

RACE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND REPRESENTATION:
REDEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CHICAGO

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Abstract

As the legal foundation of racial affirmative action in public education erodes, alternatives to these policies must be examined where diversity is socially and pedagogically valued. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if race-neutral, socioeconomic status-based affirmative action policies can be applied to produce comparable levels of racial/ethnic enrollment proportions within schools (versus racial affirmative action). My study examines the Chicago Public Schools' *Admissions Policy for Magnet, Selective Enrollment and Other Options For Knowledge Schools and Programs*, which applied a SES-based admissions standard to the Selective Enrollment High School program in 2011. Using data on Selective Enrollment High Schools and CPS demographic enrollment, this thesis determines the treatment effect of the new policy on enrollment proportions through multiple linear regression. The analysis provides empirical evidence that SES-based admissions policies yield statistically significant decreases in Black and minority student enrollment proportions, which are 5.8% and 7% lower than enrollment under a racial affirmative action admissions policy, respectively. However, based on anecdotal evidence, the CPS policy provides one of the strongest race-neutral affirmative action policy formulas available to date, and nonetheless works to ensure the presence of a critical mass of minority students.

Dedication

First, to my parents, without whose unwavering support and encouragement this thesis would have remained an idea.

Second, to my high school teachers at Northside College Prep, who taught me the value of creativity, intellectual curiosity and academic passion: in particular, Tim Devine, Dianne Maleug, Anna Searcy, and Jeff Solin. And finally, to my AP Microeconomics teacher, John Belcaster, who inadvertently inspired me to study public policy with his final lesson: “Economics teaches us the way the world really works; it is your job to make the world the way it should be.”

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Chapter 1. Introduction: Background, Policy Significance and Specific Aims

The national landscape surrounding affirmative action in education has drastically changed over the past decade. Historical policy mainstays protecting diversity are being challenged as public school systems react to an idealized post-racist American culture. Within public magnet schools and institutions of higher learning, admissions policies—where relevant—have begun evolving past racial affirmative action, leaving many minority students with narrower avenues to opportunity. Despite the legal ban on segregation decided in 1954 by *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, undeniable racial and economic segregation exists within many urban school districts today, in many cases resigning minority students to underperforming neighborhood schools. In cases where these students have the chance to pursue higher quality public education through specialized or magnet schools, affirmative action policies can ensure equitable levels of minority student enrollment. Today, the challenge for public schools—primary, secondary, and tertiary—is how to maintain diversity, as race becomes an increasingly impermissible admission or school composition factor.

In states where integration efforts are voluntary, utilizing race explicitly to determine school enrollment is no longer permissible. In public primary and secondary schools, *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 1* (2007) held that that race could not be used as an admissions factor in public schools to combat de facto segregation¹ because, among other issues: no effort to consider a race-neutral alternative was taken, and the policy did not individually consider student assignment based on race. Justice Anthony Kennedy

¹ *De facto* segregation is segregation that voluntarily occurs in practice, but is not ordained by law. In the case of public schools, this means that schools are segregated because of factors like neighborhood composition and self-segregation. This is held in contrast to *de jure*, or “by law,” segregation, which is mandated by law. School composition policies that included de jure segregation have since been remanded, and in the case where these segregation policies were found, quota systems or busing policies were generally enforced until the district gained unitary status (proved that the harm of the previous discrimination had been corrected).

concluded, in his concurring opinion, that race-conscious mechanisms, which do not lead to differential treatment or preference to a student based explicitly upon race, would likely be held constitutional thereupon (*PICS v. Seattle*, 2007). As a result, some public school districts and institutions are aiming to capture and ensure diversity with policies that apply designed race-conscious mechanisms—as opposed to race-based.

In public primary and secondary schools that have admissions procedures, policies concerning diversity (where no prior de jure segregation had been practiced) vary between school systems: in some, districts utilize a strict merit-based system, which rarely—if ever—produces a critical mass of minority students. More commonly, these admissions procedures are treated most similarly to that of a university—where race is factored in some way. In higher education, the landmark Supreme Court decision, *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978) concluded that, while explicit racial admissions quotas violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, utilizing race as a “plus” factor for minority candidates was legitimate and served a compelling interest. This interest was maintained by the *Grutter v. Bollinger* (2003) decision, which held that race-conscious admissions policies were a justifiable means to achieve the education benefits of a diverse student body. However, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated, in the decision: “The Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today” (*Grutter v. Bollinger*, 2003, p. 310).

Only a decade later, racial preference in admissions is already highly contested. In June 2013, the Supreme Court remanded *Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin* (2013)—upholding the pedagogical and legal foundations of affirmative action, but increasing the standard of scrutiny for the use of race as an admissions factor in public education. Thus, policymakers at

the University of Texas at Austin are challenged to prove that their criteria in admission are the only way to ensure a diverse student body. On April 22, 2014, the Supreme Court held that it is constitutional for states to ban affirmative action policies outright in *Schuetz v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action* with a 6-2 decision (Liptak, 2014). In 2006, Michigan's Proposal 2, which banned public schools from using race as an admissions factor, was incorporated into the state constitution—and Michigan joined Arizona, California, Florida, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma and Washington in the company of states that have instituted bans on affirmative action in public institutions or schools. This landmark decision will change the national perspective on affirmative action, and may now affect admissions policies at magnet schools, specialized schools, and institutions of higher education across the country. In response to the changing legal climate surrounding existing affirmative action, some proactive public school systems have already attempted to implement policy reform that uses non-racial diversity measures to ensure the continuation of satisfactory racial balance.

One such reform, adopted by the Chicago Public Schools in 2010, utilizes a socioeconomic status-based variable to achieve racial diversity. This relatively new policy, fully implemented in the 2011-2012 academic year, has attempted to maintain a similar level of student body diversity when compared to the previously employed quota system. Although some parents and community members disagree with the design of the new admissions standards, the affected schools have remained relatively diverse (Chicago Board of Education [CBOE], 2011).

Twenty-first century judicial decisions and public sentiment have seemingly shortened the lifespan of explicit racial affirmative action, but the inarguable inequality of access to high-quality education, for both low-income and minority students, endures—necessitating policy

action. While arguments for socioeconomic affirmative action have been made for decades, the Chicago case study is significant because it exhibits the first deliberate SES-based admissions policy in a primary and secondary public school system, which is applied to the city's selective enrollment and magnet schools (Thomas et al., 2011). Thus, the question remains as to whether or not these mechanisms can accurately capture and maintain a socially beneficial and equitable level of diversity within public schools. By analyzing enrollment trends pre- and post-policy implementation, this thesis will determine whether this policy ensures comparable, significant levels of racial diversity within affected schools.

The Court's decisions imply that race-neutral affirmative action policies are possible methods to achieve diversity in schools, and I will examine whether or not the Chicago Public Schools' race-neutral admissions policy is as effective as a quota system at producing diversity within schools. First, in this thesis, I will establish the social, legal, and historical framework surrounding both modern desegregation and affirmative action policies, from a national perspective and in Chicago. Second, I will explain the Chicago Public Schools' designed socioeconomic status-based admissions policy and relevant variables, and discuss the origins of socioeconomic status as a factor in diversity maintenance. In the subsequent chapter, Chapter 3, I will introduce the analyzed data and the regression model through which the policy will be evaluated. In Chapter 4 (Results), I will examine changes in the share of enrollment represented by several demographic groups of students at Selective Enrollment High Schools in Chicago, before and after the implementation of SES-based admissions standards, to determine the effect of the policy on school racial/ethnic composition. Finally, in the conclusion, I will address broader implications and limitations of my findings, and present opportunities for further research on socioeconomic affirmative action.

Chapter 2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

Desegregation, particularly desegregation education policy, began in 1954 with the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), wherein it was decided that state-imposed segregation violated students' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection, concluding that "[racially] separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" (*Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 1954, p. 495). Despite the weight of this decision, integration progress was slow in states that had historically instituted segregation laws: for example, in 1965, only 7.5% of Black students in the South attended schools with White students (Levine & Havighurst, 1989, p. 309). In states that had not instituted explicit segregation, increasing urban residential segregation led to growing public schooling segregation in many Northern cities. This was the case in Chicago, where in 1960, 69% of Black residents lived in communities that were at least 95% African-American ("Local Community Fact Book," 1984).

It was not for another ten years that two pieces of national legislation—the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965)—would begin nearly a decade of widespread desegregation efforts across the country (concentrated in the South), and marked the practical beginning of educational racial integration in the segregated South. The Civil Rights Act, which provided injunctive relief against all forms of discrimination, was bolstered by the ESEA with respect to school desegregation: states were given financial incentive to promote integration, and additional funding was allotted to schools serving low-income families. Thus, in the South, integration efforts were more hastily implemented, and generally met with little resistance. As a result, the racial balance within many of these schools became consistent with national averages as legal changes, busing, and school board redistricting worked to eliminate the "separate but equal" school. In the North, both civil rights advocates

and the courts began taking steps to combat some de facto segregation—in New York and New Jersey, courts upheld districts’ decisions to draw school boundary lines in order to produce more substantial racial balance. Comprehensive voluntary integration initiatives passed in some states (like Massachusetts), which aimed to eliminate imbalance altogether, and were seen sparingly in the 1970s and 1980s in Northern states and urban centers. In contrast, other districts engaged in school district gerrymandering and new, isolating school construction in order to produce levels of segregation akin to that seen in pre-*Brown* southern schools (Levine & Havighurst, 1989).

Concurrently, institutions that utilized admissions procedures (particularly, in higher education) adopted policies of affirmative action as a result of the Civil Rights movement. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Executive Order 11246, which compelled government contractors to employ affirmative action in their hiring practices, and in subsequent years, many colleges and universities adopted similar policies. At the time, only five percent of undergraduate students, two percent of medical students, and one percent of law students were Black (“Affirmative Action,” 2013).

Affirmative action admissions and hiring policies began to be placed under increased scrutiny in the late 1970s, where quota policies in cases of voluntary integration and diversity-seeking were deemed unconstitutional (*Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*, 1978).² Further, as the political landscape surrounding the Civil Rights movement began to change as equal rights concepts became more widespread—and the social psychology arguments of race relations outlined in the 1960s grew outmoded—both desegregation and affirmative action policies aimed at improving diversity in public schools were deprioritized (Levine & Havighurst,

² Quotas could be legally employed in cases where institutions were found guilty of past, substantial de jure segregation; in these cases, a quota was allowed as an alternative policy to correct past injustices by providing more equitable access to harmed minority groups. Such was the case in Chicago in 1980, and had been in many Southern school districts during the early stages of integration.

1989). In affirmative action, this meant that the scrutiny applied to minority benefits grew every year. For integration, this meant the de facto segregation that emerged in the North as a result of more popular neighborhood school policies kept schools segregated: growing inequity in Northern cities offset the comparatively immense progress made in desegregation in the South. In the North, where at best racial isolation marginally decreased, or at worst, grew, urban residential segregation became the integration challenge of the late twentieth century.

Urban Segregation and Chicago's Consent Decree

In 1973, a landmark decision in *Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado* defined the level of scrutiny to be applied to indirect de facto segregation in Northern cities. Within the context of desegregation, it was the first major decision regarding segregation outside of the South, and worked to spur most of the comprehensive integration efforts in major cities that had never experienced government-imposed, explicit school segregation, but saw extreme practical levels of racial imbalance. This established a *prima facie* case of constitutional violations by the Denver schools, whereby the board intentionally implemented policies that furthered racial segregation within their district. Although, because of a variety of external, private factors, many neighborhood schools may experience some levels of undue racial isolation, it is the legal responsibility of the school boards to ameliorate these issues through desegregation and integration policies. In the case of Denver, it was determined that not only did policymakers reject resolutions to implement desegregation measures in the affluent Park Hill neighborhood, but also actively promoted racial segregation:

[Through] the construction of a new, relatively small elementary school, Barrett, in the middle of the Negro community west of Park Hill, by the gerrymandering of student attendance zones, by the use of so-called 'optional zones,' and by the excessive use of

mobile classroom units, among other things, the respondent School Board had engaged over almost a decade after 1960 in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregation with respect to the Park Hill schools (192).

With respect to public school policy, this case established that school boards bear the burden of proving that segregation existing within their districts is not the result of any segregative intent (*Keyes v. School District No. 1*, 1973). Thus, following this decision, many other districts' policies—across the Northeast and Midwest—became the subject of lower-court lawsuits, which often led to decades of mandated, broad desegregation initiatives. In Denver, the result was 21 years of mandatory busing, in which about a quarter of public school students were forcibly bused to schools throughout the city in order to achieve district-wide racial balance (Brooke, 1995).

The court decrees were often met with White flight and public discord. In 1968, before the first lawsuit was brought against the Denver School District, almost 64,000 White students attended public schools in the city. In 1975, when the policies mandated by the Supreme Court decision were enforced, 7,000 fewer White students were enrolled. In violent protest, arsonists set fire to nearly one-third of the buses to be used for desegregation, and the home of Wilfred Keyes (the plaintiff in the landmark case) was pipe bombed. Parents, particularly middle class, White parents, protested the busing policy vehemently (as they had played a large role in ensuring that desegregation resolutions were not passed in the late 1960s), and when desegregation continued, they responded by removing their children from the Denver Public Schools. Thousands of White families moved to the suburbs or enrolled their children in private schools as a direct result of this policy change: in 1970, 89% of Denver's population was White. But by 1990, it had shrunk to 72.1%, and is currently less than 68%. In the 1960s, Denver's

population was growing at a rate of about 18.8%. In the 1970s, this rate dropped to 4.2%, and in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, the urban population decreased by 4.3 and 5%. While these population trends are not uniquely explained by the school policy, it was one of the largest contributing factors to Denver's trend of White flight in the late twentieth century. By 1995, when the desegregation busing policy was vacated, White enrollment in Denver Public Schools had dropped over 71%. Even with desegregation busing, some schools still had around 90% minority enrollment, simply because there were not enough White students in the school system to integrate (Brooke, 1995). White flight was one of the worst—and most counterproductive—effects of Northern integration policies. In the end, Denver ended its desegregation policy in part because of the growing lack of White students within the school district.

Certainly, many White middle class families were leaving large cities in droves in the 1970s and 1980s: while desegregation policies did factor into many of these decisions, school policies were not wholly responsible for White flight—as neighborhood decline, urban infrastructure, and sprawl contributed to the middle class suburban shift. In fact, middle class Black families who lived in working class neighborhoods relocated during this time period as well, in an effort to remove their children from schools and neighborhoods plagued with poverty, crime and violence (Wolman, 1976). However, the phenomenon of White flight was often, if not always, taken into account when designing desegregation policy—as the presence of White families in a district was a key ingredient in the integration mix. Thus, most late desegregation policies, crafted after decades of observed urban White flight, were conscientious of White residents, and featured more voluntary, and less invasive, integration measures (Levine, 1989). This was the case in Chicago in 1980, where a federal suit resulted in a desegregation decree that was implemented through policies of compensatory funding for failing majority-minority

schools, voluntary busing, and magnet school construction—which, ultimately, had marginal effects on overall school integration or quality. Measurable desegregation in Chicago, since the 1960s, has only been seen in one program: magnet schools.

The story of segregation and desegregation in Chicago actually begins much earlier than the *Keyes* decision or Chicago's consent decree—in 1965, the Chicago Public Schools were the first Northern recipients of a Civil Rights Act Title VI complaint, which alleged that integration efforts were hindered by school boundary gerrymandering, inadequate transfer plans, extreme school quality gaps, and explicit segregation at some Chicago schools. As a result, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now defunct) withheld \$32 million in ESEA funding. However, the clout of the Chicago political machine proved stronger than the justified complaint—after a short meeting between Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley and President Lyndon B. Johnson, the funds were released to the CPS (Danns, 2011).

Over the next decade-and-a-half, minor desegregation efforts were made in response to public and institutional pressure. Using the argument of White flight prevention (although it would later be determined that in Chicago, desegregation did not as significantly influence White flight compared to other cities like Denver), voluntary desegregation busing was instituted in some neighborhoods: and in a public school system of over 550,000, at most 600 Black students were integrated into White schools through this limited busing system. In the early 1970s, under orders from the Illinois state government, the CPS developed a more comprehensive desegregation plan that relied more heavily on voluntary busing and magnet schools. Busing, which was unpopular in many White as well as Black communities, failed to provide any substantial measure of desegregation in Chicago. The magnet school program, another product of this wave of reforms, was also small in scale. The first magnet school (later Selective

Enrollment), Whitney M. Young High School, opened in 1975, and a handful of other magnet elementary and high schools sprung up across the city. However, by the end of the decade, only about 5% of Chicago schools were participating in desegregation by busing, and worse than 89% of minority students attended segregated schools (Danns, 2011; Bogira, 1988). While this level of segregation was not necessarily uncommon in Northern urban school districts, in the case of Chicago, it was systematic.

Finally, after over fifteen years of segregation violations, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare charged the CPS with seven violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that the district engaged in policies that:

- (1) Created attendance boundaries and structures which promoted racial segregation; (2) maintained racially segregated branch schools; (3) maintained segregation through permanent or temporary facilities to relieve overcrowding; (4) maintained crowded, inferior schools in such a way to identify them for Black students; (5) assigned teachers and staff to match the race of the students at those schools; (6) used a permissive transfer policy which allowed White students to transfer out of schools in which they were the minority; and (7) associated segregated schools with segregated housing projects (Danns, 2011).

When the complaint was addressed in federal court, CPS was charged with purposefully segregating minority and White students, and agreed to remedy the injustices with a comprehensive desegregation plan. The first concession made, however, was that not all students could be desegregated: with White enrollment around 17% when the policies were being drafted, there simply were not enough Whites within the district to provide racial balance at all of the schools (Danns, 2011). Had initial complaints against Chicago been prosecuted—in

1965, when half of CPS students were White—true integration could have been reasonably achieved. White families had been steadily leaving the city and public school system since the 1950s: White enrollment comprised 62% of total enrollment in 1950, but by 1987, that proportion had dropped to only 14% of the CPS population. Appendix A provides information on CPS demographic enrollment trends for select, benchmarking years between 1950-2010. By the time desegregation was legally mandated in Chicago in 1980, minority students comprised over 80% of the enrollees (Bogira, 1988).

After minor consideration of a highly unpopular interdistrict transfer program (with wealthy, White suburban districts), the board agreed upon a desegregation plan that would provide increased access to more magnet schools, voluntary transfers for thousands of minority students,³ and compensatory programs and funding for segregated, failing schools. Of all of these policies, only the magnet program saw any accomplishment in terms of desegregation—in fact, the schools, particularly the Selective Enrollment schools, became the crown jewels of the otherwise inequitable, failing CPS system. Not only were most of these schools some of the strongest performing academically, but most provided dynamic, integrated environments for students from all over the city.

These specialized programs, however, disproportionately benefitted White students and absorbed a hefty amount of resources relative to the other larger mandated desegregation programs. The benefit, however, was necessary for the provision of desegregation: while Whites composed around 15% of the CPS population, at that time more than 15% non-minority students were needed at each magnet to provide a desegregated environment relative to the urban

³ It is notable that this aspect of desegregation was relatively successful; by 1986, nearly all (save two) of the formerly all-White public schools were reduced to under 70% White through the busing of Black and Hispanic students. However, these desegregation efforts were one-way: nearly all of the all-minority schools remained segregated, and remain so today (Danns, 2011).

population. By the late 1980s, double the amount of Whites were enrolled in magnet schools as were enrolled in neighborhood public schools. The magnet program, adequately designed to keep White families in the Chicago Public Schools, actually improved the White student public school experience far more than it did for minorities—with the best Selective Enrollment schools (the highest performing level of magnet schools) enrolling nearly 40% White student bodies. Further, not including transportation costs, the CPS spent over double the amount, per pupil, on magnet school students than it spent on compensatory programs at racially isolated schools (Bogira, 1988). Understanding that these top-performing, high-resource schools would attract proportionally more White students than non-White, to protect access for the disadvantaged minority, quota policies were established as a part of 1980 Consent Decree, which mandated that all magnet schools enroll 65-85% minority students, at minimum. By combining this corrective quota with academic programs to attract White students, the magnet schools actually worked to create diverse learning environments, which have persisted (Bogira, 1988). However, without the quota system, the schools would have likely become segregated majority-White institutions—as seen in other selective magnet systems, like New York’s Specialized Schools (NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 2012).

In 2009, when the consent decree was vacated as a result of longstanding compliance, the CPS made a concerted effort to maintain the diversity that was present at most of its selective schools. The quota system, which was only legal to rectify de jure segregation outlined by the consent decree, was no longer an option. In 2010, the school district piloted a new admissions policy, which factored neighborhood socioeconomic status instead of race or ethnicity.

The Chicago Public Schools' Socioeconomic Status-Based Admissions Policy

The Blue Ribbon Committee, a task force appointed by the Chicago Public Schools, began to draft a new admissions policy for Chicago's nine Selective Enrollment public high schools in 2009.⁴ CPS had previously ensured diversity in its admissions-based schools via a consent decree-mandated racial quota since 1980. This decree, ordered as a result of unconstitutional segregation policies devised to limit "White flight," was terminated and vacated on September 24, 2009, as CPS had demonstrated long-standing compliance (*United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago*, 2009). However, following *PICS v. Seattle* (2007), the race-factored policy outlined by the decree was no longer a permissible method of maintaining diversity voluntarily.⁵ Thus, CPS was challenged to determine a new policy that would maintain a comparable level of student body diversity within its admissions-based schools.

As a caveat, neighborhood schools generally see diversity reflective of the local school district population, as a result of numerous anti-desegregation judicial decisions in the 1990s, which empowered de facto segregation following the expiration or vacation of court-mandated desegregation, as in *Freeman v. Pitts* (1992). Consequently, the Chicago Public Schools system—when examined altogether—is actually one of the most segregated metropolitan school systems in the country. In terms of community racial variation and isolation, as measured by the percentage of students who would have to change schools to achieve system-wide, level racial

⁴ Today, Chicago Public Schools operates ten Selective Enrollment schools, including South Shore International College Prep, which opened in 2011. The final admissions policy applied to a total of ten (10) schools when it was accepted on August 24, 2011.

⁵ In accordance with *PICS v. Seattle*, using race as an explicit factor in admission or composition is permissible when it is utilized to correct previously instituted segregation. Because the consent decree was mandated as a result of unconstitutional segregation policy, race as an admission and school composition factor was permitted. When the decree was vacated, the Court determined that CPS faithfully carried out desegregation policy and that the harms of past discrimination had been ameliorated. Thus, race alone could no longer be considered a compelling factor in determining school composition.

distribution (dissimilarity index), Chicago ranks worst in four out of six dissimilarity categories, when comparing the five most segregated metropolitan areas nationally. Appendix B summarizes these dissimilarity indices. Further, in Chicago, 71.8% of all Black students attend over 90% minority schools, and almost half attend over 99% minority schools (Orfield, Kucsera, & Siegel-Hawley, 2012, p. 60). To put this into perspective, in the 1960s, this figure was about 65% nationally (Coleman, 1966, p. 3). And while this high level of segregation was largely ignored in the twenty-first century policy sphere—as national desegregation policy is no longer enforced in most school districts—more equitable admissions policies for the Selective Enrollment and magnet schools were designed to allow equal access to high quality education for students regardless of racial or socioeconomic background. Piloted in 2010 and implemented the following academic year, the new policy took into account student socioeconomic status as a categorical factor in admissions decisions (CBOE, 2011).

Under the *Admissions Policy for Magnet, Selective Enrollment and Other Options For Knowledge Schools and Programs*, admission to each of the current ten Selective Enrollment High Schools⁶ is determined by two factors: composite admissions score and socioeconomic tier (CBOE, 2011).

Admissions Score Calculation

The composite admissions score is a numerical point value calculated based on three equally-weighted factors: high school entrance exam score, seventh grade reading and math standardized test scores, and seventh grade academic marks (in reading, math, science, and social studies). Each of these sections is weighted equally with 300 points—wherein perfect (99th

⁶ Chicago Public Schools Selective Enrollment High Schools are: Robert Lindblom Math & Science Academy, William Jones College Preparatory High School, Walter Payton College Preparatory High School, George Westinghouse High School, Albert G. Lane Technical High School, Gwendolyn Brooks College Preparatory Academy High School, Northside College Preparatory High School, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Preparatory High School, Whitney M. Young Magnet High School, and South Shore International High School.

percentile) Selective Enrollment High School admissions exam scores, perfect standardized test scores (the Illinois State Achievement Test is most commonly used), and straight “A”s garner a maximum score of 900 (CBOE, 2011). Before the new admissions policy was instituted, admission to these Selective Enrollment schools was based solely on composite admissions scores and race, with composition ratios of at most 35% White and at least 65% non-White (*United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago*, 2009).

Socioeconomic Tier Calculation

The socioeconomic tier system, which attempts to ensure equality of access to students of all backgrounds, was introduced as an additional factor in admission with the new policy (replacing quotas). In this system, students are assigned to a tier—1 through 4—based upon where they live in the city; specifically, their census tract. CPS annually assigns tiers to each of the city’s tracts based upon a percentile ranking of six neighborhood factors: median family income, percentage of home ownership, percentage of single-parent households, percentage of the population that is English-speaking, highest level of adult educational attainment (a structured variable), and local school performance (a structured variable). Based upon this data, the tracts are split into four equal, ranked groups— the tiers—with Tier 1 representing lowest socioeconomic tracts and Tier 4 representing the highest (Thomas et al., 2011).

The socioeconomic (SES) score is calculated, per tier, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{SES Score} = & \text{Percentile Median Income} \\
 & + \text{Percentile Home Ownership} \\
 & + \text{Percentile Single-Parent Family} \\
 & + \text{Percentile Non-English Speaking} \\
 & + \text{Percentile Education Score} \\
 & + \text{Percentile Local School Performance}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

Where percentile median income, home ownership, single-parent family, and non-English speaking data are taken directly from the Census (or estimates), and both education score and school performance are structured variables utilizing Census and test score data, respectively (Thomas et al., 2011).

The education score is calculated based on tract adult educational attainment as listed on the Census, with categories: less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, Bachelor's Degree, Advanced Degree. Each category is weighted to reflect the implicit positive socioeconomic effects associated with higher community education levels. The score is calculated based on the equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Education Score} = & 0.2 * (\% \text{ Less than High School Diploma}) \\
 & + 0.4 * (\% \text{ High School Diploma}) \\
 & + 0.6 * (\% \text{ Some College}) \\
 & + 0.8 * (\% \text{ Bachelor's Degree}) \\
 & + 1.0 * (\% \text{ Advanced Degree})
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Where the lowest possible score is 0.20 (no adults in the tract have completed high school) and the highest is 1.0 (all adults have completed an advanced degree). These scores are then ranked (assigned a percentile) and tabulated in the SES score figure (Open City, 2013).

The school performance variable, which was incorporated in 2011 after the pilot program yielded significantly decreased Black enrollment, takes into account local school quality by examining public school composite test scores, based on the Illinois Standard Achievement Test (ISAT). This score variable is simply the weighted average of the ISAT performance of that neighborhood: for any school within a census tract, composite ISAT scores are averaged across all students tested (grades 3-8) and multiplied by the proportion of students served by the school with respect to total tract public school enrollment. These scores are then summed for each

elementary school in the census tract to determine the local school performance variable. The performance variable can be summarized by the equation:

$$School\ Performance = \sum x \left(\frac{School\ Enrollment_n}{Tract\ Enrollment} \right) * Composite\ ISAT\ Score_n \quad (3)$$

Local school performance scores are then assigned percentiles, which are utilized in the final SES score calculation.

Once the percentiles for all six factors of the SES score are calculated, they are summed for each census tract and rank-ordered. The tiers are then determined by grouping the 25% lowest into Tier 1, the next lowest 25% into Tier 2, and so on. There are typically marked differences across all categories between tiers: for example, in the pilot year (2010), the median income in a Tier 4 neighborhood was \$76,829, compared to \$30,791 in Tier 1 (*Policy briefing* [PowerPoint slides], 2011).

Selective Enrollment Admissions Structure

Student admission into a Selective Enrollment High School is then determined by taking into account both composite admissions score and tier. Under the current policy, 30% of the seats in Selective Enrollment schools are reserved for the students who have the highest composite scores—regardless of socioeconomic status. The remaining 70% of seats are divided evenly between each of the four tiers—with the top students from each tier, ranked by individual composite admissions score, earning acceptance to their choice of school (Thomas et al., 2011).

These measures were designed to create a minority/non-minority mix that was similar to that which was produced under a quota system in a race-neutral way, even though some aspects of the neighborhood tier factors were evidently targeted at specific demographic groups. Although this policy change was met with some criticism—most notably from families in

wealthier neighborhoods whose children are now less likely to be admitted under the SES system—socioeconomic affirmative action is viewed as an increasingly viable alternative to traditional, race-based affirmative action. However, the SES-based policy's limitations and novelty in modern practice preclude any recommendation for this change without further analysis. Although other SES-based affirmative action policies have been practiced in some institutions throughout the country, their effectiveness is neither conclusive nor convincing.

The goal of the new policy was to ensure that students from all socioeconomic backgrounds had equal access to Selective Enrollment High Schools, while also working to maintain diversity within the schools. Historically, the best Selective Enrollment High Schools saw skewed socioeconomic distributions—favoring higher income students—but also diverse student bodies, in accordance with the consent decree. The Blue Ribbon Committee was thus tasked with both expanding access and maintaining diversity without any explicit race factor—ultimately designing one of the first high school socioeconomic status-based admissions policies in the country.

The Blue Ribbon Committee designed the SES-based admissions policy in a race-neutral way, while removing some bias against minority students—predicted by a strict socioeconomic admissions policy—by introducing two additional variables, outside of SES indicators, to the tier system: percentile non-English speaking and percentile local school performance. The percentile non-English speaking factor directly targets Hispanic students, whose communities (tracts on the West Side of the city) are the highest non-English speaking percentile in the city. Without this factor, Hispanic admission to Selective Enrollment High Schools would have fallen significantly. The local school performance variable was added after the pilot year of the admissions program as a sixth factor when a marked drop in Black Selective Enrollment

admission was observed. Because of residential segregation, community poverty, and violence, schools within predominantly Black communities (tracts) are the worst performing in the city. Thus, when school quality was taken into account, Black enrollment rose because the SES variable percentile for all of these predominantly Black, low-income communities dropped—making it less competitive for these students to gain admission (Thomas et al., 2011). The question remains, however, as to how well these variables are able to proxy race and maintain comparable student body composition post-racial affirmative action policy. Further, can this designed socioeconomic tier system be applied to other schools’ and districts’ policies—where *Fisher v. Texas* and *Schuetz v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action* threaten race-factored admissions policies and affirmative action altogether?

The Origins of Socioeconomic Affirmative Action

Since racial affirmative action policy was introduced during Civil Rights era, popular opinion in the United States regarding affirmative action—once touted a guarantor of equity—has shifted dramatically. In a national survey conducted by Gallup, only 28% of American adults stated that they felt race should be taken into account in college admissions decisions, and policy in many states and school districts reflects this sentiment. Further, about two-thirds of respondents believed that applicants should be evaluated based solely on merit. While opinions on the importance of affirmative action vary by racial group (with 22% of Whites favoring racial affirmative action, versus 48% and 31% of Black and Hispanic respondents, respectively), less than half of all minority groups believe that race should be a considered factor (2013).

Conversely, the importance of diversity in schools is not contested. However, both example and research illustrate that merit-based admissions systems, unaccompanied, cannot produce diverse student bodies: in either colleges or high schools. After California instituted its

ban on racial affirmative action in 1996 (Proposition 209), minority enrollment dropped drastically at the state's top colleges: after UCLA implemented this policy in 1998, by 2006, only about 2% of the entering first-year class was Black (Hayasaki, 2006). A study conducted by Anthony Carnevale and Stephen J. Rose found that if performance (as measured by grades and test scores) were the sole basis of student admission, only 4% of the seats at the top 146 colleges in the U.S. would be occupied by Black and Latino students (2004). In New York City's Specialized High Schools, where admission is determined only by rank-order entrance exam performance, only 5% of Black and 6.7% of Latino students who applied were offered admission into any of the Specialized High Schools (versus almost 31% and 35% acceptance rates for White and Asian students, respectively), although nearly 70% of all public school students in New York City are minorities. At Stuyvesant High School, the most selective program of the Specialized High Schools, only 19 Black applicants were offered seats in a class of 967 students (NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 2012). Meritocratic admissions policies do little to ensure equality of access for minority students. Thus, it is imperative that some form of affirmative action is taken where diversity is considered valuable.

Even *Schuetz v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action* (2014), which constitutionally sustains racial affirmative action bans, holds that diversity is a compelling state interest. The question, rather, concerns the consideration of race-neutral alternatives to achieve this end: for example, whether or not socioeconomic affirmative action could protect racial diversity within schools as attempted by the Chicago Public Schools.

The important role of socioeconomic status in affirmative action and classroom composition has been considered since the James Samuel Coleman's *Equality of Educational Opportunity* in 1966. More commonly known as the Coleman Report, the study of over 600,000

students at 4,000 schools across the United States found that when it comes to educational outcomes, what is “put into” schools is less important than who is enrolled. The landmark study determined that school characteristics and inputs—like funding, facilities, resources and school day length—had no determinate positive impact on student achievement and attainment, as measured by academic performance and graduation rates. Coleman found, instead, that the social class was the only accurate predictor of academic success: socioeconomically disadvantaged students consistently achieved lower scores and levels of attainment than their middle- and upper-middle class peers. Summarizing his findings, Coleman (1966) reported:

Taking all these results together, one implication stands out above all. That schools bring little influence to bear on a child’s achievement that is independent of his background and general social context; and that this very lack of an independent effect means that the inequalities imposed on children by their home, neighborhood, and peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities with which they confront adult life at the end of school. For equality of educational opportunity through the schools must imply a strong effect of schools that is independent of the child’s immediate social environment, and that strong independent effect is not present in American schools (325).

Thus, while Coleman made no specific policy recommendations within his Report, the implication—that diverse student body composition was the key to equality of educational opportunity—was clear. By linking social capital and values with achievement, Coleman identified the importance of peer effects on outcomes for disadvantaged students. When disadvantaged students are placed in classrooms with majority middle- and upper-middle class students, they report a marked improvement in educational outcomes, while advantaged students experience no negative effect: education was not, and is not, a zero-sum game. The achievement

gap—which has nonetheless persisted into the twenty-first century—could be addressed by creating diverse classrooms. These discoveries subsequently changed the modern understanding of educational equality and social reproduction. If schools were to provide equal opportunity for all students, integration was vital (Coleman, 1966). Accordingly, this study was the basis of many of the desegregation busing policies that were decreed during the latter half of the 20th century.

The relationship between social class and race was perhaps more definite during the early years of desegregation, as defined by Coleman and his contemporaries, than it is in the twenty-first century. This connection, combined with the collective racial equality movement, shaped the quota-based busing systems that defined public education policy during the 1970s and 1980s. These widespread desegregation policies—which, when decreed, were aimed at correcting past discriminations, rather than providing for equality of opportunity explicitly—were set to expire once each offending school district had achieved unitary status; when the magnitude of the original harm for the affected minority groups had been sufficiently amended. Consequently, many of these policies expired or were vacated after the probationary period ended, and as a result, *de facto* segregation within school systems and districts—based upon residential segregation of minority and low-income families—reemerged. As desegregation policies have begun to disappear from public educational institutions, dissimilarity index scores comparable to the Civil Rights-era have become commonplace (Orfield, Kucsera & Siegel-Hawley, 2012). Concurrently, the judicial scrutiny applied to desegregation policies that are race-centric has become narrower. Thus, the policy question of how to correct this dissimilarity—given the understanding of the importance of peer effects—becomes increasingly difficult. Simply put, the easiest solution to correct this imbalance is to incorporate socioeconomic status into affirmative

action policy, aiming to influence school composition through a legal—and effectual—social categorical variable.

The socioeconomic-peer effects theory demonstrated by Coleman in 1966 has been revalidated and substantiated by other scholars (Jencks, 1972; Wilson, 1969), but incorporating a standalone socioeconomic variable-based cannot equitably become policy because it systematically favors White applicants. Although Black and Hispanic students are disproportionately overrepresented within the low-income social tiers, poor Whites still vastly outnumber these Black and Hispanic students (Carnevale & Rose, 2004). Additionally, low-income White students still perform markedly better than their minority peers: of the highest-performing low-income students (90th percentile test scores), only 17.3% were Black or Hispanic (Kane, 1998).

A comparison of Black and White low-income students based on data provided by the College Board, which administers the SAT, found an 80 to 100 point gap in math and verbal test scores between these two groups—thus, White low-income students, who outnumber Black low-income students 5:2, would be favored under strict socioeconomic affirmative action (Slater, 1995). Research on student body composition at the University of California at Berkley concluded that current if racial affirmative action policies were replaced by socioeconomic affirmative action, Black enrollment would drop by 62% and White enrollment would increase by as much as 25% (Slater, 1995). Another simulation, which examined elite colleges and universities, found that within the larger pool of all low-SES students, qualified (based on a test score cutoff, academic marks, teacher recommendations, and leadership experience) Black and Hispanic students would represent only 4% and 5.8% of the total seats reserved for low-income students based on socioeconomic affirmative action—compared to 6% of seats under traditional

affirmative action policy (Carnevale & Rose, 2004). Thus, socioeconomic status cannot be used as a sole variable when developing innovative affirmative action admissions policies, as the results would be unduly biased against minority students.

Select university programs have integrated multi-faceted socioeconomic variables into admissions considerations in the face of affirmative action bans. When California instituted its ban in racial affirmative action in 1996, many state institutions struggled to maintain diversity. As a result, the UCLA law school implemented a trial run of a socioeconomic-based admissions policy in 1997 in order to maintain some level of diversity, factoring student-level demographic data for each of the nearly 4,000 applicants on: parental education, parental income, parental net worth, single-parent households in neighborhood, families on welfare in neighborhood, and young adults who are high school dropouts in neighborhood. After collecting this data, the admissions committee calculated the mean and standard deviation for each of these categories based on the top 1,000 applicants (based on assigned academic merit scores from the committee). For low-SES students whose admissions profiles were above a minimum academic threshold, a point “boost” in overall admissions scores was granted—and thus chances of acceptance for disadvantaged students. Under this policy, roughly 30% of admitted students received this boost, while 70% were accepted based on merit alone. This policy, however, was never able to achieve the same level of diversity as the race-factored admissions policy, although the UCLA School of Law saw higher minority enrollment than Boalt Hall (UC – Berkeley Law), which took neither racial nor socioeconomic affirmative action measures. The UCLA case, however, provides evidence that socioeconomic status-based admissions policies are feasible and do protect diversity to a degree—although these policies alone cannot replace explicit race-conscious admissions policies as a means to ensure adequate racial balance (Sander, 1998). Thus,

socioeconomic diversity can only serve as one piece of a more complex affirmative action policy that assumes the ethical and pedagogical responsibility of a racially diverse student body. In the case of the Chicago Public Schools, where a more complex admissions model is introduced, is the Selective Enrollment High Schools' race-neutral, socioeconomic status-based affirmative action policy sufficient to ensure diversity—where other similar policies have failed?

Chapter 3. Research Design: Data and Methods

As alternatives to racial affirmative action are considered nationally, I will evaluate the efficacy of the Chicago Public Schools' new socioeconomic status-based admissions policy as a solution to maintain minority representation. Ultimately, this thesis will address two questions:

1. Does the SES-based affirmative action policy have an effect on demographic group enrollment, relative to racial affirmative action (i.e., quota system)?
2. How can other school systems and institutions adapt this admissions model to satisfy diversity as race-based policies are placed under increased scrutiny?

The overarching question of this thesis is whether or not the Chicago Public Schools' admissions model can be applied comprehensively or in part to produce an admissible level of diversity.

Elements of the socioeconomic variables presented in the tier system may not necessarily provide the same predictive racial proxies for public school systems (i.e., selective magnet elementary and high schools, residentially segregated districts, universities, professional schools) across the country: as the importance of factors outside of pure socioeconomic statistics in ensuring diverse student body composition have been enumerated, the analysis will determine if the combination and weighting of SES factors with race proxies (percent English-speaking, local school quality) is viable for CPS, and subsequently relatable nationally. Thus, the first and most important question is whether or not the socioeconomic tier system employed by CPS ensures a comparable level of racial diversity. To answer this question, I apply linear regression analysis to determine the impact of a socioeconomic status-based system treatment effect on minority and racial group enrollments at Selective Enrollment High Schools in Chicago.

Data and Data Collection

Data from various actors surrounding the operations of the Selective Enrollment High School (SEHS) program was sourced to analyze the impact of the socioeconomic status-based admissions policy on racial and ethnic group enrollment. In addition to enrollment counts and proportions, which are of key interest, CPS demographic enrollment data is also examined as a control variable in the regression. All demographic count data collected is ratio level.

SEHS Enrollment Data

The enrollment data utilized in this analysis comes directly from the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), which monitors matriculation to the Selective Enrollment and other public school programs in the City of Chicago. This information includes school-level demographic data concerning race and ethnicity, among many other measures (for example: percent free and reduced-lunch, school locations, principal information, student standardized test scores, etc.). For the purposes of this study, I examined Fall 2006-2013 Grade 9 demographic enrollment totals per school. Data from eight schools: Gwendolyn Brooks College Preparatory High School, Jones College Preparatory High School, King College Preparatory High School, Lane Technical High School, Lindblom Math and Science Academy, Northside College Preparatory High School, Walter Payton College Preparatory High School, and Whitney Young Magnet High School, were utilized to analyze school- and SEHS-level demographic shifts as a result of the new admissions policy.⁷

⁷ Although there are ten total Selective Enrollment High Schools, the remaining two schools—Westinghouse High School and South Shore International High School—were established within the last two years, and thus do not have enough data points for any pre- and post-policy comparison.

The SEHS Grade 9 enrollment data for each school are coded: White, Black, Hispanic, Asian⁸ and Minority. The fifth group, Minority, is generated as the sum of Black, Hispanic and Asian enrollment in a given year. I will not examine trends in multiracial or Native American enrollment, as these categories were inconsistently reported year-to-year. Appendix C illustrates total Grade 9 demographic group enrollment proportions and counts, per year, for each Selective Enrollment High School included in the study.

CPS Enrollment Data

The Chicago Public Schools has publicly reported annual data on student demographics since 1999. These global trends in system enrollment, enumerated in Appendix A, illustrate shifting demographic shares within CPS overall (as Hispanic enrollment rises and Black enrollment drops), of which SEHS enrollments are a small part. This is especially important as trends in national minority populations indicate that the proportion of minority students in public schools (particularly the Hispanic population), especially in urban areas, will increase substantially into 2025 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010). Thus, annual Grade 9 demographic enrollment proportions for CPS are used to control for global student population trends across all Chicago Public Schools. The CPS Grade 9 enrollment data are coded: White, Black, Hispanic, Asian and Minority (similarly). Appendix D illustrates total Grade 9 demographic group enrollment counts, per year, for the Chicago Public Schools.

Empirical Method: Linear Regression

The Blue Ribbon Committee, in design of the 2011 *Admissions Policy for Magnet, Selective Enrollment and Other Options For Knowledge Schools and Programs*, put forth as a priority sustaining diversity in the Chicago Public Schools' Selective Enrollment High Schools.

⁸ From Fall 2010-2013, ISBE reporting of Asian enrollment split into three categories: Asian, Asian/Pacific Islander and Hawaiian/Pacific Islander. These three categories are combined into one group, Asian, in this analysis, which is consistent with the reporting of Asian enrollment from Fall 2006-2009.

However, the legal environment surrounding voluntary racial affirmative action in public schools was not supportive of the historically effective quota system. Under these circumstances, the committee crafted a policy that aimed to produce race-neutral diversity through a devised socioeconomic status tiered system (SES admissions policy). A regression model can estimate the effect of this new policy on demographic enrollment proportions for each group when compared to the baseline proportions produced by the vacated quota policy, relating the proportions from each cohort.⁹ Demographic enrollment proportions for each coded group (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian and Minority) are derived from the total enrollment counts.¹⁰ In my analysis, the treatment is defined as whether or not the SES admissions policy was in effect in year t , and is described by a binary variable, $Treat_{st} = \{0,1\}$, where $Treat_{st}$ takes on a value of 1 where school s was operating the SES policy in year t , and 0 otherwise. The treatment coefficient, β_1 , will indicate the effect of the SES admissions policy on demographic enrollment. β_1 can also be interpreted as the difference in demographic enrollment proportion for a specific demographic group, Y , between SES and quota admissions policies. The outcome of interest, Y_{st} , is the proportion of incoming Grade 9 enrollees of a particular race or ethnicity (e.g., White, Black, Hispanic) at a Selective Enrollment High School, s , in year t . Thus, this model will answer the question: is demographic enrollment affected by the new SES admissions policy? The model is summarized by the equation:

$$Y_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_{st} + \beta_2 t + \sigma_s + \varepsilon_{st} \quad (4)$$

⁹ Where the cohorts are split based upon admissions policy type (quota, SES). Practically, the two groups will constitute data from each of the eight schools in fall enrollment years 2006-2010 and 2011-2013 correspondingly.

¹⁰ Note that these proportions will not sum to 1 as Native American, multiracial, other, and non-reporting groups are not included in the analysis.

Where t is a linear trend and σ_s represents school fixed effects (i.e., a dummy variable for each school). In all regressions, the error term, ϵ_{st} , is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0. To develop a more robust model, school-specific time trends were added to account for variation in enrollment trends over time unique to each school, where $(\sigma_s * t)$ captures school-specific linear time trends, giving:

$$Y_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_{st} + (\sigma_s * t) + \sigma_s + \epsilon_{st} \quad (5)$$

Finally, the most robust regression model tested is given by the equation:

$$Y_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_{st} + (\sigma_s * t) + \sigma_s + \beta_3 \rho_t + \epsilon_{st} \quad (6)$$

Where the control variable, ρ_t , is added to the regression to capture trends in the average demographic enrollment proportion of all Grade 9 students entering any CPS high school in year t . This variable controls for systemic demographic enrollment changes (whereby, for example, increases or decreases in CPS Grade 9 demographic proportions could partially explain matching SEHS trends), isolating the composition effect of the treatment on the entering SEHS class.

The aforementioned regression models are estimated separately for each racial/ethnic group—White, Black, Hispanic, Asian and Minority—to determine the effect of the socioeconomic status-based admissions policy on each group's SEHS representation. The significance and relative magnitude of the treatment coefficient will determine if the new policy influenced enrollment outcomes for the studied demographics. The data used in all regressions come from ISBE and CPS counts and proportions for Fall 2006-2013 Grade 9 enrollment.

Limitations of Data

Sample Size

Given the relative novelty of the socioeconomic status-based admissions policy, the analysis is limited to only three years of post-implementation data. As only four years of pre-policy data are analyzed (to control for exogenous historical effects), the sample size for each regression is to $N = 56$ (school-by-year observations). Following the regression framework outlined, a more compelling test can be explored with a larger sample size in subsequent years.

Application Trends

The 2010 SEHS admissions policy change was highly publicized when it was implemented, and influenced many families' and students' decisions and application processes for high school. Further, as the policy continues, popular knowledge of the relative difficulty of SEHS acceptance for a student from a Tier 3 or 4 neighborhood (with virtually or near perfect admissions scores required at the top Selective Enrollment High Schools) may discourage application to the SEHS program altogether. Tier status may affect the likelihood of a student applying to, and thus enrolling in, a Selective Enrollment High School: thus, if there is quantifiable a behavioral effect of the new policy that influences application, pre- and post-policy application rates per tier¹¹ must be included in the regression to determine if the SEHS demographic proportions are affected by changes in applicant behavior. These data were not included in the analysis for two reasons: one, it is not publicly available; and two, preparing the

¹¹ Application rates per tier would be considered for the regression model over racial/ethnic group application trends because the neighborhood tier assignment determines effective score cutoffs. Thus, tier ranking—not race—could have an encouraging or discouraging effect on application rates, depending upon whether the tier is low or high. Utilizing application rates per racial/ethnic group would less effectively capture the true effect of the SES admissions policy on applicant behavior, but may alternately be considered as a control.

data for inclusion in the regression model would add immense complexity.¹² However, the most robust regression model would include controls for SEHS application rate trends.

¹² Including tier-factored trends into the regression would require retroactive tier assignment, based on the socioeconomic tier calculation outlined in Chapter 2, to all census tracts pre-SES admissions policy implementation to provide a baseline tier application rate.

Chapter 4. Results

This chapter is organized in two sections: descriptive statistics and regression analysis. The first section summarizes data on the sample, giving the means and standard deviations of Grade 9 racial/ethnic demographic proportions within the Selective Enrollment High Schools and CPS. The second section examines the regression models applied to quantify the effect of the socioeconomic status-based admissions policy on racial/ethnic group enrollment. Two regression models are presented and interpreted: the first measures treatment effect controlling for time trends, and the second measures treatment effect controlling for both time trends and CPS system demographic enrollment trends. The latter regression model suggests that the SES admissions policy has a significant negative effect on Black and minority SEHS enrollment.

Descriptive Statistics

Ratio level data on enrollment counts and proportions within the Chicago Public Schools and Selective Enrollment High Schools was collected to inform the examined relationship between the new SES admissions policy and demographic enrollment. Table 1 on the following page presents mean characteristics for the SEHS sample ($N = 56$) of demographic enrollment proportions and CPS sample of demographic enrollment proportions over Fall 2006-2013 (excluding Fall 2010). Means and standard deviations of enrollment proportions under each admissions policy are also given in order to establish variation in proportion, and a simple t -test to measure the difference between pre- and post-policy enrollment. More detailed source data (counts for Grade 9 demographic enrollment from Fall 2006-2013) on SEHS and CPS enrollment are given in Appendices C and D respectively. Appendix E gives figures displaying

annual Grade 9 demographic enrollment trends at each Selective Enrollment High School, as they vary considerably.¹³

Sight analysis of the SEHS mean differences between racial/ethnic group proportions under the two admissions policies indicates a slight variation in enrollment, although no changes are significant. (However, there are significant changes in CPS Grade 9 demographic enrollment proportions over time.) Regression analysis of the socioeconomic status-based policy treatment is used to determine whether or not variation in SEHS enrollment is explained by the effect of the new admissions standards, controlling for time and CPS Grade 9 enrollment.

¹³ This variability motivated the inclusion of the school effect dummy variable, σ_s , in the regression models.

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics: SEHS and CPS Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions

Variable	Full sample	Admissions Standard		<i>p</i>
		Quota	SES	
<i>SEHS Grade 9 Enrollment:</i>				
White	0.2034 (0.1544)	0.2047 (0.1533)	0.2016 (0.1593)	0.9421
Black	0.4255 (0.3329)	0.4400 (0.3364)	0.4061 (0.3343)	0.7093
Hispanic	0.2313 (0.1173)	0.2164 (0.1138)	0.2512 (0.1214)	0.2760
Asian	0.1022 (0.0903)	0.1176 (0.1054)	0.0818 (0.0614)	0.1437
Minority	0.7966 (0.1544)	0.7953 (0.1533)	0.7983 (0.1593)	0.9421
<i>CPS Grade 9 Enrollment:</i>				
White	0.0751 (0.0015)	0.0758 (0.0013)	0.0743 (0.0013)	0.0002
Black	0.4784 (0.0356)	0.5073 (0.0146)	0.4400 (0.0065)	0.0000
Hispanic	0.3959 (0.0327)	0.3715 (0.0211)	0.4283 (0.0059)	0.0000
Asian	0.0324 (0.0025)	0.0308 (0.0018)	0.0347 (0.0011)	0.0000
Minority	0.9067 (0.0010)	0.9095 (0.0125)	0.9030 (0.0011)	0.0145
<i>N</i>	56	32	24	-

Note. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis below the means. Full sample includes Fall 2006-2013 enrollment proportions, excluding Fall 2010 proportions. CPS Grade 9 enrollment proportions necessarily include SEHS Grade 9 enrollment proportions.

Regression Analysis: SES Policy Effect on Racial/Ethnic Group Enrollment Proportions

The first model presented captures the effect of the socioeconomic status-based admissions policy on enrollment proportions for a given demographic group (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian and Minority), with the predicted outcome proportion Y controlled by time trends, which are included in the model globally (CPS-level trends) and at an individual school level. Table 2 presents the results of this analysis for each coded demographic outcome proportion, where panel A estimates treatment effect given a global time trend (equation 4) and panel B estimates effect given school-specific time trends (equation 5). The second multivariate regression model introduces control for each demographic CPS Grade 9 enrollment cohort over the examined time period. Table 3 presents the results from estimations of equation 6 (also including global time trends) on outcome proportion Y for each demographic. Comparing the similar results of the two regression models, it is evident that controlling for the linear CPS Grade 9 enrollment trends indicates that the SES-effect predictions are robust to system-wide demographic variations. Thus, forthcoming discussion on the empirical results will focus on the second, more robust regression model (presented in Table 3).

The regression model suggests that the socioeconomic admissions policy, when compared to the baseline quota standard, has significantly impacted levels of Black and minority student enrollment in the SEHS program. The average effect of the policy on Black enrollment proportions is -0.058 (significant at $p = 0.05$), meaning that the SES policy decreases Black enrollment in Selective Enrollment High Schools by nearly 5.8%. Minority (excluding non-Hispanic White) enrollment was also significantly impacted ($p = 0.10$) by the policy, as the average decrease in enrollment proportion as a result of the new policy reaches roughly 7%.

TABLE 2. Impact of SES Policy on Demographic Enrollment Proportions

Variable	Proportion Enrollment				
	White (1)	Black (2)	Hispanic (3)	Asian (4)	Minority (5)
A. Global Time Trend					
Treatment	0.0353 (0.0315)	-0.0617 (0.0324)*	0.0114 (0.0236)	-0.0427 (0.0329)	-0.0353 (0.0315)
Year	-0.0085 (0.0064)	0.0062 (0.0065)	0.0052 (0.0046)	0.0015 (0.0045)	0.0085 (0.0064)
B. School-Level Time Trend					
Treatment	0.0353 (0.0342)	-0.0617 (0.0352)	0.0114 (0.0256)	-0.0427 (0.0357)	-0.0353 (0.0342)
Brooks - Trend	-0.0068 (0.0063)	0.0127 (0.0065)*	-0.0039 (0.0047)	0.0077 (0.0066)	0.0068 (0.0063)
Jones - Trend	-0.0080 (0.0063)	0.0073 (0.0065)	0.0008 (0.0047)	-0.0020 (0.0066)	0.0080 (0.0063)
King - Trend	-0.0085 (0.0063)	0.0106 (0.0065)	0.0011 (0.0047)	0.0074 (0.0066)	0.0085 (0.0063)
Lane - Trend	-0.0082 (0.0063)	0.0043 (0.0065)	0.0050 (0.0047)	0.0027 (0.0066)	0.0082 (0.0063)
Lindblom - Trend	-0.0087 (0.0063)	-0.0075 (0.0065)	0.0154 (0.0047)**	0.0105 (0.0066)	0.0087 (0.0063)
Northside - Trend	-0.0099 (0.0063)	0.0214 (0.0065)**	0.0073 (0.0047)	-0.0179 (0.0066)**	0.0099 (0.0063)
Payton - Trend	-0.0118 (0.0063)	0.0030 (0.0065)	0.0031 (0.0047)	-0.0001 (0.0066)	0.0118 (0.0063)
Young - Trend	-0.0062 (0.0063)	-0.0026 (0.0065)	0.0127 (0.0047)**	0.0040 (0.0066)	0.0062 (0.0063)
Include Grade 9 demographic enrollment controls	No	No	No	No	No
Outcome mean enrollment proportion (baseline):	0.2047	0.4400	0.2164	0.1176	0.7953
<i>N</i>	56	56	56	56	56
<i>R</i> ²	0.9716	0.9922	0.9633	0.9373	0.9716

Note. Models are estimated with a robust ordinary least squares regression, accounting for demographic enrollment clustering effects within each school over time (reflected in given standard errors). Predictions of enrollment proportions are given based on historical demographic 9th-grade Selective Enrollment data over time, pre- and post-SES admissions policy implementation (treatment), controlling for time trends. Time trends are controlled utilizing either a global (CPS) trend variable or school-specific time trend variables, and both regressions are given (models A and B respectively). All models also include school fixed effects. Given baseline means reflect mean SEHS demographic enrollment pre-treatment. Reported *R*² values reflect regression models given school-level time trends. Standard errors appear in parenthesis below the beta coefficients; significance of standard errors is indicated: * = $p \leq 0.10$, ** = $p \leq 0.05$.

TABLE 3. Impact of SES Policy on Demographic Enrollment Proportions, Controlling for CPS Enrollment Trends

Variable	Proportion Enrollment				
	White (1)	Black (2)	Hispanic (3)	Asian (4)	Minority (5)
A. Global Time Trend					
Treatment	0.0458 (0.0335)	-0.0579 (0.0246)**	0.0173 (0.0189)	-0.0427 (0.0332)	-0.0703 (0.0375)*
Year	-0.0098 (0.0066)	0.0079 (0.0126)	-0.0027 (0.0096)	0.0021 (0.0040)	0.0148 (0.0075)*
B. School-Level Time Trend					
Treatment	0.0458 (0.0364)	-0.0579 (0.0268)*	0.0173 (0.0206)	-0.0427 (0.0361)	-0.0703 (0.0408)
Brooks - Trend	-0.0080 (0.0065)	0.0145 (0.0135)	-0.0118 (0.0113)	0.0083 (0.0061)	0.0130 (0.0075)
Jones - Trend	-0.0092 (0.0065)	0.0091 (0.0135)	-0.0071 (0.0113)	-0.0014 (0.0061)	0.0142 (0.0075)*
King - Trend	-0.0098 (0.0065)	0.0124 (0.0135)	-0.0068 (0.0113)	0.0079 (0.0061)	0.0148 (0.0075)*
Lane - Trend	-0.0095 -0.0065	0.0061 (0.0135)	-0.0029 (0.0113)	0.0033 (0.0061)	0.0145 (0.0075)*
Lindblom - Trend	-0.0099 (0.0065)	-0.0057 (0.0135)	0.0075 (0.0113)	0.0111 (0.0061)	0.0150 (0.0075)*
Northside - Trend	-0.0111 (0.0065)	0.0232 (0.0135)	-0.0006 (0.0113)	-0.0173 (0.0061)**	0.0161 (0.0075)*
Payton - Trend	-0.0131 (0.0065)*	0.0048 (0.0135)	-0.0048 (0.0113)	0.0005 (0.0061)	0.0181 (0.0075)**
Young - Trend	-0.0075 (0.0065)	-0.0008 (0.0135)	0.0049 (0.0113)	0.0046 (0.0061)	0.0125 (0.0075)
Include Grade 9 demographic enrollment controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome mean enrollment proportion (baseline):	0.2047	0.4400	0.2164	0.1176	0.7953
<i>N</i>	56	56	56	56	56
<i>R</i> ²	0.9724	0.9922	0.9639	0.9374	0.9740

Note. Models are estimated with a robust ordinary least squares regression, accounting for demographic enrollment clustering effects within each school over time (reflected in given standard errors). Predictions of enrollment proportions are given based on historical demographic 9th-grade Selective Enrollment data over time, pre- and post-SES admissions policy implementation (treatment), controlling for time trends and changes in overall 9th-grade CPS matriculation demographics. Time trends are controlled utilizing either a global (CPS) time trend variable or or school-specific time trend variables, and both regressions are given (models A and B respectively). All models also include school fixed effects. Given baseline means reflect mean SEHS demographic enrollment pre-treatment. Reported *R*² values reflect regression models given school-level time trends. Standard errors appear in parenthesis below the beta coefficients; significance of standard errors is indicated: * = $p \leq 0.10$, ** = $p \leq 0.05$.

Approaching statistical significance, the regression model also demonstrates treatment effects on White and Asian enrollment proportions: where a 4.6% positive SES policy treatment effect on White enrollment proportions is observed, versus a 4.3% negative treatment effect on Asian enrollment proportions. The model predicts no significant effect on Hispanic enrollment as a result of the new SES policy.¹⁴ Taken together, these findings indicate that the socioeconomic status-based admissions policy has harmed minority enrollment proportions, placing particular burden on Black students. Appendix F summarizes the policy effect for each demographic group given this regression model.

These results generally support the findings of earlier researchers, who have asserted that socioeconomic status-based admissions policies tend to favor White applicants (Carnevale & Rose, 2004; Kane, 1998; Koertz, et al., 2002; Sander, 1998; Slater, 1995). However, all previous studies examined postsecondary enrollment effects, sourcing data from large universities, university systems, or groups of universities. Thus, my findings provide the first perspective on the enrollment effects of a socioeconomic status-based high school admissions policy, as Chicago's was the first SES-based high school admissions procedure to be implemented in a selective high school program. While this scale and sample size makes my results less generalizable, ultimately, the results confirm that SES-based affirmative action policies result in lower minority enrollment relative to racial affirmative action policies.

¹⁴ Preliminary qualitative justification for this assertion suggests that this policy does not harm Hispanic enrollment, and may actually increase it (see the beta coefficient), because one of the tier determinants considered is percentile English-speaking, which would almost exclusively benefit tiers with high proportions of Hispanic residents. This conclusion could indicate the relative effectiveness of operative race-conscious SES criteria at maintaining or improving minority representation.

Chapter 5. Findings and Conclusions

This thesis provides the first empirical evidence of the effect of socioeconomic status-based admissions policies on selection-based high school enrollment outcomes. In my analysis of the Chicago Public Schools' Selective Enrollment High School admissions policies and enrollment trends, my findings show that SES-based admissions policies result in decreased enrollment for minority and Black students. Thus, my primary research question—whether or not the CPS SES-based admissions policy would provide comparable levels of diversity when held against the demographic enrollment outcomes ensured by quota systems—was answered, concluding that the SES-based admissions policy was not effective at matching quota level diversity, and actually produced a significant drop in minority and Black enrollment proportions.

Alternative Hypothesis: Non-Linear Urban Population Trends

Although CPS system-wide enrollment trends were accounted for within the final regression model, the shifting demographics of Chicago could actually have a larger impact on the enrollment proportions than predicted in the model (by coefficient ρ_t). The strongest alternate hypothesis states that minority enrollment outcomes observed under the SES-based admissions standard are actually explained by non-linear urban demographic trends; specifically, Black flight. The regression model presented assumes that CPS enrollment population trends, and Chicago demographic trends, are linear: however, if a longer time horizon is examined, these population trends may exhibit non-linear properties. From 2000-2010, the Chicago population fell by over 200,000 residents. Black residents accounted for more than 178,000, or 89%, of this total (Keen, 2011). Inspired by the same factors that spurred some upper-middle class Black flight in the late-twentieth century—pervasive poverty, unemployment, crime and violence—this trend reemerging as one of the most important urban demographic phenomena: over half of the

nation's Black population live in the suburbs—up from 43% in 2000 (The changing colour, 2011; Wolman, 1976).

As Black families leave the city core, fewer Black students enroll in the CPS—a trend illustrated in this study's data. However, the analysis presumes that this trend is linear; based on the linear relationship observed, there is no treatment effect of the changing proportion of Black CPS enrollment on the proportion of Black students enrolled in Selective Enrollment High Schools. Where these enrollment and urban population trends are non-linear, both the significance and magnitude of the SES policy treatment effect on Black enrollment would decrease where these trends are negative, which could render an SES treatment effect near 0 where these population trends are most pronounced. In turn, as the negative modeled minority enrollment treatment effect is largely driven by Black enrollment proportion changes, this could indicate the affected decrease in Black and minority enrollment outcomes from the new SES-based policy are explained by overall urban population trends, rather than Selective Enrollment admissions policies (which could further imply that the policy is decidedly effective at maintaining quota-levels of racial diversity). Without more extensive information on Black population trends in Chicago, including future data points, it would be difficult to establish a non-linear population trend even where one exists. This alternative hypothesis, however, is unlikely, as it assumes that the non-linear changes in enrollment occur concurrently with policy implementation—and the observed flight has occurred since the turn of the century. Given current information and models, it is still apparent that the SES-based admissions policy results in lower levels of Black and minority enrollment.

Implications

Analysis indicates that the current CPS socioeconomic status-based policy will produce significant, albeit minimal, decreases in Black (5.8%) and minority (7%) demographic enrollment within Selective Enrollment High Schools. Additionally, decreases in Asian enrollment (4.3%) and increases in White enrollment (4.6%) approach significance. Thus, the policy neither improves nor maintains minority or minority group representation compared to a race-based affirmative action policy, like a quota system. However, despite the marginal predicted changes in enrollment proportions, the policy still works to maintain a critical mass of minority students.

It is unlikely that a race-neutral affirmative action policy will ever be able to produce equivalent levels of racial diversity within programs and schools compared to a racial affirmative action. Conversely, it is more important to note that the socioeconomic status-based admissions policy prescribed by Chicago Public Schools' *Admissions Policy for Magnet, Selective Enrollment and Other Options For Knowledge Schools and Programs* is still a valid diversity maintenance tool. Although it does result in decreased Black and minority enrollment when compared to the vacated racial quota system, compared at face value to other race-neutral admissions policies—like the merit-based (race-blind) admissions policy practiced by New York City's Specialized High Schools or the simpler SES-based policy tested by the UCLA School of Law—minority enrollment and representation is much higher in the CPS. The meritocratic system, employed by perhaps the most operationally comparable school system in the country (the NYC Specialized High Schools), gave only 12% of admissions offers to Black and Hispanic students combined in 2013, while these students comprise over 70% of the city's public school students (Cramer, 2013). In New York, however, there was never any affirmative action. At

UCLA, where the new policy can be benchmarked against pre-Proposition 209 (1996) admissions data, the SES-policy produced a class with 73.2% fewer Black students, compared to affirmative action enrollment data from 1990-1996 (Sander, 1998). In the Chicago Public Schools, the statistically significant decreases in Black and minority enrollment proportions observed are considerably less severe. The CPS policy was well designed and specific, taking care to account for minority demographic groups (particularly, Black and Hispanic) with targeted race-neutral variables, which have allowed the policy to escape much of the White bias seen in most SES-based affirmative action. Thus, although the CPS policy is decidedly less effective at producing high levels racial diversity than a quota system, it is one of the strongest alternatives to racial affirmative action policies available. Ultimately, my conclusions indicate that a socioeconomic status-based tiered affirmative action policy can deliver acceptable, and perhaps one day equitable, levels of minority group representation within schools.

Nonetheless, this recommendation is limited. While the socioeconomic status-based policy is fairly (given the small effect size) successful at provisioning racial diversity within Chicago Public Schools, a similarly designed tier system may be difficult to implement, to efficient outcomes, in public school districts nationwide or to institutions of higher learning. The effectiveness of the SES-based is necessarily rooted in the selected tier factors, which group the student applicant cohorts into four socioeconomic tiers. These factors were selected specifically for the Chicago model, and thus presume that there is some correlation between race, SES and neighborhood based upon: income, home ownership, single-parent household proportion, percent non-English speaking, adult education levels and local school quality. Preliminary research indicates that Chicago's urban residential neighborhoods are uniquely segregated along both racial and socioeconomic lines (Orfield, Kucsera, & Siegel-Hawley, 2012). In public school

districts where the same demographic patterns do not exist, the new CPS admissions policy may prove ineffectual. For universities, assigning statewide or national tiers introduces a host of new challenges, complexities and limitations. However, the CPS policy is still particularly important, as it indicates that it is possible to use race-neutral methods to achieve an undisputed critical mass of minority students. As a result, policymakers pursuing alternatives to racial affirmative action can use the CPS Selective Enrollment tier system as a basis for their own race-neutral, constitutional affirmative action policies, taking into account residential patterns where a neighborhood-based tier system is considered.

In order to design the most effective race-neutral affirmative action policy based upon socioeconomic status, the correlation between SES tier and race must be understood. Future research in the area of community-factored, socioeconomic status-based affirmative action should include extensive correlation analysis between neighborhood socioeconomic status and race—including the identification of new predictive factors to include in a tier formula, outside of the six utilized by the CPS—which would not only be instrumental in designing better race-neutral affirmative action policies, but also improve our understanding of the components of modern racial minority disadvantage. And where this marked disadvantage exists, it is the role of policy to work to ameliorate these issues.

It is indefensible to wholly dismiss affirmative action without demonstrating equality of educational opportunity for any minority or disadvantaged groups. However, despite stagnating, pervasive segregation and a persistent achievement gap, policy progress has led many schools, institutions, and even states away from any racial consideration in admissions procedure—while offering few alternatives. The CPS Selective Enrollment High Schools' admissions policy is a socially valuable tool, illustrating policy innovation in affirmative action by capturing and

protecting disadvantage without consideration of race. Forward, given the eroding constitutionality of racial affirmative action, such policies may be the only means to achieve diversity within public schools and institutions. Independent of any court decisions or school policies, protecting equality of access for all students is a key challenge for modern education and civil rights. Thus, the exploration of innovative, equitable admissions and affirmative action policies—like the CPS policy—will ensure equal opportunity for minority students into the future.

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Appendix A. CPS Demographic Enrollment Trends, 1950-2010 (Select Years)

Year	Percentage of Enrollment				Total Enrollment (est.)
	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian/Pacific Islander	
1950	62	36	-	0	372,000
1960	55	42	-	0	480,000
1970	35	55	1	1	578,000
1978	22	61	16	2	495,000
1981	17	61	20	2	443,000
1987	14	60	23	3	429,000
1998	10	53	33	3	431,000
2000	10	53	34	3	432,000
2005	8	49	38	3	421,000
2010	9	43	44	3	403,000

Note. Table data compiled from Chicago Public Schools data (2014) and data published in *Society and education*. Adapted from *Society and education*, by D.U. Levine and R. J. Havighurst, 1989, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Appendix B. Public School Racial Dissimilarity Index (Select Cities), 2009-2010

	Dissimilarity Index					
	White Black	White Asian	White Latino	Black Asian	Black Latino	Asian Latino
New York-Newark-Edison, NY-NJ-PA	0.78	0.56	0.70	0.71	0.49	0.61
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA	0.68	0.52	0.69	0.68	0.55	0.62
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI	0.79	0.47	0.65	0.80	0.69	0.65
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX	0.58	0.47	0.58	0.55	0.43	0.60
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX	0.62	0.50	0.60	0.54	0.41	0.59

Note. Adapted from "*E Pluribus*"... *Separation*, by G. Orfield, J. Kucsera, and G. Siegel-Hawley, *ERIC Database* (ED535442).

Appendix C. Selective Enrollment High School Demographic Counts (Grade 9), 2006-2013

	Racial/Ethnic Group				
School	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian/Pacific Islander	Total Enrollment
Brooks					
2006-2007	0	169	34	1	205
2007-2008	1	173	22	1	200
2008-2009	5	175	18	1	199
2009-2010	2	170	27	0	199
2010-2011°	1	162	32	0	198
2011-2012	3	168	18	1	192
2012-2013	0	147	22	0	173
2013-2014	1	167	26	1	196
Jones					
2006-2007	54	37	55	29	183
2007-2008	52	39	59	26	192
2008-2009	67	60	72	25	224
2009-2010	66	65	65	39	235
2010-2011°	59	51	58	21	197
2011-2012	56	46	60	25	200
2012-2013	63	41	81	12	217
2013-2014	116	80	125	42	427
King					
2006-2007	4	228	9	6	249
2007-2008	3	204	4	2	218
2008-2009	4	237	6	3	250
2009-2010	2	235	5	1	243
2010-2011°	4	202	16	4	228
2011-2012	1	204	10	1	220
2012-2013	2	192	11	8	218
2013-2014	0	142	6	0	148
Lane					
2006-2007	318	125	424	155	1095
2007-2008	293	172	459	154	1131
2008-2009	328	125	503	166	1122
2009-2010	344	117	475	113	1050
2010-2011°	323	83	513	121	1066
2011-2012	358	116	573	132	1204
2012-2013	213	63	382	79	819
2013-2014	252	83	386	113	922

(Table continues)

	Racial/Ethnic Group				
School	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian/Pacific Islander	Total Enrollment
Lindblom					
2006-2007	6	115	28	1	150
2007-2008	3	201	48	5	260
2008-2009	8	143	44	2	197
2009-2010	0	129	49	1	179
2010-2011°	4	171	66	2	246
2011-2012	4	148	64	3	220
2012-2013	4	165	80	8	260
2013-2014	4	151	64	6	227
Northside					
2006-2007	94	9	54	78	248
2007-2008	112	9	68	94	309
2008-2009	99	10	62	86	258
2009-2010	103	17	54	90	264
2010-2011°	124	29	54	56	268
2011-2012	125	19	72	46	274
2012-2013	97	32	72	48	270
2013-2014	83	21	75	48	266
Payton					
2006-2007	68	33	27	23	165
2007-2008	91	41	55	46	259
2008-2009	71	82	50	32	235
2009-2010	77	83	71	25	256
2010-2011°	65	36	31	13	156
2011-2012	97	46	56	20	251
2012-2013	86	40	43	29	205
2013-2014	60	37	54	21	233
Young					
2006-2007	158	155	108	72	493
2007-2008	154	177	112	75	546
2008-2009	141	175	95	91	502
2009-2010	143	141	97	122	503
2010-2011°	132	103	132	53	439
2011-2012	146	142	136	64	512
2012-2013	156	132	160	68	536
2013-2014	147	109	136	67	468

Note. Enrollment data for Native American (NA) and Multiracial (MR) students are not listed due to inconsistent reporting of counts over the evaluated time period; however, total enrollment counts reflect the total class size (including NA and MR). ^oEnrollment data from the 2010-2011 school year is omitted from analysis because it was a result of the pilot SES program, which was amended thereafter.

Appendix D. CPS Demographic Counts (Grade 9), 2006-2013

Year	Racial/Ethnic Group				Total Enrollment
	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian/Pacific Islander	
2006-2007	2,832	19,742	13,006	1,044	37,514
2007-2008	2,622	17,761	12,600	1,135	35,151
2008-2009	2,577	17,532	13,001	1,070	34,233
2009-2010	2,572	15,963	13,183	1,097	32,877
2010-2011 ^o	2,279	14,171	13,135	996	31,081
2011-2012	2,319	13,494	12,811	1,067	30,336
2012-2013	2,176	13,249	12,719	972	29,812
2013-2014	2,231	12,945	13,098	1,037	30,069

Note. Enrollment data for Native American (NA) and Multiracial (MR) students are not listed due to inconsistent reporting of counts over the evaluated time period; however, total enrollment counts reflect the total class size (including NA and MR). ^oEnrollment data from the 2010-2011 school year is omitted from analysis because it was a result of the pilot SES program, which was amended thereafter.

**Appendix E. Selective Enrollment High School Demographic Grade 9 Proportion Trends,
2007-2014**




Figure 1. Demographic Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions, Gwendolyn Brooks College Preparatory Academy High School




Figure 2. Demographic Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions, William Jones College Preparatory High School




Figure 3. Demographic Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Preparatory High School




Figure 4. Demographic Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions, Albert G. Lane Technical High School




Figure 5. Demographic Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions, Robert Lindblom Math & Science Academy




Figure 6. Demographic Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions, Northside College Preparatory High School




Figure 7. Demographic Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions, Walter Payton College Preparatory High School





Figure 8. Demographic Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions, Whitney M. Young Magnet High School

Appendix F. Treatment Effect of SES Policy on Demographic Group Enrollment

Note. Significance is indicated: * = $p \leq 0.10$, ** = $p \leq 0.05$.