# CONTEXT CUES: WEIGHTED CUES, PLACE IDENTITY, AND THE CANDIDATE EVALUATION PROCESS

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science.

Chapel Hill 2014

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#### **ABSTRACT**

ERIC R. HANSEN: Context Cues: Weighted Cues, Place Identity, and the Candidate Evaluation Process

(Under the direction of Thomas M. Carsey.)

When called to choose between candidates for political office, how do voters sort through multiple, often conflicting group-based cues to decide how to cast their ballot? I propose a weighted cue theory of candidate evaluation, in which individuals take multiple vote cues into account but hold some cues as more influential to their vote choice than others. Citizens weigh group cues as a function of the strength of group identity and the salience of that group identity in the campaign context. I test the theory by comparing the effects of party cues (Democratic and Republican) and place identity cues (rural and urban) through a survey-embedded candidate evaluation experiment. Results of the survey provide little support for the theory. Rather than taking both partisan and place cues into account at different weights, respondents only drew upon partisan cues to evaluate the candidate. The study suggests that place identity is an important political cue to few individuals and provides a marginal explanation for differences in voting patterns between rural and urban places in the United States.

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#### Introduction

During the course of a campaign, voters receive many competing cues from candidates on how to cast their ballots, often along the lines of group identities. How voters integrate these competing and sometimes conflicting cues to arrive at a final vote choice is the subject of a good deal of research in political science. While some argue that voters use single cues such as party ID (Campbell et al. 1960) or ideology (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006) as a heuristic that determines ultimate vote choice, others argue that voters take multiple cues into account to form a broad, holistic depiction of candidates that informs their vote (Rahn 1995). However, the conditions under which either process will occur remains unresolved in the literature.

To address this question, I examine the interacting roles of campaign context and individual variation in group identity. I argue that voters take multiple cues into account, but rely on certain group cues more than others (or "weight" these group cues more) to size up candidates for political office, based on voters' strength of identity with the groups made salient during a campaign. I test this theory of weighted cues comparing the importance of two group identities to voters: party identity and place identity. The centrality of party identification to voting behavior has been studied extensively in the political science literature and needs no further explanation here. Less commonly studied is the role of place identity in politics. Research across the social sciences indicates that people identify with places (Bell 1992; Creed and Ching 1997; Gieryn 2000; Keith and Pile 1993). Place identity is similar to, yet distinct from, other common social identities, such as gender and race. People understand politics through the context of their place affiliations and identities (Rico and Jennings 2012; Walsh 2012). In the United States, a particularly strong place identity is a rural identity. Rural Americans, those who identify with small towns and the countryside outside the reaches of cities and sub-

urbs, are distinctly aware of their communities of origin in developing their own social identity (Creed and Ching 1997). Thus I expect rural identifiers to make inferences about candidates who promote their own identity with rural areas.

I employ a survey-embedded experiment to test these expectations. Respondents are asked to read a description of a candidate for the U.S. Senate, then assigned to one of nine experimental conditions in which the place identity (urban, rural, none) and party identity (Democrat, Republican, none) of the candidate are manipulated. The findings indicate that rural identifiers do not evaluate rural candidates more positively when place identity is made salient. Furthermore, the data do not support the hypothesis that as an individual's rural identity becomes very strong, it supplants party identification as the more informative of the two competing cues when both are made salient.

This study has implications both for our understanding of voters' decision-making processes and for our understanding of rural voters. The findings suggest that place identity, as measured in the survey, is not an inherently meaningful political cue to voters. The study provides additional support for the importance of party identification as a very important group-based political cue. Furthermore, the results suggest that differences in political behavior between rural and urban Americans may be explained by other variables and not by inherent differences in personal identification with urban or rural areas.

#### **Identity Formation and Activation**

Group identities matter greatly to individuals' understanding of the relationship between themselves and the broader political system in which they participate. The social identity approach illuminates how group identities become important to citizens' evaluations of the candidates and, ultimately, their vote. Social identity theory (SIT) and its corollary, self-categorization theory, posit that individuals categorize themselves into social groups in order to enhance their own status and lend themselves a measure of self-reference in comparison with others (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987).

Identities form in association with minimal groups; simply the cognitive perception that two distinct groups exist, separate from any realistic conflict or competition between the groups, causes individuals to categorize themselves in one group or another and favor members of their ingroup.

Social identities form in connection with broader, nonminimal social groups (Deaux et al. 1995; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Because the types of groups that can be classified as social groups vary across cultural contexts, the broad definition of a social group is a collection of individuals who: 1) perceive themselves belonging to a common group, and 2) and form a psychological attachment with that group. In a culture with a heterogeneous mixture of social groups, individuals motivated by a need for positive self-concept attach positive or negative evaluations to specific social groups. Subsequently, they form evaluations of themselves and others on the basis of a comparison of the relative standing of the associated groups in the broader culture.

Social identities affect political behavior; voters bring their own social identities into the polling station as a guide in selecting candidates. When called to cast their ballots on Election Day, voters are notorious for basing their decisions on very little substantive information about the candidates and issues (Converse 1964; Feldman and Conover 1983). In the absence of perfect information about candidates and issues, voters draw upon certain cues to make inferences and determine their vote choice (Conover 1981). Voters are not perfect in their search for relevant cues. They may use cues such as the candidate's physical attractiveness (Budesheim and DePaola 1994) or personal affection for the candidate, devoid of issue content (Kinder 1978), to decide for whom to vote. Most germane to this study, group identity is a valuable component of the political evaluation process and serves as a relevant cue to voters (Conover 1984). Voters may evaluate candidates on the basis of the group identities the candidates express. Voters may also make evaluations based on how candidate issues, positions, and campaign promises will benefit or harm the identity groups the voter belongs to. Group identities serve as a particularly strong cue in the absence of other cues such as party and ideology (Conover 1981; Kam 2007).

For a voter's social identity to be activated and made part of her decision-making process, the social identity must be made salient to the voter (Lau 1989). Identity salience may occur if certain issues important to the group are raised in public discourse and framed in a way that directly appeals to the group's identity (Conover 1984, 1988; Nelson and Kinder 1996). Identity salience may also occur when political candidates project a particular social identity.

Once a social identity is activated, citizens make comparisons between their ingroup and outgroup. In making these assessments, group members treat the ingroup with favoritism and may derogate the outgroup (Brewer 2007). Though prejudice or outgroup derogation may be one method of increasing an individual's self-esteem through their group (Crocker and Luhtanen 1990), ingroup favoritism is not necessarily indicative of outgroup hate (Brewer 2007).

## **Weighted Cues and Candidate Choice**

When it comes to candidate evaluation and, ultimately, vote choice, group identities are not necessarily determinative cues. Voters draw upon several cues that hold relevant political content and can be useful for making electoral decisions. Perhaps the strongest cue is party identification. Party cues strongly predict vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960; Feldman and Conover 1983) and inform citizens' issue positions on low-salience issues or in low-information environments (Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014; Carsey and Layman 2006; Nicholson 2012). Other strong cues to voters include, but are not limited to, candidates' race or ethnicity (Barreto 2010), gender (Stambough and O'Regan 2008), and ideology (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006).

When multiple cues create competing considerations, voters may integrate competing cues and information into holistic images of the candidates and use these images to compare candidates (Rahn 1995). Alternatively, voters may take one or two important cues into account and discount all other cues. For instance, Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) find that since Southern realignment, ideology has strongly overridden group

identity as the key determinant of party identification, and that party identification is the strongest determinant in individual vote choice. In another study, Kam (2007) finds that one candidate's group identity (Hispanic) implicitly shapes his evaluation by voters, but only in the absence of party cues. When voters are aware of the candidate's party, the effect of group identity on evaluation disappears.

I argue a third possibility exists: the simultaneous occurrence of both processes in the form of "weighted cues." A theory of weighted cues holds that voters form holistic images of candidates using multiple, disparate group-based cues they receive throughout the course of a campaign. However, rather than giving all cues equal importance in forming such an image, voters allow certain cues to influence that holistic evaluation more than others. The importance, or weight, that an individual gives to a group cue depends on the strength of the individual's identity with the group and the salience of the cue in the context of the campaign. Group cues are not weighted as heavily when individual identity with a group is strong but the group is not strong.

The types of cues individuals weigh more heavily depend upon their own experiences, knowledge, and motivations in selecting a candidate. Party, while likely a very important cue for many people, is not the most important cue for all voters. Some voters may deem race, ideology, gender, or place of origin as the candidate's most important quality. A certain number of cues will be deemed important and all other cues frivolous. One voter may care only about one cue (e.g. party) while another will want to know the candidate's race, gender, previous occupation, and stances on several issues.

## **Rural Identity Formation and Activation**

I explore the above theory of weighted cues by comparing the effects of party identification and place identity, specifically rural identity, on candidate evaluation when each identity cue is provided to voters. Both party and place identity are expected to operate under the parameters of the social identity approach (Deaux et al. 1995).

One prominent type of place identity in the American context is an identity with rural spaces (Creed and Ching 1997; Walsh 2012). Following the social identity approach, individuals form a psychological attachment to rural spaces and categorize themselves as "rural" or "small-town" people (Hummon 1990). An important qualifying statement to make about rural identity is that it is conceptually distinct from the physical location of a person (Walsh 2012). To be sure, there is likely a high correlation between rural location and rural identity. The development of a social identity is not arbitrary; the cues that individuals receive from others in order to self-categorize as rural must be transmitted through socialization during a period of residence in a rural area. More critical to the development of a rural identity than physical location, however, is the psychological attachment that a person develops in connection with a rural space and the people who live there.

In addition to being a distinct category of self-reference, rural identity is a source of political meaning similar to other politicized identities, such as race or gender. Rural identity may also form part of the basis of individual judgment on political issues. Rural Americans identify with certain types of communities, then form political opinions on the basis of what will benefit those communities. By many popular accounts, this has led rural (white) voters to favor Republican candidates overwhelmingly (e.g. Frank 2004). Though rural vote shares have trended in favor Republican candidates in recent presidential elections (Gelman 2008; McKee 2008), there remains an incredible amount of political and, especially, partisan diversity among rural voters (Bartels 2006; Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003; Gimpel and Karnes 2006; McKee 2008). A less reductive way to understand rural voters than as committed Republicans is as a group of citizens who see decisions about their economic livelihoods made in the political arena by urban elites who neither listen to the concerns of rural people nor understand their way of life (Walsh 2012).

Rural identity is most likely to inform vote choice if candidates make that identity salient by appealing directly to the identity in their presentations of themselves or their positions on certain issues. In making rural identity salient, media and political elites

send cues to rural voters that trigger a common identity, which subsequently affects these voters' evaluations of the candidates. In 2008, for instance, vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin sought to evoke the "real America" she saw existing in small towns and the country's interior, presumably in contrast with liberal coastal metropolises she saw being out-of-touch with a traditional American culture. Candidates also publicize their places of origin as a way of appealing to potential voters who can relate with them on the basis of a shared place identity. Several recent presidents have projected rural or small-town identities. Jimmy Carter's hometown of Plains, Georgia and Bill Clinton's hometown of Hope, Arkansas became well-known places; George W. Bush was often photographed clearing brush at his Crawford, Texas ranch.

Though informative to some voters, rural identity is not likely the overriding determinant of vote choice; it is a politicized but not inherently political identity. Inherently political identities, like party identification, likely affect citizens' ultimate vote choice more strongly. However, for some individuals, place ties may serve as more informative and more important cues than party ties. Thus, comparing the effects of party identification and rural identity serve as an ideal test of a theory of weighted cues.

## **Hypotheses**

To summarize the arguments made above, rural identity is one of many social identities that individuals use to situate themselves in a social or political context. Rural identity is separate from the physical location of the possessor of the identity. Individuals may internalize and form ingroup biases around a rural identity. This identity can be triggered when the identity is made salient by media or political elites through evocation of rural issues or political candidates' own place identities. However, other salient identities such as partisanship emerge during the course of a campaign. When presented with both identity cues, voters integrate the cues, giving an unknown weight to each cue, into a summary positive, negative, or neutral evaluation of the candidate. From this theory I derive the following hypotheses:

H1: Individuals expressing a rural identity will more positively evaluate a candidate portrayed as having a rural identity than a candidate not portrayed as having a rural identity. (Ingroup Candidate Identity Hypothesis)

Citizens draw upon salient social identities in order to form evaluations. In the context of a campaign, one way an identity may be made salient is if the candidate expresses an identity shared with an individual voter. Ingroup favoritism will be triggered by the similarity, and the voter will consequently evaluate the candidate more positively than a candidate not expressing a rural identity, *ceteris paribus*.

H2: Individuals expressing a rural identity will more negatively evaluate a candidate portrayed as having an urban identity than a candidate not portrayed as having an urban identity. (Outgroup Candidate Identity Hypothesis)

Conversely, rural identity may be triggered when the candidate's place identity is revealed to be that of the outgroup (urban). Rural voters may perceive urban candidates as actively undermining rural interests and causing economic deprivation in rural areas (Walsh 2012). Evaluations of the candidate could then be subject to the effects of outgroup derogation, with rural identifiers evaluating urban candidates more negatively than candidates not expressing an urban identity, *ceteris paribus*.

H3: In the absence of any mention of a candidate's rural identity, the effect of rural identity on candidate evaluation will disappear. (Salience Hypothesis)

Identity is only a reference point for evaluations when the identity is made salient in public discourse through candidate identity or issues. Thus, if neither the candidate's place identity nor issues appealing to rural voters are made public, then rural identity is unlikely to be activated. Therefore I expect that when neither candidate identity nor rural issues are mentioned, the effect of a voter's rural identity in evaluating a candidate will be negligible.

H4: Individuals will most positively evaluate candidates who share both their place and party identity, but with the weight of each cue depending on the strength of individual identification with either place or party. (Weighted Cues Hypothesis)

Group identity is one of the many cues voters search for when determining how a candidate stacks up. However, group identity may conflict with other cues that voters receive, including other group identities. One such strong, conflicting cue is party. The party cue is a heuristic that provides voters with a great deal of information, allowing them to infer the candidate's issue stands and ideology (Conover 1981). Voters will likely take both group and party cues into account when sizing up candidates. Therefore I expect that an additive effect will exist between party and place cues. Voters will most positively evaluate a candidate who is both in their place ingroup and shares a party identification with them. They will least positively evaluate a candidate of the outgroup and opposing party. However, the weight that voters give to either the party or place identity will depend on the strength with which they identify with either their party or place.

#### **Data and Methods**

In order to test the four hypotheses, I employed a survey-embedded experiment using a 3 x 3 experimental design. The survey was administered online to 443 undergraduate students enrolled in an entry-level political science course at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Of those, 417 finished the survey.

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of nine conditions and asked to read a profile of a fictional candidate for the United States Senate. The candidate profiles were worded identically, but two items of information about the candidate were manipulated across the conditions. These were the candidate's place identity (urban, small town, or no mention of identity) and his party affiliation (Democrat, Republican, or no mention of party). Respondents read:

John Reynolds is a lifelong resident of [a small town in OR a large city in

OR no mention of setting] a neighboring state. He is a community leader. He graduated law school at the top of his class and has since worked as a public attorney in his hometown. He has served two terms in the State Senate. While in office, he fought to expand access to hospitals and medical care [in rural areas OR in cities OR no mention of setting]. He introduced bills to strengthen public schools in his state, working with teachers' unions and school administrators to make sure that taxpayer dollars for education were well spent. And he worked to bring new jobs to [small towns and rural areas OR urban areas OR no mention of setting], where they are needed most. [John Reynolds is running as a Democrat. OR John Reynolds is running as a Republican. OR no mention of party]

A candidate for the U.S. Senate, rather than another political office, was chosen because a Senator must represent a statewide constituency. A statewide electorate is an ideal context in which to study competing identities between rural and urban voters for three reasons. First, political scientists have observed competition between rural and urban areas in state-level political arenas, particularly in state legislatures (e.g. Wright and Schaffner 2002), suggesting this type of place identity will be important in a statewide contest. Second, a state is large enough so that both urban and rural areas are likely to exist within the boundaries of a state, in contrast with smaller legislative districts that might encompass only an urban or rural area. Thus, when respondents read that the candidate hails from a small town or large city in a neighboring state, either statement is realistic and provides the reader meaningful information. Third, a state is small enough so that urban or rural is an informative place label, compared with a national electoral setting where a label of a candidate as a resident of a certain state or region may provide a more informative cue to voters.

After receiving the candidate profile treatment, respondents were presented several items that measured their evaluation of the candidate as a test of H1, the Ingroup Candidate Identity Hypothesis. On 7-point Likert scales, respondents answered questions including "How much do you like John Reynolds?" (Dislike Extremely to Like Extremely), "How likely is it that John Reynolds shares your views on political issues?" (Very Unlikely to Very Likely), and "If John Reynolds were running for the Senate in your state, how likely would you be to vote for him?" (Very Unlikely to Very Likely). Finally as a test of H2, the Outgroup Candidate Identity Hypothesis, respondents an-

swered items eliciting whether they felt the candidate's interests were in conflict with their own and whether they felt the candidate was prejudiced against people like them. The complete wording of each candidate evaluation item can be found in the appendix.

Once respondents evaluated the candidate, they answered a series of questions assessing the strength of their identity with certain settings. Respondents were asked to recall their hometown, described on the instrument as a place where they have lived with which they feel a special connection and tell others that they are from. Then they were asked to classify their hometown as urban, suburban, small town, or rural. As might be expected from a sample of university students, those identifying with suburban hometowns were overrepresented in the sample, with self-categorized suburbanites comprising 48.9% of the sample. Small town identifiers constituted 24.75% of the sample, urbanites 16.8%, and rural identifiers 9.6%.

Based upon their own categorization of their hometown, respondents were given a set of eleven questions measuring strength of identification with groups (in the present survey, identification as urbanites, suburbanites, small town residents, or rural residents). Respondents agreed or disagreed with each description of identification with the setting based on a 7-point Likert scale. The battery of group identification questions is located in the appendix.

Finally, respondents were asked to report their gender, race, party identification, and income level. Where possible, question wording was borrowed from the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES). The sample reflected the demographic characteristics of UNC students in that females, whites, and those with family incomes above the national median household income were overrepresented in the sample relative to national populations. Women comprised 62.8% of the sample. Whites constituted 80.6% of the sample. African Americans made up 6.5% of the sample, Asian Americans 6.7%, other races 6.2%. Latinos of any race made up 7.0% of the sample. The median annual household income of respondents fell in the range of \$80,000-\$100,000.

In order to find the effects of identity, I estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable is **Candidate Support**, constructed as an additive

index of respondents' ratings of the candidate on three 7-point Likert scale items: how much they liked the candidate, how likely they were to vote for the candidate, and the extent to which they felt the candidate shared their views on the issues. Of all possible items that could be used to construct the variable, these three were chosen because the underlying concept of these items relates most directly to the evaluation of the character as a candidate. The Cronbach's alpha of the three items is  $\alpha=0.82$ , with interitem correlations averaging r=0.613.

The independent variable of interest is strength of place identity. I include two identities that should be activated by the candidate's place identity in some experimental conditions: Strength of Urban Identity ( $\alpha=0.9$ , avg. interitem correlation = 0.44) and Strength of Rural Identity ( $\alpha=0.9$ , avg. interitem correlation = 0.46). The strength of identity scales were adapted from those developed by Roccas et al. (2008). The former is measured only among those who categorized their hometowns as urban. By contrast, the latter is constructed from strength of identity of those who categorized their hometowns as either rural or as small towns. Previous research indicates that Americans use the terms rural and small town interchangeably and make no distinction between the two types of settings when describing where they grew up (Hummon 1990). In models not reported here, I find no statistically significant or substantive difference in results when strength of rural identity is measured only among rural identifiers, only among small town identifiers, or among both at the same time.

To compare the strength of place identity against another identity known to affect voters' perception of candidates, I include a variable for respondents' party identification. **Democrat** is coded "1" if the respondent self-identified as a Democrat in the survey and "0" otherwise. Likewise **Republican** is coded "1" if the respondent self-identified as a Republican and "0" otherwise.

Dummy variables are included for eight of the nine experimental conditions that respondents were assigned to. **Urban Cue** and **Small Town Cue** indicate conditions in which respondents read the candidate's place background but were given no information about the candidate's party affiliation. Similarly, **Democratic Cue** and **Republican Cue** 

indicate conditions in which respondents read the candidate's party affiliation but were given no information about the candidate's place background. Small Town Democrat Cue, Small Town Republican Cue, Urban Democrat Cue, and Urban Republican Cue indicate conditions in which respondents were informed of both the party affiliation and place background of the candidate. Respondents assigned to a condition in which no place or party information was given about the candidate serve as a control group. A dummy for the control group is omitted from the regression. Finally, interaction terms between respondents' partisan and place identities and each experimental condition were included to discern when candidate cues activate respondent identity and lead to evaluations based on ingroup or outgroup bias.

#### Results

Before discussion of the regression results, two descriptive summaries of the results are worth highlighting. Summary statistics of the principal variables are located in Table 1. First, a notable range of respondents' strength of identification with different place settings emerged from the analysis. Respondents' strength of place identity was calculated by summing 7-point Likert scores from each of the eleven questions in the battery, creating a possible range in values from 11 (strong negative identification) to 77 (strong positive identification). A score of 44 on the scale indicates neutral identity (or a weak attachment) to a place. With average scores very near the midpoint on the scale, small town, rural, and urban respondents on average identified weakly or neutrally with their hometowns. Suburban respondents identified much more negatively with their hometowns.

Second, no strong relationship between place identity and partisan identity was discovered. The Pearson's correlation between simple self-classification as rural, small town, suburban, or urban and each of the two parties was calculated. No pair of place identities and party identities correlated strongly. The correlation with the largest absolute value was between Democrat and urban identity at r = 0.111. Additionally, the Pearson's correlation between the strength of each place identity and each party

**TABLE 1: Summary Statistics** 

Variable	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Candidate Support	15.01	2.94	4	21
Democrat	0.34	0.47	0	1
Republican	0.33	0.47	0	1
Strength of Rural Identity	45.2	11.35	22	69
Strength of Small Town Identity	45.4	11.07	20	76
Strength of Suburban Identity	37.52	11.52	11	72
Strength of Urban Identity	44.86	10.68	11	68

identity was calculated. Again, no pair of identities correlated strongly, the correlation with the largest absolute value being r = 0.124 between Democrat and urban identity. No meaningful change to these results was found when correlations were calculated to include self-identified Democratic-leaning independents among Democrats and Republican-leaning independents among Republicans. A table displaying the full set of correlation tests is located in Table 3 in the appendix. A crosstabulation of respondents' party identification and place categorization is presented in Table 4 in the appendix.

These summary statistics provide evidence that people positively identify with their communities and that people identify more strongly with some types of communities (small towns and cities) than others (suburbs). They also provide evidence that no meaningful relationship exists between community identity and party identification. Some urbanites may identify as Democrats due to their community identity, just as some rural respondents may identify as Republicans. However, in the aggregate there is no evidence that urban or rural respondents are disproportionately likely to identify with one party or the other.

#### Ingroup Evaluations

The marginal effects of rural identity and urban identity of three ingroup place identities and two party identities are presented in Figure 1. The full results are presented in Model 1 of Table 5 in the appendix. Model 2 in the same table contains results controlling for the race and income of respondents; neither of these variables had any impact

on the results.

Generally, the marginal effects for place identity do not conform with expectations. First, I find limited support for the Ingroup Candidate Identity Hypothesis. For all three conditions in which the candidate rural identity cue is given, the marginal effect of respondents' rural identity is in the expected, positive direction but statistically indistinguishable from zero. Rural identity has no statistically significant marginal effect when the candidate is described as Republican with no place identity, but there is unexpectedly a positive effect when the candidate is presented as a Democrat with no place identity.

The effects of place identity are small, particularly when compared to the effects of party identification when interacted with partisan cues. When given the Small Town Cue, respondents' rating of the candidate increases by 0.026 points for each one-point increase in respondents' strength of rural identity. To put this in perspective, when a respondent moves from the minimum observed value of rural identity (strength of identity = 22) to the maximum observed value (strength of identity = 69), her rating of a small town candidate with no partisan affiliation increases on average by 1.22 points out of a possible 21 points, controlling for other factors. This represents only a slightly more positive evaluation of the candidate despite a drastic change in the identity of the respondent. By contrast, partisanship has a much stronger effect on candidate ratings. When Democratic respondents are presented with a Democratic candidate, their rating of him is on average about four and a half points higher than Independent respondents are found for Republicans; when Republican respondents are presented with a Republican candidate, their rating of him is on average about four points higher than Independents.


The results for rural identifiers are inconsistent with those for urban identifiers. Those identifying strongly with cities did not rate the candidate any more positively when he was presented as a fellow urbanite. Though falling short of statistical significance, the marginal effect of urban identity among those assigned to a condition where the candidate was presented as an urbanite was negative, signed opposite of the hy-

pothesized direction. This finding was repeated across all conditions interacted with strength of urban identity. No matter how the candidate was presented, urban identity had no effect on candidate evaluation.

Finally, the models presented in Table 5 in the appendix provide a test for H3, the Salience Hypothesis. The model does not provide support for the hypothesis. When respondents are assigned to a condition in which the candidate is described as rural, strength of rural identity exerts no statistically significant marginal effect on support for the candidate. It does exert a statistically significant, positive effect when the candidate is described as a Democrat with no place identity; no such effect occurs when the candidate is described as a Republican with no place identity. The finding of an effect of rural identity when respondents are presented with only a Democratic cue may be explained in one of three ways. First, rural identity may be associated with support for the Democratic Party and the cueing of the candidate's party spurred rural identifiers to evaluate him more positively. However this is unlikely because, as demonstrated above, place identity does not correlate with party identity. A second possibility is that the issues described as important to the candidate triggered the support of rural identifiers when the candidate was described as a Democrat but not as a Republican. This could imply that rural identifiers trust a Democratic candidate more on the issues of education, healthcare, and economic growth more than they trust a Republican candidate who holds the same positions on the same set of issues. However, this also seems like an unlikely cause. It might be expected that if rural identifiers on average trusted the Democratic brand more than the Republican brand, they might as a group identify strongly with that party, a relationship that the summary data shows does not exist. A third possibility is that the finding is due to random chance, and that the set of rural identifiers assigned randomly to the Democratic Cue condition happened to give the candidate very positive evaluations. This possibility is bolstered by the fact that respondents' place identity has no effect on candidate evaluation when the candidate's place identity is not made salient in the other three tests of the hypothesis in this model.

FIG. 1: Ingroup Evaluations

## Marginal Effects of Rural Identity by Condition



## Marginal Effects of Urban Identity by Condition






FIG. 2: Outgroup Evaluations

## Marginal Effects of Rural Identity by Condition



## Marginal Effects of Urban Identity by Condition



#### Outgroup Evaluations

Simply because individuals display positive ingroup bias on the basis of place identity does not mean that they must also display negative outgroup derogation. Thus, I test the Outgroup Candidate Identity Hypothesis in Models 3-5. As a model of outgroup exposure, strength of a certain place identity is interacted with an opposite place cue. For example, Strength of Rural Identity is interacted with Urban Cue. The test is conducted with three different dependent variables. In Model 3, the same Candidate Support scale is used as in the first two models. Here, support for the outgroup hypothesis will be indicated by statistically significant, negative coefficient estimates on the interaction terms. Models 4 and 5 use two other dimensions upon which respondents were asked to evaluate the candidate: **Conflict of Interest** and **Prejudice**. The corresponding item questions can be found in the Appendix. In contrast with Model 3, the two models with these dependent variables will indicate support for the outgroup hypothesis with statistically significant, positive coefficient estimates on the interaction terms.

The results for the marginal effects of place identity on outgroup candidate evaluations based on Model 3 (dependent variable of candidate support) are presented in Figure 2. Full results for all three models are presented in Table 6 in the appendix. The marginal effects of rural and urban identity on outgroup candidate evaluation do not provide support for the Outgroup Candidate Evaluation Hypothesis. While the marginal effects of rural identity on candidate support are all signed in the expected, negative direction, none of the effects achieves statistical significance at the .05 level of confidence. For urban identity, the marginal effect is signed in the expected, negative direction for those given place and party cues. However, the marginal effect of urban identity on evaluation of the candidate with the Small Town Cue is positive. Again, none of the marginal effects achieve statistical significance at the .05 level of confidence.

Turning to the full results, none of the three models provides support for the Outgroup Candidate Identity Hypothesis. According to the outgroup hypothesis, evaluations of the candidate should be more negative among respondents possessing a strong place identity when the candidate's place identity is (a) made salient and (b) is different than the respondent's identity. Thus, statistically significant, negative coefficient estimates should be expected for the interaction terms between place identities and discordant candidate cues in Model 3. This finding is not made for any interaction between place identity and candidate outgroup across all three models. In many, but not all, of the corresponding interaction terms, the coefficient estimate is negatively signed, but none of these estimates reaches statistical significance at the .05 level of confidence. This finding stands in contrast to partisan outgroup evaluations, where Democratic respondents rate the Republican candidate statistically significantly less positively than the independent or Democratic candidate across all models. The same is true for Republican respondents' ratings of the Democratic candidate. Thus, respondents do not think less of the candidate if he does not share a common place identity with them. Outgroup derogation occurs only across partisan boundaries.

The models presented in Table 6 provide another test for H3, the Salience Hypothesis. Again, no evidence is found in support of the hypothesis. Strength of rural identity exhibits no statistically significant effect in any condition in which the candidate is described as rural, regardless of whether the dependent variable is Candidate Support, Prejudice, or Conflicting Interest. Rural identity does exhibit a statistically significant, positive effect on Candidate Support and Conflicting Interest when respondents are given the Democratic Cue. Rural identity has a similar effect on Prejudice when respondents are given the Republican Cue. As before, these results are likely due to random chance. However, when the candidate's place identity is not made salient, three out of four times the respondent's strength of place identity has no effect on her evaluation of the candidate.

## Weighted Cues

Preliminary tests offer little evidence that place identity plays a major role in respondents' evaluation of the candidate. Though estimates of the effect of place identity on support for the candidate are, on the whole, signed in the expected directions, the effects are small and never achieve statistical significance at the .05 level of confidence.

Now I turn to a test of the Weighted Cues hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, respondents who hold both party and place identities should take both into account when the candidate's party and place identities are made salient. However, respondents should give more weight to one identity over the other depending on the strength of their identification with either place or party.

The hypothesis can be tested by examining the marginal effects of party identity given place identity and condition. Marginal effects plots of the three-way interaction term are presented in Figure 3, based on results of the full model presented in Table 7 in the appendix. Each of the four plot provides the marginal effect of party identification in each condition for which respondents were presented with both the place and party identity of the candidate (e.g. Small Town Republican Cue). The X-axis of the plots provides the values of the respondents' strength of place identity (either rural or urban as indicated by each plot). The Y-axis indicates the marginal effect of party identity (either Democrat or Republican as indicated by each plot). Support for the Weighted Cues hypothesis would be indicated by a negative slope of the marginal effect of party identification as values of strength of place identity increase. A negative slope would indicate that when place identity of the respondents is weak, party identification is the strongest predictor of a positive candidate evaluation. However, as respondent strength of place identity increases, the marginal effect of party identification on candidate support should decrease and eventually become statistically indistinguishable from zero. In this scenario, a strong place identifier should be making her evaluation of the candidate completely on the basis of place identity, with the match between the candidate's and respondent's party identification playing no role in the evaluation.

The marginal effects plots provide little evidence in support of the Weighted Cues hypothesis. In three of the four conditions, the slope of the marginal effect of party identification is positive, including in both of the urban candidate conditions. In each of the rural conditions, the marginal effect of party identification becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero as respondent strength of rural identity increases. The increase in standard error size appears not to be entirely related to the declining number

of observations in the high range of the scale, because standard errors in the low range of the scale (where there are similarly few observations as in the high range of the scale) are relatively small. However in the Small Town Democratic Cue condition, the slope of the marginal effect is positive. Only in the Small Town Republican Cue condition does the marginal effect plot conform with expectations. Thus, the tests conducted here provide limited evidence in support of the Weighted Cues hypothesis.


Though evidence does not allow for the conclusion that respondents do not use weighted cues to evaluate candidates, it does not allow for the rejection of the conclusion either. First, as rural strength of identity increased, rural Republican respondents evaluated the candidate less on the basis of their party identification, in line with theoretical expectations. Second, the plots suggest possible differences in the role of strong place identity between rural and urban respondents. However, because the analysis thus far does not support the conclusion that either rural or urban identity matters to candidate evaluation, it is impossible to conclude that place identity matters more than party identification to rural respondents but not to urban respondents. Future research might test the Weighted Cues hypothesis comparing two politicized identities known to affect candidate evaluation, such as party identification and race.

One qualifier of these results is that party identification in this analysis is measured only as a dichotomous variable of whether respondents self-identified as a Republican or as a Democrat. The strength of partisan identity is not measured, and thus weak Democrats are not distinguished from strong Democrats, nor weak Republicans from strong Republicans. Future analysis should incorporate strength of partisan identification to determine whether the results obtained here can be replicated when strength of party identification is taken into account.

## Separate Identities

Though descriptive statistics provided evidence that place identity did not correlate with party identification among respondents, further analysis is needed to demonstrate that respondents did not conflate the place identity and party identification of the candi-

FIG. 3: Marginal Effects of Party ID Given Place Identity and Condition



date in the absence of full information. Respondents may have made inferences about the party affiliation of the candidates based on the cues describing the candidate's place of origin. For example, respondents reading that the candidate was from a small town may have inferred he was a Republican and subsequently used that inference to inform their evaluations. If the candidate's place and party identity were conflated, we would expect that expected values of the dependent variable would not be significantly different across all conditions. For example, Republican respondents in the Small Town Cue condition would not rate the candidate significantly differently than Republicans in the Republican Cue condition.

A Monte Carlo simulation was used to determine whether respondents made distinctions between these cues, with expected values of ingroup candidate evaluations calculated based on 1000 draws from a multivariate normal distribution. Then, confidence intervals were drawn around the difference in expected values. This test was conducted six times. The first through third tests were used to determine whether rural-identifying respondents made distinctions between the Republican Cue, the Small Town Cue, and

the Small Town Republican Cue. The fourth through six tests were used to determine wheter Republican respondents made distinctions between the same three cues.

Figure 4 in the appendix shows the density plots created from the simulation. If respondents did evaluate the candidate differently based upon each of the three given cues, then the value of the difference between the marginal effect of each cue would be significantly different from 0. In reading the plots, a value of 0 on the x-axis would not fall within the 95% confidence intervals, marked by horizontal gray lines on each side of the bell curve. The plots indicate that in none of the six tests was the marginal effect of one candidate cue significantly different from the marginal effect of another cue at the 0.05 level of confidence. Thus, I can provide no evidence that rural and Republican respondents evaluated the candidate significantly differently after receiving the Republican Cue, the Small Town Cue, or the Small Town Republican Cue. Thus, respondents may have inferred the candidate's party identification based on his place identity or vice versa, in accordance with popular stereotypes about the relationship between place and party.

#### **Qualitative Evidence**

In addition to the quantitative data presented above, qualitative data was collected from the survey. Respondents who said they were likely to vote for the candidate were presented an opportunity to give an open-ended response to the question, "Why would you vote for John Reynolds?" Likewise, individuals responding that they were unlikely to vote for the candidate were asked why they would not vote for the candidate.

Among those who elected to give an answer (n=293), the most common responses were that their decision was based on the candidate's issue priorities or personal judgments of the candidate's character. All open-ended responses were hand-coded as fitting into six categories, depending on which candidate attributes the respondent mentioned: the party of the candidate, his place affiliation, his personal traits (e.g. intelligent, qualified, honest), his issue priorities, his ideology, and other responses and comments. For

purposes of illustration, the candidate's place affiliation was further subcategorized for mentions of rural places, urban places, and other (including references to "community," "area,", or "where he's from.")

Table 2 provides the count of open-ended response types only among those respondents who were given a place cue, a party cue, or both. By far, respondents most commonly made their evaluations on the basis of the candidate's issue priorities and personal traits. Far behind these two sets of considerations were the partisan and place cues given to sets of respondents.

Despite the prominence of issues and traits factoring into respondents' evaluations, place identity cues were not irrelevant to many respondents. Thirty-seven responses directly referenced the candidate's place identity or support for specific type of places (19 responses) or wrote more broadly about his commitment to his community, area, or "where he's from" (18 responses). Of those responses which discussed the candidate's place identity or support for certain places, the majority (15 responses) came from respondents approving of his support for rural areas. One respondent wrote of the candidate that, "[h]e works to improve rural areas..." and that she would vote for the candidate because, "I am from a rural area that often receives little government assistance." Another respondent who tied her own rural identity to the candidate's wrote she would vote for the candidate because, in her own words, "I am also from a small town that has seen hard times in terms of job availability, and John Reynolds, as described in the paragraph, tried to put jobs back into small towns." Other respondents wrote they voted for the candidate simply because "[h]e comes from a small town" or "he wants to help people in rural areas." More still responded to the candidate's prioritization of certain issues in rural areas. Respondents in this subset commented that they liked that "he wants to bring more jobs into small rural areas," that he was focused on "expanding healthcare into rural areas," and more generally "improving rural regions."

The remaining four respondents who wrote about place identity in more explicit detail than simply remarking on the candidate's community mentioned urban areas or simply their hometowns. One respondent wrote, "[h]e appears to be fighting for issues

TABLE 2: Categories of Open-Ended Responses

Category	Number of Responses	
Party	38	
Place, Rural	15	
Place, Urban	4	
Place, Community	18	
Personal Traits	114	
Issue Priorities	146	
Ideology	11	
Other	22	

Note: Responses were coded for multiple categories, yielding a response sum greater than the n-size of 293.

that would affect me personally, specifically when he works on bringing jobs to urban areas." Another commented that, "[h]is past involvement in urban areas, education policy, and job creation resonates with what I perceive to be the needs of my state."

Though this set of 19 responses is a very small subset of the entire sample, the ratio of pro-rural responses to pro-urban responses suggests that place identity is a more accessible and important consideration to rural-identifying respondents than urbanites in their evaluations. Of the 15 "rural" responses, only nine came from individuals who reported identifying with a small town or rural area. The average strength of rural identity for these nine responses ( $\mu = 46.7$ ) approximated the mean of the variable ( $\mu = 45.2$ ).

The qualitative data collected provides evidence that, to at least a small number of people, place identity and community experience matter. Some respondents made judgment calls on whether or not to support the candidate based on what he would do for communities like their own. However, it is clear based on the open-ended responses that the personal characteristics, issue positions, and, to a lesser extent, partisan affiliation matter more to respondents' evaluations than the place identity of the candidate.

## **Discussion and Implications**

When sizing up candidates, voters look for cues on how to cast their ballot, including cues based on group identity. It is argued that when voters must integrate disparate or competing identity cues, they weigh the importance of each cue and allow some cues to inform their decisions to a greater extent then other cues. The strength of the voter's identity with each group she may self-categorize as belonging to helps in determining the weight of each cue in her overall evaluation of a candidate.

However, the experiment above, which tests how respondents' strength of identity with rural or urban places affects evaluations relative to party identity, provides little evidence that some cues matter more than others as voters integrate them. When respondents were presented a candidate with two different cues (place and party), the marginal effect of respondents' party identification on candidate support only decreased in one of four experimental conditions, in contrast with expectations. Thus, respondents who strongly identified with rural or urban communities likely did not use the candidate's place identity as a stronger cue on how to vote than his party affiliation, even when those respondents shared the candidate's party affiliation.

The present work faces some limitations. As with many controlled experiments, some degree of external validity is sacrificed for the sake of internal validity. The description presented in the experiment forces respondents to evaluate the candidate with much less information than they would receive about candidates in actual elections. The characteristics of the sample (i.e. undergraduate students at one university) also raise some questions about the external validity of the experiment.

Measurement error resulted from the survey instrument and affected the statistical analysis. Rather than measuring strength of respondent place identity as a scale from weak or neutral attachment to strong attachment, strength of place identity was measured as a scale from from strong negative to strong positive feelings about place. As the scale was measured, average scores indicated weak attachment.

Finally, the experiment above makes no effort to determine exactly what sorts of

places count as rural or urban, instead leaving respondents to define those terms for themselves. Classifications of places as rural, urban, suburban and the like are subjective and will vary depending on the frame of reference utilized by the classifying person. For instance, a New Yorker may consider the mid-sized city of Omaha, Nebraska a small town, while any other person from the largely rural state of Nebraska may consider Omaha a major city. Thus, an exact definition of "rural identity" or any other place identity must remain vague. Most important to political understanding and behavior, though, are both the individual's perception of how candidates relate to communities like his or her own and to what extent the individual believes that that community relationship matters.

This study contributes to our understanding of political behavior by highlighting the continued importance of group identities to American voters. It also points out that, when it comes to voting decisions, some identities matter more to individuals than others. The evidence presented here does not lead to the conclusion that place identity can become more important than party identification to candidate evaluation among strong place identifiers. However, it does not rule out the possibility either; future research should test the hypotheses presented here comparing a different set of politicized identities.

This study also has implications for our substantive understanding of voting behavior in rural America. People living in rural areas are not well understood by political scientists, as few studies in the field have specifically investigated political dynamics in rural locales. Geographic context should certainly matter to political behavior, particularly because geography plays significantly in the division of people into districts, counties, townships, precincts, wards, and other political jurisdictions. Rural voters are particularly important to understand because of their overrepresentation in some key electoral arenas, notably the U.S. Senate and the Electoral College. Understanding the perceptions and motivations of rural voters is vital to understanding the electoral dynamics of the United States.

The present work adds to our understanding of rural political behavior by highlight-

ing the importance of place to some rural voters. People form psychological attachments to the types of places they inhabit over time (Keith and Pile 1993) and rely upon their place identities to inform their understanding of politics (Walsh 2012) and political behavior. Thus, differences between rural and urban Americans' political behavior do not simply boil down to differences in partisan affiliations, ideology, religiosity, race, or any number of other factors offered in previous literature on rural American politics. Rural identity, as demonstrated elsewhere, is a particularly strong politicized place identity. Those who identify with rural places strongly expect their elected officials to understand their way of life and act in office in a way that supports the civic and economic life of rural areas.

## **Appendix 1: Survey Items**

#### **Candidate Evaluation Questions**

- 1. How much do you like John Reynolds?
- 2. How likely would you be to vote for John Reynolds?
- 3. How likely is it that John Reynolds shares your views on the issues?
- 4. How likely is it that John Reynolds is honest?
- 5. How likely is it that John Reynolds is trustworthy?
- 6. How likely is it that John Reynolds is friendly?
- 7. How likely is it that John Reynolds is competent?
- 8. How likely is it that John Reynolds' interests are in conflict with your own?
- 9. How likely is it that John Reynolds is prejudiced against people like you?

## **Strength of Identity Measure (Small Town Condition)**

- 1. I feel strongly affiliated with other people from small towns.
- 2. City people can learn a lot from people from small towns.
- 3. Being from a small town is an important part of my identity.
- 4. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the lessons I learned living in a small town.
- 5. I am glad to support other people in small towns.
- 6. Compared to city people, people from small towns are particularly good.
- 7. It is important to me that I view myself as being from a small town.
- 8. I am strongly committed to my small town roots.
- 9. Relative to city people, people from small towns are a very moral group.
- 10. It is important that others see me as being from a small town.
- 11. When describing myself to other people, one of the first things I tell them is that I am from a small town.

## **Appendix 2: Results Tables**

TABLE 3: Partisan Correlates of Place Categorization and Identity

Variable	Democrat	Republican
Rural Identity	r = -0.028	r = -0.021
Small Town Identity	r = -0.106	r = 0.023
Suburban Identity	r = 0.026	r = 0.036
Urban Identity	r = 0.111	r = -0.057
Strength of Rural Identity	r = -0.049	r = -0.0005
Strength of Small Town Identity	r = -0.113	r = 0.064
Strength of Suburban Identity	r = -0.022	r = 0.079
Strength of Urban Identity	r = 0.124	r = -0.078

TABLE 4: Crosstabulation of Respondent Place Categorization and Party Identification

Variable	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Don't Know	Total
Urban	32	19	14	5	70
	(45.7%)	(27.1%)	(20.0%)	(7.1%)	(100.0%)
Suburban	72	71	43	18	204
	(35.3%)	(34.8%)	(21.1%)	(8.8%)	(100.0%)
Small Town	26	36	27	14	103
	(25.2%)	(35.0%)	(26.2%)	(13.6%)	(100.0%)
Rural	12	12	10	6	40
	(30.0%)	(30.0%)	(25.0%)	(40.0%)	(100.0%)
Total	142	138	94	43	417
	(34.1%)	(33.1%)	(22.5%)	(10.3%)	(100.0%)

*Note*: Each cell contains the number of respondents, with row percentages located below the number in parentheses.

TABLE 5: Evaluation of Ingroup Candidates

	Dependen	t variable:
	Candidat	e Support
	(Model 1)	(Model 2)
Democrat	-1.165**	-1.153**
	(0.492)	(0.493)
epublican	-2.081***	-2.038***
opacinean.	(0.462)	(0.470)
turn other f December 1 I december	-0.018**	0.010**
rength of Rural Identity	(0.009)	-0.018** (0.009)
	, ,	
rength of Urban Identity	-0.010	-0.011
	(0.010)	(0.010)
nall Town Democrat Cue	-1.888***	-1.897***
	(0.725)	(0.726)
rban Democrat Cue	-1.967***	-1.968***
	(0.641)	(0.654)
HITT. D. LIV. C.		
nall Town Republican Cue	-2.796*** (0.664)	-2.813*** (0.666)
	(0.00+)	(0.000)
ban Republican Cue	-2.614***	-2.631***
	(0.700)	(0.701)
mall Town Cue (No Party)	-1.385**	-1.384**
	(0.650)	(0.654)
dear Con (No Boots)	0.022	0.014
rban Cue (No Party)	0.022 (0.648)	0.014 (0.651)
	(0.0.0)	
emocratic Cue (No Place)	-4.101***	-4.108***
	(0.965)	(0.968)
epublican Cue (No Place)	-2.793***	-2.809***
	(1.007)	(1.010)
rength of Rural Identity X Small Town Cue	0.026	0.027
	(0.017)	(0.017)
	0.022	0.022
rength of Urban Identity X Urban Cue	-0.023 (0.023)	-0.023 (0.023)
emocrat X Democratic Cue	4.518***	4.507***
	(1.089)	(1.091)
epublican X Republican Cue	4.075***	4.066***
	(1.297)	(1.299)
rength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue	0.037	0.037
or runar runary is respublican out	(0.026)	(0.026)
4 CD 111 1 WD		
rength of Rural Identity X Democratic Cue	0.103*** (0.025)	0.102*** (0.025)
	(0.023)	(0.023)
rength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.035)	(0.035)
rength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue	0.021	0.022
and the second s	(0.030)	(0.030)
W. Carrell Transport	A 154***	4 170***
emocrat X Small Town Democrat Cue	4.154*** (0.983)	4.170*** (0.985)
epublican X Small Town Republican Cue	4.674***	4.664***
	(1.055)	(1.058)

Democrat X Urban Democrat Cue	4.581*** (0.980)	4.568*** (0.988)
	(0.380)	(0.988)
Republican X Urban Republican Cue	4.516***	4.552***
	(1.092)	(1.096)
Strength of Rural Identity X Small Town Democrat Cue	0.021	0.021
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Strength of Rural Identity X Small Town Republican Cue	0.031	0.032*
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Strength of Urban Identity X Urban Democrat Cue	0.001	0.00002
· ·	(0.031)	(0.031)
Strength of Urban Identity X Urban Republican Cue	0.013	0.014
suchgain of croam radiately if croam respectively.	(0.025)	(0.025)
Republican X Small Town Cue	1.487*	1.474*
Republican A Siman Town Cue	(0.830)	(0.832)
Democrat X Small Town Cue	1.953**	2.136**
Beniocial A Sinan Town Cae	(0.897)	(0.907)
Republican X Urban Cue	1.892**	1.907**
Republican A Olban Cuc	(0.874)	(0.876)
Democrat X Urban Cue	0.415	0.406
Democrat A Orban Cue	(0.913)	(0.915)
	(0.715)	
White		-0.096
		(0.346)
Income		-0.032
		(0.065)
Constant	16.543***	16.778***
	(0.408)	(0.541)
Observations	415	413
R <sup>2</sup>	0.303	0.305
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.244	0.243
Residual Std. Error	2.561 (df = 382)	2.563 (df = 378)
F Statistic	5.184*** (df = 32; 382)	4.884*** (df = 34; 378)

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

TABLE 6: Evaluation of Outgroup Candidates

Democrat			Dependent variable.	:
Democrat		Candidate Support	Prejudice	Conflicting Interest
Republican			(Model 4)	
Republican   0.760   -0.223   -0.190   (0.248)	Democrat			
Strength of Rural Identity  (0.469) (0.228)  (0.028)  Strength of Rural Identity (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)  Strength of Urban Identity (0.010) (0.010) (0.005)  Small Town Democrat Cue (0.588) (0.281) (0.286) (0.286) (0.281) (0.286) (0.287) (0.300) (0.305)  Small Town Republican Cue (0.627) (0.300) (0.305)  Small Town Republican Cue (0.627) (0.300) (0.305)  Small Town Republican Cue (0.566) (0.271) (0.276) (0.300) (0.305)  Small Town Republican Cue (0.566) (0.271) (0.271) (0.276) (0.300)  Urban Republican Cue (0.715) (0.366) (0.271) (0.276) (0.348)  Small Town Cue (No Party) (0.488) (0.617) (0.295) (0.300)  Urban Cue (No Party) (0.708) (0.332) (0.338)  Democratic Cue (No Place) (0.185) (0.0889) (0.425) (0.433)  Republican Cue (No Place) (0.959) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.007)  Strength of Urban Identity X Urban Cue (0.015) (0.007)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue (0.022) (0.011) (0.011)  Republican X Democratic Cue (0.023) (0.012) (0.012)  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue (0.025) (0.012) (0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Perublican Cue (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Perublican Cue (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Perublican Cue (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue (0.024) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)  Democrat X Small Town Perublican Cue (0.025) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)		(0.450)	(0.216)	(0.219)
Strength of Rural Identity	Republican	0.760	-0.223	-0.190
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)	•	(0.469)	(0.226)	(0.228)
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)	Strangth of Dural Identity	0.002	0.006	0.006
Strength of Urban Identity  -0.013 (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)  Small Town Democrat Cue  0.776 -0.075 (0.588) (0.281) (0.286) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288)  Urban Democrat Cue  1.252** -0.390 (0.627) (0.300) (0.305)  Small Town Republican Cue  0.952* 0.271 (0.276) (0.300) (0.305)  Small Town Republican Cue  1.095 -0.018 -0.306 (0.271) (0.276)  Urban Republican Cue  1.095 -0.018 -0.306 (0.342) (0.348)  Small Town Cue (No Party) 0.488 0.361 -0.331 (0.617) (0.295) (0.300)  Urban Cue (No Party) 1.868*** 0.349 -0.155 (0.708) 0.332) 0.338)  Democratic Cue (No Place) -1.213 0.669 0.361 (0.889) 0.425) 0.433)  Republican Cue (No Place) 0.185 1.096** -0.264 (0.959) 0.467) 0.467) 0.467)  Strength of Urban Identity X Urban Cue 0.018 0.004 -0.008 (0.015)  Democratic Cue -3.330*** 1.201** 0.081)  Republican X Democratic Cue -3.330*** 1.201** 0.081) 0.0985*  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue 0.016 -0.022* 0.001)  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue 0.016 -0.028** -0.007 -0.001 0.055)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue 0.016 -0.028** -0.007 -0.001 0.055)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue 0.016 -0.028** -0.007 -0.009** -0.009* -0.001 0.055)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue 0.079** -0.007 -0.001 0.0029 0.0014) 0.0015)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue 0.079** -0.004 0.0029 0.0014) 0.0015)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue 0.079** -0.009 -0.009** -0.009 -0.009** -0.0004 -0.009 -0.0010 -0.0029 -0.0010 -0.0029 -0.0010 -0.0029 -0.0010 -0.0029 -0.0010 -0.0025 -0	Strength of Rural Identity			
Small Town Democrat Cue 0.776				
Small Town Democrat Cue	Strength of Urban Identity			
Urban Democrat Cue  1.252** -0.390 -0.186 (0.627) (0.300) (0.305)  Small Town Republican Cue  0.952* 0.271 -0.472* (0.276)  Urban Republican Cue  1.095 -0.018 -0.306 (0.715) (0.342) (0.348)  Small Town Cue (No Party) 0.488 0.361 -0.391 (0.617) (0.295) (0.390)  Urban Cue (No Party) 1.868*** 0.349 -0.155 (0.708) 0.3322 (0.338)  Democratic Cue (No Place) -1.213 0.669 0.361 (0.889) 0.0425) 0.0425)  Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Cue 0.015  Republican X Democratic Cue -3.350*** 1.120** 1.20** 1.213 0.669 0.361 0.007)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue -3.350*** 1.134) 0.0551) 0.0552)  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue -3.350*** 1.20** 0.016 0.028* 0.016 0.029* 0.016 0.055) 0.017 0.007 0.001 0.0010 0.0551 0.0077 0.001 0.0010 0.0552)  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue -3.350*** 0.016 0.029* 0.016 0.029* 0.017 0.010 0.010 0.029* 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.0552)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue -0.008 0.003 0.0033 0.016 0.0079 0.001 0.0029 0.0014 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0014 0.0015 0.0033 0.0016 0.0016 0.0029 0.0014 0.0016 0.0029 0.0014 0.0016 0.0025 0.0017 0.0016 0.0025 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0010 0.0010 0.0029 0.0014 0.0019 0.0014 0.0019 0.0014 0.0014 0.0019 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0025 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011		(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Urban Democrat Cue  1.252**	Small Town Democrat Cue	0.776	-0.075	-0.333
Small Town Republican Cue		(0.588)	(0.281)	(0.286)
Small Town Republican Cue	Urhan Democrat Cue	1 252**	-0.390	-0.186
Urban Republican Cue  1.095				
Urban Republican Cue  1.095		0.050*	0.254	0.450*
Urban Republican Cue  1.095	Small Town Republican Cue			
Small Town Cue (No Party)  0.488 0.361 0.617) (0.295) (0.300)  Urban Cue (No Party)  1.868*** 0.708) 0.708 0.708 0.332) 0.332) 0.338)  Democratic Cue (No Place) -1.213 0.669 0.361 0.889) 0.425) 0.433  Republican Cue (No Place) -1.213 0.669 0.361 0.889) 0.425) 0.433  Republican Cue (No Place) -1.213 0.669 0.361 0.889) 0.425) 0.433  Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Cue 0.959) 0.185 0.004 0.007) 0.007)  Strength of Urban Identity X Rural Cue 0.032 0.022) 0.011) 0.007)  Republican X Democratic Cue -3.350*** 1.201** 0.681 0.543) 0.552)  Democrat X Republican Cue -4.310*** 0.134) 0.551) 0.0552)  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue 0.016 0.025) 0.012) 0.012)  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue 0.016 0.025) 0.012) 0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue 0.079*** -0.007 0.001 0.029** 0.0012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue 0.079*** -0.007 0.0012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue 0.079*** -0.007 0.0012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue 0.079*** -0.007 -0.029** 0.0024) 0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue 0.029 0.029 0.014) 0.016)  Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue -6.782*** 0.339 1.663*** 1.181** 0.730		(0.500)	(0.271)	(0.270)
Small Town Cue (No Party)         0.488 (0.617)         0.295)         (0.300)           Urban Cue (No Party)         1.868*** (0.708)         0.349 (0.332)         -0.155 (0.308)           Democratic Cue (No Place)         -1.213 (0.669 (0.425))         0.361 (0.425)         (0.433)           Republican Cue (No Place)         0.185 (0.959)         1.096** (0.467)         -0.264 (0.467)           Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Cue         -0.018 (0.004 (0.007))         -0.007 (0.007)         (0.007)           Strength of Urban Identity X Rural Cue         0.032 (0.011) (0.007)         -0.007 (0.001)         (0.0011) (0.0011)           Republican X Democratic Cue         -3.350*** (1.134) (0.543) (0.552)         1.201** (0.543) (0.552)         0.681 (1.134) (0.543) (0.552)           Democrat X Republican Cue         -4.310*** (0.310 (0.551) (0.552)         0.985* (1.134) (0.551) (0.552)           Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue         0.016 (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)         -0.004 (0.025) (0.012) (0.012)           Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue         0.079*** (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)         -0.002** (0.002) (0.014) (0.016)           Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue         0.024 (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)         -0.004 (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)           Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue         -6.782*** (1.078) (0.516) (0.525)         0.525)	Urban Republican Cue			
Urban Cue (No Party)  1.868*** (0.708)  1.868*** (0.332)  0.338)  Democratic Cue (No Place)  -1.213 0.669 0.361 (0.889) (0.425) (0.433)  Republican Cue (No Place)  -1.213 0.669 0.361 (0.889) (0.425) (0.433)  Republican Cue (No Place)  0.185 1.096** -0.264 (0.959) (0.467) (0.467)  Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Cue (0.015) (0.007)  Conorrior  Cono		(0.715)	(0.342)	(0.348)
Urban Cue (No Party)  1.868*** (0.708)  1.868*** (0.332)  0.338)  Democratic Cue (No Place)  -1.213 0.669 0.361 (0.889) (0.425) (0.433)  Republican Cue (No Place)  -1.213 0.669 0.361 (0.889) (0.425) (0.433)  Republican Cue (No Place)  0.185 1.096** -0.264 (0.959) (0.467) (0.467)  Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Cue (0.015) (0.007)  Conorrior  Cono	Small Town Cue (No Party)	0.488	0.361	-0.331
Democratic Cue (No Place)	( <del></del> )/			
Democratic Cue (No Place)		4.0<0444	0.240	0.455
Democratic Cue (No Place)  -1.213 -0.669 -0.361 (0.889) -0.425) -0.433  Republican Cue (No Place)  0.185 -0.264 (0.959) -0.467) -0.264 (0.959) -0.467) -0.0467  Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Cue -0.018 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.011	Urban Cue (No Party)			
(0.889) (0.425) (0.433)   Republican Cue (No Place)		(0.700)	(0.332)	(0.550)
Republican Cue (No Place)  0.185 (0.959) (0.467) (0.467) (0.467)  Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Cue  -0.018 (0.015) (0.007)  Condition of Urban Identity X Rural Cue  0.032 (0.022) (0.011)  Republican X Democratic Cue  -3.350*** (1.134) (0.543) (0.552)  Democrat X Republican Cue  -4.310*** (0.134) (0.551)  Condition  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue  0.016 (0.025)  Condition  Condition  0.016 (0.025)  Condition  Condition  0.017  Condition  Condition  0.018 (0.024) (0.012)  Condition  Condition  0.018 (0.012)  Condition  0.019**  -0.007 -0.029** (0.012)  Condition  0.012  Condition  0.013  Condition  0.014 (0.015)  Condition  0.015  Condition  0.016 (0.024) (0.012)  Condition  0.016 (0.016)  Condition  0.017  Condition  0.018  Condition  0.019  Condition  0.019  Condition  0.019  Condition  0.019  Condition  0.0110  Condition  0.012  Condition  0.014 (0.014)  Condition  0.014 (0.015)	Democratic Cue (No Place)			
(0.959)		(0.889)	(0.425)	(0.433)
Co.959	Republican Cue (No Place)	0.185	1.096**	-0.264
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)		(0.959)	(0.467)	(0.467)
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)	Strangth of Dural Identity V Urban Cue	0.019	0.004	0.008
Strength of Urban Identity X Rural Cue  0.032	Strength of Kurai Identity A Orban Cue			
(0.022) (0.011) (0.011)  Republican X Democratic Cue				
Republican X Democratic Cue  -3.350*** (1.134) (0.543) (0.552)  Democrat X Republican Cue  -4.310*** (1.134) (0.551)  Output  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue  0.016 (0.025) (0.012)  Output  Strength of Rural Identity X Democratic Cue  0.079*** (0.024) (0.012)  Cue  -0.008 (0.033) (0.016)  Output  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue  0.024 (0.033) (0.016)  Output  Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue  -6.782*** (1.078)  Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue  -3.426***  1.181**  0.730	Strength of Urban Identity X Rural Cue			
(1.134) (0.543) (0.552)  Democrat X Republican Cue		(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democrat X Republican Cue  -4.310*** 0.310 0.985* (1.134) 0.551) 0.552)  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue 0.016 0.025) 0.012)  Cue 0.079*** 0.007 0.012)  Strength of Rural Identity X Democratic Cue 0.079*** 0.004 0.0024) 0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.0012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue 0.008 0.0033) 0.016)  Cue 0.004 0.0016)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue 0.024 0.029 0.014)  Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue -6.782*** 0.339 1.663*** 0.525)  Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue -3.426*** 1.181** 0.730	Republican X Democratic Cue	-3.350***	1.201**	0.681
(1.134) (0.551) (0.552)  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue  0.016		(1.134)	(0.543)	(0.552)
(1.134) (0.551) (0.552)  Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue  0.016	Democrat V Republican Cue	_4 310***	0.310	0.085*
Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue  0.016	Democrat A Republican Cuc			
(0.025) (0.012) (0.012)  Strength of Rural Identity X Democratic Cue  0.079***				
Strength of Rural Identity X Democratic Cue  0.079***	Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue			
(0.024) (0.012) (0.012)  Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue  -0.008		(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue  -0.008 (0.033) -0.004 (0.016)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue  0.024 (0.029) (0.014)  Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue -6.782*** 0.339 1.663*** (1.078) (0.516)  Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue -3.426*** 1.181** 0.730	Strength of Rural Identity X Democratic Cue	0.079***		
(0.033) (0.016) (0.016)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue  0.024 (0.029) (0.014)  Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue  -6.782*** (1.078)  0.339 1.663*** (1.078) (0.516)  Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue  -3.426*** 1.181** 0.730		(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)
(0.033) (0.016) (0.016)  Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue  0.024 (0.029) (0.014)  Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue  -6.782*** (1.078)  0.339 1.663*** (1.078) (0.516)  Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue  -3.426*** 1.181** 0.730	Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue	-0.008	-0.004	-0.004
$ (0.029) \qquad (0.014) \qquad (0.014) $ Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue $ -6.782^{***} \qquad 0.339 \qquad 1.663^{***} $ $ (1.078) \qquad (0.516) \qquad (0.525) $ Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue $ -3.426^{***} \qquad 1.181^{**} \qquad 0.730 $	ar ereal racinary it respanse an each			
$ (0.029) \qquad (0.014) \qquad (0.014) $ Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue $ -6.782^{***} \qquad 0.339 \qquad 1.663^{***} $ $ (1.078) \qquad (0.516) \qquad (0.525) $ Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue $ -3.426^{***} \qquad 1.181^{**} \qquad 0.730 $	0. 1.611. 11.6.77	0.024	0.000	0.000
Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue	Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue			
(1.078) (0.516) (0.525)  Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue -3.426*** 1.181** 0.730		(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue -3.426*** 1.181** 0.730	Democrat X Small Town Republican Cue			
1		(1.078)	(0.516)	(0.525)
	Republican X Small Town Democrat Cue	-3.426***	1.181**	0.730
	1			

Company	Democrat X Urban Republican Cue	-5.502***	1.488***	1.704***
Company   Comp	•	(1.059)	(0.507)	(0.516)
Company   Comp	D II' VIII D (C	4.400***	1 720***	1 121**
Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Republican Cue         -0.038 (0.032)         0.001 (0.015)         0.005 (0.015)           Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Democrat Cue         -0.030 (0.023)         0.009 (0.012)         0.001           Strength of Urban Identity X Small Town Republican Cue         0.003 (0.012)         0.0113 (0.015)           Strength of Urban Identity X Small Town Democrat Cue         -0.004 (0.029)         0.014)         0.014)           Strength of Urban Identity X Small Town Democrat Cue         -0.004 (0.026)         0.013)         0.003           Republican X Small Town Cue (No Party)         -1.019 (0.831)         -0.025 (0.398)         0.275           Democrat X Small Town Cue (No Party)         -1.363 (0.860)         -0.028 (0.405)         -0.014           Republican X Urban Cue (No Party)         -0.713 (0.860)         -0.642 (0.419)         0.248 (0.870)           Democrat X Urban Cue (No Party)         -2.990*** (0.414)         -0.122 (0.414)         0.421)           Democrat X Urban Cue (No Party)         -2.990*** (0.399)         -0.122 (0.429)         0.614 (0.890)           Constant         14.320*** (0.399)         (0.191)         (0.194)           Observations         415 (0.399)         415 (0.111)         416 (0.399)           Observations         415 (0.330)         0.180 (0.129)         0.056 (0.129)	Republican X Urban Democrat Cue			
Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Democrat Cue		(1.023)	(0.494)	(0.498)
Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Democrat Cue       -0.030 (0.023)       0.009 (0.012)       0.002 (0.011)         Strength of Urban Identity X Small Town Republican Cue       0.003 (0.029)       0.013 (0.014)       0.015 (0.014)         Strength of Urban Identity X Small Town Democrat Cue       -0.004 (0.026)       0.003 (0.013)       0.003 (0.013)         Republican X Small Town Cue (No Party)       -1.019 (0.831)       -0.025 (0.398)       0.275 (0.831)         Democrat X Small Town Cue (No Party)       -1.363 (0.860)       -0.028 (0.407)       -0.014 (0.860)         Republican X Urban Cue (No Party)       -0.713 (0.870)       -0.642 (0.414)       0.248 (0.421)         Democrat X Urban Cue (No Party)       -2.990*** (0.870)       -0.122 (0.614 (0.890)       0.642)       0.6429)         Constant       14.320*** (0.890) (0.422)       2.820*** (0.429)       3.761*** (0.399)       0.191) (0.194)         Observations       415 (0.330) (0.180) (0.191) (0.194)       0.129 (0.56)       0.274 (0.111) (0.056)         Residual Std. Error       2.510 (df = 382) (1.200 (df = 382)) (1.220 (df = 383))       1.220 (df = 383)	Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Republican Cue	-0.038	0.001	0.005
(0.023) (0.012) (0.011)		(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Country   Coun	Strength of Rural Identity X Urban Democrat Cue	-0.030	0.009	0.002
(0.029) (0.014) (0.014)	Stronger of Marian Identity 11 Stoum Democrati Suc			
(0.029) (0.014) (0.014)	Strangth of Urban Identity V Small Town Depublican Cur	0.003	0.013	0.015
Strength of Urban Identity X Small Town Democrat Cue $-0.004$ (0.026) $0.003$ (0.013) $0.003$ (0.013)         Republican X Small Town Cue (No Party) $-1.019$ (0.831) $-0.025$ (0.398) $0.0405$ )         Democrat X Small Town Cue (No Party) $-1.363$ (0.407) $-0.028$ (0.407) $-0.014$ (0.419)         Republican X Urban Cue (No Party) $-0.713$ (0.870) $-0.642$ (0.414) $0.421$ )         Democrat X Urban Cue (No Party) $-2.990^{***}$ (0.870) $-0.122$ (0.414) $0.421$ )         Democrat X Urban Cue (No Party) $-2.990^{***}$ (0.890) $-0.122$ (0.429) $0.614$ (0.429)         Constant $14.320^{***}$ (0.399) $2.820^{***}$ (0.191) $3.761^{***}$ (0.194)         Observations $415$ $415$ $415$ $416$ $82$ (0.191) $415$ $416$ $82$ $0.330$ $0.180$ $0.129$ $0.129$ $0.274$ $0.111$ $0.056$ $0.274$ $0.111$ $0.056$ $0.274$ $0.274$ $0.111$ $0.056$ $0.274$ $0.274$ $0.111$ $0.056$ $0.274$ $0.274$ $0.111$ $0.056$ $0.274$	Strength of Orban Identity A Small Town Republican Cut			
Constant   Constant		(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.014)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Strength of Urban Identity X Small Town Democrat Cue	-0.004	0.003	0.003
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	,	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.013)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Republican X Small Town Cue (No Party)	-1.019	-0.025	0.275
	republican it small fown cue (10 fully)			
		(**** )	(******)	(3, 33)
Republican X Urban Cue (No Party) $-0.713$ (0.870) $-0.642$ (0.414) $0.248$ (0.421)         Democrat X Urban Cue (No Party) $-2.990^{***}$ (0.890) $-0.122$ (0.429)         Constant $14.320^{***}$ (0.399) $2.820^{***}$ (0.191) $3.761^{***}$ (0.194)         Observations R <sup>2</sup> (0.330) $415$ (0.180) $416$ (0.129)         Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> (0.274) $0.111$ (0.056)         Residual Std. Error $2.510$ (df = 382) $1.200$ (df = 382) $1.222$ (df = 383)	Democrat X Small Town Cue (No Party)	-1.363	-0.028	-0.014
		(0.860)	(0.407)	(0.419)
	Republican X Urban Cue (No Party)	-0.713	-0.642	0.248
		• 000***	0.400	0.614
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Democrat X Urban Cue (No Party)			
		(0.890)	(0.422)	(0.429)
	Constant	14.320***	2.820***	3.761***
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.399)	(0.191)	(0.194)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$				
Adjusted $R^2$ 0.274 0.111 0.056 Residual Std. Error 2.510 (df = 382) 1.200 (df = 382) 1.222 (df = 383)				
Residual Std. Error 2.510 (df = 382) 1.200 (df = 382) 1.222 (df = 383)				
F Statistic $5.890^{***}$ (df = 32; 382) $2.622^{***}$ (df = 32; 382) $1.768^{***}$ (df = 32; 383)				
	F Statistic	5.890*** (df = 32; 382)	$2.622^{***}$ (df = 32; 382)	$1.768^{***}$ (df = 32; 383)


Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01


TABLE 7: Candidate Evaluation by Weighted Party and Place Cues

_	Dependent variable
_	Candidate Support
	(Model 6)
Democrat	-0.365
	(0.501)
tepublican	-1.348***
•	(0.484)
trength of Rural Identity	-0.012
delight of Kurai Identity	(0.013)
trength of Urban Identity	-0.019 (0.017)
	(0.017)
nall Town Democrat Cue	-1.810**
	(0.756)
rban Democrat Cue	-1.745***
	(0.671)
HT D III C	2.002***
nall Town Republican Cue	-3.003*** (0.719)
	(0.717)
ban Republican Cue	-2.431***
	(0.727)
nall Town Cue (No Party)	-0.313
•	(0.486)
han Coa (Na Barta)	0.674
ban Cue (No Party)	0.674 (0.463)
	(01.05)
emocratic Cue (No Place)	-4.263***
	(0.971)
epublican Cue (No Place)	-2.787***
	(1.015)
ength of Rural Identity X Small Town Cue	0.030*
engui of Ruful Identity A Sinan Town Cuc	(0.017)
rength of Urban Identity X Urban Cue	-0.023 (0.023)
	(0.023)
rength of Rural Identity X Democrat	-0.019
	(0.017)
emocrat X Small Town Democrat Cue	3.640***
	(1.062)
reports of Dural Identity V Small Town Democrat Co-	0.016
rength of Rural Identity X Small Town Democrat Cue	0.016 (0.024)
rength of Rural Identity X Republican	-0.002
	(0.015)
publican X Small Town Republican Cue	5.185***
<del>-</del>	(1.470)
rength of Rural Identity X Small Town Republican Cue	0.043*
rengan of Kurai fucility A Silian Town Republican Cue	(0.025)
rength of Urban Identity X Democrat	0.008
	(0.020)
mocrat X Urban Democrat Cue	3.932***
	(1.002)


Strength of Urban Identity X Urban Democrat Cue	-0.031 (0.043)
Strength of Urban Identity X Republican	0.015 (0.024)
Republican X Urban Republican Cue	3.571*** (1.235)
Strength of Urban Identity X Urban Republican Cue	-0.020 (0.034)
Democrat X Democratic Cue	4.455*** (1.047)
Republican X Republican Cue	3.666*** (1.274)
Strength of Rural Identity X Republican Cue	0.039 (0.026)
Strength of Rural Identity X Democratic Cue	0.106*** (0.025)
Strength of Urban Identity X Republican Cue	0.003 (0.036)
Strength of Urban Identity X Democratic Cue	0.019 (0.031)
Democrat X Rural ID X Small Town Democrat Cue	0.033 (0.056)
Republican X Rural ID X Small Town Republican Cue	-0.032 (0.039)
Democrat X Urban ID X Urban Democrat Cue	0.063 (0.061)
Republican X Urban ID X Urban Republican Cue	0.061 (0.052)
White	-0.144 (0.351)
Income	-0.039 (0.066)
Constant	16.416*** (0.582)
Observations R <sup>2</sup>	413 0.296
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> Residual Std. Error F Statistic	0.225 2.593 (df = 374) 4.148*** (df = 38; 374)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


FIG. 4: Density Plots from Monte Carlo Simulations







- $\begin{tabular}{ll} (A) & Difference in Rural Identifiers' Evaluations of Republican \\ & and Small Town Candidates \\ \end{tabular}$
- $\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{(B) Difference in Republicans' Evaluations of Republican} \\ & and Small Town Candidates \end{tabular}$





- (C) Difference in Rural Identifiers' Evaluations of Republican and Small Town Republican Candidates
- (D) Difference in Republicans' Evaluations of Small Town and Small Town Republican Candidates





- (E) Difference in Rural Identifiers' Evaluations of Small

  Town and Small Town Republican Candidates
- (F) Difference in Republicans' Evaluations of Small Town and Small Town Republican Candidates

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