ASSIMILATION PROCESSES OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS: COLLEGE EDUCATION, UNION FORMATION, AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

by
Ping Chen

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Approved by:

Co-Advisor: Kathleen Mullan Harris

Co-Advisor: Guang Guo

Reader: Ted Mouw

Reader: Catherine Zimmer

Reader: Michael J. Shanahan

ABSTRACT

PING CHEN: Assimilation Processes of Immigrants and Their Descendants: College Education, Union formation, and Labor Market Outcomes
(Under the direction of Kathleen Mullan Harris and Guang Guo)

This dissertation advances our understanding of the assimilation processes of post-1965 immigrants and their descendants. In particular, I select issues that have not been intensively examined before, addressing three major life events during adulthood, including college education, union formation, and labor market outcomes, to investigate adaptation processes of immigrants and their offspring.

Chapter 2 examines the possible educational pathways the new second immigrant generation may take during transition to adulthood. To assess their degree of assimilation, I make two levels of comparison. At the first level, I examine horizontal intergenerational mobility by comparing the educational status of the new second generation with their parents. I find that the new second-generation youth, as a whole, are doing better than their parents in high school graduation. However, the pace and degree of intergenerational mobility varies by ethnic backgrounds regarding college education. At the second level, I assess vertical inter-class mobility by comparing the educational status of the new second generation with the third- and higher-generation non-Hispanic white peers (mainstream proxy). I find that there is stratification of college education for inter-class mobility. While Mexican Americans are much less likely to attend college than their third- and higher-generation white counterparts, Cuban Americans and Asian Americans

are more likely to go on with college education than their third- and plus-generation non-Hispanic white generation. Disadvantaged groups, like Mexican Americans and those of other Central-South American and Caribbean origins, lag behind in such social factors as parental human capital, family structure, and family size, which contribute to reduce their likelihood of college education and probably their eventual lower status in American stratification system.

Chapter 3 examines union formation processes among young adults of different immigrant generations during transition to adulthood. As living together without marrying becomes a common phenomenon among young adults in American society, one may ask whether immigrant descendants who are raised in ethnic Asian or Hispanic families will take the union formation pattern of cohabitation as their native peers do. This chapter provides strong and robust evidence regarding that first generation youth are less likely to embrace the alternative union formation path of cohabitation in the presence of cultural, structural, and contextual controls, as compared to the third and higher-generation non-Hispanic white peers. In addition, the first generation is more likely to take the traditional route of marriage during early adulthood.

Chapter 4 shifts the research attention to examine the economic adaptation processes of contemporary Asian and Hispanic immigrants in comparison to their native peers in the context of a segmented labor market. I first re-define the U.S. labor market into four segments: non-enclave primary segment, non-enclave secondary segment, enclave-primary segment, and enclave-secondary segment. I then focus on the impact of various nativity and immigrant statuses on labor market outcomes, including labor segment membership, hourly wages, and non-monetary job benefits, among immigrants. I

find that native-born and naturalized citizenship are more advantageous statuses than non-permanent residency and permanent residency to incorporate immigrants and their descendants into the mainstream labor market and facilitate their attainment of higher wages and more job benefits. Non-naturalized immigrants are much more likely to be concentrated in ethnic enclaves and in lower rungs of the open market, and subject to lower pay and fewer benefits due to their inferior immigrant statuses.

To my father, Shi Chen, and my mother, Yinxiu Wei,
whose constant love, support and encouragement have been my sustaining force
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Over the last four decades, the United States has experienced a surge of mass immigration with much greater diversity than the immigration from Europe at the turn of the 20th century. This mass immigration has drawn a significant number of immigrants from various Asian and Latin American countries. Many of these post-1965 immigrants are young adults in their 20s and 30s who either bring their young kids with them, or form families and have children soon after their arrival in the United States (Farley and Alba 2002). This has resulted in fastest growing populations of two kinds: adult immigrants of Asian and Hispanic origins; and first- and second-generation immigrant children (Chen, Harris, and Guo 2005; Farley and Alba 2002). One question that has drawn wide scholarly and public attention is whether these post-1965 immigrants and their descendants will assimilate or not? My dissertation topics are part of this debate, attempting to provide new evidence to address this complex question. Each of the following three chapters addresses issues that have not been intensively examined in the current immigration research.

In current immigration literature, there are two major competing theories that predict assimilation outcomes of the post-1965 immigrants and their offspring. The first theoretical hypothesis is s*egmented assimilation*. This theoretical perspective argues that the social context for which the descendants of pre-World War I European immigrants is different from what the contemporary immigrants and their offspring are experiencing.

First, the racial context is different since early European descendants were uniformly white while a large number of post-1965 immigrants and their children are of Asian and Hispanic origins who have skin colors other than white which may lead them to experience discrimination because of their non-white skin color (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Second, the economic context is different. The early immigrant descendants have the opportunities to move up gradually through betterment in jobs while remaining part of the working class during premier industrial period of the U.S. But in the post-industrial era, such opportunities do not exist in an hourglass economy since remaining in low-level jobs shut down opportunities for upward mobility while high-tech and professional occupations are where career improvement and mobility is possible and these kind of jobs require postsecondary degrees, which make it harder for immigrants and their descendants to attain.

Thus, segmented assimilation perspective rejects the unitary adaptation road suggested by *straight-line assimilation*. Instead, it hypothesizes that there are *divergent* pathways of assimilation for post-1965 immigrants and their descendants. It provides three possible assimilation outcomes: one is the path of *upward* mobility characterized by acculturation and economic integration into the middle-class; an opposite road is the *downward* assimilation into the inner-city underclass; and another refers to the deliberate preservation of the value and solidarity of the immigrant community while making rapid economic advancement into middle-class America (Portes & Zhou 1993, Zhou 1999). This perspective emphasizes the cumulative effect of assimilation outcomes over generations. In their view, downward assimilation will *increase* over time.

While segmented assimilation perspective believes that the adaptation process of the post-1965 immigration is different from the early European immigration and assimilation due to its unique features related to the nonwhite ethnic origins and cultural backgrounds, and a different socioeconomic and political context, Alba and Nee (2002) contend that the specificity of the current wave of immigration, although real, should not be overstated. On the contrary, they emphasize the continuity between the past and present patterns of incorporation.

Particularly, they assert that the political context is improved as a result of the civil rights legislation and blurring of the racial boundaries with the increasing rates of inter-racial marriage. So they do not think downward assimilation is the destined road for disadvantaged immigrant minority groups when the blurring of the racial boundaries, in combination with the existence of economic opportunities, are able to open up roads for ethnic minorities to assimilate. They admit that processes of assimilation might be different, like for human-capital immigrants versus traditional labor migrants, but *they are all expected to end up assimilating*. The only difference lies in the variation in the pace of assimilation and in strategic individual and collective actions each individual and group take to assimilate.

Descendants of human-capital immigrant may move up more rapidly than the offspring of the labor migrants, but this does not mean that children with little parental human capital have no space for upward mobility at all. They still may have chances to experience *modest upward mobility*, as experienced by many members of previous second generation, such as the children of Italian immigrants during the 1930s and 1940s. So assimilation should not simply include social mobility or actual attainment of middle-

class status. One should also examine horizontal intergenerational mobility. If children of immigrants do better than their parents, even though they may still lag behind than their contemporaries, they may consider themselves as making improvement over their older generation and making a further step to realize American dream.

To assess these competing theoretical arguments, I select three major life events during adulthood, college education, union formation, labor market outcomes, to investigate assimilation processes of immigrants and their descendants. While adaptation experiences of foreign-born immigrant parents set up the social, cultural and economic base for the assimilation of their children, immigrant offspring are the key actors to influence assimilation pathways of their future younger generations. Thus, two of my dissertation chapters focus on immigrant descendants.

To study immigrant descendants, I choose the life stage of early adulthood which has been rarely examined in current immigration research. According to the life course theory, transition to adulthood is a critical life stage that is quite different from childhood and adolescence (Arnett 1998; Shanahan 2000). Individuals start the journey during this transition to gain greater autonomy from their families, accept responsibilities for one's self, make independent decisions, become financially independent, and explore possibilities in romantic relationship, work, family and worldviews (Arnett 1998; Arnett 2001). Throughout this process they form a foundation for their adult lives that will have life-long impacts on their eventual social and economic outcomes. The major markers in the transition to adulthood in Western societies usually include leaving the parental home, pursuit of higher education, work, family formation, and parenthood (Booth, Crouter, and Shanahan1990; Shanahan, 2000). I focus on two life events, college education and union

formation, to understand adaptation processes of immigrant descendants during their transition to early adulthood.

As educational assimilation is the key to assess the success of immigrant descendants, this topic has been intensely investigated. However, due to the lack of data, most of the studies focus on public school period, like elementary school, middle school, or high school. Postsecondary educational outcomes, like college education, are rarely examined. One reason this area is not thoroughly studied is that a large number of the second generation are still young in their school years. However, at the same time, many of the post-1965 second generation have already finished high school, started college life, gone into labor market and even started a family life (Chen, Harris, and Guo 2005).

In debates regarding assimilation processes of the second generation, conclusions are usually drawn from findings regarding childhood and adolescent outcomes which are limited (although informative) in predicting their eventual assimilation outcomes over the life course. If we want to know more about the socioeconomic outcomes of the second generation, we need to examine their early adult life. College education in part is the primary factor that creates opportunities for the new second immigrant generation for upward mobility that their parents may never have had. Educational achievement is closely related to the attainment of individual socioeconomic status during adult life.

Thus, Chapter 2 examines the possible educational pathways the new second immigrant generation take during their transition from adolescence to adulthood. This investigation includes several steps. First, I discuss in detail two noteworthy contemporary studies of the second generation, including their competing assimilation views, their study design which will affect their conclusion, and their findings about

educational assimilation outcomes of the new second generation. Second, I develop two approaches to examine academic assimilation. The first approach examines horizontal intergenerational mobility by comparing the educational status of the new second generation with their parents in three pathways: no completion of high school, high school graduation with a diploma, and continuing with college education. The second approach examines vertical inter-class mobility by comparing the educational status of the new second generation with the third- and higher-generation non-Hispanic white peers (mainstream proxy) at similar ages in the aforementioned three pathways to examine the extent to which the new second generation assimilate to the contemporary mainstream.

The major contributions of this chapter include: (1) focusing on the developmental stage of early adulthood, instead of childhood and adolescence, to assess educational achievement of the new second generation; (2) using a more important and ultimate measure of educational attainment, college education, instead of public school outcomes, like GPA or standardized test scores, to examine academic assimilation of the new second generation; (3) presenting two perspectives, horizontal intergenerational mobility and vertical inter-class mobility, to explore academic assimilation of the new second generation; and (4) using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, which has superior features to other data used for this topic, including its longitudinal design, national probability sample, uniquely rich information on ethnicity, immigrant generation, individual and contextual characteristics, to enhance the generalizability of the study results and expand the scope to examine educational assimilation of the new second generation.

Chapter 3 then moves on to examine *union formation* processes among young adults of different immigrant generations *during transition to adulthood*. Especially over the last 40 years in the U.S., various nontraditional union formation patterns emerge, like rising rates of unmarried cohabitation, the postponement of marriage, declining marriage rates, and high divorce rates (Cherlin 1992; Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart, and Landry 1992; Sweet and Bumpass 1987; Waite 2000). Socialized in postindustrial American society, will the immigrant descendants be acculturated to take alternative union formation pathways instead of choosing the route of traditional marriage? As living together without marrying becomes a common phenomenon among young adults, will the immigrant descendants who are raised in ethnic Asian or Hispanic families take a similar path of union formation patterns as their native peers?

Chapter 3 uses appropriate data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health to examine how union formation processes differ across various acculturation stages during the transition to young adulthood among children of immigrants. I first use an event-history approach to describe differences in age patterns of union formation, including cohabitation and first marriage for three immigrant generations: (1) the first generation (foreign-born individuals with foreign-born parents); (2) the second generation (U.S.-born children with foreign-born parents); and (3) the third- and higher-generation (U.S.-born children with U.S.-born parents). Union formation differences are further assessed by the level of English language assimilation and by controlling for other covariates, like individual, family and structural factors.

This chapter contributes to the immigration research in four areas: (1) uses a developmental approach and longitudinal design (instead of cross-sectional approach) to

understand young adults of immigrant descendants' adaptation processes of union formation patterns; (2) provides first evidence of this kind regarding acculturation effects on union formation patterns among immigrant offspring; (3) uses nationally representative data for a diverse set of ethnic groups that has not taken a thorough look at ethnic and immigrant generational differences in union formation processes (3) uses nationally representative data for a diverse set of ethnic groups to advance knowledge about social trends in family change impacted by the recent wave of immigration that has not taken a thorough look at ethnic and immigrant generational differences in union formation processes; and (4) sets the stage for further investigation into adaptation processes of immigrant descendents in family formation *over the life course*;

Chapter 4 then shifts the research attention to the adaptation of adult immigrants as a comparison to the assimilation experiences of their descendants. For adult immigrants who usually migrate to the United States for job opportunities, their experience in the labor market is the context for understanding their assimilation processes.

This chapter examines the economic adaptation processes of contemporary Asian and Hispanic immigrants in comparison to their native peers in the context of a segmented labor market. There are several goals of this chapter. First, I point out limitations of previous definitions of the labor market structure and re-define the U.S. labor market into four segments: non-enclave primary segment, non-enclave secondary segment, enclave-primary segment, and enclave-secondary segment. This approach treats the enclave economy as a stratified structure of various wage levels and job benefits rather than a uniform entity. Second, I focus on the question regarding *why* immigrants

and their descendants are distributed across different segments of the labor market. Basically, nativity and immigrant statuses are important factors that represent different levels of rights, benefits, and opportunities, which will determine immigrants' location in the labor market and their economic benefits. However, we have not paid sufficient attention to the great variation in nativity and immigrant statuses and its relation to labor market outcomes. Thus, the third goal of this chapter is to assess the impact of various nativity and immigrant statuses on labor segment incorporation, and associated economic outcomes, in terms of hourly wages and non-monetary benefits.

The major contributions of chapter 4 includes: (1) providing a comparative view regarding adaptation processes of Asian and Hispanic immigrants relative to their native peers in metropolitan labor market; (2) offering an alternative definition to refine our understanding of the segmented U.S. labor market by incorporating ethnic enclave economy as a stratified entity into the definition; (3) deepening the understanding about the impacts of nativity and immigrant statuses on segmented distribution of immigrants in both general and ethnic labor markets, and the important effects of segmented distribution in the labor market on the variation in the economic outcomes of the earnings and job benefits for contemporary Asian and Hispanic immigrants.

As a whole, my dissertation sheds light on our understanding about contemporary immigration regarding assimilation processes of both adult immigrants and their descendants. Parents come as labor workers while children of immigrant parents are involuntarily selected into American society for their socialization from childhood to adulthood. The life courses of these two distinct groups are closely related to and influenced by each other. However, because the socialization processes of these

immigrant generations are different, their adaptation experiences have unique features. The three topics I chose to study focus on different stages and domains of immigrant assimilation in an effort to provide new insights into the life of contemporary immigrants and their children who face different challenges and difficulties and as a result take distinct assimilation pathways throughout their life course in their receiving country.

CHAPTER 2: ASSIMILATED TO COLLEGE EDUCATION? INTERGENERATIONAL AND INTER-CLASS MOBILITY OF SECOND IMMIGRANT GENERATION

Over the last four decades, the United States has experienced a surge of mass immigration with much greater diversity than European migration at the turn of the 20th century. It has been drawing a considerable number of immigrants from various Asian and Latin American countries. Many of these post-1965 immigrants are young adults in their 20s and 30s who either bring their young kids with them, or form families and have children soon after their arrival in the United States (Farley and Alba 2002). The new millennium has witnessed the fastest growing population of the first- and second-generation immigrant children – many of whom are already young adults who recently completed high school and started their adult life (Chen, Harris, and Guo 2005; Farley and Alba 2002). One question that draws widely scholarly and public attention is whether this new second generation will assimilate or not?

Unlike the adult first immigrant generation, for whom socioeconomic success or failure is largely determined by their achievement in the labor market, for the second generation, the key assimilation outcomes are closely related to their academic attainment. How well they perform and how far they go in school will strongly affect their eventual position in the American stratification system. Such influence is both at the individual and collective levels (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

As educational assimilation is the key to assess the success of immigrant descendants, this topic has been intensely investigated. However, due to the lack of data, most of the studies focus on public school period, like elementary school, middle school, or high school. Postsecondary educational outcomes, like college education, are rarely examined. One reason this area is not thoroughly studied is that a large number of the second generation are still young in their school years. However, at the same time, many of post-1965 second generation already finished high school, started college life, went to labor market and even started a family life (Chen, Harris, and Guo 2005). Debates have been going around whether the second generation will assimilate. However, conclusions are usually drawn from findings regarding childhood and adolescent outcomes which are limited (although informative) to predict their eventual assimilation outcomes over the life course.

If we want to know more about the socioeconomic outcomes of the second generation, we need to examine their adult life. Especially, college education is the primary factor that creates opportunities for the new second immigrant generation for upward mobility that their parents may never have had. Educational achievement is closely related to individual socioeconomic status during adult life. In 2004, American adults aged 25 and older who had completed high school were about twice as likely to be unemployed as those with a bachelor's or higher degree college education (5% vs. 2.7%; National Center for Educational Statistics 2005: Digest of Education Statistics 2005). Moreover, the median annual income of those who have a bachelor's or higher degree was considerably higher than the median income of high school graduates with no

college education ($35,725 vs. $57,220 for males and $26,029 vs. $41,681 for females) (National Center for Educational Statistics 2005).

Thus, this chapter particularly examines the possible educational pathways the new second immigrant generation would take during their transition from adolescence to adulthood. This study includes several steps: (1) first discuss in details two noteworthy contemporary studies of the second generation, including their competing assimilation views, their study design which will affect their conclusion, and their findings about educational assimilation outcomes of the new second generation; (2) develop two ways to examine academic assimilation. One is to examine horizontal intergenerational mobility by comparing the educational status of the new second generation with their parents in three pathways: no completion of high school, high school graduation with a diploma, and continuing with college education. (3) The other is to examine vertical inter-class mobility by comparing the educational status of the new second generation with the third- and plus- generation non-Hispanic white peers at similar ages (proxy to the mainstream) in the aforementioned three pathways to examine the extent to which the new second generation assimilate to the contemporary mainstream.

The major contributions of this study are: (1) focusing on the developmental stage of early adulthood, instead of childhood and adolescence, to assess educational achievement of the new second generation; (2) using a better measurement, college education, instead of public school outcomes, like GPA or standardized test scores, to examine academic assimilation of the new second generation; (3) choosing two aspects, including horizontal intergenerational mobility and vertical inter-class mobility (instead of just one aspect) to explore academic assimilation of the new second generation; (3)

using better data, the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, which has superior features, including its longitudinal design, national probability sample, superbly richer information on ethnicity, immigrant generation, individual and contextual characteristics, to enhance the generalizability of the study results and expand the scope to examine educational assimilation of the new second generation.

The Legacies Study

Segmented Assimilation

Segmented assimilation perspective argues that the social context for which the descendants of pre-World War I European immigrants is different from what the contemporary immigrants and their offspring are experiencing. First, the racial context is different sine early European descendants were uniformly white while many black, Asian, and mestizo children of today's immigrants have to face racial barriers of the non-white skin color (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Second, the structure of economic opportunities has changed. The early immigrant descendants have the opportunities to move up gradually through betterment in jobs while remaining part of the working class during premier industrial period of the U.S. But currently, such opportunities do not exist in an hourglass economy since remaining in low-level jobs shut down opportunities for upward mobility while the high-tech and professional occupations are where career improvement and mobility is possible and these kind of jobs requires postsecondary degrees, which make it harder for immigrant descendants to achieve.

As a result, many immigrant youth may take different pathways of assimilation depending upon individual characteristics, ethnic backgrounds, familial and

neighborhood contexts (Portes 1999; Portes and Zhou 1993). Some take the road of upward mobility while others assimilate into American underclass. Studies have found Asian-Americans outperformed white students who, in turn, outperformed African-American and Latin-American students by significant large margin, and that ethnic differences remained marked and consistent across different regions, schools and grades after factors like social class, family structure, and immigrant status are held constant (Steinberg 1996). Others found underperformance of certain ethnic groups, like Dominican immigrant children (Pessar 1987), Haitian youth in Miami and West Indian youth in New York City (Portes and Stepick 1993; Waters 1996a) as a result of rapid assimilation into ghetto youth subcultures that rejects upward mobility.

Design and Findings of Legacies Study

A most extensive and updated study of the new second generation is conducted by Portes and Rumbaut (2001) to test the segmented assimilation theory in the book of "Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation." This empirical study uses a sample of the 1992 eighth and ninth graders in two metropolitan areas, San Diego, California and Miami/Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. They interviewed the respondents in 1992 and follow them up in 1995, to probe many aspects of the lives of the new immigrant second generation.

Legacies study uses two measures, including academic test scores (Stanford math and reading tests) and GPAs during junior high school period and another two measures, including GPAs and high school dropout during senior high school to assess educational achievement. Their results on academic achievement provide further evidence about

ethnic differences in academic test scores and GPAs both during junior and senior high school, conforming to previous findings. For example, some groups of Hispanic origins, like the second-generation adolescents of Mexican and Haitian origins do much worse in school, when an array of individual, family, and school factors are held constant. Cuban Americans, descendants of another refugee groups, are bifurcated between those attending private schools, and those in public schools, with those in private school achieve higher than those in public schools. In contrast, children of Asian origins, like Chinese and Korean immigrants and those of Vietnamese refugees perform much better than the average. Laotians and Cambodians, who perform poorly in terms of standardized achievement scores but have average grades that exceed the norm when controlling for other factors.

In addition, they find that second generation students as a whole do better in the respect of high-school dropout than third- and higher-generation native students of any ethnic background. However, there are variations among immigrant nationalities in rates of school completion. The differences reflect the cumulative effects of variation in individual, family, and school factors.

Based on its empirical evidence, Legacies concludes that "On the whole, the new second generation seems to be *achieving and adapting well*, as indicated by its superior academic performance relative to native-parentage students. … This combination of factors means that while the second generation as a whole is moving ahead and thus providing grounds for general optimism, some children are doing much better than others."

Limitations

Undoubtedly, the Legacies study is a most informative and comprehensive piece of research that attempts to understand the adaptation process of the new second generation. However, its conclusion is limited by its sample design, which is based on nonrepresentative regional sample. It limits its capability to generalize its results to the national population of the new second generation at similar ages. In addition, the study window of adolescence (between junior high school and senior high school years) they chose are limited to inform the adaptation processes during adulthood. If we want to evaluate the eventual socioeconomic assimilation of the new second generation, we must go beyond adolescence to examine adult life, especially how they perform in terms of college education, which is the major determinant for their eventual position in the labor market, and hence American stratification system. Third, as its findings show the second generation as a whole is doing better than the third and higher-generation peers academically during high school period. This does not provide enough evidence to support their hypothesis about the downward assimilation as an alternative pathway for some groups of the new second generation. We need further evidence to test whether downward assimilation is a possible alternative for some ethnic groups.

The New Second Generation Study

Rethinking Assimilation

While many scholars believe the adaptation of the new second generation has unique features due to the nonwhite ethnic origins and cultural backgrounds of the

contemporary immigration, is situated in a different socioeconomic and political context, and does not resemble the early European immigration and assimilation, Alba and Nee (2002) contend that the specificity of the current wave of immigration, although real, should not be overstated. On the contrary, they emphasize the continuity between past and present patterns of incorporation.

Particularly, they assert that the new immigrants' racial specificity, while indisputable, is no more an obstacle to assimilation than the "racialized" views previous immigrants—like the Irish, the Italians or the Jews—suffered in the past. This is part of the result of the institutional changes that have taken place since 1965: the civil rights legislation that is meant to enforce equal rights for all Americans and the cultural shifts that have led to increasing tolerance and acceptance of physical and cultural differences of other social and racial groups. They argue that it has not been historically true and is unlikely to prove true in the new future that the racial boundaries are not permeable. The boundaries will be blurred (although they recognize that race has not really lost its bedrock importance) through assimilation, which is foreshadowed in the already high rates of intermarriage in the U.S.-born generations of new immigrant groups and in the residential assimilation to the middle-class among the linguistically acculturated members.

Thus, they do not think downward assimilation is the destined road for disadvantaged immigrant minority groups as the blurring of the racial boundaries, in combination with the existence of economic opportunities, should open up roads for ethnic minorities to assimilate. They admit that the road of assimilation might be different, like human-capital immigrants versus traditional labor migrants, but *they are all expected*

to end up assimilating. The only difference lies in the variation in the pace of assimilation and in strategic individual and collective actions each individual and group take to assimilate. Descendants of human-capital immigrant may move up more rapidly than the offspring of the labor migrants, but this does not mean that the offspring of little human capital have no space of upward mobility at all. They still may have chances to experience modest upward mobility, as experienced by many members of previous second generation, such as the children of Italian immigrants during the 1930s and 1940s. So assimilation should not simply include social mobility or actual attainment of middle-class status. It should also examine horizontal intergenerational mobility. If children of immigrants do better than their parents, even though they may still lag behind their contemporaries, they may consider themselves as making improvement over their older generation and makes a further step to realize American dream.

Findings

Based on these arguments, a recent study (Farley and Alba) takes an alternative approach to examine assimilation of the new second generation. They compare the young adult of the new second generation (age 25 to 39; born between 1960 and 1974) with the older immigrants adults (age 50 and over) (as a proxy to the parents of the new second generation) to assess to what extent the new second-generation assimilation intergenerationally. They also compare the young adult of the new second generation with the third- and higher-generation young adult of the white population and to investigate how they are situated in vertical structure of the stratification system.

They use a sub-sample from the Current Population Survey, merging the March 1998 and March 2000 CPS samples to test their hypotheses. The measures they use for educational attainment include the status of whether earning a high-school diploma or GED and status of whether earning a four-year college degree. They simply use descriptive statistics, percentage of educational outcomes, to draw conclusions. They find the considerable decrease of the proportion that lack high school diplomas among every group of the second-generation adults, as compared to first-generation immigrant. They also find a great increase in the proportion of college or advanced degrees than the comparable first generation. However, there are variations in these two outcomes across different ethnic groups. As compared to the third- and higher-generation non-Hispanic whites, second generations from Asia, Europe, South America and the Caribbean reported greater attainments while those from Central America, Puerto Rico and Mexico have lower attainments.

The overall conclusion based on their empirical results arrives at: "there is *no sign of second-generation stagnation* to be found in these educational data. All second-generation groups report more extensive attainments than the first generation and, with the important exceptions of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Central Americans, now have educational achievements exceeding those of third- and higher-generation whites."

Limitations

Due to the descriptive feature of the study, validity of their conclusion needs to be further assessed, as we do not know if both intergenerational and parallel ethnic differences are statistically significant and whether the results can be generalized to the

national level. The second limitation is related to the feature of CPS, which does not include real data on parents of the new second generation. Third, the data are limited to examine details regarding reasons for variation in educational outcomes across different ethnic groups.

New Features of My Study Design

Testing of Competing Assimilation Theories

In line with Alba and Nee's (2002) arguments, in order to answer whether the new second generation will be assimilated, I argue that assimilation should be examined on two dimensions: (1) whether the new second generation is doing better than their parents to assess horizontal intergenerational assimilation; (2) whether the new second generation is doing better than the third- and higher-generation non-Hispanic white peers (a proxy to American mainstream) to evaluate vertical interclass assimilation. If evidence is found in these two dimensions, this will support Alba and Nee's neo-assimilation theory and put segmented assimilation theory into question. In this study, I particularly focus on the aspect of college education to foresee the socioeconomic assimilation outcomes of the new second generation in general.

Importance of College Education in Understanding Assimilation

As we are aware that college education is a major determinant for the success in socioeconomic assimilation for the new second generation, this area has not been intensively studied. One reason is that a large number of this group are still young and

haven't gone beyond high school period. The other reason is the lack of data. My study overcomes these limitations and focuses on a group of new second generation who are old enough for evaluation in terms of their post-high school adaptation experiences.

The time individuals finish high school is also a critical life stage for transition to adulthood. This transition is quite different from childhood and adolescence. Individuals start the journey during this transition to gain greater autonomy from their families, accept responsibilities for one's self, make independent decisions, become financially independent, and explore possibilities in many domains, like education, work, romantic relationship, family, and worldviews (Arnett 1998; Arnett 2001). Throughout this process they form a foundation for their adult lives that will have life-long impacts. One of the major markers of this transition in American society is postsecondary education achievement (Booth, Crouter, and Shanahan 1990; Shanahan 2000).

Educational pathways the new second generation take during this period is vital for their eventual success in adaptation, because it not only differentiates individuals into different skill and wage level of jobs at the point of entry into the labor market. It also has long-term effects: workers without a college degree are more adversely affected in their long-term wage growth than college graduates. Moreover, those with a high school diploma or less encountered actual wage losses at the point of job change, while workers with college credits or degrees fared better, and are more likely to experience wage gains both when they stay with the same employer or change jobs (Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock, and Scott 2001).

However, during the transition to adulthood, they already left high school and no more have institutional guidance and the provision of vocationally specific educational

credentials. Young immigrant descendants are pretty much on their own and face a variety of choices they have to make on their own: either drop high school, enter the labor market directly after high school, or go on with college education. Obviously, under the pressure of a competitive labor market, pursuit of higher education becomes extremely important for successful socioeconomic assimilation. Thus, many young people extend their years of education after high school and attend college and graduate school to accumulate more human capital. Although postsecondary education is critical for individual advancement and upward mobility, not every immigrant youth has the privilege to take this road. Many others have to stop their educational road and join the labor force directly to support themselves and even their families.

Although there is variation in possible academic routes during transition to adulthood, like no attainment of high school diploma, no further education after the attainment of high school diploma and continuation with college education after high school, the key to success is college education. If the new second generation can make it through college education, their chance of life-long success may greatly increase. If we try to answer the question whether the new second generation will assimilate or not, the measures in this chapter should be better and more straightforward than outcomes employed in other studies, like Legacies study.

New National Comprehensive Data

My sample comes from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). Add Health is a nationally representative study of adolescents in grades 7 through 12 in the United States in 1995. Add Health uses a multistage, stratified, school-

based, cluster sampling design. Included in the sample were students from 80 high schools (both public and private), and a corresponding feeder junior high or middle school. The study, designed to explain the causes of adolescent health and health behavior, focuses on the multiple contexts in which young people live.

Add Health involves three waves of data collection and several data collection components. Data in this chapter come from both Wave I and III. Wave I in-home interview was conducted between 1994-1995 over a sample of more than 20,000 adolescents in grades 7 to 12 in the U.S., collecting unique data regarding various outcomes and the social contexts in which adolescents live, including family, school, and neighborhood contexts. In 2001-02 Add Health conducted the third in-home interview with 15,197 original respondents from Wave I, now aged 18-27. Wave III provides longitudinal data to document trajectories out of adolescence and into the transition to adulthood in various domains, including work, higher education, union formation and parenthood. See Harris et al. (2003) for more details regarding the Add Health design.

Add Health data have several advantages over the samples of Legacies study and CPS. Unlike the regional nonprobability study in Legacies, Add Health baseline sample of Wave I is a nationally representative and probability sample of over 20,000 adolescents in grades 7 through 12 in the U.S. in 1994-1995. Another advantage of Add Health is that it has some correspondence with Legacies sample in that Add Health directly reflects the Legacies sample which includes 11^{th} and 12^{th} graders in Miami and Florida school districts in 1995. But Add Health sample has a wider range that includes not only 11^{th} and 12^{th} graders but also 7^{th} through 10^{th} graders and is drawn at the national level, not just limited to certain metropolitan areas.

Third, Add Health study, though not a particular immigrant study, is aware of the diversity of the high school population. It not only oversamples several ethnic groups, including Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Chinese adolescents, but also contains unprecedented richer information on race-ethnicity and nativity status of both the parents and students than any other national longitudinal studies, because Add Health allows researchers to identify specific country of origin of both the students and parents (Harris et al. 2003).

Fourth, unlike CPS, it also includes comprehensive information about the parents of the new second generation. This makes it possible to directly compare immigrant parents and their children, which is able to generate more accurate evidence about intergenerational mobility. Fifth, unlike the cross-sectional design of CPS, Add Health is of a longitudinal design that follows respondents from early adolescence to adulthood. It is also more detailed than CPS as it contains richer information on individual characteristics and family, school, and neighborhood factors that potentially influence educational pathways.

My analysis sample is restricted to respondents who have valid data on all variables of concern both in Wave I and III. In an attempt to control for the temporal order of causality, I will examine the impact of independent and control variables measured at Wave I on outcome variables at Wave III. The final analytic sample includes 13,073 young people ages 18-27 in 2001-2002.

New Measures of Educational Attainment

While the new second generation of Add Health were in grade 7 through 12 (aged 11-21 with mean age at 15) in Wave I 1994-1995, most of them have finished high

school (for those who stay in high school are the one who were delayed or repeated grades) Wave III 2001-2002. Wave III data provides researchers good opportunities to investigate how well they do in terms of high school graduation and postsecondary education beyond high school.

By the time when Add Health Wave III survey was conducted, all the respondents (aged 18-27 with mean age at 21) should be expected to have finished high school and got a high school diploma if they conform to the norm of American society. It also provides a good timing to assess whether those respondents continue with college education right after high school during their transition to adulthood. Educational achievement is measured by three alternative pathways: incompletion of high school education (3% out of the sample of 13,073); graduation with a high school diploma (47%); and college education (50%). The focus is on college education. The outcome variable of ever-attended-college includes several situations: (1) respondents who are attending college (either junior college or regular college) and have not finished it yet (31%); (2) respondents who have already attained a college degree (either junior college degree or bachelor's degree) (19%). For young adults who do not attend college right after high school, they have chances to go on with postsecondary education later in their adult life. But delayed college attendees are more likely to lose ground at first place and socioeconomically stalled when they compete with their peers who finish college education "on time." Thus it's important to assess the right-after-high-school college entrance to understand the adaptation process of the new second generation.

MEASURES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The New Second Generation

Second generation often refer to persons who are born in the United States with one or both parents born outside the country (Farley and Alba 2002). Following the general practice, I do not distinguish whether a second-generation person has one or two foreign-born parents. In Legacies study, Portes and Rumbaut (2001) use a broad definition of second generation which include individuals who were born outside the country and brought to the United States before adolescence. Many of Rumbaut's studies (like (Rumbaut 1995) define this group of immigrant children as 1.5 generation. I use the operational definition of Legacies studies to incorporate those individuals who were foreign born and have arrived in the United States by age 12 and whose parents were also foreign born and were not U.S. citizens at the time of immigration as second generation, because children before adolescence are at a developmental stage where individuals easily leave their old way of life behind and adapt to the new environment for which their adaptation experience is quite similar to those who are born in this country (Harris and Chen 2004). In addition, using similar definitions makes it possible to compare results between my study and Legacies' study as part of my sample includes an age cohort (11^{th} and 12^{th} graders in 1995) of Legacies' study.

Third and Higher generations are defined as persons born in the United States whose parents were also born in this country. My data are not able to distinguish the third generation from fourth and higher generations.

Ethnicity of the New Second Generation

The new second generation is characterized by great variation in racial and ethnic backgrounds. I use the respondent's self-reported ethnic identity in combination with the country of origin for immigrant children or the country of parents' origin for children of immigrants to define race-ethnicity. For the Hispanic and Asian children of immigrants, self-reported ethnic identity was checked against country-of-origin reports of youth and parents for consistency and to achieve a more specific ethnic identity.

For immigrant youth who are not Hispanic or Asian, I use country of birth to assign ethnic origin. For native-born youth with native-born parents (i.e., third- or higher-generation), I assign ethnic group based on self-reported ethnicity. For the small group of third- or higher-generation youth who self-reported multiple racial-ethnic backgrounds, I identify a single racial-ethnic category by cross-checking their country of origin, dropping "other" as a multiple category, or assigning the first choice of their country of origin as their ethnic backgrounds.

Due to the small sample size of some ethnic groups, I put some ethnic groups under one category based on their cultural and regional similarities. As a result, I classify the second generation young people into nine categories: (1) those of Mexican origin, (2) those of Cuban heritage, (3) those of Puerto Rican Origins, (4) those of Central South American, or Caribbean origins, (5) those of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, or Indian heritage, (6) those of Filipino background, (7) those of Vietnamese, Cambodian, Pacific Islander, and other Asian heritage, (8) those of European/Canadian origin, and (9) those of African origins. The sub-samples of specific ethnic groups are even smaller for the third- or higher-generation, so pan-ethnic categories have to be used. Thus the third- or

higher-generation are divided into five groups: (1) Mexican Americans, (2) individuals of other Central-South American or Caribbean origins; (3) Asian Americans, (4) African Americans, and (5) non-Hispanic white Americans.

Other Independent Variables

I use similar control variables of Legacies study to make possible the comparison between the two studies. I include respondents' age at Wave I and sex as controls. I include family capital as determinant of immigrant youth's education achievement.

Family capital is measured by various factors, including parental education, parental occupation, family structure, and number of siblings. Parental educational and occupational levels can be regarded as parents' socioeconomic status, which not only determines the possible amount of economic resources for their children's education, but also is a form of social resource that provides information and advice about the choice and prospects of educational pursuits of the children. Studies have shown a close connection between parental socioeconomic status and the educational attainment of their children (Haveman, Wolfe, and Spaulding 1991). Children have a very high likelihood to follow the educational path their parents have gone through (Sandefur, Eggerling-Boeck, and Park 2005). Besides, parental socioeconomic status provides the basis from which the children can move up. If the starting level is low, the children's advancement will be impeded and slowed down. If the starting point is relatively high, the children's advancement can be speeded up.

Parental education (the higher of the two parents if both are present) is measured as a set of dummy variables: less than high school; high school graduate; some college;

college graduate or higher; and missing parental educational data. Parental occupation is grouped into four levels based on students' report of their parents' occupation: professional job; medium-level job; low-level job, and missing parental occupational data. See details in Appendix A.

Second, family structure is another crucial source for family support. While "non-traditional" family structure, like single parenthood and stepfamilies, have detrimental effect on school performance and achievement (Cherlin 1992; Cherlin and Frank F. Furstenberg 1994; Coleman 1988; Coleman, Ganong, and Fine 2000; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Zill 1996), immigrant children are found more likely to be raised in two-parent families (Foner 1997; Rumbaut 1996). Intact immigrant family structure becomes a facilitator for their children's academic success in school. In addition, number of siblings determines the social capital an immigrant child can receive at home. Those with fewer children have greater social capital at home to foster a better support system for their children's academic work (Portes 1998). Family structure is measured as a dichotomous variable with intact family (coded as 1) and other types of nontraditional families (like single-parent families and step-parent families).

Family is also a place where cultural values and norms are transmitted intergenerationally (Coleman 1988). I include several acculturation factors within families. The first one refers to language acculturation between parent and child. It is measured by bilingualism (those who speak another language at home are considered bilinguals and those who only speak English at home are considered monolinguals). Bilingualism is regarded as an indicator for selective acculturation because it is easy for immigrant parents to transfer the values of their home country to their children as the

children understand their parents better if the child speaks the language of the foreign parents. In contrast, monoligualism is viewed as the indicator for dissonant acculturation when communication and transmission of ethnic values become difficult if the child cannot fully understand the parent's language and refuses to speak parent's foreign language. The variable, bilingualism, is only included in descriptive analysis since no significant differences in bilingualism are found in multivariate analyses.

Another more direct indicator of intergenerational acculturation, parent-child conflict, is also included. Parental expectation for college education is another measure about students' reports of how disappointed their parents would be if they did not attend college. Immigrant parents usually have high prospects for their children's success in upward mobility, because they view their adjustment problems as temporary and take optimistic view and adaptive strategies to react to their current predicament (Ogbu 1991). Parents can exercise their influence on their children's academic success through transferring to their children the high expectation for educational goals (Portes 1998).

In keeping with previous studies that have used Add Health, I incorporte a measure of academic engagement (Johnson, Crosnoe, and Elder 2001; Perreira, Harris, and Lee 2006; Resnick, Bearman, Blum, Bauman, Harris, Jones, Tabor, Beuhring, Sieving, Shew, Ireland, Bearinger, and Udry 1997; Riegle-Crumb, Farkas, and Muller 2006). Engagement is measured by students' reports the number of times they had trouble paying attention in school, and had trouble getting homework done. School engagement is a direct reflection of individual effort in academic achievement, which is closely related to academic outcomes.

Finally, school context is an important indicator for assimilation environment. School context is a multi-dimensional indicator. I choose two variables, including the type of the school (either public school or private school), and region of the school to measure school context. Schools can be potential barriers to successful adaptation if the student attends a public school. This prediction is based on the lower quality of instruction in these schools and expected character of negative peer influences in them. The region of the school tells whether the school is concentrated with immigrant descendants, like school in western and southern regions. The academic adaptation environment is quite different if the school is highly populated with students from immigrant families where tolerance of diversity or racial and ethnic conflicts might be higher than schools where immigrant children are rare.

ANALYTIC STRATEGIES

I incorporate various analytic strategies to pursue my goals. I use bivariate analysis to compare mean differences across various statuses, including no high school diploma, high school graduation with a diploma, college education beyond high school between the parent and child in immigrant families. Similar outcomes are included to compare mean differences between various ethnic groups of the new second generation with the third- and higher-generation non-Hispanic white young adults.

I also use multivariate analysis to deal with the comparison between the new second generation and third- and higher-generation non-Hispanic white individuals. In multivariate analysis, the outcome variable is a dichotomous variable with 1 referring to the status of ever attended college (including those who are either attending college at the

time of Wave III interview or who have already finished college education). Based on the nature of outcome variable, I use bivariate logistic regression for multivariate analysis. I first estimate a "baseline" model (controlling for age, gender, and generation-ethnicity) to examine generation-ethnic differences in college attendance. I then explore how such differences, if there are any, operate through individual and family characteristics, acculturation and school context.

Both bivariate and multivariate analyses are weighted. Add Health uses a multistage, stratified, school-based, clustering sampling design. These characteristics must be incorporated into analyses to obtain unbiased parameter estimates concerning the entire population, unbiased estimates of variance and standard errors, and correct statistical test results (Chantala 2001). Both our bivariate and multivariate analyses take into account these characteristics, including sampling weights, stratification and clustering. Unlike the legacies study and the new second generation study, both my bivariate and multivariate analyses can be generalized to the national level.

Results

Characteristics of the New Second Generation

The weighted result (Table 2.1) regarding the distribution of the second generation youth for the birth cohort of 1974-1983 shows that 60% of the second generation youth are of Asian or Central and South American origins. This is a direct reflection of the sharp increase in post-1965 mass immigration from non-European regions. As Table 2.1 indicates, there is great variation in family capital, acculturation

factor, areas of settlement, and school context among the second-generation youth depending upon their country of origin.

ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN HUMAN CAPITAL

Table 2.1 shows that statistically significant differences are found in several key family capital variables, including parental education, parental occupation, family structure, and number of siblings, among various ethnicities of immigrant families.

Due to selected immigration, the level of immigrant parents' human capital (as compared to native-born non-Hispanic white parents) is associated with regions of the sending countries. All immigrants of Hispanic origins have significantly less human capital than the native-born non-Hispanic white parents, while immigrants of Asian origins either have more human capital, like those from China, Japan, Korea, India, and Philippine, or have similar human capital, like those from other Asian regions (such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Pacific Island), as the white parents.

Among all the disadvantaged Hispanic groups, Mexican parents have the least human capital, over 50% have less than high school education, while they have much lower proportion than native-born white parents in attainment of high school degree and college education or higher degrees. All Hispanic parents are much less likely to work in high-ranking professional jobs than non-Hispanic white parents of the third- and higher-generations. Especially Mexican parents (67%) and Parents from Central and South America and Caribbean regions (53%) are highly concentrated in low-level jobs as compared to white parents (45%).

However, among Asian families, they do not share similar socioeconomic advantages and have great diversity within themselves. Parents of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indian origins are significantly more likely to receive college education and to work in high-level professional jobs than native white parents. Parents from Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, Pacific Islander areas are slightly disadvantaged in that they have significantly higher proportion in less than high school education and low-level jobs as they come from economically and politically afflicted areas and arrived in the United States as refugees.

ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE

Among Hispanic families, second-generation youth of *Mexican* heritage possess one positive family capital as they (72%) are significantly more likely to live in intact families than the third and plus-generation white peers (63%). However, youth of *Central-South American and Caribbean* origins and Puerto Rican origin are further disadvantaged as they are more likely to live in broken and nontraditional families than their white counterparts.

Concerning family size, except Cuban families, all other families of Hispanic origin have significantly higher number of siblings than the third- and plus-generation white individuals. The Hispanic new second generation are greatly disadvantaged in adaptation due to this relatively big family size when family resources are already lacking due to their low level of human capital.

In contrast, second-generation youth of Asian origins (except Filipino families) are more likely to live in intact families where parent-child bonding is more secured than

the third- and plus-generation white counterpart. Those of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indian origins have similarly small family size as the third and plus-generation white families, while Filipino families and youth of other Asian origins, like those of Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, and Pacific Islander backgrounds, have significantly bigger family size with more siblings. However, they have strong family ties that are reinforced by the intact family structure.

ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN TYPE OF ACCULTURATION

There is some variation in parental expectation for college education among Hispanic families. While foreign-born Cuban and Puerto Rican parents have similar level of expectation for college for their children as native-born white parents, Mexican parents have significantly lower level of expectation for their children. In contrast, only those of Central-South American and Caribbean origins have a higher expectation for their children. Dissonant acculturation, as measured by parent-child conflict, is not found between the second-generation youth of Hispanic origin and their parents. Youth from Cuban families are actually doing better than their white counterpart in this respect. They have significantly lower level of conflict with their parents.

Bilingualism of the second generation is a widespread phenomenon among the second-generation youth of Hispanic origin, especially among those of Mexican, Cuban, Central-South American, and Caribbean origins. Although there is higher percentage of bilingualism among youth of the third-generation Hispanic origin than their white peers, the large majority of the third generation of Hispanic heritage are rapidly acculturated to speak only English at home.

Unlike Hispanic families, Asian parents universally have higher expectation for their children's college education no matter where they come from. Like Hispanic families, dissonant acculturation is not found among Asian families. Bilingualism is common among the second generation of Asian origins, although their rate of speaking a foreign language at home is lower than youth of Hispanic origins. By third- and higher-generation, they are no different from their white counterparts, showing speedy language assimilation.

ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AREAS OF SETTLEMENT AND SCHOOL CONTEXT

The demographic distribution of the second generation is not even across the country. Distributing areas of the second generation vary by ethnicity. Among Hispanic families, those of Mexican origins are more likely to settle in the West and South, while Cuban families are extremely concentrated in the South. Puerto Ricans are more likely to settle in Northeastern area while those from Central-South American and Caribbean areas are most likely to settle in the South, followed by the Northeastern areas.

Among Asian families, higher percentage of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indian families is concentrated in the West and Northeast, while Filipino families are most likely to settle in the West. Those from other Asian areas are more evenly distributed, although they have higher level of concentration in the West.

While West is the home for most recent immigrants, both Southern and Northeastern areas have different distribution of immigrant families, with more families of Hispanic origin in the South, and with more families of Asian origin and Puerto Ricans in Northeast. Exceptionally, Midwest is more a home to native-speakers than to

immigrants and their descendants. Universally, all the second generation is highly concentrated in public schools. Especially Mexican and Cuban youth have exceptionally higher rate of concentration in such schools than the third- and higher-generation white peers.

Generally speaking, there is great variation in family, acculturation factors, area of settlement among the immigrant families. Asian families, as a whole, seem to provide better conditions, like more family capital and better acculturation context, than Hispanic families for their children's adaptation in American society.

Horizontal Intergenerational Assimilation

NO HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA

Concerning educational assimilation in terms of intergenerational mobility, Figure 2.1 shows that the new second generation of each immigrant group are doing better than their parents in finishing high school. No intergenerational stagnation in incompletion of high school education is found. The result shows a considerable decrease of the proportion of lacking high school diploma among second-generation youth. The parent-child differences in no high school graduation is statistically significant for all ethnic groups except for those of Filipino origin and African origin. This is not abnormal as Philippine and African immigrant parents already have relatively low rates of less than high school education. When their children resemble them in this aspect, it means that they are good at maintaining a relatively high status as their parents in educational achievement. A huge progress is found in Mexican families: 57% of Mexican parents do not have a high school diploma while only 7% of their children do not get a high school

diploma, as their children were able to benefit the universal requirement of secondary education which otherwise may not be accessible in their home country.

HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA AND COLLEGE EDUCATION

As previous results indicate, there is a great improvement in graduating high school with a diploma among both the second and third- and plus- generation youth. Such advancement among immigrant children benefit from the availability of American public school system to every adolescent who resides in the United States, regardless the immigrant status of their parents. However, moving up by simply finishing high school does not guarantee a promising future for the new second generation. When young people get a high school diploma, they have different choices. They can stop and straightly enter job market or go on with college education. Although public school system is available to everyone, American society does not have a high financial reward for high school diploma. High school diploma holders usually end up in low-paying and low-ranking jobs that block upward mobility both in career development and income growth (Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock, and Scott 2001). What determines the success of the socioeconomic assimilation is whether one has attained college education.

Figure 2.2 shows the results regarding whether children from immigrant families stop by high school graduation or are able to attain college education, relative to their parents. The right side of the bars represents the percentage of high school diploma and the left side of the bars represents the percentage of college education. The two percentages are relative to each other, indicating that higher percentage of high school diploma results in lower percentage of college education, and vice versa.

As Figure 2.2 shows, not every generation-ethnic group make improvement in terms of college education over their parents. Figure 2.2 presents that the second-generation Mexican youth have significantly higher percentage than their parents in both high school diploma and college education. Second-generation Cuban youth have similar level of high school graduation as their parents but have significantly higher rate of college education. The second generation youth of Puerto Rican origins and Central-South American and Caribbean origins are more successful in attaining a high school diploma than their parents, however, they, like their parents, are constrained to go further with college education.

Among those of Asian heritage, the second generation youth of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indian origin have both significantly higher percentages of high school diploma and college education than their parents, while those of Filipino origin are only significantly different in high school education as compared to their parents. However, second-generation youth originated from other Asian areas, like Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or Pacific Island, do not make improvement in educational attainment over their parents.

The second-generation youth of European origin have similar educational level as their parents, while second generation individuals of African origin do better than their parents in college education. When I compare intergenerational educational mobility among the third- and plus-generation youth, I find that all the third- and plus-generation youth do *not* go further ahead in college education although all the racial-ethnic groups except Asian do better in high school graduation than their parents.

Generally speaking, the second-generation youth are doing better than their parents in escaping high-school dropping out. However, as the starting points of assimilation race (as indicated by their parents' educational level) varies across different racial and ethnic groups, the space left for improvement varies across different immigrant groups. Among those of low-achieving parents, the advancement of the second-generation youth is hindered. If parents can hardly achieve anything beyond high school, their children's achievement is likely to be impeded. Among those of high-achieving parents, they can make similar achievement as their parents or they can even make further improvement in terms of college education than their parents, like those of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indian origins.

There are exceptions, like the second-generation Mexican American and Cuban American young adults. Compared to Puerto Rican and Central-South American and Caribbean counterparts, Mexican youth seemed to present a success story in college education. But actually, the reason they are able to surpass their parents is that very few (only 12%) Mexican parents have college education while much higher percentage of Puerto Rican (39%) and Central-South American and Caribbean (42%) parents got college education. When Mexican parents lag too far away from all other generation-ethnic groups, it, as a result, leaves more space for their children to achieve.

Intergenerationally, second-generation youth of Mexican origin make great advancement academically, as the majority (93%) have left the track of high school drop-out, and are able to finish high school and some (34%) even go further with college education. Cuban youth are the highest achievers among those of Hispanic origin, equalizing its level of college education with those of Asian origins. Unlike Mexican

youth, youth of Puerto Rican and Central-South American origins find it harder to surpass their parents in terms of college education as their parents' level of college education are much higher than that of Mexican parents.

As a whole, the result indicates a great variation in the pace and degree of intergenrational mobility depending upon parents' original human capital. Although both the second generation and third- and higher-generation youth are doing better in graduating high school and attaining a high school diploma, they do not uniformly surpass their parents in college education.

Vertical Inter-class Assimilation

Even though some ethnic groups, like Mexican youth and Cuban youth, surpass their parents in college education, this does not mean they will make a success story since their competitors in the job market are their third- and plus-generation white peers. Usually how individuals define their success is to compare their socioeconomic status with their peers at similar ages. So we must go beyond intergenerational comparison and focus on vertical interclass mobility by comparing the second-generation youth with the third- and higher-generation white peers who are at identical age and usually considered a reference group (a proxy to mainstream).

As Figure 2.3 shows, among the second-generation young adults of Hispanic origins, their educational attainment level varies by ethnicity, as compared to their third- and higher-generation white peers. Those of Cuban origins have high academic achievement, having significantly lower percentage of less than high school education and high school graduation and higher percentage of college education than non-Hispanic

white peers. However, relative to their native-speaking white peers, second-generation Mexican youth present an opposite picture: having significantly higher percentage of high school drop-outs and high school graduation and significantly lower percentage of college education, despite that they are doing better academically than their immigrant parents. Although youth of Puerto Rican (lower) and other Hispanic origins (higher) are significantly different in high school dropouts from their non-Hispanic white counterpart, their distribution of high school diploma and college education is similar to that of the white counterpart.

Among Asian groups, those of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indian and Filipino backgrounds have similar educational achievement: while they have significantly lower level of less than high school education and high school completion, they have significantly higher level of college education than the third- and plus-generation non-Hispanic white peers. Those of other Asian origins, like Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, or Pacific Islander, have polarized outcomes within themselves: while they have significantly higher percentage of no high school diploma, they also have higher percentage of college education than their white counterparts. Comparative results between the second-generation European youth and their white counterpart is similar to that of Chinese and Filipino group. The second generation African youth have similar result as the other Asian group.

The third- and plus-generation Mexican and African American young adults do not make much improvement in terms of educational achievement. While they have significantly higher percentage of high-school dropouts and high school graduation, they have significantly lower percentage of college education than their non-Hispanic white

counterpart. Other Hispanic youth, like the second generation of similar background, have similar level of college education as their white counterpart although their percentage of high school incompletion is significantly higher. Unlike the second generation, the third generation Asian individuals do not achieve higher than their white counterparts.

Educational Achievement in College Education - Results from Multivariate Analysis

Model 1 (in Table 2.2) shows initial generation-ethnic differences (controlling for age and gender) in college education. They are no different from the results of bivariate analyses. To identify whether racial-ethnic differences remain while holding background variables constant, I estimate a sequence of logistic models. I estimate a baseline logit model (Table 2.2, Model 1) on immigrant generation and ethnicity (while controlling for age and gender). I then add sets of variables corresponding to family capital, including parental education, parental occupation (Table 2.2, Model 2), family structure and number of siblings (Table 2.2, Model 3), acculturation factors (including parental expectation for college education, parent-child conflict, and school engagement in Table 2.2, Model 4), school region, and type of school (Table 2.2, Model 5) to the baseline.

As Model 2 to Model 5 show, all the background factors, including family capital, acculturation factors and school context, are associated with the likelihood of going to college for young adults of both the second generation and third- and plus-generation young adults. Specifically, the higher likelihood of going to college and the superiority of females are consistent with results obtained by other national student samples (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Both parental education and occupation make a big difference.

Individuals whose parents have college education and high-level professional jobs are much more likely to benefit from this rich human capital and continue with college education after high school. Intact families also foster a positive and protective environment for children to pursue college education. Conforming to previous studies, more siblings result in the diffusion of limited family resources (both social and financial), which reduces the chance to go on with college for children of immigrants (Portes 1998).

Acculturation factors are also very important for children of immigrants. Immigrant descendants whose parents with high parental expectation for college education are more likely to go on with college education to pursue their assimilation goals. In contrast, parent-child conflict, which resulted from conflicting life views, has negative effect on educational achievement. Greater individual effort, which immigrant youth are more willing to invest, leads to higher likelihood of college education as well.

School context is another important factor for educational adaptation of immigrant offspring. Results in Model 5 shows that school systems in the Northeast are able to boost up the likelihood of going to college, compared to schools in the South. Besides, public schools, where children immigrants are highly concentrated, decrease the likelihood of going to college.

Of course, the next focus of my study is to assess to what extent generation-ethnic differences in college education can be explained by individual, family, and contextual factors. The following discussion includes a comprehensive report of results both from statistical models (Table 2.2) and Figure 2.4. While Table 2.2 provides a general picture about whether generation-ethnic differences remain when individual, family, and

contextual factors are held constant, Figure 2.4 estimates the probability of going to college for each generation-ethnic group. Figure 2.4 represents the probability of college attendance under two conditions. The light-colored line shows the probability of college education by putting into equation typical values of each independent variable within each generation-ethnic group (taking mean for each continuous variable and mode for each categorical variable for each generation-ethnic group). The dark-colored line shows the probability of college education by replacing typical values of the third- and higher-generation white youth to explore whether probability of going to college will change while the individual remains being an immigrant descendant while all the other individual and structural characteristics are changed to be a third- and higher-generation white individual.

SECOND-GENERATION MEXICAN AMERICANS

However, coefficients for generation-ethnicity variables change when family capital, acculturation factors, and school context variables are added to the model. Surprisingly, among second-generation Mexican Americans, the negative effect of *Mexican* background is reversed to a positive effect (in Model 5) when other variables are held constant. The Mexican background in immigrant families becomes a protective factor instead of a stigma (commonly stereotyped by the general public) to boost postsecondary education among second-generation Mexican American youth. As we know from the descriptive result, second-generation Mexican American are stalled in three areas: lower parental human capital, bigger family size, and lower parental expectation for college education, which suppresses the protective effect of their ethnic

capital. Figure 2.4 provides further evidence regarding how the fate of Mexican American can be reversed. The result shows that the probability of going to college greatly jumps from much lower to a little higher than the third-generation white youth when parental human capital and parental expectation for college education increase and family size decreases to the level of the native white peers.

SECOND-GENERATION CUBAN AMERICANS

Table 2.2 shows that second-generation Cuban American youth achieves higher in college education than the third- and higher-generation white peers. The positive effect of the ethnic capital of immigrant Cuban background even increases (with coefficient increasing from .631 in Model 1 to 1.134 in Model 5) when family capital, acculturation factor, and school context variables are held constant. Figure 2.4 further reveals that second-generation Cuban American youth's probability of going to college increases when individual and structural characteristics are adjusted to the level of the third- and higher-generation white peers. The major change lies in the increase of parental human capital. However, their higher school engagement and lower level of parent-child conflict were replaced by the worsened conditions as the native white peers are doing worse in these two areas. If they remain the same in these two aspects, their probability of college attendance will be even higher and show an even greater advantage over the third- and plus-generation white peers.

Second-Generation Puerto Rican, Central-South American and Caribbean American Youth

Although Table 2.2 does not show a significant difference in college attendance between second-generation Puerto Rican, Central-South American and Caribbean American Youth and their third- and higher-generation white counterparts, Figure 2.4 reveals that their probability of continuing with college education is much lower than the white native peers when family capital, acculturation factor, and school context variables are adjusted to the typical value of their ethnicity. As we know from Table 2.1 that they are greatly disadvantaged in parental human capital, broken families and big family size, all contribute to hinder their academic achievement. If such conditions are changed to be like their native-born white peers, their probability of going to college can reach the similar level of their white peers.

SECOND-GENERATION YOUTH OF ASIAN ORIGINS

Result in Table 2.2 shows that second-generation Asian American youth have significantly higher level of college education than their white counterparts either before or after controlling for family capital, acculturation factor, and school context variables. Some changes occur when other covariates are added to the model. As shown in Model 5, the positive effect of ethnicity for those of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and Filipino origins decreases when individual and structural factors are held constant. This indicates that when these second-generation Asian groups are superior in various areas, like greater parental human capital, higher parental expectation for college education, greater school engagement, as compared to third- and higher-generation white individuals

at similar ages, their changing to take on native white characteristics does not help them achieve even higher but only pulls them down to a lower level of achievement. In contrast, those originated from poorer Asian regions, like Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Pacific Island, benefit in academic achievement by keeping their ethnicity (as coefficient increases from .538 to .700 in Table 2.2) while other characteristics are equalized to be a typical American young adult.

Generally speaking, if the background factors, including family capital and acculturation factors are equalized, the white privilege is drastically reduced. The gap with the third- and plus-generation white youth does not appear to be significant for most of the generation-ethnic groups. For some groups, like second generation Cuban Americans, second-generation African Americans, and third- and higher-generation Asian Americans, their already higher probability of college attendance increases further if they take on the characteristics of their white counterparts.

Discussion

This study is devoted to examining the academic assimilation of the new second generation. The contemporary second generation is composed of diverse ethnic groups and of various birth cohorts (from infant to adult) and the group of the new second generation is changing adding each year newcomers and new births from immigrant families. As a result, we not only expect a growing population, an aging population, but also a changing population of the contemporary second-generation immigrant descendants. It's impossible to generalize my results to every birth cohort of the new

second generation. This research particularly focuses on 1973-1984 birth cohorts who are at age 18-27 (young adults) in 2001-2002.

My study assesses both intergenerational mobility and inter-class mobility to provide a comprehensive and thorough picture about the academic assimilation of the new second generation. In summary, the new-second generation as a whole are doing better than their parents academically no matter which ethnic group they belong to. However, degree and pace of assimilation varies across different generation-ethnic groups. Among the Hispanic group who has relatively low level of parental human capital, some are making a remarkably successful story, like Cuban Mexican youth who surpass their parents in college education. Benefiting from the free access to universal high school education, Mexican American youth find it easy to surpass their parents in high school completion. By accomplishing this, they even find opportunities to continue with postsecondary education, which is not possible for most of the Mexican parents. I find that being the most disadvantaged group socioeconomically, second-generation Mexican American youth do not completely give up pursuing American dream. They seem to have the strong immigrant optimism to shed off their parents' low status and to move further ahead despite of the many social, political and economic hurdles they have to jump over. This effort for intergenerational upward mobility does not reflect much pessimism to assimilate into underclass as assumed by the segmented assimilation theory. However, among the moderately disadvantaged groups (like those of Puerto Rican, and other Central-South American and Caribbean origins) whose parents have a higher educational level than Mexican parents but a lower level than the native white parents, their effort to surpass their parents in college education is not that successful. Although

they are doing better in high school completion than their parents, they remain at the similar educational level as their parents.

However, when comparison of inter-class mobility is investigated, it is quite noticeable that stratification in academic achievement, especially in college education, exists. Among the second-generation young adults, Mexican American individuals are much more likely to be high school graduates or high school dropouts than the reference group (the proxy to mainstream), remaining the lowest in academic achievement. On the other hand, Cuban Americans, youth of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and Filipino backgrounds, youth of European and African origins outperform the third-generation white peers in college education. Other groups, like those of Puerto Rican origin, other Central-South American and Caribbean origins, those of other Asian backgrounds, like Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, Pacific Islander, seem to lie in the middle of the stratification system. As a whole, the second-generation immigrant youth seem to inherit the ranking of their parents in educational attainment although the gap with the middle-class mainstream is narrowed.

Academic stratification in college education is closely related to labor market outcomes and eventual position in the social stratification system. It's very likely that second Mexican American may get stuck in the lowest level of the job distribution. Cuban Americans and some outperforming Asian American groups may be more likely to assimilate into the mainstream middle-class or upper middle-class, while other racial-ethnic groups remain somewhere in between. This seems to conform to the prediction of the segmented assimilation theory. Depending upon variation in individual and structural characteristics, there are divergent paths leading to different assimilation outcomes.

Although intergenerational upward mobility is accomplished among all the racial and ethnic groups of the new second generation, some groups' low degree of mobility does not provide enough strength to move the whole group to a higher level of the social class collectively despite that some are capable of escaping the parents' low status and join in the middle-class mainstream (like 34% of Mexican American young adults in my study are able to go to college) at the individual level. The lack of strength to move up to the middle class is mainly due to the low parental human capital, and big family size with which family resources are extremely limited for every child to pursue higher education. This applies to the case of second-generation Mexican Americans, youth of Central-South American and Caribbean origins, since the probability of going to college greatly increases when their individual and structural characteristics are changed to resemble those of the typical third- and higher-generation white peers. As a whole, we can see intergenerational improvement partly supports Alba and Nee's neo-assimilation theory. However, it should be noted that assimilation is not complete and has a long way to go to reach the levels of mainstream American society for immigrant descendants.

ACADEMIC ASSIMILATION OF THIRD- AND HIGHER-GENERATION AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ASSIMILATION

Alba and Nee (2003) argue that assimilation can finally be achieved by all ethnic groups in a long run. My findings indicate that the second-generation immigrant children are still highly stratified in the postsecondary education and very likely in their eventual position in American society. The promising future of some disadvantaged groups may

rely on the assimilation efforts of the third and higher-generations. What then do the third- and higher-generation non-white Americans in my study tell us?

Concerning horizontal intergenerational mobility, bivariate results inform us that the third-and higher-generation youth of each racial-ethnic group (except Asian as the rates are quite low in the following areas) are doing significantly better in getting off the track of high-school dropouts and graduating from high school. However, none of the third- and plus-generation racial and ethnic group has higher rates of college education than their parents. This situation is acceptable if parents are already high achievers, as the case of Asian Americans. Their maintenance of their parents' status indicates that they are as academically assimilated as their parents, although we do not have enough information to tell variation within different Asian groups as the measure of ethnicity is lacking.

However, for groups whose parents have little human capital, the situation is different. Unlike their second-generation Mexican American peers, third- and higher-generation Mexican American youth do not make much progress in college education, relative to their native-born parents. They also have significantly lower likelihood of continuing with college education than their white counterparts. When all other characteristics are equalized to be a typical American youth, even the positive effect of the Mexican ethnic capital disappear for the third- and higher-generation as individuals of Mexican origins are much more acculturated with speedy language assimilation (in Model 5).

Obviously, social conditions for assimilation of the current third- and higher-generations might be different from the context for assimilation of the future third- and

higher-generations. Changes in parental human capital cannot guarantee continuous upward mobility, since many other factors may affect assimilation outcomes, including racial-ethnic context, economic opportunity for minority ethnic groups, and stability of family structure. As Table 2.1 shows, the third- and higher-generation Mexican Americans have higher rates of nontraditional family residence and big family size. High levels of Americanization through longer length of stay may wash away immigrant advantages. Many studies have shown that greater acculturation leads to adverse outcomes, like worsened physical and psychological health, increase of parent-child conflict, adoption of nontraditional life choices, like cohabitation, out-of-wedlock childbearing, broken marriages (Chen, Harris, and Guo 2005; Harker 2001; Harris 1999; Harris and Chen 2004). All may contribute to weaken the strength of bettered parental human capital and then stall the possibility for upward mobility.

Second, the structure of economic opportunities has changed. The early immigrant descendants have the opportunities to move up gradually through betterment in jobs while remaining part of the working class during premier industrial period of the U.S. Situated in postindustrial hourglass economy, individuals either have a college degree or higher degree to attain a high-tech and professional occupation for job advancement and income growth, or get stuck with a high school degree or lower level of education to remain in low-level and low-paying jobs which provide no economic future, no career, no security and little income growth (Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock, and Scott 2001). So this polarization of the job structure may perpetuates over several generations since remaining as part of the working class may no more provide enough chances for socioeconomic advancement.

Third, in considering the prospect for long-term assimilation of disadvantaged immigrant groups, like Mexican American, the case of African Americans may give us some hint. We know that African American is a distinct minority group in the United States. Over a long-term struggle, they gradually make progress and advance over each generation. Among the third- and higher-generation African Americans, many can be regarded as descendants of their slave forefathers. Compared to their forefathers' distress, they've made tremendous improvement in their social status. But my result (in Table 2.2 Model 1) shows that their likelihood of going to college is still significantly lower than their white counterparts. This is mainly due to their lower parental human capital, broken family structure, and bigger family size. If individuals are disadvantaged in one area (like parental human capital), they are more likely to inherit other disadvantages simultaneously (like nontraditional family, out-of-wedlock childbearing, big family size, underclass cultural values), which all work together to pull them down socioeconomically.

Another reason for the stagnation of minority groups might be discrimination. A possible way to reduce discrimination toward minority racial-ethnic groups is through interracial marriage, which may help blur the racial-ethnic boundaries. However, even such boundaries are broken, the socioeconomic disadvantaged groups may still get stuck in low levels of the stratification system as they have inherited the characteristics of the underclass that are not easy to shed off even through several generations' effort, like little human capital, single-headed families, and big family size, in a polarized society where opportunities for moderate upward mobility are lacking. Furthermore, the advantaged groups will use their power to retain the status quo to compete for limited wealth and resources in the society. With a transforming structure of population composition, the

competition for high social status has a chance to change. We are definitely aware of the considerable increase of minority population, including groups of Hispanic and Asian origins, due to continuing immigration since 1965. As a result, the share of the non-Hispanic white population (the large majority of which are middle class or upper middle class) decreases. This is likely to change the climate for the assimilation of the future immigrant generations. It, hence, may provide opportunities for a change in the power structure and distribution of social resources among different racial-ethnic immigrant groups in the future.

Appendix A:

Description of Background Control Variables

Variable	Description
Age	Constructed by subtracting the birth date (which was verified with Wave II and Wave III data for those who are interviewed at both or either of these two interviews) from the interview date of Wave I in-home interview and converted to an integer age.
Gender	Respondents' gender confirmed by the interviewer and Wave II and III data. Female coded 1 and male coded 0.
Race/Ethnicity	Respondents' racial and ethnic backgrounds. Reconstructed based on reports on several questions, including (1) whether the respondent is of Hispanic or Latino origin; (2) the particular Hispanic or Latino background if the respondent self-reported to be of Hispanic or Latino Origin. They have several choices, including Mexican/Mexican American, Chicano/Chicana, Cuban/Cuban American, Puerto Rican, Central/South American, or Other Hispanic; the racial background (White, Black or African American, American Indian or Native American, Asian or Pacific Islander, or Other) if the respondent reports to be a non-Hispanic; (4) the specific ethnic background if the respondent reports to be of Asian background. They can choose among Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Asian Indian, Korean, Vietnamese, or Other; (5) the report on the one racial category that respondents use to identify themselves. The ethnicities of those who were not born in the United States were further confirmed by their response to the question on the country where they were born and their response to their parents' country of birth at Wave I. The ethnic background of those who were born in the United States and whose parents were born in another country were further confirmed by the reports about their parents' country of birth at Wave I. Priority is given to respondents' mother's country of birth when both parents were born in different countries. If the mother was born in the United States and the father was born abroad, then the origin is determined by the father's birthplace. If there are any cases that cannot be confirmed, responses to questions at Wave III were included to determine students' ethnicity. Questions at Wave III include the prior 5 question used at Wave I, plus questions regarding family origin to list as many as four countries, groups, or geographic areas of origin. As a result, an ethnic background variable of nice categories were created (excluding Native Indian American as they are not of interest of this chapter): (1) Mexico; (2) Cuba; (3) Puerto Rico; (4) Caribbean and Central-South America (including those from Caribbean, Central America, and South America except Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico) (See details for the definition of Caribbean and Central-South American regions at http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/forcsa.html); (5) China, Japan, Korea and India (which have similar high-level parental human capital); (6) Philippines; (7) Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Pacific Island, and other Asian areas; (8) Europe/Canada (9) Africa

	A pan-ethnic indicator of four categories is also created: (1) Origins of Caribbean and Central-South America; (2) Asian origin; (3) European/Canadian origin; (4) African origin.
Immigrant generation	Reconstructed categorical variable based on students' reports on whether they were born in the U.S. at Wave I and III, the time when they first moved to the United States if they report to be born in a foreign country at Wave I, and on whether their parents were born in the U.S. at Wave I. Classified with 2 categories: (1) *second generation*, including those who were born in the U.S. but whose parents were in a foreign country, and those who arrived at the age of 12 or younger (age of arrival was calculated by subtracting the arrival time by the birth date); (2) *third- and plus- generation* are of those who were born in the U.S. and whose parents were also born in the U.S.
Race/Ethnicity by immigrant generation	A combination of two constructed indicators of racial/ethnic background and immigrant generation. Classified as 14 categories for which the second generation youth has enough sample to be identified by specific ethnic backgrounds while the third- and higher-generation youth have sufficient sample to be identified by pan-ethnic categories: (1) 2^{nd} generation Mexican/Mexican American; (2) 2^{nd} generation Cuban/Cuban American; (3) 2^{nd} generation youth of Puerto Rican background; (4) 2^{nd} generation youth of Caribbean, or Central-South American background; (5) 2^{nd} generation youth of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indian backgrounds; (6) 2^{nd} generation Filipino American; (7) 2^{nd} generation youth of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, Pacific Islander, and other Asian backgrounds; (8) 2^{nd} generation youth of European or Canadian backgrounds; (9) 2^{nd} generation youth of African American background; (10) 3^{rd}+ generation Mexican American; (11) 3^{rd}+ generation youth of Caribbean, and Central-South American background; (12) 3^{rd}+ generation youth of Asian background; (13) 3^{rd}+ generation youth of European background; (14) 3^{rd}+ generation youth of African American.
Parental education	Students' report of parents' educational level at Wave I. Coded as the highest level attained by either parent (the higher of the two parents if both are present) and categorized as the following scale: (1) *no high school diploma* (including those who never went to school and those who did not get a high school diploma or completed a GED; (2) *high school graduate*, or those who completed a GED; (3) *some college education* including those who went to college, but did not graduate and those who went to a business, trade, or vocational school; (4) *college degree or higher* (including those who graduated from a college or university or received professional training beyond a four year college or university; (5) *missing* either because the respondent doesn't know or refused, or doesn't know if the parent went to school, or the respondent doesn't know what level.
Parental occupation	Student's report of the kind of job either parent (the higher of the two parents if both are present) does at Wave I. Classified as four categories: (1) professional jobs (including professional 1, such as doctor, lawyer, scientist; professional 2, such as teacher, librarian, nurse, manager, technical, such as computer scientist, radiologist; (2) medium-level jobs (including office workers and sales workers); (3) low-level jobs (including service jobs, craftsperson, construction worker, mechanic, factory worker, transportation, military or security, farm worker or

	other); (4) missing parental occupation.
Intact family	A dichotomous variables based on students' report of whether they lived with two married biological or adopted parents in the home (coded 1) or whether they had any other family type, including stepfamilies, and single-parent families (coded 0).
Number of siblings	Count of student's report on all the siblings they have at Wave I.
Parental expectations	Calculated as the average of student's perception of how disappointed both parents would be if they did not graduate from college on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high) at Wave I. One report is included if the student lives with a single parent.
Intergenerational conflict	Mean response (ranging from 0 to 1) of students' reports on whether they have had a serious argument about their behavior with both parents in the past at Wave I. One report is included if the student lives with a single parent.
Bilingualism	A dichotomous indicator about students' report of whether they speak another language at home (coded as 1) or only speaking English at home (coded as 0)
School engagement	Calculated as the average of students' responses to the following two questions: had trouble paying attention in school, and had trouble getting homework done. Response categories ranges from 0 (never) to 4 (everyday). All the items were reverse coded so that a high score means greater engagement.
School region	National region where the school is situated. Classified as four regions: (1) West; (2) Midwest; (3) South; (4) Northeast.
Public school	School type with two categories: public school coded as 1 and private school as 0.

Figure 2.1. Comparing Status of No High School Diploma between Parent and Child, by Generation and Origin



Note: dotted line refers to the level of the third-generation non-Hispanic white individuals. If the difference between parent and child is statistically significant, they are represented as: $^{+}$p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Figure 2.2. Comparing Status of High School Graduation and College Education between Parent and Child, by Generation and Origin



Note: dotted line refers to the level of the third-generation non-Hispanic white individuals. If the difference between parent and child is statistically significant, they are represented as: $^{+}p<.10$, $^{*}p<.05$, $^{**}p<.01$, $^{***}p<.001$.

Figure 2.3. Comparing Three Educational Statuses among Second Generation and Third-and Higher-Generation Young Adults, by Generation and Origin



Note: If the difference between each generation-ethnic group and third- and higher-generation white youth is statistically significant, they are represented as: $^{+}$p<.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The "+" in parentheses means the percentage difference is higher than the reference group (the third- and higher-generation white youth); and "-" in parentheses means the percentage difference is lower than the reference group.

Figure 2.4. Adjusted Probability of College Education



Note: Underlined categories of generation-ethnicity refer to the increase of probability when the mean values of independent variables are adjusted to be the same as those of third- and higher-generation white men. Female young adults have similar patterns of adjusted probability of college education.

Table 2.1. Weighted Mean Differences of Independent Variables for the Full Sample and by Immigrant Generation-Ethnicity

		Second Generation				
Variable	Full Sample	2Mexico	2Cuba	2Puerto Rico	2Central/South America/Caribbean	**3Europe/ Canada**
N	13,073	682	297	157	219	**6860**
% of Full Sample (unweighted)	100.00	5.22	2.27	1.20	1.68	**52.47**
% of Full Sample (weighted)	100.00	3.68	6.47	6.98	1.66	**65.36**
% of Each Generation (unweighted)						
% of the sub-sample of second generation (N=2703)	100.00	25.23	10.99	5.81	8.10	**---**
(% of N of second generation) weighted	100.00	25.21	4.42	4.78	11.37	**---**
Demographic						
Age at 1994-1995 (11-21)	15.37	15.53	15.48	14.95	15.59	**15.33**
Age at 2001-2002 (18-27)	21.74	21.99	21.77	21.44	22.04	**21.70**
Female	.49	.45	.44+	.56	.52	**.50**
Family Capital						
Parental education						
< High school	.11	.57***	.25***	.20	.24***	**.07**
High school degree	.38	.22***	.41	.39	.26***	**.38**
College education	.48	.12***	.32***	.39+	.42*	**.52**
Missing	.04	.09***	.02	.02	.08+	**.03**
Parental occupation						
High-level professional jobs	.22	.07***	.15*	.05***	.14**	**.26**
Medium-level jobs	.06	.03**	.06	.09	.01***	**.06**
Low-level jobs	.44	.67***	.54	.42	.53*	**.45**
Missing	.29	.24	.26	.44*	.31*	**.23**
Family structure						
Intact family	.59	.72*	.67	.50*	.54+	**.63**
Number of siblings (range 0-12)	1.40	2.38***	1.18	1.67*	.1.70***	**1.28**
Acculturation Context						
Parental expectation for college (1-5)	3.95	3.74*	3.97	4.05	4.24**	**3.93**
Parent-child conflict (0-1)	.31	.27	.23***	.32	.30	**.32**
Bilingualism						
Speak another language at home	.06	.65***	.65***	.26***	.70***	**.00**
Individual Effort						
School engagement (0-4)	2.78	2.76	3.11***	2.71	2.87	**2.75**
School Context						
School region						
West	.16	.45**	.04*	.14	.14	**.13**
Midwest	.31	.05***	.00***	.07***	.06***	**.38**
South	.39	.46	.93***	.18+	.49	**.35**
Northeast	14	.04	.02***	.61+	.31	**.14**
Public school	.93	.98*	.99*	.91	.93	**.93**

Table 2.1. Weighted Mean Differences of Independent Variables for the Full Sample and by Immigrant Generation-Ethnicity (continued)

		Second Generation					
Variable	Full Sample	2China/Japan/ Korea/India	2Filippine	2Vietnam/ Pacific Island/Others	2Europe/Canada	2Africa	**3Europe/ Canada**
N	13,073	302	359	174	363	150	**6860**
% of Full Sample (unweighted)	100.00	2.31	2.75	1.33	2.78	1.15	**52.47**
% of Full Sample (weighted)	100.00	1.20	2.16	1.22	3.69	0.66	**65.36**
% of the sub-sample of second generation (N=2703)	100.00	11.17	13.28	6.44	13.43	5.55	**--**
(% of N of second generation) weighted	100.00	8.18	7.94	8.33	25.24	4.49	**--**
Demographic							
Age at 1994-1995 (11-21)	15.37	15.41	15.46	15.56	15.24	15.41	**15.33**
Age at 2001-2002 (18-27)	21.74	21.73	21.85	21.94	21.57	21.83	**21.70**
Female	.49	.43	.48	.49	.46	.47	**.50**
Family Capital							
Parental education							
< High school	.11	.12	.06	.17*	.08	.10	**.07**
High school degree	.38	.21***	.22***	.25*	.30**	.30	**.38**
College education	.48	.64+	.67*	.50	.61*	.45	**.52**
Missing	.04	.04	.05	.08	.02	.15*	**.03**
Parental occupation							
High-level professional jobs	.22	.44*	.22	.13***	.30	.21	**.26**
Medium-level jobs	.06	.04	.09	.07	.08	.01***	**.06**
Low-level jobs	.44	.40	.44	.57*	.41	.31*	**.45**
Missing	.29	.12***	.25	.22	.21	.47***	**.23**
Family structure							
Intact family	.59	.84***	.59	.77*	.69	.40***	**.63**
Number of siblings (range 0-12)	1.40	1.21	1.63*	2.11***	1.54**	1.50	**1.28**
Acculturation Context							
Parental expectation for college (1-5)	3.95	4.38***	4.31**	4.33**	3.93	4.02	**3.93**
Parent-child conflict (0-1)	.31	.30	.30	.27	.28	.23*	**.32**
Bilingualism							
Speak another language at home	.06	.43***	.26***	.54***	.09***	.06*	**.00**

Individual Effort							
School engagement (0-4)	2.78	2.86	2.81	3.00*	2.78	2.98*	**2.75**
School Context							
School region							
West	.16	.34*	.89***	.32*	.19*	.16	**.13**
Midwest	.31	.17*	.01***	.29	.31	.13**	**.38**
South	.39	.17**	.05***	.23	.25*	.46	**.35**
Northeast	14	.32**	.04***	.15	.25*	.25	**.14**
Public school	.93	.82	.85	.87	.91	.87	**.93**

Table 2.1. Weighted Mean Differences of Independent Variables for the Full Sample and by Immigrant Generation (continued)

		Third generation				
Variable	Full Sample	3Mexico	3Central/South America/Caribbean	3Asian	3Africa	**3Europe/ Canada**
N	13,073	441	231	202	2636	**6860**
% of the sub-sample of third generation (unweighted) (N = 10,370)	100.00	4.25	2.23	1.95	25.42	**66.15**
% of the sub-sample of third generation (weighted)	100.00	.04	.01	.01	.18	**.77**
Demographic						
Age at 1994-1995 (11-21)	15.37	15.17	15.55	14.78	15.53	**15.33**
Age at 2001-2002 (18-27)	21.74	21.52	21.90	21.03**	21.89	**21.70**
Female	.49	.48	.44	.44	.50	**.50**
Family Capital						
Parental education						
< High school	.11	.20***	.13	.02***	.13***	**.07**
High school degree	.38	.43+	.40	.40	.44+	**.38**
College education	.48	.33***	.45	.57	.37***	**.52**
Missing	.04	.03	.02	.02	.06***	**.03**
Parental occupation						
High-level professional jobs	.22	.16**	.16*	.24	.09***	**.26**
Medium-level jobs	.06	.04	.06	.06	.03***	**.06**
Low-level jobs	.44	.50	.39	.46	.28***	**.45**
Missing	.29	.29	.39**	.24	.58***	**.23**
Family structure						
Intact family	.59	.54**	.47**	.66	.32***	**.63**
Number of siblings (range 0-12)	1.40	1.62**	1.47+	1.48+	1.51**	**1.28**
Acculturation Context						
Parental expectation for college (1-5)	3.95	3.81	3.94	4.14*	3.97	**3.93**
Parent-child conflict (0-1)	.31	.33	.31	.35	.27**	**.32**
Bilingualism						
Speak another language at home	.06	.06***	.05*	.06	.00	**.00**
Individual Effort						
School engagement (0-4)	2.78	2.63	2.73+	2.74	2.90***	**2.75**
School Context						
School region						
West	.16	.47***	.13	.81***	.06*	**.13**
Midwest	.31	.18**	.21**	.08***	.21*	**.38**
South	.39	.34	.18**	.05***	.67***	**.35**
Northeast	14	.01	.48**	.05***	.05***	**.14**

Public school	.93	.94	.88	.83	.96	**.93**

Note: each mean is compared with the mean of 3rd generation white; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table 2.2. Logit Coefficients on the Determinants of College Education, by Generation-Ethnicity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Race-Ethnicity					
(3rd-gen non-Hispanic White)					
2nd-gen Mexico	-0.641***	0.256	0.271	0.241	0.327*
	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.152)	(0.147)
2nd-gen Cuba	0.674*	1.169**	1.131**	1.011**	1.134**
	(0.260)	(0.253)	(0.235)	(0.262)	(0.256)
2nd-gen Puerto Rico	-0.604	-0.212	-0.190	-0.219	-0.337
	(0.419)	(0.373)	(0.385)	(0.397)	(0.417)
2nd-gen Central-South America/Caribbean	-0.061	0.376	0.437	0.310	0.303
	(0.259)	(0.261)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.225)
2nd-gen China/Japan/ Korea/India	1.309***	1.276**	1.194**	1.116**	1.087**
	(0.270)	(0.351)	(0.345)	(0.327)	(0.333)
2nd-gen Philippine	0.619*	0.571**	0.574**	0.490*	0.542*
	(0.246)	(0.196)	(0.204)	(0.198)	(0.215)
2nd-gen Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos/ Pacific Island/Others	0.566+	0.875*	0.860*	0.709*	0.700*
	(0.319)	(0.340)	(0.336)	(0.330)	(0.323)
2nd-gen Europe	0.594***	0.555**	0.558**	0.585**	0.558**
	(0.158)	(0.168)	(0.163)	(0.174)	(0.175)
2nd-gen Africa	0.658*	1.108**	1.192**	1.107**	1.089**
	(0.301)	(0.334)	(0.339)	(0.341)	(0.342)
3rd-gen Mexican American	-0.534**	-0.222	-0.178	-0.155	-0.0859
	(0.173)	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.171)	(0.171)
3rd-gen Asian	-0.308	-0.103	-0.0513	-0.0874	-0.200
	(0.225)	(0.239)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.253)
3rd-gen other Hispanic	0.089	0.0252	0.0240	0.0112	0.0303
	(0.355)	(0.358)	(0.354)	(0.360)	(0.312)
3rd-gen African American	-0.523***	-0.152	-0.0833	-0.177	-0.113
	(0.145)	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.123)
Age	-0.075**	-0.0812**	-0.0823**	-0.0600**	-0.0602**
	(0.025)	(0.0221)	(0.0222)	(0.0224)	(0.0221)
Female	0.388***	0.490**	0.491**	0.460**	0.467**
	(0.054)	(0.0627)	(0.0616)	(0.0640)	(0.0638)
Family Capital					
Parental education					
(High school degree)					
Less than high school		-0.710**	-0.685**	-0.654**	-0.629**
		(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.102)
Some college		0.470**	0.476**	0.467**	0.475**
		(0.0777)	(0.0769)	(0.0773)	(0.0766)
College education or higher		1.033**	1.024**	0.965**	0.958**
		(0.0817)	(0.0818)	(0.0833)	(0.0823)
Missing		-0.800**	-0.765**	-0.788**	-0.779**
		(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.153)
Parental occupation					
(Low-level jobs)					
High-level professional jobs		0.820**	0.806**	0.781**	0.765**
		(0.0853)	(0.0876)	(0.0868)	(0.0852)
Medium-level jobs		0.552**	0.553**	0.533**	0.521**
		(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)

Missing		-0.188**	0.187**	0.186**	0.186**
		(0.0580)	(0.0643)	(0.0648)	(0.0650)
Intact Family			0.601**	0.556**	0.552**
			(0.0637)	(0.0649)	(0.0665)
Number of siblings			-0.0790**	-0.0715**	-0.0739**
			(0.0251)	(0.0255)	(0.0249)
Acculturation context					
Parental expectation for college				0.208**	0.206**
				(0.0291)	(0.0280)
Parent-child conflict				-0.210**	-0.217**
				(0.0615)	(0.0607)
School engagement				0.212**	0.218**
				(0.0352)	(0.0355)
School context					
School region (West)					
Midwest					0.146
					(0.175)
South					-0.0326
					(0.124)
Northeast					0.304+
					(0.162)
Public school					-0.419*
					(0.175)
Constant	0.968*	0.429	0.0795	-1.537**	-1.234**
	(0.378)	(0.329)	(0.342)	(0.374)	(0.420)
N	13073	13073	13073	13073	13073

CHAPTER 3: WILL CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRANT YOUTH BE ACCULTURATED TO COHABIT? UNION FORMATION PATTERNS DURING TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD

One of the most profound demographic changes that ushered in the new millennium was the large influx of immigrants to the U.S. and the rapidly changing ethnic diversity of the U.S. population since the 1965 Immigration Act (Portes and Rumbaut 1990). With the huge increase in immigrants added to the population annually since 1965, immigrant children (first generation) and U.S.-born children of immigrants (second generation) are the fastest growing portion of the U.S. population. Unlike descendants of immigrants from Europe in the early 20th century, many contemporary children of immigrants have Asian or Hispanic origins (Portes and Rumbaut 1990).

The racial and ethnic diversity and rapid increase of children of immigrants have transformed the social, economic and cultural foundations of their adaptation processes. Although considerable research has used cross-sectional data to explore outcomes of immigrant adults, very few studies have taken a developmental and comparative approach to examine adaptation processes in young adulthood depending upon acculturation stages and over the life span. Within the past several years more attention has been given to the adaptation experiences and outcomes of children of recent immigrants (Porte 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001), especially educational outcomes during childhood and adolescence. However, when the focus shifted to children of post-

1965 immigrants, many of these children have already reached the stages of young adulthood. We therefore lack a developmental view of how these young adults have adapted to American society over the life course as they aged from adolescence to adulthood. This gap is largely due to a lack of data on life trajectories for immigrant children or missing information on nativity and immigrant status of young adults (Edmonston 1996; Hogan and Eggebeen 1997; Jasso, Massay, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000; Jensen and Chitose 1996; Porte 1996).

Recent data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) has made possible exciting new research on adaptation processes in terms of transitional events in various life domains during young adulthood among individuals of different immigrant generations. Add Health over-sampled certain Hispanic and Asian ethnic groups which increases the number of immigrant children for analysis. The study began in the mid-1990s, capturing the increasing representation of children of immigrants who were in grades 7 through 12 at Wave I, and has unprecedented diversity in race and ethnicity on a national level. Add Health followed the respondents one year later for a Wave II interview, and then in 2001-02 for a Wave III in-home interview, and recorded life history events in various life domains during respondents' transition to adulthood.

In this chapter, I use Add Health data to examine how union formation processes differ across various acculturation stages during the transition to young adulthood among children of immigrants. I first use an event-history approach to describe differences in age patterns of union formation, including cohabitation and first marriage for three immigrant generations: (1) the first generation (foreign-born individuals with foreign-born parents); (2) the second generation (U.S.-born children with foreign-born parents);

and (3) the third- and higher-generation (U.S.-born children with U.S.-born parents). Union formation differences are further assessed by the level of English language assimilation and by controlling for other covariates, like individual, family and structural factors. Our study contributes to the family literature that has not taken a thorough look at ethnic and immigrant generational differences in union formation processes, and advances knowledge on social trends of family change due to the recent wave of immigration.

Union Formation Processes for Individuals at Different Acculturation Stages

Compared to the assimilation context for early European immigrants and their descendants in the early 20th century, the social stages of adaptation for the new wave of immigration have become more complex, and diversified (Perlmann and Waters 2004). Norms about marriage and sexual relationship have greatly changed in many post-industrialized countries. Over the last 40 years in the U.S., dramatic changes in union formation are characterized by the postponement of marriage, declining marriage rates, rising rates of unmarried cohabitation, and high divorce rates (Cherlin 1992; Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart, and Landry 1992; Sweet and Bumpass 1987; Waite 2000). Interestingly, these sweeping changes in the family happened almost at the same time as the large wave of post-1965 immigration ushered in. As a result, the adaptation context of union formation became much more complex for contemporary children of immigrants because immigrant families and communities with Asian and Latin American backgrounds have very different norms about family formation in which they raise their

children. When western norms and non-western norms about family collide, the type of life styles children of immigrants choose remains an interesting question.

According to assimilation theories, socialization context plays an important role in acculturation processes for immigrant children (Portes 1996b; Zhou 1999). Comparing children of different immigrant generations, both foreign-born children to foreign-born parents (first generation) and native-born children to foreign-born parents (second generation) are more likely to have a closer tie to their ethnic values and cultural traditions than the third generation who are native born with native-born parents. Children in immigrant families are more likely to live in intact families and speak another language other than English at home, especially first generation youth. Furthermore, immigrant families are typically embedded in tightly knit social networks within ethnic communities where children are socialized (Zhou 1997; Zhou and Bankston 1996). Such networks of social relations reinforce ethnic norms about family formation and other life events, and operate as social controls on children's choices of life styles. Therefore, children in immigrant families may be more likely to take in the family values of their parents reinforced by ethnic communities, and choose life styles that conform to their ethnic norms. Based on the social context in which immigrant children grow up, I expect youth in immigrant families to choose the more traditional route of marriage rather than the western form of cohabitation when they form close intimate partnerships.

In contrast, when children are native born to parents who are also native born, and most of their parents are whites and African Americans, the socialization environment for them is quite different. As children are socialized in American ways through their exposure to the native cultural and family structural contexts, they are more likely to

adopt the developmental behavior typical of American contemporaries. Numerous studies have documented the increasing prevalence of cohabitation as an alternative and acceptable union type that portrays a cultural retreat from marriage among native-born whites and African Americans (Smock 2000). Based on previous findings, I expect that third-generation young adults are more likely to choose widely accepted western way of cohabitation for union formation rather than marriage first.

During the acculturation process, language assimilation plays an important role in measuring individual distance from the host society (Portes and Hao 1998). Norms and values are mainly transmitted through language and communication. When immigrant children are able to speak their parents' language, communication between the two generations becomes much smoother and parents with a foreign tongue are able to hand down values of their own ethnic group to their children in a more effective and natural way, promoting parental socialization of children. Some studies have examined the effect of language assimilation on educational outcomes and found a positive effect of bilingualism on educational aspirations (Portes 1996b) and academic performance (Zhou and Bankston 1998).

However, not much research has been done to investigate the relationship between the level of linguistic assimilation and other outcomes, especially adult experiences in different life domains. This study uses language assimilation as an alternative measure of acculturation to examine its effect on union formation patterns during the transition to adulthood among immigrant descendants. Previous studies have shown rapid language assimilation across immigrant generation: the first generation is more likely to be bilingual than the second generation, and monolingualism (only speaking English)

becomes a general pattern among the third generation (Portes 1996b). The risk of rapid assimilation is that it can alienate children from their immigrant parents and can lead them to reject their native culture (Mouw and Xie 1999). Bilingualism bridges both the language and cultural gap between the parent and child and leads the child to adopt the cultural values and behaviors that their parents practice. Based on this evidence, when I consider the union formation patterns among immigrant descendants, I expect that those who speak a foreign language at home are more likely to adopt the conventional union form of marriage and reject the western way of cohabitation before marriage than those with greater language assimilation who only speak English at home.

Based on the theoretical arguments presented, I pursue several research goals in this chapter: 1) identify and compare patterns of the transition to first cohabitation and first marriage among young adults at different stages of acculturation; 2) examine the effect of acculturation factors, measured by immigrant generation and level of language assimilation, on transitions to cohabitation and marriage during young adulthood; and 3) evaluate the importance of acculturation effects when cultural and structural factors are controlled for at individual, family and local community levels.

Data and Methods

Data are drawn from Wave I and Wave III of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). In 1995 Add Health conducted a survey of a nationally representative sample of over 20,000 adolescents in grades 7 to12 in the U.S., collecting unique data on the social contexts in which adolescents live, including family, school, and neighborhood contexts. In 2001-02 Add Health conducted the third in-home

interview with 15,197 original respondents from Wave I, now aged 18-26. Wave III provides longitudinal data to document trajectories out of adolescence and into the transition to adulthood in various domains, including union formation, career development, and higher education. Add Health has extraordinarily rich information about relationships, and a complete history of cohabitation and marriage. The richness of the event history data on transitions in early adulthood, accompanied with unprecedented information about race, ethnicity, and immigrant generation at a national level, makes it possible for us to explore union formation processes among individuals of different immigrant generations during their transition to young adulthood. Our analysis sample is restricted to respondents who were never married at Wave I (only a handful) and who had valid data on all the variables of concern in Wave I and III. These restrictions result in a sample size of 13,313.

Add Health used a multistage, stratified, school-based, clustering sampling design. These characteristics must be incorporated into analyses to obtain unbiased parameter estimates concerning the entire population, unbiased estimates of variance and standard errors, and correct statistical test results (Chantala 2001). Both our univariate and multivariate analyses therefore take into account these characteristics, including sampling weights, stratification and clustering.

I have chosen age 8 as initial age that marks the onset of continuous exposure to the risk of cohabitation or marriage. The observation period begins at 8 years of age for each individual and ends at the age of first cohabitation, first marriage, or the date of interview at Wave III if the individual never cohabits or marries by Wave III. Duration is based on person-years, and individuals either experience an event or are censored by the interview

at Wave III. The analyses consist of two steps. In the first step, life-table techniques are used to examine the age patterns of union formation by immigrant generation.

In the second step, event-history models are used to analyze the transition to different types of union formation. A discrete-time method of event-history analysis is employed where the discrete dependent variable is a transition into a co-residential union (Allison 1995). The dependent variable is classified by the type of transition: first cohabitation, first marriage without cohabitation beforehand, or no cohabitation or marriage (censored cases by the time of Wave III interview). Cohabitation and marriage are treated as "competing risks" (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980). To explain the process of transition to union formation, a multinomial logit model is estimated contrasting the determinants of censored cases with the two types of union formation separately. The probability that an observation falls into each state of the dependent variable is a function of the attributes of the observation so that a different set of parameters is estimated for each choice.

Using maximum likelihood methods, the basic model estimated is

$$Log \frac{P_{ij}}{P_{iJ}} = \alpha_j + X_i \beta_j$$

where a_j is a constant and b_j is a vector of regression coefficients for transition path j, for j = 1, 2, , J-1 (number of transition routes). Our prediction of the odds of cohabitation and marriage are based on multinomial logistic regression models. I estimate the odds of 1) first cohabitation versus no union; 2) first marriage versus no union. I assume that factors of interest have different influences on the odds of cohabitation and of marriage. Duration is specified in the model by including a set of dummy variables for the ages 8-16 and 17-22, with ages 23-28 as the reference. For each type of transition, the

model allows a different base (or intercept) transition rate during the last age interval of 23-28 from the rates of transition in the other age intervals.

Our general strategy is to test a series of models, first estimating a "baseline" model (duration, sex, immigrant generation) to examine the generational differences on the odds of cohabitation and marriage. I build progressively on this baseline model by adding cultural factors, including ethnicity and religiosity, in model 2; structural factors, including parental education, family structure, and number of siblings, in model 3; contextual variables, including school region, proportion of Hispanics and proportion of female-headed households in the neighborhood, and urbanicity, in model 4 to evaluate the extent to which generational differences in decisions to cohabit and marry persist after a series of controls. Then I use linguistic assimilation as an alternative acculturation measure to immigrant generation to examine its effect on union formation patterns, following the same steps employed for immigrant generation.

Measures

Acculturation is measured by immigrant generation and bilingualism. Immigrant generation is coded as a three-category variable: foreign-born children to foreign-born parents (first generation), native-born children to foreign-born parents (second generation) and native-born children to native-born parents (third generation). Bilingualism is measured by language spoken at home to capture the level of linguistic assimilation. It is coded as three dummy variables for English, Spanish, and other languages. As these two variables are highly correlated, they can not be examined in the same model. Instead I run separate models for each measure to test for the robustness of our acculturation findings.

The control variables in this analysis include sex (female =1), cultural factors, structural factors at the family level, and social context characteristics. Cultural factors can be regarded as forces that promote cultural and ethnic norms that reinforce views about traditional family structures, and orient young adults' choices for types of union formation. I measure cultural factors by ethnic background and religiosity. Ethnic background is defined as a nine-category variable: Mexican, Cuban, Central and South American, Puerto Rican, Chinese, Filipino, Other Asian, African and Afro-Caribbean, and Canadian and European. Race and ethnic background is self-identified by the respondent.[1] Religiosity is measured by summing responses from Wave I on how often the child attends church (responses range from 0 = no religion, 1= never, to 4 = once a week or more) and respondents' reports of the importance of religion (range from 0 = not at all to 4 = very important).

I control for parental education, family structure, and number of siblings as structural factors in the family environment that influence the union formation patterns of children. As argued by life course theory (Elder 1997; Elder 1998), family formation decisions are often influenced by life trajectories of linked lives within a family. Those who have grown up in unstable families and whose parents have experienced cohabitation tend to make similar life choices (Axinn and Thornton 1993; Thornton 1991; Thornton, Axinn, and Hill 1992). Although little is known about union formation patterns in immigrant families across different ethnic groups, previous research indicates that immigrant families are more likely to be intact than native families, and emphasize

[1] In Add Health, respondents are allowed to check multiple categories of race and ethnicity. For the small number of respondents who indicate mixed race and/or ethnicity, we identify one major ethnic group to which they belong by exploring their responses on country of birth and parents' country birth.

family solidarity (Foner 1997). Children in immigrant families are also more likely to have many siblings who further reinforce norms about traditional family forms, and influence their siblings' union formation trajectories towards marriage. Add Health allows for rich detail on family living arrangements, classifying adolescents who live with two biological or adoptive parents, a biological parent (mainly the mother) and a step parent, single mother, single father, and surrogate or foster parents (including grandparents, aunts and uncles, other adult relatives, or non-relative adults). Number of siblings is a count variable.

Socioeconomic disadvantage is found to reduce the odds of marriage and increases the risks of cohabitation (Manning and Smock 1995). Children in immigrant families with lower parental education may experience a "downward assimilation," characterized by adopting life styles that run counter to traditional ethnic norms through choosing western ways of cohabitation (Axinn and Thornton 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993; Schoen 1992; Zhou 1999). Parental education (the higher of the two parents if both are present) is measured as a set of dummy variables: less than high school; high school graduate; some college; college graduate; and missing parental educational data.

At the contextual level, I include school region, neighborhood characteristics (proportion of Hispanics and proportion of female-headed household), and urbanicity (urban =1) as control variables. School region is defined by four categories: West, Midwest, South (baseline), and Northeast. All the independent variables of concern come from Wave I in-home interview because their influence is likely to develop during adolescence when individuals begin to experience romantic relationships and form their expectations for subsequent union formation.

Results

Exploratory Analysis

Our sample has an age range between 18 and 28 years at the time of Wave III interview (99.3% of respondents are 25 or younger).[2] Among 13,313 of the young adults who provide retrospective reports on their cohabitation and marriage history, 37% report to have cohabited at least once without prior marriage while 11% report that they got married first without cohabitation. Consistent with current cultural norms in the U.S. among young people aged 18-28, cohabitation is much more a popular path of union formation than marriage.

Figure 3.1 presents the hazard rate of first cohabitation by immigrant generation, derived from the life table analysis. Clear immigrant generational differences are present in the transition to first cohabitation. Across all ages, both the second and third generation have higher rates of entry into cohabitation than first generation descendants, with the exception of the ages 21-22 when the first generation has a slightly higher rate than the second generation. Third-generation individuals not only have much higher rates of cohabitation since age 18 than the first and second generation, but also experience a steep increase in the hazard rate between age 18 and 24. It is noteworthy that the second generation, who are more acculturated into the American society, experience higher rates of cohabitation than first-generation young adults. First-generation young people not only show much lower rates of cohabitation than the second and third generation, but their age

[2] The majority of the sample is between ages 18 and 26, with a handful aged 27 and 28.

pattern differs as well. Among the first generation, the rate of change in the hazard with increasing age is much lower (hazard function is flatter), except the peak that shows a higher rate during the age interval of 21-22, but even this peak is much lower than that of the second and third generation.

Figure 3.2 shows the cumulative probability of cohabitation by age across immigrant generations. We see again that with increasing acculturation across the immigrant generations, the probability of first cohabitation increases. The least acculturated first generation have the lowest probabilities of cohabitation and the cultural standard bearers in the native-born population have the highest probabilities. The figure indicates that 60% of third-generation respondents have cohabited by the age of 26, as compared to 44% of the second generation and 37% of the first generation. These differences are statistically significant at the .001 level, as indicated by the log-rank test (chi-square 177.0389, df =2, $p < .0001$).

Similar to the transition into cohabitation, the patterns for entry into first marriage without cohabitation beforehand also differ by immigrant generation. Here the least acculturated more often choose the traditional route of marriage in their union formation behavior. Figure 3.3 shows that first-generation young adults have higher rates of marriage since age 19, especially during the young ages 21-23, than the second and third generation. Second and third generation youth catch up during age 24 when their rate of marriage increases substantially. These findings indicate earlier entry into marriage among the first-generation young adults, and more delayed marriage for the second and third generation.

The cumulative probability of first marriage shown in Figure 3.4 begins to diverge to higher levels among first generation youth at age 22. Differences are statistically significant at the .05 level, as indicated by the log-rank test (chi-square 7.777, df =2, p < .02). By age 25, 25% of the first-generation youth have entered marriage without cohabitation beforehand compared to 21% of the second- and third-generation immigrant descendants. Interestingly, the pattern of first marriage among second-generation youth differs little from the third generation.

These results are consistent with our expectations about the effect of acculturation on union formation transitions. The hazard of conforming to the western norm of cohabitation rises as immigrant children in the second generation are more acculturated to American society. Acculturation also slows entry into marriage that is not proceeded by cohabitation such that second generation young adults have the same marriage patterns as the third generation; whereas the least acculturated first generation follow more traditional routes of early marriage.

Before conducting multivariate analyses to examine whether these effects of acculturation hold up in the context of control variables that may influence both acculturation processes and the hazard of cohabitation and marriage, we examine generational differences across each control variable of interest. Table 2.1 displays the weighted means of control variables by immigrant generation. These variables are found to vary across immigrant generation, and the mean differences for most variables except sex and the proportion of female-headed households in the neighborhood are statistically significant at either the .001 or .01 level. Consistent with previous findings (Jensen and Chitose 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Zhou 2002), first-

and second-generation immigrant children are more likely to have Latin American or Asian ethnic backgrounds. The distributions on language spoken at home show rapid linguistic assimilation across generations. About 72% of first-generation youth speak another language other than English at home, with a rapid drop to 30% of foreign language use at home among second-generation descendants. In contrast, over 99% of the third generation who are mostly of European/Canadian or African origins only speaks English at home. Children from immigrant families are socialized in a different cultural environment where they are more likely to speak a foreign language other than English at home, and are more religious (especially the first generation) than the third-generation individuals.

Although first- and second-generation immigrant children are much more likely to have less educated parents, they are also more likely to live in intact two-parent families, consistent with previous research (Chapman and Bernstein 2003). Moreover, youth in immigrant families are much more likely than third-generation youth to reside and attend schools in the West, South and Northwest, and to be concentrated in urban areas and in neighborhoods with high proportions of Hispanic population. The cultural and structural realms at both the micro- and macro-levels during adolescence suggest a different socialization environment for first- and second-generation youth in immigrant families, which in turn is likely to affect their early adult decisions in various domains including union formation patterns.

Regression Analysis

Discrete time models of competing risks provide an empirical framework to explore the factors that predict the hazard rate of different union formation choice among young adults at different acculturation stages. Defining the dependent variable as a polytomous choice of union formation, I use a multinomial logit regression to estimate the probability of the transition to first cohabitation and the transition to first marriage, relative to censoring. Odds ratios and standard errors for regression coefficients are shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Note that the results displayed represent the preferred model attained through several stages of model testing. The first column of each model in both Table 2.2 and 2.3 presents odds for cohabitation versus no union and the second column displays odds for marriage versus no union.

Multinomial regression results provide some support for our expectations regarding the relationship between acculturation and rates of cohabitation and marriage when other factors are controlled. Table 2.2 shows results that particularly focus on the effect of immigrant generation as one of the measures of acculturation. The baseline model (Model 1) includes duration, sex, and immigrant generation. The second model adds the cultural factors, ethnic background and religiosity. The third model adds the family structural variables parental education, family structure, and number of siblings. The fourth model includes contextual factors, including school region, proportion Hispanic and proportion of female-headed household in the neighborhood, and urbanicity.[3]

[3] Assuming that there is gender difference in union formation processes, I did a chow test, running models that generated two sets of coefficients, with one for male and other for female, and testing whether these pairs of coefficients are equal. The results indicated that no gender differences in the effect of the cohabitation factors on cohabitation and marriage, which means the acculturation processes of cohabitation and marriage are similar to male and female immigrant descendants. So I do not run separate models for male and female respondents. Details about this chow test are available upon request.

Column 1 of the baseline model (Model 1) indicates a significant effect of immigrant generation on union formation choices such that the first- and second-generation youth have lower rates of cohabitation than the third generation controlling for sex. The lower rate of cohabitation among first generation young adults remains significant with little change in its effect size when cultural, structural and contextual factors are added progressively to the model. The odds ratio in Model 4 shows that first generation youth have 30% lower rate of first cohabitation than the third generation. In contrast, there is substantial change in significance level (from $p<.01$ Model 1 to $p<.10$ in Model 4) for the negative effect of second generation on the rate of cohabitation, indicating that part of the negative effect is explained away by cultural, structural and contextual variables.

Among the ethnic differences found, Chinese stand out as a unique ethnic group with a 43% (in Model 4) lower likelihood of cohabiting compared to whites (of European/Canadian origin). Higher levels of religiosity reduce the odds of cohabitation among young people. Those from socioeconomic advantageous families (with higher parental education) are less likely to cohabit during young adulthood. Non-intact family structures represented by living in a step-family, with a single parent or with surrogate parents increase the odds of cohabitation among young adults. These results are consistent with previous findings that show children from unstable families are more likely to cohabit (Axinn and Thornton 1993; Thornton 1991). In addition, those who reside and attend school in the Midwest during adolescence are more likely to cohabit than those in the South, where traditional values are emphasized. Those who live in neighborhoods with a higher proportion of female-headed households are more likely to

choose cohabitation over marriage, suggesting neighborhood socialization away from marriage.

In contrast to cohabitation, Column 2 of Model 1 shows the results for the transition to first marriage without prior cohabitation during young adulthood. Consistent with our bivariate results from life table analysis, I find that first generation young adults enter marriage at younger ages than the third generation. However, the rate of marriage among second-generation adults is not significantly different from that of the third generation, also consistent with the life table results presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.

When cultural, structural, and contextual variables are added sequentially to Model 1, the generational difference in first marriage between the immigrant children and native-born persists throughout the three models (except Model 3). In Model 4, the results indicate that first-generation youth have a 50% higher rate of first marriage than the third generation. Results on the other covariates are as expected. Religiosity promotes the choice of marriage without prior cohabitation compared to no union. Greater number of siblings within the household also encourages young adults to leave home and marry. The only ethnic difference is found between African and European offspring, with African/Afro-Caribbean youth having lower rates of first marriage than whites, consistent with much of the previous research on racial differences in marriage (Lichter, McLaughlin, LeClere, Kephart, and Landry 1992; Mare and Winship 1991; Raley 1996). Chinese ($p<.10$) and other Asian ($p<.10$) seem to have lower rates of marriage than their white peer during early adulthood. Those who have postsecondary education (especially with a bachelor's degree or higher) are more likely to stay unmarried, implicitly suggesting their alternative choice of delayed marriage (Mortimer

and Larson 2002). Those who resided and attended school in regions other than South are less likely to choose marriage than no union, again reflecting the more conservative culture in the south.

When language assimilation is included as a substitute for immigrant generation in Table 2.3, I again find a significant effect of acculturation on both transitions to first cohabitation and first marriage. In particular, those who speak Spanish at home have a much lower rate of cohabitation than those who only speak English at home even when all covariates are entered into Model 4. Those who speak another language (mostly an Asian language) at home also have lower rates of cohabitation than native-speakers when cultural, structural and contextual factors are controlled.

Concerning marriage timing, those with Spanish as a second language are much more likely to enter marriage without prior cohabitation. However, this effect is explained away when cultural, structural and contextual variables are progressively added. Those who use other languages at home are not significantly different in the timing of marriage from native-speakers. This finding indicates a different acculturation milieu between the Hispanic community and other ethnic (especially Asian) communities for immigrant descendants' adaptation experiences in marriage behavior during young adulthood. Descriptive results in Table 3.4 about weighted mean differences in control variables across three language categories indicate that Hispanic speakers are more religious, come from families with lower human capital, live with more siblings, and reside and attend schools in the South than English and other language speakers. These distinctive characteristics increases rate of first marriage, which explains why the effect of Hispanic language diminishes when these factors are added to the model. Endorsement

of early marriage is successfully handed down to immigrant descendants of Hispanic origin through family, cultural, and religious mechanism when young people preserve the language of their own ethnic community. Almost all the results for control variables in Table 3.3 are quite similar to those in Table 3.2 when immigrant generation variable is included, so they are not repeatedly reported.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this study I have documented the effects of acculturation on union formation patterns among immigrant descendants not previously found in life course studies or research on the adaptation experiences of immigrant offspring. We argued that when children experience a greater degree of acculturation into U.S. society, they are more likely to adopt the western way of union formation by cohabiting before marriage instead of choosing the conventional route of marriage without cohabiting first. We use alternative measures of acculturation, immigrant generation and language assimilation, to provide a fuller picture of acculturation processes in union formation patterns among immigrant youth during transition to young adulthood. Our findings are robust and provide support for our hypotheses about the effects of acculturation.

Both first- and second-generation young adults have lower rates of cohabitation, and the first generation has higher rates of marriage relative to young people of the third generation when cultural, structural and contextual variables are controlled. Language assimilation provides additional insights into union formation patterns among young immigrant descendants. Bilingualism either in Spanish or Asian languages restrains immigrant youth from taking the western path of cohabitation. Those who speak Spanish

with their family at home are evidently reinforced by traditional family values and norms, displayed by their higher rates of entry into marriage without prior cohabitation.

The results on language assimilation complement the findings on generation effects in that it is largely the first generation who are bilingual (Table 3.1) and it is mainly the first generation that show distinctly traditional behavior with respect to union formation. The second generation, which is more acculturated than the first, has readily adopted contemporary marriage patterns away from early marriage, but is still slow to adopt the western move towards cohabitation, and when native-born children of foreign-born parents retain their ethnic language skills at home, they are especially less likely to cohabit.

Previous research shows that cohabitation has several adverse consequences, including lower marital quality and increasing risk of divorce (Axinn and Thornton 1992; Schoen 1992; Teachman, Thomas, and Paasch 1991; Thomson and Colella 1992). Thus, rapid acculturation exposes immigrant children to a more open context where individualism, freedom, and tolerance of alternative life styles are widespread, and increase their risks of cohabitation, possibly resulting in a lower quality of family life. On the other hand, a slower pace of acculturation and attachment to their ethnic community through language preservation during adolescence may prevent youth in immigrant families from choosing unfamiliar lifestyles that lack family support when they enter young adulthood and are no longer under parental control. Especially in Hispanic communities, the traditional form of marriage is passed down to the younger generation through language attachment.

This study is one of the first to examine the processes of cohabitation and marriage among immigrant youth in their transition to adulthood. Both exploratory and multivariate results indicate that the process of cohabitation is distinct from marriage. In early adulthood, individuals are more likely to cohabit than enter marriage without cohabitation across all immigrant generations in American society, revealed by higher rates of cohabitation than marriage across all three generations. A slower pace of acculturation not only prevents but also delays cohabitation among immigrant descendants. Especially influenced by the contemporary trend of delayed marriage in the United States, native-born youth in immigrant families (the second generation), do not enter marriage at an early age as their parents did, but also do not choose cohabitation, but instead may delay marriage until they have established themselves socially and economically in the mainstream society. Cultural differences are also found that Hispanic speakers have revealed its uniqueness in espousing early marriage. Such family value can be transmitted inter-generationally through family and religious forces when children from Hispanic families preserve their language that smoothens the communication and interaction with their parents and ethnic community.

Generally speaking, this research uses a developmental approach and longitudinal design to understand adaptation process in union formation among young adults of immigrant descendants, underscores the complexity of this process and broadens the basis for future research on the life course of immigrant offspring. Our contribution provides substantial evidence that patterns of union formation differ during young adulthood depending upon the degree of acculturation when cultural, structural, and contextual variables are held constant. This is the first evidence of this kind that examines

the relationship between acculturation process and union formation pattern, and provides nationally representative results for a diverse set of ethnic groups and immigrant population, setting the stage for further investigation into adaptation experiences in the family domain over the life trajectory, and contributing to the larger picture of family change in an increasingly diverse American society.

Figure 3.1. Hazard Rate of First Cohabitation by Immigrant Generation



Figure 3.2. Cumulative Probability of First Cohabitation by Immigrant Generation



Figure 3.3. Hazard Rate of First Marriage by Immigrant Generation



Figure 3.4. Cumulative Probability of First Marriage by Immigrant Generation



Table 3.1. Weighted Means of Independent Variables by Immigrant Generation

	Generation 1 (Foreign-Born/Foreign-Born Parents)	Generation 2 (Native-Born/Foreign-Born Parents)	Generation 3 (Native-Born/Native-Born Parents)
Sex			
Male	.510	.506	.483
Female	.490	.494	.513
Ethnicity***			
Mexican	.258	.259	.033
Cuban	.036	.037	.001
Central-South American	.194	.089	.009
Puerto Rican	.012	.052	.007
Chinese	.046	.024	.001
Philippine	.135	.060	.002
Other Asian	.208	.091	.005
African/Afro-Caribbean	.038	.061	.170
European/Canadian	.074	.328	.773
Language spoken at home***			
English	.275	.704	.995
Spanish	.432	.223	.003
Other	.293	.072	.002
Religiosity*	5.95	5.62	5.53
Parents' education***			
Less than high school	.335	.224	.085
High school diploma	.161	.219	.314
Some college	.117	.170	.215
Bachelor's degree or higher	.296	.315	.347
Missing	.091	.072	.047
Family structure**			
Two biological or two adopted parents	.652	.656	.575
One step-parent + one biological parent	.125	.118	.158
Single mom	.141	.162	.195
Single dad	.025	.030	.029
Two step-parents or other	.057	.035	.044
Number of siblings**	1.93	1.75	1.34
School region***			
West	.354	.317	.130
Midwest	.083	.185	.362
South	.391	.324	.394
Northeast	.172	.174	.114
Proportion Hispanic***	.327	.205	.038
Proportion female-headed household*	.076	.066	.070
Urbanicity***			
Urban	.895	.751	.447
Rural	.105	.249	.553
N (total = 13, 313)	994	1,971	10,348

Note: for religiosity, the mean differences between gen1 and gen2, and between gen1 and gen3 are significant at the .01 level while the difference between gen2 and gen3 is not significant. For proportion female-headed household, the mean difference between gen1 and gen2 is significant at the .01 level while differences across other comparison groups are not significant at the .05 level.
*p <.01; ** p<.05; *** p< .001

Table 3.2. Weighted Multinomial Odds Ratios of Generational Effects on Union Formation in a Competing Risks Framework: Add Health 1994 - 2002

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Cohabit	Marry	Cohabit	Marry	Cohabit	Marry	Cohabit	Marry
Duration (age 19-22)								
Age 9-18	.063***	.024***	.062***	.024***	.059***	.023***	.058***	.023***
	(.079)	(.130)	(.079)	(.129)	(.078)	(.128)	(.077)	(.125)
Age 23-24	1.322***	2.264***	1.316***	2.323***	1.364***	2.406***	1.382***	2.493***
	(.062)	(.084)	(.063)	(.085)	(.062)	(.085)	(.063)	(.085)
Age 25-28	.892	1.115	.880	1.168	.885	1.195	.906	1.298
	(.174)	(.213)	(.172)	(.212)	(.177)	(.212)	(.176)	(.220)
Female	1.406***	1.731***	1.456***	1.711***	1.482***	1.748***	1.477***	1.817***
	(.044)	(.083)	(.045)	(.082)	(.043)	(.083)	(.043)	(.085)
Immigrant generation (Third generation)								
First generation	**.505*****	**1.566*****	**.553*****	**1.482****	**.512*****	**1.266**	**.605*****	**1.497****
	(.104)	**(.161)**	**(.131)**	**(.148)**	**(.134)**	**(.154)**	**(.140)**	**(.145)**
Second generation	**.779****	**.998**	**.774****	**.901**	**.779****	**.825**	**.858+**	**.989**
	(.086)	**(.145)**	**(.095)**	**(.136)**	**(.094)**	**(.135)**	**(.092)**	**(.132)**
Ethnicity (European/Canadian)								
Mexican			1.268+	1.617**	1.040	1.195	1.202+	1.094
			(.129)	(.157)	(.124)	(.172)	(.107)	(.182)
Cuban			.637+	.656	.590*	.641	.874	.479
			(.254)	(.440)	(.215)	(.421)	(.281)	(.521)
Central-South American			.858	1.237	.783	1.126	.922	1.113
			(.168)	(.194)	(.163)	(.190)	(.171)	(.234)
Puerto Rican			1.117	.811	.886	.672	1.033	1.006
			(.176)	(.327)	(.181)	(.330)	(.169)	(.365)
Chinese			.466***	.287*	.573**	.377	.569**	.384+
			(.207)	(.565)	(.207)	(.588)	(.207)	(.564)
Philippine			1.015	.517*	1.130	.608+	1.174	.626
			(.305)	(.288)	(.282)	(.289)	(.266)	(.343)
Other Asian			.865	.523+	.952	.554+	.940	.577+
			(.204)	(.343)	(.202)	(.349)	(.209)	(.327)
African/Afro-Caribbean			.935	.567***	.739***	.489***	.644***	.356***
			(.073)	(.147)	(.067)	(.141)	(.072)	(.154)
Religiosity			.919***	1.092***	.940***	1.109***	.940***	1.074***
			(.008)	(.023)	(.009)	(.023)	(.009)	(.022)
Parental education (Less than high school)								
High school diploma					.837**	.828	.840*	.896
					(.069)	(.154)	(.069)	(.151)
Some college					.669***	.706*	.679***	.783
					(.081)	(.155)	(.084)	(.148)
BA or higher					.479***	.391***	.493***	.448***
					(.085)	(.189)	(.087)	(.170)
Missing					.722**	.812	.724**	.902
					(.123)	(.251)	(.121)	(.241)
Family structure								

(Two biological or two adopted parents)								
One step-parent + One biological parent					1.663*** (.053)	1.423*** (.101)	1.651*** (.052)	1.369** (.108)
Single mom					1.418*** (.052)	.866 (.104)	1.402*** (.051)	.870 (.107)
Single dad					1.526*** (.108)	1.223+ (.223)	1.499*** (.113)	1.227 (.218)
Two step-parents or other					1.748*** (.101)	1.364+ (.180)	1.730*** (.099)	1.391+ (.183)
Number of siblings					.984 (.017)	1.071* (.031)	.979 (.018)	1.095** (.031)
School Region (South)								
West							1.006 (.094)	.600** (.179)
Midwest							1.075 (.083)	.504*** (.161)
Northeast							.794** (.088)	.231*** (.172)
Proportion Hispanic							.478** (.260)	.877 (.271)
Proportion female-headed Household							5.050*** (.394)	3.270 (.732)
Urban							.980 (.067)	.769* (.110)
Constant	-2.402*** (.044)	-3.949*** (.096)	-1.963*** (.068)	-4.382*** (.164)	-1.823*** (.089)	-4.140*** (.228)	-1.883*** (.108)	-3.621*** (.238)
N (person years)	13,313 (181,455)		13,313 (181,455)		13,313 (181,455)		13,313 (181,455)	

Notes: Odds ratios with standard errors of regression coefficients in parentheses for all variables; regression coefficients for constant. Reference category for the competing risks of cohabitation and marriage is no union.
$^{+}p <= .10$, $*p <= .05$, $**p <= .01$, $***p <= .001$

Table 3.3. Weighted Multinomial Odds Ratios of Language Assimilation on Union Formation in a Competing Risks Framework: Add Health 1994 - 2002

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Variable	Cohabit	Marry	Cohabit	Marry	Cohabit	Marry	Cohabit	Marry
Duration (age 19-22)								
Age 9-18	.063***	.024***	.062***	.023***	.059***	.023***	.058***	.023***
	(.079)	(.130)	(.079)	(.129)	(.078)	(.128)	(.077)	(.125)
Age 23-24	1.324***	2.281***	1.319***	2.330***	1.368***	2.415***	1.386***	2.500***
	(.063)	(.084)	(.063)	(.086)	(.062)	(.085)	(.063)	(.085)
Age 25-28	.894	1.136	.882	1.180	.888	1.205	.910	1.306
	(.175)	(.211)	(.172)	(.211)	(.177)	(.211)	(.176)	(.220)
Female	1.414***	1.735***	1.462***	1.710***	1.488***	1.749***	1.483***	1.817***
	(.044)	(.083)	(.045)	(.082)	(.043)	(.083)	(.042)	(.086)
Language spoken at home (English)								
Spanish	**.678***	**2.087***	**.716***	**1.497**	**.620***	**1.229**	**.741***	**1.246**
	(.124)	**(.157)**	**(.121)**	**(.257)**	**(.112)**	**(.249)**	**(.119)**	**(.245)**
Other	**.335***	**.713**	**.410***	**.832**	**.369***	**.730**	**.407***	**.906**
	(.165)	**(.273)**	**(.172)**	**(.252)**	**(.165)**	**(.272)**	**(.172)**	**(.259)**
Ethnicity (European/Canadian)								
Mexican			1.207	1.407	1.026	1.083	1.179	1.058
			(.139)	(.217)	(.134)	(.218)	(.110)	(.198)
Cuban			.567*	.546	.554**	.552	.819	.452
			(.255)	(.471)	(.221)	(.461)	(.281)	(.532)
Central-South American			.773	1.125	.734+	1.056	.868	1.146
			(.166)	(.236)	(.161)	(.227)	(.166)	(.264)
Puerto Rican			1.046	.735	.842	.598	.999	.953
			(.170)	(.326)	(.174)	(.328)	(.161)	(.369)
Chinese			.497***	.365+	.633*	.467	.666*	.495
			(.193)	(.565)	(.186)	(.567)	(.190)	(.552)
Philippine			.837	.671	.920	.728	1.060	.811
			(.297)	(.265)	(.280)	(.261)	(.255)	(.333)
Other Asian			.852	.707	.956	.729	1.016	.758
			(.182)	(.358)	(.185)	(.366)	(.194)	(.362)
African/Afro-Caribbean			.931	.571***	.734***	.491***	.641***	.355***
			(.074)	(.147)	(.067)	(.142)	(.072)	(.155)
Religiosity			.940***	1.091***	.942***	1.110***	.941***	1.175***
			(.009)	(.023)	(.009)	(.023)	(.009)	(.022)
Parental education (Less than high school)								
High school diploma					.822**	.836	.829**	.890
					(.067)	(.155)	(.068)	(.152)
Some college					.655***	.711*	.670***	.780
					(..082)	(.159)	(.084)	(.152)
BA or higher					.466***	.394***	.483***	.446***

					(.084)	(.187)	(.085)	(.170)
Missing					.705**	.805	.714**	.898
					(.128)	(.258)	(.123)	(.247)
Family structure (Two biological or two adopted parents)								
One step-parent +					1.652***	1.434***	1.640***	1.376**
One biological parent					(.054)	(.103)	(.053)	(.108)
Single mom					1.419***	.874	1.402***	.874
					(.051)	(.104)	(.051)	(.107)
Single dad					1.506***	1.237	1.488***	1.232
					(.108)	(.224)	(.113)	(.219)
Two step-parents or					1.736***	1.389+	1.718***	1.408+
Other					(.101)	(.183)	(.100)	(.186)
Number of siblings					.982	1.066*	.979	1.093**
					(.018)	(.030)	(.019)	(.030)
School Region (South)								
West							1.004	.593**
							(.094)	(.179)
Midwest							1.080	.505***
							(.083)	(.160)
Northeast							.797*	.233***
							(.088)	(.171)
Proportion Hispanics							.446**	.942
							(.268)	(.258)
Proportion female-headed Household							5.096***	3.323
							(.390)	(.732)
Urban							.976	.772*
							(.066)	(.109)
Constant	-2.424 ***	-3.964 ***	-1.982 ***	-4.381 ***	-1.820 ***	-4.156 ***	-1.881 ***	-3.623 ***
	(.043)	(.092)	(.068)	(.163)	(.088)	(.227)	(.107)	(.238)
N (person years)	13,313 (181,455)		13,313 (181,455)		13,313 (181,455)		13,313 (181,455)	

Notes: odds ratios with standard errors of regression coefficients in parentheses for all variables; regression coefficients for constant. Reference category for the competing risks of cohabitation and marriage is no union.
$^{+}p <= .10$, $*p <= .05$, $**p <= .01$, $***p <= .001$

Table 3.4. Weighted Means of Independent Variables by Language Spoken at Home

	English	Hispanic	Other
Sex			
Male	.487	.500	.461
Female	.513	.500	.513
Ethnicity***			
Mexican	.041	.607	.042
Cuban	.003	.078	.000
Central-South American	.014	.269	.021
Puerto Rican	.011	.040	.008
Chinese	.003	.000	.133
Philippine	.011	.000	.164
Other Asian	.015	.000	.424
African/Afro-Caribbean	.162	.001	.040
European/Canadian	.740	.006	.168
Religiosity***	5.52	6.25	5.94
Parents' education***			
Less than high school	.086	.545	.235
High school diploma	.301	.141	.195
Some college	.212	.101	.131
Bachelor's degree or higher	.352	.101	.346
Missing	.042	.112	.094
Family structure*			
Two biological or two adopted parents	.580	.651	.748
One step-parent + one biological parent	.156	.121	.050
Single mom	.191	.170	.142
Single dad	.030	.015	.024
Two step-parents or other	.043	.043	.036
Number of siblings*	1.37	2.09	1.77
School region***			
West	.147	.308	.392
Midwest	.349	.026	.192
South	.383	.564	.163
Northeast	.121	.102	.253
Proportion Hispanic***	.047	.474	.173
Proportion female-headed household*	.070	.082	.070
Urbanicity***			
Urban	.470	.922	.857
Rural	.530	.078	.143
N (total = 13, 313)	11,879	986	448

Note: for religiosity, only the mean difference between English and Hispanic speakers is significant. For proportion female-headed household, only the mean difference between English and Hispanic speakers is significant at the .01 level while differences across other comparison groups are not significant at the .05 level.

*p <.01; ** p<.05; *** p< .001

CHAPTER 4: DIVERGENT PATHS OF ECONOMIC ADAPTATION: NATIVITY AND IMMIGRANT STATUSES, LABOR SEGMENT MEMBERSHIP AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING

With a rapid growth in the influx of Asian and Hispanic immigrants since 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, extensive research has focused on economic adaptation processes of various contemporary immigrant groups and their descendants in the U.S. labor market. However, questions about how they are distributed over the segmented U.S. market, and how labor segment membership leads to various economic outcomes have remained open for debates.

Concerning distributional pattern, dual labor market theorists posit that the secondary sector is the place where immigrants are concentrated, and inflicted by adverse economic outcomes (Ong & Valenzuela 1996; Piore 1979), while the ethnic enclave hypothesis argues that immigrants are not restricted to the secondary sector, and have an alternative avenue, that is, the enclave economy, to "make it" in America (Wilson & Portes 1980). Although the "ethnic-enclave hypothesis" advances the conceptualization of the structure of the labor market, inconsistent evidence has been found to question whether ethnic economy is a better place for immigrants.

Conflicting results about the economic well-being of immigrants in ethnic enclaves imply that previous scholarship about the structure of the ethnic enclave needs to be re-assessed. This chapter discusses limitations of previous definitions and redefines the structure

of the U.S. labor market, using refined criteria and treating the enclave sector as a stratified. In addition, the question regarding *why* immigrants and their descendants are distributed across different segments of the labor market needs further exploration. Basically, nativity and immigrant statuses are important factors that represent different levels of rights, benefits, and opportunities, which will determine immigrants and their descendants' location in the labor market and their economic benefits. However, we have not paid sufficient attention to great variation in nativity and immigrant statuses and its relation to labor market outcomes. Thus, the second goal of this chapter is to assess the impact of various nativity and immigrant statuses on labor segment incorporation, and associated economic outcomes in terms of hourly wages and non-monetary benefits.

Segments of the U.S. Labor Market

The major feature of the contemporary American society facing recent arrivals of immigrants and their children is the segmentation of the U.S. labor market. Social researchers have attempted to depict the structure of the American labor market; however, no consensus has been reached on what the labor market should look like. Theorists of dual labor market posit that the structure of the U.S. labor market is a form of bifurcation, with two distinct parts: primary labor market and secondary labor market (Averitt 1968; Piore 1979).

In the capital-intensive primary sector, workers hold stable, skilled and highly paid jobs with security in employment, favorable working conditions and promising prospects for career development (Peck 1996). In the labor-intensive secondary sector, however, workers get unstable, unskilled and low paid jobs with high rates of turnovers, unfavorable working conditions, and few opportunities for career advancement. When the U.S. labor market has

an intrinsic need for low-skilled workers to fill the vacancies of the secondary sector, native workers have no motivations to fill up those dead-end jobs. Thus the secondary sector becomes the place for immigrants, who are hired primarily because of their vulnerability rather than their skills (Ong & Valenzuela 1996).

However, Wilson and Portes (1980) point out that dual-labor-market theory ignores another labor market segment, that is, ethnic enclave, which provides opportunities for immigrants to avoid harsh consequences of being absorbed into the secondary labor market and to achieve upward mobility. Portes and his colleagues emphasize the co-ethnicity of employers and workers as a important feature for the enclave economy, as they define it as "a concentration of such firms in physical space --- generally a metropolitan area --- that employ a significant proportion of workers from the same minority" (Portes & Jensen 1989). The ethnic enclave hypothesis posits that immigrants in ethnic enclaves receive earning-returns to past human capital comparable to earning-returns of those in the non-enclave primary sector.

The three-sector structure of the labor market has been widely used to understand the economic well-being of contemporary immigrants. However, criteria for drawing boundaries among the primary sector, secondary sector, and enclave sector remain under-specified (Nee, Sanders, & Sernau 1994). Dualists have employed various empirical criteria to distinguish the primary sector from the secondary sector in the open economy, including occupational distribution, industries, economic scale, firm size, capital intensity, and business organization (Gordon, Edwards, & Reich 1982; Hodson 1984; Robert & Kalleberg 1981; Sakamoto & Chen 1991; Tolbert, Horan, & Beck 1980; Wallace & Kalleberg 1981). Among these various

principles, occupational division has been more commonly used in empirical research (Griffin, Kalleberg, & Alexander 1981).

It becomes a little problematic when researchers attempt to divide the ethnic-enclave sector from the primary and secondary sectors. If the ethnic economy is regarded as the third sector of the U.S. labor market, the criteria to partition it as a separate sector should be the same as the ones that divide the primary and secondary sectors. However, principles that distinguish ethnic enclave from primary and secondary sectors usually rely on place of residence, place of work, ethnicities of the owners and employees, or sectorial concentration, instead of occupational division (a principle typical for the division between the primary and secondary sectors).

Despite various approaches are taken to draw the boundary of the enclave sector, one aspect is ignored that ethnic enclaves may not be distinct from the primary or secondary sector in terms of occupation, or industrial distribution. The same jobs and industrial sectors may both appear in the primary sector and enclave sector, or in the secondary sector and enclave sector, even though ethnic enclaves may have a concentration in limited job categories and industrial sectors (Logan, Alba, & McNulty 1994; Zhou & Logan 1989). Empirical evidence has found the stratification within the enclave economy: entrepreneurs and male workers are more likely to get positive returns to their past human capital than employees, and female workers, respectively (Bonaich & Modell 1980; Hum 2000; Sanders & Nee 1992; Zhou & Logan 1989).

However, little has been done to conceptualize the enclave sector as a stratified system. In my view, the ethnic-enclave tends to resemble the general labor market in a way that it is occupationally polarized. Thus, I regard the U.S. labor market as a *four*-segment structure,

instead of a three-sector system. First, I separate the U.S metropolitan labor market into two parts: non-enclave and enclave sectors. The two sectors are distinguished by the criteria of the co-ethnicity of employers and employees, firm size, and geographic location of the business. The enclave sector is a concentration of such firms of small scales in a metropolitan area, with employers and workers are from the similar ethnic backgrounds. The non-enclave sector will represent a group of firms that are outside the enclave section. Furthermore, regarding each sector as a stratified occupational system, I then use the occupational criterion to divide each sector into two segments: the primary segment where high-ranking jobs are located; and the secondary segment where low-ranking jobs are concentrated. As a result, the U.S. labor market is separated into four segments: non-enclave primary segment, non-enclave secondary segment, enclave-primary segment and enclave-secondary segment.

Economic Outcomes of Labor Segment Membership

While the distribution of the labor market is important, the issue of whether this differentiated distribution leads to various consequences, such as wages and benefits, is more salient. Previous research has attempted to assess the earnings of immigrants in the enclave sector, and primary and secondary sectors of the labor market. However, due to limitations on definition and measurement of the enclave and non-enclave sectors, inconsistent results lead us to question whether earnings of enclave segment are comparable to those of the primary labor market.

Some studies have shown favorable returns of the ethnic enclave among immigrants, especially among Cuban immigrants, which complies with the ethnic enclave hypothesis (Nelson & Tienda 1985; Portes & Jensen 1989; Wilson & Portes 1980), while others found

that positive returns are only enjoyed by some immigrants within the enclave, like entrepreneurs, male workers, but not attained by every worker in the enclave economy (Sanders & Nee 1992; Zhou & Logan 1989). Some research even found unfavorable returns for those in ethnic enclaves (Bonaich 1973; Bonaich 1978; Duncan & Lieberson 1959; Frisbie & Neidert 1977; Hum 2000).

By treating the ethnic enclave as a bifurcated system rather than a uniform structure, and dividing the labor market into four components, I re-assess economic outcomes of different labor segments in two aspects, including hourly wages and benefits. Although hourly wages or earnings are often used as indicators of economic outcomes, very limited research have conducted multivariate analyses to assess other aspects, such as benefits of pension, health insurance, and paid sick leave, which are important factors to examine individual economic well-being (Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson 2000). Jobs without benefits may inflict considerable hardships on workers and their families. Especially for immigrants who are in a foreign land, such non-monetary benefits as pension, health insurance, and paid sick leave are able to ensure long-term security, which cannot be supplemented by earnings.

Nativity and Immigrant Statuses and Segmented Adaptation

When ethnic enclave scholars regard enclave economy as an ethnic phenomenon, and compare economic outcomes of the enclave sector and non-enclave sector, less work is done to investigate *why* immigrants and their offspring tend to work in one segment than the other. In terms of labor market incorporation, the widely used model relies largely on human capital attributes, such as educational level, language proficiency, length of residence, and work experience, to explain economic adaptation regarding job locations and earning-returns

(Borjas 1990). Undeniably, human capital is of great importance to distribute immigrants into various segments of the U.S. labor market.

However, less focused attention is given to variation in nativity and immigrant statuses and its relation to immigrant labor market incorporation. Often times, nativity and immigrant status is measured as a two-category variable to distinguish foreign birth from native birth and compare economic outcomes of these two groups to assess the relative standing of immigrants in American hierarchy. However, two-category classification of nativity and immigrant status fails to capture complexities and considerable variability of immigrant statuses defined by immigration policies. A more detailed division of diversified immigrant statuses rather than a two-item categorization is needed if we want to have a more accurate comparative view about immigrants' location as well as associated economic well-being in the job market.

Basically, nativity and immigrant status is not a factor that simply reflects progression of assimilation based on length of residence in the U.S. Rather, immigration and naturalization policies play a vital role in regulating immigrant statuses both upon their entry into and during their stay in the United States. U.S. policies, per se, not only grant unequal access to various nativity and immigrant statuses, but also define those statuses with different degrees of eligibility for labor market participation. This, in turn, affects where immigrants settle and how much economic return they receive in workplaces.

Before discussing their effect, several statuses, including native-born citizenship, naturalized citizenship, permanent residency, and non-permanent residency, need to be distinguished. First, descendants of immigrants who are born in the United States are usually guaranteed U.S. citizenship at birth. Second, among legal immigrants, they can be

distinguished by three statuses: non-permanent residency, permanent residency (Green-card holders), and naturalized citizenship. Non-permanent residents refer to those who stay in the United States temporarily for various purposes, such as study, temporary work, visit and travel. There are two types of immigrants among non-permanent aliens: legal aliens who hold valid temporary visas to stay in the U.S. while unauthorized aliens who enter without a valid visa or stay overdue their visa. Permanent residency means the status for those who are not citizens of the United States, but are legally accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2004). Naturalized citizenship is conferred upon a foreign citizen or national after he or she fulfills the requirements established by Immigration and Nationality Act (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2004).[1]

Concerning eligibility for job market access, citizens are not restrained to access any occupation in the labor market. Naturalized immigrants may enjoy all the rights that native-born citizens have. However, a naturalized citizen who has the same credentials as a native-born citizen may not have equal access to the job market, since implicit discrimination from employers against a foreign accent, non-white skin color, and non-Anglo-Saxon cultural practices may encumber their economic attainment. For immigrants without citizenship, permanent residency seems a higher status than non-permanent residency to attain better jobs, more flexibility to change jobs, and better economic benefits.

Non-permanent residency is the most restrictive and least favorable status because

[1] The general requirements for naturalization include: a. a period of continuous residence and physical presence in the United States; b. residence in a particular USCIS District prior to filing; c. an ability to read, write, and speak English; d. a knowledge and understanding of U.S. history and government; e. good moral character; f. attachment to the principles of the U.S. Constitution; and, g. favorable disposition toward the United States.

many temporary visa-holders are not allowed to work in the U.S. (like B-2, F-2, and undocumented immigrants). Even among legal aliens who hold certain types of visas with permission to work (like H-1B, F-1, J-1, J-2), they are denied of some jobs despite their high qualifications because many companies are either not able or willing to sponsor (applying for work visa) them. Many legal non-permanent residents are allowed to adjust their status to permanent residency and then to naturalized citizenship. However, the U.S. policies do not give each applicant the same preference for the approval of their permanent residency or citizenship, which complicates the adjustment process (Portes & Rumbaut 1990). The feature of temporary stay for non-permanent residents indirectly excludes these foreign workers from the protection of the labor law and welfare system, and leave them at the mercy of employers who can exploit them without facing resistance or penalty.

When we review the history of American immigration law, we cannot deny that the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act plays a critical role in economic incorporation of contemporary immigration. The 1965 Immigration Law has a preference for the reunification of families, grants unlimited number of immigrant visas to immediate family members of U.S. citizens, and allow them to look for jobs in any part of the labor market. This and revised 1990 acts create occupational preferences to attract high-skilled immigrants (Hagan 2004; Greenwood & McDowell 1999). The U.S. Congress also expanded the number of temporary work visas, the H-1B visas, to recruit high-skilled workers (with many from Asia) to work especially in areas of computer science programming, engineering, education, medicine, and health-related occupations since 1990 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2003). However, H-1B visa holders are restricted for job mobility and economically disadvantaged in workplaces because their status of non-permanent residency limit their

freedom to change jobs and bargain with employers for better pay or benefits.

In addition, U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy treats refugees differently. For example, the police grant those from the communist regime (like Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, and Eastern European countries) "refugee status" with permanent residency for employment, while deny those who come from non-communist countries under political turmoil or economic breakdown (like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti) of legal residency in the United States, which force them into vulnerable positions in the labor market (Espenshade 2001; Portes & Rumbaut 1990).

In sum, immigrant statuses are not merely earned through individual efforts or longer length of stay, but are largely determined by U.S. policies. With unequal access to immigrant statuses associated with varying degrees of eligibility for work, immigrants and their descendants are stratified with different levels of rights, benefits, and opportunities in workplaces upon their arrival and during their stay in the U.S., which determines their later economic adaptation outcomes in the labor market.

However, we do not have much knowledge about the impact of various immigrant statuses on job locations and economic outcomes among contemporary immigrants and their descendants. What we know more so far is merely the distinction between the foreign-born and native workers: the foreign born are overrepresented in low-paying service and manual jobs and underrepresented in managerial and professional specialty occupations; immigrants are less prominent in intermediate-level jobs; a sizable proportion of refugees and of those admitted to reunite with families are concentrated in the low-skilled occupations (like service workers, operators, fabricators, and laborers), and foreign-born workers earn substantially lower than the native (Smith & Edmonston 1997).

To address previous limitations, this chapter takes a comparative approach to examine the effect of various nativity and immigrant statuses on distribution of immigrants and their descendants over segmented labor market and their variation in economic outcomes regarding wages and job-related benefits.

Data

The data come from the Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality (LASUI), which is part of the larger multidisciplinary project known as the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI). These data have rich information on changing labor market dynamics to understand modern urban inequality. Because the focus of this study lies on labor market experiences of immigrants and their offspring in big metropolitan areas, the city of Los Angeles becomes an ideal urban site for empirical study in a way that L.A. is one of the biggest cities to receive a considerable proportion of working-age immigrants diversified with various immigrant statuses and ethnicities (Smith & Edmonston 1997; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 2002).[2]

The merit of the LASUI data is that they contain detailed information on nativity and immigrant statuses which make this study possible, when most of the data lack this to explore the issue (Edmonston 1996). The data also make it possible to conduct comparative analyses of labor market experiences across different ethnic groups because they provide detailed information on ethnicities rather than pan-ethnic categories of Hispanics and Asians employed in other studies.

[2] MCSUI has targeted four cities, including Detroit, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Boston, for research. Among these four cities, LA is the only gateway city that incorporates large number of contemporary immigrants. Besides, data for other three cities lack detailed information about ethnicity so they are not appropriate for this study.

The survey, conducted during the period of 1993 and 1994, was designed to capture the multiracial characteristic of Los Angeles, by sampling non-Hispanic white, Hispanic, black and Asian adults, twenty-one years of age or older, and living in households. My sample is restricted to a sub-sample of Asian and Hispanic respondents who reported their current or last job. My final sample size is 1355 for the dependent variable of labor market membership. The sample size for the dependent variable of wages is 1135 because some respondents have missing data on wage, including those who do not report their earnings, unit of pay period, or hours of work per week, or have extreme wage values.[3] In addition, because those who are self-employed do not report job benefits, the model that examines the economic outcome of benefits excludes 134 self-employed respondents, and the sample for this model results in 1121 respondents.

Measures

Dependent Variables

Having defined the U.S. labor market as a four-part structure, I turn to the task of operationalizing the four labor segments, bringing together the criteria used by researchers of dual labor market and principles developed by scholars of the ethnic enclave perspective. First I use four indicators, including firm type, firm size, ethnicity of co-workers, and ethnicity of supervisors, to divide the labor market into two parts: non-enclave sector, and enclave sector. Essentially, workers are classified as working in the enclave when they report

[3] "Extreme" values were identified as a computed hourly wage of less than $2 per hour, or a computed hourly wage greater than $50 per hour that was not consistent with the respondent's occupation, and treated as missing. I've compared characteristics of those who have missing value on wages with those who don't and find no significant difference between these two groups of people in terms of age, education, and receipt of benefits.

to work for a private company (other than government) of a size less than or equal to five hundred employees, when the majority of their coworkers are of similar ethnicity, and the supervisor is of similar ethnicity as well if they report to have a supervisor.[4] The ethnic economy might be limited by special coverage and small size (Zhou 1992), however, few studies (e.g. Hum 2000) have reported the ranges for the size of the ethnic economy. Thus, I choose a size of five hundred to limit the firm in ethnic enclaves to a reasonably small scale.

Since both non-enclave and enclave sectors are viewed as a stratified system, each sector is further divided into two parts: primary and secondary segments. Occupations are often regarded as appropriate units for division, since occupation may be perceived as a collection of jobs that perform similar technical activities, have similar training, skill requirements, and roughly similar market situations (Griffin, Kalleberg, & Alexander 1981). Specifically in this chapter, I use occupational classification suggested by Hum (2000) to make the division between primary and secondary segments.[5] Unlike previous research which divided the U.S. labor market into three segments: primary sector, secondary sector, and ethnic-enclave sector (Beiley & Waldinger 1991; Hum 2000; Portes & Bach 1985; Wilson & Portes 1980), the labor market is measured as four parts: non-enclave primary segment, non-enclave secondary segment, enclave-primary segment, and enclave-secondary segment.

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[4] The LASUI survey does not provide specific categories of ethnicity when they ask the respondents to identify the race of the coworkers, and race of their supervisor. The categories are: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, Asian, and other. The racial categories are treated as a proxy for the ethnicity of coworkers and supervisors. When Mexican and Central American respondents report that the majority of their coworkers are Hispanic and they have Hispanic supervisors, I consider them to work in the co-ethnic economic sector. Likewise, the similar treatment is used for Chinese, Korean, and Japanese who report to work primarily among Asian workers, and have an Asian supervisor.

[5] The division is based on occupation codes of 1990 census (see Appendix 4C.A). The complete information regarding 1990 census occupational classification codes can be found at http://www.nlsinfo.org/nlsy97/docs/97HTML00/97guide/matt1codes90.htm#occup.

To examine economic outcomes of the labor segment membership, I use two dependent variables: hourly wages and benefits. The wage variable is calculated based on unit of earnings, number of hours worked per week, and earnings before taxes including tips and bonuses. The original variable of hourly wages is excessively skewed, so I perform a log transformation of the wage variable. I also incorporate another dependent variable, benefits, for analysis. The LASUI data allow me to assess three aspects – health insurance, paid sick leave, and pension benefits – that can be indictors of good job characteristics. Those who have health insurance and pensions are much more likely to enjoy the security during their employment. Paid sick leave shows a superb job feature because it even provides employees with financial security during their sick on-leave periods. My measure of benefits is a total count of these three characteristics which are strongly correlated ($r = .60$ for health insurance and pension; $r = .71$ for health insurance and paid sick leave; and $r = .62$ for pensions and paid sick leave), indicating that a job associated with one benefit tends to have other two benefits as well (Kalleberg, Reskin & Hudson 2000).

Independent Variables

I incorporate a key independent variable to measure nativity and immigrant statuses. It is derived by combining three measures, nativity, citizenship, and permanent residency, which yields four categories: U.S.-born citizenship, foreign-born naturalized citizenship, foreign-born permanent residency (Green card holder), and foreign-born non-permanent residency.

Control variables include age and gender (female = 1). I also include human capital, ethnicity, and work context factors in a series of multivariate models. Human capital

variables include educational attainment, English proficiency, and foreign language use, which are typical factors included in economic assimilation literature. Human capital is a reflection of workers' skills and bargaining power. Those with higher education have better options in the labor market than less educated workers. Educational attainment is measured as the highest degree the respondents have earned with five categories: no high school degree, high school diploma or GED, community college or associate degree, bachelor's degree, and master, Ph.D, or other professional degree.

As a large proportion of my sample are foreign-born immigrants, their success in the labor market depends largely on their English language skills. Those who are proficient in English have an advantage to participate in the "mainstream" market, or have a greater chance for upward mobility within ethnic economy (Zhou 1992). The English proficiency variable (ranging from 1= low level to 6 = native speaker) is measured by averaging the scores for self-reported spoken and written English. Those who are born in the U.S. and do not speak any other language than English are not asked the question about their language skills, and coded as "native-speaker", and get the highest score for English proficiency variable.

Foreign language use represents the degree of attachment immigrants hold to their own ethnic community. The use of a foreign language in the home has different functions regarding labor segment membership: it may reduce chances for the better positions outside the enclave, whereas it might enhance attachment to their own ethnic networks, and increase chances for employment within ethnic economy. In my sample, both native-born and foreign-born respondents were asked the question whether there is any language other than English used in their home (yes = 1).

Ethnicity is one of the key factors for understanding adaptation processes in the U.S. labor market among immigrants and their descendants (Borjas 1992; Portes 1996a; Waters 1996b; Zhou 1997). It not only has rich information about where the respondents or their ancestry come from, but also entails the cultural codes that immigrants hold or their offspring inherit to distinguish them from other ethnic groups and to be connected to the ethnic community (Borjas 1992). In addition, ethnicity represents status quo of an ethnic group in the host society that may influence individual access to chances of employment in the labor market. Ethnicity is defined by five categories: Korean, Japanese, Chinese, Mexican, and Central American.[6] Central American includes respondents from Puerto Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Dominica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

Work context factors include length of work experience and work arrangement, which capture both previous and current situations in the labor market. Length of work experience measures respondents' days of previous experience in the kind of job they are doing now. Greater length of work experience may help respondents get into more advantageous segments of the labor market. A growth in diversities of employment types and increase in nonstandard work arrangements in contemporary industrial societies complicate the processes of economic mobility, and adversely affect individual economic well-being (Appelbaum 1992; Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson 2000). I include work arrangement variable to measure five employment types: regular full-time, independently self-employed, employer, regular part-time, temporary work, and seasonal or other types of work.[7]

[6] Several variables, including race, ancestry or ethnic origin, and sampling strata, are used to identify Korean, Japanese, and Chinese. And variables of race and Spanish or Hispanic origin are used to identify Mexican and Central American backgrounds.

[7] I also include family context factors, including marital status, and number of family members living with the respondent without income to capture complex family structures in immigrant families and economic hardships

I incorporate the same independent variables to assess their impacts on both labor segment membership, and economic outcomes. I also include interaction terms between nativity and immigrant statuses and labor segment membership to understand whether the effects of immigrant statuses on economic outcomes are the same across different labor segment memberships. Because the variable of nativity and immigrant statuses is nominal with four categories, and labor segment membership is categorical with four responses, the interaction between them yields nine dummy variables (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003).

Methods

Depending on the nature of three dependent variables, different estimation procedures are employed. I use multinomial logistic regression for the dependent variable of labor segment membership, which is a nominal variable of four categories. The mathematical formulation for this logistic model is:

$$\log\left[\frac{P(y=j)}{P(y=J)}\right] = X'\beta_j \quad \text{where j} = 1...\text{J} - 1$$

Multinomial regression has J-1 sets of coefficient estimates for J-1 comparisons (Long 1997). Treating the enclave-primary segment as the baseline, the model generates three equations that contrasts the non-enclave-primary segment, non-enclave secondary segment, and enclave-secondary segment with the reference category of enclave-primary segment separately. As a result, it produces three sets of coefficient estimates as one estimation. I use exponentiated coefficients, e^{β} (odds ratio), for the interpretation of the results.

The second dependent variable, logged hourly wages, is a continuous variable, so I use

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incurred by members in extended families who do not have income. However, they were excluded from final models for presentation because none of these variables are statistically significant at the .05 level.

ordinary least square regression to assess its link with membership in different labor segments. When the dependent variable is limited (unlike interval-ratio variables) and measured by a number of events (usually equal or greater than zero), its underlying distribution is a poisson regression (Long 1997). Because the dependent variable of benefits is measured by a count of benefits one receives through employment, including health insurance, pension, and paid sick leave, with a range between 0 and 3, I use poisson regression for the analysis. I choose the poisson regression over the negative binomial regression, because the test of over-dispersion is not significant. The function for the poisson regression can be written as:

$$\text{Log (number of job characteristics)} = X'\beta$$

I use exponentiated coefficients, e^{β}, for the interpretation of the results.

Nativity and Immigrant Statuses and Divergent Paths in Segmented Labor Market

Table 4.1 presents the bivariate relationship between nativity and immigrant statuses and locations in labor market. Clearly, labor segment membership varies by nativity and immigrant statuses ($p < .001$; $\chi^2 = 246.194$ with $df = 9$). A large proportion (60.7%) of the native-born children of immigrants participate in the non-enclave primary segment, a place for the "mainstream" middle-class, followed by naturalized immigrants (44.1%). Naturalized citizens have the advantage to work in primary segments both inside (32.3%) and outside (44.1%) enclave economy. In contrast, immigrants without citizenship, including permanent residents and non-permanent residents, tend to occupy jobs in secondary segments both inside and outside the enclave, with non-permanent residency being the most disadvantageous status in the labor market.

While the descriptive analysis is suggestive, it is important to control for other factors affecting these bivariate results. The baseline model (Model 1) in Table 4.2 indicates significant effects of immigrant and nativity statuses on distributional patterns in the labor market, net of age, gender, and ethnicity. Both permanent residents ($e^{\beta} = 3.77$) and non-permanent residents ($e^{\beta} = 3.18$) have higher odds than naturalized immigrants to work in the secondary segment of the enclave. In contrast, naturalized citizens are more likely than immigrants with other statuses to work in the non-enclave primary segment, as compared to the enclave-primary segment. Furthermore, native-born children of immigrants are 177% more likely than naturalized immigrants to work in the non-enclave primary segment. The results suggest that citizenship, either earned through naturalization or native birth, has an advantage to channel individuals into the middle-class mainstream, and pulls them away from their original ethnic communities.

Generationally, immigrant descendants are more economically assimilated into the mainstream than the foreign-born, which is consistent with the prediction of the straight-line assimilation. My results tell us more about how various immigrant statuses yield divergent paths of labor market incorporation. Specifically, naturalization promotes labor segment choices for immigrants, while non-permanent residency and permanent residency tend to confine immigrants to the lower strata of the labor market. To note, the effects of permanent residency and non-permanent residency remain strong and statistically significant in reducing immigrants' chances to work in non-encalve primary labor market, even when human capital and work context factors are held constant in Model 3.

Results in Model 2 indicate that human capital is more important than immigrant status to differentiate immigrant job locations within the enclave economy. College education is

useful to keep immigrants away from low-end jobs both within (e^{β} = .324) and outside (e^{β} = .528) enclaves. However, education is not very helpful channeling individuals into non-enclave primary segment. English proficiency is more important a qualification for mainstream labor market participation. When English proficiency is taken into account, permanent residents and non-permanent residents increase their chances to work outside enclave and seek high-skilled jobs. Those who speak, write, and read English better also have an advantage to be engaged in the primary segment of the enclave economy, suggesting that higher English proficiency helps immigrants obtain better jobs. In addition, the result indicates that those who speak a foreign language at home have higher odds to work in the enclave-primary segment than the two secondary labor segments (e^{β} = .343 & e^{β} = .352). The ability to speak a foreign language acts like cultural capital for immigrants to access networks within the ethnic community, and enables them to get better jobs within enclaves (Portes 1995; Zhou 1992).

Concerning ethnic differences, Mexican and Central-American immigrants show a different pattern of labor market participation from Koreans. Both groups are more likely to work in the other three segments rather than the enclave-primary segment. This conforms to previous findings about the higher rate of Korean concentration within ethnic enclaves (Portes 1995). If the ethnic economy provides an alternative avenue to make a living for new arrivals who are poor in English, and lack knowledge of American cultural norms, ethnic jobs are not equally distributed over different immigrant groups, since not all immigrant groups are able to establish functioning social networks to acquire sufficient capital resources, and develop entrepreneurial skills for enclave economies (Portes 1995).

When I add work context variables in Model 3, I find that previous work experience

tends to help one get away from lower end of the labor market. Regarding work arrangement, the result suggests that the enclave-primary segment is a good place for entrepreneurship, because employers are much more likely to work in the enclave-primary segment than the other three segments. Independently self-employed workers are also more likely to work in the enclave-primary segment than the open market as well. However, the enclave-secondary segment is the place for high concentration of temporary jobs characterized by insecurity, high rates of turnovers, and bad pay. Workers with temporary jobs are 102% more likely than regular full-time workers to work in the enclave-secondary segment.

Wage Differences, Labor Segment Membership, and Immigrant Statuses

When results in Table 4.1 and 4.2 imply a differentiated distributional pattern in the segmented labor market depending upon nativity and immigrant statuses, whether these segmented assimilation patterns lead to economic consequences is revealed subsequently. Column 1 in Table 4.3 presents the mean differences in logged wages across different segments ($F = 37.39$ with $df = 3$; $p < .001$). Wages are highest for workers in the non-enclave primary segment, followed by the enclave-primary segment, non-enclave secondary segment, and enclave secondary segment, sequentially.

Table 4.4 shows multivariate results for OLS regression of logged hourly wages. Higher wages of the non-enclave primary segment than those of the enclave-primary segment is also found in the multivariate analyses, net of other independent variables in Model 3. In addition, the higher wage advantage of the enclave-primary segment over the non-enclave secondary segment disappears, when work arrangement is added in Model 3. These results put in question the prediction of the ethnic enclave hypothesis that immigrants in ethnic

enclaves receive earnings comparable to those in the primary labor market. My findings indicate that even when high-paid jobs are kept as a separate segment, leaving out low-paid jobs to the secondary segment, those who work in the enclave-primary segment still earn less than those in the primary segment of the open market, and do not necessarily gain an advantage over those in the secondary segment of the general market, net of demographic, human capital and work context factors.

In addition, my results suggest that wages of the enclave-primary segment are higher than those of the enclave-secondary segment, net of other covariates. These results have several implications. First, this suggests that the ethnic enclave is a stratified system; with those working in the primary segment earning more than those in the secondary segment. Second, higher wages of the primary segment of the open market than the enclave-primary segment indicates a systematic difference between these two sectors.

As shown in Model 1, when the labor segment is held constant, those at an older age earn more than those at a younger age. Female workers are disadvantaged in wage earnings as compared to male workers. Individuals with Mexican and Central-American origins tend to earn less than those with Korean background. Educational attainment, English proficiency, and foreign language use at home are helpful explaining wage differences of the U.S. labor segments, suggested by a considerable drop in the coefficients of the labor segment membership and an increase of adjusted R-square (from .34 in Model 1 to .44 in Model 2).

Both higher educational degrees and English proficiency greatly increase one's earning ability across all segments. When work arrangement and length of work experience variables are added in Model 3, the coefficient for the comparison between the enclave-primary segment and non-enclave primary segment goes up from .073 to .120, indicating that wage

differences between these two primary segments are suppressed when work arrangement is not included, because immigrant employers are more likely to work in the enclave-primary segment and tend to have higher wages than other workers. When immigrant employers are separated from the rest of the immigrant workers within the enclave-primary segment, the disadvantage of lower wages in the enclave-primary segment becomes more salient.

Most importantly, even when labor segment membership, human capital, and work context variables are held constant, wage differences across various immigrant statuses sustain (as shown in Model 3). The results suggest that both non-permanent residents and green-card holders earn less than naturalized immigrants although no significant wage differences were found between naturalized immigrants and native-born citizens. When previous research has considerable emphasis on the role of education and nativity on income stratification between native and foreign-born workers, it neglects the impact of various immigrant statuses on earnings among foreign-born workers. The evidence in this chapter provides a different perspective to examine economic stratification within immigrants. I also test the effects of interaction terms between labor segment membership and nativity and immigrant statuses, however, the effect of nativity and immigrant statuses on wage differences do not vary by labor segment membership.

Benefits, Labor Segment Membership, and Immigrant Statuses

Column 2 in Table 4.3 depicts the bivariate relationship between job benefits and labor segment participation. The non-enclave primary segment offers the highest number of benefits (1.99), followed by the enclave-primary segment (1.24), non-enclave secondary segment (1.09), and enclave-secondary segment (0.62) ($F = 78.04$ with $df = 3$; $p < .001$).

Table 4.5 presents the multivariate results of poisson regression of job benefits among non-self employed respondents. The baseline model (Model 1) shows that those who work in the enclave-primary segment get 48% more benefits than those in the enclave-secondary segment, but receive 55% less benefits than those in the non-enclave primary segment. However, the number of benefits provided by the secondary segment of the open market is not significantly lower than the enclave-primary segment.

Echoing results for wage differences in the previous section, these results indicate that the enclave-primary segment is not so much a good place, both in terms of wages and job benefits, as the primary segment of the open market for immigrants and their descendants. The enclave-primary segment may even share similar features of the non-enclave secondary segment, in terms of lower wages and fewer job benefits. The enclave-secondary segment is the worst place for immigrant workers who receive lowest level of hourly wages and non-monetary benefits. Female workers are disadvantaged in benefits as well as in wages.

Concerning individual characteristics, those at an older age receive more job benefits than those at a younger age, and individuals with Chinese or Japanese origins garner more benefits than those with Korean background, net of other variables in Model 1. Results in Model 2 indicate that education and English proficiency also increase job benefits. Work arrangement matters as well, as shown in Model 3, because regular full-time workers receive more benefits than those with nonstandard employment.

Noticeably, results throughout the three models suggest significant differences in job benefits across various immigrant statuses. Particularly, immigrants without citizenship gain fewer benefits than their naturalized counterparts, while benefit differences between a native-born citizen and naturalized citizen are not significant. Lastly, when I enter in Model 4

interaction terms between labor segment membership and nativity and immigrant statuses, they greatly improve the model fit (χ^2 of Wald test= 22.92 with df = 9; p<.01). The interaction between enclave-secondary segment and native-birth suggests that the positive effect of native birth on job benefits varies by labor segment membership. Specifically, native-born descendants of immigrants enjoy higher gain of benefits in both segments of the enclave relative to their naturalized counterparts, and the gap is greater in the secondary sector than in the primary sector within enclaves.[8] Moreover, the interaction between enclave-secondary segment and permanent residency reveals that the negative effect of permanent residency on benefits is greater in the secondary segment of the enclave than in the primary section of the enclave.

Conclusion

This chapter takes a comparative approach to examine economic adaptation processes of Asian and Hispanic immigrants and their descendants in metropolitan labor market. My findings about the uneven distribution across different segments of the labor market indicate that immigrants and their descendants do not all get stuck in low-end jobs, but are disproportionately located across various parts of the employment market. In addition, my results suggest that employment mechanisms operate differently across various sectors of the labor market. Within the non-enclave mainstream labor market, nativity and immigrant status plays a vital role: American citizenship (either native-born or naturalized) is much more advantageous than both permanent and non-permanent residency to channel individuals with similar backgrounds (controlling for human capital factors) into upper rungs of the job

distribution. Within the enclave economy, nativity and immigrant status no more matters much. Instead, human capital is much more decisive in sorting immigrants into different parts of the enclave economy: those with lower education, lower level of English proficiency and use of foreign language at home are more likely to be absorbed into low-end jobs within enclaves.

Furthermore, my findings indicate that segmented distribution in workplaces lead to various economic consequences. Economic advantages, both in terms of hourly wages and job benefits, are found in the non-enclave primary segment over the enclave-primary segment, net of other controls. Even when immigrant employers tend to develop careers within enclaves and to reap economic benefits, entrepreneurship through industriousness and ethnic capital does not help them to be as economically successful as those in the non-enclave mainstream market. For immigrant workers who are not naturalized, the situation is even worse, because they are more vulnerable to discrimination and exploitation both inside and outside the enclave. In the context of a rapid growth in nonstandard employment, they are more likely to take temporary positions with low wage, few job benefits, and lack of security. Especially within the ethnic enclave, their foreign language accent and attachment to ethnic communities make them subject to economic hardships and encumber their upward mobility to mainstream market.

These findings have two implications. First, the treatment of enclave economy as a stratified system is necessary, because significant gaps in wages and non-monetary benefits are found between the enclave-primary and enclave-secondary segments and immigrants are economically divided within enclaves. Second, findings in this chapter contradict previous research which supports that earning-returns in the ethnic enclave are commensurate with

those in the primary segment of the open market. Immigrants who stay in ethnic enclaves, even those who hold high-skill positions, tend to fare economically worse than those who work outside enclaves and in mainstream job market. Those who take labor-intensive occupations in enclave economy are the most disadvantaged group because they get the lowest pay and least benefits, even worse than those who work in secondary segment of the general market. The rosy picture that depicts enclaves as a "protected niche" needs to be further explored.

This chapter also deepens the understanding about the impacts of nativity and immigrant statuses on segmented distribution both in general and ethnic labor markets, and their important effects on economic outcomes regarding earnings and job benefits. As indicated by the results, native-born offspring of Asian and Hispanic immigrants are more likely to assimilate into the non-enclave primary segment, and reap more benefits and earnings across every each labor segment. This conforms to the prediction of straight-line assimilation perspective about the positive effect of generational time on economic assimilation into the mainstream. However, this perspective cannot completely explain the divergent paths immigrants take in a segmented labor market. The findings support my hypothesis about the important role of immigrant status as an indicator for various degrees of economic rights, benefits, and opportunities in determining immigrants' job location and economic well-being in American stratification system.

Among various immigrant statuses, naturalization is more conducive for foreign-born immigrants to enjoy economic rights and benefits identical to those enjoyed by native-born American citizens. Naturalized immigrants have better chances to assimilate into the primary labor market, and to avoid vulnerability within ethnic enclaves. In contrast, non-permanent

and permanent residency tend to confine workers to lower strata of the labor market, and adversely affect their economic well-being. This implies that non-naturalized immigrants seem more likely to be afflicted by job losses, wage and benefits reduction, and expansion of part-time, and temporary employment in the context of post-industrial economic restructuring.

Although immigrants can improve their economic status through naturalization, naturalization is a long and complicated process and not every immigrant have an equal access to it. For a new arrival who comes as non-permanent alien has to get permanent residency first and remain in this status for several years before being naturalized. However, U.S. immigration policies unequally allot permanent residency among foreign entrants. Even with permanent residency, individuals are not able to make much advancement both in terms of job selection and attainment of economic benefits, as shown in this chapter. Among several immigrant statuses, non-permanent residency is the most vulnerable status in the U.S. job market because policies related to immigration and employment impose many restrictions on labor market participation for non-permanent aliens. Even those who came with professional skills on H-1B visas are unfairly treated in the job market: they have much less freedom to choose and change jobs and less bargaining power to confront employers for better earnings and benefits, let alone undocumented immigrants who are taken advantage of by labor-intensive sector of the labor market (Rodriguez 2004).

The federal government seems to take an ambivalent, and often inconsistent, approach to the employment of immigrant labor. Rather than implementing a stable policy for legal labor immigration, the government has employed policies to supplement employment-based immigration through various short-term programs, like legalizing workers through IRCA (the

Immigration Reform and Control Act) and recruiting foreign high-skill labor through H-1B visas (Rodriguez 2004). The use of short-term programs, instead of consistently issuing such statuses as permanent residency and naturalization to immigrants, indirectly allows exploitation of immigrant labor in the job market. Temporary workers, especially authorized workers, often are easily controlled and taken advantage of by employers, because their temporary statuses (often facing sudden termination, bureaucracy during renewal process, refusal for renewal and legalization from the U.S. immigration agency) make it difficult for them to resist in the face of unfair pay, benefits reduction, and poor or illegal working conditions (Browning and Rodriguez 1985).

Basically, my study implies that immigrant status is not merely earned through individual effort and longer length of residence in the U.S., but largely determined by the selectiveness of U.S. immigration policies. This biased selection has a notable and prolonged impact on socio-economic attainment of the current immigrants and their descendants and perpetuate the stratification system in American society. On the one hand, public and congress fear that contemporary immigrants and their offspring are not able to assimilate successfully and are greatly concerned about the consequences of segmented adaptation of today's immigrants and their children for American cultural, economic, and social systems. On the other hand, immigration policies continuously create barriers to attainment of such beneficial statuses as permanent residency and naturalization and, hence, impede economic advancement for many Asian and Hispanic immigrants and their descendants because current policies add more vulnerability to their already inferior position ascribed by their non-white skin color and physical appearance, non-European cultural practices, and strong foreign accent.

This chapter intends to call for more scholarly and political attention to the role of nativity and immigrant status in understanding contemporary economic adaptation processes. This also invites more investigation to reassess direct and indirect impacts of immigration policies on the relationship between nativity and immigrant statuses and employment mechanism and rewarding system in U.S. workplaces. Researchers and public often ascribe differentiated economic outcomes between immigrants and natives to variation in human capital attributes. However, human capital cannot fully account for major social divisions in the U.S. labor market. Less is known about how immigration policies affect the association among immigrant status, labor market incorporation, and economic achievement. Future studies should advance to distinguish various visa types defined by immigration policies in more detailed ways to examine their relations to labor market restrictions and economic segmentation, and critically evaluate the inefficiency of immigration policies that reinforce inequality among and discrimination against contemporary immigrants in the U.S. labor market.

Appendix A:

Labor Market Segment Composition Defined by 1990 Census Occupation Codes

Primary Labor Market	
1990 Census Code	Occupation
MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL SPECIALTY OCCUPATIONS	
003 - 022	**Executive, Administrative, and Managerial Occupations**
023 - 037	**Management Related Occupations**
PROFESSIONAL SPECIALTY OCCUPATIONS	
043 - 063	**Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors**
064 - 068	*Mathematical and Computer Scientists*
069 - 083	*Natural Scientists*
084 - 089	*Health Diagnosing Occupations*
095 - 097	*Health Assessment and Treating Occupations*
098 - 106	*Therapists*
113 - 154	*Teachers, Postsecondary*
155 - 165	*Teachers, Except Postsecondary*
166 - 177	*Social Scientists and Urban Planners*
178 - 179	*Lawyers and Judges*
183 - 199	*Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes*
TECHNICAL, SALES AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OCCUPATIONS	
	Technicians and Related Support occupations
205 - 208	*Health Technologists and Technicians*
213 - 235	*Technologists and Technicians, Except Health*
	Sales Occupations
243	Supervisors and proprietors, sales occupations
253 - 257	*Sales Representatives, Finance and Business Services*
	Sales Representatives, Commodities Except Retail
258	Sales engineers
259	Sales representatives, mining, manufacturing, and wholesale
	Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services
284	Auctioneers
	Administrative Support Occupations, Including Clerical
303 - 307	*Supervisors, Administrative Support Occupations*
308 -309	*Computer Equipment Operators*
314 - 315	*Secretaries, Stenographers, and Typists*
316 - 323	*Information Clerks*
325 – 329, 336	*Records Processing Occupations, Except Financial*
337 -344	*Financial Records Processing Occupations*
	Duplicating, Mail and Other Office Machine Operators
347	Office machine operators, n.e.c.
	Communications Equipment Operators
353	Communications equipment operators, n.e.c.
	Mail and Message Distributing Occupations
354	Postal clerks, exc. mail carriers
363, 365 - 374	*Material Recording, Scheduling, and Distributing Clerks*

375 - 378	*Adjusters and Investigators*
379 - 389	*Miscellaneous Administrative Support Occupations*
SERVICE OCCUPATIONS	
	Protective Service Occupations
	Supervisors Protective Service Occupations
413	Supervisors, firefighting and fire prevention occupations
414	Supervisors, police and detectives
416 - 423	*Firefighting and Fire Prevention Occupations*
416	Fire inspection and fire prevention occupations
417	Firefighting occupations
	Police and Detectives
418	Police and detectives, public service
423	Sheriffs, bailiffs, and other law enforcement officers
	Service Occupations, Except Protective and Household
	Food Preparation and Service Occupations
433	Supervisors, food preparation and service occupations
445 - 447	*Health Service Occupations*
	Personal Service Occupations
457	Barbers
458	Hairdressers and cosmetologists
FARMING, FORESTRY AND FISHING OCCUPATIONS	
473 - 476	**Farm Operators and Managers**
	Other Agricultural and Related Occupations
477 -484	*Farm Occupations Except Managerial*
	Related Agricultural Occupations
488	Graders and sorters, agricultural products
489	Inspectors, agricultural products
494 - 496	**Forestry and Logging Occupations**
497 - 499	**Fishers, Hunters, and Trappers**
PRECISION PRODUCTION, CRAFT, AND REPAIR OCCUPATIONS	
	Mechanics and Repairers
503	Supervisors, mechanics and repairers
505 - 518	*Mechanics and Repairers, Except Supervisors*
	Vehicle and Mobile Equipment Mechanics and Repairers
523 - 534	Electrical and Electronic Equipment Repairers
535 - 549	Miscellaneous Mechanics and Repairers
	Construction Trades
553 - 558	*Supervisors, Construction Occupations*
563 – 569, 575 - 598	*Construction Trades Except Supervisors*
613 - 617	**Extractive Occupations**
	Precision Production Occupations
628	Supervisors, production occupations
634 – 635, 637, 639, 643, 645 – 647, 649, 653-655	*Precision Metal Working Occupations*
656 - 674	*Precision Woodworking Occupations*
675 - 679	*Precision Workers, Assorted Materials*
686 - 688	*Precision Food Production Occupations*

	Precision Inspectors, Testers, and Related Workers
689	Inspectors, testers, and graders
694 - 699	**Plant and System Operators**
OPERATORS, FABRICATORS, AND LABORERS	
	Machine Operators, Assemblers, and Inspectors
	Machine Operators and Tenders, except Precision Metal Working and Plastic Working Machine Operators
703	Lathe and turning machine set-up operators
707	Rolling machine operators
713	Forging machine operators
	Metal and Plastic Processing Machine Operators
719	Molding and canting machine operators
734 - 737	*Printing Machine Operators*
	Textile, Apparel, and Furnishings Machine Operators
739	Knitting, looping, taping, and weaving machine operators
	Machine Operators, Assorted Materials
759	Painting and paint spraying machine operators
763	Roasting and baking machine operators, food
766	Furnace, kiln, and oven operators, exc. food
773	Motion picture projectionists
774	Photographic process machine operators
	Fabricators, Assemblers, and Hand Working Occupations
783	Welders and cutters
789	Hand painting, coating, and decorating occupations
	Production Inspectors, Testers, Samplers, and Weighers
796	Production inspectors, checkers, and examiners
797	Production testers
	Transportation and Material Moving Occupations
	Motor Vehicle Operators
803	Supervisors, motor vehicle operators
806	Driver-sales workers
808	Bus drivers
	Transportation Occupations, Except Motor Vehicles
823 - 825	Rail Transportation Occupations
828—833	Water Transportation Occupations
	Material Moving Equipment Operators
843	Supervisors, material moving equipment operators
844	Operating engineers
848	Hoist and winch operators
849	Crane and tower operators
853	Excavating and loading machine operators
855	Grader, dozer, and scraper operators
	Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers, and Laborers
	Helpers, Construction and Extractive Occupations
866	Helpers, construction trades
867	Helpers, surveyor
868	Helpers, extractive occupations
Secondary Labor Market	
1990 Census Code	Occupation

	Sales Occupations
263- 283	*Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services*
285	Sales support occupations, n.e.c.
335	File clerks
	Duplicating, Mail and Other Office Machine Operators
345-346	Duplicating, Mail and Other Office Machine Operators
348	Telephone operators
355 - 357	*Mail and Message Distributing Occupations*
359	Dispatchers
364	Traffic, shipping, and receiving clerks
377	Eligibility clerks, social welfare
SERVICE OCCUPATIONS	
403—407	Private Household Occupations
415	Supervisors, guards
424	Correctional institution officers
425 - 427	Guards
	Service Occupations, Except Protective and Household
434—444	Food Preparation and Service Occupations
448- 455	Cleaning and Building Service Occupations, except Household
456	Supervisors, personal service occupations
459—469	Personal Service Occupations
485—487	*Related Agricultural Occupations*
519	Machinery maintenance occupations
573	Drywall installers
599	Construction trades, n.e.c.
636	Precision assemblers, metal
644	Precision grinders, filers, and tool sharpeners
683	Electrical and electronic equipment assemblers
684	Miscellaneous precision workers, n.e.c.
693	Adjusters and calibrators
OPERATORS, FABRICATORS, AND LABORERS	
	Machine Operators and Tenders, except Precision Metal Working and Plastic Working Machine Operators
704	Lathe and turning machine operators
705	Milling and planing machine operators
706	Punching and stamping press machine operators
708	Drilling and boring machine operators
709	Grinding, abrading, buffing, and polishing machine operators
714	Numerical control machine operators
715	Miscellaneous metal, plastic, stone, and glass working machine operators
717	Fabricating machine operators, n.e.c.
723 - 725	*Metal and Plastic Processing Machine Operators*
726 - 733	*Woodworking Machine Operators*
738	Winding and twisting machine operators
743 -749	*Textile, Apparel, and Furnishings Machine Operators*
753 -758	*Machine Operators, Assorted Materials*
764	Washing, cleaning, and pickling machine operators
765	Folding machine operators

768	Crushing and grinding machine operators
769	Slicing and cutting machine operators
777	Miscellaneous machine operators, n.e.c.
779	Machine operators, not specified
784 -787	*Fabricators, Assemblers, and Hand Working Occupations*
793	Hand engraving and printing occupations
795	Miscellaneous hand working occupations
798	Production samplers and weighers
799	Graders and sorters, exc. agricultural
804	Truck drivers
809—814	*Motor Vehicle Operators*
826	Rail vehicle operators, n.e.c.
834	Bridge, lock, and lighthouse tenders
845	Longshore equipment operators
856	Industrial truck and tractor equipment operators
859	Miscellaneous material moving equipment operators
864	Supervisors, handlers, equipment cleaners, and laborers, n.e.c.
865	Helpers, mechanics and repairers
866	Construction laborers
869	Production helpers
874	Production helpers
875 -889	*Freight, Stock, and Material Handlers*

Table 4.1. Mean Differences of Labor Segment Membership by Nativity and Immigrant Statuses

	Enclave-Primary Segment	Enclave-Secondary Segment	Non-Enclave Primary Segment	Non-Enclave Secondary Segment	N 1,355
Immigrant and Nativity Statuses					
U.S. born citizenship	15.18	7.14	60.71	16.96	224
Naturalized citizenship	32.26	12.90	44.09	10.75	279
Permanent residency	27.40	32.27	21.00	19.33	657
Non-permanent residency	18.46	42.05	10.77	28.72	195

Pearson chi-square (246.194) with df = 9 ***$p < .001$(two-tailed test).

4.2. Odds Ratios of Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Labor Segment Membership from Nativity and Immigrant Statuses and Other Independent Variables: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality, 1993 - 1994

	Model 1			Model 2		
Independent Variables	Enclave Secondary Segment	Non-Enclave Primary Segment	Non-Enclave Secondary Segment	Enclave Secondary Segment	Non-Enclave Primary Segment	Non-Enclave Secondary Segment
Age	1.004	1.002	.999	.989	1.008	.993
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Female	1.473	1.255	1.542	1.225	1.299	1.447
	(0.161)*	(0.155)	(0.179)*	(0.170)	(0.159)	(0.183)*
Ethnicity (*Korean*)						
Japanese	1.140	1.572	1.294	1.511	1.284	1.290
	(0.356)	(0.308)	(0.474)	(0.375)	(0.315)	(0.485)
Chinese	1.550	1.237	1.229	1.541	1.173	1.172
	(0.256)	(0.232)	(0.362)	(0.275)	(0.238)	(0.369)
Mexican	3.768	2.894	8.964	1.754	3.305	5.426
	(0.256)**	(0.244)**	(0.328)**	(0.302)	(0.279)**	(0.361)**
Central American	3.176	2.160	8.435	1.690	2.296	5.464
	(0.296)**	(0.306)*	(0.361)**	(0.333)	(0.328)*	(0.386)**
Immigrant status (*Naturalized citizen*)						
U.S. born citizen	.852	2.047	1.460	1.418	1.102	1.225
	(0.381)	(0.259)**	(0.351)	(0.445)	(0.300)	(0.399)
Permanent resident	2.403	.453	1.096	1.591	.585	.860
	(0.240)**	(0.198)**	(0.271)	(0.257)	(0.209)*	(0.285)
Non-permanent resident	3.524	.273	1.460	1.744	.452	1.069
	(0.313)**	(0.336)**	(0.343)	(0.347)	(0.354)*	(0.376)
Education (*HS diploma*)						
No HS degree				1.430	.867	1.590
				(0.237)	(0.259)	(0.256)
Community college				.449	.934	.733
				(0.302)**	(0.253)	(0.317)
Bachelor's degree				.324	1.147	.528
				(0.277)**	(0.225)	(0.313)*
Master or Ph.D				.359	1.119	.295
				(0.465)*	(0.318)	(0.650)
English proficiency				.640	1.368	.909
				(0.102)**	(0.098)**	(0.108)
Foreign language used at home				.343	.684	.352
				(0.500)*	(0.347)	(0.433)*
Work arrangement (*regular full time*)						
Independently self-employed						
Employer						
Regular part-time						
Temporary						
Seasonal + Other						
Days of experience						

Constant	.173 (0.448)**	.833 (0.392)	.148 (0.515)**	7.973 (0.886)*	.322 (0.773)	1.108 (0.911)
Log-Likelihood		-1667.909			-1578.209	
DF		27			45	
N	1355	1355	1355	1355	1355	1355

	Model 3		
Independent Variables	Enclave Secondary Segment	Non-Enclave Primary Segment	Non-Enclave Secondary Segment
Age	1.003	1.026	1.018
	(0.009)	(0.009)**	(0.010)
Female	1.067	1.124	1.243
	(0.174)	(0.168)	(0.191)
Ethnicity (*Korean*)			
Japanese	1.285	1.066	.927
	(0.386)	(0.338)	(0.505)
Chinese	1.282	.896	.844
	(0.285)	(0.254)	(0.384)
Mexican	1.464	2.562	4.136
	(0.314)	(0.296)**	(0.379)**
Central American	1.406	1.867	4.208
	(0.346)	(0.345)	(0.406)**
Immigrant status (*Naturalized citizen*)			
U.S. born citizen	1.096	.837	.806
	(0.458)	(0.322)	(0.416)
Permanent resident	1.440	.509	.734
	(0.264)	(0.222)**	(0.299)
Non-permanent resident	1.489	.370	.981
	(0.354)	(0.368)**	(0.390)
Education (*HS diploma*)			
No HS degree	1.359	.858	1.449
	(0.243)	(0.268)	(0.267)
Community college	.390	.896	.679
	(0.309)**	(0.264)	(0.329)
Bachelor's degree	.358	1.327	.602
	(0.284)**	(0.239)	(0.327)
Master or Ph.D	.364	1.139	.295
	(0.473)*	(0.337)	(0.667)
English proficiency	.662	1.433	.953
	(0.104)**	(0.104)**	(0.113)
Foreign language used at home	.367	.705	.347
	(0.513)	(0.373)	(0.455)*
Work arrangement (*regular full time*)			
Independently self-employed	1.065	.015	.068
	(0.309)	(1.034)**	(0.755)**
Employer	.316	.271	.074
	(0.280)**	(0.232)**	(0.537)**
Regular part-time	1.701	1.464	2.147
	(0.328)	(0.308)	(0.321)*
Temporary	2.016	1.114	1.794
	(0.308)*	(0.334)	(0.323)
Seasonal+Other	1.029	2.507	.844
	(0.511)	(0.527)	(0.563)
Days of experience	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)*	(0.000)	(0.000)**
Constant	6.554	.228	.909
	(0.915)*	(0.823)	(0.958)
Log-Likelihood		-1492.690	
DF		63	
N	1355	1355	1355

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for regression coefficients.
*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed tests)

Table 4.3. Mean Differences of Labor Segment Membership by Hourly Wages and Benefits

		Hourly Wage	Significance	Benefits	Significance
Labor Segments					
Enclave-primary segment	1	13.63	1>2***	1.24	1>2***
			1<3**		1<3***
Enclave-secondary segment	2	6.98	2<3***	.62	2<3***
			2<4*		2<4***
Non-enclave primary segment	3	14.79	3>4***	1.99	3>4***
Non-enclave secondary segment	4	7.69	1>4***	1.09	1>4 ns
N		1134		1121	

Note: ***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$ (t-test for mean differences for any pair for four categories of labor segments). Nonsignificant differences are indicated by ns.

Table 4.4. Coefficients of OLS Regression Predicting Logged Hourly Wages from Labor Segment Membership, Nativity and Immigrant Statuses, and Other Independent Variables: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality, 1993 - 1994

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	0.008	0.009	0.007
	(0.001)**	(0.001)**	(0.001)**
Female	-0.215	-0.207	-0.175
	(0.031)**	(0.029)**	(0.028)**
Ethnicity (*Korean*)			
Japanese	0.240	0.147	0.159
	(0.074)**	(0.070)*	(0.068)*
Chinese	0.056	0.004	0.022
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Mexican	-0.273	-0.092	-0.080
	(0.053)**	(0.054)	(0.053)
Central American	-0.368	-0.164	-0.147
	(0.060)**	(0.059)**	(0.058)*
Labor segments			
(*Enclave- primary segment*)			
Enclave-secondary segment	-0.367	-0.205	-0.165
	(0.045)**	(0.043)**	(0.043)**
Non-enclave primary segment	0.199	0.073	0.120
	(0.042)**	(0.040)	(0.040)**
Non-enclave secondary segment	-0.216	-0.150	-0.084
	(0.049)**	(0.046)**	(0.046)
Immigrant status			
(*Naturalized citizen*)			
U.S. born citizen		-0.055	-0.018
		(0.058)	(0.057)
Permanent resident		-0.124	-0.113
		(0.044)**	(0.043)**
Non-permanent resident		-0.200	-0.176
		(0.060)**	(0.059)**
Education (*HS diploma*)			
No HS degree		-0.100	-0.080
		(0.041)*	(0.040)*
Community college		0.104	0.106
		(0.050)*	(0.049)*
Bachelor's degree		0.241	0.224
		(0.047)**	(0.046)**
Master or Ph.D		0.434	0.424
		(0.070)**	(0.069)**
English proficiency		0.092	0.085
		(0.017)**	(0.017)**
Foreign language used at home		0.087	0.081
		(0.062)	(0.061)
Work arrangement			
(*regular full time*)			
Independently self-employed			0.057
			(0.069)
Employer			0.183
			(0.052)**
Regular part-time			-0.171
			(0.044)**
Temporary			-0.228
			(0.046)**
Seasonal+Other			-0.180
			(0.075)*

Days of experience			0.000
			(0.000)
Constant	2.216	1.724	1.768
	(0.079)**	(0.143)**	(0.142)**
Adjusted R-square	.34	.44	.46
N	1135	1135	1135

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 4.5. Odds Ratios of Poisson Regression Predicting Number of Benefits from Labor Segment Membership, Nativity and Immigrant Statuses, and Other Independent Variables: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality, 1993 – 1994

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Age	1.006	1.006	1.006	1.006
	(0.002)**	(0.003)*	(0.003)*	(0.003)*
Female	.906	.880	.925	.922
	(0.053)	(0.054)*	(0.054)	(0.055)
Ethnicity (*Korean*)				
Japanese	1.320	1.284	1.258	1.253
	(0.119)*	(0.121)*	(0.122)	(0.122)
Chinese	1.256	1.163	1.151	1.144
	(0.099)*	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Mexican	1.126	1.390	1.373	1.356
	(0.097)	(0.106)**	(0.107)**	(0.107)**
Central American	.808	1.102	1.116	1.083
	(0.120)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Labor segments (*Enclave- primary segment*)				
Enclave-secondary segment	.515	.664	.696	.156
	(0.098)**	(0.102)**	(0.102)**	(0.466***
Non-enclave primary segment	1.548	1.234	1.267	1.359
	(0.073)**	(0.076)**	(0.077)**	(0.139)*
Non-enclave secondary segment	.936	1.002	1.033	1.170
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.191)
Immigrant status (*Naturalized citizen*)				
U.S. born citizen		.887	.933	1.228
		(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.195)
Permanent resident		.783	.804	.708
		(0.079)**	(0.080)**	(0.160)*
Non-permanent resident		.425	.490	.601
		(0.139)**	(0.139)**	(0.242)*
Education (*HS diploma*)				
No degree		.820	.860	.855
		(0.087)*	(0.087)	(0.088)
Community college		1.085	1.085	1.090
		(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Bachelor's degree		1.205	1.159	1.146
		(0.080)*	(0.081)	(0.081)
Master or Ph.D		1.328	1.294	1.293
		(0.111)*	(0.112)*	(0.113)*
English proficiency		1.101	1.090	1.068
		(0.035)**	(0.036)*	(0.036)
Foreign language used at home		.989	1.001	.972
		(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Work arrangement (*regular full time*)				

Regular part-time			.633	.633
			(0.091)**	(0.091)**
Temporary			.301	.303
			(0.149)**	(0.149)**
Seasonal+Other			.278	.284
			(0.271)**	(0.272)**
Days of experience			1.000	1.000
			(0.000)**	(0.000)**
Interaction terms (*Naturalized citizen * enclave primary segment*)				
*U.S.-born citizen * Enclave Secondary segment*				3.485
				(0.566)*
*U.S.-born citizen * Non-enclave primary segment*				.705
				(0.204)
*U.S.-born citizen * Non-enclave secondary segment*				.683
				(0.266)
*Permanent residency * Enclave secondary segment*				5.497
				(0.482)**
*Permanent residency * Non-enclave primary segment*				1.087
				(0.184)
*Permanent residency * Non-enclave secondary segment*				1.017
				(0.228)
*Non-permanent residency * Enclave secondary segment*				4.415
				(0.541)**
*Non-permanent residency * Non-enclave primary segment*				.519
				(0.415)
*Non-permanent residency * Non-enclave secondary segment*				.564
				(0.350)
Constant	.919	.752		-.023
	(.138)	(.268)		(.286)
Log-likelihood	-1630.6474	-1557.0233		-1467.580
N	1121	1121		1121

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for regression coefficients.
*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

CONCLUSION

Findings in previous three chapters lead us to see different aspects of the assimilation processes of post-1965 immigrants and their descendents. When Chapter 2 assesses academic assimilation of the new second generation, I find that the new second-generation youth, as a whole, are able to do better than their parents in high school graduation. This achievement is not surprising as immigrant descendants have free access to U.S. public school system for which many of the immigrant parents may not have this kind of privilege in their original countries. However, the pace and degree of inter-generational mobility varies by ethnic backgrounds regarding college education. Not every generation-ethnic group does better than their parents in college education. Only certain groups, like Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, and those of African, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Indian origins are able to surpass their parents in continuation with college education.

More importantly, when inter-class mobility is examined, stratification of college attendance is found across different ethnic groups. While Mexican Americans are much less likely to attend college than their third- and higher-generation white counterparts, Cuban Americans and Asian Americans are more likely to go on with college education than their white counterparts. Disadvantaged groups, like Mexican Americans and those of other Central-South American and Caribbean origins, are lagged behind in such social factors as parental human capital, family structure, and family size, which contribute to

decrease their likelihood of college education and probably their eventual lower status in American stratification system.

When Chapter 3 expands the scope to examine the social life of immigrant descendants in terms of union formation processes during transition to adulthood, it provides strong and robust evidence to reveal that first generation youth are less likely to embrace the alternative union formation path of cohabitation in the presence of cultural, structural, and contextual controls, as compared to third and higher-generation non-Hispanic white peers. In contrast, second generation's lower likelihood of cohabitation is explained away by the cultural, structural and contextual factors. In addition, the first generation is more likely to take the traditional route of marriage during early adulthood. When the alternative indicator for acculturation, language assimilation, is used, my findings similarly show that those who speak a foreign language at home have lower rates of cohabitation and bilingual Latinos have higher rates of early marriage without prior cohabitation experience.

As previous studies show the adverse effects of cohabitation, like worsened quality of marriage if those who have cohabitation experiences before marriage and increasing risk of divorce, being raised in immigrant families seems to provide a protective force for immigrant descendants and prevent them from being socialized into the alternative lifestyle of cohabitation that may harm the life quality throughout their life course. This conforms to other studies that found similar trend of "downward" assimilation in various outcomes during childhood, adolescence and young adulthood, like lower academic performance, higher odds of having early romantic relationship, higher level of engagement in risk behaviors, and worsened physical and psychological health, when the

acculturation time is lengthened and language assimilation is fastened (Harker 2001; Harris 1999; Harris, Harker, and Guo 2003; King and Harris 2002).

When Chapter 4 examines labor market outcomes of foreign-born adult immigrants, I not only look at the distribution of immigrants in general labor market, but also examine their distribution in the ethnic enclave economy. By treating the enclave as a stratified system, I am able to get into the details regarding immigrants' membership in different segments of the labor market. I also include an important but often-neglected factor, nativity and immigrant status, to examine its link with labor market membership and economic outcomes in earnings and job benefits. My findings reveal that native-born and naturalized citizenship are more advantageous statuses than non-permanent residency and permanent residency to incorporate immigrants and their descendants into the mainstream labor market and facilitate them to attain higher wages and more job benefits. Unlike the prediction by the ethnic enclave hypothesis, the primary segment of the enclave provides significantly lower wages, and less job benefits than the primary sector of the open market. Non-naturalized immigrants are the most disadvantaged group and much more likely to be concentrated in ethnic enclaves and in lower rungs of the open market, and inflicted by lower pay and benefit reduction due to their inferior immigrant statuses.

Findings in Chapter 2 and 3 provide pictures of different life realms among immigrant descendants, one for the academic life and the other for the social life during early adulthood, while Chapter 4 reveals adaptation experiences of foreign-born immigrants relative to native-born immigrant descendants. When these pictures are put together, one definitely sees the complexity of the adaptation processes of contemporary

immigrants and their offspring. So to what extent can we answer the question regarding assimilation: is there downward assimilation for some groups or are all the groups experiencing certain levels of upward mobility?

Regarding educational achievement, I find that even the disadvantaged groups of the second generation succeeded in attaining high school diploma and surpass their parents in high school graduation (although not in college education). This inter-generational improvement probably can be regarded as *modest* upward mobility in education (at least in Alba and Nee's view). However, we are not sure such modest upward mobility is able to guarantee a better job relative to their parents. Studies have shown that high school graduates are often concentrated in jobs in lowest rungs with low pay and high level of insecurity, and no chance for career advancement (Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock, and Scott 2001; National Center for Educational Statistics 2005). Thus it remains a question whether intergenerational upward mobility in high school graduation is able to yield modest economic upward mobility in the labor market.

When the inter-class mobility is examined, I find a clear pattern of educational stratification across different racial and ethnic groups of the new second generation. In a stratified society, it's usually the relative educational standing (not absolute standing) that determines the relative position in the labor market and their eventual socioeconomic status. In other words, individuals with the lowest educational achievement (regardless of the absolute degree) may be distributed to the lowest level of the job market while those with the highest educational achievement will occupy highest-level jobs. As we know, high school diploma is no more highly valued and rewarded in postindustrial era as in pre-industrial and industrial eras. Usually college education is a door to upward mobility,

however, some disadvantaged groups, like Mexican Americans and those of Central-South and Caribbean origins, have the lowest attainment in college education. Although these disadvantaged groups of the new second generation do not experience educational downward assimilation, compared to their immigrant parents, which is contrary to the prediction of the segmented assimilation perspective, their lower educational attainment relative to the third- and higher-generation white peers may block them from taking high-level jobs in the labor market.

Furthermore, findings in Chapter 4 may provide some other hints for the assimilation trend of the second generation in the job market. Results in Chapter 4 show that foreign-born and un-naturalized immigrants are much more likely to be concentrated in the secondary segment of the ethnic enclaves which have jobs of the lowest pay and least benefits. In contrast, native-born immigrant descendants are much more likely to work in general labor market other than enclaves. This implies that even though high school graduates of the new second generation tend to take low-level jobs in the labor market, they still have more chances to work in the mainstream labor market which provides higher pay and better benefits than ethnic enclaves where their immigrant parents are more likely to work because of the poor English skills of the parents. If such evidence can be confirmed by further studies, we may have a hope to see a modest upward mobility inter-generationally in the job market for the second generation.

Even though in the academic realm, some groups of the second generation are disadvantaged because of certain individual and social factors, like low parental human capital and big family size with limited resources, they still have some other advantages over the third- and higher-generation white peers in social life. As revealed by Chapter 3,

both the first- and second-generation immigrant children are less likely to choose the alternative lifestyle of cohabitation that may prevent them from living a low-quality marriage life which may otherwise yield a high cost for them when immigrant descendants have many other challenges to deal with during their life course.

The findings in the previous three chapters, as a whole, imply that academic life, social life, and work life are not independent but are mingled together to influence one another. So my works point to the direction of the future immigration studies that could investigate the interplay of the different dimensions of the life events to form a more comprehensive understanding of the adaptation processes of the immigrant descendants in post-modern American society.

Besides, human lives are linked and embedded and linked together in social relationships (Elder 1998). Especially the lives of the parents and children are often interdependent to have interactive impacts on each other. Both adult immigrants and their descendants face challenges in their adaptation. None of their experiences should be viewed in isolation. When adult immigrants face discrimination and experience unfair treatment in the labor market, this will result in serious consequences because their disadvantaged status and adverse economic outcomes are going to be passed down to and absorbed by their younger generation, as we know from the findings in Chapter 3 that the educational level and occupation of the parents are closely related to the academic attainment of college education for immigrant descendants. Thus more work is needed to link the lives of the immigrant parents and their children to provide a comparative view that predicts inter-generational mobility over time.

In addition, immigrant statuses of the parents should be incorporated as another important factor to examine assimilation outcomes of the immigrant children. We know from Chapter 3 that low parental human capital and disadvantaged family structure have an adverse effect on the academic attainment of the new second generation. These negative factors are often associated with un-naturalized status or even undocumented "illegal" status of both the parents and children, like the case of Mexican Americans, which may deprive them of many rights and opportunities that further impedes them from upward mobility in the assimilation processes. These are all linked together to provide policy implications regarding how the government of the United States treat those un-naturalized and unauthorized immigrants, which definitely will influence the fate of assimilation outcomes of the post-1965 immigrants and their offspring.

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