EVENTALIZING BLACKNESS IN COLOMBIA

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This dissertation illustrates from four concrete moments the relevance of eventalizing the analytic categories with which we usually think the past and present of blackness: 1) the ethnicization of blackness at the end of last century where a anthropological and culturalist discourse prevails; 2) the medicalization and racialization of the society at the beginning of twentieth century when hygienic and biological assumptions prevail; 3) the national construction of a literate elite (letrados) and the first experts by the middle of the nineteenth century from the imaginary of the progress tied to the disciplination of labor and the scrutiny of wealth; and 4) the technologies of salvation for the slaves introduced to Cartagena of Indies deployed in the first half of seventeenth century from the Christian theopolitics.

My argument consists in identifying these concrete problematizations to show their singularity and density in which they emerged and transformed through different articulations of blackness. Therefore, there is not adequate to subsume nor to collapse in analytic models, more or less sophisticated, those appeals to ‘race’ or to ‘ethnicity’ as principles of historical intelligibility that cross all and each one of these articulations of difference. This dissertation is not about the conventional description of ‘cultures’ or ‘pasts’ from ‘the native’s point of view’; but, it is an eventalization of blackness that
refers to rethinking an object (or objects in plural) that has emerged in thought through specific games of truth associated with certain modalities of power.
A Katherine, inspiración y compañía irreemplazable
“[…] what human beings fear more than anything is not their own death nor the suffering, in which several times refuge has been found, but the anxiety produced by the necessity of questioning oneself […]”

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<tr>
<td>ACIA</td>
<td>Integral Peasant Association of the Atrato River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANUC</td>
<td>Association of Rural Users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-55</td>
<td>Transitory Article 55</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRIC</td>
<td>Indigenous Regional Council of Cauca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAR</td>
<td>Project of Agricultural and Rural Integral Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECN</td>
<td>The Special Commission for the Black Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constituent Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBP</td>
<td>Biopacifico Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>Process of Black Communities</td>
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<td>PMRN</td>
<td>Program of Management of Natural Resources</td>
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is based on my research among afrodescendants that goes back to the beginning of the 90s. My initial interest centered around studying the economic models and the local knowledge of black populations dedicated predominantly to the timber extraction with traditional technologies in the rivers Satinga and Sanquianga, in the southern Pacific region. Between 1992 and 1994, I undertook several periods of fieldwork, some of them for more than six months, in the context of an internship with the Research Program of the National University, in Medellín, that was part of an international cooperative project called Bosques Guandal.

While I carried out my fieldwork in those rivers of the southern Pacific region, I had the opportunity to witness the emergence of ethnic-territorial organizations and the local empowerment of their leaders. I attended some of the first workshops for the promulgation of the transitory article of the then recently sanctioned Political Constitution. This article considered the recognition of the collective property rights over the land for black people of Pacific region, as well as the recognition of some cultural rights for the black population in Colombia in general.

Working for the Colombian Institute of Anthropology (ICAN) in 1995, my research was mainly oriented around the ethnography of the emergent organizational movement in southern Pacific region of Colombia. Two years later, under the direction of Mauricio
Pardo and with funding from Colciencias (Colombian Institute for the Development of the Science and the Technology), a research team was created in the ICAN to study in the entire Pacific region the relationships among social movements, State and NGOs. The intense exchange among the members of this team has allowed me to understand what could be called the process of ethnicization.

My masters thesis at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill facilitated the systematization of materials produced from this research and introduced a more detailed theoretical elaboration taking into account the work of Stuart Hall and Michel Foucault (Restrepo 2002). For the chapter of ethnicization of the present dissertation some passages of my thesis are used, introducing much more empirical evidence and a broader frame of interpretation.

My interest in historical materials on the afrodescendants is more recent. It emerged from the dissent produced by the analyses of some historians in Colombia that evidence a sort of historical blindness and a sort of epistemological violence to the singularity and complexity of some historical documents that they deal with. It surprised me how easily they projected certain notions of contemporary common sense in their writings underestimating the density, heterogeneity and contradictions of these historical documents in issues such us the images of blacks or the technologies of intervention over their bodies as individuals or populations.

The definitive impulse to examine my problem from a perspective, that I would like to consider genealogical, derived from my experience of studying in the United States. I was strongly impressed by the centrality of race in the academic establishment, which has a clear tendency to racialize almost any discourse or analysis dealing with
blackness and difference, even though it may have occurred along other historical and social formations. From the historical and ethnographical materials that I had gathered, I found two main difficulties to follow this mainstream tendency. On the one hand, the singularities of the ethnicization process that I had studied were not really understandable if one assumed that only the issue of race is at stake, and therefore erroneously refereeing ethnic articulations to a sort of cultural euphemism. On the other hand, the texts of the seventieth century that I was working with showed conceptual configurations around blacks, Ethiopians and *morenos* or to those of casts and nations that could be racialiced only from a labor of obliteracy possible from a blindly historical presentism. I was dealing with some materials in which individuals and social aggregation were divided, individualized, and constituted in some clear distinctions and hierarchies that, among other aspects, appealed to color but without a category of race or a racial articulation.

Once my doctoral project was defended in 2003, I returned to Colombia to continue my fieldwork and to gather historical documents pertinent to my research. I completed the information on the ethnicization with more observations and new interviews. Also, I was dedicated to gathering the sources (printed and archival) that would serve as the base for the historical chapters. I had the support of a research assistant, historian Edgardo Pérez, to examine Archivo General of Nation and Archivo Historico of Antioquia. In addition, I got copies of the old printed books that are fundamental in my analysis like that of Alonso de Sandoval, those of Luis López of Mesa and that of José María Samper, among others. Most of the writing of the dissertation was completed in Seattle, between 2005 and 2006. After receiving useful comments from Arturo Escobar on two previous versions of this dissertation, I finished this version during my daily commitments.
between the University of Magdalena in Santa Marta and Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá. I wrote the whole dissertation in Spanish, the language in which I feel more comfortable thinking. Because this text is a translation, there are still several passages and expressions that conserve my Spanish grammar and categories. I hope this won’t be an unsalvageable difficulty for its understanding.

This dissertation aims to illustrate the singularity of certain problematizations by approaching four moments: 1) the ethnicization of blackness at the end of last century where a anthropological and culturalist discourse prevails; 2) the medicalization and racialization of the society at the beginning of twentieth century when hygienic and biological assumptions prevail; 3) the national construction of a literate elite (letrados) and the first experts by the middle of the nineteenth century from the imaginary of the progress tied to the disciplination of labor and the scrutiny of wealth; and 4) the technologies of salvation for the slaves introduced to Cartagena of Indies deployed in the first half of seventeenth century from the Christian theopolitics.

As it will be clear in the first chapter, I do not pretend to offer a history of the mentalities or a social history of the African diaspora of what is nowadays denominated Colombia. I do not seek to speak in the name of the subalterns, nor to account for their perspectives and positions. Thus, this dissertation is not one in which -as if this were possible- the voices and experiences of afrodescendants emerge. My aim is narrower, but no less plagued with difficulties. With this dissertation I seek to dislodge certain historical presentisms and metaphysical anchors of the contemporary racialist and ethnicist thought on which are constituted a major part of academic and intellectual analyses and critics of different tendencies. For this reason, I have appealed to the
eventalizing procedure and to the category of problematization derived of my reading of Michel Foucault.

Eventalizing and problematization have not had the same echo that those categories such as biopolitics, governamentality or genealogy, which are also derived from Foucault’s work. While these three have an important place in the contemporary theoretical imaginary (mainly in the United States) and they are used in multiple scholarly works, the implications of the categorie of eventalizing has been virtually inadvertent. Problematization, however, has been a very important category for anthropologists such us Paul Rabinow (i.e. 2003). Needless to say that with my insistence in calling attention to these categories I do not pretend to offer a ‘more appropriate’ reading of Foucault (that which would be, in the best in the cases, a monumental irony for a thinker like him), but showing with a concrete example their relevancy for avoiding analytic and historical mistakes that seem to inhabit the common sense (the doxa in Bourdieus’s words) of the most diverse scholars.

Questioning the de-eventalizing tendency of academic and political common sense --and, as long as they share assumptions, of activists, officials and intellectuals as well-- constitutes the theoretical and political location from which I examine different articulations of blackness. It is a task against the ossification of thought: “[…] by force of always repeating the same formulas […] one ends, it is true, to think in the same way, because one end not thinking at all” (Gramsci [1929-1930] 1981: 127). A task, then, that picks up the Gramscian premise about the pessimism of the intellect and the optimism of the will. The pessimism of the intellect is a critical attitude without guarantees that does not stop before the holy thresholds of the politically correct or what seems (or really is)
emancipatory or progressive. This involves a work that moves in the worldly land of the concrete, rather than the abstract certainties of conceptual systems smoothly defined that clarify everything in advance, once and forever with solar clarity. In this time of moral certainties, where good and evil seems to be clearly identified, the pessimism of the intellect is disturbing and, as the epigraph of this dissertation suggests, produce an anguish stronger than the one produced by suffering and one’s own death.

Finally, it is important to make a clarification about the text. My writing style supposes a patient and careful reader that follows the countless quotations from which my argument slowly advances. My proposal is a detailed exam of the textual evidence that respects the inflections of the texts and authors, the subtlety and density of their arguments. This way of writing opposes the habit of the fast reading that underestimates textual details and density. It is in the interstices of those details where one can disrupt the historical presentism that obliterates the emergence and deployment of an analytic space to understand the singularity of any articulation of blackness.
CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL STAKES

“[…] any effort at empirical description takes place within a theoretically delimited sphere, and that empirical analysis in general cannot offer a persuasive explanation of its own constitution as a field of inquiry […] theory operates on the very level at which the object of inquiry is defined and delimited, and that there is no givenness of the object which is not given within an interpretative field […]”


Eventalizing as principle of historical intelligibility

On May 20 1978 a round table discussion was held during which Michel Foucault was interpellated by several historians on his book *Discipline and Punish*. A critical paper of Jacques Léonard (“The historian and the philosopher”) concerning the book and Foucault’s replies (“The powder and the cloud”) served as the basis for the discussion.¹ It is in this context where Foucault appeals to the term eventalizing to illustrate the specificity and the contrast of its framework with regard to what then had become in the principle of intelligibility characteristic of historians.

The contrast between the use of eventalization as an analytic procedure and the work of the historians perceived by Foucault is explicit. From his perspective, the

¹ There is not translation to English of the whole discussion, but only the round-table published first as “Questions of method” in *The Foucault Effect* (Edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller). The whole discussion appeared in French titled *L’Impossible prison*, and edited by Michel Perrot.
historians have emptied history of the events; they have produced a ‘de-eventalized history’ due that the principle of historical intelligibility from which they operate is that of de-eventalization:

It has been some time since historians lost their love of events and made ‘de-eventalization’ their principle of historical intelligibility. The way they work is by ascribing the object they analyze to the most unitary, necessary, inevitable, and (ultimately) extrahistorical mechanism or structure available. An economic mechanism, an anthropological structure, or a demographic process that figures the climactic stage in the investigations—these are the goals of de-eventalized history. ([1978] 2000: 228).

It is not my purpose to echo Foucault’s words to erase in a statement what historians have done and, less still (from a non eventalization procedure itself), to collapse the multiple differences, contradictions and developments that have been produced in the last three decades among different scholars interested in the past. What interests me, on the contrary, is to recapture the implications of his statements—mainly how they operate in his own work without explicitly using the word eventalization—to examine the historicity of the articulations of blackness.

Contrary to other terms with which the contributions of Foucault are identified, that of eventalization has not been highlighted among scholars. This word appears only in a few passages in this work. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it constitutes a marginal or secondary aspect in his thought. My argument is that, on the contrary, eventalization as procedure constitutes the specificity and the linkage of archaeology and genealogy, and it defines the philosophical and political horizon in which Foucault’s work is inscribed.

Eventalization as procedure questions two interrelated habits of thought supposed by most of the theoretical and political imagination of our days: historical presentism and
the metaphysical inquiry. Historical presentism consists of the imposition of analytical
categories and assumptions that belong to some historicity horizons to others obliterating
possibilities of understanding of their singularities and incommensurabilities. In
opposition to the presentism, Stoking suggests that the historicism consists of: “[…] the
commitment to the understanding of the past in its own sake” (1968: 4). In the sense
given by Stocking, then, eventalization could be considered a type peculiar to
historicism. As other forms of historicism (in the sense of Stocking), eventalization
questions an extended attitude of thought that is comfortable and indulgent regard to the
most obvious anachronisms.

Eventalizing constitutes a radical suspicion of and a permanent struggle with the
concepts and assumptions that tend to be taken for granted; it implies a procedure of
cautious approach to other horizons of historicity and the own ones seeking to understand
in their singular configurations an event or series of events. This does not mean that an
erasure of the conditionalities of the present is considered possible (not even desirable),
of the situatedness and historicities of thought, to be in this way free of all obstacles to
access the past ‘such as it was’. It is not a naive defense of the possibility or desirability
of a subject of knowledge outside of (or without) history. On the contrary, it is to wonder
for each instant about the historicity that constitutes and supposes our own present. A
history of the present, not one history of the past, as Foucault indicated as his own
interest.

2 This enunciated of eventalizing as a sort of historicism is only applicable to the way in which
Stocking understands this concept, which is very particular. As Chakrabarty (2000: 22) noted, the
term ‘historicism’ implies a long and complex history, being in fact their more common
conceptions what is questioned with the eventalizing procedure, as I hope to clarify later on.
Therefore, in this sense, eventalizing is not a sort of historicism but rather a kind of anti-
historicism.
The constraints of the present are not all equals nor do they have the same weight. As Ranajit Guha notes, these constraints are not homogeneous due to the fact that they vary according to the experiences and understandings of the specific present that are expressed in the categories and assumptions from which the past is spoken: “[…] is not possible to write or speak about the past without the use of concepts and presuppositions derived from one’s experience and understanding of the present, that is, from this ideas by which the writer or speaker interprets his own times to himself and to others” (1997:6). It is in fact in this diferenciality of experiences and in a radical suspicion and permanent struggle with the concepts and assumptions with which one operated from a procedure of eventalizing. In this procedure the examination of the conditions of possibility in which something has emerged allow us to take a critical distance from the historical presentism and its powerful effects. Of course that eventalization is not the only way for this questioning, and it is probable that it is not the most expeditious.

While the subject of study is closer to our own horizon of historicity, it is more difficult to identify the effects and operations of historical presentism given the subtlety of their mediations. At more of a ‘distance,’ the epistemic violence of the historical presentism tends to be more evident and intolerable even to the most superficial of the analyses with a minimum reflexive attitude on the terms that constitute them. Thus, as I will demonstrate in one of the chapters of this dissertation, when the descriptions written by the Jesuit Alonso de Sandoval in the first half of the seventeenth century on the body of those ‘Ethiopians’ that arrived as enslaved to the port of Cartagena are read with some seriousness, or when his discussions on the ‘color’ with which they will ‘resuscitate’ are
followed with close attention, it requires a monumental effort of obliteration of the singularity to see them as a matter of racial thinking and race.

Nevertheless, as I will approach in another chapter of this dissertation, it turns out to be more difficult to identify the singularity of descriptions and discussions of, for example, some *letrados* of mid nineteenth century in the New Granda due to the fact that they appeal to a vocabulary that we assume we recognize and that interpellates us directly. Thus, for example, due to their uses of the term of ‘race’ or their descriptions on the ‘natural indolence of blacks’, one tent to establish a set of associations and permutations that say more about the moral and intellectuals stages of our own present and of ourselves than of the singularity of the racial articulations of those *letrados*.

The metaphysical inquiry is the second habit of thought questioned by the procedure of eventalizing. Foucault states that the rupture with the evidence that looked for the eventalization as procedure implied that: “It means making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, and immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformity on all” ([1978] 2000: 228). Three of the most prominent features in the metaphysical inquiry consist of thinking in terms of historical constants, anthropologic universals or prefabricated generalizations. These three features converging in the obliteration of the singular of an event or series of events is what eventalizing seeks to highlight. In relation to the historical constants, besides the critiques of the historical presentism previously introduced, Foucault underlines his suspicion about the intellectual attitude of the ‘lineal reading of history’ that constitutes most political and sociological analysis, and that “[…]
consists in presupposing the repetition and extension of the same mechanisms throughout the history of our societies” (Foucault 1986: 5).

In opposition to this lineal reading of the history, Foucault has proposed genealogy. Recapturing the distinction that Nietzsche made of the categories Ursprung (origin) and Erfindung (invention), Foucault (1977) established a substantial methodological difference among the genealogical inquiry of lines of multiple transformations and dispersions of events or series of events that emerge in determined correlations of force and, on the other side, the metaphysical investigation of the monolithic ‘origin’ and the teleological unfolding of a transcendental entity associated with certain tendencies of the historical analysis. The genealogy consists in “a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make a reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness through the course of history” (Foucault 1980: 117). In this sense, genealogy can be considered as a component of the procedure of eventalizing, one that opposes what Chakrabarty characterizes as ‘historicism.’

In his book Provinzializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty defines ‘historicism’ as a mode of thinking that assumes that “[...] in order to understand the nature of anything in this world we must see it as an historically developing entity, that is, first, as an individual and unique whole —as some kind of unity at least in potentia— and, second, as something that develops over time.” (2000: 23). This way of thinking is not limited to the plainest teleological analyses:

Historicism typically can allow for complexities and zigzags in this development; it seeks to find the general in the particular, and it does not entail any necessary assumptions of teleology. But the idea of development and the assumption that a certain amount of time elapses in the very process of development are critical to
this understanding. Needless to say, this passages of time that is constitutive both
the narrative and the concept of development is, in the famous words of Walter
Benjamin, the secular, empty, and homogeneous time of history. (Chakrabarty

Understood in this way, historicism as a mode of thinking operates from the
establishment of historical constants, this is, it supposes the existence of entities —virtual
or actual— that maintain their nature, unit and identity underneath the appearances along
a series of developments that go back to the beginnings of a secular historical time,
empty and homogeneous. The principle of intelligibility consists, then, in refers to these
general and final entities the particularities or specificities identified that cannot be more
than accidents of their manifestation in a given moment. From this perspective,
eventalizing as procedure is opposed and questions ‘historicism.’

In regard to the anthropological universals, Foucault argues for a systematic
skepticism that is translated in the historical interrogation of their constitution. In an
essay written under the alias of Maurice Florence for the *Dictionnarie des philosophes*,
Foucault presented toward the end of its life what had constituted his methodological
elections in the following terms. In the first place, “Avoid as much as possible the
universals of anthropology [...] in order to investigate their historical constitution”
([1984] 1988: 15). Second, before to appeal to a constituent and transcendental subject of
the philosophy, “[...] we must descend to the study of the concrete practices through
which the subject is constituted in a field of knowledge” ([1984] 1988: 15). In another
passage, he affirmed it in the same way: “One has to dispense with the constituent
subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to arrive at an analysis with can account for
the constitution of the subject within a historical framework.” (Foucault 1980: 117).
These methodological elections point to the question of the anthropological universals and to the necessity of locating the analysis in the plane of the concrete practices and of their historicities. Not more the Subject neither Reason, Desire, History, Law, Unconscious or Culture (this way with a capital initial) as anthropological universals undermine in an de-eventalized analysis the configuration of relationships, practices and representations that emerge, transform and disperse in a given moment. It is not that one refuses the existence of anthropological universals, but rather they are thought more as one of the points of arrival to concrete analysis than the altar at which the inquiry for density and singularity is sacrificed. As Rabinow indicated, this helps to make Foucault a thinker who engages in “[…] constant pluralizing and decapitalizing of all great concepts, first principles, and fundamental ground that our tradition has produced. The problem of reason is not a juridical or ontological one; it is historical and political.” (1984: 14).

Finally, the in advance established generalizations also oppose the possibility that the events or series of events appear in their singularity. In this point, Chakrabarty argument is relevant: “Singularity is a matter of viewing, it comes into being as that which resist our attempt to se something as a particular instance of a general idea or category.” (2000: 82). One of the most important premises of eventualization as procedure is to challenge the tendency to endorse what is examined to a general principle, a law or a case of an entity that subordinate it. This challenge means a permanent struggle with language due that “[…] since language itself mostly speaks of the general […] Facing the singular might be a question of straining against language itself […]” (Chakrabarty 2000: 83). In a passage that is reminiscent of the above quotation from
Foucault about the historians and their tendency toward de-eventalization, Chakrabarty mentions Paul Veyne to establish a distinction between specificity and singularity:

“History is interested in individualized events […] but it is not interested in their individuality; it seeks to understand them — that is, to find among them a kind of generality […]” (Cited by Chakrabarty 2000: 82).

The metaphysical intelligibility tends to wonder about the nature of a thing or certain fact that transcends itself. Therefore its question is always about what something is, what its nature is. In contrast, for eventualization as procedure the pertinent question is about how an event or series of events are constituted in a certain moment:

In order to get a better understanding of what is punished and why, I wanted to ask the question of how does one punish? This was the same procedure as I had used when dealing with madness: rather than asking what, in a given period, is regarded as sanity or insanity, as mental illness or normal behavior, I wanted to ask how these divisions are effected. It’s a method that seems to me to yield […] at least a fairly fruitful kind of intelligibility. (Foucault [1978] 2000: 224).

In synthesis, the perspectives and frameworks that constitute the dissimilar articulations of the metaphysical inquiry appeal to foundationalist positions on behalf of a reality beyond the surface of the appearances or of the variations considered them as accidents or simulacrum. Therefore, they assume the existence of primordial and transhistorical entities. Eventualization involves, on the contrary, a radical historical ontology that seeks for not to ignore its own historicity. Chakrabarty argues a series of precisions that are relevant in the establishment of the limitations and achievements of a historical ontology as the one that is involved by eventualization. He indicates that “It is not enough to historicize ‘history,’ the discipline, for that only uncritically keeps in place the very
understanding of time that enables us to historicize in the first place.” (Chakrabarty 2000:93). This form of understanding time supposes a sort of naturalization:

The naturalism of historical time, however, lies in the belief that *everything* can be historicized. So although the non-naturalness of the discipline of history is granted, the assumed universal applicability of its method entails the further assumption that it is always possible to assign people, places, and objects to a naturally existing, continuous flow of historical time. (Chakrabarty 2000:73).

Nevertheless, this conception of time and the applicability to what exist is only a way-to-be in the world, in which operates on the principle of the disenchantment of the world:

One historicizes only insofar as one belongs to a mode of being in the world that is aligned with the principle of ‘disenchantment of the universe,’ which underlies knowledge in the social sciences […] But ‘disenchantment’ is not the only principle by which we world the earth. The supernatural can inhabit the world in these other modes of worlding, and no always as a problem or result of conscious belief or ideas. (Chakrabarty 2000:111).

These statements echo with Foucault when, in his text on eventalization, he argued:

The question I won’t succeed in answering here but have been asking myself from the beginning is roughly the following: What is history, given that there is continually being produced within it a separation of true and false? By that I mean four things. First, in what sense is the production and transformation of the true/false division characteristic and decisive for our historicity? Second, in what specific ways has this relation operated in Western societies, which produce scientific knowledge whose forms are perpetually changing and whose values are posited as universal? Third, what historical knowledge is possible of a history that itself produces the true/false distinction on which such knowledge depends? Fourth, isn’t the most general political problems the problem of truth? How can one analyze the connection between ways of distinguishing true and false and ways of governing oneself and others. (Foucault [1978] 2000: 233).

This dissertation follows eventalization as procedure in its critique of the metaphysical inquiry of blackness. It does not start with the assumption of historical constants, anthropological universals or generalizations that would give a ‘master coherence’ or an existence of blackness independently of the events or series of events that constitute it as such. It does not appeal to ‘race’ as an historical constant that would spin in its specific
configurations the articulations of blackness associated to the moments in question (the first half of the seventeenth century in Cartagena, half of the nineteenth century, and principles and the end of the twentieth century). Nor does it assume that the different inscriptions of and interventions in populations appealing to approaches such us grammatics of color or of blood are expressing anthropological universals as formal structures of thought or characteristic that would operate as transhistorical and indelible marks to already-made subjects.

This dissertation also refuses to assume as a starting point generalities that define our ‘present’ in the historical, political and anthropological analyses. They tent to collapse the singularities of the term of ‘black’ used by Sandoval in the seventeenth century when it is supposed that the term operates in fields of visibility and of enunciation of the same ‘nature’ that those that transverse the discussions and measures taken by abolitionists, chorographers and essayists in the nineteenth century or those that have guided the organizational unfolding and the bound narratives of ethnization process more recently at the end of the twentieth century. In other words, to challenge the tendency to endorse to a general principle as ‘racism’, ‘eurocentrism’ or ‘coloniality’ the constitution of a blackness in abstract without bothering for the singularities, their transformations and dispersions in the concrete.

To put in question the metaphysical inquiry of blackness from the perspective of eventalization does not mean that then there is not any point of continuity, nor that sedimentations of the events or series of events that have constituted specific articulations of blackness do not have any historical gravity. It is not that historical becoming is, then, reduced to events or series of events absolutely arbitrary in regard to the events or series
of events that precede them and in an absolute rupture from which the only remainder is an incommensurable singularity. To put in question this metaphysical inquiry means that the continuities should be demonstrated in the concrete and without the easy violence of historical presentism. It means to demonstrate, without obliterating the singularities that are subject of scrutiny, how some sedimentations operate in the emergencies, transformations and dispersions of the new events or series of events that constitute blackness in a given unfold and historical moment.

Recapturing his distinction in relation with historians, Foucault ([1978] 2000: 237) considers that it largely resides in “[…] the absence of a schema. Nor infra- or superstructure, no Malthusian cycle, no opposition between state and society […].” Historians are confused and irritated dealing with this absence “[…] of those schemas that have bolstered historian’s operations, explicitly or implicitly, for the past hundred or hundred and fifty years.” Then, it makes the irritation of historians understandable. Foucault is not “[…] interested in constructing a new schemata or in validating one that already exist. […] [Neither he wants] to propose a global principle for analyzing society.” (p. 237). The absence of a pre-ordained schemata or general model and the lack of a global analysis of the society constitute two features that distinguish his work from that of historians. But the problem that he claims is one that refers to the effects of reality associated with the correlative formation of fields, objects, subject positions and discourses.

For the illustration of this distinction with the work of historians, Foucault appeals to the example of the sexuality. While for the historian it is “[…] perfectly legitimate […] to ask whether sexual behaviors in a given period were supervised and controlled, and to
ask which among them where heavily disapproved of” (p. 237), the problem that he posses is quite different:

[… it’s a matter of how the rendering of sexual behavior into discourse comes to be transformed, what types of jurisdiction and ‘veridiction’ it’s subject to and how the constitutive elements are formed of the domain that comes—and only at a very late stage—to be termed ‘sexuality’ are formed. Among the numerous effects the organization of this domain has undoubtedly had, one is that of having provided historians with a category so ‘self-evident’ that they believe they can write a history of sexuality and its repression. (p. 238).

In this point enters eventalization as principle of intelligibility: “The history of the ‘objectification’ of those elements historians consider as objectively given (if I dare put it thus: of the objectification of objectivities), this is the sort of sphere I would like to traverse.” (p. 238). The objetivation of the objectivities, this is, to take like object what appears as given, those evident objectivities on those that analysis and endless disputes are built, on those that the historical documents are interpreted, but also through which make sense the actions and narrative of the own present. To wonder for the obviousness and naturalness that maintains them outside of the field of the thought, of their visibilities, it is in fact what eventalization seeks.

This dissertation is located along this horizon of intelligibility. It is not my intention to produce a sort of social history, nor to offer de-eventalized outlines, in particular those that, under the suggestive label of ‘long duration,’ interpellate the theoretical imagination of some historians and anthropologists. It is not the point to attempt to examine the social behaviors produced in a moment giving regard to some marked individuals though the gradients of the multiple articulations of blackness. In a nutshell, this dissertation should not be read as social history or cultural history of ‘black’ people. My question refers to the regimes of jurisdiction and veridiction in which
blackness is articulated in four situations and very concrete authors (in order to do so, I will appeal to another concept of Foucault: that of problematization). In an effort not to cultivate false expectations, it is very important to keep in mind that my work is very modest. I do not seek to offer complete vision of these regimes of jurisdiction and of veridiction for the articulations of blackness, but to highlight some configurations in which their singularities can be evidenced.

With this dissertation I want to make the contribution of opening an analytic space to initiate the production of the history of the objetivation of ‘black’ people, of that objetivation of the objectivities that is imposed as a self-evident truth to the eyes of activists, bureaucrats and experts equally. But, even in its modesty, it is not a futile exercise but one that carries deep implications. My dissertation is a first babbling full of tribulations that requires to be decanted with the work of the coming years.

As long as the event in its singularity and irreducibility constitutes the object of interest in the procedure of eventalization, a distance is marked with structuralist or semiotic analyses that are centered in the logic of the structure and of the meaning respectively: “[…] the event as main object of search. Nor the logic of meaning neither the logic of structure are adequate to this work” ([1975] 1999:63). The procedure of eventalization differs from the procedures of structuralist and semiotic analyses, as well as from the dialectical ones. In regard to structuralist procedure, Foucault wrote: “One can agree that structuralism formed the most systematic effort to evacuate the concept of event, not only from ethnology but from a whole series of other sciences and in the extreme case from history. In that sense, I don’t see who could be more of an anti-structuralist than myself.” (1980: 114).
The differences between these procedures are not limited to taking the event in place that structure once occupied. “It’s not a matter of locating everything on one level, that of the event, but of realizing that there is actually a whole order of levels of different types of events differing in amplitude, chronological breadth, and capacity of produce effects.” (p.114). Therefore, “The problem is at once to distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along they are connected and engender one another.” (p. 114). Thus, differentiation and reconstruction of the events, its imbrications, planes and interactions, do not fit into the model of structure or of communication. Before the figure of the exchange of significant, what is at stake is the relationships of power: “From this follows a refusal of analyses couched in terms of the symbolic field or the domain of signifying structures, and a recourse to analyses in terms of the genealogy of relations of force, strategic developments, and tactics.” (p. 114). Therefore, he concludes: “[...] I believe one’s point of reference should not be to the great model of language and signs, but to that of war and battle.” (p. 114). Here Foucault introduces a powerful statement:

The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. History has no ‘meaning,’ though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail –but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics. (p. 114).

Neither dialectics (as logic of contradiction) neither semiotics (as structure of communication) account for this belligerent historicity that demands an intelligibility in detail of power relationships, this is, of the struggles, strategies and tactics that constitute the different events or series of events in their differentials configurations and planes:
“‘Dialectic’ is a way of evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and ‘semiology’ is a way of avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of language and dialogue.” (p. 115).

The memory of these confrontations, of the belligerent historicities that drag and determine us, is in those ‘subjugated knowledges.’ “Both the specialized domain of scholarship and the disqualified knowledge of people have contained the memory of these combats, the very memory that had until then been confined to the margins.” (Foucault [1975-6] 2003: 8). In order to make these memories emerge, a genealogical intervention is required: “[…] what might be called genealogy […] both the meticulous rediscovery of struggles and the raw memory of fights.” (Foucault [1975-6] 2003: 8). These genealogies of memory, of the historical inscription of the confrontations and struggles, are only possible if the effects of the totalitarian, formal and unitary scientific discourses are questioned (such as those of structuralism, semiology or, in general, the de-eventalizing histories) that seek to incorporate and to erase the fragmentation, location and dispersion of subjected or buried knowledge:

Compared to the attempt to inscribe knowledges in the power hierarchy typical of science, genealogy is, then, a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set them free, in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse. The project of these disorderly and tattered genealogies is to reactivate local knowledges […] against the scientific hierarchicalization of knowledge and its intrinsic power-effects. (Foucault [1975-6] 2003: 10).

Thus genealogies are anti-sciences, in the sense that they question the effects of the knowledge considered to be scientific. But genealogies are not interventions that “[…] demand the lyrical right to be ignorant, and not that they reject knowledge, or invoke or
celebrate some immediate experience that has yet to be captured by knowledge. That is not what they are about. They are about the insurrection of knowledges.” (p. 9).

Genealogies are anti-sciences mostly because they are “[…] an insurrection against the centralizing power-effects that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse organized in a society such as ours.” (p. 9). In the insurrection of these knowledges archaeology can be “the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities”, while “genealogy is the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them.” (p. 10-11).

Foucault understands subjugated knowledges, on the one hand, as the buried scholarly knowledge or erudite knowledge and, on the other hand, the disqualified knowledge of people “[…] these singular, local knowledges, the noncommonsensical knowledge that people have, and which have in a way been left to lie fallow, or even kept in the margins.” (p. 8). These last ones, constitute what Foucault denominates “[…] a particular knowledge, a knowledge that is local, regional, or differential, incapable or unanimity and which derives its power solely from the fact that it is different from all knowledges that surround it […]” (p. 7-8). In the concept of subjugated knowledge, then, they meet in “a strange paradox” two forms: the buried erudite knowledge (the theoretical, meticulous knowledge) and people’s knowledge (local, singular knowledge, disqualified by the hierarchy of knowledge and science).

Following these statements, as long as my question involves the events, or series of events, that articulate blackness in very specific moments, my dissertation it is not a structural or semiotic analysis. It does search for constants of the human spirit or
structures of long duration that are below or beyond the thought and practices of the subjects. Nor does it face what has been said and made in order to reveal the deepest meanings, what those subjects of language really meant as components of systems of exchanges of meanings or as communication technologies. It shares with Foucault the idea that the historicity that drags and determines us is belligerent, one marked for the succession of confrontations and constant struggles in different planes and places, where diverse strategies and the tactics spread in different institutional and programmatic configurations produce bodies, spaces and subjectivities. In this sense, there is the relevance of the genealogy as a dense chronicle of these confrontations and struggles.

In those subordinated or buried knowledges the activity of hierarchy and effects of the truth of the scientific knowledge can be traced in the memories of these struggles. Thus, in this dissertation these subordinated knowledges are examined in different works and authors, not as a saga or tragedy of the anthropological or historical sciences but an indication for the cartography of the historical struggles that constituted them. Rather than approaching Sandoval like a precursor to the anthropological or other types of studies of the African diaspora and thus examining his work in order to separate truth from his ‘false conscience,’ this dissertation deals with his work as a piece of memory that registered and embodied a particular moment in those belligerent historicities that dragged and constituted him. Today, Sandoval’s work is part of the subordinated knowledge, concretely of that buried knowledge of erudition that the hierarchy of the knowledge and of the science ignores because of the false conscience of the theology, but it is also a local, singular knowledge, one that is interpreted as mere religious fanaticism within this hierarchy of knowledge and science.
Something similar happened in regard to abolitionists, corregraphers and essayists of nineteenth century examined in another chapter. Rather than approach their writings from the position of the scientific establishment and their effects, this dissertation hopes to approach them from the slow and gray work of the genealogy. The idea is no to read their work as plagued by what are alleged mistakes from a present scientific establishments but as evidences of fragments of struggles and confrontations already produced in which are sketched, sometimes obliquely, certain articulations of blackness.

**Problematizations, programs and games of truth**

Problematization constitutes another of Foucault’s concepts central to my dissertation. The concept of problematization appears in a retrospective reading of his own work that Foucault undertook in the last years of his life:

What serves as a form common to the work I’ve done [...] is the notion of *problematization*, though I had not yet sufficiently isolated this notion. But one always moves backwards toward the essential; the most general things appear last. It’s the price and recompense of all work where theoretical stakes are elaborated starting from a certain empirical domain. (Foucault [1984] 1989: 295).

The concept of problematization refers to: “[...] the set of discursive or non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and false, and constitutes it as an object of thought (whether under the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.).” (Foucault [1984] 1989: 296). This object of thought is constituted as problem in the problematization process: “[...] the process of ‘problematization’ — which means: how and why certain things (behavior, phenomena, process) became a problem.” (Foucault [1983] 1988: 17). Problematization is a concept that is in the same
vein as eventalization in the sense that what is relevant are the historical singularities of these objects or problems: “The study of [modes of] problematization (that it, of what is neither an anthropological constant nor a chronological variation) is thus the way to analyze questions of general import in their historically unique form.” (Foucault 1984a: 49).

With the concept of problematization Foucault questions both the theory of the representation as reflection of objects already made, as well as the textualist conceptualizations that suppose that the object is only a discursive mediation:

“Problematication doesn’t mean the representation of a pre-existent object, nor the creation through discourse of an object that doesn’t exist.” ([1984] 1989: 296). Then, nothing else is more incorrect than to consider that with the notion of problematization what is involved is a flat negation or emptying of the reality and materiality of the world on behalf of a radical textualism or of a coarse idealism. In a small article about problematization published in The History of the Present, Foucault clarified this point:

For when I say that I am studying the ‘problematization’ of madness, crime, or sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. The question I raise is this one: How and why were very different things in the world gathered together, characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, ‘mental illness’? And even if I won’t say that was characterized as ‘schizophrenia’ corresponds to something real in the world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The problematization is an answer to a concrete situation which is real. (Foucault [1983] 1988: 17).

Equally, the relationship between a given problematization and its historical context has been object of misreading. It has been considered that in his analyses Foucault ignores

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3 A similar critic about the theory of the representation as reflect is argued by Stuart Hall (1997).
the articulations of a given problematization with the historical context: “There is also a mistaken interpretation according to which my analysis of a given problematization is without any historical context, as if were a spontaneous process coming from anywhere.” (p. 17). Contrary to what is suggested by this accusation, Foucault argues that “[…] I have tried to show, for instance, that the new problematization of illness or physical disease at the end of the eighteen century was very directly linked to the modification in various practices, or to the development of a new social reaction to diseases, or to the challenge posed by certain processes, and so on.” (p. 17).

Nevertheless, once this has been said, Foucault argues that: “[…] a given problematization is not an effect or consequence of a historical context or situation, but is an answer given by definite individuals (although you may find the same answer given in a series of texts, and at a certain point the answer may become so general it also becomes anonymous).” (p. 17). Therefore, problematizations are not simple derived or mechanical expressions of contexts or historical situations from which they emerge, transform and disperse. But neither are they freely floating without any anchorage or connection to the specific context or situation in which they are deployed.

A given problematization is an object of thought constituted as a problem for certain individuals; not the imposition of a context or historical situation by means of a sort of a collective unconscious. Problematizations are like answers given by concrete individuals:

[... is neither a representation nor an effect of a situation does not mean that it answers to nothing, that is a pure dream, or an ‘anti-creation.’ A problematization is always a kind of creation; but a creation in the sense that, given certain situations, you cannot infer that this kind of problematization will follow. Given a certain problematization, you can only understand why this kind of answer
appears as a reply to some concrete and specific aspect of the world. There is the relation of thought and reality in the process of problematization. (p. 17).

Problematizations are not submerged in an unconscious that have to be uncovered through hermeneutic methodologies, but rather they are on the surface: “Like Nietzsche, for Foucault the most profound thought is that which remains on the surface. To analyze problematizations is not to reveal a hidden and suppressed contradiction: it is to address that which has already become problematic.” (Rabinow and Rose 2003).

Foucault develops the concept of problematization in connection with his history of thought, which contrasts with the history of ideas (as the analysis of the systems of representations) and that of mentalities (as the analysis of the attitudes and of the schematics of behavior): “It seemed to me there was one element that was capable of describe the history of thought: this was what one could call the element of problems or, more exactly, problematizations.” (Foucault 1984b: 388). The distinction between thought (and, therefore, what establishes the specificity of its history) and representations or behavior resides in that the first refers to freedom and a reflexive distance with regard to what is done, while the second gives meaning, inhabits or determines behaviors. Therefore, not all domain or behaviors become objects of thought, that is, become problematized. It is required that this domain or behavior lose its familiarity and certainty that maintains it in the margin of the field of visibilities of thought. This denaturalization takes place when a series of difficulties emerges and demands to be faced (p. 389).

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4 “What distinguishes thought is that is something quite different from the set of representations that underlies a certain behavior; it is also something quite different from the domain of attitudes that can determine this behavior. Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem.” (Foucault 1984b: 388).
Problematization, then, should not be considered “… as an arrangement of representation but as a work of thought.” (p. 390).

This loss of familiarity, the uncertainty and raised difficulties are aspects derived of social, economic and political processes. These processes operate as instigation for the emergency of certain problematizations, but they do no define nor determine their content: “They can exist and perform their action for a very long time, before there is effective problematization by thought. And when thought intervenes, it doesn’t assume a unique form that is the direct result or the necessary expression of these difficulties […]” (p. 388). Therefore, problematization should be understood as “[…] an original or specific response —often taking many forms, sometimes even contradictory in its different aspects—to these difficulties, which are defined for it by a situation or a context and which hold true as a possible question.” (p. 389).

As long as problematizations are not a direct, immediate or necessary expressions of the social, political and economic processes, dissimilar answers can be given as well as several problematizations can be presented for the same constellation of difficulties, of de-familiarizations and uncertainties in a given domain of the action or behavior (p. 360). Due to diverse responses actually articulated, “[…] what has to be understood is what makes them simultaneously possible: it is the point in which their simultaneity is rooted; it is the soil that can nourish them all in their diversity and sometimes is spite of their contradictions.” (p. 389). The difficulties to which the problematization responds are not simply translated or manifested in thought, but rather they are elaborated by some concrete conditions from which the possible answers are established and in which the constituent elements of the different solutions emerge: “This development or a given into
a question, this transformation of a group of obstacles and difficulties into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response, this is what constitutes the point of problematization and the specific work of thought” (p. 389).

The inquiry into the concrete problematizations and specific forms of problematization characteristic of a critical history of thought constitute a methodological strategy radically different from that of deconstruction: “It is clear how far one is from an analysis in terms of deconstruction (any confusion between these two methods would be unwise)” (p. 389). It is probable that Foucault had in mind Derrida’s deconstruction with his emphasis on textualism in the examination of logocentrism and the metaphysics of the present. Anyway, what opposes Foucault from deconstruction is

[...] a movement of critical analysis in which one tries to see how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed; but also how these different solutions result form a specific form of problematization. And it then appears that any new solution that might be added to the others would arise from current problematization, modifying only several of the postulates or principles on which one bases the responses that one gives. (p. 389-390).

Some of these problematizationes are expressed in programs such as the well known Panoptic of Bentham. This way, the problematizations can be translated and registered in a series of concrete institutional practices. Programs are not entities in the sense of ‘ideal types’ of Max Weber. The category of ‘ideal type’ allows historians to have a structure of understanding that applies to related series of data with the purpose of “[…] to recapture an ‘essence’ (Calvinism, the state, the capitalist enterprise), working from general principles that are not at all present in the thought of the individuals whose concrete behavior is nevertheless to be understood on their basis.” (Foucault [1978] 2000: 231).

On the contrary, the programs are explicit and they refer to “[…] sets of calculated, reasoned prescriptions in terms of which institutions are meant to be recognized, spaces
arranged, behaviors regulated. If they have an ideality, it is that of a programming left in abeyance, not that of a general but hidden meaning” (p. 231). Not all the formulated programs are realized since some are selected while others are left as proposals. Also, in a concrete institution they are simplified and not applied in the way that they had been initially designed, adapting them and already combining them with the practices existent.

Of the fact that the majority of these programs are never intrumentalized -or that when they are it is in a simplified way or different from how they had been designed- it does not mean that they are simple chimeras without anything to do with the ‘real life’. Their mere formulation is something that expresses and constitutes reality:

For one thing, the elaboration of these schemas corresponds to a whole series of diverse practices and strategies […] For another thing, these programs induce a whole series of effects in the real (which isn’t of course the same as saying that they take the place of the real): they crystallize into institutions, they inform individual behavior, they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things. (p. 232).

The programs should not be considered to be erratic projects without any reality, but as constituent components of the reality.

Articulate or not in forms of programs, problematizations suppose the emergence of certain objects, of certain problems, in given regimes of truth and jurisdiction. In Foucault’s description of his own work as a critical history of thought, he argues that this “[…] would be an analysis of the conditions under which certain relations of subject to object are formed or modified, to the degree that the latter are constitutive of a possible knowledge” (Foucault [1983] 1988: 13). Rather than suppose the subject and the object, Foucault suggests that these relationships should be explored from the mode of subjectification and that of objectification. For the mode of subjectification: “The question is to determine what the subject must be, what his conditions must be, what
status he must have, what position he must occupy in the real or in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of any given type of understanding.” (p. 13-14).

On the other hand, in the mode of objectification determines “[…] under which conditions something can become an object for a possible knowledge, how it has been problematized as an object to know to what methods of analysis it has been susceptible, and what part of itself has been considered pertinent.” (p. 14). The regimes of truth refer to games of truth in which the relations between concrete modes of subjectification and objectification are established, transformed and dispersed. On the other hand, the regimes of jurisdiction indicate what can be made, this is, the competences and jurisdictions of claimed practices or imputed by a subject (resultant of those modes of subjetivation) with regard to an object (resultant in those modes of objetivation). Thus, these regimes of truth and of jurisdiction are not limited to the problematizationes (not even to the programs realized in specific institutional environments). However, both problematizations and programs find in these regimes their conditions of existence and transformation.

It is not surprising, then, that Foucault outlined his work as consisting of:

“Eventualizing singular ensembles of practices, so as to make them graspable as different regimes of ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘veridiction’ that, to put it in exceedingly barbarous terms, is what I would like to do.” ([1978] 2000: 230). He insisted on the distinction of this procedure of the eventualization with regard to the history of knowledge, or the teleological analyses of a growing rationality, or the universal unconscious structures of human species that would determine behaviors:

You see that this is neither a history of knowledge nor an analysis of the advancing rationalities that rule our society, nor an anthropology of the conditions that, without our knowledge, rule our behavior. I would like, in short, to resituate
the production of true and false at the heart of historical analysis and political critique. (p. 230).

For the materials discussed in this dissertation, I understand that blackness can be examined as a series of problematizationes that refer to certain objects of thought constituted as problems in a set of discursive and not discursive practices, in assemblages of specific regimes of truth and of jurisdiction. Thus I am not elaborating my analysis from a theory of the representation understood as reflection of some objects already constituted, or as a mental chimera that would not have any correspondence with the world ‘out there’. A textualist constructivism is not what I have in mind when I argue that in the uses of the term ‘black’ there are certain problematizations that might be investigated in their concretion and singularity. Nor do I pretend to deny the materiality of the objects that operate in the different problematizations identified with relationship at the end of ‘black’ in Sandoval’s work, in the debates and writings analyzed for the nineteenth century or for principles of the twentieth century, or in the most recent ethnical articulations that transverse discourses and practices of activists, bureaucrats or experts.

In the materials analyzed in this dissertation there are original answers given by concrete individuals dealing with certain situations. Some of them offered solutions in form of programs or deployed technologies. It is in these answers where one can find some problematizations, where certain objects enter in games of truth and of what is doable.
On Articulation

‘Articulation’ is a crucial concept in Hall’s critique of any sort of reductionism in the analysis of a social formation. In a broad manner, by ‘articulation’ Stuart Hall means the no necessary linkage between two levels or aspects of a particular social formation: “An articulation is thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time” (Hall 1996: 141). In this sense, an articulation is a kind of contingent linkage in the constitution of a unity. However, it does follow that it is randomly established because there are certain historical conditions in which a specific articulation could be produced or not.

Although certain articulation is contingent, it does not mean that every articulation is equally possible, nor that the articulations are floating freely in order to be anchored randomly in any place and time. Thus, any articulation is deeply historical —it depends not only on the context in which it emerged but also how it shapes this context once it is produced. Moreover, once an articulation has been established it must be continually renewed because, under changing situations, this articulation could be dissolved and another might be created in its place. Thus, it is an ongoing process of articulation/de-articulation, a sort of continual struggle in which there is no any guarantee of permanence once an articulation is produced. In Hall’ words:

By the term ‘articulation,’ I mean a connection or link which is not necessarily given in all cases, as a low or a fact of life, but which requires particular conditions of existence to appear at all, which has to be positively sustained by specific processes, which is not ‘eternal’ but has constantly to be renewed, which can under some circumstances disappear or be overthrown, leading to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections —re-articulations— being forged. It is also important that an articulation between different practices does not mean
that they become identical or that the one is dissolved into the other. Each retains its determinations and conditions of existence. However, once an articulation is made, the two practices can function together, not as an ‘immediate identity’ (in the language of Marx’s 1857 Introduction) but as ‘distinctions within a unity’ (1985: 113-114).

The notion of articulation does not imply necessarily a discursive intervention. Hall, for example, uses the notion of articulation to refer practices: “It is also important that an articulation between different practices does not mean that they become identical or that the one is dissolved into the other” (Hall 1985: 114, emphasis added). In another text, he used the notion of ‘discursive articulation’, which might mean for him that there are sorts of non-discursive articulations: “The ‘struggle in discourse’ therefore consisted precisely of this process of discursive articulation and disarticulation” (Hall 1982: 78).

Whether or not an articulation is always a ‘discursive articulation’, it is clear that for Hall “[…] all social practices are within the discursive […]” (1985:103). In that sense, an articulation must be produced within discourse. However, as he also noted this ‘within discourse’ does not mean that: “[…] there is nothing to social practice, but discourse” (1985: 103; emphasis in the original).
CHAPTER 2
ETHNICIZATION

“This transformation in meaning, position and reference of ‘black’ […] was one of the ways in which those new subjects were constituted. The people—the concrete individuals—had always been there. But as subjects-in-struggle for a new epoch in history, they appeared for the first time.”


For those who have witnessed the multiple movements of indigenous and black communities in many parts of Latin America, the concept of ethnicity is closely associated with processes of empowerment for the segments of the population that have been denied rights, experienced social discrimination, and been the target of multiple modalities of exploitation. The FZLN (Front Zapatista of National Liberation) in the southern Mexico or the CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuador) in Ecuador are examples of different organizational apparatuses in which ethnicity and cultural difference have occupied a central place. With a base in this type of mobilization and organizational apparatuses, many scholars that consider ethnicity and cultural difference as an openly counter-hegemonic factor. Arguments about ethnicity, community, culture, identity, ancestrality, autonomy and tradition advanced by indigenous and afrodescendant populations that appear in this discourse are located in opposition to policies of structural adjustment, neoliberalism, modernity and
globalization associated with national or transnational economic and political elites. ‘Interculturality from below’ against ‘neoliberalism and globalototalitarism from above’ it seems to synthesize this understanding of the place of the dissimilar ethnic movements in the age of globalization.

Some activists involved in one of the most outstanding sectors of the contemporary black movement in Colombia, known as the Process of Black Communities (PCN), seem to understand this discourse in that way. This sector of the black movement, embodying some ‘political culture’ (Escobar, Álvarez and Dagnino 1998) articulated around notions of territory, autonomy, ancestrality and cultural identity of ‘black communities’, finds its most paradigmatic expression in the Colombian Pacific1. This modality of articulation of cultural politics is not limited to this sector of the black movement, but they have consolidated in the last decade to become one of the most powerful academic and political images of black ethnicity in Colombia (Ng’Weno 2007). They either constitute the starting point that is assumed by some or, on the contrary, the referent of the disputes or differences deployed by others.

The multiple differences and nuances that are perceived in the contemporary black movement (and in their interpretations) are transversed by the ethnicization process, in which the political subject and the subject of rights lays in the notion of an ethnic group with its own culture and different from those of Colombian society.

1 The region of the Colombian Pacific covers the westernmost portion of the country, nearly 1,300 kms. long (extending from the Panamanian border in the north to that of Ecuador in the south) and occupies an approximate area of 71,000 km² between the Pacific Ocean and the Andes. For a description of the region in geophysical terms, see Escobar (2006: 61-76).
It is a fact that different organizational sectors or intellectuals today question certain terms in which this ethnicization has been materialized. However, it is within or against this ethnicization (to varying degrees) that the diverse organizational expressions have been constituted in the last decade. Nevertheless, until as recently as three decades ago such ethnicization was literally unthinkable. This chapter describes the emergence and unfolding of this ethnicization as the most recent and extended problematization of blackness. What today seems to be obvious in the academic and political imaginary, is an event in the thought and the political practice that has a history, it constitutes a novel problematization of blackness.

Finally, it is important to insist that in this chapter I do not pretend to make ethnography of the local appropriations of the articulation of blackness associated with ethnicization. It is not that I consider it irrelevant to examine the tensions, failures or incorporations of this articulation from the local populations with those that this articulation seeks to interpellate. The point is that my interest is quite different, as I hope was expressed in the previous chapter. I want to give evidence for the historicity of an articulation of blackness that tends to be taken for granted in certain spheres of experts, functionaries and activists. My aim is to make a genealogy of the problematization of blackness as an ethnic group, understanding this in a very particular way and making visible the growth of certain organizational modalities and interventions on behalf of those 'black communities.'

With my examination of this articulation along the plane of the discursive formations or of the mediation practices developed by the church and the state, I do not pretend denied agency among the local populations, nor that the activists and the
organizations reproduce passively what those formations and practices suppose. It is not that local populations and activists are beyond such formations and practices (something that I hope is demonstrated in my analysis), I am aware that their existence, subjectivities and interventions are not limited to them (aspects that would not only demand another theoretical perspective and empirical support, but a different dissertation).

**Emergence of ethnicization**

The discourse that black communities constituted a specific ethnic group with a set of territorial and cultural rights did not simply drop from the sky ready-formed. This discourse is the product of the historical and political context in which it arose. In fact, the claims made to the state for the collective rights to the forests due to the specific ethnic and cultural characteristics of black peasants was articulated for the first time in the process of the constitution of a black peasant organization —the Integral Peasant Association of the Atrato River (Asociación Campesina Integral del Atrato, ACIA) (Escobar 2008, Castillo 2007, Ng’Weno 2007, Pardo 1997: 236-237, Wade 1992, 1995). Before that, it was literally unthinkable and there is no empirical evidence that would demonstrate the contrary.

During the eighties, the historical conditions that made possible the existence and reproduction of the rural black population in the North Pacific region were undergoing radical transformations. The timber industry had obtained permission from the government to exploit the remaining forest reserves in the region, industrial mining had pushed people to access new fields of extraction, and new migrants from the interior of the country appeared who were associated with these industries and increased trade.
Another transformation, also consequence of state intervention, was the legal recognition of collective property for the indigenous groups that inhabited the region. This was made possible by the successful process of organization of indigenous groups, both on the regional and national levels (Castillo 2007, Gros 2000, Ulloa 2005).

Under these transformations, the territorial and economic model historically developed by the local black communities reached its limits.\(^2\) Equally, internal changes in the demography and in the life aspirations of local populations played an important role (Villa 1998: 435-440). The open-ended frontier that had characterized the territorial expansion in the middle Atrato River reached a terminus with these transformations. Thus, the historical conditions of reproduction of black rural communities changed radically, producing a situation in which the discursive and organizational strategies of black ethnicity were thinkable for the first time.

Besides these transformations, other important factors came together in the articulation of this discourse and a first organizational strategy was born in the middle Atrato River. The Catholic Church and a new project of international cooperation developed in the area both played an important role. The Catholic Church’s support of the peasants of the middle Atrato was crucial to the crystallization of their major organization in the first half of the eighties (Wade 1996: 289).

During that time, the missionaries (the priests both from the Pastoral Claretiana and from the Verbo Divino as well as the nuns from Ursulinas) organized what they called

\(^2\) This model was characterized by dispersed settlements along rivers by family groups that used different ecological niches based on a multi-choice productive system (Whitten 1974).
Christian Grassroots Committees (Comités Cristianos de Base) (Pardo 1997: 235-236).³

It is important to note that the organizational work of the Catholic Church among the black peasants was preceded and paralleled by the Church’s close support of the region’s indigenous organizations, such as the Organización Regional Embera y Waunana (OREWA). It was in the context of this missionary organizational work that the first indigenous organizations based on ethnic claims for the Pacific lowlands emerged and were consolidated. Obviously, the missionaries’ approach to the organization of black peasants of the middle Atrato River was highly influenced by these previous experiences. If indigenous organizing has had an important antecedent in other parts of the country — during the seventies with the origin of the Indigenous Regional Council of Cauca (CRIC) (c.f. Gros 2000)— in the case of the black communities ACIA was the first black ethnic organization in Colombia (Sánchez, Roldan and Sánchez 1993: 177-178).

Although in a less evident way than that of the Catholic missionaries, the project DIAR⁴ was other important factor in the emergence of the discourse and organizational strategy of black communities as an ethnic group. DIAR was a project of international cooperation between the Dutch and Colombian governments. According to recent research about the different projects of international cooperation in the Pacific region, one of the results of the project DIAR is the emergence of Acia:

Non-controversial positive results are the support and initiation of base organizations like […] Acia (Asociación Campesina Integral del Atrato) and the ‘Acuerdo de Buchaudó’ with the following ‘Acuerdo 21’. These acuerdos or agreements gave the Afro-Colombian population the right to live in the jungle,

³ In order to grasp a more detailed analysis of the relationship between missionaries and the emergent organizations, see Khittel (2001) and Rivas (2000).
⁴ Project of Agricultural and Rural Integral Development (Desarrollo Integral Agrícola y Rural, DIAR).
which was prohibited by ‘Ley Segunda’ of 1959. Also was decided that for timber
permits to companies the approval of local communities was made necessary. The
unbridled exploitation of the forest by timber companies became harder. Acia also
fought strongly for the conservation of the forest en the rights of its inhabitants. A
model created by DIAR for collective territories for fishing, hunting, forestall
production and timber on subsistence level in exchange for sustainable forest
conservation is now being used in various other parts of Chocó. (Carpay 2004: 10).

DIAR researchers began to articulate a discourse that represented the black peasant of the
middle Atrato River in a different way. Rather than backward, the novel discursive
articulation showed that these blacks had developed a complex productive system nicely
adapted to the rain forest ecosystem. Where previously their practices had been seen as
expressions of irrationality and backwardness, in this novel paradigm they came to be
understood as having developed traditional production practices that express the
amazingly wise logic of the conservation of their ecosystems. In a word, black peasants
were transformed by this discursive alchemy from the savage-savage to the noble-savage,
from the ignorant by antonomasia whom the state needed to develop to the wise ecologist
working with nature from whom one must learn.

It was precisely this sort of experts’ gaze that began to resonate with the novel
organizational experiences such as ACIA that originated around a set of claims based on
the premise that the rural black population of the middle Atrato River constituted an
ethnic group. Thus, it was under these particular conditions that there emerged a black
ethnic discourse that argued not only for the ancestral settlement and collective
ownership over the forests, but also a discourse that argued that they had managed those
forests according to a set of traditional production practices that conserved their
What became known later on as the Agreement of Buchado, carried out in 1987, constituted the first moment where those who, until then, were only thinkable as ‘black peasants’, argued to a state entity (Codechocó) stating their rights as ethnic group. To sanction the agreement in Buchadó, the directive board of Codechocó produced Resolution Number 88 of the 30th of July, 1987, in which 600,000 hectares were assigned to develop “a program of community participation that allows the preservation and the sustained use of the renewable natural resources as well as the scientific investigation” (Sánchez, Roldan and Sánchez 1993: 179). In this sense, the Acia was not only the first organization that argued collective rights to ‘territory’ by appealing to its cultural specificity and to its status as an ethnic group, but also it was also constituted in an organizational referent toward the beginning of the 90s for different activists in the Central and Southern Pacific regions.

In the Central and Southern Pacific regions before the 90s, a series of organizational experiences of a different nature were accumulating: from the union organizations (such as in the case of Maderas y Chapas of Nariño in Tumaco or the union of Puertos Colombia in Buenaventura), going by the different chapters of the Association of Rural Users (Anuc) until the models of cooperative or of union associations. Important civic movements with headquarters in Buenaventura and Tumaco, had dramatic expressions as the ‘tumacazo’ in the second half of the 80s and they achieved some of their objectives for the improvement of public services and for the modernization of the urban infrastructure.

However, these organizations did not develop a discourse or organizational modality articulated around the political subject of the ethnicity from a vision of black
communities as an ethnic group with a culture defined by traditional practices of production, a specific social organization, a territory and or a distinct identity. In other words, they did not operate from an articulation of blackness constituted by ethnicization. The political subjects that configured their discourse and agency involved those of class (peasants, workers or poor people), citizen (civic movements) or unions (associations of producers).

Folklore initiatives could be identified as closer to the political subject of ethnicity and to its articulation of blackness (such as recovery and diffusion of dances and oral tradition) and those constituted around the pastoral, for which Gerardo Valencia Cano is the most visible figure. In both cases it was appealing to ‘the cultural’ and to ‘the black’, to the self-recognition and valuation of cultural expressions and the traditions of black inhabitants from the Pacific region. Nevertheless, the way that ‘the cultural’ was articulated from the folklore perspectives and the pastoral perspectives are very different from what characterized the ethnicization process in the 90s.

In analytic and political terms one cannot ignore their contributions, but nor can they be confused with what is presented in the 90s. This is due to the simple fact that they were speaking about culture and tradition, or because some people were working in the rivers with local populations on issues related to discrimination and racial identity, or because some of the activists today within the ethnic-territorial organizations were participating in these earlier activities (Agudelo 2002: 123-124). It is not enough in arguing about ‘the cultural’ to have an organizational proposal like the ones deployed in the process of ethnicization of blackness in the 90s since the notion of culture, its content, and its function in a network of categories (territory, traditional practices of production,
collective property, identity, and so on) it is radically different. There are huge ruptures and discontinuities among Anuc’s struggles over peasant land and the territorial ethnic organizations mobilized by the territory and on behalf of black communities as an ethnic group.

From local to national: the Political Constitution of 1991 and its Transitory Article 55 (AT-55)

The next articulation of the ethnicization of blackness takes place in the context of the Political Constitution of 1991. This national articulation finds in Buchadó its most direct and immediate genealogy in the local level. According to the father Gonzalo de la Torre: “If in the agreements of Buchadó it is already claimed the convention of ILO for ethnic groups [...] it is then in the participation on the workshops of preparation for the political constitution where it is clearly affirmed the ethnic claim to the territorial” (Cited by Agudelo 2002: 209). It is in the context of the convocation to the National Constituent Assembly (NAC), in the process of their deliberations and in the results of the new Constitutional text (mainly in the Special Commission for the Black Communities, as it will be exposed) where it is articulated an unusual political culture around a black ethnicity anchored in the cultural, the territorial, the community, the traditional, and the identity among others. In the words of one of the most visible figures of the PCN:

For the first time in the country it is argued rights for the black community as cultural expression overcoming the until that moment tendency of the accusation-protests for the equality of rights. From this central point the proposal of this sector in the process national constituent claimed the recognition of the multiethnic and pluricultural character of the Colombian society; the recognition of the black community as ethnic group; the right to the traditionally habited territories; the right to the protection and development of their culture as base for a
plan of social and economic development for black communities, and the right to participate in the decisions that affected them. Under these flags other organizational expressions of black community of other regions of the country like Atlantic Cost and urban groups of cities like Bogotá, Cali and Medellín that were working until then for the equality of rights as citizens and against the racial discrimination, mostly under the orientation of the Cimarrón Movement, of which they left in that joint. (Grueso 2000: 63).

The Political Constitution of 1991 —which replaced the centenary Constitution of 1886— inserts as one of its principles the ethnic and cultural diversity of the nation. There is a set of articles in the Political Constitution that develop this principle in terms of specific rights for the ethnic groups. However, whereas the indigenous groups were explicit subjects of territorial, economic, educative and political dispositions, the black population only found in the Transitory Article 55 (AT-55) of this Constitution a direct reference to their rights as an ethnic group.5 This difference made evident, at the level of the political imaginary inscribed in the Constitution, the asymmetry in the materialization of the cultural rights of the indigenous and of black people (Arocha 1998, Wade 1992, 1995).

This asymmetry was the result of many factors. Among them it is important to highlight the different social and discursive locations occupied by Indians and Blacks in the structures of alterity since colonial times:

Blacks and Indians have both been characterized as Others, located in the liminal spaces of the nation, but they have fitted in different ways into what I call the

5 The Transitory Article 55 (AT-55) defined the creation by the government of one special commission, with the participation of the activists that represented the communities involved, in order to study the terms of a law, the object of which would be to recognize the collective propriety over the lands of the Colombian Pacific of these communities that have inhabited this region, according with their traditional production practices. This law would also define the mechanisms of state protection of the cultural identity and economic rights of these communities. This transitory article could also apply to other black communities in the country that have similar conditions as those living in the Pacific region.
structures of alterity. The apparent ‘invisibility’ of black people in Colombia, for example, has not been due to a simple process of discrimination -Indians have, if anything, suffered even greater discrimination- but due to the precise mode of their insertion into the structures of alterity. They have not been institutionalized as Others in the same way that Indians have. (Wade 1997: 36-37).

Associated with this factor, it is also important to note that among the members of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) entrusted with the responsibility to elaborate the political constitution, various indigenous candidates were elected whereas none of the black candidates were (Agudelo 1998, Oslender 2001). That is the reason why the proposals and claims of black organizations to be recognized as an ethnic group with its territorial and cultural rights were presented to the National Constituent Assembly (NAC) through the indigenous candidates elected, as well as through some of the candidates of the M-19 Democratic Alliance. The initial proposal was rejected for reasons of legal form (Fals Borda 1992). However, after adjusting this proposal to fit the legal requirements, the NAC approved in their last session the text presented as Transitory Article 55 (AT-55).

In spite of the difficulties and asymmetries noted, the processes associated with the AT-55 might be considered the most important episode in the political and discursive relocalization of blackness in the structures of alterity in Colombia (Wade 1997). As one of the activists and participants on the Special Commission of Black Communities created by the AT-55 put it: “The existence of Transitory Article 55 of the Political

6 M-19 Democratic Alliance (Alianza Demócratica M-19) is the political party that resulted from the demobilization of an important guerrilla group (M-19) that negotiated with the government one year before the election of the National Constituent Assembly and one important condition was the realization of this Assembly in order to transform the Political Constitution.
Constitution originated by far the most important social and political mobilization in the recent history of the black people in Colombia” (Cortés 1998: 1).

The Transitory Article 55 (AT-55), presented and approved in the closing sessions of the National Constituent Assembly, mandated the creation of a Special Commission of Black Communities. In this government appointed commission, ‘representatives’ of the communities involved were asked to develop the terms of the text of the law to be sanctioned by the president. The object of this law was to recognize the right of ‘collective property’ for the ‘black communities’ that had occupied, according to their ‘traditional production practices’, what until then were considered the ‘empty lands’ (baldíos) of the rural riversides of the Colombian Pacific. This law also sought to establish the mechanisms toward the protection of the ‘cultural identity’ of these communities as well as the ‘rights’ of their ‘economic and social development’. In addition, the AT-55 opened the possibility of applying these dispositions to other communities of the country if they demonstrated ‘similar conditions’ to those in the Pacific region.

As I have noted, the initial text of what became the AT-55 was rejected on legal grounds. Later, Fals Borda wrote about the incident: “I remember that much of the resistance in the Assembly was based on the ignorance about the social organization and the historical settlement of the Pacific Coast” (1993: 222). This indicates two important themes that, as I will note, configured the whole process of the composition of the Law 70 of 1993 in different ways. On the one hand, there was the claim of the lack of knowledge about the ‘black communities’ and, on the other, an appeal to the ‘knowledge’ of the experts —mainly anthropologists. On the suggestion of the president of the
Assembly, a small group was created to fix the rejected text to comply with juridical formalism. The resulting text was approved as Transitory Article 55.

The political configuration of the black community as an ethnic group was outlined with the AT-55 at the national level. Nevertheless, some of the crucial aspects of this configuration were already evident in the initial rejected text. In fact, in this first text, the ‘black communities’ already appeared as an ethnic group. Indeed, due to their ethnic character, these communities argued for their right to property in “the rural territories traditionally inhabited” by them. Thus, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘community’ appeared as discursive core referents with political and legal implications. In a similar move, this initial text contained a set of nodal categories in the politics of black ethnicity that appeared for the first time in the national sphere, such as ‘territory’, ‘cultural identity’, ‘social and economic development’, as well as the important dichotomy ‘rural/urban’. Since then, these notions were constituted as the terms of the discussion, despite the ongoing struggle over their meanings and implications.

If this text not approved by the Constituent National Assembly is compared with the one that definitively was as AT-55, some significant elements can be noted in which they differ from one of another. First, the ethnic condition of those ‘black communities’ does not appear explicitly as foundation of the AT-55, contrary to the text proposed initially in the Constituent National Assembly. Second, in the initial text the relationship ‘Cuenca of the Pacific’ - ‘similar areas’ was not specified. AT-55 introduced this relationship that from then conditioned great part of the discussion in the Special Commission and it will be conserved in the proposal of law presented to Congress. This element is very important because, as I will analyze later on, it constitutes the ‘Cuenca of
the Pacific’ as a paradigm of the representations on the ‘black community’ in Colombia. Third, the category of ‘territory’ disappears, being replaced by the term ‘collective property of lands’; in the same way the ‘right to territory’ is defined as being due to it having been ‘traditionally inhabited’ and that the State should ‘guarantee’ to this ‘communities’, becomes the ‘recognition’ of the ‘collective property’ of those ‘lands in the rural riverside areas of the rivers of the Cuenca of the Pacific’ that the State conditions to their ‘occupation’ according to ‘the traditional practices of production’ of these ‘communities.’

Besides the disappearance of the term ‘territory’, it diluted the hierarchical relationship and the condition sine qua non referred in the previous text by the ‘territory’ and the ‘preservation’ of ‘the cultural identity’ and the ‘foment’ of the ‘economic and social development’. With the AT-55 a duality is established in the purposes of the Special Commission that was charged to study and propose the text of the law: on one hand, the ‘collective property’ is limited to an area and specific communities and, on the other hand, it had to design some ‘mechanisms’ that would allow the ‘protection’ of the ‘cultural identity’ and of those ‘rights’ of those ‘black communities’ in Colombia, for the invigoration of their ‘economic and social development.’

The AT 55 involves, contrary to the initial text, a series of constraints and juridical procedures of which were required from the point of view of the constituents in order for it to be approved as an article of the new Constitution. The formation of a Special Commission included a new political subject, a novel discourse: the ‘representatives’ of those ‘black communities’. Until that moment, the Colombian state had not contemplated the emergence of a interlocutor defined in this representative specificity. Until the
creation of AT 55, from multiple institutional planes, as much local as national, you could be a ‘representative’ of the people, of the voters, of a political party, etc., but not of ‘black communities.’

This unusual political subject also began to acquire a form in the ‘international community’. It is in this context that some actions were begun and networks acquired greater importance in the politics of the ethnicity disputed in Colombia. One of the first actions at the international level to press the Colombian government on the issue of ethnic rights for the ‘black community’ is given in the context of the regulation of the AT 55. Thus, the Ministry of International Relationships remitted to the secretary of the Presidency in October 14th 1992, several letters coming from the embassy of Colombia in Berne, from the Working Group Switzerland-Colombia that contained 525 support signatures to “the appointment of territories for the natives and black of the Pacific Region.”

The Special Commission for the Black Communities: Negotiating Black Ethnicity

The Special Commission of Black Communities was created a year after the Political Constitution of 1991. This commission, created by President Cesar Gaviria on August 11, 1992 included government officials, scholars, politicians and representatives of the communities involved. The Ministry of Government (now the Ministry of the Interior) was charged with the leadership of this Special Commission. From the government’s perspective, this charge clearly reflected the political character of this Special Commission. Other governmental institutions that participated in the Commission were: the Agrarian Reform Institute (Incora), the National Planning
Department (DNP), the National Institute of Natural Resources and Environment (Inderena), the Geographical Institute Agustín Codazzi (IGAC), and the Colombian Institute of Anthropology (ICAN). The fact that the government included these institutions in the Commission made evident a set of assumptions about its contents and perspectives.

The Special Commission also included representatives of the communities involved. In order to guarantee this participation, so-called Consultative Commissions (CCs) were created. These CCs were formed at the department level by different organizations that somehow were expressions of the black communities. There were four CCs for the Pacific region —Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Nariño. Although the presidential decree included the possibility of Consultative Commissions outside of the Pacific region, in practice the creation of another Consultative Commission outside of the Pacific region —the Consultative Commission of the Caribbean Coast— was allowed only after a long discussion within the Special Commission. These difficulties made evident the extent to which the Pacific region embodied the paradigm of the ethnicity of the ‘black community.’ There were also several well-known African-americanists and several politicians who consider themselves black assigned to the Special Commission.

In the Special Commission the representations of the ethnicity of the ‘black communities’ were distilled and written down in the text subsequently approved as Law 70 of 1993. In this commission, that regiment AT 55, was established a negotiation process and agreement of the terms of this text and, in consequence, of the representations of the ethnicity and cultural identity of those ‘black communities’. This negotiation became evident when the two texts of the proposals of the law collided, one
written by the commissioners belonging to the organizations and the other written by the officials of the government institutions. With these two proposals positions were polarized inside the Special Commission. They were denominated as the proposal of the communities and that of the government. A particular opposition (we/them) was established defining the place from which one spoke, on behalf of those ‘communities’ or on behalf of the ‘government.’

In the session of April 23rd 1993, gathered in the minute 006, the commissioners of the organizations presented their proposal. Before advancing it, the commissioners requested a well-known afroamericanist anthropologist who participated as Special Commissioner to read the document on the ‘afrocolombian identity’ elaborated by a working group of the journal America Negra in which he participated (C.E. April 23 of 1993. Acta 006. p 5). This act indicates how the discourse of experts, introduced by the same commissioners of the organizations, preceded and legitimated the proposal of the text of the law of the ‘communities’, in fact with the academic validation of the identity and specificity of their ethnicity (C.E. April 23 of 1993. Minute 006. p 6).

The proposal for the text of the law exposed in this session by the representatives of the organizations is articulated, reinforcing and opposing in some crucial aspects the discursive formations that had been presented in the process. In the first place, it centers the meaning of the law to define and to regulate the relationships between the State and the ‘black communities’ as long as they constitute an ‘ethnic group’. This statement defines, in an explicit way, the ethnicity as a political question in the relationships of the State with a subject that exists as such for its ethnic and cultural alterity.
The proposal designed by the government officials, on the other hand, was articulated to the ‘right’ to the ‘collective property’ of certain ‘lands’ with some conditions and to some specific ‘communities’. Although this proposal considered explicitly ‘black communities’ in its particularity of ‘ethnic group’, ethnicity as a political question is not in any moment the agglutinative spirit of the government discourse in its proposal.

The proposal that the members of the organizations developed introduced one of the most arduous discussions aired within the Special Commission. That is, whether the law should be applied to all ‘black communities’ of the country or only to those communities that were inhabited the Pacific region using ‘traditional practices of production’. This conflict was expressed with particular relevance in the interventions the vice minister, who was the president of the Special Commission:

I consider that in the proposal of the communities, which says that this law «is to recognize the territorial, economical, social, cultural and political rights» of the black communities of Colombia, as well as that according to the dispositions in the 2nd article, summarizes the central point of our disagreement because in our concern this commission must pay attention, following the Constitution, to study the development of the Transitory Article 55 in order to recognize some rights not for all black communities, but for those that have been occupying the river zones of the Pacific region. In that sense the discussion is to determine what the limits of the law are. The project presented by the government attempts to develop the Transitory Article 55, which is clear in that it says that a law must be expedite that recognizes these communities’ right to collective property, into the areas to which the same law refers. And, according to the article, this law must recognize specific communities, as it is a fact in the documents of the [National] Constituent [Assembly] […] not for all the black communities of the country […] This law must also regulate, according to the Transitory Article 55, the mechanisms for the protection of the cultural identity and mechanisms to foment the social and economic development of these communities. In addition this Transitory Article mentioned that this norm should be applied to other zones of the country with similar conditions, that is, to the zones to which the AT-55 refers —the zones
occupied by black communities in wastelands [*baldíos*], rural and river basins with traditional production practices in a collective way.\(^7\)

Obviously the commissioners of the organizations did not identify with this interpretation of the aims of the law due to the fact that they argued that AT 55 should be interpreted in the context of the Colombian Political Constitution where it was recognized and through which ethnic and cultural diversity were protected. According to them, if ‘black communities’ possessed an ethnic singularity and manifest identity, the law should have as its focus the rights of all the ‘black communities’ in Colombia without limiting it to some specific communities and to land and property.

The difference in the approaches, the contrasts between a maximalist and minimalist conception of the law, is evidence of the two different agendas in the arduous process of negotiation between the representatives of the organizations and the government officials:

The work of the Special Commission represented a complex exercise of agreement in which it put at stake interests and logical that could meet for moments and opposed in others. The starting point for the government was to be presented as executioner of the new spirit that emerged of the Constitution. Therefore their function understood it as tight to regulate the AT 55, guaranteeing this way some rights to the Colombian population’s sector: the black communities of the Pacific. This would countersign the democratic vocation of the State and its disposition to strengthen the process of a political actor’s construction with the one who exchange from its recognition as ethnic group. For the black organizations it was to continue in the conquest of a recognition space that had begun with AT 55 but that it should go much further on. Of the territorial, economic, social and cultural rights for the black populations from the Pacific had to transcend toward the claim of the group of the Colombian black populations, being to closer up to a symmetry with regard to that achieved by indigenous (Agudelo 2002: 222).

In the text of the law presented on behalf of the ‘black communities’, ethnicity was one of the categories that required precise definition. In this definition an overlapping of the

categories distilled from the concepts of black ‘ethnos’ (*etnia*), ‘community’ and ‘people’. Those of ‘ethnos’, ‘community’ and ‘people’ was represented as being composed of a ‘group’ of ‘family trunks’ (*troncos familiares*) of ‘Afro-American’ origin. ‘Trunks’ that, in turn, were defined for their possession of their ‘own culture’, a ‘history’, a ‘territory’ some ‘systems of rights’, ‘traditions’, ‘customs’, ‘forms of government and internal control’, as well as for the ‘revelation’ and ‘conservation’ of the ‘conscience of identity’. All the above-mentioned concepts allowed, then, the difference and specificity of this ethnos, people or community of the other ‘ethnic groups’. In this definition, the ‘family trunks’ were configured as the social unit and their ‘Afro-American’ origin appeared as a historical experience that bounded its particularity.

In the proposal presented by government, the representation of ethnicity is not an object of an explicit definition, but rather it must be decoded between the lines and, only occasionally, it appeals to the category of ‘ethnic group’ to refer to the ‘black communities’. In the definition of this last category a series of conceptual associations are introduced about the particularity of these communities as ‘ethnic groups.’

Although both share a similar structure, that is, they defined the ethnicity or black community through a series of characteristics which can be enumerated; there were some differences between the two conceptualizations. In the first place, although in both versions ‘black communities’ is the topic of the discourse, the first elaboration makes it part of a series of categories, it is juxtaposed with that of ‘black ethnos’ and ‘black people’. In the government definition, none of the concepts featured in the first version appeared such as family trunks, territory, systems of rights, and forms of internal control and government.
The concept of ‘territory’ was another nodal category in the proposed text for the law proposed by the representatives of the organizations. In the definitions a privileged space was granted to the way in which ‘territory’ was understood and what the concepts associated with it would be. The concept of ‘territory’ was defined by the historical ‘occupation’ of the lands, for their use -either for living there, exploitation or conservation, by means of those ‘traditional practices of production’- and for the character of collective use of their forests. In the government proposal, on the other hand, the category of ‘territory’ it was not definite. The government text does not speak of territories, but of collective property of ‘baldias lands’; this is not determined due to ancestrality in their occupation, but rather by the delimitation of the areas ‘rural riverside’, for a grant of ‘collective property.’

A general agreement existed in both proposals in that the participation of ‘black communities’ was one of its principles. However, multiple differences arose in regard to the mechanisms and modes of participation elaborated by the two proposals. One of the most outstanding discussions relating to the representation of the ethnicity in the black communities of Colombia, referred to the definition of the ‘consejo de palenque’ as political-administrative unit of the territories and of rights of those ‘black communities.’ The opinion maintained by the government was that this construct was unfounded in the juridical plane. This was the perspective that prevailed above the ‘traditional invention’ that implied the appeal to this historical figure of those ‘palenques’ in the process of ethnicization of ‘black community’.

The categories of ‘economic and social development’ are conserved in the text presented by the ‘communities’ as proposed to the Special Commission. They are defined
in terms very general terms; such as ‘to improve’ the ‘level of life’ of the population.

‘Improvement’ conditioned some characteristics specific to the ‘black communities’ such as their history, culture, rights, and necessities. In this respect it was consistent with the proposal of the government, although in both proposals ‘development’ appears ambiguous and, in some moments, in contradiction with the discourses of tradition and of environmental harmony of those ‘traditional practices of production’. Therefore, the category of ‘development’ finds some concrete limits that, seemingly, distance it from a classic conception based exclusively on approaches of the economic analysis. The representatives as well as the officials considered this change in the scope of the definition necessary and they tried to make it compatible with a discourse that appealed to the tradition of the black communities and the conservation of the ecosystems by means of their ‘traditional practices of production.’

The ‘environmental harmony’ that characterized the relationship between the ‘black communities’ and nature was one of the axes that allowed for the representation of the cultural and ethnic alterity of blackness. In this sense, those ‘traditional practices of production’ were defined as guarantees of this non-destructive relationship with the ecosystems and habitat.

An environmentalist discourse can be observed in the definition of the ‘black community’, but it also supported the gathering of information and the accusations that were carried out from the Special Commission. The fact that the granting of a forest concession in the Pacific to a timber company produced an internal tension in the Commission between the representatives of the organizations and the government officials is of particular importance, since the representatives interpreted this grant as a
lack of real political will on the part of government for the recognition of the rights of the ‘black community’. That this supposed harmony of the ‘traditional practices of production’ constituted by a logic that one could term environmental is a clear analogy with the representation of the native ecological practices of Colombian ‘indigenous groups’ (Ulloa 2005, Wade 1999). Both would be guarantors of the conservation of the ‘biodiversity’ of the ‘balance’ of the ecosystems, a sort of sanitary cord before the perverse desire of capital.

The region of the Colombian Pacific constituted one of the most crucial aspects in the construction of the ethnicity of the ‘black communities’ in Colombia. A relationship established between region of the Pacific and similar zones that defined that region as paradigm in the application of the law from the time of the AT 55. As I previously stated, one of the most prominent points of deliberation in the Special Commission was in fact the aim of the bill – would it be limited to communities in the Pacific or would it be applied independently to all of the black communities in Colombia.

Once was the assumed position, the scope of the application was the ‘black communities’ of the Colombian Pacific. It was not only due to the fact that the representatives of the organizations were almost entirely from the Pacific themselves, but also due to the fact that the bulk of the relatively scarce anthropological knowledge available largely referred to this region. These were the raw materials that shaped the political construction of the ethnicity of the ‘black community’ expressed in Law 70. Thus, for example, the category of ‘family trunks’ used several times in the proposal of the representatives of the ‘communities’ - even for the black people or community- was ethnographically registered at the beginning of the 70s in a river of the southern Pacific,
but anthropological investigations in other parts of the Pacific or even recent studies in the same south Pacific do not indicate their presence (i.e., Hoffmann 1999).

The AT 55 in the Pacific nariñense

Once the AT 55 was included in the Political Constitution of 1991, a series of processes were set into motion that largely explained the organizational characteristics consolidated during the decade of 90s. I will illustrate these processes for the Pacific nariñense because my fieldwork in the area allows me to go into depth in my description. In other areas of the Pacific and in the Caribbean similar processes can be appreciated. For detailed descriptions of these processes in other regions, the dissertations of Carlos Efrén Agudelo (2002) and Ulrich Oslender (2001) serve as excellent sources for Cauca, while the report of the historian Alfonso Cassiani (1999) and the book of Elisabeth Cunin (2003) offer valuable information for the continental Caribbean. For Valley of Cauca there is the thesis of Libia Grueso (2000) and the manuscript of Alfonso Cassiani (2003).

For the Southern Colombian Pacific, the emergence of the narratives and politics of alterity of the black community have been associated with the processes generated around the Transitory Article 55 (AT-55) of the Political Constitution of 1991. Before the AT-55, these narratives and politics did not exist in this part of the Pacific, neither in terms of the organizations’ dynamics, nor in relation to other social and institutional actors. Thus, for this region, the AT-55 was a sort of catalyst that supported the emergence of a novel kind of social organization based on ethnic claims. These were

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8 By south Colombian Pacific I mean the coastal Pacific of Nariño’s department. Therefore, I will use synonomously either South Pacific or Pacifico nariñense.
possible, as we shall see, through numerous mediations that enabled the emergent organizational dynamics around this cultural alterity of the ‘black community.’ To argue that the AT-55 catalyzed the emergence of the black community in the Southern Colombian Pacific is not to reduce the process to a mechanical and passive response to the institutional demands associated with this Transitory Article 55.

In contrast with the northern Pacific, an ethnic discourse had not become an organizational referent in the southern Pacific before the AT-55.\footnote{Why the ethnicization of blackness was first produced in the north Pacific and not in the southern Pacific is related with the particular juncture in the north, in which missionaries and scholars support a process of organization in particular conditions of loss of access to natural resources following the experience of their indigenous neighbors. I have already presented in at the beginning of this chapter a broad picture of this juncture. For more details see Khittel (2001) Pardo (1997, 2002), Sánchez, Roldan and Sánchez (1993) Villa (1998, 2001), Wade (1992, 1995), and Wouters (2002).} In this part of the Pacific lowlands, there were no organizations like the ACIA developing political strategies based on the cultural alterity of black communities. Moreover, it was only with the AT-55 that the organizational experiences started to be articulated in these terms. This does not mean that all the organizations that came to embody this discourse arose after the AT-55. Some of them preceded the AT-55 —such as the Junta Pro-defense of the Patia Viejo and Patia Grande Rivers, Coagropacifico, Asocarlet or Coopalmaco. Nevertheless, the existence of these organizations before the AT-55 does not mean that they already had framed their struggles into the ethnic discourse and strategy of black community that was made conceivable by the AT-55.

More recently, some of these organizations and activists have presented themselves as having had an awareness of black ethnicity from the beginning of their struggle. However, even though some of them exhibited some features of anti-racist struggle, they...
were anchored in other organizational referents and political subjects. In short, the articulation of blackness on the basis of the black community as ethnic group was only introduced in the southern Pacific region with the creation of the AT-55.

For the majority of local activists in the southern Pacific it was with the AT-55 that they became aware for the first time of the existence of a discourse that argued in terms of the alterity of the black community. More concretely, it is in a crucial event organized by the religious leaders in Choco (in March of 1992) that some of the current leaders of the organizations got news of the incipient process underway in Assembly National Constituent toward the inclusion of territorial rights of black communities as an ethnic group for the Pacific region:

The first time that we realized this [AT 55] it was in a meeting of afrocolombians at level of church that we were in Quibdó, Choco. There were 250 participants, among priests and lays committed, and there we sign so that that article was taking in account by the constituents, and at the end it passed. Already in the last pages of the Constitution [...] In the encounter of Quibdó, of Nariño the father Ricardo Cruel, the sister Yolanda, it was the father Garrido, it was the sister Bernarda Gallego, my person, there were three lays of Satinga, Luz Marina, Ernesto and the other one. The sister Luz Nelly, she lived then in that in Boca de Candelilla and a girl of Salahonda, Piedad, she is also a teacher, the teacher Piedad [...] That the first time that I listened that was that later was the transitory one 55, that time they were already in the last sections for the closing of the Constitution. And then the partners of Choco, they gave as that alert of the commission that had been made and they looked for the back from the participants to the assembly because by ninety percent we were black. 10

In the same sense, who was the first candidate for the Process of Black Communities (PCN) to the House of Representatives, indicated:

Being still in the Convenio [with the CVC], in the 92, with the doctor Emiliano, he has informed us here that in the Political Constitution of the 91 already appeared the Transitory Article 55 and that it was advancing an organization process and of

10 Interview by Oscar Almario and the author with to the president of Organichar. El Charco, November 22th 1998.
proposals of regulation of this article. In what was the Constituent one we don’t participate neither we were informed. We participate in the voting but I don’t as process, but as a Colombian. It was later, when the transitory article of the Constitution was already that other partners worked on it. There we were informed by the director, by the doctor Emiliano Zambrano here in Tumaco of CVC. And because I arrived of a training of Sutatenza and people wanted the delegate of the cooperative to be me. On behalf of the representation of the cooperative I participated in the Consultiva of Nariño, I was at national level, I had to travel a lot the country. Workshops were made in the rivers on what was the Transitory Article 55, we contribute to the proposal of the regulation of the article.¹¹

It was with the promulgation of the AT-55 that a set of categories began to circulate that not only enabled activists to think in a different manner, but also defined novel modalities of organization, a new flow of resources and additional possibilities of interlocution at the local, regional, national and international levels. It was in this context that the institutional and conceptual space for the ethnic representation of blackness emerged in the southern Pacific as well as the imagination of a novel black community and political subject.

It does not follow from this, however, that the grassroots organizations created under previous representations were not important, nor that the various government officials, missionaries, scholars, businessmen, and others ‘actors’ had not articulated other practices and representations in relation to the black population of the region. The absence of the ethnicization of blackness does not imply a discursive and practical vacuum of knowledge about the local people, by themselves or by other actors.

Before the nineties, for example, there were important organizing experiences in certain civic movements, as well as in labor unions, student and peasant struggles. There were also various associations of fishermen, farmers and small businessmen. In addition,

¹¹ Interview with José Arismendi, Tumaco, October 1997.
some folklore groups, mainly based around the preservation of ‘traditional’ dance and music, were created during the eighties in Tumaco with the aim of recovering and conserving ‘traditional black culture’. In this way, the construction of a specific alterity of the black community did not constitute the center of a thinkable order and of the emergence of these political actors. On the contrary, class, trade union membership, and citizenship were some of the axes of articulation of the experiences and organizational identities. The worker, the peasant, the fire wood collector (leñatero), the fisherman, the shellfish collector (conchera), the citizen or the costeño made up the great majority of the subject positions before the emergence of the black community. But, this lack of alterity not only included the organizational plane, but also more conventional strategies of political action such as political parties, from the liberal and conservative to those on the left with presence in the region such as MOIR (Independent and Revolutionary Labor Movement).

The language of the cultural alterity of the black community supported by the AT-55 was not only novel for the activists of the organizations, but also for the majority of the regional and local actors. With the exception of a few members of the Catholic Church (who had had some knowledge of the organizational experiences of ethnic character in the Chocó advanced in the 1980’s with the direct support of religious organizations), it is possible to argue that there was a widespread absence of a discourse on the ethnicization of blackness. To think about the local populations in terms of a black community, with territory, traditional production practices, an ethnic identity and a set of specific rights, was an exercise in the construction of difference that only became
possible in the Pacífico nariñense in the decade of the nineties with the institutional and social positioning of this new articulation of blackness.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the local populations were not thought about in any other way or that they remained ‘invisible’ in the eyes of experts, businessmen, elites, civil servants, intellectuals, politicians, ‘popular workers’ and various types of religious authorities. On the contrary, in the case of state institutions, for example, these populations were the object of diagnosis, planning and intervention based on other criteria and appealing to other narratives.

In this way, to exemplify one case among many, towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the nineties, a Dutch funded project for the protection of the guandal forest (with the participation of institutions as dissimilar as PNUD, the embassy of Holland, Department of National Planning, Corponariño and the National University), represented the local populations as peasants, wood cutters (corteros) or as inhabitants of the forests. Never in this document was there an image of the local populations as an ethnic group nor was there an appeal to the system of categories consolidated in the region a few years later with the Transitory Article 55. The absence of the above mentioned system of categories was not a particularity of the Guandal Project; the same thing can be observed as a constant for the set of the diverse invention/interventions from the institutions, programs and state projects before the nineties (Pedrosa 1996).

Before the nineties, there was a wide range of representational categories and of relationships with the local black populations, but none of them appealed to the ethnic discourse of “black communities”. Thus, for example, even though the existent variety of this range, the different businessmen are framed in what you can denominate the regime
of the lack and the ‘anthropological pessimism’ that is imbricated with the predominant extractivist model that has characterized the operation of the capital in the region. The nuances are multiple, obviously, depending on many variables, among which it is necessary to highlight the origin of the dealers and their level of local insertion. Indeed, for a medium merchant paisa with a grocery in the small town of Bocas of Satinga, attracted by the peak of the timber extraction of the area, the local black population appears markedly divergent from the perspective of the small black proprietor of timber mill born in the region. For the first, the regime of the lack is invested in the nationalist discourse of being paisa, anchored in the imaginary of the progress and tenacity of the ‘race paisa’ that openly minimizes another type of economic rationalities as a clear expression of the laziness and managerial inability of non-paisas such as people from the Pacific. On the other hand, for the proprietor of a small timber mill born in the rural area of the rivers Satinga and Sanquianga this nationalist paisa narrative doesn’t mark his reading of his region and people.

In the Southern Pacific the AT-55 was a sort of catalyst for the emergence of the discourse and strategies of the ‘black community.’ Nevertheless, the AT-55 by itself does not explain why such a discourse and strategies had an almost immediate and relatively widespread reception, as much among the nascent and existing organizational experiences as on the part of those actors who assumed mediators’ roles. Moreover, the

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12 The notion of paisa defines locally a person from the interior of the country —especially from the regions of Antioquia and Valle del Cauca. By extension, this term applies to people with ‘white’ features, sometimes including foreigners, who cannot qualify for the categories of serrano or culimocho. Serrano is someone from the Pasto region in the Andes. Culimocho is the ‘white,’ supposed descendants from European shipwrecked people, who have inhabited small settlements as fisherman for generations in the Pacific, such as the coasts of Vigía, Mulatos and San Juan de la Costa.
AT-55 could have happened inadvertently. Indeed, the demands for the creation of a Consultative Department Commission and the election of the representatives of the Department of Nariño to the Special Commission for Black Communities could also have no resonance for the local people. Or, in what would carried virtually the same meaning, they could have been part of the bureaucratic booty of the political conventional sectors of this region of the Pacific.

Therefore, the fact that the AT-55 was a sort of catalyst is understandable precisely because its discourse made sense in terms of the people’s experiences in this part of the Pacific. Indeed, this discourse not only allowed them to articulate a new representation of themselves, but it also defined concrete and possible mechanisms for organizational configuration. One of the elements of the novel discourse that corresponded with the local experience was, precisely, that of the defense of the land. In the Southern Pacific the notion of property has been defined by social norms. Rather than by the state’s titles of ownership, it has been through this type of social sanction that everybody knows who owned and had legitimate access to what type of resources (Camacho 1999, Rivas 1999). Nevertheless, when the AT-55 appeared it acquired particular relevance for the local people because of their experiences of the expropriation of their lands by foreigners and because they could no longer find any additional uninhabited lands.

There are multiple local experiences from which the discourse associated with the AT-55 acquired meaning. For example, Reinalda Perlasa (the president of Organichar) said that these experiences helped to ‘awaken the consciousness’ of the people who were initially skeptical:

The idea of creating Organichar originated from the people who were to make up the organization, the people who took things really seriously. Because for some it
was like a joke, but others at least were managing to awaken their consciousness, and there were people of El Charco, people of the river Iscuandé and people of the Tola […] Here in the Tapaje we had a very positive experience because a few paisas [mestizos foreigners from the interior of the country] had started invading the territory of the communities. Then for the people there was an expectation and they were using it as example: ‘It is not a lie because we already have a few paisas here and these paisas already want to expel us from our lands, then the story is true.’ And the people of the Tapaje showed a lot of interest. These paisas came in order to extract wood and later they started a farm. Then, since here people have a lot of solidarity with each other —this is one of our principal values— they gave the paisas permission to build a little house. And later the lady who gave them the permission was expelled from her territory by them. They made the house too big. So the people had already had this experience which helped to awake consciousness little by little.

Many more cases like this could be mentioned, some as dramatic as the encroachment of the African palm and shrimp cultivation frontier in the zone. In fact, since the decade of the eighties those industries have adapted the most fertile soils for these crops, displacing the inhabitants of these zones, even murdering those who objected to the loss of their lands. Making allusion to the case of the forced displacement caused by the expansion of the African palm and shrimp cultivation activities, an important activist from the organizations in the Pacífico nariñense argued that: “With all these things that were happening, the AT-55 was seen as a great possibility for our defense” (Cortés 1999: 133). In other cases, the displacement of local people was imaginary, such as in the rivers Satinga and Sanquianga where some missionaries argued that the Dutch were coming to take the land stating that the project of technical international cooperation was coming to the zone.

13 See last foot note.
Despite the importance of the real or probable threat of the local loss of lands, this was not the only aspect of the AT-55 that resonated with local processes. For example, in Tumaco’s urban areas, a ‘cultural sector’ was in process of consolidation and was appealing to the ‘recovery of the tradition’ of authentic blackness (Aristizabal 1998). Even though most of these ‘cultural workers’ were born or had grown up in the city of Tumaco, they constructed a discourse of ‘black culture’ with reference to a golden past that still existed in the rural areas. Sociologists, anthropologists and educators also influenced the constitution of this urban movement that aimed to recover and revaluate black ‘artistic-cultural’ heritage. For these ‘cultural workers’ —many of whom participated in the Municipal Consultative Commission— the AT-55 was consistent with their culturalist recovery of blackness.

Nevertheless, there were other reasons that pushed certain local state actors to start to articulate the black community as an ethnic group. As one would expect, this articulation was not a homogeneous process, and today there are still huge differences and even contradictions among the dissimilar institutions, programs and state projects operating in the region of the Pacifico nariñense. In this sense, for example, while some projects of technical international cooperation such as Guandal Project or the CVC-Holland Project immediately welcomed and supported the AT-55 process; others, such as the municipal governments, have not widely incorporated the discourse of the black community even at present (Pardo and Alvarez 2001).

15 Comisión Consultiva Municipal Pro-Etnia negra (COMÚN)
Law 70 of 1993: juridical inscription of ethnicization

The final text of the Special Commission, once sanctioned, it is known as Law 70 of 1993. As I already noted, this law was the result of an arduous negotiation among the members of the Special Commission where the proposal presented on behalf of the communities and the proposal presented by the government were compared and, after hours of discussion, they fused the two versions in a bill proposal that was approved without further modifications by the Congress of the Republic. Although this bill contained elements of both proposals, there were aspects that were left aside.

‘Black communities’ are the subject of the law in a double sense. On one hand, only some ‘communities’ were identified as having the right to ‘collective property’ due to the fact that they have been ‘occupying’, according to some ‘traditional practices of production’, certain type of ‘lands’, this is, those ‘baldias’, ‘rural’ and ‘riverside.’ On the other hand, it also referred to the ‘black communities’ of Colombia in general, for which the mechanisms toward the protection of their cultural identity and of their rights as an ‘ethnic group’ go along with the support of their ‘economic and social development’ with the purpose that this communities obtain conditions of ‘equality of opportunities’ with regard to the ‘rest of the Colombian society.’

In the definitions section the meanings of the following categories are clarified: basin of the Pacific, rivers of the basin of the Pacific, riverside rural areas, baldias lands, black community, collective occupation, and traditional practices of production. These categories are constructed in an attempt to avoid ambiguity. The last three are of particular relevance to the understanding the representations of ethnicity that transverse its political instrumentation.
According to these definitions, the ‘black community’ differs from other ethnic groups in that they reveal and conserve consciousness of identity, the fact that they are constituted by a set of families of afrocolombian origin with their own culture and shared history, and the fact that they possess their own traditions and customs inside the relationship of field to town. Therefore, the representation of ethnic, family, cultural and historical singularity of traditions and of customs structures the definition of ‘black community’. Although elements of the previous drafts of the text of the law were suppressed, the idea of the expressed and definitory singularity of ‘black community’ was conserved. The afrocolombian origin of the families and the relationship of field to town in the traditions and customs, established an anchorage of concrete content to the definition of ‘black community’. The other elements of the definition merely allow some black communities to be represented as different from any other type of communities or non-black groups, but they do not allow for a definition of whether or not among black communities there are ethnic, cultural or historical diversities.

Nevertheless, with the categories of ‘collective occupation’ and of ‘traditional practices of production’ much more than the sense of ‘black community’ is conditioned. The first is defined by the ancestral presence of these communities on lands of their collective use that constitutes their ‘habitat’ and upon which their traditional practices of production are operating. Thus, the notion of black community denotes a ‘collective use’ of lands ancestrally appropriated through traditional practices of production. These practices are made up of a series of activities and technologies - agricultural, mining, forestry related, hunting and gathering - that guarantee the ‘conservation of life’ and ‘sustainable development.’
In sum, in Law 70 ‘black communities’ appear, then, as a family community of afrocolombian origin that shares a history, a culture and some traditions and customs that have ancestral occupation of lands with collective use through traditional activities and techniques which have allowed conservation of the life and sustainable development. Once sanctioned by Law 70, organizations and activists eagerly rushed to study in detail the terms of the law, memorizing many of their passages and interpreting its reaches and limitations. As it happened with the AT 55, many workshops were held for the diffusion of the law, photocopies of this law were circulated and commentaries were printed to explain in simple language what it meant: “People support the law 70 as a language, that was their daily and that is their daily. We have our law. We already told them why of the law 70, why they had approved it to us, which our principles were inside the law 70 that each articulate of that law involves, to that we have right, what we have to take care because that is ours. And people were getting the story.”

While promulgating information about Law 70, activists, advisers and resources converged to deploy a considerable amount of work with people across all regions of Colombian Pacific. This involved not only a huge cobertura, but also a more specific intervention in terms of organizational consolidation and, in the places where they did not yet exist, toward the creation of new organizations. Thus, from the perspective of the activists, the diffusion of the law served as an opportunity for organizational consolidation due to the financial and human resources that converged in the period directly after its enactment.

Disputes over Law 70

For some organized sectors, Law 70 of 1993 constituted a significant advance in their visibility as an ethnic group in the national scenario. In this respect, the narrative of Reinelda Perlasa, long-time president of Organichar, is very illustrative:

At the beginning, so that we were organized, arose AT 55. From where did that AT 55 come? In Colombia everybody knows that the black communities have not had right, because the government has always considered us as ethnic minority. Soon after the new Constitution of 91 all the unions, all the ethnic groups, all the sectors wanted to claim their rights. The black communities also, although the idea didn’t come from those of us who live in the most remote areas in the Pacifico region. But an idea from Carlos Rosero and other partners of Choco resulted that the constituents at the very end of the Constitution put us a Transitory Article 55. That articule said that if in the next two years of the Articulate Transitory 55 the black community had not been organized, then the government would left us without rights. For that it gave us an extension of six months more. Because we thought that in the government’s mentality, it never realized that the communities could be organized, because it had always considered us as the last ones, as the unable ones. But thanks to god and to the good will of all, we were able to score a goal, I tell you so, to the government before the two years and we begun to dialogue with people and to let them know the transitory one 55.17

For some activists, this sensation of Law 70 as an achievement obtained by the organizations it is extend to the legislation of some countries in the Latin American context: “The existent legal recognitions in the different countries are been of the pressures, mobilizations and demands that the organizations of black community have advanced” (Grueso 1996: 3).

Many claims were not achieved, and Law 70 did not contemplate the totality of the aspirations of the base organizations that participated in the process of the Special Commission. Nevertheless, after the law that abolished slavery, for many activists Law

70 was the legal starting point for the materialization of a relationship with the State and the Colombian nation based on their claims of ethnic-cultural difference. Rather than a concession on the part of the government, this law was perceived as a victory for the nascent black movement that moved away from a conventional speech associated with civil rights or demands for equality. Rather, this was seen as coming closer to a focus that the movement claimed the right to the cultural difference. That is, of a framework of equality without difference to one of the difference in equality.

In the analyses elaborated by some activists it is indicated that the juridical recognition of ethnic rights and the institutional spaces opened by Law 70 should not only be taken into consideration when making a balance of the achievements, but also that the process of their formulation itself implied significant advances in organizational and discursive terms:

[…] but beyond the significant advances achieved in the institutional and legislative aspect, it is had achieved during this stage some big levels of cohesion and national integration of Black Communities and of their organizations as well as the advance in the construction of the territorial ethnic discourse, framed in the diffusion, protection and defense of the rights of black communities as ethnic group, what begins to establish as objective of the different organizations […] (Cassiani 1999: 36).

At the time of its promulgation, not all perceived the achievements of Law 70 and the politics of ethnicity in these terms. Some criticism was articulated, mainly by urban black intellectuals with a middle class background. As Mauricio Pardo indicated, the source of this criticism is:

[…] disdain with the immense majority of the figures of the traditional political leadership and […] middle sectors of the region have looked to the action collective peasant, even attributing them the intention of instituting a sort of apartheid involves some class positions in those that more suitable strata underestimate the actions and claims for maintain the productive vernacular
practices, the same ones that in dominant visions have been considered as models of backwardness and marginalization (Pardo 2002: 69).

One of these criticisms advanced by black intellectuals was published in one of the newspapers in Quibdó\(^\text{18}\), called *Barule*. For them, the AT 55 and Law 70 should be understood as “[…] monsters of backwardness and racism” (Barule Nº 5. Quibdó. May of 1993. p 4). The ‘backwardness’ is argued because the declaration of the collective property really meant the establishment of “[…] areas excluded from the economy and forbidden from technological and scientific advances, constrains for the free evolution of the productive forces, true broths of cultivation of the backwardness, inertia and paralysis.” (Barule Nº 5. Quibdó. May of 1993. p 4).

Moreover, collective property was considered as a marker of ‘inferiority’ and ‘archaism’ that is in process of being overcome by the ‘superior’ form of modern private property: “This inferior and archaic form of collective property is typical of primitive and prehistoric societies. In the few and straggling places where they still survive, they is breaking down and changing into the modern system of private property.” (Barule Nº 5. Quibdó. May of 1993. p 4). This modality of ‘primitive’ and ‘overcome’ property is, also, seen by the authors of this article as directly related to a colonial model for indigenous groups that it is imposed in a mechanical way to the peasants of the Pacific region:

This very old form of collective property was imposed to blood and fire by the Spanish crown in the colonial period when confined the indigenous people to the disgraceful resguardos. AT 55 and their derived law are monsters of the legislation for tribal and semitribal indigenous groups, transplanted in an almost literal way to the riverside peasants of the Colombian Pacific Litoral. (Barule Nº 5. Quibdó. May of 1993. p 4).

\(^{18}\) Quibdó es la capital del departamento del Chocó, localizado en la parte norte del Pacífico colombiano.
The appeal to the figure of ‘palenques’ constitutes another of the arguments for those which the AT 55 and Law 70 appear ‘backward’: “Pretending to resuscitate palenques in a few years before the twenty first century does not pass as being something ridiculous and absurd. Those expressions of the slaves’ resistance made their sense ago three or four centuries in a society completely different to the current one.” (Barule Nº 5. Quibdó. May of 1993. p 4). On the other hand, the ‘racism’ that the AT 55 and Law 70 supposedly embody is compared explicitly with Hitlerian racism and the Apartheid in South Africa as in all of these cases a necessary relationship between property and the destruction of the ‘earth’ with ‘racial aspects’ was maintained. Indeed, the application of the norms derived from Law 70 would mean that

[...] regions would exist in Colombia where people would be expropriated and segregated by racial factors. The Hitlerian racism clamed in Germany the ‘Aryan territory’ and it unhained it the Second World War and their own defeat. In 1913 the South African racists approved and Land Act or Law about the property of the earth based on the race, one of the pillars of the abominable one ‘Apartheid’ that confined blacks in the called bantustanes or autochthonous territories (Barule Nº 5. Quibdó. May of 1993. p 4).

With the result that for the authors of the text, “in Colombia the defenders of AT 55 and their derived law advocate for the racial segregation, antidemocracy and the creation of Bantustans or palenques autonomous” (Barule Nº 5. Quibdó. May of 1993. p 4). The fact that it was intended a legislative act of this nature it is explained by the same authors some months later in the same periodical, *Barule*, as the product of some ‘bad children of Choco’ with a ‘infantile mentality’ that joined racist sectors to look for their selfish interests to be able ‘to live off the black one’:

The infantile mentality of some bad children of Choco led them to unite with some racists to make choir and to obtain the approval of discriminatory, racist and primitive norms. The thinking class of Choco should take cards in this matter and to denounce the racism of who inside do not feel any love or positive desire for the

Given these arguments, the Departmental Consult Committee diffused an official statement to the public, dated June 3 1993. In this official statement, the Consult Committee questioned the article published in *Barule*. The first argument is the precision and truthfulness of the information of the article related to the process of the AT 55, that which constitutes evidence of its ‘ignorance’. The second deals with the referent of ‘progress’ and how to understand ‘technological advances’ and their benefits for communities:

> What do you call technological advances? The backhoes or the big bulldozers cutting timber that destroy our forests and soils? Are they big technological advances truly, what have they left us? Which have the advances of the towns been, where the big mining consortia and have lumbermen had establishment?; none. They have only generated misery, desolation, illnesses, social decomposition etc. etc. (Consultiva Departmental del Choco 1993).

In third place, the Consultive Committee argued that they were not looking for a segregationist approach with their struggle but rather hoping to establish the conditions for their future as ethnic group and for a life with dignity. Rather than racists, they felt that they had been victims of racism: “Historically the racism has been the ideology of the dominant classes of the exploiters against the exploited, based on this and other reasons; we do not want to fall in the evil that racism generates, since traditionally we have been victims of it.” (Consultiva Departmental del Choco 1993). Finally, the official statement deals with question the authors of the article. They declare that the authors of the articles are “people unwelcome to the process of the black communities.” The disputes over Law 70 are not limited to this set of articles published in Choco at the
moment of its signature. Another example that illustrates these disputes, a black state official in Tumaco asserted:

I am against anything having to do with Law 70 because is a manipulated process. I believe that these processes are not the result of the vision of the black people themselves in Colombia, but that they obey to what it is thought that blacks should be in Colombia […] One of the main problems with Law 70 is that we are always working with imported models. The models have to be adapted to every circumstance. Foreign models of development have always been imposed on us. That is the reason why the programs that have been done in the Pacific region never produce any real impact. These actions have never been done according to what we are thinking, but what other people believe how blacks should be. Law 70 says how blacks should be, and then we work in order to become like that. Rather than to be, Law 70 refers to the should be. We say that the laws are born to interpret a reality, but Law 70 wants to interpret a reality that is not ours. Law 70 wants to forge a non-existent reality. That is the reason why they lead the people into workshops and indoctrinate them. Thus, one finds that those who have been in this process speak in the same way as the National Planning Office’s experts. If you go to the most recondite settlement of the Pacific, there you will find a person who is talking about Law 70, and he will speak to you exactly in the same way that the people in Bogotá do. It is a totally manipulated process.  

More than five years after having sanctioned Law 70, and from the perspective of an official of the State that speaks from an ‘us’ as black, he introduces a critique of the imposed and unreal discourse that supposes this law about the region and its people. In this way, it is in the opposed side of those who see this law as a conquest of the communities and as the expression of their rights and realities. Other oral and written debates could be brought up. Nevertheless, before extending into the filigree of these debates, the point here is to illustrate the existence of strong tensions and incommensurable contradictions with regard to the ethnicization process, even in the region of the Colombian Pacific. The ethnicization embodied in the discourse that transverse Law 70 of 1993 was distant then of an absolute consent because it implies an  

articulation of blackness that is not shared by diverse sectors that considered themselves as blacks, afrodescendants or afrocolombians.

**Regulation of Law 70: institutionalizing the representation of black communities**

With Law 70 of 1993 the frame for the institutionalization of a particular articulation of blackness was established. The institutionalization of this articulation had two components that constitute the two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, the locations that were opened up inside the State with the intention of incorporating the transformations and the politics derived from the different legislative acts related with black people’s ethnic rights. On the other hand, they are organizations, networks, coalitions or even individuals that establish (and dispute) the novel demands for representativeness mostly from the State, from the NGOs and international entities, and others.

With regard to the institutionalization on the part of the State, since the regulation of Law 70 established a series of functions and spaces that should be occupied on behalf of ‘black communities’ within the governmental infrastructure. As an activist indicated, the risks were evident: “[…] if we don’t have some clear approaches of relationship with the government’s institutions we can fall in their clientelist networks” (Cortés 1999:138). In Ministry of the Interior a unit titled the “Direction of Black Communities” (Dirección de Asuntos de Communidades Negras) was created in order to promote actions toward a proper assistance to these communities by the national government’s programs. This Direction was later fused into the unit of Asuntos Etnicos (Ethnic Affairs) within the same ministry.
The Commission of High Level it was introduced a mechanism of negotiation between the representatives of black communities and the national government to follow the aspects related with the regulation of the Law 70 and other problematics associated with the rights of the black communities. In the House of Representatives two positions were dedicated by special election for the members of ‘black communities’ in order to guarantee the political representation of these communities in the National Congress. In 1994, Zulia Mena and Agustín Valencia were the first two people chosen by this special election (Cunin 2003b). Equally, from Law 70 and its regulatory ordinances the participation of a representative from the ‘black communities’ in the directive committee of the regional autonomous corporations (Codechocó, CVC and Corponariño, among others) was defined with jurisdiction in the areas inhabited by these communities. In the same way, a representative of the black communities was defined for the National Council of Planning. A Pedagogic Commission for ethnoeducation was also created and assigned to the Ministry of Education. A special fund of scholarships for afrocolombian students was also created.

With regard to the novel demand for the representation on behalf of ‘black communities’, a set of organizations, networks, coalitions or, on occasions, individuals emerged. This response has facilitated the consolidation of certain organizational expressions, but it has also meant its fragmentation and undermining (Pardo 2002: 61). Much of the struggles within and between different organizational expressions over the occupation of spaces of negotiation with the government or in programs and concrete projects can be understand in the context of the dispute for who rightfully (or not) speaks on behalf of black communities.
One of the tensions concerning representation has in fact come out of the regulation of Law 70 and of the creation of the community councils. By means of the ordinance 1745 of October 12th of 1995, that regulated Chapter III of Law 70, the characteristics and functions of the community councils were defined as were the procedures to request the collective ownership of lands. After this ordinance was passed, the collective ownership over near five million hectares in the region of the Pacific has been secured. From this ordinance and as one of the requirements for the titillation, community councils have been constituted. Although many of them are continuations of previous organizational efforts and are articulated organically with the ethnic organizations that preceded them, other community councils were result of interventions contrary to these organizations such as certain managers and a group of consultants deployed by Incora.

With the regulation of Law 70, mining and timber industries saw their permits for the exploitation of natural resources limited in areas where there was a possibility for collective ownership for black communities. Some of managers from these industries supported the formation of community councils as a strategy to gain the will of the communities to obtain permits of exploitation of forest or mining recourses (Agudelo 2002, Oslender 2001). It was in this way, for example, that Alenpac (company exporter of wild palms hearts) organized a Community Council in Bocas of Saquihondita and a new organization called ONRI (Organization of Negritudes of the River Iscuandé). On the other hand, under the direction of Otilia Dueñas, the Incora bolstered the constitution of some community councils in the Valley and the Cauca starting from the recruiting of consultants that collided with the perspective and rhythm of the extant ethnic organizations as well as outside of the Regional Committees. The councils formed in this
way entered into dispute over the representation of black communities, at least at the local level, and generated certain tensions. It is evident in an interview with Rosa Solís:

I worked as an adviser of Pacific Plan in a training project for women. Then when my friend Otilia Dueñas was appointed as director of the Incora I went to look for a job and what they offered me was the consultancy to create community councils. Members of the PCN were opposed to the idea that other blacks than themselves might work in that. Otilia knew how to face them and I could carry out my consultancy to create various community councils in several districts (veredas) of Buenaventura. I worked with 4 districts for titillation […] (Quoted in Agudelo 2001: 237).

From the perspective of some analysts, the subsequent institutionalization following the ratification of Law 70 has implied both the consolidation of a script and the increase dependence on state resources limiting significantly the initiative of the organizations:

Law 70 and its institutional implementations have caused constriction of the political initiative, of the ideological proposals of the black movement and of its organizational advance. This is a situation different to which was presented during the mobilization for the inclusion of the black rights in the constituent and during the discussion that led to the promulgation of Law 70. The resources and accesses to the institutional activity created by Law 70 have become factors of tension between the organizations and other actors of the black movement. When having foreseen the Law 70 the establishment of collective territories in the Pacific administered by community councils, the localities with territorial titles or in process of titling often preferred deal directly with the government and with the institutions and they breakaway of regional coordination with urban headquarters of the social movement (Pardo 2002: 61).

Mediations in the Production of the Black Community

The emergence and consolidation of the organizational strategies of the ethnicization of blackness have been possible for a series of imbricate and changing mediations. These strategies did not arise or consolidate through the isolated action of ‘communities’ nor their activists. Although these actions have been crucial, the support
of a series of actors who have participated for various reasons directly or indirectly in the constitution of the ethnic-territorial and ethnic-cultural organizations as well as in training their activists cannot be ignored. In the theory of social movements, these mediations are conceptualized as the ‘network of the movement’ (Escobar, Álvarez and Dagnino 1998). This network is composed of people, institutions, resources and discourses that are articulated in diverse ways to generate conditions of emergence and transformation of social movements: “[...] the social movements appear as the result of the confluence of different forces of the civil society and not only as the autonomous and isolated mobilization of the social group in question or as a result of the actions of having dedicated activists [...]” (Pardo 1997: 231).

In what follows I will present some mediations of the church and of the state to illustrate this point. The purpose is to glimpse how the ethnic articulation of blackness has historically supposed the mobilization of a series of actors, discourses and technologies that constitute a set of conditions of possibility for the action and for the political imagination of the organizations and activists.

**The Church: empowering local organizations**

As in the Chocó, in the southern Pacific the work of the Church had been central in the emergence and consolidation of certain organizational dynamics related to the ethnicization of blackness. By their own initiative, the missionaries went to several zones of the Pacífico Nariñense talking about the existence of the AT-55. Especially in the Patía Viejo and Grande, Mira, Mosquera, Satinga, Sanquiang and, later, in El Charco, they
initiated a project of diffusion of the AT-55 and, in many cases, were the promoters of
the organizations of ethnic character that have since taken part in the process.

The fact that the missionaries had promoted organizational processes in this part of
the Pacific also refers to their self-representations. In particular, this is a clear expression
of the fact that they did not see their ‘mission’ in a conventional manner. As Father
Antonio Gaviria put it: “We understood that our mission is not strictly religious, but that
it should help the integral development of the community. We saw clearly that if nobody
would, we would have to do the work in order to organize the people.”

This conception of the Church as an entity concerned with the ‘development’ of the
region does not appear for the first time with the promotion of the organizational
processes of the local people. Rather, this idea has been part of the missionary work of
the Carmelitas since the first half of the twentieth century when they staffed the Mission
of Tumaco. Since then, the Church has assumed a conception of its mission not only in
terms of the spiritual sphere, but also of ‘the social and economic progress of the region’
(Monsignor Izarar, quoted by González 1982: 180). This was reflected in the construction
of infrastructure (for example, the airports at Bocas of Satinga and El Charco or the
communal Radio Mira). These activities caused surprise among their superiors in Europe
because they were not in keeping with the usual conception of missionary work
(González 1982:110-115).

Even more, around the fifties the efforts of the missionaries were oriented towards
‘peasant promotion.’ However, at that time this meant to bring in European colonists. In
the words of one missionary, this strategy sought “[…] to have a much bigger and more
active efficacy on the morality of the region than the sermons of the missionaries”
(quotation in González 1982: 86). The differences between the mid-century regime of representation of the Church that brought European white colonists into the region and the Church of the nineties that promoted the ethnic organizations of black community are thus evident.

The interest of the priests of Tumaco’s Vicariato in supporting the organizational process based on the model of the alterity of black community originated in the relation they had with the missionaries of Chocó and, especially, from the knowledge gained by ACIA’s experience. Nun Yolanda Cerón, who was murdered by paramilitary groups in September of 2001 for her organizational work, related this first moment this way:

We begin in the Vicariousness the process of planning, that was in the year 90. When we begin the assemblies of the Vicariousness, we hardly began to meet the agents of Pastoral and in that moment it was already conformed the team of Indigenous Pastoral, with most of them of the CMV, Swisses and Germans, they accompanied the indigenous process Awa, the whole process of recovery of lands and a lawyer advised them, Miguel Vázquez that worked with Funcol and he also worked a little with the Obapo in the Choco. Due that he worked with the team of Indigenist Pastoral, he gave us the latest news on the plans of the Pacific. Then, we begin to be disturbed with all that there were on plans of the Pacific and that was the thematic of the assemblies: what to make in front of the situation of the Colombian Pacific, in concrete of the Pacific nariñense, with all those development plans that will come. Already in the 91 he told us that in the Constitution people were struggling for a space for black communities, so that something comes out for the black communities. Then, it was really the EPI (Equip of Indigenous Pastoral) through the lawyer that we were pushed first toward an Afro pastoral, to define an Afro pastoral, that we had to commit with an Afro pastoral. (Quoted in Rivas 2000: 8).

On the other hand, father Antonio Gaviria related:

I had already been before in Choco and I met Acia. In the year ninety us, some partners leave Guapi, then we decide that we wanted to locate ourselves in this coast. And we went to know Choco, later we came to know this coast. Finally we stay here because we saw more urgency, more necessity. Then in the visit to Choco I met the Acia and I was conversing with people. Of the coast it is where first they began to be organized and to the root of the Transitory one 55 there is whole process that they lived there, because inclusive there counted me that, for that time that the constitution had not still come out, they counted me that they had
requested kind of a resguardo like the indigenous and the government did not give it to them. Then already the idea was there [...] that was evolving until in the Constitution that came out.”

Despite the interest shared by missionaries in the AT-55, they had differences of opinion depending on local conditions. In this way, while in some zones the Church assumed openly the organizational work that led to the constitution and support of the organizations, in other localities its influence has been less direct or non-existent.

Equally, whereas in some organizations the members of the Church had a profound acceptance of the organizations (including one case in which a priest became a member of an important local organization and of the regional coordination), with other organizations the relationship between the missionaries and the activists were —and have continued to be— tense or based on antagonisms.

Among those organizations that the Church promoted and actively accompanied are those of the northern Pacifico nariñense. In the case of the municipalities of Olaya Herrera and Mosquera, for example, the labor of the missionaries undoubtedly was crucial to the emergence of organizations such as Orisa, Universan, (north and south) Odemap and Oromo. In the words of Father Antonio Gaviria, once the AT-55 was formulated:

[...] We organized the first assembly that was in The Marías, in the river Satinga. Many people attended, I calculate that there were around seventy people. We provided the food and the people assumed the cost of their own transportation. We, from the parish, invited the people to this meeting. In this assembly, we described the Transitory Article 55. There we brought a guy, who was studying law [...] He helped us with the presentation of the topic from the juridical point of view. Everything was done on a very rudimentary plane, because there were not organizations here. The meetings of Community Action Boards [Juntas de Acción Comunal] had not worked. The Peasant’s Association [Asociación de Usuarios

Campesinos] is a nominal thing. The meetings of parents associations at the schools are the only things that work, but once at the beginning of the school year and again at the end. There is much solidarity, but there is no organization, there wasn’t any organization. These were the first serious organizations […] The issue went in this way: each settlement [vereda] chose a representative and later all of the representatives met and we elected the president […] The usual thing in these meetings —president, vice-president, secretary, spokesperson, like in the meetings of the Junta de Acción Comunal. Orisa was founded in this meeting, and even its name was chosen. After that, we held the meeting (asamblea) in Sanquianga. I couldn’t attend there […] but it was almost ready and other brothers did the asamblea. Later we did the same in Calabazal. Later, I promoted another organization in Mosquera, Oromo. I remember it very well. I promoted meetings for the neighborhoods. Later I held a meeting to choose president and so forth. Nevertheless, this organization has worked very little. Later we started the organization Odemap, in Satinga […]  

Although the participation of the Church made the formation of these organizations possible, it did not undermine the importance of other actors. For example, for the specific case of the organizations of the municipalities Olaya Herrera and Mosquera, there were other mediating instances, particularly the Guandal Project (a project of technical international cooperation), the Working Group of Buenaventura and the National Movement Cimarrón.22 Besides indicating the obvious participation of the Church, the above quote by Father Antonio Gaviria makes evident the representation that some priests have of their relationship with these organizations. In Organichar’s case, which encompasses the northern municipalities of the Pacífico nariñense (The Tola, El Charco and Iscuandé), the Church has occupied an equally outstanding place, though different from the previous organizational experiences at Olaya Herrera and Mosquera in many aspects.

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22 About the history of Cimarron National Movement see Wade (1995) and Agudelo (2002).
Organichar has had the direct participation of the members of the Church in the organizations as activists. This is the case of Father Alex Jiménez, who was an active member of this organization. He also was for a time one of the three regional coordinators of the movement for the department of Nariño. Though Father Alex Jiménez came to El Charco after the approval of the Law 70 of 1993, the Church and Organichar had been already closely linked since the process of diffusion of the AT-55. So, the president of Organichar, founder and principal activist of the organization, Reinelda Perlasa first heard about the AT-55 from an event that the Church carried out in Quibdó (Choco). In her words, from the beginning: “[…] the Church has been the only administrative entity that helped us. And we give thanks to the Church. Monsignor Gustavo gave us all his support, the priests who came here also: Father Ricardo, Father Juan, and now Father Alex who have been working with us. And thanks to this help we could go forward.”

As Reinelda Perlasa also noted, Father Alex Jiménez was a crucial figure in strengthening the relations between the Church and the local organization. Not only because he was the direct link between the Church and Organichar, but also because he dedicated himself to taking an active part in obtaining resources and facilitating infrastructure, in participating in the workshops, and in diffusing conflicts with local businessmen (mining, African palm and shell fish), as well as in getting the information necessary for the process of the legal recognition of their lands on the basis of his anthropological training at the Missionary Institute of Anthropology ‘Miguel Angel Builes.’ As he put it:

When Law 70 came out, since Monsignor knew that I really liked this discourse, he obtained the text of the law. And already when I came here to El Charco, I got
in touch with Organichar. Organichar had already existed for a while, from the Transitory Article 55. They had done good work. But many of these groups try to act and then tend to disappear. Then we started meeting, we were meeting I believe every Monday. And then I passed a small project on to the Franciscans of France and we started moving, we were going out [to river communities] from Friday until Sunday. I was accompanying them simply because I did not know anything about this discourse. And Reinalda and others spoke, and I simply observed. And I started reading the laws. At a certain moment I started taking part also [...] Then came the expulsion of the retroexcavadoras [an industrial gold mining machine] and already in another assembly of Palenque [The regional network of organizations of black community] they named me to be the departmental coordinator, probably because of the work on the [expulsion of the] retroexcavadoras. I don’t remember how long I was in the departmental coordination. But then I came here because as regional coordinator I spent a lot of time out. I wasn’t even fulfilling my duties as a priest and neither in the grassroots work of the organization. A year ago I dedicated myself to working towards the recognition of their land’s rights, and especially doing ethnography of traditional practices, writing history, as well as demarcating the territory […] 26

Another important figure in the mediations of the Church in the ethnicization of the black community was the nun Yolanda Cerón. In her words:

We took the Transitory Article 55, we studied it, and we devoted ourselves to spreading it through the different rivers. Those who were in Bocas de Satinga, they moved for the river Satinga. Father Secallina, who was in El Charco, went to the rivers Tapaje, Mataje, Iscuande, and La Tola. Father Garrido and Sister Bernarda were already advancing previous organizational process, which was the Jun Pro-defense of the Patía Viejo. Father Garrido, since he was very knowledgeable about the black communities and of the history of Africa, had already started working for the people’s struggle for the right to land. They also devoted themselves to spreading the AT-55. The organizations that already existed took better shape with this Transitory Article 55. We began to spread AT-55 in 1991 in the river Patía Grande. Luz Mery Rengifo, who was in the river Mira, worked in that river, whereas Father Garrido and Sister Bernarda worked in the Patía Viejo and the Telembí rivers. As a product of this process the rural organizations arose. So there arose grassroots peasants’ organizations such as Asomira, Acapa, Onepe... All of them were formed by the Church […] Other organizations, from Barbacoas especially, that already existed before the AT55, also took as their cause the defense of the territory: Camino Sindagua and Fundación Chigualo.23

23 Quoted by Rivas (2000: 8-9).
Although in other zones of the Pacífico Nariñense the joint participation of the Church and the organizations has been less marked or direct, the existence of a set of mediations in the process of production of an ethnic articulation of blackness and in emergence of the ethnic organizations is clear. Toward May of 1992, the Vicariousness summarized its work in the following way:

In relation to the development of the work of promotion and accompaniment of the organization of the black communities of the Apostolic Vicariousness of Tumaco, we allow to put on in your knowledge some of the last events, with the intention of propitiating a creative dialogue that allows a good coordination of our efforts and give us some lights on the next tasks.

1. The Pastoral Teams of the parishes have assumed with seriousness the accompaniment and promotion of the organization of black communities. This way in some regions the process is more advanced, for example in the rivers Satinga and Sanquianga and in the river Patía Viejo comes working three rural organizations. On the other hand, Salahonda, the Mira river and the Gran Patía have already advanced several meetings and organizational works. In the surroundings of road Tumaco-Pasto the process begins.

2. Several years ago some organizational works were done in Iscuandé, Tola and El Chardco that it is necessary to begin again. In Mosquera the dynamic began in these days and the first meeting with peasants of Roberto Payán of San José just happened. Also, peasants and miners of the rivers Telembí and Guelmambí are mobilizing these days.

3. In most of these places they are being carried out maps of the territories of each community and the peasants are writing small reports and censuses of their main problems and rights. These works are being picked up by our teams. As it can be see our work already begins to give the first fruits and it has been carried out only and exclusively with the effort and the good will of the missionaries and of the communities. These last ones have financed the transports and they have massively assisted to the invitations demonstrating great interest.24

The mediations of the Church in the emergence and support to the novel organizational dynamic were not exclusive to the Pacific Nariñense. In the department of Valley of the Cauca, the Church had also this influence. Victor Guevara, one of the most outstanding

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members in the Palenque Congal (PCN), indicated the influence of the Catholic Church in the creation of some organizations at the beginning of the 90s:

During this period, in the year of 1990 the social mobilization in the rural area of the municipality of Buenaventura, like in the whole Pacific Coast, began to build a new page with the creation of an organizational initiative of community character impulse by, among other sectors, the Catholic Church in the priests’ leadership: Joaquín Mayorga who officiated as responsible in the church of the river Naya until the river Raposo and the father Antonio who was responsible for the church of El Cinco and it corresponded him to assist until the river Anchicayá, they were responsible for the attention of the catechesis in the rural area. (quoted by Cassiani 2003: 149-150).

With the result that, these “[…] priests put in the center of their work mission to promote the community organization, having as base the catechists of the rivers. They embody for such effects the first organizations in the rivers Anchicayá and Cajambre, well-known as the Committee Pro-Defense of the river Anchicayá and the Committee Pro-Defense of the Interests of the Cajambre” (Cassiani 2003: 150). Once constituted, these organizations also had the support of different governmental entities (Cassiani 2003: 150). This process is related by an activist in the following terms:

The model of Acia showed us the road toward where to focus our work. This meant for us a change in the project of life. We overturn us to work in the rivers. Some organizations and some antecedents already existed in the region. The experience of Monsignor Valencia Cano’s work was present in some organizations like the ‘Committee pro-Defense of the river Anchicayá’, which existed before our arrival to the region. Then similar organizations were created for the river Cajambre in the one that we influence. A priest that worked in the rivers Naya and Cajambre, Joaquín Mayorga, energizes the organizational work in these rivers with the model of the river Anchicayá. Another priest originating of the Naya is ordered in the river and because for that ritual the whole community was present we take advantage to inform people on the advances that were had in the discussion with the government on the territorial rights for the black communities. In that moment we were still the ‘Coordinator of Black Organizations’. Then we begin the organization in the other rivers of Buenventura. Initially we had to mobilize with our own resources. Some of us had a job and we invested part of our wages in mobilizing us to the rivers. Then through María Lucía Hurtado that worked in the CVC and of Libia Grueso in SENA we got the...
first money of projects that allowed to work under better conditions (Quoted in Agudelo 2002: 213).

According to one of the publications of Cimarron of the time, in the context of an encounter promoted by the Church to celebrate the ordination of one of their priests a support group it created in which participate different entities:

In the area surrounding Buenaventura, the Southern Pacific, a very important contribution in the diffusion of AT 55 developed it a Group of Support to the Peasant Organization that was created in November 22th of 1991 in Merizalde, in a rural encounter promoted by the Parish to celebrate the Cimarron partner’s ordination Gilberto Garcés. In the beginning the support group was integrated by Cimarron, the Coordinator of Black Communities, the Institute Matía Mulumba, Plan Godfathers, Afro ITI, Collective Gerardo Valencia Cano and other organizations. Their central objective was to develop unity in the diffusion and promotion of the rural organization and AT 55. Little time later, the support group disappeared when the National Coordinator of Black Communities changed the name for Organization of Black Communities that promotes a process of coordination of the peasant organizations and some of the urban sector of Buenaventura dealing with the development of the negotiation with the government of AT 55. (Cuadernos del Cimarron 1992: 14).

In the region of the Colombian Pacific, it is the department of Cauca where the Church has been less relevant to the organizational dynamics of ethnic character: “Contrary to the Choco or Nariño, where the Church has played a more institutional role of support and it has even been one of the main promoters of these organizational processes, in the Cauca the relationship with this process has been, until the time of our investigation, rather product of individual initiatives” (Agudelo 2002: 59). This does not mean that it has been totally pushed to the margin as had been illustrated by the anthropologist and community leader Gerardo Bazán: “I remember that the first time that we found out what was passing with the new constitution and that of transitory 55 were when the Church invited us to some to a meeting that was made in Buenvaventura. This was at the end of 1991” (quoted by Agudelo 2002: 253).
For the entire region of the Pacific, Mauricio Pardo has argued that the biggest organizational success in the Acia (Choco) and Acapa (Nariño) might be largely attributed to that the mediations of the Church have been bigger and much nearer the accompaniment: “This accompaniment for several years allowed the training of local leaders, the consolidation of organizational practices, the sedimentation of discourses, the establishment of relationships and the knowledge of sources of funds, factors these of difficult reach for an association of inhabitants in a forest far from the national circuits” (2002: 67).

For the organizational processes that have consolidated in the Colombian continental Caribbean, the Church has also been outstanding. In this respect, Alfonso Cassiani writes:

[...] the church was a valuable ally undoubtedly in the different places [...] The presence of religious in the frame of the process of conformation of the Social Process of Black Communities in the Costa Caribbean, was given in three levels. The first one was constituted by those religious expressions with which there were an interaction, such as the case of the Ecclesiastical Communities of Base and Maria’s Legion. With them, we developed actions together and exchanged invitations to the different events programmed by an or another part. The second is constituted by those that supported the work of Black Communities in direct form, assuming commitments for their same character without being part of any organization of Black Communities, such it is the case of the Nuns that supported and encouraged the conformation of the Organizing Committee of the Barrio Nariño and that they moved away from the work because they were transferred. The parish of the Bahía and with this the Missionary Team of Bahia [...] which was constituted by priests, religious and lays, the one that assumed as option the encouragement of ethnic, historical and cultural identity of the communities of the bay, to such a point that they conformed a group of delegates with representatives of each community, with those that besides analyzing and contextualize the biblical word, the reality of each community were analyzed, from the perspective of the identity [...] The third level is formed by those who assumed commitment and they were linked to the work and even ended up making part of the different coordination instances and orientation, such it is the case of the father Willian Riascos of the order of the Franciscans and Ubaldo Santos, who were pillars of a lot of importance in its respective places [...] (1999: 59-60).
The motives for which some sectors of the Church have been overturned with more or less intensity to the mediation of the process of ethnicization of blackness demand a research by itself that it is still to be carried out and that it escapes to the aims of this dissertation. That research should begin with the recognition of the difference not only between sectors, but also among different places. There is nothing like a unique and monolithic policy and action, but tendencies that should be accountable in their local articulations where the influence of some individuals sometimes constitutes a decisive factor. Also, that research will have to elaborate a genealogy of what today is known as the Afro-Colombian Pastoral and of its articulation with the theology of liberation. The options for the ‘poor’ and the interpretation of the gospel from an emancipator perspective, allow for the understanding of the emphasis in the organizational and popular processes. An important element in this process has been the anthropological training of some priests.

*The State: Special Commission, Biopacifico Project and PMNR*

The State’s mediations have been even deeper than those of the Church, but they have been more marked by ambiguities and tensions in different planes. Although some wanted to simply see the State as a monolithic entity against which the organizational movement has deployed its fights and reached its conquests (and, without doubts, partly this is true), the relationship and place of the State in the ethnicization process are much
more complex. Not only opponents, the limits between State and the organizations and their activists are not always easily recognizable.

To understand the State’s mediations in the ethnicization of blackness, an ethnography of the State is required. There is a tendency to imagine State as a monolithic entity defined by a unique rationality that transverses all and each one of its planes, actions and agents. From an ethnographic perspective, these narratives about the State should be subjected to examination as well the various ritual, bureaucratic and daily practices through which the State is performed and confronted in diverse social contexts where multiple positions of subject and subjectivities converge. The State as an apparatus and its rationality beyond the representations, relationships and practices embodied in the infinite actions where it puts at stake its existence, is the ‘State-myth’, the ‘State essence’ that tend to be naturalized to fix relationships of power in the social body appealing to transcendental entities.25

The reaches and characteristic of the State’s mediations in the process of the ethnicization of blackness have not only varied over time, but also with the institutions and scales along which they are deployed. Without a doubt, these mediations are contradictory and plagued by tensions. Nevertheless, the grounds and the conditions of possibility of most organizational movements (as much in their narratives as in their strategies) are related with the state institutional network in which they operate. The recognition of ethnic rights, the discursive and material resources deployed, as well as the interventions concerning social imaginaries and subjectivities that constitute the

ethnicization of ‘black communities’ and their organizations are not given in an emptiness nor they remit exclusively to ‘communities’ and activists. On the contrary, it is in the frame of the State (and to some concrete institutional and juridical networks) from which this ethnicization and the involved organizations emerge as novel political subjects.

The Special Commission for the Black Communities (CECN), the Biopacifico Project (PBP) and the Regional Committees (CR) of the Program for Management of Natural Resources of the Ministry of the Environment constitute three spaces in which State’s mediations have taken place in the ethnicization of blackness. They are not the only ones, but they are the most relevant in terms of the concrete content and the techniques deployed in this ethnicization. It was in the CECN where the techniques were distilled and where the concrete terms of the ethnicity of the black communities were negotiated. An analysis of the discourse of the different records and documentation of the CECN compiled by their Technical Secretary, shows how (not without antagonisms and disagreements) the content of notions like ‘traditional practices of production’, ‘social organization’, ‘identity’, ‘culture’ or ‘territory’, that would give a specific sense to the ethnicization of blackness that is captured in the law, were produced. The situation was not one where some representatives of the communities already had the contents of the law and its categorizations defined ahead of time in their heads and then were limited by struggles with some functionaries of the government who were sometimes advised by academics or politicians who were part of the CECN.

As was already discussed, there were opposing conceptions about the reaches of the law expressed in the government and in the organizations. Beyond this point, the State
mediation in the CECN should be understood more in terms of the terrain and rationality in which the disputes were given and where the consents were established. The representatives of the organizations differed about the contents and reaches of the law, but the discussions were given on the rationality of the knowledge of the State (that is, that of the experts). Sometimes, representatives appealed to the creole language of Palenque or to the funeral songs from the Pacific region to show their cultural difference, but such attempts did not break the State’s terrain or rationality. The processes of translation of the representatives’ experiences, as well as of those of the members of the ‘communities’ mobilized in several activities, in terms of the language of the State and of an judicial fixation that does not tolerate ambiguity or contradictions, it was not one-dimensional nor a simple exercise of pouring pre-defined content into another mold. It was, on the contrary, a creation process, an interpellation of the grids of intelligibility from which the world is thought and experienced and, therefore, of how one acts (or does not act) in it.

Another important edge of the State’s mediations in the process of the ethnicization of blackness in the context of the CECN involves the economic resources summoned to finance several workshops for diffusion of the AT 55 and for consulting with communities concerning the possible contents of the law. These resources were used also to finance, either in total or partially, the mobilization and meetings of the leaders of black organizations at the departmental, regional or national level. Without a doubt this mediation was relevant, but I would like to call attention to how certain experiences, memories, and knowledges of multiple local inhabitants of the Pacific region and their representatives were interpellated in terms of organizational inscriptions, workshops
formats, and the performance of tradition and authority. I will develop this point in the next section. For now is enough to note that a set of techniques (such as organizations, assemblies or workshops) and forms of visualization (such as census or maps) are not simply neutral tools whose only function consists in gathering pre-existing information. It is in fact at this level where it would be necessary to locate the deepest of the State’s mediations in the CECN.

PBP was another scenario for the State’s mediation of the process of the ethnicization of ‘black communities’. For some activists (mainly those bound to the sector of the PCN, but not exclusively) and academics, PBP was one of the most valuable experiences of negotiation. Financed by contributions of The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Swiss government, the PBP was designed with the aim of consolidating a strategy for the conservation and sustainable management of the biodiversity in the region now called Bio-geographical Choco. In terms of its first plan of operation: their aim “[…] is to go beyond the simple measures of control of the use of the natural resources and to generate a new development strategy for the population located in the region, based on the protection and sustainable use of the biodiversity instead of their extraction and destruction” (PBP, 1993: 3). To know, to value, to mobilize and to formulate-assign were the four action areas contemplated in this plan of operation. Although initially profiled as a project with a biologist vision of biodiversity and without a significant participation of local populations, due to the involvement of several external sources of pressure (such as an unfavorable evaluation and the positioning of the indigenous and black ethnic organizations of the region), PBP entered into a dynamic of negotiation with representatives of certain organized ethnic sectors. This negotiation let
not only to a new formulation of its operative plan, but also of its conceptual frame about biodiversity in the Pacific region.

PBP mediations involve several planes. The most evident was to become in one of the most important spaces of discussion, dispute and negotiation of multiple indigenous and black organizations of the Pacific region. Some organizations, such as the network of women Matamba and Guasá in the Cauca (Asher 2004), emerged from a strong impulse of PBP: “PBP not only negotiates with the ethnic and community organizations of the region, but rather it stimulates their creation. In some regions the most ostensible results of PBP are exactly in the support given to the organizational processes” (Agudelo 2002: 91).

Once sanctioned under Law 70 of 1993, between 1995 and 1998, PBP became a scenario of regional organizational empowerment (mainly of those organizations associated with the PCN) while a settled down ‘enlarged committee’ with the participation of representatives of the organizations (and the diffusion and consultation to the local populations by means of events financed by the project) defined the criterion of intervention and to design the plan of operation. The mediation consisted, in this first plane, of putting into circulation a series of notions (such as those of biodiversity) and to establish a debate centering on some problems (the conservation and handling of the biological diversity) between the activists of the organizations and the inhabitants from the Colombian Pacific. In this way, a term that previously was broadly unknown such as ‘biodiversity’ became central through the activities of PBP in the imaginary of the local residents and the activists in the region. After the discussions introduced by activists, in the institutional discourse of PBP this term was transformed from its initial meaning of
mere biological diversity to one in which this biological diversity is associated with cultural difference of the ethnic groups that have inhabited the region. Moreover, it is in the context of these discussions and negotiations in which other notions for the organizations such as ‘territory-region’ acquired meaning. Thus, the association already established among ‘black communities’, ‘territory’ and ‘nature’ was shaped through PBP mediations.

Finally, among the spaces of state mediation it is relevant to mention the Program of Management of Natural Resources (PMRN) of the Ministry of the Environment and, more concretely, the Regional Committees for the collective land titling of black communities. PMRN is a program approved in 1993 by the national government that received resources via a loan from the World Bank in August of 1994 for, among other objectives, to advance the collective land titling indicated by Law 70. PMRN assumed that there was a correlation between conservation of biodiversity and the collective land titling to the black and indigenous communities of the region: “The Program opts to support the process of collective land titling with the conviction that will have a favorable impact on the biodiversity, just as it has demonstrated it the constitution of indigenous reservations in the Amazon region” (Sánchez and Roldan 2002: 17).

The collective titling of the black communities supported by the PMRN was produced through the Regional Committees, which were a ‘mixed space’ where different institutions of the State (of those which the Net of Social Solidarity - attributed to the presidency - as the coordinating entity) converged, as well as the black and indigenous ethno-territorial organizations. Designed as scenarios for negotiation, the regional committees looked to define the agenda for the designation of resources and pursuit of
the different stages implied in obtaining the collective land titling. The land titling processes were composed of different stages: training, solicitation of advice from internal authorities, negotiation between ethnic groups and definition of boundaries, and, once the titles had been obtained, regulation of the use of the natural resources of the land titled (Sánchez and Roldán 2002: 14).

In their evaluation of PMRN, Enrique Sánchez and Roque Roldán (2002: 29-30) considered their biggest achievement to be the collective titling of black communities, as of the 2.3 million hectares that were considered the goal in the Plan of Action, 2.38 millions were titled, which corresponds to 58 community councils. In this frame, “with the resources of the Program community leaders were trained through 36 events and were the same organizations and Community Councils that carried out part of the studies that the law demanded so that a land globe is recognized as of collective property” (Sánchez and Roldán 2002: 30).

The World Bank was not limited to simply financing the loan, but rather it was closely bound into the design and surveillance of the Program. In words of Diomedes Londoño, who was the technical coordinator of the PMRN in the Ministry:

The World Bank has been checking the execution of the projects of PMRN very closely. These financial organisms have not only participated in the financing but also in the discussion of policies. The Bank has been a factor of important pressure for the execution of the land titling to black and indigenous communities. When the plans are delayed the World Bank settles the accounts to the ministry. (Quoted by Agudelo 2002: 90).

Therefore, Agudelo considered it to be the case that: “The mistrust with which the World Bank investigates the development of the policies that finances corresponds well to the changes operated in this type of international organizations that privilege the mechanisms of local actors’ participation in the search of more effectiveness and profitability in the
implementation of their projects” (2002: 90). In this sense, the Sectoral Director of the Unit of Social Development for Latin America and the Caribbean of the World Bank, Shelton H. Davis, in his foreword to the report of evaluation of the PMNR, not only recognizes the correspondence of the collective titling of black communities with the new policies of the World Bank, but also the participation of the later for the ‘assistance’ in the design of the PMRN:

[...] one of the reasons for which the World Bank was prepared to finance these components of collective land titling was its own policy on indigenous people (Operative Guideline 4.20), which entered in validity in 1991. This policy makes emphasis in the protection of the territorial rights of the indigenous people and other vulnerable ethnic groups. It is interesting to note that during the same year in that the Operative Guideline entered in validity, the Colombian government was preparing (with the attendance of the Work Bank) the PMRN, and the National Constitution was also issued. (Davis 2002: viii).

On other occasions, the intervention of the World Bank has taken a direct interaction with the community councils for the financing of the management plans derived from the collective land titling. Thus, for example, for the design of the first of the management plans for the Pacific region, Ulrich Oslender indicates that: “I was in Guapi at the time when the Trinidad and Tobago-born World Bank representative visited and spoke to the various community council leaders on the Cauca coast. It was in these meetings that a decision was made that the Community Council Napi was to benefit from direct World Bank support” (2001: 254). About this management plan, Oslender noted that

[...] identifies problems affecting the population and the ecosystems of the lands of the river Napi as perceived by its inhabitants and interpreted by ‘experts’ [...] Furthermore, it develops a general outline of action, together with more specific programmes and projects to be implemented within the territory of the community council. Geographers, biologists and forest engineers participated in the analysis with their ‘expert knowledges’ and representatives of the local communities were also involved, as well as government officials overseeing the logistics of the project. (Oslender 2001: 254).
Given the magnitude of the resources and the intervention of the PMRN, the geographer Karl Offen (2003: 59) is surprised that some academics (not to mention the activists) describe land titling as if it had been dictated mostly by the social movements such as the PCN, diminishing the place and the impact of World Bank’s policies for Latin America through the conditions and pursuit that were made when the loan was given to the PMRN. With the significant thing that it can be to think of the mediations in terms of the flow of resources and the connections with state or global agendas (as those of the World Bank), it cannot miss other more subtle, but perhaps deeper mediations. A good starting point is an observation made by Sánchez and Roldán in the same evaluation report:

The titling process generated an intellectual movement in the same communities, where old people, hunters, gathers and traditional doctors were given to the task of reconstructing the history of the occupation of the community territories and of explaining, from the own perspective, the importance and uses of their natural resources. Places and resources were rediscovered, it was recovered the names of many rivers and streams, historical facts were revived and it was put on evidence the risks and dangers of the undue uses of the resources. Part of this knowledge was consigned in maps and memoirs elaborated in workshops of social cartography and journeys -monteos- made by the community experts in the knowledge of the territory but, as they recognize it some of the Afro Colombians leaders, the most important thing was the fact of putting to work together to young and old, men and women and to socialize a traditional knowledge on the biological resources and on the community territory as part of their own identity. Some of these materials were consigned in the textbooks and training materials. (2002: 36-37).

It is in fact in this intellectual movement of the communities themselves, at the local level and with the participation of old and young, women and men, where the state mediations went deeper in the ethnicization of blackness with the collective land titling. The constitution of the community council, for example, demanded some written statutes and a plan of management, it supposed some communication channels and representation, it looked to the agency as a specific link between the place and its inhabitants as well as
promoting a specific cultural and environmental politics. All this was possible for an intervention (the intellectual movement to which Sánchez and Roldán referred) in the quotidian and the local inhabitants perceptions. In this intervention an entire army of experts (working on the elaboration of the required maps, the writing of the history, social organization and culture of the community, in the definition of the necessary statutes, etc.) mediated the intellectual movement of the local inhabitants associated with the process of collective titling.

As I will expose in the following section, this intellectual movement put at stake a series of techniques of invention and modalities of visualization that actively build the notions of territory, tradition, community, culture, and identity as well as intervening along the plane of the subjectivities and individual and collective perceptions about themselves and others, about past, present, future, space and the social and natural environment. What is at stake in training, in planning, in classification or in the mapping are not a set of ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ tools for mechanical transcription of pre-formed realities. These tools are instruments of political mobilization, as the activists know them (of concientización, in their language). They interpellate knowledge, experiences and local subjectivities from some grids of intelligibility that respond to the state rationality and expert knowledge. They traditionalize, territorialize, and communalize; in a word, they ethicize from criteria and in a culturalist, historicist, ecological, cartographical language, from which the State, its institutions and representatives usually operate. These criteria and language is endorsed and propagated to the local populations so that it appears as their own knowledge, as the most authentic participation and the simple expression of their deeper desire.
Techniques of invention and forms of visualization

In order to produce an ethnographic account of the ethnicization of blackness, it is pertinent to examine the techniques of invention and forms of visualization that have shaped and enacted this ethnicization. The techniques involved in the invention of blackness as an ethnic group have been multiple —they range from meetings to workshops, from assemblies to departmental (and national) commissions, from ethnic organizations to the program or institutional components, from legislation to projects as mechanisms of interaction with the state and NGO’s. They have involved forms of visualization through maps, censuses, documents and surveys. They have been put in operation by an army of experts —from activists and governmental officers to the advisers and academics.

In their interaction, these techniques and forms of visualization constituted the most profound apparatus through which the black community has been produced and reproduced as ethnic group. In their apparent neutrality, rationality and objectivity, in their silent labor of assembling, registering and reporting, they have displayed one of the most powerful components of the politics of ethnicity. From the state or the Church to ethnic organizations, these techniques of invention and forms of visualization have been systematically displayed. The tacit consensus about them has precisely constituted the basis of their powerful effects. Such techniques of invention and forms of visualization that have traversed the ethnicization of the black community refer to a sort of specifically modern rationality. This fact introduces an apparent paradox —the discourse of ethnicity and tradition as effects of modernity.
Among these techniques one must differentiate those that entail the concentration of people in a determined time and space with a specific aim. Workshops, meetings, assemblies and commissions belong to this type of technique. All of them involve the spatial displacement and the temporary breaking of the daily routine of work or festivities in order to be in/formed, give information and take-legitimize decisions. They are techniques of production and circulation of a certain kinds of speech, of a particular management of the body and of the establishment-reproduction of specific power relationships. In fact, to be in/formed includes a wide scale of activities that go from receiving ‘news’ or training to gaining ‘awareness’ or ‘consciousness’. The activities of receiving ‘news’ about the AT-55 and of the need to respond organizationally to the AT-55’s conjuncture is illustrated by Nelson Montaño, president and founder of Orisa (Organization of the Satinga River):

Father Antonio entrusted me with warning the people. Then I began to call the people, to tell people that a person would come to do a workshop about the black communities, and that Father Antonio would like us to listen to this person. This meeting was in January 16th, the day that Carlos Ramos arrived. Father Antonio told me about the importance of this meeting with the people. He told me that I would talk with the people, that I would say to them that we owned our territory and that the black communities are discriminated and so forth, so that we want to improve their situation. He said also that there was a transitory article 55 that speaks about the legal recognition of the land and about economic, social and political rights. 26

These techniques also attempted ‘to awaken’ the ‘consciousness’ of people of the rights of the black community and of the importance of taking part in the formulation of what later become Law 70. Thus, recalling Reinelda Perlasa’s words: “Because for some it was like a joke, but for others at least one was awaken their consciousness [...] Then we

started meetings and spreading the story [about AT-55] in Iscuandé, in the Tapaje river and in La Tola […]”

27 Training in organizational formation and in leadership was another important aspect of these techniques: “[…] people were brought to give human rights courses, and we did also meetings on political formation.”

28 This type of technique supposed forms of production and circulation of discourses, of disposition of bodies, as well as the introduction of a set of relationships and assumptions. Thus, in this space-time of the meetings the word was regulated: who, how, when and what was spoken followed a format that was not that of the space-time of the daily life of work or even the festivity of the local populations. Even if local formats were inserted, they mainly appeared as performance. *Alabaos* (a sort of singing funeral prayer), for example, were sung to open an assembly, or *decimas* (an oral tradition poetry form) were written to be recited in an event, but the space-time formats in which *alabaos* or *décimas* are produced were totally different.

The bodies were confined into the discipline of the chairs in school classrooms. People had to concentrate on presentations that often followed the model of conferences or technical presentations. The participants’ interventions were regulated according to topic and time. The schedules and rhythms were defined on the basis of a temporality marked by the clock. These techniques implied a management of the body that was strange for many local people, although more familiar for the activists and advisers with ‘educational capital’. Finally, these techniques inserted relations and assumptions among the attendees at multiple levels.


28 Interview with Father Antonio Gaviria, Satinga, January 2nd 1998.
Even though it has been commonly argued that these workshops involved the equal participation of everybody, this was not the case given that both the format and the themes of many of the workshops had been defined in advance according to the financial resources provided by a specific entity or the urgencies of organizational dynamics. Moreover, hierarchies were established between those who designed and coordinated the workshop and those who attended, activists / non-activists, leaders / militants, and men / women, among others.

Other types of techniques established certain modern modalities of action and planning. The organization itself was one of the more widespread techniques of this type. Many organizations arose in the context of the AT-55—one might even argue that there was an organizational ‘boom’ in the first three years of the nineties. From advisors and activists’ perspective, these organizations were the response to a previous situation of ‘non-organization’ of the black people:

Organichar was born in the moment at which the government demanded that all the communities had to be organized and that these organizations had to register in Bogotá. Then our mission was to first awaken the consciousness of the people so that they would realize the reason for the organization, because we were living without any kind of organization.

Moreover, this ‘absence of organization’ has been considered the reason for the situation of abandonment, marginality, backwardness and poverty of the peoples of the region. Given this representation, it is not strange that the proposal ‘solution’ was to teach local people about the ‘real organizations’ and support their creation. For the

29 A similar irruption was produced on the national level (Agudelo 2002).
Church especially, “to organize the people” constituted one of its core causes in the region since the formulation of the Afro-American Pastoral in the 1980s (Cepac 2003). In terms of contents and form of operation, the organizations of the black community were modern and responded to the state logic of institutionalization of the ‘social actors’ — with legal representative, president, treasurer, and legal inscription, among others.

The organizations of the black community reproduced in this way a mode of institutionalization of political action. Thus, at some levels the ethnic organizations were inscribed in a logic of social action previously developed by other figures such as Community Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal) or Parents’ Associations for the schools (Asociaciones de Padres de Familia). However, the ethnic organization transcended these other modalities of institutionalization of social action not only because of their stronger dynamic, but also because the former became a network with different levels of intervention and negotiation of the state politics. A similar observation might be made in relation to the organizations’ forms of operation — through assemblies with defined moderators, work commissions, projects, reports, etc.

In sum, the ethnic organizations were not the simple expression of a sort of traditional form of social organization as their members sometimes represent, or as certain advisers or academics sometimes suggest. Rather, they are modern modalities of collective action closely tied to the logic of the Colombian State. Furthermore, one could say that the non-visualization of the multiple organizational structures that exist de facto among the black populations has been an important condition for the emergence and consolidation of this kind of ethnic organization. Even today, and despite their ethnic
narratives, the organizations have not grasped many forms of social power and organization of the local populations.\textsuperscript{31}

The notion and practice of working and interacting with other actors based on ‘projects’ equally belongs to the type of technique in which the black community emerged through certain modern modalities of action and planning. The design and implementation of a project is an exercise of planning, which according to Escobar (1992) constitutes one of the mechanisms of modernity through which the discourse of ‘experts’ colonize the life-world (a la Habermas) to produce ‘the social.’ For the ethnic organizations, the design and implementation of projects have occupied a crucial role in obtaining financial resources. Advisers and activists have appealed to a number of state or non-governmental instances for specific projects. However, the projects have been more than a privileged strategy for obtaining financial resources. Rather, the projects have constituted a daily exercise of articulation of what the black community is, what its ‘problems’ are, and how, when and who must solve them.

As an ethnic group, the black community has been scrutinized, unfolded and inscribed through numerous projects produced by the organizations in the name of their communities. These projects constituted not only a symbolic space of articulation of the ‘black community,’ but also an instrument of social intervention in the realm of the local populations. They assume, if one wishes, a social engineering perspective. In the form of projects, the black community has been circulated in the most diverse scenarios such as ecclesiastic European organizations, a variety of non-governmental organizations, and

\textsuperscript{31} Precisely in this contradiction lies the source of many difficulties in the implementation of the Communitarian Councils.
various State’s programs. These ‘bureaucratic journeys’ through projects of the black community as an ethnic group have mutually and constantly shaped the gaze of the activists and organization as well as state officers, advisers and NGO functionaries. In the name of the ‘black community,’ these projects have institutionalized certain flows of discourses, people and resources. Therefore, this ‘language of the project’ has been a nodal technique of invention of the black community as an ethnic group. As the other techniques already examined, this ‘language of the project’ responds to a modern logic.

The Management Plan for the Community Council River Napi has a strong discursive component that is oriented towards global discourses on sustainability and conservation. On first sight it seems to make more sense to outsiders to the region than to local peasants and fishermen, and doubts may be raised as to how viable it will be to translate the Plan’s propositions into practice. Yet, its elaboration with the active participation of the community has also managed to raise consciousness levels over the problematic environmental situation in the Pacific and over the new legislation and the ensuing mobilization of black communities in the rivers of the Pacific. As an observer of this process pointed out, a lot of young students were keenly involved in the discussions of the final assembly called by the Management Plan committee, and the conscientisation of these young people may in future lead to their active participation in the local organizing processes or indeed in the national social movement of black communities [...] (Oslender 2001: 258).

The making of legislation can also be understood as another technique of invention of the ‘black community.’ As is noted in this chapter, the current legislation about the black community as an ethnic group (mainly Law 70 of 1993 and the decree 1745 of 1995) was the result of a process of negotiation between the government and the representatives of the organizations. This process of negotiation anchored the specific juridical meanings of the black community as an ethnic group in a double way. First, these meanings were defined upwards through techniques such as meetings, assemblies and workshops from the local to departmental and national levels. Second, they were defined through
documents, activities and representatives downwards from the Special Commission (national level) and by the Departmental Consultative Commissions to the local organizations. These flows shaped and distilled the black community as an ethnic group. The Special Commission and the Departmental Consultative Commissions mainly responded to the bureaucratic logic of the state, with schedules for each one of their sections, secretaries, hierarchies, documents, files, and so forth. At both levels, the experts’ discourses constituted the main currency through which the positions were discussed and agreements reached.

Moreover, the juridical realm cannot tolerate ambiguities because the terms of a law or decree must be as clear as possible in order to avoid disputes or applications contrary to the original intent of the legislators. This fact meant that the legislation ossified the black community as an ethnic group. Who is or is not a member of the black community has been clearly defined in the juridical texts and this definition has had a performative effect since they have widely circulated among activists and local populations, given that they was the basis of several workshops and training activities. Nowadays, it is relatively easy to find a person in the far reaches of the Southern Pacific that not only recites from memory extensive passages of Law 70 or decree 1745, but who also uses them to engage in a conversation or a request. If one keeps in mind this fact and adds the general tendency among the rural populations to deify written texts (and laws in particular), then it could be argued that the legislative proposals produced important performative effects of reification of the black community as an ethnic group.

Other important effect of this negotiation between the representatives and the government was the constitution of a feeling of ‘community’, a sort of novel ‘we,’ among
the representatives and activists of the different organizations. In fact, in diverse national
(Special Commission, but also the national assemblies), regional (Departmental
Consultative, but also the departmental assemblies) and local (workshops, meetings and
assemblies of each organization) scenarios, there was a feeling of community among the
activists and representatives. This feeling acted as a nodal point in the understanding of
the relevance of what has been named since then ‘The Process’ (El Proceso):

At the end of 1992, we started the departmental consultative commission. Organichar had two representatives to this commission, myself and Henry because we were pushing strongly for the organization. We related with representatives of other organizations and there [in the departmental consultative] we became familiar with them. We were meeting with those from Buenaventura, from Tumaco, Satinga, Mosquera and also the people from here, from Iscuandé, that we had not met before. From that moment on, there was a group unity, The Process. It didn’t make a difference whether you were from here or from another place. It was in this departmental consultative that we thought about creating a Palenque [the name chosen for the regional network of ethnic organizations].

In relation with the forms of visualization there has been a broad scale that goes from the ‘simple’ compilation of signatures to the making of maps, surveys and censuses, as well as the writing of documents or the publication of pamphlets. The maps and censuses constituted one of the first activities of the newly-created organizations of the black community in the southern Pacific: “The tasks that we did after coming from Quibdó were the maps, the census, the diffusion of the information of the AT-55 […] Father Antonio facilitated the transport and food for us in order to go to Mosquera and El

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Charco. Then I gave them the information, and Maria [Angulo] did the part of the Patia [River].”

These local maps and censuses were not precisely neutral tools for the description of a preexisting social reality. Rather, as Biggs (1999: 377) has argued, the practice of cartography (and the produced maps more specifically) introduces a kind of register that in its abstraction, objectification and differentiation of the space is associated with modernity in an analogous way to how the clock is linked with the modern representation of time.34 Thus, “As geographers have described in other participatory mapping contexts, public discussion of a territorial claim coupled with a territorial representation and its historic-cultural significance is wholly bound up with changing notions of territoriality that the finished map in-tends to represent […]” (Offen 2003: 61). On the other hand, according to Urla (1998), the censuses are not the neutral and objective technology that positivists, technocrats and policy-makers have naively supposed. On the contrary, censuses constitute a specifically modern political modality of visualization-invention and administration-domestication of ‘the social’.35

In the context of the southern Pacific, maps, censuses and surveys have been produced since the AT-55. Most of them were directly conducted by the local organizations involving an active participation of local populations. During the second half of the nineties, maps, censuses and surveys were important pieces in the constitution of the Community Councils (Consejos Comunitarios) as well as to get legal recognition

33 Interview by Oscar Almario and the author with Nelson Montaño, president of Orisa, Bocas de Satinga November 24th 1998.
35 In the same way, Anderson ([1983] 1991) has brilliantly argued how censuses, maps and museums have been technologies of representation since the colonial states.
of their territories (under the name of lands of black communities). As forms of visualization, maps, census and surveys have contributed to the production of the black community as an ethnic group. The exercises of mapping have introduced criteria and codes of spatial representation, objectification, abstraction, and differentiation. Hence, this form of visualization has conditioned what, who and how certain aspects have been spatially displayed and registered. It is through these maps that ‘the territory’ has become objectified. Here, as Thongchai puts it: “A map anticipated spatial reality, not vice versa” (quoted by Anderson [1983] 1991: 173).

For the Pacific caucano, the geographer Ulrich Oslender describes one of these processes of mapping:

The communities in the lower section of the river Guapi, for example, were supported by the Cali-based NGO Fundación La Minga, for whom the project of social cartography implies the development of maps with and for local communities in their own terms. In this exercise, local people’s mental maps serve as the common starting point, in that paper and pens are provided and locals discuss amongst themselves how to draw a map of their territory. The cartographic ‘expert’ accompanies and encourages this process, tries to answer questions arising, and oversees the collective production of a mental map of the area. This activity allows on the one hand an interpretation of local territorial perceptions, as the participants choose to draw and to represent those environmental features that they consider important, and on the other hand it enables the participants themselves to ‘walk around’ the aquatic space in their imaginations in a kind of ‘mental appropriation of their territory’. The workshops on social cartography thereby also fulfill a role of conscientisation where the riverside dwellers think and talk to one another about their river and the surrounding lands, and in so doing reflect on territorial conflicts and other problems affecting the community. The central orientating feature in most mental maps is the main river, which is normally drawn first by participants and around which they then spatialise their territorial imagination, adding other features such as tributaries, plantations and settlements [...] Subsequently participants are instructed in the use and the reading of ‘official’ maps, to then produce a new map that considers scale and technical details such as co-ordinates, topographical features and a legend. This map accompanies the respective community’s application for a collective land title presented to INCORA. The objective of social cartography is hence twofold: for participants to know their territory - an internal process of conscious
territorialisation; and for them to make their territory known—an external process of articulation and communication of their territorialities. (2001: 250-251).

As a form of visualization, the production of these maps was not a simple exercise of bringing to light a pre-existing territory. The intervention is deeper and it goes beyond the emergence of unusual ways of to experience and to represent spacial experiences, to make and to articulate new senses that become into territory. It is not that spacial practices had not previously existed, but rather that they were not the same nor will they already be the same from the discursive modalities and modalities of visual representation embodied in the mapped ‘territory’. The maps are not a simple and neutral transcription on paper of a representation and experience that it was in the minds of ‘the community’. The frontiers that are traced, the names that are introduced, the deciphering patterns and scale, the perspective and the two dimensionality, the code and abstraction, all this is conjugated in a resulting image, which emerges to the eyes of many local residents for the first time associated with the concept of territory.

In the workshops the experts and activists asked for some things and not for others, placing data on the paper with some terms and not with others, showing them some patterns of mapping. This invention of territory is yet another in the list of multiple interventions (meetings, assemblies, workshops, negotiations) which leaves profiling, little by little, in the local scale and in the subjectivities, the process of ethnicization of black communities.

In this sense, Oslender introduces an interesting reflection that suggests that what is at stake with these cartographies is the production itself of the ‘territory of black communities’, contrasting in several aspects with the spatial practices and experiences deployed by local populations before their ethnicization:
Although some movement leaders have pointed out that they ‘have their cartography clear in their heads’, the exercise itself raises questions over territorial conflicts and the very nature of the boundaries to be drawn. Whereas private property amongst rural black populations is clearly delimited, mainly by using natural boundaries such as certain streams, rocks or trees […] the mountain backlands (respaldo de monte), which are used in activities such as hunting and gathering, are perceived as an open, collective space without any clearly established boundaries. The need to delimit these areas on maps therefore runs against traditional spatial and territorial visions. Furthermore, with regard to inter-ethnic relations between black communities and indigenous groups, there have traditionally existed what I would term ‘overlapping territorialities’ in that black people may enter and use what is perceived as or known to be indigenous collective territory and vice versa, always if their respective activities do not infringe upon the other ethnic group’s territorial rights. There have traditionally existed what can be called ‘tolerated territorialities’ between black communities and indigenous groups on the Pacific coast that consist of ‘fluid boundaries’ which are nevertheless clearly marked and respected in imaginary space […] Yet, it is now the very legislations with regard to the creation of Indian reservations (resguardos) and collective lands of black communities that are causing inter-ethnic conflicts by imposing the previously unimportant notion of fixed boundaries that have to be delimited in space, on maps and thus also in the territorial imaginations of both indigenous and black communities. We are currently witnessing an external imposition of fixed boundaries onto local epistemologies of fluid boundaries and tolerant territorialities, forcing local communities to translate their territorial aspirations onto maps which Western-style institutions will accept as legitimate documentation to accompany their land rights claims. This is a little discussed but important side effect of the legislation, and one which has to be judged negatively, as it has led to increasing territorial conflicts between black and indigenous communities. (Oslender 2001: 253).

Censuses and surveys have also introduced forms of visualization of the ‘black community.’ Rather than being neutral and objective methodologies, censuses and surveys actively intervene on the ‘social reality’ that they are claimed to account for. They imply not only a grid of accountability, but also the operation of a set of power relationships embedded in the question/answer mechanism. Their effects of truth are based on the compelling magic of the quantitative realm, mostly presented in the form of graphs or charts.
For the case of the southern Pacific, censuses and surveys crystallized explicit
criteria of belonging to the ‘community.’ Thus, in order for someone to be considered a
member of the community, these censuses and surveys defined patterns of mobility and
presence/absence. Like the map, the censuses and surveys defined criteria of visualization
of the ‘black community.’ Thus, the ‘community’ started to acquire a particular existence
in terms of numbers spreading in multiple ways through variables such as age, sex, time
of habitation, ‘head of family,’ and type of occupation. Censuses and surveys inserted a
set of conceptual borders in order to produce a clear cut ‘we’ —the community.

Conclusion

The ethnicization process that I have examined in this chapter constitutes an
unusual problematization of blackness articulated from 1980s. This problematization
refers to a culturalist othering shaped by expert discourses of anthropologists and
historians. The ethnicization of blackness implies that the political subject and the subject
of rights are based on the notion of an ethnic group defined by the possession of a
particular culture which is different from the group of the Colombian society. The
ethnicization supposes a novel articulation of blackness in which certain aspects of the
social life of concrete populations are objectificated in terms of 'culture', 'territory',
'traditional practices of production', 'identity', 'communality' and 'ancestralit', among
others. It also supposes some technologies of intervention on these novel ethnicized
populations.
It is on behalf of a defense of the cultural difference articulated in terms of this population's ethnicity that get tied up a series of strategies of knowledge, of measure, of interpellation for the most varied 'army' of experts, activists and brokers. A series of techniques and subjectivities to become subjects of veridiction and jurisdiction for certain experts, officials, religious and activists. Anthropological and historical games of truth on the approaches and characteristic of the ethnicity of the black communities that establish modalities of subjectification (ethnic identities, politics of identity, subjectivities) and concrete objectification (culture, territory, ancestry, community). Regimes of veridiction that establishes an order of what is possible to make from the articulate juridical and political institutional network around the ethnicization that constitutes com of intervention of the state, of the social movement and of another series of mediators of those 'black communities.'
CHAPTER 3

RACIAL ARTICULATIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

In January of 1918, the psychiatrist Miguel Jiménez López\(^1\) presented at the Third Congress of Medicine in Cartagena his Memory “Our races decay. Some signs of collective degeneration in Colombia and in the similar countries: The current duty of the science” (Torres 2001: 133).\(^2\) This Memory and a series of conferences dictated during 1920 in the Municipal Theater in Bogotá by Jiménez and other outstanding intellectuals were compiled by Luis López de Mesa in a book titled *The Problems of Race in Colombia*. These conferences referred to the derivative debate of the sustained thesis put forth by Jiménez in their Memory of 1918 that there existed a series of obvious physical and psychic signs in the population that proved that ther had been ‘degeneration’ of ‘race’ in Colombia.

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\(^1\) He occupied different public positions: minister of government (1922), representative to the Camera, senator of the Republic, president of the Directory National Conservative and representative for the country to the Assembly of the United Nations (1951).

\(^2\) In the book published by López de Mesa, the title with which the Memory of Jiménez appears is conserved partially: “Some signs of collective degeneration in Colombia and in similar countries”. The Memory developed some of the points that he had already indicated in his inaugural lesson of the “Course of mental pathology”, in August 11 1916 (Torres 2001: 128).
The degeneration of race emerges as a problematization that demands expert knowledge in order to correctly interpret its manifestations in the population. A problematization that stays not only within the realm of the concern of psychiatrists, but rather one that transcends the clinic and the medical congress in order to become fodder for public debate in which another series of outstanding experts and political figures participated. It is a problematization that profiles a group of measures to be taken to reverse the process of ‘degeneration’ of the population. These measures implied a biopolitics of regulation of several aspects of the population’s life, feeding behaviors, hygiene, labor rhythms and the exercising of bodies and cultivation of minds.

Associated with this problematization of the degeneration of the race in Colombia there circulated a series of representations about the racial components of the nation and programs and measures were issued to intervene in diverse ways within the racialiced populations. The ‘black race’ or ‘African race’ appears to have been shaped in this way by the discourses that medicalized the social life of the country’s inhabitants. Blackness is articulated by a racialist frame of thought where the appeal to ‘biological’ grounds acquires relevance. This chapter approaches this problematization of the degeneration as it was debated in the 1920s in order to relate it to the articulations of blackness that are glimpsed among some of the most visible intellectuals who participated in this debate.³

In the first part of this chapter I shall present the argument of Jiménez on his diagnosis of the degeneration of the race in Colombia and the measures he suggested to

³ This debate has been examined from different perspectives (Castro 2007, Helg 1989, Noguera 2003, Pedraza 1996, 1999). Nevertheless, none has been centered in the racialist narratives about blacks, which is the dimension of the debate that interests me in this chapter.
deal with what appeared to him to be a worrisome situation not only for the ‘men of science’, but also for the future of the Colombian nation.  

In the second part of this chapter I explore the articulations of blackness existent among the authors who participated in this debate, paying particular attention to Luis López de Mesa. Thus, I begin by identifying some of the images of blacks that explicitly appeared in the texts of their lectures, making some punctual allusions to other texts and authors. Then I focus on the arguments about ‘miscegenation’ (mestización is the Spanish word used by Luis López de Mesa) and I explore how the crossing of the different ‘races’ was understood and what the political implications of such crossings were, as well as the suggested alternatives. Finally, I examine the omnipresence and ambiguity of the term ‘race’ showing that, even in a debate clearly shaped by a medicalization of the social, it was not an exclusively biological notion, nor was there consent among the authors about the relevance of this category.

1. Hermeneutics of the degeneration

The Memory of Jiménez presented to the congress of medicine of 1918 is divided into different parts. The first could be termed ‘diagnosis’ where the signs of ‘degeneration’ are presented in their physical and psychological aspects. The second part could be titled ‘etiology’ where some of the causes for this ‘degeneration’ are identified.

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4 For an exam of the disputes in favor or against the supposed degeneration of race in Colombia argued by Jimenez, see Torres (2001) and Pedraza (1996).
Finally, he introduces a therapeutic strategy that establishes a series of measures designed to deal adequately with the ‘degeneration’ of the ‘race’ in Colombia.

The signs of ‘physical degeneration’ are divided by Jiménez into anatomical, physiological and pathological. Among the anatomical indicators, he argues for the existence of ‘ethnic distinguishing characteristics’ that define “certain organic particularities as normal features of some races” (p. 9). What constitute a certain population must be taken into account because for one ‘race’ may be a ‘normal condition’ in another it can be a clear ‘degenerative sign’: “[…] the prognatism, for example, is a degenerative sign of the most appreciable in the Aryan races, as long as in the Ethiopic race is a normal conformation; the prominence of the maxillary bones, ethnic character of the Mongolic groupings, is an abnormality in the Caucasian race” (p. 9). Equally, ‘brachycephaly’ is considered to be “[…] normal morphological character in the aboriginal races of the America”, but if this is in other ‘races’ there is no doubt that it should be considered ‘a degenerative sign’.” (p. 9).

In his study of the anatomical signs, Jiménez not only used the information derived from his clinical work, but also incorporated data from healthy individuals of 21 years old “[…] coming from all the places of the republic, of the different social sectors and also of the diverse racial extractions” (p. 9). The physical list of the ‘degenerative signs’ involves stature, the cephalic index, the form of the skull, of gluteus in the women, the

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5 It is important to highlight that nobody totally shared Jiménez’ thesis about the degeneration of the race in Colombia. Some were especially critical, as the ‘hygienist’ Jorge Bejarano that questioned most of the Jimenez’s evidence and conjectures. Luis López de Mesa took distance of some of his positions while reinforced or remarked others. Similar tactic followed the physiologist Calixto Torres Umaña. The instructor Simón Araujo and the sociologist Lucas Caballero were opposed to particular aspects of Jiménez’ thesis on which they were considered experts, even modifying his diagnose on the harms suffered by the country, as well as their causes and solutions.
conformation of the ocular globe, the formation of the ear, of mouth cavity, of the feet, of the vagina and the uterus, as well as of the mammary glands.

In the identification of all these signs a series of calculations and observations that evidence disproportions (for excess or lack), asymmetries or ‘bad habits’ operate. The bodies of the individuals are subjects of scrutiny, but only as allows for the establishment of certain data. The purpose of the collection of this information is to search for knowledge of the ‘phenomena of degeneration’ of the ‘race’ that are expressed through the bodies of the individuals. An entire hermeneutics of abnormality spreads through the scrutiny of the endless ‘degenerative signs’ that surely take place invisible to eyes of non-experts.

The employment of medical terminology invests conceptualizations of the body with notions that indicate its deviations, excesses, precariousness, its abnormality. A dense fabric of medical language that is not always explained and whose effect is not only that of pointing out the place from which the expert ‘speaks’, but really wrapping up the description in the ‘game of truth’ through science.

Jiménez continued describing the ‘physiologic signs’ that indicate the ‘physical degeneration’ of ‘our race’. Among these signs there is no possible optimistic reading since the diagnosis is discouraging: “there are numbers made of functional character that put in evidence the biological inferiority of our race with regard to the average of the human species” (p. 12). The ‘biological inferiority’ of the ‘race’ in Colombia is evident in its ‘physiology’. They involve the ‘biological characters of a society’ (‘marriage rate’, ‘birth rate’, ‘mortality’, and ‘longevity’) as well as the ‘nutritious movements’ expressed

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6 Notice the singular in ‘our race’. On this point, I will return later on.
in ‘eliminated urea’, ‘wealth of the red globules’, body temperature, pulse rhythm and breathing, blood pressure and ‘incomplete elaboration of the nutritious materials’.

Referring to the ‘psychological degeneration’, Jiménez indicates a series of characteristics that without a doubt prove that “[…] in the psychological it is not less evident this collective decadence of Colombia and of the countries located in the same area” (p. 23). Already arguing for those “countries located in the same area”, Jiménez considers not only that “our intellectual contribution to the great human work has been scarce” (p. 23), but also that “[…] we have shown ourselves to the world as unstable groupings and in a state of permanent social disintegration” (p. 24). In the same sense, in his lecture of May of 1920, he noted “[…] what is habitual in the Latin American of the tropics is the easy discouragement, the changeability of aims and designs” (p. 67). The question that he posed was whether this scarce contribution and uncertainty might be understood as a “physiologic inferiority” or a “degeneration”, as an “inherent ethnic modality to the blood of our people” or as the expression of “a decrease of the original vital forces.” It is not a surprise that Jiménez chose the second term of the disjunctives (p. 24). In an open contrast between a glorious past and a decadent present of the different ethnic aggregates, Jiménez writes:

Our current population’s component races were in some time superior to today. Compare the relatively flourishing state […] of the indigenous empires of the Americas with the depressed and miserable condition of contemporary indigenous people. Make the paragon of conquering and adventurous Spanish of the XVI century with the residuals of uncontaminated Iberian blood of all mixture that they can be today in our continent and you see how all the energy and capacities have decreased. Follow the evolution of the Creole product through a century of our history and study it with impartiality and, without inappropriate enthusiasms for the scientific work, the psychology of the generation that carried out the Independence comparatively in the Spanish colonies with the current generations. It will be evident for any observer, the quick decadence of all these ethnic aggregates. (p. 24).
For Jiménez everything indicated a “process of decadence” that although it went back several generations, he felt it had intensified in the last fifty years. So, “[…] the racial handicaps have acquired a sharp march that translate themselves in several phenomena of social psychology.” (p. 24). Rather than witness a ‘domestic natural evolution’ where a ‘growing cultivation of the intelligence’ would be observable, Jiménez considered that Colombian population seems to be in “[…] a premature decrepitude” (p. 25). The explanation of it is biological and not historical: “[…] its reason of being is more biological than historical” (p. 25).7

A ‘pathological social stage’ was observed in the infinity of ‘psychic characters’ that mediated all the manifestations of collective life. ‘Infantile impatience’, ‘extreme emotionality’, ‘impulsiveness’, and ‘mental instability’ were some of the “[…] frankly morbid characters of the race that have been translated in our history by a series of agitations and changes that have credited us as one of the most unstable towns in the universe […]” (p. 26). The more than sixty internal wars and the countless coup and military civil strife, as well as the eleven political constitutions promulgated within one century, not only constitute an indication of such an uncertainty, but also it was only for this reason that “[…] our country already deserves the study of psychiatrists” (p. 26).

Referring specifically to the many political constitutions, Jiménez asked in his lecture of May of 1920: “doesn’t this fact imply a state of inconsistency in the collective will, a versatility of feelings and of ideas that it is only seen in infantile or senile spirits?” (p. 67).

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7 Notice the contrast between ‘biology’ and ‘history’ that constitutes Jiménez’s thought.
Besides such examples of supreme ‘instability’, Jiménez points out “[…] how scarce our intellectual production of true value is” (p. 26). This is due to the fact that the ‘national thought’ is penetrated and determined by ‘ideological currents’ from outside that are then blindly followed. Therefore, “In diverse scientific disciplines—except for isolated sporadic cases—we are capable to continue and assimilate to some degree to the great universal work, but we do not collaborate within it in a sensitive and efficient way” (p. 26). Jiménez considered this to be an expression of a ‘mental formation’ which tends toward imitation, rather than assimilation and original contribution:

There is, truly, in our mental formation something that allows us to appropriate easily all the intellectual or moral currents that come to us from people that have been, until the present, our spiritual drivers and, to the heat of these influences, we see flourish superior spirits that, in turn, form currents and schools of thought and of expression. But this, more than assimilation, is imitation […]” (p. 25).

Mentioning figures from the University with great experience in teaching, he concludes that another of the signs of the ‘collective regression’ consists in “[…] the youth’s undeniable intellectual decadence” (p. 27). The ‘setback’ is noted with regard to how previous generations showed greater enthusiasm for and dedication to their studies as well as greater physical strength. Even in areas like the natural sciences, the decline has been such that, according to the then Rector of the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Medicine, Pompilio Martínez, “we were better endowed in the final years of the Colony” (p. 28).

For Jiménez, other phenomena also bear great significance: the crime rate, the rate of suicide and the rate of madness. To these phenomena Jiménez adds another series “[…] of developing facts of a falling morality […]”: this is, “[…] all the forms of social decadence characteristic of the big centers: the sectarian, the fanatic, the professional
agitator, the elegant forms of the swindle, as the industry gentleman, the parasite; the amoral politician; secret and refined prostitution, precocious criminality, infantile prostitution, drug addiction, the sexual perversions” (p. 30). All these ‘forms of social decadence’ of the urban centers “[…] can be to be considered, in rigor, as stigmas of a frankly degenerative state and, largely, determined by hereditary flaws” (p. 30).

In a conclusive way, Jiménez considered it to be the case that all the psychological signs pointed in a single direction: they were “[…] the expression of a reduced intellectual and moral coefficient, not only with regard to other social contexts but also in relation to our own society in previous times” (p. 32). Added to the organic and functional signs already examined, they constituted a “[…] base to admit that — collectively— the inhabitants of this zone are the step of a degenerative ongoing process since time ago.” (p. 32).

Jiménez not only identified the group of signs that showed our ‘state of biological decadence’ (p. 32), but also devoted himself to the enumeration of the main ‘causes’ of this state. There are some external causes, as well as some internal causes. Among the external causes, he mentions first those that “diminish in a permanent way the nutritious activity of the organisms”. Likewise, he indicates other causes such as: food low in protein, the lack of hygiene, the sedentary lifestyle of the ‘well-off classes’, the corporal fatigue in the ‘popular classes’, education styles, the food intoxications, the alcoholism (in particular the consumption of chicha, a homemade fermented alcoholic beverage), tropical illnesses, various infections (including syphilis and tuberculosis), and misery “with all its physical and moral consequences” (p. 33).
On the other hand, the internal causes of the ‘vital degradation’ refer to the decline of the ‘collective organism’ for lack of “currents of new and vigorous blood” that came “to refresh the exhausted trunks” (p. 33). This exhaustion, degradation or ‘decline of our races’ is correlated to specific ‘zones’: “After suffering this phenomenon of decrepitude, we are not but one of the so many cases that the history of societies presents us” (p. 33): All the races that have populated this zone in any hemisphere have undergone similar evolution. For Jiménez the ‘tropical zone’ causes the decay and quick disappearance of the ‘superior races’: “it seems to be demonstrated that the superior races, those that are called to an intense culture cannot find acclimatization nor are they capable of blooming anywhere but in the temperate areas, under the tropics they decay and disappear shortly […]” (p. 33).

Moreover, Jiménez had no qualms about affirming that for the perfect operation of the human organism, and to avoid quickly wearing it away, would require seasonal change, something that the tropical zone lacks (p. 34). This constitutes the ‘laws’ that compelled the disappearance of the different ‘civilizations’ that previously tried to establish themselves in our land: “[…] the Mayan, the Naskas, the Caribbeans, the Chibchas were short stages in American prehistory; when each of these races began to produce works of some culture, they then underwent social shocks, showing a quick decline, then disappearing from the stage of nations” (p. 34).

**Therapeutic techniques and the ‘men of science’**

It is ‘the fertile action of the science’ that must inspire therapeutic techniques to slow down or even to halt the noxious effects of these ‘laws’, of “[…] the numerous
influences of physical and moral order that are hurting or bringing ruin and death to our collective organism […]” (p. 34). The ‘men of science’ should direct their studies and action to the main points indicated by Jiménez. A series of measures is suggested which had as their target the intervention in a diverse range of aspects of life of the Colombian population. The measures were of two types: palliative and radical.

The palliative measures “[…] that conspire to slow, in the best case, our decadence and temporarily to lift the biological and moral level of our people. They are, then, purely palliative resources for the harm we have suffered” (p. 36). Listed among these palliative measures, there would be those of ‘tropical hygiene’ and of ‘hygiene of the heights’ (p. 34-35).

In the same way, Jiménez considers that the ‘men of science’ should “Indicate to the population, especially to the poor classes, what type of nutrition, quantitative and qualitatively, would be more adequate for the different regions, according to the climate and the particular necessities” (p. 35). In addition, they should to force inhabitants “[…] to implement, in agreement with legislators and educators, measures of public and private hygiene that would compel everybody to follow measures of personal hygiene” (p. 35). They should also make compulsory “[…] the adoption on the part of the upper classes, especially the woman, habits of physical exercise that break old habits of the sedentary lifestyle and of excessive closing that have always characterized us” (p. 35).

For ‘working classes’ their work would “[…] introduce the necessary periods of rest and would prevent the exhaustion that is imposed inconsiderately on certain sectors […]” (p. 35). Also, education would have to be subject to total revision in order to “[…] give physical culture importance from early age; of avoiding the school fatigue and of
forming to the educating—in both sexes—a firm and personal will” (p. 35). With all the scientific effort and experience, a struggle should be made against the various illnesses, from alcoholism to malaria, anemia, syphilis, tuberculosis, cancer, leprosy and beriberi. Finally, the ‘men of science’ should simultaneously focus their efforts on the fight “[…] against the misery, […] and social parasites, already prevalent with the creation of agricultural colonies in our extensive and very fertile territories, which arrived with the introduction of new industries […]” (p. 36).

In this way, the palliative measures suggested by Jiménez implied a medicalization of society making it a surface for the intervention of expert knowledge of medicine and hygiene. It supposed a detailed regulation of the population in terms of its mobility, feeding, public and private health, physical activity, education, behaviors and conditions of life. This describes an entire program of biopolitics guided by medical knowledge.

These palliative measures by themselves were not enough, but rather a ‘radical remedy’ would be required to deal with the biological dimension of the degeneration of the race:

Let us not think that just by making our lives hygienic, or that by issuing laws that protect to the proletariat, by building roads and spreading rails everywhere or by establishing wise educational systems can we retrace our descent down the fearful slope that our country has continued along from time immemorial. The harm is deeper: it is not only economic, psychological and educational; it is biological. It is simply a problem of exhausted races, which in order to rejuvenate fresh blood will be necessary. (p. 37).

Thus, the ‘radical remedy’ for the ‘physical and psychical degeneration’ of the Colombian race is “[…] a plentiful current of immigration of healthy, strong races and disciplined by working and exempt secular habits, as soon as it is possible, of the social illnesses that are determining our regression” (p. 36-37). Some pages later, he insisted as
a doctor that, after a careful diagnosis, he would prescribe the following measures for the cure of this suffering: “This is, then, the radical remedy for our decadence; good and plentiful immigration.” (p. 39).

To carry out this prescription more than the medical knowledge was required. The ‘problem of immigration’ was crucial for the ‘men of science’ (among whom, of course, doctors occupied a prominent place), and for the ‘men of state’. The first group, ‘men of science’ should study their viability attentively in economic terms and its effectiveness in its ‘ethnological aspect’. To the second group he indicates “That they [the men of state] must not overlook that, among all the questions that today which besieges the neo-Latinos of the Americas, this question is of more transcendence for our future and the one that requires an effort decisive from Governments and society in general.” (p. 37).

Jiménez next considered some of the principles that should be continued in order to drive a successful and appropriate immigration which will hopefully reverse the deepest of the biological and in a radical way the physical and psychic degeneration that has identified. He begins mentioning the three conditions identified by Le Bon that would ensure a ‘good crossing’, adding a fourth:

Considered ethnologically, the immigration to our countries should posses, certainly, to the three conditions in that Le Bon has summarized the probability of a good crossing: 1º that the races subjected to the crossing are not numerically unequal; 2º that they do not differ too much in their characters, and 3º that they are subjected for a long time to identical environmental conditions. It might be added for our case, in my opinion, a fourth condition: that one of the races presents organic and psychological characters which would be able to compensate for the deficiencies of the one we want to improve. (p. 37-38).

According to these principles, it was indispensable that the “[…] importation of the new population must be sufficiently numerous” (p. 38). Otherwise, it would not have relevant effect since what had happened in the past would happen again “[…] what happened with
the Iberian conqueror blood that, absorbed shortly by the aboriginal blood, it was dragged down by this in the process of their decadence, not so much morphologically, as much as physiologically and morally.” (p. 38). Thus, the ideal would be an uninterrupted wave of immigration of appropriate races lasting many years and in a considerable flow. The proposal of Jiménez consisted of a radical racial transformation of Colombian population.

To choose the ideal country from where the ‘ethnic contingent’ required should be taken was “a complex point and it should be considered in light of morphology, physiology and psychology” (p. 38). To reach a proper decision,

It should be kept in mind, one by one, if it is possible, the different characters that we have pointed out in the first part of this study which are faulty or degenerative in our race so that the new residents of this zone drown them out by virtue of their contrary qualities in a slow process of miscegenation and adaptation (p. 38).

About this point, Jiménez was very detailed:

[...] the most desirable way to regenerate our population is, as much as possible, a product that involve, these conditions: white race, height and weight a little superior to the average among us; dolichocephalic; of harmonic corporal proportions; that dominates in him a facial angle of eighty two grades approximately; of proportionate factions to neutralize our tendencies to the prognatism and the excessive development of the maxillary bones; sanguine-nervous temperament, that is specially capable to inhabit the heights and the torrid towns; of grateful practical gifts; methodical for the different activities; capable in manual works; of a great development in its voluntary power; not very emotive; not very refined; of old working habits; tempered in its outbursts by a long government discipline and of moral; race in that the home and the institution of the family conserve a solid and respected organization; capable and strong for the agriculture; sober, economic and suffering constant in its enterprises. (p 38-39).

It is in the central regions of Europe, where “[...] they have mixed and moderated happily the characters of the southern and northern people of the Old Continent [...]” (p

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8 The advantages of this immigration would not be palpable in the first or second generations, but rather as are showed by the observations on “countries of great migratory movement” as Argentina and Uruguay, “[...] it is from the third generation [that] result products of more adaptability and vigor” (p. 38).
the places in which would be found “[…] the races that more approach this
desideratum […]” (p 39). Jiménez notes, even, a listing of the countries and regions
where it would be practical to search for the people for ‘our immigration’: Switzerland,
Belgium, Holland, Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Tyrol. He also suggests “[…] for their
physiologic and moral conditions, Basque, the Irishmen and the Bretons, and maybe also
the inhabitants of the Scandinavian countries.” (p. 39).

In their first conference of 1920, Jiménez elaborates more explicitly several points
that are hardly sketched out or are merely implicit in his argument about the relevance of
the immigration composed by ‘white blood’ presented in his Memory of 1918. On the
one hand, besides being a remedy that ‘intervened at the deepest level’ (the biological) to
reverse the degeneration of the ‘race’, the immigration of ‘white blood’ also aimed to
dilute (or ‘to drown out’) the traces of aboriginal and black blood, which were attributed
to be a factor of backwardness and of regression:

The immigration of white blood, very well chosen and regulated as should be
done, is for the developing countries an incomparable element of population, of
progress, of production and of political and social stability. A current of
sufficiently numerous European immigration would slowly drown out the
aboriginal blood and the black blood that are, in opinion of the sociologists that
have studied us, a permanent element of backwardness and of regression in our
continent” (p. 74-75).

On the other hand, in a crucial passage showing his positions, Jimenez discusses the
effects of the ‘Asian immigration’ arguing that a mixture with the ‘Mongolic stump’
(cepa mongólica) would mean a regression for ‘our population’ that would move it away
from the ideal type of beauty that was admitted then as first condition in the
‘improvement of the races’:

We should perfect our race in all sense: in the intellectual, in the moral, in the
morphological: the evolution toward the type of physical beauty admitted today in
the world is first condition in the improvement of the races; the corporal features and physiological more deficient in our population, far from being perfected, would suffer a complete regression by mixing with characteristic individuals of the Mongolic stump. (p. 75).

An intervention toward the racial improvement that contemplated different but interrelated terrains (intellectual, moral, and morphological) and that would not ignore ‘physical beauty’ was taken as the starting point. That type of physical beauty was not embodied by the ‘Mongolic stump’ (to which the ‘aboriginal races’ belonged p. 335), but rather the European immigrants of ‘white race’ that Jiménez suggested as the contingents of populations where the redeeming waves of immigration must come: “Let’s open our frontiers to all the winds of renovation and all the strong and beautiful races of the Universe in the same way that the United States and Argentina have arrived at the summit” (p. 367).

With all these elements in mind, then, Jiménez presented in a conclusive way his formula for the salvation of what appeared to him to be the obvious degeneration of the ‘race’ in Colombia:

Let us form in our racial ground conditions of physical and moral vigor that cannot come to us but from those points of the planet where the human species has been giving its best products for the past two thousand years. Without abandoning for a moment the two important factors of Education and of Hygiene, let us attack the harm in the origin; let us renovate our blood, and we will have proceeded with good sense and with accuracy. (p. 74).

Jiménez felt that Colombians should follow the example of other republics of the continent such as Argentina and United States because they had understood and applied a policy of consistent immigration. By taking the corresponding immigration measures, they had ‘improved’ their ‘ethnic and social conditions’, while in Colombia the illusion of being a ‘cheerful and confident nation’ was maintained: “As long as all the young
republics of the Americas, without stopping to discuss these issues, are busy today with improving their ethnic and social conditions by means of immigration of the good races of Europe, we, faithful to our absurdity, continue being the cheerful and confident nation […]” (p. 76).

In synthesis, the positions articulated by Jiménez allow us to glimpse a discourse that circulated at that time arguing for counter measures for the degeneration of the ‘race’ in Colombia based on the analysis of corporal and behavioral indicators. Starting from this problematization, he suggested a series of measures designed to transform the population: from a regulation of different aspects of public and private practices to an intervention program that would penetrate more deeply (at the biological level) to what he considered the roots of the problem, which consisted of considerable and prolonged immigration of ‘white blood’ with very specific physical and moral characteristics.

It is crucial to highlight the terms in which the debate was being structured. A strong influence from medical knowledge that transcended the narrow limits of the clinic to debate the present and future state of Colombian society openly from the premise that the population’s biological characteristics constitute a principle of intelligibility for the problems they faced as well as their solutions. It is in this context which some articulations of blackness very different from those produced in the context of ethnization, that I have examined in the previous chapter, operate.
2. Articulations of blackness

Images of Blacks

The explicit references to Blacks in the set of conferences gathered in the book *Problems of the race in Colombia* are scarce, but quite eloquent with regard to the images that were at stake. They are brief and dispersed mentions, rather than detailed elaborations. This shortage of references to Blacks is similar to the lack of references to Indians. Therefore, it is not that the lecturers spoke of the latter more thoroughly while silencing the indications to Blacks.

In his Memory of 1918 and in their first conference of 1920, Jiménez makes a diagnosis of the degeneration of the race in the country, establishes its causes and suggests the solutions, but only sporadically and vaguely mentions the racial differences in the country. It is not until his second and conclusive conference that Jiménez considers these differences. He addresses them in answer to the criticism outlined by other lecturers such as López de Mesa and Bejarano, who had questioned the applicability of Jiménez’s observations of as it centered on the highlands with a very particular population and marked by his work in the medical clinics. Thus, López de Mesa asked:

> How, then, do we take the problem of our race as a whole, if there are so many and so varied, and in so intermingled proportion? How do we consider our problems equation of first grade, if this multiplicity of races and of mestizos are associate and vegetate in that confused profusion of climates that I noted before?” (1920: 86).

According to Jiménez three are multiple ‘racial trunks’, ‘ethnic nuclei’ or ‘human varieties’ that have converged in the new continent in general and in Colombia in particular. Place of origin and color are the indicated vectors used to distinguish them:
In the inter tropical of the new continent three racial trunks have been juxtaposed: one aborigine and two imported in recent time (four centuries in the human evolution are a very short time). Of these three ethnic nuclei, the aborigine is with all probability a dependence of the great Mongolic family; the other ones, one of Aryan or European extraction and the other of African origin. They have met, then, in our floor, the three big human varieties: the yellow, the white, and the Black. (p. 335-336).

This juxtaposition has been made between the continent and Colombia “[…] a new, curious and interesting experience in the natural history of the mankind” (p. 336). Due the ‘three racial trunks’ that inhabit Colombia, Jiménez organizes great part of his last conference in responding “[…] two capital queries: 1. In what way has made feel the influence of this zone on the races that today inhabit it? 2. Which of the three varieties will prevail in the future?” (p. 336). With regard to the first one, he does not have anything new that to add to what constitutes his central thesis already discussed. This is that the influence of the ‘zone’ is noxious to the ‘organized beings’ in general, and for humanity, in particular being the deep cause of the physical and psychical degeneration that he diagnosed. In the second ‘capital query’, on the other hand, is the most explicit descriptions the ‘black race’ that transverse his work and that operate implicitly in his formulations about the degeneration of the race in Colombia, specifically in those passages where he appealed to the effect regenerator of the ‘white race’ that would be brought along by the immigration measures that he suggested.

On the topic of which of “[…] the three races that populate Colombia […] it will prevail in the future […]” (p. 351), Jiménez defines two distinct areas in which different developments would be profiled. One would include “the plateaus and first gradients of the Andean region” (p. 351), while other would contain the ‘low climates’ that is “the regions of the coast, valleys of our big rivers and lower slopes of the mountain range” (p.
353). For the area of the plateaus and the first gradients of the Andean region, he predicts the extinction of the ‘pure aboriginal race’ as the consequence of their being “[…] absorbed partly by the white blood, and consumed in the rest, for the different destructive factors, especially corporal fatigue, misery and illnesses” (p. 351). On the other hand, the ‘pure white race’ won’t find a better presage: “[…] it has already suffered serious abuse of the height and of the endemics and intoxications of the zone; it is the race that shows bigger problems in the nervous system and in its glands of internal secretion.” (p. 352).

In this passage it seems that the thesis of the degeneration of the race in Colombia of Jiménez is applied mostly for this ‘race’. Now then, it is the mestizo who seems to have more future promise in this region: “The mestizo is maybe the best organized for the mountain climates and to resist to the various debilitating causes coming from the land, of the air, of the allowances, of the waters and of the diverse parasitic germs” (p. 352). Although the mestizo can achieve some ‘collective efficiency’ with the help of ‘hygiene and the appropriate education’, Jiménez does not seem optimistic: “[…] until today, its weakness of will, translated by the inconsistency of feelings, for the mobility of ideas and for the lack of own control, have shown them to be not very organized for the democratic and autonomous life.” (p. 352).9

For the ‘low climates’, Jiménez does not hesitate to predict a future in which the ‘black race’ would prevail: “It is then the black race that has been shown to be more fertile and more prosperous in these latitudes, and it is not venturous to admit that in a time in the not very distant future they will prevail, at least in the form of the mulatto

9 On this point, I will return later on.
product” (p. 353). In this sense, he even points out that he has observed “the phenomenon of the progressive africanization of our races in the low regions”. Therefore, he notes:

[…] a wave of colored blood darkens our population day by day, printing on it its morphological features and its moral reactions. And it is natural that happens this way. The black race, a genuine product of the tropics, is called to prosper in this zone with its specific characteristics; the races different from the Black, refractory to the torrid rigors, will go giving every day: the final result is not doubtful (p. 353).

Thus, as conclusion to his question, Jimenez considers that “Of the three main ethnic varieties that form our social ground, it is the Ethiopic, and its varieties, that offers greater examples of adaptation and vitality” (p. 354). Yet, this ‘progressive darkening’ is a cause of anxiety in the eyes of Jiménez because the country where the ‘color element’ prevails is hopelessly destined to be under the tutelage and protection of the ‘more gifted races’ such as has been demonstrated by different examples in the world:

[…] the countries where the colored element continues being preponderant have gone slowly but surely toward the model of tutelage state and of protectorate under other more gifted races. Liberia adopted from its foundation that regime, due to which has subsisted, and, in our continent, Santo Domingo and Haiti are a painful illustration of this social phenomenon.” (p. 353).

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10 This notion of ‘Ethiopic’ to refer to what denominates in other passages ‘race’ or ‘blood’ black seems to be remaining of what was a relationship among what was called in other times Ethiopia and ‘nations of blacks’, as I will show in chapter 5. Jiménez only mentions the word of ‘Ethiopic’ twice.

11 This argument is used, at the end of the twenties, by Laureano Gómez, a very visible political figure of the conservative party and future president of Colombia, in his Conferences in the Municipal Theater of Bogotá. For Laureano Gómez the predominance of ‘blacks’ in a ‘nation’ involved a condemned to disorder and political and economic uncertainty: “In the nations of America where prevail blacks it also reigns the disorder. Haiti is the classic example of the turbulent and irresponsible democracy. In the countries where the black has disappeared, like in the Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, it has been able to establish an economic and political organization, with solid bases of stability” ([1928] 1970: 48). On this point, I will return later on.
The ‘retraction of the capacities for civilized life’ is the consequence of the increase of the ‘organic defenses’ of the ‘races’ that have become more capable in and more resistant to the ‘zone’:

This is another way of species’ adaptation to our land: the prevalence of the most capable and resistant, of the races made for this zone that are able to deal with the inclemencies but that, however, and for a relentless vital balance, on time that increment their organic defenses, they retract their capacities for the highly civilized life. (p. 353-354).

Of the other lecturers, only two refer explicitly to Black, dark or African race or blood (or simply to Blacks). The hygienist Jorge Bejarano opposed Jiménez point by point on his argument about the physical and psychicalogical signs of degeneration. Nevertheless, Bejarano converged with Jiménez in his representation of the ‘black race’:

Hard and resistant to the deleterious action of our tropical climates; agile and rapid to furrow the rivers; capable for the work of the mines and for agricultural labor; amazingly fertile living in low convenient climates, the blacks multiplied […] so quickly that the numbers surpassed what is imagined […] The black race, favored by the tropical sun, for their wild customs and for their scarce intellectuality and morality, reproduced prodigiously and populated the extensive districts of our valleys and rivers. (Bejarano 1920: 192).

Luis López de Mesa offered the same diagnosis as Jiménez with regard to the gradual influence of ‘African blood’ in the country: “[…] today it ascends, slow and unstoppable, the African blood through the veins of our rivers toward the veins of our race.” (LM 1920: 180). López de Mesa advances three points to sustain his observation: in the first place, “[…] because one can see how the Colombian population is darkening more and more with time, because of the 58,000 black slaves that only were the only population at the beginning of the nineteenth century, today there are 400,000 more or less pure, and a million discernible mulattos […]”; second, “[…] because the dark blood resists in its succession of mixtures five generations and only three the white one”; and finally
“because the tropic kills this [the white blood] […] [while] the Indian [blood] gives up terrain in the vital fight.” (LM 1920: 180).

Bejarano and López de Mesa, like Jiménez, established a correlation between the low lands and black (or dark or African) ‘race’ (or ‘blood’) which they find obvious. Thus, these authors considered it to be the case that there are some immanent characteristics to this ‘race’ (or ‘blood’) that make them particularly suitable for climates of the low lands, those of the ‘tropical sun’ or of the ‘tropics’. Their prodigious reproduction and the successful settling of these lands become indicators of such singularity and growing influence in the ‘darkening’ or ‘africanization’ of the Colombian population, at least in regions of ‘tropical climate’. Therefore, they assumed that ‘tropical climate’ favors the ‘black race’ while annihilating ‘white blood’.

Given this correspondence between the variation of certain climates and the ‘races’, Bejarano did not hesitate to argue for the existence of a necessary geography in the distribution of the races and in their crossings:

This way, then, races and castes had their crossing and their unavoidable and fatal geography: Whites and Indians of pale color, and the mestizos that were born of their crossing, occupied the mountainous regions and high plateaus; the blacks and their crossing with the Indian, the ‘zambo’ […] populated the costs and the hot valleys. (1920: 192). 12

This image finds a parallel in the positions of López de Mesa when he speaks of the distribution of the different ‘population groups’ in the varied territory and dissimilar climates:

12 The same as other parts of the conference of Bejarano, this statement has a close similarity with an argument of José María Samper that will be examined in the following chapter. These loans of a liberal intellectual of the nineteenth century for a debate at the early twentieth are very interesting, and invite an exam on the continuities and ruptures of discourses among intellectuals of the elites of different times. Nevertheless, the enunciation contexts have changed; therefore what seems an even identical sentence might operate as a different statement (see Foucault 1972).
In so vast a territory and across such varied climates not vegetate less varied population groups; white, Indians and mestizos in this Cordillera Oriental; mulattos, white and black in Cordillera Central and Occidental, with small aboriginal groups, as well as along the coasts and in the valleys of our big rivers, although more loaded with color certainly (LM 1920: 85).

Giving greater specificity to the contrast suggested by Bejarano, in his conference Luis López de Mesa argues that in order “[…] to study some aspects of this complex struggle between blood and zone” (p. 86) it is useful to divided the climactic areas into two categories: the first is the range of 3000 to 1500 meters above sea level, while the second is from 1500 to 0 meters above sea level. According to this distinction, ‘Spanish blood’ or ‘white populations’ find refuge in a climate in the first category, but “[…] located under these levels they have suffered serious reduction, and some have degenerated, others emigrated in a slow exodus of families, and not few of them stagnated its population’s growth.” (LM 1920: 87).

There was not another alternative for the ‘man of European origin’ that to bend to the mountain ranges to be able to prosper: “The man of European origin has needed to be refolded to the mountain ranges to be able to prosper in Colombia but he already survived the moment of contact with the brave tropical zone.” (LM 1934: 39). López de Mesa is clearly pessimistic about the zone of the low lands: “In this area that goes from a thousand five hundred meters to sea level, resides the biggest pitfall against civilization and race.” (LM 1920: 180).

‘African race’, closely associated to this aptitude to inhabit the ‘brave tropical area’, it was considered to be stronger than other ‘races’. This argument was made as supposed explanation of their enslavement during the colonial period: “For those climates [of our hot valleys] and that dishonest work that was not compensated due to the scarce
yield obtained by the Indian, it was needed to turn our eyes toward a stronger race for the work under tropical climates. That race was the African […]” (Bejarano 1920: 191). The biggest strength that ‘African race’ showed, as López de Mesa noted in the passage cited above, is in the level of blood: ‘dark blood’ remains during five generations of mixture while white blood only three.\(^{13}\) This strength did not mean, however, that the ‘colored population’ might not get diluted in the near future due the growing influence of the white population, resulting in a ‘lightly olive-skinned (trigueño) type:

One can, thus, to announce that if the immigration ceases, more or less clandestine, of the Afro-Antilleans, there will be among us a slow absorption of the population of color by the white population, with the result of a lightly olive-skinned type, a little to the Arab way, of good dimensions and beautiful eyes, festive temperament, sympathy and generosity, like it is notorious in […] transition types. (LM 1934: 49).

This reasoning is sustained in the work of authors such as Jiménez regarding the design of immigration measures that appeal to what could be denominated an ‘arithmetic of blood’ so that certain types or populations disappeared while others were positioned.

Besides the characteristics already indicated, there were in circulation a series of associations between ‘black race’ and some intellectual and moral characteristics. Thus, Bejarano highlighted that ‘black race’ has ‘wild customs’ and ‘scarce intellectuality and morality’. This is opposed to the way in which he described ‘European race’: which is “[…] superior in moral and intellectual capacity and handicapped in regard to multiplication because their object was not to populate or to assimilate, and because of

\(^{13}\) In regard to the 'indigenous blood', the 'white blood' appeared to be dominant: “The contact with the white blood destroys them [to those of Indian blood or less or more pure] in a relentless way […] for the prevalence of its blood in the misccegenation, which biologically also means destruction” (LM 1920: 88).
their indifference toward inferior races, they formed a close group, reproducing slowly in
the plateaus and soft regions.” (Bejarano 1920: 192).

This assumed moral and intellectual superiority of Europeans over Africans and
Indigenous groups is an image of the racial thought at the time broadly extended among
these intellectuals and the political figures. Referring to this hierarchy, Laureano Gómez,
who became President in the 1940s, argued: “Our race comes from the mixture of
Spaniards, Indians and Blacks. The last two flows of inheritance are stigmatized as being
of complete inferiority” ([1928] 1970: 44). Gómez equally referred to the Indians and
Blacks as ‘savages races’ and ‘barbaric elements’ (p. 47).

In later publications, Luis López de Mesa associated Blacks with the phase of
childhood because their assumed behavioral characteristics and because their features of
caracter expressed a lack of self-control and of maturity related with adulthood. In his
Introduction to the history of the culture in Colombia, López de Mesa wrote:

It is said, and it seems to be the truth, that the Black man is a big boy. Voluptuous,
in love with life, dance, music and song, he laughs with his lips, eyes, hands and
feet; without a past, he bends to the environment in language, religion, politics and
social customs. Curious, conceited and buttery, he has virtues of fidelity and good
companionship, as he demonstrated it in the period of the slavery, and even today
make him a good comrade. Of his dialects few words are conserved, of his
religions hardly the inclination to the superstition and magic […] (LM 1930: 24).

This image of childhood associated with Blacks was contrasted with that of premature
aging associated with the ‘Indigenous of the oriental highland’. This contrast is
underlined with metaphors: “The Black looks at life through the glass of long view that
enlarges everything, while the native contemplates life with the same glass but the other
way around, through the side that moves away and minimizes the images” (p. 25). In one
of his previous texts, titled *The Ethnic Factor*, López de Mesa had already established this contrast in very similar terms:

African ancestry is still perceived in their descendants that live more or less in isolated groupings and even in those that inhabit the towns of medium culture, where we have seen them conserve the prestige of the magic, the symbolic dances, the nostalgia for the forest, the savage’s infantile terrors, the tendency to vegetate indolently, the pleasure for songs, for brilliant colors, for pungent aromas, for distilled drinks, sensuality and game. Chatterboxes and conceited, how far they are from the taciturn, humble, impenetrable, fatalistic aborigine, as if hurt by a relentless fate, submissive to the bleakness, to the hunger, to the insults, who liquidated life and was then found irreparably imbecile. From that sensual boy to one who has aged prematurely, there are astronomical distances (LM 1927: 29-30).

In these passages it is indicated “[…] the existent discrepancy among the different races, not only in their behavior, but in the fundamental concepts of life […]” (LM 1927: 29). This notion of ‘childhood’ is equally central in the description of Laureano Gómez: “The spirit of the black, rudimentary and formless, in that they remain in a perpetual childhood” ([1928] 1970: 46).

To summarize what has been presented thus far. The images of Blacks operate inside a racial frame of thought that supposed several races as constituent, historically and in the present, of the population of Colombia. For the authors whose work was analyzed, the Colombian population is racially differentiated; it is not a racially homogeneous entity. Blacks have specific characteristics of their ‘race’ or ‘blood’ that make them particularly capable of inhabiting certain areas (the coasts and the hot valleys, the low lands or the tropical areas) in which the presence of other ‘races’ leads to their disappearance subsumed by the demographic influence of Blacks. Thus, Jiménez and López de Mesa described this phenomenon as the ongoing ‘darkening’ or ‘africanization’ of the population. This strength is, then, one of the images of Blacks that circulates in the
examined texts. Strength in terms of resistance to those zones which were thought to be practically uninhabitable, is also expressed in the domination of their blood when crossed with that of other ‘races’. Another image consists of the correlation between certain zones and black or African ‘race’ or ‘blood’. Given these images it is no surprise that at the beginning of twentieth century they are still echoing pro-slavery arguments such as the notion that Africans were brought as slaves because of their great resistance to fatigue when working under certain environmental conditions. On the other side of the coin of the images of the resistance and strength, there were other images of the black such as their moral and intellectual inferiority as well as their supposed stagnation in childhood stage.

**Miscegenation**

These images significantly mark the conception that Luis López de Mesa had about the crossing of the ‘races’. In general, in Colombia miscegenation was understood as having been produced when a ‘superior race’ was mixed with either of the two ‘inferior races’: “The advantageous social, pecuniary position and aesthetics of Iberians and their tendency toward unions with inferior races, were the reasons for the rapid miscegenation that has not yet ceased” (LM 1934: 50). Rather than a simple aggregation of the characteristics of progenitor races, from this miscegenation the mestizo and the mulatto emerged, defined by new qualities: “The mixture of these two races with the Spaniard does not create products that are merely the addition and subtraction of characters, but rather some new qualities arise” (LM 1930: 26).
Following his argumentation, López de Mesa opposes the use of the terms mestizo and mulatto. Thus, on one hand, “[…] the mestizo does not present a diminished intelligence from the level of the white due to the inferiority of the Indian rather, he acquires subtlety, analytical skills, beneficent restlessness that allow him to straighten his direction toward good positions mainly in politics, priesthood, and jurisprudence” (p. 26). For the other side,

The mulatto will elevate to pride himself on the naive vanity of the black, he will exchange the disordered fantasy for better organized imagination; he will continue to be voluptuous, but already more active and more venturesome; equally kind, but already rebellious. He will have, then, a love for literature, oratory and poetry in first term, he will like luxury, he will waste his own capital with an exaggerated trust in his capacity and destiny (p. 26).

Continuing with the contrast: “Neither will achieve the intellectual heights of the great syntheses, or will excel in the formation of new ideas, or in invention. The summits of the superior intelligence do not seem affordable to their encouragement” (p. 26). Finally, “[…] in regard to civilization […] the mestizo seems more inclined to the speculative part of it, let us say to culture, while the mulatto to material progress” (p. 27).

In the texts examined, it is evident that López de Mesa followed an explicit racial hierarchy in which the culminating point of intelligence and domination of passions was embodied by the white. And the mestizo and the mulatto were represented as being less associated with negative connotations than the Indian and the black. It seemed that the white (or European) ‘blood’ (or ‘race’) entered in kind of a racial equation as the ‘factor’ that necessarily ‘improved’ other bloods or races (this was the underlying logic of the immigration measures suggested by Jiménez).

If the miscegenation in which white or European blood (or race) participates was a factor for ‘improvement’, the mixture of the ‘impoverished blood and of inferior cultures’
was rejected by López de Mesa as an error with disastrous consequences for the country and its future:

The mixture of the native of the Cordillera Oriental with that African element and even with the mulattos derived from him, it would be a fatal error for the spirit and wealth of the country: they would be added, instead of being eliminated, the bad habits and defects of the two races, and we would have a zambo, who would be astute and indolent, ambitious and sensual, hypocrite and conceited at the same time, of ignorance and feeble. This mixture of impoverished blood and of inferior cultures determines products who are mental inadaptable, perturbed, nervous, weak, corrupted by madness, epilepsy, crime who fill asylums and jails when they come in contact with civilization (LM 1927: 12).

Although López de Mesa will value the mestizo or the mulatto as superior in regard to the black and Indian, he felt that “The products of the first generation of mixture are in general fairly balanced, but after the second and third mixture they already have adapted to the land and they stabilize functions inside a social and racial level more uniform” (LM 1934: 99). To be successful, the miscegenation (in which that, obviously, European blood should participate) implied a succession of generations in which noxious influences of ‘inferior races’ were gradually diluted (their ‘bad habits’ and ‘defects’).

In a position that seems to contradict López de Mesa, Laureano Gómez argued that “The psychic aberrations of the genitor races become worse in the mestizo” ([1928] 1970: 47). To sustain his position about the “[…] immediate and remote effects of the mixture of races [that] are problems elucidated thoroughly by ethnologists […]” (p. 47), he refers a ‘law’ formulated by Otto Ammon: “[…] mestizos combine the discordant qualities of their parents and produce returns toward the most distant ancestors; the two things have the common effect that the mestizos are physiologically and psychologically inferior to the component races” (p. 47). Therefore, Laureano Gómez considered it to be the case that: “The primary mestizo does not constitute a usable element for the political
and economic unit of America; he conserves too many defects of the indigenous; he is false, menial, abandoned and he rejects any effort and work” ([1928] 1970: 48).

In a similar way, Jiménez reinforces the idea that the ‘American mestizo’ is a result of a ‘extreme and aberrant type’: “Of this conflict of blood types so diverse and distant has arisen profusely, as in all violent encounters, extreme and aberrant types, in the morphological as in the psychichological” (Jiménez 1916, mentioned in Torres 2001: 131). Thus, he concludes that in: “The countries where this racial element prevails [the mestizo], such as Paraguay, Bolivia, Mexico, Central America and Peru are, for this reason and for no other, those that have experienced and they continue to experience a more upset political history” (Jiménez p. 352; added emphasis). At least on this plane, Jiménez suggested that the mestizo could be compared to the black because both were used as explanations of the political convulsion.

In opposition to these pessimistic perceptions about the uncertainty and political chaos derived directly from the predominance of ‘inferior’ racial components (either the black and their descendants or the mestizo), for Bejarano it was “[…] proven that the promiscuity of the races, in those that the element that is socially considered inferior prevails, gives place to the reign of the democracies” (p. 193). The democracy, as the best of the political models, was a form of political organization facilitated by a ‘promiscuity of races’ in those that the ‘inferior element’ was majority.14

There could not be then more opposing visions of the effects of miscegenation in the political régime: violence, chaos and uncertainty for Gómez and Jiménez (a turn to a

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14 With this statement, Bejarano recaptures an argument that had already been outlined to half of the XIX century by José María Samper ([1861] 1969). See next chapter.
sort of pre-political life), while for Bejarano it meant a condition of possibility for
democracy (the political expression par excellence).

In a closer position to that of Bejarano, for López de Mesa the relative
homogeneity in ‘nature’ and ‘population’ was the true foundation for the constitution of a
stable republic where chaos and anarchy would not reign. Therefore, he considers a
‘miracle’ that Colombia had not sunk in the total anarchy given so much heterogeneity in
its nature and population: “it is and continues to be a miracle that Colombia constitutes an
unitary republic and that its people today live in peace. Anarchy should be the resultant
of so much heterogeneity in its nature and population” (LM 1920: 86).

In synthesis, the distinctions and the racialized hierarchy of population informed
the images about the black and the outcomes of its crossings with other ‘races’. In
general, the ‘miscegenation’ of black (or Indian) with European (or their descendants)
was imagined as a mechanism of ‘improvement of the population’. Hence, as Santiago
Castro (2007) has argued, for some (such as Jiménez) it relied on this mechanism par
excellence (the urgent measure to deal with the process of degeneration of the ‘race’),
while for other (Bejarano and López de Mesa) the interventions on the different
populations referred more to aspects of hygiene and education. The mestizo (in the
broader sense in the word), however, was not subject to this consensus: while some felt
this was a condition for the possibility of democracy (Bejarano), for others (Gómez and
Jiménez) explained the political uncertainty of the countries where they prevailed, mainly
if the African component was the most marked.
Omnipresence and ambiguities of the notion of race

As has become evident, in the presented fragments the competing notion of ‘race’ swarm in the conferences and other examined texts of that time. This omnipresence does not mean, however, that is an easy task to identify what these authors were referring with the word. It appears so much in Jiménez, as well as in the work of the other lecturers and in the title of the book that gathers them (The problems of the race in Colombia). Equally, it is a recurrent word in the later publications of the experts or political figures of the time that I have presented. Those different authors often substitute this word with others such as ‘blood’. One can sometimes suppose that a notion of race operates tacitly when they use the term associated to white or black (European or African). It is also explicitly linked with the term ‘biology’ or with aspects considered biological, but also with other kind of aspects like the ‘spirit’ or to the ‘soul’ of the collectives. For some authors the relationship between surroundings and ‘race’ is presented in a direct way, for others this relationship is more complicated. While the great majority of these authors take for granted the term of ‘race’, there are some voices (such as Bejarano) that put in question its analytic relevance.

The term ‘race’ is substituted for, juxtaposed and opposed to a wide range of words. Jiménez juxtaposes a series of terms that seem to operate as its synonyms: ‘racial trunk’, ‘ethnic aggregated’, ‘blood’, ‘human variety’, and ‘stump’, among others. He frequently replaces ‘race’ with ‘population’, ‘people’, ‘country’ and even ‘nationality’. He talks about ‘our races’ in the plural, but more often about ‘our race’ in the singular. He refers to ‘race’ in different articulations like ‘our race’, ‘white race’, ‘race antioqueña’
or ‘Jewish race’. In some occasions he use the concept of ‘race’ for animals such as dogs, cows and pigs (p. 51, 61, 73), what does it mean that he does not consider it exclusively a notion applicable to the ‘varieties’ of the ‘human species’. In his conferences and other texts, López de Mesa also demonstrates that multiplicity and exchangeability with the use of the term of ‘race’. In his texts there are several terms and expressions that seem to operate as synonyms for ‘race’, but none with more frequency than ‘blood’. Other authors, such as Bejarano refer to ‘race’, but also to ‘blood’ (p. 193, 197), ‘type’ (p. 192, 197) or even to ‘element’ (p. 204). In the writings of the other authors whose conferences are gathered in the book *The Problems of Race in Colombia* a smaller diversity of terms is found, fewer instances of the term ‘race’. The sociologist Lucas Caballero (1920) and the instructor Simón Araujo (1920) mention ‘country’, ‘society’, and ‘population’ more often.

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16 Besides the multiple passages to those that refers simply as ‘race’, ‘blood’, ‘Spaniard’, ‘white’, ‘Indian’, ‘mulatto’ or ‘black’, some of the terms only used by López de Mesa in the two conferences of 1920, include: ‘ethnic trunks’ (p. 35), ‘ethnic groups’ (p. 144), ‘stump’ (p. 35), ‘white populations’ (p. 87), ‘men of color’ (p. 95), ‘peninsular stump’ (p. 127), ‘black residents’ (p. 129), ‘aboriginal race’ (p. 89, 92, 102), ‘indigenous race’ (93, 106), ‘Indian race’ (p. 95), ‘white race’ (p. 95, 129), ‘Saxon blood’ (p. 88), ‘Indian blood’ (p. 88), ‘white blood’ (p. 88, 130), ‘indigenous blood’ (p. 98), ‘aboriginal blood’ (p. 114), ‘black blood’ (p. 120), ‘dark blood’ (p. 130).

17 Only being limited to the explicit adjectival uses of the word ‘race’, they are in the two conferences of Bejarano articulations such as the following ones: ‘indigenous race’ (p 191, 192), ‘aboriginal races’ (p. 192), ‘autochthonous race’ (p. 195), ‘African race’ (p. 191), ‘African black race’ (p. 193), ‘black race’ (p. 192), ‘Colombian races’ (p. 193), ‘white race’ (p. 194), ‘our race’ (p. 194), ‘racial families’ (p. 195), ‘Antioquian race’ (p. 196), ‘European mestizo race’ (p. 196), ‘aboriginal races’ (p. 233).
Although some refer to the ‘race’ in Colombia in the singular, there is an agreement among the lecturers that in the past and present of Colombia they are different ‘races’ not just one. It is Jiménez who appeals most often to the singular of the notion, but in his last conference he clearly argues for constituent and current differences of the races in Colombia. The sociologist Lucas Caballero interpreted Jiménez’s statements of race in the singular in the following way:

For me, and in this doctor Jiménez López is in agreement [that it is no possible to argue that in Colombia there is only one race] and that he takes the denomination of race conventionally for the population assimilated with a certain unit of life that history has modeled inside our geographical unit and that it has come to be organized as Nation and as State (Caballero 1920: 295).

In his conception, it was not right to attribute an ethnic unit to any State in the modern times since this would be only possible in the ‘small wild tribes’ (Caballero 1920: 295). In the same sense, López de Mesa in the introduction to the book, indicates how the ‘nations’ constitute ‘ethnic agglomerations’.

The differences were also presented inside specific racialized populations in Colombia. Thus, for Bejarano and López de Mesa the difference among the ‘aboriginal races’ was very marked, including variations as much along ‘civilization scales’ as in their somatic characteristics. From the maximum degree of savagery expressed in the nakedness and even cannibalism of the low lands to the ‘semi-civilized’ inhabitants of the plateaus with “[…] industries, of stable government and even of relatively advanced scientific and moral notions.” (López de Mesa 1920: 86). The bodies were also locations for the expression of difference:

Aboriginal races differed in great ways in terms of stature and color, in the value and the character, some were very dark among the Caribbean, white almost […] [as] the tribe of the Guanes, for example; some short as the Muiscas, and others
well developed as those that even subsist today in the plains toward the Orinoco, and the tall and hefty nation of the Taironas of the lower Magdalena (p. 86).

Equal differences can be appreciated with the Africans that were brought as slaves: “Nor does it seem that the black slaves had one origin, and today we already know something of the African ethnic multitude that in that confirms this for us” (p. 86). Or of the Europeans “But the ethnic trunks of those groups [of diverse population distributed in the territory] they are not uniform [Also] the same stump […] modifies so much in the different Colombian regions in their physiognomy, like in the psychology and even in the accent” (LM 1920: 85). The diversity (in a strict hierarchy, without room for doubts) rather than homogeneity constitutes one of the central tropes of the conferences and works of Luis López de Mesa. In the same sense, Bejarano considers it to be the case that even since the time of the Colony the ‘variety of the races’ has been enormous:

In the time of the Colony, the variety of races was already enormous: there were this way the Spanish race and its varieties; the native and its varieties; the African; the mestizo of Spaniards and Indian, the diverse races of indigenous coming from their fusion; the ‘zamba’, product of mixing between Indians and blacks, and the ‘mulatto’ derived of white and black. (p. 193).

As it is now clear, the different authors use the word ‘race’ with varying frequency in their conferences and writings. However, Bejarano is the only one who, although he uses the word regularly, questions the relevancy of the concept and the implications of its use. In the first place, mentioning the authority of experts in different areas of the knowledge, he questions whether ‘race’ has any utility, among other reasons, because it is not possible to establish a correspondence between the different racial classifications and any demarcation in ‘Nature’:

Biologists and very well-known sociologists; naturists of all times, have an agreement that in the same way that it is difficult and almost superhuman to give to the word ‘race’ its true meaning, likewise it is impossible and subjective to
arrive to classifications which do not correspond to any demarcation in Nature […] (p. 231).

Also, in spite of the difference in their origins, the ‘components of a people’ end up resembling each other under the influence of multiple factors:

Refugees on the same land, chained by common interests, tied by unions of blood and of family; evolving under the influence of the same psychic and moral surroundings; exposed to and convicted to suffer the same impression of so many inherited conditions to form their physiological, intellectual and moral type, the components of a peoplehood and they end up resembling each other, in spite of the diversity of their origins (p. 231).

Thus, the distinctions argued for by the ‘theory of the races’ have disappeared given their mixture: “Thanks to the influence of mixture, practiced almost unconsciously, they have lost their special distinctions, if they ever had them […]” (p. 231). Therefore, the relevance of the ‘theory of the races’ is in an inverse relationship to advances of humanity: “As humanity advances the theory of the races reverses […]” (p 231).

Equally, Bejarano questions the derived negative effects of the racial distinctions: “[…] this personal concept of the characteristics that are assigned to a race, is what has made it so that on the surface of the earth it has extended, like a tragic veil, the hate between them and the division among men” (p 231). He mentions the work of Gobineau as the foundation for “[…] an enthusiastic hymn in favor of the races called superior, and of a merciless condemnation of those called inferior” (p. 232). Also, this work shows the “[…] false and inhuman postulate of Nietzsche, ‘the weak have no right to life’” (p. 232). He attributes to this conception of the existence of supposed ‘superior races’ an expression of racial discrimination: “This is the cause that in old Europe people were pursued who have had the stigma of inferiority imposed upon them; this is the main motive of the rejection of a race […]” (p. 232). This type of pronouncement and criticism
invite us to examine with more care the tensions in the racial thought of the time
embodied by the intellectual elite and political officials.

Another difference in the articulations of racial thought among the authors that have been examined was their respective understanding of the relationship between ‘race’ and surroundings. In fact, there was a wide circulation of the supposition of the existence of a close relationship between ‘area’ (‘geography’, ‘physical surroundings’, ‘natural environment’ or ‘climate’) and ‘blood’ (or ‘race’). Nevertheless, differences can be identified in how they understood this relationship and its implications. Jiménez established a determinant relationship: different ‘races’ were the simple and direct expression of diverse external conditions, of different influences of the ‘zones’ or ‘climates’ on ‘human nature’. Indeed, the radical cause of the ‘degeneration’ of the ‘race’ in Colombia was the negative influence of the ‘tropical zone’ on the population. As I already argued, for Jiménez the acquired characteristics that showed a decline of the ‘race’ due to the influence of noxious external conditions were susceptible of being reversed over the course of a few generations by means of an appropriate mixture. It is in light of that premise that we must understand his clamor for measures of immigration which would introduce considerable and appropriate contingents of ‘white blood’ from certain regions of Europe.

Bejarano, on the other hand, considered the relationship among the ‘surroundings’ and the ‘race’ to be more flexible. He proposes the notion of ‘permanent adaptation’ rather than of degeneration (1920: 194). Against Jiménez, Bejarano argued that the men are, by nature, ‘cosmopolitan’ beings (p. 206). Therefore, the ‘native races’ of the African and American continents should not be considered ‘deformations’ of a original
type as a consequence of the extreme violence of adverse external conditions, but rather they should be considered successful adaptations. He distinguishes between ‘organic’, ‘social’ and ‘physical’ surroundings. The ‘climate’ constituted one part of the last type of surroundings. Thus, for Bejarano surroundings could not be limited only to ‘climate’. This means that the concept of ‘surroundings’ is itself modeled by human actions and it is not only a default variable that shapes ‘race’.

Closer to the positions of Bejarano than to those of Jiménez, for other lecturers like Calixto Torres Umaña (1920) the influence of the physical surrounding was not absolute since ‘men’ had the capacity to transforming them to suppress or to attenuate their unfavorable influences:

It is an undeniable truth that the tropic exercises a deleterious force on the human races as well as on many animal species. But it is also a demonstrated fact that through the experience men’s intelligence has a certain ability to make the tropics absolutely favorable regions to the conditions of animal life (Torres Umaña 1920: 177).

Hence, where different authors seemed to converge was in the precepts of the Lamarckism, that is to say that the characteristics acquired by an individual through the use or atrophy of an organ could be inherited by its descendants. Torres Umaña affirmed, for example: “[…] if the acquired characteristics are inherited in an unfavorable sense, there is more reason to believe that they are the fruit of reestablishment by virtue of biological force […]” (1920: 178). Bejarano invoked, even, the well-known

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18 The definition of climate, which he considers that has stayed per centuries, it attributed to Hippocrates: “the set of physical conditions of a place in their relationships with the organized beings” (Bejarano 1920: 207).
19 Doctor, physiologist and grateful pediatrician, rector of the National University of Colombia. Father of the well known Colombian guerilla and priest Camilo Torres Restrepo.
20 For Lamarckism in the Latin America, see Stepan (1991).
Lamarckian statement that the function produces the organ, as if it were a law of physiology:

If deeply decisive factors such as climate enter into the growth and development of the organism, height or level of the sea, cold or heat, those same factors influence with more reason the functions of the organism, since it is a law of physiology that function produces the organ and that the function of this depends on factors like the environment (Bejarano 1920: 209).

In the examined texts, ‘race’ is a word widely used. Nevertheless, the senses and reaches of a relatively omnipresent word are quite foggy. A clear point of departure is that one can argue that, for the different authors, ‘race’ referred to some empirical features of the body, among which, color of the skin was crucial. Bejarano, for example, wrote the following passage:

The clear and precise differences found between color and size make acceptable the existence of very different indigenous races […] In Peru was found an entirely white indigenous race, and among the Caribes a black one, this way in our land, before the fusion of the European with the Indian and with the black, there were red, reddish tribes, dull, brown, dark yellow, almost black and even pale (p. 192-193).

This was something similar to what López de Mesa argued in an already commented passage. It was considered to be a fact the existence of different ‘indigenous races’ along with accompanying features of color and size. Also, the white or black color of a ‘race’ was not exclusive of Europe or Africa respectively. This is very relevant because the tendency to establish certain correlations between a particular color and certain continents is, at least in these passages, put into question. The difference in color and size, the difference of the races as for these features observed in their bodies, is
attributed by Bejarano to ‘climate factors’ (p. 192). External factors, then, would explain
the differences between these ‘races’. 21

As is now clear, the notion of ‘race’ did not only refer to certain somatic attributes
such as ‘color’ or size, but also to moral, intellectual and psychical features. Thus,
for example, for authors such as Luis López de Mesa each race possessed a sort of
‘psychology’, a series of mental characteristics that differentiated them from one another.
Although they were either hereditary or learned in the early socialization process (an
issue that was not clarify by López de Mesa), this psychology involved collective
historical experiences: “The psychology of the aboriginal race was determined by its
conditions of long submission and sufferings specific to it” (LM 19120: 92). These
differences in ‘psychology’ among ‘racial groups’ were not a kind of mechanical product
of the variations in climate, as a coarse determinism could argue:

It is true that the cold climate of the plateau predisposes one to calmness; true that
the ardor of the tropic communicates to the blood premature appetites […] that the
Andean agriculture demands persevering love to surrender its gifts, and that the
river and the sea invite one to go on pilgrimage and to live effusively. It seems to
me, however, that these influences do not create the nature of those racial groups,
but rather to these are added to further exaggerate them. (LM 1934: 8).

The authors whose work I have examined attributed certain features, both moral and
intellectual, to specific ‘races’. It is clear from the passages already quoted how the
images of blacks were presented. Equally, these authors made similar statements for
other ‘races’ defining some characterizations that go beyond color and size of bodies.
One of those that more visibility acquired in the different writings is the Antioquian race

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21 In this point he seemed to coincide with Jiménez (1920: 350-351) that the ‘races did not only
derive of the negative or positive influences of the different ‘zones’, but also he attributed to
certain types of solar rays the differences in the pigmentation among them.
(raza antioqueña), for which the most diverse celebratory comments were dedicated, in which it appeared it as the paradigm of progress, morality, and duty. I won’t examine in detail the racial discourse about the Antioquians because it would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, for the sake of illustrating how certain corporal characteristics appeared articulated with moral features, or even specific social relationships, let me transcribe the following passage: “In Antioquia the race has evolved until the deepest social divergence and politics with the rest of the Republic. The family and the Government are their very special formations […] as well as the individual character of their residents. They have an angular, folded and hefty, severe and virile physiognomy […]” (LM 1920: 85). Equally, it is enough to remember Jiménez’s descriptions on the two aspects of the degeneration (physical and psychichological) of the ‘race’ or the characters attributed to the contingents of ‘European race’ that were constituted in the radical remedy with their immigration.

Some authors argued, even, that races have ‘souls’. This was supposedly something different from blood, but that it was closely imbricated to it. López de Mesa wrote: “You have opened an inquisition on race as blood; I have also extended it to race as spirit and as nationality” (LM 1920: 188). In a previous passage, remembering an anecdote in which “[…] a nice black man from my mountains, very learned and very cunning”, affirmed that “‘Us the representatives of the Latin race ‘ […]’, López de Mesa meditates about the truth of such a statement and discards the taunt that could raise “the antithesis that he himself [the nice, very learned and cunning black] argued” since “[…] the soul of the races is in its language” (LM 1920: 99). Thus, language is closely

22 For a study of the images of the racial articulations of ‘antioqueños’, see Appelbaum (2003).
associated to the ‘spirit of the races’, what constitutes the nation: “[…] the most advanced	nations take care of their language, as cultural exponent, as a contingent of the spirit of
their races and of the national modality that informs them, to distinguish and guide, and
as invaluable vehicle of their own ideas, character and feelings” (LM 97).

It is relevant to highlight that when one speaks of the ‘soul’ of the ‘races’ there is
not a necessary correspondence with certain features of the body, like color. Laureano
Gómez referred equally to the ‘soul of the races’, a phenomenon that he understood to be
a mysterious and uncertain sphere in the ‘psychology of the collectives’:

Nobody can explain the soul of the races, because everything is mysterious and
uncertain in the psychology of collectives. Despite this, it can be perceived that
there is a characteristic feature in each people that, although enigmatic, is
persistent, it starts up from the past and it will subsist in the future through the

Notice the substitution of ‘race’ for ‘people’ and the association of ‘blood’ and
‘spirit’, as well as the fact that each race would possess a ‘soul’ (understood it as
psychology of the collectives) as its distinctive feature.

The relationships between ‘race’ and ‘culture’ are even more complicated to
discern. The word ‘culture’ appears with such diverse meanings and articulations,
although it is referred to less often than ‘race’. Contrary to the omnipresent word ‘race’,
‘culture’ is found on few occasions. Nevertheless, this does not make its meanings and
referents either more clear nor more straightforward. In one of the fragments already
quoted, the relationship between race and culture appeared as the inability of native races
of Africa and those of the American continent to producing or even to assimilate the
‘high culture forms’ associated with Europeans: “All these products [native and African
races] are capable, without a doubt, to inhabit their respective climates and to suffer
natural inclemency, but they have been shown, until today, unable to produce, nor to assimilate, the high forms of human culture” (Jiménez 1920: 47).

Thus, statements like this establish a clear hierarchy associated with the relationship between ‘race’ and ‘culture’. Jimenez insisted in this position: “It seems to have been demonstrated that the superior races, those that are called to an intense culture cannot find acclimatization nor are they capable of blooming but in the temperate areas, under the tropic, they decay and they disappear shortly […]” (p. 33). Notions like high forms of culture or intense culture suggest the existence of not-so- high forms of culture or not-as-intense cultures.

Laureano Gómez also made a similar argument: “[…] neither for those of Spanish origin, nor for the African and American influences, is our race a privileged one for the establishment of a fundamental culture, or the conquest of an independent and autochthonous civilization” ([1928] 1970: 49). From his perspective, there were differences in the constitutions of those ‘races’ that would profile them as either capable or incapable of the establishment a ‘fundamental culture’. To bring in an already presented text of López de Mesa (1927: 12), the term of ‘inferior cultures’ (and ‘impoverished bloods’) is associated to the ‘mixtures’ of both Indigenous of the Cordillera Occidental and the ‘African element’.

In the different texts several associations of the term ‘culture’ are identified. For example, in a particular statement López de Mesa seems to understand culture as a component of civilization, as its ‘speculative part’ and which differs from ‘material progress’ (p. 27). This same author, in his description of the indigenous of the highlands, appealed to the notion of ‘culture in depth’ to take into account a series of attitudes and
characteristic “[…] of a race that looks mainly toward the inside, of a race toward a
culture in depth” (LM 1934: 8). In one of their conferences, López de Mesa (1920: 93)
spoke of ‘mental culture’, to refer to the ‘indigenous race’, culture that was considered by
him as limited by the economic difficulties to those that this race was subjected.

In sum, in spite of the ubiquity of the word ‘race’, in a large number of the
examined texts, one can realize the heterogeneity of its meanings and some
contradictions among this handful of intellectuals. Although there are some uses of race
as synonym for the term ‘Colombian people’, in general the authors established a
distinction of at least three races (bloods or ethnic trunks, among other categories) as
constituent in the historical process of the formation of the population of the country, but
also of a differential geographical distribution. In the examined materials, ‘race’ is more
problematic and less homogeneously defined of that sometimes has been thought due to
the authority of the discourses of medicalization of the society and of what is known as
‘scientific racism.’

Some authors such as Bejarano showed, even, their dissent from some of the
suppositions of the predominant racialist thought and their assumptions about the
influence of the surroundings in human populations. It is necessary to highlight that in the
work of the examined authors categories of ‘race’ operate that are not reduced to what we
seem today willing to consider as ‘biological’. 23 Although ‘race’ referred in some aspects
to features that might appear as ‘biological’, these did not limit their meaning. There

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23 For a historicization of the notions of ‘nature’ and ‘biology’, see you Wade (2002).
were aspects that were associated with race as ‘moral’, ‘intellectual’ or ‘psychological’, which are not what we consider today as biology. 24

Conclusion

The articulations of blackness that operate in the texts examined for principles of the twentieth century contrast with those evidenced in the previous chapter. Rather than a blackness governed by the problematization of ethnicization, for the commented authors from the beginning of the twentieth century, there is a blackness shaped by a series of discourses that medicalize society and in which a racial articulation occupies a central place supposing a ‘biological’ substratum of populations.

Despite the differences of positions with regard to the debate about the degeneration of the ‘race’ in Colombia, all authors were discussing the subject in the terrain of expert discourse constituted mainly by medicine and hygiene. The problematic shared by them is that of a diagnosis of the present and future of Colombian population given its particular racial characteristics. In this sense, their articulations of blackness are clearly racialized and inscribed in a grammar of blood where an inferior place is assigned to the ‘black’ determined by a series images of proximity to nature.

24 These statements about ‘race’ as ‘soul’ or about its relationship with ‘culture’ introduce a position that question an idea of race limited to biology. This seems to be in correspondence with which different academics have indicated for Latin America. Marisol de la Cadena (2005) has insisted on this point showing with their works centered in the Peru that the ‘race’ is articulated appealing to the ‘culture’. In this vein, Peter Wade (2003: 271) sustains that in Latin America the racial classifications cannot be limited to strictly biological criteria, because often they are criteria of cultural order those that constitute these classifications.
The images of the ‘black’ identified were registered in a clear geography and hierarchy (moral and intellectual) of the races. One of the shared suppositions is the establishment of an ineluctable ‘geography of the races’ assumed a set of correlations between the characteristics of certain places (areas, climates, physical surroundings, natural atmosphere) and the dispositions of certain racial conglomerates. The low lands, the tropical climate or, simply, the tropics operated as indicators of the place (geographical and of proximity to the nature) of the ‘black.’

The ‘black’ is represented thus from a racial thought that associates him/her with some areas and geographical conditions more than to others. As consequence of his own ‘nature’, he can inhabit those places and to prosper there. Areas and conditions that are imagined distant -when not opposed- to the domain of bodies, subjectivities and considered spaces characteristic of civilization and progress. Thus, the ‘black’ is located in a closer proximity to nature, animal passion, childhood and to the past. Therefore, he is located in a place opposed to civilization, maturity and progress.

Thus, the images of the ‘black’ are organized in a contrast between civilization and nature. Nearer to the nature -in the most opposed climatic zones to the advance of the civilization and without domain about his/her passions- the ‘black’ embodied a sort of antithesis of civilization. From this series of premises, the uncertainty and the political tutelage are the ineluctable consequences of the demographic predominance of ‘blacks’. Hence, the ongoing ‘africanization’ or ‘darkness’ of sectors or of the Colombian population constituted a source of anxiety for these intellectuals of the elite. It represented obstacles more or less unavoidable for the collective future: in their extreme versions, the condemnation to the chaos and the political uncertainty, to the distancing of
the intellectual and moral achievements of civilization. Therefore, these images about the ‘black’ say more about the elite that represented them than they do of the populations to which they supposedly referred. They evidence the anxieties, frustrations and aspirations of the experts and intellectual elite on the process of imagine both the population and the nation.
CHAPTER 4
ABOLITIONISTS, CHOROGRAPHERS AND ESSAYISTS:
REPRESENTATIONS AND INTERVENTIONS ON BLACKNESS THROUGH THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

On July 20, 1849, there was an elaborate ceremony in Bogota commemorating
‘Independence’, which had been achieved nearly 30 years ago, that included the most
distinguished political figures in the city and the country. The newly elected president,
liberal José Hilario López, was one of the most conspicuous attendants. The Municipal
Palace was spruced up for the celebration, and beautifully framed pictures of the most
prominent figures of the Independence War were exhibited. Not surprisingly, Simón
Bolívar’s portrait was given the place of honor. He was the undisputed mythical figure,
even more so after his death in December 1830, of the libertarian movement that had led
to Independence. After a ceremony led by the higher ups in the Church hierarchy at the
huge Cathedral on the city’s Main Square, a solemn parade which included the Council’s
president, his secretaries, the governors, council members and several members of the
Philanthropic Society walked to the Town Hall’s archways. The crowd assembled at the
square were able to observe at that moment a troop of forty-four slaves standing to the
right to the president and several other government officers.

1 Description based on Hernández de Alba’s (1956: 70) accounts, drawn upon records appearing
in the city’s newspapers.
Once they had occupied their places, Juan Antonio Pardo distributed thirteen freedom letters among the slaves while he uttered the following words: “it is not far away the day when as an apology to humanity and philosophy and reason, all our brothers living under our homeland’s sun are given back the rank of men and the dignity of citizenship”. Two attendants went forward to deliver one certificate of freedom to each slave. President López also participated in the ceremony delivering four certificates of freedom, which he purchased himself. Each and everyone of them was emancipated because of very specific reasons: on behalf of the ‘martyrs from Independence’; in memory of José Félix de Restrepo, a ‘Christian philosopher and protector of slaves’; to the importance of Antonio Morales, who is said to have given ‘the first cry of freedom’; and on behalf of his youngest daughter. This section of the ceremony was closed by Governor Vicente Lombana, who proclaimed the freedom of the remaining slaves, twenty of which had been voluntarily paid for, and seven of which had been manumitted by their former masters. The just-freed forty-four, covering their heads with a bonnet as a symbol of their emancipation and eagerly kissing their letters of freedom, showed up at the square where thousands of people shouted a clamorous ‘hurrah!’ and there was an outburst of cheers as an expression of deep popular enthusiasm.

Since 1821, when the Free Womb Law was passed and manumission committees were created, public ceremonies where enslaved were manumitted were common in several places of the New Granada.² Some of these acts were celebrated within the

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² Names, political constitutions and borders of what is the Colombian Republic today were changed several times during the 19th century. In 1830, Great Colombia was broken up. During the Colony, it encompassed the territories under the Viceroyalty of New Granada, which in general terms are the present-day countries of Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador.
framework of religious holidays. At other times, manumissions were held in the middle of a reception for a Liberal party political figure, who had just come to town (Helg 2004). Nonetheless, most of them were held on the dates commemorating events leading to Independence from Spanish Colonial government and to the birth of the Republic. As abolitionist debate and measures show, freedom from Spanish domination operated as a correlative for slave manumission. Thus, ritualization of enslaved manumission acts would be articulated with the creation of a collective memory and a feeling of national communality legitimating the practice of power by Creole elites. Slavery abolition did not follow Independence. It was just in 1851, more than forty years after the beginning of Independence wars and nearly thirty years after independence was won, that the law bringing slavery to an end was passed.

In the first part of this chapter, I will examine the problematization articulated in the abolitionist debate. With this review I intend to make evident the varied imagery of slaves and those who have already gained freedom, which referred, in an oblique way, to the articulation of blackness. I will follow the contours of the argumentation lines put forward in discourses and statements, decrees, legal instruments, and acts.

In the first chapter, I gave a detailed account of my approach, from the notions of eventalization and problematization. However, it is important to note that I am not purporting to write a history on slavery abolition in New Granada, nor does my study make up a social or economic history of forces or processes that led to abolish slavery.

During the Great Colombia period, most of the current Republic of Colombia was included in the State of New Granada. Once Great Colombia was dissolved, the Republic of New Granada was created (1843), later becoming the Granadina Confederation (1858), the United States of Colombia (1863) and, finally, the Republic of Colombia (1883). With the intervention of the U.S., Panama separated from Colombia in 1903.
Furthermore, it is not my aim to bring political or philosophical influences or original ideas on the New Granada debate under the spotlight, in relation to deployments in other places in the world, as England or other nations in the Americas. Even less, this study does not offer a history of ‘ideas’ around abolitionism nor make a comprehensive analysis of the resulting laws.

In the second part, I will discuss a set of documents produced within the framework of the Corographic Commission by Agustín Codazzi and Felipe Pérez. For nearly 10 years (between 1850 and 1859), this Commission was in charge of moving throughout the New Granada describing the features and riches of its various provinces, and making a general map of the Republic. In performing their task, Codazzi wrote reports for the governors of the provinces located in what is called today the Colombian Pacific region. Pérez, responsible for the making of a general synthesis of what was going to be the first political geography of the then called United States of Colombia, collects much of Codazzi’s material.

In examining these works, I bring to light the images on ‘Blacks’, which are explicit in Codazzi and Pérez’ passages. Further, I explore the notion of ‘race’, articulated in the different passages, as well as the narratives of progress related to them. Those narratives propose a set of political intervention aiming to make populations work, trade and consume to ensure the survival of the nation.

Finally, in the third part, I will discuss some excerpts from Jose María Samper’s work, a well-known political and intellectual figure at the time. Samper is an essayist, and member of the geographers and ethnographers societies from Paris, who wrote a well-known book on the political revolutions and the social condition of the Hispanic
American republics. I am interested in exploring how blackness appears in his conceptualizations of what he calls ‘Mestizo civilization’, and in his thesis of ‘ethnological promiscuity as a physiology of politics’. Also, I will examine his notions of ‘race’, ‘caste’ and ‘types’, and his formulations of ‘ethnographical zones’, which would mean an inevitable ‘geography of races’, illustrated in the ‘types’ of ‘mulatto’ and ‘zambo’.

The three sections making up this chapter allow me to outline the specificities of the articulations of blackness, from the scholars and first experts, whose problematization was based on disciplined work and moralization of behaviors as conditions for progress and political order in the emerging republic.

1. The abolitionist debate

On January 1st, 1852, in the village of Cipaquirá (sic), a settlement near Santa Fe de Bogotá, the same day the manumission law would come into force, Father Jervasio García made a speech that ‘acknowledged’ the complete freedom of slaves throughout the territory of the New Granada. Beginning with a biblical exegesis, Father Jervasio García began his speech noting how ‘man’ was created by God, ‘engraving in him the sacred image of holiness’, making him a ‘noble creature’ that was placed on the ‘superb throne of Nature’ and who was given an absolute command over ‘animals on Earth’ (p. 3). After describing the ‘fall’ from the ‘Delights of Eden’ by our ‘first parents’ (referring to Adam and Eve) and recalling the sentence they were given by the ‘crime’ they committed, he argued emphatically that the origin of slavery cannot be imputed to this
divine punishment: “[...] I do not see the degrading slavery of a man under another man as an express punishment or specific penalty caused by sin” (p. 4).³

Conversely, for Father García the origin of the ‘degrading slavery’ was to be found “[...] on those barbarian and uncivilized folks who were not shamed of having as virtues the cruel infanticide, drunkenness, dissipation, injustice and despotism, that abhorrent plague of society [...]” (p. 4). This ‘barbarism’ and ‘uncivilization’ turned them into [...]

miserable people, where the more numerous class was made up of no less than vile slaves, miserable people frequently dominated by the judgment of a popular anarchy, people, lastly, where man despite his highness and dignity, remained oppressed under the shameful burden of chains, mixed up with beasts (p. 4).

Hence with the abolition of slavery “[...] filthy vapors of messiness, barbarism and idolatry began to brighten” (p. 4). García asked, then, to ‘thank Goodness’ for having “[...] condescended to improve the unhappy condition of that crowd that under the vile name of slaves had to suffer a master’s ferocity, who could tantalize them and even to have their own lives at his disposal had been his will” (p. 4). It is just the divine will and hand, which at the end imposed itself on ‘barbarism’ and ‘idolatry’ with the principles of ‘Christian fraternity and equality’. As if addressing to the Creator itself, García exclaimed:

Oh, yes, sovereign and eternal liberator, only you could pull those folks’ aged disorders out forever, which were led by a ruining philosophy rich only in nonsense and delirium, who were led astray and cheated with some doctrines made up to degrade and destroy a huge part of mankind: but the moral enchanter’s voice rumbles even in the confines of the world, and wherever man wants to listen in wonder to the new principles of sacred Christian equality and fraternity. (p. 5).

³ He did not mention the biblical passage —thoroughly commented two centuries earlier by father Alonso de Sandoval (1647: 21)— about the curse Noah cast upon his son Ham, which quite a few theologians considered as the origin not only of slavery but of the Ethiopians’ skin color (this will be addressed in detail in the upcoming chapter).
So, in García’s gaze (p.5) the establishment of slavery is contrary to the most basic teachings of equality and fraternity which make up the very ‘essence of Christianity’ and its doctrine.

In his discourse, García asked ‘what is a slave?’ His answer does not make room for ambiguity. A slave is a ‘rational’ being, a ‘man’, whom a ‘society’s’ (not divine) ‘curse’ and the ‘old civilization’s right’ have condemned capriciously and absurdly to an ‘opprobrious and degrading’ state of being a ‘thing’ (not an ‘individual’), the target of the ultimate depreciation, debarred of their links with ‘society’ and ‘family’ (and, occasionally, even of the sacrament of marriage), downgrading them to ‘work as a brute (an animal)’, whom have been denied their fair ‘natural rights’ and have been exposed to the ‘cruelty of their inhuman master’. In his own words:

A slave is a man capriciously damned to live in such a degrading and opprobrious condition that is never his own master, being the property of another man to whom his/her freedom is tied: he is an individual that, according to the nonsensical old civilization’s right, cannot be considered as an individual, but as an object, one who can be disposed of. What a ridiculous and extravagant idea! He is a personage so shamed that he has no ties or relationships with society or with family. But, what am I saying! Talking about conjugal union between slaves, there was a time when it was not considered legitimate, as if Jesus Christ had barred them from participating in that sacrament; but the humble and unfortunate fruit of those unions was certainly considered by their masters as being their legitimate property. Here we see how those unfortunate were mixed up with beasts: They were looked down, condemned to work as beasts for ever, and they could even be sold without permitting them to raise their voice claiming their legitimate rights of nature; they are wretches who ignore how or why they are overwhelmed under the enormous burden of a curse thrown by society; they are rational beings continuously exposed to their inhuman masters’ cruelty, who, made into executioners, scourge them with a merciless hand and bury them in a prison to be consumed in hunger, thirst and nakedness. That is what a slave is, and we are not considering here the huge amount of hidden wicked acts that only God knows. (García 1852: 5-6).
By ‘nature’ and ‘origin’, all ‘men’ are equal: ‘the toasted-skinned African’, ‘the white-skinned European’, ‘the yellow-skinned Asian’, ‘the copper-colored American’ and even “[...] the black-skinned from Oceania, who seems to make up the race of the ugliest and most stupid men, the wildest and dopiest tribes, and up to now mostly unknown. All of them have the same origin; all those men are equal by their nature and origin [...]” (p. 5-6). So, for Father Jervasio García the fact that those ‘men’ are equal by ‘origin’ and ‘nature’ does not favor the diluting of some kind of hierarchies or the disavowing of certain differences. Those hierarchies are denoted when he talks of ‘savage and dopy tribes’ and differences (which may be considered as hierarchies, too) concerning colors and locations.

Without exception, all ‘men’s’ ‘nature’ is that of “[...] the rational creature, where the image of God himself glitters [...]” (p. 6). This is what makes them different from ‘beasts’ in their very essence, and also that their origin dates back to Adam: “[...] Have not by any chance —he asks himself— all men had the same origin? Have not all of us come to this miserable world through the same Adam’s path? [...]” (p. 5). Taking into account this essential equality among all ‘men’, Father Jervasio García does not find “[...] any reasonable motive for those men to have dared to revile and degrade their kindred in such an unfair and shameful way [...]” (p. 6). All the “[...] hideous and abhorrent distinction between slaves and masters [...]” goes against even the express divine will commanding ‘man’ to govern ‘brutes’ (‘animals’) yet not any other ‘man’: “God who created man did not want him to rule over no other than animals, and thus He said, you will rule over fish in water, birds at sky and reptiles creeping on dust of Earth; not man ruling over another man, but man over brutes” (p. 6).
In his opinion, then, there is no other thing more opposite to Christianity’s ‘doctrine’ and ‘spirit’ than the condition of some men being slaves. That is why he asks again, anticipating potential critics, “You tell me now, could Christianity consent such a barbarian and insufferable abuse as unjust as scandalous?” (p. 6). A scathing no is his response, and he hurries to remark that ‘religion’ had opted for “[...] relieving and softening in some way these unfortunates’ doom, while the day for its complete abolition would come [...]” (p. 6). Since ‘religion’ (as well as ‘governments professing it do’) has not ‘wanted [to have] violent spoils’, this complete abolition of slavery would not be possible, but through a gradual process where in

[...] a continuous fight against aged habits, it was necessary to gain folks’ willingness towards the Gospel’s new doctrines, so that it was possible to dethrone and suppress those oppressing and violent barbarian laws. This was the great, the important reform being claimed by disheartened mankind’s rights, and this was the imperative cry echoing by a pure, flawless religion founded on Christian charity, equality and fraternity (p. 6).

Father Jervasio García considers the Church to have been fighting for centuries to “[...] make disappear from its chaste heart that filthy leprosy; that affront to human kind [...]” (p. 7).

Father Garcia continues, “Philanthropic, educated and civilized governments, which have been honored by hoisting the flag of the holy principles of equality and fraternity, which have tirelessly worked to completely slaughter that infamous chain whose first link is lost in the darkness of an ancient barbarism [...]” (p. 7). These governments have been joined by “[...] the Republic of New Granada, which, overcoming thousands of drawbacks, has worked with an unremitting zeal to achieve the complete freedom for slaves [...]” (p. 7). And the day he was pronouncing his speech could therefore be considered as
a memorable day for the philanthropic and generous Granadino. Such a day will form part of the brightest page in our history in front of all nations and the whole world, as it is the day when the dark blot which disfigured and served as a hindrance to our civilization and our principles completely disappeared (p. 7).

Slavery abolition is a proof of the ‘philanthropic and generous thoughts and feelings’ of the ‘legislators in 1851’, with which “[...] their glory” is immortalized “not only in the Granadian’s heart, and our fortunate homeland, but also in all nations where slavery has been looked at indignantly and as an opprobrious abuse against Nature and man’s dignity [...]” (p. 7). By the end of his discourse, Father Jervasio García admonishes the slave directly, as being a citizen with his own rights and warrants derivative from political constitution, without the presence of his ‘hateful master’ and with a commitment to ‘not to abuse from freedom’ and be faithful to ‘homeland’ by respecting authorities and observing order and laws.

Nearly fifty years before, in 1805, the slave José de Castro from the city of Mompox, wrote in his memorial of his thoughts on slavery and his reflections on Father García’s speech. In his memorial,⁴ he stated that the existence of slaves and masters was considered to be contrary to the “[...] precept Our Lord Jesus Christ gave us to love our fellow human beings as we love ourselves”. Furthermore, he noted that this existence “[...] was lacking doctrine, or that servants and slaves were not the sons of God as free men were”. Along these lines, José de Castro was arguing there was a contradiction between Christian doctrine that all ‘men’ were equal before God, and the inequality

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⁴ Historian Jaramillo Uribe, who transcribed the memorial, notes it was “certainly written by a literate man” (1969: 74). My argument does not focus on who is ‘really’ talking in the memorial (the slave who signs it or the alleged literate who writes it), but rather on the terms of the argument used.
between servants and free men. On the other hand, his memorial also conceptualized that it is in ‘the codes’ where there are ‘enslaved men’ rather than in ‘Nature’: “[…] there are no slave men but in the codes. As for free men’s lack of humanity and insensitivity, Nature would not be able to allow for, by any means, one of the most shameful outrages”.

It was not only against ‘doctrine’, but also against ‘Nature’, “[…] a wretched portion of mankind [is] despised and humiliated to the level of beasts” because of some ‘free men’s’ ‘lack of humanity’ and ‘insensitivity’.

José de Castro’s memorial and Father Jervasio García’s speech share some terms of argumentation, among which the following should be noted: the equal origin of all ‘men’ according to Christian doctrine; the ‘humanity’ of slaves and serfs and therefore their ‘equality’ before God; the distinction in ‘Nature’ between ‘men’ and ‘beasts’; the immanent cruelty (‘lack of humanity’, ‘insensitivity’, ‘barbarism’) of slavery as an institution and its unmistakable contradiction with ‘doctrine’ and ‘Nature’; and, finally, the existence of serfs and slaves is brought about by codes or ‘men’s’ laws rather than by a ‘divine curse’. Between the speech pronounced by Father Jervasio García at mid-century and José de Castro’s memorial, at the beginning of that same century emerged the ‘abolitionist debate’ of New Granada.

Even among those in disagreement with abolition’s feasibility, most agreed with the arguments of Father Gervasio García’s speech and José de Castro’s memoir. While under the rule of the Spanish Crown, the newspaper El Redactor Americano del Nuevo Reyno de Granada, from Santa Fe de Bogotá, published, on August 19, 1807, an excerpt of the agreement signed to advance the slave trade prohibition, which had been originally published on the London Gazzette on January 12 earlier that year. That excerpt was
followed by an extensive comment, probably written by the then editor in chief to *El Redactor*, Manuel del Socorro Rodríguez.

The commentator casts doubt on the possibility of slavery ceasing to exist “[...]” even though some philanthropic geniuses are determined to write and effectively recite on this point” (p. 141-142) and despite the fact that its abolition would mean “[...] mankind’s absolute bliss!” (p. 141). Certainly, he claims, such abolition would be more geared towards “[...] slave trade’s extinction [...]” (p. 141), but it would not be conducive to slavery abolition, as it results from war among ‘nations’: “While nations worldwide remain in their fateful state of gaining their authority and respective rights through war and arms, slavery cannot but exist” (p. 142).

Echoing a popular argument of the epoch, the commentator argues that slavery results from ‘humankind’s’ laws that the defeated’s life be preserved for their ‘own good and the common good’ instead of annihilating them (p. 142). Thus, it is with such a ‘humane’ act towards the defeated that we find the origin of slavery:

[...] It looks as if this had been the origin of slavery since primitive ages if we think of it as common and general; ignoring here the power given to parents to sell their children in certain nations, and the right of public government to punish with such a penalty to incorrigibly wicked people in other countries. (p. 142-143).

Faced with “[...] the ancient and hard to abolish slavery what remains to be done is to be aware of the duty rational free subjects have to treat slaves with a charitable gentleness” (p. 144). Before thinking of the abolition of slavery, the recommendation is ‘to be indulgent and compassionate’ to ‘our fellow human beings’ and ‘brothers’ who have been “[...] degraded from the dignity of common society [...]”, and who are “[...] reduced to the dispirited and miserable condition of carrying around their neck such a heavy burden of serfdom [...]” (p. 144). Such indulgence and compassion refer to the
‘justice’ of ‘love towards our kindred’ and to the “[...] holy respect imposed on us by divine and human laws” (p. 144).

In the same way as Father Jervasio García’s speech or José de Castro’s memorial, the *El Redactor Americano*’s commentator considered slaves to be, at a certain level, equal to ‘free subjects’ (‘our kindred’ or ‘brothers’, in his words). Likewise, the origin of slavery results from human practices (like war among ‘nations’) not to mention a ‘divine punishment’ as the source of its origin. All three authors coincide, also, in considering that slavery or serfdom entailed a ‘state’, a specific ‘condition’ (miserable for all of them). That is why there is nothing in the ‘nature’ of those who have been submitted to slavery which makes them unable to become ‘free subjects’ or, what is the same, nothing which turns them into slaves. Despite these points of agreement, the commentator completely disagrees with the others in that he echoes an argument in force —at least from the 12th century on— (as the upcoming chapter will show) arguing that reducing victims to serfdom was an act of justice rather than of one of barbarism or cruelty in itself.

The widest gap between the commentator and the friar and the slave is in his apology for the goodness and gentleness of slavery in the ‘peoples under the Spanish rule’ at large and in Santa Fe de Bogotá in particular (p. 144-145). Therefore, in view of the pessimism about eliminating the source of slavery (that is, that ‘nations’ cease to impose themselves by force and that quarrels among them are no longer settled through war) and its ‘benevolence’ in Spain’s colonies, the commentator considers slavery an institution that will be kept alive.
In 1821, after a convulsive series of wars between supporters of independence and vindicators of the Spanish colonial regime, the emerging republic’s Cúcuta Congress passed the July 21st Law about “Freedom of childbirths, manumission and slave trade abolition” (Restrepo Canal 1938: xxvii). What fourteen years earlier had seemed unviable in El Redactor’s commentator’s eyes was being passed as a law. This Law established that once put into force, female slaves’ children should be free (Freedom of Wombs). However, those children would be educated and supported by their mothers’ masters and, as payback, they would serve them until they were eighteen years old. Also, the Law required that children would not be sold separately from their parents until they had reached puberty, and prohibited the introduction of new slaves or their trade outside Colombian territory. Finally, funds for manumission and committees to administer them were established.5

José Félix de Restrepo was the person in charge to read the speech to set out the draft on June 27. Restrepo’s argument on the manumission of slaves was based on several propositions: “1) that slavery directly goes against Nature’s right; 2) against the essence of the Gospel; 3) against the Republic’s security and permanence; 4) against decorum; 5) against population; 6) against the increase of agriculture, mining and all kind of industry” (p. 123).

In general, Restrepo’s argumentations are more on the side of Father Jervasio García José de Castro than on El Redactor’s skeptical commentator. For Restrepo,

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5 Rather than an abolitionary law, according to Margarita González (1974: 17), this law extended slavery under various mechanisms of mentoring and bound servitude by freed-men. For the most part, this law recreated the manumission law promoted by Restrepo himself in the State of Antioquia, which was passed by the legislator body as a Law on April 20, 1814, but had a short life due to the Spanish Reconquest in 1816.
slavery goes against ‘Nature’s right’ in that ‘blacks’ are ‘rational creatures’ made by
‘God’ “[…] in his image and likeness” (p. 83). ‘Blacks’ are part of ‘humankind’ and only
‘our vices’ have denied them their rights through slavery. Restrepo’s reasoning assumes
‘black’ slavery goes against those fundamental rights. Therefore, it is a “[…] macula for
humankind and religion […]” (p. 128). That is why he does not have reservations to state
that slavery abolition is a restitution of “[…] sacred Nature’s rights […]” (p. 128).

Like García and Castro, for Restrepo “[…] blacks are sons of Adam our common
father and they should enjoy the same rights whites do […]” (p. 83). So, for him it is
beyond question that “[…] only the difference in color is a reason enough to take
advantage of their works and to subdue them as we please” (p. 83). Like Father Jevasio
García and José de Castro, Restrepo considers slavery a barbarian act maintained by
Europeans and master’s interest and greediness. The ‘miserable slaves’ ‘doom’ overflows
even imagination as one can hardly “[…] conceive such an immense cumulus of crimes
and disgraces” (p. 85). ‘Doom’ and ‘condition’, rather than ‘Nature’ or ‘origin’ is how,
Restrepo explains, ‘Africans’ have been reduced to slavery. In this respect, he asserts that
even that doom could have been altered had they had naval and military technology the
Europeans do: “Had they [Africans] have had more ships and gunpowder and had they
discovered America, our fathers and we would be in Africa performing the same duties
they serve us” (p. 100).

Although Restrepo seems to give in to the point of the ‘fair war’ (in his case, that of
a people unjustly subdued against its oppressors), he does it in a rhetorical way to argue
that even thus ‘our slaves’” serfdom cannot be considered legitimate:

It is not difficult to agree that there is a sort of legitimate serfdom […] and this can
only have its roots in two principles. First, when a man submits himself under
other’s service. Second when a folks wrongfully submitted succeeds to outdo its oppressors. In such a case, defeated ones may be submitted to serfdom and even to be claimed a compensation for damages (p. 99).

Assuming, also, that shifting death for serfdom “comes from a beneficial principle rather than from the desire of gain” (p. 100.), this does not correspond with the ‘Africans’ situation as: “What wrong have they done to us? When did they invade our coasts if they even did not know Europe and America existed?” (p. 100).

Like García and Castro, Restrepo brings into question the use of ‘Holy Scripture’s’ passages to legitimate slavery. Restrepo notes there is nothing more contrary to Christian religion and its gospel than slavery (p. 104). Hence Restrepo predicts a divine punishment if slaves are denied what they are granted by the intervention of Providence. Referring to an ‘honorable writer’, whose name he keeps secret, Restrepo asserts that “[…] European nations that have refused to abolish the black trade, as England proposed, have been immediately punished, and in a most noteworthy way” (p. 98). A divine threat was imminent for the future of the republic if serfdom “of that class of men we call slaves” was to be kept.

Just as Father Jervasio García, Restrepo considers that not only slavery goes against Christian religion and it’s Gospel, but also against the political constitution that defines government as popular and representative.

Given that slavery subsists, it is nor one neither another. Not the first one, because a Government formed by so many lords with vassals, so many little absolute rulers, as miners and landowners are, has a stronger likeness to aristocracy than to democracy […] Not even the second one, for a big portion of Colombia remains excluded from representing and being represented (p. 120, 121).6

6 “Subsistiendo la esclavitud, no es ni lo uno, ni lo otro. No lo primero, porque un Gobierno compuesto de tantos señores de vasallos, de tantos pequeños soberanos absolutos, cuanto son los mineros y hacendados, más analogía tiene con la aristocracia, que con la democracia […] No lo
This contradiction in the ‘political body’ leads to its ruin:

In political bodies, as well in natural ones, their constituting elements, be they opposite, result in the compound’s fermentation and ruin. Slavery is always hateful compared with freedom. They are enemies thrown in a deaf war; and sooner or later one’s victory over the other brings about the death of State (p. 116).

Then, to maintain slavery was equal to dooming slaves to “fearsome disasters”, as they would rise for freedom using violence. Quoting Bolívar, he reminds lawmakers of the justice, necessity and benefits arising from such a measure, as the histories of slavery in Spartacus and Haiti have demonstrated (p. 117). Restrepo could also have quoted the message with which Juan del Corral submitted his proposal for the Freedom of Womb Law to Antioquia’s Legislative Body seven years earlier, which he had commissioned Restrepo himself to write. In that message, his fear of slaves’ violent and unrestrained insurrection is evident and, particularly, fear of the events that occurred in Haiti.7

In his discourse, Restrepo also discussed manifold arguments slaverists brandished to oppose the abolition of slavery. In the first place, Restrepo refers to slaverists’ argument that freeing ‘blacks’ would result in ‘great harm’ to society since only ‘fear of punishment’ restrains them from falling into ‘vices’: “Blacks are dominated by every vice: they are lazy, deceitful, thieves; having all those defects they will cause great harm

7 “While even the shadow of slavery has not disappeared from among us; while we see all classes aiming to follow some similar principles to perpetuate the Republic’s stability, do not believe, you, people representatives!, that freedom has been consolidated for ever. Do not bet on inland’s peace which our homeland enjoys today, on that which it will enjoy in forthcoming, if you do not strive for making excessive the unchangeable laws of justice over a certain class of unfortunate men, who signaling the reins of servitude out of spite, will end by bursting forth in a bloody uprising […] imagine for a moment the horrors, murders, atrocities occurred at the island of Haiti, as a result of French wanting to be the only free, keeping through a formal decree slavery among their colonies’ blacks, and revoking the beneficial and liberal dispositions previously passed” (Del Corral, quoted en Restrepo [1827] 1968: 323-324).
in our society, if fear of punishment does not restrain them” (p. 101). Against this perception of ‘apostles of tyranny’, Restrepo refers to travelers in other lands commenting on their ‘moral virtues’:

On the evidence of travelers, blacks are capable of the more absolute civilization; they have an inclination for music and arts; possess moral virtues; are compassionate, hospitable and in the current political transformation, they have set example of heroic generosity. The loyalty with which they keep a thing is incorruptible. Love and respect towards parents —as disregarded as it is among nations called themselves cultured— is really important […] (p. 101-102).

All the more, certain ‘vices’ imputed to ‘blacks’ are but a consequence of their ‘condition’ of slavery and of the ‘influence of our customs’ rather than the expression of ‘blacks’ particular nature. Indeed, such ‘vices’ could also be observed in ‘whites’. Additionally, concerning the vice of ‘laziness’ in particular, it is not surprising they do not ‘love’ the work from which they do not receive any earnings.8 Slavery not only foments ‘vices’ but also attempts on ‘mores’. Stealing, suicide, murder, abortion, prostitution, pandering and perjury make up crimes which are “[…] its [serfdom’s] immediate and necessary consequence […]” (p. 105).

In his speech, Restrepo addresses another argument by opponents of abolition claiming that slaves were not prepared to be freed and that they had to be educated first. “Slaves, others say, do not have any culture: it is necessary to give them some education before making them free; otherwise they would cause much harm to society and would destroy each other” (p. 102). Against this argument, Restrepo notes that was precisely

8 “If relocated amidst a foul weather they continue to be sluggish, mischievous, hypocrite, deceitful, it is a shortcoming due to their condition and by contagion of our own behavior. In whites, we can see the very same, and even worse, defects. Concerning laziness specifically, it is no wonder they do not love a work which they do not get any benefit from: should we find ourselves in the same circumstances we would do the same” (p. 102).
one of the reasons Spaniards refused to concede independence to Americans (p. 102-103). Again, Restrepo calls upon the inconsistencies of maintaining slavery when they had risen against Spanish rule on behalf of independence. Independence and freedom are compared, as well as Colonialism and slavery.

The point Restrepo delves into the most is the questioning of the proposal that the abolition of slavery would bring about general ruin. Abolition, some people believed, went against individual and collective prosperity, and threatened the guarantee that mines and fields would have at anyone’s disposal the workers they demanded: “Slavery goes against prosperity in Colombia. What a mistake! —the apologists of despotism claim. Who is going to work our mines and cultivate our fields?” (p. 110).

Restrepo discusses various issues concerning that line of argumentation. First, he stresses it is based on the gap of pretending to measure in terms of gold and merchandising what makes up an interest of another sort, a superior one and one over which one cannot make allowances. The second issue lies in demonstrating how wrongful are those who perceive the abolition of slavery to be a condemnation against prosperity in Colombia. Restrepo argues that contrary to the fear of “[…] ruin those gloomy cannibals proclaim in such a mourning tone” (p. 111), freedom of slaves is “[…] the infallible way, the only way through which agriculture and mining can flourish” (p. 111). This is the case because the slave does not have any incentive for profit or individual interest in the yield of his work, as it will be separated from him and he will not be acknowledged for it: “Let us get real: individual interest is the only incentive to make any kind of industry flourish: there is no man so selfless who will not get
discouraged seeing the result of his work is going to go to other hands, and he will not have even the reward of gratitude” (p. 113).

These new laborious hands, having learned their jobs from their parents in the states or mines, would practice them up to the age the law had defined, and then they would continue to perform them and thus they would not become a burden for society. In their new condition, they will be the driving force of demographic growth, the farming of our lands, and the replacement of tyranny to give room for happiness, justice and prosperity (p. 112).

Finally, Restrepo introduces a series of calculations on procurement prices and sustaining expenses for a slave to stress that for owners the cost is greater “[…] working their possessions with slaves than with free men” (p. 115). In contrast with the costs of the slave’s work, he proposes appealing to a specific logic that he believes questions proprietors, “The free man is only occupied when ploughing, sowing and harvesting; he is fired when he stops to be useful and nothing is lost when he dies” (p. 116). As obvious as his deliberations are, they have not been understood by proprietors because their selfish interest makes them blind: “All of these deliberations are quite evident, but interest never reasons accurately” (p. 116).

Paradoxically, the measures suggested by Restrepo did not consider the cost of the immediate abolition of slavery. Restrepo points out that the ‘cure’ may be as ‘deadly’ as the ‘disease’ if it is not applied in a timely fashion. But he appeals to a ‘real politics and a Christian justice’ that these measures should not be violent nor should they cause new harm in remedying old injustices. “Slavery could be compared with electrical fire, as it is
convenient to evacuate it slowly in order to not to suffer the effects of a violent exposition” (p. 124).

Restrepo summarizes his position as follows: “[…] not to concede freedom is a barbarity, but to grant it suddenly is haste” (p. 123). Maintaining slavery is a barbarous act, a criminal selfishness, a risky inconsistency, a contradiction with Christian doctrine and an injustice against men’s natural rights, he argues. The hastiness in suddenly emancipating slaves is a critical addition to his argument and he devotes a paragraph to discuss it. Two points are mentioned in this respect, which he assumes are not controversial. The first one says: “Social freedom has certain degrees and needs a certain disposition in those who receive it so that it does not become dangerous. One cannot abruptly move from one state to its opposite without being exposed to big inconveniences” (p. 124). There is no other word concerning what would seem to be a contradiction with his insistence that slaves were unprepared to be free and the Spaniards’ beliefs that ‘Americans’ were unprepared to be independent. Gradualness, non-violence, and moderation - Restrepo’s advice for the abolition of slavery echoed the Spaniards’ caution about the independence of the ‘Americans’ independence, even though he himself questioned this position.9

9 Juan del Corral’s message quoted above might clarify what might seem a contradiction in Restrepo’s argumentation. Del Corral clearly notes the problem would lie in the immediate and simultaneous abolition of slavery, rather than in freedom of wombs reclaimed by Restrepo’s bill: “I recognize, however, that just as it is an overall manumission of slaves, its consequences would be deadly to our Republic. Some men degraded by servitude, lacking education of ideas and feelings, having no property nor links to this homeland —to whom they have never belonged— would as a natural consequence become perverse and, inebriated with a sudden emancipation, would behave as criminal and bandits. Yet these considerations should not staunch us to undertake some essential moves that step by step result in a universal manumission” (Del Corral, quoted in Restrepo [1827] 1968: 325).
The second refers to the dangers of a judicial decision that would suddenly ruin ‘whites’ who have invested their fortune in slaves, protected by laws in force until then: “[…], whites who, in compliance with existing laws, have invested their fortunes in some sort of trade, as unjust as it was […], shall not be ruined all of a sudden […]” (p. 124).

Restrepo does not seem to recognize a contradiction between his sympathy with the owners’ potential ruin and his argument for the lower costs of free labor and the benefits of free men’s individual interest, which allegedly would make a force that would increase five-fold the number of ‘hardworking hands’, but also would result in population growth, the productivity of land and the guarantee of happiness, justice and tolerance.

At the end of his Discourse, Restrepo proposes his ‘remedy’ for the harm that abolition would cause owners through the ‘Free Womb’ proposal. This remedy is radical in that it “prevents the spread of that political cancer”, at the same time the masters’ rights are not hurt because the only thing to be taken away from them is “[…] the hope of something that does not exist, and which could never be applied the title of conquest, just war, invention or any other from which dominance is gotten” (p. 125). Also, the landowner would be reimbursed for food, clothing and other expenses from those freeborn individuals by having them work for them in their ‘parents’ works’ until the age of sixteen or eighteen.

Four years after passing Law of July 21st 1821, Senator Joaquín Mosquera wrote and published a Memorial on the need to amend this law. There, he discusses this law ‘drawbacks’ in relation to ‘public peace of mind’, ‘citizenship’s’ estate and the ‘nation’s’ income (Mosquera 1825: 4). Ultimately, what Mosquera intends to demonstrate, through the three propositions included in his Memory, is that in the way the law was sanctioned
what is at stake is our ‘homeland’s’ ‘prosperity’ and ‘health’ (p. 3, 33). Mosquera asserts repeatedly that he is not against

The cause of slaves, which has been taken before the court of reason, politics and religion by so many honorable writers for over one-half century, so that no one can cast a doubt on it. Nor should these discourses be repeated, because they have been seen by everyone; and opinion, that irresistible power, has an irrevocable judgment on that issue (p. 3-4).

Thus, he says he does not intend to set against “[…] what universal opinion has approved” (p. 4), and that he wants “[…] slaves to be free, with all the zeal of the citizen most devoted to humankind […]” (p. 33).10

In his first premise, Mosquera discusses how Law 21 of 1821 compromises public peace undermining social foundations (pages 5-15). Against Restrepo’s claim that ‘free men’ by law would work as farm workers, and so there would be no need to fear supposed disorders, Mosquera appeals to comments about ‘freedmen’ in certain regions to illustrate the impending ‘harm’ threatening public peace. Thus, for example, in Chocó and Magdalena “[…] freedmen, and free men of the same species, have become so co-naturalized with savage and idle life that they nearly do not have any clothing or food, despite the fertility of the land: and that is the source of the repeated robberies, as there is hardly one person who pass among them without risking his property and even his life” (p. 8).

Slavery, then, is considered as the means to a civilized and productive life for a population that would be otherwise abandoned to ‘idleness’ and ‘savage life’, with no

10 As Jaime Jaramillo accurately says (1969: 78) in his classic study on the juridical and philosophical controversy on slaves’ freedom in New Granada, by that time the overt defense of slavery had become undefendable. Given that situation, the more conservative politicians and slaves owners opposed the ‘abolitionist ideas’ more in the procedural arena and on the moment when juridical emancipation of slavery should be established, underlying in passing the ‘inviolable right to property’. That seems to be the path Mosquera chose in his Memory.
clothing or food, snatching property and life from travelers. In contrast to Restrepo—who believed that freed men would learn from their parents the occupations they would be willing to work in afterwards—, Mosquera underlined that “[...] they will be in their habits worse than slaves, as being abased men by a servile education, with all the strength of intense passions, that characterizes African race, and they are [sic] stronger in youth, they are not to be repressed by their lord’s authority” (p. 6-7; emphasis by the author). As those freed men will not have the control that the masters have on their slaves, the consequence would be licentious, scandalous behavior, as they would attack property, subvert law, and stir those in still living in slavery to rise up (p. 7).

If this can be attested by anyone who has traveled to those places, then —Mosquera asks in a rhetorical manner— “What will happen the day when those hordes of idle bandits grow, as the Republic has ninety thousand slaves??” (p. 8). His answer could not be more pessimistic:

I consider that a herd of furious tigers released from chains would not do so much harm as it would do to set those immoral men free, who lack honor, hope and fear. Our nation would find itself in a state of wild anarchy, and it would likely would lack the means to prevent the harm which would follow the frenzy of brutal passions from those monsters, who would celebrate their triumph with horrid joy, over the ruins of freedom and civilization (p. 8).

Hordes of idle bandits, grown to thousands; immoral men, lacking honor, hope and fear; monsters indulging in brutal passions: those would be the forces that would bring havoc to the country, reducing freedom and civilization to ruins. Furthermore, Mosquera does not cease to stress that it is “virtuous and emeritus citizens, who have risked everything to found a free homeland […]” (p. 8), the victims to be sacrificed with such a law. Such a law is going to untie such fearsome forces that will undermine social order’s foundations. There are places, such as what is today called as the Pacific region, where the slaves’
subordination has been the only dike to contain the eruption of ‘wild anarchy’ and of the emergence of ‘barbarian tribes’, who are as pernicious to ‘society’ as beasts living in those ‘inaccessible and ancient jungles’ are (p. 11).

A subtler difference with Restrepo’s discourse lies in Mosquera’s use of the term ‘race’. Restrepo only mentions the term in a couple of passages corresponding to quotes of other authors. In contrast, Mosquera repeatedly uses the term in a conspicuous fashion. Thus, for example, according to Mosquera, society is “[…] made up of distinct races that are different from each other in civilization, bodily features and political privileges, which still exist in habit” (p. 6). Nonetheless, the distinction between ‘races’ in the ‘civilization’ and ‘political privileges’ issues does not seem to be ascribed to some kind of unchangeable trait, but derives from the ‘condition of servitude’ to which ‘blacks’ have been submitted, which have put them “[…] into the condition of wild tribes, both in their habits and in their character” (p. 6).

Therefore, some ‘liberal laws’ to alleviate the slaves’ ‘hard fate’ and ‘change [their] morals’ would open “[…] the path for a gradual improvement and their civilizing advance, and to make them able to be incorporated into society with the other citizens” (p. 6). Hence Mosquera considers “[…] that blacks are prone to all the moral and intellectual improvements” (p. 6). But those ‘improvements’, that ‘civilizing advance’ is made possible only as a gradual process through “[…] the civil and moral education of slaves […]” (p. 6).

11 The difference was expressed as that some were ‘citizens’, so they were ‘within society’, while the others were slaves, meaning they were out of society.

12 Referring to the ‘Indians’ of the Chocó coast, Mosquera suggests that the fact that they can speak a bit of Spanish and have a succinct understanding of Christianity are the only criteria
For Mosquera, without a change in education, ‘freed men’ will have the same ‘habits’ — or even worse — as the ‘slaves’ among whom they have grown: “Nobody could deny that Blacks, sons of slaves, having grown up in a mine or a plantation, serving with their parents until they are 18, will have the same habits and won’t be different from them but in the name of freedom” (p. 10). As a consequence, they wouldn’t be really prepared to take on ‘social freedom’:

It is also true that they will not have learned to write or read; in a word, they are actually slaves who are brought to the condition of natural freedom. And, what would be the craft or useful professions to be assigned by government to those wild men, who haven’t been educated, in order to have them assume the enjoyment of social freedom? (p. 10).

Mosquera is arguing from the distinction between two states of freedom: social and natural. Freedom is a state, as slavery is. Natural freedom can be obtained without being prepared to gain access to social freedom. In this case, even though they are given the name of freedom they will be in fact slaves. Social freedoms entails a set of changes in slaves’ habits which make them wild, through moral and intellectual education, where reading and writing appear to have a higher relevance. To enjoy social freedom, then, it does not suffice to have a legislative instrument emancipating them from their masters’ which help to vaguely distinguish them “[…] from the barbarians who the Spaniards found when they discover these coasts” (p. 12). Hence for senator Mosquera, ‘Indians’, at least those from the coast of Chocó are so close to the condition in which those ‘barbarians’ were hundreds of years earlier. Also, those ‘Indians’ as well as ‘Blacks’ from Chocó demonstrate their lack of ability to enjoy ‘social life’ which, of course, Mosquera locates in Cauca cities like Popayán: “Both Indians and Blacks, when leaving Chocó to go to the Cauca cities for some need, they are desperate to return to their domicile. Neither good food nor the beautiful natural views of that valley nor the help they receive from their lords, nothing makes they prefer social life” (p. 12).
legal authority. With 4,500 uneducated men obtaining their legal freedom every year, “[…] we see ourselves threatened to face this social blight […]” (p. 14).

Therefore, Mosquera is completely in disagreement with the law inspired in Restrepo’s Discourse: “[…] to think that eliminating slavery in a few years, as the law establishes, without gradually improving the slaves’ civil and moral education, is a chimera” (p. 6). Mosquera insists, then, on the need to change ‘slaves’ education before granting them ‘natural freedom’. This would mean the establishment of a series of rules to ensure this gradual transformation which, he says, had been recently carried out in Jamaica (p. 13). It is hardly surprising, then, that at the end of his Memorial, in the paragraph titled “Fundamentals to be taken into account to change law…”, he advances in the second item, after the proposal of suspending the effects of the Wombs Law: “A manumission board will be created to work on the rule or rules which are more conducive to improve to the extent it is possible moral and social education of slaves; to make them capable to be useful citizens for the Republic” (p. 34).

The second proposal considers that this law strips ‘citizens’ of their property, without having a fair compensation and in contradistinction with what was passed in this ‘Constitution of Republic’ (pages 16-26). Mosquera considers this Law to be null and void as it violates the right to property, which is contemplated in one this Constitution paragraphs: “[…] the inviolability of a citizen’s property is one of the political dogmas” (p. 16-17). He challenges Restrepo’s claim that ‘womb freedom’ was not detrimental to

13 In doing this differentiation between natural and social freedom as well as considering that the sudden liberation of slaves would be followed by some sort of wild anarchy, Mosquera repeated the arguments appeared in journal El Español by Wilberforce, “A famous writer really favorable to the freedom of blacks […]” (p. 9).
the owners. From an economic point of view, Mosquera considers that “Slavery is nothing other than [...] the guarantee the nation gave the slaves’ owners, that the usufruct of their works would be perpetual through births” (p. 19).

Therefore, he declares sententiously that “[...] when it frees those newly born, without paying their price, what happens is the equivalent to breaking vouchers, or amortizing them, without paying to the holder, as it should be done, the amount of their value” (p. 19). This behavior is “[...] contrary to the fundamental dictum in moral and politics mandating to give everyone what he is owed” (p. 19). Thus, senator Mosquera suggests the effects of law are abated to pass another law instead “[...] which has the same purpose [that of manumitting slaves] by the means that could be effective; without compromising public security, affect the right to property; which are political dogmas in all civilized nations” (p. 26).

Finally, in his third proposal Mosquera claims that a serious decrease in the ‘nation’s’ income shall result from the law of manumission. Again, Mosquera opposes Restrepo’s arguments, who considered manumission would bring affluence to the ‘nation’. For senator Mosquera, that law “[...] causes harm in that it causes to lessen the capital or products, which make up the riches of a state” (p. 27). The issue that caused the lessening of capitals was mining, as owners would lose their investment in slaves and gold mining declined because of [...] insubordination among slaves due to the law of manumission” (p. 31).

At the end of his Memory, senator Mosquera plainly states seven points that will serve as the ‘foundation’ to amend the Law of manumission of 1821. I have already explained the first two points, that is, that the effects of law be suspended and a
committee to study the guidelines to improve slaves’ moral and social education. In the third one, this committee should put forward “[…] the means helping to accelerate the absolute elimination of slavery” (p. 34). In the fourth, Mosquera suggests that funds raised by manumission should prioritize manumitting slaves by families, who “should be more honest” (p. 34).

The fifth and the sixth underline the Church and priests’ role in manumission ceremonies and sermons to slaves. The ritual was associated with the ceremony of manumission giving it a tone of solemnity to highlight from the priest’s authority to indicate his duties and get a promise from the ‘freed’ on his stringent compliance with certain duties: “The manumission ceremony will be celebrated at the church with some sort of grandeur. There, the priest, after having presented the freed a set of his duties as a citizen, and the benefits associated with its following, will have the freed promise he shall observe them” (p. 34). In the same way, the priest “will remind him of the fundamental duties with religion, as it is just its holy truths which can lead them to subordination, soberness, and love to work” (p. 34). Finally, the seventh item points out the endorsement of the prohibition of the slave trade in Colombia and the rendering free to everyone who enters the Republic as a result of slave trade, statutes already included in the Law of 1821.

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By the second half of 19th century, the argument that slavery was a ‘barbarian’ act in opposition to ‘Christian doctrine’ (a paradigm of unquestioned morality and ethics in the different narratives analyzed) and to the precepts of ‘civilization’ was circulating
among the discourses of the epoch. From an ontological perspective, because of his ‘nature’ and ‘origin’ the ‘slave’ was considered to be a ‘man’ (that is, in less sexist language, to be a human being). There was, then, a transcending primordial communality among those who were submitted to servitude and those who submitted them. In the different narratives, slavery appears to be a ‘state’, a ‘condition’, rather than a transcending or immanent feature within the enslaved’s ‘nature’. An immanent racial inferiority is not appealed to explain the fact that some human beings are enslaved. Therefore, an immanent difference of those who had been enslaved was not claimed as the grounds to legitimate their reduction to slavery.

Even more, the ominous thing about slavery was exactly the reversion of ‘natural rights’ resulting from treating the enslaved as if he were a ‘beast’ (an animal). ‘Beasts’ and ‘men’ were supposed to be in radical ontological opposition, slavery appearing as its perverse erasure; one carried out by whom could be no other than those closer to ‘savagery’ (that is, closer to animality). Now, the immanent ‘men’s’ sameness in ‘nature’ and ‘origin’ was not opposite to the fact that there were ethical and civilizational hierarchies among those. Some were ‘barbarians’, ‘savages’ and ‘infidels’, while others were ‘civilized’. Thus, a Eurocentric conception of social evolutionism was articulated to abolitionist conceptualizations. But it drifted away from the articulations of civilizing projects in earlier centuries in that such a hierarchy was not immanent to ‘human nature’.

14 For the 19th century, we have the works by Julio Arias (2005) and Alfonso Múnera (2005) on the specialization of difference and hierarchy in the construction of nation by the political elites in our country. On specific regions, we have two recent volumes by Oscar Almario (2005) on Colombian South Western region, as well as Nancy Appelbaum’s study (2003) for Riosucio, Caldas.
it did not operate anymore as a theological or moral argument to enslave certain populations.

‘Slave’ and ‘citizen’ were opposed to ‘colony’ and ‘republic’ in an isomorphic relationship. In Restrepo’s speech, such an isomorphism is manifest, which constitutes a powerful element in his argumentation by pointing out the inconsistencies (to say the least) within the ‘political body’ and the divine and human threats to the future of the emerging republic. In the first, divine fury could reverse the almost-miraculous luck Independentist armies’ victories had had and throw them into the jaws of new despots. The second saw in the omnipresent ghost of Haitian revolt a paradigm of ‘chaos’, ‘violence’ and ‘destruction’ through which ‘hordes’ of enraged enslaved people would took by force what was denied to them legitimately.\(^{15}\)

In the texts analyzed, the enslaved people’s ‘condition’ or ‘status’ makes itself evident (as well as its effects on their descendants). That turns them into a specific population group for elite debates about their characteristics and the measures to be taken by the State for their normalization and regulation as (future) citizens, as well as for the preservation of the wealth, law and order and political stability at the Republic. The criollo elite’s imaginaries and anxieties translated themselves into a series of assumptions about behavior, dispositions and attitudes towards this population, putting at stake or keeping unchanged material welfare and the Republic political body as a whole.

In abolitionist debates, a problematization of social life appears crystallized, as it appeared to the eyes of scholars and jurists at the time. ‘Anarchy’, ‘chaos’, ‘criminality’, ‘ruin’ and ‘idleness’ were the tips of the iceberg articulating this problematization and

\(^{15}\) For a study about the influence this imaginary had in Criollo elites in Haiti, see Helg (2004)
guiding the measures implemented following the Law of 1851, when slavery was judicially abolished.

2. The Chorographic Commission

In the recently established republic, where military and political disputes among various sectors and regions had not ceased and continued to mark the rest of the nineteenth century, a new commission was created to produce a comprehensive chorographic description of New Granada. Materializing in the liberal government of José Hilario López, the commission began its work just a year before abolition was proclaimed. It was led by the Italian engineer Agustín Codazzi until his death on February 7th, 1859 during one of his trips. The commission covered most of the provinces of the then called New Granada for over ten years. Hundreds of hand-made maps were created annotating such details as place names, roads, towns, rivers, valleys and mountains. The Commission collected more than four thousand plants, many of which were investigated for their properties and possible uses. Thousands of drawings of the diverse landscapes and a variety of people engaged in daily activities in different regions were drawn by contracted artists that accompanied the commission. The fragmented and scattered statistics found to be in existence during that time about different localities were gathered, organized, and complemented by new information found by the commission.

At fifty-seven years old, Codazzi signed a contract to move forward on a New Granada project similar to which had been developed in the neighboring republic of
Venezuela. According to the first article of the contract signed on December 20th 1849, Codazzi “[…] agrees to make a complete description of New Granada and develop a general chart about said republic as well as a chorographic map of each one of its provinces, with the corresponding itineraries and particular descriptions, to be completed within six years at the latest, starting January 1st, 1850 (Acevedo 1957:10). The characteristics and mechanics of the assigned work and documents are detailed in the remaining eleven articles of the contract.

The government asked the Commission to deliver a detailed and precise knowledge. Not just maps and statistics of provinces, but descriptions of the cantons making up provinces. A study of the characteristics and difficulties of the roads in each canton, the distance and time to travel from city to city, the location of military posts relevant to their defense, a physical geographical description that included boundaries, the configuration and size of each canton, descriptions of mountainous regions, rivers, and other physical characteristics. The register should be as detailed as possible about “[…] natural production and manufacturing in each locale, the population, military statistics, commerce, livestock, useful local vegetation, vacant land and it’s qualities; wild animals, mining, climates, weather and seasons, and other noteworthy particulars”.

For the completion of the study, Codazzi counted on the help of the government in different aspects, they made available the existing information and guaranteed, though the local authorities, protection, help, and the facilities needed by the commission.

The goals established in the contract were clear, a subsequent wealth of knowledge in descriptions, tables, maps, images that noted the most elementary aspects of the counties and their populations, but complete in trying to cover New Granada as a whole.
With the creation and beginning of the Commission, the fragmentation and insufficient nature of the extant information was recognized from the perspective and logic of the government over the diversity of the localities and the people that formed the grenadine nation.

This was because the Commission read the nation on its potential for production and extraction of natural riches and the manufacturing of certain products [...] Without a doubt, the population appeared as a state problem, particularly because of their physical and, above all, moral capabilities for a working life (Arias 2005: 92).

Rather than producing erudite knowledge, the Commission was charged with generating practical knowledge to govern. Not only in the sense of explaining detailed descriptions and maps of how to militarily defend New Granada, such as the conditions and times to move an army on different roads, but also information with a scrutinizing level of detail about the effective and potential characteristics and “riches” of each locality. Even more so, the knowledge that the Commission was responsible for was not only a style of government, but also a concrete political project (Sánchez 1998).

This way of governing meant that expert knowledge based on observations and detailed measurements about the characteristics and riches of New Granada was essential input for its ‘good government’, that is, one that beyond being ‘rational’ would be oriented towards ‘progress’, which according to the epoch’s liberalist ideas, meant using commerce between ‘nations’ as the source of riches and well-being (Restrepo 1999: 35). The political project that went along with the expert knowledge produced by the Commission was embodied by liberal sectors in power, who were pleading for federalism, a political trend which focused on the image of a ‘nation’ with diversity of regions and people occupying a central place:
As the outcome of the Chorographic Commission’s work won some definition and legitimacy as a scientific product, that is, as a result of the descriptive and objective work on the country’s physical, moral, and political geography —and not as a work of fiction forging realities—, its creative and prescriptive power will increasingly grow. And it will do that by carrying out its job to construct a particular ‘national identity’ that expresses the political and social interests committed to the decentralization process that will finally bring federalism. The Commission’s political commitment will become so clear and its constructive power so clearly perceived that the study itself will be repudiated and condemned to oblivion –or what is almost just the same, reduced to manufactured maps— when new winds blow in the new direction of centralism and claim for other signs of identity (Restrepo 1999: 40).

The results of the Chorographic Commission were widely available even before the study was finished. Particularly, some members’ accounts of their journeys, a few displays of some of their drawings and several reports published in newspapers in the capital city, like *El Neogranadino*, or in volumes devoted to a good number of provinces. Thus, the descriptions, statistics, tables, drawings, and maps produced by the Commission did not have the government as its only addressee. As indicated by Restrepo in the citation above, a seemingly non-fictional knowledge but scientific, based on measurements and observations obtained through extensive and extenuating journeys to the farthest and unknown geographical corners of New Granada, had a powerful effect on the literate elites of the time. It had a descriptive effect, but also a normative one on the landscapes, populations and riches of the different localities and regions in New Granada. In this way, the operation found an intervention into the image of the nation putting an emphasis on the diversity: “Far from inventing a national unity based on a common ethnic origin, or on traditions, beliefs, or shared language the Commission tried to emphasize diversity as an important element that permits segmented identification” (Restrepo 1999: 53).

This diversity, without a doubt, was found to be subordinate to a strict hierarchy where regions and populations embodied the political ideals of the ‘Granadine nation’:
That they [the members of the Chorographic Commision] want to show the diverse characteristics of the constituents of the nation does not signify that they do not clearly show hierarchy between humans. Those who speak of hierarchy also allude to appropriate patterns or models of behavior that become political ideals against whom others are compared (Restrepo 1999: 53).

Most of the excerpts examined in this section come from the report that Agustín Codazzi wrote for the governors of the provinces informing what is known today as the ‘Colombian Pacific Region’. Specifically, reports sent to governor of Chocó, to governor of Barbacoas, and to governor of Buenaventura. These reports —about the work of the Chorographic Commission— appear to respond to demands from governors of each of these provinces, not only for the expert’s remarks concerning the establishment of roads to communicate with the interior, but they also include an evaluation of the state of each province, their advantages and disadvantages that would be confronted and the set of measures that needed to be directed towards their inhabitants in the interest of their own ‘progress’.

In this way, the descriptions about these provinces’ physical conditions and their inhabitants, as well as disquisitions on their future and the measures to be adopted have a very concrete frame not to lose track of. For its part, the passage examined in his own *Physical and Political Geography of the United States of Colombia* by Felipe Pérez — another member to the Chorographic Commission, pertains to the section meant for the State of Cauca, which included within its vast territory what is considered today the ‘Pacific Region’. Pérez’s book, published in two volumes in 1862 and 1863, is the result of the work of organizing and publishing the materials of the Chorographic Commission according to the new political-administrative divisions, as it was assigned to Pérez by General Mosquera in 1861 (Acevedo 1957: 19). Therefore, some passages written by
Codazzi in his reports are cited—sometimes nearly word for word—, especially in the most explicit discussions of the ‘African race, its mixtures and descendants’.

**Images of ‘blacks’ in Cauca State**

Both Agustín Codazzi and Felipe Pérez demonstrate a rather detailed attention to ‘blacks’ or the ‘African race’ when writing their descriptions of provinces or countries in Cauca state, which belong to what is currently considered as the Pacific Colombian region. In his report to the governor of the province of Barbacoas, dated June 24th, 1953, Codazzi describes in the following terms ‘African race’ individuals dwelling in the province:

Individuals belonging to this [the ‘African race’], used to dedicate themselves to mining; but nowadays, making a wrong use of their recently acquired freedom, have in grand part left this work and live in absolute independence, on the banks of the rivers, planting a few plantain trees, some corn stalks and sugarcane, whose products, together with the abundant fish in the rivers, livestock, and wild boars, that populate non-flooded lands, provide them with a coarse but secure food source. As they live almost naked; men wearing a simple loincloth, and women dressed with a plain cloth tied around their waists, if they want to get some clothes to go in town, they go to the beach on the river and wash the auriferous sands and in a few hours they have enough to go shopping (Codazzi [1853b] 1959: 333-334).

A similar image had been presented by Codazzi himself in a report to the governor of the province of Chocó on March 22nd, 1853:

The plantain, a little bit of corn, and a few cocoa trees and cane stalks give them just enough for daily consumption along with an abundance of fish and wild boar. African race descendants are content with just these things; other necessities are almost non-existent. Men live naked and women wear a simple loincloth tied around their waist; with the palms that they have on hand they make their wretched huts and a piece from the damagua tree serves as their bed and only cover at night. When a family wants to buy a change of clothes they simply go to the auriferous rivers or streams and with gold pan in hand they submerge themselves to pull out the sands, or they go to the banks and pan until they find the gold nuggets they need to go shopping, returning home to enjoy the sweet far
niente, smoking, talking, sleeping and for pleasure sometimes the man will search the nearby mountains looking for game while the woman takes the canoe to visit her friends (Codazzi [1853a] 1959: 324).

Nine years later, during one of his trips, Felipe Pérez, describes the ‘blacks’ of the state of Cauca in very similar terms in one of the passages of his text Physical and Political Geography of the United States of Colombia:

The black, naked or with only a paruma or guayuco, is the inhabitant of these fertile lands, in which he does not know more than the small marginal span of the rivers from where he has his hut. His plantations are limited to a few banana trees, cane, yucca, cocoa and some maize, which he has randomly spread in the forest [...] It is in the middle of this forest that the plants of maize prosper, grow and mature, crowded as if they were wheat. The maize, nevertheless, is small and with little ears, like it has to be with similar systems, only peculiar to this region. Nevertheless it is not only the cultivation of these fields which constitutes the work of the blacks, because these are insignificant. The principal work is the exploitation of the rivers to extract from the sand and the stones the golden particles and platinum that almost all these rivers have. This work would produce a great amount if the will corresponded with the strength of the worker. Born and raised in the loneliness of the jungles, he did not know another will different than the will of his master or owner that obliged him to work. But since the former ceased to be there, the latter did not know any other motive and he is not persistent in the effort. However, the truth is that he does not need to work. The banana tree profusely gives him bread, the rivers fish and the jungles tatabros and peccaries; harassed by hunger, he satisfies himself with an ear of maize or a couple of bananas, and only for pleasure or amusement devotes himself to hunting and fishing. Women —accustomed to being naked, or to wear only a piece of cloth that pulls over their bodies, which usually doesn’t cover their knees—, do not aspire to dress themselves or to dress their numerous children. Thus, their children live completely naked until they are eight to ten years old. At the age of twelve females are mature, and become married giving way to new families that quickly become established having as their only patrimony no more than a machete, a canoe, and a hatchet —tools necessary to build a house, clear a piece of land next to the river, and plant corn or plantain, cane & travel and fish. Their bed is a board or a piece of palm, on which they set a piece of damagua (a piece of a tree that the Indians prepare very well); a clay pot complete the nuptial gifts, given that the fruit of the totumo gives them all the utensils for cooking and eating. It’s more common to see women panning for gold than men; which is explained because they like to have necklaces, earrings, and pieces of stamped cloth in which they appear adorned at town festivals; while men pass the time in futile conversations, visiting friends, crossing rivers looking for fish or entering the jungle in search of peccary, which they treasure. (Pérez 1862: 291-292).
In these passages Codazzi and Pérez insist, using nearly identical words, that there is a ‘lack of necessities’ among the ‘African race’ or ‘blacks’ living in these regions (provinces, counties, or countries, as they also call them). Concerning food, they limit themselves to ‘coarse but secure food sources’ coming from a few “plantain trees, cane, yucca, cocoa trees and some corn” as well as from the abundance of ‘tatabros i sainos’ (wild boar) that live in the dry jungle and fish from the rivers. As for work, “the truth is that [blacks] do not have to work”. Their crops are minimal and their system of planting corn, native to the region, is limited to irrigating the wild areas that have been cleared. They dedicate themselves to hunting or fishing only “for pleasure or fun”. Even though the main ‘occupation’ is the “exploitation of the rivers and streams, to remove gold or platinum nuggets from the sand,” they only do this for a ‘few hours’ when a family wants a “change of clothes to look nice in town” or because the women “like to have necklaces, earrings and a few pieces of stamped cotton cloth in which they appear adorned at town festivals”. In this way, before they dedicate time to ‘work’, for Codazzi “descendants of the African race” in Chocó are found enjoying “[…] the sweet far niente, smoking, talking, sleeping and for pleasure sometimes the man will search the nearby mountains looking for game while the woman takes the canoe to visit her friends” (Codazzi [1853a] 1959: 324).

The ‘will’ to work in mining depended on the master or taskmaster. But “since he was not there anymore, they did not know any other [will]; also they are not perseverant in labor”, and “making a bad use of their recently acquired freedom” they abandoned mining to “live in absolute independence”. As for dress, “they have no aspirations” and nudity among men, women, and children is not the exception. Men can be seen naked or
at most covered by a loincloth. The same thing occurs with women and their “numerous
children”. A proper dress is only used to go to town. Founding a new family needs no
“more than a machete, a canoe and a hatchet”. And the women are just that at the young
age of twelve.

Thus, rather than making a Rousseauian reading —in agreement with an apology to
the ‘state of nature’ or the ‘good savage’— this ‘lack of necessity’ of the “African race’
or the ‘blacks’ over these regions is clearly associated by Codazzi and Pérez with terms
like ‘laziness’, ‘ignorance’, and ‘backwardness’. What has already been suggested in
certain linguistic expressions and modifiers in the passages transcribed above is beyond a
shadow of a doubt in the ones that follow. Following the excerpt cited from a report to
the governor of Chocó, Codazzi writes:

A race which almost completely passes the day in such laziness is not called to
achieve progress in the country [referring to the country of Chocó]. Ignorance on
one side, apathy on the other, a misunderstood pride for having become free, leads
them to be (and they really are) slaves of their lesser necessities to live like the
Indians whom we call barbarians (Codazzi [1853a] 1959: 324).

For his part, Felipe Pérez concludes the extensive passage cited above with the following
observation:

It is notable in these inhabitants of Cauca the shortage of necessity, the extreme
ignorance in which they live, the uniformity of their lives, consisting in eating,
even though it is poor, drinking strong alcoholic drinks, endlessly talking and
dancing to the rhythm of a drum (which is never missing) and to a kind of piano
called a marimba, an instrument of their own invention […] (1862: 292).

To Codazzi’s eyes, the ‘few necessities’ do not really make them free (like Rousseau
believed), instead it subjects them to a slavery that condemns them to live like the Indians
called barbarians”. In the same vein, Pérez perceives them as dedicated to dance,
conversation, and strong liquors, in the middle of ignorance and unchanging life, and bad
food. Far from finding a ‘love of work’, an ‘ambition’ for ‘civilized life’ ‘comforts’ and its resulting riches:

If this strong and robust race loved to work and had ambition for the comforts of civilized life, they could quickly become rich and change their miserable huts for warm and comfortable houses, the stumps they use to sit on for comfortable, well-made furniture; their ugly nudity for elegant clothing, and their ignorance, or at least that of their children, for the primary and most indispensable rudiments of education. Yet for this, it would be necessary to constantly work in minerals, extracting the precious metal, anyway stockpiling gold (which is not scarce) in order to be able to enjoy a less savage, more agreeable life; which is difficult in the present state of these populations, lacking a healthy example (Pérez 1862: 293).

In the same sense, Codazzi wrote that the way in which mines in Chocó were exploited leads them to produce but the ‘little’ that is needed to get by: “[…] a few isolated people, ignorant and without the slightest aspirations, and what is worse yet, without the noble stimulation of making oneself rich in order to enjoy life, give their children an education, and a future […]” (Codazzi [1853a] 1959: 325). The series of contradictions informing Codazzi and Perez’ accounts is explicit: love of work vs. indolence, comforts of civilized life vs. misery of a savage life, riches vs. poverty, warm, comfortable houses vs. miserable huts, comfortable, well-made furniture vs. stumps to sit on, elegant clothing vs. ugly nudity, indispensable rudiments of education (at least for their children) vs. perpetuating ignorance in the next generations. I will return to this bundle of relationships and their close ties to the narrative of ‘progress’. But before continuing in this direction it is necessary to clarify the notion of ‘race’ with which these authors operate to avoid projecting upon them the allegations of an uneventalizing reading that is entailed by the term and that tends to be taken for granted.
The category of ‘race’

In the passages transcribed above, Codazzi and Pérez have used the term ‘race’ (the first author used ‘African race’ several times, and the second one used ‘black race’ and ‘sturdy and strong race’). In his turn, Pérez resorts more frequently to the use of the term ‘black’, even though Codazzi, in other passages not transcribed yet, resorts to it, too. For instance, in a passage from his report to the Governor of Chocó, quoted above and to be further transcribed, Codazzi ([1853] 1959: 328) widely uses the terms ‘black’ and ‘blacks’ with the same meaning he has given to ‘African race’. In the same way, Felipe Pérez resorts to the ‘African race’ term (see for example pages 317, 327, 330).


Leaving aside the variations the term undergoes in the remaining four volumes of Codazzi and Pérez’ two volumes referring to the state of Cauca, it is important to emphasize how there appears such a multiplicity and, even more interesting, a seeming
lack of consistency in the meaning of this term. (And this is only limited to the terms
where the word ‘race’ is followed or goes immediately before an adjective.)

Now, this multiplicity of terms cannot be easily subsumed in what I’d like to call
the ‘racial trilogy’ (black-African, white-European, Indian-American). This reading
matrix of the ‘racial trilogy’, which we are prone to thrust upon is one of the mightiest
mechanisms of text de-eventualisation written in mid-nineteenth century, containing the
term ‘race’. Perhaps a concrete passage is a fairly good illustration for such a point. In his
report to the governor of the Barbacoas province, Codazzi describes how extremely
unhealthy its mangrove swamps are, as they

[...] emit an enormous amount of unhealthy gases, which along with vapors from
muds subject to the same heat, make up a pestilential atmosphere [...] making
places located in the middle of mangrove swamps, or near them, become extremely
morbid (Codazzi [1853b] 1959: 332).

This makes them turn into “[...] a certain death for white race, a hospital for criollo race
and a healthy place for the African race. This is a singular contrast, born out of the
different constitutions of the above mentioned races” (p. 332). Next I will discuss the
issue of the different ‘constitutions’ of the above mentioned ‘races’ and its relation to
environmental conditions. For the time being, I intend to highlight Codazzi’s distinction
between different ‘constitutions’ of the ‘white race’ and ‘criollo race’. In such an excerpt,
‘criollo race’ does not overlap with ‘white race’, which poses a problem to reading the
matrix of the ‘racial trilogy.’

As we saw in the last passage, the (‘healthy’) features of the place are a clue to
scramble through the specificities of ‘race’ concept and its relations to the articulations of
blackness in the descriptions of State of Cauca provinces. On the ‘Chocó region’, Felipe
Pérez wrote:
The atmosphere in these places is so humid, that clothes and shoes are left soaked, and the traveler finds himself in a permanent steam bath, which should naturally undermine all the system and give rise to agues. Nobody could inhabit these regions without catching colds and calentures; and white man, no matter how used to it, will live a shorter life than living in other places; his fibers will be weakened and he will carry a weak and sick life, no matter how little he exposes himself to water and sunlight.

It is different with African race, whose people are used to this climate, nor Indians, since the earliest time there. Black men, brought in from the scorching land of Africa, where rain falls over six months a year, as much as here, are in the same climate here as they were in their country of origin, hence their nature is not affected.

Born in this race, grown amidst this steam bath and keeping themselves naked, they do not suffer because of the sun or rain; eating plantains, fish and wild boars; used to drink alcoholic drinks, they keep themselves strong and robust, proliferating considerably because of their women’s fertility and the steady consumption of fish. They are so fertile that women give birth since they are thirteen or fourteen, at the latest (Pérez 1862: 329-330).

In his turn, Codazzi noted: “The extremely humid and rainy hot climate disallow anyone but this race [the African race] and its mixtures to work in farming and mining [...]]” ([1853a] 1959: 324). This ‘climate’ prevents any other inhabitants (who are ‘active’ and ‘diligent’): “If only other active and diligent inhabitants could be brought to work in mines, there would be some hope that motivation and envy make [African race individuals] be tempted to imitate them; but this hardly could be, because of climate, which is a strong reason” (p. 325). In his report on province of Casanare, Codazzi reinforces those images on ‘black race and its mixtures’:

Black race individuals are seen to enjoy a better health and to be less susceptible than whites to the dangers from miasmas pullulating there. This should not surprise us [??], as we know that in Choco, the white race can hardly live. They would die should they attempt to the works blacks carry out, who enjoy good health, naked exposure to sun and water, and prodigious reproduction. They

16 In the RAEU dictionary of 1817 miasma is defined as follows: “Miasma. m.n. Med. poisonous vapors being exhaled by certain sick bodies, generally emanating from corrupted or stagnating waters. It is used in its plural form, Miasmas.” (p. 572, 3).
double their number every twenty years, while in Europe one hundred years are required for the same achievement. If a race like that would inhabit Casanare’s grassy plains, they would grow rapidly, and barbarian Indians would draw back because of that […] (Codazzi [1857] 1956: 378-379).

In those passages, the countries and provinces at the State of Cauca, known today as Pacific region’s lowlands, were depicted as hot climate spots with a proverbial humidity and rainfall. Furthermore, mangrove swamps at coastal shores, with their gases and muds made up a ‘pestilential atmosphere’ and are extremely ‘unhealthy’. ‘African race’ (and its ‘mixtures’) or ‘blacks’ are used to living in such conditions. These ‘climates’ (the ‘extremely humid atmosphere’) do not undermine their ‘systems’, nor do they cause a “weak and sickly existence”. Under the unwholesome influence of vapor released by mangrove swamps and their muds (sometimes called ‘miasmas’), they do not fall death nor even sick. On the contrary, as they are “already used to these climates” they “live strong and robust” doubling their numbers thanks to their women’s early and healthy fertility and the “continual consumption of fish”.

The contrast in the different ‘constitutions’ of ‘races’ cannot be clearer: what for one race means propitious conditions to increase in number enjoying good health, to become strong and robust, for the other races mean the loss of their lives, or at least, their sudden shortness as they should be attack by an irremediable weakness and illness: “Neither the white race individuals nor their descendants (all of them used to hot suns in other latitudes) are able to come to these lands so rich in gold and arable fields, but under the inescapable threat of losing their lives” (Pérez 1862: 293). ‘African race and its mixtures’ and ‘Indians’ are put in one edge, while ‘white race and their descendants’ are

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17 For the representations of the Pacific region in the 19th century, see Leal (2004) and Rodriguez (2004).
put in the other edge of a ‘climate’-derived spectrum on the ‘countries’ of the ‘plains with auriferous rivers’.

Not all regions, countries and provinces in the state of Cauca, corresponding to which is today known as the Colombian Pacific lowlands are subject to these extreme ‘climate’ conditions neither all their inhabitants belong to the ‘African race or its descendants’ or to ‘Indians’. This makes both these ‘countries’ and their inhabitants’ images more complex. Codazzi and Pérez describe the presence of a “race of whites, descendants from Spaniards and Indians, or from Spaniards and mulattoes” (in Codazzi’s words [1853b] 1959: 333) or from ‘cuarterones’ (according to Pérez 1862: 289) living in the rocky islands or ‘beaches’ along the coast in the Barbacoas region. Those ‘beaches’ and their dwellers are described in terms which differ from terms used to describe ‘blacks’.

Codazzi, for instance, says: “In spite of having their orchards near to the mangrove swamps, they enjoy good health, as trade winds in this sea come from the Southwest and give them pure air, bringing the vapors from mangrove swamps to the lands inhabited by African race” ([1853b] 1959: 333). Hence their beaches are ‘salubrious’. On the other hand, this dwellers are described as ‘active’, ‘diligent’, ‘intelligent’, ‘used to wearing clothes’, ‘fond of traveling’, excellent ‘sailors’ and clearly organized around the figure of a ‘patriarch’.18 Also, the author says they grow ‘cattle’, have ‘sementeras’ (farming areas)

18 “The oldest in the family becomes the island’s patriarch, and its inhabitants live under his rule; so that even though they are considered under the rule of the inland’s divisions, they do not recognize other dependence but their main chief’s, their beaches’ legitimate and perpetual commissary” (Pérez 1862: 289).
and their houses are surrounded by a multitude of ‘coconut plantations’, ‘gardens’ and ‘useful trees’, which make up a ‘cheer and varied landscape’.19

In the same way, when Felipe Pérez describes concrete points populations do not seem to be considered equal anymore as ‘African race’ or ‘blacks’, but it turns to be not only some ‘whites’, but also different mixtures of them and Indians. Thus, for instance, he wrote:

A few white men live in the Baudó; the rest of them are sambos, blacks and half-civilized Indians, that is, naked as the rest; but having some clothes to wear on Sundays, and hardly speaking Spanish, sauf by women, who do not understand it or do not want to speak it (1862: 324).

And he adds,

A few blacks dwell on the Baudó river shores; but near its headwaters and even in its headwaters the old Chocoes live, keeping their manners and costumes. They navigate the rivers which disembogue into the sea, have some orchards, and live with some fugitive blacks or sambos, their children sharing the color of their skin and both races’ instincts (1862: 324).

For the village of Sipí, “[…] A mixed race of indians, sambos and blacks dwell in this town of miners and farmers […]” (p. 325). Or for the Noanamá’s village “It is made up of some sambos and mulattoes; their housing is, as all around town, placed on stakes, and many of them on the verge of collapsing. Indigenous people live more often scattered

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19 In one of his passages, Codazzi writes: “The race inhabiting those beaches is one of whites, descendants from Spaniards and Indians, or from Spaniards and mulattoes. They are strong, intelligent and active people; they have cattle, make little boats and canoes; they use to wear clothes and around their homes there are plenty of useful trees and a multitude of coconut plantations, serving as an ornament to these little patriarchal islands. It is from those islands where the Republic will take the best sailors in the Pacific”. (Codazzi [1853b] 1959: 333). In similar words, Pérez says: “The race inhabiting these places seems characteristic from them, even though they believe to be white (descendant from Spaniards), so that they look down on Indians and blacks, despite their blood runs into their veins but mixed with Caucasian blood. They look like cuarterones, and they are active, diligent, intelligent, fond of travelling and without a doubt, the best sailors of the State in the Pacific coast.” (Pérez 1862: 288-289).
along the San Juan River and its tributaries’ shores” (p. 326). Referring to the ‘section of jungles and mines’ of the ‘Buenaventura region’, Felipe Pérez noted that:

[…] it is only inhabited by the descendants of the first black slaves [...] and by the mixtures that resulted among them, Indians and the Spanish race. The most common colors are black, mulatto and sambo, except for a few families descending from whites, even though mixed, and very few real criollo whites, who live in Buenaventura [...] (Pérez 1862: 302).

In short, from the passages commented we infer that Codazzi and Pérez believe ‘African race and its mixtures and descendants’ have a ‘constitution’ that allows them to live and work in ‘unhealthy climates’ for other ‘races’ like those referred as ‘European’, ‘Spaniard’, ‘white’, ‘Antioqueño’ or ‘criollo’. In the same way, concerning counties, provinces and regions belonging to what is called today the Colombian Pacific region, the images of ‘blacks’ or ‘African race’ (and its ‘mixtures and descendants’) are explicitly associated to ‘indolence’, ‘ignorance’, ‘nakedness’ and ‘backwardness’, among others. From this difference in ‘constitutions’ in relation to ‘climate’ and from those images of ‘blacks’, can we infer Codazzi and Pérez are demonstrating the immanent inequality between ‘races’ in terms of their abilities of ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’?

Should we understand as pessimism and racial determinism expressions like “[…] this race is inherently indolent and lazy […]” (Codazzi [1853b] 1959: 336)? What does the term ‘nature’ means and which is its relation to the term ‘race’?

At this point, it is relevant to present some passages from Codazzi’s “Indigenous antiquities”, dated November 28, 1857, as this text, like no other one, throws some light on these questions, especially because of its explicit references to the ‘mixture’ between ‘races’. In this work, Codazzi views the mix of the ‘indigenous’ race with the ‘European’ or ‘African’ races have made the first one to become: “[…] pushing, showing a clear
understanding, activity and a very educable character” ([1857] 1956: 435). However, Codazzi adds, “Where indigenous race has been kept pure, everything is sleeping, and rather than improving their primitive condition, it has been dehumanized to the point that today they are not able to produce what their grandparents achieved in works of art” ([1857] 1956: 435). For Codazzi, this is not derived from the ‘Indians’ nature’ nor does it imply that he ascribes it to any sort of racial determinism:

To say this is derived from the Indians’ nature would be equivalent to announce the doctrine of a primary inequality between races and their predestination, ones towards culture and intellectual greatness, others to perpetual barbarism and degradation; a doctrine opposite to the ideas we have of God’s justice and the human line’s unity. ([1857]1956: 435).

He is not appealing to a “primary inequality among races”, which would be grounded on their ‘nature’. ‘Dehumanization’ of the ‘indigenous race’ is explained as a series of ‘moral’ and ‘physical’ causes (as I will explain later on), while the ‘glorification’ of the ‘mestizo’ does not correspond to a sort of ‘improvement’ in his ‘nature’, but it corresponds instead to a ‘moral’ emancipation in the face of a process of ‘social degradation’ due to the violence and brutality of Conquest:

It does not suffice to put in touch a weak race with a strong one in civilization, so that both are leveled out with the improvement of the ignorant one. If contact is done in a kind way —the strong one not exerting a violent oppression on the weak one destroying in their souls any thread of activity on their own and any drive to exalt themselves— it will result in the ignorant civilization; but if, as in the Spanish conquest, the strong race chases, despoils and terrifies the weak one, if it tears their national roots out, if it destroys their traditions and plunges the individuals’ moral being in the deepest degradation and slavery, then the oppressed being despoiled of a homeland, or a nation, having their race’s dignity annihilated, as well as their family’s and themselves’ dignity, lose any interest or will to improve themselves, and lets himself to be dehumanized. Vilified nationality is in those cases a sort of stigma diminishing and degrading man; besides nationality it is a sort of regeneration as the race’s degradation stops oppressing and break the individual’s spirit, and the moral being recovers its innate energy. That is why the indigenous race’s mixing, to produce men who are not Indians, emancipate mestizo from original degradation, and this gives him the
vigor to aspire to become equal to those who are above them; that is so definite that during the Colonial regime, European rulers label them as insolent and considered almost any mestizo as such. It was natural: then any non-Spanish head raised should seem too insolent to those Conquest-offhand gentlemen (Codazzi [1857]1956: 435-436; stress in the original).

So the ‘mestizo’ figure is very specific here; it gives an account of a historical condition with domination and violence from one ‘race’ over another at stake rather than an improvement of the ‘nature’ of the ‘indigenous race’.

In its turn, the ‘Indian dehumanization’ in the ‘tribes’ harm and backwardness’ is the result of a series of ‘moral causes’ and ‘physical causes’. Among the first ones is the violent domination of the ‘tribes’ that were put into submission, as well as those that the ‘Guajiro’ people have used ‘[…] all their zeal, all their willpower to fight against conquest […]’ resorting to ‘[…] a nomad life as the more adequate to keep their independence […]’ (Codazzi [1857] 1956: 437). This last strategy results in a challenge as ‘[…] it is well known that errancy is against the rising and practice of the domestic crafts and the intellectual perfection of men. Sedentary life is the foundation of any culture.” (p. 437). In its turn, ‘physical causes’ are those that were ‘born from the climate and accidents at the territory they live in” (p. 437-438) to which, like the ‘andaquis’, they have been compelled by the displacement brought about by the Conquest.

Concerning those circumstances there is not much hope, not even for Europeans themselves:

Should man be put in the middle of this mighty and never tamed physical nature, put him alone and with an obtuse stone axe in his hands as his only help, and demand him to dominate that overpowering world around him! In such a situation, man is the loser, physical world absorbs him, and he turns into a beast as beasts are, wanderer and sanguinary as beasts are, rude and coarse as the trunks of the trees blocking him space and light, against which his stone axe is powerless […] even the European man, in the same circumstances, would lose his intellectual qualities, would turn into a barbarian down to the level of cannibals, and would
see his racial vanity completely humiliated and entirely abolished his supposedly natural privileges […] (Codazzi [1857]1956: 438, 439).

Even though it is true that Codazzi is setting up a hierarchy in terms of ‘civilization’, in these passages he is far from applying such hierarchy to an immanent difference in the ‘nature’ of ‘races’. That ‘indians’ or ‘Africans’ were “weak races in civilization” compared with ‘mestizos’ or ‘Europeans’ is not explained on the basis of their immanent characteristics or inequalities inherent to their ‘nature’, but on the basis of ‘moral’ and ‘physical’ causes, that, one could say in a contemporaneous language, for historical reasons. Even more, acquired ‘civilization’, as the ancient Andoquíes’ one —to which Codazzi attributes the making of Saint Agustín’s statues— or an European’s, could be reverted down the lowest level of civilization represented in the figure of a cannibal for the same causes.

Codazzi understands ‘civilization’ as a process leading ‘men’ not only to emancipated from the constraints imposed by the ‘physical world’, but also to a gradual disappearance of differences among ‘peoples’ or ‘nationalities’ as the ‘culture’ grows and becomes universal’. Differences among such ‘peoples’ or ‘nationalities’ are ‘swept away’ by the ‘arts’ of ‘civilization’ since it serves as a ‘material crust in which men are surrounded by climates’ in order to reunite them in a single ‘family’ of the ‘human lineage’ “[…] whose members are linked by filiation ties that unite them to their common Creator and Father” (p. 447). It is within this conception that the notion of ‘progress’ fits in, which I will next analyze based on Codazzi’s reports and the paper by Pérez I have been commenting about regarding what is known today as the Pacific Region of Colombia.
A Narrative of Progress

A narrative of progress organizes and gives meaning to the descriptions and interpretations that Codazzi and Pérez make about these regions and their inhabitants. From their perspective, it appears there is no doubt that the “African Race” or “blacks” inhabiting these provinces, countries or states represent in their bodies, activities and attitudes something very different to what the authors consider expressions of aspirations for ‘civilized life’ and the achievements deriving from ‘progress’.

In view of the images of an “indolent African race”, it is no wonder that Codazzi indicate that the ‘mercantile movement’ driven by dynamics linked to exogenous populations would allow a few of the ‘more civilized’ to be the first to leave their ‘lethargy’, and “stupidity,” resulting in a “moralization” of “African Race” as a whole:

African Race, lazy nowadays, who live off fish and plantain trees while inhabiting the banks of rivers, whose sands contain gold, without wanting to extract it, as soon as they see some mercantile movement in the jungle —where barely any Indian ventures into today— might have their laziness overcome by envy and the desire to make what others make be awakened within a few of the more civilized leading them to plant large quantities of cacao trees and rice and beans for export along with corn and sugarcane, which would, when planted, give a crop year round, like the plantain, and could be readily exchanged for liquor, brown or white sugar which would be carried to the markets on the Pacific Coast [...] and the example of those who began with a few things and came to have means enough to get some comforts in life, will make the most stupid come out of their laziness —those who are just sitting around in their miserable huts, happy with having a mere cornbread or a piece of yucca or a couple of plantains to eat. Then the population would be moralized, and they, attracted by the desire to get rich, would dedicate themselves to work and would not be like they are today —lazy and indolent, doing almost nothing, content with their miserable food and only having only a miserable dress to wear to go to town on Sundays, and spend some money on fermented beverages that only serve to make them more stupid (Codazzi [1855] 1959: 366-367).
Impasses to ‘progress’ in the lands inhabited by “Blacks” are due to their inherent “poverty”. Conversely, both authors believe “[…] these lands are extremely rich in gold and cultivable fields” (Pérez 1862: 293). From the evidence of the passages transcribed above, the ‘lack of necessities’ of the ‘African Race and its mixes and descendants’ is due to a combination of their limited ‘aspirations’ and their lands’ ‘richness’, not just in gold but also in crops, fish and game: “Plantains give them plenty of bread, rivers fish and the jungle wild boars and peccaries” (Pérez 1862: 291). Referring to the San Juan River, Felipe Pérez (1862: 327) makes explicit that this ‘country’ with its land ‘extremely rich in alluvial gold’ has not ‘progressed as it should have’, and he makes a contrast with the ‘progress’ which is to be found in Antioquia where white race has a friendly ‘climate’ different to that of Chocó where climate is “very bad for the white race” (Pérez 1862: 327).

It is no wonder that Codazzi and Pérez strive to imagine a future where ‘prosperity’ on these regions in Cauca State lies partly on some sort of ‘white race’s’ redeeming strength, which will settle itself in the mountain ranges with ‘wild forests’ —inhabited at that time— having a friendlier climate for whites, who are driven by the still unknown ‘gold hatcheries’ waiting there for the “intelligent and hardworking miner”. That is why on the region of Barbacoas, Pérez writes:

[…] there will come a day when gold hatcheries lying in the mountain ranges will be recognized […] then the high peaks will be visited and inhabited by the intelligent and hard-working miner, who will turn wild forests into cultivated lands, full of towns and homesteads; and hills, today unknown, that can only be seen at a distance as elevated crests of dark green, they will begin to be crossed by roads and men will get down from their stirrups searching for plains and rivers, and for water and some relief that will facilitate safe quick transportation to the

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20 On the images of the different sectors of the elite in the XIX century on the riches of the Colombian Pacific Lowlands see Leal (2004).
The black race will then leave its stupidity behind, and will be stimulated to imitate white men’s welfare in the highlands, and to work the lowlands, helped by its rapid multiplication and vigorous organization. Then the wild, ancient jungle will be cleared and the climate will be corrected and prosperity will appear which today is banished from those so fertile places (1862: 293).

Referring to Chocó, Codazzi considered the future construction of the inter-oceanic channel to be a motivation for which “[…] the always enterprising and active Antioqueño will not be content and will move to the mountains […]” to cultivate, and others will open new roads. This will lead to the discovery of new gold mines which:

[...] the Antioqueños will certainly be the first—and foreigners will follow—to come to exploit them, because they are situated higher up in altitude where the Caucasian race can devote itself to work without fear of getting sick. A new era will come to Chocó: the highlands will be cultivated and inhabited, leaving in the low lying banks of the Atrato River the lazy blacks, always naked, always poor. It could be that contact with active people and that rapid progress which are always found places rich in mineral wealth, make them leave their stupidity, lethargy and abandon in which they live and look for a way to imitate them through work. Only with white race’s settling in the high mountains of the Atrato, Andágueda and its tributaries, will Quibdó have a promising future, because this city (almost abandoned to the lazy blacks’ apathy) could then become a shipping point to send food and commodities to those who would have established themselves in the highlands, and steamships would arrive there with their loads (Codazzi [1853] 1959: 328).

As suggested in the prior passage, “imitation” would be an important factor in abandoning “laziness” that, according to Codazzi and Pérez, characterized “blacks” from Chocó. But with imitation they did not only refer to the “Caucasian race” or the “Antioqueño” who would settle the mountain ranges, but also to “men equal to them” in the Gulf of San Miguel in Panama whom they would come into contact with through the exchange of wood and provisions once the inter-oceanic channel was built, in whose construction “the whole commercial world and great nations” were interested:
Should blacks from Chocó leave their laziness they would be able to go down the Atrato and reach Calcedonia, bringing wood and provisions while at the same time they can go down sailing on the San Juan and the Baudó rivers to take them to the Gulf of San Miguel. It might be that seeing men like them who work endlessly to get ahead will stimulate them to use their time wisely and awaken in them the desire to enjoy the comforts of those men. (Codazzi [1853] 1959: 327).

Considering the prompt colonization that Codazzi and Pérez saw coming, then, these regions were shaped into three ‘zones’: “[…] that of the flood plains and deltas, the plains with alluvial gold rivers; and that of the highlands, completely deserted” (Pérez 1862: 295). The first —— that of “flood plains and deltas” at that time included foul mangrove swamps only inhabitable by “blacks” and of one of the beaches and rocky islands where “cuarterones” were found —-, will be converted into the “Holland of Cauca” when these lands would have been elevated and jungle be pulled down, trade winds will refresh the coast, the unhealthy pestilence will cease, and you will see in them all the fruits of the torrid zone, so sought after in foreign markets, combined with the efficient force of a numerous population of farmers, marine and merchants (Pérez 1862: 295).

The second zone, consisting of old alluviums and crisscrossed by innumerable rivers “a mining and farming country” inhabited by “African race, its mixes and descendants” in “a few and small villages” separated by large distances “[…] will be replaced by a swarm of cities, ranches, country homes, and the whole plain —— covered with roads, railways, channels and rivers —— will have a ready and quick way to be able to carry to the coast the many products from such a fertile land” (Pérez 1862: 295).

Finally, that of the “mountainous region”, at that time uninhabited but that was meant to be settled by “industrious” miners, farmers, and businessmen of “Caucasian race” or “white race”, such as Antioqueños or foreigners. In this “zone” the “wild forests” would disappear to give way to cultivated land, a swarm of small towns, homesteads and roads:
A temperate, fresh and healthy climate is the most appropriate for the active and industrious white race to settle in; as the riches which are to be found there will serve to open new roads to haul goods through the currently impassable mountains, which will communicate a healthy impulse to African race individuals dwelling on the banks of the rivers, through an excess of happiness (Pérez 1862 295-296).

For the region of Buenaventura, Pérez seemed to be considering that the ‘progress of civilization’ could not only be derived from the external influences brought about by ‘white race’ individuals, but that it is also possible to “[…] hope that from the increasingly number of its present day inhabitants, who enjoy good health and strength” (1862:306). In this direction the region’s population’ internal dynamics would be recognized. Given the few conditions necessary to form new families, Pérez considered it viable to hope for these settlers to have considerable numbers of offspring. That is,

When their society be more numerous and its relationships more intimate and multiplied, civilization will begin to progress, and then the old jungles will fall to the hatchets of a vigorous population, born in the independence of the forests; then navigable rivers and streams will serve to bring the Buenaventura market the numerous products of those virgin lands, where all tropical fruits can be grown (1862: 306-307).

Among the consequences we could have that, “[…] when man has further extended his empire, the nature of the climate will change, modifying the features of the swamps and of the humidity caused by the jungle” (Pérez 1862:307).

From the passages commented upon, it does not follow some sort of racial or environmental pessimism since both ‘African race, its mixes and descendants’ and the “climate” may be the target of a series of concrete interventions to prevent these states, countries or regions from being ‘slowed down’ even more or rather staying
“stationary”. On the basis of the written excerpts quoted above, it is evident that both authors believe the influx of “industrious” dwellers settled in the neighboring ridges would have the desired effect, as a consequence of the gradual imitation, of changing ‘African’/‘black race’s’ state of “ignorance”, “indolence”, “unhappiness” and “lack of wellbeing”.

But hopes of ‘progress’ for these regions do not lie only on the impulse derived from the settling by active and industrious inhabitants in the mountainous zone or on the dynamics of population growth —as Pérez suggests in the case of Buenaventura—. Furthermore, both of them insist on a series of measures to be taken by governors to force “lazy” settlers to “work”. These measures were to be immediately applied and would invoke patriotism from those who desired “progress”, as recommended by Codazzi in his report to the governor of Chocó:

Thus, those who truly and patriotically want this country to progress should, from this very moment on —before joblessness becomes chronic—, think of ways to compel men and women to devote themselves to work, so that a family consisting of three or four people able to work only needs one or two to subsist and the others should enlist as workers, with a salary corresponding to the service they provide, under penalty of being considered vagabonds ([1853a] 1959:325).

In the same report, Codazzi had suggested a few pages before the necessity to force a ‘working class’ to work through ‘properly combined law enforcement body’ if the aim was that “[…] the province progresses as fast as other industrious countries go […] On the contrary, the country might fall behind more and more due to the lack of workers or

21 Thus, in a report on the province of Casanare dated in Bogotá on March 28, 1856, Codazzi addresses the secretary governor in the following terms: “Two big obstacles to development are found in that province: weather and Indians. Both can be changed through time but in the meanwhile it would be useful to examine them to see what can be done to accelerate that change” (Codazzi [1857] 1956: 376).
else to stay stationary, causing enormous harm to the development of public riches” (Codazzi [1853] 1959: 323). In the case of Barbacoas, Codazzi insists in the urgency of some measures backed by severe regulations that force to work under penalty of being considered vagabonds, as happens in Europe with ‘white men’, even though they have not been ‘slaves’ in the recent past. And in order to make those ordinances effective, Codazzi suggests the creation of a ‘law enforcement body’ made of “[…] the most intelligent, active and formal individuals among blacks themselves […]” ([1853b] 1959: 336).

Thus, a series of measures meant to modify the behavior of specific populations’, which appeared to the eyes of the experts as an unwillingness to work. Those measures should be established by the government of the provinces starting with the legislation against “vagrancy”, that forced to work and a police body to make sure the law is followed.

‘Work’ is a fountain of riches not only for “civilians” but also for the ‘nation’. ‘Work’ is the source of ‘riches’ and ‘personal welfare’ gives access to ‘comforts’ and means to leave the ‘state of misery’: “[...] if a man wanted to work, like any hardworking man who has ambition to learn and acquire wealth to enjoy a few things and leave the state of misery in which he finds himself” (Codazzi [1853] 1959: 325). Clothing, housing and the tenure of other possessions are the fruit of ‘labor’: “When man is born, he is born naked, and if he is successful in getting some clothing, a nice home and to enjoy some comforts, it is because of work” (p. 336). In this same way, the riches of the nation settle in individuals’ labor. At this point Codazzi is explicit: “[...] since they refuse to work, with the pretext of being free, it is clear that there is no work nor public riches, because
as I see it, the combined riches of citizens constitute the riches of the State” (p. 324). In the words of José María Samper—an author whose work I will deal with in some detail in the next section: “[…] work [is] the essential base for all property, all social force and all progress […]” (Samper [1861] 1969: 298).

Hence in willingness to ‘work’ or to be ‘indolent’ among specific populations what is at stake is the future of the ‘nation’. ‘Labor’, then, ceases to be seen as a strictly individual affair, to become an issue concerning the ‘nation’. That is why Codazzi asks himself, “Had every Granadine nation had a population as that of Chocó, where would it get direct, indirect, proportional and regressive contributions from to keep the labor system? Would it have any hope for progress and enrichment in spite of its rich elements?” ([1853a] 1959: 327).

Any disposition or action resulting in compelling to ‘work’ is then perceived as something good for those same populations which would be otherwise condemned to ‘misery’: “To compel this inherently lazy and indolent race to work in order to get rich is to do something positive, as they are more or less like the semi-barbaric Indians, who need tutors” (Codazzi [1853b] 1959: 336). But at the same time to get these populations ‘used to working’ and to eradicate their tendency towards ‘debauchery’ is necessary for the good of the ‘nation’ as a whole:

It is necessary to eradicate those ideas that confuse freedom in the good sense with debauchery or idleness. First of all it is necessary to accustom them to the work, which remunerated, results in benefits for them and the whole nation. What would it be of this country if the working class only sewed enough seed to eat? What if there was nothing to transport and the nation never saw merchant ships coming to its coasts to trade? (Codazzi [1855] 1959: 367).
But ‘work’ as a source of riches needed ‘commerce’ to bring ‘material progress’ to reality. And for commerce to become a reality, it was needed communication pathways to break isolation:

In order that a country’s material progress may readily develop, it is critical to bring into contact commercial points, even those places that appear to be naturally isolated between impassable mountain ranges. To destroy these and to destroy isolation is of benefit to people, and not doing so they stay as prisoners, unable to move (Codazzi [1853] 1959: 347).

On this assumption Codazzi understood not only the relevance of the Chorographic Commission’s works “[…] that tend to provide positive assets, looking for new trade paths, that are almost always found, even in the highest steepest parts of the Andes […]”, but also an agenda for governors with ‘positive assets’ for “[…] the Nation, to the poor but industrious, as well as hardworking and rich people […]” ([1853] 1959: 347). Now, according to Codazzi, commerce provided money that was the ultimate driving force for ‘humankind’, because with “[…] money there is farming, livestock, manufacturing, art, science, riches, comforts, good taste, considerations, positive pleasures and enjoyments; in the end, where there is money there is no poverty nor thoughts of uprising or revolution, and much less in the aspirations or the insatiable urge to hold public office” (Codazzi [1852] 1956: 312-313). As commerce is the fountain of money Codazzi concludes that “[…] in short, it is seen today that trade is the world’s owner” (p. 313).

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It cannot be argued that the notion of ‘race’ contained in the narratives by Codazzi and Pérez is identical to other racial articulations such as the ones conveyed by the scientific racism of the early twentieth century, analyzed in the previous chapter. Like
any other racial articulation theirs establishes a racial hierarchy according to which the
‘African race, its mixtures and descendants’, in what it is today defined as the Pacific Region of Colombia, is somewhat distant from the attitudes, practices and conceptions of ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’. Nonetheless—and this is what differentiates it from racial articulations reviewed in the previous chapter—within their conception the relationship between difference and hierarchy is not conceived as an identity or, even less as a constant. That is to say, while Codazzi and Pérez assume there are different ‘constitutions’ among the various ‘races’, which somewhat enable them to live in different ‘climates’, their hierarchy of position or capacity for ‘progress’ or ‘civilization’ is not derived from this difference.

It is evident in the projections and measures that Codazzi and Pérez imagine for inhabitants of the State of Cauca that the ‘African race, its mixtures and descendants’ are transformable towards ‘progress’ or ‘civilization’. They are not proposing that this transformation implies a change in their ‘constitution’ by means of, let’s say, ‘mixing’ with ‘white race’ as prominent intellectuals and politicians suggested in the early twentieth century. Those transformations (better defined by expressions like ‘moralization’) would come from influences originating in the ‘mercantile movement’ or the ‘imitation’ of ‘industrious inhabitants’ settled in ‘nearby zones’ and even from inner dynamics like demographic growth or government measures.

Thus, one of the most pronounced features of the narratives of Codazzi and Pérez—the ‘indolence’ of ‘African race’ living in this counties, regions and countries—is not to be placed at the same level of the ‘constitution’, which enable these peoples to live in a given ‘climate’. Deeventalizing these readings collapse these two levels and when faced
with descriptions like the ones I have cited, in which the word ‘race’ is associated to the establishment of differences and hierarchies, they cancel out their singularity and density. In this regard, let’s review Codazzi’s notion of ‘mestizo’. According to him ‘mestizos’ were not above ‘indians’ because of a change in the ‘constitution’ of the ‘indigenous race’ resulting from a racial ‘crossbreeding’ (an argument used by some authors in the early twentieth Century, reviewed in the previous chapter). Instead, he claims this higher position was due to the ‘emancipation’ from an ‘original degradation’ caused by the Conquest and maintained in the colonial regime. Singularities like those mentioned above should not be overlooked when trying to understand the specificities of racial articulations that prevailed in views of authors like Codazzi and Pérez by the mid nineteenth century.

The problematization of blackness that appears in Codazzi and Pérez means inducing the concepts of the ‘progress’ of the ‘nation’ in relation to the work of its ‘inhabitants’ and the commerce derived from it. ‘Moralizing’ and disciplining bodies so that they perform a ‘job’ was achieved through a series of measures set by rulers and the imitation of more industrious populations settled in the cordilleras which will rescue the ‘African race, its mixtures and descendants’ from their ‘indolence’.

3. Ethnographical zones

In contrast with Codazzi’s works, which were based on observations, measurements and statistics, Samper presents himself as an essayist. From the very title his work is said to be an ‘essay’. However, on the cover appears Samper’s title as a “Full member of the Societies of Geography and Ethnography in Paris”. Given this membership, it is no wonder that in his descriptions and insights on the ‘Hispanic-Colombian republics’ he uses terms like ‘ethnological conditions’ or ‘ethnographical zones’.

The book gathers a series of papers published in Spanish in a journal in London and the translation from French of an essay submitted in 1860 to the Ethnographical Society of Paris, which was printed in its monthly journal. Concerning the papers, Samper makes the reader aware of their spontaneous character and the fact that they were written ‘as rough thoughts’ without the limitations and rigor that a systematic work needs. From ‘On the essay’, Samper says it deals particularly with the Granadine Confederation, the object of the book being ‘Colombia’ and her peoples as a whole.

In this respect, it is relevant to note that Samper puts forward an innovation in terminology. In order to prevent confusions between Americas (the whole continent) with the United States, and to pay homage to the ‘discoverer’ of the New World, he is calling ‘Colombia’ the continent from the South Cone up to Mexico and Hispanic-Colombia to the Hispanic countries of this part of the continent. Also, he refers to aboriginal populations and their descendants as ‘Colombians’. In the following discussion, I will

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22 “[…] we allow ourselves to put forward (and we are giving an example with this manuscript) that hereafter we will use the following classification: Colombia, —the portion of the New World going from cape Horn up to Mexico’s northern border; America, —the remaining portion of the continent. Thus, Colombia will bear two classifications: one is a geographical zone, comprising meridional Colombia (from cape Horn to the gulf of Darien and the mouth of the Orinoco); Northern Colombia (Mexico), and insular Colombia (archipelagos of The Antilles or the
maintain the terminology used by Samper, the reader will have to bear in mind the corresponding conversions.

‘Mestizo civilization’

Samper considers New World to be a scenario where the primary ‘races’ of the world have merged in the “blend of bloods, traditions, powers and characters” ([1861] 1969: 78). Unlike the Old World, where ‘traditional concerns’, ‘international rivalries’ and ‘apathetic climates’, among other factors, have rendered difficult the ‘brotherly crossbreeding of races’, the New World seems ‘providentially’ destined “[…] to be the theater for fusion and reconciliation of races […]” (p. 79).

‘This ‘blend’ or ‘reconciliation’ of ‘races’ is viewed in a positive light by Samper. Rather than an obstacle or problem to be overcome or avoided by the New World, such ‘brotherly crossbreed of races’ “lays the foundations for a new civilization” (p. 79).

Samper is convinced that this is a new ‘mestizo civilization’, predestined to ‘regenerate the world’. “Yes, it is true that at its beginning a mestizo civilization is surprising, complex, tumultuous, unrefined and apparently contradictory, but it is meant to regenerate the world through the practice of the most important Christian principle: brotherhood!” (p. 79). 23 This civilization is problematic, tumultuous and apparently contradictory because it is just in its early stages.

Caribbean Sea); and other ethnographical classification, including the various ‘Colombias,’ — Spanish, Portuguese, French, British, Netherlander, etc.” (p. xiv).

23 Some words and expressions are written in italics in the book by Samper. When transcripting them I will maintain this format.
Ideal conditions to facilitate this ‘providential work’ of the ‘mestizo civilization’ converge in the Hispanic-Colombian republics and Samper points out some of them: “[…] the novelty of soil and social conditions, the enormity of progress elements, the wonderful promiscuity of all climates and simultaneous productions as well as the absolute need for Colombian societies to be liberal and welcoming or they will otherwise come to a standstill” (p.79). Samper highlights the ‘liberality’ and ‘hospitality’ of Hispanic-Colombian republics as the result of the independence process from Spain. He even claims that if the only positive consequence of ‘independence’ were the propitiation of this ‘providential fusion of human races’ (and that of ‘domestic animals’) it would be enough to consider it pertinent:

If independence achieved by these societies had only resulted in favoring such providential fusion of human races and even that of domesticable *animals*, that would be enough for civilization to be entitled to be rejoiced about Colombian emancipation and the obligation of encouraging it and maintain it. (p. 79-80).

The ‘independence’ has propitiated this ‘fusion’ because prior to it very few Europeans used to settle in ‘Colombia’. With its ‘independence’, ‘liberal and welcoming institutions’ were introduced thus making Europeans (Spanish, English, French, German, Italian, etc.) who arrived at Hispanic-Colombia without the intention to settle, “[…] to accept they can have a new motherland there, where they can have liberties, equal rights, more thoughtfulness, a much less obscure and subordinated and much more auspicious social status than they used to have in Europe” (p. 80). As follows,

In consequence, an European gets interested in Hispanic-Colombia, gets married to a criolla, becomes part of the great Colombian family and contributes to form a beautiful race, mestizo and yet Caucasian, in which the heroic feeling and energy of Hispanic-Colombian people come together with the positivistic, individualistic, enterprising and tenacious of Anglo-Saxon, German and Swiss people, among others (p. 80).
These ‘fusions’ between ‘Europeans’ and ‘criollos’ show “[…] how useful the independence of Hispanic-Colombian people has been for civilization” (p. 80 Samper stresses the existent of ‘superior types’ resulting from this ‘fusion’:

We could cite countless personal examples of superior types resulting from the fusion taking place in Hispanic-Colombia, promoted by our democracy, between the great white element of this continent and immigrants, foreigners or naturalized people from England, France, Germany, Italy and other European counties (p. 80-81).

A joyful future is to be expected in Colombia from this ‘crossbreeding’ of ‘white races’ (‘European’ and ‘criollos’)” (p. 80).

In this regard, Samper highlights two facts on which the ‘future civilization’ is based in the New Granada. On one hand, the mixture of races and their varieties which, without failing to allow the European element to become predominant, has made possible the birth and daily growth of a particularly democratic people, both by birthright and climate […]” (p. 337-338). On the other hand there is “[…] the progressive absorption, more or less evident and necessary, by the strong white and black races of indigenous pure races, the only ones strongly resisting conquests of civilization because of their indolence and weakness and the degrading state they were reduced to by the colonial regime” (p. 338).24 In a footnote he adds: “The former [white race] is strong because of its intelligence, will and traditions and the latter [black race] because of its physical resistance and fertility” (p. 338).

In other words, this future was based on a ‘democratic people’ resulting by birthright (mixture of races and varieties) and climates (multiple and complementary) and

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24 This notion of degeneration is very different from the one suggested by Jiménez, which was reviewed in the previous chapter. While Samper is proposing a degeneration due to historical reasons, Jiménez considers it in biological terms.
where ‘pure indigenous roots’ get diluted before the force of black and white races thus overcoming the only serious obstacle to civilization: “[…] as crossbreeding is intensified, because of the infusion of African or European blood, civilization is best developed in popular masses […]” (p. 336). While ‘pure indigenous races’ were diluted by crossbreeding with the ‘strongest races’, the ‘African race’ was also doomed to disappear someday as a ‘special type’:

[...] although African race has increased in 28%, it has achieved its most important development through mixtures; so it seems to be doomed to disappear one day, as a special type, as well as the indigenous element, after powerfully energizing the blood of white and indian races (p. 306).

‘Races’, ‘castes’ and ‘types’

Samper recounts that before Conquest and Colony there existed in “[…] Hispanic-Colombia a multitude of disagreements concerning color and size, which reveal the existence of very different indigenous races” (p. 70). There was a broad range of skin color variations: “There were red, reddish, tanned, coppery, almost black or very brown, others were matte yellow and some were remarkably whitish; and on types or sets of traits —voice, body structure, size, costumes and other features— varieties were limitless” (p. 70). In a footnote, he even mentioned that “It is well-known that one of the Caribbean races was entirely black, and that in Peru, a completely white indigenous race was found” (p. 70).

This differentiation in the ‘types’ color’ followed a geographical distribution pattern which went hand in hand with altitude and temperature ranges: “[…] because of climatic influences or by virtue of the essential differences between races, we could say,
according to the conquerors’ traditions and the current observations, that to the scale of altitude and temperature degrees coincided with a pronounced gradation in the different types’ shades” (p. 295-296). Thus, “[…] in New Granada, Red-Skins […]” have only existed “[…] in lowlands, which were hence very humid lands, that is, along the shores and in the Grasslands, and at the bottom of deep valleys” (p. 296). In contrast, “On the mountain slopes, Indians were coppery or yellowish skinned, a shade between pale soot, a bit dark, typical of the types settled on the prairies and valleys, and the somewhat tanned skin typical of indians at the high plains” (p. 296).

This variation in the color of ‘skin’ associated to ‘altitude scales’ and ‘temperature ranges’ is juxtaposed with a differentiation in terms of ‘more barbarian races’, ‘more advanced in civilization’ and ‘intermediate bellicose hordes’.25 The first ones were to be found in the vast regions which comprised the lowlands, including: “[…] coastal region, from the peninsula of Guajira (including it) through the Western edge of the isthmus of Panama, and over the coast of Chocó, the Atrato valley and the lowlands along the Magdalena river […]”, as well as “[…] the prairies and forest along Orinoco and Amazonas rivers, and at the bottom of all the big hollows” (p. 294). In its turn, “The more civilized races were scattered on the high plains […]” (p. 294). Finally,

[…] there were also numerous and mighty intermediate hordes, settled on the mountain ranges slopes and abutments. Always busy in going to war against their

25 Samper’s criteria to define which races were more ‘advanced in civilization’ included: (1) buildings “[…] temples, palaces and big cities, roads in good condition, knowledge of many arts, even though they were rudimentary”; (2) they “practiced a regime of public granaries, they had permanent markets and traded actively their industrial products”; (3) they “loved peace and sedentary life, obeying regular governments, more or less connected by federative links […]”; (4) “[…] they had a clergy, a complete theogony and a permanent public worship […]” (5) “[…] they had gotten a clear notion of property, marriage, family and heritage […]”; and (6) “[…] they had laws, permanent institutions and a justice management body which conceded plenty of guarantees […]”. (p. 294-295).
neighbors, fighting today against the more civilized from the high plains, tomorrow against the more barbarian at the bottom of the valleys (p. 295).

Before Samper’s eyes such distribution resulting from the differences of climates and races was repeated under the colonial regime, resulting in an apparent distribution of populations and civilization: “[…] differences between climates and races shaped a population distribution very distinctively marked, ranked according to the requirements of topography.” (p. 299). Thus, the “European race looked almost completely to the high plains more or less elevated and to the folds of the mountains” while the “[…] African race, enslaved, was condemned to exploit mines and to live in the remains of colonization, in the profound and burning valleys […].” On the other hand, “[…] indigenous races, exploited and weighed down everywhere, stood in their respective regions.” Given such distribution: “[…] there was, then: upwards the civilization, — towards the medium, abandonment, — downwards, slavery violence and horrors” (p. 299).

For his part, he associates ‘blacks from the African race’ to physical strength for the hardest works, and as those best suited to burning weather to great fertility. Samper echoes a well-known argument assuming blacks had superior strength to work in ‘ardent climates’: “Blacks were not only necessary for hard work in ardent climates, but also for sailing, which demanded rowers or bogas who were really tough and who had harsh habits” (p. 67-68). Fertility is explained by Samper on the basis of the argument that as with other ‘barbarian races’ the different capabilities of the individual are unbalanced. In ‘black race’, ‘physical skills’ completely overcome ‘faculties of intelligence’ and ‘morality’ is found to be ‘depressed’. This empire of physical faculties translates into a great fertility. On the contrary, “[…] reproduction becomes slow and difficult, as it
happens in France, when a race reaches a very high degree of moral and intellectual refinement” (p. 68).

This correlation between fertility and predominance of some ‘faculties’ over some others, as in relation to the different ‘climates’ to which they were meant for, are conjured by Samper to account for the differences in multiplication and crossing of the ‘races’ during the colonial regime. ‘European race’, mainly concentrated around the high plains and warm weather regions, and who were not only politically dominant but “[…] a thousand times superior in moral and intellectual aspects […]” compared to ‘black and coppery races’, but reproduced slowly because of the “[…] concerns preventing crossing with the different races” (p. 68). For his part, “Black [race] should multiply itself prodigiously, favored by tropical sun, tough and vulgar food and abatement of their moral and intellectual faculties” (p. 68). Finally,

Indigenous races should be lessened or stay still wherever civilian life burdened them with arduous tasks; but they had to flourish in number wherever they were in their natural sphere, like high plains, as their multiplication could not be opposed to by refinement or the remarkable progress of civilization. (p. 68).

For Samper, crossing between ‘Colombian races’ (that is, ‘indigenous races’) and ‘black race’ was favored by “[…] similarities in their subservient and degraded condition, and the lesser discord regarding type and blood between blacks and Indians, than between both of them and whites […]” (p. 68-69). Such crossing helped to make “[…] arise the caste that is called zamba or of zambos in Colombia […]” (p. 69).

Referring to the distinctive social elements conquest and colonial government put in touch, yet not harmoniously, Samper differentiates three ‘races’, two of which present ‘varieties’: ‘Spanish races and varieties’, ‘Indigenous races and varieties’, and ‘African black race’ (p. 72). In a consistent way with other passages of his book, Samper often
emphasizes the diversity of ‘Indigenous races and varieties’ as well as ‘European’ (in this case in particular, even on the Spanish ones), while ‘African or black’ appears in singular. Besides those ‘races and varieties’, Samper distinguishes four ‘castes’ resulting from the different crossings: “1) mestizo castes comprised of Spanish and Indian individuals; 2) the castes of the various indigenous races, mixed up through conquest and colonization; 3) mulato caste or resulting from whites and blacks; and 4) the zambo caste, sprang from the crossing of indians and blacks” (p. 71). While the two first ‘castes’ are shown in plural form, the two last are in singular and in italic type. Which seems to suggest that Samper tended to think in the multiplicity of the first ones in contrast with some sameness in the second ones, where, it is worth noting, crossing with the ‘African black race’ is involved.

The panorama of crossings gets tangled as there exist a “[…] great variety of secondary castes arisen from the successive crosses between blacks and mulattoes, mulattoes and whites, indians and mulattoes, indians and zambos, and so on.” (p. 71-72). The categories where these ‘secondary castes’ are inscribed are not registered by Samper. From this passage, we cannot help but suppose the differentiation between some ‘castes’, which we could venture to consider to be primary castes, and some others which are explicitly called ‘secondary’. Also, we could note the observation that crossings giving birth to those ‘secondary castes’, or at least to the ones listed in this passage, take place between primary ‘races’ and ‘castes’.

When presenting the data of the last census performed a few years before the Independence wars, Samper considers convenient to clarify one of the categories in which population was disaggregated: “It is convenient to make note that under the
common designation of whites are not only comprised Spaniards and pure criollos, but also the great number of mestizos from Spaniard and indian, who are completely white-skinned” (p. 73). In another passage, concerning the censuses performed during the time of the Colony, talking on the notion of ‘varied mestizos’ he underlines: “This name includes mulattoes, zambos, etc., in whom indigenous or African blood prevails over European blood” (p. 303). When he puts forward an estimate of population in New Granada, Samper disaggregates population in two categories: 1) “Pure whites, and white mestizos, in whom the European element prevails”; 2) “Indigenous, with a certain mix of European blood, but prevailing the indian one”; 3) “Mestizos (mulattoes and zambos) in whom indigenous and African races prevail”; and 4) “Unmixed blacks (free)” (p. 305). It is worth noting that Samper here establishes a distinction between white mestizos on one side and mulatto mestizos and zambos on the other side.

‘Ethnological promiscuity’ as a ‘physiology’ of politics

Although Samper emphasizes that “[…) there is no man in the whole world, whatever his condition, who does not regard slavery as a very serious and complex evil” (p. 66), he also believes that with the forced arrival of hundreds of thousands of ‘African-race’ slaves an element that would necessarily result in establishing the ‘democratic republic’ was introduced in the New World. Samper celebrates and attributes this fact to divine intervention. He asserts, from a ‘social and political perspective’, that

[...] the introduction of slavery in the New World was an immense and providential event. No other social deed offers such a clear proof of the following sublime and comforting truth: God’s endless wisdom uses even the faults of humankind to do good deeds, forcing the fulfillment of its mysterious plans —its divine plan of eternal unit, supreme harmony and infinite progress. (p. 65).
Stating that slavery was caused by a divine intervention that made possible the
development of a ‘democratic republic’ is an odd twist from one of the most extended
figures of speech in force during previous centuries which legitimized slavery by
claiming also a divine intervention but with the purpose to save the souls of enslaved
Africans.

Samper attributes the need to impose slavery in Hispanic-Colombia to the
requirements of Colonization and the conditions of ‘indigenous races’ (p. 66). Such
requirements involved the exploitation of gold and silver mines, generally located in
‘ardent climates’ and demanding a huge physical effort as well as a disciplined approach
to work which “[…] indigenous races were completely unable of […]” (p. 66).26 With the
establishment of ‘African race’ slave based commerce, which he imputes to the advice
given by Las Casas, who was interested in saving the ‘indigenous races’,

[…] the future of Spanish or latinized Colombia was decided. It was an enormous
revolution in politics and civilization! Certainly neither Las Casas nor the king of
Spain or his ministers and lieutenants even suspected that by taking such measure
they were acting as revolutionaries, serving the cause of Cosmopolitan unit of
progress and preparing the reign of democratic republic in Hispanic-Colombia! (p.
67).

In the eyes of Samper democracy was the inevitable result of a colonial regime that,
unintentionally, had created the conditions for the ‘fusion’ of the most dissimilar ‘races’
“[…] by bringing into contact those races and promoting an inevitable crossbreeding of
the colonial regime that prepared the advent of democracy, turbulent in its childhood, as a

“If indigenous races living in high or cold lands, somewhat used to the tasks of a relatively
civilized life, went down to the ardent, humid and desert valleys, where all gold deposits were
located, they would perish shortly. Indians settling in valleys and coasts, in a full savage state,
had a total lack of work habits and were completely incompetent for exploiting mines” (p. 66-67).
fatal and logical fact, based on a rigorous physiological need that was meant to happen sooner or later” (p. 73-74).

Samper establishes a direct and necessary correlation between the mixture of peoples, or fusion of races, and democracy: “[…] Interrogate History and it will invariably tell you that democracy, more or less pure, evident and persistent, has been the political and social synthesis of all peoples, greatly mixed up or conformed by very different race fusions”. (p. 74).27 He forcefully states that: “[…] democracy is the natural form of government in mestizo societies” (p. 76-77). Or, as he had asserted in previous pages, “[…] democracy is an inescapable condition for promiscuous races” (p. 74).

Nevertheless, “Hispanic-Colombian society, the most mestizo society in the whole world, has been forced to be democratic, in spite of any sort of resistance, and will always be democratic while causes which have produced the ethnological promiscuity persist” (p. 77).28

What Samper calls ‘promiscuous races’, ‘mestizo societies’, ‘very mixed peoples’ or ‘ethnological promiscuity’ constitutes a ‘blood based democracy’ operating as the foundation on which democracy in politics is determined as its necessary result: “[…]

27 Samper differentiates here between freedom and democracy: “Freedom is very different from democracy, because the former refers to an individual and the latter refers to a social mass, — freedom has always been and will be more common in pure or almost unmixed races; while democracy is the inevitable condition of promiscuous races.” (p. 74). Thus, he links Protestantism and certain races coming from a ‘common trunk or origin’ to the former, and the latter to Catholicism and ‘strongly mixed races’: “[…] Scandinavian race and Germanic races in England, Germany, Holland, etc., have opted for Protestantism while strongly mixed races, from center and south Europe, have been faithful to Catholicism. Protestant religion is essentially liberal, with an independent personality, —whereas Catholic religion is democratic, —based on collective action.” (p. 74-75).

28 As we set out in the previous chapter, Bejarano uses this argument to object to those who saw in the ‘mestization’ (a term coined by Lopez de Mesa) an obstacle for the country’s future and political order.
and establishing a mixed society meant preparing a blood based democracy, the point of departure for a democracy based on ideas and law. If races cannot argue purity they cannot aspire to supremacy either “[…] and the regime of equality also becomes the only possible form of organization” (p. 292). In order to account for such necessary correlation Samper asserts that: “Politics has a physiology, allow me to say, just like human beings do, and its phenomena respond to an inflexible logic principle as physical natural phenomena do” (p. 77).

One could deduce from the previous passages that Samper is arguing that this mixture of fusion of races must be taken to the point where all differences are suppressed so that a new kind of homogeneous entity can be formed, a mestizo race. However, rather than abolishing blood-based differences, Samper understands this mixture and fusion as keeping differences among ‘races’ or ‘castes’ so that none of them can argue a pure origin or a strong blood to exert an aristocratic predominance: “When races are kept pure or get mixed to form a homogeneous mass, equalized by knowing they share the same blood, their aspirations lead them to establish a variety of aristocracies: heroic or belligerent, clerical, monetary, territorial or literary” (p. 76).

In contrast to this obliteration of differences of blood, “[…] in societies resulting from the fusion of antagonist or deeply discordant races, no one could argue the power of blood; no one can expect to obtain an aristocratic predominance, which would be totally without foundation and would be subject to the constant reproach of an impure origin” (p. 76). In this case democracy appears as an inevitable consequence: “A scenario where institutions must necessarily be based on democratic principles, that is to say, admitting the concurrence of all castes, opening common ways for them, annulling any type of
social antagonism, combining all efforts without classifying them [...]” (p. 76). If democracy cannot be consolidated, the consequence is a permanent civil war and a widespread paralysis (p. 76). 29

‘Ethnographic zones’ in New Granada

Given the comprehensive task that the analysis of the different Hispanic-Colombian republics involves, Samper chooses his ‘country of origin’, New Granada, as the core area for his reflections. His decision was also based on the fact that New Granada was considered by Samper to be the “most typical state in Hispanic-Colombia, both in terms of geography and topography and ethnology issues” (p. 81). Therefore, his comments about that State would not be limited, strictly speaking, to that one but they would be considered to have some validity for the other States.

What makes New Granada ‘typical’ in terms both of ‘geography’ and ‘topography’ as well in ‘ethnology’ issues is, in Samper’s words:

[...] the Granadine land is in the threefold circumstance of being entirely located in the torrid zone, being lined by a great deal of mountain ranges which give its topography a prodigious variety, and having wide coastlines over both oceans, which makes access of all foreign immigrants easier. Also, because of its notably liberal institutions, the Granadine Confederation is prone, as no other Colombian State, to the fusion of all races (p. 81).

New Granada is described as a territory where, due to the wide range of ‘elevation and exposure degrees’, there is a confluence of “[...] all of the races and the most varied

29 Through a biblical metaphor Samper asserts: “Japheth, Shem and Ham have united in a fraternal hug in the New World, tending to reconstruct the unit of human kind; not uniformity, an obstructing unit, but that progressive and Christian unit translated in an admirable and sublime phenomenon: harmony in diversity!” (p. 76).
organizations, all possible degrees of temperature subsist, and prosper together, or are able to prosper, all the produce our planet’s soil is able to give off.” (p. 82). This way, among Hispanic-Colombian republics New Granada contrasts with Chile, which is notably Spanish. It is in New Granada where not only ‘all races’ can be observed and compared “[…] in their physical and moral development […]”, but even more ‘curious’ is there is to be found “[…] the multiple phenomenon of the combinations of types, moral patterns, tendencies and aptitudes which are derived from the coexistence of so many races —some of them entirely pure, but a bit modified by the influence of the medium they live in, some others related between each other by more or less intense crossings.” (p. 83).

In contrast with the orderly sequence of seasons that is observed in Europe, in New Granada we see ‘the phenomenon of simultaneity’, because of the great variation of altitudes above sea level:

As the Granadine territory is located along the Equatorial line, seasons don’t follow a sequence. But since it is crossed by so huge and intricate mountain ranges, it admirably compensates the lack of seasons with the limitless differences of elevation and exposure at the different locations, having, with an indisputable advantage, all the climatic variations latitude can produce in Europe. (p. 82).

That spatial ‘simultaneity’ is an ‘indisputable advantage’ over the temporal ‘sequence’ of seasons. Hence “[…] with a thermometer or barometer in his hand, every individual could choose the climate he finds more convenient and the production he needs, so that you can find social, richness and food resources layered over the immense Andean amphitheatres” (p. 82).

Degrees of ‘elevation and exposure’ fall under a law that necessarily follows the ‘production of nature’, as well as those of farming and ranching. In their turn, the
different ‘races’ reflect those variations as they tend to be settled in a selective way all over the New Granada territory, making up different ‘social zones’:

[...] races and castes are tiered like in amphitheaters, from the sea shores and the interior grasslands up to the highest Andean tops being habitable; and that topographical distribution is so determining that wherever social zones match thermal zones along with their items of food and labor (p. 99).

Then, Samper establishes a parallel between climatic variations and the ‘living layering’ where ‘races’ and ‘castes’ fit into:

Thus we can say that as mountain ranges are from their bottom to their top like huge natural thermometers, society makes up a living layering, whose layers or sediments are the numerous and varied races and castes, resulting from very complex crossings, all of them located in the medium that best fits with each one’s blood, traditions, industry and energy. (p. 99).

That layering makes up an entire ‘geography of races and castes’, which has its origins in the Colony:

[...] races and castes should have, as it was earlier, their own inescapable and fatal geography: whites and indians with a pale tanned skin and mestizos arising from their crossings, would clump together in mountainous regions and high plains; while blacks, red-skinned and brown-skinned indians, as well as mestizos resulting from their crossing, should settle on coastal regions and burning valleys (p. 69).

As in highlands, ‘black slaves’ “were not necessary and were not comfortable in the cold climates”, the ‘mulatto caste’ is found only in the lowlands, by coming into contact with the few whites who had their mines, sugar refineries and ‘trade speculations’. Then, Samper reasons, “[...] population was split in two big groups of races and castes: in highlands, whites and whitish and the indians who could get used to that climate; and in lowlands, blacks and blackish or brown, sambo and mulatto castes” (p. 69).

That ‘inescapable and fatal geography of races and castes’ in a colonial regime bringing with it the ‘African race’ slavery involved, additionally, not only a distribution
of ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarity’, but also the beginning of two opposed directions where one was gaining ground over the other: “By virtue of that distribution of races and social conditions, all of civilizing work in New Granada should be synthesized in a double movement of descent and rising”. That meant in particular that

[...] civilization had to go down towards the slopes and the valleys to multiply themselves there, exploiting the auriferous soil and truly tropical. Barbarism should go up to the high plains in order to disappear or to undergo deep transformations. It is in that two-fold movement where we can find a reason for the crossing that have been verified between the various races in New Granada (p. 299).

The simultaneous occurrence of all climates and its relationship to the presence of the various ‘races’ and ‘castes’ make up the different ‘ethnographical zones’ to be found in New Granada. Rather than resulting in a conflict of interests and disputes between the various counties and groups, Samper views this multiplicity from the perspective of complimentary and reciprocity:

[...] all possible productions and manifestations are simultaneous, and while each group occupies its own place or location, no one can live without the existence of the others. All of them assist and need each other without any possible natural antagonism, as there is no antagonism between the regions serving as a center to them. Whites, of Spanish origin, who are mainly settled in the cities at the high plains, need the Indian who works as a farmer or manufacturer of crude fabrics. They both need the llanero, who provides them with cattle, as well as the llanero needs the service of criollos and Indians’ arts, farming and commerce. Man from the highlands is not able to live without requesting their produce (sugar, tobacco, corn, cacao, coffee, straw hats, gold, etc.) to mestizos and mulattoes from the middle lands and the deep valleys; and they both get the commercial participation of the sambo and the mulatto from the coast, without whom there would not be navigation (in spite of steamboats) nor any traffic. In their turn, inhabitants from low and middle lands feed physical and morally with the produce from highlands, and the literary works of the more refined populations, which are concentrated under beneficial climates (p. 99-100).

That amazing diversity of climates and inhabitants necessarily leads to the increase of commerce and the strengthening of crossings, which leads to creating fraternal ties,
maintaining peace and removing all barriers (p. 339). I will delve further into the correlations that Samper establishes between ‘Granadine types’ (particularly ‘mulattoes’ and ‘zambos’) and the different ‘zones’ (low, middle and/or high lands) existing in New Granada. For the time being, I am interested in noting that what Samper viewed as reciprocity and complimentarily not necessarily meant equality, as it is apparent from his own assumptions the hierarchy between ‘climates’ (some ‘beneficial’ in opposition to the others) and ‘populations’ (some of them being showed as more refined than others, some of them as a source of moral example for the others).

This is obvious when he imagines its results. Samper considers that, if not opposed by institutions, there are three evident outcomes resulting from the contact and the coexistence between the various ‘ethnographic zones’:

1st, the simultaneous development of social groups, under the fruitful law of example; 2nd, the continuous fusion of those groups, somewhat slow but infallible, and in any case fortunate, because the experience shows white race is the most absorbing, the one that prevailing because of their intelligence and moral faculties; 3º the manifold progress of civilization, resulting from the free action of each and every caste (p. 100).

From his point of view, then, from the ‘free’ confluence of the different ‘social groups’ (racialized and spatialised) there will result a ‘development’ for all and a ‘manifold progress of civilization’ within the bounds of a gradual, but beneficial, ‘fusion’ of those ones given the ‘fact’ that the ‘white race’ is the more prone to ‘absorb’ and ‘prevailing in intelligence and moral faculties’. The image of the ‘ethnographic zones’ attributes to ‘nature’ a racialized and spatialised difference, where the ‘fusion’ or ‘crossing’ between ‘races’ or ‘castes’ is perceived as a positive thing within the bounds of an apparent hierarchy that necessarily aims to the ‘democratic civilization’.
It is, then, nature which imposes by itself the need of the fusion of races, and we can say without fear of exaggeration that Andean mountains, which represent the God’s infinite kindness because of their amazing magnificence and sublime majesty, are in the Colombian world the best agents of democratic civilization (p. 340).

It is necessary to highlight how ‘nature’ as reflected in the Andean mountains is seen by Samper as a clue of divine will. In a similar passage that statement is kept:

It is comforting to see that those mountain ranges, apparently so enemies of progress, have been the agents of God —silent but irresistible— in that wonderful work of the mix of races, which should have resulted in an entire democratic society, a race of republicans, simultaneously representing Europe, Africa and Colombia, and giving a particular character to New World (p. 299).

Concerning ‘institutions’ favorable to the positive results expected from the ‘contact and coexistence’ of the different ‘ethnographical zones’, Samper unswervingly states that they are given within the bounds of the regime of the ‘democratic republic’. Beyond any doubt, Samper emphasizes that: “[…] the political, social and economic system that best adapts to that admirable juxtaposition or coexistence of races, castes and varieties […] [is] that of democratic republic, —that of the complete individual freedom, the complete legal equality and the popular sovereignty.” (p. 100-101).

Hence only this “[…] regime can accommodate so many varieties, respect all the manifestations, respect all the manifestations of progress, stimulate all the efforts, guarantee all the rights and keep brotherly union, without forcing anyone” (p. 101).

Contrary to the ‘democratic republic’, “Colonial regime was not able to meet that necessity: the fusion of races or mestizaje (miscegenation). That is why it succumbed; that is why the 1810 revolution was unanimous and simultaneous” (p. 101). The collapse of the colonial regime is attributed to its inability to meet that ‘strong necessity of the fusion of races’.
Samper describes several ‘Granadine types’ in some detail. His descriptions are focused in the ‘more remarkable’ from New Granada: the “[…] Bogotano criollo, the Antioqueño white, the Pastuso indian, the indian from the Eastern Mountain range or Chibcha, the mulatto from the coast or from Magdalena lowlands, the llanero from the Orinoco hollow, and the sambo boatman from the so-called country boga.” (p. 83). The descriptions Samper articulates concerning ‘mulatto’ and ‘sambo’ ‘types’ are of special interest in my analysis.30

‘Mulattoes’ constitute a ‘mestizo caste’ consisting of the ‘most beautiful qualities’ of ‘Spaniard’ and ‘black’, with their ‘defects’ being only transitory and due to the beginnings of any ‘mestizo caste’ (p. 90). According to Samper, the “[…] Hispanic-Colombian mulatto, who is not subject to disdain or despise like those from South America,31 thanks to the Spanish character and to our brotherly institutions […]” (p. 90) they have some features from ‘blacks’, ‘Spaniards’ (from the Andaluz, but not from the Aragonese or Castillian) and ‘Colombians’. About the first ones, he says, “Our mulattoes have from blacks the physical endurance, loyalty, kind love for family and the ability to do hard work […]” (p. 90).

About the ‘Spanish’ he says “[…] the heroic sense, the galant spirit, the highly poetic instinct, the chivalrous pride that does not bear any attack against dignity or honor,

30 For a study on the ‘types’ among thinkers on the 19th century in Colombia, see Arias (2005).
31 Remember that in Samper’s terminology, South America corresponds to the southern portion of the United States.
the impressionable genius, the *bavard* or discursive, boaster and expansive […]” (p. 90). Additionally, as the “[…] mulatto is novel and changeable, […] [it is] proved that his Spanish parents were not from Aragón or Castilla; and he adds to the black’s voluptuousness the Andalusian’s chivalric obligingness” (p. 91). Finally, mulattoes have “[…] from the Colombian, the instinctive love for freedom and few sedentary tendencies” (p. 91).32

Samper goes on describing the ‘mulatto’ characteristics: “Apparently you can note in the mulatto a certain proportion of features of the races that gave him birth: his physical structure is much blacker than white; his moral qualities are immeasurably whiter than black” (p. 91). On the ‘mulatto’ Samper goes on noting he is
docile and flexible when treated with benevolence and kindly expressed reason, but rough, insolent, turbulent, inhospitable, when feeling he is being insulted, despised or treated harshly. Fantasy-rich, highly accessible to poetic influences, keen on perfumes, luxury and novelties, he likes to make noise, to start people talking, and his generous and enthusiastic vanity makes him prone to political pretensions, to the desire of rise higher, to ennoble himself and become the focus of attention, almost invariably in a selflessly way (p. 91).

Further, ‘mulatto’ has a “[…] fast and clear intelligence […], particularly for fine arts, public administration matters, jurisprudence and trade […]” (p. 91). Besides, “[h]is conjugal fidelity is troublesome, his courage is audacious, but not much enduring, his religiosity is carefree” (p. 91). Thus, Samper concludes that “[…] mulatto is, then, an interesting type that, well regulated, might be offer results not only noticeable but amazing, thanks to the spirit of progress and imitation distinguishing him” (p. 91).

32 Note the notion of heritage operating in Samper: there are several collective traits inherited, which are attributed to the ‘races’. In the same way, in the description of the ‘types’ each of them is given certain intellectual, moral and behavioral characteristics, besides body features.
‘Mulattoes’ appear also as outstanding actors in the revolutions which have taken place in Colombia, which has lead ‘mulatto or brown peoples’ to have a ‘bad reputation’ in Europe:

In Colombia, when revolutions or faction groups are not directly promoted by government members, clergymen or military leaders (which the most frequent ones), they are usually led by mulattoes, or at least they are willing to support them, hence the bad reputation being given to mulatto and brown peoples in Europe (p. 89-90).

Given that tendency among ‘mulattoes’ to lead or support ‘revolutions’, Samper argues it is due not “[…] to his caste essence, to hate against whites or to communist visions that non-white men are so prone to civil turmoil […]” (p. 90), nor it is “[…] because of civil unrest, oppression or legal inferiority […]” (p. 90), but “[…] mulatto is turbulent because he is a mulatto […]” (p. 90). That is due, according to Samper, “[…] to blood exuberance, high qualities, an exuberance that, yet lacking the twofold bridle of education and finely consolidated interests, it produces transient eruptions but they do not announce anything wrong for the future” (p. 90). Therefore, “The day will come when people have had an education in freedom and democracy, and when interests have been multiplied and consolidated, through the strength of things, mulatto castes will be one of the strongest and most fruitful elements of civilization in the New World” (p. 90).

If mulattoes have some ‘positive’ characteristics in Samper’s eyes (without any doubt due to the influence of white race’s ‘moral qualities’), ‘sambos’ constitute “the worst caste or race in the country” (p. 99). ‘Inferiority’ of the ‘races’ giving birth to ‘sambos’ and its degradation, induced by the ‘climate’ he lives in, make ‘sambos a race of animals’:

The evident inferiority of its original races (African and tanned Indian) and its more or less profound degradation, helped by a climate fermenting everything
(because sun and earth embrace each other in infinite lubricity), have produced in sambos a race of animals in whose forms and faculties humankind feels repugnance of seeing their image or a part of their great being […] (p. 95-96).

Sambos “shows themselves in all their ugliness” in three ways: [1] on board of the *champan* or boat, [2] on the beach, dancing *currulao*, and [3] in their ranches, on the riverbanks, enjoying the *dolcissimo far niente* typical in sauvages” (p. 96). Samper describes each form in detail.

From the rowers at the Magdalena River, Samper starts by highlighting sambo’s nakedness and personal traits:

[…] going up the Magdalena, you can see 20 or 30 figures with the rosewood color, glossy as grease, dressed like our father Adam, with an added cloth below their waists called *tapa-rabo*, and synthesizing in their stupid, impassible and clumsy faces, and in their hairs halfway between woolen flecks and straight locks, prevailing traits of black or indian, more or less amalgamated or modified (p. 96).

Samper follows by describing the ‘mulatto’ ‘gibberish’ when setting sails from the port or meeting another canoe, where ‘religious sentiment’ towards saints and virgins gets mixed with the ‘most shameful things’. 33 Throughout the route, the ‘sambo’ appears to Samper as an honest man concerning his passengers’ goods and other valuable items, but he notes he does not hesitate to open and pillage any vault containing food or liquors:

“The sambo’s probity ceases where greediness or overindulgence temptations begin” (p. 96).

33 “On board of the champan […] the 20 or 30 wild men, when sailing off a port, chant in a loud and husky voice, making a dreadful gibberish, an interminable list of all the virgins and saints who are said to be the most miraculous in the riverain villages, in spite of those making part of each boga’s particular devotion. But that dedication is not purely religious: it is a sort of potpourri of vows and promises, concupiscent memories, scorching forswearing, insults to the ones that remain on the beach, recommendations for all *comáes* (*comadres* or kinswomen) and *ñas* (an abbreviation for doña or lady). That gibberish is as unintelligible as disgusting and abominable. That is how the clergy’s indolence and neat greediness have allowed sambos nurturing a religious sentiment mixed up with the most undeserving things! If the boat meets another one descending by the river, God saves the travelers on board! Both crews say each other the worst atrocities in the more obscene language you can imagine, even if they are excellent friends”. (p. 96).
He finishes his talk on the rower, noting: “When he jumps to earth, in passing, by some farm, it is like locusts: anything to eat falls under filibusterism” (p. 97).

The second way illustrating, according to Samper, ‘sambo’s ugliness’ has to do with the ‘currulao’ dance on the beaches or on the streets and small squares, where “[…] the sambo and the samba reveal their wild lubricity […]” (p. 97). Samper does not hide his horror in describing the dance: “The couples set apart and replace each other thorough and capriciously; all of them chanting tunes of a brutal and savage melody in unison, and all of them trying to compete, as they all are half-dressed, in their gestures’ lubricity, the obscenity of their movements and the extravagance of the rhythmic contortions […]” (p. 97). Therefore he judges that “When seeing that horrid view, you believe you are looking, in a nightmare, a zambra of sinful people turning around in one of hell’s caverns, paying homage to the seven deadly sins!” (p. 98).

Finally, Samper looks at length to the ‘sambo’ at his ranch on the riverbank. This one lives in a “[…] wretched hovel on the riverbank, on a sandy steep, by the wild forest and next to small plantain and corn fields” (p. 98). In his hammock “[…] the voluptuous prince of solitude, is reclined drowsy, sluggish, free and wild just like the tree shading him.” (p. 98). Samper goes on painting the scene:

Near the ranch you can see, drying out in the sun on one rack, a hammock or a fishing net (atarraya) with which the sambo fishes; under the ranch shade several racemes of green and ripe plantain hang from the beams, and at the bottom of the steep bank swings between osiers and grass plants the little boat (piragua) that serves the half-savage man to fish and make short outings (p. 98).

Thus, ‘sambo’ lives in “[…] an indolent way, without any religion, no social relationships, free from any authority, content with his miserable fate and without any aspiration” (p. 98). In that way, “[…] he believes he is more fortunate than anyone else,
because he does not have the citizen’s duties nor the needs of civilization” (p. 98). He has all he needs:

His eternal plantain, corn and mandioca fields (these last ones being almost a luxury), his hammock, his net and his canoe, suffice him to live with. When he needs some salt, lead for his net, a matchet, a knife, a mattock or any piece of fabric or any other cloth, he fills his piragua with plantains, mandiocas and dried fish, and goes to sell them to the nearest village or parish, he provides himself of anything he needs and comes back to his life of indolent repose. (p. 98).

From these images of the ‘sambo’ as the “worst caste or race in the country” Samper does not infer a pessimist vision over his future and his place in the New Granada. Even though ‘he will continue to vegetating while he continues to be isolated and ‘desert surrounds him’,

[…] the development of commerce, sailing, communication pathways, of agriculture, etc., will be bringing civilization, from a conquest to the next, through the forests and valleys; and not too late those inferior castes, mixed with the common movement, will receive some instruction, will be gradually educated, up to rise higher, through freedom and equality, by means of contact and fusion with the other castes (p. 99).

The influence of the civilizing movement that will arrive up to the ‘indolent’s’ settlement, who ‘lacks any aspiration’ will redeem ‘sambo’. Thus, “His industrial participation shall be needed; as mestizo’s physical strength was barely driven by a lack of stimulus and application” (p. 99).

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Samper openly celebrates the ‘mestizo civilization’ emerging in the New World from the gradual ‘fusion’ of ‘races’, which tends to the dominance of the ‘European component’. He forecasts, also, the disappearance of ‘indigenous races’ due to the progressive absorption by ‘white and black races’, which he considers to be stronger, the
first ones in the intellectual aspects and the second ones in physical and reproductive issues. The emerging ‘mestizo civilization’ is not so much the result of the colonial regime as an outcome of the independent republics, and particularly of ‘democracy’, which makes easy for ‘races’ to cross. In its turn, democracy is strengthened by that crossing because no ‘race’ can pretend to have an ‘aristocratic ascendancy’ over the rest adducing a purity of origin. Thus Samper sets up a correlation between the ‘crossing of races’, democracy and the emergence of a ‘mestizo civilization’. Hence he refers to that crossing in terms of a ‘physiology’ of politics. That crossing does not mean, however, a mere blurring of racial differences in a homogeneous and indistinct mestizo race, but the reconfiguration of such differences on the basis of the existing geographical and climatic variations.

Before the Spaniards arrived, a clear geographic distribution of races and civilization had always existed —for Samper—, varying according altitude scales and degrees of temperature. To describe that geography of races and civilization in his epoch’s New Granada, Samper coins the concept of ‘ethnographic zones’, which he understands as a correlation between several characteristics of the environment and prevalence of certain ‘races’, ‘castes’ or ‘types’. While the different ethnographic zones relate to a hierarchy (where ‘white race’ and ‘civilization’ occupy the first place), Samper considers that variation mainly in terms of complementarity making society an interdependent living stratification reflecting geographical and climatic differences. Samper interprets those conditions in New Granada as a result of Providence’s work, and justifies slavery imposed to African people. Also, he celebrates the current political
regime as the best possible institution in contradistinction to the breakdown of the Colonial regime.

The two ‘Granadine types’ he analyses appear in a clear contrast. The ‘mulatto’ is subject to innumerable apologies to his ‘fair qualities’, while ‘sambo’ is considered plainly as ‘the worst caste or race in the country’, a ‘race of animals’. The ‘mulatto’ has kept in his physical structure a stronger influence from blacks than from whites, but regarding moral qualities, white race has prevailed. Even though he is ‘turbulent’ by nature (“the mulatto is turbulent because he is a mulatto”), a few features that are troublesome for his participation in the New World may be sorted out through education and democracy.

‘Sambo’s’ ‘ugliness’ and animality are expressed in the figures of the rowers, the currulao dancers and the inhabitants of ranches by the riverbanks. Nakedness, savage costumes, libidinous bodies and movements, indolence, as well as the lack of any religion, freedom from any authority and lack of aspirations, make the ‘sambo’ the ‘Granadine type’ that is closer to nature and furthest away from ‘citizen’s duties’ and the ‘needs of civilization’. Only the contact and fusion with other castes due to the boom of trade will make these ‘lower castes’ to rise higher from their ‘miserable condition’.

Conclusions

The three parts comprising this chapter make evident the particular blackness articulations concerning those of ethnization in the end of the 20th century or those passing around in the context of the debate of ‘race’ degeneration in Colombia at the
beginnings of the same century. We can depart by highlighting that rather than being experts, like anthropologists and historians or physicians and hygienists, in the 19th century those who established the articulations of blackness were mainly scholars (jurists and essayists).

Rather than a problematization in terms of cultural difference or ‘biological’ background in the Colombian population, in the first two parts the problematization taking shape is one of moralization of behaviors and the discipline of work performed by the freed populations as the grounds for the maintenance of political order and progress in the emerging republic and nation. In the third part, dating from the second half of the nineteenth century and from the essayist’s approach describes the country for a European audience, the main problematization lies in the positive evaluation of the existence of manifold ethnographical zones showing a populational and geographic variety in New Granada from which a ‘mestizo civilization’ under a democratic regime is outlined.

As opposed to a racial thinking openly associated (but not limited) to a ‘biological’ substrate which was circulating in the debate on the degeneration of ‘race’ in Colombia in the beginnings of the twentieth century, in abolitionists documents studied dating from the nineteenth century, the term ‘race’ only appears marginally (and never openly associated with the ‘biological’) and does not provide any argument advocating for or against abolition. It is not that some immanent characteristics to slaves or freed men’s ‘nature’, but their ‘conditions’ of subjugation which explain their features. In the work of Codazzi and Pérez, ‘race’ appears often, but differently from racial articulations from the beginning of the twentieth century —when ‘progress’ was not understood as an ‘improvement’ in ‘race’ through ‘mestization’, by an infusion of European ‘blood’ with
migrations. The programs recommended are government measures aimed to disciplining work or imitating hard-working population.

Samper, in his turn, refers to ‘races’, ‘castes’ or ‘types’ approaching them from the notion of complementarity of the diverse climatic zones to which they are associated, in a tone far away from the pessimist reading of the degeneration of race at the beginnings of the 20th century. A ‘Granadine type’ like the ‘sambo’ —for whom Samper does not hesitate to use derogatory expressions associating sambos with animality— will even have a better future, Samper believes, thanks to the influence of other peoples which will occur through a boom in commerce. This will be given not through their disappearance by biologic blending with other ‘races’, but through historic processes of commerce, education and imitation, making ‘sambos’ rise higher than their current condition.

As it can be seen, Samper’s arguments are similar to those of Codazzi and Pérez, and to those posed in the abolitionist debate and measures. They help us glimpse some articulations of blackness that diverge from the articulations established at the beginning of the twentieth century or, even more, from those that would become associated with ethnization by the close of the same century.
In 1611, a slave ship approached the port of Cartagena de Indias coming from Cape Verde. Since the ship was “infested with smallpox, measles and typhus”, local authorities impeded its entry to the city fearing the infections would spread. Despite the difficulty that meant for them, several monks from the Company of Jesus reached the ship promptly. Once aboard, they found “[…] many people seriously ill with smallpox, bent from the severity of their illnesses, those who were seemingly the most dangerous […].” In spite of their pitiful condition, those who drew Father Alonso de Sandoval’s attention were “[…] three who were sick with diarrhea, each one from a different nation, language and caste.” Immediately he got ready to catechize them and give them the baptism, with such industriousness, that they were all baptized that very evening. When he came back, two of the three sick men had died. However, thanks to his diligent and sound intervention they had been set free from what, to the religious eye, was immeasurably worse than captivity, illness, and the extreme misery of their bodies, in other words, the

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1 For a detailed analysis of illnesses suffered by enslaved people, and classifications at the epoch, see Chandler (1981).
‘eternal condemnation’ of their ‘souls’, where they died without receiving the sacrament of baptism.²

From 1607 until his death in 1652, Sandoval devoted much of his labor as a member of this religious order to catechize, baptize, and administer other sacraments to hundreds of slaves who landed at the port of Cartagena (Astrain 1919: 596-597). According to estimates made at the time, sixty thousand adults were baptized by Sandoval “[…] after instructing them with incredible endurance and patience.”³ Other Jesuits participated in this work with equal or greater commitment. However, it was Sandoval who drafted a treaty that was first published in 1627 in the city of Seville, Spain, which was titled: *Nature, holy and profane policy, customs and rites, discipline and evangelical catechism among all Ethiopians.*⁴

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² This account was found at the “Annuas” of 1611, quoted by Astrain (1919: 600). Sandoval refers to the same story, too ([1627] 1956: 575).


⁴ During Sandoval’s life, two editions were published with twenty years between both of them. As I have already noted, the first edition was printed in Seville in 1627 entitled: *Naturaleza, policía sagrada i profana, costumbres i ritos, disciplina i catecismo evangélico de todos los etíopes* (Nature, holy and profane policy, customs and rites, discipline and evangelical catechism among all Ethiopians). According to Valtierra (1956: xxi), Sandoval might have written his book in a recess in Lima, between 1617 and 1619, because not only the bibliography he quotes involved a collection which could hardly be found in Cartagena at that time, but also because there are some records from 1620 evidencing the existence of the manuscript. Twenty years later, in 1647, a new edition was published in Madrid, this time under the title of: *De Instauranda Æthiopum Salute. Historia de Ætiopia, naturaleza, Policía sagrada y profana, costumbres, ritos y catechismo evangélico, de todos los aetíopes con que se restaura la salud de sus almas*. However, in that second edition only the first part was printed, with the title: “De la naturaleza, policía sagrada, y profana, costumbres, abusos, rítos de todos los Etiopes que se conocen en el mundo: y de otras cosas notables, que se encuentran en sus Reinos. De su esclavitud, predicación en ellos del Apóstol S. Tomé. De sus Santos, y Varones ilustres” (1647: 1). On the Latin terms in the title: *instauranda* and *salute*, Alberto Gutierrez S.J., professor of Storia Ecclesiastica at the Pontificia Università Gregoriana, in Rome, noted: “Instaurare means ethimologically: renovate, repeat, restart... but classics use it also in the sense of: solidly establish, edify, build, organize, etc.
First of all, Sandoval’s work presents a detailed description and a thorough defense resulting from his vast experience in a missionary technology focused on “restoring salvation to blacks” ([1627] 1956: 6; 1647: 14qq), who set sail from ports in Africa to come as slaves to the West Indies. Rather than being led to ‘convert’ ‘Ethiopians’ in their lands, the ‘main and primary aim’ of this missionary technology consisted of ‘reparation’ and ‘restoration’ through a proper baptism, of ‘spiritual health’ to ‘black slaves’, referred to as ‘bozales’, who came in ships ‘armatures’ as if they were ‘Christians’ without actually being so([1627] 1956: 6-7: 14qq). It was a technology of ‘restoration’, ‘reparation’, as long as it turned into ‘real Christians’ those who were considered as such without being it. It was a missionary technology aiming to create conditions for the salvation of each and every ‘bozal’ through a detailed and individualized test and the proper intervention.

In order to implement such interventions, it was necessary to gather some differentiating information to aid in the understanding about ‘Ethiopians’ bodies, places of origin, ‘castes’, ‘nations’ and ‘languages’, along with a thorough and continuous

In the language of the epoch, it is the verb used to refer to the establishment of the process of the ‘Christian police’ or the Christian evangelization popes and kings aimed for, and which was passed to the ‘Laws of the Indies’” On another hand, “Salus: is a very broad term in Latin language, meaning health, fitness... safety, life, salvation, moral and spiritual health... eternal redemption” (email communication from April 13th, 2005).

5 ‘Bozal’ was the term used to refer to slaves recently come from Africa, and who did not understand the ‘Spanish language’ neither their ‘costums’ nor the ‘Christian police’. In contrast, ‘ladino’ referred to those ‘Ethiopians’ who, having lived in ‘Christians’ land’, had acquired some of their ‘language’, ‘costums’ and ‘police’.

6 Armature meant a slave cargo: “They are called an armature (if there are three hundred, four, five and even six hundred and more, which is the amount a vessel can be loaded with), and armatures if there is a number enough to load many vessels; and those are the most commonly seen arriving to this city, twelve to fourteen a year, carrying such an amount of blacks each; the cargo of a few black people is referred to as a lot” ([1627] 1956: 107).

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register of each slave (both ‘bozales’ and ‘ladinos’), their particular characteristics, and their spatial location in the city. That knowledge was not pretentious, but pragmatically aimed to differentiate ‘Ethiopians’, in order to readily guide, almost with a single look, a hermeneutics of bodies in the interest of identifying the requirements to examine and intervene promptly and adequately on their souls. It was a knowledge that resulted from concrete practice and around a defined problematic; a ‘subordinate knowledge’ that ran parallel, underneath and close to, but not openly against the knowledge embodied by the ‘solemn doctors’.

That missionary technology was not, like a perfect syllogism, the result of abstract disquisitions or the exegesis of existing texts, but it was born from the ‘religious’ daily practice, mainly in the ‘armatures’, “[...] bearing the stench of the rotten bodies and the very dark feces [...]” of dying ‘bozales’, who —since they were not ‘properly baptized’ or not baptized at all— died being condemned “for all eternity”. It was because of the distress that the ‘bozal’s’ dying body caused in the ‘religious’ man, that an entire missionary technology was defined, distilled, instrumentalized: “[...] those poor blacks, who die in droves, lacking even someone to prepare a medicine for them not to mention someone to regret or feel compassionate of their certain eternal damnation [...]” ([1627] 1956: 484).

It is due to this ‘monk’s’ astonishment that a thorough technology of ‘salvation’ was deployed over the irreducible individuality of the “bozal.” That is why, on behalf of ‘those blacks’ salvation’, each and every house in town was visited, ‘masters and captains

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of vessels’ were inquired, landing sites were constantly visited and, even, slave trader vessels that weren’t yet allowed to land ill ‘armatures’ —because of fear of infections spread— were boarded.

Sandoval gathered materials, described procedures. Even before being published, Sandoval’s innumerable letters and communications made people in distant places such as Jesuits in Loanda (Africa) or high pontiffs, like the archbishop of Seville (in Europe) ask themselves about concepts and practices that had been part of the common sense of how to regard ‘black slaves’ up until then. Sandoval makes visible a problematization suggesting the transformation of the modalities of intervention over the bodies and souls of ‘Ethiopians’, who arrived squeezed together by the hundreds inside the holds of Portuguese vessels.8

Sandoval’s imprint marked his contemporary Jesuit companions’ work in Cartagena; among whom was Pedro Claver (who was later canonized)9, perhaps the most prominent figure in the historical imaginary, which emerges in our times in a range of official and popular narratives as the “slave of slaves” or the “first fighter for human rights” (Splendiani 2000: Tom. II, VI). Rather than an isolated individual work, Sandoval’s work gathers and gives shape to an emerging problematization which interpellates missionary work. A problematic that several religious sectors faced as the

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8 By that time, Portuguese traders had the monopoly of slave trade for the Spanish colonies. For a history on licences and records granted by The Crown in its colonies, see Palacios Preciado (1973).

9 Claver’s beatification was decreed by the Holy See in 1855 and his canonization, in 1888, more than 200 years after his death (Splendiani 2000: 36).
increasing number of ‘bozales’ and ‘ladinos’ rendered their Christian notions questionable.

After it was published, numerous monks followed the guidelines that Sandoval recorded in his work in the interest of ‘restoring spiritual health’ to ‘Ethiopians’ who arrived to the West Indies or to Spain. As Valtierra notes (1956: xxv), Sandoval’s work was soon turned into a sort of ‘vade mecum’, a ‘handbook’ on the ‘missionary methodology’ throwing new light on the monks’ intervention. In the same sense, Vila Vilar notes in her introduction to the most recent edition that “[...] his printed methods were being used successfully by other companions and followers [...]” (1987: 38). And that was not only in Cartagena or the West Indies. The archbishop of Seville, for instance, enacted an Instruction which derives itself from Sandoval’s guidelines, echoing his procedures and concerns. Besides, in an article devoted to Afroamerican missionary work, anthropologist Pedro Pablo Morales (1987: 272) considers that Sandoval was the genuine architect of that pastoral, the steps of which were followed by those who were devoted to that work at the time.

In this chapter, I will study Sandoval’s work in order to evince the problematization he suggested. In doing that, I intend to reveal his singularity and the density of the discourses and practices designated and assumed by Sandoval on ‘Ethiopian slaves,’ either ‘bozales’ or ‘ladinos’. Such a density and singularity refer us to some particular

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10 ‘Missional methodology’ suggested by Sandoval has an antecedent and a clear influence in Joseph de Acosta’s work (Chaves 2007: 77). Hence, to make a genealogy of such a ‘methodology’, we should consider Acosta’s conceptualizations. On the theoretical grounds presented in the first chapter, that work transcends the aims of this dissertation.

11 This Instruction is reproduced by Sandoval ([1627] 1956: 463-475).
articulations of blackness and to a technology of intervention. These articulations of blackness are related to a set of notions that I will examine thoroughly, such as those of ‘Ethiopians’, their ‘nature’, their ‘features’, their ‘natural and moral customs’, ‘false religions’, ‘ceremonies’ and ‘rites’, which do not obliterate plurality and singularity among its various ‘nations’ and ‘castes’. Additionally, the technology of intervention involves some dominance over slaves’ bodies through the salvation of soul, but also has an impact on the relationships between them and ‘masters’ and ‘monks’. Such a technology is related to Sandoval’s notions of (‘sacred’ and ‘profane’) ‘police’ and those of ‘discipline’ and ‘evangelic catechism’ and could be defined as a technology of salvation.

1. On Ethiopians and other black nations:

Articulations of blackness in Sandoval’s work

*Ethiopia y Ethiopians: exegesis of this name and considerations about the concept*

Regarding the name, Sandoval makes use of the exegesis establishing associations between ‘Ethiopia’ and the ‘black color of its natives’:

In reference to the name, in former times dignified doctors called Ethiopia Ethera, sphere, heaven or fire element. Referring to the Genesis, Iosepho and El Tostado say that Sacred Scriptures, according to the original Hebrew text, call Abyssinia, Chus; and its natives Abyssinians, chusians, taking the derivation from the name of Chus, Ham’s son, who populated it, because Chus means the same among Hebrews as Ethiopian means among us. Pliny says, on chapter thirty six from his sixth book, he took the denomination of Ethiopian, son of Vulcan, that prevails in those places. Others say that the name comes from the verb *cremo*, meaning ‘to burn’ and thus saying Ethiopians is equivalent to say burnt-faced men ([1627] 1956: 20-21).
In the Sevillian Edition, Sandoval concludes: “For these reasons it is convenient for us to call Ethiopians all black nations, regardless of any other specificities such as Guinean, Calabarian, ardas, Lukumi, Congo, Angolan, Kaffir and Macua among others” ([1627] 1956:21). Sandoval seems thus to establish an identity between ‘Ethiopians’ and ‘blacks’: “[…] Ethiopians (to whom we commonly refer as blacks, due to the color) […]” ([1627]1956: 6; 1647:qq13).

Nonetheless, a more detailed reading of this edition challenges the assumption that Sandoval is operating with articulations of blackness in which this identity is established without tensions or nuances. What justifies a more thorough reading of the first edition is expressly stated by the author in the second one. Thus, after the paragraph cited above about the origin of the name ‘Ethiopia’, Sandoval concludes: “On that ground, and to fully understand the matter and everything we are going to say in this volume, it is convenient to differentiate all black nations. And so I claim that whenever we say Ethiopians, we are making reference to African blacks in general” (1647: 9).

Later, I will present the relationship between the term ‘Ethiopian’, which operates in a general realm, and other more specific terms such as ‘Kaffir ethiopians’ or ‘Guinean Ethiopians’ and the relation between the latter and the notions of ‘nation’ and ‘caste’. For the moment, I want to emphasize the fact that even though Sandoval links ‘Ethiopians’ with ‘black nations’, this does not imply that all ‘black nations’ are necessarily considered ‘Ethiopians’. Besides the ‘color’, the word ‘Ethiopian’ involves a specific
Sandoval differentiates two ‘Ethiopias in Africa’: ‘Western or interior Ethiopia’ and ‘Eastern or above Egypt Ethiopia’. The term ‘Ethiopians’ refers to “black Africans” (1647: 9). In order to achieve a thorough examination of the articulations of blackness adopted by Sandoval, it is necessary to expose five considerations.

The first consideration is that Sandoval openly states that not all ‘African natives’ are ‘Ethiopians’ and, consequently, ‘black nations’. Talking about Africa, he writes: “Four nations of people were its first inhabitants: two of them were native, Africans, who lived in the North, and Ethiopians, who lived in the South; and two foreign nations, Phoenicians and Greeks, who settled in some lands in the North and Levante” ([1627] 1956: 13; 1647: 1647: 7). Thus, while ‘Ethiopians’ are part of one of the two ‘nations of African native people’, they are not the only people, because you also have the ‘Africans’. In this strict sense, for Sandoval ‘Africans’ are part of the other ‘African native nation’, different from the nation of the ‘Ethiopians’. From this perspective, ‘Africans’ are not ‘Ethiopians’ because it is quite different to say ‘Ethiopians’ means ‘black Africans’, in general, than to say ‘Africans’ (as Sandoval understands it in this passage) are ‘Ethiopians’. So, attributing the notion of ‘Africans’ as a synonym of

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12 For Sandoval there are ‘four parts in the world’: Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Upon reading his descriptions about each of these ‘parts’ not only a very specific group of surroundings and ‘confines’ (limits) (far from the ones ‘our’ common sense immediately tends to attribute to them) are made evident, but also a clear hierarchization of them. America is the fourth part while Europe is the first one. These ‘parts of the world’ do not correspond to the series of associations and learnings linked to the contemporary continent geography. For a historization and calling into question of geographical representations imposed today as an indisputable truth, in a rampant presentism, see Pickles (2004).
‘Ethiopians’ to Sandoval or saying that his book is about Africans (without italics) is, at best, an anachronism.

The second consideration is that Sandoval contends that there are ‘black nations (or ‘castes’)’ beyond the confines of ‘Western and Eastern Ethiopia’. So, given that some authors have designated Eastern India as Greater Ethiopia, Sandoval points out that it might be relevant to call ‘Indians’ ‘blacks’:

Virilio and other authors called India the whole Ethiopia [...] And even saint Epifanio, Anastasio, and Nizeno call large Ethiopia the Eastern India, because Indians are tanned, and almost burnt, just like Ethiopians [...] From where I infer that we can, near enough, call all Indians and Ethiopians blacks [...] (1647: 305-306).

Next, Sandoval (1647: 306) punctuates this ‘general statement’ making use of the true knowledge of ‘tanned blacks’ settled in the Eastern India by listing those he considers as such.

The consideration that it is possible to call those ‘Indians’ from ‘Eastern India’ ‘blacks’ cannot be explained by saying that Sandoval ‘confuses’ India and Ethiopia, a confusion in which the former would be part of the latter. On the contrary, by establishing an open and categorical distinction between India and Ethiopia, unlike some authors who have included these ‘regions’ either in the first one or the second, Sandoval concludes, based on other authors, that:

[...] Ethiopia, both superior and interior, can not be certainly called India, not even near India. The reason being it is a region part of Africa, whose name derives from that famous Ethiopian, son of Vulcan, who ruled it. Had it not been that we claim
having taking this designation, both Africa and Ethiopia, from a Greek word, that in our language means to burn, or to have the face tanned (1647: 306).\textsuperscript{13}


Sandoval even mentions that in the Americas several authors indicate the presence of ‘nations of blacks’ in the ‘peruvian’ and ‘magellanic’ parts,\textsuperscript{14} which have been reported by different explorers ([1627] 1956: 11; 1647: 7, 8).\textsuperscript{15} Although in some passages Sandoval uses the category ‘Ethiopians’ to talk equally about both ‘nations of blacks in Asia’ or ‘in the world’,\textsuperscript{16} in general he does not use the notion of ‘Ethiopians’ to talk about these, and never to refer to the few of them who have been indicated in America.

Thus, in general, for Sandoval ‘Ethiopian’ and ‘black’ are not identical terms, they are

\textsuperscript{13} I will talk later about the approach that associates ‘Ethiopians’ and ‘other black nations’ with the image of a ‘tanned face’.

\textsuperscript{14} Sandoval refers to an America conformed by three parts: ‘Mexican’, ‘Peruvian’ and ‘Magellanic’ (1627 1956: 11; 1947: 7).

\textsuperscript{15} Some of them were even slaves: “And Francisco Lopez de Gomara in his general History of Indias, says that this Vasco Nuñes de Balboa having killed Torrecha in battle entered Queraca where he found his black slaves and when he asked where they had been brought from, they only replied there were men with that color near there against whom they fought regularly” (1647: 8). Talking about the priests of the Society of Jesus, Sandoval mentions that in the Amazon there is a “[...] nation very different from the others, which can be found throughout that river, because they are black like Guineans; with black complexion and curly hair [...]” (1647: 8).

\textsuperscript{16} Thus, for example, “[...] the Lord kept hidden for so long Ethiopians nations, scattered all over the world [...]” (1647: 1).
not overlapping or interchangable.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore, the trend marked by Sandoval is that while ‘Ethiopians’ are ‘black’, ‘blacks’ are not (necessarily) ‘Ethiopian’.

The third consideration is that ‘a nation of Ethiopians’ can vary in terms of ‘color’, even including in certain cases ‘whites’. Talking about the ‘fulos’ from ‘Western or Interior Ethiopia’, Sandoval notes:

But what he admires most of this part is what many Portuguese people, who have been in the inlands of the kingdom of the great Fulo, report. They say there are, among them, countless fulos, men and women who are whiter and blonder than Germans, with long straight and golden hair like European women, and who are never captured or come to Spanish lands and therefore we only see here black, mulattoish or fully mulattos, brown, zambo, brownish, almost black (loro), chestnut-colored or tanned fulos here because this nation and even all black nations we have referred to contain such wide variety of colors and many others ([1627] 1956: 23; 1647: 12).

Consequently, the relation established by Sandoval between ‘Ethiopians’ and ‘black nations’ gets more complex since one single ‘nation’ might contain ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’, like in the case of ‘fulos’. It is thus not possible to consider as necessary this association of ‘Ethiopians’ with ‘black color’, because, given its variety, there are at least some ‘Ethiopians’ who are not of this ‘color’ ‘[...] also among all black nations we have referred to” ([1627] 1956: 23; 1647: 12).\textsuperscript{18} As I will address in the next section, Sandoval

\textsuperscript{17} In some passages Sandoval does establish such identity. The following paragraph is an example: “Regarding the constitution of Ethiopians’ heads, Celio Rodiginio reports something very peculiar, and which I find difficult to believe because experience seems to contradict it, and that is that blacks’ heads do not have the fibrous joints, through which the various parts of the head are put together, fit and link to each other, and which we commonly see in dead body skulls, and their heads are one single piece, without any joints or links” (1627 1956: 27).

\textsuperscript{18} Not only can ‘Ethiopians’ be ‘white or other than ‘black’, but also some of them have monstrous shapes like ‘ethiopians cyclopeans (agriópagos)’, who have a single eye on their forehead ([1627] 1956: 165). I will address this point later.
([1627] 1956: 21-24; 1647:10-13) offers detailed and abundant examples of how ‘black’ children are born from ‘white’ parents and vice versa, sometimes conserving, sometimes not, other body features traditionally associated with ‘black nations’.

For Sandoval the ‘black color’ associated with a ‘nation’ is not always identical. Instead, he acknowledges the existence of different shades of ‘blackness’ (just like there are different shades of ‘whiteness’): “[...] you can tell the difference between them almost by their hues; because there are white men with different types of whiteness and black men with different types of blackness: and it goes from white to russet and blond, and from black to ash-colored, swarthy, reddish and fulvous [...]” (1647: 10).19 Throughout his work Sandoval uses a wide vocabulary to talk about the different ‘ways of blackness’ of ‘men’. From ‘tanned blacks’ to a “[...] great variety; some of them are blacker than others; some others are not so black; others are reported to have the color of the baked quince; others are almost black (loro) or zambo, or brownish, mulattoish and tanned colored [...]” (1647: 91). Apart from indicating this variety in a great deal of his descriptions of the various ‘reigns’, ‘provinces’ and ‘regions’ of blacks in the world, Sandoval also shows it in the sections devoted to the cartography of slaves’, bodies.20

The fourth consideration is that sometimes Sandoval uses the terms ‘dark-skinned’ and ‘swarthy’ as synonyms of ‘black’, but in other passages he seems to consider them two of the many possible ‘ways of blackness’. Regarding the use of the term ‘dark-

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19 This fragment is part of the modifications and developments that Sandoval introduced in the edition of 1647.

20 Regarding the terms associated with the ‘degrees of blackness’ by Sandoval, the Diccionario de Autoridades (Dictionary of Authorities) published in the XVIIIth century can offer some hints: “Bazo, za. (brownish) Adj. Dark and yellowish color” (RAA 1726: 582).
skinned’, Sandoval writes: “[...] universally we use the designation Ethiopians for all the dark-skinned people from Africa” (1647: 10). In another passage describing different explanations offered by several authors about the black color of hair, Sandoval points in his second edition (replacing the word ‘Ethiopians’ he used in his first edition and preserving untouched the rest of the text): “And the cause of the fact that the hair of these dark-skinned people [‘Ethiopians’ in the first edition] is usually very black, says Avicena, and Celio, is that extremely hot places results in black color, because of the vehement severity of the smoky nature which makes it natural to be born with this kind of hair” (1647: 22; 1627 1956: 27).

Concerning the term ‘swarthy’ (Moreno), there are many more cases illustrating how this term functions as a substitute for ‘black’. For example, the title of the fourth book of the first edition is: “Our sacred religion of the Society of Jesus has always held the highest esteem for swarthy people and its interest in their spiritual wellbeing and it has made glorious efforts to convert these souls” ([1627] 1956: 477). However, there are also passages in the work where ‘swarthy’ (Moreno) refers to a ‘way of blackness’: “[...] it is so common for us to see the birth [...] of swarthy children, and even very black, from white parents, and very white, blond and rubicund children from black parents. [...]” ([1627] 1956: 21; 1647: 10).

Finally, the fifth consideration is that while Sandoval distinguishes between ‘Ethiopians’ and ‘black nations’ in the ways previously indicated, this does not imply that the articulation of blackness within which Sandoval operates consists of a simple dichotomy between nations with various ‘ways of whiteness’ and ‘blackness’. In other words, Sandoval is not saying that all non ‘white nations’ are ‘black’. Even though he
refers to them in particular, ‘natives’ from America are not of ‘black color’: “[...] Indians from our world, most of whom are, in general, fulvous or baked-quince colored, or chestnut-colored [...]” (1647: 10). Later in the second edition, when challenging the relation that some authors have established between ‘color’ and ‘temper’, he clearly expresses this point: “[...] in Sevilla, people are white, in Africa they are black, in our Indias fulvous, in the Rio de la plata chestnut-colored, they are at equal degrees from the equinoctial: and men from Asia and Africa who live by the Torrid Zone, are black, and those who live below such Zone are not, in Mexico, Peru and Quito [...]” (1647: 17; emphasis added).

‘Germans’ are cited to exemplify an extreme ‘whiteness’, thereby operating as a paradigm of ‘whiteness’.21 In other countries, Sandoval presumes that a Spanish man or woman is necessarily ‘white’.22 So there is a close connection between Europe and the ‘ways of whiteness’ or ‘whites’. However, the different ‘ways of whiteness’ are not exclusive to Europe. In the referred literature on the discussion of whether the ‘temper’ and the ‘climate’ determine the ‘color’, Sandoval points the existence of ‘whites’ in China:

21 The above cited passage on fulos who are whiter and blonder than Germans is an example. In one of the transcripts which referred to a case observed by Sandoval in Mompox involving some white girls who were born from black parents, he also illustrates this point. Yet another passage: “[...] whose natives [from a group of islands located in the magellanic zone of America or, according to other authors in Asia] are black like Kaffirs, they have untidy hair, with big and curly mats of hair: their faces are skinny and ugly, although amid them (as I said) there are some who are as white and blond as Germans. They are domestic and keen witted people.” (1647: 9).

22 As it is evident in a previous quote formerly mentioned: “[...] Spaniards living in lands of blacks, married to other Spaniards, will give birth to black children; and on the contrary, in our Europe swarthy people will give birth to white children, something the experience contradicts” ([1627] 1956: 26; 1647: 26).
[...] in China, Guangzhou, where Chinese people are employed, you can see they have very different colors: because those who are born in Guangzhou and its coasts are swarthy [...] and those from inland provinces are white, some of them more than others, according to the proximity of cold lands: because some of them are similar to the ones in Spain and others are blonder, even resembling Germans, blond and rubicund ([1627] 1956: 25; 1647: 16).

Likewise, Sandoval reports the existence of ‘whites’ in Eastern India “[...] Mayol [...] found a climate so varied in the so called mount Zanton that people who were born and live in the part overlooking the East are white: while in the zone overlooking the West all inhabitants are greatly black (albeit both groups live like beasts) [...]” (1647: 16).

In turn, the geographical distribution of the various ‘ways of blackness’ is much broader and extends over the other three ‘parts of the world’. Although, according to what has been said, Sandoval does not hesitate to talk about ‘nations’ of ‘black color’ in Asia and to mention some reported cases in America, it is in Africa and specifically in the two Ethiopias where these nations are more widely represented.

‘Black color’ of bodies: ‘cause’, ‘quality’ and ‘nature’

Sandoval presents the ‘causes’ that have been brandished from the ‘ancients’ to the ‘contemporaries’ to explain the ‘black color’ of ‘nations’ like the ‘Ethiopians’ with a different level of detail. He begins by reiterating the postulate referring to the “[...] reign of the imagination over the actions of the body [...]” ([1627] 1956: 21; 1647: 11) at the moment of ‘conception’, to explain the differences of ‘conditions’ and ‘qualities’ between parents and their children: “[...] it is a common occurrence to see, ugly children, born from very beautiful parents, and the opposite, from ugly parents, beautiful children,
and from white parents, dark or even very dark skinned children, and from black parents very white, blond, light-eyed and rosy-cheeked children [...]” ([1627] 1956: 21; 1647: 10).

This explanation dates back to Aristotle, who alleged the following about the forementioned variations: “[…] imaginatio facit casum: that the cause is the imagination, which is greatly varied in man at the moment of conception. It is there where the birth of children sometimes so different and dissimilar to their parents originates” ([1627] 1956: 21; 1647: 10). It is at the moment of ‘creation’ (conception), that radical differences between progenitors and their offspring are sometimes introduced, due to the ‘reign’ of the imagination. Consequently, this ‘dissimilarity’ of parents to their progeny cannot be established in ‘irrational animals’, which do not possess “such a rich imaginativeness” (1647: 10)\(^{23}\), as frequently as in ‘men’ who are considered ‘rational animals’.

Sandoval goes on to illustrate this point by recurring to literature and to his own experiences on how ‘black’ children are born from ‘white’ parents, or vice versa. As, for example:

And from the Kingdom of Beni I have true and faithful information that many black women of this chaste and generation whose husbands are also black, birth children of such whiteness, that out of pure dawns [in the 1647 edition it says ‘pure whites’] they are born near sighted and with sterling hair, also the children of these whites are with variable frequency born black again, but all of them, white or black, are effeminate, little useful and are only apt as conjurors ([1627] 1956: 22; 1647: 12).

\(^{23}\) The complete fragment is: “[…] the cause is the imagination, which is greatly varied in man at the moment of creation. It is from where the birth of children sometimes so different and dissimilar to their parents originates. This can be verified, though to a limited extent with brute animals, in the sense that they do not possess as great imaginativeness as men: hence forth their brood is born ordinary, unoriginal and very much alike their source” (1647: 10).
One of the richest passages that can be used to understand the complicated aspects of the articulations of blackness adopted by Sandoval actually corresponds to his own observations about the subject matter. It is justifiable to transcribe it here extensively since I shall soon refer back to several of its abstracts.

What I did see with my own eyes in this City of Cartagena de las Indias was a boy named Francisco, seven years of age, from the nation of Angola, originally from the town of Quilombo, whose parents were black skinned, yet he was white like no other, his whiteness exceedingly prominent, blond and of distinguishable Spanish-like features, who was the wonder of the whole city which he awed, and which would parade him about from here to there throughout its streets; he had murky and very near-sighted eyes: the only trace of his black heritage was in his rounded nose and in his hair, which although golden was very coiled...what I witnessed in the township of Mompós, a part of the same Governmental district as the city of Cartagena was no less wondrous, it was in the presence of four of the gravest Priests in the Province of the New Kingdom of Granada, where we were headed around the year 1621 towards the Provincial Congregation, and they were no less astonished by the marvel. It so happens that we were showed three young lasses, legitimate daughters of Martin, a black from Angola, and of Maria, his wife, also from Angola, also black, slaves to Marin de Istayza and Ana Gomez, his wife, both neighbors of said township. The first was named Juana, nine years of age, of good graces, appearance and Spanish-like features, yet black like her parents. The second would have been about six, named Ventura, homely, thick-lipped, wide-nosed, big-legged like a black woman, never the less, blonder and more light-eyed than a German, I say she was predominantly white, so white that she could not see well. And her hair though coiled like that of a black woman, was of a color between golden and silver. The third named Theodora would be about two, white, blonde and light-eyed also as near sighted as the second, but even more homely. When the first of these two monsters, sort of speak, was born, the house was ablaze with jealousy and suspicions, reiteratedly accusing its mother of illicit behavior, and even though she put out that fire, when her husband and a certain priest were able to verify the spouse’s paternity, since back in Angola he had bore a son with another black woman who had been born as white as the daughter whose legitimacy was in question and that besides that his brothers, and his mother’s daughters, had been born alternatively mixed, some white, and some black, moreover the second birth stilled the turmoil, and put an end to the suspicions. And a few days later, while we were all heading up the river of the Magdalena, we gazed (with admiration as they were rowing in one of 30 canoes which had been joined in a fleet) upon the same parents as before and two bothers sons of black parents, who were natives from the same township, one coal black skinned and the other of such a particular and fiery orange color, that when we laid eyes on him we knew of wonder, and to see the locks on one so yellow and so
entwined and so black on the other, I thought was akin to seeing the sort of ethiopians to which Solino refers to, that have a body which is the color of gold [...] ([1627] 1956: 23-24; 1647: 11-12).

To explain these and other ‘marvels’, Sandoval echoes the thesis which states that “[...] the force of the parents’ imagination at the moment of conception of their children [is the cause] is what impresses upon them the traces and characteristics of all things conceived” ([1627] 1956: 22, 1647: 11).24

This ‘force of the imagination’ or of the ‘fantasy’ which intervenes in the ‘act of creation’ is not exclusive to the mother: “And this force of the fantasy in the act of creation, is no less present in the imaginativeness of the father, than in that of the mother, what’s more because of it being an efficient cause in itself, or being unique amongst the secondary causes, or being the main one, it can transmit itself and make a stronger impression of the image it wants to project.” (1647: 14). Therefore, “[...] it is a vehement imagination which imprints an idea of the imagined thing upon matter, thus causing a resemblance to it, as can be proven besides with what has already been said, with many examples from the ancients, who for instance by imagining the statues and paintings of the time conceived children in their likeness.” ([1627] 1956: 24).25 Following this line of

24 Although the force of the imagination or of the fantasy also has its domain over what was created after conception: “[...] the domain of this fantasy, is not limited only to the moment of conception, but rather it extends throughout the period of time where that which was created remains inside of the mother’s womb” (1647: 15).

25 For the second edition, this transcription ends in “in its likeness”, Sandoval thus introducing more detailed elaborations about the relationship between the imagination, the soul, and conception. (1647:13-15).
thought, Sandoval notes “ [...] it would seem then that we have reduced the cause for the color of the Ethiopians to the imagination.” ([1627] 1956: 24).  

Even though he shares in the notion that the ‘imagination’ can explain the cases of ‘dissimilarity’ between parents and children, Sandoval does not consider that this ‘cause’ truly explains the presence of the ‘ethiopians’ or of the ‘nations of black color’ in general. The ‘cause’ brandished by ‘other philosophers’ questioning this ‘reign of the imagination’ has been different since, based on Aristotle’s second book *De Anima*, they consider that ‘creation’ should be attributed to the ‘sensitive’ and to the ‘vegetative soul’, but not so to the ‘rational’ ([1627] 1956: 24; 1647: 15). From here, they argue that their point is proven by the fact that a horse breeds another horse without having a ‘rational soul’ and a plant begets another plant without possessing a ‘sensitive soul’. Moreover, in the latter, differences can occur even within the fruits of the same bunch without the intervention of the ‘rational soul’ which they are devoid of by ‘nature’.

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26 “And so, according to this sentence, it would seem that these Philosophers pretend that we reduce the cause for the color of the Ethiopians to the imagination. But let us read the next chapter attentively” (1647: 15).

27 Matter to which I shall return later on in reference to its arguments about *monsters* and *human nature*.

28 A contrast between the two editions is presented here, which seems to be easily attributable to a mistake of the first edition, as the argument following remains consistent. In the first edition Sandoval excludes both the ‘sensitive essence’ and the ‘rational essence’ from the cause of the ‘creation’: “Other philosophers, however reverent of Aristotle’s sentence, second book of *De Anima*, all in all follow a different path hence proving that regardless of Aristotle’s sentence, which attributes creation to the vegetative essence and not to the sensitive nor to the rational conclude this cannot be so [...]” ([1627] 1956: 24). By contrast in the second Edition it is clear that only the ‘rational essence’ is excluded: “Other grave philosophers follow a different path hence proving that what we have argued in the previous chapter cannot be so, regardless even of Aristotle’s very own sentence which attributes creation to the vegetative, and to the sensitive essence, and not so to the rational essence [...]” (1647: 15).
Sandoval, however, does not consider this argument to be an accurate rebuttal of the thesis of the imagination given that ‘man’, in part due to his ‘nature’, is the only being capable of rationality, the ‘rational soul’\(^{29}\) encloses and contains the other two ‘souls’ (the ‘sensitive’ and the ‘vegetative’): “[...] in the creation of his peer which is man a rational animal where all three souls concur [...] with their virtues and functions” ([1627] 1956: 25; 1647: 16). These ‘virtues’ and ‘functions’ of the three ‘essences’ or ‘souls’ would be: “[...] the rational rationalizes, argues and imagines; the sensitive feels, and the vegetative increases, grows and dilates.” ([1627] 1956: 25; 1647: 16).

For these philosophers then it is to the ‘sensitive’ and to the ‘vegetative soul’ to which the ‘creation’ of a peer can be attributed, as for the cause of unlikeness, they prefer recurring to an alternate explanation: “So, these philosophers allege that the provenance of these black colored nations lies in the heat that exists on the surface of the body, which brazes and chars the complexion since the lands inhabited by them are wounded with extraordinary violence by the Sun, and are therefore very warm.” (1647: 16).\(^{30}\) Sandoval admits that this premise seems to stem from the observation of the diversity of ‘colors’ related to the ‘temperament’ of the land which they inhabit: “Prompted towards this by

\(^{29}\) Notice that Sandoval is using the notion of ‘soul’ and of ‘essence’ indistinctively in this abstract. From there he considers that “[...] man is a rational animal in which all three souls concur [...]” ([1627] 1956: 25).

\(^{30}\) The transcript of the second Edition is the following. “So they say that the cause of existence of black ethiopians stems from the heat lying on the surface of the body, which brazes and chars complexion, due to the fact that the lands which they inhabit are wounded by the sun with extraordinary violence, and are therefore very warm weathered.” ([1627] 1956: 25) Notice how Sandoval changes ‘ethiopians’ for ‘nations of black color’, which supports my thesis that Sandoval does not establish a discernable identity in his articulation of blackness between ‘ethiopians’ and ‘nations of black color’ or ‘blacks’. Also, notice the difference (this time attributable to the grammatical reform of the print) of ‘face’ and ‘warm’ for ‘warm weathered’.
experience, observing in men (wandering all over the world) just as much difference in their colors as the difference related to the temperament of the land which they inhabit” ([1627] 1956: 25; 1647: 16).

Sandoval, nonetheless appeals to the same experience to question this argument as the “[...] cause for the marvel: because if temper made it or the climate caused it, the Spaniards who live in land of the blacks, married to Spanish women, would engender blacks; and the opposite, in our Europe the blacks would engender whites [...]” ([1627] 1956: 26; 1647: 16). In the second edition Sandoval adds the following passage, which leaves no room for doubt about his position on the matter:

So then, this variety in colors, does not stem from the Sun, nor the land: because we can observe that in neighboring places to the two Tropics, some very white people or of ashen color, who remain unchangeable in their colorlessness can be found amongst others who are very black, as in the kingdom of Melinde, and Mombasa. And in some places where its hotter under the same Parallel (which is of the same climate and firmament constitution) we also see, that in some parts, like in this America, men are born white: in others, like in the Abyssinian Regions, of a reddish, or dark brown color, and in others very black, as in one Providence in Asia, which they call Malabar, and other Provinces and Kingdoms (1647: 17).

Hence, it is clear at least in what refers to the diversity of ‘colors’ amongst ‘men,’ that Sandoval is in no way near the approaches of what centuries later gained form as ‘environmental determinism’ or ‘geographic determinism’. If experience leads to discarding the ‘temperament of the inhabited earth’ (‘temper’, ‘climate’, ‘sun’, ‘land’, ‘Parallel’ or ‘firmament constitution’) as the ‘cause’ behind the difference of ‘colors’ that exists amongst ‘men’, Sandoval proposes that two alternatives are left: (1) the “will of
God” or (2) “[...] the particular qualities that these people intrinsically possess within
themselves” ([1627] 1956: 26).31

According to Sandoval, philosophers have explored this second alternative stating that :
“ [...] whiteness originates from the highest [‘and predominant’, he adds in the
second edition] coldness, as seen in snow, and blackness from the utmost [‘and
excessive’, he adds in the second edition] heat, as seen in tar; which is substantiated with
the thoughts of Aristotle and other ancients, who reduced the whiteness of the swan to the
coldness of the mother’s womb, and the blackness of the crow to the heat of the same
matrix [...]” ([1627] 1956: 26; 1647: 17). In this line of reasoning, then, it is, in an ‘innate
and intrinsic quality of utmost and excessive heat’ where the philosophers would find the
‘cause’ for the ‘black color’ of some ‘men’.32 Sandoval accepts this approach, but
attributes it a divine intervention over the ‘first qualities’ which would be made explicit
in the ‘second quality of blackness’:

Thus it is my opinion, and sentence in such a debated matter, that the black
complexion of all these eritrean nations, did not originate only from the curse
which Noah cast upon his grandson Canaan (which we will later state) but, also

31 Again, the second Edition is more complete than the first: “It seems that this originates, either
from the will of God, who intended this variety, for the adornment and beauty of the universe; or
from the qualities which are intrinsically particular to these people themselves; or Proficit à
spermatis natura; this is, from the semblance, and quality of the forbearers” (1647: 17). In this
case however, it would seem, that Sandoval is making a mention of three alternatives instead of
two.

32 In this point it becomes extremely valuable to contrast the two editions, since the first only
dedicates one paragraph and a half to what would be his position, which for its briefness and lack
of clarity allows attributing to Sandoval what was actually a conventional interpretation within
Christianity, which was that not only the existence of blacks but also that the first slavery was
simply a form of divine punishment that had been cast upon the descendants of Ham. Despite the
previous, in light of the second edition, the revision of the first shows that even though Sandoval
accepts this interpretation, he does so by introducing other elements that lead him to other
conclusions, as I will establish in the following paragraphs.
rather from a predominant, innate, and intrinsic quality, God raised Ham with, which was excessive heat, so that the children he bore, would come out with this charred appearance, hence branded as the descendants of a man who hath dared dishonor his father with such impertinence; and so it was decreed, that in the seminal matter of his firstborn Chus, and in no other, such a temperament for the first qualities would be present, which was fundamental in order for that second quality of blackness to stem from them, hencefore Ham would not be lacking that excess of heat, which Philosopher’s require for the black color (1647: 17).

The creation of this ‘first quality’, associated with ‘excessive heat’ (which is ‘predominant’ ‘innate’ and ‘intrinsic’ and would manifest itself in the form of the ‘second quality of blackness’), was initially introduced by God “[...] for the variety, and beauty, which he intended nature to have, and is therefore the reason for the diversity of colors in birds and other animals in nature [...]” (1647: 18). It is only later that

[...] it was precisely with apprehension, and with reserve, how that black color which until then was a part of variety, and begot beauty, would become char, and stain, and in the scarlet letter (sort of speak) of the Blacks, for being descendants of such a grandfather, who was punished after he hath committed against his father Noah a horrid deed of an ugliness as intrinsic as embedded in its evil nature [...] (1647: 18-19).33

Of course Sandoval quotes and echoes ‘grave authors’ who make all ‘blacks’ descend from Ham as divine punishment due to the curse cast upon him by his father Noah: “[...] many authors state, that the Ethiopians, the blacks, and all other eritreans, descend from

33 The complete fragment is the following: “By this we do not mean to say, that the blackness of Chus was given to him by God from the very beginning as punishment, or as penance, for him or his father, for a fault which had not yet been committed, but rather that it was given for variety, and beauty, as was intended in his nature, and which causes the variety of colors in the birds and all other animals in that nature; it was precisely with apprehension, and with reserve, how that black color which until then was a part of variety, and caused beauty, would become char, and stain, and in the scarlet letter (sort of speak) of the Blacks, for being descendants of such a grandfather, who was punished after he hath committed against his father Noah a horrid deed of an ugliness as intrinsic as embedded in its evil nature...In the same manner how the title of Israeli or Indian, so glorious in other times, turned into an ignominy, and an offense to its descendants, after their forefathers committed an inhumane profanity, which brought forth such an indignant death to their Messiah, and to their God” (1647: 18-19).
[..] the heritage of Ham, as punishment for the fault which he committed by mocking his father’s drunkenness and nudity, much to his dishonor” (1647: 18).

This form of divine punishment, is equally related to “[..] the first condition of serfdom and slavery that we know of” (1647: 21): “Ham was not only burdened for the offense he had committed against his father, with bearing his obscure and black progeny, but also with (as I already noted) having it subjected to captivity, his father’s curse encompassing the whole of his lineage condemning it to perpetual serfdom” (1647: 21).

One elaboration, which Sandoval adds a few paragraphs later, this time about the ‘color’ in which ‘blacks’ are to ‘resurrect’, gives us more elements with which to propose a more thorough revision of his text on the matter. The ‘resurrection’ is a subject that Sandoval deals with on two occasions in the second edition: In reference to the ‘blacks’ in the first book and to the ‘giants’ and ‘pigmies’ in the third. His postulates are of particular relevance in these passages because they are proof, among other things, of his notions of ‘nature’. Although I will later readdress this notion in reference to the ‘human race’, for now it is pertinent to advance in what is related to the ‘color of the blacks’.

Sandoval does not share the criteria of many authors (whom he does not mention) in reference to the argument “[..] that generally all people are to resurrect of the same white color, without making any differences between those that were black, and those that were white in the world […]” (1647: 23). These authors support the claim in which “[..] this color [white] is predominant over others, since it possesses more light, also God raised the first men with it, and with it they were preserved for a long time, until for the fore mentioned reasons they stained the complexion of the face, which resulted in the
degeneration of the color white into black […]” (1647: 23). Sandoval, on the contrary, considers that ‘blacks’ are to resurrect of the same ‘color’ and not ‘white’ as others argue: “[…] thus being blacks in their lands, they will not cease to be so when they transfer to ours: because this color is already natural in them, and being so, it seems more plausible that they are to resurrect with it […]” (1647: 23).

Resurrection meant the ‘perfection in the natural’, the absence of “nature’s’ impulses towards ‘vices’, ‘deformities’ or ‘fractures’ (in ‘beauty’, ‘proportion’ and ‘grace’) Hence fore they are to resurrect as ‘blacks’

[...] once the imperfections, which are common traits to them are removed: because the skin and, features of their appearance shall be so beautiful, of such luster, and grace, that in that sovereign city, they shall make a no less admirable than pleasant novelty: it shall be the color black, not tattered, nor worn, but vivid, luminous, pitch-black as if it had been forged with blood, wholly penetrated by a light stronger than that of the Sun, and who shall by the gift of clarity, be given and incredible charm, and gracefulfulness. Not to mention the beauty of their blackness, which shall not consist so much of the color in itself, but of its softness, which could be equally found in either, black or white, and shall be of a greater pleasantness to behold. (1647: 23).34

To summarize what has been said up to this point, Sandoval assumes that the first ‘men’ were ‘white’ and that it is from the descendants of Ham (specially his children Chus, Mezrain, and Phut) that the origin of all the ‘eritrean nations’ (as the first known for ‘serfdom’ and ‘slavery’) should be traced back to. This ‘blackness’ is conceived by Sandoval as a ‘second quality’ which is dependant on a ‘first quality,’ which is

34 In the third book, Sandoval refers back to this point: “[...] the Ethiopians are to resurrect with the color black. Because even if its to be believed, that in the beginning God did not create men with shadows, nor moles of blackness ; and that this color, when in its origins began to degenerate and to blear into the color white , it was shadow, mole, imperfection, and lack of beauty ; but then came to be as inherently natural to the Ethiopian individuals, that they gave highlight to nature itself, with their black color, and variety, what in the first progenitors had been a defect, and in a way a monstrous deformity, came to be an adornment of beauty for them.” (1647: 339).
‘predominant’, ‘innate’ and ‘intrinsic’ consistently present in the ‘excessive heat’ (and in this point, he follows the ‘philosophers’, many of whom are ‘pagan authors’ or ‘infidels’). Introduced by God before Noah’s curse was cast upon Ham, as a manifestation of the ‘variety’ and ‘beauty’ of ‘nature’; thus, it was only after the fact that blackness was transformed into ‘char’ and ‘stain’. It is from here that Sandoval can argue, against the bulk of the authors of his time, that resurrection occurs in this scenario of absolute perfection in which each one’s ‘nature’ is expressed devoid of ‘vices’, ‘ugliness’ and ‘fractures’, where the ‘blacks’ are to resurrect with that reformed ‘color’.

‘Black color’ is not only used by Sandoval in reference to ‘body’, but also in reference to ‘soul’. The black color of the ‘souls’ is directly associated to ‘sin’ “[...] the souls black from sin [...]” ([1627] 1956: 7). Even though in the biblical etiology of the ‘black color’ of the ‘ethiopian nations’ and ‘other blacks’ around the world there are indications of the ‘mark’ or ‘stain’ of Ham due to the faults he committed and to the curse cast upon him by his father, there is nothing from which to conclude that because their bodies are of a ‘black color’ then their ‘souls’ are necessarily and immutably to be black as well: “[...] to the sight they are black, but can possess the candor and whiteness that is given by the blood of Christ to whomever should cleanse themselves with it.” ([1627] 1956: 5). The ‘black souls’ can cease to be so: “[...] the souls black from sin, are beautified through God by the light and clarity of his gracefulness.” ([1627] 1956: 7).

The ‘black souls’ tainted by sin, are touched by divine grace that ‘beautifies’ and ‘whitens’ them through the intervention of a clergyman. While sin itself is a fault or a deviation of the soul’s ‘perfection’ and ‘grace,’ the ‘black’ color of the ‘soul’ is merely a contingency of sin and it is not inherent to its ‘nature’. Sandoval explains how the ‘color
black’ (or the word ‘Ethiopian’) came to be associated with ‘sin’, he refers back to the Scriptures: “[...] in the divine writings the words Black and Ethiopian are often used in the same sense as sinner, and malignant” (1647: 88). Thus establishing a relationship between the ‘black color’ of the ‘soul’ and its ‘ugliness’ on one side, and the ‘beauty’ and the wholesomeness of ‘whiteness’ on the other. In father Vicente Imperial’s approval, which appears at the beginning of the Seville edition, the argument in support of the aims and relevance of the work can be read as follows: “This book was arranged and ordained for the purpose of whitening a multiplicity of souls and to rid them of the ugly blackness of sin [...]” ([1627] 1956: 4). Consequently, Sandoval establishes that there is not necessarily a correlation between the ‘color’ of the body and the ‘color’ of the ‘soul’.

**Body features among ‘black nations’ and their ‘causes’**

Not only ‘color’ is relevant when considering someone as belonging to the ‘black nation’. As we have already seen, when Sandoval presented the cases where a couple of ‘black’ parents had given birth to ‘white’ children or vice versa, his description does not just confirm the difference in ‘color’. There are a series of other aspects Sandoval indicates in his description which help to make evident the association between ‘color’ and ‘body’. Let’s remember that the seven year-old child named Francisco, from the ‘Angolese nation’ and ‘native’ of the village of Quilombo, who Sandoval mentioned as a wonder and surprise for all Cartagena de Indias. ‘White’ as no other, and with ‘extremely Spanish like traits’, “[...] he just demonstrated he was from the black nation in his snub
nose and in his hair, which in spite of being blond was very curly [...]” ([1627] 1956: 23-24; 1647: 11-12).

Such criteria are used by Sandoval when describing three little sisters (Juana, Ventura and Teodora), daughters of Martín and María, ‘Angolese nation black’ slaves. Unlike Francisco, the oldest sister was ‘black’, but just like him, she had ‘Spanish features’ and was ‘very graceful’ and ‘good-looking’. The one that followed, however, was ‘extremely white’, so much that Sandoval wrote that she was even: “entirely whiter, blonder and blue-eyed than a German girl” ([1627] 1956: 24). In spite of that extreme whiteness, the girl was “[...] rather ugly, wide mouthed, snub nosed, wide-footed just like black women are... and very curly-haired just like them [...]” ([1627] 1956: 24).

Significantly, Sandoval replaces that description in his second edition with the following: “[...] having all the plainnesses and dispositions typical in blacks [...]” (1647: 13).

Sandoval seems to be operating on the disjunctive of having on the one hand ‘Spanish features’ (those he notes in the cases of Francisco and Juana, which are linked to the last one’s ‘gracefulness and good-lookingness’), and on the other hand the ‘uglinesses’ and ‘dispositions’ that are ‘typical among blacks’ (that is, at least for the case of Ventura, who was ‘widemouthed’, ‘snub nosed’ and ‘wide-footed’ as well as ‘curly-haired’). In Francisco’s description, there is again a reference to his ‘snub’ nose and ‘curly hair’.

In this point, the reader might be readily tempted to conclude that Sandoval simply attributes those characteristics to ‘blacks’ ‘nature’, to a sort of group of established traits, which would be stuck to that ‘generation’ in what he called the ‘prime quality’. Also, we tend to read Sandoval’s words as an aesthetic appraisal, looking down not only on ‘black
color’, but also on its related body features. Further, I will come back to the manifold and contradictory connotations, even on an aesthetic level, that Sandoval presents in relation to ‘black color’. For the time being, I am interested in showing several passages in which Sandoval problematizes the simple conclusion that those features belong to the same ‘color’, or that they are necessarily associated to the ‘black color nations’.

Again, this passage is from the 1647 edition, which greatly clears up what the first edition discussed in a more ambiguous way. In this passage, Sandoval is rendering questionable several authors (especially Celio Rodiginio) who have argued that several characteristics associated to ‘blacks’ could be attributed to excessive heat:

The cause of black people being ordinarily wide footed, says the same author, and he explains it is the excessive heat that, just as the effects fire has on wood, so it is with heat on animals’ bodies. Also, we may say, from experience, the primary cause of that feature is to walk barefoot always, so that loose feet become ugly, and get remarkably out of proportion. Others do not lack reasons either, looking further for the cause, by saying that is because most of those Ethiopians were badly treated at birth, and their coarse traits, they say, are due to the scarce care or none at all that midwives used to have when delivering them, and that is why they are uncouth and lack harmony in their faces and the rest of their bodies, as it happens among Spaniards. And thus we can see, that having disregarded that issue, even in whites, there are the same flaws, ugliness and other deformities (1647: 23).

In Sandoval’s eyes, then, concrete practices like walking barefoot or ‘midwives’ neglect would be the ‘cause’ of some of ‘ugliness and dispositions typical among blacks’. Therefore suggests that ‘whites’, too, exhibit those same ‘flaws’, ‘ugliness’ and other ‘deformities’ because of that neglect. That baldly calls into question a simplistic reading of Sandoval’s work, which would attribute to him the idea of the same ‘cause’ for the ‘color’ among ‘blacks’, the ‘shape of their feet’ or their ‘so coarse features’. On the
contrary, Sandoval makes a distinction between those two types of traits and (at least with some of those suggested in the excerpt quoted) attributes them to different ‘causes’.

As we have seen, the ‘very curly hair’ is another trait Sandoval considers to describe Francisco or Ventura as evidencing their origin in the ‘black nation’ in spite of being ‘white skinned’. Several paragraphs before the excerpt we just quoted, Sandoval presents the explanations Celio Rodiginio himself gave on why ‘Ethiopians’ hair is ‘very curly’, ‘wispy’ and ‘black’. To which Sandoval responds: “[This] is not as unquestionable, as not having some exception, especially as for the curliness, for we know that inland, in the city of Brava and Madagajo, in front of Mozambique, there is a black nation, called the Maracatos, who have straight hair and [are] very graceful and fair” (1647: 22; [1627] 1956: 27-28).

Sandoval resorts to a counterexample to problematize the fact of the necessary relationship between a ‘black nation’ and the shape of ‘hair’. In other passages, when describing different blacks’ nations, he brings up differences in hair again. He had called into question another one of Celio Rodiginio’s hypotheses concerning the ‘Ethiopians’ shape of head’. Sandoval openly casts doubt on that because ‘experience contradicts’ what that author says, namely, that among black people the skull has just one piece, as it does not have the “[…] eight sutures, that is, joints that some parts set and lock together in head, as we use to see in the heads of the dead [...]” (1647: 22).
The ‘multitude’ of ‘Ethiopians’: ‘kingdoms’, ‘provinces’, ‘nations’ and ‘castes’

Not only are there big differences in the ‘ways of being black’ among ‘Ethiopians’. In Sandoval’s eyes, ‘Ethiopians’ include an overwhelming ‘multitude’ of ‘nations’ and ‘castes’ spread across several ‘kingdoms’ and ‘provinces’, and differ in their ‘original languages’, ‘customs’ and ‘moral’ and ‘natural features’ (‘profane police’), as well as in their ‘religions’, ‘ceremonies’ and ‘rites’ (‘sacred police’). Since the ‘Sacred Scriptures’ exegesis, the concept of ‘being black’ seems to be linked to ‘multitude’, ‘abundance’ and ‘variety’:

And that multitude and variety of nations had a meaning even in the Sacred Scripture itself, as where the King psalmist, referring to God, said: Posuisti tenebras latibulum suum, Theodoreto says, that here being black means incomprehensibility and multitude, denoting black is a symbol of multitude and abundance. Which is something we can see in all black nations, as nature gives birth to them in large numbers ([1627] 1956:14; 1647: 29).

Hence there are “[...] so many and varied Provinces, Kingdoms, and Regions inhabited by an almost infinite number of individuals, peoples and nations, all different among them, and being different in many things” (1647: 6).

Due to several factors I will further explain, the “restoration” of “health” for Ethiopians requires some procedures of intelligibility tending to individuation and differentiation of that ‘multitude’, which is concretely manifested in ‘bozales’. That individuation and differentiation of bodies, languages, names (‘nations’ and ‘castes’) is made in the interest of defining the minimal units of intervention on their ‘souls’ at the earliest convenience, and in the most adequate and effective way. Given the obligations of his missionary practice, and the ‘multitude’ of ‘Ethiopians’ that he faces, Sandoval
produces a knowledge that he intends to ‘reduce to a method’, as such absence of a method seems unintelligible and chaotic to him. Deciphering the elaborate marks, or lack of them, on the ‘bozal’s’ body, their linguistic skills, or their ability to be catechized is made possible through the construction of a differentiating and individualizing knowledge.

Such a differentiating and individualizing knowledge on the ‘multitude’ of ‘Ethiopians’ is constructed around the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘caste’. Although he calls upon other categories such as ‘language’, ‘kingdom’, ‘province’ and ‘region’, Sandoval makes these gravitate around those of ‘caste’ and ‘nation’. Both categories make up the fundamental entities from which Sandoval not only describes and interprets the ‘multitude’ of ‘Ethiopians’, but also those signaling tactics of intervention that he suggests or implements. He reduces the unintelligibility of an overflowing and confusing variety of ‘Ethiopians’ to an organized description around the basic entities of ‘nation’ and ‘caste’ spatially disaggregated. Following a pattern of exposure, Sandoval describes those fundamental entities and their particularities in a positivist way.

Based on those entities, he puts together the information available at the time, contrasting it and complementing it with the results of his own research among ‘slaves’ or ‘Portuguese’ people who had been at ‘Ethiopians’ lands, chiefly among vessels, captains, and the owners of ‘armatures’. The main distinction between Asia and Africa puts an order in the presentation of those entities, as well as in the more specific difference between ‘Western or interior Ethiopia’ or ‘Eastern or above Egypt Ethiopia’.
However, detail on the description of ‘nations’ and ‘castes’ are broader for ‘Western Ethiopia’.  

Only for ‘Western or inland Ethiopia’, Sandoval mentions a significant number of ‘nations’ and ‘castes’. ‘Banyuns’, ‘berbers’, ‘biafadas’, ‘biojoes’, ‘iolofos’, ‘mandingas’, ‘nalues’, ‘fulos’, ‘fulupos’, ‘zapes zozoes’ are some of the nations come from the ‘Guinea rivers’; which are referred to as ‘Guinea Ethiopians’, too ([1627] 1956: 91-92). Besides, those who were landed at the port of Saint Thomé include the ‘nations’ and ‘castes’ of ‘ardas’, ‘carabalies’, ‘lucumies’ and ‘popoos’ ([1627] 1956: 94-95). Finally, from Loanda and Angola he mentions those of ‘Angians’, ‘Angolans’, ‘Congos’, ‘Monxiolos’ and ‘Malembas’ ([1627] 1956: 96). In ‘Eastern Ethiopia’, they refer to the ‘nations’ of ‘Paravas’, ‘Albasians cafres’. Among the later, we find “All the black nations located in the middle of the boundaries of Eastern and Western blacks [...] Macuas, Monomotapas, Zimbans and those from the Cape of Good Hope, along with other innumerable peoples, called Cafres” (1647: /16/). In that more concrete scale, notions of

35 In the 1627 edition, the first book starts by presenting the ‘kingdoms’ and the ‘nations of blacks’ from Asia. He devotes two chapters to ‘Paravas blacks’, one to ‘blacks’ from the myriad of Maluco islands, and three to ‘Filippine blacks’. Afterwards, he devotes a large number of chapters to ‘Ethiopians’. First, Ethiopians from Guinea or the rivers, then the ‘Ethiopian’ kingdoms at Sierra Leona, Congo and Angola. Then, he spares a bit on ‘Eastern or above Egypt Ethiopia’: cafres macuas, cafres mocarangos, albasinos and buidinos, among others. In the 1647 edition, this order is reversed: in the first book “kingdoms and provinces of blacks dwelling in Western or inland Ethiopia” and in the second one, on “the major kingdoms, provinces and islands of blacks located on Eastern or above Egypt Ethiopia”.

36 I do not intend to track the correspondence or the lack of it in the different names Sandoval suggests for the different nations and castes with those of the ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘cultures’ ‘actually living in Western Africa at the time, according to research historians. For such an analysis, see Maya (2005).
‘nation’ and ‘caste’ refer to the minimal entities to which we can reduce the ‘multitude’ of ‘Ethiopians’.

The conceptual relationship between ‘caste’ and ‘nation’ is difficult to understand due to what seems to be a contradictory and ambiguous use in Sandoval’s work itself. In several passages, there is a mention to a given ‘caste’, which is further referred to as ‘nation’ or vice versa, indicating that Sandoval might be using both terms as synonyms. ‘Zapes’, for instance, are referred to as a ‘nation’ ([1627] 1956: 16) and later on as a ‘caste’ ([1627] 1956: 93). Other times, it would seem that a ‘nation’ includes several ‘castes’, which make more concrete the last concept of ‘caste’ and more general that of ‘nation’. Several passages can be identified where Sandoval refers to the term ‘casta’ to define types of groupings linked to prestige and hierarchy in a ‘nation’. On ‘Iolofos’ and ‘Berbesies’, he wrote:

They have in high esteem their aristocracy and are fond of being flattered: for that purpose they have three types of rascals, some are called Cantibatre, some others are Finas and there are real Tubuanes from Spain, and others called Indians, a caste that is very despicable among them. Those Finas and Indios cannot enter into nobleness houses nor eat in the dishes they use: they stand at their doors singing to get something to eat, and when they are given something it is thrown to them to the ground or they get in some ware of their own (1647: 46-47; emphasis added).

Some other times, Sandoval establishes an inverse relationship, that is, that a ‘caste’ would cover several ‘nations’. At least for ‘Ethiopians’, Sandoval seems to suppose that both categories can designate the same entity or its relevant and significant internal divisions. However, in several passages it looks as if there was some lack of rigor. Thus, for example, while referring to ‘Balantas’ as a ‘caste’, he nonetheless talks about it being composed of several ‘castes’, and then he says that ‘Balantas’ are a ‘nation’: “Under the
caste and the name of Balantas there are many castes of this nation, so that some of them cannot understand others being from very remote lands and not so much police [...]” ([1627] 1956: 92). Also, he includes ‘castes’ and ‘nations’ within a ‘caste,’ such as in the case of ‘Zapes’: “[...] of this Zape caste there is a great diversity of languages and nations, and all of them state they are Zapes, so that when gathering them for catechism they have to be differentiated between pure Zape, Cocoli Zape or Yalonga Zape, that is called Zozo, or Baga Zape, and a great diversity of castes comprised under the general name of Zape, and not always speaking the same language [...]” ([1627] 1956: 93). A few paragraphs later, after addressing a couple of additional aspects on the term ‘nation,’ I will return to the relation between ‘nation’ and ‘caste’.

Sandoval does not limit his use of the term ‘nation’ to ‘Ethiopians’, but also includes conglomerates like the ‘Spanish nation’ (1647: 18, 34; [1627] 1956: 56), the ‘Portuguese nation’ (1647: 2, 35; [1627] 1956: 56), or “[...] other nations, especially English, Netherlander and French [...]” (1647: 42; [1627] 1956: 59). Even more, Sandoval calls upon the term ‘nation’ to designate wider conglomerates. The most common is that of ‘black nations’, but there are also others that related to defined areas, such as ‘Ethiopians nations’ ([1627] 1956: 6, 13; 1647: 1), ‘Ethiopian nation’ ([1627] 1956: 211, 212), ‘people nations’ ([1627] 1956: 13), ‘Guinea nations’ ([1627] 1956: 72), ‘nations from rivers’ ([1627] 1956: 91), ‘Filippines’ nations’ ([1627] 1956: 47). In other cases, the concept responds to criteria other than the spatial to underline commonalities

37 In those cases, Sandoval resorts to the plural form of nations instead of the singular form of nation. In a few instances, however, he uses the concept of ‘nation’ in the singular form to include all ‘Ethiopians’ ([1627] 1956: 6, 13).
among those conglomerates like ‘barbarian peoples nations’ ([1627] 1956: 16, 67),
‘barbarian and pagan blacks’ nations’ ([1627] 1956: 76), ‘idolaters’ nations’ ([1627]
1956: 44).

When using the term ‘nation’ to refer to more encompassing conglomerates,
Sandoval resorts to the plural ‘nations’ instead of the singular ‘nation’. In rare occasions,
however, he uses the concept of ‘nation’ in the singular form to include all ‘Ethiopians’
([1627] 1956: 6, 13). ‘Nation’ works, then, with different meanings highlighting specific
and differentiating commonalities of specific conglomerates. A given ‘nation’ from
Guinea (such as the ‘fulupos’), may be included in the ‘Guinean nations’ (or ‘river
nations’) and these, in turn, in the ‘Ethiopians’ nations’ (or ‘Ethiopian nation’). Some of
the latter (but not all of them) might be included in a more encompassing conglomerate
even transcending ‘Western or inland Ethiopia’, like ‘blacks’ nations’ or ‘barbarian and
pagans’ nations’. In the various meanings of the term ‘nation’ to refer to ‘peoples’
conglomerates, there is no textual evidence of any of them referring to human nation.
Hence, we cannot suggest that for Sandoval ‘nation’ could mean something like ‘gender
of peoples’. This seems to be suggested by Sandoval a couple of times with the
grammatical formation of “all genders of peoples and nations” (1647: 19, 140).38

38 Otra de las acepciones de ‘nación’ son las de nacimiento o pertenencia. En varios pasajes
Sandoval se refiere a que alguien es ‘de nación’ tal o cual para indicar nacimiento: “[…] don Juan
de la Cruz, malabar de nación […]” ([1627] 1956: 39); o, como en un fragmento anteriormente
citado, “[…] un niño llamado Franciscos, de edad de siete años, de nación angola, natural del
pueblo de Quilombo…demostraba ser de nación negro en la nariz que la tenía roma y los cabellos
alabando las hazañas del Infante de Portugal “[…] a la gloria de Dios y su nación […]” ([1627]
1956: 54).
As I argued above, the ‘colors’ of ‘Ethiopians’ nations’ vary not only between each other and within themselves in ‘degrees of blackness,’ but also ‘nations’ like those mentioned in the case of ‘Fulos’, could include ‘degrees of whiteness’ (some of these so ‘white and blond as German people’). In this sense, there is no a necessary and steadfast relationship between a ‘nation’ and a ‘color’. Even more, in a more concrete scale, as I also have said, there is not necessarily a correspondence between the ‘color’ of parents and that of their children due to the influence that the ‘reign’ of ‘imagination’ has among ‘men’ as ‘rational animals’ at the moment of ‘creation’.

In the same way, Sandoval does not conflate the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘language’. Even though several ‘nations’ can be identified by a ‘natural language,’ which is specific to them, there are other cases in which different ‘languages’ lay within one single ‘nation’. Therefore, it was relevant to know precisely where the ‘bozales’ came from in order to choose a proper interpreter. Even between ‘nation’ and ‘religion’ there is no necessary correspondence, as there are diverse ‘nations’ sharing one single ‘religion’, be it ‘pagan’ or ‘Christian’. Evidently, for Sandoval ‘Christian nations’ include the Spaniards and Portuguese in Europe, but there are also other ‘nations’ in other parts of the world that might be considered as such. On the other hand, Sandoval is evidently displeased with the spread of the “damn sect of Mohamed” among different ‘Ethiopians’ ‘nations’: “In general, Iolofos, Berbesies, Mandingas and Fulos are able to understand each other, even though languages and castes are diverse, because of the great communication they have for having received all those nations the damn sect of Mohamed” ([1627] 1956: 91). Finally, as I will show further, there are a few ‘nations’ in
the world that lack even a ‘religion’, a fact that, to Sandoval’s eyes, makes them appear as the most ‘barbarian’.

The ambiguity and interchangeability between the terms ‘nation’ and ‘caste’ that occurs in reference to ‘Ethiopians’ does not seem to be operate in the case of the Spaniards’ and Portuguese ‘nations’. The relatively few times he refers to Spaniards or Portuguese in this way, Sandoval uses the term nation but not ‘caste’. In Sandoval’s work, there are no terms such as ‘Spanish caste’ or ‘Portuguese caste’. But there is no textual evidence of the use of caste for broader conglomerates, as is the case of the ‘Ethiopians’ nations’ as ‘Ethiopian caste’ nor even ‘Guinea caste’. Likewise, there are no terms such as ‘human caste’, in spite of the fact that he often talks about ‘humankind’ (see the following part). On the other hand, on one occasion Sandoval uses the word ‘caste’ in a context other than that of ‘nations’ of ‘people’: “[...] and from a high caste mare and from a horse equally bred results a foal similar to its parents in the shape and color, yet the other is different” (1647: 10; [1627] 1956: 21; emphasis added).

**Human nature of Ethiopians and other black nations**

For Sandoval, Ethiopians and other nations of blacks are part of humankind, that is, he considers them to be men and as such, they share certain features that would determine part of their nature. Sandoval assumes the existence of a human species or humankind,
and he repeatedly uses these terms, as well as the notions of *men* and *people.* These notions of *human species, humankind, people* or *men* involve a set of common features but they also allow for a *diversity* of forms that are not uniquely related to *color* but also even include the monstrous. Sandoval pays close attention to headless or one-eyed men, bizarre *hermaphrodites,* fierce *Amazons,* giants of up to one hundred *cubits* tall and *pigmies* of only one. As I will discuss later the figure of *monster,* and monstrosity, has an outstanding place in Sandoval’s work.

Let’s state clearly the common features that, according to Sandoval, define *humankind* and inside which it is possible to establish a variation range including *Ethiopians* and other *black nations* and even monstrosity. My thesis is that it is not the shape of the *bodies* (which can even be malformed and monstrous), but the *rationality* and the capacity for *grace* that defines the specificity of *humankind,* of *men,* as compared with other *animals* and *creatures* like *angels.* In a general way, Sandoval enacts a distinction between *brute animals* and *men,* that is to say, between *rational* and *irrational* *animals.* As we mentioned when we discussed the place of *imagination* in the conception, *which* dated back to Aristotle, Sandoval points out that it: “*…* is the imagination, which is greatly varied in man at the moment of conception. It is the origin of why children are sometimes born who are so different from and dissimilar to their parents. This can be verified, though to a limited extent with brute animals, in the sense that they do not possess as great imaginativeness as men: hence forth their brood is ordinarily born,  

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39 Terms such as *human* are recurrent in Sandoval’s work. For example, terms like *human lineage* (1647: 334); *human nature* (1647: 337, 341); *humankind* (1647: 337); human life (1647: 34); human generation; *human species* (1647: 29). ([1627] 1956: 29; 1647: 311)
unoriginal and very much alike their source” (1647: 10). In one of the previously cited passages, regarding the same discussion, he wrote:

In my opinion, Aristotle only attributes this virtue to the anima vegetativa of those things that, by virtue of their nature, have no capacity for rationality. But being the rational anima, essentially exclusive of men, the most important, and therefore, it encompasses and contains the other two souls, the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul [...] it is clear that in conceiving his fellows, who are animal rational men, the three souls concur [...] contributing with their virtues and operations; and so the rational soul ratiocinates, deliberates and imagines; the sensitive soul feels and the vegetative increases, grows and expands ([1627] 1956: 25; 1647: 15-16; emphasis added).

Thus, men are different from irrational or brute animals precisely in that, due to their nature, they are capable of rationality; they possess a rational anima because they are rational animals. This distinction is not considered a mere difference but it is associated with a perfection hierarchy. When discussing the centaur as an example of conception between men and brute animals, Sandoval mentions the Galen’s critical view to draw his own conclusions:

[...] Galen makes fun of and mocks Pindar, the poet, for saying centaurs were conceived by men and horses, and asserts that conception between rational men and brute animals is impossible because of the disproportion existing between them. And this seems to be true because even though they are concordant in being sensitive animals they are not compatible at conception in that men possess the most perfect grade, their rationality [...] ([1627] 1956: 33).

In this passage, Sandoval introduces the difference and hierarchy based on perfection degrees, the criterion being that men are rational while brute animals are not.

In the second edition more developed and complex approaches on the difference and hierarchy between men and brutes are found, in comparison with the first edition where they were barely outlined. After presenting the portents of some animals such as
the elephant, Sandoval devotes chapter XXII to describing the various views of “[...] some ancient and modern philosophers [...]” (1647: 410) about “[...] whether these animals are rational and have understanding of the most admirable issues, and apparently are so rational that in the Republic of their actions they act and exercise” (1647: 410).

Alluding to Aristones and Saint Thomas Aquinas, he clearly proposes this difference and hierarchy:

In irrational animals almost all virtues found in all things lower than them are condensed, and so Aristotle said virtues contained in plants are also present in animals, which also contain many other virtues not present in plants: because the nature of animals is more noble than the one of all the other vegetal and animated things, for they are adorned with senses, unlike plants, as Aristotle said: and so according to Saint Thomas, animals had a sensitive anima and those who live on Earth, are quadruped and were created on the sixth day are more perfect than the ones conceived in the fifth day, that is to say, than fishes and birds[...] (1647: 412).

Now then, what seems to be a clear distinction and hierarchy between brutes and men is, to some extent, challenged not only by the wonders exhibited by some of these brutes, but also by the differences among men themselves:

Then if the prominent difference existing between the discourses and reasons of some men in comparison with others, and their resemblance with irrational animals, in their short discourse and the lesser reason they show in their operations, their imbecility and vulgarity, led, not many years ago, to some knowledgeable and discrete people to challenge and doubt the humanity and status of rational animals of the Indians from this Kingdom and new world; or, on the contrary to say they were wild brutes (like the ones seen in many other parts of the world, and at many other times and to whom we have not considered rational repeatedly) and to N.S.P. Alexandro VI to consider them rational and men in essence, as the others, and so it was asserted by all theologians (1647: 411).40

40 Some others are so brutal that they are not considered men, even though they are indeed: “The Indians settled in this drain [of the great lagoon in Paraguay] are so brutal that they do not consider themselves to be men. It is alleged that when asked what kind of people they were, they replied they were not men but Uros, as if they belonged to another genre of animals” (1647: 151).
Sandoval considers a series of conclusions drawn from the assertions of philosophers (Christian and gentile, ancient and modern). These conclusions are included in six assertions, in the last of which Sandoval includes his belief: (1) philosophers who “[...] taking into account those particular and reasonable things they noticed in brutes [...]” without argumentation and in a contradictory way call them “[...] brute men, or rational brutes, which is the same” (1647: 413). (2) Others “[...] more moderate and circumspect with words”, talk about “[...] instinct, darned understanding, deformed discourse and things like these [...]” to name those “[...] admirable and wonderful operations [...]” of irrational animals, “[...] but strictly speaking, they do not refuse to acknowledge the brutes to have a true and own reason and a rigorous and own discourse, and they do not declare a more profound difference and reverence between them and men, than the one existing, as we said before, between an unwise man and a wise one.” (1647: 414). (3) Others, “who seem to delve into this issue”, propose that just like there is a “diverse genre of reason and understanding” between men and angels [...]”; the same happens between men and brutes.41 (4) Other authors claim that the supposed rationality of brutes is merely deception, imitation and appearance: “[...] really, everything is apparent and malformed, and unlike men, brutes act instinctively and based on an imperfect knowledge in comparison with men who act with understanding, a very perfect

41 “[...]as there is among men and Angels a different genre of understanding and reason, in terms of species, one being inferior and the other superior, one discursive and the other without discourse, one with a more perfect nature and the other with a less perfect nature, without touching the supernatural and moral. Also does any different genre of understanding and reason exist between men and brutes in terms of species and nature, so that for irrational animals, that is, without a human reason, and not so rational as men, we do not refuse to accept some understanding, and inferior reason, as well as some imperfect discourses [...]” (1647: 414).
knowledge and a reflexive and discursive virtue” (1647: 414). (5) Those who believe that “[...] these irrational animals act as infant men, in a crazy and dream-like way [...]” (1647: 414), thus, not being rational. (6) Finally, Sandoval states his belief: “[...] among the species of the universe we can distinguish two reasons, objective and subjective; one is in the act and the other is in the potency; one is material, transcendental, and simple and the other is formal, special, and reflective” (1647: 415).

In this sense, Sandoval establishes a distinction and hierarchy between brutes and men in the following terms. The reason among brutes is objective, in the act, material transcendental and simple, while that of men is subjective, in potency, formal, special and reflective. From this he concludes: “[...]taking only into account the man in his natural order of his noble species without considering his most elevated aspect, the most brute man is as superior as the most clever and wonderful man in the world” (1647: 415).42

Besides the rationality and the degree of perfection it involves, man is the only creature, among the visible creatures and below the sky being able to attain grace; his nobleness and excellence are based on it. Unlike angels, man is a visible creature: “[...] man (one of the visible creatures created by God and the most noble and illustrious) [...]” ([1627] 1956: 329). Unlike angels, created for the heaven, man is the most excellent creature, the creature par excellence, created by God below heaven: “Man is called the creature par excellence because he is the most excellent creature God created below the sky and he created all other creatures to be of service for him” ([1627] 1956: 106; 1647: 42

42 “[...] because [many and great philosophers] saw that only this [the man] among all animals makes use of thousand different carnalities and delights; only him is weakened by avarice, ambition and an insatiable wish to live, and the care of grave and what comes after it” ([1627] 1956: 192).
The capacity for grace, exclusive of man, consists in the possibility, through a series of practices, to access celestial and divine things. Spiritual health refers to this capacity for grace, without which man is inexorably led to the eternal damnation.

Let’s summarize what has been said so far about the first premise. Sandoval establishes a double distinction to define man’s nature. On the one hand, we have the irreducible difference and hierarchy, in terms of perfection, of man compared to brutes or irrational animals. While man nature involves a subjective, potential, formal, special and reflective reason; brutes or irrational animals possess an objective, actual and material transcendental simple reason. On the other hand, even though men and brutes are below-the-heaven and visible creatures, only man possesses nobleness and maximum excellence, given his capacity for grace to access celestial and divine things.

Sandoval does not exclude Ethiopians and the rest of nations of blacks from humankind. Their nature is the same as that of men. Sandoval does not recur to any special concept to enclose them in such a way that their belonging to this category could be called into question totally or partially. Their nature is not the one of the brutes or irrational animals. This point is not even discussed by Sandoval. There is no chapter or passage where he addresses in detail the various views in literature or where he discusses whether Ethiopians and the other nations of blacks must or must not be considered men. Even more, one the core assumptions on which his whole proposal of catechism for

43 “It was a very good decision to give man, not many but two legs: beasts have four legs, birds only have two, and that is why men are similar to one of the birds, so that he can see high things and with the wings of sublime thoughts he flies through the heights, this is why it was said of him, he will renew his youth, just like the eagle rejuvenates, so that he can reach celestial and divine things and fly higher than eagles for contemplation […]” (1647: 76).
slaves lays, his very concern for restoring their spiritual health, is that, at minimum, these Ethiopians are men, their nature is that of humankind. The black color of these Ethiopians’ nations does not challenge their humankind. Variation of color in men is part of their nature: “Concerning his [the Ethiopian’s] nature, I believe one of the wonders God uses when creating the man is color, so it is greatly admirable and worthy of observation to see a white man and another black man, entirely opposite colors [...] And, undoubtedly such dissimilar colors are worthy of marvel [...]” (1647: 10).

**Monstrosity and resurrection: perfection, nature and grace**

To make clearer the discussion on the human nature of Ethiopians and other black nations, it is relevant to describe at some length two interrelated topics in Sandoval, concerning the variation of forms in humankind and in its nature: monstrosity and resurrection. Particularity, singularity, marvel and monstrosity seem to reign in the Ethiopian collective imaginary recorded in the vast literature Sandoval tracked. Hence, their celebrity: “[...] Ethiopians’ lands [...] have several things so unusual that it makes them the more renowned lands in the world, not only because of color, and monstrosity of men; but also in animals, birds from air, fish from water, in the sea, in rivers,

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44 In his first edition, Sandoval devotes the third chapter in the first book to: “On the cause of the extraordinary monsters and other amazing things to be found in Africa, mainly in the part Ethiopia occupies” ([1627] 1956: 28-34). Further, in the same book, he stands back in another chapter to tell “On some singular and amazing things authors tell there are in the kingdoms of all those Ethiopians” (164-174). The second edition, collects and substantially enlarges those two untitled chapters in the third book (or is it the book that is untitled?): “On the many monstrous, singular and very amazing things, Authors tell there are in the Kingdoms of those Ethiopians and other lands of Black peoples, as well as lives of their Saints and Honorable men, which have been tracked” (1647: 308-519).
fountains, streams, ponds; in the monsters from earth, plants, and trees in the forests, minerals, rocks” (1647: 308; 1627 1956: 165). Concerning monstrosity, the myriad references Sandoval gathers from the different authors say that not only in Ethiopians’ and other black peoples’ lands do a broad variety of monsters exist, but some of those monsters are described as men.

The monstrosity of men that abound in Ethiopians’ lands and other nations of black peoples can be best understood by understanding the very cause of the creation of monsters and its ruling principle: “To understand the higher difficulty we address in this chapter on the diversity of forms found in the human kind among Ethiopians and other kingdoms of black peoples, it is necessary to know the cause of the creation of monsters and its ruling principle, which, once understood, the difficulty will be solved” ([1627] 1956: 29; 1647: 311; emphasis added). Once we know this cause of generation of monsters in general, Sandoval hopes that the difficulty of understanding certain forms of men, who, being men, are at the same time monsters, will be overcome:

Assuming what was said in the last chapter, it will not be difficult to understand how different forms can arise from human creation, mainly in the Kingdoms of Black Peoples, as some will say ones could have been conceived as monsters because of a natural flaw, and others by their parents matching with other animals from a different species [...] (1647: 315).45

In general terms, Sandoval considers that a monster is a sin of nature, as it does not achieve the perfection it should attain: “[...] it is more in accordance with reason saying a monster is nothing but a sin of nature, which because of lack or excess, does not reach the

45 In his first edition, Sandoval ([1627] 1956: 33) had presented this only for Ethiopia.
perfection a living being should have” ([1627] 1956: 29-30; 1647: 311). That sin of
nature happens: (1) by deficiency (lack) or surplus in matter;\(^{46}\) (2) when two animals
from different species match\(^{47}\); (3) by shortcoming of matter or the natural heat to give
birth to the perfect animal nature creates a form that matches better with that matter;\(^{48}\)
and (4) by breaking down of the mold, vessels and tunics leading to several creatures to
mix.\(^{49}\) Sandoval adds two additional causes, not belonging to sins of nature. Thus,
completing the list, monsters would arise (5) by supernatural cause and (6) by being
incubuses.\(^{50}\)

Especially in its second edition, Sandoval’s work reviews a large number of
monsters from the Ethiopians and other nations of black peoples’ lands, which were then
circulating in different books written by a range of different authors. In this respect,

\(^{46}\) “Such a sin happens often by lack of matter, so the animal is often born with no arms or feet, or
any other member. Also, it happens for excess of the same matter, having three arms or six
fingers, in each hand, or being born with a pair of heads, four arms or four feet, which most
commonly happens in very fertile birds or in animals giving birth to many animals at a time,
because matter could mix up and blend” ([1627] 1956: 29-30; 1647: 311, 312).

\(^{47}\) “Furthermore, they are monsters, who have been conceived through the matching of two
animals of a different species; they are not from one or the other but a certain third species, a mix

\(^{48}\) “Other times the cause of those monstrosities lies in that not being able to conceive an animal
perfect according to the standard of its species, because of lack of the matter or natural heat
needed, nature strives to engender what it is able to, being something more universal, like an
animal in common, and with that purpose it introduces the form which fits better to that matter”

\(^{49}\) “[...] breaking down of the mold, and fractures in vessels and tunics with which nature wraps
creatures having some confusing left over matter with the essential one, so that they mix when
nature was striving to form two children, and could not finish, and there is left one imperfect,
both of them joined, and there neither imagined forces from Heaven nor the mother’s participate”
(1647: 311-312).

\(^{50}\) “The ultimate cause I can find to explain those monsters’ coming into being (I will leave
Incubuses for the next chapter) is supernatural, due to sins of their parents, or to mark an event, so
that God speaks to us through those signals [...]” (1647: 314).
historian Enriqueta Vila Vilar notes how: “The book published in 1647 might be one of the more complete at its time, not only because of the news more or less true about Africa, but also for the compilation of fantastic literature” (1987: 39). To mention only some of those who Sandoval openly considers as monstrous men and whom he refers to as Ethiopians, we find: “[...in Ethiopia there is a nation called Monoculos, for they have one single eye in the middle of their foreheads” (1647: 319-320); “Ethiopians Sciopedes, who cover themselves with one foot that is so big that it is enough to protect them from the heat of sun” (1647: 320); “[...] the Ethiopians Eaunos, who have their mouth on their chest, but it is as small, that it is necessary in order to feed them to pour food into them with a straw...” (1647: 320); “Other [Ethiopians], called the Astomos, do not have any mouth, so they feed themselves with the smell of fruits and flowers, and die when faced to a bad odor”; “Other Ethiopian nations who have eyes on their shoulders”; “[...]

Ethiopian Blemmios do not have any head, yet they have their eyes and mouth on their chest” (1647: 325); and in Ethiopia there are also women “[...] with long beards [...]” or “[...] with wild boars teeth” (1647: 348, 349). We could not miss the nations of giants and pygmies to whom he devotes special attention (1647: 330-342), even devoting one chapter to talk about the size they will have after their resurrection.

Here, monstrosity and resurrection overlap, thereby showing assumptions on the nature of men and their relation to the variation of their forms. The day of the final judgment, men who attained grace will be resurrected along with their bodies without any vice nor imperfection. In resurrection, everybody’s utmost nature will be manifested by divine mediation, according to everybody’s species, temperament and complexion. It
is in the supernatural that everybody’s nature will be purged of vices and imperfections in order to show itself in absolute perfection and completeness:

[…] men will not be resurrected with any defect nor excess, even though they are natural shortcomings, but in their perfect nature’s size, with God making up for any flaw and fault they had in their life. Those who died as children not only will be resurrected with a perfect understanding, but with that perfect size they had or should have had in their youth, according to what was meant in their condition and nature. And those who were at their death excessively tall, disproportionate, and gross will be resurrected without those excesses, as well as lame man without lameness, blind with their eyes healed. And to say it in one word, nobody will be resurrected as a monster or defective, but perfect and complete, in one’s own perfection not only specific, but also individual, according to their own species and complexion (1647: 337).

Sandoval notes that it can also be assumed that some variety and unevenness among bodies does not contradict the utmost perfection men will be resurrected with: “[…] we should presuppose that a certain variety and unevenness in bodies does not go against nor contradict that perfection and size, as long as it is neither defective nor monstrous” (1647: 338). That a certain variety and unevenness in bodies is not assumed to be defective or monstrous is the line of discussion that gives Sandoval the possibility of considering that giants and pygmies would be resurrected as such. However, Sandoval has to further elaborate his argumentation in order to consider such a possibility, as it goes against what saints and theologians had previously stated. In order to do that, he introduces a threefold distinction between the undermost, mid and utmost degrees for the perfection of a consummate stature (1647: 341-342).

That association between perfection and nature shapes Sandoval’s argumentation, as well as his conception of the supernatural sphere as the place where nature would manifest itself in its pure expression. Quoting Saint Thomas, he notes: “In the
resurrection [...] there would be the ultimate perfection, the reparation of nature [...]” (1647: 339). Such reparation will be accomplished by the divine power: “[... ] everything lacking or having excess of will be removed or provided by the divine power” (1647: 338).

Even more interesting for my analysis of Sandoval’s ‘articulation of blackness’ is his argument that in some cases what used to be a vice, defect or imperfection, could become nature, that is, it would be connaturalized: “[... ] what in many cases happened and originated in some people as a flaw and imperfection in nature was being connaturalized in others as time passed, turning out in perfection, beauty and nature in these ones, what used to be vice, deformity and monstrosity in those ones” (1647: 339).

Taking up this argument to apply it on the example of giants and pygmies, Sandoval uses the same reason to support his hypothesis that Ethiopians and other nations of blacks will be resurrected in that color.51 Thus, Sandoval says:

[...] those first Pygmies, and Giants, who degenerated from their ascendants in the beginning, vitiating their nature, and complexions with excess and flaws in their distempered character; but that in Giants, and in Pygmies who came later for several centuries, became usual and connaturalized, so that the extraordinary complexion was not anymore a vice and became nature, nor a monstrous preternaturality, but a natural particularity to be ten cubits tall, e.g. the Giants’ stature, or one single cubit, in the case of Pygmies; resulting such variety, as we said above, not only in singular beauty for the whole nature, but in fairness and

51 Another significant passage apart from the ones I quoted in the last part, in addressing this topic, is the following: “[... ] just like in final judgment there will not be resurrected black, brown or yellow skinned men nor any other showing imperfection and vice, according to the temperament they lived with or were asked for in their individuality and nature, as they were white in their origin and birth; because they will have at resurrection their own and natural color, and not the one they acquired through damage by dew and sun, and other distempers and bizarre or odd causes [... ] And that however Ethiopians will be resurrected with their own color, in all their perfection and beauty, as such color is connatural to them, according to their temperament and primal qualities” (1647: 340).
ornament in these ones, what used to be ugliness and decline of perfection in their first ancestors, according to their natural complexion, and native temperament, which they inherited at the beginning and which vitiated and distempered at those times (1647: 337-338).

This notion of *connaturalizing* leads us to think in the mutation of *vice, imperfection* or *defect*, that is, in *perfection, in nature*. A relevant consequence of this is that *human nature* not in all aspects (like color) is the same to be established by *God* at the time of Adam and Eve’s creation (in God’s direct image, as Sandoval does not cease to recall — 1647: 341). In other words, the variety of forms among *men* does not necessarily involves *monstrosity, deformity* or *vice*, but it accounts for a nature that changes as time goes by. Thus, at least at this level, although *whites* from Spanish or Portuguese *nations* may be able to claim that Adam or Jesus Christ were *white, they* do not constitute the only possible form of *perfection* and *beauty*, *human nature* does not end in their color.

In short, *human nature* includes a *variety of forms*, some of which are as extreme as the *monstrous nations*: “The existence of small men makes part of human nature, so that sometimes a mole, as we have seen, may result in something beautiful, and neglect may result in something ugly. Their existence makes part of the world’s ornament…” (1647: 337). Even though among *nations of men* there is some degree of variation in bodies, Sandoval maintains a basic commonality, which would make them belong to *humankind*. This commonality is based on the fundamental distinctions between *men* and *brutes*, which are their difference in reason and ability to attain grace. Therefore, the fact that *Ethiopians* and *other nations of blacks* change their *color* does not imply they are not to be considered *men*, a part of *humankind* just like *nations* of other *colors*.
On the difference among men and the place *Ethiopians* occupy

Even though all *men* are equal, since by *nature* they are qualitatively different from *beasts* or *irrational animals* or from other *creatures*, like *angels*, Sandoval does not discard the idea that there is a difference and unevenness among *men*. Not only is there a variety of forms among *men* (some of them even considered monstrous), but there are also remarkable differences within the very commonalities of *human nature* (*reason* and *grace*).

Concerning *reason*, Sandoval assumes that there are several differences among *men*. One such a difference comprises a range that spans from wise *men* and scholars, who are necessary for the exaltation of the *republic*, to those *men* who due to their “[...] poor discourse, and the poorer reasoning they demonstrate, to their imbecility, and their ignorance [...]” (1647: 411) resemble *irrational animals*. In another passage, we observe this distinction between *men* when he states that missionary work should be meant “[...] not just for men, who are considered as such because of their reason and gentle character, but also for beastly, imbecile, feral and barbarian men” ([1627] 1956: 484).

As for *grace*, Sandoval establishes clear differences, too. Not only would there be some men who are more righteous than others, but in fact, only *real Christians* would be on their way to attaining *grace*. The *Catholic Church* serves as a mediator between *man* and *grace*. So that there is no possibility to be saved without such mediation: “Since the virtue of Religion is universal, it involves many aspects of divine worship, and embraces like the sea does with many rivers flowing all over the earth. Its duty is, then, first of all to open men’s eyes, so that they understand that outside the Catholic Church’s ship there
is no health, as there was no life at the time of the Flood for those who were fighting the waves outside Noah’s ark” (1647: 24). In matters of religion, Sandoval is in no way a relativist. In spite of recognizing that most nations have a religion, he regards them all as hopelessly false (I will come back to this point in the next section).

The distinction between Christians and infidels is fundamental. Although all men (Christians and infidels) are able to attain grace as a consequence of the nobleness and excellence with which they were created by God, only Christians are able to attain it. And even then only those Christians who, through the proper compliance of the Catholic Church-led practices and rulings, keep their spiritual health will deserve grace. An infidel or gentile can be reduced, thereby becoming Christian. Indeed, their work for the restoration of health to Ethiopians consists of making actual Christians of those who pretend to be so without being properly baptized and, in many cases, have not been baptized at all. Now, while that passage from infidel to Christian is possible for both men, given that they were both created by God, the distinction between one and the other is plain. Sandoval understands such distinction in terms of the difference and distance between the brute and man, spirit and flesh, life and death, grace and nature, God and men.

[...] thus, it does not suffice any conversion to make a Christian from an idolater, but in all nature there is not a bigger [...] we could notice, there is no less from an infidel to a Christian, than from a brute to a man, and that it is the same for any man to leave his heritage and gentile mores for the Faith and the imitation of Christ, as it is for animals to lose their natural life, when they are killed violently, and in a certain way be transformed in human life when they are eaten, but for those transmutations nature is enough; and in the transformation of Faith, only grace has the power. Then it is evident that when things are more or less evident or less similar between each other it is more or less easy to go from one to the other (for that reason air catches fire more easily than water, and water is more easily distilled from air than from fire) as the clearly stated Moors’ superstition that such
ease we felt seemed quite close to idolaters’ blindness: far from it, the logical impossibility we admit in converting infidels to our Holy Faith is a most certain fact that our Faith is as different and distant from evil sects as are spirit from flesh, life from death, grace from nature, God from men (1647: 57; [1927] 1956: 75-76).

Specifically referring to *Ethiopian slaves*, Sandoval called into question that they were considered *beasts* and he repeatedly argued against those who considered they were *unable to become Christians*. As we will see further below, both these assumptions are fundamental to justify the pertinence of his labor with slaves. Without them, his efforts would not only be in vain but he would be *dooming* himself as he would be unduly administering *sacraments*. For the time being, I’d like to quote an excerpt where Sandoval’s clearly states that *slaves* are not supposed to be *beasts* and that they have the *ability* to become *Christians*, but he also suggests that the higher or lower ability among them is to be found in any *nation*, including *Spaniards*’ and that (as I will demonstrate later) the lesser capacity observed among *bozales* is attributable more to their *living conditions* and *fate* than to their *nature*:

From what I had said we can deduce two things; one, that those blacks are not beasts as I have heard some people say meaning they are incapable of becoming Christians, nor they are to be considered infants [...] as they are nothing else but adult men, and as such they are to be baptized, having previously agreed and carrying out all the other necessary procedures, and on our part, teaching, in a rather accordance to the higher or lower capacity we would find in them, because all nations possess such difference of understanding among their people. The other thing is that as these people’s capacity is not as high as Spaniards’, both Gospel’s pastors and ministers are under the obligation of teaching them very slowly, with a longer catechism, for neither we were born being learned nor in schools and doctrines we learn faith issues in as a short time as we want those poor bozales to learn it, not because understanding but in our own language, which they lack, and not the first one; for they have freewill, freedom and they make use of them in all human actions they face; thus, making war and peace, buying and selling, exchanging and trading as we do. And sometimes (though rarely) they have even rejected to be baptized and leave their sect and false laws ([1627] 1956: 345-346).
Accordingly, we should not be surprised that Sandoval categorically suggests that slaves’ *incapacity* is just an appearance due to the “lack of instruction” and “mistreatment which prevent them from being good Christians” thereby leading them to “live as brutes”.52 Hence, their particular condition, with physical abuse and bad example from their masters and armatures’ owners, is the reason why they are unable to understand:

[...] it seems that God, talking his way, had removed half of slaves’ understanding (and I would even add that considering how harmful is being a slave to the armatures’ lords, to be able to endure that they should have been left none), but we should not believe they are less perfect than those who are free, but because that same condition that bodies endure shadows the soul’s understanding, and they are able to understand as if they had half of their wits, and they have an appetite as voracious as a thousand of them. ([1627] 1956: 193).

In short, Sandoval acknowledges the difference existing between men in terms of reason and the means to attain grace. However, from that we should not assume that he is making a case for a necessary correspondence between those Ethiopians’ nations’ black color and a defined degree of human rationality and (in)ability to attain grace. In other words, Sandoval is not assuming those nations of blacks are irremediably and necessarily inferior to Spaniards or Portuguese because of their color.

**Barbarian or political people: distinction and hierarchy between nations**

The differences among men in terms of reason and the means to attain grace are not the only difference Sandoval notes. As I said above, in matters of religion Sandoval is

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52 “But the scarce or none instruction at all, and the many and very bad example prevent them from being good Christians, and lead them to live as brutes and seem incapable” ([1627] 1956: 199).
no relativist. Nor is he about the issues concerning *mores* and the concept of *natural* and *moral qualities* among the different *nations* opposed to the *Christian police*. However, in the issues that do not go against that, Sandoval proves less critical. Undoubtedly, concerning the *sacred police* (*religion*) and the *profane police* (*natural and moral customs*) of *nations* from *orb* (the ‘earth’), Sandoval establishes not only a set of differences, but also a hierarchy. Such differentiation and hierarchies are mentioned in several passages, but most often they are implicit in ‘sloppy’ comments or in the very criteria underlying his exposition and procedures. Among the explicit passages, I will start by referring to the more obvious ones on Africa, the West Indies, Europe and Asia.

Sandoval makes a difference between *citizen* (*civilians and politicians*) and *peasant* (*people that work in the countryside, ranchers and farmers*). Both *types of people* are to be found in *Africa*. That distinction between *citizens* and *peasants* is contrasted to that of the *nations*, also in Africa, who *like savages* “typically live [...] wandering through the jungles, without the practice of agriculture, without any order under a republic, without any laws or dealing with humans [trade], inhabiting caverns and caves on the ground, feeding themselves with roots of herbs, wild fruits, from meat and blood of wild beasts” ([1627] 1956: 14).

Quoting Acosta, for the *West Indies* Sandoval offers a scheme of settlement in the *new world*. The first *wild men* arrived to this *quarter of the world* by crossing a passage whose existence, even though it hasn’t been *discovered* yet, must be presupposed: “[...] the first settlers on the West Indies came looking for land, and with them, or by themselves, came all the rest of the animals: hence we can conclude that all the land of the Indies is prolonged with Asia, Europe and Africa, and the new world with the old
one, even though up to the present day the land linking and putting together both those worlds is not discovered yet: or whether sea is in the middle, the passage is so short that it can be crossed by swimming by beasts and with fragile boats by men” (1647: 145). In those beginnings, savage men fed themselves from hunting and they penetrated the very rough lands. While they were gradually discovering the new world, they lived as beasts “[...] with no home, nor sown land or livestock, neither King, nor God or reason” (1647: 145). Thus, Sandoval continues: “Afterwards, others looking for new and better lands settled in the good lands and brought up order and police, and some sort of Republic, though barbarian. Then, from among them or from other nations, there came men more spirited and skillful than the others, and they conquered and oppressed those who were less powerful until they created Kingdoms and great Empires” (1647: 145).

Sandoval devotes a few lines explicitly to the land of Europe in the first of his analysis of the four parts of the world, although this is the shortest of the four, in it he notes that Europe is the “[...] highest in nobleness, virtue, solemnity, magnificence and amount of political people [...]” (1647: 2; [1627] 1956: 12). He adds that formerly it dominated, through the Greek and Roman monarchies all over Africa and Asia, “[...] and it is presently the master of a huge part of the world, under the authority of the Apostolic Church, that is based in Rome, the Head of the world and Christendom, and under the great power of Spain, so that many Provinces and Kingdoms, from the West and Eastern Indies, and the Kingdoms and Empires of Ethiopians are under their rule” (1647: 3).

Referring to a fable circulating among chingalas from the island of Ceylon in the second part of the world (Asia), Sandoval provides us with an excerpt that says more
about his own categories and classifications than about those nations to which that *fable* is attributed:

People say that as first settlers were coming from everything running on the other side of the famous river Ganges towards the East, *like beasts through those jungles, without practicing agriculture, lacking the rule of Republic, as well as laws and interchange with humans, living in caverns and caves on the ground, feeding themselves with roots of herbs, wild fruits, meat and blood of wild beasts.* It happened that one clear and quiet day, as many of those wild and barbarian people were waiting for the sun to rise, to embellish it, as they used to do, astonished before its radiance, and life of the same Planet: at the time that it appeared in the Horizon, striking the Earth with its rays and opening it, it gave birth and made appear, as if from its entrails, a man at the bloom of youth, superior to all those who were known up to then, in authority, grace, handsomeness, gentleness, venerableness, and that for the same reason forced everybody looking at him to venerate him and love him. All the people there came running around him, asking him who he was and what his commands were. And the newly born miraculous man replied he was the son of Sun and Earth, who had been sent by God to rule and govern people who were living as brutes instead of living as rational men; all of them prostrated and adored him venerating him as their only King, and lord of Earth, and *he started to dictate rules and order in life, farming fields and building cities, introducing trade and enlarging the Empire by himself and through the arms,* so that he outpaced all the other Eastern Provinces, which we nowadays call Pegu, Tanacarii, Sion, Cambaya, Cochinchina, stepping inland up to forty leagues northwards. (1647: 178; emphasis added).

In addition to those passages that express the criteria with which Sandoval is establishing a difference between *nations,* there are innumerable loose fragments in which such criteria can be confirmed as well. As it was to be expected, *religion* is important for the differentiations and hierarchies Sandoval establishes. Lack of it is an incontrovertible proof that a *nation* should be considered the most *barbarian* and *beastly* in the world:

God’s majesty is so great and natural, and the reverence and obedience due to it are so deeply rooted in all men’s souls that in all the world’s nations and republics, despite their barbarism and blindness, the primary and highest trade was always religion, not only to comply with such a necessary and natural obligation we all have to acknowledge, observe and duly worship the great Prince and sovereign Ruler of all that was created, but also because they were persuaded that only keeping religion among them could they preserve their kingdoms, states and
republics. Therefore I think that nation of Kaffirs is the most beastly and barbarian all over the world, for they do not worship God nor do they have idols or images or temples, nor do they make sacrifices or have ministers devoted to divine worship nor do they have any religion, being atheists as they are, despite being aware of the other life ([1627] 1956: 115; 1647: 221; emphasis added).

In other passages, Sandoval associates passion and treating each other as beasts (that is, without law or police) with barbarian people. Talking about the reasons why some Ethiopians (and particularly their princes and Kings) enslave others from their own nation, he notes: “[…] they are like barbarians, ordinarily not following reason, but passion, neither analyzing nor consulting the rights they are entitled to” (1647: 95). And he adds,

And nobody should be startled, that those people treat each other so badly, selling each other: because they are barbarian, wild and uncouth people, and this is associated to barbarism, baseness and rusticity when growing, that they treat each other as beasts: according to several fables, they hurt and beat each other those wild people (1647:95).

Besides, for Sandoval letters and the men devoted to them are a fundamental part of a republic, without which it could not exist. Sandoval asks himself: “What is a Republic without letters, but a body without nerves, a fruitless field, a barbarian confusion, a herd of beasts? Plato said Wise men-led Republics were venturous, then how unfortunate are the ones without such a guide?” (1647: 110). Letters and men devoted to them are necessary to maintain a republic alive. Religion as the foundation of a republic and the indispensable matters of conscience could not be treated without theologians, so that litigations could not be solved without amicus curiae, illnesses could not be healed without physicians nor buildings could be built, nor army could be managed or navigation possible without mathematicians, astrologers and geometricians (1647: 110).
So that referring once more to the simile of body, Sandoval resorts to nerves to illustrate letters and the men devoted to them: “[…] how reasonable and sound were those Princes in behaving in such prudent manner on that matter, for it is true that one of the main parts of a Republic are letters, and the men devoted to them; which serve in this body we have formed the same function as nerves in the natural body” (1647: 110).

In brief, several criteria seem to be operating in the distinctions Sandoval establishes. The household type —where and how people live— is called on to differentiate between those living in caves, in the ground, and in jungles, and those who have dwellings and roofs, and those who build villas and cities. Sustenance, what and how they eat, allows him to establish distinctions between those living like and from wild beasts and fruits from hunting and gathering, and those devoting themselves to agricultural crafts such as farmers in cultivated lands and ranchers with livestock, and those who devote themselves to business and trade (human treatment). The order of the republic also establishes a distinction between those who lack those forms of police and government, those who have barbarian-like institutions, and those who build kingdoms and empires and dominate others. In short, Sandoval distinguishes between nations living as wild men or beasts, and nations of political people. The extent of dominance and subjection of other nations, the existence of lettered men, and their reduction of Christian law all serve to further distinguish political people.

At this point, it is mandatory to ask several questions the answers to which do not come easily: How does Sandoval explain differences among men? Are such differences permanent and unchangeable or temporary and subject to change? Did the missionary
work of reducing *infidels* and Christianizing them involve a project to erase such differences, to build a Christian community where differences and hierarchies between *nations* wouldn’t exist anymore? Do the distinctions and hierarchies among the world’s *nations* that are proposed by Sandoval serve as a justification for *Ethiopian slavery*?

**Serfs and masters: origin and lawfulness of inequality among ‘men’**

The first ‘serfdom’ and ‘slavery’ known in the world was Ham’s as a result of Noah, his father’s, curse on him, “[...] because of his shamelessness towards him, when treated [Noah] with such disrespect, [thus Ham] lost his noble condition and even his freedom, as he was made a slave himself as well as all of his offspring [...]” ([1627] 1956: 27). As it was said above, that curse is also associated with the origin of the ‘nations of black color’ in the world.53 In that sense, a reader could argue that Sandoval considers that ‘slavery’ and ‘serfdom’ would be, at least for Ham’s descendants, part of their ‘nature’ just as their ‘color’ is. Yet, that is a more complex matter.

For Sandoval there is no doubt that men are equal before *nature* and *God*. On one hand, inequality between *masters* and *slaves* does not reflect a differential treatment by *nature*. Quoting Salomon, he argues that “[...] nature did not care more in forging princes than plebeians, nor it used more adornments to dress the gentleman than the villain; it did not give additional eyes nor feet or arms to the nobleman than to the plebeian” ([1627]

53 “Not only had Ham to bear the consequences of having offended his father with having his offspring dark, and black, but also [...] subject to captivity, as his father’s curse covered all of his offspring damned to perpetual serfdom.” (1647: 21).
Thus, referring to lords and serfs “[…] to all of them nature made equal both in birth and death” (1647: 75). Thus he warns lords: “[…] don’t forget that you share your serfs’ nature […]” (1647: 76), and reminds them to acknowledge that “[…] those who are their slaves are equal in nature to them” (1647: 76). Besides, both slave and lord: “[…] were made equal by the redemption and by Christ’s blood, which was poured for all” (1647: 77).

Opposite to several masters’ thinking, Sandoval categorically states that there is no such abyss between a lord and a slave’s body, lineage, soul or virtue:

Now lords tell me; answer to me the faded lords: what made you so different? Body? No, as it is made of flesh and bone as theirs. Father? No, as we all have Adam as our father on earth, and one and another say God: pater noster, qui es in caelis. Soul? No, as they both are spiritual, eternal, and rescued by Christ? Virtue and retreat? No, as they are as lost in the slave as in the master, as a lazy master could never make a diligent servant, and many times the servant is better and more God fearing than his lord (1647: 79).

The existence of lords and slaves is the result of a few men tyrannizing others’ freedom ([1627] 1956: 105; 1647: 74). This was not the way God peopled earth in the beginning of the world, but the way it developed in time and with malice increase among men.54

Delving into this conceptualization, quoting Bodino, in his second edition Sandoval writes:

And somewhere else he says that the origin of slavery, and that of Republics, was violence, greed and cruelty: for before there was any city or citizens or some other form of Republic among men, family men were supreme lords at their homes,

54 “It is known […] that at the beginning of the world Our Lord God did not people earth with lords and slaves nor was there notice of any majority among dwellers, but with the passing of time and the growing of malice, some of them began to tyrannize others’ freedom […]” ([1627] 1956: 105).
In this sense, for Sandoval *slavery* and *serfdom* were added by *men* a posteriori. At this point he asks himself about the lawfulness of the existence of *slaves* and *masters* in the world, that is, if their existence goes against *natural law* and *rule*, against *written* law and the *law of grace*.

Sandoval presents different positions that consider *slavery* and *serfdom* unlawful. He starts by arguing that many old wise men considered that as “[...] nature made men free, nobody could take that away, for in that rational and free condition they make themselves different from brute animals: and thus they thought it was against all reason and nature that there were slaves who were deprived from freedom and forcefully subject to their masters’ will” (1647: 81).

Besides, several *nations* had considered *slavery* and *serfdom* to be unlawful. Ancient Lydos and Trapobans, for example, “[...] rejected the possession of slaves [...] [because] it was not sound to rely on their enemies, having them at home, as you cannot expect loyalty from someone who is against his own will [...]” (1647: 82). Slavery and serfdom were equally unlawful for “[...] many Republics, and Christian Kings, as we can see in the provinces of Italy, France, England and Germany, who did not permit having
native or foreign slaves [...]” (1647: 82). Those nations ruled so on the basis that “[...] freedom cannot be sold or changed for gold or silver, as it is a gift bestowed by God on all the Angels and men, who are rational [...]” (1647: 83).

Despite presenting those positions, Sandoval agrees with other arguments that do consider some forms of slavery and serfdom lawful. Against those saying slavery and serfdom go against natural rule and law, Sandoval affirms, echoing Aristotle and de Molina, that:

[…] it would be senseless to say the slaves’ condition goes against natural rule and law, as it is nothing but something to be followed, according to the rational nature, whose compliance is our first rule of action […] Because if serfdom and slavery go against natural law, it would not have been sanctioned as lawful by political law [...] (1647: 85, 86).

That is, political or common law cannot go against natural law. In saying this he resorts to the theologians’ subtleties that make a difference between precept and permission in natural law:

But in elucidating this predicament Theologians state it scientifically: they say that serfdom goes against permission in natural law: but not against its prohibitions or rules: and that natural permissions could have been derogated by common law, as it happens in many cases. They call freedom, a natural law permission: because nature makes everyone free and does not force anyone to serve another: but they do not consider it a natural precept: because nature never commanded that men were free: and thus it allowed to introduce serfdom among human rights, without contradicting them: as it didn’t apportion the dominion of things, divide common law: nor did it abrogate marriage in many cases that human laws declared them null, without going against nature, whose laws are firm and invariable (1647: 84).

Opposing those nations that declared slavery to be unlawful, Sandoval mentions that there are many other political nations: “[...] affirming, that [it] is lawful and fair for some people to serve and to be sold as any other good orestate” (1647: 84). They defend their
opinion on the basis that: “If it is considered fair for men to lose their life to pay for crimes: how would it be considered unfair that because of those same crimes or others they lose their freedom, which is less valued and worthwhile?” (1647: 85). However, that reasoning is limited to just war, as when it is “[…] unfair there cannot be dominion over vanquished people nor can the vanquisher acquire that one: because he was unfair and he cannot be given an unfavorable title, so that he could not be called a lord, but a tyrant” (1647: 86).

Serfdom and slavery, then, are not opposed to natural law. Conversely, they both should be considered convenient, provided that they are justified: “In conclusion […] we are not denying it is not highly convenient having serfs and slaves in the world; but we are saying that such convenience, slavery and serfdom should be justified […]” (1647: 92). It is convenient that there is servitude in the world, as on inequality between men depends world to be preserved. Therefore, Sandoval is arguing, with Augustine, that serfdom is necessary in the world, that it is necessary for some men to rule and some others to obey, for some to be lords and other to be subjects:

So that it is definitely true, that [He] there was serfdom in the world, as equality among men would be harmful, and it could not be kept in the world: and thus we can see, that being Kings there was later a difference in value, as Augustine elegantly argues and states so often, declaring that in humankind there should be a natural serfdom and lordship of men: thus it is necessary for there to be some who rule and some who obey: some people to be lords and some to be subjects (1647: 92).
Thus Sandoval adheres to thesis of ‘natural serfdom’,\textsuperscript{55} inspired by Aristotle:

Apart from, as Aristotle noticed well, two sorts of peoples should be willing to be subject to servitude. Those who are rude and witless, undoubtedly should serve those who are wise and judicious, so that they govern and rule on them, teaching how to live a virtuous life, which they cannot get to know by themselves: and nature, which made them unable to study sciences, gave them bodily strength, and the ability to work and serve: and that is the name ancient wizards gave them — sons of earth, arguing that they are tireless workers, as oak trees and stones. So that nature itself made some men lords and others serfs; and seemingly some of them were born to rule and others to be ruled [...] And there are also those who, even though having acumen and ingenuity, lack the possibility to support themselves and make a living, as well as the interest for learning a mechanical craft; so it is all right for them to be subject to serve those who can relieve their poverty, and give them what they need to live (1647: 93).\textsuperscript{56}

From these premises, then, it should not surprise us that Sandoval argues that the benefits of serfdom and slavery are so obvious--not for the lord, but for the serf or slave-- that one would have to be blind not to recognize them:

How could one cast any doubt on the great benefit done to a man who is unable to govern himself, and who does not have any art or craft or trade with which make a living, administrating him, serving themselves from him, and more importantly, taking care of his costumes and teaching him to live honestly, and according to the doctrine of Church? Tertaliano said well on a different topic, that there are indignities deserving thanks. Or who could be so blind as to not to notice the great mercifulness with which God has treated bozal men, through making them slaves, bringing them under the power of Christian lords, who have given them the enlightenment of the Gospel, baptizing them, keeping them in the Faith, where

\textsuperscript{55} That thesis of ‘natural serfdom’ was commented on by Augustine and revisited by Sepúlveda in his famous discusión con De las Casas a century earlier.  en la famosa discusión con De las Casas un siglo antes.

\textsuperscript{56} In his first edition, Sandoval mentions Aristotle’s thesis in passing, but seeming to indicate that what he calls nature is actually slaves’ bad luck: “We could well treat the natural evils those miserable blacks have, that if nature pressured the very kings’ lives with censuses and tributes of miseries, founded on the very nature, the root where they come from, it is clear that He would not be more benevolent with those that fate put in so bad condition, that it seems they prove what Aristotle said, that there were men who seem to have naturally been born to be slaves and subjects to others” ([1627] 1956: 194).
they will achieve the salvation for their souls, for if they were living in freedom, they would have been miserably lost? As we have largely proved in the discourse of all this treaty [...] (1647: 86).

When everything would seem to indicate that Sandoval was closing ranks with his pro-slavery contemporaries acclaiming the arrival of thousands of Ethiopian slaves to the West Indies, his examination of the concrete circumstances under which they are captured calls into question its fairness. Before moving to this point, it is relevant to clarify one last point regarding the fact that Sandoval echoes Aristotle and Augustine and the thesis of natural serfdom. Does Sandoval think of these inequalities in terms of nations of whites and blacks? Are whites something like ‘lords by nature’ to Ethiopians? It is much easier to ask this question than to find a response in the same text, with textual evidence, and not simply by attributing Sandoval an outright statement based on two or three disconnected excerpts as it seems to be usual for certain readers who boast of being historians. I will come back to this question. As of right now, I wish to refer to a comment that Sandoval makes in the anecdote below in order to suggest, in a provocative manner, that the answer to that question would be no:

[...] a Moor came to town to sell some goods, and headed towards the Priest (who they call Bexemin), being there he advised the Priest he had come not so much because of business but to discuss with him a doubt he had, to ask why whites were free and blacks were slaves to them. The priest told him then that it was because God had first created whites, and then blacks, to whom he commaned to serve their oldest brothers, as they had been the last ones (1647: 45).

57 We should remember that two opposite readings of Aristotle and Augustine on this issue of ‘natural serfdom’ were the origin of the famous debate between De las Casas and Sepúlveda.
In the titled “Index of the most notable things,” in the comment, Sandoval notes:

“Answer. It was ridiculous what was given a Moor by a Bexerim, who asked him, why Blacks served whites?”

**On ‘ethiopian’ slavery: Given justifications and modalities of capture**

Chapter XVII of the first book of the Seville edition entitled “On Slavery of Blacks from Guinea and Other Ports, A General Outline” Sandoval looks into the justifications regarding blacks who arrived in captivity to the port of Cartagena. The second edition of Sandoval’s book has two chapters (from XXI to XXII) of the first book related to this topic. In both editions, Sandoval openly refuses to put himself amidst the ‘great controversy’ established by the ‘experienced in the justification of such an arduous and difficult business’. Even when in the second edition he pauses on the matter and presents all the different positions of the Experts (*doctos*), in the first book he only re-directs his readers to the well-known text by Molina.

At this point Sandoval chooses an arguing strategy which consists of presenting the reader with all the modalities of the ‘rescue’ of slaves, based on the authority his wide experience gives him, and on the information obtained directly from those who have been in the lands of the ‘ethiopians’ (such as the members of the religious Loanda company or the captains of ships and ‘ship-owners’ that were directly involved in the slave trade.) Sandoval contrasts the concrete captivity practices and the authority of the ship’s captain or the monks who tried to ‘reduce’ the ‘ethiopians’ to Christianity with the ‘circumstances’ under which men were justly or not, made captive. Therefore, if the
legality of the existence of slavery was not doubted (ie. ‘nature’), the forms in which the ‘ethiopians’ who arrived in the huge ships were made captive did raise questions (ie. ‘circumstances’): “This is by all means one of the most talked about matters there has ever been, not even nowadays do scholars understand the nature of the matter, but they do not understand the adjacent circumstances that obscure it either” (1647: 93 emphasis added).

Nonetheless, these questions are confirmed to the reader: “It is true that I will leave the determination of your justification to the experienced, who have written in a very serious and certain way about this issue, while I illustrate their intent only with examples, and particular cases, where the prudent, discrete, and educated will clearly see true conclusions” (167: 74). Therefore, “[...] I will content myself just by putting before everyone’s eyes what has long been experienced by me in what has to do with the handling of blacks, which I have carried out for many years, so that each one can consider his own ideas and do what seems more just to him” (1647: 93-94; [1627] 1956: 97).

This decision can be understandable in the context from which Sandoval writes. The letter of Father Luis Brandon (head of the school of the Company of Jesus in San Pablo de Loanda, dated on March 12 of 1610 which was written as a response to one sent by Sandoval) shows some of the aspects of this context:

Your Majesty questions me about the conditions of good captivity of the blacks that get there. I respond that you should not have any doubt about this. The conscience board in Lisbon never punished this, since they are cultivated men. Besides, all the bishops that were in Saint Thome, Cape Verde, and Loanda, never punished it either. We have been here for forty years and there were also Fathers of our religion here and in the province of Brazil, who never considered this trade
as illicit, and therefore we and the Fathers of Brazil buy these slaves for our service with no scruple whatsoever. ([1627] 1956:98; 1647: 100). 58

Wondering whether the ‘ethiopians’ that arrived to the Western Indies were ‘well captured’ in this context means questioning the whole framework of ecclesiastic authority, which, by action or omission, had sanctioned their slavery. Before engaging in a theological or philosophical discussion about the justification (or lack thereof) of the slave trade in the abstract and questioning the established authority, Sandoval prefers to appeal to the examination of the existing concrete practices. “If good sense judges, it is better to be guided by known experience, than by the best studied science” (1647: 93-94).

In the second edition, Sandoval clearly refers to the five “[...] reasons and very well justified causes, by which one can be justly captured and sold.” (167:94) These ‘titles’ of the ‘real slaves’ are (1) the birth of a slave mother (2) having been captured in a fair war (which for Christians only applies to those waged against the Moors), (3) civil right (4) because of crimes committed against the law, and (5) because of the decision to sell their children in cases of extreme need (167:94). These reasons or causes under which someone can be ‘justly captured and sold’ make up the frame from which Sandoval displays his description of the modalities of capturing ‘Ethiopians’ arriving to the West Indies. Once again, the second edition is very useful for clarifying the ambiguities and the slight indications of the first: “The bad thing is that many of these are mixed with

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58 Besides, from the perspective of Father Brandon, the salvation of so many souls cannot be played with because of a bunch of ‘badly captured’ [men]. “And loosing so many souls that leave from here, of which many are saved, does not seem as a great service to God, and those that are saved are many and goodly captured” ([1627] 1956: 99; 1647: 101). Father Brandon recommends Sandoval not to resort to the slaves themselves to know whether they are well or badly captured since “[...] no black says that he is a good captive [...] because they always say that they were stolen and badly captured, believing that by saying this they will be set free.” ([1627] 1956: 99; 1647: 100).
faked or unjust ones, so many of the ones sold as slaves come betrayed and forced, as we will notice in the rest of this chapter.” (1647: 94).

The ‘barbaric ways’, ‘savagery’, or ‘bestiality’ of the ‘ethiopians’ themselves, partly explains the arrival of such a large number of slaves reduced to captivity in an unfair manner. This happens by means of wars, punishment to the princes, and children being sold by parents (167: 95) Regardless of this, the other party is responsible of the Spaniards and Portuguese who contributed to the increase of the unfair captivities with their treachery, but mainly because they promote - directly and indirectly - wars amongst ‘ethiopians’ in order to get a provision of slaves.

According to an anecdote extensively mentioned by Sandoval, two ship-owners of slave ships originally from Angola asked him about his own opinion on the justification of captivity of the ‘goodly’ or ‘badly’ obtained blacks as a consequence of the immense difficulty, expenses, and many dangers to the ship-owners when carrying them since they are “[...] sold in Christian land, where they remain gentiles for all their lives.” ([1627] 1956: 99; 1647: 96). In his metaphorical response, Sandoval leaves no open doubt about the fact that none of the causes argued by the ship-owners would make any captivity fair:

If your Highness went from here to San Francisco, and there you will cut the lamp’s rope and take the lamp home; then when justice will arrest you for stealing and will want to hang you (as they hanged another one who stole in Santo Domingo) you could say that you did not steal the lamp, but took it to compensate the effort of going from here to there. If justice approved the justification of your work and not punished you, then I can say that you bring your blacks in good faith, and that the reason you argue is valid. ([1627] 1956: 99-100; 1647: 96).\footnote{In the second edition, Sandoval expands his argument in the following way: “tell me what would you say if when you arrived to port, a pirate will meet you and steal your black slaves, and if you asked him why he was taking away your blacks he will respond that he did it very...}
In this way, Sandoval considers that the fact that ‘ethiopian’ slaves are reduced to Christianity legitimizes the unfair ways under which they had been captured. Nonetheless, Sandoval assumes that they have been chosen by providence to enjoy their grace. In this aspect, when he was carrying out his ‘instruction’ to adequately prepare them for baptism and other sacraments, he emphasized the aspect for which, in spite of all the evil, they should feel deeply fortunate. 60

Sandoval also notices how other ‘ship-owners’ did not have a clear conscience. One of them confesses that “[...] he was sure that there would not be half the wars amongst blacks, if they knew the Spaniards would rescue them” ([1627] 1956: 102; 1647: 95), another said “[...] that he could not avoid feeling bad when seeing that in some ships, the captain received some blacks bought from other blacks, at midnight, in a hidden manner, and at a lower price.”([1627] 1956: 103; 1647: 96). Although not all ‘ship-owners’ show restlessness in their conscience, their stories did show the injustice and betrayals, of which Spaniards and Portuguese were participants. One of these ship-owners - - noted Sandoval - “came to me bragging” to tell me with great delight the way

consciously, since the valuables in his loot were much more expensive than the blacks. What will you answer back? Any answer you give will satisfy me as much as your Majesties will be satisfied by the pirate’s response.” (1647: 96).

60 “[...] How much love do you owe to God, for all the benefits He has done and the good He has given you? For having raised you, and having made Himself man, suffering until His death, so you can enjoy Him there in Heaven forever, and now He wishes you to be Christians, your brothers, your children, for which I take you from your land where you were moors, gentiles, barbarians, children of the devil. Now you leave your parents, relatives, and friends in such distress and misery and condemnation, and I choose you to teach you the true path, full of eternal bliss [...]” ([1627] 1956: 396).
in which he had obtained his ‘ship’ with about three hundred ‘pieces’. Sandoval tells him how a king used his many women to lure some of his men into committing ‘adultery’ and therefore, they became objects of punishment of the king (who went from captivity to death) even if they were relatives.” ([1627] 1956: 103; 1647: 96).

Sandoval pauses to describe the different and most commonly used modalities of capture. He begins by differentiating the origin of slaves from Cape Verde, Saint Thome, Angola, and Guinea, since different models of capture existed in each of these places. While the first edition begins with native slaves from Cape Verde, the second one begins with slaves from the rivers in Guinea. I will follow here the order of exposition of the first edition. The island of Cape Verde was not ‘land of ethiopians’, the slaves that embarked from there came from other places. Therefore, they had already “been bought from a third, fourth or more owners”. So, “there has been no difficulty in making these blacks slaves... there are no scruples, [neither on the island], nor among the buyers here in our ports” ([1627] 1956: 97; 1647: 99). Therefore, “Without getting involved in the intrinsic justification of the situation [...]” ([1627] 1956: 97), Sandoval leaves the island of Cape Verde to turn his attention to the description of captures in places that were in the ‘land of ethiopians’. He acknowledges that the port of Saint Thome has ‘short relation’ in the justification of captivity of the blacks that come from there. He mentions,

61 Sandoval mentions that because “[...] the blacks are called the pieces of the ships [...]”([1627] 1956: 366). ‘Piece’ was a unit of measure used in the trade “Slaves were generally traded in batches, which included men, women, elders, and children, in order to get rid of some of the worst and get an average price. The typical slave was a male or female, anywhere between fifteen and thirty years of age, healthy, well built, and with all his/her teeth. This slave was referred to as a piece of the Indies. In the black jargon so many pieces were the equivalent of so many perfect slaves” (Ortiz 1916: 133).
nonetheless, that a ‘captain’ and ‘lord of these ships’ said that “[...] the justification of the captive of many blacks he held prisoners to sell to Spaniards that arrived to his lands, was to make the whole generation of any who angered him prisoners, together with the criminal that had made him angry” ([1627] 1956: 98; 1647: 100). Seeing this, Sandoval adds: “From which I can infer that if that is the justification for a rescue over there, I can well see what kind of treatment they will receive” ([1627] 1956: 98; 1647: 100).

Then, he moves on to describe the capturing modalities of those that come from Angola, about which he reports having less information. This information is provided by the aforementioned letter of the rector of the Jesuits school, as well as from the conversations he held with the ship-owners and ship captains that brought slaves from those lands. According to Father Luis Brandon,62 ‘a badly captured’ or ‘captive with a bad title’ is one who ‘does not deserve captivity’, either because he was stolen or because he has been sold to a master of those lands for subtle issues, which according to the laws and customs, does not constitute a cause for captivity. Regardless of this, he says that there should be no ‘scruples’ about the well or badly captured ‘blacks’ since after buying them in ‘good faith’ or ‘good conscience’ from a merchant who had bought them himself under the same conditions, even if they are badly captured, “it is of common opinion that the owner of something obtained with good faith, can sell it and it can be bought from him [...]” (quoted by Sandoval [1627] 1956: 99; 1647: 100). Father Brandon adds that even if it is true that “[...] in the fairs where these blacks are bought, some were badly

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captured [...] these are not many; and to look among ten or twelve thousand blacks that each year leave this port, some badly captured, is an impossible thing no matter how many things are done” ([1627] 1956: 99; 1647: 100-101).

Based on the words of a ship captain, Sandoval mentions how the captives that copiously arrived from Angola to Cartagena during those days were obtained. The abundance was a consequence of a war between two powerful kings, one of which asked the Portuguese for help. He had to send a “rich gift consisting of a large number of blacks” ([1627] 1956: 100; 1647: 102) with his ambassador. They helped him with good soldiers, something that was not hidden from the other king, who not only did the same, but also increased the size of the gift. The latter also received help from the Portuguese and resulted victorious, obtaining alas, not only the gifts from both kings, but also the defeated. Aside from this extraordinary flow of captives as a result of war, there was another method used in this ‘land’ to ‘rescue’ the ‘pieces’ that made up the ‘ships’. Neighbors and inhabitants had some black slaves referred to as ‘pumberos’. These pumberos were quite expensive and were in charge of sailing up to eighty leagues to reach the market together with a group of ‘loaders’ who carried the ‘merchandise’ with which they would pay some merchants called ‘genses’ for the slaves that these genses had obtained in distant and various ‘kingdoms’. Once the slaves were rescued, a return journey started, during which the ‘pumberos’ “[...] account to their masters, bringing back as proof and testimony of the ones that died on the road, some hands, that create horror and surprise when are seen and smelled” ([1627] 1956: 101; 1647: 103).

For the slaves that came from Guinea, in the port of Cacheo, the modality of acquisition of the ‘pieces’ implied a mediator and his agent in Angola, but the main
difference was that they used the merchandise beforehand for the expeditions. In other words, a merchant or owner of a slave ship arrived to port with different kinds of ‘merchandise’ (painted veils, wine, garlic, beads, and iron) and he handed them to the Portuguese called ‘tangomaos’, who lived in this port. Those who obtained the ‘pieces’ through their agents, known as ‘mochileros’, went inland “[...] with that merchandise to try to rescue the blacks that were exchanged for them, and are secure” ([1627] 1956: 101; 1647: 97).

Contrary to that, in the port “[...] of the berbesies and iolofos the damned are rescued because of their crimes and wars [...]” ([1627] 1956: 101; 1647: 97). Sandoval notes that these “[...] wars are caused generally by gossip…. and for robberies.” ([1627] 1956: 101; 1647:97). The delinquents who commit crimes such as adultery, homicide, and robbery are condemned to death or captivity by all the elders of the ‘republic’ in the public square. The captives are then handed to the king who can send them to his farm or sell them. In the port of the ‘bijogoes’ the modality is different since these are the ones in charge of going to the expeditions where the blacks are captured and handed to the Portuguese:

And in the port of the bijogoes countless blacks are rescued, to whose captivity we refer to punctually. The bijogoes leave their land after their captain has gone to the house of the dead to offer wine and some animal as sacrifice; the dead are heads of cows, rams, and other animals full of thousands of garbage and very wrapped in cloth, and much varnished of all the blood they are tainted with. It is disgusting to see it; they also worship some wooden sticks tied up saying they are also their dead, and they believe they are gods, but they have a foul smell caused by all the blood that has been spilt over them. At the end of the sacrifice they rise up as if the devil has entered their bodies, and they get water from the sea two times, as is their oath, then the captain with horns drinks and is forced to fight and capture all those he finds, even if they are his relatives or acquaintances, and from the same island. Once this is done, they embark in canoes like the ones that sail down the Magdalena river, but so big that they each fit up to fifty black warriors, with their
captain and pilot, all rowing with such fury, that they carry the canoe flying down rivers and deep inland until they are in places where they can listen to the dances of blacks, mainly biafaras whose kingdoms are destroyed. They get close at night and the quarter of dawn, when the others fall asleep tired of dancing, they grab them, tie them, and take them to their lands, where there are commonly other rescue boats with Portuguese to whom they are sold, having first presented part of their beards (some have) as a sacrifice to the gods and having cut some of the captives heads [...] and not to miss the chance and to be always ready, they make the women build their houses, sow their land, plant, and pick their rice and millet ([1627] 1956: 101-102; 1647: 97-98).

To conclude the part dedicated to describing the concrete modalities of capturing the ‘ethiopians’ that arrived to the ports of the West Indies and mainly to show the injustices that are clear to the eye, Sandoval even suggests that freedom should be reestablished according to the same legislation that considers slavery legal and that covers up a lot of the abuses:

[...] it seems that buying and selling blacks is licit and just in its nature, and if it is not damaged by any of the injustices we have proven, it seems to be convenient, to verify the justification of true slavery, in a case where so many injustices are at plain sight. Would it be legal for a person to sell what he wrongly acquired abroad? Could tailors, and antique dealers, merchants or silversmiths, buy what they are offered, when it is probably stolen? If a fleet came to this port and there would be word that most of what it brings is stolen, would they be able to make business? So I say it is a doctrine and a natural law, not to allow slavery with injustice, and the civil laws, which usually allow or cover up some abuse that only God can extirpate, do not conceal this, and order that when there is proof of violence or treachery they should be set free. (1647: 103).

I have expanded on this point not because I have a particular interest in showing Sandoval as a leader of criticism or a courtier of what seemed to form the common sense and the expert discourse about the slavery of the ‘ethiopians’. My intention is rather to follow the same line of argument that Sandoval uses in order to illustrate a series of absences.
Sandoval did not point to the ‘color’ of these ‘nations’ as an argument for the slavery of the ‘ethiopians’, as he managed to do at the beginning of his work in reference to Ham and his descendants. Sandoval also, does not discuss the particular ‘properties and natural or moral customs’, not even their ‘false religions’ as an argument for the slavery of the ‘ethiopians’

2. ‘Christianizing’ captives: technology of salvation

On baptisms: disputes about their nullity or the lack of them

The core concern in Sandoval’s work and social endeavor is related to the baptism of the ‘Ethiopians’ arriving as slaves at ports like Cartagena de Indias. His concern derives from the fact, verified throughout his long experience, that many of them had been baptized in ways that rendered them ineffective or simply had not been baptized at all. From a religious perspective this was the highest risk, even higher than the risk of death, disease or all afflictions they could possibly have had to struggle with in captivity: “[…] the eternal damnation that had come to claim their souls for they had died without the holy sacrament of baptism” ([1627] 1956: 108). They were ‘infidel[s]’ and hence unable to ‘save’ their ‘souls’. To do so they had to be Christians. And this was impossible unless they were properly baptized ([1627] 1956: 358). To complicate the situation further, it was assumed that ‘bozales’ had been properly baptized at their arrival and, consequently, they were considered to be Christians.
Sandoval overlaps the terms ‘Salvation’ and ‘health’. ‘Spiritual health’ referred essentially to the ‘salvation of [the] soul’ from the perils of ‘death’ or ‘eternal damnation and to ‘man’s health’, given his status of ‘rational creature’ and his ‘capacity for grace’. There is a clear overlapping between ‘salvation’ and ‘health’ in Sandoval’s work. This is evident for example, when comparing the titles in the second edition (“De Instauranda Aethiopum salute. ‘History of Ethiopia; nature, sacred and profane police, with customs, rites and evangelic catechism of all Ethiopians through which the health of their souls is restored”) with the one proposed in the presentation (De Instauranda aethiopum salute, : Treatise on how to restore blacks salvation […]”) ([1627] 1956: 6: added emphasis).

It should come as no surprise then that Sandoval’s work and social endeavor were conceived by him as having a tendency towards the ‘restoration’ of these ‘Ethiopians’ ‘health’ through the detailed and individualized exam of the validity of their baptism, their proper catechization and preparation to appropriately receive the baptism (when necessary) and other sacraments that made them Christians and allowed them to follow the divine precepts and those of the Church in order to achieve their ‘salvation’.

Therefore, even though Sandoval criticized the atrocities of ship owners and masters and often interceded on behalf of the slaves’ physical well-being, their salvation was the cause around which all his efforts revolved. As Enriqueta Vila Vilar points out:

Taking in consideration his proposals and specially his work it is inevitable to believe that his main purpose was saving their souls. His efforts in improving their way of life as well as the act of denouncing, present throughout his work, was a position you expect from a person who witnessed on a daily basis the suffering

63 Otherwise, this use seems to have been widespread, because in one of the dictionaries of the early XVIII century, the following was the third acceptation of the term health: “It is considered to be the state of grace and justification, which is the life of the soul” (RAA 1739: 31).
and problems of beings among which he lived and whose cause he was committed to [...] (1987: 20).

One of the main controversies that support and are present throughout Sandoval’s work and social endeavor is the invalidity of a great deal of baptisms carried out in certain African ports before going out to sea to the Western Indies. Based on his long experience with careful and individualized examinations of hundreds of ‘bozales’, Sandoval distinguishes between those who are most often ‘really baptized’, arriving from Luanda port (‘angolas’/angolans, ‘congos’, ‘angicos’ y ‘malebas’) and San Thome (‘araraes’, ‘lukumi’ y ‘pure carabarian’), and those who normally are inappropriately baptized (or not even baptized at all) and who embarked at the ports of Guinea and the island of Cape Verde ([1627] 1956: 378-379). Nonetheless, Sandoval recognizes that this situation can vary, depending on the times and the ministers in charge of performing them ([1627] 1956: 347).

To prove how inappropriate the baptisms carried out in certain ports and nations were, Sandoval uses not only what his experience has showed him but also presents the reader with a variety of sources supporting his considerations. Sandoval transcribes four sworn testimonies by captains and masters of vessels given to scribes from the city of Cartagena between 1610 and 1613. The first description details how the slaves in the ‘ship’ were baptized, and the other three certifications are merely a corroboration of the former, except that “[...] they did not see any ceremony to perform children’s baptisms [...]” ([1627] 1956: 350). Sandoval transcribes carefully those passages where the different names of the public scribes in charge are cited and how these, in turn, are ratified by others. Through this he shows his determination to place his discourse beyond
any doubt, endorsing those vessel captains who have witnessed the baptisms. These sworn testimonies were used before being included in his book in the preparation of the dossier that was sent to the Archbishop of Sevilla ([1627] 1956: 351).

It is precisely the archbishop’s inquiries and reactions that Sandoval uses as another source to reinforce his belief that baptisms were inadequate or completely absent in many of the ‘bozales’ that arrived at ports such as Cartagena de Indias. Thus, Sandoval invokes, “[...] the laborious crafts of the very illustrious lord don Pedro de Castro y Quiñones, Archbishop of Sevilla, on the twenty-eighth of November, 1613, in the presence of many witnesses, to find out everything about this matter [...]” ([1627] 1956: 351). The transcript of these inquiries as well as the diagnosed materialized in a communication by the Archbishop, are sent to Sandoval. While all the certifications collected were not transcribed “[...] because many of them were the same I sent authenticated to your very illustrious lordship [...]” ([1627] 1956: 351), Sandoval does transcribe some of the passages commented by the archbishop of Sevilla “[...] for a better endorsement of what we have been saying” ([1627] 1956: 352).

For a greater consistency of his statements, Sandoval also transcribes excerpts of two letters written by the principal of the college of the Association of Angola, father Gerónimo Vogado—“[...] who has been completely devoted to the ministry of swarthies, claiming that God has led him to discover a great and rich mine that is currently working [...]” ([1627] 1956: 353)—, addressed to Father Diego de Torres, former provincial of the Province of Paraguay, Tucumán, and Chile. In both letters, father Geronimo endorses Sandoval’s claim about the inadequacy of the baptisms carried out in this port. Sandoval adds a third letter, but this time from a clergyman of the Society of
Jesus, signed in Córdoba, Tucumán, on December 21, 1622. In this letter, based on what “the very black traders say and attest”, it is “[...] what I assert about how inconsistent is the proper administration of this sacred sacrament, even in the ports and lands that declare to be careful in doing so” ([1627] 1956: 348).

In addition to these testimonies, Sandoval offers several accounts he personally obtained. The first account is based on the arrival of a priest who was visiting Cartagena from the port of Cacheo, Guinea. This priest was in charge of a ship which he claimed to have baptized and ordered to catechize in his presence. Nonetheless, the inquiry carried out by Sandoval among them indicated just the opposite:

But when I saw, after examination, that they did not respond to anything and that they were as bestial as the rest I saw, I visited again the Visitor and informed him about this doubt and difficulty, begging him humbly to tell me what exactly were the things he had ordered those blacks to say before baptizing them. He accepted delightedly and this is what he said. When I entered the vessel I sent for a black, the most cunning one, one of those you always have, a deckhand, and I told him to be a sharp leader with those people, asking them if they wanted to be like white men. He spoke with them and replied: They accepted, my lord and Father, (it is worth noticing that it is not certain that they understood him, since they might speak from two or three to more than sixty different and diverse languages ). He also said to them that if they wanted to be poured with that water over their heads they would be like white men; and after the black told me they had accepted I baptized them. And when replying about the nullity of this act he never accepted to modify it and only when those people were not under his control they could be properly catechized and baptized ([1627] 1956: 354-355).

Likewise, Sandoval reports the case of the ‘black chalona’ or ‘interpreter’ in a ‘ship’ who was called by his ‘master’ who ordered him to repeat for Sandoval what he had said to the others in their language when they were being baptized:

Relatives, hear what I say, open your eyes: here you have fresh water and over there is the sea salty water; you shall not drink this one because it causes the runs, you shall drink this sweet water, because it is for white people; and no more words were heard from him. He said nor the Father or his master had told him what he
should tell them, and instead they only ordered him to talk to those black people and he thought those words were appropriate; and that having all of them consent on his argument and catechism water had been poured over them ([1627] 1956: 355).

Sandoval’s conclusion is categorical: “[...] baptisms of black people [...] that were and have been carried out in their lands, ports and other places, in the way referred to above [...] are regularly null and invalid, and evidently arguable” ([1627] 1956: 357). He points out that details of how those baptisms were carried out and the use of different sources and authorities is not exaggerated, but very calculated, since it is precisely the nullity or total absence of the baptisms carried out which justify the eminent need for Sandoval’s work and labor. His argumentation strategy makes use of concrete experiences of other people and himself reflected in various documents so that both wise and profane readers get convinced of how inadequately performed the baptisms were or, even more, of the total absence of this sacrament among ‘Ethiopians’ who arrived at the Western Indies. He refers to the detached knowledge of clergymen and ‘ship owners’. The authority comes from the experience of those who, because of their work, were directly in touch with slaves.

These testimonies also show the great inconsistencies and variations in the practice of clergymen when baptizing slaves. That is why in his work Sandoval tries to define a set of criteria to determine which baptisms of slaves can be considered valid, and he also proposes a ‘method’ that can be used as a guide for those who have to perform them. Regarding the validity of baptism, Sandoval invokes theologians, while for the ‘method’ he refers to the one he has developed throughout the many years devoted to this ‘ministry’.
The will-consent (‘intention’) and the understanding-knowledge (‘notion’) are conditions sine qua non for the baptism in adults to be valid. On one hand, Sandoval indicates it is a ‘doctrine’ found in “[…] the sacred canons, councils and all doctors […]” in order for the baptism of adults to be valid it is necessary to obtain a voluntary consent and intention of receiving the sacrament […]” ([1627] 1956: 357). On the other hand, citing Joseph Acosta, he proposes that knowledge subsumes will, since “[…] there cannot be will about something which is unknown, for nothing is loved without somehow being known” ([1627] 1956: 358). Based on this assumption Sandoval defines three ‘conjectures’ that allow him, based on the testimonies previously cited, to conclude with ‘moral certainty’ the nullity of baptisms of a great deal of Ethiopians that arrived as slaves to the Western Indies.

The first conjecture refers to the fact that slaves did not have the necessary ‘notion’ about the ‘meaning of baptism’ they were receiving, and so they could not have had the will to be baptized without a previous understanding or knowledge ([1627] 1956: 358). On the contrary, they accepted the water that was poured over them and the ceremony carried out for something different, according to their own beliefs:

[...] every day it is possible to find a myriad of blacks who know this water or ceremony is something whites do (this is how they refer to Christians), but they do not know, and no one has ever explained, its purpose, its intention or what reason

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64 Sandoval indicates three types of certainties: ‘natural’, ‘supernatural’ and ‘moral’. While the ‘moral’ certainty refers to “[…] human, variable and uncertain things […]” ([1627] 1956: 357), the ‘supernatural certainty’ refers to matters of faith and the ‘natural certainty’ to ‘nature’ matters which are “[…] certain and infallible, because the former is established upon God’s authority and the latter upon the evidence of things” ([1627] 1956: 356).
Christians or whites have to wash themselves with it, as they do when they want or have to ([1627] 1956: 360).

There of the appropriate ‘notion’ of baptism necessarily precedes consent or will. So, “[...] in no way would they appraise or understand what they were told and consequently they were not properly baptized [...]” ([1627] 1956: 361). Given the circumstances described by the testimonies of vessels captains, ship owners and clergymen, “I find it impossible that these blacks, generally speaking, perceive at that moment something that helps them realize that such action is a sacred matter ordered by God or intended for the salvation of their soul; and this is enough for the first conjecture” ([1627] 1956: 362).

The second conjecture is that there is no proof that slaves gave their consent to be baptized ([1627] 1956: 362). On the contrary, Sandoval considers that given the conditions they were in, and by the time they were supposedly baptized, the slaves must have really felt a deep hatred for white men:

[...] that they not only will not want to receive water from white men, but will also despise being like them, because they feel so much anger and disdain for Spaniards, they also despise and put aside from their heart everything they think or are told to bring them nearer to their capital enemies, white men; and being also superstitious, they also consider this to be a superstition and evil for them; and they are surprised when the Father comes to baptize them, fearing this act might be life threatening ([1627] 1956: 362-363).

The fact that they did not show any resistance is better explained by a fear of the despotic dominion they were subjugated by, because of which they did not refuse the fire used to brand them and mark them.

The third conjecture concerns the fact that the answers given by slaves when asked about baptism are “so varied and ridiculous” that they show that slaves did not appraise
what they were receiving and, therefore, they were not really baptized ([1627] 1956: 363). Some of them thought the water thrown on them was similar to the branding iron used by their masters to indicate ownership; others believed they were washing their head because they were too dirty; others imagined they were pouring them with water to have their hair cut easily; others thought they were refreshing them because it was very hot; others believed they were trying to prevent them from “having an awkward treat with black women during the shipping time”; others thought it was a measure to prevent diseases, mainly headache; one or two said it was intended to cast a spell on them so that they would not possibly revolt during the trip against whites and also that they were doing this to make them able to, once ashore and after being poured again with water, dredge a lot of gold for their masters ([1627] 1956: 363-364). Sandoval discards their alleged ‘roughness as the cause of the ‘insanity’ of their answers. On the contrary, based on his experience of more than eighteen years he points out that those who come from Luanda, properly catechized, give adequate answers to the questions they are asked ([1627] 1956: 364). From these conjectures Sandoval concludes:

From here I conclude that these are not real baptisms, and all masters of these blacks are convinced that they do not incur in excommunication by embarking their pieces (this is how they refer to blacks in ships) and setting sail without baptizing them, even though they are warned against this risk to have them baptize; which is proved by the fact that the warning intends them not to let blacks set sail without receiving a real baptism and to make them Christians and sons of God. This is not done; then they take them to carry out a mere ceremony without any incidence, effect or value and resulting in serious sacrileges and sins, with the risk of not having those blacks baptized again; which will be remedied with what had been said above ([1627] 1956: 366-367).
Warnings for ‘worker on blacks’ behalf

Sandoval dictates a set of warnings in order that “[...] a man becomes increasingly a fitter minister for such a higher work [...]” ([1627] 1956: 330). These warnings are the result of teachings acquired through “[...] many years of experience, and the mistakes and successes I have had through this time” ([1627] 1956: 330). Sandoval delivers, thus, one by one the components of practices with ‘bozales’ arriving to the port of Cartagena de Indias, but also with those living in the city. As a whole, those warnings are intended to make the worker on blacks’ behalf take the initiative of readily and efficiently succoring those ‘bozales’ who were risking an impending death without having gotten at least to be legitimately baptized, through which they would be able to prevent ‘eternal damnation’. Such warnings make up a set of rules and procedures to be followed in daily work among its ministers.

The first warning consists of taking the initiative on ‘remedying’ ‘bozales’ ‘needs’. Rather than waiting to be called to accomplish his duties, the ‘worker on blacks’ behalf’ should live in a continuous search for those in need of him:

[...] we will not wait to be called to remedy their needs, but besides being ready to go after we have been sure of them, we should be walking steadily from one part to the other, looking for souls fated to blessedness, whose bliss and eternal life depends on such care ([1627] 1956: 330).

That attitude of unceasing search through different places, of taking initiative, becomes essential face the ‘negligence’ and ‘neglect’ that enslaved people were typically left in, especially bozales, due to their difficulties to convey what was wrong with them: “[...] due to the negligence and neglect of those blacks’ masters, and how all of them are
naturally considered to be unable to remedy their own pains, as they do not understand us nor they comprehend our actions […]” ([1627] 1956: 330).

Therefore, the ‘worker on blacks’ behalf should stay attentive to the arrival of slave ships to the harbor. When one of those vessels arrives, he must promptly proceed to visit the ‘slave cargoes’ in order to check for himself, following an inspection and diagnostic, the conditions and risks each ‘bozal’ is in:

It is, then, of the utmost importance that in knowing that slave cargoes have been put off we do not incur in such an offense and great evil of waiting to be given notice of their illnesses, instead we have to go and look for them to the cargoes, to the vessels, if that was possible, before they land, to the backwaters they used to be kept and confined because of their serious maladies or to keep the cities safe from illnesses they used to spread, so that seeing them with our own eyes we could readily heal them; that has to be done in such an accurate way that not even the masters themselves should we credit, when we went to see them and inquire for their illnesses they ascertained they are all right and their pains are insignificant or not serious […] ([1627] 1956: 330).

Not only do we have to promptly intervene, but we also have to do so in person without delegating that work to third parties or be content with what captains of vessels or ‘ship owners’ say about the bozales’ conditions or concerning someone among them being sick or in risk of death. It is not enough, then, to simply ask or be informed by third parties. Sandoval is categorical on this point: “[...] let us not be satisfied with less, as for seeing them with our own eyes [...]” ([1627] 1956: 331).

The second warning says that if, after examining the ships, sick people are found, it is necessary to try to heal them ‘as soon as they can’, and not postponing it even if the illness does not seem very serious ([1627] 1956: 331). The ‘remedy’ Sandoval is referring to consists mainly in making sure those ‘bozales’ do not die without having been properly baptized. The rush is supported on the basis that those black people should
be ‘assured’ as they could suddenly die, even in those cases where that would seem very likely:

[…] as those blacks are per se so strong, that even when dying they stand on their feet; By the time they manifest any illness or let one know of it, they are already very ill and since they do not know how to explain or describe their malady, they are often near death and one can barely tell whether they are ill or not, for which reason, as I say, it is best to remedy their condition as quickly as possible, judging by these and other reasons, such as that their diseases are all very grave (en orden a este fin?), because if not, every day we will have a thousand irremediable disasters. ([1627] 1956: 333).

Besides, Sandoval adds, if this remedy is left for another day, they risk not doing it at all, as every day there is increasingly more work to do, if “[…] I left for tomorrow, there will be something else then, and we will not be able to do everything […]” ([1627] 1956: 331). By delivering the remedy to ill men as soon as possible, “[…] the worker will work in peace and not drowning in the sea of grief, thinking: there I have two people ill, somewhere else I have four; here it is six and there it is ten […]” ([1627] 1956: 332). This ministration involves, then, a continuous and uninterrupted work, for “[…] the current needs in ministration are urgent, and we cannot leave a single day without making something in that sense” ([1627] 1956: 332).

The third warning is to build, in a manner of speaking, a network of informants who keep ‘doctors in medicine and the rest of surgeons’ warned and prevented, to be alerted in case anyone falls ill. This, Sandoval added, made up for “[…] their master’s neglect, who call us (if by any chance they remember to do it) when there is no remedy left” ([1627] 1956: 333). Turning to ‘doctors of medicine and other surgeons’ was “[…] a longtime-proven easy resource, to which everyone comes in a timely manner and with deep charity” ([1627] 1956: 333). Similarly, Sandoval suggests that the same could be
done with their masters and butlers, but “[...] keeping them calm through good words, respect and offering them some business that happens and giving them some items of devotion [...]” ([1627] 1956: 333). Also, they had to warn other priests in case they had to ask for help when they thought that it would prove difficult to accomplish their work “[...] they warn us, that we will come promptly for the remedy of the ill and the relief of confessors” ([1627] 1956: 333).

The imperative need and the excellence of this ministry demand that not only the fervent ‘worker’ overcomes difficulties in his work with ‘nude’, ‘stinky’ and ‘rude Ethiopians’ (1647: XXX), but also that he has at his disposal a technique to guide his work—a technique to make the proper catechisms, to accurately check the validity of their baptisms and to effectively proceed in administering sacraments—. That is, in Sandoval’s eyes, the object and pertinence of the work.

‘Interpreters’ and ‘chalonas’: translation and mediation with ‘bozales’

‘Interpreters’ were essential pieces in the technology of salvation Sandoval proposed. As this dact could seem unimportant for others, Sandoval categorically emphasizes such relevance ([1627] 1956: 339-340). For Sandoval, it is of the utmost importance that the ill or healthy adult understands he is being baptized, catechized or confessed. Understanding and good will on the individual’s side are two unavoidable principles that constitute the foundation of his missionary work (we will delve into this point further below). Since Sandoval assumes that understanding is mediated by
language, ministry towards ‘bozales’ using a myriad native languages demanded to face “[… ] this difficulty, being the utmost or one of the most serious in the practice of this ministry […]” ([1627] 1956: 338).

An alternative would be that the worker devoted to this ministry would learn the ‘bozales’ languages (or at least one of them), which is discarded by Sandoval as a ‘moral and naturally impossible’ task due to their multiplicity and unintelligibility between a great part of them: “[… ] it seems morally impossible that we learn all those languages, as they are so numerous and there is no one main language, as well as there is no one who can teach them or being our communication with blacks enough to acquire them naturally” ([1627] 1956: 335; emphasis added) hence the relevance and necessity of resorting to interpreters to carry out their work. That forced the worker on blacks’ behalf to go “[…] search for languages and interpreters during whole days, because should this difficulty be not overcome, all the effort expended in this exercise would fall, as we know for sure that when languages are not familiar there is no kinship between two men” ([1627] 1956: 335).

Finding a proper interpreter is not only vital work, but it could not be disregarded as beneath a monk’s task, even if it meant going from house to house looking for one and, not finding a man, having to take a woman to accomplish their work: “And don’t

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65 “[… ] in view of this I conclude admonishing those who say blacks are incapable to administer sacraments and give notices of God’s law, that they do not want to deliver it in Spanish, as they don’t understand it, but vested with charity and zeal of the Lord’s glory and good towards so desperate souls, you should look for interpreters in their own languages, as they will understand very well with them. I confess that when a black speaks to me in his language, and I do not understand a word, I seem to be more bozal than him, when I talk to him in my own language, and I believe everyone can say the same thing […]” ([1627] 1956: 346).
think of it as dishonorable for a religious man going around house to house in search of those languages and interpreters, and after finding them taking them, even if they are dark-skinned [...] because not all the times can we find people fit to serve as interpreters in languages [...]” ([1627] 1956: 337, 338).

Given the linguistic diversity among ‘bozales’ and the urgency of spiritually assisting those being at risk of death, Sandoval proposed to keep a thorough record of each slave in order to promptly locate the required interpreter. Such a record consisted of a booklet where ‘castes’, ‘languages’ and ‘interpreters’ were recorded in alphabetical order. On the last ones, aside from their names, place of residence and masters, they registered the languages they spoke. Thus,

[…] when looking for the Angolese, Arda, Caravali, Banu, Mandinga or Biojo, among many others, for there are more than sixty, those of Angola, Saint Thomas, the rivers of Guinea and the remaining ports they come from, allow, thanks to that record, to know where they can be sought and found promptly and readily; equally for catechisms as for baptisms and confessions of ill; because otherwise it will be a never ending task and we could risk, after so much effort, not having done anything after a whole day of search, as it used to happen to me before using this record ([1627] 1956: 338).

In order for the use of interpreters to be successful not only did they need to have a comprehensive record of linguistic skills and location of every enslaved person, but it was also necessary to know both the linguistic differences between ‘castes’ and within them, as well as knowing which were intelligible and which were not, hence the relevance of being able to identify a ‘bozal’s ‘nation’ or ‘caste’ just by looking at his body or gathering a few pieces of data from third parties or the individual himself. Those skills and the success of that scrutiny was the basis of success in identifying interpreters.
That technology of salvation entailed, then, an ample knowledge of ‘Ethiopians’, on which deciphering differences and individual bodily features and gestures was founded.

The proper interpreter was not necessarily the one who spoke a ‘bozal’ ‘genuine and native’ language. As it was not rare for slaves to speak more than one language, the difficulties in communication were solved by resorting to the languages that the ‘bozal’ could understand, even if they were different to those of his own ‘nation’ and ‘caste’ or forming chains of interpreters, that could be formed by three or more ‘interpreters’ ([1627] 1956: 338).

It was not enough though to have one or several staggered interpreters who made communication possible in order to overcome the myriad languages used by the ‘bozales’ being ‘Christianized’. It was necessary to ensure that the ‘interpreter’ (or the series of ‘interpreters’) wouldn’t create confusion about the doctrine due to an individual lack of knowledge or lack of capacity. Sandoval developed a mechanism to ensure the proper functioning of any interpreter, making sure in each step that the interpreter correctly understood the doctrine:

And when they were not instructed in the ways of catechizing and correctly delivering what they are told to say, it is advisable to make them repeat what they were told, and after checking once or twice that they have understood, we could assume they will always understand it and they will deliver it faithfully in their own language, because it happens that they don’t say in any way what they are told to say but what they want, and confusion is so great that it is noticed. And in case the interpreter does not understand, the solution is to repeatedly ask a question that would be told complete when talking with an intelligent interpreter, three or four times, so that just as ill people that begin to eat little by little what healthy people would eat at once, thus they could understand little by little for themselves and for the others. And we should not wonder of many of them not comprehending or repeat one of those questions completely, for when there is one student among ten diligent students who repeat exactly and faithfully what he is explained, he is highly esteemed. Also it is a good means to make the interpreter repeat the ministry by asking him, e.g. Tell me, son, is there a God? He replies
yes. How many Gods do we have? He replies one single God. Then, say this to this bozal in your own language. Tell me, who is God? He repeats: there is the mystery of the Holy Trinity, then just as you have told me, repeat it to your relative in your own language; and so on with all the ministries, doing so it would be hard to find a interpreter who is not able to catechize satisfactorily, given that to this instruction we add patience and gentleness ([1627] 1956: 338-339).

Given this different capacity among interpreters to use doctrine for catechism, Sandoval suggests that they should be identified and, if possible, to rely on them as much as possible to prevent having to check every time how faithful the interpreter’s delivery of the doctrine being conveyed by the missionary is. Therefore, not all interpreters with the same linguistic skills are equal. The same thing happens with certain characteristics, like gender. Even though it is not essential, it is ideal to work with interpreters having the same sex as the ‘bozal’ in question when catechizing or administering sacraments ([1627] 1956: 338-339). Finally, as missionary technology required the figure of the interpreter, a ‘ladino black’, who was owned by a slave-owner, it was up to the worker on the blacks’ behalf to appeal to the double will of the ‘interpreter’ and his/her ‘master’ to accomplish that mission. Thus, this ‘worker’, in a gentle and humble way, was compelled to make them both know the relevance of this labor and its consequences for the Divine delight ([1627] 1956: 339).

In the years that followed the publication of Sandoval’s first edition of the *Instauranda*, there were several changes, as Jesuits bought several slaves with the abilities required to be their interpreters. For Cartagena de Indias, Jesuits charged and bought to ‘ship owners’ to bring ‘chalones’ from Africa, who spoke several languages. At times, the Jesuits owned up to eighteen interpreters (Vila Vilar 1987: 32).
Sandoval justified the use of interpreters as essential pieces of the technology of salvation for ‘bozals’ by pointing to the fact that apostles and other important figures used interpreters for the ‘conversion’ of ‘infidels’ from very ancient times (1627 1956: 335). However, some people not so thoroughly convinced of the pertinence of using ‘interpreters’, mainly for the exam and confession of ‘bozales’, considering that those had to be done in confidence, and therefore only with the intervention of the confessor as a mediator between ‘God’ and ‘men’.

**Components of the technology of salvation**

The technology for the restoration of health among ‘Ethiopians’ involved several components. The first step was the ‘examination’, where the condition of the slaves who arrived on ‘slave cargoes’ was diagnosed, identifying, organizing, and prioritizing the interventions that were to be made upon each one. They were then inducted into catechism in differentiated groups, which sought to adequately prepare them for the rite of baptism. Once the catechisms were completed, the rites of baptism were performed. And once they were baptized, it was considered that the spiritual ‘health’ of the ‘Ethiopians’ had been restored. In his book, written as a guide for the future ‘workers of blacks’, Sandoval, exposed the way in which to examine, catechize and baptize the ‘Ethiopians’, based on his work, which had proven to be successful since he calculated

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66 Apparently, Pedro Claver learned to speak one of the African languages (Angolese) to facilitate his missionary labor (Splendiani 2000: 63).
that more than six thousand baptisms were practiced a year without any major difficulties ([1627] 1956: 407).

**Examination**

The examination of the baptisms was of the highest relevance, and the ‘worker on blacks’ behalf was not to spare any efforts when it came to shedding the light of truth upon them. The examination constitutes a central component of the missionary technology because the meticulous register of information about the condition in which each and every one of the ‘bozales’ that had arrived on the ‘slave cargoes’ of the vessels depended on it. Not only was it crucial to find out with the greatest certainty and brevity if they had been baptized but, if so, whether their baptisms were valid or null. Furthermore, it was also important to identify their ‘nation’ and ‘caste’, their ‘native tongue’ or others that they could understand, moreover whether or not they were in any danger of death due to any diseases plaguing their bodies.

Their efforts should initially be focused towards the ill, above all those who were at mortal risk. It was necessary to know with as much accuracy as possible about their whereabouts, how many they were and what disease they suffered: “[…] we shall be informed about the magnitude of the infirmed; to which houses they are taken to be treated; how many are ill and from which castes those who have remained on the vessel originate, on the outskirts of town, unable to disembark, so not to infest it, or those who are healthy. […]” ([1627] 1956: 378). It was equally important to know the whereabouts and the number of healthy slaves still on the vessel (be it because they were caring for the
infirmed or because they were denied entrance to the city due to the fear of infection) and those who had disembarked at different locations of the village designated for that purpose. All this information had to be exact and was recorded in written form so that “[…] it was known and not forgotten, that all distress which is attended to can be remedied in due time, even in the midst of the harshest predicament or the severity of evil […]” ([1627] 1956: 378).

This quick diagnostic constitutes the first stage of the examination, which could be compared to a kind of first aid treatment. Its purpose was to obtain an exact and individualized knowledge of the ‘bozales’ who arrived and above all, of their condition in order to be able to establish an agenda for intervention paying special attention to those who were ill and at mortal risk. Once this rapid diagnostic was established, the individual examinations were carried out. For this purpose, they were separated from each other so it could be decreed beyond a shadow of a doubt whether they had been duly baptized. This exam did not exclude ‘Ladinos’ who had a tendency to hide the value of their baptisms. ([1627] 1956: 378).

The ‘interpreters’ played an important role both in the rapid diagnostic and in the more meticulous exam. However, they were not the only source of information. The ‘blacks’ taskmaster’ relied on a series of physical indicators which allowed him, at a moment’s glance, to differentiate, amongst the ‘bozales’ ‘nation’ and ‘caste’ of provenance. The different tattoos, incisions and body piercings constituted signals that he should have had the ability of recognizing and associating with certain ‘nations’ and ‘castes’. Sandoval dedicates one of the passages of his work to describing the most common amongst these body markings ([1627] 1956: 90-97). This knowledge, derived
from the constant work done with ‘slave cargoes’ and the ‘bozales’, constituted a tool of
great importance to more accurately determine which were the ‘interpreters’ that had to
be promptly summoned for the agonizing:

And this advisement of signs which we have given about every caste and nation
(although many have none, which is also a sign) is a very necessary thing for the
knowledge of these blacks, by which we could sort them out when there is no
other way, hence be able to bring them to the catechism of the rite of baptism or
confession, initially the ignorance about this matter of recognition brought me
great confusion, and brought forth the danger of condemnation to many infirmed,
who died without the remedy of the holy sacraments, for not knowing their nation,
which once known makes finding an interpreter who can understand them to
become and instrument for their good an easier task ([1627] 1956: 97).

The hermeneutics of the ‘bozales’’ bodies for which the ‘blacks’ taskmaster’ sight should
be trained, also included recognition of early signs of sickness. Often unable to
communicate due to the absence of an interpreter and amidst many infirm, this
‘taskmaster’ had to be able to distinguish not only which illnesses would lead to a certain
death and which ones would not pose such a risk, but also to establish if the infected one
had sufficient time in which to be adequately prepared for the rite of baptism or if, on the
contrary, it was necessary to promptly intervene before it might be too late for his/her
‘salvation’. There was a group of illnesses that caught the eye and were easily
recognizable, but there were others that were equally grave yet went by generally
unnoticed until the slave simply dropped dead or fell terminally ill: “[…] because a black
bozal does not know how to explain his illness and he does not seem to be unwell never
the less is dead by dawn; and he can be seen eating and drinking, and even walking
about, up until the day he passes away, many a times without having received the
sacraments. […]” ([1627] 1956: 437). Therefore, the ‘blacks’ taskmasters’ had to possess
the ability to read the most minimal of signs in order to detect those illnesses that were overlooked by many amongst slaves who seemed to be healthy.

After this rapid diagnostic was done and the rites of baptism had been administered to the moribund and those in imminent danger of dying, the ‘blacks’ taskmaster’ had to then establish the necessary conditions for advancing his work with those who were healthy. These conditions entailed procuring the necessary number of ‘interpreters’, coordinating with them and their proprietors when and where the examinations would take place and, finally, group the slaves by the appropriate nations and castes which would be in turn subject to the examination at the same time and place. In order to carry out this task effectively, the utmost importance was given to the meticulously written record which detailed where the possible ‘interpreters’ inhabited, what were their linguistic competencies and who were their proprietors, it was here that the whereabouts and the condition of the slaves that were to be examined could also be found. Thereby, the ‘blacks’ task master’ used his knowledge of the city in terms of a detailed cartography and put it into play.

Another important component to further these examinations consisted of ‘preparing the mood’ of the slaves. This began at their arrival at port, when the blacks’ taskmaster made his presence immediately known. “[...] loaded with broadcloths with which to cover them decently, because without them they would make a dreadful sight for chaste eyes, and some sweet treat or gift was also presented, so to soften, and thus attract them in order towards the ways of God” ([1627] 1956: 108).

It is based on his many years of experience that Sandoval exposes the way in which to ascertain the nullity of the cargo slaves’ baptism. Sandoval claims, this method
for furthering the examination, will undoubtedly allow one to distinguish those who have
been truly baptized from those who have not. The exam can be done with ease and
brevity if it is executed with great punctuality and all the indications are followed to the
letter, even those which at first glance might seem purposeless or trivial “[… ] because all
are necessary when dealing with loutish, melancholic and pusillanimous people” ([1627]
1956: 378).

Once the conditions were established (having the interpreters, grouping the slaves
by their corresponding nations and castes, and having already predisposed the mood), this
exam began by separating the individual who was to be the object of the examination
from the rest of slaves in order to subject him to an interrogation away from the others
with the mediation of the interpreter. The interrogation was begun by asking for the
subject’s name. Whether or not they answered with a Christian name constituted the first
indicator for the ‘blacks’ taskmaster’ in ascertaining if the examined slave had or had not
been truly baptized ([1627] 1956: 383). An affirmative answer however was not enough,
since many who made reference to a Christian name had not been properly baptized.

This question was followed by one which inquired if they had been present at the
time when the other slaves on the ‘slave cargo’ had been baptized and whether they had
been soaked by water or not. In case of a negative answer, a series of both general and
specific questions would be made (making references to particular places) to explore if
at another place or time they could have partaken of the baptismal water. If it was found
that they definitely had not received this water, it did not mean that the examination was
over. Quite the contrary, Sandoval proposes to the ‘blacks’ taskmaster’ that “if it is found
to be true that they have indeed not been baptized, inquire into the cause with diligence
and examine the reason [...]” ([1627] 1956: 384). In the opposite case in which the examined were to say that he had received the baptismal water, it was to be inquired with diligence if when they had received it its meaning had been explained in their ‘native tongue’ or in another in which they could have understood the significance of water and if so whether they had received it willingly “ [...] to accept the law of the whites which baptized him and to honor their God” ([1627] 1956: 384).

The purpose they sought to achieve was one of ‘moral certainty’ by not only ascertaining if the baptismal water had been received or not, but also if the conditions in which it had been received had allowed for the examined to at least grasp the basic concept of its significance. This exam concludes by marking the body of the examinee and gathering him with others in the same condition so that he could be easily identified and thus be able to further the respective tasks with each and every single one of them without any confusion. If it was found that the baptism was valid: “[…] a pendant of a white image made of tin shall be hung around their necks as a sign that they are Christians; and if they have no name or they have forgotten the one given to them at the time of baptism, which rarely happens, they will be given new ones and are to be put aside […]” ([1627] 1956: 384). Conversely,

[...] if from the questions and answers there was to be the same assurance and moral certainty that they are not Christians be it because they have not been cleansed by the water or because they are lacking any other of the essential elements which are required, and that respond to a ridiculous aforementioned variety, and have therefore ill received the rite of baptism, well then, let them be set aside, both men and women, so as they can be baptized in their due time without distinction. ([1627] 1956: 385).
Finally, if the examination left the blacks’ taskmaster with any doubts and the ruling over
the validity or nullity of the baptism could not be ascertained with ‘moral certainty’ “[…] let them be set aside tying a thread to their thumb in order to recognize them and to later baptize with distinction.” ([1627] 1956: 385).

All the slaves (‘bozales’ and ‘ladinos’) who arrived with the ‘slave cargo’ were
obliged to be examined, including the children. Since the validity of the baptisms in the infants does not require their willful-consent (‘intention’) due to the fact that they are devoid of ‘the use of reason’, their examination was done through their mothers or whomever assumed their role, and the efforts were then focused on inquiring whether the infant had or had not received the baptismal water and, this being the case, they were asked to recreate the situation in which the event occurred as to be able to conclude with certainty whether or not the baptism could be considered valid ([1627] 1956: 367-368).

*Catechism*

Catechism was another important component of the technology of salvation. It involved a whole pedagogical strategy in order for slaves to understand the basic doctrinal principles and to be able to give an accurate response to the questions posed by the monk. That pedagogical strategy involved a teaching made through interpreters, similes and imagery. Also, it required a proper time and space, not only from slaves, but also from interpreters and clergymen. Slaves had to be grouped according to their different ‘nations’ and ‘castes’. They were asked to open their bodies and minds to learn what they were to be
taught. In brief, it involved a technique to allow the ‘restoration’ of ‘health’ to ‘Ethiopians’.

Having examined each slave, catechism followed. For those who were not baptized or whose baptism was null, catechism consisted of teaching the Christian doctrine they needed to be completely able to accept or reject a legitimate baptism. For those who were already baptized, catechism allowed them to enhance their knowledge of the different doctrinal issues to be taught. Now, in his work Sandoval captures what he considers to be the issues slaves need to learn in order to be introduced into the Christian community. Those items are derived from the concrete practices deployed in the experience acquired from years of work.

According to Sandoval, doctrine is made up of nine items, which have to be taught to slaves. These ‘ministries’ and necessary issues, to be taught in a specific order, were not to be passed without being completely sure the slaves had learned them. In those items, the meaning of baptismal water was addressed; the way it turns men into Christians; the existence of one single God, who created everything what exists, and is eternal, omnipresent and omniscient; the mystery of the Holy Trinity (three people and one single real God); the fact that Jesus was born like a man to redeem men from their sins; that his mother was the Virgin Mary (who continued to be a virgin); the existence of heaven as a reward and hell as a punishment; Jesus Christ’s resurrection; and, finally, the resurrection of men at the end of times ([1627] 1956: 389-391).

Sandoval considers that having this knowledge is enough, given that those slaves have a “[...] serious need and such a great lack of understanding [...]” ([1627] 1956: 393). In case of dying soon, they would “[...] know what they needed in order to be saved and
to be able to receive the other sacraments” ([1627] 1956: 393). But if they live longer, gradually they could learn what is remaining and they could improve the basic knowledge they had received.

Sandoval defines, then, the contents of doctrine that would be contained in the catechism. He also points the specific pedagogical strategies that should be considered in the ‘instruction’ of slaves. First, that it should be carried out in the ‘native language’ or in one that ‘bozales’ can understand. This involves the mediation of interpreters, who are given priority depending on the time and place that they are available ([1627] 1956: 386). Therefore, sometimes the interpreter is required to go to a house where blacks are gathered, some other times blacks are taken “[...] to the interpreter’s house, when he does not want or is not allowed to leave the house, in order to make work easier and help him/her as much as possible” ([1627] 1956: 387).

But not only should language be comprehensible, but the language used should be straightforward and simple to make it adequate to the ‘uncouthness’ and the limited capacity of understanding of ‘bozales’:

What people devoted to the instruction and teaching of such miserable people should care the most is to adapt themselves as much as they can to the shortness of capacity among these people, delivering doctrine gradually and not saying more than their understanding could reach, as otherwise it would be confusing and would fail to accomplish what we intend. ([1627] 1956: 394).

The principle Sandoval was talking about is that the teaching of doctrine should be adapted to the different conditions and capacities: “[...] the variety of doctrine and teaching should be in accordance to the differences among people” ([1627] 1956: 394).
Many concrete illustrations and analogies should be presented to each doctrinal piece in order to make the proper comprehension of what is taught easier. Sandoval constantly mentions varied examples that he used. The cloth plied in three parts, so that being in three parts it is one, for the case of the mystery of the Holy Trinity or that the Son of God is equal to Him just as “[…] the son of a white man is white and the son of a black man is black; and the son of a mulatto and indian is mulatto and indian […]” ([1627] 1956: 390).67

The continuous and patient repetition of each aspect of doctrine that was presented is another characteristic of the pedagogic technology that was implemented. They were repeated in different ways, with different words and examples, so that there was not any doubt that the slaves could understand the concept they were being taught: “[…] it is a very good technique not to say much, but very little, and very roughly said, in their own way […] not mentioning to these people additional speculations, but repeating to them what is many times told, and giving them time to understand […]” ([1627] 1956: 388-389). These repetitions, which could seem excessive, were absolutely necessary in Sandoval’s eyes, due to the ‘bozales’ shortness of understanding: “And don’t you think so many repetitions, so continuous and specific could be omitted, for all of them are very necessary and of the utmost importance to put these people to work and best suit their lack of understanding, so that getting a better disposition, they are able to attain a higher grace […]” ([1627] 1956: 404).

67 Claver, on his part, appealed to images at this point. In the statements collected in the process for his beatification and canonization (Splendiani and Aristizábal 2002), the pictures he showed the slaves to illustrate heaven and hell are mentioned recurrently.
Another characteristic of the pedagogic technology was to ask them many questions at every step of the process in order to verify that they had understood, and to ensure that they did not move forward until they demonstrated they had sufficiently learned the issue they were being taught. It was not enough to get a right answer. It was mandatory to verify whether the slave had understood a concept by changing the terms of the question ([1627] 1956: 382).

Catechisms implied, then, a whole mental and bodily disposition on the part of bozales in order to be taught successfully. That disposition was fed through gifts that the monks gave them directly or through their masters: “[...] first of all we have to try to win their will, be it giving them something, if they take it, or having their masters give them, specially if they ask for it, which they use to do, or having them be dressed decently or wearing something, no matter if it is old or discarded [...]” ([1627] 1956: 380). Among gifts, fresh water was in a high place: “[...] jars with fresh water will be distributed (a highly important resource and thus much repeated), for they are not even able to have saltwater, and they are deadly thirsty, especially women and children, so that they highly esteem and value that” ([1627] 1956: 380-381). Thus, their bodies underwent a whole preparation involving their congregation and distribution following the lines of ‘nation’ and caste, as well as of those of gender ([1627] 1956: 380).

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68 To relieve thirst of slaves is essential in the relationship monks used to establish from the beginning with them. In several passages, Sandoval uses different examples to illustrate the extreme necessity and neglect slaves endured. He mentions, for example, how he discovered in the beginning the water remaining from baptism had not been thrown out, but slaves had drunk it, or how children obstreperously cried when they were in their mothers’ arms and they saw, but their mothers did not dare to ask for it.
But it was necessary to prepare slaves’ “[...] hearts (who are always very sad and melancholic due to serious illnesses, the lack of merry gatherings and work in such a cruel captivity) for our main endeavor, which is the salvation of their souls, as then God’s law can enter and settle and be solidly engraved in a happy and quiet heart” ([1627] 1956: 382). In order for their hearts to be prepared, Sandoval advises the workers of blacks to talk to slaves about the love their master felt towards them, whom they “[...] will ask and beg […] to treat them well, give them gifts and heal them, and then that they have a good master with whom they can live happily during their captivity” ([1627] 1956: 382). Also, Sandoval continues to advise these workers:

Suggest that the Lord was merciful in bringing them to this land of Christians, as it is worthier to be captive here than free in their land; for here, even though their bodies are captive, their souls are resting because of the freedom they are to attain with the holy baptism water. Open wide their hearts by saying they will have in these lands many relatives whom they could address to, and that if they serve well, they will have a good captivity, they will be happy and well dressed, that they should leave behind all of their sadness and grief and be happy, for afterwards they will enjoy health and full happiness. Other times, when the interpreter happened to be a ladino and knowing, have them talk by himself about anything he considers convenient, which uses to be of high esteem. Also, have him tell them from time to time during the catechism talk, that what they are saying is the truth, enforcing that in saying that he could not possibly deceive them or say something wrong one belonging to their own caste, nation, and a relative to them, etc. ([1627] 1956: 382).

This way, the pedagogical strategy deployed in catechism implied captive bodies, but clean and covered, gather together and distributed, hearts prepared to understand the principles of doctrine they required to be Christians. In their turn, the worker of blacks not only should see that the conditions to go forward with catechism were feasible (from finding an interpreter to gathering together ‘bozales’ classified by their respective ‘nations’ and ‘castes’ and preparing them mentally and bodily for that), but also he had to
be watchful of the interpreter’s performance and see that the slaves were really understanding the concept of every one of the doctrinal pieces they were being taught ([1627] 1956: 386). He should read gestures, understand hesitations and silences as well as indications of satisfaction or rejection; expressions of joy with the palm of their hands. Furthermore, the ‘worker of blacks’ had to treat slaves with the utmost consideration, kindly, giving them the time they need to comprehend the doctrine, without losing his patience because of delays, improper responses or silences in which they appeared to be ashamed and embarrassed ([1627] 1956: 382).

Once catechism concluded, and before baptism, the worker of blacks should make every slave feel remorse for their own ‘sins’ through an ‘act of contrition’ where he will make evident his mortification for having offended God. That ‘act of contrition’ included everyone’s promise to amend their future behavior in accordance with the ‘commandments’ of ‘God’s law’ and the Church. In order to do that, it was necessary to make them know those commandments according to their particular conditions and capacities as it had been done with the doctrinal pieces ([1627] 1956: 396-397).

**Baptism**

Also, the performance of baptisms among slaves had to be done in accordance with their particular conditions. As a result of their work, Sandoval designed a whole baptismal ceremony fit for those conditions, which he describes in his work as aiming to “[...] deliver an even method to those who are to come, so that following an equal
procedure, they prevent many things that might arise as a consequence of a lack of consistency [...]” ([1627] 1956: 402).

After having accomplished catechism and the act of contrition, the ceremony of baptism asked for the cleansing of bodies. In order to do that “[...] they are said to go and wash themselves quietly and calmly [...]” ([1627] 1956: 402). That cleansing of bodies had two additional purposes: on the one hand, to allow baptismal water to touch the head’s skin and, on the other hand, to make slaves know the difference between the reverence they owed the water cleansing their bodies and that which would cleanse their souls. Once the bodies were cleansed, they were said to sit again in the arrangement they had had earlier.

Baptisms were performed in groups of ten, men went first and women followed. They were said to kneel with “[...] their hands joined with as much devotion and quietness as possible, around a silver font or a median tray, if there was not any other thing to collect water” ([1627] 1956: 402). In that position, through interpreters, the ‘priest’ asked everyone again if they were willing to be baptized. Having ensured their willingness, he gave all ten the same name, one among the more common, which they could pronounce easily. He had them repeat their name, and as all of them had the same name, those who happened to forget it could have their companions to recall it. He said to them, additionally, “[...] that under that name they would be known and called from then on as Christians and sons of God, leaving and forgetting that which they used to be called after in their land, because that was a Moorish, gentile and devil’s son’s name” ([1627] 1956: 403). All ten were given a common godfather or godmother, generally who served
as interpreter or somebody else “[…] Male or female ladino dark-skinned belonging to
their same caste, who was present […]” ([1627] 1956: 403).

To drop water, they hung around “[…] the neck an adorned rosary, with a silver
medal hanging on it, running down everyone holding a lit candle in their hand […]”
([1627] 1956: 403). To finish, and before they stood up and mingled with all the others,
they had a tin medal tied around their neck, hanging from a strong thread at chest level so
that through it they could be recognized as baptized. Also, “[…] they are told not to lose
the medals they are wearing around their necks, in order to make them know the esteem
the are to have towards those medals, as they are a sign of Christians and sons of God,
and through them everyone can recognize them and treat them as such and not despise
them” ([1627] 1956: 405). Once they were ready, they were told to go and sit and another
group of ten was called and so on until everyone had been baptized.

Conclusions

In the articulation of blackness depicted in Sandoval’s work there are no simple
overlaps between ‘Ethiopian’ and ‘black’ or between ‘Ethiopia’ and Africa. Strictly
speaking, the notion of ‘African’ (in plain terms) is opposed to that of ‘Ethiopian’, while
’nations of blacks’ are not limited to ‘Ethiopians’. Moreover, not all ‘Ethiopians’ from
the same ‘nation’ are ‘black’ and there are various ‘ways of blackness’ among the
different ‘nations’.
‘Black color’ among ‘Ethiopians’ and other ‘nations of blacks’ is called a ‘secondary quality’, which is derived from a ‘prime quality’: the ‘excessive heat’ attributed to a divine intervention initially intended to add variety and beauty to the world, but which was afterwards the sign of their punishment. Thus, on one hand, it calls into question the thesis that assumed that ‘color’ was derived from external influences like ‘temple’, ‘climate’, ‘sun’, ‘soil’ or the ‘composition of the sky’ and, on the other hand, when attributing black color to an ‘excessive heat’ belonging to a ‘prime quality’ it is introducing a variation in the biblical interpretation of Ham’s curse, which allows him to think that it was in the interest of beauty and variety in the world that ‘blacks’ were created, and that only with the passing of time such color became associated with the ‘smudge’ and ‘stain’. Besides, ‘black’ color among the ‘nations of blacks’ makes part of ‘perfection in nature’ rather than ‘vice’, ‘deformity’ or ‘break’, as it is clear in Sandoval’s formulations concerning resurrection.

As for certain bodily features belonging to the ‘nations of blacks’, attributed to them by other authors or even Sandoval himself, in his articulations blackness such features are not attributed to ‘primary’ or ‘secondary features’ pertaining to those ‘nations’, but instead he suggests that some of them are the result of certain practices by midwives or of certain uses. Sandoval comes to argue that several bodily features associated with the ‘nations of blacks’ (‘ugliness and dispositions blacks commonly have’) are also present among ‘Spaniards’, because they are a result of habits like walking barefoot or due to the neglect of midwives at the time of delivery. Sandoval makes the opposite occurrence evident, too: individuals with ‘Spanish-like traits’ who are from a ‘black nation’.
In several passages, Sandoval goes against generalization based on those bodily features, even recurring to contrary examples in order to illustrate the non applicability to all ‘nations of blacks’. Sandoval mentions a set of bodily features in passages where he is describing someone from a ‘nation of blacks’, that are not necessarily associated to the ‘color of skin’, as in some individuals it is as white as in ‘Germans’ themselves. Concerning other features, like the texture of hair, Sandoval gives contrary examples from ‘nations of blacks’ where those traits being attributed to them in general are not found. Thus, Sandoval calls into question a simplistic and monolithic relationship between color and bodily features.

Now, in Sandoval’s work, the articulation of blackness is inscribed in what we could call a moral chromatics where the colors black and white represent sin and virtue, respectively. And even though the association of ‘souls’ black color’ and ‘sin’ is a constant, there is no implication that there is any correlation between the ‘color’ of a body and that of its ‘soul’.

The concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘caste’ are central in Sandoval’s articulation of blackness. Rather that a homogeneous entity, in Sandoval’s eyes ‘Ethiopians’ appear to have a monumental multiplicity, a ‘multitude’, made intelligible through its distribution across different ‘nations’ and ‘castes’. ‘Nation’ and ‘caste’ do not overlap nor are they limited by ‘color’, ‘language’, ‘religion’ or ‘customs’. The category ‘nation’ is not used to talk about ‘Ethiopians’ and ‘other nations of blacks’, exclusively, but also to refer to Spaniards, English, Portuguese and Netherlanders.

In his articulation of blackness, Sandoval does not cast any doubt on whether ‘Ethiopians’ and ‘other nations of blacks’ belong to ‘humankind’. They are ‘men’ made
different from ‘brutes’ (‘irrational animals’) because they have ‘reason’ and capacity to attain ‘grace’. All of his technology of ‘salvation’ is made possible thanks to this assumption. Therefore, despite the ‘variety of forms’ in ‘humankind’ he is not being unaware of a substantial similarity. However, there are differences between ‘men’ in ‘reason’ and ‘grace’, so that Sandoval refers to an obvious hierarchy. In that hierarchy ‘conditions’ and ‘fate’ prevail over something referred to as the nature of the ‘variety in shape’ among ‘men’, as Sandoval advances in the case of slaves. Another distinction and hierarchy among nations is introduced by Sandoval in the sense that the ‘Christian police’ is found on one end and the more ‘barbarian’ and ‘beastly’ ‘nations’ are located on the other end (some of them even lacking any form of ‘religion’). Thus, while there are nations which are inferior to others, with Spaniards and Portuguese being in a superior position, Sandoval does not refer to ‘color’ either in ‘Ethiopians’ nor in ‘Spaniards’ and ‘Portuguese’ to give an account of this hierarchy.

While in several passages Sandoval refers to the well known story of Noah’s curse on Ham’s progeny as the root of the earliest ‘serfdom’ and ‘slavery’, he also argues that slavery does not mean ‘lords’ and ‘slaves’ have a different ‘nature’, but that some people ‘tyrannize’ others’ freedom. It is clear, then, that for Sandoval ‘Ethiopians’ are not slaves because they are ‘black’, but because they have been tyrannized by others. Sandoval acknowledges ‘fair war’ as a lawful cause of slavery (sharing this concept with the authorities of this period), however he appeals to the vessels’ captains’ testimonies and the exchange of letters with other Jesuits to make evident the modalities of capture of the Ethiopians that arrived as slaves to the port of Cartagena de Indias. And the fact that those slaves were ‘infidels’ brought to a ‘land of Christians’ did not justify those
modalities of capture. Looking for some other insights in several passages that seemed to indicate this (which show a lateral style of argument that does not call authorities into question straightforwardly), Sandoval does not limit himself to simply repeating the statement that ‘Ethiopians’ are slaves because they are ‘blacks’, that is, because of the divine curse that legitimates their serfdom. Slavery is a ‘condition’ that is not a consequence of their ‘nature’, manifested in ‘color’.

The confluence of the imperative ‘need’ to ensure ‘Ethiopians’ ‘souls’ ‘salvation’ and the specificity of the missionary technology to achieve it, make up Sandoval’s problematization. His work intends to account for the imperative of ‘Ethiopians’ ‘salvation’ and the defense of a missionary technology designed to adequately face such work. It is no wonder, then, that Sandoval considers that his book is a ‘treaty’ for the restoration of ‘Ethiopians’ ‘health’:

I have entitled this work as De instauranda aethiopum salute, that is to say: A treaty on how the salvation of blacks should be restored; because its primary and main end is not to lead to their lands to convert them (yet it continues to be the secondary aim, and even the primary one, as should that be, there would not be necessity for half of this work of ours), but in the parts where their cargos are brought and they land, with a Christian name and title, without being such (as it would be seen in its pages) we examine their baptism, educate their rudeness, and are well taught, we proceed to baptized them, with which we will repair and restore their health, which —for the reasons we have said above— was lost and kind of unfeasible ([1627] 1956: 6-7; 1647: 14qq).

Concerning ‘spiritual health’, ‘black slaves’ and ‘whites’ are not in the same condition. Even though they are both equal in capacity to attain ‘grace’, the ‘fate’ of ‘black slaves’ is quite different than that of ‘whites’, and the difficulties they face because of their enslaved condition are so numerous that it is worth to deploy a series of actions in the interest of achieving their ‘souls’ ‘salvation’. That is why Sandoval establishes his work’s
pertinence as articulated to that series of actions that should respond to the particular ‘condition’ of ‘Ethiopians’ arriving as slaves to the West Indies. Thus, Sandoval clearly sees that the ‘Ethiopians’ enslaved ‘condition’ puts them in a particular situation, one of extreme ‘misery’ and ‘unhappiness’, of great ‘necessity’, on everything concerning the needs of the soul. In general, that is the raison d’être of the ministry with slaves and in particular, the pertinence of Sandoval’s work.

69 “But, someone could say, that being blacks and whites as equal in Christ’s clothes, and being blacks and whites’ souls so equally esteemed in their compliance, there would be scarce need for this work of mine, as it has been treated by so many and so serious authors, on the health of souls, which includes everyone, so that it seems this work of mine is superfluous. I reply to that, that blacks’ fate is so sad and dark, and so many the difficulties their slavery burdens them with, that it is imperative to paint that one and refer to these ones, in order to move temperaments towards compassion and show them how they will vanquish those difficulties, and they will improve their luck, that is my purpose.” ([1627] 1956: 6; 1647: 13qq; emphasis added).
EPILOGUE

“The work of an intellectual is not to mold the political will of others; it is, through the analyses that he does in his own field, to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-value rules and institutions and starting from this re-problematisation (where he occupies his specific profession as an intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (where he has his role as citizen to play).”


"Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will"


There is a tendency to argue the progressiveness and counter-hegemonic character of the emergent ethnic claims of social movements (both indigenous and afrodescendent) throughout the region of Latin America, as well as to celebrated the multicultural policies recently developed not only in Colombia, but also in most of the other neighbouring countries, mainly under the active pressure of those social movements. These movements have been theorized as expressions of local resistance in the defence of cultures and places based on a politics of recognition and equality. Through their transnational networks, they constitute hopeful alternatives to neoliberal globalization. Arguing that ‘another world is possible,’ these movements reject the neoliberal discourse, which has become increasingly predicated on the assumption that there is no alternative to the
market and to private enterprise. The political projects embedded in such movements are framed as a form of political subjectivity that empowers the local, subjugated indigenous populations and afrodescendent people throughout the entire region. Thus, progressive academics and activists have together engaged in intellectual and political struggles for the visibility and empowerment of ethnic agendas and ethnic rights.

From this perspective, academics and activists argue that the politics of knowledge must be framed in the following terms. Given the conditions of oppression and exploitation in which these populations have been living, there exists the risk of critical scrutiny of the discourses and practices of ethnic social movements. Therefore, to historicize the premises upon which these narratives and practices are predicated could be seen as morally inadequate, epistemologically impertinent and politically reactionary. This historicization is morally inadequate because a scholar has no ‘moral authority’ because of his/her doubly privileged position of being an academic in the ‘North’ from which to be able to critically scrutinize the discourses and practices that constitute the cornerstones of the political intervention of those who have been under oppression and exploitation. It is epistemologically impertinent because there is no such as thing as a neutral description or absolute truth and, therefore, any interpretation is a political intervention—even those made by individuals who wrongly imagine themselves to be beyond or above these struggles. Finally, it is politically reactionary because this sort of analysis de-empowers the historically oppressed people and, therefore, supports the reactionary and neo-conservative sectors and agendas reproducing through this the exploitation and domination of those people.
There is another tendency that suggests a different approach. This tendency argues that these ethnic movements (among indigenous populations or afrodescendants) are not necessarily counter-hegemonic, but that they may be captured in novel articulations of the ‘neoliberal’ transformations of the modalities of sovereignty of states and transformations of the forms of global capital accumulation and reproduction. In this vein Christian Gros (2000) argued that there is a significant correspondence between the multicultural state’s policies, the eruption of ethnicity and the spread of neoliberalism, not only in Colombia, but also more widely in Latin America.

From his perspective, the transformation that took place during the Eighties, of the ‘national-populist model’ of the state toward the increased adoption of a neoliberal model, is compatible with the emergence of localized political actors such as the indigenous communities: “[…] the recognition of indigenous autonomy, such as has taken place in Colombia, could, in part, be understood (and only in part) as a type of indirect rule that, in a neoliberal and decentralized framework, could be transferred to the communities’ responsibility until that moment supposedly assumed by the state.” (Gros 2000: 100-101). However, Gros is not arguing for a mechanical economic determination of indigenousness. Nor, he is claiming that the multicultural policies of the state are, by themselves, omniscient or omnipresent explanations of the emergence and success of ethnic movements. Instead, he claims that there is a theoretical and a political relevance in understanding the deeper connections between changing subjectivities and social actions, and also of the transformations in the political and economic models of the reproduction of hegemony and domination.
Another example of this tendency is Peter Wade’s article about biodiversity and multiculturality in Colombia (Wade 1999). This article explored the ‘politics of nature’ in relation to ethnicity and otherness. Wade historicized the assumption that indigenous people have an ‘environmental ethic’ and, therefore, that they are natural guardians of the environment. This historicization begins with the concept of the ‘noble savage’ that expresses a structural ambivalence about modernity. Wade links this structural ambivalence with the idea that civilization requires a contrastive element of ‘primitivism’ in order to configure difference and hierarchy. In this sense, ‘civilization’ invents and naturalizes an otherness that can be located in a hierarchical system. Nevertheless, Wade argued that blacks and indigenous people have been embedded in different locations in that hierarchical system of altericization.

While indigenous alterity has been relatively well institutionalized and early became an object of colonial and postcolonial state policies, black alterity has not become a subject of those policies. It is in that sense that black communities have not been located as the paradigmatic ‘other’ as the indigenous people have been. Wade claims that these are the historical reasons why indigenous people have been regarded to be better candidates to be labelled as guardians of the environment. Nevertheless, in the Colombian case, the perceptions of blacks and indigenous people have recently converged in that representation of being suitable guardians of the environment. This convergence was produced in the context of the redefinition of Colombian nationhood. Official multiculturalism, neo-liberalism, and environmentalism became part of state discourse, and they are pertinent to the understanding of that convergence as well. The entire project of empowerment and disempowerment of black and indigenous ethnic
groups has dealt with this ambiguity. On the one hand, recent transformations of models of domination and capitalist accumulation have been configured, and are based on this difference. On the other hand, these discourses and practices are subjects of dispute and re-signification for the ethnic movements of indigenous or black communities.

From analyses like these of Gros and Wade, it is clear that the politics of knowledge of ethnicity and social movements in Colombia and Latin America must be framed in a different way. Rather than politically reactionary, the critical inquiry into the narratives and practices that have constituted the cornerstones of the politics of ethnicity are not only relevant, but also absolutely necessary in order to problematize unseen forms of domination and exploitation. From this perspective, to naturalize either the ethnic political subject, or difference undermines, if not elides, both the critical analysis of, and the contestation of novel modalities of domination.

I envision the politics of knowledge of this dissertation to be representative of neither the first tendency nor the second. The effects of assuming eventalization as approach is to trace different lines of visibilities and enuncibilities of various ‘articulations of blackness’. Rather than an argument ‘for’ or ‘against’ of one of the tendencies analysed above, this dissertation should be seen as an attempt to locate both of them in a broader discursive, and non-discursive, field of games of truth that, throughout time, has constituted different ‘objects’ of thought –i.e. problematizations--., which have become targets of a specific modality of power. Thus, as an intellectual (and political) enterprise, this dissertation had been an attempt to historicize ‘blackness’ without relying on guarantees given by the assumption of any sort of transcendental racial or ethnic subject.
‘Articulations of blackness’ is a conceptualization that avoids those perspectives that subsume blackness in any sort of transcendental racial or ethnic subject, which are ineluctably trapped in a ‘metaphysics of presence.’ From those perspectives, the plurality and historicity of blackness are obliterated. Thus, they are just a term of the endless permutations of a logocentric and formal dichotomy.

Rather, as was demonstrated through this dissertation, my analytical perspective is an attempt to capture different ‘articulations of blackness’ in their positivity, singularity and dispersion. ‘Articulation of blackness’ refers to those formations that have been articulable and visible (a la Deleuze 1988) as such within concrete assembles of relations of forces and games of truth. Instead of assuming preexisting or transcendental blackness that have been ‘repressed’ or ‘(mis)represented’ from ‘above’ and from ‘outside,’ ‘articulations of blackness’ are constituted as specific ‘problematizations.’ As it was explained in the first chapter, problematization does not mean the representation of a pre-existing object, nor the creation through discourse of a nonexistent object. Rather, the problematization is the set of discursive or non discursive practices that makes something enter into the game of true and false, and constitutes it an object for thought (Foucault [1984] 1989: 296).

Thus, the different ‘articulations of blackness’ do not refer to a pristine and previous ‘outside’ of power/knowledge, but nor are they purely imaginary creations lacking grounding in the world. Their conditions of existence and transformation are embedded in these relations, even thought those ‘articulations of blackness’ are not reducible to these relations. Rather than a hermeneutics of a certainty, smooth and
singular blackness, this dissertation must be considered a contribution to a political history of truth in its vacillations, conflicts and plurality. It requires the scrutiny of the regimes of truth in which different ‘articulations of blackness’ have emerged, been dispersed, deployed and transformed.

Blackness, along with other marked social locations (such as indigenousness) may constitute a specific case of ‘subjugated alterity.’ It is a matter of empirical research to examine the concrete and multiple assembles in which ‘blackness’ has emerged and operated. ‘Subjugated alterities’ are not necessarily radical exteriorities, nor closed social totalities. Nevertheless, they can be configured as a constitutive and radical exteriority such as Orientalism (Said 1979) and Third Word (Escobar 1995).

These ‘alterities’ are ‘subjugated’ because the games of truth through which they are constituted as objects of thought are those that appeal to qualified and authorized knowledge that establish strategies and operations of division, distribution, hierarchy and segregation of the social body. ‘Subjugated alterities’ constitute, among other possible points through which specific relations of force have passed, a specific diagram or apparatus of capture: “The forces appear in ‘every relation from one point to another’: a diagram is a map, or rather several superimposed maps. And from one diagram to the next, new maps are drawn. […] It is on the basis of the ‘struggles’ of each age, and the style of these struggles, that we can understand the succession of diagrams or the way in which they become linked up again above and beyond the discontinuities” (Deleuze 1988: 44).
For a great part of the studies concerning the African Diaspora, almost everybody enunciates the fact that the racial or ethnic categories are historical constructions that go beyond the ‘scientific racism’ and its reification of biological determinism characteristic of the end of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, at the same time, they do not find any problem in examining the dissimilar discourses and practices on ‘castas’ in the colonial age as another racial articulation. It is also very evocative that some academics consider the recent processes deployed by ‘ethnic-territorial organizations’ of ‘black communities’ in Colombia or Ecuador tied to their claim of cultural rights and a differentiated identity to be racial. Something similar happens with ‘ethnicity’. Although almost all scholars consider it to be true that ethnicities are historical constructions, there are several analyses that assume afrodescendants to be an ethnic group with a specific ‘culture and their own identity’ both in the present and in the colonial and republican past.

In spite of predicaments of the different tendencies of constructivism (or perhaps due to them) and of the countless intents to show from concrete studies the historical and spatial multiplicity of the articulations of the racial categories established around the African Diaspora, there is a sort of spell from the racialist thought (and, more recently, ethnicist thought) that obliterate the possibility to grasp the political and theoretical implications of those singularities and specificities. A historicization of contrasting articulations of blackness is necessary if one think that it matters to understand the limits of the racialism and ethnicism as principles of historical intelligibility.

This dissertation is a response to aspects not discussed by most part of the historical, sociological and anthropological studies on the afrodescendientes in Colombia.
Many of them are related with the effects of a ‘historical presentism’ embodied by the racialism and ethnicism that seem to established a *doxa* (a la Bourdieu) in these studies, but also in the political practice and the social imaginary articulated for and on behalf of Afrocolombians. What is in stake here is the recognition of the close relationship between the historicity of the thought and the real possibilities of the political interventions. This relationship could be formulated in a double question: On the one hand, how to think, from our inevitable present condition, about some past that not only constitutes a temporal distance but also some other horizons of experience and knowing? On the other hand, how to think about our most immediate present with categories that have been coined in a recent past and that, therefore, they might not be the most appropriate for attempts to grasp what is still nascent and even cloudy from the perspective of the inherited frames? Both questions converge to underline the relationship among the weight of the historicity of ‘our’ thought and the possibility of understanding some other historical expressions (those that constitute its ‘exteriority’) or to understand otherwise even our own historical situation.
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