

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE US AND THE UK: AN EXPANSION OF
'SECURITY' OVER TIME

Claire Purcell Cassedy

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, Concentration
TransAtlantic Studies.

Chapel Hill
2013

Approved by:

Holger Moroff

Graeme Robertson

Milada Vachudova

ABSTRACT

**CLAIRE PURCELL CASSEDY: National Security Strategies of the US and the UK: An Expansion of
‘Security’ Over Time
(Under the direction of Holger Moroff)**

As the second decade of the century begins to unfold, the global security environment is unlike any that nations have faced before. Instead of traditional state-based aggression, nations must contend with threats originating from a growing spectrum of non-state actors while contending with a level of economic austerity not felt for more than fifty years. In light of these factors, how do nations ensure the security of their people, territories, and interests? How do they define security and how have those definitions changed? Using the United States of America and the United Kingdom as comparative cases, this paper examines how the nations’ definitions of ‘security’ have evolved in the post-Cold War era. While developed independently in accordance with each nation’s respective experiences and interests, both the US and the UK’s definitions of security have expanded over time, indicating a broadening securitization of national politics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	iv
ABBREVIATIONS.....	v
INTRODUCTION.....	1
SECURITY IN GOVERNMENTAL DISCOURSE.....	2
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORMATION PROCESSES OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.....	3
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE US AND THE UK.....	5
UK STRATEGY OVER THE YEARS.....	16
US STRATEGY OVER THE YEARS.....	18
US AND UK NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES IN COMPARISON.....	21
BROADENING DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY.....	24
CONCLUSION.....	25
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	28

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE

1. The 1998 National Security Strategies of the US and the UK.....	5
2. The 2006 US National Security Strategy and the 2008 UK National Security Strategy.....	9
3. The 2010 National Security Strategies of the US and the UK.....	13

ABBREVIATIONS

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

EU European Union

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC National Security Council

NSRA National Security Risk Assessment

NSS National Security Strategy

SDR Security and Defense Review

SDSR Strategic Defense and Security Review

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

US United States of America

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

INTRODUCTION

As the second decade of the century begins to unfold, the global security environment is unlike any that nations have faced before. After centuries of state-based aggression and clashes between great powers, the international system now finds itself plagued by asymmetrical warfare waged by groups that are not tied to any specific geographical location. Security threats know no borders, and are advanced by the technologies and openness afforded them by the double-edged sword of globalization. In addition to these already near-insurmountable security challenges, the western world is attempting to limp back from an economic crisis unlike any seen in over fifty years. In light of this incomparable security environment, how do nation-states ensure the security of their people, territories, and interests? In what ways do nations define threats, national interests, and propose to secure those interests? What are the implications of these definitions for how these nations will seek to ensure their security in the future?

I will examine these questions using the United States of America and the United Kingdom as my comparative cases. I am particularly interested in comparing the US and the UK for several reasons. The two nations have possessed a 'special' relationship for decades, but now find themselves at a crossroads. Both the US and UK militaries share the experiences of the most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and while both nations are working to learn from the mistakes of those experiences, the UK has struggled with internal and external pressures (from European Union members) since pledging support for the US invasion of Iraq. Additionally, after sharing these similar experiences in terms of types of recent conflicts (namely, insurgents and failed states) and terrorist attacks in the 21st century, I am interested to see how the two nations may diverge in future military conflicts, organization systems, and defense strategies.

In order to compare the security definitions and proposed policy reactions of the US and the UK I will analyze and compare the publicly available national security strategies. I will assess the national security strategies of each nation from 1998, mid-to-late 2000s, and 2010. These were chosen in order to take in to account the changes in each nation's policies over time and to provide a basis for the current

iterations of security strategy. I will examine how each nation's strategies have changed over time, and then how they compare to each other.

I begin my study with a discussion of the concept of security, its use in discourse, and its implications. I will then address the inherent implications of the strategy forming process. Afterwards I will assess the US and UK national security strategies over the years and against each other, before taking into account what that means for the nations' definitions of security.

SECURITY IN GOVERNMENTAL DISCOURSE

The term 'security' is an empowering term that carries with it charged emotions, heightened discourse, increased powers, and a potential for the trampling of sovereignty (Buzan, 1997:21). It is therefore critical to examine how a nation's government and leaders define 'security' and how that definition might change over time. The academic discussion of securitization outlines the 'desecuritization' of discourse and politics as the desirable goal for governments (Buzan 1997: 19). Do governments possess that same goal? As threats have changed, how have their definitions of security? If the term is ever-broadening, is there a limit? What are the implications of the increasing securitization of politics? Securitization, first enumerated by the Copenhagen School headlined by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, is defined as

“a successful speech act through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within the political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Stritzel, 2007: 358).”

It is important to note that it is a choice, to discuss or define an issue in terms of security. Objects and events are not inherently related to security (international security in particular), and if a government discusses them in relation to security, it is a pointed and deliberate designation. Phrasing things in terms of security is not an objective feature of an issue (Buzan, 1997: 24). In making the deliberate choice to discuss an issue in terms of security, the government has securitized the issue (it is not independently security-related). Put simply, if it is the government states that it is a matter of security, only then does it become one. For example, through discussing climate change and clean energy

options through the framework of the 2008 UK National Security Strategy, the British government has thus chosen to establish climate change and clean energy as security concerns for the nation moving into the future (HM Government, 2008: 51). Now designated as security concerns, initiatives surrounding climate change and the development of clean energy options hold an elevated position in the hierarchy of policymaking, as efforts towards clean energy is now equated with efforts towards national security. The issue at the core of these broadening definitions of security is not an expanding ‘militarization’ of the nations, but rather the securitization of politics and policy (Bailes, 2008: 119).

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORMATION PROCESSES OF NATIONAL POLICY

When examining the nation security strategies of the US and the UK (or any government’s public policies), it is critical to consider the origins of the strategies and the methods by which they are produced. Graham Allison’s “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis” provides three conceptual models through which to examine a government’s actions. These three conceptual models, when applied to the examined national security strategies, serve to highlight some of the constraints inherent on a government’s public policies.

Allison’s ‘rational choice’ model states that governments will make decisions and act in a manner consistent with the pursuit of their national interests (1969: 691). Where national security strategies fit in with this model is in the expression of national interests. The national security strategy expresses the highest tier of national interests, those interests that guide the preservation of the global and existential security of the nation. If following the rational choice model, governments should only act in accordance with the pursuit of these interests.

The ‘organizational’ model, as put forth by Allison, perceives actions as a result of the processes that surround them. Any policy output that a government creates is a direct effect of the processes and procedures that have gone into the decision making process (Allison, 1969: 698). Thus, the national security strategy that the US or the UK publishes is molded by the steps that were required to form it. The 2008 and 2010 UK NSSs serve to illustrate the organizational conceptual model. Prior to those

years, the UK's iterations of national security strategy had been concentrated within individual governments and thus, the political parties that had been in power at a given moment and those particular Cabinet offices. Beginning in 2008, however, the UK instigated a new 'whole-of-government' process to the creation of their NSSs wherein all Ministries and divisions of the Armed Forces had an opportunity to review and amend the strategy prior to publication (Stolberg, 2012: 56). Through this rock tumbler of a process, the post-2008 NSS would be dramatically shaped not simply by the instigator of the security reviews, but by the extensive governmental process behind its formation. Considered through the lens of the organizational model, the 2010 UK NSS was an even stronger example of the effects of organizational processes. The 2010 NSS combined this relatively fresh concept of a whole-of-government national security strategy and paired it with the real budgetary constraints faced by the government. This added step to the formation of the NSS greatly influenced the policy output that was subsequently formulated. Through a requisite consideration of budgetary constraints, greater or lesser emphasis was placed upon national security threats through the proportionate amounts of financial consideration. Instead of considering threats equally, budgetary considerations placed the threats in a clear hierarchy, with cyber terrorism efforts receiving a budgetary increase while all others saw at least some budget reductions (although by how much also sent a message as well) (Stolberg, 2012: 61).

The third conceptual model, the bureaucratic political model, when applied to the creation of national security strategy serves to highlight the influence that individual actors can have on the formulation of a national policy. The very people involved in the creation of policy or a decision making process can have a profound effect on what, if any, action is taken (Allison, 1969: 707). In the cases of the US and the UK's NSSs the bureaucratic model is fairly evident, although somewhat less so in the case of the UK. The 1998 UK Security and Defense Review (in contrast to the 2008 and 2010 NSSs) was instigated and carried out by the presiding Labour government at the time (Stolberg, 2012: 56). As it was a process began by and molded by the Labour government, the resultant SDR was not as comprehensive or evenhanded as the later iterations of UK national security policy. The bureaucratic conceptual model fits well when applied to the formation of the 2006 US NSS. While the 2006 edition sought to be a

refinement of the 2002 NSS, the entire review process and indeed, writing process was guided by two men handpicked by the Bush administration, Dr. Peter Feaver and Dr. William Inboden (Stolberg, 2012: 83). Though it is difficult to identify where the experiences and personalities of the two individuals had specific, direct effects on the NSS (highlighting a shortcoming of the bureaucratic model), having the voice of the document limited to such a small and personal creation process indubitably influenced the language of a document where the slightest turn of phrase could signal a very different message to a foreign observer. The bureaucratic model, like all three of Allison's conceptual models, is not independently sufficient to provide a comprehensive explanation, but each can help illuminate an oft overlooked facet of the policymaking process. Though not without problems, Allison's models serve to highlight the multitude of influences and factors that guide the creation of a national security strategy and subsequently, how security is defined.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE US AND THE UK

We begin our examination of the US and the UK's national security documents by considering the nations' respective security documents published in 1998. Though I am most interested in the more recent strategies, in particular those immediately post-emergence of the economic crisis, it is important to examine the nations' published security strategies post-Cold War, yet prior to the 9/11 attacks and the nations' involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the case of the UK, the 1998 Security and Defense Review set out the new Labour government's comprehensive assessment of the UK's defense policy and military capabilities (HM Government, 1998, 23). It outlined what the UK's immediate threats were, the guiding principles with which they would be dealt, and what troop schemes were at the nation's disposal with which to respond. *Table 1* outlines in what ways each strategy deals with its nation's interests, perceived security environment and threats, as well as resultant priorities in moving forward with their security objectives.

Table 1. The 1998 National Security Strategies of the US and the UK

	United States	United Kingdom

Security Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Dynamic, Uncertain -Globalization -Interconnected World 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Lack of immediate significant threats -Importance of international organizations -Need for regional security in Central and Eastern Europe
National Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime -Instability from failing states and the breakup of states -Regional or state-centric threats -Foreign intelligence collection -Weapons of mass destruction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Terrorism originating from Northern Ireland -Non-state threats (i.e. terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime) -Traditional state expansionism
National Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Vital: protecting the existence and physical integrity of the US -Important: concern not its survival, but the nation's well being -Humanitarian and other: interests related to the preservation of American values 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Promoting effectiveness of NATO -Continuance of US presence in Europe -Global economic interests -Working in international organizations -international stability, freedom, and economic prosperity
Future Priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Strengthening and improving international organizations -Improved military within budget -Increased support for diplomatic efforts -Increased security of infrastructure -Promoting the global economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Preservation of European continental security through NATO -Stability and security in the Middle East -Importance of the UK contributing in meaningful ways to the UN and its missions

(HM Government, 1998; US White House, 1998)

As outlined by the United Kingdom's SDR, 1998 saw the UK in a security environment characterized by a lack of immediate, significant threats to the UK or its overseas territories. As a result, it expressed the notion that the nation no longer required a large standing army, but instead needed to diversify its forces, and focus on a military that was smaller, but broader in its reach and capabilities. The contemporary threats, as perceived by the UK in 1998, reflected a changing international environment, but still reflected immediate concerns to the British homeland such as the potential for terrorism in Northern Ireland (HM Government, 1998: 13). This consideration highlights that although the UK's security environment was not categorized by any existential threats, it did not exempt them from internal violence and concerns. In pursuit of Britain's publicly declared interests, the SDR then laid out the UK's upcoming security priorities, somewhat of a 'to do' list for the future. Interestingly, it is at this point that

the SDR explicitly refers to the preservation of European continental security. It is only after stressing their continued membership in NATO that the SDR cites the emerging importance of the EU and the role that it may have in preserving Europe's stability. It states that the EU has "a vital role in helping to preserve and extend economic prosperity and political stability, including through the Common Foreign and Security Policy" (HM Government, 1998: 16). In practically the same breath however, it moves on to discuss the important role of the Western European Union in cooperative defense efforts, illustrating the lack of reliance upon the EU at the time for unified defense measures and foreign policy. It does speak of working towards a coordinated approach to European security, but via a European Security and Defense Identity within the framework of NATO (HM Government, 1998: 16). It is evident then, that in the 1998 appraisal of UK defense policy, that the EU was far from being considered a viable means to ensure regional or international security. The priority of stability in the Middle East is expressed as a critical interest to Britain, as they observe that "Conflict in the Middle East carries the risk of escalation and...its proximity to the southern boundary of the European Union and NATO gives us a continuing stake in its stability" (HM Government, 1998: 17). Pointedly (and interestingly), the SDR then cites Saddam Hussein's Iraq as an example of a continuing threat in the region noting, "the presence and potential spread of ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and even nuclear weapons add to the risks" (HM Government, 1998: 17). Immediately following that statement, the SDR recognizes that allies have similar interests and relationships in the region and that the UK "would expect to work with them in responding to any future crises" (HM Government, 1998: 17). The prescience of the strategy is notable.

The 1998 United States national security strategy, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," establishes the US's perceptions and publicly expressed security environment, threats, interests, and its security priorities as the nation moved into the turn of the century. As the US's NSS describes it, the dynamic and uncertain security environment of 1998 was characterized by increasingly deadly threats, but those threats were being combated through equally increasing powerful military capabilities (US White House, 1998: 6). Connected with the concept of globalization, the US must now operate in a security environment that considers the stability and functioning of countries oceans away. As the NSS

document states circuitously, “we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad unless we are secure at home” (US White House, 1998: 6). The resultant complex environment would then demand that the US use all its instruments of national power to promote the strength of the US domestically and internationally. The threats to the US’s security as perceived by the government in 1998 covered a broad range of subjects, but included some interesting divergences from the UK’s 1998 SDR. The NSS, unlike the SDR, mentions the threat from foreign intelligence collection services. The strategy states that in recent years the efforts and the numbers of attempts to garner intelligence against the US have increased and that vigilance and technology to counter these efforts must be supported in the ensuing years (US White House, 1998: 10). The NSS also explicitly mentions weapons of mass destruction as present threats to the US’s security. While mentioned in connection with reducing stores of such weapons, and upping the protection of existing arsenals, the NSS also states that the proliferation of WMDs (of all kinds), “provides[s] rogue states, terrorists, and international crime organizations the means to inflict terrible damage on the United States” (US White House, 1998: 6). In the UK’s contemporary document, although WMDs are touched upon later in the SDR, they are not discussed in the overall assessment of the UK’s current threats and challenges. In terms of expressed national interests, the 1998 US NSS blatantly puts forth three guiding objectives (see *Table 1*), under which all interests fall (US White House, 1998: 10). In accordance with those objectives, the national security interests of the US include the security of the US territory and people, close cooperative relations with influential countries, international democratic values, open trade internationally, and a cleaner global environment. Furthermore, the NSS expresses as an interest in preserving the US’s ability to influence those who can affect our well-being (US White House, 1998: 27). This statement alone opens up the actions available to the US in terms of its related global reach. In the course of outlining the nation’s security priorities for the future, the NSS specifically makes it known that the US is willing to act unilaterally when it is “the most advantageous course,” although the strategy also stresses that one of its goals in the coming years is strengthening and improving the international organizations of which it is a member (US White House, 1998: 2). The NSS emphasizes working through a stronger and well-integrated NATO, supporting the

Partnerships for Peace program in Central and Eastern Europe, and the World Trade Organization.

However, an explicit part of the US security strategy as the century drew to a close was to “harness our diplomatic, economic, military, and information strengths to shape a favorable international environment outside of formal structures” (US White House, 1998: 2). Explicitly stating this priority draws a sharp contrast with the UK’s emphasis on acting through its alliances and international organizations, particularly in reference to humanitarian and development needs.

This paper will now explore the 2008 UK security strategy, entitled “The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World,” and the 2006 US National Security Strategy. Both of these documents represent important directions for their nations’ respective security strategies. The 2006 US NSS represents a refinement of the 2002 strategy and as such puts forth a clear, studied, deliberate security strategy that articulates the overarching strategy of the Bush administration. The 2008 UK security strategy represents the first time the UK took a whole-of-government approach to a cohesive national strategy that was supported by all sides of the political spectrum (Stolberg, 2012: 56).

Table 2. The 2006 US National Security Strategy and the 2008 UK National Security Strategy

	United States	United Kingdom
Security Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Comparable to the Cold War era -Battling totalitarian ideologies (i.e. radical Islamism) -Globalization (positive and negative) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Highly complex, unpredictable -No state directly threatens the UK -Threats that do exist have large impact on international stability -Globalization (positive and negative)
National Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Global Terrorism (top priority) Four Categories: -Traditional (state-based, military aggression) -Irregular (terrorism, insurgency, and illicit trafficking) -Catastrophic (WMDs and global pandemics) -Disruptive (threats to space and cyber infrastructure) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Terrorism, nuclear weapons and WMDs, transnational crime, global instability due to failing/fragile states, civil emergencies, and state-based threats -Drivers of insecurity (include climate change, energy competition, resource scarcity, poverty, poor governance, demographic changes, and

		globalization)
National Interests	-Expansion of democracy -Protection and expansion of free trade and liberal markets -Defeat of terrorism	-‘ Guiding Principles ’ (including human rights, rule of law, accountable governments, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all)
Future Priorities	Two Pillars: -Promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity -Leading an increased and strengthened community of democracies	-Address traditional, immediate threats (ex: counterterrorism) -Address underlying drivers of insecurity (ex: explore clean energy)

(HM Government, 2008; US White House, 2006)

Although the UK had published previous Security and Defense Reviews (for example the previously discussed 1998 edition), the 2008 National Security Strategy was an articulation of a strategy that was to guide the actions for the whole UK government and in particular its foreign relations arms (Stolberg, 2012: 56). The SDR was a review carried out by the Labour government, as a ‘taking stock’ measure of security and defense objectives and the means with which to carry them out (Stolberg, 2012: 56). The NSS was to be more specific in identifying threats to the nation and in detailing with what measures they would be dealt. The security environment faced by the UK in 2008 is one of a great deal more complexity than in 1998. The threats to the UK, as expressed in the NSS, were threats to the integrity and interests of the state in addition to being threats to their individual citizens and way of life. There were six immediate threats, as perceived by the government, and a seventh more broad threat of drivers of insecurity (see *Table 2*). Those drivers were considered pervasive and long term, but critical to undertake in order to ensure long-term stability and security (HM Government, 2008: 19). Whereas the 1998 SDR touched upon security interests that were highly specific (i.e. European continental integrity and protecting oil supplies), the 2008 UK security interests were expressed as “Guiding Principles,” a set of core values that were to guide the government’s approach to foreign and security policy (see *Table 2*) (HM Government, 2008: 8). While this may sound wonderful and aspirational, it also serves to back up the UK’s participation in the coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq earlier in the decade. According to the NSS, the UK’s priorities as it moves forwards will address the immediate threats to national security

such as terrorism and transnational crime, but will also focus on addressing the underlying drivers of insecurity in the hopes of establishing a more stable international order in the future. To that end, the 2008 NSS outlines a veritable ‘to do’ list as it lays out step-by-step how the UK intends to approach the risks it faces. There is an emphasis on an integrated, interdependent approach that will engage all relevant government ministries in not only counterterrorism measures, but planning for civil emergencies and exploring alternative energy sources. The approach outlined in the NSS seeks to be a comprehensive doctrine that will underlie the myriad facets of the realities of the 2008 security environment. As its first whole-of-government security strategy, the NSS appears to incorporate that wholeness into the prescriptions for the future, calling upon military, intelligence, economic, development, and environmental expertise. The result of this approach is a large and rapid expansion of the UK’s definition of security and the securitization of policies once considered simply political.

The 2006 US National Security Strategy presents a broad, yet focused approach to the global security environment. The strategy begins by likening the security challenges and efforts of the last few years prior to 2006 to the early days of the Cold War (US White House, 2006: 6). During that time, the US faced (and overcame) the specter of communism and fascism, and the security strategy frames the current security environment as engaged in a similar big-picture struggle against a totalitarian ideology. The ideology of extreme Islamism (which the document thankfully clarifies as a radical perversion of the religion) sets the stage for the overarching environment of pervasive global terrorism, and the continued war on terrorism (US White House, 2006: 6). The other main characteristic of the current security status as the 2006 NSS perceives it, is globalization. While it was indirectly alluded to in the 2002 strategy, by the time of the drafting of the 2006 iteration the influence and importance of globalization had become a considerable factor, both positive and negative. There was a wide range of threats (or in the strategy’s parlance, ‘challenges’) that faced the US in 2006, with global terrorism topping the list of priorities (US White House, 2006: 13). Ongoing and international, the threat posed by totalitarian ideologically based terrorism remained the most pressing for the US. The 2006 NSS breaks the challenges out into four categories (see *Table 2*), but stops short of ranking their importance in relation to each other (US White

House, 2006: 49). In the expression of national interests that the US is seeking to protect, the 2006 NSS is far less explicit than preceding or proceeding versions. The 2006 NSS primarily outlines threats and how the US will frame their upcoming responses, but several core interests can be determined, the expansion of democracy and protecting and expanding free trade and free markets (both for the stimulation of global economic growth and the domestic ramifications) (US White House, 2006: 30). Economic freedom was seen as the optimal way to move forward, and would promote and support ideals of liberal democracies globally. Although one would think the US interests would be framed as more domestically focused, a pervasive interest in the 2006 NSS is the defeat of terrorism. As phrased in this version of the strategy, the defeat of global terrorism itself seems to be an interest (versus an interest of protecting US territory from terrorist attacks). The priorities in 2006 as the US security strategy moved forward fell under two pillars, as outlined in President Bush's introduction. The first pillar was the priority of promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity. The second pillar was confronting challenges by *leading* an increased and strengthened community of democracies (US Government, 2006: 8). Promoting US security through strong and clear leadership was a strongly expressed priority for the future of US security endeavors. On the international relations front, the 2006 US NSS emphasized cooperation and positive relations with other powers but also stressed maintaining flexibility for US global relationships. As one of the items on the US's 'to do' list regarding international cooperation, the NSS states that the US will seek to promote UN reforms including increased financial accountability, efficiency, and burden-sharing (US White House, 2006: 50). Pointedly though, the NSS does state that while the US recognizes that international cooperation is needed to sustain global actions, the US must be prepared to and will act alone if necessary (US White House, 2006: 42). Thus, while alluding to criticisms lodged by the international community in the preceding years, the US reasserts its abilities and willingness to act without full support from the international community.

The final iterations of national security strategies of the United States and the United Kingdom to be examined are the 2010 US National Security Strategy and the UK's 2010 national security strategy. Though both nations have published other varieties and reviews of national security documents since

then, the 2010 US and UK NSSs have been chosen as they are documents that mirror the same purpose and were published in the same year. The UK's NSS of that year was published alongside the 2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review, but the SDSR largely concerns the tools with which to carry out strategy, while both nations' NSS documents provide the national guiding strategies for their respective tools and would provide the clearest side-by-side comparisons (Stolberg, 2012: 55).

Table 3. The 2010 National Security Strategies of the US and the UK

	United States	United Kingdom
Security Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Globalization and change -Risk of overextending US's efforts and resources -Growing impact of non-state actor -Rise of multiple global actors (i.e. developing multipolar system) -US still simultaneously engaged in two wars 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Globalization, interconnectivity, and rapid change -Increasingly multipolar international system -Shift eastward of economic 'weight' -Impacted by literal environmental factors -UK's reach disproportionate to size
National Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Terrorism as one of many threats -Other threats include transnational crime, threats to space and cyber capabilities, threats from climate change, and from dependence on fossil fuels -Failing states potentially breeding regional instability -Danger from WMDs (in particular nuclear weapons) 	<p>NSRA process establishes three tiers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Tier one: international terrorism, cyber-attacks, major natural disasters, international military crisis -Tier two: CBRN attack domestically or overseas territories, major insurgency abroad, rise in organized crime -Tier three: large-scale conventional military attack, disruption to oil/gas supply, conventional state-based attack on overseas territory or ally
National Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Strong, innovative US economy -International open markets -Promotion of opportunity and prosperity in domestic and international economy -Peace, security, opportunity through international cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Economic prosperity -Security of nation's land and infrastructure -Shaping a stable world
Future Priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -National security begins at home -US's strength is equal to its economic strength, and as an example of a prosperous democracy -US must live by values in order 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Seeks to reduce likelihood of attacks against UK through global reduction of hostility towards the nation -Work to control spread of harmful technologies (WMDs)

	to promote them abroad	-Foster innovation in new energy technologies
--	------------------------	---

(HM Government, 2010; US White House, 2010)

The UK's 2010 security strategy document, entitled "A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy," follows the organization of the previous edition. The 2010 NSS also outlined a new approach to the presentation and communication of the national security strategy in the future. The 2010 NSS, produced by the new National Security Council, sets out a clear focus for the government's focus and resources, and establishes a schedule of publishing NSS documents annually in the future, as well as a regular schedule of Strategic Defense and Security Reviews every five years (Stolberg, 2012: 56). The interdependence of the current security environment, as expressed by the 2010 NSS, is exemplified by the recent economic crises, and how the events in a couple of nations were quickly felt internationally (HM Government, 2010: 4). Additionally the international system, a fairly stable unipolar system in the late 1990s and even into the beginning of the 21st century, is becoming increasingly multipolar. Along with this notion is the noticeable shift in the economic 'weight' distribution eastward (HM Government, 2010: 14). The present security environment is also influenced by changing literal environmental factors such as climate change and resource scarcity. Finally, a key factor in the UK's perception of the 2010 strategic context is the understanding that in reference to the UK, it has "a global reach disproportionate to its size" (HM Government, 2010: 21). In the 2010 NSS, the UK presents a fresh approach to Britain's security approach, establishing a replicable process with which to assess risks or threats to national security. The National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) was developed in order to cull, assess, and prioritize all potential risks to national security, originating both domestically or overseas (Stolberg, 2012: 65). Intelligence specialists, analysts, and subject-matter experts were asked to contribute their expert opinions on imminent threats to the UK and from their experience and collaboration the NSRA was solidified (Stolberg, 2012: 66). From the NSRA, the NSC identified their priority order and organized the threats into three tiers of national security risks (see *Table 3*). In this 2010 iteration of the UK's national security strategy, a comprehensive list of the nation's interests are not as explicitly stated, but instead expressed as overarching values that shape their strategies

subsumed under the heading of ‘Our enlightened national interests’ (see *Table 3*) (HM Government, 2010: 20). In order to achieve the UK’s objective of a ‘secure and resilient’ UK, the NSS seeks to reduce the likelihood of attacks against the UK through the global reduction of hostility towards the nation. This would be achieved through the promotion of cooperation internationally, strengthening alliances to render hostile attacks against the UK risky, and to increase development aid and work to reduce poverty to stem the fomentation of instability (HM Government, 2010: 20). On a more positive note, the security strategy also stresses the importance of fostering innovations in new energies technologies (to reduce reliance on foreign sources) and stresses the continued importance of the UK’s relationship with the US as essential in the maintenance of security and prosperity (HM Government, 2010: 4). Interestingly though, the majority of the 2010 NSS’s ‘to do’ list for future security objectives are largely outward-looking. In fact, the document outlines the logic of its strategies in a concise statement, “we aim to tackle problems at root overseas, to reduce the likelihood of risks turning into actual attacks on us at home” (HM Government, 2010: 25).

The corresponding security document for the United States in 2010, the concisely named “National Security Strategy,” represents the first (and most recent) iteration of the security strategy of President Barack Obama’s administration. As also the first NSS to be published since the recent economic crisis, it represents a deviation from both the Bush administration’s security strategy and that of fellow Democrat Bill Clinton’s administration. The 2010 security environment as perceived by the US, is categorized by globalization and change similar to that of the UK. The changes however, for the US, represent a significant break from previous security concept stalwarts emphasizing the need for the US to increasingly act through international organizations and alliances (or else risk overextending itself), while also presenting a not-generally publicly stated position regarding these international institutions (US White House, 2010: 11). The NSS asserts that the present international institutions were begun under different circumstances, and therefore are organized under notions that are no longer as useful or relevant as they once were (such as purely state-based membership). While not condemning the utility of international organizations outright, the NSS suggests that the basis of these organizations needs

significant overhaul (US White House, 2010: 13). The NSS also recognizes that a looming factor of the present security environment is the fact that the US is still simultaneously engaged in two wars, which represent a drain on both the military and monetary resources of the nation. When considering threats to national security, the 2010 NSS takes a deviation from the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric espoused by the previous administration. This national security strategy presents terrorism as one of many threats that the US faces to its security (US White House, 2010: 8). Unlike before, this NSS gives comparable attention to other immediate threats to the nation (see *Table 3*). The national interests as expressed by the NSS are four-fold and largely concern the strengthening of the US as an example for the international community (see *Table 3*). The priorities of the national security strategy set forth to protect these interests, presents a much greater domestic focus than the UK or the previous iterations of the US NSS. In fact, the overarching message of the 2010 NSS is that national security begins at home. Perhaps in light of the economic crises that began in 2008, the focus is turned inward, now more than ever. The direct connection is made in the document; the US’s economic strength is always equal to the US’s strength internationally (US White House, 2010: 9). This follows from the notion that our direct monetary resources, our influence in the global economic system, our strength serve as an international example of a prosperous democracy, and our normative powers derive from those attributes. Thus the focus is placed on improving the domestic front in order to influence the international.

UK STRATEGY OVER THE YEARS

Across the 1998, 2008, and 2010 expressions of the UK national security strategy, one of the consistently expressed viewpoints was that there was no major existential thread posed by state-based actors. Although at this point that may seem to be a given, the fact that this has remained a constant for the past fifteen years is incredible when considering history. For the majority of the 20th century and in fact, the few centuries before it, state-based aggression was the only significant threat to a nation (barring catastrophic natural disasters and pandemics). The late 1990s still saw some wariness from traditional state expansionism (i.e. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq), but no state posed a threat to the UK and her people.

Another consistency across the three examined NSSs, was the consideration of non-state actors and threats. Even in 1998 factors such as religious conflict, environmental pressures, crime, and terrorism were discussed, but by 2010 their character, originations, and rankings had changed. The threat of terrorism, for example, has grown and changed over the last fifteen years. In the 1998 SDR, terrorism is highlighted as a prevalent threat, but the terrorism that they were considering then was originating from Northern Ireland (HM Government, 1998: 13). By 2008, the nature of terrorism and the British public's associations with it had changed. While residual concerns regarding Northern Ireland terrorists are mentioned, the focus has shifted to radical Islamist based terrorism (HM Government, 2010: 16). Following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US and the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, terrorism elevated to a top tier threat to the security of the UK, and the locus of that threat shifted to external to the British Isles. Once the 2010 NSS rolled around, the character of terrorism remained fairly consistent from 2008, but was placed even higher as a security priority, now being expressed as a "real and pressing threat" (HM Government, 2010: 20).

In fact, the clear trend that can be traced along the publishing of the UK security strategies is the movement to a broader conception of security and the broadening radius of geographical security concerns. The 1998 edition of the SDR was highly specific in pointing out specific transgressors and the originating points of insecurity. For example, it points to Northern Ireland based terrorism, and the potential for Bosnian conflict spillover. It also points to security and development needs in the Central and Eastern European countries (HM Government, 1998: 13). This is not to say that no national name dropping occurs in the 2008 and 2010 editions of the NSS, but in these later strategies threats are alluded to in much broader strokes with phrases like 'transnational crime' without pointing to the nations in which this flagrantly occurs (as they had with Hussein's hostile Iraq in 1998) (HM Government, 1998: 17). The broadening radius of security concerns is illustrated in the progression of strategies as well. The 1998 edition refers to the continental security of Europe as an interest, and while it is most assuredly something in which the UK is still interested in 2010, the later NSS in its expression of interests makes broader reference to open markets, economic innovations, and shaping a stable world in order to reduce

risks to the UK. This is also indicative of the global broadening of what the UK perceives as pertinent to its integrity and well-being. As the economy and in turn the basis of the UK's influence becomes internationally integrated, so too does the UK's areas of interest and interference. Finally, one can also observe the shift from a focus on more internally controllable security factors to external factors. While the 1998 SDR points to things that the UK can do, actions it can directly take such as strengthening NATO participation and focusing on their responsibility to contribute as a permanent UN Security Council Member, the later editions look more outward (HM Government, 1998: 17). The 2010 edition focuses on pervasive problems in the rest of the world that impact UK security. The underlying aim of the 2010 NSS is, "to tackle problems at the root overseas in order to reduce the likelihood of risks turning in to actual attacks on us at home." (HM Government, 2010: 23). Again, the focus now in these later public expressions of national security strategy are not direct actions the UK can take to mitigate risks, but instead emphasizes how the UK can apply influence in order to shape the global environment.

US STRATEGY OVER THE YEARS

Upon examining the 1998, 2006, and 2010 versions of the US national security strategy, it becomes evident that although there are consistencies across all of the strategies, each version also possesses foci and themes unique to its edition. Across all three examined documents there are several overarching goals and conditions of the security environment throughout the past fifteen years. Even though the concept was still arguably nascent in 1998, the term globalization is used to categorize the security environment at the time (US White House, 1998: 6). As the technological advances that support globalization were still in early development, the notion that the world's events and economy were becoming increasingly integrated was a foundational concept to the US's perception of its own security. The awareness of globalization only increased by the publication of the 2006 NSS, where it recognized that not only were the US people able to be affected by events the world over, but the flow itself of people, goods, and ideals was higher than ever, and proved to be a basic part of today's society (to both positive and negative ends) (US White House, 1998: 6). By the publication of the 2010 US NSS,

globalization as a term and concept is integrated throughout the strategy, as the US recognizes that nations are no longer islands, and instead have highly interconnected economies and markets that required greater international cooperation and coordination. Events that happen in the remotest regions of the world can send out a rippling effect in terms of economics, domestic politics, international relations, and security. Another consistency throughout the 1998, 2006, and 2010 editions is the emphasis on maintaining and promoting an open and free market. This emphasis is paired with two notions, the promotion of democratic ideals and that of prosperity, to greater and lesser degrees depending on the version of the strategy. The 1998 NSS presents supporting the free market and international democratic values in the same breath, positioning both as parts of a well-rounded approach to security and US security interests. In 2006, the overall focus of US interests is on the expansion of democracy internationally, with the promotion of open markets and free trade as a pillar in support of international democratic movements (US White House, 2006: 30). In this case, open markets are directly linked to successful, peaceful democracies. In 2010, the focus has shifted to the prosperity of the US as instrumental to national security strategy, and presents the free market as essential to that prosperity. For the latest security strategy in particular, the reasoning is that global free markets lead to prosperity which equals domestic strength which in turn equals strength as a world leader (US White House, 2010: 10). One aspect that the 2006 and 2010 iterations of the security strategy share is specific conditions of the security environment in which they operate. The 1998 security environment was dynamic and uncertain, molded by the emerging conditions of globalization, but what the two later strategies share is attempting to manage the backlash from major security engagements. The 9/11 attacks on the US served to uproot much of the invincibility that the nation felt in the post-Cold War era. It altered perceptions of where and how terrorists could strike, and with what tools we were equipped to deal with them. Thus, although respectively five and nine years removed from the events, both 2006 and 2010 NSSs approached terrorism, the threat of terrorism and battling its underlying causes from a very real and active position. Additionally, both of the later security strategies examined were created while engaged in an ongoing two-war military situation. The occupation of Afghanistan and the later invasion of Iraq have become

inextricable from the security environment in which the US acts, and operationally, resourcefully, and financially have had profound impacts on US relations worldwide.

Although each of the US national security strategies have overlapping elements, each of the editions have distinct thematic qualities that separate them from each other and anchor them to their contemporary periods. The 1998 NSS is a remarkably well-rounded consideration of the state of US national security and a frank appraisal of immediate and potential future threats to the nation. In a nutshell, it addresses all facets of general US national security. The 2006 and 2010 editions present very different frameworks for their national security prescriptions, each weaving unique themes throughout their assessments and recommendations. The 2006 US NSS is rife with references to the “War on Terror” (capitalizations in accordance with the strategy) and promoting the expansion of democracy (US White House, 2006: 14). The overview of the security strategy likens the threat of terrorism to the US’s struggle against communism and fascism, in other words, a long-lasting struggle for the ‘soul’ of the nation. It plainly states that “the War on Terror is not over” (US White House, 2006: 13). In order to aid the US in this epic struggle against terrorism and the totalitarian ideology underlying the contemporary form of terrorism is the other overarching theme of the 2006 edition, the global promotion of democracy. The 2006 NSS portrays democracy as the cure-all for radical Islamism and outlines the spread of democracy as instrumental in this struggle against terrorism. Within the consideration of its interests, the strategy lists supporting democratic movements in every nation and culture (disregarding historical and cultural differences). Additionally, in its priorities for the future, or ‘the way ahead’ in the parlance of the NSS, the 2006 strategy aims to ‘open societies’ through democracy and the spread of liberalism (US White House, 2006: 30). According to the NSS, economic freedom equals political liberty and as such, is “a moral imperative” (US White House, 2006: 41). The theme of global democracy is seen throughout the national security strategy and underpins all aspects of the 2006 plan for action. In contrast, the overarching theme of the 2010 US NSS is strengthening the domestic economy. As the first NSS since the 2008 economic crisis and its lingering effects, the first NSS of the Obama administration frames global security in terms of domestic economic success. All aspects of the security strategy are referenced

in terms of economic strength. The security environment as the 2010 versions outlines it is characterized by globalization, global economic conditions, how international events impact our internal events, the need for international cooperation to stave off US overextension, and the draining effect that the two-war situation has upon our finances and resources (US White House, 2010: 16). Its security interests include a strong, innovative US economy, open markets, and the promotion of opportunity and prosperity in the international economic system. As it looks forward, the emphasis on domestic economic health and welfare only grows. The US will seek to embrace our global economic interconnectivity through increased international cooperation. The NSS draws the link that our domestic economic strength always equals our strength internationally. Thus as the 2010 NSS outlines the way ahead, it is focused internally far more than the two national security strategies examined prior. For the 2010 edition, national security begins at home (in sharp contrast to the 2006 push towards the imposition of democracies abroad).

US AND UK NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES IN COMPARISON

This examination of US and UK national security strategies now turns to the direct comparison of the two nations over the years. In 1998 the scope of each nation's national security strategies provided the sharpest contrast in their content. While the US NSS took a broad approach to security considerations, presenting a well-rounded appraisal of the security environment and potential threats to the US, the UK SDR took a more detailed approach, and was highly specific to the UK's immediate security concerns. Assuming a realist perspective, this difference could be due to the balance of military power in Europe following the end of the Cold War. The US, independently and through NATO, played a large role in the security of Europe and the stabilization of the former Soviet bloc nations. The UK, as a part of the nascent European security paradigm of the European Security Strategy, played a more limited role in the international security realm. The US, still playing a dominant role in European security, would then need to consider far more risks and threats than simply territorial threats to the homeland. The 1998 US security strategy also highlights the emerging factor of globalization and explores the implications for the US economy and military. The UK strategy instead focuses more inward, and largely concerns itself

with the security of the UK within the European region. It underscores this through advocating the continued engagement of NATO in Europe and through supporting stabilization efforts in the Central and Eastern European nations (HM Government, 1998: 13). Both 1998 security strategies however, succeed in perceiving the growing and varied nature of threats to the US and the UK's security. While there are threats that are unique to each nation, both take notice of the emergence of transnational and non-state-based threats in the form of organized crime, terrorism, and illicit trade. Additionally, both nations identify the breaking up of failed states as potential sources of instability, either for conflict spillover regionally or as safe haven for illicit activities. Interestingly, and likely as a holdover from the Gulf War, the US and the UK still recognize the potential for state-based threats to domestic security as well. One of the notable hallmarks both of the 1998 security strategies is the emphasis on international organizations and cooperation. The US and the UK each see increased coordination and activity within the organizations of which they are members as crucial in insuring the future stability of their respective nations and the international system.

Moving forward in time to the 2006 US NSS and the 2008 UK NSS one sees somewhat of a deviation in the underlying frameworks of the national security strategies. Whereas the UK has put together (for the first time) a whole-of-government, comprehensive assessment of all aspects of national security, the US strategy (while detailed and addressing many factors) approaches the 2006 edition as an opportunity to fine-tune their previous 2002 strategy (Stolberg, 2012: 82). In form, the US 2006 NSS follows a very strict adherence to the 2002 strategy, using the same section headings, summarizing the 2002 versions of each section, highlighting the related positive and negatives developments, and then presenting how the government intends to proceed. The scope then, by way of the adherence to old headings, is limited to the overarching security concerns of 2002. The concerns in 2002 while related to those of 2006, were enumerated in a time of upheaval in the American perception of security. It was the year following the 9/11 attacks and preceding the invasion of Iraq and as such it is clear why then the overwhelming scope of the strategy is limited to the promotion of democracy abroad and the defeat of global terrorism. In contrast, the 2008 UK national security strategy is comprehensive in scope (in fact

much more like the 1998 US NSS). It lists out the broad range of threats faced by the UK, considers the multifaceted security environment in which they are to operate, and then present a detailed, step-by-step, integrated approach towards countering the previously enumerated threats. The very chronological considerations of the 2006 US NSS and the 2008 UK NSS are starkly different. The US strategy is looking to past strategies and how to improve them, while the UK strategy seeks to set out for the first time, a complete guiding strategy for the future. The two strategies are only similar in their assessment of threat types, and their elevation of terrorism to immediate and pressing threat.

In 2010, the national security strategies presented by the US and the UK were similar in scope and form but much like the US NSSs over the years, had overarching themes that greatly differed. Both security strategies presented comparable assessments of the present security environment, their nation interests, and their perceptions of threats, but vastly differed when considering the underlying causes of their present insecurities and how to proceed in the future. While the US and the UK both clearly recognize that strong and innovative economies are important for the wellbeing of their countries, the emphasis of the US NSS (as alluded to previously) is on domestic economic strength. The theme that underpins the security strategy of the US is that domestic strength (via economic means) directly correlates with international strength. If the US is to lead on the global scale, it first must shore up its internal workings. This is a marked deviation from prior US NSSs and from the contemporary UK strategy. This also in no way should be mistaken for a regression to isolationism on the part of the US. Instead, it is the recognition that in a world categorized by globalization, the US must present an economically indestructible front in order to lead the world and influence events internationally (US White House, 2010: 36). The 2010 UK NSS by contrast, is overwhelmingly outward facing. The UK experienced the recent economic crisis as much as any western nation and sees the need for economic growth, but sees the route to security in the UK through overcoming risks abroad (HM Government, 2010: 25). The UK's NSS looks outward, listing as its priorities in the future promoting international cooperation to reduce hostility towards the UK, strengthening alliances in order to render attacks against the UK highly risky, and working to encourage international development and reducing poverty to

counter regional instabilities (HM Government, 2010: 25). This strategy sees reaching out of UK territory and influencing the global environment as the means to domestic security. As mentioned before, the philosophy of the 2010 UK NSS is that it seeks to conquer threats at their roots overseas in order to reduce the likelihood that those threats will turn into actual attacks on the UK homeland. Thus, while both nations are still contending with a security environment in which they are engaged in military actions abroad, terrorism is a daily and immediate threat, and both are reeling from the worst economic crisis in at least a half-century, the US seeks to ensure its safety from the inside out, while the UK seeks to take on the threats abroad.

BROADENING DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY

Following the Cold War, many have argued that Western powers (the US in particular) experienced a so-called ‘threat deficit’ wherein lacking the balancing force of the specter of the Soviet Union, the military prowess of the US had no unifying enemy or framework within which to orient themselves (Buzan, 2006: 1). Instead, they spent much of the 1990s without an opposing force against which to define their international role. This casting about can be seen in the 1998 national security strategies of both the US and the UK, albeit expressed in different ways. The 1998 US security strategy is the broadest American strategy considered in this study, taking stock of every possible threat to US security or foment of instability. The 1998 UK strategy is much narrower in focus, and yet considers threats ranging from car bombs from Northern Ireland to traditional state-based aggression.

However, after the 9/11 attacks, the West was once more provided with an ‘other,’ which they readily cast as a near-existential ideological crisis. The US, with the already ingrained rhetoric of the ‘global War on Terror,’ prolonged this portrayal of an epic struggle of civilizations in their 2006 National Security Strategy as well. As early as the introduction, the 2006 US NSS draws connections between the Cold War and the War on Terror, expressing the struggle against radical Islamic ideologies as comparable to the darkest days of the Soviet menace (US White House, 2006: 1). By the 2006 iteration of the US NSS, it was also becoming evident that the war in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the overhanging War on Terror

would not be ‘shock and awe’ operation and that a new long-term struggle was emerging. The White House took the opportunity afforded them by the national security strategy to firmly establish the War on Terror as not only an epic, long struggle against a new totalitarian ideology, but to draw clear connections between the contemporary conflict and the “triumph of freedom” over communism and the Soviet Union (US White House 2006: 1). The UK’s reaction to the post-9/11 environment was to establish concrete government-wide definitions of security. Prior to the publication of the 2008 UK NSS, the UK had conducted security and defense reviews by sporadic individual partisan governments, but in response to the security environment of the new century, the UK saw the need to establish their definition of security, which as is evident by the 2008 NSS, is anything but narrow. In fact, even the UK’s decision to create a comprehensive national security strategy was in an attempt to follow the US’s lead in the security and defense realm, clearly casting the US in the UK’s ‘us’ group.

Barry Buzan even goes so far as to assert that the Bush Administration’s War on Terror provided the underlying support for the broadening definition of security internationally (Buzan, 2006: 1104). Through tying together global terrorism and the transnational threats that may (or may not) support terrorist operations such as drug smuggling and illicit trade, the US has drawn an increasingly multifaceted picture of the threat of international terrorism and a widening circle of challenges with which to contend in order to subvert the looming threat of terrorism. Those challenges, which would include drug trafficking, smuggling, and border controls, allows that which is under the policy umbrella of ‘security’ to significantly expand.

CONCLUSION

Indeed, this broadening definition of security is reflected in the armed forces themselves. As the definition of security grows to include more aspects, the military is being transformed, increasingly performing ‘crimefighting’ operations versus traditional ‘warfighting’ operations (Andreas and Price, 2001: 31). The schism is even evident in the language used to discuss the operations, with the designation ‘operations other than war’ (Andreas and Price, 2001:31). Even prior to what would become

the prolonged engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, Andreas and Price perceived the shift in the security and military paradigm, with the military performing more and more policing, advising, and training operations (Andreas and Price 2001: 36). As the governments expand their definitions of security and that which is necessary to attain it, the military is drawn into far more complicated situations, where traditional paradigms of aggressive actions and 'shock and awe' are no longer useful and in fact, can be detrimental in an urban conflict-zone characterized by asymmetrical warfare.

What is to be taken from the above examined national security strategies then, are each nations' changing and expanding definitions of security. The US and the UK have enjoyed a close, special relationship over the last century and even more recently have shared similar experiences on the international stage. In the last fifteen years, both nations have experienced the deployment of military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorist attacks on their homelands, and significant economic crises. The national security strategies that each government publishes then, represent a mirror for how these shared experiences are perceived in each country and how those perceptions will result in future policy efforts. The UK national security strategies become steadily broader in scope and external in focus. The US strategies do not progress in such a linear manner, but instead waffle between thematic perspectives after the 1998 NSS while continually drawing in an ever-widening circle of policy issues.

Thus, despite the shared connection and experiences of recent history, the US and the UK are developing different and unique responses to the insecurity of the global stage. The UK response is to look outward but keep in mind internal realities (i.e. the budget). As the world draws closer through globalization, the UK is increasingly viewing that world as unstable and threatening to their national security. There is a definite move towards the external world being the threat to domestic bliss, but the UK recognizes that in this globalized security environment isolationism is no longer an option. As a result, their national strategy is to work to eliminate those threats before they reach the shores of the British Isles. While this presents some troubling implications for the UK's perception of the external world (of zones of instability as the 'lesser,' or a resurgence of colonial perceptions of 'uncivilized'

societies), this outward approach is the resultant response from their developed expression (and perception) of security.

On the other hand, the US security strategy response as we move into the future is far more inward facing. Despite this renewed focus on domestic policy and strength, the US also recognizes that isolationism is no longer an option. The US response is to look inward in order to preserve its position abroad. The US prosperity and unlimited defense budget of the preceding decades is no longer a given, and the consideration of means is a new reality with which the US military must cope. Instead of the budget being a constraint for the security strategy (as with the UK), rectifying the government's budget is the security strategy, which represents yet another policy area that has been drawn into the state's consideration of 'security.' For both the US and the UK, while historic, traditional security concerns are diminishing, that which is considered under the scope of 'security' has only expanded.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andreas, P. and Price, R. (2001) 'From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State,' *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 31-52.
- Bailes, A. (2008) 'The EU and a 'Better World': What Role for the European Security and Defense Policy?' *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No.1, pp. 115-130.
- Buzan, B. (1997) 'Rethinking Security After the Cold War,' *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 32, No. 5, pp. 5-28.
- Buzan, B. (2006) 'Will the 'Global War on Terror' be the New Cold War?' *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 1101-1118.
- Allison, G. (1969) 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,' *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 689-718.
- HM Government. (1998) *The Security and Defense Review*, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defense by Command of Her Majesty, July 1998.
- HM Government. (2008) *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, March 2008.
- HM Government. (2010) *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October 2010.
- Stolberg, A. (2012) *How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents*, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
- United States White House, (1998) *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, October 1998.
- United States White House, (2006) *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006.
- United States White House, (2010) *National Security Strategy*, May 2010.
- Strizel, H. (2007) 'Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 357-383.