NEW MILITARY HUMANITARIANS: COMPETITION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES IN 1999 KOSOVAR REFUGEE ASSISTANCE IN ALBANIA.

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ABSTRACT

Mary Elizabeth Walters; New Military Humanitarians: Competition and Cooperation between NATO and Humanitarian Agencies in 1999 Kosovar Refugee Assistance in 1999
(Under the direction of Wayne Lee)

Within the larger context of Serbian ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1999, a complex relationship developed between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations as they responded to the unexpected magnitude of the Kosovar refugee crisis. For the first time in NATO’s 50-year history, the military organization took action in alleviating a humanitarian disaster. Civilian humanitarian organizations, rather than being in the lead, took a backseat to NATO military planning. NATO’s soldiers, meanwhile, were on the frontlines not of battle, but of providing humanitarian assistance to Kosovar refugees. NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, both competed and cooperated in their ad hoc efforts to establish refugee camps in Albania as the international media scrutinized the situation. Competition for funding and resources between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations shaped and limited efforts at cooperation across a wide range of Kosovar refugee assistance efforts.
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New Military Humanitarians: Competition and Cooperation between NATO and Humanitarian Agencies in Kosovar Refugee Assistance in 1999

Introduction

Hundreds of large, drab, army green tents stretched across a field in neat rows and columns, each tent meticulously spaced from the next. At regular intervals larger thoroughfares intersected the endless march of tents, creating an unforgiving grid of canvas and humanity. Smartly dressed soldiers moved purposefully through the camp, setting up more tents and repairing continual drainage problems. Kosovar refugees looked on uncertainly, still not sure if their new security would be jerked out from under them. Two heavily armed gates guarded the entrance to the temporary city with men in bulky vests and helmets watching for threats. Not that far away, another tent city sprang up. This one, while still highly structured, had smaller, bright white tents organized in small clusters. Broad paths connected the clusters to each other. Harried civilian aid workers in jeans and rumpled shirts met with elected Kosovar refugee leaders from each cluster of tents, determining policies and priorities. In Albania, NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations clashed over how to build these temporary tent cities and broader aspects of responding to the 1999 Kosovar refugee crisis. For the first time in NATO’s 50-year history, the military organization took action in alleviating a humanitarian disaster. NATO’s prominent role in responding to the 1999 Kosovar refugee crisis inverted ‘traditional’ military and civilian roles. Civilian humanitarian organizations, rather than being in the lead, took a backseat to NATO military planning. NATO’s soldiers, meanwhile, were on the frontlines not of battle, but of providing humanitarian assistance to Kosovar refugees.
Within a larger story of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, was woven a complex and changing relationship between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations as the international community responded to the unexpected waves of Kosovar refugees between March and June 1999. NATO and the humanitarian organizations, such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), both competed and cooperated in their *ad hoc* efforts to establish refugee camps in Albania and the ultimate transition from military-led to civilian-led refugee assistance. Although the Kosovar refugee crisis extended into three neighboring countries, this study focuses on competition and cooperation in Albania, where the ethnic and cultural similarities of Albanians and the Kosovar refugees simplifies the story relative to the refugee relief efforts in Macedonia and Montenegro.

The unanticipated magnitude of the refugee crisis starting in March 1999 caught the international community off guard and left civilian humanitarian agencies, such as the UNHCR, who would usually manage refugee crises, unable to do so. With hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees in need of immediate assistance and the international media scrutinizing the situation, NATO filled the assistance vacuum. Competition for scarce funding and resources between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations shaped and limited efforts at cooperation across a wide range of Kosovar refugee assistance efforts, such as the construction and management of refugee camps.

The 1999 Kosovar refugee crisis was part of the larger story of the death throes of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The earlier conflicts in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia crucially shaped the expectations and actions of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ethnic Serbs, Kosovars, and the international community, including NATO. Like the wars in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia, ethnic cleansing characterized the conflict in Kosovo.
Over the course of 1998, ethnic violence in Kosovo steadily increased, as did international concern and diplomatic efforts. In early 1999, the violence peaked with several widely reported Serbian massacres of Albanian Kosovars, the most obvious symptom of a broader campaign of ethnic cleansing.\(^1\) In this context, the Contact Group, made up of France, Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, attempted a final diplomatic solution in Rambouillet, France. When these talks collapsed, NATO launched Operation Allied Force on March 24.\(^2\) Although Operation Allied Force was envisioned as a three-day bombing campaign, it lasted 78 days, only ending on June 10. Out Kosovo’s population of roughly two million, over 800,000 Albanian Kosovars had fled into Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Another 550,000 Kosovars became internally displaced persons within Kosovo.\(^3\)

The refugee crisis itself, the influence it exerted over broader events surrounding Kosovo in 1999, and its continuing impact remain little understood. There are several reasons for this including the recentness of the event, the event lying at an odd gap in the relevant academic fields, and the truly global dynamic of the conflict. Ethnic Albanian refugees fled from the Serbian region of Kosovo into Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania. Some of these refugees were then flown around the world to countries as far away as Australia.\(^4\) In addition, a daunting


\(^3\) U.S. Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Kosovo: One Year After the Bombing*, 106th Cong., June 8, 2000, 6.

\(^4\) In 1999, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro were republics within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition, I have used “Macedonia” as a short hand for the Republic of Macedonia. In many official
number of international organizations and NGOs converged on Kosovo and the surrounding area, not to mention the nineteen member-states of NATO who were intimately involved in the conflict. If this were not enough complexity, the initial wave(s) of ethnic Albanian refugees, or Kosovar refugees, which fled Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, were later replaced with ethnic Serb and Roma refugees, an issue outside the scope of this thesis.

Closely related to these issues is the challenge of sources. For example, NATO has a very strict 30-year minimum release policy for its archives. Similar release problems exist for most government archives. Despite this apparent lack of sources, in reality there is actually an abundance of source material. NATO, its member-states, the various agencies and military branches of each NATO-member states gave regular press briefing and published reporting of their humanitarian actions. Civilian humanitarian organizations, as well as human rights organizations, published frequent reports on the state of the crisis and the actions, and their effectiveness, taken by individual organizations. Civilian humanitarian organizations’ archives are also frequently more open, for example the archives of the provided particularly rich sources. The danger of many of these sources is that there is a preponderance of civilian sources, and therefore perceptions, over those of NATO and NATO’s military components. There are exceptions, however. The UNHCR after action reporting, for example, was marked by organizational soul-searching and the reports bluntly stated their own organization’s shortcomings and its reliance on NATO in key aspects. Thus, as with any historical undertaking, disparate and self-interested sources can be woven together to form a semblance of the past.

NATO and UN documents, Macedonia is referred to as the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) as a result of an ongoing naming dispute with Greece.
Historiography

The events in Kosovo remain too recent to have garnered significant historical attention, and there is virtually none on the refugee aspect. More surprising is the lack of historical work on peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention in general. Both sit at an odd intersection of historical subfields. Diplomatic historians have examined the high politics of the negotiations and peace agreements that either precede most peacekeeping missions or follow on the heels of their deployment. Similarly, historians of international law have thoroughly explored the evolving legal frameworks of peacekeeping. Meanwhile, historians of human rights have written on the human rights crises that frequently coincide with peacekeeping missions and often provide the foundational rationale for missions. In contrast, few military historians have looked

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at peacekeeping because few peacekeeping operations before the 1990s corresponded with
conceptions of what the military ought to be doing or what the field of military history should
cover. In contrast, NATO’s bombing campaign has been extensively studied by military
historians interested in the role of air power and strategic bombing.

NATO’s transition to military humanitarianism in responding to the Kosovar refugee
crisis, however, fits into a larger historiographical discussion on the nature of western militaries,
or the existence of a “western way of war.” The unifying theme in this discussion is the belief that
culture matters. Russell Weigley argues that “what we believe and what we do today is governed
at least as much by the habits of mind we formed in the relatively remote past as by what we did
and thought yesterday.” As Wayne Lee observes, “machine guns may kill, but ideas decide
where to place them, how to man them, and when the most effective moment is to begin firing
them.” In the same manner, culturally informed ideas shape when to restrain from the use of
force, how to interact with civilians in war zones, and whether to deliver humanitarian assistance
to refugees. NATO’s humanitarian assistance efforts in Albania raise particular questions about

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9 The exceptions to this tend to focus around peacekeeping missions that involved significant fighting to were identified more as interventions than peacekeeping operations. See: Philippe Girard, *Clinton in Haiti: the 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Norrie MacQueen, *The United Nations since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1999).


the purpose and appropriate roles of western militaries. This historiography briefly examines the literature on the western way of war and the related field of the American way of war, focusing on historic and academic conceptions on military roles.

Although not lacking in detractors, the “Western way of war” thesis proposed by Victor Davis Hanson has profoundly influenced the field of military history, as well as branches of security studies, policy, and the American military. As John Lynn notes, current work “on war and culture…cannot avoid Hanson’s thesis.”13 Hanson first articulated his idea in 1989 in The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Ancient Greece and he further elaborated it in Carnage and Culture in 2002. Hanson argues, “throughout the long evolution of Western warfare there has existed a more or less common core of practices” that originated in ancient Greek hoplite infantry battle.14 While Hanson identifies a host of characteristics, such as civic militarism, individualism, discipline, morale, and command, the “preeminent characteristic,” however, is the quest for decisive battle.15 Therefore, according to Hanson, the Western way of war emphasizes “annihilation…head-to-head battle that destroys the enemy” in a quick and decisive manner.16

Building upon Hanson’s version of the Western way of war, Geoffrey Parker merges the concept of a Western way of war with the older historiographical debate on the rise of the West. In his earlier work on the rise of the West and the Western military revolution, Parker described the aim of this branch of literature as identifying how Europe, “initially so small and so deficient


15 Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 21; Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

16 Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 22.
in most natural resources,” was able to rise to global political, economic, and military power.\textsuperscript{17} Later, Parker added the Western way of war to his explanation of the rise of the West. In particular, Parker focuses on the destructiveness of Western militaries. Beyond a continuous tactical emphasis on infantry, Parker argues, “western strategy, whether by battle, siege, or attrition, almost always remained the total defeat and destruction of the enemy.”\textsuperscript{18} According to Parker, this tradition of destruction combined with an emphasis on technology, discipline, surprise, and economic strength create a western way of war that helps to explain the rise of the West.\textsuperscript{19}

Although Hanson gained the support of some prominent military historians, he also has equally prominent detractors. John Lynn’s \textit{Battle} is particularly scathing of “Hanson’s thesis.” Lynn argues that its “most fundamental assertions,” that the western way of war “has maintained a continuity from the Greeks to the present day and its assertion that Western military practices are, in fact, unique” are untenable.\textsuperscript{20} While Lynn does not deny the importance of “the constant availability of military literature from ancient Greece and Rome,” he argues “this literature did not necessarily act as an agent of the Western Way of War.”\textsuperscript{21} In fact, many of these classic writings ran counter to the premises of the western way of war. Despite these misgivings, Lynn


\textsuperscript{19} Parker, \textit{The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare}, 3.

\textsuperscript{20} Lynn, \textit{Battle}, 13, 15.

\textsuperscript{21} Lynn, \textit{Battle}, 23.
identifies a return to principles derived from the classical period at the end of the eighteenth century that continues to shape western militaries.\textsuperscript{22}

Related to this debate is the discussion over the American way of war. Although work on the American way of war predates Hanson’s thesis, the concept of a western way of war continues to exert a significant influence and in many ways merged with aspects of Hanson’s ideas; indeed in Adrian Lewis’s estimation, “the American way of war is an outgrowth of the Western Way of War.”\textsuperscript{23} Russell Weigley launched the discussion of an American way of war in 1973. In a book that has become a “touchstone” of American military history, Weigley argues that not only does America have a unique way of war, but that since the Civil War “annihilation became characteristically the American way in war.”\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, the American conception of strategy until the Korean war was extremely narrow. In fact, Weigley argues American conceptions of strategy even “excluded from consideration the purposes for which a battle or a war was being fought, military strategists gave little regard to the non-military consequences of what they were doing.”\textsuperscript{25} Although the advent of the Cold War and nuclear weapons forced the enlargement of military strategy to include a broader range of issues, the older tradition of a limited conception of strategy remained powerful, and powerfully limiting, in the American

\textsuperscript{22} Lynn, \textit{Battle}, 15.


\textsuperscript{25} Weigley, \textit{The American Way of War}, xviii.
Throughout Weigley’s narrative, the primary focus of the American way of war is achieving military victory, resulting in a narrow vision of the military’s purpose and relegating any roles not directly contributing to victory in conventional battle secondary.

Unsurprisingly, since 1973 there have been many modifications and challenges to Weigley’s conception of the American way of war. Some historians have sought to prove or disprove the American way of war through specific case studies, but of more interest here are attempts to update or challenge Weigley’s work through new sweeping accounts. Adrian Lewis, for example, heavily influenced by American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, argues that in the American way of war, the aim of war is “the destruction of the enemy's main army, followed by the occupation of the country; and finally, the transformation of the defeated national politically, economically, socially, and, ultimately, culturally.”

Lewis dismisses military operations other than war, such as peacekeeping, in one paragraph as peripheral to the

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28 Lewis, The American Culture of War, 26.
military’s primary warfighting purpose.\textsuperscript{29} In a similar vein, in an article on the United States Air Force Grant Hammond admits that anything less than “boots on the ground…may be an intervention, but not a ‘real’ war.”\textsuperscript{30} Weigley’s American way of war has also influenced other fields, such as security studies. Colin Gray, for example, adopts much of Weigley’s argument in reformulating the American way of war. Gray, like Weigley, argues, “The American way, in effect, is to treat warfare as a near autonomous activity, all but separate from its political purposes and consequences.”\textsuperscript{31} Additionally, the American way of war is impatient, expecting quick and decisive results.\textsuperscript{32}

Other historians, such as Antulio Echevarria and Brian Linn, have problematized Weigley’s thesis without completely rejecting it. Echevarria argues that the characteristics Weigley and others have described are not a way of war, but a way of battle. He explains that both practitioners’ and academics’ “concept of war rarely extended beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success, and hence was more a way of battle than an actual way of war.”\textsuperscript{33} Nevertheless, Echevarria accepts Weigleys’ characteristics as accurately describing the way the American military fights. In contrast, Brian Linn argues that Weigley’s thesis fails to capture the complexity of the American way of war and that Weigley’s emphasis on annihilation can be too easily confused with the

\textsuperscript{29} Lewis, \textit{The American Culture of War}, 384.


\textsuperscript{32} Gray, “The American Way of War,” 32.

broader military ideal of a quick victory.\textsuperscript{34} Focusing on the United States Army, Linn provides an alternate conception of the American way of war. He identifies three intellectual traditions, which he terms Guardians, Heroes, and Managers, that compete for dominance. Guardians view war as both an art and a science, viewing war as an “engineering project.”\textsuperscript{35} Heroes are more interested in the “human element” and their conception of war as “simply battle” most closely fits the broader literature on the American way of war.\textsuperscript{36} Finally, Managers emerged in the later part of the nineteenth century and view war as requiring “the mobilization of the entire nation.” Importantly, Linn observes that, “their fixation on future wars made this group indifferent to small outbreaks of violence, postconflict operations, and unconventional missions.”\textsuperscript{37} Although Echevarria and Linn conceptualize the American way of war very differently, they have one important commonality that is also shared by the bulk of the literature on the American way of war: the dismissal of limited conflicts, such as peacekeeping, as a significant area of concern for American military practitioners, thinkers, and even historians.

The most significant exception to the focus on conventional warfare in the American way of war literature comes from outside of professional history. In 2002 Max Boot, a former journalist at the \textit{Wall Street Journal} and currently a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, published \textit{The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power}. Boot argues that while the traditional American way of war that “annihilates the enemy” exists,

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\textsuperscript{34} Linn, “The American Way of War Revisited,” 530.


\textsuperscript{36} Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}, 7, 8.

\textsuperscript{37} Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}, 7.
there is also a “less celebrated tradition in U.S. military history - a tradition of fighting small wars.”\textsuperscript{38} Boot traces the long tradition of the American military fighting small wars, such as wars against Native Americans in the west, marine expeditions, and naval gunboat diplomacy. Despite this long tradition, Boot argues that the American military developed a type of amnesia in regards to these experiences, insisting that they were instead “temporary diversion[s] from their ‘real’ job – preparing to fight a conventional army” or navy.\textsuperscript{39} Even the Marine Corps, which Boot points out were known as “State Department troops: in the early twentieth century, abandoned their \textit{Small Wars Manual} in preference for “the greater glory of major wars.”\textsuperscript{40} Boot, however, fails to develop his argument to its full potential, ignoring the development and humanitarian tasks that often accompanied these savage wars of peace.

There remain two final historical works worth considering, although both address small niches in the broader topic of the American way of war. Tony Mullis adds to Boots conception of an alternate American way of war by arguing that the so called new missions of the 1990s, in particular peacekeeping, in fact had a long precedent in the American military tradition. Mullis argues that if peacekeeping “is defined as the use of military force to maintain peace and order” either through the “interposition of armed soldiers between hostile factions” or the use of military force or its threat, then many of the “constabulary duties” of the Army qualify as peacekeeping. In particular, Mullis points to Army operations against the Sioux in 1855 and in


\textsuperscript{39} Boot, \textit{The Savage Wars of Peace}, 283.

\textsuperscript{40} Boot, \textit{The Savage Wars of Peace}, xix, 283.
pacification efforts following the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854.\textsuperscript{41} One of the central themes of Mullis’s study is that the circumstances of Army operations against the Sioux, within the Kansas Territory, and in other constabulary missions “required the army to conduct operations it was often loathe and ill-trained to perform – peacekeeping and peacemaking.”\textsuperscript{42} Mullis broadens the role of the military from fighting and winning conventional battles, to the complex tasks associated with peacekeeping that fail to fit nicely into warfighting.

Frank Schubert further broadens the role of the American military in his short study, \textit{Other than War: The American Military Experience and Operations in the Post-Cold War Decade}. Schubert argues, “Much of the American military tradition is a study in dualities” between major wars against foreign armies and \textit{gendarme} or constabulary actions. In fact, according to Schubert, despite the overwhelming focus on the first category, the vast majority of army, navy, and marine operations were actually \textit{gendarme} operations. Rather than \textit{gendarme} operations distracting the American military from major wars, Schubert presents the Spanish-American War and the First World War as breaks with the more common \textit{gendarme} missions.\textsuperscript{43} Like Boot, Schubert admits that there is an equally long tradition of American servicemen disliking \textit{gendarme} tasks, particularly following the Civil War.\textsuperscript{44} Instead of the American military being best suited to fighting wars, Schubert argues that the American military has an equally long tradition of “peace operations, nationbuilding, humanitarian work, and law

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\textsuperscript{42} Mullis, \textit{Peacekeeping on the Plains}, 4.
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\textsuperscript{43} Frank N. Schubert, \textit{Other than War: The American Military Experience and Operations in the Post-Cold War Decade} (Washington: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint History Office, 2013), 3.
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\textsuperscript{44} Schubert, \textit{Other than War}, 17.
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In this light, NATO’s Kosovar refugee assistance efforts in Albania, and the significant role played by the United States, were not something revolutionary and new, but part of a long, if often overlooked, tradition in the American way of war.

Although the United States military, and as a result much of NATO’s military leadership, entered the Kosovo NATO’s military humanitarianism was not without problems, NATO succeeded in meeting Kosovar refugees’ most basic needs. NATO troops adapted to the new environment, built refugee camps, and supported civilian humanitarian agencies broader efforts through infrastructure projects and the logistical network NATO established. These successes challenge assumptions in the historiography on the western and American way of war that western militaries are geared toward decisive battle. Instead, NATO’s actions in Albania indicate that, at the very least, the American way of war is broad enough to include operations other than war, despite their frequent neglect.

The Path to NATO’s Military Humanitarianism

As the situation leading up to the crisis in 1999 gradually worsened, NATO and its member-states created a discourse of humanitarianism and human rights as the groundwork for possible military intervention. In January 1999, for example, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana unequivocally outlined the objectives of any future NATO military campaign in Kosovo:

First, to help prevent a humanitarian catastrophe caused by refugees and displaced persons fleeing the violence - a catastrophe that we narrowly averted last autumn. Second, to help to protect the human and civil rights of the people of Kosovo; and third to help to achieve a political settlement for Kosovo based on a large measure

45 Schubert, Other than War, 2.
of autonomy for this region within the frontiers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{46}

The rhetoric of Solana and leaders from NATO member-states placed the commitment to human rights at the heart of NATO’s public legitimization for military action against Serbia. As Robert Sherwood, one of Franklin Roosevelt’s speechwriters, observed during World War II, “when you state a moral principle, you are stuck with it, no matter how many fingers you have kept crossed at the moment.”\textsuperscript{47} Sherwood’s observation proved telling over fifty years later as NATO's very public rhetorical commitment to humanitarian principles cast a long shadow over the conduct of NATO's military intervention following the collapse of peace talks in 1999. Having publicly and repeatedly based the legitimacy of their military intervention on humanitarian grounds, NATO was forced to live up to those high ideals. This dynamic not only took shape in the bombing campaign itself, but also in the leading role NATO reluctantly took in providing assistance to the thousands of Kosovar refugees fleeing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. As the refugee crisis only got worse, and critics blamed NATO bombing rather than Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milošević, NATO increased its involvement in Kosovar refugee assistance.

The origins of the conflict are complex, as was NATO’s path to intervention. Colin Powell famously argued that the 1990s wars in the Balkans resulted from “an ethnic tangle with roots reaching back a thousand years.”\textsuperscript{48} This widespread perception of the region and its difficulties paints too broad a brush. It is true, however, that both Serbs and Albanians have


constructed a narrative of ancient conflict to justify their fighting during the First and Second Balkan Wars, both World Wars, and the vicious reprisals that have recurred during every shift in power. Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians in 1998-1999 was the latest occurrence in this pattern of violence. After the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia Herzegovina, especially after the failure of UN peacekeepers to halt the killing of over 7,000 Bosniak men and boys in the Srebenica safe area, the international community was keen to avoid a repeat in Kosovo. Media coverage of the massacre of 85 Kosovar civilians by Serbian paramilitary forces, combined with the more general increase in Serbian violence against Kosovars, triggered the demand by the Contact Group that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milošević agree to a ceasefire or face an arms embargo and various other political and economic sanctions.49 U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright warned at a Contact Group meeting, “History is watching us. In this very room our predecessors delayed as Bosnia burned, and history will not be kind to us if we do the same.” Albright’s warning reveals not only the desire to avoid a repeat of the mistakes of the past, but the importance of humanitarian concerns, and issues of legitimacy tied to upholding humanitarian rights, in Western rhetoric on Kosovo.

Kosovar refugees were already becoming a serious concern by mid-1998. In July, over 14,000 Kosovar refugees were registered in northern Albania and another 80,000 were internally


50 Taken from Albright’s remarks at a Contact Group meeting in London on March 9, 1998 and quoted in Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 24.
displaced persons within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{51} By October, humanitarian agencies warned that unless action was taken many refugees and internally displaced persons would not make it through the winter due to lack of adequate shelter.\textsuperscript{52} With these worries in mind, Dayton Accords veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke negotiated an agreement with Milošević on 16 October, which provided for the cessation of attacks on civilians, the withdrawal of some Serbian forces, granting of access to humanitarian agencies, allowing refugees to return, and the creation of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission.\textsuperscript{53} This Holbrooke-Milošević agreement postponed the worst of the violence and was instrumental in helping up to 50,000 internally displaced persons survive the winter.\textsuperscript{54}

The agreement proved to be even more temporary than expected, however, and on 19 December, Serbia launched a new offensive in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{55} The operation was spearheaded by the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia and aimed to re-occupy supply routes held by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), sparking a widespread cycle of KLA and Serbian\textsuperscript{56} retaliatory attacks

\textsuperscript{51} U.S. House Committee on International Relations, \textit{Kosovo: Current Situation and Future Options}, 105\textsuperscript{th} Cong., July 23, 1998, 5.


\textsuperscript{53} Daalder and O’Hanlon, \textit{Winning Ugly}, 23.

\textsuperscript{54} Daalder and O’Hanlon, \textit{Winning Ugly}, 39.

\textsuperscript{55} Daalder and O’Hanlon, \textit{Winning Ugly}, 59.

\textsuperscript{56} Throughout this thesis, the term “Serbian” refers to official military forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, as well as ethnic Serbian paramilitary units drawn from the Republic of Serbia and from Kosovo itself.
and kidnappings.\textsuperscript{57} In particular, reporters covered an incident in which Serbian forces massacred forty-five Kosovar civilians at Račak on January 15, 1999.\textsuperscript{58} With the pressure of public opinion rising, the United States National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee met on January 16. The meeting focused on the implications of the deaths at Račak, including the need for a Presidential statement condemning the massacre, using it to renew pressure upon Milosević, and even dispatching General Wesley Clark to Belgrade to “impress upon President Milosević the gravity of the situation.”\textsuperscript{59} Finally, on March 20, 1999, widespread Serbian ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians reached critical levels and forced the evacuation of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission.\textsuperscript{60}

The final diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group to end the violence culminated with the Rambouillet Talks.\textsuperscript{61} The Rambouillet Agreement would have established the framework for “democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” Under the Agreement, Kosovo would govern its own internal affairs, including legislative, while FRY maintained “competence” over the territorial integrity of Kosovo, monetary policy, defense, foreign policy, customs, federal taxation, and

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  \item \textsuperscript{57} OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, \textit{Kosovo/ Kosova As Seen As Told}, 58.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, \textit{Kosovo/ Kosova As Seen As Told}, 55.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} James Steinberg, \textit{Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee of the National Security Council Meeting on Kosovo} (Situation Room, January 17, 1999).
  \item \textsuperscript{60} OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, \textit{Kosovo/ Kosova As Seen As Told}, 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Allin, \textit{NATO’s Balkan Interventions}, 55.
\end{itemize}
federal elections. On 18 March, the Kosovar delegation signed the agreement under pressure from the United States. The Yugoslav delegation, however, refused.

With the failure of Rambouillet and resting on the rhetorical foundations of humanitarianism and human rights built over the previous year, NATO launched Operation Allied Force. From the beginning, NATO used the protection of human rights to legitimize the bombing campaign. President Clinton told the American public that America and the world had a “moral imperative” to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians and that only “firmness can stop armies and save lives.” Similarly, British Prime Minister Tony Blair argued, “For these poor, defenceless people we are the only chance they have got.”

NATO envisioned Operation Allied Force as a three-day bombing campaign that would quickly cause Milošević to acquiesce to NATO’s demands. This vision was strongly rooted in NATO’s 1995 bombing experiences in Bosnia, where NATO launched its first bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force. Although it only lasted a little over two weeks, Operation Deliberate Force is generally believed to have been an important factor in bringing Serbian forces to the negotiating table, resulting in the Dayton Agreement. The presumed speed of the operation therefore obviated the fact that the bombing would not directly address the ongoing


63 Malcolm, Kosovo, xii, xvii.


ethnic cleansing of Kosovars, the purported reason for NATO’s intervention.\(^{67}\) When the initial days of bombing failed to coerce Milošević to concede, NATO transitioned to a prolonged, escalatory bombing campaign designed to gradually increase pressure on Milošević.\(^{68}\) This type of bombing campaign, however, was poorly suited to stopping ethnic cleansing. Milošević could disperse his troops into the general population, making it impossible for NATO to bomb them without unacceptable civilian casualties while still maintaining full operational capacity.\(^{69}\)

Further complicating matters for NATO, Milošević accelerated the pace of Operation Horseshoe, “a controlled near-encirclement, designed to force Kosovars inside the ‘horseshoe’ to exit in one particular direction” out of Kosovo.\(^{70}\) At first Operation Horseshoe concentrated on "securing a wide corridor for the introduction of more forces into the province" in the Drenica region where the KLA had strongholds, and in the broad stretch of southwest Kosovo near the

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\(^{67}\) Allin, *NATO’s Balkan Interventions*, 61.


\(^{70}\) Malcolm, *Kosovo*, xii, xviii.
Albanian border. By doing so the Serbs funneled displaced Kosovars out of Kosovo entirely. 71

Operation Horseshoe, and more importantly the manner in which it was depicted by the media, shaped the conduct of Operation Allied Force and contributed to NATO’s need to be seen doing humanitarian work in the refugee camps. Operation Horseshoe put NATO in a difficult bind. While the organization’s public rhetoric emphasized ending the Serbian violence against the Kosovars and ameliorating the suffering of Kosovar civilians, humanitarian issues were relegated to the periphery of the strategy underlying Operation Allied Force. General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, captured the crux of the uneasy relationship between humanitarianism and Operation Allied Force itself in an interview with CNN on March 26. He noted, “It was always understood from the outset that there was no way we were going to stop these paramilitary forces who were going in there and murdering civilians.” 72 Even the Department of Defense’s 2000 report to Congress admits that Operation Allied Force struggled to effectively stop Serbian units committing ethnic cleansing. “The Serbian forces conducted an extensive strategic, tactical, and operational-level denial and deception campaign,” making it difficult for NATO planes to locate and destroy Serbian units and air defenses. 73 Meanwhile, Serbian forces continued to force ethnic Albanians from their homes and out of Kosovo.

71 Malcolm, Kosovo, xii, xi, xx.


Having staked the legitimacy of NATO’s intervention on improving the Kosovars’ humanitarian situation, images of refugees’ extreme suffering and degradation threatened to undermine Operation Allied Force’s already precarious legitimacy and international support.\footnote{74} Reflecting on the crisis in August 1999, the UNHCR reported that the situation in Kosovo was unique from the other crises the UNHCR had faced up to that point due to the unprecedented coverage by television media, which “brought the crisis more to the consciousness of the citizens of the major donor countries.”\footnote{75} Analyst Lawrence Freedman argues the CNN effect played a critical role in prompting and dictating NATO action in Kosovo.\footnote{76} This version of the CNN effect argues that widespread media coverage of human suffering can arouse the public opinion.

\footnote{74}{The importance of humanitarianism, or at least NATO’s rhetoric of humanitarianism, does not deny that there were other important motivations for NATO’s intervention. For example, 1999 was NATO’s 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary and NATO was struggling to justify itself in the post-Cold War world. Another explanation is likely that public pressure and interest was not solely based on humanitarianism, but a broader representation of Milošević as the source of evil in the Balkans, or a new Hitler.}


of democracies to pressure their governments to intervene. Freedman goes so far as to argue that NATO’s humanitarian rhetoric led to dangerously high public expectations concerning the speed by which the bombing campaign would succeed, not only militarily but also in relation to Solana’s stated goal of alleviating the humanitarian plight of the Kosovars. In addition, Freedman notes that NATO's own expectations of a speedy bombing campaign and its relation of this to the media, created unrealistic public expectations in regard to the humanitarian costs of the operation itself. As a result, as Operation Allied Force degenerated into a drawn out bombing campaign many international observers began accusing NATO actions, rather than those of the Serbians, of causing the Kosovar refugee flow.

A disconnect developed between public expectations and the reality of the conduct of Operation Allied Force. As Bill Frelick, the Senior Policy Analyst for the United States Committee for Refugees remarked at a Senate Hearing in April, “We are left with a strange, ironic, and tragic discord between the military and humanitarian realities. NATO embarked on the bombing campaign purportedly to stop the slow ethnic cleansing of Kosovo…Tragically, but predictably, it had the opposite effect.” The magnitude of the disconnect, and the risk of the CNN effect backlashing against NATO itself, significantly influenced NATO's response to the Kosovar refugee crisis. Facing growing public pressure, NATO's early humanitarian-based rhetoric contributed to the organization's later need to find alternative humanitarian responses and successes in the form of refugee relief efforts. In this way, the humanitarian version of the

77 Freedman, “Victims and Victors,” 335, 358.


CNN Effect contributed not only to initial Western motivations to pay attention to the Kosovo crisis, but also to the manner in which NATO responded to unfolding events, conducted its bombing campaign, and carried out *ad hoc* refugee assistance.

By the time the first bombs of Operation Allied Force fell on 24 March 1999, Albania and Macedonia had been accepting Kosovar refugees for the better part of six months. With increased fighting within Kosovo in early 1999 and the launch of NATO’s bombing campaign, more refugees were expected to cross out of Kosovo. The UNHCR, for example, had begun negotiating with the government of Albania in 1998 “to allocate land for refugees in case the conflict in Yugoslavia worsened.” No one, however, was prepared for the actual magnitude of the refugee crisis that started in March. The OSCE estimated there would be 50,000 Kosovar refugees, while the UNHCR planned for between 40,000 and 80,000. Even the most alarmist estimates stopped at 100,000. In late March, over 64,000 Kosovar refugees crossed into Albania at the border crossing alone. At the time, the UNHCR had one staff member in Kukës, who, unsurprisingly, was completely overwhelmed. By the time NATO’s bombing ended and Milošević had agreed to NATO’s terms, a period of 78 days, over one million Kosovars had been forced from their homes. More than 800,000 Kosovars had fled Kosovo into Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Another 550,000 Kosovars became internally displaced persons.

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82 Clarke, “Humanitarian Dimension in Kosovo,” 215.
within Kosovo. An estimated 444,000 refugees found shelter in Albania, 344,500 in Macedonia, and 69,900 in Montenegro.

The UNHCR quickly tried to respond, organizing an emergency response team to assist in Albania on March 29. It took until April 2, however, for the UNHCR reinforcements to reach Kukës. The main challenge facing the UNHCR emergency response team at the end of March, which continued to challenge the UNHCR and other civilian agencies throughout the crisis, was funding and logistics. The refugee and military crises stretched the logistical capacities of Albania and Macedonia to the breaking point and military needs inevitably took precedence. Thus the UNHCR-chartered aircraft flying into Tirana with the emergency response team was delayed an extra day to make room for NATO aircraft. While military primacy complicated civilian response efforts, the sheer magnitude of the crisis left the UNHCR and other agencies unequipped to take the lead position in organizing international response regardless. Andrew Jones of the UNHCR reported, “Due to the volume of refugees and the speed of entry into Albania the response required was way above the 80,000 contingency for which the UNHCR had planned.” Suddenly, civilian humanitarian agencies had an extra 720,000 refugees to support. In the initial chaos, a “capabilities vacuum” formed that left relief efforts piecemeal and

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83 Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Kosovo: One Year After the Bombing, 106th Congress, June 8, 2000, 6.

84 Clarke, “Humanitarian Dimension in Kosovo,” 214.


uncoordinated. Almost by default, NATO took the lead in refugee relief efforts.\textsuperscript{87} As Walter Clarke notes, “No international agency can compete...with the resources available to an individual sovereign state determined to exercise national policy imperatives,” or in this case an organization such as NATO.\textsuperscript{88}

**Military Humanitarianism Emerges**

As Kosovar refugees flooded across the borders into Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro, NATO attempted to pick up the pieces of refugee assistance. NATO, however, had few plans in place for such a contingency, though some member-states, such as the United States, had limited contingency plans.\textsuperscript{89} Senator Ted Stevens visited Albania and Macedonia shortly after the start of Operation Allied Force and recalled,

> the refugee situation appeared to be very grave and seriously lacking in organization and planning. It appears we and NATO had simply made no provision for the flow of refugees...My memory will last forever seeing people standing in line for a three-quarter-of-a-mile line to receive one meal a day, cold meal a day, with eight people serving 38,000 people in that line we saw.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite this rocky start, NATO quickly turned its vast funding and logistical capacity to the problem of relieving Kosovar refugees. By April 6, Mercy Corps Vice President Nancy Lindborg

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\textsuperscript{88} Clarke, “Humanitarian Dimension in Kosovo,” 216.

\textsuperscript{89} For a sampling of United States planning, see: James Steinberg, *Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee of the National Security Council Meeting on Kosovo* (Situation Room, October 12, 1998); James Steinberg, *Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee of the National Security Council Meeting on Kosovo* (Situation Room, September 26, 1998); James Steinberg, *Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee of the National Security Council Meeting on Kosovo* (Situation Room, October 9, 1998); James Steinberg, *Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on Kosovo* (Situation Room, October 13, 1998); James Steinberg, *Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee of the National Security Council Meeting on Kosovo* (Situation Room, October 19, 1998).

\textsuperscript{90} Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Kosovo Operations Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999*, 106\textsuperscript{th} Cong., April 27, 1999, 2.
was praising NATO’s rapid “logistical support for U.N. and international relief groups to bring food, water, and shelter to the refugees camped along the border.”

Although NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies temporarily united over their common concern for Kosovar refugees, competition remained. For civilian humanitarian organizations, not only was the well-being of the Kosovar refugees at risk, but also the organizations’ institutional values and purposes for existing. For many of the major civilian humanitarian organizations, neutrality is central to both the manner in which they function and also in their own self conceptions. The very mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, is to serve as an “impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict.” NATO was anything but neutral and was, in fact, actively fighting on behalf of the Kosovars against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It remains unclear what impact NATO’s lack of neutrality had on their relief efforts. What is clear is that both NATO’s partiality and militarization deeply concerned many civilian humanitarian agencies. For example, on April 14, UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogata met with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana over her concerns about maintaining the “civilian nature of the operation” with NATO’s increasing involvement. She went on to warn that it was essential to “maintain the civilian nature of the camps” and confine NATO’s role to “refugee protection” and logistical support.

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an element of Ogata’s concerns, as well as those of the broader civilian humanitarian community, reflected concerns over NATO encroachment on their traditional responsibilities and turf, it is also indicative of broader organizational cultural differences in outlook and procedures that hindered cooperation between NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies.

Ironically, NATO was equally anxious to reassure themselves and civilian humanitarian organizations that they wanted no humanitarian role. On April 21, as NATO’s deployment in Albania, Albania Force or AFOR, was in the midst of transporting thousands of Kosovar refugees away from Kukës to AFOR-built refugee camps, AFOR spokesman Commander Maltinti avowed that “NATO is not seeking to create a humanitarian role for itself…we are only concentrating on providing military resources not immediately available to civil agencies.”94 This balancing act between conducting humanitarian assistance but disavowing serious involvement looks odd when compared to high-level NATO statements, such as a statement to the press on April 12 that “These extreme and criminally irresponsible policies, which cannot be defended on any grounds, have made necessary and justify the military action by NATO.”95 It makes much more sense, however, when compared to attitudes towards humanitarian operations and peacekeeping within the various NATO militaries. The United States is perhaps an extreme case, but clearly demonstrates the conflicted attitude many militaries had regarding non-warfighting missions. The United States Army’s manual on peace operations at the time of the Kosovar refugee crisis argued that the Army was “extremely well suited” to these operations, but also that soldiers’ warfighting capabilities are “unavoidably affected by the nature of the peace


The US military and NATO recognized that only they were capable of filling the logistical gap in refugee assistance, but they also feared such operations as degrading their primary function of warfighting.

**Funding**

While most civilian humanitarian agencies, such as Mercy Corps, recognized the necessity of NATO military support and welcomed logistical support, they did not do so without reservation. Funding and logistical support became the key foci of competition and cooperation between NATO’s military elements and civilian humanitarian agencies. Admittedly, an examination of humanitarian funding during the crisis highlights competition between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations. This element of competition is important, however, because attempts at cooperation between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations were shaped by continuous competition over funding. These funds were converted into personnel, resources, and the influence to make decisions and lead negotiations with the Albanian government and local authorities.

During the Kosovar refugee crisis, the UNHCR struggled to fund its budget. Although the UNHCR receives a small part of the UN’s standard operating budget, it mostly relies on donations, as do other civilian humanitarian organizations. Additionally, many of the largest donors, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, are NATO member-states. In Kosovo, however, these key donors often chose not to donate to civilian agencies, or at least not in as significant quantities as previous refugee crises. The UNHCR observed during the crisis

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96 Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 100-23 Peace Operations* (1993), 38, 89.

that many donors chose to “assist refugees directly through” national assistance organizations, such as USAID, “or through respective NATO forces.”\textsuperscript{98} States had many reasons for funnelling resources through NATO and country-based aid organizations, but the role of the media is inescapable. The UNHCR observed that constant television coverage of the Kosovar crisis “brought the crisis more to the consciousness of the citizens of major donor countries.” This increased consciousness of publics, in turn, contributed to states’ need “to be seen to be doing something” directly rather than through intermediaries such as the UNHCR.\textsuperscript{99} In May, UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogata issued one of many appeals for additional funding. Ogata begged, ”We are looking to our traditional donors to provide us with the financial means to cope with this emergency. I appeal in particular to countries in Europe and the European Commission.”\textsuperscript{100} In addition, many donors were somewhat reluctant to donate to the UNHCR due to its initial absence from relief efforts.\textsuperscript{101}

Beyond NATO’s immediately apparent contribution to Kosovar refugee assistance in the construction of camps and shouldering the majority of the logistical carrying capacity, matters quickly grew far murkier. As with most NATO missions, each member state independently bore all costs resulting from operations in and around Kosovo in 1999, rather than costs being drawn from one of NATO’s central budgets. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, "There is no single source of consistent data on how much each NATO member state contributed


\textsuperscript{99} Lustig, \textit{Albania: UNHCR’s Environmental Responsibilities}, 1, 2.

\textsuperscript{100} UNHCR, “Kosovo Crisis Update,” \textit{UNHCR}, May 11, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80c20.html).

to the military and non-military activities related to Kosovo.”

What is left is an incomplete, and at times inconsistent picture of the financial and material resources mobilized by NATO’s member states. In total, the UNHCR received roughly $347 million earmarked for humanitarian assistance efforts in the former Yugoslavia during 1999. Of that, $173.5 million came from NATO member-states, $0.9 million from the Council of Europe, $75.5 million from the European Commission, and $12 million from private donors. Of the funds earmarked for humanitarian relief in the former Yugoslavia, approximately $59 million went to Kosovar refugee relief efforts in Albania.

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103 It is difficult to consistently breakdown the subdivision of funds within this category. The UNHCR’s reporting fails to specify which part of the former Yugoslavia individual country’s funds go. Therefore, the broad category of “humanitarian assistance efforts in the former Yugoslavia” includes ongoing operations in Croatia and Bosnia, in addition to efforts in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania. On occasion the UNHCR reports that a country used funds for specific purposes, such as $1.2 million from France for protection and registration of Kosovar refugees, but generally the UNHCR fails to specify.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO Members</th>
<th>Military Humanitarian Spending $^{106}$</th>
<th>UNHCR Donations $^{107}$</th>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>$173.5$ million</strong></td>
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Figure 1: Humanitarian Spending of NATO Member-States

The above table, while incomplete, shows a striking difference in funding commitments between NATO’s military contingents and UNHCR commitments. Even with the costs of the military humanitarian efforts of eight NATO member-states missing, NATO spent over $100 million more on military-provided relief than they donated to the UNHCR in the entirety of the former Yugoslavia. In addition, these figures do not reflect the additional money NATO member-states donated to other civilian humanitarian agencies. For example, in May 1999 alone,

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$^{106}$ Data for military humanitarian spending is drawn from Carl Ek, *NATO Burden Sharing and Kosovo: A Preliminary Report* (Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2000). At present, data for many NATO member-states is incomplete. In their reporting, most countries did not separate military from non-military humanitarian assistance, or grouped military humanitarian assistance with combat operations in Operation Allied Force. None of the reporting differentiated between spending in Albania and Macedonia.

$^{107}$ Data for NATO member-states’ contribution to the UNHCR is drawn from UNHCR, “Donor Profiles,” in *UNHCR Global Report 1999* (Geneva: UNHCR, 1999), 401–406, (http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d4d530.html). For most countries, the UNHCR only reported donations to “Humanitarian Assistance in the Former Yugoslavia.” Since it only selectively reported donations to specific humanitarian efforts in Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, or Montenegro, I have relied on the broader category to avoid a false representation of spending. For example, if only donations listed for the Kosovar refugee crisis specifically are reported, then the United States is completely unrepresented.
the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migrations awarded civilian humanitarian agencies, such as Mercy Corps, the American Refugee Committee, and the International Federation of the Red Cross, $16.5 million for efforts relating to the Kosovar refugee crisis.  

While the U.S. was one of the main heavy lifters, NATO utilized the concept of role specialization to most efficiently utilize the financial and in-kind contributions of NATO member-states.  

For example, the Czech Republic sent a small contingent of engineers and medical personnel to Albania that was used to construct a field hospital and refugee camp at a cost of $8.5 million. Similarly the Hungarian NATO contingent was organized into two Sanitation/Spraying Teams that targeted sanitation issues in refugee camps and collective centers. This is one example of a workaround used to share logistical supplies. The camps the Hungarian Teams traveled to were built and managed by other NATO member-states. By focusing on a specialized task, in this case sanitation, the Hungarians were, in effect, sharing their supplies with other countries but circumventing problematic property rights issues.


110 Ek, NATO Burden Sharing and Kosovo, 6-9.

111 Mukalled, Albania: Technical Programme, 3.
In most refugee crises the UNHCR had generally been one of the largest and best-funded humanitarian agencies on the scene. The UNHCR then translated this money into power and influence, allowing it to direct responses to refugee crises. As a result of the funding situation in Kosovo, however, the UNHCR found itself a second-class player in comparison to the funding, resources, and power of NATO. One UNHCR report bemoaned the fact that because of the UNHCR’s “relatively small” share of the funding pie, the UNHCR was prevented “from playing its classic role of leading agency in the management of the operation and caused a vacuum in terms of overall coordination of the emergency operation.”

Another report spent several pages attempting to explain “why UNHCR had direct responsibility for a smaller proportion of the refugee camps than might be expected.” A third report attempted to reframe the situation by arguing the “enormous resources deployed” through such a wide “variety of relief agencies and their different technical backgrounds” made a coordinating role by the UNHCR even more “crucial.”

The UNHCR’s existential crisis was not built upon straws; the organization experienced very real shortfalls in both funding and influence. As analyst Jim Whitman later noted, “Critics

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112 Although this explanation is lacking from UNHCR reporting, an element of the UNHCR’s usual funding dominance is likely that most of the UNHCR’s missions operate in areas of relatively little, or fleeting, importance to international politics, such as the decades old refugee camps in Kenya for Somalia refugees. See: Hossein Sarem-Kalali, *Albania: Provision of Refugee Shelter in Kosovo Emergency Operation, 11 June - 10 September 1999*, EESS Mission Report (UNHCR Engineering & Environmental Services Section, 1999), UNHCR Archives, Box 181, iv.


and donors combined to drive a downward spiral of funding shortages.”¹¹⁶ From early May onwards, the UNHCR was operating on fumes. In April, the UNHCR issued an appeal for $143 million to cover emergency aid for the next three months. By May 7 it had only received $77.4 million and exhausted the last $11.8 million on May 6. To complete operations in May, the UNHCR estimated it needed an additional $40 million.¹¹⁷ Four days later, the UNHCR warned that “If significant resources are not announced immediately, UNHCR will not be able to make further essential commitments to assist the refugees.”¹¹⁸ By the end of the month, the worst of the funding shortage had been met and only $10 million of the appeal remained unmet.¹¹⁹ The underfunding of the UNHCR is not, in itself, unique. In fact, it is common for the UNHCR to be underfunding and continually appealing for donations. The impact of the funding shortage in Kosovo, however, was unique in that the UNHCR was underfunded by traditional Western European donors and that NATO was unwilling to wait for the UNHCR to slowly collect resources and implement refugee assistance efforts. Instead, NATO began establishing refugee camp and leading assistance efforts during the lag period, which in most refugee crises would be normal.

Most of these funding battles took place outside of the Balkans, in places such as Geneva, New York, and Brussels. In Albania, competition for funding, and the resulting resources, took place either informally or through the Emergency Management Group (EMG). The Emergency


¹¹⁷ UNHCR, “Kosovo Crisis Update,” UNHCR, May 7, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80b34.html).


Management Group (EMG) was established to ease the logistic and resource distribution among the roughly 200 civilian humanitarian organizations and NATO forces operating in Albania. The major partners in the EMG were the Government of Albania, Albania Force (AFOR), the UNHCR, the World Food Program, the World Health Organization, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as well as other major non-governmental organizations.

The EMG aimed to bring together the most important actors providing Kosovar refugee assistance and coordinate relief efforts, resource distribution, and liaise with the Albanian Government. Within the EMG, tasks were divided among five “desks”: Information, Security, Food, Logistic, and Shelter. AFOR attempted to use the EMG as a means of building trust and cooperation between itself and civilian aid organizations. AFOR personnel were attached to each of the EMG’s main desks and an AFOR help desk was created to facilitate cooperation with civilian agencies. In an attempt to decrease competition among civilian agencies, all civilian requests for logistic support from NATO had to come through the EMG so that NATO spread its resources evenly. While the EMG succeeded in bringing together all the major actors, its success in facilitating cooperation and coordination is debatable.

In practice, the EMG served as yet another forum for competition among civilian humanitarian organizations and between them and NATO. Even accounts of who established the

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EMG reveal the degree that competition permeated relations between NATO and the UNHCR. Based on NATO accounts, the EMG appears as the child of the Albanian Government and NATO’s AFOR. 125 UNHCR reports, on the other hand, describe the EMG as being established by the Government of Albania and the UNHCR. 126 Clearly NATO’s and the UNHCR’s accounts cannot both be accurate and the origin of the EMG may have been a mix of both accounts. For the UNHCR, the EMG “filled out, to some extent, the vacuum in coordination and in the management of the crisis” which would normally have been filled by the UNHCR directly. 127 UNHCR Senior Site Planning Coordinator Hossein Sarem-Kalali, also the Head of the EMG Shelter Desk, argues that the EMG provided the UNHCR with a platform through which it could shape policies and strategies of other agencies. 128 While Sarem-Kalali uses the dissemination of the UNHCR Guidelines and Plans of Action for Shelter as an example, fellow UNHCR worker Andrew Jones notes that these guidelines were “given little attention, but also the sites [of refugee camps] were constructed without proper consultation” with UNHCR experts. 129 Meanwhile, NATO accounts of the EMG depict AFOR as shepherding the many disparate civilian humanitarian organizations into some semblance of order. 130


129 Jones, Albania: Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees, 14.

In sum, ongoing competition between NATO, the UNHCR, and other civilian humanitarian agencies impeded efforts at cooperation, even within the EMG. Funding shortfalls for the UNHCR are not, in themselves, unusual. Usually, however, the UNHCR is not competing for influence and leadership in directing the international response to refugee crises. During the Kosovar refugee crisis, however, NATO was unwilling to wait while the UNHCR slowly gathered the resources to respond. Instead, NATO poured resources into Albania and Macedonia and, in doing so, took the lead role in providing refugee assistance.

Logistics

Alongside competition over funding, civilian humanitarian organizations competed with each other and with NATO for the resources NATO’s logistic network brought into the Balkans. From another perspective, however, logistics proved one of the most successful arenas of cooperation between NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies. NATO capabilities ferried resources into and around Albania, worked with the UNHCR in transporting refugees, and helped civilian aid workers travel across difficult terrain.

Logistically, NATO was ideally situated to respond to the Kosovar refugee crisis. During the Cold War, NATO established a logistical support system designed to support a major war in the case of Soviet aggression in Europe. In the post-Cold War period the basic structures of this system were maintained, with strong military staging bases in Germany and Italy. This logistical system was converted to support both military and humanitarian operations in and around Kosovo. NATO’s operations surrounding the Kosovo crisis in 1999 were some of its earliest truly multinational operations. Although it may seem counterintuitive for a multinational military alliance, until the early 1990s NATO was, at best, ambivalent towards multinational military
cooperation.\textsuperscript{131} During the Cold War, military integration was largely limited to the national corps level within the Northern Army Group and the Central Army Group.\textsuperscript{132} After the end of the Cold War, NATO’s member-states contributed smaller military units, necessitating the creation of multinational force structures. Although NATO began this process in 1991, implementing the new command structures was still underway in 1999, putting Kosovo in the midst of this transitional period.\textsuperscript{133}

NATO’s new multinationalism was accompanied by logistical growing pains. Until 1996, NATO’s logistical framework was based on national responsibility. Each member-state was responsible for supporting its own forces or obtaining support through Host Nation Support Agreements. In 1996 NATO granted commanders of multinational forces the authority to “coordinate” logistics and recognized that “logistics are not solely a national responsibility.”\textsuperscript{134} Efforts to implement the new 1996 logistics framework, however, were stalled by 1999. In particular, national laws regarding property titles and usage restrictions and financial burden-sharing issues have, according to analyst Thomas-Durell Young, “confounded efforts to effect multinational logistics cooperative arrangements.”\textsuperscript{135} Thus in Albania, NATO created a


\textsuperscript{132} Young, \textit{Multinational Land Formations and NATO}, 7.

\textsuperscript{133} Young, \textit{Multinational Land Formations and NATO}, 7-9; John R. Deni, \textit{Alliance Management and Maintenance Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century} (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 44.

\textsuperscript{134} Young, \textit{Multinational Land Formations and NATO}, 21.

\textsuperscript{135} Young, \textit{Multinational Land Formations and NATO}, 21.
temporary logistical arrangement in which member-states largely supported their own units and Kosovar refugee assistance efforts, but collaborated in regards to logistics delivery.

As the UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogato told NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, “I have asked for NATO member states to provide support because we need it, their airlift capacity, their airport and seaport logistic capacity, some of the site constructions.”\textsuperscript{136} To support the UNHCR and establish broader refugee relief efforts, NATO deployed AFOR and the Ace Mobile Force. To ameliorate the limitations of Albania’s infrastructure, NATO took control of Tirana’s Rinas International Airport and much of the Durrës port. By mid-April, Tirana could accommodate almost 300 flights daily, in sharp contrast to the 13 it could accommodate at the start of March.\textsuperscript{137} AFOR equipped the airport with new traffic control radar systems. By the end of the crisis, 3,489 flights had landed, including 1,139 flights moving humanitarian supplies totaling over 10,000 metric tons. In addition, over 4,578 metric tons of aid entered Albania through Tirana by helicopter.\textsuperscript{138} As the only major airport in Albania, however, landing space at Tirana was fiercely fought over, even among military elements split between warfighting and humanitarian relief.\textsuperscript{139}

While revitalizing Tirana Airport was essential, most heavy military equipment and humanitarian aid entered Albania through the port at Durrës. AFOR established a Port Management and Coordination Center, which worked with local Albanian port authorities to


\textsuperscript{138} Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Naples, NATO, “Operation Allied Harbour.”

coordinate port functions and the inflow of humanitarian aid. Thanks to cooperation between NATO forces and the Albanian government, unloading was increased to twelve ships daily. AFOR also established a storage and marshaling area in which unloaded supplies could be safely stored before being transported to different locations within Albania.\footnote{140} Before supplies could be relocated, Albania’s weak transportation network had to be addressed. AFOR engineers and NATO contractors repaired over 189 kilometers of road during the operation to facilitate over-ground transportation. In addition, AFOR had over 1,719 vehicles with a total daily capacity of almost 1,000 tons of aid. As civilian humanitarian agencies assumed greater responsibilities, these resources were rarely used as most civilian aid organizations used local Albanian drivers and vehicles as a planned measure to stimulate Albania’s economy.\footnote{141}

Building upon Cold War era logistic structures, NATO created workarounds to adapt to the multinational military context in Albania. At the most basic level, the success of these workarounds is evident in the fact that none of the NATO military units or the Kosovar refugee camps they established experienced any significant supply shortages. Unlike the UNHCR, the Kosovar refugee camps built and managed by NATO forces never came close to closing due to lack of funding or resources. From an Alliance perspective, specialization allowed NATO to better integrate its resources into a more coherent assistance effort without challenging national logistics prerogatives.

\footnote{140} Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Naples, NATO, “Operation Allied Harbour.”

\footnote{141} Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Naples, NATO, “Operation Allied Harbour.”
Militarized Refugee Camps

Examining funding and logistics in isolation from the broader context of the Kosovar refugee crisis and without a close examination of refugee assistance on the ground creates a picture primarily of competition. Important levels of cooperation did occur, however. Just as the previous two sections on funding and logistics examined elements of competition between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations, the next two sections on refugee camps and the transition from military to civilian leadership explore aspects of cooperation. Before shifting focus to the numerous refugee camps established in Albania, however, it is important to establish what these camps did, and did not, do.

If the well-being of the Kosovar refugees had depended solely on NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies, then the refugee crisis of 1999 would have developed into a full blown catastrophe. There was a roughly one-week delay between the uptick of Kosovar refugees flowing into Albania and a significant international response. Given the unexpected magnitude of the crisis, this one-week delay actually represents a relatively quick response. Nevertheless, even that week-long delay could have been devastating for the majority of Kosovar refugees. In the first ten days following the initiation of Operation Allied Force, some 155,000 Kosovar refugees crossed into Albania.\textsuperscript{142} In blunt terms, a UNHCR report stated, “The border areas did not have the capacity of receiving such a huge number of people” and neither did civilian or military organizations in those first ten days.\textsuperscript{143} In fact, the only reason the crisis was not worse was the unprecedented response of local Albanians, particularly in the border areas, in opening

\textsuperscript{142} Jones, \textit{Albania: Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees}, 2.

\textsuperscript{143} Sarem-Kalali, \textit{Albania: Provision of Refugee Shelter in Kosovo Emergency Operation}, 1.
their homes to Kosovar refugees. The UNHCR reported, “successful absorption of a large number of refugees into Albania was largely due to the hospitality of the Albanian people in accepting refugees into their homes.”

Alternatives to the Refugee Camps

It is difficult to over-emphasize the importance of these private accommodations, particularly in the ability of Albania and the international community to respond to the mass outflow of refugees around the start of Operation Allied Force. Roughly 305,592 Kosovar refugees, or 61 percent of the total documented number of refugees in Albania, are estimated to have stayed in private accommodations. Seventy percent of refugees housed in private accommodation stayed with urban families, while 30 percent stayed with rural families. Roughly 10,766 rural families hosted refugees and the average rural family size increased by 85 percent. According to monthly registration efforts by the government of Albania, each host family accommodated an average of nine Kosovar refugees. In contrast, only 68,909 documented Kosovar refugees in Albania stayed in refugee camps. Thus while contemporary media coverage, as well as later scholarship, focused on the efforts of NATO and humanitarian

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agencies to build temporary shelters and refugee camps, the full potential of the Kosovar refugee crisis was averted by ordinary Albanian families.

Conditions in private accommodations varied widely and the international community initially faced challenges in assisting these refugees. The international community’s attitude is best captured by the UNHCR’s statement that private accommodation “was the best option for shelter due to the fact that no major capital investment is required.”¹⁴⁹ Depending on the case, Kosovar refugees might be wholly supported by host families, make partial financial contributions to host families, or be forced to fully meet their living costs. For many Kosovar refugees, meeting any sort of financial obligation was difficult since most had been forced to pay multiple bribes just to leave Kosovo. Eventually, the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies organized relief to families hosting refugees in the form of cash grants or in-kind support. While this system was ideal in theory, in practice many refugees in private accommodation saw little to none of this aid.¹⁵⁰ In August, British volunteer Joannes Ayers met with some of the leaders of the “Association of Kosova Refugees in Durres.” Ayers recounts the President going “to great lengths to explain how useless they [the UNHCR] had been…how since their evacuation several months earlier they had only received one aid packet.”¹⁵¹

In addition to private accommodation and refugee camps, roughly 21 percent of Kosovar refugees in Albania stayed in collective centers.¹⁵² Over 300 buildings housed 91,323


¹⁵⁰ Whitman, “The Kosovo Refugee Crisis,” 174, 175.


¹⁵² Jones, Albania: Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees, 8.
refugees. These collective centers ranged widely in size, quality, and management, making finding specifics for any one center very difficult. Various humanitarian organizations and local municipal authorities managed most centers. Public buildings, such as schools, accounted for 90 percent of the buildings used, but private facilities and large abandoned buildings were also renovated to house refugees. In Kukës alone, 70 collective centers were established. UNHCR worker Stefan Meersschert observed, “most often refugees had to pay a substantial rent, certainly in regard to the often poor conditions of those buildings.” Despite the often-poor living conditions and expensive rent, the UNHCR reported that these collective centers represented “a more cost effective solution in terms of capital investment for construction and management” than refugee camps. Collective centers were often *ad hoc* responses by local government or individual civilian humanitarian agencies, both of which left few records.

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Despite the relative unimportance of refugee camps in Albania, huge sums of money were poured into the camps and they captured the bulk of media attention. For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense reportedly spent between $45 and $70 million on just one refugee camp. Over 50 refugee camps were eventually built, although roughly 10 percent were never used due to the rapid repatriation of the Kosovar refugees. Nevertheless, even at the peak of the Kosovar refugee crisis these camps only housed roughly 68,909 Kosovar refugees. The initial wave of camp building coincided with the period in which the UNHCR remained largely out of the picture and the Emergency Management Group was just being established. As a result, NATO and humanitarian agencies operated largely independent of each other in building refugee accommodations.


Only after the worst of the crisis passed did the UNHCR and other key civilian humanitarian agencies assume a directing role. Thus, although the refugee camps were the least important measure in helping Albania cope with 465,800 refugees, the camps were the focus of international involvement, media attention, and where competition and cooperation between the new NATO military humanitarians and civilian humanitarian organizations was most intense.

Refugee Camps and Barracks

Initial NATO and civilian attention focused on the area around Kukës and the nearby Morini border crossing. The magnitude of the crisis facing Kukës was immense. On March 30 alone, over 16,000 Kosovar refugees crossed into Albania near Kukës and by the following day the total reached 90,000. The same day NATO established regular helicopter relief flights between Tirana and Kukës ferrying humanitarian supplies. A few days later, Italy had a convoy on the road to Kukës, the result of Operation Rainbow, an effort led by the Italian government involving military, government, and private aid which shipped supplies to shelter 25,000 Kosovar refugees as well as a mobile hospital, trucks, and buses. By April 8 the Italian military opened a refugee camp between the Morini crossing and Kukës, which initially housed 3,000 Kosovar refugees. The camp also included a medical center and psychological support for

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refugees and the capacity to medevac critical cases to Tirana. The Italians quickly constructed a camp eventually grew into the Kukës Transit Center and over 423,000 Kosovar refugees were processed through it during the crisis. By April 19, the newly minted Albania Force (AFOR) was fully established with 2,000 troops on the ground and plans to send an additional 6,000. Civilian humanitarian agencies, such as the UNHCR, were conspicuously absent from these early NATO mobilization efforts. On April 21, almost a month after the start of Operation Allied Force, NATO spokesman Commander Malinti, was still referring to making “preliminary contact with...the UNHCR, the international and non-governmental organisations” in regard to building refugee camps.

For a multitude of reasons, it quickly became apparent that continuing to support Kosovar refugees in the Kukës area was untenable. Kukës, and northern Albania in general, had little to recommend itself as capable of accommodating the burgeoning numbers of Kosovar refugees. One UNHCR report noted, “While Albania is considered the poorest country in Europe, Kukës [the main crossing point into Albania] is considered the poorest city in Albania.” The 1990s were a difficult decade for Albania. At the start of the decade, Albania’s economy collapsed with the end of communism and isolationism. Albania’s still recovering economy was again crippled

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165 UNHCR, “Kosovo Crisis Update,” UNHCR, March 31, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80c3c.html); UNHCR, “Kosovo Crisis Update,” UNHCR, April 8, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80b48.html); Clarke, “Humanitarian Dimension in Kosovo,” 216.

166 Meersschert, Albania: Coordination of Water and Sanitation Sector Activities in Kukes, 1.


169 Meersschert, Albania: Coordination of Water and Sanitation Sector Activities in Kukes, 15.
in 1997 when a pyramid financial scheme fell apart. In part as a result, government and judicial institutions lost most of their remaining legitimacy and instability increased as official and traditional local centers of authority came into open conflict. Albania lacked basic infrastructure and much of the infrastructure it did have was poorly maintained. The Tirana-based government was weakest in Northern Albania and as a result infrastructure there was in especially poor shape.\textsuperscript{170} For example, due to the extreme isolation of Kukës from Tirana, the UNHCR reported that the “Kukës population supported most of the [refugee] burden on its own.”\textsuperscript{171} Albania’s poverty, therefore, shaped every aspect of the Kosovar refugee crisis, from its initial phases to the closing of refugee camps.

As NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies began establishing refugee camps, they increasingly looked away from Kukës and northern Albania for camp locations. Although building camps further away from Kosovo posed its own difficulties, both NATO and the main civilian agencies agreed it was the best course of action. Three main factors shaped their decisions: the lack of capacity in northern Albania to support refugees, the need for security, and the fear of successive waves of refugees. Given northern Albania’s pre-existing poverty, the sudden appearance of hundreds of thousands of refugees had already stretched resources and infrastructure to the breaking point. Hossein Sarem-Kalali, the UNHCR Senior Shelter Site Planning Coordinator, warned, “The remoteness of these regions and poor access made the provision of assistance and aid extremely difficult. Besides, the security of refugees could not be guaranteed in these border areas.”\textsuperscript{172} The area around Kukës, and much of northern Albania in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170}Meersschert, \textit{Albania: Coordination of Water and Sanitation Sector Activities in Kukes}, 15,16.
\item \textsuperscript{171}Meersschert, \textit{Albania: Coordination of Water and Sanitation Sector Activities in Kukes}, 15.
\item \textsuperscript{172}Sarem-Kalali, \textit{Albania: Provision of Refugee Shelter in Kosovo Emergency Operation}, 1.
\end{itemize}
general, experienced spillover violence from the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The KLA used northern Albania and refugee camps near the border as recruiting grounds and staging centers. Mortar rounds commonly landed in Albania. Aid workers often had to temporarily move positions further away from the border, a UNHCR post had a near miss with two mortar shells, and in one of the most striking cases over 8,000 Albanian villagers near Kukës fled their homes after a bout of particularly active shelling. In addition, there was constant concern that another wave of Kosovar refugees could, at any moment, appear at the border crossings and have nowhere to go. As a result, a key priority in the selection of camp locations was to shift the burden of supporting Kosovar refugees to other regions of Albania. Sarem-Kalali goes on to explain, “The transfer of the refugees to other parts of Albania was the only option left to the international aid agencies.”

Recognizing that the border areas were saturated only answered part of the dilemma of building camps. In a short period of time, NATO had to find either public or private land on which camps could be built. Establishing camps and finding land required negotiations with local and national Albanian government officials, as well as with private individuals. Negotiations covered not only finding usable land, but also compensation agreements, environmental responsibilities, and eventual cleanup expectations when the camps closed. The ad hoc nature

\[173\] UNHCR, Kosovo Crisis Update,” UNHCR, May 31, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80b38.html).

\[174\] UNHCR, “Kosovo Crisis Update,” UNHCR, April 22, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80e1f.html).

\[175\] Sarem-Kalali, Albania: Provision of Refugee Shelter in Kosovo Emergency Operation, 1.

\[176\] Jones, Albania: Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees, v.
of initial camp construction, however, “led to a highly complex pattern of camps, collective centres and hard shelters.”

Nevertheless, by the end of the crisis, over 1,200 acres were devoted to refugee camps. Of this land, 214 acres were in private hands, 934 acres were productive state land, and another 84 acres were unproductive state land. While the Government of Albania was under great pressure to provide NATO with land for refugee camps, this land was often unsuitable for camps. The Spitalle Camp, for example, established near Durres and housing 2,200 refugees, was located next to a garbage dump and a tannery, as well as in an area that had just recently been in the tidal flats. Even the UNHCR was prone to building camps in undesirable locations out of necessity. The UNHCR Hamallaj Camps 1 and 2 were both built in swamps.

In the confusion of the crisis, several camps were established without proper consultations, resulting in long-term difficulties. Additionally, lack of a strong humanitarian agency presence resulted in avoidable mistakes as NATO and other less-experienced groups attempted to fill the gap. In many cases, initial lack of cooperation in camp construction resulted in long lasting bitterness between NATO and civilian aid organizations.

177 Jones, Albania: Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees, v.

178 Jones, Albania: Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees, 6.

179 Lustig, Albania: UNHCR’s Environmental Responsibilities, 2-3.


182 Lustig, Albania: UNHCR’s Environmental Responsibilities, 7.
One of the most egregious failures of both negotiation and cooperation between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations was the establishment of Camp Hope by the US Department of Defense. Camp Hope was a centerpiece in Operation Sustain Hope and was built hastily to house 20,000 Kosovar refugees. Unfortunately, the Department of the Defense ignored two warnings from the UNHCR Environmental Team against the location agreed upon with the Fier municipality, which happened to be in the middle of a swamp. The camp was prohibitively expensive, costing as much as $70 million. To put that in perspective, the International Federation of the Red Cross established a program to house Kosovar refugees that cost roughly $112 per refugee. In contrast, Camp Hope cost approximately $2,5000 per refugee. After all the expense, the refugees were forced to evacuate due to flooding. The desire for a quick fix and media praise, led the US to ignore attempts at collaboration with the UNHCR and created long-term difficulties in operating in the Fiers area and in post-crisis cleanup efforts.

Once locations were found, NATO forces began building the camp structures. Although civilian humanitarian agencies were involved in this initial process, for the most part it was NATO military forces designing and constructing the camps. Critically, there was no NATO-

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184 Lustig, Albania: UNHCR’s Environmental Responsibilities, xi, 47.


186 Lustig, Albania: UNHCR’s Environmental Responsibilities, xi, 47.

188 Jones, Albania: Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees, 6.
wide procedure for camp construction. As a result, national norms of NATO’s member states dictated the structure and eventual living standards of the camps. Afterwards the UNHCR sharply criticized these ad hoc campsites as being based on each organizations’ “own norms and standards” rather than accepted humanitarian standards. In the cases of military-constructed camps in particular, the UNHCR accused them of being “built to ‘working,’ and not for ‘living’ standards, which negatively impacted the living conditions of Kosovar refugees.

Many images of the refugee camps show neatly organized camps with bright white tents laid out in crisp rows and columns. While making for a great publicity tool, these grid-like camps bucked twenty years of humanitarian guidelines. The UNHCR readily admits that grid layouts are often the simplest mode for organizing refugee camps and maximizing space, but considers this format the least desirable. At the most basic level, high population densities themselves are undesirable because they lead to increased problems with sanitation and disease control. At a more human level, the grid layout adds to the difficulties refugees face in adapting to their new environment. The UNHCR’s *Handbook for Emergencies* warns, “a rigid grid design makes the creation of community identity difficult, as the refugees are not usually accustomed to living in such a pattern.” Instead, shelter construction should be family oriented and camps organized “into small community units or villages…[which] in turn organized central core services.”

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addition, those bright white tents were considered a means of last resort by the humanitarian community and were under no circumstances considered acceptable long-term shelter. ¹⁹³

While many of NATO’s member states had previously conducted peacekeeping missions and had experience with humanitarian disasters, none were truly prepared for the Kosovar refugee crisis. The U.S.’s existing doctrine on Peace Operations was representative in its assumption that any humanitarian assistance performed by the military would be auxiliary to that of civilian humanitarian organizations. The last doctrine published before Kosovo on peacekeeping cautions commanders, “in most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed by the NGO…it is, however, crucial to remember in such missions the role of the JTF should be to enable – not perform – NGO tasks.”¹⁹⁴ Similarly, a draft NATO doctrine for peacekeeping published in 1998 argued that NATO forces were best suited for “peace enforcement action against those responsible for threats to peace and security, or who carry out acts of aggression.”¹⁹⁵ Like the American doctrine, NATO forces were envisioned as enabling humanitarian efforts by organizations such as the UNHCR. None of the countries who participated in Kosovar refugee relief efforts were prepared to undertake a humanitarian assistance operation without the guidance of civilian organizations.

Without uniform guidelines on the care of refugees and in most cases without doctrinal guidance from their own governments, NATO’s military components fell back on what they new how to build: barracks. In a telling slip, the U.S. Department of Defense announced plans to

¹⁹³ UNHCR, Handbook for Emergencies, 36.


build “barracks” in Albania to house the Kosovar refugees.\textsuperscript{196} Designed primarily for large numbers of single men, many of the resulting barrack-styled camps were poorly suited for large refugee families.\textsuperscript{197} The quality of camp structures varied widely across the camps built by different NATO member states. In some camps, Kosovar refugees lived in shelters with more luxuries than many would have had in their own homes. The camp built by the Kuwaiti government, for example, was air-conditioned, a rare commodity in the poverty-stricken Balkans. In contrast, a camp built by the Turkish military was described as housing refugees in “rudimentary shelters.”\textsuperscript{198} More in this vein, British volunteer Joannes Ayers visited overcrowded camps in which over 30 people were crammed into “family rooms no bigger than 10 ft. x 15 ft.”\textsuperscript{199}

In contrast to NATO’s barrack-style refugee camps, the Quatrom refugee camp managed by Relief International was constructed in a very different manner and much more in line with the UNHCR’s ideal type of refugee camp. The camp was built by a German military unit, Oxfam donated the water and sanitation system, while the German Red Cross installed it. Although Quatrom was built by the German military, it was laid out according to principles established by Relief International. Rather than being a grid, tents were organized into clusters with 20 to 24 tents per cluster. This arrangement was designed to foster a sense of community and agency. Camp manager Bobbie Lord explained on May 15 that,

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\textsuperscript{197} Clarke, “The Humanitarian Dimension,” 218.
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\textsuperscript{199} Ayers, “A Month in Albania.”
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Each cluster elects two people, one of which is a woman, to represent them and they are the community leaders. We want to establish self management in the camp, meaning that the refugees organized themselves and become responsible for life in the camp - safety, health, water, sanitation, recreation, women's issues etc. all run by refugee committees.\textsuperscript{200} The community-oriented structure and consensus-based decision-making process stand in marked contrast to the efficiency-driven and hierarchical NATO military camps.

Before these barrack-style refugee camps could even be an issue, Kosovar refugees had to be convinced to relocate from Albania’s border areas and then be transported to the new camps. Both tasks proved difficult. In mid-April, the UNHCR launched an information campaign to explain to refugees the reasons they needed to move to camps in other parts of Albania.\textsuperscript{201} In mid-May, AFOR flew refugees from Kukës to Camp Hope for a “go-and-see visit.”\textsuperscript{202} The United Kingdom was particularly active in the relocation information campaign, donating $26,000 to the UNHCR to support this and other information activities related to Kosovo.\textsuperscript{203} Refugees, however, were often reluctant to leave for yet another unfamiliar location and relocation efforts continued up until the end of Operation Allied Force in June.

Moving large numbers of Kosovar refugees from the boarder regions to camps spread across Albania posed an entirely different type of challenge. Albania’s notoriously bad roads were simply not capable of handling large volumes of traffic, particularly not military and


\textsuperscript{201} UNHCR, “Kosovo Crisis Update,” UNHCR, April 22, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80e1f.html).

\textsuperscript{202} UNHCR, “Kosovo Crisis Update,” UNHCR, May 19, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80c10.html).

\textsuperscript{203} UNHCR, “Donor Profiles,”, 401–406.
humanitarian convoys. The movement of Kosovar refugees therefore involved a mix of private cars, buses, military transportation, and helicopters. By mid-April, NATO began moving 3,000 Kosovar refugees daily from the Kukës region to ten refugee camps established elsewhere in the country. A few days later with the cooperation of the Albanian government and civilian humanitarian agencies that number jumped to 10,000 daily for several weeks.

Feeding the thousands of Kosovar refugees remained a daily challenge, both logistically and financially throughout the crisis. In several camps established and managed by the German and Italian militaries, Kosovar refugees were treated to “three hot meals a day and hot showers.” In contrast, the U.S. military handed out MREs once daily to refugees. Similarly, while 600 Italian soldiers built and managed a single camp, “a handful” of UNHCR personnel later managed the very same camp. The luxuries Kosovar refugees temporarily enjoyed in some NATO-run camps caused very real problems in the eventual transition to management by civilian humanitarian agencies. During the crisis Karen Koning Abuzayd, the regional representative for the UNHCR, argued that the high standard of living provided by some of NATO’s member-states “has been another one of the problems we face when NGOs take over. None of us can quite keep up with this standard” of living.

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Civilians to the Fore

The transition from NATO-led relief efforts to civilian coordination was anything but smooth. By mid-April civilian humanitarian agencies finally had their feet under them and were anxious to take the initiative from NATO. No one, however, was really sure how, or if, this should be accomplished. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Julia Taft warned Congress on April 14,

The issue that we have there is what do we want NATO to do, what do we want the host country security forces to do, police forces to do, and what do we want the UN system and NGO's to do. And these are starting to get mixed up.\textsuperscript{208}

For good or ill, NATO had established the initial infrastructure to cope with the Kosovar refugees largely without the assistance of the UNHCR and only secondary level help from other humanitarian agencies. The challenge became how to reinsert these agencies into the management and leadership of refugee assistance. Taft captured the crux of the challenge when she explained that to make sure “there is no gap and there is no precipitous handover” from NATO’s “incredible job in doing these camps virtually overnight” required “a lot more involvement of the UN to help that happen.”\textsuperscript{209}

The transfer to civilian leadership, as with the rest of the Kosovar refugee crisis, was complicated by the large number of individuals, states, and organizations involved. Just as the militaries of each NATO member-state set up refugee camps largely independently, they handled the transfer to civilian leadership independently. For example, United States Department of State Assistant Secretary Julia Taft and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration worked closely with the UNHCR throughout the crisis, including the handover process. Through this

\textsuperscript{208} Senate Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary. \textit{The Kosovo Refugee Crisis}, 54.

\textsuperscript{209} Senate Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary. \textit{The Kosovo Refugee Crisis}, 54.
working relationship, which existed prior to the Kosovar refugee crisis, the United States military handed over control of its camps to the UNHCR. Many other NATO member-states, however, made arrangements with other civilian humanitarian organizations, often based in their own country, to take over the management of the refugee camps. In addition, it became common for separate civilian humanitarian organizations to take over the running of specific tasks at camps, rather than an entire camp. Here the UNHCR and other more traditional humanitarian organizations came into conflict with newer and typically smaller organizations over power dynamics and proper roles during and after the transition from military leadership. As Taft eloquently framed it at a Senate hearing, “We can’t go around this region having an Italian camp here, a USA camp here. I mean, this is not rational.”

An Unexpected End

The end of the Kosovar refugee crisis continued the pattern of unusualness and extremes. On June 10, Milošović agreed to NATO’s terms and signed the Military Technical Agreement. Historically, refugee repatriation is a slow process in which the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies slowly convince and prod refugees into returning; not so in Kosovo. A month and a half after the end of the bombing campaign, however, the UNHCR reported that “more than 95% of Kosovar refugees had left” Albania. This “rapid” and “unpredictable” repatriation occurred not at the behest of the UNHCR, but was “self-initiated” by the Kosovar refugees. In fact, NATO and humanitarian agencies agreed that it was still unsafe for Kosovar refugees to go back to their

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210 Senate Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Kosovo Refugee Crisis, 55.

homes, concerned with the possibilities of “land mines and booby traps in destroyed houses and transport routes.”

Not only was this mass repatriation unprecedented in scope and speed, but its reason was unexpected as well. Kosovar refugees were explicit in their belief that NATO would protect them. Hossein Sarem-Kalali, the UNHCR Senior Shelter Site Planning Coordinator observed, “the deployment into Kosovo of the NATO-led Kosovo Force prompted the spontaneous repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees from Albania to Kosovo.”

In fact, Kosovar refugees were eager to return to Kosovo, so much so that at the Morini border crossing they queued for over three hours in the blistering July heat. The UNHCR became so concerned over the risk of sunstroke and dehydration that they scrambled resources to distribute water to the most vulnerable of waiting refugees.

The return of Albanian Kosovar refugees sparked a second refugee crisis. The United States Congressional Situation Report for June 17 warned, “Some roads in Kosovo are clogged with a two-way refugee flow: thousands of ethnic Albanians are returning to Kosovo from refugee camps despite safety concerns, and Kosovo Serbs are fleeing for fear of revenge attacks.”

Some of these post-bombing refugees stayed in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, joining other internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Serbia and Montenegro. Others found shelter in refugee camps recently deserted by ethnic Albanian refugees. Here, NATO’s pro-Albanian

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212 Andrew Jones, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees, 10-17 September 2000, EESS Mission Report (UNHCR Engineering & Environmental Services Section, 2000), UNHCR Archives Geneva, 12.


214 Meersschert, Albania: Coordination of Water and Sanitation Sector Activities in Kukes, 4.

bias, and the assumed complacency of humanitarian agencies, put relief efforts at a decided disadvantage. A year after NATO’s intervention, U.S. Ambassador James Pardew reported on a “pilot project to return Serbs to Kosovo,” but warned that ethnic Serbs in and out of Kosovo remained “reluctant partners” in cooperation efforts with both OSCE and UNMIK.216

Meanwhile in Albania, civilian humanitarian organizations were left with the arduous task of dismantling the refugee camps scattered across the country. The unexpected mass return of Kosovar refugees forestalled the complete handover from military to civilian led refugee assistance efforts, which complicated the process. In fact, at the end of June, NATO was still working on scheduling the handover of several camps to civilian humanitarian organizations.217 The camp rehabilitation responsibilities of NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies were, at least in theory, agreed upon when the camps were established. Many civilian humanitarian agencies, however, “left without taking appropriate measures relating to camp cleaning and rehabilitation of campsite,” leaving the UNHCR to clean up.218 Closing the refugee camps involved the dismantling of structures, removal of equipment, and returning the land to its original state. For example, at a UNHCR-managed camp near Kukës, the UNHCR had to remove gravel, level the land, and then plough it to ready it for agriculture.219 In several cases, closing the refugee camps was complicated by looting by local Albanians. For example, the Malteser Camp was looted in early July. The site had been picked so clean that UNHCR worker Terry

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216 Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Kosovo: One Year After the Bombing, 8.


219 Meersschert, Albania: Coordination of Water and Sanitation Sector Activities in Kukes, 4.
Lustig reported that “there was little evidence that the camp had been there.” Even more impressive is Lustig’s report on a camp in Kukës. He sardonically notes that, “there was no looting. Villagers closed the camp by threatening the camp operators with guns.”

Closing the last of the empty camps in Albania was anything but the end of competition and cooperation between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations. As Kosovar refugees flooded back into Kosovo, AFOR shifted gears to provide logistical support to civilian humanitarian agencies within Kosovo. In July, AFOR’s logistic efforts focused on assisting the World Food Program and UNHCR shift their operations, as well as over 500 tons of humanitarian aid supplies, into Kosovo.

**Conclusion**

By August 1999, NATO had successfully completed its first humanitarian operation, and was well on its way to establishing its second in Kosovo proper. NATO, its member-states, and their militaries had responded quickly to a Kosovar refugee crisis that had expanded well beyond initial expectations. NATO structures and standing operating procedures established to combat the threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe were quickly adapted to meet the needs of both Operation Allied Force, as well as Kosovar refugee needs in Albania and Macedonia. Likewise, the funding structure of NATO in which each member-state bears the cost of its own operations proved effective, at least as far as NATO’s own operations were concerned. Far more importantly, NATO demonstrated that a military alliance could successfully and quickly meet the basic needs of refugees. While some of NATO’s efforts might not have conformed to

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221 Schubert, *Other Than War*, 46
international humanitarian standards, the absolute faith that Kosovar refugees placed in NATO by the end of the crisis speaks profoundly to NATO’s capacity to perform humanitarian operations.

NATO and many of its member-states, however, lacked experience with humanitarian operations. The challenges that resulted from learning as they went were exacerbated by the absence of a strong initial UNHCR presence. The closest parallel to the events in 1999 is Operation Provide Comfort in 1991. Immediately following the success of the 1990 Gulf War, fought by a coalition that included many NATO member-states, a group of ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq rebelled against Saddam Hussein and were brutally suppressed, resulting in large numbers of refugees and a humanitarian disaster. The United States, with UN approval, redeployed Army and Special Forces units from the Arabian theater and Fort Bragg to the mountains of northern Iraq to provide emergency relief. The Army built and administered Kurdish refugee camps before facilitating the transfer of responsibilities to the UNHCR. The Army’s tasks included “the building of shelters and distribution of supplies, ensure order, and provide security throughout the area.”222 In addition, the US military provided logistical support to the UNHCR and over 40 other civilian humanitarian relief agencies.223 Unlike in the later Kosovar refugee crisis, however, the UNHCR directed US military humanitarian efforts from the beginning of the crisis. Without the UNHCR or another civilian humanitarian agencies playing a coordinating role in 1999, NATO’s member-states acted relatively independently of each other and made many avoidable mistakes.

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Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the dynamics of cooperation and competition between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations were even more complicated in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In Macedonia, preexisting ethnic tensions between ethnic Albanians, Serbs, and Macedonians further complicated the Kosovar refugee crisis. The government of Macedonia worried that the sudden influx of more ethnic Albanians would trigger a conflict in Macedonia and was therefore reluctant to accept refugees. Although 250,000 Kosovar refugees entered Macedonia, roughly 96,000 refugees were transferred to either Albania, or other countries in Europe or as far away as Australia.\(^{224}\) The added security concerns in Macedonia, negotiations with the Macedonian government, and the logistics of transporting refugees out of Macedonia created even more complex relationships between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations and a difficult negotiation between international humanitarian norms and the reality in Macedonia.

While Operation Allied Force may be a textbook example of the American way of war preferred by the United States military, NATO’s simultaneous Kosovar refugee assistance efforts in Albania support historians’ claims for an alternative American way of war. American forces, as well as the military forces of other NATO member-states, proved fully capable of performing these non-warfighting tasks. Even though most units deployed to Albania lacked previous experience or training in peace operations, they were able to adapt. During the Cold War, the UN developed a norm against major world powers participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Although the aim of this norm was to discourage the spread of the superpower contest, an unintended side affect was encouraging amnesia among western militaries with regard to a long

\(^{224}\) Jones, *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees*, 10.
tradition of *gendarme* operations. With the end of the Cold War, western militaries began a painful process of reincorporating the tradition of “savage wars of peace” into their self-conceptualizations. Military humanitarianism in NATO’s Kosovar refugee assistance efforts, was one stage in this process. The experiences of NATO’s militaries in the Kosovar refugee crisis and in later state building in Kosovo itself influenced counterinsurgency strategy and military development projects to win the hearts and minds in Afghanistan and Iraq.

After the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, militaries, many from NATO member-states, were praised for their humanitarian relief efforts. If civilian humanitarian organizations welcome military assistance in responding to natural disasters, why are they leery of accepting a military role in disasters resulting from war? In addition to challenging views of appropriate military roles commonly held by civilian humanitarian organizations, NATO’s assistance to Kosovar refugees in Albania also challenges views militaries hold about themselves. Examining the Kosovar refugee crisis in 1999 begins to tackle the broader issue of why western militaries became more involved in humanitarian operations, how they went about it, and the implications for military cultures and roles.

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**Secondary**


Gow, James, Richard Paterson, and Alison Preston, Eds. *Bosnia by Television*. London: British Film Institute, 1996.


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