ingest
cdrApp
2018-08-23T18:03:17.822Z
d39a25df-af15-48e9-aec2-c9af81a997a2
modifyDatastreamByValue
RELS-EXT
fedoraAdmin
2018-08-23T18:03:56.739Z
Setting exclusive relation
addDatastream
MD_TECHNICAL
fedoraAdmin
2018-08-23T18:04:08.211Z
Adding technical metadata derived by FITS
addDatastream
MD_FULL_TEXT
fedoraAdmin
2018-08-23T18:04:09.736Z
Adding full text metadata extracted by Apache Tika
modifyDatastreamByValue
RELS-EXT
fedoraAdmin
2018-08-23T18:04:21.219Z
Setting exclusive relation
modifyDatastreamByValue
MD_DESCRIPTIVE
cdrApp
2018-09-27T15:06:43.337Z
modifyDatastreamByValue
MD_DESCRIPTIVE
cdrApp
2019-03-21T16:09:25.137Z
Joshua
Blanchard
Author
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Angsty Metaethics
Some disagreements evoke philosophical angst: the judgment that the truth of some thesis
is essential for the meaning or intelligibility of our lives, combined with the worry that it might
be false. Chapter 1 develops an account of this attitude, its phenomenology, and its normative
status in contrast to related attitudes. Philosophical angst illuminates what is at stake in debates
ranging from the metaphysics of reasons to the relationship between God and meaning.
Chapter 2 defends the motivation and coherence of the project. I give a general argument
for expecting that there are significant evaluative differences in the implications of competing
metaethical theories: radically different accounts of important domains probably differ in
evaluative upshot. I then respond to three puzzles for making evaluative judgments about
metaethics.
Chapter 3 defends pro-realism, the view that it is much better if moral realism is true
rather than any of its rivals. First, moral realism vindicates the dignified moral status described
by the best normative moral theories, and so it is much better if realism rather than nihilism is
true. Second, moral realism secures a desirable independence for moral justification that is
different in kind from anti-realistic independence.
Chapter 4 rebuts arguments that it is better if antirealism is true. First, there are reasons
for thinking that morality itself would be worse if realism were true. Second, there are moral
reasons for thinking we shouldn’t endorse realism. I argue that such arguments either rely on
implausible grounding principles or they overgeneralize to all metaethical projects.
Although I have raised questions of angst and value, one might think that this is
irrelevant to truth. Chapter 5 shows that this reasonable impulse is mistaken. Inferences from It
is better if p to It is the case that p are appropriate in contexts of inquiry in which theorists are
responsible for accommodating not only the non-evaluative features of some domain, but the
evaluative features as well. Metaethics is one such context.
Summer 2018
2018
Ethics
Philosophy of Religion
moral realism, philosophical angst, value theory
eng
Doctor of Philosophy
Dissertation
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Degree granting institution
Philosophy
Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord
Thesis advisor
Susan
Wolf
Thesis advisor
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Russ
Shafer-Landau
Thesis advisor
Ryan
Preston-Roedder
Thesis advisor
text
Joshua
Blanchard
Creator
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Angsty Metaethics
Some disagreements evoke philosophical angst: the judgment that the truth of some thesis
is essential for the meaning or intelligibility of our lives, combined with the worry that it might
be false. Chapter 1 develops an account of this attitude, its phenomenology, and its normative
status in contrast to related attitudes. Philosophical angst illuminates what is at stake in debates
ranging from the metaphysics of reasons to the relationship between God and meaning.
Chapter 2 defends the motivation and coherence of the project. I give a general argument
for expecting that there are significant evaluative differences in the implications of competing
metaethical theories: radically different accounts of important domains probably differ in
evaluative upshot. I then respond to three puzzles for making evaluative judgments about
metaethics.
Chapter 3 defends pro-realism, the view that it is much better if moral realism is true
rather than any of its rivals. First, moral realism vindicates the dignified moral status described
by the best normative moral theories, and so it is much better if realism rather than nihilism is
true. Second, moral realism secures a desirable independence for moral justification that is
different in kind from anti-realistic independence.
Chapter 4 rebuts arguments that it is better if antirealism is true. First, there are reasons
for thinking that morality itself would be worse if realism were true. Second, there are moral
reasons for thinking we shouldn’t endorse realism. I argue that such arguments either rely on
implausible grounding principles or they overgeneralize to all metaethical projects.
Although I have raised questions of angst and value, one might think that this is
irrelevant to truth. Chapter 5 shows that this reasonable impulse is mistaken. Inferences from It
is better if p to It is the case that p are appropriate in contexts of inquiry in which theorists are
responsible for accommodating not only the non-evaluative features of some domain, but the
evaluative features as well. Metaethics is one such context.
Ethics
Philosophy of Religion
moral realism; philosophical angst; value theory
Doctor of Philosophy
Dissertation
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Degree granting institution
Philosophy
Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord
Thesis advisor
Susan
Wolf
Thesis advisor
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Russ
Shafer-Landau
Thesis advisor
Ryan
Preston-Roedder
Thesis advisor
2018
2018-08
eng
text
Joshua
Blanchard
Creator
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Angsty Metaethics
Some disagreements evoke philosophical angst: the judgment that the truth of some thesis
is essential for the meaning or intelligibility of our lives, combined with the worry that it might
be false. Chapter 1 develops an account of this attitude, its phenomenology, and its normative
status in contrast to related attitudes. Philosophical angst illuminates what is at stake in debates
ranging from the metaphysics of reasons to the relationship between God and meaning.
Chapter 2 defends the motivation and coherence of the project. I give a general argument
for expecting that there are significant evaluative differences in the implications of competing
metaethical theories: radically different accounts of important domains probably differ in
evaluative upshot. I then respond to three puzzles for making evaluative judgments about
metaethics.
Chapter 3 defends pro-realism, the view that it is much better if moral realism is true
rather than any of its rivals. First, moral realism vindicates the dignified moral status described
by the best normative moral theories, and so it is much better if realism rather than nihilism is
true. Second, moral realism secures a desirable independence for moral justification that is
different in kind from anti-realistic independence.
Chapter 4 rebuts arguments that it is better if antirealism is true. First, there are reasons
for thinking that morality itself would be worse if realism were true. Second, there are moral
reasons for thinking we shouldn’t endorse realism. I argue that such arguments either rely on
implausible grounding principles or they overgeneralize to all metaethical projects.
Although I have raised questions of angst and value, one might think that this is
irrelevant to truth. Chapter 5 shows that this reasonable impulse is mistaken. Inferences from It
is better if p to It is the case that p are appropriate in contexts of inquiry in which theorists are
responsible for accommodating not only the non-evaluative features of some domain, but the
evaluative features as well. Metaethics is one such context.
Ethics
Philosophy of Religion
moral realism; philosophical angst; value theory
Doctor of Philosophy
Dissertation
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School
Degree granting institution
Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord
Thesis advisor
Susan
Wolf
Thesis advisor
Ram
Neta
Thesis advisor
Russ
Shafer-Landau
Thesis advisor
Ryan
Preston-Roedder
Thesis advisor
2018
2018-08
eng
text
Blanchard_unc_0153D_18068.pdf
uuid:04521451-7433-4dd1-95fb-6d8eda06b848
2020-08-23T00:00:00
2018-07-18T17:27:22Z
proquest
application/pdf
594939