

# **THE KREMLIN'S CONSTRAINTS**

## **A Three-Tiered Model for Explaining Gubernatorial Vulnerability in Russia, 2005-2007**

MATTHEW NICHOLAS GREEN

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Russian and East European Studies.

Chapel Hill  
2008

Approved by:

Dr. Graeme B. Robertson

Dr. Robert M. Jenkins

Dr. Jonathan Weiler

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

There are few endeavors that are truly individual undertakings and this thesis is certainly no exception. I owe debts to many, and here I hope to convey some modicum of appreciation for their contributions. My thesis committee members provided advice and constructive criticism throughout the process that strengthened this paper considerably. This thesis is the product of two years of study at this university; though all instructors contributed something in some way, two members of the Political Science faculty were influential in shaping not only this paper but broader ideas as well: Dr. Graeme Robertson and Dr. Milada Vachudova. Of course, these years of study would not have taken place if it were not for the generous support of the Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies, and in this vein, I owe a special thanks to Dr. Robert Jenkins for bringing me to Carolina. I also wish to thank Katrina Nowak and Jeffrey Ringhausen for providing valuable feedback throughout the thesis process. Last, but certainly not least, there are those who were at work behind the scenes. I thank God for his many blessings and his mercies, which are truly new every day. And I would like to express my gratitude to my family for their support in what were some very trying, hectic months. To you all, огромное спасибо!

## **ABSTRACT**

**MATTHEW NICHOLAS GREEN: THE KREMLIN'S CONSTRAINTS: A Three-Tiered  
Model for Explaining Gubernatorial Vulnerability in Russia, 2005-2007  
(Under the direction of Dr. Graeme B. Robertson)**

This paper examines the new system of gubernatorial appointments in Russia and argues that in spite of the expansion of federal powers in this area, the federal center is still restricted in its usage of these powers. These limitations are demonstrated through the creation of an index that assesses gubernatorial vulnerability and produces a three-tiered model of strength classification. These classifications dictate to the center both a governor's susceptibility to replacement as well as the terms on which any change will take place. The model is supported by the introduction of three case studies, one belonging to each strength tier.

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## CHAPTER 1

### A SYSTEM THAT RECENTRALIZES POWER?

*“Hello Vladimir Vladimirovich. My name is Natal’ya Bugaeva. I live in the city of Birobidzhan. I am 11 years old. I want to ask you this question: Why in the central square of this city have they erected an artificial New Year’s tree and not a live one?”*

*“Natasha, honestly speaking, I don’t know why this happened. Especially since Birobidzhan is situated in such a place where there are plenty of live fir trees. Maybe it’s only because an artificial tree is more expensive and someone from the local leadership needs to incur charges for some incomprehensible reason. At the same time, I want to remind you that today is the birthday of your governor, Nikolai Mikhailovich Volkov, for which I want to congratulate him. I think that it would be right if the governor gave a present to both you and all the residents of Birobidzhan for his birthday, and erected a live fir tree in the city square, and not an artificial one.”*

*– President Vladimir Putin, appearing in his annual*

*“Direct Line” phone-in show, 2002<sup>1</sup>*

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<sup>1</sup> “Stenogramma ‘Pryamoi linii s Prezidentom Rossii,’” 19 Dec. 2002, State Television Channel “Rossiya,” 19 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.linia2002.ru/>>.

President Vladimir Putin's two terms have typically been seen as synonymous with recentralizing power in Moscow.<sup>2</sup> In order to ascertain how representative of reality this impression is, an analysis of Russia's governors<sup>3</sup> proves useful as an indicator of the political balance of power between the federal and regional levels of government. I argue that while Putin's attempt to centralize is very real, and to some extent successful, the federal government in Moscow is still limited in its reach. Nikolai Petrov wrote:

The system of governors, even the reappointments, has thus far been a hybrid: on one hand, it has introduced elements of rotation – as in the Stalinist era; on the other hand, it is a compromise with the old clan-elites. The latter is particularly noticeable in the case of such heavyweights and traditional irritants for the Kremlin as Yurii Luzhkov, Mintimer Shaimiev, or Murtaza Rakhimov. Politics is the art of the possible, and even untying its hands legally, the Kremlin is forced to suffer many of its most inconvenient governors.<sup>4</sup>

I find myself in general agreement with Petrov on these points, but they are left as little more than unsubstantiated observations in the brief article in which they appeared. They do, however, provide a suitable point from which to embark upon a more detailed and comprehensive examination of the gubernatorial appointment system. In this project, I will

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<sup>2</sup> See for but a few examples: Wines, Michael, "Putin's Plan to Centralize Power in the Kremlin Wins a Round," 01 June 2000, The New York Times, 21 Jan. 2008, <<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807E0D6153CF932A35755C0A9669C8B63>>; Kessler, Glenn, "Rice, Headed to See Putin, Cites 'Worrying' Trends in Russia," 20 Apr. 2005, The Washington Post, 21 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1069-2005Apr19.html>>; Parsons, Robert, "2005 in Review: Russia's Centralization Gathers Pace," 12 Dec. 2005, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 21 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/ace0524f-7ade-4a60-be05-ccf14183ae07.html>>; Trenin, Dmitri, "The Legacy of Vladimir Putin," 10 Oct. 2007, The Carnegie Moscow Center, 21 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/76874.htm>>; Associated Press, "Rice Criticizes Putin's Concentration of Power," 13 Oct. 2007, International Herald Tribune, 21 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/13/europe/13subrice.php>>.

<sup>3</sup> Strictly speaking, there are at least four different titles used for the regional executive official, depending on the individual Russian subject in question: governor, head of administration, mayor, and president. The official wording employed by federal legal documentation (*vysshee dolzhnostnoe litso sub'ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii* or *rukovoditel' vysshego ispolnitel'nogo organa gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub'ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii*) presents unwieldy translations ("highest official figure of a subject of the Russian Federation" or "leader of the highest executive organ of state power of a subject of the Russian Federation") that are not conducive to practical use. Thus throughout this paper I will use the term "governor" in a general sense as has become the custom in discussing Russian politics. I will only use other titles when they are applied to a specific case.

<sup>4</sup> Petrov, Nikolai, "Naznacheniya gubernatorov: tri goda spustya," July 2007, The Carnegie Moscow Center, 07 Dec. 2007, <<http://monitoring.carnegie.ru/2007/07/analytics/petrov-nikolaj-naznacheniya-gubernatorov-tri-goda-spustya/>>.

support my positions by utilizing an index and three case studies to evaluate gubernatorial appointment decisions of the past three years (i.e. following the abolition of gubernatorial elections in Russia). What I hope to demonstrate is that while Putin is now able to appoint governors, undoubtedly a real accomplishment from his point of view, he is still constrained in who he may replace with these powers. Furthermore, even in cases where he may replace governors, there is still another level of distinction between governors who must be extended a “golden parachute” and governors who have such weak standing that they may be forced out without any sort of compensation. Despite the gains made on behalf of the federal center in the past eight years, the Russian president – whether it is Putin, or soon, Medvedev, being discussed – is still faced with three distinct tiers of governors’ strength, which dictates to the Kremlin who it may deal with and how it may deal with them. In this way, Moscow is in a position not unlike during the 1990s, when it was faced with dealing with a wide range of subjects which possessed varying levels of power and autonomy. I consider the new gubernatorial selection mechanism produced by recent legislative reforms as a useful lens through which to we may view not only successful centralization of power but the restraints that exist upon the federal government’s powers as well.

### ***Project Sourcing***

The data in this project was acquired from a wide range of academic and media sources, primarily based on online access. Given the recent nature of these reforms, this project required a great deal of emphasis on evolving situations and sources. The Internet has proved invaluable in this task, permitting a researcher to access information on a scale that would have been unimaginable only a few years ago. Here I should mention some of the most useful resources that I utilized in this task. Grigorii Belonuchkin’s website – actually

registered as an electronic periodical publication with the Russian government – proved indispensable in accruing gubernatorial election results of the past decade and a half.<sup>5</sup> Belonuchkin’s data is vast, but not complete in all cases; in these instances the Independent Institute of Election’s website proved useful in filling out missing data.<sup>6</sup> In compiling the gubernatorial appointment decisions, the chart provided by J. Paul Goode<sup>7</sup> supplemented another Russian website operated by the late Vadim Yakushov.<sup>8</sup> This information was then brought up to date by using Russian media outlets, primarily the “tagging” sections of Rossiiskaya Gazeta<sup>9</sup> and Ekspert,<sup>10</sup> as well as the Kommersant family of publications.<sup>11</sup> Though a relatively late find, the Russian version of Google News appears to be one of the most promising sources of this data for future research.<sup>12</sup>

Once I directed my attention at the cases of individual governors, I used the typical resources one might expect – mainstream search engines such as Google and Yandex.<sup>13</sup> Yandex also provides a news search function akin to Google News, which proved helpful in

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<sup>5</sup> Belonuchkin, Grigorii, “Politika: Vybory,” 29 Mar. 2005, 10 Nov. 2007, <<http://politika.su/vybory/vybory.html>>.

<sup>6</sup> “Rezul’taty vyborov,” Mar. 2008, The Independent Institute of Elections, 11 Feb. 2008, <<http://vibory.ru/election.htm>>.

<sup>7</sup> Goode, J. Paul, “The Puzzle of Putin’s Gubernatorial Appointments,” Europe-Asia Studies, 59.3 (2007): 365-399. 378.

<sup>8</sup> Yakushov, Vadim, “Gubernatory, naznachennye po novoi skheme,” Aug. 2007, 12 Nov. 2007, <<http://proekt-wms.narod.ru/states/gubernators1.htm>>.

<sup>9</sup> “Naznachenie gubernatorov,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, <<http://www.rg.ru/plus/gubernatory>>.

<sup>10</sup> “Naznachenie gubernatorov,” Ekspert, <<http://www.expert.ru/topics/150257/>>.

<sup>11</sup> “Kommersant,” Kommersant, <<http://www.kommersant.ru>>.

<sup>12</sup> “Novosti Google,” Google, <[http://news.google.com/news?ned=ru\\_ru](http://news.google.com/news?ned=ru_ru)>.

<sup>13</sup> “Yandex,” Yandex, <<http://www.yandex.ru>>.

obtaining both biographical information and following developments.<sup>14</sup> Biografiya.ru<sup>15</sup> and Russia Profile's "Who's who?" resources<sup>16</sup> also aided in the development of governors' backgrounds. The official websites of regional executive and legislative branches proved useful as well. I supplemented the usual Russian newspaper sources (including Kommersant, Ekspert, Vedomosti,<sup>17</sup> Novaya Gazeta,<sup>18</sup> Nezavisimaya Gazeta,<sup>19</sup> and Argumenty i Fakty<sup>20</sup>) with IA Regnum's regional press roundups,<sup>21</sup> which were helpful in fleshing out regional political developments (particularly in the Saratovskaya Oblast). Also beneficial in this vein were the Russian Regional Report<sup>22</sup> and the Russia Analytical Digest.<sup>23</sup> Finally, this project would have proved virtually impossible if not for the information published by Russian government agencies. The Kremlin's website was useful in obtaining presidential decrees, speeches, and other information.<sup>24</sup> Goskomstat provides some of the core economic and other

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<sup>14</sup> "Yandex: Press Portrety," Yandex, <<http://news.yandex.ru/people/>>.

<sup>15</sup> "Biografiya.ru: Biograficheskaya entsiklopediya," Unified State Register of Legal Persons, <<http://www.biografija.ru/default.aspx>>.

<sup>16</sup> "Who's Who?," Russia Profile, <<http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/whoiswho/>>.

<sup>17</sup> "Vedomosti," Vedomosti, <<http://www.vedomosti.ru/>>.

<sup>18</sup> "Novaya Gazeta," Novaya Gazeta, <<http://www.novayagazeta.ru/>>.

<sup>19</sup> "Nezavisimaya Gazeta," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, <<http://www.ng.ru/>>.

<sup>20</sup> "Argumenty i Fakty," Argumenty i Fakty, <<http://www.aif.ru/>>.

<sup>21</sup> IA Regnum, "Novosti Rossii," <<http://www.regnum.ru/>>.

<sup>22</sup> Orttung, Robert, Russian Regional Report, 1996-2006, The Russian and Eurasian Security Specialized Network for Research on Security Related Developments, 20 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/index.cfm>>.

<sup>23</sup> Neumann, Matthias, et al., Russian Analytical Digest, 2006-2008, The Russian and Eurasian Security Specialized Network for Research on Security Related Developments, 20 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/index.cfm>>.

<sup>24</sup> "Prezident Rossii," The Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, <<http://kremlin.ru/>>.

statistics the reader will encounter here.<sup>25</sup> The Central Election Commission's website was, unfortunately, used primarily (when available), to check results found elsewhere.<sup>26</sup> Electoral Geography,<sup>27</sup> Belonuchkin, and the Independent Institute of Elections provided many of initial sources of these results.

### *Plan of the Paper*

Arguably, we have entered a new phase of Russia's federal development, one in which the regional elites no longer contest their basic relationship with the federal center as they did in the 1990s. Rather than disputing their status as subjects of the Russian Federation, they now seek to maximize their gains within the Federation.<sup>28</sup> The federal center is dominant, but not all-powerful and the balance of power is constantly shifting. Furthermore, the balance of power between individual regions and the federal center varies depending on the region in question. I therefore argue that Moscow still faces restrictions on its ability to act, and one area where these restrictions still exist is the governor's post. In late 2004, the Russian government adopted new legislation that abolished the popular election of regional governors, and in the place of elections substituted a presidentially-directed appointment

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<sup>25</sup> "Federal'naya sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki," The Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation, <<http://www.gks.ru/>>.

<sup>26</sup> "Svedeniya o provodyashchikhsya vyborakh i referendumakh," The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, <<http://www.izbirkom.ru/izbirkom.html>>.

<sup>27</sup> "Elections in Russia," Electoral Geography 2.0, <<http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/r/russia>>.

<sup>28</sup> Goode has argued as much in his article. See also Kimitaka Matsuzato's introductory chapter in which he states that regional and sub-regional authorities now view their interests as coinciding with the central elite. Matsuzato attributes this to the cultivation of a "clannish" party at the same time as program-oriented parties are in crisis. This chapter is in Matsuzato, Kimitaka, ed. *Fenomen Vladimira Putina i rossiiskie regiony*, Moscow: Materik, 2004. Nikolai Petrov in "Tri goda spustya" also briefly touches upon this, writing that the new system has "definitely promoted the restoration of a single elite space."



process. In spite of the reforms of gubernatorial selection processes, the center remains unable to affect change to the full extent permitted by the law and is unable to project its power on a uniform basis. I will argue that the extent to which the regional leaders have established their power is directly related to the outcome of these gubernatorial appointment decisions. The political standing of the governors, I argue, can be assigned to one of three tiers, with each tier having a different set of possible outcomes when a governor's seat comes up for consideration of appointment. The tiers are populated by considering four different regional indicators: the retention of significant regional enterprise control following privatization processes, gross regional product, the length of the governor's tenure at the point of the appointment decision, and whether or not a region possesses republic-level status within Russia's varied framework of subject types. I hold that the differences in the governors' capacity to navigate the political playing field in pursuit of their jobs are a result of the political standing conveyed by these indicators. Those regional governors that were endowed with positive results when evaluating these factors substantially improved their bargaining position when dealing with the center.

In order to further substantiate my claims, I introduce three case studies, one of which is a republic; the other two examples are oblasts.<sup>29</sup> The first case study is the Republic of Tatarstan which is a "strong" region, receiving the highest of ratings due to its economic and political qualities. I maintain that such regions make their executives invulnerable to replacement. The second case study is the Saratovskaya Oblast, which serves as a "moderate

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<sup>29</sup>There are actually six different types of federal subject, but in practical terms, the republic-oblast differentiation is the one of the most substance. The federation also has two "federal cities" (Moscow and St. Petersburg), a single "autonomous oblast" (nominally an ethnic Jewish entity), with the remainder of subjects consisting of okrugs (which typically were carved out of a region and ethnic in character) and krais (essentially large, but sparsely populated, oblasts). The okrugs have largely been targeted for abolition by Putin's administration, to be incorporated into the regions from which they were circumscribed.

strength” region with a mixed set of economic and political qualities. In this type of region, the governor may be removed or he may retain his seat. In the former instance, he is considered to “pact” with the center for a federal appointment to a position elsewhere – this is precisely what the former governor of the Saratovskaya Oblast did. The last case is a “weak” region, the Sakhalinskaya Oblast, where the lack of the region’s assets means that the governor’s fate is wholly dependent on Moscow’s wishes. These governors may retain their posts or may be pushed aside – in which case they are not positioned to demand any compensation. What I hope to show with these examples is the variation of regional political power, and thus the variation in possible outcomes when a governor’s seat is under review. To recap, in the above outlined case studies, three basic levels of regional political power, and corresponding levels of bargaining power, are demonstrated.

The organization of my paper will proceed in the following fashion. In Chapter 2, I will give some historical background relating to the gubernatorial appointment system and discuss some of the previous work that has been done in related areas. In Chapter 3, I will then turn to my project, explaining the creation of the model, discussing the indicators I noted above in greater detail and analyzing the results. The next three chapters are then devoted to in-depth analysis of what has transpired in three regions of great importance. Chapter 4 is devoted to Tatarstan, Chapter 5 will discuss Saratovskaya Oblast, and Chapter 6 will complete the case study portion of the paper by covering the Sakhalinskaya Oblast. Each of these case study chapters will begin with a discussion of the indicators in these particular regions. Having provided this regional “snap-shot,” I will then turn to the next component of each chapter: an analysis of the appointment outcome that took place. I conclude with Chapter 7, where I will restate my findings, as well as provide some final thoughts on

predicting appointments, the significance of the reforms, and the future of the system in Russia.

## CHAPTER 2

### A TRAGEDY AND A NEW ERA

*“Which criteria do you follow in the selection of a candidate for the highest executive post of a subject of the Federation?”*

*– Sergei Borisovich Tarasov, Samarskaya Oblast.*

*“Sergei Borisovich, above all else I am guided by personal and managerial qualities. A person who will occupy such a high post as leader of a region – and we have huge regions – a person with real authority, should be above all a respectable person in the most straightforward, humane sense of that word. Of course, this should be a professional with good practices of managerial work. And thirdly, and not the least important detail comprising this whole packet which is reviewed during the resolution of this question, this is a person who should be passable and acceptable for the region and for the legislative corps of one or another region. We have had cases when we have submitted candidacies which were not acceptable to the regional assemblies. And this didn't provoke negative reactions from me. On the contrary, I consider it to mean that the mechanism, under which a candidate for governor should be vitally connected with the nationwide interests and sensitive to regional problems, works. And in the event which I referred to, we have occasion to propose another candidate – and he passes. I consider that all of these components are equally important. These are what guide the decision.”*

*–Putin, “Direct Line” phone-in show, 25 October 2006<sup>30</sup>*

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<sup>30</sup> “Stenogramma ‘Pryamoi linii c Prezidentom Rossii,’” 25 Oct. 2006, State Television Channel “Rossiya,” 18 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.liniya2006.ru/>>.

Less than two weeks after the Beslan school massacre in North Ossetia, President Vladimir Putin responded with a series of proposed political reforms aimed at increasing the state's capacity to deal with the problem of terrorism. "We need to act," he said in an address, "to raise the effectiveness of governing bodies in solving the whole compound of tasks facing the country."<sup>31</sup> One revision that was supposed to increase this effectiveness was the abolition of the existing system of elections of regional executives by their populace. Citing Article 77 of the Russian Constitution, Putin claimed that the regional executive branches had failed to function alongside their federal counterpart in a coordinated fashion. This failure was totally unacceptable, as the problem of terrorism "demanded the mobilization of all resources." It was "obvious," Putin continued, "that the cohesiveness of action of all executive branches here should be guaranteed above all and unconditionally." The solution to the problem as Putin saw it was to bring the regions and Moscow together: what was needed was "the joint participation of the Federation and its subjects in the formation of executive organs of power in the territories of Russia."<sup>32</sup> In essence, regional authorities had not acted in a competent manner in addressing the attack on the school – a view echoed in a recent textbook approved by the Ministry of Education, which cites as a reason for the abolition of the electoral process the "unpreparedness of executive authorities to effectively act in crisis situations."<sup>33</sup> The solution was thus to appoint governors – hardly a new idea. A review of the events of 1998 – before Putin became either prime minister or

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<sup>31</sup> Dolgov, Anna, "Putin Urges Changes to Centralize Power," 14 Sep. 2004, The Boston Globe, 21 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/09/14/putin\\_urgues\\_changes\\_to\\_centralize\\_power/](http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/09/14/putin_urgues_changes_to_centralize_power/)>.

<sup>32</sup> Putin, Vladimir, "Vstupitel'noe slovo na rashirennom zasedanii Pravitel'stva s uchastiem glav sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii," 13 Sep. 2004, The Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, 20 Nov. 2007, <[http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/09/13/1514\\_type63374type63378type82634\\_76651.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/09/13/1514_type63374type63378type82634_76651.shtml)>.

<sup>33</sup> Razuvaev, Jr., Vladimir, "Skandal'naya 'Istoriya' doidet do shkol," 25 Dec. 2007, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-12-25/1\\_uchebnik.html?mthree=1](http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-12-25/1_uchebnik.html?mthree=1)>.

president – in the Russian Regional Report noted that, “Although Yeltsin and his associates debated the possibility of once again appointing governors, regional elections continued across the country.”<sup>34</sup> Putin has seemingly changed his position as well, but in the opposite direction. In a set of interviews early in his presidency, Putin told his interlocutors:

I think that we have to preserve both the local self-government and a system of election for governors. But all of these connections have to be more balanced. While preserving the system of electing governors, for instance, we should consider applying sanctions against them. To remove them from office, for example.<sup>35</sup>

In September 2004, a legal project establishing a new process of selection of regional executives was drafted, and was then passed by both houses of the legislature and signed by Putin; within six months of its first Duma reading, the new legislation entered into force. Russia’s final gubernatorial election took place in January-February of 2005. On January 28, Putin sent his nomination of Sergei Dar’kin to the Primorskii Krai’s legislative assembly for confirmation. In a special session one week later, the regional deputies agreed to Putin’s choice with a 35-1 confirmation vote.<sup>36</sup> The second round of the final gubernatorial election in Russia, for the head of the Nenetski Autonomous Okrug (AO), took place two days later.

The reformed system functions in this manner: the head of the government (the Russian president) proposes a candidate to the regional legislature. The legislature in turn votes on whether to approve the appointment of the nominee. If a presidential nominee twice fails to be confirmed, then a month long period of “consultation” with the regional

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
<sup>34</sup> Shklyar, Natan, “Russian Regions 1998: Year in Review, Economic Crisis Strengthens Governors,” 14 Jan. 1999, Russian Regional Report, 18 Feb. 2000, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=14234>>.

<sup>35</sup> Putin, Vladimir, et al., Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President, New York: Public Affairs, 2000. 183.

<sup>36</sup> “Naznachenie glav regionov v 2005-2006 gg,” 2006, Institute of Regional Politics, 15 Jan. 2001, <<http://regionalistica.ru/monitoring/rotation/appointments/>>; “Sergei Dar’kin utverzhden Zakonodatel’nym Sobranie Gubernatorom Primorskogo Kraia,” 04 Feb. 2005, The Administration of the Primorskii Krai, 14 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.primorsky.ru/content/?a=642&s=72&p=1>>.

legislatures is led by the president. After this month, the president may appoint a temporary executive official and dissolve the regional legislature.<sup>37</sup> The legislature would thus seem to be at a severe disadvantage in these confirmation proceedings. In previous confirmation votes, this assumption would appear to be borne out, since in no vote yet has a Putin appointee failed to be accepted by a regional legislature (or even come close to being rejected, judging by voting records).<sup>38</sup> Such a fundamental change in law, providing for such a seemingly large transfer of power, would seem poised to meet with fierce opposition. Yet this was not the case, as will be discussed later.<sup>39</sup>

**Figure 2.1: Gubernatorial Turnover Rates, 1992-2007  
(Does Not Include Interim Governors)**



Sources: Turovsky, Belonuchkin, Media Reporting

<sup>37</sup> “Federal Law of the Russian Federation of 11 December 2004, Number 159-FZ, on the enactment of changes to the Federal Law ‘On the general principles of the organization of legislative (representative) and executive organs of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation’ and to the Federal Law ‘On basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right to participation in referendum of the citizenry of the Russian Federation’,” 15 Dec. 2004, *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 15 Nov. 2007, <<http://www.rg.ru/2004/12/15/gubernatory-dok.html>>.

<sup>38</sup> Many of these results may be viewed at the Institute of Regional Politics mentioned above.

<sup>39</sup> This is much the position that Goode takes.

Though there had been many instances of federal and regional political conflict over the past decade, the abolition of gubernatorial elections was not used obtusely as a house-cleaning mechanism (see Figure 2.1). A review of the turnover rates shows that the average number of new governors per year, not including interim governors, from 1992 to 2007 was 9.44.<sup>40</sup> Once delineations are made on the basis of era, the replacement rate of governors in the abolition-period is the lowest figure of all – below both the average for post-Soviet Russia as well as against the Yeltsin and early Putin-era figures. After January 2005, when the new law went into affect, the average is just 7.06 new governors per year (See Table 2.1).<sup>41</sup>

<b>Table 2.1: Average Annual Turnover, by Era (Does Not Include Interim Governors)</b>			
All Years (1992-2007)	Yeltsin (1992-1999)	Putin: Pre-Abolition (2000 - February 2005)	Putin: Post-Abolition (February 2005 - 2007)
9.44	10.88	8.52	7.06

Sources: Turovsky, Belonuchkin, Media Reporting

### ***Why Governors?***

In order to gain a better understanding of the state of the center-periphery relationship in Russia at present, I have elected to focus this paper on a single political office, the regional

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<sup>40</sup> These figures are based on those found in Turovsky, Rostislav, “Vlast’ i biznes v regionakh Rossii: sovremennye protsessy obnovleniya regional’nykh,” originally published in Regional’naya elita sovremennoi Rossii, Moscow: Fund Liberal’naya Missiya, 2005, 143-178, and republished on the website of the Institute of Regional Politics at <<http://regionalistica.ru/library/articles/rft16/>>. These numbers were supplemented with those figures found at Grigorii Belonuchkin’s website Politika.su, “Gubernatorskie vybory – 2005,” 29 Mar. 2005, 04 Jan. 2008, <<http://politika.su/vybory/rre05t.html>>, as well as other media reporting. Note also that the numbers do not include interim governors who gained their post in a temporary capacity – for instance, as the result of the death of a governor. In any effort to maintain the maximum continuity, for the Post-Abolition figures I have omitted the five cases I discuss later. If these governors are included, then the Post-Abolition figure reaches 8.67, which makes it only slightly higher than the Putin Pre-Abolition period. In either case, the number is a significant departure from the Yeltsin era.

<sup>41</sup> Due to the lack of data on the early gubernatorial retention rates, it was not possible to perform tests of statistical significance on these figures across eras.



executive official. Though this is restrictive in some ways – it does not allow for a deep investigation of regional legislatures or courts, for instance – it is nevertheless the most important office at the regional level. As Goode writes, “In centre-regional and centre-local relations, the elected governor represented the whole range of interests based on the region’s territory, and was therefore capable of bargaining and negotiating to a greater extent than any other political actor.”<sup>42</sup> Stoner-Weiss has shown that in the past, governors were important not only to their constituents, but to the federal government as well through such measures as simultaneous employment by regional and federal agencies, and the regional authorities’ provision of housing to federal employees. More generally, the importance of enlisting the aid of governors to achieve federally prescribed goals was indicated by federal officials themselves.<sup>43</sup> This was not only the case in Stoner-Weiss’s interviews in late 1999, but later as well, at least in the view of the population. In late June 2004, the Russia Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) asked over 1,500 respondents across 39 regions: “Which authority in your region matters most of all in the real state of affairs today?” Most frequently cited were governors, by 38 percent of those polled (“the president, the government, other federal organs” collectively accounted for 25 percent; “mayor, raion head of administration” accounted for 16 percent). Furthermore, when broken down based on the respondent’s income, the lowest percentage remains at 38 percent – and peaks at 52 percent for those respondents with incomes over 5,000 rubles. Clearly, governors were still regarded as the most important officials in the lives of Russians in the regions.<sup>44</sup> This centrality to all levels

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<sup>42</sup> Goode, 380.

<sup>43</sup> Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post Soviet Russia, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 83-88.

<sup>44</sup> “Press-Vypusk No. 100: Ot kogo zavisit zhizn’ v regionakh?,” 09 July 2004, Russia Public Opinion Research Center, 01 Mar. 2008, <<http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/848.html>>.

of politics means that not only is the governor's political power substantial, but it also means that the office is a focal point in the political tensions between different interests both inside and outside of the government. The position of a governor therefore renders his office as an ideal point of examination in understanding the changes that have taken place in the center-periphery relationship over the past eight years.

### ***Testing the Governors***

The way that I test the strength of a governor's bargaining position is by assessing the success with which he keeps his job. Admittedly, this can be somewhat problematic. First, it assumes that a particular governor only seeks self-aggrandizement – it rules out the “good” governor who seeks the advancement of the interests of his constituency rather than personal advancement. Furthermore, it assumes that the only way in which a governor can “win” is if he retains his position – it does not allow for a “gray-area.” On the former shortcoming, I can offer no evidence to prove what a “good” governor is or to assess whether he accomplished his goals – this is a purely subjective evaluation. On the second point, however, I have included a third option in addition to “winning” or “losing” a position outright in the form of a “pacted withdrawal.” This variant arises from the fact that in many instances in Putin's tenure, governors were effectively able to negotiate their way out of office since they had substantial political authority. To put it another way, this third group of regional executives had insufficient power to retain their offices, but enough authority to either cause political headaches for the Kremlin or to be of value to the Presidential Administration in some other capacity. Thus they had to be bought out of office with a political appointment elsewhere. This may not provide a complete picture of a negotiated settlement, since the only visible

concession is this political position. Nevertheless, I will show that a general trend can be established.

### ***Related Literature***

Russian regional executives have been the focus of considerable attention in the post-Soviet period, and the transition to the system of appointments should stimulate a new set of literature in this area. Previously, some authors have demonstrated the importance and influence of governors in a variety of spheres. The idea that the regions and their leadership engage in bargaining with the federal government is hardly new. Daniel Treisman, for instance, has previously demonstrated that a strategy of “selective fiscal appeasement” was adopted by Moscow to maintain the country’s territorial integrity. Treisman argues that those regions which presented the center the most potential problems (in the form of separatism, strikes, protest votes, etc.) received the most generous budgetary transfers from the center. Weaker regions, meanwhile, were not only unable to partake of these more lucrative financial terms, but effectively subsidized the more powerful regions.<sup>45</sup> Treisman’s arguments were specific to the 1990s, in which regions were able to negotiate the terms of their incorporation into the Russian Federation. Though this is no longer the case, bargaining still very much exists in different forms in Russia.

Soderlund has identified some of the levers of influence with which governors exert influence over the federal center; this paper essentially reverses the directionality, so that rather than asking how the center is affected, I ask how the center affects the periphery. Soderlund examined influence exercised on the federal center by regional governors against

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<sup>45</sup> Treisman, Daniel, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.

their bargaining power. By utilizing the bimonthly ratings of 2003 of Turovsky, et al.,<sup>46</sup> he then operationalized the federal influence of regional executives, and then compared this against a series of independent variables, many of which were similar to those used in compiling the index used in my project. His research found that bargaining power was a function of several factors, including electoral support, regional economic standing, and republic status.<sup>47</sup>

Robertson has also assessed gubernatorial bargaining power, though in a different area: labor activity. He compares measures of “political loyalty” and “bargaining resources” against strike activity in the Russian regions. This article demonstrates that both of these measures influence levels of strike activity in certain conditions. When a region lacked bargaining resources, it was considered weak, and thus vulnerable to a test of political loyalty. If the governor was politically loyal to Yeltsin, the number of strikes was restricted. On the other hand, if a governor was both weak and at odds with the Yeltsin administration, then there was a marked increase in the number of strikes – an indication of a governor using one of his few bargaining chips in relations with the center.<sup>48</sup> Robertson was able to operationalize both political allegiance and vulnerability; in my paper I am primarily concerned with only the latter due to the lack of transparency in politics that exists today.

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<sup>46</sup> The ratings are similar to those discussed below, but are for the year 2003 and are thus a bit more dated. Furthermore, they assess two qualities – governor’s political influence and governor’s federal influence – and do not address the question of “probability of appointment” since this was well before the new appointment system was adopted.

<sup>47</sup> Soderlund, Peter J. “Electoral Success and Federal-level Influence of Russian Regional Executives,” Europe-Asia Studies, 57.4 (2005): 521-541.

<sup>48</sup> Robertson, Graeme B., “Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes,” American Political Science Review, 101.4 (2007): 781-798.

When a governor lacks bargaining resources, this lack of insulation makes him vulnerable to the center's intervention.

Already, just three years into this new era, a few articles have been published that examine various aspects of the gubernatorial reforms.<sup>49</sup> Goode has provided some useful insight into the origins and intentions behind the new system. He asserts that the Putin administration has adopted "Soviet-era institutional practices" as a shortcut in the place of a more conventional institutionalization. This entails efforts to build up a *vertikal* of power through rotation of cadres, patronage, and "concession prizes" for "losers." Goode considers that the reasons for the acceptance of the reforms by regional elites were two-fold. First, governors were offered a better position from which to keep their jobs. Second, governors considering Putin's strength were confronted with a sense of the "inevitability" of the adoption of the reform, which was a function of the success enjoyed by "Putinism." It is interesting that in Goode's interpretation of events, the regional executives are beneficiaries of the reforms and the regional legislatures, already feeble, are further undermined.<sup>50</sup> His position on the significance of legislatures stands in contrast to Chebankova's arguments.

Chebankova takes the position that the new reforms have ushered in changes that may not be desirable for the Presidential Administration. These "unintended consequences"

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<sup>49</sup> Throughout the paper I will use "reforms" in the plural form, since there have been at least four changes affecting gubernatorial appointments over the past few years. The major alterations, of course, took place following the Beslan school massacre. Later, as discussed by Goode in fuller detail, a pair of presidential decrees (*ukazy*) specified the nomination process to be used, and another federal law provided that majority parties in regional assemblies could nominate gubernatorial candidates. At the end of 2006, another law, as outlined by Belonuchkin's blog, was set to enter force that stipulated resignations would no longer be accepted by the regional legislatures but by the Russian president himself. See Belonuchkin, Grigorii, "Sekretnyi nomer 'Rossiiskoi Gazety,'" 12 Jan. 2007, 10 Mar. 2008, <<http://di09en.livejournal.com/2007/01/12/>>. These legal document designators are as follows: N 159-FZ (11 Dec. 2004), N 202-FZ (31 Dec. 2005), and N 258-FZ (29 Dec. 2006) for the federal laws; N 1603 (27 Dec. 2004) and N 756 (29 June 2005) for the presidential *ukazy*.

<sup>50</sup> Goode, 380-3. See also Hough, Jerry, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-making, Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

include decentralizing trends, such as increasing not only the importance of regional legislatures but their inclination towards resisting both the Kremlin and governors as well. Chebankova cites several instances in which the regional legislatures have either threatened to reject the Kremlin's nominees or have impeached sitting executives. The appointment reforms, teamed together with earlier federal statutes ordering that the at least of one-half of regional assemblies' seats be determined by party lists rather than single-mandate districts, have restructured politics in the regions to more closely resemble parliamentary systems of governance rather than the presidential-style variant that has dominated thus far. Ultimately, this may also spark a democratizing trend at the regional level, as opposition parties shift their focus to competing in races in which they have realistic chances of winning.<sup>51</sup>

Analysis of the governors has not, of course, been confined to Western authors. One of the most prominent Russian scholars in this sphere, Rostislav Turovsky, has not only published articles that focus on Russian regional executives, but for several years headed a project that provided detailed ratings for all of Russia's governors. Unfortunately, Turovsky appears to have ceased publishing these ratings after 2004, at the end of which he also published a list that ranked the probability of a governor losing his seat once the appointment system was adopted. The means for acquiring all of these rankings involved a group of expert assessments (18 Russian observers, including Turovsky, primarily from academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, and media outlets). Indeed, Turovsky and his co-panelists did an impressive job of predicting the dismissal of the weakest of governors – of these they only appear to miss four of 18 outright (two others were removed outside the normal operation of the appointment system; one was a last minute scratch from running in

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<sup>51</sup> Chebankova, Elena, "The Unintended Consequences of Gubernatorial Appointments in Russia, 2005-6," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 22.4 (2006): 457-484.

the final gubernatorial election, the other died in office). Yet there are several governors further up the list that they failed to identify: Oorzhak (Republic of Tuva, 52<sup>nd</sup>), Sovmen (Republic of Adygea, 37<sup>th</sup>), and Prusak (Novgorodskaya Oblast, 17<sup>th</sup>) and Alkhanov (Chechnya, 14<sup>th</sup>). Two others also highly rated lost their positions, though arguably these are unfair to add since they are outside the system of appointments: Kokov (Kabardino-Balkariya Republic, 16<sup>th</sup> – poor health) and Sobyenin (Tyumenskaya Oblast, 10<sup>th</sup> – promoted). Overall, these ratings are quite strong in their validity. Yet, they suffer from two shortcomings. The ratings at this point are more than three years old – which means a large number of gubernatorial appointment decisions have already occurred. Moreover, while Turovsky and his peers have performed admirably, there is little in the way of tangible measurement – these figures are based wholly on the opinions of the experts. The panelists evaluated three different components (the influence a governor has over federal level authorities and business, influence over local authorities and business, and the governor's popularity amongst the populace), with each component graded on a five-point scale. These three components were then combined to provide an overall rating on a five-point scale.<sup>52</sup> A model that is more up-to-date as well as based on providing some concrete statistical basis thus helps to further illuminate the state of the gubernatorial appointment system at present. This is what I try to contribute with the model I outline in the next chapter.

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<sup>52</sup> Turovsky, Rostislav, "Regional'nye lidery v dekabre 2004 goda," 29 Dec. 2004, Politcom.ru, 20 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.politcom.ru/2004/reiting15.php>>.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE MODEL: ESTABLISHING VULNERABILITY AND TRANSITION TYPES

*“...A person, who submitted this question to us, recalled how once on “Direct Line,” just as today, the question was twice raised about the distress of the city of Ust’-Kut. And then this year, you nominated Aleksandr Tishanin to replace Boris Govorin for the governor’s post of Irkutskaya Oblast. This was such a fresh political development. Is this a result of “Direct Line?”*

*“No. This is more than anything else, of course, the result of an evaluation of the situation in the region and a result of the fact that Boris Aleksandrovich Govorin had already served out two terms in the capacity of governor. For such a region as Irkutskaya Oblast, this is quite a solid term. He has a great deal of experience in both state and managerial assignments. I hope that we will find for an opportunity to put his knowledge and strengths to work in some other area. But I want a person to emerge in this region, who on one hand knows the problems of Irkutskaya Oblast, but all the same, has a fresh view on how to solve the problems, in the resolution of which people who live in that oblast are interested. And the proposed candidate is exactly that administrator who has already worked for one and a half or close to two years in the region, who worked in the capacity of head of the regional subunit of the stock company “Russian Railways,” who knows practically the entire economy, who knows the region’s problems, but at the same time is a person who is not connected by any sorts of obligations – pardon me, I’ll say it bluntly – to the local bureaucracy, which should solve some problems much more effectively than has been done previously.*

*–Putin, “Direct Line” phone-in show, 27 September 2005<sup>53</sup>*

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<sup>53</sup> “Stenogramma ‘Pryamoi linii c Prezidentom Rossii,’” 27 Sep. 2005, State Television Channel “Rossiya,” 19 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.liniya2005.ru/>>.



The following chapter is dedicated to reviewing the relationships between a governor's standing and his fate both at the time of the gubernatorial appointment decision and in the period that follows thereafter. I will first discuss some of the assumptions involved, and then I will discuss some of the background of the project design. Having done this I will explain the five cases I have omitted from the overall process.<sup>54</sup> Next, the four factors on which I assessed the regions, and the relationship between these factors and appointment decisions and outcomes will be discussed individually. Finally, I will review the composite results, which will demonstrate that governors can be distributed into one of three tiers. These tiers have had a strong impact on the fate of the incumbent governor.

### ***Definitions and Processes***

This project revolves around an event I call a “gubernatorial appointment decision.” This activity takes place in one of seven cases (see Table 3.1). First, it takes place when a governor's term expires; the date of termination is counted not from the adoption of the new system, but from the point at which the governor in question was last elected. The term length is set at either four or five years, depending on the regional statutes concerning the chief executive. An appointment decision can also take place in five other instances in which a governor leaves office prematurely. The governor may be formally fired due to the loss of the president's confidence; this has proven to be a quite rare occurrence (only three of 78 cases through 2007). Far more frequently, the governor resigns “by personal decision” and triggers an appointment decision prior to the legally prescribed termination of his authority. These resignations can be described in one of three ways: the governor is forced out, the

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<sup>54</sup> These are Mikhail Evdokimov (Altai Krai), Valerii Kokov (Kabardino-Balkariya Republic), Sergei Sobyenin (Tyumenskaya Oblast), Alu Alkhanov (Chechnya), and Viktor Shershunov (Kostromskaya Oblast).

governor seeks an early resignation to apply for the president's vote of confidence,<sup>55</sup> or the governor genuinely no longer desires to retain his office (for health reasons or due to a promotion, for example). A governor may die in office, thus prompting an appointment decision (this has happened twice, in both cases as the result of automobile accidents). Finally, regional consolidation also triggers appointment decisions. For instance, the merging of the Permskaya Oblast with the Komi-Permyatskii Autonomous Okrug produced the Permskii Krai. This new subject required a governor, who in this case was the governor of the erstwhile Permskaya Oblast, Oleg Chirkunov.

<b>Table 3.1: Gubernatorial Appointment Decision Types</b>			
<b>Categorization</b>		<b>Example (Region in Parentheses)</b>	<b>Possible Outcome(s)</b>
Expiration of Term		Dmitrii Ayatskov (Saratovskaya Oblast)	Reappointment, Loss of Office
Loss of President's Confidence		Vladimir Loginov (Koryakskii AO)	Loss of Office
Resignation	Vote of Confidence Attempt	Mintimer Shaimiev (Republic of Tatarstan)	Reappointment, Loss of Office
	Forced Out	Ivan Malakhov (Sakhalinskaya Oblast)	Loss of Office
	Retirement	Valerii Kokov (Kabardino-Balkariya Republic)	Loss of Office
Death		Mikhail Evdokimov (Altaiskii Krai)	Loss of Office
Creation of New Subject		Oleg Chirkunov (Permskaya Oblast/ Permskii Krai)	Effective Reappointment of One of the Merged Territory's Governor, Loss of Office by Both of These Governors

<sup>55</sup> An interesting note regarding the early appeals method: while it would seem the Kremlin enjoyed making use of it, having accepted five candidates as of mid-March 2005, the populace was less enthusiastic about this mechanism. Despite a majority of respondents backing the new system of appointments (54% in March 2005 either "fully agreed" or "most likely agreed" that new system was necessary – up from 38% just the previous September), the same 54% felt this new tactic was "most likely negative" with just 23% believing it to be "most likely positive." See: "Press-Vypusk No. 178: Rossiiane o naznachenii i otstavkakh gubernatorov," 28 Mar. 2005, Russia Public Opinion Research Center, 01 Mar. 2008, <<http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/1149.html>>.

These gubernatorial appointments constitute the first half of my project. The other major component is what I term the “Vulnerability Index.” The index is an unweighted composite score of four different components that are measures of the standing of the region and its executive. Measures utilized include the gross regional product of the subject in question, the length of a governor’s tenure in office at the time of the appointment, whether or not the subject has republic status, and whether or not the regional administration retained significant control over enterprises created during the privatization processes of the 1990s. Thus a governor is awarded a score of zero to four points, which in turn generates three different types of governors of different strength (see Appendix A). These scores are then compared against the gubernatorial appointment decision outcomes, which produces a pair of important conclusions. First, governors of the strongest type are effectively invulnerable to losing their seats. The remaining two tiers of governors can lose their offices, which leads to the second conclusion: those governors occupying the middle tier reached “pacted” removals from office, operationalized here as an appointment to a political office in the federal government. This is a reflection of the political standing and power of these governors, who can be viewed as having sufficient power to either be assets to the Kremlin elsewhere or to present a sufficiently credible threat to obstruct the federal government’s policy preferences that they must be “bought out.” This leaves the weakest tier of governors, who are considered to be wholly at the mercy of the Kremlin; when these governors have been ousted, they typically have faded from the political scene altogether.

### ***Case Population and Selection***

In setting up this project, I populated a list of 78 gubernatorial appointment decisions from 2005 to 2007. I then converted this into a revised set that consists of 73 cases. This revised set omits two governors who died in office (Mikhail Evdokimov of the Altai Republic and Viktor Shershunov the Kostromskaya Oblast), a governor who resigned for what appear to be legitimate health reasons (Valerii Kokov the Kabardino-Balkariya Republic) and two special cases (Alu Alkhanov of the Republic of Chechnya and Sergei Sobyenin of Tyumenskaya Oblast). The reasons for the first two omissions is evident, but the final three instances merit a discussion of why they have been deleted from consideration in my model.

I considered Kokov's resignation to be forced by non-political concerns: that is, his health. Though a resignation may be publicly described as occurring for "health reasons," it can be difficult to distinguish genuine instances of political resignations for health reasons from those which were undertaken as a result of more dubious, Khrushchevian machinations. In Kokov's case, however, it seems clear that he resigned for purely personal reasons: the governor died just a month and a half after leaving office, from a "prolonged illness," reported to be cancer by one media outlet.<sup>56</sup> I have also chosen to omit Chechnya on the basis of the events that have transpired there over the past two decades. Alkhanov's service came in the only region to be forcibly retained into the Russian Federation, at the cost of not one, but two, wars that altered all facets of life there, not least of all the political landscape.

Sobyenin's exclusion arises from his promotion to a political office with real influence. Though coming from outside the St. Petersburg or security service circles often

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<sup>56</sup> "Kreml' prishel k vyvodu: khoroshii gubernator – staryi gubernator," 06 Dec. 2006, Novyi Region – Nizhnyi Novgorod, 19 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.nr2.ru/nn/95116.html>>; RIA-Novosti, "V Nal'chike zavershilas' tsermoniya proshchaniya s Valeriem Kokovym," 30 Oct. 2005, 19 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.rian.ru/society/20051030/41937083.html>>.

attributed with influencing Putin, one reporter observed that he "...always was absolutely loyal to Vladimir Putin, and publicly demonstrated this," and was one of the first governors to join the party of power, United Russia. The same piece even speculated that Sobyenin may have an opportunity to succeed Putin.<sup>57</sup> Even though this did not come to fruition, it is worth noting that Sobyenin's current position as the chief of staff of the Presidential Administration is the same that President-elect Dmitrii Medvedev occupied prior to his promotion to first deputy prime minister; moreover, the man Medvedev tapped to lead his election campaign was none other than Sobyenin.<sup>58</sup> Sobyenin's transition to the federal level of government, in sum, appears to have little to do with removing a problematic governor: his elevation appears to have far more to do with staffing an important presidential position with a competent official.

### ***Constructing the Model***

The basic design of my model proceeds as shown in Figure 3.1. I do not believe that there is a literal "formula" to determine the fates of petitioning governors – though a presidential decree last June ordered the establishment of an "evaluation" regime to assess the effectiveness of regional executives in 43 areas.<sup>59</sup> It does, however, show some key

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<sup>57</sup> Melikova, Natal'ya, "Stanet li Sobyenin preemnikom Putina? Fenomen Sobyenina: Na byvshem gubernatore Tyumenskoi oblasti Putin otrabotal osnovnye elementy spetsoperatsii 'Preemnik'," 13 Nov. 2006, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2006-11-13/7\\_sobianin.html](http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2006-11-13/7_sobianin.html)>.

<sup>58</sup> Nowak, David. "Sobyenin to Manage Medvedev Campaign," 21 Dec. 2007, The Moscow Times, 18 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/12/21/011.html>>.

<sup>59</sup> Samigullina, Aliya, et al. "Gubernatorov razlozhat po 43 punktam," 29 June 2007, Gazeta.ru, 18 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.gazeta.ru/2007/06/29/oa\\_243164.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/2007/06/29/oa_243164.shtml)>. The order may be viewed at "Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Ob effektivnosti deyatel'nosti organov ispolnitel'noi vlasti sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii," No. 825, 28 June 2007, The Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, 08 Feb. 2008, <<http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=040264>>. Perhaps this is also done with Yeltsin's early misadventures in mind: On page 310 of "Russia: Managing Territorial Cleavages under Dual Transitions," (in


factors that may insulate governors from federal influence. I first analyze four factors, which will be discussed in more detail in the subsections below, including how they were operationalized. These four factors are converted into a point score of either zero or one point, and these four indicators are then compiled as a Vulnerability Index with scores ranging from zero to four points. Having obtained this composite score, the regional executive can be categorized into one of three tiers of strength: strong governors are those who received three or four points; moderate strength executives received scores of one or two points; the final set of governors, the weakest and most vulnerable to federal influence, are those who received ratings of zero points.

These different categorizations prove to be very important in determining the outcome of a gubernatorial appointment decision. Strong governors (eight of 73 cases) have only one possible path: the retention of their position. The moderately empowered governors (48 of 73 cases) have a pair of possible outcomes. They can either retain their position or they can be “bought out” of office with another federally appointed post. In sum, these governors therefore are somewhat vulnerable to federal pressures, but also possess sufficient standing to receive something in return for retirement from their post. The weakest governors (17 of 73 cases) have a pair of potential paths as well: they can retain their position, like all the other incumbents, or they can be ousted without any concessions made to them. In either instance, they are wholly at the mercy of the center: if they retain their post, they will be expected to be the most malleable of governors; if they are sacked, they do not present a

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Bermeo, Nancy and Ugo M. Amoretti, eds. *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) Kathryn Stoner-Weiss writes that “in some cases, Yeltsin appointed so many individuals at the same time that his administration lost track of exactly who was coming to power in the provinces.”

sufficiently credible threat to the Kremlin in other spheres.<sup>60</sup> All of this is to say that the center, despite successfully increasing its control over the regions in the past eight years, is forced to deal with different regions and leaders, who possess varying degrees of strength, and this in turn produces different outcomes.



<sup>60</sup> For a full breakdown of the different outcomes, see Appendix B.

***Indicator I: Substantial Regional Economy (GRP)***

The most basic economic indicator for a given region is its gross regional product (GRP).<sup>61</sup> This figure provides an understanding of the size of the overall economy and proves to be a powerful indicator of a governor's vulnerability (see Appendix C). In order to provide for a comparison of those governors on the basis of their success in retaining their position, these cases were partitioned into two tiers, and were awarded a point for being in the higher output tier, while the other half of cases that fell in the lower tier did not receive a point (due to an odd number of cases, 37 cases constituted the lower tier, only 36 were in the upper tier). Sixteen of the 21 governors (76.19 percent) who were replaced were located in the lower half the of GRP bracket; this translates to 43.25 percent of governors in the lower bracket losing their positions, while just 13.89 percent of governors in the upper bracket were ousted – in other words, a governor was more than three times as likely to keep his job if he was from one of wealthier regions reviewed. In terms of the relationship between GRP and bargaining outcomes later, three of the five cases (60.00 percent) where the incumbent hailed from an upper tier region were successful in obtaining a federal appointment, and both of those who did not obtain federal posts received other political positions. Conversely, just five of 16 governors (31.25 percent) in the lower tier instances managed federal posts after they left office. The average GRP of a retained governor was nearly three times as high as his unseated counterpart.

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<sup>61</sup> The figures cited here and used for this analysis are drawn from the official data provided by Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (often referred to the name of its Soviet predecessor, Goskomstat, or Rosstat). Though ideally the figures used in my research would be drawn from the year of the appointment decision, statistics have only been publically disseminated for the years through 2005. Nevertheless, given the limited scope of the appointment cases (less than three years), it is doubtful that these figures would have drastically changed or altered the relative standings between regions. The GRP figures can be viewed at: Federal'naya sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, "Valovoi regional'nyi produkt," 2006, State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation, 02 Nov. 2007, <[http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01\\_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/i-vrp.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/i-vrp.htm)>.



### ***Indicator II: Retention of State Control of Enterprises***

Not only is leading a large economy important, but the ability to take control of that economic apparatus is beneficial as well. In cases where the regional government retained control over significant shares of privatized stock corporations, this form of economic autonomy proved to be an extremely strong insulator against being ousted by Moscow (see Appendix D). In order to define this level of control, I have incorporated the definition and data compiled by Aleksandr Radygin and Georgii Mal'ginov of the Institute for the Economy in Transition.<sup>62</sup> Radygin and Mal'ginov calculated that seventeen regions retained a significant share (15 percent of all created companies) in stock companies that were privatized between 1993 and 1999. A significant share is held to mean either a controlling packet or a "golden share" which confers controlling rights greater than the actual percentage of stock owned would normally allow. In 20 of 21 cases (95.23 percent) in which a head of administration did not retain his position, he governed a region in which the administration did not retain a significant level of control over enterprises in his region. The sole exception to this rule was North Ossetia (governed by Aleksandr Dzasokhov), where the region only barely crossed the 15 percent threshold (it retained 16 percent of released firms). In terms of those regions where the regional administration did retain significant shares, 13 of 14 candidates (92.86 percent) kept their position. Only 38 of 58 (65.52 percent) of those regional leaders who lacked this degree of control were able to retain their positions. In sum, this economic control component has been shown to provide the incumbent with a considerable level of insulation.

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<sup>62</sup> Radygin, Aleksandr D., and G.N. Mal'ginov, "Gosudarstvennaya sobstvennost' v rossiiskikh korporatsiyakh: problemy effektivnosti upravleniia i zadachi gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniia," Mar. 2001, Institute for the Economy in Transition, 07 Dec. 2007, < [http://www.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19\\_19/article.php?art=8](http://www.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19_19/article.php?art=8)>. See section "2.1 Kolichestvennyi aspekt problemy," particularly Table 3 and the accompanying text.

### ***Indicator III: Regional Ethnic Stability***

Another possible factor constricting the Russian president's decision is the ethnic stability of a region. Given Russia's ethnic diversity, as well as its historical delineation of geographic and political power on the basis of ethnic identity, this is no small consideration. The best known instances of volatility along these lines are the Chechen Wars, of course, but other examples exist as well. In order to evaluate the strength of this variable, I assessed the appointment of governors on the basis of whether or not they represented a republican-level subject of the federation (see Appendix E). Fifteen heads of republics were subjected to gubernatorial appointment decisions since the new system was established. In six of these cases (40.00 percent), the incumbent failed to retain his job. Of these rejections, three (50.00 percent) received a federal appointment, two (33.33 percent) received other government positions, and one (16.67 percent) received no political office. Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, republics were actually more likely to have their governors replaced, in spite of what additional autonomy those regions did in fact enjoy due to their special status. The retention level for all other subjects was 74.13 percent; for republics, it was just 60.00 percent. In terms of post-removal success rates of being offered a federal job, republican heads were somewhat more successful, with three of the six (50.00 percent) receiving federal positions, compared with just five of 15 (33.33 percent) non-republican bosses receiving federal posts.

#### ***Indicator IV: Tenure***

Another restriction upon Moscow's decision-making process was the extent to which the regional executive had managed to become entrenched and was able to build up a regional political base. In order to test for the incumbent's level of regional penetration, the length of a governor's tenure at the time of the appointment decision was reviewed (see Appendix F).<sup>63</sup> There is a relationship between the retention of one's position and tenure: just four rejected governors belonged to the upper tier; the remaining 16 belonged to the lower tier. In looking at all governors, those in the top tier were slightly more likely to keep their posts on the basis of tenure: 28 of 36 (77.78 percent) kept their seats at that level compared with 24 of 36 (66.67 percent) at the lower level. There is a minor difference in the average tenures of those governors who kept their jobs (a 101.18 month mean average) and those who lost them (a mean average of 95.28 months). What is more noteworthy, however, is that there is a clear split within the group of governors who did not retain their positions: at the bottom half of this group, only two received federal positions after they lost their gubernatorial posts; moreover, all three governors that were officially sacked belonged to this group. At the top half of this group, five of these officials received federal positions and three received other political posts. The mean average was also a significant difference between those who bargained and those who were forced out completely: 122.14 months of experience versus 80.82 months (a 37 percent difference).

#### ***The Vulnerability Index and Outcomes***

The comprehensive results which form the Vulnerability Index show strong patterns in comparing the point system totals and the results of gubernatorial decisions. Moreover,

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<sup>63</sup> In this instance I did not include Dagestan's Magomedov, since due to his region's unusual political structure it is not clear when he should be considered to be the highest executive official.

there is a strong relationship between point totals and bargaining power within the group of governors that was dismissed. In only one case (14.28 percent) in this set of dismissals did a governor who received zero points receive a federal appointment.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, none of the remaining six is known to have received any sort of governmental position at any level following their dismissal. All three of the heads of administration that were formally sacked belong to this ill-protected group. In the top half of this bracket, the figures are completely different. For those 13 heads of administration that received scores of one or two points and were replaced, seven of them (53.80 percent) received federal positions (see Table 3.2 and Appendix B). Of the remaining six who did not receive federal appointments, five received other political appointments at the regional level: four joined the federal legislature; the fifth took a position in the mayor's office in Moscow. What this demonstrates is that there is a clear advantage in bargaining position for those governors who received moderate levels of points. They did not retain sufficient power to hold their offices outright, but they were able to secure employment in political positions after their resignation. Those extremely weak governors, conversely, were largely forced into non-political or marginal political roles (i.e. within a party, as Vasilii Starodubtsev of the Tul'skaya Oblast did, or in competition for another position, as Vladimir Tikhonov of the Ivanovskaya Oblast attempted to do in a Duma bid, unsuccessfully). In a pair of the more drastic fates that ex-governors met with, one ended up in prison (Aleksei Barinov, Nenetskii AO),<sup>65</sup> while another is now an 11<sup>th</sup> grade schoolteacher (Leonid Korotkov, Amurskaya Oblast).<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> That sole case was Mikhail Mashkovtsev of Kamchatskaya Oblast, who does not appear to have ever assumed his duties in this position – he is currently living in St. Petersburg, and overseeing the construction of his apartment, following the death of his wife. Thus the decision to include his case here may be debated, but I have chosen to err on the side of caution.

<sup>65</sup> “Byvshii gubernator Nenetskogo okruga prigovoren k trem godam uslovno,” 06 Sep. 2007, Polit.ru, 20 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.polit.ru/news/2007/09/06/barinov.html>>; IA Regnum, “Prigovor po delu eks-gubernatora

### ***An Alternative Demonstration of Regional Tiers: The “Varangian Factor”***

The arrival of “Varangians” (or “outsiders” in less dramatic terms),<sup>67</sup> as one magazine has taken to labeling new arrivals, has attracted attention in the past few years.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, this appears to be a deliberate Kremlin strategy, the benefits of which are two-fold. As Joel Migdal has written, by utilizing personnel decisions as a political instrument – what he terms “the Big Shuffle” – the leader seeks to move officials from their original territorial domain or professional competencies, and thus prevent them from manifesting a strong political base or gaining a dangerous level of expertise.<sup>69</sup> The drawback to this approach, of course, is a likely loss of efficiency. There is a second advantage in that such appointments may be simultaneously used to hollow out the political capacity of some of the stronger Russian regions by depriving them of some of their best politicians.<sup>70</sup> Two regions in particular stand out – both of which not coincidentally are belong to this strong tier: the federal city of Moscow, which lost a trio of its deputies to this promotion strategy (Valerii Shantsev,

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Nenetskogo AO ostavlen bez izmenenii,” 26 Oct. 2007, 20 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/905749.html>>; “Ya rasschityval na polnoe opravdanie,” 26 Oct. 2007, Rosbalt Sever, 20 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.rosbalt.ru/2007/10/26/425906.html>>.

<sup>66</sup> Palei, Natal’ya, “Leonid Korotkov sobiraetsya posvyatit’ pedagogike novyi etap svoei zhizni,” 3-9 Oct. 2007, Teleport, No. 40, 21 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.amur.info/news/2007/10/09/22.html>>.

<sup>67</sup> The term is refers to the Scandinavian Varangians, who were supposedly “invited” to rule over the “native” Slavic and Finno-Ugric peoples.

<sup>68</sup> See for instance articles discussing the arrivals of Shantsev, Boos, and Nagovitsyn in these terms: Kravtsova, Maria, “‘Varyagi’ nastupayut ostorozhno,” 29 Aug. 2005, Ekspert, 09 Jan. 2008 <<http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2005/32/32ex-polit4/>>; “Georgii Boos: ‘Klany rynok kontrolirovat’ ne budet’,” 12 June 2006, Ekspert, 15 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2006/22/qa\\_boos/](http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2006/22/qa_boos/)>; “Varyagom bol’she,” 11 June 2007, Ekspert Sibir, 10 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.expert.ru/printissues/siberia/2007/22/news\\_zamestilel\\_gubernatora/](http://www.expert.ru/printissues/siberia/2007/22/news_zamestilel_gubernatora/)>; Popova, Ol’ga, “Proshchanie s epokhoi,” 03 Sep. 2007, Ekspert Volga, 15 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/32/noviy\\_gubernator/](http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/32/noviy_gubernator/)>. Nikolai Petrov also uses the term in discussing Shantsev in “Incoming Outsiders,” 09 Aug. 2005, The Moscow Times, 10 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/73015.htm>>.

<sup>69</sup> Migdal, Joel, Strong Societies and Weak States, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, 206-226.

<sup>70</sup> Petrov, “Incoming Outsiders.”

<b>Table 3.2: Ex-Governors' Fates</b>					
<b>Region</b>	<b>Incumbent</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Points</b>	<b>Federal Appointment?</b>	<b>Current Employment</b>
Nenetskii	Aleksei Barinov	8/06	0.00	No	Sacked; currently serving three-year prison term
Ivanovskaya	Vladimir Tikhonov	11/05	0.00	No	Ran in 2007 Duma elections; lost
Amurskaya	Leonid Korotkov	6/07	0.00	No	Sacked; high school teacher
Kaliningradskaya	Vladimir Egorov	9/05	0.00	No	Heads lumber company
Koryakskii	Vladimir Loginov	4/05	0.00	No	Sacked; head administrator for tariffs, Kamchatskaya phone company
Sakhalinskaya	Ivan Malakhov	8/07	0.00	No	Forced to resign after natural disaster; no known employment
Kamchatskaya	Mikhail Mashkovtsev	6/07	0.00	Yes	Supposedly on Consultative Commission to the State Council of the Russian Federation (CCSCRF); does not appear to be active
Novgorodskaya	Mikhail Prusak	8/07	1.00	Yes	CCSCRF
Tul'skaya	Vasilii Starodubtsev	3/05	1.00	No	Active in the KPRF and Agro-Industrial Union of Russia
Nizhegorodskaya	Gennady Khodyrev	8/05	1.00	Yes	Ministry of Regional Development?; CCSCRF
Altai Republic	Mikhail Lapshin	12/05	1.00	No	Federation Council; Died
Adygea	Khazret Sovmen	12/06	1.00	No	Advisor to Mayor of Moscow
Samarskaya	Konstantin Titov	8/07	2.00	No	Federation Council
Saratovskaya	Dmitri Ayatskov	3/05	2.00	Yes	Promoted to Amb. to Belarus; then CCSCRF member
Irkutskaya	Boris Govorin	9/05	2.00	Yes	Ambassador to Mongolia
Buryatiya	Leonid Potapov	6/07	2.00	Yes	Presidential Aide; CCSCRF
North Osetiya-Alaniya	Aleksandr Dzasokhov	6/05	2.00	No	Federation Council
Tuva	Sherig-ool Oorzhak	4/07	2.00	Yes	CCSCRF
Dagestan	Magomedali Magomedov	2/06	2.00	Yes	Presidential Commission on the Strengthening of the Russian State and Federal Relations

Mikhail Men', and Georgii Boos), and Tatarstan, which lost Nikolai Kolesov to Amurskaya Oblast.<sup>71</sup> By utilizing this policy of alienation, the Kremlin is provided with a lever with which to exert some influence over the most autonomous of regions in the long term. In assessing the relationship between this Varangian factor, the data set shows that as the point total rises, so does the probability that the region in question will be able to send a local official to the governor's post. I reviewed the successors for the 21 cases in this project (See Table 3.3), and used the newly arriving governor's previous geographic political base as the determinant for his classification. I should note that in two cases, Vitalii Potapenko and Aleksandr Tishanin, the individual's preceding work placed him in the region he was appointed. I chose to consider them Varangian nevertheless. This was so determined because the former was a federal inspector posted there for less than two full years – previously he had spent long periods in of time in KGB/FSB service in Tajikistan and St. Petersburg/Leningradskaya oblast.<sup>72</sup> The latter, the reader may remember from the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, worked for Russian Railways and had been in the Irkutskaya Oblast for less than two years as well. For those regions that received no points on the comprehensive Vulnerability Index, only half of them (four of eight regions) escaped a Varangian invasion; this increased to a 60 percent success rate (three of five regions) for the regions which were awarded one point, and was capped by a 75 percent success rate (6 of 8 regions).

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<sup>71</sup>See the following article for more details. The piece also notes that one of the republics most influential political figures, the mayor of the capital city of Kazan, Kamil' Iskhakov was appointed as Putin's presidential representative to the Far East Federal District. The district is headquartered in Khabarovsk, some 3,500 miles from Kazan. See "Gubernator iz Kazani," 29 May 2007, Ekspert Online, 11 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.expert.ru/newsmakers/2007/05/29/kolesov/>>.

<sup>72</sup> "Novyi gubernator NAO Valerii Potapenko: biografiya," 21 July 2006, Pravda.ru, 19 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.pravda.ru/districts/northwest/naryan-mar/21-07-2006/191403-nao-0>>.

In light of a Nikolai Petrov article, I also considered a timing element to the Varangian appointments. Petrov, writing about the appointment of Varangian Valerii Shantsev in the Nizhegorodskaya Oblast in August 2005, noted that this choice set a precedent that "...promises to be important because it signals that the rotation principle, which the Kremlin has revived in recent years and used for regional security and law enforcement heads, may now be applied at the gubernatorial level."<sup>73</sup> After a brief spurt of Varangian appointments started by Shantsev's selection, these outsider nominations subsided and became more sporadically applied. Moreover, they were evenly distributed in terms of the point totals – in the first wave there were two weak regional occurrences, one moderate regional occurrence, and one strong regional occurrence – which was mirrored in the second phase). As these results show, Varangian replacements have a tendency to reflect the strength of the former governor and the region as calculated in the Vulnerability Index. This helps to substantiate the broader case that this standing has consequences in the center-periphery bargaining process.

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<sup>73</sup> Petrov, "Incoming Outsiders."



<b>Table 3.3: “Varangians” and Vulnerability Index Point Totals</b>					
<b>Region</b>	<b>Subject Type</b>	<b>New Governor (Former Region)</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Points</b>	<b>Local Replacement or Outsider?</b>
Nenetskii	Okrug	Valerii Potapenko (St. Petersburg/Leningradskaya FSB)	8/06	0	Outsider
Ivanovskaya	Oblast	Mikhail Men’ (Moscow – Regional Government)	11/05	0	Outsider
Amurskaya	Oblast	Nikolai Kolesov (Tatarstan – Regional Government)	6/07	0	Outsider
Kaliningradskaya	Oblast	Georgii Boos (Moscow – Regional Government)	9/05	0	Outsider
Koryakskii	Okrug	Oleg Kozhemyako	4/05	0	Local Official
Sakhalinskaya	Oblast	Aleksandr Khoroshavin	8/07	0	Local Official
Kamchatskaya	Oblast	Aleksei Kuz’mitskii	6/07	0	Local Official
Smolenskaya	Oblast	Sergei Antuf’ev	12/07	0	Local Official
Novgorodskaya	Oblast	Sergei Mitin (Moscow – Federal Government)	8/07	1	Outsider
Altai Republic	Republic	Aleksandr Berdnikov	12/05	1	Local Official
Tul’skaya	Oblast	Vyacheslav Dudka	3/05	1	Local Official
Nizhegorodskaya	Oblast	Valery Shantsev (Moscow – Regional Government)	8/05	1	Outsider
Adygea	Republic	Aslancherii Tkhakushinov	12/06	1	Local Official
Irkutskaya	Oblast	Aleksandr Tishanin (Irkutskaya – Russian Railroads)	9/05	2	Outsider
Saratovskaya	Oblast	Pavel Ipatov	3/05	2	Local Official
Dagestan	Republic	Mukhu Aliyev	2/06	2	Local Official
Samarskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Artyakov	8/07	2	Local Official
Buryatiya	Republic	Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn (Tomskaya – Business)	6/07	2	Outsider
North Osetiya-Alaniya	Republic	Taimuraz Mamsurov	6/05	2	Local Official
Tuva	Republic	Sholban Kara-ool	4/07	2	Local Official
Yaroslavl’skaya	Oblast	Sergei Vakhrukhov	12/07	2	Local Official

### ***The Limitations of the Model***

As the reader may have noted, there are several instances in which the model fails to accurately predict the pacted transitions of governors. I attribute this to several shortcomings in its construction as well as the general limitations of this approach. First, and arguably foremost, the Vulnerability Index is populated with only four factors and this is done so in an

unweighted fashion. If the index were to be expanded sufficiently to include a larger number of factors (and even this would be complicated to some extent by availability of desired data), I contend that a high rate of success would become a nearly perfect rate of success.<sup>74</sup> Yet even if this revision were to take place, there would always be the prospect of cases that could not be explained by tangible statistical factors alone – the timing dynamics I discuss in the final chapter come to mind. Another potential shortcoming is the distinction between federal posts and other governmental posts (particularly federal legislature posts). I have considered the former to be superior professional assignments in this paper; I think this is, in fact, typically the case. However, given Russia’s regional variation, as well as the differing goals of individual politicians, it is not unlikely that in some circumstances a legislative post might be more desirable to a governor. In some cases, an ex-governor might find that being a federal senator allows him to spend time in both Moscow and in his home region (three of the four senators represented the region they formerly governed). This could be interpreted as either an exercise in rationalism (they felt they were better positioned politically to “bridge” the federal and regional levels) or a decision based on non-material goals (retaining a place in the community, remaining with a family, etc.).

On the other side of the pacted transitions, why was a former governor like Mikhail Mashkovtsev of the Kamchatskaya Oblast, who received a minimum score, given an appointment that he did not merit based on this system? The first possible answer to this question is that it is unclear whether he has actually been appointed to the commission or not.

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<sup>74</sup> I would suggest adding, for example, measures for gubernatorial vote tallies prior to the abolition of elections when discussing political factors. If the focus shifted to strictly regional structural considerations, I believe that factors emphasizing structure and allocation of resources should be emphasized: the level of international trade linkage (ideally both in-flows and out-flows), the Hirschman Index, the regional relationship to the center in terms of tax distribution, the level of foreign enterprise presence, and the nature of regional enterprise types (based on the understanding that some types of enterprises are easier to extract taxes from than others).

The Kremlin's website does not provide these appointments – what we are essentially left with in many cases is simply the statements of the ex-governors themselves. Despite supposedly being tasked to his post in late May of 2007, as of late July of that year he still had not joined the commission since he was “on leave.” Interestingly, at that point he also claimed that members of the commission also receive parallel appointments to presidential aide posts – which the Presidential Administration press service denied.<sup>75</sup> Mashkovtsev seemed to be in no hurry to accept whatever appointment he may have received; indeed, in January 2008 Mashkovtsev had still not become active in the commission, instead saying that a place had been reserved for him – but that he had refused it, since for the time being, he wished to live in St. Petersburg. True to his labor roots, the Communist member wistfully observed that he wouldn't mind returning to his previous work as a lathe turner: “...it wouldn't be so bad to be settled into a small private enterprise, and a modest entrepreneur would be proud that he has an active member of the State Council working on his staff!”<sup>76</sup> It is unclear at this point if he has ever actually joined this body, or if this is another instance in which rumors of “impending appointments” and non-binding discussions between political figures have combined with a non-transparent federal executive branch to produce an “appointment” where none exists. Assuming that Mashkovtsev has in fact been posted to the federal commission, then there is one other possible explanation: in doing so he would be the first member of the commission from the Far Eastern Federal District (all others are also represented, save the Central District) to become available for appointment. This would mirror the State Council itself, which consists of one governor representing each Federal

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<sup>75</sup> Yarmoshevich, Roman, “Klub byvshikh gubernatorov,” 27 July 2007, Kommersant, 20 Nov. 2007, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/region/khabarovsk/page.htm?year=2007&issue=132&id=219660&section=7274>>.

<sup>76</sup> Zhaglina, Tat'yana, “Podumyvayu o rabote tokarem v nebol'shoi masterskoi,” 08 Jan. 2008, Argumenty i Fakty Kamchatka, 26 Jan. 2008, <[http://kamchatka.aif.ru/issues/1418-1419/01\\_04](http://kamchatka.aif.ru/issues/1418-1419/01_04)>.

District on a rotating basis. In other words, with all three of the other unemployed governors who came from the Far Eastern Federal District belonging to the ranks of the sacked (formally in two instances, informally in Malakhov's case) perhaps Mashkovtsev was the first and only choice for the post.

With all this being said, I still strongly believe that the model as outlined here firmly establishes the linkage not only between strength and retention of the governor's post, but the relationship between this authority and the office one receives after leaving his seat. All governors in this model were positioned correctly in terms of establishing their vulnerability – admittedly, this is done with the aid of hindsight. It conforms to the federal appointments with 87.5 percent accuracy (or perfectly, depending on how Mashkovtsev is treated). The difference in average point scores between federal appointees and non-federal appointees is clear: the former were rated at 1.50 points, the latter at only .69 points. I consider there to be by the harshest calculations, seven “failures” (yielding a success rate of 66 percent). Of these, one was an “overachiever” (Mashkovtsev); six were “underachievers,” meaning that their moderate strength status should have positioned them for federal appointments: Starodubtsev (Tul'skaya Oblast), Dzasokhov (North Ossetia), Mikhail Lapshin (Altai Republic), Sovmen (Republic of Adygea), Konstantin Titov (Samarskaya Oblast), and Anatolii Lisitsyn (Yaroslavl'skaya Oblast). Three of these were appointed as senators, two gained other political offices (one in the Moscow mayor's office, the other in the State Duma), and one, a dedicated communist, is working in his party. Perhaps the model did not fully capture these individual cases' strengths (or lack thereof), perhaps it does not pay enough attention to the non-federal political posts, or perhaps it simply does not take proper heed the fact that the involved agents are human beings who in some cases pursue non-rational goals or who have

personal problems they must address. Having acknowledged these shortcomings, I would like to emphatically state that I believe that this model has proven the twin trends for which it was created: regional standing not only affects a governor's vulnerability, but his career options in those cases in which he leaves his post. In doing so, I have demonstrated that though the Kremlin has achieved some political gains versus the periphery, it is still limited in its ability to exercise its powers there.

### ***Conclusion***

I have demonstrated that there exists a strong relationship between a Vulnerability Index score and the fate of a politician in two related instances. At the point that the appointment decision is being made, the center is faced with restrictions upon whom it may replace. In those cases in which a replacement is possible and is desirable, and is then made, this bargaining position once again becomes relevant in determining the fate that awaits an ousted governor in the form of his post-governorship employment opportunities. This is further substantiated by an ancillary measure, the comparison of the Vulnerability Index scores against the Varangian appointments. I will now proceed to the second half of this paper, a set of case studies. I hope to use these instances to illustrate in fuller detail how a governor's standing translates into his bargaining power. The first case, Tatarstan, shows a governor with the strongest level of standing, which he has used to protect his seat.

## CHAPTER 4

### STILL TOGETHER AFTER ALL THESE YEARS

#### THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN & MINTIMER SHARIPOVICH SHAIMIEV

*“You are the lead horse. And we are your harness.”*

*–Shaimiev, at a gathering of regional  
executives, to Putin, 2002<sup>77</sup>*

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<sup>77</sup> Netreba, Tat'yana , “Prezident: Kak dovel rodinu Lenina do ruchki?,” 10 July 2002, Argumenty i Fakty, 19 Mar. 2008, <[http://gazeta.aif.ru/online/aif/1133/02\\_01](http://gazeta.aif.ru/online/aif/1133/02_01)>, originally viewed at <[http://www.anticompromat.ru/putin/o\\_putine.html](http://www.anticompromat.ru/putin/o_putine.html)>.

I will begin this case study by discussing the four different indicators on the Vulnerability Index, as they apply specifically to President Mintimer Shaimiev and the Republic of Tatarstan (RT), and demonstrating how these qualities have been used to the Shaimiev's advantage. President Shaimiev and his region received the maximum score of four points, indicating that he is a "strong governor." Strong governors, the reader will recall, are considered to be invulnerable to replacement by the federal center. This neither means that they do not conflict with Moscow, nor that they have not suffered political defeats in the past eight years, but that they are secure in the most important of ways: their executive position. Indeed, such a mixed set of developments, with some losses to the central government and some successful repulsions of its encroachment, was the case in Tatarstan during Putin's years in office, as is detailed by Mukharyamov and Mukharyamova.<sup>78</sup> In the final two sections, I will discuss Shaimiev's third term – which I consider to be his "first reappointment," as well as his official reappointment in 2005. I will conclude the chapter by briefly looking forward to the future of the post of president of Tatarstan.

### ***Tenure***

First taking office on June 12, 1991, Shaimiev is one of the longest-serving governors in all of Russia. Even more impressive is the fact that he was elected to this post rather than relying on an official stamp of approval from Moscow. This lack of appointment can be viewed as evidence of his political might even before the Soviet Union formally dissolved. Of the remaining 10 governors reviewed in this paper who obtained their governorship in 1991, Shaimiev is the only one who was did so through a process which involved at least the

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<sup>78</sup> Mukharyamov, N.M., and L.M. Mukharyamova, "Tatarstan v usloviyakh retsentralizatsii po-putinski," in Matsuzato, Kimitaka, ed., Fenomen Vladimira Putina i rossiiskie regiony, Moscow: Materik, 2004.

trappings of popular legitimation – all the others were appointees.<sup>79</sup> He received dominating tallies in the three elections that took place in the region in 1991, 1996, and 2001, in which he took 70.16 percent, 97.14 percent, and 79.52 percent of the vote, respectively. Thus Shaimiev was seemingly able to build up a substantial political network. This is confirmed by Kimitaka Matsuzato, who detailed a “caciquismo” political system in which Shaimiev leads an oligarchic apparatus that thrives off of a robust political machine. This system is one that weds appointment of “meso-elites” at the city and raion executive levels with their election to a seat in the regional legislature. In doing so, it provides Shaimiev with a means of verifying the political credentials of his appointments – in other words, their ability to create winning electoral campaigns. Failure to attract these votes and gain popular election to the legislature results in their dismissal from their executive duties as well. For those who are successful in gaining both offices, they are admitted to the republican oligarchy. Having created a successful political instrument, they are then expected to utilize that tool to mobilize (or block mobilization) upon Shaimiev’s request.<sup>80</sup> The republican center is thus able to exert pressure over the federal center, which was just as true in 1993 with Yeltsin’s

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<sup>79</sup> These other 10 governors were Konstantin Titov, Vladimir Chub, Eduard Rossel’, Viktor Kress, Mikhail Prusak, Viktor Ishaev, Leonid Polezhaev, Anatoly Lisitsyn, Nikolai Volkov, and Aleksandr Filipenko. It should be pointed out that another executive considered here, Magomedali Magomedov, was a high-ranking member of the republican leadership before the Soviet Union collapsed as well. Establishing exactly when Magomedov should be considered the “governor” is a difficult proposition as I have noted earlier in this paper. His republic utilized a unique form of an executive branch that sought to reconcile the republic’s ethnic diversity with political stability by establishing a 14-member state council and a rotating presidency – which never actually rotated during the nine years it formally existed as a result of a number of interesting “interpretations” of the law. In 2003, as part of the adoption of a new constitution, this “rotating” executive role became a free-standing presidency – occupied once again by Magomedov. For further discussion of the Dagestan case, see Oversloot, Hans, and Ger Van Den Berg, “Politics and the Ethnic Divide: Is Dagestan Changing From Complex to Simple Oligarchy?” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 21.3 (2005) 307-331.

<sup>80</sup> Matsuzato, Kimitaka, “From Ethno-Bonapartism to Centralized *Caciquismo*: Characteristics and Origins of the Tatarstan Political Regime, 1990-2000,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 17.4 (2001): 43-77. See especially 52-63.



constitutional referendum<sup>81</sup> as it was in 2000, when Shaimiev delivered 68.89 percent of the vote – the fifth highest total in all of Russia – to Putin. Not coincidentally, just four days before the election, Putin visited the republican capital of Kazan and lavished praise on Shaimiev:

Today President Shaimiev proposed an absolutely acceptable variant of both inter-budgetary and federative relations; they are in line with the Russian state. I have already said, and will once again repeat, that the President of Tatarstan is one of the founders of the modern Russian state. He stood at the fountainhead of the formation of the Federation.<sup>82</sup>

Shaimiev would remain a backer of Putin, delivering him 82.60 percent of the vote in the 2004 presidential race.

The vote totals are not the only evidence of machine politics. Nikolai Petrov's assessment of democratization in the regions in the ten year period from 1991 to 2001 is in agreement with a level of authoritarianism. Tatarstan ranks a less-than-inspiring 69<sup>th</sup> of all regions in Russia. It is one of only six regions to get the minimal score in elite turnover, and had very low scores in such relevant categories as openness, free and fair elections, political pluralism, and local self-government.<sup>83</sup> Finally, Tatarstan shares many of the same characteristics of a region that participated in "machine politics" by Henry E. Hale. Hale finds that a successful machine is the product of both Soviet legacies and gubernatorial characteristics. In Tatarstan, there are key similarities to a region with machine politics as described by Hale: in terms of legacy, Tatarstan has republic status, a substantial agricultural population, and a significant overall population. With regard to gubernatorial characteristics, its leader belongs to the titular ethnic group and has previous leadership experience in the

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 59-60.

<sup>82</sup> Mukharyamov and Mukharyamova, 323.

<sup>83</sup> Petrov, Nikolai, "Regional Models of Democratic Development," in McFaul, Michael et al., eds. Between Dictatorship and Democracy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, 239-267.

agriculture sector.<sup>84</sup> To restate these findings, Shaimiev has been able to stay in office for an extraordinary lengthy of time, and has used that entrenchment to construct a political apparatus with which to exert pressure over the federal center.

### ***Regional Economy***

Both Matsuzato, and Mukharyamov and Mukharyamova have assessed Tatarstan's economy as being quite diverse. A review of the GRP by sector as well as the Hirfendahl Index bears this out. It ranked twenty-seventh most diverse of all regions, with a score of 1611.58. The top five sectors are Mineral Extraction (30.6 percent), Manufacturing Activity (16.7 percent), Wholesale and Retail Trade (11.7 percent), Construction (10.3 percent), and Agriculture, Game and Forestry (7.8 percent). With a GRP of 488,609.1 million rubles, it has the fifth largest economy in Russia after the two federal cities, the Moscow oblast, and the hydrocarbon-rich Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug. It ranks 15<sup>th</sup> when GRP is adjusted per capita. It only rates 45<sup>th</sup> in terms of the average wage – likely in part due to the agricultural sector.

### ***Enterprise Control***

A retention of significant shares of enterprises proved to be a very strong factor in improving the resistance of the republic to the federal center, as I have shown in the third chapter.<sup>85</sup> Privatization in Russia proceeded unevenly; in the majority of cases it was

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<sup>84</sup> Hale, Henry E. "Explaining Machine Politics in Russia's Regions: Economy, Ethnicity, and Legacy," Post-Soviet Affairs, 19.3 (2003): 228-263.

<sup>85</sup> Turovsky seems to suggest something of an alternative to simply calling this resistance in some cases, including Tatarstan. He contends that in some of these instances this is actually permitted, if not embraced, by the central authorities on the basis that it allows these business interests to be exercised for political goals, chief amongst them delivering the vote. The center in this view achieves its primary goal (election results) by

coordinated by the federal government through the State Property Committee (GosKomImushchestvo, or GKI), but in some instances, including Tatarstan, this authority was delegated to the regional administrations. In Tatarstan, the regional authorities did not divest themselves wholly of the property, instead retaining sizable control of “privatized” enterprises. Considering the enormous size of the economy as discussed in the preceding section, this meant that the regional authorities had considerable direct political leverage over the Russian economy as a whole. The precise extent of enterprise control is difficult to ascertain, but the regional government’s dominance is evident. The figures provided by Radygin and Mal’ginov for the 1993-1999 period position the republic as having the fifth highest total (36.8 percent) of the share of retained state enterprise control in Russia. This strong figure does not tell the full story, however, as the state also retained a “golden share” in another 31.4 percent of the created companies in the republic (second only to the neighboring Republic of Bashkortostan, which had a figure of 55.2 percent). In other words, 68.2 percent of created enterprises were within the republic’s control (second in total overall after Kabardino-Balkaria Republic (80.2 percent)). It should, of course, be emphasized that this covers only privatized enterprises, and not business start-ups or outside firms. This high figure compares favorably with the figure provided by Julia Kusznir, who writes that,

[b]y introducing its own privatization vouchers and excluding regional companies from federal auctions, Tatarstan’s administration secured control of the regional economy. In early 2000, about 65%

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allowing the incumbent to remain – rather than declaring war on these regional executives and fighting for complete control of the regional economic apparatus. In doing so, the Kremlin not only reduces its costs but avoids the chance of losing some of this ground to Russian Big Business. Though this argument is not entirely invalid, it seems to be of secondary importance based on the findings of this paper. The Kremlin is interested in more than simply vote totals, particularly insofar as the Kremlin is not of a single institutional mindset but consists of competing clans and interests. The primary reason, I contend later in this chapter, that Tatneft has not been parceled out and sold to non-republican firms is the strong regional standing of the political leadership. See Turovsky, Rostislav, “The Influence of Russian Big Business on Regional Power: The Models and Political Consequences,” in Gill, Graeme, ed., Politics in the Russian Regions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 147-148.

of the region's wealth was under the control of the governing political elite, which thus also constituted the region's economic elite.<sup>86</sup>

Finally, in at least one important case in which a firm *was* privatized and sold off, the regional administration was still able to gain control. Solnick describes how the KamAz automotive factory was privatized and shares were sold to international investors. The regional government (in collusion with federal authorities) then reacquired blocking stakes in the firm (the government of Tatarstan actually did so on not one, but two occasions) and thus reduced the share of the international investor to just 11 percent.<sup>87</sup>

The main vehicle through which the republican government exercises control is the holding company Svyazinvestneftekhim, owned fully by the administration. Within this company there are currently shares in 22 other firms, owning stakes ranging from 2.796 percent of shares (the commercial bank Ak Bars) to 100 percent of the shares (the pharmaceutical company Tatkhimfarmprepaty). Also within this portfolio are corporations in the chemical, energy, and telecommunications sectors. Perhaps most importantly, the republic controls 33.60 percent of the company Tatneft which produced about 5.1 percent of Russian total production in crude oil in 2007 (25 million tons).<sup>88</sup> The company also participates in ventures outside the republic (both within Russia and abroad). The government presence is evident on the 15-member board of directors, as Kusznir observes. The composition has changed a bit since Kusznir wrote, but the same number of board members (five) concurrently hold seats in the Tatarstan republican government: the prime

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<sup>86</sup> Kusznir, Julia, "The New Russian-Tatar Treaty and Its Implications for Russian Federalism," 06 Mar. 2007, Russian Analytical Digest, 10 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=28890>>.2.

<sup>87</sup> Solnick, Steven, "Russia between States and Markets," in Prakash, Aseem, and Jeffrey A. Hart, eds., Responding to Globalization, New York: Routledge, 2000. 217-221.

<sup>88</sup> "About the Company," 2008, OAO Tatneft Corporate Website, 19 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.tatneft.ru/eng/>>.

minister (and chairman of Tatneft), the minister of land and property relations, the minister of finance, and the advisor to the president on mineral resources, oil and gas, and the head of the department on issues of the oil-gas complex of the cabinet ministry of the RT.<sup>89</sup> Though the majority of the company may be owned by ostensibly non-governmental actors, the “golden share” provision allots to the regional government more corporate control than its voting stock would normally confer based on percentages alone.<sup>90</sup> The republic has not been loath to use the corporate enterprise to political ends, as at least two cases illustrate. In the first instance, the company forgave a loan to a state-run company and issued two other loans to state enterprises, in one case at no interest and in the other at a .01 percent interest rate. This led to one investment group analyst to warn that, “The relationship between Tatneft and Tatarstan has traditionally been incestuous and it is likely to continue to be so.”<sup>91</sup> And in a less serious vein, the company-sponsored Ak Bars Kazan hockey club decided to take advantage of the 2004-2005 National Hockey League lockout to assemble an all-star roster – with a supposed payroll of \$50 million (for reference, the NHL salary cap the following season was \$39 million).<sup>92</sup> Their mission, as was any team’s goal, was to win the championship cup, but in this case it was special, as it was meant to coincide with the

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<sup>89</sup> Kuszniir, Julia, “Economic Actors in Russian Regional Politics: The Example of the Oil Industry,” in Gill, Graeme, ed. *Politics in the Russian Regions*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, and “Organs of Administration – OAO Tatneft,” 2006-2007, OAO Tatneft Corporate Website, 19 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.tatneft.ru/leaders.htm>>.

<sup>90</sup> The concept of the “golden share” originated during Thatcher’s privatization drive in UK in the 1980s. It was supposed to afford the government oversight of strategic enterprises while ceding actual ownership to the private sector. The definition of “golden share” varies depending on the case in question, but the mechanism typically permits the government veto-rights over any major corporate decision: sale of assets, asset acquisitions, mergers, or restructuring of shares or voting rights.

<sup>91</sup> Gismatullin, Eduard, and Torrey Clark, “Tatneft Reveals Itself as a Generous Lender,” 18 July 2005, *The Moscow Times*, 10 Nov. 2007, <<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/07/18/046.html>>.

<sup>92</sup> Badin, Boris, “Shabashniki na l’du,” 10 Apr. 2006, *Russkii Kur’er*, 03 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.ruscourier.ru/archive/1247>>.

millennial anniversary of the founding of Kazan, and the accompanying celebration for which the capital city had been renovated for several years. The team reached finished fourth and promptly lost in the first round of the playoffs.

The point of this, of course, is not to bemoan excessive spending on free agents in hockey. It is to illustrate how economic control can be (mis-)used to the political aims and benefit of the regional political elite. In Tatarstan this is clearly the case. Bashkortostan's energy giant, Bashneft came under fire from the federal government for just this reason. In that region, President Murtaza Rakhimov's son Ural controlled a significant stake in the firm, but after a battle with federal officials, Bashneft is in the process of being forced out of the younger Rakhimov's hands, despite his efforts to have it parceled out into "charitable foundations."<sup>93</sup> This assertion by the federal government is currently being met with resistance by the region and it is not clear at this point the extent to which the federal courts can (or will) enforce their decision.<sup>94</sup> Both the larger size of Tatneft and the fact that its ownership was distributed amongst a combination of regional political elite, regional business interests, and international investors probably account for the failure by the federal government to do the same in the republic. To conclude, Shaimiev exerts substantial control over a major regional economy, and in doing so, he possesses an important bargaining chip in any dealings with the federal center.

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<sup>93</sup> See for instance: Bushueva, Yuliya, et al. "Privatizatsiya po-bashkirski," 23 July 2003, Vedomosti, 18 Mar. 2008, Database on-line, Available from Eastview Russian Central Newspapers, <<http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=5121470>>; Pleshanova, Ol'ga, et al., "Bashkirskii TEK otkhodit Rosimushchestvu," 04 Dec. 2007, Kommersant, 18 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=832221>>.

<sup>94</sup> IA Regnum, "Vlasti Bashkirii nashli novye urchagi kulyarnogo vliyaniya v Kremle?," 04 Sep. 2007, 18 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/879931.html>>.

### ***Republic Status***

As cited in Matsuzato, Indus Tagilov observed that “republics are not mere administrative units but cells of culture and traditions.”<sup>95</sup> Tatarstan is the “homeland” of the Tatar nationality, despite the fact that only approximately 36 percent of Tatars reside there. Nevertheless, they constitute nearly 53 percent of the residents of the republic (compared to a 39.5 percent share for ethnic Russians).<sup>96</sup> This large Tatar population, taken together with a Soviet tradition of promoting ethnic minorities to leadership positions within autonomous regions, has led to a situation in which Tatar influence is amplified, as Julia Kuznir describes:

About 90 percent of the regional elite was recruited from the Soviet *nomenklatura*, with 60 percent of top politicians even retaining the same positions that they already had during the Soviet era. According to a study of ruling groups in Tatarstan, ethnic Tatars made up 80 percent of the governing elite in 2003. The majority of ruling politicians was of rural descent, between 40 and 60 years old, and had completed a degree in higher education, mainly in the agricultural sector.<sup>97</sup>

Yet, this privileged genesis for the Tatar elite did not translate into the same drive for national independence as it did elsewhere. As Matsuzato writes, “Tatar official nationalism is not based on a national liberation model. Rather it tries to affect Russia’s state building as a legitimate historical component.”<sup>98</sup> Shaimiev’s actions during the early 1990s, then, did not constitute the same sort of threat as Chechnya in the eyes of the Kremlin. The mainline politicians in Tatarstan, including Shaimiev, sought as their ultimate goal a bilateral treaty rather than simply being incorporated by the multilateral Federal Treaties as just another ordinary subject. To the extent that there was some separatism in the region, it was restrained

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<sup>95</sup> Matsuzato, 45.

<sup>96</sup> Population figures taken from “Demoskop Weekly,” 2002, Institute of Demography at the State University – The Higher Institute of Economics, 20 Jan. 2008, <[http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus\\_nac\\_02.php?reg=56](http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_02.php?reg=56)>.

<sup>97</sup> Kuznir, Russian Analytical Digest, 3.

<sup>98</sup> Matsuzato, 71.

by Shaimiev.<sup>99</sup> Put simply, Tatarstan's elite were content to remain within the Russian Federation, but wanted to be treated differently from ordinary oblasts. Their demands, as well as their threats, were sufficiently restrained that given their strong bargaining position and the weakness of the federal center in the early 1990s, they were able to obtain the maximum level of autonomy. A series of bilateral agreements concluded in early 1994 were unique at that point in the country's history. Though there has been some debate as to the real significance of the treaties themselves,<sup>100</sup> the two parties were treated as mutually consenting equals rather than as superior and subaltern: the delegation of authority was between the organs of state power of the RF and the RT; the quartet of signatories consisted of the presidents and premiers of the two entities. Furthermore, the final text of the treaty spoke to the republic's unique juridical standing, with the preamble stating that the treaty is agreed to considering that:

...the Republic of Tatarstan as a state united (*gosudarstvo ob'edinena*<sup>101</sup>) with the Russian Federation by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, and agreements on the delineation of subjects of competencies and mutual delegation of authority between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan, engaging in international and foreign economic relations, agree to the following...<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Matsuzato, 66-68.

<sup>100</sup> For a much fuller discussion of the treaties, including this debate, see especially pgs. 58-67 of Mukharyamov, Nail', "Respublika Tatarstan" in Matsuzato, Kimitaka, *Regiony Rossii: Khronika i rukovoditeli: Tom 7: Respublika Tatarstan, Udmurtskaya respublika, Respublika Mordoviya*, Sapporo, Japan: Hokkaido University, 2000. Available in digital form at <<http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publicn/tom7/contents.html>>.

<sup>101</sup> The Russian language has at least three terms conveying the idea of "united," though with different nuances. *Edinyi* express the idea of unity or singleness (for example, as in United Russia). *Soedinennyyi* expresses the idea of joined together (as in the United States of America). *Ob'edinennyyi* expresses the idea of association; in this linguistic context, it suggests the strongest form of autonomy (as in the United Nations).

<sup>102</sup> "Dogovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respublika Tatarstan o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniya i vzaimom delegirovani polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi Respublika Tatarstan," 15 Feb. 1994. The original document appears to have been withdrawn from the official website of the Republic of Tatarstan, but a copy may be viewed at the online library of the Politnauka project at <<http://www.politnauka.org/library/doc/dogovor-rtrf.php>>.



This special status was further confirmed by Aleksei Vashchenko, described as an expert on international affairs, who rejected the “state united with the Russian Federation” passage, exclaiming that this was “on the whole, a terrible phrase,” and that the significance of it was that “there are two states – there is the Russian Federation, there is Tatarstan, and they have concluded between them alliance obligation.”<sup>103</sup> In sum, the republic was awarded powers that were well outside the jurisdictional scopes of all other Russian regions at the time. Given these better terms, this obviously created an incentive for other regions to follow suit, and indeed dozens did just this.

After coming to power, Putin took aim at these sorts of bilateral agreements on the whole; yet in the summer of 2007, he signed just such a document, once again, with Tatarstan. This time, the economic, resource, and foreign privileges in the 1994 treaty were not present; it was, from the RT’s point of view, a weaker agreement. Nevertheless, it was exceptional, as it accorded special status to the republic. And there remained some notable concessions in terms of the republic’s political uniqueness. Citizens would carry the standard internal passport of the RF, but they would also be permitted to include a Tatarstan passport “insert” as well. Tatarstan was not recognized by Moscow as having sovereignty, but the republic was still labeled a “state” (*gosudarstvo*) which possessed “full state authority beyond the competence of the Russian Federation.”<sup>104</sup> These may have been largely symbolic gestures, but they were not small concessions coming from Putin. There was one other

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<sup>103</sup> Fishtein, Efim, moderator, “Forum-2000 v Prage: global’noe sosushchestvovanie – vyzovy i nazdezhdy 21 veka; Budushchee Tatarstana v sisteme Rossiiskoi Federatsii; Razrabotka komp’yuternykh igr kak vid malogo, no perspektivnogo biznesa, Sozdanie novykh natsional’nykh shkol v Sankt-Peterburge,” 11 Oct. 2005, Sponsored by Radio Svoboda, 18 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.svoboda.org/programs/tw/2005/tw.101105.asp>>.

<sup>104</sup> Corwin, Julie A., “Tatarstan: Moscow, Kazan Agree to Share Power – Again,” 03 Nov. 2005, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/11/8d037c1e-6805-41d3-b0be-19e95d6cb9b2.html>>.

interesting article of the treaty, which applies directly to the subject this paper is concerned with: the office of the president of Tatarstan. Article 2, point 5, provides that:

For nominees to fill the highest executive office of the Republic of Tatarstan, introduced in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the federal law, an additional requirement is established, stipulating competency in the state languages of the Republic of Tatarstan. The competence in the state languages of the Republic of Tatarstan is established in a declarative way.<sup>105</sup>

In other words, the president of Tatarstan must be proficient in *both* Russian and Tatar.

Given that a very low number of ethnic Russians speak Tatar, this effectively blocks a Varangian candidate from entering on the job following Shaimiev's presidency.

### ***Shaimiev's "Two Reappointments"***

Shaimiev, as I have noted, has enlisted Putin's help twice in retaining his office.

Though only the latter instance is technically an appointment, the first was essentially an appointment as well, since by the letter of the law, Shaimiev should have been forced to step down. This arose from the fact that the federal government passed a law limiting all governors to two terms in 1999. However, it was not clear in the accepted text of the law whether or not it applied retroactively or not.<sup>106</sup> Shaimiev had at this point been elected twice. As a result, if he wanted to retain his seat, it was necessary to undertake some political maneuvering through which to circumvent the legislation. Mukharyamov and Mukharyamova provide a detailed recreation of the events that followed. Initially, the first two attempts to amend the federal law to clarify that the term limit should start not from the

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<sup>105</sup> "Dogovor."

<sup>106</sup> Such an omission would appear to be a stunning oversight, but it appears that failure to determine whether a law is retroactively applied or not is something that still occurs. Consider, for instance, a recent addition to the legal codex of the RF, Article 1473, which went into force 01 January 2008. The law, which regulates the use of the adjective "Russian" in the names of corporations, fails to comment on whether this applies to firms incorporated prior to the first of the year or not. See: "Vse rossiiskoe – gosudarstvennoe," 21 Jan. 2008, Kommersant Vlast, 25 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=843221>>.

initial point of election, but *after* the law's 1999 induction met with failure. The third effort, on October 29, 2000, which actually consisted of not one, not two, but three votes, was successful. The first vote failed. Deputy Vladimir Zhirinovsky called for a revote, but it once again failed, this time by three votes. Fate would intervene, however, as a "computer glitch" permitted a third vote. In the interim, deputies spilled out into the lobby, where they were met by Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov. Miraculously, the number of deputies in support of the amendment immediately shot from 223 to 282. Shaimiev could stand again for not just a third, but a fourth term (this point was rendered moot by the shift to the appointment system). The consequence of doing this, however, was that the law applied to *all* heads of administration, and thus nearly 20 other governors, who would have automatically been cashiered, were given new political life.<sup>107</sup> Thus, it appears that Putin was willing to pay a substantial price to aid Shaimiev.

Shaimiev's third term was set to expire in the spring of 2006; yet he appeared before Putin a full year early to ask for his vote of confidence. In doing so, he was just the 12<sup>th</sup> governor to put an appointment decision before Putin, and set a precedent for other leaders to submit to Putin. As Aleksei Titkov of the Carnegie Moscow Center said when questioned on Putin's motivations:

I believe from Putin's side, there was a very strong desire to have such a strong regional leader as Shaimiev set an example for other regional heads on how to transfer to the new system of relationship with the federal authority," Titkov said. "Because so far, the first 10 governors who got or, in a few cases, didn't get reappointed as governors were either weak politicians with unstable positions in their regions who simply wanted to secure themselves [by getting the president's support] or those whose term was about to expire."<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Mukharyamov and Mukharyamova, 340-2.

<sup>108</sup> Saidazimova, Gulnoza, "Russia: What's Behind Putin's Reappointment of Powerful Tatar Leader?," 16 Mar. 2005, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/03/644f4ce2-ff39-4f49-885d-ff62d25a2a31.html>>.

Interestingly, Shaimiev claimed that he was content to retire, but he remained at Putin's request to guarantee stability.<sup>109</sup> Normally, this could be seen as simple political bluster, particularly in comparisons to governors like Dmitrii Ayatskov of the Saratovskaya Oblast, who made a similar claim. Yet, in this instance, there may well be some substance to it, since Putin had been on relatively good terms with a leader who operates a robust political machine in a region with substantial economic concerns and a large ethnic population that has been privileged in the halls of government. Indeed, there appears to be at least one other instance in which Putin successfully "convinced" a governor to remain in office despite his intentions to the contrary. Roman Abramovich of the Chukotskii AO had signaled his intent to leave the position;<sup>110</sup> he was reappointed by Putin anyway. The reason for this was relatively straightforward: it kept Abramovich and his wealth, at least partially in service of Russia, rather than of the United Kingdom, where he owned substantial property holdings.

As Andrew Osborn wrote in The Independent:

He has tried politics, and it is not for him," a source close to the oligarch told The Independent on Sunday. But the \$1.5bn his staff say he has ploughed into the remote area has transformed its infrastructure and standard of living - a recent poll found that 20 percent of the locals viewed him as "a god."<sup>111</sup>

In this light, Shaimiev may well have remained in part due to Putin's desire. Even if this was not the case, however, it still suggests an exercise in collusion with the federal center, since to do so technically required Shaimiev to resign prematurely and then be "appointed." If

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Corwin, Julia A., "Oligarch/Governor Says He Won't Seek Second Term," 30 Apr. 2002, RFE/RL Newswire. No longer available through original author – duplicate was viewed on 24 Feb. 2008 at <<http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2002/02-04-30.rferl.html>>.

<sup>111</sup> Osborn, Andrew, "Putin Squeezes Abramovich to Keep the Roubles Flowing East," 05 June 2005, The Independent, 17 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/europe/putin-squeezes-abramovich-to-keep-the-roubles-flowing-east-493073.html>>.

Shaimiev did not believe that he could trust Putin to reappoint him, he would have no incentive to effectively forfeit the final full year of his tenure.

### ***Looking Ahead***

One other point remains: Tatarstan after Shaimiev. If he remains in power until the expiration of his fourth term, this will likely mark a new period in Tatarstan's leadership. At that point he will be 73 years of age and it is not clear whether he would face a new battle due to term limits. Article 91, point 5 of the Constitution of Tatarstan states that, "One and the same person may not be elected (or "selected?") to the position of president of Tatarstan more than two terms in a row."<sup>112</sup> Due to the vagaries of the language employed (the term "elected" and "selected" (*izbran*) are one and the same in Russian political literature and the new laws on appointing governors), the kinds of tactics Russian political figures have used in the past (including in Tatarstan), and the strong standing of Shaimiev, it is not clear just *what* this means. Assuming however, that Shaimiev does decide to step aside – or is forced to step down for health considerations – he is well-situated to have significant input into who his successor is, based on his influence as well as the language competency provision that the president of RT must possess. This will be the final testament to Shaimiev's power, as it may demand a pacted transition, rather than simply installing a "Varangian." In the past, some governors have been able to effectively select successors in addition to determining their own fate – two of the highest profile examples of this are Evgenii Nazdratenko of the Primorskii Krai and Mikhail Nikolaev of the Republic of Sakha-Yakutiya. Nazdratenko was "bought

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<sup>112</sup> "Konstitutsiya Respubliki Tatarstan," 2002, Official Server of the Republic of Tatarstan, 20 Feb. 2008, <[http://www.tatar.ru/?node\\_id=222](http://www.tatar.ru/?node_id=222)>.

out” of his seat by Putin with the post of head of the State Fisheries Committee (and later, when he wore out his welcome at this job, the title of deputy head of the Security Council).<sup>113</sup> Nazdratenko’s deputy served as acting governor, and was then followed by Sergei Dar’kin, with Nazdratenko’s backing won the seat in 2001.<sup>114</sup> Nikolaev was able to select as his successor, Vyacheslav Shtyrov, the chairman of Alrosa (the government-held diamond-extracting powerhouse in Sakha, which Nikolaev himself had previously led) – over the preferred Kremlin candidate, and was thereafter appointed to the Federation Council, apparently against the Kremlin’s wishes.<sup>115</sup> One of the benefits of the new system of appointing governors has been reducing the costs for the center in terms of the “buy-out” (with a position on the State Council commission, which is discussed in fuller detail in the next chapter) rather than a plum position from which to pillage and wreak havoc such as Nazdratenko’s, while at the same time reducing the influence that ex-governors can retain in their region by tapping successors. Shaimiev may be the first real exception to this inability of a governor to select his successor: it will be interesting to see what sort of succession processes surrounds the “strong” governor-types as whole in the coming years. Though the Presidential Administration can undermine this process by offering jobs elsewhere to members of regional heavyweights’ staffs, it can only remove some of the strongest protégés (and possible successors) – not all of them.

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<sup>113</sup> “Putin Finds a Place for Kasyanov’s Arch-Foe,” 05 May 2003, Gazeta.ru, 20 Feb. 2008, as translated and posted in Johnson’s Russia List, Article #14, 05 May 2003, original in email form, with web-archive accessible at <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7167-14.cfm>>.

<sup>114</sup> Zhunusov, Oleg, “Darkin Set to Win Primorskii Gubernatorial Elections,” 06 June 2001, Russian Regional Report, 20 Feb. 2008, <<http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=0DB20691-9E0D-6050-4402-64634A73F13A&lng=en>>.

<sup>115</sup> “Yakutskim kandidatam podpisan prigovor,” 13 Dec 2001, Kommersant, as seen in Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 13 Dec. 2001, 11 Nov. 2008, <[http://jamestown.org/publications\\_details.php?volume\\_id=24&issue\\_id=2158&article\\_id=18991](http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=24&issue_id=2158&article_id=18991)>.

### ***Conclusion***

I have show that Shaimiev is a “strong” governor. His strong regional standing has insulated him from the being removed, despite the fact that his region is one that would be a very lucrative entity to take control over. The region has retained substantial control over enterprises, it has the interwoven factors of regional autonomy and ethnic diversity, and its leader is one whose tenure as regional executive predates the Russian Federation itself, which has allowed for the construction of a dominating political machine. It remains to be seen what will happen to Tatarstan once Shaimiev steps aside, but it is likely that he will have a major role in shaping the selection of his successor. This situation is in contrast to the next case study, in which the incumbent governor possessed only moderate strength, and had to surrender his post – though at a cost to the federal center.

## CHAPTER 5

### REJECTIONS, INSURRECTIONS, AND RESURRECTIONS

#### THE SARATOVSKAYA OBLAST & DMITRII FEDOROVICH AYATSKOV

*“It’s difficult to break Lukashenka, very difficult. He has very firm footing. Of course, he needs to get a hold of himself and realize that Russia is Russia, Belarus is Belarus, Putin is Putin, and Lukashenka is Lukashenka. And in no case should he pout, and say that he has worked there for a long time and that someone should run errands for him.”*

*– Ayatskov, prior to his departure to Minsk  
as Russia’s ambassador to Belarus<sup>116</sup>*

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<sup>116</sup> Politov, Yuri, “Da, posol ty: Dmitri Ayatskov dobiraetsya do Minska s priklucheniymi,” 28 July 2005, *Izvestiya*, 23 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article2383616/>>.



Based on his attendance at the 1998 G-8 Summit, Dmitri Ayatskov is known outside of Russia for two things. He was introduced by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to his American counterpart, Bill Clinton as the future president of Russia. And, following his encounter with Clinton, he was so impressed with this “cool guy,” that he remarked to journalists, “I envy Monica Lewinsky.”<sup>117</sup> These two incidents, one sober yet positive, the other outlandish and lacking real substance, nicely sum up Ayatskov’s nine years in office. They also speak to the middle-tiered standing Ayatskov received in the four-point Vulnerability Index. Ayatskov’s negative characteristics were many: his comments were legendary, his performance left something to be desired, and he was a Yeltsin-era official at a time when it was not fashionable to be so. Yet, he was also a savvy politician, governed a region with a strong regional economy, and had managed to evade prosecution efforts.

Based on these mid-range scores, Ayatskov was a “pacted” governor in my model. He was rated at two points on the basis of his region’s substantial economy and his long tenure. He also had liabilities: he did not govern in a region with significant ethnic considerations and his regional government did not retain substantial enterprise control in the post-Soviet privatizations. I will begin by briefly discussing each of these four points with more specificity to the Saratovskaya Oblast and Ayatskov. This constitutes the first portion of this chapter. Having then outlined why Ayatskov was rendered vulnerable to federal intervention, I will then address why Ayatskov was rejected by the Putin administration, since vulnerability does not necessitate dismissal in and of itself as demonstrated by many other cases. Finally, I will cover the “buy-out package” that Ayatskov received. His case is one that illustrates either the sorts of potential threats that strong ex-governors may pose or

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<sup>117</sup> “Chem znamenit Dmitrii Ayatskov,” 15 May 2004, Kommersant, 20 Jan. 2008, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=474599>>.

the assets they may put to use for the administration. In either instance, they thus require settlements rather than unceremonious ouster. In the course of this chapter, a picture of the region in a broader focus will emerge as well, showing how chaotic and contentious politics at the regional level can still be in Russia.

### ***Regional Economy***

Saratovskaya Oblast, situated in the Volga Federal District and lying on the border with Kazakhstan, possesses one of the stronger economies as a whole in terms of gross regional product (GRP) in Russia, ranked 28<sup>th</sup> in 2005. On the other hand, it also had a per capita GRP figure that was well under both Federation and Federal District standards. It ranked 53<sup>rd</sup> in this category, with a figure of 64,634 rubles per person; the Volga district average, which ranked higher than only the Southern Federal District, had a figure of 92,055 rubles per capita, while the country as a whole had an average of 125, 773.7 rubles per capita. The average wage paid out was also relatively low compared to other regions: it ranked 65<sup>th</sup> with an average monthly wage of 5439.3 rubles; this positioned it below the averages of all federal districts and the country as a whole. In reviewing Hirschman Index scores, which measure concentration of the economy by sector, Saratovskaya Oblast has the seventh lowest score of all Russian regions, which means it has one of the most diversified economies by sector. In fact, of the lowest eight scores, only two regions managed to retain their governor. This would suggest that having an extremely diversified economy may fuel alternative bases of power from which to oppose the incumbent. In a case such as Saratovskaya Oblast with a strong economy, this would seem to amplify the incentives for striving to take over the incumbent's seat. The economy, then, was fairly strong, but was spread across many sectors and thus allowed for many alternate bases of support to exist.

### ***Tenure***

Ayatskov's tenure was another strong suit. Tenure can be thought of as a strong measure of both the incumbent's ability to build a political support network as well as his ability to navigate political crises successfully. He was appointed by then-President Boris Yeltsin in April of 1996, and then elected to office in March of 2000. Thus, at the point of his appointment decision in March of 2005, Ayatskov had approximately 106 months of experience in the governor's seat (28<sup>th</sup> longest of the reviewed governors in this paper). It should also be noted that in another measure – election results – Ayatskov returned a very strong tally: 67.32 percent of the total in 2000, compared to just 9.66 percent for his nearest competitor, Igor Karaulov. As a result of this majority, a second round of voting was not required. Voting totals, of course, can be problematic measures of actual popular support; after all, vote totals can be the result of a muscular political machine that coerces the populace to vote favorably or they can be falsified outright. As far as this project is concerned, however, whether vote tallies accurately reflected the will of the people or not is not crucial as it is nevertheless a testament to the governor's ability to maintain political control. Ayatskov was thus a) genuinely popular, b) in control of a robust political apparatus, or c) capable of retaining the allegiance of sufficiently powerful authorities to falsify the vote on his behalf – all of which speak to his strength as a political figure.

### ***Republic Status***

The Saratovskaya Oblast lacked republic-level status in the Russian Federation. It has neither a history of strong regional autonomy nor a significant minority population: the top three ethnic minority constituencies are Kazakhs (2.93 percent), Ukrainians (2.52 percent), and Tatars (2.16 percent). Thus, though it shares an external border with Kazakhstan, it

nevertheless is dominated by ethnic Russians, a group that constituted 85.94 percent of the region's population.<sup>118</sup>

### ***Enterprise Control***

Regarding state enterprise control, the region simply did not retain high stakes in state enterprises during the main privatization period of 1993-1999. Liberal policies seem to have prevailed in the region. For instance, land liberalization took place during Ayatskov's tenure, in 1997, which permitted the purchase and sale of land parcels for the first time (particularly important in a region where agriculture, at 15.4 percent of total GRP, was the second leading sector after manufacturing activity).<sup>119</sup>

### ***The Pitfalls Facing a Middling Governor: Ayatskov's Replacement***

As I have noted earlier, obtaining a low score on the Vulnerability Index is necessary for the center to remove a governor but it does not compel this action. After all, there are other possible reasons to keep a weak governor in place: personal loyalty, shared political views, or good performance in certain areas that are important policy goals for the presidential administration. Furthermore, weak governors would seem to be more open to manipulation from the federal level of government. So, the question regarding Ayatskov is thus: why was he not reappointed to office? In this case, I argue it is likely the result of a pair of factors. First and foremost, he cultivated powerful enemies at the federal level. Secondly, his performance and behavior as governor left something to be desired.

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<sup>118</sup> "Demoskop Weekly."

<sup>119</sup> "Saratov Land Law Enters into Force," 04 Dec. 1997, *Jamestown Foundation Monitor*, 21 Feb. 2008, <[http://www.jamestown.org/publications\\_details.php?volume\\_id=2&issue\\_id=310&article\\_id=3433](http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=2&issue_id=310&article_id=3433)>.

In retrospect it certainly seems Ayatskov made crucial mistakes in his personnel decisions – an error that he of all people should not have made since he obtained his office largely by undermining his own boss, the then-vice-governor of Saratovskaya Oblast.<sup>120</sup> He made not one, but two appointments that potentially figured in his demise. In fact, two current vice speakers of the State Duma are former vice governors of Saratovskaya Oblast: Vyacheslav Volodin and Lyubov Sliska, both of whom were “exiled” to Moscow by Ayatskov. Volodin is also the secretary of the presidium of United Russia (ER). Both were said to be interested in leading the region, and Volodin in particular exercised considerable control in the region. According to one newspaper account announcing Pavel Ipatov’s appointment to governor, Volodin was cited as one of the leading candidates to succeed Ayatskov. Indeed, he apparently began his “campaign” some time earlier, if not in participating in the attempts to prosecute Ayatskov, then in May of 2004, when he cut the regional branch of ER out from underneath of Ayatskov by filling the party conference with his own supporters.<sup>121</sup> However, in February 2006, just a few weeks before the appointment decision was made public, he lamented that his party would not “let him go into governing,” since, it pleaded, he was needed in the Duma. A newspaper piece cites sources in the Presidential Administration and the Duma as saying the non-appointment was rather less theatrical: Volodin had simply changed his mind.<sup>122</sup> Another explanation simply may be that

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<sup>120</sup> Malyakin, Il’ya, “Saratov’s Governor Dmitri Ayatskov: A New Actor On An Old Political Stage,” 20 Feb. 1998, Prism, The Jamestown Foundation, 05 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.jamestown.org/publications\\_details.php?volume\\_id=5&issue\\_id=254&article\\_id=2876](http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=5&issue_id=254&article_id=2876)>.

<sup>121</sup> Malyakin, Il’ya, “United Russia Party Declares War on Saratov’s Ayatskov,” 11 May 2004, Russian Regional Report, 28 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13853>>.

<sup>122</sup> Nikolaeva, Anna, and Anfisa Voronina, “Ayatskova smenit atomshchik Ipatov,” 25 Feb. 2005, Vedomosti, 28 Feb. 2008, Database on-line, Available from Eastview Russian Central Newspapers, <<http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=7405568>>.

Volodin did not have a sufficiently close relationship with Putin personally.<sup>123</sup> To make matters even worse, Ayatskov appeared to alienate a substantial portion of his legislature when he tried to ram through a new slate of regional political appointees, causing several deputies to pledge their support for Volodin should he seek the gubernatorial post.<sup>124</sup> Once vulnerable due to the new powers accrued by the center, it was only a matter of time before Ayatskov would be confronted.

Yet for all his weakness, Ayatskov was something of a survivor – he had successfully fended off one of the most overt tactics used by political opponents – the criminal inquiry. In fact, it was not only Ayatskov who has been targeted by the prosecutor’s office, but his wife as well on another occasion. The true source of these attacks may never be fully known – and the list of people with whom Ayatskov conflicted is substantial – but as one publication noted, it’s hardly likely that there was not, at the very least, tacit federal approval of the action, since such an important political position was involved. Regardless of the source of the attacks or the strength of the case against him, what is noteworthy is that Ayatskov was not forced out via this method, but possessed sufficient political standing to retain his post.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Malyakin, Il’ya, “Saratov Elections in Doubt,” 30 Nov. 2004, Russian Regional Report, 28 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13853>>.

<sup>124</sup> Malyakin, Il’ya, “In Saratov, Legislature Starts to Assert Itself over Governor,” 21 Oct. 2004, Russian Regional Report, 28 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13853>>.

<sup>125</sup> Regarding the criminal inquiries, see: Yablokova, Oksana, “Saratov Governor Faces Corruption Charge,” 18 May 2004, The St Petersburg Times, 18 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action\\_id=2&story\\_id=530](http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=530)>; Borisov, Sergei, “Governors: On Parade,” 15 July 2004, Transitions Online, 19 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/printf.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=73&NrSection=3&NrArticle=12373&ST1=ad&ST\\_T1=job&ST\\_AS1=1&ST2=body&ST\\_T2=letter&ST\\_AS2=1&ST3=text&ST\\_T3=aato1&ST\\_AS3=1&ST\\_max=3](http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/printf.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=73&NrSection=3&NrArticle=12373&ST1=ad&ST_T1=job&ST_AS1=1&ST2=body&ST_T2=letter&ST_AS2=1&ST3=text&ST_T3=aato1&ST_AS3=1&ST_max=3)>; Malyakin, Il’ya, “Procurator Files, Drops Charges Against Ayatskov,” 02 June 2004, Russian Regional Report, 29 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13853>>.

### ***A Region Divided***

Saratovskaya Oblast, at what should have been the apex of centralization of power in Putin's Russia, remained a region of political fragmentation, both between federal and regional levels of government, as well as within what was ostensibly the party of power, ER. In the first case, for instance, just last year a conflict over hunting rights led to a situation that was nothing short of bizarre, with competing regional and federal agencies issuing their own permits, fining holders of the other's permits for failing to hold proper documentation, and declaring open season on different game: woe to the poor hunter who wanted to pursue wild boar with a license from the regional agency; with the purchase of a license from the federal agency, however, he was wished *ni pukha, ni pera* and sent on his merry way.<sup>126</sup> Such a situation illustrates a serious problem faced in Russia today with ill-defined delineations of power. In the second type of conflict, there arose fractures within United Russia, as will be discussed below. This confused and fluctuating environment provides a fascinating backdrop to Ayatskov's return to politics.

Having been deprived of his office, Ayatskov now faced the prospects of finding a new place of employment. The Presidential Administration sought to avoid ousting Ayatskov outright because of the considerable influence he still wielded. As a result, shortly after his request for the president's nomination to the governorship was rejected, Ayatskov was appointed as the new ambassador to Belarus, which was no small consolation prize. Unfortunately for Ayatskov, however, his outlandish behavior would soon cost him this job as well. Speaking prior to his departure to Minsk, Ayatskov issued statements attacking Aleksandr Lukashenka personally, as the reader will recall from this chapter's epigraph.

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<sup>126</sup> Andreeva, Nadezhda, "Favored by Vyacheslav," 22 Nov. 2007, *Novaya Gazeta*, 15 Feb. 2008, <<http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/87/07.html>>.

Lukashenka, for his part, was irritated for obvious reasons, and notified Moscow that Belarus would not accept Ayatskov as the new ambassador. At this point, Ayatskov found himself out of work.<sup>127</sup>

The unemployment of their former governor was a boon to the rumor columns of the Saratovskaya press. There were repeated predictions as to where Ayatskov would land a new job. At various points he was said to be on the verge of being sent to Moscow as a member of the Federation Council representing some Far Eastern region (sometimes specified as the Amurskaya oblast),<sup>128</sup> at others he was said to soon be appointed as an aide in the Presidential Administration or a deputy presidential representative to a federal district,<sup>129</sup> and was even mentioned to be considered for the rector of the regional college.<sup>130</sup> Yet Ayatskov apparently remained out of the sphere of officialdom for the next year and a half. On one hand, it appeared that the former governor had fallen on hard times. His opponents claimed he had split up with his wife and that he spent his time repairing roofs. Ayatskov for his part claimed to occupy his time with more scholarly pursuits, writing a book and giving

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<sup>127</sup> He would later claim that he never wanted the job and that he deliberately sabotaged this appointment. See "Dmitrii Ayatskov ne rvalsya v Minsk," 10 Feb. 2006, Kommersant, 10 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?docid=648665>>.

<sup>128</sup> IA Regnum, "Politika" in "Saratovskie SMI: Partiinye million vyshli bokom saratovskim shkolam," 28 Aug. 2006, 01 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/695049.html>>; IA Regnum, "Politika" in "Saratovskie SMI ishchut rabotu Ayatskovu i schitayut den'gi v karmane merii," 11 Sep. 2006, 01 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/702677.html>>; IA Regnum, "Ayatskov stanet dal'nevostochnikom?" in "40 deputatskikh kresel podelyat tri partii: obzor pressy Primor'ya," 25 Sep. 2006, 01 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/710082.html>>.

<sup>129</sup> IA Regnum, "Politika" in "Saratovskie SMI za nedelyu: v gorod vozvrashayutsya Ayatskov i bor'ba s inakomysliem, a gorozhanam ugrozhayut doma-ubiitsy," 05 Nov. 2005, 01 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/539520.html>>.

<sup>130</sup> IA Regnum, "Obrazovanie" in "Saratovskie SMI: gorozhane pereplatili za kommunal'nye uslugi desyatki millionov rublei," 21 Jan. 2006, 01 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/580289.html>>.



lectures,<sup>131</sup> while confessing that he had, in fact, done a bit home remodeling – but only for himself and the mother of his main rival, Volodin (the balcony on Volodin’s neighboring apartment constituted such an eyesore, that Ayatskov felt compelled to help, according to his account). In the same interview, he also saw fit to share this bit of information with the journalist: he had actually been offered his old job once again, but unfortunately, he had to turn down this offer since he was beyond that point in his political career – and besides people would likely view his return more negatively than positively.<sup>132</sup> Whatever the case may have been, it seems he was still involved sufficiently in regional politics to irritate his opponents. Ayatskov answered a question regarding his fate with this response: “I am grateful to President Putin that he did not appoint me to the next term as governor of the oblast. I shall always remain the first and only popularly elected governor of the Saratovskaya Oblast.”<sup>133</sup>

In spite of his loss of one federal post, Ayatskov was set to return to the political scene with another federal appointment. Before discussing this new position in fuller detail, it is worth examining the political environment in the region in the two years between Ayatskov’s ouster and his second federal appointment, since it is important to explaining why a seemingly beaten and irrelevant ex-governor was activated for political service. There are three possible reasons why the Kremlin would offer a new post to Ayatskov. The first explanation, that Boris Yeltsin interceded on his “old friend” Ayatskov’s behalf is not

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<sup>131</sup> Melikova, Natal’ya, and Natal’ya Kostenko, “Loyal’nye sgodyatsya gde ugodno,” 29 Mar. 2007, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 03 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-03-29/3\\_ayackov.html](http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-03-29/3_ayackov.html)>.

<sup>132</sup> IA Regnum, “Persony” in “Saratovskie SMI: Ayatskov zasteklil balkon Volodinu, no otkazhet Putinu,” 16 Oct. 2006, 01 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/722192.html>>.

<sup>133</sup> “Onlain-konferentsiya Ayatskova Dmitriya Fedorovicha,” 16 Nov. 2006, SaratovBiznesKonsalting, 03 Mar. 2008, <<http://online.sarbc.ru/showquestion.phtml?id=156&qid=all>>.

convincing since Yeltsin had become politically irrelevant and suffered from ill health – and would, in fact, die just three weeks after Ayatskov’s second federal appointment.<sup>134</sup> The other two possibilities, both of them revolving Ayatskov’s role in United Russia’s disintegration in Saratovskaya Oblast, are more realistic, but it is not possible to discern which one is more accurate. The first variant holds that such a decision was made in light of the threat to the Kremlin’s policy preferences that Ayatskov could pose. The second possibility is that such a decision could have been undertaken due to his experience and connections, and thus it was wise to enlist him to serve the Kremlin. Regardless of whether this was a forced decision or a willful choice on behalf of Moscow, it nevertheless fully supports the notion that Ayatskov retained substantial political authority in the region, with or without his executive seat, and thus merited a pacted transition type, rather than an unceremonious dumping. I will now discuss the two variants in fuller detail, since they provide some critical understanding as to the motives behind the appointment – which reflect the ex-governor’s political power – and only then turn to discussing the new post specifically.

In the first scenario, it can be suggested that Ayatskov made trouble for Moscow. Ayatskov appears to have been involved in stirring up dissent at the regional level in late 2006, in what one journalist referred to with the title of “The Saratovskii Insurrection” in October of that year.<sup>135</sup> In a November 16 online conference sponsored by a business consulting firm, in which Internet users submitted questions to Ayatskov, he claimed that while in his opinion there was real opposition to Moscow in the oblast legislature, he did not

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<sup>134</sup> See: Andreeva, Nadezhda, “Ayatskov vozvrashchaetsya,” 02 Apr. 2007, Novaya Gazeta, 03 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/23/07.html>>.

<sup>135</sup> Bocharova, Svetlana, “Saratovskii bunt: Chleny partii vlasti priznalis’ v simpatiyakh k ‘Rodinu,’” 31 Oct. 2006, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 03 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-10-31/6\\_riot.html](http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-10-31/6_riot.html)>.

have anything to do with the defections.<sup>136</sup> Just a few days earlier, he told a journalist that he had not been offered a proposition to lead a unified opposition on the regional level, but he would consider any such offer. He added "...I will help the leader of Rodina, Vladimir Pozharov, regardless of the fact that I myself am a member of United Russia." After all, he said, "all wise people will leave the regional branch of United Russia. And I don't discount that they will join Rodina."<sup>137</sup> Rodina would, in fact, eventually merge with other parties into Just Russia (SR). As Olga Popova wrote in Ekspert, the demarche announcing the split was "in part (or in full) explained by the fact that three of the named deputies were close to former governor of the Saratovskaya Oblast, Dmitri Ayatskov" – one of whom, Vladimir Titaev, was his brother-in-law.<sup>138</sup> Popova went on to note that two of the disgruntled deputies had lost seats in regional government corporations since Ipatov came to power. What Ayatskov appears to have done then, is made use of his ties to beneficiaries of the old regime who had reason to revolt against the new powers-that-be. Indeed, this "centralization" of power by Moscow actually initiated a process of fragmentation at the regional and capital levels. Where before there stood an overwhelming United Russia majority, power was diffused so that opposition parties constituted nearly half the deputy's posts.<sup>139</sup>

The second scenario has Ayatskov leading the charge on behalf of nascent Just Russia, the Kremlin's left-wing party of choice. This would be of particular value, since it would not only potentially increase the seats available to pro-Kremlin parties, but it would

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<sup>136</sup> "Onlain-konferentsiya."

<sup>137</sup> Bocharova, "Saratovskii bunt."

<sup>138</sup> Popova, Ol'ga, "'Medvedi' nesut poteri," 12 June 2006, Ekspert, 04 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2006/22/news\\_medvedi\\_nesut\\_poteri/](http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2006/22/news_medvedi_nesut_poteri/)>.

<sup>139</sup> Bocharova, "Saratovskii bunt."

concurrently erode the support of the few non- Kremlin parties that remained. Since the oblast was in Russia's "rust belt" of industry and had a significant agricultural base, these conditions meant that voters were more left-leaning than in other regions of Russia and, as such, a left-wing pro-Moscow party would be more appealing to these groups. Such an assumption is borne out by a review of previous regional legislative elections. As recently as 1999, the Communist Party (KPRF) was the leading vote getter in the region with 30.4 percent of the vote, as compared with the 22.7 percent share the runner-up, Unity, received. In 2003, the KPRF's share shrank dramatically (as it did throughout Russia) but it still received a respectable 16.8 percent of the vote. The 2007 elections resulted in the KPRF's share dwindling even further to 12.34 percent, and the newly founded SR taking in 9.19 percent at the expense of the KPRF (and aided by the abolition of the "against all" candidates option that voters had previously been allowed to use as a protest). Though seemingly paltry – certainly in relation to ER's 64.81 percent – this figure was nevertheless significant.<sup>140</sup> Not only did SR's vote tally move a few more seats out of the KPRF's column, but it did so after the party was essentially officially abandoned by Putin's choice to lead ER's ticket. In sum, by building up SR in the Saratovskaya Oblast, the Kremlin would effectively be giving itself greater political control – and it was all the better that this benefit would come directly at the expense of the KPRF.

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<sup>140</sup> Electoral figures are drawn from "Electoral Geography 2.0, Russia," 2008, 21 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/category/countries/r/russia>>.

### *Ayatskov Ascendant*

Initially the defections appear to have worked out well for both the individuals and party itself. The ranks of SR swelled to nine members (of the 35-member Oblast Duma), and as late as the end of October 2007, the party seemed to be doing well. The authors of one article wrote that the status of SR in Saratovskaya Oblast was unique in Russia. In spite of the fact that the federal level party was providing minimal support to its regional offices, the Saratovskaya office was thriving: it had theretofore avoided intra-party divisions and had enlisted the support of some important regional business figures. And in the background of these newfound gains, rumors –but no evidence – of Ayatskov’s involvement were present.<sup>141</sup> The previous July, the regional press spoke of Ayatskov as a real power broker in the region, at the center of attempts to reconcile departed party members. One newspaper wrote of Ayatskov being “paid his due” since he was influential on the decision of two of the deputies; another opined that Ayatskov “remained one of the key players in the political scene of the oblast; moreover, he was a more predictable, strategically rational, and desirable player for the federal center than local clans and groups, which were too easily given to arranging and carrying out only mercenary aims.”<sup>142</sup> Though SR was still inferior in number to 18 deputies on ER’s part, it was nevertheless no small feat for a party which had not officially existed just a few months previously – this essentially positioned the party within a few defections of robbing ER of its majority in the legislature. Yet, it would soon end in shambles.

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<sup>141</sup> Kiselev, Mikhail, and Ol’ga Popova, “Ostrov stabil’nosti,” 29 Oct.2007, *Ekspert Volga*, 04 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/40/regionalnaya\\_elita/](http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/40/regionalnaya_elita/)>.

<sup>142</sup> IA Regnum, “Politika” in Saratovskie SMI 17-23 iyulya: v Saratove perepisali oppozitsiyu,” 24 July 2006, 02 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/677999.html>>.

The regional elections, postponed from March of 2007 to December of that year for “technical reasons,” such as failure to pass electoral laws with sufficient haste, would deal an overwhelming defeat to SR – and all other opposition parties as well: 19 seats grew to 32 for ER; SR and KPRF each received a paltry pair of seats. Part of this may well have been the lack of federal party support, as well as Putin’s effective disavowal of SR when he agreed to headline ER’s party list, but regional bickering seems to have shifted its focus as well. A battle between Volodin on one side, and Sliska and Ipatov on the other, concluded with Volodin losing some ground as well as a key ally in a regional leadership position.<sup>143</sup> Volodin had also managed to lose a comrade-in-arms in the federal inspector, Viktor Budylev, who was replaced by a “clean federal” (that is, he supposedly had no regional connections or interests), Pavel Grishin. As the same article notes, the Saratovskaya elite by this time had effectively split into three factions: Volodinites, Ipatovites, and the opposition, which included the members of SR and KPRF (and who, according to the author, were not unlikely to bloc with Ipatov in some votes).<sup>144</sup> An Ipatov ally took the job as the head of the executive committee of ER in Saratovskaya Oblast, and as such increased the power of Ipatov, who just two years previously was an enterprise manager, not a politician. This in turn meant there was a sufficiently strong governor now in place to rally around, and as such it seems

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<sup>143</sup> For more information on Sliska-Volodin conflict(s) see: Bocharova, Svetlana, “Deputat ushel na voynu so Sliskoi: V Saratove podal v otstavku mestnyi lider partii vlasti,” 21 Nov. 2006, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 01 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-11-21/7\\_sliska.html](http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-11-21/7_sliska.html)>; Gerasimenko, Olesya, “Sliska obidela utechka,” 09 Dec. 2006, Gazeta.ru, 02 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.gazeta.ru/2006/12/08/oa\\_226069.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/2006/12/08/oa_226069.shtml)>; Latynina, Yulia, “Going For A Spin Around the Blocs,” 19 Dec. 2006, The St. Petersburg Times, 08 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action\\_id=2&story\\_id=19805](http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=19805)>.

<sup>144</sup> Bocharova, Svetlana, “Polpred prines elitam mir: Novyi glavnyi federal’nyi inspektor po Saratovskoi oblasti vzyal kurs na dukhovnost’,” 29 May 2007, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 03 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.ng.ru/regions/2007-05-29/5\\_saratov.html](http://www.ng.ru/regions/2007-05-29/5_saratov.html)>.

ER's power increased dramatically.<sup>145</sup> Put briefly, politics in the Saratovskaya Oblast were not politics as usual.<sup>146</sup> Ayatskov, at the very least, was able to exploit a volatile political situation in Saratovskaya Oblast – if not drive it himself.

Whatever the case may have been, all of this culminated in Ayatskov being offered another federal appointment the following spring of 2007 – which certainly did not sit well with some figures. Sliska saw fit to scold Ayatskov: “He doesn’t need to go to extremes, he doesn’t need to occupy himself with populism that’s no longer serious at this age.” The same piece cited an unidentified “colleague” of Ayatskov as issuing a more scathing reaction: “You remember: first he closed the sobering-up stations, then he declared prostitution legal, then he proposed to build a business center on an island in the middle of the Volga and an airstrip for large planes. It’s plain that these are boys’ fantasies. But for a man in the state service to do such things is simply frivolous.”<sup>147</sup> In early April of 2007, the former governor was appointed to the Consultative Commission to the State Council of the Russian Federation (CCSCRF) that had been formed by a presidential decree less than two months

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<sup>145</sup> Kholmogorova, Vera, “Novaya ‘Zhizn’ na novom postu,” 30 Oct. 2006, Ekspert Online, 04 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.expert.ru/articles/2006/10/30/sprav\\_ross/](http://www.expert.ru/articles/2006/10/30/sprav_ross/)>; Popova, Ol’ga, “Kreshtest dlya partii,” 04 Dec. 2006, Ekspert Volga, 04 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2006/33/regionalnye\\_vybory/](http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2006/33/regionalnye_vybory/)>; Popova, Ol’ga, “Golosuyut nogami,” 05 Feb. 2007, Ekspert Volga, 04 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/05/nakanune\\_vyborov/](http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2007/05/nakanune_vyborov/)>. See also Melikova, Natal’ya, and Natal’ya Kostenko, “Platsdarm dlya eks-prezidenta,” 26 Feb. 2007, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 Jan. 2008, <[http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-02-26/1\\_platsdarm.html](http://www.ng.ru/politics/2007-02-26/1_platsdarm.html)>.

<sup>146</sup> It should also be noted that during the time that these federal-regional and intraregional struggles were taking place, a similar flare-up and split took place in the capital city Saratov’s Duma as well, though Ipatov seems to have managed to defuse this situation a bit more deftly. See: Bocharova, Svetlana, “Vozvrashchenie bludnykh deputatov: Saratovskii gubernator ugovarivaet parlamentariev vernut’sya v partiya vlasti,” 16 Nov. 2006, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 04 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-11-16/6\\_thereturn.html](http://www.ng.ru/regions/2006-11-16/6_thereturn.html)>.

<sup>147</sup> Melikova and Kostenko, “Loyalnye.”

earlier.<sup>148</sup> Little concerning the new body's tasks or goals is outlined in the *ukaz*; the order simply states that the body was created

...for the rendering of consultative assistance to members of the State Council, presidium of the State Council on questions, included in the plan of operation of the State Council, a consultative commission of the State Council is formed. The personnel composition of the consultative commission of the State Council is determined by the President of the Russian Federation. By decision of the President of the Russian Federation, in the composition of the consultative commission of the State Council may be included persons having experience in public (state or social) activities. Members of the consultative commission of the State Council participate in the work of the State Council. Members of the consultative commission of the State Council participate in its work on a *pro bono* or paid basis.<sup>149</sup>

The level of actual political influence the body may have at the federal level of government is in probably minimal and Ayatskov is but one of several former governors who sit on this commission. The CCSCRF is an advisory body, not binding the government to in any way, shape, or implement the policy prescriptions of the ex-governors. Yet, the positions are nevertheless beneficial to their holders in a few key ways. First and foremost, the posts keep the former governors politically active, giving them the prospect of continuing and/or elevating their political careers in the future. It is after all, an official title, granting access to political elites (in Moscow no less). This potentially gives them access to a different set of officials, in addition to those regional and local officials with whom they had worked in the past. In other words, it allows them to “keep their irons in the fire,” and provides them with hope for the future. Additionally, and importantly to some governors, it provides a set of material benefits. According to media reporting, this consists of a modest salary (approximately 6,000 rubles per month), a car and driver, and perhaps most importantly, an

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<sup>148</sup> Andreeva, Nadezhda, “Ayatskov vozvrashchaetsya,” 02 Apr. 2007, *Novaya Gazeta*, 04 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/23/07.html>>.

<sup>149</sup> “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii No. 241: O vnesenii izmenenii v Polozhenie o Gosudarstvennom sovete Rossiiskoi Federatsii, utverzhdennoe Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiskoi Federatsii ot 1 sentyabrya 2000 g. No. 1602, signed by Vladimir V. Putin, 23 Feb. 2007, The Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, 14 Mar. 2008, <<http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=38100&PSC=1&PT=1&Page=1>>.



office on Staraya Ploshchad' in central Moscow.<sup>150</sup> For his part, the ever flamboyant Ayatskov responded to his appointment with an exclamation to the press that he was willing to work for free since he was not really interested in privileges or financial compensation.<sup>151</sup> A few months later it seems he had changed his mind. He told a newspaper that he not only received a modest salary but "bonuses" as well, which served to inflate his salary to approximately the same amount he had earned as governor.<sup>152</sup> In sum, the positions the former governors received appear to be fairly minor. Even if the roles played by the commission are inconsequential, it nevertheless serves as a pacted exit for a strong political figure, one that despite having been out of office for two years, having been harassed by the procurator, and having made powerful enemies, nevertheless retained such political power as to compel compensation rather than being simply tossed aside as some weaker governors had been.

### ***Conclusion***

Saratovskaya Oblast is a vivid depiction of all the dimensions surrounding federal-regional relations and the gubernatorial office in Russia today. It not only shows the limitations placed on the center (the need to issue a buy-out package to Ayatskov to ward off a regional political revolt or the need to enlist him in a party-building project), but it shows the precarious situation facing the Russian president even in situations in which he manages

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<sup>150</sup> NTA-Privolzh'e, "Obyazannosti Khodyrev kak chlena konsul'tativnoi komissii pri Gossoвете RF budut opredeleny k seredine sentyabr – gazeta," 07 Aug. 2007, 20 Jan. 2008, <<http://nta-nn.ru/news/item/?ID=116356>>.

<sup>151</sup> Melikova and Kostenko, "Loyalnye."

<sup>152</sup> Tseplyaev, Vitalii, "Universal'nye kadry," 07 Nov. 2007, *Argumenty i Fakty*, 18 Mar. 2008, <[http://gazeta.aif.ru/online/aif/1410/bel04\\_01](http://gazeta.aif.ru/online/aif/1410/bel04_01)>.

to seemingly achieve a victory. While initially Putin may have been able to offset some of Volodin's power in the region by appointing Ipatov, he in turn made an enterprise manager, who should have been weak and malleable from the center's point of view, into a politician in his own right. The new governor's political development, combined with a pair of State Duma deputies – from the same party no less– who battled for control in the region led to a situation in which politics went from a mundane ER majority to a state of affairs in which things quickly spiraled out of control and parties at regional and municipal levels fractured. Either the Kremlin saw a renewed threat from Ayatskov and sought to make him a new deal, or saw in him the clout to rally another base of power to check the feuding deputies and governor and lead a start-up party. In any event, things ended badly for the members of SR, with their humiliating defeat in December 2007; the same can not be said for Ayatskov, who traded his home in Saratov for an office in downtown Moscow. As the reader will see in the next chapter, not all former governors were so fortunate.

## CHAPTER 6

### A DEPARTURE INTO OBSCURITY

#### THE SAKHALINSKAYA OBLAST & IVAN PAVLOVICH MALAKHOV

*“I want you to report to me why people with children are sleeping on concrete.”*

– *Putin, to Far Eastern Presidential Representative Kamil’ Iskhakov following an earthquake in Nevel’sk on Sakhalin, August 2007*<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Kaftan, Larisa, “Putin ustroil raznos na Sakhalin,” 08 Aug. 2007, Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 10 Mar. 2008, <<http://bishkek.kp.ru/daily/23946/71190/>>.

Sakhalinskaya Oblast represents the final tier of governors in this study: the “weak” governors who are most vulnerable to federal appointment whims. These governors, the reader will remember, received scores of zero points in the Vulnerability Index, which has two important implications in this paper’s framework. First, unlike the “strong” governors, this set of leaders is totally exposed to being removed or failing to be reappointed by the federal government. Secondly, unlike the medium-strength governors, these leaders do not even possess sufficient bargaining position to merit a federal appointment following their departure from office. In this case, the incumbent, Ivan Malakhov, was unceremoniously dumped following a natural disaster in his province. Malakhov did not receive a federal appointment – nor does he appear to have obtained employment in any other sort of political capacity. I argue that this is a reflection of his weak standing.

### ***Regional Economy***

As bluntly stated by Russia Profile, “[o]ther than hydrocarbons, Sakhalinskaya has no effective industrial base.”<sup>154</sup> Another way of putting this is to use Daniel Goler’s term: Sakhalinskaya Oblast is one of Russia’s “resource-based peripheries.”<sup>155</sup> By the Russia Profile report’s calculations, 57.5 percent of industrial output in 2000 was derived from oil and gas sectors; in 2006 this figure had leapt to 80 percent.<sup>156</sup> According to the data acquired from Goskomstat, the situation is similar based on the GRP by sector. At first glance the “minerals extraction” category appears to be relatively modest – just 21.8 percent of all GRP

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<sup>154</sup> “Sakhalin: Economy,” Russia Profile, 10 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/territory/districts/Sakhalinskaya/economy>>.

<sup>155</sup> Goler, Daniel, “Russia’s Northern Periphery in Transition: Regional Fragmentation in the Far North,” in Gill, Graeme, ed., Politics in the Russian Regions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

<sup>156</sup> “Sakhalin: Economy,” Russia Profile.

for 2005. Yet the figure for “construction” is the largest in the Russian Federation by far – 29.6 percent. Some of this is probably due to the distortion deriving from the relatively small size of the population and the fact that the island is so remote and is positioned in a harsh climate (second in construction, though ten percentage points back, for example, is the similarly remote and severe climate of the Chukotskii AO).<sup>157</sup> Yet, a substantial portion of this construction sector is directly related to the development of these energy projects. Beyond this there is little else in the way of other prominent sectors. Fishing is one of the strongest sectors versus others in the Russian Federation, at 6.9 percent, but the other numbers are astonishingly weak: just 4.4 percent in manufacturing activity, 17<sup>th</sup> lowest in Russia; a paltry 7.7 percent for retail and wholesale trade, which ranks the region 11<sup>th</sup> lowest in the country.

In terms of scale of the economy, the Sakhalinskaya Oblast ranked 38<sup>th</sup> in Russia in 2005, which is even more impressive when it is taken in to consideration that it is the 20<sup>th</sup> smallest region by population in the country. Yet, as will be discussed further in the next section, the nature of the economy is one that does not lend itself to benefiting the regional authorities, much less the regional population. Its 14<sup>th</sup> highest GRP per capita does not accurately demonstrate this. The fact is that according to one working paper, in 2003 it had one of the four highest poverty rates in Russia (and it had the second largest percentage of people belonging to the severest level of impoverishment).<sup>158</sup> The situation does appear to have improved somewhat in the past few years, but even so, it is still being reported on as a

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<sup>157</sup> “Otraslevaya struktura VPR po vidam ekonomicheskoi deyatel’nosti (po OKVED) za 2005 god,” 2006, State Commission for Statistics of the Russian Federation, 10 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01\\_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/stru05.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/stru05.htm)>.

<sup>158</sup> Denisova, Irina, and Marina Kartseva, “Poverty is No Crime: Measuring Poverty in Russian Regions,” 2005, Center for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School, 18 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP84Denisova\\_Kartseva\\_2005\\_modified.pdf](http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP84Denisova_Kartseva_2005_modified.pdf)>.

real problem (particularly given the inflation that is wrought by the large-scale outside investment).<sup>159</sup>

### ***Enterprise Control***

Sakhalinskaya Oblast did not retain significant shares of state enterprises by Radygin and Mal'ginov's definition. More importantly in this case is the fact that so much of the region's most lucrative sector – hydrocarbon extraction – not only failed to be formally retained by the regional administration but actually was dominated by outside influences, at the obvious expense of the region itself. Robert Orttung, in classifying the nature of the economic structure of Russian regions labeled Sakhalinskaya Oblast a “foreign-influenced region.” It was the sole region to earn that distinction exclusively (three others had significant influence, but were nevertheless members of other classifications), which should give the reader an idea of the importance of foreign investment in the regional economy.<sup>160</sup> As far as this paper is concerned, these outside influences consist of a trio of actors: federal officials, Russian energy companies, and foreign energy actors. I will briefly discuss these three players individually below as they relate to economic control in the Sakhalinskaya Oblast.

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<sup>159</sup> See for example: ITAR-TASS, “Sakhalin Governor Goes to Moscow for Bigger Share of Oil Revenues,” 15 Mar. 2005, as viewed on 15 Mar. 2008 at <[http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art\\_272393.php](http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_272393.php)>; Verini, James, “Putin's Power Grab,” Dec. 2007, *Portfolio*, 15 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/international-news/portfolio/2007/11/19/Sakhalinskaya-Island-Oil>>.

<sup>160</sup> Orttung, Robert, “Business and Politics in the Russian Regions,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, 51.2 (2004): 48-60.

Pursuant to the Russian Constitution, any resource rights beyond twelve miles from shore are assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.<sup>161</sup> Since much of the deposits lie outside of this zone, they were presumably not available to regional authorities. Federal authorities therefore exercised considerable leverage over these hydrocarbons (unlike continental deposits, such as those in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). Furthermore, land-based reserves do not require the same level of investment or expertise to extract as do offshore reserves. And in 2005, the Sakhalinskaya Oblast's position became even weaker, with the passage of new federal legislation that no longer propagated the "rule of two keys," as the earlier dual-jurisdiction clause of the constitution held. Rather than having to reach mutual agreement with the federal government as in the past, this was recrafted to hold that certain kinds of deposits were to be managed by the center and others by the regions. Needless to say, the former controlled the most lucrative sorts of deposits; the regions were assigned the right to regulate "wide-spread" minerals such as sand, gravel, etc.<sup>162</sup> In sum, though the subsoil of Sakhalinskaya Oblast held immense value, very little of these resources were actually available to the regional administration.

Russian energy companies are important in this case since both their motivations and their methods impact the region substantially. With regard to the first point, these firms have an obvious reason for seeking to develop and extract hydrocarbons in the Sakhalinskaya Oblast, since it possesses such huge energy resource bases. Secondly, in order to do so, they (like firms in other sectors) have not historically restrained themselves from getting involved

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<sup>161</sup> Moe, Arild. "Offshore Developments: The Compatibility of Federal Decisions and Regional Concerns," in Honneland, Geir, and Helge Blakkisrud, eds. Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia: The Case of the Northwest Regions, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001.

<sup>162</sup> Turovsky, "The Influence of Russian Big Business," 150-1.

in regional politics, particularly after the 1998 economic crisis.<sup>163</sup> In the energy sector this has included the most obvious type of political activity: a high-ranking oil official becoming a governor, which has happened in at least two cases (Roman Abramovich from Sibneft' who leads the Kamchatskii Krai, and Boris Zolotarev from Yukos who led the Evenkiiskii AO).<sup>164</sup> Similarly, a Yukos manager managed to become vice-governor of the Samarskaya Oblast.<sup>165</sup> As the reader will come to see, a similar change that was in corporate interests may have taken place in Sakhalinskaya Oblast.

The international actors are important since they effectively act as a check against the regional administration. The failure to develop hydrocarbon fields in the Sakhalinskaya Oblast is undesirable for the federal government, but it is not absolutely critical to its functioning; the same cannot be said of the Sakhalinskaya regional authorities given their dependence on this sector. A similar situation in the Sakha – Yakutia Republic involving the state diamond monopoly Alrosa further illustrates this. The De Beers Diamond Company, which dominates that industry, insisted that any deal struck had to be officially sanctioned by both the federal and regional authorities prior to any purchase of diamond assets. Given the overwhelming control over the diamond market exercised by De Beers, this was a powerful factor in forcing a settlement – one which, since the republic was so dependent on diamond revenues, gave the federal center an upper hand for much the same reason as in Sakhalinskaya Oblast's case.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> On this point, see Orttung, and Turovsky and Kuszniir in Gill.

<sup>164</sup> Kuszniir, "Economic Actors," 164.

<sup>165</sup> Turovsky, "The Influence of Russian Big Business," 144-145.

<sup>166</sup> Solnick, 215-220.



In sum, the regional authorities had minimal control over their energy assets, which given the position of prominence of this sector, meant they had little in the way of economic control at all. Even in one of the few remaining significant economic fields, fishing, they had essentially lost all regulatory control and were victimized by chronic overfishing and evasion of paying duties on those catches.<sup>167</sup> Unlike in some cases, such as Tatarstan, where the regional administration had essentially captured business, Sakhalinskaya Oblast's authorities were unable to do so – and in fact, following the appointment of a new governor, Aleksandr Khoroshavin, it might even be argued that the regional government was captured by business.

### ***Tenure***

Malakhov was the vice-governor when the incumbent Igor Farkhutdinov suddenly died in a helicopter crash in Kamchatskaya Oblast. As such he automatically became the chief executive on August 20, 2003. He would go on to win the special gubernatorial elections in December, but his performance in that race was anything but convincing. In a race with 13 other candidates, he garnered 35.17 percent of the vote in the first round; in the second he managed just 53 percent. By comparison, in 2000 his predecessor won 56.29 percent in the first round. Unlike the other two governors discussed earlier, Shaimiev and Ayatskov, Malakhov lacked a long tenure at the point of his appointment decision – he had been in office less than 48 months. Indeed, the fact that he lasted as long as he did was probably more an issue of ensuring some regional political stability following a crisis in the top level

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<sup>167</sup> Bradshaw, Michael, "Sakhalin Oblast: Sectoral Globalisation," in Herd, Graeme P. and Anne Aldis, eds. Russian Regions and Regionalism: Strength through Weakness, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

oblast leadership: not only had Farkhutdinov perished in the helicopter accident, but with him some other important figures, as Victor Yasmann writes:

Among the dead were Farkhutdinov's press secretary; the oblast's chief financial specialist; its chief doctor; the head of the oblast's construction department; the head of the oblast's health, housing, and communal-services department; the heads of the oblast's transportation department; and the head of its fuel and energy department; as well as the directors of three private companies.<sup>168</sup>

Malakhov's leading opponent, Fedor Sidorenko, was Farkhutdinov's main rival in the 2000 election as well. This lack of a viable alternative probably contributed to the decision by the Kremlin to throw United Russia's support to Malakhov for the time being.

### ***Republic Status***

The region does not have republic status. This is a function of its history: the islands were disputed and the subject of a series of agreements between Russia and Japan, which at various points in time shared ownership of the territory or occupied partitions of it. Following World War II, the entire territory was annexed by the Soviet Union and a policy of "Russification" was initiated. The ethnic Japanese population that remained after the wartime evacuations was repatriated;<sup>169</sup> Japanese toponyms were replaced by Slavic names as befitting of "innately and inherently Russian lands."<sup>170</sup> This is readily apparent in the 2002 census numbers: respondents identifying themselves as Japanese totaled 333 (or .06 percent of the population) in a territory where they had previously been 300,000 strong prior to

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<sup>168</sup> Yasmann, Victor, "Sakhalin Governor and His Associates Died in Helicopter Crash," 26 Aug. 2003, RFE/RL Security Watch, 12 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.rferl.org/reports/securitywatch/2003/08/34-260803.asp>>.

<sup>169</sup> It seems to be a matter of dispute whether they were deported (see Guroff, Nick, "Russia: Island on the Edge," 17 May 2007, Public Broadcasting Service, 15 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/rough/2007/05/russia\\_island\\_o.html](http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/rough/2007/05/russia_island_o.html)>) or "wanted only to return to Japan" (see Floyd, David, "Review: Sakhalin: A History," International Affairs, 48.3 (1972): 533-534.). Whatever the case may have been, it is clear that this exodus fundamentally changed the ethnic complexion of the province.

<sup>170</sup> Vysokov, Mikhail, A Brief History of Sakhalin and the Kurils, as accessed on 15 Mar. 2008, at <<http://www.sakhalin.ru/Engl/Region/book/ussr.htm>>; Guroff.

Second World War. The population today is 84.28 percent Russian. The largest minority group is ethnic Koreans (5.41 percent of the 2002 population), who were themselves victims of forced population transfers (on behalf of the Imperial Japanese regime which dispatched them to the island as laborers).<sup>171</sup> Thus, Sakhalinskaya Oblast lacked either the history of political autonomy or the diverse ethnic makeup that was the grounds for republic-level status.

### ***Malakhov's Fall: Bad Performance or Energy Intrigue?***

Following a major earthquake that took place in Nevel'sk in August 2007, the response of the regional authorities came under fire by the federal government. Shortly after the disaster, an irate Vladimir Putin called his federal representative to demand of him: "I want you to report to me why people with children are sleeping on concrete."<sup>172</sup> The federal representative, Kamil' Iskhakov, turned his attention to Malakhov. As he recounted to the press, he arrived at the scene of the disaster the following day, and contacted Malakhov to see why he was not present himself, despite the fact that he was supposedly only an hour's drive away.<sup>173</sup> "I'm already here," he told Malakhov, who responded, "How are you already here?"<sup>174</sup> Five days after the disaster, Malakhov resigned by "personal decision." The poor performance in the aftermath of the disaster was the immediate stimulus of Malakhov's exit, but determining whether this was the real cause of his dismissal or just a pretext is difficult. It

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<sup>171</sup> "Demoskop Weekly."

<sup>172</sup> Kaftan, "Putin ustroil raznos na Sakhalin."

<sup>173</sup> L'vov, Aleksandr, "Postradavshie ot zemletryaceniya na Sakhaline ne dovol'ny deistviyami vlastei i spasitelei," 03 Aug. 2007, *Belorusskie Novosti*, 16 Mar. 2008, <[http://naviny.by/rubrics/disaster/2007/08/03/ic\\_articles\\_124\\_152103/](http://naviny.by/rubrics/disaster/2007/08/03/ic_articles_124_152103/)>.

<sup>174</sup> Kaftan, "Putin ustroil raznos za Sakhalin."

is worth saying that there were certainly many players who stood to benefit from his demise. In any case, it is obvious that Malakhov's weak standing rendered him totally dependent on remaining in the good graces of the Kremlin and did not even provide him with sufficient positioning to merit compensation. Having not met with Moscow's approval, Malakhov was replaced.<sup>175</sup>

### *A Native (and Sympathetic?) Son*

Malakhov's replacement, Aleksandr Khoroshavin was previously a mayor in the region. Khoroshavin's previous employment seems significant, since the Kremlin has for the most part preferred to bring in Varangians from the outside, as well as the fact that Sakhalinskaya Oblast was not an ethnically defined region. This appointment decision would seem to hint at some remaining insecurity about the loss of leadership in 2003 and the desire to retain some continuity. As discussed further below, Khoroshavin also had some ties to Rosneft by virtue of a regional headquarters of that company being present in Khoroshavin's city, Okha.

Within 45 days of assuming his new post, Khoroshavin signed for the first time a five-year agreement with Rosneft, in which the company seemingly promised to be a "good" company in line with the Putin's goals of corporate "social responsibility."<sup>176</sup> The company concluded a deal in September 2007 which pledged to invest one billion rubles

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<sup>175</sup> A search of Internet sources did not reveal employment at any level of government for Malakhov.

<sup>176</sup> Kulikova, Nina, "Social Responsibility of Russian Businesses," 29 Nov. 2004, RIA-Novosti, as viewed on 15 Mar. 2008, in *Johnson's Russia List*, Article #20, 29 Nov. 2004, as archived at <<http://65.120.76.252/russia/johnson/8473-20.cfm>>.

(approximately \$41.85 million at the time of writing) in the region's social programs over five years.<sup>177</sup> The scope of the agreement is very broad according to Rosneft:

In particular, the agreement envisions measures in the creation of favorable conditions for the elevation of the quality of life of the populace, including by way of the investment of funds by Rosneft in the social sphere, as well as by means of philanthropic and sponsorship activity. Furthermore, the company intends to promote the elevation of the employment level in the oblast, and also the development of physical culture and sports.<sup>178</sup>

For Rosneft's part, it does not appear that Khoroshavin's appointment hurt the company's interest in the region's reserves. According to some observers, the appointment of the new governor may play to Rosneft's benefit, given his earlier ties to the company. This is particularly important, since the Sakhalinskaya-3 and Sakhalinskaya-4 fields are currently being contested by Rosneft and Gazprom.<sup>179</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

I have shown that Ivan Malakhov represents the third and lowest tier of the gubernatorial ranks. This tier, as result of their weakness, receives neither protection against the center's decisions against them nor a "golden parachute" following their dismissal. It should be emphasized once more, however, that a governor of this tier, like a governor of the middle tier, does not necessarily face dismissal. They may well retain their post, on the basis of several reasons, including but not limited to their perceived loyalty, shared ideological

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<sup>177</sup> "Rosneft i Sakhalinskaya oblast' podpisali soglasenie o sotrudnichestve," 27 Sep. 2007, Rosneft press release, 12 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.rosneft.ru/printable/news/news\\_in\\_press/270920072.html](http://www.rosneft.ru/printable/news/news_in_press/270920072.html)>; IA-Sakh, "Gubernator Aleksandr Khoroshavin vstretilsya s vitse-prezidentom 'Rosneft' Sergeem Karaganovym," 27 Feb. 2008, 12 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.sakhalin.info/news/48404/>>.

<sup>178</sup> Rosneft' press release.

<sup>179</sup> "Sakhalin: Economy," Russia Profile; Nowak, David, and Anna Smolchenko, "Sakhalin Governor Latest to Resign," 08 Aug. 2007, The Moscow Times, as seen on 20 Nov. 2008, in Johnson's Russia List, <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-170-5.cfm>>.

convictions, or the lack of a suitable replacement. Indeed, there are nine such cases in which these governors did successfully retain the governor's powers at the point of their appointment decision. On this Kremlin decision-making component and other remaining aspects of the process, let us now turn to the final chapter of this paper.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

*Host: Pensioner Lyudmila Karachentsova from the hamlet of Degtyarevskii of the Kochubeevskii raion of Stavropol'skii Krai complains to the president that in her village there is no water. "Alas, we have no water," Lyudmila Alekseevna glumly told us, – this is a statement from Komsomol'skaya Pravda – "although I heard that in Stavropol' the money for the water supply had been received. Where did it get lost? Residents of the village are walking 200 or 300 meters with buckets for water."*

*"All and all, I understand that naturally, Lyudmila Karachentsova, a pensioner from this hamlet, is not satisfied in the solving of this problem, or to be precise, the non-solving of this problem. I should tell you that just these past few days the question of the submission of the candidacy to the governor's position of Stavropol'skii Krai has been decided. The documents concerting the acting governor have been prepared by me, but they will not be sent to Stavropol' until this problem is solved."*<sup>180</sup>

*–Putin, "Direct Line" phone-in show, 27 September 2005*<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> The governor, Aleksandr Chernogorov, must have resolved the problem satisfactorily, as he was reappointed one month later.

<sup>181</sup> "Stenogramma 'Pryamoi linii s Prezidentom Rossii,'" 27 Sep. 2005, State Television Channel "Rossiya," 18 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.liniya2005.ru/>>.

In this final chapter, I have several goals in mind. I would of course like to first restate my findings as is customary. I will then to expand the scope of the discussion a bit and address several points regarding the broader issues at stake here. To this latter end, I will first examine some of the possible factors that are considered in making the appointment decision in the cases in which a governor is vulnerable. Vulnerability, after all, does not mean the center is compelled to dismiss a governor. I will then address what these reforms have actually meant to three different groups. Finally, I will briefly look ahead to the “post-Putin” era, insofar as it may exist, and discuss the outlook in those terms.

### ***Results***

I have shown that despite the *de jure* appointment powers that have been acquired by the Russian executive branch, these powers are still constrained in their application. These constraints are defined by the political standing of the region and its governor, which in this project has been operationalized through the Vulnerability Index. In practice, there exist three tiers of governors, with different levels of bargaining power versus the federal center, and these three tiers directly contribute to the outcome of a gubernatorial appointment decision. In the strongest of tiers, the governor is considered invulnerable to replacement by the president. I will reiterate again that this does not mean that the governor and the center do not conflict, that the governor wins all battles versus the center, or that the federal government has not made significant inroads in consolidating central authority in the Russian Federation over the past eight years. However, it does conclusively demonstrate that there still exists a set of constraints on this centralizing effort. The analysis of the mid-tier governors corroborates this set of constraints. Though these governors may be subjected to removal from their posts, they nevertheless possess sufficient political authority to typically demand a



“buy-out” package, a pre-emptive political maneuver. For the purposes of this project, this settlement was considered to be an appointment to a federal position in the government. Finally, the weakest set of governors is considered to be completely dependent on the good will of the Presidential Administration. This group of governors may be ousted at Moscow’s discretion. Again, it should be stressed that by belonging to either of these lower two tiers, a governor does not necessarily face being fired or not reappointed. They may well keep their positions. In other words, belonging to the lower two tiers is necessary for dismissal, but does not demand it.

### ***Establishing Vulnerability vs. Predicting an Appointment Decision***

Determining gubernatorial vulnerability is comparatively easy when we turn to attempting to explain why a governor, if vulnerable, is in fact replaced. One of the major arguments surrounding gubernatorial appointment decisions is that these are simply a product of “delivering the vote” to the appropriate Kremlin candidates. Turovsky for example writes that, “The most important thing for the Kremlin is the governors’ ability to organize federal elections in its interest ...”<sup>182</sup> This may well be the case in some instances: the last two gubernatorial changes in 2007 (Anatoly Lisitsyn of the Yaroslavskaia Oblast and Viktor Maslov of the Smolenskaya Oblast) did appear to be the result of poor State Duma election performances.<sup>183</sup> Lisitsyn and Maslov, after all, had the third and fourth lowest vote percentage totals (53.17 percent and 53.92 percent, respectively). Yet there were two other

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<sup>182</sup> Turovsky, “The Influence of Russian Big Business,” 158.

<sup>183</sup> IA Rosbalt, “Putin uvolil gubernatorov Yaroslavskoi i Smolenskoi oblastei,” 19 Dec. 2007, 19 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.rosbalt.ru/2007/12/19/441831.html>>; Bocharova, Ol’ga, “Poshli kak po Maslovu,” 14 Dec. 2007, Gazeta.ru, 19 Mar. 2008, <[http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2007/12/14\\_a\\_2427809.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2007/12/14_a_2427809.shtml)>; Patsar, Elena, “Parlament kak nakazanie,” 19 Dec. 2007, Vzglyad, 19 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.vz.ru/politics/2007/12/19/132798.html>>.

governors with lower yields who kept their seats (Valentina Matvienko of St. Petersburg and in dead last, Valerii Potapenko of the Nenetski AO, who did not even cross the 50 percent threshold in his region). Furthermore, there are 26 other governors who failed to cross the 60 percent mark (the Russian Federation had a figure of 64.26 percent). In looking at the cases as a whole, the averages are stunningly similar regardless of whether a governor delivered the vote for Putin in the presidential race or for United Russia in the Duma races (see Table 7.1). Poor performance at the ballot box may be a factor in some cases (either the sole factor or one of several as discussed below) but it does not mean that a governor is automatically doomed.

<b>Table 7.1: Relationship between Retention of Post and Electoral Performance</b>				
	Average Vote for ER in Duma 2007	Change in Vote for ER in Duma from 2003 to 2007	Average Vote for Putin in 2004	Change in Vote for Putin from 2000 to 2004
Regions Where Incumbent Was Replaced during Putin (21 instances)	64.97%	25.81 percentage points	72.83%	18.63 percentage points
Regions Where Incumbent Was Not Replaced during Putin (52 instances)	64.73%	25.91 percentage points	71.28%	17.75 percentage points

Source: Electoral Geography. These intervals were not statistically significant at the .90 confidence level.

I also consider a second set of factors that may be taken into account – the economic performance of the governor in question (see Table 7.2). Here I have compared the gubernatorial outcome against the per capita GRP change rates and the change in the average regional wages paid to workers. An examination of the results shows that there is a moderate relationship between the decisions. Interestingly, it is not a positive but a negative predictor:

governors with economies that operating more effectively are actually more likely to lose their posts.

<b>Table 7.2: Relationship between Retention of Post and Economic Performance</b>		
	% Change in GRP per capita between 2000 and Most Recent Full Year Prior To Appointment Decision (Not Available after 2005)	% Change in Wages between 2000 and Most Recent Full Year Prior To Appointment Decision (Not Available after 2006)
Regions Where Incumbent Was Replaced during Putin	194.93*	299.01*
Regions Where Incumbent Was Not Replaced during Putin	176.16**	256.94**

Source: State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation. These intervals were not statistically significant at the .90 confidence level.

\*Data was available for only 19 of 21 instances (not included: Koryakskii and Nenetskii AOs).

\*\*Data was available for only 48 of 52 instances (not included: Evenkiiskii, Agino-Buryatskii, Yamalo-Nenetskii, and Khanty-Mansiiskii AOs).

The third set, meant to assess quality of life of the population, is surprising in its results (see Table 7.3). The data selected was intended to measure two of the four major planks of Russia's National Priority Projects (housing and agriculture).<sup>184</sup> I have also included the change in reported crime instances. These measures would seem to suggest that appointment decisions are in some way driven by performance in quality of life areas. It should be emphasized that calculations of the confidence levels for means in all measures in all of three of these factors sets, including those in Table 7.3, did not yield results in excess of the 90 percent confidence level, which may in part be due to the limited sampling size available at this point in time. While these figures may serve as *prima facie* basis for further research, they should be considered preliminary and subject to change entirely. It should also be stressed that these findings apply to the governors as a whole – and it cannot and should not be ruled out that they do or do not matter in individual cases. In sum, these findings are

<sup>184</sup> The other two spheres are education and healthcare. No suitable measures could be identified and collected for these components.

included to show some initial general tendencies, and frankly speaking, to serve as a launching point for further research – they should not be interpreted as a conclusive declaration of determinacy.

<b>Table 7.3: Relationship between Retention of Post and Quality of Life Performance</b>				
	% Change in Crime Rate between 2000 and Most Recent Full Year Prior To Appointment Decision (Full Availability)	% Agricultural Output vs. Preceding Year for Last Full Year Before Appointment (Not Available after 2006)	% Change in Installation of Living Space between 2000 and Most Recent Full Year Prior To Appointment Decision (Not Available after 2006)	% Change in Living Space Installed per capita between 2000 and Most Recent Full Year Prior To Appointment Decision (Not Available after 2006)
Regions Where Incumbent Was Replaced during Putin (21 instances)	3.86	2.17	33.90**	8.73
Regions Where Incumbent Was Not Replaced during Putin (52 instances)	6.59	3.13*	47.22***	7.71

Source: State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation. These intervals were not statistically significant at the .90 confidence level.

\*Data was available for only 50 of 52 regions (not included: federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg).

\*\* Data was available for only 19 of 21 regions (not included: Kamchatskaya Oblast and Koryakskii AO).

\*\*\* Chukotskii AO was excluded as an extreme outlier, and thus only 51 of 52 regions are included for this figure.

With regard to the individual cases of gubernatorial appointment decisions, based on the appointment decisions that constituted this project and the analyses, media reporting, and articles reviewed in researching these instances, I would contend that there are no fewer than five broad potential reasons that can contribute to a vulnerable governor's dismissal. These factors may function independently of one another in a case or may interact – that is to say that in a certain case there may be a single reason for failure to be reappointed, in another there may be several reasons. The broad factors consist of, but are not limited to political performance/identification (delivering the vote, supporting a regional merger, party

affiliation past or present), regional performance (achieving certain economic or standards of living goals, effective response to disasters), extraneous pressures – that is, actors that belong to neither the Kremlin or the regional executive (business interests, regional legislatures, regional clans), promotion to another position, and finally, timing dynamics (relative to either the reforms’ entry into force or to elections).

The first four factors should be fairly straightforward, but the fifth, timing dynamics, is an interesting one that merits some explanation for two reasons. First, it illustrates how difficult it is to base a determination exclusively on concrete performance indicators. Secondly, it allows us to understand the governors as being complex and active, rather than inanimate objects that are simply on the receiving end of the Kremlin’s wrath or support. The governors are, in fact, dynamic and independent forces that seek to maximize their gains and actively seek to maneuver around the restrictions placed upon them. An article in the Russian version of Newsweek asserted that there was a certain “grace period” available to governors who acted quickly following the institution of the reform. These governors included officials who were considered to be at extreme risk of ouster by Putin – they consisted of individuals with mafia ties (Sergei Dar’kin of Primorskii Krai), Communist Party membership (Aleksandr Mikhailov of Kurskaya Oblast), and employment by Yukos (Boris Zolotarev of the Evenkiiskii AO); another’s main opponent was cousin of the head of ER, Boris Gryzlov (Leonid Korotkov of Amurskaya Oblast).<sup>185</sup> And finally, Konstantin Titov (Samarskaya Oblast) was a rival of Putin’s in the 2000 presidential race, yet he managed to be reappointed in 2005 (though he would be forced out in August of 2007). What seems to exist is a willingness to allow those governors who were some of the earliest to appeal to Putin for

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<sup>185</sup> Vernidub, Artem, “Poshli snimat’ guberniyu,” 28 Mar. – 3 Apr. 2005, Russkii Newsweek, 30 Nov. 2008, <<http://www.runewsweek.ru/rubrics/?rubric=country&rid=146>>.

reappointment to gain a reprieve. In doing so, Putin was able to signal that he was not going to fundamentally alter the governors' complexion as a whole. This indication allowed all governors to understand that they had a fair chance of retaining their posts and thus denied them any incentive to mount a collective resistance from the beginning.<sup>186</sup> Such a hypothesis also may shed some light on a few seemingly perplexing instances: six incumbents have been involved in appointment decisions twice – and received different outcomes.<sup>187</sup> In two of these instances this is quite straightforward: Viktor Shershunov (Kostromskaya Oblast) died in a car crash and Sergei Sobyenin was promoted to presidential chief of staff. Two others were the same who had poor Duma performances last December, Maslov and Lisitsyn. This leaves Titov and Korotkov – both of who can be argued to have submitted their requests for votes of confidence in the grace period. Yet a reprieve is not the same thing as a genuine vote of confidence: both were subsequently forced out (Titov lasted for about a year and a half; Korotkov for two years, four months). Interestingly, Korotkov's longer survival time did not denote a sign of political superiority: Titov ended up in the Federation Council; Korotkov is now teaching high school classes.

There are also instances, similar to Malakhov's case in Sakhalinskaya Oblast, in which it can be difficult to distinguish the true intentions behind a governor's dismissal. Vladimir Loginov, labeled the "platinum king" when he was elected to office,<sup>188</sup> was the governor of the Koryakskii Krai when the region faced a heating fuel crisis in which some 25,000 citizens

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<sup>186</sup> See Goode for similarities on this point, 387-8.

<sup>187</sup> A seventh governor, Ravil' Geniatulin of Chitinskaya Oblast appears a second time, but outside of the timing scope of analysis of this paper. In his case, this is due to the merging of his oblast into the Zabaikalskii Krai in March 2008. Geniatulin now heads the krai.

<sup>188</sup> "Russia's Only Female Governor Loses in Koryak," 06 Dec. 2000, Russian Regional Report, 18 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=14155>>.

were said to be left without sufficient means of heating. The reasons for the shortage were reported to be the geographic position of the region and the extreme corruption that exists in the krai's government structures.<sup>189</sup> With these details, it seems there may be some merit to dismissing Loginov on the basis of his performance. It would be easier to accept this hypothesis, however, if one does not consider the man Putin tapped to replace Loginov: Deputy Governor Oleg Kozhemyako. Kozhemyako arrived from Primorski Krai, renowned for the high level of corruption overseen by its then-governor Evgenii Nazdratenko.<sup>190</sup> Moreover, Kozhemyako made a fortune in the legendarily corrupt fishing sector.<sup>191</sup> And finally, what makes the situation even more stunning is that Putin himself, then the president's head of oversight, was tasked by Yeltsin to investigate "out of control fishing" associated with Nazdratenko's staff, including Kozhemyako – though the results of the investigation were never made public.<sup>192</sup> Finally, one other consideration is the push for regional mergers that has taken place in Putin's years in office. Loginov may have been blocking the merger, since it would put him out of a job; under Kozhemyako this regional merger was realized, with the Koryakskii AO being absorbed into the Kamchatskaya Oblast to form the Kamchatski Krai (the referendum to do so took place about seven months after Loginov was dismissed). Thus, it is easy to see how muddled the picture can be surrounding a governor's dismissal. In this instance any or all of no fewer than three reasons exist for a

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<sup>189</sup> Shirokov, Slava, "Putin Fires First Governor, In Koryak Okrug," 15 Mar. 2005, Russian Regional Report, 18 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/rrr/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13834>>.

<sup>190</sup> Coalson, Robert, "...As Website Speculates That Kremlin Manufactured Crisis," 16 Mar. 2005, RFE/RL Newsline, 18 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/03/160305.asp>>.

<sup>191</sup> Shirokov.

<sup>192</sup> "Kto takoi Oleg Kozhemyako," 10 Mar. 2005, Kommersant, 18 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=553321>>.

change of governors (poor regional performance, outside pressure to gain access to the resources, or the desire to achieve some political goal – here, a regional merger).

### ***Significance of the Reforms***

I would suggest that the significance of the new gubernatorial reforms depends on the political stratum in question. To this end I will briefly comment on three different parties: the Russian populace, the Russian elite, and the international community. The latter I think is fairly simple to assess, so I will address it first. For the international community, the significance was quite clear: appointing governors was one of the clearest signs that the Putin administration sought to centralize its authority by rolling back democracy and acquiring authoritarian qualities in the process. In this view, governors, oligarchs, and Moscow formed the trinity of power brokers in post-Soviet Russia; now that the first two have been brought into submission, this leaves the federal government to proceed unfettered and to do as it wishes.

Russia's elite faces some real challenges in my opinion. The overwhelming dominance of Putin and his team has had an unfortunate side effect. The ranks of the political elite have stagnated, which is evident with the governors, the majority of whom keep their posts.<sup>193</sup> This has been paralleled in the federal legislature as well. In a recent Kommersant Vlast article, the author discusses the fates of the “victors.” Virtually all the deputies expect to rise in status in the parliament by gaining seats on committees and in leadership posts. However, with all deputies being “successful” there is limited room for advancement: the long-time deputies expect to keep their influential duties by virtue of their loyalty and tenure;

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<sup>193</sup> Goode, 390-1.



the relative newcomers can point to their performance, and services and funding rendered to the party. This pressure for advancement can be ameliorated to some extent by creating new committees and posts – the present convocation of Duma set records in both these ways.<sup>194</sup> Yet, it will ultimately force the Kremlin to face some very unhappy and potentially very influential deputies – to see the threats of which one need look no further than the Saratovskaya Oblast legislature with all of its splintering and chaos. By not allowing a natural, democratic cycle of political “death” and regeneration, it seems that it is creating a situation that will grow more unstable and more unmanageable.

Yet, dominant parties in other regime types have successfully managed entrenched elites for extended lengths of time; one that comes to mind is the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) in Mexico. In this case, however, the rigid application of the law of nonconsecutive reelection on all offices forced circulation of elites which translated into protection of the single-party dominance of the political playing field. Even if a politician was forced to accept a “demotion” to a lesser office for one term, there was always the prospect of advancing up another rung or two in the next batch of elections.<sup>195</sup> The two assets of this system, in other words, were predictability and uniformity. In Russia, there is currently a similar dominance by one party, but the circulation of elites is anything but uniform and unpredictable. Term limits apply in only some cases, and then extremely unevenly, as I have noted throughout the paper. Relevant laws, the cornerstone of predictability, have been routinely circumvented, reinterpreted, or ignored as the situation

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<sup>194</sup> Kamyshev, Dmitrii, “Narodnye izgnanniki,” 04 Feb. 2008, *Kommersant Vlast*, 22 Feb. 2008, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=848170>>.

<sup>195</sup> Magaloni, Beatriz, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 47-48.

requires. All of this is not to say that success breeds eventual failure. It would be a fairly shallow prediction to simply say that at some point ER will lose its dominance; this seems, on the basis of human history (and the PRI's eventual loss of its political monopoly), to be an inevitable occurrence. One of the important considerations that will determine the durability and the effectiveness of the system while it does exist, however, is the way that it manages these personnel decisions.

The most difficult question to answer, it turns out, is the one that I initially saw as the most simple to resolve: what does the new system of appointments mean to Russian society as a whole? I can offer the reader no definitive answer on this point, only some general thoughts. The obvious answer is that it is a purely negative development for the population – after all, the center, the governors (as Goode would say), and even regional legislatures (as Chebankova would submit) can be argued to have benefitted in some way – and presumably this is a zero-sum game of politics where some party has to be a “loser.” This would, of course, be the electorate, which was cut entirely out of the selection process. Based on Konitzer's work, there may well have been accountability of governors to their electorate in at least *some* of Russia's regions with gubernatorial elections – but this was far from universal.<sup>196</sup> It would follow that with the deprivation of the right to elect regional heads of administration, there would follow a loss of accountability of governors to anyone other than the Russian president. Yet it is clear that the governor and president do not operate in a vacuum – there are several known avenues for injecting outside influence into the decision-making process. The regional legislature in Nizhny Novgorod effectively stared Putin down in rejecting the reappointment of Gennady Khodyrev – and Chebankova provides several

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<sup>196</sup> Konitzer, Andrew, Voting for Russia's Governors: Regional Elections and Accountability under Yeltsin and Putin, Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

other similar incidents as part of a chain of “unintended consequences.”<sup>197</sup> Businesses have had no qualms about influencing gubernatorial outcomes in the past – and if we subscribe to the idea that Khoroshavin was very much the choice of Rosneft, a state energy juggernaut, then that remains the case. Or if the corporate side is played down, then the Moscow clans aspect may be argued: it may be viewed as a battle between Kremlin clans – Sechin, et al. and Rosneft on one side; Medvedev, et al. and Gazprom on the other – in seeking control of Sakhalinskaya Oblast reserves. Finally, another sort of clan politics may be added, that of ethnic minority groups which is salient, in for example, Dagestan. In that instance, there is a traditional balance of regional government appointments based on which ethnic group an individual belongs to: the president is supposed to be from one group, the speaker of the parliament from another.

In the short term, Russian society may well have been cut out of decision process. Yet there are other means of influencing politics than voting. Taking away the right to vote merely channels political participation into different avenues – avenues that are more difficult to control. In doing so, it would seem that it may encourage the development of regional civil society groups that would then in turn direct their requests to Moscow. One other point worth making is that while the Kremlin may have been able to inject some certainty into who decides gubernatorial selection, it has at the same time lost one of the strongest indicators of what the population’s view of their regional political status is. This may encourage the Kremlin to accept, if not embrace, the emergence of such groups as a means of both gaining information and alleviating pressure from reaching such a point that the state of affairs in the regions spirals out of control. Another phenomenon is that the federal center has not been resistant to amending the system in the past few years – witness

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<sup>197</sup> Chebankova, 478-9.

the introduction of the right of majority parties in regional legislatures to nominate candidates, for instance. It is not unthinkable that the pool of input may be expanded further. It may sound outlandish to say so at this point in time, with democracy having seemingly beaten such a hasty retreat in Russia, but in some sense maybe this is precisely the sort of shakeup that is needed in a stagnated political system. It would seem that to some extent the greatest threats to regimes may not be in standing pat, but in introducing radical changes: as Migdal has so convincingly argued, states are quite good at inducing change; they possess much less impressive records in achieving their goals. All of this is to say that the situation is far more complicated and unpredictable than it may appear at first glance.

### ***Looking Ahead***

In conclusion, there remains much to be seen with regard to the reformed post of governor in Russia. This paper has demonstrated that there still exist varying degrees of vulnerability across Russia's regions and that strength of sitting governors has a direct impact on the outcome of a gubernatorial appointment decision. Furthermore, by investing so much potential power in the hands of a single individual, this means that when the occupant of this post changes, so too does his use of the appointment power. Dmitrii Medvedev may well follow Putin's course, or he may set out on his own, either attempting to use it to clean house on a wide scale or using it to dump unwanted governors only on occasion. And adding to all of this uncertainty are the governors themselves, who have resources to use against the center as well as the incentive to do so when their jobs are in jeopardy. In several cases, for example, governors have passed legal amendments to their regional statutes which allow them to serve five-year terms, rather than four-year terms (conveniently these provisions apply not only to future governors, but to the sitting executive as well). Another point to take

into consideration is the fact that the reforms are but three years old. New “interpretations” and amendments are not to be ruled out. After all, laws have a unique dynamic of their own – they reflect the balance of political power at a static point in time; as power shifts to one side or another, this opens up room for maneuver – the Duma’s exercise in ramming through Shaimiev’s right to seek a third term is evidence of this. All of this is to say that Russian politics have not, as it turns out, become more predictable – they have become less so.

**APPENDIX A**  
***Vulnerability Index Scores***

Region	Incumbent	Replacement	Date of Putin Appointment	Retained Post?	Enterprise Control	GRP	Tenure	Republic	Score
Kamchatskaya	Mikhail Mashkovtsev	Aleksei Kuz'mitskii	06/01/07	No	0	0	0	0	0
Penzenskaya	Vasilii Bochkarev	N/A	05/14/05	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Kaluzhskaya	Anatolii Artamonov	N/A	07/26/05	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Kurskaya	Aleksandr Mikhailov	N/A	02/22/05	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Evenskii	Boris Zolotarev	N/A	03/03/05	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Amurskaya	Leonid Korotkov	N/A	02/24/05	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Tverskaya	Dmitrii Zelenin	N/A	07/10/07	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Smolenskaya	Viktor Maslov	N/A	06/24/05	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Bryanskaya	Nikolai Denin	N/A	10/15/07	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Ulyanovsk	Sergei Morozov	N/A	03/28/06	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Smolenskaya	Viktor Maslov	Sergei Antuf'ev	12/19/07	No	0	0	0	0	0
Amurskaya	Leonid Korotkov	Nikolai Kolesov	06/01/07	No	0	0	0	0	0
Ivanovskaya	Vladimir Tikhonov	Mikhail Men	11/22/05	No	0	0	0	0	0
Kaliningradskaya	Vladimir Egorov	Georgii Boos	09/16/05	No	0	0	0	0	0
Koryakskii	Vladimir Loginov	Oleg Kozhemyako	03/09/05	No	0	0	0	0	0
Sakhalinskaya	Ivan Malakhov	Aleksandr Khoroshavin	08/09/07	No	0	0	0	0	0
Nenetskii	Aleksei Barinov	Valerii Potapenko	08/07/06	No	0	0	0	0	0
Novgorodskaya	Mikhail Prusak	Sergei Mitin	08/07/07	No	0	0	1	0	1
Nizhegorodskaya	Gennady Khodyrev	Valery Shantsev	08/08/05	No	0	1	0	0	1
Evreiskaya	Nikolai Volkov	N/A	02/25/05	Yes	0	0	1	0	1
Orlovskaya	Egor Stroev	N/A	04/23/05	Yes	0	0	1	0	1
Agino-Buryatskii	Bair Zhamsuev	N/A	09/15/05	Yes	0	0	1	0	1
Kostromskaya	Viktor Shershunov	N/A	04/21/05	Yes	0	0	1	0	1
Vladimirskaya	Nikolai Vinogradov	N/A	02/18/05	Yes	0	0	1	0	1
Moskovskaya Oblast	Boris Gromov	N/A	05/04/07	Yes	0	1	0	0	1
Lipetskaya	Oleg Korolev	N/A	05/28/05	Yes	0	1	0	0	1
Krasnodarskii	Aleksandr Tkachev	N/A	04/23/07	Yes	0	1	0	0	1
Tambovskaya	Oleg Betin	N/A	07/13/05	Yes	0	0	1	0	1
Orenburgskaya	Aleksei Chernyshev	N/A	06/15/05	Yes	0	1	0	0	1

Chukotskii	Roman Abramovich	N/A	10/21/05	Yes	1	0	0	0	1
Krasnoyarskii	Aleksandr Khloponin	N/A	06/04/07	Yes	0	1	0	0	1
Primorskii	Sergei Dar'kin	N/A	02/04/05	Yes	0	1	0	0	1
Sankt-Peterburg	Valentina Matvienko	N/A	12/20/06	Yes	0	1	0	0	1
Permskii Krai	Oleg Chirkunov	N/A	10/10/05	Yes	0	1	0	0	1
Adygea	Khazret Sovmen	Aslancherii Tkhakushinov	12/13/06	No	0	0	0	1	1
Altai Republic	Mikhail Lapshin	Aleksandr Berdnikov	12/22/05	No	0	0	0	1	1
Tul'skaya	Vasilii Starodubtsev	Vyacheslav Dudka	03/30/05	No	0	0	1	0	1
Dagestan	Magomedali Magomedov	Mukhu Aliyev	02/20/06	No	0	0	1	1	2
Tuva	Sherig-ool Oorzhak	Sholban Kara-ool	04/06/07	No	0	0	1	1	2
Buryatiya	Leonid Potapov	Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn	06/15/07	No	0	0	1	1	2
Saratovskaya	Dmitri Ayatskov	Pavel Ipatov	03/03/05	No	0	1	1	0	2
Irkutskaya	Boris Govorin	Aleksandr Tishanin	08/26/05	No	0	1	1	0	2
Khabarovskii	Viktor Ishaev	N/A	07/09/07	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Tomskaya	Viktor Kress	N/A	03/10/07	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Yaroslavskaya	Anatoly Lisitsyn	N/A	11/02/06	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Sverdlovskaya	Eduard Rossel'	N/A	11/21/05	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Belgorodskaya	Evgenii Savchenko	N/A	06/16/07	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Rostovskaya	Vladimir Chub	N/A	06/14/05	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Samarskaya	Konstantin Titov	N/A	04/26/05	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Kalmykia	Kirsan Ilyumzhinov	N/A	10/24/05	Yes	0	0	1	1	2
Chuvashiya	Nikolai Fedorov	N/A	08/29/05	Yes	0	0	1	1	2
Vologodskaya	Vyacheslav Pozgalev	N/A	06/21/07	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Murmanskaya	Yuri Evdokimov	N/A	02/14/07	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Mordoviya	Nikolai Merkushkin	N/A	11/10/05	Yes	0	0	1	1	2
Stavropol'skii	Aleksandr Chernogorov	N/A	10/31/05	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Leningradskaya	Valerii Serdyukov	N/A	07/09/07	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Chelyabinskaya	Petr Sumin	N/A	04/18/05	Yes	0	1	1	0	2
Kareliya	Sergei Katanandov	N/A	03/03/06	Yes	1	0	0	1	2
Novosibirskaya	Viktor Tolokonskii	N/A	07/12/07	Yes	1	1	0	0	2
Sakha-Yakutia	Vyacheslav Shtyrov	N/A	12/07/06	Yes	0	1	0	1	2
Tyumenskaya	Sergei Sobyenin	N/A	02/17/05	Yes	1	1	0	0	2
Ingushetiya	Murat Zyazikov	N/A	06/15/05	Yes	1	0	0	1	2
Samarskaya	Konstantin Titov	Vladimir Artyakov	08/29/07	No	0	1	1	0	2

North Osetiya-Alaniya	Aleksandr Dzasokhov	Taimuraz Mamsurov	06/07/05	No	1	0	0	1	2
Yaroslavskaya	Anatoly Lisitsyn	Sergei Vakhrukhov	12/19/07	No	0	1	1	0	2
Omskaya	Leonid Polezhaev	N/A	05/24/07	Yes	1	1	1	0	3
Moskva	Yurii Luzhkov	N/A	06/27/07	Yes	1	1	1	0	3
Khanty-Mansiiskii	Aleksandr Filipenko	N/A	02/24/05	Yes	1	1	1	0	3
Yamalo-Nenetskii	Yurii Neelov	N/A	03/11/05	Yes	1	1	1	0	3
Kemerovskaya	Aman Tuleev	N/A	04/20/05	Yes	1	1	1	0	3
Komi	Vladimir Torlopov	N/A	12/07/05	Yes	1	1	0	1	3
Tatarstan	Mintimer Shaimiev	N/A	03/25/05	Yes	1	1	1	1	4
Bashkortostan	Murtaza Rakhimov	N/A	10/10/06	Yes	1	1	1	1	4



**APPENDIX B**  
***Governors by Strength and Fate***

Governor Strength	Quantity (%)	Points	Quantity (%)	Retained Post?	Quantity (%)	After Exit	Quantity (%)
<b>Strong</b>	8 (10.96%)	Four	2 (2.74%)	Yes	2 (2.74%)		
				No	0 (0%)	Fed	0 (0%)
						Other Gov	0 (0%)
						Non-Gov	0 (0%)
		Three	6 (8.22%)	Yes	6 (8.22%)		
				No	0 (0%)	Fed	0 (0%)
						Other Gov	0 (0%)
						Non-Gov	0 (0%)
<b>Moderate</b>	48 (65.75%)	Two	28 (38.36%)	Yes	20 (27.40%)		
				No	8 (10.96%)	Fed	5 (6.85%)
						Other Gov	3 (4.11%)
						Non-Gov	0 (0%)
		One	20 (27.40%)	Yes	15 (20.55%)		
				No	5 (6.85%)	Fed	2 (2.74%)
						Other Gov	2 (2.74%)
						Non-Gov	1 (1.37%)
<b>Weak</b>	17 (23.28%)	Zero	17 (23.29%)	Yes	9 (12.33%)		
				No	8 (10.96%)	Fed	1 (1.37%)
						Other Gov	1 (1.37%)
						Non-Gov	6 (8.22%)

**APPENDIX C**  
***Relationship between GRP and Retention of Office***

Region	Subject Type	Incumbent	Retained Post?	Upper Tier?	GRP 2005 (mln. Rubles)
Evenkiiskii A.O.	Okrug	Boris Zolotarev	Yes	No	2,955.6
Aginskii-Buryatskii A.O.	Okrug	Bair Zhamsuev	Yes	No	3,448.9
Koryakskii A.O.	Okrug	Vladimir Loginov	No	No	5,276
Ingushetiya	Republic	Murat Zyazikov	Yes	No	7,502.9
Altayskaya Respublika	Republic	Mikhail Lapshin	No	No	9,694.7
Kalmykiya	Republic	Kirsan Ilyumzhinov	Yes	No	9,725.4
Tyva	Republic	Sherig-ool Oorzhak	No	No	11,572.4
Chukotskii A.O.	Okrug	Roman Abramovich	Yes	No	12,760.4
Evreiskaya A.O.	A. Oblast	Nikolai Volkov	Yes	No	14,441.9
Adygeya	Republic	Khazret Sovmen	No	No	16,636.4
Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya	Republic	Aleksandr Dzasokhov	No	No	31,014.0
Kamchatskaya	Oblast	Mikhail Mashkovtsev	No	No	38349.8
Nenetskii A.O.	Okrug	Aleksei Barinov	No	No	44,577.3
Kostromskaya	Oblast	Viktor Shershunov	Yes	No	45,092.0
Ivanovskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Tikhonov	No	No	45,981.7
Mordovia	Republic	Nikolai Merkushev	Yes	No	46,000.3
Orlovskaya	Oblast	Egor Stroyev	Yes	No	57,983.4
Novgorodskaya	Oblast	Mikhail Prusak	No	No	60,960.2
Tambovskaya	Oblast	Oleg Betin	Yes	No	64,538.7
Bryanskaya	Oblast	Nikolai Denin	Yes	No	66,825.1
Smolenskaya	Oblast	Viktor Maslov	Yes	No	68,383.1
Smolenskaya	Oblast	Viktor Maslov	No	No	68,383.1
Chuvashiya	Republic	Nikolai Fedorov	Yes	No	69,498.3
Penzenskaya	Oblast	Vasilii Bochkarev	Yes	No	73,504.7
Kaluzhskaya	Oblast	Anatoly Artamonov	Yes	No	74,506.7
Buryatiya	Republic	Leonid Potapov	No	No	74,892.7
Kareliya	Republic	Sergei Katanandov	Yes	No	76,313.2
Amurskaya	Oblast	Leonid Korotkov	Yes	No	76,673.4
Amurskaya	Oblast	Leonid Korotkov	No	No	76,673.4
Kaliningradskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Egorov	No	No	80,768.2
Ul'yanovskaya	Oblast	Sergei Morozov	Yes	No	82,534.1
Kurskaya	Oblast	Aleksandr Mikhailov	Yes	No	87,211.4
Vladimirskaya	Oblast	Nikolai Vinogradov	Yes	No	87,840.6
Tverskaya	Oblast	Dmitri Zelenin	Yes	No	94,860.3
Dagestan	Republic	Magomedali Magomedov	No	No	96,863.1
Tul'skaya	Oblast	Vasilii Starodubtsev	No	No	108,726.7
Sakhalinskaya	Oblast	Ivan Malakhov	No	No	121,146.3
Yaroslavskaya	Oblast	Anatoly Lisitsyn	Yes	Yes	130,957.2

Yaroslavskaya	Oblast	Anatoly Lisitsyn	No	Yes	130,957.2
Murmanskaya	Oblast	Yuri Evdokimov	Yes	Yes	141,886.8
Lipetskaya	Oblast	Oleg Korolev	Yes	Yes	145,932.8
Stavropol'skii Krai	Krai	Aleksandr Chernogorov	Yes	Yes	147,018.6
Belgorodskaya	Oblast	Evgenii Savchenko	Yes	Yes	147,184.8
Tomskaya	Oblast	Viktor Kress	Yes	Yes	158,218.7
Khabarovskii Krai	Krai	Viktor Ishaev	Yes	Yes	161,306.1
Saratovskaya	Oblast	Dmitri Ayatskov	No	Yes	169,148.5
Komi	Republic	Vladimir Torlopov	Yes	Yes	172,992.7
Sakha	Republic	Vyacheslav Shtyrov	Yes	Yes	185,172.9
Primorski Krai	Krai	Sergei Dar'kin	Yes	Yes	188,769.3
Vologodskaya	Oblast	Vyacheslav Pozgalev	Yes	Yes	194,891.6
Leningradskaya	Oblast	Valerii Serdyukov	Yes	Yes	212,091.7
Orenburgskaya	Oblast	Aleksei Chernyshev	Yes	Yes	214,252.6
Omskaya	Oblast	Leonid Polezhaev	Yes	Yes	223,433.2
Novosibirskaya	Oblast	Viktor Tolokonskii	Yes	Yes	240,788.7
Irkutskaya	Oblast	Boris Govorin	No	Yes	262,557.5
Rostovskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Chub	Yes	Yes	264,067.2
Kemerovskaya	Oblast	Aman Tuleev	Yes	Yes	296,164.6
Nizhegorodskaya	Oblast	Gennady Khodyrev	No	Yes	296,929.7
Permskii	Krai	Oleg Chirkunov	Yes	Yes	338,915.7
Chelyabinskaya	Oblast	Petr Sumin	Yes	Yes	350,341.8
Tyumenskaya	Oblast	Sergei Sobyenin	Yes	Yes	357,191.9
Krasnodarskii Krai	Krai	Aleksandr Tkachev	Yes	Yes	371,177.5
Bashkortostan	Republic	Murtaza Rakhimov	Yes	Yes	381,431.0
Samarskaya	Oblast	Konstantin Titov	Yes	Yes	402,308.6
Samarskaya	Oblast	Konstantin Titov	No	Yes	402,308.6
Krasnoyarskii Krai	Krai	Aleksandr Khloponin	Yes	Yes	433,510.6
Yamalo-Nenetskii A.O.	Okrug	Yuri Neelov	Yes	Yes	445,732.6
Sverdlovskaya	Oblast	Eduard Rossel'	Yes	Yes	481,690.4
Tatarstan	Republic	Mintimer Shaimiev	Yes	Yes	488,609.1
Sankt-Peterburg	City	Valentina Matvienko	Yes	Yes	667,905.4
Moskovskaya	Oblast	Boris Gromov	Yes	Yes	704,390.1
Khanty-Mansiiskii A.O.	Okrug	Aleksandr Filipenko	Yes	Yes	1,421,371.2
Moskva	City	Yuri Luzhkov	Yes	Yes	4,005,883.0

**APPENDIX D**  
***Relationship between Enterprise Control and Retention of Office***

Region	Subject Type	Incumbent	Replacement	Date of Putin Appointment	Retained Post?	Retained Enterprise Control?
Evenkiiskii A.O.	Okrug	Boris Zolotarev	N/A	03/03/05	Yes	No
Aginskii-Buryatskii A.O.	Okrug	Bair Zhamsuev	N/A	09/15/05	Yes	No
Koryakskii A.O.	Okrug	Vladimir Loginov	Oleg Kozhemyako	03/09/05	No	No
Ingushetiya	Republic	Murat Zyazikov	N/A	06/15/05	Yes	Yes
Altayskaya Respublika	Republic	Mikhail Lapshin	Aleksandr Berdnikov	12/22/05	No	No
Kalmykiya	Republic	Kirsan Ilyumzhinov	N/A	10/24/05	Yes	No
Tyva	Republic	Sherig-ool Oorzhak	Sholban Kara-ool	04/06/07	No	No
Chukotskii A.O.	Okrug	Roman Abramovich	N/A	10/21/05	Yes	Yes
Evreiskaya A.O.	A. Oblast	Nikolai Volkov	N/A	02/25/05	Yes	No
Adygeya	Republic	Khazret Sovmen	Aslancherii Tkhakushinov	12/13/06	No	No
Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya	Republic	Aleksandr Dzasokhov	Taimuraz Mamsurov	06/07/05	No	Yes
Kamchatskaya	Oblast	Mikhail Mashkovtsev	Aleksei Kuz'mitskii	06/01/07	No	No
Nenetskii A.O.	Okrug	Aleksei Barinov	Valerii Potapenko	08/07/06	No	No
Kostromskaya	Oblast	Viktor Shershunov	N/A	04/21/05	Yes	No
Ivanovskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Tikhonov	Mikhail Men	11/22/05	No	No
Mordovia	Republic	Nikolai Merkushkin	N/A	11/10/05	Yes	No
Orlovskaya	Oblast	Egor Stroyev	N/A	04/23/05	Yes	No
Novgorodskaya	Oblast	Mikhail Prusak	Sergei Mitin	08/07/07	No	No
Tambovskaya	Oblast	Oleg Betin	N/A	07/13/05	Yes	No
Bryanskaya	Oblast	Nikolai Denin	N/A	10/15/07	Yes	No
Smolenskaya	Oblast	Viktor Maslov	N/A	06/24/05	Yes	No
Smolenskaya	Oblast	Viktor Maslov	Sergei Antuf'ev	12/19/07	No	No
Chuvashiya	Republic	Nikolai Fedorov	N/A	08/29/05	Yes	No
Penzenskaya	Oblast	Vasilii Bochkarev	N/A	05/14/05	Yes	No
Kaluzhskaya	Oblast	Anatoly Artamonov	N/A	07/26/05	Yes	No
Buryatiya	Republic	Leonid Potapov	Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn	06/15/07	No	No
Kareliya	Republic	Sergei Katanandov	N/A	03/03/06	Yes	Yes
Amurskaya	Oblast	Leonid Korotkov	N/A	02/24/05	Yes	No
Amurskaya	Oblast	Leonid Korotkov	Nikolai Kolesov	06/01/07	No	No
Kaliningradskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Egorov	Georgii Boos	09/16/05	No	No
Ul'yanovskaya	Oblast	Sergei Morozov	N/A	03/28/06	Yes	No
Kurskaya	Oblast	Aleksandr Mikhailov	N/A	02/22/05	Yes	No
Vladimirskaya	Oblast	Nikolai Vinogradov	N/A	02/18/05	Yes	No
Tverskaya	Oblast	Dmitri Zelenin	N/A	07/10/07	Yes	No
Dagestan	Republic	Magomedali Magomedov	Mukhu Aliyev	02/20/06	No	No
Tul'skaya	Oblast	Vasilii Starodubtsev	Vyacheslav Dudka	03/30/05	No	No

Sakhalinskaya	Oblast	Ivan Malakhov	Aleksandr Khoroshavin	08/09/07	No	No
Yaroslavskaya	Oblast	Anatoly Lisitsyn	N/A	11/02/06	Yes	No
Yaroslavskaya	Oblast	Anatoly Lisitsyn	Sergei Vakhrukhov	12/19/07	No	No
Murmanskaya	Oblast	Yuri Evdokimov	N/A	02/14/07	Yes	No
Lipetskaya	Oblast	Oleg Korolev	N/A	05/28/05	Yes	No
Stavropol'skii Krai	Krai	Aleksandr Chernogorov	N/A	10/31/05	Yes	No
Belgorodskaya	Oblast	Evgenii Savchenko	N/A	06/16/07	Yes	No
Tomskaya	Oblast	Viktor Kress	N/A	03/10/07	Yes	No
Khabarovskii Krai	Krai	Viktor Ishaev	N/A	07/09/07	Yes	No
Saratovskaya	Oblast	Dmitri Ayatskov	Pavel Ipatov	03/03/05	No	No
Komi	Republic	Vladimir Torlopov	N/A	12/07/05	Yes	Yes
Sakha	Republic	Vyacheslav Shtyrov	N/A	12/07/06	Yes	No
Primorski Krai	Krai	Sergei Dar'kin	N/A	02/04/05	Yes	No
Vologodskaya	Oblast	Vyacheslav Pozgalev	N/A	06/21/07	Yes	No
Leningradskaya	Oblast	Valerii Serdyukov	N/A	07/09/07	Yes	No
Orenburgskaya	Oblast	Aleksei Chernyshev	N/A	06/15/05	Yes	No
Omskaya	Oblast	Leonid Polezhaev	N/A	05/24/07	Yes	Yes
Novosibirskaya	Oblast	Viktor Tolokonskii	N/A	07/12/07	Yes	Yes
Irkutskaya	Oblast	Boris Govorin	Aleksandr Tishanin	08/26/05	No	No
Rostovskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Chub	N/A	06/14/05	Yes	No
Kemerovskaya	Oblast	Aman Tuleev	N/A	04/20/05	Yes	Yes
Nizhegorodskaya	Oblast	Gennady Khodyrev	Valery Shantsev	08/08/05	No	No
Permskii	Krai	Oleg Chirkunov	N/A	10/10/05	Yes	No
Chelyabinskaya	Oblast	Petr Sumin	N/A	04/18/05	Yes	No
Tyumenskaya	Oblast	Sergei Sobyenin	N/A	02/17/05	Yes	Yes
Krasnodarskii Krai	Krai	Aleksandr Tkachev	N/A	04/23/07	Yes	No
Bashkortostan	Republic	Murtaza Rakhimov	N/A	10/10/06	Yes	Yes
Samarskaya	Oblast	Konstantin Titov	N/A	04/26/05	Yes	No
Samarskaya	Oblast	Konstantin Titov	Vladimir Artyakov	08/29/07	No	No
Krasnoyarskii Krai	Krai	Aleksandr Khloponin	N/A	06/04/07	Yes	No
Yamalo-Nenetski A.O.	Okrug	Yuri Neelov	N/A	03/11/05	Yes	Yes
Sverdlovskaya	Oblast	Eduard Rossel'	N/A	11/21/05	Yes	No
Tatarstan	Republic	Mintimer Shaimiev	N/A	03/25/05	Yes	Yes
Sankt-Peterburg	City	Valentina Matvienko	N/A	12/20/06	Yes	No
Moskovskaya	Oblast	Boris Gromov	N/A	05/04/07	Yes	No
Khanty-Mansiiskii A.O.	Okrug	Aleksandr Filipenko	N/A	02/24/05	Yes	Yes
Moskva	City	Yuri Luzhkov	N/A	06/27/07	Yes	Yes

**APPENDIX E**  
***Relationship between Republic Status and Retention of Office***

Region	Subject Type	Incumbent	Replacement	Date of Putin Appointment	Incumbent Retained Office?
Evreiskaya A.O.	A. Oblast	Nikolai Volkov	N/A	02/25/05	Yes
Sankt-Peterburg	City	Valentina Matvienko	N/A	12/20/06	Yes
Moskva	City	Yuri Luzhkov	N/A	06/27/07	Yes
Stavropol'skii Krai	Krai	Aleksandr Chernogorov	N/A	10/31/05	Yes
Khabarovskii Krai	Krai	Viktor Ishaev	N/A	07/09/07	Yes
Primorskii Krai	Krai	Sergei Dar'kin	N/A	02/04/05	Yes
Krasnodarskii Krai	Krai	Aleksandr Tkachev	N/A	04/23/07	Yes
Krasnoyarskii Krai	Krai	Aleksandr Khloponin	N/A	06/04/07	Yes
Permskii	Krai	Oleg Chirkunov	N/A	10/10/05	Yes
Kamchatskaya	Oblast	Mikhail Mashkovtsev	Aleksei Kuz'mitskii	06/01/07	No
Kostromskaya	Oblast	Viktor Shershunov	N/A	04/21/05	Yes
Ivanovskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Tikhonov	Mikhail Men	11/22/05	No
Orlovskaya	Oblast	Egor Stroyev	N/A	04/23/05	Yes
Novgorodskaya	Oblast	Mikhail Prusak	Sergei Mitin	08/07/07	No
Tambovskaya	Oblast	Oleg Betin	N/A	07/13/05	Yes
Bryanskaya	Oblast	Nikolai Denin	N/A	10/15/07	Yes
Smolenskaya	Oblast	Viktor Maslov	N/A	06/24/05	Yes
Smolenskaya	Oblast	Viktor Maslov	Sergei Antuf'ev	12/19/07	No
Penzenskaya	Oblast	Vasilii Bochkarev	N/A	05/14/05	Yes
Kaluzhskaya	Oblast	Anatoly Artamonov	N/A	07/26/05	Yes
Amurskaya	Oblast	Leonid Korotkov	N/A	02/24/05	Yes
Amurskaya	Oblast	Leonid Korotkov	Nikolai Kolesov	06/01/07	No
Kaliningradskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Egorov	Georgii Boos	09/16/05	No
Ul'yanskaya	Oblast	Sergei Morozov	N/A	03/28/06	Yes
Kurskaya	Oblast	Aleksandr Mikhailov	N/A	02/22/05	Yes
Vladimirskaya	Oblast	Nikolai Vinogradov	N/A	02/18/05	Yes
Tverskaya	Oblast	Dmitri Zelenin	N/A	07/10/07	Yes
Tul'skaya	Oblast	Vasilii Starodubtsev	Vyacheslav Dudka	03/30/05	No
Sakhalinskaya	Oblast	Ivan Malakhov	Aleksandr Khoroshavin	08/09/07	No
Yaroslavskaya	Oblast	Anatoly Lisitsyn	N/A	11/02/06	Yes
Yaroslavskaya	Oblast	Anatoly Lisitsyn	Sergei Vakhrukhov	12/19/07	No
Murmanskaya	Oblast	Yuri Evdokimov	N/A	02/14/07	Yes
Lipetskaya	Oblast	Oleg Korolev	N/A	05/28/05	Yes
Belgorodskaya	Oblast	Evgenii Savchenko	N/A	06/16/07	Yes
Tomskaya	Oblast	Viktor Kress	N/A	03/10/07	Yes
Saratovskaya	Oblast	Dmitri Ayatskov	Pavel Ipatov	03/03/05	No
Vologodskaya	Oblast	Vyacheslav Pozgalev	N/A	06/21/07	Yes

Leningradskaya	Oblast	Valerii Serdyukov	N/A	07/09/07	Yes
Orenburgskaya	Oblast	Aleksei Chernyshev	N/A	06/15/05	Yes
Omskaya	Oblast	Leonid Polezhaev	N/A	05/24/07	Yes
Novosibirskaya	Oblast	Viktor Tolokonskii	N/A	07/12/07	Yes
Irkutskaya	Oblast	Boris Govorin	Aleksandr Tishanin	08/26/05	No
Rostovskaya	Oblast	Vladimir Chub	N/A	06/14/05	Yes
Kemerovskaya	Oblast	Aman Tuleev	N/A	04/20/05	Yes
Nizhegorodskaya	Oblast	Gennady Khodyrev	Valery Shantsev	08/08/05	No
Chelyabinskaya	Oblast	Petr Sumin	N/A	04/18/05	Yes
Tyumenskaya	Oblast	Sergei Sobyenin	N/A	02/17/05	Yes
Samarskaya	Oblast	Konstantin Titov	N/A	04/26/05	Yes
Samarskaya	Oblast	Konstantin Titov	Vladimir Artyakov	08/29/07	No
Sverdlovskaya	Oblast	Eduard Rossel'	N/A	11/21/05	Yes
Moskovskaya	Oblast	Boris Gromov	N/A	05/04/07	Yes
Evenkiskii A.O.	Okrug	Boris Zolotarev	N/A	03/03/05	Yes
Aginskii-Buryatskii A.O.	Okrug	Bair Zhamsuev	N/A	09/15/05	Yes
Koryakskii A.O.	Okrug	Vladimir Loginov	Oleg Kozhemyako	03/09/05	No
Chukotskii A.O.	Okrug	Roman Abramovich	N/A	10/21/05	Yes
Nenetskii A.O.	Okrug	Aleksei Barinov	Valerii Potapenko	08/07/06	No
Yamalo-Nenetskii A.O.	Okrug	Yuri Neelov	N/A	03/11/05	Yes
Khanty-Mansiiskii A.O.	Okrug	Aleksandr Filipenko	N/A	02/24/05	Yes
Ingushetiya	Republic	Murat Zyazikov	N/A	06/15/05	Yes
Altayskaya Respublika	Republic	Mikhail Lapshin	Aleksandr Berdnikov	12/22/05	No
Kalmykiya	Republic	Kirsan Ilyumzhinov	N/A	10/24/05	Yes
Tyva	Republic	Sherig-ool Oorzhak	Sholban Kara-ool	04/06/07	No
Adygeya	Republic	Khazret Sovmen	Aslancherii Tkhakushinov	12/13/06	No
Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya	Republic	Aleksandr Dzasokhov	Taimuraz Mamsurov	06/07/05	No
Mordovia	Republic	Nikolai Merkushkin	N/A	11/10/05	Yes
Chuvashiya	Republic	Nikolai Fedorov	N/A	08/29/05	Yes
Buryatiya	Republic	Leonid Potapov	Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn	06/15/07	No
Kareliya	Republic	Sergei Katanandov	N/A	03/03/06	Yes
Dagestan	Republic	Magomedali Magomedov	Mukhu Aliyev	02/20/06	No
Komi	Republic	Vladimir Torlopov	N/A	12/07/05	Yes
Sakha	Republic	Vyacheslav Shtyrov	N/A	12/07/06	Yes
Bashkortostan	Republic	Murtaza Rakhimov	N/A	10/10/06	Yes
Tatarstan	Republic	Mintimer Shaimiev	N/A	03/25/05	Yes

**APPENDIX F**  
***Relationship between Tenure and Retention of Office***

Region	Incumbent	Replacement	Date of Putin Appointment	Incumbent Retained Office?	Months Incumbent was in Office at Point of Decision
Ul'yanskaya	Sergei Morozov	N/A	03/28/06	Yes	15.07
Nenetskii A.O.	Aleksei Barinov	Valerii Potapenko	08/07/06	No	18.03
Permskii	Oleg Chirkunov	N/A	10/10/05	Yes	19.03
Bryanskaya	Nikolai Denin	N/A	10/15/07	Yes	33.87
Smolenskaya	Viktor Maslov	N/A	06/24/05	Yes	37.17
Ingushetiya	Murat Zyazikov	N/A	06/15/05	Yes	37.57
Sankt-Peterburg	Valentina Matvienko	N/A	12/20/06	Yes	38.50
Tverskaya	Dmitri Zelenin	N/A	07/10/07	Yes	42.63
Primorskii Krai	Sergei Dar'kin	N/A	02/04/05	Yes	43.57
Amurskaya	Leonid Korotkov	N/A	02/24/05	Yes	46.53
Evenkiiskii A.O.	Boris Zolotarev	N/A	03/03/05	Yes	46.83
Altaiskaya Respublika	Mikhail Lapshin	Aleksandr Berdnikov	12/22/05	No	47.53
Sakhalinskaya	Ivan Malakhov	Aleksandr Khoroshavin	08/09/07	No	47.63
Komi	Vladimir Torlopov	N/A	12/07/05	Yes	47.70
Nizhegorodskaya	Gennady Khodyrev	Valery Shantsev	08/08/05	No	48.30
Tyumenskaya	Sergei Sobyenin	N/A	02/17/05	Yes	49.10
Koryakskii A.O.	Vladimir Loginov	Oleg Kozhemyako	03/09/05	No	51.20
Kurskaya	Aleksandr Mikhailov	N/A	02/22/05	Yes	51.57
Krasnoyarskii Krai	Aleksandr Khloponin	N/A	06/04/07	Yes	56.40
Kaluzhskaya	Anatoly Artamonov	N/A	07/26/05	Yes	56.47
Kaliningradskaya	Vladimir Egorov	Georgii Boos	09/16/05	No	57.90
Chukotskii A.O.	Roman Abramovich	N/A	10/21/05	Yes	57.90
Sakha	Vyacheslav Shtyrov	N/A	12/07/06	Yes	58.80
Adygeya	Khazret Sovmen	Aslancherii Tkhakushinov	12/13/06	No	59.00
Ivanovskaya	Vladimir Tikhonov	Mikhail Men	11/22/05	No	59.17
Orenburgskaya	Aleksei Chernyshev	N/A	06/15/05	Yes	65.63
Tambovskaya	Oleg Betin	N/A	07/13/05	Yes	66.57
Smolenskaya	Viktor Maslov	Sergei Antuf'ev	12/19/07	No	67.00
Amurskaya	Leonid Korotkov	Nikolai Kolesov	06/01/07	No	73.77
Krasnodarskii Krai	Aleksandr Tkachev	N/A	04/23/07	Yes	76.67
Kamchatskaya	Mikhail Mashkovtsev	Aleksei Kuz'mitskii	06/01/07	No	77.47
Penzenskaya	Vasilii Bochkarev	N/A	05/14/05	Yes	85.07
Lipetskaya	Oleg Korolev	N/A	05/28/05	Yes	85.53
Moskovskaya	Boris Gromov	N/A	05/04/07	Yes	87.83
Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya	Aleksandr Dzasokhov	Taimuraz Mamsurov	06/07/05	No	88.63



Novosibirskaya	Viktor Tolokonskii	N/A	07/12/07	Yes	90.10
Kareliya	Sergei Katanandov	N/A	03/03/06	Yes	93.53
Kemerovskaya	Aman Tuleev	N/A	04/20/05	Yes	93.67
Tul'skaya	Vasilii Starodubtsev	Vyacheslav Dudka	03/30/05	No	96.23
Irkutskaya	Boris Govorin	Aleksandr Tishanin	08/26/05	No	96.97
Vladimirskaia	Nikolai Vinogradov	N/A	02/18/05	Yes	98.33
Chelyabinskaya	Petr Sumin	N/A	04/18/05	Yes	99.87
Kostromskaya	Viktor Shershunov	N/A	04/21/05	Yes	99.97
Aginskii-Buryatskii A.O.	Bair Zhamsuev	N/A	09/15/05	Yes	102.73
Leningradskaya	Valerii Serdyukov	N/A	07/09/07	Yes	105.70
Saratovskaya	Dmitri Ayatskov	Pavel Ipatov	03/03/05	No	106.60
Stavropol'skii Krai	Aleksandr Chernogorov	N/A	10/31/05	Yes	107.43
Mordovia	Nikolai Merkushkin	N/A	11/10/05	Yes	121.60
Murmanskaya	Yuri Evdokimov	N/A	02/14/07	Yes	122.43
Yamalo-Nenetskii A.O.	Yuri Neelov	N/A	03/11/05	Yes	132.97
Vologodskaya	Vyacheslav Pozgalev	N/A	06/21/07	Yes	134.93
Chuvashiya	Nikolai Fedorov	N/A	08/29/05	Yes	140.10
Orlovskaya	Egor Stroyev	N/A	04/23/05	Yes	144.40
Kalmykiya	Kirsan Ilyumzhinov	N/A	10/24/05	Yes	150.43
Bashkortostan	Murtaza Rakhimov	N/A	10/10/06	Yes	153.93
Buryatiya	Leonid Potapov	Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn	06/15/07	No	155.50
Khanty-Mansiiskii A.O.	Aleksandr Filipenko	N/A	02/24/05	Yes	158.20
Evreiskii A.O.	Nikolai Volkov	N/A	02/25/05	Yes	158.37
Samarskaya	Konstantin Titov	N/A	04/26/05	Yes	163.87
Rostovskaya	Vladimir Chub	N/A	06/14/05	Yes	164.20
Belgorodskaya	Evgenii Savchenko	N/A	06/16/07	Yes	164.50
Tatarstan	Mintimer Shaimiev	N/A	03/25/05	Yes	165.43
Sverdlovskaya	Eduard Rossel'	N/A	11/21/05	Yes	169.17
Yaroslavskaya	Anatoly Lisitsyn	N/A	11/02/06	Yes	178.97
Moskva	Yuri Luzhkov	N/A	06/27/07	Yes	180.70
Tyva	Sherig-ool Oorzhak	Sholban Kara-ool	04/06/07	No	180.70
Tomskaya	Viktor Kress	N/A	03/10/07	Yes	184.63
Omskaya	Leonid Polezhaev	N/A	05/24/07	Yes	186.43
Khabarovskii Krai	Viktor Ishaev	N/A	07/09/07	Yes	188.50
Novgorodskaya	Mikhail Prusak	Sergei Mitin	08/07/07	No	189.43
Samarskaya	Konstantin Titov	Vladimir Artyakov	08/29/07	No	191.97
Yaroslavskaya	Anatoly Lisitsyn	Sergei Vakhrukhov	12/19/07	No	192.53

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