The Role of International Actors in Post-conflict Bosnian Elections

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ABSTRACT

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(Under the direction of Dr. John D. Stephens)

This thesis discusses the role of international actors in the post conflict elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It focuses mainly on the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in shaping the electoral system and influencing electoral politics through conflict management strategies. The main focus is placed on the entity parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2002 in order to assess the value and success of the conflict management strategies employed as well as the success of the international actors themselves. The thesis concludes that while international actors have been successful in producing a degree of stability in Bosnia since 1995, they have been less successful in reducing the saliency of ethnic politics in elections and consequently the role of the major ethno-nationalist parties in the post-conflict political system.
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# ABBREVIATIONS

## General

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Central Election Commission</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Dayton Peace Accords</td>
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<td>EASC</td>
<td>Election Appeals Sub-Commission</td>
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<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniak / Croat Entity)</td>
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<td>MMC</td>
<td>Multi-member Constituencies</td>
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<td>PEC</td>
<td>Provisional Election Commission</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska (Serb Entity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Process</td>
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## International Organizations

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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council</td>
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## Political Parties in Bosnia

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOSS</td>
<td>Bosnian Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina Patriotic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNS</td>
<td>Democratic National Alliance</td>
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<td>DNZ</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Union</td>
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<td>DPS</td>
<td>Democratic Patriotic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union</td>
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<td>HSP</td>
<td>Croatian Rights Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHI</td>
<td>New Croatian Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMIP</td>
<td>Union for Peace and Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBiH</td>
<td>Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina Partry</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNSD</td>
<td>Alliance of independent Social Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Serbian People’s Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPAS</td>
<td>Serb Patriotic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPRS</td>
<td>Socialist Party Republika Srpska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Serb Radical Party</td>
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<td>ZL</td>
<td>Unified List (former SDP)</td>
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Introduction

Ten years on from the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 and the end of violent conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a relatively stable example of the international community’s role in democratization. The state and institutions built from the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (also known as the Dayton Agreement) have to a large extent continued intact.

With the involvement of the international community in the Bosnian conflict, the community committed itself to securing the stability and development of the Bosnian state. While this role is manifold, their role in elections is a good gauge for the over-all involvement of the international community in the peace and transition process in Bosnia. More generally, elections form a fundamental part of the international communities basic approach to state-building and democratization. There are countless examples of where the international community has focused particularly on elections in their involvement.¹ Elections in this sense are often used as the catch-all indicator for “democratic progress” in transition and post-conflict societies. Moreover, as an institutionalized means to regulate power sharing, they are of primary importance to ethnically divided states. Consequently, “creatively crafted electoral rules hold particular promise because they structure the

¹ This is particularly true in other place in the former Yugoslavia, such as Kosovo. See Andrew Taylor’s essay (2005) for a similar evaluation of the international community’s role in elections and democratization of a post-conflict ethnically diverse state.
incentives and pay-offs available to political actors in their search for electoral victory,
making some types of behavior more rewarding than others” (Reilly 2001: 10)

The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is no exception to this general framework. With the establishment of a multi-ethnic state through the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia must deal with the issues of being both a post-conflict state as well as an ethnically divided state. Elections in BiH are consequently an integral part of the post-Dayton peace-building process, forming one of the main tasks of both the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Office of the High Representative as well as having an annex of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) dedicated exclusively to it (Dayton Annex 3). According to the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the U.S. government agency in charge of monitoring and encouraging compliance with OSCE agreements, “continuous elections, if held in as free and fair a manner as possible have been viewed by the international community as a means to bring stability and recovery to a country divided by extreme nationalist political leaders” (CSCE 1998: 1). Thus, elections have primacy in the international community’s effort to reduce the efficacy of ethno-nationalist politics in Bosnia. They are often seen as a means to establishing a normal political discourse. That is one that is not centered on ethno-nationalist lines.

Therefore, elections have been of prime importance to the international actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, these international actors (mainly the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Office of the High Representative) have had difficulty in limiting the political power of the wartime nationalist parties of the constituent ethnic groups. In fact, the wartime ethno-nationalist parties have formed the majority of the governments in the state since its inception following the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.
Nevertheless, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) together with the Office of the high Representative (OHR) have attempted to limit the electoral success of ethno-nationalist parties through electoral engineering, which is largely informed by contemporary conflict management strategies for ethnically divided states.

These attempts have been based on consociational and integrative conflict management strategies. The post-Dayton order in Bosnia is mostly based on the first approach that is a consociational approach. Here ethnic conflict is managed through power sharing arrangements and recognized groups rights to participate in the political process.\(^2\) Conversely, integrative approaches seek to abate ethnic conflict by forcing elites to cooperate across ethnic lines.\(^3\) This cooperation is achieved (in theory) by establishing an institutional logic that creates rewards (electoral usually) for elites that make appeals to other ethnic constituencies. Both of these approaches have been used by the international community in post conflict Bosnia. While the Dayton framework, which includes the Bosnian constitution in Annex four, is largely a consociational design, post-Dayton strategies and election law have included both types of conflict management, as well as other means of direct intervention.

In this thesis I plan to follow elections in Bosnia in two phases: the period from 1998-2002, and the period after 2002. Within the first phase I will focus on the 2000 elections and in the second phase I will focus on the 2002 elections. I will primarily focus on the parliamentary elections in Bosnia’s two entities(i.e. the two largest political divisions established through Dayton), which are the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS). The entities, established through Dayton, are the two largest

\(^{2}\) This approach was primarily established by Arend Lijphart (1977).

\(^{3}\) This approach was primarily established by Donald Horowitz (2000).
political units in Bosnia and have large individual competences vis a vis the federal (i.e. national) level government. Moreover, 2002 acts as a useful divide in assessing the role of international actors on elections in Bosnia because in 2002 the OSCE took a more passive role with the return of the electoral commission to Bosnian control. Before 2002, the OSCE as well as the OHR took a very active role in electoral legislation and design through the post-Dayton provisional electoral commission (PEC) that the OSCE ran.

This thesis will more generally follow the literature on the role of international actors and organizations in democratization and the roll of elections in divided societies (as well as post conflict societies). In order to address this question, I will first investigate the role and mandate of the most important international actors in BiH, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Office and the High Representative. From these actors, I will first analyze potential models and strategies for dealing with democratization in divided societies and then move onto how these organizations have attempted to employ these strategies within the existing structure of post Dayton Bosnia.
International Actors and Democratization

Democratization is often addressed from a domestic perspective. However, the influence of external actors on democratization and domestic political change is an integral part of political transition in many states (Pevehaus 2002). Moreover, elections are an essential part of the international community’s concept of democracy (Carothers 2002). Consequently, elections have central meaning in international efforts in post-conflict and transition states (Reilly 2002a).

International actors have been especially important in the case of Europe, where the European Union (EU) among others has striven to exert its political influence through conditionality and guide political change, particularly in its neighborhood (Dimitrova and Pridham 2002; Vachudova 2005). This conditionality of the EU on new member states is largely documented and has generally been seen as successful example of the role that international actors can play in transition states.

We can include Bosnia and Herzegovina in this trend to some degree because it began a similar process with the signing of the Stability and Association Process (SAP) in 1999 and the opening of negotiation for the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) in November 2002. Nevertheless, Levitsky and Way have shed light on this topic in their argument that democratization supported by international actors through so-called “linkages.” This entails that the more linkages a state has, the more democratization pressure exerted upon them by international actors (Livitsky and Way 2005). Geoffrey Pridham and Milada Vachudova argue separately that international actors develop conditionality in order to exert democratization leverage on transition states (Dimotrova and Pridham 2004; Vachudova 2005). In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the role of conditionality is less clear because international actors have a clear legal mandate through the Dayton Agreement in order to implement the peace process.
of 2005. Moreover, the EU agreed to a stronger engagement in Bosnia during the last elections, which just occurred in October 2006.

However, the case of Bosnia is also somewhat unique because of the wide-ranging, general powers that the international actors have been granted. Bosnia’s development has been strongly affected by the influence of international actors, beginning with the international intervention during the conflict. Many organizations have participated after Dayton (refer to table one). There is a general consensus that state-building in the case of Bosnia was a necessary international project. The normative conditions following the conflict supported the mandate of international actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler 2005). Through these powers it is possible to interpret BiH as an international protectorate.

Indeed, the role of international actors in Bosnia is debated. According to some analyses, international organizations have had a negative effect on Bosnia because they lack accountability and transparency (Chandler 2000; Knaus and Martin 2003; Caplan 2005). The main argument of this position is that external regulation and interference delays democratization. According to Chandler “the trend towards giving greater decision-making to international administrators can produce unintended results, undermining Bosnian institutions and creating relations of dependency rather than a basis for stable democratic self-government” (Chandler 2000: 3). Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin argue equally that “in Bosnia and Herzegovina, outsiders do more than participate in shaping the political agenda –

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5 At this point there is no contractual relationship between Bosnia and the EU until the completion of the SAA (European Commission 2005). However, the SAP can also be interpreted as a part of the integration process (Dangerfield 2004).
7 He argues that this new normative framework emerged after the cold war.
8 The main argument of these texts is that the role of international organizations has a negative impact on Bosnia because they are not accountable to the people. The debate mainly revolves around the usefulness of international organizations in the democratization process.
something that has become the norm throughout Eastern Europe, as governments aspire to join the European Union. In BiH, outsiders actually set that agenda, impose it, and punish wish sanctions those who refuse to implement it” (Klaus and Martin 2003: 61). This critique matches the role that international organizations have played in elections as well, where they have received many powers in elections in order to implement and realize the peace and democratizations process. While elections are now in general characterized as free and fair, the reduction of influence from the ethno-national parties is only slim. Because of the stated goal of the international community in BiH to increase interethnic political participation it is very difficult to assess the participation of international organizations in Bosnia as successful.

Reciprocally, there are several analyses that see the international presence in Bosnia as both necessary and on average positive for the residents of BiH (Bose 2002). Bose argues that the international participation in BiH is not an example of “liberal imperialism”, despite the fact that many errors were made there. Instead, she emphasizes the peacekeeping measures of the international actors in BiH evidence of the positive role that the international community place in the democratization process.
International Actors in BiH and their Mandate

Since the end of the conflict in Bosnia, the main actors have been the Office of the High Representative (OHR), who also since 2005 has worked as the special representative (SR) of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (See table 1). These two organizations have been especially important in organizing and conducting elections, as well as regulating and legislating the electoral system in post-conflict Bosnia. Carrie Manning and Miljenko Antic argue that “over time electoral regulations have been imposed with the aim of securing electoral outcomes favorable to the successful implementation of Dayton. As defined by Dayton’s implementers, this has meant, most importantly, the formation of multi-ethnic or non-nationalist governments at all levels” (Manning and Antic 2003: 53).

The High Representative

The High representative (HR) was installed after the conflict through the Dayton Agreement and is the strongest international actor / institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HR is nominated by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which is an ad hoc intergovernmental Council that consists of 55 representatives from both states and organizations. This nomination is additionally ratified by the United Nations Security Council (Bieber 2006). The PIC supervises the OHR and sets its goals.

Indeed, the powers of the high representative are what is most often debated (Chandler 2000; Knaus and Martin 2003; Caplan 2005).
The Dayton Agreement charges the Office of the High Representative with the supervision of the implementation of all the civilian aspects of the peace agreement on behalf of the international community. According to Dayton the OHR is “the final authority in the theater regarding interpretation of this agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement” (DPA, Art IV, Annex 10). The first mandate of the OHR included overseeing, coordinating and reporting on the implementation of the peace settlement (DPA, Art. II, Annex 10). However, this mandate was broadened in 1997 by the Peace Implementation Council because the existing mandate was not seen as strong enough (Caplan 2004). Through this re-interpretation of the mandate, the OHR received new executive and legislative capabilities. The High Representative was permitted to exercise his authority to issue legally binding decisions as well as to dismiss civil servants, who overstepped their legal duties under Dayton (PIC 1997).\(^\text{10}\)

Since 2002, the High Representative is double-hatted as the Special Representative of the European Union (EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was appointed by the Council of General Affairs and External Relations and facilitates political coordination between the EU and Bosnia as well as supervises the European Police Mission in BiH (EUPM).

In regard to elections, the HR has the ability (after the Bonn Meeting) to dismiss candidates, who have violated the peace agreement. He is also a member of the electoral commission, which was established by the OSCE. The OHR also has the competence to draft new electoral laws.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{10}\) These new powers were labeled the “Bonn Powers” after the Bonn meeting in which the PIC decided to broaden the OHR’s powers.

\(^{11}\) The PIC instructed the OHR to design and draft a new electoral law after the first elections. This bill was finished in 1999, but was not accepted by the Bosnian parties, which had to agree to it for it to be ratified (PIC 1997).
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The other important organization in BiH that I will deal with is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is recognized as a regional arrangement from the United Nations, which functions as an instrument for early warning, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe. The OSCE is one of many international organizations that are charged under the Dayton Agreement with the responsibility to help BiH’s transition to a stable, secure, and democratic society. According to the framework of the Dayton Agreement, the OSCE was officially charged to

1) lead free and fair elections
2) oversee human rights
3) ensure regional security and stability

In order to complete these tasks, the OSCE established a mission in BiH (OSCE 1995). For the purposes of this thesis, I will mainly discuss the role of the OSCE in regard to elections as that is the main theme of this work.

Under the Dayton Agreement the OSCE was charged with conducting free and fair elections (DPA, Annex 3). The Dayton Agreement states that the OSCE is mandated “to certify whether elections can be effective under current social conditions in both entities and, if necessary, to provide assistance to the parties in creating these conditions” (DPA, Art. I, Annex 3). How the OSCE should create these conditions is explained in the next article.

The OSCE should observe the preparations for the elections on the different levels of governance in BiH and observe the elections themselves as well as ensure the punctuality of the elections.

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12 These elections were to be conducted according to the criteria of the OSCE in the Copenhagen Document (paragraph 7 and 8). The Copenhagen document is the conclusions of the second meeting of the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the former OSCE) in 1990. Both paragraphs deal mainly with the execution of elections by international actors.
The OSCE should also establish a provisional electoral commission (PEC) (DPA, Art. III, Annex 3). This commission passes electoral reforms and regulations and consists of the leader of the OSCE Mission to BiH, the HR (or an appointed representative), representatives of the main parties in BiH, as well as other persons that the OSCE decides to include (DPA, Art. III, Annex 3). The leader of the Commission is by default the representative from OSCE. He/she has the authority singly to make decisions in the electoral commission. The commission should have only existed for the first elections in 1996, but the authority of the OSCE was extended by the PIC, when a new electoral law was unable to be passed (Peace Implementation Council 1997). However, the provisional electoral commission was placed under Bosnian control finally in 2002. The new electoral commission was taken over by the Bosnia government and the role of the OSCE was reduced to observer-status. Nevertheless, there is still cooperation between the two organizations.

The new mandate of the OSCE now includes responsibility for human rights, security cooperation, education, and democratization. The conducting of elections since 2002 has been reallocated as a sovereign power of the Bosnian state.

International Actors, as it is apparent, have had a very strong role in the electoral process of post-conflict Bosnia. Through the power of draft laws these organizations have tried to pursue a course of “institutional engineering” in order to reduce ethnic conflict through political institutions. However, the success if these attempts is limited, as we will see (Manning and Antic 2003; Manning 2004).

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13 This commission deals with electoral legislation over (for example) the eligibility of political parties, candidates, and voters, the role of domestic and international election observers, as well as the publication of election results.

Elections in Divided and Post-Conflict Societies

Elections are very often the main focus of the international community after a conflict or during a political transition. Thomas Carothers has astutely argued that elections have received a “determinative importance” in the democratization process (Carothers 2002: 7).\footnote{Carothers asserts that this conviction of the international community is misplaced because “in many transition countries, reasonable, regular, genuine elections are held but political participation remains shallow and governmental accountability is weak […] It is also striking how often electoral competition does little to stimulate the renovation or development of political parties in many gray-zone countries” (Carothers 2002: 15).} Benjamin Reilly observes as well that elections have become an essential part of peacekeeping missions (Reilly 2002a: 118).\footnote{He sees five reasons for this: 1) elections are a beginning point for the new political order 2) elections can spark the development of democratic politics 3) elections help to select representatives 4) elections help to form a government 5) elections confer legitimacy (Reilly 2002a: 118).} It seems the more that international peacekeeping missions have focused on the stability of a state and even the building of state, where one doesn’t exist, the more that elections have received a central importance in the approach of the international community. Terrence Lyons notes that elections form the core of the “democratic reconstruction model” of the international community (Lyons 2004: 37). According to these views, elections are the dominant starting point of post-conflict political order.

Moreover, post conflict societies are often strongly divided along linguistic, religious or other cleavages. In these societies elections are even more important because they regulate power-sharing and power divisions (Reilly 2001; Reilly 2002b; Bieber and Wolff 2005). In these societies it is relatively easy for elites to play the “ethnicity card.” This
danger is especially prevalent during elections, as a method to mobilize more voters.\(^\text{17}\) This can lead consequently to a downward spiral, where the different elites attempt to outdo the others with escalating rhetoric and claims.

Before we can investigate strategies that help to minimize or reduce this downward spiral, we must establish a clear concept of the role of ethnicity in politics to use. The role of ethnic politics in the process of political change is integral and calls for further development of the relation between ethnicity and politics. It is important to understand the role that ethnicity plays in politics in order to determine how ethnicity enables elites to maintain political power. In this sense, we need to further flesh out the idea of ethnicity in order to see how it intersects with the political sphere.

Scholars have generally approached ethnicity in two broad ways. In one approach, they have emphasized ethnicity as a primordial concept, existing as a natural category. The other approach focuses on ethnicity as a socially constructed category (this approach is sometimes referred to as instrumentalism). The primordial approach has less credibility as a general approach, but can at times inform constructivist approaches. James Fearon and David Latin contend that there are three versions of the constructivist approach; ethnicity constructed by discourse, ethnicity constructed by social and economic processes, and Elite construction of ethnicity (Fearon and Latin 2000). These versions vary in their attempt to explain how ethnicity is constructed and how ethnic construction leads to violence.

For the purposes of this paper, I will follow the approach laid out by Benjamin Reilly (Reilly 2001). Reilly conceptualizes the intersection of ethnicity and politics as a mixture of both primordial and instrumental approaches. According to Reilly “ethnic identity can be

\(^{17}\) V.P. Gagnon argues similarly that the ethnicity also can demobilize opposition instead of mobilizing more support (Gagnon 2004).
seen, on the one hand, as being based on ascriptive and relatively immutable factors such as religion, tribe, race, or language – a position often characterized in the scholarly literature as ‘primordialism’ – and, on the other hand, as being a more malleable function of constructed social identities formed by colonialism and by post colonial developments” (Reilly 2001: 4).

Thus, he sees the politicization of ethnic identity as the result of instrumentalization of elites of existing ethnic categories. In this sense, ethnic identity is in many ways an elite construction, or at least insofar as it enters the political sphere.18

Bosnia and Herzegovina does not deviate from this intersection of ethnicity and politics. As a deeply divided society, ethnic identity still plays an important role in political alignment. The main division runs across religious lines, but as Greenberg (2005) has argued, linguistic differences have also been instrumentalized to define ethnicity. The main ethnic groups are the Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. The Bosnians are historically Muslim, while the Serbs are historically Eastern Orthodox, and while the Croats are historically Catholic. The three dominant ethnic groups have corresponding parties: Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) (see table 3 for a rough sketch of party alignments). These parties are still the strongest parties in Bosnia (with respect to geography). The party system in Bosnia does not fit a classical left-right conflict structure (Pugh and Cobble 2001). Instead, one must classify and order the parties through ethnicity and the degree of nationalism in order to produce an accurate map of the Bosnian party system (See table 5). Manning argues

18 This approach is also pursued by Milada Vachudova. She sees ethnicity as a construction of elites, who use it to mobilize support for themselves and principally their illiberal democratic regimes (Vachudova 2005). Greenberg sketches a similar phenomenon in his study of language and ethnic identity in the Balkans. He contends that language is instrumentalized, in order to define ethnicity (Greenberg 2004).
that the continued dominance of ethnic cleavages points to their “embeddedness” within the competition structure and party system (Manning 2004).19

Bosnia is historically a very heterogeneous region (see map 1). However, after the conflict there was a general consolidation of ethnicity in the two entities through attempts at ethnic cleansing during the conflict. Bosniaks and Croats are generally located in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Entity (FBiH) and Serbs are generally located in the Republika Srpska entity (RS) (see map 2 and table 2).

There is a large literature concerning democracy in divided societies. However, we can distinguish two main approaches within this body of work. These are namely: consociational and integrative (also known as centripetal) conflict management strategies.20 Both approaches are dependent on interethnic elite cooperation and the agreement of the elites to govern inclusively instead of exclusively. The consociational approach is grounded on an explicit recognition of ethnic identity and consists of a focus on community rights. The theory presumes that a successful government is only possible when the institutions themselves recognize ethnic identities. This approach normally uses proportional electoral systems in order to secure representation for every group. The approach also uses quotas to secure representation within the proportional system. Consociational democracy tends to create stability at the cost of an institutionalization of ethnic difference (Caspersen 2004).

The other approach, integrative, attempts to overcome ethnic division in the society. Horowitz, the main author in this approach, criticizes consociational models because he

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19 The argument here is that ethnic cleavages function in the same way as social cleavages defined by Lispet and Rokkan (1967), by structuring the party system. Donald Horowitz (2001) also argues that ethnic cleavages can structure ethnic party systems.

20 Arend Lijphart is the best known author in the consociational tradition and Timothy Sisk, Donald Horowitz, and Benjamin Reilly are all well known authors in the integrative tradition (Lijphart 1977; Sisk 1996; Horowitz 2000; Reilly 2001).
believes they institutionalize ethnic divisions (Horowitz 2000). His approach attempts, instead, to establish institutions that create incentives for elites to cooperate. This approach normally uses preferential voting systems (Casperesen 2004). In a preferential voting system the voters must rank the candidates according to preferences. When the votes are counted, the votes for the highest ranked candidate on each ballot are counted. However, if these votes do not achieve an absolute majority, the candidate that received the least amount of votes is left out, and the ballots are recounted using the second vote of the ballots, where the first vote was given to the left-out candidate. This is repeated until an absolute majority for a single candidate is achieved. In this system it is theorized that candidates need to make appeals to voters outside their ethnic group. These appeals, consequently, should lead to the creation intra-ethnic parties or conflict lines. This approach, however, functions better when ethnicity is not territorialized because elites are forced to make intra-ethnic connections and therefore must seek support from other ethnic groups. Theoretically, then, this approach has the potential to overcome ethnic divisions through institutional engineering.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is normally described as a consociational democracy (Bose 2005). The political framework (based on the Dayton Accord) is to a large degree oriented towards the consociational model. However, there are also elements of an integrative approach within the framework, and these seem to be growing as the Dayton framework is amended (Belloni 2004; Caspersen 2004; Bieber 2006). The constitution, which is in the fourth Annex of the DPA, has many consociational elements. The central state consists of a two chamber parliament and a president. The president actually consists of three officials, each representing their respective ethnic group. The first chamber of the parliament is the “House of Representatives” and is elected from the two entities, a third of the representatives come from RS and two thirds come from the FBiH. The second chamber is called the “House of Peoples.” This chamber consists of 15 representatives, who are selected by the entity parliaments. Consequently, the representation of the major ethnic groups is secured within the institutional framework of BiH. However, the decentralization of much of the powers of the central state to the entities (or even the cantons) where ethnicity is relatively homogenous has created a stable, but weak state-level government. The Bosnian

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21 These are mainly: the common institutions between the ethnic groups (the three person presidency, council of ministers, and two chamber parliament), ethnic autonomy (two relatively homogenous entities and within the FBiH relatively homogenous Cantons), power sharing and veto rights (Caspersen 2004).

22 This body uses the same proportion between the two entities as the first chamber (1/3 for RS and 2/3 for FBiH)
government, as an institution, has relatively narrow powers and must contend with many veto players.\(^{23}\)

BiH is divided into two entities: Republika Sprska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH). Both entities have their own parliaments. The entities’ competences include everything that is not under the jurisdiction of the central government. Consequently, the entities have a wide scope of powers and competencies. The FBiH is further divided into municipalities and cantons. Power in this system is consequently located on the most ethnically homogenous levels. In the RS this is the entity level, and the FBiH this is often at the canton or municipal level. This division accounts for the large degree of ethnic autonomy in the consociational approach.

Elections in this system are highly complex, because there is a large number of a different institution that must be elected. Moreover, there are different rules depending on each institution as to how the members are elected. For the purposes of this paper, I will mainly deal with the parliamentary elections in each of the entities.

\(^{23}\) The central state has competencies in foreign policy and relations, trade policy, monetary policy, inter-entity transportation, air traffic control, refugees, and the finance of the institutions (Bieber 2006: 46-47). A new constitution was drafted that attempted to give more powers to the central state, in an attempt to ease the burden of EU accession negotiations. However, this new constitution failed in to gain support in the House of Representatives in April of 2006 (Skrbic and Vogel 2006).
Post-conflict Elections in BiH

After the end of the conflict, the OSCE, as I have detailed, was given a mandate to conduct elections in BiH (DPA, Annex 3). The first elections took place in 1996, only nine months after the end of the conflict and were conducted under the guide of the OSCE led Provisional Election Committee (PEC). According to Dayton, these elections were to be conducted six to nine months after its coming into force.

The PEC was established as the primary governing body for electoral regulation and tasked with conducting the first elections. The PEC consisted of a representative of the OSCE’s mission to BiH, an appointed representative of the OHR, and representatives of the three main parties in BiH (HDZ, SDA, SDS).24 The Commission was in charge of registration of political parties, establishing eligibility of voters and candidates, establishing the role of domestic and international observers, as well as supervising the whole process of the elections, among other tasks (ICG 1996).

Prior to the elections, a focus was placed on refugee return as a means to re-establish pre-conflict heterogeneity and to protect against a single ethnic group dominating a given area. Consequently, the OSCE attempted through the PEC to hinder the territorialization of ethnicity at the time by mandating that citizens should vote in their pre-1991 constituency and when they were unable to do so, they must register with the PEC in their new constituency. This followed the general guidelines established by the Dayton Agreement,

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24 This composition was slightly changed in 1998 to include members of non-ruling parties as well as some civil society actors.
which stipulated “a citizen who no longer lives in the municipality in which he or she resided in 1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected to vote in person or by absentee ballot, in that municipality” (DPA, Annex 3). Accordingly, refugee return was linked to election participation, in the hope that it would aid moderation.

Then OSCE chairman Flavio Cotti warned that if more work was not done to ensure a certain minimal standards, then the vote might lead to further entrenchment of the nationalist parties and “pseudo-democratic legitimization of extreme nationalist power structures” (OSCE 1996). Nevertheless, the elections went ahead, as to remain within the time-frame established by Dayton. The elections were won by the ethnic national parties (see table 4 for the election results) Accordingly, this result legitimized the wartime ethno-national parties and lead to a consolidation of power between these parties (Shoup 1996; Manning 2004).

While the OSCE found that the elections did not completely satisfy all of the criteria for being free and fair, they went ahead and certified the results (ICG 1996). Election fraud was prevalent – there was even an election turnout of 105 percent (Manning 2004). The ethno-national parties defrauded the result and encouraged voters to stay in their post-conflict constituencies in order to preserve the de facto ethnic cleansing that was achieved after the conflict. In fact, there was only minimal refugee return (Bieber 2006). The international efforts to conduct the elections in Bosnia were in many ways then unsuccessful. Because of the lack of unity over a new permanent election law, the mandate of the OSCE was extended indefinitely by the PIC after 1996 elections.

Even though the elections in 1996 and 1998 legitimized the ethno-national wartime parties, they also created a degree of stability. This stability is largely due to the success of the consociational framework established by Dayton (Caspersen 2004). While this
framework failed to create intra-ethnic cooperation, it did lead to relative stability in a post-conflict society.

2000 Entity Elections

The 2000 elections continued much as the previous ones (1996 and 1998) under the authority of the OSCE and the Provisional Election Commission (PEC). This mandate was extended by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) because of the lack of progress in forming a new electoral commission under the guise of the Bosnian State. The PIC also included the OHR as a main player in the upcoming elections, stating that “the High Representative and the OSCE Head of Mission to ensure that all parties, candidates and officials are in full conformity with provisions of the Peace Agreement and OSCE rules and regulations” (PIC 2000). Additionally, the extended powers of the OHR (the so-called Bonn Powers) were also active in the upcoming elections. Thus, the OHR had the right to dismiss candidates as well as elected officials who openly opposed the peace process. The perceived lack of success of the international community in the first two post-conflict elections in BiH (1996 and 1998) led to a more active role in the next elections (Manning and Antic 2003). Accordingly, the stage was set for increased intervention of the part of the international actors.

This intervention mainly took the form in drafting and passing a new electoral law before the 2000 elections. Before the 2000 elections the HR and OSCE passed a new electoral law (Belloni 2004). The OSCE and HR agreed on five large reforms in the PEC:

1) Open party lists

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25 The council concluded in its meeting that the elections should continue in November of 2000 as planned, but under the OSCE. It also stipulated that the OSCE should make changes to the election law before the upcoming elections (PIC 2000).
2) Multimember Constituencies (MMC)
3) Compensatory seats
4) Preferential voting system for RS president
5) New rules for FBiH House of peoples (Barry rule)

The OSCE took on open party lists because they were seen as a method to link candidates to their constituency. Previously, BiH used closed party lists. This entails that voters only vote for a party and consequently the party decides who was elected in each constituency. In open party lists the voters are able to vote for both the candidate and the party. This method was supposed to increase the responsibility of the candidate to his/her constituency (Belloni 2004).26

The OSCE also created MMCs for the entity parliament elections. This entailed that the entities were divided into smaller constituencies for the parliament elections. This effort was supposed to also increase the responsibility of the candidate to the constituency (Bieber 2006).27 The new MMCs created clear ethnic majorities in the constituencies. Consequently, it was unlikely that a candidate would receive support from other ethnic groups.

The OSCE created compensatory seats for parties that did not overcome the minimum threshold. This led to a larger fragmentation of the parliament, because more parties were able to enter. The OSCE attempted, as well, to increase the return of refugees to their pre-conflict constituencies.

The last two measures are integrative electoral strategies. I will not discuss the preferential voting system, as it does not pertain to the parliamentary elections in the entities.

The new rules change the method for electing the House of the Peoples in the FBiH and

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26 Bieber cites an OSCE report, which argues that open party lists place “more decision making power in the hands of the voters, and ensures that elected officials are more accountable to those who elect them” (Bieber 2006: 94).
27 Bieber cites another OSCE report which says that MMCs increase responsibility because it is “easier for citizens to know who is responsible for representing them and their interests, thereby increasing the incentive for elected representatives to be responsive to the needs of the voters” (Cited in Bieber 2006: 95).
came to be known as the Barry-rule because it was strongly championed by then OSCE Ambassador Robert Barry. Under the previous rule members of the House of Peoples in the FBiH were elected by the cantonal assemblies. However, each national group was permitted to select its own representative. Accordingly, Bosniaks were not able to vote for Croat representatives and vice versa. The new rule changes this, allowing for all members of the assemblies to vote on the representatives to the House of Peoples. Additionally, quotas were put in place to maintain the distribution and prevent under or over representation. The intended purpose of such a measure is to increase moderation within the elected officials. The assumption is that when candidates are elected by the entire body, then they must make more moderate claims in order to appeal to voters that are not from their ethnic constituency. Accordingly, Croat candidates would have to appeal more to Bosnian voters in the Canton assemblies in order to be elected to the House of Peoples and vice versa.

This change the election rules in rules shortly before the upcoming elections angered the Croat leadership within the HDZ and they claimed that the rule-change was a deliberate attempt to marginalize them within the government (Belloni 2004). They especially perceived the rule change regarding the House of Peoples as an attempt to marginalize the Croatian voice in the government. This rule change helped to mobilize Croatian voters, who already had low turnouts in the last municipal elections and were threatening to repeat in the upcoming elections (ICG 2000).

The rule changes sparked a refusal by the HDZ to cooperate with International actors, when the HDZ refused the mandatory OSCE audit. The HDZ was further sanctioned by the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), a sub-commission of the Provisional Election Commission, for non-compliance with the standards on campaign slogans and materials. The
EASC found the slogan “Determination or Extermination” was found to incite ethnic hatred and that they used imagery in television spots that was also inappropriate (OSCE 2000). The Commission also struck several candidates from the HDZ party lists because they expressed anti-Dayton views (IGC 2000). The HDZ exploited these measures as well in order to point to a bias against Croat interests in BiH by international actors and used this to mobilize potential voters by playing on their fears.

Despite this growing radicalization of the Croat voters, many international observers held out hope for the upcoming election as an opportunity to end the rule of the nationalist parties. This hope was mainly based on polls that indicated that the Social Democrat Party (SDP), the moderate non-nationalist party left over from the former communist party, had gained much ground against the SDA among Bosniak voters (ICG 2000).

The SDA, the main war-time Bosniak nationalist party, had recently lost ground in the municipal elections and seemed destined to lose more ground in the upcoming entity and state elections. Moreover, the anti-corruption campaigning of the OSCE along with the leading Sarajevo Newspaper, Dnevni Avaz had damaged the reputation of the party, showing how “it’s misuse of funds and corrupt practices, bore significant responsibility for the poor economy, non-payment of pensions, lack of assistance for war invalids, the squandering of international assistance and the abuse of the privatization process, all to the detriment of ordinary Bosnians” (ICG 2000).

Another reason for optimism among the international community was the perceived threat to traditional SDA voter pool from the break away moderate Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH). Previously, after splitting from the SDA the SBiH has been a willing coalition partner, however, in the latest municipal elections, the SBiH had distanced itself
from the SDA and appeared willing to seek other coalition partners. While the SBiH is not a non-nationalist party like the SDP, they did have a much more moderate reputation and were seen by the international community as a means of advancing moderate voices. The party itself campaigned in favor of Dayton and the institutions that it created (IGC 2000). The party leadership, under war-time Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Silajdzic accordingly set itself to be the “king-maker” of the election. Moreover, the party experienced significant pressures from international actors to form a coalition with the SDP (IGC 2000).

The international community also held hopes, although slightly smaller, that positive changes would occur in the Republika Srpska (RS) as well in the upcoming entity elections. It was hoped that voters would turn away from the hard-line nationalist party, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). The main two parties looked to by the international community to step in were the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP), both relatively centrist Serbian parties.

In the run-up to the elections there was a growing thought that the OSCE would ban the SDS from the elections based on their open opposition of the Dayton Agreement and the continued control over the party by suspected war criminal Radovan Karadzic (ICG 2000). Both the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. at the time, Richard Holbrooke, and the International Crisis Group, an important policy institute, advocated the ban of the SDS in the run up to the elections (Bieber 2006).

However, the OSCE claimed that it did not want to disenfranchise a large segment of the RS population, which would have voted for the SDS. Such a move would have an even
greater affect since the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) had already been banned in 1999. Consequently, the SDS was allowed to run candidates in the elections.

The 2000 elections were the first time that non-nationalist parties were able to create a coalition excluding the main nationalist parties (e.g. SDA, SDS, and HDZ). The so-called “Alliance for Change” won on most levels of government, which was a coalition of several of non-nationalist parties, including the SDP, as well as moderate nationalist parties SBiH and NHI (see tables 6 and 7). At the entity level a similar coalition was formed in FBiH, while a coalition excluding the SDS was only nominally possible in the RS. As can be seen in tables six and seven, the results of the oppositional parties clearly increased. However, this result is more likely evidence of the active support given to the oppositional parties by the OSCE (Bieber 2006; Belloni 2004). Moreover, the support for the ethno-national parties remained relatively high and only the SDA had clear losses from previous years.

The reforms (open party lists, MMCs, and compensatory seats) did not encourage voting across ethnic lines. Belloni argues that open party lists do not advance multi-ethnic parties because the voters have no incentive to vote for other a party of a different ethnic group (Belloni 2004). Moreover, it is very difficult to encourage this sort of behavior is a largely consociational regime. Belloni argues that “without altering the consociational structure of BiH institutions, any positive effects of electoral engineering can only occur under the most unusual and unpredictable circumstances” (Belloni 2005: 340). The relative homogeneity of the entities blocked the need for candidates to appeal to other ethnic groups for support because they only need to appeal to their own to be elected.

In the Federation the SBiH ended up as the king maker in the entity parliament elections, being in the position to choose between coalition with the SDA or the SDP. After
significant international pressure, the SBiH agreed to help form a coalition with the SDP. However, due to the absence of a clear winner, the coalition had to include many of the other small parties in the House.

In the Republika Srpska, the SDS emerged as the party with the largest number seats. However, the PDP was able, under the strong pressure from international actors, to form a government not included the SDS.\(^{28}\) The government required the passive support of the SDS in exchange for increased posts and influence at the lower levels of administration.

2002 Entity Elections

Following the 2000 elections the OHR and OSCE focused on completing a permanent election law for BiH, which was adopted in 2001 (Belloni 2004). This law included a transfer of the authority for the PEC from the OSCE to the Bosnian state, which retained a position within in the commission, but was reduced to observer status and has merely an advisory role. The new body was renamed the Central Election Commission (CEC). The elections were consequently the first since the conflict to be conducted under Bosnian control.

The new election law made several changes in the existing election rules in BiH. First, it increased the mandate of elected officials to fours years. Previously, the OSCE, through the PEC, could dictate the term lengths after each election (IGC 2003). Second, it extended the preferential voting system used for the RS presidency to the federal level presidency. However, the extension was limited because it maintained the electoral basis. Voters in FBiH voted on the Croat and Bosniak presidents, while voters from RS voted for the Serb candidate (Belloni 2006). Third, the new election law proscribed that illegal

\(^{28}\) The exclusion of the SDS was imposed by the OHR on the PDP (Bieber 2006).
occupants of property are only allowed to vote in their pre-war residency (Belloni 2004).
The other changes were largely the incorporation of the previous election law written by the
OSCE into the new national law.

The involvement in this election of the international community was consequently
much more subdued. While the OHR, OSCE, EU, and the U.S. all made their preference
known for the non-nationalist candidates, there was far less direct intervention as there had
been in the previous elections. The OHR did provide direct support to the coalition by
providing them with an economic program to campaign with (ICG 2003). The OHR also
mounted a “get out the vote” campaign to help counteract some of the early predictions that
there would be a low voter turnout.29 Other international actors either made visits or made
public statements regarding their support for the current coalition in the elections, including
EU foreign policy special representative Javier Solana and the new U.S. secretary of State
Colin Powell.

Nevertheless, the polls indicated that the nationalist powers would be the main
winners of the election. This is perhaps partially due to the inability of the parties from the
“Alliance for Change” coalition to run on a common platform in the 2002 elections,
preferring instead to run independently (Burwitz 2004).

The result of the 2002 elections was the removal of the short lived alliance for change
from power and consequently the re-capturing of the government by the ethno-national
parties (Burowitz 2004) (see table 6 and 7). The SDP was the largest loser in these elections,
while the results of the other parties remained more or less the same. Burrowitz surmises
that most the SDP voters abstained. As proof for this, participation was markedly less as in
previous elections. Nevertheless, the elections were conducted however without any

29 The national democracy institute of the U.S. predicted that turnout would be below 40 percent (ICG 2003).
problems (Freedom House 2005). This points to the stabilization of the system, even after subtracting direct international participation, even though the OSCE and HR still maintained a high presence during the elections as observers. Moreover the elections were marked by a lower turnout, around 57 percent. The provision of compensatory seats and use of proportional representation caused more fragmentation without diluting the support of the main nationalist parties (Belloni 2006). Instead, establishing a viable opposition became next to impossible with the proliferation of small oppositional parties in the parliaments.

The main nationalist parties formed a coalition at the national level, and at the entity level the HDZ, SDA, and SBiH went back their traditional coalition, while the PDP, SDS, and SDA formed a coalition in the RS (IGC 2003). While a non-nationalist government was numerically possible in both entities, it was impeded by various difficulties. In FBiH it would have been necessary to have the support of every single party in the house in order to exclude both the SDA and HDZ – no small task. In RS, the results were much more manageable (surprisingly) for a moderate government to be established. However, existing rivalry between the leadership of the SNSD and PDP prevented any such coalition from occurring (ICG 2003). Consequently, the PDP acted again as king maker and formed a coalition with the SDS and the SDA, who received only a few appointments in the government.
Conclusions

As we have seen, international actors have had a quite active presence in Bosnia since the end of the conflict. With the signing of Dayton, a legal and institutionalized entry point was created for many international organizations to participate in and influence Bosnian politics and society at many different levels. Potentially one of the largest of these entry points has been the mandate that the OSCE and OHR have received in conducting and directing post-war elections in Bosnia. Elections form an important part of the international community’s program in post-conflict Bosnia, as they manage the distribution of power. Consequently, the rules for distributing this power are extremely important in a post-conflict and ethnically divided society. Elections, then, were poised to be one of the principle conflict management techniques of the international community, as well as an indicator of overall democratic progress.

Initially, the OSCE and the OHR were fully able to participate in the drafting and later the revision of Bosnian election law. Through this power, they were given the opportunity to put their conflict management strategies into institutional practice. Moreover, these actors held sway over the conducting of the elections and were initially had the right to remove candidates and to approve the election results.

However, the international efforts in BiH have only been partially successful because they have largely consisted of ad hoc measures. Theses measures often resulted in a mixed logic, where the consociational structures worked against the integrative measures being
pursued. The OSCE and HR have pursued both integrative and consociational conflict management strategies within a deeply consociational system. These competing logics fail to ameliorate the ethnic divides. Moreover, the consociational design has largely territorialized and institutionalized ethnicity, creating further problems in achieving the stated goal of reducing the saliency of the ethnic cleavage. The lack of refugee return exacerbates this issue even more, by solidifying the conflict era ethnic cleansing. Ad hoc responses and unilateral directives have also impeded the further developments by altering the institutional rewards and the locus of power and consequently the psychology of the parties and political actors.

Integrationist scholars have argued that Bosnia should implement more preferential voting, which was adopted for the RS presidency in the 2000 elections, and used for the national level presidency in the most recent elections in October of 2006. However, some scholars have argued that the use of preferential voting was not perfectly adapted because it only allowed for citizens to vote within their ethnicity and for the national level it restricted voters to their entities.

Proponents of integrationist conflict management theories have also argued that Bosnia requires a complete restructuring for further reforms to be effective. They criticize the current consociational foundation of BiH, especially the territorial ethnic division that became enshrined within the Dayton political boundaries and lack of refugee return. Robert Belloni (2004) has suggested along these lines that the creation of nation wide electoral base for the presidency could be a first step. While this is often criticized on the grounds that it gives increased influence to the largest ethnic group, the Bosniaks. Belloni has also suggested that the relaxation of strict proportionality in the parliaments could alleviate some
of the excessive fragmentation and improve their chances of establishing an effective coalition.

In measuring the success of conflict management strategies, many theorists have taken the absence of widespread violence as the defining criteria for success (Horowitz 2000). Under this criterion it seems that Bosnia has had a fair degree of success. BiH seems to have reached definite level of stability. The perception that a new outbreak of conflict will occur has generally declined within the population, signally a degree of stability. However, the continued presence of the international community weakens the need for Bosnian political actors to genuinely accept the post-conflict system. Thus, anything more than this stability will most likely require large changes within the institutional logic as well as a reappraisal of the international influence and mandate in BiH.
## Appendix A: Tables

### Table 1. International Participation in BiH (After Dayton)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex of Dayton</th>
<th>Area of Authority</th>
<th>International Organization / Body</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-A</td>
<td>Military Aspects</td>
<td>NATO (IFOR, SFOR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-B</td>
<td>Regional Stabilization</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Inter-Entity borders</td>
<td>NATO (IFOR, SFOR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>HR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, Article IV</td>
<td>Constitutional Court</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, Article VII</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Human rights Ombudsman</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Commission for public corporations</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Civil Implementation</td>
<td>HR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (DPA 1995)

### Table 2. Population Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Federation BiH (FBiH)</th>
<th>Republika Srpska (RS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bieber 2006

### Table 3. Orientation of the Political Parties in BiH and their Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosniak</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Croat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Nationalist</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>HSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>HDZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Nationalist</td>
<td>SBiH</td>
<td>SNSD, PDP</td>
<td>NHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non Nationalist</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cross-national</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bieber 2006
### Table 4. Results from 1996 Parliamentary Elections FBiH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZL (now SDP)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBiH</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNZ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shoup 1996

### Table 5. Results from 1996 Parliamentary elections, RS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPIM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZL (Former SDP)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBiH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP-Krajina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shoup 1996

### Table 6. Results from 2000 and 2002 Parliamentary Elections, FBiH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Seats (140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Source: Bieber 2006
Appendix B: Maps


http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia/ethnic_majorities_97.jpg
Map 2. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political Border after Dayton

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