All For One and One For All: Regional Collaboration in Industrial Recruitment Strategies, A Comparative Case Study

The United States as a whole is still adjusting to the restructuring of the global economy that started in the 1960s, accelerated in the seventies and eighties, and runs, seemingly, uncontrolled today. This restructuring has lead to the fragmentation of once dominant, heavily vertically integrated firms and has made it close to impossible for the US to produce many goods as cheaply as those found in other areas of the world. Stagnating wages, a gutting of middle management positions, as well as rampant job loss in traditional manufacturing sectors characterize this restructuring.

The gutting of these traditional manufacturing sectors not only decimated the cities of the Midwest and Rustbelt but it also severely affected many manufacturing economies in the south, including North Carolina. North Carolina saw thousands of textile and furniture jobs leave the state as manufacturers either failed or moved their factories overseas to cheaper production sites. This loss of work crippled many counties in the central and western parts of the state. Wilkes, Ashe, and Allegheny counties have taken this brutal experience to heart and have formed a regional strategy to make themselves more competitive and adaptive to the changing global marketplace. They do this by collaborating with each other on workforce development, education, recruitment, and retention.

The eastern region of North Carolina, also decimated by losses due to global

competition, responded in their own fashion. The region took a revolutionary and innovative step in the founding of the Global TransPark. The TransPark lies within the 13county Eastern North Carolina Economic Development region. The TransPark is designed to be a comprehensive advanced manufacturing and transportation hub that takes advantage of the eastern region's proximity to major highway, rails, water, and air transport infrastructure.

Both of these initiatives are novel and bold and speak to the rising necessity of regional planning and economic development in order for firms and regions to remain competitive and growing in this new globalized market place. That being said, there has been mixed success in these individual efforts in successfully recruiting new companies and maintaining the political will to keep these regional efforts. The TransPark, only recently successful in attracting some larger-sized firms, was initially deemed a disappointment in its ability to successfully attract new firms, as well as suffering from political infighting and a break down in the collaborative spirit. Whereas, in Wilkes, Ashe, and Allegheny counties there has been mixed success in attracting some firms to the region while simultaneously strengthening the bonds amongst the counties. This study will focus primarily on Wilkes, Ashe, and Allegheny counties and their Northwest North Carolina Advanced Materials Cluster comparing its structure and efforts with those of the early years of the GlobalTranspark.

These two cases are comparable because they both represent a regional sectoral

strategy that encompass actors from local and state government, private industry, and the education and not-for-profit sectors. These types of initiatives are increasing and it is important that planners and policymakers better understand what these initiatives are and what are some of the major issues and concerns that should concern them when undertaking such policies. The TransPark has languished for over a decade due to a combination of mismanagement, losing political support, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of guaranteeing regional buy-in. While each of these issues could be the source of individual studies, I decided to focus upon the question of creating and maintaining regional cooperation because guaranteeing regional political support will allow for good organizations to be able to fix themselves. Without regional support, these initiatives, if improperly managed or conceived, can only fail and inhibit the possibility of future regional collaboration. In order to encourage better regional collaboration, it is imperative that we be aware of what actually makes a regional collaboration work. This study attempts to offer some insight.

The Northwest North Carolina Advanced Materials Cluster, henceforth the AMC, is an attempt by three rural counties to grow and develop an advanced materials industrial cluster. A cluster, loosely defined, is an interrelated set of firms within an industry or closely related sets of industries that rely on their geographic proximity and similarities to maximize their own innovation and competitiveness. What make the AMC unique is that its member counties are attempting to form a cluster where, currently, there is none, but they do possess a strong history of manufacturing and a seed of sorts, in two relatively large advanced materials firms and some smaller advanced materials manufacturers.

Thus far, the development of the cluster has been quite slow due to the current economic crisis, preventing successful recruitment of new firms and limiting steps that can be taken in strengthening firms already in the region. But the AMC is still operating and moving forward with a variety of initiatives, especially in education and in encouraging networking among different firms and government, and it is successful in that the AMC has drawn the three member counties closer together and has shown the necessity and effectiveness of regional collaboration and planning. The AMC has been able to do all of this thanks not only to dedicated management and leadership but also because the AMC's organizational structure was designed with regionalism and increasing regional collaboration and strength at its core. So, even with its modest success, overall, in attracting new firms, the AMC still holds political support for two primary reasons, the first is that the AMC has made multiple, concrete steps that will improve the regional economy in the medium-term by focusing on workforce development and interfirm networking and not on recruiting, which is quite difficult given the current economic situation. Second, the AMC was designed to be a *regional* organization with the *region* at its identity. As such, any steps that it takes or policies that it enacts are for the good of the region and this is understood by political leaders because they designed the AMC to operate as such.

Conversely, the North Carolina Global TransPark, an intermodal transportation and

manufacturing hub in Lenoir County North Carolina, has met with less overall success and has lost much of its political credibility since its opening in the early 1990s. The difference between the TransPark and the AMC's ability to navigate these tough early years of organizational life rests on the fact that AMC's creators have stayed true to their regional mandate and that is reflected in the **organizational structure** of the AMC, whereas the TransPark, while a regional project, was flawed in that this regional view was not adequately built into the organizational system. The structure of the TransPark fragments and isolates different actors from each other, placing regional economic development and county officials in a separate office that has little to no input on the TransPark's actions. This kind of fragmentary structure lies in direct opposition to the integrative structure that informs the AMC's actions and policy recommendations. It is the goal of this paper to try and demonstrate that proper organizational structure is imperative for the successful implementation and management of regional economic development schemes.

A Look at Regionalism

The last twenty years have seen a massive increase in regional partnering for the purposes of economic development. A national survey of regional partnerships in 1998 identified 133 regional partnerships. Of those partnerships 105 of them (78.9%) were created between 1980 and 1997. The rise in popularity of regional partnerships is at the

intersection of developments in governance and economic development thinking. She points to the concurrent "3rd waves" of regional governance and economic development.

The "waves" of economic development are historical transitions in approaches to economic development. Scholars in the fields of regional economic development place our current system in its third historical wave.

The first wave of economic development was defined by industrial recruitment, the recruitment of primarily large, manufacturers, derisively referred to as "smokestack chasing". This wave was initially perfected by southern states in the US that used financial incentive and hostility to collective bargaining to lure firms away from their traditional northern and midwestern strongholds in the fifties and sixties. This practice initiated a national bidding battle for manufacturing firms, pitting state against state in a vicious cycle of "beggar they neighbor" policies. This practice of very aggressive recruitment died down considerably in the seventies and eighties thanks to the rising competitive pressures of foreign countries that could offer cheaper resources and labor than any state in the US could. In addition, greater use of technology and more advanced production techniques brought other first-world competitors like the Japanese and Germans at the forefront of international manufacturing. This squeeze from the top and the bottom forced American manufacturers to adjust and for economic developers to look elsewhere. This forced economic developers to look at their own regional capabilities and ushered in the second wave.

The second wave of economic development could be called the "wave of capacity building". This wave is characterized by states and regions looking at their indigenous capabilities and attempting to maximize them. The focus was now less upon attracting outside firms but in closing capital funding gaps through the development of state venture capital funds, in assisting universities in better moving their research into production faster, as well as improving workers skills and offering greater support to budding entrepreneurs through counseling, and financial support, either direct through state-run venture capital funds, or through programs like small-business incubators that often subsidize rent and offer additional services. While these efforts have helped to move many states forward over the past fifteen years or so, they still suffer from some major weaknesses. The two biggest weaknesses of this second wave are its inability to scale up to an appropriate level and the fragmentary nature of many programs. First, while many of these programs have shown some marked success on an individual firm level, it has been nearly impossible to have this success grow to a true regional statewide scale. This has to do with available resources, states simply do not have enough money or staff to run very large venture capital firms, and political considerations, Americans are still quite wary of government intervention in the private sector and it would be a difficult sell to convince many populations that increasing the state's government presence in industrial policy would be a good thing. In addition, the fragmentary nature of these programs inhibit much of their success. For example, many states have programs that deal with worker training and retraining and they have programs

on integrating advanced technology into firms. Rarely are these services combined or adequately coordinated. The fragmented structure of these programs actually inhibits their effectiveness and prevents proper collaboration amongst offices. This lack of coordination is only magnified due to a lack of accountability amongst programs, only intensifying individual "turf wars" amongst programs.

The third wave in economic development policy is characterized by voluntary agreements between governments and sectors in public-private and intercommunity partnerships. Ross and Friedman describe this next step in the process as moving beyond simply a question of policy to one of organizational change. This is done through leveraging not only financial but also human resources through job training, networking, and other approaches that take firms within a region and linking them together in order to form a more competitive local economy. These strategies are distinct in that they are shifts from more centralized, federal and state-funded funded firm-centered approaches. These initiatives are now more local, decentralized, and multi-jurisdictional, using vaired organizational and institutional approaches that have resulted in a new kind of partnership. Olberding says that there are four main attributes to many of these partnerships:

1. They are led by actors from the public, private, and not for profit sectors

2. They focus on specific strategic areas

3. They stress building government *capacity* over increasing the size of government

4. They employ processes designed to foster a shared vision and collaboration

throughout.

Unfortunately, while these third-wave policies are proliferating, their adoption, while growing, still must compete with first-wave policies. Eisinger cites multiple surveys that show not only an "ambivalence" to state-led economic development policy amongst officials but a return to first wave recruitment practices. This resurgence is reflected not only in the comments of development officials and political leaders but is most dramatically seen in the rise of bidding values on potential investments. For example, Eisinger compares the \$11,000 per worker paid by the state of Tennessee in public incentive funds for the recruitment for a Nissan plant in 1984, compared to Alabama's pledge of nearly \$200,000 per job for their Mercedes plant in 1992. This increase in bidding wars between states is only partially moderated by policy leaders, now aware of the political risks of industrial recruitment, enacting "claw back" provisions and other policies that allow state to recoup their incentive money if the economic benefits of a recruited firm do not materialize.

Economic development policy, like any area of policy or social science, often folds back onto itself as it moves forward and develops and matures. The resurgence of firstwave policies that have accompanied the growing adoption of third-wave policies serve as a reminder that policy and politics are never simple and that all of these policies, plans, and initiatives exist within a specific historical and *political* context. What third-wave policies, especially at the regional level, offer is the creation of a new space where there is room for experimentation and collaboration. As the public and political leaders continue to be ambivalent towards the effectiveness of economic development policy and states and federal budgets continue to shrink, it will be the task of regions to fill the gaps. Given the lack of taxation power many regions have, this means that they will have to focus more heavily upon working with non-governmental actors and looking to leverage their available resources. In other words, regions may start to adopt more third-wave policies and become more active in their development.

Methodology

The author held a series of in-depth interviews with varied stakeholders, economic development directors, county and regional government officials from the TransPark and AMC regions, as well as representatives from community colleges and the private sector and asked them what made their specific regional organizations unique and effective as well as what they thought would make their organizations more effective in the future. These stakeholders were found and contacted through a network approach. The first interviewees were contacted through exploring county websites and articles on economic development and contacting officials currently active in economic development in the region. After speaking with these individuals, the author asked each of these individuals for three more names of people to contact for potential interviews, at which point, those people would also be contacted.

Interviews were conducted over the phone, in-person, and over email. The interview times ranged from twenty-five minutes to well over two hours, with clarifying or follow-up questions often sent over email to allow interviewees time and space to clarify their prior statements. While this network approach allowed the author to collect many names, the number of interviews granted remained limited, nine interviews with four individuals, but the author feels that he captured a wide array of voices of actors that are and were intimately involved in both projects and feels that the observations presented, and the conclusions drawn, are sound and valid. Of course, this work would only have been strengthened with the addition of more people involved in these projects.

In addition to interviews, the author drew upon newspaper articles, promotional brochures, and other primary documents relating to the Advanced Materials Cluster and the Global TransPark.

The Idea

In Northwestern North Carolina, Wilkes, Ashe, and Alleghany counties are running their own experiment in forming an advanced materials cluster from scratch through a series of regional industrial recruitment and retention schemes, as well as, a regional workforce development plan centered at Wilkes Community College. The Northwest North Carolina Advanced Materials Cluster Inc. is the non-profit organization tasked with leading the regional cluster strategy. The result is an effective, if slightly haphazard, combination of institutions that drive the regional strategy. The non-profit manages the overall region's strategy in recruiting potential new businesses as well as offering support services and cluster building services to already existing firms. Wilkes Community College is responsible for educating and training the future workers in these advanced materials plants and in working with business leaders to design and implement curricula that meet the needs of business and improve the skills of its students. The individual county leaders are responsible for maintaining contact with their current businesses and working alongside the AMC in recruitment and retention strategies. Finally, the business owners in the advanced manufacturing industry who are in contact with officials not only from the AMC but also their county economic development officials and teachers and administrators at the community college.

Professor Will Lambe at UNC's School of Government wrote a case study on this region in his book *Small Towns, Big Ideas: Case Studies in Small Towns Community Economic Development.* This work seeks to act as an addition to the goal of Prof. Lambe's work of profiling successful economic development programs throughout small-towns and rural American and to delve more deeply into how development leaders can successfully design and organize a successful regional economic development initiative.

Alleghany, Ashe, and Wilkes Counties

Alleghany, Ashe, and Wilkes are the three counties that encompass the NW North Carolina Advanced Materials Cluster. Table 1 gives a basic demographic breakdown of the region. These three counties are indicative of regions found throughout certain sections of the state as well as throughout the country. The populations are slightly older, majority white and poor. In addition, all three counties have populations with lower rates of individuals with a bachelors degree or any college and high unemployment rates. These data point towards a region found in many areas of this country and in North Carolina that struggle due to ongoing economic restructuring, increased competitive pressures from abroad, and attempting to transition from one-industry, sometimes even one-company, towns and regions.

| | Ashe | Alleghany ² | Wilkes |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Population | 25,482 | 10,677 | 66,607 |
| Median Age | 43 | 43 | 39.9 |
| Race (Percentage) White Black Hispanic or Latino (Of | 96.40% N | 95.70% 1.20% | 89.90% 4.50% |
| any Race) Other | N 3.30% | 5.00% 2.30% | 5.30% 1.30% |
| Median Household Income | \$35,339.00 | \$29,244.00 | \$33,564.00 |
| Per Capita Income | \$19,932.00 | \$17,691.00 | \$19,750.00 |
| Unemployment Rate ¹ | 12.30% | 12.30% | 13.40% |
| Poverty Rate (Family) | 11.30% | 11.30% | 15.10% |
| Educational Attainment High School Diploma or Equivalency Associate's Degree Bachelor's Degree | 31.80% 6.00% 8.20% | 33.30% 7.10% 9.90% | 33.00% 8.30% 8.20% |

Unemployment figures taken from the North Carolina Employment Security Commission
Alleghany demographic information taken from the 2000 Allegheny County Factsheet, demographic information for the other counties taken from 2008 ACS

Tables 2,3, and 4, found in the appendix, give a basic industrial break down of three counties, showing employment in industry and average weekly wages. The region's strong manufacturing base is still evident, even in these tough economic times. Manufacturing dominates, by share of employment, other industries in the region, although retail trade follows as the next largest employer in all three counties. For traditional manufacturing centers undergoing structural transition, this is to be expected. **Table 1- Regional Demographic Characteristics**

This is a worrisome development, though, as the median wages found in the retail service sector are significantly lower than those found in the manufacturing. In Ashe county, the median wage in manufacturing is nearly twice that of the private retail sector. This is a large difference and does not bode well for the future earning potential of the citizens of Ashe. Interestingly, there is also significant difference between manufacturing wages among the three states. Ashe manufacturing workers earn nearly two-hundred dollars more per week than those in Wilkes and Alleghany counties. But overall, the data show that these are vulnerable counties that are at risk for being permanently left behind with an aging, relatively uneducated population without access to good, high-paying jobs.

As was mentioned earlier, the region has a long history in manufacturing, primarily centered on textile and furniture production. The slate of plant closings in the mid-1990s

due to accelerated industrial restructuring severely impacted the region, resulting in the loss of over 10,000 jobs in the three-country region. Two companies served as examples and inspiration for the creation of the materials cluster. The first was a modern textile manufacturing company, Magnolia Manufacturing that used large, modern looms that were incredibly different from the looms used by the older companies that the county was accustomed. This new company served as a wake up of sorts for the development officials in the three counties. Magnolia represented the continued advancement of seemingly staid, endangered industries like textile manufacturing and it served to demonstrate that the US could still be competitive manufacturing but that these companies had to be modern and technologically advanced with qualified workforces. The second was the successful recruitment and eventual collaboration with an advanced materials company, Martin Marietta, During the recruitment process multiple officials, from John Hauser, Dean of the Industrial, Engineering and Customized Industry Training Division at Wilkes Community College, and Don Adams, head of Alleghany County Economic Development, spoke with Martin Marietta's CEO, Grant Godwin. Godwin made it clear to these two that Martin Marietta was committed not only to remaining in the region but in being an active participant in the continued development of the region.

With this assurance from Godwin, Hauser began to think about ways that Martin Marietta could help in the greater development of the region as a whole. He decided that Martin Marietta would act as a great anchor company from which one could draw in more companies to add value to its business and help the region as a whole. Thus the idea for Northwest North Carolina Advanced Materials Cluster was born.

What should be focused upon, though, when looking at the AMC and the entire strategy for these counties is the collaborative regional effort of the exercise. The principal strength of the Cluster lies in the ability of these three counties to come together, pool their resources, plan, and act together. The following section focuses on how even with a relatively immature Cluster organization the institutional linkages among the three counties are where the Cluster's greatest and most innovative strengths lie. **Looking at Northwest North Carolina Advanced Materials Cluster Inc.**

The AMC is managed by Northwest North Carolina Advanced Materials Cluster Incorporated, a 501-C3 non-profit chartered in November of 2007. This non-profit replaces an advisory committee based in Wilkes Community College and is now controlled by a board of governors. The permanent board members are the three county managers, the three county commission chairs, and the president of Wilkes Community College. In addition to those seven, fourteen other board members are selected. The permanent board members can appoint up to one board member each, and the remaining at-large members are elected by the board, of which, at least six should have experience in the business or industry that the board wishes to impact. The board is responsible for creation of a strategy and action plan for the AMC and to further strengthen the advanced materials industry in the region. The non-profit has had a mixed success rate thus far that has shaped the current capacity building strategy.

Mike Pierce, Director of Advanced Materials Technology at Wilkes Community College and the head of the non-profit frequently mentions the successes and strengths of the non-profit in encouraging institutional linkages as well as workforce development. The non-profit focuses, currently, on emphasizing the business climate and the well-trained workforce for outside companies as well as guiding their policies in the region. The AMC is the principal strategic planning organization for the advanced composites industry in the three-county region. Its focus is on guaranteeing the competitiveness of the advanced composites sector in the region through firm innovation and competitiveness, supplying a very well educated and trained labor force, and in fostering firm interconnectedness.

Early Successes

An area where the AMC has achieved early marked success is in workforce development. The AMC is instrumental not only in curriculum design for Wilkes Community College for composite manufacturing but is also active on a statewide scale in workforce development. Its two most notable achievements are its training courses and certifications based at Wilkes Community College and the workpath websites. Mike Pierce has developed an Advanced Materials Technician course, based on the Certified Composite Technician certification course given by the American Composite Manufacturers Association of America, and an Applied Engineering associate's degree program that attempts to give graduates all of the general skills that employers have said are required in the advanced composites field. In addition, the associate's degree can act as a preengineering degree that students can take to four year institutions and have a good start in an engineering curriculum. The Composite Technician certification allows for those who pass to fulfill pretty much all duties required of them on the shop floor, and at the end of the course the students will sit for ACMA national certification test.

The certification course and the Applied Engineering degree are valuable to employers because they fill the gaps in general skills that employers say they require. These general skills include: critical thinking, math skills, and familiarity with composite engineering theory and skills, such as CAD design, basic circuit analysis, and materials testing, all of which are covered in Wilkes Community College Applied Engineering Technology degree. In addition to supplying needed skills, these curricula were actively designed with the input of employers. Wilkes Community College and the AMC knew that the best way to design courses that industry would respect would be through collaborating with industry actors. Not only do these courses give residents of the region good standing with local employers but these are skills they can take around the state, and even nationally with the technician certification.

Along with the college coursework, the AMC, in conjunction with the High County COG, NC Rural Center, Wilkes Community College, JobLink, and the North Carolina Community College System have set up goworkpath.com and gostudentworkpath.com. These two websites are all-in-one websites that connect potential workers with not only job placement services but also job and skill assessment services and resources for education. The website offers a career readiness test, resources for potential employers, access to JobLink services, career planning advice all in an attractive and simple to use website.

The board has also decided to focus on more "traditional" economic development actions, in addition to its workforce development schemes. This includes developing marketing materials and forming greater partnerships with industry. Mr. Pierce said this move was, "...a good place to start," and that this model had two strengths: the first was that is a well-known model and allows the AMC to have programs in place that potential funding sources are familiar and comfortable with supporting, second, an organization's actions are limited by what it can afford to do and, frankly, the AMC simply lacks the resources necessary to engage in more of the intense cluster development projects as recommended by theorists like Porter. Mr. Pierce does want to eventually move the AMC beyond these traditional tasks when the economy recovers, focusing on greater business support services. He believes that the advanced composites sector offers firms of an appropriate size for such services and believes the AMC is best positioned to act as a leader in this area. This would include continuing workforce development services, exploring infrastructure support, and financing schemes, in other words, a more orthodox cluster support and growth scheme.

Mr. Pierce is a strong advocate for education and workforce development and sees

his mission as not only supporting the advanced materials industry in his region, but also to improve the employment the chances of the people in his county, region, and the state. The website is one part of the solution to address the lack of potential employees with strong enough general skills for many employers. These websites are meant to act in tandem with other programs and curricula around the state to get individuals, particularly high school students who do not plan to go to college, on a path to finding good work and possessing the skills necessary to be employable. In addition, because the website is statewide and carries wide institutional support it has the potential to grow as a model application for assessing, placing, and monitoring future workers of the state. The fact that the AMC and Wilkes Community College active participants and advocates for the workpath websites show how important workforce development is to their mission, as well as their dedication to the idea of regionalism.

All For One...

The greatest advantage that this capacity building/cluster development strategy has is the intense regional collaboration and interconnectedness of the three counties. The regional organizations have developed into an ordered hodgepodge of formal agreements, informal relationships, and fairly clear delineated roles.

The basic political unit for this region is the county. The county is the

intersection where local, county, and regional leaders can meet and plan, and the counties provide a lot of funding. The role of the county is unique within the region because the counties exist within what one could call a competitive collaborative relationship. For the economic development officials of the counties, their primary responsibility is to bring good jobs to their county. As a result, county heads see their primary role as recruiting new businesses. At the same time, the counties each have their own strengths and weaknesses and collaborate in order to attract new business. This is done through the AMC working agreement.

When a potential target company is located, Mike Pierce will make the initial contact with the company. From that meeting Mr. Pierce collects the requirements of the company and takes that information to the region's county managers and economic development directors. From there, Mr. Pierce will invite the firm to Wilkes community college, make a presentation on the region on the AMC and regionalism, in general. At this presentation are the economic development directors and county managers from each of the counties. From there the firm is invited on a tour of the three counties (in an order determined before the meeting). Each county will then present a confidential incentive package that they will present to the target firm. If a firm decides to locate within the region then the counties not chosen will be promptly notified and will discuss how to best support the county that the firm chose and to work with that county on potential opportunities for potential locations of vendor or supply chain firms. This combination of showing a unified front yet recognizing and allowing for individual county initiative is a simple yet effective compromise solution that strengthens county cooperation yet allows for vigorous, but friendly, competition. It is a simple and elegant process that keeps regionalism at the center of industrial recruitment and economic development.

While this cooperation is new and unique, there is still very much a battle to cement a regional identity. All of those interviewed mentioned the political difficulties in pushing for greater regional integration and cooperation. The dominant view in the area is still fairly parochial. Cooperation is often seen as a weakness or as, "...giving away public money to other counties," as one county leader described it. Fortunately, though, the region has a long history of cooperating on individual projects and the desire to continue cooperating regionally is growing. The High Country COG is highlighted as being one of the primary reasons that the region is able to coordinate as well it as it already does. The COG, for years, has managed, with the counties, a shared home and community care program, has offered technical assistance services, implementation assistance, even networking events. In addition, the COG holds monthly meetings with county leaders to keep everyone abreast of program progress and to act as a time of information sharing and collaboration. In addition to the COG, the counties also share the community college, a regional health system, their water, and they also share a regional tourism development plan.

It is this expansive view of cooperation and greater regional identity that all interviewed said was the greatest strength to come out of this advanced materials initiative. Don Adams, the Alleghany County Manager said that, "... if advanced materials were to fail as an industry, the strengthened relationships between leaders in the region would still have made this worthwhile". The reason why it would remain valuable is because the counties would have created stronger relationships amongst themselves and further the cause of regionalism, which all who were interviewed believed was vital for these counties to survive and eventually prosper again. This project has shown the truth to this old adage. The very existence of the AMC is a testament to that realization. The three counties had to recognize that they each had strengths and weaknesses and could combine these to make themselves infinitely more attractive than by themselves. For example, Ashe County is the most mountainous of the three counties. As a result, there is a lack of developable land for larger manufacturing plants. But Ashe has multiple manufacturing firms already within the county and a well skilled workforce so it makes sense for Ashe to work with Wilkes or Allegheny to bring in new factories because those factories will hire people from Ashe. Together, everyone wins.

The most important feature of the growing regional identity in the AMC is the growing political support for regional initiatives. All of the interviewees praised their respective county commissioners for having bought in to the idea that regional cooperation and planning are important. Dr. Mitchell mentioned how the commissioners recently voted more money into the AMC's budget to pay Mike Pierce more money and potentially look to expand the services his office can offer. There is a hope that this increased cooperation

among elected officials will also filter down to the voting populations in each county.

Challenges and Limitations

Unfortunately, the current economic climate and limitations within the organization itself have limited some of the potential success and strategies of the organization. The current economic climate has meant that many companies that were considering coming to the region to set up their own production sites have cancelled. To adjust to the lack of opportunity in recruitment, though, the non-profit has decided to turn inward and focus not only on workforce development but also increasing industry participation and communication between industry, education, and government officials. The industrial outreach efforts have met with mixed success. But the advanced composites industry in the region has decided to start its own projects in collaboration.

Martin Marrietta, which unfortunately closed its plant this past fall, and PPG, two of the largest advanced composite manufacturing firms in the region, started the North Carolina Advanced Composites Consortium in order to bring together private industry and to start thinking more strategically and increase industry's capacity to be able to work with organizations like the AMC. Unfortunately, the consortium has yet to be incorporated and is much more of a semi-formal networking group, but it does have members across the state and have asked Mr. Pierce to act as an education liaison where he can help to create a coherent set of educational requirements for the industry.

Due primarily to the current economic hardship the AMC has not yet shown itself

to be fully capable of managing the individual manufacturing members' relationships within the cluster. One of the main reasons for this is a lack of available resources for extensive outreach and the recession inhibits many owners and managers from attending scheduled AMC meetings as they are primarily concerned with keeping their businesses solvent. There simply is not time to organize and get people to attend a large, full cluster meeting due to the combination of the economic downturn, a lack of available resources, and travel limitations of business owners.

An additional limitation lies in the lack of a strategic plan, although just recently the board instituted an identity statement and a strategic map that explicitly set out goals and targets for the next few years. The board is in the process of drawing up a plan but two years have passed since the incorporation of the AMC non-profit and a plan is still forthcoming. Part of that is due to the extended amount of time it took to get the board set and finalized but there are other, non-operational issues involved. One has to do with the political and spatial identity of the cluster itself.

The three-county region that makes up the cluster is unique but also a political construct. The counties have set up a series of interlocking institutions and agreements to cooperate, but the greater region is probably a more appropriate scale of analysis and policy intervention. For example, Surrey and Yadkin counties to the south have more level land and have better access to highways with I-77 and 421 passing through them. In addition, Ashe, Wilkes, and Alleghany counties exist within the greater labor shed of the region with

many people commuting among the counties. Many argue that this expanded area is the real "region" and not just Wilkes, Ashe, and Alleghany. In addition to being a more accurate representation of the actual region's spatial make up, an expanded region would allow for greater opportunities to the south. For example, Forsyth County has an automotive manufacturing plant that is scheduled to open and this plant could offer opportunities for the cluster. The cluster could as a backfill and supplier region for this plant and increase its offerings of products and grow. Without Surrey and Yadkin counties included or the political will to look to expand or cooperate outside of the set boundaries of the three counties, the Cluster potentially loses out. The board decided to maintain the region at the three county scale because they felt that the Cluster would become too big and complex and wanted to maintain the focus specifically on Ashe, Wilkes, and Alleghany counties.

The AMC's immediate goal is to improve relations and connections with local industry. The AMC has participated in regional workforce development network meetings. Mr. Pierce's main goals are to get government officials, educators, and business interests in the same room together. Simply getting these individuals in the same room and offering them time to simply network and talk help to strengthen the social ties that are absolutely necessary for a Cluster to work. For example, two manufacturers in Alleghany county that met at the workforce network meeting were able to set up a supplier agreement in order to fill the regular shortfalls that befell them.

Regionalism at the TransPark

The Advanced Materials Cluster has its regional character mission hard-wired into its very organizational structure and identity. The by-laws of the AMC dictate that the permanent board members are the leaders of the region's counties and the interlocal agreement requires that potential advanced composite industries are approached and recruited as a region. The very language of the agreement stresses the importance of constantly reinforcing the fact that the AMC is a regional project before all else and that the gain of one county is a gain for all of the counties. This is not found in the organizational structure of the TransPark. The section of the organization specifically tasked with regional development, the North Carolina Eastern Region Development Commission is a separate entity that has, in practice, zero input on the strategic choices of the TransPark. The TransPark Foundation and the TransPark Authority are both separate and do not have greater regional representation; the TransPark Authority being run by the state DOT and the Foundation being run by private interests that were primarily selected due to their financial might in the region. Because of this we find that the organization, which espouses regionalism as its cause and goal, actually *excludes* regional government leaders from the decision making process of what is supposed to be a regional project.

The eastern region of the state in the late eighties and early nineties was suffering similar ills as that of the western region of the state today. A region that was heavily

dependent upon agriculture and inexpensive manufacturing, the eastern region of the state was suffering from the loss tobacco revenues and increased global competition that destroyed manufacturing. In an attempt to address these issues, Henson Barnes, president pro term of the state senate in 1990, approached the mayors of the largest cities of the eastern region of the state to present to them the idea of the TransPark. This group of five mayors formed the "Eastern Air Cargo Exploratory Committee" in order to formalize the relationship among the five counties in which their cities were located. This group of mayors eventually expanded to include leaders from eight other counties and was named the North Carolina Global TransPark Authority. Thus the Global TransPark was born as an explicitly regional project.

The North Carolina Global TransPark is an intermodal transportation and manufacturing hub in Lenoir County North Carolina. Conceived of in the early 1990s by Dr. Jack Kasarda of the Kenan Institute of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The TransPark was designed in order to take advantage of the necessity for rapid manufacturing and transportation services in our globalized economy. It was to house manufacturers that specialized in just-in-time production and offer state of the art transportation services in order to move their goods as quickly as possible. This included not only advanced transportation information technology, but also access to superior transportation infrastructure. This included a planned four-lane highway that connected the TransPark to US 70 and interstates 40 and 95, a ten-thousand foot runway on site that would allow for large cargo aviation trips, and a rail spur that terminated at the coast in order to connect the TransPark to the major ports in the eastern part of the state. This ambitious project would be managed and planned by the Global TransPark Authority, controlled by the NC DOT. The Global TransPark Foundation, a non-profit collection of private individuals that raise money to support the Authority in their recruitment and development efforts, and the North Carolina Eastern Region Development Commission, the 13-county eastern region responsible for regional economic development projects that are connected with the TransPark.

The Global TransPark started as a regional enterprise, lead by the mayors and county leaders of Eastern North Carolina but the statute that set up the authority turned the initiative into a state and private business centered project that ignored the needs of the region. There are many reasons for the lackluster performance of the Global TransPark over the past twenty years: early mismanagement and poor leadership, over promising of projected gains, a misestimation of the time necessary to get the site at a true operational level. But one of the greatest mistakes to accompany the Global TransPark's development has been its indifference towards the region that it is supposed to be serving. This is primarily due to the organizational *structure* of the TransPark itself. The tri-part division of the duties of the TransPark segregate the regional leaders from the development divisions. That TransPark Foundation and Authority have to work together by design but the Eastern Regional Development Association, officially tasked with devising regional economic

development schemes that are connected with the TransPark, in some way, are left on an island.

This isolation is built into the TransParks organizational structure. Unfortunately, unlike the AMC's by-laws and working agreement that keep the region as the central scale of focus and strategy, the TransParks tri-part organizational structure and state-centered management ignored the greater eastern North Carolina region. The TransPark Authority, the organization responsible for the planning, management and growth of the TransPark, it should be emphasized, is a state-run and state funded organization. This is seen in the act that constituted the TransPark and its Board of Directors. The Board is made up of: 7 members appointed by the governor, 3 members are appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Speaker Protempore of the Senate, the State Treasurer, the President of the North Carolina System of Community Colleges, the President of the University of North Carolina, the Chairman of the State Ports Authority, one member appointed by the county commissioners in *which the complex is located*, one member appointed by city council in which the complex is located, and the Commissioner of Agriculture.(emphasis added by author) What is conspicuously absent from this board is meaningful representation from the 13-county Eastern North Carolina region.

In practice, this has resulted in very little to zero input from the regional county leaders in the TransPark's development schemes. While this division of labor and responsibilities is logical and appropriate in certain areas, questions of firm recruitment and long-term planning should have heavy regional input, if only to make sure that those leading the recruitment efforts are better aware of the varied assets and opportunities available in the region. Unfortunately, the opposite occurred in the early years of the TransPark. An official from the Eastern Development Association during the early years of the TransPark points towards the successful recruitment of Seagrave Aviation as one of the most egregious examples of the TransPark administration ignoring the greater region and its interests. The TransPark recruited Seagrave Aviation in 1996 to much fanfare as it was one of the first companies to be successfully recruited to the park. Unfortunately, the TransPark recruited Seagrave Aviation in violation of the trust of the rest of the region. While there was no legal agreement to that prohibited the TransPark from bidding on Seagrave, two other counties in the region that housed Seagrave's operations were competing to be the consolidated home Seagrave's operations. The TransPark, backed by state and private money from the foundation, was able to offer a much better incentive package and poached Seagrave from the two counties competing for it. This hurt the TransPark in two ways. The first was that the recruitment of Seagrave, while successful, was not a great gain. Seagrave brought less than one hundred jobs to the TransPark and utterly ruined any political support or goodwill it had within the region. The TransPark was supposed to be an engine of growth not a competitor. The TransPark committed the gravest of sins in a collaborative scheme, betrayal.

The TransPark also betrayed the region by showing its Lenoir-centered bias. After

the establishment of the TransPark Lenoir county officials decided that their county should be a commercial air hub once again. Lenoir once held the primary regional airport but had lost that status in the 1980s. In order to regain their dominance the county started to campaign for an expansion of their county airport in order to draw commercial air back to Lenoir county. The TransPark decided to offer their support behind Lenoir's plans fueling a perception that they wished to favor Lenoir's airport over already existing regional airport hubs. These two instances show exactly what happens when you do not have regionalism and, more importantly, regional representation in the decision making process. If the Foundation or the Authority had significant regional representation then the TransPark would never have stepped between the two counties competing for Seagrave nor would they have allowed the TransPark to openly campaign for Lenoir's county efforts to disrupt the regional airport system.

What is unfortunate about the case of the TransPark is that it started as an enthusiastic and successful regional initiative, responsible for the creation of the North Carolina's Eastern Region economic development organization and the passage of a fivedollar license tag tax to sponsor regional development efforts. After those initial steps, though, the TransPark Authority, along with the Foundation, were separated from the interests of the region as a whole. This is not due to any kind of malevolent intent on Board members of the Authority or the Foundation but simply indifference due to a lack of exposure to regional concerns. There was simply no one available to represent the interests or concerns of the greater region.

Conclusion

What lessons can be taken from these two cases when policymakers or planners are considering joining the many experiments in regional collaboration? Looking at the AMC the TransPark, and the array of literature that deals with economic development policy, organization, and collaboration, I believe that there are four essential attributes that a regional collaboration, whether for economic development or any other area where multiple counties or municipalities would attempt to work together where before they had not.

The first rule seems rather obvious but it is absolutely vital and that is that a regional economic development organizations should be *regional*. By regional, I mean that regionalism should be formally built into the organizational structure. You must have regional representation on the controlling board of directors and participating and setting strategy. This cannot be overstated, a regional collaborative effort cannot effectively work, or cannot be called an effective regional organization, without regional representation. This means that there must be representatives from the affected counties/municipalities that the region encompasses. Shutting them out or not giving them an adequate voice risks limiting the effectiveness of potential planning and helps to engender political ill will.

The second rule would be to have a manageable mandate. A major characteristic of many current initiatives is that they respond to specific strategic areas, as discussed in the

literature review. This keeps an initiative focused, prevents unsustainable over reach into other areas, and, most importantly, having a specific goal allows for an initiative to be benchmarked and measured. As such, this requirement mirrors Olberding's second rule almost exactly. But it is important to remind officials and business interests to keep these efforts relatively specific, usually by focusing on a specific sector and staying within that sector. This does not actually limit these efforts too greatly as there are many, many layers within one particular sectoral scheme that require a lot of attention and energy in order to make them work, but the temptation to expand one's mandate or to try and address additional problems within a given organization, especially an organization that has met with marked success, are great. Giving in to these temptations should be avoided at all costs.

The third rule looks at capacity building. Mainly that capacity building should be the principal goals of these organizations and not necessarily trying to expand any particular office or industry's influence over a given region. This is a concern for both public and private interests and should be watched for carefully. Again, this is a situation where having strong regional representation and a mixed board will help to allay many of these concerns but it should be noted, nonetheless.

The fourth and final rule, which should be a general rule for all organizations, in the author's opinion, is that there needs to be an accountability system in place. This means that there should be rules for firing organization officials and some form of metrics instituted

such that progress is periodically measured and that there are mechanisms for acting upon both positive and negative outcomes.

These four rules cover organization, strategy, process, and accountability. If organizations can address these concerns and codify their approaches, then many political and management conflicts can be avoided and organizations can focus upon actually making themselves effective

Overall, the North West North Carolina Advanced Materials Cluster meets these theoretical requirements and are a fairly successful organization because of it. Given the current economic recession and the precarious state of manufacturing in the US and North Carolina, the fact that the AMC has been able to weather the closing of Martin Marietta's plant and continues to expand upon its services, develop new plans in workforce development, and continually communicate with county leaders makes this organization a premier example of what a regional economic development organization should be. The organizations workforce-centered approach, while unique and seemingly contradictory of the tenets of cluster theory, frees the organization from having to battle the forces of economics directly. The AMC simply does not have the resources to keep businesses like Martin Marietta or PPG supported in tough times, nor should it. By working on improving the workforce, encouraging communication and collaboration among industry and business, the AMC is playing a central role in the capacity building role that it has. In that sense, it has already been quite successful and has placed itself to continue being successful as it expands its services.

Conversely, the TransPark failed to meet the criteria for a successful regional effort. I maintain that the weight of the TransPark's failure to stay true to the regional nature of its mission is primarily due to its structure. Just like a house with a faulty foundation will collapse under its own weight, the tri-part division of the TransPark removed the regional character from its essential identity. Frankly, the TransPark turned from an original regional initiative into a top-down, state and business led endeavor focused on Lenoir county, the site of the TransPark. There were some positive regional externalities that came from this. The NC Eastern Development Association passed a five dollar license plate fee that is to go directly towards funding projects within the 13-county region. Although, even this promising initiative was cancelled by the member counties because they believed that the funds would go directly to the TransPark as opposed to the region. Frankly, the counties would never have suspected such a thing if the TransPark Authority and state officials had worked with good faith with the eastern counties from the very beginning. Incidents like these are frustrating because the TransPark meets the other three rules: it has cooperation and linkage among the private, public, and not-for profit sectors, it is focused on a specific strategic area, and there is an accountability system in place to remove incompetent officials (although some may argue that the system does not work efficiently enough). This should be seen as a warning to planners looking to work with other municipalities in order to form a regional development organization. You must keep regionalism at the core of your

organizations identity and mission. Other wise, you may be doomed to inefficiency,

political impropriety, and continued economic decline.

Local Appendix

Table 2: Ashe County Industry and Weekly Wages, Third Quarter of 2009Ashe County Industry Employment and Weekly Wages for ThirdQuarter 2009

| Ownershi | Industry | Establish ments | Average Employm | Average Weekly | Percentag e of Employm |
|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|---|-------------------|------------------------------|
| р | | ments | ent | Wage | ent |
| Aggregate | | | | | |
| of all | Total All | | | | |
| types | Industries | 646 | 7,472 | \$547.87 | 100.00% |
| F 1 1 | Total | | | | |
| Federal Governme | Federal Governme | | | | |
| nt | nt | 15 | 59 | \$764.94 | 0.79% |
| 110 | Total | 10 | | \$701.91 | 0.1970 |
| Local | Local | | | | |
| Governme | Governme | | | | |
| nt | nt | 18 | 822 | \$655.63 | 11.00% |
| | Total | | | | |
| D | Private | 500 | ()=(| ф <i>с</i> оо ст | 05 2201 |
| Private | Industry | 599 | 6,376 | \$532.57 | 85.33% |
| State | Total State | | | | |
| Governme | Governme | | | | |
| nt | nt | 14 | 215 | \$530.10 | 2.88% |
| | Agricultur | | | <i>QUU</i> | |
| | e, | | | | |
| | Forestry, | | | | |
| D | Fishing & | • | 1.66 | . | 2 220/ |
| Private | Hunting | 20 | 166 | \$451.17 | 2.22% |
| Private | Mining | * | * | * | NA NA |
| Private | Utilities Constructi | | | | INA |
| Private | on | 129 | 644 | \$560.65 | 8.62% |
| Tilvate | Manufactu | 129 | 044 | \$500.05 | 0.0270 |
| Private | ring | 23 | 1,295 | \$708.39 | 17.33% |
| | Wholesale | | -,_, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, | | |
| Private | Trade | 23 | 232 | \$703.59 | 3.10% |
| Local | | | | | |
| Governme | Retail | | | | |
| nt | Trade | 1 | 6 | \$285.54 | 0.08% |
| Duiner | Retail | 107 | 1 000 | \$200 F4 | 14.570/ |
| Private | Trade | 106 | 1,089 | \$389.54 | 14.57% |
| Federal | Transporta tion and | | | | |
| Governme | Warehousi | | | | |
| nt | ng | 10 | 49 | \$676.49 | 0.66% |
| | Transporta | | | | |
| | tion and | | | | |
| | Warehousi | | | | |
| Private | ng | 12 | 56 | \$404.22 | 0.75% |

| Local | | | | | |
|----------------|-------------------------|-------|-------|--|--------|
| Governme | Informatio | | | | |
| nt | n | 1 | 17 | \$361.91 | 0.23% |
| | Informatio | | | | |
| Private | n | 7 | 86 | \$630.56 | 1.15% |
| Federal | Finance | | | | |
| Governme | and | | - | ¢1.207.60 | 0.000/ |
| nt | Insurance | 1 | 7 | \$1,307.69 | 0.09% |
| | Finance and | | | | |
| Private | Insurance | 30 | 200 | \$699.64 | 2.68% |
| Tillvate | Real | 50 | 200 | <i>00</i> | 2.0070 |
| | Estate and | | | | |
| | Rental and | | | | |
| Private | Leasing | 30 | 92 | \$522.62 | 1.23% |
| | Profession | | | | |
| Local | al and Technical | | | | |
| Governme nt | Services | 1 | 4 | \$698.94 | 0.05% |
| 111 | Profession | 1 | | φ070.94 | 0.0370 |
| | al and | | | | |
| | Technical | | | | |
| Private | Services | 27 | 74 | \$524.58 | 0.99% |
| | Manageme | | | | |
| | nt of | | | | |
| | Companie | | | | |
| | s and Enterprise | | | | |
| Private | S | 4 | 168 | \$865.91 | 2.25% |
| 1111000 | Administr | · · · | 100 | <i><i><i>Q</i>OO<i>OO<i>OO<i>OO</i></i></i></i></i> | |
| | ative and | | | | |
| | Waste | | | | |
| Private | Services | 19 | 87 | \$366.84 | 1.16% |
| Local | Education | | | | |
| Governme nt | Education al Services | 7 | 439 | \$724.62 | 5.88% |
| 111 | Education | / | 439 | \$724.02 | 5.0070 |
| Private | al Services | 5 | 34 | \$439.92 | 0.46% |
| State | | | | | |
| Governme | Education | | | | |
| nt | al Services | 1 | 70 | \$431.70 | 0.94% |
| | Health | | | | |
| Local | Care and Social | | | | |
| Governme nt | Assistance | 4 | 68 | \$660.36 | 0.91% |
| 111 | Health | + | 00 | φ000.30 | 0.71/0 |
| | Care and | | | | |
| | Social | | | | |
| Private | Assistance | 45 | 1,202 | \$549.28 | 16.09% |
| . | Arts, | | | | |
| Federal | Entertain | | | | |
| Governme nt | ment, and Recreation | 1 | 2 | \$632.00 | 0.03% |
| 111 | Arts, | 1 | ۷ | ψ0 <i>52</i> .00 | 0.0370 |
| | Entertain | | | | |
| | ment, and | | | | |
| Private | Recreation | 7 | 38 | \$261.24 | 0.51% |

| Private | Accommo dation and Food Services | 41 | 688 | \$218.71 | 9.21% |
|----------|---|----|-----|------------|-------|
| | Other Services, | | | * | |
| | Ex. Public | | | | |
| Private | Admin | 29 | 150 | \$493.05 | 2.01% |
| Federal | Public | | | | |
| Governme | Administr | | | | |
| nt | ation | 3 | 1 | \$1,566.00 | 0.01% |
| Local | Public | | | | |
| Governme | Administr | | | | |
| nt | ation | 4 | 288 | \$573.81 | 3.85% |
| State | Public | | | | |
| Governme | Administr | | | | |
| nt | ation | 13 | 145 | \$577.60 | 1.94% |
| | Unclassifi | | | | |
| Private | ed | 38 | 26 | \$558.13 | 0.35% |

Source: Demand Drive Data System, D4, North Carolina Employment Security COmmission, Quarterly Census Employment and Wages

Table 3- Alleghany County Industry Employment and Weekly Wages, ThirdQuarter of 2009

Alleghany County Industry Employment and Weekly Wages for Third Quarter 2009

 OwnershipIndustryEstablishmentsAverage EmploymentAverage Weekly WagePercentage of Employment Aggregate of all typesTotal All Industries3503,582\$456.90 100.00% Federal GovernmentTotal Federal Government1060\$650.91 1.68% Local GovernmentTotal Local
Government13495\$589.07 13.82% PrivateTotal Private Industry3162,941\$423.50 82.10% State GovernmentTotal State Government1186\$702.69 2.40% PrivateAgriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting24285\$355.44 7.96% PrivateMining444\$478.73
1.23% PrivateUtilities***NA PrivateConstruction58222\$416.93
6.20% PrivateManufacturing18527\$520.24 14.71% PrivateWholesale Trade1035\$675.12

0.98% Local GovernmentRetail Trade16\$158.47 0.17% PrivateRetail Trade37288\$392.68 8.04% Federal GovernmentTransportation and Warehousing631\$675.74 0.87% PrivateTransportation and Warehousing759\$893.60 1.65% Local GovernmentInformation15\$357.85 0.14% PrivateInformation317\$664.96 0.47% PrivateFinance and Insurance1774\$666.75 2.07% PrivateReal Estate and Rental and Leasing916\$423.66 0.45% PrivateProfessional and Technical Services1744\$602.03 1.23% PrivateManagement of Companies and Enterprises***NA Local GovernmentAdministrative and Waste Services160\$331.08 1.68% PrivateAdministrative and Waste Services1135\$355.17 0.98% Local GovernmentEducational Services4200\$427.67 5.58% State GovernmentEducational Services136\$385.12 1.01% Local GovernmentHealth Care and Social Assistance345\$715.00 **1.26%** PrivateHealth Care and Social Assistance27547\$409.53 **15.27%** Federal GovernmentArts, Entertainment, and Recreation 120\$678.97 **0.56%** PrivateArts, Entertainment, and Recreation7267\$345.98 7.45% PrivateAccommodation and Food Services27353\$197.02 9.85% Local GovernmentOther Services, Ex. Public Admin110\$6,816.60 0.28% PrivateOther Services, Ex. Public Admin2387\$473.65 2.43% Federal GovernmentPublic Administration39\$503.06 0.25% Local GovernmentPublic Administration2169\$491.78 4.72% State GovernmentPublic Administration1050\$931.35 1.40% PrivateUnclassified1518\$379.13 0.50% Source: Demand Drive Data System, D4, North Carolina Employment Security COmmission, Quarterly Census Employment and Wages

Table 4- Wilkes County Industry Employment and Weekly Wages for Third

Quarter 2009

Wilkes County Industry Employment and Weekly Wages for Third Quarter 2009

| Ownership | Inductory | Establishmen | Average | Average | Percentage of |
|----------------|-----------|--------------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| Ownership Indu | Industry | ts | Employment | Weekly Wage | Employment |

| Aggregate of | Total All | | | | |
|--------------|-----------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------|
| all types | Industries | 1,352 | 20,913 | \$586.79 | 100.00% |
| Federal | Total Federal | 1,552 | 20,915 | φ300.77 | 100.00 /0 |
| Government | Government | 20 | 200 | \$894.47 | 0.96% |
| Local | Total Local | 20 | 200 | ψυστη | 0.9070 |
| Government | Government | 40 | 3,034 | \$629.35 | 14.51% |
| Government | Total Private | 40 | 5,054 | φ027.55 | 14.51% |
| Private | Industry | 1,275 | 16,826 | \$569.99 | 80.46% |
| State | Total State | 1,275 | 10,820 | \$309.99 | 00.40% |
| Government | Government | 17 | 853 | \$694.78 | 4 0.00/ |
| Government | | 17 | 633 | ¢094.76 | 4.08% |
| | Agriculture, | | | | |
| | Forestry, | | | | |
| Private | Fishing & | 23 | 148 | \$460.22 | 0 710/ |
| | Hunting | 23 | 140 | \$400.22 | 0.71% |
| Private | Mining | | | - | NA |
| Private | Utilities | 6 | 41 | \$832.68 | 0.20% |
| Private | Construction | 160 | 1,154 | \$640.52 | 5.52% |
| Private | Manufacturing | 88 | 3,747 | \$550.95 | 17.92% |
| | Wholesale | | | | |
| Private | Trade | 68 | 714 | \$664.91 | 3.41% |
| Local | | | | | |
| Government | Retail Trade | 2 | 10 | \$355.05 | 0.05% |
| Private | Retail Trade | 221 | 2,478 | \$417.55 | 11.85% |
| | Transportation | | | | |
| Federal | and | | | | |
| Government | Warehousing | 13 | 115 | \$720.53 | 0.55% |
| | Transportation | | | | |
| | and | | | | |
| Private | Warehousing | 28 | 402 | \$838.32 | 1.92% |
| Local | | | | | |
| Government | Information | 2 | 27 | \$378.22 | 0.13% |
| Private | Information | 14 | 278 | \$880.49 | 1.33% |
| | Finance and | | | | |
| Private | Insurance | 75 | 814 | \$647.98 | 3.89% |
| | Real Estate | | | | |
| | and Rental and | | | | |
| Private | Leasing | 49 | 183 | \$593.47 | 0.88% |
| | Professional | | | | |
| Federal | and Technical | | | | |
| Government | Services | 1 | 18 | \$899.54 | 0.09% |
| | Professional | | | | |
| | and Technical | | | | |
| Private | Services | 88 | 363 | \$664.88 | 1.74% |
| | Management | | | | |
| | of Companies | | | | |
| Private | and Enterprises | * | * | * | NA |

| | Administrative | | | | |
|------------|--------------------------|-----|-------|--------------------------|-----------|
| | and Waste | | | | |
| Private | Services | 74 | 541 | \$495.33 | 2.59% |
| | Administrative | | | <i><i>ϕ iiiciccc</i></i> | 213370 |
| State | and Waste | | | | |
| Government | Services | 1 | 14 | \$648.46 | 0.07% |
| Local | Educational | | | | |
| Government | Services | 25 | 1,407 | \$655.28 | 6.73% |
| | Educational | | | | |
| Private | Services | * | * | * | NA |
| State | Educational | | | | |
| Government | Services | 1 | 390 | \$613.68 | 1.86% |
| | Health Care | | | | |
| Local | and Social | | | | |
| Government | Assistance | 5 | 817 | \$675.73 | 3.91% |
| | Health Care | | | | |
| | and Social | | | | |
| Private | Assistance | 124 | 2,049 | \$503.70 | 9.80% |
| | Arts, | | | | |
| | Entertainment, | | | | |
| Private | and Recreation | 11 | 61 | \$271.56 | 0.29% |
| | Accommodatio | | | | |
| | n and Food | | | | |
| Private | Services | 99 | 1,588 | \$223.80 | 7.59% |
| | Other Services, | | | | |
| Local | Ex. Public | | | | |
| Government | Admin | 1 | 2 | \$1,227.65 | 0.01% |
| | Other Services, | | | | |
| D | Ex. Public | 06 | 17(| ¢272.07 | 2 2 2 2 4 |
| Private | Admin | 86 | 476 | \$373.07 | 2.28% |
| Federal | Public | | (7 | ¢1 101 77 | 0.220/ |
| Government | Administration | 6 | 67 | \$1,191.67 | 0.32% |
| Local | Public | 5 | 771 | \$542 60 | 2 6004 |
| Government | Administration | 3 | 771 | \$543.69 | 3.69% |
| State | Public Administration | 15 | 140 | ¢76667 | |
| Government | Administration | 15 | 449 | \$766.67 | 2.15% |
| Private | Unclassified | 45 | 25 | \$854.09 | 0.12% |

Source: Demand Drive Data System, D4, North Carolina Employment Security COmmission, Quarterly Census Employment and Wages

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