FROM BLACK TO BROWN: (NON)SHIFTS IN THE RACIAL POSITIONING OF MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES

Atiya Husain

A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Sociology.

Chapel Hill
2014

Approved by:
Karolyn Tyson
Charles Kurzman
Anthony Perez
ABSTRACT

Atiya Husain: From Black to Brown: (Non)Shifts in the Racial Positioning of Muslims in the United States (Under the direction of Karolyn Tyson)

This study examines the racialization of Muslims in the US and what it means for the positioning of Muslims within the US racial framework. I conduct content and discourse analysis of mainstream media representations of Islam and Muslims in newspaper articles, randomly sampling articles from three mainstream newspapers over the period of three years before and after 9/11 to investigate the following research questions: How are Muslims and Islam racialized before and after 9/11? Have there been any shifts in representation during this time period? While a number of studies have conducted content analysis to analyze Muslim racialization, they have focused on “Arabs and Muslims,” and thus left African American Muslims outside of their analysis. My primary finding is that Muslims across racial groups are racialized as foreign to the US, and that the ways in which they are racialized as foreign depends on their “actual” race/ethnicity.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................. iv

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1

CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 4

  Background: Racialization ................................................................................................................. 4
  Differential Racialization and Racial Triangulation .......................................................................... 5
  Citizenship ......................................................................................................................................... 7
  Racialization of Arabs and Muslims ................................................................................................. 8
  Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 12

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................... 13

  Data Collection ................................................................................................................................. 13
  Coding and Data Analysis ................................................................................................................. 15

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS .......................................................................................................................... 17

  The 9/11 Effect ................................................................................................................................. 17
  Racialized as Foreign ......................................................................................................................... 17
  Differences between Groups based on Foreignness ....................................................................... 18
  African American Muslims ............................................................................................................... 21

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 26

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 30
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Racial Triangulation of Asian-Americans (Kim 1999) ........................................................................... 6
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The attacks of September 11, 2001 signaled several major shifts in the United States. The Department of Homeland Security came into existence. Foreign wars against Iraq and Afghanistan began. The attacks also led to a domestic war against “Arabs and Muslims” and those who “look Muslim” through policies like the PATRIOT Act and NSEERS (Volpp 2002). From 2002-2011, the National Security Entry-Exist Registration System (NSEERS) required non-citizens from select countries to register with U.S. authorities. Not only did the U.S. government target these groups, but so did average Americans: in 2001, at least five people were killed in hate crimes because they were perceived to be Muslim. However, only one victim was Muslim; the others were Sikh, Hindu, and Christian (Volpp 2002).

The pervasiveness of discrimination and hate crimes against people who “appear” Muslim after 9/11 led researchers to study the logic behind this grouping. They concluded that the lumping together of those who are perceived to be Muslim indicates some sort of process of racialization at work (Chan-Malik 2000; Curtis 2013; Joseph, D’Harlingue, and Wong 2008; Love 2009; Rana 2011; Selod and Embrick 2013; Volpp 2002), which Omi and Winant (1994) define as the attribution of racial meaning to social groups. Racial meaning is being attributed when social groups are characterized as having inherent or seemingly natural qualities, whether biological or cultural qualities. One example of racial attribution to the term “Muslim” is representations of Muslims as having qualities associated with South Asians or Arabs, such as certain skin tones and types of clothing (Bhattacharyya 2008; Brown et al. 2013; Franks 2000; Prashad 2000; Silva 2010).

Scholarship on the racialization of Muslims after 9/11 has often focused on representations, as this article does, and offers many insights and several notable drawbacks that my paper will address.
This body of work rightly addresses processes by which Muslims are racialized, seeing race as a process rather than a fixed attribute attached to people. It also sees Americanness as part of the process. While most of it focuses explicitly on threat, some of it sees how even positive representations and meanings serve to racialize. While insightful and pushing theoretical boundaries in ways, this literature neglects to analyze how the racialization of Islam post-9/11 affects African American Muslims. While ostensibly analyzing all Muslims, this body of work reflects the experiences and realities of brown Muslims, often implicitly. This focus makes sense on one level because the racialization of Muslims after 9/11 is directed so prominently on brown bodies. It is common sense. At the same time, this analysis may overlook how historical racialization of Muslims in which fears of black radicalism and its association of Islam was prominent in the mainstream US imagination. This history may inform today’s racialization of Muslims. Mainstream white America felt quite threatened by black radicalism, many of whose leaders were Muslim (Daulatzai 2012; Marable and Aidi 2009). According to historian Edward Curtis, “The Black Muslim Scare of the 1960s was the pinnacle of pre-9/11 fears about the Muslim threat to the American nation-state” (Curtis 2013:98). This was a time when the FBI was intensely focused on tracking and repressing African American political dissent, and the Nation of Islam was one of their major targets as early as the 1940s. This was due to the FBI’s fear that African Americans were attracted to anti-American ideologies including Islam and, of course, Communism. Islam came under suspicion, Curtis argues, because of its association with black resistance to white supremacy. But one may not know this upon reading much of today’s scholarship on Muslim racialization in the U.S.

Aside from its utility in analyzing mainstream U.S. perceptions of threat, the comfort with which “Arabs and Muslims” are lumped together obscures the actual make-up of the Muslim population in the U.S. According to the Pew Research Group, 26% of Muslims in the US self-identify as black, and the majority of these are African-American (Pew 2007). Another survey shows that 35% of Muslims in the US are black (Gallup Center for Muslim Studies 2009). According to Gallup, the remainder includes: 28%
white, 18% Asian, 18% other, 1% Hispanic. According to Pew, the remainder includes: 38% white, 20%
Asian, 16% other or mixed race. These demographic realities and the relative absence of African
American Muslims from post-9/11-focused research on Muslim racialization raises questions about how
precise this post-9/11 analysis of Muslim racialization actually is, and possible skewing toward how
brown Muslims are racialized at the expense of examining black Muslim racialization along with it.

In my study, I broaden the category of “Muslim” to include all who are identified as such, in
keeping with the demographic reality of the population, to examine how racial meaning is attributed to
the group, and what that attribution means for the positioning of Muslims within the US racial
framework. I conduct content and discourse analysis on mainstream media representations of Islam and
Muslims in newspaper articles. I sample articles from three mainstream newspapers over the period of
three years before and three years after 9/11 to investigate the following research questions: How are
Muslims and Islam racialized before and after 9/11? Have there been any shifts in representation during
this time period?
CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Background: Racialization

Racialization has many meanings across disciplines; debates on the meaning of the term yield no agreed upon definition since it was first used by Frantz Fanon (Fanon 1952; Miles and Brown 2003; Murji and Solomos 2005). The range of focus spans from the process by which groups are consolidated and essentialized into racial groups (Miles and Brown 2003; Omi and Winant 1994) to the association of racial groups with certain traits (Tyson, Darity, and Castellino 2004). Research shows that groups of people (e.g., Hispanics, Ibo, Yoruba, Slavs), policies (e.g. the GI Bill, welfare) and characteristics (e.g., poverty, illness) are racialized (Alba 2005; Brodkin Sacks 1994; Gilens 1999; Ignatiev 1995; Katz 1989; Lieberman 1998; Metzl 2009; Perez 2008; Purkayastha 2005). This research demonstrates that race is not just a phenotypic construct, but also a political one, because racial meaning can be attached to a wide range of peoples and phenomena based on non-phenotypic criteria. For example, “white” on the census includes Europeans, North Africans, and Middle Easterners. In 1997, the Office of Management and Budget considered creating “Middle Eastern” as an ethnic category on the census in order to track discrimination against this group. It was concluded that further research was needed so this initiative did not pass. Instead, “Middle Eastern” remains one of the three groups that are considered “white” on the census, including North Africans and Europeans. Therefore, the category “white” on the census includes people like Sudanese, for example, who would be considered black in their daily life and as such doesn’t reflect salient phenotypic similarity. Even when racial meaning is based on phenotype, the selection and presumed significance of phenotypic traits is also a socially and historically contingent process (Haney-Lopez 2006; Omi and Winant 1994; Smedley 1999; Wade 1997) (Alba 2005; Smedley
that “reflects and affects the social, political, ideological, and economic struggles between the races” (Bonilla-Silva 1997:472).

**Differential Racialization and Racial Triangulation**

Revisiting racialization literature can get us back to fundamental elements of racialization like how groups are constructed in relation to each other and for particular purposes. It also allows us to examine how Muslims are positioned in the US racial framework. Two of the main theories that I will discuss here are differential racialization (Almaguer 1994) and racial triangulation (Kim 1999). Both of these theories look at the economic and political conditions under which Asians, Latinos, blacks, and whites are constructed as racial groups relative to one another. The relative placement of these groups in the racial hierarchy helps us understand how various racial groups among Muslims, which includes Asians, Latinos, blacks and whites, may be discussed in the media relative to one another.

Building from Omi and Winant (1994), Tomas Almaguer’s (1994) concept of differential racialization shows how groups are fit into the racial hierarchy. Developed through an empirical analysis of the complex race politics of California in the early twentieth century, his theory suggests that racial groups are constructed and reorganized over time and in relation to one another. Kim’s (1999) “field of racial positions” pushes both Omi and Winant’s (1994) concept of racial formation (or racialization) and Almaguer’s (1994) differential racialization theory forward. The field of racial positions builds on both of these by showing us along which lines/axes groups are placed relative to one another, and it also shows how groups are valorized in some ways and ostracized in others.

Omi and Winant’s (1994) now well-established racial formation theory proposed a way to understand how racial groups form in the first place. They challenged dominant ways of understanding race in sociology, particularly the ethnicity paradigm (Park 1950), and proposed a theory that considers ethnicity, class, and nation as important features in the attribution of race. While ethnicity theory focused on explaining the adaptability of racial identity, it did so based on European immigrants like Irish
Catholics and European Jews who eventually came to be considered white (Brodkin Sacks 1994; Fox and Guglielmo 2012; Guglielmo 2003; Ignatiev 1995) and accepted as Americans (Park 1950). This model is not applicable to all ethnic or racial groups as it shows them all as taking an upward trajectory over time, which does not accurately capture the trajectory of non-white groups. Omi and Winant’s theory is more adaptable and able to explain the differences in the trajectories that different groups take.

The case of Asian Americans has been used to build on differential racialization theory in efforts to continue to move beyond a “black-white paradigm” (Jung 2011; Kim 1999). Kim (1999) shows how Asian Americans have been constructed as a racial group in relation to whites and blacks based on economic policies, immigration, and in representations. She theorizes that Asian Americans are “racially triangulated” relative to blacks and whites in order to maintain white supremacy. “Triangulation” refers to Asian-Americans’ placement as an intermediate group in between black and white on a basic graph in which the x-axis represents insider or outsider status in the U.S., while the y-axis represents superiority or inferiority.

![Figure 1: Racial Triangulation of Asian-Americans (Kim 1999)](image)
Whites and blacks are in the same plane on the y-axis because they are considered truly American (or fully assimilated). Asians are placed in between black and white because they are superior to blacks but inferior to whites. Asians are also in a different plane than whites and blacks on the x-axis because they are considered foreign. One of this theory’s strengths is that the hierarchy is not one-dimensional and considers foreignness and assimilation as racial constructs. Asians are ostracized in relation to whites based on foreignness, and valorized in relation to blacks based on model minority status through assimilation.

Applying the differential racialization framework to most research on Muslim racialization would lead one to conclude that Muslims may replace Asians as a foreign, intermediate group between blacks and whites. This is because research on Muslim racialization explains the racial logic in the lumping of Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and others with certain phenotypic features. The problem with this application of racial triangulation to Muslims in the US is that there are actually many Muslims in all three of Kim’s racial categories – white, Asian-American, and black– and the lack of empirical evidence on how black and white Muslims fit into the racialization narrative gives us reason to probe further. In other words, to limit Muslims to the intermediate category, which would be a logical conclusion based on the Muslim racialization literature, miss part of the story. Therefore, the importance of Kim’s work for this research is in the finding that foreignness is a racial construct that has implications for racial attribution in general, and the placement and co-construction of racial groups relative to one another.

Citizenship

Race and citizenship are intimately connected (Haney-Lopez 2006; Jung 2011; Mills 1997; Omi and Winant 1994). While Kim argues that blacks are insiders relative to Asian Americans and whites, others have argued that African Americans’ citizenship and belonging in the U.S. is also tenuous though perhaps differently from how Asian Americans are understood to be foreign (Daulatzai 2012; Mills 1991). Both groups, like people of color in general, are constructed as a foil to national identity (Liu and
Mills 2006). Discussion of African-American citizenship is typically centered on the *Dred Scott* decision in which it was ruled that African Americans were not citizens, and the nullification of this decision following the post-Civil War amendments. Although nullified, such a discussion must consider that African Americans remain “legally entitled [while] informally denied” the “rights and privileges of full citizenship” (Jung 2011:20).

The debate on the status of African Americans with regard to citizenship and belonging resonates with research on Muslims in the US that frequently looks at Muslims’ lives through the lens of citizenship (Volpp 2002) and this still disproportionately focuses on Muslims from the Middle East and South Asia who are immigrants or are the children of immigrants. This debate informs this study’s consideration of foreignness in understanding the racialization of Muslims in the US.

**Racialization of Arabs and Muslims**

The concept of racialization is still under construction in literature on Muslims in the US. In the literature dealing with “Arabs and Muslims,” there has been an ongoing debate on whether racialization is occurring (Naber 2008; Rana 2011), particularly through the “racial crystallization of the category Arab-Muslim” (Ewing 2008:2), or whether political or ethnic-based discrimination explain what others call racialization (Maira 2008; Shryock 2008), or if Muslims are understood through racial logic (Byng 2008; Love 2009). With a few exceptions in whose footsteps this study follows, this debate is most often concerned with post-9/11 discrimination against the category “Arabs and Muslims” (Byng 2008; Cainkar 2009; Naber 2008; Rana 2011) to the point that racialization is often inaccurately understood as synonymous with overtly discriminatory Islamophobia. This conflation of racialization and Islamophobia is misleading because there is Islamophobia that is not racial (i.e. Qur’an burning), because racialization of Muslims also occurs through seemingly positive or sympathetic representations of (or behavior toward) Muslims that may not appear Islamophobic at face value (Kazi 2009).
There has been debate around the very use of racialization theory to understand Muslim experiences in the US. Anthropologist Andrew Shryock’s argument against racialization theories is that racialization theory is a political tool that “attempts to...give Arabs and Muslims a more secure place within dominant structures of American identity politics” (Shryock 2008:98). He says that “Arabs and Muslims are not racialized in consistent ways and are defined instead by their association with highly specific (and racially misconstrued) cultural forms” (2008:98-99). While I agree that an issue with racialization theory may be that the inconsistency with which Arabs and Muslims are racialized is not reflected in the research, I argue that it is due to the drive to understand and challenge the logic behind racialized policies and practices directed at Muslims and those who “look Muslim,” which leads researchers and others to the category of “Arabs and Muslims,” or to the desire to “correct” what they see as cases of mistaken identity and wrongful consolidation of groups that aren’t “actually” the same. The problem with this is that it assumes that some racialized groups actually are similar and that their racialization then “makes sense.” Shryock’s critique reifies the belief in the existence of distinct races such that assignment to one or another can be done accurately, i.e. not racially misconstrued. If race is socially constructed, racial attribution is not a matter of accuracy as much as it is a matter of certain logics. As the previous section in this literature review demonstrates, race and ethnicity have been imagined in many different ways historically. While acknowledging its weaknesses, racialization theory investigates the construction of racial categories rather than taking the assignment of groups to racial categories for granted.

Empirical research engaging racialization literature on Arabs and Muslims using mainstream media data has successfully tracked many images attached to Muslims. For example, Joseph et al (2008) examine articles from the New York Times through the period of 2000-2004 and find that Muslim and Arab Americans are portrayed as having stronger ties to their countries of origin than other immigrants, as being more devout than other Americans, as having greater loyalty to religion over nation, and as
possessing links to international Muslim movements. The study also finds that Muslim and Arab Americans are understood as “high risk citizens” who are prone to “irrational religious rage” (Joseph et al 2008:234). The focus of Joseph et al is on the implications of these stereotypes and discrimination for Muslims. Byng (2008) also uses mainstream media data to analyze Muslims after 9/11. She seeks to capture how religious identity is used to organize social inequality when those religious identities are central to political conflicts. She thus examines Muslims after 9/11 using articles from local papers in the northeast U.S. and the Washington Post from May 2002 – May 2003. She claims that the religion-based inequality that Muslims face “mimics racial inequality” due to essentializing and the construction of hierarchy. This claim challenges those who hold that “benign markers of difference” (2008:659) exist in American society. Byng’s work considers the complexity of religious and racial identity for Muslims following 9/11, and its concern with hierarchy leads naturally into questions of racial hierarchy based on the complexity of social inequality that she describes.

In contrast to the racialization literature that focuses on “Arabs and Muslims,” research on black Muslims has been less concerned with the racial formation process and more focused on histories of Islam in the U.S.(Abdullah 2010; Diouf 1998; IV 2002; McCloud 1995) and race relations among Muslims (Jackson 2005; Karim 2008; McCloud 2006). This may reflect how blacks have occupied a much less ambiguous position in the U.S. racial hierarchy than Arabs and South Asians (Love 2009), which may make racial formation appear to be less of a concern than history, race relations, and the particular dynamics of inequality. However, racialization of black Americans should not be taken for granted since it is ongoing. While it began in early US history, it is ongoing and re-created over time (Wacquant 2000). The combination of black and Muslim identity may result in a more complex racial identity than previous empirical studies of Muslim racialization have been able to accommodate.

Literature on Muslims and race in the US focuses on the divide between “Arabs and Muslims” on the one hand and “black Muslims” on the other. These terms are challenging in their inaccuracy and
in the hold they have over the literature. Some describe this divide as “immigrant Muslims” and “indigenous Muslims” (Jackson 2005; Karim 2008). Immigrant Muslims refers to Arabs and South Asian Muslims, as well as others who are from Muslim majority countries, as well as the children of immigrants, while indigenous Muslims refers primarily to African American Muslims. This language has currency in the literature on American Muslims even as it is inconsistent and at times inaccurate since the American-born children of immigrants are not immigrants themselves but fall into the category of immigrant, and the term indigenous typically refers to Native Americans rather than African Americans. Though the terms are awkward, the evidence supporting a gap is strong, and the literatures on “Arabs and Muslims” and “black Muslims” are frequently concerned with different issues.

Partially in response to these issues, there is some research that connects “Arabs and Muslims” and “black Muslims” into a larger narrative that focuses on the forces that lead to racialization rather than the categories that they create. The problem with focusing on the racial categories if one is talking about racialization processes is that these categories may be mistaken for being stable rather than contingent. Media studies scholar Sohail Daulatzai (2012) situates the representations of these groups in the larger processes that create them (Daulatzai 2012). He draws connections between the “War on Terror” and the “War on Drugs.” These wars gave birth to two figures in the 1970s: the “Black criminal,” who is a domestic threat to the US, and the “Muslim terrorist,” who is a foreign threat to the US (Daulatzai 2012:89). These two figures are differentiated from one another by a few qualities: the type of violence associated with them, and their status as domestic or foreign. While they differ on those counts, he argues, they both “formed the twin pillars of U.S. statecraft in the post-Civil Rights era” (2012:97). In other words, the US fashioned its national identity in opposition to the “Black criminal” and the “Muslim terrorist.” For Daulatzai, these figures overlap in the form of Black Muslims, who are considered the greatest threat to the nation. The value of Daulatzai’s research in this project is that he weaves what others call “immigrant” and “indigenous” Muslims into one narrative in which Muslims are
constructed as a threat. Here, Daulatzai departs from the racialization literature on Muslims which tends to focus on people with origins in the Middle East at the exclusion of black American Muslims. In showing the links between black America and Middle Easterners, different types of racial meaning are connected into a larger narrative about Muslim racialization.

Summary

In summary, this study examines representations of Muslims in the US in order to determine how Muslims in the U.S. are understood racially and to revisit the appropriateness of existing theory on this matter. Based on racialization theory as a foundation, a review of the literature on Arabs and Muslims shows gaps in analysis in which the absence of racial understandings of African American Muslims skews analysis toward the racialization of “Arabs and Muslims.” This gap results in inaccuracy about how Muslims as a whole are racialized. An engagement with the literature on citizenship and nativism provides a framework for understanding “internal minorities” as a whole, including all racial groups among Muslims in the U.S. Differential racialization and racial triangulation theories provide possibilities for how Muslims in the U.S. may be situated in the racial hierarchy.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Based on the findings of previous research on the racialization of Muslims pre- and post-9/11 (Bayoumi 2006; Byng 2008; Cainkar 2009; Naber 2008; Rana 2011), I begin with the notion that the term “Muslim” has racial meaning attached to it. Using the existing research as a compass for my study, I build on these works to determine how racial meaning is attributed to the term “Muslim” and whether the prevalence of this phenomenon has changed based on the major events of 9/11.

The theoretical goal of this paper is to construct a framework to better understand how racial meaning is applied to Muslims in the U.S. The choice of research method is motivated by two empirical goals: to analyze media representations of Muslims in the U.S., and to assess the frequency with which particular representations appear. Therefore, I draw on both discourse and content analysis. These two methods share a focus on the analysis of textual meaning; they are also used in the study of media (Kimberley A. Neuendorf 2002). According to Neuendorf (2002), content analysis is within the quantitative analysis tradition; the measures of frequency of the basic constructs of interest in this study are derived through content analysis. Discourse analysis, on the other hand, is a qualitative method that provides the tools to systematically analyze the themes, language, and rhetorical moves found in media representations of Muslims in the U.S. (van Dijk 1991; Hijmans 1996). I conduct content and discourse analysis of newspaper articles over the period of 1998-2004 from the top three highest circulating newspapers in the US: the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and USA Today.

Data Collection

Several sample restrictions are imposed to focus more sharply on the target population of interest: Muslims who live in the US. Sampling involves three steps. First, using the search engines Lexis Nexis and Factiva, I collect every article containing the words “Islam” and/or “Muslim,” including all
possible variations of the terms (e.g., “Islamic” or “Moslem”). I manually skim and retain all those that contain at least one reference to Muslims or Islam in the US. Manually collecting articles about American Muslims is preferable to including “American” in the original search terms. This is because “Muslims” is broader and does not run the risk of unintentionally excluding articles that should be included. Another reason for not including “American” is because the fact that the Muslims in these articles are American is conveyed through mention of the American cities they live in, American organizations that they are affiliated with, and other indicators. Second, to ensure representativeness, these articles (n=1200) are then randomly sampled using a random number chart, resulting in a total number of 281 articles in the final sample uploaded into qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA. Lastly, because my analysis is on how Muslims are racialized, I remove articles with only religious representations of Muslims, and I code those with only racial or racial and religious representations.

The current study differs from existing research on this topic in a few ways. First, my study compares pre- and post-9/11, and looks at both “liberal” and “conservative” newspapers. Second, I analyze the connection between “Arab” and “Muslim” without taking this connection as a given. This is an important distinction, because previous research examines racialization (which in this case is the glue between “Arab” and “Muslim”) as a form of discrimination; but, in fact, it is possible to be racialized into a more privileged position on the racial hierarchy (e.g., Irish and Germans). Indeed, racialization does not only lead to subordination.

Unlike Joseph et al (2008), who conducted close textual readings of New York Times articles on “Arab and Muslim Americans” over the period of 2000-2004, searching for thematic patterns in word choice and rhetorical moves, I do not select articles on the basis of nationality (e.g., Arab American, Arab, Middle East American, Egyptian American or Libyan American).
Coding and Data Analysis

Using MAXQDA, I systematically read and code each sampled newspaper article. In content and discourse analysis, the unit of analysis is the message (Neuendorf 2002). I code passages within each article in order to track rhetorical moves and other micro-level ways in which racial meaning is communicated. However, I conceive of the “message” more broadly than individual passages within articles, and thus the unit of analysis in this study is each article and not quotes within them. This methodological choice is rooted in the theoretical understanding that readers may not absorb every word of the newspaper articles they read, but rather skim and come away with a general feel for what they have read.

Coding begins with a pre-established set of codes and continues with codes that are developed from the data. First, I code all direct and indirect references to race and ethnicity using in-vivo coding (Glaser and Strauss 1967). I create codes to account for racial representations found in the data that my coding scheme did not already account for, as well as the codes that I created before approaching the data. Most codes have been determined prior to approaching the data in order to capture the major constructs of interest. These codes focus on race. They break down the multiple ways of understanding race to see exactly how it is applied to Muslims. These codes include: foreign/immigrant, biological references to race (e.g. skin color), cultural references to race (e.g. associating beards and hijabs with “Muslim culture” rather than religious practice), skin color (so that if there are any biological references to race they are noted), when race is explicitly stated, and racial imagery/stereotypes (example below). Other codes include: Arab / Middle Eastern, black / African American, South Asian, white, and other. Based on this perspective in the literature, my study pays attention to divides based on race and citizen/immigrant status without using the terms “immigrant” and “indigenous,” and thus leaving room for alternative language and concepts that better capture the racial positioning of Muslims in the U.S.
In the first stage of analysis, I also remove articles that do not have any racial representations. Second, I read the coded passages to identify patterns in associations between racial groups and certain actions, practices, issues, and places. In this second stage of analysis, I also code racial stereotypes that contain racial meaning but do not identify a person’s race.

Because processes of racialization are always embedded in other forms of hierarchy (Bonilla-Silva 2001:37), additional codes focus on gender, sexuality, and class. To examine how religious representations of Muslims connect with racial ones, I also code religious imagery of piety, belief, practice, dress, and so on. I also code phrases that do the work of an adjective, such as “Muslims who live in the US.” I code such examples as racial representations.

Some racial representations fall into the category of the “new racism,” “colorblindness,” or “laissez-faire racism” expressed by Balibar (1991), Bonilla-Silva (2009), and Bobo et al (1997), respectively (Balibar 1991; Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2009). These theories refer to the ways in which racism is made to appear non-racial, which relates to the coding process because I code such representations as racial. The images that I will look for are found in media research on Arabs and Muslims (Byng 2008; Joseph et al. 2008) and blacks (Entman and Rojecki 2001; Gilens 1999), as well as present day anti-black racism in general (Bobo et al. 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2009). Liu and Mills’s (2006) work on plausible deniability finds that racist intent is denied through two major methods: first, through criticism based on violation of “traditional values in mainstream society” rather than a group’s ethnicity, and second, through nationalist discourse (2006:84-85). Their research provides two concrete ways in which color-blindness is deployed in news media representations.

I construct analytical categories that capture major patterns in the data. The final stage of coding the data is to code each article by which of these analytical categories it falls under.
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

The 9/11 Effect

Following 9/11, there are some shifts as well as some stability in racial representations of Muslims in the United States. As expected, the number of racial representations of Muslims increased after 9/11. The average increase is 26.2% across the newspapers. The greatest increase was in the Wall Street Journal by 45%, followed by USA Today by 29%, and the New York Times by 5%.

Major shifts in how Muslims are talked about racially following 9/11 include 1) the drastic increase in the number of articles on Middle Eastern Muslims, and 2) the entrance of white, Latino, and African American (non-NOI) Muslims into the data.

Racialized as Foreign

The primary finding is that Muslims as a whole are racialized as foreign to the U.S. Sometimes their foreignness is expressed explicitly using the term “foreign” as in the following example from USA Today in the days following 9/11:

The international nature of the attacks is re-igniting persistent tensions among foreign students, particularly Muslims, and student groups. While many student groups, including the U.S. Students Association, are campaigning against hate attacks, Arizona State University, for one, reported that a Muslim student was punched, kicked and hit with eggs Thursday. American University in Washington, DC., (sic) closed down for part of the day Thursday after receiving bomb threats.¹

In this quote, Muslim students are considered one group among foreign students, even though Muslim student groups in the U.S. include American Muslims.

Rather than stating it explicitly as in the previous example, the foreignness of Muslims is more often expressed by contrasting Muslims and Americans as two different groups – even when discussing American Muslims – as in this letter to the editor at USA Today in 2002:

From absurd security shakedowns of gray-haired grandmothers at airport gates to the politically correct rewrite of Tom Clancy's thriller novel for the movie The Sum of All Fears, in which Islamic terrorists are replaced with comically generic neo-Nazis, it is clear that even after the events of Sept. 11, America has not come to terms with its Muslim enemies. It is true that not all, or even most, Muslims are terrorists. But let's face it: The Swedes are not the ones blowing up Americans.²

By comparing Muslims to people of a different country (the Swedes) and by contrasting Muslims with Americans, the writer characterizes Muslims as foreign. This passage contrasts Muslims and Americans. This contrast is usually more subtle than the above two passages, as the following findings demonstrate. Comparisons, adjectives, word choice, and other rhetorical devices express the overriding theme:

Muslims as a whole are racialized as foreign to the U.S.

**Differences between Groups based on Foreignness**

Both before and after 9/11, Muslims from the Middle East are characterized in the print media as foreign to American culture and/or the American “way of life.” African American Muslims (almost entirely Nation of Islam), on the other hand, are most frequently characterized as foreign to American values of colorblindness and meritocracy before 9/11. The sheer number of articles on terrorism made it an important pattern; these articles were typically about Middle Eastern, Arab, and South Asian Muslims in the U.S. These articles stood in contrast to another cluster of articles on African American Muslims, who were not associated with terrorism. Rather, they were associated with violence and rage that was most often explicitly related to race in the article. The vast majority of articles fell into one of these two groups: they were either about Middle Eastern Muslims and terrorism, or African American Muslims and racial violence. The types of violence, in particular, express the foreignness that is

---
associated with Muslims of all races and ethnicities because they are Muslim. Muslims accused of terrorism and those associated with them were frequently contrasted with Americans as in the following passage from an article by a reporter at the New York Times in 2003:

Later this year, probably before its winter recess, the court will decide whether to hear a United States citizen's challenge to his open-ended detention as an "enemy combatant." The man, Yasser Esam Hamdi, an American-born Saudi who was apparently captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan, has been held without access to a lawyer in military brigs, first in Virginia and now in South Carolina, since April 2002. The federal appeals court in Richmond, Va., ruled in January that he was not entitled to a lawyer and had no right to challenge the basis for his continued detention. The justices have also been asked to hear a Freedom of Information Act case challenging the Bush administration's refusal to release information, including their names, about the hundreds of people, nearly all of them Muslim immigrants, who were arrested in the weeks following the terrorist attacks. Overturning a ruling by a federal district judge, the appeals court here ruled in June that the information, even concerning those found to have no connection to terrorism, was exempt from disclosure.³ (emphasis added)

The racial meaning in this article is found in the reporter’s description of Hamdi as an “American-born Saudi.” This language emphasizes that he is American by birth (only). The article goes on to summarize the mass arrests and deportation of Arabs and Muslims through the NSEERS program as affecting “Muslim immigrants,” when in fact the program included North Koreans and non-Muslim immigrants from Arab countries. This suggests that Muslims are understood as foreign to the U.S. since “Muslim immigrants” is a stand-in for this broad group of people subject to NSEERS. The journalist’s characterization reflects the overrepresentation of Muslim-majority countries on the list.

Middle Eastern Muslims in the U.S. include not only those born in the U.S. but also immigrants and naturalized citizens. This means that this group’s foreignness falls within the “common sense” on the issue; it can be said that Middle Eastern Muslims in the U.S. are actually foreign. However, the fact that foreignness is also applied to Middle Eastern Muslims who are born in the U.S. reveals the racial logic in considering them foreign to the U.S. since they are not actually foreign but are nevertheless discussed that way, as in the following example from a New York Times contributor in 1999:

One image Muslim girls say is often associated with their religion, in both the eyes of non-Muslims and stricter Old World Muslims, is that of the arranged marriage. Zahera and Eamon say one reason they are sensitive about observing their curfew and quelling the aunties' suspicions is that they want to preserve their reputations in the community for when the time comes to find husbands..."They bring samosas, they bring bracelets," Mrs. Saed said. "If you take them, it means yes, but I never touch them. Also, if you serve tea with sugar, it means you want the match. If you give no sugar, it means no. If you give coffee, they get really mad; it means they're low." She said she never gives coffee, but she never puts sugar in the tea, either. "I say I'm sorry, but my daughters are not ready to marry." Zahera shot her a grateful look, adding, "And when we are, it won't be to a picture of someone's nephew in Turkey." Eamon nodded.

"My father says we can marry who we want -- just make sure he's Muslim," she said. Not that some parents don't choose their children's mates, sometimes even for daughters who on other levels are very American. Fahima Ahmed, a junior at Friends Seminary in Manhattan, is so busy with extracurricular activities that she is rarely home. With her loose-fitting jeans and homegirl accent, it would be hard to pick her out from other teenagers in her Lower East Side neighborhood were it not for the scarf framing her heart-shaped face. But despite her smooth command of American culture (her family moved here from Bangladesh shortly before she was born), Fahima is firmly traditional on one matter. "When I'm 19, I'll have an arranged marriage," she said. "It's the one thing my parents are really set on." As it was for her two older sisters, in Fahima's first year of college her parents will begin to vet young men in the Muslim community, meeting with their families several times before introducing one to Fahima. While she will have veto power, she will get to meet her potential husband only a few times before making a decision.4 (emphasis added)

This article as a whole distinguishes between Muslims and tradition on the one hand and American culture on the other. According to the article, arranged marriages are Islamic, and thus not American, which is clear because American culture and arranged marriages are contrasted with one another:

“sometimes even for daughters who on other levels are very American.” It is Fahima’s Americanness that is pointed out in contrast: “loose-fitting jeans,” “homegirl accent,” and “extracurricular activities.” These would not be of note if the Muslim girl’s Americanness was well established and unquestionable.

In other cases, the foreignness of Muslims is communicated through the comparisons and justifications that are provided in articles. For example, in USA Today in 2004, a reporter describes scenes at an airport following 9/11:

With tempers fraying, Hispanic American pilots mistaken for Arab Muslims forcibly were removed from some commercial flights by panicky crews in the days immediately after 9/11. Even a sunburned American of Norwegian and Italian descent, and a space lab worker of

Jordanian descent with Pentagon security clearance, received the heave-ho, according to passenger complaints filed with the Department of Transportation.\textsuperscript{5}

This is one of only four passages in the data on skin color. This passage illustrates that certain shades of brown skin are a marker for those whose removal from flights would make sense. To consider the association between Arab Muslims and other brown skinned people a matter of “mistaken” identity is to deny in a color-blind manner the existence of the racial logic that links these very different groups. Denying the existence of this racial logic allows it to flourish invisibly (CITE EBS). In the passage above, Arab Muslims are a problem while other brown skinned people are cleared of otherwise legitimate suspicion based on their profession: the Hispanic Americans are rendered unsuspicious because they are pilots, the person of Jordanian descent is unsuspicious because of his or her occupation and their security clearance. On the other hand, Arab Muslims are discussed as a whole, or generally. The article seems to imply that simply by being a member of that group - Arab Muslims - one could be justifiably removed. So is the sunburned American of Norwegian and Italian descent since his or her occupation is not discussed either. In the passage, Arab Muslims’ tenuous relationship to America is evidenced in the contrast between them and the other passengers with presumably similar skin tone. The others are not a problem for the very same reason why Arab Muslims are a problem: race and color. While the other groups’ “mistaken” removal had to be explained, the only logic or explanation necessary for Arab Muslims was simply being Arab Muslims.

\textit{African American Muslims}

While the foreignness of those who are “flying while Arab” or even Middle Eastern Muslims born in the U.S. like Fahima may resonate with common sense, the foreignness of African American Muslims may be less intuitive since most African Americans have been in the U.S. for many generations. African Americans have been understood as \textit{outsiders} to the U.S. based on them being barred from

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
citizenship and not having the right to vote for a significant part of U.S. history, among other things. (See literature review for full discussion). The articles I analyze lead to my proposed theory that African American Muslims may be considered more than outsiders; they are considered foreign, and the expression of their foreignness is different from that of Middle Eastern Muslims. Terrorism for Middle Eastern Muslims is analogous to the role that black nationalism and the “angry black man” stereotype play in rendering African American Muslims foreign. All articles in the data regard black nationalism as dangerous and sometimes violent as in the following example from USA Today in 2000:

> But cultural and political tensions may rise with the growth of Islam. Although often overlooked, Christianity has united American blacks, whites and Hispanics. Although Christian denominations differ dramatically, these gaps pale in comparison to the theological and spiritual differences between Christianity and Islam. **There also is the risk that a belief in “holy war” can be misused to raise the stakes in racial and religious conflicts. And African-American converts to Islam too often embrace a black nationalism that is hostile to American and Christian values or includes an anti-Semitic agenda.**

According to this article, African Americans become a threat to the U.S. upon conversion to Islam because it leads to ideas about race (black nationalism) that are un-American. Although it is an approach that is itself born in the U.S., black nationalism renders African American Muslims foreign to American values. African American Muslims may not be considered geographically or culturally foreign to the U.S. as Middle Eastern Muslims are, but their political commitments or approaches to racial inequality contribute to the notion that they are foreign to some image or understanding of the U.S. It is also notable that this passage compares black Christians and Muslims, which tells us that it is not (only) the blackness of African American Muslims, but also their Muslimness, that makes them a threat to American values.

---

The foreignness of black Muslims’ black nationalism is further illustrated in the following quote from the New York Times in 2003 describing the findings of mental health specialists analyzing the case of Lee Malvo:

Lee Malvo is an African American Muslim man accused of sniper attacks in Washington, D.C., in 2003: “Mental health experts for the defense have likened Mr. Malvo’s relationship with the older man to the ties a (sic) cult member has to a charismatic leader or a child soldier to a warlord. A result, they said, is that Mr. Malvo lost all sense of morality, all sense of identity, and became little more than an extension of Mr. Muhammad ego (sic). Exploiting Mr. Malvo’s hunger for a father figure, Mr. Muhammad trained Mr. Malvo to be a soldier "in his war against America," Dr. Neil Blumberg, a forensic psychiatrist from Maryland, testified on Wednesday. Mr. Muhammad used an array of techniques to indoctrinate Mr. Malvo, Dr. Blumberg and other experts testified, including isolating him, controlling his diet and sleep, forcing him to watch violent videos, training him to use guns and teaching him a violent brand of Islam and black separatism. The indoctrination desensitized Mr. Malvo to violence, broke down his already shaky sense of self and made him unable to resist Mr. Muhammad’s commands. In psychiatric terms, the experts said, he suffered from dissociative disorder. "He doesn’t have multiple personalities," Dr. Blumberg testified. "But he’s lost his sense of identity as a result of the prolonged and coercive persuasion or indoctrination." (emphasis added).

Malvo’s “violent brand of Islam and black separatism” are considered so outside of what is acceptable that it is included as part of Malvo’s brainwashing.

Other articles are less explicit about the danger that African American Muslims pose and more subtly compare them to other black groups. This makes African American Muslims appear foreign relative to their fellow African Americans even, who are already outsiders to the U.S. as the literature on nativism and citizenship explains. A 1999 New York Times article about a peaceful march in New York City following the fatal police shooting of Amadou Diallo, a young black Muslim man is representative of the pattern.8

The police said there were no arrests and no problems during the rallies at Federal Plaza and at Cadman Plaza in Brooklyn, or along the two-mile marching route between. The peaceful, controlled nature of the event stood in marked contrast to the last rally of a similar size, when Mr. Giuliani -- who was not yet Mayor -- joined about 10,000 police officers at City Hall to protest Mayor Dinkins’s plans for the Civilian Complaint Review Board in 1992. "If you are the type of marcher that believes in violence, turning over cars and cursing, you’re at the wrong

---

8 That Diallo is Muslim is not given importance in the article; its focus is on the peacefulness of the march.
march," Mr. Sharpton told the boisterous crowd gathered at Cadman Plaza, next to the Federal courthouse where jury selection is under way in the trial of four officers accused of torturing a Haitian immigrant, Abner Louima, in a Brooklyn police station in 1997. "That's Giuliani's march against Dinkins. We march with dignity. Sharpton and his fellow organizers did lose control of the crowd briefly, as several angry groups -- black Muslims in black T-shirts, then African-American men in white T-shirts and construction hats, then the Congress for Puerto Rican Rights -- tried to upstage them at the head of the line to cross the bridge.⁹ (emphasis added)

Sharpton and the other march organizers are contrasted with “angry groups” like black Muslims, who are shown as being against the tenor of the march that the article otherwise praises. Black Muslims are shown alongside African American men and the Congress for Puerto Rican Rights as being outside of mainstream black politics that Sharpton represents. That the anger of these three groups challenges the control of the march harkens back to the stereotypical image of the “angry black man” in which anger is more than an emotion; it is violence (Entman and Rojecki 2001).

The following passage from the *New York Times* in 1999 also includes a comparison between African Americans and African American Muslims that depict the latter as foreign to the (mainstream) politics of their fellow African Americans. It includes the first few paragraphs of an article that covers the Million Youth March as a political move that puts Harlem residents in between Khallid Abdul Muhammad and Mayor Rudy Giuliani.

"The White Man Is the Devil" buttons were on sale near an antidrug van labeled Mr. Crack, bow-tied men calling themselves “messengers of Allah” hawked Muslim newspapers, and as many as 30 of New York’s finest guarded deserted corners as a sparse troupe of black teen-agers chanted: “Whose street? Our street!” Wilbert W. D. Love 2d, an undertaker in Harlem for 47 years, kept his distance. That was not hard to do on the seven blocks of Malcolm X Boulevard that had been set aside yesterday for the Million Youth March, where shortly after the noon starting time, the crowds on the six-lane boulevard were so thin that frustrated vendors began packing up almost immediately. Mr. Love declared the rally’s organizer, Khallid Abdul Muhammad, “ignorant and pompous.”  "This is a whole bunch of mess -- a waste of time and money," Mr. Love said. Neighborhood residents have felt caught between Mr. Muhammad and Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, and seemed to blame both leaders equally for central Harlem’s loss of a peaceful summer weekend for the second year in a row. Even though the crowd was far smaller than last year, they felt their neighborhood was being occupied. Anthony W. Bowman, 47, who was holding a barbecue in his backyard and said he did not know anyone who went to the rally, was one of many who said that Mr. Giuliani had promoted Mr. Muhammad’s event by denying him a

---

permit, prompting a widely covered court fight that the city lost. "We’re being invaded," said Mr. Bowman, who conducts walking and bus tours of Harlem. "Khallid Muhammad and Mayor Giuliani have a grudge match, and our children are being put on the front line."\(^{10}\) (emphasis added).

The rest of the article goes on to describe residents’ anger and frustration with Muhammad, but it says nothing further about their anger and frustration with Giuliani, although residents “blame both leaders equally.” It is important to note that the local black community is being posited as the victim, and that black Muslims are thus seen as not part of the black community. In other words, the contrast between black Muslims and the black community, as in previous examples, remains and shows black Muslims to be outsiders (i.e. foreign) to the black community.

---

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this study, media representations became a way to track racialization. Echoing earlier research (van Dijk 1991; Joseph et al. 2008; Liu and Mills 2006), I confirm that the way that racialization happens on an ideological level is by language choice, comparing and contrasting, and other rhetorical moves. The reason these rhetorical moves are significant is because they reflect common sense to some degree. Comparing and contrasting two things does not make sense to readers unless they are familiar with one of them or can see the logic connecting the two things. This study confirms how nationalism, as per Liu and Mills (2006), and particularly American nationalism, comes through as a color-blind racial construct that constructs Muslims as outsiders to the nation. While this finding is not new when it comes to racialization literature that disproportionately focuses on Arab and South Asian Muslims, what is new is that my analysis is able to explain the racial positioning of black Muslims as well, as they constitute a significant proportion of Muslims in the US.

Historical, legal, and sociological research shows that African Americans already experience outsider status in the U.S. My findings here extend that finding: African American Muslims are not just outsiders, but rather foreigners. Theoretically, this is an important finding that reveals the connection between religion and race. It suggests that the racialization of a religious group operates differentially based on the sub-groups within the religious group. For African Americans, being Muslim pushes them even further in to the margins of the United States, while Middle Easterners are not frequently imagined as separate from Muslims. Because of the strong association between Middle Eastern people and Muslims, it is challenging to talk about what the “effect” of being Muslim is on how they are understood racially; these two identities are quite fused together. The inseparability of these two identities – Middle
Eastern and Muslim – has a long history (see Said 1979) and is reinforced by the 9/11 attacks, and Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. The effect that this association has is to color all Muslims with foreignness, even if they would otherwise not be considered foreign to the U.S., as in the case of African Americans and particularly whites.

The connections made in this study between Middle Eastern and African American Muslims empirically extends the work of researchers like Sohail Daulatzai who have already drawn substantive theoretical connections between the forces that racialize these two groups. His argument focuses on the construction of violent figures related to being black and being Muslim, which is supported by the findings of this study but pushed into a broader framework of Muslims’ relationship to America, which includes stereotypes of violence as well as “kinder, gentler” stereotypes (Bobo et al. 1997) that do the same work as the antagonistic ones.

Both Middle Eastern and African American Muslims have a tenuous relationship to the US based on being Muslim and a racial minority, even as Middle Eastern Muslims are on the national radar as threats in ways that African American Muslims are not. The degree of threat is contingent on history. Prior to the Cold War, “terrorism” was not a terrifying phenomenon as it is now in the US imagination, but black radical movements were understood as quite a threat to the US establishment in ways that they are not now. The instability of which threat is greater and what that means for racialization does not take away from the fact that they are connected. In fact, their historical contingency speaks to what it really means for race to be socially constructed.

Theoretically, this paper shows how differential racialization is a complex process, especially in the case of a group that is not officially considered a race but is discussed that way. Being Muslim appears to be firmly attached to Middle Easterners (both Muslim and not) but more mutable in the case of African American Muslims. Many representations in this study are not only racial; they are laced with religious imagery related to belief and practice. Rather than providing neat answers as to where
Muslims fit in the US racial hierarchy, as per Kim’s (1999) racial triangulation, these results only raise more questions. If being Muslim is not as firmly attached to African Americans, who are at the bottom of the racial hierarchy, what does being Muslim mean for African American Muslims’ marginalization relative to other African Americans and other Muslims? Some argue that black Muslims are a threat for their blackness, primarily (Aidi 2003; GhaneaBassiri 2010); however, it is challenging to separate them when the histories of blackness and Islam on the one hand, and Europe and America on the other hand, are so deeply intertwined (Asad 2003; Daulatzai 2012; Rana 2011). One possibility is to see being Muslim as a thread that runs through the racial hierarchy, perhaps comparable to the further racial marginalization that comes with being a racial minority of a less privileged class, gender, or sexuality. At the same time, this understanding may not apply to those for whom being Muslim cannot necessarily be thought of as separate from their race as Middle Eastern. The only firm conclusion, it appears, is that being Muslim has some relationship to racial attribution.

Future studies can address the strength of these claims with a larger sample size. While this particular weakness of this study enabled in-depth analysis, a larger sample size would allow representations of other racial groups of Muslims not analyzed here, such as whites, since they are considered to not “have” a race (Lewis 2004). As faulty as this common sense, color-blind premise is, it makes whites a sort of blank slate upon which to see what the “effect” of being Muslim is on those whose relationship to America is firm and unquestioned.

There is a lot of theoretical and empirical work left to do on the racialization of Muslims given the internal inconsistency and contradictions in issues of race in the US. To approach the question of the racialization of Muslims in the US is to deal with multiple threads: the relationship between representation and reality, the contingency of racial formation, and the relationship between US racial formation and foreign relations. Race remains a central organizing feature, but its exact dynamics shift;
the boundaries of racial categories are negotiated and the case of Muslims in the United States sheds light on these processes.
REFERENCES


