Education Outcomes, Party Contacting, and Change in Party Identification

by
David C. Kershaw

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Approved by:

George Rabinowitz, Advisor

Michele Hoyman, Reader

Thomas Carsey, Reader

Michael MacKuen, Committee Member

James Stimson, Committee Member

Abstract

DAVID C. KERSHAW: Education Outcomes, Party Contacting, and Change in Party Identification.
(Under the direction of George Rabinowitz.)

This dissertation presents three studies that challenge the conventional understanding about the ways in which political elites influence citizens' orientations toward, as well as the citizens' resources that bear upon, political participation. The studies question assumptions about the intent and consequences of elite behavior in three distinct, but related substantive literatures. These literatures include: electoral contacting, party identification formation, and state education outcomes.

The first study helps explain the long observed pattern where political elites disproportionately contact the socioeconomically and politically advantaged during elections despite theory from the campaign mobilization literature that argues contacting will have the most influence on individuals who are socioeconomically and politically disadvantaged. This paradox is explained once one recognizes that contacting during elections serves divergent goals that are tied to the election cycle and to election competitiveness. Broadly speaking, contacting in elections should be seen as having two participatory recruitment stages: a resource gathering stage-with resources coming from the advantaged-and a mass-mobilization stage-where every vote counts only when elections are competitive.

The second study challenges the idea that political parties and their operatives only alter party identities through a few indirect mechanisms: strategic positioning on issues and performance of elected officials. Rather, this study argues that campaign

contacts have the unanticipated consequence of offering opportunities for behavioral reinforcement of citizens' party identities.

The final study reassesses the racial discrimination explanation for the persistent relationship between statewide diversity and poor education outcomes. While this study reaffirms the existence of the pattern, a critical finding is that socioeconomic status and other conventional explanations are better at predicting poor education outcomes than state level diversity. By probing more deeply, this study also discovers that white student outcomes drive the association between diversity and outcomes.

To Kathy, Murphy, Ken, and Bailie.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

My dissertation presents three studies that challenge the conventional understanding about the ways in which political elites influence citizens' orientations toward, as well as the citizens' resources that bear upon, political participation. The studies question assumptions about the intent and consequences of elite behavior in three distinct, but related substantive literatures. These literatures include: electoral contacting, party identification formation, and state education outcomes.

The first study challenges the long held belief that political elites always set out to disproportionately contact the socioeconomically and politically advantaged during elections despite theory from the campaign mobilization literature that argues contacting will have the most influence on individuals who are socioeconomically or politically disadvantaged. While the evidence does persistently show that the advantaged are disproportionately contacted during elections, I argue this disconnect between theory and evidence is explained once one recognizes that contacting during elections serves divergent goals that are tied to the election cycle and to election competitiveness. Broadly speaking, contacting in elections should be seen as having two participatory recruitment stages: a resource gathering stage-with resources coming from the advantaged-and a mass-mobilization stage-where every vote counts only when elections are competitive.

Overall, I theorize that once we account for the conditional nature of recruitment strategies, we should see that campaigns do contact a broad and representative segment of society; even if this only occurs when elections are competitive.

In terms of the substantive influence of contacting, the literature portrays campaign contacting as primarily altering political participation and vote choice. Further, the literature also suggests the effects of contacting are generally limited. I take issue with this characterization and argue that this literature underestimates the importance of campaign contacts on political behavior and attitudes. Specifically, in my second study I argue that campaign mobilization and recruitment efforts also have the unintended consequence of altering party identities through behavioral reinforcement.

According to the behavioral reinforcement theory of party identification (Converse & Markus, 1979), a citizen's bond to a party is created and/or strengthened each time he or she votes for that party. Since, campaign contacts are recognized to influence both the turnout and vote choice decisions-two steps necessary for translating latent affect into identity, I theorize that contacts must alter party identities, if only indirectly. At the same time, I also argue the vote is not the only participatory opportunity campaigns offer. If an important mechanism for identity formation is behaviorally supporting a party, those performing other core campaign tasks (e.g., giving money) should also develop stronger bonds to the parties. While this study establishes the relationship between contacts and party identities, one implication of the theory (given the persistence of party identities), is that campaign contacts may have effects on participation and vote choice that last well beyond the current election.

The final study questions the degree to which state political elites in diverse states are successfully able to place barriers that result in poor education outcomes for minorities. At issue is the persistent relationship between statewide diversity and poor

education outcomes noted in the state politics literature. Although a variety of explanations exist for this pattern, one influential strain of research–the Racial Diversity Theory of State Politics–suggests this pattern results largely from discrimination in state level politics (Hero & Tolbert, 1996; Hero, 1998; Hero, 2007). Unfortunately, this research does not adequately account for the background of the students or local forces; the factors the education outcomes literature says largely drive education outcomes. This omission along with several other theoretical and methodological considerations leads me to theorize that this prior research may overstate and/or mischaracterize the role of statewide discrimination in education outcomes. I argue a better specified model will show socioeconomic factors and other conventional explanations play a much greater role in outcomes for all students than this research cedes.

While this study of elite behavior does not directly address a question of how elites affect political behavior, it does directly impact the conclusions drawn from the political participation literature. This literature generally concludes that racial disparities in participation are modest to nonexistent once socio-economic status is accounted for in the models (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). However, this conclusion may be premature if state actors are highly successful at instituting barriers that result in poor education outcomes.

Chapter 2

Mobilizing the Mobilized: The Electoral Recruitment Paradox

The classic theory of participation recruitment suggests that parties and politicians mobilize the people they know, those at the center of social contacts, those most likely to effectively produce desired outcomes, and those likely to participate in response to recruitment efforts (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Nie, Juan and Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). These characteristics represent individuals with resources, deep social networks, capacity for action, and susceptibility to recruitment effort (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Nie, Juan and Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). That is, "the wealthy, the educated, and the partisan" (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993, p.32).

At the same time, researchers also argue that elections are ultimately about votes, and theory indicates that those who have the most potential for participation will likely vote without prompting and others will not vote even if encouraged (Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 1999; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Thus, rational prospectors should focus on those at the margins of participation. If participatory mobilization has the most influence on individuals who are not likely to be socio-economic or political elites,

why would much of the literature assume, and survey evidence show, that elites are disproportionately recruited to participate in elections (Abramson and Claggett, 2001; Gershtenson, 2003; Krueger, 2006; Niven, 2002, 2004; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993)?

2.1 Two Strategic Recruitment Stages

This paper sorts out this paradox by establishing that participatory recruitment during elections serves several divergent but complimentary goals that are explicitly tied to the timing within the election cycle and the competitiveness of the election. Broadly speaking, elections should be seen as having two recruitment stages: the first a resource gathering stage, and the second a mobilization stage.

The resource gathering stage involves the preelection day organizational buildup and operation. From early in an election until election day, a campaign must establish and maintain a basic organizational structure designed to respond to developments in the environment and to achieve the campaign's election goals. This means two things from a participant recruitment standpoint.

First, campaigns need to find activists to run all aspects of the operation. This includes everything from running the phone banks to making strategic resource allocation decisions. However, campaigns do not want just anyone filling these positions. The ideal participants have commitment and capacity; they are willing and able to effectively complete the tasks they are given.

Second, commitment and capacity alone are insufficient to win elections. Campaigns also need cash to fund the activities of the campaign operatives. Simply, campaigns need those willing and able to give lots of money.

In sum, these operational resource needs force strategic elites to spend most of the election seeking support from the committed, the skilled, and the wealthy. The implication is that the individuals recruited in this stage of the election will epitomize

the classic socio-economic and political elite, as these individuals are most likely to have and to provide the resources the campaigns need (Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 1999; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Fenno, 1978; Nie, Juan and Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995).[1]

However, campaign resource recruitment needs change over the course of an election. As election day nears, campaigns turn from focusing on recruiting activists and raising money towards getting supporters to the polls. Yet, campaigns must make choices about the nature and purposes served by the mobilization efforts. In effect, campaigns need to ask themselves, "Is this election going to be close?" and related, "Is it worth the time, effort and money to launch a full vote mobilization effort?"

If the answer to both questions is yes, the election is competitive and the campaign should direct mobilization efforts towards maximizing supporter turnout. Theoretically, elites should use available information to mobilize marginal voters in order to maximize turnout (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 1999; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).[2]

Given that the campaigns have already recruited many of the habitual voters in the resource gathering phase, campaigns could succeed in reaching the marginal voter by

[1]Note that campaigns do contact a broad swatch of the public during the vote identification phase. However, campaigns try to prevent mobilizing out-partisans during the contact. Consequently, this approach results in many of the contacts being unaware of the contact, let alone being asked to participate.

[2]Marginal voters are those with around a 50 percent probability of voting. The literature assumes some individuals are virtually certain to vote, while others are certain not to vote. The expectation of a nonlinear association between mobilization efforts and turnout presumably arises from a pattern of diminishing returns associated with the benefits (selective, solidary, or purposive) provided by the campaign contact. Extra benefits will not greatly add to the reasons for voting. These individuals already likely receive high levels of benefits from voting (i.e., those with a high sense of duty and strong partisan attachments, the habitual voter) and will vote regardless of the contact. Mobilizing them will not add votes to the candidates. Conversely, some individuals are likely to receive very low levels of benefits (i.e., a socially isolated individual with no civic duty who works three jobs) such that the benefits provided by the campaign will not greatly increase his vote probability. Mobilizing these individuals will also not add votes to the candidates.

targeting the remaining registered voters, regardless of their socio-economic status. The unregistered clearly cannot help the candidate, as they have zero vote potential. Mobilizing the unregistered represents a pure waste of resources. Targeting the remaining registered voters as a strategy arises from the fact that a variety of factors (i.e., interest, duty, issues, etc.) play an important role in the vote decision while they simultaneously do not perfectly covary with socio-economics. Furthermore, each citizen's mix of these factors remains largely unknown to campaigns despite the early stage efforts. Consequently, rational prospectors cannot simply recruit the center of the socio-economic distribution and hope to reach the optimal targets. "Rational prospectors" (Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 1999) should reach out to all registered voters relatively equally, with contacting priorities made using any information they have acquired.

In contrast, as election day approaches, if an election appears to be uncompetitive, campaigns will use their organizational structures to loosely mobilize in order to achieve objectives other than vote maximization. Other present and future oriented objectives served by vote mobilization may include: training, or building the morale of, the campaign staff; maintaining or expanding their resources (or resource base) for the current or future elections (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Box-Steffensmeier, 1996; Goodliffe, 2004); getting disabled partisans to the polls; and simply maintaining a certain vote level.[3] In fact, prior research fundamentally errs by failing to account for the fact that vote maximization arguments are clearly germane only in competitive elections, and by failing to recognize that inequalities in recruitment should emerge wherever vote maximization does not strictly guide electoral recruitment strategies in the late stage. Voters only carry equal weight when elites recruit participants to maximize the vote.

[3]Note that uncompetitive elections consistently show evidence of substantial contacting rates. For example in the 2000 presidential election, contacting rates in nonbattleground states were a nontrivial 35%. The last minute nature of these contacts suggests vote mobilization. Data from midterm uncontested elections in states with no Senate elections show similar results. NES data from 1978-2002 indicate a contacting rate by the two major parties of approximately 23% under these conditions.

The targeted recruit should be the socio-economically and/or politically advantaged if the goal of the contact is some other participatory act.

The failure of prior research to recognize that campaigns have time and condition varying resource needs–and, by implication, the failure to differentiate among key subpopulations, recruited for distinct purposes at specific times in the election–may help to explain the apparent socioeconomic bias seen in most studies of electoral recruitment. At a minimum, studies of electoral recruitment must account for differences in the strategic goals served by early, late-competitive, and late-uncompetitive election recruitment efforts. Doing so will not only shed light on the strategic purpose and timing of different forms of recruitment, but should also show that elites strategically hunt for resources and activists for most of the election before turning to vote mobilization in the late stage. Further, this approach should show that elites only vote maximize under truly competitive conditions.

2.2 Methodology and Measurement

To test these expectations I turn to the 2000 presidential election and the National Annenberg Election Study (NAES) pre-post general election panel study. The NAES focuses on a single election and uses a rolling cross-sectional design, providing the ability to distinguish early contacts from late. The NAES also contains individuals in both competitive and uncompetitive situations, allowing us to see how contacting strategy varies with competitiveness.[4] Unfortunately, the 2004 NAES does not ask the appropriate questions to enable testing the theory, so the test is restricted to 2000.

This study separates the resource gathering stage analysis from the mobilization stage analyses. For the purpose of this study, October 31, 2000 marks the beginning

[4]While the theory is applied in a presidential election, the patterns should manifest in any election.

of the mobilization stage and the end of resource gathering stage.[5] Assuming that the mobilization period starts just seven days before the general election follows other mobilization research and recognizes that mobilization efforts close to elections are the most effective (Nickerson, 2007).

Each stage analysis will use the same set of variables to predict whether an individual was contacted by either of the major parties in the specific stage. These analyses use self-reported responses to the Annenberg pre and post "contact with the campaigns" questions to establish who was contacted by the campaigns.[6] The pre-election contacting battery was used to create the contacted dependent variable in the early stage analyses. Individuals who reported being contacted in the pre-election survey and were interviewed prior October 31, 2000 were coded as early contacts. Individuals who only report a contact in the post-election survey, or reported a contact in the pre-election

[5]The same substantive conclusions emerge under several alternative mobilization stage start dates–such as three days before the general election, or state registration deadline. These results are available on request. Overall, NAES sampling resulted in only about 43% of the NAES panel being asked if they were contacted by the campaigns in the pre-election survey. All panel respondents were asked about contact with the campaigns in the post election survey. However, this study's analyses focus on the subset of respondents who were asked about their contact with the parties in both waves.

[6]Unfortunately, the NAES uses two similar but different questions to gage respondents contact with the campaigns in the pre and post election surveys. Up through November 6, 2000, the NAES asks respondents, "During the campaign, has anyone from one of the campaigns talked to you in person or on the phone about the presidential election?" After the election the NAES asks, "During the campaign this fall, did any of the campaigns contact you about the presidential election?" The question wording shift could cause inter-stage comparability problems. Contacting could include countless forms of interaction including bulk mail, door hangers, phone calls, and face-to-face canvassing. Several considerations make this an unnecessary worry. First, people perform relatively shallow searches for information in order to answer poll questions (Zaller, 1992). We also know that the everyday environment individuals face contains far more stimuli than working memory can process (Steenbergen and Lodge, 2003*a*). Thus, available information includes only that which captured the individual's attention for more than a fleeting moment. For most people, most of the time, bulk mail contacting will never making it into long-term memory as mail simply will not activate the surveillance system. Alternatively, we train ourselves to respond to knocks at the door or the ring of the phone. This increases the probability that an individual archives these events in long-term memory. Thus, responses to these questions should largely reflect these forms of contacting. Comparing the reported NAES cross-section contacting rates for the ambiguous question wording with the contacting rate of a 2000 National Election Study (NES) question resembling the NAES preelection question demonstrates nearly identical contacting rates, 31.9% and 32.5% in the NES cross-section.

survey but were interviewed after October 30, 2000, were coded as late contacts.[7]

The existence of two separate participant contacting stages, and distinctiveness of elite strategies, are strongly implied when we take a look at the simple monthly plots of the percentage of the population who reported a campaign contact (see Figure 1.1). The NAES rolling cross-section and panel data both establish that presidential campaigns quickly seek out a small number of citizens (under five percent of the population) but do not openly contact the vast majority of citizens until the very last moments of the campaign.[8] This pattern strongly suggests that mass vote mobilization did not occur in the primary phase. Conversely, it is consistent with the idea that campaigns focus their participatory recruitment activities on involving a core segment of the population to handle most of their campaign needs.

[7]A small number of the individuals interviewed after October 31 in the pre-election survey reported a campaign contact in the pre-election battery but did not report the contact in the post-election survey. Consequently, both questions were used to identify late contacted individuals.

[8]Figure 1 also shows that the panel data closely match the cross-section, speaking to the generalizability of the panel data. It also suggests that large portions of the population simply are not forgetting they were primary mass-mobilized.



Figure 2.1: Campaign Recruitment in the 2000 Presidential Election: January through November 6

2.3 Resource Gathering Stage Analysis & Results

The resource gathering stage analysis uses variables that reflect election relevant information, citizens' geographic locations, citizens' integration in their communities, and the standard recruitment variables to predict early campaign contact.[9] Income, educational attainment, political knowledge, partisanship, and self-employment status variables represent money, commitment, capacity, and the other resources desired by political elites (Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 1999; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995).[10] Increasing levels of resources should coincide with an increased likelihood of being contacted in the resource gathering stage. While, (log of) length at residence, a set of place of residence dummies, registration status, gubernatorial or senatorial election competitiveness, native son, and disability status variables capture those factors shown to alter the likelihood of being vote mobilized.[11] The likelihood of being vote mobilized should increase with length at residence, being registered to vote, living in a state with other competitive elections, living in more urbanized areas, being disabled, and living in one of the candidate's home states. The fact that contextual differences in the likelihood of being contacted emerge in the late stage (even in battleground states) reflects the reality that campaigns cannot contact all potential voters. Thus, these variables capture some of the strategies campaigns use to reach the most voters given limited (use of) resources. For example, campaigns disproportionately target densely populated areas

[9] A description of each of the variables used in the analyses is found in Table 2.4 at the end of the chapter.

[10] Self-employment status does not appear directly in prior research. However, its inclusion derives directly from contacting/mobilization theory. This research argues elites seek out those with time, resources, and those central to dense social networks. The self-employed often have all of these characteristics.

[11] Using the log of length at residence accounts for a positive but diminishing increased likelihood of being contacted for each additional day living at the same address.

with their mobilization effort because it takes less effort to reach an equal or greater number of voters in these areas than it would a rural area of equal size. Similarly, the inclusion of controls for the candidates' home states and for other competitive elections attempts to account for well established campaign operations and for the coordinated use of multiple ongoing campaign organizations, respectively. In order to maintain consistency with the literature, age and marital status were added as controls.

However, the existence of primaries during this period raises the possibility of vote mass-mobilization. Consequently, a control for primary season was also incorporated in the model. Individuals living in states where primaries were held prior to the date John McCain dropped out of the race were coded one, all others zero.[12] A logit analysis is used to estimate how well these variables alter the likelihood of an early stage contact.

In addition to looking at specific indicators, this study argues that support for or against the theory will be found by looking at clusters of variables and how they do or do not explain contacting in each stage. Specifically, I expect that commitment and capacity indicators such as income, strength of partisanship, education, self-employment status, and knowledge will predict early stage contacting, but not late stage, competitive election contacting. Because vote maximization should not guide mobilization and because campaigns always need money, wealthy individuals should still be the focus of late stage contacts in nonbattleground states. However, the effects of the other resource variables should diminish as the need to recruit large numbers for difficult participatory acts has passed.

In contrast, the mobilization and contextual variables (e.g., registration status, place of residence, log of length of residence, other competitive elections, and native son) will

[12]Several other controls were used to try to find significant primary mobilization effects. Some of these included: using the date Bush officially reached the minimum number of delegates to mark the end of the competitive primary season and using a variable that captured each individual's state order in the primary season. None of these variables found primary mass-mobilization effects.

help to predict late stage contacting but not early stage contacting. Simply, the vote mobilization indicators should only predict contacting when vote mobilization occurs; in the final days of an election.

Consistent with expectations, strategic elites target strong partisans, the wealthy, the self-employed, and the politically knowledgeable in the resource gathering stage (see Table 2.1). That is, elites target individuals ideal for demanding participatory acts.

Furthermore, it is notable that the measures that the theory suggests predict late recruitment (i.e., living in a battleground state and being a registered voter) fail to account for mobilization at this stage. Joint tests of significance reinforce the idea that these variables do not contribute to our understanding of contacting in this stage ($\chi^2_8 = 3.50\, p = .899$). This is consistent with the argument that an individual's capacity and resources matter more at this stage than factors that might be directly associated with mobilizing turnout.

Table 2.1: Predicting Resource Gathering Stage Contact with Individual and Contextual Characteristics

	Resource Gathering Stage Contact
Commitment & Capacity Variables	
Weak Partisan	-0.639*
	(0.288)
Independent Leaner	-0.789*
	(0.327)
Independent	-0.328
	(0.446)
Political Knowledge	0.431*
	(0.136)
Educational Attainment	0.065
	(0.056)
Income	0.152*
	(0.071)
Self-employed	0.668*
	(0.279)
Mobilization & Contextual Variables	
Registered Voter	0.560
	(0.537)
Battleground State	-0.124
	(0.257)
Time at Residence	0.096
	(0.126)
Urban Resident	0.032
	(0.334)
Suburban Resident	0.078
	(0.296)
Native Son	-0.128
	(0.415)
Competitive Race	-0.241
	(0.251)
Competitive Primary	-0.060
	(0.242)

Continued on Next Page...

Table 2.1: – Continued

	Resource Gathering Stage Contact
Demographic Controls	
Disabled	0.674
	(0.624)
Age	0.007
	(0.009)
Married	-0.530*
	(0.240)
Constant	-6.566*
	(0.871)
N. of cases	2368
chi-squared	57.080
pseudo R-squared	0.075

* $p < 0.05$; Source: 2000 NAES panel data (pre-election battery up through 10/31/00).

The impact of money on the likelihood of contacting is impressive. Table 2.2 shows the effect of income simultaneously controlling for strength of partisanship, knowledge level, and whether someone was self-employed. The predicted effect of earning over $150,000 annually translates to having an approximately three-fold increase in the predicted probability of campaign contact in this stage, compared to those earning less than $10,000. Clearly, more knowledge, strong partisanship, and being self-employed all enhance the probability of contact. Overall, the predicted probabilities reported in Table 2.2 corroborate the importance of both commitment and social placement for the likelihood of early contacting.[13]

Interestingly, living in a state with a competitive primary did not increase the probability of a contact in the early stage of the 2000 election.[14] This is consistent with a nationwide search for resources (Gimpel, Lee and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008).

[13]Note that Table 2.2 presents only weak and strong partisans because independents and independent leaners are statistically indistinguishable from weak partisans in the likelihood of being contacted.

[14]In a separate analysis, an interaction between the primary control and republican identifiers did not show any party specific mass-mobilizing efforts.

Table 2.2: Predicted Probabilities of an Early Stage Contact for Different Combinations of Income, Strength of Partisanship, Knowledge Levels, and Self-employment Status

	Weak Partisan			Strong Partisan		
Knowledge	Very Poor	Average	Excellent	Very Poor	Average	Excellent
Not Self-employed						
$10,000	.005	.011	.027	.011	.025	.057
$15,000	.006	.013	.031	.012	.029	.065
$25,000	.007	.015	.036	.014	.033	.075
$35,000	.008	.018	.041	.017	.038	.086
$50,000	.009	.021	.048	.019	.044	.099
$75,000	.010	.024	.055	.022	.051	.114
$100,000	.012	.028	.063	.026	.059	.130
$150,000	.014	.032	.073	.030	.068	.148
Over $150,000	.016	.037	.084	.035	.079	.168
Self-employed						
$10,000	.009	.022	.050	.020	.047	.105
$15,000	.011	.025	.058	.024	.054	.120
$25,000	.013	.030	.067	.028	.063	.137
$35,000	.015	.034	.077	.032	.072	.156
$50,000	.017	.040	.089	.037	.083	.177
$75,000	.020	.046	.102	.043	.095	.200
$100,000	.023	.053	.117	.049	.109	.225
$150,000	.027	.061	.133	.057	.125	.253
Over $150,000	.031	.070	.152	.066	.143	.283

Notes: These predicted probabilities are created with all nonpresented continuous variables set to their mean and dummy variables set to zero.

2.4 Mobilization Stage Analysis & Results

The second analysis takes the same set of variables used in the resource gathering stage analysis and attempts to predict late-stage election contact. However, in the mobilization stage analysis, I interact the battleground dummy with all of the variables used in the model to distinguish late battleground and nonbattleground contacts.[15] Interacting the battleground state indicator with each variable in the model allows us to test whether the variables have different effects (slopes) in the battleground and nonbattleground states. These analyses also include a dummy for those who first reported a campaign contact in the resource gathering (early) stage.[16] The continuous and registered voter variables were centered to reduce collinearity.[17]

Turning to the mobilization stage in nonbattleground states, the results indicate parties do not attempt to reach out to all voters equally in the vote mobilization stage in uncompetitive elections.[18] The significance of the income variable in Table 2.3 indicates that, even in this late stage, campaigns actively seek out individuals with money. In fact, the magnitude of income's impact on recruitment probabilities is comparable to

[15]States are distinguished according to Shaw's (2006) "the 'real' real list" of battleground states. Battleground states include Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

[16]Theoretically, battleground states should be similar to nonbattleground states in the resource gathering stage. Money and activists are valuable regardless of where they originate. Consequently, this study only uses interaction terms to distinguish competitive from uncompetitive elections in the late stage. To be sure, additional analyses explicitly tested for differences between battleground and nonbattleground states in the resource gathering stage. Both classes of states demonstrated similar contacting patterns in this stage (available upon request).

[17]Despite these measures, the battleground indicator fails to achieve significance due to irresolvable collinearity (VIF=9.97).

[18]The first column in Table 2.3 gives the effects of the variables in nonbattleground states. The second column lists the coefficients for the interactions between the variables and the battleground state indicator. These coefficients tell us whether, and to what degree, the variables perform differently in predicting battleground state contacts. The third column is the linear combination of the first two columns and presents the expected effects of the variables in the battleground states.

that of the early stage. This is consistent with presidential campaigns continuing to gather resources. This is not surprising as the hunt for money is continuous and usually continues on even after an election is over. However, less immediately valued resources such as political knowledge, self-employment, and strength of partisanship notably fail to influence late stage contact probabilities; individually or jointly ($\chi^2_7 = 8.94$ $p = 0.257$).

Table 2.3: Predicting Mobilization Stage Contact with Individual and Contextual Characteristics

	Nonbattleground Contact	Interaction	Battleground Effect
Commitment & Capacity Variables			
Weak Partisan	-0.123	-0.080	-0.203
	(0.135)	(0.232)	(-0.189)
Independent Leaner	-0.091	-0.074	-.164
	(0.146)	(0.251)	(.204)
Independent	-0.190	-0.109	-.299
	(0.225)	(0.396)	(.326)
Political Knowledge	0.015	0.075	.090
	(0.061)	(0.103)	(.083)
Educational Attainment	0.016	0.059	.075
	(0.028)	(0.048)	(.039)
Income	0.159*	-0.177*	-.018
	(0.036)	(0.062)	(.050)
Self-employed	-0.170	0.234	.064
	(0.183)	(0.299)	(.236)
Mobilization & Contextual Variables			
Registered Voter	0.832*	0.204	1.036*
	(0.281)	(0.450)	(.351)
Time at Residence	0.194*	-0.108	.085
	(0.062)	(0.104)	(.083)
Urban Resident	0.559*	-0.261	.298
	(0.165)	(0.279)	(.225)
Suburban Resident	0.147	0.205	.353
	(0.151)	(0.239)	(.185)
Native Son	-0.142	-0.440	-.582
	(0.191)	(0.400)	(.352)
Competitive Race	0.308*	-0.515	-.206
	(0.127)	(0.212)	(.170)
Competitive Primary	-0.036	0.201	.164
	(0.126)	(0.213)	(.171)

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Table 2.3 – Continued

	Nonbattleground Contact	Interaction	Battleground Effect
Other Controls			
Disabled	0.645*	-0.551	.093
	(0.298)	(0.562)	(.477)
Age	0.021*	0.012	.033*
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(.006)
Married	-0.147	0.563	.417*
	(0.126)	(0.219)	(.179)
Early Contact	1.596*	0.507	2.102*
	(0.331)	(0.840)	(.772)
Battleground State	0.536		
	(0.299)		
Constant	-0.846		
	(0.183)		
N. of cases	2413		
chi-squared	312.137		
pseudo R-squared	0.108		

* $p < 0.05$; Source: 2000 NAES panel data.

When we look at the commitment and capacity variables' effects in battleground states (column three), we see evidence of what theory leads us to believe we should see, substantial equity in recruitment. The power of the income predictor (the sole surviving key socioeconomic characteristic) is canceled in the interaction term (column 2); in fact it is slightly reversed. Jointly, none of these variables explain battleground state contacting ($\chi^2_7 = 2.72$ $p = 0.844$). This is precisely what should be seen in vote mobilization when every registered voter counts equally.

Figure 1.2 demonstrates the uniqueness of battleground states by plotting the change in predicted probability for changes in income categories for individuals in both types of states.[19] Figure 1.2 shows how income highly structures recruitment in non-battleground states. Moving from the lowest to the highest income category would increase an individual's contact probability by well over 200 percent. In contrast, those in the highest income categories in battleground states are slightly *less likely* to be contacted than those in the lower categories. In sum, the uncompetitive electoral systems results in inegalitarian contacting patterns while competitive elections result in egalitarian contacting patterns.

[19]The contribution of the covariates is set to the mean.



Figure 2.2: Relationship between Income and Mobilization Contacts in Competitive and Uncompetitive Conditions, in the NAES 2000 Panel

2.5 Discussion & Conclusion

When it comes to electoral mobilization, popular theory suggests elites will not exclusively recruit advantaged citizens. However, most research of recruitment in elections leave the impression of an overall strategy that does focus on the advantaged. This study argues these patterns emerge from the failure to recognize the conditional nature of recruitment strategies. Rather, campaigns recruit different types of individuals, at specific times within an election cycle, in order to achieve Disaggregating elections into two stages and controlling for competitiveness uncovers strategic behavior. We saw an elite, resource-oriented strategy in the early through end stage of the campaign. In the late phase however, the strategy turned to general mobilization in battleground states, but retained its resource orientation in nonbattleground states. These are the behaviors that correspond to a strategic theory of contacting. Simply, elites alter their electoral contacting strategies in elections to conditional goals.

Still, this blunt methodological approach to unpacking elite strategic behavior leaves many unanswered questions. For example, are there any fundamental differences between national campaigns and state campaigns; or differences between statewide and local campaigns in the contacting/mobilization strategies? It seems likely that the size and geographic dispersion of the constituency; the candidates' resources; citizen interest and involvement in an election; and the ambitions of the elites could all alter the nature, timing, and breadth of election contacting strategies.

At the same time, it is not entire clear at this point how these factors influence strategies. Unfortunately, up until now, most research assumed contacting was geared toward vote maximization efforts. Indeed, one of the big contributions of this paper is that it forces us to think of contacting as a strategic process that is tailored to achieve the long and short term goals of different campaigns, facing different strategic incentives. Future research will continue to test how variation in context influences

campaign strategies. Hopefully, we will eventually come to understand the strategic goals furthered by the large number of campaign contacts in uncompetitive elections.

Finally, despite the fact that this article does not answer all our questions, we can at least be somewhat comforted by the fact that inequalities in campaign contacting rates are not inevitable. Campaigns do contact a broad and representative segment of society; even if this only occurs when elections are competitive. In fact, making our elections competitive would likely substantially undermine the socio-economic bias in campaign contacting; at least in the vote mobilization stage.

2.6 Operationalization of Concepts

Table 2.4: Defintion of Select Independent Variables Used in the Analyses

Concept	Operationalization
Early Stage Contact	Individuals who reported being contacted in the pre-election survey and were interviewed prior October 31, 2000 were coded as early contacts.
Late Stage Contact	Individuals who only report a contact in the post-election survey, or reported a contact in the pre-election survey but were interviewed after October 30, 2000, were coded late contacts.
Income	A nine point income category scale created from respondents' self-reported income. The scale ranges from "Less than $10,000" to "$150,000 or more."
Educational Attainment	A nine point educational completion scale created from the respondent's self-reported of his/her educational experience. The scale ranges from "grade eight or lower" through "graduate or professional degree".
Political Knowledge	A five point scale created from the interviewer's grade assessment of each respondent's political knowledge. The scale ranges from "F" to "A."
Self-employed	Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported being self-employed.
Strength of Partisanship	Series of three indicator variables coded one for individuals who reported being partisan leaning independents, weak identifiers, and strong partisans. Pure independents are the omitted, baseline category.
Place of residence	Series of two indicator variables coded one for individuals who were coded as living in an urban and suburban area. Rural residents are the omitted, baseline group.
Length at residence	Continuous variable that tells how many years respondent lived at his/her current resident. The variable was logged prior to analysis.
Competitive Primary	Indicator variable coded one for individuals who lived in states with primaries held before Senator McCain conceded. These states include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Vermont, and Washington.

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Table 2.4: – Continued

Concept	Operationalization
Competitive Race	Indicator variable coded one for individuals who lived in states with competitive gubernatorial or senate races. States with competitive races include Florida, Delaware, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
Registered Voter	Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported being registered to vote or not having to register to vote.
Battleground State	Indicator variable coded one for Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, else zero.
Married	Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported being married.
Age	Variable that ranges from 18 to 97.
Disabled	Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported being disabled.
Native Son	Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported living in Texas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming.

Chapter 3

Campaign Contacts and The Formation of Party Identities

Given that party identification plays a central role in determining political preferences, attitudes, and behaviors, political parties have a vested interest in fully understanding how their behaviors alter party identities. The existing party identification literature suggests political parties and their operatives can only alter party-in-the-electorate through a few indirect mechanisms: strategic positioning on the issues and the effective performance of elected officials (Achen, 1992; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Carsey and Layman, 2006; Fiorina, 1981; Hetherington, 2001; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1989; Wawro, 2002). However, there is reason to believe party contacting in elections can influence party identification.

3.1 Campaign Influence on Partisanship

Given that party identification is viewed as relatively stable, the idea that something as simple as a party contact might influence party identification seems counterintuitive. Yet there is reason to suspect that party contacts may help to behaviorally reinforce party identities.

Converse and Markus's (1979) behavioral (vote) reinforcement theory of party identification argues that we create or alter the linkages between ourselves and a party when we vote for that party (see also Dobson and Douglas, 1975; Howell, 1980; LoTempio, 2002). Specifically, individuals who vote consistently for a party are more likely than individuals who inconsistently vote for that party to take on–or increase the strength of–attachments to that party.

At the core of this theory lies an important idea, that latent affect for a party does not fully translate into an identity without an intervening behavior; the vote. That is, two steps must be taken in order for an individual to effectively create or strengthen his/her bond with a party. First, the individual must turn out to vote. Second, the individual must consistently vote for the party (i.e., make few cross party votes). Only after taking both steps will the voter have successfully altered her affective/cognitive links to the parties; strengthening connections to one and possibly moving farther away from the other(s). In contrast, the nonvoter does not create or strengthen bonds to the parties, all other things being equal.

If we work through the logical implications of the theory, we see that any force that alters an individual's turnout decision or ballot choice also alters the likelihood that an individual will strengthen his/her bonds with the parties. Consequently, if contacting alters either the vote decision or the vote choice, then contacting will influence the formation of party identities.

Fortunately for parties, existing research recognizes that campaign contacts are explicitly aimed, and successful, at influencing both the likelihood of voting and the vote choice. First and foremost, abundant evidence exists to suggest get-out-the-vote operations influence the likelihood of voting (Bennion, 2005; Bergan et al., 2005; Caldeira, Clausen and Patterson, 1990; Gerber and Green, 2000*a*,*b*; Goldstein and Ridout, 2002; Holbrook and McClurg, 2005; Karp and Banducci, 2007; Karp, Bowler and Banducci,

2003; Nickerson, Friedrichs and King, 2006; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). However, research also shows contacting alters attitudes toward, and likelihood of voting for, the parties (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Lefkowitz, 2004; Vavreck, Spiliotes and Fowler, 2002). In sum, the empirical findings of the vote mobilization and maintenance literatures suggest that campaign contacts should alter party identities (albeit indirectly through the vote).

At the same time, the vote is not the only participatory opportunity campaigns offer. Campaign representatives also ask citizens to donate money, attend campaign events, place lawn signs, and so forth (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Kershaw, 2009; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). If an important mechanism for identity formation is behaviorally supporting a party, those who perform these other core campaign tasks should also develop stronger bonds to the parties.

3.2 Assessing Party Identity Change

Overall then, we have strong theoretical reason to believe campaign contacting brings with it multiple opportunities for individuals to behaviorally alter their party identities. To test whether Democratic and Republican contacting actually alters the strength and/or direction of individual party attachments, I turn to the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey general election panel and use self-reported contact with the presidential campaigns.[1]

The dependent variable used in the analysis is change in party identification.[2] To

[1]The lack of available data currently prohibit more detailed analyses of the potential pathways. Simply, most existing surveys do not ask pre-election and post-election party identification questions, and do not ask directional campaign participation questions let alone about depth of that participation.

[2]The substantive importance of contacting emerges using a variety of methods (ordinary least squares with lagged dependent variable, ordered logit, multinomial logit etc...) and model specifications.

create the dependent variable, I subtracted the post-election seven point party identification scale from the pre-election party identification scale. Those who scored zero maintained their identities. Given that higher values on the scale captured Republican identification, individuals who scored one or greater moved a step or more Republican. Those below zero moved Democratic.

To finalize the variable, I recoded the scores for individuals whose values exceeded one and negative one, to one and negative one. There are two different reasons for the simplification to three transition states (moved Republican, maintained their current identity, or moved Democratic). The first is that it is empirically rare, and theoretically unlikely, for individuals to move any more than one step up or down the scale over the course of a single election cycle.[3] The limited number of cases in some outcome categories undermines the ability to estimate ordered and/or generalized ordered models.[4] Second, without recoding, the best specified models would also violate the parallel regression assumptions and would be unestimatable. For example, a leaning independent cannot more than four places up or down the scale. Consequently, the leaning independent would always have a zero probability of moving five or more spots on the scale. If we include indicators for leaning independents, these indicators would perfectly predict failure.

Several considerations led to the decision to analyze change in party identification rather than predicting placement on the party identification scale. The first consideration is that the analysis of change approach controls for all of the unobserved, time invariant forces that affect placement on the party identification scale (Wawro, 2002).

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[3]The raw data in 2000 show that approximately sixty percent of the population in the 2000 NAES panel did not move at all, 26.9% moved one step, 7.2% moved two, 2.6% moved three, and the remainder moved four or more.

[4]Small numbers of observations in outcome categories cause convergence failures in gologit2.

The second reason is this method allowed me to test whether contacting had different effects for different types of partisans. Most prior research assumes that individuals located at each step on the party identification scale behave the same in response to the same external stimuli (e.g., performance in office). This is a questionable assumption. Since strong partisans have deep affective attachments, anchored in a wealth of past political experience, it is likely that strong partisans will be highly resistant to external stimuli (Burdein, Lodge and Taber, 2006; Kunda, 1990; Lodge and Taber, 2005; Morris et al., 2003; Redlawsk, 2002; Steenbergen and Lodge, 2003*b*; Taber and Lodge, 2006). In contrast, independents may be more "moveable" due to their lack of existing (or a balanced) affect for the parties. Unfortunately, the traditional method of using a respondent's lagged placement on the party identification scale to predict his/her current placement on the scale is not easily modified in a way that allows us to capture differences in contacting effects by partisan subgroups.[5] By analyzing change, I was able to include partisan indicators (and partisan indicators interacted with party contact variables) in order to test for conditional effects.[6] These tests indicated that contacts were less effective on strong partisans (available upon request). This fact plus several additional methodological considerations lead to me to employ a different dependent variable (and a separate analysis) for pure independents, independents who lean towards a party, and weak identifiers than I use for strong partisans.

[5]It is also likely that ordinary least squares on such an analysis would violate a number of assumptions including constant error variance.

[6]The failure to account for this varying resistance would bias estimates of the effectiveness of contacting as the wrong functional form would be specified.

3.3 Model & Analysis - Independents, Leaners, & Weak Identifiers

The following model is used to test whether contacting alters the identities of independents, leaners, and weak identifiers:

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y \;=\; & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Democratic\ Contact + \beta_2 Republican\ Contact \\
& + \beta_3 Clinton\ Favorability + \beta_4 Clinton\ Favorability\ Change \\
& + \beta_3 Net\ (Bush - Gore)\ Favorability \\
& + \beta_4 Net\ (Bush - Gore)\ Favorability\ Change \\
& + \beta_5 Leans\ Democratic + \beta_6 Leans\ Republican + \\
& + \beta_7 Weak\ Democrat + \beta_8 Weak\ Republican + \\
& + \beta_9 Gore\ Voter + \beta_{10} Bush\ Voter + \\
& + \beta_{11} Days\ To\ Election + \epsilon
\end{aligned}
$$

The key variables of interest in the model are the Democratic and Republican contact indicator variables.[7] It is worth noting that these contacts are not strictly with-in party contacts. In fact, the large number of cross-party contacts (e.g., Gore campaign contacting Republican voters) could result in a substantial number of individuals moving away from the party they identify with (see Table 3.1).

[7] An individual was coded one for the Democratic (Republican) contact variable if she reported that the Democratic (Republican) party contacted her.

Table 3.1: Democrat and Republican Contacts Among Partisans Subgroups in the 2000 Presidential Election

	Republican Contacts	Democrat Contacts
Strong Republican	25%	13%
Weak Republican	16%	11%
Leaning Republican	15%	13%
Independent	9%	9%
Leaning Democrat	12%	15%
Weak Democrat	11%	17%
Strong Democrat	12%	24%

Source: 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey, Election Panel
Note: The party identification scale was created using the pre-election battery.

Overall, the model pits contacting against a rigorous set of controls.[8] Most importantly, the model includes presidential vote choice predictors (i.e., voted for Bush or Gore). The inclusion of current vote-choice variables controls for many of factors that move partisanship (Franklin and Jackson, 1983). As such, it provides a strong check against finding significant contacting effects. As an added benefit, their inclusion also tests whether campaign contacts add any predictive power independent of the vote (i.e., contacts alter identities through other mechanisms beyond vote reinforcement).

Other model variables include: Clinton's pre-election favorability, change in Clinton's favorability, Bush's (Bush-Gore) net pre-election favorability, change in Bush's net favorability, partisan subgroup indicators, and a variable that captures the days-to-election. The Clinton favorability variable proxies for the respondents' assessments of the Democrat's performance in office (see (Cohen, 1999)).[9] The inclusion of the net favorability variable should account for multiple candidate characteristics (issues, character, and so forth) that might alter the respondents' party identities.[10] The inclusion of change in Clinton and net Bush favorability scores allows us to capture movement in individuals' assessments of these actors. The inclusion of the indicator variables for different types of partisans recognizes that different groups of partisans may have different probabilities of moving. Finally, because the NAES pre-election party identification questions were asked on different days prior to Election Day, the addition of the days-until-election variable will account for difference in campaign exposure (opportunity for events to alter identities).[11]

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[8]Given the novelty of the idea that campaign contacts can alter party identities, this should instill confidence in the results.

[9]The probabilities of moving Republican versus moving Democratic–and maintaining position on the scale versus moving Democratic–should decrease as Clinton favorability scores rise.

[10]In contrast, the probabilities of moving Republican versus moving Democratic should fall as Bush's net favorability increases.

[11]The earlier the in the election cycle respondents are asked to give their party identities, the more

Note that Brant Tests indicate that several of the variables (the partisan subgroup indicators and the days-to-election variable) violate the parallel regression assumption. Since the effects of the contacting variables–the variables of interest–do not vary by outcome category, I use a generalized ordered logit approach to test whether campaign contacts alter individuals' identities.[12] The generalized ordered logit falls between the ordered logit and multinomial logit in that it permits the researcher to allow the effects of select variables to vary with the different categories of the dependent variable.[13] This approach has benefit of easing the ability to interpret the effects of the variables that do not violate the parallel regression assumption–relative to multinomial logit.

Turning to the results, Table 3.2 shows that campaign contacts alter party identities. The significant coefficients for both Democratic and Republican contacts tell us that these contacts simultaneously draw independents', leaners', and weak identifiers' party identities toward the contacting party and away from the other party. Thus, a Democratic contact equally strengthened weak and leaning Democrats; pushed some independents into leaning toward the Democrats; and weakened some leaning and weak Republicans.[14]

For the sake of interpretation, it is important to reiterate that this movement is relative to the respondent's original identity status. For example, we can interpret

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likely they are to move from their initial placement.

[12]This model was estimated using gologit2 in Stata.

[13]In contrast, ordinal logit constrains the effect of the variables to be the same for each category in the dependent variables, while multinomial logit estimates a separate effect for all of the variables for each category of the dependent variable.

[14]Note that a separate analysis used interactions between the contacting variable and each party identification indicator in the model in order to test whether contacting was more successful in moving some classes of identifiers than others. The results suggest the party contacts were equally effective on independents, leaners, and weak identifiers. This analysis is available upon request. Additional analyses tested whether one party's contacts were more effective than the other. No significant differences in the degree and/or direction of the movement were discovered. These analyses are also available upon request.

Table 3.2 to mean that a weak Democrat, an independent, and a weak Republican all "moved" Republican, the same amount, in response to a Republican campaign contact. However, this movement has substantively different meaning for the each type of partisan. The weak Democrat became a leaning-independent, the independent became a Republican-leaner, and the weak-Republican became a strong Republican.

Table 3.2: Predicting Individuals Who Moved a step Up or Down the Seven Point Party Identification Scale During the 2000 Presidential Election

Beta	
Democratic Contact	-0.535*
	(0.090)
Republican Contact	0.390*
	(0.084)
Clinton Favorability, pre-election	-0.004*
	(0.002)
Change in Clinton Favorability	-0.002
	(0.002)
Candidate Favorability Difference, pre-election	0.009*
	(0.001)
Change in Candidate Favorability Difference	0.008*
	(0.001)
Bush Vote	0.756*
	(0.150)
Gore Vote	-0.707*
	(0.143)
Days to General Election	-0.001
	(0.001)
Independent - Leans Democratic	0.821*
	(0.151)
Independent - Leans Republican	-0.111
	(0.174)
Weak Democrat	1.014*
	(0.154)
Weak Republican	-0.303
	(0.163)

Continued on Next Page...

Table 3.2: – Continued

Gamma	
Days to General Election	0.002*
	(0.001)
Independent - Leans Democratic	-.472*
	(0.186)
Independent - Leans Republican	-.783*
	(0.192)
Weak Democrat	-.885*
	(0.188)
Weak Republican	-0.483*
	(0.182)
Cut-point 1	-1.249*
	(0.185)
Cut-point 2	1.138*
	(0.186)
N. of cases	3145
log-likelihood	-2862.190
Chi-squared	789.393

* $p < 0.05$ Note: Only includes independents, independent leaners, and weak partisans. The gamma coefficients tell us how much those variables violate proportional odds assumption.

In terms of magnitude, contacting appears to substantially influence movement in party identities (see Table 3.3). For example, an unmatched Democratic contact raised the probability that the average non-voting Independent stepped toward the Democrats from .258 (for those with no contacts) to .372.[15] Importantly, this contact also helped to maintain party identities by reducing the probability that the average independent stepped toward the Republicans from .252 to .165. While individually modest in size, the contact earns a .201 net advantage for the Democrats by moving individuals toward them and reducing the likelihood that they move Republican. Note that Republicans similarly advantaged themselves by their contacts. Their contacts net a .148 advantage. These results are doubly impressive after we recognize that the model includes variables that mediate the relationship between contacting and party identities.

Contacting effects are even more dramatic in concert with the vote. A party contact of an eventual party voter help raised the probability that the average independent would move toward the party above .5 (.546 for Democrats and .514 for Republicans). The party contact simultaneously pushed the likelihood that the independent would move toward the other party to close to zero.

It is noteworthy that these findings emerge despite the inclusion of the vote choice. This suggests that something inherent in the act of contacting is important for maintaining/altering party identities, above and beyond its influence over the decision to vote and vote choice.

The robustness of these findings was put to the test using the American National Election Study 2000-2004 panel survey. Despite a small number of cases, that analysis found comparable results using a similar method and model (see the analysis at the end of the chapter).

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[15]These probabilities were generated by setting the model predictors to their means.

Table 3.3: Predicted Probability that an Independent Moved a Step Democratic or Moved a Step Republican in 2000, by Contact and Vote Status

	Non-voter		Gore Vote		Bush Vote	
	Stepped Democratic	Stepped Republican	Stepped Democratic	Stepped Republican	Stepped Democratic	Stepped Republican
No Contact	0.258	0.252	0.413	0.142	0.140	0.417
Democrat Contact Only	0.372	0.165	0.546	0.089	0.218	0.296
Republican Contact Only	0.190	0.332	0.323	0.197	0.099	0.514
Contacted by Both	0.286	0.225	0.449	0.126	0.159	0.383

Note: Only includes independents, independent leaners, and weak partisans.

3.4 Model & Analysis - Strong Partisans

Unfortunately, the limited range of the party identification scale results in a situation where strong partisans can only be observed maintaining or weakening in their identities. Consequently, in order to jointly test whether contacts alter the identities of strong partisans, we need to recode the dependent variable from a three outcome variable (moved Democratic, maintained, or moved Republican) to a two outcome variable (weakened versus maintained partisanship).[16]

While the model retains all of the predictors used in the prior analysis, all of the variables in the model were recoded to capture either in-party reinforcing or out-party pulling forces. For instance, in-party (e.g., Democrats contacting Democratic voters) and out-party (e.g., Democrats contacting Republican voters) contacting variables replaced the Democratic and Republican contacting variables. Similarly, the continuous variables were recoded (folded) so that high values represent in-party reinforcing forces. This folding is necessary to account for the fact having certain attitudes implies different outcomes for Democrats and Republicans.

For example, high Clinton favorability should help predict Republicans who are likely to weaken, but will also predict Democrats who are likely to maintain. To make this measure in-party reinforcing, I simply subtracted Republicans' raw Clinton favorability scores from 100. The candidate favorability difference variable was created by subtracting Gore's favorability score from Bush's for Republicans and Bush's favorability from Gore's for Democrats. The full model includes in-party contact, out-party contact, in-party vote, out-party vote, folded Clinton favorability, folded change Clinton favorability, net in-party candidate favorability, change in net in-party candidate favorability, and days-to-election variables as well as an indicator for strong democrats.[17]

[16] A logit analysis is used to test whether campaign contacts altered the identities of strong partisans.

[17] The Clinton change variable was folded by multiplying the variable by -1 for Republicans. The

Turning to Table 3.4, we see that contacting does not alter the probability that a strong partisan will weaken. While the contacting coefficients are directionally consistent with theory, neither the in-party nor the out-party contacting variables are significant. Overall, this finding is not surprising. After all, strong affective attachment takes time, and a consistent field of forces, to develop. As a result, contacting should typically only have the smallest of affect on strong partisans' identities. In fact, the effects may be so small that they might not emerge as significant over the course of a single election. Strong partisans are just not as pliable as other types of identifiers. That in-party contacts emerge as significant in the multi-election analysis (ANES 2000-2004) at the end of the chapter, supports this slight-movement interpretation.

change in Bush net favorability was folded by multiplying the variable by -1 for Democrats.

Table 3.4: Predicting Strong Partisans Who Weakened in Attachment to Their Parties in 2000

	Weakened Attachment
In-party Contact	-0.141
	(0.140)
Out-party Contact	0.121
	(0.164)
Clinton Favorability, pre-election (folded)	-0.007*
	(0.003)
Change in Clinton Favorability (folded)	-0.003
	(0.004)
Candidate Favorability Difference, pre-election (folded)	-0.013*
	(0.003)
Change in Candidate Favorability Difference (folded)	-0.012*
	(0.002)
In-party Vote	-0.681
	(0.399)
Out-party Vote	0.338
	(0.499)
Days to General Election	0.001
	(0.001)
Strong Democrat	-0.135
	(0.133)
Constant	0.313
	(0.471)
N. of cases	1947
log-likelihood	-816.182
chi-squared	161.784

* $p < 0.05$

3.5 Discussion & Conclusion

Existing research on party identification only allows the parties to have a very indirect influence on the development of party identities. Combined, the mobilization and behavioral reinforcement literatures suggest this view is wrong. Rather, parties actively sponsor opportunities for behavioral reinforcement of identities.

The results of this study are consistent with this view, as unmatched campaign contacts appear to move independents, leaners, and weak partisans closer toward the contacting parties and away from other party. This is a win-win for the contacting party. To be sure, parties do not have unlimited power to alter party identities. The identities of strong partisans do not appear to respond to campaign contacts; at least over the course of a single election.

Still, that this study finds contacting effects that are robust in the face of a conservative model suggests that campaign-citizen interactions play a role in party identification. The next step is to move beyond the limitations of self reported campaign contacts and systematically vary and track how participation feeds into the formation of party identities.

3.6 Contacts and Party Identity Formation Between 2000 and 2004

To test the robustness of the single election findings, I apply the same methodological approach used in the single election analyses to the 2000-2004 American National Election Study panel survey.[18] The dependent variable remains change in party identification. However, the change being measured is the change in party identification from before the 2000 general election to after the 2004 general election. This approach allows us the best opportunity to explore whether contacting has a measureable impact on strong partisans.

The theoretical model for this analysis is very similar to the model used in the single election analysis. However, I altered the coding of several variables to suit the survey's panel design.

Rather than a series of dichotomous indicators, these analyses use summary indexes to handle repeated measures. Most importantly, a cumulative contacting index is made by taking the difference between the number of Republican and Democratic contacts over the period. Similarly, the analyses uses the difference between the total number of all Republican and Democratic votes an individual made.[19] Next, party performance is controlled by a variable that captures each individual's total George Bush feeling thermometer score in 2000, and by a variable for change in this score between 2000 and 2004. Candidate evaluations are controlled by Bush's net feeling thermometer advantage in 2000–which is the difference between Bush's and Gore's feeling thermometer

[18]To the best of my knowledge, the 2000-2004 panel survey is the only survey that lets us test contacting effects over the course of multiple elections. All the others fail to ask detailed contacting questions and/or to provide both pre-election and a post-election party identification question batteries.

[19]The vote indices includes votes for the House of Representatives, the Senate, and President.

scores–as well as the change between Bush's net feeling thermometer advantage in 2000 and his advantage over Kerry in 2004. Finally, the model also includes indicators for the different types of partisans.

Once again, this study tests for contacting effects on strong partisans separate from independents, leaners, and weak identifiers. Like before, the variables in the strong partisan model were recoded (folded) to represent in-party reinforcing forces in the strong partisan analysis. For example, the contacting index was created by subtracting the number out-party contact from the number of in-party contacts. The voting index was created by subtracting the number of out-party votes from in-party votes.[20]

Despite the paucity of cases, the analysis in Table 3.5 recreate the basic finding of single-election analysis, that party contacts move independents, leaners, and weak identifiers toward the contacting parties. Looking at the predicted probabilities (see Table 3.6), we see the importance of contacting for altering party identification over multiple elections. The average independent who received two unmatched Democratic contacts would be expected to have a .356 probability of moving toward the Democrats.[21] In contrast, three unmatched Republican contacts increased the probability that the average individual moved Republican by .555.

However, the results of the analysis of strong partisans is not identical to the single election strong partisan analysis. The likelihood that a strong partisan will maintain his strong affective attachment to his preferred party rises with unmatched in-party contacts (see Tables 3.7 and 3.8).

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[20]To fold Bush's feeling thermometer I subtracted the Democrats' Bush favorability scores from 100. The folded candidate favorability difference variable was created by subtracting Gore's feeling thermometer score from Bush's for Republicans and Bush's thermometer from Gore's for Democrats. The Bush thermometer change variable was folded by multiplying the variable by -1 for Democrats. The change in Bush feeling thermometer advantage was folded by multiplying the variable by -1 for Democrats.

[21]In this subsample no individual received three unmatched Democratic contacts.

Table 3.5: Predicting Individuals Who Moved a step Up or Down the Seven Point Party Identification Scale Between the 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections

Beta	
Party Contacts Index	0.306*
	(0.097)
Bush Feeling Thermometer, 2000	0.006
	(0.009)
Change in Bush Feeling Thermometer, 2000-04	0.004
	(0.007)
Candidate Feeling Thermometers Differences, 2000	0.014*
	(0.006)
Change in Candidate Feeling Thermometers Differences, 2000-04	0.013*
	(0.005)
Vote History	0.132*
	(0.035)
Independent - Leans Democratic	0.705
	(0.365)
Independent - Leans Republican	-0.613
	(0.393)
Weak Democrat	0.341
	(0.365)
Weak Republican	-0.998*
	(0.324)
Gamma	
Independent - Leans Democratic	-0.799*
	(0.371)
Independent - Leans Republican	-0.542
	(0.363)
Weak Democrat	-.807*
	(0.394)
Cut-point 1	-0.723
	(0.528)
Cut-point 2	1.180*
	(0.526)
N. of cases	479
log-likelihood	-444.551
chi-squared	143.157

* $p < 0.05$. Note: Only includes independents, independent leaners, and weak partisans. The gamma coefficients tell us how much those variables violate proportional odds assumption.

Table 3.6: Predicted Probability that an Independent Moved a Step Democratic or Moved a Step Republican between 2000 and 2004, by Number of Contacts

	Non-voter	
	Stepped Democratic	Stepped Republican
Two Unmatched Democratic Contacts	0.356	0.212
One Unmatched Democratic Contact	0.290	0.268
No Unmatched Contacts	0.231	0.332
One Unmatched Republican Contact	0.181	0.403
Two Unmatched Republican Contacts	0.140	0.478
Three Unmatched Republican Contacts	0.107	0.555

Source: National Election Study, 2000 to 2004 Panel

Table 3.7: Predicting Strong Partisans Who Weakened in Attachment to Their Parties Between 2000 and 2004

Party Contacts (folded)	-0.391*
	(0.194)
Candidate Feeling Thermometers Differences, 2000 (folded)	-0.041*
	(0.014)
Change in Candidate Feeling Thermometers Differences, 2000-04 (folded)	-0.031*
	(0.010)
Bush Feeling Thermometer, 2000 (folded)	0.004
	(0.017)
Change in Bush Feeling Thermometer, 2000-04 (folded)	0.017
	(0.015)
Vote History (folded)	-0.069
	(0.077)
Strong Democrat	-0.018
	(0.464)
Constant	0.379
	(1.051)
N. of cases	262
log-likelihood	-107.750
chi-squared	30.203

* $p < 0.05$ one-tailed test. Source: National Election Study, 2000-2002-2004 Election Panel.

Table 3.8: Predicted Probability that a Non-voting Strong Partisan Weakened Identity between 2000 and 2004, by Number of Contacts

Three Unmatched Out-party Contacts	0.499
Two Unmatched Out-party Contacts	0.403
One Unmatched In-party Contact	0.313
No Unmatched Contacts	0.236
One Unmatched In-party Contact	0.173
Two Unmatched In-party Contacts	0.124
Three Unmatched In-party Contacts	0.087

Source: National Election Study, 2000-2002-2004 Election Panel

Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
STATE LEVEL VARIABLES					
State Percent White	39	0.8	0.1	0.4	1.0
State Opinion Liberalism	39	-0.1	0.1	-0.3	0.0
Adjusted State Per-Capita Income	39	26506	2578	21825	33383
% less than High School Degree	39	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.4
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 17	39	0.154	0.366	0	1
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 18	39	0.359	0.486	0	1
Court found Finance System Unconstitutional	39	0.308	0.468	0	1
SCHOOL DISTRICT LEVEL VARIABLES					
Districts with Minimum Black & White Populations					
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income - Black	1701	10.1	0.3	9.0	11.2
Educational Achievement - Black	1701	0.140	0.121	0	1
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995 - Black	1701	0.178	0.123	0	1
% Single-parent Households - Black	1701	-0.002	0.112	-0.613	0.497
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income - White	1701	10.4	0.2	9.7	11.5
Educational Achievement - White	1701	0.228	0.146	0	0.866
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995 - White	1701	0.158	0.079	0.006	0.681
% Single-parent Households - White	1701	0.023	0.065	-0.184	0.440
School District Percent White	1701	0.685	0.172	0.098	0.962
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch	1701	0.436	0.203	0.005	0.952
Average Instructional Spending	1701	4765	1066	2488	10783
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log)	1701	8.8	1.1	6.5	13.9
% Rural	1701	0.272	0.327	0	1
Districts with Minimum White Population					
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income - White	8228	10.4	0.2	9.7	12.0
Educational Achievement - White	8228	0.203	0.133	0	0.914
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995 - White	8228	0.157	0.075	0	0.681
% Single-parent Households - White	8228	0.000	0.061	-0.307	0.440
School District Percent White	8228	0.863	0.160	0.024	1.000
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch	8228	0.330	0.187	0.000	1.000

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Table 3.8: – Continued

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
SCHOOL DISTRICT LEVEL VARIABLES					
Districts with Minimum White Population					
Average Instructional Spending	8228	5073	1174	2488	12093
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log)	8228	7.6	1.1	4.5	13.9
% Rural	8228	0.537	0.397	0	1
All School Districts					
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income - All Public School Students	9506	10.4	0.2	9.3	12.0
Educational Achievement - All Public School Students	9506	0.189	0.126	0	0.907
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995 - All Public School Students	9506	0.171	0.076	0	0.833
% Single-parent Households - All Public School Students	9506	-0.002	0.070	-0.253	0.488
School District Percent White	9506	0.843	0.191	0.006	1.000
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch	9506	0.360	0.205	0.000	1.000
Average Instructional Spending	9506	5223	1352	2488	30830
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log)	9506	7.4	1.2	3.8	13.9
% Rural	9506	0.582	0.402	0	1

Chapter 4

A Reexamination of the Role of Statewide Racial Diversity on Grade Promotion

A good education provides the foundation for a strong economy, long lives, an informed citizenry, and is generally central to modern life. As such, societies have a vested interest in identifying those programs and policies that boost educational attainment. Unfortunately, the United States has done a poor job ensuring minority and socio-economically disadvantaged students receive an education comparable to that of their more advantaged classmates. This fact has driven education researchers to expend considerable effort looking for programs that help these disadvantaged students excel academically.

Given that localities and states disproportionately control education policy in the United States, educational attainment by state has also drawn considerable interest from political scientists (e.g., Hero & Tolbert 1996; Hero 1998; Hero 2007). This research identified a persistent troubling pattern; states with large African-American populations tend to have worse educational outcomes than states with proportionately

fewer African-Americans. These researchers offer The Racial Diversity Theory of State Politics, which argues that this association is largely rooted in statewide discrimination. A multitude of analyses appear to support their theory.

However, this literature appears to have developed largely independently of the education outcomes literature, and without appropriate recognition of that literature's central insights–that parental resources and substate forces drive outcomes. This paper exploits both traditions in an effort to rigorously retest the Racial Diversity Theory of State Politics and to provide fuller understanding of those forces that drive interstate and intrastate differences in education outcomes of all students.

4.1 Background

The most systematic attempt to understand the origins of the positive correlation between state diversity and poor education outcomes comes from Racial Diversity Theory of state politics (Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Hero, 1998, 2003*b*,*a*, 2007). This theory argues this association emerges as a result of discriminatory state level policy decisions, with discrimination increasing as state diversity increases. The estimated effects are substantial, and this research concludes that racial diversity is the dominant explanation for interstate differences in politics, policy, and outcomes; even relative to socioeconomic explanations.

> "However, the impacts of the socioeconomic variables are not always especially strong and not always consistent with the expected direction of impact...In short, social diversity holds up rather well in explaining important state political questions relative to the socioeconomic interpretation." (Hero 1998, p.145-146)

The central assumption behind this theory is the idea that policy related outcomes for black students are worse in more diverse states. For those interested in maximizing

the graduation rate for black students, the conclusion to be drawn from this research is unmistakable: black students are substantively better off in less diverse states than they are in more diverse states.

As important as Hero and Tolbert's (1996) research is for refocusing our attention to the role discrimination plays in interstate differences in policy related outcomes, there is reason to believe that this research overestimates the role state level discrimination plays in education outcomes. Importantly, this prior research does not effectively account for those forces education researchers tell us drive education outcomes.

In contrast to political science's focus on interstate differences in statewide characteristics in explaining policy and outcomes, education scholars rarely attempt to systematically explain interstate differences using statewide characteristics. When education researchers do explore state level forces, the goal is typically to identify specific policy effects. In any event, the state level forces rarely help to explain education outcomes. Rather, the education literature concludes students' background characteristics and local dynamics largely drive education outcomes. Overall, this literature tells us that the primary determinants of educational attainment include parental socioeconomic status (Burris, Heubert and Levin, 2006; Hedges and Nowell, 1999; Skiba et al., 2005; Sirin, 2005; Scott, Bailey and Kienzi, 2006), social network resources (Coleman and Hoffer, 1987; Coleman, 1988; Ralph B. McNeal, 1999, 2001), and peer-effects/concentrated poverty (Coleman, 1966; Hanushek et al., 2003; Wilson, 1987). Important secondary explanations include: local capacity and/or commitment to education (e.g., instructional spending (Balfanz and Legters, 2004)) and the size of educational institutions (Englehart, 2007; Greene and Winters, 2005; Konstantopoulo, 2006; Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Walberg, 1989).

Because the models used in prior research on racial diversity did not control for family characteristics or local forces, we cannot be sure statewide racial diversity, or for

that matter, any other state level characteristics (education, economics, and ideology) really shape those factors that influence school districts, which in turn alter individual students' education outcomes. While racial diversity may influence outcomes via state policy, it also might well be the case that individual resources, local socioeconomic context, and other local factors shape outcomes with relatively little influence from state actors. After all, the inertia of poverty and local discretion both have the potential to insulate children from any benefits emanating from state politics.

Still, this is not the only reason to be critical of the idea that the positive correlation between statewide racial diversity and poor education outcomes stems primarily from racial discrimination. Namely, in the post Jim Crow Era, representation and political power tend to grow with increased population size and concentration. That is, as groups expand, they should become better able to have their wants and needs met by the political systems at all levels (England and Meier, 1984; England, Meier and Robinson, 1985; Meier, 1984; Meier and Bohte, 2001; Meier et al., 2006, 2005; Jr., England and Meier, 1989; Selden, 1997). Within a representational framework, we would expect to see a pattern that directly contradicts that proposed by Hero (1998); diversity should be associated with positive outcomes. In effect, policy related outcomes should reflect these competing forces. However, if representational power and the willingness of whites to set up discriminatory barriers simultaneously increase with diversity, it is possible that these two normal political tendencies are thwarted or at least ameliorated.

In sum, education outcomes are driven by a complex field of forces. By applying better methods to a more fully specified model, we will be able to more accurately assess the role of both state and local factors on outcomes.

This study uses a hierarchical modeling approach that allows state diversity and other state level explanations to influence student outcomes while simultaneously accounting for local forces and student characteristics. I develop and analyze a set of

models that predict school district-level grade advancement.[1] As more and better data become available, these analyses will be expanded to the individual level.

The dependent variable used in this study is a migration adjusted Cumulative Promotion Index (CPI).[2] Each school district's CPI score is calculated by multiplying the probabilities that the school districts' high school students advance from grade to grade in sequential years and that seniors earn regular diplomas.[3] While the migration adjustments add complexity, a CPI score is the probability a student in the school district will earn a regular diploma from a school district in four years (Swanson, 2003). The grade promotion score (probability) for each district are calculated using the following formula:

$$
\begin{aligned}
CPI \;=\; & \left[\frac{RegularDiploma_{(1999+2000+2001)}}{Grade\ 12_{1999+2000+2001}}\right] \\
& * \left[\frac{Grade\ 12_{(2000+2001+2002)} - (Grade\ 11_{(1999+2000+2001)} * Migration\ Percent)}{Grade\ 11_{(1999+2000+2001)}}\right] \\
& * \left[\frac{Grade\ 11_{(2000+2001+2002)} - (Grade\ 10_{(1999+2000+2001)} * Migration\ Percent)}{Grade\ 10_{(1999+2000+2001)}}\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

[1]Unfortunately, the lack of student-level graduation data prohibits disaggregated, inter-state comparisons at the student level. The lack of school-level diploma and demographic data as well as the dual problems of intra-district transfers and school consolidations lead to the choice of school district as the unit of analysis.

[2]School district grade promotion probabilities (CPI scores) are adjusted using the average annual percent change in the school districts overall, black, or white populations between 1995 to 2000. The migration information for each school district comes from 2000 census data disaggregated to the county level. The formula for net migration percentages change is $\frac{(\frac{International\ Migration\ +\ Net\ Migration\ Since\ 1995}{5})}{Population\ in\ 2000\ -\ International\ Migration\ -\ Net\ Migration\ Since\ 1995}$. Adjusting for migration is crucial for estimating accurate graduation statistics. Immigration and emigration will result in grade promotion probabilities that are artificially high and low, respectively.

[3]Note that some school districts had unaccounted for growth from year to year (e.g., there were more students in grade 10 than in grade 9 the year before). Consequently, a few school districts had grade-to-grade promotion values above one (perfect promotion). Those with values above 1.45 are excluded from the model while the remainder was recoded to one prior to multiplying all grade-to-grade promotion ratios. This is done to keep the grade promotion measure from taking on wildly unrealistic values when population numbers were small. Different grade promotion value cutoffs and full exclusion of these school districts do not alter substantive conclusions.

$$* \left[\frac{Grade\ 10_{(2000+2001+2002)} - (Grade\ 9_{(1999+2000+2001)} * Migration\ Percent)}{Grade\ 9_{(1999+2000+2001)}} \right]$$

I use the CPI because the traditional graduation and dropout rates that most states have reported are "grossly inaccurate (Orfield et al., 2004)".[4] This inaccuracy occurs because states define dropouts differently, do not always report dropouts, do not uniformly collect dropout data across school districts, and do not even report dropouts for all grades (Orfield et al., 2004; Swanson, 2004). In contrast, the CPI incorporates more consistently reported data and has the additional virtue of covering more students and more states.[5]

4.2 Methods & Model

This study uses a two level hierarchical model to predict the grade promotion probabilities. Level one includes the school district-level summary measures of the students' background characteristics and other local forces. Level two contains statewide racial diversity, opinion liberalism, and other important state level covariates. The full model is:

Level One (School District):

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ij} &= \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} Local\ Diversity_{ij} + \beta_{2j} Average\ Adjusted\ Income\_ij \\ &\quad + \beta_{3j}\%\ Single\ Parent\_ij + \beta_{4j}\%\ College\ or\ More\_ij \\ &\quad + \beta_{5j}\%\ Outside\ County\ in\ 1995\_ij + \beta_{6j}\%\ Free\ \&\ Reduced\ Lunch_{ij} + \end{aligned}$$

[4]School enrollment and diploma data come from the Department of Education's Common Core of Data (CCD) program. CCD fiscal and non-fiscal data are for all public schools and public school districts in the United States. Missing diploma data as well as questionable dropout data, prohibits the calculation of traditional graduation rates at the school district-level.

[5]The general lack of diploma data outside these years limits the analyses to these years.

$$+\beta_{7j} Average\ Student\ Count\ (logged)_{ij}$$

$$+\beta_{8j} Per-pupil\ Instructional\ Spending_{ij}$$

$$+\beta_{9j} \%Rural_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

Level Two (State):

$$\begin{aligned}
\beta_{0j} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} State\ Diversity_j + \gamma_{02} Finance\ System\ Unconstitutional_j \\
&+\gamma_{03} Adjusted\ GSP\ Per\ Capita_j + \gamma_{04} State\ Educational\ Attainment_j \\
&+\gamma_{05} State\ Opinion\ Liberalism_j + \gamma_{06} Age\ 17\ Mandatory\ Enrollment_j + U_{0j} \\
&\gamma_{07} Age\ 17\ Mandatory\ Enrollment_j + U_{0j}
\end{aligned}$$

The variables in level one capture education research's key explanatory forces. Importantly, this includes summary measures of the background characteristics of the students in the public schools. Parents' average adjusted per capita income and educational attainment capture the socioeconomic background of district students.[6] Similarly, residential mobility and proportion single parent household variables account for variation in social network resources.[7] The other local-level variables include: the percent of students free or reduced price lunch eligible (concentrated poverty), per-pupil instructional spending, average number of students in the school district (logged), percent rural, and local diversity (the percentage of the school district community that

[6]All state and school district spending and income variables were adjusted with the Department of Education's Comparable Wage Indices (CWI) in order to enhance interstate comparisons of spending and income patterns (Taylor et al., 2007). The CWI adjusts for regional variation in income. Additionally, the subpopulation income measures were logged to account for a positive, but diminishing return relationship between income and grade promotion.

[7]Prior to inclusion, the single parent household measures were regressed on the appropriate subpopulation education attainment and per capita income variables to purge the measures of the strong association with socioeconomic resources. The residual from this regression was used to capture non-socioeconomic effects of family type on graduation.

is white). Note that controlling for concentrated poverty is essential because this can proxy for a community's ability to support high quality education and because high concentrations of disadvantaged students has been shown to lead to worse educational outcomes; these negative effects are called peer-effects (Sund, 2009; Mashburn et al., 2009). It is not important for this study's purposes to decipher which force is at work should this variable achieve significance. Rather, it is important to attempt to fully account for socioeconomic effects. Please see more detailed variable descriptions in Table 4.7 at the end of the chapter.

At the state level, I test the importance of statewide racial diversity for grade promotion using the percentage of each state's population that is white (not Hispanic) in 2000. Note that this paper defines both state and school district diversity in this manner because traditional diversity indices like the one used by Hero and Tolbert (1996) assign the same scores to comparable majority black and majority white districts. This is problematic because the theory does not describe conditions that emerge under racial homogeneity per se. Rather, the theory describes dynamics associated with a population moving from homogeneous white to diverse. This measure allows us to look for the expected patterns at both levels, while maintaining definitional consistency.[8] The model also includes the classic political science state level explanatory variables: economic resources, educational attainment, and citizen opinion liberalism (Erikson, Wright and McIver, 1993).[9]

Finally, the model includes indicators for states that had compulsory attendance requirements to age 17 or 18; and an indicator for states where court cases (as late as 1993)

[8]The use of the Hero and Tolbert (1996) index for the state does not lead to substantively different conclusion (analysis available on request).

[9]I use percentage of the state population with less than a high school degree in order to slightly reduce collinearity with school district level educational attainment.

found the states' education finance systems unconstitutional. Raising mandatory attendance to age 18 (Bridgeland, DiIulio and Streeter, 2007) and education equity/adequacy oriented system reforms are two popular proposed solutions for state educational attainment woes. Yet, to my knowledge, no peer-reviewed study systematically assesses the effects of adequacy reforms on interstate differences in grade promotion.[10] The descriptive statistics of these variables are found in Table 4.1.

[10]Note that this study follows Hero (2007) and omits white ethnic diversity as predictor. This is in part because of the ethnic diversity variables usefulness as a theoretical/operational construct, but also because it strongly correlates with ideology and socioeconomic explanations. Similarly, the close association between state diversity and state political culture noted by Hero (1998) leads me to exclude this explanation from the analyses.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
STATE LEVEL VARIABLES					
State Percent White	39	0.8	0.1	0.4	1.0
State Opinion Liberalism	39	-0.1	0.1	-0.3	0.0
Adjusted State Per-Capita Income	39	26506	2578	21825	33383
% less than High School Degree	39	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.4
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 17	39	0.154	0.366	0	1
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 18	39	0.359	0.486	0	1
Court found Finance System Unconstitutional	39	0.308	0.468	0	1
SCHOOL DISTRICT LEVEL VARIABLES					
Districts with Minimum Black & White Populations					
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income - Black	1701	10.1	0.3	9.0	11.2
Educational Achievement - Black	1701	0.140	0.121	0	1
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995 - Black	1701	0.178	0.123	0	1
% Single-parent Households - Black	1701	-0.002	0.112	-0.613	0.497
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income - White	1701	10.4	0.2	9.7	11.5
Educational Achievement - White	1701	0.228	0.146	0	0.866
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995 - White	1701	0.158	0.079	0.006	0.681
% Single-parent Households - White	1701	0.023	0.065	-0.184	0.440
School District Percent White	1701	0.685	0.172	0.098	0.962
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch	1701	0.436	0.203	0.005	0.952
Average Instructional Spending	1701	4765	1066	2488	10783
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log)	1701	8.8	1.1	6.5	13.9
% Rural	1701	0.272	0.327	0	1

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Table 4.1: – Continued

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
SCHOOL DISTRICT LEVEL VARIABLES					
Districts with Minimum White Population					
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income - White	8228	10.4	0.2	9.7	12.0
Educational Achievement - White	8228	0.203	0.133	0	0.914
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995 - White	8228	0.157	0.075	0	0.681
% Single-parent Households - White	8228	0.000	0.061	-0.307	0.440
School District Percent White	8228	0.863	0.160	0.024	1.000
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch	8228	0.330	0.187	0.000	1.000
Average Instructional Spending	8228	5073	1174	2488	12093
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log)	8228	7.6	1.1	4.5	13.9
% Rural	8228	0.537	0.397	0	1
All School Districts					
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income - All Public School Students	9506	10.4	0.2	9.3	12.0
Educational Achievement - All Public School Students	9506	0.189	0.126	0	0.907
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995 - All Public School Students	9506	0.171	0.076	0	0.833
% Single-parent Households - All Public School Students	9506	-0.002	0.070	-0.253	0.488
School District Percent White	9506	0.843	0.191	0.006	1.000
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch	9506	0.360	0.205	0.000	1.000
Average Instructional Spending	9506	5223	1352	2488	30830
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log)	9506	7.4	1.2	3.8	13.9
% Rural	9506	0.582	0.402	0	1

In order to get a fuller understanding of the forces that drive grade advancement, I analyze the model for all students and then by race. Even though we are most interested in race specific hypotheses tied to the Racial Diversity Theory of state politics, I analyze a model of all students in order to test whether the basic pattern identified in earlier research reemerges in these analyses.

The first analyses of race specific grade promotion probabilities examines school districts that contained at least twenty black students in each year included in the analyses (1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002).[11] The next two analyses of race specific grade promotion probabilities use an identical subset of school districts; those that contain at least twenty white and twenty black students. The second analysis predicts black grade promotion. The third analysis predicts white grade promotion probabilities in these districts in order to eliminate selection bias. The final analysis reruns the white grade promotion model after dropping the minimum twenty black student requirement.

As a methodological note, it is relevant to emphasize that the use of multilevel modeling accounts for correlation among observations in "nested" data (e.g., school districts within states). This correlation biases standard errors and can lead to an increased likelihood of finding significance if not properly controlled.[12] This approach also allows us to assess the amount of inter-state variance explained by the model.

---

[11]Limiting the analyses using the 20 student cut-off drastically reduces the number of school districts analyzed. Nationwide there are 4,939 school districts in 43 states that had at least one black student in the ninth grade. Of these, 2670 had more than 10, only 2082 had 20 or more black students; and 1886 also had at least 20 white students. The removal disproportionately affected the racially homogeneous states. Only a fraction of the school districts that contain any black students remained. Montana, North Dakota, and Vermont drop out of these analyses altogether. Note that school districts in Arizona and South Carolina were excluded because the school districts in the state fail to accurately report diploma data. However, this weak limiting condition is necessary in order to establish relatively stable estimates of school district outcomes for the racial subpopulations. Unfortunately, this leaves a gap in our understanding of how students achieve when present in very small numbers. Still, these analyses cover approximately 87 percent of all known white students and 80 percent of black students, nationwide. Coverage of the states analyzed is even better at approximately 96 percent coverage for whites and 85 percent for blacks.

[12]The model is estimated using the xtmixed command in Stata.

Furthermore, multilevel models allow us to simultaneously estimate the effect of district and state level forces. In fact, this approach allows us to estimate the proportion of state level variance that the model explains.

4.3 Analysis of All Students' Grade Promotion

By first analyzing the grade promotion probabilities for all students, we get a sense of how well racial diversity and other factors in the model predict grade advancement. Overall, the results appear to support racial diversity's earlier findings, as grade promotion probabilities rise with increases in the proportion of the state population that is white (see Table 4.2). Further, the effects are consequential. A ten percent increase in a state's white population associates with .024 higher school district level grade promotion probabilities.

At the same time, it seems prior research overstates the degree to which racial diversity drives grade advancement. Statewide racial composition's effect is comparable to those of the individual background characteristic, local contextual, and policy effects.

Table 4.2: Random Intercept Model of Factors Predicting the School District's Overall Cumulative Promotion Scores, 1999 to 2002

	All Students
School District-level	
Parental Adjusted Per-capita Income (log)	0.068*
	(0.009)
Parental Educational Achievement	0.206*
	(0.015)
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995	-0.183*
	(0.015)
% Single-parent Households	-0.324*
	(0.018)
School District Percent White	0.049*
	(0.009)
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch	-0.139*
	(0.011)
Instructional Spending Per-Pupil	-0.000
	(0.000)
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log)	-0.021*
	(0.001)
% Rural	-0.007
	(0.004)
State-level	
State Percent White	0.237*
	(0.063)
State Opinion Liberalism	0.019
	(0.118)
Adjusted State Per Capita Income	-0.000
	(0.000)
% less than High School Degree	-0.286
	(0.189)
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 17	0.026
	(0.020)
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 18	0.041*
	(0.018)
Court found Finance System Unconstitutional	0.039*
	(0.016)

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Table 4.2: – Continued

	All Students
Constant	0.165
	(0.173)
Intercept Standard Deviation	0.042*
	(0.005)
Level-1 Residual Standard Deviation	0.096*
	(0.001)
N. of cases	9506
log-likelihood	8731.421
chi-squared	4708.518

* Significant at 0.05, two-tailed test.

For instance, equity/adequacy lawsuits appear to have raised the school district level, all student grade promotion probabilities by .039 points. Note that these lawsuits spawned far more than improving financial equity. Most undertook a series of expansive system reforms (e.g., the Kentucky Education Reform Act and Arkansas' Quality Education Act) aimed at achieving better education outcomes. Since each state implemented a unique blend of services in response to their particular contextual needs, unpacking the particular bundle of policies that lead to better grade promotion will await future research. However, it is worth noting that, many of these states instituted comprehensive school reform programs as well as took major steps forward in systematically assessing and tracking student performance (Murray, Evans and Schwab, 1998). In fact, some of these states hold schools and districts directly accountable for failing to meet basic standards (e.g., Kentucky, South Carolina, New Jersey, and Massachusetts)(Fine, King and Janow 2003; Kentucky Department of Education 2000). Standard-based reform and comprehensive school reform have been linked to better achievement test performance (Borman et al., 2003; Swanson and Stevenson, 2002).

Perhaps surprising, state compulsory attendance laws had an even greater impact on grade promotion probabilities. States that had compulsory attendance to age 18 raised their state's grade promotion probabilities by .041. To achieve a comparable effect via state racial diversity, the state would have to become 17.3% whiter; approaching two standard deviations.

While the results are consistent with Racial Diversity Theory, other traditional explanations do not fare as well. Statewide education, income, and opinion liberalism do not systematically relate to school district-level grade promotion probabilities. These variables are individually and jointly ($\chi^2_3 = 2.49\ p = .477$) non-significant. This pattern reemerges in most of the subsequent analyses.

Still, the significance of parental resources and local forces means that simply focusing on state level variables when trying to explain education outcomes will lead to biased estimates and potentially incorrect inferences. Most importantly, we see that political scientists need to account for parental resources. The district level measures of the parents' wealth, education, mobility, and marital status all help to explain student outcomes, with effects similar to racial diversity's effects. When combined with the significance of the free and reduced price lunch variable, these results affirm the central role resources play in determining education outcomes.

Finally, grade promotion also depends on the school districts' racial contexts. The likelihood of students graduating on time rises somewhat with the whiteness of the school district. Although, school district racial context effects pale in comparison to those of parental resources. A ten percentage increase in a school district's white population would only increase the district's grade promotion probability by .004 points.

Overall, these results partly reaffirm prior political science research findings on the determinants of education outcomes. However, one should not draw final conclusions from this analysis alone as this analysis does not tell us if these forces affect black and white outcomes equally. Most importantly, we cannot tell if the association between high levels of diversity and poor outcome is in fact driven by black outcomes dropping with increasing diversity–as Racial Diversity Theory suggests. Consequently, I disaggregate and analyze the race specific grade promotion probabilities. I begin with an analysis of black grade advancement.

4.4 Black Students Grade Promotion Analysis

Analysis of black grade promotion probabilities provides a critical test of the racial diversity thesis. If increases in statewide racial diversity lead to increases in state level racially discriminatory policies, minority education outcomes should be worse in diverse

states than in homogeneous white states.

It turns out racial diversity provides little help in understanding school district level black grade promotion probabilities in this period of time. The results in the first column of Table 4.3 reveal that statewide racial composition is not a significant predictor of black grade promotion.[13] This result undermines the earlier findings that black students graduate at higher rates in lower diversity states.

[13]Statewide racial diversity remains not significant even when I run a model that excludes the local level variables and the state level policy variables.

Table 4.3: Random Intercept Model of Factors Predicting the School District's Black and White Cumulative Promotion Scores, 1999 to 2002

	Black-Full	Black	White	White-Full
School District-level				
Parental Adjusted Per-capita Income (log)	0.058*	0.057*	0.169*	0.098*
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.009)
Parental Educational Achievement	0.258*	0.235*	0.111*	0.145*
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.016)
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995	-0.104*	-0.117*	-0.265*	-0.215*
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.017)
% Single-parent Households	-0.234*	-0.228*	-0.541*	-0.345*
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.020)
School District Percent White	0.014	0.018	0.119*	0.044*
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.012)
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch	-0.124*	-0.149*	-0.091*	-0.149*
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.012)
Instructional Spending Per-Pupil	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log)	-0.018*	-0.016*	-0.011*	-0.018*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
% Rural	-0.014	-0.024	-0.069*	-0.009*
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.004)
State-level				
State Percent White	-0.009	-0.021	0.041	0.183*
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.058)	(0.056)
State Opinion Liberalism	-0.127	-0.146	-0.143	-0.065
	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.129)	(0.106)
Adjusted State Per Capita Income	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% less than High School Degree	0.096	0.101	-0.272	-0.303
	(0.265)	(0.267)	(0.195)	(0.170)
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 17	0.059*	0.058*	0.028	0.021
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 18	0.037∓	0.035	0.036*	0.042*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Court found Finance System Unconstitutional	0.098*	0.099*	0.052*	0.033*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.014)

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Table 4.3: – Continued

	Black-Full	Black	White	White-Full
Constant	0.134	0.158	-0.927*	-0.137
	(0.273)	(0.279)	(0.270)	(0.165)
Intercept Standard Deviation	0.042*	0.042*	0.031*	0.037*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Level-1 Residual Standard Deviation	0.125*	0.125*	0.089*	0.092*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
N. of cases	1844	1701	1701	8245
log-likelihood	1189.533	1094.600	1667.142	7915.297
chi-squared	473.446	445.711	1609.486	3849.048

* Significant at 0.05, two-tailed test. ∓ Significant at 0.05, one-tailed test.

Interestingly, like state diversity, school district racial composition also fails to predict black grade promotion probabilities. Combined, the strong message is that the school districts' black grade promotion probabilities did not depend on the whiteness of the state or the local community populations. This means that the positive association between local and state racial diversity and outcomes seen for all students is in all likelihood being driven by white grade promotion sensitivity to racial context. This assertion is directly tested and affirmed with subsequent analyses of white grade promotion probabilities.

While racial diversity did not explain black grade promotion, it is clear that socioeconomic class and local factors continue to assume a central role in explaining inter-district differences in outcomes. The school districts' black student grade promotion probabilities increase with increasing parental income and education levels. Concentrated poverty, high residential turnover, living in rural areas, large school districts, and high concentrations of single parent households all associate with poor grade promotion probabilities. Note that this model replaces the school-wide summary measures of parental resource variables with black student parental resource variables. Theoretically, and empirically, black student resources have a greater impact on black student outcomes than do the resources available to a district's student body as a whole.

Finally, successful equity/adequacy lawsuits and mandatory attendance appear to take on even greater importance in explaining the school districts' black grade promotion probabilities. States that underwent reforms in response to equity/adequacy lawsuits increased grade advancement .098 points. Similarly, compulsory attendance to age 17 adds .059 points, while compulsory attendance to age 18 adds .037.

Black Students Grade Promotion Analysis - Districts With Minimum White Students

In order to set up a comparison of how the forces in the model explain white versus black outcomes, I rerun the black grade promotion analysis using only those districts that also have a minimum of twenty white students. This excludes 143 districts from the analysis. The results of this analysis (see Table 4.3, Column 2) are virtually identical to the results of the previous analysis. However, the compulsory attendance to age 18 fails to achieve significance using a directional test of significance.[14]

4.5 White Grade Promotion Analyses - Districts With Black Students

While the analysis of black grade promotion probabilities tell us much of what we want to know (that black students are not better off in less diverse states), that analysis raised the important question; If black student outcomes were not driving the association between statewide diversity and the grade promotion probabilities of all students, whose were? One possibility is that it is the white students' grade promotion probabilities that covary with diversity. To test for this possibility, I expand my analyses to white grade promotion probabilities. These additional analyses also allow us to see similarities and differences in all of the forces that predict grade promotion probabilities, and help us sort out the role socioeconomics plays in outcomes.

This study's third analysis looks at white grade promotion in the same districts used in the previous analysis in order to see how well the common model predicts white

[14]While most of the variables are robust to specification, this variable fluctuates between significant and non-significant in this analysis. Future research needs to flush out whether some state or district contextual effect is undermining the effectiveness of this law.

students' grade promotion probabilities without the threat of sample bias. Overall, the factors that predict these districts' black grade promotion probabilities also predict their white students' grade promotion probabilities. Notably, statewide racial diversity again fails to emerge as a significant predictor of the school districts' promotion probabilities.

For the third time, background characteristics and local policies emerge as strong predictors of grade promotion. The districts' white grade promotion probabilities are a function of all the students' background characteristics, concentrated poverty, residential mobility, statewide equity/adequacy reforms, school district size, and rural context.

Still, the contributing forces are not identical. Most importantly, and suggested by the null results in the black grade promotion analysis, higher concentrations of whites in a school district associate with higher white student graduation probabilities. Paradoxically then, black grade promotion probabilities do not covary with district diversity, while white grade promotion probabilities do. Unfortunately, the origin of the positive association between white grade promotion and local racial composition is not directly explained by an extension of racial diversity theory to the local level. Hero (1998) argues whites create barriers to advantage themselves, and disadvantage minorities, as diversity rises. Under these conditions, we would expect to see the black students' outcomes to covary, not the white students' outcomes.

In another difference, these school districts' white grade promotion probabilities are improved with compulsory attendance to age 18 but not to age 17. More consequential is the fact that all analyses reflect a positive role for compulsory attendance on grade promotion.

Finally, I also find that per-pupil instructional spending emerges as significant. In sum, it appears funding decisions and policies may have conditional effects that

aggregate analyses do not detect. Note that statewide diversity does not predict per-pupil instructional spending (see Table 4.6).

4.6 White Students Grade Promotion Analysis - Expanded

However, by limiting these analyses to school districts with at least twenty black students, I leave open the possibility that the outcomes for white students in these districts are atypical of white outcomes. Consequently, the final analysis uses the exact same model used in the previous analysis to analyze white outcomes for all school districts that have at least 20 white students in ninth grade in each year being analyzed. While the effects of the explanatory forces vary, the results of the analysis of the larger set of school districts parallel the results from the previous analysis. Nearly all of the variables that predicted white grade promotion for the truncated set of school districts also predict grade promotion for the full set of school districts. Importantly, instructional spending, equity/adequacy reforms, and mandatory education to age 18 reemerge as predictors of grade promotion.

The results of this analysis depart from the other white grade promotion analysis in one important way. As suggested by the analyses of all students, white students appear to do better in racially homogeneous states.

That black outcomes would be immune to variation in state diversity while white outcomes are susceptible is an unexpected result. If Racial Diversity Theory is correct, and populations in racially diverse states refuse to provide state services in order to keep minorities from getting ahead, the apparent consequence is that state level barriers have the greatest negative effect on white outcomes.

Still, it is premature to assume that the lower white grade promotion probabilities

associated with high levels of diversity is simply the result of misapplied discrimination. Several alternative explanations exist for this unusual pattern. For example, one alternate explanation may be a school district selection effect. It is not that concentrated white populations create better outcomes for whites, but that white families have more resources that enable them to move into better school districts and states with better schools.

Another possible explanation is found in the data itself. The grade promotion probabilities used in this analysis–much like the graduation rates used in previous research–are for public school students only. The negative association between diversity and white outcomes might come from a large number of white students fleeing to private schools, leaving a pool of white students who may not mirror the students who left. Simple correlations between the percentage of the population that is white and the percentage of white parents with children in public schools suggest that this might be behind the association at both the state (.545) and school district levels (.331).[15] Under this scenario, racial considerations may explain the pattern found by Hero and Tolbert (1996), but not in the way they originally conceived of it. That is, it is the accumulation of private decisions, and not statewide policy discrimination that is underneath the association between diversity and poor (white) outcomes. In any case, this is a puzzle that must await future research.

4.7 Explaining Interstate Variation

While the various coefficients are the key interpretative elements from the analysis, it is useful to appreciate that the model does a good job of explaining interstate differences in grade advancement. When we can look at the proportional reduction in state

[15]The state and school district diversity measures do not highly correlate (.078 and .011 respectively) with the percentage of black parents placing their children in public school.

level variance (R_2^2) in Table 4.4, we see that the model explains most of the interstate differences in grade promotion probabilities.[16] The common model explains between 65 percent (school districts' black grade promotion probabilities) and nearly 80 percent (all students) of state level variance.

Table 4.4: State-level Variation Explained by the Models

	State-level Variation Explained
All Students	0.780
All Black Students	0.653
Black Students in Matched Districts	0.648
White Students in Matched Districts	0.730
All White Students	0.784

4.8 State Characteristics and State Policy

While many of political science's traditional state level measures failed to predict grade advancement, it would be premature to write these characteristics off as completely unrelated to grade promotion. We need to test whether these characteristics indirectly influence grade promotion via the policy and funding decisions accounted for in my model. We test these characteristics with two additional analyses.

The first supplemental analysis used multilevel techniques to test whether the state characteristics predict district level instructional spending. The second analysis used the state level characteristics to predict those states in which the state courts found the educational systems unconstitutional. [17]

[16]Since multilevel modeling separately accounts for state and school district level variance, we can simply compare the variance of the null model to variance remaining after accounting for the covariates. The formula is $R_2^2 = \frac{\widehat{\psi_0} - \widehat{\psi_1}}{\widehat{\psi_0}}$.

[17]Note that I do not attempt to predict the states' likelihood of having different compulsory attendance ages. This is because these laws were passed at the turn of the 20th century or earlier and we have no reliable data on the state characteristics of interest.

It turns out that these variables do relate to grade promotion, albeit only through per-pupil instructional spending. While Table 4.5 suggests that the statewide characteristics are non-significant predictors of district-level per-pupil instructional spending, joint tests of significance reveal that statewide income, education, and liberalism do associate with greater instructional spending ($\chi^2_3 = 10.88\ p = 0.012$). Note that statewide racial diversity does not predict per-pupil instructional spending; even in simple bivariate analyses, and a joint test of significance with statewide income, education, and liberalism fails to achieve significance. In contrast, turning to Table 4.6, we see that none of the political science's classic state level variables are significant predictors of the states that had their education finance systems ruled unconstitutional.[18] Still, these results reaffirm the importance of these characteristics for explaining interstate differences in outcomes; at least through some policies.

[18]Joint tests of significance also fail to uncover any association between these variables and a finding of unconstitutionality.

Table 4.5: Assessing the Relationship between State-level Characteristics and a Court Decision that Found State Education Financing Systems Unconstitutional (prior to 1994)

	Successful Equity/Adequacy Court Challenge State
Adjusted State Per Capita Income	0.000
	(0.000)
% less than High School Degree	0.072
	(0.064)
State Opinion Liberalism	0.021
	(0.034)
State Percent White	-0.021
	(0.018)
Constant	-4.694
	(5.127)
BIC	62.716
N. of cases	39
log-likelihood	-22.199
chi-squared	3.747

* Significant at 0.05, two-tailed test.

Table 4.6: Random Intercept Model Assessing the Relationship Between State-level Characteristics and Instructional Spending Per-pupil

	Instructional Spending Per-Pupil
Adjusted State Per Capita Income	0.087
	(0.061)
% less than High School Degree	-710.179
	(2649.884)
State Opinion Liberalism	2457.935
	(1707.924)
% White - State	707.138
	(912.818)
Constant	2870.876
	(2143.383)
Constant	664.493*
	(76.752)
Residual	1056.163
	(7.675)
N. of cases	9506
p-value	0.010
log-likelihood	-7.98e+04
chi-squared	13.229

* Significant at 0.05, two-tailed test.
Jointly, these variables do predict instructional spending. Separately, all but state diversity predict instructional spending per-pupil.

4.9 Discussion & Conclusion

This study was motivated by the belief that a fuller understanding of racial diversity (or any state level force) on education outcomes requires a blending of political science and education outcomes research traditions. The findings presented in this study simultaneously reaffirm and challenge political science's understanding of the role of racial diversity and the other forces that drive graduation.

First and foremost, while racial diversity does predict grade promotion, this study paradoxically finds that diversity does not predict black grade promotion probabilities. When we look at black and white grade promotion probabilities separately, we see that it is white students, not black students who are sensitive to variation in racial context. Thus, if racial diversity spawns statewide barriers which negatively impact grade promotion; it is the white students who are among the most affected. Still, this pattern may arise from private citizens moving between states and school districts or exiting to private schools. Regardless, these results do not support the idea that active, discriminatory state politics is the primary determinant of black grade promotion probabilities.

Rather, this study supports the idea that student background characteristics and local forces drive educational achievement. Parental resources (income, education, mobility, and household composition), concentrated poverty, and school district size emerged significant in each analysis. Importantly, these results suggest prior research underestimated the importance of socioeconomics (and overstate the role of racial diversity) in determining outcomes.

From a policy perspective this research has two messages. First, state level reforms aimed at equalizing educational resources had a positive impact on student grade advancement. This suggests that identifying and adopting the elements of these reforms

should help to boost grade promotion in others states. Second, legally requiring students to attend additional years of schooling–particularly to age 18–seems to increase the likelihood that students of all races will graduate on time with a regular diploma.

4.10 Operationalization of Concepts

Table 4.7: Definitions of Independent Variables Used in the Analyses

Concept	Operationalization
State Diversity	The percentage of each state's population that is white (not Hispanic) in 2000.
School District Diversity	The percentage of the district wide community that is white (not Hispanic) in 2000.
Educational Attainment	The percentage of the school district's subpopulation public school parents with at least a bachelor's degree.
Income	The school district's subpopulation public school parents' CWI adjusted per capita income, logged.
Single Parent Households	The residual of regression of the percentage of subpopulation public school households that are single parent variable on the prelogged, CWI adjusted per capita income variable.
Residential Mobility	The percentage of subpopulation public school parents that lived in a different county in 1995.
School District Socio-economic Context	The percent of all students eligible for free or reduced price lunch.
Early equity/adequacy states	A dummy coded one for states where, prior to 1994, a major court case found the state's education system unconstitutional. Listed are the state and the year of the first major decision: AR (1983), CA (1971), CT (1977), KS (1972), KY (1989), MA (1993), MD (1983), NJ (1973), NM (1974), TX (1989), WV (1979), and WY (1980). Source: CITE.
Compulsory Education to 17	A dummy code one for states that mandate school attendance to age 17. This includes: AR, CO, IL, ME, MS, PA, SC, and TN.
Compulsory Education to 18	A dummy code one for states that mandate school attendance to age 18. This includes: CA, CT, KS, LA, NE, NV, NM, OH, OK, SD, TX, UT, VA, WA, and WI.

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Table 4.7: – Continued

Concept	Operationalization
School district size	Average total number of pupils (logged) for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
Instructional Spending Per-pupil	Average per pupil instructional spending for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
Average State Educational Attainment	Average percentage of the population with less than a high school degree.
State Economic Resources	CWI adjusted per capita income.

Note: All district level subpopulation characteristics come from the 2000 census data rolled up to the school district level. School district spending and size data come from the Common Core of Data.

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