TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION:
COUNTERTERRORISM ANALYSIS AND POLICY IN THE
POST 9/11 ERA

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science (Trans-Atlantic Masters Program).

Chapel Hill
2007

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ABSTRACT

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The transatlantic relationship between the United States of America and Europe has traditionally been one of the closest alliances throughout modern history. The relationship remained close even after the loss of the common Soviet threat and into the twenty-first century. However, the morning of September 11, 2001 would become the turning point in the transatlantic relationship that highlighted fundamental differences in threat perceptions between the two allies. 9/11 introduced a new common threat to the twenty-first century—international religious-based terrorism. Despite the emergence of a new common threat, divergences in threat perceptions, legitimacy of force, and politico-military cultures have wedged themselves deep into the current transatlantic relationship. The European Union and the United States fundamentally differ on how to address the threat of terrorism. This raises the question: Why do the European Union and the United States differ in their respective threat analyses of modern terrorism and in their policies to address it?
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The transatlantic relationship between the United States of America and the European Union was at its height in military and institutional cooperation throughout the events of the twentieth century. During the Cold War, the serious threat of Soviet aggression gave both America and Europe a common threat in a tense, bipolar system. Because of this common threat, differences on power, perceptions, and policy were largely submersed for the defense of the ‘West' under the umbrella of American military might. However, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain brought down more than an empire; it brought an end to an old common threat suffered by both the United States and the Europeans which tied the two into nearly mirrored security policies.

During the last decade of the twentieth century, Europe redefined itself economically and, to some extent, militarily to take on a more active role in the international system. The United States encouraged the European Union to take responsibility for the European continent because it wished to pursue a less active policy in European defense, but was still the primary means of security through the NATO alliance. Divergences in security policies during this decade were minimal, mainly limited to European frustration over inability to suppress regional conflicts. The European Union was in its infancy in foreign and security policy during the 1990s, but
quickly became ‘baptized by fire’ in state rebuilding and peacekeeping missions after the conflict in former Yugoslavia (Ginsberg 2001). These learned abilities would serve the EU well in the future. The end of the 20th century foreshadowed the end of America’s sole responsibility towards physical defense of the European continent.

After the terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001, the transatlantic relationship faced a new challenge—international religious terrorism. In the face of a new common threat from international religious extremism, the European Union and the United States have chosen to address modern terrorism through increased levels of international cooperation and individual domestic policy efforts. Unprecedented cooperation between government, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies ushered in the new era of transatlantic relations. This new era was not without its problems though. In 2002, attitudes began to surface on both sides of the ‘pond’ that American and European interpretations of threats and acceptable levels of vulnerability no longer reflected mirrored security policies. What was an almost imperceptible rift during the twentieth century has ripped open in twenty-first century transatlantic relations over the threat of terrorism. This leads to the question: Why do the European Union and the United States differ in their respective threat analyses of modern terrorism and in their policies to combat it?

In the following thesis, I will attempt to answer this question by examining how American and European politico-military cultures have been structurally founded on different interpretations of legitimate threats, use of force, and soft power. The emergence of an enemy such as international terrorism does not require the suppression of fundamental ideological and cultural transatlantic differences like in the Cold War. As
threat perceptions experience variations on either continent, the level of security cooperation in counterterrorism policies will subsequently rise and fall. If threat perceptions are aligned, as in the Cold War, then the transatlantic levels of security cooperation are high. If the perceptions are divergent, as in the War on Terror, then the levels of security cooperation are low and may hinder effective action. The greater implication behind diverging threat analysis reveals a potential stagnation of effective counterterrorism policies—exacerbating the rift in security cooperation between the transatlantic allies is the greatest threat to successfully managing international terrorism in all its forms. Without successful management of intercontinental threats of terrorism, we are all at greater risk for another large scale attack.
CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL AND MODERN PRESENCE OF TERROR

Historically, terrorism has proven itself to be contrasting experiences for Americans and Europeans. Many countries within Europe have been dealing with terrorist organizations operating within their borders and targeting their citizens for decades. Americans, on the other hand, have experienced a limited scope of familiarity with terrorism prior to the 21st century.

Terrorism Before 9/11

Terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon in Europe, but Islamic extremism has changed the way Europeans view and deal with modern terrorism. For example, Germany and Italy have both seen their share of terrorist organizations since the late 1960s and learned long ago the lessons of just how high their cost tolerance with groups like the Red Brigades or Red Army Faction would reach. Europe’s experience with these non-Islamic terror organizations, whose methods included kidnapping and bank robbing, have led to law enforcement’s procedural familiarity even with the current wave of Islamic based terrorism flowing throughout Europe.

As far back as June 1976 an intergovernmental organization was “established to facilitate the sharing of information between European Community (EC) members over
issues relating to terrorism” (Rees 2004: 165). This forum was called TREVI, or Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence Internationale, and “became the meeting place for Interior Ministers of EC states to exchange information and discuss issues of concern as well as to serve as an interface with third-party countries” (Rees 2004: 165). TREVI had a specific working group which focused on terrorism and included police officers and intelligence specialists (Rees 2004: 165). Prior exposure to terrorism in Europe led many law enforcement and intelligence agencies to be ‘old hats’ at intragovernmental counterterrorism cooperation long before the U.S.’ policy focus changed in 2001.

Contrary to many European counterparts, the United States had little exposure to domestic terrorism before 2001 and certainly limited experience in international collaboration in managing domestic acts of violence. The first World Trade Center attack in 1993 by Islamic militants killed 6 people and revealed the accessibility of major American targets. The deadliest domestic terrorist attack before the second attack on the World Trade Center towers was the Oklahoma City Bombing in April of 1995. A parked van loaded with explosives toppled the Mera building and killed 168 people (‘Oklahoma City Tragedy: The Bombing’, 1996).

The United States also experienced isolated incidents of terrorism abroad, but nothing on the scale of 9/11 and certainly nothing to significantly shift American strategic culture at the time. Examples of attacks abroad include: U.S. Marine base attack in Lebanon in 1982, the Beirut Barracks Bombing in 1986, U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, bombing of the Khobar Tower in Saudi Arabia in 1996, but the most significant bombing abroad to challenge U.S. strategic culture came from a
suicide attack on the *USS Cole* in 2001 (Rees 2004: 166). All of these examples illustrate how civilians are just as valuable targets as military ones, perhaps more so because of the fear instilled in the surviving populace. American exposure to terrorism prior to 9/11 was not new, but still very limited in scope. Suicide bombers were a characteristic of the Middle East, and before 9/11, not something conceivably found in New York or London.

9/11

On the morning of September 11, 2001, four transcontinental flights, each loaded with up to 11,400 gallons of fuel, were hijacked by members of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda and turned into deadly missiles (9/11 Commission Report 2004: 4). Two Boeing 767s hit the World Trade Center towers in New York, one Boeing 757 hit the Pentagon, and the fourth plane, another Boeing 757, was crashed in a field in Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to take back the plane (9/11 Commission Report 2004: 7-14). The fourth plane was suspected of trying to hit the White House or United States Capitol (9/11 Commission Report 2004: 14). The lethality of murdering over 3,000 innocent civilian targets in one attack completely overshadowed any previous terrorist attacks in history. According to the *9/11 Commission Report*, “Before 9/11, al Qaeda and its affiliates had killed fewer than 50 Americans, including the East Africa embassy bombings and the *Cole* attack” (2004: 340). The enormous loss of life on American soil that September morning brought counterterrorism policy away from the fringes of threat analysis and directly into the limelight.

The first question many people asked after learning of the four hijacked planes used as weapons was, *why?* Two states confronting one another in aggression implies the
presence of two rational actors who have other means at their disposal for addressing an issue, such as diplomacy, economic sanctions, and allies. The nature of the 9/11 attacks altered the rules of this game. Terrorism is really a methodology, or series of actions taken to implement some goal (Snow, 2006). There has been a decline in terrorist groups with political motivations whose aim is not to cause a large number of civilian casualties, and a rise in religious extremist terrorism “where it may be the object of the perpetrators to destroy as many of their enemies as possible” (Rees 2004: 164). Islamic extremism utilizes terrorism in order to accomplish what they deem ‘political’ aims against Western democracies, such as the forceful expulsion of infidels from the Holy Land and the destruction of Israel (Snow, 2006). These are not the demands of a rational actor, therefore traditional military means are not a rational deterrent—suicide bombers do not fear retaliation.

Afghanistan

In the wake of the most atrocious terrorist attacks on foreign soil, the United States began seeking a military target to hold responsible. Terrorism, by its very definition, is a non-traditional military threat. The attacks on September 11, 2001 were not perpetrated by a state-sponsored army or even by an al Qaeda ready to stand toe-to-toe on the battlefield with American forces. Four planes became weapons against Western democracy, and the hijackers that perpetrated the deadly attacks on American soil had to come from somewhere. On the morning of September 17, 2001, American President George W. Bush met with his principle advisors “to assign tasks for the first

There are three ways to effectively combat terrorism: find and eliminate individuals, destroy their sanctuaries and training grounds, and destroy their ability to finance operations. The first way is extremely difficult to do because individuals are mobile and often have the support of the populace around them. The first step is then always to destroy any support network terrorist organizations might be utilizing. Training camps, state sponsors, or state sanctuaries are much more tangible targets for a military response. While rescue operations were still underway in New York and Washington, the United States and members of the European Union were making preparations for retaliation against the support networks of terrorism in Afghanistan.

In the United States, President Bush shifted U.S. foreign and defense policy to fighting a global war on terrorism against terrorists and anyone who would dare harbor them. The National Security Presidential Directive 9, titled “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States,” became the first directive on a global war on terrorism on October 25, 2001. This document is classified, so the exact text is unknown, but on March 23, 2004 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified before the 9/11 Commission that this directive was aimed at using military force to attacking the sanctuaries al Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan. As stated in Rumsfeld’s testimony, an air campaign was launched on October 7, 2001 against the Taliban in Afghanistan, twenty-six days after the worst attacks in American history.

European support for military operations in Afghanistan to bring down the Taliban was substantial. For the first time ever on September 12, 2001, NATO invoked
its Article 5, the mutual defense clause. Despite widespread European support for and participation in the invasion of Afghanistan, offers of logistical and troop support were not seriously accepted by American military commanders until after the conflict was largely over. The Belgium government held the EU Presidency at the time of the World Trade Center attacks in 2001, but the “offer of the Belgium government to contribute military equipment and soldiers to the war in Afghanistan was turned down” (Szyszkowitz, 2005: 173). Several European countries, however, did contribute to Operation Enduring Freedom on a bilateral basis.

Once the majority of the fighting was completed, then the U.S. turned to the Europeans for major contributions towards maintaining security. Many countries participated in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and “the UK initially took the leading role, with the support of troops from France, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal” (Rees 2006: 113). With European forces concentrating on maintaining security in Afghanistan, the American forces were free to turn their attention to their next target—Iraq.

The crisis of 9/11 also revealed a key weakness in the communication of the leaders of the transatlantic partnership between the U.S. and the EU. The EU was fragmenting from within over the leadership abilities of the Belgium Presidency after 9/11. As a result of the weak presidency, the major players within the European Union increased their bilateral relations with the U.S. (Szyszkowitz, 2005: 173). Ranking members in the American government, such as Colin Powell, sidestepped the EU Presidency in favor of directly contacting the major EU Member States and Javier Solana
for coordination efforts (Szyszkowitz, 2005: 173). The planning and implementation of operations in Afghanistan were squarely in the hands of the United States.

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan quickly accomplished its goal of defeating the Taliban, but Afghanistan still remains a key component to the War on Terror. Today, objectives have shifted in the country from eliminating the Taliban to more state building and prolonged reconstruction efforts. Due to the European Union’s experiences in the late 1990s on its own continent, state building is an acknowledged strength of European forces. Recent figures reflect the shift in policy focus in Europe, 64% of those polled in the twelve participating European Union member states in Afghanistan operations stated that they approve of troops being used for reconstruction efforts, as opposed to only 30% who support troops for combat against the Taliban in 2007 (Transatlantic Trends 2007: 17).

Mission objectives were accomplished in Afghanistan, but only through the costs of American and coalition lives. As of October 18, 2007, the United States has had 449 deaths and 1,291 wounded in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (http://icasualties.org/oef/). Including U.S. and all coalition forces, there have been 708 fatalities in Afghanistan (http://icasualties.org/oef/).

Iraq

Before the United States began its campaign in Afghanistan, plans for the invasion of Iraq were being formed. On September 18, 2001, a memo was sent to Condoleezza Rice titled, “Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks,” in response to a presidential tasking asking staff to explore
any possible links between Iraq and 9/11 (9/11 Commission Report 2004: 334). The memo argued that links were weak between al Qaeda and Iraq, and more importantly, that “there [were] no confirmed report[s] on Saddam cooperating with Bin Laden on unconventional weapons” (9/11 Commission Report 2004: 334). Nevertheless, both Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld argued for attacking Iraq almost immediately after 9/11 (Clarke 2004: 26, 30).

The Bush Administration and its supporters began to argue that invading Iraq and defeating Saddam Hussein were the next step in the War on Terror. The Bush Administration “used the rationale of state sponsorship of terrorism and the threat of WMD to justify the use of force towards a country with which it had long experienced an antagonistic relationship” (Rees 2006: 116). In the State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President Bush named an “axis of evil” in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. It was in this State of the Union that President Bush began laying the groundwork for gaining public support for an invasion of Iraq:

By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic… Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch.

In March 2003, the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to oust dictator Saddam Hussein and destroy the weapons of mass destruction suspected to be in Iraq. The Bush administration, as well as many in the American public and media, believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and might pass them on to the enemies of the America. This fear was articulated in the 2003 National Strategy for

The invasion of Iraq led to the capture, trial, and execution of Saddam Hussein. Hussein was hung 56 days after a court found him guilty for the deaths of 148 Shiite Muslims (‘Saddam Hussein executing, ending era in Iraq’, 30 December 2006). The invasion did not lead to the discovery of weapons of mass destruction or ties between Iraq and the 9/11 hijackers. In testimony before the Senate Arms Services Committee in 2004, the head of the Iraqi Survey Group David Key stated that Iraq was in clear violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1441 and 687, but “that it is highly unlikely that there were large stockpiles of deployed militarized chemical and biological weapons there.”

Many in Europe adamantly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Just one year after the invasion, a survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press showed how favorability ratings of American plummeted throughout Europe (A Year After Iraq 2004: 1). The sympathy and support for America from 9/11 fell by the wayside as citizens in Europe did not see the invasion of Iraq as justifiable in the War on Terror. Favorability ratings of Americans fell from 75% in 2002 to 58% in 2004 in the United Kingdom, America’s closest ally in the War on Terror (Year After Iraq 2004: 1).
America’s unilateral invasion of Iraq was also seen as an exaggeration of the terrorist threat, especially in light of the failed discovery of WMDs. High numbers in France (57%), Germany (49%), and even Britain (33%) indicate that European populaces saw even in 2004 the U.S.’ use of military force as an overreaction to the threat of terrorism (A Year After Iraq War 2004: 2). Currently, an overwhelming majority in Europe and a growing majority in the U.S. think Iraq was a mistake and wish to withdraw.

Iraq has become a quagmire for American engagement in the Middle East. The Bush administration’s propensity for unilateralism has left it without numerous allies to turn to for help in easing the burden on American forces. The situation is “unacceptable” in Iraq and the largest problem remains security (President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007). Since the beginning of the invasion, securing against insurgencies has proven impossible. President Bush rejected calls for withdrawals of American forces in Iraq from both Republicans and Democrats, instead opting for a temporary troop surge in 2007 (President’s Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007).

As of October 19, 2007, 3,834 members of the U.S. armed forces have died in Iraq (http://icasualties.org/oif/). Also as of October 19, 2007, 4,137 total deaths from all coalition forces had been reported (http://icasualties.org/oif/). Since the beginning of U.S. military operation in Iraq, 27,753 members of the U.S. armed forces have been wounded (http://icasualties.org/oif/). Prior to 2005 the exact number of Iraqi civilian killed is uncertain, but since March 2005 38,252 Iraqi civilians have been killed in the violence there (http://icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx).
CHAPTER 3
FRAMING THREAT ANALYSIS

To better analyze the differences in threat analyses and counterterrorism policy divergences between the U.S. and the EU, two key concepts must be introduced to create a framework for comparison. The first important concept is the ‘strategic culture’ of a nation. Strategic culture can be defined as, “cultural beliefs and practices about war as deriving from national historical experiences, national aspirations, and geostrategic circumstances” (Farrell, 2005: 2; quoting Colin Gray). This concept will be important throughout the rest of this analysis as a key indicator of why the United States or the European Union will see a threat as credible, the legitimate use of force, and acceptable levels of vulnerability. For example, the only wielder of legitimate force in the international system is the state (Reese 2006: 70). The rationale behind what is considered a justifiable use of its force becomes part of that state’s ‘strategic culture’ (Reese 2006: 70).

The second key concept will be the introduction of five security sectors. B. Buzan, O. Waever, and J. de Wilde developed five security sectors to completely address the five areas of security in the international system. The five sectors are military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. These sectors will offer five areas of strengths and weaknesses in which to compare the United States and the European Union
in security issues. These five sectors do not represent a traditionalist view of security, but rather better describe, for the purposes of this thesis, all the necessary means to effectively manage terrorism domestically and abroad.

The transatlantic relationship has historically experienced very high levels of cooperation in addressing security matters that would threaten not only the European continent but the democratic West as well, including the German threat during World War II and the Cold War era Communist Soviet Union. The United States van guarded the transatlantic relationship with its military and economic superiority in both engagements, but began to turn its attention other areas on the world stage by the last decade of the 20th century. The 1990s also revealed a European desire to become a great geopolitical power in its own right.

During the Cold War, the bipolar system between the United States and the Soviet Union led to American strategic culture centering on three core principles:

1. American leadership of the western alliance, with a preference for multilateral action;
2. nuclear deterrence; and
3. a shared belief in the utility of military force to achieve security objectives

(Lantis 2004: 363)

These three principles illustrate how American strategic culture did prefer multilateralism during the Cold War, but also the preference for military force in achieving security objectives. These three principles identified by J. Lantis will reveal how strategic culture in the U.S. has had to evolve to confront the new threat of terrorism. As evidenced in today’s international system, military force alone cannot achieve security objectives when facing a non-traditional military threat. President Bush acknowledged this shift in his January 2007 President’s Address to the Nation. The ability of the U.S. strategic
culture to adapt to the 21st century demonstrates the fluidity of a nation’s strategic culture to the attitudes, beliefs, and threats of that time.

Following the Cold War, the European politico-military culture sought to expand itself beyond an economic powerhouse of civilian power to defender of the European continent through multilateral institutions. In contrast, the American politico-military culture rescinded its dominant focus on the European continent for more troublesome spots posing direct threats to American interests abroad. The EU’s strategic culture was ripe for expansion after the Cold War, but a capabilities gap throughout the 1990s revealed the EU as a subordinate player in their own continental security. Bearing the brunt of the world’s military operations in the 1990s meant that the U.S. assessed threats from the perspective of ‘primary target’ during and after the Cold War, while Europe only perceived themselves as ‘marginal targets’. Therefore, Europe was able to develop a strategic culture based more on soft power. During the last half of the 20th century, it is clear that “US strategic culture was characterized by a common belief in the utility and appropriateness of the use of conventional military force” (Lantis 2004: 364).

Fundamental differences in ideology are also part of the competing strategic cultures of the U.S. and Europe. While both Europe and the United States are liberal democracies, they differ on where this legitimacy lies: “[T]he United States sees legitimacy stemming from the nation-state, while Europe believes it flows from the will of the international community” (LaFleur, 2005: 195). This difference is subtle, but very significant. Understanding this key difference explains where transatlantic disagreement lies about the legitimate use of force. When the U.S. invaded Iraq against the will of the international community, the European Union perceived that action as illegitimate.
Whereas, the same action (the invasion of Iraq) was perceived by the U.S. as an inherent right of the state to pursue its vital interests as a state, regardless of the will of the international community. This single fundamental difference is the most telling aspect on why the rift in transatlantic relations has widened so significantly.

To further expand the argument on how the U.S. and Europe have differing modern strategic cultures, I will use the author of “Strategic Culture and American Empire”, Theo Farrell. Farrell states that modern American strategic culture exhibits, “a military preference for high technology…and a pragmatic approach to circumventing legal restraints on the use of force” (2005: 13). While this description is accurate, it does present a paradox.

It is a paradox that American strategic culture dictates the government attempt to seek international consensus on the use of force, but will not hesitate to utilize its overwhelming military capability in the event a consensus cannot be reached. To explain the rationale behind this paradox, we must refer back to Lantis’ first and second principles of American strategic culture during the Cold War. The Bush administration attempted to win the support in February 2003 of the international community through presenting the case for an Iraqi invasion to the United Nations, the premiere example of a multilateral institution. Colin Powell went before the United Nations Security Council to address Iraq’s violation of Security Council Resolution 1441, a resolution calling for the inspection of Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. When it became clear the international community would not act militarily on Iraq, the United States decided to forego multilateralism for a unilateralist approach. The U.S. can do this because it maintains a clear military advantage in its capabilities to project its power without the
assistance of any other nation or organization. The decision to act unilaterally is further evidence of the U.S.’ belief that a state’s legitimacy is derived from itself.

The strategic culture of the European Union is much more difficult to formalize due to the special circumstance of each member state also having a national strategic culture. National strategic cultures are an impediment to formalizing a ‘European’ strategic culture because they often compete with one another. Britons have a different strategic culture than the French; the Polish have a different strategic culture than the Spanish, and so on. These disparities must be addressed before the EU can move to a common set of norms, beliefs, and ideas on the deployment of force against compelling threats.

In spite of various national strategic cultures, significant progress has been made in identifying a ‘European’ strategic culture through policies such as the Common Security and Defense Policy, a European Security Strategy, Europol, and increased EU military operations abroad. According to Adrian Hyde-Price, two themes are broadly shared in the European strategic culture:

The first is a view of war as destructive and uncontrollable and consequently something to be avoided at almost any cost. The second is the belief that a primary role—if not the primary role—of armed forces is deterrence and collective territorial defense.

(2004: 326)

These two themes are prevalent in not only the formation of every security and defense policy since the formation of the European Community, but most significantly, are prevalent in the staunch opposition to reasons behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The European strategic culture especially stands out when put in comparison with the U.S.’ orientation on threat analysis and securitizing a potential threat. This
comparison is particularly identifiable when noting the acceptable norms and ideas on military force when combating terrorism and its root causes. From a European perspective, “they often emphasize process over result, believing that ultimately process can become substance” while the U.S. “is less patient with diplomacy” and favoring the “stick over the carrot” (Kagan, 2003: 4-5). While these are generalizations, they do characterize the Bush administration’s decision to combat terrorism abroad through military action.

Strategic culture has evolved since the Cold War, and so has what constitutes a legitimate security issue in a world where ‘security threats’ and ‘terrorism’ are the buzzwords to mobilize policy. Yet another fundamental difference in ideology is highlighted between the U.S. and EU: Can a nation-state effectively address a traditional threat (i.e.-military threat) in a non-military manner? To answer this, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde have delineated security issues into five sectors that specify types of interaction:

[T]he military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.

(1998: 7)

These sectors are not mutually exclusive for results, but rather work in conjunction with one another to more effectively focus a nation-state’s capabilities in security issues.

These five sectors help to clarify why the European Union does not see itself as ineffective in security issues by not being a major military actor, but strengthened due to
its strong presence in four of the five security sectors. Succinctly stated, Europeans see their security outside of the military sector, thus their security contributions are most effective outside of the military realm as well. The United States, on the other hand, still views the international system as a traditionalist and “insist[s] on military conflict as the defining key to security” (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 3).

By using the strategic cultures and the five security sectors to create a framework for analysis, I can clearly answer the question: Why do the European Union and the United States differ in their respective threat analyses of modern terrorism and in their policies to combat it?
CHAPTER 4
AMERICAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONS THROUGH 9/11

This section will show that while relations between the U.S. and Europe were experiencing a high point in the 1990s, the end of the Cold War gradually brought to light fundamental differences between American and European strategic cultures. As the European Community began to step out from under America’s defense umbrella, it raised its ambitions to become an independent actor in world affairs. However, its military weaknesses were revealed quite starkly by its inability to deal with the wars in the Balkans. Following the disappearance of the Soviet threat, European publics did not support heavy defense spending, instead focusing on internal issues such as deepening European integration. U.S. and EU relations up until 9/11 highlight successful transatlantic security cooperation, but with the U.S. clearly setting the agenda as a result of the capabilities gap.

*Transatlantic Cooperation in the 1990s*

The period between the end of the Cold War and the end of the 1990s has been characterized by Europeans seeking a security identity of their own, while Americans were turning their attentions to existential threats outside of Europe. America’s domination of authority in European security entered a new phase with the end of the
Cold War. Immediately following the Cold War, Europeans began to focus more inward on increased European cooperation, integration, and enlargement; whereas, the U.S. “saw the threats from nuclear proliferation and rogue states presenting the gravest concerns...” (Rees, 2006: 5). Despite new focuses, the nature of the transatlantic relationship was not starkly redefined immediately following the end of the Cold War.

The first major challenge facing Europe during these formative years of post-Cold War security analysis came with the ethnic violence in the breakup of former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995. When conflict arose essentially in Europe’s ‘backyard’, the world awaited a ‘European’ response. As the European Community’s president at the time, Luxemburg’s Poos expressed, this was a European problem that called for a European solution. The famous ‘Hour of Europe’ declared by Poos would come to haunt the European Union as it quickly became evident that conflict on the European continent could not and would not be effectively dealt with by European forces. Roy H. Ginsberg coined this first attempt at diplomatic and humanitarian intervention in Croatia and Bosnia as a “baptism by fire in a zone of war” (2001: 57).

Unfortunately, this baptism by fire scorched the European Community. They learned an extremely valuable lesson: diplomacy not backed by military capabilities cannot achieve effective crisis management. By late fall of 1991, the United Nations became involved through the deployment of multinational peacekeepers to enforce cease-fire agreements (Ginsburg, 2001: 58). Despite the presence of international peacekeeping forces, the violence did not stop. Ultimately, the United States altered its strategy on intervention in the region to direct involvement. It wasn’t until 1995, with the help of NATO air strikes and American leverage that the ethnic violence was finally ended and
agreements reached at the Dayton Peace Conference in Dayton, Ohio, USA (Ginsburg, 2001: 58, 190). Also in 1995, the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was signed in an effort to increase transatlantic security cooperation, but the results of this agenda were disappointing. The early 1990s were a testing ground for the European Community’s desire for an expansion of capability, but the breakup of Yugoslavia proved to be too overwhelming for independent operations.

In 1999, Europe again had an opportunity to exercise military independence from the United States with the emergence of conflict in Kosovo. Again, the European Union was unable to muster enough power to project military capability beyond its own borders. The learning curve for engagement in the former Yugoslavia had been steep, and European intervention in Kosovo was much more tailored to effective crisis management within their diplomatic limits. As Ginsburg points out, “[the] Dayton [Accords] compared poorly to the Rambouillet Conference in 1999 when the EU countries took the lead and sponsored, held, and chaired meetings designed to stop the tide of war in Kosovo” (2001: 191). Still, “the Kosovo conflict at decade’s end exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern warfare that would only widen in subsequent years” (Kagen, 2003: 22).

The operational failures in former Yugoslavia and Kosovo illustrate how the EU “lacked the wherewithal to introduce and sustain a fighting force in potentially hostile territory, even in Europe” (Kagen, 2003: 22). Beyond these criticisms, however, lies a deeper issue. The European Union began a path towards more military capability in neutralizing threats to peace, not only in maintaining a defensive posture. The failures in former Yugoslavia and Kosovo helped to shape the European strategic culture to one of
collective defense and deterrence of war, violence, and regional conflict, as outlined by A. Hyde-Price.

More importantly, the European Union recognizes its strength does not lie in the military sector of security alone, but in the economic and political sectors; its military presence was to restore peace, not engage.

For many of the advanced democracies, defense of the state is becoming only one and perhaps not even the main de facto, function of the armed forces. Their militaries may be increasingly trained and called upon to support routine world order activities, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention, that cannot be viewed as concerning existential threats to their states or even as emergency action in the sense of suspending normal rules.

(Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 22)

The foundations for European and American threat analyses were laid during this decade, and these foundations revealed inherent differences in assessment through culture, ideology, and capability from early on. These differences became suppressed within the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War. American hegemony was solidified in a unipolar system in the last decade of the 20th. On the morning of September 11, 2001, all of these differences were momentarily forgotten as the ‘West’ once again became the target.

Transatlantic Cooperation After September 11, 2001

The terrorist attacks on American soil by Al-Qaeda on the morning of September 11, 2001 forever changed the political and military psyche on combating international Islamic terrorism for the average American. The morning of 9/11 became the formative moment for Americans because it left them feeling like vulnerable targets in a dangerous
world. The scars from 9/11 on the national psyche left Americans as finding “the world a much more threatening place than do most Europeans, and, consequently, believe immediate action is necessary to make it safer” (LaFleur, 2005:196). In September 2001, 55% of the American public believed that sacrificing civil liberties were necessary to combat terrorism (American Psyche Reeling From Attacks, 2001). While the majority of the public supported sacrificing civil liberties in the wake of the attacks, 70% of those polled opposed the monitoring of personal telephone calls and emails (American Psyche Reeling From Attacks, 2001). The ease of domestic restrictions on intelligence gathering under the Bush administration, in spite of the majority opposition indicated, reveals the ability of the administration to play on the fears of the public to pass such legislation.

In the days and weeks in the immediate aftermath of that day seared into memory, the United States and Europe were arguably as close as they had been since World War II. As the French President famously cried out, ‘We are all Americans today!’” Despite this heartfelt sympathy from Europe and the world, Americans were left feeling very much alone. The ‘sleeping giant’ who had been awoken after Pearl Harbor found itself on its knees for reasons incomprehensible to the average American for some time after 9/11. Nevertheless, the American government and people came to fundamentally understand one thing: We are the primary targets.

The transatlantic pond had never seemed as wide and deep as when dissention began to surface between Member States of the EU and the U.S. administration over what extent the use of force can be exerted on a perceived threat. Although the United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 1365 was “accepted and granted America’s right to react to the terrorist attacks, the neutral member states insisted on one specific point:
Europe wanted the international war against terrorism to be fought under the sovereignty of the UN” (Szyszkowitz, 2005: 172). The undying pledges of support soon waned when it became evident that the U.S. would not be conducting military operations under the auspices of international oversight. The U.S. felt as though the burden of primary target gave it the inherent right to engage itself against perceived threats. The American strategic culture became fixed on a ‘War On Terror’. Fully 85% of Germans, 80% of French, 73% of British, and 68% of Italian respondents to a 2002 poll said the U.S. was acting mainly for its own interests in the fight against terrorism, taking little into account the interests of its transatlantic allies (Americans and Europeans Differ Widely On Foreign Policy Issues, 2002). Transatlantic security cooperation was spiraling downwards in the post-9/11 period, as European allies “seemed more concerned about restraining American power than about toppling terrorists and tyrants” (LaFleur, 2005: 194).

The nature of modern terrorism in a post 9/11 world did, however, force both the EU and U.S. to realign their threat perceptions. Europe felt deep-hearted sympathy for the U.S. after 9/11 and pledged support both militarily and politically. A ‘new political will’ was injected into the transatlantic relationship to foster greater cooperation in the U.S.-led ‘War on Terror’ (Rees 2004: 163). Europeans embraced a new level of security cooperation following 9/11 as they prepared to combat terrorism internally and externally, as well as inviting their American counterparts to observe their internal security practices already underway. Policy change soon followed suit: “On 21 September the heads of government met in Brussels for a Special European Summit, where they not only declared their ‘unconditional support’ with the United States, but
also agreed on the EU’s extensive action plan to combat terrorism” (Szyszkwowitz, 2005: 173). This ‘Road Map’ established sixty recommendations that would adapt the EU’s model of internal security, originally constructed to deal with organized crime and illegal immigration, to cope with the threat of international terrorism (Rees, 2006: 79-80). The relationship was taken to new heights when “American representatives were admitted into some of the key EU meetings on internal security: the Police Chiefs Operational Task Force (PCOTF), the CFSP Counter-Terrorism Working Party (COTER) and the third pillar Working Party on Terrorism (Rees, 2006: 80). Transatlantic security cooperation during this time was at the apex before the nosedive.

This apex of cooperation began its descent slowly but then picked up speed as the Americans began to perceive far more issues as a threat to their national security than the Europeans. When the U.S. disregarded the failure of a UN Security Council Resolution to invade Iraq, instead choosing to do so unilaterally, Europe could not ignore the American government’s blatant failure uphold the very international institutions it helped create. The conditions became poised for policy divergence on counterterrorism measures.
CHAPTER 5
THE RIFT AT ITS WIDEST POINT: IRAQ

American Policy Approach to Terrorism Under the Bush Administration

Despite different prior exposures to terrorism before 9/11, is it possible for modern terrorism policy of the ‘West’ to converge after 9/11? Truthfully, not in the foreseeable future. Efforts to manage international terrorism could very well be a catalyst for increased security cooperation between the European Union and the United States since both representatives of the ‘West’ are key targets, but policy approaches to these two problems dictate otherwise. Aside from a shared (but not equal) target status, Europeans and Americans have taken from their experiences with modern terrorism two very different conclusions on confronting this problem. Each perceive the threat slightly differently than the other and this has, as a consequence, produced varying degrees of commitment to military and diplomatic means. The separation in how ‘threatened’ Europeans or Americans perceive themselves has resulted in a prevalent common threat being a modern wedge in transatlantic relations on security cooperation, thus undermining counterterrorism efforts by both sides.

The American government and people perceived themselves as the primary target of modern terrorism. This mentality dramatically impacted the American politico-military culture and became the backbone within the Bush administration from late 2001
onwards behind policy approaches focusing on not allowing a threat to fully materialize before actions are taken. Some of the first legislation immediately after 9/11 was the USA PATRIOT Act (The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001), signed into law by President George W. Bush on 26 October 2001. This legislation built on anti-terrorist laws passed in the 1990s under the Clinton Administration after the Oklahoma City Bombing by a ‘homegrown’ terrorist. The Patriot Act hugely expanded law enforcement’s ability to investigate the lives of American citizens suspected of terrorist association. For example, under the Patriot Act, law enforcement could “seize telephone bills, e-mails, medical records, educational reports, bank statements, business files, even library records; and, under its infamous ‘sneak and peek’ provisions, let them conduct secret searches of suspects' homes” (Economist 9 October 2004). The Patriot Act zoomed through Congress, but was almost immediately heavily criticized for its abundant crackdowns on civil liberties.

Another major increase in domestic security policy transpired in 2002 with the formation of the Department of Homeland Security. Furthermore, in September 2002, the Administration published the National Security Strategy, a thirty-five page document setting forth a new agenda for the American approach to global terrorism, rogue states, and the promotion of democracy. During March 2006, an updated National Security Strategy was published that remains the definitive document for all security issue policy to date. The Bush Administration further defined its fight against transnational terrorism in September 2006 when it released the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (an earlier version was available in 2003, but the most applicable text is from 2006). This
laid out the strategy to win the ‘War on Terror’ using all means at the US’ disposal—military, ideological, democratic, and financial. While the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006 addresses all five security sectors, there is a disconnect between acknowledging all sectors are important and implementing counterterrorism policies that only emphasize the military sector.

The decision to use force against Afghanistan was widely supported on both sides of the pond. After handing security matters in Afghanistan over to its allies, the U.S. began gearing up for its invasion of Iraq on the premise that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, or was trying to acquire them, in order to sponsor terrorism. The link between Iraq and terrorism was received with huge skepticism and opposition in Europe and eventually outright proven unfounded by the 9/11 Commission (2004: 334). The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have redefined modern warfare in combating an elusive enemy, but the intentions behind them are as different as EU and U.S. strategic cultures today.

Ultimately, transatlantic relations under the Bush administration have been mired in low points. There are several reasons behind this and some have already been analyzed at this point, but another important impediment needs to be discussed as to why the US government, under the leadership of the Bush administration, failed to rely on multilateral institutions. Traditionally, “NATO has been the dominant forum for promoting transatlantic military co-operation since its founding in 1949, yet it has shown little appetite to become focused on a broader, ‘soft’ security agenda of issues” (Rees 2004: 169). NATO simply could not adapt its framework to deal with fighting terrorism in all five sectors of security (military, economic, financial, societal, and environmental).
This failure led to increased bilateral relations with individual countries in Europe, the best example being the United Kingdom. Increasing bilateral relations with some European countries in the ‘New Europe’ and decreasing relations with ‘Old Europe’ has only further undermined counterterrorism cooperation within the EU.

*European and National Policy Approaches to Terrorism in the European Union*

The internal security structure of the European Community and later the European Union was established to handle international organized crime and illegal immigration, thus it was much more easily adaptable to combat international terrorism than any internal structure of the United States. Transatlantic cooperation was at an all-time high following 9/11, but the common threat of modern terrorism was not enough of an adhesive to hold the transatlantic rift together for too long. Policy approaches from the European perspective have been much slower than the American response, but are indicative of a strategic culture emphasizing terrorism as more of a law enforcement issue than a military one.

In December 2003 the European Union published the European Security Strategy—their answer to the U.S.’ National Security Strategy of 2002. Although much less detailed, this European Security Strategy lays out a strategy for fighting terrorism, organized crime, failed states, weapons of mass destruction, and regional conflict. This document is the first attempt by the EU at formulating a ‘European’ strategy and clearly emphasizes a multilateral approach to security. Through this document, a clear distinction can found between threat perceptions of Europe and the U.S., as well as
differing focus on what strengths the EU can bring to the military, diplomatic, and societal sectors of security.

As laid out in the theoretical framework, characteristics of the strategic culture in Europe are much harder to pinpoint because of the national identities of its 27 Member States. Some of these States, such as France and Germany, led the charge against American unilateral action in Iraq. Others are willing to support U.S. efforts abroad through troop and equipment cooperation, such as the U.S.’ closest ally the UK, or Poland, who relies more on American-led protection via NATO. One argument against the European Union’s efforts to ‘fight’ terrorism is that they lack a single ‘European’ methodology. The European Security Strategy has been a significant step in streamlining various methodologies of addressing security issues within the 27 Member States.

Intragovernmental cooperation and information sharing is at an all-time high within the EU and indications are very good that these relationships will only improve in the future. A ‘single’ European approach to terrorism is not required for effective management of terrorism. With such close intragovernmental cooperation, the EU can play up its strengths in the five security sectors, while downplaying its weaknesses.

Europe-wide policies have had to address the different motivations for terrorist attacks within member states and different national policies. The national policies are shaped by public opinion and threat perception of individual governments. When both Spain and the United Kingdom became victims of religious based terrorism, each populace had distinct reactions. In Spain, the new government rejected closer transatlantic ties and withdrew support. In the wake of the London bombings, the UK embraced the transatlantic partnership even more. The inconsistent nature of these two
reactions became the subject for much debate and criticism on the failure of a ‘European’ mentality about terrorism. However, the attacks in both countries were seen as caused by the government’s support for the war in Iraq.

Not everyone in Europe is content with their current levels of intensity in combating terrorism either. Some senior officials in Europe are beginning to voice doubt about the strength of their own policy in comparison with the United States’. Germany’s Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble publicly acknowledged in an explosive interview with Der Spiegel that more discussion needs to take place on the targeted killing of terrorists abroad and whether constitutional restrictions are currently too strict on the preventive detentions of suspects (Spiegel Online, 9 July 2007). Minister Schäuble’s statements incited a public outcry, clearly indicating that any ties with such extreme American policy would not be welcome in the European strategic culture. Nevertheless, some European policies are tougher than those in the U.S., revealing that the U.S. is not the only target to have serious counterterrorism policies in place. In Spain, a terrorist suspect can be in pre-trial detention for as long as four years and France permits warrant less taps and detentions for up to a year without substantial cause (Wall Street Journal 19 July 2007).

Many American scholars and policy makers argued that the transatlantic divergence over threat analysis could converge only if Europe lived through their own 9/11. In a terrible foreshadowing of events, Madrid, Spain was attacked on March 11, 2004, followed a year later by London, England on July 7, 2005. Many in the Bush administration expected the EU after these tragic events to fall in line with the ‘War On Terror’, but the violent events proved too much for the Spanish population. The Spanish
government was voted out of office, along with their support for the U.S.’ efforts in the Middle East. The bombings in Madrid also opened up a wider issue: The Spanish did not see themselves as ‘primary’ targets, so when attacked for their association with America, the primary target, the Spanish populace took steps to distance themselves from the United States. The removal of a pro-U.S. government by the Spanish people only reinforces the American mentality that they ‘go it alone’ in seriously combating terrorism.

The terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005 killed 37 people as the London public transportation system was bombed (‘London bombings toll rises to 37, 7 July 2007). On July 21, three more trains were bombed by Islamic suicide bombers with ties to Pakistan. All of the bombers had been men living in the UK and converted to radical Islam from within the UK. According to a 2006 UK Intelligence and Security Committee report, “The 7 July group’s connections to Pakistan (including the visits there in 2003, 2004 and 2005) have confirmed the significance of overseas links and travel to the development of terrorism in the UK and the continued need to tackle this threat abroad as well as at home” (Intelligence and Security Committee Report into London Terrorist Attacks 2006: 35). The London bombings became a prime example of how a ‘European 9/11’ would fail to bridge the transatlantic rift as ‘homegrown’ terrorists successfully attacked their primary target.

These two attacks also illustrated the split within the European camp over threat analysis and appropriate measures for handling terrorist threats. Spain found its pro-U.S. policies and military support a victim of the widening transatlantic rift. The United Kingdom found its threat analyses not far off mark with that of the United States after the
London bombings. Two separate terrorist attacks within Europe brought about two different conclusions to combating terrorism through national policies. Such events do not offer any evidence that threat perceptions and counterterrorism policies between the U.S. and EU will begin converge in the near future.

*Case Study: Extraordinary Rendition*

Beyond the divergence of counterterrorism policy approaches discussed thus far is the outright contrast in the acceptability of counterterrorism policies as a tool of the state to suppress the individual. The most blaring example of how deep the transatlantic rift has recently become can be found in the case of extraordinary rendition practices since 9/11. American and European politico-military cultures were structurally founded on different interpretations of legitimate threats, the use of force to address these threats, and the rights of an individual who poses a threat to the state. These differences have never been starker than in where the line of an individual’s rights as a member of society end and acceptable interrogation methods begin. American counterterrorism policy under the Bush administration has been treading on the underside of legitimate rendition practices to extract information from suspected terrorism operatives and supporters out of Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the world. When President Bush proclaimed that terrorism should be fought by any and all means necessary, he was including the darker, secret means as well.

One such darker method, whose secrecy was publicly revealed in 2005 by the *New York Times*, is the practice of extraordinary rendition by American forces.

Extraordinary rendition is “[t]he extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or
State to another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, where there is a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” (Report on Rendition 2007: 6). The U.S. government has never officially acknowledged the practice, but President Bush and officials in his administration have continued to vehemently deny facilitating torture by handing over detainees with the knowledge they will be mistreated by a third party. However, extraordinary rendition has been around since at least the 1980s as a secret practice of the U.S. government (Weaver and Pallitto 2006: 110). Despite the precedence for the practice, the Bush administration made sure the practice was no-holds-barred by the CIA after 9/11 (Mayer 2005; Weaver and Pallitto 2006: 110).

The Bush administration titled the extraordinary rendition practices, along with other extreme measures to combat terrorism after 9/11, the New Paradigm. The rationale behind this expanded practice is, “the threat posed by stateless terrorists who draw no distinction between military and civilian targets is so dire that it requires tough new rules of engagement” (Mayer 2005). Jane Mayer, a journalist for the New Yorker, used numerous first person accounts and government officials to aptly describe the process in her explosive 2005 article, “Outsourcing Torture”:

Terrorism suspects in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East have often been abducted by hooded or masked American agents, then forced onto a Gulf Stream V jet… This jet, which been registered to a series of dummy American corporations… has clearance to land at U.S. military bases. Upon arriving in foreign countries, rendered suspects often vanish. Detainees are not provided with lawyers, and many families are not informed of their whereabouts. The most common destinations for rendered are Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Jordan, all of which have been cited for human-rights violations by the State Department, and are known to torture suspects.
The New Paradigm must be maintained in secrecy due to its blatant illegal nature. Most obviously, it directly violates the Geneva Convention’s Common Article 3. At the very least, the New Paradigm facilitates the torture of suspects rendered to third party countries like Egypt or Syria. By not openly acknowledging the practice, there can be no accountability for the violation of human rights’ conventions or international law.

Not everyone is against the practice of extraordinary rendition. According to the former head of the CIA’s Osama bin Laden desk, Michael Scheuer, the practice of extraordinary rendition has been extremely successful in combating terrorism (Scheuer 2005). One senior Department of Defense official stated in an interview to The New York Times, “The intelligence obtained by those rendered, detained and interrogated [has] disrupted terrorist operations… It has saved lives in the United States and abroad, and it has resulted in the capture of other terrorists” (Jehl and Johnston 2005). Prior to 9/11 there were several cases of extraordinary rendition that delivered results, specifically when detainees were rendered to Egyptian authorities for questioning (Mayer 2005; Scheuer 2005). Mayer documents cases of extraordinary rendition to Egypt since 1995, citing individuals like Talaat Fouad Qassem in 1995 and Shawki Salama Attiya in 1998 as examples of these practices under the Clinton administration (2005).

Furthermore, extraordinary rendition under the Clinton Administration, according to Scheuer, was expected to uphold certain legal criterion before being allowed to proceed. Every suspect apprehended was convicted in absentia and the CIA’s legal counsel reviewed and signed off on every operation, with authorization by the executive branch, the Justice Department, and the National Security Council (Mayer 2005; Scheuer 2005). Within days of 9/11, President Bush signed a classified Presidential Directive
allowing the CIA broad authority to operate independently in pursuing suspected
terrorists and their supporters. Whatever legal and humanitarian checks were on the
former practices of extraordinary rendition were replaced by even more secrecy and
independence by U.S. agents acting on behalf of classified presidential orders.

According to the Bush administration, these individuals are not prisoners of war
but unlawful combatants who are not entitled to protection under the Common Article 3
in the Geneva Convention. In a statement by President Bush on 29 November 2001:

…non-U.S. citizens who plan and/or commit mass murder are more than criminal
suspects. They are unlawful combatants who seek to destroy our country and our
way of life…We’re an open society. But we’re at war. The enemy has declared war on
us. And we must not let foreign enemies use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself.

Foreign terrorists and agents must never again be allowed to use our freedoms
against us.¹

The “forums of liberty” that President Bush refer to include participation in a judicial
system, legal representation, protection of civil liberties and human rights.

Why are the new practices of extraordinary rendition so detrimental to the
transatlantic relationship? To begin, when the world’s superpower and arguably the
leading liberal democracy practices torture or knowingly sends detainees to be tortured,
the legitimacy of that democracy is seriously, seriously damaged. The Bush
administration is relying on “institutionalized secrecy to an unprecedented extent” and is
steadily “becoming less accountable to other branches [of the US government],” or to
international treaties, organization, and allies (Weaver and Pallitto 2006: 111).

¹ From a speech to the US Attorneys Conference, 29 November 2001; quoted in the Intelligence and
Security Committee Report on Rendition 2007, p 9
Extraordinary rendition is further indicative of the fundamental differences in the choices of action towards addressing a terrorist threat as a direct result of divergent threat perceptions between the U.S. and EU, especially since the U.S has a history of leading the practice for the West. However, the New Paradigm has taken this practice to a level beyond anything previously cleared by Commander-in-Chiefs. The New Paradigm illustrates the darkest fissure in transatlantic security cooperation and has uncovered the European community’s new mistrust in the U.S,’ ability to uphold human rights. The New Paradigm has proven costly for the Bush administration as allies have withdrawn cooperation, and in some cases outright sought legal restraints against the CIA operatives themselves. In January 2007, a German court issued an arrest warrant for 13 people suspected of being part of a CIA “abduction team” that seized Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, in late 2003 in Macedonia and flying him to Afghanistan (Landler 2007: 1). The German citizen was held for five months, in which time he was “shackled, beaten, and interrogated about alleged ties to Al Qaeda” and then released without being charged (Landler 2007: 1). The arrest warrant out of Germany is yet one more legal challenge to the CIA’s practices of extraordinary rendition and could very well pose problems to the CIA’s ability to move freely around Europe in pursuit of terrorist suspects (Landler 2007: 1).

Even the U.S.’ closest ally, the United Kingdom, has backed away from security cooperation with the U.S. in light of its extraordinary rendition practices under the New Paradigm. Following 9/11, the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) aided the U.S. government in what they called “Renditions to Justice”, or capturing suspected Al-Qaeda operatives and supporters and handing them over to the American CIA (Intelligence and
Security Committee Report on Rendition 2007: 19). At the time, SIS believed that the U.S. government had not altered its extraordinary rendition practices since the Clinton administration, when “criminal suspects seized abroad were either brought to the United States for trial, or taken to a country where they were wanted for criminal charges” (Bonner and Perlez 2007: 6).

However, it soon became apparent by the Bush administration’s rhetoric that their practices had been significantly expanded. The debate over whether captured suspected terrorists are ‘prisoners of war’ or ‘enemy combatant’ illustrates the will of the Bush administration to engage in skirting around established guidelines on the treatment of prisoners. Security cooperation was quite high between the British intelligence communities and the American intelligence communities until around 2005, when a planned joint operation was scheduled between the British and American intelligence services but failed to take place when SIS was unable to secure assurances that humane treatment and a time limit on any detention (Bonner and Perlez 2007: 6). For such an operation to be dropped due to the inability of the CIA or the Bush administration to offer concrete assurances that torture and illimitable detention would not take place reveals how far the New Paradigm has widened the rift in transatlantic covert cooperation. In general, the British government vocalized reservations present all over Europe—the CIA could come after our citizens and there is nothing to stop them from being tortured (Report on Rendition 2007: 20).

The most important lesson to remember from this case study is that sanctioning torture and hand delivering captured detainees to third party countries only delegitimizes the very democracy the West is trying to promote. There is no question the U.S. is losing
credibility over this practice with its allies and the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Middle East. Counterterrorism policies and operations will be worthless if transatlantic security cooperation in capturing real threats to American and European publics halt due to the greatly expanded extraordinary rendition practices of the current U.S. administration. With the New Paradigm, the cost tolerance towards these practices of almost every European government has been exceeded. If the next elected U.S. administration hopes to mitigate the current transatlantic rift in security cooperation, it will need to drastically scale back its extraordinary rendition programs.
CHAPTER 6
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

There are quiet a few people on both sides of the Atlantic who do not agree that the state of transatlantic relations today can be explained through the framework of opposing strategic cultures and differing threat perceptions. The fact that the framework applied here is not based solely on a traditionalist or realist point of view, but incorporates aspects of realism, is the first cause for objection. Stronger objections are also voiced that this framework fails to address the manipulations of the Bush administration to fight a unilateral war for oil. These alternative explanations offer wider considerations when trying to answer the question of why a transatlantic rift exists, but key weaknesses disqualify them from being utilized in the framework of this thesis.

The neorealist argues that the state of transatlantic relations today would need a framework that discounts historical experiences for more objective standards. According to this argument, strategic culture fails to connect itself to the long-term behavior of a state. A neorealist would argue that a state will always act to expand their power, capabilities, and resources so long as there is opportunity, regardless of past experiences and established cultural practices (Johnston 1995:35). The framework of strategic culture I present in this study rejects the neorealist framework because it does not take into account the historical experiences of a state as learned tools to expand its utilities, like
power. Furthermore, a neorealist framework would fail to completely explain why counterterrorism policies differ between the U.S. and the EU because a state can only expand its capabilities in effectively managing terrorism through learned experiences. The neorealist framework also fails to account for the resiliency of an enemy, targeted population, and cost tolerance.

This thesis is not promoting strategic culture and differing threat analyses as the only explanations for the transatlantic rift, but it does seek to provide an indicator beyond superficial reasons to the fundamental differences between the U.S. and EU. The transatlantic rift didn’t form overnight and neither did opposing strategic cultures. The strategic cultures highlighted throughout this paper trace their origins back to the Cold War and are good indicators of what will and will not exceed the cost tolerance of the national populaces. Furthermore, differences in threat analysis have also been present far longer than American troops have been in the Middle East. The problems in Iraq have been the biggest wedge in the relationship to date, but those problems neither caused nor explain why a transatlantic rift existed in the first place or why the use of force became such a fertile wedge.

Whether the alternative explanations come from the political left or right, both sides center around one issue—Iraq. Some believe that the United States invaded Iraq for its oil. Others believe that there really were weapons of mass destruction, but that we were too late before they were smuggled out of the country to Iran or Syria. Still others believe President Bush was settling an old score from his father’s administration. Operation Iraqi Freedom has become far more than the Vietnam War of our times; it has become the symbol for the transatlantic rift.
Is the American approach creating more terrorists abroad? Is that really the reason Americans feel more threatened? Yes, American operations abroad are creating more terrorists as the loss of civilian life climbs to enormous figures, but that is not the only reason Americans feel more threatened. The radicalization of European citizens to plan and execute attacks against American targets abroad lends credible evidence to this debate. However, the counterargument refers back to the U.S. as being the ‘primary’ target for terrorism, while the EU remains secondary as part of the ‘West’. This counterargument relies on the same credible evidence of European citizens becoming radicalized in Europe and attacking American targets abroad. The question of whether the American approach is creating more terrorists abroad is easily a topic beyond the narrow scope of this work, but the answer is dependent upon how you interpret the bombings in Madrid and London. Did the terrorists attack in Europe because America was too well protected of a target? Was it more harmful to attack the U.S.’ allies in the War on Terror (especially because Spain pulled its support for the U.S.’ military engagements shortly after their attacks)? These questions are not easily identifiable, but do offer further opportunities to apply this framework for analysis.

If the European Union had the full military capability of the United States, would they have chosen the same course? No. A capabilities gap exists, but EU capabilities are at a point in 2007 that they do not need to be subordinate to the Americans when it comes to counter or anti-terrorism policies. After 9/11 the U.S. turned to their European counterparts because, at that time, they had a better idea of how to combat terrorism through law enforcement. Again, effectively combating terrorism is NOT a traditional military operation. Even if the EU had the full military capability of the United States,
their actions would still not detour far from their established strategic culture embedded in more diplomatic means.

Robert Kagan, a well-known author on the American political right, offers another explanation on the differing threat perceptions between the EU and US in the wake of the late 20th century: the incapacity to respond to a threat can also lower the threshold for tolerance of security threats (2003: 32). To clarify, the EU concentrated only on questions of importance within the scope of Europe because they had failed to project themselves beyond this capacity, whereas the U.S. began to perceive threats in China, the Middle East, and North Korea because it had the capacity and vital interests to do so. This theory was sound during the late 20th century when traditional threats were prevalent, but does not explain divergent threat perception over modern religious terrorism. Yes, a capabilities gap exists in the military sector between the EU and the US, but the EU’s strength in the political, societal, financial, and environmental sectors of security do not render it incapable of acting on a serious threat. Moreover, the counterargument against Kagan argues that the threshold for tolerance of security threats is influenced more by the prominence of the threat than the incapacity to deal with it. For example, why would the EU’s cost tolerance for terrorism be the same as the U.S.’ if they don’t share the same status of primary target?

These are only a few of the plethora of alternative explanations available for the why transatlantic relations are currently distant. Transatlantic relations were anything but perfect before 9/11 and it may be some time before they are at pre-Iraq levels again. No matter what alternative explanation is presented, if it does not take into account the
historical and cultural influences on how a nation’s respective threat analysis is reached, then it is falling short of being a sound theory.
CHAPTER 7

FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

Why do the European Union and the United States differ in their respective threat analyses of modern terrorism and in their policies to combat it? American and European politico-military cultures stem from different perceptions on the legitimacy of threats, force, and policy. The emergence of an enemy such as international terrorism does not require the suppression of fundamental ideological and cultural transatlantic differences as in the Cold War. The level of security cooperation in counterterrorism policies has risen and fallen throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, and now we are experiencing a deep low. Six years after 9/11, a tragic event that arguably brought the transatlantic relationship closer than ever before, a great rift remains. I have clearly outlined the fundamental reasons behind the transatlantic rift since the Cold War. I have also clearly provided the reason that the transatlantic rift has worsened since 9/11. While I have clarified the ambiguities behind the transatlantic relationship, I cannot predict exactly where it will go.

The future of the transatlantic relationship is murky at best, but would most likely improve if the U.S. propensity for aggressive military action and blatant disregard for international law would cease. The divergence in threat analysis has led the Bush administration to extreme measures in security that would not have been considered
appropriate prior to 9/11. Although the transatlantic rift was starkly widened with the invasion of Iraq, the rift will still be there after the Bush administration has long been out of office. The superficial, administration-specific reasons that may have widened the rift will be eased and noticeable increases in the levels of transatlantic cooperation will happen, but the rift will still be there. Whatever administration is in power in the U.S., be it Bush or not, will not sacrifice ‘their’ way of thinking in order to appease Europe. I believe this is a fundamental aspect of not only the transatlantic relationship, but any relations between nation-states. The next leadership in office in the U.S. will undoubtedly bring a more level-headed approach to transatlantic relations, but a new style of leadership will not solve the problems under the surface.

International terrorism has become the foremost threat of the West. I believe that a greater convergence of threat analysis is possible between the United States and the European Union than what exists today, but not while the Bush administration is still in power or the Iraq War is still being waged. It will take a new American leader to realign the transatlantic relationship towards more collaborative counterterrorism policies, but not because President Bush caused the transatlantic rift. The Bush administration has exceeded the will of the international community and may exceed the will of the American public before all is said and done.

It is undeniable that the two sides of the transatlantic pond have deep historical and cultural connections with one another. However, the two strategic cultures will never be totally complementary of one another, nor will either side completely excel in all five security sectors. Until European and American strategic cultures can converge towards a
more shared threat perception on terrorism, their counterterrorism policies will not reflect
the same methodology to achieve their objectives, thus perpetuating the transatlantic rift.

The future of the relationship may be further stalled in light of new reports that
Islamic terrorism is finding new recruiting grounds in Europe, and that these new cells
are using European countries as home bases in which to launch attacks against American
targets. On September 5, 2007, CNN reported German police arrested three Islamic
militants, two of whom were German citizens and Islamic converts, for planning massive
attacks against the US Ramstein Air Force base and the Frankfurt Airport in efforts to kill
Americans. The three men were part of a German terror cell called the Islamic Jihad
Union, founded in December 2006, and had received training in Pakistan. The Islamic
Jihad Union had amassed 1,500 pounds of hydrogen peroxide, the same chemical used in
the London transport bombings in 2005—but this quantity would have been much more
powerful and deadly than either the London or Madrid bombings (CNN.com 5 September
2007). The two attacks were thwarted by German law enforcement and a spokesman for
Germany’s Interior Ministry reported that all three suspects arrested had been under
surveillance for more than six months (CNN.com 5 September 2007). The German
authorities had warned the US government of an impending terrorist action. Despite
information sharing on the part of the Germans, the Pentagon still said “the arrests had
underscored the need for international cooperation” (Knowlton 6 September 2007).

The planned attacks in Germany against American targets serve as yet another
reminder that the ‘West’ faces a common threat, whether they are yet able to sufficiently
converge their policies or not. If Islamic terrorists are using European countries as
launching grounds for attacks, then terrorism is a serious threat to not only the primary
target but anywhere that facilitates it. What is serving as the more prevalent transatlantic wedge has the potential to shrink the rift as well.

During the September 21, 2001 meeting between then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and the EU Troika of Louis Michel, Javier Solana, and Chris Patten, four areas of cooperation were targeted for greater transatlantic collaborations: tighter airline security and closer police and judicial cooperation, terrorist financing, border controls, and an improved exchange of intelligence information between the United States and Europe (Rees 2004: 178-179). In all four areas security cooperation has increased since 9/11, but all four areas also represent clashes in relations as well. In the wake of 9/11, the “EU agreed on the European arrest warrant, the common definition of terrorism and the common list of terrorist groups and individuals, the freezing of assets of people and organisations involved in terrorist activity, the upgrading of Europol and the establishment of Eurojust” (Szyszkowitz, 2005: 187). European and American security cooperation is at low point right now, but they have experienced several successes that could easily serve as starting points to further cooperation: “A number of countries cracked down hard on terrorists whose names appeared on US watchlists; within little over a year after 11 September, more than 200 people had been arrested in western Europe—primarily in Spain, Britain, Italy, and France” (LaFleur, 2005: 198). While the transatlantic rift will never be reconciled because European and American strategic cultures will never be the same, there is so much potential for convergence in the future.
REFERENCES


