Human Trafficking:
Explaining the Levels of Practice

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ABSTRACT

Jacqueline Lindsay Tello: Human Trafficking: Explaining The Levels Of Practice  
(Under the direction of Layna Mosley)

Considered to be the modern form of slavery, numerous states have undertaken significant measures to combat human trafficking. Yet, while a majority of states have enacted legislation specifically targeting human trafficking, there has been a discrepancy between law and practice. I argue that central to understanding the variation of governments’ human trafficking practices is identifying the overall strength of local human rights organizations. The results of this paper provide support for my argument that the overall strength of local human rights organizations drives governments’ human trafficking practices.
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“It ought to concern every person, because it is a debasement of our common humanity. It ought to concern every community, because it tears at our social fabric. It ought to concern every business, because it distorts markets. It ought to concern every nation, because it endangers public health and fuels violence and organized crime. I’m talking about the injustice, the outrage, of human trafficking which must be called by its true name—modern slavery.”

-President Barack Obama (2011)

This description of human trafficking, more often than not, highlights the heinous nature and dire consequences of human trafficking. It implies that human trafficking infiltrates every aspect of society. More importantly, that human trafficking produces negative externalities that can be found in every country in the world. Given the steady rise of human trafficking worldwide, it is to no surprise that the international community has initiated several measures in an attempt to combat this growing phenomenon. In 2000, the United Nations adopted the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (hereafter referred to as the Palermo Protocol) and the United States implemented the Trafficking in Victims Protection Act (TVPA). Shortly after, in 2002, the European Union proposed and ratified its own version of human trafficking legislation entitled the EU Framework Decision on Trafficking in Human Beings. These pieces of legislation demonstrate the growing importance that various actors—ranging from international organizations to individual states—have placed on combatting human trafficking. Even more striking, is that a variety of states have undertaken considerable measures to criminalize all forms of human trafficking.
Yet, as the number of countries signaling their resolve against the human trafficking trade through the enactment of legislation increases, this raises the concern of governments’ human trafficking practices. Often the same factors motivating states to outlaw human rights atrocities are not necessarily the same indicators pushing states towards better human rights practices. Identifying the crucial factors that persuade states to improve on their human trafficking practices has important implications since states are increasingly acknowledging the growing phenomenon of human trafficking both within and outside of their borders.

Focusing on governments’ human trafficking practices, this paper considers what characteristics found within the domestic realm promote strong state policies against human trafficking. Specifically, this paper explores the role that local human rights organizations play in determining governments’ human trafficking practices. This paper begins by considering what past studies have discovered about the determinants of human trafficking and human rights practices in general. Next, I argue that the most important factor contributing to governments’ human trafficking practices lies in the overall strength of human rights organizations. Turning to the methods section, I explain the series of statistical models performed to test the hypothesis generated from the theoretical framework using original data on governments’ human trafficking practices from 2001-2009.

**Literature Review**

What is human trafficking? As defined by the United States government, human trafficking or trafficking in persons refers to any activities involved when someone obtains or holds a person in compelled service. The term human trafficking encompasses a wide variety of human rights abuses and can be disaggregated along the following categories: bonded labor, debt bondage
among migrant laborers, involuntary domestic servitude, forced child labor, child soldiers, and child sex trafficking (TIP 2012).  

Human Trafficking  

Previous literature on human trafficking has been highly qualitative primarily due to the fact that there was no reliable data capturing the magnitude of countries’ human trafficking laws and practices (TIP 2001, 2002; UNDOC 2006; Bartilow 2010). Much of this research has focused on single case studies or linked the negative externalities produced by human trafficking to other illicit trades (TIP 2001). However, where once data availability posed a serious issue to researchers and policymakers, this problem no longer exists. Currently, there are two quantitative human trafficking datasets: one produced by Cho, Dreher and Neumayer (2012) and another one by Cingranelli, Tello and Quince (2013). While the two datasets capture various aspects of human trafficking, present in both datasets is a gap between law and practice. While the Cingranelli et al. dataset emphasizes this point more accurately; the gap between law and practice is found in both datasets.  

1 In 2002, the U.S. government took a step further in adding a category for “severe forms of human trafficking category” as (a) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or (b) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery (TIP 2002).

2 See Figures 1 and 2.
The most recent literature published on human trafficking primarily focuses on the determinants of the flows of human trafficking in various countries (Friebel and Guriev 2006 and Auriol and Mesnard 2010; Danailova-Trainor and Belser 2006; Di Tommaso et al. 2009; Bettio and Nandi 2010; Clawson and Layne 200; Akee et al. 2012; Aronowitz 2001; Salt 2000; Schloenhardt 2000; Cho 2012; Akee et al. 2010a, b; Cho et al. 2012; Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2001). In the literature, scholars have identified a large number of push and pull factors of human trafficking that can be categorized into four major pillars: migration, vulnerability, crime, and policy and institutional efforts.

Previous work suggests that there is a linkage between migration and human trafficking. Numerous cases have been cited demonstrating that victims are often recruited through personal connections or personal agencies (IOM Counter Trafficking Module; Cho 2012). Moreover, Akee et al (2010a, b) shows that increased migration between two countries induces human trafficking flows between the countries. Thus, migration plays a significant role in determining the levels of human trafficking present in countries. In terms of vulnerability, scholars often point out the vulnerable position of women in society as a strong indicator of human trafficking flows (Danailova-Trainor & Belser 2006; Di Tommaso et al. 2009; Bettio & Nandi 2010; Clawson & Layne 2007; Kelley & Simmons 2012). According to the UNODC, human trafficking is a gender-based form of violence that especially targets females. A majority of the victims that fall prey to human trafficking are females that are exploited in the sex industry or unfair labor practices (UNODC 2006). Since human trafficking is an illicit crime, researchers have showed that trafficking can be determined by profitability. In other words, human trafficking can be a function of market size (Akelee 2010a). Finally, in terms of policy and
institutional efforts that dictate the level of human trafficking, researchers have analyzed the role of corruption and law enforcement (Cho et al. 2012). Cho et al. suggest that specific anti-trafficking policies, such as prosecution punishing traffickers, protection for victims, and controlling borders tackles the root of the human trafficking problem (UN 2000).

In the most exhaustive quantitative analysis on the causes of human trafficking, Cho (2012) identifies specific push and pull factors of human trafficking. Her research indicates that crime prevalence explains the levels of human trafficking in both destination and origin countries. Interestingly, the level of gender equality did not have robust effects on human trafficking as suggested by previous work. Moreover, the linkage between migration and human trafficking is present via the globalization facilitating factor—that exposure to foreign contacts and information—determines human trafficking.

Moving away from explaining the causes of human trafficking, other scholars have begun to examine the conditions under which countries will be pressured to criminalize or adopt stronger anti-trafficking policies. In other words, scholar have started to put the “politics” back into the equation in explaining the determinants of specific human rights practices. In the most recent study examining the factors that push countries to criminalize human trafficking, Kelley & Simmons (2012) analyze the factors that motivate states to criminalize human trafficking. They find that states respond faster to harsher grades, and that they react when their grade first drops below a threshold. They also find that states are more likely to criminalize human trafficking when they simply are included in the US TIP Report. In sum, shaming and scrutiny contribute independently to state decisions to criminalize. Moreover, this research also suggests that
external pressures such as shaming via the US TIP report, as opposed to ratification of the Palermo Protocol, is more effective in pushing states to criminalize human trafficking. Yet, missing from their analysis are the specific elements that encourage states to go the extra step and actually implement their anti-trafficking policies.

_Determinants of Human Rights Practices_

The extant literature on the determinants of human rights violations has primarily focused on the domestic sources that mitigate the incentives for political leaders to either protect or repress their citizen’s basic rights (Poe and Tate 1984). While the main human rights literature has primarily focused on state repression, it does provide valuable insights on other indicators that drive governments’ human trafficking practices. In their empirical study, Poe and Tate highlight six broad categories that determine a government’s decision to respect human rights: level of democracy, level of economic development and growth rate, population size and growth rate, prevalence of military and/or leftist regime, colonial legacy, and recent exposure to international war and/or civil war (1984). In their model, human rights repression is a tool that governments use to solve conflicts. Given the fact that democratic leaders can be electorally ousted; democracies tend to have higher levels of respect for human rights than their autocratic counterparts. Thus, indicating that countries with stronger levels of democracy should be more inclined to combat all forms of human rights practices including human trafficking.

Efforts to understand how important external and internal pressures motivate state actions with respect to human rights practices have focused on international human rights treaties and human rights organizations due to their most visible presence among the international community. A large number of scholars have shown that on their own, human rights treaties
generate weak external enforcement resulting in minimal improvement in countries’ human rights practices (Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui 2005; Simmons 2009). Compared to security and monetary international treaties, human rights treaties lack the self-reinforcing incentives and joint-gains advantages that encourage both willing and resistant states to fully comply with the policies stipulated in these types of treaties. Moreover, when choosing which issues to engage in, political leaders view other states’ human rights record to be at the bottom of their priority list (Simmons 2010).

Simmons (2009) offers a nuanced theoretical framework to explain the conditions under which states comply with international human rights treaties. Previous literature on the subject ignored the importance of the domestic side to this issue. According to Simmons, treaties are meaningful because they actually empower the individuals, groups, or parts of the state with different rights preferences that were not empowered to the same extent in the absence of the treaties. Simmons claims that treaties can influence domestic politics in three ways. First, international treaties alter the national agenda. Issues that were not particularly controversial in its nature, but not as important to the national processes, are given more weight. Secondly, treaties provide an important outlet to marginalized groups through the various legal resources. Finally, treaties can encourage local groups to mobilize to demand human rights compliance. Thus, it is not external enforcement mechanisms that secure states’ compliance with international treaties, but political change that occurs at the domestic level. The findings indicate that treaties have their largest effect in polities in which domestic stakeholders have both the motive and means to organize and demand compliance. In autocracies, citizens often have no means to mobilize without fear of reprisal from the state governments. On the contrary, in stable
democracies, where rights are fully protected, citizens lack the incentive to mobilize. Thus, in transitioning or partial democracies, international treaties will become useful tools to local groups that actually have both a motive to mobilize and less fear of state repression. While international treaties may set the stage and legitimize the human rights norm, the real change or progress occurs through the pressures exerted from the domestic sphere.

The most promising research explaining the domestic components influencing governments’ human right practices comes from the interdisciplinary research on the role of human rights organizations (HROs). HROs offer an additional source of pressure onto governments on various human rights issues. Human rights organizations are often the crucial link between the government engaging in human rights abuses and the triggering of international awareness on those atrocities (Bob 2002, 2005) HROs accomplish their goals and objectives through two main processes: either working individually or collectively as part of transnational advocacy networks working on the same issue (TANs). In the first approach, human rights organizations are able to persuade state actors into prioritizing human rights issues by linking it to monetary assistance or means. That is, HROs will often lobby governments on specific human rights issues they believe to be the most important.

At the collective level, human rights organizations or NGOs form linkages with other domestic and international actors to form transnational advocacy networks centered on the same issue (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) “include actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck & Sikkink 4). As Keck and Sikkink demonstrate, “international and domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a central
role in most advocacy networks” often working at the forefront of many human rights issues (92).

In particular, local organizations are often responsible for providing reliable information on specific issues relating to their goals to international organizations (Bob 2002; Carpenter 2007). Local organizations are better equipped with more manpower on the ground that provides them better access to victims. Moreover, they collect, investigate, analyze and disseminate information to other various agencies (Meernik et al 2012). In doing so, international organizations rely on local human rights organizations as unbiased sources of credible information.

Thus, by pointing out the central importance of local human rights organizations in TANs and as a critical link in exposing governments’ human rights records, it is apparent that the strength of local human rights organizations specifically engaged in human trafficking drives governments’ human trafficking practices.

Theory

Based upon the preceding section, it is apparent that in order to understand the variation among governments’ human trafficking practices, research needs to focus on the domestic sphere—specifically on the role of local human rights organizations. In this section, I will argue that the overall strength of local human rights organizations explains the different levels of governments’ human trafficking practices.

Before exploring this unique causal mechanism of the overall strength of local human rights organizations driving governments’ human trafficking practices, the problem of endogeneity emerges in two forms. First, that the strength or number of local human rights
organizations might be directly related to country’s magnitude of the human trafficking problem. In other words, it is important to establish that the number of local human rights organizations is independent of the size of the human trafficking phenomenon. The region of Eastern Europe presents a prime example in illustrating the point that variation in local human rights organizations is not directly associated with the sheer volume of the human trafficking problem. As far back as 2001, the annual TIP report has consistently highlighted the fact that human trafficking poses a serious problem in all of the countries in Eastern Europe. Compared to other regions, Eastern Europe has some of the highest levels of human trafficking. In fact, not only are several of the countries in Eastern Europe popular source and destination countries, but also, serve as important transit states for human trafficking to the rest of the world. Although human trafficking is one of the most common illicit trades found in Eastern Europe there has been a significant amount of variation in the strength of local HROs engaged in combatting trafficking. For example, in Moldova, there was no presence of local NGOs involved in human trafficking. Yet, in other countries such as Albania or Bulgaria, the presence of local human rights organizations fluctuate between zero to moderate strength while the magnitude of the human trafficking problem still remained at an all time high.

The second issue of endogeneity may occur if governments with an underlying propensity to combat human trafficking might be more likely to allow and facilitate the growth of local human rights organizations. Put simply, higher levels of democracy would lead to less restrictions on the activities of local HROs and thus further enable them to flourish in those types of countries. A prime example of this not being the case is reflected in the case of India. During

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3 The empirical test of this issue is performed in the methods section.
the years of 2001-2009 India has regularly maintained the same level of democracy, however, governments’ human trafficking practices have varied depending on the strength of local human rights organizations. That is, while the degree of democratic rule has remained constant in India, the overall strength of local HROs has driven governments’ human trafficking practices in a positive manner.

Moving beyond these endogeneity concerns, human trafficking presents a complex puzzle to both researchers and policymakers for several reasons. Similar to other forms of human rights abuses, human trafficking encompasses a wide variety of human rights activities. Human trafficking ranges from human bondage to prostitution with a strong gendered element biased towards women. Moreover, the literature points out that the roots of human trafficking can be found outside of government domain. That is, demand for “free” labor and illicit acts often entices criminal organizations and traffickers to engage in this type of business (Cho 2012). Furthermore, strong external factors such as the adoption of international treaties--the Palermo Protocol--and shaming in annual reports published by the United States may lead to the criminalization of human trafficking, however, pressures to improve human trafficking practices lie within the domestic base (Simmons 2009; Kelley & Simmons 2012). Thus, through local human rights organizations specifically engaged in human trafficking issues, governments are pressured into improving their own human trafficking practices.

The interdisciplinary research highlights several processes through which local human rights organizations apply pressures onto governments to strengthen their human trafficking practices. First, local human rights organizations and NGOs are active in lobbying government counterparts at both the local and central levels (TIP 2001, 2009). In many cases, these activists
exert pressures onto governments to increase their services to victims and improve their human trafficking laws regarding punishment for perpetrators.

HROs exert influence onto governments to remain up to date on specific programs, policies and trends that greatly diminish the demand for human trafficking. This type of pressure is applied often in the form of training for government officials. In several countries, NGOs regularly offer workshops and small conferences for government officials to participate in on the issue of human trafficking. During these workshops, NGO members often educate government officials on the types of services they should be providing for victims and train police officers on how to interact with victims. Moreover, NGOs often provide information regarding the types of policies that other countries have in place to diminish human trafficking (TIP 2001, 2005, 2007). Lastly, NGOs attempt to keep records on inflows and outflows of human trafficking occurring in specific regions and share this with government officials (TIP 2001).

In many instances, HROs ally with governments in setting up a wide range of programs that aid victims of human trafficking and provide adequate resources for their legal issues (TIP 2012). A large majority of local NGOs work exclusively on protection services for victims of human trafficking. For example, in Bangladesh, active local NGOs organize awareness campaigns and set up shelters for victims of human trafficking. These NGOs work primarily with women who were trafficked for the purposes of domestic servitude or sexual exploitation (TIP 2001, 2002, 2003). Interestingly, in countries where no government program exists, all of the victim services are provided through NGOs, such as in Bulgaria (TIP 2001, 2005, 2009). In the case of Bulgaria, local NGOs have been attempting to coordinate their efforts with the
Bulgarian government on providing adequate services to victims for several years but unfortunately to no success.

In addition, HROs offer governments an added element of accountability in that they keep detailed records of any information regarding instances when government officials are complicit with human traffickers or engage in the actual trade themselves for profit (TIP 2012). Every year, when the U.S. embassies collect information regarding the human trafficking problem in each country, numerous NGOs report their own independent accounts of the phenomenon for the given year. In these detailed accounts, active local NGOs often provide explicit information regarding the governments’ human trafficking practices in several areas (TIP 2001, 2009). In doing so, human rights organizations provide an additional source of oversight to governments engaging in poor human trafficking practices.

Therefore, without the added pressures stemming from powerful human rights organizations, there would be no incentive for governments to improve their human trafficking practices.

Hypothesis:
Therefore, given the theory stated above, the following hypothesis is generated:

H1: As the overall strength of local human rights organizations working on human trafficking issues increases, this will lead to an improvement in governments’ human trafficking practices

Methods

In order to test the hypothesis generated above, I assemble a cross-sectional time-series dataset for the years 2001-2009. I begin in 2001 for two important reasons: First, is that reliable data for
both human trafficking law and practice in the Cingranelli et al dataset begins in 2001.\(^4\)

Moreover, this is when the anti-human trafficking norm is first embodied within the international community in both the UN Palermo Protocol and the U.S. Trafficking in Victims Act (Kelley & Simmons 2012). This is important because it demonstrates that the growing phenomenon of human trafficking within the international community but also gives more power to human rights organizations working to combat this particular issue around the world.

In empirically testing the hypothesis generated above I use an ordered logistical model primarily because the dependent variable, government’s human trafficking practice, is an ordinal measure that ranges on a scale of one to three. Previous quantitative research on human rights practices have used ordinary least squares (OLS) to model the outcome (Davenport & Armstrong 2004; Poe & Tate 1994). Although OLS is easier to interpret, it assumes that the dependent variable is continuous and normally distributed leading to inefficient and/or biased estimates (King 1996). The dependent variable, governments’ human trafficking practice, violates these assumptions.

*Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable will be a country’s human trafficking practice taken from the Cingranelli et al Human Trafficking Dataset (2013).\(^5\) The human trafficking practice dependent variable ranges from one (no government respect for anti-human trafficking law) to three (full government respect for anti-human trafficking laws). Thus, higher scores indicating better human trafficking practices. A government’s human trafficking practice is primarily based on the

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\(^4\) The Cho et al. dataset also begins in 2001 too.

\(^5\) See Data Appendix for Coding Guidelines
amount of efforts undertaken by government officials in a number of areas: prosecution of human trafficking, providing assistance to victims, and implementing various programs to combat trafficking. This measure was coded based on the information provided in the Annual U.S. Trafficking in Person’s Report (TIP) and various documents provided by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

It is important to note that another reliable human trafficking dataset produced by Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2012). I utilize the Cingranelli et al. dataset as opposed to the Cho et al. dataset for a few reasons. First, they adopt the UN Palermo Protocol definition of human trafficking. In the Palermo Protocol, the human trafficking term is only used to refer to transferring of persons across international borders. Our definition, based on US laws, includes human trafficking within borders. Human Trafficking that occurs domestically, or within borders, is the most common form of human trafficking in some countries. Secondly, because we do use the TIP reports to code for human trafficking law and practice it would make sense to adopt the US definition of human trafficking. Cho et al use this source as one of their two primary sources for coding human trafficking based on prosecution, prevention, and protection. Also many less developing countries have adopted US human trafficking law due to the fact the US reserves the right to prohibit the allocation of foreign aid for those countries that do not abide by their standards. Most important, since I am examining the varying levels of countries’ human trafficking practice, the Cingranelli et al. dataset most accurately captures this phenomenon by having two distinct variables—one for the strength of governments’ human trafficking law and

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6 According to multiple Trafficking Persons Reports, the vast majority of human trafficking is internal in the following countries: Afghanistan, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, China, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. It is important to note that internal trafficking does take place in several other countries.
one for governments’ respect of human trafficking practices. Whereas, in the Cho et al. dataset, their measures for governments’ level of protection, prevention and prosecution combines both law and practice into one scale.

Independent Variable

For this analysis, the main independent variable is the strength of human rights organizations working specifically on human trafficking issues. Currently, there exists no reliable measurement that captures the overall strength of human rights organizations solely working on human trafficking related problems in every country for any given year. Instead, scholars have captured this measurement by either counting the number of NGOs, IGOs, or Human Rights Organizations present in a country for any given year or combining the number of organizations with the amount of “shaming” publicized through media outlets (Murdie & Davis 2012; Kelley & Simmons 2012). Moreover, none of the data mentioned above is disaggregated yearly for all of the years examined in this paper.

Therefore, in order to capture the overall strength of human rights organizations present in every country/given year, I created an ordinal variable on a scale ranging from zero (no presence of human rights organizations) to two (very strong presence of human rights organizations) taken from the Annual Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP). I define non-government organizations following the same definition found in the TIP reports. The TIP reports states that NGOs are local non-governmental organizations working specifically on human trafficking issues. A score of zero indicates that there was no presence of local human trafficking organizations organized on this issue. A score of one was given when countries had “several” or a “number” of human rights organizations working on human trafficking issues in a
country. Finally, in order to receive a score of two, there must be more than fifteen human rights organizations organized in a country. I use the number fifteen as a cut off point between receiving a score of one and two because in many of the country reports if there is a large number of NGOs engaged in the human trafficking phenomenon then it reports the specific number. Moreover, this signals that there is a significant amount of coordination among the NGOs to indicate that there is a strong human rights organization presence in the country for the given year.

Control Variables

A serious test of these hypothesis will include a set of control variables to minimize the possibility of other factors influencing the impact of human rights organizations on governments’ human rights practices. Previous work has demonstrated that on average, democracies display better protection for their citizens’ human rights (Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Hofferbert & Cingranelli 1996; Poe, Tate & Camp-Keith 1999; Cingranelli & Richards 1999, Davenport 2007). In order to account for this, I have included a democracy measure taken from Polity IV. As shown by other research, a number of economic factors often influence a government’s propensity towards state repression (Mitchell & McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991 Poe & Tate 1994). The following economic variables were incorporated in this study: GDP Per Capita, Inflation Rate, Trade flows, and net Official Development Assistance. Previous research suggests that as a country’s GDP Per Capita and trade flows increase, governments will demonstrate stronger respect for human rights practices. On the hand, as inflation and foreign aid increase, governments will be less inclined to protect their citizens’ human rights. In addition, I included a variable controlling for population size. Some research suggests that as a country’s
population size increases, governments have more incentives to infringe on basic human rights (Poe & Tate 1994). In order to capture migration, I use a proxy of remittance\(^7\) inflows (Cho, Dreher & Neumayer 2012). As Cho demonstrates, migration has a negative effect on human trafficking patterns. The data for these measures were taken from the *World Bank Development Indicators, 2012*.

Finally, following previous research on human trafficking I include a set of other important control variables that have been shown to affect human trafficking. As demonstrated in the literature, human trafficking has a strong gendered element—mostly victimizing women—I include a variable that captures the level of women’s political and economic rights in every country taken the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Dataset (UNODC 2006; Kelley & Simmons 2012). Previous research has included a narrow measure, the share of women in parliament, to account for level of women’s rights present in a country for a given year (Kelley & Simmons 2012). I include two measures; women’s political and economic rights that capture a wide variety of internally recognized rights. As other research demonstrates, countries with strong women’s economic and political rights have better human rights practices in general. Additionally, I include a dichotomous variable measuring the presence of international government organizations (IGOS) in every country (Kelley & Simmons 2012). Previous research demonstrates that aid from IGOS greatly improves governments’ ability to cover human trafficking problems. Lastly, I include a tier variable that captures the tier level that a country is cited in the annual U.S. TIP report (Kelley & Simmons 2012). As Kelley and Simmons suggest, mention in the TIP encourages states to criminalize human trafficking (2012).

\(^7\) The following control variables are logged: remittances, official development Assistance, Inflation, and GDPPC.
Endogeneity Issue

One concern that arises when examining the impact of human rights organizations on governments’ human trafficking practices is the issue of endogeneity regarding the independence of the local human rights organization measure. Since it is plausible that NGOs will respond with more facilities/services in countries that may have a larger human trafficking problem than other states, I perform an additional statistical test to diminish the endogeneity issue. The best method to diminish this problem would be to have an appropriate measure that controls for the magnitude of the human trafficking problem present in every country for a given year. Due to the illicit nature of this enterprise there is no appropriate measure for the magnitude of human trafficking. At the beginning of each U.S. Trafficking In Persons Report, officials explicitly state that it is impossible to give an accurate estimate of the magnitude of the problem (TIP 2001, 2002, 2003).

Therefore, I test the correlation of the variable, strength of human rights organizations, with the Freedom House measure of civil society for all of the Eastern European countries.\(^8\) The civil society measure ranges on a scale of 0-7 (lower values indicating stronger civil society present in the country). I test the correlation between these two measures on this subset of countries for the following reasons. First, it is acknowledged in most of the U.S TIP reports and other publications issued by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International that all of the countries in Eastern Europe are not only affected by human trafficking, but are also the largest source, transit and destination countries for human trafficking. Secondly, the civil society

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\(^8\) Missing from this statistical test are the following countries: Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, and Yugoslavia.
variable centers around the strength and independence of NGOs not only working on human trafficking, but on a wide variety of human rights issues.

In order to test the relationship between these two variable I perform two separate tests, Pierson’s correlation and an analysis of variance. The Pierson correlation test treats both variables as continuous and resulted in -.3634. The result demonstrates that the civil society and human rights organization variables move in opposite directions and are highly correlated with one another. The second test, the analysis of variance (ANOVA), was performed because the human rights organization variable is a categorical measure and not continuous which is assumed in the Pierson correlation test. The results from the ANOVA test are even more positive. The F-statistic for the relationship between the two variables is 13.63 with a p-value of 0.000. Therefore, by running these additional robustness checks, which demonstrate that the human rights organization variable is highly correlated with another similar variable, the endogeneity issue is greatly diminished.

Results

The summary statistics for all of the variables used in the regression are presented Table 1\(^9\), with regression results in Table 2, and with predicted probabilities from the first model reported in Table 3. Table 2 shows three separate regressions performed to account for problems related to using cross-sectional time-series data with an ordered logistical regressions. In the first ordered logistical regression (Model 1) the dependent variable, governments’ human trafficking practices, is lagged. This deals with the time problem that a previous year’s score may affect the

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\(^9\) As a robustness check I ran the correlation between all of the variables. None of the correlations were higher than .350, which was found between the Polity and HRO measures.
next year’s human trafficking practice. The second ordered logistical model includes clustering.

Finally, the third ordered logistical model has fixed effects.

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<td>.949</td>
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<td>10.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1339</td>
<td>87.420</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>48.286</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP PC (logged)</td>
<td>1366</td>
<td>2.718</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.821</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Rights</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>1.301</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.723</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>1381</td>
<td>2.011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.547</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>5.13e+08</td>
<td>2.69e+08</td>
<td>7.47e+08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.14e+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Assistance (logged)</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>19.325</td>
<td>19.44</td>
<td>1.411</td>
<td>12.577</td>
<td>23.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>2373.81</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>5337</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances (logged)</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>6.182</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>2.076</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>1386</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turning to the results of the models estimating the effects of the strength of human rights organizations on governments’ human trafficking practices (reported in Table 2), I find support for my hypothesis. Across two thresholds of the overall strength of human rights organizations, the relationship between HROs and governments is consistent with the hypothesis. Each model demonstrates that the strength of human rights organizations has a positive relationship with governments’ human trafficking practices. Put simply, as the strength of human rights organizations increased, governments engaged in better human trafficking practices. The
presence of human rights organizations is statistically significant at the .01 level in all three ordered logistical models. Moreover, the coefficients suggest that as HROs become stronger, this leads to a greater improvement in governments’ human trafficking practices.

Interestingly, the only consistent control variable statistically significant at the .05 level in model 1, and .01 level in models 2 and 3, was the Tier measure. Previous research indicates that mere mention in the TIP report encourages states to criminalize human trafficking (Kelley and Simmons 2012). Consistent with previous research, the tier measure has a clear positive effect on governments’ human trafficking practices. In Model 1, the inflation rate control variable was statistically significant at the .05 level. The results demonstrate that inflation rate has a negative effect on governments’ human trafficking practices. The second model shows that remittances are statistically significant at the .01 level. Remittances have a negative effect on governments’ human trafficking practices. Finally, in the third model women’s political rights and trade are statistically significant, at the .05 level.

Finally, an additional diagnostic test was performed on all three ordered logistical models to test for the proportional odds assumption. In the first model, the diagnostic test failed, however, this was primarily due to the fact that the dependent variable, governments’ human trafficking practices, is lagged. The diagnostic tests were successful in the two other ordered logistical models (2 &3). Both models 2 and 3 do not have lagged dependent variables.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Trafficking Practices (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2, t-1</td>
<td>1.587 (.225)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3, t-1</td>
<td>3.257 (.584)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Presence</td>
<td>1.745*** (.3111)</td>
<td>2.305*** (.4255)</td>
<td>3.893*** (.496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Presence</td>
<td>4.451*** (.976)</td>
<td>4.784*** (.715)</td>
<td>8.634*** (1.303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>.007 (.020)</td>
<td>.021 (.035)</td>
<td>.078 (.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier</td>
<td>.001** (.001)</td>
<td>.002*** (.0007)</td>
<td>.004*** (.0008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>.166 (.259)</td>
<td>.209 (.245)</td>
<td>.418 (.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Rights</td>
<td>-.077 (.179)</td>
<td>.054 (.189)</td>
<td>-.167 (.263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>.253 (.255)</td>
<td>.276 (.240)</td>
<td>.880*** (.421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPPC</td>
<td>-.003 (.0255)</td>
<td>.001 (.027)</td>
<td>-.004 (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-.035** (.017)</td>
<td>-.019 (.019)</td>
<td>.025 (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
<td>-.032** (.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
<td>-.135 (.105)</td>
<td>-.098 (.121)</td>
<td>.062 (.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>-.057 (.055)</td>
<td>-.134*** (.056)</td>
<td>.390 (.259)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cut Offs                             |                              |                              |                              |
| No HROs/Some HROs                    | -1.273 (2.262)               | -1.278 (2.507)               | -1.355 (2.911)               |
| Some HROs/Strong HROs                | 2.219 (2.278)                | 1.748 (2.501)                | 2.410 (2.000)                |
| N                                    | 534                          | 608                          | 902                          |
| AIC                                  | 678.032                      | 823.401                      | 1044.394                     |
| Adjusted R2                          | .244                         | .095                         | .390                         |

Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis
***p-value<.01 **p-value<.05 *p-value<.1
Predicted probabilities were calculated for each score of governments’ human trafficking practices, holding all other variables at central values.\textsuperscript{10} For the continuous variables (polity, inflation rate, trade, GDPPC, development assistance, and remittances) the central values were set to the means. The predictive probabilities show that for no human rights organization presence, the probability of a government receiving a score of one, the worst human trafficking practice, is much higher than for few or strong human rights organizations presence. Interestingly, the predictive probability of scoring a two for governments’ human trafficking practices is higher when there is the strongest level of HROs as opposed to just a few HROs. Just as important, the predicted probability of scoring a three for governments’ human trafficking practices is substantially higher for few or stronger HROs than no HROs.

\textsuperscript{10} All of the variables were held constant at the mean except for the following factor variables which were held at the median: IGO, Economic and Political Rights.
Collectively, these models and predictive probabilities support my hypothesis. The overall strength of human rights organizations engaged in human trafficking issues is more likely to positive affect governments’ human trafficking practices. On average, countries with strong levels of human rights organizations, consistently demonstrate better human trafficking practices. These results highlight the importance of human rights organization in pressuring governments to improve their human trafficking practices.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this paper, I posed a very important question that has largely been ignored from the political science literature. What explains the variation in governments’ human trafficking practices? The findings suggest that the overall strength of human rights organizations has a positive effect on governments’ human trafficking practices. That is, human rights organizations engaged in human trafficking issues will lead to an improvement in governments’ human trafficking practice. This suggests that in order for real change to occur, it must happen in the domestic realm. More specifically, local human rights organizations engaged in human trafficking issues are the most important element
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