between Western and non-Western countries' media.

Finally, the study examines second level intermedia agenda-setting effect at the

global level to determine whether the attribute agendas of the media in different countries are dissimilar. The multi-national investigation did not yield clear-cut results. Findings suggest a complex inter-nation intermedia relationship at the attribute level and imply that, in the age of globalization, a simple “ideological difference” reasoning derived from the Cold War days is probably outdated.

TO BEN BEN AND HAN HAN

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# **CHAPTER 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

The idea of agenda-setting travels widely and well. The phrase itself rarely requires translation and has been used in studies in at least 15 countries around the world. Yet few systematic cross-national comparative studies have ever been undertaken. On one hand, agenda-setting may be a truly universal phenomenon that cuts without distinction across all cultures, post-industrial or pre-industrial, sectarian or secular, and all kinds of media systems, authoritarian or free, partisan or professional, sophisticated or primitive. If so, a major explanation of media influence is universal, and can be studied with equal productivity in any country. On the other hand, differences in media systems may have implications for media effects at both the individual and collective level, and thus the agenda-setting process may differ from country to country.

Agenda-setting research is now well into its fourth decade of existence and development. Most of the hundreds of agenda-setting studies have a made-in-the-U.S.A. label. Although there are some studies that have explored the agenda-setting process in other countries, such as Japan, Spain, and Germany, few of them have been able to examine more than one country and provide comparative information. This is because, perhaps, it is difficult to conduct multinational studies for feasibility and practicality reasons. Collecting data from different countries is a hard task, which demands extensive international cooperation and inevitable compromises.

A chance to replicate and extend the original agenda-setting study – a comparison of the salience of a set of objects measured in public opinion and media content – across a wide range of political and media systems, is a target of opportunity that should not be missed. One such opportunity occurred in early 2006, when PIPA (The Program on International Policy Attitudes) released the report for the BBC World Service poll of 27 countries from around the world, which asks a question that is strikingly similar to measures used in many of the agenda-setting studies in the past 40 years: “In the future, when historians think about the year 2005, what event of global significance do you think will be seen as most important?” This has brought forth the possibility of a multinational agenda-setting test.

In this study, results of the BBC study in 11 countries were matched with a content analysis of major media in those countries to examine the correspondence between media agendas and public agendas in a variety of political and media systems and then to compare media agendas across the countries to identify whether international intermedia agenda-setting effects may exist – for instance, whether the United States or Western media set the agenda for other media systems nearer the periphery of the global system.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### **The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media**

Agenda-setting theory contends that the mass media tell the public not only what to think about, but also how to think about it – the first process, or first level of agenda-setting, is about the transfer of the salience of issues, or items, on the media agenda to the public agenda, while the second process, or second level of agenda-setting (also called *framing*<sup>1</sup>), is about the transfer of the salience of selected attributes. Since the initial Chapel Hill study by McCombs and Shaw (1972) found that the public's perception of the relative importance of issues is determined to a strong degree by the amount of media coverage devoted to issues, hundreds of follow-up studies have found a link between public concerns and media emphasis.

With or without the label, the idea of agenda-setting has been with us since the days of the penny press. In his early work, Lippmann (1922) contended that people do

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<sup>1</sup> Attribute agenda-setting merges agenda-setting theory with the concept of framing in framing theory. While some scholars suggest the interchangeable usages of attribute agenda and frames for theoretical parsimony, others, represented by Scheufele (2000), contend to keep distance between the two theories. They argue that framing is quite different than agenda-setting because it involves not merely prioritization of individual objects or attributes, but also activation of entire interpretive schemas, in other words, invoking schemas that influence the interpretation of incoming information. This argument is based on the assumption that subtle changes in the wording of the description of a situation might affect how audience members interpret this situation. For more information about attribute agenda-setting and framing, see McCombs, M. (2004). *Setting the agenda: The mass media and public opinion* (pp. 86-97). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

not deal directly with their environments as much as they respond to “pictures” in their heads. Although he did not specifically use the term itself, Bernard Cohen is generally credited with refining Lippmann’s ideas into the theory of agenda-setting. He argued that the world looks different to different people depending on what the press offers them. Cohen’s writing became the basis for what we now call the agenda-setting function of the mass media. This perspective might have lingered in obscurity if it had not been empirically confirmed by research conducted by McCombs and Shaw.

### *First-Level Agenda-Setting*

During the 1968 presidential election, McCombs and Shaw conducted the first test of Lippmann’s thesis in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. They tested the proposition that through their day-by-day selection and display of the news, the mass media influence public perceptions of what are the important issues of the day. In particular, they believed that a causal relationship existed between the media and the public – over time, the priority issues of the news media would become the priority issues of the public. The independent variable in the Chapel Hill study was news media agenda. In newspapers, cues include the size of the headline, the length of the story, and the page on which the story appears. Similar television cues include position of an item in the newscast and the length of the story. These cues assist the audience in prioritizing the small number of issues selected for attention in the daily news. The dependent variable was public agenda, which refers to whether something is perceived as important or prominent. To operationalize this concept, McCombs and Shaw focused on one of public opinion’s major terms, the public’s perception of the most important problem (MIP) facing the country. They then ranked the issues according to the percentage of voters naming each



issue. To test the agenda-setting hypothesis, they matched responses to their open-ended survey question with a content analysis of the major news sources used by the voters. Just as the public agenda of issues had been rank-ordered according to the percentage of voters naming an issue, these same issues were rank-ordered on the news agenda according to the percentage of news coverage on the issues falling into each category. A strong relationship ( $r = .967$ ) was found between the public's and the media's agendas of issues. McCombs and Shaw thus labeled this transfer of salience from the media agenda to the public agenda the "agenda-setting" influence of mass communication.

Lippmann (1922) may have been the intellectual father of the agenda-setting idea, yet he did not give the theory its name. Forty years after, the conceptualization of agenda-setting was advanced by Cohen (1963), who contended that the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is very successful in telling its readers what to think about. Only a few years later was this theoretical notion labeled by McCombs and Shaw. They have constructed a model test to determine the existence of agenda-setting in mass communications.

### *Second-Level Agenda-Setting*

There has been 40 years of agenda-setting research and development since McCombs and Shaw conducted the seminal study in 1968. The vast majority of following studies have focused on the first level of agenda-setting, in other words, the issue agenda, or objects.<sup>2</sup> Second-level agenda-setting, which focuses on the salience of attributes that

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<sup>2</sup> Commenting on the theoretical evolution of the agenda-setting processes, McCombs and Shaw (1993) defined a news agenda as any set of objects or a single object competing for the attention of the public or the media. This theoretical refinement has spurred an understanding of agenda-setting effects that has become more sophisticated through expansion in the scope of the research. This theoretical refinement justifies the usage of the BBC 2005 Most Significant Event

are linked to an object, has been a relatively new addition to the research literature. Conventional agenda-setting research has focused at the object level and assessed how media coverage could influence the priority assigned to objects (e.g., issues, candidates, events, and problems). In doing this, media tell us “what to think about.” However, there is another dimension to consider. Media can also tell us “how to think about” some objects. Media do this by influencing “attribute agendas.” They tell us which object attributes are important and which ones are not. Just as objects vary in salience, so do the attributes of each object. Each of those objects has numerous attributes, and those attributes define another agenda.

This second dimension of agenda-setting research examines the transmission of attribute salience, which is about the role of the news media in the framing of issues and other objects in the public mind. The attributes of a certain object stressed in the media share very similar meaning with frames in framing theory. Agenda-setting theory’s fusion with framing is a major theoretical extension. The debate over the definitional similarities and dissimilarities between attributes in the agenda-setting process and frames in the framing process helped agenda-setting theory fine-tune the conceptual ground for the attribute agenda-setting effects.

Many studies have found empirical evidence of frames in media content. For example, in their 1976 presidential campaign study, Weaver *et al.* (1981) examined the images that voters held of presidential candidates. The study followed the classical Chapel Hill design, comparison of a media agenda measured by content analysis with a public agenda measured through survey research, but with a shift in focus from an agenda

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Poll data in this study.

of objects to an agenda of attributes. They found a high degree of correspondence between the agenda of attributes on the news agenda and the attributes salient in voters' minds.

The term *framing* may be traced back to Goffman's (1974) work, in which frames were defined as embodiments of "the principles of organization which govern (social) events" (p. 10). Framing was then applied to the news process by Tuchman (1978), who noted that frames turn non-recognizable happenings or amorphous talk into a discernible event. According to Entman (1993), framing essentially involves selection and salience. "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe...Frames define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects." (p. 52)

Depending on how an issue is presented or "framed" in the media, people will think about that issue in a particular way. Research into audience frames investigates how and to what extent specific media frames influence readers' or viewers' perceptions of certain issues. It attempts to reveal the extent to which certain audience frames are replications of media frames (Scheufele, 1999). Price *et al.*'s (1997) study provides compelling evidence that the frames in the news influenced the topical focus of respondents' thoughts. Their experiment asked a sample of students to respond to a

fictitious story about the state funding of their university. Students were randomly assigned to different versions of the story, all containing the same core of information but varying in their opening and closing paragraphs in accordance with the frame employed, which was either conflict, human interest, or personal consequences. Immediately after reading the story, the students were asked to write down all the thoughts and feelings that they had while reading the story. As the results indicated, the different news frames significantly affected both the topical focus and evaluative implications of the thought-listing responses. In contrast, Valkenburg's and Semetko's (1999) study presented their readers with real issues that were prominent in the news during the time of data collection — increasing crime rates and European integration. Findings of this study also strongly verify that news frames can exert a significant effect on audiences' thoughts and recall.

As Entman (1993) states, an increase in salience enhances the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory. He considers Kahneman's and Tversky's (1984) work as “perhaps the most widely cited recent example of the power of framing and the way it operates by selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others” (p. 53). Kahneman and Tversky (1984) asked experimental subjects the following: “Imagine that the U. S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs would you favor?” (p. 343). In this experiment,

72% of subjects chose Program A; 28% chose Program B. In the next experiment, identical options to treating the same described situation were offered, but framed in terms of likely deaths rather than likely lives saved: “If program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die” (p. 343). The percentages choosing the options were reversed by the framing. Program C was chosen by 22%, though its twin Program A was selected by 72%; and Program D amassed 78%, while the identical Program B received only 28%.

As this classical experiment illustrates, the frame determines whether most people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and decide to act upon it. This is a typical experiment that clearly demonstrates that frames select and call attention to particular aspects of the reality described. This, simultaneously, means that frames draw people’s attention away from other aspects. As Entman (1993) concludes, receivers’ responses are clearly affected if they observe and process information about one interpretation and have little or incommensurable data about alternatives.

#### *Ideology as a Source of News Framing*

Although news media and practitioners are supposed and profess to be objective, neutral and impartial, they do not operate in a social, political, economic and ideological vacuum. “Among the few certainties produced by six decades of research in mass communication is the dictum that news is a socially created product, not a reflection of an objective reality” (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998). News frames, or internal structures of the mind, often are based not on individual values but rather on external

values such as social norms, organizational constraints, and interest-group pressures (Tuchman, 1978), or as Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) put it, on “an invocation of socially created collective universals and traditional understandings to define and interpret new issues at hand.” Durham (1998) maintains that journalistic frames develop primarily through the reporter-source relationship, where eventual agreement on the nature of a story between the two becomes assumed. Merrill and Odell (1983) contend that journalists adapt to the social good (or supposed social good) at the expense of their conscience and existential responsibility.

Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) argue that ideology is a major source of framing in the news, and framing is an important mechanism by which ideology is transmitted through the news. “As a socially constructed product, news is influenced by a host of political, economic, and ideological factors, and open to a fascinating process of cognitive simplification called framing” (p. 52). According to Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad, three types of ideology may be expected to exert primary influence on the framing of news: dominant ideology (views and ideas shared by the majority of people in a given society), elite ideology (the particular ideology or policy orientation on the part of the government or the administration in power at any given point in time), and journalistic ideology, or occupational ideology (arising mainly from media routines and occupational value). Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad employ quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the operation of framing in the U.S. and Chinese coverage of the Fourth U.N. Conference on Women and the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Forum in Beijing in 1995, finding that the coverage in both countries clearly reflected the mutually reinforcing operation of the dominant, elite, and journalistic

ideologies as primary sources of influence on framing of the news. As Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad conclude:

“The findings of this study point to a prominent role played by dominant ideology in the framing of international news. In the context of news work, and in the case of international news coverage in particular, the dominant ideology of the nation (be it capitalist or communist) appears to function as a major source of framing. Although individual journalists can, and sometimes do, succeed in stepping outside such ideological boundaries, their overwhelming tendency to draw on ideologically driven frames serves as a powerfully mechanism by which dominant ideology is transmitted and perpetuated through news media” (p. 150).

### *Theoretical Critiques*

The important and straightforward Chapel Hill study highlights both the strengths and limitations of agenda-setting as a theory of media effects. “Agenda-setting” implies causality, but correlation statistics do not serve the purpose of such a hypothesis test. Direction of agenda-setting effect is questioned by some scholars: What is the actual nature of the relationship between news and its audience? Could it be the public setting the media’s agenda and then the media reinforce it? Maybe the media are simply responding to their audiences? Because of the unanswered causality, some scholars lamented that agenda-setting may be an apt metaphor, but it is no theory.

It is important, however, not to judge the utility of the agenda-setting approach based on the earliest studies. Although these had many limitations, they have inspired other research that is providing intriguing if still controversial results. For example, some researchers have attempted to overcome the causality questioning by conducting research with an experimental approach, which is commonly agreed to prove causality. Longitudinal panel analysis is another approach to overcome the causality questioning.

Agenda-setting is a fascinating idea, and it has attracted a tremendous amount of research attention. It was estimated more than a decade ago that about 25 agenda-setting studies appeared annually (Dearing & Rogers, 1996), and since then, even more studies in this research stream have been published each year. However, most of the hundreds of agenda-setting studies have a made-in-the-U.S.A. label, comparing American people's public opinions with American media agendas. As more and more evidence accumulated about the agenda-setting influence of the mass media on the public in the U.S., some scholars began to ask instead, is such an agenda-setting pattern specific to America? What about other countries? Do agenda-setting effects exist in diverse cultural settings? Is the agenda-setting process in other countries different from the process in the U.S.? Is it similar? Or is it in sharp contrast?

### **Agenda-Setting in Other Countries/Regions**

Agenda-setting studies conducted either in other countries, or using data from other countries, generally are influenced by the American agenda-setting research approaches. Studies have been carried out in Argentina (Lennon, 1998; Pereson, 2002), Australia (Gadir, 1982), Canada (Winter *et al.*, 1982), Denmark (Siune & Borre, 1975), Germany (Kepplinger *et al.*, 1989; Schoenback & Semetko, 1992), Ghana (Anokwa & Salwen, 1988), Israel (Caspi, 1982), Japan (Mikami *et al.*, 1994; Ogawa, 2001; Takeshita, 1993, 2002; Takeshita & Mikami, 1995), Saudi Arabia (Al-Haqeel & Melkote, 1994), Singapore (Holaday & Kuo, 1992), South Korea (Lim, 2006), Spain (Berganza & Martin, 1997; Lopez-Escobar *et al.*, 1998a; Lopez-Escobar *et al.*, 1998b; McCombs *et al.*, 1997; McCombs *et al.*, 2000; Sanchez-Aranda *et al.*, 1997), Sweden (Asp, 1983), Taiwan (King, 1994, 1997), Venezuela (1975), and maybe elsewhere. Although dealing with



varied countries, these foreign studies have certain aspects in common, one of which is that they follow the American agenda-setting paradigm in observing the agenda-setting process in the target country or countries on either the first level or the second level, or both, and compare the results with those found in American studies.

### *Latin America*

In Argentina, evidence of significant agenda-setting effects was found during the 1997 legislative elections in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (Lennon, 1998). In September of the year, the correlation for the top four issues of the day was weak (-0.20) between the public agenda and the combined issue agenda for the five major Buenos Aires newspapers. As Election Day approached in October, however, the correspondence between these agendas for the most important issues soared to +0.80, an increase that indicates considerable acquisition from the news media in the closing weeks of the election campaign. Additional evidence of agenda-setting effects was also found during the 1998 Argentina primary election held to select the presidential candidate for a major political coalition (Pereson, 2002) – for the six most significant issues of the day, the correspondence between the public agenda at the time of the election and the newspaper agenda of the previous month was +0.60; for television news, the correspondence was even stronger (+0.71).

### *Europe*

Intending to test both the first- and second-level agenda-setting effects, Lopez-Escobar *et al.* (1998a) used data from the 1995 Spanish regional elections to explore two sets of hypotheses: An increment in media use for political information corresponds to 1)

an increment in community consensus about social priorities, and 2) an increment in community consensus about politicians' attributes. The analysis of the first-level effects, which largely replicates the study conducted in North Carolina, U.S., shows that a trend toward consensus in an agenda of issues is also present among the Spanish public. Analysis of the second-level effects shows that the pattern of increasing social consensus is also present.

At the second level of agenda-setting, there is evidence, also from the 1995 local elections in the Spanish province of Navarra, that political advertisements influenced the subsequent depiction of the candidates on television news (Lopez-Escobar *et al.*, 1998b). The primary influence of the advertising was on depictions of the candidates' qualifications. On television, the time devoted to qualifications increased more than eightfold from the early days of the campaign to the latter days. One other aspect of the agenda-setting process is the intermedia agenda-setting, which is the interactions and influence of the various mass media on each other. This study found strong evidence of intermedia agenda-setting – comparisons of the coverage on six local issues in two Pamplona newspapers yielded strong correlations with the subsequent television news agenda. This intermedia agenda-setting pattern is highly similar to the pattern in Roberts' and McCombs' (1994) Austin, Texas study during the 1990 gubernatorial campaign, which found that the issue agenda of the local daily newspaper influenced the issue agenda of local television news.

The existence of agenda-setting effects in diverse cultural settings is also well demonstrated by the extensive evidence gathered during the 1996 Spanish general election (McCombs *et al.*, 1997; McCombs *et al.*, 2000). Among voters in Pamplona,

Spain, there was evidence of significant influence by the major news and advertising media on the images of the three candidates. Comparisons of the voters' pictures of the candidates with the descriptions of the candidates in the various mass media yielded striking results: All the correlations were significantly positive, among which the correlations between the voters' agenda of attributes and the attribute agenda of the newspapers, both local and national, are especially highly significant. Additional analyses (Berganza & Martin, 1997; Sanchez-Aranda *et al.*, 1997) found that, along with increased exposure to newspapers, television news and political advertising, there were increases in both positive appraisals of other candidates and negative appraisals of one's preferred candidates, which suggested that voters did learn from the media.

In Germany, a longitudinal agenda-setting study (Kepplinger *et al.*, 1989) found that the tone of the news about politician Helmut Kohl in news magazines and major newspapers influenced public opinion between 1975 and 1984 about his political performance, first as a leader of the opposition party and later as a chancellor. Shifting patterns of positive and negative tone in the media, summed across six attributes of Kohl, explained significant shifts in his level of approval among the German public. The median correlation between the affective tone of the attribute agendas for six major news media and subsequent public opinion was +0.48.

A dramatically different result of a compelling argument, however, was found during the 1990 German national election, where the salience of problems in the former East Germany significantly declined among voters despite intensive news coverage (Schoenback & Semetko, 1992). An agenda-deflating effect was especially apparent among readers of the large circulation tabloid *Bild*, whose convergence of the integration of

East Germany was framed in highly optimistic terms. In this case, the conclusive argument was the positive tone of the news coverage on the issue of German integration, an attribute that reduced the salience of the issue on the public agenda.

### *Middle East*

In Israel, Caspi's (1982) study found that the agenda of questions posed to government ministers by Knesset members reflected the agenda-setting influence of the newspapers – the number of questions grounded in news reports steadily increased from 8% in the inaugural 1949-1951 Knesset to 55% in the 1969-1973 seventh session.

### *South/East Asia*

In the initial Chapel Hill study, the median correlation among the issue agendas of the five daily newspapers (a mix of local and elite dailies) and two television networks observed was highly significant (+0.81), an apparent indication of intermedia agenda-setting. King's (1994) Taiwan study had a similar comparison of the issue agendas for three major daily newspapers and three television stations in Taipei during the 1992 Taiwan legislative elections. It found a median intermedia correlation that was also highly significant (+0.75). King's (1997) later study compared the attribute agendas in the major Taipei newspapers for three mayoral candidates, also finding strong correlations among them (median correlation +0.93).

In Japan, a wealth of agenda-setting research has been conducted since the early 1990s. Takeshita (1993) studied the agenda-setting process in a 1986 Japanese mayoral election. Voters in Machida City, a municipality in the Tokyo metropolitan area, regarded welfare policies, urban facilities and local taxes as the three most important issues in the

election. Comparison of the public agenda, which had seven issues in total, with the coverage of the four major newspapers serving Machida City yielded a modest, but significant, correlation of +0.39. The influence of news in a major Japanese daily newspaper also was found apparent in the pattern of concerns among residents of Tokyo about global environmental problems (Mikami *et al.*, 1994). Among Tokyo residents, the media attribute agendas resulted in significant learning: Their agenda of sub-issues about the global environment showed substantial agreement with the emerging agenda of the two newspapers during the months leading up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in June 1992.

The 1993 Japanese general election also demonstrated the validity of agenda-setting theory across cultures as well as at two distinct levels of cognition; both the first and second levels of agenda-setting were simultaneously examined (Takeshita & Mikami, 1995). Beginning with traditional agenda-setting, the influence of intensive news coverage was examined on the salience of political reform, an issue that accounted for more than 80% of the issue coverage in two major national newspapers and three TV networks. Moving on to the second level of agenda-setting, the salience of system-related aspects of reform on the public agenda was found positively related with attentiveness to political news, and this was the aspect of the issue, its attribute, emphasized in the news. On the other hand, since the ethics-related aspects and their attributes of political reform received minor attention in the news, there was little relationship between the salience of the ethics-related aspects of reform on the public agenda and attentiveness to political news.

In a second level agenda-setting experiment conducted in Japan (Ogawa, 2001),

the effects of object salience in the media were demonstrated in the amount of change found for three behaviors (“want to discuss the issue,” “want more information on the issue,” and “greater interest in the issue”) related to each subject’s lowest-priority issue among the four unobtrusive issues measured. Half of the subjects enrolled in the experiment read articles about their lowest-priority issue that contained only bare facts (the typical objective style employed by journalists for spot news). The other half read interpretative articles about their lowest-priority issue that forecast the impact of the issue on the reader. Consistently greater change in the three behaviors was found among subjects reading the interpretative news articles.

A content analysis of the *Mainichi Shimbun* during a 52-week period identified 12 distinct aspects or attributes of Japan’s economic difficulties in the news coverage (Takeshita, 2002). Placing these attributes in the context of problematic situations, a survey of the public asked how problematic they regarded each of the 12 aspects. The attribute agenda-setting effects of the newspaper’s coverage of the economy was tested both at the level of lower-order attributes, the 12 aspects of the issue, and at the macro-level of frames, the four problematic situations. At both levels, the degree of correspondence between the newspaper’s agenda and the public’s agenda increased monotonically with greater exposure to the news. In this analysis of Japanese public opinion, there are agenda-setting effects for both micro- and macro-attributes.

### **Intermedia Agenda-Setting**

The area of research usually referred to as “intermedia agenda-setting” deals with the influence that mass media agendas have on each other, which concerns how media agendas are being shaped, instead of how they are shaping the public’s agenda. That is, if

one medium publishes its stories, other media will mirror that medium's content and deal with the content in their publications as importantly as in the original medium.

Previous research has documented empirical evidence for this process of intermedia agenda-setting (eg. King, 1994; King, 1997; Lim, 2006; Lopez-Escobar *et al.*, 1998b; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Reese & Danielian, 1989; Takeshita, 2002). In general, at the national level, high status news organizations, such as *The New York Times* and *Associated Press*, set the agendas of other news organizations; at the local level, local newspapers and television stations influence the news agenda of their competitors.

In a study of how 24 Iowa daily newspapers used the *Associated Press* (AP), Gold and Simmons (1965) found an overall coefficient of correspondence of +.915, indicating that local news agendas were strongly influenced by wire service reports. Although each local newspaper used only a small number of the wire stories available, their coverage reflected the same proportions for each category of news as did the wire reports. In the line of such media effects, Whitney and Becker (1982) showed the wire service's influence on local media's agenda, with a correlation coefficient of +.71 between the number of items transmitted by the wire service and the number of stories selected from each category of news. Wire services' effect on other media can be traced back to the classical White's (1950) gatekeeper study. Breed (1955) also showed such effects of the wire services' agenda and pointed out the trends of local media's standardization of news stories.

The effects were not limited to the wire services. Other major or elite news organizations, such as *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, also influence the selection of topics on the news agenda. For example, Reese and Danielian (1989)

identified *The New York Times*' agenda-setting role by illustrating that the *NYT*'s coverage on the drug issue was followed by *The Washington Post* and *The Los Angeles Times*. Some television networks also followed the *NYT* issues.

This intermedia influence can be found both among news organizations and individual journalists. Constantly, journalists are in a position to cover ambiguous issues. They thus tend to rely on each other for ideas and confirmation of their news judgments. Editors tend to question coverage that differs from other news sources, so journalists seek consistency and conformity in their reporting of events. This phenomenon, known as pack journalism, was observed by Crouse (1973) during the 1972 presidential campaign:

“What happened was that Johnny Apple of *The New York Times* sat in a corner and everyone peered over his shoulder to find out what he was writing. The AP guy was looking over one shoulder, the UPI guy over the other and CBS, NBC, ABC, and the Baltimore Sun were all crowding in behind...He would sit down and write a lead, and they would go write leads...Finally, at midnight, the guy announced that Muskie had 32 percent and McGovern had 26 percent, and Apple sat down to write his final story. He called it something like ‘a surprisingly strong showing for George McGovern.’ Everyone peered over his shoulder again and picked it up. It was on the front page of every major newspaper the next day” (Crouse, 1973, pp.84-85).

Similar situations occur outside the parameter of a presidential campaign. Prichard (1987) described how a December 1982 story about a man attempting to blow up the Washington Monument was stuck at page 1A of *USA Today* until Dan Rather led with it on the “CBS Evening News.” By appearing on a major network, the story had been given a “verification factor.” Haws (1993) also observed *The New York Times*' decision to identify William Kennedy Smith's alleged rape victim. The *Times* had identified Patricia Bowman in an article published on April 17, 1991. In the news story, the *Times* explained that it normally withheld the names of alleged sexual assault victims,



but since *NBC* had identified Bowman the night before, it no longer felt responsible for protecting her privacy. The identification of Bowman was deemed legitimate by the *Times* because another news organization had previously named her.

The intermedia agenda-setting process has also been examined in countries outside the U.S. In Spain, an examination of intermedia influence among newspapers and television during the 1995 local elections measured both first- and second-level agenda-setting effects (Lopez-Escobar *et al.*, 1998b). Intermedia agenda-setting at the first level was found significant. At the second level, for substantive attributes, newspaper political advertising influenced both the newspaper and television news agendas, whereas TV news in turn influenced the TV political advertising agenda; for affective attributes, the intermedia relationships are largely reciprocal. In Taiwan, a comparison of the issue agendas for three major daily newspapers and three television stations in Taipei during the 1992 Taiwan legislative elections found a median correlation of +0.75 (King, 1994). A comparison of the attribute agendas in the major Taipei newspapers for three mayoral candidates found a median correlations of +0.93 (King, 1997). In Japan, the framing of economic problem by two major newspapers was compared for two sets of attributes – problematic situation frames and sub-issue frames – and across two different time periods – 26 weeks and 52 weeks (Takeshita, 2002). The median correlation for these four comparisons fell between +0.72 and +0.73. Most recently, Lim (2006) examined the causal relationships among the issue agendas of three online news media in South Korea during two time periods, finding that the leading online newspaper influenced the issue agendas of both the secondary online newspaper and the online wire service.

Originally, the idea of exchanging influence among the media came from simple

curiosity – if media set the public agenda, then who sets the media agenda? As more and more evidence accumulated about the agenda-setting influence of the mass media on the public, scholars in the early 1980s began to instead ask the question of “who sets the media’s agenda.” To distinguish this first phase (media agenda as effect) of the agenda-setting process from the second phase (media agenda as cause), some scholars call it “building the media’s agenda” or “shaping the media’s agenda” (McCombs, 2004).

Agenda building, or agenda-shaping, is concerned with influences on the media agenda.

The expansion of the parameters of agenda-setting research from the question of who sets the public agenda to that of who sets the media agenda has resulted in three major areas – media agenda-setting, public agenda-setting, and policy agenda-setting studies (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). While some prominent scholars identified the sources of the media agenda in various ways (Funkhouser, 1973; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), intermedia agenda-setting studies examine mainly the relationships among different media, attributing the source of the media agenda to other media. But it still opens the door to potential news agenda makers like politicians, PR, and other influential forces, in order to expand the theoretical territory of the agenda setting effects on the media. According to McCombs (2004), the interactions among news organizations, or intermedia agenda-setting, is one of the three key elements to shape the media’s agenda, the other two of which are news sources and news norms, which will be discussed in a global context in the following section.

### **Global News Determinants (Media Agenda Shapers)**

McCombs (2004) uses an “onion” metaphor to illustrate who might set the media’s agenda (see *Figure 2-1*). At the core of the onion is the media agenda; the

concentric layers of the onion represent the numerous influences at play in the shaping of the media agenda. As McCombs identifies, there are three fundamental layers: the layer immediately surrounding the core is news norms, such as social norms and traditions of journalism; the intermediate layer is the other news media, such as the interactions and influence of the various mass media on each other; and the outer layer of the theoretical onion is news sources, such as the president of the U.S., routine public relations activities, and the efforts of political campaigns.

International communication researchers have explored media agenda-shapers in an international context. Most of these studies adopted quantitative methods to examine various factors that influence international news flow across national borders, although there also are a number of studies that employed qualitative methods to uncover determinants of news coverage. This line of research, originated in the 1960s by a handful of Scandinavian scholars, is usually called “international news determinants,” which, as in the theoretical framework of agenda-setting, can be called media agenda-shapers. These systemic determinants, as Wu (1998, 2000, 2003) calls them, can be fit into either the “news sources” or the “news norms” layers in McCombs’ metaphoric onion.

As Ahern (1984) and Wu (1998, 2000, 2003) agreed, determinants of international news flow can be divided into two broad categories, gatekeeper perspective and logistical perspective. The former category generally centers on *news norms*, that is, the social psychology of the news professionals and how those characteristics eventually affect news output; the latter category, which examines the socioeconomic components and physical logistics of news gathering, generally focuses on *news sources*. With regards

to the gatekeeper factors, traditional newsworthiness, sociocultural structure and organizational constraints over news professionals and the agenda-setting impact of international news services have all been found to influence international news flow. On the other hand, the influential factors included in the logistical group are: The GNP of each nation, population, geographic size, eliteness, communication resources and infrastructure, volume of trade, regionalism, geographic proximity, political/economic interests of host countries, and cultural proximity.

#### *News Norms (Gatekeeper Perspective)*

News professionals and international news agencies play an important role in the gatekeeping effect on international news coverage. They can either decide the amount of coverage a country receives or determine the topics or issues that will be emphasized if a particular country is covered at all. According to various studies, news editors tend to either neglect or belittle the audience's interests in international news. In addition, news people often seem to hold peculiar perceptions about their readers' needs, and even disregard results of empirical audience research. For example, both Schramm (1960) and Hester (1971) found that news editors tend to act on their intuitive assumptions about readers – they often believe that most readers are only interested in the countries where there exist cultural or ethnic ties rather than those that are entirely unrelated. Chang and Lee (1992) found that American editors' criteria of selection are, in effect, related to their backgrounds, such as foreign language training, professional education, political ideology and availability of news hole and wire services. To ascertain international news values held by American journalists, Chang *et al.* (1987) compared the events in 1984 and news coverage of the same year, finding that deviance of the event, relevance to the US,

potential for social change and geographical distance were the factors that distinguished the events that were covered and those that were not. This study is in line with the earlier research of Shoemaker *et al.* (1986), which suggested “deviance” as an underlying construct of newsworthiness.

International communication scholars (e.g., Hachten & Scotton, 2002; Hachten & Scotton, 2007; Stevenson, 1994) are often struck by how differently journalism is practiced in different parts of the world. They constructed “normative concepts” of press systems, just to highlight the special features and to help distinguish the underlying elements among them. Haynes (1984), however, pointed out that there exists an overwhelming similarity of international news with regard to topic selection – political relationships between nations and domestic politics occurring in foreign countries are the primary focuses of foreign news across the spectrum of the world’s journalism. Another primary focus is “bad news.” Regardless of the various definitions of “bad news,” studies dealing with this research agenda resulted in complex findings. Some (e.g., Stevenson & Gaddy, 1984) suggest that the Third World or developing countries indeed receive heavier coverage of bad news, others (e.g., Cooper, 1984; Pal, 1993) found that the Third World countries are no more likely than their Western counterparts to be covered on “coups and earthquakes” – media generally tend to produce “bad news”; there does not appear to be a significant difference between from the West and from the Third World.

In addition to the influence of individual gatekeepers and their preference for certain news values on international news, some scholars have argued that the forces acting upon news professionals, such as organizational constraints and cultural customs, also affect news selection, perhaps to a greater extent than those much studied

psychological mechanisms at the personal level. Johnson (1997) suggests that, despite the importance of news values, individual reporters' efforts, and the ideological framework in which the journalists operate, news organizational and market determinants are influential and should be focused on. Johnson even dissected the organization factors from the general gatekeeper category to form two new independent categories of determinants: news organization factors (including variables specific to the news organization, such as size, profitability, number of foreign editors, number of wire services available) and news organization market (audience in the community in which a typical newspaper operates, e.g., percentage of Mexican-Americans in a particular newspaper's market). Johnson found in her 1997 news flow study that the percentage of the population having a Mexican heritage (news organization market) and circulation size (news organization factor) the strongest predictors of coverage of Mexico, and circulation size was the sole predictor of length and source of articles about Mexico and Mexicans.

#### *News Sources (Logistical Perspective)*

Research in this line generally deals with determinants that fit into one of the following three sub-categories:

1. National traits

Studies that tested the influence of national traits on news flow generally stem from Galtung's & Ruge's (1965) seminal work, which presented a structural theory of foreign news. Ostgaard's (1965) and Galtung's (1971) works, are also among the most frequently cited literature in this research stream. As a conceptual framework, their theory claims that economic, social, political and geographic characteristics of nations determine the amount and the nature of coverage one country receives in another

country's news media. Putting the structural theory to test, Rosengren (1977) discovered factors such as trade and population affect the volume of news a nation receives, yet the explicability of each factor varies across countries. Ahern (1984) found that trade and GNP together with international relations account for almost 60% of the variance in predicting the number of news stories published. In a similar vein, Wu (1998, 2000, 2003) and Pietilainen (2006) found that the trade between nations was one of the most conducive factors in augmenting press coverage in foreign countries. The "trade" and "international relations" factors can actually be classified to the next sub-category, interactions and relatedness.

## 2. Interactions and relatedness

Nnaemeka and Richstad (1980) surveyed 19 newspapers of the Pacific region and found that the nations having a colonial tie are given more news attention within the same colonial group. Echoing this study's finding, several subsequent studies also found old colonial ties to be important factors in determining the volume of news flow. For example, in Atwood's (1985) study, findings indicated that African and Arab countries tended to get covered with more stories in the press of the same colonial group. Language was found to be another decisive element among the interactions and relatedness factors. For example, Kariel and Rosenvall (1983) found that French-language and English-language newspapers fall into distinctly separate groups.

There are also a number of studies addressing the influence of regionalism or geographic proximity on news selection, suggesting that both factors contribute to international news presentation.

## 3. Communication infrastructure

The extent to which a country is equipped with sufficient communication infrastructure and human resources in collecting and processing international news is usually defined as a logistical factor. Findings on this factor are mixed. Larson's (1979) seminal study found that international news wire is the most important factor, followed by the presence of an national news agency. Years later, with updated data added to the original sample, Larson (1984) did not find evidence to support the original conclusion about the prediction of satellite communication facilities, although the other two factors were found to significantly influence newscasts - location of U.S. network bureaus and the presence of international news agency in the nation. The presence of international news agencies also appeared to be one of the two principle predictors in Wu's (2000) 38-country comparison study.

From previous studies, one can observe that few, if any, international communication theories have been developed from this body of literature accumulated in the past few decades due to varied media samples, time frames, key definitions, analytical methods and operationalizations of variables in each study. Apparently, a systematic and across-the-board examination of the existing variables, and perhaps some new ones, is needed in the future. It is also observed that most of the previous international news determinants studies focused on news norms and news sources perspectives. Little research, if any, has paid attention to the international intermedia agenda-setting process, as is called "interactions and influence of various media on each other" layer in McCombs' metaphoric "onion." Based on recent developments and changes in the news environment and in technology worldwide, a global survey would be timely to explore the international intermedia agenda-setting process.



## **Global Media Systems**

As noted earlier, international communication scholars (e.g., Hachten & Scotton, 2002; Hachten & Scotton, 2007; Stevenson, 1994) are often struck by how differently journalism is practiced in different parts of the world. They thus constructed “normative concepts” of press systems, just to highlight the special features and to help distinguish the underlying elements among them. These concepts, as Hachten and Scotton (2007) call them, reflect the varied ideologies of press control worldwide.

According to Hachten and Scotton (2007), there are five different country-level media systems. However, it is important to note that no country falls perfectly under one concept. These concepts reflect how the media ideally should perform under certain political conditions and social values.<sup>3</sup>

The Authoritarian concept is the oldest and most pervasive of the five. In this concept, the press is always subject to direct or implied control by the state or sovereign. In the traditional sense, the press operates outside of the government and is allowed to gather and publish news but it must function for “the good of the state.” The press functions from the top down in these systems- the king declares what is newsworthy because truth and information are a monopoly of those in power. Diversity of views is considered wasteful and dissent is annoying. Some examples of nations with an Authoritarian media system are Kenya, Pakistan, Burma, Libya and South Asian nations such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. It is also possible for democratic nations to have an authoritarian press under certain conditions such as war or terrorist attacks.

Another media concept is Communist, which is a modification of the

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<sup>3</sup> Also see Siebert, F. S., Peterson, T. & Schramm W. (1963). Four theories of the press. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Authoritarian. In Communist media systems, the media are not privately owned (as in the Authoritarian) but are part of the government. The press is believed to serve the positive functions for society by socialization to desired norms. Communist systems are free from a profit motive because they only transmit official views and policies. They mobilize support for nation building, but the fatal flaw of the Communist system is that it serves the party but not the people. Examples of this press concept can be seen in Cuba, North Korea, China, Laos, and Vietnam. Often these communist systems face rebellion by the people who listen to outside media broadcasts (such as the BBC and VOA).

The Revolutionary media concept is of a press of people who believe strongly that their government doesn't serve their interests and should be overthrown. They feel no loyalty to the ruling government. The concept of illegal and subversive underground communication using press and broadcasting is difficult to find pure examples of, yet the Iran cassette tape revolution fits well. More than 1,000 tapes were broadcast from mosques that had speeches with revolutionary messages. After a successful rebellion and overthrow of power, revolutionary media become developmental.

The Developmental concept is not clearly defined. It can be seen as a variation of the authoritarian concept because the main goal of the media is nation building. It combines national integration with economic development but pays little attention to personal freedoms of expression because they believe they are irrelevant in the face of poverty. It is traditionally anti-American and is a reaction against the West by the media-deficient. This media concept began to lose momentum in the mid 1990s as the Western concept and democratization gained popularity.

Finally, the Western concept is found in Western nations such as the U.S., U.K.,

Canada, Italy, Spain, and France, among others. The Western concept values the right of the press to report on, comment on and criticize the government without retaliation. These nations do not consider seditious libel as a crime; they share the characteristics of high incomes, education, and literacy levels, healthy market economics, and an established tradition of independent journalism. These media are relatively free of arbitrary government regulation.

Today the most viable concepts are Western and Authoritarian, although the Western concept continues to be criticized for being sensationalist and profit-oriented. Despite the diverse media systems worldwide, Haynes (1984), as noted earlier, pointed out that there exists an overwhelming similarity of international news with regard to topic selection – political relationships between nations and domestic politics occurring in foreign countries are the primary focuses of foreign news across the spectrum of the world's journalism. Among the factors that contribute to this similarity, the Western news purveyors play an important role globally. Besides the big news agencies that have long been regarded as the world's media agenda shapers, such as *Reuters*, *AP*, and *AFP*, several international newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting organizations are believed to be especially important among opinion leaders around the world (Rampal, 1995). These include newspapers such as *The New York Times*, the *Times* (of U.K.), the *Guardian* (also of U.K.), the *International Herald Tribune* (based in France), the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Financial Times* (of London); newsmagazines such as *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *Economist* (of U.K.); news broadcasters such as *CNN* and *BBC* (of U.K.). Among them, the impact of *CNN* on global communication has been particularly extensively researched (Volkmer, 1999).

The practices of Western mass communication have been more and more widely dispersed and accepted by people worldwide. The September 11 incidents, and later the bombings in Madrid and London, as well as the tsunami and hurricanes Katrina and Rita, showed the world how crucial it is for professional journalism, signified by Western media, to supply reliable and verifiable news to their audience at a time of crisis.

Since the fall of the Communist “second” world, the Western concept of journalism and mass communication has become the dominant model throughout the world and is widely emulated (Hachten & Scotton, 2007). Many non-Western nations have adopted not only the logistics of the Western press and broadcasting but also its norms, ethical standards and philosophy.

## **Hypotheses**

By and large, previous agenda-setting research conducted in countries outside the U.S. has generally found similar agenda-setting patterns in each individual country studied as in the U.S. – the links between public concerns and media emphasis. Despite the hundreds of agenda-setting publications, however, we are unable to see a universal picture of the agenda-setting function of the mass media due to the lack of multinational comparison. More research in a wide variety of countries is needed.

This current study, while asking a traditional agenda-setting research question, whether and how the media tell the public what to think about, in other words, if public concerns correspond to media emphasis, is able to include multiple countries so that comparisons across different cultures are possible and a global picture may be seen. Second, previous agenda-setting research on intermedia agenda-setting effects is limited to the media outlets of one particular city, area, or country. This study is the first to move

beyond this limitation. It explores international intermedia agenda-setting effects with multinational agenda data in a context of increased globalization. For example, it asks, do American media, as a media superpower, have influences on the agendas of foreign media? This is a significant extension of the research on agenda-setting. The extent to which media in different countries perceive the same events as significant is an indication of how much the media world has become globalized. Along with the rapid progress of globalization, international intermedia agenda-setting certainly deserves attention.

Based on previous research, the following hypotheses are proposed in this study:


H1: There are positive correlations between the public object agendas and media object agendas in the countries studied.

H2: There are positive international intermedia correlations among the object agendas of the media outlets of the countries studied.

H3: Western countries' media have more influence on the object agendas of non-Western countries' media than vice versa.

H4: Although the object agendas of the media outlets in different countries are similar, the attribute agendas are dissimilar (due to different ideologies).

**Figure 2-1 Who Sets Media's Agenda: A Metaphorical Onion**



Source from McCombs (2004)

## CHAPTER 3

### METHOD

#### Sampling and Data Sources

The BBC World Service Poll of 27 countries<sup>4</sup> asked respondents about the most significant global events in 2005: “In the future, when historians think about the year 2005, what event of global significance do you think will be seen as most important?” The poll was conducted for the BBC World Service by the international polling firm GlobeScan together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. The 27-nation fieldwork was coordinated by GlobeScan. The poll was completed during October, November, and December 2005, with a total sample of 32,439 people. The poll involved either face-to-face or telephone surveys in each country, with national samples in most countries.<sup>5</sup> Respondents in most countries were adults of 18 years or older.<sup>6</sup> (For survey operationalization details in each of the countries studied in this project, see **Appendix 1**; for more information about the poll, visit

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<sup>4</sup> Countries surveyed: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Congo (DRC), Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, USA.

<sup>5</sup> Except for Brazil, Philippines, Turkey (urban samples), Indonesia (major metropolitan areas sample).

<sup>6</sup> Except for Brazil (18-69 years old), Finland (18-79), France (15 or older), Germany (16-70), Indonesia (18-60), Saudi Arabia (18-59), South Africa (16 or older), South Korea (19 or older), Turkey (15 or older).

[http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Other%20Studies/BBCTopEvent\\_Dec05/BBCTopEvent\\_Dec05\\_rpt2.pdf](http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Other%20Studies/BBCTopEvent_Dec05/BBCTopEvent_Dec05_rpt2.pdf).)

In general, according to the PIPA report of the poll, the most common answers for the most significant events were the war in Iraq, the Asian tsunami, and hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the U.S. The war in Iraq was cited as the most significant event by 15% worldwide. Not surprisingly, this was especially prominent among Iraqis with 43% citing it. It was also relatively high in South Korea (31%), Spain (28%), the US (27%), and Turkey (26%). The other most widely mentioned event of 2005 was the Asian tsunami, volunteered by 15% worldwide. Not surprisingly, Asia-Pacific countries were most likely to cite it - Sri Lanka (57%), Indonesia (31%), Australia (27%), South Korea (24%), and the Philippines (21%). The US hurricanes – Katrina and Rita – were cited by 9% worldwide. While 15% of Americans cited it as the most significant event, larger percentages were found in Afghanistan (18%) and Argentina (18%). The death of Pope John Paul II and the inauguration of Pope Benedict XVI was the fourth most-widely-cited event. Worldwide, 6% mentioned this as the most important event of the year. Much of this came from several Catholic countries, where very large percentages cited it, especially Poland (48%), but also Italy (17%). Large percentages also cited it in the Congo (29%) and Kenya (10%). The London bombings were seen as the most significant event by 4% overall. Interestingly, among Britons, only 7% mentioned the London bombings, while in Indonesia, 48% mentioned the Bali bombings. The London bombings also figured more prominently among Ghanaians (11%) and Australians, South Koreans, and the Spanish (8% each) than among the British. Global warming figured prominently in the thinking of 3%, who cited the earth's getting warmer or the international



negotiations related to climate change as the most significant event of the year. Concerns about global warming were especially high in Mexico (13%), Finland (11%), Great Britain (10%), Canada (8%), and India (8%).

A remarkable finding of the poll is how similar the assessments were across countries (see *Figure 3-1-1, 3-1-2, 3-1-3*). The top three events cited worldwide were also among the three most frequently cited in a large number of countries. As Steven Kull, director of PIPA comments, the extent to which people in different countries perceive the same events as significant is an indication of how much the world has become globalized.

The BBC poll data were used as a measure of the public agenda in each country. For media agenda, data were collected from the LexisNexis Academic database.

From the 27 surveyed countries, first the seven English-as-official-language countries were selected for this study: Australia (AU), Canada (CA), the United Kingdom (UK), India (IN), Kenya (KE), the Philippines (PH), and the United States (US).<sup>7</sup> With the availability of bilingual helpers, the list of investigated countries was then expanded, with Spanish-as-official-language countries Argentina (AR), Mexico (MX), Spain (ES), and French-as-official-language country France (FR) joining in. As a result, 11 countries in six different continents (Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, North America, Oceania), and newspapers in three different languages, were included in this study.

### **Variable Operationalization and Data Collection**

For each country, the agenda-setting effect analysis involves two major variables: Public Agenda (percentage of the public in a particular country that cited a particular

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<sup>7</sup> Ghana and South Africa are not included because their top national dailies were unavailable in the LexisNexis database.

event as MSE, as reported in the BBC poll), and Media Agenda (frequency of news reports on a particular event in major newspapers of a particular country during the year of 2005, as returned in the search of LexisNexis Academic database).

In the LexisNexis searches, “keyword (MSE) ‘in Headline, Lead paragraph, Terms’” was used as search criterion.<sup>8</sup> To identify what papers qualify as “major newspapers” in a country, first the most recent edition of the World Press Trends (2005), published by the World Association of Newspapers, was consulted for a list of top national dailies (by circulation). Several scholars and librarians who specialized in the area of international communication were also consulted with to further ensure validity. As a result, non-mainstream papers that are identified in the World Press Trends as top papers because of large circulations were excluded. For instance, *The Sun* is the number-one circulated paper in the U.K., but it was not included in the study because it is a tabloid. Thirdly, which newspaper(s) to include in the search was decided in accordance with availability in the LexisNexis database. For example, if a country’s top national daily is not included in the database, the second paper, if available in the database, was considered. And so on and so forth. As a balanced result, the following newspapers are included in the searches for media agendas: *Herald Sun*, *The Daily Telegraph* (Australia); *The Toronto Star* (Canada); *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Guardian* (United Kingdom); *The Times of India*, *Hindustan Times* (India); *The East African* (Kenya); *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (Philippines); *USA Today*, *The New York Times* (United States); *La Nacion*

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<sup>8</sup> For Mexico and Argentina, because only one top national daily of each country was available in the LexisNexis database and the searches using this criterion returned a very limited number of news reports for each object (most fewer than 4 for the entire year), we expanded the searches using “in full text” instead.

(Argentina); *El Universal* (Mexico); *El Pais*, *El Mundo* (Spain); *Le Figaro*, *L'Equipe* (France).

The Public Agenda (percentage) and Media Agenda (frequency) data collected were entered to SPSS 12.0 for statistical analysis. (For a complete listing of the object agenda data, see **Appendix 2.**) Correlation tests were conducted to observe the relationship between the public object agendas and media object agendas in each country, and international intermedia agenda-setting effects.

### **Cross-Lagged Correlation Analyses for Causal Relationships**

Traditionally, agenda-setting theory hypothesizes that the agenda-setting function of news media causes the correlation between the media and public ordering of priorities. Over the years, the major criticism of agenda-setting research has been that correlation itself does not prove causation.<sup>9</sup> To overcome such a weakness, this current study employs the cross-lagged correlation technique to explore the directional causality of international intermedia agenda-setting process. The validity of this cross-lagged correlation method is justified by a few recent agenda-setting publications, including Roberts and McCombs (1994), King (1994), Lopez-Escobar, *et al.* (1998b), and Lim (2006).

The cross-lagged correlation technique was first suggested by Campbell (1963) as a method of studying mutual effects with continuous variables. It can be used to

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<sup>9</sup> Some scholars suggest replacing correlation method with regression, which may result in more interpretable information, including unstandardized coefficient, or "raw b," as an indication of effect size, or "efficiency." Many media effects studies do not produce or report raw b, which, when proper care was taken with scale construction, can actually provide unique and important information about media efficiency that no other statistical indicator offers. For more information on unstandardized coefficient, see Zhao, X. (1997). Conceptual components of media effects and their regression indicators. Paper presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Chicago, Illinois.

investigate causal relations without experimental manipulation (Rozelle & Campbell, 1969). True experiments control for spurious causal relations by random assignment to treatment groups, thus guaranteeing that there is no systematic relation between the dependent variable and the treatment. The cross-lagged approach investigates causality in the absence of a true experiment design, but in a passive manner – that is, instead of addressing the traditional causal question of whether X causes Y, the cross-lagged analysis examines which is the predominant cause-effect direction. *Figure 3-2* depicts the model. Two variables, X and Y, are measured at two points of time, Time 1 and Time 2. Six correlations can then be computed as illustration in *Figure 3-2*. The synchronous correlations,  $R_{X1Y1}$  and  $R_{X2Y2}$ , refer to those typically obtained in static correlation studies. Correlations between the same variable at different points in time,  $R_{X1X2}$  and  $R_{Y1Y2}$ , are referred to as auto-correlations. The causal analysis focuses on a comparison of the two cross-lagged correlations,  $R_{X1Y2}$  and  $R_{Y1X2}$ . A cross-lagged analysis uses the following reasoning: If X has a stronger effect on Y than vice versa, then the correlation between  $X_{t1}$  and  $Y_{t2}$  ( $R_{X1Y2}$ ), should be greater than the correlation between  $Y_{t1}$  and  $X_{t2}$  ( $R_{Y1X2}$ ).

H3 is a directional hypothesis, in other words, regarding cause and effect. To test H3, a series of cross-lagged correlation analyses were conducted using object agendas of the multiple countries' media. Cross-lagged correlations offer two advantages for hypothesis-testing. First, two competing hypotheses are examined simultaneously: X causes Y and Y causes X. Furthermore, both of these hypotheses can be assessed by the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline, the level of correlation to be expected on the basis of the autocorrelations and synchronous correlations alone.

To obtain media agenda data in different countries at two time points,<sup>10</sup> first “Time 1” was defined as the first week of the first occurrence of the event, and “Time 2” as the second week.<sup>11</sup> Due to practical reasons, those year(s) long global topics, such as “war in Iraq”, “global warming”, and “avian flu,” were excluded. As a result, “Asian tsunami (12/26/2004)”, “US hurricanes (8/29/2005)”, “death of pope (4/2/2005)”, “London bombings (7/7/2005)”, “Bali Bombings (10/1/2005)”, and “Pakistan Earthquake (10/8/2005)” are the remaining six MSEs included in this cross-lagged analysis to test H3. The numbers of news reports on a particular event in the major newspapers of a particular country at Time 1 and Time 2 were then collected respectively, as returned in the search of LexisNexis Academic database. A series of cross-lagged correlation tests were conducted to detect causal directions among the countries.

### **Diction Semantics Analysis: Second-Level Agenda-Setting**

To test H4, the linguistic analysis capability of Diction text-analysis software was used to identify similarities and differences in the words of the media reporting of the global events in different countries. The advantage of this over traditional content analysis is that the method is more reliable, and more objective, because it avoids human coding errors and biases. The advantage and validity of this Diction method are justified

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<sup>10</sup> Some scholars suggest one more time point in order to rule out spurious causal relationships. This study adopts the tradition in agenda-setting research that uses two time points.

<sup>11</sup> Research literature (Winter & Eyal, 1981) suggests that the optimal time span for observing agenda-setting effects is four weeks or more, which applies primarily to the process from media to public. Literature (Riffe *et al.*, 1993) also suggests the superiority of constructed week sampling over simple random and consecutive day samples of newspaper content. Since this study involves “events,” (rather than “issues”) which started mostly as breaking news, and examines the agenda-setting process from media to media, constructed week sampling does not serve the research purpose, and a four week period could be too long to capture media response. This study adopts Lopez-Escobar *et al.*’s (1998b) sampling method, which is two consecutive weeks of the target period. To set a time frame for sampling that is practical requires a certain amount of arbitrariness anyway, and there is no great harm in simplifying this way.

by and its capabilities are utilized in a number of recent media content studies, including Shanahan (2000), Royal (2003), Carroll (2004), Hart and Childers (2005), and Huffaker and Calvert (2005).

Admittedly, computerized content analysis has to face challenges regarding its certain aspects, the biggest one among which is its validity. Diction program's founder Roderick Hart once discussed his experience dealing with what he called "stereotypes" about computerized content analysis:

"I have found virtually every stereotype about computerized content analysis to be untrue. It is allegedly to be mechanical, but I have found it creative. It has been decried as oafish, but I am fascinated by its subtlety. It is said to be reliable but not valid, and yet I see its validity as its greatest strength. It is said to be reactive, colorless, and arcane; I have found it to be heuristic, exciting, and altogether normal. I have reached these conclusions after tinkering with computerized language analysis since 1968. Since I began these studies, enormous strides have been made in the area...Moving from the first version of Diction to the most recent version has...taken a considerable amount of time. The slow course of that development...has given me ample opportunity to reflect on the program's theoretical assumptions...I have become increasingly comfortable with those assumptions. Accordingly, I use this opportunity to lay out Diction's unique features, to expose how it does what it does, and to show why such matters seem important." (Hart, 2001, p. 44).

Regarding the advantages of computerized content analysis, Hart (2001) contends that, if properly coached, computers can detect continuities and discontinuities, can track associations across semantic space, note situational changes, distinguish the characteristic word choices of one person from those of another; can also detect stabilities in language behavior, and so can explain, for example, why Ronald Reagan was both traditional and radical, why Richard Nixon declaimed during Vietnam but minced during Watergate.

Diction 5.0 is a Windows-based program that uses a series of dictionaries to search a text passage for semantic features. Diction's five overall measures, also called

master variables, *Activity*, *Optimism*, *Certainty*, *Realism* and *Commonality*, are composed by standardizing all previous scores, combining them via addition and subtraction, and then by adding a constant of 50 to eliminate negative numbers. According to Diction 5.0 Users Manual, these five measures provide the most general understanding of a given text. The five dimensions or master variables are derived from a variety of intellectual sources ranging from John Dewey to Wendell Johnson to James David Barber. “Diction is indebted to a number of important social thinkers,” according to Hart (2001, p .45), “but, because it is a quantitative tool, it is at best an imperfect approximation of their ideas.” The five dimensions or master variables, as claimed by Hart, represent the most robust understanding of the semantic content. The five master variables, in brief description of each, are:

*Activity*: language featuring movement, change, the implementation of ideas, or the avoidance of inertia. The formula for certainty is: (Aggression + Accomplishment + Communication + Motion) – (Cognitive Terms + Passivity + Embellishment).

*Optimism*: language endorsing some person, group, concept, or event, or highlighting their positive entailments. The formula for certainty is: (Praise + Satisfaction + Inspiration) – (Blame + Hardship + Denial).

*Certainty*: language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, completeness, and a tendency to speak ex cathedra. The formula for certainty is: (Tenacity + Leveling + Collectives + Insistence) – (Numerical Terms + Ambivalence + Self-reference + Variety).

*Realism*: language describing tangible, immediate, recognizable matters that affect people’s everyday lives. The formula for certainty is: (Familiarity + Spatial

Awareness + Temporal Awareness + Present Concern + Human Interest + Concreteness)  
– (Past Concern + Complexity).

*Commonality*: language highlighting the agreed-upon values of a group and rejecting idiosyncratic modes of engagement. The formula for certainty is: (Centrality + Cooperation + Rapport) – (Diversity + Exclusion + Liberation).

Further details of Diction and its various scales are available in the Users Manual accompanying the program. Here *Certainty* is taken as an example to illustrate how scores are derived - Tenacity is defined as all uses of the verb “to be” (is, am, will, shall), three definitive verb forms (has, must, do) and their variants as well as all associated contractions (he’ll, they’ve, ain’t) - these verbs connote confidence and totality; Leveling is words used to ignore individual differences and to build a sense of completeness and assurance: included are totalizing terms (everybody, anyone, each, fully) adverbs of permanence (always, completely, inevitably, consistently), and resolute adjectives (unconditional, consummate, absolute, open-and-shut).

The Diction program also provides a set of norms for various kinds of content so that one can compare the text under scrutiny with similar documents. A distinctive feature of Diction 5.0 is that it comes equipped with a variety of norms users may employ for getting understanding of a given text or body of texts, which range from public speeches to poetry, from newspaper editorials to music lyrics, from business reports and scientific documents to television scripts and informal telephone conversations. According to its Users Manual, these normative data have been generated by running more than 20,000 texts through Diction (all texts were produced in the U.S. between 1945 and 1998). The program stores means and variances for each category from



previous and extensive work with Diction, then compares them with the files created for a specific project.

Diction can be used for a variety of research purposes. As Hart and Carroll (2008) assert, the Diction program has been largely used to study political messages, but it has also been used to analyze media reportage, corporate annual reports and vision statements, historical and literary documents, religious sermonizing, economic forecasting, medical documents, crisis communications and, increasingly, Web sites and internet traffic. While Diction is but one computer program available to researchers, Hart and Carroll contend that it is arguably the most “deductive” program available because (1) its dictionary structure has been conceptually derived and (2) it compares all output to a normative data bank, thereby (3) highlighting a given text’s rhetorical distinctions and (4) permitting immediate cross-comparisons to other Diction-processed texts. Carroll (2004) also argues that Diction 5.0 is particularly well-suited for agenda-setting studies because the program contains an assumption of additivity, which implies that a word used 10 times is twice as important as a term used only five times, and that more is somehow better or worse than less.

For this project, Diction provides an innovative way to examine the mass volume of text content – the media coverage of the nine global events/topics in the multiple countries examined (because Diction is English-based, the non-English news coverage was not examined). Hypothesis 4 (“Although the object agendas of the media outlets in different countries are similar, the attribute agendas are dissimilar”) was proposed based on the assumption that each individual nation-state has its own ideology and culture and therefore, the rhetorics in the media languages used in different countries are supposedly

dissimilar. For this, Diction agreeably serves the study purpose, given its theoretical foundation that words are important because they point to speakers' (in the case of this project, news writers') feelings and to the situations in which they find themselves. As Hart (2001) argues, words are shaped by cultural experiences, and they point back to those experiences – for instance, for most countries “progress” is enough, but Americans might demand a stronger form, “good progress.” Hart also suggests that words also point to the epistemological assumptions people make – for example, poets resist fixities, while engineers trust only nominalizations.

The “relevance” function of the LexisNexis Academic database was used to sort the search results list of the news coverage items in each of the countries examined. The top ten relevant news coverage items for each global event/topic in each country's major newspapers were sampled to be included in the semantics analysis. The body text of each of these top ten relevant news coverage items for each global event/topic in each country's major newspapers<sup>12</sup> were compiled into one file to be entered into Diction as unit of analysis. As a result of data collection, 63 (9 MSEs  $\times$  7 English Countries) units of text files were entered to the Diction text-analysis program and 302,910 words in total were analyzed. By comparing the five semantic scores of one country's news accounts with another's, it was possible to produce insights into whether an international intermedia attribute agenda-setting effect exists.

The data set that Diction 5.0 generated (for a complete listing of the Diction scores, see **Appendix 3**) was converted to SPSS 12.0 for statistical analysis. Paired-

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<sup>12</sup> The total number of news coverage items on a certain MSE in a certain country's newspapers may be fewer than 10. For example, LexisNexis returned only 7 “Bali Bombing” news items from searching the sampled Canadian newspaper.

sample t-tests were conducted to observe the relationships and differences among the different countries' rhetoric of media coverage.

**Figure 3-1 Public Agendas in 11 Countries**

*Figure 3-1-1*




Figure 3-1-2






Figure 3-1-3



**Figure 3-2 Cross-Lagged Correlation Model**



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **Public Object Agendas and Media Object Agendas**

As illustrated in Appendix 2, in Australia, the Asian Tsunami is both the most-cited Most Significant Event in public (27%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=1562); the least cited in public is the Pakistan Earthquake (0%) and the least covered in newspapers is the Avian Flu (N=34). In Canada, the Iraq War is both the most cited MSE in public (17%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=513); and the Bali Bombing is both the least cited in public (0%) and the least covered in newspapers (N=8). In Spain, Iraq War is also both the most cited MSE in public (28%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=163); the least cited in public is Pakistan Earthquake (0%) and the least covered in newspapers is Avian Flu (N=0). In France, Asian Tsunami is both the most cited MSE in public (14%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=136); the least cited in public is Pakistan Earthquake (0%) and the least covered in newspapers are Bali Bombing (N=0) and Pakistan Earthquake (N=0). In U.K., the most cited MSE in public is Asian Tsunami (16%) and the most covered in newspapers is Iraq War (N=1592); the least cited in public are Pope Death (.5%), Avian Flu (.5%), and Bali Bombing (.5%), and the least covered in newspapers is Bali Bombing (N=36). In the U.S., Iraq War is both the most cited MSE in public (27%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=2272); and the least cited in public is Avian Flu (0%) and the least covered is Bali Bombing (N=18). In



Argentina, the Iraq War is also both the most cited MSE in public (25%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=34); Bali Bombing and Pakistan Earthquake are both the least cited in public (.5%) and the least covered in newspapers (N=0). In India, Asian Tsunami is both the most cited MSE in public (31%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=1144); the least cited in public are Avian Flu (0%) and Pakistan Earthquake (0%), and the least covered is Bali Bombing (N=5). In Kenya, the most cited MSE in public is Asian Tsunami (20%) and the least are Bali Bombing (0%) and Pakistan Earthquake (0%); the most covered in newspapers are Asian Tsunami (N=4) and Pope Death (N=4), and the least are U.S. Hurricanes (N=0), London Bombing (N=0), Bali Bombing (N=0), and Pakistan Earthquake (N=0). In Mexico, the most cited MSE in public is Global Warming (13%) and the least are Bali Bombing (0%) and Pakistan Earthquake (0%); the most covered in newspapers is U.S. Hurricanes (N=94) and the least is Bali Bombing (N=0). In the Philippines, Asian Tsunami is both the most cited MSE in public (21%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=99); the least cited in public are Global Warming (.5%) and Pakistan Earthquake (.5%) and the least covered in newspapers is London Bombing (N=0).

### **Relationships between Public Object Agendas and Media Object Agendas**

The overall correlation between media and public object agendas was first tested: For all 11 countries studied, the general correlation turned out to be significant ( $r = 0.573$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $N = 9 \times 11 = 99$ ). Thus, the study further looked into the correlations for each of the individual countries. As *Table 4-1* shows, the correspondences between the public and media agendas in 10 out of the 11 countries are highly significant (median correlation  $r = 0.855$ ), with the U.S. having the astoundingly highest significant correlation ( $r =$

0.982). The U.K. has the lowest significant correlation among the 10 countries, but it is still considered very strong ( $r = 0.692$ ). The correlation for Mexico turned out to be non-significant. The precise reason for this is unknown. One possible explanation lies in the availability of data sources in the LexisNexis database – for Mexico, among its top national dailies, the study included only *El Universal* in the search because it is the only one included in the database. *El Universal* is one of the oldest and most respected newspapers in Mexico, but its circulation has declined to the third in the nation, according to the most recent WPT (World Press Trends, 2005) statistics. And this may suggest that it is not very influential on public opinion in Mexico.

The surprisingly high correlations found in the 10 different countries strongly suggest an object agenda-setting function of mass media around the world. Hypothesis 1 (“There are positive correlations between the public agendas and media agendas in the countries studied”) is supported.

### **International Intermedia Correlations**

Because of the aforementioned evidence of a global agenda-setting phenomenon, it is reasonable to expect international intermedia relationships. To test Hypothesis 2 (“There are positive international intermedia correlations among the agendas of the media outlets of the countries studied”), the 55 sets of bivariate correlations among the media agendas of the 11 countries were calculated. As *Table 4-2* illustrates, 20 pairs of bivariate correlations were found significant, with the highest significant correlation being 0.950 (Canada and Argentina), and the lowest significant correlation being 0.670 (Argentina and Australia). Hypothesis 2 is partially supported.

Specifically, as the highlighted numbers in the table indicate, the U.S. media agenda significantly corresponds to the media agendas of the U.K., Canada, Spain, and Argentina; the U.K. media agenda is significantly positively associated with the media agendas of Canada, Spain, and Argentina, as well as the U.S.; the Canada media agenda significant corresponds to the media agendas of Australia, Spain, Argentina, and France, as well as the U.S., and the U.K.; the Australia media agenda significantly corresponds to the media agendas of India, Philippines, Spain, Argentina, and France, as well as Canada; the India media agenda significantly corresponds to the media agendas of the Philippines, and France, as well as Australia; the Kenya media agenda significantly corresponds to the Philippines' media agenda; the Philippines media agenda significantly corresponds to France's, as well as the media agendas of Australia, India, and Kenya; the Spain media agenda significantly corresponds to the media agendas of Argentina and France, as well as the U.S., the U.K, Canada, and Australia; the Argentina media agenda significantly corresponds to those of the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and Spain; and the France media agenda is significantly associated with those of Australia, India, and the Philippines.

In these international intermedia agenda-setting tests, Mexico appears erratic again – its media agenda is not statistically significantly associated with those of any other countries. The study attributes this to the same reason explained in the findings and discussion regarding Hypothesis 1 – that *El Universal* might not be a powerful representative of the general media agenda in Mexico. It should be pointed out, however, that Mexico's correlations with U.S. (.663), Canada (.496), and Argentina (.555) are fairly strong, although not statistically significant.

Intermedia agenda-setting has been well documented, although not in an internationally comparative context or a global level. As aforementioned, most previous agenda-setting research on intermedia agenda-setting effects is limited to the media outlets of one particular city, area, or country. For example, the pioneering studies typically focused on the vertical relationships between national news agencies and local newspapers in a specific country. Other studies focused on the horizontal relationships between different types of media outlets, such as newspaper versus television, in a local area. This study is the first to move beyond this limitation to test cross-national intermedia influence.

Overall, although there is no perfect agreement, our hypothesis about international intermedia agenda-setting is supported in 20 of the 55 sets of comparisons. The significant correspondences suggest that an international intermedia agenda-setting function may exist among the news media in different countries about the globally significant events of the year of 2005. Without empirical evidence, one doesn't want to speculate why a particular country's media agenda is associated with the media agendas of some countries but not the others (and thus won't assume that the intermedia correlation between the U.S. and France is non-significant because the French and Americans don't like each other in many ways; or that the U.K. and Canada have significant intermedia correlation because, as a charter member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Canada has connections with the United Kingdom in many aspects, etc.). However, this phenomenon can be discussed in general. News sources, other news media, and news norms can all play a direct or indirect role in shaping the media agenda (McCombs, 2004). In particular, interactions and relatedness, such as

colonial ties (Nnaemeka & Richstad, 1980; Atwood, 1985), language groups (Kariel & Rosenvall, 1983), can be of significant influence on this inter-nation intermedia matter.

This international intermedia agenda-setting phenomenon found here can be attributed to three factors: 1) the nature of the BBC survey (it asks people from around the world “what event of *global* significance do you think will be seen as most important,” and in accordance with this, this study collected media data on these *global* events), 2) the Internet as a global news medium, which has made international intermedia agenda-setting possible because most of the media outlets have put their news products online, allowing instant access by other media outlets from around the world, and 3) most importantly, the superpower of Western media, whose global influence also has been well documented in previous research literature.

It should be pointed out that the existence of an international intermedia agenda-setting function of the mass media around the world is not *proved* by the correlations found in this part of the study, of course, but the evidence is in line with the conditions that must exist if such a function does occur.

### **Cross-Lagged Comparisons**

Based on the international intermedia correlations found in the previous section, this study further speculated what kind of directions of intermedia agenda-setting, if there are any, exist in this seemingly interconnected global media world. As stated earlier, the Western media’s global influence has been well documented, and this study thus hypothesized such a directional international intermedia agenda-setting process (H3: Western countries’ media have more influence on the object agendas of non-Western countries’ media than vice versa). Such a directional hypothesis concerns cause and

effect. To test H3, a series of cross-lagged correlation analyses were conducted using object agendas of the 11 countries' media. As mentioned in the method chapter, cross-lagged correlations offer two advantages for hypothesis testing. First, two competing hypotheses are examined simultaneously: X causes Y and Y causes X. Furthermore, both of these hypotheses can be assessed by the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline, the level of correlation to be expected on the basis of the autocorrelations and synchronous correlations alone.

After sorting out the panels containing non-significant cross-lagged correlations, 14 panels that contain at least one significant cross-lagged correlation remained in the further comparison study (total number of panels is 55). *Figure 4-1* illustrates the flow of international intermedia influences.<sup>13</sup>

*Figure 4-1-1* shows the correlation of the U.S. media agenda at Time 1 with the Canada media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Canada media at Time 1 and U.S. media at Time 2. The correlation of .909 is greater than the reverse correlation .494 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .699, indicating a significance influence from Canada to U.S. *Figure 4-1-2* shows the correlation of the U.S. media agenda at Time 1 with the Spain media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Spain media at Time 1 and U.S. media at Time 2. The correlation of .873 is greater than the reverse correlation .340 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .581, indicating a significance influence from U.S. to Spain.

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<sup>13</sup> In the analysis, the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline coefficient =  $\frac{R_{X1Y1} + R_{X2Y2}}{2} \times \sqrt{\frac{R_{X1X2}^2 + R_{Y1Y2}^2}{2}}$ .

It accounts for the correlation that results purely from chance. Therefore, any cross-lagged correlation that is smaller than the baseline coefficient should be ignored. For more information about the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline coefficient or the cross-lagged statistics, see Cook, T. D. & Campbell R. D. (1979). *Quasi-experimentation: Design & analysis issues for field settings* (pp. 309-321). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.

*Figure 4-1-3* shows the correlation of the U.K. media agenda at Time 1 with the Australia media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Australia media at Time 1 and U.K. media at Time 2. The direction of influence is not as clear cut as in the previous two pairs of countries because both correlations, .898 and .848 exceed the Baseline of .823, and the difference between the two is minor. *Figure 4-1-4* shows the correlation of the U.K. media agenda at Time 1 with the Canada media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Canada media at Time 1 and U.K. media at Time 2. The correlation of .818 is greater than the reverse correlation .654 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .649. Although the reverse correlation of .654 exceeds the Baseline slightly, this cross-lagged panel is still identified as an indication of an influence from U.K. to Canada because it is not significant. *Figure 4-1-5* shows the correlation of the U.K. media agenda at Time 1 with the France media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: France media at Time 1 and U.K. media at Time 2. The correlation of .878 is greater than the reverse correlation .844 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .857, indicating a significance influence from U.K. to France. *Figure 4-1-6* shows the correlation of the U.K. media agenda at Time 1 with the India media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: India media at Time 1 and U.K. media at Time 2. The correlation of .862 is greater than the reverse correlation .745 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .799, indicating a significance influence from U.K. to India. *Figure 4-1-7* shows the correlation of the U.K. media agenda at Time 1 with the Philippines media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Philippines media at Time 1 and U.K. media at Time 2. The correlation of .858 is greater

than the reverse correlation .774 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .811, indicating a significance influence from U.K. to the Philippines.

*Figure 4-1-8* shows the correlation of the Philippines media agenda at Time 1 with the Australia media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Australia media at Time 1 and Philippines media at Time 2. The correlation of .944 is greater than the reverse correlation .894 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .897, indicating a significance influence from Philippines to Australia. *Figure 4-1-9* shows the correlation of the Philippines media agenda at Time 1 with the France media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: France media at Time 1 and Philippines media at Time 2. The correlation of .988 is greater than the reverse correlation .918 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .950, indicating a significance influence from France to Philippines. *Figure 4-1-10* shows the correlation of the Philippines media agenda at Time 1 with the India media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: India media at Time 1 and Philippines media at Time 2. The correlation of .993 is greater than the reverse correlation .961 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline .976, indicating a significance influence from Philippines to India.

*Figure 4-1-11* shows the correlation of the India media agenda at Time 1 with the Australia media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Australia media at Time 1 and India media at Time 2. The correlation of .892 is greater than the reverse correlation .848 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .867, indicating a significance influence from India to Australia. *Figure 4-1-12* shows the correlation of the India media agenda at Time 1 with the France media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: France media at Time 1 and India media at Time 2. The correlation of



.991 is greater than the reverse correlation .876 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .931, indicating a significance influence from France to India.

*Figure 4-1-13* shows the correlation of the France media agenda at Time 1 with the Australia media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Australia media at Time 1 and France media at Time 2. Again, the direction of influence is not as clear cut as in other pairs of countries because both correlations, .968 and .904 exceed the Baseline of .898. Although seemingly there is reciprocity, France media is likely to be the stronger agenda setter, since the correlation of the France media agenda at Time 1 with the Australia media agenda at Time 2 is greater and its significance level is higher.

*Figure 4-1-14* shows the correlation of the France media agenda at Time 1 with the Canada media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Canada media at Time 1 and France media at Time 2. The correlation of .865 is greater than the reverse correlation .675 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .672. Although the reverse correlation of .675 also exceeds the Baseline slightly, this cross-lagged panel is still identified as an indication of an influence from France to Canada because it is not significant. This is similar to the relationship between U.K. media and Canada media, as illustrated in *Figure 4-1-4*.

In summary (see *Table 4-3*), it seems U.K. is the most powerful global intermedia agenda setter, influencing the media of Canada, France, India, and The Philippines. France appears to be another powerful player, influencing Philippines, India, and Canada. The findings also suggest other international intermedia agenda influencers. These include The Philippines (influencing Australia, India), Canada (influencing U.S.), India (influencing Australia), and the U.S. (influencing Spain).

The fact that U.K. and France were found to be powerful international intermedia agenda influencers is hardly surprising, given the two countries' historical, political, economic and cultural influences in the world (Wu, 1998, 2000), and especially the world's most influential news purveyors they possess – *Reuters*, *Times*, *Guardian*, *Financial Times*, *Economist*, *BBC* of U.K., and *AFP*, *International Herald Tribune* of France, etc., have long been regarded as the world's opinion leaders. On the other hand, the fact that U.S. was not found as powerful an international intermedia influencer as U.K. and France is strikingly counterintuitive, considered its global influence as a nation-state and as a media empire. It is also contradictory to existing research literature (Rampal, 1995; Volkmer, 1999; Wu, 2000), which has documented the powerful influence of its highly globalized media outlets, such as *CNN* and *Associated Press*. One possible explanation lies in the sample this study selected for U.S. media in this study, which are *USA Today* and *The New York Times*. As newspaper outlets circulated primarily in the relatively isolated American continent, their level of global impact may not be as much as that of their broadcasting or wire services counterparts.

Without empirical evidence, one does not want to speculate why a particular country's media have more influence on the media agendas of some other countries but not vice versa. We should be cautious to argue that the existence of a causal international intermedia agenda-setting function of the mass media around the world is *proved* by the cross-lagged correlations found in this study, although the evidence is in line with the conditions that must exist if such a function does occur.

To draw conclusions for H3 involves how one defines the term "Western." It has been found quite challenging to clearly define Western versus non-Western. The basic

definition of what constitutes “the West” varies, expanding and contracting over time, in relation to various circumstances. It is dependent on the context, which can be political, economic, cultural, linguistic, religious, and so on. The exact scope of the “Western countries” thus has to be somewhat subjective in nature, depending on what criteria are employed. There is always room for debate. In general, however, it is commonly agreed that, in a geopolitical context, it includes the countries of Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. These are Western European or Western European-derived nations which enjoy relatively strong economics and stable governments, tolerate free Christian institutions, have chosen democracy as a form of governance, favor capitalism and free international trade, and have some form of political and military alliance or cooperation.

In accordance with the commonly agreed geopolitical scope, six countries investigated in this study are defined as Western countries (AU, CA, UK, US, ES, FR) and the remaining five are non-Western (IN, KE, PH, AR, MX). Given this criterion, four composite variables were computed: the combined Western media agendas at Time 1 and Time 2, and non-Western media agendas at Time 1 and Time 2. Cross-lagged correlation analysis was conducted again to determine the direction of intermedia agenda-setting between the Western and non-Western countries. *Figure 4-1-15* shows the correlation of the Western media agenda at Time 1 with the non-Western media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Non-Western media at Time 1 and Western media at Time 2. The direction of influence is not clear cut because both cross-lagged correlations, .617 and .645, exceed the Baseline of .607, which suggests reciprocal influence.

It is a great pity that, based on the data this study was able to collect, three of the five non-Western countries, Argentina (missing data), Kenya (limited data), and Mexico (missing data), were not able to individually form any directional intermedia agenda-setting relationship with their international counterparts. It should be pointed out, however, that India and The Philippines were found to have evident intermedia relationships with certain Western countries, although the direction is not unilateral. As mentioned earlier, the cross-lagged results indicate that India's media agenda may be influenced by their U.K. and France counterparts, while in the meantime it may have an influence on Australia's media. The results also suggest that The Philippines' media seems to be influenced by U.K. and France media. In the meantime, it seems to have an effect on its Australia counterpart. Although such evidence supports the argument of Western countries' media having stronger influence on non-Western media than vice versa, this study is reluctant to draw an overall conclusion for H3 based on only two non-Western countries' (IN and PH) relationships with the Westerns.

The fact that this study has not found adequate evidence for an overall flow of media agenda from Western to non-Western countries suggests, on one hand, that the decades-old problems pointed out by the psychology-laden NWICO debates, which concern about the impact of Western powers, may need to be rethought to enhance our understanding of the global media landscape in the age of globalization. On the other hand, it also raises the questions about whether this lack of evidence may be due to sampling bias (at the country level, all the non-Western countries included in the study are either English or Spanish countries, which are generally closer to the West in many aspects than many other countries in the world; at the media level, only newspapers are

examined), or data deficiency (limited or missing data for some non-Western countries). The definition for Time 1 and Time 2 in testing this hypothesis (two consecutive weeks) may be another reason. Future research may test the same hypothesis by analyzing media content for constructed weeks, or a more extended period of time.

### **Attribute Agendas**

As mentioned earlier in the literature review chapter, ideology is a source of news framing. H4 hypothesizes that the attribute agendas of the media in different countries are dissimilar (due to different ideologies), although the object agendas are similar. To test H4, Diction text-analysis software was used to obtain rhetoric scores so as to identify similarities and differences in the words of the media reporting of the nine global events in different countries. Because Diction is English-based, the non-English news coverage was excluded from this test. As a result, this step of the study includes media agendas of the seven English-as-official-language countries: Australia, Canada, U.K., India, Kenya, the Philippines, and the U.S.

H4 was proposed based on the findings for H2, which revealed positive international intermedia correlations among the object agendas of the media outlets of some of the countries studied, including U.S. vs. U.K., Canada; U.K. vs. Canada; Canada vs. Australia; Australia vs. India, Philippines; India vs. Philippines; Kenya vs. Philippines. Therefore, testing H4 involved eight pairs of comparison of attribute agendas.

The numerical data set as text analysis results that Diction 5.0 generated (see **Appendix 3**) were converted to SPSS 12.0 for statistical analysis. A series of paired-sample t-tests were conducted to explore the relationship between each of the pairs of

countries' media coverage (significance level set as .05). *Table 4-4-1, 4-4-2, 4-4-3, 4-4-4, 4-4-5, 4-4-6, 4-4-7, 4-4-8, and Figure 4-2-1, 4-2-2, 4-2-3, 4-2-4, 4-2-5, 4-2-6, 4-2-7, 4-2-8* present the test results of differences and relationships.

*Table 4-4-1* and *Figure 4-2-1* show that the U.K. news coverage and the U.S. news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on any of the rhetoric scores except for *certainty* ( $r = .818, p = .007$ , meaning that U.K. coverage and U.S. coverage are significantly similar in terms of certainty). *Realism* has a moderate  $r$  (.498). Overall, the U.K. rhetoric has no significant difference than the U.S. rhetoric, although U.S. seems to have higher level of *activity* than U.K., as shown in *Figure 4-2-1A* (if the significant level were set to be .10, this difference with  $t = -1.910$  and  $p = .092$  would be considered significant). One can, however, see the apparent similarity in terms of *certainty* (see *Figure 4-2-1C*) – clearly, the two sets are positively correlated.

*Table 4-4-2* and *Figure 4-2-2* show that the Canada news coverage and the U.S. news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on any of the rhetoric scores, although *realism* has a fairly strong  $r$  (.628, if the significant level were set to be .10, this relationship with  $p = .070$  would be considered significant) and *commonality* has a moderate  $r$  (.445); and on average, the Canada rhetoric has no significant difference than the U.S. rhetoric (see *Figure 4-2-2A, 4-2-2B, 4-2-2C, 4-2-2D, 4-2-2E*).

*Table 4-4-3* and *Figure 4-2-3* show that the Canada news coverage and the U.K. news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on any of the rhetoric scores, although *commonality* has a moderate  $r$  (-.445); and on

average, the Canada rhetoric has no significant difference than the U.K. rhetoric (see *Figure 4-2-3A, 4-2-3B, 4-2-3C, 4-2-3D, 4-2-3E*).

*Table 4-4-4* and *Figure 4-2-4* show that the Australia news coverage and the Canada news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on any of the rhetoric scores, although *commonality* has a moderate  $r$  (-.427); and on average, the Australia rhetoric has no significant difference than the Canada rhetoric (see *Figure 4-2-4A, 4-2-4B, 4-2-4C, 4-2-4D, 4-2-4E*).

*Table 4-4-5* and *Figure 4-2-5* show that the Australia news coverage and the India news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on any of the rhetoric scores; and on average, the Australia rhetoric has no significant difference than the India rhetoric (see *Figure 4-2-5A, 4-2-5B, 4-2-5C, 4-2-5D, 4-2-5E*). However, as *Figure 4-2-5C* shows, India seems to have an obviously higher level of certainty than Australia (if the significant level were set to be .10, this difference with  $t = -1.941$  and  $p = .088$  would be considered significant).

*Table 4-4-6* and *Figure 4-2-6* show that the Australia news coverage and the Philippines news coverage on the most significant global events have significant correlations on *activity* ( $r = .670, p = .048$ ) and *realism* ( $r = .698, p = .037$ ), but not on *optimism, certainty, and commonality*; and overall, the Australia rhetoric has no significant difference than the Philippines rhetoric. As *Figure 4-2-6A, 4-2-6C, 4-2-6D, 4-2-6E* illustrate, the Australia and Philippines coverage show no apparent pattern of difference in terms of *activity, certainty, realism and commonality*. One can, however, detect that The Philippines has obviously higher level of *optimism* than Australia (see *Figure 4-2-6B*). If the significant level were set to be .10, this difference ( $t = -1.978, p =$

.083) would be considered significant. On the other hand, one can see the apparent similarity in *activity* and *realism*, as illustrated in *Figure 4-2-6A* and *4-2-6D* – clearly, both of the two pairs are positively correlated.

*Table 4-4-7* and *Figure 4-2-7* show that the India news coverage and the Philippines news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on any of the rhetoric scores, although *activity* has a moderate  $r$  (-.453); and on average, the India rhetoric has no significant difference than the Philippines rhetoric (see *Figure 4-2-7A*, *4-2-7B*, *4-2-7C*, *4-2-7D*, *4-2-7E*).

*Table 4-4-8* and *Figure 4-2-8* show that the Kenya news coverage and the Philippines news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on any of the rhetoric scores, although *activity* has a fairly strong  $r$  (.720) and *commonality* has a moderate  $r$  (.435); and on average, the Kenya rhetoric has no significant difference than the Philippines rhetoric, as *Figure 4-2-8A*, *4-2-8B*, *4-2-8C*, *4-2-8D*, *4-2-8E* illustrate. However, as *Figure 4-2-8A* shows, Philippines seems to have a higher level of activity than Kenya. If the significant level were set to be .10, this difference ( $t = -1.557$  and  $p = .098$ ) would be considered significant.

The overall pattern of the results is clear in that these findings, which are based on the Diction rhetoric scores, suggest no significant differences among the media coverage of the countries studied, although a certain country's media coverage might seem more active, optimistic, or certain than another. Given the overall “no significant difference” pattern, we conclude that H4 is not supported.

News media are representatives of the countries where they root in and their practitioners do not operate in a social, political, economic and ideological vacuum.



Scholars have contended that news is a socially created product (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998) and framing, as a process of news production, often is based on external values such as social norms, organizational constraints, and interest-group pressures (Tuchman, 1978). As mentioned earlier in the literature review chapter, ideology has been found to be a major source of framing in the news and framing is an important mechanism by which ideology is transmitted through the news. Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad argue that three types of ideology – dominant ideology, elite ideology, and journalistic ideology, or occupational ideology – may be expected to exert primary influence on the framing of news. Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) found in their study a prominent role played by dominant ideology in the framing of international news – in the case of international news coverage, the dominant ideology of the nation, be it Western, Authoritarian, Developmental, Revolutionary, or Communist (Hachten & Scotton, 2007), appears to function as a major source of framing.

Based on these understandings, this study hypothesized that the attribute agendas of the media in different countries are dissimilar (due to different ideologies), although the object agendas may be similar. The findings in this study, which suggest no clear pattern of differences in rhetoric, are strikingly surprising.

The results of this study demonstrate just how complex the international intermedia relationship at the attribute level could be. Given that no significant differences were found in the study to support the “dissimilar attribute agenda” hypothesis, one is likely to infer that there must be similarities. The fact that the study found no overall trend of associations of attribute agendas among the countries either (except for a few sporadic occasions — U.K. and U.S. media are similar in terms of

certainty, and Australia and Philippines media are similar in terms of activity and realism) is counterintuitive.

The fact that this study found in general more evidence for similarity than dissimilarity in attribute agendas across the countries is comprehensible, however. This study examined the media content across the seven countries in 2005. By this time, four of the five non-Western countries included in this study – Argentina, Mexico (used to be authoritarian), India, Philippines – have more or less adopted Western media systems. Since the fall of the communist “second” world, the practices of Western mass communication have been more and more widely dispersed and accepted by people worldwide. Just like what Hachten and Scotton (2007) claim, the Western concept of journalism and mass communication has become the dominant model throughout the world and is widely emulated and many non-Western nations have adopted not only the logistics of the Western press and broadcasting but also its norms, ethical standards and philosophy.

With the collapse of communism, the Cold War framework that news professionals had long been using to select, structure and prioritize international news can not apply to the new world any more. Frames and angles that stem from the emerging, developing framework could all be very much different now. As globalization accelerates, the geographical and cultural borders for news are becoming more and more blurred. The confluence of an increasingly open political climate, growing economics in many non-Western countries, and the wonders of technology may have contributed to the blurring of ideological differences across different countries.

## **Summary**

The results of this study provide insights into mass media's agenda-setting function in the global context. The findings demonstrate how much the world has become globalized. First, similar patterns of the mass media's agenda-setting function on the public are found in different countries around all the six continents. Second, news media in different countries around the world, using different official languages, seemed to perceive the same events as most significant.

The findings of this study focus on intermedia agenda-setting effects at the global level. Previous studies have documented an intermedia agenda-setting effect, as often indicated by a highly redundant news agenda within a country or culture. Across countries or cultures there may be considerable variation. This study, however, has revealed similar media agendas worldwide. It has found existing evidence for first-level (object agenda) inter-nation intermedia agenda-setting among the countries studies – twenty pairs of countries have significantly correlated media agendas.

Moreover, based on the understanding of the “arterial process” (Breed, 1955) existing among media outlets (which means small news media sought guidance from larger news media), this study explored for evidence of directional inter-nation intermedia agenda-setting, presuming that the media of the politically, economically, and culturally pivotal and powerful West have stronger influence on their non-Western counterparts than vice versa (Wu, 1998). This study cannot argue a general causality between Western and non-Western countries' media because of the lack of evidence due to limited or missing data for some non-Western countries. However, the effect of this minor data deficiency is uncritical because the findings for the individual countries still show us a colorful picture of the possible directional intermedia agenda-setting effects

worldwide. Future studies can address this Western vs. non-Western issue by expanding country and media outlet samples or using other data sources than LexisNexis. It should be stressed again, however, that the international intermedia agenda-setting process could be far more complex than we can disentangle with cross-lagged correlation techniques. Findings of causality from cross-lagged correlation analysis could be superficial or even spurious because a third factor may be at work on the relationship.

Furthermore, this study explored second-level (attribute agenda) intermedia agenda-setting effect at the global level. The multi-national investigation did not yield clear-cut results. In contradiction to our previous understanding of the relationships among ideology, nation-state, and media (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998; Hachten & Scotton, 2007), which leads to a “dissimilar attribute agenda across nations” assumption, this study found no evidence of overall differences in media rhetoric. On the other hand, this study detected sporadic evidence of similarities in media rhetoric across certain nations, although there was no overall trend of associations universally. These suggest a complex inter-nation intermedia relationship at the attribute level and imply that, in the age of globalization, a simple “ideological difference” reasoning derived from the Cold War days is probably outdated. In an increased context of globalization, one should be cautious about assuming that the attribute agendas of the media in different countries are different due to different ideologies.

Diction software is useful for several reasons. It allows us to analyze mass volume of media content for various countries with the same set of semantics measures. It becomes increasingly useful as more and more of the raw data of text content is made available in searchable electronic databases. Semantics is part of the several theories of

media influence, and the level of words and their meanings in an agenda-setting process is one that deserves more attention. Although the Diction semantics scores analyzed in this study present neither really powerful nor general explanations of attribute agenda similarity and dissimilarity, one should not conclude that this method may be omitted from future analyses, but rather that it be supplemented by potentially more meaningful ones, including using human coders to verify Diction analysis and results.

**Table 4-1 Correlations of Public Agendas and Media Agendas in 11 Countries**

<i>Official Language</i>	<i>Country</i>	<b>Pearson r</b>	<b>p</b>
English	AU	.966**	< .001
	CA	.939**	< .001
	UK	.692*	.039
	IN	.879**	.002
	KE	.736*	.024
	PH	.801**	.009
	US	.982**	< .001
Spanish	AR	.855**	.003
	MX	.131 (NS)	.737
	ES	.775*	.014
French	FR	.730*	.026

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Table 4-2 International Intermedia Correlations**

		<i>US</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>CA</i>	<i>AU</i>	<i>IN</i>	<i>KE</i>	<i>PH</i>	<i>MX</i>	<i>ES</i>	<i>AR</i>
<b>UK</b>	<i>r</i>	<b>.722*</b>									
	<i>p</i>	.028	.								
<b>CA</b>	<i>r</i>	<b>.774*</b>	<b>.819**</b>								
	<i>p</i>	.014	.007	.							
<b>AU</b>	<i>r</i>	.267	.596	<b>.756*</b>							
	<i>p</i>	.488	.090	.018	.						
<b>IN</b>	<i>r</i>	-.091	.231	.518	<b>.821**</b>						
	<i>p</i>	.816	.550	.153	.007	.					
<b>KE</b>	<i>r</i>	.026	.192	.345	.481	.495					
	<i>p</i>	.947	.621	.363	.190	.175	.				
<b>PH</b>	<i>r</i>	.002	.304	.574	<b>.814**</b>	<b>.838**</b>	<b>.759*</b>				
	<i>p</i>	.996	.426	.106	.008	.005	.018	.			
<b>MX</b>	<i>r</i>	.663	.141	.496	.114	-.028	-.143	-.076			
	<i>p</i>	.052	.717	.175	.769	.943	.714	.846	.		
<b>ES</b>	<i>r</i>	<b>.684*</b>	<b>.802**</b>	<b>.931**</b>	<b>.830**</b>	.590	.460	.641	.278		
	<i>p</i>	.042	.009	<.001	.006	.094	.213	.063	.469	.	
<b>AR</b>	<i>r</i>	<b>.832**</b>	<b>.725*</b>	<b>.950**</b>	<b>.670*</b>	.398	.457	.547	.555	<b>.919**</b>	
	<i>p</i>	.005	.027	<.001	.048	.289	.216	.127	.121	<.001	.
<b>FR</b>	<i>r</i>	.054	.245	.580	<b>.777*</b>	<b>.816**</b>	.566	<b>.906**</b>	.111	.622	.555
	<i>p</i>	.891	.526	.102	.014	.007	.112	.001	.776	.074	.121

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Table 4-3 Directions of Intermedia Agenda-Setting in 11 Countries**

	<i>Country</i>	<i>Influenced By</i>	<i>Influencing</i>
Western	AU	FR, PH, IN	
	CA	UK, FR	US
	ES	US	
	FR	UK	<b>PH, IN, CA</b>
	UK		CA, FR, <b>IN, PH</b>
	US	CA	ES
Non-Western	AR		
	IN	UK, FR, PH	<b>AU</b>
	KE		
	MX		
	PH	UK, FR	<b>AU, IN</b>



#### Table 4-4 Paired-samples Correlations and Differences

Table 4-4-1 Paired-samples correlations and differences: UK vs. US

<i><b>Pair</b></i>	<i><b>r</b></i>	<i><b>p</b></i>	<i><b>t</b></i>	<i><b>p</b></i>
US-UK activity	.117	.764	-1.910	.092
US-UK optimism	.254	.510	-.133	.897
US-UK certainty	<b>.818</b>	<b>.007</b>	-.592	.570
US-UK realism	.498	.172	1.022	.337
US-UK commonality	.253	.511	-1.439	.188

Table 4-4-2 Paired-samples correlations and differences: CA vs. US

<b>Pair</b>	<b>r</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>p</b>
CA-US activity	.395	.293	-1.557	.158
CA-US optimism	-.241	.533	.312	.763
CA-US certainty	-.543	.131	.582	.577
CA-US realism	.628	.070	1.628	.142
CA-US commonality	-.445	.230	-.305	.768

*Table 4-4-3 Paired-samples correlations and differences: CA vs. UK*

<b><i>Pair</i></b>	<b><i>r</i></b>	<b><i>p</i></b>	<b><i>t</i></b>	<b><i>p</i></b>
CA-UK activity	.067	.864	.942	.374
CA-UK optimism	.271	.481	.437	.673
CA-UK certainty	-.390	.300	.738	.482
CA-UK realism	.325	.394	.250	.809
CA-UK commonality	-.445	.230	-.305	.768

*Table 4-4-4 Paired-samples correlations and differences: AU vs. CA*

<b><i>Pair</i></b>	<b><i>r</i></b>	<b><i>p</i></b>	<b><i>t</i></b>	<b><i>p</i></b>
AU-CA activity	.064	.870	.070	.946
AU-CA optimism	.018	.963	-1.415	.195
AU-CA certainty	-.018	.963	-1.786	.112
AU-CA realism	.338	.374	.511	.623
AU-CA commonality	-.427	.251	.067	.948

*Table 4-4-5 Paired-samples correlations and differences: AU vs. IN*

<b><i>Pair</i></b>	<b><i>r</i></b>	<b><i>p</i></b>	<b><i>t</i></b>	<b><i>p</i></b>
AU-IN activity	.351	.354	.520	.617
AU-IN optimism	-.365	.334	-1.247	.248
AU-IN certainty	.040	.918	-1.941	.088
AU-IN realism	.090	.819	1.121	.295
AU-IN commonality	-.017	.966	-.021	.984

Table 4-4-6 Paired-samples correlations and differences: AU vs. PH

<b>Pair</b>	<b>r</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>p</b>
AU-PH activity	<b>.670</b>	<b>.048</b>	1.373	.207
AU-PH optimism	-.362	.338	-1.978	.083
AU-PH certainty	.018	.964	-1.074	.314
AU-PH realism	<b>.698</b>	<b>.037</b>	.107	.918
AU-PH commonality	-.078	.841	-.884	.402

Table 4-4-7 Paired-samples correlations and differences: IN vs. PH

<i><b>Pair</b></i>	<b>r</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>p</b>
IN-PH activity	.453	.220	.768	.464
IN-PH optimism	.059	.880	-1.439	.188
IN-PH certainty	-.146	.708	1.534	.163
IN-PH realism	.320	.401	-1.123	.294
IN-PH commonality	.266	.488	-.852	.419

Table 4-4-8 Paired-samples correlations and differences: KE vs. PH

<b><i>Pair</i></b>	<b><i>r</i></b>	<b><i>p</i></b>	<b><i>t</i></b>	<b><i>p</i></b>
KE-PH activity	.720	.106	-1.557	.098
KE-PH optimism	-.132	.802	.312	-1.883
KE-PH certainty	.325	.530	.582	1.974
KE-PH realism	.103	.846	1.628	-1.383
KE-PH commonality	.435	.388	-.305	.627



# Figure 4-1 Cross-Lagged Correlations for International Intermedia Object Agendas

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 4-1-1 U.S. vs. Canada




Figure 4-1-2 U.S. vs. Spain




Figure 4-1-3 U.K. vs. Australia




Figure 4-1-4 U.K. vs. Canada




Figure 4-1-5 U.K. vs. France




Figure 4-1-6 U.K. vs. India




Figure 4-1-7 U.K. vs. Philippines




Figure 4-1-8 Philippines vs. Australia






Figure 4-1-9 Philippines vs. France




Figure 4-1-10 Philippines vs. India




Figure 4-1-11 India vs. Australia




Figure 4-1-12 India vs. France




Figure 4-1-13 France vs. Australia




Figure 4-1-14 France vs. Canada





Figure 4-1-15 Western vs. Non-Western



## Figure 4-2 Comparison of Attribute Agendas

Figure 4-2-1 Comparison of Diction scores: UK vs. US

Figure 4-2-1A Activity






Figure 4-2-1B Optimism




Figure 4-2-1C Certainty




Figure 4-2-1D Realism




Figure 4-2-1E Commonality




Figure 4-2-2 Comparison of Diction scores: CA vs. US

Figure 4-2-2A Activity




Figure 4-2-2B Optimism




Figure 4-2-2C Certainty




Figure 4-2-2D Realism






Figure 4-2-2E Commonality




Figure 4-2-3 Comparison of Diction scores: CA vs. UK

Figure 4-2-3A Activity




Figure 4-2-3B Optimism




Figure 4-2-3C Certainty




Figure 4-2-3D Realism




Figure 4-2-3E Commonality




Figure 4-2-4 Comparison of Diction scores: AU vs. CA

Figure 4-2-4A Activity




Figure 4-2-4B Optimism






Figure 4-2-4C Certainty




Figure 4-2-4D Realism




Figure 4-2-4E Commonality




Figure 4-2-5 Comparison of Diction scores: AU vs. IN

Figure 4-2-5A Activity




Figure 4-2-5B Optimism




Figure 4-2-5C Certainty




Figure 4-2-5D Realism




Figure 4-2-5E Commonality






Figure 4-2-6 Comparison of Diction scores: AU vs. PH

Figure 4-2-6A Activity




Figure 4-2-6B Optimism




Figure 4-2-6C Certainty




Figure 4-2-6D Realism




Figure 4-2-6E Commonality




Figure 4-2-7 Comparison of Diction scores: IN vs. PH

Figure 4-2-7A Activity




Figure 4-2-7B Optimism




Figure 4-2-7C Certainty






Figure 4-2-7D Realism




Figure 4-2-7E Commonality




Figure 4-2-8 Comparison of Diction scores: KE vs. PH

Figure 4-2-8A Activity




Figure 4-2-8B Optimism




Figure 4-2-8C Certainty




Figure 4-2-8D Realism





Figure 4-2-8E Commonality



## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH**

By taking a cross-nationally comparative perspective on mass media's agenda-setting function, this exploratory study offers some initial insights into the agenda-setting process in a global context, both at the first level and second level.

The first contribution of this study is that it offers a general big picture of the object agenda-setting function of mass media around the world, rather than giving an account on one or two countries, like most previous research did. This was made possible by the multinational data source, which allows cross-national comparisons.

Another significance of this study is that it presents a new way to look at the intermedia agenda-setting relationship - that is, it moves this research from vertical (e.g., national wire services vs. local newspapers) or horizontal (e.g., local newspapers vs. local televisions) comparisons within a country, or a local area, to multinational intermedia comparisons. Given the rapid development of globalization and its impact on media outlets around the world, this is certainly noteworthy. This study thus opens the way to a new frontier in both international communication and agenda-setting research.

Most significantly, this study is the first to explore directional intermedia agenda-setting between Western and non-Western countries. Although this study did not acquire adequate evidence to support its hypothesis (it could be argued that the samples of countries and media outlets were too limited, or the content data source, LexisNexis, is



inadequate for certain countries/media), this innovative approach itself is seminal and worth noting. Another innovation of this study is that it explored second level agenda-setting across different countries' media outlets, especially using computer-assisted content analysis method. The fact that the Diction semantics scores analyzed in this study provided neither really powerful nor general explanations of attribute agenda similarity and dissimilarity across the countries does not necessarily mean that this method is not optimal in serving the purpose, but rather that it can be supplemented by potentially more meaningful ones.

The investigation of the directional intermedia agenda-setting between Western and non-Western countries did not yield clear-cut results. Although there was some evidence of causality between certain countries, the majority of the effects did not reach statistical significance. These initial observations, however, should not be considered conclusive. Overshadowing this study is the unanswered question, "Do Western countries' media indeed have a stronger influence on the media agenda of non-Western countries than vice versa?" The inconclusive findings of this study certainly imply that further investigation is needed. Future research should aim at clarifying this issue, if conditions allow, with representative samples at both the country level and the media level.

The 11-country sample is not systematically selected, or representative of some kind of random sample of countries, media, or news coverage. In addition, the number of the media sampled in each country is not the same. These reservations should be taken into account when assessing the results of this study and developing future research.

Due to language barriers, this study was able to examine only those countries

whose official languages are English, Spanish, or French. Future research may include countries having other official languages to see an even bigger picture of the media world, if coders of other languages are available. Additionally, due to resource constraints, this study examined only major newspapers' content as representatives of media agenda in each of the countries. Future research may expand the news content sample to multiple media types. What if television or radio outlets regard the world's most significant events or most important problems in a different way than newspapers do? What if, determined by the particular nature of radio as a news medium, international intermedia influence across radio stations around the world is virtually impossible? – Maybe, maybe not. In addition, as the Internet has emerged as the “fourth mass medium,” and especially that it has drastically impacted the global media world as the newest context of news, it is important to pay attention to Internet news content in future research.

Due to the limitation of the LexisNexis database's capability, most non-English countries are not included in the content analysis of this project. However, representative countries, although their official languages are not English, are of significant importance in the global media landscape. The evolving media in the Arabs and the caged media in the free economy of China, in particular, are not to be missed (Hachten & Scotton, 2007; Paterson & Sreberny-Mohammadi, 2004). Possible remedies of this issue include methodological triangulation - that is, the use of other methods to study the same problems or further validate the outcomes and results. Sometimes referred to as the use of mixed methods, methodological triangulation provides a greater level of richness and detail, which in turn, increases interpretability, meaningfulness, and validity of the data

and the findings (Greene *et al.*, 1989). As Keyton (2006) suggests, quantitative methods are weak for understanding people's interpretations, and weak for discovering new phenomena, while qualitative methods are strong and useful for these.

To further validate and explain the international intermedia agenda-setting process, qualitative methods, including focus groups and intensive interviews, can be employed to collect non-numerical data from media gatekeepers to study the countries that are missed in previous quantitative analyses.

The prospects for news content selection and flow look better than ever before at the dawn of the 21st century. Thus, international communication, or global communication, as it is more trendily labeled nowadays, via the channels of news media appears more important than ever, and definitely needs to be further examined in this age of globalization. With the advent of more advanced technologies and more channels to access information worldwide, global news exchange will be much more rapid and diversified. The existing and newly discovered hypotheses pertaining to this research topic will have to be updated constantly.

These suggestions in combination with the results of the content analyses in the current dissertation suggest that the context of increased globalization offers a rich opportunity to expand our theoretical horizons. The author hopes this dissertation can ignite the potential for new theoretical developments in both agenda-setting and international communication.

## APPENDIX 1

### “Most Significant Events” Survey Operationalization Details in 11 Countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Sample Size</i>	<i>Sample Frame</i>	<i>Type of Sample</i>	<i>Survey Method</i>	<i>Field Dates</i>
<b>US</b>	1000	18+ yrs	National	Telephone	11/14-30/2005
<b>UK</b>	1000	18+ yrs	National	Telephone	11/11-17/2005
<b>CA</b>	1004	18+ yrs	National	Telephone	11/14-26/2005
<b>AU</b>	1026	18+ yrs	National	Telephone	11/25-12/09/2005
<b>IN</b>	1452	18+ yrs	National	Face-to-face	11/20-30/2005
<b>KE</b>	1005	18+ yrs	National	Face-to-face	12/01-08/2005
<b>PH</b>	1000	18+ yrs	Urban*	Face-to-face	11/21-12/07/2005
<b>MX</b>	1000	18+ yrs	National	Face-to-face	11/05-18/2005
<b>ES</b>	1012	18+ yrs	National	Telephone	12/02-14/2005
<b>AR</b>	1003	18+ yrs	National	Face-to-face	10/26-11/22/2005
<b>FR</b>	1002	15+ yrs	National	Telephone	11/10-19/2005

\* In the Philippines the survey was conducted in the National Capital Region, representing 27% of the total urban population.

(Source from [www.pipa.org](http://www.pipa.org))

## APPENDIX 2

Public Agenda and Media Agenda data in 11 Countries (Public in %; Newspaper in frequency)

MSE	US		UK		CA		AU		IN		KE		PH		MX		ES		AR		FR	
	Pub	NP	Pub	NP	Pub	NP	Pub	NP	Pub	NP	Pub	NP	Pub	NP	Pub	NP	Pub	NP	Pub	NP	Pub	NP
Asian Tsunami	8.0	391	<b>16.0</b>	798	12.0	462	<b>27.0</b>	<b>1562</b>	<b>31.0</b>	<b>1144</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21.0</b>	<b>99</b>	4.0	19	7.0	144	7.0	26	<b>14.0</b>	<b>136</b>
Iraq War	<b>27.0</b>	<b>2272</b>	9.0	<b>1592</b>	<b>17.0</b>	<b>513</b>	20.0	766	8.0	122	3.0	2	10.0	29	8.0	28	<b>28.0</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>34</b>	12.0	30
US Hurricanes	15.0	1488	6.0	330	14.0	309	6.0	306	7.0	52	9.0	<b>0</b>	9.0	2	4.0	<b>94</b>	8.0	41	18.0	20	5.0	22
Pope Death	.5	146	<b>.5</b>	82	1.0	38	1.0	73	1.0	17	10.0	<b>4</b>	3.0	22	2.0	3	6.0	2	7.0	6	2.0	2
London Bombing	1.0	287	7.0	887	1.0	143	8.0	499	3.0	109	4.0	<b>0</b>	2.0	<b>0</b>	1.0	2	8.0	18	4.0	1	4.0	1
Global Warming	4.0	390	10.0	579	8.0	209	5.0	255	8.0	92	2.0	1	<b>.5</b>	29	<b>13.0</b>	8	3.0	9	1.0	7	4.0	8
Avian Flu	<b>.0</b>	83	<b>.5</b>	104	1.0	70	.5	<b>34</b>	<b>.0</b>	20	2.0	1	1.0	24	6.0	3	.5	<b>0</b>	1.0	4	2.0	58
Bali Bombing	.5	<b>18</b>	<b>.5</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>.0</b>	<b>8</b>	5.0	384	.5	<b>5</b>	<b>.0</b>	<b>0</b>	1.0	8	<b>.0</b>	<b>0</b>	1.0	7	<b>.5</b>	<b>0</b>	.5	<b>0</b>
Pakistan Earthquake	1.0	97	2.0	145	.5	92	<b>.0</b>	95	<b>.0</b>	384	<b>.0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>.5</b>	3	<b>.0</b>	2	<b>.0</b>	16	<b>.5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>.0</b>	<b>0</b>

## APPENDIX 3

Diction Scores for 2005 Most Significant Events Coverage in 7 English Countries\*

<i>MSE</i>	<i>AU AC</i>	<i>AU OP</i>	<i>AU CE</i>	<i>AU RE</i>	<i>AU CO</i>	<i>CA AC</i>	<i>CA OP</i>	<i>CA CE</i>	<i>CA RE</i>	<i>CA CO</i>	<i>IN AC</i>	<i>IN OP</i>	<i>IN CE</i>	<i>IN RE</i>	<i>IN CO</i>	<i>KE AC</i>	<i>KE OP</i>	<i>KE CE</i>	<i>KE RE</i>	<i>KE CO</i>
Asian Tsunami	52.15	49.58	46.89	50.07	49.87	52.79	49.89	50.37	48.61	53.57	51.27	47.51	42.32	46.34	49.75	53.60	48.88	49.95	48.58	50.07
Iraq War	54.41	47.05	47.84	49.37	52.10	51.75	50.70	50.04	49.94	48.62	54.52	49.03	45.58	49.07	48.56	51.41	46.18	45.74	47.15	54.01
US Hurricanes	50.48	48.08	40.81	48.67	48.46	51.90	48.72	47.52	49.50	51.04	50.69	49.23	48.93	46.20	53.36	.	.	.	.	.
Pope Death	49.27	38.77	32.92	53.54	49.38	51.66	48.87	47.08	49.57	49.51	50.81	48.87	46.26	48.32	48.73	48.05	50.25	53.50	48.14	48.63
London Bombing	53.19	46.80	45.66	47.76	49.91	50.90	50.92	44.49	45.82	47.81	48.80	47.08	43.94	48.66	46.23	50.18	45.89	43.07	50.21	49.63
Global Warming	53.81	45.68	43.52	45.84	50.46	53.33	45.72	38.31	49.29	43.68	51.66	50.67	50.76	48.24	54.49	49.85	46.94	47.98	47.97	51.13
Avian Flu	51.53	47.53	44.91	47.10	48.33	52.84	46.06	47.10	47.82	50.99	52.26	48.52	47.16	46.75	47.67	50.39	48.02	46.40	47.96	47.94
Bali Bombing	49.77	49.01	29.50	47.10	49.07	51.51	48.24	47.65	47.98	48.95	51.70	45.44	44.58	46.88	47.15	.	.	.	.	.
Pakistan Earthquake	53.02	47.63	45.92	48.24	49.09	50.53	46.69	45.46	45.69	51.80	52.88	48.67	48.84	49.05	50.92	.	.	.	.	.

\* AC = Activity, OP = Optimism, CE = Certainty, RE = Realism, CO = Commonality

(To be continued in next page)

### APPENDIX 3 (continued from last page)

Diction Stores for 2005 Most Significant Events Coverage in 7 English Countries<sup>\*</sup>

<i>MSE</i>	<i>PH</i> <i>AC</i>	<i>PH</i> <i>OP</i>	<i>PH</i> <i>CE</i>	<i>PH</i> <i>RE</i>	<i>PH</i> <i>CO</i>	<i>UK</i> <i>AC</i>	<i>UK</i> <i>OP</i>	<i>UK</i> <i>CE</i>	<i>UK</i> <i>RE</i>	<i>UK</i> <i>CO</i>	<i>US</i> <i>AC</i>	<i>US</i> <i>OP</i>	<i>US</i> <i>CE</i>	<i>US</i> <i>RE</i>	<i>US</i> <i>CO</i>
Asian Tsunami	51.54	48.29	48.86	48.58	49.00	51.98	46.92	48.06	50.35	49.36	52.58	48.47	47.08	47.64	50.68
Iraq War	53.34	47.09	40.42	48.30	50.12	53.14	47.89	43.63	48.80	48.03	54.49	46.29	42.77	49.28	50.16
US Hurricanes	47.98	48.94	45.70	46.76	49.67	52.50	51.18	43.68	49.13	47.26	53.52	48.74	45.49	46.91	47.83
Pope Death	45.70	50.20	43.79	53.90	48.14	49.44	48.00	46.90	47.25	49.20	50.03	48.59	46.67	48.30	47.42
London Bombing	51.95	52.09	43.03	49.60	50.17	49.04	49.68	44.70	46.34	49.66	52.73	47.81	46.71	46.82	48.81
Global Warming	50.00	51.38	44.97	48.91	51.15	50.45	48.41	48.27	49.82	50.34	56.07	48.65	47.78	49.57	53.55
Avian Flu	50.51	49.48	46.87	48.45	49.84	51.34	45.05	43.59	46.23	51.03	52.47	46.91	44.28	47.28	49.42
Bali Bombing	51.11	49.02	44.08	45.71	48.78	52.91	46.63	43.69	45.74	48.59	50.42	49.50	43.01	45.69	50.93
Pakistan Earthquake	56.25	47.79	42.53	46.91	59.95	51.66	49.09	45.10	49.12	47.72	52.92	48.62	45.85	46.55	50.85

<sup>\*</sup> AC = Activity, OP = Optimism, CE = Certainty, RE = Realism, CO = Commonality

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