CHALLENGING OBSERVED PREJUDICE: TESTING THE ROLES OF GOAL INTENTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS

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ABSTRACT

Keenan M. Jenkins: Challenging observed prejudice: Testing the roles of goal intentions and implementation intentions
(Under the direction of Paschal Sheeran)

Confronting prejudice is an effective way to reduce further prejudice, especially when that confrontation comes from an observer. Past research has shown that observers of prejudice often fail to confront, and numerous studies examine the reasons why people fail to confront. However, there is little research on how to increase rates of observer confrontation. Research on self-regulation suggests that implementation intentions – if-then plans to automatize behavior in response to situational cues – are an effective way to bridge the gap between intentions and behaviors; this should also hold true when it comes to bridging the gap between intending to and actually confronting prejudice. One hundred thirty-eight White participants completed an online survey in which they received an implementation intention, a goal intention, or no intention to confront prejudice. In a behavioral follow-up, participants were given the opportunity to verbally confront a White confederate whom they heard make a racially prejudiced remark about a Black confederate. Subsequently, participants were asked to choose one of the confederates for a partner task. Results from hierarchical logistic regressions showed that goal intentions, rather than implementation intentions, led to an increase in rates of verbal confrontation. However, neither goal intentions nor implementations affected partner choice. Across all conditions, over 75% of participants selected the Black confederate as a partner, suggesting a ceiling effect. The results suggest that in the domain of confronting prejudice, goal intentions suffice, whereas implementation intentions may induce deliberation at the critical moment.
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INTRODUCTION

If we accept and acquiesce in the face of discrimination, we accept the responsibility ourselves. We should, therefore, protest openly everything … that smacks of discrimination or slander.

– Mary McLeod Bethune, *What the Negro Wants*, 1944

Minorities face prejudice frequently (Kessler, Mickelson, & Williams, 1999; Seaton, Caldwell, Sellers, & Jackson, 2008) – at both the systematic level (e.g., laws and policies that disproportionately and disadvantageously affect Black Americans) and the interpersonal level (e.g., prejudiced comments). There is a large literature devoted to laboratory methods of reducing both explicit and implicit prejudice (e.g., Lai, Hoffman, & Nosek, 2013; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Vescio, Secrhist, & Paolucci, 2003; for a review, see Paluck & Green, 2009). However, one understudied behavioral means of prejudice reduction is *confronting prejudice*. Confronting prejudice is the act of “verbally or nonverbally expressing one’s dissatisfaction with prejudicial and discriminatory treatment to the person who is responsible for making the remark or behavior” (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006, p. 67) and is known to be effective in reducing subsequent expressions of prejudice (e.g., Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006; Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Dickter, Kittel, & Gyurovski, 2012; Mallet & Wagner, 2011).

Previous research on confronting prejudice has mostly examined the prevalence of confrontation and reasons why people fail to confront prejudice, rather than suggesting ways to encourage people to confront prejudice. The current dissertation begins by examining this past research on confronting prejudice – specifically, the reasons that targets (i.e., people toward whom prejudice is directed) and observers often fail to confront perpetrators (i.e., those who
exhibit prejudice), as well as the effectiveness of observer confrontation (i.e., confrontation by those who witness prejudice). Next, I borrow from self-regulation research on bridging the gap between intentions and behavior to guide my hypothesis that an implementation intention intervention should increase rates of confronting prejudice. Then, this hypothesis is subjected to an empirical test using a longitudinal, behavioral study conducted over two sessions.

**Existing Research on Confronting Prejudice**

Research has suggested that confronting prejudice is an effective way to reduce subsequent prejudice. Czopp and colleagues (2006) found that after being confronted about their prejudice, perpetrators showed less stereotyping on subsequent tasks and reported less prejudiced attitudes. Similarly, men are more likely to point out sexist language and engage in compensatory behavior after being confronted about their sexism (Mallett & Wagner, 2011).

What makes confronting prejudice effective? Research by Czopp and Monteith (2003) suggests that confronting prejudice elicits guilt in perpetrators. The Self-Regulation of Prejudice model (Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002; Monteith, Mark, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2010) suggests that guilt is one of the many types of self-directed negative affect that leads to the regulation (i.e., suppression) of prejudiced responses. Further, observer confrontation reduces prejudice by emphasizing a norm of anti-prejudice. Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, and Vaughn (1994) found that when one person expresses disagreement with prejudiced attitudes, other bystanders also expressed more anti-prejudice attitudes (see also Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Crandall & Stangor, 2005; McDonald & Crandall, 2015).

Even though confronting prejudice is an effective way to reduce prejudice, it is an uncommon occurrence. Past research suggests that when people have the opportunity to confront prejudice, they do so less than 50% of the time whether they are targets (e.g., Hyers, 2007; Swim
& Hyers, 1999; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001) or observers of the respective prejudice (e.g., Dickter & Newton, 2013). Even when people predict that they will confront prejudice, they fail to do so when given the opportunity (e.g., Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009; Shelton & Stewart, 2004). Targets may not confront prejudice if they believe that their challenge will not be effective (Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2012; Rattan & Dweck, 2010) – that is, they believe it will not change the perpetrator’s prejudiced attitudes. Further, targets may face negative interpersonal consequences if they confront (Shelton & Stewart, 2004). Targets of prejudice who confront the perpetrator may be disliked (Czopp et al., 2006), or labeled as complainers (Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003), overreactors (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), or rude (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Confrontations by targets are “likely to be taken less seriously and discounted as a typical and trivial cry of prejudice” (Czopp & Monteith, 2003, p. 542).

Similarly, observers often fail to confront prejudice because they anticipate high response costs; they fear negative evaluations from perpetrators and other observers (i.e., being perceived as rude or impolite), and they fear negative interpersonal consequences such as retaliation from the perpetrator (Dickter, 2012; Dickter & Newton, 2013). However, these fears, which decrease observers’ motivation to confront prejudice, are unfounded. In fact, the response costs of observer confrontation are low; observers who confront prejudice garner more respect and are better liked than observers who do not confront (Dickter et al., 2012; Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Gulker, Mark, & Monteith, 2013). Observers are also more effective at reducing prejudice than are targets who confront (Dickter et al., 2012; Drury & Kaiser, 2014; but see also Czopp et al., 2006). The burden of confronting prejudice is often placed on the targets of prejudice, even though their claims of discrimination are usually dismissed. Rasinski and Czopp (2010)
suggested that observer confrontation is surprising (i.e., observers have no vested interest in confronting prejudice), which may make such confrontation more effective. Further, Czopp and Monteith (2003) stated that observer confrontation “elicited more guilt from participants yet simultaneously made them feel less tense and uneasy than a target’s confrontation. Although (and perhaps because) they are surprising, observer confrontations may provide a nonthreatening atmosphere for recipients to appreciate the confrontation message” (p. 542).

Inclined Abstainers: The Failure to Follow Through on Intentions

A meta-analysis of meta-analyses by Sheeran (2002) found that intentions only account for 28% of the variance in future behavior, indicating a gap between intentions and behavior. Similarly, Gollwitzer’s (1990; 2010) mindset theory of action phases suggests that being motivated to act does not necessarily spur action. Sheeran (2002; see also Sheeran & Orbell, 2000) suggested that inclined actors (i.e., people who intend to act and then do so) and inclined abstainers (i.e., people who intend to act and then fail to do so) do not significantly differ on intentions, attitudes, subjective norms, or perceived behavioral control. This indicates that while intentions may be consistent across actors and abstainers, intentions alone are not enough to predict behavior.

This intention-behavior gap exists with respect to confronting prejudice – that is, a number have studies have shown that intentions to confront prejudice do not predict actual confrontation of prejudice. For example, Brinkman, Garcia, and Rickard (2011) found that women self-reported wanting to confront prejudice more often than they reported actually doing so. Research by Shelton and Stewart (2004) suggests that individuals cannot accurately forecast their actions regarding confronting prejudice. In Study 1, women read a hypothetical scenario in which a man asked them sexist questions or offensive/non-sexist questions during a job
interview. Despite the social costs involved with confronting, women reported that they were more likely to confront the sexist interviewer than the offensive/non-sexist interviewer. In a subsequent behavioral study, women participated in an in-person job interview. Even though women in the first study predicted that they would confront a sexist interviewer, women in Study 2 were less likely to confront the sexist interviewer when the social costs were high (i.e., when women were told to imagine that the job was important, well-paying, and prestigious). Woodzicka and LaFrance (2001) found similar results when examining women’s responses to imagined versus actual sexual harassment during job interviews.

When it comes to confronting prejudice, being an inclined abstainer can lead to a number of intrapersonal consequences. Rasinski, Geers, and Czopp (2013) found that when people who value confronting fail to act in the face of prejudice, they experience cognitive dissonance, which they attempt to vanquish by subsequently devaluing confronting or positively evaluating the perpetrator. Shelton and colleagues (2006) found that failing to confront prejudice can also lead to self-directed negative affect (e.g., guilt, shame) and increased rumination.

Observers of prejudice, like targets, are also susceptible to this discrepancy between desired and actual confronting behaviors. Kawakami and colleagues (2009) found that observers significantly overestimated the amount of negative affect they would feel in response to overhearing a prejudiced comment; further, observers overestimated the extent to which they would ostracize the perpetrator. Crosby and Wilson (2015) found that not only do observers overestimate their negative affect and ostracism, but they also overestimated the extent to which they would confront a homophobic slur.

Why does this gap persist? Observers may anticipate negative interpersonal consequences (Dickter & Newton, 2013) or social costs (e.g., Shelton & Stewart, 2004) of confronting, and
change their minds about confronting at the critical moment. Further, people overestimate how negatively they will feel when they overhear a prejudiced remark, and thus may fail to confront prejudice when the opportunity arises because they do not feel as bad about the prejudice as they had anticipated (e.g., Crosby & Wilson, 2015; Kawakami et al., 2009). Thus, self-regulatory problems that were not anticipated at the time of forming the intention to confront prejudice (e.g., changing one’s mind about confronting, not feeling upset like one had expected) can undermine the translation of one’s intention to confront into action.

**Bridging the Intention-Behavioral Gap with Implementation Intentions**

To increase the likelihood of converting intentions into behavior, goal intentions can be supplemented with *implementation intentions* (Gollwitzer, 1999). An implementation intention is an “if-then plan specifying when, where, and how the person will instigate responses that promote goal realization” (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, p. 70). These if-then plans link a goal intention (“I intend to confront prejudice!”) to a critical situation and a response that will be effective in realizing that intention (e.g., “If I hear someone make a prejudiced remark, then I will calmly confront the person – I will ask, ‘What did you mean by that?’”). A number of meta-analyses have indicated that supplementing goal intentions with implementation intentions significantly improves rates of goal attainment (e.g., Adriaanse, Vinkers, De Ridder, Hox, & De Wit, 2011; Bélanger-Gravel, Godin, & Amireault, 2013; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Sheeran, 2002). Implementation intentions predict behavior through a number of mechanisms; here, I focus on three of those mechanisms and then describe how implementation intentions can facilitate the confrontation of prejudice.

**Implementation intentions activate an implemental mindset.** Dual-process models have been used to describe goal pursuit (Gollwitzer, 2012; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999).
Specifically, an individual searches for and selects a goal, and an individual implements and initiates goal-relevant behavior; these processes represent a deliberative mindset and an implemental mindset, respectively. While mere goal intentions can be “formed against the backdrop of deliberative mindsets” (Gollwitzer, Wieber, Myers, & McCrea, 2010, p. 149), forming implementation intentions activates an implemental mindset. Research has suggested that implemental mindsets provide an advantage over deliberative mindsets with respect to goal attainment. For example, Brandstätter and Frank (2003) induced an implemental mindset in people by making them create a plan for executing an uninitiated goal. These individuals, compared to those with a deliberative mindset, exhibited greater persistence on a goal-relevant behavior. Furthermore, Armor and Taylor (2003) found that people induced with implemental mindsets exhibited better performance on a task (i.e., a scavenger hunt) than those induced with a deliberative mindset. When people form implementation intentions, they adopt an implemental mindset, thereby focusing on striving for and achieving goals.

**Implementation intentions emphasize opportunities to act.** The *if* component of implementation intentions specifies a critical situation or cue that evokes the goal-relevant behavior. Forming implementation intentions enhances the detection of opportunities to strive for a goal (Gollwitzer, 1999). For example, across three experiments, Webb and Sheeran (2004) showed that people who formed implementation intentions to identify a particular number (3) or letter (F) were more likely to correctly identify these numbers and letters in a computerized task than those who did not form an implementation intention. Similarly, Parks-Stamm, Gollwitzer, and Oettingen (2007, Study 1) found that people who formed implementation intentions to identify five-letter words in a recorded story were more able to detect these words than those who formed goal intentions. Furthermore, Webb and Sheeran (2008) also found that the effect of
Implementation intentions on goal-relevant behavior was mediated by accessibility to goal-relevant cues. These studies suggest that implementation intentions predict goal-relevant behavior because the formation of if-then plans helps people identify good opportunities to take action and perform the desired behavior.

Implementation intentions automatize behavior. Implementations intentions create a mental link between the critical situation and the goal-relevant behavior, and in so doing, strategically automatize goal attainment (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Thus, when an individual makes a plan to take action in a given situation (e.g., overhearing a prejudiced remark and verbally confronting the perpetrator), initiation of the response is more immediate, more efficient, and requires less cognitive resources (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2011). Sheeran, Webb, and Gollwitzer (2005; see also Webb & Sheeran, 2006) stated that, “the moment people encounter the situational cue specified in the if component of their plan, the action specified in the then component is initiated in a mechanistic fashion” (p. 95). This automaticity spurred by implementation intentions can also be observed in studies examining response latency. A number of studies (e.g., Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; Parks-Stamm et al., 2007; Webb & Sheeran, 2004, 2007, 2008) have found that response latency mediates the effect of implementation intentions on goal attainment – that is, implementation intention leads to faster responses to a cue, which in turn leads to the desired behavior.

Furthermore, studies using EEG and fMRI techniques suggest that after the link between the situation and behavior is created, performance of the desired behavior is activated by regions of the brain dedicated to automatic and nonconscious processes (Schweiger Gallo, Cohen, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2013; Wieber, Thürmer, & Gollwitzer, 2014).
Using Implementation Intentions to Promote Confronting Prejudice

Previous research has examined how implementation intentions can be used to regulate one’s own prejudice (e.g., Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Mendoza, Gollwitzer, & Amodio, 2010; Stewart & Payne, 2008). Research by Gollwitzer and Brandstätter (1997) showed that people who formed implementation intentions to speak up against xenophobic remarks that were made in a video more quickly seized an opportunity to act than people who did not form an implementation intention. However, research has yet to examine the effect of implementation intention interventions on confronting prejudice in person.

As stated above, there is a prevalent gap between intentions and action with respect to confronting prejudice. When people observe prejudice, they often deliberate over whether to react, weighing the pros (i.e., reduced negative intrapersonal consequences) and cons (e.g., increased negative interpersonal consequences) and failing to confront. The fear of interpersonal consequences is a barrier to confronting observed prejudice; however, forming implementation intentions helps people to overcome competing goals and obstacles to goal attainment (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998) differentiated between implementation intentions that were task-facilitating/action-focused and those that were barrier handling/reluctance-focused. The former type of plan is geared at automatizing action initiation so that potential barriers (e.g., fear of interpersonal consequences) no longer gain a grip on behavior. Barrier-handling plans, on the other hand, are geared at managing obstacles to performance (e.g., feeling reluctant to respond) so that the intended behavior can proceed undisturbed. Gollwitzer and Schaal (1998) observed that both types of plan are effective at implementing goal-relevant behavior, and both types of plan are tested here. Implementation intentions activate an implemental mindset and should therefore help people initiate reactions to
observed prejudice or effectively manage obstacles such as reluctance that could undermine response initiation. Furthermore, because implementation intentions delegate control of the behavior to automatic processes, deliberation over whether or not to confront observed prejudice should be reduced in lieu of an immediate, planned response.

Implementation intentions should also facilitate confrontation by making it easier to detect prejudice. Understandably, if a remark is not interpreted as prejudiced, one is unlikely to believe that the remark deserves to be confronted. People are often poor at detecting prejudice from themselves (Pronin, 2007) and from others (Kaiser & Major, 2006; Major & Kaiser, 2005; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Stangor et al., 2003). Because Whites are rarely the victims of racial prejudice, they may have difficulty detecting observed prejudice (Sue et al., 2007). When a person makes an if-then plan to confront prejudice, the if component of a plan (e.g., “If I hear a prejudiced remark…”) should make instances of observed prejudice more salient to observers, thereby giving them more opportunities to enact the behavior specified in the then component of the plan.

In sum, implementation intentions should help people overcome the self-regulatory obstacles to confronting prejudice. Even people with the best intentions may fail to take action if they lack relevant self-regulation strategies (e.g., Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009; Webb, Schweiger Gallo, Miles, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2012). However, self-regulation processes have been shown to bridge the gap between intentions and behavior (e.g., de Bruin et al., 2012). Thus, I propose the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** People who form implementation intentions to confront prejudice, relative to goal intentions or no intentions, will be more likely to verbally confront prejudice.
Hypothesis 2: People who form implementation intentions to confront prejudice, relative to goal intentions or no intentions, will be more likely to ostracize the perpetrator.

Hypothesis 3: People who form implementation intentions to confront prejudice, relative to goal intentions or no intentions, will exhibit more negative affect immediately after hearing a prejudiced remark.

Method

Participants

Participants were 145 White students at the University of North Carolina. Six participants were excluded from analyses because of audiovisual errors (e.g., the video was inaudible). One participant was excluded from analyses because of experimenter error. Thus, analyses are reported for 138 participants (91 females, 44 males, 1 non-binary; \( M_{\text{age}} = 19.23 \) years, \( SD_{\text{age}} = 1.56 \) years). Some participants were recruited via the Introduction to Psychology SONA volunteer pool (N = 92) and were given class credit in exchange for their participation; the other participants responded to flyers posted around campus (N = 46) and were given $10 upon completion of the study.

Design and Procedure

The current study employed a between-subjects design with four groups (goal intentions; action-focused implementation intention; reluctance-focused implementation intention; control). Participants signed up for a two-session study on “Individual vs. Group Decision Making.” Measures for Session one are listed in Appendix A; the protocol for Session 2 can be found in Appendix B. The average time between session 1 and session 2 was 12.16 days (SD = 9.76 days).
Session 1. The purpose of Session 1 was twofold: to assess participants’ forecasted reaction to prejudice and to deliver the implementation intention manipulation. Participants signed up for a two-session study on “Individual vs. Group Decision Making.” In the first session (completed online via the Qualtrics survey software), participants were given the following cover story:

Thank you for participating. The study is about individual and group decision-making. You will be asked to describe how you would navigate some interpersonal dilemmas. During this first session, each person will get a random selection of six situations to respond to. During the second session, you will come into the lab to make partner/group decisions about a random selection of six situations. In the second session, you will not necessarily discuss the same dilemmas that you see during this first session. We will be presenting some situations to you. Your task is to decide what you would do in the situation. For some situations, we will give you suggestions of what you could do.

Participants then completed a survey in which they responded to six “interpersonal dilemmas,” including this target scenario about hearing someone make a prejudiced comment:

Your parents are organizing a barbecue for family and friends. While the barbecue is getting set up, your father’s work colleague, Jhamal, arrives. He apologizes, saying that he couldn’t bring any food, but he did bring some paper plates and napkins. Paul, a family friend in his late 60s, quietly says to you, “Wow, really? I definitely expected him to say fried chicken or something like that. Black people are so cheap!!” Paul then laughs.

After reading this target scenario, participants self-reported the likelihood that they would confront the prejudiced comment (1 = not at all likely, 7 = very likely).

After responding to the target scenario, participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: goal intention (n = 40), action-focused implementation intention (n = 33), reluctance-focused implementation intention (n = 21), or a no-intention control condition (n = 44). Those in the goal intention condition were asked to memorize and re-type the following goal:

My goal is to calmly confront a person who makes a prejudiced remark and ask, “Why did you say that?!"
Those in the action-focused implementation intention condition saw the same goal, and then were asked to memorize and re-type the following implementation intention:

*If I hear someone make a prejudiced remark, then I will calmly confront the person – I will ask, “Why did you say that?!”*

Participants in the reluctance-focused implementation intention condition were all given the following stem:

*If I hear something prejudiced, then no excuses, no hesitation – I will say...*

Then, these participants were able to choose one of the following three phrases to complete the implementation intention:

“...are you serious?”
“...I don’t agree with that.”
“...I don’t think you should say that.”

Participants were then asked to memorize and re-type their chosen implementation intention.

Next, participants in the goal intention, action-focused implementation intention, and reluctance-focused implementation intention conditions were asked, “How committed are you to this plan?” (1 = not at all committed, 7 = very committed). Participants in the no intention condition did not see a goal or plan to confront prejudice.

The other five scenarios (see Appendix A) only served as filler material to enhance the cover story; thus, responses to these scenarios were not analyzed. After responding to all the scenarios, participants provided demographic information (age, gender, race, year in school, and political preference). Participants were then directed to a website to sign up for time to come in to the lab to complete the second session about “group decision-making.”

**Session 2.** The purpose of Session 2 was to obtain behavioral measures of participants’ confrontation to prejudice. After arriving for the second session, participants were told to wait in
the hallway before their session started. One White confederate and one Black confederate also appeared in the hallway, acting as additional participants. The researcher came to collect the participant and confederates, and led them to the lab, in which a webcam was hidden to record the sessions. Participants and confederates were always arranged such that the participant was seated across from the White confederate, within view of the webcam. Soon after entering the room, the Black confederate and the researcher left the room under the pretense that the Black confederate had forgotten to sign a form; ostensibly, this held up the experiment. After the Black confederate and the researcher left the room (for an average duration of 76.81 seconds; SD = 17.53 seconds), the White confederate made a prejudiced remark: “Typical Black [guy/girl], is he lazy or just stupid?” The White confederate was not scripted to make any further comment, though she was instructed to respond in a neutral, detached manner to anything the participant said. The participant’s verbal response to the prejudiced remark (or lack thereof) was our first outcome measure (0 = did not confront, 1 = confronted). For participants who did confront, the time (in seconds) between the prejudiced comment and their verbal confrontation was also measured (i.e., response latency).

Next, the Black confederate and the researcher reentered the room. The researcher then mentioned that the experiment is a partner task, and then she prompted the participant to pick one of the confederates as a partner. Thus, the participant had a choice to pick either the White confederate who just made a racist remark or the Black confederate. Selecting the Black confederate (and, thus, ostracizing the White confederate) was operationalized as confronting prejudice (see Kawakami et al., 2009) and served as the second outcome measure (0 = White partner, 1 = Black partner). After the participant verbally indicated which person they wanted as
a partner, the experiment was over. The researcher then debriefed\footnote{Twenty-two participants received a funnel debriefing. These participants were probed for suspicion of the experiment’s true purpose. One participant reported, “I can tell there’s some acting” but did not mention prejudice. No other participants reported suspicion during the funnel debriefing. However, all participants were coded for suspicion by the independent raters.} and compensated the participants.

Two independent raters ($\kappa = .76$), both of whom were blind to experimental condition, coded participants’ verbal responses to the confederate’s prejudiced remark ($0 = \text{did not confront}$, $1 = \text{verbally confronted}$). Examples of confronting include: “That’s rude,” “What did you mean by that?” or “What does race have to do with it?” The two independent raters ($\kappa = .69$) also coded whether or not participants exhibited suspicion ($0 = \text{no suspicion}$, $1 = \text{suspicion}$). Examples of participants’ suspicious behavior included looking directly at the camera for long periods of time or verbally suggesting that the procedure was part of a cover story. For both confronting and suspicion, the raters coded the videos according to a codebook (see Appendix C) and disagreements between raters were settled by the author, who was also blind to condition.

Additionally, two independent raters also coded participants’ non-verbal reactions during the first ten seconds after the prejudiced comment. Specifically, the raters used an affect grid (Russell, Weiss, Mendelsohn, 1989) to assess participants’ valence and arousal, which served as our third outcome measure. Valence scores ranged from -4 (very negative) to 4 (very positive); similarly, arousal scores ranged from -4 (very low energy) to 4 (very high energy). Inter-rater reliability was assessed by computing the two-way random, absolutely agreement, average-measures intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for each dimension. The resulting ICC for valence indicated a high level of agreement across raters, ICC = .72; the resulting ICC for arousal indicated a fair level of agreement across raters, ICC = .48. Scores for each dimension were averaged across raters to obtain composite valence and arousal scores.
Data Analyses

Participants’ responses in Session 1 and Session 2 were matched by their anonymous SONA ID numbers or by email addresses (which were then discarded). I first conducted a randomization check to assess whether participants’ demographic measures or experimental variables (i.e., days between sessions, opportunity to confront) differed significantly across the four conditions or across the two recruitment methods. Next, I examined the correlations between the outcome measures (verbal confrontation and partner selection) and all other measures.

Then, chi-square tests of independence were used to examine the association between condition and the outcome measures. To specifically examine the effect of the goal intention and implementation intention manipulations, two dummy variables were created: a goal intention variable (1 = goal intention condition, 0 = all other conditions) and an implementation intention variable in which the action-focused and reluctance-focused implementation intention conditions were combined to increase the power (1 = implementation intention conditions, 0 = all other conditions). I conducted logistic regression analyses with the two dummy variables simultaneously predicting two of the outcome measures (verbal confrontation and partner selection). I also conducted Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) on nonverbal reactions (i.e., affect and arousal).

Additional analyses included ANOVAs to measure the effect of condition on response latency for participants who did confront. The additional analyses section also includes analyses excluding participants who exhibited suspicion.
Results

Randomization Check

Participants did not differ on any demographic measures across conditions, $F_s < 2.14$, $\chi^2_s < 11.36$, $p_s > .05$. Participants in the reluctance-focused implementation intention condition ($M = 7.19$ days, $SD = 4.69$ days) had a shorter delay between sessions than those in the other conditions, $F(3, 134) = 3.42$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .07$. This is likely due to the fact that data for participants in this condition were collected close to the end of the semester, resulting in less time to spare between sessions. Participants in the reluctance-focused implementation intention condition also had significantly less time to confront the perpetrator than participants in all other conditions, $F(3, 133) = 3.28$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .07$. Again, because data for these participants were collected near the end of data collection, I attribute this difference to research assistants’ impatience. Importantly, neither delay between sessions nor time available to confront was related to any of the outcomes assessed here ($r_s < .14$, $p_s > .10$).

Correlations

Table 1 shows the correlations between all measures. Verbal confrontation was significantly correlated with Black partner selection, $r = .22$, $p = .01$, indicating that people who confronted the verbal remark were more likely to select the Black confederate as a partner. Verbal confrontation was also significantly correlated with both nonverbal valence ($r = -.44$, $p < .001$) and nonverbal arousal ($r = .26$, $p = .002$), indicating that people who verbally confronted the prejudiced remark exhibited more negative valence and higher levels of arousal in the ten seconds after the remark was made.
Rates of Verbal Confrontation

Table 2 shows how often participants confronted the prejudiced remark in each condition. Across all conditions, 26.8% (37/138) of participants verbally confronted; this included 40% of people (16/40) in the goal intention condition, 21.2% of people (7/33) in the action-focused implementation intention condition, 19% of people (4/21) in the reluctance-focused implementation intention condition, and 22.7% of people (10/44) in the control condition. A chi-square test of independence showed that there was no significant association between condition and rates of verbal confrontation, \( \chi^2 (3, N = 138) = 5.09, p = .16 \).

To assess the effect of the goal manipulation on rates of verbal confrontation, the dummy variables for both goal intentions and implementation intentions were entered as simultaneous predictors in a binomial logistic regression (see Table 3). These variables accounted for a marginally significant amount of variance in verbal confrontation, Nagelkerke \( R^2 = .05 \), \( \chi^2 (2) = 4.86, p = .09 \). The odds ratios indicated that participants who received the goal intention to confront prejudice were 2.27 times more likely to verbally confront the prejudiced remark than participants in the other conditions; this effect was marginally significant, \( \text{OR} = 2.27, 95\% \text{ CI}[0.88 - 5.84] \), Wald \( \chi^2 = 2.87, p = .09 \). Conversely, the implementation intentions dummy variable was not a significant predictor of verbal confrontation, \( \text{OR} = 0.87, 95\% \text{ CI}[0.33 - 2.29] \), Wald \( \chi^2 = 0.08, p = .77 \). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported: implementation intentions did not predict a significant increase in rates of verbal confrontation. On the contrary, forming goal intentions was a significantly stronger predictor of verbal confrontation than forming implementation intentions.
**Partner Selection**

Table 2 shows the frequency of participants who selected the Black confederate as their partner in each condition. Across all conditions, participants overwhelmingly chose the Black confederate: 77.5% (31/40) in the goal intention condition; 72.7% (24/33) in the action-focused implementation intention condition, 81% (17/21) in the reluctance-focused implementation intention condition, and 77.3% (34/44) in the control condition. A chi square test of independence revealed that there was no significant association between condition and partner selection, \( \chi^2 (3, N = 138) = 0.53, p = .91 \).

To assess the effect of the goal manipulations on rates of selecting the Black partner, the dummy variables for both goal intentions and implementation intentions were entered as simultaneous predictors in a binomial logistic regression (see Table 4). These variables did not account for a significant amount of variance in partner selection, Nagelkerke \( R^2 < .001, \chi^2 (2) = 0.04, p = .98 \). The odds ratios indicate that neither goal intention (OR = 1.01, 95% CI[0.236 – 2.82], Wald \( \chi^2 = 0.001, p = .98 \)) nor implementation intention manipulations (OR = 0.93, 95% CI[0.36 – 2.38], Wald \( \chi^2 = 0.02, p = .88 \)) significantly predicted partner selection. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

**Nonverbal Reactions**

An ANOVA with three levels (goal intention; combined implementation intentions; and control) was conducted to assess the effect of the goal manipulation on participants' affect in the ten seconds following the prejudiced remark. Results revealed that condition has a significant effect on valence, \( F(2, 131) = 3.31, p = .04, \eta^2 = .05 \). A post hoc Tukey test showed that participants in the implementation intention conditions (\( M = -0.34, SE = 0.20 \)) reported significantly less negative affect than participants in the control condition (\( M = -1.06, SE = 0.18 \),
condition on arousal ratings, $F < 1.00, p > .05$. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was rejected. Appendices D and E show the progression of valence and arousal, respectively, over time. Across all conditions, participants tended to exhibit less negative valence across time. Participants were at a high level of arousal immediately following the prejudiced remark, but quickly settled down and hovered around a neutral level of arousal within one minute of hearing the remark.

**Additional Analyses**

**Response latency.** I also measured the response latency for participants’ verbal confrontations. Among the 37 participants who did confront, they took an average of six seconds to do so (SD = 0.08). An ANOVA with three levels (goal intentions; combined implementation intentions; control) revealed no significant difference in response latency between the conditions, $F < 1.00, p > .05$.

**Participants exhibiting suspicion.** Twenty participants (14.5%) were coded as exhibiting suspicion. Suspicion rates did not differ significantly by condition (goal intentions = 22.5%, combined implementation intentions = 14.8%, control = 6.8%), $\chi^2 (2, N = 138) = 4.16, p = .12$. Suspicion was not related to rates of confrontation, $\chi^2 (1, N = 138) = 2.07, p = .18$. Sixty percent of suspicious participants did not confront, whereas 40% did confront. Suspicion was related to partner selection, $\chi^2 (1, N = 138) = 4.34, p = .04$. However, including suspicion in the logistic regression predicting partner selection did not alter the (non)significant effects of goal intention and implementation intention conditions.

**Discussion**

Given that past research has found that observers of prejudice rarely step in to confront, it is promising that over one-fourth (26.8%) of all participants in the current study confronted the
prejudiced remark, including 40% of those who formed a goal intention to do so. This is similar to findings from past research. Rattan and Dweck (2010) reported that 25.5% of their participants confronted prejudice, while Shelton and Stewart (2004) reported that 28.4% of their participants confronted prejudice. The rate of confrontation in the current study is also higher than the rates found in some studies – Swim and Hyers (1999) and Woodzicka and LaFrance (2001) found that only 16% of participants offered a direct, verbal confrontation in response to prejudice. However, the hypotheses were rejected: implementation intention interventions did not significantly increase rates of confrontation. In fact, mere goal intentions were enough to significantly increase verbal confrontation. Neither implementation intentions nor goal intentions significantly predicted whether or not participants selected a Black or White confederate for a partner task; across all conditions, over three-fourths of all participants selected the Black confederate. This stands in contrast to the findings of Kawakami and colleagues (2009), in which only 37% of participants who heard a racist comment subsequently selected the Black partner.

**Why Were Goal Intentions Effective and Implementation Intentions Ineffective?**

Setting goals or forming goal intentions are central to numerous theories in social psychology (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Locke & Latham, 1990) and have been observed to improve rates of goal attainment in both correlational (Sheeran, 2002) and experimental studies (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). The present findings showing that the formation of goal intentions increased rates of behavioral performance provides valuable corroboration of these findings and does so in a novel context (confronting prejudice). Previous research has shown that implementation intentions generally outperform goal intentions with respect to eliciting goal-directed behavior. However, the results reported herein suggest that in the domain of confronting prejudice, implementation intentions are not as effective as mere goal intentions.
Why were implementation intentions ineffective? It may be that implementation intentions induced a deliberative mindset, that is, caused people to think about the best course of action. People with a deliberative mindset often reflect upon which goals to strive for and consider the desirability and feasibility of different goals (Gollwitzer, 2012; Gollwitzer et al., 2010). Deliberative mindsets are most useful when a person is setting goals as they enable the person to decide upon the best course of action. Deliberative mindsets are less useful, however, when a person is trying to implement goal-relevant behavior because the person needs to take action rather than deliberate about what to do and potentially miss good opportunities to act (Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Ratajczak, 1990; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987).

As implementation intentions take the form of an “if-then” plan, the wording of each component of the plan is important (Gollwitzer et al., 2010). Because implementation intentions work by linking the situation (the if component) to the behavior (the then component), both the situation and the behavior must be specific and unambiguous for the goal to be attained. In the current study, the then component of the plan was very specific – participants in the action-focused implementation intention condition were told exactly what to say (“...I will calmly confront the person – I will ask, ‘Why did you say that?!’”) while participants in the reluctance-focused implementation intentions chose their own specific response. However, the if component of the plan (“If I hear someone make a prejudiced remark...”) may have been too general for the implementation intention to produce the predicted effect. When the if component of an implementation intention is not specific enough, encountering the critical situation could induce a deliberative mindset. Gollwitzer and colleagues (2010) stated that, “forming more inclusive if-components does not seem to represent a viable alternative to forming specific ones, at least
when the swift recognition of the situation is crucial for successful action initiation” (p. 143).

With respect to the wording of implementation intentions, Gollwitzer, Bayer, and McCulloch (2005) stated that, “People should specify the situation in the if-part to such a degree that a given situation will no longer raise the question of whether it qualifies as the critical situation or not” (p. 510). In the current study, taking action (i.e., confronting the White confederate’s remark) in response to the implementation intention was dependent on participants interpreting the remark as prejudiced. However, the if component of the plan used here may have been ambiguous and induced a deliberative mindset in participants, making them question whether the remark was prejudiced, and, thus, disrupting a confronting response.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

The methods used in the current research were neither flawless nor exhaustive. Future research could make a number of improvements to better understand the role of goals and if-then plans in confronting prejudice.

**Lack of commitment to the plan or superordinate goal.** One possible reason that the implementation intentions did not increase rates of verbal confrontation is that participants were not committed to the goal of confronting prejudice before encountering the plan. In the current study, participants who received an implementation intention reported that their commitment to the plan ($M = 4.53$, $SE = 0.21$) was significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, $t(51) = 2.43, p = .02$. However, when I used the dummy variable for implementation intentions to test whether the effect of the implementation intention intervention on verbal confrontation was moderated by commitment to the goal; the interaction term was not significant, OR = 0.72, Wald $\chi^2 = 1.05, p = .31$. Thus, lack of commitment to the plan does not appear to explain the non-significant effects of implementation intentions observed here.
While I measured participants’ commitment to the plan they encountered in our study, I did not measure participants’ commitment to the broader goal of confronting prejudice. Research by Sheeran and colleagues (2005) found that the effects of implementation intentions are dependent on the presence of, and the commitment to, superordinate goal intentions – that is, implementation intentions increase the likelihood of goal attainment when there is already a strong (rather than moderate or weak) goal intention to perform a behavior. Implementation intentions are meant to bolster existing goal intentions (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). People who are not committed to confronting prejudice may have been less motivated to perceive the remark as prejudiced – that is, they may have been less likely to identify the critical cue that would have activated a response. Therefore, future research should account for participants’ commitment to the overarching goal of confronting prejudice.

**Stronger behavior-goal link.** In the current study, the goal was to confront prejudice; however, the behavior that was specified (i.e., asking the perpetrator, “What did you mean by that?”) may not have been strongly related to that goal. Some studies (e.g., Becker & Barreto, 2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999) have shown that assertive responses to prejudice are less common and less favorable than nonassertive confrontations. In the current study, the suggested confrontation was a decidedly (and intentionally) nonassertive expression of dissatisfaction. However, people who formed implementation intentions may not have accepted the suggested response as a valid means to achieving their goal of confronting prejudice – that is, they may not have linked the behavior with their goal. Thus, a stronger, less ambivalent verbal confrontation (e.g., “That was prejudiced!”) may have made the implementation intention more effective.
**Increased motivation to confront.** Finally, increasing a person’s motivation to confront observed prejudice could increase their likelihood of so doing. While past behavior does not always directly predict subsequent behavior (Ajzen, 1991, 2002; Ouellette & Wood, 1998), past failures to confront prejudice may motivate people to take action in the future. For example, research by Smallman and Roese (2009) found that content-specific counterfactual thinking predicts behavioral intentions (e.g., thinking “I should have confronted the prejudiced remark” leads to intentions to confront subsequent prejudice). Furthermore, Gollwitzer and colleagues (2010) have suggested that combining counterfactual thinking with implementation intentions can effectively bridge the intention-behavior gap. Future research could examine an intervention that combines upward counterfactual thinking (e.g., “I should have confronted the prejudiced remark.”) with implementation intentions to confront prejudice (e.g., “Next time I hear a prejudiced remark, I will immediately confront.”). This may be a more effective way to increase motivation to confront prejudice.

Protection Motivation Theory (PMT; Rogers, 1983) also provides insight into how people become motivated to act. While PMT has been mainly used to understand responses to environmental and disease threats (see Floyd, Dunn, & Rogers, 2000), the theory can also be used to understand responses to social threats, such as expressions of prejudice. PMT suggests that, in part, motivation accrues from four factors: strengthened response efficacy, strengthened self-efficacy, weakened response costs, and enhanced moral norms.

*Response efficacy* refers to the belief that a response will be effective in alleviating the threat. That is, motivation to confront prejudice is increased when people believe that their confrontation will be effective (Good et al., 2012; Rattan & Dweck, 2010; Stewart, Latu, Branscombe, & Denney, 2010). *Self-efficacy* is important for confronting prejudice because even
if people believe that confronting prejudice will be effective, they may be unmotivated to confront because they lack confidence in their ability to execute the confrontation. Consistent with this idea, research suggests that individuals high in optimism are more likely to believe that their confrontation will be effective at reducing prejudice, and thus are more likely to confront prejudice (Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Sechrist, 2010; Wellman, Czopp, & Geers, 2009). Meta-analyses of both correlational (Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000) and experimental studies (Sheeran et al., under review) indicate that self-efficacy is a powerful determinant of motivation. Thus, self-efficacy would seem to be an important target in interventions to increase the motivation to confront prejudice.

Even high response efficacy and self-efficacy may not suffice to motivate confrontation, however, if observers perceive high response costs (i.e., if they believe that confronting will have negative consequences). If observers believe that they will be negatively evaluated (i.e., perceived as rude or impolite for confronting) or anticipate that perpetrators will retaliate against the confrontation (Dickter & Newton, 2013), they will likely be less motivated to confront prejudice. Although observers often anticipate that high response costs will result from confronting prejudice, confronting is actually beneficial for observers. A recent meta-analysis by Sheeran, Harris, & Epton (2014) found that decreasing perceived response costs (as well as increasing perceived response efficacy and perceived self-efficacy) leads to stronger behavioral intentions. Targeting response costs should thus be effective in influencing the motivation to confront prejudice.

Finally, moral norms may be important when considering the confrontation of prejudice. Moral norms are “personal feelings of moral obligation or responsibility to perform, or refuse to perform, a certain behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 199). Observers may fail to confront prejudice
because they do not feel morally responsible for so doing. A meta-analysis by Rivis, Sheeran, and Armitage (2009) found that moral norms are key predictors of intentions and motivation (see also de Gorsuch & Ortberg, 1983; Harland, Staats, & Wilke, 1999; Leeuw, Valois, & Houssemad, 2011; Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995). Godin, Conner, and Sheeran (2005) found that morally aligned intentions more strongly predict behavior than attitudinally aligned intentions – that is, when the intention is based on “based on the moral correctness of the behavior” rather than “the perceived consequences of acting” (p. 500). Directly measuring and manipulating a person’s moral norms regarding the confrontation of prejudice may increase the likelihood that forming implementation intentions will lead to confronting prejudice.

Conclusion

The current dissertation is a promising first step in examining how goal setting and implementation intention formation influences confronting prejudice. As goal intentions are effective at promoting the confrontation of prejudice, goal-setting should be added to the repertoire of action strategies for anti-racism trainings at schools and workplaces. Future research is necessary to further examine the underlying processes that fuel goal-oriented confrontation and to examine whether or how to effectively employ implementation intentions to make confronting prejudice a more automatic, less effortful task. Future interventions should also consider a more intensive approach to implementation intentions to confront prejudice – for example, using counterfactual thinking and motivational interventions to enhance the effectiveness of if-then plans. As Bethune suggested, to “acquiesce in the face of discrimination” is tantamount to supporting prejudiced actions; the current research provides a tactic for people to translate their nonprejudiced attitudes into anti-racist action.
Table 1

Descriptive Statistics: Means (Standard Errors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Goal Intention (n = 40)</th>
<th>Action-focused Implementation Intention (n = 33)</th>
<th>Reluctance-focused Implementation Intention (n = 21)</th>
<th>Control (n = 44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forecasted confronting</td>
<td>4.35 (0.22)</td>
<td>4.27 (0.31)</td>
<td>3.90 (0.46)</td>
<td>4.17 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to goal</td>
<td>4.68 (0.25)</td>
<td>4.97 (0.28)</td>
<td>3.86 (0.29)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days between sessions</td>
<td>15.17 (1.50)</td>
<td>11.09 (1.66)</td>
<td>7.19 (2.08)</td>
<td>12.59 (1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to confront</td>
<td>1:18 (0:02)</td>
<td>1:19 (0:03)</td>
<td>1:06 (0:02)</td>
<td>1:18 (0:02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response latency</td>
<td>0:06 (0:02)</td>
<td>0:03 (&lt; 0:01)</td>
<td>0:07 (0:02)</td>
<td>0:07 (0:02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>19.30 (0.25)</td>
<td>19.48 (0.27)</td>
<td>19.28 (0.34)</td>
<td>18.95 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political preference</td>
<td>3.60 (0.22)</td>
<td>3.59 (0.31)</td>
<td>4.52 (0.31)</td>
<td>3.74 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Responses on the forecasted conditioning variable ranged from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating a participant more strongly believes they would confront prejudice. Responses on the commitment to goal variable ranged from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating a stronger commitment to the goal intention or implementation intention. Responses on the political preference variable ranged from 1 to 7, with lower scores indicating a more liberal ideology and higher scores indicating a more conservative ideology.
Table 2

*Correlation Matrix*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Verbal confrontation</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Black partner selection</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nonverbal – arousal</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nonverbal - valence</td>
<td>-.44*</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Forecasted confrontation</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Commitment to goal</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.36*</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Days between sessions</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Opportunity to confront</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Gender</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.26*</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Age</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Political preference</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>-.34*</td>
<td>-.30*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p* < .05. The following variables were coded as dichotomous: verbal confrontation (*0 = did not confront, 1 = verbally confronted*); Black partner selection (*0 = selected White partner, 1 = selected Black partner*); gender (*0 = female, 1 = male*). Higher scores on the forecasted conditioning variable indicate that a participant more strongly believed they would confront prejudice. Higher scores on the commitment to goal variable indicated a stronger commitment to the goal intention or implementation intention. Lower scores on the political preference variable indicated a more liberal ideology; higher scores indicated a more conservative ideology.
Table 3

Percentage of Participants Who Verbally Confronted and Selected the Black Confederate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome variable</th>
<th>Goal Intention (n = 40)</th>
<th>Action-focused Implementation Intention (n = 33)</th>
<th>Reluctance-focused Implementation Intention (n = 21)</th>
<th>Control (n = 44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal confrontation</td>
<td>16/40&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (40%)</td>
<td>7/33&lt;sup&gt;bc&lt;/sup&gt; (21.2%)</td>
<td>4/21&lt;sup&gt;ac&lt;/sup&gt; (19%)</td>
<td>10/44&lt;sup&gt;bc&lt;/sup&gt; (22.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black partner selection</td>
<td>31/40&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (77.5%)</td>
<td>24/33&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (72.7%)</td>
<td>17/21&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (81%)</td>
<td>34/44&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (77.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Within each row, frequencies sharing the same superscript are not significantly different from each other at p < .10.*
Table 4

**Logistic Regression: Condition Predicting Verbal Confrontation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Wald $\chi^2$</th>
<th>Odds ratio (95% CI)</th>
<th>Model $\chi^2$</th>
<th>Nagelkerke $R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition: Goal intention vs. other</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>2.27† (0.88 – 5.84)</td>
<td>4.86†</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition: implementation intention vs. other</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.87 (0.33 – 2.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.† p < .10. CI = Confidence Interval. Two dummy variables were used as simultaneous predictors: a dummy variable comparing goal intentions to all other conditions and a dummy variable comparing implementation intentions to all other conditions.*
Table 5

Hierarchical Logistic Regression: Condition Predicting Partner Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Wald $\chi^2$</th>
<th>Odds ratio (95% CI)</th>
<th>Model $\chi^2$</th>
<th>Nagelkerke $R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition: Goal intention vs. other</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>1.01 (0.36 – 2.82)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition: implementation intention vs. other</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.93 (0.36 – 2.38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* $p < .05$. CI = Confidence Interval. Two dummy variables were used as simultaneous predictors: a dummy variable comparing goal intentions to all other conditions and a dummy variable comparing implementation intentions to all other conditions.
APPENDIX A: Measures for Session 1

Are you currently enrolled in PSYC 101 (Introductory Psychology) or were you enrolled in PSYC 101 last semester (Fall 2014/Spring 2015)?

Yes  No  [if yes, ineligible to participate]

------------------

Thank you for participating. The study is about individual and group decision-making. You will be asked to describe how you would navigate some interpersonal dilemmas. During this first session, each person will get a random selection of six situations to respond to. During the second session, you will come into the lab to make partner/group decisions about a random selection of six situations. In the second session, you will not necessarily discuss the same dilemmas that you see during this first session.

We will be presenting some situations to you. Your task is to decide what you would do in the situation. For some situations, we will give you suggestions of what you could do.

Please be honest when responding.
Remember, your responses are anonymous.

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1) You are having a few friends over to your house for a game night. Most of your friends are reserved about their political opinions, but you two of your friends, Jeff and Marissa, are on opposite ends of the political spectrum. They are both very forceful about their political opinions, and you forgot to consider this when inviting them both to game night. Someone makes a joke about the recent government shutdown, and sure enough, Jeff and Marissa start to argue about the issue, ruining the festive mood. How do you defuse the situation?
2) You are hanging out with some friends of yours. You see someone who you do not recognize, but you think the person is very attractive. You go up to introduce yourself, and you learn that his/her name is Taylor. While you originally came there to with your friends, you spend most of the night hanging out with Taylor. As the night ends, you get Taylor’s number and you both make a vague promise to see one another again. How long do you wait to contact Taylor and why? Do you text or call?
3) Your parents are organizing a barbecue for family and friends. While the barbecue is getting set up, your father’s work colleague, Jhamal, arrives. He apologizes, saying that he couldn’t bring any food, but he did bring some paper plates and napkins. Paul, a family friend in his late 60s, quietly says to you, “Wow, really? I definitely expected him to say fried chicken or something like that. Black people are so cheap!!” Paul then laughs.

How likely would you be to confront Paul about his comment?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not at all                     Very likely

How likely are you to change the subject?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not at all                     Very likely

How likely are you to subsequently avoid Paul?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not at all                     Very likely

Goal intention: Thinking more broadly than just Paul’s particular comment, here is a plan to confront prejudice. Please say the following sentence to yourself three times. Please do not go on to the next page until you can repeat your plan twice without making a mistake – and without looking at the screen.

“My goal is to calmly confront a person who makes a prejudiced remark and ask, ‘What did you mean by that?’ ”

Please re-type the goal: My goal is to ________________________

Action-focused implementation intention: Thinking more broadly than just Paul’s particular comment, here is a plan to confront prejudice. Please say the following sentence to yourself three times. Please do not go on to the next page until you can repeat your plan twice without making a mistake – and without looking at the screen.

“If I hear someone make a prejudiced remark, then I will calmly confront the person – I will ask, ‘What did you mean by that?’ ”
Reluctance-focused implementation intention: Thinking more broadly than just Paul’s particular comment, here is a plan to confront prejudice. Please select the option below that you feel you would be most likely to say.

“If I hear something prejudiced, then no excuses, no hesitation - I will say…”

- Are you serious?
- I don’t agree with that.
- I don’t think you should say that.

How committed are you to this plan/goal?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Definitely no  Definitely yes
4) Your older brother has a well-paying job that makes him suffer very few financial burdens. However, you begin to notice him talking about how he doesn’t have money to do things he used to be able to do, like go see a movie or go out to eat. He still has his job, so you wonder what the problem is. While you’re at his house, you see an open drawer at his desk. In that drawer, you find a little black notebook with names, dates, and large dollar amounts (~ $10,000). You also see a book on how to win at poker. You begin to think that your brother has gone into debt because he may have a gambling problem.

How likely would you be to confront your brother about his gambling problem?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Very unlikely to confront  Very likely to confront

More generally, would you confront someone you know who has a gambling problem?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Definitely no  Definitely yes

Here is a plan for confronting your older brother. Please say the following sentence to yourself three times. Please do not go on to the next page until you can repeat your plan twice without making a mistake – and without looking at the screen.

“As soon as I get the chance, I calmly confront my brother and ask ‘What’s going on that you’re not telling me?!’”

Please re-type the plan: As soon as I get the chance, I ________________ and ask ________________

How much do you think you could commit to this plan?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Definitely no  Definitely yes

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5) You have arranged a first date with someone for tonight at 7:00pm at a restaurant on W. Franklin Street. You have dressed up very nicely, and you are very anxious, but excited. You walk into the restaurant at 6:55pm and are promptly seated by a host. By 7:03pm, your date still has not arrived – you just chalk it up to being fashionably late. However, the time ticks by and, eventually, you notice that it is 7:31pm and your date has still not arrived. You check your phone and see that you haven’t received any calls or texts. What do you do?
6) You are on the 7th floor of the library working on a group project with your friends Brandon and Rebecca, who are dating each other. You have been friends with both of them since the first week of college. Rebecca gets up to go down to the reference desk to ask a few questions about finding articles online. While she is gone, you notice Brandon slide over to be closer to you, and you also feel his leg rest against yours under the table. As he leans over to look at your computer, he puts his arm around your shoulder and gets a bit too close. You realize that he is flirting with you. How do you respond?

How likely are you to tell Rebecca?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Very unlikely              Very likely

How likely are you to subsequently avoid Brandon?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Not at all              Very likely
Demographic Information

It is helpful to us to know something about the kinds of people who are participating in our studies. Please complete the demographic information below. Again, all of your responses will be kept completely confidential.

Gender: Male Female

Race:
- White/Caucasian
- Black/African-American
- Hispanic/Latino
- East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese)
- South Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani, Burmese)
- Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
- Other (please specify_______________________)

Age: _____________

Political Preference: [strongly liberal – strongly conservative]

Year in school: 1 2 3 4 5+

Major or intended major: _____________________________

Please enter your email address: _________________

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On the next page, you will get a link to sign up for the second session. Remember, in the second session, you will come into the lab and participate in a group-decision making task with a random selection of dilemmas. You will not necessarily see the same dilemmas that you saw in this first session.

Here is a link to sign up for the second session. Remember, you will receive your compensation when you have completed the second session. We will send you an email reminder 24-48 hours prior to your second session.
APPENDIX B: Session 2 protocol

- The two confederates and the participants will be seated in the third floor lobby.

- The experimenter will go to the lobby to retrieve the participant and confederates.
  - **Experimenter:** “Is anyone here for the Group Decision Making task in room 310? [after participant/confederates raise hands] You can follow me.”

- Lead them into the room and ask them to have a seat. Ensure that the seating arrangement is such that the participant is seated on one side of the table, facing the two confederates on the other side of the table.

- Once everyone is seated, the experimenter will say:
  - **Experimenter:** “Okay, before we start, are any of you participating for credit for PSYC499?”
  - **Black confederate:** [raises hand] “Me.”
  - **Experimenter:** “Did you bring your permission form?”
  - **Black confederate:** What permission form?
  - **Experimenter:** “The PSYC 499 form that I have to sign before you can participate?”
  - **Black confederate:** “Oh…no, I totally forgot…”
  - **Experimenter:** “Well…I need to sign that before we can start the study”
  - **Black confederate:** “Oh…”
  - **Experimenter:** “(sigh) I think I might have a copy of the form in our other lab. Come with me, you can sign it in there.”

  (During this exchange, a look of annoyance gradually overcomes the White confederate’s face.)

- The Black confederate then gets up and follows the experimenter out of the lab. Once they have left the lab, they will actually go around to a graduate student office for about 1-2 minutes.

- After the Black confederate and the experimenter have left the lab, the White confederate will turn to the participant and say,
  - **White confederate:** “Typical black guy/girl, is he lazy or just stupid?”
  - **If the participant confronts the confederate, the confederate can say things like:**
    - “So how long do you think we’re going to be here?”
    - “Well, he’s making us stay here longer, I’m trying to get this done.”
    - “Oh, I don’t know…”
    - Start another conversation
    - Don’t apologize, but remain calm
- After the Black confederate and the experimenter return, the experimenter will say:
  - **Experimenter:** [to the Black confederate] “[to all] Okay, so this study is going to be about group decision-making. This is supposed to be a partner task. However, there are only three of you…I guess you [pointing to the participant] can pick one of them [pointing to the confederates] to be your partner. I’ll be the other person’s partner.

  [If the participant asks what the partner task will be about…**Experimenter:** It’s a group decision-making task. You’ll get more instructions as you progress through the study.]

- After the participant picks a partner…
  - **Experimenter:** Okay, before we start the group decision ask, the IRB ethics board requires that participants fill out a participant experience form. Please take two or three minutes to complete this.
  - Pass out the Participant Experience Forms and pens.

- **Experimenter:** “Okay, the experiment is actually over now. There is no partner task. Here is a debriefing form to let you know what the experiment was really about. We are sorry that we had to deceive you, please read this form and let me know if you have any questions. [then participant reads form].”

- [If the participant has a question, either use your best judgment or refer them to Keenan (email address on debriefing form) if you feel uncomfortable answering their question.]
## APPENDIX C: Codebook for Raters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of coding</td>
<td>What date are you coding this video?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID number</td>
<td>What is the ID number on the video?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of session 1</td>
<td>On what day did the participant complete the online session in Qualtrics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of session 2</td>
<td>On what day did the participant complete the videotaped behavioral session?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days between sessions</td>
<td>How many days passed between session 1 and session 2?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black confederate</td>
<td>Who was the Black confederate in the videotaped session? (Diego or Simone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White confederate</td>
<td>Who was the prejudiced confederate in the videotaped session?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of comment</td>
<td>Mark the timestamp at the end of the prejudiced comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal response (yes/no)</td>
<td>Did the participant provide a verbal response challenging the prejudiced remark? (e.g.,.....)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of verbal response</td>
<td>Mark the timestamp at the beginning of the participant’s response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response text</td>
<td>What did the participant say to challenge the prejudiced remark?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of confederate reentry</td>
<td>Mark the timestamp at the time that the door to the room opens and the confederates reenter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner selection</td>
<td>Who did the participant choose in the partner task?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicion (yes/no)</td>
<td>Did the participant show suspicion about the true purpose of the study?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal suspicion</td>
<td>If the participant showed suspicion, did they say something to display their suspicion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicion text</td>
<td>If the participant said something to display their suspicion, what did they say?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicion timestamps</td>
<td>Mark the timestamp(s) where suspicion was displayed, verbally or nonverbally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coder comments</td>
<td>Please write any additional comments here.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D: PLOT OF TIME BY VALENCE FOR ALL CONDITIONS

Note: Valence scores were coded on affect grids by independent raters; possible scores ranged from -4 (negative) to 4 (positive). T1 indicates the first ten seconds after the prejudiced remark was made. The sample size for each time point on the x-axis is not the same, as some videos were longer than others.
APPENDIX E: PLOT OF TIME BY AROUSAL FOR ALL CONDITIONS

Note: Arousal scores were coded on affect grids by independent raters; possible scores ranged from -4 (low arousal) to 4 (high arousal). T1 indicates the first ten seconds after the prejudiced remark was made. The sample size for each time point on the x-axis is not the same, as some videos were longer than others.
REFERENCES


