THE SECURITIZATION OF FOREIGN AID: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION

Amber Marie Cassady

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, Concentration European Governance.

Chapel Hill
2018

Approved By:
Robert Jenkins
Holger Moroff
Donald Searing
ABSTRACT

Amber Marie Cassady: The Securitization of Foreign Aid: The European Union’s Strategic Transformation
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins)

This thesis examines how the United States (US) and European Union (EU) have developed foreign aid programs to further their security goals. The securitization of foreign aid has evolved as security threats have changed over time, and the evolution of US and EU aid policies has raised the question of how security objectives are incorporated into development policies. This thesis demonstrates that the EU has securitized foreign aid by briefly exploring the case of securitized aid in the US, tracing institutional changes within the EU, and explaining specific EU instruments and partnerships that securitize aid. As the international area continues to intensify and become more complex, the EU must strengthen its current tools or create more vehicles to carry out security and foreign aid priorities.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................................... v

SETTING THE SCENE: FOREIGN AID AND SECURITIZATION ........................................ 1

  Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 1
  Foreign Aid and Securitization............................................................................................ 2

THE US AND SECURITIZED AID .......................................................................................... 8

  Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 8
  The Cold War...................................................................................................................... 9
  Post-Cold War.................................................................................................................... 10
  Post-9/11............................................................................................................................ 12

INSTITUTIONALIZING FOREIGN AID IN THE EU............................................................ 15

  Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 15
  Institutionalizing Aid.......................................................................................................... 15

THE EU AND THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS.................................................. 20
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................20

Security Development in the EU ..............................................................................................................20

THE EU’S SECURITIZED AID: INSTRUMENTS AND PARTNERSHIPS ........................................24

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................24

Instruments ..........................................................................................................................................24

Partnerships ..........................................................................................................................................27

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................32
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDCO</td>
<td>EuropeAid Cooperation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALA</td>
<td>Asia-Latin America states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Cotonou Partnership Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalized System of Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Official Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMC</td>
<td>Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WTO  
World Trade Organization

WWII  
World War Two
SETTING THE SCENE: FOREIGN AID AND SECURITIZATION

Introduction

The mid-20th century was an era of world transformation, and one of the most complex political inventions of this time period was foreign aid. Foreign aid, a great “boondoggle” of the past century, has evolved alongside the development of the international system (Morgenthau 1962). One of the first instances of foreign aid was the United States’ (US) stimulus package to Europe to help rebuild after World War Two (WWII). Known as the Marshall Plan, the US funneled aid to the developed European countries to address important security concerns at the time: preventing another world war and thwarting communist influences. After WWII, foreign aid and security goals appeared in a combined fashion in government policies throughout the Cold War and into the 21st century.

Since the 20th century, the US and European Union (EU) have developed foreign aid programs to further their security goals. This “securitization of aid” has evolved as security threats have changed throughout time (Buzan, et al. 1998; Petřík 2008). Whereas the US has historically relied on its military to provide stability, the EU has created cohesive policies to carry out both security and foreign aid without the support of military might. First, this thesis will parse out the definitions of foreign aid and securitization and provide a brief literature review on security and development aid. Second, it will briefly explore the US’ straightforward path to securitized aid as well as militarized aid. Third, this thesis will address the transformation of the EU into a foreign policy actor capable of securitizing foreign aid. Fourth,
this thesis will analyze how the EU has utilized partnerships and instruments to carry out both foreign aid and security goals.

**Foreign Aid and Securitization**

**Foreign Aid**

It important to understand the concept of foreign aid before linking it to security. In 1962, Hans Morgenthau, a “father of the study of relations between states,” produced one of the first academic critiques of foreign aid, dubbing it as one of the most baffling innovations of the modern age (Lancaster 2007: 1; Morgenthau 1962). In his seminal piece, Morgenthau concludes that the US had yet to develop by the 1960s an “intelligible theory” of foreign aid that could garner nationwide support (1). Morgenthau’s article represents the early doubts and questionable intentions of foreign aid given by Western nations. Morgenthau describes foreign aid as a “gigantic boondoggle” that is a “wasteful and indefensible operation” to the US (304).

Foreign aid, in its most general definition, is any type of assistance given from one country or international organization to another. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1963, leading to the creation of “contemporary aid regime” that still exists in the international system today (Picard et al. 2015: 92). In the international aid system, foreign aid is most often categorized as official development assistance\(^1\) (ODA), which is comprised of public resource transfers that are overseen and documented by the (DAC). The OECD’s definition of ODA is “government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries” (OECD, 2013).

\(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\) The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines ODA as “flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25%.”
As suggested by Carol Lancaster, the former Deputy Administrator of the United States Agency for International (USAID), foreign aid is a tricky concept (Lancaster 2007). This thesis corresponds with Lancaster’s definition of foreign aid, which is “the voluntary transfer of public resources, from a government to another independent government to an NGO, or to an international organization… one goal of which is to better the human condition in the country receiving the aid” (Lancaster 2007: 9). Lancaster’s definition of foreign aid is very close to the definition given by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), but hers is broader, because ODA as defined by the DAC does not include export credits, trade finances, funding for cultural exchanges, remittances, or private charity. Lancaster suggests that foreign aid can also include cash in the form of grants or concessional loans or debt relief, and that aid be used for a multitude of activities such as budgetary and balance of payments needs, investment projects, research, reform programs, and humanitarian relief. Besides aid in physical form, aid can represent a political signal to other nations that a recipient country is in need or that the donor stands behind the people of a nation in the face of an increasingly hostile government (Lancaster 2007).

Additionally, the DAC does not consider resources given to countries not officially classified as poor to be ODA (Lancaster 2007: 92). According to the DAC, ODA only includes transfers to low-income countries but excludes what Lancaster defines as “official assistance” (OA) to countries that are not considered poor (Lancaster 2007: 10). She maintains that her definition of foreign aid is more comprehensive than the DAC’s because it does not omit aid to countries such as Russia, the Ukraine, and Israel—countries who receive aid but are not official recipients of ODA. Another difference in Lancaster’s definition is the phrase “to better the

---

2 For a country to be considered poor, yearly per capita incomes must be under $9,200 in 2001 dollars.
human condition” (10). The DAC uses the term “development” instead of “to better the human condition”—and the latter term is used by Lancaster in reference to “economic and social progress in poor countries, sustained by economic growth, and leading eventually to a reduction in poverty” (10). This thesis corresponds to Lancaster’s definition of foreign aid because it is more general and allows for the idea of one country helping another country regardless of its poverty status.

The relationship between security and foreign aid is also a complex concept—even separately, security and development are quite nebulous concepts. However, there is a wide array of books published in recent years on the connection between security and development. Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt’s book *The Securitization of Foreign Aid* provides a look at the relationship between security and development aid and explores the shift in foreign aid policy since the Cold War. Brown and Grävingholt explore how failing states and the war on terror freshened donors’ motives to securitize foreign aid programs in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and cite an “evident gap in knowledge” about the how and to what extent foreign aid has been transformed in the past few decades (Brown and Grävingholt 2016). In comparison to Mark Duffield’s work, which argues that aid is already completely securitized, Brown and Grävingholt suggest that aid is in the process of being securitized and varies depending on the time and place (Duffield 2001; Duffield 2007). Ultimately, they are interested in the effects that security concerns of major donors have had on the “rationales, priorities, policies, and practices” of their foreign aid since the end of Cold War (Brown and Grävingholt 2016: 3).

outlines how aid has increasingly been used to advance donors’ security objectives instead of addressing recipients’ development needs (Spear and Williams 2012). They argue that the start of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq especially merged the issues of security and development to address international problems and analyze to what extent security and development are linked. Beswick and Jackson also explore the complex relationship between security and development, including the role of foreign aid in their book *Conflict, Security and Development* (Beswick and Jackson 2001). By using case studies, Beswick and Jackson illustrate the connections between security, development, and conflict. Alberto Alesina and David Dollar also explore the political and strategic considerations behind foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000). They find that countries that democratize receive more aid, and that colonial legacies and political alliances—sometimes with security considerations—influence who gives foreign aid to whom and why.

Furthermore, Ngaire Woods explores the “shifting politics” of foreign aid and how the war on terror and war in Iraq have brought about new challenges for foreign aid (Wood 2005). Woods describes how human development goals have been put at risk because of such challenges, and how the entire international development community is at risk of being swept up by the war on terror. Shifting politics are also evident in Carol Lancaster’s work, through which she argues that aid began as a temporary expedient of Cold War diplomacy that has continued into a modern tool for carrying out domestic agendas (Lancaster 2007). Lancaster also highlights that merely defining foreign aid is a complex subject, and although foreign aid did not even exist in 1950, by 2000 it was “widely accepted and uncontested” (5). In regards to comparative studies, Fabbrini and Sicurelli label the US as a “security power” and the EU as a “civilian power” (Fabbrini and Sicurelli 2008: 45). Fabbrini and Sicurelli pinpoint the end of the Cold War as to when the US and EU began pursuing radically different strategies in foreign
policy; they argue that US security is based on national security and hard power instruments and that the US prioritizes national security goals before development aid. They also argue that EU security is based on international law and the use of soft power instruments, and that EU development is based on structural stability rather than sanctions (Fabbrini and Sicurelli 2008). However, this thesis approaches the US and EU from the same lens rather than different ones.

Securitization

Foreign aid has been linked to different security threats throughout time. Originally, the US used foreign aid to help rebuild Europe so that Western European countries could defend themselves from the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, both the US and Western Europe used foreign aid to deter communism in susceptible countries around the world. After the Cold War, the US and EU focused on fragile states, especially in regards to terrorism and migration after the 9/11 attacks. The development of US aid programs after WWII and the prevalence of EU common foreign aid policies after the Cold War have raised the question of how foreign aid has been securitized to carry out security goals.

Securitization is the use of foreign aid programs to carry out security objectives, and according to the writings of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, securitization is a critical term for how developed countries attach security value to foreign aid priorities and programs (McSweeney 1996). The Copenhagen School of Security Studies evaluated securitization of aid as a discourse, rather than as an “objective condition” and focused on the shift from normalcy to emergency situations in political discourse. However, the securitization of aid does not always jump directly from normalcy to extremism; as Abrahamsen points out, “rather than emergency action, most security politics is concerned with more mundane management of risk, and security issues can be seen to move on a continuum” (Abrahamsen
2005: 59). By defining the securitization of aid on a continuum, scholars are able to analyze the evolution of securitization as security threats change. In line with the continuum approach, Mark Duffield argues that securitization has evolved and that “from communism to terrorism… poverty has been monotonously rediscovered as recruiting ground for the moving feat of strategic threats that constantly menaces the liberal order” (Duffield 2010: 61).

Whereas Copenhagen School’s definition of securitization relied on the analysis of speeches and policy documents, Brown and Grävingholt look at the outcomes of aid given through a security lens and argue that the securitization of aid takes different forms and can be observed through “changes in discourse, aid flows and institutional structures” (3). Often times, securitization of aid can be seen through the following instances: when donors increasingly justify aids in terms of security; when they provide the highest levels of aid to particular countries or sectors based on security concerns; when security actors (such as the military) deliver significant amounts of aid; and when donor governments create new institutional units within their aid agencies based on security motives (3). For the purpose of this thesis, I will use the term securitization as Brown and Grävingholt have done above.
THE US AND SECURITIZED AID

Introduction

After WWII, the US became a systematic foreign aid donor in the world. The 1948 Marshall Plan, through which the US pledged $12 billion\(^3\) to help rebuild Europe after the war, was perceived by many as a “tremendous success” (Spear 2016: 19). Not only did the Marshall Plan foster strong trade relations between the US and Western European countries, but it also enabled Europe to withstand pressure from the Soviet Union and communism (Lancaster 2007: 64; Spear 2016:19). Creating a formidable ally on the same side of the Iron Curtain was the first instance that the US strategically used an aid package to advance its own security interests.

At the Harvard Commencement Ceremony of 1947, then-Secretary of State George Marshall stated that “It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace…” (Hanhimäki and Westad 2013). In this statement, Marshall encapsulated the new role of the US as a dual foreign aid and security actor—with emphasis on how “economic health” and “political stability” were inextricably linked. In 1949, President Truman created the Point Four Program which focused on providing science and technology programs to help new states “modernize quickly” with the hopes of preventing communism from taking root, and the US was providing ODA to most of the non-communist developing world by the late 1950s (Spear 2016: 19)

---

\(^3\) $140 billion in 2017 dollars.
The Cold War

In 1961, the Foreign Assistance Act officially restructured existing foreign assistance programs and separated military and non-military aid programs. The act mandated the creation of a government agency to specifically handle economic assistance programs, the USAID was founded with the aim of providing long-term economic and social development to countries in need around the world. USAID programs evolved from Truman’s technological and capital assistance programs to ones that provide development assistance, economic growth, and sustainable democracies pushed by the Kennedy Administration. Yet a majority of the restructured programs maintained the Cold War security goal of preventing communism.

A study of US disaster assistance between 1964 and 1995 describes “US foreign policy decision makers as realists at heart, seeing disasters as opportunities to enhance security” (Drury et al. 2005: 470; Lebovic 1988; Spear 2016). The Kennedy Administration believed that “economic development, combined with social and political reform,” would be enough to prevent the spread of communism (Spear 2016: 19). Foreign aid developed into a vehicle for preventing countries from falling to communism; between 1955 and 1961, Vietnam was a top five recipient of US ODA (19). The Vietnam War was the first instance that the US used development aid in conjunction with military needs—thus militarizing US ODA, not just securitizing it. USAID was expected to provide support in “battlefield fields,” and during the Vietnam War, USAID was enveloped into a single military command known as the CORDS program by the Johnson Administration (24). The securitization—and subsequent militarization—of USAID was also evident when the US funded anti-communist dictators in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Zaire despite their known corruption and human rights abuses (19). In the
beginning of Cold War, the USAID efforts were consistently used to address US security
concerts.

During the Ford and Carter administrations, securitized aid was used as a tool to deter
the spread of Communism. For example, Israel and Egypt, despite being more developed than
many other countries at the time, received some of the largest amounts of US aid-- around $2
billion annually-- in an effort to bring peace to the Middle East and therefore prevent Soviet
intervention in the region (Spear 2016: 20; Lancaster 2007: 79). The Reagan Administration
even funneled aid to support Latin American governments that backed right-wing groups.
Scholars describe U.S foreign policy decision makers as “realists at heart,” seeing disasters as
opportunities to enhance security, and conclude that the Cold War distorted foreign aid by
redirecting programs to satisfy geostrategic security goals (Spear 2016; Drury et al. 2005: 470;
Woods 2005).

**Post-Cold War**

The end of the Cold War resulted in brief period of decline in US ODA due to the
absence of a “single, all-encompassing US international interest” such as the Cold War (Sewell
during the height of the Cold War in 1985 in comparison to only $14.55 billion\(^5\) in 1997 (“U.S.
Foreign Aid Since 1977”). However, despite the decline in overall ODA aid following the Cold
War, the US reoriented its programs to related and logical security interest: to prevent another
Cold War. US aid to the former Soviet Union increased from $417 million to $2.5 billion in
1993 to provide economic assistance and reforms, and the funneling of aid to former Soviet

\(^4\) 2 percent of the federal budget; aid amount in 2010 dollars.

\(^5\) 0.7 percent of the federal budget; aid amount in 2010 dollars.
Russia and other post-communist states was seen as a means for the US to “help lock in the
dissolution of the Soviet empire” and prevent a return to the Cold War (Spear 2016: 21). By
strengthening the states on Russia’s periphery, the U.S. scared away Russia’s troops from the
Baltics and other surrounding regions. The goal of securitized US ODA at the end of the Cold
War was obvious: prevent a return to the Cold War (21).

Ultimately, the US fumbled through the 1990s looking for purpose for its aid programs
besides preventing another Cold War. As suggested by Carol Lancaster, the organization had
“no particular ideas about how to prevent conflict…” and adopted conflict resolution as a stance
just so USAID could gain relevance within the State Department and the Administration (Spear
2016: 21; Lancaster 2007: 241). Without a clear-cut security focus, the country struggled to
fully fund and direct its foreign aid program. However, the notion of aid remained despite any
major security concerns. In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office released a study titled
*Enhancing U.S. Security Through Foreign Aid*, which suggests that certain “types of
development assistance may help greatly in stemming the rapid population growth and economic
depression that…can provide a breeding group for extremist groups that cause political
instability and violence…” (Petřík 2008: 5; O’Hanlon 1994).

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War created an opening for Western industrialized
countries to redirect foreign aid to the neediest nations in order to fight poverty and inequality
rather than funnel aid to anti-communist regimes after the Cold War. However, Stephen Brown
and Jörn Grävingholt assess that these hopes were dashed when new forms of conflict arose after
the Cold War. The advent of failed and fragile states in the Middle East and Africa coupled with
ethnic conflict in the Balkans created new international problems for Western nations to manage.
Western involvement in the Balkans and UN military interventions in Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East reinforced the securitization of foreign aid rather than dismantled it. Additionally, the Clinton Administration focused on the democratization of ODA and focused on giving aid to post-conflict countries to become democratic (Spear 2016: 21). As civil wars and violence threatened to spill over borders to the developed world; the focus of US aid became “conflict prevention” (Spear 2016; Lancaster 2007: 241).

**Post-9/11**

The attacks launched on US soil on September 11, 2001, rejuvenated the need for US foreign aid abroad. The new, palpable security threat of international terrorism emboldened the US to use foreign aid as a “key tool of national power to guard against the threat of terrorism” (Natsios 2006: 132). The Bush Administration responded to the attacks with the “3Ds” of foreign and security policy—defense, development, and diplomacy (Spear 2016: 22). Following the terror attacks, ODA levels began to rise considerably, and most resources were redirected toward Iraq and Afghanistan in conjunction with US military aims. After 9/11, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that it had become impossible to draw lines between security, development interests, and democratic ideas in this new era of US foreign aid (22).

The years after 2001 marked an era of sweeping change for US foreign aid. Additionally, the US only spent $18.1 billion on foreign aid in 2001, but the amount jumped to $29.76 billion in 2003 and peaked at $44.02 billion in 2004 (“U.S. Foreign Aid Since 1977”). During this period, USAID lost a significant amount of power over US aid programs. The State Department took over USAID’s direct access to the Office of Management and Budget, disabling its access

---

6 Aid amount in 2010 dollars.
7 Aid amount in 2010 dollars.
8 Aid amount in 2010 dollars.
to key resource distributors for aid programs (Spear 2016: 24). Not only was foreign aid further securitized--it was militarized; this is clear by the fact that USAID’s share of ODA declined as the percentage controlled by the Department of Defense (DOD) increased substantially. In 1998, the DOD only controlled 3.5% of ODA, but skyrocketed to 22% by 2005 (Spear 2016: 29).

The subsequent militarization of foreign aid in Afghanistan and Iraq—and the DOD takeover of development-type activities--resulted in the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) to administer foreign aid programs in the two countries. Military commanders, rather than USAID officials, served as project managers. In 2003, CERP funds were authorized by Congress which specified that “commanders could spend the funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects” in Afghanistan and Iraq (Spear 2016: 29). The US military, had the legal authority to do in conflict zones what USAID was created to do. Between 2004 and 2011, the US military commanders spent $5 billion in CERP money (30). With the military commanders in charge of CERP, they found themselves in charge of major development programs in Afghanistan and Iraq. CERP projects focused on food distribution, agricultural production, building reconstruction (especially for hospitals and schools), and economic security (30).

This chapter demonstrated how US ODA reached new heights after 2001. Security had always played a role in US ODA decisions, especially during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, the US used aid to ensure capitalism in former communist-bloc countries (Spear 2016: 36). The US then shifted to the problem of fragile states, where US used ODA in order to stabilize fragile countries. After 2001, US ODA was used in unprecedented amounts in Iraq Afghanistan to support the country’s war on terror. This thesis will now explore how and to what
extent the EU securitizes aid, the US serves as a comparison point for what securitization is and how far securitization can go if uninhibited.
INSTITUTIONALIZING FOREIGN AID IN THE EU

Introduction

The EU’s initial absence of competency over foreign policy and the complexity of the EU’s institutions led to a gradual development of foreign aid and securitization policy over time. Nonetheless, the EU has successfully developed into one of the world’s largest ODA donors. The EU and its members provide over half of the world’s total development assistance, and the Commission alone provided around 11 percent of the world’s assistance in 2009 (Furness 2012: 77). This portion of the paper will first briefly explore how the EU has matured into a development actor and then explore how the EU advances security concerns through specific foreign aid programs.

First, it is important to define the term “EU” in this chapter. The origin of the EU—the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)—was signed into existence by Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in 1951. The ECSC became the European Community (EC) in 1957, which created a common market for member countries and allowed for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. Between 1957 and 1997, the term EC is applied in literature rather than the EU because it was not until 1992 that the Maastricht Treaty created the EU (Carbone 2007). Today, the EU comprises 28 member states, and is run multiple institutions that were established by treaties.
Institutionalizing Aid

Phase 1: The Treaty of Rome

In 1957, the Treaty of Rome signified the EC’s first phase in development policy (Carbone 2007). The European Development Fund (EDF) was one of the most important establishments of the Treaty of Rome in regards to EU development policy. Launched in 1959, the EDF became the EC’s main instrument for providing aid to Africa and overseas territories through the Yaoundé Convention. The EDF was funded by voluntary donations for member states and managed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank. Currently, the EDF usually runs on six year cycles and determines foreign aid to both individual countries and regions as a whole (Gavas 2010). The EDF demonstrated a significant step in the EC becoming a foreign aid donor because, despite its “premium on historical ties” in Africa, it was the EC’s first official instance of providing aid to developing countries (Carbone 2007: 2).

The 1960s and 1970s were years of aid expansion for the organization during this first phase of development. The introduction of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) opened market access to more of the developing world, and the accession of the United Kingdom brought its own ties to the developing world The Lomé Conventions, beginning in 1975 and ending in 2000, replaced the Yaoundé Agreement and added former British African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) colonies and sub-Saharan Africa to its foreign aid programs; today, the ACP states constitute about 80 sovereign countries. In 1976, the EC also launched a program for development assistance to Asia-Latin America (ALA), although states with colonial ties to member states comparably received more aid (Carbone 2007).
**Phase 2: The Maastricht Treaty**

The second phase of EU development policy occurred between the mid-1980s through the 1990s. This phase was a time of “profound transformation” for the EC as the Cold War drew to an end, the geographical scope and legal treaty base of EU development policy “drastically change[d]” during this time (Carbone 2007; Orbie 2012). In 1993, foreign aid became formally institutionalized in EU policy-making under the Maastricht Treaty. Also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which transformed the EC into the EU, the Maastricht Treaty created three policy pillars. These pillars-- the European Communities (social, economic, and environment policies), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) for police and judicial matters-- distinguished the EU competencies and decision-making mechanisms according to policy sector, making the EU a more dynamic and multifaceted actor (Carbone 2007: 6).

The origins of the CFSP can be traced back to the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970. The EPC was an informal setting for member states to create a common approach on foreign policy matters, including foreign aid. Goals such as international cooperation, human rights, democracy, and rule of law were discussed within the EPC, but lacked the ability to make official EC decisions—especially in times of crisis. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty established the CFSP so that members in the Council of Ministers can make binding decisions on foreign policy as an institution. The establishment of the CFSP pillar helped lead the EU to create essential foreign policy arms to make decisions about security and development policy.

During the 1990s, the EU experienced a profound amount of change; it started the enlargement process to include Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs); founded the
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia (TACIS) to provide a development and economic reform fund for countries in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia; and created the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) for natural disaster and violent conflict relief (Carbone 2007: 19). The EU also further expanded trade and development relations with Asian and Latin American (ALA) countries, and the EU participated in the political dialogue and conflict resolution in Central America (Bretherton and Vodler 2006). In 1995, the Barcelona Process strengthened the EU’s commitment to peace, stability, and free trade with the Mediterranean countries. By the end of the 20th century, the EU had transformed into a global actor with foreign policy competency.

However, despite the EU’s expansion of foreign aid programs, it experienced some “serious teething troubles” in the 1990s and struggled to implement the foreign aid programs in a timely fashion; between 1998 and 1999, the volume of aid increased 2.8 times, but the staff only increased by 1.8 times (Orbie 2012). The imbalance of programs and resources resulted in poor quality of aid packages and stalled implementation of EU aid programs. The consequences of the EU foreign aid’s turn-of-the-century transformation was perhaps best encompassed by this derisive review by the then-British secretary for international development, Clare Short:

“The European Commission’s programmes have huge potential to do good, but they are much less effective than they should be… the Commission is the worst development agency in the world. The poor quality and the reputation of its aid brings Europe into disrepute… the EU also needs to improve vastly the quality of its programs as well as the speed of implementation. Otherwise we will just have bad programmes delivered quickly.”

(Short 2000)

Phase 3: Common Policies

Following these obstacles, the EU’s third phase in development policy in the early 2000s was the beginning of the modern development strategy we see in the EU today. This phase was
characterized by “interlinked phenomena,” such as the co-existence of development and foreign policy goals (Carbone 2007: 24). Jan Orbie asserts that several vital reforms in the early 2000s improved the EU’s development shortcomings and established the EU as a “full-blown development donor” (Orbie 2012: 20).

The remainder of this thesis will expand upon the EU developments that occurred during this third phase. Modern changes included the replacement of preferential treatments with trade liberalization and the compliance of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), making EU foreign policies more globally adequate (Carbone 2007: 34). In 2001, the founding of the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO) created an office responsible for the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all external aid instruments to make foreign aid more effective (Carbone 2007).

The EU continues to be a major foreign aid player in the world today. In 2016, ODA provided by the EU reached a record high of €75.5 billion (“EU ODA”). Nonetheless, by the 21st century, the EU began to experience new growing pains. How should the EU balance security with development, and to what extent should the EU utilize foreign aid programs to carry out security goals? To answer this question, this thesis will now address the EU’s delicate security-development nexus and analyzes specific instances of EU securitized aid through instruments and partnerships.
THE EU AND THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Introduction

The EU has put forth certain policy initiatives to strengthen its security and development policies in recent years. Since the 21st century, the EU has become more dedicated to carrying out a comprehensive approach to security and development. Over time, EU’s focus on security goals has demonstrated that stability has become a “precondition for development,” and member states have come to “recognize the added value of addressing international security concerns through their common institutions” (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 141). Notable advancements in the EU’s security-development nexus include the European Security Strategy (ESS), the European Consensus on Development, the Lisbon Treaty, and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Security Development in the EU

European Security Strategy

In 2003, the ESS laid the premise for development and security policy to work together within the EU and provided a conceptual framework for the CFSP and the CSDP. The European Council’s adoption of the ESS—titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World” -- set clear objectives for common EU security interests and threats (Furness and Gänzle 2016). Essentially, the ESS defined the EU’s security environment and challenges that the EU must work to overcome (138). The ESS, the first and only European security strategy, was born in a “specific historical moment” in the height of the EU; the roll out of the euro and upcoming big bang
enlargement of Eastern European nations demonstrated the “depth and bready of the European project” (Tocci 2017: 488). The opening of the line of the ESS encompasses this idea of the EU’s historical moment: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free.” (Tocci 2017: 388). Concurrently, the EU released a strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the end of 2003, stating that development was “one of the ‘levers’ that the EU could use to pursue the strategy’s objectives” (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 139). The ESS demonstrated the EU’s transformative commitment to addressing security goals in the 21st century.

**The European Consensus on Development**

The European Consensus on Development also represented a step in the EU’s commitment to foreign aid programs in the world. In 2005, the European Commission proposed for the EU to “treat security and development as complementary agendas” with the goal of “creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious circle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures.” (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 142). The European Consensus on Development was approved by EU institutions to eradicate poverty by “building a more stable, peaceful, prosperous, and equitable world” (Bodenstein et al. 2016). The Consensus also committed to developing a common vision for EU member states to carry out bilateral policies aid through a comprehensive approach to state fragility, conflict, and other crises (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 142). In 2008, the European Council’s *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* stated that “there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace” (Gänzle 2012: 117).
The Lisbon Treaty

In 2009, the EU further developed its security-development nexus with the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty. Also known as the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Lisbon Treaty required that development cooperation be carried out within the framework of external action and established the EEAS (European Union 2007). The Lisbon Treaty implemented institutional reforms that would prioritize development policy in external affairs and address “long-standing weaknesses in the coherence and coordination of European development policy making” (Furness 2012: 74). For example, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) became the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs became a Commission vice-president, giving the leader of EU foreign policy stronger power within the EU (European Union 2007). The intertwining of development policy with external affairs not only cemented the importance of foreign aid in EU foreign policy but also paved the way for foreign aid to be used as a complement to security policy.

The European External Action Service

The EEAS became the “key EU external policy institution” and demonstrated a major advancement in EU’s attempt to harmonize foreign and security policy (Furness 2012: 74). The EEAS had four main tasks: policy coherence for development that supports EU objectives, coordination among community and member states, legitimacy through building a consensus among governments and development actors, and professionalism to minimized waste and duplication within EU institutions. To this day, the EEAS does not propose or implement policy, but prepares acts for the High Representative or other relevant EU institutions. Essentially, the EEAS manages the foreign relations, security, and defense policies under the CFSP umbrella as
well as EU diplomatic missions (Furness 2012). The EEAS is also tasked with drafting Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), which lay out timelines for development priorities in individual recipient countries, thus addressing the EU’s former issue of laggard foreign aid implementation.

Additionally, the EEAS combines the offices of the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for Common and Foreign Security Policy, demonstrating the EEAS’s streamlined approach to development and security (Furness 2012: 76). Overall, the EEAS demonstrates the EU’s commitment to creating coherence between security and development policies.
THE EU’S SECURITIZED AID: INSTRUMENTS AND PARTNERSHIPS

Introduction

The EU’s recent effort to make foreign and security policy more coherent has led to the securitization of aid programs. The securitization of aid can be seen as part of the EU’s efforts to improve the “complementarity” of security and development policy derived from the CFSP and CDSP (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 140). The threat of international terrorism, among other issues including migration and border control, have prompted the EU to carry out security goals through foreign aid. This thesis argues that the EU carries out securitization of foreign aid through strategic instruments and partnership agreements that intertwine development and security goals.

Instruments

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

First, the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), formerly the Instrument for Stability (IfS), was created in 2006 to “define the Grey Zone between the Council’s CFSP, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and the Commission’s development policy” (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 149). Overseen by the EEAS and the Commission, the IfS placed emphasis on crisis prevention: short-term crisis response and long-term capacity. The IcSP was eligible to use ODA to “support capacity building programs in third countries aimed at training and mentoring, the provision of non-lethal equipment and assistance with infrastructure improvements and help with strengthening the capacity of military actors…” thus exemplifying the use of securitized aid by the EU (European Union 2014). To
this day, the IcSP has allowed the EU to engage quickly in unfolding crisis situations through carrying out crisis response, crisis preparedness programs, and conflict prevention. The IcSP provides the EU with a “budget line and a jurisdictional bridge-builder” between development and security policy and attempts to reinstate stability and security so that peace-building partnerships can assist with the long-term policy process (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 150).

**African Peace Facility**

Second, the creation of the African Peace Facility (APF) demonstrated securitized aid through EU instruments. The EU Council created the APF in 2003, and its overarching goal was to create stable, secure conditions for development by providing predictable funds. Currently, the APF is funded by the EDF, which is funded directly by member states\(^9\) and not ODA (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 150). Despite not being able to use ODA funds for APF, the members’ financing of the APF is essential in maintaining its development objectives in Africa; such funding supports peace and security operations—including paying the expenses of African Union soldiers—in Africa. Between 2004 and 2013, the EDF channeled €740 million to Africa through the APF, and 90 percent of the funds specifically supported African-led peace operations (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 150). Since 2004, the EU has supported peace operations in Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, and Mali (150). The APF demonstrates a strategic EU instrument to foster stability in Africa through aid provided by member states.

**Common Defense and Security Policy Missions**

Third, the Common Defense and Security Policy’s (CSDP) “centrality” to the EU’s development objectives in fragile countries provides “potential entry points” for securitization of aid (Furness and Gänzle 2016: 151). CSDP missions are an example of securitization because

---

\(^{9}\) EU Treaties stipulate that the community budget cannot finance activities with military or defense implications.
they often use the EU programs to influence stability in geostrategic regions. These missions represent the delicate balance between security and development goals in complex circumstances. European Union Force (EUFOR) missions often have the goals of protecting civilians and UN workers as well as delivering humanitarian aid—an obvious coupling of security and foreign aid aims. Most often, CSDP missions complement foreign aid programs, which was apparent in missions to countries such as Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**European Neighborhood Instrument**

Fourth, the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) was created to carry out securitized aid in the EU’s surrounding regions. The ENI is the external relation arm of the EU and focuses on enhancing stability in over a dozen countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Europe (Furness and Gänzle 2016). Originally the European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the current ENI carries out political decisions and mainly disburses aid through bilateral programs. The goals of the ENI stem from the EU’s accession process, which supports regional stability objectives including the rule of law, democracy, and successful market economies. However, the ENI does not guarantee accession into the EU; instead, it focuses on vital reforms for potential members or countries that are closely tied with the EU. The security goals of the overarching European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the ENI are obvious: the EU incentivizes surrounding countries to become more stable regions by providing funding for reforms (economic, human rights, political, or trade) and offering access to EU markets. The EU budget for ENP countries jumped to €15.4 billion after the Arab Spring (Zorob 2017). Essentially, the ENI offers stability development in return for security. By
providing security, the EU can try to control migration flows and international crime from the neighborhood regions.

EU instruments such as the IcSP, AFP, CDSP missions, and ENPI blend development, humanitarian, and security objectives in the EU by making stability a prerequisite for administering foreign aid. These instruments have been partly or mostly driven by European security interests; the quest for both peace and security-related issues such as organized crime, terrorism, and migration has motivated the EU to use foreign aid to address certain concerns abroad. While there is no way to know for certain if security drives all EU development measures throughout the world, these instruments illustrate how EU security concerns certainly drive foreign aid in specific regions.

Partnerships

The EU and Africa

Strategic EU partnerships also demonstrate the use of EU foreign aid for security purposes. Currently, Africa (namely South of the Sahara) is the largest recipient of EU aid; in 2016, the EU gave over €10 billion to African countries (“EU Aid Explorer”). During the early 2000s, extensive reforms in EU development and foreign policy transformed the partnerships between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP). The original 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) focused on poverty reduction, sustainable development, and the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy (Holland and Doidge 2012). The CPA was based on four main principles: equality of partners and ownership of development strategies; participation by actors other than the central government (such as local governments and civil society); dialogue and mutual obligations (i.e. respect for human rights); and differentiation and regionalization based on each partner’s unique needs (European
Union, 2014). CPA clearly set a focus on security and implemented fundamental changes to the Lomé acquis, including the addition of peace and security, arms trade, and migration to the development cooperation framework. Between 2003 and 2007, the EDF provided €13.5 billion to ACP countries through the CPA (“EU Aid Explorer”). The Cotonou Agreement was a “unique agreement unparalleled for its time, linking politics, trade and aid in novel way” and continued to be transformed by its amendments in both 2005 and 2012 (Holland and Doidge 2012: 78).

Carbone suggests that the CPA embodied the “co-existence of political and security-related goals with ‘pure’ development goals” (Carbone 2007:35). CPA dialogue intensified after terrorist attacks in the US, Turkey, Morocco, Madrid, and London, and the revision included a clear commitment to combat impunity and promote justice (Young 2015). Cotonou’s first revision in 2005 expanded its goal from poverty-reduction policies to include anti-terrorism and non-proliferation clauses, and the EU promised to provide new financial and technical resources to carry out these specific security objectives (Holland and Doidge 2012: 80). Surely a response to the terrorist attacks, the “Fight against Terrorism” (Article 11a) agreement focused on international cooperation to exchange terrorist-related intelligence. The non-proliferation (Article 11b) agreement established national controls for the export and transit of goods related to weapons of mass destruction (European Union, 2005). The 2005 amendment also stated that participating parties must “share experience on the adoption of legal adjustments required to allow for ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” and “Fight against international crime in accordance with international law” (European Union, 2005).

Although the 2010 amendment mostly focused on aligning CPA goals with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it also furthered the securitization of EU aid by
extending the political dialogue to be consistent with outlined European Security Strategy (ESS) concerns. New security threats such as organized crime, human trafficking, drugs, and piracy were tacked on (European Union, 2014). The 2010 revision also included border control cooperation, enhancing “the security of the international supply chain” and improving air, maritime, and road transport safeguards (Holland and Doidge 2012: 80). Overall, the development-security nexus was an important theme for the revisions of the Cotonou Agreement and the EU-ACP partnership. As outlined in the most recent version of the CPA, “without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security and without peace and security there can be no sustainable development (European Union, 2014).

The EU and the Mediterranean

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) also represents the securitization of EU aid. Since the 1970s, Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) have been established partnerships with the EU through multiple successive frameworks (Ayadi and Gadi 2013). Originally, the EC provided ODA through financial instruments such as grants, European Investment Bank (EIB) loans, and European Commission Loans to the region in exchange for tariff waiving. Created in 1995, the Barcelona Process for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) established a formal dialogue with nations in North Africa, Middle East, and the Balkans region to foster cultural and economic ties between the then-15 members states and 12 non-member states in the surrounding regions (Carbone 2007). The EMP’s three original “baskets” of the partnership included the goals to foster a political and security dialogue, establish a free-trade area and an economic partnership, and encourage understanding between the different cultures within the region (Gomez 2003). Since the EMP’s establishment, most Mediterranean states have completed Association Agreements with the EU to establish free trade areas in the
Mediterranean Basin, an effort rooted in both the European-Mediterranean partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). There was also an aspect of symbolic political importance to the original EMP; it was a signal from the EU to the Mediterranean countries that they would not be neglected, despite the EU’s all-encompassing enlargement process taking place during the early 2000s (Youngs 2015).

The rising threat of instability in Northern Africa and the Middle East culminated in the reestablishment of the EMP into the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2009. Through the UfM, the EU hoped to preserve the status quo in the Mediterranean, arguably resulting in “prioritizing stability over values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (Cebeci and Schumacher 2017: 9). This reform echoed the security logic on which the ENP was founded: “to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean” (European Union 2003).

Today, the EU’s development aid towards SEMCs continues to demonstrate securitization. It is worth noting that as aid has been “remarkably skewed” towards Turkey, which accounted for 25 percent of ODA commitments to the SEMCs between 1995 and 2009 (Ayadi and Gadi 2013: 7). A reason for such continued high amounts of ODA to Turkey is because of the country’s close proximity and potential candidacy to join the EU. It is logical for the EU to funnel such high amounts of aid to the most adjacent region because instability risks spilling across member states’ borders if security concerns go awry. Securitization of aid is also apparent in the bulk of SEMC ODA being concentrated in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia who have received 70 percent of the partnership funds (Ayadi and Gadi 2013). These countries all border close to the EU and have fed the recent mass migration into member states. Overall, the UfM represents a strategic partnership that the EU maintains in order to foster stability in the
midst of contemporary security issues such as mass migration, war, terrorism, ethnic conflict, and geopolitical competition.
CONCLUSION

This thesis analyzed the securitization of foreign aid in both the US and the EU. Whereas the securitization of the US was quite obvious through the history of US foreign and military policy, the case of the EU is more multifaceted because of the EU’s gradual transformation into a foreign policy actor. As the EU created treaties, instruments, and partnerships to become a development actor, it slowly adopted a development-security nexus. By the 21st century, the EU had developed competencies on both foreign and security policy. Similar to the US, the EU began to intertwine security and foreign aid policy as its programs changed along with security concerns, making it difficult to carry out one of these tasks without the other.

In this thesis, the definition of securitization of foreign aid refers to the strategic use of development policies to address security concerns simultaneously—in the case of the EU, many aid programs have been created to bolster stability in surrounding regions. Although the EU does not-- and cannot-- securitize aid to the same extent as the US due to its lack of military, the EU has created instruments and partnerships that fulfill its commitments to both security and development goals. The IcSP, APF, CSDP missions, and ENI all demonstrate the contemporary security aims behind EU foreign policy programs. EU partnerships with ACP and Mediterranean countries also exhibit the EU’s development programs in regions to promote stability—and hence bolster security—in some of the world’s most vulnerable regions.

It has become clear that the EU has created strategic ways to achieve security aims through foreign aid policies. As terrorism, migration, and geopolitical rivalry continue to fester
in its surrounding regions, it would come as no surprise if the EU continues to envelope security concerns within development goals. Even more, as the international area continues to intensify and become more complex, the EU must strengthen its current tools or create more vehicles to carry out security and foreign aid priorities. This thesis calls for further research into how the EU securitizes aid in response to today’s most pressing security issues.
WORKS CITED


