United in Division: The Polarized French Nation, 1814-1830

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A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History.

Chapel Hill
2008

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Abstract
Maximilian Paul Owre: United in Division: The Polarized French Nation, 1814-1830
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This dissertation analyzes the political culture of the Bourbon Restoration (1814-1830), the first stable post-revolutionary, post-Napoleonic regime in France. It uses recent theoretical developments in cognitive linguistics and frame analysis to examine the impact of a polarized political conflict between liberals and ultraroyalists, the era’s two main factions, on French society. Drawing on published and archival sources such as formal political treatises, pamphlets, poems, popular songs, and state administrative and police records, this dissertation shows how polarized frames for understanding and participating in political life made the division between Left and Right a pervasive social metaphor. Each chapter outlines the frameworks that liberals and ultras used to understand the nation and conduct politics in a polarized public sphere. These ideas spread to diverse locations in France and among varied social classes, triggering further polarization in society. Specific case studies focus on events such as the expulsions of the Abbé Grégoire (1819) and Jacques-Antoine Manuel (1823) from the Chamber of Deputies and the 1823 military intervention in Spain to illustrate the political struggles that grew out of two mutually exclusive conceptions of the French nation. The central claim of this dissertation is that an overarching frame of Left/Right national division that had its origins in the revolutionary era evolved into the normative paradigm for modern French politics during the Restoration. This division has informed French conceptions of the nation and its political life, and has helped the French people negotiate the legacy of the Revolution to this day. This sense of irreparable division in the French public
sphere also suggests that national identity is not a static concept but rather a dynamic process that relies on interactions between opposed ideas of the nation in the same polity.
To Ceara
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank everyone who has ever encouraged me to pursue my passions, especially my love for history.

During my undergraduate career at the University of Vermont, James Overfield, Patrick Hutton, and Al Andrea, among others, introduced me to the formal study of history and gave me confidence in my ability to contribute to the discipline. Janet Whatley and Gretchen van Slyke introduced me to the French language and got me started on the road to research in primary source documents. At UVM, I also had the great luck of meeting Meg Welch, who ended up in Chapel Hill at the same time I started graduate school. Meg provided hours of care for our children and even more hours of wonderful friendship in a new place.

At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, I received excellent professional training from all the professors with whom I studied. I am particularly indebted to Theda Perdue, Michael Hunt, Donald Raleigh, and Jerma Jackson for helping me develop my approach and the arguments that evolved into this dissertation. Christopher Browning and Karen Hagemann agreed to sit on my prospectus committee and provided interesting insights from a non-French history perspective. I learned invaluable insights into the historical profession through teaching under Judith Bennett, Richard Talbert, Melissa Bullard, Terry McIntosh, and Konrad Jarausch. I would be remiss if I did not mention the hard work of
Violet Andrews, the Graduate Assistant in the History Department, whose attention to detail ensured that I am where I am today.

The three professors of French history at UNC, Jay Smith, Donald Reid, and Lloyd Kramer deserve special thanks. Jay Smith had the challenge of working with me my first year when my ideas, words, and writing had little direction. His patience and good humor helped me enormously then, and continue to inspire me. Don Reid, although not closely involved with this project, always interjected with critical observations that have helped broaden the scope of my work or hone in on its essence. Lloyd Kramer, my advisor, has been invaluable. Lloyd’s endless bounty of encouragement kept me hopeful that this dissertation would indeed be finished someday. Despite having to proofread and edit hundreds of pages of prose, he always saw the value of my ideas before I had learned to voice them clearly. Without his guidance, I would never have come close to what I achieved.

Other historians and scholars have also provided excellent advice and feedback on this project. I would like to thank Steven Vincent, in particular, who agreed to sit on my defense committee, and whose challenging observations reminded me that there is still much work left to do. Also deserving of thanks for their input and feedback at seminars, conferences, or through correspondence are Steven Kale, Laura Mason, Maíre Cross, Steven Rowe, Anoush Terjanian, Patrice Gueniffey, Jo-Burr Margadant, John Shovlin, Jim Winders, and James Livesey. Several other scholars contributed to my project perhaps without their knowledge, offering choice words and critical insights in passing. I would also like to thank the staffs at Davis Library at UNC, the Archives Nationales, the Bibliothèque Nationale, and the Archives Départementales des Pyrénées-Orientales for their help in finding the many sources in this text.
Knowing that I was not alone was great consolation through researching and writing this dissertation. My graduate student colleagues in the History Department kept me smiling during the all-too-tempting idle time that accompanies writing a dissertation. First, I would like to thank my “Frenchies,” Bethany Keenan, Sarah Shurts, Jennifer Heath, Natasha Naujoks, Michael Mulvey, Julia Osman, and Christina Hansen for travelling down the same road with me and keeping my attitude positive. By chance, two students of Latin American history, Michael Huner and Devyn Spence Benson, read parts of this dissertation in workshops and gave me great feedback. Josh Davis, Michael Meng, Marko Dumancic, Pam Lach, Matt Harper, and countless other good people are personally responsible for any delays that might have occurred in the writing of this dissertation. I blame them for being intellectually invigorating, fun, and available at all the wrong and, of course, all the right times.

In addition to these friends and acquaintance, several institutions and benefactors have also made this dissertation possible. The UNC History Department offered teaching assistantships and a Mowry grant that helped me complete my studies. I have also received support from the Florence Gould Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, the Lurcy Foundation, and the Lovick P. Corn Foundation. With the aid of a FLAS grant, I was able to increase my proficiency in French at the Université de Perpignan in France. The people at the Council for Library and Information Resources at the United States’ Library of Congress saw promise in my project and gave me the funds necessary to pursue research in France.

My extended and immediate families made graduate school a possibility and kept me going throughout. Without my in-law’s, Deborah and Maurice Curran’s, unconditional love and generosity, I would never have been able to go back to school for a BA, never mind
pursue history as a career. My parents, Jim and Christine Owre, always encouraged me to study history and entered my graduate career in the eleventh hour to witness their inspiration in action. They too have provided material and emotional support at critical junctures in my graduate school career. My mother Christine, in particular, deserves immeasurable credit for scrubbing my prose clean through several versions of these chapters.

My greatest thanks, however, go to my immediate family. My children, Sara, Evan, and Elise, have suffered the dislocations and the penury that accompany graduate school with great stoicism. Sara and Evan, in particular, endured my blind cheeriness over living in France while they negotiated the rigors of the French school system, and they continue to be patient with their daddy’s demanding schedule and frequent moments of stress. Nothing gives me greater pleasure than seeing Sara enjoy reading about history and Evan apply his creative appreciation for the past to his art and play; they remind me of why I started this whole process in the first place. Elise, in her capacity as our “Paris surprise,” will forever be a testimony of living in France and of this time in our lives.

Ceara, to whom I’ve dedicated this dissertation, is my rock and my best friend. She has sacrificed everything so that I could pursue my goal of becoming a history professor. Her undying patience and understanding are only balanced by her honesty and forthrightness. In times of darkness and despair, she always gave me light; when my optimism was overbearing, she reined me in and helped me understand my true priorities. Without her, I am nothing. Thank you, Ceara.
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Introduction
The Polarized Nation in Restoration France

“There are in France two principal parties, that is to say, two great orders of interests that fight: these are, on one side, the partisans of the new regime; on the other, the partisans of what one called twenty years ago, the ancien régime.” Anonymous, (1819)¹

“I will not divide, like him, France into two nations; I will not admit in the midst of us a former nation and a new nation; I will agree with him, however, if he wants, that there really exists in France two separate parties of opinions.” Isidore-Marie-Brignoler Gautier (1822)²

Irreconcilable Nations

In April 1814, Bourbon King Louis XVIII returned to the throne hoping to realize the grand reconciliation of his subjects, his children. Some revolutionaries, republicans, aristocrats, and royals, exhausted by war and exile, hoped for national unity and served the king. Other returned émigrés could not contain their vengeance. Through their intransigence, they opened the door for Napoleon to embark on his own failed “Hundred Days” attempt at a post-revolutionary settlement. After thousands more perished at Waterloo in June 1815, Louis came back once again, but no one pretended any longer that France was one family. France was a nation, irreconcilably divided. All remembered that during the preceding twenty-five years French hands had removed French heads and French émigrés had fought


French armies. All remembered how two sets of partisans had imagined two different, and in their views, perfect French nations, and set them against each other in a twenty-five year bloodbath. These same partisans now faced each other chastised under the watchful eye of an indignant and angry continent. They thought of the Restoration as the endgame in their struggle, a grand experiment in reconciliation or final victory for one side. But there was no resolution as another Revolution brought an end to the Bourbon monarchy a mere fifteen years later. Their division persisted, and persists in France to this day.

The Restoration in France (1814-1830) was a fifteen-year dialogue on the meaning of the nation that began and ended in political violence. Judging from its unstable origins and sudden violent end, its demise seems inevitable in retrospect. The period’s political actors seemed unable to resolve revolutionary-era tensions between progressive and conservative ideals, a fact some historians are tempted to use as an excuse to dismiss its lasting contributions to France’s political culture. But the opposed partisans of these ideals nevertheless participated together in France’s first stable representative government, and, despite their constant contestation, created in concert the first post-revolutionary, post-Napoleonic French society. French citizens of all types absorbed and joined in a grand debate about the essence of their nation. They read about it in the era’s relatively free press and voluminous political pamphlets, or directly engaged in the debate in assembly halls, on the street, in cafés, and in courthouses. Throughout the era and everywhere in France, people used the polarizing terms of this debate to define themselves and their nation, and to distinguish “true” French patriots from corrupted imposters. The conceptualized division

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that separated people became an integral part of the French identity. Polarization rather than consensus dominated Restoration political culture, and during the period, the French came to accept a division between the Right and Left in politics, culture, and society as the normative paradigm for their nation.

The two points of view expressed in the citations at the head of this introduction, the first from an anonymous liberal pamphleteer and the second from an ultraroyalist candidate for political office, were not isolated opinions. They outline the parameters of the Restoration’s highly-publicized dialogue on the nation and its polarized political world. Some interpreted polarization as the clash between two groups loyal to two conflicting conceptions of society, while others thought the nation was by definition unified but threatened by political division. Almost everyone, however, acknowledged the pervasiveness of the Left/Right divide in the public sphere and considered it integral to any discussion of the nation during the Restoration. In addition, the vast majority of commentators on contemporary society—not without their own opinions—traced the origins of this divide to the French Revolution. They often and sometimes imprecisely described the two main political camps of the age, liberals and ultraroyalists (ultras), as the inheritors of, respectively, the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary ideologies of popular sovereignty and absolutism.⁴ Both liberal and ultra politicians and writers fed this discourse of division by loudly proclaiming ideals of sovereignty, legitimacy, and the social order laden with implications for the makeup of the nation. While few could vote in the new political system,
and even fewer were eligible to run for office, debates about remaking the French nation and state within the context of past and current divisions extended well beyond an elite circle of politicians and electors. Throughout the period, a steady chorus of voices repeated these common themes about polarization until nearly everyone, from street activists to intellectuals, thought about the nation in partisan terms and believed in the irreparable division of France.

Analyzing Restoration France within the paradigm of division between those who accepted revolutionary progressive ideals and those who rejected them resurrects an admittedly old-fashioned view of modern European, and indeed, World History. Fifty years ago, R.R. Palmer, posited that the “Atlantic World” in the early nineteenth century was a battleground for the forces of “democracy” and “aristocracy.” “The Revolution,” he wrote, “was a conflict between [two] incompatible conceptions of what the community ought to be.” While oversimplifying historical reality, Palmer’s dichotomy does describe well the behavior of those who engaged in the Restoration debate on national identity. On one side were those who broadly accepted the Revolution’s legacy of civil, political, and social reforms, believed that the people had a right to participate in their government, and favored legal equality over hierarchy. These “leftists” broke into many camps based on their particular understandings of these principles and included moderate royalists, conservative *doctrinaire* liberals, progressive liberals, radical republicans, and even authoritarian Bonapartists. Despite differences on specific policies, all of these leftists and most self-

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proclaimed “moderates,” agreed on the value of legal equality and believed that the people
had some role to play in government. Ultras, on the other hand, were a more monolithic bloc.
They considered the Revolution an abomination that had overturned the forces of order; and
while willing to participate in representative institutions, ultras believed democratic tenets
should never displace absolute monarchical sovereignty.

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore how these two opposed political camps
framed their conceptions of the nation, how these frames spread widely within the polity, and
how they affected political culture and behavior in multiple levels of society. I argue that
thinking in terms of national division was the dominant mode of Restoration politics, and this
understanding of domestic division helped people accept and negotiate the aftermath of the
Revolution’s legacy of conflict. It was during the Restoration that the French people
internalized the idea of irreparable internal political division as the salient characteristic of
their nation.

Division characterized post-revolutionary France on multiple levels. Indeed, a
dynamic exchange between action and reaction dominated cultural, intellectual, and political
thought during most of the nineteenth century in Western Europe. Older narrative histories
of the Restoration, such as Bertier de Sauvigny’s classic work, The Bourbon Restoration,
largely accepted the Left/Right political dichotomy and the conflict between the main

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political factions of the period drove their narratives and analyses. Other historical accounts of this era explore complexities in political thought and social trends and emphasize the Restoration’s importance as the first stable post-revolutionary period in French history, but they do little to dispel the impression of constant political conflict. A recently published collection of essays, Repenser la Restauration, paints a vivid picture of the period’s diversity of thought in politics, literature, art, drama, and religion. But this variety in cultural expression coexisted with the consistent emphasis in the public sphere on the lingering bitterness over the revolutionary legacy. These works rightly dispel longstanding clichés about the Restoration which portray émigré Old Regime nobles returning to France in 1814 aiming to roll back the clock to 1789. Challenging older narratives, recent works describe the bitter bipolar political contestation of the age as a backdrop to the era’s contributions to modern France’s political and institutional development. These works all share an air of coyness in “working against the grain” to show that the Restoration had a productive and dynamic social life despite its unresolved tensions. They largely avoid, however, addressing the prevalence of political contestation during the period, or how people’s

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7 The first primer most turn to for the period’s history is still Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny’s, The Bourbon Restoration, trans. Lynn M. Case (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966).

8 Recent histories of the Restoration include, Eric Le Nabour, Les Deux Restaurations, (Paris: Tallandier, 1992), and Emanuel de Waresquiel and Benoit Yvert, Histoire de la Restauration 1814-1830: Naissance de la France Moderne (Mesnil: Perrin, 1996). Historians often group the Restoration with the July Monarchy in their analyses, see, for example, André Jardin and André-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Isabelle Backouche, La Monarchie Parlementaire, 1815-1848 (Paris: Pygmalion, 2000), and Jean-Claude Caron, La France de 1815 à 1848 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993).


experience of this contestation impinged on political life and the development of French national identity.

Recent more focused case studies of Restoration politics and culture have introduced new theoretical perspectives to the historical analysis of the period, reexamining ideas, events, and new social spaces for the post-revolutionary reconstruction of French political, cultural, and social life. New works on political thought and action during the Restoration add nuances to the simple categorization of political actors according to the rubric of Right and Left by exploring the perspectives and strategies that differentiated leftists, portraying ultras as modern politicians capable of working within representative systems, and noting the savvy use of a relatively open political press by both sides.11 Some scholars have shifted their emphasis from the elite male politics of the era to focus on post-revolutionary issues of gender and the reordering of French political and social categories around new conceptions of masculinity, femininity, and the family.12 Studies of Restoration social classes have also


12 See, for example, Jo Burr Margadant, “The Duchesse de Berry and Royalist Political Culture in Postrevolutionary France,” in The New Biography: Performing Femininity in Nineteenth-Century France (Jo Burr Margadant ed.), (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), Denise Davidson, France after
provided novel insights on the roles of labor, the family, and political identity in modern France. These works reveal a society undergoing radical transformations in personal and public life. They point to the dynamism of a period in which people sought new bases for social cohesion and developed new codes of political behavior outside the world of elite politics. Yet, these recent works do not answer some fundamental questions about Restoration social and political life. How did this creative and dynamic reordering of ideologies and social structures cope with the volume of political voices proclaiming the permanent incompatibility of the nation’s citizens? While they were experiencing the post-revolutionary transformations of ideologies, family life, and social status, how did the French people experience and internalize the dominant discourse of division?

These recent works on the Restoration point to the difficulty of applying broad abstractions to human experiences, which are always more complex than generalizing theories can explain. And yet, ironically, the French people increasingly relied on

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15 The tension between experience as a category of historical analysis and its multifarious nature in real life is examined in Martin Jay, *Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Theme* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2005). Jay admits to the difficulty in defining
abstractions to describe their community and explain the multiple transformations of social and political structures that their nation had witnessed.\textsuperscript{16} While the substantive content of Restoration discourse on the nation dealt in abstractions such as “the people,” “the patrie,” “the nation,” “sovereignty” etc., these ideas entered popular consciousness through vibrant media and immediate experiences. Abstract ideas became the currency of public culture—they filled its press, its songs, its speeches, its public demonstrations—and, as such, they shaped the conceptual frameworks through which people understood their world. While acknowledging the diversity of social experiences during the period, it is also necessary to recognize that political actors in the Restoration public sphere constantly repeated the widely shared abstraction of a divided France and that people acted on their belief in a divided France. Indeed, I argue that the shared belief in political polarization may have provided some stability in this shifting post-revolutionary social world.

At the risk of generalizing, it is fair to say that most French people, like citizens of other nations, think of their national identity largely in unproblematic terms. They believe that geographical, cultural, sociopolitical, and/or historical ties forged over two millennia created a set of characteristics binding individuals together as a nation, and that these general similarities have been strong enough to override specific events periodically dividing the experience or identifying it in historical analysis but argues we cannot do away with it as a means of understanding the past.

\textsuperscript{16} Pierre Rosanvallon claims that the French addiction to abstractions in social and political thought “drained the social of substance” and made experiencing political community and social cohesion impossible without entities to intervene between the people and the state. Pierre Rosanvallon, \textit{The Demands of Liberty: Civil Society in France since the Revolution}, Arthur Goldhammer trans., (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 71-72. The equalizing discourse of democracy—itself a grab bag of abstract concepts such as the “people,” “the nation,” “sovereignty,” etc.—had been absorbed over the twenty-five years before the Restoration and was still employed by the Restoration’s political institutions. For the transmission and acceptance of democratic discourse in various strata of French society during the Revolution see, James Livesey, \textit{Making Democracy in The French Revolution} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), especially page 165.
Theorists of nationalism usually explain the development of the modern idea of a unitary nation as either a state driven response to economic or social change, or an autonomous and positive reaction of individuals seeking to counter the atomizing social forces that accompany the march of progress. Some theorists describe the development of national identity as a response to international competition, while others see it as a product of political ideology. Despite the variety of explanations for the emergence of nationalism in modern nations, most theories assert that a single mode of nationalist thought characterizes each country, making it possible to identify normative forms of nationalism in different countries. For example, many assert that French nationalism, is a “liberal” nationalism that champions the “political” bases for national cohesion, while German nationalism is “reactionary” and emphasizes “ethnic” solidarity.

Ahistorical analyses and theorizing about nationalism are in a sense a catalogue of historical institutions, events, and ideas, the memory of which serves as the basis for national cohesion in France. Pierre Nora (ed.), Les lieux de mémoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1983-94). Of particular importance to this study is Marcel Gauchet’s article, “La Droite et la Gauche” in Les Lieux de Mémoire (Pierre Nora, ed.), vol. 3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1993). Gauchet believes that these concepts have more impact on French memory than they exerted in the Revolution.


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the “nation” and “nationalism,” or efforts at creating an overarching model of modern nationalism, can lead scholars to occlude differences and countervailing trends within nations that may in fact be just as essential to understanding how people experience living in “the nation” at any specific moment in time.

In the French case, some historians have tended to accept at face value the efforts of revolutionary Jacobins and later politicians of the Third Republic who sought to unify the French nation politically, socially, and culturally. They apply teleological approaches to the issue of nationhood—as though the aims of earlier state initiatives to create a homogenous society led directly to France’s contemporary centralized state and strong national culture. In fact, those who comprised the supposedly unified French nation have always lived in a divisive political climate in which many models of the nation competed. Both the myth of

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20 The French themselves have gone to great lengths to perpetuate this idea. See Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation et autres écrits politiques, (Raoul Girardet ed.) (Paris: Imprimerie National, 1996). The classic iteration of this dualistic theory of nationalism appears in Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, A Study in its Origins and Background (New York: Macmillan, 1944). This dichotomy in the nature of nationalism is related to another set of categories in theories of nationalism, the primordial/constructivist debate. This dissertation does not presume to resolve the debate between primordialists, who presume that the nation is an organic entity inherently bounded by its ethnicity and culture, and constructivists, who assert that the nation is an artificial political construction used to mobilize citizens. Anthony Smith’s approach, however, provides a good guide for connecting national culture to the political program of nationalism. He suggests that cultural artifacts, ethnicity, and language of social groups reflect real historical distinctions, but that these are not generic in nations—nations are in fact heterogeneous entities with multiple histories. Nationalism as a political program draws on these real distinctions to mobilize people to act in support of the nation. See, Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), Becoming National: A Reader, (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), and Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, (London: Duckworth, 1983, 2nd ed.).


22 This tension between the representation of Republican national unity and the reality of political division has generated a wealth of literature. Pierre Rosanvallon suggests in his most recent foray into this debate that the “great divide” in French society was not caused by individuals’ or cultural groups’ resistance to Jacobin centralization. Instead, the real divide in France is between the claims of intermediary bodies in civil society and the efforts of the central state to atomize individuals in the process of homogenizing the nation. See Pierre Rosanvallon’s, The Demands of Liberty: Civil Society in France since the Revolution, Arthur
an essentially unified French national character and the historical factors that prevented the realization of this ideal nation drew their strength from the violent upheavals that closed the eighteenth century and ushered in the modern era. Coming on the heels of nearly twenty-five years of warfare and political violence, the Restoration was an especially divisive period that left an enduring political legacy with inescapable implications for the formation of modern French identity. The Restoration was the arena in which the French first framed the conflict between post-revolutionary national unity and national division, and, as such, deserves special attention in historical discussions of modern French national identity.

**Identity and Political Frames**

Left/Right polarization in post-revolutionary France was not only an observable historical phenomenon; it was also intrinsic to the development of modern French identity, both on an individual level and in the broad shared sense of a collective political culture, and it persists today. Abstract and absolute conceptions of metaphysical or physical identity are the domain of philosophers and neuroscientists. “Identity,” therefore appears in these pages as a heuristic term to describe deep-seated components of human consciousness created through processes of cognition. Because it relies on humans to create it through cognition, identity is changeable depending on feedback processes between the mind and the exterior world. “National identity” as a heuristic concept, I suggest, emerges through the workings of

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three principle factors: (i) cognitive processes in structures in the unconscious mind; (ii) interactions between individuals and the culture in which they live; (iii) the influence of competing political ideas which people use to explain their national community or their roles in it. I argue that the Left/Right paradigm and the discourse of national division which developed over the course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries became imbedded in minds during the Restoration through constant exposure to political contestation. French people consciously and unconsciously used this framework—increasingly to the exclusion of other models—to explain their political reality and act politically. In this sense, polarization became an essential aspect of French identity.

This changeable nature of identity also impinges on conceptions of the interior self. I do not subscribe to single theory of the self but rather emphasize insights from a few salient, and at times conflicting, scholars on the subject, especially when their insights resonate with my own analysis of French national identity during the Restoration. I accept Charles Taylor’s assertion that people’s identification with the “good life” underpins all modern ideas

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of the self. According to Taylor, realization of selfhood implies the recognition of an optimal moral framework, one explicitly superior to any other option, and the application of this moral framework to construct and guide one’s life.\(^\text{24}\) Textual evidence from the Restoration certainly suggests that those who emphasized an ideal nation linked their view of France to their own convictions about personal morality and values. My argument, however, draws more heavily on Jerrold Seigel’s work on the development of ideas of the self in Western history.\(^\text{25}\) His contention that conceptions of the self are varied and adaptable and draw on multiple resources for their expression is in line with my heuristic theory of identity. He suggests that multiple arenas of human experience namely, the biological, the relational/social, and the reflexive inform ideas of the self. These different fields for conceptualizing the self and identity reach imaginatively across disciplines to better postulate how contexts that range from the physical functions of the brain to the social environments in which people live provide resources for self-fashioning and understanding the self in relation to the exterior world.\(^\text{26}\)

Modern society provides many opportunities and arenas in which people can conceptualize and refashion their selves. The social and political chasm opened by the Revolution and the atomizing effects of Napoleon’s centralized state made Restoration France a particularly fertile period for reconceptualizing the self. Jan Goldstein and Seigel


\(^{25}\) Seigel’s contention that there is no one “true self,” nor is there one history of it, and that historical context impinges on the conceptualization and articulation of an idea of selfhood is also germane to the arguments presented here. He writes, “...it [the history of the self] is the story of attempts by people, formed in different environments and possessed of different resources and intentions, to make sense of the complex and often puzzling relations between the parts of their lives.” Jerrold Seigel, \textit{The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the Seventeenth Century} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 44.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 1-5.
both assert that people in this period felt a new need to identify and realize a more autonomous self that could withstand the pressures of a changing social world. The inadequacy of Enlightenment models of the self and the failure of revolutionary attempts to transform the categories of “citizens” and “subjects” led Victor Cousin, for example, to embark on a new educational program that encouraged students to “reconstitute humanity inside themselves.”

The era of Restoration political contestation also coincided with the emergence of Romanticism in France, a movement Warren Breckman characterizes as, “a commitment to self-expression, [and] a desire to unite the liberated individual with a greater whole.” The Romantic individual’s impulse to commune with the sublime in spirit and art also carried an overtly political element—a yearning for social cohesion. Post-revolutionary romantics saw their world as “divided and dualistic,” and thus strove to find “points of connection and integration” in their search for social and political reconciliation.

Post-revolutionary trauma lent an air of urgency to the quest for individual self-actualization and rehabilitation of the sociopolitical unity of the French people—however chimerical the latter

27 Ibid., 474. Goldstein writes, “Thus the Cousinian moi was defined as a dynamic will capable of molding the world and as a foundational principle that endowed private property with metaphysical status.” Goldstein, *Post-Revolutionary Self*, 12. In a sense, people on both sides of the great post-revolutionary divide were trapped by the state. Cousin’s emphasis on creating an individual endowed with confident autonomy was a reaction to state centralization and its alienating effects. The state and its representative institutions were the only venue left for articulating a community that helped people realize their full individual potential. In other words, in order to realize oneself, one had to engage in politics. For Cousinianism as a reaction to the state, see Seigel, 469-71. Rosanvallon, as mentioned earlier, sees civil society as the buffer between the state and the atomized individual. Rosanvallon, *Demands of Liberty*.


29 Ibid., 17, 18. Not surprisingly, considering France’s political history from 1789-1830 Breckman writes that “French Romanticism, was explicitly, combatively political. Although French Romanticism,” he continues, “may have been more a response to the traumas of the Revolution than its promises, it mirrored the highly politicized nature of post-revolutionary society.” Ibid., 27. The nexus of Romanticism and politics for liberals is examined in, K. Steven Vincent, “Benjamin Constant, the French Revolution, and the Origins of French Romantic Liberalism,” *French Historical Studies* 23, no. 4 (2000): 607-637.
idea might have been.\textsuperscript{30} This societal angst over the broken and divided social world also helps explain the strong discourse of reconciliation that went hand-in-hand with polarizing partisanship during the Restoration.\textsuperscript{31} The Romantics’ emotionally charged attempts to conceptualize a new individual and define its place in the greater whole of humanity and nature, in short, often merged with a wider quest for new national identities.

During the Restoration, people tried to assert their individual autonomy even as they longed for social cohesion. If we accept the arguments of those social theorists who claim that identity is inherently social in origin and expression, it follows that post-revolutionary disunity naturally impinged upon people’s sense of self.\textsuperscript{32} According to proponents of “social identity,” societal relations and conditions comprise the arena for the performance of identity, making the very idea of the atomized individual a fiction, regardless of the anxiety people may feel about their personal sense of alienation.\textsuperscript{33} According to recent theorists such as Steph Lawler, society consists of a shared set of codes that allow for predictable outcomes in a wide variety of social interactions, from the mundane (e.g. the transfer of property) to the

\textsuperscript{30} Dominick LaCapra addresses the problem of writing about traumatic events because of their lingering divisive effects. “A crucial issue with respect to traumatic historical events is whether attempts to work through problems, including rituals of mourning can visibly come to terms with (without ever fully healing or overcoming) the divided legacies, open wounds, and unspeakable losses of a dire past.” Dominick LaCapra, \textit{Writing History, Writing Trauma} (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 45.

\textsuperscript{31} Moderation and reconciliation are discussed in Chapter One. For the persistence of this strain of thought in the July Monarchy, See Jean-Claude Caron, “Louis-Philippe face à l’opinion publique, ou l’impossible réconciliation des Français, 1830–1835” \textit{French Historical Studies} 30 (2007): 597-621.

\textsuperscript{32} As sociologist Steph Lawler recently claimed, identity is a “social and collective endeavor, not an individual odyssey.” Steph Lawler, \textit{Identity: Sociological Perspectives} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 104. The social origin of identity also makes identities changeable and potentially unstable. Bernd Simon writes, “Our identities emerge from our involvement in such relationships at various levels of social organization, and they are critically affected by changes in the organization and interpretation of these relationships.” Bernd Simon, \textit{Identity in Modern Society: A Social Psychological Perspective} (Malden, MA/Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 19.

complex (participation in national politics). Individual identities, in this view, develop as people act in relation to societal codes and expectations. People are always accepting or rejecting widely-held narratives that explain the past or present social cohesion of a particular group, and employing social “frames” that help them navigate social situations. Such narratives and frames shape individual identities because they are accessible, comprehensible, and acceptable to other individuals; and society constantly reconfirms them in daily social interactions. Their widespread acceptance also necessarily provides a basis for a group identity. Applying Lawler’s premise to the case of Restoration politics suggests that the era’s divided sociopolitical world offered two dominant narratives for “framing” interpretations of the recent past and the political present. These competing frames in turn fostered the creation of two types of social identity and two groups of individuals who adopted these different identities. By extension, the framing of political concepts of the nation generated two loosely cohesive political camps in which individuals used the words “nation,” “the people,” and “sovereignty” (among others) in very different ways to create alternative models of a national society that would allow people to perform their political and

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34 Lawler is indebted, as I am, to Erving Goffman for the concept of sociological frames. She writes, “For Goffman…human essence is not (as it is now commonly assumed) in our genes, nor is it in some idea of a ‘soul.’ Indeed, it is not innate in any way. Rather, it is dynamically and temporally done. There is a continuity of character, but it is not innate or ‘natural’; it is achieved through series of performances. And these performances are fundamentally and intrinsically social.” Ibid., 110. I argue that the texts and events described in these chapters are all examples of different performances of the nation based on frames. Lawler also employs Paul Ricoeur’s idea of narrative emplotment to explain how narratives and stories make social interaction possible. See, Paul Ricoeur, “Life in Quest of Narrative,” in On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation (David Wood, ed.) (London: Routledge, 1991).

35 Categories of individuals are not absolute and can shift with social interaction. Lawler is clear that, although identity is first social and comes from interaction in the social world, this means that individual identity can be as variable and diverse as the social world in which the individual is embedded. She writes, “So, one threat to the notion of a stable, coherent self—its ‘internal homogeneity’—is the recognition that no one has only one identity; and indeed those identities may be in tension…A second threat comes in the recognition, that identities, equally, rely on the expulsion of what they are not.” Ibid., 3. Rejection of opposing frameworks is an explicit condition in a conscious identification with a political identity.
social roles and find a broad, “national” meaning in their lives. Both of these camps implicitly considered the social identity that derived from the acceptance of certain frames of the nation to be synonymous with an optimal national identity. It is only in these connections between individual identity and the social world that the idea of “national identity” has any specific meaning beyond a semantic identification with shared traits. In this sense, national identity implies living and acting on shared conceptual ideas and behaviors that bind people together in a social community and also define individual identities.

Erving Goffman famously posited that social/cultural frames are essential to conceptualizing and engaging with exterior social reality. Through analysis of the creation, dispersal, and use of shared cultural concepts, one can chart how ideas move through society and how they inform the meaning of objective “reality.” Applied to politics, frame analysis clarifies how political concepts can create social networks that mobilize people and help them foster cohesive political and social groups. Understanding how frames work in different historical contexts can help bridge the gap between political culture or discourse, and political events or actions. If we accept the notion that culture is more than a system of symbols and also entails putting symbolic systems into practice, frames can provide insights into how intellectual systems and political practice interact. During the Restoration, the

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37 Marc W. Steinberg, “Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective Action Framing from a Discursive Turn.” in *Theory and Society*, vol. 27, No. 6 (Dec., 1998), Steinberg suggests, “Frame analysis provides us with considerable insight into the ideological dynamics of structuring opposition, mobilizing actors, and sustaining cohesion necessary for successful collective action.” Steinberg, 846.

38 Without delving into a complicated—and frankly irresolvable—discussion on the meaning of “culture,” I accept William Sewell’s theory by which, “…culture…should be understood as a dialectic of system and practice, as a dimension of social life autonomous from other such dimensions both in its logic and in its spatial configuration, and as a system of symbols possessing a real but thin coherence that is continually put at risk in practice and therefore subject to transformation.” William Sewell, “The Concept (s) of Culture,” in
political cultural “system” was comprised of “symbols”—the political words and concepts that the two main camps employed to explain their social world and political priorities—and of the political practices that used these symbols in crafting policy, writing, singing, voting, and/or joining political groups.\footnote{Mabel Berezin suggests that political culture is a “matrix of meanings” that permeates the symbols, practices, and beliefs which arise in the practice of politics in a “bounded collectivity.” Mabel Berezin, “Politics and Culture: A Less Fissured Terrain,” in \textit{Annual Review of Sociology}, vol. 23 (1997), 364. Margaret R. Somers, “What's Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere? Toward an Historical Sociology of Concept Formation,” in \textit{Sociological Theory}, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Jul., 1995), pp. 113-144. See note 46 below for how framing could also be used to explain cultural practice as a feature of the human subconscious.}

It is easy to become swamped in this sea of competing theories of individual identity, social identity, framing, and culture, all of which can help explain and contextualize political polarization in Restoration France. Frame analysis, however, has universal applicability, and theorists have recently employed its tenets and methods to demonstrate how political culture is inherently tied to the way people think, how social groups form, how political polarization develops, and, by extension of these three elements, how political identity is formed. Cognitive linguist George Lakoff offers a promising explanation of these three overlapping elements in his most recent work, \textit{The Political Mind}.\footnote{George Lakoff, \textit{The Political Mind: Why We Can’t Understand Twenty-First Century Politics with an Eighteenth-Century Brain} (New York: Viking Press, 2008). The \textit{Political Mind} specifically aims to explain partisan polarization in contemporary America and serve as a handbook for conducting progressive politics. The theoretical bases Lakoff uses to explain partisanship are not historically specific, however, and thus are applicable to other situations in which division characterized the polity. Written for a general audience, \textit{The Political Mind} provides the clearest, most comprehensive explanation of his theory of the mental “embodiment” of language and meaning and its role in political thought outlined in the following more academic works. See, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, \textit{Metaphors We Live By} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Lakoff, \textit{Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), Lakoff, \textit{Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western thought} (New York: Basic, 1999), and Lakoff, \textit{Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Psychologist Drew Westen offers a similar approach to political analysis that stresses the role of emotion in the process framing. See, Drew Westen, \textit{The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation} (New York: Public Affairs, 2007). Westen’s analysis is intriguing because he applies his ideas to case studies of American presidential elections.} This work brings together evidence \ldots
from the neurological sciences as well as Lakoff’s theoretical work in linguistics to explain the processes by which polarizing partisan concepts enter the mind and become guides for articulating political ideas and interpreting the political world. He posits that political frames and their constituent metaphors are not simply heuristic explanations—rather, frames are created unconsciously in the human mind when the brain processes language, and they become hardwired through neural circuits fired by the reception and cognitive linking of words, concepts, and emotions. According to Lakoff, words are learned and processed in a semantic assembly of frames. He emphasizes that recent medical and scientific studies of cognition in the brain have confirmed the biological validity of this semantic premise. All intelligible data become objects in our brains—they literally trigger a predictable neural firing—and then are grouped together with related concepts triggered in different areas of the brain to create conglomerate meanings, in other words, frames. This process is called “neural binding.” Semantic frames become inscribed and strengthened through the reception and repetition of language. The keys to strong cultural and social frames are thus exposure and repetition:

“Language gets its power because it is defined relative to frames, prototypes, metaphors narratives, images, and emotions. Part of its power comes from its unconscious aspects: we are not consciously aware of all that it evokes in us, but it is there, hidden, always at work. If we hear the same language over and over, we will think more and more in terms of the frames and metaphors activated by that

41 He uses the example of “buy” to show how the brain processes words through the use of frames. In this case, the mind draws on an existing frame for commercial transactions that includes related terms such as “product,” “sell,” “price,” “buyer,” “seller,” etc. Ibid., 22. Lakoff subscribes to the theory of semantic frame assembly outlined in Charles Fillmore’s work. For more on Fillmore see the collection, Charles Fillmore, Form and Meaning in Language (Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2003).

42 He cites the following example of the creation of a simple frame: “When you see a blue square, it appears as a single object. Yet the color and shape are registered in different parts of our brain. Neural binding allows us to bring together neural activation in different parts of the brain to form single integrated wholes.” Lakoff, 25. Emotional content also is wired to concepts through this process. See note 44.
Thus, when politicians compete in the public sphere using keywords to define their positions, they provide the raw data for the creation of political frames with strong emotional content in people’s brain structures. Frames for left-wing positions, frames for right-wing positions, and the overriding frame of the competition between the two are all generated through repeated exposure to rival opinions, and to commentary on their irreconcilability. The final step in forming the political frames through which people understand their society and arrange their social world occurs, Lakoff contends, because we have what scientists call “‘mirror neuron circuits’ in the premotor cortex that fire when we either perform a given action or see someone else perform the same action.” These circuits help people identify the appearance of frames when they encounter them in public discourse, and also recognize the difference in frames that do not match one’s own.

This theory of framing is particularly relevant to partisan polarizations in which two morally laden and emotionally charged ideas of the nation compete with each other. Lakoff claims that the frames of conservative and progressive thought in contemporary American politics are formed early in life with different models of family life that construct conflicting frames of responsibility and authority in the mind. “The point is simple,” he writes, “Metaphorical thought is natural. We have a Nation as Family metaphor. We have two different idealized models of the family [paternalistic authority

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43 Lakoff, Political Mind, 15. Emphasis added.

44 Lakoff demonstrates that the process of cognition and framing contains an emotional element as well that, in political framing, plays an important role in the strength of a particular frame. The basic neural operations of hearing and processing a word occur in one area of the brain and the emotional connotations accompanying all input occur in deeper brain structures where emotions are generated. The interpretive frame is created by “neural binding circuitry” that links the two areas together. Therefore, “narratives and frames are not just brain structures with intellectual content, but rather with integrated intellectual-emotional content.” Thus it is not surprising that partisan differences often revolve around different definitions of the same word, and that resulting battles over meanings are often far more emotional than logical. Ibid., 28. See also, Westen, The Political Brain.

45 Ibid., 39.

46 Lakoff claims that the frames of conservative and progressive thought in contemporary American politics are formed early in life with different models of family life that construct conflicting frames of responsibility and authority in the mind. “The point is simple,” he writes, “Metaphorical thought is natural. We have a Nation as Family metaphor. We have two different idealized models of the family [paternalistic authority
sees the simple Left/Right paradigm as a metaphor that does not actually fit political reality. People tend to be “bi-conceptual,” he claims, which means that people may use progressive frames for some aspects of their sociopolitical life and conservative frames for others. They nonetheless use the bipolar metaphor to describe their positions on all issues because this metaphor exists in the brain as the normative frame for understanding politics. Political identity then becomes an act of self-identification. Shaped by the conceptual hegemony of polarization in their minds, people make a conscious choice to identify with one or the other side of the polarity or they may reject both frames. It is this conscious declaration of identification or non-identification with these subconscious frames that best explains individuals’ opinions and makes people declare themselves to be “liberal,” “moderate,” or “conservative.”

The exertion of free will to choose one’s position does not, however, suggest the victory of the conscious mind over subconscious frames. Lakoff writes, “And yet the left-to-right scale metaphor is no concocted hoax.” Lakoff writes, “It is real as a metaphor; it is in people’s brains.” It follows that people are especially prone to use this metaphor when their world is saturated with media proclaiming the polarization of the nation.

Lakoff thus offers a universally applicable neurological theory of how political ideas and polarization become embedded in the mind. Assuming that brain functions have not altered dramatically in the last two hundred years, we can explore how the same processes of
inscribing political frames in the brain and acting on them were also in place during the Restoration period in France. Indeed, such frames will form whenever and wherever there is enough political and cultural “data” to form them in the human mind.\(^{49}\) This does not mean, of course, that historical context no longer can inform our understanding of political culture; on the contrary, it is the historical context that produces the specific frames for each historical era. People in the Restoration used their own social, semantic, and narrative resources to create political frames and live through them, and they expressed their experience of living within a divided polity in ways specific to the period. A common theme of the era, for example, was to bemoan the “spirit of party” (esprit de parti) and to consider all explicit identification with a discrete and exclusionary group of likeminded citizens an affront to national unity.\(^{50}\) In fact, there were no formal political parties in France during the Restoration, so the polarizing contestation was often more abstract or personal than formal or institutional. Without organized political parties that could have empirically distinguished the lines of bifurcation in society, the French people relied on sociopolitical stereotypes to express their concern over post-revolutionary division in the nation. Although we can follow Lakoff in assuming that real brain structures conditioned people to think in terms of polarization, the pervasive partisanship and commentaries on national division—when combined with the lack of formal parties to channel political initiatives and help people

\(^{49}\) Following Sewell’s theory of system and practice, one might argue that the system is only put into “practice” at the time of neural binding, at which point culture then becomes more hegemonic and individual agency less capable of expressing itself outside of frames.

\(^{50}\) For the resistance to parties in French political life, see Raymond Huard, La naissance du parti politique en France (Paris: Presses Sciences Po, 1997), 16-20. Ironically, this attitude often emerged in the most partisan of texts. Throughout this dissertation, “partisanship” is used as a translation and application of esprit de parti. Reference to a group whether abstractly describing the “two sides,” or mentioning specific groups such as “liberals,” “moderates,” “ultras,” etc. does not refer to political parties as they are understood in America or France today. The emergence of political parties in France during the Third Republic is addressed in the conclusion.
define and articulate opinions—also gave rise to an idea of a divided nation in the “social imaginary.” Division in the social imaginary exacerbated the emotional components in people’s conceptions of the post-revolutionary nation and drove them to emphasize the divisions in the cultural media and political events that make the Restoration a distinctive case study of political framing.

What, then, is the import of polarization during the Restoration, and what can be gained from exploring how it emerged in political thought and action in the period? This study of imagined and real divisions in the French polity focuses attention on the Restoration’s crucial role in the formation of post-revolutionary France. The constitutional monarchy of the Restoration brought the Left and Right together for sustained dialogue on the meaning of the nation. For the first time since the Revolution had introduced democratic practices and representative institutions to France, the French people had the opportunity to practice politics in a dynamic but relatively stable public sphere for an extended period of time. These conditions allowed for the hardening of polarized frames, and also habituated the French to internal division as the normative paradigm of the nation. The relative stability of the Restoration provided an opportunity for the development of the acceptable bipolar frame which emerged during this era and thereafter insulated the French from prolonged domestic

51 My own ideas on the social imaginary have been informed by Charles Taylor, who describes the social imaginary as different from theory: “There are important differences between social imaginary and social theory. I adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is on the way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends. It is also the case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society. Which leads to a third difference: (iii) the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.” Taylor, however, considers the issue of social cohesion a philosophical one, whereas frames that operate according to the same three conditions he outlines suggest a deeper, physical reality beneath and explaining the social imaginary. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 23. For more on the concept of the social imaginary as an ethereal source of legitimization, see Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). The implications of imagination in nationalism are discussed in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso Books, 1991).
political violence. Although France has of course suffered deadly internecine strife since then, the irreconcilable extremes of the Terror and the violence that characterized the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras has not been repeated. Without the Restoration serving as an apprenticeship that taught opposing groups how to conduct politics in a divided society, later episodes of political bloodshed might have repeatedly ushered in despotic regimes that forestalled polarization by quashing political life altogether.\textsuperscript{52} Instead, the violent episodes of 1830, 1848, and 1870 were relatively short-lived before politics reemerged within the paradigm of Left and Right to meet new conditions in new regimes.

“Framing” has become a catchword in the mouths of contemporary political pundits with little interest in understanding its role in history or historical debates. It is of course commonly used in the simplistic sense of “framing” an argument, but recently political strategists have also begun drawing on Lakoff’s theories of cognition to develop more effective messaging—namely, to speak to voters through pre-existing frames or supplant those frames with new ones.\textsuperscript{53} This dissertation thus serves as a case study of political framing in an era and culture far removed from the contemporary American context in which many of these theories and approaches have been developed. It examines cultural media from the past to see how the framing of Restoration politics reflected polarizing processes that have characterized the development of modern democracies. Although historical and

\textsuperscript{52} Indeed, the closest thing to this in France’s post-Restoration history was the Second Empire, but even then, the move towards liberal government and the emergence of a viable opposition in the 1860’s suggest that Napoleon III prudently allowed polarized politics to emerge.

\textsuperscript{53} Lakoff himself has been a political guru for the Democratic Party, writing handbooks that explain how partisan framing works, and how to succeed in a political system with competing frames. George Lakoff, \textit{Don’t Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate, The Essential Guide for Progressives} (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 2004). Conservatives too are explicitly engaging with political framing to better sell their message. See, Frank Luntz, \textit{Words That Work: It’s Not What You Say, It’s What People Hear} (New York: Hyperion, 2007).
cultural contexts differ in every particular period, analyzing discourse and behavior with the concept of framing helps identify what is universal and what is specific in the way political ideas arise and shape public opinion and actions in each historical era. Without overstating the similarities between the present and earlier periods, this dissertation seeks to explain how people analyzed and participated in nascent democratic politics during the Restoration and offers a means of linking our own experiences of polarization and framing to those of people in the past.

**Methods and Structure of the Argument**

I began this project with no preconceptions about the strength of Restoration partisan language. The original intent was simply to apply some of the quantitative methods used in sociological frame analyses to various sources to show how concepts combined into political frames. But the repetition of key terms and concepts in these sources was so salient that it made the prospect of quantitative analysis overwhelming. A quantitative approach risked losing sight of history’s lived experiential aspect. A statistical analysis of political terms and their movement through the culture would artificially posit causal connections rather than provide a compelling narrative to explain their cultural ubiquity. The phenomenon of polarized rhetoric during the Restoration was pervasive and atmospheric. Sources in the Archives Nationales and the Bibliothèque Nationale document the general feeling of division which pervaded the public sphere and provided a general context for particular divisive statements. This dissertation demonstrates how the constant “chatter” about division reflected

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54 Paul McLean provides a specific model for the frame analysis of historical documents with his work on Italian Renaissance letters in, “A Frame Analysis of Favor Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture,” in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 104, No. 1 (Jul., 1998), 51-91. I do, however, think a quantitative approach can help show the effectiveness of specific propaganda campaigns. My first post-doctoral project will analyze “felicitations” of judges during the Spanish War (see Chapter Three) using a model similar to McLean’s.
a state of mind and was not just the result of purposely designed political campaigns. The divisions inhered in the minds of a broad spectrum of French citizens and gave rise to discrete experiences, varied elocutions of opinion, and particular modes of thought and action. Pamphlets, speeches, poems, songs, police reports, and private letters provide prolific expressions of the idea of a divided nation. Some bemoaned this condition while others exacerbated it, and many more tried to sidestep it through mockery or by denying its hold over the people, but the sense of division remained present and fundamentally powerful.

The following chapters examine the intersections between ideas about the divided nation and the way people acted upon their own frameworks for understanding the nation. The first and last chapters examine documents written throughout the period to demonstrate the pervasive influence of “division” as a “frame” for Restoration political actors and witnesses. The middle three chapters focus on specific events between the years 1818-1823 which further polarized the Left and Right. These five years witnessed a transition from the dominance of moderation in government to the hegemony of conservative ultraroyalism. The events and texts analyzed in these middle chapters contributed to this transition and brought the idea of irreconcilable partisanship to the forefront of political thought.

Chapter One defines the two broad schools of political thought about the meaning of the nation during the Restoration. It first considers texts that defined the ideological bases of the Restoration government and its founding document, the Constitutional Charter (La Charte). It shows how the two camps drew on different ideas of sovereignty, public opinion, representative government, and class privileges to define the post-revolutionary nation and to construct the political frames that made consensus and reconciliation impossible. This chapter also examines less rarified texts such as pamphlets and poems that heightened the
sense of incompatibility between the two schools of thought. Polemical texts used the genres of philosophical dialogues and political debates to reiterate political positions outlined in more theoretical texts. These dialogues portrayed fictional characters who personified the interaction between two incompatible political camps and two opposing conceptions of the nation. The last section of this chapter examines texts proposing moderation and national unity to show how even these ostensibly conciliatory texts derived their impact and relevance from the battles of more polemical opinion-makers. As a whole, the chapter describes the two dominant “frames” of the nation, outlines the ideological themes that underpinned them, and notes the most common types of media in which they appeared.

Chapter Two examines the interaction between ideology and events that emerged in debates and discussions of the expulsion of the former revolutionary Abbé Grégoire from the Chamber of Deputies in 1819. It contrasts Benjamin Constant’s theoretical ideas of public opinion, which drew heavily on Enlightenment ideas of the coercive power of reason, with the realities of Restoration polarization to show how the use of abstract concepts of national unity became ineffectual in polarized political situations. The specific case of Grégoire shows how liberals became paralyzed by their abstract conceptions of public opinion and thus failed to develop an effective means of opposing his expulsion without further polarizing the nation. This episode began the process of hardening the division between the two camps which steadily widened over the course of the period.

The 1823 French military intervention in Spain to rescue the Spanish King Ferdinand VII from a liberal junta is the subject of Chapter Three. Using published and archival sources, it shows how a parallel war in 1823 took place on the domestic front, where the two competing camps used the language of warring nations to paint their political opponents as
foreigners whose ideological frames were incompatible with what it meant to be French. Both sides drew on the events of the recent past—namely, the execution of Louis XVI and Napoleon’s Peninsular Campaign—to explain their support or opposition to the war, but they also marshaled the specific ideological prejudices of Restoration politics to brand their opponents as the real enemy. In their calls to war, ultras reemphasized the monarch’s ultimate authority in society and his role as the paternal protector of the people and the Church. Liberals, for their part, thought intervention was an affront to the idea of popular sovereignty and the division of powers that the Charter had ostensibly established in France. This chapter considers the debates and propaganda surrounding the war as forums for articulating the two camps’ conceptions of the French nation. It also suggests that two opposing forms of nationalism were in play during the period—a liberal one based on liberal conceptions of popular self-determination, and an “illiberal” one based on the fusion of religion, monarchy, and military power. The clash of these two camps demonstrates that the era’s political culture became the site for a prolonged debate over two competing types of nationalism. Public articulation of these contrasting ideologies helped to spread discourses on the characteristics of the nation in public consciousness and to strengthen the sense of division in the nation.

Nationalist discourse often makes reference to an incompatible “other” to help define the essential meaning of the nation. Chapter Four examines the controversial expulsion of the deputy Jacques-Antoine Manuel from the Chamber of Deputies. His speech opposing the Spanish War in 1823 provoked vehement ultra denunciations both of Manuel and his liberal supporters. The ultras’ indignation swelled into a countrywide discourse concerning the inherent unworthiness of leftists in France to be citizens. During the mock trial of Manuel in
the Chamber of Deputies, both sides argued for or against his expulsion by summarizing their respective conceptions of the nation and the representative system of national government. Liberals expressed their loyalty to the idea of popular sovereignty and its embodiment in the Chamber of Deputies, while ultras emphasized “natural” laws predating the Restoration government to justify their actions. Manuel’s expulsion transformed him into a political symbol. For liberals, he became a symbol of the righteous French citizen resisting ultra iniquity and oppression, and for ultras he became the symbol of all that was anathema to their understanding of the true French nation. These ideas spread throughout France as police officials monitored Manuel’s whereabouts and reported on public expressions of support for his ideas among leftists in the streets and in communities in general. These state officials used the language of “unworthiness” to portray him and his supporters as dangers to the monarchy and France. Leftists throughout France accorded Manuel the status of a national hero—the personification of liberal virtues and beliefs—and embarked on subscription campaigns to honor him. These competing discourses of unworthiness and hero worship spread throughout France whenever Manuel’s name arose, even so far as to turn reaction to his death in 1827 into yet another dramatic public clash over political principles.

Politics during the Restoration was the domain of elites. The public sphere, however, also included non-elite commentaries on the political discourse of the period. Lower class individuals with no access to the political machinery drew upon the same divisive frames that fueled elite contestation in the Chamber of Deputies and the press. Chapter Five analyzes popular urban songs to see how the frames that informed political discourse during the Restoration filtered down into popular culture. Both liberal and ultraroyalist accounts of politics and the nation found their voices in songwriters such as the leftist Paul-Emile
Debraux and the ultra Charles-Joseph Rougemaître who composed easy-to-sing partisan works for their popular audiences. Urban songwriters also formed societies that became alternative communities outside of elite spheres, and several eschewed partisanship precisely because it did not speak to the concerns of the lower class. This chapter illustrates how the lower-class rejection of elite political partisanship foreshadowed the creation of explicitly class-based political self-identification—the “socially conscious” Left that supplanted liberalism in the years that followed the Revolution of 1830. This rejection of partisanship, however, also depended on the strength of the dominant competing political frames for its relevance. Although they eschewed the political battles that raged above them, these songwriters felt compelled to react to them. Their songs mocking politics or lamenting social disunity testify to the strength of the framing that elites employed to articulate conceptions of the nation and rally their supporters.

The conclusion to this dissertation addresses the concept of division in French history after the Restoration. It considers France’s later colonial empire and the emergence of formal political parties in the Third Republic as “release valves” for polarization. It also analyzes polarization in the context of democracy and offers some reflections on the challenges of living in a divided polity that are still relevant today in France, America, and elsewhere.

This dissertation is not a work of political theory; it is a story of the French people in a specific historical period. It offers, of course, only one of the “frames” that could be used to tell the story. There is nothing new about the story of French division. One need only consider France’s turbulent history to see polarization between Huguenots and Catholics, Jansenists and Jesuits, and Patriots and Aristocrats in the centuries before the Restoration; and the Dreyfus Affair, Vichy France, and the continuing conflict over immigration show the
persistence of intense internal divisions after this period. Nor is there anything specifically French about polarization in societies with democratic institutions. In other early nineteenth-century societies, for example, Chartists and Tories staked out uncompromising positions on the nature of government in Britain and the partisans of abolition and slavery brought polarization to the point of bloodshed in America. Polarization is a feature of democracy dating back to the *stasis* between class interests in the Athenian polis. The ubiquity of polarization in societies with democratic institutions, however, does not diminish the need for examining this phenomenon. Indeed, its constant reappearance in almost all democratic societies suggests why this feature of political life calls for further study in France and in the many other nations that generate internal polarizations as they set out to produce national unity.

The French, like peoples of all nations, do not have one national identity. Individual identities are constantly reconstituted when people engage in the social world, and one’s sense of national identity is constantly reasserted when people use political frames to articulate and act on an ideal conception of their nation. For French people during the Restoration, the only resources with which they could construct a new national identity were the polarized frames of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary politics. Although the adoption of these frames necessarily divided the French people, making them painfully aware of the lack of ideological national unity, they also helped both camps accept the nation as the product of a necessarily constant conflict between political principles. This realization indeed made the French people during the Restoration united in division.
Chapter One

Rival Frames: Defining and Contesting Post-Revolutionary France

Introduction

In 1817, a review of a political pamphlet in Archives Politiques made the following pronouncement: “It is a dilemma of our current situation that many people do not really know [in] which party they are.” The review went on to classify leftist and centrist politicians, progressing from most liberal to moderate as “independents,” “liberals,” “constitutionalists,” “doctrinaires,” and “ministériels.” The political ideology of these groups differed but all, the author claimed, cherished the liberal benefits of the Revolution as preserved in the Constitutional Charter. They stood opposed to an ultraroyalist minority who rejected civil liberties and progressive values and wanted a return of unfettered monarchical power and noble privilege. In the author’s estimation, there were really only two parties in France.¹

This conclusion reflected the deep political divide during the Restoration. The Revolution had conditioned the French to conceiving of their nation and society in terms of polarized blocs of Left and Right—it was the narrative for virtually all politics of the era. While conflicts often arose between particular factions grouped together by the review’s author, these were merely internecine squabbles and of far less significance than the more

fundamental political and social struggle between broadly-conceived progressives and reactionaries. Although politicians tried to deny or circumvent the idea of division, all who engaged in the public sphere had to address this great split in French society, and all found themselves labeled according to this paradigm. No one escaped partisan polarization.

Over the past twenty years, historians have resisted this simplistic appraisal of Restoration politics. They explore the diversity of political thought and action on either end of the political spectrum in works that, when considered together, seem to counter the assessment in the *Archives politiques*. Aurelian Craïtu and Lucien Jaume have explored the French liberal tradition, pointing out the salient differences between moderate *doctrinaires*, who did not subscribe to popular sovereignty, and *indépendants* who did. Alexander Skuy and Darren McMahon have shown how ultras understood the political reality that evolved during the Restoration and learned how to manipulate public opinion to win elections and secure power in a modernizing polity with constitutional limits and a centralized state. R.S. Alexander examines the behaviour of Bonapartists and republicans during the Hundred Days and places them in the context of the liberal opposition to the Bourbon regime. Another trend in Restoration historiography juxtaposes the stereotype of Restoration bipolarity with an actual convergence of public opinion among elites in a society of notables. A recent

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5 As Pamela Pilbeam notes in an introductory primer to the age, “between 1816 and 1827 the vast majority of members of the Chambers of Deputies belonged to no group at all and would have simply thought
essay by Emmanuel Waresquiel, a leading French historian of the period, downplays the importance of the contentious politics of the Restoration, suggesting that political division was simply a discursive political tool that elites used to curry favor. Historians, he claims, have fallen into the habit of reinterpreting elite discourse and the age in general from the perspective of this discursive division. He aims to go “against the grain” and decouple elite political discourse from historians’ interpretive gloss. Waresquiel and other contemporary historians who downplay Restoration political polarization, however, do not address how people of all social classes may have actually experienced the ubiquitous proclamations of the nation’s duality in the era’s public sphere. While highlighting important complexities, they downplay the significance of the widespread emotional reactions to polarization that dominated Restoration politics and culture.

These two approaches, the first which breaks down and reveals complexities within Restoration partisan stereotypes, and the second which deemphasizes the significance of polarization, both offer valuable insights. However, this rethinking of the Restoration does little to explain why the metaphor of a divided Restoration was so powerful and persistent at the time. In an effort to break down stereotypes and simplifications, historians have given little weight to the power of imagination, misconception, and obstinate belief to shape interpretations of reality.


7 Another recent foray into the nature of post-revolutionary France suggests that the “great divide” in French society was not caused by individual resistance to Jacobin centralization; rather, it was a struggle over the claims of intermediary bodies of civil society and the atomizing central state. According to Ronsanvallon, both liberals and royalists looked to assert these intermediary bodies against the hegemony of the state during the Restoration. Pierre Rosanvallon, The Demands of Liberty: Civil Society in France since the Revolution (Arthur Goldhammer trans.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
When historians encounter “myths” held in the past that were at odds with historical “reality,” they often try to find objective “truth,” rather than exploring how false or simplistic notions became embedded in popular thought and informed people’s ideas and actions. Nonetheless, some historians do explore the “social imaginary” to explain how imagined conceptions of society influence people and help them understand their world.\(^8\) This chapter is in one sense a study of the idea of national division in the social imaginary of the Restoration. Within a public sphere dominated by political struggles to define the post-revolutionary nation, people’s exposure to two rival “imagined communities” led to the creation of a disheartening third and utterly divided imagined nation.\(^9\) But historical studies of the social imaginary, though offering a compelling hermeneutic, do not fully explain why conflicting ideas become so powerful and hard to displace. I argue that the Restoration’s imagined national divide developed into a semantic frame hardwired in the brain. This frame inhered in people of all political persuasions and became the dominant interpretative paradigm for politics, affecting how people thought and acted.

During the Restoration, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary political ideas were already well established frames, but the struggle between these two systems of thought in a relatively stable polity was a novel development. One did not have to articulate intellectual political positions to be part of this struggle. Evidence from the archives suggests people

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\(^8\) Sarah Maza recently resurrected Castoriadis’ “social imaginary,” originally theorized to explain how people imbue their government with legitimacy, to address issues of class. Christine Haynes also writes about the social imaginary as a site for discerning difference and identifying new social archetypes in a changing public sphere. That both authors are using the idea to describe post-revolutionary society and culture suggests that conditions in the public sphere during the Restoration were particularly suited to its application. Sarah Maza, *The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay in the Social Imaginary, 1750-1850* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), and Christine Haynes, “An ‘Evil Genius:’ The Construction of the Publisher in the Postrevolutionary Social Imaginary,” in *French Historical Studies*, vol. 30, no. 4 (Fall 2007), 559-595.

acted implicitly and explicitly on revolutionary-era assumptions about the makeup of the nation. Sheryl Kroen, for example, identifies political culture and practice in public spaces outside the world of literary elites. She shows through her investigations of Restoration police records how political contests between the government and an activist population served to “transpose the struggles of the revolutionary period to the nineteenth century.”

Kroen’s case studies illustrate the divisive political culture of the Restoration among diverse populations, testifying to the wide reach of Restoration polarization. The dynamic between protesters and the state that she examines in her work, is a reflection of the polarized mentality of the French during this period. Kroen’s case studies reveal clashes over many of the same rival frames that are the focus of this chapter. She shows them alive and in play in spaces dominated by urban artisans, students, and workers, and in many of the explosive political events that characterized the polarized French community. Her study is not concerned with ideas in “high culture” or in the political philosophies in print at the time, but rather with the lived experience of post-revolutionary conflict in a variety of settings.

Yet writers in literary society, some no more elite than the street activists Kroen studies, were the vehicles for the polarized frames that all politically active people brought to their public lives. Partisan texts portrayed a divided France and provided the lexicon that gave the period’s politics their vitality and viciousness. They espoused ideal visions of the nation based on progressive and conservative frames, and put them to the service of factions in their treatises, poems, pamphlets, and songs. Works as diverse as Chateaubriand’s exegesis of the Charter and an anonymous provincial’s fictional dialogue offered utopian visions

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predicated on political victory over the internal enemy.\textsuperscript{11} The Restoration’s writers fused these two exclusive visions of an ideal nation together when they wrote about contemporary politics, propagating the frame of national division. This chapter returns to the literary sphere to identify the constitutive elements of this new frame of national division, revealing the two main ideological constructs in play and their marriage in the Restoration’s dominant framework of post-revolutionary division. The texts analyzed in this chapter reveal the power of each side’s ideology to craft compelling conceptions of an ideal community, but they also show the even greater power that opposition to rival frames brought to political writers’ ideas. While these authors propagated particular ideological positions and the frame of division, they also were victims of its coercive power to define the paradigm of their own political lives.

Historians of the eighteenth-century will no doubt notice that I do not address many antecedents of the arguments put forward in this chapter.\textsuperscript{12} This is intentional. Restoration political actors did indeed draw explicitly and implicitly from pre-existing ideas about politics, society, class, and culture—most of them from the Old Regime and revolutionary periods. They also often used the narrative of French history, especially from the preceding few decades, to make their arguments; and these narratives played major roles in their framing of the nation. But I am primarily interested in new iterations of old ideas in the context of post-revolutionary contestation. The union of rival ideas in a stable public sphere placed old theories and recent memories in a dynamic exchange unique to the era. Instead of


\textsuperscript{12} See, for example, the debates on French national identity outlined in David Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001).
looking at its sources, I interpret the political thought of the era as the product of cognition through the frames that political actors had brought to the Restoration and constructed during the period. Therefore, the familiar content of some of these frames and historical narratives notwithstanding, I will not trace their development from their origins or through their turbulent careers.

This chapter opens by identifying rival frames of the nation, government, and society during the Restoration in liberal and ultra interpretations of the Constitutional Charter. Rival conceptions of popular and absolute sovereignty formed the poles of liberal/ultra debate, but subsidiary arguments about interests and privileges also arose. This first section also explores poems and pamphlets that portrayed the Charter as the vehicle for national reconciliation and unity until partisanship came to dominate Restoration discourse. This chapter turns next to more partisan texts such as satirical dictionaries written to help people understand their political rivals through mockery, and literary dialogues that portrayed political actors in a polarized society. These writings strengthened the idea of a divided France, permanently in conflict. In the final section of this chapter, I address calls for unity, tolerance, and moderation from the era that seemed to run against the grain of partisanship. People wrote in the spirit of union et oubli (unity and forgetting) demanded by the Charter because the polarization offered no positive vision of national cohesion, only perpetual conflict. But, in fact, calls for unity were often thinly disguised reiterations of the same liberal or ultra terms and ideas that underlay division. In the end, moderation needed the


14 A good discussion of divisive elements of the Charter is found in, Craïtu, Strange Liberalism, 70-75.
Restoration political actors ensured that polarization became the normative paradigm for understanding and belonging in the French nation. Writers, politicians, and activists of the period created a dynamic of contestation that bound people together even as it pushed them to political extremes. In the process, political conflict reinforced the idea of national bifurcation and trumped ideas of national reconciliation. The Restoration, therefore, through its temporal proximity to the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras and its relatively stable public sphere, was a seminal period in the development of modern French national identity. The rival frames of the nation that fueled contestation in the period and the frame of national division continue, respectively, to divide and unite the French people.

**Part One: From the Unifying Charter to the Divided Nation**

It is sometimes difficult to discern the political affiliation of Restoration authors who wrote about the Charter because most commentators expressed similar platitudes about France’s new constitution. There were some extreme royalists and republicans who disliked the Charter, but whose voices—especially the latter—were not welcome in a public sphere in which nearly all politicians thought the monarchy and the constitution were necessary stabilizing forces in post-revolutionary France. Overtures to unity and moderation and calls to forget the past became standard tropes in discussions of the Charter, presenting an optimistic assessment of France’s political future. The Restoration’s relative stability derived from this consensual acceptance and admiration for the constitution. Indeed, the relatively
minor changes to the document after the July Revolution of 1830 confirm the Charter’s broad appeal as a foundation for French government and society.¹⁵

Behind this veil of utopian political rhetoric, however, lurked substantial differences in the philosophical assumptions that underpinned both sides’ acceptance of the Charter. The Charter covered questions of authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty in its provisions for interaction between government institutions, but it lacked clear ideological articulation of the meaning of these concepts. This lack of specificity encouraged thinkers to rely on their own respective prejudicial understandings of political theory to construe its core principles. Each side imagined that its interpretation of the Charter was correct and outlined the ideal government for France. They compared the Charter’s government with past monarchical and revolutionary systems, however, which inhibited the effective use of the constitution to negotiate the new sociopolitical conditions of the Restoration. When politicians or writers professed their love for the Charter, their partisan rivals distrusted their intentions. Soon after its adoption, the Charter was provoking disunity as much as its early enthusiasts had thought it would promote harmony, and preventing the realization of political reconciliation.

Constitutions provide more than structure for governments and guidelines for their operation; they embody foundational assertions about the character of nations. Those who write them presume that their provisions best suit the needs of their nations’ governments, people, and social orders. The rival interpretations of the Charter during the Restoration reflect differing conceptions of the nation. Exegeses and praise of the document confirmed,

¹⁵ These changes were relatively minor in their provisions for institutions and rights, but included the substantial inclusion of the liberal conception of the document as a binding contract between king and people in its preamble. For these changes see, see, Vincent Beach, “Charter of 1830,” in Historical Dictionary of France from the 1815 Restoration to the Second Empire, eds. Edgar Leon Newman and Robert Lawrence Simpson, vol. 1, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 194-99.
strengthened and set at odds the two dominant frames of the nation in currency during the period and provided a basis for interpreting the nation as irreparably divided.

**Praising the Charter**

After twenty-five years of near continuous conflict and millions of French and European deaths, restoration of the Bourbon monarchy offered relief for a war weary nation. Whispered disdain for returning nobles and repudiated revolutionaries notwithstanding, texts from the Restoration’s early years were generally optimistic. The Left could take solace in the establishment of representative government after Napoleon’s imperial dictatorship, while the Right celebrated the return of France’s rightful monarch and his noble coterie. Both sides considered the Charter to be the aegis of the new system, guaranteeing the safety and security of both people and king. Belief in the Charter’s palliative potential remained strong even in the midst of the bitter conflicts that periodically erupted throughout the period.

The dedicatory poem was the most common medium writers employed in praise of the Charter. Authors from both sides of the political divide penned verses that accentuated the positive and unifying aspects of the constitution. Their odes to national unity through the Charter often accompanied exasperated calls for an end to partisanship. A poem from 1820, for example, referred to the Charter’s “command” for national unity. “Tribunals, citizens, the Charter orders you,” the poem’s author “le Gendre” proclaimed, “Union and peace are what she commands.”

An overarching ideal of concord reigned in many works, even when writers employed more partisan language that hinted at the differing ideological interpretations of the Charter. “Michel B.,” the author of an 1828 poem on the Charter’s virtues declared that peace during the Restoration was only due to reassertion of monarchical

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16 Le gendre (Louis-Désiré), *La Charte constitutionnelle; poème didactique dédié aux français* (Mulhausen: Risler, 1820), 6.
rights. “Concord followed the flags of legitimacy,” he wrote, calling for all to praise first the king for his gifts of peace and the Charter.  

The Charter brought about peace because it ostensibly healed divisions and brought old enemies together. Its most important contribution in this regard was its incorporation of both liberal and monarchical principles. Some poets interpreted this conciliation of rival principles in the constitution as a call for union between the people who held them. In 1825, poet René Marcé wrote that by taking an oath to the Charter, the newly crowned King Charles X had conjoined defenders of the Revolution and royalist counterrevolutionaries as coequal participants in the new order. He proclaimed that “By the lilies France is guarded, / The Union, this divine charm, / Joins the palms of the Vendée, / And the laurels of the banks of the Rhine,”  

Some went further back in history to suggest an even deeper fusion of French values in the Charter. An anonymous poet from 1824 praised the choice of the Bourbon King Henri IV’s image as a replacement for Napoleon’s profile on the medallion of the Legion of Honor—preserved in article 72—because it brought together Henri’s conciliatory spirit and the courage of Austerlitz’s victors. Through these conciliatory aspects, the Charter represented “an eternal monument of the healthy alliance of monarchy with liberty.” This optimistic belief in the Charter’s perfect marriage of old and new found its proponents across the political spectrum.

17 Michel B***, La Charte constitutionnelle mise en vers français (Paris: Béraud, 1828).

18 René Marcé, Stances à l’occasion du serment de fidélité à la Charte Constitutionnelle prêté par S.M. Charles X, le jour de son sacre (Paris: Sétier, 1825), 11.


20 Ibid., 5.
Despite whatever past divisions the Charter may have healed, however, the obvious contemporary divisiveness of Restoration politics remained. And yet, even this found resolution in some odes to the Charter. In 1819, an anonymous poet proclaimed that the Charter could render “our political ills” harmless through its dictates. He promised that, “We will live henceforth on free land, / Where the powers of the Charter have imposed balance.” Such belief in the power of the Charter to heal division persisted through the Restoration, and for this reason, it assumed a near sacred status among politicians of both sides, and particularly among liberals.

The mandate of forgiveness incorporated into the Charter promised personal and collective security for many in France. In 1820, an anonymous pamphleteer wrote, “to want the security of all, peace, and public tranquility, that is being faithful to the Charter.” Finding consensus around these concepts proved easy—there were few who would want the antitheses of them—and so loyalty to the Charter became a shared ideal regardless of ideology. Thus an important element of French identity derived from basic admiration for France’s new constitution. Attachment to the Charter became more than a political position; it was the very “quality of being a good Frenchmen, good citizen, and good royalist.”

Some writers on both sides of the political divide warned against reviving arbitrary royal or revolutionary governments because the Charter’s institutions were better than all preceding French governments. Whatever the meaning of specific articles of the Charter—and differences abounded over them—it was the fundamental law of the land and, as such,

23 Ibid., 7-8.
was inviolable. Authors warned against infringement of the Charter’s articles. Violating the Charter, even for a “good deed,” some writers claimed, risked creating a pretext for further abuses. Captain Moncey, a former soldier turned liberal pamphleteer, wrote in 1819 that the king’s oath to the Charter at his coronation confirmed its inviolability. While touting the sacred status of the Charter, however, Moncey touched on the element that most often incited division, namely its poorly-defined relationship between the king and the people. He wrote, “In vain would the successors of the king pretend to be able to undermine the Charter: they would have neither the right nor the power to do so….because the people who want to defend their rights are much more powerful when they are supported by Divinity....” When liberals made the Charter a sacred text that the king himself could not alter, they raised it over the monarchy as the foundation for the nation and exposed deep-seated differences over the meaning of French sovereignty, legitimacy, and authority. This tendentious reading posed a challenge to royalists and thus undermined the Charter’s power to heal France’s political and social ills. Unguarded optimism over the Charter merely glossed over different interpretations of its meaning.

**The Charter and the Liberal Frame of Sovereignty**

The Charter’s apparent unification of opposed principles and groups within a representative system of government, also made it the context for contestation over mutually exclusive notions about legitimacy and the nation. Articles providing for the democratic practices of negotiation and debate left room for dialogue on the relationship the Charter established between the king and the people. Despite the absolute executive power accorded

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25 Ibid., 39-40.
the king in the Charter’s preamble, its concessions to representative government, while providing basic parameters for the operation of its two Chambers (Deputies and Peers), left the meaning and role of the “nation” per se poorly defined. Debating the role of the Charter in defining the nation became a trigger for heated exchanges.

Abbé Henri Grégoire, a veteran of revolutionary and Napoleonic assemblies with exposure to a variety of constitutions, was not enthusiastic about the Charter after its rushed debut in 1814. He noted that “France is without doubt the only civilized country in which one writes, discusses, and adopts a constitutional Charter in three days.” He quickly seized on the absurdity of considering the document “national” if it was imposed from above without consulting the people. Grégoire asserted that sovereignty could only come from the nation because “a nation belongs only to itself” and not to individuals or royal families.26 The Charter should mirror the nation as a testament to its rights and the duties it affirms, he reasoned, and thus should have presented a more complete picture of the nation it represented, from its monetary units and weights and measures, to its regulations and resources for public instruction and industry. Incorporating these changes that define people’s everyday lives, Grégoire believed, would give the constitution a “more popular character.”27 Grégoire presented a Jacobin interpretation of a constitution as a comprehensive outline for all aspects of life and the full exercise of the people’s sovereignty. This conception of a constitution, namely laying out all the parameters of the nation with the intent of making a people rather than coming from the people, was an extreme position in

27 Ibid., 17.
Restoration politics. But less-encompassing liberal visions of the nation still suggested that the people were its guiding force, even if the Charter’s articles did not define the nation in its totality.

For liberals and royalists alike, the Charter’s legitimacy depended on its source of authority. Did this authority ultimately derive from the king as sovereign, or did it derive from a contractual arrangement between the king and the sovereign people or nation? This debate over whether the Charter was “octroyé” (granted) or a “contrat” (contract), echoed throughout the Restoration, and liberals almost universally lined up in favor of the latter. Even doctrinaires who denied the validity of popular sovereignty allied in sentiment with liberals who opposed the absolutist alternative. The share of sovereignty that the people’s representatives wielded in the Restoration’s Chambers, however, differed from the unfettered popular sovereignty of the revolutionary Convention, and imposed limits on the political initiatives that Restoration-era representatives were obligated to or could make. Many liberals thus suggested limits to popular sovereignty in the Charter without denying the concept’s validity. A liberal pamphleteer, for example, explained in his, *De la souveraineté de la nation [On the Sovereignty of the Nation]* (1819), “We know that the nation is not able to govern by itself, nor intervene directly, in any manner, in the acts of the government.”

Trusting neither the people nor their representatives alone to wield the sovereign power of

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29 Restoration liberals thought that precipitously undertaking all the initiatives that potentially could derive from the people, as suggested in Grégoire’s call for a total outline of the nation, had opened the door to the Terror.
the nation, the author explained that governments exist because of and for the nation. Yet he also thought that the sole sovereign act of the nation itself was to fix the principles and means that should govern it. According to this theory, the Charter was the product of popular sovereignty, but also the sole manifestation of the people’s contribution to national sovereignty. Thus, the Charter remained a testimony to the people’s bestowal of power, reaffirming the fundamental rights of the people to determine their government while limiting the people’s actual participation in governance.

What precisely then was the relationship between the nation and the king? In 1826, the liberal deputy Eusèbe Salverte wrote that “... under a constitutional regime, the patrie is the property of the citizen, as citizens are the property of the patrie; one does not exist without the other.” Liberals like Salverte who believed in the popular character of the Restoration government without conditions, thus had to reevaluate the role of the king in the exercise of sovereignty. The author of De la souveraineté, for his part, maintained that the king had been merely wise enough to “read” the needs of his people and devise the Charter, but that these needs and the nation preexisted. He believed that according to the contractual nature of the Charter “he [the king] only enters [the agreement] as a party.” Although the king existed before the Restoration, the author contends, he could not sign a contract with himself; therefore, the other party had to be the nation. The Charter—its contractual nature assumed—thus confirmed the existence of the nation as an entity outside of the government


32 M. S.-A...B...D., souveraineté, 10-11.
that had the moral authority and agency needed to negotiate with the king and, if necessary, assert its independence.

The author of *Souveraineté* also pointed out, however, what the Revolution had already demonstrated. Namely, that when abstract “nations” assert political rights, in reality they become the victims of power-hungry individuals who act in their name. Nations needed trustworthy mediating powers through which to act, and the king was the only such power available during the Restoration. The king therefore still had a dominant place in the liberal reading of the Charter, but his power was susceptible to manipulation and arrogation at the hands of self-interested members of the government and the Chambers. According to the Charter, the king alone could propose amendments to the constitution, but the author of *Souveraineté* claimed that only an *ad hoc* council of the people could approve such changes. 33 This popular council, and not the Chambers, would confirm the French nation’s right to self-determination. This formulation rejected the idea of ultimate monarchical authority even as it confirmed the king as the government’s engine and mediator.

The Restoration’s representative system with its miniscule electorate and even smaller pool of eligible candidates clearly did not reflect the liberals’ grandiose language about the people’s role in government. Liberals thus had to reconcile their allegiance to the people with the lack of popular access to the Charter’s political system. Some liberals like Salverte did suggest that it was in the constitutional regime’s interest to have an ever-increasing number of active citizens and never to allow a reduction in the electorate. 34 But there was no chance that universal suffrage would emerge to make the Chamber of Deputies

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33 Ibid., 17.
34 Salverte, 8-9.
the “true voice” of the people because the memory of the Revolution’s democratic dictatorship persisted. How, then, could sovereignty be transferred from the people to the government without opening the door to despotism? One liberal philosophy called for dividing sovereignty between governmental bodies to maintain the principle of representation but also to prevent a unitary body from claiming full sovereignty. Charles-Philippe Marchand, for example, suggested a tripartite division of sovereignty into the two Chambers and the king preserved representation while shielding the people. “Representative government is not a subtle theory,” he wrote, “it is easily explained: [it is] the sovereignty of the three powers to which the Charter gave the right and the mission to make the laws....Each of the three powers possess a part of it.”

The Charter became the glue that kept the parts together and ensured that the government would not abuse the people’s grant of sovereignty.

Some liberals believed that although peoples worldwide inherently possessed ultimate sovereign authority by natural right, only the French people had the experience and constitutional history necessary to create a working hybrid government. Their ability to reduce the despotic potential of both absolute and popular sovereignty thus became a central tenet of the liberals’ conception of French national identity. In 1830, shortly before the July Revolution, M. Mézard wrote that the Charter preserved the French tradition of monarchy limited by fundamental laws that had started with the Salic Law determining the French kings’ succession, and continued with unwritten codes developed through the centuries. The Charter simply codified fundamental laws that were the link between the governed and the governed.

governing.\textsuperscript{36} Through consolidated fundamental laws it provided a solid foundation for the nation, and although it was a contract of sorts between the people and the king, it was, more importantly, a symbol of the unity deeply embedded in the history of France. “Therefore, the Charter is outfitted (\textit{revêtue}) with a strength superior even to that of a contract,” Mézard claimed, “since it cannot be annulled by either of the parties.”\textsuperscript{37}

The liberal frame of the nation in the Restoration thus centered on the Charter as the embodiment of France’s past and present—it was the tangible manifestation of French identity. Theoretical ideas of sovereignty, in the end, mattered little compared to the liberals’ almost religious praise of the Charter. Based on its confirmation of the long relationship between the people and the king, the Charter, Mézard asserted, had become “an object of veneration for all the French . . . where it is, in a word, to politics what dogmas are to religion.”\textsuperscript{38} Even in the early years of the Restoration, Mathieu-Noël Rioust called the Charter, “our political gospel” and an “object of the national cult.”\textsuperscript{39} Some went so far as to proclaim the Charter itself as “a Salic property that belongs legitimately to the French people, just as a crown does to the oldest son of the reigning dynasty.”\textsuperscript{40} It is indeed remarkable that such assertions about the fundamental importance of the Charter to the idea of the nation developed in such a short time. By 1830 it had already become for many liberals the political

\textsuperscript{36} M. Mézard, \textit{De la Charte et de ses conséquences} (Paris: A. Henry, 1830), 11-12.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 23.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 31-32.

\textsuperscript{39} Mathieu-Noël Rioust, \textit{De la Charte et ses ennemis} (Paris: Perroneau, 1816), 45-46.

\textsuperscript{40} Anon., \textit{De la catholicité et du maintien de la Charte contre les absolutistes, les ultramontaines, et les acéphalistes: par un savant avec le livre} (Paris: A. Beraud, 1828), 7.
expression of France’s most distinctive national traditions and the incarnation of the French people.

**The Ultra Frame of the Paternal Nation**

The ultras’ political framing of the nation began and ended with the king as the father of his people. They demonized popular sovereignty and denied an amalgamated sovereignty, and many considered the Charter and its government insufficiently monarchical. Yet, like their liberal counterparts who spoke more stridently about the people’s role in government than they believed or acted, many Restoration ultras who put the king’s rights first in sentiment hesitated to embrace unlimited monarchy in practice. Some ultras even professed to understand the appeal of popular sovereignty but nonetheless considered it impossible to institute. In 1830, M.R. Cabueil, for example, commented on the people’s real power and importance but thought the nation incapable of governing itself. The monarchy was thus “born of necessity” and imbued with a constitution that made its behavior predictable. The ultimate goal of politics for many ultras was to reconcile the king’s absolute authority with the king’s own constitution.

Royal authority and the traditional prerogatives of religion and the family were at the heart of the ultra national identity. For proponents of this monarchical, religious, and paternalistic conception of society, popular sovereignty was a dangerous legacy of the Revolution. In 1823, Abbé Toutain recalled the revolutionary era to declare that when “nations” govern society the “factious become the oppressors and butchers of their fellow

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41 In 1827, for example, Felix Chevalier complained that although a constitutional monarchy suited France, the “institutions which rule over it [today] are not in harmony with the principles of monarchy,” and that this lack of harmony that fueled contemporary political discord. Felix Chevalier, *De la Monarchie en France* (Paris: Tastu, 1827), 14.

Toutain thus proclaimed that “sovereignty of the people is a ridiculous dream,” and that “sovereignty and equality, in one state, are the destruction and extinction of all society.” Whereas some liberal champions of the Charter saw the king’s oath to it as a testament to the people’s sovereign sanctity, Toutain suggested that neither the adherence of the monarch to the constitution nor his accession to the throne were acts that expressed deference to *popular* sovereignty. He claimed instead that sacred power alone invested the king with authority—just as the ordination of a bishop rather than his election is the source of ecclesiastical authority. Once a nation agrees on a family to rule over all and consecrates the sovereign through the recourse of divine sanction, the people remain outside of all governance. Kings do not rule by brute strength or riches, but by the vital essence of royal power that they receive directly from God, the aspect of their persons that makes them objects of holy veneration.

Ultras placed the family metaphor at the center of their conception of the nation. The “king as father” and “father as king” had a long history in France and many émigrés’ speculations on the political philosophy of the Restoration began and ended with these paternal anchors of social order. Theories of patriarchal authority blended state-of-nature

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44 Ibid., 9.


46 Ibid., 14.

arguments and “common sense” with religious conviction to create an ostensibly irrefutable political philosophy grounded in natural law and self-evident truth. Ultras claimed that absolute monarchy was the natural government of France—that all other options were “unnatural” and more importantly, “un-French”. Abbé Thorel, in a treatise first published in 1807 and reprinted a third time to popular acclaim in 1821, elaborated a typical theory of paternalistic monarchism and the “absurdity of the sovereignty of people.” Before explaining how ultras understood the Charter, it will be helpful to examine Thorel’s treatise in some detail to understand ultras’ opinions about the nation in the context of a paternalistic conception of society.

In Thorel’s system, God is the source of all authority. He alone invested the first father Adam with dominion over the Earth and, more importantly, over his family. Citing Puffendorf’s concept of the multiplication of families as the source of the “people,” Thorel intended to demonstrate that the idea of the “people,” if one must have recourse to it in political theory, was at best an extrapolation of family, and any other definition was an artificial construction.48 He contended that instead of chaos developing from the multiplication of families, all of humanity’s forefathers retained Adam’s God-given authority.49 Reason dictated that this authority could not be randomly created or split into pieces and parcelled. Instead, authority passed from father to the eldest son, increasing its

48 M. l’Abbé Thorel, De l’origine des sociétés et absurdité de la souveraineté des peuples, 3 vols., vol. 1, 3d ed. (1807; Paris: Egron, 1821), 21-22. I have chosen Thorel because of the popularity of his text in the Restoration, and because his iteration of the paternal nation echoed throughout the period. Numerous other long treatises had been devoted to criticizing popular sovereignty, perhaps most notably, Joseph de Maistre, “Étude sur la souveraineté,” in Oeuvres complètes vol.1 (Lyon: Vitte et Perrussel, 1884-1887).

49 Thorel claimed that “from the moment we are born, we are born subordinate to a sovereign chief” in the form of a father. Ibid., 38.
scope with each generation’s addition to the pool of subjects.\textsuperscript{50} Likewise, the nation only exists in its origins as the subject of the absolute sovereignty of a king. Therefore, the Bourbon kings, as legitimate holders of this ancient sovereignty, and as chiefs of a great nation with a growing pool of subjects increasing their authority with each century, sat at the head of society by natural right.

Thorel did not deny that contracts confirming sovereign authority existed, indeed, he noted their practical benefits. Legitimate sovereigns, Thorel asserted, had the right to delegate authority and negotiate its parameters as they saw fit. This transmissibility of sovereignty accounted for the variety of legitimate governments in the world. Republics and even full democracies could be legitimate governments, Thorel concluded, only in societies where paternal forces devised them as repositories of authority.\textsuperscript{51} In these legitimized non-monarchical governments, authority was assumed to rest in political institutions, rather than in the people who held office within them.\textsuperscript{52} In representative systems like that outlined in the Charter, for example, Thorel insisted that “Sovereignty resides not in the nomination [of a representative] but in legislation.”\textsuperscript{53} Sovereignty, in his estimation, did not change its essence in different forms of government—its source was always paternal authority and never the people.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 47-48.

\textsuperscript{51} The precedents of elected Roman kings or, more pointedly, the early Franks’ election of Pharamond as first king were not examples of popular sovereignty. Thorel pointed out that these were merely sanctioned transfers of pre-existing sovereignty. Thorel traced this theory of the delegation of sovereign authority through the Greeks, Romans, Hebrews, Franks, Maccabees, to the modern French to show its “natural” legitimacy. Ibid., 139-172.

\textsuperscript{52} Ironically, this is similar to liberal conceptions of practical sovereignty. Liberals, however, eschewed the theological origins of authority. See Chapter Two.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 87-88.
Thorel therefore directed his ire at contractual theories like Rousseau’s General Will by which people build society from the ground up, contributing their own sovereign will to create a greater authority. On a practical level, Thorel warned that popular sovereignty always devolved into the rule of the “lowest classes”—a fear many liberals shared. More significantly, it was theoretically and theologically impossible to realize popular sovereignty because individuals’ wills were synonymous with their indivisible souls and could not become dissociated from them in the form of the General Will. Thorel claimed that the proponents of popular sovereignty fundamentally misunderstood the difference between the soul and authority—two essential but markedly different aspects of the human condition. Personal authority, Thorel believed, was by definition a product of hierarchical relations and not the actuation of individual willpower. Thorel’s conception of authority thus was “neither the General Will, nor the particular will, nor a composite of votes and wills,” but rather, the God-given force of the fatherhood that kept families and nations together. Sovereign paternal authority therefore undergirded all rightful governments and alone legitimized enacting governmental policy. Political authority in this construct remained an heirloom that fathers received as protectors of their families, and by extension this paternal political authority was the necessary guarantor of the great family of society and nation.

Paternal authority was a common element in the ultra frame of the nation and Thorel was only one of several conservative Restoration theorists, politicians, and writers who subscribed to this paternalistic view of political authority and the nation. Many ultras held

54 Ibid., 71.
55 Ibid., 6.
56 Ibid., 80.
57 Ibid., 128-29.
narrower conceptions of paternalism than Thorel, and denied the legitimacy of any system of government other than monarchy. In 1826, Jérôme-Joseph de Momigny extended the monarchical ideal to explain paternal authority in the household. He asserted that fathers acted as monarchs and their children were subjects whose individuality derived solely from their membership in the family. In turn, these family units became the “individuals” of the kingdom. All the families of a nation belonged in a hierarchical chain of monarchies that descended from God, to king, to lords, and finally fathers. Religion served as the glue that held these monarchies together. 58 Momigny thus took the consequences of paternalism to their extremes by excluding the individual and all civil rights from political consideration. He stretched the implications of paternalism to such an extreme that the Charter became an obstacle to the perfection of the monarchy. According to him, it did not protect the new order as much as preserve republican political ideas damaging to the interests of the monarchy and antithetical to patriarchal society. 59

Despite such condemnations of the Charter by some theorists who adopted the paternal model of society, most ultras wanted to reconcile their paternal framing of the nation with the Restoration’s representative government and the post-revolutionary division in French society. The Marquis de Préaulx simply dismissed alternative interpretations as trivial theoretical distinctions. In 1823, he wrote that “in theory, the king alone is the true representative of the nation: in the practice of government, the nation must believe that it is represented on the outside by the king alone, in the inside, by the king, the Chamber of Peers,

58 Jérôme-Joseph de Momigny, De la monarchie selon elle-même et selon Dieu et le bon sens, essai dédié aux puissances paternelles, seules amies de l’humanité, seules conformés à la raison (Paris : Moreau, 1826), 7-8.

59 Ibid., 14.
and the Chamber of Deputies.”  

Préaulx believed that the monarch alone could “represent” the people’s interests, thus denying all real power to the chosen representatives of the people. Popular acceptance did not validate the Charter. Its validity derived instead from the “free will” of the king to accept the constitution or not, and not from the people who agreed to its conditions. 

When the king chose to accept the constitution, he confirmed his sovereignty but also revealed for all to see the great burden it imposed on him. He ruled as a “sacrifice” for his children and when these children used his government to fight among themselves, the fault never lay with the monarch but with certain ungrateful children. The poet Montaudon de Valangin in his 1822 work *Les libéraux aux enfers* [*Liberals in Hell*], for example, described liberals as the biblical “second sons” responsible for all partisan divisiveness. The “first sons,” implying here kings and ultra supporters, received authority from the Father and honored his laws to assure that peace reigned in the family. “The second, on the contrary,” Montaudon wrote, “falls prey to discord, / In disorder alone seeks joy.”

Family was thus an effective metaphor for national belonging, and nothing hurt more than a family divided.

Liberals countered paternalism by claiming that fathers normally only wield authority over their minor children. By extension, this would mean that all citizens remained

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61 Ibid., 16-20.

62 He cited Abbé Barruel’s assessment of sovereignty as a “duty from which results a right.” Ibid., 22.


64 Leftist critiques of paternalism suffered from the contradictions of revolutionary precedents, as well as society’s common acceptance of the private rights of fathers. Many right-wing advocates of paternalism used the Revolution’s denial of women’s legal and political rights to demonstrate the absurdity of popular sovereignty theories that did not include universal suffrage. H. Besnier extended this criticism of popular
children in a system of paternal authority. Liberal pamphleteer J.M. Giacobbi suggested that a representative government relied on subjects “considered as adults submitted to reason rather than as slaves to authority.” To such complaints, Thorel rejoined that a father’s authority never ceases and, more importantly, the link to the universal authority of God remains regardless of the relationship to the human father. What made the paternal idea so powerful and difficult to refute, however, was that most people living in the male-dominated world of nineteenth-century France regarded it as a self-evident truth. Fathers were the inherited and elected heads of society who dominated the public sphere, so their accepted authority made a perfect model for the ultras’ conception of state authority. It is little wonder that many liberal young men of the era, by contrast, embraced a creed that downplayed the implacable authority of their fathers in favor of a philosophy that empowered the individual.

The two sides’ respective theories of political authority and legitimacy informed their readings of the Charter, and also defined two basic frames for understanding the contested nation during the Restoration. They described how two groups of people imagined the community in which they lived, the philosophical foundations of their government, and the links between their contemporary world and the recent and distant past. The liberal frame conflated the people and the nation and made them the philosophical centerpiece of the Restoration political settlement as partners with the king, regardless of the actual political


66 Thorel, *De l’origine*, 174.

rights accorded or denied to citizens. Ultras envisioned the nation as a unified whole with one legitimate guiding force, the king/father who was the model for all fathers in the maintenance of a Christian social order. When politicians referred to these differing theoretical assumptions in political debates, their passionate allegiance to them hardened rival concepts of “national identity.” Their ubiquity made them the source of division, transcending the niceties of political theory to become exclusionary biases that colored almost every aspect of cultural expression. Political opinions inherently became assessments of the “natural” and correct way to be French. To understand one’s political, and by extension, national identity during the Restoration was to accept one of these political models, or deny them both. Regardless of the choice, everyone lived within the contested terrain of the nation that resided between ideological poles. Whatever their separate implications for identity, it was impossible to avoid the divisive effects of political frames in conflict during the period. I suggest that constant battles between partisans of these frames, eventually created the Restoration’s third dominant frame of national division.

The Frame of Division: Politics, Public Opinion, and Class

Despite the partisanship that colored both sides’ interpretations of the Charter, it remained on a practical level a guideline for everyday political practice. By putting the clauses of the Charter into play—electing deputies, interacting with judges and peers, and negotiating the contentious relationship with the king’s ministry—politicians of the Restoration placed their conceptions of the French nation in the center of specific debates. The more tenacious politicians’ allegiance to one or the other conception of the Charter’s meanings, the more they saw that conception mirrored in their political decisions. Disagreements over policy came down to discussions of the Charter, and when it seemed that
a violation of its principles had occurred, or the other side misunderstood its meaning, arguments ensued that called the very nature of France into contestation. Debates about policy thus often became debates about the identity and meaning of the French nation and its people.

Many astute politicians realized that such contestation was a natural by-product of a representative system. An anonymous 1822 pamphlet written by an “ex-préfet,” for example, surmised that rising and falling fortunes of factions and the cyclical disturbances of elections were “healthy crises” that rejuvenated the nation. “Through them all the powers of society,” he wrote, “are so perfectly weighed that, although subjected to a continuous movement of action and reaction, and each pushed to its own sphere by the impetuous force of opinion, they operate regularly their annual revolution with as much regularity as those celestial bodies that move guided by divine wisdom.” Others believed that once the vast majority of politically-active citizens accepted the Charter and its resultant government as legitimate, the contestation would merely reflect an emotional bifurcation and not a genuine split in the nation itself. In 1828, the self-declared “moderate royalist” Jean-Baptiste-Louis-Joseph Billecocq pointed out that, “... one mutually accuses the other of violating the Charter. Thus, whatever the sincerity of one or the other in the expression of this solicitude for it, it remains that the source of contention is always present and they are reduced to combat on the same terrain.” Through mutual acceptance of the Charter, both sides tacitly accepted the existence of the other as an element of the representative system. This recognition, was not, however, strong enough to overcome the divisive partisan prejudices.


The strength of a government with democratic elements lies in its ability to tolerate opposition. During the Restoration, a series of political events, the ex-préfet’s “crises,” tested the limits of this tolerance, as the government shifted its ideological center with the election of new chambers or the changing of ministries. The writer/politician, the Comte de Pradel, accepted that all societies give birth to a diversity of opinion, but he praised the institution of constitutional monarchy which “gives to this opposition a systematic march and a uniform goal that removes all danger.” He warned, however, against expecting the political infighting to lead to stability, stating that a perfect balance of forces was “chimerical.” The best one could hope for was a constitution strong enough to prevent one faction from overpowering the other. Although Pradel had confidence in the government’s ability to placate the opposition, he underestimated the power of partisan ideology to influence public opinion. Faced with the reality of partisanship that trumped the unifying power of the Charter and its government, he berated the ministry for its failure to offer countervailing opinions of its own and its tendency to react tentatively to the initiatives of the two power blocs in the Chamber of Deputies. Pradel hoped that the administration could maintain public peace by asserting itself between the clashing factions. Yet when politicians associated their political ideas with the identity of the nation, ministerial initiatives to maintain a tranquil political environment made the government itself potentially treasonous if its policies contravened the ideological imperatives of either side.


71. Ibid., 23.

72. Ibid., 83.
Political practice is the intermingling of private and public interests. The government of the Charter, like all participatory political systems, provided opportunities for particular interest groups. Optimists like Billecocq praised this facet of the Restoration, claiming that under the government of the Charter public affairs became everyone’s business for the first time in the history of France. He asserted that this connection between the public and private was the best means of instilling the “authority of moral ideas” in citizens, of bringing them all together in unified support of the government.  

But, again, dominant political conceptions of the Charter made differentiating private and public interests difficult. In other words, liberals who believed the people were partners in the Charter tended to support policies that guaranteed personal freedoms and opened government access to a wider pool of citizens; whereas ultras who believed that the Charter consolidated a paternal order, tended to support positions that solidified their places in the patriarchal chain of authority. Public policies derived from these philosophical antecedents generated accusations that opposing political positions benefited special groups rather than the general interests of France.

Inconsistencies between political theory and practice posed particular challenges for liberals who maintained that the popular will found its voice in the Charter. The protection and empowerment of individuals inherent in the liberal credo clashed with the collectivism implied by the General Will. Despite a broad consensus against mass democracy among liberals, a place for individuals as partners in the political process was necessary if the identity of the nation emanated in large part from the people. Moderate doctrinaire liberals like Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard and François Guizot circumvented this problem by favoring passive rights for all citizens while denying altogether the rights of participatory citizenship.

for the great majority of the people.\textsuperscript{74} For many other liberals, however, this theoretical quandary remained. How does one confirm the importance of the people as partners in the Charter while protecting the stability of the state? The liberal writer Giacobbi, for one, believed that the people’s participation in the political process through elections (when possible) or petitions strengthened the state and legitimized the representative system. “When that happens,” he wrote, “they [the people] regard the state as a portion of their individual property, and instead of putting the public interest ahead of the private, they are led to mix them together.”\textsuperscript{75} In turn, representatives were expected to actively incorporate the people’s wishes into their political programs.

If the nation itself were to participate in crafting public policy, however, a filter was needed to avoid having private interests dominate the genuine people’s voice. “Public opinion” was the term Restoration politicians typically used for this control on popular participation in the political process. For liberals, it was the incarnation of the enlightened population of a nation, but it was also a term on which there was no liberal consensus (see Chapter Two).\textsuperscript{76} The liberals’ frequent recourse to it, however, showed how compelling their framing of the nation was—one simply could not avoid finding a place for the people in politics if they were an essential part of the identity of France. Ultras, for their part, simply adopted the use of “public opinion” to describe that element of the populace that agreed with them—a familiar political practice.

\textsuperscript{74} See, Craïtu, \textit{Strange Liberalism}, and Lucien Jaume, \textit{L’Individu Effacé}.

\textsuperscript{75} Giacobbi, \textit{Coup d’œil}, 8.

\textsuperscript{76} See for example the place allotted for public opinion in, Anon., \textit{Examen du Libéralisme. Par un libéral} (Paris: Bailleul, 1819), 17. Chapter Two analyzes this problem in depth.
Many partisan arguments that relied on public opinion differentiated between the “true citizens” of public opinion—those who agreed with their positions and accepted the same framing of the nation—and others whose self-interests excluded them from public opinion. When liberals realized that representative government could support social groups who had private interests at odds with their own ideology, the natural response was to exclude these people from the body of public opinion. If the citizens were the patrie and their enlightened opinions gave the new order its strength, those who worked against them necessarily were “bad citizens” or even “foreigners.” Charles-Philippe Marchand, for example, called his ultra enemies the “anti-national” faction. The more moderate Narcisse-Achille de Salvandy, went so far as to declare that an ultra “voluntarily ceases to be French” when proposing initiatives contrary to de Salvandy’s conception of good policy. The metaphorical purging of the body politic was the only recourse for those who believed in the popular will and the influence of public opinion on the exercise of power. Excluding political enemies’ from the polity allowed liberals to maintain the fiction that France’s individual wills merged and bestowed legitimacy on the government of the Charter.

Salvandy, loyal to the concept of disinterested public opinion, claimed that “independent citizens are those for whom the applause of factions is not able to corrupt . . . who frankly dare to place themselves between the extremes.” In practice, however, the Charter offered no magic formula to dispel the Restoration’s political culture of exclusion. Liberalism ostensibly implied tolerance for opposition and the embrace of negotiated

77 Marchand, De l’intervention, 1.
79 Ibid., 71.
solutions, but when explaining the meaning of the constitution and the role of the government exposed essential differences between liberals and ultras, the liberals shed their moderate tone. With no shared understanding of the Charter, the nation for them no longer denoted the union of disparate elements from both sides of the revolutionary divide but rather the grand majority of correct-thinking leftist people. This great mass of the people comprised those who transcended the historical divide, whose newfound allegiance to the Charter—as understood in partisan terms—made them the “generous elements of public opinion.”

From a broad ideology of tolerance, a brand of liberal intolerance developed to the point that the liberal Charles Comte suggested that the Chambers needed to be composed of “homogenous elements” in order to function properly.

Ultras used even stronger language of political exclusion. The Marquis de Préaulx interpreted liberal enthusiasm for the Charter as a disingenuous front for the desired fall of the monarchy. But when ultras proclaimed it as a document that emanated from the king’s authority, he tried to show that they were the true champions of the constitution. Préaulx suggested that only a “miserable and puerile vanity” prevented liberals from giving up their utopian visions of society and accepting the absolutism implied in the octroyé clause of the Charter’s preamble. He conceded that there was room in France for those rehabilitated liberals whose folly had led them to fallacious interpretations of the constitution, but he also

81 Charles Comte, Dissolution des chambres, ou nécessité d’un appel à la nation (Paris : Fain, 1819), 14.
82 Préaulx, De la Charte, 10.
83 Ibid., 15.
promoted an “eternal war on the destructive principles which have caused all our evils.”

Representative government had thrust the “people” on ultra politicians and writers who did not have strong ideological conceptions of the people other than as paternal subjects on which to base their policies. To make the system work, those whose principles went against a set of core values of the nation simply had to be regarded as bad children, traitors, foreigners, or even subhuman. The extreme ultra, Jérome-Joseph de Momigny, whose dismissal of the Charter has already been noted, saw two opposed societies in France. He adopted a Manichean worldview with good royalists on one side and their inverted image in the liberals who perverted all good French characteristics by challenging the social order. Despairing of ever achieving unity between the two societies, he promoted instead the complete destruction of the nation’s bad elements. In the end, Momigny argued, there were two incompatible forces in France, and ridding the country of liberals was a precondition for any constitution or government.

In addition to the abstract ideas of people and authority, class issues left over from the Old Regime and the Revolution also gave rise to political division. As the Restoration elite divided along political lines, a tendency to over-emphasize the disparities of social class emerged despite the reality of increased homogenization among the sociopolitical elites. The most partisan ultras reveled in class distinctions that separated “honest men” from the liberals. The ultra daily, L’Oracle, for example, proclaimed that the liberals were “not worthy of being even the least of our servants.” Meanwhile, liberals often castigated ultras for

84 Ibid., 65.
85 Momigny, De la monarchie, 5.
86 Anon., “L’Étoile des Mages,” L’Ultra/L’Oracle de France, I.1 (1819) 18-19
wanting to recreate a feudal order. Behind these simpleminded aspersions, however, the issue of class had real implications for conceptualizing the new order. When the Charter confirmed the revolutionary values of equality before the law and access to positions by merit, it forced political thinkers to reimagine the political and theoretical bases for a blatantly unequal social world. Political events and policies resurrected the class issue throughout the Restoration, but one moment in particular set the tone for the entire period.

When Louis XVIII prorogued the reactionary ultra-controlled Chambre Introuvable (Chamber of Deputies) on 5 September 1816, dismissing all deputies and calling for new elections, many thought it spelled the end of ultra participation in the government. After the Hundred Days in 1815, ultras had grown comfortable wielding power within the representative system despite their ideological prejudices against such a system. The dissolution forced many to reevaluate the Charter and its government. Stung by the seeming betrayal of the king, ultras reevaluated the constitutional monarchy in social terms that spoke to the class interests of the nobility rather than simply the relationship between king and people. Many chose to read the Charter as a document that confirmed royal power while also propping up the aristocracy as the nation’s spokespersons, thus reviving a noble claim that had been a common theme in eighteenth-century French political culture.  

The famed romantic writer turned politician François-René, Vicomte de Chateaubriand, had established himself as a figurehead of noble ultraroyalism at the onset of the Restoration. In 1816, he wrote *De la monarchie selon la Charte* [*Of the Monarchy According to the Charter*] to persuade his fellow ultras of the benefits of the constitutional

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monarchy despite the Chamber’s dissolution. His mélange of liberal ideas on freedom of the press and his explicit acknowledgement of the Charter as the sole legitimate choice of government for France rankled some ultras, but Chateaubriand also defended aristocracy in power. Chateaubriand assured his ultra readers that, unlike the legislative system of the early Revolution (which was based on the National Assembly’s power to veto royal opposition) the Charter did not delineate a “system” for the exercise of legislative power, but rather a political “order” that the king’s absolute veto guaranteed. Its provisions for the separation of powers and respect for due process rested upon the unshakeable authority of the throne, assumed to be a natural ally of noble interests. This guarantee of stability in the throne would protect the sociopolitical order from political instability—including the temporary setback of the dissolution.

By championing its preservation of social order, Chateaubriand tried to convince ultras that the Charter reflected their conception of the nation and could help them achieve their political goals. The Charter’s order, he specified, included a privileged place for the aristocracy. Ultras questioned the wisdom of representative bodies—especially in light of

88 Chateaubriand embodied many of the prejudices of the ultras but combined them with a liberal attitude towards freedom of the press and a romantic sensibility that he applied to his political thinking as well as his literature. For more on the political career of Chateaubriand see, Micheline Guiton, Politique et personnalité: Chateaubriand (Paris: Presses du Palais Royal, 1985), Jacques-Alain de Sédouy, Chateaubriand : un diplomate insolite (Paris: Perrin, c1992), and Ghislain de Diesbach, Chateaubriand (Paris: Perrin, 1995).

89 Chateaubriand was firmly in the mainstream of the ultra camp on monarchical power according to the Charter. The king of the Charter he wrote, paraphrasing Article 13, “is a divinity that nothing can reach, inviolable and sacred, it is thus infallible.” All responsibility for the failures of the king’s exercise of executive powers fell on the ministers. The deliberative processes of the Chambers on ordinances that the king remitted to their votes solemnized the king’s authority when approved, or isolated the ministers in cases of disapproval. To the question of whether a system that shields the king from criticism would render him only a symbol of authority, Chateaubriand claimed that the Charter made the king stronger than ever before, answerable only to God in the choice of ministers and in the ultimate command of the army. In these regards, he was in step with most ultras. François-René Chateaubriand, De la monarchie selon la Charte (Paris: Le Normant, 1816), 8, 12-13, 27-28.

90 Ibid., 39.
their recent removal from one of them—and supported their misgivings with unsophisticated analyses both of the Old Regime they pined for and the Restoration government under which they were actually living. Chateaubriand, however, suggested that the Charter’s “order” formally protected the practical interests of the nobility with the establishment of the Chamber of Peers; but it also protected them in philosophical terms by defining royal power within a hierarchical political order and not as an arbitrary force potentially as harmful to noble interests as it was to individual liberty. Ultras, he claimed, could solidify and expand their power by patiently using the Charter’s provisions in coordination with the ministry. Thus, he chided his fellow ultras, “we don’t have the courage to brave the little inconveniences, in order to acquire great advantages.” With this sentiment, Chateaubriand ironically proclaimed the Charter’s defense of a rigid sociopolitical order while simultaneously declaring it changeable enough to obtain and solidify political advantages specifically for the ultra nobility. This attitude reflected a cynical view of constitutional forms such as Charter—they were both guarantors of public freedom and tools for special interests.

In the post-dissolution days of 1816, many liberals and moderates saw a contradiction between Chateaubriand’s professions of faith in the Charter and royal authority and his allies’ complaints against the moderate ministry. They considered the ultras’ claim that the purging of the legislature usurped the people’s wishes as a smoke screen for preserving aristocratic privilege. In response, the doctrinaire Amable-Prosper Barante, reprimanded ultras who, after 1816, could no longer reconcile their royalism with the Charter. Barante did


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not read the Charter simply as a formal and static declaration of laws. Like Chateaubriand, he considered it “a means” and not an end in itself. He asserted that the king had made the correct political move by leaving noble privileges out of the new constitutional monarchy.

For Barante, such an omission better represented the longstanding nature of the French monarchy as protector of the nation. “All the kings of France who wanted to establish order and calm” he claimed, “have always made alliance with the nation against the privileged and their pretensions.”92 The Charter’s “order,” he suggested, should guarantee the progress of the people’s liberty by responding to the needs of the people, not noble interests. The Charter had to be flexible to incorporate politics, but the policies created in its institutions should only bring progressively more liberty to the people.93 Barante’s Charter was a symbol of the promise of the king to his people to protect an evolving social order that derived both from the recent revolution and the long history of alliances between the king and the nation in the Old Regime.

For more liberal observers, the debut of the Charter meant much more than the introduction of a political *modus operandi* for solidifying a social class or protecting the evolution of society. The liberal Jacques-Charles Bailleul lambasted Chateaubriand in 1818 for separating the nobility, what he called the “former privileged corps,” from the nation.94 Bailleul specifically rejected the notion that the Charter could serve the political ends of nobles who had abandoned France during the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. Instead, he believed that because the Charter rested on a symbiotic relationship between the king and the

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92 Amable-Guillaume-Prosper Brugière Barante, *Que la Nation ne peut pas plus séparée du Roi, et que le Roi de la légitimité* (Paris: Pillet, 1816), 11-12.

93 Ibid., 12.

entire nation, it transcended its particular provisions for exercising power to become an incarnation of the mutually-supporting interests of the monarch and the people. In Bailleul’s view, the monarchical interests that Chateaubriand saw as allied to ultraroyalist sentiments “are in the center of the nation itself, in this Charter which has become a common and national good; in this Charter which, despite all their efforts will never become an instrument of harm in the hands of the royalists of M. de Chateaubriand.” Bailleul repeated the liberal claim that the Charter was the embodiment of the nation’s interests—both the king and the people—and not simply a rulebook for conducting government business to further the ends of an incorporated nobility. Liberal writers, in short, claimed that the Charter offered a political system for a royal-popular alliance against a nobility that no longer represented the French nation.

The liberal and ultra frames of the nation, the two main paradigms used to describe sociopolitical conditions and institutions during the Restoration, came to dominate the public sphere. Liberals and ultras, however, articulated their theories about the Charter, the government, the meaning of the nation and/or people, and their prejudices against each other in the context of political conflict. In a hotly contested political sphere, their two frames of the nation naturally incorporated within them an oppositional dynamic. People of all classes and with varying personal opinions became habituated to the incessant contestation between two seemingly incompatible sociopolitical groups. An overarching frame of national division thus developed when politicians and writers from the two sides developed and voiced their ideas in relation to the domestic political “other.” In people’s minds, this frame of national division influenced the way the French understood and described their world. One could not

95 Ibid., 38.
read a book, look at art, attend a religious ceremony, or simply talk at a café without engaging with, and more often than not, propagating the idea of national division. As political events heightened public bitterness, this overriding frame of national division grew more dominant. The next section of this chapter analyzes works that propagated the frame of national division through partisan texts. While reinforcing the constituent elements of both sides’ ideologies, these political texts explicitly employed them in ways that reinforced the idea of a divided nation. Their authors imagined idealized visions of national unity, but used them to divide the national community.

**Part Two: National Division in Partisan Texts**

*The Confusion of Tongues in Satirical Political Dictionaries*

There is perhaps no aspect of culture that informs national identity more than language. The French, in particular, take pride in their language as a primary attribute that binds the nation. During the Revolution, initiatives to stamp out regional languages, patois, and dialects in favor of a homogenous version of French developed in response to theories of popular sovereignty—if the people as a whole were to exercise their authority, they had to speak in one voice. During the Restoration, the importance of language as a component of national identity continued, but the focus of a “politics of language” changed to accommodate the varying conceptions of the nation in circulation at the time. Political partisanship, in particular, colored the debate on language and shifted it away from a discussion of dialects and regional language to differences in political lexicons. Writers reinforced the conception of a divided France through often satirical dictionaries of opposing

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96 Abbé Grégoire was particularly influential in drafting legislation to homogenize the French language. See, Sepinwall, *The Abbé Grégoire*. 
factions’ “languages.” There could be no unified nation when the opposed parties who participated in its political life could not agree on definitions of key terms.

In 1823, the liberal writer Charles-R.-E. Saint-Maurice complained in his Petit dictionnaire ultra [Little Ultra Dictionary], that ruling ultras “have denatured the sense of different expressions that they exploit to their profit.”97 Contemporaneously, the ultra Michel-Nicholas Balisson de Rougemont declared in the Petit dictionnaire liberal [Little Liberal Dictionary] that “the same expression, employed by two writers of differing opinions has two definitions.”98 In both cases, these writers offered, their satirical dictionaries as guides to understanding the true intentions of political opponents. Their jabs went so far as to exclude certain concepts—ideas fundamental to being a French citizen during the Restoration—from the opposition’s lexicon as unknown or foreign concepts. The following are but two examples:

ROI.--It is by accident that this word was included in the liberal dictionary; it is not in usage in this language.99

PATRIOTISME.--It is by error that this word was included in this dictionary of the ultras; it is not at all in usage in their language.100

While the authors offered the examples above in jest, their dictionaries did, however, reflect serious political conceptions of the nation articulated by theorists of both camps. By mocking the opposition’s positions on essential concepts such as sovereignty, rights, and representative government, the dictionaries reinforced the irreconcilable nature of the differences between the two sides. The dictionaries abound with examples of the rival

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98 Michel-Nicholas Balisson de Rougemont, Petit dictionnaire libéral (Paris: Ponthieu, 1823), v-viii.

99 Ibid., 63-64.

100 Charles-R.-E. Saint-Maurice, Petit dictionnaire ultra, 69.
political theories that could foster division and turn abstract concepts into concrete barriers between the sides. The authors’ definitions for their opponents’ conception of sovereignty are a case in point:

SOUVERAINETÉ: Supreme authority. Since the fall of Napoleon, the liberals only recognize that of the people; any other in their eyes is usurpation. 101

SOUVERAINETÉ: Despotism. The ultras do not recognize any true sovereignty in the history of France but the reign of Louis XI and of Charles IX. All others in their eyes showed weakness on the throne. … In general, sovereignty is a cake that the ultras would really like to see divided; on the condition, however, that their vassals would not be allowed to share in it. 102

These oversimplifications reflected the authors’ prejudices more than they addressed their rivals’ actual beliefs. In the former, ultra Balisson de Rougemont wanted to highlight the contradiction between liberal support for Napoleon, and liberals’ belief in popular sovereignty. In the latter, Saint-Maurice accused the aristocracy of supporting absolute sovereignty in name, while advocating in reality a system of government that favors noble privilege.

Partisan dictionaries were not serious political testaments in and of themselves because their ironic and flippant tone makes it hard to see where lampooning ended and real criticism began. They do, however, reflect biases that the two sides brought to the political process. 103 Both authors used these satirical texts to highlight the irrationality of the other’s ideas and to suggest that something more inherent than ideas separated the ultras and liberals. How they were received is unclear, but like most polemical texts, there was undoubtedly an audience for each that looked past the jabs and agreed that, if not outright foreign, their

101 Balisson de Rougemont, Petit dictionnaire liberal, 66.
102 Saint-Maurice, Petit dictionnaire ultra, 92.
103 The issue of language and interpretation, after all, permeated the main dispute of the Restoration: the meaning of the Charter. Questions of language and interpretation also arose during the expulsion of Manuel from the Chamber of Deputies in 1823. See Chapter 4.
political enemies spoke a language incompatible with France, her king, and the Restoration government. The ultra daily *l’Oracle* complained about the inability to communicate intelligently with liberals but explained that “…indignation makes us bear it until these frenzied men, learning to respect reason, come to merit that we speak to them in our noble language.”

Claiming incomprehension made it easier for both sides to avoid genuine discussion and made the frame of national division more obvious in the public sphere.

*The Nation in Dialogue*

Restoration-era writers used treatises in dialogue form to portray France’s polarization. Philosophical dialogues had a long history both in France and throughout Western history, but their popularity in Restoration debates coincided with the developing frame of national division. Fictitious conversations between royalists, moderates, and liberals attempted to demonstrate the possibility of negotiating the divide in the nation, resolving discord into the promised unity of the Restoration. Despite good intentions, these texts often resolved the conflict by pointing to one side of the political debate as the way to resolve France’s political conflicts. Most dialogues ended with the conversion of one of the characters to the opinions of the other, suggesting that domestic tranquility could only come about through the victory of one side; that France’s hoped for unity only could rest on political homogeneity and on optimistic visions of the end of France’s post-revolutionary division.

Dialogues reduced the often complex political debates to simple choices of Left or Right. They reiterated partisan interpretations of the political scene and tried to condition the public to be reactive rather than conciliatory; in other words, to choose a side rather than look

for compromise. Political dialogues polarized people even though their stated goal often was to overcome partisanship. Repeated stereotypes and extreme portrayals of one side’s policy offered stark choices for “undecided” readers. The dialogues emphasized the relevance of partisan ideas to political decision making and stressed that only certain opinions suited France. They thus gave the reader a sense of the stakes involved in choosing sides. In this aspect, they are good examples of how division and partisanship incorporated people into the nation’s political world, and how the concept of a divided France spread.

Some dialogues simply told the story of one friend converting another to his way of thinking. “J.B.” the author of the dialogue, *Pierre et Paul, ou le libéral et l’ultra converti* [*Peter and Paul, or the Liberal and the Converted Ultra*] (1822), implied that the adoption of the liberal position was for the good of the converted as well as the country. Paul, the newly “liberalized” ultra, utters an epiphany speech typical in new converts:

> You have convinced me, I will brave all evils,  
> I embrace the party of all the liberals:  
> In vain, one boasts of heroics from old parchments  
> In order to blind me by vain promises.  
> I believe that merit is what one must seek  
> And that the noble *honest man* is equal to the worker.  
> I become proud and free as much as one can be  
> I know to love a God, without adoring a priest  
> Who says to me that if I praise liberty,  
> ‘My brother, vanity, all that is only vanity.’

This post-conversion speech reiterated many of the themes that liberals employed to attack ultras. It railed against nobles and priests while praising liberty and equality, demonstrating again how the Restoration’s visions of unity often contained the seeds of division.

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105 Authors could draw this out to its extreme as in an anonymously written ultra pamphlet that emerged during the war in Spain entitled, *Dialogue entre un français et un libéral* (Dijon: Noellat, 1823), that contents of which will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Not all dialogues that used the biblical partnership of Peter and Paul ended with such an agreement. *Pierre et Paul, ou le chemin blanc [Peter and Paul, or the White Road]* (1817), portrayed two friends split along party lines. Pierre, the liberal, opens the dialogue professing that all spoken words should lead to greater conciliation, but his ultra friend Paul counters that only a deluded person would want everyone to think alike.\(^\text{107}\) The two are stuck in a conundrum, both wishing for national unity, but the realist Paul thinks the liberals’ overheated passions and their lack of reason prevent it from emerging. He states, “Every day we see good sense cast off by foolishness and truth stifled by hypocrisy. It is in vain that one searches to conciliate spirits, dissipate defiance, extinguish the enmities, to combine finally, all the parties into a single one, that of reason and truth.”\(^\text{108}\) Paul believes there will always be irrational revolutionaries ready to destroy the monarchy, making a complacent partnership based on reason a foolish political goal. Here, the dialogue portrayed partisanship and political passion as the norm and suggested it was unrealistic to expect anything else in post-revolutionary France.

In an anonymous dialogue from the *département* of the Creuse, *Nous ferons-nous ultras? [Should We Make Ourselves Ultras?]* (1820), an ultra character, M. Mobile, and M. Franc, a liberal, debate the upcoming elections. Throughout the dialogue, Mobile echoes ultra talking points from Paris, but Franc counters that blindly allying with power offers voters little insight into the real political questions at hand. What is at stake, Franc claims, is the nation itself; and the choice before voters is between two radically different conceptions of it. Elections offered voters a chance to choose the principles that could best resolve lingering


\(^{108}\) Ibid., 11.
issues from France’s history and prepare a foundation for her future. A vote was not simply for candidates or even parties but also for those principles of governance that matched voters’ conceptions of the nation. Thus the choice did not just concern who would hold political office, but also whether the liberals’ or ultras’ core principles would inform policy and provide the outline for post-revolutionary nation building. 109 Through Franc, the author of Nous-ferons promoted the idea that individual choices affected the French identity, and that people far from Paris had a say in the Restoration debate over the meaning of the nation.

After showing that partisan choice is essential to confirming France’s identity, Franc recalls the long history of liberal principles in France, and claims they better represent the king’s own desires. Franc explains to Mobile that the aristocracy has always been the source of French political division and still is, because of aristocrats’ longstanding enmity for reform. When Mobile equates voting for liberals with attacking the king and the Charter, Franc asserts that France’s monarchs had always forged alliances with the people against the nobility. Indeed, the nobility had shown itself more likely to serve foreign kings in times of crisis, as it had done in the Revolution. 110 According to Franc, however, the worst aspect of the ultras was the contradiction between their values and their actions. While they championed their feudal rights and duties to the nation, they were fully aware of the changing nature of French society. Ultras, Franc claims, know they need to participate in representative politics, and have honed their false democratic rhetoric to sway feebleminded voters like Mobile. Ultras were more than willing to manipulate public opinion to succeed in democratic


110 Ibid., 12.
elections, but they still pranced about like courtiers. They were, in short, outdated and deceitful Don Quixotes turning gullible voters into their Sancho Panzas.\footnote{Ibid., 17.}

Regardless of the ideological position of their authors, dialogues pointed to the importance of political participation. The ultra writer, M. Desvaux, warned against apathy in his dialogue, \textit{De l’indifférence en matière de politique et de ses conséquences} \textit{[Of Indifference in Political Matters and Its Consequences]} (1823). In this work, Phoedon, an ultra, encourages his friend Arion to become more involved in politics. Arion responds that he does not understand how his own political participation could make a difference, that the monarchy should be strong enough without him.\footnote{M. Desvaux, \textit{De l’indifférence en matière de politique et de ses conséquences} (France (presumed Paris): Lebel, 1823), 3.} Phoedon then reminds him that “two parties divide France;” one loved by the king and the other hated. Public duty demanded that good citizens protect the king’s interests against “the bad ones” \textit{(les mauvais)}, in this case, liberals. When Arion claims he does not understand, Phoedon explains that the meaning of “liberal” has changed from, “a grand and generous soul” to “a fomenter of disorder, a dangerous being.”\footnote{Ibid., 5.} Desvaux’s text thus performed multiple services for the ultra cause: it stirred up support for the ultra policies, it placed liberals outside the boundaries of acceptable national norms, and it rehashed the discourse of mutual incomprehensibility. At the end of the work, Phoedon successfully persuades Arion to embrace the ultras and actively engage in politics.\footnote{Ibid., 7-8.} The dialogue, like \textit{Nous-ferons}, thus also argued for the necessity of choosing a political side and reinforced the normative dynamic of national division.

\footnote{Ibid., 17.}

\footnote{M. Desvaux, \textit{De l’indifférence en matière de politique et de ses conséquences} (France (presumed Paris): Lebel, 1823), 3.}

\footnote{Ibid., 5.}

\footnote{Ibid., 7-8.}
The dichotomous nature of the Restoration’s political dialogues offered little opportunity for moderation as a political sentiment. When it did appear, the “moderate” character often became the focus of partisan proselytizing. In an ultra dialogue entitled, *Sur l’esprit de parti. Dialogue entre un modéré et un ultra* [On the Spirit of Party. Dialogue between a Moderate and an Ultra] (1818), the author Fé Fondenis used the dialogic form to show self-proclaimed moderates the liberals’ faults. His ultra character tries to convince a moderate friend that liberals are irrational and inherently unworthy of the nation. The ultra dismisses his friend’s faith in the Charter as the bulwark of the regime and claims that nefarious liberals prevent laws alone from assuring society’s repose. According to the ultra, liberals have no religious morality. They lack the “paternal fury” of religion, the character claims, and thus have no “brake” on their ambitions. \(^{115}\) When the moderate character complacently asserts that France’s safety depends on forgetting about the past, the ultra counters that “forgetfulness does not remove the appetite.” He implies that liberals, conditioned by revolutionary success and frustrated by their contemporary lack of power, could never submit to the authority of a monarch. \(^{116}\) If liberals could not forget their erstwhile glory in the Revolution, the author Fondenis suggested, the rest of France should not forget the risk they posed.

Moderates in partisan dialogues were often either blank slates for conversion, as in Fondenis’ work, or subtly disguised partisans who demonstrated dispassionate analysis in contrast to the rabid opinions of their counterpart. The latter featured in Rigomer Bazin’s, *De la monarchie sans la Charte, ou nouveaux doutes éclaircis par un constitutionnel* [Of the


\(^{116}\) Ibid., 4-5.
Monarchy According to the Charter, or New Doubts Clarified by a Constitutionalist] (1816).

In this dialogue, the “constitutionalist” Ariste tries to explain to his ultra friend Edouard that the new Restoration regime provides more stability for France than did the Old Regime. Edouard though, distrustful of the language with which Ariste attacks intransigent ultras, specifically takes issue when Ariste describes ultras as the “party of feudalists.” When Edouard complains that, in his “lexicon,” “‘party’ always takes on a bad light,” Ariste counters that “party” only denotes a group of people with shared opinions and principles. Realistic people, he claims, expect the holders of similar political ideas to merge in voting blocs.\(^{117}\) Indeed, for Ariste, people divided into parties based on opinion better suited French society than the Old Regime’s hierarchy.\(^{118}\) He blames ultras for making opinions irreconcilable when they use divisive labels such as “factions” for their political enemies.\(^{119}\)

Despite his attempt to make Edouard look naïve, the author Bazin actually made Ariste, the sensible moderate character, the real partisan in the dialogue.

Dialogues responded to the incessant exposure to politics French people faced during the Restoration by serving as forums for honing debating skills. In the ultra journal, L’Oracle, a dialogue between two royalists with different political temperaments aimed to sharpen the ultras’ political discourse. Written in 1819, at the apogee of the Restoration’s “liberal phase,” the text portrays the two characters, “C” and “U,” discussing ways to diminish the influence of the “hydra of independence.” U urges ultras to avoid ridiculing their political rivals and focus instead on attacking the opposition’s ideas. “Their strength is

\(^{117}\) Rigomer Bazin, De la Monarchie sans la Charte, ou nouveaux doutes éclaircis par un constitutionnel (Paris?: Renaudin, 1816), 5-6.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., 9.

\(^{119}\) Ibid., 5-6.
not in the sword,” he declares, “it is in the seriousness and the enthusiasm that they bring to their discussions.” Ultras in contrast, U contends, often present frivolous and superficial arguments to the detriment of their own and France’s reputation.\textsuperscript{120} U believes ultras can lead liberals to accept the ultra ideology by using “the cold-bloodedness of reason and the seriousness of science.”\textsuperscript{121} The editors of \textit{L’Oracle} knew that partisan ideology had great exposure in the public sphere, and so resorted to the dialogue form, so often employed in philosophical treatises, to suggest debating strategies with which to counter the opposition’s ideas. Only through reasoned refutation could the French nation demonstrate that it possessed the mental resources to prevent another revolution and bolster her standing in the world. Nothing short of France’s international reputation was at stake.

Restoration writers followed the characters in \textit{l’Oracle}’s advice and used the dialogue format to debate political theory. When questions of sovereignty, legitimacy, and the meaning of the Charter arose in the context of personal interactions, the dialogues’ authors reinforced the role of ideas in creating partisan identities. Yet, some dialogues exposed the complexities of Restoration political thought and defied rigid classification. Royalist Claude-Antoine Goupil’s, \textit{Dialogue sur la Charte entre le maire d’une petite ville et celui d’un village voisin [Dialogue on the Charter between the Mayor of a Small City and that of a Neighboring Village]}( 1819), presents such a case. Goupil used the dialogue form to expound on the benefits of the Charter and ostensibly promote ultra principles, but in the text, he surprisingly echoed many liberal sentiments. The mayor of the large city, for example,

\textsuperscript{120} U urges his friend to adopt a more reasoned approach because “Europe has its eyes on us, it awaits the end of this struggle with interest.” Anon., “Dialogue entre deux royalistes, MM. C*** et U**.” \textit{L’Ultra/L’Oracle de France}, vol. I, no.4 (1819), 116-17.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 120-21.
assures his friend that the king granted the Charter to establish a “tempered monarchy” that ensured that all French people, regardless of rank or birth, would enjoy equal rights. He tells the minor mayor that a tempered monarchy had supplanted absolutism, and declares that the Restoration’s representative bodies had united the nation and the king. Goupil specifically praised the way in which the Charter had incorporated the Aristotelian notion of balance between democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical forces to ensure a peaceful society.

Goupil echoed the ideas of many moderate liberals when he praised the Charter’s division of powers, but, as a good ultra, he also considered the king the only real authority in France—an idea with illiberal implications for individual liberty. The “big mayor” in the dialogue suggests that when the king took an oath to uphold the Charter, he placed the “seal of religion” on it, and especially on its clause declaring his ministry solely responsible for the government’s actions. Turning more pointedly partisan, the mayor then contends that the king’s sacred authority allows him to ignore Article 11 of the Charter which prevented the state from persecuting French citizens for their actions during preceding regimes. The executive power that the king brings to foreign affairs, the mayor proclaims, also applies to protecting the domestic security of his people. Thus the king, and by proxy his ministry, has the authority to decide who should and should not serve in the government regardless of the Charter’s intent. This conclusion turned Goupil’s seemingly moderate explanation of the Charter into an apology for political exclusion.

123 Ibid.,14.
124 Ibid., 86-87, 27.
125 Ibid., 23-24.
Goupil’s own ambivalence and seemingly contradictory conclusions challenged the Restoration’s polarized public sphere. During the period, people brought the frame of national division to bear on their culture and society, and sought resolution of politically ambiguous situations according to its terms. When the loose ends in Goupil’s fictitious dialogue confused partisans, therefore, a real dialogue emerged in the French press in order to discern on which side of the great divide Goupil stood. Liberal journalist Etienne Aignan praised Goupil’s measured analysis of some aspects of the Charter but attacked the author for his critique of “false philosophy” as the source of revolutionary violence. Aignan claimed that while Goupil praised the liberal benefits of the Charter, he also attacked the principles of Enlightenment thought that made these benefits possible. Liberal principles, Aignan wrote, did not create the Terror, people did. Similarly, people, namely ultras, and not philosophical ideas now threatened the Restoration regime. Instead of attacking liberal philosophy in his explanation of the Charter, Aignan suggested that Goupil’s mayor should tell his colleagues to protect it against ultras. Aignan’s review clarified Goupil’s political stance for liberal readers. Targeting a few key concepts, he identified Goupil as a member of the enemy faction.

Ultras and liberals were not the only writers to produce dialogues during the Restoration. Self-proclaimed moderates likewise reacted to and incorporated the frame of national division in literary dialogues. Ministériels, self-proclaimed moderates in support of the centrist ministries of 1816-1820, used the dialogue form to attack partisans to their left and right, and to bemoan the divisive effects of polarization on the country. In the anonymously written, Le masque tombé, dialogue entre un ministériel et un ultra [The Fallen

126 Etienne Aignan and Goupil, Réflexions de M. Aignan, sur le dialogue entre le maire d’une petite ville et celui d’un village voisin (Paris: Boucher, 1819), 3.
Mask, Dialogue between a Ministerial and an Ultra] (1818), the independents, left-wing liberals such as Constant, Lafayette, and Manuel, came under fire for harboring clandestine republican sentiments, but the ultras bore the brunt of the attack. The author argued through his ministériel character that only the moderate ministry and its supporters understood the king’s intentions and thus were the only force capable of reversing the “spirit of party.” The idea of ultraroyalist opposition to the government perplexes the ministériel character in Masque tombé. He cannot fathom how people can claim that they are staunch supporters of the monarchy when their resistance, “outrages the king, offends the nation, and becomes a powerful obstacle to the reestablishment of order.”¹²⁷

The author of Le masque tombé turned the dialogue between his ministerial and ultra characters into a debate on the meaning of the label, “royalist.” His ultra character describes the overall political strategy of his faction: to arrogate the mantle of royalism and thus make the ministériels uncomfortable when they attacked ultra initiatives.¹²⁸ The ultra argues that polarization occurs because principles and doctrines are less important to the people than popularity and passion in politics. To attack the ministry’s doctrines, therefore, the ultras attacked the ministers themselves because “doctrines will succumb with the men who defend them.”¹²⁹ The ministériel counters that the ultras’ resentment for the government and their insistence on pushing their religious and absolutist program will only serve to radicalize the people further, and undermine all royalists whether ultra or moderate.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Anon., Le masque tombé, dialogue entre un ministériel et un ultra (1818), 2.
¹²⁸ Ibid., 13.
¹²⁹ Ibid., 14.
The moderation in texts such as *Masque tombé* was illusory as polarization persisted in them as the normative mode for conducting politics. In the semantic debate over the meaning of “royalist,” the *ministériel* claims to follow a middle road, but largely falls into the habit of polarizing the political discussion. While repeating the theme of national reconciliation, he employs exclusionary language to brand the ultras as unfit for participating in the Restoration government. This persistent trend to use a dichotomous interpretation of Restoration politics reveals the frame of national division’s power to not only define the semantic field of contestation, but also the parameters of political affiliation. The author of *Masque tombé* claimed to want to save France from division, but on closer reading his text aims merely to redefine the categories of factions. While bemoaning the Left/Right split, the author actually repositioned *ministériel* moderates as defenders of the Left.

Ultras benefitted from a polarized polity because their uncompromising conservative positions became much more easily recognizable and defendable when juxtaposed with liberal relativism. Naturally, the ultras attacked the ministry when its members promoted policies that the ultras considered too progressive. To prevent the Center from reconciling with the Left, they rigidly defined the term “royalist” as a synonym for “ultra.” In an anonymously written anti-*ministériel* dialogue from 1817, the ultra author objected to *ministériel* professions of royalism and called the ministers “infras,” or those who profess royalism but crave only power.\(^{131}\) The author’s ultra character stresses in the dialogue that the Restoration pitted religion against revolution, and this was a battle that left no room for a moderate middle ground. The ultra denies *ministériel* accusations of infidelity for challenging the king’s government, claiming that he and his colleagues could differentiate their dislike of

\(^{131}\) Anon, *Dialogue entre un ministériel et un royaliste* (Paris, 1817), 1-2.
the government from their love for the king. “We cherish its [the monarchy’s] paternal authority, transmissible in his august race by the order of primogeniture. If that is what you intend when you speak of government, then we are in perfect accord,” the ultra tells the ministériel, “but if the word government expresses in your thought, the ministry, there is where we differ.” This dialogue reveals how the frame of national division derived from the ideological positions of its constituent left-wing and right-wing frames. By themselves, these constructs left no place for moderation. In the overarching frame of division, moderates could not withstand the power of a polarized perspective on politics. In this case, ultras used the dialogue form to strengthen polarization by casting moderate ministériels at worst, as enemies as threatening as liberals; and at best, as insignificant bystanders in the fundamental battle of beliefs.\footnote{Ibid., 3.}

In the last days of the Restoration, the dialogue form drew upon the starkest contrasts between liberals and ultras, and confirmed the impossibility of compromise between the forces of revolution and reaction. The ultra Ollé de Mantet’s \textit{Dialogue entre un royaliste et un libéral} \footnote{M. d’ Ollé de Mantet, \textit{Dialogue entre un royaliste et un libéral} (Paris: Le Clère, 1830), 35.} (1830), used the literary dialogue format to reaffirm the familiar octroyé interpretation of the Charter and its implications for the nation. When the liberal character in the dialogue claims that the people and the king form a partnership, the ultra rebuts that the Charter has always remained a document that the king could give or revoke. Indeed, Montet argued through his “royalist” that the Charter only served the nation if the elected deputies formed a majority for the protection of the monarchy, in which case “all the men of honor will no longer form but a single will.”\footnote{Ibid., 3.}
Months before the July Revolution a dialogic political conversation still described national unity in France as a political act of conformity and conversion. Mantet’s dialogue testified to the strength of division as the dominant frame for conceptualizing the nation—a fact that the approaching violent confrontation between the Left and Right would only strengthen.

**Part Three: The Paradox of Moderation**

Despite the great diversity of thought on either side, the popularity of divisive pamphlets, satirical dictionaries, and dialogues during the Restoration testified to polarization as the dominant theme in the public sphere. The two most common frames, loosely described here as the liberal and ultra frames were not, however, the only ideological choices in currency. *Doctrinaire* liberals, *ministériels*, and moderate royalists—people like François Guizot, Pierre Royer-Collard, Casimir Perier, and Prosper Amable Barante among others—professed principles that pulled from both the Left and the Right, and they often declared themselves above the partisan fray. But these politicians of the “*juste milieu,*” many of them in the moderate ministries of the early years of the Restoration, railed so strongly against partisans of both sides that they often fueled polarization. In the process, as witnessed in the dialogues against *ministériels*, they found themselves characterized as partisans of either side or branded as simply irrelevant to the post-revolutionary struggle. In the end, the notion of pure independent moderation as a political identity was largely a fiction. Self-proclaimed “moderates” needed polarization to provide the imagined political space of the middle ground on which they staked their positions. But, more importantly, they were incapable of

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preventing people from using the frame of national division to label them as members of the Left or Right.

As illustrated in the texts praising the Charter, the Restoration settlement itself promoted unity and moderation as the nation’s core values. Early in the period, especially before the Hundred Days, calls for unity, tolerance, and moderation filled political pamphlets. Prejudices, demands for conformity, or poorly-concealed partisanship dressed up as “moderation,” however, often lay behind conciliatory sentiments in these texts. In 1815, for example, Paul-Auguste-Jacques Taschereau de Fargues wrote that the nation’s safety depended on the unity of its citizens’ opinions and goals. Disjointed public opinion weakened the nation, he claimed, and pragmatic “unity” in the Charter’s system would not alone suffice to prevent instability if people used government institutions to pursue self interest. Therefore, the nation demanded genuine unity of opinion.\textsuperscript{135} Taschereau’s tone was moderate and conciliatory, but his demand was clearly unrealistic and totalitarian. Many of these early calls for national unity contained similar delusional initiatives for the complete erasure of all pre-existing opinions, as if removing the political frames that guided behavior depended only on exhortation.

Polarization is emotionally destabilizing in general, but in the Restoration’s post-revolutionary context, it contributed to especially acute social anxiety. Moderate texts from the era thus often depicted the psychological damage partisan debates in the public sphere wreaked on families and individuals. An anonymous pamphleteer wrote in \textit{Tolérance pour les opinions [Tolerance for Opinions]} (1815), “How many times have we seen fathers at

\textsuperscript{135} Paul-Auguste-Jacques Taschereau de Fargues, \textit{De la nécessité d’un rapprochement sincère et réciproque entre les républicains et les royalistes, par un ami de la France et de la Paix publique} (Paris: Patris, January 1815), 35-36.
odds with their children, households dissolving, families in discord following these unhappy political discussions?” The only recourse the author offered was an emotional plea for France to unite, though he admitted that the French might be conditioned to political division. “French, French,” he pleaded, “tolerance is not so much our virtue; it agrees poorly with the vivacity of our character. But will we do nothing for the king, for the patrie?” The author’s assessment of the French character was accurate judging by the course of the next fifteen years; simply calling for people to rally to the king was a naïve denial of the deep theoretical differences that pervaded the political establishment and would inhere in the frame of national division.

The highpoint of Restoration “moderation” came with King Louis XVIII’s elevation of Elie Decazes as his favored advisor. Although not officially the head of the ministry until the end of 1819—and even then he only held the post for less than two months—Decazes dominated the political establishment from the dissolution of the Chambre Introuvable (largely his idea) in September, 1816, to the assassination of the Duc de Berry in February, 1820. During this period, both ultras and liberals alternately felt excluded from the decision-making process depending on the overall tenor of the political scene. Decazes himself could not abide the hot-headed politicians on the Left and Right, and often employed draconian measures to ensure that the government’s centrist candidates won elections to the Chamber of Deputies, and clamped down on partisan activities throughout France. His

\[\text{\textsuperscript{136}}\text{Anon., Tolérance pour les opinions, confiance dans le Roi (Paris: Poulet, 1815), 3.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{137}}\text{Ibid., 7.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{138}}\text{Decazes has received little individual attention from scholars. See his biography by Roger Langeron, Decazes: Ministre du roi (Paris: Hachette, 1960).}\]
ministériel supporters in the state bureaucracy, however, carried out his policies with such verve that they only strengthened the partisan convictions of both sides. Both ultras and liberals during the Decazes years thus considered the ministry a tool of their political enemies.

Decazes’ own conservative concern for order, especially when he served as Minister of Police, gave rise to several initiatives to stamp out partisanship and preserve public peace. For example, while he liberally suggested and implemented the relaxation of press laws, he had no tolerance for transmission of partisan ideologies outside of Paris. Decazes considered the spread of partisan texts in the provinces a source of instability, and tried to stop their dispersal by cracking down on the activities of *colporteurs*, or traveling peddlers. He ordered prosecution for the sale of any unauthorized text that disturbed the public peace. In official dispatches (*circulaires*), he warned officials in the provinces that colporteurs can reach even the smallest hamlet spreading “the spirit of faction to the most isolated.” He was not, however, above using them to spread ideas that discredited ultras and liberals in the countryside. In a *circulaire* from 1815, he suggested that “legitimate authorities” could turn their activities to the benefit of the state by spreading “useful truths.”

It seemed Decazes did not mind a nation filled with political opinions so long as those opinions mirrored his own.

Decazes’ actions reveal two important aspects of state “moderation” during the Restoration. First, they confirmed that division dominated the public sphere, since stopping its spread became the state’s top priority. Second, they reveal the immoderate means that

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139 It is no coincidence that many of the “*doctrinaires,*” (Guizot, Royer-Collard, Barante et al.), held state offices during this period.

140 Archives Nationales (AN) F7-6729, Elie Decazes, *circulaire*, Paris, 15 December 1815. Unfortunately, the zeal of *préfets* for propagandizing led to an overabundance of licenses for colportage, leading Decazes to insist later that these dispensations be granted only to men of “good morals.” AN F7-6729, Elie Decazes, *circulaire*, Paris, 7 March 1816.

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ostensibly moderate state actors employed to counter liberals and ultras. Decazes saw no contradiction in conducting a divisive partisan campaign to stop his political enemies from fighting each other. In the process of quashing partisanship, he betrayed his own tendencies to group certain people under the privileged status of “moral” men—a step towards labeling people as worthy or unworthy of participating in French public life.

The activities of the ministry from 1816 to 1820, earned the undying enmity of followers of both political persuasions. Such sentiments generated a genre of “moderation literature” that championed the representative system and its polarized politics as a foil against state power. While not conceding on any ideological issue, these texts ostensibly offered a framework for conducting politics with one’s political enemies. The liberal writer, Pierre-Louis Lacretelle’s, *Des partis et des factions; et de la prétendu aristocratie d’aujourd’hui* [Of Parties and Factions: And of the Supposed Aristocracy of Today] (1818), praised “parties” as the bulwarks of a representative government. “Parties are necessary elements in a free regime,” he wrote, “They are systems of opinions on the res publica in the mass of citizens.” Factions, on the other hand, were conglomerations of people with isolated interests who entered into parties and corrupted them. These factions damaged both ultras and liberals and turned healthy ideological polarization into national division. Fortunately, Lacretelle claimed, preeminent and reasonable politicians in either camp could internally manage these wayward groups. The real danger to the Restoration compromise came from those not in parties, the “neuters,” people forever destined to adopt opinions not their own, and who subsequently used those opinions to serve their own interests above the public good. It was these people, he claimed, who were ready to accept tyranny if their ends demanded it.

In political struggles between the two main ideological positions, they entered into the fray but added nothing of value, vitiating “real” moderation while damaging the efficacy of parties by encouraging them to be reactive and intransigent.\textsuperscript{142} Lacretelle, in particular, had no patience for those who chose not to ally with anyone out of respect for the “juste milieu.” “In politics,” he wrote, “the juste milieu can only be in the principle that concerns matters at hand...real moderation is a force in the soul and a dignity of character....false moderation is only a composition. . . It is piece by piece or altogether, weakness, cowardice, and disguised calculation.”\textsuperscript{143} Real virtue in politics demanded a balanced approach that applied consistency in principles and moderation in the application of them. Thus, “real moderation” demanded two parties of reasoned partners willing to compromise and yield in matters of state.\textsuperscript{144} Lacretelle’s vision of moderation depended upon polarization; his theory was the closest to acknowledgment of the benefits of national division during the era.

The most optimistic appraisal of the Restoration’s political scene envisioned a potential alliance between the ultras and the liberals in an active campaign against the ministériels. In 1817, the “constitutional royalist” Gabriel de Bourbon-Busset wrote, “the ultraroyalists and the independents have always been in agreement on a principal point; that it is equally right to reject passive obedience that only suits slaves and brutes. They have always witnessed the same sentiment; that is a profound contempt for the ministériels.”\textsuperscript{145} Bourbon-Busset saw moderation and conciliation not in terms of ideology and political

\begin{quote}
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\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 7-9
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 12
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 11
\textsuperscript{145} Gabriel de Bourbon-Busset, Les ultraroyalistes, les indépendants, et les ministériels au tribunal de l'opinion publique (Paris: Renaudière, 1817), 12.
\end{quote}
theory but rather as a shared commitment to defend the rights enshrined in the Charter that allowed both sides to articulate their visions for the nation. Bourbon-Busset overstated the extent to which both ultras and liberals equally desired press freedoms and the relaxation of “tribunals of exception” (courts not stipulated in the Charter often used to prosecute political crimes), but his call to minimize the power of the ministry over the Chambers found followers in both camps. He believed, perhaps naively, that the coalescing of the two sides’ principles would occur when they worked together to protect the Charter from an overreaching ministry. If the two parties could “… reunite their talents and their efforts so that we enjoy the full and entire execution of this fundamental law [the Charter],” Bourbon-Busset claimed that both ultras and liberals would magically convene in the juste milieu where public opinion wanted them to be. Bourbon-Busset’s optimism about the ability to merge the two parties in defense of the Charter did not offer any real solution for ridding France of its polarized politics, it merely substituted another bogeyman for both parties—the nefarious middle.

As we saw in poetry praising the Charter and in dialogues, the most common sentiments of reconciliation were often poorly-concealed propaganda pieces for one of the two dominant political frames. The liberal writer and politician Benjamin Constant may have genuinely desired the peaceful coexistence of different parties, but his attempted program to “reunite the parties in France,” (De la doctrine qui peut réunir les partis en France, 1817) made no concessions to the ultras’ ideological framework. Constant believed that the ultras’ acceptance of the Charter, its conditions, and its governmental forms would, if it was genuine,

146 Ibid., 29.
147 Ibid., 32.
“put an end to the domestic evils of our patrie.”  

He reasoned—foreshadowing the neurological theory of political frames by nearly two centuries—that representative processes inculcate democratic language in their participant and held the key to unifying France’s divided polity: “The moment is favorable,” Constant opined, “the government, the deputies, the opposition, all of France, holds today to the same language. It is impossible that this language does not influence the men who speak it. They will penetrate themselves with the principles of liberty by repeating them.” Although, seen over the longue durée, Constant’s idea about the power of democratic language seems plausible, he ignored the fact that the ultras repeated their own absolutist interpretations of the Charter in the same representative institutions in which liberals participated. At its core, Constant’s theory offers an adaptation of the same facile idea of conversion that many partisans considered the best option for reuniting France. The power of political framing in the Restoration was so strong that those, like Constant, who held to an idea about the meaning and essence of the nation, could not see beyond their preconceptions. Constant expected the coercive power of his frame for understanding his nation and its government to transform the body politic into a society with shared values and beliefs. He forgot that his political enemies had their own frames through which they understood their place in the government, and they too had their own conversion fantasies.

For hard core ultras, the religious element of paternalism made pure moderation or conciliation unlikely and indeed anathema. The ultra M. Coustelin, for example, wrote “Moderation in the exercise of domestic life is an admirable quality....but in politics to serve

148 Benjamin Constant, *De la doctrine qui peut réunir les partis en France*, 2nd ed. (1816; Paris: Fain, 1817), 5.

149 Ibid., 20.
moderately one’s king and one’s patrie, means to only employ for them a part of one’s faculties; to fill moderately one’s duties. It’s bad to acquit oneself like this, to defend or encourage moderately virtue, and repress moderately vice....” 150 Partisan divisiveness required a passion and conviction that was incompatible with moderation. Luckily, for all who accepted and thrived from the divided polity of France, chances for the success of moderation during the Restoration were small.

Conclusion

In 1820, a year of particularly bitter and turbulent fighting between ultras and liberals, the reputable printer Pillet published a romance novel by the mysteriously named M. René de G*** entitled, La libérale et l’ultra, histoire véritable [The Liberal (Lady) and the Ultra]. In the preface, the author stated that he wrote the novel to warn France of the dangerous “spirit of party” that divided the nation. 151 The book traces the turbulent history of two star-crossed lovers, Alphonse and Olympe, whose political affiliations kept them apart. Alphonse is an ultra from an émigré family while Olympe belongs to a family of liberal ex-Napoleonic notables. Throughout the story, the Restoration’s notable moments of political turmoil provide dramatic tension, and this constant penetration of the political into their personal lives keeps the couple from reaching their romantic idyll. In the spirit of Romeo and Juliet, the novel ends with Olympe’s suicide. “Alphonse,” writes Olympe in her farewell note, “it was written in my destiny that I would never be happy, not even with you whom I love! A cruel dissemblance of opinions has rendered us eternally strangers and maybe even odious to

150 M Coustelin, Réflexions sur les affaires d’Espagne et sur la politique du gouvernement français (Paris: Trouvé, 1822), 15. One is reminded of Barry Goldwater’s quip from 1964, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.”

151 M. René de G***, La libérale et l’ultra, histoire véritable (Paris: Pillet, 1820), v.
each other.” Fortunately for the democratic history of modern France, the suicide of the Left was not in the cards, but the country never overcame its own history of ill-suited partners. The ambivalent dynamic that drew the French Left and Right together and pushed them apart as it did to Olympe and Alphonse persists in France to this day.

To sum up the Restoration as a family feud between two radically opposed political groups admittedly oversimplifies the era. Yet, the sheer volume of pamphlets, speeches, novels, poems, and letters that complain about this condition of society cannot be discounted in searching for nuance. The duality of political society became the dominant discourse of the era. As such, it demands analysis and consideration as possibly the most significant factor contributing to the development of post-revolutionary French national identity. Political theories from the revolutionary era that came into conflict during that period coalesced during the Restoration into two broadly conceived conceptions of the nation. These two schools of thought influenced French foreign and domestic politics for the remainder of the nineteenth century. Although nearly all major differences in modern French political philosophy can trace their origins to the bifurcation of society during the Revolution, the possibility of their cohabitation in a stable polity only emerged in the Restoration.

The Restoration’s politicians and writers drew from the Revolution’s well of political ideas and inculcated their themes in the populace through their participation in the Charter’s government and their own commentaries on politics in literary texts. The left-wing and right-wing frames for the nation already existed but they had never before been placed in prolonged juxtaposition. The Restoration offered a political system in which proponents of each frame defended and honed their ideas through political contestation. Ideological ideas of

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152 Ibid., 166.
proper governance informed both sides’ conceptions of the Charter, and their interpretations of that document, in turn, expressed two ideal national identities. During the Restoration, therefore, the two camps possessed two different and rival frames for understanding the nation. These two conceptions of the nation hardened the more they faced resistance in the public sphere, and created an overarching dynamic in the social imaginary of two clashing nations.

I suggest, however, that this development was not just imagined. As I noted in the Introduction, contemporary research in neurological science and cognitive linguistics point to the link between pervasive discourses and the development of frames in the subconscious mind. These frames affect people’s interpretations of their reality and their behavior in social situations. During the Restoration, these two rival frames provided bases for social cohesion in the form of partisan identities. For those frustrated partisans who participated in politics and the literary public sphere, conflict with the “other” became the sine qua non of their own ideological positions. For those who simply witnessed political conflict or read about politics, this conflict itself overrode its constituent parts, until social cohesion derived as much from the frame of national division as it did from the ideologically opposed frames of the nation.

Over the next four chapters, we will see how all three frames influenced political texts and actions, and informed French identity.

In the midst of all the divisive rhetoric, political violence, and failed initiatives to make the Restoration compromise work, a new form of national identity emerged. The texts reviewed in this chapter illustrate how division became the norm in French political culture. Without partisanship’s emotional content, the differences between the sides may never have become so viscerally connected to the idea of being French, and the sense of national
belonging would have remained isolated on either side. The authors cited above were all passionately invested in creating the post-revolutionary nation, and yet, they could not avoid the fact of polarization. In the end, national division was the only idea of France on which all sides could agree. Although polarization and the conflict it triggered were often painful and mean-spirited, they made clear to all that joining the nation meant joining the debate on it.
Chapter Two

Polarization and Public Opinion: Benjamin Constant during the Grégoire Affair of 1819

Introduction

Abbé Henri Grégoire had little enthusiasm for the Restoration of the monarchy, and considering his past, it was not surprising that ruling royalists did not care for him either. As a former member of the revolutionary Convention, he had voted for the execution of Louis XVI, an act which had branded him a regicide. Equally distasteful to royalists was his service during the Revolution as bishop in the short-lived Constitutional Church of France in which he had promoted progressive anti-papal Catholicism.1 Throughout his long career as a clergyman and politician and into his semi-retirement during the Restoration, he remained an outspoken defender of human rights, championing Jewish civil liberties and advocating the abolition of slavery. After years of defying Napoleon, Grégoire might have welcomed a constitutional monarchy, but his history, republican principles, and obstinate character assured that royalists kept him at arms length. Although some proclaimed his innocence in the matter of regicide and suggested that he re-enter public life, as an anonymous ultra pamphleteer noted, being a regicide was “an honor that he claims, and one that cannot be

stolen from him without injustice.”

For ultras no crime was more heinous than regicide; it was one act not covered by the spirit of reconciliation that ostensibly characterized the Restoration.

Grégoire’s unexpected, and unsought, election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1819 naturally shocked the entire political establishment. Already a lightening rod for controversy, his sudden appearance at the center of public life sparked a series of events that further polarized an already divided polity. The scandal following Grégoire’s election in September and his subsequent expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies in early December was a major factor in ensuring that partisanship rather than accommodation became the dominant mode of Restoration political life. Up to that point, practicing political moderation had been a challenge for those caught between a liberal Left and an ultraroyalist Right.

The Desolle/Decazes ministry, supported in the Chamber of Deputies by doctrinaire liberals and moderate royalist ministériel deputies, had struggled particularly hard to hold to the juste milieu. Dispirited ultras still stinging from the dissolution of the Chambre Introuvable in 1816, however, and liberal “independents” who were anxious to protect the Charter from its reactionary enemies and promote progressive policies both considered the ministry a

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2 Anon., Réponse aux calomnies contre M. Grégoire, ancien membre de la Convention Nationale, ou extraits de ses discours et de ses écrits (Paris: unknown, 1814), 16. Although Grégoire later claimed he was for commutation of Louis XVI’s execution, it seems his support for the sentence remained strong even after the act itself. See, Jean-Daniel Piquet, “Lettre secrète de l'abbé Gregoire et de ses trois collègues en mission dans le Mont-Blanc, à Danton,” in Cahier Historique, vol. 46, no.3-4 (2001) : 397-414.

potential enemy in the Center, and often struck at the middle as well as at ideological opponents on the Left or Right.

In the midst of growing tension in this three-way contest for political power, an ironic and cynical act of sabotage sparked the Grégoire affair. Ultras in the département of the Isère voted for him to defeat the ministry’s candidate and embarrass the government. They planned to publicize the election as evidence that the ministry, the monarchy’s instrument of authority, had become so radical, lax, or both, with its tolerance of “revolutionary” liberals that a regicide could win a seat in the king’s government. Grégoire became a cause célèbre, a pariah, or an embarrassment to members of the political community depending on their political affiliation. The Chamber of Deputies, with only one vote in his favor, ultimately denied Grégoire’s admission. This near unanimous vote by those on both the Left and Right, however, belied the inexorable polarization of the French polity that the Grégoire episode exacerbated.

This chapter examines Grégoire’s election and expulsion and its political ramifications for the period largely from the perspective of the liberal writer and politician Benjamin Constant, a leader among the progressive “independent liberal” deputies and journalists. In the previous chapter, I broadly outlined some of the ideological frameworks that divided the French. This chapter reveals how contingencies (events, people, etc.) made

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the abstract principles of governance associated with those frames unsuitable guides for conducting politics in the real world. When confronted with the Grégoire situation, Constant wavered between his allegiance to popular sovereignty and the corollary demands of the “people,” and his desire for a stable constitutional government. He was particularly concerned that supporters of Grégoire’s candidacy would rely on demagoguery and overheated rhetoric to defend the Abbé and thus play into the hands of ultras who wanted to paint the entire Left, including in their estimation, the ministry, as dangerously radical. In spirit, Constant supported Grégoire’s right to take a seat won through a legal—if controversial—election, but feared that independents would lose the influence they had gained in the Chambers in 1818-19. This trepidation led to his and his colleagues’ timid and inconsistent response to the extra-constitutional act of expulsion.

Constant faced his most difficult challenge in managing public opinion. Despite his extensive theorizing on politics, society, and government, and years of political experience, Constant’s approach to engaging public opinion revealed the inconsistencies that plagued his thinking on the subject. During the Grégoire crisis, his loyalty to an abstract theory of public opinion hindered his efforts to defend the Abbé’s honor while protecting the independent liberals’ political fortunes. His inability to reconcile his ideological idea of the “people” with an effective political strategy, revealed how inchoate ideas such as “public opinion” led to ineffectual political practice. Constant and his liberal colleagues’ did not meet their constituents’ expectations or act in a coherent manner during the crisis because they had not yet found a suitable language or political strategy that resonated with their political frames. They first had to accept that the frame of national division, with its divisive implications for
political life, had become the dominant paradigm for political thought and behavior, and it
demanded politics according to its own terms.

In the twenty-first century, one approaches “public opinion” with warranted
skepticism; it has become either a questionable product of polling or a catch phrase
marshaled in defense of a particular political stance, but “public opinion” carried different
meanings in the early nineteenth century. Most French politicians and writers of the
Restoration had only limited experience in conducting electoral politics and interacting with
the public through a relatively free political press. To make up for a lack of experience, many
subscribed to philosophical categories of the Enlightenment or marshaled the political
rhetoric of the Revolution to promote their ideas about the polity and representation, and
bandied about the term “public opinion” with the same reckless imprecision as twenty-first
century politicians.5

In his influential work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jurgen
Habermas describes the ascendancy of public opinion in the eighteenth-century as a feature
of political life in the “public sphere.” According to Habermas, the emergence of this sphere
laid the groundwork for modern democratic societies by ensuring the development of forums
free from state interference in which the people’s opinion could coalesce and then enter into
formal political discourse outside of state institutions.6 He suggests that those engaged in the
public sphere truly believed that individual interests, opinions, and wills would merge into a

5 George Lakoff contends that such reliance on eighteenth-century modes of thought—in particular, the
belief in reason’s coercive power to influence opinions—still hinder effective progressive politics. See George

6 “The public sphere in the political realm evolved from the public sphere in the world of letters,” he
claims, “[and] through the vehicle of public opinion it put the state in touch with the needs of society.” Jürgen
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois
rational consensus on optimal policy choices for society as a whole. Habermas’ paradigm explains how citizens in absolutist states developed rival ideas about sovereignty and legitimacy as “abstract, depersonalized laws”—the end products of rational deliberation in the public sphere—and thus created the philosophical foundations of representative democracy.

In reality, however, political contestation in representative institutions most often revolves around practical issues and individual personalities rather than obtuse political categories. Habermas’ theoretical explanation of social and political change thus does not adequately explain how believing in a theory of rational public opinion affected actual political conduct once representative democratic institutions emerged. Furthermore, it obscures the connections between real people, institutions, and events in political life. This lack of specificity hampers the application of Habermas to developments in the eighteenth-century, and offers even less insight into later political developments. Those nineteenth-century politicians who tried to apply categories of political thought developed in the eighteenth-century public sphere to political action in post-revolutionary France faced a similar challenge of reconciling theory with practice.

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7 Ibid., 83.
9 Habermas discusses in particular the inability of the French to find a means of incorporating public opinion into bourgeois constitutional government. This made developing a new system of government that granted access to the bourgeoisie a political priority. “Whereas their British contemporaries understood the public spirit as an authority that could compel lawmakers to legitimize themselves,” he writes, “in France the continuing isolation of society from the state manifested itself in the fact that, in the minds of these intellectuals, the critical function of opinion publique remained strictly separated from legislative function.” Habermas, The Structural Transformation, 96.
The French Revolution, in fact, had exposed how unsuited to representative institutions this eighteenth-century conception of public opinion was. Mona Ozouf describes how French political theorists of the eighteenth century imagined public opinion as a “tribunal” set against abuses of power. By the time of the Revolution, its litigious connotations had turned it into a polemical catch phrase like those bandied about in trials to persuade a jury. In theory, rational public opinion was supposed to serve as a legitimate force opposing the \textit{a priori} claims of monarchical sovereignty, but in practice—namely, in its usage in political tracts—it was simply a rhetorical device. One major problem with the application of public opinion was that theorists imagined it in monolithic terms rather than as a conglomerate expression of individual interests. When revolutionaries tried to articulate a new vision of the nation outside of monarchical absolutism, they could not reconcile one concept of the nation represented by depersonalized public opinion, with a vision of the nation as the conflation of all individual wills and interests into the General Will. After the political vacuum of the Napoleonic years, Restoration politicians thus had to wrestle with three vying strains of public authority as they attempted to negotiate in a representative system: monarchical absolutism, Old Regime style public opinion, and the claims of popular


\footnote{“Public opinion,” Ozouf writes, “had become a concept of recourse just as ductile and elastic as the opposing concept of abuse, the polemic function of which seemed boundless.”Mona Ozouf, “‘Public Opinion’ at the End of the Old Regime,” \textit{The Journal of Modern History} 60, Supplement Issue (1988): 12.}

\footnote{Baker claims that this tension was resolved to the detriment of public opinion as an operative concept during the Revolution when ruling Jacobins eschewed the idea of a rational, engaged public and instead offered the even more abstract ideas of popular sovereignty and representation as proxies for the voice of the people. Baker, \textit{Inventing}, 198.}
sovereignty. In a nation convinced of its divided nature, public opinion remained the under-
examined but over-used claim to authority between the rival ideas of absolute and popular
sovereignty. Claiming the support of public opinion could be the political equivalent of
claiming to represent the nation as the sovereign people or the nation as a family under the
king.

The Grégoire episode offers an example of how political principles and theories
influence policy and practice. The first section of this chapter examines Restoration ideas
about public opinion to provide background for why politicians acted the way they did when
engaging the public. The second section discusses Constant’s theory of public opinion during
the era. The chapter then turns to Constant’s political activities, in particular, his ambivalent
and failed efforts to manage the liberal oppositional rhetoric, and reveals the difficulties of
conducting politics effectively during the era without further polarizing the polity. The final
section describes how the Grégoire case unfolded over the course of the fall of 1819 and how
Constant’s efforts to exert control over radical public opinion proved ineffectual. It shows
him caught between managing the liberal response to Grégoire’s expulsion and honoring the
leftist population’s opinions on the matter; opinions which threatened the status of liberals in
the government and, in turn, the safety of the representative system as a whole. 1819 brought
the beginning of the end of moderation in power. By the time of Grégoire’s expulsion, the
deepening of post-revolutionary polarization had trumped Constant’s efforts to carefully
manage the crisis and had sacrificed the possibility of moderation to the inevitability of
partisanship.

The events and ideas presented in this chapter reveal the complicated nature of
political behavior during the post-revolutionary period. While people’s exposure to politics in
the press reinforced the shared frame of national division, partisan politicians and writers acted on the presumption of national unity according to their own frames. Ironically, when politicians acted on the claims of an abstract monolithic “public opinion,” a more divided public resulted. Although the strong strain of moderate politics during the era seemed to defy this general trend towards polarization, the alienation of the centrist ministry during the Grégoire crisis points to the difficulty of maintaining the *juste milieu* in the face of uncompromising beliefs in the nature of the nation. Nuances and complexities emerge in this chapter that defy the characterization of the nation during the Restoration as simply divided between Left and Right, but it was these same ambiguities that ironically led to a further polarization of the political establishment.

**Part One: Public Opinion in Restoration Political Discourse**

The installation of representative government under the Restoration and the advent of a free press after fifteen years of Napoleonic repression made the “public” suddenly relevant again in French politics. While severe limitations on suffrage and varying levels of censorship denied the greater populace unfettered access to the political system, markedly more open public forums for the expression of political ideas nonetheless gave the Restoration its effervescence and character as an age in which politics was on everyone’s mind. Politicians and writers of all political persuasions considered engaging the populace essential to conducting politics. In this environment, “public opinion,” regardless of its theoretical underpinnings, became a virtual partner in producing and promoting political positions; a partner whose support everyone claimed.

The divided polity in which Restoration politicians operated made it difficult to claim the clear support of public opinion. In an age when contestation was the norm and the nation
suffered from a deep sense of division, readily apparent political differences worked against any conception of a unified, rational, and disinterested public opinion. If Restoration politicians held that public opinion was a monolithic rational force in the sense of the Old Regime, they could not simultaneously regard it as the viewpoint of the particular individuals and social groups that destabilized their political world. Rather than being an environment, as Keith Baker claims for the Old Regime, “between absolute authority and revolutionary will” in which public opinion could operate, the Restoration’s bitter political climate ensured that the pristine concept of public opinion would wallow in the mud of factional fighting, preventing any universally accepted definition of the “real” opinion of the public from emerging.  

Politicians and theorists of the age thus had to contend with the cheapening of the idea of public opinion; while still vaunting its power, they confirmed its status as a catch phrase in the hands of polarized actors, all of whom claimed somewhat unconvincingly to espouse the true opinion of the nation.

The Restoration’s political press became the forum for engaging with and claiming the allegiance of public opinion. Early in the Restoration, liberals and several prominent ultras defended press freedoms because they felt that speaking and listening to citizens was necessary in a representative system. This broad agreement between left-wing and right-wing politicians, however, occluded ideological differences about the source of political

14 Baker describes how French politicians of the Old Regime disdained British party politics used public opinion to “imagine a form of political practice that would acknowledge the new authority of ‘the public,’ on the one hand, while avoiding the conflicts and instabilities of a politics of contestation, on the other.” The Restoration with its contestation was thus no place to put such an idea of public opinion into practice. Ibid.

15 Ozouf writes : “One [idea of public opinion] was modern, and carried the individualistic and egalitarian premises of public opinion to their logical consequences. This view refused to see public opinion as more than the spontaneous result of combined dissidences and divergences which thrust up from the bottom, starting with opinions, those teeming, eternally preexistent volitional atoms. In this perspective, public opinion, which arose from the social, was not in the hands of political authority.” Ozouf, “Public Opinion,” 19.
legitimacy, the nature of the nation, and the role of press as either an instrument of opposition or a bulwark for state authority, all of which emerged in the various partisan journals of the period. Regardless of the varied content of journals and pamphlets, many agreed with Chateaubriand when he wrote in 1816, “There is no representative government without freedom of the press. Here is why: representative government clarifies itself through public opinion on which it is [also] based. The Chambers will never know this opinion if it does not have any organs [for communicating it].” Authoritarian distrust of the press remained strong among state officials, however, and as politicians assumed positions of power in the ministry, the urge to silence opposition papers often arose. Debates over the press and initiatives to curtail it were thus a constant feature of political life and became especially acute in 1817, 1820, 1827, and 1830, when conservatives (including ministériels in 1817) tried to pass or successfully enacted laws limiting press freedoms. These periodic debates naturally became forums for articulating the role and meaning of public opinion in the political system.

Chateaubriand believed that individuals had the right to voice their opinions in the press, but he offered an abstract and more static conception of public opinion’s actual role in governing. For him, public opinion—after the press “clarified” it—became fixed once the electorate’s votes had legitimized it. In a representative system, the public would respond to the reasoned persuasion of politicians and writers, confirm or reject elite opinions through its votes, and then remove itself from the process. He believed that the press could indeed help


17 François-René Chateaubriand, Vicomte, De la monarchie selon la Charte (Paris: Le Normant, 1816), 42

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“clarify” public opinion, but that once clarified, the political system would rest on a chain of opinion from the people, to the deputies, to the ministers, ensuring that all participants in the system would be familiar with the needs of the people. His view was common among politicians on the Left and Right who believed that constitutional forms were the best compromise between mass democracies in which public opinion wielded too much power, and autocracies in which it was entirely stifled. Considering the miniscule electorate and the public’s lack of real access to the political system, identifying those in the government with public opinion paid lip service to the people while maintaining their impotence.

Chateaubriand preserved public opinion as a monolithic force, even as he removed it from power. This act of legerdemain concerning public opinion at least avoided the pitfalls that came with those who tried to act on theories of public opinion that assumed both its uniformity and its constant agency in the political process.

The Restoration’s hybrid monarchical/democratic system and polarized public sphere challenged assumptions of a unified public will. Early in the Restoration, some moderate pamphleteers like Paul-Auguste-Jacques Taschereau de Fargues simply denied the reality of political division among the populace and still believed public opinion could (and should) coalesce naturally into consensus. He made unity of opinion a necessary precondition for the political system’s survival, suggesting that disjointed public opinion weakened the nation by exposing it to factions. To fight the divisive effects of partisanship, he demanded unity in individual opinions. The advent of factional politics, however, did not shock those who

18 This fixity of opinion can be seen in the title to one of his chapters in his De la monarchie selon la Charte, “The ministry must come out of public opinion and from the majority of the Chamber of Deputies,” Ibid., 61-62.
thought that political differences were natural, and that people should look for agreement only among likeminded citizens. L. Hubert, for example, believed that the deliberative processes that formed public opinion could lead to rational consensus, but he admitted that more than one rational opinion could exist in the nation. Hubert wrote that political parties were the organs of a clarified, rational public opinion that allowed differences in opinion to enter into the political process only after reflection had confirmed their rational legitimacy. For him, parties ensured that likeminded citizens would come to the most reasonable iteration of their respective positions and weed out pride, egoism, ambition, and other features of individual interests. Through this means, the political system could rest on differences, but these differences would not generate the destabilizing passions of unmanaged individual opinions.

Elections and the barrage of publicity that accompanied them forced writers to address the role of majority and minority opinions in the nation. Some associated public opinion with the simple majority of individual opinions, and considered parties the products of minorities who moved against the will of the people. Joseph-Philippe-Etienne Rey, for example, believed that the majority could only express itself as public opinion without the interference of parties. “In the social body,” he attested, “opinion is the national thought that is composed of the majority of individual opinions, and if the laws express the national will, all is in harmony; … as long as factions last, the morale of the nation finds itself perplexed and in a state of continual anguish.”

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manipulation and contingent upon the numbers of likeminded individuals, reflected the desire of many that the Restoration system of government legitimize itself on the basis of popular consent. This line of reasoning among leftist constituencies hearkened back to belief in popular sovereignty and the General Will, but it relied on capricious individuals to make the “right” choices. An anonymous writer for the ultraroyalist newspaper *L’ultra*, although equally distrustful of parties, discounted the role of the majority in making up public opinion. “It is not the populace who judges these high questions: it [public opinion] is only the echo of a small number of men at the head of the nation. It is for these men principally that we write...”22 These two differing conceptions of the role of actual people in forming public opinion, one emphasizing natural majorities and the other promoting the stewardship of elites, did not fall within neat ideological boundary lines: ultras, when victorious in elections, claimed the allegiance of the majority of citizens who represented public opinion, while several liberals, especially the *doctrinaires*, believed that opinion must be promulgated from above.

One solution, more rhetorical than practical, to the problem of conducting politics in the presence of an attentive populace was to assume that the people would come to share the politicians’ opinions through exposure to elite discourse and create a “public opinion” in line with reasonable thinking—one that could ensure that the “will of the people” resided in the government. As an advocate of moderation, Gabriel Bourbon-Busset, wrote in 1816, “There exists but a single happy revolution, it is that which general opinion realizes. This opinion forms itself from the words of the wise. This word becomes that of the people, and the

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21 Joseph-Philippe-Etienne Rey, *Réflexions sur l’état présent de la France, moyen de rémedier à ses maux, ou le retour de l’age d’or; dédiées à tous les Français* (Paris: Lefebvre, 1816), 4-5.

government, struck by its justice, knows to hear it and make it triumph.”

A year later, Busset figuratively placed ultras, *ministeriels*, and liberals before the “tribunal” of public opinion to see if they reflected the “words of the wise.” He determined that all three could reasonably claim the support of public opinion so long as they were dedicated to the constitutional system that French public opinion had settled upon as the optimal form of government for the nation. Bourbon-Busset hoped public opinion would restrain political passions because it had chosen both monarchical sovereignty and the protection of liberties in the Charter. In his view, the compromise that public opinion had desired was now an institutional reality. The “wise men” had spoken and they had demanded monarchical sovereignty. They installed the Charter and now expected the rest of the polity to abide by the government’s dictates now wrapped in the mantle of public opinion’s legitimacy. All sides needed to uphold the government because public opinion allegedly established a system agreeable to all parties; in fact, government institutions themselves became manifestations of public opinion.

**Part Two: Benjamin Constant and Public Opinion**

Benjamin Constant’s own ideas about public opinion developed in the political climate of the Revolution. He recognized the tension between popular or collective sovereignty and individual liberty and his concern over these potentially incompatible ideas


24 “The ultraroyalists and the independents are the two extremes of the political line,” he wrote, “Public opinion placed in the center wants to render to one and the other the justice that is due to them by reason of the talents they deploy, the services they have offered, or want to offer.” Bourbon-Busset, *Les ultraroyalistes, les indépendants, et les ministériels au tribunal de l’opinion publique* (Paris: Renaudière, 1817), 32-33.

25 Ibid., 20.
permeated his ideas about public opinion and its role in politics. During the Restoration, he struggled to conduct politics in the spirit of reconciliation and unity—for the sake of preserving the constitutional system that ensured liberty for individuals—while accepting that real individual opinions were fractured and polemical, and that when placed at odds with other opinions they led to contestation damaging to the system. His ideological presumptions about the nature of public opinion and sovereignty, both contradictory and abstract, influenced a political and rhetorical strategy that failed to satisfy either the demands of his constituents’ voiced opinions or his desire to avoid polarization.

Constant assumed that conducting politics in a representative system required interacting with public opinion, and in theory, he believed that proper usage of elections and the press would ensure that the public’s interests were satisfied. Instead of simply massaging the press to create a simulacrum of public opinion that matched his political agenda, however, Constant genuinely tried to reconcile an abstract conception of public opinion with real individuals’ desires. He thought that managing liberal rhetoric would help the genuine voice of the people—a conflation of individual opinions—to emerge.

Constant, more than most people of the era, appreciated the difficulty of negotiating between theory and practice when it came to the public. He was, after all, a theorist with his own conception of public opinion, a politician beholden to his constituents, and a journalist responsible for helping to “clarify” opinions in the minds of the populace. While Benjamin Constant did consider public opinion the “life of states,” in practice he had difficulty clarifying how one should interact with it and conduct politics according to its dictates.26 In the Old Regime tradition, Constant thought of public opinion as a “magic circle” that limited

despotism in the modern age. So long as public opinion remained a product of reason, he believed it should be an effective deterrent to the arbitrary use of power. \(^{27}\) Biancamaria Fontana notes, however, that Constant also thought that because public opinion emanated from real individuals it was inherently a destabilizing political factor. \(^{28}\) According to Fontana, Constant believed that “opinion could retain its [legitimate] nature only when it emerged spontaneously from civil society, without the mediation and interference of political authority.” \(^{29}\) Despite his cautious approach to engaging the public, Constant’s own political journalism obscured the line between his belief in the disinterested nature of public opinion and his desire to inform and influence his readers.

The problem of speaking and listening to real social groups was more than one of philosophical bias or style, for reliance on public opinion when opposing the government could challenge the representative institutions that Constant cherished. \(^{30}\) Although Constant himself believed that “opinions [alone] are never guilty,” he felt that acting on untamed popular opposition endangered civil society and struck at both the government and the people. \(^{31}\) In other words, if public opinion emphasized solely opposition it challenged the

\(^{27}\) Fontana gives an excellent analysis of Constant and opinion in her chapter “Government of Opinion,” Fontana, *Benjamin Constant*, 82-95.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 83. Fontana’s point is strengthened when one considers the overall place of the individual in Constant’s liberalism. The dichotomous tension between individual and state played a central role in Constant’s thought and explains some of his contradictory actions. Most scholars contend that Constant believed a liberal state was the first necessity for the protection of individual rights. Historian Lucien Jaume, however, suggests that Constant prioritized the individual over the state and thought that government must remain a neutral place for the negotiation of competing claims with no power in and of itself. See Lucien Jaume, *l’Individu effacé*, 19, 130.

\(^{29}\) Fontana, *Benjamin Constant*, 85.

\(^{30}\) Stephen Holmes suggests that, “Constant’s attitude toward publicity, in other words was inherently ambiguous: it can poison the air as well as cleanse it.” Holmes, *Benjamin Constant*, 251.

\(^{31}\) Benjamin Constant, “De la doctrine politique qui peut réunir les partis en France,” *Cours de Politique*, 286.
orderly constitutional practices that prevented despotism. Thus, while making claims based on public opinion, Constant “was equally preoccupied with the need to ensure the efficient and undisturbed functioning of government which opinion threatened.” This vision of individual opinion as suspect or beholden to personal interest rather than societal good was common among Restoration politicians, and yet, paradoxically, it was not uncommon for writers to admonish politicians and writers for trying to change people’s minds. Rey, for instance wrote that “the intention of the people is always pure when no influence maligns it or seizes it.” Constant, for his part, faced a quandary: as a journalist his job was to influence opinions, but as a politician he was to submit to the dictates of public opinion.

Applying this conflicting set of principles resulted in an equally disjointed set of political practices. Constant’s milieu of self-titled “independent liberals”—so called to set themselves apart from the “slavish” moderate doctrinaires or ministériels—including such luminaries as the Marquis de Lafayette, the millionaire banker Lafitte, and the fiery orator Jacques-Antoine Manuel, made up the most progressive bloc of deputies. Their press organs, Le Mercure de France, La Minerve, La Renommée, and Le Constitutionnel, were among the most widely read journals in France. With the rise of their political fortunes in 1819, they could convincingly argue that they represented public opinion. But just as revolutionary

32 Fontana, Benjamin Constant, 88.

33 Ozouf sums up his conundrum: “...just as authorities in classical antiquity were faced with the insubordination of individual liberty, public opinion was faced with the caprice of individual opinion, with which it still had to come to terms.” Ozouf, 13. This observation is particularly applicable to Constant in 1819. It was, after all, during this year that he wrote his classic treatise on “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared to that of the Moderns.” Constant, De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes, (Paris, 1819).

34 Rey, Réflexions, 5.

35 Ozouf articulates the essence of his problem when she asks, “Should individuals wait to be illuminated by an encounter with public opinion in a self-evident form, or is it their task to bring it to light?” Ozouf, “Public Opinion,” 14.
Jacobins acting on the abstract ideals of the Enlightenment were, as Furet argued, destined to commit acts of terror because of the uncompromising ideal of the General Will, so too was the behavior of independent liberals linked to their discursive assumptions. Unfortunately for Restoration liberals, their desire for moderation prevented them from fully acting on their theoretical assumptions about the polity. This led to them making contradictory choices—and in the Grégoire case making no choice at all—which revealed their political impotence. If they thought public opinion threatened their own political credibility, they were inclined to break away from abstract principles.

Rhetorical allegiance to the abstract nation and lack of formal party structure made conducting politics difficult for independent liberal deputies. In principle, they thought they represented both real individuals and the abstract nation, and made grand speeches about their role as the defenders of the people’s interests. In their engagement with the people, they seemed unable to strike a balance between advocating for the abstract “nation” on the whole, for the small number of people who actually voted for them, or for their “constituents” in their départements. They could not communicate in any real way with the abstract nation, and they could not substitute a small electorate for the nation. Personally taking into consideration the opinions of thousands of individuals in their respective départements was impossible and would necessarily expose differences in real opinions in the land. In short, if representative government meant advocacy, allegiance to an abstract idea of public opinion complicated the relationship between the governing and the governed. Formal political

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37 Representation necessarily implies an act of abstraction that complicates the relationship between the governing and the governed. As Nadia Urbinati writes, “…representation highlights the idealized and
parties would not have solved this theoretical conundrum, but they might at least have consolidated the efforts of liberal politicians to confront crises. Without party organization and discipline, politicians had recourse only to rhetoric, which led them to base their claims on abstract principles rather than actionable goals. Without a platform, they had no basis for practical goal-oriented interaction and disputation. Resorting to rhetoric laden with imprecise philosophical and political concepts inevitably resulted in the hollow polemics that characterize a clash of general principles. These problems became clear to Constant as he communicated with his fellow liberal politicians and supporters in his constituency, and engaged with the greater public through his journalism.

Despite Constant’s clinging to the idea that accurately informed public opinion would back the most rational and moderate policies, many of his liberal friends still felt compelled to inculcate opposition, and recklessly tailored their rhetoric to satisfy leftist elements that voted for them and read their journals. When elements of the public responded favorably to their progressive initiatives, independents interpreted this as public opinion’s desire for a more radical agenda. The inherent danger to this approach was that what resonated with a certain leftist segment of the population gained legitimacy as ‘public opinion,’ and had the coercive power to dictate the behavior of politicians. Because of their desire to respond to political sentiments in the populace, independent liberals transformed the notion of public opinion into a more modern concept of political popularity, and in the process exacerbated radical passions that fed partisan polarization. Their rhetoric incorporated two unresolved and mutually exclusive assumptions: the belief that public opinion is legitimate because it

judgmental nature of politics (its reflexivity, in contemporary terminology), an art by which individuals transcend the immediateness of their experience and interests, and ‘educate’ their political judgment on their own and others’ opinions.” Nadia Urbinati, “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation,” in Political Theory, Vol. 28, No. 6 (Dec., 2000): 760.
expresses self-evident reason and the belief that politicians and writers must court the masses to create and then satisfy public opinion. This tension paralyzed the independent liberals during the Grégoire crisis. When pressed, they proved unwilling to sacrifice their political positions by heeding the dictates of their constituents who wanted them to unconditionally support Grégoire, and unable to articulate the reasons for their tactical withdrawal before ultras who had no qualms about taking advantage of their manufactured political crisis to claim the allegiance of public opinion.

Before the Grégoire affair, Benjamin Constant had every reason to be confident in the rule of public opinion as he conceived it: the electorate had been supportive of the independents, his bloc enjoyed a reasonable (albeit at times contentious) relationship with the centrist ministry, and he had been instrumental earlier in 1819 in successfully fighting an attempt to curtail freedom of the press. In short, the public was voting rationally, constitutional forms acceptable to a rational populace stood, and the press remained free enough to ensure political transparency. Despite these successes, 1819 was anything but politically peaceful and the free press actually exacerbated competition among rival factions, all of whom claimed to represent “public opinion” in partisan terms that destabilized the system.

In the process of conducting politics, commenting on politics, and staying in touch with his constituents, Constant himself had to contend with the contradictions in his own concept of public opinion, while wrestling with the flood of opinions on politics that came from his colleagues, constituents, and political rivals. He may have believed that if

38 On reason in liberal theory see, Jaume, l’Individu, 63. See also Stephen Holmes, Benjamin Constant, 243-45. Guizot and other doctrinaires also used public opinion as the operative force behind their concept of the “sovereignty of reason.” For Constant specifically on sovereignty of reason see, Holmes, Benjamin Constant, 10.
independents remained vigilant against resorting to demagoguery in the name of public opinion they could prevent the Right from using the election of Grégoire to paint them as too radical for monarchical government. Unfortunately for independents, there was no disciplined consensus among them on how to interact with the people and ensure that public opinion was behind them. If independents uniformly had believed that public opinion meant at least consensus among likeminded citizens, and if they had spoken in one voice on the Grégoire affair, they might have succeeded in showing that they were with the “people” on the issue. They discovered, however, that their differing interpretations of what public opinion meant, how it formed, and how it could be used to mobilize support led to an incoherent response to crisis and a failure to capitalize on their popularity.

Part Three: Constant and Oppositional Rhetoric in 1819

Despite the vicious tone in the press and in the chambers, most elites who participated in politics enjoyed relatively cordial relations and shared Paris’ salons in comfortable proximity with each other.39 The rhetoric of contestation in the public sphere, however, painted the Restoration political scene in uncompromising polarized tones. People of the era characterized their age as a time of condemnation, fear-mongering, exacerbated emotions, and vicious personal attacks replete with exaggerated political language. Because hyperbole was suited to the spirit of contestation that many liberal deputies and journals assumed public opinion dictated—and to match the bile of ultras—the independent liberals of Constant’s

39Many Restoration salons divided according to political affiliation, but there were several popular ones in which politicians and writers from all sides came together. Steven Kale suggests that the salons served as sites in which feminine influence tempered political passions and allowed the elites to present a unified front of reconciliation even while they vociferated in the Chambers and the press. Although partisan salons developed, women, Kale claims, exerted a calming influence that kept decorum among elites. Steven Kale, French Salons: High Society and Political Sociability from the Old Regime to the Revolution of 1848 (Baltimore, MD/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 108-10. See also, Steven Vincent, “Elite Culture in Early Nineteenth-Century France: Salons, Sociability, and the Self,” in Modern Intellectual History vol. 4, no. 2, (Aug. 2007): 327-51.
milieu entered 1819 publicly bellicose and determined not to give ground. Constant quickly became aware of the need to fashion a *modus operandi* that balanced polemics and moderation in order to appeal to public opinion while still protecting the liberals’ own standing in the Chambers. Constant’s tergiversations over how best to speak politically exposed the inconsistencies and ambiguities of his approach to engaging public opinion in a representative system encumbered by polarizing rhetoric.

Exchanges between Benjamin Constant and Charles-Louis-François Goyet, a liberal journalist and political activist from Sarthe, the *département* Constant represented as deputy, highlighted two different approaches to managing rhetoric and engaging public opinion. Goyet, who wielded considerable influence among liberals in the *département*, wrote often to Constant in Paris to keep him apprised of local public opinion. Despite the warm relationship that they nurtured while Constant represented the *département*, they often disagreed on the appropriate way to address and respond to the populace. In December 1818, for example, Goyet sent Constant a letter on the upcoming election (Constant’s) for publication in the popular *La Minerve*, with his blessing to “... correct, emend, deduct from [the letter]” as he saw fit. Yet when Constant sought to soften the tone of the letter, Goyet cautioned against excessive changes, suggesting that his tone was purposely forceful in order to “give hardiness to a few overly timid liberals.” For Goyet, public opinion’s dictates

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42 Constant’s letter is not included in the collection, but Goyet’s response made clear its basic content. Goyet to Constant, Le Mans, 18 January 1819, Ibid., 28.
were obvious: because public opinion reflected the opinions of people with whom politicians agreed, it required forceful words and action in its name in order to reassure the people in the countryside who composed it that politicians were listening to them.

Goyet recognized the tendency of leading liberal politicians to oscillate between defiance and pragmatism, but still felt that Constant and liberals in Paris should courageously stand behind the opinions of the populace. He told Constant that vacillation would not suffice to satisfy the public in the Sarthe, reminding him that “if I had ceded over the past year to observations dictated by timidity, four ultras would still be deputies [of the Sarthe].” Goyet pointedly suggested to Constant that *La Minerve*’s cosmopolitan sensibilities did not speak for the people who supported liberals in the departments. Nonetheless, the editors of *La Minerve* were unwilling to publish Goyet’s submission because of the sensitive political climate, forcing an embarrassed Constant to relay the news to Goyet of its rejection by the editorial staff. Goyet accepted the decision but not without some bitterness over the cautious tone in the paper.

This exchange embodied more than a rural versus city debate; it demonstrated that liberal politicians who comprised the national face of opposition had no consensus on how to engage public opinion. Two factors hindered them: the first was lack of an organized party structure with a platform. Without a platform they had no systemic link to the populace, or a

43 “I respond . . . *la Minerve* writes for France and Europe, and me, I write for the peasants of the Sarthe.” Ibid. After reviewing articles that Goyet wrote for the local paper *le Propagateur*, Constant praised his ability to adapt his writings to the unique conditions in his department. Constant to Goyet, Paris, 23 January 1819, Ibid., 31.

44 Constant to Goyet, Paris, 28 January 1819, Ibid., 36. The editor Delacretelle, had written Constant on the 27th informing him that “it [the letter] would be rather more [harmful] than advantageous to the cause whose defense M. Goyet embraces so courageously.” Delacretelle to Constant, Paris, 27 January 1819, Ibid., 37. Constant, although an editor, does not appear to have been involved in the decision.

45 Goyet to Constant, Le Mans, 1 February 1819, Ibid., 38.
means of ensuring that the people’s representatives would hear the will of public opinion. Instead of joining a forum for practical political interactions, when liberal politicians entered the political fray in Paris they had only rhetorical weapons based on abstract and inconsistent political principles behind them. The second problem arose from the principles themselves, especially those that informed liberals’ understanding of public opinion. Goyet wanted to make a frank appeal to the restive inhabitants of the Sarthe, while the editors urged more politesse to avoid damaging the delicate balance of politics. He seemed to belong to the camp that believed public opinion resided in the collectivity of voluntary wills—in other words, the majority opinion of his département that had awarded Constant his seat. Without a programmatic approach to engaging public opinion, Constant, and presumably the editorial board of the Minerve, offered rhetorical support for broad ideals that they and the leftist populace shared, but did not feel compelled to voice the actual opinions of people, particularly if they were incompatible with the deputies’ political strategy. Their emphasis on managing rhetoric thus made them an unstable link in the chain of authority from public opinion, through the press, to the government. Goyet’s disagreement with the editors confirmed that the politicians in Paris and the grassroots opposition allied along uncertain lines. The caution displayed by Constant and the other editors of La Minerve, on the other hand, suggests that, at least in early 1819, influential liberals still exerted some control over how their colleagues in the press responded to and reached out to public opinion.

For all of Constant’s embarrassment at the rejection of Goyet’s letter, he often urged caution when confronting political enemies. In February 1819, the month in which La Minerve rejected Goyet’s letter, Constant called on independent liberals in the Chamber to temper their radical speeches. He noted how debates touching on the most basic liberal
causes such as fighting a bill to further restrict the electorate grew dangerously heated. Urging moderation, he warned “The voice of liberty is strong and resounding, but it may wound ears still little habituated to hearing it.” Despite this warning, many liberal deputies continued to strike back at their political opponents with ardor. They followed Goyet’s inclination to voice the “people’s will” and emphasize its oppositional nature, rather than to mitigate the threat that overheated contestation posed to the institutions that purportedly represented the desires of the people. Constant called this predilection for stormy rhetoric a “heritage of arbitrary times” undermining the governmental institutions that best preserved and protected civil liberties.\(^\text{46}\)

Constant, nonetheless, sent a mixed message to the deputies in session. His own rhetorical strategy emphasized flexibility over consistency and he often changed his view of proper conduct in debate.\(^\text{47}\) Soon after urging liberals to soften their rhetoric, he criticized the deputy Marquis Trophime-Gerard de Lally, “a name honorable in the splendors of liberty” for his “tender feelings” while speaking against a restrictive election law. According to Constant, de Lally “spoke with sweetness bordering on weakness” and did a disservice to the critical nature of the debate.\(^\text{48}\) Lack of experience in representative governance made it difficult for politicians like de Lally and even Constant to know how strongly to defend the principles that they, and ostensibly public opinion, supported without harming their reputation or being perceived as tools of special interests.

\(^{46}\) Benjamin Constant, “Session des Chambres,” *La Minerve*, 5 February 1819, 37.

\(^{47}\) For more on Constant and the problem of rhetoric, see Jean Starobinski, “Benjamin Constant : comment parler quand l’éloquence est épuisée,” in *The Transformation of Political Culture, 1789-1848*, volume 3 of *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, 3 vols. (François Furet and Mona Ozouf eds.) 3:187-201.

\(^{48}\) Constant, “Session des Chambres,” *La Minerve*, 1 March 1819, 246.
For Constant, politics was an eternal negotiation between principles and their application, and different contingencies dictated which policy, and which rhetorical strategy to marshal to his cause. Constant’s mixed signals to the deputies reflected his political flexibility, but not all minds were as perceptive and nuanced as his and some simply disagreed on how to represent public opinion. Many of his friends thought they were engaged in a crucial battle to establish a post-revolutionary nation in the face of political enemies bent on undercutting progressive principles. These liberals, convinced that Restoration politics consisted essentially of fighting a monolithic “other,” understandably ignored his calls for prudence and expressed themselves in the hyperbolic tones that they thought public opinion demanded. Constant, also affected by post-revolutionary divisiveness, had faith in the “magic circle” of public opinion and its ability to arise spontaneously and rationally against encroachments upon liberty, but he underestimated the emotionally traumatizing effects of polarization. When events emerged that demanded liberals rally around their principles, Constant often abandoned his quibbles and marshaled his writing and rhetoric to speak for leftist opinion in the nation whose claim to the title of public opinion was simply a rhetorical expediency. The end results of Constant’s wavering approach to rhetoric and public opinion were contradictions and paralysis in the face of the ultras’ more cohesive and comprehensive political maneuvering.

During the summer of 1819, however, liberal deputies still gained seats in the Chamber and won several political battles, including easing censorship laws to ensure that public opinion had access to political news. Their successes bolstered their confidence and suggested that they were indeed representing the will of the majority of the nation. Perhaps overconfident from their electoral and legislative victories, they employed an ever more
strident tone of opposition, angering ultras and alienating the ministry and the moderate ministériel deputies. When the Chambers went into recess for elections in August, the press became the primary forum for garnering the support of the populace, and soon proved incapable of resisting the hyperbolic rhetoric that divided the nation and put all the liberal gains of the year in jeopardy.

**Part Four: Polarization and the Grégoire Crisis**

*The Collapse of the Moderate Center*

After proroguing the ultra-dominated *Chambre Introuvable* in 1816, Louis XVIII entrusted power to a ministry filled with many former Napoleonic statesmen; competent men trained in administration under a despotic system.⁴⁹ Elie Decazes, as discussed in Chapter One, had the most influence on the King, and consequently was perhaps the most universally disliked man in France.⁵⁰ Louis XVIII, “attached to him with a senile passion,” gave the young minister unprecedented influence over policy especially from 1817 to 1819.⁵¹ Decazes’ control of the police bureaucracy and his influence over departmental préfets helped keep provincial politics in line with his stated moderation, but state manipulation of elections and his arbitrary enforcement of laws against the press and political activities garnered him few supporters on either end of the political spectrum. Decazes especially irked ultras who believed they were the true champions of monarchy. They distrusted his liberal affiliations and were still seething over the important role he had played in purging the

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Chamber in 1816. Liberals, too, came to distrust his willingness to use state power to ensure political tranquility and feared a union between his ministry and the ultras. Squeezed between two extremes, Decazes and the moderate ministries of the early years of the Restoration eventually proved unable to withstand the pressures of polarization.

In terms of ideological principles, ultras, not ministeriels, were the liberals’ archenemies. Since the beginning of the Restoration, liberal journalists in papers like La Minerve and La Renommée had portrayed ultras as intransigent members of the high nobility with no taste for democracy, and had warned their readers of the ultras’ recidivist absolutism. They employed polemical rhetoric to match the perceived threat of these implacable royalist enemies. Yet, since 1816, the political gains of ultras had in fact been negligible. By early 1819, conservative ultras composed a weak minority in the Chamber of Deputies and their operatives, at the urging of the centrist ministry, were under attack everywhere in France. The state’s arbitrary campaign against partisanship, however, had the opposite effect, whipping up oppositional hyperbole among the very partisans on both sides whom it aimed to silence. Ultras painted Decazes as a vestige of revolutionary and Napoleonic despotism, while liberal journalists accustomed to vicious battles with ultras, simply ascribed the same monarchical and anti-democratic motivations they saw in ultras to the decidedly more ambiguous ministry and its moderate supporters.

The tendency to interpret politics according to the uncompromising categories of Left and Right, did not prevent the liberals from first appreciating the potential benefits of a

52 Harpaz, L'Ecole libérale, 118. For Constant himself on ministerial duties see, Benjamin Constant, De la responsabilité des ministres (Paris, 1815).
moderate ministry. At the end of 1818, when Decazes became Minister of the Interior, the most powerful portfolio in the administration, more astute liberals like Constant were hopeful that the young friend of moderate liberals like Royer-Collard and Guizot would at least curb ultraroyalist initiatives. Indeed, compared to the previous ministry, the new ministry included a number of left-leaning moderates and seemed poised to enact relatively progressive policies. Regardless of the details of the new ministries’ policies—soon to be revealed as more conservative than liberals had hoped—liberals saw it as a vast improvement. Constant wrote to his friend Goyet in December about the “… the triumph of the liberals and the nomination of a ministry entirely different from that which has threatened us for some time. This is a victory for public opinion.” Political winds blowing in the liberals’ favor made it easier for Constant to state unequivocally that the voice of public opinion had been heard, and that the new ministry would fulfill its duty of responding to the same voice that had put it in power.

The relationship between independent liberals and the ministry, however, quickly soured when the ministry did not consistently support liberal initiatives in the Chamber of Deputies. During those occasions when the ministry did act in concert with the independents, as when it supported—for the moment—the expansion of press freedoms in June 1819, but even these occasions did not inspire great confidence among liberal writers and politicians who expected more from a ministry supposedly in tune with public opinion. In August, for example, a writer for the liberal paper La Renommée using the penname, “Popilius,”

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53 Although not the president of the new council of ministers, a post held by the innocuous General Desolles, Decazes would clearly steer government policy.

54 Isabelle Backouche, La monarchie parlementaire, 1815-1848 de Louis XVIII à Louis-Phillipe (Paris: Pygmalion, 2000), 60.

complained to the ministers that “the projects on the freedom of the press that . . . we know well were not your work; [they] bore the imprint of your hesitation . . . This [lukewarm support] is, moreover, the limit of your efforts.”

Throughout 1819, liberals progressively formed a negative impression of the new ministry and especially of Decazes. When ministerial initiatives began to contravene liberal principles—especially when rumors circulated that Decazes would support an ultra-sponsored push to further restrict suffrage—the liberal press redefined the ministry as the primary force threatening representative government and opposing public opinion. As Popilius chided, “some only accuse you of weakness, but by associating yourself with the injustice of your [ultra] predecessors, you assumed for yourself a part of the bitter reproaches aimed at them.”

The ministry had become with the ultras the “other” that stood against national public opinion.

Constant for his part feared the damaging effects of this polarizing rhetoric on the liberal opposition. He thought that strident language would isolate the bloc of independent liberal deputies whose rising fortunes depended on maintaining a shaky alliance with moderate ministériels against the ultras. Hotheaded language that painted political opponents of whatever stripe in uncompromising broad brush strokes sold liberal publications and helped create a clear leftist identity, but it also pushed moderates away and strengthened the ultras’ arguments that liberals were the slaves of party interests. Constant warned in La Renommée, “I can admit what some suggest is a fact; that the need for popularity motivates

56 Popilius, “Variétés; À MM les Ministres” La Renommée no. 53, 6 August 1819, 211.

57 Throughout 1819, independents were especially displeased with Decazes for his support of clerical education, the persistence of ultras holding posts, arbitrary court actions against the law professor Bavoux (a public scandal during the summer), the continued exile of men implicated in Napoleon’s Hundred Days, and the ministry’s perceived influence over elections. Harpaz, L’École Libérale, 115-16, 122, 124.

58 Popilius, (op. cit), 211.
liberals; but what risks are run when they only know to find the way to popularity through opposition?” 59 This admonition against a polarizing popularity contest, however, went against those elements of liberal thought that considered the press to be the conduit for voicing public opinion’s opposition to authority. As an anonymous writer for *La Renommée* stated, “opposition is [the only tone] worthy of the difficult circumstances in which we live.” 60 Independent journalists, like their ultraroyalist counterparts, failed to exercise caution when they wrote, and acted on the common conviction that post-revolutionary politics were a matter of black and white. Strengthened by success and the concomitant belief that public opinion supported their side, liberal journals often conflated all groups on their right into the enemy of the nation.

The prospects for a broad liberal/moderate coalition grew slimmer as the tone of political debate during the summer elections became more heated. Decazes had an unenviable position. Despite incessant criticism, measures such as the easing of censorship, which he initially supported against conservative opposition, required that he balance pressures from both the king, himself surrounded by ultras such as his brother the Comte d’Artois, and liberals in the Chambers. 61 Unfortunately, neither ultras nor liberals gave him credit for his ability to negotiate in the small space between the polarized factions. They either branded him an enabler of revolutionaries or chided him for playing the part of an overly ambitious courtier. By the time of the Grégoire affair, Decazes, unappreciated by liberals and under pressure from the king, sought political allies on the far Right and


especially shunned independent liberals. The supporters of the ministry increasingly attacked political enemies on the Left, and in the process strengthened the poles to the detriment of the their own places in the Center. Polarization ultimately drowned out all moderation once Abbé Grégoire entered the fray.

*Crisis and Fallout: The Election and Ejection of Grégoire*

When he heard of Grégoire’s election to the Chamber of Deputies, the Comte d’Artois, the figurehead of the ultras, confronted his brother Louis XVIII asking, “do you see where they are trying to lead you?” The “they” to whom he referred were liberals—understood by ultras to mean all the independents, doctrinaires, and the ministry. Artois spoke for ultras fearful of the direction the Restoration system of government had taken since the dissolution of the Chambre Introuvable. He hoped the election of Grégoire would prove to the king that the liberals’ true desire was to overthrow France’s constitutional monarchy and spark a revolution. In fact, the people doing the “leading” were ultra electors in the département of the Isère who, playing politique du pire, threw their support behind Grégoire in order to defeat the ministry’s chosen candidate. It was a cynical move that forced independent liberals to negotiate the tension between preserving the electoral system that put Grégoire in the Chamber and maintaining their own status in that body. Ultras, by promoting the Abbé, emphasized the stark differences between the Left and Right, and forced the political poles further apart. They hoped that competition with “revolutionary” liberals would be a more effective political strategy than competing for the king’s ear with an insufficiently monarchist cabinet.

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Ultras resorted to such tactics because the elections that year had devolved into a competition between the Left and Center, which threatened to make ultras irrelevant. Over the summer of 1819, independent liberals directed their electoral campaigns largely against the ministry’s chosen candidates. They considered the elections an opportunity to capitalize on the general dissatisfaction with the ministry and consolidate liberals in the nation around their bloc of more progressive deputies. To achieve this they stressed the necessity of defeating any ministry initiative to further limit the electorate, and the importance of confronting the perceived growing alliance between ultras and the ministry—a farfetched notion considering the mutual antipathy between those two groups. The ministry for its part engaged in typical strong arm tactics in the provinces, demanding that préfets massage the elections to ensure the victory of its chosen candidates. Ideologically, both factions shared some liberal values but both resorted to the rhetorical devices of the age to paint each other as polar opposites—as belonging to the “other side” of the post-revolutionary divide. While the independents concentrated on defeating the ministry, ultras, impotent for the moment and left out of the competition, used Grégoire to indict the entire electoral system as excessively liberal. The sudden appearance of a revolutionary giant on the political scene of the Restoration presented what one ultra termed, a “happy pretext,” for the Right’s designs on the electoral system. In this confused three-way political battle, only the ultras seemed sure of their political enemies.

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63 Harpaz, l’École Libérale, 106, 120.

64 For essential differences see, Jaume, l’Individu, 19.

Choppin-D’Arnouville, the préfet who convened the electoral college of the Isère and assumed responsibility for ensuring that the ministry’s candidate won the département’s seat in the Chamber, was well aware of the danger ultra tactics posed. Calling ultras members of a party that “shows itself against the national interests,” he wrote after the event that their efforts had demonstrated their lack of genuine support for the constitutional system.  

According to the Choppin-D’Arnouville, soon after the nomination of Grégoire, and up to the very day of the convocation of the département’s electoral college, it was clear that his candidacy would not be successful. When rumors circulated that local ultras planned to support Grégoire over a ministerial candidate, the préfet sensed that ultras would proclaim the indignation of the nation over his selection and turn his candidacy into an indictment of a ministry that could allow such an affront to royalty. Ever since the Restoration, he claimed, it had been the strategy of the “aristocratic party” to take advantage of the smallest event to cause a stir, and then take umbrage as the offended majority most worthy of ruling the nation.  

This moderate ministériel understood how public opinion worked in real political gamesmanship; one simply had to claim its support without theorizing on its meaning. Ultras proved more than capable of playing that game.

The liberals’ victories in the elections—which their journals took as another sign that public opinion was behind them—blinded many to the implications of Grégoire’s presence on the political scene. As early as August 8, the ultra daily La Quotidienne warned of liberal attempts to “grégoriser” the Isère and, claiming their own stake as representatives of

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67 Ibid., 9-10.

68 Of the forty-eight seats up for election, independents (“constitutionnels”) won 37, ultras 5, and ministériels 6. La Renommée, no. 97, 20 September 1819, 381.
public opinion, reported on the flood of concerned letters they had received from their readers.\textsuperscript{69} Despite the attention it normally paid to news in rival journals, \textit{La Renommée} remained aloof throughout August and only late in the month rather blandly mentioned that “a great number of liberals also support M. Grégoire.”\textsuperscript{70} Liberal journals did not take the ultras’ machinations seriously, and spent much of the late summer congratulating themselves for their compatriots’ electoral successes. Even those writers for \textit{La Renommée} who were aware of the ultras’ tactics in supporting Grégoire failed to see the danger in the Abbé’s sudden emergence and instead praised “the rare sagacity of the ultramonarchical faction” for choosing a capable and seasoned politician.\textsuperscript{71} Publicity about Grégoire picked up in September so that by September 25 \textit{La Minerve} noted that the ultra press had published sixty-two separate bulletins on his election, while the liberal press still paid little attention to it.\textsuperscript{72} It may have seemed to the independents that an examination of the situation—namely, the realization that it would not be hard for conservatives to construe Grégoire as incompatible with the current regime—would slow the perceived momentum that their strident opposition had won for them. For all of their allegiance to absolute sovereignty over the claims of the “people,” ultras demonstrated that they understood how to manipulate public opinion to their benefit by letting their press organs condemn Grégoire even after their electors had voted for him.

\textsuperscript{69} “Grégoriser” was a neologism meaning “make like Grégoire” with all its revolutionary implications. \textit{Quotidienne} 220, 8 August 1819, 2.

\textsuperscript{70} X., “Elections” \textit{La Renommée}, no. 75, 29 August 1819, 295. \textit{La Renommée} ran a weekly column, “Esprit des Journaux,” which monitored and critiqued other journals.

\textsuperscript{71} A., “Intérieur: Paris 27 septembre,” \textit{La Renommée} no. 105, 28 September 1819, 413.

\textsuperscript{72} Harpaz, \textit{l’École Libérale}, 119.
To avoid jeopardizing their popularity with those liberals who had supported Grégoire’s candidacy, some independents, finally aware of the trap the election presented, engaged in a behind-the-scenes effort to persuade him to step down. In a letter dated October 2, August Staël, son of the deceased liberal icon Germaine de Staël, politely wrote to Grégoire that as he (Grégoire) did not actively seek the position, he should not feel shame in preemptively resigning in the name of “public utility.” Staël reminded him that freedom of the press remained in question, that a new restrictive electoral law loomed, and that the ministry would likely cast off its few “liberal” members if the affair jeopardized its relations with the king. He urged Grégoire to sacrifice his own standing for the greater good regardless of his public support. Staël, indicating that he was sensitive to the unsteady nature of opinion, nevertheless believed that “public opinion [was] more sensible on what it fears than clear on what it desires.” He predicted “your presence in the Chamber will serve to divide the friends of liberty, double in anger the strength of the right, and throw back to the ultras all those who still distinguish themselves [from the ultras] by nuances.” Staël’s letter was not an isolated case as many others soon joined in the effort to persuade Grégoire to refuse his seat.

This behind-the-scenes campaign to convince Grégoire to withdraw his candidacy contrasted with the explicit and enthusiastic support of the Abbé in the liberal press. La

73 Ironically, this is one of the many names that Constant used for public opinion. Fontana, Benjamin Constant, 82.


75 Ibid., 221.

76 See also, D’Argeson to Grégoire, Ormes, 7 October 1819, reprinted in full in Ibid., 223-24.
Renommée referred to the election as having “settled public opinion” by rewarding a candidate “worthy of France”—an ironic choice of words considering how ultra deputies later condemned Grégoire as “unworthy” of sitting in the Chamber.\(^7\) Aware of the propaganda emanating from ultra and moderate circles alike, the writers in *La Renommée* countered charges that the election was an act of treason by downplaying Grégoire’s republicanism and emphasizing that Article 11 of the Charter forbade investigations into past behavior and voting records in old assemblies, including voting for regicide.\(^7\) They also printed several letters from Isère as evidence of the public support for Grégoire and refuted objections to his candidacy based on a residency technicality; an argument that several independent deputies later tried to use to forestall Grégoire’s investiture.\(^8\) By all accounts, the independents’ public face during the Grégoire affair remained staunchly in support of the Abbé.

The impending crisis troubled Benjamin Constant as the extent of the damage that the affair could inflict on the liberal cause became apparent to him. Constant turned to Goyet, the voice of the Sarthe, and offered a dismal prognosis. He believed that Grégoire’s acceptance of the seat would result in the king’s refusal to attend the opening of the Chambers, and that the ultras, also refusing to sit with him, would clamor for a purge of both the legislature and

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\(^7\) *La Renommée* even denied that liberals were trying to get Grégoire to retire and stridently defended his right to a seat. *La Renommée*, no. 138, 31 October 1819.

\(^8\) “Departemens,” *La Renommée*, no. 87, 10 September 1819, 342. The irony of their use of the word, “worthy,” would become apparent when ultras leveled the charge of “unworthiness” at him.

\(^7\) *The Charte* was the constitution Louis XVIII granted upon retaking the throne in 1814. The direct wording of the article clearly indicated that Grégoire had a right to a seat. “Esprit des Journaux,” *La Renommée*, no. 95, 18 September 1819, 375. “Intérieur,” *La Renommée* no. 105, 27 September 1819, and no. 145, 7 November 1819, 569.

the ministry. The ministry would then shift to the right, replacing the few liberal ministers in
the cabinet with ultras in order to reassure the worried king that the government was in line
with monarchical principles. On the other hand, Constant predicted that if the efforts of some
liberals to encourage Grégoire to resign met with success, it would damage the independents’
standing among the public that supported him. Constant reiterated the quandary for Goyet:
“Think it over well: [Grégoire’s] resignation: triumph of the ultras, outburst against all of us,
discontent of many liberals; no resignation: an attempt at and nearly certain expulsion,
probable ultra ministry, violation of principles, [and] return to revolution.” He then professed
to Goyet that his inclination was to fight for Grégoire’s rights by “throwing himself at the
foot of the tribune [in the Chamber of Deputies] to defend principles.” 81 Constant perhaps
added this last phrase to reassure the more strident Goyet that he would ardently defend the
value of public opinion as expressed in an election, but in reality, he had no formula for
countering the ultras’ cynical exploitation of public opinion. Such maneuvers did not enter
into the realm of theory in which Constant formulated his concept of the “magic circle” of
public opinion. In short, his ideas contained no provisions for manipulations of public
opinion.

Goyet himself remained predisposed to value the public’s emotional support for
Grégoire over pragmatic exigencies, regardless of the damage that this incarnation of radical
oppositional opinion in the country could inflict on the political system. His response to
Constant thus unequivocally stated his opposition to Grégoire’s resignation. Among possible
negative results, Goyet claimed, resignation would usher in the “discouragement of
constitutional electors and the disappointment, and maybe the retreat, of some courageous

81 Constant to Goyet, Paris 23 October 1819, Correspondance, 169-70.
men who in the departments sit at the head of public opinion.” He urged that “liberal writers treat the question of purification [expulsion from the Chambers], loudly, frankly, and explicitly.” The tension between speaking directly to mirror the will of the people and managing the tone of rhetoric had created a critical impasse and conflicted once again with Constant’s strategic sense of balance. These countervailing strategies exposed the contradictions between Constant the journalist and Constant the politician.

Although not a believer in the absolute rational nature of public opinion—it remained the combined voices of individuals—Constant still hoped that reason would usher in consensus after political debate. Rational consensus, however, worked on two levels: one between the independent liberal politicians as a group and the other between liberal politicians and the perceived public opinion of the masses. If liberal politicians acted rationally, they ostensibly would come to the conclusion that seating Grégoire in the Chamber would jeopardize their successes and the liberties they cherished. Judging by the whisper campaign to convince the Abbé to withdraw his candidacy, this first level of consensus among politicians was within reach. But to expect rational consensus in public opinion on the Grégoire case—in essence, to ask public opinion to reject its expressed choice in a fair electoral system and to ignore the Charter’s mandate to forget the past—was unrealistic and showed how little theory could account for the contingencies of real political behavior. Straining to resolve the tensions between political theory and action, the independents as a group did not develop an effective strategy or a plausible rhetorical explanation for their actions. Constant wrote to Goyet about his colleagues’ lack of a

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82 Goyet to Constant, Le Mans, 27 October 1819, Ibid., 174.
83 Ibid., 175.
coherent and unified response to the crisis, "the liberals are as you have read them, united on the fundamentals but each going their own way, some by impatience, others by defiance, many by desire to shine (briller)." Public opinion, the supposed a priori consensus builder, failed to unite the disorganized independent liberals, or bring about a rationally cautious consensus among the populace on the Grégoire affair.

Confusion reigned in independent circles as it became clear that the stubborn Grégoire would not resign. He himself strongly refuted the idea, suggesting that "giving my resignation would be an act of cowardice, and I dare to believe that a stain of this nature would never blot my character." Goyet and other more radical liberals supported him, noting that the campaign to defend Grégoire had become a cause célèbre among the "liberals" in the country. Goyet warned Constant of the negative effect that the resignation would invite and urged him not to be involved in or even to publicly approve of the effort to persuade the Abbé to resign. Public opinion, at least as far as the leftist voters of the Sarthe were concerned, had spoken and demanded the satisfaction of seeing Grégoire honored with the seat he had earned in an election.

Decazes and the other ministers, disappointed by the results of the elections, and equally shaken by Grégoire’s looming presence in the public sphere, feared for their places in the government. Even before the inevitable battle in the Chambers over Grégoire, the shake up of the ministry that Constant had feared materialized. Comte d’Artois and the ultras had exaggerated the implications of Grégoire’s election and had pressured the king to do

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84 Constant to Goyet, Paris 29/30 October 1819, Correspondance, 178.
85 Grégoire to D'Argeson, undated (mid-October) 1819, in Grégoire, Memoires, 225.
86 Goyet to Constant, Le Mans 2 November 1819, Correspondance, 183.
something about his ministry and the electoral laws that had allowed such an affront to the royal family. Decazes in turn felt the weight of events and realized his political survival depended on placating the king and appeasing the ultras. When the ministry changed on November 19, ridding itself of three left-leaning members and replacing them with conservative politicians, the hope of concerted liberal action by the Left and the Center foundered. An embittered Decazes, now president of the council of ministers, survived the purge—for the moment—and turned his back on independents whose intransigence had confounded him throughout the year. In response, La Renommée grew even more strident, whipping up opposition to the ministry and pressuring independent politicians still gingerly trying to sidestep the Grégoire affair to raise their voices in protest. Constant’s efforts to temper liberal rhetoric failed as the polarizing effect of the affair demonstrated his minimal influence over public opinion, at least as it was portrayed in the pro-Grégoire liberal press.

Despairing of a rational solution to the crisis, Constant joined the public chorus of voices in support of Grégoire, and against the ministry and ultras, even as he privately bemoaned the harm that his election was inflicting on the liberals’ political fortunes. He turned to polemics and hyperbole to criticize the ultras’ efforts to expel Grégoire from the Chamber before it sat, even going so far as to attribute the move to the ministry. "I am convinced," he wrote about the affair in La Minerve, "that the goal of our ministers is none other than returning us to revolution." It was an ill-considered strategy. Hoping to bolster the

For the full extent of the external and internal pressure on Decazes to assume control of the ministry in response to Grégoire’s election, see Langeron, Decazes, 245-50. It was in this context that Artois confronted the king.

See Harpaz, L’École Libérale, 130.

Benjamin Constant, "Du projet de conférer aux Chambres le droit de s'épurer, et de quelques autres projets de même nature." La Minerve, 1 December 1819, 200.
confidence of those in support of Grégoire, he conjured up the same polarizing visions of revolution and crisis that made the ultras’ condemnation of the Abbé so effective. Constant's article appeared on December 1, 1819, a day before the opening of the Chambers, but it did not contain a definitive endorsement of Grégoire, rather it merely refuted the ultras’ reasoning for the expulsion. His continued ambivalence on how to handle the issue was typical for the great majority of his peers.

The independents’ actions leading up to and on December 6 when the Chamber ultimately expelled Grégoire demonstrated in microcosm the contradictions between their appeals to public opinion and their participation in the representative system, and weakened their political viability. Although they still felt compelled to use radical rhetoric in defense of Grégoire’s right to take the seat he had won, their dedication to the new political order took precedence. After the failure of last-ditch efforts to encourage Grégoire to resign, the independents resolved to fight in the Chamber only against the ultras' reasons for expulsion, namely, Grégoire’s "unworthiness" (indignité). They admitted that Grégoire's residency status may have made the election "illegal" but downplayed the fact that ultras singled out only Grégoire for such scrutiny from the four incoming deputies of Isère. Incidentally, La Renommée had repeatedly and convincingly refuted non-residency as an argument throughout October and November.

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90 On the night of 3 December 1819, a commission of leading independents went to Grégoire's residence to convince him to resign; Constant declined to join them. Harpaz (ed.), Correspondance, 205 [in notes].

91 Two out of Four deputies had to have residence in department, Grégoire lived in Paris and one other deputy, François de Nantes, likewise did not reside in Isère. If the residency of a third deputy came into question, as it did for M. Sapay, the electoral college of Isère was to settle the issue. Sapay himself ardently defended his residence status before the opening of the Chamber. See, Charles Sapay, Charles Sapay, député de l'Isère, à ses collègues, membres de la Chambre des Députés des Départemens (Paris: Bailleul, 1819).
Determined at least to avoid a vote on “unworthiness,” independents had to counter the combined arguments of ultras, moderates, and the ministry. “Ministériel” deputy Joseph-Louis-Joachim Laîné pleaded the unworthiness case against Grégoire in terms of preserving constitutional monarchy, claiming that Grégoire and his "frightening memories" were "incompatible with liberty [and] with royal legitimacy." Constant responded in the Chamber to the charge of unworthiness by emphasizing the Charter’s proscription against investigations of politicians’ revolutionary past and called on the Restoration’s spirit of union et oublí. He denied that regicides presented an exception to the rule, using the example of Joseph Fouché, former minister of police for Napoleon and Louis XVIII, as an example of a revolutionary regicide with a far more compromising past than Grégoire’s who nonetheless had served the monarchical government. Caution ruled the day, however, and in a rather bland conclusion to an otherwise passionate argument, Constant suggested that "we simply limit ourselves to deliberate on legality [of excluding Grégoire for residency status]." He certainly did not throw himself at the foot of the tribune as he had promised Goyet he would.

Independent deputy Jacques-Antoine Manuel, who had a reputation for radicalism, (see Chapter Four) presented a more forceful case against expulsion. Manuel suggested that nearly everyone in the Chamber had colluded with distasteful governments. When confronting the ultras, he resorted to the same scare tactics they used, accusing the Right of proposing a "usurpation of power, an instrument of tyranny that is a mortal attack on the Charter." Manuel’s speech reflected the independents’ belief in the legitimacy of the

93 Fouché, the Duc D'Otranto, had a bloody revolutionary record filled with conspicuous violence and a vote for regicide, yet he sat in the king’s ministry in 1815. Ibid.
94 Ibid., 732.
current government and the need to defend it from all encroachments, but his rhetoric too closely mirrored the polarizing tropes in the liberal press that had encouraged the ultras’ extreme reaction to the Grégoire case in the first place. In the end, Manuel’s defense, like Constant’s, was only rhetorical and he blandly focused on the motive for expulsion. He asked that "the Chamber only deliberate on the question of validity . . . the alleged motive of unworthiness should only be presented in the second order." The independents in the Chamber had found some consensus on how to approach this specific vote, but their rhetoric still left them divided in their allegiances between passionate opposition and pragmatic survival.

Ultimately, the Chamber decided on a straight vote for admission or non-admission, regardless of motive. As no consideration of Grégoire’s domicile played into the decision, the independents’ attempts to maintain what they considered the legality of the procedure failed. Still they had an opportunity to stand on principle and save face with liberal public opinion by voting for the admission of Grégoire, safe in the knowledge that they probably did not have the votes to ensure victory. Yet when the voting began only Charles-Joseph-Mathieu Lambrechts, out of more than one hundred independent liberals in the Chamber voted for his admission. It is hard to comprehend what the independents hoped to preserve through this surprising showing. The potential for a productive relationship with the political Center had already dissipated after the new Decazes ministry assumed power and shifted to the right. Only the discontented leftist segment of the populace remained as the independent liberals’ political allies, and the liberal deputies’ actions on December 6 drove a wedge

95 Ibid.

96 Lambrechts was Grégoire’s close friend. Ibid., 739.

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between them and these ambiguous partners. Instead of heeding the wills of individuals whose opinion mattered in practical political terms—i.e., the non-ultra constituents of the Isère who voted for Grégoire and their own constituents like Goyet—liberal deputies acted on a vague notion that public opinion demanded that they acquiesce to what by any account was an unconstitutional act. Paradoxically, if the reason for not heeding the populace was to preserve the constitution that protected the people, the result of their actions was an affront to the political system the Charter had founded.

The main section (“Interieur”) of the La Renommée on December 9 contained the first of few liberal examinations of the event. The anonymous author, unwilling to admit to his own paper’s volatile tone throughout the year, claimed that ultras had used the Grégoire affair to “stir up passions” and increase their popularity. Stating that “the ultras and the ministers are not popular . . . this must reassure the nation,” the author seemed himself to have been stuck between believing in public opinion as the voice of the abstract “nation,” and believing in the value of individuals’ opinions.  

La Renommée’s editors and writers attempted to portray the independents’ behavior throughout the crisis as a unified and brave attempt to “defend the national majority that it [the independent coalition] represented;” an assertion that many of the liberal public would have failed to appreciate if they had read the transcripts of the December 6 session. In practice, public opinion proved an unwieldy and altogether too labile a concept to use for practical political effect. Rhetorical posturing that claimed the support of public opinion without complications took over as the dominant mode of debating the makeup of the nation.

97 “Interieur.” La Renommée, no. 177, 9 December 1819, 695.

What did the leftist public actually think about the independents’ showing? Constant for one feared the damaging effect that the affair would have among his constituents. He wrote Goyet: “I write to you, my excellent friend . . . in order to ask what you think of us. But it is not on a point on which our opinions [Goyet and Constant’s] are so unanimous . . . it is on the effect that this event will produce among our friends, and on the judgment in which they hold, namely, our deputies.”

Goyet responded after hearing of Grégoire’s expulsion and expressed his deep disappointment: “I must not allow you to ignore, my dear Constant, that the countrymen [campagnards] appear profoundly afflicted by the indifference of the deputies for their constituents.” He protested that prudence and moderation only served to weaken the independents’ mandate. Goyet decried how politicians and writers claimed the authority of public opinion, but failed to look for the people’s opinion when it mattered most, or to honor and value it when it spoke through elections. He pondered: “Why not look for its [the independent coalition’s] force in the people . . . why don’t they address their constituents and all of France on the current crisis?”

Goyet exposed a critical fault in Restoration liberal theory: in a representative system there was no means by which one could both truly listen and respond to the people, and the political system relied on the assumption that public opinion would independently and rationally defend it against the encroachments of unchecked authority. “Leftist” public opinion could be dangerous for “liberal” political careers, so the political leaders chose the more pragmatic course, and in the end, this too failed to protect them from political backlash among their constituents and their political enemies.

99 Constant to Goyet, Paris 6 December 1819, Correspondance, 204.

100 He referred specifically to the electoral crisis that the Grégoire affair sparked. Goyet to Constant, Le Mans 11 December 1819, Ibid., 211-12.
Grégoire himself may not have cared about his political fate. He had not chosen to run, and only accepted the nomination at the urging of some independents who later failed to support him.\textsuperscript{101} He remained at his lodgings in Paris on December 6 to avoid public humiliation in the Chamber. That day, he wrote his friend Lambrechts to express why he did not resign and his disappointment with those he had hoped would defend him:

> A resignation would have only therefore succeeded to mask the weakness, and speaking frankly, the \textit{cowardice} of pretended liberals who fearfully follow the example of some energetic men placed at the height of the Left. The nation should know those to whom it accords or refuses its respect, and the session today will give it a good measure of these men.\textsuperscript{102}

Grégoire predicted that after taking “good measure,” the public that had rallied behind the independent liberal deputies as the champions of opposition to arbitrary power, would see them as the cautious and ineffectual politicians they had shown themselves to be during his expulsion.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Independents legitimized their opposition to the ministry and ultras by claiming in the press and political debates that they represented “public opinion” as they perceived it in the leftist populace. During the Grégoire crisis, they failed to present a unified and ideologically coherent response to the crisis surrounding Grégoire’s election because they could not resolve the tension between appealing to the masses and maintaining their viability in the Restoration system of government. In the end, the independents’ muddled attempts to protect their standing in the Chamber left Grégoire without a seat. But their behavior hurt their cause even more; their oppositional rhetoric alienated potential allies and falsely raised the hopes of

\textsuperscript{101} Especially the Marquis de Lafayette. See Necheles, \textit{Abbé Grégoire}, 213-14.

\textsuperscript{102} Grégoire to Lambrechts, Paris 6 December 1819, \textit{Mémoires de Grégoire}, 250.
people behind “public opinion” whom they had addressed and to whom they responded throughout the year.

Unfortunately for thinkers like Constant, the theoretical conception of the populace as a body capable of reaching rational consensus and conspiring to enchain authority through its dictates had no basis in reality. Instead, he had to contend with a scarred polity sensitive to the deep sense of political division in the nation. The frame of national division rendered Constant’s theoretical ideas unsuited to the political reality of the era, and this helps to explain the disparity between his ideas and his actions during the Grégoire crisis. Hypersensitive to the partisan atmosphere, independents backed into a popular oppositional discourse that offered them little when they faced a situation that demanded a more pragmatic approach to politics. Polarization was an inexorable force, isolating the independents when they tried to be pragmatic and committing them to divisive partisanship when they followed their constituents’ inclinations.

The Grégoire affair did not mark the end of the independents as a political force nor was it the first instance in which the problem of engaging public opinion presented difficulties for them. But it did, however, illustrate for a large segment of the leftist population, including several independent politicians, that partisan battles are won by activists who are not beholden to theory and not afraid to cynically manipulate the political system. Ultras who were in danger of becoming politically irrelevant as a fringe group on the far Right benefited because polarization pulled the ministry to the Right. Eventually, they used the assassination of the king’s nephew, the Duc de Berry, in February 1820 as a pretext

103 Indeed, throughout 1819 their efforts to preserve the electoral laws, recall exiles, decry the misuse of ministerial justice, and other initiatives could serve to illustrate the tension between radical speech and pragmatic politics. To follow these events from the perspective of the independents see, Harpaz, L’École Libérale, 99-128.
to further isolate liberals and convince the king to name an ultra-dominated ministry. This shocking event deepened and fixed the divide between the two sides in the post-revolutionary debate on the French nation. With the fall of the Decazes ministry, however, the government enacted restrictive press and electoral laws that brought liberals and many moderates together in opposition.\textsuperscript{104} The assassination would become another defining event for polarization, but even before this, the Grégoire affair had demonstrated the failure of independents to make strategic decisions in their opposition to both moderates and ultras. Like the ultras, the independent liberals fell into the habit of making clear, polarizing statements about their opponents, but this tactic left little space for pragmatic politics. On the other hand, dichotomous politics, while damaging to the national sense of unity, later actually helped liberals articulate and promote an effective ideological opposition to the government that was in step with leftist opinion in the country.

It was an irony of this era that a lack of formal political parties translated into more vicious partisanship. The increased polarization that followed the Grégoire case, however, helped liberals to see themselves as more of a “party,” confront a similar case of expulsion in 1823 with a different strategy (see Chapter Four), and develop a successful election strategy in the mid 1820’s.\textsuperscript{105} During the 1820s, liberals began to systematically engage the populace and successfully integrate a wide spectrum of independent and \textit{doctrinaire} liberals and even...


some royalists like Chateaubriand to act in concert against the arbitrary ultra Villèle ministry of the mid-1820’s and the Polignac ministry during the last year of the Restoration period. Voters’ organizations such as aide-toi, le ciel t’aidera (help yourself, and God will help you) and subscription campaigns took advantage of the polarized climate of the era to galvanize broad support for liberal candidates and embark on a practical program for attaining electoral victory. Their later successes in 1827 and 1830 testified to the benefits of acknowledging polarization and marshaling the support of likeminded citizens rather than assuming that the nation—and by proxy—public opinion would magically coalesce around the camp of liberal deputies.  

The organizers of these campaigns recognized the oppositional character of public opinion but responsibly channeled it into a plan of action that could yield results without alarming more moderate politicians.

Using the Grégoire situation as a case study of political polarization helps demonstrate the power of events to both confirm and complicate the ideological assumptions that led to France’s post-revolutionary sense of national division. All politically aware people during the period could have articulated the basic differences that divided liberals and ultras and could have interpreted Grégoire’s election through this rubric of post-revolutionary polar politics. At the same time, liberal politicians realized that acting on their own and their constituents’ ideological convictions would damage their political standing. During the crisis, Benjamin Constant and his colleagues were confounded by the conflict between the conceptual frameworks that claimed political legitimacy both through public opinion and

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through adherence to the constitutional political order. They had to rely on both public
opinion and established institutions in order to mount a successful opposition to forces that
threatened the Charter as they interpreted it, but they were inflexible when politics demanded
flexibility and malleable when their constituents and public opinion demanded firmness.
Balance between the interests of one’s constituency, the conceptual framework of one’s
ideology, and pragmatic political practice is essential to democracy. For independents in
1819, none of these factors were well defined. Ironically, because they relied on language
and concepts whose application had never been allowed to mature in practice, they facilitated
a further polarization of the nation that they neither predicted nor desired. The Grégoire affair
thus became a kind of political education for liberals, even as it contributed to their isolation.
Chapter Three

Rival Nations at War: Restoration Nationalism and the Spanish War of 1823

Introduction

On January 28, 1823, Louis XVIII opened the new year’s legislative session with a speech to a combined meeting of the Chambers of Peers and Deputies. In it, he announced his intention to intervene militarily in Spain to help that nation’s King Ferdinand VII reassert his monarchical rights over a Spanish liberal junta (Cortes). Few of the men in attendance were surprised as the prospect of war had consumed France’s attention for several months. Louis defended his decision by stressing France’s responsibilities to contribute to the continent’s stability and to repay the nation’s debt to her allies for restoring his throne. Reminded of their own suffering during the Revolution, he claimed, the French people recognized the need to attack the Spanish liberals before they spread revolution to other nations—especially France. Louis declared, “After having given witness to other nations of our discord’s terrible effects, we are ourselves now exposed to dangers deriving from similar misfortunes among a neighboring people.”¹ France was finally ready to reenter the international stage as a stable partner in the post-revolutionary European order, and to protect her own monarchy in the process.

Louis’s speech outlined the Restoration’s conflict over the nature and purpose of post-revolutionary France. Could the nation overcome its own revolutionary history? Did

attacking another state because of its constitution jeopardize the balance of liberal and royalty ideals in the French Constitutional Charter? In January of 1823 these questions were already circulating in the public sphere. During the following year, liberals and ultras rearticulated their ideas of France and her role in the world, and used the war as a pretext for asserting rival national values in foreign and domestic affairs. As French troops crossed into Spain, the French people debated whether their armies represented an aggressive absolute monarchy or a cautious constitutional nation.

That the French needed to intervene was perhaps fitting considering that French armies under Napoleon were the original cause of Spain’s troubles. When Spain’s Bourbon King Ferdinand VII returned to his country in 1814, the liberal Cortes that had resisted Napoleon’s armies for six years wanted the King to uphold their constitution. Ferdinand, however, obstinately refused and continued to rule as an absolute monarch. In 1820, Spanish troops rebelled before departing to subdue the rebellious Latin American colonies and demanded that Ferdinand adopt the constitution. He did so reluctantly, but by 1822 his continuing resistance to the Cortes led to civil war between Spanish royalists based near the French border and “constitutionalists” in Madrid who held the king under house arrest. At the Congress of Verona in late 1822, the European powers, shocked by these events and the rise in liberal agitation and rebellion throughout Europe, agreed on the need to prevent the Spaniards’ “revolutionary spirit” from reigniting revolution in France and Europe. The French delegation at the Congress, led by the new foreign minister Chateaubriand, saw an opportunity for France to reassert its stature as a European nation by defeating the Spanish
rebels and rescuing Ferdinand.²

After French troops departed for the frontier in April, the campaign itself was rather anti-climactic. Under the titular leadership of the Duc d’Angoulême, King Louis’ nephew, the French army entered Madrid in late May, fought one real engagement with the taking of the Trocadero fort on August 31, forced the Cortes to capitulate at Cadiz, and freed Ferdinand by late September. With Ferdinand back on the throne, the campaign was over in five months; it was a surprisingly easy affair compared to the six long years from 1807-1813 that had sapped Napoleon’s army on the peninsula.

A foreign war under the Bourbon’s white flag presented Restoration writers and politicians with new circumstances, but they relied on the same partisan frames that had defined Restoration political culture since 1814. Ultras still claimed to defend a Catholic, paternalist model of absolutist government, replete with notions of natural law, societal order, and hierarchy, while liberals still argued for political and civil liberties and the right to national self-determination. The war, however, lent a palpable sense of urgency to France’s internal conflicts. Both camps understood that this was France’s first international demonstration of power since Waterloo; how the nation acted externally would either alleviate or exacerbate international and domestic concerns over its internal stability. More importantly, ultras and liberals thought the use of military force would confirm the nation’s domestic values and priorities, thus raising the stakes of intervention even higher.

A recent article by Kôbô Seigan shows how liberals and ultras used the history of the French Revolution to debate the war.³ His interesting insights notwithstanding, Seigan draws

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primarily from two press sources and does not fully address how the war fit into the broader context of Restoration politics. His aim, moreover, is to demonstrate how the Restoration’s political actors resurrected and refought the Revolution in their debates. Though they often used historical precedents in their arguments, however, they did not get these ideas directly from the Revolution. The historical narrative of the revolutionary era had already passed through the filter of Restoration polarization. Over the preceding eight years, partisanship and political events had created a paradigm for understanding both the past and the present. Thus revolutionary and Restoration memories contributed to the rhetoric both sides employed to think, speak, and write about the war. The failure of national reconciliation at the beginning of the Restoration, for example, was just as emotionally traumatic as the revolutionary and Napoleonic legacy. Despite all of the relevant comparisons between the two eras that politicians made, the nation’s contemporary disunity influenced political behavior in 1823 more than memories of 1793 or 1808. The political dynamics analyzed in this chapter thus deserve consideration in their immediate political contexts rather than simply as unresolved revolutionary issues. As a whole, therefore, I choose in this chapter to deemphasize the “revolutionary” in “post-revolutionary.”

Besides Seigan’s recent foray into the subject, however, historians have largely overlooked the 1823 Spanish War. It was, after all, a relatively short and bloodless affair. The war usually arises in broader discussions of the conservative crack down on liberal

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4 Emmanuel Waresquiel considers the Hundred Days (and the subsequent White Terror) to be the foundational moment of Restoration politics. See Emmanuel de Waresquiel, L’histoire à rebrousse-poil: Les élites, la Restauration, la Révolution (Paris : Fayard, 2005).
movements throughout Europe in the post-Napoleonic age. Historians of Restoration politics have examined how ultras used the war to solidify and strengthen their domestic political power, but they pay little attention to the widespread polarized debate over the intervention. For example, Guillaume Bertier de Sauvigny describes how the war quashed the liberals’ claims of being the true “heralds of patriotism,” but he offers few examples from the public sphere that illustrate this change in patriotism during the Restoration. Martial patriotism had in fact evolved in the years before the war from an idea in service of a left-wing nation in arms in 1818, to an idea in service of a right-wing monarchical and Christian crusade by 1823. Although this shift only pertained to a five-year period and culminated in an obscure military conflict, analyzing its manifestations in the public sphere reveals how polarization informed essential debates about the nation, and how events and political frames interacted in the Restoration.

The Spanish War also provides a good example of how the frame of national division informed liberal and ultra nationalism. Military action provided liberal and ultra politicians and writers with an opportunity to articulate their understandings of French history and France’s role in the world, but each side needed the other to convey their own ideas about the

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5 Approaching the war from this international perspective, Paul Schroeder glosses over its French domestic ramifications, and instead focuses on how the war opened up rifts between allies and threatened the continental system’s order even as it reaffirmed France’s role in the world. Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 627.

6 Across the board, the general consensus on the war in Spain is that it consolidated the ultras’ hold on public opinion, guaranteed the support of the army, and humiliated the liberals who opposed it. See, for example, André Jardin and André-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 61-62, Isabelle Backouche, La Monarchie Parlementaire, 1815-1848, de Louis XVIII à Louis-Philippe (Paris: Pygmalian, 2000), 101-104, Emmanuel de Waresquiel and Benoît Yvert, Histoire de la Restauration, 1814-1830 : Naissance de la France moderne, (Paris : Perrin, 1996), 358.

nation and its citizens. By 1823, polarization had permanently conjoined the two sides and with such strong bonds that they could not imagine an ideal nation nor explain its past without resorting to attacks on contemporary domestic enemies. Liberals and ultras used their own internal frames to conceive perfect visions of France, but the frame of national division, and events, dictated how they entered political discourse. The prospect of military action in Spain, for example, turned Restoration political actors’ ubiquitous calls for unity and reconciliation according to their own political terms, into exclusive descriptions of the nation predicated upon the defeat of foreign and domestic enemies.

The rival nationalisms in play in 1823, however, still echoed earlier odes to utopias because their proponents still believed all true citizens were behind their efforts. Nationalists typically rally public opinion in wartime by emphasizing shared national values, and asking people to promote and defend them. Despite the fact that the French people had split on almost all political issues up to 1823, and had made clear through their words and actions that they disagreed on the war, both liberals and ultras nonetheless believed all of the nation was willing to fight for their respective ideas of France.

The liberals of the Restoration believed in a nation of united people with inherent rights to at least a voice in governance if not always sovereign authority. The liberals constructed the nation as a sociopolitical entity with a civic conception of a people who conveniently shared cultural traits. Despite their low numbers in the democratically-elected 1823 Chamber of Deputies, liberals also claimed that “the nation” supported their antiwar position. Without any power, they portrayed the ultra government as a foreign entity set against the oppressed majority of the people-as-nation, similar to the position of the many ethnic groups concurrently dominated by Europe’s imperial powers. Liberals, however,
stressed political ideology over ethnicity as the driving reason for oppressed “majorities” to coalesce around a nationalist platform. Conveniently, the rebellion in Spain had arisen over political issues and not geographic or ethnic self-determination. French liberals therefore identified more fully with the Spanish rebels, and used the Spanish struggle as a metaphor for their own claim that the French people were frustrated political shareholders denied participation in ruling the nation.

The pro-war ultras in power, on the other hand, promoted an illiberal, primordialist, and xenophobic nationalist discourse. They championed absolutist government, defined the nation in ethno-paternalistic terms of king and family, and branded their political enemies as foreign elements in the country. During the Spanish War, ultras promulgated this conservative creed through a modern, centralized state apparatus and representative institutions firmly in their control. They then saturated the Restoration’s public sphere with the idea that democratically-justified public opinion supported their nationalist war policy. In short, they rallied national opinion to support a conservative ideology, and in the process fashioned a nation that fit with their political ideas and agenda. External and internal threats compelled this nation to exert its strength on both foreign and domestic fronts. The war was the strongest impetus up to that point in the Restoration for mobilizing the ultraroyalist frame of the French nation.  

In addition to their competing nationalisms, French liberals and ultras magnified the war’s significance by expanding the scope of its significance beyond Spain and France to

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8 This fits with a general trend in aggressive nationalisms according to which the nation only really exists when it is mobilized for combat. As John Comaroff and Paul Stern suggest, “collective identities [such as nations] are not ‘things’ in or for themselves, but an imminent capacity that takes on manifest form in response to external forces.” John L. Comaroff and Paul Stern, Introduction to New Perspectives on Nationalism and War, (Australia/US et al: Gordon and Breach, 1995), 5.
encompass the whole world. Both sides claimed to defend all of humanity or civilization, as well as their specific national community. In the process, rhetoric designed to rally the French nation became a complicated mix of nationalist and universalist sentiments. The liberals’ ideology of popular sovereignty, and the ultras’ paternalistic model of legitimacy, however, brought consistency to each of these simultaneous defenses of the nation and the world.

Many Restoration liberals, with the notable exception of *doctrinaires*, accepted some form of popular sovereignty because they conceived of it as a universally applicable system of political organization. The progressive movements of national self-determination they championed (in Italy, Germany, Greece, etc.), however, had brought together claims for civil and national rights which seemed to belong to two distinct and apparently exclusive categories—civil rights and political liberty for all humanity, and national rights to sovereignty for distinct peoples. Fortunately for them, French liberals’ labile idea of popular sovereignty made it possible to combine these two types of rights to make an ideological basis for nationalism that simultaneously promoted civil rights for the people writ large, and rights of self-determination for a particular community. This hybrid of national and popular sovereignty proved flexible enough to rally even the *doctrinaires* to defend another nation’s and people’s rights to independence and political liberty, and to claim that French people also enjoyed these rights.

In paternalism, ultras likewise found a dogma that could link national and universal claims. The proponents of paternalism did not consider cultural traits, values, and sentiments as the primary attributes that linked members of a community. Although ultras used the

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people’s common attributes as rhetorical devices to rally political support, they identified the essence of the nation with a hierarchical familial chain linking the king and the people, and fathers and sons.\(^{10}\) According to the natural law of paternalism, all communities shared the same bases of authority, namely God and those kings and fathers to whom He granted temporal power. Ultras thus found in paternalism a sufficiently cohesive ideology with which they could rally people to defend both the French nation and the Spanish king.

Universalism complicated the matter of defining the nation and heightened the rhetoric surrounding it. Liberals and ultras both made claims for two separate groups of constituents: the liberals for France-as-nation, and humanity-as-bearers of rights; the ultras for France-as-family under the king, and humanity-as-family under God. Both sides portrayed their second, wider-set of human beings in terms of civilization and accused enemies of barbarism or primitivism. Liberals, therefore, branded European absolutist governments and their loyalists as destroyers of humanity’s shared rights, and ultras considered European liberals subhuman.\(^{11}\) During the Spanish War, the dualistic nature of both the French nation and humanity spawned a complicated rhetoric of the “other:”

According to both sides, the parameters of belonging to a morally righteous community thus not only extended beyond the nation’s borders and cleaved boundary lines within them, but they also paradoxically defined the unitary essence of French identity. Acting on the

\(^{10}\) Anthony Smith notes that ethnicity is but one of several “axes of alignment and division in the pre-modern world”. In ultra nationalist discourse “nation” gave way to “family,” but this described a political relationship in the community as much or more than an ethnic one. See, Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 46.

\(^{11}\) Nationalist movements often create “ingroups” that strengthen their internal cohesion by castigating an “outgroup” or “other.” Daniel Druckman writes that “competitive intergroup contexts arouse strong ingroup identification coupled with outgroup derogation.” Daniel Druckman, “Social-Psychological Aspects of Nationalism,” in *New Perspectives on Nationalism and War*, (Australia/US et al: Gordon and Breach, 1995), 85.
demands of this universal moral community made people see this war as a far more significant affair than its minor military actions suggested it actually was.\textsuperscript{12} In addition to rival nationalist and universalist ideologies, evolving democratic practices also played a part in the war. A recent study by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder explores the connection between nationalism and incomplete democratization. These authors suggest that weak institutions in democratizing nations allow elites to use foreign aggression to garner support for their agenda and legitimize themselves.\textsuperscript{13} By 1823, eight years of volatile political contestation had caused considerable anxiety among the French over the stability and legitimacy of the constitutional regime. Ultras took advantage of this anxiety to go to war, and after its successful conclusion, they strengthened their influence in democratic institutions by turning a wave of patriotic enthusiasm for victory into a wave of electoral support in the 1824 elections.\textsuperscript{14} Ironically, their success in controlling the Restoration’s democratic institutions rested on a propaganda campaign promoting an essentially undemocratic idea of society.

This chapter is an analysis of how rival nationalist claims emerged during the war, how they appeared in published and archival sources, and how they drew on and strengthened the frame of national division. The first section of the chapter offers a

\textsuperscript{12} David Bell posits that the Napoleonic Wars had conditioned people to thinking of international conflict in terms of total war because, in the post-revolutionary context, military conflict serves imagined utopian communities as much as real nations. See, David Bell, \textit{The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It} (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007).

\textsuperscript{13} “In the absence of strong state institutions to knit together the nation,” Mansfield and Snyder write, “leaders must struggle for legitimacy in an ill-defined, contested political arena,” Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, \textit{E lecting to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies go to War}, (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 2005), 9-10.

\textsuperscript{14} A wave of pro-war sentiment even before its conclusion was a lucky outcome considering that the French population was just beginning to recover from the trauma of supplying Napoleon’s war machine for over ten years. For more on the relationship between the populace and the military see, Michael Broers, \textit{“ Civilians in the Napoleonic Wars,”} in \textit{Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Europe, 1618-1900} (Linda and Marsha Frey, eds.) (Westport CT/London: Greenwood Press, 2007), 146-52.
of the two sides’ discourses on patriotism and peace in 1818, when occupying allied troops left France, and their stances in late 1822 and early 1823, when the prospect of war in Spain loomed. Between these two periods, liberals transformed from stridently defiant patriots into pacifists as the ultras arrogated martial patriotism and put it to service in support of the war. The next section focuses on how the French people framed the war in debates and exacerbated polarization in the provinces by turning support or opposition to the war into categories of belonging and exclusion in the nation. The final section focuses on official and unofficial propaganda texts celebrating the troops’ return to France to reveal components of the ultra frame for understanding the war and the nation. On the whole, the texts and events described in this chapter illustrate how the frame of national division grew stronger as partisan rhetoric over the war further polarized liberals and ultras.

The debates over the Spanish War reflected mutually exclusive conceptions of post-revolutionary France, and demonstrated the difficulty of conducting foreign policy in a post-traumatic polarized society. The prospect of foreign war led liberals and ultras to confront France’s revolutionary past in the most explicit manner since 1815. Yet their attempts to articulate the nation in the context of both contemporaneous partisanship and historical precedents only hardened the frames that kept the two sides apart. Ultras continued to rail against the Revolution, and found in the Spanish situation a perfect example of the revolutionary danger liberalism posed. They gave new life to the Revolution over which they had claimed victory numerous times in their pre-1823 rhetoric; only to conjure up its specter in Spain and exorcise its influence over the French. Liberals had long repudiated the Revolution’s war on monarchy despite its ideological roots in popular sovereignty. The war, however, found them defending Spanish liberals who professed similar political ideas to their
own, but who also engaged in an explicitly revolutionary act of aggression against a monarch. These circumstances thus also forced liberals to revise their understanding of the Revolution and its lessons to justify their position. By bringing opposing political ideologies and the memories of the Revolution into intense conflict, the war strengthened rival frames of the nation and widened the divide in Restoration society.

Part One: Peace, Patriotism, and France’s role in the World

Prologue: The 1818 Liberation of France

In 1818, the ministry under the Duc de Richelieu successfully negotiated the departure of foreign troops who had occupied parts of France since Waterloo. Though most French people found cause for celebration in the liberation of native land, the event highlighted differences in the patriotic sentiments of the Left and the Right. France’s defeat in 1815, and the subsequent humiliations of occupying troops, reparations, and internal political discord, had shaken the people’s confidence in France’s status among European states. Unable to conduct foreign affairs independently, the French focused their competitive energies inward and branded domestic rivals as foreign elements. Patriotism, the emotional expression of national identity, reflected the unstable poles of Restoration public opinion. Should patriotism emphasize love for monarchy, love for the people, or love for the Charter that united the two? When the French called upon these patriotic sentiments, they exposed the unresolved arguments beneath them and further exacerbated the division in the nation.

Both sides framed their patriotic discourses around events of the recent past. The Right eschewed the militaristic posturing that had ruined France in the Napoleonic era and equated patriotism with ardor for the king and Church. The ultra lexicon of national heroes did include Old Regime warriors and émigré soldiers, but most royalists reserved their
highest praise for Louis XVIII who had brought peace when he ascended the throne. Liberals also decried Napoleon’s wars and their effect on domestic policy, but they admired the popular nature of the revolutionary levées en masse, and identified with republican and Bonapartist praise for citizen-soldiers, and those groups’ more strident position against the presence of foreign troops on French soil. During the first years of the Restoration, therefore, the Left’s patriotic rhetoric was far more martial and jingoistic than that of the Right.

Most French people regardless of ideology disapproved of allied troops on their soil but largely remained silent. Some extreme elements in society, however, actively protested against the occupation and tried to discredit the new regime by claiming that Louis XVIII needed foreign troops to remain on the throne.\footnote{For continued Bonapartism and resistance to the regime and the allies see, R.S. Alexander, \textit{Bonapartism and Revolutionary Tradition in France: The Fédérés of 1815} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).} In 1817, for example, an agitator in Versailles posted a leaflet calling for a government that would not “deliver France to foreigners bound by foot and fist in irons.”\footnote{Archives Nationales (AN), F7-6706, “Copie d’un écris, dont trois exemplaires ont été trouvés à terre, à Versailles dans différens endroits de la Ville; le 22 août,” Police Report, August, 1817.} Political elites on the Left did not resort to such sentiments, but as allied powers began to suppress liberal movements in other countries, French liberals turned decisively against Europe’s conservative regimes. They therefore thought a troop withdrawal would repudiate the idea of absolute monarchy and confirm France’s constitutional government. The liberal writer and politician Eusèbe Salverte believed that public opinion had forced the government to make the allies leave, claiming that “opinion is entirely national, and almost unanimous” in its desire to keep France constitutional and liberal.\footnote{Eusèbe Salverte, \textit{Des Pétitions. Dissertation par Eusèbe Salverte, suivi par des considérations sur l’immutabilité de la Charte Constitutionnelle} (Paris: Dupont, 1819), 39.} He claimed Richelieu had heard “opinion,” and fulfilled the
nation’s desires. This interpretation simplified the political and economic incentives that actually spurred Richelieu to push for the departure, but it reflected a common impression among French liberals that France as a progressive, constitutional state contrasted with Europe’s authoritarian monarchies.

Many liberals believed that the liberation heralded a new era of accord between constitutional states and “peoples.” The “people,” writ broadly and not just referring to the French people, were the true beneficiaries of the allies’ departure. According to this line of reasoning, the liberation of France was the first step toward concluding peace between nations and social classes. This optimistic appraisal reflected the liberals’ confidence that their recent political successes in France would terminate domestic and international discord. The liberal author E. F. Moncey wrote, “The liberals must now carefully commit themselves to cementing an indestructible union between all the peoples, to destroying national hatreds.” This language of international solidarity would later expose liberals to accusations of treason and disloyalty to the regime, especially when prejudice against foreign monarchs remained its salient feature. But it also shows how, even before the war of 1823, liberals incorporated universalist themes in their political conception of the nation.

Already in a precarious position in the 1818 Chamber of Deputies, some disconsolate ultras actually bemoaned the departure of foreign troops. They had counted on them to guarantee the throne’s security, and interpreted their withdrawal as a sign that France was distancing herself from Europe’s conservative monarchies. Furthermore, some believed that

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18 The famed songwriter, Béranger, praised the prospect of a new international pacifism in a poem written to celebrate the liberation, _La Sainte-Alliance des peoples_ (1818).

the stability military occupation had offered was responsible for France’s growing prosperity. "You protected the arts and sciences, /And commerce was ever growing;" an anonymous poet wrote in an ode to the allies, "We have not with all our finances, / Paid enough for this eminent service." For ultras insecure because of their weakened domestic strength, dark clouds seemed to hover on the horizon.

A few pessimistic souls notwithstanding, most ultras joined in the national chorus celebrating the liberation of French territory. But for many of them, Louis XVIII alone deserved credit for the troops’ departure, because only the stability of his throne could have convinced the allies that France had been rehabilitated enough to allow them to leave. A wide swath of public opinion shared this opinion including the poet Denis-François Decors who wrote, “Let us celebrate, Oh my verses, the happy deliverance, / Let us admire the prudence and high virtue / Of this monarch to whom we owe such a gift.” In 1818, there was little reason not to be patriotic and rally around the king. He had stabilized the regime and, despite the ultras’ strong dislike for his moderate ministry at the time, he had shown himself strong enough to appease both domestic and foreign opinion.

In the end, despite differing interpretations over its significance, few could argue against removing foreign armies and their uncomfortable reminder of the Restoration’s inauspicious origins. On the whole, widespread optimism accompanied the evacuation and echoed many of the political tracts of the period that called for national unity and political moderation. The poet-songwriter P.-A. Ducis, for example, celebrated their departure as the

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21 Denis-François Decors, le neuf octobre mil huit cent dix-huit, ou le Départ des troupes alliées (Paris: Eymery, 1818), 4-5.
beginning of national reconciliation in his *Ode sur le départ des troupes étrangères* [*Ode on the Departure of Foreign Troops*](1818). “Let us stifle forever our civil discord,/ These impotent regrets and useless hopes,” he implored, “Under the same color, ah! let us all live in peace!” 22

Such sentiments of unity, however, did not last. While the nation celebrated, these early reflections on France as a resurgent international power held the seeds for the later debates over the war in 1823. Opinions on the liberation drew from each side’s interpretations of the Restoration: France was either a constitutional state, championing the progressive ideals of a new era, or a monarchical state that owed its institutions to the king’s bounty. As partisan conflicts intensified in the years between the allies’ departure and the advent of the Spanish War, the debate over France’s role in the world diminished under the press of domestic crises. When it was time for more troops to leave France—this time French soldiers on the attack—these unresolved differences over France’s national identity and role in the world reemerged in stronger and starker tones.

**Prewar Debates and the Congress of Verona**

Intervention in Spain was but one in a series of international measures against liberal agitation and rebellion in Europe. Austrian troops had invaded Piedmont and Naples in 1820-21 to suppress aggressive liberal reforms and nationalist movements in those countries. In Germany, Prussian agents actively sought out and prosecuted liberal booksellers and publicists. In France, the abortive attempts of the *carbonari* movement to foment revolt in the French army met with swift reprisals against its ringleaders and led to suspicions—in some

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cases justified—about the loyalty of leading liberals in the Chambers.\textsuperscript{23} The division between “peoples” and the conservative monarchies of Europe suggested in 1818 liberal discourse had become a reality on the continent.

In the midst of these troubles, a French diplomatic delegation led by the bellicose ultra foreign minister Mathieu de Montmorency traveled to the Congress of Verona. All France knew that the situation in Spain topped the Congress agenda. The ruling heads of Russia, Prussia, and Austria had expressed their dissatisfaction with France’s political turmoil and intimated that France would suffer the most if the Spanish revolution spread beyond the peninsula. A young diplomat, Charles de Bois-le-Comte, attended the meetings and described how the decision to intervene strained the delegation. While liberals in France criticized the French government for its seeming collusion with absolutist and anti-constitutional monarchs, the ultra ministry under the Comte de Villèle and its delegation at the Congress vacillated between appeasing the Holy Alliance and asserting France’s independence. Despite ultra propaganda that favored war as a defense of international monarchical principles, the French delegation reacted negatively to the condescension of the allied powers. Bois-le-Comte described how an Austrian delegate’s claim that “France must consider herself as an agent of the Grand Alliance” did not make the delegation any more eager to act. The gathered representatives of Europe, whether aggressively anti-revolutionary like the Prussians or cautious like the English, frankly doubted France’s ability to perform the task. The Prussians distrusted the loyalty of France’s “children soldiers,” while Wellington condescendingly urged France not to get involved for her own safety. The lack of

\textsuperscript{23} For the complicity of liberals in the carbonari movement, See Alan Spitzer, \textit{Old Hatreds and Young Hopes: The Carbonari against the Bourbon Restoration} (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
unity in the French delegation raised further questions about France’s readiness to deal with Spain.\textsuperscript{24}

The French delegation’s indecisiveness led to the shakeup of the French mission. Montmorency, whose over-conciliatory attitude towards the Holy Alliance disturbed Villèle, resigned, giving way to Chateaubriand as foreign minister. The delegation stood at a crossroad. Not wanting to appear as the Holy Alliance’s “reporters of the situation in Spain” and desiring to preserve “independence of action,” the French seemed to want to avoid war.\textsuperscript{25} Chateaubriand, however, was no pacifist. He described intervention in Spain as essential to the safety of the Bourbon regime in France. An invasion of Spain would forestall the spread of liberalism in France and strengthen the ultras’ hold on public opinion. At the close of the Congress, France emerged from the shadow of the allied powers in a final act of liberation from the old coalition that had crushed the nation eight years earlier. Bois-le-Comte wrote, “The question of Spain returns importance to France. She now aspires to disengage from the ties she had had to form.”\textsuperscript{26} The reasons for war remained the same, namely, the domestic threat of rebellion and the pressure from allies who had already marched against revolutionaries. But France would not be the servant of the Holy Alliance. Instead, the royalist ministry nationalized the war and sold it as a purely French act.

The prospect of war gave rise to a wave of pacifism among liberals and some moderates back in France. One of these moderates, Auguste Frankoual, believed that public opinion could tolerate the tension between liberals and ultras, but that “it rejects all these

\textsuperscript{24} Archives Nationales (AN), AB-XIX-3484, Charles-Bois-le-Comte, Manuscript, “Congrès de Vérone,” (1822), Archives Nationales, 204-05.

\textsuperscript{25} AN, AB-XIX-3484, 182-83. The instructions from Villèle to the delegation confirm this cautious attitude.

\textsuperscript{26} AN, AB-XIX-3484, “Congrès de Vérone: Table analytique des matières.”
exaggerations which try to lead the vessel of the state out of the port where it has happily landed after so many great storms.”²⁷ He seemed to recognize the stability that rested behind polarization and longed to preserve it. Frankoual’s appeal for peace, however, went unheeded. Liberals and ultras had been arguing for years without damaging the stability of the state, but facing the prospect of war, ultras seemed willing to sacrifice internal peace to focus on winning a wider ideological battle that France’s borders could no longer contain.

Some writers, on the other hand, welcomed a war of aggression as a means of unifying the nation and diverting energies wasted on partisan bickering. Angliviel de La Beaumelle’s *De l’excellence de la guerre avec Espagne* [*On the Excellence of the War with Spain*] (1823) and *Encore un mot sur l’excellence de la guerre avec Espagne* [*One More Word on the Excellence of the War with Spain*] (1823) argued that war would alleviate domestic contestation by distracting the nation and externally releasing its pent-up aggression. Believing that war was a natural state of society that alternated with peace, La Beaumelle saw the impending intervention as an inevitable product of prosperity which he claimed, “renders it [the nation] audacious....”²⁸ La Beaumelle advocated national rejuvenation through military action. Listing all the ultra arguments for war and pointing out their absurdity, he argued that their validity mattered little so long as they could ostensibly justify a preemptive attack and restore France’s stature and honor. For example, La Beaumelle considered it irrational to fight a war against an abstract concept such as popular sovereignty, but doing so provided a means for arbitrarily deciding when to fight and for how


long to continue fighting—thus its “excellence” as a causis belli.  

La Beaumelle believed that Restoration politicians had sullied France’s honor by identifying it with ideological positions. Honor based on political beliefs, he claimed, only kept men in contestation with one another. War, on the other hand, offered an opportunity to revitalize the nation by strengthening familial honor, the “real” honor that allows men to defend parents and friends, and expanding the concept to include protecting the nation and the world. With war, La Beaumelle wrote, “we will be able to find our honor related to situations that, in the beginning, seemed most foreign to us.”

The army too would undergo a transformation through war, abandoning the “revolutionary principle” of “passive obedience,” and replacing revolutionary slavishness with the genuine honor—again familial in nature—that comes from sanctioning the king’s decisions.

The arguments of Frankoual and Beaumelle, however, were not representative of the commentaries on the impending war. Most politically active people in France thought of the war as a reflection of the domestic political climate rather than a threat to general peace or a diversion from partisan politics; they viewed foreign policy through the lenses of their own domestic political prejudices.

Liberals, alarmed by the subjugation of popular movements in Italy, Germany, and Spain, saw these acts of repression as attacks on the “peoples” that many had expected to enjoy more freedom and political agency after 1818. They hesitated, however, to criticize directly the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian rulers of the “Holy Alliance,” because they feared ultras would accuse them of attacking monarchy as a principle, thus raising further

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29 Ibid., 25.
31 Ibid., 35.
doubts about their allegiance to Louis XVIII. When protesting against the Alliance, liberals thus often differentiated between noble ministers who dictated policy and the monarchs who stood above reproach. Liberal deputy and writer Edouard Bignon, for example, accused the Alliance’s “cabinets” of erecting obstacles to the natural and worldwide development of progressive values. “The people’s intellectual forces are directed toward perfecting the social order,” Bignon lamented, “In opposition to this tendency, cabinets deploy all the strength of their intellectual and material resources to stop this march of peoples and even to turn it around.” Bignon’s argument applied as well to the ultras in the Villèle ministry as to the likes of Metternich of Austria or Nesselrode of Russia. In all these cases, self-interested noble ministers duped the kings they served.

Liberals distrusted the ministers who claimed that they only sought peace in Europe after twenty-five years of warfare—even when they largely delivered on that promise. They accused Europe’s conservative ministries of turning the Congress of Vienna’s original purpose, namely stability, into a more abstract and mutable aim of “peace.” In a pamphlet entitled, De la Sainte-Alliance et du prochain congrès [Of the Holy Alliance and the Next Congress] (1822), the anonymous author wrote, “In the mind of M. Metternich, peace is only a means of supporting a powerful war against the peoples.”

While the autocratic ministers of the Holy Alliance may have merited some criticism for their cynical interpretation of

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32 To negotiate this difficulty, some liberals transferred to international politics the political theory in Article 13 of the Charter which stated that ministers alone were responsible for bad government policy. See Vincent Beach, “Charter of 1814,” in Historical Dictionary of France from the 1815 Restoration to the Second Empire, eds. Edgar Leon Newman and Robert Lawrence Simpson, vol. 1, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 192-94.


34 Anon., De la Sainte-Alliance et du prochain congrès (Paris: Constant-Chante, 1822), 33.
stability, liberals in France for their part overlooked the instability that accompanied the peoples’ agitation for rights. Their ideological conviction that France’s Charter reflected the people’s and the king’s shared sovereignty and authority, and that all peoples had a right to create similar polities, allowed liberals to justify the disruptive effects of rebellion. They interpreted the Alliance’s actions in Europe as attacks on their own political convictions, rather than as peacekeeping; but in many respects both sides were right.

The French liberals’ view that European absolutists had set themselves against the people drew strength from the well-publicized dissensions among the diplomatic delegations at the Congress of Verona. When the British under Wellington objected to intervening in Spain, many French liberals’ interpreted their stance as confirmation that “constitutional states” like England and France were natural allies in a struggle against the autocratic states of Europe; a contention that fed ultra contempt for the English and the French liberals who admired them.35 Some hotheaded leftists even advocated rekindling a broad ideological conflict between “free” and monarchical states. If not actively campaigning for hostilities, many liberals at least believed that circumstances demanded a show of force against the monarchs’ rush to war. Such was the proposal in an anonymous pamphlet entitled, Des moyens de prévenir une révolution en France et d’arrêter l’effusion du sang [The Means of

35 The aims of the English at the Congress of Verona were in fact not as moderate as the French liberals wanted to believe. See, Günther Heydemann, “The Vienna System between 1815 and 1848,” in “The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848”: Episode or Model in Modern History? (Peter Krüger and Paul Schroeder eds.), (Munster: Lit, 2002), 187-203. This anti-English sentiment bounced back and forth between the liberals and ultras over the course of the Restoration. In 1818, liberals tended to be anti-English as they were part of the occupying contingent; in 1823, the ultras mocked the anglophilia among French liberals, see, for example, M. Symon, L’Anglomanie ou l’Anti-Français, Poème, (Lyon : Brunet, 1823), in which the poet wrote, ““Ungrateful fellow citizens, enchanted French, /Cease to show yourselves so infatuated.”
Preventing a Revolution in France and Stopping Bloodshed] (1822), which advocated armed neutrality among constitutional states to ensure the peace of Europe.  

Liberals tried to prevent the war by demonstrating that constitutions posed no threat to monarchs or Europe. Antiwar pamphleteers, using the Charter’s success as evidence, claimed that constitutional monarchies were indeed the antithesis of revolution. In a pamphlet entitled, De la politique extérieure qui convient à la France [Of the Foreign Policy Suited to France] (1823), the anonymous author stated that, after years of warfare, France chose constitutionalism as its guiding principle and would not tolerate a regression to arbitrary government. Therefore, “nothing simpler determines the natural policy of France since the restoration. In effect, a constitutional state’s first allies are other constitutional states like itself. It is a truth that a child’s reason could grasp.” Liberals claimed that the international struggle between constitutionalism and absolutism spoke to the essence of the political struggle in France. Therefore, whatever decision the French government made would reveal its designs for France. “If it is true that the domestic policies of a country determine its foreign policy,” the author of De la politique wrote, “and that foreign policy in its turn reveals its domestic policy, what is a [state] power planning when it takes for its cause arbitrariness over rights?” Did going to war reveal that the government did not consider France a constitutional state?  

Proponents of the war scoffed at accusations that intervention in Spain revealed the arbitrary nature of the French government. Ultras supported Louis XVIII’s right to defend the

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37 Anon., De la Politique Extérieure qui Convient à la France, (Paris: Boucher, 1823) 6-7.

38 Ibid., 14.
legitimacy and absolute power of kings, but they also claimed that the manner in which the
decision to attack Spain developed reflected his love for the Charter and its institutions.
Recent history had demonstrated the difference between a legitimate monarch’s war and a
despot’s war. The pamphleteer M. de Parc-Locmaria reminded his readers that Napoleon had
lied and committed crimes to justify his incursion into the Peninsula and then brutally
suppressed the Spanish nation. “Louis, on the contrary, from the height of his constitutional
throne, surrounded by worthy representatives of a nation … reveals in the face of the entire
world, his principles and his projects.” Parc-Locmaria equated the transparency of the
Restoration system with popular and constitutional consent for war. Not all constitutional
states had the same priorities, he wrote, and only France among all the great nations shared a
long border with the most destabilized area in Europe—a fact that surely trumped calls for
solidarity between constitutional states.

Defense of popular sovereignty in Spain featured prominently in French antiwar
pamphlets, but the basic ideas of national sovereignty and a nation’s right to freedom from
foreign interference did need ideological justifications. An anonymous pamphleteer asked
during the lead up to the war whether any government could police the domestic policies of
another. If the answer was “yes,” then what guarantees did France have that the Holy
Alliance would not force Louis XVIII to abandon his constitution as the French now did with
Ferdinand VII? “Has the art of governing become so difficult,” the author asked, “that a
prince is not able to escape from the dangers of popular unrest without compromising his

18-19. Napoleon had invited Ferdinand and his father Charles VII to come to Bayonne in 1808 to sort out their
differences and then treacherously held them prisoner and put his brother Joseph Bonaparte on the Spanish
throne with the aid of French troops.
most beautiful right, that of sovereignty?” 40 How could France feel safe when everyone knew that the continental monarchs had no love for the Charter, its representative government, or the partisanship it spawned?

For the writer of the controversial pamphlet, *Craintes qu’inspire à un roturier le projet de guerre contre l’Espagne [Fears that the Project of War against Spain inspire in a Commoner] (1823)*, the French people merited the Charter and its protections because Louis knew their “ardor for independence.” 41 Independence, the author claimed, existed in two interwoven spheres of political activity, domestic and foreign. When ultras revealed their designs on the new system by attempting to restrict domestic liberties and roll back the tide of progress, they also damaged the autonomy of the French state in relation to its neighbors. If autocratic regimes had already abrogated the constitutions of Naples and Piedmont, what would stop them from doing the same in France? 42 Only a strong Charter would prevent foreigners from attacking, but unfortunately, going to war was a sign of its weakness.

The issue of national independence also troubled some moderates who opposed the war. The author of *De la monarchie en France [Of the Monarchy in France] (1822)*, “D*** ex-préfet,” predicted that the Holy Alliance would abandon the French to their own devices once French troops had defeated the Cortes, because “the principles of the Charter are by definition almost as dangerous for it as those of the Cortes’ constitution.” 43 No fan of revolution, the author suggested a more cautious approach to the issue of Spain. The Cortes,


42 Ibid., 14-15.

he claimed, propelled by its revolutionary impulses, would naturally choose to attack France and would be defeated. He suggested that France therefore ally with England and stand firmly but passively against both revolution and absolutism while awaiting the inevitable downfall of these combating systems. Such a stand would ensure that both French and Spanish sovereignty remained unsullied, and France would not be surrendering its independence to foreign kings.

The ultras, for their part, loudly proclaimed France’s newfound independence when the Holy Alliance gave the French government carte blanche in the intervention, and they had few qualms about encroaching on Spain’s own freedom of action. According to them, the Spanish rebels’ ideology threatened the independence of all nations. The coauthors of an ultra pamphlet, *Traité sur le droit d’intervention* [*Treatise on the Right of Intervention*] (1823), claimed revolutionary ideology in power destroyed a nation’s natural order, and once the social hierarchy in one nation collapsed, all hierarchies in other nations were at risk. Thus, the authors denied that the question of intervening in Spain involved merely a “national” element. It was instead an international social problem; revolutionaries would never stop agitating the lower classes and a national border would not prevent their influence. The French were not attacking the Spanish people or their nation’s sovereignty, only the principles of rebellion. By changing the substance of their argument from the right of national independence to the duty of combating revolutionary principles, ultras made a domestic political statement as well as justifying an interventionist foreign policy. The *Traité’s* authors alleged that the adoption of revolutionary principles explained the French

44 Ibid., 84-89.

lifers’ resistance to war, leading them to wonder how “it was possible that the stubbornness of some men for empty systems and incomprehensible doctrines could expose us to such a great danger?” Intervention in Spain remained the only recourse against the great threat of revolution; if it failed there, France and the world order faced inevitable destruction.

The authors of the *Traité’s* contention that the Left in France supported the same principles as the Spanish rebels demonstrated how Restoration divisiveness exacerbated political arguments and broadened the war’s significance beyond immediate circumstances in France or Spain. Arguing over France’s values and beliefs was an important introspective element of the debates over the war, but evaluating how the war reflected Restoration France’s essential character also led to claims about France’s status and the meaning of civilization. Were France’s actions civilized or did they threaten French civilization? What were the stakes for the world if France did not act in Spain? C.-J.-V. Darttey, a liberal writer and future sous-préfet under the July Monarchy, argued that war in Spain would violate the tenets of a civilized society. Darttey contended that a society could only be civilized so long as its people shared goals leading to general happiness. In the context of the war, even the ideological differences that divided French public opinion over the Spanish situation could not destroy the consensus of opinion in “civilized” France supporting the Charter’s constitutional protections. Believing that, “If the will and the practices of a people are in equal harmony, this people will be civilized,” Darttey labeled France’s constitutional government “civilized” because, despite political differences, all the French wanted the Charter and contributed to its success by participating in its institutions. Therefore, it was

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46 Ibid., 30.

now incumbent upon France as a civilized nation to prove that it could coexist harmoniously with other states and preserve civilization writ large. According to Darttey, the ministry’s march to war thus could have but one aim: to foment internal division in order to “occupy the minds” while they assaulted the civil liberties all French held dear. 48 Through its disregard for its own people’s values, the ministry would attack French civilization itself and threaten the world if it sent troops into Spain.

Ultras were even more likely to see the looming war in broad apocalyptic terms. In Dernières considérations sur le Congrès de Vérone [Last Considerations on the Congress of Verona] (1822), the Comte de “P…Ki” believed that political and social bifurcation in France pointed to a deep divide in all human societies. He considered the convened sovereigns at Verona to be the representatives of moral and religious civilization set against a minority “occult” group that wanted the “ruin of all institutions.” 49 Not only did this conspiratorial group threaten Ferdinand VII, it also held all legitimate manifestations of government at its mercy, including the French Restoration’s representative system and civil liberties. Not convinced by the argument that constitutional states naturally shared similar political interests, the count proclaimed that the French Charter and the Holy Alliance existed only to preserve “social order.” 50 A hierarchical social order alone guaranteed civilization’s survival because this order emanated from legitimate monarchs. Legitimate monarchs could do whatever was necessary to preserve the social order, and those opposed to them contravened nature and forfeited their constitutional rights and privileges.

48 Ibid., 92-93.
49 Comte M de P….Ki, Dernières considérations sur le Congrès de Vérone (Paris: Boucher, 1822), 3.
50 Ibid., 14.
Justifying intervention in Spain in these broad terms became considerably easier than supporting the war as simply an exercise undertaken in the French national interest. The Comte asserted that, “The interests of this war are those of religion, morality, civilization, [and] of all the institutions that represent them.” Just as Dartey saw the Villèle ministry as an enemy of humankind, ultras like the Comte believed that anyone promoting revolutionary principles threatened Church, king, and civilization itself; and as a result they lost their membership in a civilized nation. The ultras thus defended the pillars of their ideal conception of France through recourse to universalist themes.

When they tied the national to the universal, ultras implied that key elements of French identity existed outside geographical and culturally specific French traits. Indeed, some ultras believed that championing the singular “nation” as an abstract ideal threatened the greater civilized world order. Louis-François-Hilarion Audibert, while ardently patriotic in his own way, wrote that “the thoughts of statesmen must rise high enough to see the world instead of a point. Then they will remain convinced that each nation is but a fraction of the Grand Society, of the eternal society.” Audibert accused the war’s opponents of wanting to detach each nation from this general good, and of disrupting the world’s harmonious operation when they proclaimed national rights. He contended that nations had a purpose, however. They collectively inherited the role of guarantors of this universal society from the Church and its councils, and filled the void that the disintegration of medieval Christian consensus had left behind. Audibert thus likened the nations of Europe to accusatory prelates

51 Ibid., 52.
whose order to intervene in Spain was an act of “political excommunication for those who throw themselves outside of the law of nations through revolt.”53

Although both sides looked beyond the boundaries of the nation to illustrate the universal causes and stakes involved in the war, they also elevated France’s stature by claiming that she alone held the fate of humanity in her hands. The French delegation’s refusal to act in the Holy Alliance’s service reinforced this belief. Considering the significance accorded the war, the uncertain resolution of the Spanish question at the Congress of Verona at first perplexed bellicose ultras and left some liberals hopeful. The Congress did not conclude with a definitive order for French intervention, and ultras expressed their displeasure that the agreement to allow France to act alone was couched in the “language of doctrinaires,” leaving the possibility of war only a “hypothesis.”54 The allies supported action against the Spanish revolutionaries but no grand coalition of monarchs would march to save civilization. The French delegation had insisted on their independence of action and thus the war had become a solely French national affair. Writers on both sides of the debate drew on analogies in contemporary French politics and French history to make their cases. The French Revolution in particular provided a wellspring of metaphors and allusions from which to draw effective emotional motifs to oppose the war or justify it in the court of public opinion.

Using the historical precedent of the French Revolution to address the Spanish situation emphasized familiar national themes in a debate that could become hyperbolic when it dealt in competing universalisms. The Revolution brought to mind memories and

53 Ibid., 28.
54 Comte M de P....Ki, Dernières, 49-52.
references that all French people understood. The liberal author of *Craintes qu’inspire à un roturier* proclaimed that attacking supporters of the Spanish constitution would bring disaster to the Spanish monarchy that the French were ostensibly trying to save. “You are going … to respond to me that the fear of seeing Ferdinand and his family devoured by parties is the sole motif, the sole goal of your efforts and of your hostile wishes against Spain,” he wrote, “how imprudent you are! Do you recall the deadly blow delivered to Louis XVI when the allies wanted help him?” In the end, he argued, attacking constitutional Spain would only result in spilling a king’s blood, and those who most loudly proclaimed monarchical rights would shoulder the blame. This dire warning based on the historical precedent of the Revolution, was repeated in many liberal arguments against the war, including its most famous iteration that sparked Jacques-Antoine Manuel’s expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies (see Chapter Four).

For their part, ultras painted the Spanish revolutionaries as dangerous copies of the French liberals, and depicted French liberals as frustrated Jacobin revolutionaries. M. Coustelin, declaring that of the two main political groups in France, “one wants legitimacy, the other rejects it,” thought liberals had no loyalty to Louis XVIII or the Charter, but were slaves only to passion and power. A war had raged since the beginning of the Restoration, he claimed, but in unfair terms that served only liberal interests. The liberal minority, as Coustelin described them, had incessantly tried to rally the majority mass of non-political French citizens against the righteous remnant of the ultras. Unfortunately, this ultra minority, “a lamb in prey of the wolf,” blindly celebrated minor electoral victories and the defeat of

55 Anon., *Craintes qu’inspire à un roturier*, 18.

ineffectual conspiracies and overlooked the threat that the liberals’ mere existence posed to monarchy in France and Spain. Coustelin referred to the recent history of the Revolution to illustrate the danger of trusting political deliberation instead of acting aggressively against such mortal enemies. “Why, as in 89,” he asked, “do those who are able to save us sleep in shameful security, and deliver themselves to political abstractions instead of guiding themselves by the simple notions of good sense and experience?” The Revolution served as the ultras’ great metaphor for comparison—partly because they used it to discredit liberals with facile comparisons to Jacobins, and partly because it still resonated emotionally with the French people.

Despite their hatred of the French Revolution, ultras had a sense of ownership of the Revolution as their and France’s ideological nightmare. They conflated the French and Spanish revolutions as they looked for historical evidence to justify intervention in Spain. In the Spanish case, an almost personified Revolution—the ultras’ same old enemy—was a continuing source of infectious and misleading doctrines. Lieutenant-Colonel Duchateau, a war hawk pamphleteer, even claimed that the Spanish rebellion had not evolved independently from the French Revolution, but that French liberals had purposely instigated it by seeding revolutionary principles in Spain in order to “illuminate again the incendiary torch of revolutions among us [the French].” France’s revolutionary past became an ironic source of twisted national pride for ultras. They saw the Spanish rebels as a poor imitation of genuine French Jacobins. An anonymous pamphleteer wrote that Spain “dares even in her

57 Ibid., 11-12.
58 Ibid., 50-51.
illusions of supposed superiority, to utter a language that France is more accustomed to speak
than to hear.” Experience had shown that fighting Revolution was a holy task that only
experienced French royalists could undertake—indeed, it was their personal burden. Saving
Ferdinand would do more than protect France and Europe from new revolutions; it would
give ultras an opportunity to end France’s most tragic episode and create the conditions for
returning peace to France forever.

The factors that emerged in prewar arguments over intervention continued to arise
after Louis XVIII’s speech to the Chambers, but the triumphal chorus of news from the front
later drowned out antiwar opinions. In this short prewar period, however, important
ideological points arose. The prospect of war made both sides rethink the relationship
between the Restoration, patriotism, and peace, and the two sides seemingly reversed their
positions on these issues—the Left largely abandoned its militaristic posturing and
conspiracies, while the Right became comfortable wielding Napoleon’s leftover war
machine. Writers from both sides also found in the prewar debate a forum for voicing their
opinions on France as a constitutional state, and on the relationship between the government
and the people. With the international element of war added to these common Restoration
topics, writers began debating France’s role in the world and whether a civilized nation
should prioritize its own people or all of humanity. The self-referential aspect that the French
Revolution brought to Restoration thought, however, limited these questions to speculation
and kept the focus of the war strictly on contemporary domestic politics. Despite the many
contemporary factors that played into the decision to intervene in Spain, writers in these

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60 Anon, *Causes Légitimes de la Guerre Contre l’Espagne entreprise par le gouvernement français*
(Paris: Abel Lanoe, 1823), 5-6.
debates turned the Spanish war into just another campaign in the ongoing struggle between the Left and Right that had started during Revolution.

**Part Two: Debating the War and Framing its Meaning**

*Debates in the Chamber of Deputies*

According to the Articles of the Charter, the king did not need permission to send troops into Spain; his executive authority extended to all aspects of foreign policy and all branches of the military. The war might have been a foregone conclusion, but discussions about the wisdom of the endeavor did have their place within the legislative process. The Chambers had the right, for example, to debate an official response to the king’s opening speech announcing his intentions and to weigh in on the extraordinary loan of 100 million pounds (*livres*) needed to fund the operation. Some of the arguments in the Chambers for and against the war echoed those put forth in prewar pamphlets, but they arose in a confrontational legislative setting that accentuated the divisiveness of Restoration politics. The Restoration’s representative democratic institutions continued to bring opposing sides together in debate, but arguments in the Chambers predictably fomented division rather than leading to consensus.

The prospect of war in 1823 presented deputies with the first significant foreign policy issue since the liberation of France in 1818. Deputy Edouard Bignon, the author of the prewar tract against the “cabinets,” noted that in 1818 the vote to liberate the country had passed without argument, which he claimed demonstrated the Chamber’s belief in a nation’s right to freedom from foreign intervention. Why, he wondered, was there now a sudden rush to occupy another nation? Bignon overlooked the jingoistic tone of some leftists in 1818.

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but such amnesia did not plague ultra politicians. Indeed, ultras considered the celebrations of the troops’ departure five years earlier as a sign that the Left had not really accepted the peace that Louis XVIII and the allies brought to Europe. The ultra deputy François-Régis LaBourdonnaye thus complained that “all demand peace today with the same furor that they formerly demanded war.” Labourdonnaye’s statement reflected the lack of appreciation for the nuances that differentiated ideological beliefs from political behavior in Restoration political debates. While the aggressive policies of the revolutionary and Napoleonic period did not accurately represent liberal ideology or policy, the liberals’ joy at the allies’ departure in 1818 had seemed to ultras like a victory parade for the discredited regimes of the recent past. In these interpretations of events that took place just five years before the Spanish War, the memory of that period’s brief shared happiness faded in the face of politicians whose political frames forced them to condemn every aspect of their opponents’ past and present.

A pro-business bloc that included bankers, merchants, and increasingly visible industrialists sat among the liberal deputies and pragmatically emphasized the war’s threat to commerce and industry. One such deputy was the liberal industrialist from the department of Basses-Pyrénées bordering Spain, Jean-Pierre Basterrêche. Basterrêche believed that the free movement of commerce alone could guarantee the stability of Europe and preserve Europe’s civilization. The question extended beyond the economic benefits of individual deputies, Basterrêche claimed, as merchants and industrialists steered the economic ship of the

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nation.\textsuperscript{63} Other deputies of the business class such as Prosper Delauney foresaw the devastation of the Restoration’s hard-won prosperity. He claimed the war’s short-term effects would be “the ruin of industry and of commerce,” and would usher in a period of “long and painful privation.”\textsuperscript{64} These alarming predictions, however, did not deter the war’s supporters. Chateaubriand for one was quick to point out the damaging effects of the Spanish situation on commerce since 1820. Nothing was worse for business, he suggested, than revolutionary instability.\textsuperscript{65}

History, however, played the most prominent role in the debates. France and Spain had long shared a history of war and peace that often heightened the emotional content of the situation. To start, both nations’ Bourbon monarchs traced their roots to France’s most popular king, Henri IV (r. 1589-1610). Henri’s story and legacy had long been the source of conciliatory discourse in France, but his legacy, too, became susceptible to partisan interpretations of his reign and France’s past relations with Spain. Liberal deputy Edouard Bignon thought the example of Henri IV’s resolution of the sixteenth-century Religious Wars provided a lesson in reconciliation for the Restoration’s political factions, but that it also warned against French incursion into Spain. From Bignon’s perspective, the ultras’ Spanish royalist allies now played the role that rebellious French nobles had played in the Catholic League that had fought Henri IV. He compared the current Spanish King Ferdinand VII to

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\textsuperscript{63} M. Basterrêche, \textit{Opinion de M. Basterrêche, député des Basses-Pyrénées, sur le projet de loi de l’Emprunt des 100 millions; séance du 24 février 1823}, (Paris: Boucher, 1823), 1-2. Ironically, the Basterrêche family made their fortune in the arms industry.


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the French Valois King Henri III (r.1574-1589), the ill-fated precursor of Henri IV whose wavering allegiance to the League eventually led to his assassination at the hands of one of its enthusiastic supporters. Surely, Bignon argued sarcastically, none of the ultras would claim that the Spanish King Phillip II’s support of French Leaguers in their domestic struggles created safe conditions for King Henri III. He then averred that “The war you want to undertake is a new war of the League.” Despite ultra claims of protecting the current Spanish king against an ungrateful nation, Bignon claimed that by acting as interventionist Leaguers, ultras were pushing Louis XVIII to start a war that had the potential to be “as anti-dynastic as it is anti-national.” 66 He declared that opposing the war was actually a way to save the Spanish branch of Bourbons from the fate of the French House of Valois. 67

The Revolution naturally dominated arguments over Spain. Ultras, however, rehearsed a litany of “revolutionary spirits,” “revolutionary doctrines,” and vaguely defined “revolutionaries” in nearly all debates. They forced the liberals to debate on their terms, framing the Cortes’ challenge to King Ferdinand VII as the Revolution reborn or continued in liberalism. Some liberals did not hide from this assertion and proclaimed that the progressive spirit of the Revolution did indeed persist in France’s own institutions and throughout Europe. They pointed to progressive reforms throughout Europe, including in the Holy Alliance’s constituent states. The general-turned-deputy Horace François Bastien Sébastiani wondered why the “revolutionary spirit” offended so many when it, “Possesses all of Europe, and makes itself heard even in some governments which treat new ideas with

66 Bignon, Opinion, 5-9.

67 Ibid., 21-22.
extreme contempt and aversion.” This international argument mattered little however. The real issue in the minds of many of the deputies was not Europe’s adjustment to new principles, but the concept of revolution as understood solely in French terms. The Revolution had never really ended for many of the deputies. When Delauney claimed that “The same war that one wants to make today in Spain, was waged thirty years ago in France,” many of his ultra enemies would agree with him.

Once the terms of the debate crystallized, each side blended the plotlines and characters from the Revolution and from Restoration polarization and applied a new narrative to the war. Each claimed that following their policies would lessen domestic conflict and prevent another cycle of revolutionary violence from troubling Europe. Although everyone agreed that the two events, the Revolution and the Spanish War, were comparable manifestations of revolutionary conflict, the two sides differed when it came to assigning correlating roles between the villains and heroes of the two eras. If widespread violence did erupt in Spain, who would assume the blame: monarchical interventionists or revolutionaries?

For Chateaubriand, polarization provided the answer. There were two groups during the Revolution: those who supported the king and those against him. Thus all those who opposed monarchies now would take the blame if Spanish liberals harmed Ferdinand. But, ever the Romantic, he went further than blaming liberals; he wanted to destroy the revolutionary spirit that prevented social and political unity. Chateaubriand spoke of the

68 Sebastiani said the revolutionary spirit could be found in the Prussian minister Hardenberg’s reforms, and in Russian Czar Alexander’s religious reforms and his attempts to lessen the burden of serfdom. M. Général Sébastiani, Opinion de M. le Général Sébastiani, député de la Corse, sur l’Emprunt de cent millions, (Paris: Tastu, 1823), 4-5.

69 Delauney, Opinion, 3.
intervention as if it was a matter of personal and national vengeance against an abstract enemy more than an issue of protecting a foreign king. He assured the Chamber that France was not trying to reassert the Inquisition or bolster despotism, and he urged the deputies to see the events in Spain for what they were: “It is its [France’s] old enemy in Spanish garb that provokes us,” he reminded his colleagues, “it is the Revolution which, lurking at the feet of Bourbons, looks for a second victim.”

This line of reasoning—that an animate “revolution” had returned—resonated especially among older nobles who remembered their own victimization during the Revolution.

Ultras had recourse to these scare tactics especially when liberals continued to elevate people’s rights over monarchs’ legitimacy. If liberals articulated a belief in popular sovereignty, suggested that kings ruled in concert with the nation, or simply professed that the people have rights, ultras dismissed them as treasonous revolutionaries. The doctrinaire deputy Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, who routinely condemned popular sovereignty and professed the king’s legitimacy, for example, became an enthusiastic revolutionary in ultras’ eyes when he championed the people’s rights in his speeches against the war. Royer-Collard proclaimed that God had given kings to people to represent the people’s interests. He declared that “…this principle comes from heaven to console the Earth: that kings are made for the peoples and not the peoples for kings; that public consent is the largest and most solid base of their [kings’] authority,”

In Royer-Collard’s statement, the Charter appeared to be a sort of political contract, but his religious allusion to a divine hand placing kings on thrones hardly sounded revolutionary. The ultra daily *L’Etoile*, however, called it “a speech in which

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70 Chateaubriand, *Discours*, 21.

he reproduced all the doctrines of the *Social Contract ...*” and summed up his position as, “The king of France gave the Charter to France, therefore we must truly impose the constitution of the Cortes on Ferdinand.”

Any time the liberal angle on the nature of the Charter emerged—that the king entered into a contractual agreement with the people—ultras interpreted it as a clarion call for revolt in Spain in the name of popular sovereignty. Chateaubriand merely split hairs when he proclaimed that France “pretends neither to impose theories, nor combat other theories with cannon fire.”

In ultra discourse the Cortes’ armies were merely the material manifestations of France’s abstract but real enemy, the ideological belief that kings alone did not exercise sovereignty.

When proclaiming the sovereignty of the French and Spanish people proved an ineffectual strategy for liberals, they turned to a more practical argument based on the two nations’ similar institutions. This institutional argument began with the popular liberal belief that the French constitutional state should not choose to go to war against another state with a constitutional government. The deputy and writer Charles-Guillaume Etienne, discounting the Revolution’s precedents, plainly stated that the impending Spanish War “should not be the first war undertaken by constitutional France...”

General Sébastiani thought a constitution and its resultant institutions reflected the mutable and contractual relationship between a people and its government. He used this argument to discredit a favored ultra theme, namely, that rescuing the uninspiring Ferdinand VII from honoring a constitution that he had signed preserved the legitimate power of a “grandson of Henri IV.”

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mocked these ultras who championed and argued for the power of kings, and yet complained of their impotence in the face of constitutions. “Has the grandson of Henri IV ceased to reign,” he wondered, “because his power, previously without limits, received some constitutional limits? Since when did human institutions and royal authority . . . receive the brevet of immutability?” For liberals, political institutions like monarchies and constitutions came after the people-as-nation became self aware, and Spain’s constitution reflected this societal fact. Political philosophy for ultras, on the other hand, started with an unshakable conception of monarchical power not alterable by constitutions.

Many pro-war royalists, however, proved savvy enough to avoid overplaying their absolutist ideology. Although ultras lauded the absolute power of kings, they also commanded a sizeable majority in the Chamber of Deputies, a fact that enabled them to consider the war as a product of the French Charter and its representative forms. LaBourdonnaye, for instance, proclaimed that the Chamber of Deputies would give the intervention in Spain a constitutional sanction when they voted to support the king’s decision for military action. This sanction, however, by no means translated into solidarity between the French and Spanish as constitutional states. LaBourdonnaye emphasized that the Cortes’ constitution and the Charter differed at their foundations. The former derived from illegitimate popular sovereignty and thus could only protect material interests. Its institutions, therefore, were not the voice of a constitutional nation but rather the seeds of new revolutions.

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77 Ibid., 3-4.
If the ultras’ control of the French government’s institutions in 1823 somewhat vitiated the liberals’ contention that constitutional states should naturally cooperate, the liberals still argued for a nation’s right to freedom of action. The liberal deputies thus tried countering the ultras by focusing on two aspects of a nation’s right to independence relevant to the Spanish intervention: France’s right to conduct foreign policy without pressure from other states, and Spain’s right to conduct domestic policy without foreign interference. Although Louis XVIII made the final decision to invade, liberals maintained the idea in circulation since the beginning of the Congress of Verona, i.e., that the king was succumbing to foreign pressure. As Bignon declared, “We are French and not the satellites of a foreign will; we are French, and not the gendarmerie of absolute power.”

Royer-Collard shared this patriotic indignation when he contended the French had not fought in the nation’s recent wars for the revolutionary government or Napoleon’s empire, but for the universal principle of national independence. If, he stated, the French government interfered in Spain’s domestic affairs at the behest of other nations, it would violate both nations’ rights to enjoy their national sovereignty. Chateaubriand in response to this charge, however, accused the liberals of confusing isolation with independence. Treaties and international agreements did not infringe upon a nation’s independence, he claimed, and there was no “shameful yoke” in agreeing on policy with equal powers. After all, he asked, “What nation has ever been without alliances with other nations?”

78 Bignon, Opinion, 18.
79 Royer-Collard, Opinion, 6-7.
80 Chateaubriand, Discours, 17.
When persuasion and reasoned argument failed to sway the war’s supporters, only righteous indignation remained for the liberal deputies. They tried to frame the debate in terms of a sovereign people against the war; of a constitutional government that should have followed its political base, public opinion, and opposed the intervention. When these arguments failed to stop the rush to war, the liberal deputies stopped relying on themes that suggested national unity and tried instead to show how ultras who supported the war did not belong in the nation. They claimed that because the war ran counter to the nation’s values, principles, and interests, the ultra ministers who had planned the war and convinced the king of its necessity did not merit his confidence. Sébastiani accused them of heeding only the “language of Coblentz,” a reference to the reactionary émigrés who declared war on their own nation during the Revolution, and claimed that “The party that dominates us …has become its [the language of Coblentz’s] organ, obeys its prejudices, its old hatreds, and wants to make absolute power triumph in Spain in order to bring it back to France.” The liberal minority thus made its own government a near foreign entity, and rhetorically excluded the ultra majority from “national belonging” based on what they considered the ultras’ real political ideology of absolutism. Political affiliation and professed beliefs had long before set the contours of competing discourses of national belonging, and the war brought their boundaries into sharp focus.

According to some liberal deputies, if this un-French ultra cabal allowed constitutionalism to succumb to absolutism, the Restoration system of government would crumble. The ultra ministry, standing outside the contract of king and people, proposed a war that actually attacked these two national elements that had come together in the Restoration

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81 Sébastiani, Opinion, 5.
settlement. “Ministers who counseled such a war,” Sébastiani thus claimed, “rendered themselves guilty of the crime of high treason against the king and against the nation which is inseparable from him.” Ferdinand VII became an afterthought to liberals—the real king threatened in Europe was Louis XVIII. Following these increasingly hyperbolic sentiments, more liberals turned their divisive rhetoric on their fellow countrymen, branding them as criminals and traitors. Basterrêche vowed that if the Chamber voted in support of the war, he would throw himself at the feet of the king and tell him that those counseling war “are the scourges of France and humanity; that they are the enemies of his family’s happiness.”

The war ran so counter to the interests of France, some liberals contended, that its supporters must have had the Charter itself in their sights. The push to war, even the moderate Royer-Collard contended, could never have arisen in the royal mind but had to have emanated from “a party or a system, which having never understood the Restoration as but a punishment, constantly applies itself to keep alive the humiliation of France. … and it [this party] corrupts all: the Charter, the representative government, the administration: it would even corrupt, if possible, religion.” The inevitability of the war had painted the liberals into a corner, so as their last resort they claimed the essence of Frenchness for themselves, thus deepening the nation’s social and political divide.

War brought deputies who figuratively represented two separate internal nations into bitter conflict as they competed to represent a reformed and rejuvenated France to the world. The debates over war confirmed the post-revolutionary rift and suggested its permanence by

82 Ibid., 7.
83 Basterrêche, Opinion, 10.
84 Royer-Collard, Opinion, 9.
explicitly drawing it across centuries of French history. The only recourse left was to diminish the stature of one’s ideological enemies. By this means, liberals could preserve the belief that representative institutions might still hold the potential to represent public opinion and the will of the people. In 1823, liberal deputies were hard-pressed to claim that they represented public opinion in light of their minority position in the Chamber. Bignon maintained, however, that he and his fellow liberal deputies were the “patriotic minority” in the Chambers that alone represented the interests of the greater nation. He described the condition of the nation at the onset of the war as hopelessly unbalanced between the needs of the many and the interests of the few:

“From one side finally, more than twenty-nine million French people, from the other three or four-hundred thousand individuals dreaming, in their private interests, of the reestablishment of absolute power with its abusive distinctions, its dilapidations, and its disorders.”

Most ultras had likewise cast reconciliation aside and hoped that the war would permanently discredit their political enemies. They saw liberals as dangerous incarnations of contradictory theories and hypocrisies rather than as true Frenchmen. While in the past liberals had relished France’s military might under Napoleon, their current opposition to the war merely reflected their loyalty to self-interest. LaBourdonnaye described them as:

“Radicals and carbonari, men seduced by new doctrines, and philanthropists without foresight; passionate friends of the arts and of industry, and calculating economists who only see the government in the Bourse, who only see the happiness of the people in the rapid movement of their commerce…”

Two nations stood opposed within France. Their real numbers, the nuances in their political beliefs, the moments of reconciliation between individuals that might arise now and then, mattered little in light of the discursive barrier that arose between them. Political

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86 La Bourdonnaye, *Opinion*, 16.
leaders in both “nations” responded to influences in the public sphere that simplified reality as a stark battle between good and evil. The debates on the war thus strengthened the interpretive frame that divided the nation into irreconcilable parties. A battle over the meaning of Restoration France that had started with the implementation of the Charter now lost all possibility for a peaceful reconciliation. Both sides could agree on only one political truth: that being a member of post-revolutionary French society meant living in a broken nation.

The army, the French group most personally affected by the war, ironically was the one sector of society that might have offered an example of unity to the rest of France. Liberals assumed that the military’s strong contingent of former Napoleonic soldiers would agree with their antiwar stance. The failure of the carbonari movement to incite widespread rebellion among the troops, however, should have warned liberals not to put too much faith in the army as an ideological ally. Chateaubriand, confident of the army’s loyalty to the king, saw national reconciliation springing from the wartime military units that successfully mixed old imperial and new royalist troops. The war, he believed, would “create an army” from former enemies that would boost France’s confidence and stature in the international community by “reestablishing our independence.” Divided politicians would take longer to reconcile but they too, Chateaubriand posited, would follow the lead of these newly unified companions-in-arms. 87 In fact, his prediction seemed to come true by the end of the year, but unity in victory would prove to be just a cosmetic fix for France’s divided political culture.

87 Chateaubriand, Discours, 22.
War in the Departments: Stifling Dissent, Fostering Division

With war now the official government policy, all important employees of the state became its champions and overseers of public opinion on the intervention. In effect, préfets, judges, prosecutors, and other functionaries became mouthpieces for ultra propaganda. Officially sanctioned enthusiasm for the war swept up local officials who promoted the war and cracked down on pessimistic antiwar sentiments and liberal protests that continued to arise.

The Interior Ministry and its Bureau of Police, in particular, wanted to stop the spread of “false news” before it turned the populace against the war. Traveling peddlers’ (colporteurs) rumors had been inciting political unrest since the beginning of the Restoration (see Chapter One), and the government could not tolerate their negative influences on a wartime populace. With military action on the horizon, the Interior Ministry sent several broadsheets and memos to the préfets, sous-préfets, and mayors, to ensure that the government’s message over the war drowned out rumors, and interpretations that ran counter to ultra discourse. The language of these “circulaires” thus incorporated many of the ultra themes on the war. Shortly before the war, the Director of Police Franchet-Desperry, for example, described colporteurs as seeders of “germs of sedition” whose sole desire was to spread “alarming news” and “declamations against the government.” He thus cast his net widely and ordered the arrest of all voyagers who indulge in “shameful speeches” or otherwise show “criminal intentions.”88 For many préfets who identified with the ultra cause, this vague wording created an opportunity to punish anyone who disagreed with their ideology.

88 AN F7-6729, Circulaire, Le Directeur de la Police aux préfets, 2 March 1823.
With the departure of troops for Spain, Franchet-Desperey reacted to increased incidents of pessimistic rumor mongering and gave more detailed advice to the préfets on what to look for and whom to blame. He offered examples of common “false noises” that permeated the public sphere, stating his belief that the hand of a “revolutionary faction” was coordinating a mass deception campaign. Franchet-Desperey assumed a deep division in society between “good French” who remained faithful, or at least silent, on the war and the “bad French” who advertised their unsuitability for inclusion in the nation by spreading lies about the war. He assured his functionaries that “the government of the king, is strong from the support of all the good French … they [colporteurs spreading alarms] are able, however, to trouble the security of classes little enlightened.” By criticizing those susceptible to antiwar opinions as “little enlightened,” he equated the ultra position with rational public opinion and suggested that any opposition to the war was irrational and anti-French. The préfets in turn posted circulaires with similar divisive sentiments. A broadsheet out of the prefecture in Rouen (Seine-Inférieure), for example, warned the people of the department that an “enemy faction” hoped to disrupt the government of the king by spreading “the most absurd news.”

The sous-préfet de Coulommiers (Seine-et-Marne), Le Brun de Charmettes, pushed the discourse of national division to extremes when he called for the mayors of his arrondissement to crack down “alarms” about the war. Pessimistic rumors about the effects or outcome of the war, he wrote, reflected the liberals’ “disappointed ambitions” to reorder society according to revolutionary principles. Their activities during wartime, Le Brun de

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89 AN F7-6729, Circulaire, Le Directeur de la Police aux préfets, 10 April 1823.

90 AN F7-6729, Le Conseiller de Préfecture délégue, Circulaire pour affichage, 7 May 1823.
Charmettes asserted, “rendered them day by day more foreign in their former patrie, [they] have insensibly ceased to be French and make themselves in their souls and by intention, the associates and compatriots of all the seditious of the universe.” By contrasting the “unworthy French,” with the rest of the nation’s people, Le Brun de Charmettes fomented divisions in his small arrondissement and sorted its denizens according to predetermined set of cultural values and political principles. “Heaven has chosen between fidelity and rebellion,” he wrote, “between religion and atheism, between civilization and anarchy....” 91 Polarization had migrated from politics to government administration. This phenomenon was not necessarily a new feature of the Restoration, but the war exacerbated the divisions between Left and Right as the government now aggressively committed its resources to spreading ultra ideology.

The government cracked down on all types of unauthorized public displays of opinion, but what exactly constituted a “shameful discourse” on the war? The types of speech that caught the authorities’ attention contained at least one of the following three elements: pessimistic predictions for the army and the potential damaging effects of war on France; repetition of liberal political ideology when referring to the war; or falsifications of the news from Spain in ways that suggested the benefits of a French defeat. These three types of rumors often blended in a haphazard fashion, leading préfets to misinterpret more innocuous opinions as sedition. In addition, the more extreme transgressions took place in public spaces where the influence of alcohol was probably as much of a factor as political ideology.

Before the hostilities opened, much of the apprehension over the war reflected some people’s genuine concern for their livelihood. This was especially true among the merchant class, whose liberal champions in the Chambers had warned of the risk that war posed to

91 AN F7-6729, Le Sous-Prefet de Coulommiers, Circulaire, April 1823.
commerce and industry. In March, in the department of Cotes-du-Nord, the leading merchants of the ports of Binie and Portieux began a petition protesting the war because most of their trade was with Spain and her colonies. Ideological factors did not play into these merchants’ desire to preserve their source of revenue. Some officials, however, interpreted the voicing of their legitimate concerns as a product of seditious agitation. In early March, 1823, the préfet of the Aisne suggested of a similar petition expressing merchants’ apprehensions that “liberals spread this falsehood to alarm people because the situation with commerce is prosperous.” These outright dismissals of constituents’ worries suggested that ideologically prejudiced authorities judged anyone who questioned the war either as internal enemies or unwitting victims of these enemies.

Seeing dangerous agitation in nearly all forms of opposition was even easier when protestors against the war voiced liberal suspicions about ultras’ intentions in going to war. The préfet of the department of Charente reported on a seditious speech in which a man in the commune of Bois-Bretau declared he wanted the French army to be defeated because “if we win the battle it is certain that one would reestablish feudal rents in France and the nobles would reassert their rights.” Beyond the clearly unwise call for French defeat, this statement illustrated a lingering liberal and lower class anxiety about ultras’ intentions for France and their loyalty to the Charter. Even after the war’s outcome was no longer in question, people continued to voice their suspicions. In Montpellier, for example, a man

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93 AN F7-6718, Préfet of the Aisne to Minister of the Interior, Laon, France, 1 March 1823.

94 AN F7-6718, Préfet of the Charente to Minister of the Interior, Angoulême, France, 12 May 1823.
named Redoulés claimed that if indeed the news about the victory of French troops was accurate, then “we would soon have the inquisition in Spain and France.”

Concern for the preservation of the Revolution’s social reforms was prevalent among the members of the lower classes who had distrusted the Restoration regime since its inception. More prosperous people, however, seemed less concerned with the social threat of a resurgent nobility and clergy than protective of the principles of constitutional monarchy that had opened political opportunities for them. They were more likely to echo liberal pamphlets and speeches that defended Spain’s sovereignty and constitutional forms. A police report, for example, described the speech of an insurance agent in the department of Puy-de-Dôme named Perrot who publicly opposed the war and claimed that France had no right to remove another people’s institutions. Similar declarations defending the sovereign freedom of any nation from intervention arose even among lower-level state bureaucrats. The bailiff and supernumery in the village of Lombey (Gers) paid a fine and spent a month in jail for stating in a tobacco shop that, “it was shameful and despicable that the French government fought against such a good cause . . . that it was contemptible that we would want to impose laws on Spain.” Their dismissals from their posts, of course, followed shortly after police reported their comments.

These incidents suggest that people throughout the country understood that the war reflected broad domestic disagreements. They interpreted the events in Spain from the perspective of France’s internal discord. Drawing on rhetoric in the political press and the

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95 AN F7-6718, Préfet of Herault to Minister of the Interior, Montpellier, France 31 October 1823.

96 AN F7-6949, Préfet of Puy-de-Dôme to Minister of the Interior, Clermont-Ferrond, 15 November 1823.

97 AN BB30-193, Report to Minister of Justice, 10 August 1823.
Chambers, people in the departments merged popular stances on the war with their own economic priorities, social insecurities, and political beliefs. Préfets and other functionaries likewise interpreted local acts broadly, incorporating isolated events into the national discourse between conflicting political forces. Widespread instances of seditious remarks about the war among unruly drunks only exacerbated the feeling among conservative officials that the enemy was as present within France as it was in Spain. Can we blame the préfet of Ariège for doing his job when he took umbrage at public cries of, “Down with the Bourbons,” “Down with the French Army,” “Shit on the King” and “Long live Napoleon?” It is not surprising that authorities considered those who fomented such disorder as unworthy of inclusion in the Restoration nation. These common wartime interactions between a hotheaded populace and a repressive administration only increased the polarization of the political landscape.

*War in the Departments—Promoting the Triumph*

Members of the state bureaucracy did not just oppose public expressions of antiwar sentiments; they also promoted support for the war effort through officially sponsored celebrations, laudatory literature, songs, and theatrical productions. These manifestations of public joy at the triumph of the French military countered the liberals’ antiwar discourse and spread instead the ultras’ vision of France.

Even before the troops’ return from Spain and Louis XVIII’s reception for Angoulême in Paris in December, 1823, government officials on all levels had been orchestrating celebrations of the French victory. The Minister of the Interior had ordered that préfets of every department organize celebratory fêtes and parades, and that the mayors of

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98 AN F7-6949, Préfet of Ariège to Minister of the Interior, Foix, France, 25 June 1823.
those communes in which returning troops maintained their barracks hold congratulatory banquets. Spontaneous outbursts of joy also broke out all over France, and it seems that people of all political persuasions took part in celebrating the war’s quick and painless conclusion. This widespread joy over the war’s success may well have provided an opportunity for national reconciliation but the ultra taunting and gloating that pervaded many celebrations reflected the ultras’ belief that France had triumphed over domestic political enemies as well as a foreign nation. The celebrations of the end of hostilities thus turned into propaganda for an ongoing political battle against liberals.

Official festivities usually consisted of a solemn mass, a procession of returning troops, and a public banquet for government officials, important citizens of municipalities or departments, and military officers. Prefectures and city halls distributed food to the poor and homeless to demonstrate the bounty of the king and his government. In several cities, local administrators commissioned special musical or theatrical productions to demonstrate and praise the accomplishments of the army and its leaders. In the festivities at Troyes on 6 January 1824, for example, a “Cantatille” or short piece of musical theatre topped off a day that included masses, food distributions, and a military review of the local national guards. The préfet proudly reported that spontaneous choruses of “vive le roi” interrupted the production.\(^9^9\) In Rouen, the prefecture organized a banquet for all 1500 troops of the 3\(^{rd}\) Infantry Regiment, erected a triumphal arch, and commissioned busts of the Duc d’Angoulême and the King, which became the subjects of several couplets and toasts.\(^1^0^0\) In Nantes and several other communities in the department of Loire-Inférieure, laurel leaves

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\(^9^9\) AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Aube to Minister of the Interior, Troyes, France 14 January 1823.

\(^1^0^0\) AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Seine-Inférieure to Minister of the Interior, Rouen, France 3 January 1823.
and the Bourbons’ white flag adorned every window to celebrate the return of the 14th Line
Infantry. The préfet in Nantes boastfully claimed that officers congratulated him for
preparing a better welcome than Bordeaux, thus suggesting that officials used the revelry to
boost their own reputations as much as they fêted the troops. 101 Smaller towns like Mézières
(Ardennes) also wanted their efforts to match or better those of other towns in content and
spirit. The prefecture’s report from Ardennes therefore noted approvingly that the mayor
gave a speech “full of the most monarchical sentiments.” 102 As the overseers of public
opinion, the préfets ensured that enthusiastic celebrations expressing the public’s enthusiasm
benefited the ruling ultra government by spreading its ideology.

In a circulaire to the sous-préfets and mayors of the department of Bouches-du-
Rhone dated 11 October 1823, the préfet, the Comte de Villeneuve, strongly encouraged his
underlings to design their celebrations as demonstrations of Christian and monarchical
values, and frame them around ultra political themes that disparaged the liberal opposition.
Villeneuve reminded his staff, for example, that the war had destroyed the “hydra of
revolutions” that men who “dared to call themselves representatives of the nation” had
nurtured. 103 These exhortations to frame the celebrations in the same terms that ultras had
used to launch the war, shows how the postwar festivities kept alive the ultras’ struggle
against domestic ideological enemies even after their external foes had been defeated.

Préfets’ reports to the ministry on the celebrations thus stayed on message and
painted the festivities in ultra colors, combining a healthy dose of flattering platitudes about

101 AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Loire-Inférieure to the Ministre de l’Intérieur, Nantes, France, 16
December 1823.

102 AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Ardennes to Minister of the Interior, Mézières, France, 14 February
1824.

103 AN F7-6949, Préfecture des Bouches-du-Rhône, Circulaire, 11 October 1823.
the king, the Duc d’Angoulême and the troops, with well-established ideological descriptions of a nefarious liberal and revolutionary enemy. A gendarme’s report from Rennes, for example, described the arrival of the Royal Guard, “victorious from the struggle of legitimacy against revolutionary anarchy,” and the community’s unanimous approval of their conduct.\footnote{AN F7-6949, Gendarmerie de Rennes to Franchet-Despery, Rennes, 14 November 1823.} The préfet of the department of the Jura made the same point in a speech to returning troops. “It was fitting for a French army,” he observed, “directed by a noble and worthy offspring of Henry IV and Louis XIV, to go and close the abyss of revolutions in Spain, reassert order and assure the peace of all Europe.”\footnote{AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Jura, Copy, “Adresse au Colonel, 19\textsuperscript{e} Ligne, par le préfet du Jura,” 7 January 1824.} Playing down the fact that everyone loves a parade—even if only for reasons of curiosity—local officials tried to convince the central government that the crowds attending the celebrations confirmed the ultras’ command of public opinion. In the department of Morbihan, the préfet reported that the demonstrations of joy were “new proofs of an ardent devotion and an inalterable fidelity to the legitimate dynasty” in the department.\footnote{AN F7-6949, Préfet of Morbihan to Minister of the Interior, Vannes, France 23 December 1823.}

Préfets, hoping that the seemingly unanimous satisfaction with the government’s foreign accomplishments would lead to further political success on the home front, tried to turn the people’s enthusiasm into support for the ultra government’s preferred candidates in the 1824 elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In the department of the Indre, for example, the préfet noted that “these demonstrations of royalism, good at all times, are particularly useful with the approach of the elections.” He even saw the festivities as an opportunity to “rehabilitate” the town of Châteauroux by converting the town’s liberals with the good
examples of royalist sentiment on display. In Carcassonne (Aude), the préfet noted that, in general, “apathy is the dominant character of the inhabitants.” With the burst of “royalist enthusiasm” that accompanied the celebrations, however, he expressed optimism that the “choice [of deputy] will be excellent if the elections take place.” Throughout a tour of festivities in the department of la Manche, the préfet there noted the benefits of war on the public spirit. At his own ball in St. Lo he claimed, “The opinions in this reunion seemed unanimous.” At each of these events he met with the departments’ important electors, including liberals, and considered the events during his tour “as a sort of prelude to the elections.” “Everywhere I heard for a refrain,” he claimed, “even from a mass of liberals, ‘we will do what you want.’”

The préfets may have had good intentions when they reached out to local liberals in their departments. Their attempts to use national pride to overcome internal political differences, however, often appeared to liberals as overt “royalizing” for electoral gain rather than as an example of genuine compromise between erstwhile political enemies. Ultra officials’ attempts at reconciliation were also undermined by their continued branding of liberals as traitorous elements unworthy of inclusion in good society. Even when préfets tried but failed to bring people together, they were likely to fall back on divisive rhetoric to explain why the strategy of reconciliation did not work. In La Rochelle (Charente-Inférieure), for example, the préfet’s attempt to host an inclusive celebration at the local theater failed for a lack of funds and the party held instead at a tax official’s house ended up excluding several liberal groups.

107 AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Indre to Minister of the Interior, Châteauroux, France, 4 January 1823.
108 AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Aude to Minister of the Interior, Carcassonne, France, 26 December 1823.
109 AN F7-6949, Préfet of la Manche to Minister of the Interior, St. Lo, France, 2 January 1823. The préfet took this offer literally and put himself forward as the government candidate.
members of the town’s high society because the house was too small. The préfet lamented that several “evil doers” (malevolants) seized upon this exclusion as a pretext to host a separate commemoration of the war filled with “liberal sentiments.”

Despite his best efforts to cultivate unity at the official event, it seemed that the two sides could not come together even when they tried.

Other préfets were less conciliatory in their assessments of the liberals. The protests and acts of vandalism which marred some of the festivities added to their misgivings about their liberal constituents. In Mende (Lozère), the secretary-general of the prefecture reported that “some bad subjects no doubt tormented by the public enthusiasm profited from the darkness of the night to overturn the arc-de-triomphe under which the regiment had been received.” While events like these disturbed public order, most préfets did little to stop equally disruptive royalist crowds from heckling liberals and exulting in the triumph of their cause. In Colmar (Haut-Rhin), the préfet himself attended a royalist victory party in which a crowd paraded busts of the king and Angoulême through the streets. The préfet brazenly reported that he and the crowd stopped under known liberals’ windows and shouted “vive le roi” and “down with liberals,” but that “there was no direct provocation.”

A hostile crowd bearing torches and threatening townspeople raised no alarms—so long as the people shouted royalist slogans.

The war brought about an ultra triumph on many levels and seemed to mark the end of even the pretense of a balanced political system. In 1824, it was not unreasonable to

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110 AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Charente-Inférieure to the Minister of the Interior, La Rochelle, France, 10 December 1823.

111 AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Lozère to Minister of the Interior, Mende, France, 16 January 1823.

112 AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Haut-Rhin to Minister of the Interior, Colmar, France, 5 December 1823.
assume that the political bloc of liberals in the Chamber of Deputies, the press, and at the
departmental level would simply dissolve as ultras continued to discredit the opponents of
the war. A look at the celebrations in Grenoble gives a sense of the apparent final triumph of
the royalist cause. Crowds greeted the arrival of the 25th Infantry Regiment, the préfet
reported, with an “elan” that “swept up even the most pronounced liberals. Whether from
shame or calculation, they imitated the royalists’ example.” Of the fifteen-hundred notables
invited to the departmental fête, only a handful of leading liberals refused to come. The
préfet asserted that “these men are the same who have distinguished themselves in all times
by their hatred of the government.” He was sure that these few liberals abstained from
attending only to remain in the good graces of their party for the upcoming elections.
Although some might have interpreted these liberals’ obstinate refusal to attend as a sign that
partisanship remained strong, the préfet assured his superiors that “all passed in such a way
to shed light on the liberals’ weakness in numbers and to give to uncertain minds a good idea
of the royalists’ strength.”¹¹³ For ultras, attaining their domestic goal of solely representing
France far outweighed the international importance of what transpired in Spain.

**Part Three: Framing the War in Ultra Nationalist Rhetoric**

The ultra discourse on the war recast the history of France and Europe since the
Revolution as a seamless story of death and resurrection, which culminated in the French
intervention in Spain. As the troops returned and met the acclaim of the populace, this
triumphal narrative took root in official documents, propaganda, and popular songs and
poems. The story had many facets: that revolution was a supernatural blight on humanity;
that intervention in Spain brought the end of the revolutionary era in Europe; that it was the

¹¹³ AN F7-6949, Préfet of the Isère to Minister of the Interior, Grenoble, France, 23 December 1823.
triumph of legitimacy over liberal doctrines; that all France could finally rally around the Restoration; that Spain and France were again united by Bourbon blood; and, finally, that France had saved civilization, thus restoring her rank as the preeminent nation in the world. Royalists successfully framed the war around these elements and drowned out interpretations of the events that ran counter to them. They maintained this hegemonic control over the message of the war throughout 1823.

**Judicial Felicitations**

When the ultra Minister of Justice Charles de Peyronnet asked members of the judiciary to send their congratulations to the king and the Duc d’Angoulême, judges, prosecutors, and justices of the peace throughout France simply drew from the well-worn nationalist discourse to create a series of propagandistic “felicitations,” many of which ended up in the *Moniteur Universel*. Their effect was to create an impression of uniform opinion both in the government and throughout the provinces. Often criticized by the ultra press for its softness on political crimes, the judiciary benefited from this publicity to prove its loyalty to the new regime just as the army had done through its discipline and obedience during the campaign. Reading the letters from judicial officials highlights the ultras’ success in framing the war, even if some of the judges and prosecutors had misgivings over the ultra domestic agenda. The postwar felicitations are among the period’s most notable examples of how ultra nationalist rhetoric cobbled together narrative elements about the history of France, essential political conceptions of national identity, and condemnations of a liberal “outgroup,” and tried to inculcate in the populace a vision of the ideal French nation.

The members of the judiciary who congratulated the king on the war’s swift end adopted the ultras’ vengeful and triumphant rhetoric to describe contemporary events they
considered inextricably linked to those of the previous thirty years. They framed the war as France’s duty to intervene and stop the same harmful phenomena that had disrupted France earlier. The first obvious correlation between the two events appeared in the threat that revolutions posed to kings. Many felicitations thus began by reminding the king of the misery of France’s recent past. “Widowed of its legitimate kings,” the Tribunal of Mirande wrote, “France groaned under the yoke of usurpation and anarchy.” Louis XVIII returned, the felicitations’ common narrative continued, and saved France, showering it with the benefits of the Restoration while remaining vigilant against the return of revolutionary threats. The Royal Court of Metz, and many others, although thankful for the benefits of the Restoration, suggested that revolution had avoided destruction and simply migrated to other nations. Their statement read: “The revolution that the August presence of Your Majesty had banished from your kingdom, found refuge in the isle of Leon.” This narrative of revolutionary displacement came full circle when it echoed the king’s own framing of the events in the Spain with which he had opened the Chambers in February 1823, namely that the peninsula replayed the painful memories of France’s past for all to see. Revolution “succeeded in reproducing in Spain these scenes of disorder and anarchy that signaled the first years of our unhappiness,” wrote the Tribunal of Arbois. The felicitations suggested to people that Spanish revolutionaries had given life to formerly abstract but deeply personal and painful memories of the Revolution—they made the present a reminder of a shared national history.

114 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Mirande, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Mirande, 14 December 1823.
115 AN BB30-262, Cour Royale de Metz, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Metz, 7 November 1823.
116 AN BB1-222, Tribunal d’Arbois, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Arbois, November 1823.
To explain how the past resurfaced in the present, judges trained in the skills of reasoned debate incorporated the more extreme and fantastic ultra language and imagery in their congratulatory letters. They portrayed revolution as outside of nature and natural human society and described it in diabolical terms as a perverted sickness or spirit that possessed people and deprived them of reason and respect for order. The letters thus drew on a counter-revolutionary tradition of depicting the Revolution in supernatural terms of monsters, demons, and hell. ¹¹⁷ With the motifs of the “hydra of revolutions” or the “abyss” that emerged hundreds of times in the judicial felicitations, the judges were able to explain the persistence of Revolution and then describe its defeat in Spain in terms of eschatological finality.

The hydra allusion was a particularly effective way of explaining the spread of revolution and its pertinacity. The justices of the peace of St. Quentin (Aisne) declared, “One believed that the hydra of revolutions was forever enchained …We were wrong. She hid herself under the mantle of hypocrisy, and there, in shadows and mystery, she mixed her revolutionary poisons to infect all of Europe.”¹¹⁸ Whatever particular social or political ill incited a people to revolt became simply a regenerated head of the same unnatural beast. This hydra metaphor explained the spread of liberal principles without engaging in any substantial way with their claims, thus forestalling debate over the political present. The many-headed monster also helped explain why Louis XVIII’s celebrated return did not end revolution. “Sire the revolutionary hydra was only expelled from France,” explained the Tribunal of


¹¹⁸ AN BB1-222, Justices of the Peace, Canton of St. Quentin (Aisne), Felicitations For The War In Spain, November 1823.
Gray, “...in all countries as far as the New World she becomes more furious everywhere and
belches forth her deadly poisons.”119 With the defeat of the Spanish constitutionalists,
however, the French army had performed the Herculean task of delivering the “last blow to
the hydra of Revolution.”120

The mythological imagery of the hydra often accompanied a more Christian allusion
to hell, the “abyss.” The tribunal of Lure wrote in their congratulations that, “you have closed
forever the abyss of revolutions; you have stuck down the cruel hydra that devoured so many
victims.”121 The abyss proved a useful allegory for the many disastrous effects of revolution
in society. It was at one time, the source of monsters that plagued humanity, the proverbial
site of falling into error, and an explicit depiction of the societal rift that revolutions caused.
In short, the abyss image incorporated the ultra frame for understanding France’s past and
present, and also illustrated how people employed the frame of national division to craft
political messages. Everyone had to acknowledge the profound effects of polarization, but
the boost in confidence that the war brought to the ultras made it seem as though closing the
divide was possible. The tribunal of Avesnes thus thankfully declared to the king that, “You
have closed the abyss that threatened to swallow our destinies and from which sprung all
calamities.”122 The implied content of these saved “destinies” was a unified future for

France without a deep gulf separating the people.

When felicitations did not resort to supernatural allusions to describe the Revolution,
you turned to metaphors of disease, sickness, and contagious madness to describe its

119 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Gray, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Gray, 25 November 1823.
120 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Toulon, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Toulon, 30 November 1823.
121 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Lure, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Lure, November 1823.
122 AN BB30-262, Tribunal d’Avesnes, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Avesnes, 6 December 1823.
ideological tenets and hint at the disfigurement of humans and society that resulted from unhealthy political principles. The real transformation of the prewar “cordon sanitaire,” a military quarantine district set up in the early 1820’s on France’s Spanish frontier to prevent a yellow fever epidemic from spreading to France, into the army that marched into Spain, helped propagate the idea of the war as preventive medicine. The Tribunal of Vouzières, for example, claimed the king prescribed war “to preserve our soil from the contagion of Revolutions.” What form did this disease take? The felicitations often vaguely referred to it as “revolutionary doctrines,” “revolutionary principles,” or a “false philosophy,” whose main components were the principles of popular sovereignty, absolute liberty, and equality. The Tribunal of Montpellier declared that, “This false philosophy which, delighting in hopes of a chimerical perfection, allows thrones to sit on volcanoes and makes peoples prey to the horrors of anarchy.” Using the language of contagion and disease to describe dangerous doctrines spread the war’s effects beyond France. The lawyers attached to the Tribunal of Réole declared that “This illustrious and sweet conquest, Sire, was the first need of the paternal heart of Your Majesty, as the destruction of unhealthy doctrines and of revolutionary maxims was the first need of nations.” Medical analogies in the felicitations thus also reinforced the universalist aspects of the ultra nationalist rhetoric on the war because all humans were susceptible to disease.

By describing how the king and his army defeated a universal threat, the felicitations’

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123 AN BB30-262, Le Tribunal de Vouziers, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Vouziers, Ardennes, 21 November 1823.

124 AN BB30-262, Le Tribunal de Premier Instance de Montpellier, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Montpellier, France, 12 November 1823.

125 AN BB1-222, Les Avoués près du Tribunal de Réole, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Réole, France, 6 November 1823.
authors suggested that the war confirmed France’s important place in the world. “All the thrones were threatened by [the Spanish revolutionaries’] audacious and sacrilegious enterprise,” wrote the Tribunal of Toulon, but only French soldiers under a legitimate king knew how to defeat the international liberal cabal. Because thrones were the backbone of society, the Tribunal of Draguignan described the intervention as a “war undertaken for civilization itself...” France was no longer a defeated nation but an international savior whose prominent place in the world met the expectations of the most optimistic prewar opinions. The writers of the royal felicitations never doubted the preeminence of French culture in the world, but they could now point again to her martial strength as a point of national pride. In a letter congratulating Angoulême, the Tribunal of Figéac asserted that France was back in “the first rank of nations by its power as she was by her civilization.”

The felicitations thus contained the ironic element of ultra nationalism by which the French nation grew stronger and more in line with nature when it protected universal values. Ultras, as noted, associated legitimacy with a paternal absolute monarchy, and felicitations that made claims according to this principle of rule applied its benefits to both the world and the nation. In this respect, paternal legitimacy became an inclusive national and international value that the war’s successful outcome preserved. “The dogma of legitimacy,” the Tribunal of Dole’s felicitation read, “[the] sole guarantee of the repose of nations, has just been cemented by glory.”

126 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Toulon, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Toulon, 30 November 1823.
127 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Draguignan, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Draguignan, 18 November 1823.
128 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Figeac, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Figeac, 4 November 1823.
129 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Dole, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Dole, 6 November 1823.
légitimacy, the Tribunal de Saint-Dié’s felicitation also suggested, would benefit France and herald a future in which all the French would embrace the king’s “paternal scepter” and “forget deplorable and deadly dissensions in the bosom of peace and happiness.” These authors of felicitations thought curing one side of its erroneous political beliefs while asserting universal principles would overcome France’s domestic disputes and bring the nation and world together.

The swift victory in Spain of universal and national values persuaded the judiciary’s members that erstwhile opponents of the war would heal themselves of their errors and show their patriotic fervor for the ultra model of the nation. The people, claimed the felicitation of the Tribunal de Réole, are “more and more proud to be French.” All the French, the Civil Tribunal of Agen claimed, would live in a hierarchical society that would enable France to enjoy “repose and happiness, [and] the sweet fruits of a paternal reign.” The troops’ example provided the needed catalyst for a grand transformation of Restoration society; the Revolution would finally end and society would come together. Those on the Left were even invited to partake in the joy, “After so many examples of bravery and generosity, may the enemies of the correct system,” the Tribunal de Commerce de Calvi beseeched, “heartily reunite with all your faithful subjects and may all cry in one voice, Long live the King!, Long live the Duc D’Angouleme, Live forever the Bourbons!”

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130 AN BB30-262, le Tribunal de Saint-Dié, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Epinal, 10 November 1823.

131 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Réole, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Réole, France, 7 November 1823.

132 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Villeneuve d’Agen, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Villeneuve d’Agen, 18 December 1823.

133 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Commerce de Calvi (Corse), Felicitations for the War In Spain, Calvi, 29 December 1823.
felicitations, there was room for everyone in the national and royal parade.

The war also revitalized the Spanish and French amity that Napoleon’s invasion and the subsequent turmoil in Spain had damaged. Felicitations thus portrayed the war as a charitable act that would return dividends in friendship and stability on the borders of France. The Tribunal de Lure’s felicitation claimed that the war brought “true liberty to a neighboring people torn by anarchy and civil war, to a people naturally the friend and ally of the French.”\(^{134}\) Many others went further in cementing the bond between France and Spain when they used the same paternal terms that had made the war a European priority. In the case of Spain these international links were especially close because of the nations’ shared Bourbon heritage. Some remembered, for example, how Louis XIV was purported to have declared when his grandson ascended to the Spanish throne in 1700, “il n’y a plus de Pyrénées” (The Pyrenees are no more). Authors of the felicitations seized on this quip and inserted it in many of their letters. Spain was no longer a foreign country, the Tribunal of Montargis claimed, “We are but a single family, il n’y a plus de Pyrenees!”\(^{135}\) Spain too could now enjoy the same benefits of paternal monarchy as the French.

Despite a resurrected love for Spanish brethren and token references to national reconciliation as a result of the war, political attacks still surfaced in the felicitations. Many law courts could not resist the temptation to gloat and punish the liberals for their antiwar stance and thus they reinforced the frame of national division when honoring the king. They found easy targets in those liberals who continued to express their misgivings about the war.

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\(^{134}\) AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Lure, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Lure, November 1823.

\(^{135}\) AN BB30-262, Tribunal de Montargis, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Montargis, 4 November 1823.
“Some worried minds,” wrote the Royal Court of Agen, “some sick at heart, inappropriately draw sinister augurs for public liberties from this [victory].” Felicitations countered those who continued to oppose the government by warning leftists that the war was, as the Tribunal of Barbesieux declared, a “memorable lesson for the artisans of revolutions.” This lesson became in essence a last acknowledgment of the liberals’ existence as a political group because the ultra government confidently planned them to push them out of the system in the 1824 elections. From the bench at Figéac, the drafters of a felicitation declared, “may your domestic enemies, Sire, if some still are able to exist, recognize their errors and become again your faithful subjects, enjoying in peace the benefits of your government.” Hundreds of similar messages filled the pages of the Moniteur, and several hundred others were produced but not printed. Together, they offer a glimpse at how nationalist ultras framed the war and reinforced their own frame of the nation in the process.

The War in Cultural Media

In November, 1823 spectators at the Grand-Théâtre of Bordeaux were treated to a one-act allegorical “ballet of circumstance” entitled, Les Lauriers d’Ibérie [The Laurels of Iberia], which the local authorities had commissioned to celebrate the war in Spain. The ballet retold the history of France in dance and song from the time of the mythical Frankish king Pharamond to the march of French troops into Spain in 1823. Throughout its historical narrative the villain, Discord, repeatedly attempts to sabotage the “chosen” people and kings of France while Genius (génie) defends them. Over the march of time, kings prove that they

136 AN BB1-222, Cour Royale d’Agen, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Agen, 6 November 1823.
137 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Barbesieux, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Barbesieux, 6 November 1823.
138 AN BB1-222, Tribunal de Figeac, Felicitations for the War In Spain, Figeac, 4 November 1823.
can overcome Discord’s machinations. Henri IV, for example spares the life of a member of the Catholic league calling out to his soldiers, “Stop, he is a Frenchmen!” Discord comes back, however, during the Revolution with monsters from hell including Envy, Hatred, Vengeance, and Furies, but this time Genius grows the wings of victory and fights them off. The ballet then abruptly concludes with a triumphal march in which Spanish ladies and French cavaliers dance together and representatives of all of France’s social classes unite in celebration.\(^{139}\)

In this one act, the ideological frames that ultraroyalists used to define and defend the Spanish war reappeared on stage: kings governed by divine right, the French had a special role in the world, and supernatural forces caused divisions in society. What stands out in descriptions of the ballet, however, is its seamless transition from the Revolution’s defeat to the triumph of French arms in Spain. The absence of any reference to the intervening years matched the royalist interpretation of the Spanish war as the last act of the Revolution, and intimated that the war had ended the Revolution, thus removing the final barrier to national unity. It was as though the Restoration with its polarized polity had never existed.

Performances of plays like \textit{Les Lauriers} took place all over France in the fall and winter of 1823-24. They were part of a large official campaign to celebrate the war which, combined with an even larger body of unofficial spontaneous poems and songs, praised the French triumph in Spain.

Not all songs celebrated the war, however, as a few isolated cases of antiwar songs appeared throughout 1823. These grew scarce over time but their content highlighted

remaining leftist sentiments that countered the ultra pro-war discourse. C. Hyacinthe, for example, had warned that the war would disturb France’s prosperity in his song, *Dithyrambe: La France en alarmes aux bruits de guerre contre l’Espagne* [Dithyramb: France in Alarms from the Sounds of War against Spain](1823). The work affirmed the author’s allegiance to the “paternal king” who brought prosperity to France but questioned the political motives of those pushing the war. “Is it liberty you want to destroy / In the heart of the Castilian?” the poem asks. If so, the author warned, “Do not tarnish your glory. / Of my tragic history / Read the sad accounts;” echoing the liberal warning in the Chambers about the danger foreign intervention posed to kings. 140 Less restrained authors—who remained safely anonymous—called on the military to disobey. Claiming that France’s leaders had “lost their minds,” the author of an untitled song from Metz reassured the soldiers that the Spanish would see them as brothers and that they should, “reserve all their blows / for the agents of the ministry.”141 Such antiwar rhetoric only fueled ultra indignation, but it soon disappeared—at least in its published formats. The most popular leftist songwriters and poets were simply unprepared to challenge military aggression in verse, so when war came, they ignored it or even added their voices to the victory celebrations. By the end of the war, a few left-leaning songwriters and poets were celebrating the army’s exploits, and their focus on the martial glory of France simply migrated from Napoleonic nostalgia to Royalist glory in Spain. For the most part, however, leftist songwriters and poets largely followed the lead of prominent liberals and refrained from comment for fear of seeming treasonous or ungrateful for the French victory.


141 Anon., *Chanson inédite* (Metz, France: Verronnais, 1843).
Royalist lyricists, meanwhile, wrote works in support of the ultra political program and imbued them with a decidedly antagonistic anti-liberal tone. The framing of the war that *Les Lauriers d’Ibérie* achieved without words was matched in the explicit language of songwriters and poets. Their songs and poems reasserted the union of paternal monarchy and faith as the natural basis of society, chastised liberals for being un-French, reiterated the connection between the intervention in Spain and the French Revolution, and proclaimed the salvation of humanity and civilization. These themes all came together in a general call for unity among the French—naturally, according to ultra terms—and for alliance with the Spanish. The celebratory songs and poems went beyond all other literature on the war in outlining the ultra nationalist creed. Heady days of fêtes and parades put the populace in the right frame of mind to bolster this lyrical propaganda’s effectiveness and inspired political support for the ultra regime.

Many collections of poems and songs came from the efforts of the préfets who organized the celebrations. Thus it is not surprising that all sorts of soldiers, bureaucrats, and other officials suddenly fancied themselves lyrical artists. One such poetic creation was *La Couronne Poétique du Prince Généralissime* [The Poetic Crown of the Prince Generalissimo] (1824), a large collection of celebratory texts financed through a subscription campaign whose donors included members of the royal family and numerous government officials. Its introduction stressed its political tone by proclaiming that “our collection will therefore be received with interest by all the good French, by all the faithful Spanish who owe their upcoming happiness to the wisdom of our Bourbons and the union of the Princes of Europe against revolutionary factions.” While its editors suggested that the songs in *La Couronne Poétique du Prince Généralissime; Receuil de pièces choisies*, (B. Mondor, ed.) (Paris: J.-M. Eberhart, 1824), ii.

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Couronne had emanated from unanimous public opinion in support of the war, their substance qualified them as examples of one-sided ultra propaganda.

Poems and songs celebrated the war for saving the natural union of altar and throne. In a series of couplets, an author named, “Adjutant Grigoul,” described the liberals of Spain as “A party that believes itself master / of changing God and king.”\textsuperscript{143} In a similar vein, an “old soldier of Condé” vividly described the Spanish threat for the benefit of returning soldiers at a Parisian banquet. The Spanish rebels, he wrote, were “cohorts without restraint, with audacious sacrilege / Burning Iberia and threatening at the same time / Both priest and altar, both prince and the state.”\textsuperscript{144} Such sacrileges, as the ultra authors described them, threatened France’s own restored Catholicism and upset the natural order of all societies. In other poetic attempts to portray the war as a defense of natural order, writers emphasized the private family metaphor to make paternalistic ideology relevant to the general populace. G. Menard de Rochecave, for example, described the crimes of revolutionaries against this order in his cantata, \textit{L’armée française en Espagne} [\textit{The French Army in Spain}]: “The Father succumbed to the hand of his sons, / Mothers reject their daughters, / No more friendship, no more families.”\textsuperscript{145} The poet assumed that everyone could identify with these painful descriptions of families torn apart by unsafe doctrines and give their support to the protection of the greatest father in society, the king, to ensure their own household remained safe.

The sanctified royal bloodline of Bourbons became a central feature of many celebratory texts. The victorious Duc d’Angoulême, who by many accounts made a rather

\textsuperscript{143} Grigoul, “Couplets,” in \textit{La Couronne}, 96.
\textsuperscript{144} Anon., “Stances,” in \textit{La Couronne}, 100.
dull impression in person, emerged from the war as a “worthy son of Henri Quatre, [and] the savior of enchained Bourbons.” 146 All the monarchical figures of the campaign from Ferdinand VII to Louis XVIII found themselves likewise transformed into near religious symbols for the sake of sanctifying and promoting the paternal nation. The poet J. H. Aldebert compared Louis XVIII and Angoulême to the story of Christ in a poem about “Louis” who, “Like the Supreme Being had done before, Sent his Son among us.” 147 Almost blasphemous in its use of metaphor, this kind of religious enthusiasm for the monarchy nonetheless dominated ultra rhetoric on the war.

This marriage of monarchy and religion formed the backbone of the ultras’ nationalistic justifications for war. Using traditional, conservative religion to turn national identity into a crusader’s platform, the ultras extolled the virtues of their idealized paternal nation as the only model for France because God Himself had instituted the system. This confidence in the religious foundation for political beliefs overrode considerations for another nation’s right to self-determination. The poet Angélique Salmon thus asserted that divine guidance condoned the French goal “To deliver Iberia, returning to it in one stroke / Her religion, her monarch, and her ancient laws.” 148 France’s religious and monarchical legacy also justified sacrificing one’s life for the nation. For those bemoaning the loss of life during the Spanish campaign, the Abbé de Bonnevie consoled them with a nationalist creed of monarchical legends and faith. “If the native soil is denied their bodies,” he declared, “the


faith of Clovis takes care of their soul.”\textsuperscript{149} Such praise of self-sacrifice to the past and present nation is a classic hallmark of a nationalist program. Although the war’s relatively few casualties probably diminished the impact of this rhetoric, it illustrated the ultras’ nationalistic conception of France.

The ultra conception of the French nation as an inclusive entity, however, had no room for liberals or revolutionaries—they were anathema to civilization itself. The royalist songs and poems conflated Spanish and French liberal revolutionaries and contrasted them with upstanding citizens who valued their king and religion. On one side of the battle stood, “humanity,” on the other a small faction of “ingrates,” or worse, inhuman monsters. The author Vergeil in his ode to the Duc d’Angoulême called the liberals of Spain, “a factious inhuman party.”\textsuperscript{150} An anonymous poet imagined the war as a mythic struggle between good and evil and called those French liberals who supported Spanish rebels “vile and perjured children” of an “indignant” France.\textsuperscript{151} According to Angélique Salmon, French and Spanish liberals relished only power behind their progressive fronts. “Traitors, you affect noble sentiments;” she railed, “your mouth always vaunts independence, / And your avid hands seize power. / Nothing is sacred for you, and your authority / Relies but on crime and impiety.”\textsuperscript{152} According to these accounts, the inclusion of unreformed liberals within the French national family was no longer possible. They branded liberals as the dangerous domestic “other” and contrasted them with an ideal vision of a uniformly royalist French

\textsuperscript{149} Abbé de Bonnevie, \textit{Discours à la mémoire des militaires français morts en Espagne, pendant la guerre}, (Lyon: Durand et Perrin, December 1823), 35.


\textsuperscript{152} Salmon, \textit{La Délivrance}, 5.
people. The prolific royalist songwriter, Charles-Joseph Rougemaître, went so far as to proclaim that only war supporters were “worthy of the name ‘French.’” Poets’ praise for France’s natural order of throne, Church, and family contrasted with their portrayal of the unnatural monsters and hydras that opposed this order. M. Bressier, for example, portrayed Louis XVIII invoking God to purge the earth of a “frightful monster.” Other authors equated spreading liberalism with the hydra that featured so prominently in judicial felicitations. Thus the “old Condéen” praised the defeat of a “bloodthirsty hydra,” while M. de Frenay referred to the more politically descriptive “hydra of anarchy.”

Depictions of unnatural opponents and poetic hydras played a prominent part in the ultras’ effort to portray the war as the last throes of the French Revolution. To make this historical connection songwriters and poets recast the constitutional uprising in Spain as an addendum to the political and social changes of the previous hundred years. Bernard-François-Anne Fonvielle wrote, “This racket of a long-winded century / Troubles the peace of the world through its clamor,” and conflated rebels in Spain with the revolutionaries of the 1790’s to remind the people of the stakes involved in fighting the war. This theme showed up in a poem called *Stances sur la Guerre d’Espagne* [Stanzas on the Spanish War] (1824). “Some Jacobins, of the impious race / Overturned all the altars,” wrote the author “Min. F.” But now, “Their reign finished on Earth / This sect resisted in vain. / Antoine

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[Angoulême] is armed with thunder / To purge them from the human race.”  

Finally, the long nightmare of the Enlightenment and the Revolution had ended.

This sense of a passing era tempered the vindictive nature of some of the ultra poems and songs. Peace’s greatest gift, claimed many of the songs, would be the union of the sister nations of France and Spain. By freeing Ferdinand and removing the threat of European revolution, the war gave hope to two nations that had suffered from the past thirty years of conflict. Now Spain and France both would enjoy the repose that France had attained in the Bourbon Restoration. “Brave Spaniard,” wrote the Chevalier Jacquelin, “fulfill your destinies! / This is the day when two peoples united / Are going to repeat: no, no more Pyrenees!”

Just as France had allied her destiny with the Holy Alliance, Spain too (in the words of an anonymous songwriter) had joined this “unanimous concert of the most powerful nations” that would “fill forever the abyss that revolutions open.”  

The war had expanded the extent of civilized Europe through exorcising Spain’s demons. Its royal bounty knew no limits.

France could also finally enjoy domestic peace and repose. So long as the French learned to enjoy, as Rougemaître called it, “liberty without license,” internal disputes would drown in a chorus of broad royalist enthusiasm.  

Scenes of jubilation in which citizens flocked to welcome the troops home became promising augurs of things to come. Partisanship would not disappear without effort, but the first steps towards reconciliation had

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159 Anon., Cantate en l’honneur de son altesse royale, Monseigneur le Duc d’Angoulême, Généralissime des armées Françaises en Espagne, (Montpellier, France: Jean Martel Aîné, 1823), 1-4.

been achieved. In *Le nouveau chant français [The New French Song]* (1824) M. Capelle called on the nation to take advantage of the war’s opportunity to heal: “Frenchmen, on this solemn day, / Let us forget our conflicting paths; / Under the laws of a paternal king / Let us reassume our brotherly titles.”

His appeal for peace and unity elucidated the pragmatic voice of Restoration royalist moderation. It acknowledged the split in society and hoped that with the triumph of the royal army, partisans would set their grudges aside. For the more enthusiastic and spiritual ultras, the war fulfilled God’s plan for France. As a song written for the celebrations in Troyes claimed, “The prophecy is finally fulfilled! / France, God just granted your wishes, / From all sides, there is nothing but harmony / Perfect accord, and happy French!”

This fortunate result had little to do with the democratic principles incorporated in the Restoration Charter. Unity had arrived by the hand of God—but humans still inhabited the earth, and their prejudices were too strong for victory to defeat.

Conclusion

All the ultras’ hopes for the war had come true. Ferdinand sat again on the Spanish throne unencumbered by a “revolutionary” constitution. Public opinion supported the war and its results, and people seemed content with ultra rule in France. Considering the rout of the liberals in the 1824 elections (they won only 17 seats out of 428), it was not unreasonable to conclude that the war did indeed end political contestation in France. Even moderates like Billecocq voiced hopeful sentiments that the war would “consummate” the Restoration and its “new institutions … rally the vast majority of the French around the reigning dynasty and

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its tempered monarchy, and show to Europe a France guaranteed on the outside by an imposing strength and on the inside by paternal laws.”¹⁶³ But it was not to be.

Two major factors ensured that political polarization would continue despite the victory in Spain. The first was the viciousness of the backlash against the liberals. If unity had been the sole focus of the celebratory discourse in the winter of 1823-24, it might not have hardened the hearts of liberals, but ultra gloating over the war set liberals on a determined path to reassert their position, eventually leading to their success in the elections of 1827 and the removal of the Villèle regime. The second factor was postwar Spain itself. For all the ultra rhetoric about the absolute power of kings, their own power in France came from electoral victories in a constitutional representative system. When Ferdinand immediately set out on a campaign of brutal repression and revenge, it vitiated ultras’ claims of moderation and compromise. Few ultras would have tolerated the arbitrariness of Ferdinand in their own country, and none had an answer for why Spain continued to be unstable after the glorious intervention. In sum, bitter feelings and disappointment followed in victory’s wake.

Royalist commentators on the results of the war had little new to offer as the brutality spread across Spain. For many the great post-revolutionary political struggle continued. Pierre-Sébastien Laurentie, for example, believed that a new domestic war must be “pressed with the same ardor as the first.”¹⁶⁴ Ultras believed that they no longer needed to defend their exclusive reading of the Charter and the Restoration—the time for dialogue had ended. The Charter must no longer tolerate contradiction; as the author of Des résultats de la guerre


d’Espagne [The Results of the Spanish War] wrote in 1824, “it [the Charter] wasn’t given to eternalize the political quarrels and make them descend into the bosom of household foyers,” and there was no room for “revolt and felony” in its institutions.165 Victory had given the ultras confidence that their conception of essential French identity would become the normative model for the whole nation. The corollary of this assumption was a continued demonization of liberals. Isidore-Marie-Brignole Gautier claimed that the war had “demonstrated to the least clairvoyant that these men, today enemies of all legitimacy, are anti-French and anti-loyal.”166 Ultras like Gautier did not understand that partisan ideologies flourish best when opposition to them persists. In a way, these continued attacks were providing ideological life-support for the ultras’ necessary enemies. Without an “other” the ultras might have lost their enthusiasm and political passion. Absolute victory itself threatened to undermine the effectiveness of the ultras’ message.

The ultras could keep contestation alive in France, but there was little they could do to fix Spain.167 It took only a year for liberal and other antiwar writers to reenter the debate with the examples of renewed internal violence in Spain acting as a foil to ultra triumphalism. An “Elector of Paris” claimed that building a national consensus out of the war would never happen because it was “an enterprise that was neither royal, nor national, but all ministerial.”168 If there was any benefit to emerge from the conflict it was the example that

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165 M. A. de B***, Des résultats de la guerre d’Espagne; précédés d’un coup d’oeil sur la révolution espagnole de 1820, (Paris: David, 1824), 82-83.


168 Anon. (un électeur de Paris), De l’opposition; de la guerre d’Espagne; et des élections générales aux électeurs de 1824, (Paris: Everat, 1824), 23.
Spain’s continuing problems gave of the dangers of fanaticism and the “counterrevolutionary hydra.”\textsuperscript{169} The Spanish royalists seemed a sad lot of obscurantist reactionaries when compared to the French troops who had shown themselves loyal, and the Duc d’Angoulême who proved magnanimous in victory. Jean-Marie Duvergier de Hauranne wondered, “what became of our influence, the just price of our spilled blood?”\textsuperscript{170} In the liberal estimation, there were no winners in Spain, but France had definitely lost something by presenting to the world this sad example of French impotence in following through on a foreign policy decision. Instead of the war ushering in the proud return of post-revolutionary France to the world stage, a theme which had featured prominently in the ultras’ pro-war rhetoric, the liberal belief that French intervention would meet harsh international criticism and fail the judgment of history came to seem the more likely outcome. The future minister under the July Monarchy, Narcisse-Achille Salvandy, noted in 1824 that regardless of prewar opinion, all sides were now paying for the war, all sides had fought in it, and thus all had to share in its failures. Ultimately, Salvandy thought that future historians would sadly note without any reference to ideological distinctions that “Terror reigned over the Spanish, and the French army was there.”\textsuperscript{171}

In perhaps the greatest political conversion of the Restoration, the erstwhile perfervid ultra writer Joseph Fiévée harshly condemned the war within a year of the great “victory.” His observations on its true effect precisely summed up its real legacy. “The war in Spain may appear to be a guarantee against what one calls moral contagion,” he wrote, “[but] who

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 34.


is able to deny that it divided minds, gave more ardor to passions, [and] gave birth to
suspicions between the parties which reciprocally sharpened them?” Fiévée astutely
recognized that two rival political ideologies remained and both of them made claims for the
ture nature of the nation. He saw that the war’s true effect was to ensure that polarization
would only increase in France.

Placed in the context of an ongoing debate about France’s post-revolutionary national
identity, one could argue that the war in Spain was the most important event during the
Restoration. Ideology had separated the nation from the moment of the Charter’s inception.
Liberals and ultras alike had used largely domestic political traits and behavior as a basis for
articulating national identity and rallying support for their policies and opinions. But these
efforts were incomplete bases for nationalist rhetoric before the war raised the stakes to a
wider international framework. It took the prospect of exposing France to the scrutiny of the
world to transform domestic political practices into full nationalist programs. In the process
of this transformation, both sides realized that partisan claims for national identity stretched
beyond the ethnic nation and incorporated transnational expressions of political solidarity.
Although this international political context complicated the classification of French
nationalism during the period—offering multiple national and international characteristics of
essential French identity—it also suggested that nationalism is much more dynamic and
ambiguous than most theorists have recognized.

172 Joseph Fiévée, *De l’Espagne et des conséquences de l’intervention de l’armée*, 4th ed. (Paris :
Baudouin Frères, 1824), 84-85.

173 This challenges in particular theories of nationalism that offer essential models for nationalist
development such as Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1992), and those that consider the ethnic nation as the sole basis for building modern
nationalist movements, such as, Gregory Jusdanis, *The Necessary Nation*, (Princeton: Princeton University
power is a necessary factor for nationalism, and by that account, the ultras came close to meeting the threshold of modern state nationalism. But minorities in government such as the Restoration liberal deputies also have the ideological resources needed to foster nationalist programs and mobilize them in representative institutions and the press.

The Restoration political culture that had normalized polar contestation helps explain the development of these two nationalist responses to the war. The entire political discourse of the Restoration up to 1823 had consisted of an internal dispute over the meaning of post-revolutionary France. Politicians, writers, and common witnesses to political activity had proved unable to resist interpreting France’s identity through its domestic political divisions. With the advent in 1822-23 of an international stage on which to show post-revolutionary France to the world, the nation lacked the internal cohesiveness necessary to unify public opinion around which particular idea of the nation should represent the country. Major events like wars can often bring people together in consensus on the meaning of the nation, but the inability of the Spanish War to do this for France demonstrated how entrenched partisan identity had become during the Restoration. The classic war theorist Clausewitz, himself a contemporary of the Restoration, famously wrote that war is “a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”\(^{174}\)

During the Restoration, ideological conceptions of the nation had lent themselves to a new vision of French society in which division and contestation became the normal frames for understanding France’s post-revolutionary condition. This chapter’s study of the Spanish War demonstrates how political differences and dueling nationalist rhetorics combined to increase the great divide in Restoration political culture. Yet how could French soldiers have risked their lives for a French nation that remained a subject of debate? Are we to believe that all the soldiers who marched were committed royalists? The fact that the army followed orders more likely demonstrated that irremediable political divisiveness had indeed become a banal facet of French society. The government could count on the army because its soldiers followed orders from the king, not from those who bandied vicious political attacks. The marching soldiers thus symbolized a nation that had become habituated to political division and accustomed to the state’s role as the tie that bound its divided subjects.
Chapter Four

Manuel’s Expulsion and the Personification of Partisan Identity

Introduction

Over the course of the Restoration, Jacques-Antoine Manuel acquired a reputation as a fiery orator. His passionate speeches in the Chamber of Deputies supporting freedom of expression, liberty of the press, and electoral rights often rattled his reactionary ultraroyalist enemies. In 1822, for example, he famously stated in the Chamber that France had only welcomed the Bourbons back “with repugnance” in 1814.¹ In the past, immunity for deputies at the tribune had protected him from consequences for uttering such inflammatory statements, but on 28 February 1823 the normal rules of the Chamber no longer applied. After a purported “defense of regicide,” Manuel faced expulsion from the legislature. As ultra Deputy Duplessis de Grenaden saw it, the Chamber was not merely a governmental institution; it should also be “like a head of the family who inflicts on one of its members a domestic correction; who chases him from the family.”² By alluding to France’s revolutionary, regicidal past, Manuel stained France’s family honor and earned the irreversible reprobation of his legislative colleagues. After his expulsion, both sides saw Manuel as an incarnation of the polar divide in post-revolutionary France. For leftists, he

¹ Manuel had uttered his famous line, “La France n’avait vu arriver les Bourbons qu’avec répugnance” (France had only witnessed the arrival of the Bourbons with repugnance) during debates over censorship in January 1822. *Archives Parlementaires* (AP), series 2, vol. 37, (Paris: Dupont, 1874).

² AP, series 2, vol. 38, 473. Such language is reminiscent of the Old Regime *lettres de cachet*, which confirmed a noble’s paternal rights over his children.
became a hero, for ultras, a symbol of the nation’s discredited revolutionary past. As the ultras saw it, he had stepped beyond the limits of belonging that defined a true Frenchman. Deputy Grenaden marshaled the ultras’ ideological construct of paternalist legitimacy to explain Manuel’s unworthiness to serve in the king’s government and justify his removal from it. Previous chapters have illustrated how this ultra framework competed with the liberal framework of the nation as a collection of individuals with inherent rights. In short, ultras conceived of society as a hierarchical family, and prioritized preserving the chain of authority from the king, through fathers, to the whole nation. At the other end of the spectrum, liberals considered individuals and their collective wills the basis for society, and made protection of individual rights the object of politics. Partisan politicians and writers on both sides argued in common that they defended “true” French people against the encroachments of the domestic “other” embodied in their political rivals. The Spanish War triggered more pointed debates over France’s national identity and exacerbated the exclusionary rhetoric used by both sides. After Manuel’s expulsion, these arguments affected the behavior of functionaries and the public at large who either attacked him or praised him. From 1823 until his death in 1827, Manuel was a symbol of the conflict between the two ideal conceptions of the nation that dominated political culture during the Restoration.

Manuel, a native of Provence (Barcelonette) and former officer in the revolutionary army—he served under Bonaparte in the 1796 Italian Campaign—spent much of the early Restoration as a legal consultant. In 1815, he earned a seat in the Chamber of Deputies to represent his home département of the Basse-Alpes, and served until the dissolution of the Chambre Introuvable. In 1818, the Vendée elected him to represent that département as its deputy and he won that seat again in 1820. A colleague and friend of prominent men like the
Marquis de Lafayette, Benjamin Constant, the banker Jacques Lafitte, and the famed songwriter Pierre-Jean Béranger (his best friend), Manuel stood out as the “independent” liberals’ most fiery orator. From the moment of his entrance into the Chamber, he became a focal point for ultra attacks on liberals. For many ultras, Manuel was the stereotypical revolutionary who paid lip service to the constitutional monarchy while secretly longing for the return of revolution.3

The Manuel affair and its impact on political activity in France was an extension of the debates over the war in Spain. Manuel delivered the controversial remarks that led to his expulsion in a speech opposing France’s intervention in Spain, and backlash against him typically accompanied pronouncements in favor of the war. While the French army waged war in Spain, redefining French nationalism and patriotism in matters of foreign policy, the French state struggled to control the discourse on Manuel on the domestic front. Well coordinated and widespread subscription campaigns to honor Manuel, and impromptu welcoming committees that cropped up wherever he traveled demonstrated the leftist populace’s identification of him as a symbol of opposition to the ultra regime and a true patriot. Ultra officials countered by criticizing his followers as ungrateful citizens who were as dangerous as the Spanish revolutionaries fighting French troops in Spain. This struggle over the public’s perception of Manuel sustained debates on the meaning of the war vis-à-vis national identity even after the success of the war had become self-evident.

The two main political camps identified Manuel either as an incarnation of virtue or of vice. He became more than a simple actor in the political struggles of the Restoration; his

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name and image became symbols for the promise of a progressive nation, or the memories of a tragic past. Revolutionaries had elevated the Republic’s stature by creating and promulgating the image of Marianne, Napoleon had created a cult of personality around his person, and the Bourbon family had recourse to the longstanding iconography of monarchy to celebrate their elevated stature. During the Restoration, an age in which republican and Napoleonic imagery were officially prohibited, liberals also used people to personify virtues, but drew upon more current and concrete examples of virtue to represent their political ideals. Manuel and Sergeant Mercier, the national guardsman who refused to remove him from the Chambers, thus personified both the progressive values dear to liberals and leftists and resistance to the hegemony of ultras in the government. Campaigns throughout France to honor Manuel and Mercier drew the ire of ultra authorities and stimulated a countering discourse which characterized Manuel as an example of the worst form of revolutionary and anti-monarchical vice.

Early nineteenth-century French politicians, especially ultras, continued to operate according to the Old Regime code of honor. Under normal circumstances, a universally accepted code of honor ensured that gentility and propriety ruled even in the Chamber, despite the incisive debates that emerged in that setting. Only cases of egregiously unacceptable behavior would incite politicians to withdraw the respect due a fellow member of the government and passionately condemn him. Abbé Grégoire did not merit honor because he was a regicide and ultras claimed that Manuel lost his honor through his

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rhetorical combativeness. When ultras found a pretext for expelling Manuel, they withdrew the respect for him that honor dictated—honor already withdrawn in the ultra press—and branded him an illegitimate Frenchmen, inherently unworthy of inclusion in the polity. They promulgated the idea of Manuel’s unworthiness through their press organs and through the state bureaucracy, which by 1823 was firmly under their control. Supporters who protested in his name in turn found themselves branded with the same stigma of dishonor as Manuel.

Ultras imagined and promoted a society of French people grounded on the Christian, absolutist, and paternal forces of order which gave the nation life and protected it from outside threats. They accordingly withdrew the benefits of belonging to the French nation from discredited outsiders—namely French people politically incompatible with the new regime—who prevented the realization of an ideal post-revolutionary nation.\(^6\) Adopting this framework for understanding the nation gave meaning to ultras’ conception of their own worth and allowed them to feel self-consciously superior to those who rejected it.\(^7\) By 1823 ultras had become savvy propagandists and, just as they had done for the Spanish revolutionaries, they promulgated political stereotypes to sell and contextualize their ideological frame of the nation. Broad labels for political enemies such as “revolutionaries” were effective tools for defining entire groups of people as unworthy of inclusion in the nation. But when they attacked Manuel, they used him to personify the dangerous liberal other and interpreted events related to Manuel as signs of the spreading contagion of

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\(^6\) Rogers Brubaker describes this process of “othering” as an essential part of creating citizens in a modern state: “Domestic closure against noncitizens is essential to the modern state qua nation-state, just as territorial closure against noncitizens is essential to the modern state qua territorial state.” Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 29.

\(^7\) Such a formulation is suggested by Charles Taylor who writes, “To think, feel, judge within a framework is to function with the sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is incomparably higher than others which are more readily available to us.” Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 19.
revolutionary interests that they had combated in Spain. Ultras also considered people who praised Manuel to be contagious carriers of principles dangerous to the nation. The ultras retained Old Regime honor and noble prejudice and compounded them with exclusionary discourse that often accompanies partisanship in democratic societies. While the familial terms they used were remnants of a longstanding discourse of paternal authority, ultras also mobilized the more modern resources of a centralized state and a democratic public sphere, to propagate an image of Manuel as hostile to national regeneration.

This chapter analyzes published and archival sources to illustrate how the Restoration’s competing frames emerged as guides for specific political and state activities during the period. The first section describes events that led up to and took place during Manuel’s expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies. Ultras justified the action by defining the nation and its institutions as emanations of the king’s paternal power, and claimed that natural, unwritten laws readily apparent to logical royalists necessitated Manuel’s removal. In his defense, liberals marshaled their own conceptions of a post-revolutionary nation dependent on the input of its citizens and the dignity of the bond between the king and people. Claiming that the Charter trumped all arbitrary applications of force, they rested their case on a literal reading of the law and tried to stop the war and prevent Manuel’s expulsion because those actions threatened the entire nation, including the king. The second section

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8 It is little surprise that during this period categories of deviance and social control that are still recognized today began to permeate the discourse of police work, prisons, and insane asylums, as Foucault so brilliantly illustrated in, Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (trans. Alan Sheridan) (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).

9 Larry Siedentop attests that the concept of exclusion is inherent in democracy, especially those that champion an “ancient” discourse of citizenship with a small number of active participants in government. He writes, “Central to this discourse, consequently, are categorical exclusions from citizenship, permanent forms of social inequality. Citizens are equal, but they preside over a society composed of inferiors.” Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 55.
uses police records to explore the effect that the event had on people in the provinces. Several case studies show how ultras described people who manifested their support for Manuel as ungrateful social pariahs hopelessly corrupted with revolutionary interests. This section also examines the subscription campaigns in honor of Manuel and Mercier to see in turn how leftist activists throughout France tried to elevate the two men into exemplary icons of French identity. The last section examines Manuel’s funeral in 1827 to show the lasting impact of the events of 1823 on the psyche of a divided nation.

Examining Manuel’s expulsion and its aftermath in the context of the Restoration’s divided polity, reveals the power of frames to influence action and help people understand and categorize the political world in which they live. The frames of the nation expounded in Chapter One of this dissertation were more than static concepts that broadly outlined political positions; they were also tools in the hands of able politicians and writers. Ultras underscored their belief in the hierarchal familial order of the nation by branding Manuel and his supporters as outside the social norm, while liberals championed the dignity and protection of the individual under the Charter by protesting his expulsion and elevating him to the status of national hero. Political division during the Restoration was not only a phenomenon in elite Parisian discourse, it showed up in the activities of leftist activists throughout France and in the state functionaries who tracked them. The events described here reinforced the idea of irreparable national division and showed how people experienced living within this polarized frame of the nation. When both these parties acted, they drew on ideas in elite discourse and made the abstract idea of belonging to a nation more tangible and experienced—national division as a concept became incarnate in the contrasting portrayals of Manuel, his supporters, and his detractors.
Part One: Manuel’s Expulsion

Creating a Regicide

Abbé Grégoire’s expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies in 1819 had set the precedent for Manuel’s later removal, but that was not the first time the government had removed people from positions of power based on their political opinions or past behavior. Partisan behavior went against the spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness that supposedly characterized the Restoration era, and yet numerous state functionaries and administrators found themselves unemployed if a superior thought their beliefs were incompatible with the monarchical government. How did royalists justify these actions that seemed to contradict the spirit oubli in Article 11 of the Charter?

Chateaubriand thought expulsion a necessary condition for the success of the constitutional monarchy. In De la monarchie, he suggested that ultras should accept the representative system and turn it to their advantage but should also guard against revolutionary recidivism by being “vigorous, without ceasing to be constitutional.”

Chateaubriand justified expelling people who harbored “revolutionary interests” from official positions because their complete removal would “purify” (épurer) the king’s government. According to him, “Justice is not vengeance, oblivion (oublié) is not a reaction; it is not necessary to persecute anyone, but it is equally not necessary, in fact it is dangerous, to confide offices to the king’s enemies.” Chateaubriand thus promoted a deep purging of the state machinery, for only a complete sweep of the government would “satisfy publics

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11 Ibid., 479.

12 Ibid., 483.

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condemnation [of revolution].” While these warnings addressed specifically the army and the state bureaucracy, and not necessarily the Chambers, Chateaubriand’s prejudices against those who colluded with revolutionaries and his conception of unworthiness entered the lexicon of Restoration royalists as they sorted the “good” French from the “bad.” In a broader context, through *Monarchie* Chateaubriand helped spread the idea that representative government was an inevitable product of France’s political evolution, but he also stressed that participation in it was not a privilege all should enjoy. It was only a matter of time before ultras applied their “vigorous” inclinations against deputies who represented revolutionary principles in general (Grégoire), and those who espoused them in the Chamber (Manuel).

The effort to purify the Chambers began in earnest with an extra-constitutional restriction of the electorate. In May 1820, responding to widespread fear of liberals following the February assassination of the Duc de Berry, the new prime minister Richelieu and ultra deputies proposed the “Law of the Double Vote,” so named because it gave citizens in the wealthiest tax bracket two votes in the elections to the Chambers compared to other citizens’ one vote. In effect, this legislation gerrymandered the electorate along class lines and ensured that wealthy ultras in the *départements* would enjoy disproportional representation. Liberals rightly interpreted this as a cynical attempt to redefine citizenry and ensure ultra domination of the legislative process—in essence to “purify” the Chamber permanently. As demonstrations against the law erupted in the streets of Paris, many liberals considered their

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13 Ibid., 485-86.

14 The debates in the Chamber of Deputies over the Law in June confirmed the widening gap in Restoration political culture. More centrist liberals began to realize that without ministerial support, fighting both ultras and independent liberals was no longer possible. Only a few doctrinaires thus chose to support the bill while most moved to the left to fight it. See Alan Spitzer, “Restoration Political Theory and the Debate over the Double Vote,” *Journal of Modern History* 55, no. 1 (1983) 54.
opposition to it as a heroic stand against despotism.\textsuperscript{15} Manuel argued against the bill with his characteristic pugnacity suggesting that ultras risked instigating “new revolutions,” by altering the Charter’s provisions for fair representation.\textsuperscript{16} After its successful passage, many on the Left shared Manuel’s conviction that the Law of the Double Vote had destroyed the compromise outlined in the Charter. As the carbonari movement proved, “new revolutions” indeed became the last hope for many liberals who only a year earlier had reveled in electoral successes and defended the system of government outlined in the Charter. In the elections of 1820, the ultras benefited from the Law and increased the number of seats they held in the Chamber of Deputies, bringing that body closer to the purity that they regarded as essential to the preservation of the constitutional monarchy. Manuel, whom they considered the most blatant contagion of leftist thought within that institution, remained in the Chamber as a reminder of the ultras’ unfinished work.

Over the next two years, ultra complaints about Manuel grew steadily. In 1822, he uttered the notorious quip about France’s “repugnance” at the Bourbon’s return. His name was also associated with the conspiracies of that year, bringing his loyalty to the monarchy further into question. Manuel seemed impervious to criticism, however, and unabashedly continued to rail against ultras and the exclusively ultraroyalist Villèle ministry that emerged in late 1821. Ultras could not abide his use of the rostrum in the Chamber of Deputies to inveigh against the government, considering it an affront to the king himself that sullied the

\textsuperscript{15} Liberal Deputy Bignon declared, “Messieurs, the discussion that occupies you this moment is maybe the last when free voices are still able to make themselves heard . . . this tribune will no longer belong but to tyranny and servitude.” AP, 2:28, 23 May 1820, 43.

\textsuperscript{16} “It is thus [through the introduction of bills such as the Double Vote] that, provision by provision, the liberties of France will be destroyed, and the citizens finally despairing of enjoying under this government liberties so many times guaranteed and conquered by so many sacrifices, would no longer have a choice but between new revolutions or the sacrifice of their liberties.” Ibid., 9 June 1820, 353.
Chamber’s special status as the bond between king and people. During the elections of late 1822, for example, ultra deputy Isidore-Marie-Brignoler Gautier complained about, “An orator who, by his loquaciousness and wise cracks acquired for himself a certain celebrity in the liberal party, did not fear to say and want to prove that the return of the Bourbons in France was seen by her [France] with repugnance....Is it possible to match the audacity of this imposter?” Gautier urged the electors in his department to “...reject the men presented by this party that calls itself French, that speaks in the name of the people, and that, by its political conduct, shows itself its most implacable enemy.” Fellow ultra Jean-Claude Clausel de Coussergues took these sentiments further, suggesting that “The liberal people, or rather the tribe of liberal people who pretend to be French, was defined by one of its orators: it is the people who saw the return of the Bourbons with repugnance.” Clausel de Coussergues damned Manuel’s opposition as evidence of a stain on his character; Manuel and his ilk were no longer French and thus did not deserve any special treatment, even within the Chamber itself.

The ultra daily paper, l’Étoile, assumed to speak for the people of the Vendée who had voted for Manuel, claiming that, “M. Manuel sees the Bourbons on the throne with repugnance and the immense majority of Vendéens see with repugnance M. Manuel as deputy of the Vendée.” The paper cited the president of that département’s electoral college who claimed that Manuel’s election would be, “painful for the heart of the king,” and decried

17 Isidore-Marie-Brignoler Gautier (du Var), Coup d’œil sur la véritable position des partis en France, adressé aux électeurs de la 1er série; par un ami de la légitimité et de la Charte, 3d ed. (Paris: Pillet Ainé, 1822), 22-23.

18 Ibid., 23.

19 Jean-Claude Clausel de Coussergues, Quelques considérations sur la marche du parti libéral dans les premiers mois de 1822, et sur certains discours de ses députés, 2d ed. (1822; Paris: Egron), 23.
the power of a small minority of Vendéens to give Europe this “grand subject of pain and
shame.” Ultras felt especially chagrined that the Vendée, the heart of counterrevolutionary
opposition during the Revolution, sent someone to the Chamber whose “unpunished outrages
and privileged sedition” were an affront to the memory of locals who had died fighting
against revolutionary principles. 20

Historians of the Restoration have given Manuel’s expulsion some attention, but they
usually depict the event as the ultras’ spontaneous reaction to his speech on the war.
Evidence suggests, however, that ultras had considered his removal from the Chamber well
before he made his speech. While the above citations point to the general and longstanding
enmity that ultras had for him, in the beginning of 1823—during the feverish prewar
debates—the ultra press began to insinuate that a final solution to the problem of Manuel’s
presence in the Chamber was needed. In the ultra daily, Le drapeau blanc, the editors placed
removing “unworthy” deputies and initiatives from the Chamber at the top of their wish list
for the new year. “We wish that the Chambers never obey any other voice than that of public
opinion;” they wrote, “that the noble Chamber of Deputies rejects he who is unworthy;
maintains itself independent, does not lend support but to what is pure, allows to drop or even
casts off that which is dubious and stained.” 21 Although the editors of l’Étoile did not refer
to Manuel by name, they too left no doubt as to their aspirations for the new Chamber when
they wrote, “We assume that the first question that will be stirred up in the Chambers will be
the exclusion or admission of a famous deputy. One believes that this Chamber will manifest

20 L’Étoile, no. 807 (14 January 1823): 2.

21 Le drapeau blanc, no. 1 (1 January 1823): 1. The use of the singular, “he,” to describe the unworthy
suggests that they had someone in particular in mind.
loudly its *repugnance* at seeing him seated in its midst.”

These statements in the popular royalist press must have resonated with the many ultra deputies who began haranguing Manuel from the moment he rose to speak on February 26.

*The Chamber of Deputies, February 26-27, 1823*

Arguments for and against the Spanish War over the winter of 1822-23 (see Chapter Three), raised the level of animosity between the two camps before Manuel spoke in the Chamber. Liberal and ultra deputies both had referred to the Revolution and its precedents in their arguments over the war, but when Manuel resorted to this comparative approach, he confirmed the ultras’ belief that he was a revolutionary at heart. He began his speech by refuting the claim that Spanish liberals posed any threat to the French state. Manuel stated that the king of Spain’s reasons for refusing to accept a constitution mirrored the ideology of royalists in France whose loyalty to the Charter he questioned. He tried to downplay the threat from Spain, but in doing so, he made the mistake of drawing parallels to the revolutionary history of France. He challenged the Chamber to come to terms with *all* the dangers that revolution posed for any form of government by asking, “The revolutionary spirit is without doubt dangerous, but is the spirit of counterrevolution any less so?” To illustrate this point, Manuel reminded the Chamber of the damage to the royal family that followed the allied intervention in the French Revolution. His line of reasoning led to the following statement triggering the ultras’ indignation and bringing about his expulsion:

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24 This was all too common a technique in Restoration politics. See the classic work on the subject, Stanley Mellon, *The Political Uses of History: A Study of Historians in the French Restoration*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958).

“Must I say that at the moment the dangers to the royal family became graver, that is when France, revolutionary France, sensed that it needed to defend itself in a new way, with a totally new energy . . .”  

Before he could finish his sentence, ultras in the Chamber rose to interrupt him and demanded that the President of the Chamber silence Manuel for his “defense of regicide.” This vague reference to the execution of Louis XVI pushed the ultras’ patience too far, and they reacted immediately to this sudden outrage with calls for his removal.

An anonymously written eyewitness account of the event in *Le drapeau blanc* reinforces the idea that Manuel’s expulsion was indeed premeditated. According to this account, several ultras had been heckling him without pause throughout his speech and accusations of regicide had begun well before he had reached the critical passage: “Then we lead kings to the scaffold,” M. Augier de Cheseau retorted when Manuel voiced his opposition to the war; “You make yourself the advocate of revolutions” several voices on the Right clamored against Manuel and added, “these same doctrines you defend led to the scaffold.” Just before Manuel’s final affront, M. de Sesmaisons protested, “You justify regicide!” Ultra deputies even hinted at his exclusion by mocking Manuel’s reference to “French citizens,” asking, “Are you talking about you?....citizen?” to the laughter of the right wing of the Chamber. Liberal deputies’ efforts to bring the session to order met with a

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26 Ibid., 439.

27 Ultras prided themselves on their level-headed nature in debates; looking down on passionate rhetoric. William Reddy explains, however, that, “Passion is allowable in the public sphere, in the form of just anger in defense of the public good and a combative spirit towards one’s political foes, especially those who act (in one’s own opinion) in such a manner as to vitiate the rule of legitimacy, the application of the law, the good order of civil society, or private morality.” Reddy, *The Invisible Code*, 60.
scornful reproach from Ravez, the President of the Chamber, who claimed that he alone policed the Chamber.  

In the context of this buildup, Manuel’s half-finished statement contained all the evidence ultras needed to judge him as incompatible with the regime. Manuel meant his statement to be a warning against regicide; he thought it wise to remind the Chamber that during the Revolution the threat of outside intervention had forced the French people to take drastic measures. In other words, if the royalists wanted to protect the person of the King of Spain, then they should bear in mind the lesson of history and not intervene in Spanish affairs. Ultras heard—or chose to hear—a different message, however, and, as they had made clear in their expulsion of Grégoire, a regicide had no place in the Bourbon government. By drawing the comparison between the two eras Le drapeau blanc claimed “he made himself an apologist for regicide” and ultras could no longer allow him to be “encouraged by impunity.”  

Solidly in power in 1823, ultras extended the definition of unworthiness that they applied to Grégoire to anyone who referred to regicide without reflection and remorse. The issue was referred to a special committee to determine Manuel’s punishment. Its members returned the next day proposing his expulsion. The ultra deputy Comte François-Régis de Labourdonnaye, began the Chamber session of 27 February with a proposal for expulsion on the basis of that body’s “higher jurisdiction” to police itself. Labourdonnaye recognized the immunity of deputies for speeches in the Chamber but posited that this legal

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29 Le drapeau blanc, no. 58 (27 February 1823): 1.

30 The next day, Manuel attempted to defend himself by submitting to the president what he intended to say if the ultras had allowed him to finish, but they would not allow the president to read it. Manuel claimed that his statement was to have ended, “... [and] placed in movement all the masses, exalted all the popular passions and thus led to terrible excesses and a deplorable catastrophe in the middle of a generous resistance.” It was, however, attached to the official record. AP, 2:38, 27 Feb. 1823.
benefit came with a duty to “punish the faults, offenses and crimes committed in the exercise of this liberty.”

Ultras did not specifically address which article in the Charter supported expulsion, but presented what to them seemed like a commonsense interpretation of its intent. Akin to Chateaubriand’s claim in *De La Monarchie*, the Charter’s sentiment of forgetfulness and forgiveness did not protect “revolutionary interests” in the government.

The liberals condemned the ultras for prosecuting a deputy who spoke from the tribune, and noted *a fortiori* the absurdity of judging Manuel on the basis of a statement that he did not finish. After addressing the lack of evidence for Manuel’s “defense of regicide,” liberal deputy Charles-Guillaume Etienne accused the right of not respecting the rules governing the Chamber and stated that a vote without some formal process would deny Manuel the basic protections of law that even the pettiest criminal received. Such an act, Etienne proclaimed, would replace the reasoned procedures of the Chamber with the violent whims of a majority and would “burn at the same time the right of defense, law, justice, and liberty.” For many liberals the spectacle of passionately vengeful ultras who repeatedly interrupted Manuel and then refused to let him speak further was incompatible with duties of a legislature or a judicial court. As the *doctrinaire* Comte Louis-Beauvoir de Sainte-Aulaire dryly noted, “Messieurs, it is a bizarre spectacle that an accused is booed by his judges!”

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31 Ibid., 444.

32 Liberal deputy Stanislas Girardin railed against the President in an examination of the session published after the event. According to Girardin, from the very moment of the ultras’ interruption of Manuel, the president set the tone and the parameters of the debate by tying Manuel’s word “energie” to the death of Louis XVI. Stanislas Girardin, *Examen de la conduite du Président de la Chambre des députés; dans la discussion relative à la proposition faite par M. le Comte de la Bourdonnaye, le 27 février, pour exclure M. Manuel de la Chambre des Députés* (Paris: Plancher, 1823), 7.


34 Ibid., 446.

Saint-Aulaire’s sentiments mirrored those of many moderate royalists and *doctrinaires*, who might have earlier preferred to see the hotheaded Manuel removed from the Chamber, but who also felt that the ultras’ proposed expulsion demanded strict legal analysis. Even deputy Laîné, a veteran centrist royalist who in 1819 had clamored for Grégoire’s expulsion, admitted that although he voted to consider the proposition (in his *bureau*) to prevent “a similar scandal” from occurring again, he nevertheless demanded that the proceedings against Manuel follow basic rules of law. Laîné reminded the Chamber that the act of expelling a sitting deputy had no precedent in the Restoration (Grégoire had not yet taken the oath of office at the time of his expulsion), and that it was necessary to address the issue within the following parameters: whether a proposal for expulsion was absolutely essential to the survival of the Chamber; if a new law allowing expulsion was within the “core rights” or unwritten code of the Chamber; and if the Chamber had the right to impose a penalty mandated by such a law, especially when applied retroactively.\(^{36}\) In his short address to the Chamber, Laîné urged ultras to defend their extralegal proposal in terms of constitutional legality. But over the next few days the debate over Manuel’s fate became a forum in which rival conceptions of legality competed—some allegedly based on the letter of the law and some on concepts of justice that transcended formal legal strictures. In these debates on the source and reach of the Chamber’s power, both sides marshaled many of the ideas behind their rival conceptions of the nation, and ignited an ideological debate on legality, sovereignty, and the meaning of French identity.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 452.
The Ultra Case for Expulsion

Ultras insisted on Manuel’s expulsion to fulfill the demands of the natural laws governing society. They sidestepped the Charter’s limitations on their actions by referring to what was for them the common sense dictates of a hierarchical paternal order. If the written law of the land admittedly contained no provision for Manuel’s removal, Deputy Duplessis de Grenaden argued, then legal grounds to remove a deputy from the Chamber could be found in the self-evident “positive laws” that predated society and cemented the king’s legitimate power as the father of the country. He argued that using the faculties of human reason one could recognize a crime against society’s natural order without recourse to written law. According to this a priori code, the Chamber as an expression of the king’s political authority automatically had, as La Bourdonnaye stated, “high jurisdiction over its members on all which is relative to the order of its deliberations and the public order that this power is especially charged to maintain.” When crime disturbed the maintenance of order in the Chamber, the deputies thus had to purge unhealthy elements by means of “internal policing.” There was no choice in this matter, for the preservation of the natural and social order was essential to the monarchy’s survival—any other response would be shirking the deputies’ duty to protect society. Ultras thus believed they could define a crime and its penalty and apply it retroactively in a single proceeding.

37 AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 472.
38 AP, 2:38, 1 March 1823, 457.
39 When asked how the government felt about the expulsion, the minister in attendance that day, ultra M. de Corbière, used the phrase, “interior policing,” in order to remove any association between the actions of the Chamber and the king’s policies. He clearly felt the proceedings on expulsion should continue. AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 489.
40 Perhaps most remarkable in this strategy is the extent to which it mirrors the types of arguments Jacobins used on the eve of the Terror. Enlightenment thought had been a target of royalists since before the
Ultras also justified bold action against Manuel on the basis of honor. Ultras, particularly sensitive to ideals of gentility and decorum, thought that representative institutions needed to maintain the same protective self-management that characterized the royal court during the Old Regime. Thus Labourdonnaye appealed to the “anterior principle . . . that in France one still calls honor, which does not permit any body whatsoever of preserving in its breast a member who soils the dignity of its character.”41 By claiming this distinguishing trait of honor, the ultras distanced themselves from liberal colleagues whose revolutionary morality did not merit their respect. In fact, they thought Manuel’s presence in the Chamber threatened their own honor. Grenaden warned that if members treated unworthy revolutionaries with honorable respect, the Chamber would become, “. . . an object of scandal and ignominy.”42 Ultra disgust at the prospect of sitting with Manuel thus reflected the divide in French political culture—honorable royalists and sullied liberals were two separate peoples, and the ultras assumed that only people like themselves were legitimate Frenchmen deserving of the privilege of serving the king.

Aware that the expulsion they proposed closely mirrored the arbitrary actions of the revolutionary Convention, ultras made every effort to minimize this similarity. Grenaden suggested that the action against Manuel was “nothing odious and is especially not able in any way to be compared to the judgments of those execrable assemblies of memory . . .”43 He instead accused the liberals of trying to promote the legacy of the Revolution and

Revolution; their use of a common element of it reflects the extent that they were willing to speak a modern political language to further their aims.

41 AP, 2:38, 1 March 1823, 456.

42 AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 472.

43 Foremost in everyone’s mind was the expulsion of the Girondins from the revolutionary Convention on 31 May 1793. Several references to this event punctuated the proceedings. Ibid., 473.
suggested that they “cease looking in this sewer in order to find some good; stop praising its
benefits and its happy results as you call them.”[^44] In reality, both sides pointed to the
Revolution both for precedents to follow and to avoid. In this case, Grenaden forestalled the
inevitable comparison to specific events in the Revolution by attacking its overarching
political ideals.

Grenaden’s argument for the Chamber’s arbitrary powers exposed key differences
between the liberals and the ultras over the meaning of representative government and
sovereignty. While liberals believed that governments existed both to protect the people and
grant them access to the management of their own lives, ultras saw government institutions
as organs for social control. Grenaden argued that “The repression of disorders and crimes is
a necessary condition for the existence of society. It is the principal aim of government and
laws.”[^45] While most liberals believed that electing officials resulted in a body that—when
combined with royal authority—embodied or shared some form of sovereignty, ultras
steadfastly held to their belief in absolute authority and considered the legislature merely an
instrument of monarchical power. Contaminated representative institutions contravened the
king’s absolute right and duty to enforce order. People who placed the rules and rights of the
Chamber before the dignity of the king demonstrated a dangerous misunderstanding of the
nature of sovereignty. Ultras brought this ideological issue of rival conceptions of
sovereignty to bear on the Manuel incident, and found support among those deputies who felt
the Chamber deserved special protections against the past excesses of revolutionary popular
sovereignty. Grenaden warned that preventing deputies from maintaining a pure Chamber

[^44]: Ibid., 474-75.
[^45]: Ibid., 472. Emphasis added.
would allow “the impious and senseless dogma of popular sovereignty, fundamental base of all the edifice of revolutionary doctrines,” to enter into the Restoration government and usher in the “most dreadful despotism.” It was a convoluted argument that tied the safety of representative institutions to the preservation of absolute sovereignty.

Ultras strengthened the appeal of these political arguments for expulsion by resorting to a xenophobic interpretation of Manuel’s speech and his intentions. For many ultras, liberals were a foreign element in the country and anyone who spoke a foreign political language like Manuel’s had no place in France’s institutions. They suggested that when he spoke from the tribune, his actual words mattered little because their meanings were different from those of the ultras. Ultras thus reiterated the popular idea that liberals spoke a different language, one incompatible with monarchy (see Chapter One). Indeed, ultras claimed they were incapable of interpreting Manuel's statement in any way other than as a declaration of rebellion. As an article in the ultra daily la Quotidienne explained, “. . . the liberals have subjected the words of our language to the same modifications that they have subjected our institutions; they hear them in their manner, and as they have not, up to this point, published their dictionary, we are obliged to assume the definitions in their discourse.”

Claiming to be unable to understand how Manuel could make his statement without it being an apology for regicide, the ultras blamed their incomprehension on the presence of foreign elements in the

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46 Ibid., 475.

47 Some ultras pointed to the English Parliament as an example of a stable representative system that was not based on popular sovereignty and that also had an accepted history of expulsion. M. Hyde de Neuville, for example, delighted in reminding the Chamber that the British Whig Charles Fox, a hero to many liberals, had voted to expel a member of Parliament. Ibid., 479. The reception of Manuel’s expulsion in Parliamentary circles in London, however, was far from positive. See, Comte de Marcellus, M. de Marcellus to M. de Chateaubriand, London, 5 March 1823, in Politique de la Restauration en 1822 et 1823, (Paris : Jacques Lecoffre, 1853).

Chamber and the nation. They construed any and all statements remotely critical of the ultras or the king’s policies as treasonous. The ultra case was a simple one by their admission. In their estimation, Manuel’s crime was merely a symptom of a larger problem, namely that liberals with their dangerous principles and their incomprehensible “revolutionary slang” still sat in the Chambers.49

Shortly after the event, ultra deputy Charles de St. Hilaire wrote a pamphlet that examined Manuel’s expulsion in relation to the Charter and predictably found that ultras did not violate any of its articles. In a rather tendentious reading of that document, he even construed the Charter’s admonition to forget the past (Article 11) as justification for the expulsion. St. Hilaire contended that although the Charter demanded that all forget the past, liberals still could not shake their old radicalism and clamored for the preservation of the Charter against the encroachments of absolutism. He implied that, through their intransigence, it was the liberal bloc that did not embrace the spirit of oubli. By holding onto discredited beliefs about the abuse of power, liberals selectively remembered what had no place in the new regime and ignored the pain that oppositional attitudes towards monarchical power had brought in the past. “There is no abuse of this prevision,” St. Hilaire concluded, “there are only the present day abuses of the liberals.”50 St. Hilaire thought that liberal opposition to the expulsion on the basis of the Charter matched Manuel’s speech in its audacious sedition. “These complaints would not be received but as vain protestations, if those who express them were isolated simpletons. But when one hears them resound in a sacred space, where the men to which the most honorable and respectable mission of

49 Ibid.
representing thirty million individuals and of defending and supporting their rights sit, they necessarily produce a profound impression in France and in Europe.”

During the Manuel event, the ultras largely ignored the lack of any clear provision in the Charter for expulsion, but later reinterpreted its provisions to justify their action as a brave defense of the constitutional monarchy and its institutions.

**The Liberal Rebuttal**

St. Hilaire embarked on his exegesis of the Charter because, during the debate on Manuel’s expulsion, liberals based their arguments largely on the Charter’s legal strictures. They maintained their confidence in the Charter as the source of the Restoration’s legitimacy and correctly reminded the Chamber that it did not contain any provision for the removal of a sitting deputy. The liberal deputy and former Napoleonic general, Maximilien-Sébastien Foy, began the proceedings on March 3, claiming that the Chamber was not a courtroom and chastised Ravez for even allowing the discussion to take place: “I say that Monsieur President fails his duty if he submits to ordinary forms of discussion a proposition so extraordinary, a proposition which is outside of the rules, outside of the Charter, outside of Justice!”

As the cornerstone of their argument, liberals continually emphasized the moral and political importance of the Charter’s spirit of compromise and attempted to demonstrate how the expulsion of a member of the Chamber undermined both the letter of Charter and its intent, and in turn threatened the monarchy itself. By defending the king’s gift of the Charter,

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51 Ibid., 3.

52 AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 467. Liberal deputy Stanislas Girardin also railed against the President in an examination of the session published after the event. According to Girardin, from the very moment of the ultras’ interruption of Manuel, the president set the tone and the parameters of the debate by tying Manuel’s word “énergie” to the death of Louis XVI. Stanislas Girardin, *Examen de la conduite du Président de la Chambre des députés: dans la discussion relative à la proposition faite par M. le Comte de la Bourdonnaye, le 27 février, pour exclure M. Manuel de la Chambre des Députés* (Paris: Plancher, 1823), 7.
they hoped to avoid accusations of harboring revolutionary principles and hold the moral high ground in the debate.

Liberals complained that the expulsion of a deputy challenged that portion of sovereignty that the king relegated to the people. Although most liberals publicly eschewed the idea of unfettered popular sovereignty after having witnessed the abuses of mass democracy in the Revolution, they still railed against arbitrary actions that countered the will of the people as expressed in an election. They argued that the monarch alone reserved the right to dissolve the entire Chamber, and then only for the explicit purpose of calling new elections as Louis XVIII had done in 1816. If the Chamber autonomously expelled Manuel, it both negated the will of the people who had voted for him and usurped a monarchical prerogative, effectively undermining the two political forces that lay at the foundation of the Restoration compromise. 53 If the ultras removed Manuel, the Chamber would be following the example of the Jacobin majority in the revolutionary Convention of 1793-94, whose reckless abuse of power proved so costly to the nation.

This argument fit a conception of legitimacy held by liberals in both doctrinaire and independent circles, according to which the Charter’s delineation of the duties and rights of various branches of government defined neutral spaces of negotiation. Practical sovereignty resided not in a single body—and especially not in a portion of one body, in this case the majority in the Chamber of Deputies—but in the political process itself. 54 Nearly all participants in the Restoration’s system of government agreed that ultimate sovereignty

53 Saint-Aulaire challenged the ultras, stating, “You do not have the right to expel a deputy from the Chamber without invading the rights of the electoral colleges and the royal prerogative.” AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 470.

originated with the king, but he had portioned the exercise of practical sovereignty to himself, his ministry, and the Chambers. The legitimacy of any political action rested upon the respectful and cautious deliberation of policy among these three entities—it ensured that the delicate balance of government necessary for the preservation of social order would remain intact. When one arm of the government rashly acted on an emotional whim, as the liberals accused the ultras of trying to make the Chamber do, it arrogated to itself the rights of the other two and vitiated the legitimacy of the whole. As General Foy observed, “If this principle [of the right to expel] is admitted without modification, the sovereignty will henceforth reside in the current majority of the Chamber of Deputies, it will no longer reside in the great body politic, composed of the King and of the two Chambers in which hereditary royalty must hold the strongest hand and exercise supremacy.”

Maintaining balance in government was the theoretical prerequisite for locating some portion of sovereignty in representative institutions, and arbitrary action by any branch of government necessarily hindered its legitimate expression.

More conservative doctrinaires also believed that sovereignty derived from the exchanges between various branches in government, but unlike independents, doctrinaires argued the legitimacy of these exchanges depended on the “sovereignty of reason.” Sovereignty resided neither in representative institutions nor in absolutist monarchy, but rather in the expression of reason by those most qualified to understand the needs of

\[55\] AP., 2:38, 3 March 1823, 490.

\[56\] Summing up the doctrinaire, François Guizot, on truth and sovereignty, Pierre Manent writes, “Men’s only conceivable sovereign is neither their will nor their consent, but the natural rule of their will or consent by right, reason, justice, or the moral law . . . it is up to political action to bring sovereignty about in just decisions.” Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism (Princeton: Princeton University, 1996), 100-101.
Countering the ultras’ arguments based on natural law, *doctrinaire* deputies emphasized a rational response to the crisis, demanding that rational actors work together to find the truth, rather than bluntly re-stating the ideological prejudices of the deputies who argued for Manuel’s expulsion. For a sovereign and legitimate response to the crisis to emerge, it had to be the result of honest negotiation, not reaction. For *doctrinaires*, the ultras’ refusal to use agreed legislative processes to arrive at an accurate interpretation of Manuel’s statement—and to properly interpret the dictates of the Charter concerning such a statement—prevented the realization of a rational response, and contributed to an overall failure of the government to exercise legitimate sovereignty.

Regardless of their beliefs in sovereignty, several liberal deputies simply demanded that factual truth drive the political process, and expressed their concern that the ultras improvised the facts of the situation to create “self-evident” conditions necessary for Manuel’s expulsion. If the Charter intended the Chamber to be a conduit for public opinion, it had to deal honestly with facts and not with confident but baseless assertions of the truth. Liberals claimed that ultras could not even understand the facts if they insisted on a tendentious reading of Manuel’s speech. In particular, they attacked the ultras for presuming

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58 Aurelian Craitu states that the search for sovereignty in doctrinaire political philosophy can only evolve by “allowing for the confrontation of independent and equal powers capable of reciprocally imposing on each other the obligation of seeking the truth together.” Craitu, 283.

59 Lucien Jaume asserts that Constant, in particular, insisted on the natural expression of truth in government and thus equated politicians in power who claimed to know the “truth” with the dangerous moral self-satisfaction of the revolutionary governments. Jaume, *L’individu*, 69.
to know Manuel’s intent when they interrupted him, and for using their own prejudicial understanding of his intent to banish him and solidify their power. \(^{60}\) Saint-Aulaire expressed his concern that ultras arrogated truth as their special preserve and then boldly proclaimed their rectitude when in fact they had no way of knowing what Manuel had intended to say. He declared, “I affirm that never has been found a country so savage, and in which the ideas of reason were so bizarrely understood, that one would refuse an orator the right of explaining his thought; that one had persisted in saying to him: ‘you had the intention of saying such a thing’ while he himself declares a contrary intention.” \(^{61}\) The ultras’ attempts to legalize the illegal and redefine the intentions of both Manuel’s words and the laws of the Chamber rankled those liberals who claimed that sovereignty rested on honest and rational deliberation, or who simply believed that government should not attempt to divine the “truth” from insufficient evidence.

No formal declaration of solidarity between rival factions of liberals emerged from the debates over Manuel, but the participation of *doctrinaires* in his defense pointed to the growing convergence of liberal opposition. \(^{62}\) Noted *doctrinaire* liberal Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, formerly a defender of the Décazes ministry *and* the decision to exclude Grégoire from the Chambers in 1819, accused the ultras of putting their prejudices against Manuel.

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\(^{60}\) Outrage over the ultras’ interpretation of Manuel’s half-finished statement spread in liberal circles. An angry reader of *Le Constitutionnel* wrote in a letter to the editor, “... they are only able to derive [a guilty judgment] from a complete ignorance of things, or really would make us think that nothing would appear more criminal, in the judgment of passions, than the success with which they are cast away from the weight of good reasoning...” Letter, “À M. le rédacteur du *Constitutionnel* de Népomucène L. Lemercier, de l’institut de France,” *Le Constitutionnel*, 2 March 1823, 1.

\(^{61}\) AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 470.

ahead of their loyalty to the government of the Charter “I have not been the protector of license and all species of excess is odious to me,” he declared, “I will say frankly, however, that there are in these exaggerated pleas, injustice and too little attention to the nature and needs of representative government.” Normal in his speech and sentiments in the Chamber, Royer-Collard decried the arbitrary nature of the ultras’ actions and adopted the same alarmist language he had chided independents for using in earlier crises. He portentously declared to the whole Chamber, “You are placed, Messieurs, between unlimited liberty which is the life of representative government and the limitation of this liberty which is its downfall.” The case demanded taking sides, and unlike what had transpired in the Grégoire case, standing on principles trumped cautious liberals’ political pragmatism.

Intimations that the end of representative government under the Charter was drawing near clarified the debate for liberals; instead of being an isolated incident, the Manuel case became a defining moment in the battle to define post-revolutionary France. Even more conservative moderates sensed that the ultras did not want to heal the rifts that remained from the Revolution but rather wanted to win outright the war that the two “nations” of France had waged for thirty years, and do it through the very institutions liberals held dear. Centrist deputy Casimir Perier thought that through their subversion of the rules of the Chamber, the ultras took on the role of the arbitrary majority that the sad history of the Revolution had discredited. He reminded the ultras that “You do not want to be compared to the Convention? Well, you would be right not to imitate it.” Perier thus adapted the discourse on “revolutionary interests” that ultras’ used to justify their actions and claimed that reaction

63 AP, 2:38, 3 March 1823, 476.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., 483.
and its principles, rather than revolution, threatened France’s political stability. Majority-rule democracy, which had set such dangerous precedents in the radical phase of the Revolution, was now in the hands of those counterrevolutionaries who had most loudly condemned it.

The “trial” ultimately resulted in the expulsion of Manuel from the Chamber for the duration of his term through an ultra-dominated voice vote that was essentially a spontaneous acclamation in favor of the proposal for his removal. But physically removing Manuel from the Chamber on March 4, proved more difficult and revealed even more dramatically the extent of the Left’s ire. When the National Guard entered the Chamber to remove Manuel, the entire left half of the hall—and a good portion of the center—rose in protest and the situation almost resulted in violence. After admonishing words from Lafayette, National Guard Sergeant Mercier refused to remove Manuel, and the army gendarmerie had to execute the task under the recriminations of a hostile liberal bloc. In a show of solidarity among liberals hitherto disorganized and at times mutually suspicious, sixty-three resolved to share Manuel’s fate and accompany him out of the Chamber for the remainder of the session.

Lafayette explained the reasoning behind his and his colleagues’ retreat: “There are no longer either municipal or administrative elections, or any of the popular elections, or freedom of the press, or properly constituted juries, or representation emerging from the bosom of the nation; those guarantees of 89 and 91 whose reestablishment would have been easy and swift no longer exist.”

Ironically, those who had spent eight years fighting expulsion now chose

66 The issue never came to a formal vote as the Left refused to dishonor the Chamber by voting for the “illegitimate” charge. Voice votes from the Right carried the day. Although approximately 10 Centrists raised their voices in a “no” vote, the majority of the Center-Left and Left raised their voices to shout down the proceedings, the situation was chaotic enough to close the session for the remainder of the day. Ibid., 494.

self-expulsion as a means of expressing their disappointment that the institutions of the Charter now represented the antithesis of reconciliation and compromise.

**Part Two: The Manuel Affair and its Meaning in the Provinces**

**Immediate Reactions**

Manuel’s expulsion was a highly publicized event, but it was overshadowed by news of the war in Spain. Without extensive press coverage of its aftermath, the cafes and streets of France became the primary forum for debating the meaning and merit of the event. Ultras viewed it in the context of the Spanish War and combined their enthusiasm for the armed intervention in Spain with their disdain for Manuel. His expulsion became a symbolic purging of revolutionary interests from the entire nation, and triggered real persecution of activists in the provinces as revolutionary contagions. For ultras, liberals who supported Manuel became as suspect as those who protested the war, and through their ingratitude and obstinacy, revealed themselves as anti-French and beyond rehabilitation. Leftist constituencies throughout France turned Manuel and Sergeant Mercier into a national heroes; embodiments of perfect Frenchmen fighting for the people’s rights. These two conceptions of Manuel and his supporters vied with each other in the battle for public opinion between the two sides of the Restoration political divide.

During the trial in the Chamber, Manuel’s supporters and detractors had taken to the streets to voice their opinions on the matter. According to police reports, a crowd of fifty to sixty young men accompanied Manuel from the Chamber to his residence each day of the trial, shouting inflammatory statements in his support and against the ultras and the war.68

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The event energized radical youth all over Paris, alerting the ultra press to the power of demagogues like Manuel to consolidate opposition. Most accounts of unwarranted political activity in favor of Manuel met with the ultras’ scorn because of their theatrical nature and the supposed cowardice of the activists. *L’Étoile*, for example, described a scene in which “liberal screamers” in Paris surreptitiously looked for an escape before meekly shouting “*Vive Manuel, vive liberté.*”^69* Le drapeau blanc*, on the other hand, declared that the convergence of street radicals and liberal deputies revealed the dangerous aspect of liberal thought. The editors noted that “the two great sects of revolutionaries, aristocratic and demagogic” always came together whenever righteous people attacked a revolutionary principle. In this case, the editors portrayed these two leftist groups from different social classes as unified in their defense of the principle of popular sovereignty, and, by extension, they were natural supporters of regicide. “This grave incident adds to the divergence of opinions and the irritation of minds,” the *drapeau’s* editors wrote, adding that it would also make it easier to distinguish those with “generous hearts” and those for whom “political crimes were an elixir that increased the audacity of their challenges to royal authority.”^70* According to the ultra press, how one reacted to Manuel’s expulsion became a marker for national identity and belonging.

Liberal deputies also contributed to public interest in Manuel’s expulsion by distributing copies of their declaration of protest to constituents in the *départements.*^71* The

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69 *L’étoile*, no. 856 (6 March 1823): 2.

70 *Drapeau blanc*, no. 62 (3 March 1823): 1.

71 Liberals felt compelled to publicize their indignation, if only to counter the wave of war propaganda. Even before the vote, *Le constitutionnel* declared, “We are suitably situated to collect the judgments of public opinion, and to make heard the words of wisdom and truth [regarding the expulsion].” *Intérieur, Paris 2 mars 1823,* *Le Constitutionnel*, 1 March 1823, 1.
declaration accused the ultras of adopting “a doctrine subversive to all social order and all justice,” by turning the Chamber into a court for the trial of a member. The ultras, so liberal deputies declared, would turn Manuel’s expulsion into a pretext for a complete reversal of the Charter’s protections. This, combined with the war, was an explicit attempt to “consummate counterrevolution” as the principle to guide France henceforth, and expose the nation to “foreign occupation.” “Not wanting to render us complicit in the evils that this faction has been able to attract to our patrie,” the deputies declared, they decided to remove themselves from the Chamber as the last remnant of politicians who actually still honored the Charter.72 Combined with the ultras’ divisive reaction to Manuel’s speech, this liberal declaration spread the idea that the men who composed the government of France represented two different cultures and nations whose divisiveness extended to all France. Manuel may have left the Chamber in disgrace, but he entered the public sphere as a symbol of progressive values.

Ultra authorities feared the divisive effect the liberals’ declaration would have especially because, as one official posited, “the least village must be infected by it.”73 Throughout France préfets, police commissars, and gendarmes, went on the offensive against any manifestation of support for Manuel. Their efforts, however, were counterproductive. Indeed, Manuel’s case might well have drifted into nation’s collective memory as just another political crisis but the constant surveillance of him, his supporters, and their activities ensured that his name would continue to attract notoriety and remind people of the event and the ideological struggle that spawned it. The Ministry of the Interior, the main administrative


73 AN F7-6718, Le Conseiller d’etat to Minister of the Interior, Paris, 31 March 1823.
body of the government that directed the police and the vast state bureaucracy, helped keep the affair alive through its constant communications to government officials concerning Manuel’s whereabouts.\textsuperscript{74} Government officials in Paris collected as much information on Manuel from the \textit{départements} as they could to keep apprised of his activities and the effect his expulsion was having on the populace.\textsuperscript{75} Local functionaries in turn reinforced the elite discourse of division by reading events through the polarizing lens of national politics. With the successful prosecution of the war, those conducting the surveillance seemed convinced that their efforts were merely part of a mopping up mission in the long struggle to redefine France. Many official reports confidently asserted that the types of people who supported Manuel proved that liberals were in decline, and confidently mocked a party that “has only been able to find its support among the dregs of the nation.”\textsuperscript{76} The self-confident tone of many police records, however, belied the state’s inability to erase political contestation throughout France.

\textit{Where is Manuel?}

According to police records, Manuel seemed to be everywhere and nowhere in the spring of 1823, triggering a rash of communications up and down the state hierarchy. Vague and contradictory reports of Manuel’s travels arrived constantly at the ministry and generated


\textsuperscript{75} AN F7-6718, Manuel’s police file in the \textit{Archives Nationales}, rivals in thickness those of more famous liberals such as the Marquis de Lafayette and Benjamin Constant.

\textsuperscript{76} AN BB30-206, Préfet des Pyrénées-Orientales to Minister of the Interior, Perpignan, 8 March 1822.
many equally imprecise responses.\textsuperscript{77} A typical example is a letter from the \textit{préfet} of the \textit{département} of the Marne, relaying information from the \textit{sous-préfet} of Rheims about the preparation of liberals in the town to give Manuel a triumphal parade upon his arrival in that town.\textsuperscript{78} As in several other cases that spring, Manuel did not show up. Nevertheless, the \textit{préfet} ordered the mobilization of the gendarmerie and the police to prevent any disturbances, reminding all those in his jurisdiction of the need for vigilance against liberal agitation.\textsuperscript{79}

More rumors of Manuel’s travels reverberated through the department of Ardennes, and as in Rheims, the \textit{préfet} ordered a strict surveillance of local liberals lest Manuel arrive. In this case, the \textit{préfet} tied Manuel’s supposed travels in the area to his more genuine concern for the political ramifications of a liberal giant on the situation in his own \textit{département}. “One has assured me that the object of this action [Manuel’s trip],” the \textit{préfet} wrote, “in addition to the immediate project of fêting Manuel and bearing him in triumph, is to prepare in advance the liberals’ elections for next year.”\textsuperscript{80} The \textit{préfet} used the rumors of Manuel’s travels to draw attention to the real political ramifications of liberal networking. Whether or not Manuel showed up was immaterial; the use of his name and fame were effective means of reinforcing partisan loyalty for both sides and preparing for future political battles.

In May, authorities implicated Manuel as an accomplice in a criminal act of conspiracy, but again, these allegations derived from spurious news of his travels. The \textit{préfet}

\textsuperscript{77} AN F7-6718. No less than thirty different notes pertaining to passports and visas for travel to certain departments and cities in the spring of 1823 are found in Manuel’s police file yet few pertain to documented trips Manuel actually took..

\textsuperscript{78} AN F7-6718, Préfet de la Marne to Minister of the Interior, Chalons, 18 April 1823.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} AN F7-6718, Préfet des Ardennes to Minister of the Interior, 21 April 1823.
of the department of the Rhône wrote to the Minister of the Interior about a rumor that Manuel had stopped in the town of Chalons-sur-Saône in the neighboring department of Saône-et-Loire, and that while he was there, local liberals arranged for the purchase of 500 muskets from an arms dealer.\textsuperscript{81} In the same letter, however, he expressed frustration with the lack of exact information on Manuel’s whereabouts and read liberal mischief into this deficiency. “What is remarkable,” he wrote, “is the care that the liberals took to hide Manuel’s voyage by announcing, the moment he left Paris that he retired to his house due to illness.”\textsuperscript{82} According to this account, shoddy police work was not to blame for the mysterious appearances and disappearances of Manuel, but rather the machinations of liberals. In reality, Manuel never went to Chalons-sur-Saône that spring.

This manipulation of news concerning Manuel’s whereabouts became commonplace during the spring of 1823. Later in May, the \textit{préfet} of the Rhône assured the minister that if Manuel arrived in Lyon, the capital of his département, there would be little fanfare as the “heated partisans” of the city had cooled off.\textsuperscript{83} Yet, after learning that Manuel had never left Paris; he changed his tune and asked the Minister for news of Manuel’s travel plans. In a letter he sent to Paris on June 8, he noted that the local liberals “announced it [Manuel’s arrival] daily,” and surmised that perhaps “it is only a means employed by them to feed the sort of fermentation that exists here.”\textsuperscript{84} If we are to take the \textit{préfet}’s letters at face value, either Lyon’s political scene had changed considerably during the period between the end of May and the first week of June from cool to “fermenting,” or the \textit{préfet} had joined in the

\textsuperscript{81} AN F7-6718, Préfet du Rhône to Minister of the Interior, Lyon, 22 May 1823.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{83} AN F7-6718, Préfet du Rhône to Minister of the Interior, Lyon, 28 May 1823.

\textsuperscript{84} AN F7-6718, Préfet du Rhône to Minister of the Interior, Lyon,, 9 June 1823.
game played by both sides in which the idea of Manuel became a tool for political motivation.

Exasperated by the volume of information concerning Manuel and its lack of clarity, the préfet of Saône-et-Loire finally wrote the Minister of the Interior that “all that one reports to your Excellency concerning the diverse circumstances of the voyage have no basis.”\(^ {85}\) He cited the eagerness of local police commissars who mistakenly placed Manuel in the town of Chalons-sur-Saône and in the city of Dijon.\(^ {86}\) After condemning the rumors and insinuation, however, he nonetheless noted their political power: “The fact alone of the presumed arrival of this unworthy deputy was an event interesting enough to spark my attention since it could give rise to a movement among the liberals and maybe to some scenes capable of compromising the public tranquility.”\(^ {87}\) Had he considered the matter further, he might also have noted the effect these rumors had on his colleagues. A national political scandal united them together in action. Functionaries throughout France had recast the Manuel affair as a local concern and in the process increased their vigilance against “revolutionary interests” in their own jurisdictions. While police surveillance of political crimes was a constant feature of prefectural administration, events like the Manuel affair provided state officials with an issue to rally around and refocus their efforts. When préfets spread news of Manuel up and down the chain of command, they promulgated the idea of his unworthiness and its impact on local circumstances, reinforcing the idea that Manuel and his supporters posed a threat to social order.

\(^{85}\) AN F7-6718, Préfet du Saône-et-Loire to Minister of the Interior, Mâcon, 6 June 1823.

\(^{86}\) A man named “Manel” arrived and caused this confusion. Ibid.

\(^{87}\) Ibid.
The cases highlighted above demonstrate that a mere rumor of Manuel’s arrival in a city was enough to excite both liberals and ultra officials. In some cases support for Manuel could spark a small riot, thus justifying the government’s claim that liberals disrupted the Restoration’s social order. One such event occurred in the provincial city of Clermont-Ferrand on the night of July 11-12, 1823. During these two days and nights, liberals there congregated in support of Manuel, professing their identification with the larger liberal cause and earning for themselves the enmity of local authorities. Local functionaries saw in these disturbances the effect of revolutionary principles in the city, and used the ultra discourse of unworthiness to label local supporters of Manuel as equally outside the national norm.

Clermont-Ferrand’s “Manuel moment” had a farcical air because, again, he himself never passed through the town. As had happened earlier with authorities in Chalons-sur-Saône, Dijon, and Lyon, officials in Paris in a letter dated 6 July warned local officials in Clermont-Ferrand of Manuel’s impending arrival there. The news set off a flurry of activity aimed at forestalling any troubles that might arise. The préfet of Puy-de-Dôme was particularly concerned that the arrival of this man of “baneful celebrity” would be able to stir up a “class of people ignorant and forlorn enough” to give him their zealous support. On the night of 11 July, a group of about two-hundred people who expected Manuel’s arrival escorted a carriage through the Riom gate. Seeing the carriage, several people cried out, “It’s him!,” despite the efforts of others to show that it was not. It did not seem to matter who rode in the carriage, however, as the crowd followed it into the center of the city. A group of local police agents and other officials gathered to confront the crowd and they soon discovered that Manuel was not inside the coach, but rather General Lauriston, a former Napoleonic general

88 AN F7-6718, Préfet of the Puy-de-Dôme to Minister of the Interior, Clermont-Ferrand, 15 July 1823. 273
and current member of the king’s household. Lauriston, “singularly furious” because of his reception at the gate and the subsequent parade, tried to identify himself, but the crowd insisted that he was none other than Manuel.\textsuperscript{89} As night fell, cheers of “\textit{vive Manuel},” “\textit{vive liberté},” “down with the police,” “down with the gendarmerie,” and even “down with Lauriston!” erupted in front of the inn where the hapless general lodged. The next day, a similar scene occurred but the gendarmerie quickly dispersed the crowd.\textsuperscript{90}

The events in Clermont-Ferrand generated a considerable amount of correspondence between state officials, including the \textit{préfet}, the gendarme officers, and the Minister of the Interior. These reports cast the events in Clermont-Ferrand in the same terms as royalists throughout France used to describe the liberal opposition. Such a ruckus, the \textit{chef d’escadron} of the gendarmerie remarked, “Is proof without doubt of the bad mindset (mauvais esprit) that animates some of the inhabitants of the city of Clermont, to show support for those who dare to praise regicide is an odious infamy.” He subsequently asked the Minister of the Interior whether crying, “\textit{vive Manuel}!” was the same as crying, “Down with the king.”\textsuperscript{91} The \textit{préfet} in turn used the events to verify the tainted reputation of several inhabitants of the city who were already under suspicion. Most of these were the typical sort of Restoration troublemakers, students and soldiers on half-pay; but for the \textit{préfet}, these were the foot soldiers of the real enemy, the liberal politicians.\textsuperscript{92}

That \textit{préfets} and gendarmes would mirror the language and classifications of the central royalist government in Paris is not surprising; their careers depended upon their

\textsuperscript{89} AN F7-6718, Gendarmerie to Minister of the Interior, Clermont-Ferrand, 16 July 1823.

\textsuperscript{90} AN F7-6718, Gendarmerie to Minister of the Interior, Clermont-Ferrand, 14 July 1823.

\textsuperscript{91} AN F7-6718, Gendarmerie to Minister of the Interior, Clermont-Ferrand, 16 July 1823.

\textsuperscript{92} AN F7-6718, Préfet du Puy-de-Dôme to Minister of the Interior, Clermont-Ferrand, 15 July 1823.
political affiliations. In addition, they were usually outsiders in their jurisdictions, and placed in their posts to ensure conformity in the application of the law throughout the nation. Emotional distance from the subjects they ruled reinforced the divisive stereotypes which they read into local events. But even local officials such as the commissars of police, adopted the discourse of national politics to describe local activists, branding them with monikers that suggested their unworthiness as citizens. They condemned M. Rodde, an employee in the tax office as, “a man virulent and excessively dangerous.” They portrayed the bourgeois lawyer, M. Marmoulet as, “a man not less dangerous than the first.” They even accused M. and Mme. Blondeau, the director of the local college and his wife, of professing “bad principles and manifesting them openly.” The commissars suggested that these people had long been a potential source of agitation in the community, and their presence in the town alone could explain how the events that had unfolded could have taken place. The “virulence” of revolutionary principles was on display in these degenerate denizens. “As for Manuel,” they proclaimed, “he has not yet appeared [and] all signs make us believe that some agitator discontented with the calm we enjoy made use of these unfortunate events to spread disorder among us and trouble our tranquility.” The report revealed a community already split, as was the nation, between opposing political camps. Although the commissars shared the city with liberal citizens, they defined the community along political lines, and declared that the agitators were outsiders whose political disturbances threatened the safety of the good citizens who supported the government. When they made claims for the community, it was clear that certain types were not included.

\[93\] AN F7-6718, Report of three police commissaires (Périenant-Deschenais, Leqoqt, and Giraud) from Clermont-Ferrand to Minister of the Interior, 19 July 1823, AN F7-6718. Emphasis added.
In the end, only Mme. Blondeau appeared in court and received a fine. Fearful that the school her husband ran would corrupt the youth of the city—student activism being a constant source of anxiety among Restoration officials—the Director of Police in the Ministry of the Interior wrote the Grand Master of the University to ask that he take, “suitable measures to repress the spirit of insubordination and malevolence” in the school. In August, an aide to the préfet of Puy-de-Dôme duly reported the temporary suspension of the school and a fine levied against Blondeau that brought the incident to a close. Although Manuel’s expulsion had occurred in early March, the state’s watchful eye over events relating to him gave his expulsion a political longevity that the press alone could not sustain and in places far removed from political life in Paris.

*Manuel the Unholy*

Through its efforts to reassert the sanctity of the king and promote a hierarchical social order, the Church proved to be a stalwart ally in the ultra program of rebuilding the nation along counterrevolutionary lines. In particular, Jesuit missions to localities throughout Restoration France were perhaps the most visible manifestations of the “de-revolutionization” of France, becoming reactionary *carnavals*—purgative events meant to regenerate the nation. The Catholic Church also became a strong ally in ultra propagation of the discourse of worthiness and unworthiness. For the most part, Restoration clergy followed the state line on Manuel and aid in defamatory attacks on his person. Thus in the department of Seine-et-Marne, close to Paris, the préfet described a simple baptism as a

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94 AN F7-6718, Minister of the Interior to the Grand Maître del’université, Paris, (no date but between July 19 and August 1, 1823).

95 AN F7-6718, Préfet du Puy-de- to Minister of the Interior, Clermont-Ferrand, 23 August 1823.

suspicious event of political import. On 28 March 1823, the préfet wrote to the Minister of the Interior that a local merchant, M. Gueuvin of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, had invited Manuel to be the godfather of his child and attend a grand celebration with Gueuvin’s large family and local friends. The préfet feared that the occasion would be the “pretext of some scandalous acclamations . . . an approval of the anti-royalist conduct of this deputy and an indirect affront toward the government.” He warned the mayor of the town of the affair, and ordered the local captain of the gendarmerie to stop by any legal means the “inconveniences” that would arise from the religious ceremony and its probable attendance by liberals. 97

This letter sent in March should have alerted the central administration to the potential trouble in La Ferté sous Jouarre, but it took a high-profile court case to generate a state response. In May, the publisher of the liberal journal Le Courrier Français was on trial for libel—a common occurrence for liberal publications after the reformation of press laws in 1820. The minister wrote to the Bishop of Meaux to see if charges in the Courrier concerning a parish priest in the diocese of Meaux who had refused to allow Manuel to attend a baptismal ceremony were true. He asked the bishop to explain the specific diocesan rules that ordained such action if it had in fact occurred. 98 A diocesan official, Sr. Guifferat-Virgen, answered in lieu of the bishop. According to him, canonical law prevented those deemed “unworthy” from being baptized or being present at a baptism. At the ceremony in mid-April, the parish priest of La Ferté sous Jouarre had determined on the basis of Manuel’s “anti-monarchical” statements in the Chamber of Deputies, that the ex-deputy was not fit to

97 AN F7-6718, Préfet of Seine-et-Marne to the Minister of the Interior, Melun, 28 March 1823.

98 AN F7-6718, Minister of the Interior to the Evêque de Meaux, Paris, 7 May 1823.
be a godparent. Summarizing the events that transpired in the town that spring, Guifferat-Virgen concluded that; “the former deputy, by accepting the role of godfather and allowing himself to be accompanied to the church by a part of the populace that he had excited, wanted the liberal party to insult religion and the government at the same time.” By refusing to allow Manuel to participate in the sacrament, the priest had saved a child from receiving baptism while being held in the hands of an anti-French pariah. At the baptismal font in a small town, a common ceremony suddenly became a forum for national politics. Both the parish priest and Guifferat-Virgen interpreted their Church roles as champions of a specific vision of national worthiness. Through incidents like these, the Catholic Church reinforced its attachment to its secular ultra allies, adding a layer of religious validation to the campaign against Manuel.

**Souscriptions: Making a Liberal Icon**

On March 23, 1823, two voyagers stopped at an inn in Nancy and loudly discussed the Manuel affair. Before they left, they produced a sheet of paper and wrote their names on it, and pledged 55 francs each to purchase a gift for Sergeant Mercier. The sergeant was now a national hero for refusing to remove Manuel from the Chamber of Deputies and for conducting himself in a manner befitting the ideal French national character. Leaving it at the restaurant, they hoped that others would join their effort and contribute to the cause. The innkeeper, however, discovered the paper the following day and destroyed it. While they failed to gather supporters, several other initiatives throughout France successfully collected

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99 AN F7-6718, Sr. Guifferat-Virgen of the Diocèse de Meaux to Minister of the Interior, 10 May 1823.

100 Ibid.

101 AN F7-6718, Prefecture of the Meurthe to Minister of the Interior, Nancy, 29 March 1823.
funds through similar subscription campaigns (*souscriptions*) and delivered honorific gifts to Manuel and Sergeant Mercier. 102

Through *souscriptions*, liberals throughout France did their part to keep Manuel’s name in the public sphere. These campaigns with their gifts of crowns, medals, swords, liqueurs, and even ceremonial firearms, were legal according to the codes of the day, but they galled the ultra state officials because they demonstrated the resilience of the liberal opposition. Those who pledged money to honor a sullied political figure and a disobedient soldier had the audacity to publicly declare their disapproval of the ultras who brought about the expulsion, and to successfully network with others to show their continued ability to rally the Left to action. If liberals could successfully bring people together to honor Manuel and Mercier, then they could potentially rally voters to bring liberals back into the Chamber. Prosecuting the proponents of these campaigns, however, tested the limits of ultra domination. Ultras tried to use the state machinery to promote their vision of an ideal ultraroyalist nation and distinguish the good Frenchman from the corrupted Frenchmen as they had done in the Chamber, but they had to work within the limits that the legal system imposed on them in the *départements*.

Through *souscriptions* Manuel and Mercier became symbols of the leftist opposition to the ultras’ abuse of authority, and examples of patriotism and ideal national character. As one national campaign for a medal honoring Manuel proclaimed, “from time to time it is necessary to recognize the noble names and the traits that prove their devotion to their Patrie

102 AN F7-6718, dossier 1. This dossier in the National Archives contains folders for 22 separate departments from the Pyrenees to the English Channel entitled, “*Souscriptions en faveur de l’ex-député Manuel et de Mercier, Sergent de la garde nationale*” for the following departments: Aisne, Aube, Aveyron, Côte d’Or, Côtes du Nord, Doubs, Finistère, Gironde, Indre et Loire, Meurthe, Isère, Puy-de-Dôme, Pyrénées Basses, Pyrénées Hautes, Rhin Bas, Rhin Haut, Rhône, Seine, Seine-Inférieure, Seine-et-Marne, Vosges.
with strong resolve…”\textsuperscript{103} Souscriptions countered ultra authorities who considered demonstrations in support of Manuel as a sign of contagious unworthiness. Not willing to cede the fact that certain elements of the nation could legitimately label Manuel and Mercier heroes, authorities considered subscription campaigns simply a “means which the factious adopt in order to stir up trouble,” rather than a genuine expression of their ideals concerning national character.\textsuperscript{104} Two different readings of the affair emerge in the interaction of the government and activists over the subscription campaigns. Liberals maintained their cohesiveness through networking to support national heroes, while ultras considered the efforts yet another sign of the inherent unworthiness of liberals and leftists who praised apologists for regicide and recalcitrant soldiers instead of the king.

A lengthy correspondence between authorities in Rouen over a campaign in honor of Mercier demonstrated the language that state officials used to describe the souscription phenomenon. After hearing of Manuel’s expulsion on March 5, 1823, the master of requests for the département of Seine-Inférieure predicted in a report to Villèle that the leftist lower classes of the city, already upset over the war and “too blinded by their interests to appreciate the conduct of the king’s wise government,” would react poorly to the news.\textsuperscript{105} His presentiments proved correct by the middle of the March, when he learned that Rouen liberals in the National Guard planned to honor Sergeant Mercier with an honorific musket. Local officials naturally took umbrage to the idea of liberals honoring a defender of regicidal values with a weapon. First, the local authorities wanted to ensure that the gun would not be

\textsuperscript{103} Anon., Prospectus. Médaille de M. Manuel (Paris : Constant-Chantpie, 1823), 1.

\textsuperscript{104} AN F7-6718, Préfet of the Cotes-du-Nord to Minister of the Interior, St. Brieuc, 11 March 1823.

\textsuperscript{105} AN F7-6718, Prefecture of the Seine-Inférieur to Minister of the Interior, Roeun, 5 March 1823.
of “a caliber of war,” and thus illegal. Then they would inspect the inscription to see if it was illegal.  

In a letter from the ministry of the Interior to the préfet of Police in Paris, the minister described the maneuvers of the “revolutionaries of Rouen” as part of a larger plot emanating from Paris. The man supposedly responsible for the wider contribution campaign, M. Lemire, had already been the subject of surveillance in the South and West of France. This individual of “crude immorality” had spread alarm throughout the country and distributed “dangerous writings.” Officials in Rouen drew from the language that Paris used to describe Lemire to describe the local people involved in the souscription. In a letter from the prefecture dated 29 March, for example, the local merchant Duhamel who organized the campaign is described as “a man whose opinions couldn’t be more violent” despite his rather comfortable bourgeois life and lack of past criminal behavior. Despite the alarmist tone of the préfet and his staff, the local prosecutor informed the prefecture that he doubted that Duhamel had broken any law. Two forces, one pushing the officials to an extreme interpretation of the contribution campaign as a sign of criminal unworthiness among the population, and another forcing the issue back within the letter of the law competed in Rouen, leaving the royalist in charge there with more rhetoric than direction for action.

Royalists in the Chamber may have justified their actions against Manuel by asserting their majority rights and backing their claims with an ideological defense of natural law, but their confidence in these abstract justifications for action did not always carry down through

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106 AN F7-6718, Préfet of the Seine-Inférieure to Minister of the Interior, Rouen, 25 March 1823.
107 AN F7-6718, Minister of the Interior to Préfet de Police, Paris, 28 March 1823.
108 AN F7-6718, Prefecture of the Seine-Inférieur to Minister of the Interior, Roeun, 29 March 1823.
the state bureaucracy. The Bureau of Analysis in the Ministry of Interior wrote the préfet of Seine-Inférieure that the inscription, “Fusil of honor given by the National Guard of Rouen to Sgt. Mercier,” signified a crime of “defamation and calumny” against the National Guard. But as much as the préfet’s master of requests wanted to take action against the “revolutionaries” of Rouen, the prosecutor informed him definitive terms that the musket and its engraving did not actually violate the law. In addition, the official notified Paris that actions such as the dedication of the musket would only serve to rile up the liberals of Rouen and inflame the already heated political environment. In short, the préfet would not pursue the matter further and let Paris handle it in the future.

The inability to prosecute Duhamel and others in Rouen who had been involved in the souscription exposed a fundamental weakness in promoting a partisan agenda through the machinery of a modern state. The essentially liberal checks and balances inserted into the legal system created boundaries which even the most strident opinions of national unworthiness could not cross. While the Chamber, the representative body, succumbed to ultra majority rule and expelled Manuel, and most préfets in 1823 tended to mirror the political biases of the ultra deputies, the wider state apparatus still included officials who considered themselves to be disinterested bureaucrats. It is impossible to discern the political leanings of the prosecutor in Rouen from the police records on the souscription campaign, but his hesitancy reflected the internal limits that ultras encountered when they overplayed the import of individual events. Liberals had seized on Manuel’s expulsion as a last-ditch

109 AN F7-6718, Prefecture of the Seine-Inférieur to Minister of the Interior, Roeun, 5 April 1823.
110 AN F7-6718, Minister of the Interior to the Préfet de la Seine-Inférieur, Paris, 9 April 1823.
111 AN F7-6718, Prefecture of the Seine-Inférieur to Minister of the Interior, Roeun, 12 April 1823.
effort to define the ideal character of the nation, and ultras proved unable to stifle their efforts. Despite disappointment at their failure to prevent liberals from lionizing the unworthy, ultras needed liberal opposition to remain as a counterpoint to their own efforts to define the ideal national character. The ultra vision of the nation depended upon keeping the concept of leftist unworthiness in circulation and the liberals’ *souscriptions* provided ultras with an opportunity to do just that.

**Part Three: Manuel’s Last Stand: The Funeral at Père Lachaise**

The successful outcome of events in Spain discredited much of the liberal opposition (from the point of view of the Right), so that by the end of 1823, Manuel had largely receded from the public sphere. The subscription campaigns proved that elite liberals still had supporters throughout France, but when compared to the triumphant din of ultra propaganda over the war, they could not keep Manuel’s name—or the ultra deputies’ actions against him—in popular memory for long. He himself tried to reenter politics in 1824, but failed in his bid for reelection. Only after his death in 1827 at the age of fifty-two did Manuel once again become the center of controversy. His funeral triggered an outpouring of grief among the leftist masses in Paris who took advantage of the occasion to again elevate Manuel as an exemplar of national virtue and show their support for opposition liberals. It also gave Restoration authorities one more opportunity to portray Manuel as an example of the inherent unworthiness of the liberal bloc.

Even before the event, the press and authorities expected Manuel’s death to stir the passions of his supporters and create a scene similar to one that occurred during the liberal deputy General Foy’s burial in 1825. The liberal paper *Le constitutionnel* reported on 20
August 1827 that Manuel had gone to Jacques Lafitte’s chateau outside Paris to convalesce. When the Director of Police in Paris, Franchet-Despery, found out that Manuel had indeed died on the 20th, he sent warnings out to the préfet of the département of Seine-et-Oise and to local mayors to expect demonstrations. He seemed particularly eager to avoid having Manuel buried in Paris as the chance for mobs of unruly mourners would greatly increase. Lafitte himself, however, had already written the authorities of his and Manuel’s brother’s intentions to inter the body in the Parisian cemetery of Père Lachaise. A series of bureaucratic hurdles confronted Lafitte and his coterie as they tried to make arrangements for the transfer of the body. Instead of the two days of preparation normally needed for a funeral, a full five days passed before the cortege was given permission to bury the body in Paris, and then only on the condition that the funeral procession could not enter the interior walls of Paris. It would have to reach the cemetery only through exterior boulevards.

The police closely watched Lafitte’s château at Maisons as dozens of mourners traveled there to offer their respects to Manuel’s body as it lay in state. Among them were the prominent liberals the Marquis de Lafayette, Augustine-Jean de Schonen, Alexandre Mechin, and the songwriter and Manuel’s best friend, Pierre-Jean de Béranger. Although all were saddened by their friend’s death, they understood its potential to rally the leftist contingent in Paris. Lafitte at first requested an immediate transfer of the body to its final resting place in Paris to avoid its “putrefaction,” but then abruptly decided to embalm the body at his estate.

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113 AN-F7-6720, Franchet Despery to Minister of the Interior, Paris, 21 August 1827.

114 AN-F7-6720, M. Lafitte to Préfet de la Police, Maisons sur Seine, 21 August 1827.

115 Ibid.
and delay the funeral, blaming the authorities for stalling.\textsuperscript{116} In fact, the fault for the delay in interring Manuel’s body lay more with the liberals who sent invitations to the funeral to more than eight-thousand merchants and other residents of Paris. Not surprisingly, the authorities expressed their outrage over the changed nature of the event—it had gone from a private ritual to a mass spectacle loaded with political undertones.\textsuperscript{117}

Liberals understood the symbolic value that Manuel had accrued since his expulsion. The \textit{souscription} campaigns for him had established his name and image in the iconography of the Left. They mourned the loss of their colleague and fellow soldier in their struggles with the government and the ultra faction, but they remained political animals at heart. They knew that the ultras still despised Manuel and continued to sully his reputation, and feared that his funeral would provide one last chance for ultras to humiliate him and his fellow liberals. Béranger prophetically wrote, “We fear both the censor for his eulogy and the police for his convoy,”\textsuperscript{118} and thought that a more subtle procession would be wiser because, “the ingratitude of which he was the object merits this lesson.” Lafitte, who actually made the arrangements, complained that “the hateful authority that had pursued the living Manuel pursued him still after his death.”\textsuperscript{119} There was therefore poetic justice in having Manuel

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\item \textsuperscript{116} AN-F7-6720, Préfet de Police to Minister of the Interior, Paris, 22 August 1827.

\item \textsuperscript{117} AN-F7-6720, Préfet de Police to Minister of the Interior, Paris, undated. Attached to this officer’s note is a copy of the printed “Invitation to burial,” written by Lafitte and dated, 22 August 1827.

\item \textsuperscript{118} Manuel’s closest friend Béranger was particularly upset at the loss. He wrote Dupont de l’Eure from Maisons on the 22\textsuperscript{nd}, “There is a great emptiness in my existence. I still have not found words to express my sadness.” Pierre-Jean de Béranger, \textit{Lettres inédites de Béranger à Dupont de l’Eure, (correspondance intime et politique), 1820-1854} (Paul Haquard and Pascal Fothuny eds.) (Paris: Pierre Douville , 1908), 68-69. Béranger was later buried in the same tomb as Manuel.

\item \textsuperscript{119} Jacques Lafitte and F-A. Mignet, \textit{Relation historique des obsèques de M. Manuel, ancien député de la Vendée} (Brussels, 1827), 6-7. He complained that “...the authority which, conserving after the death of Manuel its animosities towards him, did not want the journals to publish testimonies of respect and regrets, or
\end{itemize}

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return to Paris with the support of the nation; it would demonstrate the resilience of liberal opposition despite the ultras’ vengeful repression.

On Friday, August 23, the procession of four carriages left Maisons in the morning accompanied by an escort of gendarmes. Some cheers went up in the various villages through which the convoy passed but the move went largely without incident until it reached the Paris walls. At the Barrière des Martyrs, a crowd of young men forcefully took the casket off of the hearse and tried to carry it through the streets. Failing this, they proceeded to take the harnesses off of the horses and pull the hearse by hand. An accompanying gendarme officer described the young men them as, “a group of hotheads who pulled the hearse by hand and by their actions and countenances showed themselves to be animated by evil dispositions.” The officer quickly restored order after this “revolutionary ovation” and tried to get the cortege to the cemetery as quickly as possible, but met with more scenes of disorder along the way. The whole event had taken on the air of a protest rather than a funeral.

Franchet-Despery described the events to Prime Minister Villèle, suggesting that liberal politicians orchestrated with radicals in Paris to embarrass the authorities despite Lafitte’s, Lafayette’s, and Mechin’s calls for order. According to his agents, several liberal agitators distributed a printed call for the parading of Manuel’s body through the site of anyone to announce the hour and place where the citizens would be piously assembled to honor him for the last time...”, Ibid., 9.

120 AN-F7-6720, Préfet of Seine-et-Oise to Minister of the Interior, Versailles, 23 August 1827. The préfet of Seine-et-Oise had written with trepidation the night before that the liberals would no warning of when they would leave for Paris and, much to the official’s dismay; the cortege would be running along the same road as the king’s carriage would take on its way to the hunt. Ironically, the two processions did in fact meet at a bridge in the département of Yvelines and Manuel’s cortege had to yield to the royal authorities. The apologist for regicide proved that he respected the authority of the king even in death.

121 AN-F7-6720, Franchet Despery to Minister of the Interior, Paris, 24 August 1827.
Louis XVI’s execution. People threw crowns of laurel and oak at the party and a gold crown, funded by one of the *souscriptions* at the time of his expulsion, sat on top of the hearse. Peddlers sold little medallions of Manuel, and members of the procession purportedly offered money to onlookers with which they could purchase them. Franchet-Despery did not doubt the collusion of the liberals to create this disorder and claimed that Lafitte had spent fifty to sixty thousand francs on the procession. 122

Whether or not the event was the product of political bankrolling or a more spontaneous show of affection, the people of Paris came out in force and soon dominated the proceedings. Several thousand persons grew quickly to crowds of tens of thousands who chanted “Honor to Manuel, honor to the worthy defender of our rights,” as they wrested control of the funeral from the liberals and the gendarmerie alike and again pulled the hearse by hand. 123 When Sergeant Mercier showed up and removed his own crown, another offering from the subscription campaigns, and placed it on Manuel’s coffin proclaiming, “this crown belongs to him as much as to me because if I showed some energy, it is he who gave me the example of courage,” the crowds grew even more animated and disobeyed all orders to harness the horses and leave the street. 124 The political spirit of the age threatened to turn the gravitas of Manuel’s funeral into a farcical battle of wills between the people and the state. Only Lafitte’s timely intervention with the gendarmerie saved the situation from becoming violent when he convinced the crowd to allow two horses help pull the hearse. 125 It was a liberal compromise.


Once in the cemetery, a large crowd gathered to hear Lafitte, Lafayette, Béranger, and de Schonen give their eulogies to Manuel. The crowd reacted enthusiastically to their words of praise for the deceased mixed with political pronouncements. Lafitte stated that liberals should have spent all their time since Manuel’s expulsion protesting this “violation of national representation,” but failing to do so, they could rest content knowing that Manuel nonetheless stood by them without complaint. He declared Manuel worthy of inclusion in the patrie’s canon of illustrious men predicting, “France recognizant will never forget your public virtues....”

*Souscriptions* established Manuel as an embodiment of public virtues, and in death, he became a martyr to the nation. By no accident, Manuel’s grand monument sat next to that of the liberal deputies, former general Maximilien Foy and Stanislas Girardin, both of whom defended him at the time of his expulsion. Lafayette carried out the last act of Manuel’s national apotheosis by bringing these three together as figurative lieu de memoire—no longer just men, but inspirational sites for rallying an ideal national identity. Lafayette noted their power to remind the French of the significance of these individuals’ lives to the greater national history. “Here, Messieurs, I see myself surrounded with funereal monuments that recall great afflictions and great memories, of grand talents and illustrious victims.”

Like Lincoln at Gettysburg—an apt analogy considering the melee that preceded the funeral—Lafayette turned the fallen into symbols that could unify people through the mere recollection of their sacrifices for the nation.

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125 Ibid., 18-20.
126 Ibid., 23.
127 Ibid., 24.
In polarized Restoration France rejection of the political “other” accompanied most calls for national unity, and Manuel’s funeral was no exception. In the spirit of Manuel, who seemed to find the most incendiary language to match his every political act, the last speaker, the deputy de Schonen, spent as much time castigating the ultra opposition as praising his fallen comrade. He reiterated the difference between heroes like Manuel and Foy, and the ultras whose character and opinions “real French” people could not abide. “Your enemies, the eternal enemies of France never conquered you!” he declared to the deceased. Later in his speech, de Schonen borrowed the ultras’ old charge against Manuel of “unworthiness” and turned it against them proclaiming, “You were the worthy elected of the patrie, and we will not be unworthy children of it.”

It seemed partisan rancor was so strong that one could not praise the dead without measuring them and the rest of society with a political litmus test.

The political content of the eulogies was not lost on the authorities. Franchet-Despery reported that the first speeches contained some passages “dictated by the worst spirit,” but nothing unexpected for a gathering of liberals and Parisian agitators. He mocked Lafayette for offering nothing new beyond “old theories and passionate declamations.” De Schonen’s partisan eulogy, however, startled the police director with its stark divisive language. It was “written with extreme and violent fanaticism,” Franchet-Despery complained, “where one noticed the words, ‘the people of France, the people are the strength, and the people are equality…”’ In his estimation, “it was truly a call to revolt.”

Calling on the “people” became a seditious sentiment when de Schonen drew the boundary of belonging around those who approved of Manuel’s life and example. Franchet-Despery understandably did not

128 Ibid., 26-27.

approve of de Schonen’s xenophobic language in front of an unruly crowd. The crowds during the procession had demonstrated their perfervid political enthusiasm; the last thing the police needed was a passionate call of opposition to ultras and the authorities.

Franchet-Despery’s men only managed to round up some suspects for disorderly conduct on the day of the funeral, but the ultra government’s real enemies remained the elite liberals who spoke and the principles they espoused. Because the cemetery was a protected spot and the service was ostensibly a religious one, no laws existed to curtail the speakers or punish them for their pronouncements—but printed words were another matter. The newspaper *le Courrier Français*, for example, had tried to print a testimonial honoring Manuel before the funeral but the censors had intervened to prevent the publication of any incendiary commentary on Manuel’s life or death. Lafitte’s close friend with whom he published his account of the funeral later, the historian François-Auguste Mignet, quickly accused the censors of mimicking the inquisition. He called them, “The Holy Office of spies charged to proscriber all that is honorable, of protecting all that is vile, ...”*130* Prepared for more divisive language from the pro-Manuel camp, the censors were ready when Lafitte and Mignet published their own account of the funeral.

On 19 September, the prosecutor M. La Palme brought charges against Mignet as the primary writer of this account, and his publisher, Gaultier-Languionie, for “exciting hatred and contempt for the royal government,” defaming the Chamber of Deputies, and printing a “provocation to rebellion.”*131* In his arguments, prosecutor La Palme took offense to the way

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in which liberals recast Manuel’s expulsion as a heroic act. He railed against the orators at the funeral who pointed out the crown of oak presented to Manuel through a subscription campaign as a sign of his “triumphant” expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies. “Is not presenting this expulsion as a triumph for M. Manuel,” he asked, “by all evidence the same as vowing to shame the conduct of those who pronounced this expulsion?” He found de Schonen’s speech the most odious for its divisive phrase, “eternal enemies of France,” used to describe the Chamber.  

The fault for these words in La Palme’s estimation lay not with de Schonen himself, but rather with the editors of this account who packaged the entire funeral as an apology for revolutionary principles. He declared that the work, “exhumed the frightful doctrine of sovereignty of the people.” As much as he proclaimed his disdain for the polarizing effect of the funeral, by defending Manuel’s expulsion one more time, La Palme could not help but contribute to the partisan understanding of the event.

Those who mourned Manuel and those who tried to control the event understood that the funeral was primarily a political action. Pére Lachaise became a political site as soon as the eulogies for Manuel began and his specter loomed large over both the crowd and the authorities. Even in death, he upset ultras by defying their vision of the French as universally in support of their policies. The funeral showed that even sacred spaces and events were not immune to the infection of partisanship. In birth, as in the baptism at Le Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and in death, partisan categorization became an unavoidable aspect of the French people’s existence.

132 Ibid., 19-20.

133 Ibid., 74.
Conclusion

Soon after the July Revolution of 1830, a procession of national guardsmen from the town of Charonne made their third annual pilgrimage to Manuel’s tomb to honor him for his defense of French liberty. After the troops laid a tricolor flag on his tomb as “a gage of the recognition of the people towards the energetic defender of its rights,” the mayor of Charonne praised the deceased in a speech regaling in the recent momentous events. “Your grand soul will have applauded our efforts and our successes,” he assured Manuel, and then promised that all present would help preserve the revolution. To cries of “Gloire à Manuel.” the parade marched off.134

The public memory of Manuel soon marched off as well. In truth, he was no lasting lieu de memoire, but existed as a political and social phenomenon for a few months as a symbol of a larger dynamic of political conflict. Partisanship was a creative force that could turn any event, person, or idea into a vessel for the public consumption of politics. Manuel was not the only news of 1823 and so other events and people quickly replaced him as focal points of political discourse. For the remainder of the Restoration at least, his name was synonymous with the most strident brand of liberal opposition to the ultras, but after the installation of a putative liberal regime and the movement of the opposition further to the left, Manuel was no longer relevant to the political contexts of the 1830’s and 40’s. New oppositional figures and events stepped in to replace Manuel and other figures of the Restoration as rallying points for the Left.

Manuel’s ephemeral fame coincided with the hardening of political lines in France. Combined with the Spanish War, the events in the Chamber in March 1823 marked the

134 Anon., Honneurs rendus à la mémoire de Manuel (Paris?, 1830).
definitive solidification of post-revolutionary polarization. There would still be exceptions to
the strict categories of political Right and Left—self-described moderates, extemporaneous
allegiances between certain ultras and liberals, and ideological variety on either side—but by
1823, the main political discourse of the era had crossed the threshold of intolerance. With
the lines between the government and the opposition firmly established and the chances for
compromise remote after 1823, however, it became easier to identify political allies and
engage in more effective political action. It is perhaps no coincidence that shortly after
thousands of people took to the streets of Paris to praise Manuel at his funeral, liberals
successfully regained their standing in the Chambers in the elections of 1827.  

People read more significance into Manuel’s expulsion and later events because of
the grand scale of political conflict in the Restoration public sphere. Manuel—and the
activities triggered by his name—reminded people that France was divided into two camps,
both of whose members defined themselves within the context of a polarized polity. Without
iconic events and figures to help people understand sociopolitical conditions, the sheer
volume of political news would perhaps have made people feel irrelevant and helpless in the
face of France’s continued and inexorable evolution into a polarized society. Many leftists
were always ready to voice their opposition to the government, but they needed a cause
célèbre to risk acting on their political passions; Manuel, for a few brief moments, provided
them with one. On the other end of the spectrum, framing the relatively frequent unrest in
provincial towns and cities of France using the discourse of unworthiness with which ultras
defined Manuel, gave functionaries and policemen a greater sense of purpose in their
maintenance of order. People of all classes and in all regions of France used Manuel’s name

135 For the organization of the liberal and ultra opposition to Villèle’s government in 1827 see,
to identify with political processes that were largely out of their control, and found meaning in their relationship to the post-revolutionary French nation. Few of the activists in Clermont-Ferrand or elsewhere referred to the ideological points that liberal deputies brought up in their defense of Manuel when they took to the streets, but they nonetheless felt a connection to the political world that was beyond their geographic and demographic reach. Manuel was, for a time, the personification of themselves as ideal French citizens. Unfortunately, revolution was perhaps inevitable from the moment that people began to think of their political enemies as foreign, unworthy, or otherwise incompatible with correct-thinking French people, and themselves as members of the true nation.

The Manuel case highlights the power of the Restoration’s rival political frames to instigate national political action and to penetrate multiple levels of society and regions. Liberal deputies stridently supported the inalienable right of the people to claim some portion of sovereignty. When they perceived that this crucial aspect of their understanding of the nation was undermined they removed themselves—in the name of the people—from what they considered a corrupt government. They then turned Manuel into an exemplar of the ideal citizen in their conception of the nation; he embodied the frames they used to define the nation. Ultra deputies considered Manuel foreign to the paternal and familial concept of the nation to which they adhered, and made Manuel an outsider antithetical to the values they considered the essence of French identity. As news of the expulsion spread, people all over France and from all walks of life acted within these two rival frames, internalizing them and making them relevant to their immediate life situation and surroundings. Souscriptions testified to the level of commitment of leftists to their progressive framework of the nation, just as the diligence of officials who monitored them testified to their belief in an equally
compelling opposed framework. The clashes in the provinces of these two ideologies of national belonging and between those caught up in these battles were features of a broad national debate. Despite the strong adherence of people to one or the other of the dominant partisan frames, Manuel and the events surrounding his expulsion concretized for most French people the reality of living in a nation permanently divided by the contestation between the left and right wings of political culture.
Chapter Five

Two Nations Singing: Polarization and Working-Class Chanson

Introduction

In 1819, Paul-Emile Debraux and Paul Tournemine released volume one of *Les soupers lyriques*, the first in a series of songbooks featuring works by urban songwriters.¹ They wrote in their introduction that the “liberation of our patrie,” referring to the departure of allied troops in late 1818, had inspired them to publish songs for group singing.² Debraux and Tournemine believed that singing could rid the country of its domestic strife and unite the nation in celebration. Yet songs and singing were not ideal platforms for conciliatory sentiments. Group singing, in particular, often exacerbated post-revolutionary sociopolitical polarization. No matter how cloaked in metaphor, satire, or escapism a song’s political sentiments may have been, those who wrote songs and those who sang them did so in a sociopolitical arena plagued by virulent divisiveness. In this environment, it became impossible for songwriters to be completely apolitical, or to prevent others from reading politics into both songs and their singing. Seen as the political objects they inevitably

¹ Their partnership would fracture in 1821, when Tournemine took over *Les Soupers* without, according to Debraux, consulting the contributors. From then on, the two released rival collections. Tournemine retained the title, *Les soupers lyriques*, while Debraux went on to publish his and his colleagues songs under the title, *Les soirées lyriques*. Both series collected songs from the goguette writers although there was little crossover of writers between the two collections. It seems that Tournemine welcomed contributions from a wider circle of songwriters than Debraux and he originally intended. There might have been a political dimension to the split based on the seemingly more moderate tone of Tournemine’s and his colleagues’ songs after 1821, but this is speculation. See Debraux’s introduction to Paul-Emile Debraux, (ed.), *Les Soirées lyriques, pour faire suite aux deux premières années des Soupers Lyriques, par les mêmes auteurs*, vol. 1 (Paris: Renaudière, 1821), ii.

became, Restoration-era songs thus reveal the breadth and depth of post-revolutionary
division as even joyous and hopeful refrains became the soundtrack for political conflict.

This chapter analyzes Restoration songs and singing to help illuminate the
relationship between the polarized political identities of elites and non-elite popular culture,
and to assess the degree to which the partisan discourse of formal politics penetrated the
public sphere. These songs give some insight into how members of the lower class responded
to the political world that excluded them. Analysis of songs and singing in the Restoration’s
city streets and cafés suggests that the political polarization of the era affected the writing,
performance, and reception of music among members of the lower class. Opening sites for
political activity, songs and singing became markers of sociopolitical affiliation and tools for
constructing post-revolutionary political identities that addressed social status as well as
ideological orientation on a national scale.

With no access to formal politics and limited involvement in the public sphere of
political publications, the great majority of the French people had to create alternative spaces
for political activity. Sheryl Kroen identifies some of these spaces in Politics and Theater,
such as missionary auto-de-fés for the destruction of revolutionary and Napoleonic
memorabilia, and street demonstrations at performances of Tartuffe throughout France.
Kroen’s work, as discussed in Chapter One, shows how the lower class used acts of protest as
a means of engaging in the debate on the nature of post-revolutionary France outside of
institutional and electoral politics. Members of the lower class made their political voices
heard through their engagement in these group activities. Her convincing arguments
notwithstanding, Kroen avoids textual expressions of lower-class political sentiments to

3 Sheryl Kroen, Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815-1830
concentrate on the “performance” of politics during the Restoration, thus leaving the connection between the concepts of “high politics” and the political activities of the people under-explored.

Popular songs provide insight into this connection because they were texts, both explicitly and implicitly political, which group performance turned into public markers of sociopolitical affiliation. A few people read journals and pamphlets aloud in order to galvanize public opinion around shared principles and prejudices, but songs went farther by encouraging people to announce their political preferences in groups. Putting their lyrics to popular airs, songwriters and singers merged words and ideas with the nonverbal experience of making music, using easily remembered phrasing to inculcate ideas and sentiments in the performers and the audience. The resulting scenes played on multiple levels in both these groups as the tunes, the styles of singing, and the composition of the singing group all combined to create unique situations and statements. In the context of Restoration partisanship, these multiple layers of experience increased the number of ways that songs divided as much as joined people together.

Divisive political songs have a long history in France. During the Revolution, for example, songs such as the Marseillaise and the Réveil du Peuple vied for popularity among

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political factions. Under the increasingly populist regimes of the Revolution, the government tried to appropriate political songs to rally support among the urban poor. Laura Mason describes in *Singing the French Revolution* how songs and the act of singing itself created unstable conditions for propagandizing, as uncontrollable groups of carousing singers brought their own meanings to their performances.\(^5\) In particular, Mason shows how instead of conforming to a homogenized popular culture, songs increased political polarization as vying factions adapted songs and singing to their causes.\(^6\) Mason claims that during the post-revolutionary era “singing had moved indoors,” and become the product of specialized singing societies that nurtured revolutionary political culture for a later renaissance.\(^7\) This assessment unquestionably stands for revolutionary sentiments, but I also believe that the content coming from these singing societies, or *goguettes*, deserves more attention.

*Goguettes* served as local sites for political expression, but they were also houses of production from which accessible songs destined for public repetition spread to nearly every large city in France. Working-class songwriters downplayed songs’ revolutionary content, but still echoed, reformulated, commented on, and criticized the era’s partisan politics. Their works gave the disenfranchised public an opening into the political world.

Not everyone who wrote popular songs was of the “working-class”—this is especially true of many of the royalist works in this chapter—but urban artisans, unskilled laborers,

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\(^6\) Ibid., 211.

\(^7\) Ibid., 207.
lower-level civil servants, and ex-soldiers wrote extensively. Although they understood the socioeconomic stratification of the nation and their lack of access to its political system, they did not necessarily consider themselves a “class” in the modern sense of the word. The discourse of class during the period included the familiar terms *classe ouvrière* and *bourgeoisie*, which suggested a contemporary consensus on the basic pattern of modern class hierarchies, but the referents for such labels were fungible and varied in interpretation. Moreover, occupational factors that encouraged industrial workers to consider themselves members of a distinctive social and political class—the “proletariat”—had not developed enough in France for labor alone to bind people. What socially binding principle then led people to speak for “workers” and “the people” in the collective, as *goguette* songwriters often did, while criticizing the wealthy ruling class? What did it mean to be “class-conscious” and express ideas about social inequity in cultural media without a firm understanding of the specific parameters of class?

In his groundbreaking study of class-consciousness, *The Making of the English Working Class*, historian E. P. Thompson explored the cultural aspects of class formation by considering the “shared experiences” of the working class. Thompson first articulated the idea that people do not experience abstract structures such as class but rather live within a

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8 Denise Davidson notes this confusion of class terms in Restoration society. She cites Saint-Simonians, Guépin and Bonamy, who claimed in the early 1830’s that there were eight degrees of class, the bottom four—if not five—of which (*bourgeois pauvres, ouvriers aisés, ouvrier pauvres, and ouvriers misérables*) all took part in the working class song culture I describe in this chapter. Denise Davidson, *France after Revolution: Urban Life, Gender, and the New Social Order* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 13. Sarah Maza suggests that self-identification as a member of a certain class is a necessary condition for historical analysis based on class terms. She uses this theory to prove the fictive nature of the bourgeoisie who, it seems, rarely considered themselves as such. When people referred to the “bourgeoisie,” it certainly had no direct correlation to the classic Marxist term for the owners of the means of production. Maza’s theory, however, does not apply as easily to the Restoration-era lower class. The lower class, whether peasant or urban worker, self-consciously identified themselves with many of the class terms that I use freely in this chapter. See, Sarah Maza, *The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay on the Social Imaginary, 1750-1850* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
system of cultural practices defining who they are and what ties they have with members of
the wider community.⁹ His position that workers nonetheless collectively embodied the
working-class as determined by overriding socioeconomic factors, however, left Thompson
firmly in the camp of social historians who assume the legitimacy of class as an
unproblematic basis for analysis. The movement from social history with its structures such
as class, to cultural history and its focus on diverse discourses around which historical actors
crafted identities has made recent historians hesitant to make broad claims based on class.¹⁰

Looking for a compromise between the camps of social history and cultural history,
Geoff Eley and Keith Nield acknowledge social history’s deficiencies in their recent essay
entitled, The Future of Class in History, but they do not advocate the complete rejection of
social structures as bases for historical analysis. Class, they argue, still has value as a field of
historical study despite its loss of power as the ultimate determinant of historical actors’
identities and agency. Eley and Nield are comfortable defining “class” as the result of “the
advocacy for a particular way of thinking about social identity” rather than as a rigid,
structurally determined social position.¹¹ They contend that people respond to contingencies

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⁹ "Class-consciousness” Thompson wrote, “is the way in which these experiences are handled in
cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms...” E.P. Thompson, The
Making of the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon, 1964), 11. I believe that historical actors’
“consciousness” of the political, social, and economic factors differentiating members of society played a major
role in post-revolutionary self-fashioning. “Class” identities, albeit contingent and situational, emerged when
members of the Restoration lower class acknowledged their disenfranchisement.

¹⁰ The retreat from social history during the “linguistic turn” that characterized new cultural history has
had a lasting impact on the study of class. Not satisfied with the retention of structures beneath Thompson’s
“shared experience”, several social historians turned away from class as an identifiable structure of social
organization. Three works in particular were emblematic of this shift, especially as it pertained to the issues of
labor, society, and culture: William H. Sewell, Jr., Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor
from the Old Regime to 1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Gareth Stedman Jones,

¹¹ They write, “We might approach class as less an observable or preexisting topography of structurally
distributed social differences than as a set of emergent claims about how the social world should best be
that allow them to “center” on sociopolitical identities such as those associated with the formal idea of class. The contingent processes by which this “centering” occurs are not reducible to structural or post-structural explanation, but they nonetheless result in “sociologically-specified class capacities.”¹² In this study, when I use the terms “working class” or “lower class,” I follow Eley’s and Nield’s methodology and apply a “class” label to those excluded from the Restoration’s political processes, and, in particular, to those urban workers who later self-consciously constructed a political identity around the socioeconomic structures of industrial labor. An urban movement based primarily on labor and class did develop during the July Monarchy, but I contend that during the Restoration, exclusion from formal political participation was the “contingency” that encouraged members of the working class to use a discourse of class unity that the goguette community reified through singing together.

Historians of nineteenth-century France have considered goguettes, fraternal organizations, dancing clubs, and cafés essential organs for building lower-class communities and institutionalizing codes of behavior among members of the working class.¹³ Historian Steven Rowe is convinced that workers wrote songs and participated in the goguettes to foster solidarity and redefine social hierarchies in the face of a burgeoning laissez-faire economy and sociopolitical bodies that excluded them.¹⁴ Rowe’s work supports my

¹² Ibid., 173.

¹³ Denise Davidson, for example, looks at the post-revolutionary reclassification of class and gender boundaries in these settings in her recent work. See especially chapter 4 of Denise Davidson’s, France after Revolution (op. cit.). Maire Cross has recently started researching Flore Tristan’s involvement with “socialist” singing groups in the 1840’s. She too contends that these groups helped foster class unity.
contention that the goguette’s function as an alternative community helped songwriters create statements about their group identity and the relations within that group. Yet, since his focus is on worker identity and not politics per se, he does not deeply explore the connection between the workers’ impulse to join groups and sing together and their specific commentaries on elite politics. Police scrutiny and repression might well have pushed members of the working class to bond in fraternal organizations, but such exclusionary forces did not insulate working class songwriters from the currents of elite politics.  

This chapter looks at songs as elements in the broader phenomenon of political polarization to facilitate understanding the effect of partisanship on Restoration society writ large. The first section examines songs as political artifacts apart from their creation and performance. It examines how songs appeared in the street, arrived anonymously in the mail, and became the subject of intense police scrutiny; factors all of which triggered partisan assessments of their authors, performers, or possessors. This section also considers how the police reacted to the goguettes as political organizations and how goguette songwriters understood their role in society. The second section analyzes royalist and ultraroyalist propaganda, some of it the product of working class songwriters, to show how they reflected the Restoration’s political environment and added to the bitter contestation within post-

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15 In fact, the important role of songs and singing as a means of engaging with and appropriating the political currents of the day was not lost on people living during the Restoration. In *The Margins of City Life*, John Merriman, for example, explores how rivaling gangs from the city of Perpignan’s leftist and royalist quartiers used popular political songs to taunt each other. The gangs’ performances of songs that further polarized the city and brought the tenor of divisive national politics to the local stage revealed “the cultural dichotomy between elite and popular politics.” Although Merriman devotes little attention to the content of the songs sung in Perpignan, his work is further evidence that non-elites used singing to construct political identities by drawing both on popular media and on prevailing currents in the partisan public sphere. John Merriman, *The Margins of City Life: Explorations on the French Urban Frontier, 1815-1851* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 134, 141-43.
revolutionary society. The two last sections survey songs from leftist *goguettes* themselves. The penultimate section examines songs that supported leftist ideology, considered liberal elites as allies, and took a definitive stand against ultraroyalists and the Right. The final part of this chapter analyzes songs from the *goguettes* that voiced frustration with elite politics and either advocated alternative, more radical, political solutions or eschewed politics altogether. These last songs that eschewed partisanship provide a missing link between the relative political silence of the working class Left vis-à-vis the exclusivity of Restoration politics, and the rhetorical class unity that drove leftist politics during the July Monarchy and beyond.

The songwriters and songs reviewed in this chapter are by no means exhaustive of the Restoration’s music scene. Formal musical performances including operas, concerts, and vaudeville reviews ran throughout the period, and though politics also crept into these forms of music, much of the literature on them does not connect artistic expression to the Restoration’s culture of contestation. The famed Pierre-Jean de Béranger’s political works are also missing from this chapter’s analysis. Béranger did not routinely socialize in working-class circles; his closest friends were liberal politicians and rich bankers. He was without doubt the darling of leftist songwriters, but according to admirers like Eugène de Pradel, “Béranger is too profound to be amusing, too perfect to be understood or to be sung in the joyous outpourings of dessert.” The works of writers like Paul-Emile Debraux,

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François Dauphin, and even the ultraroyalist Charles-Joseph Rougemaître, all of whom made their only imprint on the historical record through their now largely forgotten songs, give a better sense of the working-class response to partisanship than formal music or the body of Béranger’s political oeuvre.

Previous chapters have explained how partisanship dominated the Restoration’s public sphere, influencing formal political institutions, the press, literature, theater performances, and street activism. This charged political arena gave rise to an exaggerated sense of division in the nation. The era’s variety of thought and action notwithstanding, polarization affected all aspects of Restoration history. This chapter provides some insight into how this environment affected the era’s songs and how, in turn, these songs contributed to sociopolitical divisions during the Restoration. The sheer volume of songs produced during this fifteen-year period makes it infeasible to give a comprehensive view of the role of music and songs during the Restoration. Nonetheless, this analysis reveals some of the dynamics between political contestation and popular culture in the makeup of the post-revolutionary nation.

**Part One: Songs and Singing in the Context of Contestation**

In 1823, the popular songwriter Paul-Emile Debraux wrote that the chanson “has attained a certain degree of importance, and this light genre of poetry in which our nation excels and suffers no rival now merits a little more consideration than one awarded it previously.”¹⁹ Songs, however, shared the stage with all the other forms of media and activity by which partisan ideologies spread during the Restoration. The periodical press, pamphlets, and literature, for example, conveyed most of formal political sentiments and opinions of the era, but most people had no access to the Restoration’s political institutions and therefore had

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to find other ways to voice their opinions. Conservatives, for example, mobilized political support among the underclass with religious missions in the provinces and public auto-de-fés meant to purge France of its revolutionary sins. Radical elements on the Left anonymously posted seditious broadsheets throughout France and often took to the streets in protest. An underclass gang culture based on political affiliation thus emerged in many cities and often drew elements of the lower class into broader national political conflicts.\(^{20}\) These activities all contributed to the dissemination of political ideas and strengthened the idea that post-revolutionary France was a divided nation. The song emerged in this environment, speaking for common people of all affiliations—and sometimes for the state—and serving as a tool for inculcating values and principles.\(^{21}\) The “light genre of poetry” indeed became an important political entity, turning the printed word into action and allowing those who sang in groups to express political sentiments in a public forum.

Whatever the official or public reaction to singing, political songs and their singers could not help but accrue labels associating them with one side or the other of the post-revolutionary divide. Police officials and random observers could instantly determine singers’ political tendencies by looking at their repertoire of songs (and their lyrics) and the contexts in which they sang.\(^{22}\) Outside of their performance, songs became autonomous,

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\(^{20}\) See John Merriman, *Margins*, especially Chapter Five’s study of leftist and royalist gangs in Perpignan.

\(^{21}\) Robert Brécy cites historian Victor Fournel on this unpredictable element of singing: “In France, the song has always been a power, the living and mobile expression of opinion, or rather of public pressure—the natural and often redoubtable complement of freedom of the press. It is the soul and the voice of the people.” Robert Brécy, *Florilège de la chanson révolutionnaire de 1789 au Front Populaire* (Condé-sur-Noireau: Editions Ouvrières, 1990), 9.

\(^{22}\) In addition to their lyrical content, songs could convey political sentiments through the style in which one sang and the imposition of lyrics over familiar music; both these elements added to the variety of emotional and intellectual responses. Laura Mason considers these non-textual factors as essential elements of the political song. They changed the delivery and reception of songs in ways that simply reading the lyrics
unsung emblems of defiance when anonymous people left copies of lyrics in public places, or sent them to political enemies in order to disgrace or outrage them. The song thus became a political artifact that could stir people to action or conjure up powerful reactions by its mere presence. Considering their prevalence and power, it is not surprising that reports on songs and singing filled the era’s police records. More than perhaps any genre, songs and singing—lightening rods for political contestation—both reflected and contributed to the dominance of the idea of a divided nation.

Music’s power to inspire a wide range of actions and reactions among the people and authorities led to songs and songwriters assuming an air of importance. Songwriters, if we are to believe their lyrics, generally thought highly of themselves and their work, and boasted of the important role they played in French society. French songwriters had long claimed that their nation was the most lyrically gifted and considered the song an integral part of national identity. Debraux and his companion François Dauphin, for example, wrote in a guidebook for songwriters entitled, *Bréviaire du chansonnier, ou l’art de faire chansons* [*The Songwriter’s Guidebook, or the Art of Making Songs*] (1830), that songs had embodied the national spirit throughout the nation’s history, and remarked on the ability of songs to foster national solidarity throughout France’s troubled past. Speaking of the Restoration, however, Debraux and Dauphin lamented that political polarization had come to dominate French songs. “Then the chanson no longer knew to whom to pay attention;” they wrote, “some

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23 This tendency among the French to consider their nation the preeminent songwriting nation has a long history. In her comments on a version of this paper given at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Society of French Historical Studies, Laura Mason cited the 18th c. Chevalier de Jaucourt who declared that “the French prevail over all of Europe for the wit and grace of their songs; having always delighted in this entertainment, they have always excelled at it.” (Permission granted) Similar sentiments were expressed, as we shall see, by Restoration songwriters.
pulled it to the right; others dragged it to the left.” They contended that partisanship had destroyed the sublime connection between songs and the nation and had given rise to works that vitiated important national values by coloring them in partisan terms. Debraux and Dauphin claimed that political songs had reduced patriotism, for example, to disdain for the opposing party rather than heartfelt attachment to positive national virtues. The aesthetic drawbacks of Restoration political songs notwithstanding, Debraux and Dauphin encouraged songwriters to assume their important role of defining the nation even if it meant taking sides in the political battles that raged around them.

For their part, Debraux and Dauphin capitulated on the issue of aesthetics and political neutrality because they believed that Restoration songwriters—especially at the critical time of their writing (1830)—could not prevent politics from entering into their lyrics. “In this epoch when politics have invaded everything,” they asked, “how is one able to write songs without politics coming and sliding under the plume of the songwriter?” Despite their dislike for the base partisan sentiments in Restoration songs, Debraux and Dauphin suggested that songwriters dedicate themselves to opposing the government. “Under a constitutional government,” they wrote, “the song is not able to make what one calls a bande à part; it belongs by essence to the opposition party. . . [in this way] the chanson must be eminently political.” In short, writers could no longer passively assume that their compositions reflected the nation. The polarized state of the country demanded that songwriters take a political stand, and for most goguette writers, that meant allying with the

25 Ibid., 55.
26 Ibid., 59.
oppositional Left. Such sentiments, if we assume other writers shared them, helps explain the many reports of disorderly singing groups and transcriptions of songs that filled the era’s police records.

In its efforts to crack down on seditious songs and unruly singers, the state first watched for works that expressed republican or Napoleonic sentiments challenging the monarchy’s legitimacy. During the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, songs like the *Marsellaise*, *Ca ira*, and the *Chant du départ* had rallied civilians and soldiers around conceptions of a nation that bore little resemblance to Restoration France. The memory of violent urban mobs singing these political songs led Restoration authorities to distrust singing crowds in general—especially outside of officially sanctioned events—as threats to public order. Police officials in the centrist (Decazes-dominated) ministries of the first years of the Restoration, in particular, distrusted both royalist and leftist singers because they spread destabilizing partisan contestation. They therefore documented the appearance of songs or instances of unauthorized singing sessions throughout France.

Instances of disruptive singing by ultraroyalist crowds, however, only sporadically appeared in Restoration police records. Ultra songs naturally voiced pro-monarchical sentiments, and by indiscriminately sprinkling “*vive le roi*” throughout their songs and singing sessions, royalists avoided rigorous state repression. However, when their singing did disturb public order or question the king’s choice of ministers, they could indeed draw the authorities’ attention. In 1818, for example, a police commissar in the department of the Moselle forwarded a copy of a song to Decazes that local ultras had sung after loudly declaring their hatred of the ministry. In this case, boisterous group singing triggered the police reaction and not the content of the song itself. The commissar accused the local ultras
of turning the singing of royalist songs into a forum for spreading calumny against the king’s ministry. He reported that “this tiny minority” of ultras in the town had demonstrated in their gathering, “new proof of its pronounced hatred for the king’s system and principally against your person.” With Decazes’ resignation and the ascension of ultra-friendly ministries in 1820, police accounts of ultra singing like this one became scarce.

Republican and Bonapartist songs, and the unruly crowds who sang them, therefore remained the government’s chief concern throughout the period. Reports from all over France testified to the activity of these disenfranchised leftists. The variety and numbers of songs sung and instances reported in the archives are too substantial to address in detail here, but, in general, they ranged from subtle allusions to past regimes to outright denials of the king’s legitimacy and calls for violent civil disobedience. In one case from 1818, for example, the préfet of the Corrèze wrote Decazes concerning the seizure of a handwritten chanson entitled, “Chanson de la Pomme de Terre,” which announced Napoleon’s imminent return to France at the head of an army of Africans. The “Pomme de Terre” and hundreds of songs like it appealed to France’s urban underclass, but few officials considered such fantastic scenarios a genuine political threat. Even the préfet thought that only the “ignorant” would believe such nonsense. Judging by sheer numbers, however, the nonsense in such songs became a nuisance when police had to keep filing reports on the many hundreds of songs like the “Pomme de Terre.”

Often a singing group’s activities challenged authorities more than the lyrical content of songs. In 1822, for example, the police reported that a group of eleven young men greeted

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27 AN F7-6839, Report, Commissar of Police of the Moselle to Minister of Police, 23 September 1818.
28 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Corrèze to Minister of Police, Tulle, 6 February 1818.
passersby at the Paris barrier of Menilmontant with songs “in which they spoke derisively of the name of ‘Louis’ and the ‘King’ to provoke laughter” and, according to the préfet, to incite a brawl with royalists entering and exiting the city. Similar situations occurred in the commune of St. Gaudent (Haute-Garonne) during celebrations of the 1823 Spanish War, when singing at the ultra Monsieur Francès’ private party generated a countering chorus from political opponents in the streets. The préfet reported, with some satisfaction, that M. Francès’ formed an ambulatory ultra singing group in retaliation that went on to challenge local liberals with disruptive and mocking songs. Instances such as these reveal how singing acted as a catalyst for political confrontation and deepened divisions between people.

In addition to reports of provocative singing, transcripts of anonymous songs filled police archives as authorities tracked their migration around France by mail, *colporteurs*, or other mysterious means. Often, songs appeared simultaneously in various places throughout France, generating a flood of reports to Paris on their appearance and their effect. In 1818, the police commissar in the commune of Dôle (Jura) brought some of these “smuggled” songs to Decazes’ attention but thought he only needed to quote their first and last lines, as he was sure that the police administration already knew them. His superior, the préfet of the Jura, however, thought the songs were dangerously divisive. He wrote to Decazes that “It is with these means [the mysterious circulation of songs]… that dark malevolence, always active and circumspect, looks to recruit partisans, to deteriorate the public spirit, or at least to

29 AN F7-6839, Report, Drouet and Genaudet (Commissars of Police) to Minister of the Interior, 1822.

30 AN F7-6949, Report, Prefecture of the Haute-Garonne to Minister of the Interior, Toulouse, 5 December 1823.

31 AN F7-6839, Report, Commissar of Police of Dôle (Jura) to Minister of Police, Dôle, 31 May 1817.
nourish in a certain class of the king’s subjects this spirit of party.” These exchanges between Decazes and authorities in the departments illustrate how songs, even unsung, became symbols for Restoration partisanship. When officials reported them, they acknowledged that polarizing political sentiments moved freely around the country—a song, it seemed, challenged efforts to maintain public order by simply surfacing in the area.

The widespread transmission of the song, *Ulysse et Télémaque*, an allegorical work that placed Napoleon, his Empress Marie Louise, and their son Napoleon II respectively in the Homeric roles of Ulysses, Penelope, and Telemachus, revealed the remarkable extent to which unpublished songs could travel during the Restoration without knowledge of their authorship or provenance. Between 1817 and early 1819, the ministry in Paris received numerous reports of the song circulating among soldiers on half pay. The préfet of the Gironde first wrote to Decazes in August of 1817 that the song seemed to have originated in Paris and was inspiring the “most seditious sentiments” in Bourdeaux. Decazes had apparently been aware of the song for some time and responded that “although the allegoric turn which the author has made use of seems to prevent it from becoming truly popular, the individuals who propagate it should be the object of strict surveillance.”

*Ulysse et Télémaque* often inspired this mixed reaction from authorities who begrudgingly admired the composition’s style but decried its allusions to the Bourbon family’s illegitimacy. Reports continued through the fall and winter of 1817-1818, with several references to *Ulysse’s* popularity among “certain classes of society” and even some

32 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Jura to Minister of Police, Lons-le-Saunier, 4 June 1817.
33 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Gironde to Minister of Police, Bourdeaux, 14 August 1817.
34 AN F7-6839, Draft Letter, Minister of Police Decazes to Préfet of the Gironde, Paris, 22 August 1817.
“exalted royalists” whose dislike of the centrist ministry explained their interest in the
song. When any seditious song appeared, the police tried to identify those responsible for
its composition or distribution, an easy task in the case of the half-pay officers caught
drafting copies of *Ulysse* in a café in Aix, but not so easy when it appeared on the street or
arrived in the mail. Over the course of 1818, *Ulysse et Télémaque* emerged in Dijon, St.
Malo, Nantes, Montpellier, the Var, Rochefort, and in the Vendee. In the Vendée, the préfet
even presumed its local origins and proceeded to list locals as the suspected authors, unaware
of its prevalence throughout France.

Even as they attempted to negate the spirit of party, local officials tended to think in
divisive political terms when *Ulysse* and other songs suddenly appeared in their jurisdictions.
This became more difficult when anonymous leftist agitators took advantage of this tendency
to send songs to political enemies in order to bring the loyalty of some local royalists into
question or simply to anger them. In 1818, the préfet of the Var reported that the loyal M.
Perruquier of Fréjus, received *Ulysse* by post from Lyon and promptly turned it over to the
police in order to reaffirm his allegiance to the government before anyone discovered he
received it and questioned his politics.

Anonymous mailings of songs and repudiations of them became common occurrences
throughout the period. In 1822, in the commune of Tréson (Nord), for example, several
people “animated with royalist sentiments” received four seditious songs and turned them

35 AN F7-6839, Report, D’Arnaud for the préfecture of Pyrénées-Orientales to Minister of Police, 19
September 1817.

36 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Bouches-du-Rhône to Minister of Police, Marseilles, 9 July 1818.

37 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Vendée to Minister of Police, Bourbon-Vendée, 15 December
1817.

38 AN F7-6839, Report, Préfet of the Var to Minister of Police, Draguinan, 26 February 1818.
over to the mayor. Included among the songs was the particularly vicious “Ronde de la France,” which accused the King of impregnating his niece, the Duchess de Berry. 39 In June 1827, Captain Bourgogne of the 43rd regiment in the fortress of Bellegarde received an anonymous letter from Paris. Inside the envelope were four seditious songs, including the infamous “Ronde.” Bourgogne forwarded the songs to his colonel expressing his indignation. “I am absolutely ignorant,” he wrote, “of who may be the person taking pleasure in passing on these writings which strengthen principles so blameworthy and so contrary to my own sentiments.”40 These incidents are further evidence of the autonomous political valence of songs. With the advent of ultra-dominated ministries in the 1820’s, authorities increasingly treated songs in general as carriers of contagious sedition. As transmitters of unwelcome ideas, songs became contraband and political weapons in the hands of opportunists who played on the era’s penchant for partisan labeling.

The written song as a textual artifact had limited political power, so the state naturally concerned itself more with how singing songs brought people together. Remembering the recent history of revolutionary clubs and urban crowds, the Restoration government naturally distrusted gatherings and enacted laws against unsanctioned meetings of more than twenty people. Spontaneous singing groups threatened the state’s maintenance of public order in the streets, but the appearance of goguettes as independent, semi-secret, and, most alarming, very popular urban singing societies posed a potentially greater threat as organized forums for the expression of potentially volatile opinions. Inspired by the Caveau, the famed eighteenth-century singing society, and the contemporary success of well-known lyricists like Béranger

39 AN, F7-6929, Report, Préfet of the Nord to Minister of the Interior, Lille, 19 August 1822.
40 AN F7-6705, Letter, Captain Bourgogne to Colonel 43rd line, Bellegarde, 12 June 1827.
and Désaugiers, these groups met to drink, sing, and emulate France’s renowned songwriters. Their meetings provided a working-class environment for artistic expression that increased a sense of fraternal solidarity among Restoration France’s disenfranchised urban dwellers. The *goguettes* usually featured less seditious songs than those that anonymously made their way around France—some clubs forbade political songs altogether—but the state still thought the clubs fostered unwelcome nostalgia for past regimes, and kindled partisanship in the nation by creating an independent forum for politics.⁴¹

Early police reports portrayed the *goguettes* as “bastard Masonic societies” that raised suspicions but posed no real threat to the state. When informers infiltrated them, they found that several, like the “*Lapins*” (Rabbits) which convened at M. Babier’s Paris residence, spent their time innocently drinking and offering toasts to the King and his family.⁴² One 1818 report on a Parisian group called the “*Amis du terrier des lapins du Midi*” (Friends of the Midi Rabbits’ Den) described how thirty families or so (including wives and children) attended a gathering at a café just outside the city in Montrouge. After their families returned to Paris, the club’s male members retreated to a private room in the café owner’s house. There they composed and sang couplets that critically touched on some political subjects, but unpublished and sung indoors, these songs were not subject to prosecution. The reporting officer did skeptically remark, however, on the club’s “republican organization” that included a president, vice-president, and secretary.⁴³ Despite political undertones in some of the societies, the early ministries of the Restoration generally tolerated them. In a report on

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⁴¹ For a brief history of the goguettes and their political variety, and for more on Debraux, see, A. Cim, *Paul-Emile Debraux, roi de la goguette* (Paris: Flammarion, 1910).

⁴² AN F7-6700, Report, Officiers de paix to Minister of Police, Paris, 13 July 1816.

⁴³ AN F7-6700, Report, Officiers de paix to Minister of Police, Paris, 19 August 1818.
more suspect groups, including the *Enfants de la folie*, the préfet of police suggested that despite their propensity to sing “liberal songs and some couplets to the glory of French armies,” these groups did not “seem to have any political goal.” 

Still, the pseudo-Masonic secretiveness of the *goguettes*, the drunken nature of their meetings, and the fact that people of questionable allegiance to the regime attended them made the societies worthy of continued surveillance.

Naturally, the authorities heightened their scrutiny when *goguettes* explicitly challenged the Bourbon state. In one case in 1818, a police informer closely monitored a Bonapartist group called the “Sans Gènes” which met under tricolor garlands and repeatedly toasted the King of Rome (Napoleon’s son). One member, M. Pargon, an employee at the royal treasury, told the police informer that members had to have supported the previous regime and not have shown any joy for the Bourbons’ return to power in order to join. This same man assured the informer that there were more than twenty similar groups in Paris. That same year, another police official described the “*Enfants de la folie*” as a meeting where members put “exalted liberal ideas that tended to republicanism” to song. Despite the state’s wariness over their political aspects, the number of *goguettes* grew steadily during the first five years of the Restoration and played an ever more substantial role in the social life of the urban working class.

Government nonchalance over the *goguettes* disappeared in the conservative backlash that followed the assassination of the Duc de Berry in February 1820 and the ascension of

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ultra-friendly ministries. The growing number of *goguettes* (at least 40 to 50 in Paris by 1820) and the correlating increase in the number of members attending had made them and their rowdy patrons more visible and irksome to the state. In a *circulaire* from 25 March 1820, the Préfet de Police reminded officials that the penal code forbade all unauthorized meetings of over twenty individuals, especially when they promoted sedition, blasphemy, and immoral behavior. “These reunions,” he wrote, “called *goguettes* are composed, in general, of individuals animated by a very bad spirit.” He complained that composers and singers had transformed public eating places into “clubs where they loudly manifest a spirit the most contrary to order and tranquility....” 48 Although the préfet did not mention it in his report, the recent appearance of published *goguette* songbooks surely increased the government’s alarm over the singing societies.49 In response, the préfet commissioned a special internal report on the *goguettes*.

The manuscript *Rapport sur les sociétés ou réunions lyrico-bachiques*/*Report on Lyrical-Bacchic Societies or Gatherings* (1820), highlighted the extent of the *goguette* phenomenon, their songs, and the challenges they presented to the regime in terms of maintaining public order and preventing the spread of unacceptable political opinions.50 The anonymous author of the *Rapport* described *goguettes* as refuges for people unable to come to terms with the political, social, and cultural stability that had suddenly followed more than twenty years of war. He correctly surmised that their songs reflected the social and political realities of disenfranchised working class people, and while enumerating the *goguettes*’

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49 Debraux’s and Tournemine’s *Soupers lyriques*, cited at the opening of this chapter, is generally considered the first organized collection of *goguette* songs. See note 1.


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transgressions and threatening aspects, he tried to understand why these groups formed and to suggest what the government could do to counter or take advantage of them. From the scale of the problem he described in the report, however, it seemed that authorities could do little to stop their spread.

Approaching the problem methodically, the author first ranked the types of goguette songs according to order of threat they posed to the state. He considered the great majority of them, the “chants grivoises” (saucy and satiric songs), relatively harmless so long as women were not in attendance during their performance. The next category, “chants philosophiques,” raised more concerns because they insulted religion and the clergy, leading the author to declare them potentially criminal. “Chants politiques,” he went on to describe, “produce bad effects because even the least significant songwriter who criticizes the government’s actions and propagates ideas fashioned in liberal colors . . . procures through them [songs] a mass of proselytes for the [liberal] orators of the century.”

The last category and the most alarming were “chants militaires,” which the author found remarkable for their nostalgia for the Empire, bellicose xenophobia, and vengeful tone. The author opportunistically believed, however, that “If external enemies threatened the kingdom, they [goguettes] would even be useful to the state, because one often hears in them productions that breathe a love of glory and pride in the patrie.” Young people who sang in the goguettes had few opportunities for glory anymore, and the author thought they would likely welcome the chance to fight for France because they enjoyed singing about patriotic war. He suggested the government take an active part in offsetting the goguettes’ political and moral threat and preserve their patriotic virtues by regulating them and enrolling “prudent, educated, and devoted men into them.” The author unfortunately feared that
“liberal papers” had already polluted the *goguettes* with a strong “hatred of monarchs” that needed prompt correction. In the absence of a real plan to get *goguettes* to support the government, the authorities ordered the closure of the most offensive clubs.

Despite the successful closure of some *goguettes* following the 1820 *Rapport*, the singing societies rebounded quickly and actually grew in numbers during the remaining years of the Restoration. Some societies like the *Amis de la Vigne* (Friends of the Vine), purposely avoided seditious political songs and repeatedly toasted the king and his family, but far more were like the *Société des Troubadours*, in which almost all songs criticized the government. After a renewed effort at closing the *goguettes* failed, in 1827 the préfet of police decided that the best course of action was to tolerate those clubs that applied for permission to meet and to monitor them closely. These official permissions often came with an order to sing only *chanson grivoises* or *satiriques*, and to avoid politics altogether.

Songs and singing opened sites for political expression among the lower classes on both sides of the political spectrum. In an environment in which the political song had become a seditious object and singing had become associated with the disturbance of public order, the existence of organized singing societies presented challenges to ministries that either wanted to quash partisanship (before 1820), or inculcate ultraroyalist ideology (after 1820). Regardless of which political persuasion they espoused, songs demonstrated how the

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51 AN F7-6700, Internal Report, *Rapport sur les Sociétés ou Réunions Lyrico-Bachiques*, Paris, 31 March 1820. It is interesting to note the great explosion of martial songs in favor of intervention in Spain in 1823. This corroborates my contention in Chapter Three that the ultras arrogated martial patriotism.


53 AN F7-6700, Report, Maître des requetes at the Cabinet of Police to Unknown, 26 October 1828.

54 One such injunction can be found in an official sanction granted to M. Servet to form a *goguette* in 1828. AN F7-6700, Report, Prefet of Police in Paris to M. Servet, Paris, 23 October 1828.
frame of national division permeated popular media and how its corollary political ideas and activities were not limited to the government and the press. While the Restoration’s political elites articulated partisan ideas about the post-revolutionary nation in their forums, royalist apologists, goguette songwriters, and the anonymous authors and distributors of political songs in the cities and villages of France all contributed to the polarization of the French people by echoing or countering elite claims, and turning songs into politically divisive weapons. The song became a powerful but independent and unpredictable factor in this political culture.

**Part Two: Pro-Royalist Songs**

In 1822, songwriter, playwright, and pamphleteer Auguste Hus commanded all lyricists to “Bourbonize! Bourbonize the French song,” but considering the majority of songs written at the time, he might have found his order unnecessary.55 Songs praising the Bourbons appeared regularly in printed songbooks and state-sponsored publications; and pro-Bourbon songs dominated the public sphere despite the high profile of seditious works. The government naturally embraced songs that celebrated the king and his family, praised the peaceful conditions of the Restoration, and lambasted the revolutionary and Napoleonic past. Indeed, the first two themes even appeared in many left-leaning goguette songwriters’ works. Repeated calls of “vive le roi” in songs did not necessarily signify a political position because this pro-monarchical cry was the Restoration’s ubiquitous platitude. Ardent ultraroyalist songwriters, however, stood out because they had long embraced polarizing politics and, especially after 1820, committed their pens to identifying and fighting enemies of the king.

55 Auguste Hus, *De l’influence de la chanson français, ou la philosophie, la métaphysique, et la politique de la chanson Bourbonisée* (Paris: Rougeron, 1822), 1. Hus’ rambling disjointed pamphlets seem to be the product of a frenzied if not outright insane mind.
and his government. As organs of state propaganda, these ultra-friendly songwriters could express their political beliefs without fear of reprisals, and use songs to outline the ultra vision for the nation. Their calls of “vive le roi!” belied a commitment to a hierarchical, paternalist nation, and a strong condemnation of opposing principles and the people who held them.

Royalist songwriters belonged to the same national singing culture as the goguettes, Béranger, and even the seditious songs that circulated through the country. Their songs enjoyed as much exposure, if not street popularity, as Béranger’s works, and probably had a larger national audience than the goguettes’ regularly proscribed offerings. Feeding on the optimism of the day, royalist writers incorporated goguette lightheartedness into their ideological lyrics, bringing vaudevillian sarcasm into their satirical attacks on politically active liberals and other more radical leftists. The ultraroyalist songwriters’ efforts, above all, aimed to strengthen support for ultras in power, and counter the Left’s high-esteem among urban workers. As inheritors of France’s long tradition of popular political songs, they self-consciously waged an ideological war to retake the medium from the unruly mobs.

It is difficult to identify an ideal type of ultra songwriter because people of many different social, economic, and political backgrounds incorporated pro-royalist sentiments in their songs. Members of all social classes wrote royalist songs, from high-ranking government officials and nobles, to soldiers, peasants, and urban laborers. For every renowned contributor to the royalist canon of songs like the vaudevillist Marc-Antoine-Madeleine Désaugiers, there were less established and often far more political writers such as Charles-Joseph Rougemaître, a low-level government employee and author/editor of several
volumes of stridently ultraroyalist songs. Ideologically speaking, the lower-class Rougemaître exemplified the ultra spirit in his works, the majority of which stand out from standard pro-Bourbon songs of the era for their vicious attacks on liberals and other leftists. As a frequent attendee of Parisian goguettes, Rougemaître surely brought some of his views into these working-class settings. Judging from the popularity of his songs (often reprinted in the press), and the existence of at least a few royalist goguettes, it is reasonable to assume that ultra propaganda songs had some traction among the urban working class.

Ultra songs, like many in the era, often voiced conciliatory sentiments in their celebrations of Louis XVIII, his family, and the long-awaited peace that had accompanied the monarchy’s reinstallation. Just as staunch defenders of the monarchy had in other media, ultra songwriters declared the king’s divinely sanctioned paternal authority to be the source of the Restoration’s benefits. An untitled song from 1815, for example, stated that, “In the midst of a deadly crisis, / Louis appeared, a celestial spirit; / He came as a father to his subjects/ To offer the olive branch of peace.” Some ultra songwriters portrayed the ascension of the paternal king, who by nature belonged to all French people, as an ideological victory for conservatives and demanded that songs of thanksgiving focus solely on the king and his family. “Louis by the nation,” wrote a contributor to one of Désaugiers’ collections, “Must be loved like a father…/ May our verses and our songs / Only speak of the Bourbons.” Royalist songwriters thus took the themes of reconciliation and forgetting the

56 Desaugiers was the son of the more famous Marc-Antoine Désaugiers, an eighteenth-century opera writer. The son was a successful vaudeville writer and Béranger’s friend and companion in the Caveau. Désaugiers mostly avoided politics but his biases against the Left emerged in several of his songs, and he lent his name (as editor) to several collections of more stridently royalist works.

past (*oubli et union*) common in other songs and made them conditional upon the acceptance of the king as the nation’s father and sole source of the Restoration’s peace. They probably reiterated Louis’ legitimacy and role as the nation’s true father in order to compete with the many leftist works pining for France’s past regimes. Writers like Michael-Joseph Gentil de Chavagnac, countered leftist nostalgia by asserting that national reconciliation could only come about with the installation of France’s *natural* leaders. In a work entitled *La cause et les effets*, (*The Cause and the Effects*), he wrote, “If hearts, / Sense the need to unite … It is because France / Finally has French princes.” Celebratory songs from committed ultras’ pens politicized reconciliation. They made the acceptance of a restricted vision of sovereignty—in this case, absolute paternal sovereignty in the hands of France’s legitimate king—the exclusive condition of reconciliation and the sole object of celebration.

Despite their narrow vision of the conditions for national reconciliation, royalist songwriters still considered unity to be the nation’s normal state and thought of party politics as a disease that only afflicted self-interested enemies. Many fervently believed the Revolution had split the nation, but from the perspective of the polarized conditions of the Restoration, they interpreted this divide in partisan terms. For some ultra songwriters, Restoration society consisted of good French people united under the king, the majority, and a few opponents whose allegiance to factions prevented their inclusion in the nation. In S.E.A. Dinomé’s song, *Le premier jour de l’an 1821* (*The First Day of the Year 1821*), for example, even moderate (and vocally pro-monarchist) *doctrinaire liberals* who did not support the ultra government were considered another impediment, albeit a weak one, to the

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unity of France. Dinome claimed that despite all the commentaries of Guizot, “this coryphée of the doctrinaires,” the French would unite in support of the king “without the distinction of parties.”⁶⁰ He implied that without the imposition of parties, the French would rally around their natural leader. Singing songs like Dinome’s in public made the ultra discourse of national unity particularly effective. These songs portrayed a nation singing together in celebration of the king and in stark contrast with elite liberal politicians who only spoke for factional interests. In short, politicians who chose party over unity did not join the national chorus.

Royalist songwriters portrayed doctrinaires and their followers as misguided partisans, but considered “independent” liberals to be outright scoundrels, unconditionally and innately unworthy of France. In 1818, for example, an anonymous songwriter demanded their permanent removal from politics, proclaiming, “No more of these good friends of France, / These hot partisans of ‘independence’.”⁶¹ Ultra songs ridiculed renowned members of the liberal opposition such as Lafitte, Constant, and Manuel, portraying them as fools, foreigners, and demagogues. An anonymously penned song mocked Lafitte, a millionaire banker, for assuming that generosity would yield political gains. “On patrons beneath him, / Master ‘Jaco’ Lafitte….spreads money everywhere;” the author asserted, “But we believe that that route, / Leads to bankruptcy.”⁶² Although liberals could not buy the support of the working class, royalists feared they could use their rhetorical skills to dupe its artisans, workers, and the urban poor. To counter the liberals’ persuasive language, ultra songwriters

⁶⁰ S.E.A. Dinomé, Le franc ultra: Chansons royalistes à l’occasion de la naissance de S.A.R Monseigneur le duc de Bordeaux et du premier jour de l’an 1821 (Blois, France: P.D. Verdier, 1821), 6-7.


⁶² Anon., Chansons par trois royalistes non fanatiques (Paris: Sétier, 1823), 139-41.
described them as dishonest and out of touch with good Frenchmen. One songwriter even accused Constant of being a foreigner—he was indeed born Swiss—for whom “Language is a sponge / That pumps out the lie, / And brazenly distills it,” and called for his immediate deportation. When it came to attacking liberal speakers, Manuel naturally attracted the most attention. In royalist songs, he represented the worst aspects of liberalism because he could get ignorant people to accept dangerous principles. A song by “E.L.” entitled, *Le Patriote par excellence, ou le bon français comme nous en connaissions tant [The Patriot par Excellence, or the Good Frenchman Like Many We Know]* (1824), for example, described a worker reacting to Manuel’s famed quip about France’s “repugnance” for the Bourbons (see Chapter Four). “Someone said it to us: / It is with repugnance / That we had welcomed back the Bourbons!” the worker sings, “…/ To love them I vainly force myself, / But I cannot find them to my taste.” Despite its mocking and satirical tone, “E.L.’s” song highlighted the threat royalist songwriters’ thought left-wing partisans posed to national unity. Ultras assumed that the nation naturally agreed with their political principles, but they also felt that liberals like Manuel could weaken the will of the people and pull them from their natural love of the king.

Ultra songbooks featuring these caricatures of liberal politicians nevertheless were comprised of a majority of standard royalist celebratory songs. We may assume, therefore, that singing sessions featuring both types were common. This contrast between the two genres, the laudatory song and the political attack song, outlined the parameters of ultraroyalist ideology. The former articulated conditions for national healing, namely, the

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reinstallation of the legitimate paternal king, while parodies of liberals revealed threats to national unity. In short, as ultras described them in music, liberals put self or group interests before the nation, championed foreign leaders, engaged in divisive mercenary politics, and undermined the people’s respect for the king. After singing numerous songs with “vive le roi!,” punctuating their refrains, a group could then sing Nommez-moi, a song which portrayed a liberal politician screaming, “Name me! Name me! I am an enemy of the King!,” and instantly grasp the difference between royalist fellowship and liberal self-interest.65

Not all royalist songs portrayed party politics negatively. Even though few songwriters could participate in formal politics, the inability to avoid partisan language in their songs prompted them to move beyond praise for the king and condemnation of enemies, and embrace the ultra bloc of politicians. An idealized ultra politician perhaps unsurprisingly incarnated all the virtues of the perfect Frenchmen. The author of La fièvre tricoleur (The Tricolor Fever), “B.,” suggested “The ultra possesses frankness, / love and sincerity; / He adopts for his device / Honor and fidelity.”66 Right-wing songwriters sang proudly of the label “ultra” as a badge of esteem. Edmond-Louis Barbier, a popular poet and songwriter, proclaimed that “The liberal who will read me, / Will name me, no doubt, ultra. Ah! To that I consent.”67 The anonymous author of the song L’ultra, defied the “greatest songwriters in the world” to prove their superiority over him as a “good ultra.”68 By proclaiming themselves as ultras, songwriters could distinguish their works from the choruses of “vive le roi” that

65 Anon., “Nommez-Moi: ou encore un voix à gauche, chanson dédié aux électeurs,” in Ibid., 95.
66 B..., La Fièvre Tricoleur (Toulouse, France: B. Despax, 1821), 1-3.
68 Anon., Chansons par trois royalistes non fanatiques, (Paris: Sétier, 1823), 139-41.
substituted perfunctory praise for a committed engagement in the Restoration’s political battles.

Royalist songwriters seemed determined to compete with and outdo their political rivals in all arenas, including merriment. As equal inheritors of the French singing tradition, they enjoyed nights of wine and song as much as those on the Left did, and, so long as the king inspired their headiness, ultra songwriters encouraged people to drink and sing with ardor. Songwriters such as M. Jacquemart thought singing the king’s praises justified drinking and flirting. “On this happy day,” he wrote, “France is en goguette, / Flow, good wines, jump young lady, / In the name of the king.” Although they encouraged celebration, royalist songwriters wanted to avoid having their works associated with the leftist goguettes and the riotous singing crowds that raised government suspicions. In Le vrai chansonnier (The True Songwriter), Rougemaître urged royalists to avoid the political statements and unruly behavior characterizing the goguettes’ productions. “Dear friends, let’s sing, let’s sing, / But even in our drunkenness,” he implored, “May a discreet wisdom / Purify our songs.” Rougemaître’s plea for decorum implicitly condemned the goguettes, which he likened to revolutionary clubs whose “hideous troops / In a threatening club /…/ Presented you with blood.” Good royalists had to balance the joys of wine and song with their love for the king. Only then could they outdo their political rivals in singing and celebrating.

Rougemaître associated leftist revelry with revolutionary violence, following the ultra tendency to consider all political enemies, regardless of ideology or temperament, as violent unrepentant revolutionaries. Many right-wing songwriters portrayed goguette singers as

69 Jacquemart, “Fêtons le Roi,” in Rougemaître, l’Anti-Libéral, 198. “En goguette,” in its original, pre-singing club (and present-day) definition meant to be “on a bender” or “partying hard.”

fanatical sans-culottes, and interpreted their licentiousness as nostalgia for unfettered liberty and revolutionary violence. In an anonymous ultra song entitled, *Brutus Bras-de-Fer (Brutus Strong Arm)*, a time-traveling Jacobin from 1793 gleefully encourages Restoration liberals to celebrate the return of their beloved popular sovereignty. “No more priests, no more masses, / No more good God, no more kings,” Brutus exclaims, “/ No more grandees, no more nobility, / We will recover our rights, / And the people will finally be happy, / Will again become sovereign. / What a pleasure, / What a pleasure, / The good times are coming back!”

71 A songwriting army officer, the Chevalier de Joannis, called even elite liberal politicians, “true sans-culottes, / And Jacobins in the mud,” who dared to contest the king’s rights. 72 Royalist songwriters saw revolutionary underhandedness even in the varieties of left-wing ideology. In his satirical piece, *Les Libéraux*, Rougemaître interpreted these variations in liberal thought as a sign of the Left’s dangerous changeability and general dishonesty. “This impious race of patriots” he wrote, became “sans-culottes” after ’89, pillaged under Robespierre, and fell “like Brutus’ monkeys” at Bonaparte’s feet. 73 How then, he wondered, could they be trusted to uphold their oath to Louis XVIII?

In royalist songs, blind adherence to “revolutionary principles” explained the liberals’ inconstancy and obstinate rejection of pure monarchical values. In tune with ultra politicians and pamphleteers, songwriters considered abstract revolutionary virtues to be contagions or supernatural forces. In a diatribe against “La Liberté,” songwriter “A.G.” depicted liberty, the Left’s foundational principle, as a monster of diabolic origin: “There was once a monster in

71 Anon., “Brutus Bras-de-Fer, patriote de 1793, à ses amis les libéraux de 1822,” in Ibid., 31.
72 Le Chevalier de Joannis, “Ronde de Table,” Ibid., 131.
hell / Who in a fit of his rage, / Having one day broken his chains, / To all places brought carnage. / Escorted by treason, / We see this bloodthirsty monster / Take the name Liberty, / To enslave all the earth.”

In keeping with the competitive spirit of the day, songwriters then lashed out at Restoration liberals infected with perfidious liberty, calling them “secret plotters,” “cunning regicides,” “impudent utopists,” and “black Jacobins” who had fallen too far under the influence of revolutionary principles for rehabilitation.

Ultra songwriters contended that revolutionary principles had undermined the liberals’ participation in the Restoration system, vitiating all of their claims of loyalty and good intentions. When liberty and treason so often marched together, ultras asked, how could anyone trust liberals who proclaimed the rule of law and the sanctity of the Charter? Rougemaître, for instance, claimed that the liberals wanted to destroy the “king’s legitimate power” by fomenting crime “in the name of law.”

Suspicions of duplicity made ultra songwriters distrust liberals who cried out “vive la Charte” in chorus with “vive le roi.” Royalists assumed this cry had hidden meanings, that it actually insulted the king who had given the Charter to the nation. “Do you know how to read / This lovely cry of Vive la Charte?” asked songwriter “A.D.-V.C.” in his Le dessous de la Charte (The Underside of the Charter), “I will venture to explain it to you /…/ ‘Alone I allege to make the law / I do not know God, or faith.’ / Voila, the underside of the Charter.” In this song, the ultra songwriter danced around the central constitutional problem of the Restoration: the origins and meaning of the Charter. In most songs, however, the issue rarely arose. More important than the

74 Mgr. A. G…, “La Liberté,” Ibid., 75.
75 Anon., Deux Chanson; ou étrennes aux libéralistes (Paris : Gueffier, December 1828).
political niceties surrounding the meaning of the Charter was the liberals’ belief, as ultra songwriters imagined it, in the incompatibility of kings and “the people.” Because some liberals questioned the nature of this relationship in the Charter, ultras accused all leftists, regardless of their professed beliefs on this issue, of adhering to the principle of popular sovereignty. “The liberal on all kings, / swears a doctrinal war,” wrote the anonymous author of *Le liberalism dévoilé: Chant anti-philosophique*, *(Liberalism unveiled: Anti-philosophical Song)*, “[he] speaks of the people and its rights,/Says that revolt is legal./In his anti-royal system,/He has an ideal project/ For an anarchic government.”78 This royalist songwriter followed the common script for attacking the Restoration Left: connect the liberals to revolutionary principles and then deny their loyalty to the restored monarchy.

This strategy naturally led ultra songwriters to accuse liberals and other leftists of treason, and to challenge the *goguettes*’ professed patriotism. Many of the *goguettes*’ most popular songs romanticized the revolutionary and Napoleonic soldier, and contrasted patriotic principles with the aristocratic self-interest. Some ultras tried to counter this theme by composing verses lauding Old Regime heroes, but those warriors were long dead and praising them did not resonate in a post-revolutionary public sphere. Songs about more contemporary examples of royalist military patriotism, such as counterrevolutionary émigrés and Vendéens, also failed to compete with the flood of leftist works extolling the patriotism of the millions of French who had served under recent regimes.

Ultra songwriters responded by criticizing the Left for placing the “*patrie*” and the “nation” over the paternal king, once again raising the central political question of Restoration debates. They considered the popular martial song as evidence of the Left’s

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misplaced love, and, as they did with “Liberté,” they questioned the value of patriotism. In ultra songs, old soldiers so beloved in the goguettes’ productions became mercenaries who placed “patriotism” above virtue. “Seduced by gold, some warriors, /” complained the author of Libéralisme dévoilé, “Sacrificed honor, laurels, / To the shadow of Patriotism.” 79 Ultra songwriters portrayed liberals’ patriotism as camouflage for their true desire to introduce revolutionary principles. “The liberal that I critique,” wrote Barbier, “Is this ultra-republican, / Who, always sings this refrain: / …/ Let’s push on to anarchy! / It is for the happiness, the happiness of the patrie.” 80 With the advent of the Spanish War, the ultras created a new genre of Restoration military songs redefining military patriotism in royalist terms (see Chapter Three), but they never stopped attacking the Left for its praise of soldiers loyal to the Revolution and Napoleon.

To sing of politics, the nation, or the people without privileging the king was to invite ultra condemnation throughout the period. Pro-royalist songs enjoyed great exposure in the press, at official functions, and in their own songbooks, but in general, they had difficulty crafting nuanced political messages. Politically, their songs enjoyed the privilege of being acceptable to the government and simple to understand. To praise the monarchy was simple, but in a polity in which such praise was the norm, ultraroyalist songwriters had difficulty differentiating themselves from the crowd. They distinguished themselves only with simplified condemnations of their political opposition, but by doing so, they further polarized politics and made the monarchical utopia of which they sang more difficult to attain.

79 Ibid., 26.
Part Three: Leftist *Goguettes*’ Political Songs

Few working-class songwriters called themselves “liberal” in the same way that their counterparts on the Right assumed the titles “royalist” or “ultra.” Rather than parroting liberal politicians in the press, their songs combined issues particular to the working class with a diverse ménage of leftist positions including some discredited Bonapartist and republican principles. Strong class-conscious radicalism pervaded their works, leading them to attack aristocratic royalists who supported the regime more viciously than most liberal politicians would. Despite differences in temperament, elite liberals and lower-class songwriters all agreed that the “nation” meant the French people as bearers of special rights and not simply as subjects of the sovereign king. On this foundation, working-class songwriters forged a rhetorical alliance with liberal politicians that occluded the variety in both lower-class leftist and elite liberal politics, and was strong enough to unite both groups against the ultras’ reactionary policies. Although leftist songwriters often hid political opinions behind sarcasm and satire—especially in the published collections of *goguette* songs—their songs’ brought polarized elite politics to the urban lower class.

Despite their reputation for radicalism, *goguette* songwriters rarely attacked the king and his family in their published works. In fact, many expressed thanks for the benefits of Bourbon rule. Their songs of praise, however, could subtly undermine the king’s special status by suggesting conditions for monarchical power. In particular, they offered an alternative to the ultras’ spiritual conception of monarchical authority as an unquestionable and unconditional gift of God. Debraux and his erstwhile writing partner Charles Le Page, for example, urged Charles X, “whose heart is the hope of France,” to accept and fulfill whatever duties the people gave him. “If our love, in its independence,” they wrote, “For all
present offers you but a flower, / It will die if your hand abandons it.” They reminded the king that, “The least flower that one merits, / Is worth more than a vain crown.”

Behind their deferential tone, Debraux and Le Page insinuated with their metaphorical gift of a flower that the king’s authority came from the people, making him a caretaker answerable to the people. The goguette contributor, Perdry, navigated even more dangerous waters when he satirically claimed—alluding to a tradition by which a “king” is crowned every Christmas after finding a bean in a cake—that legitimacy derived more from chance than through blood. “Chance alone renders legitimate,” he wrote, “The rights of this royalty.”

Singers of this work would have had the opportunity to reflect on the true king’s status as they lightheartedly sang about the ersatz monarchs they crowned each year.

Despite hinting at limits to the king’s authority, in general leftist songwriters seemed grateful that his return ushered in a period of peace that could facilitate national reconciliation and unity. In the calm that followed twenty-five years of turmoil, a sense of repose and leisure took hold in many songwriters, and rather than disrupting placid conditions with political attacks, they called for national unity after years of division. The collegial social world of the goguettes with its culture of obligatory fraternity served as a model for the renewed nation. Many songs addressed the problem of post-revolutionary division as one of sentiment, as though wine and song alone could unite the French. Debraux, for example, thought he could drown discord in wine and song because, “We are all sons of the same France.”

These calls for unity (à la goguette) emphasized the French people’s

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natural fraternal bonds and powers of self-regeneration while downplaying the king’s role in
unifying the nation. This stood in stark contrast to royalist songs that considered the king’s
paternal force to be the sole source of unity.
Leftist goguette songs spoke of the king and the people’s mutual rights and duties,
preserving respect for the former and claiming independence for the latter. Songwriter E. C.
Piton, for example, reminded his audience that “The king counts on the patrie, / The patrie
expects all from the king.” 84 Although disagreements over this relationship between king and
country fueled the era’s fundamental debate on the nature of the Charter, few songwriters
diverted themselves from gaiety to engage explicitly in this debate. By underlining the
autonomy of the French people, however, they reiterated the liberals’ conception of the
constitution as a contract and followed the lead of many poets in praising the document as a
national treasure. Many songwriters dedicated works to the Charter and sang of it as the true
source of the era’s unity and peace. It became the sine qua non of the Restoration’s promise
of reconciliation and peace. As Eugène de Pradel wrote, “… without the Charter, / All the
French are lost.” 85 After giving France the Charter, the king receded into the background of
most leftist songs while the nation celebrated without him.
Not all goguette songwriters rejoiced over the new era. Indeed many looked primarily
to the past for inspiration. Some works spoke nostalgically about France’s recent history
while others condemned the Old Regime, but both genres offered a divisive assessment of
Restoration society through the lens of the past. Some leftist songwriters considered national
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Paul-Emile Debraux, “Encore un chanson,” in Le nouvel enfant de la gougette (Paris: Hardy, 1823),

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84

E.C. Piton, “Le roi et la patrie,” in Les soirées lyriques, 6° Année ; chansons inédites (various, eds.),
(Paris : Béraud, 1824), 145.
85

Eugene de Pradel, Les étincelles; recueil de chants patriotiques et guerriers, de chansons de table et
d’amour; précédé d’une Epître aux braves (Paris : Marchands des Nouveautés, 1822), 139.

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reconciliation, as offered by the ultras, illusory because it meant denying the recent past rather than resolving differences. They turned to carefully praising certain aspects of life during the previous regimes, especially the military exploits that had offered the lower class a sense of purpose and identity. Songs such as Debraux’s *La Colonne* [*The Column*], which considered Napoleon’s column on the Place Vendôme a symbol of a proud but defeated nation, became staples among singing crowds throughout France. Praising the past naturally led to attacks on ultras, whom songwriters considered accessories to foreign enemies. Leftist songwriters condemned upper class treatment of the French people even before the Revolution. Rehashing revolutionary rhetoric about aristocrats’ mistreatment of the common people, songwriter Pierre Tournemine considered the Bastille a more fitting symbol of France’s past than the Vendôme column. “When finally the truth shines, / Let us forget these times of regrets,” he wrote, “[When] Crime was in the palaces, / And innocence in the Bastille.” 86 Although they chose different monuments to represent France, both Debraux and Tournemine spoke as much to division in their contemporary society as in the past. A “true” symbol of France would remind the people of continuing inequality and arbitrariness, and not just lost glory or old injustices.

Many lower class songwriters recast the Restoration on the whole as a period of loss, and pined for civil and political rights for which so many had sacrificed their lives. Their songs often portrayed old soldiers or government officials from previous regimes (*bannis*) in order to highlight persistent social inequality and the incompleteness of Restoration unity. Exiled old sergeants, dismissed clerks, and disgraced national heroes featured prominently in these maudlin patriotic songs. Debraux’s *Adieu d’un français* [*Farewell of a Frenchmen*] 86

(1821) depicted an exiled French soldier uttering these last words from France’s border:

“Adieu beautiful patrie, / Adieu cherished France, / Alas, I am going / To leave you forever.”

Debraux and others commonly referred to these bannis as prototypical “Frenchmen” lamenting their exclusion from national unity. The popularity of these songs undoubtedly appealed to the many slighted ex-soldiers who attended the goguettes, but they also drew upon wider working-class suspicions about the refashioning of post-revolutionary society. In addition to their anger at the contradiction between national unity and exile that the treatment of the bannis exposed, leftist songwriters also thought their punishment proved the Right’s lack of patriotism. One songwriter, “J.A.D.,” for example, wrote that the “ultra-monarchic” admired “oriental arbitrariness” and “scandalized the national spirit” while treating “patriotic love as a crime.”

They expressed their outrage, in particular, at the ultras’ persecution of national heroes in favor of proud émigré aristocrats whose martial abilities could not match the accomplishments of honorable Napoleonic soldiers. H. Sybille, for example, summed up the attitude of many when he pointed out the contrast of “these proud warriors, who honor France, / Next to whom are these intruder warriors....” Sybille’s condemnation joined many other songs in which the Restoration’s noble warriors appeared as “Don Quixotes” and frauds.

Leftist songwriters were particularly galled that nobles, who did not fight for France during the previous twenty-five years, now claimed civil and political rights denied the


working class. In the past, service to the state had given members of the lower class a modicum of political power, and though the memory of such political enfranchisement under previous regimes was often at odds with reality, leftist songwriters contrasted the conception of empowerment with the actual and rhetorical exclusion of the working class from political participation during the Restoration. Some songs declared that past regimes had recognized service to the nation as the criterion for inclusion in the body of citizens. In *Le soldat citoyen [The Citizen Soldier]* (1822), Pradel wrote from the perspective of an old working-class soldier reminiscing on how his service once gave him citizenship and allowed him to stand up to elite derision. “In vain,” the old soldier proclaims, “Would they dare say to me, Laborer, you are nothing. / For I am a citizen.”  

Songwriters again compared old soldiers with émigrés to highlight the injustice of French citizenship and identity in the Restoration. They especially criticized ultras for emigrating during the Revolution, and then declaring their status as “true Frenchmen.” Mocking this common ultra claim, Debraux portrayed an émigré noble complaining about the Restoration’s ostensibly inclusive nature, “Finally we push excess, / To the point of naming ‘French, / Some men who, since their childhood, / Did not even quit France.’”  

Songs like Debraux’s reveal the insecurity of the political and civil position of the working class during the Restoration. Without suffrage or the opportunity for national service, workers had little to gain from the new regime. Working-class resentment only increased when ultras claimed their superiority and flaunted their access to the political system.

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Lack of access to the political system drove working-class songwriters to contrast greater society’s faults with the goûtettes’ internal cohesive structures. The singing society became an alternative world where equal members belonged to a social order with its own rules. From the shelter of these mini-republics with elected officers and equal members, songwriters mocked the ultras’ attachment to noble birthright and the Old Regime’s defunct hierarchy with its arcane rituals and social markers of belonging. In the goûtettes, Debraux explained, “You banish the symmetry / That one observes at the tables of kings.” The goal instead was to “enjoy in peace…your [the goûtettes’] laws” and “laugh at the vain etiquettes / Of all the grandees.”92 The goûtettes created conditions for working-class people to bolster their self-worth vis-à-vis the upper echelons of society. Compared to the goûtte’s bawdy but equitable atmosphere, songwriter J. Moreau thought aristocratic snobbery was simple posturing, and pointed out the absurdity of claiming a higher social status. “May an ambitious fool / Speak of his ancestors / And boast of his nobility,” he wrote, “I believe myself noble also / When I am drunk.”93 His sophomoric commentary aside, Moreau suggested that the social roles of the past no longer had meaning in the post-revolutionary world. In reality, both the goûtettes’ attendees and returning nobles created fictive worlds in their songs that reflected their own conceptions of an ideal society.

Despite the derisive lightheartedness with which working-class songwriters wrote about ultras and their pretensions, they also feared that their enemies in the nobility were trying to reestablish feudalism in France. Songwriters combatted this threat by ridiculing the


Right’s narratives of the past, starting with the story of the origins of the French people that ultras had used to justify social hierarchy. In a song entitled *Un morceau de pain* [A Piece of Bread], Debraux referred to the widespread belief that French nobles descended from the Frankish barbarians who had enslaved the Gallo-Romans. Instead of valorizing nobles like apologists for this historical theory, however, he used the narrative to explain the nobility’s rapacity and violent history of repression. “One day the Franks, a people rude and savage,” he wrote, “On the Gauls swept down like brutes, / They reduced the vanquished to servitude.”94 Other goguette songwriters complained that nobles still harbored nostalgia for licensed debauchery at the peasants’ expense and mockingly described the ultras as pining for the “good old times” when the nobility’s pleasure determined wrong from right. The songwriter Aury, for example, wrote from the perspective of a noble who recalls when members of the lower class never complained. “…they were happy, / These good peasants of France, / To obey the valiant,’ Aury’s fictitious noble sings, “…that a great lord / Did them honor / By seducing, in their families, / Either their wives or their daughters! / Ah, how happy we were / In the times of our elders.”95 The idea that nobles could not reconcile their past with the relatively progressive features of the new regime became a predominant theme. In his song, *Le malheureux*, [The Unhappy], Debraux described a sleeping marquis, who dreamt, “Puffed up with the foolish hopes / For the return of his feudal rights.”96 In fact, returned nobles adjusted skillfully to the new political and legal system, but Debraux nonetheless reiterated the belief that all nobles secretly longed for a return to the Old Regime.


Moreover, he and other songwriters insinuated that the noble mind retained an innate and subconscious preference for societal regression. Working-class songs, perhaps more than any other medium, perpetuated this perception and contributed to the conviction that post-revolutionary division was insurmountable.

A biting assessment of contemporary royalist behavior accompanied these satirical assaults on ultra nostalgia. Leftist songwriters claimed that longing for the past made returned émigrés unable to forgive and forget as mandated by the Charter. Instead, ultras had become slaves to vengeance who spent their time punishing the rest of France for their own losses. “Our Grandees, with a criminal hand,” wrote the songwriter Lavigne, “Welcome her [Vengeance] and caress her: / They applaud her crimes; / They point out her victims for her / Who should fall under her blows: / They have from old thatched cottages, / Chased entire families, / In order to satisfy her wrath.”

This image of “grandees” persecuting peasants in their thatched cottages revealed the class-consciousness that underpinned working-class political songs. Songwriters gave voice to widespread dissatisfaction with the development of new noble (and non-noble) elites who dominated all government positions. Songwriter Frédéric Fougéray considered all men who wielded power during the Restoration “newcomers.” In his 1823 song Obéis et tais-toi, [Obey and Shut Up], he castigated the ultra ministry for its arbitrary assault on those who had risen through merit. “These parvenus, through their audacity,” he wrote, “Want to climb higher still: / From the feeble they seize their places, / And buy their honor with the weight of gold.”

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97 Lavigne, Proscrits, ou le cri français, Ode (Paris: Sétier, 1819), 3-4.

émigrés and other wealthy ultras who dominated the ultra government arose from the pervading sense of class persecution fueling working-class songs.

The conviction among songwriters that the new system was not equitable exposed even the king to occasional criticism. Despite the license with which they attacked ultras and nobles in general, even slight remarks aimed specifically at the king’s role in government could land songwriters in jail. Indeed, both Pradel and Debraux spent several months in prison for vaguely worded allusions to the king.99 One way goguette writers could complain about the government while avoiding prosecution was to emphasize the humanity and fallibility of the new regime’s elite players—including the king—without specifically naming them. Early in his published career (and before the government of the ultraroyalist Villèle ministry under which he faced prosecution), Debraux criticized kings in general using this leveling technique: “See these sovereigns, / Some poor humans / Calling themselves tutelary Gods; / These gods of flesh and bone /.../Kings, show less pride; / Like us the coffin claims you;...”100 Debraux’s later writing partner, Charles Lepage, used the same approach to criticize the king’s cabinet. Following the lead of the Charter, he distinguished between the inviolable king and his ministers, and attacked the latter for their claims of superiority.

“Know the kings of the Earth / Boast well of the most accomplished,” he wrote, “Attack, in their ministries, / These false inheritors of Sully /.../ Fight young songwriters / A minister is nothing but a man.”101 Lepage reminded the Restoration ministers of their humanity and put

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them in their place by referring to the greatness of previous ministers such as Henri IV’s famed advisor Sully, the mastermind of that monarch’s conciliatory policies.

Songwriters attacked ultra ministers and their supporters because they perverted the new regime’s political institutions and, more than any other group, prevented French people from realizing national reconciliation. Songwriter Eduoard Corbière, for example, accused the ministry and its declared supporters in the Chambers (ministériels) of colluding to destroy the Restoration system of government. In his song Le budget de 1820, un député ministériel à ses collèges [The Budget of 1820, a Ministerial Deputy to His Colleagues] (1819), Corbière likened the ministerial approach to politics to a banquet of gluttons. In the song, fictional ultra politicians sample and devour the fundamental freedoms that the Left cherished. “The Charter, of freedom / is the rampart unassailable,” one of his ravenous ministerial deputies brags, “But [in it] I partook of a certain paté / Whose crust was delectable.” Along with the Charter, the gourmands also devoured election laws because they posed a threat if left untouched. 102 Corbière thus portrayed right-wing politicians as both avaricious and arbitrary and highlighted the contrast between greedy fattened men who destroyed the Charter and already unfair election laws, and the goguettes’ singers who drank and ate together in an equitable fashion.

The Catholic clergy also felt the wrath of leftist songwriters, not necessarily for religious reasons but because they supported the conservative governments of the era. Goguette songwriter Favard (aîné) mocked the Catholic missionary movement’s close ties to ultra politicians. In Sermen d ‘un missionnaire [Oath of a Missionary] (1820), he portrayed a Jesuit priest admonishing the people for their love of “grenadiers over crusaders,” and their

102 Edouard Corbière, “Le budget de 1820, un député ministériel à ses collèges,” in La marotte des ultras, ou recueil des chansons patriotiques (Brest, France: P. Anner, 1819), 10-11.
reading of *philosophes* rather than scripture. Favard’s cleric rails against a crowd protesting the ministry: “You dare to condemn the abuses / That the ministry commits; / I see it, you no longer know / To see all, suffer all, and stay silent.”¹⁰³ For working-class songwriters, religious zealots joined the ranks of reactionary enemies opposed to their celebrations. In a revised version of the revolutionary war song, *Le chant du depart* [*The Chant of Departure*], for example, Debraux wrote, “Beat it wicked buffoons, / Censor, minister, / And monk with a sinister eye.”¹⁰⁴ When they took on the clergy, working-class songwriters did not refute dogma or criticize the pious, but saw in the Church yet another sinister form of Restoration authority impinging on their liberty.

For all their songs’ general political content, urban working-class songwriters rarely wrote about contemporary political debates and those involved in them. When not complaining about the fate of Napoleonic soldiers or the general iniquity of Restoration society, they generally portrayed politically active ultras’ initiatives as nuisances that sprang from the deep reactionary impulses leftist songwriters criticized. Songwriters were, however, acutely aware of the divisiveness of Restoration politics, and when the situation demanded it, they occasionally expressed support for the liberal opposition. In general, they understood that liberals in the Chambers valued many of the same principles as working-class leftists and so merited praise, especially when compared to their ultra counterparts. Debraux, for example, assessed the virtues of deputies in the Chambers in his allegorical song, *La charte d’amour* [*Love’s Charter*]. He associated personal traits with political opinions and left little ambiguity over his own preferences: “Foolishness and clumsiness, / On the Right have the


first row. / Gluttony and Sloth / In the Center establish their camp; / On the Left we admire
the verve / Bravery and Loyalty / And Minerva placed Honor there / Right next to Liberty.”

Despite their exclusion from political participation, some members of the goguettes expressed similar sentiments of solidarity with the liberal elite. The liberal, wrote the songwriter A. Gombault, besides “reading Minerve,” voting to “recall the bannis,” and respecting “old warriors,” embodied the generosity of spirit necessary for post-revolutionary reconciliation. “Without anyone dictating his conduct,” Gombault wrote, “To go with
greatest haste, / To succor without return / A poor devil in the hospital, / That there is a
liberal.”

They would not have the chance to vote for liberals, but these songwriters knew that, of all the wealthy people managing their nation’s affairs, the liberals by nature were less likely to offend working-class sensibilities.

Judging from their songs, the main theoretical debates of the period mattered little to the artisans, trades people, veterans, and clerks of the goguettes. Living in stressed, unstable economic conditions, they first sought targets that could explain the perceived regression in society from progressive principles. Anger inspired some to write songs that met with prosecution, and which further animated the divisive street activists of the period. These songs, which often appeared transcribed in police archives, lacked subtlety as they leveled personal attacks on the restored monarchy and all that accompanied it. When they worked within the legal framework, however, leftist songwriters were better able to express class prejudices and suspicions that underlay their dislike for ultras and their reactionary

supporters. Working-class songwriters identified with politicians who shared their faith in the people and who resisted the return to a society that offered fewer civil and political rights. Liberals spoke of liberty and equality. Even if these virtues in elite politicians fell far short of street radicals’ expectations, the goguettes’ singers and writers could consider them allies on the same side of the post-revolutionary divide.

**Part Four: Rejecting of Elite Politics**

In the midst of the Restoration’s incessant barrage of political discourse, goguette songwriter J.B. Gagnée chose to ignore the rancor and focus on drinking. “To discuss politics / Has for me few attractions” he claimed, “But a bacchic debate / Never tires me out.” For all of their pleas of justice for exiles, their anger at aristocratic privilege, and their identification with other leftists, many goguette songwriters shared Gagnée’s frustration with politics. Gombault declared that “If many angry people in caustic mood, / To trouble our joyous delights, / Want to talk to us about politics, / That will not do.” The singing societies never intended to be sounding boards for leftist politics, but rather an escape from the rancor of the period. Songwriter Demailly thus made swearing off politics the foremost rule for a goguette, claiming at the end of a song listing his singing societies’ regulations, “Especially, no political song; / It ices over gaiety.” Was this escapism itself an expression of political identity? In a society that did not offer any political outlet for the lower class other than petitions, the tendency to avoid politics became a statement of dissatisfaction with


the status quo and not simply a capitulation to political impotency. Escapism, mockery, and
disgust were the symptoms of a class searching for alternatives to ultra and liberal politics.
By routinely dismissing the partisan rancor above them, songwriters opened a space for a
new model of politics based on lower class solidarity.

Goguette songwriters, like writers of every political persuasion and in every genre
during the Restoration, wrote effusively on the theme of unity. Songwriter “Béchu” offered
the following refrain: “Reunite the opposing parties, / And may this cry be repeated: / Good
French! Let us live as brothers, / For that is the wish of Humanity.”¹¹⁰ We have seen how
these common sentiments of unity could belie prejudices about the ideal makeup of the
nation, or hold reconciliation hostage to the adoption of one side’s way of thinking. When
members of working-class goguettes wrote about unity, they too incorporated ideological
biases in their songs. More often than taking political sides, however, goguette songwriters
expressed disappointment at the unrealized promise of the new age, and blamed both
opposing factions for interrupting with their contestation what should have been a national
celebration. Some, like Pierre Tournemine, thought France’s unity required genuine
ideological agreement. “I would like, oh my country, oh France!” he wrote, “That your
children, having but one color, / For your honor, your independence, / Were in agreement in
mind and heart.”¹¹¹ Tournemine offered no political conditions for this unity, but without a
doubt, the partisan status quo failed to offer the lower class an appealing vision of national
unity.

¹¹⁰ Béchu, “L’humanité ; chanson morale,” in Les soupers lyriques, troisième année 1821 (Pierre

¹¹¹ Pierre Tournemine, “Je voudrais, chanson philosophique,” in Les soupers lyriques, deuxième
Goguette songwriters imagined the end of contestation through surrender to wine and song because partisan politics mitigated any real chance for national reconciliation. The songwriter Valentin painted a fanciful picture of implacable political enemies, liberals Etienne and Constant, and ultras Bonald and Marcellus, setting their political differences aside to toast one another and sing each other’s praise. “Thirty years caused our tears! / May instantly,” Valentin hoped, “…Bonald tip one back with Etienne! / May Marcellus sing an antiphony, / To the health of Constant.”  

This song turned political identity into a personal trait that any willing individual could overcome. Valentin knew that the goguette could maintain the peace of its members through a commitment to good cheer, and thus suggested that upper-class politicians and journalists likewise give revelry a chance. His was a working-class solution to the nation’s discord, and it revealed the exasperation of those whose only entry point into formal politics was through singing. 

Although vexing for those songwriters who held out hope for reconciliation, the elite politicians’ constant rhetorical battles at least provided humorous fodder for working-class songwriters. Debraux, for example, lauded freedom of the press because it opened a window on the foolishness of partisan politics. “In my delight / I believe I have already read,” he stated, “All the great puppets of the two spirits of party, / Go on, let them make battle. / Go on, may they squabble, / What noise!, what agitation!... / I who have nothing invested in this, / I am going to laugh heartily over it.” Debraux spoke for the urban worker who had no access to the institutions in which liberals and ultras fought. The polarizing politics of elites may have penetrated all levels of Restoration society, but lower class French people only


\[113\] Paul-Emile Debraux, “La Liberté de la presse,” in *Chansons Complètes*, 290.
interacted with these politics on a discursive level. Words alone did little to alter lower-class social realities, the basic needs and conditions of urban life remained unchanged by debates on the nature of post-revolutionary France. Debraux explicitly tied the goguettes’ tendency towards distracting celebration to a laissez-faire attitude towards politics. For those who had “nothing invested in this,” squabbling elites at least offered prime targets for derision.

Other songwriters were less forgiving when they emphasized how class divided those who participated in the political system from those excluded from it. One typical class-conscious response to incessant partisan discourse was to condemn all politics as the domain of wealthy, egocentric elites looking for fame. As the songwriter Marteau chided in his song Chanson de table [Table Song] (1819): “May the orator at the tribune, / Harangue the peoples and the kings, / To make a name for himself in history.”\(^\text{114}\) Although critical of forces that excluded them from politics, many writers considered statecraft a burden that few working class people would choose.

François Dauphin expressed such sentiments in his class-conscious work, L’artisan. “My mind concerns itself but little / With the frail vessel of the state,” his character admits, “To the great ones alone who fear the storm, / I abandon the till / And I go after my work / To laugh and drink with the crew.”\(^\text{115}\) Dauphin’s fictitious artisan makes no claim to political participation. Instead of complaining about his exclusion from politics, he leaves the troubles of governance to the “great ones” and abandons himself to drinking and merriment. Considering the rampant partisanship that increasingly hampered the Restoration’s political system, Dauphin’s abdication of responsibility was also an implicit condemnation of how


elites ran in circles when conducting the nation’s business. “To speak of the grandees’ disputes / Is an unwise path to take,” Debraux reminded his readers, “Let us save our time, / For more agreeable pursuits /…/ Let’s allow the potentates fight. / And good grief, let’s live as brothers.” Members of the political class proved unable to resolve their differences, but the urban working class responded by creating their own conditions for societal solidarity in their songs. Rejecting the partisan rancor dividing the upper class was the first condition of class-consciousness, and indeed, national unity.

Disdain for upper class politicians developed into silent anger when the songwriters’ political impotence made it impossible for them to address the issues most important to them. Debraux, for example, castigated the rich for abandoning the poor veterans and noted that only the wealthy “monsieurs” could fix the damage they caused. In his song Ne parlons pas politique [Let Us Not Speak Politically], he asked his audience, “Do you want to know who betrayed them [veteran soldiers]? / It is for you, the Monsieurs, to give the reply.” The song’s refrain, however, highlighted the pointlessness of trying to work within “the Monsieurs” system because one was more likely to alert the police to one’s politics than to meet with any success. Debraux capitulated to his impotency and eschewed addressing political problems, “Because I no longer like to speak politically, / I no longer speak politically.” This calculated withdrawal from the political sphere did not mean that the Left gave up advocating for social and political priorities, but rather, it reflected a widespread belief that they could gain much satisfaction through engaging the rich “monsieurs” who controlled the system.

117 Paul-Emile Debraux, “Ne parlons pas politique,” in Chansons Complètes, 56.
Songwriters could counsel their friends to ignore politics, but the Restoration’s active public sphere made such advice hard to follow. The press, in particular, fed on political acrimony and publicized partisan divisiveness to generate readers. As literate members of the underclass, songwriters in all likelihood could not avoid coming across and digesting the political news of the day. The press therefore came under attack in several *goguette* songs because it fueled the elites’ political contestation. In their song *Je n’en veux plus [I Want No More of It]*, Tournemine and Hippolyte Leroy expressed their frustrations with political journals. “In our periodical works, / If I saw nothing on morals,” they wrote, “I have of a hundred political speeches, / Deplored the sad colors…And I said: / Each writing / That one reads / Offers, under the name brochure, / But a dictionary of abuse / I want no more of them.”

Sometimes songwriters did not distinguish between politicians and the press, especially because many deputies also wrote articles or published speeches in partisan journals. Songwriter Louis Voitelain thought that when politicians had access to the press, it highlighted how the two sides contradicted each other and ended up vitiating their arguments. “Ultras, liberals, / Proclaim they are for the good cause; / And in their speeches, / Each paints his system in pink,” he explained, “….All is written in the name of France. / How these writers / Good God, are liars.”

Leroy, however, berated journalists, and even suggested that they *caused* the great divide in society. He wrote, “And you also, Messieurs the journalists, / In my opinion, how deaf you are; / You grow the lists of the factious, / You lose yourselves in wicked speeches; / Quit, quit your sterile quill, / Through chansons terminate

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your trials.”  

It is interesting to note, however, that none of the songwriters complained about the great number of their songs that made their way into the same journals they condemned. These songs, as we have seen, were equally capable of exacerbating the political situation.

Working-class songwriters wrote their share of incendiary political works, but they also attacked the “spirit of party” and called on elite members of the government to place the nation before their political affiliations. Songwriter Casimir Josselin, for instance, condemned state officials for bringing divisive party politics to their jobs. “Judges, sometimes in your decisions / The demon of parties presides,” he lamented, “You, deputies, in your decrees, / This fatal god also directs you.” Many songwriters attacked anyone who purposely adopted the label of “liberal” or “ultra,” because these terms kept people from identifying first with the nation. The lyricist Comédon thought that privileging factional identity prevented the nation from enjoying the promised peace of the new age. He reminded politicians that “We tear at our cherished mother, / With the names of ultras and liberals. / No more parties, may honor rally us /… / Let us cry out less strongly, and be good Frenchmen.”

Pradel echoed this sentiment in his song, *Conseils aux ultras et libéraux* [Advice to Ultras and Liberals], and reminded politicians that “From deadly divisions / Follow revolutions.” “Wouldn’t it be better to love one another?” he asked, “Liberals, ultras, let’s end our miseries

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We are French, we must live as brothers.” Exclusion from formal politics lent an air of authenticity to leftist songwriters who articulated this common theme of unity. Although they were as responsible for political bile in the public sphere as any other sector of society, by not participating in the system they could ostensibly claim that they were above the vicious politics that kept France from healing.

Working-class songwriters may have written numerous songs about French solidarity because they understood that the lower classes always suffered most when politics turned bitter and divisive. With no formal outlet for the expression of political beliefs, working class activists could not hide behind the mantle of political legitimacy that shielded most upper class liberals, and met instead with violent reprisals and prosecution when they tried to voice political opinions on the street. Achille Fosset described the price that members of the working class often paid for being politically active in his song, *Les conseilleurs ne sont pas les payeurs* [The Givers of Advice Don’t Pay the Price]. Fosset wrote, “I found myself in a crowd, / Someone said to me, cry Vive La Charte, / Me, I cheerfully obeyed right away, / Soon afterward, two infamous thugs, / While punching me, for the price of my clamors, / made me see that for popular commotions, / The givers of advice don’t pay the price.” On the street, political differences led to violence. When prodded to voice political positions in public, members of the urban working class exposed themselves to violent retribution, public condemnation, and prosecution. It is little wonder that many wary songwriters chose to avoid the partisan fracas.

Ultimately, detachment from the political world increased songwriters’ belief in the superior patriotism of the working class. Protected from accusations of private or party interest by their lack of access to the political system, working-class songwriters believed they could speak for the French nation better than partisan politicians could. Debraux, for example, sang, “I never praised power, / I never praised parties; / In all times, my voice was for France.” Dauphin too claimed in his song, La vie du bon laboureur [Life of the Happy Laborer], that disinterest in politics was the working person’s greatest virtue because it fostered a love for the nation unsullied by partisanship. “To civil discords, / In all times the stranger,” he wrote, “Near to servile flatterers / He cannot draw up. / Sensitive to suffering / Of the patrie in tears, / He only sees France, / And not the colors.” Dauphin portrayed the working person as a pure patriot, allied to no one but compatriots and devoted to the patrie before self-interest.

Retaining memories of their agency during the Revolution and excluded for the moment from the formal political world, urban shopkeepers, soldiers, artisans, and clerks waited for their influence to rebound. Elites conducted their politics largely unconcerned about how the working class would react, but in the event the lower class rediscovered its political muscle, songwriter Bonichon-Beaugrand warned, “In political matters, / Prudence is better than spirit /… / Men of state take guard, / Do not wake the sleeping cat.” The “cat” that eventually awoke in 1830 had not been idle through the political turbulence of the Restoration. The working class spent fifteen years as witness to political contestation in

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which it could not join, but which helped it recognize its exclusion from the post-revolutionary settlement and develop new models of social cohesion. Working-class songwriters were not immune to partisanship, indeed they identified with many of the assumptions behind elite liberals’ ideology. But the contrast between discord at the top of society and solidarity in their *goguettes* helped the working-class songwriters envision post-revolutionary France outside the parameters of liberal and ultra contestation—a society founded on the principle of lower-class unity.

“In me had been born the hope / Of one day seeing the parties die out;” François Dauphin wrote in 1821, “But hiding under an enthusiastic air, / I hear hatred buzzing around.”  

128 While many songwriters tried to distance themselves from the Restoration’s formal politics, few actually offered political solutions in their songs that could heal sociopolitical polarization. When they voiced their most common ideal for the nation comprised of an autonomous people, they alienated conservatives and only exacerbated the division in society. In time, their vision became even more radical as it coalesced around working-class identity and solidarity, further widening the gulf between the Left and Right. The July Revolution, a movement that temporarily merged working-class and elite liberal interests, ushered in an equally contentious and divisive era of French politics. After this brief period of enthusiasm, the great dividing line in post-revolutionary society merely shifted, creating new conservative elites from the Restoration’s moderate liberals and opening a space for more class-conscious politics on the Left. Urban workers after 1830 continued to sing for the disenfranchised, giving voice to a post-revolutionary utopia of

workers, wine, and song that stood in stark contrast to the exclusivity of the elite political world.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has placed one artistic medium, songs and singing, in the context of Restoration politics and the frames that divided the nation. When people sang in groups outside of formal performance during this period, they took part in a political activity regardless of the content of songs. Where they sang, what they sang, the makeup of their singing groups, the tenor of their voices, the comportment of singers, and the tunes over which they sang their lyrics all contributed to creating unique political statements with multiple interpretive possibilities. These many instances of singing all emerged in a political environment, the main feature of which was a widely shared sense of national division.

People made sense of their political world partly by interpreting incidents of singing and songs according to the preexisting polarized frames in currency. Singing thus engaged the divided polity, reifying the main feature of Restoration political discourse by creating groups who glorified different, and controversial, conceptions of society in their songs. Songs and singing created a feedback loop with the hegemonic discourse of division, voicing divisive sentiments of their own, reacting to or mirroring elite rhetoric, or rejecting altogether the politics of contestation of the day. Even this last response did little to bring the two sides together but rather alienated all those who valued the Restoration’s political system.

This chapter has featured four general types of songs: Radical songs of the street spread outright sedition and blasphemy, angering conservatives and alienating moderates, and encouraging the Right to assess the Left broadly as unfit for political inclusion. Royalist songs, some officially sanctioned by the government and others published independently,
although varied in the degree of their reactionary sentiments, all parroted the main tenets of right-wing ideology. More moderate or at least circumspect leftist songs from the *goguettes* promoted many of the same ideas as elite liberals, but brought working-class prejudices and sensitivities into the left-wing political message. Finally, a wide selection of songs from the *goguettes* eschewed political life altogether and called for national unity inspired by the same feelings of class solidarity that animated their singing societies. The common element in all of these genres is that each contributed in some way to further polarizing the French polity.

Using songs as a window into Restoration contestation reveals some of the ways in which the frames of a divided nation affected cultural media, class, and the larger narrative of modern French history. Songs and singing were just one of the cultural forms that promoted political ideas. Like artists in visual arts, poetry, and drama, songwriters came under the influence of post-revolutionary polarization and divided into two main camps. The tension between Romanticism and Neo-classicism in literature and the theater, and in other areas of cultural life, may have been the most self-evident and explicitly discussed area in which post-revolutionary political dualism entered the arts, but no other art form was as popular as singing. This exploration of songs helps make the case for the persistence of polarization in French society. By looking, in particular, at the songs from the *goguettes*, the ways in which class differences changed the way people understood and managed political discourse comes into better focus. On one level, it seems clear that Restoration France was divided into two camps, but this heuristic simplification of post-revolutionary French politics did not preclude variety in the political sentiments of either side.

One significant variation in the broad ideological divide of the Restoration is found in the era’s working-class milieu. The prejudices and priorities of the lower class colored its
political engagement. Members of the working class were as susceptible as any other sector of society to imagining the nation as hopelessly divided between those who accepted and those who rejected the Revolution, but they viewed this division through the lens of their increasingly destabilized urban life, and accordingly highlighted class injustice as the root cause of France’s bifurcation. This class parameter suggests that political division had creative and responsive elements. Division was not a static condition and led to new visions of social cohesion for the nation. When working-class songwriters rejected elite partisanship, they opened a space for a new vision of leftist solidarity built on recognition of lower-class consciousness and social cohesion. This development, however, did not alter the idea of a permanently divided nation. Industrial-era socialists may have become the new far-Left of the nineteenth century, but in the eyes of their political enemies, they were still the “great other” of the Revolution.
Conclusion

French Polarization and the Lessons of Democracy

Coping with Polarization in France

Modern American presidential campaigns are filled with stories about the personal characteristics of the candidates, but, in the minds of millions of Americans the candidates are merely stand-ins for pre-existing ideological positions. Most Republicans and Democrats vote for their party’s candidate regardless of the individual at the top of the ballot. With few exceptions, each party’s members make their decisions based on hardwired political frames and expect their opponents to do the same. For modern Americans, the idea of a divided nation is not news; it is the normal condition of society, regardless of occasional complaints about the corrosive effects of partisanship. Similar patterns of party identification and divided electorates appear in almost all contemporary democracies.

During the Restoration period, French citizens likewise grew accustomed to division in their nation. But for them the process of adjustment was more difficult and noteworthy. During the preceding twenty-five years they had witnessed destruction on a scale unseen since the Thirty-Years War. Most people therefore accepted the Restoration government and its promise of peace, but they were unready for the sociopolitical and cultural practices that would develop as contending political groups used the new political institutions, the press, and the streets of France to expound their rival ideas of the nation. In arenas as diverse as the assembly hall and the street, the French confronted post-revolutionary divisions. The idea of division fueled military initiatives such as the intervention in Spain and made politicians like
Benjamin Constant founded in the face of unstoppable political polarization. But it also helped people identify their national political values in their choice of associates and the songs they sang together; and the political conflicts forced the opposing groups to formulate strategies for success in a divided political world. National political division, in short, provided a framework for understanding the nation and for taking part in its political and social life.

Political polarization has persisted in France since the fall of the Bourbon Monarchy in the Revolution of 1830. With each subsequent regime change in the nineteenth century, the categories of Left and Right simply migrated along the ideological spectrum in both directions. Individuals and groups realigned on either side of the great divide or formed new sub-categories within each side. After 1830, for example, *doctrinaire* liberals, allied with leftists at the end of the Restoration, became the backbone of the Center-Right monarchical government, ultras became legitimists on the far-Right of the political spectrum, and the remaining liberals splintered into Bonapartist, republican, and socialist groups in the oppositional Left. Ideological principles also shifted to the Left or Right, with some concepts (for example, popular sovereignty) gaining acceptance in public opinion and others (for example, monarchical government) losing popular support. While right-wing ideologies occasionally regained their popularity during particular regimes (e.g., the early Second Empire) and circumstances (e.g., the Dreyfus case), overall, the French polity and state moved to the left over the course of the nineteenth century. By 1900, for example, only far-Right fringe elements still championed absolutism, the centrist governments of the Third Republic had embraced republican principles wholesale, and egalitarian socialist principles that were unacceptable or unimagined during the Restoration had become mainstays of the
French Left. Despite these shifts along the Left/Right spectrum, the polarized paradigm remained. At any specific point in time during these shifts, people who followed politics could identify the political actors to their right and left.¹

This movement along the scale of political identity for individuals and for the nation as a whole was a prolonged response to the legacy of the Revolution. The enduring concepts of the Left and Right helped French people negotiate and make sense of political change, providing a stable framework throughout changes in the sociopolitical world that occurred with each new regime. The categories that defined the political scale in ideological terms may have derived largely from pre-revolutionary and revolutionary contexts, but Restoration conflicts inscribed these concepts together in people’s minds as the normative model of political alignment.

The case studies in this dissertation all point to trends that have continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The tension between the two competing ideological frames of the nation described in Chapter One, namely paternal/Christian absolutism versus popular sovereignty, drove the narrative of nineteenth-century French political history. With the fall of Vichy France, absolutism lost its appeal in French society, but right-wing parties in France still identify with the Restoration ultras’ emphasis on order before freedom. Other Restoration-era themes have also persisted. Grégoire’s and Manuel’s expulsions from the Chamber of Deputies, for example, both drew on the categories of belonging and exclusion that shape ideal conceptions of the nation. This process of domestic “othering” reared its ugly head again with the rise of anti-Semitic right-wing politics in the Third Republic and often accompanied broader complaints about the illegitimacy and unsuitability of the republican

¹ Alain de Benoist suggested in 1995 that this paradigm is no longer relevant to France’s contemporary politics. I, however, find these common sentiments of the early post-Cold War era somewhat premature. See, Alain de Benoist, “The End of the Left-Right Dichotomy: The French Case,” in Telos, 102 (1995):545-557.
form of government for the French people. The Dreyfus affair was thus both a debate about
the nation and another case of expulsion based on the “political frames” of national
belonging and exclusion.

During the Spanish War in 1823 liberals and ultras clashed over two different
concepts of French nationalism; and each group used ideal notions of national identity to
define France’s role in the world. These nationalist discourses have driven French foreign
and domestic policy since the Restoration. The liberal/civic and illiberal/ethnic nationalism
that liberals and ultras adopted in 1823 still have support in France. The French state itself
has long identified with the liberal model and has used civic conceptions of the nation to
justify its program of colonial assimilation and promote the domestic assimilation of
immigrants. But one need only look at the history of the French state’s actual treatment of
immigrants or read the statements of recent political leaders like Jean-Marie Le Pen to know
that ethnic, right-wing nationalism is alive and well in France. The contemporary immigrant
populations in France who have been left out of the process of French nation building would
no doubt understand the feeling of marginalization expressed in the goguette songs in
Chapter Five. Just like the urban workers of the Restoration, disenfranchised immigrants
have often turned music—such as the rappers MC Solaar and Sinik—to express their
dissatisfaction with a regime that does not welcome their voices or offer them any acceptable
political model of national belonging.

The French people have continued to use ideologically-specific political frames of the
nation to understand national sociopolitical phenomena and events and voice their reactions
to them. But they also have continued to bring polarizing language and the frame of national
division to their interpretations of the world and their actions in it. Polarization is the tie that
binds partisan identities together in the context of specific events, and it thus provides continuity in French politics. Although polarization creates a certain internal political stability, it can also threaten the very state mechanisms that permit it to develop and to filter down into society.

Throughout the nineteenth century and through much of the twentieth, the French state tried to mitigate the detrimental effects of internal polarization through external imperialist distractions and international competition. France’s nineteenth-century colonial efforts, in fact, began partly as an attempt to calm the Restoration’s polarized polity. Twenty-five days before the end of the Restoration, Marshal Bourmont landed at Sidi Ferruch in Algeria at the head of a French army. Both Charles X and the head of his ministry, Polignac, had promoted the invasion of Algiers to distract French public opinion from the government’s increasing unpopularity. The ultra government’s military efforts came too late to save the regime, but the army it sent to Algeria remained for over a century. Unlike the 1823 French intervention in Spain, a country whose internal political dynamics reminded the French people of their own domestic situation, the invasion of Algeria and the colonial project that followed offered an outlet for national glory outside of Europe’s political, social, and ethnic frameworks. Colonialism allowed political rivals to support the international projection of French power in concert and provided the French with a new, specific “other” whom people on both sides of the post-revolutionary divide considered uncivilized. Although individual French politicians of all persuasions voiced reservations about the colonial project, and some domestic rivalries migrated to the colonies, most members of both camps backed France’s imperial ambitions.² French people by and large believed that all of them,

² The exportation of France’s internal conflict between the clergy and the state is covered in J.P. Daughton’s recent work on missionaries in the Third Republic. He writes, “…civilizing policies were
regardless of their political affiliations, were inherently superior to the indigenous populations of the colonies.

The sense of cultural superiority that unified the French people when they encountered other ethnic groups also emerged when they confronted other Western nations. The longstanding and nearly universal French ambivalence to the influences of Britain and America, however, has never been strong enough to overcome domestic polarization. Nor have the French entirely resisted “Anglo-Saxon” influences in political, social, and cultural thought.3 Indeed, France’s own mirroring and rejection of English parliamentarianism during the Restoration crept into the era’s polarized debates on the nature of government, and no clear ideological lines divided anglophiles from anglophobes. The flexibility that the French have always brought to their “othering” of the Anglo-Saxon model of society and government, demonstrates how French people of all persuasions have used Britain and America as foils for understanding themselves. This introspective comparison between nations has increased the social cohesion of France, even if some have bemoaned their nation’s lack of progress compared to Britain or America or disparaged the intrusion of those nations’ perversely “un-French” way of life into French society. Political cohesion against an external other was far simpler in the case of Germany’s immediate military threat between the years 1870 and 1940, and it reached its height in the union sacrée between the Left and Right during World War One. However, while external “others” of rival nation-states have

periodically distracted the French from their internal disunity, the dislike or fear of other nations has never fully supplanted the paradigm of internal division in France.

With the advent of the Third Republic’s parliamentary government, French political actors also discovered the virtues of formal party organization as a means of compartmentalizing political polarization and, in the process, reduced its destructive potential. The United States embraced political polarization in the nineteenth century and the Republican and Democratic Parties have become nearly synonymous with government. In France, on the other hand, a multi-party system developed under the Third Republic, and multiple parties on the Left and Right continue to influence French politics to this day. Despite the proliferation of parties in modern France, however, the bipolar structure of ideologies has never disappeared. The Left and Right in France have simply subdivided into groups with different ideological priorities and political cultures. Instead of acting on the grand scale of dual (and dueling) abstractions, French politicians of the Third Republic divided into multiple interest groups, each capable of effective engagement in the political system. Although this process of splitting grand ideological constructs into smaller more tactically efficient bodies relieved some of the tensions of abstract polarization, the pervasive sense of national division persisted in the emergence of political parties. Indeed, the fragmentation of ideological interests into new parties actually sustained the sense of national division even as it made the division less disruptive within a functioning representative political system.

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democracy. Significantly, the party system in France preserved the Left/Right paradigm because each splinter party typically focused on one or more aspects of the commonly held left-wing or right-wing ideological conceptions of the nation. Certainly few French people who pay attention to national politics would shy away from using the broad post-revolutionary categories of Left and Right that animated Restoration political culture to describe the two principal national political subcultures in their nation. Today, as I have suggested, these generalizations still draw on the political frames that the French internalized during the Restoration.

**That Familiar Feeling**

I began this project in September 2002, one year after the attacks on September 11, 2001 which had temporarily unified a shocked United States. By 2002, this unity had already dissolved as Democrats and Republicans moved toward their familiar ideological poles to debate the post-9/11 nation and its role in the world. These political battles between the two parties became a monumental struggle to define the very essence of the American nation. Categories of national exclusion and belonging filled the popular political press, painting all elections as ultimate decisions on American identity. Partisanship in America, although not a new phenomenon, is now inescapable; it has marshaled all the resources of mass media and consumer culture to propagate political division in all areas of human life. People now routinely ascribe political affiliations to a variety of ostensibly non-political aspects of life.

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6 As Hanley writes, “Today the left/right polarity seems unavoidable insofar as it is based on the existence of two recognizable sub-cultures.” Ibid., 179.

7 Reading the titles in the political section of the contemporary American bookstore is to come face-to-face with the polarizing exclusivity and political xenophobia that characterizes partisanship run amok. See, for example, Ann Coulter, *Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism* (Pittsburgh: Three Rivers Press, 2004), and Michael Moore, *Stupid White Men ...and Other Sorry Excuses for the State of the Nation!* (New York: Harper, 2002), among hundreds of other provocative titles from the popular political press published in the last eight years.
The car one drives, the food one eats, the church one attends, the people with whom one associates, and even the way in which people raise their families all have become aspects of political identity that situate one on the Left or Right.

My point in recalling these recent American divisions is to emphasize the overarching effects of polarizing discourse on society. Although historians must separate the present from the past, the similarities between the discourses of Restoration France and contemporary America were too salient for me to ignore as I conducted my research. In 2003, for example, when the United States prepared to go to war in Iraq, I was reading about the 1823 intervention in Spain. During both periods, proponents of war employed similar arguments about the reasons for invasion: military action was needed to remove an imminent threat to the nation, and the invasion would ensure the development of a favorable political ideology in an important region of the world. Opponents claimed that the invasion would threaten international stability and fundamentally contravene the principles that had kept civilized nations from preemptively interfering in the internal affairs of other nations. These debates about military action drew on and fed the polarized discourse in both eras, strengthening the widely-shared political frame that assumed the inevitability of conflict between two fundamentally incompatible visions of the nation.

The differences between politics in contemporary America and Restoration France, of course, far outweigh the similarities. The United States is a long-established modern republic with strong centralized and democratic institutions. Most of its citizens accept the government’s legitimacy and view its institutions as ostensibly neutral sites for politics. Restoration France, on the other hand, could hardly be called a modern democracy. Its limited electorate, its institutionalized class structures, and of course, its monarchical head of
state all differed from a modern conception of democracy. In addition, Restoration politicians and citizens could not agree on the fundamental source of legitimacy behind the government and its Constitutional Charter, if they believed in the legitimacy of a constitutional monarchy at all. Modern mass media also makes politics in contemporary America a much more intrusive experience than it was during the Restoration, exponentially amplifying the number of political spaces and events. But the mechanics of the human mind have not changed, and considering the common frameworks that encouraged polarization and division in Restoration France can contribute to understanding the significance of polarizing frames today.

In modern America, as in Restoration France, political discourse emerged as a battle between two sets of assumptions about moral legitimacy in society and government. The divisive political opinions expressed in both eras have inhered in the mind as strongly rooted moral constructs that define both personal and collective identities. In both eras, religious and moral influences have given the political ideologies of both sides a sense of authenticity. During the French Restoration, in particular, unresolved religious and moral differences merged with ideological concepts of government to form two opposed sociopolitical camps and cultures. Liberals and leftists spoke of the people in terms that dripped with Rousseauean spiritual sentimentality. Ultraroyalists, for their part, adorned their absolutism with an apostolic stamp of authority. Religious intolerance thus also made its way into the practice of French democracy during the Restoration. Through the liberals’ embrace of anticlericalism, and the ultras’ insistence on restoring the Catholic Church’s relevance to French

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8 Considering the neural link between language and emotion cognitive centers in the brain, the concept of emotional legitimacy posited by George Lakoff and Drew Westen seems particularly applicable to this phenomenon. See, George Lakoff, *The Political Mind: Why We Can’t Understand Twenty-First Century Politics with an Eighteenth-Century Brain* (New York: Viking Press, 2008), and Drew Westen, *The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).
society, religious views became political sentiments that further fuelled the rival factions’ commitments to ultimate political victory rather than compromise. Religious and moral prejudices made the creation of an internal political “other” easier by blending exclusionary rhetoric with longstanding justifications for intolerance.

Nascent democracy itself brought its own exclusionary dynamic to the Restoration political world. Both ultras and liberals claimed the support of public opinion when they won elections to representative bodies and enacted new policies. Each group, when it had the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, assumed the people were behind them and conjured up the righteous wrath of an imagined nation to attack the minority in policies, poems, and pamphlets. Because they dominated the government for most of the Restoration, ultras best displayed this hybrid of democracy and intolerant exclusion. Operating from key positions of power, the ultras excluded their enemies from the polity through quasi-legal measures and justified their actions by claiming the right of the majority. Although they railed against the perfidious influence of unfettered democracy, they often adopted the Jacobins’ language and methods, bringing exclusion to state institutions through legislation and the manipulation of established rules of political conduct, and justifying exclusion as a legitimate tactic in the literary sphere. Although liberals were more conciliatory in their language, they were equally guilty of using moral self-righteousness to brand their opponents as unfit for inclusion in the

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10 It may be that Democracy maintains the culture of expulsion through the legal framework of elections. Elections heighten the indignation of those in the losing party while bolstering the confidence of the winners, and thus do little to mitigate the desire in some segments of the population to rid themselves permanently of their internal enemies. What usually follows a transfer of power through democratic processes is a backlash aimed at abrogating the opposing, losing side’s gains over the course of their administration. Electoral victory impinges not only on new policy—an understandable correction for the winners to initiate—but in extreme cases it also creates a strong sense of vindicated legitimacy in the newly elected majority.
nation. Indeed, the liberals who assumed power in 1830 wasted little time in employing the exclusionary tactics which ultras had used repeatedly during the Restoration. Examining politics in the Restoration thus sheds light on the inability of many, and particularly emerging, democratic regimes to reconcile their ideas of legitimate government with a loyal opposition. This problem to some extent also plagues modern America and definitely hinders the consolidation of democracy in the contemporary developing world; in short, people often see their political opponents as a profound danger to their own interests and the nation.\textsuperscript{11}

The characteristics of political practice outlined in this dissertation may seem commonplace to the modern reader. They are the recognizable symptoms of partisanship. Democracy, despite its often beneficial implications for individual liberty, slyly obscures the reality of contestation within it—in practice, democratic elections and policies can frequently become vehicles for banishing political rivals and their ideas from active participation in the polity. The competing ideologies in democratic societies are more than rhetoric; they shape fundamental frameworks of individual consciousness, and as such, are by nature uncompromising. Winning an election will not win over people’s minds; only the adoption of new frames can fully supplant deeply embedded ideologies. The process of reframing is long and difficult, and it typically leads to an equally exclusive new framework. Such reframings occur only rarely because of the moral convictions with which people cling to their ideological positions. The fervid partisan tone of politics in the Restoration or in contemporary America strengthens exclusive ideological frames and makes it extremely difficult to reach compromise between groups with opposed and deeply held convictions.

\textsuperscript{11} For the difficulties that encumbered the implementation of French democracy in the nineteenth century see, Serge Bernstein et al., \textit{L’Invention de la Démocratie, 1789-1914} (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 2002). For the problems in instituting democracy in non-democratic societies see, Larry Diamond, \textit{Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
The short-term secret to conducting politics effectively in a democracy is to understand how opposing camps frame their socio-political worlds and to speak within those frames to explain policy initiatives. In the long run, new political frames will slowly gain strength only when they resonate with significant aspects of pre-existing moral frameworks.

I did not write this dissertation, however, to expound on the weaknesses of modern democracy or to suggest strategies for conducting politics, but rather to understand how polarization in one nascent quasi-democratic society affected national identity. In the end, I have come to believe that national identity must be understood as a dynamic process for study rather than as a static subject for study. To speak of national identity in broad and uncomplicated terms is to misunderstand its meaning as individuals actually live it. This foray into Restoration political culture has demonstrated that understanding the nation in a democratic society requires understanding how national cultures are created through the languages of competing political frames. The nation exists both in the mind and in the world when these frames are employed to voice opinions, craft or support enactment of policies, and respond to events. When people act on their political convictions, they naturally employ frames through which they understand the nation, and they usually expect opposition.

Real, practical national identity evolves through this process of contestation. Conflict endows political frames with vitality and strengthens individuals’ sense of moral certitude in their political convictions. When people adopt an identity, they implicitly and sometimes explicitly reject other options in the social world. Through this rejection, however, they create a rubric for belonging and not belonging that helps define the parameters of national identity. The Revolution provided a basic outline for all future political contestation in France by dividing political life between the Left and Right, but the Restoration turned this
dichotomy into a stable, enduring system of political, social, and cultural oppositions that the French people have constantly used and redefined ever since.
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