The U.S. Army Public Diplomacy Officer: Military public affairs officers' roles in the global information environment

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ABSTRACT
CHAD G. CARROLL: The U.S. Army Public Diplomacy Officer: Military public affairs
officers' roles in the global information environment
(Under the direction of Dr. Dulcie Straughan)

Globalization and the rapid emergence of technology have created a new domain in
which friendly and enemy information sources operate: the global information environment
(GIE). This new domain is a departure from the historical military-domestic media
relationship because now Army Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) cannot address only the
American people with their communications. They currently address both domestic and
international audiences – especially during war. With public relations roles theory as its
basis, this thesis contains qualitative and quantitative methods to determine the extent to
which PAOs are performing diplomacy through their interaction with foreign media and
publics. Furthermore, this thesis provides two options for transforming all or some PAOs
into Public Diplomacy Officers (PDOs.)

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ABBREVIATIONS

APAC	Army Public Affairs Center
C2	Command and Control
CA	Civil Affairs
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COIN	Counter-insurgency
CONUS	Continental United States
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic
DINFOS	Defense Information School
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EW	Electronic Warfare
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
GIE	Global Information Environment
IO	Information Operations
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
OPORD	Operations Order
OPSEC	Operational Security

PA	Public Affairs
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PAOQC	Public Affairs Officer Qualification Course
PDO	Public Diplomacy Officer
PR	Public Relations
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TWI	Training With Industry
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
WOT	War on Terrorism

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Background

The nature of warfare is now in a time of tremendous change. Accordingly, the United States Army, while conducting operations around the world, is changing its operational force structure to be more successful, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but on future battlefields as well. Gone is the heavy, Desert Shield/Desert Storm-era force led by the Army's mighty divisions as its operational unit. Today, the Army employs modular brigade combat teams that can be interchanged easily. Although the Army has changed some of the structure of its traditional war-fighting units, arguably it has not thoroughly addressed improving some of the other non-traditional, non-kinetic battlefield functions such as public affairs. To have future success in counter-insurgency (COIN) environments such as Iraq, the Army would be well served to posture its public affairs officers (PAOs) for effective communication to a worldwide audience.

Globalization and the rapid emergence of technology have created a new domain in which friendly and enemy information sources operate: the global information environment (GIE). This new domain is a departure from the historical military-domestic media relationship because Army public affairs officers now address both domestic and international audiences during war. With the absence of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and United States Information Service (USIS), America's public diplomacy voice around the world is now silent except for a few programs and the influence of the

Voice of America (VOA). The United States, its leadership, and its military must recognize that the military's relationship to the press now includes the entire world.

American journalists have accompanied and reported on the U.S. military's actions with mixed results. In past wars, the Army in particular has struggled with the correct level of press access. Keeping the American people informed of their representative military's actions is at odds with the military's other goal of maintaining operational security (OPSEC) to prevent the enemy from obtaining accurate information to be used for their efforts against U.S. troops. Journalists attempting to cover U.S. military actions after Vietnam found themselves subject to unprecedented censorship and restrictions.[1] Media coverage on the U.S. military's actions in Grenada and Panama was ineffective for the most part, but improved during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Desert Shield/Desert Storm ushered in a new age of media coverage with CNN's 24-hour news cycle and live briefings from Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell. Today's conflicts usher in even more change.

Media are now able to cover military actions conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq with unprecedented depth due primarily to technological advances. However, Army public affairs officers (PAOs) now are not just addressing American media outlets, but they also provide information to non-U.S. media companies such as News Corp. from Australia, Bertelsmann from Germany, Sony from Japan, al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera in the Middle East.[2]

Recent operations in the Middle East have alerted the U.S. military to the perceptions held by many citizens in the Arab world. In 2005, the U.S. military finally established a media center in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to assist in countering negative coverage of the

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[1] Ryan Barber and Tom Weir, "Vietnam to Desert Storm: topics, sources change," *Newspaper Research Journal* 23 (Spring / Summer 2002): 88.

[2] Benjamin Compaine, "Global Media," *Foreign Policy* (November / December 2002): 21.

United States' involvement in the Middle East. According to Army Captain Eric Clark, an officer then based in Dubai, "we were essentially allowing al-Qaeda and other terrorists to run rampant with lies and propaganda."[3] He added, "We're late in this fight. We're filling a vacuum that's existed in Arab countries for years."[4] PAOs operating all over the world increasingly struggle with their new role of public diplomacy.

The military and the Army in particular have recently increased some of their diplomatic capabilities, but continue to struggle with the exact level of resources that should be dedicated to military public diplomacy. Arguments against the military performing public diplomacy generally place the role of diplomacy solely on the Department of State (DoS), or commonly, State Department. These individuals believe that the military's sole mission is fighting and winning the nation's wars. Given the four instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) – those in this camp believe in a rigid division of national responsibility where government organizations, including the military, should stay in their appropriate lane.

However, some who argue for military diplomacy as a feasible option point out current operations in the War on Terrorism (WOT) may have forced the military into a more diplomatic role at times. Solders in Iraq and Afghanistan are the 'face of America' to individuals in those countries and the military cannot avoid their diplomatic role – especially in stability and support operations. With the dissolution of the USIA and USIS, the United States lost key assets in promoting its ideals and values to citizens of the world. Army PAOs on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan are part of the team that is attempting to fill that void

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[3] Jim Krane, "U.S. military woos Arab media," *The News & Observer*, Raleigh, NC (April 20, 2006): 15A.

[4] Ibid.

virtually overnight by representing America to the international community through its media.

If part of the center of gravity for the Iraq War is the American and Iraqi people's public opinion of the war, Army public affairs officers are at a distinct disadvantage simply because they are expected to play by the traditional rules of honesty and duty to their publics. Conversely, al Qaeda and other like-minded organizations are able to fabricate stories and transmit them to audiences worldwide. While continually operating in a reactive mode of disputing enemy claims, the U.S. military PAOs are hindered in their mission to provide accurate, timely information on the conflict. By the time they counter the sometimes false messages, the anti-U.S. opinion is already galvanized in the minds of even more moderate Muslims. For such reasons, PAOs not only are currently performing diplomatic efforts, but can increasingly expect to do so.

Statement of Purpose

This thesis analyzes the extent to which Army PAOs perform diplomatic-type roles and addresses the potential need for a new career field within the U. S. Army: the public diplomacy officer, or PDO. Global, rapid media cycles have necessitated this new function, which would take skill sets from current PAOs and other information operation (IO) officers and give these new officers the ability to interact with international media just as comfortably as they do with American media. This work will include several areas that will combine to demonstrate a need for the career field: A review of relevant IO and PAO doctrine, previous functions of the USIA and USIS, the current global information environment, and the public relations (PR) roles academic research stream. Despite the debate for or against PAOs

performing diplomatic functions, a survey of Army PAOs will examine the extent to which they are already performing these tasks in their current practices. This thesis aims to further the discussion on U.S. Army information operations and ultimately, assist the U.S. military in its endeavors in the War on Terrorism.

Literature Review

In order to adequately address this complex topic, a review of the appropriate literature comes from a variety of sources. First, it is important to take inventory of current relevant Army doctrine on IO and PA operations. If the Army is to improve its communication strategies, it must understand its current doctrinal posture. Second, the review will include a picture of the current GIE, to include the missing functions of the USIA and USIS in that environment. This gap between Army doctrine and the current GIE will demonstrate how PAOs, who are trained to inform the American people, have been placed in a situation by their environment in which they can no longer address only this audience. Finally, the PR academic research stream of public relations roles will be reviewed. PR roles research provides an appropriate format for analyzing how PAOs currently perform public diplomacy functions. To maximize future military communication successes, Army doctrine must reflect the public diplomacy roles that PAOs currently perform and need to perform around the world.

A. Army Doctrine for PAO roles and State Department Programs

The Army constantly disseminates information to various publics, both domestically and internationally. Three types of Army officers, distinguishable by their intended

audiences, have the mission of information dissemination and are relevant to this study: public affairs officers (PAOs), psychological operations (PSYOP) officers, and civil affairs (CA) officers who conduct civil-military operations (CMO). Army public affairs is an organization under the newly created Fires, Maneuvers and Effects branch of specialties which includes combat arms branches such as infantry and artillery. PSYOP is a type of information operations (IO) and CMO is an IO-related function. Public affairs personnel are chartered with educating and informing the American people about the nation's military. PSYOP personnel use information dissemination to hostile and anti-U.S. forces to encourage their cooperation and mentally decrease their will to fight. Civil affairs soldiers who conduct CMO interact with local citizens in a unit's area of operations to build support and to establish and maintain positive relationships with the local civilian population. Although various government agencies such as the State Department are involved in diplomatic matters, Army doctrine addresses these career fields' responsibilities within the context of tactical military operations, which may or may not include a significant number of government civilians. Figure 1 demonstrates these three roles in terms of intended audience.

PAO responsibility		CA responsibility	PSYOP responsibility	
American People	*American Media*	*Civilians in Areas of Operations*	*Insurgent Groups*	*Hardcore Terrorists*

Friendly ← **Spectrum of Theoretical Support** → Hostile

Figure 1. Information roles by audience and level of theoretical support

To elaborate on the first organization, Army public affairs, Army doctrine defines

those roles and duties as the following:

> Public Affairs fulfills the Army's obligation to keep the American people and
> the Army informed and helps establish the conditions that lead to confidence in
> America's Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict and
> war.[5]

Key to this definition are the intended audiences for Army public affairs: the

American people and the Army itself. Army public affairs doctrine is a combination of law

and prior military doctrine that establishes the limits of its activities by such measures as

1913's Gillette Amendment.[6] Public affairs has a three-fold mission: media relations,

command information, and community relations. Media relations is the primary function

through which public affairs personnel communicate through the media to the American

people on the actions of their country's military. This function is the primary topic of this

work simply because during a combat operation, military PAOs are required – not their

civilian counterparts. Internal information, formerly called command information, enhances

mission accomplishment, readiness, and morale by keeping soldiers, their families, and the

Army community informed of activities.[7] Community relations, now often a civilian public

affairs function, attempts to embrace and foster mutually beneficial relationships with various

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[5] Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-61.1, *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (1 October 2000).

[6] James Marshall, "Sharing the global information environment: training Army public affairs officers to understand and operate in the military information operations area," Master's Thesis. Davis Library, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, M3685 (2003). The 1913 Gillette Amendment prohibits the government from using taxpayer money to persuade American public or to hire "publicity experts." This is the primary reason government spokespersons are referred to as Public Affairs Officers or Information Officers instead of Public Relations practitioners.

[7] Department of Defense Information School, Public Affairs Officer Qualification Course curriculum. Fort Meade, Maryland (May 2005).

organizations and communities such as cities and towns near military bases. While military units are deployed with their PAOs, many installation public affairs sections are heavily manned by PA civilians. Figure 2 depicts Army public affairs' three functions or roles.

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                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │  Army Public    │
                    │    Affairs      │
                    └─────────────────┘
         ┌───────────────────┼───────────────────┐
┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐
│     Media       │ │    Internal     │ │   Community     │
│   Relations     │ │  Information    │ │   Relations     │
└─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘
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Figure 2. Three roles of Army Public Affairs

PSYOP, specifically an IO function, and CA, an IO-related function historically have had different audiences. In 2003, the Army redefined IO as:

…the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making.[8]

Although a significant part of IO involves technical, non-communication roles such as computer network operations (CNO), operations security (OPSEC), and electronic warfare (EW), PSYOP are operations that "convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to … influence the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and

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[8] Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (November 2003): 1-53.

individuals."[9] For example, PSYOP soldiers may use host nation mass media to plant doubt about enemy leadership, project the image of U.S. superiority, and convince hostile forces that it is in their best interests to cooperate with U.S. forces. Presidential Decision Directive 68 requires that PSYOP information programs "must be truthful."[10] Military deception, a related IO function, is a set of actions "taken to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions and operations."[11] IO officers in this field deliberately attempt to provide false information about U.S. military plans directly to hostile leadership with the intention of manipulating hostile forces.

A third set of military communicators, civil affairs officers, conduct civil-military operations, or CMO. Their role is to establish and maintain relationships between the Army and host nation civil authorities such as police and the general population. Host nation leaders such as tribal leaders in Afghanistan and Iraqi police can be valuable allies in the Army's attempts to quell insurgent actions and factional warring. Their role involves frequent interaction and relationship building with host nation leaders who may have a positive influence on local citizens. CA officers often gather critical information through their host nation relationships, but must exercise caution regarding their contacts' perception of how their shared information is used. If a host nation information source shares crucial intelligence information with a CA officer and believes that officer uses the information inappropriately or separate from the spirit in which it was shared, the entire relationship could be in jeopardy. Cultural training and appropriate language training often are important skill sets in assisting CA officers in their roles.

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[9] Field Manual 3-13, 2-7.

[10] Field Manual 3-13, 2-8.

[11] Field Manual 3-13, 2-6.

Army public affairs' relationship to IO has been and continues to be a widely debated topic in and around the Army. At stake is the Army PAOs' credibility to tell the domestic media and American people the absolute truth about Army operations. If the American people and media view PAOs as simply an IO officer attempting to manipulate domestic public opinion in ways similar to how PSYOP officers attempt to manipulate foreign attitudes, public affairs' believability and integrity will cease to exist. Alternately, some argue that all of these roles – PA, PSYOP, and CA – involve truthful information dissemination. These individuals believe that if internal communications equals the external communications, the message may only be unique by minimal cultural nuances and/or language translations.

Army doctrine provides some assistance in defining how PA, PSYOP, and CA roles should remain separate or in some cases may work synergistically. Army doctrine states that PA, PSYOP, and CMO "communicate information to influence audience understanding and perceptions of operations. They are coordinated to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort, ensure unity of purpose, and ensure credibility is not undermined."[12]

In the Army's latest manual on IO and PA, directives to public affairs officers increasingly address interaction with local populations, or non-U.S. audiences. This is a departure from the historical role of PAOs, which was to address only the American public. For example, doctrine now states that for PAOs, "conveying consistent messages to local populations is especially important during peace operations and some support operations."[13] It further proposes that PAOs should develop media analysis plans that provide "a sense of

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[12] Field Manual 3-13, 2-110.

[13] Field Manual 3-13, 2-108.

the issues the local population's attention is focused on."[14] In general, PA supports IO "by producing accurate, timely, and balanced information for the public, explaining – after the fact – the objectives of an operation."[15] These latest changes to Army doctrine indicate that PAOs perhaps could perform these roles more effectively if they were trained in public diplomacy. The Army's CA officers do an exceptional job of interacting with the local population, but are not trained like PAOs to interact with the media. When PAOs influence a local population, essentially they are performing the same role as a CA officer, except they are doing so through the host nation media.

The line between CMO roles and IO is even more rigid. Army doctrine states that "the need of CA forces to maintain credibility with the civil populace limits the extent to which they can support IO."[16] CA officers should exercise cautious judgment in sharing information about their audiences with PSYOP or other IO officers. If foreign audiences perceive that information has been used against them or in a manipulative or malicious way, their relationship with the CA officer will undoubtedly be strained or even collapse.

Figure 3 represents how these three entities – PA, PSYOP, and CMO – support or in some cases, do not support each other. Acronyms in the figure are explained in the glossary.

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[14] Field Manual 3-13, 2-109.

[15] Field Manual 3-13, 2-106.

[16] Field Manual 3-13, 2-116.

	IO	CMO	PA
IO supports by		• Influencing/informing populace of CMO activities and support • Neutralizing misinformation and hostile propaganda directed against civil authorities • Controlling electromagnetic spectrum for legitimate purposes	• Conducting counterpropaganda and protection from misinformation/rumor • Developing EEFI to preclude inadvertent public disclosure • Synchronizing PSYOP and OPSEC with PA strategy
CMO supports by	• Providing information to support friendly knowledge of information environment • Synchronizing communications media and message with PSYOP • Coordinating C2 target sets with targeting cell • Establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with indigenous personnel and NGOs • Supporting PSYOP with feed–back on PSYOP themes • Providing news and information to the local people		• Providing information on CMOC activities to support PA strategy • Synchronizing information communications media and message • Identifying, coordinating, and integrating media, public information, and host-nation support
PA supports by	• Developing information products to protect soldiers against the effects of misinformation or disinformation • Coordinating with PSYOP and counterpropaganda planners to ensure a consistent message and maintain OPSEC • Support counterpropaganda by countering misinformation • Providing assessment of effects of media coverage to OPSEC planners • Providing assessment of essential nonmedia coverage of deception story	• Producing accurate, timely, and balanced information for the public • Coordinating with CA specialists to verify facts and validity of information	

Figure 3. How PA, PSYOP, and CA mutually support each other[17]

These three Army functions all deal with information dissemination but approach that role in very different ways based on their intended audience. The changing nature of military operations, however, has increasingly blurred the line between these groups' specific roles. As the next portion of the literature review addresses, changes in the GIE have made it increasingly difficult for the PAO to address only the American people, for the PSYOP

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[17] Field Manual 3-13, figures 2-3.

officer to address only anti-U.S. forces, and for the CA officer to interact only with the local host nation population.

The State Department programs

Although not included in Army doctrine, a key component to understanding the military and public diplomacy involves activities of the U.S. Department of State (DoS). The DoS includes the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs whose mission is "to integrate diplomacy and military power to foster a stable and secure international environment hospitable to American interests and values."[18] In 2006, the DoS had 19 Political Advisers (POLAD) whose missions involve providing diplomatic advice and information to uniformed commanders such as the four service chiefs, the nine DoD Combatant Commanders, key NATO commands and other operational commands.[19] The DoS has wisely begun to increase the number of POLADs, but they remain the diplomacy proponents and advisers at extremely high echelons.

As the Iraq War has progressed, several military leaders, including General David H. Petraeus, current commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, have noted that Iraq's problems cannot be solved by military action alone, but rather through the combined efforts of the U.S. government's various organizations. The key issue involving placing more POLADs or DoS diplomats on the ground in Iraq is security. William Nash, a retired general and analyst for the Council on Foreign Relations assessed the State Department's limited participation in the Iraq War by saying, "There is no way in the world to justify nonparticipation in the most

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[18] United States Department of State Political-Military Affairs Guide, Summer 2006.

[19] Ibid.

significant challenge the U.S. has faced…certainly in the last 50 years. The nation has deep,

deep problems in Iraq and the failure to marshal all national resources is criminal."[20]

Advocates for not placing more diplomats on the battlefield include Ambassador

James Jeffrey, the State Department's coordinator for Iraq policy. Jeffrey states, "To have

thousands of civilians running around the country would require a tremendous security

presence."[21] Jeffrey also estimates that having thousands more civilians in Iraq would

require tens of thousands more soldiers to provide security for them. Finally, he claims the

State Department simply does not have that many more people to send to Iraq. Therefore, for

the greater part of the Iraq War, the U.S. military has been forced to perform diplomacy in

situations where there is no one else to do it.

B. The Global Information Environment (GIE): Need for a new approach

The emergence of the constantly changing, highly technical and influential GIE is a

much different domain than that in which the Army has historically operated. Army doctrine

has slowly evolved from previous wars and operations. In previous conflicts, journalists

such as Ernie Pyle in World War II sent human-interest pieces on soldiers that sometimes

took days to reach the United States. The strained relationship between the press and the

military in Vietnam is well documented, with many veterans still believing the press lost that

war. Some literature on the press/military relationship in Vietnam coined this phenomenon

as the "Post-Vietnam Blame the Media Syndrome."[22] Subsequent Army studies in the 1980s

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[20] *The Army Times*, June 19, 2006: 39.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Barry E. Venable. "The Army and the media," *Combined Arms Center Military Review* (January/February 2002): 13.

after operations in Grenada and Panama were significant efforts by the military to improve its relationship to the media.

More recently, Knightley and others have written about Desert Shield/Desert Storm as a "deadly video game" of a war in which Americans were able to see smart bombs on television and the apparent huge successes of their military.[23] Compared with today's media cycles, these earlier conflicts were in an outdated, relatively slow information environment.

Army PA doctrine, last updated in 2000, is based on these historical conflicts and PAOs' interaction with purely domestic media and audience. Fortunately, IO doctrine was updated in 2003 and incorporated several key lessons regarding the GIE from current conflicts. It does not, however, address PAOs' approach to the GIE. Current IO doctrine states "most operations are conducted in full view of a global audience."[24] Additionally, it states the GIE "allows news reports and analyses to rapidly influence public opinion and decisions concerning military operations. Audiences include the U.S. public, decision-makers, multinational partners, other nations and international organizations."[25] Thus, due in large part to lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is awakening to its ability to interact with international public opinion and the consequences if it does not. Whether planned or unplanned, the military, led by the U.S. Army, has taken on the challenge of engaging in public diplomacy with international media and audiences simply by the nature of transparent news coverage and the emergence of international media.

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[23] Philip Knightley, *The First Casualty: The war correspondent as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).

[24] Field Manual 3-13, 1-31.

[25] Field Manual 3-13, 1-32.

Public opinion in the U.S. and public diplomacy abroad increasingly have been shaped by media shifting from a vertical nature to a horizontal one. Daily newspapers, network radio, and television have been referred to as "vertical" forms of media because they form a stovepipe of information flow that attempts to inform the entire community.[26] In the U.S., public opinion on wars previously was shaped by the three major television networks – ABC, NBC, and CBS – and perhaps to a lesser degree by public television. In fact, when facing mounting public pressure on the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Baines Johnson claimed, "If I've lost Walter Cronkite, I've lost America."[27] Now, with the enormous growth of media, President George W. Bush could not make the same claim about a single media source losing the Iraq War.

Instead, citizens of the world now get their information from a variety of "horizontal" media – television, websites, blogs and specialized sources that may support their existing viewpoints. This emergence of horizontal media – of which international media are a significant part – allows individuals to fit world events to their own expectations on an unprecedented scale.[28] International audiences can now gather their information on the U.S. Army from a media outlet such as al-Jazeera or one that is consistent with their preconceived ideas about the U.S. With this divergence of media into a more horizontal form, public diplomacy is more difficult than at any other time in American history.

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[26] Donald Shaw, "Using agenda-setting and audience agenda-melding to create public information strategies in the emerging papyrus society," *Combined Arms Center Military Review* (November/December 2006), 13.

[27] Age Beat: The Newsletter of the Journalists Exchange on Aging, November 7, 2006, available at: http://www.asaging.org/agebeat/abo_issue.cfm?id=173; internet

[28] Shaw, "Using agenda-setting and audience agenda-melding to create public information strategies in the emerging papyrus society," 14.

A glaring example of the Army having to adapt to the GIE is the introduction of al-Jazeera into the battlefield. In the early stages of the Iraq War, al-Jazeera, an independent, Arab-owned television media outlet, caused the Army to struggle with its interaction with non-U.S. media. In 2003, television crews from al-Jazeera combed through Iraq and often filmed graphic images of war casualties and destruction – clips that also appeared in U.S. media outlets. While the U.S. military was touting to the world its capability to launch pinpoint attacks to minimize civilian casualties, al-Jazeera was showing dead Iraqi civilians who it claimed were killed by coalition bombings, to approximately fifty million citizens of the Arab world.[29] Diplomacy efforts aimed at the international community – especially to the Arab world – significantly regressed.

To understand the gap that now exists in influencing the growing international media, a review of the roles of the United States Information Agency – known as the United States Information Service abroad – provide a sound beginning. In 1953, the Eisenhower Administration created the USIA; its role was to influence foreign audiences and make the international community feel more receptive to U.S. policies overseas.[30] Many Americans are not aware of the organization because it was expressly prohibited from distributing its materials within the United States. Its sole mission was to enhance public diplomacy with the international community.

USIA programs included the Fulbright Scholarship Program through which American students studied in foreign countries, the Voice of America radio station, movies,

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[29] Knightley, *The First Casualty: The war correspondent as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq*, 538.

[30] Donald R. Browne, "United States Information Agency: spread information about the United States throughout the world," *History of Mass Media in the United States* (1998): 672.

collaborative books, and libraries often located near foreign universities.[31] Most young

citizens of the world were able to satisfy their curiosity about America via the local USIA

office. As a result, the U.S. was successfully grooming a generation of international citizens

who were more receptive to its policies.

The USIA's tragic paradox is that arguably its greatest success – assisting in bringing

about the end of the Cold War – contributed to its demise. Political support for USIA

programs declined during the 1990s because government leaders viewed the agency's

mission as complete.[32] Although remnants of the Voice of America program still exist, the

USIA was officially abolished in 1999 under the Clinton Administration, with some of its

personnel reassigned to the U.S. State Department.[33] Remnants of some of the USIA's

efforts, including the Fulbright Scholarship Program, are now administered by the State

Department.

More recently - in June 2003 – Congress directed the State Department to "establish

an advisory group on public diplomacy for the Arab-Muslim world to recommend new

approaches, initiatives, and program models to improve public diplomacy results."[34] The

advisory group, chaired by former ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, produced the report,

"Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in

the Arab-Muslim World," frequently referred to as the "Djerejian Report." The Djerejian

Report stated that Arabs and Muslims lack an understanding of American culture in part

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[31] Wilson Dizard, "Telling America's story," *American Heritage* 54 (August/September 2003): 41.

[32] Wilson Dizard, "Telling America's story," 42.

[33] Wilson Dizard, "Telling America's story," 42.

[34] Michael J. Zwiebel, "Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA," *Combined Arms Center Military Review*, (November-December 2006): 26-35.

because they are subject to a strong, anti-American biased media without hearing the American viewpoint.[35]

The U.S. now sees itself in an ideological struggle not unlike the Cold War and therefore requires functions similar to the former USIA. A new generation of international citizens has emerged and because of increasingly diverse media options, this generation is more likely to form an opinion about the U.S. from non-U.S. sources. Beyond the current area of focus, the Middle East, recent Army operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and any of the other countries in which the Army is deployed, demonstrate how the U.S. military could benefit from increased public diplomacy that begins before the actual military operation begins.

C. Public Relations Role Theory: the academic research stream

To get at the heart of what exactly PAOs do in a theater of operations, the appropriate academic research stream is public relations (PR) roles. The concept of PR roles was introduced in 1978 by Broom and Smith and attempts to define the day-to-day activities of public relations practitioners.[36] The majority of the literature in this area combines quantitative surveys of public relations practitioners with qualitative methods to analyze how practitioner roles have evolved through the end of the 20th century. The author has discovered no academic research specifically dedicated to the day-to-day roles of Army PAOs.

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[35] Michael J. Zwiebel, Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA," 28.

[36] Glen M. Broom and G.D. Smith, "Toward an understanding of public relations roles: An empirical test of five role models' impact on clients," presented at the meeting of the Public Relations Division, Association of Editors in Journalism, Seattle (August 1978); also see Glen M. Broom and G.D. Smith, "Testing the practitioner's impact on clients," *Public Relations Review*, 5(1979): 47-48.

The primary researchers in the public relations roles field such as Broom, Dozier, Cutlip, and Center use the now-almost ubiquitous definition of public relations: "the management function that establishes and maintains mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and the publics on whom its success or failure depends."[37] The definition is appropriate for the Army PAO as well. The Army depends on the American public for financial, recruiting, and emotional support, but also can achieve success much more easily if the relevant international publics support its efforts. Civil affairs officers are a testament to the Army's recognition that it benefits the deployed Army to establish and maintain mutually beneficial relationships with host nation publics. Instances do occur in which the Army cannot provide full disclosure of its operations in order to protect soldiers' lives and operational security, but the long-term interests of the Army are served when it fosters a mutually beneficial relationship with various publics.

Roles theory initially defined four theoretical roles of PR practitioners: *expert prescribers* were the informed, expert PR practitioners; *communication facilitators* were the information flow specialists between management and publics; *problem-solving process facilitators* were PR practitioners who helped management think through PR problems and issues; and *communication technicians*, as the name implies, provided the necessary communication services.[38] In the Army force structures, PAOs and their non-commissioned officers (NCOs) theoretically perform the first three roles and rely heavily on junior public affairs enlisted soldiers to perform technical roles. Additional research in the 1980s

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[37] David M. Dozier and Glen M. Broom, "Evolution of the manager role in public relations practice," *Journal of Public Relations Research* 7 (1995): 5.

[38] Glen M. Broom and G. D. Smith, "Testing the practitioner's impact on clients," *Public Relations Review* 5 (1979): 47-59.

narrowed the above four roles into two primary types: public relations manager and public relations technician.[39] This structure also is consistent with Army PAOs and their more-senior NCOs, both of whom perform manager roles while junior enlisted soldiers serve as the technicians.

During the 1990s, roles research generally analyzed how certain roles of PR practitioners related to variables such as the environment in which they worked, practitioners' relationship to management, salary, and gender differences.[40] Researchers of management roles refined the tasks that public relations managers performed as opposed to those of public relations technicians. Roles research on salary differences analyzed how public relations roles differ between those who receive large or small compensation. Finally, work on gender differences in PR roles research addressed the differences in public relations tasks performed by men and women in the same organization.

Admittedly, some of the work in this area, such as salary PR roles studies, is not appropriate for studying the military, or may be applicable to a different area of study. However, several studies appropriately transfer from civilian PR practitioners to military PAOs in the attempt to analyze PAO roles.

For example, over the years, roles researchers surveyed PR practitioners repeatedly to examine how the profession changed through the decades.[41] Similarly, military public affairs could benefit from analyzing how PAOs have changed their roles and the manner in which they perform their duties. Many PAOs have undoubtedly encountered tactical situations that

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[39] David M. Dozier, "Program evaluation and roles of practitioners," *Public Relations Review* 10 (1984): 13-21.

[40] Elizabeth L. Toth, Shirley A. Serini, Donald K. Wright, and Arthur G. Emig, "Trends in public relations roles: 1990-1995," *Public Relations Review* 24 (1998): 145.

[41] Greg Leichty and Jeff Springston, "Elaborating public relations roles," *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 73 (1996): 467.

would be useful to update Army public affairs doctrine – the last of which was officially

updated in 2000. For future PA doctrine to be effective, it must incorporate PAO

experiences from the field – experiences that increasingly have an international flavor.

Another area of PR roles theory applies to the military. Dozier proposes that PR

practitioners invoke a manager-type role when they perform "environmental scanning," or

attempt to capture potential PR issues by proactively analyzing their pertinent public.[42] This

is a role PAOs may perform, both in the U.S. and overseas in a deployment. If PAOs have,

in fact, engaged in "environmental scanning" of foreign audiences and responded

accordingly, perhaps the results would contribute to the understanding of emerging PAO

issues, which may in turn lead to the discovery of more diplomatic roles being performed by

PAOs.

Another branch of PR roles research involves perception of PR practitioners and their

ability to effectively communicate messages to their publics. Callison concludes that PR

practitioners, as compared to independent information sources, are viewed more negatively

by the public and thus are less effective than an independent source in communicating

messages.[43] The Army benefits when an independent media source or organization supports

its efforts or carries its messages – as opposed to a PAO or commander simply answering

questions at a press conference. The challenges Callison mentions are not only similar, but

arguably more difficult for a PAO operating in an international environment. PAOs'

tendency to work more in line with diplomacy duties may result from the way a foreign

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[42] David Dozier, "The Organizational Roles of Communications and Public Relations Practitioners," in *Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management,* ed. James E. Grunig (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992): 327.

[43] Coy Callison, "The good, the bad, and the ugly: Perceptions of public relations practitioners," *Journal of Public Relations Research* 16 (2004): 371-389.

public views the PAOs' efforts in their country. In order to overcome any preconceived negative notions of their message in a foreign land, PAOs may need to use such CA skills as language or cultural-specific training – very different skills than most PAOs currently use or in which they have received training. The author discovered no current list of these diplomatic, 'outside-the-box' skills that PAOs are effectively using in various areas of operations.

The vast majority of work in PR role theory uses surveys of PR practitioners in the civilian world and attempts to create a standard definition of practitioner duties. Leichty and Springston elaborated on PR roles by questioning practitioners on 38 different areas that statistically grouped neatly into eight separate functions: advocacy, PR catalyst, gatekeeping, PR training, PR counsel, communication technician, formal research, and information acquisition.[44] This work expanded upon previous studies and highlighted some of the changes in how PR practitioners' duties had evolved. Military PAOs perform each of these eight functions in varying degrees, based on the nature of their duty assignment. However, the only genuine reference point to observe how PAO roles have evolved into more diplomatic-type roles is Army doctrine covered in the first part of the literature review.

Qualitative work also exists about PR roles theory development, but is limited. Sallot, Porter, and Acosta-Alzuru used in-depth interviews with PR practitioners to determine how their use of technology affected their roles.[45] Such studies allow PR practitioners to elaborate on their roles and provide rich depth of information not commonly found in simple

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[44] Greg Leichty and Jeff Springston, "Elaborating public relations roles," *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 73 (Summer 1996): 470.

[45] Lynne M. Sallot, Lance V. Porter and Carolina Acosta-Alzuru, "Practitioners' web use and perceptions of their own roles and power: a qualitative study," *Public Relations Review*, 30 (2004): 269.

multiple-choice surveys. Recognizing Army deployments and PAO roles often provide

complex situations; in-depth interviews with key PAOs – similar to this qualitative study –

may provide a unique depth of information for enlightening results.

The true strength in using PR roles research to analyze PAOs roles lies in the research

stream's attempt to define how PR roles change. Authors such as Toth, Serini, Wright, and

Emig have used quantitative methods to demonstrate how the roles of managers and

technicians have increasingly merged with each other.[46] This finding is a strong parallel to

how PA, CA, and PSYOP officers' roles have increasingly merged. The theory has existed

long enough that the body of academic work in this area represents how PR practitioners

today perform their duties differently from their counterparts in the 1980s. In some studies,

practitioner roles have stayed virtually the same, but more simplistic models that offer fewer

PR functions have also emerged. Likewise, PAOs today arguably perform their duties and

roles much differently than did PAOs in Desert Shield / Desert Storm, Grenada, and Panama.

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[46] Elizabeth L. Toth, Shirley A. Serini, Donald K. Wright, and Arthur G. Emig, "Trends in public relations roles: 1990-1995," 145.

D. Summary of literature

An updated information environment in which the Army now operates is pictured in Figure 4; this also provides an updated representation of the range of theoretical support.

No longer in existence = public diplomacy gap

PAO responsibility		USIA responsibility		CA responsibility	PSYOP responsibility	
American People	*American Media*	*International Media*	*International Citizens*	*Civilians in Areas of Operations*	*Insurgent Groups*	*Hardcore Terrorists*

Friend ◄— Spectrum of Theoretical Support —► Hostile

Figure 4. Updated information roles by audience and level of theoretical support

Incorporating the changes in today's global information environment, Figure 4 updates Figure 1 by adding two new audiences: international media and citizens. The U.S. arguably lost its voice to these publics when it lost the USIA. Years and years of USIA work nurtured the diplomatic relationship with the international community, and now the U.S. is trying to reestablish that relationship in parts of the world. The U.S. Army has organizations that cover the left and right of the two new groups, so it is logical that the Army is capable of addressing the international media and community. Army units, with PAOs for every brigade-sized element, operate around the globe and in some instances, become a natural choice for the diplomatic role when the situation requires it. Additionally, a civilian organization such as the USIA or Department of State representatives would be extremely

vulnerable to terrorist attacks throughout the world simply because of their unprotected, non-military posture. With some refinement and the addition of the increased public diplomacy efforts, the Army could have more success while interacting with its ever-growing international public.

To conclude the literature review's three elements, this study combines Army doctrine, the current global information environment, and the public relations roles academic body of research. Figure 5 depicts how these elements combine to create the need for this study.


Figure 5. Relationship of three literature review areas: doctrine, GIE, and roles theory

Army doctrine defines the roles of public affairs officers, information officers, and civil affairs officers. The GIE has necessitated that PAOs analyze their role on the battlefield – specifically in terms of public diplomacy and the now-missing functions of the USIA.

Finally, several PR roles articles contribute to the methods in which this study will analyze the changing PAO role. The following research questions emerge from this literature analysis:

Research Questions

R1: What roles, skills, and attributes do Army public affairs officers currently perform or use in executing public diplomacy duties?

R2: How do Army public affairs officers view changes in training requirements for their current roles, skills, and attributes?

This thesis will examine how and to what extent PAOs already perform public diplomacy duties via research question one. Second, PAOs in the field will provide input on how their functions on the battlefield have changed and potentially what training the Army can provide in the future to enhance their diplomatic abilities. The answers to these two questions will provide a reference point about what roles PAOs currently perform and the extent to which they are already working as public diplomats.

The primary obstacle with Army PAOs performing diplomacy roles openly is the internal tension between providing information and promoting a political message or objective. PAOs are expressly prohibited from conducting propaganda efforts and must be truthful in all communications. Rather than engaging in the political element of government communications, this thesis studies the extent to which PAOs provide truthful information to foreign media and publics. The resulting information should contribute to ongoing dialogue on the development of Army information-related doctrine, and further contribute to the

scholarly discussion about public relations roles within a particular discipline. Chapter two

explains the specific methodology used to examine this thesis' research questions.

Chapter II

METHODOLOGY

Methodology Overview

Army public affairs is a relatively diverse branch of the Army. It is, therefore, somewhat difficult to establish an all-encompassing picture of the career field that captures it in its entirety. Assignments in Army public affairs range from high echelons in tactical units and the Pentagon to special operations units to representatives for recruiting programs such as Army NASCAR. Many Army public affairs officers are currently deployed in the war on terrorism in Iraq or Afghanistan. Although the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve have several hundred PAOs, the current approximate population of active-duty Army public affairs officers by rank is:


Figure 6: Total number of active duty PAOs by rank[47]

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[47] Public Affairs Officer Branch Manager, Major Steven Warren, 1 March 2007.

In an attempt to capture the current set of public affairs roles and skills performed by PAOs, I chose to survey all active-duty majors and lieutenant colonels. These two ranks not only make up the majority of the career field, but PAOs at these two ranks are the ones who perform the routine, day-to-day tasks of the career field. Majors generally have 10 to 16 years' time in service in the Army and generally 2 to 6 years as a public affairs officer. Lieutenant colonels generally have 15 to more than 20 years' service in the Army and most of them have served as PAOs for at least five years.

Many captains are relatively new to the branch and don't have as much public affairs experience as majors and lieutenant colonels. Conversely, colonels have much experience, but they serve at extremely high, specialized levels of the Army, which may not adequately provide a common point of reference for PAO common tasks and roles. For these reasons, this research excludes input from captain and colonel PAOs and examines data only from majors and lieutenant colonels.

Qualitative research

A complex issue such as PAO roles is best analyzed using a mixed-methods research approach. I first conducted individual in-depth interviews with select PAOs who have performed diplomacy-type roles in order to study this area qualitatively. It was important for me to use a qualitative research method because, as a PAO, I have some personal insight into this study. I conducted one interview at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with a PAO involved in special operations missions. I conducted a second interview via telephone with a PAO who had had numerous overseas deployments and extensive experience as a PAO working in foreign countries. A senior PAO at the rank of colonel suggested these individuals as

appropriate points of contact for this area of study because of their deployment experiences in various cultures outside the U.S.

Initial interview questions helped me gather information on the individuals' deployment experience to understand better the extent to which they have been exposed to situations with non-domestic audiences. Subsequent questions targeted the extent to which these PAOs performed public diplomacy roles. From the interviews, two consistent themes emerged that assisted me with structuring the survey. First, interviewees discussed 3 audiences: domestic, foreign media and foreign publics. The second theme that emerged was 3 types of relevant training: foreign media training, foreign culture training, and language training. I analyzed the interview data to get a more complete picture of the overall military/public diplomacy issue; I also used the themes of audiences and training to help draft a survey for the PAO field at large. Appendix A contains the interview outline used for this research.

Quantitative research

In the quantitative portion of this study, I used the above-mentioned interview data, select PR role academic studies, GIE works, and Army doctrine to draft a survey of all majors and lieutenant colonels currently serving as PAOs. The survey had 3 sections: an initial group of questions to gather basic demographic information, a section to gather data for R1, and a section to gather data for R2.

The Army public affairs branch helped me gather email addresses for some majors and lieutenant colonels while I used Army Knowledge Online (AKO), the Army's intranet, to look up email addresses for many PAOs. I sent emails to all 250 majors and lieutenant

colonels that explained my research and the appropriate link to the survey on the online survey site, Zoomerang. Appendix B is the actual 20-question, multiple choice survey.

It was important to establish at the beginning of the survey some demographics on the respondents – namely, whether or not they have been deployed as PAOs outside of the U.S. Key information from this survey came from the respondents who have operated in a foreign environment as PAOs. Several questions allowed respondents to comment on a question or to clarify an answer to the multiple choice questions. For example, if a PAO answered that he/she spoke a foreign language, they were asked to list the particular language.

After the initial demographics section of the survey, the second area asked questions about the various publics with whom PAOs interacted while they were stationed state-side and/or deployed. PAOs were asked to answer how often they interacted with various publics based on a five-point scale: daily to several times a week, a few times a month, only a few times ever, not a single time, or not applicable. For example, when asked if he/she interacted with foreign media while deployed, a PAO who had never been deployed would answer "not applicable." Data from these questions formed the assessment for R1 on the current diplomatic-related roles of PAOs.

In the third and final section of the survey, questions focused on gathering data for research question two, areas in which PAOs should receive additional training. PAOs were asked how useful appropriate language, cultural and foreign media training would be to them by answering either very useful, somewhat useful, don't know, not useful, or a waste of time. Data from this section would help the Army prioritize its future public affairs training, as requested by PAOs currently serving around the world.

I computed various trends with SPSS statistical software to determine what kinds of attributes and/or skills combine to create the current roles for Army public affairs officers. Simple analysis from Zoomerang provided raw percentages of PAOs who fell into various categories for each question. For example, raw survey data provides the percentage of respondent PAOs who speak a foreign language fluently. The initial section of the results chapter includes basic information on the PAO community demographics.

For each survey question, I calculated the mean, standard deviation, range, minimum and maximum for all variables to understand the basic properties of each variable. Questions 10 through 17 from the survey were used to answer R1. Variables one and two, listed below, measure the PAO community's level of interaction with U.S. media when they are stationed in the U.S. or deployed, respectively. Variables three and four measure the PAO community's interaction with foreign media when they are in the U.S. or deployed. Variables five and six measure the interaction with non-media, foreign publics in both locations. Variable seven measures the extent to which PAOs view their roles as including diplomatic duties. The seven variables relevant to R1 are:

1. **CONUSdomestic:** While stationed in the U.S., the PAO's interaction with domestic (U.S.) media.

2. **DEPLdomestic:** While deployed outside the U.S., the PAO's interaction with domestic (U.S.) media.

3. **CONUSforeign:** While stationed in the U.S., the PAO's interaction with foreign (non-U.S.) media.

4. **DEPLforeign:** While deployed outside the U.S., the PAO's interaction with foreign (non-U.S.) media.

5. **CONUSpublic:** While stationed in the U.S., the PAO's interaction with non-military, non-media foreign publics.

6. **DEPLpublic:** While deployed outside the U.S., the PAO's interaction with non-military, non-media foreign publics.

7. **Diplomacy:** Frequency of performing PAO duties that the respondent considers diplomatic in nature.

To simplify the results, I used the 'recode' feature in SPSS to change the raw answers, in the form of 1 through 5, to three categories of high, medium, and low levels of interaction. The recoding criteria were:

'High'
1-frequently: daily to several times a week.
2-sometimes: a few times a month.

'Medium'
3-rarely: only a few times in the course of my work

'Low'
4-never: not a single time or incident
5-not applicable: my situation does not match the question's design

I then performed frequency statistics on the recoded variables to determine a high, medium, or low level of interaction with the various publics. To adequately answer R1, I focused on the various roles and skills that deployed PAOs answer in the 'high' category listed above.

To address R2, I used the questions 18 through 20 on the survey and turned them into variables in SPSS. These three variables measured the PAO community's level of perceived usefulness for foreign language, cultural and media training. The three variables relevant to R2 are:

1. **LangTng:** appropriate foreign language training usefulness to a PAO.

2. **CultTng:** appropriate foreign culture training usefulness to a PAO.

3. **FMTng:** appropriate foreign media training usefulness to a PAO.

Once again, to simplify the results, I recoded the raw answers, in the form of 1 through 5, to three categories of high, medium, and low levels of usefulness. The recoding criteria were:

'High'
1-very useful, 2-somewhat useful

'Medium'
3-neutral

'Low'
4-not useful, 5-not useful at all

I then performed frequency statistics on the recoded variables to determine a high, medium, or low level of usefulness as perceived by the PAO respondents. To adequately answer R2, I focused on the training that PAOs answer in the 'high' category listed above. As an additional level of analysis, I measured the differences in perceived training between those PAOs who had deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and those who had not deployed. Deployment experience will be coded as '0' for none and '1' for some – similarly to many

gender quantitative studies. I performed cross tabs in SPSS with deployed versus non-deployed in the columns and the high, medium and low levels of usefulness for each of the 3 training areas – foreign language, culture and foreign media training – represented in the rows. The results demonstrate how PAOs who have deployed view the importance of the three proposed categories of PAO training.

In addition to the quantitative data analysis, a final open-ended survey question allowed respondents to provide their input on this research area. Comments from the survey and interviews will serve to highlight some of the military/diplomatic issues not entirely captured by the quantitative data analysis. Several PAOs had passionate, in-depth comments on this issue, which indicates the members of the career field have strong opinions on the current and future roles of PAOs.

Research Limitations

A potential limitation for both the interviews and survey is the participants' willingness to be completely candid and forthcoming with their experiences. Military officers will not release any information that violates operational security or is sensitive in nature. PAOs who serve in special operations units are especially wary of this because they are more likely to interact with foreign publics than PAOs in traditional Army units. Special Operations forces operate in foreign countries more often than the regular Army does, and therefore, SOF PAOs go with the units to those foreign locations. Accordingly, SOF PAOs are potentially exposed to information that is classified at a higher level unlike regular Army PAOs at perhaps the brigade level.

Additionally, the study participants, as soldiers serving in the Army, may have some experiences or information that they simply do not want the Army to have – similar to civilians not wanting to release every piece of information to their employers. I took measures to mitigate this limitation by keeping all survey and interview data confidential and secure in accordance with applicable University of North Carolina's Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidelines and regulations.

A second limitation of this research involves observing public diplomacy solely as a military function when it obviously is not. The Department of State and other governmental agencies lead U.S. efforts in public diplomacy through diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) actions. This research does not analyze the United States' entire diplomatic effort involving other government organizations. However, this thesis does address the military's cross-coordination with the State Department in the area of public diplomacy, which does occur at times.

A final limitation is survey participants are all active-duty PAOs. The Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve have several hundreds more PAOs – including a significant number with deployment experience. However, given time and resource constraints, I chose to only survey active-duty PAOs. Chapter three will review the results of the interviews and survey.

Chapter III

RESULTS

The qualitative interviews and quantitative survey data explain the changing duties and functions of PAOs into more diplomatic-related roles. I received 140 completed survey responses out of a possible 250, which is a 56% response rate. Given the Army's high tempo of operations, the number of responses was a solid indicator of PAOs' willingness to assist in analyzing their branch. PAOs, like all Army officers, receive several survey requests each year, but do not routinely receive survey invitations specifically on their relatively small career field.

Of particular assistance were current and former PAOs who were participants in the Army's Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) process like me. Their familiarity with the ACS program and spirit of cooperation in furthering the understanding of Army public affairs contributed to the high response rate. Several respondents provided valuable comments on the open-ended questions and even offered additional information in response to the solicitation email. One survey respondent accurately represented several of his peers in their eagerness to study the PAO career field by saying, "About time!!! This is one area we PAOs must take the initiative on."

Demographic Results

Survey respondents included 91 Majors (out of 191 solicited), 47 Lieutenant Colonels (out of 59 solicited) and 2 Colonels who were very recently promoted from Lieutenant Colonel. I chose to include their input into the survey because their promotions were recent and amended their responses to reflect lieutenant colonel as their rank. These numbers represent a 47% response rate for all active-duty PAO majors and an 80% response rate for all active-duty PAO lieutenant colonels. Figure 7 depicts the number of responses versus number of solicitations by rank.

Figure 7. Survey respondents versus solicitations by rank

Most of the respondents had more than 16 years of time in service in the Army. Eighty-one respondents, or 58% of the total number of respondents, had 16 or more years' time in service. The next two categories of time in service were almost equal. Thirty respondents, or 21%, had 14 to 16 years of time in service. Twenty-eight respondents, or 20%, had 10 to 13 years' time in service. One respondent had less than 10 years' time in service. Data on time in service clearly shows the survey participants were a well seasoned

group of PAOs with many years of experience. The survey population also includes input

from a solid range of experience since all time in service categories between 10 and over 16

years were represented with an adequate distribution. Figure 8 represents the distribution of

time in service for the survey respondents.

Figure 8. Survey respondents time in service

Fifty-two respondents (37%) had been PAOs for 7 or more years. The following

categories for time served as a PAO were fairly well distributed between 13% and 17% of the

survey population. Fourteen percent of respondents had 5 or 6 years' time served as a PAO;

16% of respondents had 3 or 4 years time served as a PAO. Seventeen percent of

respondents had 1 or 2 years time served as a PAO. Thirteen percent of respondents had less

than a year's time in service as a PAO. Once again, demographic data on time served as a

PAO offers a solid distribution across the range of possibilities.

PAO deployments

Not surprisingly, a majority of the survey respondents had been deployed to Iraq or

Afghanistan as a PAO. Seven respondents (5%) had deployed to one of these locations 3 or

more times. Nineteen respondents (14%) had deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan twice. Sixty respondents (43%) had deployed to one of these locations once. Fifty-four respondents (39%) had not deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan as a PAO; some may have deployed to one of these locations in another capacity. Given the Army's operational tempo and continued troop rotations to combat zones, it is important to understand these data represent a snapshot of deployment experience as of March 2007. Figure 9 demonstrates PAO deployment experience.

Figure 9. PAO deployments to Iraq and/or Afghanistan

A fewer number of PAOs had deployed to areas other than Iraq or Afghanistan. Sixty-two respondents (44%) had never deployed to an OCONUS location as a PAO other than to Iraq or Afghanistan. Thirty-one respondents (22%) had deployed once. Twenty-two respondents (16%) had deployed twice. Twenty-seven respondents (19%) had deployed to an OCONUS location other than Iraq or Afghanistan as a PAO 3 or more times. Deployment numbers overall represent a PAO force that has been deployed OCONUS in numbers similar to the Army in general, with the highest number deployments being to Iraq or Afghanistan.

PAO Functions

A majority of survey respondents (53%) said they spent most of their time performing media relations. Twenty-seven respondents (19%) perform command information most of the time. Eight respondents (6%) said they spend most of their time doing community relations. Forty-four respondents (31%) answered "other" and provided clarifying information. The most common write-in answers included "strategic planning," "IO staff," or "not currently in a PA assignment." Some respondents explained they were currently in ACS or training with industry (TWI) programs. Some respondents in the "other" category stated they dedicate their time to two or all three functions relatively equally and could not accurately state which function they spend the most time performing.

PAO Training

The survey respondents represent a well-trained PAO force. One hundred twenty-nine respondents (93%) graduated from the Defense Information School's Public Affairs Officer Qualification Course (PAOQC). Given this high number of PAOQC graduates, the survey respondents were able to comment intelligently in subsequent questions on how well this training prepared them for their roles as a PAO. Only 10 respondents (7%) had not attended PAOQC. A few of those 10 individuals emailed me and asked if they should participate in the survey despite not attending PAOQC. I informed them of my intent to survey all major and lieutenant colonel PAOs and therefore, they should participate in the research if they so desired.

A large number of survey respondents had additional public affairs-related training beyond PAOQC. Seventy-four respondents (55%) had some sort of additional training. The most common forms of this additional training were ACS, TWI, an undergraduate degree in journalism, or joint PAO training. Sixty-one respondents (45%) stated they had no additional public affairs-related training beyond PAOQC. Since over half of the survey respondents had some form of additional PA training, the survey population represents a relatively well-educated PAO force.

When asked if they speak a foreign language fluently, only 20 respondents (14%) stated that they did. The majority, 119 respondents (86%), did not speak a foreign language. The two most common languages spoken were Spanish and German, followed by only a few with French and Italian language skills. Only 1 PAO survey respondent stated they spoke Arabic and one other said they were familiar with it enough to function effectively in an Arabic-speaking environment. Some PAOs who deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan undoubtedly had some exposure to the appropriate language in those countries, but did not mention any significant level of language skills or even familiarity.

Analysis of data for R1

The 7 variables relevant to R1 demonstrate that PAOs' roles include diplomacy through their significant interaction with foreign media and foreign publics – especially while deployed. Surprisingly, PAOs also interact at times with foreign media and publics while stationed in the U.S. In the global information environment, foreign media are often able to access PAO information from Army websites and contact them for information. Table 1 depicts the percentages of PAOs who interact with various publics while stationed stateside.

	Interaction with domestic media	Interaction with foreign media	Interaction with foreign publics
High	61.8%	21.5%	12.5%
Medium	11.1%	34.0%	35.4%
Low	23.6%	41.7%	47.2%
No answer	3.5%	2.8%	4.9%
Total %	100%	100%	100%

Table 1. CONUS PAOs interaction with various publics

For PAOs stationed in the U.S., their level of interaction with the domestic media is, as expected, high – 61.8%. Almost one quarter of PAOs said that while in the U.S., their level of interaction with domestic media was low. Perhaps surprisingly, 21.5% of PAOs had a high level of interaction with foreign media – even while stationed in the U.S. However, more than 40% of stateside PAOs had a low level of interaction with foreign media. Finally, most PAOs stationed in the U.S. understandably had relatively low or medium levels of interaction with non-military, non-media publics. Only 12.5% of surveyed stateside PAOs had high levels of interaction with this group.

A similar chart showing levels of interaction with these groups while PAOs are deployed demonstrates even higher levels of involvement. Table 2 depicts the percentages of PAOs who interact with various publics while stationed outside the U.S. or deployed.

	Interaction with domestic media	Interaction with foreign media	Interaction with foreign publics
High	68.8%	60.4%	52.1%
Medium	3.5%	8.3%	18.8%
Low	25.0%	27.8%	25.7%
No answer	2.8%	3.5%	3.5%
Total %	100%	100%	100%

Table 2. Deployed/OCONUS PAOs interaction with various publics

Table 2 demonstrates that PAOs interact with domestic media at very similar levels whether they are stationed in the U.S. or deployed. Interaction with U.S. media while deployed is even higher (68.8% in the high category) than when PAOs are stateside (61.8%). The category with the biggest change from Table 1 to Table 2 is interaction with foreign media. While stateside, only 21.5% of PAOs had a high level of interaction with foreign media. When deployed, the percentage in the high category jumps almost 40 percentage points to 60.4%. Interaction with domestic and foreign media appeared to have a dichotomous state – either PAOs interacted with the media or did not. Both categories had very low levels of medium interaction. Just over half of the surveyed PAOs (52.1%) had a high level of interaction with non-military, non-media foreign publics.

Survey and interview comments strongly support the results in table 2 that PAOs interact with both foreign media and publics. Some relevant comments for this foreign publics and media theme included:

> *"In Iraq I spent 50% of my time working with local media and local PAOs coaching and mentoring them on professional practices in PR and journalism"*

> *"This [PAO diplomacy] is an area that continually gets insufficient attention due to the ongoing requirements of Western media and publics, yet has an enormous impact on the operation being undertaken."*

> *"I have found foreign media contacts are difficult to come by and you must build a relationship with them. They are putting their lives on the line whenever seen with coalition forces. This cannot be underrated."*

The above comments highlight the global information environment in which PAOs now find themselves. The third comment highlights how PAOs build relationships with foreign media contacts similar to how they build relationships with U.S. media. This relationship-building task is difficult not only because of cultural and language barriers, but also because of the inherent danger to foreign media sources who choose to work with the U.S. Army. Both quantitative and qualitative research supports the position that PAOs are interacting with foreign media and publics.

The seventh and final variable addressing R1 describes the extent to which PAOs see themselves performing diplomatic-related roles.

	Level of diplomatic-related duties
High	46.5%
Medium	20.8%
Low	28.5%%
No answer	4.2%
Total %	100%

Table 3: Level of PAO perception of diplomatic-related duties

Generally, almost one-half of survey respondent PAOs had high levels of diplomatic-related duties and functions which involve interaction with foreign media and publics. The other half of the survey population was split relatively evenly between medium and low levels. These results are consistent with PAOs' assessment regarding their interaction with foreign media and publics.

From these data, it appears diplomatic-related roles and duties are currently performed by PAOs – particularly in a deployed environment. Stateside PAOs still routinely interact with domestic media, but also interact significantly with foreign media. While deployed, PAOs interact with foreign media at similar levels that they interact with domestic media in the states. PAOs have some interaction with foreign publics, but at lesser levels than their interaction with the domestic and foreign media. These data support that PAOs are still the Army's point of contact with the media – only now their roles and duties include interaction with foreign media and publics as well.

Several interview and survey comments mentioned PAO diplomatic efforts in coordination with Department of State POLAD roles and duties. Comments also addressed diplomacy as a PAO role. Relevant comments on the diplomacy theme included:

"The Army's Chief of Public Affairs office has dedicated a Lieutenant Colonel in the office to deal with the foreign media for the first time. That LTC interacts with the State Department POC…to provide at large media opportunities to media registered as foreign media. The program is top notch and does very well…"

"…creating a better, more routine, linkage with DOS would greatly increase our ability to reach out to various publics."

"As military is but one aspect of conflict resolution, PAOs will find themselves increasingly drawn into diplomatic events/efforts. This can be both good and bad depending on the event."

"…Recommend looking at the lack of training PAOs get in coordinating w/DoS…"

"Public Affairs Officers are the one and only designated spokesperson for their respective [commands]. They must be aware of the culture, diplomatic, and political issues with the host country to include the local and foreign media."

Once again, the quantitative and qualitative research in this study support the position that PAOs are currently performing diplomatic-related roles and duties and that coordinating diplomatic-related messages with the State Department is increasingly important to the U.S.' overall national objectives.

To summarize the data relevant to R1, the diplomatic-related roles and duties of PAOs include:

- Significant involvement with foreign media while deployed

- Some interaction with foreign media even while stationed in the U.S.

- PAOs' perception that they do perform diplomatic-related roles.

- Increased coordination or desired coordination with the State Department

Analysis of data for R2

The three variables relevant to R2 demonstrate that PAOs perceive a great deal of usefulness in appropriate foreign cultural training, foreign media training and language training – in that order of priority. Table 4 depicts the survey respondents' opinion on the usefulness of each of the 3 areas of diplomatic-related training.

	Foreign language training	Cultural training	Foreign media training
Useful	82.6%	94.4%	91.0%
Unsure	5.6%	0.7%	2.8%
Not useful	9.0%	2.1%	2.8%
No answer	2.8%	2.8%	3.5%
Total %	100%	100%	100%

Table 4. PAO opinion on usefulness of various types of training

The PAOs who responded to the survey believe that all 3 areas of training would benefit the public affairs community. Cultural training received the highest percentage of usefulness with 94.4%, followed by 91.0% for foreign media training. Although foreign language was perceived as useful by most PAOs, it was not as useful as the other two categories of training. This was supported by several comments from the survey regarding the availability of interpreters in a deployed environment.

Survey and interview comments highlight the PAO community's opinions and were supportive of the quantitative analysis. Comments on the future PAO training theme included:

"[we] need to understand the cultural aspects and learn the language."

"More training and education should be implemented in public diplomacy/foreign media relations in PAOQC along with a follow-on specialty course available to PAOs who have already gained some real-world experience through their assignments."

"Particularly with interest in foreign media training, I would like to see training on how a culture views and values its various types of media. For instance, a culture may rely much more heavily on local vice regional newspapers, or more on electronic media."

"I would strongly encourage the Army to provide PAOs will training similar to that of Civil Affairs personnel with regard to foreign publics."

"It's imperative that we train PAOs to interact with the foreign media... PAOs must understand the media environment in order perform their duties and to capitalize on opportunities. We currently do a poor job of this."

Additional comments specifically on foreign language for PAOs are consistent with

the quantitative research which depicts language training as the least important of the 3

proposed areas. The language theme is visible through several comments:

"You need to appreciate the cultural differences when working with foreign media, but you don't necessarily have to speak their language (we have interpreters available for that)."

"All interaction with local media in Afghanistan is conducted through an interpreter. It is OK to know how to use some of the basic Pashtu phrases... which shows the locals that you are making an attempt to learn a little bit about their culture. However, the time lines for train up to deployment, redployment etc. require the brigade to target what the commander determines is the most important task to train-up on prior to the deployment and full language training is usually not on that list of priorities."

Two survey respondents believed language training was extremely important, as

evidenced by one PAO saying, "...the very nuanced responses we are often required to give

are too many times lost in translation between PAO, linguist, foreign journalist, and finally

foreign publics." On the other end of the spectrum, one PAO respondent said, "An

interpreter goes a long way and unless you immerse yourself in the culture and language

(which we don't have time to do) it [language training] is wasted time."

In taking the analysis of PAO training a step further, the following crosstabs tables

depict the differences in perceived training areas between those who deployed to Iraq and

Afghanistan and those who had not. The following three tables depict the difference in

perceived usefulness of foreign language training, cultural training and foreign media

training between deployed and non-deployed PAOs.

	Deployed PAOs	Non-deployed PAOs
Useful	79.8%	87.3%
Unsure	4.5%	7.3%
Not useful	11.2%	5.5%
No answer	4.5%	0.0%
Total %	100%	100%
Chi-squared value	0.218	

Table 5. Usefulness of foreign language training, deployed vs. non-deployed PAOs

	Deployed PAOs	Non-deployed PAOs
Useful	92.1%	98.2%
Unsure	1.1%	0.0%
Not useful	2.2%	1.8%
No answer	4.5%	0.0%
Total %	100%	100%
Chi-squared value	0.354	

Table 6. Usefulness of foreign culture training, deployed vs. non-deployed PAOs

	Deployed PAOs	Non-deployed PAOs
Useful	87.6%	96.4%
Unsure	3.4%	1.8%
Not useful	3.4%	1.8%
No answer	5.6%	0.0%
Total %	100%	100%
Chi-squared value	0.265	

Table 7. Usefulness of foreign media training, deployed vs. non-deployed PAOs

Although levels of usefulness for all three areas are high, non-deployed PAOs perceive slightly higher levels of usefulness for the training than do formerly deployed PAOs. It appears non-deployed PAOs, perhaps expecting a deployment overseas and fearing the unknown, want to be trained in diplomatic-related areas before their mission. Although the Chi-squared values do not approach a level of significance (0.05), the raw data indicate a slight difference in opinion between the 2 groups. The lowest of the 'high' levels of usefulness was for deployed PAOs and their opinion on foreign language training.

Applying these data to R2, it is apparent that PAOs view some changes to their current training. The vast majority of participants value appropriate foreign culture training, foreign media training and to a lesser extent, foreign language training as part of conducting their current roles and duties. Not only do non-deployed PAOs have a perceived need for diplomatic-related training, but formerly deployed PAOs who have been to Iraq or Afghanistan also see this training as an appropriate endeavor. Chapter four will provide a discussion of results and offer recommendations to improve PAO training.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The results from this research suggest that PAO's duties and roles currently include

diplomatic duties such as interacting with foreign media and publics. Basic survey

demographic data create a current snapshot of the PAO active duty force: a well-educated,

often-deployed, seasoned group of professionals. Of the three PAO functions – media

relations, command information, and community relations – media relations is still the

primary activity for most PAOs included in this research.

The data relevant to R1 supports the position that deployed or OCONUS PAOs

interact with foreign media as much as stateside PAOs interact with domestic media. The

only difference between a stateside PAO and a deployed one is that deployed or OCONUS

PAOs are operating in the foreign, global information environment for which PAOs

historically are not trained to do. Not insignificant to this study, the data even suggest that

stateside PAOs interact with foreign media. This is undoubtedly due to worldwide media

outlets – regardless of their countries of origin – contacting the U.S. Army for story material.

PAO research participants described two types of their interaction with foreign media

and publics. First is the PAOs' interaction with those audiences on behalf of the Army and

the nation – similar to PAOs' roles in dealing with the U.S. public. When PAOs address

foreign media and publics, they are communicating the Army's message and allowing the

world to view and assess actions taken by the U.S. military. Although not specifically promoting a political message, PAOs do provide access and truthful information to worldwide audiences in support of U.S. military operations.

The second layer of interaction undoubtedly stems from counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq where PAOs work with their Iraqi equivalent counterparts and local media to establish and maintain a freedom of press in a nation that has not formerly known one. PAOs can "get by" the first layer of interaction without having to possess specialized, culture-specific training because of interpreters and limited interaction. However, if the nation expects U.S. Army PAOs to not only establish, but maintain a free press in another country such as Iraq, the PAO force deserves appropriate geopolitical, culture and foreign media training with which to accomplish that mission.

Almost half of survey respondents (46.5%) said their duties at times include diplomatic-related actions. The role of PAOs as diplomats is consistently debated. Proponents believe that PAOs can and do create desired effects on a foreign public through the media. Opponents of PAOs performing diplomatic roles claim that PAOs must remain a pure, credible source for the American people and thus, their actions should not be too closely related to those actions normally done by IO.

The results in this thesis create a very clear picture that PAOs believe appropriate cultural and foreign media training are important. The PAOs who participated in this research realize that foreign language training would be useful, but also understand the time and resources that would go into providing this training to PAOs might not make it a viable option. Although PAOs who had not deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan perceived higher levels

of usefulness for this training than did formerly deployed PAOs, both groups perceived the training as useful.

In a sense, every Soldier who deploys is in some capacity a diplomat. The actions of one Soldier or a small group of Soldiers such as those at Abu Ghraib can create intense diplomatic situations or crises. However, the ante is higher for PAOs because they are official Army spokespersons and engage the worldwide public through its media. Regardless of the state of current debate on PAOs performing IO or diplomacy, this research shows that a rather high level of interaction between foreign media and Army PAOs already occurs. The current PA/IO/CA structure segments the world's publics in a way that is no longer possible in the GIE.

Is a Public Diplomacy Officer career field appropriate? A recommendation:

The global information environment and current nature of U.S. military operations has necessitated a change in the traditional PAO/IO/CA structure. This thesis supports the argument that a Public Diplomacy Officer, or PDO, is a necessary career field for future U.S. Army operations because:

- In a combat area of operations, civilians from the DoS cannot maintain a large diplomatic presence.

- According to these data, PAOs are now performing diplomatic-related roles through their interaction with foreign media and publics.

- PAOs overwhelmingly believe foreign culture, media and language training are worthwhile in performance of their duties.

There are a few branches that could change or combine to create the PDO career field, but the current career field that is most appropriate to morph into the PDO is the PAO simply because of the high levels of interaction with foreign media and publics. IO and CA undoubtedly interact with host nation and foreign publics on the local level, but the GIE has brought U.S. diplomacy to the world through the media – the PAO's domain. There are some options to consider if the Army pursues a PDO career field.

Option 1: Turn all military PAOs into PDOs

This option has distinct advantages. First, since the Army is increasingly "civilianizing" former military assignments to free up military personnel solely for combat-related assignments, Option 1 is consistent with this trend. Instead of dissolving the PAO career field, the Army might want to consider turning public affairs stateside into a civilian-only branch where former PAOs, retirees and veterans who are qualified to speak about the military could continue to serve as civilians. Furthermore, military PAOs would be available to tactical units and have the primary mission of public diplomacy in support of their deployable units' missions. PDOs would be combat-ready, uniformed officers while stateside PAOs would be civilians.

Undoubtedly, if all services in DoD adopted a similar posture, PAOQC would have to change significantly and perhaps be renamed to PDOQC – Public Diplomacy Officers Qualification Course. Since the PDOs' focus would be overseas and in foreign environments, future training would have to include some cultural and foreign media training

to prepare PDOs for their assignments. Coordinated training either with or similar to State Department POLAD training would benefit especially higher-ranking PDOs.

Option 1 also has its share of disadvantages. First, it would be time and resource-intensive to train the branch (approximately 300 officers) to a standard that would translate effectively to their mission. Given the numerous cultures in the world and potential areas of operations, it would be impossible to train every PDO in a few cultures. A remedy to this problem perhaps exists in specializing PDOs into certain geographical categories similar to areas of responsibilities for foreign area officers (FAOs) and special operations units. This would perhaps "single-track" a PDO into a certain set of assignments based on geographic considerations, but it would get the necessary skill sets in the right places. Given the immediacy of the Iraq War, the Army also should not train every PDO to specialize only in the Middle East; future conflicts could very well involve different cultures and parts of the world.

A second disadvantage for Option 1 is that it would pull uniform-wearing spokespersons away from the military communities. Part of the effectiveness of Army Public Affairs involves the presence of active duty spokespersons and leaders who are present to interact with the domestic media and U.S. citizens. The American people have historically had a high degree of trust in a uniformed leader such as General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who displayed tremendous confidence and technical knowledge during his communications during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Although civilians, retirees and veterans would undoubtedly do an admirable job of representing the current Army, Option 1 would make civilians the sole face and voice for the military in the U.S. The American public may

simply be more receptive to a uniformed person speaking to them about military operations than someone in civilian clothing.

A final disadvantage for Option 1 is the deployment-only functions of the PDOs would make their peacetime role more difficult to determine. OCONUS PDOs would still perform their functions in their assigned foreign countries. However, during times of relative peace, PDOs assigned to tactical units would not have a day-to-day primary duty. Some duties could include additional culture and language training or relationship-building visits to foreign media outlets. Effectively training PDOs at the National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center would be a difficult task because it would require actual foreign media participation as role players in order to achieve the desired training effects.

Option 2: Create specialized fields within Army Public Affairs

Option 2 would create sub-branches within the current PA career field. One branch, an Operational PAO, would continue to perform media relations, command information, and community relations in the domestic realm – exactly the same way the current PAO community is designed to do. A second specialized field, the PDO, would perform diplomacy-related functions in deployable tactical units. Perhaps a third career field would be an extremely small number of individuals who are assigned as PDOs to special operations units. This concept of sub-branches is not unusual to the Army. For example, officers in the Engineer branch are assigned to numerous types of units throughout their careers such as combat units in a light division, combat units in an armored division, construction units and even topographic map units. Basic engineer officer tasks remain the same, but engineer

officers learn the nuances of their particular type of unit. Although much smaller than most officer branches, the PAO branch could conceivably splinter in a similar way.

An advantage to Option 2 is that it would take significantly less time and resources to train a few PAOs rather than the entire force. Many PDOs could even attend existing Army civil affairs or PSYOP training to round out their skill set. For all PAOs, PAOQC would be the initial level of training for everyone in the branch, but PDOs could continue their assignment-specific training before deploying to an area of operations and interacting with foreign media.

The most glaring disadvantage of Option 2, as would probably be pointed out by those promoting a strict division between PA and IO, is that stateside PAOs could be viewed in the same manner by the U.S. public as PDOs. The U.S. should continue to have confidence in the integrity and credibility of Army PAOs and that trust could conceivably diminish if the domestic public thought PAOs were manipulating information or openly performing diplomacy on the U.S. public. It would be a tragic situation if the U.S. public viewed Army PAOs as public relations "spin doctors" instead of purveyors of truth and access.

A second disadvantage of Option 2 may be that dividing an already relatively small PA branch would create a tension between the sub-branches that could hinder cooperation. If Option 2 or a similar option is adopted, the relationship between operational stateside PAOs and deployed or OCONUS PAOs could range from friend cooperation to one of elitist attitudes by one group or the other. The Army undoubtedly benefits when its entire PA community shares information and techniques; splintering the already small community could detract from some of that existing cooperation.

Regardless of the option the Army chooses, if the Army creates a PDO field, it must strongly consider the foreign perception of this new branch. Not only should the Army train the PDOs appropriately, but it should also consider educating the foreign media on the new the roles and responsibilities of the PDO. Given no information on PDO roles, the foreign media could make up their minds that PDOs are manipulators of information and should not be trusted. A foreign media "boot-camp" program, similar to programs attended by U.S. media in combat areas, would benefit the Army in defining its position on the new branch. Additionally, if trained properly, PDOs themselves could convince foreign media and publics that they are a credible source of information on U.S. military operations.

The PDO and roles theory research

This thesis uses public relations roles theory as the framework for analyzing PAO roles and duties. Instead of addressing common roles theory functions such as manager/technician roles and differences in practitioner roles due to gender or salary, it has specifically addressed diplomatic-related roles of PAOs. This thesis' most probable contribution to PR roles theory is perhaps its proposition that public relations professionals, not just Army PAOs, are engaging foreign media and publics more often.

Since civilian organizations operate in the same global information environment as the military, PR practitioners could perhaps find themselves interacting with media and publics outside of their particular cultural area of expertise. For example, many international organizations hire a separate PR representative who understands the Hispanic culture and

speaks Spanish. It would be interesting to discover how neatly those PR practitioners fit or do not fit into their specified geographic or cultural area. Future research in this area could focus on the extent to which PR professionals in U.S. or international organizations deal with media and publics external to their established area of responsibility.

Another potential addition to the PR roles theory from this thesis is that it demonstrates some of the potential differences between civilian and government PR and PA roles. Compared to civilian public relations, there has been relatively little work done on the roles of government information personnel for whom there exists many different guidelines and regulations. For government and military public affairs personnel, it proposes an entirely new role to the research stream: the diplomat. As a representative for the U.S. government, of which the U.S. military is an instrument, public affairs practitioners have an inherent diplomatic role. Although several similarities exist between government and civilian representatives' roles, government public affairs professionals adhere to different principles such as the Gillette Amendment and therefore, will perhaps perform fewer or different roles than civilian PR practitioners do.

Several areas of future research could build on the results from this thesis. First, to truly understand the effectiveness of military communications, future studies would be well-served to conduct research from the recipients' points of view. It would be interesting to study how foreign publics view the U.S. military as they receive information from various sources. This approach could demonstrate how effective foreign media is in shaping foreign public opinion as opposed to information directly from PAOs. This research area would be similar to Callison's work, which concluded that PR practitioners, as compared to independent information sources, are viewed more negatively by the public and are less

effective than an independent source in communicating messages. This research could involve surveying foreign citizens to see who they trust more: a PAO who speaks their native language, a PAO who does not, or only their local media. A study similar to Callison's work could use Army PAOs and observe their efforts from the foreign public's point of view.

Another appropriate area for future research would be to do this study in 10 years to see how PAO roles have changed. Many PR roles researchers such as Broom, Smith, Dozier, Toth, and Serini have performed similar PR roles research throughout the years to determine how the PR profession has changed. This thesis has been written during the Iraq War when PAO involvement with foreign media is obviously high, so it would be interesting to see where the level of foreign interaction is for PAOs in another 10 years.

Finally, an interesting study would involve analyzing the U.S.' overall diplomatic effort from various government agencies. It could be that other government agencies, not just the State Department, are increasingly interacting with foreign media and publics. Although the State Department historically has had the role of foreign diplomacy, perhaps the GIE has caused that role to be shared with other U.S. government organizations. This work could also study the specific coordination between such entities as the DoS, the CIA and the military.

Conclusion

The speed of the global information environment and the long absence of the USIA/USIS have caused the U.S. to play 'catch-up' in strategically communicating its messages to the world during the War on Terrorism. While the State Department engages diplomacy at relatively high echelons, Army PAOs are beginning to engage foreign media and their audiences at the tactical level. State Department POLADs provide a valuable service to the overall U.S. mission, but primarily because of security concerns, cannot be at every foreign media event like the larger, tactical-level PA force. This vacuum of diplomacy is currently being filled out of necessity by Army PAOs. PAOs who serve in combat units often are the only diplomatic representative to foreign media. Unfortunately, they have been placed in this diplomacy role while primarily being trained only to engage domestic publics.

In an environment where terrorist propagandists can create anti-U.S. sentiment through manipulated images on the Internet, it is increasingly important to have a PAO force that is keenly aware of the geopolitical, cultural climate in order to take appropriate actions in support of military operations. Regardless of the time and resources committed by the Army to provide diplomacy-related training, PAOs should continue, at a minimum, to train themselves in various areas: culture, history, politics and of course, U.S. and international media. In order to begin to get nimble enough not only to respond to anti-American propaganda, but also to proactively engage worldwide public opinion, PAOs need proper foreign media and beyond-the-basics cultural training – either from the Army or by their own initiative.

Should the Army consider a PDO career field, it must realize PAO credibility is at stake. The above two options deserve careful consideration because doing nothing is not an intelligent option. In order for the Army to begin to quantify its message effectiveness, it needs PDOs who understand the foreign audience enough to recognize when messages are effective or not.

The PAO community is no longer denying they interact with foreign media and publics – especially in COIN environments. The Army would be well served to establish a PDO career field as part of the PA branch and train that force to interact effectively with the global media. PDOs can still provide access and truthful information to the public – only now that public includes not just U.S. citizens, but the entire world.

Appendix A – Interview Outline

Section I: Background information

1. What is your name and rank?

2. How long have you been in the service? How long have you served as a PAO?

3. Where have you been stationed state-side?

4. Have you been stationed overseas? If so, where and how long?

Section II: General PAO roles

5. Have you been deployed into a combat zone as a PAO? If so, where and how long?

6. What specific assignments have you had as a PAO? (probes: media relations officer, brigade or division PAO, command information officer, etc.) Also, focus on deployments outside the U.S. but in a non-combat zone.

7. When deployed, describe your typical day. (Probes: skills used, most important attributes)

8. When assigned state-side, describe your typical day. (probes: skills used, most important attributes)

9. What were the primary differences in your duties between a state-side assignment and a deployment? Similarities?

Section III: Public diplomacy roles

10. How often did you interact with U.S.-based media such as the broadcast networks, CNN, FOX, and/or domestic print media? (i.e. daily, weekly, etc.) (Allow subject some latitude in defining 'interact')

11. How often did you interact with foreign-based media such as al-Jazeera, al Arabiya, or other non-domestic print media? (i.e. daily, weekly, etc.)

12. What are some of the primary differences and similarities in working with domestic and foreign media?

13. With whom did you interact when deployed? (probes: non-military U.S. publics and/or citizens, host nation leaders, etc.)

14. How often did you interact with non-military foreign publics and/or citizens when deployed?

15. What are some of the primary differences/similarities in working with domestic and foreign publics?

16. Who else in your unit or other military units interacts with foreign publics or media? (probes: PSYOP or CA officers, chaplains, commanders, all leaders, etc.)

17. What similarities or differences did you notice in how these other individuals interacted with foreign publics or media?

18. What staff or staff officer was most responsible for diplomacy to foreign publics in your area or operations? Most responsible for interacting with foreign media?

Section IV: Public diplomacy training

19. Do you have any additional PAO-related training beyond the Public Affairs' Officer Qualification Course? If so, what training?

20. How adequate was your training in preparation to perform PAO roles interacting with U.S.-based media?

21. How adequate was your training in preparation to perform PAO roles interacting with foreign media?

22. If training has been inadequate, what additional type of training would have been valuable to you in executing your roles as a PAO? (i.e. cultural, language, etc.)

23. What combination of skills, attributes, roles would be useful for Army officers interacting with foreign media? Does the Army have a need for a public diplomacy officer?

24. If so, where in the unit structure should this position go? (probes: brigades? battalions? subset of the PAO career field? subset of a related information career field such as PSYOP or CA?)

25. What should the relationship between a PAO and PDO? (probes: peer? subordinate? Should a PAO be separate from a public diplomacy officer?)

26. Any other comments to add on this topic?

Appendix B – Survey for Major and Lieutenant Colonel PAOs

1. Rank:
    a. Major
    b. Lieutenant Colonel
    c. Other (please specify)

2. Time in service in the Army:
    a. Less than 10 years
    b. 10-13 years
    c. 14-16 years
    d. More than 16 years

3. Time in service as a public affairs officer:
    a. Less than 1 year
    b. 1 or 2 years
    c. 3 or 4 years
    d. 5 or 6 years
    e. 7 years or more

4. How many times have you deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan as a PAO?
    a. Never
    b. 1 time
    c. 2 times
    d. 3 or more times

5. How many times have you deployed as a PAO to an area of operations outside of the U.S. not including Iraq or Afghanistan?
    a. Never
    b. 1 time
    c. 2 times
    d. 3 or more times

6. Which PAO function did you most often perform?
    a. Media relations
    b. Command information
    c. Community relations
    d. Other (please specify)

7. Are you a graduate of the Public Affairs Officer Qualification Course?
    a. Yes
    b. No

8. Do you have any additional PAO-related training beyond PAOQC?
    a. Yes (please list)
    b. No

9. Do you fluently speak a foreign language?
      a. Yes (please list all)
      b. No

For the following questions, please mark appropriately: 1-frequently, 2-sometimes, 3-rarely, 4-never, 5-not applicable

For the purposes of this study, define the terms as the following:
1-frequently: daily to several times a week.
2-sometimes: a few times a month.
3-rarely: only a few times ever
4-never: not a single time or incident
5-not applicable: my situation does not match the question's design

10. As a PAO in a stateside assignment, how often did you interact with U.S.-based media such as local broadcast networks, CNN, Fox News, or domestic print media such as newspapers?

11. As a deployed PAO, how often did you interact with U.S.-based media such as local broadcast networks, CNN, Fox News, or domestic print media such as newspapers?

12. As a PAO in a stateside assignment, how often did you interact with foreign-based media such as al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, or other non-U.S. based media?

13. As a deployed PAO, how often did you interact with foreign-based media such as al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, or other non-U.S. based media?

14. As a PAO in a stateside assignment, how often did you interact with non-military, foreign publics and/or citizens not expressly associated with the media?

15. As a deployed PAO, how often did you interact with non-military, foreign publics and/or citizens not expressly associated with the media?

16. As a deployed PAO, how often did you interact with non-English speaking publics in performance of your duties?

17. As a deployed PAO, how often did you perform duties you would consider diplomatic in nature?

For the following questions, please mark appropriately: 1-very useful, 2-somewhat useful, 3-I don't know, 4-not useful, 5-a waste of time

18. How useful would appropriate language be for PAOs preparing to deploy?

19. How useful would appropriate, PAO-specific cultural training be for PAOs preparing to deploy?

20. How useful would appropriate foreign media training be for PAOs preparing to deploy?

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