ELECTORAL REFORM, PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

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This dissertation examines the links between electoral reform and political party system development in new democracies where iterated reforms are increasingly common, requiring an understanding of their causes and short-term consequences. It examines this relationship in detail in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim democracy. It finds that, although the rules of the game may appear to be in flux during iterated electoral reforms, those reforms often follow a predictable dynamic and consistently demonstrate evidence of seat-maximization. Assessing how a combination of strategic and alternative motivations may affect decision-making, as well as how prior reforms constrain future reform options, is key to understanding how reforms affect the composition and shape of the ensuing party system. The dissertation employs a multi-methods approach, conducting both a large-N quantitative analysis with an original dataset of cross-national electoral reform and a case study of Indonesia. The large-N analysis includes 34 cases of electoral reform from 1950 to 2010; for the case study I draw on in-depth interviews with key reform actors, archival research, and an analysis of election outcomes from 1999-2009 to assess the relationship between electoral reform, party system change and the process of democratization in Indonesia.
To Reed and my family, whose support has made the difficult and frustrating aspects of the process of writing a dissertation much easier to endure, and to Dirty Paws, who provided a constant reminder not to take life too seriously.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>Golongan Karya (Party of Functional Groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>Partai Demokiasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democracy Party - Struggle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB/PBB</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (Bintang Bulan) (Star &amp; Moon (Moon &amp; Star) Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS/PK</td>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Keadilan) (Prosperous Justice (Justice) Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reformed Star Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPDK</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Demokrasi (National Democratic Unity Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>Hati Nurani Rakyat (People's Conscience Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia Movement Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People's Representative Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pansus</td>
<td>Panitia khusus (Special Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panja</td>
<td>Panitia kerja (Working Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPU</td>
<td>Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Election Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bawaslu</td>
<td>Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum (Election Supervisory Body)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panwaslu</td>
<td>Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Umum (Election Supervisory Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depdagri</td>
<td>Departemen Dalam Negeri (Ministry of Home Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Mahkamah Konstitusi (Constitutional Court)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAF</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies (Jakarta)</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Why do some new democracies succeed in deepening and consolidating their political institutions and channels of representation while others fail or face severe instability? I argue that one primary reason for some states' successful democratic progress is their adaptability. When an electoral system creates instability in the political party system citizens will become frustrated with the capacity of elites to represent and govern them, but if the state can adapt its electoral system to mitigate such problems then democratization can continue. To be sure, the process of electoral reform can mitigate some problems, too much reform or reform undertaken with undemocratic goals can undermine progress. To achieve a better understanding of the success or failure of democratization we must evaluate the process and effects of electoral reform, analyzing its potential benefits and limits.

A belief in institutional "stickiness" sustains most observers of politics: political institutions, particularly democratic ones, should be difficult to alter lest they be changed and abused at the hands of the power-hungry and powerful. The US Constitution is nearly impossible to amend and, while slow to reflect demographic and social changes in society, is highlighted as a bulwark of stability that keeps U.S. democracy out of harm's way, particularly in the early period of system consolidation and state-building or through periods of temporary crisis such as the challenged outcome of the 2000 presidential elections. The Italian system, in contrast, demonstrates the perils of institutional flexibility -- change to the electoral system, even with the best of long-term goals to create stability of inter-party competition and channels of accountability, wreaked enough havoc on the party system
and threatened democratic chaos such that elites had to change the system back within a decade. The myriad of undemocratic reforms that have occurred in many transitional and consolidating democracies over the past few decades attest to the need for stability in institutional design and construction.

But democratization is a tricky business, failures are often unpredicted and the scope and breadth of failure are sometimes impossible to comprehend. The rollback of democratic practices, electoral competition, and respect for the rule of law in many countries, in addition to the erosion of political rights and civil liberties, suggest that, even when chosen with the best of intentions, democratic institutions are not perfect. When flaws are clear and exposed they should be addressed. This is not to suggest that every little problem with democratic function necessitates wholesale reform, but that some measure of flexibility can be used to rectify problems generated by the system itself. Does this open the door to a landslide of abuse by elites? Perhaps. But is there a way to navigate the narrow space between productive, progressive reform and abuse? Undoubtedly. A handful of cases underscore this point, now the goal is to understand how and why they have succeeded, where they might have failed, and what general patterns and mechanisms we might glean from studying them.

Most scholarly work conceives of electoral reform as a strategic choice game, the byproduct of powerful elites attempting to consolidate democratic institutions in their favor.¹ Such theories are frequently powerful, especially when employing large-N samples over time. These models can explain many general patterns but, in order to produce parsimonious theories, downplay or ignore the reform process and make broad assumptions regarding the knowledge and motivations of power-hungry, non-ideological actors and the competition-limiting outcomes they seek. There may in fact be cases where political elites do not enact

¹ See Boix (1999, 2010), Colomer (2005) and Remmer (2008) for examples of the strategic model.
reforms for the simple power-maximizing reasons that strategic choice theories would predict.

One irony of such assumptions is that when considering the initial choice of electoral systems scholars are far less pessimistic about the nature of elites, who adopt a wide range of options from the electoral menu for a wide range of ideological reasons and logistic constraints (Reynolds 2002; Reilly 2006). An entire field of electoral engineers have advised and consulted on constitutional revisions and rewrites over the past few decades in countries from Mongolia to Estonia to South Africa. Among the many considerations posed by advisors and adopted by elites when choosing the initial structure of institutions: will these institutions improve representation and competition and strengthen or deepen our democracy? If scholars can accept that ideology and democratic performance matter to some degree at the initial stage of electoral system choice, why do they automatically discount its importance in the process of revisiting or revising those choices?

Additionally, the invitation to electoral engineers, international NGO advisors and domestic experts and academics suggests that many elites in new democracies are not themselves experienced or adequately prepared to make fully-informed decisions regarding the choice of electoral system rules and regulations. Indeed, the very presence of such actors indicates the likely gap between aspirations and knowledge, especially in democracies where competition previously did not exist or existed in limited fashion in the prior regime. Among the questions scholars might ask: how much do we really know about the level of knowledge and information possessed by political elites during the process of electoral reform?

In new democracies where information, understanding and ideology may be important or even dominant factors in the reform process, current strategic theories may
provide little insight to the shape and scope of reforms eventually adopted. Previous literature demonstrates that ideological factors can play a role, such as in the adoption of proportionality rather than majoritarianism, and that the complexities of electoral system options can create misunderstanding or confusion among reformers in countries with limited experience with competitive electoral politics. In cases from Italy to Poland to Colombia politicians have adopted reforms for a diverse set of reasons, many of them reflecting ideological beliefs about the nature of elected representation, accounting for constituent demands and/or demonstrating what limited experience with electoral systems and structures can do to elite preferences and choices. I believe that Indonesia fits this type of case, exemplifying the limits of strategic choice theories as its legislature has adopted progressively more democratic reforms over time despite the desires of many power-hungry elites who might derail the reform process in any given period.

The foundation of seat-maximization models rests on assumptions that actors undertaking reform: a) know exactly what they are doing, understanding not only the reform options they face but their likely effect on electoral outcomes as well; and b) only pursue reforms for resource-control/seat-accumulation reasons rather than ideological views about what might be best for democracy and the development and strengthening of democratic institutions and channels of representation.

The case in Indonesia does not fit these basic assumptions. Accordingly, I make two distinct arguments about the need for an alternative model of reform. First, in new democracies there may be more diverse expectations about actor motivations and knowledge

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2 Examples include Katz (2005), who raises some of these issues with respect to established democracies and electoral reform, particularly in contrast with reforms adopted in new democracies or transitional situations, and Birch at al (2002) who discuss the adoption of electoral systems and reforms in Post-Communist democracies.
to consider. Particularly in new democracies where many political actors have little experience with competitive elections and party politics but do have concerns about the durability of the new regime, actors themselves are likely to draw on a broader range of motivations and experience a lower degree of certainty than is the case in established democracies. Instead of high information and seat-driven strategy, in many new democracies reformers may pursue ideological beliefs about the need for proportional representation in diverse societies or misunderstand the functional difference between parallel and compensatory multiple tier systems.

Second, evaluating the process of reform -- how and why particular constellations of reforms are adopted at any given iteration -- is paramount to understanding the iterated nature of reform in new democracies, especially where the relationship between party system and electoral reform is endogenous. In the aggregate, reforms are often viewed in a snapshot "one case of reform at one point in time" example: the switch from an indirectly- to directly-elected executive in Israel in 1992, the switch from a list proportional representation to a mixed-electoral system in Italy in 1993, the switch from a mixed-electoral to a list proportional representation system in Italy in 2005. Few reforms are viewed as the product of iterated processes, or as the result of multiple rounds of reforms about the same issues across election and reform periods. The Italian case is one of great importance in this regard. The return to a PR system came as the direct result of unintended consequences of the previous switch away from PR -- a move meant to simplify the party system actually created greater fragmentation and thus reformers essentially "changed the system back" to a variation of the previous, less fragmentation-inducing, system.

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3 See Bawn (1993), Katz (2005), Renwick et al (2009), and Renwick (2010) for examples of more diverse, ideological motivations and considerations of coalition politics and partners that constrain actor choice.
Yet we rarely see analyses where a theory explains both the first round outcome and its impact on the reforms adopted in the second round, either explicitly related in terms of causal relationship or indirectly linked where the first reform constrains outcomes that lead to the second reform. In this sense, the iterated nature of the process requires conceptualization and explanation. Ratchet effects can constrain choices in later rounds of reform, necessitating an understanding of the relationship to previous reform outcomes.

Additionally, if reforms occur over multiple periods it is important to understand why, in part because it is a relatively uncommon occurrence or may seem as such because we are making too many or incorrect assumptions about the reason reform occurs. For example, if there are new, unconventional, not exclusively strategic reasons for reform perhaps there will be more recognizable examples of iterated reform. Though institutions are typically assumed to be sticky, following the logic that once the effort to reform has been made it is difficult to make changes again, perhaps the question should be: if you can reform once why can't you reform again? If the past thirty years are any indication, with a number of countries exhibiting iterated reform tendencies, understanding the rise of iterated reform is important, especially if there is some aspect of iterated reform that diverges from existing theory about one-time reform.

To that end, we must evaluate: 1) a more diverse set of motivations which include not only power/seat calculations, an undeniably important element of any electoral reform process, but also the underlying ideological beliefs of key actors; and 2) constraints posed by early period choices in iterated reform process. I argue that we should consider these two constraints on the seat-maximizing strategies of actors in the reform process in order to more completely and accurately explain how and why the reform process unfolds as it does.
In addition to a richer understanding of the cause and effects of electoral reform, I extend this discussion of democratization to an important case: Indonesia. As the world's third largest democracy, the world's largest Muslim majority country, and one of the world's youngest democracies, it is surrounded mostly by countries with inconsistent, limited or non-existent democracy. Its progress has survived domestic conflicts in Aceh and Papua, ethnic and religious strife across the archipelago, and multiple large-scale natural disasters on an annual basis. Despite virtually no history of open and competitive elections before 1999 it remains Southeast Asia's most robust democracy and its path has evolved through multiple rounds of reform to the country's democratic institutions.

Figure 1.1 List of Indonesian Electoral Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>List Type</th>
<th>District Magnitude</th>
<th>Electoral Threshold</th>
<th>Proposal:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1999 (Regulations for the 1999 Elections)</td>
<td>Fully proportional, fully closed</td>
<td>Province-level with subdivided allocation</td>
<td>Past entry threshold with low registration barriers</td>
<td>district level of 2-7/8 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2004 (Reform from 2001-2003)</td>
<td>Fully proportional, semi-open with high individual threshold</td>
<td>District-level: 3-12 seats</td>
<td>Past entry threshold with moderate registration barriers</td>
<td>no change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2009 (Reform from 2007-2008)</td>
<td>Fully proportional, semi-open with moderate individual threshold</td>
<td>District-level: 3-10 seats</td>
<td>Past entry threshold, legislative electoral threshold (2.5%) for national level</td>
<td>Proposal: raise to 4-5% and apply to subnational levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2009 (Constitutional Court rulings in late 2008)</td>
<td>Fully open, lists still ordered if voters cast their votes for just parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2014 (Reform from 2010-2012)</td>
<td>Proposals: return to closed, keep open, switch to mixed or SMD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indonesia represents a case of iterated reform, revising its election laws every five years prior to the next cycle of elections since democracy was instituted. It also demonstrates some of the limitations of the core assumptions of the strategic choice model wherein key actors often do not fully understand or similarly understand reform options or view them with
a non-ideological lens. Figure 1.1 summarizes the changes in Indonesia’s democratic electoral system.

While Indonesia's reform has occurred with each new set of elections (three since 1999) these have not been democracy-undermining changes. Indonesian democracy is arguably more robust today than it has ever been, with greater inter-branch balance (a directly-elected president replaced the parliamentary-style executive), declining party system fragmentation (shrinking from 21 to 16 to 9 legislative parties), and peace (resulting in part from much-improved civilian control over the armed forces). Amidst the decline of democracy across its own regional trade circle, Indonesia is the sole country to demonstrate improvement in the quality of its democratic institutions throughout the past decade.

Indonesia is also unique as the world's only Muslim majority democracy not bordering the European Union, achieving Freedom House "free" status six short years after democratizing, and is the sole "free" democracy in a region full of authoritarian, electoral authoritarian and lapsed or defective democratic regimes.  

This dissertation evaluates the actor-specific motivations and structural factors that constrain and enable electoral change over time, by analyzing the ongoing process of institutional reform occurring over multiple electoral periods. In doing so, it is critical to carefully measure and evaluate, through a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods: 1) the institutional constraints faced by elites at the time of reform initiation; 2) the assessments of elites regarding electoral reform options via their seat-maximizing self-interests and

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4 Turkey is the world's other Muslim majority success case of democratization, with a neighborhood of established democracies surrounding it, while the closest democracies to Indonesia are Australia (which distances itself from Southeast Asia when it is politically convenient to do so), Thailand (whose electorate and elites both seem to misunderstand the point of elections to the democratic process) and the Philippines (whose quality of democracy is constantly in question due to restrictions on most types of political freedoms and civil rights as well as the ongoing conflict and perpetual inability to reach an agreement with the Muslim population in Mindanao).
beliefs as well as their understanding of the structure and consequences of potential reforms; 3) the choices and behavior of political elites when initiating and negotiating electoral reform packages; and 4) the balance of power among parties and elites in the decision-making process as that balance changes to reflect new electoral outcomes. In addition to reconstruction of the reform process at each stage of negotiations up to the resulting law and election, I analyze the electoral results to assess the effect of reform on the election outcome.

A multi-method approach is necessary because explaining the process of institutional change and how new choices are made within the previously-chosen institutional structure are two closely related questions. While quantitatively measurable factors can explain much about power balance among decision makers, I argue that not only the power balance between but also the ideological and electoral interests of such actors, as well as their level of knowledge and understanding of the issues they debate, are important to understanding the exact package of changes adopted at any one iteration of reform. Ascertaining such ideological and electoral interests requires a qualitative approach in a system where party discipline and legislative experience cannot be assumed to be high and where the interests and impact of bureaucrats and civil society leaders involved in the process of reform cannot be quantitatively measured. A quantitative approach is more appropriate for examining how reforms affect election outcomes and redistribute power among future decision-makers by altering the rules of the electoral game.

In new democracies, especially those with inchoate party systems and weak links between voters and parties, electoral reforms may paradoxically help to induce or provide the impetus for important changes in the party system. Reforms based on short-term goals may end up encouraging additional electoral reforms, rather than the long-term stabilizing effects
sought by reformers; yet reforms that happen in an iterated sequence may generate stabilizing party system effects over time. Strategic choice theories that focus on seat maximization often provide satisfactory explanations for such outcomes in the aggregate, making those models a baseline for such analysis. However, while my alternative explanations may be less parsimonious, they can offer a richer understanding of how electoral reform works in many of the world's youngest democracies, clarify why parties sometimes do not exclusively pursue seat maximizing strategies, and can inform future cases of reform as well.

I focus on two key areas of electoral reform in my approach to understand institutional transformation: the structure of *intra*—and *inter*-party competition. The first area concerns the subjects of voter attention, or *intraparty* competition: how does the system define who are the competitors in elections? While it is possible for the competitors in elections to be both party and candidate, some types of electoral structures effectively remove the role of individual candidacy for legislative office. Thus, the first area under consideration when I focus on Indonesia is the changes made from a party-centric closed-list proportional representation system based on provincial-level districts inherited from the pre-democratic era to a system subsequently more open with smaller and smaller districts that have moved the focus much more to candidates while retaining priority for parties on multiple levels.

The second area concerns the subject of the size and complexity of the party system, or *interparty* competition: how does the system control for the number of parties, the relative sizes of parties, and the diversity or range of parties within the system? While it is possible to have a relatively large number of political parties with limited fragmentation, some types of electoral rules can be implemented to encourage or force simplification (or basic
truncation) of the party system. Thus, the second area under consideration is changes made from an easy-entry system at both the stage of entering the electoral arena and entering the legislative arena to a system subsequently more closed on legislative entry while still open in electoral entry. These two areas – the structure of party nomination lists and the structure and application of an electoral threshold – are the sections of the election and political party laws that are the focus of this dissertation. As each area has undergone multiple changes since democratization (both were the subject of discussion and revision for the general election and political party laws in 2004 and 2009, and are both under active discussion for further revision for the 2014 elections), they represent an opportunity to evaluate multiple-iteration reforms in consecutive inter-election periods, yet have been the subject of different pressures over time.

The research design draws upon a combination of three primary types of data: archival, interview, and election-related. The process tracing of the reforms is analyzed via: a) archival documents of the draft and final versions of the laws as well as pertinent Constitutional Court rulings related to the laws; 2) position papers submitted by each party or party coalition in reaction to the initial draft of the law and transcripts of the legislative committee proceedings during the drafting negotiation stages; 3) newspaper and journal coverage of the reform process; 4) and interviews with participants (legislative representatives, party leaders, government bureaucrats, etc) and observers (domestic and international civil society members, academics, etc). Evaluating the effects of the reforms at each inter-election period requires the following: 1) election returns from the 1999, 2004 and 2009 general elections, including all individual vote-share data from all parties at the national level from 2004 and 2009; 2) election district maps from the 1999, 2004 and 2009 general
elections; and 3) composition of the national legislature based on final seat allocations from the Election Commission, including both the size of each party as well as which representatives obtained seats.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature, introduces my theoretical framework of integrated electoral reform and discusses the impact of such a reform model on the resulting political party system. Following the literature review I begin with a discussion about reforms, specifically the contrast between seat-maximizing and alternative motivations and ratchet effects that constrain choice in iterated reform. I continue to a discussion of the dimensions that reforms take as well as the complications of evaluating cross-temporal reform processes. I then introduce my framework of reform suggesting that, although seat-maximizing logic that motivates nearly all other scholarly work on reform has merits and can explain a great deal about most reforms that occur, the roles of alternative motivations and constraints must be integrated in order to evaluate their impact on the outcome of the reform process. I provide a set of testable hypotheses regarding the causes and effects of electoral reform and conclude with a brief explanation of the selection of the Indonesian case.

Chapter 3 introduces the reader to the Indonesian case. First I provide a brief historical context that describes the transition to democracy under former president B.J. Habibie. I then discuss the broader transition context of democratic reform in Indonesia, including the impact of the constitutional amendment process, shift to direct election of the president, and political and fiscal decentralization. Next I establish the relationship between and roles of the legislature and the executive in the process of law-making and institutional reform and introduce key parties and actors in play since 1999. Finally I conclude with a description of the changing composition of the party system across the democratic elections.
Chapters 4 and 5 cover the periods from 1999-2004 and 2004-2009, incorporating both qualitative data, reconstructing the reform process using original legislative committee transcripts and in-depth interviews with key reform actors and observers, and quantitative analysis, drawing on election outcomes to assess changes to the party system's composition. Each chapter first begins with an assessment of the existing electoral structure and party system composition resulting from that structure. Then it introduces the key actors during the reform period and explains the initial draft of proposed reforms with each major component under revision. Following a description of the initial position of key actors/parties at the outset of reform I process trace the negotiations between the legislative commission members and their various parties as well as the input from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the government's representative in the electoral reform process, and various experts and civil society groups.

To perform the process tracing, I draw on a range of qualitative data sources obtained during 15 months of fieldwork in Indonesia. First are archival documents of initial drafts and final versions of the law on general elections and the law on political parties used to conduct the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections, as well as any Constitutional Court rulings that drastically altered the key sections under study. These were read and coded for the specific changes made from one election to the next (ie., the difference between the 1999 and 2004 final laws, and 2004 and 2009 final laws), as well as to establish the starting point of negotiations in each revision period and changes made during negotiations (ie., the difference between the 2004 initial draft and final laws, and 2009 initial draft and final laws). Second are transcripts of all official discussions within the relevant legislative commissions, notably Commission 2 which deals with issues of domestic governance, regional autonomy, and state apparatus, and
official party caucus (fraksi) positions on the draft laws. These were read and coded to assess the different party positions on the key sections of the laws (e.g., which parties supported the electoral threshold, which did not, which wanted a level above 3%, which wanted below 3%), as well as to assess the specific reasons given during commission review meetings to justify such positions and to negotiate over specific details (i.e., the exact percentage a party needed to cross the threshold, etc).

Third are newspaper, journal and policy report coverage of commission deliberations, party positions on the draft laws and judicial reviews, civil society views on the deliberation process and final laws. These documents were read and coded to triangulate the data yielded from the archival documents and transcripts as well as from interviews. Fourth are interviews with: a) members of the People's Representative Council (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) from the 1999-2004 and 2004-2009 Councils, primarily with members of Commission 2 and the leaders of the individual party fraksi, b) members of the Ministry of Home Affairs from 1999-2004 and 2004-2009, primarily the Director General and expert staff responsible for writing the initial draft of each of the laws being studied as well as presenting the drafts to Commission 2 and remaining as technical advisers during the internal commission negotiations about changes to the drafts, c) members of the Constitutional Court from 2007-009 who ruled on issues pertaining to the general election and political party laws, d) members of domestic and international civil society providing technical assistance and advice to party leaders, voters, and the government during the drafting and negotiation processes, e) members of academia who observed, advised, and/or assisted civil society or political leaders in the drafting and negotiation processes, f) members of political party central boards, specifically those directly handling campaign and election strategy, candidate
selection, and public opinion polling. The transcripts of interviews were read and coded along with interview session notes to assess specific reasons for decision-making during the reform periods and changes over time in party positions on reform and election strategies.

Chapter 5 also includes an explanation of the post-adoption Constitutional Court decisions that further altered the election law after the legislature had finished its reform process, and the impact and implications of Court decisions altering the outcome of legislative choices and the entire process of reform. All commission transcripts, position papers and adopted laws were personally obtained in Jakarta at the library and document archives of the People's Representative Council, news coverage through a variety of university-based archives, and draft laws and court decisions through individual contacts at the Ministry of Home Affairs and Indonesian legal databases. All interviews were held in person in the Indonesian language, in the cities of Jakarta, Serang and Yogyakarta, from January through December 2010.

In the last substantive section of Chapters 4 and 5 I present a series of quantitative analyses of the actual election outcome and various counter-factual outcomes that would have resulted had a different package of reforms that was discussed been adopted. The data included in these analyses are drawn from original hard- and soft-copies of official election returns, including province and district-level party vote totals from 1999, province, district, and sub-district level party and individual candidate vote totals from 2004, and province, district, and sub-district level party and individual candidate vote totals from 2009. These returns were hand-coded by party and, where applicable, individual candidates as raw scores and percentages within provinces and districts for the purpose of calculating cross-temporal vote and seat volatility for each party and the party system as well as incumbency rates and
geographic trends. I also utilized election district maps, including province and district lines from 1999, 2004 and 2009, coded by party and, where applicable, individual vote and seat shares for the purpose of calculating cross-temporal vote and seat volatility for each party as well as to assess the level of regional concentration of parties failing to meet the electoral threshold in 2009. All quantitative data was personally obtained in Jakarta at the central office of the National Election Commission (KPU, Komisi Pemilihan Umum) and at the library and document archives of the People's Representative Council.

Chapter 6 presents an original dataset of 34 countries which experienced some electoral reform during the 1950 to 2010 period. I test my expectations about the causes and effects of electoral reform on this dataset, using insights drawn from the Indonesian case to illuminate limitations in the statistical analysis. I find that while seat maximization is of utmost importance to explaining reform adoptions, there is some support for the constraints of alternative motivations and ratchet effects on unfettered alterations by power-hungry elites. In addition, I find that a long-understudied element of reform, change on the intraparty dimension of electoral systems, does in fact have an impact on party system fragmentation. The conclusions of the quantitative analysis highlight some important aspects in the Indonesian case regarding confirmation of some aspects of seat-maximization theories, as well as some limits.

Chapter 7 concludes and speaks to electoral reform discussions in the 2009-2014 period that are already underway in the legislature, as the process to revise the general election law and law on political parties begins again. The process of electoral reform is far from finished in Indonesia, with the third consecutive round of revisions currently under negotiation in the legislature. Lessons learned, and patterns and mechanisms established,
from the first two rounds of reform more than adequately inform the ongoing process of the third round. Delving into some of the "unfinished business" of the previous revisions, which were exacerbated by the Constitutional Court's decisions in late 2008, the third round of reforms already covers a broader range of issues and has posed more contentious debates than either previous round. Following a general conclusion about the constraints provided by alternative motivations and ratchet effects on seat-maximizing electoral reforms, I then extend conclusions from the Indonesian case and quantitative analysis to illuminate potential future electoral reform cases.
**Chapter 2: Theory**

Though electoral reforms may be discussed in long-standing democracies they are rarely employed. Oftentimes constitutional framers prioritized continuity within the system and set the bar for reform very high, especially with respect to alterations in electoral mechanisms. Experiences of recently democratized countries, notably in Latin America, the Former Soviet Union, and Southeast Asia, suggest the benefits of institutions that are not easily changed. In systems lacking institutional “stickiness” powerful executives may exert their will over legislatures too weak or slow to halt the process of institutional reform, resulting in undemocratic reforms such as the elimination of presidential term limits or central government appointment of previously-elected governors. Even in advanced democracies the benefits of institutional stickiness can be clear: Italian reforms in the 1990s exacerbated rather than alleviated fragmentation within the party system; since those reforms achieved none of their intended benefits, subsequent revision in 2005 produced electoral rules that closely mirrored the rules of the pre-reform period in an attempt to rebalance and re-stabilize the party system.

However, some recent democratizers have employed drawn-out processes of iterated electoral reform. In Eastern Europe, reformist governments in Poland and Romania have both pursued multi-stage reform processes to alter their rules for legislative elections since 1990. In Latin America, sometimes under regime uncertainty, elected political leaders in Bolivia and Guatemala both pursued and enacted legislative reforms in sequential election periods in the 1985-1995 period. And in post-war Germany, the rules governing elections to
the Bundestag underwent revisions in the first two elections after the East-West partition. In many of these cases, the reform processes were either directly, as they were in the case of Italian reforms of 1993 and 2005, the result of previous reforms or constrained by the outcomes of previous reforms. It is cases in which reforms occur in sequence or over time – the details that make them increasingly common and different from other examples of single-event reform processes – that will be the focus of this chapter.

There are reasons to be concerned with electoral reform for the purpose of democratic governance. First is the question of institutional stickiness: if institutions can be easily manipulated then there are implications for whether elites are really constrained by democratic rules of the game. Second is the question of effective representation: if rules constantly change then there are implications for voter understanding of the rules being used to determine representation. Third is the question of free and fair competition: while changes in the rules may not openly constrain the quality and/or quantity of election competitors, frequent or extreme changes may negatively affect some subset of the competition disproportionately or unfairly, such as minority parties.

In all periods of electoral reform there are two questions driving scholarly interest in the subject. First, what structures were in place and what changes are possible after previous reform or constitutional writing periods? Second, who are the key actors playing key roles in undertaking reforms and what are their motivations? With regards to factors such as party system composition, individual legislator profiles, and non-party actors, what motivates those involved in the process of reform? The answers to these two questions inform expectations of what reforms should be produced by the process of negotiation and adoption as well as what impact reforms should have on the existing political party system size and composition.
First, institutional structure is important because certain electoral rules can provide limits on possible reform outcomes and general propensity to maintain the status quo or something similar (for purposes of stability, institutional stickiness, etc). For example, reforming the Electoral College in the United States requires a constitutional amendment. This is an institutional structure that constrains reform possibility because passing an amendment is extremely difficult, as 2/3 of US states must ratify the amendment after Congressional adoption and surviving a presidential veto, and not one of the 700 proposed amendments to reform or eliminate the Electoral College has passed. It is important to understand why some options are never or no longer available since rules may constrain any reform possibilities or previously adopted structures may have eliminated particular voices (i.e., small parties who no longer have a voice or vote after the institution of an electoral threshold) and any ideological profiles of those voices. Previous institutional choices can limit the size and fragmentation of the party system or affect coalition incentives, making some outcomes more or less likely to occur in the process of adopting electoral reforms.

Second, motivations include electoral self-interest and power calculations as well as ideological beliefs about the nature of representation and the state. Such motivations may also be affected by how well actors understand the "menu" of electoral system options they can choose from and whether their perceptions about likely outcomes alter the nature and extent of reforms they pursue. Previous institutional choices may affect the level of party cohesion, the number of ideologically-oriented party representatives, the number of legislators having prior legislative experience and the likelihood of legislators having close ties to local constituents. It is important to understand why some types of legislator (e.g., more ideological than seat-oriented or party disciplined than self-interested) are more or less
likely to succeed under different electoral rules and how, once those types of legislators are removed from the decision-making process, their absence may take an entire set of reform options off the table or may deplete the institutional memory of previous reform negotiations and outcomes. For example, elites who can win a popular, candidate-centric campaign might exhibit different interests for future elections than party members who typically receive their nominations based on internal party hierarchy or legislative discipline. Additionally, motivations may include a particular view of the nature of representation and the state or a particular view about the role of different agencies in election conduct and decision-making. Such motivations are likely to be affected by who actors feel they represent: government bureaucratic agencies, civil society, and international and domestic NGOs all may play a role in the process of reform.

This chapter develops a more generalizable framework about electoral reform, in an attempt to encompass not only why and how reform occurs in a given period but also to evaluate why the reforms that are eventually adopted differ from what we might otherwise expect, based on the relevant actors and their assumed or expressed interests. I first present existing perspectives and debates in the scholarly literature, evaluating the benefits and shortcomings of existing theories on the subject as well as the contributions and limitations of previous frameworks for evaluating those theories using within-region or small-N empirical studies. I then go on to ascertain how well the conventional wisdom predicts events of electoral reform and show that existing theories of seat-maximization predict fewer than half of the cases of reform in the established literature. Next I present my broader framework, explaining the utility of an iterated model that conceives of reform as a more generalizable process that can account for changes in the reform process over time. I follow
the introduction of my framework with an in-depth discussion of the primary concepts involved in the electoral reform process, including the dimensions of reform, types of reformer and the role of time and path dependence in the process of constraining reform outcomes. Finally, I explain my expectations about the relationship between reformer motivations, relative strength and path dependent constraints, and eventual reforms adopted as a set of hypotheses to be tested in the following case study chapters and finally with an original dataset of 34 democracies across the globe.

*The Existing Literature*

Initial conditions were once considered the most important explanatory factor in democratic transition and consolidation, focusing on the preparedness, resources and organizational capacity of opposition members capable of wresting power away from the incumbent political elites (e.g., Vachudova 2005) or the importance of constitutional design at the time of transition to democracy (Reynolds 2002). Among others, Kitschelt (1994) and Bratton and van de Walle (1994) look to the structure of pre-democratic regimes as influential factors in the process of transitional and post-transition constitutional design, with little mention of the capacity for reform in later years. While Vachudova (2005) does in fact address the potential for an external solution to the lack of ideal initial conditions, explaining the political leverage of future membership used by the European Union on countries in Central and Eastern Europe to combat uncompetitive institutional arrangements over time, in many parts of the world there is no external actor such as the EU to provide reform pressures where they do not otherwise exist. Reynolds (2002) and Reilly (2006) build on an extensive literature (see Lijphart 1977; 1999 among others) stressing the importance of constitutional
design in conflict mitigation, but these tend to emphasize the initial choice of institutions rather than focus on the process of reform.

Now there is also a growing field of study that assesses dynamic processes in the development of democracy, focusing on evaluating and understanding the importance of the causes and consequences of institutional changes on political parties and party systems. Because the short-term effects of institutional change can be powerful in many new democracies, this type of research is essential for explaining the evolution in their party systems. The majority of the literature on institutional change focuses on two primary questions: what factors lead to institutional change and how do these changes shape political outcomes (Roett 1995; Saez 2002; Thelen 2004; Ostrom 2005)? Though the literature on party systems and electoral laws suggests a causal interactive relationship between the two (Roberts & Wibbels 1999; Marks & Wilson 2000; Hicken 2009), most studies only consider electoral laws as “sticky” independent variables that determine the shape and characteristics of the party system (Cason 2002; Dietz & Myers 2007).

In long-standing democracies, scholars have identified four causal explanations for the pursuit of reform by political elites: 1) expansion of the franchise which creates new interests in the voting population, 2) change in voter preferences regarding interests and party support, 3) public opinion favoring reform, and 4) an ineffective/inappropriate existing system of government. The first three explanations are based on largely strategic goals – as the playing field shifts among and/or within parties, winners will seek to expand and losers will seek to shore up their respective electoral slices of the pie by altering the electoral rules of the game to their advantage or acquiescing to reforms in order to appease the public.\(^5\) The

\(^5\) These are explanations that Reed and Thies (2001a: 153) refer to as “outcome contingent” elite motivations.
fourth explanation is based on largely ideological goals. For example, methods of representation may be viewed as insufficient or inappropriate for the state, such as a plurality-based system that drastically ignores minority issues because small parties and specific group interests go unrepresented. Another example is that methods of representation are inefficient for the state, such as a proportional system in a large and diverse state with no electoral threshold produces dozens of legislative parties that have no hope of coalition-building or consensus mechanisms to encourage efficient, expedient or effective governance.

Studies drawing upon this latter explanation focus not only an alternative causal mechanism for electoral change but also tend to focus on changes to electoral systems that were less common prior to the 1970s. An entire literature devoted to mixed-member electoral systems, which have been some of the most frequently adopted systems in both established and new democracies for the past thirty-five years, discusses change that has in fact occurred in established democracies even though they are, as noted, unlikely to reform. These theories primarily posit that systems themselves are inherently predisposed, by the lack of balance or "electoral efficiency" within the system, to reform but still often seek case-specific factors that make change inevitable or unlikely in each reform scenario and are built on power-based motivations that provide the final 'push' for reform. Scarrow (2001), Katz (2001; 2005), Rahat (2001; 2008), Reed & Thies (2001a; 2001b), and Moser and Thames (2001) are a few who address changes in both new and old democracies from majoritarian or proportional systems to ones that combine elements of both.

The logic of the shift to mixed-member systems results from the extremism of the previous system's rules: those systems that are extreme in one or more dimensions of inter-

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6 These are explanations that Reed and Thies (2001a: 153) refer to as “act contingent” elite motivations.
intra-party competition are predisposed to reformist pressures that require only a small trigger from actors (elites or voters) to ignite calls for change (Shugart 2001). Shifts to mixed-member electoral systems had been infrequently, with the exception of Italy, subject to further system reform, in part due to the reform's capacity to reduce or eliminate the extremism that was the underlying cause of reformist pressure; in these cases once the reform is adopted it is unlikely to 'need' to adopt other reforms. These tend to be systemic shifts that result from a disbelief in the ideological trajectory of extreme electoral systems, and despite the power calculus that triggers the actual reform, is rooted in some measure of ideology about the nature of representation. The post-communist region now has additional examples of movement away from mixed-member systems in Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, the last two of which both switched from mixed to proportional systems only to switch back to the mixed systems within a decade or two, respectively.

However, the dominant trend in the literature on institutional change focuses on the role of strong parties or “winners” in democracy who revise the rules of the electoral game to favor their current advantage and push for such changes at the point when they are the strong and can attempt to capitalize on their relative strength. This literature on strategic choice models of electoral reform suggest that reforms are undertaken at the point when one party or coalition sees an opening to consolidate their power (Bawn 1993; Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005; Remmer 2008; Boix 1999; 2010;). This point can be when party system fragmentation and/or electoral uncertainty are high or increasing, before dominant parties or actors become

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7 In some ways, these explanations are similar to Vachudova (2005) who argued that the most consolidated democracies in Central Europe were those whose initial conditions offered the greatest balance between the opposition forces and outgoing Communists. Once in power the opposition elite were forced to create strong democratic institutions that tightly bound the hands of elected officials, since they could not be sure they would win future elections based on the relatively balanced electoral strength of the opposition and the Communists.
“locked-in” (Mahoney and Thelen 2011: 3) and competition within the party system becomes more institutionalized and self-reinforcing.

According to these models change is more likely to occur when there is instability or uncertainty because in stable systems there is little incentive to challenge or alter the status quo or little reason to assume that change will necessarily be beneficial relative to the status quo. Uncertainty alters actors' perception of the value of change, either to consolidate an already strong position because of perceived new weakness to competitors or to shore up a vulnerable position because of perceived new threats from competitors. Without this uncertainty, there is little reason to suggest that change will benefit the instigator any more than the status quo already has, since seat-maximization is the only goal being pursued.

The early work in this body of literature tended to see strong parties, especially strategic ones, as the most ardent supporters of maintaining the status quo in the electoral system because it favored their retention (Bawn 1993; Boix 1999; 2010). Bawn (1993) addressed German electoral reform, explaining the choice of electoral systems as a rational bargain between parties concerned with their own chances of participating in government. She assumes strategic logic among potential reformers where they consider whether changes to the system will benefit their electoral seat-share and, secondarily, whether it will benefit like-minded potential coalition partners with whom they can assume the role of government formation. Beyond most strategic choice logic, there is an underlying assumption that reformers consider the importance of policy outcomes resulting from the new constellation of post-reform power-holders, as they are most likely to pursue reforms that not only benefit them but also benefit or at least do not detract from the success of their policy partners.
Assessing the more generalizable factors driving party system formation in post-war Europe, Boix's work more directly addressed cross-national comparisons of reform pursuits. He posited that maintaining the status quo is the most desirable of positions for ruling parties with respect to the electoral system and that changes to the electoral arena predispose the ruling parties to alter the system. In particular, two factors changed the electoral arena in such a way as to make ruling parties take notice: the entry of new voters and changes in voters' preferences. When either or both of these factors caused the creation of new parties sufficiently strong enough to challenge the ruling party or parties, as in the case of rising social democratic party support, proportional systems were adopted to ensure that previous rulers could remain a viable part of the system. When only weak new parties were created, the status quo was maintained.

Subsequent literature built on this earlier work, positing that the uncertainty of strong parties produces maintenance of the status quo as powerful actors are afraid to push for change that may result in the empowerment of their opponents (Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005; Remmer 2008). In this newer literature, institutional change is the byproduct of shifts in the competitive positions of parties where such changes serve as attempts to reinforce the status quo rather than create new patterns of political representation, arguing that party system volatility is both precursor to and byproduct of reforms. These scholars sought generalizable and testable theories of the driving factors behind electoral reform adoption.

In a formal game-theoretic setting, such as Benoit’s model, coalitions pursue change when they are rationally motivated to do so, with the expectation that alterations of allocation formulae will endow them with greater numbers of seats, and possess sufficient strength of seat-share to be able to adopt such reforms. Benoit briefly acknowledges some constraints of
this hyper-rational game-theoretic model, including its application to transitional and new democracies likely to suffer from a lack of clarity about who makes the decisions about the electoral system or perfect information on the part of elites (Benoit 2004: 384-385).

An early foray into cross-regional and cross-temporal empirical tests of the strategic motivations for reform, Colomer finds that the emergence of multi-partism encourages pressures for greater proportionality in the system, rather than simply assuming that party systems emerge from the electoral structures that constrain them (2005). The take-home aggregate message is that electoral uncertainty will result in perpetual pressures for systems based on more proportional, “less risky formulas” (2004: 4)\(^8\). His cross-national analysis does not find that the introduction of more proportional electoral rules creates greater multi-partism but instead only confirm the changes in the system that created the initial pressures for proportionality-based reform. In sum, outcomes do not necessarily reflect greater proportionality or more inclusion of smaller parties in the post-reform period but a lower level of disproportionality between votes and seats won.

In a more exhaustive statistical evaluation of recent democratic transition cases in Latin America, Remmer’s study finds that the choice of more or less proportional reforms results from changing the level of certainty of parties driving reform: in the case of rising party system fragmentation smaller parties will push for greater proportionality while in cases of declining party system fragmentation larger parties will push for greater pluralism in seat distribution (2008)\(^9\). Her analysis, similar to Colomer’s, reflects the importance of changes in the party system driving reform pressures in the electoral system, despite a lack of

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\(^8\) Colomer uses the term “inclusivity” rather than “proportionality” to reference the motivation that parties seek to be included or seek to exclude others.

\(^9\) Remmer uses the term “permissiveness” rather than “proportionality” to reference the motivation that parties seek to permit a greater or fewer number of parties into the system.
systematic discussion of what drives changes in the party system or whether party systems experiencing little change would ever reform. Her analysis is not confined to legislative but includes direct executive electoral reform as well, a potentially complicating factor in assessing the strength of strategic logic when it might be unclear who makes the decisions or holds veto power over reforms.

More recent critics of the 'strategic choice' logic have pointed to two other factors that can contribute to the shape of electoral reforms: mass intervention and opinion about the need for certain reforms and coalition partners who may limit (ab)use of reforms adopted for purely political gain. Renwick (2010) suggests that voters' desires are more important than simple strategic choice logic assumes, and that by incorporating what we know about voters and their ability to influence political elites, we gain a more nuanced understanding of how and why they sometimes make choices that appear to contradict some of their power-oriented best interests. In similar fashion, Renwick et al. (2005) follow the theoretical example of Bawn (1993) in suggesting that coalition partner interests will also constrain elite reform pursuits. If a necessary coalition partner will not benefit from reform it may restrain an elite from adopting such a reform because the longer-term costs (ie. loss of a coalition partner who may be necessary for legislating or government formation) of reform may vastly outweigh the short-term seat benefits. Yet, these theories still suggest that power calculus remains at the heart of all reform decisions, and is simply accounting for the pressure of public opinion to avoid losing votes.

Katz and Norris introduce a broader range of reformer motivations and considerations pointing to broad theoretical concerns regarding the limited nature of strategic choice logic (Katz 2005; Norris 2011), such as events in which non-electorally strategic actors are
involved with the process of reform (Katz 2011) or the strategically optimal choice was not taken by the dominant party in the negotiations over revisions to the electoral system (Norris 2001). From case studies (Birch et al. 2002; Pilet 2007) to cross-national comparisons (Bowler et al. 2006), it is clear that the values and ideologies of reformers can and do affect the specific package of reforms adopted, as well as the desire to revisit reform in the future.

Explanations of reform adoptions in Italy and Japan in the early 1990s clearly point to ideological goals among reformers and mass publics. In the Italian case, reforms adopted in 1993 shifted the system from list proportional representation to a mixed-member proportional system. The reform resulted from pressures to reduce excessive fragmentation in the overwhelmingly-large Italian legislature (630 seats in the lower chamber alone) that threatened to perpetually deadlock governments and hamstring effective governance, let alone representation (Renwick et al. 2005; Renwick 2010). The electoral outcome actually produced even greater party system fragmentation, with more parties receiving larger (but still relatively small) shares of the seats than in the immediate pre-reform elections. In response to mounting frustrations by members of parliament and party leaders alike, in 2005 the Italian system passed a new electoral law reverting to a system that largely resembled its pre-pre-reform structure. However, neither of the reforms actually benefitted the larger parties in clear terms, while the debates and public discussions regarding reform took a predominantly ideological tone with respect to representative yet effective government (Katz 2001; Renwick 2010).

While the move to a mixed-electoral system proved an ineffective solution to the problem of party system fragmentation in Italy, mixed-electoral system adoption was intended to resolve a different problem in the Japanese system. Accusations of corruption
and unresponsiveness among the leaders and high-profile members of the perpetually-ruling Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led to mounting public pressure for some type of reform (Reed and Thies 2001a; Christensen 1994). In 1993 the Japanese Diet adopted an electoral law providing for the introduction of a parallel balloting system on which each voter could choose a single-member district representative, as in the pre-reform single non-transferrable vote system, as well as cast a single party vote which would “top up” each party in proportion to its share of the party-list votes. The adoption of a parallel, rather than a more proportional, system represents concessions by reformers to the goals of some LDP leadership (Reed and Thies 2001a: 168). However, splits and pro-reform elements within the LDP, as well as strategic interests of the opposition party members, forced a change from a purely majoritarian system, as the initial LDP plurality plan in 1993 would have assured, to one with some measure of proportionality (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Sakamoto 1999).

Another consideration taken by more recent scholarly work on reform posits the inherent potential differences between “major” and “minor,” questioning whether reforms that are not capable of altering system-wide outcomes should necessarily be subject to the same power-based rational concerns and motivations of elites. The list of four dimensions of reform introduced by Lijphart (1994: 10-12) only included seat-allocation formula, district magnitude, legal threshold and assembly size as the reforms under consideration. Katz addresses these issues, suggesting that “there is no clear dividing line between major and minor reforms” and only assessing reforms within Lijphart’s four dimensions would be “inadequate to encompass all the aspects of elections that might be manipulated for partisan advantage” (Katz 2005: 69).
For example, intraparty reforms have not often been considered to carry particular importance since they are assumed to not have an effect on the distribution of seats among the reformers but within subsets of reformers (Hazan and Rahat 2010), despite knowledge that parties do not bring unitary goals or expectations into the negotiations (Blais and Shugart 2008). Recent studies have included other reforms that might alter effective representation, such as electoral mechanisms to increase symbolic or identity representation with respect to cross-cutting cleavage groups (Htun 2004; Krook 2009; Celis, Krook and Maier 2011), without a clear impact on the inter-partisan power balance. As surmised by Leyenaar and Hasan (2011: 447), “‘non-major’ reforms can indeed have major consequences for the functioning of democracy” and warrant further investigation.

The Central and Eastern European cases demonstrate a combination of strategic and ideological logic employed by reformers during processes of iterated electoral reform. Birch et al. (2002) put forth a framework of “contextualized rationality” in which strategic calculations are the basis for most reform pursuits but that in the post-communist transition environment contextual factors of historical legacies, ideological goals and perceptions of alternative choices will matter (13-18, 23). More specifically, the contextual factors will determine the “menu of choice” while the rational choice logic will determine what constellation of reforms are eventually adopted (23). Most notably in the Central and Eastern European cases we finally encounter examples of repeated reform in the transition and consolidation phases of democratization in Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, where processes of “continuing amendment” and “substantial overhaul” occur following the first free and fair elections (Lewis 2003, 217). For these cases, particularly when reviewing the first decade of change, the selection of an electoral system was an “iterative, recursive
process that both formed political actors and was formed by them” and marks a clear departure from envisioning the process of electoral reform as exclusively the dependent variable (Birch et al. 2002, 178). Bielasiak and Hulsey (2009) suggest that in the context of post-communist democratization and electoral reform there is an inclination by reformers to pursue conservative (i.e. less deviation from the status quo) reforms with greater frequency, rather than jump into a single large-scale overhaul of the system.

In the Polish case institutional problems, notably the lack of perceived “genuine political competition” in the pre-1991 electoral framework and the problems of seat allocation in the post-1991 electoral systems, served as the basis for early reforms that occurred prior to each new set of elections. In Romania the ever-increasing threshold sought to gradually limit the size of the party system during the 1990s, coupled with general media and popular discontent with politics near 2000 that prompted discussions of a majoritarian-based electoral system. In Russia the reforms seem to have eroded democratic governance over time, including constant pre-election tinkering of the election laws and the adoption of a mixed system that heavily favors the largest party in the system. Finally, in Ukraine the process of reform was extremely delayed as party-centric forces fought the central administration and executive for greater control over the process of candidate nomination and selection, pushing back the first attempt at post-1989 electoral reform to 1998 with a shift from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system. In many of these cases scholars have referenced a combination of ideological and strategic choices in determining the reforms adopted at different stages of the process (Birch et al. 2002, 187).

In addition, in the Central and Eastern European electoral reform cases scholars have focused some attention on the relatively low levels of information possessed by reform elites
Elites in these cases often had limited experience with electoral competition, failing in many instances to understand the complexities of electoral formulae or to accurately estimate the impact of certain reform options. These information-limited contexts are presumed to have a constraining effect on the ability of actors to make strategic decisions that can be observed in the aggregate: namely that while perhaps still motivated by strategic pursuit of votes and seats, parties may be making uninformed decisions which they perceive to be in their best interests but in reality leave them worse-off with respect to representation. Studies of cases in this region in this time period point to factors related to high party system uncertainty, with constant new entrants, high volatility and a short history from which to glean public support and opinion information to make informed prediction (Remington and Smith 1996; Kaminski 2002; Shvetsova 2003). Factors in these post-communist cases are likely to be issues in many other cases of new democracy where electoral competition faces levels of uncertainty and poor information not typical in established democracies with stable rosters of competitors and widely-understood rules of the electoral game.

Finally, the literature has begun to assess, usually through case studies or small-N and paired comparisons, examples of reform processes undertaken but never adopted or resulting in reforms so minor as to have almost no impact on voters or seat allocations from the original system. Some commonly-cited examples of these are first-past-the-post systems in the United States (Bowler and Donovan 2008), the United Kingdom (Blais 2008) and Canada (Massicotte 2008) where reformist efforts have consistently failed to produce meaningful changes to the disproportional formula of national-level elections. Other examples include reform discussions in France and Italy (Renwick 2010) that failed to produce “fixes” for
systems deemed by many political observers and elites to have too few or too many parties. And in a refutation of most of the logic that systems will trend toward greater proportionality over time, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania have all recently pursued, with varying levels of failure, more majoritarian components of their electoral systems (Nikolenyi 2011). Common factors cited by authors of failed reform evaluations suggest the powerful veto of courts and high barriers to reforming electoral laws or amending constitutions; component such as these in many cases were put into place by drafters of the democratic institutions to combat or prevent reform in the first place. This turn in the literature to examination of reform failures brings us full circle to early scholarly justifications for the promotion of institutional stickiness.

Testing the Conventional Wisdom

While I will save extensive testing of existing and revised theories for a later chapter, I introduce here a basic test of the conventional wisdom that seat-maximizing strategy is a good predictor of electoral reform. The analysis is simple: in a dataset of the cases of reform most commonly discussed in the previous-referenced literature there are 39 episodes of electoral reform that result in more majoritarian or proportional system adoption. I use party system size, as measured by Laakso and Tagapera’s effective number of parties (ENP) coding, to represent the power balance among parties within the system, with rising party system size as an indicator of increasing uncertainty among decision-makers and declining party system size as an indicator of decreasing uncertainty among decision-makers. I then compare whether more majoritarian reforms result from decreasing uncertainty and more
proportional reforms result from increasing uncertainty, which are the expected relationships based on the seat-maximization literature.

Of the eighteen cases of more majoritarian reforms, eight occur following a decline in the party system size (the expected relationship) and ten occur following an increase in the party system size; of the twenty-one cases of more proportional reforms, nine occur following an increase in the party system size (the expected relationship) and twelve occur following a decline in the party system size. Thus, of the 39 episodes of reform, seat-maximizing logic correctly predicts seventeen cases for a 44% accuracy rate in predictive power. This means that, albeit in a very simple model that does not control for additional factors, a coin flip (50% probability) has a better chance of predicting electoral reform than seat-maximizing power. The simplicity of the model, measuring aggregate party system dynamics rather than calculations of individual parties, may inhibit its predictive capacity – I will investigate this possibility in the following chapters.

What might account for the seemingly poor predictive capacity of seat-maximizing logic, long heralded by the literature on electoral reform as a theoretically plausible and empirically demonstrated explanation? I argue that existing empirical tests of seat-maximizing strategies have suffered from shortcomings related to both theoretical and methodological issues, which I will address in the next section.

Limitations of Existing Theories and Empirical Tests

Two shortcomings of the literature suggest the need for a revision to existing theories and more comprehensive and methodologically rigorous empirical tests of theory. The theoretical concerns include a lack of attention to potential ideological motivations of
reformers, a lack of attention to the limited knowledge and understanding possessed by elites in new democracies about the electoral menu options they face, and a lack of attention to the potential for path dependent effects on the trajectory of reforms in long-term or iterated processes. Methodological concerns include a disregard for impact of the intra-party dimension of the dependent variable of electoral reforms, a misinterpretation of the most appropriate method for temporally classifying observations, and misinterpretations of the outcomes in statistical models that are underspecified and suffer from case-selection problems. I will first address the theoretical issues followed by methodological and measurement problems in prior empirical analyses, and then will proceed to offer my solutions to both in the remainder of the chapter.

First, most existing explanations take the theoretical perspective that the relative bargaining power and potential for exploiting reform outcomes levied by parties within the system determines the outcome of institutional choice: parties make decisions almost entirely based on electoral, rather than ideological or even policy-oriented, calculations. These perspectives may gloss over the possibility that leaders pursue reform for other reasons, such as a desire to simplify the party system to encourage more cohesive coalitions or robust competition (Birch et al. 2002). While the pursuit of more ideological reasons may dovetail with the more self-interested ones, which are undeniably a driving force behind institutional change, they nonetheless deserve consideration in light of the fact that many institutional reforms that appear to defy purely electoral logic and result in the favorable consolidation of a single party or coalition's position of power. Strategic choice logic also suggests predominantly short-term considerations; where reformers have long-term considerations
there may be more room for ideological goals as well.\textsuperscript{10} As such, consideration of both the complementary and contradictory power of strategic and ideological motivations should be considered to a greater degree.

Second, two assumptions made about models of reform narrowly or incorrectly reflect the political world. The first is that political elites fully understand and can accurately assess the likelihood of a range of outcomes for each reform option under consideration. While elites tend to be more educated relative to the average voter with regard to the electoral formulae that translate votes into seats, assuming that all elites, especially those in new democracies, share an equal capacity for such calculation is problematic and likely incorrect (Andrews and Jackman 2005).

The second is that reforms can occur in a sporadic fashion, as a simple self-interested response to changes in the electoral landscape or as a means to correct miscalculations with respect to expected reform-induced outcomes (Hartlyn and Luna 2007: 12; Kuhonta 2008). This could also be iterated reform by self-interested elites seeking short-term gain and who are constrained by their legislative power. Where reforms are iterated, with changes occurring in the same area over multiple time and electoral periods, programmatic interests may be at play that either complement or contradict purely electoral interests. Automatically assuming self-interest likely does not explain why we see iterated change, since correcting for miscalculation in later periods need not reflect purely power-based motivations but the desire to fix representation and accountability concerns as well. While I address the issue of over-time reform, systematic evaluation of the effect of elite mistakes on the reform process is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{10} See Hartlyn and Luna (2007: 11) on the necessity of distinguishing short- and long-term consequences and their relationship to the goals of reformers.
Finally, it would be difficult to consider the causes and consequences of iterated rounds of electoral reform without the context of institutional “stickiness” and difficulty in democracy of rolling back reforms that voters may have grown accustomed to or desired very much. The question of path dependence must be narrowly\textsuperscript{11} and explicitly addressed within this particular research agenda: did the decision to pursue change in one area effectively eliminate the chance for other changes in the future?\textsuperscript{12} One example of this may be the way the executive is elected: once the decision has been made to directly elect the president it may be difficult if not impossible to revert to an indirectly-elected executive since the person/party holding the presidency is unlikely to give up the office or the choice may have originally been the result of popular opinion and thus any other elected official would not propose a reversion and risk her future electoral success.\textsuperscript{13} If reform can only occur once then this type of path dependent consideration would not matter since the elimination of future options is moot. In the context of iterated reforms, how choices in early periods eliminate or constrain options in later periods must be considered.

With respect to methodological and measurement issues, the first cause for concern is the exclusion in all cross-national studies of the intra-party dimension of reform. Partly due to the influence of Lijphart’s schema of measurable electoral reform on the interparty dimension, authors of multi-country analyses have only aggregate changes occurring along the majoritarian-proportional continuum with no regard for changes in the processes through which individual elites receive seats allocated by the electoral system. Though Shugart and

\textsuperscript{11} I use a narrow definition of path dependence as a process in which a choice made at time $t$ does not predetermine events at time $t+1$ but reduces the likelihood of some possibilities from occurring at time $t+1$.

\textsuperscript{12} For a discussion on the importance of path dependence to studying historic and dynamic contexts see Pierson, 2003; 2004; Mahoney, 2000; Hartlyn & Luna, 2007; Munck, 2004.

\textsuperscript{13} Tsebelis (2002) gives examples of elites who, once assuming a veto role, function in a path dependent way such as a directly-elected executive who would never hand back veto power if elected and continually electable.
Wattenberg (2001) introduce the second dimension of reform and attempt to systematically assess change along it, their priority is to evaluate the *causes* of reform and so they do not take the step of systematically evaluating the impact of either interparty or intraparty reform on electoral outcomes and party system change by country. All previous discussions of the intra-party dimension of electoral reform have come from single case studies that tend to point to the unique party or leadership factors that drive those choices rather than systematic or generalizable factors. Including such variables in statistical models to test the causes and effects of intraparty reform only requires the coding of an additional variable to replace or complement the interparty variables, rather than requiring an entirely new set of models to test theories about the cause and effect of reform.

Second, the process of coding observations of reform has suffered from both over and under specification. Annual data, especially when coded for independent variables that do not or rarely vary annually, such as party system size and change in party system size, overspecifies the effects of contextual variables and is an inappropriate way to code observations even if reforms are adopted in a single year. Single-event data, especially when multiple reforms can occur within a single country in subsequent periods, underspecifies the effects of structural variables common to individual cases of reform relative to other cases and is an inappropriate way to code observations if a single country experiences multiple reform outcomes, especially in the case of different reform adoptions (i.e. proportional representation in one election and mixed the next). A more appropriate method is needed for classifying and coding observations and applying them in a single statistical model.

Third, the outcomes of models previously used to evaluate the factors statistically associated with reform outcomes have misinterpreted underspecified results or failed to
theoretically justify case selection with respect to the statistical model being employed. A probit model that is only directed to correlate the probability of reform to the effective party system size has failed to include a range of control variables as well as alternate specifications of the independent variable. Furthermore, inclusion of cases in which no reform on the dependent variable occurs or can be expected to occur should not be included in a probit model, which is designed to measure change in likelihood of one outcome or another based on the assumption that any given observation has a possibility of any outcome. In a system where reform never occurs because barriers are so high that reform is practically impossible (barring total system collapse), comparing between the outcome of non-reform versus reform is theoretically indefensible given the way the statistical model is mathematically designed.

In order to approach the theoretical and methodological concerns raised by careful analysis of existing theories and empirical analyses, I now build on seat-maximizing logic with a revised and expanded framework for evaluating electoral reform. Detailed explanation of the role of different components and factors suggests that a more general framework can be offered, but with qualifications and measurement concerns. More specifically, I argue that while many things shape and constrain actor preferences during the electoral reform process two are of greatest importance to explaining general patterns of reform: 1) temporal effects, in particular ratchet effects that produce a unidirectional trajectory of reform outcomes; and 2) alternative motivations that constrain seat-maximizing tendencies and provide a ceiling to reform outcomes possible under the ratchet effect. From this framework I derive several testable hypotheses and discuss a detailed case study and large-N dataset through which to evaluate the explanatory power of existing theory.
An Integrated Framework for Evaluating Electoral Reform

Traditional seat-maximizing theory posits the causal mechanism of electoral uncertainty as the driving reason for reform pursuits, such that rising uncertainty of future electoral success or rising certainty of future electoral losses should lead to greater proportionality and declining uncertainty should lead to greater majoritarianism. However, preliminary results indicate the limited predictive power of this relationship. The combination of the reasons for and process of reform offered by more recent cases of electoral institutional change suggests three things. First, there is a need for a more time-specific way of generalizing the model so that it is no longer simply a model that offers a post-hoc power-based explanation for the occurrence of electoral reform at any one single snapshot in time. Second, there is a need to more carefully account for the constraints from previously-adopted reforms, which can alter the range of later-period reformers and options. Third, there is a need for a more comprehensive model of electoral reform that combines, as most elites do in rhetoric and negotiated settings, aspects of power-based (seat-maximizing) and ideological (alternative) motivations. Building upon seat-maximizing logic, which underpins most of the reason and timing of electoral reforms, with temporal constraints and alternative motivations, we arrive at an integrated framework for evaluating electoral reform.

In terms of the temporal aspect of reform, there are two primary considerations to make. The first is the question of how and whether different types of reform processes should be expected to produce different outcomes. For example, would single-event reforms produce different outcomes than a longer-term process would eventually produce? The second question is how time might affect the long-term reform processes, specifically in terms of path dependence effects on later rounds of reforms or revisions to previous reforms.
For example, does a decision made at time $t$ affect decisions made at time $t+n$? If these two considerations can alter the trajectory or direction of reform then they require explanations as to what expectations there are about the effects on the timing and shape of reform outcomes.

In terms of the alternative motivations, there are again two primary considerations to make. The first is the question of what alternative motivations for reform might be, such that they would produce potentially different outcomes than seat-maximizing logic would. For example, does a belief about the nature of democratic state stability produce a different choice of electoral reform than a desire to obtain more seats? The second question is how the two types of motivations might interact, resulting in complementary or contradictory choices and thus different outcomes. For example, if the belief about the need for a democratically stable state produces a different choice of reform than seat-maximizing logic would, which one prevails and why? If these two considerations can theoretically alter the motivations as to what reforms to adopt then they require more explanation regarding how they should affect expectations about the adoption of reform outcomes.

I argue that ratchet effects and alternative motivations constrain seat-maximizing choices by producing an iterated reform process in which choices are highly dependent on more than immediate, short-term calculations of empowered actors. Such effects are most likely to occur in new democracies where incremental change may not be viewed in a particularly negative light or actors take a more medium- or long-term view of reform outcomes. In terms of ratchet effects I argue that, due to their exclusionary or inclusionary nature, once undertaken some types of reform constrain future reform options. More specifically, some types of reforms result in the sharply reduced likelihood of future reform options while other types of reforms increase the likelihood of unidirectional changes (i.e.
increases) once they have been applied. In order to retract or reverse those reforms, there needs to be some exogenous or extreme shift in the beliefs or relative strength of actors who previously pursued reforms. It is also possible that later periods of potential reform produce adherence to the status quo of previously adopted reforms.

What then constrains reforms once they have begun on these directed trajectories? I argue that alternative motivations can provide a ceiling that constrains reformers who might wish to continually pursue reform to their own benefit. More specifically, some views about the nature of a stable state and/or democratic representation or longer-term evaluations of seat-maximization outcomes and party survival might curb reformers’ motivations regarding issues like electoral threshold increases and decreases in district magnitudes. For example, if an actor believed that in a diverse country that minority voices should be protected and represented, regardless of the size of the group, she might advocate for or pursue an electoral system based on proportionality stemming from her belief in minority representation. Another example might be if an actor believed that his country should remain unitary, and that federal structures would likely cause the dissolution of that state, he might advocate for a single set of electoral rules and regulations that applied in the exact same way to each level of government so as to avoid local specialization or regionally-specific outcomes. In order to provide a credible alternative to seat-maximizing logic, rather than simple rhetorical grandstanding, these motivations must clearly depart from what seat-maximizing logic would predict. In addition, these alternative motivations might be easy for smaller or fringe parties to perhaps credibly argue as their real goals, but it would be difficult to assess the actual impact of the alternatives relative to seat-maximizing choices if larger, effective reformers were not making them.
Rather than a simple causal relationship where pure power calculation drives all reform pursuits, now a trade-off or complementary relationship exists between power and ideology in determining an actor's reform pursuits, and those pursuits are constrained by previous choices which may be difficult to undo. Each actor's pursuits are funneled into the negotiation process where actor strength determines the eventual reforms adopted, and the resulting electoral outcome produces a new set of actors who may begin the process all over again. If the process begins again, the new actors’ motivations, relative strengths and constraints of previous choices determine the course of potential new reform. If new reform does not occur, it is either the result of reform-motivated actors without the strength to pursue reforms or a lack of reform-motivated actors, both of which may be the direct result of previous choices that eliminate certain voices.

*Understanding the complexities of iterated reform processes*

Before moving on to the component parts of the framework, I address the issue of time as it directly affects the type of reform process that may occur. Simply put, much of the literature on electoral reform has viewed reforms as one-off processes that are loosely linked to each other by “failures” of previous reform periods that require revisions in order to “fix” the problems that arise. For example, in the Italian reforms the second round of reforms was adopted to correct for “mistakes” made in the first reforms in 1992. Little of the literature attempts to conceive of the reform process as pieces of a long-term chain of events, or to distinguish between expectations of what single-event versus iterated processes might produce. Here, I attempt to rectify this oversight by opening up a discussion of how and why the structure and timing of the reform events themselves might change expected outcomes.
Particularly as reforms in new democracies become protracted, multi-iteration processes, as new actors with different motivations become involved and as constraints of previous reform periods are felt, the need to address and clarify the effects of time on specific procedures is important and long overdue.

The process of reform is often a single-shot event with a single set of actors, goals and constraints that combine to produce some package of adopted reforms. In considering reforms that occur under such a finite temporal model, it is theoretically simple enough to separate the independent from dependent variables: reform is the outcome to be explained by the mixture of actors and motivations constrained by the system already in place. However, what if reform processes exist that are not captured by a single-shot event model? How does an iterated sequence of events complicate or defy the simplicity of the independent-dependent variable relationship, and what additional factors must be considered?

In abstract terms two possibilities exist with respect to multiple-episode reform processes: dependent and contiguous series of events and independent and contiguous series of events. The definition of contiguous series of events that I use is events that occur in back-to-back inter-election periods. Dependent and contiguous series of events are those in which, over a period of time, involved actors remain relatively constant (either as representatives from a particular party or the actual actors themselves) and pursue relatively constant goals that either went unfulfilled in early events of reform or were retracted or “corrected” in later events of reform. These series of events constitute long-term reform in pursuit of a single set of end-goals or a single ‘trajectory’ of reform. Such processes, I argue, should be considered long-term but still follow the same logic and model as single events where, despite taking a very long time to complete, each represents a single process due to
the lack of variation and high level of endogeneity in terms of actors, goals, and constraints. Less abstractly put, if a reform process stretches over fifteen years but involves all the same actors working toward the same goals as in the beginning, differing only in terms of their relative strength to control the process and outcome over time, that represents a single, albeit lengthy, event of reform. What happens in the interim between electoral periods is much less influential in altering the end-goal or trajectory of reform and so we can think of those in the same theoretical way as we think of a single-event process.

Yet what really matters is when there is not a clear single process of change, when there are so many factors that change from period to period and we need to be able to tease out which of those factors really matter, which are the factors that really determine what makes change at time $t$ different than change at time $t+1, t+2$, and so on. Independent and contiguous series of events are different than dependent ones, and I argue that they represent a series of single events but ones that are related to each other by way of inverting the dependent and independent variables in the model of reform. Such independent events involve a mixture of old and new or entirely new actors, often as a result of previously-adopted reforms, who bring a mixture of old and new or entirely new goals. In addition, the new event is related to the previous event insofar as the composition of and institutional constraints faced by new reformers are direct results of the previous event, reversing the causal relationship and bridging between reform events. As such, independent and contiguous events, rather than a long-term single event of reform or simply a series of single events of reforms, should be considered an event of iterated reform.

For the sake of theoretical parsimony, non-contiguous events, even when the reform adoptions are related to previous reform decisions, should be treated as separate single events
since the likelihood is much greater that actors and external constraints have changed, even if
general goals and motivations have remained fairly constant. Thus we really only have two
types of long-term change – dependent contiguous and independent contiguous – and the
independent contiguous sets of events warrant a more complex theoretical explanation since
they are more likely to exhibit the additional factors to and constraints on the strategic model.

**Dimensions of Electoral Reform**

In order to fully understand the range of potential electoral reforms that can be
considered and undertaken, we must have an understanding of the range of system structures
and outcomes that are available to reformers. There are two primary dimensions that
structure democratic systems: interparty and intraparty. While few electoral systems fall into
the endpoint categories of these dimensions, many electoral reform paths begin with the
intention of achieving a categorical jump, rather than incremental movement, towards the
endpoint at the opposite end of that particular spectrum. The theoretical importance of the
interparty dimension to structure democratic competition and effective representation is well
documented, though the relevance to some authors of such reforms varies depending on the
degree of change enacted (Sartori 1994; Barkan 1995; Reynolds 1995; Lijphart 1999).

I argue that more attention is needed on the intraparty dimension, particularly with
respect to how it affects party system fragmentation as well as maintains party discipline in
terms of effective representation (Sartori 1994; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001; Norris 2002;
Andeweg and Irwin 2005; Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). To explain the relevance of these two
dimensions, in his seminal work on the structure of electoral institutions Giovanni Sartori
introduces the interparty element in the first chapter and the intraparty element in the second
chapter as the primary components that “shape the party system and affect the spectrum of
representation.” (Sartori 1994: ix). Figure 2.1 depicts the two different dimensions as they construct a plane, with every electoral system falling into one of the four quadrants. The systems presented in the Figure show the general location of five ideal types of systems, while the following discussion will address each dimension and specific system characteristics along each dimension in greater depth. Reforms thus reposition a system along either or both of these two dimensions.

Figure 2.1 Dimensions of Electoral Reform: Intra- and Inter-party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRAPARTY DIMENSION</th>
<th>INTERPARTY DIMENSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian Two-Party System (with multiple rounds or another mechanism for party discipline)</td>
<td>Closed List Proportional Representation Multiparty System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed member (multiparty) system</td>
<td>Electoral Threshold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian Two-Party System (with primaries or lacking a mechanism for party discipline)</td>
<td>Open List Proportional Representation Multiparty System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interparty dimension refers to the method of seat distribution and allocation, the choice of which may affect the nomination and selection aspects of systemic control, and the ideal types are proportionality-based and plurality-based representation. The nature of representation infrequently falls into these ideal types, as many electoral systems around the
world now employ an intentional mix of proportionality- and plurality-based representation mechanisms, but the two channels represent fundamentally different approaches to the nature of representation in the party system. Figure 2.2 demonstrates some of the systems that fall along the interparty dimension, and the range of potential systems that reformers can move towards or away from.

Figure 2.2 The Interparty Dimension of Electoral Systems

|---------------|--------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|

Proportionality-based systems, on the right-hand side of the continuum in Figure 2.2, are often characterized by some degree of party-centric control. These systems do not necessarily disfavor large parties in decision-making processes but are typically more inclusive from the competition and inclusion side. Proportional systems are designed to distribute seats in a way that most closely approximates the exact proportion of votes cast for any individual or party. Large districts are common in proportional systems and without mechanisms to limit the number of parties (i.e. electoral/entry thresholds) such systems tend to produce multi-party systems. The largest and most fragmented systems with high electoral volatility levels occur in countries with the largest average district magnitudes (and diverse
populations or low barriers to competitive entry), but the number of 'wasted votes' is low. Though proportionality is commonly thought of as reducing the direct link between voters and elected representatives, relatively small district size or open lists can approximate some of the representation features of plurality-based systems and the larger number of parties may offer voters more choices.

Plurality-based systems, on the left-hand side of the continuum in Figure 2.2, are often characterized by some degree of candidate-centric control. Plurality-based systems are usually designed as 'winner-take-all' contests that allow voters a direct channel of accountability by producing a single candidate to represent each party. Small districts, usually one-seat per, are a common feature of plurality systems and tend to produce dominant two-party systems because in any given district only one party can win, favoring parties with greater resources who go head-to-head. The smallest party systems with the least electoral volatility occur in countries with plurality-based elections, but the number of 'wasted' votes is the highest in such systems where many times a majority of a district's votes can be cast for losing candidates. Though commonly thought of as increasing costs of elections and inner-party conflict, the direct link does allow for a high level of accountability and limited number of parties may make choices and party messages more clear to voters.

One way of characterizing the proportionality-plurality continuum is the degree of inclusivity of each system. More inclusive systems tend to be those that fall into the proportional half of the spectrum, where many parties can compete and survive as the system moves closer to full proportionality. More exclusive systems tend to be those that fall into the plurality-based half of the spectrum, where only one party can win in each district and so the system favors the largest parties who can spread support to the largest number of districts.
While there is a range and the choice of proportional versus plurality does not determine the size of the party system alone, the correlation rate is quite high between large multiparty and very proportional systems and 2-party plurality-based systems.

However, there is one more aspect that can reduce inclusivity even in the most proportional of systems: entry thresholds. Such thresholds are a distinct mechanism for altering the overall composition of the party system and skewing representation to favor larger groups (i.e. bigger parties). As thresholds are introduced they, almost by definition, reduce proportionality as they reduce inclusivity. There are two types: 1) competitive entry thresholds that raise barriers to registration, nomination and campaign entry; and 2) electoral entry thresholds that raise barriers, beyond what might occur from district magnitude, to legislative entry via minimum vote-shares. Competitive entry thresholds exist in most countries, often as forms of basic registration, and can range from simple registry and a minimum number of signatures to demonstrations of campaign funds and requirements of functioning regional and local branch offices. Electoral entry thresholds exist in many proportional countries for the purpose of weeding out extremist parties, reducing the power of regionally-based parties, or generally simplifying the party system and government formation by reducing the number of participants. High thresholds of either type, when carefully enforced, can reduce inclusivity in proportional systems. In plurality-based systems legislative entry thresholds are unnecessary since the small district magnitude excludes smaller-party candidates. The arrow in Figure 2.2 depicts the effect of thresholds on the interparty dimension: a reduction in proportionality.

The intraparty dimension refers to who controls various aspects of the electoral and legislative arenas, and the ideal types are party-centric versus candidate-centric control. The
nature of systemic control revolves around four aspects of entry into the political arena: candidate nomination, candidate selection, government formation and member actions. The first aspect of systemic control is that of candidate nomination, which may be controlled by independent nominations directly to ballots, independent nominations to party primaries followed by voters selection to general elections, or party nominations to party primaries and/or general election lists. The second aspect of systemic control is candidate selection which may be controlled by voters directly or via ordered lists that parties control but only win seats if chosen by voters. The third aspect of systemic control is government formation which may be controlled by only one party or formal coalition of parties, a directly-elected executive who may be without party affiliation, or parties competing for positions based solely on electoral performance and legislative seat-share. The fourth and final aspect of systemic control is member actions which may be controlled by functional or legal restrictions that limit types of votes and activity in the legislature, internal party discipline (which may include formal mechanisms for punishment or advancement) or nothing at all. It is the first two aspects which are the most proximate to the process, procedures and outcomes of elections, and thus are the most subject to the formal electoral reform process. Most electoral reforms on the intraparty dimension move systems between party- and candidate-centric control of the nomination and election process, along the continuum of different systems depicted in Figure 2.3.

The two types of intraparty relations represent ideal types and few systems boast entirely party- or candidate-centric control. Party-centric control leaves the majority of election-related decisions in the hands of parties, rather than individuals. In terms of candidate nominations party-centric systems are characterized by regulations that close the
process of candidate nomination to non-party competitors, employing mechanisms such as a prohibition of independent candidates or any other type of non-party/coalition affiliated candidates. In terms of candidate selection processes party-centric systems are characterized by regulations that close the process of candidate selection to non-party participants, where voters do not select candidates directly but select parties who control which specific candidates fill the seats won by the party.

Figure 2.3 The Intraparty Dimension of Electoral Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Completely Closed Lists</th>
<th>Limits on Independent Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partially Open Lists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully Open Lists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-round without primaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party-centric control in one area need not require or even complement party-centric control in another, but many systems that endow parties with a great deal of control on one often do so on many aspects. For example, systems where parties have a great deal of internal discipline often have a great deal of party control over candidate nomination and selection, though the causal direction may be difficult to discern. Party-centric control at its most extreme means that virtually no role for individuals exists, as parties control the names submitted for nomination and seat allocations, and any individual who wishes to compete
must become part of an existing party or create a new party as a vehicle for their individual goals. Parties in party-centric systems mostly take action to prevent erosion of their control and once control shifts to candidates for nomination and selection it is difficult to undo.

Candidate-centric control puts the majority of control into the hands of individuals, prioritizing independent candidate characteristics over party roles and identifications. In terms of candidate nomination candidate-centric systems are characterized by regulations that open the process to non-party competitors, allowing independent candidates to run regardless of whether they have a party affiliation or not. Most candidate-centric systems still have a number of barriers for the entry of independent candidates, such as registration based on a certain number of supporting signatures, but in the most candidate-centric systems most of these barriers are instituted for functional reasons related to the conduct of elections rather than the purpose of limiting the competition of independent candidates. In terms of candidate selection candidate-centric systems are characterized by regulations that open the process to non-party participants, for example voters can select candidates directly from party lists or non-list ballot positions rather than only casting votes for parties who then decide who to place into seats.

Candidate-centric control in one aspect need not require or even complement candidate-centric control in another, but many systems that endow candidates with a great deal of control on one aspect often do so on many. For example, systems where candidates have a great deal of control over nomination and selection often have a lack of party discipline because parties become beholden to the strongest candidates to win seats for them and maintain their power or number of seats. Candidate-centric control at its most extreme means that virtually all elected offices are filled at the initiative of individual candidates who
can bypass parties to run campaigns and voters who choose their representatives directly, eliminating much of the role served by parties as intermediaries in the policy/platform-formation, interest aggregation, and heuristic signaling processes. Candidate-centric systems infrequently move toward more party-centric mechanisms because strong individuals have little incentive to give up their individual controls to a group that likely employs some type of group-wise decision-making process or may prioritize other types of individuals in the candidate nomination and selection process.

Much in the same way as thresholds affect the interparty dimension, independent candidacy can force party-centric systems to be more candidate-centric in nature. By nature, independent candidates can function without party sanction or endorsement although the type of electoral rules may affect the degree to which independent candidates are truly independent of the party system and partisan influence and control. In a system in which independent candidates can self-nominate and can be included on the ballots for voters to select, the level of party control declines as non-partisan elites may affect the range of candidates and composition of the legislature by appealing directly to voters. The arrow in Figure 2.3 depicts the effect of independent candidates on systems: a reduction in party control over candidate nomination and selection.

Reforms in many countries over the past few decades have exhibited a centralizing tendency with respect to the two dimensions of reform. Many countries introducing electoral reform have ended up with some form of formal or de facto mixed system (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2006: 23-24) with cases as diverse as Japan, New Zealand, and Romania all moving toward either a strict mixed-member multi-party system or one that exhibits centrist movement along both dimensions of reform. While the motivations for these central
tendencies have been quite different – from dissatisfaction with government corruption in Japan to a public referenda stemming from a campaign “mistake” in New Zealand to a mixture of strategic and ideological motivations in Romania – the result has still been that each case moved toward the center. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focus on movement of cases across the two dimensions, evaluating whether a central tendency is evident across regions and time. Chapters 4 and 5 depict the movement of the Indonesian system along the two dimensions, showing a central trajectory over the two inter-electoral periods from 1999-2004 and 2004-2009, while Chapter 6 goes into greater detail regarding individual case movement toward the center across a large-N sample of countries.

The Ratchet Effect and Electoral Reform

While the term path dependence suffers from overly-broad (ab)use in comparative historical analysis, for the purposes of this analysis ‘path dependence’ refers to the ratchet effect in which specific historical legacies of previous institutional choice directly constrain future choices (Huber and Stephens 2001). When a decision to adopt a certain reform is made, rather than pre-determine outcomes, that decision eliminates or renders extremely unlikely the adoption of other reform options in the future, due to the actors or strategic goals it eliminates. For example, the adoption of an electoral threshold reduces the number of legislative parties (else why would reformers adopt it?) and, in doing so, eliminates the voices of all the small parties it prevented from obtaining seats. Without those voices, there would be little to no reason to revisit the threshold except to increase it, since there is no longer an advocate for a threshold-less system.
The possible exception might be if public opinion reveals a desire by voters to remove the threshold, but that is an unlikely exception and one that the majority of parliamentarians would probably ignore unless their own voters also wanted removal of the threshold. Thus, the decision to adopt the threshold does not pre-determine the outcome, except to likely eliminate some parties from future legislatures, but the adoption does sharply reduce the likelihood that the threshold will be lowered or removed in the future. This follows the logic of what Huber and Stephens (2001) have termed a “ratchet” effect: changes tend to exhibit largely unidirectional movement at the hands of decision-makers to continue to push the ratchet “up” or maintain the status quo and leave the ratchet in the position of the previous change. In this type of trajectory only an extreme action of releasing the ratchet will result in a change that undoes or reverses the direction of previous reforms; such an action is infrequently undertaken.

This ratchet effect thus indicates that when reform occurs, the outcome is most likely to be maintained; a secondary outcome is that if reform occurs again it will continue to deepen the progress of the first reform, rather than rollback the first reform. The framework does not suggest a necessary deepening once one reform process has occurred, but highlights the likelihood that once a reform occurs the typical tendency is either to retain the change or, if another change is made, to deepen the effect of the previous change. With respect to specific types of reforms, some are more or less likely to display maintenance or deepening effects and some are more susceptible to rollback (i.e. displaying less of a ratchet effect).

This type of path dependent nature of party-centric control is predicated on maintenance of that control unless reforms are adopted that move the system towards more candidate-centric control. Such a change is unlikely to occur "naturally," ie. not as the
byproduct of a natural progression of reforms, since the very mechanism used to elect a
candidate directly presupposes a certain type of candidate who is unlikely to view party-
centric control favorably in terms of their chances for re-election or ability to control their
own policy goals. Thus during reform periods parties in a party-centric system will attempt
to maintain or deepen party-centric control mechanisms when they have the chance, with
maintenance of the status quo the default expectation in any given time period. On the other
side, eroding party-centric control or systems that always boasted candidate-centric control
suggests that once individuals achieve individual power there are few circumstances under
which they want to share it that might induce them to rewrite rules in a less individual-centric
way. This indicates that once candidate-centric control has been achieved to some degree,
the most likely 'natural' progression of future reforms is maintenance or deepening of
candidate-centric control.

Yet the switch from party-centric to candidate-centric is unlikely to occur as a result
of a natural progression of reforms rather than an external shock, such as pressure from
powerful individuals or external actors or as the result of a shift in ideological beliefs about
the nature of party-voter or candidate-voter relations. As such, we should expect to witness
shifts between party- and candidate-centric control as the result of more than simply strategic
choice calculations. Few parties in a party-centric system are likely to want to give up their
power to candidates or individual members, but may do so either because they view the
trade-off between seat calculations and reduced central party power as favorable (an unlikely
scenario) or some ideological factor induces a change in their beliefs about where control
should lie; the converse is also true for individuals in a candidate-centric system.
An extensive literature has investigated the directionality between proportionality and plurality systems, suggesting that shifts toward proportionality are much more common, as are shifts to mixed-member systems that combine aspects of proportional and plurality-based models (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001; Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2006). However, path dependency in this case trends toward the strategic choice explanation of power calculations: the dominant reason for a shift from proportionality to plurality or vice versa is when electoral predictions suggest a party or coalition would benefit from doing so, and the choice is only as path dependent as the fortunes of the actors who chose to make the shift. If the shift produces worse outcomes for the actors who pushed for its adoption, either the actors who benefitted will choose to keep the new system or will choose to change it back if they do not believe they will continue to benefit from it. There is a role for ideology in the causal explanation in terms of the substantive rationale for adopting reforms in either direction, and this may prove more path dependent especially in terms of preserving the existing level of proportionality, but in this case there is little in the strategic choice literature to suggest that one type of reform or another is strictly eliminated from future consideration based on previous institutional choice. In other words, in terms of the choice between a plurality- or proportionality-based system, if strategic logic is the method used to shift from one system to the other, there is no reason why the system cannot be changed back if the outcomes do not sufficiently satisfy the expected beneficiaries or the unexpected beneficiaries do not want to retain the newly-instituted system.

Finally, electoral thresholds and similar mechanisms to reduce party system size are incredibly path dependent in nature. The previous example of the mechanism of an electoral threshold demonstrates how path dependence can strategically predict the likelihood of
rolling back a threshold: based entirely on strategic choice power calculations there does not appear to be much of any reason why a system that adopts an electoral threshold would ever consider reducing or eliminating said threshold. In fact, the greater likelihood would be to consider raising it. Here again we see the potential complication for strategic theory, as individual actors may violate their own self-interested power calculations and choose to lower thresholds or somehow reduce their application. The only possible explanations are that public opinion reveals disapproval of the artificial exclusion of smaller parties via thresholds or ideology pushes elites to reconsider the mechanism as a tool of democratic competition, since it reduces pluralism in the legislature and increases 'wasted' votes. This is of course most important in cases where electoral laws must be ratified by a public referendum, as in the New Zealand case.

Intraparty control shifts can be very path dependent if adopted, implemented, and enforced. Parties will resist the opening of lists or shifts to pluralism because those choices guarantee some loss of party control, and can move a system from party-centric to candidate-centric very quickly. When parties are faced with pressures to open the selection process (from civil society, smaller parties who have some popular candidates, etc) they will limit the amount of opening or create alternative processes to circumvent open choices as much as possible; when large parties oppose this option it will fail repeatedly to gain much ground.

This means that some options are now virtually eliminated as possible future outcomes: once the shift has occurred it is difficult revert to party control over lists once they are submitted because the individual candidates now acquiring seats are likely to be the ones

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14 An example of this is the current debate in New Zealand regarding reforms to the Election Law, in particular whether there should be a change in the level of the electoral threshold and to what percentage. While multiple public opinion polls were held during the 2011 debate over whether to keep the mixed-member proportional system adopted in 1993, the public actually has the right to suggest changes directly to the electoral commission.
favored by the system of candidate-centric control and/or voters like the mechanism of direct choice. This means that the range of future options is now limited to: 1) maintenance of the status quo, 2) move to single-member districts, 3) move to smaller multi-member districts, 4) move to a mixed system that balances proportionality with plurality seats in a reapportioning or parallel formula, and 5) new requirements to become a candidate (least likely because it is too complicated and unnecessary with the diversity and pluralism in the existing process or favoring strong individual candidates).

Interparty control shifts can be very path dependent if adopted, implemented, and enforced. Small parties will resist shifts to pluralism because those choices guarantee some reduction in their seat-share while large parties will typically push because it will advantage their seat-shares. When small parties are faced with pressures to reduce proportionality they will come together in coalition or try to persuade large parties to avoid as much loss as possible; when large parties oppose this option it will not be introduced. Public opinion could also influence large parties to avoid plurality-based seat distribution, given the potential for large numbers of ‘wasted’ votes.

Once the shift to greater proportionality occurs it is difficult to revert to pluralism unless one party gains enough seats to unilaterally change the system back. Similarly, once the shift to greater pluralism occurs it is difficult to revert to proportionality unless the dominant party/parties lose enough seats in future elections that the rest of the parties in the system can force a new round of reform. This means that the range of future options rather rests with swings in electoral outcomes: 1) status quo, 2) reduction in district magnitude, 3) move to single-member districts, 4) move to a mixed system that balances proportionality with plurality in some re-apportioning or parallel formula.
Thresholds, at least parliamentary entry thresholds, are incredibly subject to ratchet effects if adopted, implemented, and enforced. Parties already sitting in legislature decide to limit their numbers and when large enough parties all agree then they will outvote the smaller parties in systems where votes are conducted via non-supermajoritarian processes. This means that some options are now extremely unlikely: there cannot be a return to pre-threshold entry because any opponent of the threshold (ie. any party who cannot garner enough votes to obtain seats) is no longer in the legislature and therefore cannot directly impact a vote or negotiation within the legislature. Path dependently this means that the range of future options is basically now limited to: 1) maintenance of the status quo, 2) diffusion of the threshold to sub-national legislative elections, 3) increase in the threshold, 4) increase in the entry requirements, 5) decrease in the threshold (least likely path).

Alternative Motivations and Electoral Reform

The new democracy cases of electoral reform over the past two decades suggest that reformers are not simply seeking power and seats every hour of every day. While few believe that all reformers are always only seeking to maximize their short-term seat-shares – particularly in the case of reformers in democracies where those reformers have exhibited other propensities toward transitional justice, reparations for human rights violations under authoritarian rule, and adoption of rules that protect and expand the rights of targeted minorities – most models of reform still focus entirely on seat-maximizing logic as the basis for all reform decision-making. Part of the reason is ease in measurement but another is that at face value it is easy to accept the argument that political elites will do whatever is necessary to maintain or obtain more power. The inaccurate predictive capacity of these
seat-maximizing models suggest a refinement of some type is needed that can more accurately account for why reform outcomes do not match the expectations more than 50% of the time. Alternative motivations that reflect a more accurate, or more predictive, view of the thought process and beliefs of elite reformers can be identified.

First, in terms of stability of the democratic state, parties may recognize that some reform trajectories, such as perpetual increasing of electoral thresholds or a switch to single-member districts, will either be fundamentally destabilizing to democracy and/or perceived as unrepresentative or illegitimate to voters. Thus there will be pressure either within or from outside the legislature to place effective ceilings on thresholds or restrict reductions in district magnitude that may eliminate elements of proportionality or plurality of voice. In terms of views about the nature of democratic representation, parties may advocate for certain electoral system elements because of the type of representative government those elements engender. For example, a party may advocate for single-member districts because they believe that is the best way to produce an effective accountability mechanism between voters and their representatives. Similarly, reduction in district size may be pursued by legislators as a means to effectively balance the functional role of legislator with the practical concerns of future candidates: smaller physical districts allow legislators to split time more effectively between legislative duties and local representation work. Alternative motivations suggest that broader goals for state stability and democratic representation may constrain otherwise seat-maximizing tendencies.

In addition, actors may pursue seat-maximization but with longer-term strategic considerations that hamper their desire to alter the existing system. The existing literature conceives of seat-maximizing strategies primarily in the short-term, as reforms will affect the
next election and its outcome; yet iterated reform processes suggest that long-term views of
seat-maximization might produce different outcomes. For example, a medium-sized party in
a new democracy may be uncertain about its long-term chances of maintaining its current
vote-share. While such a party might be in favor of an electoral threshold that eliminates
extremely small parties it is wary of any increase in the threshold above that, since it is
unsure of its own projected electoral success in the long-term. So that party may not
advocate for much of a threshold now, even though it might benefit in the short-term of the
next election from the elimination of small parties, for fear that it will be subject to an
increase later because it is not certain it will benefit in ensuing elections if it should fall at or
below that new threshold level. Thus actors may pursue reforms that complement or
contradict seat-maximizing logic with broader motivations regarding either the function and
stability of the democratic state, trade-offs in the nature of representative government and
accountability, or long-term views of seat-maximization. These alternative motivations have
effects on reforms, suggesting limits to the trajectory or ratchet effects produced by seat-
maximization pursuits.

However, in an aggregate study of electoral reform it may be difficult to distinguish
the effects of alternative motivations in the decision-making process because many parties
who may employ them do not hold much decision-making power. In a case study it is
possible to learn individual positions on reform issues, and therefore to know when reformers
have, at least rhetorically, argued for alternative reasons to adopt certain reforms. Yet, in a
large-N analysis it is quite difficult to assess alternative motivations because distinct
positions of each party may be unattainable. The argument here is not that alternative
motivations must represent a clearly different trajectory of reform than seat-maximizing
logic, but rather that when seat-maximizing logic fails to predict reform outcomes alternative motivations can provide answers. In particular, when large or otherwise effective parties who can alter or make decisions adopt alternative motivations such effects should clearly change expected reform outcomes relative to what seat-maximizing logic would predict, and should be evident in an aggregate study. In sum, in aggregate studies of reform large and sometimes medium parties who adopt alternative motivations can change the trajectory or package of reforms adopted in ways that make evident when seat-maximizing versus alternative motivations are at work.

**From Framework to Testable Hypotheses**

Though clearer explanation of the causal mechanisms at work during the reform process can help us to develop a theory that can broadly apply to many cases, a set of specific hypotheses regarding the relationship between the component mechanisms can be generated. In particular, a series of hypotheses will be generated regarding not only reform adoption as the dependent variable, but reform adoption as the independent variable in assessing change in the party system in the elections following reform. In the remainder of this section I will lay out hypotheses to correspond to the expectations of the framework: inter- and intraparty reform as both consequence and cause of party system change, the centralizing tendency within two dimensions of reform, the ratchet effects on reform adoption and trajectories.

In terms of testing broad theoretical factors, and in line with the literature on electoral reform, I use party system size (commonly referred to as party system fragmentation) and electoral uncertainty (commonly referred to as electoral volatility) as measurable proxies for expectations about general electoral performance and change. The common expectation in
the scholarly literature is that overall change in the composition and relative inclusiveness of the party system should result in changing expectations by individual parties regarding their own performance and potential in the future. Thus as party system size or volatility grow (i.e. uncertainty increases), reforms should reflect the desire for increasing proportionality; conversely as party system size or volatility shrinks (i.e. uncertainty decreases), reforms should reflect the desire to limit proportionality and increase majoritarian elements.

I also consider the amount of disproportionality in the system, measured by the distortion in the translation of vote proportions into seat proportions, as a proxy for the representativeness of the party system. In general, proportional systems tend to have lower disproportionality with fewer votes wasted on small and losing parties. Few expectations exist about the effect of disproportionality on elite behavior in terms of electoral reform, since most theories revolve around the expectation that reformers behave in predominantly seat-maximizing ways, and so reducing distortion between vote and seat shares would not be of high priority. However, if we accept that alternative motivations play a role in the process of reform adoption we might predict that disproportionality, particularly when it is quite high or increasing, would affect the reform options discussed and/or adopted. Thus, as disproportionality increases (i.e. the distortion in the vote-to-seat translation increases), reforms should reflect the goal of greater proportionality to alleviate the distortion.

Three concepts are the basis for most of the testable hypotheses: party system size, electoral volatility and disproportionality. I use commonly-accepted indices to code each of these in cross-national comparison: Laakso and Taagepera’s Effective Number of Parties (ENP) formula for the party system size, the Pedersen Index for electoral volatility and Gallagher’s Disproportionality Index for the disproportionality. Both the ENP and Pedersen
Index can be calculated based on votes or seats, while the Gallagher Index is calculated using votes and seats. Chapter 6 and Appendix C go into greater detail regarding data collection, coding and construction of the ENP, Gallagher and Pedersen Indices for the large-N quantitative analysis. In the case study in Chapters 4 and 5 I use relative party vote and seat proportions within the Indonesian system in place of an aggregate party system measure and individual party vote-to-seat differentials in place of an aggregate disproportionality measure.

I will test my expectations using measures constructed over time and lagged, to represent trends in uncertainty that develop over more than a single pre-reform election period. Thus, expectations are based not simply on the relationship between the pre-reform party system fragmentation and the ensuing reform, but on the trend in uncertainty established by the change in fragmentation between the two pre-reform elections. The expectations about party system fragmentation, electoral volatility and disproportionality yield the first two testable hypotheses of the seat-maximizing (H1) and alternative (H2) motivations arguments:

**H1:** The probability that reformers will adopt more inclusive reforms increases as party system fragmentation and electoral volatility increase, whereas the probability that reformers will adopt less inclusive electoral reforms increases as party system fragmentation and electoral volatility decline.

**H2:** The probability that reformers will adopt more inclusive reforms increases as disproportionality increases, whereas the probability that reformers will adopt less inclusive reforms increases as disproportionality decreases.

In cross-national comparisons aggregate system size and disproportionality may be the unit of measurement to test expectations regarding reform adoptions, but within country there are likely to be different expectations about the different actors – their goals and relative strength – as factors affecting reform adoptions. In particular the seat-share of medium-sized parties is more likely to affect reform outcomes in systems where the larger
parties do not themselves hold enough of the seats to pass reforms unilaterally. Furthermore, small, medium and large parties are unlikely to be uniformly affected by different reforms, and while small and large parties tend to have relatively static preferences for reform, medium-sized parties are more likely to fluctuate.

For example, in discussions about the implementation of an electoral threshold, one would expect that large parties would always favor them, since few are usually worried about meeting most cut-off levels in future elections, while small parties tend to always be against, since all are usually worried about meeting any cut-off level in future elections. Medium-sized parties are most likely to have varied preferences based on the fact that the specific level and/or proposed increases to a threshold may not have clear effects on them: if a medium-sized party falls somewhere close to the proposed level of the threshold its preferences for eliminating smaller parties from obtaining seats will conflict with its desire to keep itself in the game because it is highly uncertain about future electoral success keeping it at or just above that cut-off level.

Similarly, the propensity to adopt candidate-centric reforms may hinge on the relative seat-shares of small, medium and large parties. In theory, large parties are those that should be more capable of fielding and funding candidate-centric campaigns nation-wide, while small parties are those that should be least capable of fielding and funding candidate-centric campaigns in general but may be successful when concentrating in only one or two districts. Medium-sized parties, however, may be equally divided between the desire to preserve or pursue party-centric systems. Medium-sized parties probably lack the funding and resources of large parties to sustain individualized campaigns nation-wide but can be successful within specific regions; medium-sized parties may also be more interested in pushing party-based
platforms that appeal to identity or localized needs in those geographically-concentrated constituencies. While the expectations of success by small and large parties might be much clearer with respect to candidate-centric systems, those of medium-sized parties are less so.

Thus while we might have be able to easily predict small and large party actions on both inter- and intra-party reforms, predicting medium-sized party preferences according to strict seat-maximizing logic might be difficult. Three particular expectations regarding the non-uniformity of medium-sized party preferences emerge. First, the effects of a threshold or reduced district magnitude are less likely to be uniformly perceived by medium-sized parties, depending on their own specific size and uncertainty about future electoral success. Second, the impact of vote-to-seat differentials are less likely to be uniformly distributed across small, medium and large parties, with small and large parties all losing or benefitting relatively equally in terms of differential but medium-sized parties benefitting or losing less consistently as a group. The rationale for this last expectation revolves around the likelihood that medium-sized parties reflect strong geographic concentrations of votes more than small parties but less nation-wide appeal than large parties, resulting in less uniform effects of changes in district magnitude or vote-to-seat allocation formula. Third, similar expectations about medium-sized party preferences and candidate-centric reforms apply: it is more difficult to predict medium-sized party preferences (in the aggregate) regarding candidate-centric reforms than large party expectations of success in candidate-centric systems.

In general, we would expect that as the seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases, larger parties can pursue their seat-maximizing reforms of less inclusive and candidate-centric reforms with fewer barriers. In contrast, increasing medium-sized party seat-share will make reform direction difficult to predict since these parties as a group are the least
likely to share similar objectives. In addition, as the differential between vote- and seat-share outcomes of medium-sized parties decreases across the board, typically resulting in greater medium-sized party seat-share, more inclusive reforms will be adopted to ensure future success of the medium-sized parties. These expectations of the different effects of relative party size on seat-maximizing logic yield the following hypotheses:

**H3a:** The probability of less inclusive reform adoption increases as the seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases, whereas the probability of more inclusive reform adoption increases as the seat-share of medium-sized parties increases.

**H3b:** The probability of candidate-centric reform adoption increases as the seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases, whereas the probability of party-centric reform adoption increases as the seat-share of medium-sized parties increases.

**H4:** The probability of more inclusive reform adoption increases as the differential between vote-share and seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases, whereas the probability of less inclusive reform adoption increases as the differential between vote-share and seat-share of medium-sized parties increases.

While we expect in new democracies, perhaps more than established ones, that there is a greater likelihood of alternative motivations in early periods of reform, over time this effect may dissipate. System-wide there may be a general shift away from more ideological or representative pursuits towards more self-interested ones over time. We would expect to see such trajectories evolve as more actors become more knowledgeable and more certain about the post-transition political landscape. This may affect the trajectory of iterated reform pursuits when early choices made based on alternative motivations give way to more seat-maximizing choices in later periods. Thus there should be greater likelihood of choices such as electoral threshold adoption in later periods of reform more than early periods of reform.

**H5:** The probability of less inclusive reform adoption, particularly electoral thresholds, increases in later rounds of iterated reform, holding party system fragmentation constant.

The last set of expectations regarding reform as the dependent variable focus on ratchet effects on reform adoption, there are two primary expectations regarding the impact
of time on inter- and intra-party reforms. First, related to the constraints of previous reforms on later reforms, we should expect that reforms tend to take on a directional quality over time: if a particular type of reform is adopted in time $t$ with the expectation that it produces an effect that benefits those who adopted that particular reform, either reformers are happy with the effects and maintain them or wish to increase or continue that particular type of reform in time $t+1$. We might also expect this effect to fade when reforms occur in non-contiguous inter-election periods, since the identity (and motivations) of the reformers are more likely to change in non-contiguous periods. For example, the adoption of candidate-centric reforms is likely to affect the type of legislator elected and to reinforce support for candidate-centric methods of election, producing a ratchet effect that “locks in,” and may increase, support for candidate-centricity.

Second, due to a combination of alternative motivations and the iterative nature of reforms, the overall reform process has some type of hypothetical or actual ceiling and we should expect that over time reforms may progress toward but not cross that ceiling. For example, if a particular type of reform is likely to produce public backlash past a certain point (i.e. an electoral threshold so high that it appears to undemocratically limit competition) or an unstable party system that is unable to govern (i.e. a plurality-based system so fragmented that government cannot be form or is so divided that it cannot pass legislation), reform adoption will hit a ceiling before that point or reforms will be rolled back in order to correct the problem. These expectations yield the following hypotheses:

$H6a$: The probability of less inclusive reform adoption increases when less inclusive reforms were adopted in the previous inter-election period, but the constraints of alternative motivations and iterated reforms prevent the adoption of the most extreme less inclusive reforms.
\textit{H6b: The probability of candidate-centric reform adoption increases when candidate-centric reforms were adopted in the previous inter-election period, but the constraints of alternative motivations and iterated reforms prevent the adoption of the most extreme candidate-centric reforms.}

Finally, there are a set of expectations about what reforms produce, as the independent variable explaining change in the party system, since reformers only undertake reforms with the expectation that there will be some change that results from the reforms. First, less inclusive reforms undertaken to simplify the party system should result in a decrease in the size of the party system, while more inclusive reforms designed to more closely reflect voter choice should result in an increase in the size of the party system. Second, more inclusive reforms designed to more accurately reflect proportionality in the party system should result in a decrease in distortion during the translation from vote-to-seats. Third, candidate-centric reforms should have the effect of increasing the size of the party system, since the electoral incentives should increase party fragmentation and new party entry, relative to party-centric reforms. Fourth, a reform of any type should have the effect of increasing vote and seat volatility in the post-reform election period. These expectations yield the following hypotheses (ceteris paribus):

\textit{H7a: More inclusive reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation while less inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation.}

\textit{H7b: Candidate-centric reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation, while party-centric reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation.}

\textit{H8: Less inclusive reforms will produce an increase in disproportionality.}

\textit{H9: Any inter- or intra-party reform adoption will produce an increase in electoral volatility in the post-reform election.}

Taken together, these hypotheses are designed to explore and test assumptions in the theory regarding the relationship between electoral reform and party system change. As
such, the very factors that cause electoral reform may in turn be affected by the new rules adopted, as the interests of actors are shaped and constrained by the system those actors seek to shape and constrain. While the issue of sequence is of utmost importance to distinguishing between reform as the dependent variable and reform as the independent variable, these hypotheses are designed to directly test not only the distinction between the two but how they relate to each other when reform and party system change occur in repeated interactions.

**The Indonesian Case Relative to Broader Theory**

The case of Indonesian democratic transition and consolidation suggests an interesting counterexample to the existing theories about the contribution and importance of institutional stickiness to the process of democratization. Democratic since 1999, Indonesia's electoral institutions have undergone substantial and repeated reforms since the democratic transition ushered in a massive constitutional revision after the 1999 elections. Specifically in the area of electoral reform, the Indonesian legislature has repeatedly passed reforms that have altered the way voters vote and parties compete. Despite, and to a large degree because of, the constant alteration of institutions, Indonesia's political system now possesses greater inter-branch balance (a directly-elected president replaced the parliamentary-style executive) and peace (resulting in part from much-improved civilian control over the armed forces) than it did at the beginning of its democratic transition.

At the same time, these factors have not frozen political competition as each subsequent election has introduced at least one new party to the legislature, indicating an openly competitive electoral system that can accommodate and survive the entrance of new actors onto the electoral stage, and moderately increasing party system fragmentation from 5
(in 1999) to 8 (in 2004) to just under 9 effective parties in 2009 (calculated using the ENP measure). It appears that in this case institutional reforms need not be destabilizing or anti-democratic; what explains the ability of Indonesia's political elite to manage repeated reforms that have strengthened democracy, or at least not weakened it, and how does the Indonesian case differ from, reinforce, or build on the existing theory and literature?

Without delving deeply into the case's details, which will be covered in the following chapters, a brief overview of the Indonesian electoral reform context will explain why it is a useful case to explore this framework, as the reform process has occurred in two complete iterations and a third is ongoing. Despite perpetual reform negotiation and adoption Indonesian democracy has progressed along most indicators, suggesting that at the very least the process of electoral reform has not been destabilizing or debilitating to democratization. In fact, I argue that the very adaptability provided by the possibility and use of reforms, the ones that so often concern social scientists because of the propensity of political actors to abuse and rollback progress, has enabled Indonesia's democratization progress.

Few political systems undergo multiple rounds of institutional change on the same political issue over consecutive electoral periods, despite ongoing or recurring discussions of reform possibilities such as in New Zealand, the Czech Republic and Romania. Indonesia has undergone institutional reform on three issue areas between each of three consecutive electoral periods since democratization.\(^\text{15}\) On the questions of the proportionality and party-centric nature of the system, in 1999 Indonesia retained the closed-list proportional system from the pre-democratic era with large province-sized districts, in 2004 it changed to a semi-closed list proportional system with medium sub-province-sized districts, and in 2009 it

\(^{15}\) The third reform period is currently ongoing, and has been since 2010 with the expectation of producing a new/newly-revised General Election Law in 2012 for the 2014 legislative elections.
changed to a full open-list proportional system with slightly smaller medium sub-province-sized districts. On the question of party system size, in 1999 Indonesia had a simple electoral entry threshold that required any party standing in the election to meet a minimum percentage of the vote-share in order to compete in ensuing elections, in 2004 the entry threshold was raised higher, and in 2009 the entry threshold was removed in favor of a strict parliamentary entry threshold that required any party to obtain at least 2.5% of the total vote-share in order to receive seats in the national parliament. In each case, other reform options (ie. a single-member district system, a much higher parliamentary entry threshold) were discussed but not employed. These changes make Indonesia an ideal case to examine changes in motivating factors and the institutional constraints faced by actors, and we can trace such changes within an environment whose institutions are, themselves, a byproduct of previous rounds of reforms.

Figure 2.4 maps Indonesian reform through the 2009 elections, with reference to the general directionality of the proposals currently under discussion in the legislature to apply to the 2014 general elections. Partly due to the changing nature of reform actors, who alternate in terms of power and intraparty composition with each subsequent election, the overall process of reform has occurred in a step-wise manner rather than a smooth trajectory from one point in the inter- and intra-party dimensions of reform.

While it appears that Indonesia is moving from a proportional and party-centric system to one in the pluralist and candidate-centric category, particular anti-reform pressures stemming from ideological opposition to majoritarianism have kept it from reaching that degree of change. It does exhibit the common centralizing tendency of many reformers previously discussed this chapter, and it remains to be seen if future reforms propel it to
becoming the first reformer since France in 1986 to shift from a fully proportional to a fully majoritarian system. Political actors are still primarily driven by seat-maximizing self-interests, which are then constrained by their relative capacity to affect the reform process and their understanding and information of the reform options available. Each Indonesian reform period and specific adoptions, as well as an introduction to the major parties and their general positions toward reforms will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing chapters.

Figure 2.4 Dimensions of Electoral Reform in Indonesia

Finally, the cross-temporal element of reform must be addressed in the Indonesian context, as reforms have occurred frequently (every 5 years), regularly (beginning the process 1-2 years prior to each election cycle) and in such a manner as to continue negotiations about the same topics (system proportionality, party system size, and party-
versus candidate-centricness) but with varying actors and actor motivations. Thus, the institutional constraints do change at each reform period, both for specific actors and the actors in general, but within the confines of the same system and as a product of the previous round of adopted reforms.
Chapter 3: Indonesian Political Context

An extraordinary case of democratization, Indonesia remains one of the world's most stable young democracies despite a number of variables seemingly designed to derail or deform democratic institutions, function and performance. The literature, developed extensively by democratization scholars, focuses primarily on stateness and bureaucratic capacity (e.g. Linz & Stepan 1995), aspects of the rule of law and accountability (e.g. O’Donnell 1996), and economic development (e.g. Przeworski et al. 2000) and wealth distribution (e.g. Boix 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Ansell & Samuels 2010) as primary factors for the development and sustainability of democratic government. In addition, other scholars point to the following factors as those which can aid in democratic development: unified national identity that reduces inter-group conflict, separatism or independence movements in divided societies (e.g. Rustow 1970; Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1991); and a neighborhood of established democracies to emulate during the process of consolidation (e.g. Starr & Lindborg 2003; Brinks & Coppedge 2006).

Indonesia possesses strength in few of the factors thought to help stabilize democratic transition and encourage consolidation. Though it has had a slightly above average economic growth rate since 2000, the transition itself was born out of economic crisis and perceptions of widespread corruption that have not been particularly well addressed by political leadership; fast population growth has only exacerbated poverty and inequality levels while per capita GDP levels hover around $3900 (measured in purchasing power parity to constant 2005 US$). Indonesia’s democratic history began with a single democratic election in 1955
that gave way to more than 40 years of authoritarian rule. It is one of the world's most diverse states with large portions of the population speaking hundreds of local languages and scattered among an archipelago of 17000 islands that possess wide variation in income equality and deposits of extractive resources. Ethnic and religious diversity has led to multiple separatist movements which were barely but brutally suppressed under the New Order regime. Additionally, Indonesia finds itself in a region with few stable democratic examples and no simultaneous democratizers, not to mention the world's largest Muslim majority population with a substantial religious minority and a geographic location that guarantees annual wide-scale natural disasters.

On issues of stateness and rule of law, however, Indonesia has progressed faster and some would argue much further than most comparison countries. One explanation for the progress of Indonesian democracy is the ability of the system to make voters feel represented, instilling faith in the state rather than resorting to extra-legal methods of achieving their political goals. Though Indonesia may not have the most highly-institutionalized parties or party system, there are plenty of options for voters at the polls. While the process of Indonesian democratization has not been perfect, and there are plenty of aspects about the Indonesian political system to criticize, it has continued through difficult domestic conflicts and power struggles. I argue that a key factor in understanding how it has done so is the flexibility of the Indonesian electoral system that allows it to represent the wide range of opinions, beliefs and policy goals of the Indonesian population in such a way as to not create conflict by excluding any particular subset of the population from the democratization process.

It is difficult to understand the context of electoral reform in a vacuum: legislative
politics is affected by executive and judicial politics, civil society affects elected representatives, political parties affect each other. In the context of Indonesian democratic consolidation the process of electoral reform has certainly been affected by simultaneous reform in other closely-related areas of politics as well as the institutions within which change occurred and the ideology and range of representatives negotiating the shape of the revisions. This remainder of this chapter offers political context to democratization and the Indonesian reform process. First I provide an overview to the transition and consolidation, followed by an explanation of other major system changes during what is commonly referred to as the “reformasi,” or reform, period. Then I describe the institutional structure of the national legislature, focusing on subdivisions within the lower chamber where all national legislation is developed. Finally I introduce the political parties during the process of reformasi, highlighting changes both within individual parties and across the party system as they have impacted the overall trajectory of democratization in Indonesia.

**Indonesia’s Transition and Consolidation 1998-2009**

Multiple opponents to Suharto’s regime emerged in the decade prior to his fall. The most prominent of these, partly because of her lineage and partly because she was the one that Suharto attempted most directly to undermine within her own organization, was Megawati Sukarnoputri. She is the daughter of Sukarno, known as Indonesia’s Founding Father since he led the struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule and was the first president of the independent Republic of Indonesia (1945-1967). Heiress apparent to the leadership of the PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, Indonesian Democracy Party), one of the two political parties allowed under Suharto, her provocative and pointed critiques of the New
Order government led Suharto to finagle her ousting after her election as party chair at the PDI's 5-year congress in 1993. The government pushed an interim Congress in North Sumatra in 1996, not attended by Megawati or her supporters, and the result was a different chair-elect. Megawati's supporters refused to turn over control of the party's Jakarta headquarters and the eventual result was the worst rioting and government crackdown in the last decade of the New Order regime, with dozens of buildings vandalized and over 200 arrested. The sympathy for Megawati and her cause, democratic rule, grew in the months after the crackdown.

Two other opponents of the New Order came from the opposite end of the socio-political spectrum: the leaders of Indonesia's (and the world's) two largest mass Islamic organizations, Abdurrahman Wahid of the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Amien Rais of the modernist Muhammadiyah. Wahid, a long-time opponent of the New Order’s tight restrictions on religious expression and a proponent of religious pluralism as NU Chair, actually became a short-term Suharto supporter prior to 1998. Rais, recently returned from studying overseas to ascend quickly to the Muhammadiyah chairmanship in 1995, was a staunch opponent of the Suharto regime and proved a fast ally to Megawati’s cause for open competition and democracy. Wahid’s and Rais’ personal animosity towards each other, since each wanted to shape the transition and win power in the new Indonesian democratic state, as well as their divergent views about the role of Islam in social and political life, proved a minor hurdle to realizing their combined interests in advancing reformasi.

Combined with a somewhat unexpected last-minute change of allegiance by the military leadership and an unexpectedly reformist interim president, it was economic crisis that precipitated Suharto’s fall. The 1998 Asian financial crisis plaguing East Asia wrought
its own havoc on Indonesia, amid increasingly obvious corruption from the cronyism and nepotism lavished by Suharto on his family and associates. The combination of the hard-hitting economic crisis, the number of industries tied up in inefficient Suharto family management and long-standing perceptions of corruption were too much for the regime to withstand. Student protests erupted in Jakarta, the relatively wealthy and vulnerable Chinese populations in many cities were targeted by mobs, and the military began to back slowly away from its support of Suharto. Powerful figures in the military debated what to do until Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto refused to support Suharto. Suharto soon acquiesced to wide-spread demands that he step down, largely retreating from public life until his death in 2008.

His vice president, Bachruddin Jusuf Habibie, assumed control of the presidency and almost immediately called for new elections for the spring of 1999. Among other steps he took in the economic and social realms, he also assembled a team to revise the laws governing the elections and political parties. The team he assembled consisted of mostly U.S.-trained political scientists (whose composition and recommendations will be discussed in detail in the following chapter). Despite their recommendations to the government for a fairly extensive reform of the electoral system, which included the suggestion of adopting single-member districts to replace the existing closed-list proportional representation system, the electoral framework largely resembled that of the New Order period with one major exception: party competition was effectively opened to any and all. The controls of the Suharto era were removed and the response was staggering: over 100 parties registered and 48 met the requirements and submitted lists to stand for the elections.
Elections were held in June 1999 and the returns gave a victory of 34% of seats for Megawati's PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*, Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle), a faction that had split from the PDI, followed by a surprisingly strong showing of 26% of seats by Habibie's Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, Functional Groups). The third of the New Order parties, the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, United Development Party), came in third with 12% of the seats despite only being the fourth largest party as measured by its percentage of votes. The parties of Wahid and Rais made relatively poor showings of 11% of seats for Wahid's PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, National Awakening Party) as the third largest party measured by votes and 8% for Rais' PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, National Mandate Party) as the fifth largest party measured by both seats and votes. Sixty seats were still held by the military (TNI or *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian Armed Forces), one of the more cohesive blocks within the legislature.

In the aftermath of the elections for the new legislature a new president and vice president needed to be chosen, but the opposition to Megawati, due to her gender, party ideology and political lineage, made it difficult for all the power brokers to reach an agreement. Rais and Habibie were both bitterly disappointed at their respective positions relative to the PDI-P’s success and nearly all of the Islamist parties, such as the PPP, supported the position of a November 1998 edict (fatwa) issued by the government-backed Indonesian Council of Ulama (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia* or MUI) stating that a woman could not become the Indonesian president. With few remaining options as the negotiations between party factions in the legislature became more obtuse and clearly designed to thwart a Megawati presidency, in October 1999 the PKB’s Wahid narrowly edged Megawati to
become Indonesia’s first democratic president with Megawati becoming his extremely disgruntled vice president the next day.

One of the generally agreed views among the political elite was that some measure of political reform was necessary to develop democratic stability, along with economic reform to combat the crisis, but each faction within the legislature believed different aspects of the government infrastructure were due for reform. The PDI-P and the military actually were in virtual lock-step, believing that strict maintenance of the 1945 Constitution and limited reform in the political and economic spheres were necessary, with the PDI-P intent on implementation of protectionist economic reforms and national identity-enforcing, universalist anti-discrimination laws to protect ethnic and religious minorities. Golkar and PAN were the two most reform-minded parties, albeit with different views about what needed reform, as Golkar sought a near overhaul of the electoral system but with little interest in economic reforms that would likely undermine the position of many beneficiaries of Suharto’s nepotism and protection over the years. PAN sought as much democratic reform as possible in both the electoral and economic arenas. The PKB floundered behind the leadership of Wahid and emergent factions within the party, and thus their reformist nature appears to have been limited at least due to those factors; many Islamist parties, including the PPP and PBB, sought immediate reforms to New Order social and religious policies that banned or repressed religious (primarily Islamic) expression.

16 The 1945 Constitution is the first constitution of the independent Republic of Indonesia written by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, setting forth the five nationalist principles of *pancasila*: belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy through consultation and consensus, and social justice. The 1945 Constitution was readopted in 1959 after fourteen years of an alternative constitution imposed by the Dutch and provisional constitutions during transition to independent rule. The 1945 Constitution remained in effect during the entire New Order regime and the *pancasila* ideology was used by Suharto to justify removal of “opposition” forces and those who challenged the state (Aspinall 2005: xi).
The transition from the repressive authoritarian rule of the New Order also brought with it an explosion of ethnonationalist claims and inter-group conflict in many areas across the archipelago. Separatist pressures began immediately in Timor, Aceh and Papua; Habibie had already set a referendum on Timorese independence on the agenda for 2001, while the Free Aceh Movement (Gerahkan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) and the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM) began local and, in some instances, violent protests for extensive autonomy or independence rights. In parts of Kalimantan, Maluku and Sulawesi communal violence erupted as the legacy of decades of transmigration and unequal redistribution under Suharto forced ethnic and religious tensions to the surface. Eastern Indonesia had always been more ethnically diverse with pockets, rather than dominant majorities, of Muslims; this diversity was reflected in the rise of conflict amid pressures for greater local authority. Introduced by the team of technocrats in the laws drafted prior to the collapse of the New Order, political and economic decentralization became a priority for many reformists in the post-transition period.

In 2004 a tsunami originating from an Indian Ocean earthquake hit the coastal areas of many countries in South and Southeast Asia. One of the most devastated areas was northern Aceh, where more than 150,000 were estimated to have been killed or went missing with another 500,000 displaced and more than $4.5 billion in damages and losses. Public and international pressures mounted for a resolution to the conflict and in 2005 a peace agreement was reached in Helsinki, followed by a special autonomy law in 2006 that laid the groundwork for local Acehnese political parties, greater resource control and revenue generating powers, and the implementation of sharia law and police. Papua has been given a special autonomy law that provides for a special legislative chamber to reflect local social-
cultural aspirations but the province still controls fewer of its own natural resources and has no ability to form province-specific political parties. The settlement with Aceh has largely diffused tensions while pressures in Papua remain with limited violence and destabilization.

**Political Changes during the Reformasi Period**

During the period of *reformasi* many issues that plagued the New Order regime were opened for discussion. Among them, three elements constituted the basis for the amendment of the 1945 Constitution and overall structure of the Indonesian political system: 1) increased accountability and transparency in the competitive electoral process, 2) horizontal separation of powers between the executive and legislature, and 3) vertical separation of powers between the center and the regions. The result was four major areas of reform that occurred primarily during the 1999-2004 period: 1) revision to the electoral system, 2) the creation of directly-elected executives at the national and local levels, 3) political and fiscal decentralization in conjunction with creation of new subdivisions at the local level, and 4) the creation of a second national legislative chamber based on the principle of regional representation. The first area of reform is the subject of following chapters; I briefly outline the context of the other reform areas here.

**Constitutional Amendment #1: The Directly-Elected President**

Concerns over representative and inter-branch accountability resulted in a shift from indirectly to directly-elected executives at the national and local levels. Direct election of the president required a constitutional amendment, which was written and passed during a broader process of amendment that also produced the bicameral legislature. Prior to 2004 all
Indonesian presidents and vice presidents were indirectly elected by a vote of the national legislature, but were elected to fixed 5-year terms (consistent with the fixed-term legislative sessions) during which impeachment of the president would result in assumption of the presidency by the vice president rather than a call for new elections. During the New Order the indirect election process did not raise concerns about stability of the executive, since Suharto was not in any danger of being impeached until 1998. However, following the first democratic elections there were serious concerns among many of the parties that the multi-party competitive system would result in instability of the executive.

The first indirect presidential selection process seemed to support fears of how the fixed-term indirect presidency would work in the context of open competition: the leader of the largest legislative party, Megawati Sukarnoputri of the PDI-P, was pushed into the vice presidency by the leader of the fourth largest legislative party, Abdurrahman Wahid of the PKB, despite the PDI-P controlling three times the number of seats of the PKB. The cross-party coalition proved unstable, as did Wahid’s administration, and the impeachment of Wahid in 2001 that led to Sukarnoputri’s ascendancy to the presidency convinced most actors in the amendment process that a directly-elected executive would stabilize the system.

The rules governing the executive election were highly debated, in large part because directly-elected executives were a foreign concept for many involved in the amendment process. Concerns over the need to ameliorate the tension between a multi-party legislature and a directly-elected executive led to a unique configuration of the rules: a two-round, directly-elected but legislative-dependent president and vice president. Tickets for election to the presidency-vice presidency could only be nominated by parties or coalitions of parties receiving a minimum of 20% of the vote-share or 25% of the seat-share of the previous
legislative elections. Since the legislative elections were scheduled for April and seat allocations were intended to take 30 days, the first round of presidential elections would be held the following July based on the April outcome; if a second round was needed it would take place the following September. All parties failing to meet or join a coalition meeting the threshold could not nominate their party’s candidates to a president-vice president ticket.

In theory, the dependence on legislative vote-seat-share meant that the executive would control a significant portion of the legislature and would be able to command some support for its policies, hopefully limiting the potential for divided government or constant stalemate between the executive and legislature. Additionally, these stipulations would result in a reduction in the number of tickets that could stand for election - mathematically no more than 5 parties or coalitions of parties could nominate presidential-vice presidential tickets – and the hope was that with fewer tickets either outright first-round winners or two clearly dominant second-round competitors would emerge.

However, for the first direct presidential election many parties were worried about the fact that only Golkar and the PDI-P would be able to run their own candidates without having to form coalitions with other parties. The result was a provision, for the 2004 elections only, that parties need only clear a 5% vote-seat-share threshold in the DPR elections to be able to submit a ticket for the first direct presidential election; the result was seven tickets submitted for the first round and a second round run-off required for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla (of the Democratic Party with only 10% of the seats in the 2004-2009 DPR) to defeat Sukarnoputri and Hamzah Haz (of PDI-P and PPP with 33% of the seats in the 2004-2009 DPR). In 2009 the provision did not apply and only three tickets were submitted by parties and party coalitions, with the result that SBY won in the first round.
Political and Fiscal Decentralization

The process of political and fiscal decentralization preceded the actual democratic transition in the sense that the laws governing decentralization had been in place for decades and had been revised prior to the 1999 elections. However, the implementation of the revised laws did not occur until 2000-2001 and were again revised in 2004 to more clearly explicate the differences between provincial and district/municipal\(^\text{17}\) authorities and to incorporate provisions regarding the directly-elected local executives (governors of provinces (provinsi) and district heads/mayors of districts/cities (kabupaten/kota)). The process of decentralization clearly intended to make districts and municipalities the primary recipient of power and the provinces secondary recipients, but the process of district/municipality creation necessitated a larger role for provinces than initially intended.

The 1999 political decentralization law (UU22/1999) and fiscal decentralization law (UU23/1999) set forth an expanded role for district/municipal governments to control resources, create policy and implement national programs. As a result, many new districts/municipalities and six new provinces were created in a process known as pemekaraan, or blossoming, which dramatically increased the number of districts/municipalities between 2000-2006 before trailing off by 2008. The purpose of the pemekaraan was governance-oriented – regions and districts/municipalities representing demographically or geographically unique entities that would benefit from greater autonomy and localized policy implementation could become distinct subnational government units to achieve those ends. In practice, the majority of new districts/municipalities were created for purely political reasons, such as a homogenous religious community’s preference to not be governed by another religious group’s political representative.

\(^\text{17}\) ‘Districts’ are comparable to ‘counties’ in the United States.
The resulting explosion of new districts/municipalities meant that many were ill-equipped to handle the service and policy needs of their citizens, and so provinces, with governance structures from the New Order era already in place, were required to fill in the gaps as needed. In 2004 a revised political decentralization law re-allocated some power back to the provinces to make them more equal to the districts/municipalities, but in practice the cities and districts continued to receive greater shares of government grants and carried more weight in creating localized policies and programs. The local legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) all remained directly elected throughout the process of decentralization and in 2004 district heads and mayors became directly elected as well. Elections for these local executives were done on a rolling basis in 5-year fixed cycles, continuing the election schedules that originated during New Order. While all the DPRD were elected in fixed 5-year cycles simultaneously with the DPR, local executives were elected in non-DPRD election years (i.e., ranging from 2005-2008 between the 2004 and 2009 general elections).

In 2006 a provision for independent candidates to stand for local executive elections was upheld by the Constitutional Court, but in practice the majority of tickets (all elected in pairs of governor/vice-governor, mayor/vice-mayor, etc) were composed of party or coalition representatives who achieved a significant proportion of the vote- or seat-share from the previous DPRD elections, according to the same manner as the directly-elected president. Though the proposal of allowing independent candidates to contest the presidential elections is frequently raised by parties unable to meet the 20% vote/25% seat threshold, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly refused to entertain the possibility.
Constitutional Amendment #2: The Regional Representative Council

Concerns over separatism and inter-group conflict arose during the constitutional amendment process and resulted in the creation of a second legislative chamber at the national level: the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD). The second chamber, based on the principle of regional representation with four seats assigned to each of the 33 provinces in direct, non-partisan elections, eliminated the need for ‘functional group’ and regional representatives that had been a hallmark of New Order control. While the second chamber has limited power of initiation, in matters of district creation, subdivision and boundary changes or policy relating specifically to the region the DPD holds some rights of initiation. The DPD also votes, along with the DPR, on any constitutional amendments and most legislation; however its relative size means that the DPD by itself cannot overturn DPR votes and thus has no veto power. Constant pressure by DPD members to increase the chamber’s power have fallen on deaf ears in the DPR, which is controlled exclusively by parties and remains uninterested in granting additional powers to a non-partisan chamber, and the government, which is controlled by the same parties which control the DPR.

Legislative Institutions in Democratic Indonesia

The most powerful political institution in Indonesia is the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR), composed of the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD). The DPR is based on the principle of representation by population, with a moderately flexible number of representatives (550 in 2004, 560 in 2009). Until 2004 the DPR was composed of two types of representatives: political parties
and the military. In 2004 the military representatives were removed and all DPR members became directly-elected representatives of the political parties.

Parties within the DPR must form or become part of a *fraksi*, or legislative caucus, which can allocate at least one of its members to each of the DPR’s standing commissions and special bodies. Thus, *fraksi* must usually be composed of at least two dozen members. If a single party does not have enough representatives to form its own *fraksi*, or if it does not wish to form its own *fraksi*, it must join another *fraksi*. As of 2009 all legislative parties have formed a single-party *fraksi*; between 1999-2009 multi-party *fraksi* were common but the basis upon which parties joined other *fraksi* did not necessarily depend on ideological distance between the *fraksi* members. There are no strict rules for the conduct of *fraksi* in terms of discipline or distribution of commission assignments and each *fraksi* holds its own criteria for assignments, requirements for meetings, and plenary voting.

The DPR has a very complex internal structure, with eleven standing commissions covering different policy areas (e.g., foreign policy, finance and economic development) and multiple bodies to provide specific skill sets in areas such as legal drafting. The DPR is chaired by a speaker and four deputies, all elected from within the DPR membership for the duration of the five-year session. Each member of the DPR must sit as speaker, deputy or on one of the standing commissions, and each *fraksi* must have at least one representative on each standing commission and special body. Within the DPR the primary commission for election politics is Commission 2 (domestic governance, regional autonomy, and state apparatus). While the majority of members of special committees, which are formed to draft laws, come from within the membership of the specific commission assigned to draft the law, members of other commissions can sometimes sit on the special committees if they are
deemed to hold expertise in a particular area of relevance. DPR members can also switch commissions during five-year legislative sessions, and some fraksi often move leaders among commissions when specific pieces of legislation acquire significance.

In drafting legislation commissions typically meet with government representatives and hold meetings to solicit civil society and public feedback on elements of policies and programs under discussion. The commissions often involve DPD representatives in these meetings if the legislation pertains to regional governance. Depending on the commission and type of legislation, more direct involvement of ministries or bureaucratic agencies may take place during the drafting process, such as having Ministry of Health representatives regularly attend meetings during the formulation of a health care services bill or having Election Commission representatives provide direct input to a regulation governing the distribution of voter education materials. Commissions are where all legislation must be finalized before being presented to a plenary session of the MPR for a vote.

*Indonesia’s Party System 1999-2009*

The political party system under the New Order, though tightly controlling competition, prepared many actors for the open competition of the 1999+ electoral system, as did the social networks of the mass Islamic organizations. In particular, the Golkar Party, the PDI-P and the PPP were uniquely positioned to capitalize on organizational resources they had developed under the New Order system. Two others, the PKB and PAN, had close ties to mass Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, respectively. Thus, the PKB and PAN could draw some measure of support and identification from the
members of the organizations as well as take advantage of the popularity of leaders Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid and Amien Rais.

These five parties, with a handful of smaller parties from the 1999 and 2004 elections, shaped nearly all inter-party competition at the national and local levels and determined all government formation and legislative coalitions after 1999. According to the Constitution, the military and representatives of the authoritarian era functional groups, who represented distinct demographic minority and regional interests, continued to participate in the legislature during the 1999-2004 period, holding 250 of the 700 seats of the joint legislative body. Independent candidates were allowed for district executive elections beginning in 2006 but with such high entry barriers that few ever ran, let alone won, elections while regional non-party representatives were elected to the upper chamber of the legislature beginning in 2004. However, from 2004 the system had undergone enough reform and constitutional amendment processes that parties and their representatives controlled the lower house, alongside a directly-elected president and vice president nominated exclusively by parties. The following is a brief description of the major parties in Indonesia and their ideologies, constituencies and strategies from 1999 to present, except for pre-1999 history for those parties allowed to participate in the New Order system and parties whose leadership related to mass organizations which existed prior to and during the New Order.

*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan or PDI-P (Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle)*

The PDI-P essentially took over the legacy of secular nationalism started by Sukarno and the Indonesian Nationalist Party, becoming the Indonesian Democracy Party under New Order
and the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle during the fall of Suharto. The PDI-P’s platform is avowedly secular nationalist, largely protectionist in terms of economic development, and the self-referenced party of grassroots activism. Many high-profile PDI-P members were once political and social activists, though the highest echelons of the party leadership are undoubtedly Megawati loyalists. In the three party congresses held since the beginning of democratic rule there have never been any real challenges to Megawati’s hold on power and the party central board is packed with members loyal to her, rather than based on party support or merit.

The PDI-P has maintained, since 1999, a largely non-reformist ideology with respect to the shape and function of the institutional structure of Indonesian democracy. A surprising ally of the Armed Forces leadership, Megawati came to power and governed during her time as president primarily with the support of the PDI-P and TNI factions. Many other parties and religious organizations objected to a female president, let alone the daughter of Sukarno assuming his role as the head of state, and her presidency relied very heavily on TNI support of her policies. The PDI-P resisted many potential changes introduced during the process of constitutional amendment and was the staunchest objector to the introduction of a directly-elected executive, due partly to fears that Megawati could never win a popular contest because of her family’s legacy and the fact that she is a woman and partly to concerns that such a popularity contest under pluralism would lead to fragmentation and conflict in the party system without regard for balanced representation of minority interests (see King 2005 or Subekti 2008 for discussion of PDI-P objections). The PDI-P eventually agreed to the various reforms when Megawati believed she could win such a contest.
In addition, the PDI-P had always expressed preference for anti-discrimination laws that provided for universal protections and privileged no one or group over any others, which is a legacy of the nation-building days as the PNI under Sukarno. As a result, Chinese, Christians and Hindus often make up a good deal of the PDI-P’s voting base, though Muslims are a clear majority, while territorially-defined ethnic minorities often do not. Furthermore, despite many high-profile female leaders, PDI-P resisted the adoption of a gender quota on the grounds that female affirmative action policies were unnecessary and defied the universality of their typical policy pursuits. In terms of candidates and electoral strategy, the PDI-P is one of the few parties to really maintain a fairly strict set of selection criteria, which preferences education (at least university) and work and activism experience, and their candidates typically toe the party line and put the party first with respect to individual campaigning and representation in meetings with constituents.

Partai Golongan Karya or Golkar (Party of Functional Groups)

Golkar, during and after the New Order, maintained a clearly secular nationalist platform aimed at economic development but with limited redistribution policies in place. For thirty years party leaders had accumulated wealth and power and, despite a clear and dominant presence in the more ethnically and religiously diverse provinces of eastern Indonesia, the party seemed uninterested in advancing the cause of the impoverished or oppressed minorities unless there was some political or economic advantage to doing so. Under Suharto Golkar co-opted local strongmen, the most popular local figures, and leaders of religious and social organizations; in the post-transition era the party continued with a similar mentality by focusing its efforts on the creation of new sub-national entities it could best
control given the new democratic playing field. However, Golkar had also been the party of the technocratic and bureaucratic elite under the New Order, and thus some of Indonesia’s most efficient and effective administrators were open-minded about potential reform and still members of the Golkar elite.

Despite the tarnished legacy of Suharto, Golkar leadership resisted change in the post-transition era for two primary reasons: first, none of the party’s leadership really wanted to part with the political and economic spoils they had enjoyed under the New Order; and second, they had retained many of the national legislative seats even though their main rival, the PDI-P, had won more in 1999. What emerged was a Golkar party invested in reforms it believed would provide benefits to the party in terms of seats and control over local resources. Thus, assuming it would help them return to electoral dominance Golkar advocated complete overhaul of the electoral system; pursing a similar strategy in other economic and political reforms.

The election of Jusuf Kalla to the Golkar chairmanship in late 2004 proved a bit of a turning point for the party. Prior to his selection in 2004 as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s vice presidential running mate, Kalla had been a self-made millionaire businessman and one of the wealthiest men in Indonesia, but seemingly through business acumen rather than simple favor from Suharto. A minor figure in Golkar, his election as vice president made him an instant star in the party and he was selected to the chairmanship ahead of much more traditional Golkar accolytes, including former generals Wiranto and Prabowo who then left the party (see below on the creation of Hanura and Gerindra). In the years under Kalla, the party attracted younger elites who were trained scholars and experts in many areas of reform who, coupled with the older generation of technocrats, pushed for more coherent policies.
towards political and economic reform. The post-Kalla era has seen some measure of retrenchment away from reform and an unwillingness to take a backseat to other parties, such as PDI-P and *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party or PD).

*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP (United Development Party)*

Perhaps the least cohesive of the New Order parties, the PPP was continually hampered by Suharto’s attempts to undermine the unity of the different Muslim organizations by pitting organization leaders against each other and co-opting them when needed. The final pre-democratic election actually showed good returns for the PPP because Megawati openly worked to sabotage the success of the Suharto-controlled PDI. However, the 1999 elections proved just how ineffective and poorly supported the PPP was after the removal of the artificial aggregation of Muslim interests led to the creation of a number of new parties representing individual organizations or specialized groups. The PPP vote and seat-share declined with each successive election, with PKS claiming to have won away the lion’s share of the eroding PPP base.

As an Islamist party, the PPP is moderate regarding various aspects of Sharia law and female participation in political life but continues to pursue a fairly conservative view of political, social and economic reform. It has supported anti-pornography laws and the districts where it is strongest are ones where there has been adoption or attempts to adopt some Sharia regulations regarding dress codes, gambling bans and similar rules. In general, PPP is not extremely reformist and maintains a view of Indonesia as a unitary country with national goals, tending to prefer limited decentralization and restructuring of the state. In terms of electoral issues, PPP is most concerned with consistency across the levels of
government, pushing to harmonize rules and regulations such that the same format and mechanisms apply in the same way at the national level as at the sub-national level.

*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB (National Awakening Party)*

Controversy surrounded the decision of Wahid and the governing body of NU to found a political party based on or closely tied to NU. The NU organization had gone through many discussions about its relative role in politics for decades, trying to achieve a delicate balance between serving its members’ needs and serving as a social and ethical compass providing moral restraint to the government (for a comprehensive review of the internal debate about NU’s role in political versus social life, see Bush 2009). Many high-profile NU members had been members and candidates of Golkar and PPP before Wahid officially withdrew NU from PPP and many of those elites remained as Golkar candidates or became PPP candidates once more.

Furthermore, Wahid proved as controversial a figure in politics as in his role as NU chair. A believer in religious pluralism and tolerance, Wahid was seen by many in NU who wished to pursue an Islamic-oriented state ideology as a political leader who would pursue some or total freedom of religion. Splinter groups of smaller, avowedly Islamist NU groups emerged as new parties to challenge the direct link or mandate from NU to PKB. In practice, PKB remained more true to Wahid’s vision of an Indonesia based on religious pluralism. Wahid’s ascendency to the presidency in 1999 represented PKB’s electoral strength, the strength of NU members and of the organization in politics, and the compromise that Wahid represented between *reformasi*, the continuing strength of Golkar and the broader antipathy towards Megawati and the PDI-P.
In electoral terms, either due to limited capacity or the desire to maintain the vagueness of NU’s direct involvement in politics, PKB never fully capitalized on NU membership as a voting base. NU membership, estimated somewhere in the 40-60 million member range, vastly exceeded the best electoral showing of PKB when, in 1999, the party won 51 national legislative seats and 13% of the vote. Under Wahid, PKB’s attitude towards reform focused in more detail on social life and the protection of religious freedoms and minority groups than it did on political or economic reforms. Unafraid to pursue reform but infrequently put in the position to advocate for or against it, PKB’s ideological stance has remained vague throughout most of the post-transition era and its relatively small size since the 1999-2004 period have kept it from positions of legislative or executive power that might require it to explicitly categorize itself as reformist.

*Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN (National Mandate Party)*

Unlike Wahid, Amien Rais had less difficulty convincing Muhammadiyah members to join him in founding and supporting the PAN. A young and charismatic superstar of the modernist school of Islam, Rais returned from time studying abroad to leapfrog much more senior and powerful members of Muhammadiyah when he became the organization’s chair in 1995. An outspoken opponent of Suharto, the founder of PAN was very much devoted to democratic governance and meritocratic reward. He was disappointed to realize that Indonesian voters did not sufficiently recognize his potential. PAN never achieved the level of success he originally thought it would, mustering between 6-8% of the vote in each election since 1999 despite an estimated 20-30 million Muhammadiyah members. Despite being a somewhat controversial figure outside his organization and party, within PAN Rais
continues to have final authority over most important decisions and policies advocated by PAN even though others have gone on to succeed him as its chair.

Of all the parties in the post-transition era, PAN remains one of the most reformist in terms of ideological positioning and desire to correct inefficiencies in the political system. Surpassed only by Golkar in terms of its attempts to overhaul the electoral system to its advantage, PAN tends to offer many ideological and prescriptive or corrective assessments to justify its pursuit of reforms. Never a party to suggest that the status quo is a better alternative simply because it is already the one in place, PAN has pursued a number of changes, both major and minor, to the political structure and economic policies from 1999 to 2009. The party has also turned that same introspection inward, attempting (unsuccessfully) to reform its own candidate nomination processes prior to the 2009 elections.

While PAN aligns itself with a mass Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, that is more socially conservative than the NU, it does not pursue an Islamist state based on Sharia law. However, though many PAN members hold more conservative ideological views with respect to religious tolerance, Rais and his closest supporters advocated a pluralistic party and allowed some Chinese and non-Muslim PAN candidates and legislators during his chairmanship.

New Competitors in 2004: the PKS and the PD

Two ‘new’ parties altered the landscape following the 2004 elections. The Justice Party (Partai Keadilan or PK) had participated in the 1999 elections, winning 1.2% of the vote-share and seven national legislative seats but failing to meet the entry threshold for the 2004 elections. Repackaging and rebranding itself as the clean, anti-corruption Islamist
Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS), the party claimed 7% of the national legislative seats, polling extremely well in urban areas and with younger voters. In addition, PKS’ Hidayat Nur Wahid was the country’s highest single vote-winner and became the chairman of the legislature, giving the PKS a position of power not normally obtained by a medium-sized party. The PKS maintained its anti-corruption stance but grew more socially conservative in the 2004-2009 period, polling the same 7-8% in the 2009 elections despite expectations of another monumental growth spurt. The PKS suffers from internal fragmentation, with the biggest and most salient division coming between the faction of more focused Islamists and the faction of more strategic politicians who fear that a conservative platform will erode its electoral success.

The second new party in the 2004 elections was the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat or PD), the vehicle of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY, for short) presidential aspirations. PD won 6% of the vote-share in 2004 and, due to a clause in the election law that allowed any party gaining at least 5% to put forth a presidential-vice presidential ticket for the election, SBY and his running mate, Jusuf Kalla, claimed the presidency in the second round of voting, defeating the ticket of Megawati (PDI-P) and Hamzah Haz (PPP). The PD consolidated itself behind the immense popularity of SBY and made striking gains in 2009, pulling in 25% of the votes and seats in the national legislature, with fairly universal support from across the archipelago. The PD is a party of means, with the resources and personnel to support future growth, and many of its candidates and party central board are highly educated. PD is also one of the earliest parties to hire political analysts and consultants, and make regular use of public opinion polling. However, much of PD’s identity is tied up in
SBY and observers have often wondered what the party’s electoral fate will be once SBY can no longer be Indonesia’s president after 2014.

New Competitors in 2009: Hanura and Gerindra return former generals to politics

Started in 2006 after a losing bid to become the Golkar Party Chairman, Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat or Hanura (People’s Conscience Party) was founded by former TNI Commander General Wiranto. Wiranto had been one of Suharto’s closest followers until the withdrawal of his support proved one of the final nails in the coffin of the New Order regime. In the post-transition era Wiranto was one of Golkar’s most visible leaders, serving as the party’s presidential candidate in 2004. The 2004 election loss, coupled with Kalla’s ascendance to the Golkar chairmanship, finally toppled Wiranto from the Golkar hierarchy. Rather than take second place he opted to form his own party. Hanura has become a party with highly organized and professional candidates and legislators and, despite the introduction of the electoral threshold and to the amazement of political observers, won 3% of the votes in the 2009 elections to obtain 18 national legislative seats and a good deal of sub-national representation. Ironically, since he had left the Golkar Party to form Hanura because he lost the chairmanship and eventual presidential ticket nomination to Kalla, Wiranto stood as Kalla’s running mate in the 2009 presidential election, with the pair winning 11% of the vote and coming in third in the only round of voting.

Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya or Gerindra (Greater Indonesia Movement Party) was started in 2008 as a personal vehicle for the advancement of millionaire Prabowo Subianto, husband of Suharto’s eldest daughter and another former TNI general with a controversial history as the perpetrator of widespread human rights abuses during crackdowns on street
protests in 1998. Gerindra has made poverty alleviation one of its primary platforms, making it a natural complement to PDI-P in terms of ideology. However, the dubious distinction of its founder as a man with allegedly ill-gotten wealth and a record of human rights abuses that were never prosecuted or punished limited the party’s ability to attract voters or supporters to its cause. The party claimed 4% of the votes in the 2009 elections to obtain 23 national legislative seats and a good number of sub-national seats. Prabowo eventually teamed with Megawati to run as vice president on her presidential ticket, likely costing her the votes of many party loyalists who viewed Prabowo as a perpetrator of New Order repression and violence; the pair won 25% of the vote and came in second out of three tickets in the only round of voting.

**Minor Parties since Democratization**

*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB (Crescent Star Party), *Partai NU* or PNU (Nahdlatul Ulama Party), *Partai Damai Sejahtera* or PDS (Prosperous Peace Party), *Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan* or PPDK (National Democratic Unity Party), and *Partai Bintang Reformasi* or PBR (Reformed Star Party) are all smaller parties that have sat in at least one national legislature since 1999. All failed to meet the parliamentary threshold in 2009 but continue to have some representation at the sub-national level. One is Islamist, the PBB, with bases of support in Sumatra, West Java and South Sulawesi and with close ties to a third mass Islamic organization, *Persatuan Islam* or Persis (Islamic Association). One is a now-defunct NU-related party, the PNU, which formed in order to pursue a more Islamist agenda when it became clear that Wahid’s PKB would not. One is a Christian/Catholic party, the PDS, with a base in Jakarta, the North Sumatra capital of Medan, and East Nusa Tenggara.
One is secular nationalist, the PPDK, formed by two U.S.-trained Ph.D. political scientists, Andi Mallarangeng and Ryaas Rasyid, in response to a lack of perceived reform and governance ability in the major existing parties. Finally, the PBR is a primarily Islamist party based in South Sumatra but whose leadership has espoused a blend of Islamist and pluralist ideologies. Of these parties, the PPDK had the most direct impact on electoral design and reform as Mallarangeng and Rasyid were both former members of the team of technocrats appointed by Habibie to revise the election and decentralization laws in 1998. Rasyid had also been a former Electoral Commissioner, with a great deal of experience and expertise on electoral systems and election conduct, and became a vocal member of the 2004-2009 DPR Commission dealing with revisions to the electoral and political party laws.

*The Indonesian Party System by the Numbers: 1999-2009*

Between 1999 and 2009 the party system exhibited limited institutionalization in terms of support and strengthening of the oldest political parties. New party entry has been difficult but not impossible and the aggregate portion of the votes and seats going to the three New Order era parties declined steadily. Though not necessarily the most relevant indicator, the relative balance between New Order era parties and the new(er) parties in the system might indicate some measure of party system institutionalization. The combined vote share for Golkar, PDI-P and PPP was 66.87% in 1999, 48.25% in 2004 and 33.78% in 2009; their combined seat share was 71.65% in 1999, 53.64% in 2004 and 42.5% in 2009. In contrast, the two new parties in 2004 won more than 15% of the votes and 18% of the seats; the two new parties in 2009 won an additional 9% of the vote and 8% of the seats on top of previous newcomers.
A second dimension on which party system institutionalization might be measured is how well parties can be classified or identified along a typical left-right continuum, with easily identifiable parties aiding in system institutionalization. In Indonesia, the classic left-right divide is rarely used by scholars or political elites and almost never applies to the ideologies followed or espoused by any major parties. Instead, the Indonesian system displays a continuum better referred to as secular-nationalist versus religious-oriented, where the ideological divide occurs over the nature of the religion-state relationship. Figure 3.1 shows this ideological continuum and party placement on it.

Figure 3.1 The Party System: The Secular Nationalist-Religious Islamist Continuum

Since 1999 the balance between the secular nationalist parties and the religious-oriented (Islamist/Islamic) parties trended toward secular nationalist domination. The combined vote-share for the religious-oriented parties (PPP, PKB, PAN, PBB, PK/PKS, PNU, and PBR) was 34.35% in 1999, 37.54% in 2004 and 27.2% in 2009; their combined seat-share was 36.36% in 1999, 42% in 2004 and 30.18% in 2009. The increase in 2004 can

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18 Though it is a religious party, the PDS is composed of mostly Christians and Catholics and does not pursue a combination of religious doctrine with state institutions or the legal system. Therefore, even though their membership, candidates and representatives are almost exclusively affiliated with some Christian faith, they have similar goals to secular nationalist parties with respect to state form and function.
be directly attributed to the rise of the PKS, which campaigned on an anti-corruption, clean
government platform that overshadowed the Islamist ideology espoused by the party that
became much more overt in 2008 with their pursuit of the anti-pornography law.

Analysis of the party system shows: 1) the decline in the total number of legislative
parties from 21 in 1999 to 16 in 2004 and 9 in 2009; 2) the increase in the number of
effective parties in the legislature\textsuperscript{19} from 4.72 in 1999 to 7.07 in 2004 but subsequent
decrease to 6.21 in 2009; 3) the decrease in the percentage of “wasted” votes from 9.69% in
1999 to 4.81% in 2004 but subsequent increase to 18.31% in 2009; and 4) a slight increase in
Combined with the two previous dimensions of party system institutionalization, the
quantitative measures suggest a somewhat divergent trajectory of party system development.
Between 1999 and 2004 the system appeared to exhibit transitional flux as new parties
entered the system, old parties consolidated their voting bases and all competitors learned the
roles of democratic electoral politics. Then between 2004 and 2009 the system appeared to
consolidate as parties settled into ideological positions and roles and competition remained
open but more constrained under the new rules.

While voters in 2009 faced many of the same parties as in 2004, pre-election
evaluation of the parties suggested that, outside of the PDI-P and PKS, few other parties
relied much on ideological or platform-based appeals and from 1999-2009 many voters
appeared to have preferences for party leaders over parties, demonstrating declining party
identification (Liddle & Mujani 2007; Mujani & Liddle 2010). In general, vote volatility
from 1999 to 2009 suggests that few parties have made inroads to develop constituency-

\textsuperscript{19} Lakso and Taagepera’s Effective Number of Parties index is commonly used to approximate party system
fragmentation, and can be calculated for votes and seats. The number here is calculated by seats.
based platforms or close ties to constituent groups and the system as a whole is not particularly well institutionalized with strong personalities dominating much of the post-transition landscape (Tan 2006). However, the large and medium parties do have relatively stable core constituencies, and programmatic parties tend to have specific voting bases as well (Ufen 2008).

Figure 3.2 Percentage of National Legislative Votes by Party

![Figure 3.2 Percentage of National Legislative Votes by Party](source)

Source: National Election Commission archives

Figure 3.2 illustrates the change over time in voteshare of relevant parties. Perhaps most striking is the decline in each of the New Order parties and the PKB, increases in 2004 for PKS and 2004 and 2009 for PD, and the increase in the residual “other” category

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20 “Relevant” here refers specifically to parties who obtained more than one or two legislative seats.
encompassing between 12-30 parties in each election. In addition, in 1999 the largest party was nearly 30% larger than the second largest party, with the third and fourth largest parties half the size of the second. By 2004 the two largest parties were almost at parity but there were five mid-sized parties half their sizes; by 2009 the largest party was again nearly 30% larger than the second and third largest parties which were roughly the same size.

Figure 3.3 Percentage of National Legislative Seats by Party

![Graph of Percentage of National Legislative Seats](image)

Source: National Election Commission archives

Figure 3.3 illustrates the change over time in the seatshare of the relevant parties. Due to changes in the electoral rules and district magnitudes, the seatshare shows greater concentration in the large and medium-sized parties from 1999 to 2009. The distribution of seats is more concentrated in 1999, when five parties obtained most of the seats and the two
largest shared almost 60%, than in 2004, when seven parties obtained most of the seats but with a clear concentration in the two largest. In 2009 the three largest parties obtained the majority of the seats (more than 60%) similar to the 1999 outcome. The concentration of the seatshare held by the two or three largest parties, as well as the relative balance among them, indicates the lack of single-party control over agenda setting and legislative control.

**Conclusion**

In the view of most observers of the Indonesian case, far more is often made of democratic progress than the lack of party system institutionalization or development of closer elite-society linkages. While Indonesia boasts a healthy and vibrant civil society, and a remarkably moderate and tolerant yet deeply religious society to boot, fears of religious intolerance and eroding secular protection of democracy plague Indonesia in its second decade of democracy. The strength and dominance of the secular-nationalist parties have kept religious populism from dominating the political landscape, despite tendencies to support or at least avoid punishing religious intolerance and advocates of policies designed to forcibly introduce traditional or religious norms with legal force. Individualism and candidate-centricity has had a twin effect: erosion of the limited ideology- or platform-based party development so many scholars value for the entrenchment and consolidation of democratic rule combined with an ever-growing sense of ownership by everyday voters over the political arena long dominated by elites.

While party system institutionalization can herald the advent of democratic consolidation in many contexts, I argue that, similar to many experiences in Eastern Europe (Toka 1997; Vachudova 2005), the absence of strongly institutionalized parties competing
with easily predicted outcomes and low electoral volatility need not signal a lack of
democratic consolidation. In contrast, vibrant competition incorporating a wide plurality of
views, some of which might appear undemocratic in ideology or policy advocacy, can in fact
provide stability for a newly democratic state if all participants agree to adhere to the rules of
the game and abide by the outcome of elections. I focus on a key reason for the evolving
dynamic of Indonesian party politics and democracy: the evolution of the electoral rules of
the game allowed the system to accommodate diversity and change without obviously
sacrificing institutional quality.
Chapter 4: The 1999-2004 Period

In this chapter I explore the effect of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations on the national electoral reforms adopted in Indonesia during the 1999-2004 legislative session. I evaluate each of the major parties’ positions on three elements of reform – an electoral threshold, the size of electoral district magnitude, and the type of list proportional representation system in use – in order to assess the importance of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations in understanding the specific reforms that were adopted. In order to do so, I situate the reform process within the broader post-transition political environment and compare party preferences to the proposal by the government and the professed interests of civil society. After assessing how individual party positions affected the exact composition of reforms that were adopted I proceed to analyze the impact those reforms had on the 2004 election outcomes, assessing whether party expectations were met and setting the stage for the ensuing reform process that occurred in the 2004-2009 legislative session.

Based on seat maximizing hypotheses, in 1999 many initial factors in the Indonesian case did not indicate that reform would be inevitable. There was high uncertainty about future election outcomes while the opposition had just won the largest proportion of seats under the openly competitive rules established for the 1999 elections, suggesting that the opposition should have little incentive to drastically alter a system that had just propelled them into power and was already quite proportional. In general, the opposition was relatively interested in maintaining the status quo for both seat-maximizing and ideological reasons which will be discussed later in the chapter. In addition, the army, which had been extremely
strong under the New Order and valued the status quo that kept them in the vicinity, if not
outright possession, of power and decision-making, had no desire to overhaul the system
since revision might mean a reduction in their presence.

More importantly, based on the 1999 election outcomes and the large number of
parties competing in (forty-eight) and gaining seats from (twenty-one) the elections, it is not
obvious what seat-maximizing logic would predict in terms of what reforms would be
undertaken, if any. The system in place in 1999 was already a largely list-based proportional
one, with moderately large districts based on provincial boundaries and closed nominations.
Seat-maximizing logic would predict that high and rising uncertainty would lead to greater
proportionality but the system already boasted a fairly high degree of proportionality such
that additional proportional elements would be a) difficult to add, and b) viewed as largely
unnecessary for competitors to hedge their bets for future elections.

However, the surprisingly lopsided loss by the ruling party meant that at least one
powerful group had some incentive to alter the existing electoral system. In addition, the
academic community and other civil society actors who unsuccessfully pushed for greater
reform prior to the 1999 elections were very interested in an agenda that included electoral
reform. In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, reforms came in many areas in the
early democratic period. Outside the realm of legislative election reform, the process of
amending the constitution created a directly-elected executive and an upper chamber of the
legislature based on the principle of regional representation. Other electoral reforms
included the elimination of reserved legislative seats for the military and functional
representative groups, direct election of district heads for provincial and municipal
governments, and increasing political and fiscal decentralization to said provincial and
municipal governments. In short, reforms were occurring across most elements of electoral politics in post-New Order Indonesia, and the vast majority of the reforms were intended to strengthen vertical and horizontal accountability to some degree. The legislative election reforms followed a similar path of attempting to 1) increase democratic accountability, and 2) increase ease of voting, counting and seat allocation mechanisms. The final reform package adopted would not likely have been predicted prior to or at the beginning of the process.

In Chapter 2 I introduced a set of hypotheses predicting the determinants of electoral reform. In particular, I focused on the contrast between seat-maximizing expectations (hypothesis 1) and alternative motivations (hypothesis 2), the specific expectations that medium-sized parties would be a more important indicator of less inclusive and candidate-centric reform adoptions (hypotheses 3a & 3b) and that as medium-sized parties increasingly benefited from distortion in translation of votes into seats they would push for less inclusive reforms to cement those gains (hypothesis 4). I hypothesized that reformers in new democracies would be likely to pursue more consensual reform processes that appeared less interested in seat maximization, but that this effect would fade in later periods of reform (hypothesis 5). Finally, I expected that ratchet effects will increase the likelihood that once less inclusive and candidate-centric reforms are adopted they will be retained or reinforced in later iterated periods (hypotheses 6a & 6b) but subject to some level of constraint.

I also hypothesized about the effects of reform on party system outcomes. I expected that more inclusive and candidate-centric reforms would increase party system fragmentation (hypotheses 7a & 7b), less inclusive reforms would produce increased disproportionality in translating votes into seats (hypothesis 8), and that both interparty and intraparty reforms
would produce a general increase in the amount of electoral volatility in the party system (hypothesis 9). I will investigate these expectations in the 1999-2004 period.

This chapter traces the process of reform during the 1999 to 2004 legislative session that produced the 2003 General Election Law, probing the motivations of key actors and choices they made in order to test explanations of the theoretical framework given in Chapter 2. First, I introduce the context of reform in the post-transition period, based on the party power distribution resulting from the 1999 elections and accounting for the simultaneous constitutional amendment process. Next I address the process of reform itself, focusing on the sequence of actor participation, the timing of reform negotiations and adoption relative to other political reform processes and the upcoming 2004 election schedule, and explain changes from the previous election structure in the proposed draft law and party positions about the proposed changes. I then tackle each of the reform components – electoral threshold, district magnitude, and list structure – to assess party-level positions, strategic and seat-maximizing incentives as well as alternative arguments for or against certain reform options. I evaluate how the negotiation process affected the eventual decisions of individual parties and the legislative committees tasked with producing the General Election Law, finishing with a comparison of each element in the proposed draft law to the rules actually adopted in the final election law passed by the DPR. Finally I conclude with an evaluation of the impact of reforms on the Indonesian party system, assessing whether party expectations were met, which parties benefitted and which did not, and previewing possible scenarios for the 2004-2009 reform period based on the outcome of the 2004 elections.
Transitional Context of the Reform Period

In 1998, after Suharto had turned power over to his vice president, Habibie gathered a team of social scientists to aid the Ministry of Home Affairs in reviewing and, if necessary, revising various political laws, including laws on the governance of elections and political and fiscal decentralization. First on the list was to prepare three laws that would lay out the rules for the early general elections in 1999: Law Number 2 (UU2/1999) on political parties, Law Number 3 (UU3/1999) on the general elections, and Law Number 4 (UU4/1999) on the composition and status of the national and local legislatures. The political parties law needed revision in order to relax the tight controls on party formation, registration and participation that prohibited any but the three national parties – Golkar, PDI-P and PPP – from competing during the New Order. The general election law needed revision in order to set forth the districting and rules for elections to the national legislature, the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR), and local legislatures, the Regional People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD1, at the provincial level, and DPRD2, at the district/municipal level). The general election law also set forth rules and processes for the selection of Election Commissioners who would implement and oversee all election conduct. The composition and status law required the least revision, except where it touched upon issues related to the previous two laws. Later revisions tended to treat these three laws, along with the separate laws governing executive election and election organization, as a package of laws requiring synchronization.

The team, officially known as the Team to Revise Draft of Laws on Politics of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Tim Revisi Undang-Undang Politik di Menteri Dalam Negeri) but nicknamed for the number of its members as the Team of 7 (Tim Tujuh), included four
scholars who had earned Ph.D. degrees in the United States – Andi Mallarangeng and Ramlan Surbakti from Northern Illinois University, Afan Gaffar from Ohio State University and Ryaas Rasyid from the University of Hawaii. The others were Djohermansyah Djohan, Luthfi Mutty, and Anas Urbaningrum. The input from these team members introduced and debated electoral system components previously unheard of in Indonesia, such as single-member districts and a mixed electoral system. However, by the time the draft law made its way out of the Ministry to the legislature, and was subsequently passed by a legislature still controlled by Golkar (which held more than 70% of the seats), the electoral system was nearly identical to that of previous New Order era elections with the exception that interparty competition was now much more open and inclusive.

The primary difference in the 1999 election, compared with previous ones under the New Order, was that parties of basically any persuasion could register and compete in the elections; prior to 1998 only three parties were able to compete and were subject to stringent controls and intervention by the government. Now parties could create nearly any platform to submit, with nearly any name, symbol and list of nominees, none subject to government “approval” other than to abide by the rules and regulations that applied to all parties. The major holdover from the previous law governing political parties was the regional stipulation: parties could only form and compete if they possessed a nation-wide presence in terms of offices, headquarters and registration of nomination lists. This constraint, in practice, took the form of a registration barrier under which parties were required to register in at minimum ½ of the provinces, demonstrating that they had an office/headquarters in at least ½ of the municipalities in those provinces. Failure to comply would eliminate a party from
competition and the stipulation was retained primarily to discourage regional parties from
forming in provinces with separatist elements, such as Aceh and Papua.

Otherwise the system in 1999 largely resembled the basic system under the New
Order: closed-list proportional representation with provincial boundaries as the electoral
districts for calculating vote-seat allocation formulae. Differences were minor, in part
because the Ministry Team’s suggestions in the draft law were largely overruled by the
interests of the ruling Golkar Party and military representatives who wanted to retain the
existing system as much as possible. The structure of ballots, therefore, contained only party
names and symbols and voters simply chose a party from the ballot; once seats were
allocated to parties on the basis of sub-provincial divisions, names were taken in order from
the party nomination lists that were submitted prior to the election. Thus voters had no
control over individual candidates, only over which parties received seat allocations in their
province. An additional element, a past election vote threshold set by the Ministry’s team at
10% of the 1999-2004 DPR seats in order to contest the 2004 general elections, was
dramatically reduced to 2% in the final law.

On June 7, 1999 Indonesians went to the polls in the first election deemed “free and
fair” by the international community and election observers stationed throughout the country.
In all 28 of the country’s provinces the open competition produced multiple party seat-
winners, and fears about election-related violence proved largely alarmist. Relative to
elections in India or the Philippines, long held up as the regional democracy examples,
almost no violence emerged prior or in response to the June elections. However, concerns
were raised about the allocation process used to determine remainder seats and the political
horse-trading between parties over remainder seats across provincial lines. There was
agreement in the international donor community that such practices, which amounted to remainder vote-pooling by parties to try and win seats that were known as Stembus Accords, should be eliminated in the revision of the election law for the future with an eye toward transparency in the allocation process.

As expected by outside observers, the PDI-P won the plurality of votes with Golkar coming in second and a range of votes spread over three other parties, the New Order PPP, Wahid’s PKB and Rais’ PAN. In total, 21 parties won at least one seat, though only six won substantial enough seat-shares to boast a relatively large *fraksi*, or legislative caucus. In the 1999-2004 legislative session there were five single-party *fraksi* (PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, PKB and PBB) and four multi-party *fraksi* (the largest included the PAN) composed of two to five parties each. Table 4.1 shows the seat-shares of the largest parties in the People’s Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or DPR). In addition to the 462 seats held by the 21 competitive parties, 60 were reserved for representatives of ABRI (the Indonesian military) and PRI (the National Police).

Table 4.1 1999-2004 Party Seat-shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seat % (Number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>33.12% (153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>25.97% (120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>11.04% (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>12.55% (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7.36% (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>2.81% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>1.52% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.63% (26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The loss to the PDI-P, in particular the magnitude of the loss, surprised some in Golkar’s leadership who believed that the transitional conflict had largely been due to perceptions about Suharto’s corruption and mismanagement, not broader disillusionment with the party. Habibie, still in control of Golkar, began maneuvering for the presidency.
despite the fact that many parties, such as the PAN, were not interested in supporting a Golkar led-government to head the process of reformasi for fear that little reform would actually occur.

Despite holding a plurality of the seats in the DPR, the PDI-P did not end up holding the advantage in nominating a president-vice president combination to the executive. Still operating under a de facto pseudo-parliamentary system, the president and vice president, who automatically assumed the presidency for the remainder of the fixed 5-year term if the president died or was forced to step down, were selected from among the representatives. Given the lack of a majority party, a party hoping to secure the presidency would need allies, and likely many of them. For clear reasons, neither the opposition PDI-P’s Megawati nor incumbent Golkar’s Habibie would be able to ally with each other, and it was increasingly clear that none of the Islamist parties would consider allying with Megawati to allow a female presidency. After a lengthy period of backroom deals and politicking Megawati lost in the balloting in the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly) to Wahid and had to accept election as his vice president. This arrangement which lasted until Wahid was forced from the presidency amid scandal in July 2001 and Megawati assumed the office with the PPP’s Hamzah Haz, her primary opponent for the vice presidency, as her vice president.21

Following its inauguration, the DPR faced many tasks in 1999, including constitutional amendments and decentralization, which were briefly addressed in the previous chapter.22 The constitutional amendment process required a special legislative body,

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21 Haz had been one of the most vociferous opponents to a female Indonesian president, challenging Megawati for the vice presidency when even the Golkar opponent had dropped out of the race.
named the First Ad Hoc Committee or Panitia Ad-Hoc 1 (PAH1), which was led by representatives from the PDI-P and Golkar. The decentralization process required an additional legislative commission, one who worked with the PAH1 and also was led primarily by PDI-P and Golkar representatives. Finally, the legislative committee tasked with revising the election law drew its membership largely from the PAH1 and decentralization commission, as the election law revisions did not really begin in the DPR until after the constitutional amendment process ended.

Procedure and Sequencing in the Reform Process

Despite the lack of a clear seat-maximizing motivation for electoral reform, there were numerous actors invested in revision of the system used in 1999. Chief among the proponents of change was Golkar whose leaders now realized that the previous system would not benefit them in future elections. Others advocating for change or revision of the existing system included academics and civil society members who worried that the problems associated with the 1999 elections, such as the corruption associated with the Stembus Accords (trading remainder seats across district lines) and the closed-list system, would persist without electoral reform. International organizations, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, were consulted or became direct advocates of reform.

Finally, the political battle over the presidency from 1999 to 2001 also had ramifications for allocating government portfolios, although the Minister of Home Affairs under Wahid, former ABRI General Surjadi Sudirdja, was replaced by Megawati with

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22 For reasons of space and theoretical focus I do not address these issues here, but the DPR also faced questions regarding Timorese independence, the mitigation of civil conflicts in Aceh and Papua and sectarian violence in many parts of the country, all of which demanded attention of the national government and legislature from 1999 to 2004. For an excellent summary account of the different ethno-nationalist and religious conflicts that emerged during the political thaw of the early democratic period see Bertrand (2004).
another former ABRI General, Hari Sabarno, in August 2001.\footnote{Sabarno would actually go on to replace Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister of People’s Welfare in March 2004, by then the Election Law had been passed and election preparations fully transferred to the KPU.} The core of the team preparing the Ministry’s draft election law remained constant, despite the cabinet shuffle in mid-2001, and was headed by Siti Nurbaya, a long-time New Order bureaucrat and former Golkar youth leader. Under Nurbaya the team took the approach of consulting numerous experts and academics, which directly influenced the components and content of the draft law that was eventually submitted to the DPR.\footnote{Interviews with Siti Nurbaya (June 2010), Ramlan Surbakti (March 2010), Cecep Effendi (July 2010), Progo and Gunawan Suswantoro (August 2010) and Didik Supriyanto (December 2010).} The advice of the expert consultants, as well as the general feeling that the 1999 elections had been transitional and that reform and change represented the “only way to move forward,”\footnote{Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010).} led to the process of revision that began, as under the New Order, with a draft from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

While it seems surprising that Megawati and the PDI-P would allow a former Golkar youth leader to head a team tasked with drafting the package of political laws, it was not that uncommon an occurrence at the time: under the New Order regime most of the country’s most experienced, professional and well-trained technocrats had been in the Golkar fold.\footnote{Interviews with Akil Mochtar (May 2010), Jakob Tobing (April 2010), Valina Singka Subekti (April 2010).} Finding an experienced legislator and/or technocrat without Golkar ties at some point would have been a rarity. Within the PDI-P leadership of the DPR even figures such as Jakob Tobing, the chairman of the PAH1, were once Golkar members who switched following the end of the New Order. In short, given the lack of well-trained technocrats without a previous Golkar affiliation, leadership of the ministry team almost inevitably would have to be someone like Nurbaya.
Under the New Order, the Ministry of Home Affairs had been extraordinarily powerful and touched nearly every aspect of political, fiscal and bureaucratic governance. The Ministry wrote nearly all political laws, including those governing elections, political and fiscal authority, but following the democratic transition needed a new role to define its status within the state. In the 1999-2004 period assumed it would continue to write draft laws, partly due to perceptions within the Ministry that the DPR contained many first-time legislators who were relatively inexperienced and poorly-equipped to draft the law themselves. The revisions to the package of political laws were again headed by a single team, each composed of Ministry bureaucrats and technocrats who consulted with Indonesian academics such as Valina Singka Subekti and Ramlan Surbakti. The Ministry’s team focused attention on making a more legally-consistent set of laws that refined elements of the existing system, rather than wholesale revision for the purpose of actually changing much about the way the rules worked. The draft law submitted by the Ministry to the Special Committee (Panitia Khusus or Pansus) of the DPR’s Commission 2 diverged from the basic framework used for the 1999 elections in a few key ways, summarized in Table 4.2.

The draft law did not include clear district magnitudes for seat allocations across the country, instead referring to electoral districts based on provinces or subdivisions of provinces based on the population but without a clear allocation mechanism or way to draw or distinguish district boundaries, though the draft did specify a 550-seat DPR. The draft

27 Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010).

28 Interviews with Siti Nurbaya (June 2010), Valina Singka Subekti (April 2010) and Ramlan Surbakti (March 2010). Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010) indicated perception within the Ministry of limits on legislators due to resource constraints, having few support staff or useful documentation to bring to meetings.

29 Singka and Surbakti both became KPU Commissioners for the 2001-2007 period, and continued to fulfill an advisory role with the Ministry during this time; relayed during interviews in March-April 2010.

30 Interview with Siti Nurbaya (June 2010).
also retained the past election vote threshold, raising it to 3% of DPR seats or 4% of the seats in half of the DPRD1 or DPRD2, with no addition of a legislative entry threshold. The closed lists were not retained and the wording in the draft law clearly stipulated that plurality voting among party lists would determine which candidates received the seats allocated to the parties. The draft law submitted to the DPR represented a wide range of opinions regarding different aspects of the electoral system. Yet, it was only modestly “cleaner” than the version used to conduct the 1999 elections, leaving key issues like district seat magnitude and boundaries to the Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU).

Table 4.2 Proposed Changes in the New Draft Election Law (2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous Election Law (passed by pre-democratic MPR in March 1999)</th>
<th>New Draft Election Law (produced by Ministry of Home Affairs in June 2001)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threshold</td>
<td>Past election vote threshold 2% DPR, 3% ½ DPRD1 or 3% ½ DPRD2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Magnitude</td>
<td>Proportional boundaries, distributed according to subdivisions within provinces but lists are by number of seats available province-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>Fully closed, list order determines all seat allocations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Draft Election Law and Final Election Law from the Document Archive of the DPR

From the Ministry’s draft law each fraksi prepared an individual reaction to the draft, submitting a line-by-line list of changes desired and rationale for their objections. This 408-page aggregate set of complaints, the List of Inventory Problems (Daftar Inventarisasi Masalah or DIM), provided the Special Committee a starting point for hearings and consultations with experts, party leaders, government and Ministry representatives. Table

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31 Interview with and preparatory documents from Progo and Gunawan Suswantoro (August 2010).
4.3 summarizes the positions of major actors on the three elements of reform in the draft law (listed in the first row), including the four main single-party fraksi, the PAN-led multi-party fraksi, smaller parties, and civil society’s positions.

Between August 27 and September 3 the Special Committee consulted experts, academics and civil society organizations, and from August 26 to September 26 held discussions with the Ministry regarding various issues raised by the fraksi. The Special Committee met from October to November and a subset of the Special Committee, the Working Committee (Panitia Kerja or Panja), met from November to February for further debate before the next working draft was submitted to a plenary session of the DPR. The final version was passed and signed into law on March 11, 2003, as Law Number 12 (UU12/2003). The entire process took nine months from the draft law submission in July to passage in March, although the consultant phase only took one week and both committees only met for four months.

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32 I do not list fraksi PBB separately from the small/other parties because they hold only 13 DPR seats and thus only have a single representative on Commission 2, which is fewer than the PAN-led multi-party fraksi.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Group</th>
<th>Threshold</th>
<th>District Magnitude</th>
<th>List PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft Election Law</td>
<td>Moderate increase (to 3% DPR, 4% ½ DPRD1 or 4% ½ DPRD2 in past election vote threshold)</td>
<td>Not specified but electoral districts will be based on population within provinces and subdivisions of provinces with a set number of DPR seats at 550</td>
<td>Fully open, plurality vote within party district list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>Wants increase to 5% DPR, 5% DPRD1 or 5% DPRD2 in past election vote threshold</td>
<td>Wants “electorat districts” instead of referencing “subdivisions of provinces,” wants 600 seats</td>
<td>Want a fully closed system (used in 1999 elections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>Wants legislative entry threshold agrees to moderate increase of 3% DPR, 4% DPRD1 and wants 5% DPRD2 in past election vote threshold</td>
<td>Wants single-member districts based on administrative divisions (districts/municipalities)</td>
<td>Agrees to open list system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>Agrees to moderate increase (to 3%/4%/4%) in past election vote threshold</td>
<td>Wants 600 seats, agrees to population-based division of districts</td>
<td>Agrees to open list system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Agrees to moderate increase (to 3%/4%/4%) in past election vote threshold</td>
<td>Wants a formula to distribute seats in Java relative to outside Java</td>
<td>Agrees to mechanism of open list system but clearly confused as to what is meant by “open list”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN (lead party in Fraksi Reformasi)</td>
<td>Wants 2% DPR (same as 1999), 5% DPRD1 or 5% DPRD2 in past election vote threshold</td>
<td>Wants provinces as the electoral districts but wants each district/municipality to receive at least one seat, wants 600 seats</td>
<td>Agrees to open list system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td>Fraksi PDU wants entire past election vote threshold struck from the law</td>
<td>PBB wants seats distributed based on multiples of 100,000 population in districts/municipalities</td>
<td>Agrees or no comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Wants increase in and better enforcement of past election vote threshold</td>
<td>Wants population-based electoral districts, many look to NGOs for guidance how to draw boundaries</td>
<td>Supports fully open lists and increased transparency but need campaign finance regulations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources collected from the Document Archive (Arsip Dokumentasi, Ardok) at the DPR in Jakarta, March 2010:
1) Draft law components from Rencana Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum submitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the DPR
2) Party/fraksi preferences from Daftar Inventarisasi Masalah submitted by each fraksi in response to the Draft Law
Electoral Threshold Reform

By spring 2002 full-scale discussion over the law had begun, and one of the primary concerns of many law-makers had been the unwieldy size of the party system. At 21 parties, with ten fraksi and only five single-party fraksi, nearly all representatives of the large and medium-sized parties agreed that it was difficult to negotiate anything in the legislature since the common custom was to attempt consensus, rather than a 50%-plus-1 attitude, on policy-making. In addition, many representatives also questioned the ability of multi-party fraksi to resemble true party coalitions since some were clearly cobbled together simply to meet the required numbers for a fraksi and dividing up commission and standing body assignments among the component members proved quite difficult for some fraksi to manage.

The draft law from the Ministry of Home Affairs included nearly identical language from the 1999 Election Law regarding an electoral threshold (ambang batas): parties which contested the previous election were required to receive at least 3% of the vote cast for the DPR or 4% of the vote cast for ½ of the DPRD1 or DPRD2 in order to run as the same party in the upcoming elections. Failure to meet this past election vote threshold would be required to newly register, including a change of name, party symbol/flag and meeting all the basic requirements of new party entrants. This represented a modest change from the previous law that had stipulated the same past election vote threshold but with 2% DPR and 3% ½ DPRD1 or DPRD2 levels. The draft law did not include any parameters for a legislative entry threshold based on a minimum percentage of votes won.

33 I use the term “past election vote threshold” in place of the term used by Indonesians and consultants in Indonesia, who use the term “electoral threshold.” In this analysis, “past election vote threshold” refers to a barrier to electoral registration based on failure to meet a certain percentage of vote-share in the previous election, which is different from a “legislative entry threshold” that prevents the allocation of legislative seats to parties failing to meet a certain percentage of the vote-share. The reason for this terminology is to avoid confusion since the common political science use of the term “electoral threshold” actually refers to what I call a “legislative entry threshold” rather than the “past election vote threshold” used in news dailies, legislative and civil society debates in Indonesia.
Of the parties seeking some type of strict limitation on party entry into the legislature, Golkar was by far the most outspoken, an unsurprising reality given the party’s views on limited competition during the New Order. Golkar advocated for some form of a legislative entry threshold above and beyond, and in addition to, the moderate increase in the past election vote threshold; the party viewed the fragmented system as directly limiting its seat-share due to the number of small parties winning seats. Despite rhetoric regarding party system ‘simplification,’ a “sistem partai politik yang sederhana,” an aim of Golkar’s elite was clearly a system in which smaller parties were eliminated and would result in a greater seat-share for them. Politics during the New Order had strengthened Golkar’s power in the Outer Islands relative to Central (Java) and Western Indonesia. The party believed that elimination of smaller parties, many of which had won seats in the easternmost provinces such as Papua and Sulawesi, would result in a direct benefit to them since they would be the most likely of the larger parties to regain vote-shares when voters realized they would be wasting votes on small parties unlikely to meet a legislative entry threshold. However, Golkar leadership eventually gave up the idea as too extreme a method of limiting competition in the early democratic period, agreeing to raise the past election vote threshold for 2004 and postpone discussion of a legislative entry threshold until later.

The PDI-P, on the other hand, worried that reducing the number of parties through some sort of entry mechanism would be unfair to the spirit of democratic competition. More importantly, such a mechanism would reduce the diversity of interests the party deemed necessary to appropriately represent the Indonesian population. This perception of PDI-P

34 Interviews with Jakob Tobing (April 2010), Gunanjar Sudarsa (November 2010).
35 Interview with Fery Mursyidan Baldan (October 2010).
leaders flew directly in the face of party self-interests: the party would almost certainly have benefitted from a reduction in the party system size as strategic Catholic and Christian voters would undoubtedly have viewed the PDI-P as the most preferable alternative to wasting their votes on small parties unable to meet a legislative entry threshold. The PDI-P was in favor of retaining the past election vote threshold, on the grounds that parties should represent national interests that had repercussions for all Indonesians rather than specific interests that pertained to only subsets of the population. The PDI-P advocated gradualism in the process of increasing the past election vote threshold, explicit in its message of not wanting to undemocratically curb popular voice in the nascent years of democracy. However, this position left the door open for a return to the subject in the future.

In short, the PDI-P was happy to curb competition entry to only nationally-oriented parties, largely based on the party’s ideological platform of a unified Indonesian national identity and universalistic approach to citizenship and anti-discrimination practices. Yet, the party also preferred to allow entry to any nationally-oriented party that could win enough votes to obtain seats. The PDI-P did not view the 1999 election outcome unfavorably, having won the largest share of seats, and so it did not take the perspective that eliminating smaller parties would be necessary to retaining its strength in 2004. Thus, on both ideological and somewhat strategic perceptions, the PDI-P did not pursue a fixed legislative entry threshold that would truncate the party system’s size in 2004, despite a general consensus among observers that such a threshold would have benefitted the party.

36 Interview with Pataniari Siahaan (October 2010).
37 Interview with Hamid Basyaib (February 2010).
38 Interviews with Jakob Tobing (April 2010), Pataniari Siahaan (October 2010).
The medium-sized parties held mixed views on the issue of electoral threshold reform, in part because the uncertainty surrounding the future of electoral politics appeared the greatest for them. Rais’ PAN was already backpedaling in the wake of a less-strong-than-expected showing in 1999, and wanted the past election vote threshold of 2% at the DPR level to remain alongside a raised DPRD1 and DPRD2 level. While the PPP did not know what to make of the splintering of the Islamic/Islamist voice that it had represented for so long, the party agreed to raise the past election vote threshold but refused to discuss a legislative entry threshold. Wahid’s PKB had begun its descent into internal fragmentation within weeks of the election’s results and long before he even assumed the presidency. In the wake of his ouster prior to the election law reform the PKB appeared to have little focus or direction amid leadership uncertainty and the accusations of corruption. As such, the PPP and PKB appeared to come out in favor of increasing the past election vote threshold, likely hoping that fewer contestants would result in a better outcome for them in 2004, but stopping short of advocating a fixed legislative entry threshold without knowing if they would be able to clear it in the future. PAN also objected to a legislative entry threshold and pursued an increase in the past election vote threshold at the provincial and municipal levels but did not want an increase at the national level for fear that it would fail to meet it.

Unsurprisingly, none of the small parties that received between one and a handful of seats were in favor of introducing a legislative entry threshold or increasing the registration requirements of the past election vote threshold. In purely seat-maximizing, indeed representation survival, logic, all 16 of the small parties immediately opposed any additional

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39 Interview with Indra Piliang (July 2010).

40 Interview with Ali Hardi Kiaidemek (July 2010).

41 Personal communications with Marcus Mietzner in Jakarta, November/December 2010.
constraints on electoral competition or legislative entry. In particular, one fraksi representing a coalition of small parties advocated for the entire past election vote threshold to be removed from the law while the PK fought against any major increases.\textsuperscript{42}

The role of experts and consultants came largely in the form of IFES consultants and Indonesian academics who were now sitting members of the KPU, such as Ramlan Surbakti who had been a member of the Team 7 and Valina Singka Subekti who was a professor of political science at the University of Indonesia. Many of these experts advocated some measure of threshold, at the very least to reduce the number of parties which obtained only one or two seats, for the purpose of simplifying the system.\textsuperscript{43} During the negotiations it was clear that without PDI-P support for a legislative entry threshold there would not be one adopted. Instead the debate revolved around whether the past election vote threshold should be increased, with the objections of the small parties eventually being overruled by the consensus among experts and the largest parties that the threshold was ineffectively low.

The final result was a slight increase in the past election vote threshold, to 3\% of the votes for the DPR or 4\% of the votes for \(\frac{1}{2}\) the DPRD1 or DPRD2, and no legislative entry threshold. With respect to the electoral threshold issues, only the PDI-P’s position was clearly bolstered by a combination of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations, as both publicly and during committee meetings the party consistently argued against the introduction of a legislative entry threshold that almost certainly would have benefitted its seat-share in the 2004–2009 DPR. However, in the uncertain post-transition political environment, all of the parties including the PDI-P advocated for reforms to the electoral

\textsuperscript{42} Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010).

\textsuperscript{43} Interviews with Ramlan Surbakti (April 2010), Valina Singka Subekti (April 2010).
threshold that were clearly strategic in nature, with the large parties agreeing to increase the past election vote threshold, the medium parties split on the level and location of the increase, and the small parties guarding against the increase.

**District Magnitude Reform**

The initial draft law from the Ministry of Home Affairs included a vague stipulation for electoral district shape and size: electoral districts would be based on population within provinces and subdivisions of provinces. The Ministry’s team drafted the clause to try to tackle the concerns raised after the 1999 election during the counting and seat allocation process that the formula for seat distribution among parties was too unclear. Through a mechanism known as Stembus Accords, parties were able to take advantage of the relatively vague wording in the 1999 Election Law and trade vote-shares in one district for those in another. The trades occurred between parties who wanted certain representatives in one district to be elected and were willing to “trade” votes with another, usually small, party in that district for their votes in another district where they did not have a candidate they wanted elected as much.\(^4^4\) In short, the draft election law from the Ministry reflected a greater desire for a more transparent allocation process and a fixed number of seats per district to determine the number of candidates nominated per party per list and provide a fixed quota for determining the remainder allocations for parties to obtain seats. However, it fell short of this goal and only proposed a 550-seat DPR without specifying how many seats, either on average or a range, per district.

Golkar was a major proponent of *pemekaraan*, the process of district/municipality creation during decentralization discussed in the previous chapter, both in order to try and

\(^{44}\) Interview with Kevin Evans (March 2009).
control resources at the local level and to push for changes in national legislative districting in parts of the country where the party held its greatest proportion of seats. Since the beginning of the 1999 legislative session Golkar had raised discussions of moving to a single-member district system, commonly referred to by party leadership as a *sistem distrik*, with district boundaries drawn along administrative boundaries of the districts and municipalities (*kabupaten* and *kotamadya*) rather than through some population-based allocation formula.\(^4^5\) Golkar pursued the single-member districts in conjunction with the simultaneous decentralization process by pushing the creation of new municipalities in places where it believed it would be most likely to win a plurality-based seat. As a result, the party repeatedly advocated for a switch from proportional representation in provincial- or population-based national electoral districts to single-member district winner-take-all seats. Rhetorically, the Golkar elite pressed the issue of single-member districts as a system in which representatives would be held more accountable to their specific constituencies rather than party leaders,\(^4^6\) but the party’s simultaneous advocacy of new district creation and the single-member district system suggest a much clearer seat-maximizing strategy at work. While it is clear that Golkar would have benefited from some of the redistricting that would have taken place under a switch to single-member districts based on administrative boundaries, given the PDI-P’s strength in the 1999 elections it is not clear that the net benefit to the party would have been as large as suggested unless Golkar continuously attempted to gerrymander and create new districts/municipalities to bolster its seat-share in the DPR.

In contrast, the PDI-P advocated for near perfect retention of the existing system of proportional representation. Partly seat-maximizing in logic, since the PDI-P had been the

\(^{45}\) Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010), Ramlan Surbakti (March 2010), Rully Azwar (April 2010).

\(^{46}\) Interviews with Rully Azwar (April 2010) and Theo Sambuaga (April 2010).
winner in 1999 under such a system, the party’s adherence to the status quo represented an ideological stance on the issue as well. In terms of seat-maximization, the process of *pemekaraan* did not benefit the PDI-P in the event that administrative districts became the basis for electoral districts under a majoritarian system – the PDI-P was strongest in constituencies in Java, Bali and North Sumatera, none of which were areas where *pemekaraan* was really taking place given the population density and already-high subdivision of urban areas. In terms of alternative motivations, the PDI-P recognized that a majoritarian system would almost certainly result in a severe reduction in the size of the party system, increasing wasted votes and reducing minority representation across the archipelago. Thus the PDI-P refused to really consider a switch to single-member districts because of the drastic nature of the change it implied. Preferring a more gradual approach to change, the party instead opted to consult with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) experts who pushed a system of within-province non-administrative electoral districts based, in principle, on population thresholds. The PDI-P also preferred the upper limit of DPR seats to be 600 rather than the 550 proposed by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The medium-sized parties reacted, once again, in mixed fashion to the debate that arose primarily between Golkar and the PDI-P on the issue of district magnitude change. Though Rais in some ways was intrigued by the introduction of a single-member district system, having been educated in the US, his party’s general social democratic and pluralist platform discouraged a winner-take-all-model and PAN leadership continued to harbor suspicions about Golkar’s democratic intentions. Thus, the PAN proved a less enthusiastic

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47 Interview with Pataniari Siahaan (October 2010).

48 Interview with Bob Dahl (November 2010), supported by IFES country reports released in 2002-2003.
advocate of a total switch to single-member districts and leaned more favorably toward revision of the electoral district allocation formula that retained proportionality but required each district/municipality in a given province to obtain at least one seat in the district’s total. In addition to this requirement, the PAN opposed the limit of 550 seats and also argued for 600 as the ideal number. It is unclear that PAN pursued district changes for the purpose of seat-maximization, since it was not evident what would have been a more seat-maximizing strategy for the party at the time. However, alternative motivations did not appear to be a driving force in the PAN’s decisions regarding the degree of proportionality.

The PPP and PKB were similarly not favorable toward a system of entirely single-member districts but for different reasons. The initial position of the PPP was that seats on and outside Java should be more balanced, and the party’s leadership became amenable to some form of a mixed system when the option was proposed during committee hearings.\textsuperscript{50} Party leadership was concerned with appealing to both modern urban and traditional rural voters, particularly given the difficulties the party faced in attracting many Muslim voters who had typically voted for the PPP under the New Order.\textsuperscript{51} The result, very seat-maximizing in nature, was agreement with a proportional system based on population within KPU-drawn district boundaries, with the least densely-populated provinces all receiving at least the minimum number of seats regardless of population. The PKB, on the other hand, favored retaining proportionality because it, much like the PDI-P, had specific concentrated support in East Java where NU was strongest, and East Java was not a region that benefitted

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with Djoko Susilo (July 2010).

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Ali Hardi Kiaidamek (July 2010).

\textsuperscript{51} Interview with Ali Hardi Kiaidamek (July 2010).
from *pemekaraan* policies to create new districts where the PKB would win plurality-based seats. The PKB also wanted an increase, as the PDI-P and PAN did, to 600 DPR seats.

Thus all the medium-sized parties ended up favoring retention of the proportional representation system, though for different reasons primarily based on each individual party’s perceived self-interests and seat-maximizing logic. Both the PAN and PPP recognized that uncertainty about future electoral success would limit the appeal of single-member districts for their parties, while the PKB did not focus too closely on the issue of district magnitude so long as Java was not undermined in the seat-counting process. However, all three of the parties that were most successful in 1999 in the Javanese provinces – the PDI-P, the PAN and the PKB – wanted an increase in the number of DPR seats to 600 to ensure the continued proportions of seats to Java and were forced to negotiate back to the 550 proposed by the Ministry. Once it became clear that single-member districts based on municipalities were not going to be the basis for electoral districts, all three agreed to the lower total number of seats.

The small parties also ended up favoring the proportional system, largely due to self-preservation motivations since many knew that at most they might win a single seat under a plurality-based system but more likely they could lose their seats to Golkar or PDI-P. Only the PBB put forth a specific counter-proposal in response to the Ministry’s draft: seats should be distributed based on multiples of 100,000 people in a municipality. The PBB, with strength in densely populated areas in North Sumatra and West Java, likely supported this position because it disproportionately favored urban centers.\(^{52}\) The smaller parties also had fewer resources and personnel who understood the ramifications of the different district

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\(^{52}\) This is the only party from which I could not obtain an interview with a previous DPR member or party leader who knew about the party’s position on why they advocated for this particular way of calculating district magnitude. However, the party’s known geographic bases in North Sumatra and West Java are both densely-populated urban areas and it is logical to conclude that a formula weighting on population within municipalities would advantage these two areas, along with much of Java.
magnitude allocation formulae and likely outcomes based on the 1999 results. Many of these parties made decisions based almost entirely out of fear that changing the system would result in their elimination. As no fraksi but Golkar supported the adoption of a plurality- or majoritarian-based system of elections, and though the debate lasted for more time than was probably necessary, the net result was the retention of proportionality which all other fraksi favored to differing degrees.

Throughout the district magnitude negotiations, consultations with the IFES experts proved quite influential in the eventual system adopted and where the electoral district boundaries were drawn. In particular, IFES provided both the Special Committee and the KPU extensive advice regarding allocation options and an IFES technical team provided the KPU assistance in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping of population densities in order to calculate the most consistent, universal formula for determining district boundaries. The final result was the adoption of a system of district divisions within province based on population, with 69 districts each with 3-12 seats of the DPR’s 550 total seats. The least populated provinces, such as North Maluku and Gorontalo, each had a single district with three seats; the most populated provinces, such as East, Central and West Java, each had nine to ten districts with 10-12 seats. Thus, the formula distributed largely based on population but with some consideration for the less-populated provinces.

With respect to the district magnitude issue, once again only the PDI-P’s position was in any measure a combination of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations. PDI-P leaders consistently conveyed the difficulty in making the trade-off between proportionality and a more simple party system, clearly expressing some concern about reducing representation in

53 Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010).
54 Interview with Bob Dahl (November 2010).
the system while acknowledging that reduced proportionality would benefit the party and the presidential system. However, in the uncertain post-transition political environment, all of the parties including the PDI-P advocated for reforms to the calculation of district magnitude that were clearly strategic in nature. Golkar agreed to maintain the proportional system but with a reduction in district magnitude relative to the 1999 level, the medium parties were split on how to reduce but still maintain proportionality, and the small parties generally guarded against any change that might cause their elimination.

*List PR Reform*

The debate over the format of the candidate nomination lists proved in many ways to be the most difficult and confusing negotiation of the three reform components. To understand the debate, I will first introduce the seat allocation formula included in the Ministry of Home Affairs draft law, and the stipulation regarding individual candidate seat allocations. The draft law included an average remainder quota formula for seat allocations. Seats were allocated by calculating a quota, the total number of votes cast in a district divided by the total available seats in the district, and then awarding seats in a given district to parties based on their vote totals in multiples of the quota in that district. After seats were distributed to parties reaching full quotas, the remaining unallocated seats were distributed based on the parties holding remainder votes of percentages of the quota until all seats were distributed.

The system in place in 1999 and carried forward by the Ministry’s draft law stipulated a simple mechanism for distributing seats within the party once the remainder formula had been calculated and applied to allocate seats among parties. In each electoral district parties were to submit a list of candidate nominees, voters would then be able to choose an

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55 Interviews with Pataniari Siahaan (October 2010), and Yassona Laoly (November 2010).
individual candidate from among the party nominees, party vote total would first distribute
seats among the parties and then candidates received seats according to the highest individual
vote totals within the names on a party’s district list.

The previous system had relied far more on party control in the sense that the
nomination process ultimately determined which candidates received seats, rather than voter choice. The result of the previous system was that in 1999 many candidates “bought” their way to high list positions and expectations that the same practice would occur again in 2004 prompted some of the Ministry’s revision. The control of party leaders concerning the rank ordering meant that many types of candidates, particularly women and minorities, were buried or excluded from the lists entirely; another byproduct was that, given the lack of residency restrictions, parties tended to nominate influential party members and donors in districts where they did not reside or to whom they had no constituency ties or sense of accountability. The general perception of limited elite responsiveness and accountability, and the lack of voter choice, frustrated many in the post-1999 election period. Under this new system, party leaders only controlled the nomination procedures based on each party’s requirements or criteria for nomination and district placements; voters controlled which party candidates actually received the seats.

Golkar initially supported the draft law’s proposal for an “open” list system that would include a more voter-oriented mechanism for selecting individual candidates to fill

56 “Government pushes for open list electoral system,” September 10, 2002 in The Jakarta Post. Also confirmed during interviews with and reading of preparatory documents from Progo and Gunawan Suswantoro (August 2010).

57 Djoko Susilo of PAN specifically referenced Golkar’s practice of putting party favorites and “popular” candidates into specific districts despite a lack of constituency ties or sense of local accountability. However, he stopped short of advocating completely open lists to remedy this situation, instead arguing that the PAN did not have such a practice and the Party’s Constitution stipulated nominating local residents to district lists (interview, July 2010).
party seat allocations: opening the lists to voter selection and reducing or removing the importance of the party’s rank orderings. While Golkar rhetorically pressed for reforms to the voter selection process, the party also believed that it could field more wealthy and immensely popular candidates who could increase the party’s vote-share if voters could directly select individuals, and that the open list system would benefit them more than parties such as the PDI-P which preached party unity and identity over individual elite identification. Golkar leaders expressed few concerns about whether the opening of the lists would negatively affect the party, either in terms of voter perceptions or party unity, and never appeared to entertain fears that many other parties did that allowing individual candidates to compete against one another might create as much within-party as between-party competition.

Many other parties were skeptical of the lack of control that the open list system gave to party leaders, though many supported the idea in the initial positions offered upon first reading of the Ministry’s draft law (see Table 3.3 for specific party positions based on the DIM document). However, as negotiations went on a number of parties raised concerns that a new form of “money politics” would emerge as fears arose that instead of buying their way up party nomination lists individuals would just start paying voters directly for their votes.

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58 Interview with Rully Azwar (June 2010) suggested Golkar agreed to the open lists under proportional representation only as an alternative to the single-member districts they did not think would succeed given the PDI-P’s opposition.

59 Interview with Djoko Susilo (July 2010), personal communications with Paul Rowland.

60 Only after the 2009 elections did Golkar leader Agung Laksono admit that they should have understood that the open list system would pave the way for internal party conflict as Golkar candidates competed against not only other party candidates but each other (interview, September 2010).

61 These appeared to be reactions to concerns raised by civil society that the popularity contests that emerged would hamper good legislative candidates who did not have the resources to compete; for a debate about the benefits and costs perceived by the Indonesian academic community see Liddle (ed) Crafting Indonesian Democracy.
In addition, some parties were concerned that candidates campaigning individually would reduce party discipline and cohesion,\textsuperscript{62} diluting platforms and ideologies as their own members would be forced to compete against not only candidates from other parties but each other, as well. The PKB and the PAN were two of the only medium-sized parties to express and maintain much interest from the early days of the open list debate, partly because both assumed they would have locally-popular religious and community leaders and would benefit from the additional element of voter choice in their geographic strongholds.\textsuperscript{63}

The PDI-P was among the most vociferous opponents of the open lists, believing the internal party competition would encourage widespread money politics and turn electoral politics into a popularity contest. A party that typically required a comprehensive set of criteria for its candidate nominees, including education, work and activism experience, the PDI-P was poorly equipped to enter a political campaign based on celebrity and popularity or one which required more extensive funds, since the party typically relied on grassroots activism and its working class base.\textsuperscript{64} In short, a party that had built its identity based on the party first, and the strength of its leadership, did not have a strong interest in an election format that favored individual candidate popularity and limitless campaign funds. Many other parties shared the PDI-P’s concerns during the course of negotiations, though the strength of PDI-P objections to the open lists turned the debate toward finding a mechanism for combining party and voter choice.

\textsuperscript{62} Interviews with Anis Matta (July 2010), and Agus Purnomo (November 2010), about the persistent concerns of the PK/S.

\textsuperscript{63} Interviews with Hanif Dakiri (July 2010) and Djoko Susilo (July 2010).

\textsuperscript{64} Interview with Hamid Basyaib (April 2010), personal communication with Kuskridho Ambardi (March 2009).
Though few parties favored the competitive format of open lists, democracy advocates, international observers, and domestic experts rallied around the idea of open lists providing greater voter access and choice in the electoral process. As early as 1998, domestic and international scholars debated the lack of voter choice and accountability of party leaders in choosing candidates for seat allocations.65 Two of the former members of the Team of 7, Ramlan Surbakti and Anas Urbaningrum, were now KPU Commissioners and advisors to the Ministry, both favoring more transparent candidate selection mechanisms.66 The draft law had renewed the debate over the perceived lack of representation and accountability arising from elite control over the closed lists. Proposals and debates that began as early as the 1999 election law preparation continued, with many academics and civil society members openly advocating for some type of list openness that would force legislators to become more accountable to voters.67

Golkar eventually joined the opposition to fully-opened lists, arguing for the need to retain some party leadership control. Some of the conversion undoubtedly came from Golkar members like Feri Mursyidan Baldan, who was a vice-chair of the Working Committee and viewed his dual role as Golkar and committee representative as one of a negotiator attempting to produce the best election law with as much consensus as possible (interview, October 2010). The negotiated result was to introduce an element of openness to the lists, while retaining priority for party leaders to nominate loyalists and others supporting the party.

65 The conference, organized by R. William Liddle in Jakarta, August 1998, brought together democratization scholars and electoral engineers such as Donald Horowitz, Juan Linz, Andrew Reynolds and Alfred Stepan to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of electoral system elements. The goal of the conference was to affect the debate among policy-makers drafting what would eventually become the 1999 General Election Law but publication of the book resulting from the conference only occurred in time for the debate in 2002-2003.

66 Interviews with Hadar Gumay (February 2010) and Ramlan Surbakti (April 2010).

67 “Pressure up to adopt open-list poll,” November 18, 2002 in The Jakarta Post.
ideologies or platforms. The new ballots would have party name and symbol as well as the rank-ordered list of candidate nominees from each party directly beneath the party name. Voters could choose a party or candidate with her/his vote, votes would still be aggregated by party totals but the seats would be distributed according to an altered formula. While in 1999 the names simply were chosen in list order, in 2004 there would be a single modification to that rule – if an individual candidate received votes totaling an entire district quota (the total number of votes cast divided by the total number of available seats) in Indonesia referred to as the electoral divisor (bilangan pembagi pemilihan or BPP) for the district in which s/he stood for election, s/he would win the party’s seat outright, regardless of her/his rank-ordered placement on the party’s nomination list. Thus, extremely high support for an individual candidate could propel that candidate above her/his list placement; the likelihood of receiving such a high individual vote total was not good, so parties still retained the majority of their control over the within-party seat allocations.

With respect to the issue of the openness of the nomination lists, nearly all parties chose their relative positions on openness according to seat-maximizing motivations. PDI-P leaders consistently objected to a system based on money politics and popularity contests, but in most respects the objections to those factors stemmed from the reality that the party was not really capable of competing in such contests, benefiting in terms of legislative discipline as a result. All of the medium-sized and smaller parties advocated for some form of openness on the grounds that many viewed certain party leaders as “electable” under a candidate-centric system. Golkar agreed to limit the openness of the system, partly in reaction to the overwhelming objection to fully open lists as the negotiations wore on, but still managed to force an element of candidate-centricity that Golkar leadership believed
would benefit it come election day. The only non-seat maximizing arguments made, and picked up on by industrious political parties, came from the government and civil society in the form of concerns about limiting voter choice through party-only candidate selection mechanisms used under the New Order. On the issue of lists, adoption of a partly-open system resulted almost exclusively from seat-maximizing motivations by all parties involved.

*General Conclusions about and Expectations of the Reform Process*

The 2001-2003 process demonstrated two key elements that explain a great deal about the negotiations and reforms eventually adopted. First, during the period of *reformasi* observers noted how “full of idealism” DPR members seemed about the prospects of reform and how much easier to get compromise and a single voice on the issues it was; political interests of individual parties appeared to be more of a secondary concern.\(^68\) Second, and somewhat related to the first characterization of key political actors, parties within the DPR were more content to rely on the recommendations, simulations and information provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs and expert consultants regarding the options for reform.\(^69\)

Due to these factors, the reform process that took the Ministry’s draft proposal and turned it into a final election law passed in the DPR lasted a fairly short time – 4 months of hearings and committee meetings – and was really only moderately contentious on the issue of list type. The only proponent of a legislative entry threshold or single-member districts was Golkar, which did not have support from other *fraksi* on either issue. In contrast the open lists were totally opposed only by the PDI-P to begin with but became a point of discussion during the reform process that eventually resulted in partly-open lists for the 2004

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\(^{68}\) Interview with Valina Singka Subekti (July 2010).

\(^{69}\) Interviews with Siti Nurbaya (June 2010), Progo (August 2010), Cecep Effendi (July 2010).
elections. While seat-maximizing logic clearly motivated Golkar on all of the reform components, and to a large degree motivated the medium and small parties in their different positions, the PDI-P held seat-maximizing and alternative motivations that were evident in their stated positions and pursuit of change on many of the issues.

In the end, the process of passing the law in the DPR was relatively easy. One particular legacy inherited from Dutch colonial rule was the propensity to only send passable, and preferably by consensus, laws to the floor for a vote. Therefore, the general motivation of the committees and Commission 2 was to ensure that all major problems and disagreements had been dealt with prior to the floor debate and vote.\(^70\) As such, all of the issues included in the law needed to be agreed upon in detail before moving forward to a vote in a plenary session, and the session in March 2003 when the law was passed reflected this ease of voting. Table 4.4 summarizes the differences between the Ministry of Home Affairs’ draft proposal and the final law passed for the 2004 elections.

Table 4.4 Change between Draft Law (2001) and Final Election Law (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threshold</td>
<td>Moderate increase (to 3% DPR, 4% (\frac{1}{2}) DPRD1 or 4% (\frac{1}{2}) DPRD2) in past election vote threshold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Magnitude</td>
<td>Not specified but electoral districts will be based on population within “provinces and subdivisions of provinces” with a set number of DPR seats at 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>Fully open, plurality vote within party district list</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Draft Election Law (produced by Ministry of Home Affairs in June 2001) | Moderate increase (to 3% DPR, 4% \(\frac{1}{2}\) DPRD1 or 4% \(\frac{1}{2}\) DPRD2) in past election vote threshold |
| Final Election Law (produced by Commission 2, passed by DPR in March 2003) | Moderate increase (to 3% DPR, 4% \(\frac{1}{2}\) DPRD1 or 4% \(\frac{1}{2}\) DPRD2) in past election vote threshold |
| District Magnitude | 550 seats divided into 69 districts with 3-12 seats, boundary lines drawn based on population within provincial boundaries |
| List PR | Partly open, list order unless candidate wins 100% BPP of individual votes |

Sources: Draft Election Law and Final Election Law from the Document Archive of the DPR

\(^70\) Interview with Cecep Effendi (July 2010).
Many of the expectations about the election’s outcomes were based on the changes between the 1999 and 2004 electoral systems. The past election vote threshold was intended to decrease party system fragmentation and limit it further for the 2009 elections by reducing the number of qualifying parties. The district magnitude was expected to further decrease party system fragmentation by reducing the average number of seats parties could win in each district, though the primary goal of the fixed district magnitudes was really to reduce vagueness and corruption that plagued seat allocations in the previous elections. Finally, the partly open lists were intended to offer voters more choice over their elected representatives, while still retaining some control for party leaders as to who obtained nominations to the lists and in what order seats would be distributed if voters did not convey specific preferences.

Overall, the 2001-2003 reform process showed some support for my hypothesized expectations. It is not possible to evaluate some of the expectations given that the 1999 elections were the only democratic elections prior to the reform process. On the question of seat-maximizing logic, in general uncertainty about the 2004 elections was quite high. However, the expectation that declining uncertainty would result in less inclusive reforms (hypothesis 1) is not supported by the Indonesian case in 2001-2003, where less inclusive reforms were adopted amid high uncertainty.

The reasons for this are that while many parties clearly demonstrated seat-maximizing motivations in the reforms they pursued the PDI-P did not pursue exclusively seat-maximizing motivations yet controlled much of the reform process. The PDI-P’s opposition to adopting a legislative entry threshold or single-member districts demonstrated alternative motivations related to the Party’s beliefs regarding diverse representation and proportionality as desirable attributes in the Indonesian democratic system (moderate support
for hypothesis 2). Golkar and the smaller parties were at odds throughout the reform process, as they possessed divergent seat-maximizing interests, while the medium-sized parties tended to hold similar views on reforms but for varied reasons. While a legislative entry threshold was not adopted in part because the PDI-P opposed one, the medium-sized parties’ opposition also prohibited its adoption due to the relatively large seat-share they held (hypothesis 3a). Retention of a proportional representation system, albeit with fixed and moderately-sized district magnitude, was perceived to be in everyone’s best interests except for Golkar, which agreed when it was clear there were no other supporters of a plurality or majoritarian system, and the PDI-P, which insisted on retaining the PR system despite the likelihood that a majoritarian system might have benefitted the Party in terms of seat-share.

Many medium-sized parties and Golkar pushed for greater candidate-centricity on the grounds that they had popular leaders who would perform well in candidate-centered campaigns. This is in direct contrast to expectations (hypothesis 3b) that declining medium-sized party seat-share, i.e. increased large party seat-share, would result in more candidate-centric pursuits. The reason for retaining a relatively closed system was the PDI-P’s objections to open lists, not medium-sized party opposition to some openness. As the system in 1999 exhibited limited disproportionality, seat-maximizing concerns about the benefits of vote-to-seat distortion by the medium-sized parties played virtually no role in the adoption of the moderate-sized districts (limited data to evaluate hypothesis 4).

While the first reform period is too early to evaluate the expectations of idealism in early reform periods giving way to more strategic pursuits in later reform periods (hypothesis 5), the 2002-2003 reform period does demonstrate a clear element of idealism and reformation in the early years of democracy. Parties were more willing to give on some
issues, and to some degree it appeared that Golkar was willing to compromise on many of its desired electoral system elements in order to keep up appearances of supporting the democratization and reform process. Finally, the first reform period is also too early to evaluate claims of ratchet effects (hypotheses 6a and 6b), though reforms adopted in 2003 were of both a less inclusive and candidate-centric nature.

**Outcomes in the 2004 General Elections**

The election results demonstrated the limited effect of the reforms, with fewer parties competing but nearly as many winning seats and only 2 of 550 legislators winning seats on the basis of the open list voting (and one was ranked first by his party anyway). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the limited nature of the reforms relative to the system that existed in 1999, the reforms do reflect trends in the party system’s evolution as well as the non-universal nature of how reforms impact parties of similar size and power within the 1999-2004 DPR. I will first offer a recap of the election returns, including measures of party system size and electoral volatility. Then I analyze the effects of reforms on party system outcomes, assessing whether reforms had any of their intended impacts, i.e. benefits, to the large and medium-sized parties.

There were 24 parties competing, down from 48 in 1999, and 11 were completely new parties formed since 2000 or from combinations of parties from 1999. Of the 17 parties obtaining seats, 8 were new entrants or reformations of old parties which either did not or could not contest the 2004 elections alone. Of the 7 parties contesting the elections which did not win any seats in 2004, only three were repeat competitors which had won seats in

71 All results from the 2004 elections were collected in hard copy from the KPU headquarters in Jakarta and were translated, transcribed and calculated by the author.
1999 and none had won more than three seats in the previous elections. The share of the vote of the five largest parties plus the PBB and PK was 89.9% in 1999, but 75.2% in 2004 for those same parties; however the share of the seats of the five largest parties plus the PBB and PK was 94.4%, and 82.7% in 2004. Thus, there was a significant degree of turnover of votes within the system, although the vast majority of seats was transferred between the seven largest parties from the 1999-2004 legislature along with three new additions – the PD, the PDS and the PBR.

Table 4.5 2004 Election Outcome: Changes from 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% 2004 Votes</th>
<th>% 2004 Seats</th>
<th>2004 Vote-Seat Differential</th>
<th>% Votes Gain/Loss</th>
<th>% Seats Gain/Loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>18.53</td>
<td>19.82</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>-15.20</td>
<td>-13.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>21.57</td>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>-2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>10.55</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>-2.55</td>
<td>-2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>10.57</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>-2.03</td>
<td>-1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK/S</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKP</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-1.07</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPDK</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKPB</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-1.75</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNIM</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelopor</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-5.11</td>
<td>-3.37</td>
<td>-3.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.5 shows results of the 2004 legislative elections: the levels of each parties’ vote-share, seat-share, difference between the two,\textsuperscript{72} and change since 1999. Table 4.5 also confirms that the levels of vote and seat volatility are quite high, but as this is only the second post-transition election it is difficult to ascertain whether volatility has really increased since 1999 or whether the increase might be due to electoral reforms or democratic transition (hypothesis 9).

At the party level some fared better than others, though the changes produced party-type effects more than individual party effects. The differential tells a particular story with respect to how well parties fared in response to the reforms: parties that saw their differential rise were the beneficiaries of reforms while parties that saw their differential drop significantly were the biggest losers of reform. The smallest parties in the system did worse than in 1999, with a small or negative differential for parties failing to win only a few seats and a large differential to account for all the parties that failed to win any seats. Even though Golkar became the largest legislative party in 2004 and still maintained a positive vote-to-seat differential, the party was the biggest “loser” in terms of the new formula for translating votes into seats, with its differential declining more than 2% from 1999 when its 3.5% vote-to-seat differential made the size of Golkar’s fraksi much larger than its basic vote-share would have produced.

Of the major parties, the PPP and PKB both saw little change in their differentials between 1999 and 2004, suggesting that the reforms had a limited effect on their seat allocations relative to their vote-shares. However, both parties also performed poorly in 2004 and so it is difficult to distinguish their overall electoral performance from the impact

\textsuperscript{72} The measure of “disproportionality” in the quantitative analysis is an aggregate measure of the differential of each party within a system.
of the reforms. In general, both the PPP and PKB had much more geographically concentrated bases of electoral support, which further suggests why the reforms had little positive effect for their seat-shares. Reduction to such moderately-sized districts meant that few parties could really win many seats in any one district. Parties that benefitted from the reform thus tended to be parties which had more wide-spread constituencies or won a few seats here and there across many districts. Since the PPP and PKB both had concentrated vote bases, in West and East Java respectively, the reform had a limited effect on them compared to a party like the PAN, which only won a seat or two in any district but did so across many districts where it barely had enough votes to get a seat. The same effect of PPP and PKB is also true for the PBB, the smallest of the 1999-2004 fraksi, which saw its seat-share and differential both decline from 1999 and also possesses very geographically concentrated voting bases in West Java and North Sumatra.

The PDI-P and the PAN were the biggest beneficiaries of the reforms that redistributed seats among the contestants, even though both saw reduced vote-shares from 1999. Though the PDI-P dropped from being the largest legislative party, reducing by nearly 40% from its 1999-2004 fraksi size, its differential in the translation of votes into seats was negative in 1999 but positive in 2004. Though the PAN’s vote-to-seat differential was positive in 1999, it grew in 2004 to receive the greatest “top up” in seats relative to vote-share due in large part to its more geographically dispersed appeal. The PD followed the same process, winning a handful of seats in many different districts across the country while the other “surprise” vote-winner, the PKS, tended to concentrate primarily in urban and university areas rather than more broadly and thus received more limited benefits from the modified vote-to-seat translation mechanism. The small parties tended to see little or no
benefit from the vote-to-seat translation. In some cases, like the PKPB, small parties lost nearly all of their votes in the translation to seats because their vote-shares were too spread out across many districts and the party failed to win a single seat in many of those instances.

Figure 4.1 Change in Vote Differential by Party Size

Figure 4.1 shows these variations grouped by party sizes, with small parties falling below 2.5% of the vote-share, medium parties falling between 2.5-10% of the vote-share, and large parties falling above 10% of the vote-share. It is clear from the figure that the medium-sized parties were the largest beneficiary of the changes in the realignment of the districts, but what the figure fails to demonstrate is that in 1999 there were four large parties – PDI-P, Golkar, PPP and PKB – and only one medium-sized party, the PAN, while in 2004 the PPP moves into the medium party category along with the PAN, PKS and PD and only the PDI-P,
Golkar and PKB are still large parties as measured by vote-share. Additionally, the less inclusive reform of the reduction in district magnitude clearly produces an increase in disproportionality (hypothesis 8), evident in Figure 4.1 by increased sizes of the bars from 1999 to 2004. However, what is interesting to note is that while there were 43 small parties in 1999 the number drops to only 17 small parties in 2004, yet the differential of votes-to-seats increases dramatically. This demonstrates that even though there are fewer small parties, as measured by receiving less than 2.5 percent of the vote-share, they are receiving even less of the seat-share relative to the proportion of votes they win.

Figure 4.2 Average Party Magnitudes in 2004 Electoral Districts

In addition to the changes in differential, average party magnitude also dropped across the electoral districts as the average seat magnitude shrank. Party magnitude is an
indicator of how many seats a party holds in a district; the average party magnitude is simply the average of the party magnitudes of all legislative parties for a given district. In 1999, when there were twenty-eight districts (for each province), the average party magnitude across the national electoral districts was 0.854. In 2004, when there were sixty-nine districts and the district magnitude dropped, the average party magnitude dropped to 0.332. This suggests that despite the reduction in the number of competitors from 48 to 24, it was less likely for any party to be able to win a seat in a given district in 2004 relative to 1999. Figure 4.2 shows a map of party magnitude values. Darker colors show a higher average party magnitude (>0.333), meaning fewer parties hold seats in that district relative to the district’s size, while lighter or no color shows lower average party magnitudes (<0.332). The inset indicates average party magnitudes in the districts in and around the capital city, Jakarta.

Change in average party magnitude can indicate many attributes about a district’s representatives, but in this particular case the declining average party magnitude indicates two particular outcomes about party-level electoral probabilities. First, parties in general were more likely to win fewer seats in each district, although the relatively small changes in vote-to-seat differentials suggested that parties made up for winning more seats in a single large district with winning smaller numbers of seats in more small districts. Second, pertaining to within party nomination strategies, parties were most likely to win highly-valued (i.e. highly-ranked) candidates seats when those candidates were listed in the first-ranked position in districts where the party was strong.

Multiple seats were difficult to win, given the reduction in district magnitudes. In only five of 69 districts did any party win enough votes to take more than 3 names off its list, so candidates not listed in positions #1-3 were almost never in contention for a seat. The
only parties to accomplish the task of winning more than three seats in given district were the PDI-P in Bali (5 seats), the PKB in East Java 9 (4 seats), and Golkar in West Java 3 (4 seats), South Sulawesi 1 (5 seats) and South Sulawesi 2 (5 seats). Parties won at least 3 seats 31 times across the districts, with the majority (20 of 31) going to the PDI-P and Golkar.

Thus, declining average party magnitude, 0.4982 in 2004 down from 0.7 in 1999, shows that parties in 2004 were increasingly less likely to be successful campaigning in all parts of the country, particularly those with low population density and few seats per district. Overall, this meant that larger numbers of seats per district, and therefore more representatives per district, were being won by parties other than Golkar and the PDI-P. The other parties to receive more than 1 seat in a single district were the PKB, PKS, PD, PAN, and PPP; the remaining nine legislative parties only received a single seat in the districts where they won seats at all. However, the combined lack of an electoral threshold and drop in district magnitude did not serve to reduce the party system size as measured in effective number of parties (hypothesis 7a), though the absolute number of parties did decline 24%.

Finally, in terms of individual candidate vote-share, only two candidates successfully met the vote quota in their respective electoral districts: Hidayat Nur Wahid of the PKS in the second electoral district in Jakarta and Saleh Djasit of Golkar in the electoral district in Riau. Wahid’s vote-share, 262,019 votes in a district with a quota of 232,355 votes, easily won him an automatic seat for the PKS – the result turned out to be irrelevant since Wahid had been listed in position #1 by the PKS in his district anyway. Djasit’s vote-share was closer to the district quota, winning 195,348 votes in a district with a quota of 187,883, but once again the result barely mattered: Djasit was also ranked first by Golkar in the Riau district.
Overall, only 32 candidates cleared the 95,011 individual vote level of the smallest district BPP in Western Papua (then called Irian Jaya Barat). While most of the BPP in densely populated districts were actually over 200,000 votes, the 95,011 is a good benchmark to consider the range of individual candidate votes. In five districts – East Java district 1 (3 PKB candidates), East Java district 9 (2 PKB candidates), East Java 10 (2 PKB candidates), West Java 2 (2 Golkar candidates) and North Sulawesi (1 PD, 1 PDS and 2 Golkar candidates) – did more than one candidate win at least 95,011 votes. Furthermore, 21 of the 32 candidates were listed in position #1, with five more listed in position #2 behind a person in position #1 who also received at least 95,011 votes.

However, there is limited evidence that the openness of the lists affected the party system size in terms of seat-share (hypothesis 7b). As there were no candidates elected under this system, the change did not directly affect party system fragmentation. There were some small parties, in provinces such as Papua and East Nusa Tenggara, whose vote-share in specific districts benefited from the additional votes cast for particular candidates. Yet across the party system the shift to slightly open lists did not have an effect on party system fragmentation by encouraging the creation of candidate-centric party vehicles or the entrée of parties whose voters only cast votes for specific candidates and not the parties.

Counterfactual Analysis: How Much Impact did the Reforms Have?

The past election vote threshold had little effect on entrants in 2004, even though there was a drop from 48 to 24 parties contesting the elections. For example, since it missed the past election vote threshold from the 1999 elections, the Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang) became the Star and Moon Party (Partai Bintang Bulan) and won eleven seats
in 2004. The drop in the number of competitors had little to do with the past election vote threshold. Without a legislative entry threshold the number of legislative parties showed moderate decline, from 21 in 1999 to 16 in 2004, but effective parties rose from 5 to 7.5.

But what if a legislative entry threshold had been adopted? At 2.5% of the legislative vote-share, nine parties would not have been allowed to obtain any seats in the DPR and the 39 seats they won would have been redistributed back among the seven parties clearing the 2.5% threshold. Without a formula for recalculating the BPP, as discussions never progressed to the point where such a consideration was necessary, it is difficult to estimate the redistribution of the seats held by those nine parties among the remaining qualified parties. However, it is clear that a 2.5% legislative entry threshold would have redistributed 7% of the DPR seats and reduced the total number of legislative parties from 16 to 7. Raising the threshold to 5% would only have eliminated one additional party, the PBB, and redistributed 11 additional seats (9% of the DPR).

The reduction in district magnitude did have an effect on specific parties in the legislature, but not very much on the overall party system size. In fact, the effective number of parties actually increased from just over 5 in 1999 to 7.5 in 2004. Declining district magnitude did have the effect of concentrating more seats in the medium-sized parties – a group that grew from only one party (the PAN) to five (the PAN, PKB, PPP, PKS and PD) – at the expense of small parties – a group that included 16 in 1999 and only 10 in 2004. However, declining district magnitude also reduced the benefits of disproportionality received by the large parties. The differential in translation of votes to seats of all medium-sized parties was nearly double that of the benefit felt by the large parties. Votes were spread across fewer total parties and aggregated in medium-sized parties much more in 2004.
It is difficult, again, to project what the seat distribution would have been like under a slightly larger formula for seat distribution, but it is possible to estimate some of the potential effects of a switch to single-member district seats. If the district/municipality boundaries were the basis for each single-member district, which is a crude approximation since there were far fewer than 550 districts/municipalities in 2004 but most closely represents the system Golkar pursued, Table 4.6 shows the seat distribution that would have occurred based on the highest vote-shares in each district/municipality-based district.\(^{73}\) One aspect to note about the district/municipality-based districts: they are not standardized according to population or geography, and represent administrative boundaries.

Table 4.6 Seat Distribution under SMD in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats (Share)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>197 (58.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>83 (24.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>25 (7.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>10 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>5 (1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>5 (1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>4 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>3 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPDK</td>
<td>2 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelopor</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>337</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the outcome would very clearly have favored Golkar at the expense of the other parties, although the PDI-P’s seat-share would actually have slightly increased over the seats it won in the fully-PR version. However, this is only a rough estimate and does not fully represent all districts/municipalities because of missing detailed returns data. Furthermore, the size of the DPR would have either drastically contracted (there were only around 400

\(^{73}\) The data available at the KPU in Jakarta are missing returns from some municipalities in some districts so these calculations are done for only fully available municipal-level data. It is important to note that two of the sets of missing detailed data are in Papua, where small parties have tended to perform very well relative to the rest of the country, and Central Kalimantan which is typically considered a PDI-P stronghold.
districts/municipalities actually created by the date of the election), or there would have been some formula for further subdividing some of the existing districts/municipalities into electoral districts. Given the drastic overrepresentation of Golkar due to the party’s purposeful advocacy of the subdivision of existing districts/municipalities outside of Java, it is unlikely this particular formula for single-member districting would ever have been adopted. Yet, the counterfactual does allow us to take a crude look at what the change might have produced and why other parties resisted its adoption.

The slight opening of the list did not have any direct effect on the seat allocations within the parties; indeed the only two candidates who won seats based on individual vote totals were both listed first by their party in their respective districts and would have won their seats by virtue of the ranked-order anyway. In addition, only 32 of nearly 10,000 candidates (0.3%) won more than the minimum number of votes to be able to claim a seat based on the smallest district quota, and almost none were close enough to be able to win a seat in their own districts.

There were also variations across the parties in terms of voters casting candidate-specific votes. Across the country, the average was 51.8% of votes cast for individual candidates. The PDI-P far outstripped the competition in Central Java where it won 5.25 million of the 17.63 million votes cast (29.8%). However, only 2.02 million votes (38.5%) were cast for specific candidates, out of the 5.25 million cast for a candidate or the party, and the Party fielded only one candidate, out of 83 nominated on the ten district lists, who cleared the 95,011 threshold. In contrast, Golkar far outstripped the competition in South Sulawesi where it won 1.6 million of the 3.6 million votes cast (44.7%). In contrast to the PDI-P in Central Java, 1.06 million votes (65.9%) were cast for specific candidates, out of the 1.6
million cast for a candidate or the party. Similarly, in North Sulawesi where Golkar won 388,469 votes of the 1.2 million cast (32.3%), 327,834 of those votes (84.4%) were cast for an individual candidate.

Among the medium-sized and smaller parties there was variation as well. Despite opposition to the open list voting, the PKS fielded a number of very high individual vote winners, including the single most popular candidate in the country. The PKB had the second highest number of individual vote-winners in the 95,011+ range, but all were in East Java where the Party’s NU ties were strongest and where the party could run its most high profile NU religious leaders (ulama or kiai, as they are often called in Indonesia). Neither the PAN nor the PPP did well at the individual candidate level, fielding no candidates who broke the 95,011 threshold of individual votes despite geographic strengths in Yogyakarta and West Java, respectively. While the PDS did field a single high vote-winner in North Sulawesi, neither the PBB nor PBR had candidates who broke the 95,011 barrier despite their geographic strengths in West Java and South Sumatera, respectively, where each had some very high profile religious and community leaders. And finally, the PD did manage to field a 100,000+ vote-winner in North Sulawesi, as well as a number of other relatively strong individual vote-winners.

In general, the openness of the lists produced no change to the actual composition of the DPR. The two individual candidates who each won a full BPP in their district were already listed first by their parties and thus would have won their seats regardless of their individual vote total since no candidates listed below them won a full BPP to take their seats. However, it is important to note that despite the limited effect of moderate list openness on the DPR’s composition, many voters did cast ballots for individual candidates. Thus, parties
could take note of which candidates were popular among voters and have a sense of what level of list openness might actually produce effective change in the event of ensuing reforms.

**Conclusion**

The 2004 legislative, and following presidential, elections produced some unexpected victories and losses for the 1999-2004 members of the DPR. First, Golkar regained the mantle of the largest legislative party, though by a slim margin and with limited additional seats compared to 1999. Combined with the victory of Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla, who was subsequently elected Golkar chairman in the party’s congress in late 2004, Golkar now had direct access to the government as well as better legislative standing. In many ways these positions helped set the stage for the reform period during the 2004-2009 legislative session.

Furthermore, the dramatic decline of the PDI-P to the second-largest legislative party, combined with Megawati’s loss to Yudhoyono and Kalla in the second round of the presidential elections, confirmed the reduced role the self-professed “opposition” PDI-P would likely play in affecting reform in the 2004-2009 period. The ascendancy of the PD and the PKS offset much of the PDI-P’s loss, and the two newer party positions would determine more of the direction of reform. While the electoral system preferences of the PKS aligned closely with many preferences of the PDI-P, the two parties did not typically see themselves as natural allies. In contrast, the PD and Golkar alliance in the executive branch would come to reflect shared positions on the need for electoral reform as well as some shared preferences for the nature of those reforms. Optimism at winning the presidency enhanced the PD’s desire to reform the system in a less-inclusive way, partly to ensure that
Yudhoyono would again be able to run for re-election based on the PD’s electoral success in the 2009 legislative elections.

The positions of the three other medium-sized parties – the PAN, PPP and PKB – would also shift as the post-2004 election party congresses elected new leadership that in many cases altered electoral system preferences. While the PAN proved to benefit from the 2004 electoral system, and would go on to pursue more reform again in the next period, the PPP and PKB began to back-pedal in the wake of reduced legislative seat-shares. Three small parties – the PDS, the PBR and the PPDK – would join the PBB as parties too small to affect change alone but large enough to postpone additional changes en masse.

In terms of specific reform outcomes, while the district magnitude reduction clearly played a role in the vote-to-seat differential and had different ramifications for the various parties, neither the past election vote threshold revision nor the switch to partly-open lists had an impact on the election outcome in 2004. However, there was variation in the degree to which different parties’ candidates were more or less successful at winning individual votes in their districts, setting the stage for divergent views about the need for reforms and the likelihood about which reforms parties would be strategically more or less likely to pursue in the 2004-2009 period. Many of the general beliefs individual parties held in the 1999-2004 period persisted. The largest shifts in attitudes came from the medium-sized parties which had benefitted from the 2003 changes and from the PDI-P, which had become increasingly aware of the limited effect of some key reforms such as the past election vote threshold and faced with the reality that it had done much more poorly in 2004 than it expected.

Most importantly, the aggregate party system size had not undergone any major shifts due to the reforms, retaining almost as many legislative parties and actually increasing in
effective party system size from 1999. Parties seeking widespread reform of the system faced the potential for another round of revisions to the structure of elections, alluded to in many positions by the PDI-P, Golkar, PAN and other parties regarding “gradual” change and increases in elements such as the threshold. Many of the medium-sized and large parties now began the 2004-2009 legislative session with system ‘simplification’ on the brain, though few of the medium-sized parties felt as if they were really allies with the PDI-P and Golkar. Additionally, the remaining small parties faced the reality that if a newcomer (the PD) and other small parties (such as the PKS) managed to win significant portions of the seat-share and become medium-sized parties, they would have fewer allies to protect their interests.

Taken together, the outcome of the 2002-2003 reform period suggests high support for seat-maximizing motivations by reformers in nearly every party except the PDI-P, which demonstrated a combination of mostly complementary seat-maximizing and alternative motivations. However, the reforms had limited impact on the election outcomes and in fact did not produce some of the expected effects that reformers assumed, such as a simplification of the party system. The limited effects of this round of reforms directly contributed to the desire for more reforms in the 2007-2008 period, but also constrained some of the options for reformers.
Chapter 5: The 2004-2009 Reform Period

In this chapter I explore the effect of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations on the national electoral reforms adopted in Indonesia during the 2004-2009 legislative session. I evaluate each of the major parties’ positions on three elements of reform – an electoral threshold, the size of electoral district magnitude, and the type of list proportional representation system in use – in order to assess the importance of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations in understanding the specific reforms that were adopted. In order to do so, I situate the reform process within the post-2004 election context and compare party preferences to the proposal by the government and the professed interests of civil society. After assessing how individual party positions affected the exact composition of reforms that were adopted I proceed to analyze the impact those reforms had on the 2009 election outcomes, assessing whether party expectations were met and setting the stage for the ensuring reform process that is currently ongoing in the 2009-2014 legislative session.

The 2002-2003 reform period indicated that legislators were reluctant to make any sweeping changes to the structure of elections, preferring the status quo for two primary reasons. First, a healthy amount of skepticism about the intentions of Golkar prevailed among many elites in Jakarta; fears of a return to a system of politics that provided unequal advantages to different parties prompted many to adhere to the status quo precisely because it was Golkar who advocated for change. Second, the interest of the PDI-P, then the largest fraksi, was clearly maintenance of many elements of the system that propelled them to power in 1999; ideological concerns also kept the PDI-P from pursuing or allowing reformation of
the system in a way that appeared to limit competition and stifle diversity, even when such change might have direct benefits to the PDI-P itself. While not suggesting that alternative motivations played the largest role in determining the change (or lack thereof) in the 2001-3 reform period, it is undeniably true that changes adopted very much reflected the uncertainty of the political landscape in the early consolidation phase of democratization as well as a broader range of interests and motivations on the part of elites that extended beyond simple seat-maximizing calculations.

The 2004-2009 period changed many of these elements, notably Golkar and the PDI-P eventually finding some common ground on the issue of a threshold, other medium-sized parties, particularly the PAN, taking up some of the call for more openness of the candidate selection process, and the shifting power dynamics between the DPR and two other bodies – the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Constitutional Court. While the early consolidation phase had been marked by a distinct adherence to many New Order practices and power balances in various aspects of governance, the tides were shifting by the time the review of the draft law got under way in Komisi 2 in 2007. The reform process was more drawn out this time, more focused on the specific interests of legislative elites and less interested in the views and concerns of observers. It also left issues on the table and disputes among legislators that the Court eventually stepped in to resolve, dramatically increasing the scale of change relative to the modest revisions that resulted in 2003.

While some of the reform process resulted from shifting power balances between branches of government and a shuffling of parties at the top of the system’s hierarchy, a few key issues that emerged early on in summer of 2007 were clear legacies of the previous reform process and the 2004 election outcome. The ratchet effect was clear in all three areas
of reform, with experience in the 2004 elections playing a large role in views and choices in the 2007-8 reform process. In addition, the composition of the legislature, and in particular the members of the Commission 2 and new Special Committee established to reform the political package of laws, bore interesting marks of the system adopted in 2003. Many of the members and party leaders associated with the previous reform period remained in the legislature and could carry forward debates and views they previously held, though there was substantial turnover with the addition of the new PD and increase in the size of the PKS fraksi. In sum, the outcome of the 2001-3 reform process changed specific elements of the process in 2007-8 in important ways.

In Chapter 4 I recapped the expectations for seat-maximization and alternative motivations, with clear evidence of seat-maximizing motives on the part of Golkar and most small and medium-sized parties and the PDI-P exhibiting clear alternative motivations on at least the legislative entry threshold. In this chapter I hold similar expectations of seat maximization by many parties, though I still expect the PDI-P and, to a lesser extent, the PKS to demonstrate at least complementary alternative motives on the issue of thresholds and proportionality. I also expect the medium-sized parties to more aggressively pursue a legislative entry threshold and additional reduction in district magnitude given that many of them benefitted from the changes to the vote-to-seat distribution translation in the 2003 Election Law and should now try to more explicitly exclude smaller parties from contention.

More importantly, I now introduce some of the expectations of ratchet effects, since the 2002-3 reform period produced choices that had two consequences for the 2007-8 period. First, the choice to try to reduce district magnitude but retain proportionality had consequences for the party system. There was a reduction in the total number of parties in
the DPR, particularly in the number of small parties, and creation of more medium-sized parties which benefitted more from the vote-to-seat translation than the PDI-P and Golkar. I expect that the reduction of small parties and increase in medium-sized parties will produce either pressure for additional reductions or simple maintenance of the status quo 3-12 seat districts. A similar effect is true for the list system, as the slight openness in 2004 did not much impact seat distributions or which candidates won seats, but pushed the issue of voter-to-representative accountability into the public sphere. I expect that the issue will be revisited and will produce either pressure for additional openness or maintenance of the slightly open list system used in the 2004 elections.

Second, the past election vote threshold used in place of a legislative entry threshold proved too easy to manipulate or ignore. The result was 16 parties winning seats in the DPR. Sixteen is a reduction from the 21 legislative parties in 1999. Yet the lack of progress in simplifying the party system, coupled with a presidential election in which the first round had 7 tickets eligible to run, raises expectations that in this second period of reform the issue of a fixed legislative entry threshold should be a serious consideration. Partly because the goal of party system simplification was not met through the previous mechanism, and partly because democracy appeared to be “safe” following the successful conduction of the 2004 legislative and presidential elections, I expect an end to the reformasi honeymoon and consensus-based process of reform used in 2002-2003 (hypothesis 5). This should first and foremost affect the adoption of a legislative entry threshold.

Since these are contiguous reform episodes, I expect ratchet effects to be even more constraining than if the reforms were an extra election cycle or two apart. Given that many of the reformers had some experience in the 1999-2004 DPR, I expect that similar
motivations will be at play in the 2007-8 reform period but that the alterations made during
the reform process will explain changes made in 2007-8 that were not undertaken in 2001-3.

This chapter traces the process of reform during the 2004 to 2009 legislative session
that produced the 2008 General Election Law, highlighting key actors, choices and
constraints. First, I introduce the context of reform in the post-2004 election period, based on
the party power distribution resulting from the 2004 legislative and new direct executive
elections. Next I address the process of reform itself, focusing on the sequence of actor
participation, the timing of reform negotiations and adoption relative to other political events
and the upcoming 2009 election schedule. I then tackle each of the reform components –
electoral threshold, district magnitude, and list structure – to assess party-level positions,
strategic and seat-maximizing incentives as well as alternative arguments for or against
certain reform options. I evaluate how the negotiation process affected the eventual
decisions of individual parties in the DPR and subsequently required intervention by the
Constitutional Court, finishing with a comparison of each element in the proposed draft law
to the rules adopted in the final election law passed by the DPR and the rules actually used in
the 2009 elections after the Court’s review. Finally I conclude with evaluation of the impact
of reforms on the Indonesian party system, assessing whether party expectations were met,
which parties benefitted and which did not, and previewing possible scenarios for the 2009-
2014 reform period based on the outcome of the 2009 elections.

**Political Context of the Reform Period**

The newly-instituted direct elections for the president resulted in a PD victory over the PDI-P
in the second round of voting held in September, as the PDI-P’s Megawati and NU running
mate Hasyim Muzadi\textsuperscript{74} lost to the PD’s ticket of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf Kalla, who ran without a Golkar party affiliation in the first round but had a pro-Kalla Golkar faction’s support in the second round.\textsuperscript{75} The PD was concerned how the relative weakness of the party in the DPR, with only 10\% of the seats, would affect the government’s ability to pass legislation. SBY and Kalla became very involved in the months leading up to the election of a new Golkar chairman at the party’s 5-year congress and when the PD-supportive candidates to counter Akbar Tandjung\textsuperscript{76} had been exhausted Kalla himself became a candidate for the chairmanship, winning the election in December 2004. This now afforded the government a greater level of legislative support but many government-proposed policies reflected as much, and sometimes greater, Golkar preference as PD preference due to their relative seat-shares in the DPR.

While the legacy of dominance of the Ministry of Home Affairs very clearly directed the tone and initiation of the reform debate in 2003, as the draft law submitted by the Ministry kicked off all discussion. Representatives of the Ministry were very closely involved in the process of educating Commission 2 members regarding different elements of the law. Though not a full-scale change in 2007-2008, the Ministry’s relationship to the

\textsuperscript{74} Megawati and the PKB had a complex relationship, as Megawati’s support for Wahid waned during the final months of his presidency and her eventual ascendency to the office. However, the relationship between the PDI-P and PKB, particularly the faction of the PKB which supported NU chairman Muzadi, was still close and still one of the few Islamic organizations to support a female president. Thus, Megawati chose Muzadi as her running mate to encourage that relationship and the relatively similar ideological pursuits of the two parties.

\textsuperscript{75} After failing to win the Golkar presidential candidacy due to perceptions that as a non-Javanese he would not win, Kalla withdrew from the Golkar nominating convention and agreed to run with SBY on a PD ticket, since Golkar had already chosen its nominee: Wiranto. Since PD had a large enough DPR seat-share to contest as a single party ticket under the reduced level in 2004, Kalla did not require a specific party affiliation in order to contest.

\textsuperscript{76} SBY and Kalla perceived Tandjung’s chairmanship as detrimental to Golkar support of PD policies since Tandjung had placed Golkar in “opposition” to the SBY-Kalla government along with Megawati’s PDI-P. “Golkar Returns to Post-New Order Rule” (Golkar Kembali Berkuasa Pasca-Orde Baru) in the central Javanese newspaper \textit{Suara Merdeka}, December 20, 2004.
reform process was altered by the time the commission began reviewing the draft law as a new team leader replaced Siti Nurbaya, who left the Ministry to become the first secretariat of the newly-formed upper chamber, the DPD. While in 2003 the final election law did not diverge very much from the Ministry’s draft in basic content and practice, primarily choosing to refine details and formulae with the exception of altering the openness of the nomination lists, the final 2008 election law barely resembled the Ministry’s draft in many key areas, including the threshold and openness of lists. The Ministry team did not insert itself into the process to the same degree and some of the new team believed that the commission chairs and members would have cared little for their input had the Ministry representatives tried.\textsuperscript{77}

What the shift in power between the legislature and the government suggested was that the time had come for legislators to legislate, breaking with the New Order tradition of government initiation and directives that lingered into the early consolidation phase. The DPR began to assert itself in a number of other key areas, pushing forward policies and programs without close consultation to previously domineering Ministries, and the election law reform appeared to follow suit.\textsuperscript{78} While the Ministry of Home Affairs team continued to be involved with the process until the final law was sent to the joint MPR session, it appeared to the previous team leader that there was less of an active role by Ministry representatives in terms of education, simulation and explanation of various elements.\textsuperscript{79}

Table 5.1 shows the relative seat-shares of the largest parties in the DPR. Among the parties within the system following the 2004 elections, the two largest parties remained the same although the PDI-P fell by nearly half its *fraksi* size from 1999 and Golkar maintained a

\textsuperscript{77} Interview with Sudarsono (July 2010).

\textsuperscript{78} Interview with Cecep Effendi (October 2010).

\textsuperscript{79} Interview with Siti Nurbaya (June 2010).
similar share of the votes and seats. The PPP and PKB both declined to around the same size as the PAN, and now the PKS (formerly the PK) and PD joined them as medium-sized parties with 5-10% of the votes and seats each. Rounding out the effective legislative parties were the Islamist PBB, which had been the smallest single-party *fraksi* in the 1999-2004 DPR, the Christian PDS, the pluralist Islamist PBR, and the secular PPDK (whose leaders included two former Team 7 members, Andi Mallarangeng and Ryaas Rasyid); each of these parties held somewhere between 1-3% of the DPR seats and combined with other parties to form *fraksi*. The first direct executive elections in 2004 resulted in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from the PD and Yusuf Kalla from Golkar winning the presidency and vice presidency, respectively. This meant that although the PD controlled a small subset of the DPR seats, it had a relatively close working relationship with Golkar in the government.

Table 5.1 2004 Party Seat Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seat % (Number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>23.09% (127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>19.82% (109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>10.55% (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>10.18% (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>9.64% (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>9.45% (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>8.18% (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>2% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>2.36% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>2.55% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPDK</td>
<td>0.73% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.45% (8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of interparty dynamics, new animosity had arisen since the 2004 elections. The PDI-P’s chairwoman, Megawati, deeply resented the fact that one of her former ministers, SBY, chose to run against her in the first presidential election. More importantly, she deeply resented losing the second round run-off to the SBY-Kalla ticket; this

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80 Megawati was no happier with Kalla, who had also been one of her ministers, than with SBY.
resulted in the PDI-P’s declaration of itself as the “opposition” to the government coalition, which included nearly all other parties and elites in the system. Following Kalla’s election to the Golkar chairmanship the PDI-P now had few allies and far fewer seats than in 1999. The executive marriage of PD and Golkar only reinforced how isolated the PDI-P was in 2004.

The 2004-2009 DPR also had a new counterpart – the House of Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD) – which replaced the functional groups and military representatives in the entirely-elected new MPR. Despite having no power over legislation related to elections except those for the subnational legislatures, the new DPD represented a different element of power realignment: the lack of a military presence and voice regarding electoral processes and the structure of competitive politics. The DPD would also have an effect on pemekaraan in the sense that it would be a primary location for the origination of new districts. A non-partisan chamber, the DPD had few real abilities to constrain actions taken or legislation already approved by the DPR.

Finally, the rise of the judicial branch, in particular the creation of a powerful Constitutional Court via the constitutional amendment process in 2001, provided a final power balancing mechanism to the 2004-2009 DPR. Four of the nine justices were selected by the DPR and two were elected to the DPR prior to their court appointments, prompting concerns about judicial objectivity and the introduction of party politics to the bench. Court intervention in late 2008 produced fundamental changes to the structure and conduct of the 2009 elections.
Procedure and Sequencing in the Reform Process

Similar to the process in 2002-2003, the first draft laws were submitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the DPR for review. However, the Ministry itself had undergone a revision in the number of experts it consulted during the drafting process, and previous consultants held the perception of a return to “business as usual” in the Ministry now that reformasi was over. Former academics and members of the KPU who had consulted with the Ministry in the previous reform period were now shut out of the drafting process and the Ministry instead relied on bureaucrats to fill the role that experts had previously done.81 The Ministry’s proposed draft law diverged to some degree from the final 2003 election law, as summarized in Table 5.2, but with a key difference in terms of the list nominating system, once again choosing to push a moderate increase in the past election vote threshold and open lists.

Table 5.2 Proposed Changes in the New Draft Election Law (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threshold</td>
<td>Moderate increase (to 3% DPR, 4% ½ DPRD1 or 4% ½ DPRD2) in past election vote threshold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Magnitude</td>
<td>550 seats divided into 69 districts with 3-12 seats, boundary lines drawn based on population within provincial boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>Partly open, list order unless candidate wins 100% BPP of individual votes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Draft Election Law and Final Election Law from the Document Archive of the DPR

The draft law retained the 3-12 seat district magnitudes from 2004, including a provision for an extra ten seats due to the creation of the new province of West Sulawesi (which would need at least the minimum number of seats) and redistribution of seats in the

81 Interviews with Ramlan Surbakti (December 2010), Valina Singka Subeki (June 2010).
South Sulawesi districts from which the new province had largely been subdivided. On the
issue of the past election vote threshold the proposed level was raised to 5% of DPR seats or
5% of ½ the seats in the DPRD1 or DPRD2, but once again there was no reference to a
legislative entry threshold. Finally, on the party nomination lists, the Ministry’s team once
again attempted to introduce fully open lists with seats distributed based on plurality voting
(suara terbanyak), rather than a numerically-ordered list, as the mechanism for allocating
seats won by a party within district.

In addition, the perception among consultants and academics was that the DPR
members thought that they had less need for expert advice and could prepare for the
discussion and legal drafting themselves. Many expressed concerns regarding the “closed
door” nature of the Working Committee meetings, often held in hotels and away from the
public.\(^{82}\) However, few of the consultants and academics involved in or shut out of the
process in 2007-2008 believed that the representatives were well-equipped with anything but
political views, and some questioned whether many of the fraksi even possessed the
necessary technical staff to simulate election-related outcomes.\(^{83}\) In contrast, the
chairpersons of the Special Committee and key fraksi representatives felt they more than
adequately included expert advisors in the reform process and believed that they relied
heavily on expert input and simulations regarding key decisions.\(^{84}\) In response to the draft
law, each party submitted a list of problems that were eventually spelled out and presented to
the Working Committee of Commission 2. Table 5.3 summarizes these positions of the

\(^{82}\) Interviews with Ramlan Surbakti (December 2010), Valina Singka Subekti (June 2010), and Hadar Gumay
(February 2010).

\(^{83}\) Interviews with Ramlan Surbakti (December 2010), Didik Supriyanto (December 2010).

\(^{84}\) Interviews with Fery Mursyidan Baldan (October 2010), Andi Yuliani Paris (October 2010), Yassona Laoly
(November 2010) and Ganjar Pranowo (November 2010).
major parties on the three elements of reform in the draft, as well as some of the preferences of civil society regarding particular aspects of the law.

Key stages of the reform process in 2007-8 took longer than the one that occurred in 2002-3. Nearly two months of meetings, from July to September 2007, with consultants, experts, civil society organizations and government research representatives preceded the meetings of the Special and Working Committees. The Special Committee officially met 14 times from September to November for broad discussions and the Working Committee officially met 6 times from November to December, followed by 14 meetings of the Formulation Team (Tim Perumusan) from January to February 2008 and 17 meetings of the Synchronization Team (Tim Sinkronisasi) in February, with a final meeting of the Working Committee on February 20 prior to final submission to the plenary session of the DPR on February 28, 2008. Though the process in 2007-8 took the same total amount of time, nine months from draft law submission to passage in the DPR, the length of time spent on open-door consultations was significantly longer in 2007 and the frequency of closed-door Special and Working Committee meetings increased.
| **Table 5.3 2007 Draft Election Law and Major Party Preferences** |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                     | **Threshold**       | **District Magnitude** | **List PR** |
| **Draft Election Law** | Moderate increase (to 5% DPR, 5% 1/2 DPRD1 or 5% 1/2 DPRD2) in past election vote threshold | 3-12 seats per district, only recalculate for province creation and set maximum at 560 seats | Fully open, plurality vote within party district list |
| **Golkar**          | Wants legislative entry threshold; Also agrees to past election vote threshold increase | Wants single member district system, will settle for reduction in district magnitude range from 3-6 | Wants partly open system retained unless possible to move to single-member districts |
| **PDI-P**           | Wants legislative entry threshold but very concerned about level in 2009; maximum 3% | Considering reduction in district magnitude to 3-6 but NOT single-member districts | Wants to return to fully closed system |
| **PD**              | Agrees to past election vote threshold increase (5%/5%/5%) | Ok to increase number of districts to 80, fine with district magnitude | Wants to retain partly open system |
| **PKS**             | Wants delay and reduction of increase (to 4%/5%/5%) in past election vote threshold until 2014 | Agrees with 3-12 | Public statements and position paper confusing, appears interested in retaining partly open system |
| **PPP**             | Wants to return to 3%/4%/4% level from previous election | Agrees with 3-12 | Wants to retain partly open system, not clearly in favor of 100% BPP |
| **PAN**             | Wants better enforcement of the past election vote threshold | Agrees with 3-12 | Agrees to fully open system |
| **PKB**             | Wants delay to increase in past election vote threshold until 2014 | Agrees with 3-12 | Unclear from fraksi position paper, party leaders argued they wanted a partly open system |
| **Other parties**   | Oppose any increase to past election vote threshold | Agrees with 3-12 -Exception: PBR wants single-member districts | Oppose fully open lists, too difficult to compete against “deep-pocket” money politics of large parties |
| **Civil Society**   | Agree with moderate increase to past election vote threshold if well-enforced, some support for 2-3% legislative entry threshold | Agree with status quo -Exception: women’s groups want larger districts to help gender quota | Supportive of fully open lists but need campaign finance regulations -Exception: women’s groups want closed list to help gender quota |

Sources collected from the Document Archive (Arsip Dokumentasi, Ardok) at the DPR in Jakarta, March 2010:
1) Draft law components from Rencana Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum submitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the DPR
2) Party/fraksi preferences from Pemandangan Umum submitted by each fraksi in response to the Draft Law
Electoral Threshold Reform

The Ministry’s draft law did not alter the fundamental structure of the competitive entry threshold but raised that barrier to 1) 5% of the 2004-2009 DPR seats, or 2) 5% of the 2004-2009 DPRD1 or DPRD2 seats in at least half the provinces or municipalities. There was also an additional provision in the draft law to prohibit those parties which failed to meet barriers of 3% of seats in the DPR or 4% of seats in half of the DPRD1 and DPRD2 from running alone in 2009. Those parties would be required to run with another party meeting the barriers alone or between the two (or more) together or to disband. The draft law did not include a provision for the addition of a legislative entry threshold beyond these moderate proposed increases to the entry barrier, and the Ministry’s justification about the proposed increases clearly indicated that they believed an entry barrier would simplify the party system if the barrier was high enough.

Once in negotiations in the DPR, however, the issue of a too-large and too-complex party system arose again. With 17 parties, and nine fraksi, there were still seven parties with fewer than five seats (1% of the DPR) and another three with fewer than fifteen seats (3% of the DPR). As the legislative session progressed, more and more concerns were expressed over the nature of a presidential system combined with such a large, and perceived unwieldy, party system. There had already been seven presidential tickets competing in the first round of the 2004 elections. Many observers hoped that a reduction in the number of legislative parties would translate into some consolidation of tickets in the executive elections that followed.

In response to the limited changes in the Ministry’s draft law, the fraksi raised their objections in the pemandangan umum, or “general views,” session of the Special Committee
that introduced complaints and concerns. Golkar agreed with the increases in the past
election vote threshold and argued that the next step should be the adoption of a fixed
legislative entry threshold to increase the effectiveness of the representative body. The PDI-
P had always been a proponent of continuing diversity in the system but by the time the 2007
draft law was submitted the party had changed its views on the ability of the past election
vote threshold to be effective. Concerns that parties would continue to “cheat” the system by
changing names or face limited enforcement scrutiny convinced PDI-P leaders that a
legislative entry threshold would accomplish the goals of making parties work harder (“kerja
keras”) and simplifying the party system as long as the threshold did not get too high,
eliminating diversity.  

Among the medium-sized parties, the PD and the PAN were less concerned about the
change in the threshold level. The PD agreed to the increase in the past election vote
threshold but made no mention of a legislative entry threshold, while the PAN argued that the
problem was not the level of the threshold but effective implementation and enforcement of
the existing threshold. The PPP’s view on the draft law threshold was that it should not
increase from 3% and the party took the position that returning to 3% was adequate for
simplifying the system, both in the short and long term. The PKB wanted to delay the
increase to the threshold until the 2014 election, keeping the parameters established in the
2003 election law for the 2009 elections, while the PKS was more specific and not only
wanted a delay but wanted the increase to only become 4% of the DPR seats or 5% of the
seats in half of the DPRD1 or DPRD2, rather than 5% of either.

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85 Interviews with Yassona Laoly (November 2010) and Ganjar Pranowo (November 2010). Both argued that
too many parties could “cheat” the pre-2009 system to get around the competition entry barriers, while Pranowo
explicitly argued that implementing a legislative entry threshold would force all parties to work harder.
The fraksi representing the small parties – PBB, PDS, PPDK, PBR, Pelopor – all objected to the increased past election vote threshold and what they perceived as “hegemony” or “tyranny” (hegemoniltirani) of the majority that sought to reduce the number of parties by eliminating all the small ones and the voices they represented. In addition, some of the smaller parties were confused by the apparent contradiction in the draft law that read as if it applied to the 2009 election, and thus appeared to preempt the previous election law that automatically granted them entry into the 2009 elections since they were part of the DPR already.

Outside of the parties, the expert teams (tim ahli) that were formed by the government and civil society groups all expressed similar concerns about the ability of parties to “cheat” the mechanism of the past election vote threshold. However, there was little consensus on the best way to approach the problem, through the legislative entry threshold or better enforcement of the existing rules. Many observers felt the system too unwieldy to continue with more than a dozen legislative parties but worried about the intentions of actors pushing for the threshold.

The result, both within the legislature and the pool of advisors, was a 4-month stalemate over the most appropriate way to structure competition, with the small parties insistent on a legislative entry threshold of no higher than 1-2%, if one had to be adopted at all. One vice chairperson of the Special Committee suggested that a clear objective at the outset of negotiations was to simplify the party system and reduce the total number of DPR parties. However, the large number of participants made the reality of such an outcome

86 Interview with Didik Supriyanto (December 2010).
87 Interview with Yassona Laoly (November 2010).
difficult to achieve and negotiations took so long that the eventual result was challenged in the Constitutional Court which upheld the most significant change.

Two separate bargaining tools emerged during the negotiations over the threshold that resulted in a single eventual compromise. First, three of the largest parties – Golkar, PDI-P, PKS – wanted a fixed 3% legislative entry threshold, which most calculated would reduce the number of parties to the 3-7 party range. While the PAN and the PKB were willing to settle at 2.5% but did not want to go higher, the PPP and PD held similar positions to the smallest parties that anything beyond 1-2% would be undemocratic. The PPP argued that a threshold of 1% was enough because it could always be increased gradually in the future if needed. 88 Only the PD and PKB’s positions suggested a lack of clear strategic focus, with the PD clearly rising in popularity throughout SBY’s term in office and the PKB consistently showing signs of internal fragmentation and declining support.

The second issue was whether the legislative entry threshold would apply to the DPRD1 and DPRD2 or whether it would simply be for calculating seat allocations to the DPR; in this case the arguments for and against applying the threshold at all levels varied both on the grounds of ideology and apparent strategy. While the PDI-P and Golkar were consistent proponents of applying a legislative entry threshold at all levels, 89 both for the sake of universality and because each stood to gain in the districts where they were strongest, the PAN took the perspective that the DPRD1 and DPRD2 were generally such small numbers of seats that a threshold would not matter anyway. 90 The PPP and PKB had mixed views on applying a threshold below the national level, with the PPP viewing the unitary

88 Interview with Lena Maryana (December 2010).
89 Interview with Fery Mursydan Baldan (October 2010).
90 Interview with Andi Yuliani Paris (October 2010).
system as requiring universality in application of the rules and the PKB viewing the local diversity and keeping the big parties honest as justifications for retaining different sets of rules for the different levels of government. While the PKB’s argument could easily have represented both ideological and seat-maximizing motivations, given the party’s extreme strength in East Java but limited appeal in many other parts of the country, the PPP’s push for a universal threshold must be evaluated as an ideological perspective on the nature of the unitary state – few parties stood to lose as much as the PPP if it could not win seats in local governments and its precipitous decline in the national polls caused it to be eliminated from the political arena.

In the end, the PDI-P, Golkar and PKS issued an ultimatum to the other parties of a 2.5% legislative entry threshold or they would simply raise the number and force the issue to a vote, which they would win with tacit PAN and PKB backing. The goal of the PDI-P and Golkar had been for a threshold that applied at all levels of government but the resistance they faced in passing the 2.5% level led them to compromise and only apply the legislative entry threshold to the national election. In return, they also wanted the continuation of the past election vote threshold which made its way into the law.

However, both thresholds were challenged at the Constitutional Court. In a 6-3 vote, the Court ruled that the past election barrier would be removed but the 2.5% threshold would be upheld at the national level. Thus, the final rule applied to the elections was a 2.5% fixed legislative entry threshold and no past election vote threshold based on previous electoral performance or DPR membership. According to Justice Akil Mochtar, part of the Court’s

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91 Interview with Choisin Chumaidy (November 2010).
92 Interviews with Muhaimin Iskandar (November 2010), Hanifi Dakiri (July 2010).
93 Interview with Yassona Laoly (November 2010).
reasoning came from the argument that Indonesian democracy was consolidated and could withstand the “simplification” of the party system, though he expressed reservations that the lack of a past election vote threshold would not consolidate anything (interview, May 2010).

Throughout the negotiations PDI-P leadership displayed both seat-maximizing and alternative motivations regarding the application of a legislative entry threshold, arguing that while the party system needed simplification in order to provide more effective governance there were limits to how much competition should be limited. Golkar displayed little besides seat-maximizing logic in its pursuit of a legislative entry threshold, as its representatives occasionally conveyed their expectations that the adoption of a threshold that eliminated smaller parties (i.e. new entrants that were fragments from Golkar) would result in those smaller parties returning to Golkar and bringing their voters with them.\(^9\) In seat-maximizing logic, the PKS eventually threw its weight behind a fixed legislative entry threshold once the party came to the realization that it would likely be a beneficiary from the elimination of smaller parties; this was an about-face from the much-smaller PK perspective in 2002 when the party opposed any threshold because it was one of the smaller parties facing elimination.

The PD, PAN and PKB all hedged their bets in seat-maximizing mode, wanting little to no legislative entry threshold in case their electoral fortunes did not improve in 2009 but a more effective past election vote threshold to keep the small parties from contesting and winning a seat here or there that might otherwise go to them. The final result was a direct bargain between the largest parties, which held somewhat different rationale for their preferences, and the varied expectations of the medium-sized parties. The Constitutional Court ultimately striking down the past election vote threshold pleased the small parties in danger of missing the threshold, while the lack of a legislative entry threshold at the

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\(^9\) Interview with Agun Gunanjar Sudarsa (November 2010).
provincial and municipal levels represented a compromise between the larger parties (particularly Golkar, PDI-P, and PKS) and the smaller parties in order to pass some law in time for the elections, as well as the fact that the committee had run out of time to continue the deadlocked debate.

**District Magnitude Reform**

The Ministry’s draft law again did not alter the fundamental structure of the districts that had been put in place in 2003, retaining the exact provisions for districts of 3-12 seats in magnitude and leaving the actual drawing of district lines to the KPU. While the Ministry’s justification did not note a specific objection to the general size of the districts in terms of magnitude, it did raise some concerns about the formula for allocating the number of seats per district and warned of potential “gerrymandering” abuses that might occur.

Golkar, in addition to outright pursuit of a single-member district system, chose to frame its objections to the 3-12 seat district magnitude and call for a lowering of the ceiling to 6 maximum seats per district. The *fraksi* position paper criticized the 120% list length provided for in the 2004 elections, under which parties could nominate a list of candidates up to 120% of the available seats such that a 10-seat district’s party list could nominate 12 names, arguing that it encouraged candidates who were not serious or invested in representing their district. Golkar thus proposed a 3-6 seat district magnitude range with exactly the number of nominees per seats available – a 4 seat district could have up to 4 names from each party on that district’s party lists. However, Golkar also inserted a section into its position paper objecting to the mechanism for districting as needing to “increase communication with regional [constituents],” proposing a revision to the method for
allocating districts to regions to better balance “on Java” and “off Java” and to consider allowing for a non-fixed number of DPR seats.

By this time, the PDI-P had come around to the idea of smaller districts, arguing that their legislators could not do good work if they were expected to split time between campaigning in physically enormous districts and making policy decisions in Jakarta.95 The 3-6 district magnitude range garnered support among its leaders largely because of that constituency representation argument and in reaction to concerns voiced by observers that legislators needed to be closer to their constituents. However, the PDI-P remained steadfastly opposed to a single-member district system on the grounds that it would eliminate diversity and minority representation and, at least publicly, did not entertain discussions about reducing the district magnitude floor below 3.

However, nearly every other party wanted to retain the 3-12 seat districts used in 2004, including the PPP, PAN, PKB and PKS, with the PD initially more concerned with the total number of districts (maximum of 80) than the seats per district. During the course of discussions only the PKB and PKS appeared to change their positions, with both leaning toward a slight reduction in the ceiling on district magnitude to a 3-8 seat range. However, while the PKS changed its position permanently after running internal election simulations that suggested the change would increase the party’s seat-share,96 the PKB worried about its overall declining vote share and thus did not present itself as a consistent supporter of any reduction in the magnitude throughout the negotiations. One PAN representative interviewed expressed the view that the party had at one point wanted to consider adopting a single-member district system but did not feel there were enough other parties in support of the plan

95 Interviews with Yassona Laoly (November 2010) and Ganjar Pranowo (November 2010).

96 Interview with Agus Purnomo (November 2010).
and so backed off;\(^97\) however, no other PAN representatives suggested anything similar in the party’s platform in the 2004-2009 period.\(^98\)

One additional option that was raised, Golkar’s “on Java”/“off Java” concern, manifested itself as a confusing dialogue about a *sistem kombinasi*, or a combination system more commonly referred to as a mixed-elector system that was advocated for by some influential civil society members and international organizations, including Hadar Gumay of CETRO (Center for Electoral Reform), an Indonesian civil society organization focused on education about electoral system reform. The mixed system considered by the government was one in which the Java-based voting would take place in single-member districts based on district/municipality divisions (the *kabupaten* and *kotamadya* of the DPRD2) and the outside Java-based voting would continue to take place in multi-member districts with party lists.\(^99\) However, it is unclear if Golkar, or any other members of Commission 2 conceived of a mixed-system to this effect – interviews with Golkar representatives suggest they were more interested in a parallel system than the reapportioning model suggested by Gumay.\(^100\) The mixed system was never a serious consideration, partly because of the confusion surrounding which formula for seat allocation and ballot format were being discussed and partly because of the perception that it would be a difficult system for voters to understand.

The compromise between the PDI-P/Golkar bloc pushing for 3-6 seat districts, the PKS in favor of 3-8 seat districts, and every other party still supporting 3-12 seat districts was a slight reduction to 3-10 seats per district. The districts would be drawn along similar

\(^{97}\) Interview with Djoko Susilo (July 2010).

\(^{98}\) Interviews with Andi Yuliani Paris (October 2010), Muhammad Najib (July 2010), Bima Aria Sugianto (July 2010) and Alvin Lie (July 2010).

\(^{99}\) Interview with Cecep Effendi (October 2010).

\(^{100}\) Interview with Nurul Arifin (October 2010), personal correspondence with Hadar Gumay (November 2010).
lines to those in 2004 but the population-based calculations combined with the creation of a new province (West Sulawesi) produced eight new districts overall, from 69 in 2004 to 77 in 2009. How to subdivide some of the districts proved extremely controversial, such as the debate between Golkar and PAN over subdividing South Sulawesi’s two electoral districts into three plus the addition of the new West Sulawesi district.\textsuperscript{101}

In sum, the shift in the PDI-P’s stance on district magnitude reflected some balance between seat-maximizing and alternative motivations since the party’s leadership clearly recognized that smaller districts would allow the party to a) more effectively campaign in and b) more closely represent distinct constituencies. However, the PDI-P’s continued opposition to single-member districts consistently indicated that the party really did not believe that full-scale majoritarian districting could appropriately represent the diversity of the Indonesian nation. Golkar’s position in pursuit of single-member districts and, failing that, much reduced magnitude of the electoral districts based on proportionality, clearly signaled seat-maximization as its basic logic, while all the medium-sized and smaller parties opposed to single-member districts and drastic reductions in average district magnitude clearly did so for self-preservation reasons. The exception to this observation was the PBR which argued that single-member districts would be the preferable system due to the views of its chairman, Bursah Zarnubi, that the most democratic form of accountability came from a single representative-single district relationship, despite clear indications that such a system would rob the party of all dozen of the seats it held in the DPR.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Andi Yuliani Paris (October 2010).

\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Bursah Zarnubi (August 2010).
List PR Reform

The Ministry’s draft law once again included a provision for fully open lists, very clearly applying the same principles and similar wording as the DPD’s multi-member district plurality elections just within the confines of party lists. The wording of the clause (RUU Pemilu 2007, Article 208) clearly stated that seats would be allocated to candidates within a single party in each electoral district on the basis of suara terbanyak, the largest vote. Thus, the seats that would be awarded to parties in a given district were intended to go to the candidates with the highest vote totals within that party’s district list. The wording was more explicit than in the 2002 draft and the government’s justification to the DPR was that the eventual wording of Article 107 in the 2003 Election Law circumvented full implementation of the open list system that the law implied and that the Ministry had included in the original 2002 draft law.

Once again, the PDI-P generally took a position of opposition to the open lists but in this period the PAN had joined Golkar in supporting the move to open lists that the PD, with its presence in the government, also supported to some degree. Golkar’s objections were not very clear in details: in its position paper to the first Working Committee meeting the party confusingly advocated for a gradual opening of the lists in which a proportion of the BPP (district quota) necessary to win a seat as an individual candidate, rather than the 100% of a BPP as in 2004, eventually gave way to completely open lists; alternatively Golkar suggested a single-member district system.

In sum, both Golkar and the PD proposed similar revisions to the wording of the law that would require individual candidates to receive a minimum proportion of a BPP in order to obtain a seat through voter choice; party leaders expressed some reservations about the
loss of control of their candidates once nominated but on the whole reasoned that they would retain control of the nomination process. The PDI-P, realizing that most other parties objected to returning to fully closed lists, eventually acquiesced to the idea while keeping in mind that the proposed reform still retained party control for the nomination process and so their typically high criteria for selection of candidates would remain the party’s decision. However, the PDI-P never supported open lists and sought the compromise over the openness of the list that would retain as much centralized party control over the nomination process as possible. The PAN threw its entire support behind fully open lists but it was the only fracsi to do so at any point throughout the negotiations and remained a consistent advocate for the fully open lists, though some individual representatives did raise the idea from within the other fracsi.

The PKS position on the open lists was the most difficult to discern, notably because representatives made contradictory statements and even their position paper in the Special Committee suggested a confusing support for open lists, though perhaps it was simply to an element of openness. It is possible the confusion stemmed from fragmentation within party leadership, and also given that they were one of the few parties to have extraordinarily popular, though clearly party-oriented, DPR representatives such as Hidayat Nur Wahid who was the highest individual vote-winner in the 2004 election. However, the PKS’s internal hierarchy and advancement system was far more suited to closed lists, based on a process of caderization (kaderisasi) in which grassroots activists worked their way up to candidacy at

103 Interview with Ganjar Pranowo (November 2010).
104 Interviews with Pramono Anung (November 2010), Andi Yuliani Paris (October 2010) and Fery Mursydan Baldan (October 2010).
105 Interview with Andi Yuliani Paris (October 2010).
106 Interview with Zulkiflimansyah (July 2010).
the local, then provincial, then national level. On the whole, PKS representatives indicated little support for fully open lists and spoke about the eventual outcome as an unavoidable political compromise.

The PPP argued that lists should reflect both voter choice and party goals, but left it unclear how to adjudicate between the two in terms of actually allocating seats. In practice, no PPP representative or party leader interviewed expressed anything but opposition on behalf of the party to fully open lists and most spoke of the eventual outcome in the same way as most PKS representatives: as an unavoidable political compromise. The rest of the smaller parties, from the PBB to PDS to PPDK, all appeared unhappy with the prospect of fully open lists and viewed them as a mechanism for the largest parties to win more votes by courting popular figures and exploiting “money politics” in ways they would, or could, not.

The process of deciding what to do about a proposed system that almost no fraksi favored in its exact structure led to a protracted debate over how to “reclose” the lists to some degree. In one of the more technically-oriented discussions during the election law revisions, the Special Committee evaluated numbers from the 2004 elections to assess what percentage of a BPP would make for a difficult, yet reasonable, level for an individual candidate to obtain in order to win a seat. Proportions of a BPP in the 25-50% range were the most frequently discussed, 25% being the initial proposed level by the PD in their position paper in July 2007. The committee settled on a 30% BPP cutoff on the grounds that a higher figure

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107 Interviews with Fahri Hamzah (July 2010) and Agus Purnomo (November 2010).
108 Interviews with Anis Matta (July 2010) and Agus Purnomo (November 2010).
109 Interviews with Lena Maryana (December 2010), Choi Sin Chumaidy (November 2010), Ali Hardi Kiaademek (July 2010), and Lukman Hakim Saifuddin (July 2010).
like 50% would eliminate all voter choice because so few candidates in 2004 won 50% of a BPP in individual candidate votes.\textsuperscript{110}

The law eventually stated that 30% of one BPP was the basic requirement to win a seat individually (i.e. out of list order) at all and the 100% BPP automatically qualified an individual candidate to win a seat outright. However, if multiple candidates received 30-99% they would be chosen based on the rank-ordering of the submitted lists rather than the highest individual vote-share. For example, if a party received a party vote-share of one BPP in a district, qualifying for one seat, but none of its individual candidates in that district won at least 30% of the BPP in individual candidate votes, the party’s seat would automatically go to the first-ordered name on the party’s district list. If a party received a party vote-share of one BPP in a district, qualifying for one seat, and one of its candidates won between 30-99% of a BPP in individual candidate votes, the party’s seat would automatically go to that candidate, regardless of that candidate’s ordered list position. If a party received a party vote-share of one BPP in a district, qualifying for one seat, and two of its candidates won between 30-99% of a BPP in individual candidate votes, the party’s seat would go to the candidate ranked higher on the party’s ordered list, regardless of whether that candidate had the higher individual vote total of the two or if s/he had the exact same number of individual votes. Any candidate receiving 100% of one BPP in individual votes in a district would automatically gain a seat in that district.

Thus, the eventual package adopted defied most of the logic behind the openness of the lists in terms of translating voter choice into seat allocations. Voter choice would only matter in cases where an individual could win 100% of a BPP and an automatic seat or where

\textsuperscript{110} Interviews with Fery Mursydan Baldan (October 2010) and Andi Yuliani Paris (October 2010).
a party won a single seat and only one candidate won between 30-99% of a BPP. In all other situations the party list ordering would prevail in determining the candidates who filled seats.

Challenging the clauses (UU10/2008, Article 214a-e) in the Constitutional Court, petitioners from PD argued that the 30-99% stipulation clearly violated the spirit of pluralism and voter choice. In a unanimous ruling on December 19, 2008, the court overturned the constraints in Article 214, striking its contents from the Law and fully opening the lists to suara terbanyak, or highest individual vote, as the sole determinant in selecting individual candidates to fill party seat allocations. The court justified its opinion on the basis that Article 214 violated the spirit of “direct” election and sovereignty of the people stipulated in the Constitution. Particularly in the case where two candidates acquire extremely different numbers of votes the logical application would be that the candidate acquiring more votes win the seat over the candidate acquiring fewer votes, which was not guaranteed under Article 214. Parties were not required to resubmit the party nomination lists that were approved by the KPU in October, and so voters faced ballots that still reflected the party’s rank ordering of candidates but could vote knowing that their votes would entirely determine which of those candidates would receive seats.

The Court’s ruling prompted a number of concerns regarding judicial objectivity, as the ruling very closely reflected the system originally proposed by the government and certain political factions. However, though many parties expressed displeasure and skepticism at the ruling, all parties agreed to abide by the new rules though many now worried that the fully open lists would cause widespread internal friction as parties’ candidates would enter the March 2009 campaign period with less incentive to advocate for the party relative to their own personal interests. The parties expressing the greatest
frustration at the law, but with few concerns that they could not control their own candidates, were the PKS and PDI-P;\textsuperscript{111} the PAN leadership was happy with the Court’s ruling though individual representatives expressed private concerns about the party’s strategy for competing in a system of fully open lists.\textsuperscript{112}

With respect to the format of the lists, once again nearly every party chose to pursue the type of system it believed would be seat-maximizing for itself in the 2009 elections. The PDI-P, and to a lesser degree the PKS, pursued closed lists on the grounds that their party’s candidates reflected broader goals about the party’s platform and therefore the party should get to choose which of those candidates to represent the party’s (and its voters’) interests in the legislature. Furthermore, the PDI-P and PKS had very meritocratic candidate selection criteria, relative to the other parties, and both wanted to advertise the idea that work and advancement within the party were reasons for people to become members and stay working with/for the party on key ideological issues over time. Thus, when it came to debating over the format of the lists, the PDI-P and PKS opposed fully open lists and pursued a level of openness as a concession to the larger group within the DPR that wanted more direct voter choice of candidates.

The remaining parties, in particular the PAN, were more interested in some form of open list also for strategic reasons. Most had strength in specific voting bases, in particular the PKB in East Java and Golkar in the Outer Islands such as Sulawesi, or could field professionally-networked, resource-endowed and/or locally popular candidates, such as the PD and the PAN, in order to pursue party seats via individual candidate strength. In some

\textsuperscript{111} Interviews with Anis Matta (July 2010), Agus Purnomo (November 2010), Yassona Laoly (November 2010) and Ganjar Pranowo (November 2010).

\textsuperscript{112} Interviews with Djoko Susilo (July 2010) and Alvin Lie (July 2010).
ways the PAN’s pursuit of open lists was a combination of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations because the PAN’s leadership represented a more tightly-knit and ideologically-focused group than its candidates. However, all the parties pursuing a combination of open and closed list attributes did so partly to ensure party control over some aspects of candidate nominations and partly to tap into individual candidates’ abilities to directly win greater seat-shares for the parties.

*General Conclusions about and Expectations of the Reform Process*

The 2007-8 process demonstrated some similarities to the 2002-3 process but three key differences drove many of the negotiations and explain a good deal about the reforms that were eventually adopted, as well as the justification and motivation for the Court challenges. First, the *reformasi* “idealism” appeared to fade as party elites in the DPR now found it more difficult to compromise and reach consensus, pursuing political interests as their primary concern.¹¹³ Second, parties within the DPR were less content to rely on the recommendations and information provided by the government or expert consultants,¹¹⁴ although a number of individual legislators specifically referred to how helpful expert advice had been in formulating their positions and decisions.¹¹⁵ Third, the effects of the previous round of reform in 2002-3 constrained negotiations and set up circumstances for the prioritization of specific issues in 2007-8. Table 5.4 summarizes the differences between the

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¹¹³ Interview with Valina Singka Subekti (July 2010).
¹¹⁴ Interview with Sudharsono (July 2010).
¹¹⁵ Interviews with Fery Mursydan Baldan (October 2010), Andi Yuliani Paris (October 2010), Yassona Laoly (November 2010), Ganjar Pranowo (November 2010), and Lena Maryana (December 2010).
Ministry of Home Affairs’ draft law, the law passed by the DPR, and the final changes made by the Constitutional Court rulings.

Table 5.4 Changes from Draft Law (2007) to Final Election Law and Court Rulings (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Threshold</th>
<th>District Magnitude</th>
<th>List PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft Election Law (produced by Ministry of Home Affairs in July 2007)</td>
<td>Moderate increase (to 4% DPR, 5% ½ DPRD1 or 5% ½ DPRD2) in past election vote threshold</td>
<td>3-12 seats per district, only recalculate for province creation and set maximum at 560 seats</td>
<td>Fully open, plurality vote within party district list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Election Law (produced by Commission 2, passed by DPR in March 2008)</td>
<td>Moderate increase (to 4% DPR, 5% ½ DPRD1 or 5% ½ DPRD2) in past election vote threshold; 2.5% legislative entry threshold only for DPR</td>
<td>3-10 seats per district, results in increase to 76 districts for the 560 DPR seats</td>
<td>Partly open, 100% BPP automatically wins individual candidate a seat, 30-99% BPP wins individual candidates seats in list order of all party district candidates with 30-99%, &lt;30% in list order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Electoral System in 2009 (following Constitutional Court Rulings in October and December 2008)</td>
<td>2.5% legislative entry threshold only for DPR</td>
<td>No change: 3-10 seats per district</td>
<td>Fully open, plurality vote within party district list</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
1) Draft Election Law and Final Election Law from the Document Archive of the DPR
2) Constitutional Court Rulings downloaded from Hukumonline (HOL database) of Indonesian legal proceedings

Due to these factors, the reform process that turned the Ministry’s draft proposal into the law passed by the MPR lasted roughly the same length of time as the previous process – with 4 months of hearings and committee meetings – but the time spent on different aspects of the process varied, as well as the access of non-committee members. While the process in 2002 involved more open meetings, hearings and consultations, the process in 2007 was perceived to be much more “closed door” and exclusive to legislators rather than experts or
In addition, the number of hearings and meetings held during each month was nearly double that of the totals in 2002, such that the process technically took the same length of time in months but actually took twice the amount of time in hearing and meeting frequency.\textsuperscript{117}

In this period, parties negotiated far more over the specific levels of thresholds, district magnitudes and list openness, rather than switching positions as many had in the previous reform period. Both in the beginning of the 2007 reform process and at the end only Golkar and the PDI-P really wanted a strict legislative entry threshold, and they disagreed on how high the level should be to start, while all the medium and small parties were opposed. However, the collective will of Golkar and PDI-P was enough to force the discussion to revolve around \textit{how high} the threshold would be, rather than whether one would be instituted.

On this issue, since the PDI-P still expressed reservations about too much constraint on competition and preferred starting low and following a gradual increase in a legislative entry threshold, the 2.5\% level was chosen as the result of a compromise between the two parties which wanted a threshold and the remaining parties which did not. In 2002-2003 this negotiation never occurred because 1) only Golkar wanted a threshold, and 2) there was more general consensus that curbing competition could be detrimental to democracy. By 2007 concerns about democratic survival and constrained competition had declined and the “too many parties” argument had progressed to the point where a legislative entry threshold was no longer unacceptable and so the negotiations became about what the level of the threshold

\textsuperscript{116} Interviews with Ramlan Surbakti (December 2010), Hadar Gumay (February 2010), Cecep Effendi (October 2010).

\textsuperscript{117} I base this calculation on the transcript books of the Committee hearings and meetings, available from the Document Archive at the DPR, for both the 2001-2003 and 2007-2008 periods.
should be and to which levels of government the threshold should apply, more so than whether there should be a threshold at all. The Court’s decision reflected the general consensus that the past election vote threshold had not been well-implemented and that the legislative entry threshold did not violate any constitutional rights of the parties.

In terms of the district magnitude, once again only Golkar really pursued single-member districts and civil society’s suggestion about mixed electoral systems was not embraced as too many parties deemed the complexity problematic for Indonesian voters. With the PDI-P still opposed to majoritarianism, but increasingly in favor of smaller districts to create closer representative-constituent ties, the debate really only revolved around lowering the district magnitude ceiling. The result was a modest change. Both the threshold and district magnitude debates occurred with an eye toward reducing party system fragmentation, and the expectations of many parties were that particularly the threshold would reduce the overall number of parties receiving legislative seats and increasing the strength of the parties that did.

Finally, in one of the more divisive issues besides the threshold, the question of type of list nomination procedures dominated many of the debates. While the PDI-P, and to a lesser extent many of the small parties, wanted to return to fully closed lists, most of the parties agreed that some form of open list would be preferable, though they varied in the reasons why they believed so. With the exception of the PAN, which now completely supported fully open lists, all the remaining medium-sized parties and Golkar pushed for some form of system in which the lists were more open than in 2004 but short of fully open. The negotiations over the level resulted in the 30-99% stipulation that kept power, based on projections from the 2004 elections, firmly in the hands of party leaders except where
extraordinarily popular local elites might be able to win seats outright. As a result, the challenge issued to the Constitutional Court by PD representatives who agreed with the original government proposal of fully open lists became the final rule when the Court found in favor of striking down the 30-99% stipulation. Thus, the final rule governing the lists was only completely supported by one party – the PAN – when all others had preferred some other system to the one that was used.

Partly due to this fact, few parties had nominated candidates assuming that plurality voting within party lists would determine who received seats. The expectations regarding the impact of the change accordingly varied depending on the party in question. Parties such as the PDI-P and PKS assumed few changes because their candidates were instructed not to compete on an individual basis and believed their voters were more likely to cast ballots for the party than individuals. Golkar assumed many of its highly-listed candidates would win seats based on individual vote-share anyway since it had nominated many wealthy, locally popular candidates to high list positions based on perceptions that they would attract more voters to the party. In sum, parties had different expectations about how much the fully open lists would affect their electoral success and specific representatives in the 2009 elections.

Overall the 2007-8 reform process showed some support for my expectations, particularly in the constraints placed on reformers as a result of the previous reform period. In direct contrast to expectations about seat maximization, the growing party system size from 1999 to 2004 should have predicted more inclusive reforms in the 2007-8 period as parties were expected to hedge their bets for 2009 (hypothesis 1). Instead, the growing party system actually dovetailed with a reductivist mentality about the need for simplification of
the multi-party system and the result was adoption of less inclusive reforms despite high and growing uncertainty.

While this suggests support for alternative motivations (hypothesis 2), the reality of the situation was that all parties, including the PDI-P to a greater extent in this reform period, pursued fairly seat-maximizing strategies at the individual level in pursuing reforms they believed would benefit them. The increased benefit in the reduction of districts in 2004 convinced many medium-sized parties, along with the PDI-P and Golkar, that continuing to pursue a smaller party system might result in a net gain. The PDI-P had to some degree abandoned its defense of total pluralism, and agreed that the past election vote threshold did not appear to have any effect on simplifying a too-crowded party system. More rhetorical explanations of “better representation” to justify open lists and “efficient governance” to justify the legislative entry threshold were in force in 2007-8, but in practice the advocacy of individual parties demonstrated almost exclusively seat-maximizing logic.

The medium-sized parties, now more numerous and holding more seats than previously, became an important subset in the legislative debates (hypothesis 3a & 3b). One, the PD, held the presidency and was in a fairly close coalition with Golkar. PDI-P insistence on remaining in “opposition” to the government thus relinquished a good deal of weight to the remaining medium-sized parties during negotiations. The medium-sized parties got much of what they all wanted during these negotiations, including a low legislative entry threshold that would eliminate small party competitors, some measure of party list openness, and a general retention of proportionality. However, an important aspect of the medium-sized parties was the divergence of some on key issues: the PAN wanted fully open lists while the PKS wanted relatively closed, the PKS would agree to a legislative entry threshold
earlier than the other medium-sized parties, and both the PPP and PKB seemed uncertain what strategies to pursue. If anything, the 2007-8 negotiations highlighted the range of information and understanding possessed by the medium-sized parties regarding electoral system options. A key issue was the district magnitude, where some parties clearly understood that redistricting would affect them directly (the PAN in South Sulawesi, in particular) and others had little idea what this would mean (hypothesis 4).

The flexibility in strategy and goals by the PDI-P, the PKS and PD during the negotiation process, as well as the aggressive way that Golkar pursued the entry threshold, all heralded a shift in post-reformasi tendencies to try to get along and appear consensual. Long before the electoral reform process began the PDI-P had declared its opposition to the PD/Golkar government. This stance was reinforced as the PDI-P dug in its heels on issues of list openness, protesting until the adoption of the new law against it.118 Despite holding collectively fewer seats than in 2002-3 Golkar and the PDI-P were much more willing to draw a line in the sand on the issue of a legislative entry threshold, preferring to force medium and small parties into some sort of settlement rather than agree to simply raise the past election vote threshold. Thus, the 2007-8 period clearly demonstrated some departure from the post-transition honeymoon that encouraged certain parties to “play nice” and promote a general consensus (hypothesis 5).

Finally, the debates over the legislative entry threshold, reduction in district magnitude and list openness also demonstrated clearly perceived limits to the extremeness of change that reformers were willing to undertake, with the exception of Golkar’s attempts to restructure the entire system. On issues of inclusivity, even with the introduction of a

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118 The PDI-P also dug in its heels on the adoption of a gender quota and placement mechanism, which I do not discuss here but was a contentious issue for both the Party’s leadership and rank-and-file.
legislative threshold there were many arguments by the PDI-P, and eventual agreement by the PKS, that the threshold should not begin at a very high level in order to avoid a two-party system outcome (hypothesis 6a). On the issue of list openness, even with Golkar and the PAN at different times advocating for complete openness or even single-member districts there was never consideration that independent candidates be given free hand to run (hypothesis 6b).

**Outcomes in the 2009 General Elections**

The election results\textsuperscript{119} demonstrated much greater effects of the reforms than in 2004, as more parties competed but far fewer won seats and many highly-ranked candidates lost seats to lower-ranked candidates with the fully open lists. The reforms reflect some trends in the party system’s evolution relative to the 2004 elections, as well as the non-universal nature of reform impact on parties that was evident in 2004. But the direct effects of the 2007-2008 reforms on changes in the party system are much clearer than those which occurred in the previous reform and election. I will first offer a recap of the election returns, including measures of party system size and electoral volatility. Then I analyze the effects of reforms on party system outcomes, assessing whether reforms had any of their intended impacts, i.e. benefits, to the large and medium-sized parties.

In 2009 there were 38 parties competing, though four achieved successful registration following Constitutional Court challenges in which the Court upheld their right to contest

\textsuperscript{119} All registration and results from the 2009 elections were collected in electronic format from the Technical Office of the KPU headquarters in Jakarta and were translated, transcribed (where necessary) and calculated by the author. None of the calculations for the DPR included the six Acehnese parties, which competed in the DPRD1 and DPRD2 elections in Aceh but were not allowed to contest the DPR seats in the province’s two national electoral districts.
despite failing to meet the 2004 election law’s past election vote threshold.\textsuperscript{120} Nearly all of the 24 parties that competed in 2004 returned, with an additional dozen new party entrants. In Aceh, according to provisions in the Regional Government Act (UU 2006), the local parties could now contest the DPRD1 and DPRD2 elections but were still barred from entering the DPR elections.

Compared with 1999 to 2004, when electoral volatility of votes measured 24.34, the 2004 to 2009 vote volatility measured 30.57 for a modest increase. Seat volatility actually dropped from 41.76 from the 1999-2004 period to 26.45 in the 2004-2009 period. On balance, it would be difficult to make the argument that the increase in vote volatility was due primarily to electoral reforms rather than the coattail effect of SBY’s popularity on major gains by the PD. In terms of seats, however, the decline suggests that reforms did not have the effect of wildly redistributing seats among parties or to new parties (hypothesis 9).

At the party level, there was wider variation in how parties fared under the new rules and party-type (size) effects were as pronounced as the effects individual parties felt. Table 5.5 shows basic outcomes from the 2009 national legislative elections: the levels of each parties’ vote-share, seat-share, difference between the two, and change since 2004. Once again, the differential tells a particular story with respect to how well parties fared in response to the reforms: rise in differential indicates beneficiary of reform while decrease in differential indicates losers in the reform game. The smallest parties were once again the biggest losers in the new translation, though some of those losses came from not being able

\textsuperscript{120} Court rulings such as these, in which four parties were allowed to register for and contest the 2009 elections despite clearly failing to meet the requirements under the past election vote threshold from 2004, were also examples used by PDI-P representatives of “cheating” that rendered the past election vote threshold ineffective (interview with Laoly, November 2010).
to obtain seats if parties missed the 2.5% threshold. The differential for the small parties would have been minus 12.58%, rather than minus 18.31%, without the threshold.

Table 5.5 2009 Election Outcome: Changes from 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% 2009 Votes</th>
<th>% 2009 Seats</th>
<th>2009 Vote-Seat Differential</th>
<th>% Votes Gain/Loss</th>
<th>% Seats Gain/Loss</th>
<th>% 2009 Vote-Seat Differential Minus % 2004 Vote-Seat Differential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>20.81</td>
<td>26.43</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>13.36</td>
<td>16.25</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>18.93</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>-7.13</td>
<td>-4.16</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>14.01</td>
<td>16.79</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>-4.52</td>
<td>-3.03</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-1.42</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>-2.82</td>
<td>-3.76</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-5.62</td>
<td>-4.45</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (29)</td>
<td>18.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-18.31</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
<td>-9.09</td>
<td>-7.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2009 PD had the biggest increase in absolute vote-share, seat-share and differential between the two. The PD and Golkar were the biggest beneficiaries of the reforms made during the 2004-2009 period improving their vote-to-seat differential by almost 3, nearly twice the rate of improvement over the next biggest beneficiaries, the PDI-P and PKS. While the PD and PKS both improved their overall vote and seat shares, the PKS more modestly than the PD, Golkar and the PDI-P continued to decline in vote and seat share, representing two of the three largest drops in both. However, the four largest parties all benefitted from the new reforms relative to the gains they made in the translation of votes to seats in 2004.

The other biggest declines in terms of votes and seats were the PKB, which saw the size of its *fraksi* cut in half from 2004 but also reaped a modest benefit from the new vote-to-seat translation, and the PPP, which saw the size of its *fraksi* cut by 30% from 2004 and also
lost out from the new vote-to-seat translation. The PAN once again saw limited change in its vote-share but now appeared to be less of a beneficiary of the reforms than it had been in 2004 when only Golkar had benefited more from the new vote-to-seat ratio. The two newcomers managed to win larger vote-shares than any other new party besides the PD in 2004 but while Gerindra benefitted very slightly from the vote-to-seat translation Hanura, with more limited national appeal, did not.

Of the 17 parties from the 2004-2009 DPR only seven won seats in the 2009 general elections, along with two new entrants: Gerindra and Hanura. The 2.5% threshold eliminated six parties that would have claimed seats if the fixed entry limit were not in place: the PBB, PBR, PDS and PKPB from the 2004-2009 DPR, and two new entrants: the PKNU and the PRN. The remaining 23 parties would not have had had seats based on their district-level vote-shares, even if the 2.5% threshold had not been put into effect. Of the nine parties that won seats in the 2009-2014 legislature, Gerindra and Hanura were the smallest fraksi while the PDI-P and Golkar remained in the top three largest, joined by the PD; the four medium-sized parties remained relatively similar with the PKB switching groups with the PD to become the fourth medium-sized party along with the PKS, PPP and PAN. The three largest parties in 2009 collectively received 49.3% of the vote-share, while in 2004 those same three parties collectively received 47.6% of the vote-share; of the seven returning DPR parties the percentage of vote-share in 2004 was 80% while in 2009 it was 73.5%. This suggests that, while volatility in the system was quite high, voters primarily switched between the largest parties rather than to smaller or new parties.

The threshold had the effect of moderate seat consolidation among the top parties. While in 2004 the six largest parties – Golkar, PDI-P, PD, PKS, PPP and PKB – held 73.6%
of the votes and 81.3% of the seats, in 2009 the six largest parties – Golkar, PDI-P, PD, PKS, PPP and PAN – held 68.5% of the votes and 87.3% of the seats. What increased between 2004 and 2009 was the large number of wasted votes going to parties who failed to win any seats: 18.3% of votes were now cast for parties who could not receive a seat in any district even if it had a candidate who managed to win a full BPP on her/his own. The threshold also had the effect of reducing the effective BPP for the larger parties to qualify for largest remainder calculations since the BPP were calculated using the district’s vote totals for all parties qualifying for the national threshold, rather than the vote total of all parties competing in a given district.

Figure 5.1 Change in Vote Differential by Party Size

Figure 5.1 shows the variation grouped by party sizes, with small parties falling below 2.5% of the vote-share, medium parties falling between 2.5-10% of the vote-share, and
large parties falling above 10% of the vote-share. It is clear from the figure that while the medium-sized parties were the biggest beneficiaries in 2004, the large parties were the biggest beneficiaries in 2009 and the cost to small parties increases in 2009 from 2004. The legislative entry threshold eliminated all parties falling into the “small” category and so the small party category holds no seats in 2009, composed of 29 parties, up from 17 in 2004.

Figure 5.2 Average Party Magnitudes in 2009 Electoral Districts

In addition to the changes in differential, average party magnitude also dropped across the electoral districts as the average seat magnitude shrank and the number of competitors increased. In 2004, with sixty-nine electoral districts, the average party magnitude across the national electoral districts was 0.332. In 2009, with seventy-six electoral districts and a drop in district magnitude, the average party magnitude dropped to
0.191, indicating that it was less likely for any party to be able to win a seat in a given district compared to 2004. Figure 5.2 shows a map of party magnitude values including all parties in the system. Darker colors show a higher average party magnitude (>0.192), meaning fewer parties hold seats in that district relative to the district’s size, while lighter or no color shows lower average party magnitudes (<0.191). The inset in Figure 5.2 indicates average party magnitudes in the capital city, Jakarta.

Compared to Figure 4.2 in 2004 many districts are similarly high or low relative to the average party magnitude level of 0.191. Two particular aspects of average party magnitude change since 2004 are interesting to note. First is that subdivisions in particular districts, such as South Sulawesi, Riau, Banten and West Java (circled in red), have reduced the average party magnitude in the new districts, perhaps as a result of the larger number of seats available across the larger numbers of districts. Second is that some districts that had small party representation in the DPR, such as Papua and North Sumatra (circled in green), show increased average party magnitudes since some former representatives could not win seats due to the 2.5% threshold.

However, reducing to the subset of parties which made the threshold plus the seven who would have won at least one seat if not for the threshold gives an average party magnitude of 0.455, a higher figure than the average party magnitude in 2004. The larger number of less competitive parties in 2009 deflates the average party magnitude, causing some overestimation in the level of difficulty for competitive parties to win seats in 2009.

As in 2004, obtaining multiple seats in a district was a difficult feat, particularly with the increased number of parties competing. Only 28 times did a party win 3 or more seats in a single district, all by the PD, Golkar and PDI-P. A similar number of the seats were won as
the only seat a party took in a given district: 308 seats would go to a lone party representative from that district, compared with 301 in 2004. The reduction in the district magnitude ceiling from 12 to 10 resulted in few differences regarding the chances any given party had of winning 1, 2 or more seats. Yet, the elimination of parties failing to meet a 2.5% threshold resulted in two parties – Gerindra and Hanura – only obtaining single-seat districts. Unlike in 2004 when nine parties (53%) only won a single seat in every district where they obtained seats, in 2009 only two parties (22%) were unable to obtain multiple seats in any district. Thus the combination of the district magnitude reduction and adoption of a legislative entry threshold clearly increased disproportionality in the system (hypothesis 8).

Finally, in terms of the effect of the fully open lists, there are a number of outcomes that suggest how important this reform was to the changes within the party system. First, parties once again were not universally affected by the opening of the lists, with variance in the number of party-only votes cast across the nine legislative parties and variation in the frequency with which their voters chose out of list order in a way that elevated lower-ranked candidates. Second, in confirmation of scholarly literature demonstrating that voters often choose in order when presented with a ranked list, a majority of candidates listed in the first list position won seats while fewer than 10% of the winning candidates were ranked 4-12. Third, the high level of turnover and infrequency with which incumbents won re-election when placed in the first position on the lists of major parties suggest that strategies of relocating party loyalists to different districts where the party expected to win seats would be more difficult to pursue if voters were unwilling to vote for transplanted elites with no constituency ties. Table 5.6 offers some descriptive statistics about the election of the 2009-2014 DPR cohort.
### Table 5.6 Successful Candidates Under the Fully-Open Lists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Vote Totals</td>
<td>50462</td>
<td>6005 (Hanura)</td>
<td>327097 (PD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td>149470</td>
<td>86864 (West Papua)</td>
<td>230772 (West Java 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD Candidates</td>
<td>55544</td>
<td>10045</td>
<td>327097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar Candidates</td>
<td>54771</td>
<td>20378</td>
<td>218991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P Candidates</td>
<td>58256</td>
<td>12231</td>
<td>242504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS Candidates</td>
<td>44904</td>
<td>17487</td>
<td>119287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN Candidates</td>
<td>44482</td>
<td>11481</td>
<td>157651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP Candidates</td>
<td>43688</td>
<td>9094</td>
<td>127585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB Candidates</td>
<td>46177</td>
<td>7133</td>
<td>90092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra Candidates</td>
<td>27916</td>
<td>9168</td>
<td>118443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura Candidates</td>
<td>26171</td>
<td>6005</td>
<td>100465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Candidates over minimum BPP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Candidates over maximum BPP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Candidates over average BPP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Candidates over minimum BPP (2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite objections by both parties to open lists in theory, in practice neither the PDI-P nor PKS really had trouble with incumbent re-election or those with high list placement winning their seats. Among the major parties the PAN and Golkar won the largest number of “out-of-order” seats and the only winning candidates below position #7 on the lists; Golkar also had the lowest incumbent re-election rate of the largest parties. The PPP, PKB, Gerindra and Hanura typically had their top positioned candidates elected, while the PD had a large number of candidates elected beyond position #1 but due largely to the increase in the party’s seat-share – most of the PD candidates were elected in relative list order.

There is limited evidence to suggest that openness of the lists affected the party system in terms of seat-share, at least not when comparing the outcome to the simultaneous introduction of a legislative entry threshold. However, the threshold clearly had an effect on the number of parties yet did not actually reduce the effective number of parties (hypothesis 7a). In contrast, it is plausible to suggest that the vote totals for individual candidates in some districts, especially in the nine legislative parties, did boost the number of seats.
allocated to those specific parties in those districts. As such, there is some support for the relationship between candidate-centricity and an increase in party system fragmentation (hypothesis 7b), though the result is helped by the simultaneous effect of the threshold.

**Counterfactual Analysis: How Much Impact did the Reforms Have?**

In terms of the effects of the threshold on the size of the party system and the amount of wasted votes in the 2009 elections, Figure 5.3 shows how the 2.5% threshold eliminated parties which would otherwise have won a handful of seats. In only Papua, in the darkest color at the far eastern side of the map, would multiple small parties have won seats, 2 of the ten in the district would have gone to the PDS and the Patriot Party (*Partai Patriot*).

Figure 5.3 Small Party Seats without 2.5% Threshold
The remaining thirteen small party seats would have been distributed among the PBB (3 seats), PDS (4 seats), PKDI (1 seat), PKNU (4 seats) and PPRN (1 seat). The small parties would have won seats in quite predictable locations: the PBB in West Java, West Nusa Tenggara and South Sulawesi with their more conservative Muslim populations; the PDS in North Sumatra, North Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara district 2 with their large Christian populations; the PKDI in East Nusa Tenggara district 1 with its large Catholic population; and the PKNU in East Java districts where NU membership is highly concentrated but leadership is fragmented.

With the 2.5% threshold the nine legislative parties won a collective 81.9% of the vote-share, with 18.3% of votes “wasted” on parties which did not receive any seats; without the threshold there would have been fifteen legislative parties winning a collective 88.47% of the vote-share, with 11.53% of the votes “wasted” on parties which would not have received any seats. This means that the threshold itself only accounts for an additional 6.77% of wasted votes in 2009 (but by itself supports hypothesis 8).

Table 5.7  Seat Distributions at Different Levels of the Legislative Entry Threshold

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2.5% Threshold</th>
<th>5% Threshold</th>
<th>No Threshold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>+22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKNU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKDI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriot</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPRN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.7 shows the breakdown of potential outcomes in the elections, given the exact formula for seat distribution regardless of the level of the threshold. The second column shows the actual outcome of the elections by seat-share among the nine parties meeting the 2.5% threshold. If the threshold had been higher, for example 5%, three additional parties would have been eliminated: Hanura, Gerindra and the PKB. Seats would have been redistributed among the remaining six parties as listed in the third column. Without a threshold seats would have been redistributed according to the allocation formula among the fifteen parties according to the fourth column.

The final figures suggest that retaining the 2004 system would have made a significant difference, as only twelve of the 560 DPR members won more than 100% of the BPP in their district and all were from PD, Golkar, PDI-P and PAN. An additional 242 DPR members would have fallen into the 30-99% BPP category of the pre-court ruling law, and of those DPR members 234 would have won based on their ordered list rankings and which other candidates from their party met the requirement of 30-99% in their district and 8 would not have won a seat under the pre-court ruling system. Of the remaining 306 DPR representatives who did not win at least 30% BPP in individual votes, 235 were listed in high enough ordered positions and would have been allocated their party’s seats in their districts and 71 would not have won a seat under the pre-court ruling system. Thus, 78 (13.9%) of the 2009-2014 DPR members who were elected under the fully open list system would not have won seats under the system of partially-open lists prior to the Court’s ruling.

Among the legislative parties there was again variation in individual candidate votes. Table 5.8 shows the range of the party’s representatives winning seats under the different BPP thresholds debated, adopted and implemented. Only the seven legislative parties from
2004-2009 had candidates selected out of list order under the fully open lists, as Hanura and Gerindra both only had the top-listed candidate win in all districts where they won any seats. Of the seven parties with candidates being chosen out of order, at 11 (25.6%) of its DPR representatives the PAN had the highest proportion, followed by PKB (19.2%), PD (18.6%), PPP (16.2%), Golkar (15.9%), and the PDI-P (13.7%). With only one (1.8%) of its seat-winning candidates chosen out of party list order, the PKS had the lowest rate among the seven parties.

As Table 5.8 also notes, only four parties had candidates winning at least 100% BPP in their district – the requirement for an individual to win a seat out of list order in 2004 – the PAN, PDI-P, Golkar and PD. Eight of those candidates winning more than their district’s BPP were listed in the first position by their parties in their respective districts, while four (two from Golkar and one each from PDI-P and PD) were listed in positions 2-3. In contrast to 2004 when the highest individual vote winner, Hidayat Nur Wahid, won his seat with 262,019 votes (113% BPP in Jakarta district 2) listed by the PKS in ordered position #1, the 2009 election’s single highest individual vote winner, SBY’s son Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, won 327,097 votes (177% BPP in East Java district 7) listed by the PD in ordered position #3.

Table 5.8 Individual Candidate Votes by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
<th>&lt;30% BPP</th>
<th>30-99%BPP</th>
<th>100+% BPP</th>
<th>Highest BPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>106.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>151.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>149.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>177%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In general, the introduction of the legislative entry threshold and openness of the lists had large effects on individuals and parties but little overall effect on the effective number of parties represented in the DPR. A difference of fifteen seats due to the threshold and redistribution within the parties of seats to candidates listed out of order suggest limitations of the effect of the reforms in this election outcome. However, if the threshold is once again increased as there has been a push to do, and parties that can capitalize on candidate-centric elections begin to sprout up and win seats in 2014, we will have a better sense of the longer-term effects of these reforms which are difficult to rollback.

Conclusion

In the 2009 elections the district magnitude reduction had a limited impact on parties in the system due to how small the change really was. However, the electoral threshold had the effect of eliminating seven parties who would otherwise have won seats and the open lists had the effect of shaking up many party list orders, electing 75% legislative newcomers to the 2009-2014 DPR. To assess the impact of the open lists on experienced party leaders one need look no further than the 2004-2009 Special Committee of Commission 2: despite being listed first by their parties, Chairman Fery Mursyidan Baldan of Golkar and Vice-chair Andi Yuliani Paris of PAN both lost to lower-ranked candidates in their districts. Though there was variation in the degree to which the reforms affected the different parties, the effects tended to be larger and more widespread in 2009 than in 2004; small parties were clearly all affected but none of the medium or large parties escaped the effects of the changes either.

The elimination of the small parties and increasing proportion of wasted votes were due only partly to the implementation of the legislative entry threshold, and were also related
to the second round of district magnitude reduction. Without the threshold fifteen seats (less than 3%) would have gone to small parties; in 2004 there were 39 of 550 seats (more than 7%) which would have gone to small parties had a 2.5% threshold been implemented. In sum, while the threshold did its part to truncate the size of the system and keep seven additional parties from gaining 1-4 seats each, in practice there were far fewer total seats that would have been allocated to parties who missed the threshold.

While the party system size did reduce, the effective number of parties actually moderately increased once again, from 8 to 9. This time, however, the distribution of seats among the legislative parties resulted in three clearly large parties which each held substantially greater numbers of seats than the remaining six parties. With respect to the presidential elections, only these three parties were even in the ballpark of the required percentage of votes or seats needed to run their own tickets and only PD was able to run a ticket without an additional party involved. Golkar and the PDI-P both failed to meet the 20% vote-share or 25% seat-share requirement alone. Golkar was forced to add Hanura, with Wiranto as Kalla’s running mate, and the PDI-P was forced to add Gerindra, with Prabowo as Megawati’s running mate. The lack of small parties with only a handful of seats meant that now the smallest medium-sized parties faced the reality that they would be the next in line to miss an increased threshold and would certainly have to form a coalition with other medium-sized parties in order to run a presidential-vice presidential ticket. The smaller and medium parties now worried about looming discussions of the legislative entry threshold being implemented at the local level as well, since many received seats at the provincial and municipal levels where the threshold did not apply in 2009.
Finally, within parties dynamics had shifted with the fully open lists. Party leaders faced the uncertainty of retaining discipline and control both within the party and their *fraksi* in the DPR. General voter following of the lists were blamed on the late change in the electoral rules but it was unclear that voters necessarily would have chosen differently otherwise: ballots contained sometimes hundreds of names with thirty-eight parties and up to twelve names per party list in the largest districts. Broader concerns about voter education and popularity contests loomed as the voting drew to a close and discussion of the next round of revisions to the general election law began in early 2010.

One of the most important conclusions to draw from the 2007-8 reform period was the increasing reliance of individual legislators and candidates on bypassing the legislative process and challenging the final law at the Constitutional Court. This finding, which mirrors the increased number of challenges to actual election results in the post-2004 environment, has two possible root causes. First, the laws themselves were not well-written, prompting the need for judicial review to clear up confusion and contradictory clauses. This has been a major reason commonly cited by the Court when it justifies hearing highly-politicized cases. Second, the Court is becoming more politicized as a result of the appointment process, which allows the party members and legislators to become appointees and to bypass the legislative process, too. If court involvement continues to affect the electoral reform process to such a high degree, it will be worthwhile to speculate whether this is simply an Indonesia-specific phenomenon or whether this is a more widespread issue. However, it is unclear what general prediction might be made about Court proclivities on issues like proportionality and/or party-versus-candidate control.

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121 I interpret this finding from the wording of the Court’s ruling on the list openness.
Chapter 6: Quantitative Analysis

A general framework of understanding electoral reform is by no means a panacea by which all reform at any time in any place can necessarily be explained. Rather, the framework and causal mechanisms presented in the previous chapters serve as a bridge between existing theories, the numerous cases in which the scholarly literature and history have demonstrated the limits of the predictive capacity of existing theories, and a new direction for this study and future research to fill in the gaps. Previous studies, particularly of individual cases or small-N comparisons, often confirmed the importance of strategic choice logic in the decision-making of reformers but found limited statistical support. The following analyses make an attempt to systematize complementary explanations to seat-maximizing models, while confirming the importance of strategic explanations in the process of electoral reform.

Previously-established theory about seat-maximization generated expectations that more inclusive reforms would result from rising party uncertainty (hypothesis 1), while alternative motivations suggested that more inclusive reforms would result from rising disproportionality (hypothesis 2). Through the case study in chapters 4 & 5 I unpacked two additional factors that affect the reform process and outcomes adopted: the relative strength of medium and large-sized parties which can affect perceptions of what seat-maximizing outcomes actually are for individual parties, and ratchet effects as they impact potential later-round reform choices and outcomes. The first factor led to expectations that declining medium-sized party seat-shares would result in less inclusive reforms (hypothesis 3a) and more candidate-centric reforms (hypothesis 3b), while decreasing medium-sized parties’
vote-to-seat differentials would lead to the adoption of more inclusive reforms (hypothesis 4). The second factor led to expectations that reforms become more seat-maximizing in later periods of reform (hypothesis 5), particularly when early reform periods occur during democratic consolidation and reformers become more strategic over time. Additionally, ratchet effects increase the likelihood of less inclusive (hypothesis 6a) and more candidate-centric (hypothesis 6b) reforms when such reforms were adopted in the previous inter-electoral period, though both face limits on the level to which they can reform.

A second set of expectations also hypothesized about the effects of electoral reforms. I expect that both more inclusive (hypothesis 7a) and candidate-centric (hypothesis 7b) reforms will result in increased party system fragmentation, that more inclusive reforms should produce a decrease in disproportionality within the party system (hypothesis 8). Finally, reforms of either type in either direction should increase the level of electoral volatility in the system (hypothesis 9). I list all expectations about the causes and effects of electoral reform in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Hypotheses of the Causes and Effects of Electoral Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicting Causes of Electoral Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Predicting Effects of Electoral Reform**

| H7a | More inclusive reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation while less inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation. |
| H7b | Candidate-centric reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation while party-centric reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation. |
| H8  | More inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in disproportionality while less inclusive reforms will produce an increase in disproportionality. |
| H9  | Any inter- or intra-party reform adoption will produce an increase in electoral volatility in the post-reform election. |

I will now offer a systematic method and measurements for how to replicate these factors in large-N hypothesis tests, suggesting a specific range – 10-20% of legislative seat-share – to serve as a generalizable range of what constitutes a “medium-sized” party given the general parameters of the party systems in the current dataset as well as a broader context to countries not included in this dataset. I will also offer suggestions for incorporating these additional factors into future case studies. To test the hypotheses listed in Table 6.1 and to evaluate the overall contributions of the expanded framework I have built an original dataset that includes cases of democratic electoral reform from 34 countries. Here I first summarize the dataset, complete with explanation of the methodological additions and improvements this data offers over previous datasets. I then describe previous models and/or the revisions and additions to those models as they relate to the previously introduced hypotheses, followed by the presentation of the results and analysis. I conclude the chapter with a
discussion of the benefits of unpacking the process of electoral reform in terms of more accurately projecting reform outcomes.

**The Dataset**

The dataset constructed for this analysis is composed of 34 countries. The cases were selected for their inclusion on the basis of: a) being part of a set already evaluated for reform propensity and outcome, and b) having at least some episode of reform during the 1950-2010 time period. Reforms discussed in the ensuing analysis only include changes made to the structure of elections to the lower house of the legislature; there are no changes that focus on executive or upper house elections. The primary sources for case selection come from Shugart and Wattenburg (2001), Birch et al. (2002), Remmer (2008), and Renwick (2010). I use cases from established sources of reform for two reasons. First, in order to closely replicate previous findings and to establish the utility of my expanded dataset and causal variables, I need to use the most similar set of cases I can find relative to previous studies. Second, there is little question that the cases in these studies all qualify to some degree as recognized cases of electoral reform.

Though I exclude some of these cases, I do so for very specific reasons when they clearly do not qualify as comparable cases for this analysis. All cases from these four sources are included except for two from Shugart and Wattenberg and one from Remmer. Israel is not included because it is a case of reform of the method for electing the executive while my hypotheses are all focused on legislative electoral reform. Hungary is not included because its reforms occurred prior to the first free and fair election, making it is more a case of electoral engineering than reform of a system used to democratically elect the members.
reforming it. Panama is not included because its only electoral reform fails to meet Lijphart’s threshold for a sufficiently “large” electoral reform, a distinction I address in the next section.

Additionally, I include one case not analyzed in one of these four primary sources: Indonesia. The reason for its inclusion is that it is clearly a case with (multiple) electoral reforms, as demonstrated by the previous case study analysis, while its exclusion from the previous studies is likely due to very specific factors: it is not a mixed-electoral system (the Shugart and Wattenberg cases), it is not in Eastern Europe (the Birch et al.’s cases), it is not in Latin America (Remmer’s cases) and it is not an advanced industrial democracy (Renwick’s cases). Other cases of reform or, in most instances, failed reform are not discussed at length in the manuscript or included in the dataset, such as the failed referendum in the UK in 2011. Since I do not include cases without at least one qualifying electoral reform during the 1950 to 2010 period, many of the cases in Colomer’s study would not fit this criteria and so his dataset is not part of the basis for case selection (Colomer 2005). The cases and observation periods are listed in Table 6.2.

The reason for selecting only cases in which at least one reform episode occurred is two-fold. First, it is misleading to suggest that electoral reform is possible in any country under any circumstances. The scholarly literature has demonstrated numerous constraints on the possibility, let alone the propensity, to reform. Such explanations range from large numbers of veto players to high barriers to the amendment of constitutions, among other concerns. As such, this does not represent selection bias on the dependent variable by excluding countries simply because they have never achieved reform; there may in fact be some particular institutional aspect of their political system that prohibits reform. This is not
to suggest that reform must always be possible but rather must not always be impossible: I assume that if no reform ever occurs that it may be impossible to democratically reform.

Table 6.2 Cases and Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Elections Included</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Elections Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A List of observations does not include the elections prior to the first listed, though data for these prior elections were collected in order to calculate lagged and over-time variables.

B The French, Italian, Japanese and New Zealand data panels ideally should begin earlier to establish longer patterns of inter-party competition but the raw election return data was unavailable for calculation.

The second reason is that it is difficult to know the exact circumstances and processes of reform debates that never produced reform in countries that are not included in the dataset.

Perhaps many countries entertain the notion of reform but do not pursue it for various
strategic, ideological and/or institutional reasons. While this is not an exhaustive list of electoral reforms across time, by selecting cases in which reform has occurred at least once but span geographic and temporal distance there is some commonality (at least one episode of reform in the dependent variable per case, and many episodes in which the dependent variable is ‘no reform’) and some contextual and structural diversity (i.e. neighbors, international influences, economic crises and development levels, transition mode, and demographics, to name just a few).

Since I conceptualize reform episodes as “nested” within countries, and include countries with examples of both reform adoption and non-reform, I then turn to the choice of appropriate criteria for coding observations. For theoretical and methodological reasons each observation is based on a single inter-electoral period rather than sporadic reform episodes or annual data. Because each observation is based on a time period covering two sets of elections, the dataset contains at minimum two elections for each country spanning at minimum ten years of democratic rule. In addition, data from multiple electoral periods is needed to calculate lagged variables and variables designed specifically to measure some aspect of change over time. Each country is coded from the election period (see Appendix C for the extended codebook with more detailed explanation of the process of coding observations) prior to the adoption of its first reform through the last election up until 2009. For most countries observations actually begin more than ten years prior to the first reform whenever data was available since multiple prior elections are necessary in order to construct the lagged and time-change variables which actually begin two elections prior to the electoral reform observation period. The dataset does not cover electoral periods prior to

122 See Appendix C for descriptions of the three exceptions to the pre-2010 rule: Russia, Thailand and Venezuela.
1947, even though in the New Zealand case an unbroken string of democratic elections began well before the first observation in that data panel.

Given that the overwhelming majority of election reform processes happen only once during an inter-election cycle – and indeed, it would seem less useful to measure reform as an outcome or precursor to party system change if the reform did not happen in the election following its adoption – this method of coding observations as single inter-election periods makes theoretical sense. In addition, given the number of variables of interest which remain constant during the course of an inter-electoral period, this method of coding each inter-electoral cycle naturally avoids methodological concerns that arise from lack of variation on multiple independent variables for multiple observations in which there is also no change on the dependent variable. Rather than code observations annually, during which there is no or little variation on the majority of variables in the model for years at a time, or coding blocks of time in 3, 5 or 10 years, which either suffer from the same lack of variation in short lengths or fail to capture electoral change in the longer periods, the practice of coding by inter-electoral cycle avoids both methodological complications and substantive concerns about matching the statistical model to the theoretical question.

**Electoral Reform as the Dependent Variable**

For the first set of hypotheses about the causes of reform, the adoption of inter- or intra-party reform is the outcome being predicted. Both of these outcomes are defined by movement along the axes of the two dimensions of electoral reform in Figure 2.1. Each observation is assigned one of three possible values for each of the two dimensions: a

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123 The reason for establishing the coding process is only of particular importance here since it is a distinct method from previous studies which use annual time-series data and thus cannot be perfectly replicated due to the difference in the structure of the time-series data panels.
baseline category representing no movement along an axis, a category representing positive movement along an axis, and a category representing negative movement along an axis. In substantive terms this means that, for each of the two dimensions, a country in any one reform period can be doing only one of three things: no reform or reforms that cancel out “movement” toward a different system, reform toward greater interparty inclusivity or party-centric control, or reform toward less interparty inclusivity or candidate-centric control.

In coding the outcome of inter- and intra-party reform I rely on the types and levels of change during a given observation. The interparty dimension reform is measured categorically, with a score of 1 representing more inclusive (i.e. more proportional) reform, a score of 0 representing no reform, and a score of -1 representing less inclusive (i.e. more majoritarian) reform. Examples of reform that fall into the ‘more inclusive’ category include a large increase in average district magnitude, a large increase in the overall size of the legislative lower chamber, and adoption of a national constituency district in addition to the already existing non-national districts. Examples of reforms in the ‘less inclusive’ category include introduction or substantial raise of a legislative entry threshold, large reduction in average district magnitude, and a large reduction in the overall size of the legislative lower chamber. A score of no reform is given to countries that do not adopt any

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124 This copies the basic coding scheme followed by Remmer (2008), which was necessary in order to replicate her analysis. In addition, since the categories are not related in an ordered way, for the multinomial logit it does not matter what numeric values are assigned to the more and less inclusive categories. See Appendix C for additional details on the exact coding rules.

125 “Inclusive” refers to legislative inclusivity, rather than inclusion into the electoral competition.

126 Large district magnitude results in more proportional distribution of seats.

127 Theoretically, the larger the legislative chamber the more seats are available for distribution and potentially the larger district magnitude can be.

128 This has the effect of creating a district of relatively large magnitude which can increase small party seat chances.
revisions to existing electoral structures or only make minor changes such as a very small reduction or increase in average district magnitude.

The intraparty dimension of reform is also measured categorically, with a score of 1 representing more party-centric reform, a score of 0 representing no reform, and a score of -1 representing more candidate-centric reform. Examples of reforms that fall into the party-centric category include the removal of candidate-oriented ballots so voters could only cast votes for parties, or a large addition of entry barriers to independent candidates to register for and win elections. Examples of reforms that fall into the candidate-centric category include provisions for voters to be able to cast party and/or specific party candidate votes on their ballots, such as in an open list PR system, or a reduction in entry barriers to independent candidates to register for and win elections. A score of no reform is given to countries that do not adopt revisions to existing electoral structures or only make minor changes such as a slight alteration in independent candidate registration for elections.

While there are examples in the literature of more itemized (Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001) indicators of inter- and intraparty structures, there are particular reasons to use the tripartite measure just described with respect to studying reform along the two dimensions. First, more fine-grained methods of indexing the range of possible system outcomes does provide sensitivity in the starting and/or ending point of the reform process, and potentially lends itself to sensitive measurement of the amount of change from one time point to another. However, existing indices tend to involve a rank-ordering of system types to devise the final measurement for each country, and so change from pre- to post-reform periods may take into account not simply how much change occurs in an individual country but across countries in the sample as well. Furthermore, such indices

129 See fn. 124 and Appendix C for explanation of the tripartite coding scheme.
include measures such as voter identification of parties, which relate more to attributes or strengths of the actors in the system than the competition rules that govern their inclusion.

In addition, in attempting to understand the adoption of some packages of reforms versus alternatives through an analysis of actor-centric motivations, measuring the exact amount of difference in the pre-reform and post-reform systems may obscure a range of reforms that occur more naturally through redistricting in the event of population change, etc, which may not require negotiation between parties but simple recalculation of distribution formula. As the research question here does not revolve around the final product so much as the process of reform itself, and since I expect there to be a good deal of negotiating over details of reform, the exact index-measured distance from the pre- to post-reform system is less important than the directionality of the change. Thus I focus more on measuring whether reform occurs, and the general direction of change, rather than the specific change.

In terms of each dimension, I follow slightly different rules for what categorically shifts an observation from 0 to 1 or -1. I adhere to Lijphart’s requirements for the amount of change in a range of categories on the interparty dimension: changes in electoral formula, increase in district magnitude of at least 20%, increase in electoral threshold of at least 20%, and increase in assembly size of at least 20% (Lijphart 1994: 13). On one of Lijphart’s requirements, that 20% of seats must be affected by the change, do I diverge and use the requirement of Massicotte and Blais (1999: 345) of 5% seats affected by the changes, in order to account for shifts to mixed electoral systems. However, I do not provide an ordering for changes aggregated across that range of categories, a change in any of the requirements counts as a category shift from 0 to 1 or -1. In other words, it does not matter if a case exhibits sufficient change in one, two or three categories; so long as it meets the

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130 This actually follows a coding scheme exception set forth by Renwick (2011).
minimum requirement of change in at least one category it receives a code of 1 or -1 on interparty reform. Most cases do not exhibit change in more than one category at any one reform period, suggesting limited explanatory power of an ordered scale. In qualitative assessments of the Indonesian case the more fine-grained detail of change in multiple categories of interparty reform were assessed, but for the quantitative analysis I only use the 1, 0, -1 values.

On the intraparty dimension, which has not previously been evaluated as the dependent variable in a multi-case quantitative analysis, I largely follow the three-level change of ballot components used by Carey and Shugart (1995) and Shugart and Wattenberg (2001). Intraparty changes may occur in shifts between types of balloting: voters may not “disturb” lists submitted by party leaders (i.e. closed list), voters may “disturb” lists submitted by party leaders (i.e. semi- to fully-open list), leaders do not control access to ballots or rank (i.e. independent candidacy, primaries, etc) (Carey and Shugart 1995: 421). I follow Renwick’s coding scheme where the minimum required change is at least 20% voter preferences that can alter party list ordering (Renwick 2011). Once again, I do not provide an ordering for changes aggregated across the components; so long as a case meets the minimum requirement of change in at least one component it receives a code of 1 or -1 on intraparty reform. In qualitative assessments of the Indonesian case I addressed different aspects of the causes and effects of intraparty reform, but for the quantitative analysis I only use the 1, 0, -1 values.

131 Both of these intraparty measurements are created to assess intraparty “efficiency” and allow for variation in pooling votes across segments of mixed-electoral system ballots and districts. I do not include those elements here because they change less frequently within systems and because they are included by the authors to assess specific elements of the intraparty dimension that do not matter for this evaluation. Ballot structure here is the most important factor, and so I confine my coding scheme to changes in balloting procedure and selection.

132 As most of these changes tend to be fairly extreme, e.g. shift from closed list to fully open, reducing the level of 20% voter preference would only affect two cases in the coding.
In the dataset, in terms of interparty reform there are 33 observations of more inclusive reform, 20 observations of less inclusive reform, and 5 observations where reforms adopted are of both more and less inclusive nature. In terms of intraparty reform there are 13 observations of more candidate-centric reform and 17 observations of more party-centric reform. Appendix B offers a full list of the reforms, by case and observation, included in the dataset. While not a comprehensive picture of all reforms undertaken by these cases for the duration of the individual country data panels, this represents the most comprehensive list of reforms, per the qualifications laid out in the coding rules, that I could find for the sample of cases included in the dataset. Language skills and document availability limited any additional reform coding.

Independent Variables

To estimate the effects of seat-maximizing logic, the literature has predominantly used the proxy of party system size, measured by the effective number of parties by either vote-share or seat-share, to assess rising or declining uncertainty and dominance of the largest parties in a given party system. I follow that literature here and code party system size via Laakso and Taagepera’s calculation for the effective number of parties by vote-share (ENPV) and seat-share (ENPS) (Laakso and Taagepera 1989). I also include lagged values for prior elections and calculate the value of change between one election and the next coded by vote-share (Change ENPV) and seat-share (Change ENPS). For additional details on the formula used to code independent variables, see the extended codebook in Appendix C.

133 My coding of electoral reform outcomes closely mirrors Remmer (2008) and Renwick (2010), and I use the same general categories of the various authors in Shugart and Wattenberg (2001). I primarily use their sources to triangulate my own reading of election laws and regulations, so there should be few divergences in the coding of reforms adopted. There are a few exceptions where I have altered or used alternate levels of change as robustness checks for subsets of the data.
The second set of additional party system variables relates to the hypotheses generated by the Indonesian case study. The motivations of the medium-sized and largest parties in the Indonesian case study proved to be quite important. As the proportion of medium-sized party seat-share increased, the largest parties attempted to push through less inclusive reform mechanisms to eliminate small parties, and likely to raise the bar for medium parties. I hypothesize a similar effect to test in the large-N analysis, though I use a much higher threshold for what constitutes a medium-sized party than in the Indonesian case. I code two medium-sized party variables in the dataset: 1) the seat-share held by all parties with 10-20% each of the seat-share (MPS); and 2) the proportion of parties with 10-20% of the seat-share (Medium Parties). The reason for choosing the 10-20% range is that 20% typically represents a small enough legislative block to lack the ability to push forward an agenda unaided but 10% of seats is large enough to represent a significant portion of the population’s vote. I run these in place of the traditional and alternate models listed above, usually as lagged variables to represent medium-sized party seat-shares during the period of electoral reform. I also calculate change between seat-shares and proportion of medium-sized parties from one election to the next.

Additionally, the disproportionality in translating votes to seats is used as a latent proxy for ideological leanings. In theory, when disproportionality is relatively high the allocation formulae from votes to seats distributes those seats disproportionately relative to vote-share. Ideologically-motivated elites seeking to make the system “more representative” are more likely to pursue electoral reform of seat allocation formulae that more closely or accurately translates votes into seats. As such, I use the Gallagher Index (Gallagher 1991) to calculate a value of disproportionality (Disproportionality) for each observation, as well as
including lagged values and values measuring the change in disproportionality from election period to election period. For details on calculating disproportionality, see Appendix C.

To test whether disproportionality matters more depending on which parties are the beneficiaries of the vote-to-seat translations, I also include a measure for the disproportionality calculated only for the medium-sized parties \((\text{Disproportionality Medium-Sized})\), measured using the 10-20% seat-share range. I calculate this variable in order to test my expectations about divergent preferences within the party system depending on parties’ beliefs about whether they do or will benefit from pursuing certain reforms as motivated by seat-maximization. I calculate this variable the same way as the \text{Disproportionality} measure but simply calculate for only the vote and seat differentials for the medium-sized parties. I also include the lagged values.

Finally, the level of overall uncertainty (sometimes referred to as instability) in the electoral and party systems are often measured in the literature via two proxies: vote-share volatility and seat-share volatility. Volatility is calculated according to the Pedersen Index (Pedersen 1979) for both the aggregate change in votes from one election to the next \((\text{Vote Volatility})\) and the aggregate change in seats from one elected legislature to the next \((\text{Seat Volatility})\), as well as including lagged values and values measuring the change in volatility from inter-election period to inter-election period. For additional details on calculating volatility, see Appendix C.

As the observations are temporally defined as inter-election periods, for the sake of theoretical and methodological simplicity all party and electoral system variables are
assumed to be static between elections.\textsuperscript{134} Therefore I do not recalculate party system size, disproportionality or volatility levels for during-period change in seat-share due to resignations, appointments, removals or any other event that may produce a small change in the relative seat-share of parties or independent legislators. In the event of complete government collapse or crisis of confidence, most legislatures in the dataset would simply hold new elections via rules designed for just such a purpose, and so a new observation would begin anyway. For a discussion of methodological and theoretical justifications for inter-election codes, see Appendix C.

To test the hypothesized effect of new democracy on the dependent variables I include a measure of the age of democracy. The measure is calculated by subtracting the commonly accepted year of transition from the year of observation, rather than subtracting the year that a country’s score on a measure such as the Polity scale or the Freedom House index designated the country as “democratic” or “free.” The measure and each panel do not include breaks in a country’s democracy (i.e. a full-scale lapse or coup that results in years of undemocratic elections following the transition), and so in the case of Russia, Thailand and Venezuela their data panels end early.\textsuperscript{135} Values are given in years while logged values are included to account for the five more established democracies (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand), particularly the case of New Zealand which is the only case with an unbroken series of democratic elections beginning prior to the twentieth century. In some models the age of democracy is replaced by a dummy variables for the wave in which a

\textsuperscript{134} I recognize that many legislative replacements may occur due to death, appointments, corruption or other removal mechanisms, but there are too many cases to code for these and replacements often still come from the same party so these should not affect the aggregate measures of party system size, etc.

\textsuperscript{135} See Appendix C for a discussion of ending the Russian, Thai and Venezuelan panels before 2010.
country experienced its democratic transition: 1\textsuperscript{st} wave pre-1949, 2\textsuperscript{nd} wave post-World War II, 3\textsuperscript{rd} wave post-1978.

\textit{Control Variables}

Most models related to causes and consequences of party system change include control variables measuring economic growth and/or stability. Since I am measuring the effects of said institutions they are not included as controls, and I include a range of economic control variables to make certain that economic change, crisis or performance are simply driving party system change as opposed to the effects of institutional change (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). The first, and most traditionally used, is a measure of the rate of growth of a country’s GDP per capita. The second is a measure of the unemployment rate, as a percentage of the total working age population. The third is a measure of urbanization, as a percentage of the total population living in urban areas of more than 1 million inhabitants. The values of the controls are all obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, an annual time-series of hundreds of economic and labor indicators. Typically models do not include all of these measures, with the GDP per capita as the variable reported in the analyses below. I also include dummy variables for geographic region (Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Western Europe).

In addition, since the observations are coded in a periodic manner, rather than in annual or event-based data panels, I include a control for the length of each inter-election period measured in months, beginning from the month immediately following the election in time $t$ until the month of the election in time $t+I$. That measurement is used as the inter-election period length (\textit{Election Period Length}) for the observation at time $t+I$. The length
ranges from 6 to 76 months but nearly a majority (47%) fall between 40-54 months (~3.5-4.5 years), with only nine elections occurring within 24 months of the previous election and only six (three in Italy alone) occurring past 60 months after the previous election. A yearly measurement proved extremely insensitive so monthly data are used since the range does not cover too large or non-normal a distribution, with most observations falling between 24 and 60 months making it difficult to justify annual or logged data on the temporal control.

Table 6.3. Dataset Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age of Democracy (Year)</td>
<td>28.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged Age of Democracy</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Period Length (Month)</td>
<td>43.27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Volatility (EV)</td>
<td>33.69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Volatility (SV)</td>
<td>33.95</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Number of Parties by Vote-share (ENPV)</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Number of Parties by Seat-share (ENPS)</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>10.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ENPV</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-16.47^A</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ENPS</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-10.62</td>
<td>7.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionality</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>37.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Disproportionality</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-30.5</td>
<td>29.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GDP per capita</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>14.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>63.58</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td>89.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-sized Parties’ Seat-share (MPS)</td>
<td>19.85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Medium-sized Legislative Parties (Medium Parties)</td>
<td>36.81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Medium-sized Parties’ Seat-share (Change MPS)</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-73.48</td>
<td>84.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Proportion of Medium-sized Legislative Parties (Change Medium Parties)</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>-60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionality Medium-Sized Parties</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>8.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^A For the minimum value of the change in ENPV, which is significantly larger than the largest value of ENPV in the dataset, the change value comes from the 1990 Romanian election which produced a party system size of 21.99 ENPV but is not included in the descriptive statistics because the 1990 Romanian elections are not part of the qualifying observations. Removal of this outlier of change in EPNV only moves the mean value to -0.04, for a change of 0.1.
To summarize, Table 6.3 lists the descriptive statistics of all independent and control variables included in any of the statistical models. Lagged variables are not listed but the values of the variables measuring change over time in a variable category, such as change in ENPV from one election to another, are given. Details about each reform in each case are listed, along with the categorical reform codes, in Appendix B. Full descriptions of coding rules, formulas used for calculations of indices, exceptional cases and notable outliers are available in Appendix C, as well as detailed descriptions how exceptions and outliers affected particular model specifications. The dataset, unlike some previous datasets, constructs all measurements from raw data of each party’s votes or seats resulting from a given election and attempts to do so using uniform election reporting or by cross-validating data sources. By using consistent calculations for all observations this removes some of the bias that might arise from aggregating values from different sources. A full list of sources for the raw party-level election results and seat allocations, as well as data and information about the electoral reforms adopted, are listed by each country in Appendix D; as previously mentioned all control variables relating to economic performance come from the World Bank. All models were run using Stata9 and specific models are listed where applicable in the following analyses.

Models

In order to consistently test previous models of reform by replicating them as closely as possible I begin with a multinomial logistic regression model to test the causes of interparty reform outcomes.\textsuperscript{136} The basic model is as follows:

\textsuperscript{136} The basic model is a replication of the formula used by Remmer, minus the “year” control variable since my estimation is based on periodic, rather than annual, data. I only replicate Colomer’s model in Appendix E.
Reform = Lagged Party System Size + Lagged Change in Party System Size +  
Lagged Electoral Volatility + Change in Economic Performance + Democratic Age

I run the same model independently with respect to vote-shares and seat-shares, so that  
Model A estimates the outcome of interparty reform with respect to changes in the party  
system measured in votes and Model B estimates the outcome of reform with respect to  
change in the party system measured in seats. The only variable I have eliminated which  
is included in previous studies is the “Year” control, since my dataset is coded periodically  
rather than annually. I also use my expanded dataset, so it is very close but not a perfect  
replication. For a more exact set of replications, see Appendix E.

I then expand the model estimating reform, first to include a broader range of  
variables than previous studies do in order to increase model fit and explanatory power and  
also to estimate a second set of models regarding intraparty reform. The expanded model is  
as follows:

Reform = Lagged Party System Size + Lagged Change in Party System Size +  
Lagged Electoral Volatility + Lagged Disproportionality + Lagged Difference  
between Largest Party Seat-share + Lagged Sum of Largest Party Seat-share +  
Change in Economic Performance + Democratic Age + Election Period Length

I continue to run the model independently with respect to vote-share and seat-share, and so I  
estimate the outcome of interparty reform with respect to changes in the party system  
measured in votes (Model C) and seats (Model D). Then I estimate the outcome of intraparty  
reform with respect to changes in the party system measured in votes (Model F) and seats  
(Model G). The only exception is the difference and sum of the two largest parties seat-  
shares, which is measured in seats regardless of which model is being run. For theoretical

because he only includes one independent variable, party system fragmentation, in his probit analysis and  
controls for no other effects on propensity to reform.

137 This again replicates how Remmer runs her models, separating votes and seats.
reasons, it makes more sense to conceptualize the relative share of the largest parties in terms of seats since the legislative arena is still where most reform occurs (or is passed), so regardless of whether it is fluctuation in vote-share that triggers desires for reform, the reform will still be constrained by the relative legislative power of the two largest parties. To test the hypotheses generated by the Indonesian case study I also run two additional models estimating the outcome of interparty reform in which I replace the aggregate party system lagged and change variables with the variables measuring medium-party seat-share and the proportion of medium-sized parties in the system (Models E & H). In these models I drop the difference and sum variables for the largest parties due to issues of multicollinearity with the medium-sized party data.

Results and Analysis

Most reform occurs within the first two decades of democracy, with the latest-occurring reforms – Italy, Japan and New Zealand all moving to mixed electoral systems – coming in years 61, 41 and 136 of democratic age. While this does not suggest an inability of reform occurrence late into and beyond the democratic consolidation phase, it suggests that institutional stickiness likely prevents the majority of reform discussions from progressing beyond the negotiation stage or may, due to the increase in veto players in highly institutionalized democratic settings, be held up at some late stage in the reform adoption process (i.e. Court intervention or failure to pass as a popular initiative or referendum). Only two interparty and two intraparty reforms occurred in democracies older than 50 years and both were in the more inclusive/more party-centric direction: Italy’s second reform and New Zealand’s first.
Just seven interparty and seven intraparty reforms occurred after the tenth democratic election in any country, for a 87.93% rate of early democratic interparty reform and a 76.67% rate of early democratic intraparty reform. The average democratic age at which interparty reform occurred is 14.75 years (14.2 for more inclusive and 15.7 for less inclusive), and the average for intraparty reform is 21.9 years (same average for party-centric and candidate-centric). The distribution is skewed toward reforms in early democracy with only 16 interparty reforms (26.7%) occurring after the average and only 10 intraparty reforms (33.3%) occurring after the average. There are relatively even distributions of each direction of reform across each of the distributions. This suggests that while newly-democratic reform is not necessarily the only type there is, the overabundance in recent decades of electoral reform by democracies in their first or second decade means that more and more reformers are relatively new to the democratic game of competitive electoral politics and so assumptions based on high information and institutional experience should be made with some skepticism.

The dataset, as has already been mentioned, contains examples of all four potential types of reform outcomes: more inclusive and less inclusive along the interparty dimension, and party-centric and candidate-centric along the intraparty dimension. In Colomer’s study, he only presented evidence of 37 cases of what I refer to as more inclusive reform, none of less inclusive, party-centric or candidate-centric reform; Remmer’s study contained 14 cases of more inclusive reform and 9 of less inclusive reform, with none of party- or candidate-centric reform. My dataset contains 58 observations with interparty reform – 20 less inclusive, 33 more inclusive, and 5 where the inclusivity mechanisms offset each other in the aggregate effect of the reform – and 30 observations of intraparty reform – 13 of candidate-
centric and 17 of party-centric reform. Thus there appears to be greater variation in the dependent variable of reform outcome than previous studies have shown, and with that variation comes more incentive to explore the different aspects of reform as both cause and consequence of changes in the party system.

Measuring the factors correlated with electoral reform adoption have proven difficult in past statistical models that often underestimated or demonstrated omitted variable bias (Colomer 2005) or examined only a regional subset of cases with few observations and variables to model (Remmer 2008). I expanded the data to include wider case selection and a larger number of cases, more reform observations over a longer period of time, and more sensitive and alternative measures to those used in previous studies-. Despite this, these statistical models find little evidence to support seat-maximizing motivations or effects from many structural factors.

Table 6.4 shows the results of the replication model with my expanded dataset. The model is a multinomial logistic regression with the outcome of “no reform” as the baseline category, with statistically significant results in bold type-face. I find few statistically significant variables of interest except a lagged ENPV indicator, a lagged ENPS indicator, and the control for the age of democracy, all predictive of less inclusive reform adoption. Interestingly, the economic control of change in GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant in models predicting less inclusive reform adoption. This suggests that in poor economic times the parties in the legislature may fear being voted out of office and so will shy away from less inclusive reforms that might raise the bar for legislative entry if they suffer at the polls.
Table 6.4 Replicating Estimates of Legislative Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A Votes</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model B Seats</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More Inclusive</td>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
<td>More Inclusive</td>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPV (lagged)</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.520*</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change ENPV (lagged)</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.502</td>
<td>(0.310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.257**</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Age</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.968*</td>
<td>-2.938*</td>
<td>-0.900</td>
<td>(0.963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.0882</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1174</td>
<td>(1.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001

But what about interparty reform in a more expansive model that includes alternative indicators of party system and potential strategic motivations? Table 6.5 shows the expanded model that includes additional indicators for disproportionality, the medium-sized parties’ relative seat-share, the proportion of legislative parties that are medium sized, and the disproportionality of just the medium-sized parties in the system. Many variables are similarly signed as they are in the previous model but the new variables suggest some interesting trends in the data and the importance of the additions to improving the fit of the model.

---

138 See Appendix E for direct replication, and variants of replication, of Remmer’s full model estimating electoral reform.
Table 6.5 Estimates of Interparty Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model C Votes</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model D Seats</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model E Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More Inclusive</td>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPV (lagged)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.235)</td>
<td>0.677* (0.288)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ENPV (lagged)</td>
<td>0.156 (0.194)</td>
<td>-0.036 (0.162)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.567* (0.226)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.073 (0.163)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.552* (2.672)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Parties (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.763 (2.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.017)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.021)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.005 (0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.012 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionality (lagged)</td>
<td>0.054 (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.199* (0.098)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.091* (0.044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionality of Medium Parties (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.094 (0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GDPpc</td>
<td>0.006 (0.088)</td>
<td>-0.212* (0.105)</td>
<td>0.131 (0.064)</td>
<td>0.120 (0.064)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Period Length</td>
<td>0.024 (0.030)</td>
<td>0.074 (0.042)</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.016 (0.021)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Democracy</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.040 (0.027)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.170 (1.697)</td>
<td>-5.859* (2.466)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.1582</td>
<td>0.0998</td>
<td>0.1053</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001

There is one important factor to note in the model specifications for Models C-E. The range of outcomes from less inclusive to no reform to more inclusive might be theoretically conceptualized as either an ordinal (most likely) scale or a purely categorical scale. I estimated the model as an ordinal outcome, using an ordered logistic estimation and testing for violation of the proportional odds assumption. However, Model C violated the
proportional odds assumption (suggesting non-uniform distance between ordered categories) and thus I reverted to multinomial logit estimation for the vote-share model. I chose multinomial rather than a generalized ordered logistic model since there seems to be a theoretical justification for considering the “no reform” category as a baseline instead of an assumption that there is no inherent baseline category between the three possible reform outcomes. Models D and E are both ordered logit estimations, following the scale of -1, 0, 1 in the coding scheme. Previous studies have either theoretically or methodologically applied a categorical structure to the possible range of outcomes, resulting in the use of a multinomial logistic estimation technique.

First, the coefficient of the lagged disproportionality indicator is negatively signed and statistically significant for the less inclusive outcome in Model C. The interpretation of this result is simple: higher disproportionality is less likely to precede shifts to less inclusive systems, particularly when accounting for party system size by vote-share and the relative seat-share of the medium-sized parties. One possible substantive interpretation of this finding supports a more complementary perspective about electoral reform pursuits: when disproportionality increases along with the share of seats of medium-sized parties, larger parties are prevented from adopting less inclusive reforms. In addition to the disproportionality coefficient, the positive and significant sign on the coefficient for party system size when predicting less inclusive reform is the opposite expected of seat-maximizing logic.

Second, in Models D and E the proportional odds assumptions of an ordered logit are not violated and so we can evaluate the outcomes of less inclusive, no reform and more inclusive as ordered. In these models, when substituting in the lagged variables for the seat-
share of the medium-sized parties or the proportion of medium-sized parties and including a measure for disproportionality of the medium-sized parties, we see magnified effects from the aggregate party system variable. The negative and statistically significant coefficients for both ENPS and medium-sized party seat-share suggest that increasing party system size and medium-sized seat-share reduce the likelihood of more inclusive reform adoption. Theoretically this likely occurs because larger parties will react to dilution of their power, indicated by increasing party system size or medium-sized party strength, by adopting less inclusive reforms to eliminate or coalesce with specific medium-sized parties.

The effect is much stronger for medium-sized party seat-share, indicating that when medium-sized parties become quite strong as a group the likelihood of more inclusive systems that can accommodate small parties will drastically decrease. Thus while the overall system size matters, the strength of medium-sized parties more clearly helps determine less inclusive reform adoption or reduction in the likelihood of more inclusive reform adoption. When run as a multinomial logit that differentiates between more and less inclusive as categories of reform rather than on an ordered scale, the positive effect of medium-sized party seat-share becomes much larger for the likelihood of adopting less inclusive reforms. In addition, in Model E disproportionality is positively and significantly associated with more inclusive reforms, confirming the trend in Model C.

Following the theory from the Indonesian case, the medium-sized parties were more likely to be positively affected by earlier reform adoptions, as the largest parties sought to eliminate the smallest parties, but negatively affected by later reform adoptions, as the largest parties sought to regain votes from the medium-sized parties. Smaller parties were always at a disadvantage. This aggregate test further suggests the importance of evaluating the strength
of different types of parties rather than via an aggregate system size measurement, particularly when contemplating the possibility of over-time reform.

Finally, Table 6.6 shows the results of the expanded model with the outcome of intraparty reform and including the regional and wave dummies. I drop the democratic age variable due to collinearity with the wave dummy variable. Most coefficients fail to reach statistical significance and are often sign in unexpected directions.

Table 6.6 Estimates of Intraparty Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model G Seats</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model H Seats</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party-Centric</td>
<td>Candidate-</td>
<td>Party-Centric</td>
<td>Candidate-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>-0.278</td>
<td>(0.563)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>(0.351)</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>(0.543)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.094</td>
<td>(4.687)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Party (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.908</td>
<td>(5.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Volatility</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionality</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>-0.198</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GDPpc</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Period Length</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Dummy</td>
<td>1.997</td>
<td>(1.756)</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>(2.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/Eastern Europe Dummy</td>
<td>-32.902</td>
<td>(5197.884)</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>(1.426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America Dummy</td>
<td>21.368***</td>
<td>(2.045)</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>(1.845)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Wave Democracy</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>(1.655)</td>
<td>17.772***</td>
<td>(2.765)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Wave Democracy</td>
<td>-20.387</td>
<td>(2.889)</td>
<td>-20.537</td>
<td>(2.889)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.293</td>
<td>(4.340)</td>
<td>-21.612</td>
<td>(3.715)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.2232</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
<td>136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001
The findings in this model should differ somewhat compared to interparty reform, as the balance between legislative parties has theoretically less of an impact on reforms affecting nomination and election behavior within parties. However, since intraparty reforms often happen in conjunction with interparty reforms, we would expect to see some patterns between the systemic factors and the outcome of reform. Thus it is notable that party system characteristics, such as size and dispersion across the system, do not have a significant or consistent effect on intraparty reform pursuits and adoptions. Model F, replicating Model G replacing seats with votes, is not reported in the table because it yielded no statistically significant findings except for the Latin America regional dummy, which demonstrates the same effect on both interparty and intraparty reform outcomes as in both Models G and H.

In the intraparty models, the addition of the region and wave dummy variables account for some of the story, though much more for candidate-centric reforms. Results show that the Latin America coefficient is positive, large and statistically significant for party-centric outcomes in both models; the effect disappears in the candidate-centric models. Democratic wave makes a large and significant difference in the choice of candidate-centric reforms, with positive, large and statistically significant coefficients for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} waves.

This finding confirms some empirical cases of reforms in the two waves. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} wave finding results from some proportional systems that undertook transitions to mixed-electoral systems, such as Japan in the 1990s and Germany in the post-war period. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} wave finding results from some mixed-electoral systems that undertook transitions to majoritarian systems, such as Bulgaria and Macedonia in the early 2000s. Thus not all candidate-centric reforms in the second and third waves are necessarily toward the same type of system, but movement toward candidate-centricity does appear to be a more recent
development in cases of electoral reform. The effect is large for both waves, suggesting that reforms of a candidate-centric nature are likely to be adopted when compared to the 1st wave.

In terms of whether democratic age will affect a country’s propensity to make candidate-centric or party-centric reforms, of the thirteen episodes of candidate-centric reform, seven occurred before the twentieth year of democracy and six occurred between years twenty and fifty of democracy. In contrast, of the seventeen episodes of party-centric reform, thirteen occurred before the twentieth year of democracy while four occurred between the fortieth and 140th year of democracy. While it is clear that new democracies are more likely to make party-centric than candidate-centric reforms, older democracies also made party-centric shifts. This suggests that while older and newer democracies might be equally likely to make intra-party reforms, the direction of reform is unlikely to be a candidate-centric shift past a certain age of democracy.

_Evaluating Ratchet Effects Across Cases_

In terms of the effects of path dependency on reform, Table 6.7 shows the paths taken by repeat reformers on the three types of reforms: electoral threshold change, district magnitude change, and movement toward or away from candidate-centric reform. In the interparty reform dimension, electoral threshold increases and district magnitude decreases are more likely to be continued or the previous outcome retained in subsequent periods, while electoral threshold decreases are unlikely to occur at all and district magnitude increases are rolled back as often as they are retained, but never further increased. The exception to the rule regarding electoral threshold decrease: Albania in 2001 rolled back the threshold instituted in 1992 but then in 2009 returned the threshold to its original level.
Removing the Albanian case from the analysis produces a dataset with no rollbacks in electoral threshold increase, only retention and continuation in threshold levels when other reforms occur, and no cases of electoral threshold decrease in the dataset.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Retain Change</th>
<th>Rollback Change</th>
<th>Continue Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Threshold Increase</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 Albania 2001</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Threshold Decrease</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 Albania 2009</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Magnitude Increase</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 Peru 2000 Poland 2001</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Magnitude Decrease</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate-Centric Adopted</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 Italy 2005</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-Centric Adopted</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 Bulgaria 2009 France 1986</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the intraparty dimension, party-centric reforms are slightly more likely to be continued than rolled back or retained in multiple iterations than candidate-centric reforms, while candidate-centric reform is never simply retained when multiple stages of intraparty reform occur. However, both types of intraparty reform are nearly as likely to be rolled back as continued or retained. This suggests that intraparty reform is less likely to show a ratchet effect than electoral threshold reform or decreases in district magnitude, which are difficult to rollback but easy to continue. Thus, electoral threshold increases and district magnitude decreases display a clear ratchet effect on their reform trajectories, but intraparty reform and district magnitude increases do not. Interparty reform is more than twice as likely to be repeated: there are 23 episodes of repeated interparty reform, 13 of electoral threshold change and 10 of district magnitude change, but only nine episodes of repeated intraparty reform.
Patterns and Trajectories of Reform Causes

The statistical models offer some key insights into the causes and consequences of electoral reform in the aggregate. In terms of the causes, what is clear is that party system variables have a limited effect on intraparty reform adoptions and that, despite the influence of seat-maximizing theory, there is little statistical evidence to support the hypotheses that either aggregate party system size or change (as a proxy for strategic shifts) are the driving factors in interparty reform adoptions, particularly in the case of directional expectations. Decreasing party system fragmentation is not associated with less inclusive reforms nor is increasing party system fragmentation associated with more inclusive reforms, disproving hypothesis 1. In terms of disproportionality, used here as a test of alternative motivations, it decreases the likelihood of less inclusive reform in the vote-share model and increases the likelihood of more inclusive reform in the medium-sized party seat-share model. This provides support for hypothesis 2 that alternative motivations may be at work.

Findings about the seat-maximizing hypotheses regarding medium-sized party seat-share are clearer. Less inclusive reform is more likely the result of an increase in the seat-share of medium-sized parties, the opposite of hypothesis 3a. The effect on more inclusive reform is weaker, with statistically insignificant results when separating out the outcomes in a multinomial logit. There is no statistical support for the argument that medium-sized party seat-share affects the likelihood of party- or candidate-centric reform (hypothesis 3b).

Greater disproportionality in the translation of medium-sized party votes into seats does not have a statistically significant effect on reform adoption and thus does not support my expectation (hypothesis 4). Seven of the 17 cases of iterated reforms are of a less inclusive nature and those seven cases are out of the total 20 less inclusive reforms overall.
This suggests no support for hypothesis 5 that reformers are more likely to adopt less inclusive reforms once the democracy honeymoon period ends.

In terms of temporal and ratchet effects, the data do show support for hypothesis 6a but not as much for hypothesis 6b. Later-round less inclusive reforms are much more likely to mimic previous round less inclusive reforms, with almost no rollback in electoral threshold implementation and no rollback in district magnitude reduction. The counter-example of more inclusive reform does not display the same directionality, with rollbacks as likely as maintenance of the same type of reform. However, with so few multiple-iteration examples of candidate-centric reform (2), the effect is not supportive of hypothesis 6b: candidate-centric reform is equally likely to be rolled back as to occur a second time. Table 6.8 summarizes these findings.

Table 6.8 Summary of Hypotheses and Results – Electoral Reform as Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The probability that reformers will adopt more inclusive reforms increases as party system fragmentation increases, whereas the probability that reformers will adopt less inclusive electoral reforms increases as party system fragmentation declines.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The probability that reformers will adopt more inclusive reforms increases as disproportionality increases.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>The probability of less (more) inclusive reform adoption increases as the seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases (increases).</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>The probability of candidate-centric (party-centric) reform adoption increases as the seat-share of medium-sized parties decreases (increases).</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The probability of more (less) inclusive reform adoption increases as the differential of medium-sized parties decreases (increases).</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The probability of less inclusive reform adoption, particularly electoral thresholds, increases in later rounds of iterated reform.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6a</td>
<td>The probability of less (more) inclusive reform adoption increases when less (more) inclusive reforms were adopted in the previous inter-election period, but the constraints of alternative motivations and iterated reforms prevent the adoption of the most extreme less (more) inclusive reforms.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6b</td>
<td>The probability of candidate-centric (party-centric) reform adoption increases when candidate-centric (party-centric) reforms were adopted in the previous inter-election period, but the constraints of alternative motivations and iterated reforms prevent the adoption of the most extreme candidate-centric (party-centric) reforms.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first major conclusion to draw is that seat-maximizing logic, though useful as a baseline theoretical framework for considering elite motivations and the process of decision-making, suffers from a lack of predictive capability in evaluating electoral reform adoption in the aggregate. In each category of interparty reform adoption nearly the same number of instances of contracting and expanding party system size by votes and seats were evident. In terms of more inclusive reform observations, which should follow expanding party system size as parties seek to convert a system of total loss into only partial loss, one more observation of contracting party system size occurred than of expanding party system size. In terms of less inclusive reform observations, which should follow contracting party system size as dominant parties seek to capitalize on their gains, one more observation of expanding party system size occurred than of contracting party system size. In offsetting reforms there were equal numbers of observations of party system contraction and expansion. With only 44% of the observations following the expected reform path, the data suggests that many of the cases of reform cannot explained by seat-maximizing logic alone, or cannot be properly predicted the way that seat-maximizing theories have traditionally been measured via the proxy of aggregate party system size and change in the overall party system of a country.

The level of disproportionality in the system offers an additional insight into both strategic and alternative motivations: as disproportionality increases, elites who are pursuing reforms to either make the system more effective or representative, such as by reducing wasted votes or more accurately translating votes into seats, should pursue interparty reforms that are likely to reduce disproportionality (i.e. more inclusive). The most striking contrast in terms of disproportionality is evident when we evaluate which systems undertook which reforms. Equal numbers of low and high disproportionality cases undertook more inclusive
reform; in contrast, cases of less inclusive reform occurred in systems with low disproportionality 15 times, while only 4 times did cases with high disproportionality undertake less inclusive reform. The implications of the data do suggest that disproportionality may be an indicator of alternative motivations that is worth more carefully considering in cross-national studies of electoral reform.

In addition, the depth of understanding regarding reform as both an effect and a cause of party system change is enhanced by more nuanced ways of evaluating the nature of party systems and the distribution of power within them. By assessing the relative strength of medium-sized parties, shown in the Indonesian case to be an extremely influential aspect of different reform periods, and the relative strength of the largest parties in the system, we can understand how and why a reform that seemed as if it should have been adopted might not have been. While the effective size of the party system correlates highly to the seat-share of the two largest parties in the system (0.9121), the correlation between the effective size of the party system and the seat-share of the medium-sized parties is lower (0.777) and suggests less normal distribution regarding the parties in the middle. In a system with few medium-sized parties and many small parties, large parties may employ less inclusive reforms to eliminate the competition and may do so in collusion with the few medium-sized parties.

Finally, despite Colomer’s assertion that the primary direction of reform is toward greater proportionality due increasing uncertainty, with respect to trajectories of reform the evidence along the two dimensions of inter- and intraparty reform suggest a trend toward centrality and the importance of including the intraparty dimension, similar to predictions about reaction to “extreme” system bias (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001: 28). Figure 6.1 shows the initial position while Figure 6.2 shows the final position of each case.
Figure 6.1 Pre-Reform Placement of 33 Cases
Figure 6.2 Post-Reform Placement of 33 Cases
The total number of cases represented has been reduced from 34 to 33 since Czech reforms were offsetting and the case demonstrates no movement along either dimension. These trajectories support hypotheses 6a and 6b regarding ceiling or constraints on ratchet effects and suggest support for arguments about the salience of mixed electoral systems or systems that mix elements of inter- and intra-party selection mechanisms. The centralizing tendency is unmistakable particularly in the case of single-event reforms shown in Figure 6.3, with nearly all cases trending toward the center. Solid arrows indicate central trajectory and dashed arrows indicate reforms of a non-central nature, e.g. the move from an open list system to closed-lists.

Figure 6.3 Single-Reform Case Trajectories
There are a number of cases of reform that move from the bottom and center of the lower-left quadrant, mostly electoral variants of single-member districts with runoff elections, toward the center, mostly to mixed systems employing parallel ballots. There are also a number of cases of reform that move from the top and center of the upper-right quadrant, mostly electoral variants of large- or national-district systems with closed proportional lists, toward the center, mostly to mixed systems with reapportioning mechanisms and balance between plurality and proportional seats. Figure 6.3 only shows the reforms of the 14 cases of single-iteration reform and three (Peru, Romania and Venezuela) of multiple-iteration reform where one of the iterations was the offsetting category and no actual shift along any dimension occurred. The remaining cases of multiple-iteration reform are each mapped out below in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. For these cases each arrow represents an episode of reform and each case contains at least two arrows, solid arrows denote centralizing movement and dashed arrows non-central movement.

Figure 6.4 shows the trajectories of the eight cases that either followed centralizing trajectories or ended up closer to the center than before the first reform period, even if the latest round of reforms took the country toward the upper-right hand quadrant as in the cases of Germany and Guatemala. Colombia is a case that began as proportional, shifted to a less inclusive but still proportional system through a reduction in district magnitude and the size of the legislature, then shifted to a more candidate-centric system by allowing parties to open their nomination lists to voter choice. The result was a final placement closer to the center and the Dominican case shows an identical trajectory. The Indonesian case shows a step-wise progression toward the center away from the upper-right quadrant.
Figure. 6.4 Centrally-oriented Multiple-iteration Cases
Figure 6.5 Non-centrally Oriented Multiple-Iteration Cases
In contrast to the first three cases that all demonstrate a central trajectory from the upper-right hand quadrant, Bulgaria is a case that began as a mixed-electoral system, shifted to fully proportional after the first election, and then eighteen years later returned to the mixed system it originally used; in this case the original and final position are the same still centrally-located relative to the interim position. The Bolivian and Mexican cases both demonstrate central movement, though primarily along the interparty reform dimension and from opposite original positions, and the German and Guatemalan cases are predominantly centralizing along a diagonal trajectory but in the final reform period exhibit minor movement away from the center toward greater proportionality.

Figure 6.5 shows the trajectories of the six cases that followed reform trajectories toward the upper-right quadrant, representing systems with greater proportionality and party-centric control. For example, Macedonia is a case that began, in typical post-Communist fashion, as a majoritarian system, shifted to a mixed-system, and subsequently shifted to a fully proportional list system. The interim position is upward and the right of the original position and the final position moves again upward and right of the interim position, for a trajectory through the center from the bottom-left to the upper-right quadrant. The cases of Poland and Ukraine follow nearly the exact same trajectory while Croatia follows a similar one but with an original position more towards the center. The Albanian case has the most movement, with original and final positions that resemble the general trajectory of the Macedonian, Polish and Ukrainian cases. With the inverse trajectory of Bulgaria, Italy is a case that began as a proportional representation system, shifted centrally to a mixed-electoral system, and then returned to the mixed system it originally used. The dataset currently covers reforms through 2010, this shift is not depicted and Ukraine remains in Figure 6.5 rather than Figure 6.4.

139 Ukrainian electoral reforms in 2011 will result in a positional shift for the Ukrainian case back towards the center as a mixed-electoral system will be reintroduced for the 2012 national elections. Since the dataset currently covers reforms through 2010, this shift is not depicted and Ukraine remains in Figure 6.5 rather than Figure 6.4.
system, and then returned to a fully proportional system once again; the resulting position at
the end is relatively similar to its original position, in the center of the upper-right quadrant.
The last two boxes in Figure 6.5 show two exceptional cases that move neither toward a final
position in the center or a trajectory toward the upper-right hand quadrant: Honduras and
France. In the Honduran case, the trajectory is at first right-ward towards greater
proportionality but then moves downward towards more candidate-centricity. France began
as a two-round majoritarian system, shifted to fully proportional lists for a single election,
and immediately reformed back to the two-round system it has employed ever since.

What the repeated reform cases tell us is that with one exception, repeated reforms
can shift countries over the course of reform from either the lower-left or upper-right
quadrant toward the center, or from the lower-left or upper-right to the center to the upper-
right quadrant. The only exception to the center or upper-right final positions is the case of
France. Though discussions of a system with more proportional elements have been
discussed among the French, no real movement toward reform has occurred (Renwick 2010).
Otherwise, all repeat reformers only moved toward the center or upper-right quadrant,
regardless of their starting point.

While these figures are not enough to tell us the full story of how and why elites
adopted the reforms they did, what is clear is that even when majoritarian or candidate-
centric elements are chosen, they are done so in a distinct and limited way: there are no shifts
in the dataset to a full single-member district system. There are six cases of repeated
reformers and one case of a single-episode reformer, Armenia, shifting to a fully-proportional
system from a previous system that was not primarily proportional in nature. However, the
overwhelming majority of cases demonstrate the centralizing tendency to balance
proportional and majoritarian elements of interparty competition as well as adjudicate between party and candidate-centric elements of intraparty competition. In sum, the trajectories of these 34 cases within a multidimensional framework of reform elements suggest a more complex picture than previously assumed.

This conclusion fits with the arguments regarding alternative motivations and ratchet effects, as well as the theory that reforms likely have an ideological or alternate “ceiling” that limits reformers’ abilities to continually implement seat-maximizing reforms. Combined with the findings of perpetual increases in electoral thresholds and decreases in district magnitudes, the centralizing tendency of the majority of cases suggest that seat-maximizing efforts have a limit above which continual reforms have been or will be unlikely. In most cases where the iterated reforms have been continual increases in electoral thresholds and reduction in district magnitudes, movement has remained toward the center or even to the upper-right quadrant. Since both electoral thresholds and reduced district magnitude represent leftward movement along the x-axis, and only the case of France moves to the left of center in the subset of iterated reforms, there is support for an argument about the limits of seat-maximization since cases that move more centrally do not eventually pass through the center to the left, except for France in the 1980s.

**Electoral Reform as the Independent Variable**

Now that we have examined some of the causes of reform, let us turn to some of the consequences that the adoption of various reforms have on some notable party system outcomes and indicators. For the second set of hypotheses about the effects of reform on party systems, the dependent variables in the different models are: party system size by votes,
party system size by seats, electoral volatility, seat volatility, disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats, seat-shares of the largest and medium-sized parties, and the changes in each of these variables between elections at time $t$ and time $t+1$ where $t$ represents the election prior to a reform episode. When used as dependent variables they simply shift to the right-hand side of the equation from the previous analysis, with no change in the construction of the measurements but sometimes with the inclusion of a temporal lag depending on the hypothesis being tested.

To test the hypotheses regarding the expected impacts of reform, since elites arguably do not undertake and adopt reform if reform will produce little or no change, I include two sets of dummy variables to indicate when reform has occurred during the inter-electoral period of the observation.\footnote{140 Once again, I copy Remmer’s independent variable reform coding procedure.} Cases are given a value of a ‘1’ if they adopt a reform that makes the party system more inclusive (corresponds to a ‘1’ score on the interparty reform dependent variable) and a ‘0’ if they do not adopt such a reform. Cases are given a value of ‘1’ if they adopt a reform that makes the party system less inclusive (corresponds to a ‘-1’ score on the interparty reform dependent variable) and a ‘0’ if they do not adopt such a reform. Cases are given a value of ‘1’ if they adopt a reform that makes the party system more party-centric (corresponds to a ‘1’ score on the intraparty reform dependent variable) and a ‘0’ if they do not adopt such a reform. Cases are given a value of ‘1’ if they adopt a reform that makes the party system more candidate-centric (corresponds to a ‘-1’ score on the intraparty reform dependent variable) and a ‘0’ if they do not adopt such a reform. This dichotomous coding of the independent variables by using each distinct reform outcome on each of the two dimensions most closely parallels the use of the 3-category code values of reform as the dependent variable in the previous analysis. All control variables used in the
previous analysis are used to test the hypotheses regarding reform as the independent variable.

Models

I evaluate the impact of reforms on party system outcomes – ENPV, ENPS, Vote Volatility and Seat Volatility – once again replicating the formula from the time-series models of previous studies.\textsuperscript{141}

\[
\text{ENPV} = \text{More Inclusive Reform} + \text{Less Inclusive Reform} + \text{Lagged ENPV} + \text{Change in Economic Performance} + \text{Democratic Age}
\]

Once again the only modification to the replication model is the exclusion of the “Year” control variable since my dataset is not coded annually, and this model serves as the basis for Models I (ENPV), J (ENPS), K (Vote Volatility) and L (Seat Volatility) where the relevant dependent variable and lagged dependent variable are substituted into the basic model. For a more exact set of replications, see Appendix E.

I then expand the model evaluating the impact of reform, including a broader range of variables to account for intraparty reform effects and to increase model fit and explanatory power. Additionally I evaluate the impact of reform indicators on the amount of change occurs in party system outcomes between the pre- and post-reform elections, rather than simply measuring the effects of reform on party system outcomes. These models are structured:

\[
\text{ENPV} = \text{More Inclusive Reform} + \text{Less Inclusive Reform} + \text{Party-Centric Reform} + \text{Candidate-Centric Reform} + \text{Lagged ENPV} + \text{Lagged Electoral Volatility} + \text{Change in Economic Performance} + \text{Democratic Age} + \text{Election Period Length}
\]

\textsuperscript{141} Once again these are replications of Remmer (2008), including the division of analysis by votes and seats.
I continue to run the models independently with respect to vote-share and seat-share, so
Models M-P and U-W evaluate the impact of reform on change in the party system measured
in votes and Models Q-T and X-Z evaluate the impact of reform on change in the party
system measured in seats. This model serves as the basis for Models M-P(ENPV and
Change in ENPV), Q-T (ENPS and Change in ENPS), U-W (Vote Volatility and Change in
Vote Volatility) and X-Z (Seat Volatility and Change in Seat Volatility), and so the relevant
dependent variable and lagged dependent variables are substituted into the basic model but
the independent variables and controls remain relatively static.

Finally, I run three sets of models to evaluate the impact of reform on
disproportionality and the change in disproportionality, the sum of and change in the seat-
share of the medium-sized parties in the system and the sum of and change in the seat-share
of the two largest parties in the system. The model is structured:

\[
\text{Disproportionality} = \text{More Inclusive Reform} + \text{Less Inclusive Reform} + \text{Party-Centric Reform} + \text{Candidate-Centric Reform} + \text{ENPV} + \text{Change in ENPV} + \text{ENPS} + \text{Change in ENPS} + \text{Difference Between Largest Party Seat-share} + \text{Sum of Largest Party Seat-share} + \text{Change in Economic Performance} + \text{Democratic Age} + \text{Election Period Length}
\]

This model includes both vote-share and seat-share measurements of the party system
because disproportionality is a measure of the difference between votes won and seats
obtained. Thus it would be substantively confusing to measure disproportionality in a model
with only one or the other as predictors since they are theoretically related but do not co-
vary. Models AA-AB show Disproportionality and change in Disproportionality, Models
AC-AD show the Sum of the Seat-share medium-sized parties and change in the Sum of the
Seat-share of the medium-sized parties, and Models AE-AF show the Sum of the Seat-share
of the two largest parties and change in the Sum of the Seat-share of the two largest parties.
Results and Analysis

Previous studies’ models tested the impact of legislative reform on four party system outcomes: ENPV, ENPS, Vote Volatility and Seat Volatility. Once again, I replicate the basic model from previous studies, a pooled time-series analysis with random effects,\textsuperscript{142} with my expanded dataset. The unit of analysis is still inter-electoral period and so the observations are coded based on periods rather than years and the only variable not included in the replication is the “year” indicator since years are not the unit of analysis.

Previous studies do not specify the use of correction mechanisms, such as an AR1 (autoregressive correlation), for inefficient estimation in time series models. However, I have unbalanced panels across a range of structural and contextual variables which may affect the efficiency of estimating effects. I include the AR1 correction for auto-correlation where necessary and note the addition of the corrective mechanism in the results table. Table 6.9 shows the results of the replication with AR1 corrections for the ENPV and ENPS models and uncorrected estimations for the vote and seat volatility models.

In terms of outcomes, both more and less inclusive reforms have a positive and statistically significant impact on electoral volatility as expected. In the other models the only other factors that typically matter are the lagged values of the dependent variables. In other words, reforms clearly affect volatility but seem to have a limited impact on party system size and the coefficients are signed in inconsistent ways with respect to strategic predictions: more inclusive reforms precede a shrinking party system by vote-share and an expanding party system by seat-share, while less inclusive reforms precede expanding party systems of both types. The directionality of the less inclusive coefficients suggest that either

\textsuperscript{142} I run Hausman diagnostic tests to determine whether models should use random effects instead of fixed effects; according to the results of all Hausman tests, the random effects are the more efficient estimation model.
elites employed strategically inefficient reforms or they employed reforms for some reason other than pure seat-counting strategic logic; the coefficients on the more inclusive indicator are less clearly interpreted.

Table 6.9 Replicating the Impact of Legislative Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I ENPV (AR1)</th>
<th>Model J ENPS (AR1)</th>
<th>Model K Vote Volatility</th>
<th>Model L Seat Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Inclusive</td>
<td>-0.154 (0.120)</td>
<td>0.073 (0.103)</td>
<td><strong>8.169</strong> (2.086)</td>
<td><strong>10.654</strong> (2.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
<td>0.413 (0.158)</td>
<td>0.095 (0.133)</td>
<td><strong>11.881</strong> <strong>(2.461)</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.607</strong> <strong>(2.267)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPV (lagged)</td>
<td><strong>0.147</strong>* (0.024)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.095 (0.030)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.488</strong>* (0.035)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.394</strong>* (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GDPpc</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.401 (0.197)</td>
<td>0.243 (0.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Age</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.048 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td><strong>3.780</strong>* (0.175)</td>
<td><strong>3.323</strong>* (0.145)</td>
<td><strong>14.603</strong>* (1.832)</td>
<td><strong>16.815</strong>* (1.715)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.2510</td>
<td>0.1209</td>
<td>0.4489</td>
<td>0.3934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2</td>
<td>13.31</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>72.89</td>
<td>65.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001

The next models evaluate the addition of intraparty reforms to the models predicting party system change, as well as an increasing range of independent and control variables. In Table 6.10, Models M and N show the impact of accounting for intraparty reform and election period length, with Model N also controlling for vote volatility, when examining the impact on party system size by vote-share. Models M and N clearly show the importance of candidate-centric reforms, with large, positive and statistically significant coefficients.

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143 See Appendix E for a full set of replications of Remmer’s analysis of the impact of electoral reforms.
suggesting that adopting candidate-centric reforms increases the size of the party system as measured by vote-share. This is likely because an increase in candidate-centricity tends to result in the creation of many new parties to serve as vehicles for popular candidates. The other significant variables, the lagged dependent variable and electoral volatility, have positive coefficients. Even more significant is that it is the only reform variable to play a role in affecting the size of the party system. Election period length is significant and positively signed in the first model, suggesting that the party system is likely to expand as the length of time between elections grows; this is unsurprising since longer inter-election periods allow smaller parties more time to amass financial resources and build campaign networks.

Table 6.10 Including Intraparty Reform Impact on ENPV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model M ENPV (AR1)</th>
<th>Model N ENPV</th>
<th>Model O Change in ENPV (AR1)</th>
<th>Model P Change in ENPV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Inclusive</td>
<td>-0.497 (0.174)</td>
<td>-0.508 (0.171)</td>
<td>-0.453 (0.175)</td>
<td>-0.509 (0.171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
<td>-0.154 (0.181)</td>
<td>-0.373 (0.184)</td>
<td>-0.100 (0.182)</td>
<td>-0.375 (0.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Party-Centric</td>
<td>0.589 (0.221)</td>
<td>0.569 (0.221)</td>
<td>0.525 (0.221)</td>
<td>0.569 (0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Candidate-Centric</td>
<td>1.379*** (0.236)</td>
<td>1.742*** (0.236)</td>
<td>1.384*** (0.238)</td>
<td>1.742*** (0.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPV (lagged)</td>
<td>0.174*** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.183*** (0.024)</td>
<td>-0.841*** (0.023)</td>
<td>-0.817*** (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Volatility</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.019*** (0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.019*** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GDPpc</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Age</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Period Length</td>
<td>0.014* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.011 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.014*** (0.260)</td>
<td>2.354*** (0.259)</td>
<td>3.701*** (0.170)</td>
<td>2.353*** (0.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.3202</td>
<td>0.3819</td>
<td>0.5868</td>
<td>0.6465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2</td>
<td>30.10</td>
<td>64.28</td>
<td>337.16</td>
<td>344.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001
Models O and P evaluate the same models but use change in the party system size as the dependent variable, assessing whether the reform has an impact on changing the direction of the election outcome relative to the pre-reform election’s outcome rather than simply assessing whether the reform is correlated with the post-reform election. Model O evaluates the impact on change in the party system measured by vote-share and Model P further adds vote volatility and election period length. The results of the models in Table 6.10 show that candidate-centric reforms have a statistically significant and positive impact on change in the size of the party system, with similar results for the other variables in Models M and N. The only change is that the lagged party system size variable becomes negatively signed. This finding is expected since it suggests that the larger the party system the less overall change in system size is likely to occur. These results suggest that not only is candidate-centric reform predictive of bigger party systems in general, but that it also leads to expanding party systems between the pre-reform and post-reform elections. Once again, it is the only reform variable with a significant effect.

The next set of models focuses on the same questions with respect to the party system measured in seats. Models Q and R in Table 6.11 show the impact of accounting for intraparty reform and election period length, and Model R also controls for seat volatility when examining the impact on party system size. In these models, though still positively signed, the coefficient for candidate-centric reform is smaller than in the previous vote-based models and only statistically significant when the model does not include seat volatility, while all the coefficients for party-centric reform are now negatively signed. This suggests that candidate-centric reforms may have a limited effect such that systems allowing or favoring individual candidates or parties created as candidate-specific vehicles may correlate
to larger legislative party systems, but that the effect is nullified by the general presence of volatility (i.e. high turnover) in the electoral system. However, the coefficients for candidate-centric reform just miss statistical significance as measured by a .05 cutoff.

Table 6.11 Including Intraparty Reform on ENPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model Q</th>
<th>Model R</th>
<th>Model S</th>
<th>Model T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENPS (AR1)</td>
<td>ENPS (AR1)</td>
<td>Change in ENPS (AR1)</td>
<td>Change in ENPS (AR1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Inclusive</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
<td>-0.294</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Party-Centric</td>
<td>-0.328</td>
<td>-0.362</td>
<td>-0.345</td>
<td>-0.367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Candidate-Centric</td>
<td><strong>0.641</strong></td>
<td>0.577</td>
<td><strong>0.635</strong></td>
<td>0.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(0.186)</em></td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td><em>(0.187)</em></td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td><strong>0.124</strong></td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td><strong>-0.875</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>-0.903</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(0.031)</em></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td><em>(0.030)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.031)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Volatility</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(0.003)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.003)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.003)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.003)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GDPpc</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(0.012)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.012)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.012)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.012)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Age</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(0.003)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.003)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.003)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.003)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Period Length</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(0.004)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.004)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.004)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.004)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td><strong>2.958</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>2.679</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>3.219</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>2.642</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(0.224)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.223)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.145)</em></td>
<td><em>(0.224)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.1384</td>
<td>0.1976</td>
<td>0.4406</td>
<td>0.4667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2</td>
<td>9.84</td>
<td>19.87</td>
<td>254.77</td>
<td>271.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001

The other variables perform similarly to Models M and N with little of statistical significance. However, the strength of seat volatility cuts into the significance of the lagged dependent variable in Model R, where it just misses statistical significance. This suggests that seat volatility between time $t$ and time $t+1$ explains slightly more about the size of the party system at time $t+1$ than the size of the system at time $t$. 

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In terms of the models with the change over time party system dependent variables, in Models S and T in Table 6.11 the variables of interest work the same way, with candidate-centric reform positively signed but only significant in the model that does not include seat volatility, though once again just misses the cut-off for statistical significance in Model T. The same general directionality and level of significance of other independent and control variables applies as in Models Q and R. Once again, when accounting for change in the size of the party system, rather than the size of the system by itself, the lagged party system size becomes negatively signed but maintains its significance throughout. These results, similarly to the vote-share models, suggest that not only is candidate-centric reform associated with bigger party systems but that it also leads to expanding party systems.

In terms of modeling the impact of reform on electoral volatility, Models U and X in Table 6.12 show the impact on vote and seat volatility, while Models V, W, Y and Z show the impact on change in volatility. In technical terms, volatility itself is a change over time variable, measuring the aggregate turnover from one election to the next, but the amount of volatility and the change in the overall amount from one election to the next is a distinct concept. As such, I model volatility and change in volatility similarly to the previous sets of models on party system size and change in party system size measured by votes and seats. While Models U and X add the intraparty reform indicators and election period length to the basic model, Models V and W substitute the change measures for simple volatility in the basic models from Models K and L, and Models Y and Z add the intraparty and election period length variables to those models.
## Table 6.12 Including Intraparty Reform on Electoral Volatility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model U Vote Volatility</th>
<th>Model V Change in Vote Volatility</th>
<th>Model W Change in Vote Volatility</th>
<th>Model X Seat Volatility</th>
<th>Model Y Change in Seat Volatility</th>
<th>Model Z Change in Seat Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Inclusive</td>
<td>3.609 (3.502)</td>
<td><strong>7.300</strong> (2.046)</td>
<td>2.471 (3.146)</td>
<td>5.887 (2.987)</td>
<td><strong>9.822</strong> (2.007)</td>
<td>4.158 (3.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
<td>7.730 (2.876)</td>
<td><strong>9.420</strong> (2.440)</td>
<td>7.847 (2.982)</td>
<td><strong>11.686</strong> (2.687)</td>
<td><strong>13.398</strong> (2.258)</td>
<td><strong>14.529</strong> (2.754)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Party-Centric</td>
<td>5.545 (3.826)</td>
<td>7.886 (3.931)</td>
<td>8.280 (3.778)</td>
<td>9.565 (3.883)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Candidate-Centric</td>
<td>-1.054 (1.913)</td>
<td>2.906 (3.821)</td>
<td>-2.570 (2.972)</td>
<td>-1.846 (3.078)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPV ( lagged )</td>
<td><strong>2.925</strong> (0.532)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ENPV</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.321 (0.591)</td>
<td>0.281 (0.594)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.361</strong>* (0.038)</td>
<td><strong>-0.526</strong>* (0.035)</td>
<td><strong>-0.545</strong>* (0.036)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.149</strong> (0.579)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ENPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.714 (0.629)</td>
<td>-0.651 (0.634)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.301</strong>* (0.034)</td>
<td><strong>-0.629</strong>* (0.033)</td>
<td><strong>-0.628</strong>* (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GDPpc</td>
<td>0.210 (0.192)</td>
<td>0.398 (0.195)</td>
<td>0.398 (0.193)</td>
<td>0.136 (0.188)</td>
<td>0.265 (0.188)</td>
<td>0.309 (0.191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Age</td>
<td>-0.051 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.034 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.044 (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.038 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.037 (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Period Length</td>
<td><strong>0.344</strong> (0.062)</td>
<td><strong>0.324</strong> (0.065)</td>
<td><strong>0.312</strong> (0.065)</td>
<td><strong>0.368</strong> (0.062)</td>
<td><strong>0.313</strong> (0.064)</td>
<td><strong>0.305</strong> (0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-7.666 (3.807)</td>
<td>0.639 (3.379)</td>
<td>2.137 (3.446)</td>
<td>-6.590 (3.894)</td>
<td>3.513 (3.317)</td>
<td>3.894 (3.325)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.5111</td>
<td>0.3550</td>
<td>0.3590</td>
<td>0.4482</td>
<td>0.4163</td>
<td>0.4225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi²</td>
<td>80.53</td>
<td>73.58</td>
<td>76.18</td>
<td>78.72</td>
<td>108.43</td>
<td>107.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001
In terms of the added impact of intraparty reform on vote and seat volatility, Models U and X indicate relatively similar outcomes with respect to the vote-based and seat-based models, yet larger and statistically significant coefficients in the seat-based models suggest that seat turnover is more sensitive to electoral reforms than vote turnover. In Models V, W, Y and Z variables mostly perform as expected, though the negative coefficient of candidate-centric reform in the change in seat volatility model suggests that candidate-centric reform decreases seat volatility when most models indicate increasing volatility with any reform.

Otherwise, all other lagged and related party system indicators all are consistently signed as expected. The limited statistical effect of intraparty reform on overall system volatility makes theoretical sense. First, intraparty reforms are designed to redistribute seat allocations within rather than across parties. Second, the relatively low number of observations combined with the fact that inter- and intra-party reforms tend to occur simultaneously suggest it is possible that the lack of significance in the intra-party reforms is being driven to some degree by outliers that do not follow the general trend of the data.

In all electoral volatility models, the length of time between elections once again has a positive influence on the dependent variables, meaning that longer inter-election periods increase volatility relative to shorter periods. Once again, this is not a surprising finding given that longer inter-election periods give smaller parties and independent candidates more time to amass resources to contest elections. In addition, lengthy inter-election periods tend to occur in systems with flexible terms when the ruling party faces more certain losses in the upcoming election and chooses to prolong their tenure until the last possible moment to call new elections. Both of these factors, more than structural or contextual factors, are likely to have a specific effect on the relationship between the level of volatility and the length of the
inter-election period. However, the statistical significance of the finding suggests the importance of its inclusion into the models as a control for variation in inter-election periods.

What the results presented in Tables 6.9-6.12 all suggest is the importance in evaluating the effects of both inter- and intraparty reforms, since in almost all of the expanded models at least one of the two intraparty reform indicators is statistically significant relative to other indicators in the model, aside from the lagged dependent variables. At minimum, the results suggest the relevance of including the intraparty reforms in the model, especially when their coefficients are larger or more statistically significant than the traditional interparty reform indicators, much in the same way that the significance of the inter-election period length indicator suggests the necessity of its inclusion into statistical models to serve as a control for the effect of time. Furthermore, the R-squared values of the models including both the inter- and intraparty reform indicators are always higher than the models that only include the interparty reforms, suggesting a greater degree of model fit and explanatory power when accounting for intraparty change.

Finally, the last models evaluate the impact of reform on disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats, the share of the seats obtained by the medium-sized parties in the system and the share of the seats obtained by the two largest parties in the system. Model AA in Table 6.13 models the impact of the independent and control variables on disproportionality while Model AB shows the impact of the independent variables on the change in disproportionality from the pre- to post-reform elections. Models AC and AD show the results of two similar analyses with the Sum of the Seat-share of the medium-sized parties replacing disproportionality and change in disproportionality; in Models AE and AF the Sum of the Seat-share of the two largest parties become the new dependent variables.
### Table 6.13. Evaluating Reform on Disproportionality, Medium-Sized and Largest Parties’ Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model AA Disproportionality</th>
<th>Model AB Change in Disproportionality</th>
<th>Model AC MPS</th>
<th>Model AD Change in MPS</th>
<th>Model AE Largest Parties’ Seat-shares</th>
<th>Model AF Change in Largest Parties’ Seat-share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Inclusive</td>
<td>-0.755 (1.547)</td>
<td>2.073 (2.166)</td>
<td>0.037 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.056)</td>
<td>-1.282 (1.016)</td>
<td>2.228 (1.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
<td><strong>3.691</strong> * (1.438)</td>
<td>-0.287 (2.056)</td>
<td>0.029 (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.085 (0.053)</td>
<td><strong>6.461</strong>* (0.944)</td>
<td><strong>3.885</strong>* (1.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Party-Centric</td>
<td>0.348 (1.928)</td>
<td>-2.099 (2.732)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.050)</td>
<td>0.044 (0.070)</td>
<td>-0.965 (1.266)</td>
<td>-2.474 (1.486)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Candidate-Centric</td>
<td>0.469 (1.910)</td>
<td>-0.068 (2.712)</td>
<td>0.087 (0.050)</td>
<td><strong>0.196</strong> * (0.070)</td>
<td>4.036 (1.254)</td>
<td>-3.609 (1.472)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPV (lagged)</td>
<td><strong>3.841</strong>* (0.708)</td>
<td>-0.058 (0.879)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.023)</td>
<td>-0.982 (0.466)</td>
<td>-1.098 (0.505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ENPV</td>
<td><strong>3.784</strong>* (0.589)</td>
<td><strong>3.617</strong>* (0.817)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.294 (0.387)</td>
<td>-1.320 (0.448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td>-0.120 (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.094 (0.067)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.119* (0.033)</td>
<td>-0.120 (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPS (lagged)</td>
<td><strong>4.814</strong>* (0.875)</td>
<td>1.007 (1.087)</td>
<td><strong>0.102</strong>* (0.022)</td>
<td>0.040 (0.028)</td>
<td><strong>10.436</strong>* (0.575)</td>
<td>2.026 (0.625)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in ENPS</td>
<td><strong>4.777</strong>* (0.713)</td>
<td><strong>3.748</strong>* (0.988)</td>
<td><strong>0.048</strong> * (0.018)</td>
<td><strong>0.069</strong> * (0.025)</td>
<td><strong>11.612</strong>* (0.468)</td>
<td><strong>9.874</strong>* (0.540)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Volatility (lagged)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.050)</td>
<td>0.042 (0.068)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.084 (0.033)</td>
<td><strong>0.181</strong>* (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in GDPpc</td>
<td><strong>0.206</strong> * (0.098)</td>
<td><strong>0.463</strong>* * (0.133)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.003)</td>
<td><strong>0.008</strong> * (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.064 (0.064)</td>
<td>0.138 (0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Age</td>
<td>-0.022 (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.026 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.014 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Period Length</td>
<td>0.056 (0.032)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.026 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.033 (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td><strong>6.776</strong> * (2.099)</td>
<td>-0.975 (2.665)</td>
<td><strong>-0.182</strong> * (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.068)</td>
<td><strong>112.776</strong>* (1.380)</td>
<td><strong>-6.227</strong> * (1.516)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.4898</td>
<td>0.3545</td>
<td>0.5923</td>
<td>0.2932</td>
<td>0.8834</td>
<td>0.8408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi²</td>
<td>88.44</td>
<td>62.07</td>
<td>152.62</td>
<td>46.87</td>
<td>880.27</td>
<td>590.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0.001
Seat-maximizing logic expects that while more inclusive reform should follow this pattern to reduce overall disproportionality, less inclusive reform should follow the opposite in that low disproportionality should predispose systems to increasing disproportionality following reform. The less inclusive reform outcome suggests either that elites have either made miscalculations regarding the eventual translation of votes into seats or perhaps those elites have alternative motivations, such as an ideological goal to make the system more representative or to reduce wasted votes, and thus even when it is strategically optimal to pursue greater disproportionality such elites do the opposite. The less inclusive coefficient is the only statistically significant of any reforms in both disproportionality models. In terms of intraparty reform, neither type is statistically significant in either disproportionality model. However, intraparty reforms should have little theoretical effect or relationship to overall disproportionality between parties in the system. As expected, changes in the size of the party system have the largest effect on disproportionality.

The results from Models AC and AD show little effect of either type of reform on medium-sized party success, except for candidate-centric reforms which have a positive and statistically-significant impact on seat-share of medium-sized parties. In contrast, Models AE and AF show a large, negative and significant impact of less inclusive inter-party reform on the outcome of the two largest parties’ collective seat-share. What is unusual is that, according to seat-maximizing logic, less inclusive reforms should increase the seat-share of the dominant parties in the system, but Model AE reveals a very large opposite effect. Yet this is also in line with the Indonesian case in 2004 in which the benefits of the reduced district magnitude were felt more by the medium-sized parties than the largest parties.
In Model AE candidate-centric reforms, though just barely missing statistical significance at the 0.05 level, have a large coefficient but positively-signed, suggesting that when a system shifts to greater candidate-centric selection processes the party system, measured in seat-shares, will become more consolidated. Presumably this would be the result of the largest parties being able to capitalize on the strength of individual candidate popularity and resources to win elections. Similarly, Model AD shows that medium-sized parties are more likely to feel positive effects of a shift to more candidate-centric systems since they may be able to rely, as small parties cannot, on the strength of particular candidates and resources to run candidate-centric campaigns.

Implications of Reform Effects

In terms of consequences of electoral reform for party system change, of particular note is the relative importance of intraparty reform in affecting the party system. This refutes the logic employed in previous studies that excluded the effect of intraparty reform elements when considering reform-induced change in party system size and composition. First, the traditional expectations of reform are supported: more inclusive reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation while less inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation (hypothesis 7a). However, this effect is only clear when the model accounts for intraparty reform as well as interparty reform. The lack of support for hypothesis 7a in models that only include interparty reforms suggests the limited nature of those models to account for the effects of reform on party system outcomes. In models that account for intraparty reform, candidate-centric reforms produce an increase in party system fragmentation as measured by statistical significance in both votes and seats (though to a
lesser degree in the seat-based than vote-based models), which supports hypothesis 7b. Party-centric reforms do not display the same effect on either vote- or seat-shares.

More inclusive reforms, long assumed to be adopted in seat-maximizing models to adapt to rising uncertainty rather than rising disproportionality, do produce a decrease in disproportionality but to a lower degree than less inclusive reforms, which are statistically significantly likely to reduce disproportionality. Thus refutes hypothesis 8, and provides no confirmation for aggregate use of alternative motivations that might reflect a greater desire to reduce distortion between party vote-share and seat-shares.

Finally, while both more and less inclusive interparty reforms are extremely likely to produce an increase in electoral volatility in post-reform elections, particularly in terms of change in vote or seat volatility, the effect is not as evident from intraparty reforms, providing support for only half of hypothesis 9. Thus, while intraparty reforms, particularly of a candidate-centric nature, are likely to raise the size of the party system, interparty reforms are likely to more generally raise uncertainty within the party system. Table 6.14 summarizes the expectations relative to the findings from the analysis of electoral reform effects on party system outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Met?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7a</td>
<td>More inclusive reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation while less inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7b</td>
<td>Candidate-centric reforms will produce an increase in party system fragmentation while party-centric reforms will produce a decrease in party system fragmentation.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>More inclusive reforms will produce a decrease in disproportionality while less inclusive reforms will produce an increase in disproportionality.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Any inter- or intra-party reform adoption will produce an increase in electoral volatility in the post-reform election.</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The results of the multi-country analysis suggest mixed support for the hypotheses generated by the iterated framework of electoral reform. While ratchet effects and a centralizing tendency are unmistakably important in understanding over-time reform, the causes of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations on the adoption of reform are less clear. The limited support for either seat-maximizing or alternative motivations as causal variables in predicting electoral reform suggest that other influential factors in the Indonesian case, particularly the role of civil society and international organizations as well as intervention of the courts, should be considered as testable factors in future analyses of the large-N dataset.

In terms of evaluating claims that intraparty reforms are less likely to impact party systems, the analysis suggests support for an interesting argument in the debate: while interparty reforms are more likely to generate volatility in the party system, increasing overall uncertainty regarding electoral outcomes, intraparty reforms are more likely to directly affect the size of the party system, particularly in the case of candidate-centric reforms increasing party system fragmentation. The findings suggest more work is needed to fully consider and unpack the effects of intraparty reform on various elements of party systems, especially in large-N comparisons of which this analysis represents an early attempt. Assumptions that there is no need to study intraparty reform in the same manner as interparty reform appear incorrect.

Overall the analysis suggests mixed support for the various expectations regarding the interaction between party system change and electoral reform. Though there is mixed evidence to support seat-maximizing logic as the dominant motivation, some of this finding may be due to the way in which party system size, change and uncertainty are measured.
Medium-sized parties may hold the key to a number of reform processes, since they are likely to be large enough to have a voice in debate but unlikely, by themselves, to be the driving force behind most reforms. The data also show that it is difficult to ascertain what a good proxy for seat maximizing logic might be in terms of predicting intraparty reform, since party system fragmentation may say very little about the power balance within parties that pushes some elites to pursue more or less candidate-centric reforms. The importance of the wave of democratization, particularly when predicting candidate-centric reform, suggests the need for a better indicator of policy diffusion across cases akin to the finding in the Indonesian case that international NGOs and aid donors made a measurable difference in the range of reform options discussed.

While there are limited quantifiable measures for alternative motivations, the finding that systems with high disproportionality tend to adopt more inclusive reforms suggests that reformers may be concerned with the distortion in vote-to-seat translation, rather than simply pursuing less inclusive reforms that would exacerbate the distortion effect. Finally, evidence of ratchet effects also suggests an additional constraint on reformers’ abilities to simply push systems to the extremes on the two dimensions of reform: a general centralizing tendency across cases is clear. These findings dovetail with the Indonesian case study showing that while reformers might pursue more extreme elements of electoral systems, such as a relatively high electoral threshold, there are potentially limits to the choices they can make given the context of democratization, open competition, and representation issues.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

I have argued that a theoretical framework combining seat-maximizing logic, alternative motivations and ratchet effects can help explain and more accurately predict the electoral reforms adopted in 34 countries from 1950 to 2010 than one focused on seat maximizing logic alone. While established theories focus primarily on seat-maximizing logic, which I find to be of utmost importance to most electoral reform processes, I include alternative motivations and ratchet effects to explain unexpected reform outcomes as well as constraints on seat-maximizing (and potentially abusive and undemocratic) change. In addition, I focus on an understudied aspect of the impact of reforms on party system change: I include the intraparty dimension of electoral systems when predicting whether and how party systems will change in elections following reform adoption.

I devised two sets of hypotheses to address the causes and effects of electoral reform on party system outcomes. In terms of causes of electoral reform, I expected that seat-maximization (hypothesis 1) and alternative motivations (hypothesis 2) would increase the likelihood of specific reform adoptions. I also hypothesized that the motivations of medium-sized parties in the system would have distinct effects compared to aggregate party system size (hypotheses 3a, 3b and 4). I expected that new democracies would be the more likely location of alternative motivations (hypothesis 5) and that ratchet effects would “lock in” certain reform options when the process stretched over multiple rounds of reform (hypotheses 6a and 6b). In terms of effects of electoral reform, I first hypothesized that reforms of a more inclusive or candidate-centric nature would increase the fragmentation
within a party system (hypotheses 7a and 7b). Then I expected that more seat-maximizing reforms should produce an increase in distortion between vote-shares and seat-shares across the party system (hypothesis 8) and concluded that reforms of either type or in either direction should produce a general increase in instability within the party system.

I found the most support for the hypotheses about ratchet effects in interparty reforms and the effects of reforms on party system fragmentation, and I found the least support for hypotheses about the exact nature of how medium-sized parties affect reform outcomes. However, both the Indonesian case study and the multi-country analysis suggested the importance of medium-sized parties in affecting reform outcomes and highlighted the difficulty in evaluating medium-sized parties as a group with common interests. Though both analyses provided some evidence of alternative motivations and clearer evidence of ratchet effects in iterated reform processes, there was more evidence than initially expected regarding the important role of seat-maximizing logic across the cases and multiple rounds of reforms. In particular, both analyses indicated the need for more sensitive measures, such as using medium-sized party seat-share instead of an aggregate party system size measurement, when evaluating seat-maximization explanations as well as those focusing on mechanisms that might constrain seat-maximization.

I explored this framework – drawing causal links, investigating the plausibility of and testing these hypotheses – in two distinct ways. First, I conducted a case study of Indonesian electoral reform in contiguous periods, from 1999 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2009. In the Indonesian case the complexities of seat-maximization across different types of parties explain some of the constraints on reformers in the earliest years of democracy, providing an interesting explanation as to how and why the reforms that have been adopted since 2003
have borne the constraints of that early period. Overall there is strong evidence of seat maximizing logic across all party types. At the same time, there is some evidence for ratchet effects and some parties in some cases pursuing alternative motivations. Alternative motivations were most evident in the actions of the PDI-P, perhaps because as a large party it risked its own survival less than small parties which could not risk elimination in pursuit of more ideological goals.

Then I performed statistical analyses of the hypothesized causes and effects of electoral reform, investigating the causal relationships between seat-maximization, alternative motivations, ratchet effects and electoral reforms. The analysis found mixed results and limited evidence to support seat-maximizing and alternative motivations, though ratchet effects did appear to constrain some electoral reform options quite well. The results of the analysis point to remaining challenges in cross-national tests of these arguments.

Specifically, I argue that while seat-maximization is an undeniably significant motivation in the adoption of electoral reform, acknowledging alternative motivations may be extremely important in understanding reform adoptions particularly in certain new democracies where a broader range of motivations might be at play. In the case of at least some new democracies alternative motivations may take the form of perspectives about the nature of representation in a democratic state or longer-term concerns about stability and peace, and these may complement or contradict seat-maximization or provide for constraints on how much seat-maximization may take place. In contrast, such constraints may not be as evident in established democracies because there are norms against or pre-existing rules limiting how much dominant parties can or will modify electoral rules to reduce or eliminate the competition.
In terms of temporal effects, recent events suggest that reform adoption may be an iterated process in many cases, as reformers learn from mistakes or pursue a course of gradual change rather than wholesale revision. In cases where the reform process occurs over time, constraints on later periods of reform may arise from choices made in previous periods. One example is the introduction of an electoral threshold that likely eliminates certain parties/voices, setting the stage for future reform periods in which retention (and even increase) of the threshold is the most likely outcome.

I distinguish between reforms that occur in contiguous (sequential) periods from those that occur in non-contiguous periods in order to explain why ratchet effects are more important in some cases than in others. In the case of contiguous period reforms, actors from one party are likely to be relatively similar and to retain broadly similar motivations across periods even though the reform context around them may change (i.e. other parties may grow in strength relative to them). In the case of non-contiguous reforms, especially when reforms occur more than a decade or two elections apart, actors from one party are likely to change and thus may change some of the party’s motivations and goals in addition to the changing reform context. Ratchet effects are much more likely to impact reformers in contiguous periods than non-contiguous periods.

The quantitative analysis bears out some of the refinements of the framework I have proposed, particularly in evaluating medium-sized party interests and ratchet effects on reform adoption. Of particular note is the fact that, especially when predicting less inclusive reforms, the share of seats held by medium-sized parties is a better (and more sensitive) predictor than is an aggregate measure of party system size. This suggests the benefits of disaggregating the interests of *subsets of parties*, by relative size and strength, in order to
understand reform adoptions more accurately. Rather than using a measure simply weighting the overall size of the system’s effective parties, we might look to evaluating the relevance of certain subsets of parties when predicting a range of electoral reform outcomes. Though the case study indicates that even within subsets of parties, such as medium-sized parties, there is likely to be variation in what is interpreted to be in a party’s seat-maximizing interests, the more sensitive measure I propose can be beneficial to understanding the limitations of established theories in cross-national analysis.

The quantitative analysis also draws attention to comparisons of the effects of both the interparty and intraparty dimensions of electoral systems on party system outcomes. While previous studies have focused on the effects of change along the interparty dimension on party system fragmentation and electoral volatility, my analysis includes a test for the effects of change along the intraparty dimension as well. I find that candidate-centric reforms have the largest measurable, and statistically significant, effect on increasing party system size, while less inclusive reforms have the largest measurable, and statistically significant, effect on increasing electoral volatility. The findings suggest that while interparty reforms are important for explaining overall and increasing electoral uncertainty, the intraparty reforms are important for explaining overall and increasing party system size. The implication of the finding is that intraparty reform has an effect on party systems in ways previous theory only assumed were affected by interparty reform. Thus, changes to the intraparty dimension need further study.

The Indonesian case further demonstrates the limitations of theories with respect to the motivations and outcomes of electoral reform which focus exclusively on short-term seat-maximization. Reforms to the election and party laws before every election since transition
produced a new legislative composition after each election. Existing “strong” or “strategic” party theories posited by the existing literature can only explain some of the reform pursuits as small parties have actively pursued electorally-detrimental reforms for ideological reasons. Few of the over-time changes that have occurred resulted from explicit reform “trajectories,” which have nonetheless appeared despite the lack of cohesion among the large parties regarding long-term goals of reform. Few of the reforms adopted reflect pure seat-maximization, as both the type of party and candidate elected have reflected few probable strategic pursuits of the large parties.

However, seat-maximization played a much larger role than originally anticipated, particularly in earlier reforms. While I expected that self-interest would emerge in later periods of reform in Indonesia, and indeed the degree to which party elites were capable of projecting and articulating their seat-maximizing goals increased in later rounds, seat-maximizing (or seat-preserving) interests were clearly at play even in the initial post-transition reform period. Parties of varying size and ideological positions pursued seat-maximization or seat-protectionist reforms in 2002 and again in 2007, though the reforms that different parties believed would produce the greatest electoral benefit varied.

From the start, Golkar pursued a majoritarian electoral system in the belief that the party would be the largest beneficiary. Perhaps due to the knowledge possessed by Golkar elites, who had spent years conducting (and often manipulating) elections, it is unsurprising that the party had the most accurate sense about the way to accomplish its seat-maximizing goals in the post-transition landscape. Even so, in the 2002-2003 period Golkar was forced into compromises regarding electoral reform because it was no longer the largest legislative party and also because of a general environment of democratizing reform (reformasi) that
encouraged consensus politics and protection of openly competitive politics. By 2007 those concerns faded and Golkar, again the largest legislative party, resumed its pursuit of more drastic changes to the electoral system.

In stark contrast, the PDI-P almost never strayed from key messages and goals regarding its overall view of the electoral system. Sometimes as a complement and sometimes in opposition to maximization of its legislative seat-share, the PDI-P pressed for continuation of a closed-list system of proportional representation with few limits to competitive entry. The goal of closed-list proportional representation, and the ideological views espoused by party leaders in favor of its retention, suggests a close marriage of seat-maximizing and alternative motivations for the PDI-P in both 2002 and 2007. However, resistance to a legislative entry threshold in 2002 and resistance to a legislative entry threshold above 2.5% in 2007 suggest that alternative motivations trumped seat-maximization to some degree. An entry threshold would almost certainly have reduced the size of the party system, increasing the PDI-P’s seat-share and providing incentives for smaller parties such as the PDS and other Christian, Catholic and minority parties to join the PDI-P. By 2010 PDI-P leadership finally allowed seat-maximization to take over its interests on the issue of the legislative entry threshold, joining Golkar and the PD in calling for a threshold at 4-5% in the latest round of reforms.

The smaller parties, almost to a letter, exhibited seat-maximizing strategies in nearly every area in both rounds of electoral reform. They were unanimously opposed to a legislative entry threshold, opposed increases in the past election vote thresholds, and generally opposed reduction of district magnitude. On the issue of open lists, small parties varied in whether they supported closed or open lists but mostly chose open lists since they
felt their popular candidates might fare better in a popularity contest than in a closed system where voters might be less familiar with their parties. As such, nearly all of the small parties always pursued reforms designed to minimize their seat losses and stave off their elimination from national politics. The one exception: upon joining the DPR in 2004 the PBR advocated for single-member districts as more democratic and directly linking parties to voters, despite observations that the party would never be able to win seats under such an electoral system.

The medium-sized parties displayed seat-maximizing strategies as well, though they were far less unified than the small parties in their interpretations of which reforms would benefit them the most. Furthermore, the PKS tended to side with the PDI-P on some issues that straddled the line between seat-maximizing and alternative motivations, though from the position of the PKS those goals tended to be purely seat-maximizing in outcome, such as keeping the legislative entry threshold relatively low in 2009. What is clear is that some of the medium-sized parties had more difficulty discerning what was in their seat-maximizing interests than did Golkar or the small parties, and the parties which were more successful at navigating seat-maximization strategies inevitably benefited from changes to the system in subsequent elections. The PKB and PPP, the leaders of which did not appear to fully understand the implications of some elements of reform in both periods and thus had somewhat confusing positions on specific changes, both suffered losses in the 2004 and 2009 elections. In contrast, the PAN, PD and PKS all improved or maintained their seat-shares and displayed a clearer understanding of specific elements of the electoral system that might maximize their electoral gains. The medium-sized parties not only had divergent interests on many issues, particularly when measured by seat-maximizing logic, but also displayed more variation in their understanding of how to assess their potential electoral gains and losses.
Finally, the iterated process of reform in Indonesia demonstrates a clear ratchet effect in the second (and current) reform periods based on constraints in the first round of reforms. The lack of adoption of a legislative entry threshold in 2003 proved to be the nail in the coffin for smaller parties, as the 2004 elections proved to the PDI-P the ineffectiveness of the past election vote threshold and the need for a stronger mechanism to simplify the party system. In the current period of reform the debate on the legislative entry threshold centered around two options pushed by the PDI-P, Golkar and PD. First, what level should the legislative entry threshold be raised to? And second, how should the legislative entry threshold be applied at the two subnational levels? Even the PAN and PKS admitted the likely outcome of raising the threshold rather than simple maintenance. Since none of the small parties remained there was no one to advocate removal of the threshold, and since the smallest parties (Hanura, Gerindra, PKB) had few seats among them they remained an ineffective counterweight to the large parties.

Similarly, the fixed district magnitude adopted for the 2004 elections provided Golkar a platform for further reductions in 2007, since the party’s attempt to push single-member districts continued to fail but slight reduction in the district magnitude ceiling could be argued for with an ideological rhetoric of linking voters more closely to local representatives. In the current reform period, the debate has been about once again lowering the district magnitude ceiling and perhaps a slight reduction in the floor, to something in the 2-6 or 2-7 seat range. There has been little advocacy for returning to larger districts, though nearly all parties besides the PD, Golkar and PDI-P have expressed concerns about the new reduction proposals. While the PAN once again favored some element of single-member districts, and
Golkar once again entertained notions of a mixed system the debate has focused on the size of districts and further magnitude reductions but still retaining proportionality.

On the issue of open lists, once the slight opening occurred in the 2004 elections it was difficult for many parties to advocate a return to closed lists, except the PDI-P who had always been opposed to openness and whose voters clearly did not mind putting their choices in the Party’s hands. Most parties in 2007 were still wary of fully-open lists, partly of course because all parties had leaders who worried about their most loyal members losing seats and being forced to pander to popular election contestants. The openness of the list created by the Court’s decision proved to have serious ramifications for some of the staunchest advocates of greater voter choice, such as Golkar, many of whose leaders promptly lost their seats to more popular candidates. As such, in the current period of reform only the PDI-P really advocated for a reclosure of the lists in part because many of its voters continued to cast votes for the Party itself and most of the PDI-P candidates winning seats in 2009 remained party loyalists. The PDI-P was later joined by the PKS whose leaders and party rhetoric followed closely with the PDI-P’s assertion that its internal hierarchy and development programs would produce the best-quality legislators to represent party and voter interests, and whose selected candidates were nearly all the first-listed by the Party anyway.

In sum, the Indonesian case study clearly raises questions about the utility of the way in which we evaluate the effect of seat-maximizing logic on electoral reform, both from theoretical and methodological standpoints. First, the Indonesian case suggests that seat-maximization is not the only factor determining the interests and pursuits of reformers, though it is a very important one. In order to gain a more complete picture, particularly in
how iterated reforms may change direction or be constrained by previous choices, we need to evaluate the role of alternative motivations and ratchet effects on reform outcomes.

Second, the Indonesian case demonstrates the wide range of reform pursuits that can be made, all with seat-maximization as the foundation for choices. Large, medium and small parties inevitably pursue different rules to prevent their elimination or maximize their share of seats available. It is important to conceive of more sensitive measures that can allow us to test the relationship between seat-maximizing pursuits and electoral reform in the aggregate. Increasing party system fragmentation as a proxy for rising uncertainty in Indonesia gave way to less inclusive reforms twice, the opposite of what existing theory would predict. The case indicates seat-maximization was very important to explaining the reforms adopted yet the established proxies lack predictive power, particularly in avoidance of classifying the interests of groups of parties by their relative size and strength within the system.

Finally, we have some sense of the range of systems that might result from reforms to the existing electoral rules: countries that begin at one or both ends of the two dimensions of electoral systems typically demonstrate a general convergence toward the center and away from the extremes. This is not to suggest that all reforms will inevitably end up in the center, and indeed there are some examples which move back toward the outside, such as France, Macedonia, and even Poland of late. However, the general framework may give us a better understanding of how newly democratic or democratizing countries might pursue reform. The framework may even extend to cases of opening electoral authoritarianism, such as in Malaysia and Singapore where the systems are really only one or two reforms away from greater (and more fair) electoral competition.
While it is unclear how such systems might reform, or whether they ever will, the unfair or uncompetitive elements in their elections are not simply confined to rules restricting competitors but are often linked to the general rules of the electoral game. In Malaysia, single-member districts and gerrymandering have allowed the Barisan Nasional (BN) ruling coalition to remain in power for five decades. A shift to greater proportionality, even an incremental shift, would drastically change the fortunes of the opposition. Though it is difficult to speculate on the independent impact of such a reform, election returns from the past ten years suggest that the ruling BN has remained in power not only through defamation and imprisonment of opposition leaders but also through extreme gerrymandering to avoid allowing the opposition to take hold in any particular electoral districts. Nevertheless, opposition vote-share has grown, threatening the BN in 2008 and providing hope for elections in 2013. A small change to the election rules would undoubtedly hand the BN its first electoral defeat and worst electoral performance yet, and could be followed by other incremental changes that the logic of ratchet effects suggest would drastically alter the system in a short period of time. A better understanding of the process of iterated electoral reform can inform us what systems might look like if even small reforms were initiated.

While critics of Indonesia’s democratic progress have cited the potential negative effects of constantly changing electoral rules of the game, raising concerns about the involvement of a perceived politicized Constitutional Court and ineptitude and politicization of the National Election Commission members, the system as of 2009 has managed to avoid or navigate some typical pitfalls of early democratic consolidation. First, though voter turnout has declined since 1999, from 93.3% in 1999 to 84.1% in 2004 to 71% in 2009, 71% is still comparable to many other new democracies including some with compulsory voting
mechanisms (e.g. Brazil at 82% in 2010 and Argentina at 72.4% in 2009). Indonesian voters have not stopped going to the polls, though some public opinion surveys indicate worrying trends in rising levels of voter apathy and lack of voter identification with political parties.\textsuperscript{144}

Second, in a country as diverse as Indonesia, it would not be surprising to witness communal violence during and immediately after the political opening associated with a democratic transition. This expectation could be even more the case in Indonesia where the nationalist state-building project spanned more than four decades and was very tightly enforced under the authoritarian New Order regime. However, though intergroup violence flared up in the early 2000s, it tended to stay localized and eventually abated. A key part of the reason for the decline in violence relates to the flexibility of the Indonesian electoral system to continue to include many different voices without freezing political identities too much, combined with decentralization policies that have allowed for localized control of government. While some post-conflict, post-authoritarian states have adopted highly segmented political systems that reinforce in-group/out-group identification, the Indonesian system has emerged with few parties advocating for strict “us versus them” mentality. In other words, though the party system is large, and by some accounts weakly institutionalized, parties have provided voters many options and few of the options include a narrow interpretation of who or what it means to be Indonesian.

The very adaptability provided by the possibility and employment of electoral reforms, the ones that so often concern social scientists because of the propensity of undemocratic actors to abuse and rollback progress, has enabled Indonesia's democratization

\textsuperscript{144} Poll figures reported on the same day in two separate news dailies from two separate survey firms. Results from the Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) were published in The Jakarta Post and results from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS-Jakarta) were published in The Jakarta Globe on February 13, 2012.
progress. We know that a great deal more fragmentation would exist within the party system and that consolidation and party institutionalization would likely be hampered with the inclusion of many of the fifteen parties from the 1999-2004 and 2004-2009 legislative periods if not for recently adopted reforms. Even though nine effective parties is still quite a large party system, in a country as diverse as Indonesia a small party system would likely eliminate a subset of voices, diminishing the quality of representation. Whether the parties become more institutionalized and continue to represent the populations they profess to represent remains to be seen, but the changes thus far have been ones that have allowed democratization and stabilization to progress, even if significant issues remain.

While not all electoral reforms serve the purpose of helping to consolidate democratic institutions, the Indonesian case and a number of others in the cross-national analysis provide evidence of democratic durability during reforms. In some cases democracy can be undone or undermined by changes to the structure and quality of elections, suggesting both the theoretical and normative importance of institutional “stickiness.” Yet in many cases analyzed in this study, the process of electoral reform provided elites chances to fix or correct for perceived flaws in the function of democratic governance and representation. The inflexibility of many systems prevents changes that might more accurately reflect voter choice and representation, as highlighted by failed reform process in countries such as the United Kingdom. Through the Indonesian case study and quantitative analysis herein I have demonstrated that reforms may be pursued by elites with mixed motivations and subject to a range of constraints. Analyzing these mixed motivations is important to achieving a better understanding of the process of and outcomes produced by reforms, even as this analysis also highlights that in some cases the potential benefits of reform have been underestimated.
APPENDIX A. List of Field Interviews

The title or affiliation listed is accurate at (or close to) the time of the interview, unless otherwise noted. For those individuals who I interviewed more than twice or who consistently shared their expertise with me I have not listed a date and have listed some of their most important affiliations.

Faisal Akbar, Hanura fraksi 2009-2014 from South Sulawesi, November 2010.

Kuskridho Ambardi, University of Gadjah Mada and the Indonesian Survey Institute.

Titi Anggraini, Perludem, March 2009, December 2010.


Ferry Mursydan Baldan, Nasional Demokrat and former Golkar DPR representative (1999-2009) from West Java, October 2010.

Anies Baswedan, Paramadina University, February 2010.

Hamid Basyib, Expert Staff to the Chairman of the MPR and PDI-P member (former PDI-P candidate 2009 General Elections), March 2010.

Arif Budimanta, PDI-P fraksi 2009-2014 from West Java, July 2010.

Yudi Chrisnandi, Hanura Central Board and former Golkar Central Board member, July 2010.

Chosin Chumaidy, PPP Central Board and former PPP DPR representative (1999-2009) from West Java, November 2010.


Hanif Dakiri, PKB fraksi 2009-2014 from Central Java and former NDi-Jakarta representative, July 2010.

Cecep Effendi, Ministry of Home Affairs.


Kevin Evans, former UNDP consultant, March 2009.

Frank Feulner, Parliamentary Advisor from the UN Development Program section in Jakarta, February 2010.

Hadar Gumay, Director of the Center for Electoral Reform (CETRO).

Mestariyani Habie, Gerindra *fraksi* 2009-2014 from South Sulawesi, December 2010.


Refly Harun, Center for Electoral Reform (CETRO), March 2010.

Miriam Haryani, Hanura *fraksi* 2009-2014 from West Java, November 2010.

Muhaimin Iskandar, Minister of Labor and Transmigration and former PKB DPR representative (1999-2009) from East Java, November 2010.


Yassona Laoly, PDI-P *fraksi* 2004-2014 from North Sumatera, November 2010.


Saiful Mahsun, PKB Central Board and former PKB DPR representative (2004-2009), November 2010.


Anis Matta, Vice Chairman of the DPR and PK/PKS *fraksi* 2004-2014 from South Sulawesi, July 2010.


Indra Piliang, Golkar Party Central Board, July 2010.


Paul Rowland, National Democratic Institute-Jakarta.

Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Vice Chairman of the DPR and PPP fraksi 1999-2009 from Central Java, July 2010.


Valina Singka Subekti, Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Indonesia and former KPU Commissioner (2001-2007), April 2010, June 2010.

Agun Gunanjar Sudarsa, Golkar fraksi 1999-2014 from West Java, November 2010.


Bima Aria Sugiarto, PAN Central Board, July 2010.

Eva Sundari, PDIP fraksi 205-2014 from West Java, July 2010.

Supriarna, KPU Technical Bureau, August 2010.


Andrew Thornley, former International Republican Institute.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reform explanation</th>
<th>Inter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Reform institutes mixed system with 71% two-round single-member districts and 29% list proportional, and reapportioning mechanisms with a 4% threshold for proportional seats. This results in more inclusivity from the previous entirely two-round single-member district system and a more party-centric system with the introduction of proportionality seats.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Reform enhances majoritarian elements by adding 15 more majoritarian seats to the legislature, which increases the imbalance between the plurality and proportionality mechanisms, and moderately raises the legislative entry threshold. This results in an overall reduction in inclusivity (between both increases, not individually).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Reform returns to 71% single-member district/29% list proportional split by removing the newly-added 15 single-member district seats from the 1996 election, and reducing the threshold back to 2.5% for individual parties and 4% for coalitions. This results in an overall increase in inclusivity (by including both increases, not individually).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Reform shifts to full proportional system in 12 multi-member districts for all 140 seats, plus thresholds of 3% individual party and 5% coalition thresholds. This results in an overall increase in inclusivity due to the large shift in seats determined by proportionality rather than pluralism (from 40 of 140 to 140 of 140 seats now determined by proportionality) which more than offsets a minor increase in the entry threshold; also results in more party-centric system.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Reform via the new constitution shifts from the majority of seats allocated in single-member districts to the majority of seats allocated in proportional multi-member districts prior to the 2003 elections. This results in a more inclusive and party-centric system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>From D'Hondt to double quotient formula for seat allocation. This results in less proportional seat distribution from votes since a party needs at minimum a full quota to get remainder seats, whereas with D’Hondt parties failing to get a full district quota can still receive remainder seats.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>From double quotient to Sainte-Lague formula for seat allocation. This reform results in more proportional seat distribution since a party does not need to receive a full quota to get any seats, and the formula is more favorable to small parties relative to double quotient as well as the d'Hondt formula.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>From proportional lists at regional level to mixed member proportional split between regional single-member districts and one national PR tier, with reapportioning mechanism. Also instituted a 3% threshold for the mixed lists. This reform results in a single large proportional district, which is more proportional overall, but the move to single-member district seats plus the implementation of a fixed legislative entry threshold results in generally less proportionality and inclusiveness, and results in a more candidate-centric system through the single-member regional districts.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Refinements to the &quot;top-up&quot; aspect of the mixed apportioning and using d'Hondt to allocate list seats. This results in a more flexible relationship between the nominal and regional tiers, and the law provides that &quot;party or parties receiving the lowest share of seats shall be deprived of seats&quot; because the national tier determines overall seats, not regional lists. With the threshold this results in less inclusivity.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>From mixed parallel to entirely list proportional. Results in more inclusive and party-centric system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>From entirely proportional to mixed parallel system. Results in less inclusive system and more candidate-centric with addition of single-member districts.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Reform to reduce the magnitude of districts and the overall size of legislature, plus creation of districts for indigenous groups. Results in overall reduction of inclusiveness due to the redistricting and shrinking availability of legislative seats.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Reform allowing parties to only submit one list per district but parties have the option to allow their list to be open to voter choice rather than nationally-mandated closed lists for allocating seats. Results in an overall move toward more candidate-centric, rather than party-centric, control over seat allocation.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>From 50% single-member district/50% proportional seat division to a majority of seats determined by proportionality-based mechanism. Results in more inclusive system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Score 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>pre-2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>From mixed reapportioning to entirely list proportional, with some redistricting to combine single-member districts into multi-member list-based districts. This results in a more inclusive and party-centric system due to the shift to total list proportionality.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>More reforms were originally planned, but eventually the reform process resulted in an increased legislative entry threshold, a switch from the Droop quota to the Hare seat allocation formula, and a slight decrease in district magnitude with an overall increase in the number of electoral districts. This results in offsetting inclusivity effects of the increased legislative entry threshold and switch from Droop quota to Hare seat allocation formula.</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reform adds seats to increase the overall size of the house and district magnitude marginally increases from 4 to 5. This results in overall increase in inclusivity (between both increases, not individually).</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reform introduces preferential voting for lower house candidates on the party lists, plus creation of new electoral districts by subdividing the 8 largest districts from the previous set. This results in a more candidate-centric system that justifies scoring the intraparty shift, while the district subdivision alone does not affect nationwide allocation enough to justify scoring interparty reform shift.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reform results in increased overall congress size, and switch from list proportional representation in the mixed national-regional system to plurality in multi-member districts but retains the national district for one final election. This results in less proportionality offset by the increase in the overall number of seats available to competitors.</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reform produces effective elimination of the national district (nominal tier) and a switch to d'Hondt formula for allocating list seats. This results in declining inclusivity because system is now entirely based on small multi-member district plurality without a single large district for small party representation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reform increases overall congress size and creates a same-ballot national constituency for 1/4 of seats. This results in a more inclusive system as there are more seats available and an increase in proportionality at the national tier level.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Reform Description</td>
<td>Change in Inclusivity</td>
<td>Change in Candidate-Centricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>From two-round system to proportional representation for all seats of the lower house. This results in a more inclusive system and more party-centric by taking away the direct vote choice under the two-round system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>From proportional representation to two-round system for all seats of the lower house. This results in a less inclusive system and more candidate-centric by reinstating the direct voter choice.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>From the entirely two-round system inherited from the pre-democratic soviet era to a mixed system with list proportional seats. This results in a more inclusive and party-centric system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>From proportional with D'Hondt allocation formula to mixed system with realapportioning mechanism in closed lists; the list seats are allocated by the D'Hondt formula with a 5% threshold or 1 district seat outright for the PR seats. This results in less inclusivity due to shift from all seats proportional to majority plurality; also more candidate-centric with shift to single-member districts from pure party lists.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Reform slightly increases legislative entry threshold to a 3 district seat minimum, plus linking between national and state pools where the state-level voteshares are pooled to determine the national proportion for seats then allocated at state level with state candidates. This results in greater inclusivity due to state-level determinants that allow for more competition among smaller and regional parties.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Reform produces increase in overall size of legislative house. This results in a more inclusive system as there are more seats available for competition.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Reform reduces size of legislative house and introduces fixed, separate votes for national and district deputies (as in a parallel ballot system). This results in less inclusive system because there are fewer seats available for competition and separate ballot results in a system typically benefitting largest parties at expense of including smaller parties.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Reform increases the overall size of the legislature. This results in a more inclusive system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Reform increases overall house size and increases district magnitude, average from 4.6 to 7.4. This results in an overall increase in inclusivity (between both increases, not individually).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Change Description</td>
<td>Rating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>From proportional with closed and blocks to open list panachage in which voters can vote for as many candidates as there are seats in that electoral district and can select candidates from among the different party lists rather than from a single one. This results in a shift to a more candidate-centric intraparty system.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>From closed to semi-open proportional lists where voters now have choice of individual candidates on the ballots but candidates must receive a full allocation quota in their district to win the seat outright if not ordered high enough on their party list, plus a moderate reduction in district magnitude, and the creation of population-based electoral districts within provincial administrative boundaries. This results in a more inclusive system with reduction in district magnitude and de-coupling of province-level seat calculations; results in a more candidate-centric system as voters are offered direct choice of legislators.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>From semi to fully-open list proportional with a slight reduction in average district magnitude, with the floor remaining at 3 but the ceiling dropping from 12 to 10, and the introduction of a 2.5% legislative entry threshold. This results in a less inclusive system, due primarily to the threshold, and more candidate-centric with the shift to complete voter choice from lists.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>From list proportional to mixed with majority of seats based on single-member district plurality. This results in a less inclusive system and more candidate-centric with shift from all proportional to majority plurality seats.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>From mixed to list proportional. This results in more inclusive system and more party-centric with shift to full proportionality.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>From single non-transferrable vote to mixed parallel ballot with majority of seats based on single-member plurality. This results in more inclusivity and more party-centric with shift away from entirely plurality-based elections.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>pre-2000</td>
<td>From two-round single-member districts to mixed system with proportionality-based seats. This results in a more inclusive and party-centric system with the addition of proportional seats rather than a purely majoritarian system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Changes</td>
<td>Inclusivity Impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>From majoritarian to mixed system with 71% single-member district seats and 29% list proportional seats with D'Hondt seat allocation formula and 5% threshold for proportional seats. This results in more inclusive system by addition of proportional seats, which offsets the threshold since the previous majoritarian system had a much higher effective threshold due to its plurality-based nature; also results in a more party-centric system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>From mixed system to fully proportional with six multi-member districts with 20 representatives per district. This results in a more inclusive and party-centric system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Reform limits the majority party to 70% seats in lower house and the fully-split ballot for the parallel system is introduced. Results in more inclusivity.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Reforms allow any party with at least 35% of both ballots to get an absolute majority of seats but the majority party is limited to 60% of seats even if it receives more than 60% popular vote. This results in more inclusivity as it caps the total proportion of seats automatically going to a single party, making more seats overall available to competitors.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Reform eliminates the 35% rule with no more guaranteed majority party. This results in a more inclusive and competitive system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Reform increases the legislative entry threshold increased slightly and no party can get more than 8% more seats of votes it gets except if it wins those seats in the plurality ballots; also introduces 5 national multi-member districts to replace the single nationwide district for the PR side of parallel ballot. This results in an overall increase in inclusivity by reducing the weight of the “top-up” part of the parallel format and by subdividing the national districts which, given the entry threshold, may enable rather than limit small party competition when regionalized.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>From a preferential single-member district system to mixed system with reapportioning. This results in a more inclusive system and more party-centric with addition of list proportional seats.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Reform changes to a new seat allocation formula favoring small parties more than the allocation formula of previous system. This results in an increase in inclusivity.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Reform Description</td>
<td>Inclusivity Impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Reform reduces overall district size but combined with the creation of national constituency to balance representation. This results in an offset between more and less inclusive elements.</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Reform separates the ballots for each house and changes from a single national district to 18 multi-member districts corresponding to administrative districts and the capital. This results in a decrease in inclusivity due to shrinking district magnitude.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Reform from 25 multi-member districts to a single national district but the size of lower house is reduced from 180 to 120 seats. This results in an offset of more and less inclusive mechanisms.</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Reform returns from a national district to 25 multi-member districts. This results in less inclusivity.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Reform adopts open list proportionality, shift away from the majoritarian Soviet-era system, with Hare/St-Lague allocation formula. This results in a more inclusive system but, although adopting a list-based system, the fully open lists leave the system more or less the same level of candidate-centricity as the prior majoritarian system.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Reform switches to D'Hondt seat allocation formula and reduces the district magnitude floor from 7 to 3, with the legislative entry threshold at 5%. This results in a less inclusive system.</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Reform shifts to closed proportional lists and switches back to Sainte Lague from D'Hondt seat allocation formula, plus a reduction in the district magnitude ceiling (from 69 to 19) matched by a slight increase in the district magnitude floor (from 3 to 7). This results in a more inclusive and more party-centric system with complete closure of proportional lists taking away from direct voter choice of candidates.</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Reform reduces district magnitude and switches from Hare to D'Hondt seat allocation formula, establishes a 3% legislative entry threshold and a higher coalition threshold. This results in an offset of more and less inclusive mechanisms.</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Switch from proportional to “mixed” system where districts are single-member majority voting, but districts without a majority winner are returned to a county-level pool of party list proportionality where seats are allocated from the general pool (of non-majority won seats across districts within the county)</td>
<td>-1 -1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
using the D'Hondt formula and a 5% threshold to the parties' candidates with highest individual vote totals in the single-member district voting (i.e. largest remainders calculated at the county level would be distributed to party individuals in that district). This results in a less inclusive system with a switch away from entirely proportional seat allocation, and a shift toward a more candidate-centric system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reform Summary</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>From majoritarian two-round Soviet-era system to a mixed parallel with 5% threshold and closed lists for proportional seats. This results in a more inclusive and party-centric system.</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Reform increases district magnitude by collapsing all four national electoral districts into one large district. This result is a more inclusive system.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Reform introduces a 4% legislative entry threshold, following the failure of reform to purely or partly majoritarian system. This results in a less inclusive system due to threshold adoption.</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Reform eliminates majority-assured provision in the mixed system by linking single-member district and list votes. This results in more inclusivity by constraining “top-up” benefits to dominant parties.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>From proportional to mixed system with majority of seats based on single-member plurality. This results in a less inclusive and more candidate-centric system with shift away from entirely list proportional seats.</td>
<td>-1 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>From a majoritarian to a mixed system. This results in a more inclusive and party-centric system.</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>From a mixed system to fully proportional. This results in a more inclusive and party-centric system.</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Reform from proportional to mixed format with a 35% single-member district/65% proportional seat split, with votes from the two legislative chambers on split ballots. This results in a decrease in inclusivity with large shift to plurality-based seats; also shifts to more candidate-centric with single-member districts.</td>
<td>-1 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Reform shifts from 35/65 to 50/50 single-member/proportional representation split, with some multi-member district creation out of single-member districts that are too large for a single seat but cannot be divided since the constitution stipulates those districts must use the plurality method of election. This results in offsetting more and less inclusive mechanisms.</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C. The Dataset Codebook

The dataset constructed for this analysis is composed of 34 countries: Albania, Armenia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Thailand, Ukraine, and Venezuela. The cases are selected for their inclusion on the basis of a) being part of a set already evaluated for reform propensity and outcome, and b) having at least some episode of reform during the 1950-2010 time period. The primary sources for case selection come from Shugart and Wattenburg (2001), Birch et al. (2002), Remmer (2008), and Renwick (2010). Indonesia is the only case addition not mentioned or analyzed in one of these four primary sources, partly due to its geographic location and the fact that it had not experienced democratic transition until 1999, at least five years after the next youngest case. Other cases of reform or, in most instances, failed reform are not discussed at length in the manuscript or included in the dataset, the most notable being the failed and non-binding reform referendum in the United Kingdom in 2011.

Case selection

The reason for selecting only cases in which at least one reform episode occurred is two-fold. First, it is misleading to suggest that electoral reform is possible in any country under any circumstances. The scholarly literature has demonstrated numerous constraints on the possibility, let alone the propensity, to reform. Such explanations range from high levels of veto players to high barriers to amendment of the constitution, among other concerns. As such, countries who have never experienced reform during their democratic history are not candidates for comparison not only because they have never achieved reform; there may in fact be some particular institutional aspect of their political system that practically prohibits reform. This is not to suggest that reform must always be possible but rather must not always be impossible.

The second reason is that it is difficult to know the exact circumstances and processes of reform debates that never produced reform in countries that are not included in the dataset. Perhaps many countries entertain the notion of reform but do not pursue it for various strategic, ideological and/or institutional reasons. While this is by no means an exhaustive list of countries and electoral reforms across region and time, by selecting cases in which reform has occurred at least once but span geographic and temporal distance there is some commonality (at least one episode of reform in the dependent variable per case, and many episodes in which the dependent variable is ‘no reform’) and some contextual and structural diversity (i.e. neighbors, international influences, economic crises and development levels, transition mode, and demographics, to name just a few).

Observations: Measurement Issues

The dataset contains at minimum two observations for each country spanning at minimum ten years of democratic rule, since for each observation data from multiple electoral periods is needed to calculate lagged variables and variables designed specifically to measure some
aspect of change over time. Each country is coded from the election period (see below for explanation of coding observations) prior to the adoption of its first reform through the last election up until 2009, for most countries observations actually begin more than ten years prior to the first reform whenever data was available since multiple prior elections are necessary for the coding of independent variables of interest.

There are three exceptions to the coding through the last pre-2009 election period: Russia, which stops with the 2003 elections, Thailand which stops with the 2006 elections, and Venezuela, which stops with the 200 elections. In each of these three cases the countries are coded from the earliest free and fair post-transition election period available (Russia in 1993, Thailand in 1992, and Venezuela in 1978, which is the earliest election for which reliable and comparable data could be obtained) up until it is clear that the electoral system is subject to fraud and competition constraints or has been altered in such a way as to prohibit electoral competition, or the democratic regime has been replaced with military rule. There are other cases which have breaks in the quality of elections during their panels of observations, such as Georgia in the 2004 elections, which remain as part of the dataset due to their immediate reversion to free and fair elections and/or retention of other structural aspects of democratic institutions and rule. Alternative models have been run without the 2004 and 2008 Georgian election period observations, with no substantive change to the results. Table 2.1 lists all cases and observations periods in the set.

Each observation in the dataset represents a single inter-election period, meaning the observation begins after the conclusion of an election in time $t$ and ends with the conclusion of an election in time $t+1$. For example, the data measurements for observation ‘Bulgaria 2005’ include events occurring during the period from July 2001 (the month after the conclusion of the previous election in June 2001) until July 2005 (the month with the next sequential elections). All variables for this observation occur during this period or, in the case of lagged variables, the period immediately prior to it; in this case observation ‘Bulgaria 2001’ from May 1997 to June 2001 contains the lagged data for the observation ‘Bulgaria 2005.’ To control for variation in the length of time covered in each observation, two controls – for the number of years and number of months between the end of the previous election period and the conclusion of the current election period – have been included and run with the models; nonetheless, they prove statistically insignificant in nearly all analyses. Given that the overwhelming majority of election reform processes happen only once during an inter-election cycle – and indeed, it would seem less useful to measure reform as an outcome or precursor to party system change if the reform did not happen in the election following its adoption – this method of coding observations as single inter-election periods makes theoretical sense. In addition, given the number of variables of interest which remain constant during the course of an inter-electoral period, this method of coding each inter-electoral cycle naturally avoids methodological concerns that arise from lack of variation on multiple independent variables for multiple observations in which there is also no change on the dependent variable. Rather than code observations annually, during which there is no or little variation on the majority of variables in the model for years at a time, or coding blocks of time in 3, 5 or 10 years, which either suffer from the same lack of variation in short lengths or fail to capture electoral change in the longer periods, the practice of coding by
inter-electoral cycle avoids both methodological complications and substantive concerns about matching the statistical model to the theoretical question.

With respect to the few variables that can be coded as annual data, such as controls for economic growth and urbanization, two alternative sets have been coded. The first is an annual code for the year of the election; in the example of observation ‘Bulgaria 2005’ this data is coded for the year 2005, though much of it is taken from sources such as the IMF and World Bank and the data that is available often spans a less sensitive time period than true annualized data. The second is an average code for the years in the inter-electoral period; in the example of observation ‘Bulgaria 2005’ this data is an average of the values from years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. Models were primarily run with the former set based on the annual data from the year of the election.

**Dependent Variable: Electoral Reform**
The dependent variable of interparty reform has been coded categorically, with three possible values: no reform (the base category in the multinomial logistic regressions), more inclusive reform (i.e. more proportional, lower barriers to legislative entry, fewer constraints on legislative entry), and less inclusive reform (i.e. more majoritarian, higher barriers to legislative entry, greater constraints on legislative entry). All reforms of this nature refer specifically to the electoral and allocation rules for seats in the lower (or only) house of the national legislature.

A second set of dependent variable codes account for intraparty reform but are not run in multinomial logistic regression models due to the lack of observations necessary for the statistical computations. This version of the dependent variable is also coded categorically, with three possible values: no reform, more party-centric (or less candidate-centric), and more candidate-centric (or less party-centric). These are evaluated qualitatively as there is some variance on this dependent variable aside from the reform/no reform dichotomy. Significantly fewer cases of this type of reform have previously been identified, a fact which is largely due to the lack of scholarly attention to “minor” reforms as characterized by Lijphart and which include reforms along the intraparty dimension. These initial codes of this dependent variable represent the first attempt to systematically account for their occurrence and the factors that might affect their likelihood of adoption.

The data for all reforms come from analysis of the electoral laws and constitutions pertaining to each individual country, supplemented with secondary sources and translations where original or English-language (when necessary) documents were not available. A comprehensive list of these sources for each case follows in Appendix C.

**Independent Variables: Party System Attributes and Democratic Age**
In the majority of models I include some combination of the following independent variables, removing and/or alternating with other variables or measurements when collinearity issues arise. First are two variables of effective party system size: the effective number of parties by vote-share (ENPV) and the effective number of parties by seat-share (ENPS), which are
sometimes referred to in the literature as the ‘effective number of electoral parties’ and the ‘effective number of parliamentary parties,’ respectively. These are both calculated using Laakso and Taagepera’s formula for effective number of parties, and for both I have included single measurements of independents (aggregated into a single number) and other parties (when data availability did not permit a more sensitive measure of exact votes or seats going to usually very small parties) in the calculations. These measures are both continuous and their values range from 1.9 to 12.9 (ENPV) and 1.2 to 10.9 (ENPS). Laakso and Taagepera’s measure is calculated (for voteshare, in the example) as follows:

\[
\text{ENPV} = \frac{1}{\sum v^2}
\]

Independents and others tend to be relatively small numbers (typically less than 3% of seats or votes) and their inclusion into the ENPV and ENPS calculations make for less confusing interpretation of the model results, so with an eye toward consistency in construction of these variables I have simply included them. In 16 of the 244 observations more than 4% of seats eventually went to independent candidates, a complication for measures designed to assess party system size and concentration. These have been included and calculated in the same way as all other observations, particularly given that they all occur in countries employing mixed electoral systems and thus their exclusion or calculation via a different metric might result in biased results for the models. While I recognize the theoretical limitations of measuring and coding these systems according to the same formula as the remaining observations, for the sake of statistical consistency I have remained agnostic about the theoretical implications with the caveat that this particular measurement issue suggests that any statistical models attempting to aggregate across such diverse systems should be taken with a modicum of skepticism.

Second are two variables measuring change over time of the party system size: Change in ENPV and Change in ENPS, which are simply the value of ENPV/S in time \( t \) subtracted from the value of ENPV/S in time \( t+1 \). Each of these variables are also coded as continuous measures and range from -16.5 to 4.6 (ENPV) and -10.7 to 7.5 (ENPS). For each observation the change between the one-previous election and the two-previous election are coded for vote-share, the change between the one-previous and two-previous are coded for seat-share, and the two-previous and three-previous are coded for seat-share. These are the primary variables to test the hypotheses that rising or declining uncertainty strategically motivates pressures for and adoptions of electoral reform.

Third are two variables measuring the level of disproportionality within a given electoral system: the disproportionality between vote-share and seat-share in a given election and the change in disproportionality between electoral periods, measured as the value of disproportionality in time \( t \) subtracted from the value of disproportionality in time \( t+1 \). The disproportionality scores are calculated using the standard Gallagher formula, which produces continuous measures ranging from 0.8 to 37.8, and the Change in Disproportionality is a continuous measure ranging from -30.6 to 29.7. The Gallagher Index is calculated via the following formula:
Disproportionality = $\sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (V - S)^2}$

Fourth are two variables measuring the aggregate level of turnover in the electoral and party systems via votes (voteshare volatility) and seats (seatshare volatility) between given elections. These values are commonly calculated via the Pedersen Index and produce a continuous measure falling between a 0 to 100 range, with 0 representing no turnover and 100 representing total turnover in votes or seats between parties and candidates in the system. The volatility scores in this sample range from 4 to 99.95 (for votes) and 3.02 to 100 (for seats), and the change in these measures vary by the same amounts. The Pedersen Index is calculated (for voteshare, in the example) via the following formula:

$$\text{Volatility} = \frac{\sum abs(v_{t+1} - v_t)}{2}$$

Finally is the variable calculating the age of democracy, measured in years, which is used to account for experience with democratic competition as well as to proxy for the long-term stability and consistency of democratic institutions. The assumption in the literature is that as democracies become older and their institutions more entrenched and routinized, the less volatility the system should experience overall. Hence, all else equal as democratic age increases there should be less electoral and seat volatility, less party system change, and less pressure for electoral reform. The base variable is measured in years from the point of transition (rather than the point at which the case passes some threshold score on another indicator of democracy, such as Polity or Freedom House) and is a continuous measure ranging from 0 to 151. However, since only New Zealand passes 62 years of democracy and does so before its data series even begins, the raw values are used rather than a logged value. Alternative models have been run with the logged values and produce relatively similar results in most models.

*Control Variables: Economic Factors*

Three control variables are coded for each observation. The first control is for broad economic performance that might affect voter and elite perceptions about the necessity or increasing pressure for change in the political system. To account for fluctuations in economic growth and development, two different measures are included in various models: GDP per capita growth and unemployment rate, both measured annually. Rather than simply including change in GDP per capita, which might not be the most sensitive metric of public dissatisfaction with economic performance, the unemployment rate provides an alternate measure. Due to relatively high collinearity, most models employ only one of the two, usually change in GDP per capita which is the more commonly-used in the scholarly literature. Change in GDP per capita is measured continuously and ranges from -9.6 to 10.1; the unemployment rate is also measured continuously and ranges from 1.1 to 36. All data for all years of these economic controls come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database published by the World Bank and last accessed on September 15, 2011.
The second control measures the level of urbanization in a country, via a measure of the percent of the country’s population living in an urban area defined by a population of 1 million or greater. The measure is designed as an additional structural control to account for predominantly rural versus predominantly urban populations in the sample. The measure is a continuous variable ranging from 29.7 to 89.7. It is only sometimes included in models as an additional control and is never explanatory from the standpoint of statistical significance. The data for this indicator also comes from the WDI database from the World Bank and was last accessed on September 15, 2011; it is unavailable for the German case from 1949-1959 in a standardized format.

The third control is the length of the inter-election period, measured in months. Despite the theoretical and methodological reasons for using inter-election period-based observations, controlling for the length of time that has elapsed between elections provides an additional control regarding the potential direct effect of time on propensity for and adoption of reform. In addition, the length of time control also proxies system instability since very short inter-electoral periods often signal government failure (i.e. successful no confidence procedures) and internal party system instability and high uncertainty. Since all inter-election periods fall between the range of 6 to 76 months but, since only three fall under 12 and five fall over 60, the control variable is measured continuously in the number of months rather than a logged value. An alternative measure, the number of years, is not particularly sensitive with respect to variation and thus is not used in any of the models.
APPENDIX D. List of Electoral and Data Sources

Albania

Armenia

Bolivia

Bulgaria

Colombia
Croatia


Czech Republic


Dominican Republic


Ecuador


El Salvador

France

Georgia

Germany

Guatemala

Honduras
Indonesia

Election returns: 1999-2009 from the Indonesian National Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*). Reform information from primary source legal documents including general (legislative) election laws number 2 year 1999, number 12 year 2003, and number 10 year 2008; the 1945 Constitution and Amendments from year 2002. All documents have been translated and interpreted solely by the author of the dataset.

Italy


Japan


Lithuania


Macedonia

Mexico

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Paraguay

Peru

Poland
Romania


Russia


Slovak Republic


Slovenia


South Korea

Thailand


Ukraine


Venezuela

APPENDIX E. Replication of Previous Studies

Replication of both Remmer (2008) and Colomer (2005) was difficult due to the nature of the two studies’ data structures. While Remmer’s data was coded annually, Colomer only analyzed a single point in time: the time period during which reform occurred. As a result, replication proved challenging for both analyses. I was more successful in replication for Remmer’s design, particularly in the case of assessing the impact of electoral reform on party system fragmentation and stability.

Table E1 provides a summary of the results from a replication of Remmer’s study in estimating electoral reform outcomes. As Remmer does, I run two independent multinomial logit analyses: estimates of electoral reform by vote-share (row 2) and estimates of electoral reform by seat-share (row 3). In column 2 I present the significant findings from Remmer’s study, column 3 shows my replication of her analysis using her coding of the dependent variable (electoral reform outcome) for the Latin American cases during her time period (1978-2002), column 4 shows a replication of her basic model using a revised coding of the dependent variable and for the time period 1978-2010, column 5 shows a replication of her basic model using the expanded universe of my dissertation dataset from 1950-2010 and replacing change in GDP with change in GDP per capita, which is highly correlated with change in GDP but is more readily available for more cases over the expanded time period. Column 5 is based on the same analysis in Table 6.4 of chapter 6, and serves as the base model in the dissertation’s quantitative analysis that I then expand to include new variables. The only case omission is Panama, which I do not code for the dissertation and discuss in the case selection section of chapter 6; otherwise I code all of the same cases beginning with Remmer’s data sources and then supplementing.

As the table shows, there is divergence between Remmer’s results and my own, partly due to the different coding structure because hers is annual data and includes a year dummy while my dataset is coded periodically. My primary finding is that some of her significant variables are no longer significant and there are some reversed signs on the independent variables, though interestingly my recoded replication and expanded model have more similarities with her original analysis than the closest replication based on only the Latin American cases from 1978-2002 in both vote-share and seat-share estimations.

Table E2 provides a summary of the results of a replication of Remmer’s study in estimating the effect of electoral reforms on party system outcomes. As Remmer does, I run four independent time-series regression analyses: impact of electoral reform on party system size measured in vote-share (row 2), impact of electoral reform on party system size measured in seat-share (row 3), impact of electoral reform on vote volatility (row 4) and impact of electoral reform on seat volatility (row 5). In column 2 I present the significant findings from Remmer’s study, column 3 shows my replication of her analysis using her coding of the dependent variable (electoral reform outcome) and for her time period (1978-2002), column 4 shows a replication of her basic model using a revised coding of the dependent variable and for the time period 1978-2010, column 5 shows a replication of her basic model using the expanded universe of my dissertation dataset from 1950-2010 and replacing change in GDP with change in GDP per capita, which is highly correlated with change in GDP but is more
readily available for more cases over the expanded time period. Column 5 is based on the same analysis in Table 6.9 of chapter 6, and serves as the base model in the dissertation’s quantitative analysis that I then expand to include new variables.

The replication for the impact of electoral reforms more closely mirrors Remmer’s findings, though the similarities are stronger for the vote-share models than the seat-share models. In the model estimating the impact of reform on ENPV the findings are closer between the expanded model from my dissertation and her original Latin American dataset from 1978-2002. In the model estimating the impact of reform on vote volatility the closest replication is almost identical, and the revised coding of Latin American cases differs only slightly. In the model estimating the impact of reform on ENPS the replications do not follow as closely, with more variables of interest proving statistically significant and signed in the reverse direction from Remmer’s analysis. Similarly, in the model estimating the impact of reform on seat volatility the replications do not follow as closely, with more and different variables of interest proving statistically significant. Overall, the replication of the impact of electoral reforms more closely confirms Remmer’s findings, though the addition of new variables in my analysis in chapter 6 proves many of these findings to be of secondary importance.

Replicating Colomer proved the most difficult, not the least because of his method of case selection and choice of model. First, although I find evidence of both more and less inclusive reforms across my cases, Colomer’s original model only estimated one type of reform outcome: from majoritarianism to proportionality. Second, Colomer included many additional countries that I do not have in my dissertation dataset because the reforms occurred well before 1950 (e.g., Belgium in 1898-99, Denmark in 1913-15, Italy in 1913-19) or the country had a majoritarian electoral system but never underwent reform (e.g., Australia, Canada, India, UK, USA). As a result, the only replication I could conduct was on a limited subset of the cases used in Colomer’s original study that underwent reform at some point between 1950-2010. This makes for a very poor replication but should shed some light on whether at least part of the mechanism he is arguing for – that rising party system size measured by ENPV leads to proportional representation rule changes – is supported.

Table E3 provides a summary of a replication of Colomer’s study in predicting the probability of change from majoritarian to proportional rules. I present Colomer’s results (column 2), and then I run a revised model of a multinomial probit with three possible outcomes of “become more majoritarian/less inclusive,” “no reform,” and “become more proportional/more inclusive” based on the coding rules and cases I use for my analysis in chapter 6 (column 3). Since I do not conduct any bivariate regression analysis in chapter 6, this replication is not the basis for any of the statistical models in the rest of the dissertation.

The results presented in Table E3 show that the coefficient for ENPV is signed in the same direction (positively) but not statistically significant as a predictor of more inclusive reform. In contrast, increasing ENPV is actually a similar and statistically significant predictor of less inclusive reform in the multinomial probit model. Thus, there is no evidence in an attempt to replicate Colomer’s basic bivariate prediction model that the relationship between increasing party system fragmentation measured by vote-share and a change from majority to PR rules holds when no other variables are included in the analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Findings</th>
<th>Replication for 1978-2002</th>
<th>Recoding six cases from 1978-2010</th>
<th>Expanded Universe with change in GDP per capita (Table 6.4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Significant variables: Change in GDP, change in ENPS, and change in vote volatility predicting both more and less inclusive reform</td>
<td>Significant variables: Change in GDP, change in ENPS, and change in vote volatility predicting both more and less inclusive reform</td>
<td>Significant variables: Change in GDP, change in ENPS, and change in vote volatility predicting both more and less inclusive reform</td>
<td>Significant variables: Change in GDP, change in ENPS, and change in vote volatility predicting both more and less inclusive reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only ENPS predicting less inclusive reform is significant at .05 level</td>
<td>Only change in GDP is still statistically significant at .05 level and signed the same direction</td>
<td>Only change in ENPS predicting less inclusive reform still statistically significant at .05 level and signed the same direction</td>
<td>Only change in ENPS predicting less inclusive reform still statistically significant at .05 level and signed the same direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPS predicting less inclusive reform</td>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPS predicting less inclusive reform</td>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPS predicting less inclusive reform</td>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPS predicting less inclusive reform</td>
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<td>Reversed sign on ENPS predicting less inclusive reform</td>
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<td>Reversed sign on ENPS predicting less inclusive reform</td>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPS predicting less inclusive reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote volatility not significant</td>
<td>Vote volatility not significant</td>
<td>Vote volatility not significant</td>
<td>Vote volatility not significant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPV predicting more inclusive reform</td>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPV predicting more inclusive reform</td>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPV predicting more inclusive reform</td>
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<td>Reversed sign on ENPV predicting more inclusive reform</td>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPV predicting more inclusive reform</td>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPV predicting more inclusive reform</td>
<td>Reversed sign on ENPV predicting more inclusive reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Replicating Estimates of Electoral Reforms (Remmer 2008)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact of electoral reforms on ENPV</th>
<th>Initial Findings</th>
<th>Replication for 1978-2002</th>
<th>Recoding six cases from 1978-2010</th>
<th>Expanded Universe with change in GDP measured per capita /Table 6.9/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only ENPV (lagged) is statistically significant at .05 level</td>
<td>ENPV (lagged) and less inclusive reforms both statistically significant at .05 level</td>
<td>ENPV (lagged) and less inclusive reforms both statistically significant at .05 level</td>
<td>Slight change in coefficient values but signs and significance all same as Remmer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of electoral reforms on ENPS</td>
<td>Only ENPS (lagged) is statistically significant at .05 level</td>
<td>ENPS (lagged), less inclusive reform and democratic age all statistically significant at .05 level</td>
<td>ENPS (lagged), less inclusive reform and democratic age all statistically significant at .05 level</td>
<td>No variables of .05 level significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of electoral reforms on Vote Volatility</td>
<td>Only vote volatility (lagged) is significant at .05 level</td>
<td>Only vote volatility (lagged) is significant at .05 level</td>
<td>Less inclusive reform and vote volatility (lagged) significant at .05 level</td>
<td>More and less inclusive reforms both significant at .05 level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coefficient for more inclusive reform is larger than for less inclusive reform</td>
<td>- Coefficient for less inclusive reform is larger than for more inclusive reform</td>
<td>- Coefficient for less inclusive reform is larger than for more inclusive reform</td>
<td>- Reversed signs on change in GDP and democratic age</td>
<td>- Coefficient for less inclusive reform is larger than for more inclusive reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of electoral reforms on Seat Volatility</td>
<td>Seat volatility (lagged) and more inclusive reform are significant at .05 level</td>
<td>Only less inclusive reform is significant at .05 level (more inclusive reform and democratic age just miss at .056 and .058)</td>
<td>Less inclusive reform, seat volatility (lagged) and change in GDP (lagged) are significant at .05 (more inclusive reform just misses at .051)</td>
<td>More and less inclusive reforms both significant at .05 level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coefficient for more inclusive reform is larger than for less inclusive reform</td>
<td>- Coefficient for less inclusive reform is larger than for more inclusive reform</td>
<td>- Coefficient for less inclusive reform is larger than for more inclusive reform</td>
<td>- Reversed signs on change in GDP and democratic age</td>
<td>- Coefficient for less inclusive reform is larger than for more inclusive reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of change from majority to proportionality</td>
<td>Initial Findings</td>
<td>Multinomial expanded universe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Predicting more inclusive reform</td>
<td>Predicting less inclusive reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coefficient of ENPV = 0.298</td>
<td>• Coefficient of ENPV = 0.046</td>
<td>• Coefficient of ENPV = 0.220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Significant at .01 level</td>
<td>• Not significant at .1 level</td>
<td>• Significant at .05 level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


