

THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO US

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ABSTRACT

SERGUEI KOREPIN: The Russians Have Been Listening to Us
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson.)

This thesis shows that there is a correlation between Russians' perception of the United States and their opinion of democracy. Moreover, it shows that Russians' perception of the US are, in part, determinative of their opinion of democracy. How and why Russians have formed an association between the US and democracy is also analyzed. This thesis argues that this association was formed because of Russians resilient Soviet identity (including nostalgia), due to social modernization emanating from the US, conditioning via a poor experience with US-associated democracy in the early 1990s, as well as Kremlin and US reinforcement of the US=democracy association.

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Introduction

Since early 2014, when the conflict in Ukraine began, the US has given moral and material support to Ukraine's new government, and condemned and sanctioned Russia. Unsurprisingly, Russians' opinion of the US dramatically fell 2014-2015, what may be more surprising is that Russians' opinion of democracy also fell during this period—by 10 percentage points (about 50%) (Levada Center 2015*a*). I show that this is not a coincidence, instead, there is an important causal relationship between Russians' perception of America and their opinions of democracy.

Public opinion of democracy has been measured extensively, and there are some important works on the subject. Perhaps most prominently, Inglehart and Welzel have shown that modernization is a determinant of “self-expression” values (inclusive of greater desire for democracy), which lead to democratization. Several others have argued that perception of corruption, income, and other variables are also important determinants. However, the idea that perception of the US is causally related to opinion of democracy is new.

Public opinion of democracy is important because it has been shown to directly affect the probability of establishing and maintaining democracy—it can be thought of as the level of demand for democracy. The idea that the US is associated with democracy is theoretically important because it enables us to better address the puzzle of what determines public opinion about democracy in Russia, and perhaps other places. This idea also has policy implications—it means that paying more attention to how US actions affect the perception of America can help the process of democratization.

I begin by using concepts from psychology to explaining how and why Russians associate democracy with the United States. I find five reasons: 1. The identity of being a Cold War rival to a democratic United States is resilient. 2. Increasing social choice often comes

via the spread of US cultural content¹. 3. Russians' experience with "democracy" in the early 1990s was to some extent associated with the US. 4. The Kremlin has an incentive to reinforce the association between America and democratic reforms as long as the US is viewed negatively. 5. America often explains its foreign policy actions in terms of democracy promotion. I follow this up by using logit regressions to show that various aspects of Russians' perception of the US affects their evaluation of democracy.

To be clear, I am not saying that the US is responsible for a lack of democracy in Russia. Authoritarianism in Russia is mostly a Russian problem. However, I do show that minding how ordinary Russians perceive US actions and statements affects their evaluations of democracy, which in turn makes it easier (or more difficult), for autocratic elites to stay in power. This is a new idea and it is important because it adds to our knowledge of democratization.

Attitudes Toward Democracy

Political scientists have put a great deal of effort toward understanding democratization and finding factors relevant to this process. Many factors have been regressed with democratic governance as the dependent variable. However, preference for democracy, the dependent variable I use, is considered less frequently. Perhaps this is because it seems evident that most people want democracy—as reported by major polling organizations like The World Values Survey and Pew Polling. However, the percent of people favoring democracy varies a great deal from country to country. The population's level of preference for democracy is an important dependent variable because it is directly relevant for democratization; the idea that the degree of the population's support for democracy has a causal impact on establishing and consolidating democratic government has been argued by several political scientists, and seems uncontested (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Chanley 2000; Kenneth 2001;

¹ Modernization is characterized by an increasing number of social choices, and democracy is included in having more social choice.

Norris 2002; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999).

People with a lower opinion of democracy are less likely to obtain and sustain democracy for the following intuitive reasons. 1. People who do not support democracy are less likely to join civil society organizations related to democracy promotion. Beissinger shows that during the Orange Revolution, the main organizational force in Ukraine was that of identity, and that two-thirds of Ukrainians were apathetic toward democracy (Beissinger 2013). This has likely hurt Ukraine's democracy prospects. 2. People not favoring democracy may be more easily manipulated by autocratic elites. In comparison to Eastern Europe, former Soviet states may have had a lower demand for democracy due to a longer period indoctrination, which may have contributed to a lower ability of the populace to know just what should be expected from democracy. 3. While some political opposition groups are based in ethnicity or religion, a great deal of them push for democracy, and a lower demand for democracy likely means less of a political opposition. It is doubtless easier for Vladimir Putin to "win in the streets and in the elections" (Robertson 2011) if there are fewer people favoring democracy. Similar explanations are given by scholars that argue causality from support for democracy, to having democracy.

Scholars who have run regression analyses with "approval of democracy" as the dependent variable have often focused on independent variables that measured perceptions of political performance, corruption, social capital, demographics, and various economic factors. Several have argued that increased income brings an increased desire for democracy (Mishler and Rose 2001; Magalhaes 2014; Norris 1999).

Others argued that people's perception of various economic indicators is important, e.g. their perception of how the economy is doing, it's future, or perception of the government's economic policies (Sing 2012; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Mishler and Rose 2001; Norris 1999). However, using such independent variables is problematic because of the potential for endogeneity, which these authors do not address; it is plausible (especially in post-communist states), that one has a poor view of the country's economic performance because they prefer a communist planned economy. In fact, Sullivan shows that the strongest aspect of Soviet nostalgia is a longing for a better welfare state.

Mishler shows that “realist” measures (e.g. asking people to compare with the past) are more accurate than “idealist” measures (asking people about an abstract ideal), specifically on the subject of measuring support for democracy (Mishler and Rose 2001). Thus, like several other authors, I use income as the economic measure, which is more accurate measure and avoids the problem of endogeneity.

One of the most compelling arguments about perception of democracy is put forth by Inglehart has; that as a society gets wealthier, people transition from “survival values” to “self-expression” values, which are correlated with a desire for democracy (Inglehart 2003). Rose, and others similarly emphasize the importance of the development of social capital (Richard Rose and Haerpfer 1998). Education and Urbanity are also often measured, and can be thought of as part of modernization. Age too has been shown to matter, due to people being socialized at different political eras.

Some scholars have also argued that support for democracy (especially once established) is largely due to people valuing political freedoms, and that the government’s economic performance is of lesser importance (Yun-han Chu and Tessler 2008; Evans and Whitefield 1995)². Magalhaes, using over 100 surveys, shows that government effectiveness, defined as policy making formulation and implementation, is most determinative of support for democracy (Magalhaes 2014). In his study of African states, Bratton also shows that democracy is valued as an instrument—that while people evaluate the government based on economic performance, they value the guarantees of political rights more than economic performance (Bratton and Mattes 2001). Interestingly, Sing finds that in three democratic states in East Asia, people support democracy largely based on political performance, e.g. support for human rights. However, people in three autocratic East Asian states value democracy more based on economic performance (Sing 2012).

Other variables that have been shown to be important are perception of democracy—this can be important to determine whether the person has a similar understanding of democracy

² This is not mutually exclusive with the idea that more wealth leads directly or indirectly to a greater desire for democracy.

as most political scientists³. Chu finds Political Trust and Free and Fair Elections statistically significant (Yun-han Chu and Tessler 2008). Another important factor is corruption—Maghalaes has shown that the more corruption there is, the less people approve of the type of government under which they live. Several authors included a stand-in measure for corruption, like “Trust in Government Institutions” (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Yun-han Chu and Tessler 2008; Evans and Whitefield 1995), or corruption perception (Mishler and Rose 2001; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Richard Rose and Haerpfer 1998). An argument from Acemoglu and Robinson also fits this idea: extractive economic institutions lead to relative poverty among the majority of the population and are accompanied by extractive political institutions, i.e. non-democratic institutions. The desire for greater opportunity and greater material well-being causes people to desire inclusive institutions, i.e. democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

It is also important to note that many scholars have used the psychological mechanism of association in passing to explain their findings. Mishler notes “Americans do not love their government because they think it is democratic; they love democracy because they associate it with the American way of life.” Sing wrote “in Japan, long-time one-party rule by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party has been associated with political malaise.” Norris mentions “many people may associate party membership with ‘party supporters,’ or even ‘party loyalists.’” There is an element of making a leap of faith about such claims of association. Often we are told that a statistical correlation “shows” a psychological association, but the why and how are not clear. Moreover, authors in the public opinion on democracy literature have used the term differently—some have used it to refer to a mental link, others have used it to refer to a social contract, e.g. between people’s support for the government and the government’s economic performance. I will briefly explain the psychological mechanisms behind association and show how and why Russians associate the US with democracy.

In summary, two aspects of this study are new and different from the preceding liter-

³ Though if most people in a society held the same view, which was different from that of most political scientists, this would be much less problematic because they would all be talking about the same term.

ature. First, I explain how and why people associate democracy with the United States. Second, I put forth a new idea: that perception of the United States has a causal effect on support for democracy in Russia.

How and Why Russians Associate America with Democracy

In this section I show how psychological mechanisms of association, conditioning and resilient ideas, explain Russians' association of democracy with the US. Specifically, five factors largely explain the association Russians have between the United States and democracy: 1. A resilient identity, with the democratic United States as the rival "other," partly supported by people's nostalgia for the USSR. 2. The effects of social modernization (increasing social choice) often emanating from the US. 3. Operational conditioning via a painful experience with US-associated "democracy" in the early 1990s. 4. Possible Kremlin support for association between the US and democracy—as long as the US is viewed negatively, it is in their interest to link the US and democracy. 5. The US reputation as a model and promoter of democracy. I also show how this association facilitates the following phenomenon: Russians' perception of the US affecting their opinions of democracy.

In psychology, associations between concepts and/or mental states is considered a fundamental part of human development, in fact, memory is a chain of associations, e.g. a face brings up the associated name (Gazzaniga 2004) or, in a broader context, Cooper and Ratele note "we often see a conflation [association] of the individual and the collective in macro-processes such as truth-commissions" (ICP 2014). One type of memory is "automatic retrieval," which happens instantly (Gazzaniga 2004), and this is what I argue happens when some Russians think about the US, democracy is automatically retrieved. Through automatic retrieval via contiguity (Maher 2014), many people associate Egypt and pyramids, North Korea and dictatorship, etc. The United States has been the ideological center of democracy, and its biggest promoter, throughout most of our lives. Thus, through the process described above, people in some countries associate the United States with

democracy.

Dupuis-Deri describes a process of such association for Canadians. He notes that the Canadian Founding Fathers were “anti-democratic” and that the idea of Canada as a democracy was “the result of an official rhetoric seeking to convince Canadian citizens to participate in two extremely bloody [world] wars” (Dupuis-Deri 2009). He writes that in seeking support for the wars, the government designated “the Allies with positive images (civilization, freedom, Christianity, and lastly, democracy). It was in that way that Canada came to see itself as being democratic, in the absence of any institutional or constitutional change whatsoever that might justify this change in designation.” Dupuis-Deri argues “an associative effect took root in public discourse. It can be summed up by the following circular formula: Democracy = good = us = Canada, or Canada = us = good = Democracy”(Dupuis-Deri 2009). He argues that this process, in the first half of the twentieth century, made “democracy” meaningful for Canadians. A similar process of association has been significant in other states, specifically “America = [value judgment] = them = democracy.” In addition, Dupuis-Deri’s inclusion of a value judgment is consistent with the way people form attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken 1998). In Russia this process was facilitated by five factors, described below.

Resilient identity and nostalgia

A major component of identity formation, including one’s national identity (Crescenzi and Enterline 2001)), is defining oneself against an “other” (Wagnsson 2000). The United States being a long-time rival of Russia, some Russians have used democratic America as the “other” (Voestermans 1991). An association between the US and democracy is partly due to this resilient identity, which is supported by nostalgia for the USSR.

Part of the process of making an association can be encouraged, as noted in the Canadian case. Such encouragement can be done through “Classical conditioning,” which is an example of “associationistic learning.” The most famous example of classical conditioning

is Pavlov's Dog, though humans are by no means immune⁴. Governments use classical conditioning by repeating a few simple points to encourage mental associations consistent with their positions, e.g. the "Better dead, than red" slogan of the "Red Scare" period in the 1950's (encouraging an association between communism and evil). Certainly Soviet propaganda encouraged an association of we=good=communist.

Moreover attitudes and associations tend to be resilient for at least three reasons. First, in political valuation, like in religion, people use facts to support views that they already hold (Haidt 2012). Second, media content gets better ratings on stories that are in line with people's prior beliefs (for example, about a country), and as a result the media tends to produce just such stories (Matthew Gentzkow 2006). Third, people tend to base their opinions on what they believe to be the prevalent opinion of their social group (called "social desirability")⁵.

In addition to one's own identity, the view of another's identity (reputation) is also thought to be resilient. Crescenzi writes that "interstate rivalry does not turn on and off discretely; it evolves over time as a function of consistent behavior ... Moreover, a relationship does not cease at the point in time when the final interaction 'event' occurs. Rather, it diminishes gradually with the continued absence of further interaction" (Crescenzi and Enterline 2001). Thus, Soviet citizen's view of the US as a rival and democratic "other" to their own identity is a phenomenon that did not cease in the late 1980's, nor did it cease with the end of the Cold War.

Even though Soviet leaders in the late 1980's were more moving the USSR ideologically closer to the West, there had been a long period of presenting the US as the ideological wrong, and this has resiliency. In addition, the US being superpower counterpart, it was

⁴ At better understanding of conditioning theory has been developed since Ivan Pavlov, e.g. the unconditioned response is not exactly the same as the conditioned response. However, for the purposes of my argument the basic definition of classical conditioning is un-problematic as the main, relevant parts of the theory have not changed. Also, Organization Theory (as opposed to association), states that there is a structure of memory: remembering one thing, makes you remember a whole series of associated ideas. This is also not problematic for my argument.

⁵ In addition, F. H. Bradley argued that association results when a nerve current has once passed by a given way, and that it will pass more easily by that path in future (Kendler N.d.).

still the “other” and a danger. There was also resiliency on the US side, which reinforced Russians’ views: President Reagan was tough on communism, calling the USSR the “evil empire,” etc. During this period a portion of the elite, as well as the public, likely continued their contrasting associations of we=good and the US=democracy=dangerous.

Adding to the resiliency of Russians’ association between the US and democracy is their nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Davis describes nostalgia as “resulting from comparing the difficulties of the present to a rather idealized depiction of the past”(Davis 1979). This comparison is made to bolster one’s self-esteem because of a difficult time adjusting, following an abrupt break with the past (Starobinski 1966). Soviet collapse provided the “break with the past;” Shiraev and Makhovskaya referred to Soviet collapse as “an immeasurable psychological gap between past and present” (Shiraev and Makhovskaya 2007).

Levada polls from at least 2000, 2004 and 2005, show that the majority of Russians (as well as Ukrainians and Belorussians) agreed with the statement “it’s a disaster that the Soviet Union no longer exists” (White 2010). A 2008 survey of Russian and Ukrainian cities also found a wide-spread sentiment that the dissolution of the USSR was a bad thing (Nikolayenko 2008) and a 2009 Levada poll shows 60% of Russians “deeply regret” Soviet demise (Weir 2009). Many still identified as Soviet citizens (Levada 2005). In addition, a 2011 Pew poll shows that most respondents thought “caring about others,” “standard of living,” “public morality,” and “people getting along” have all declined since Soviet collapse (Pew 2011). Sullivan produces the following findings:

In terms of feelings of regret over the Soviet collapse, only 3% of all respondents said they were “happy that the USSR no longer exists,” while 22% stated that they “do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union.” By comparison, 58% expressed feelings of regret, with 26% saying that they “strongly regret” the collapse of the Soviet Union. In terms of feelings of pride and shame towards the USSR, 53% said that they are proud, while just 2% feel ashamed. A considerable 38% stated that they are “neither proud nor ashamed of the Soviet Union,” though this amount did not eclipse the 39% who remain “proud” of the USSR today. Overall, my survey results displayed here indicate that a majority

of Russia's citizens harbor feelings of "reflective" nostalgia pertaining to the Soviet Union.

Sullivan notes that high levels of pride and low levels of shame are consistent with nostalgia—focusing on the positive memories. His research ultimately shows that the central factor in Soviet nostalgia is the welfare state, and that most Russians do not support a restoration of the USSR. However, he also notes that "Russians are extremely proud of two features in particular when it comes to the Soviet past; the victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and the Soviet Union's ensuing attainment of superpower status," and that people "appear to utilize the memory of the Great Patriotic War along with the Soviet Union's superpower status to build up their confidence as they contend with the uncertainties in their lives today." It is likely that positively thinking back to the Soviet Union's superpower status also entails a negative automatic association with the opposing superpower—the democratic United States. Nostalgia and resilient attitudes also explain the significant minority of Russians who blame the US for the collapse of the USSR—28% in 2014 (Moscow Times 2014).

While nostalgia is likely fading, a socially resilient Soviet identity explains the increasingly positive views of the USSR in recent years. A December 2013 Gallup poll shows the majority of people in former Soviet states (including Russia) saying more harm than good came from the Soviet breakup (Gallup 2013). In addition, a recent Levada poll showed that the majority of Russians said the economy should be based on "government planning and allocation" (only 27% chose "private property and market relations")(Moscow Times 2015). Thus, the Soviet identity remains resilient, and an important part of the Soviet identity is pride in being a superpower, which comes with the association of the United States as the democratic "other."

Social modernization via the US

Socially, the Soviet Union was not a modern society (at least not relative to the West). Inglehart and Welzel define the social aspect of modernization as the change from

“survival values” to “self-expression values”—self expression values being defined as “social toleration, life satisfaction, public expression and an aspiration to liberty” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Mazaar consolidates this to an expansion of social choice, noting that traditional social institution is often a religion, though he also includes “secular faiths” like communism and fascism—the social institutions of which similarly dictate that opting-out is not okay (Mazar 2007). In the USSR social/political choices were limited and there was one “traditional” authority—the communist party. Referring to the nature of low-level Soviet government and the social networks formed to compensate for its incompetence, Richard Rose even argued that the Soviet legacy made 1990s Russia an “anti-modern” society (Rose 2001). Rose argues that Russian society was “permeated by government failure, in which formal organizations do not operate impersonally, predictably, and according to the rule of law.” This forced people to operate through informal social networks, which lack written rules, full time employees, etc.—characteristic of pre-industrial societies. Rose also ties his argument into social modernization as discussed by Welzel and Inglehart, and Mazaar—arguing that informal networks should coalesce into political parties with the growth of social trust, providing more choice (Rose 2001).

While much of what Rose describes has dramatically improved in the 2000s, Russia remains socially un-modern relative to the West. White et al. found that even in the late 2000’s, the majority of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians “seldom” or “never” identify as European (White, McAllister and Feklyunina 2010)—implying a separate identity and values from the West. This is important because people living in less socially modern societies tend to hold more undemocratic, socially un-modern, and anti-choice opinions, e.g. in surveys they show less tolerance of religious diversity, are more in favor of arranged marriages, register lower evaluations of democracy, etc.⁶ More “traditional” views continue to form the identity of many more Russians than Westerners.

Democracy too brings more choice, and is included in the idea of social modernization (this is consistent with the Kremlin’s recent promotion of socially anti-modern “traditional

⁶ This can be seen in Pew and World Values Survey country data.

values”). Moreover, socially modernizing influences (those resulting in more choice) often come from, and are associated with, America. Indeed it is American culture that is most prevalent around the world. TV shows from the US are broadcast around the world—in a 2006 survey of 20 countries, 7 of the top 10 most watched shows were American (BBC 2006). American movies often dominate cinemas—sometimes to the point where the US asks countries to reduce their screening quotas of American movies during free trade negotiations (Congressional Research Service 2014; Wagner 2007). American music remains extremely popular—just Elvis Presley and Michael Jackson have together sold over a billion albums, many of them abroad. In addition, the “top brands” as ranked by business week based on recognizability, sales abroad, etc. are American. Brands like Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, IBM, Apple, Microsoft, GE, Intel, Marlboro and Disney make up most of the biggest brands in the world (Businessweek 2007). As a result people see not just modernization, but also the United States.

Operational conditioning in the early 1990s

The third reason Russians associate the US and democracy is due to a painful experience with US-associated “democracy” following Soviet collapse. The Russian reformers of the early 1990s are often referred to as “Westernizers” (note the word itself associates Western political entities with liberal democracy), and are associated with the US. Tsygankov summed up the views of Russia’s Westernizers as “Russia is part of the West and should integrate with Western economic and political institutions: the main threat to Russia’s identity come from non-democratic states.” Wagnsson wrote that the Russian leaders at the time “argued that they had no part in the evils of the Cold War, as the Soviet leaders had, but were part of the global, democratic community which had contributed to ending the confrontation” (Wagnsson 2000). The Russians set exceedingly amicable expectations of their relations with the West and for democracy, likely resulting in a strong negative association when those years turned out to be so difficult for most Russians.

The tenure of Russia’s Westernizers was accompanied by political, economic, and social modernization—shocks to society which were associated with the West, and specifically the

US. While the problems of transition were overwhelmingly Russian, the US was associated via guidance from people like Lawrence Summers and Andrei Schleifer (Wedel 2006), via being the ideological center of capitalism and democracy-promotion, and via the arrival of American products, e.g. McDonald's, American movies, etc.

In addition, Glinski and Reddaway write that the association with the West

was particularly visible during the stormy confrontation between the Kremlin and the parliament in the fall of 1993, when the image of a unified “West” standing behind one of the warring cliques was manipulated, with conscious support from some powerful Westerners and passive acquiescence from others, to ensure a winner-take-all victory for one side in the conflict, and to deflect to “the West” the ultimate responsibility for the consequences of the winner’s actions (Glinski and Reddaway 1999).

Also, Yeltsin spoke before the US congress in 1992 in which he “effusively praised the United States for helping Russia slay the dragon of communism (Shirayev and Makhovskaya 2007). Meanwhile, there was disaster in Chechnya, “power sharing agreements” with regional leaders, and a GDP collapse of 40-50% from 1991-1998 (Goldman 2003).

Here the psychological concept of “Operational conditioning” is relevant, it describes the phenomenon of associating an action with a consequence, and produces an increase in the frequency and/or strength of a response to a stimulant (Shettleworth 2010). Russians experienced operational conditioning in the early 1990s—like touching a hot stove. Tsygankov notes that “support for the U.S. model of society fell from 32 percent in 1990 to 13 percent in 1992.” People with “traditional,” Soviet views may have felt proven right when westernization stumbled in Russia. Even years later, a 2006 survey by the Levada center showed that given 4 positive evaluations of the word “liberalism,” and 3 negative evaluations, 43% of Russians said they associated the word negatively, with either “Demagoguery of people in power,” “Wild capitalism,” or “Demagoguery of now-disgraced politicians” (Ordzhonikidze 2008).

Tsygankov writes that in the early 1990s “as the proposed vision of Westernization

failed to bring any visible improvements in people's living standards, the society became increasingly disillusioned and skeptical. The Soviet collapse critically added to this changing attitude; many Russians felt that the "talk shop" and the absence of material accomplishments were now exacerbated by the significant losses of territory and world status. The pro-Western Liberal rhetoric was lauded on the surface, but the society had already begun to withdraw its support for it" (Tsygankov 2004). By 1994, 55% of Russians agreed that "Russia should take the USSR's place in the world arena and resist U.S. aspirations for world dominance" (Wagnsson 2000). The chaos and economic hardship of the 1990s likely led to cognitive and behavioral attitude formation about democracy and the United States.

According to Tsygankov, Statism, with an emphasis on "national interests," replaced Westernism as the hegemonic ideology of Russia in the mid-1990s (Tsygankov 2004) and by 2001, 53% of Russians viewed the US as an unfriendly state (Tsygankov 2004). Zimmerman shows that from 1993-1999, the number of Russians perceiving the growth of US military power as a threat to Russia's security increased from 46% to 76% (Zimmerman 2009). Tsygankov also notes that the idea of non-Western countries eventually modernizing in the manner of Western societies was "criticized by the Russian intellectual and political spectrum as being insensitive to the Russian domestic context, and even aimed at perpetuating and expanding Western hegemony" (Wagnsson 2000). While it may not be clear whether public opinion, elites, or both had primary agency, concerns about the US were increasing, and a negative experience with "democracy" was had.

Rose et al. write "Russians' experience with Western-promoted democracy during the 1990s—including the scores of ephemeral and ineffective political parties, a president and Duma that bickered constantly as the economy collapsed and the Russian Federation fragmented, corrupt privatization and oligarchic penetration of the state—in fact discredited democracy as a feasible system of government for Russia" (Rose and Munro 2011). Some Russians likely took away an association of democracy=US=bad. A recent Pew poll shows 61% of Russians approved changing to a multi-party system in 1991, while only 50% approved the change in 2011 (Pew 2011).

Kremlin motives regarding US-democracy association

As long as the US is viewed negatively, it is in the interest of the Russian elite to link the US and democracy. The Kremlin seems to do this through the media. The perception of prevalent opinions in a social group is often formed by repetitive social messaging, especially by the media—another words, classical conditioning. Kreps notes

The perspectives that emerge in the media have an impact on each country's foreign and domestic policies, and on the decisions of its president or leader ... the media are also known to greatly influence the views of the masses. The opportunity for ordinary people, even in free countries, to shape their own image of foreign countries is quite limited, particularly in the case of countries that are separated by great distances (Kreps 1985).

In Russia, a large part of news consumption is through television, which is controlled by the government. Thus the media's influence can be guided by Russian elites where negative views of the US and democracy are reinforced, e.g. in reference to Russian elections and the US in 2007, Putin was broadcast saying “we will not allow anyone to poke their snotty nose into our affairs”(Levy 2007).

In addition, Golunov writes “initially, the resurgence of state-promoted patriotic upbringing in Russia was aimed at raising the cultural level of young people and morally preparing future military conscripts. From the start, this resurgence had a strong anti-liberal and anti-Western flavor (Golunov 2011). As long as people view the US negatively, the regime has some incentive to reinforce the association between the US and democracy. It seems to be doing so, as well as promoting a positive image of China.

America Associating Itself with Democracy

The accurate information Russians receive about US foreign policy, e.g. from the internet⁷, has also contributed to an association between the US and democracy. Part

⁷ most Russians actively use the internet (ITU 2013; RIA Novosti 2013), increasingly reading foreign viewpoints—the second-most popular internet search in Russia, in 2014, was the conflict in Ukraine (EWDN

of this is the US using democracy to describe itself, which has been internalized by Russians. Another part is American democracy promotion. The US is the largest spender on democracy promotion. The EU is a major democracy-promoter as well, but there is a difference in approach. Compared to the US, EU states spend a smaller proportion of their funds on political opposition, and a larger proportion on economic development. The United States provides more aid to civil society and political opposition groups (Kopstein 2006; Carothers 1999). Groups largely funded by the government, like the National Endowment for Democracy and Freedom House, actively give aid and advice to groups seeking democratic transition (regime change). The more direct democracy promotion approach of the US attracts more attention in that country, as well as internationally, associating the US with democracy.

In addition to associating the US with democracy, American democracy-promotion also affects people's views of democracy. This happens directly, for the people in the country in which the US is promoting democracy, and indirectly by people in other countries evaluating the results of US efforts. This is what Crescenzi calls learning from outside the dyad (Crescenzi 2007).

For Russians, US democracy promotion not only associates the US with democracy, but also invokes the traumatic period of weak government in the 1990s. In addition, US statements about a "freedom agenda" and "outposts of tyranny," singling out certain states while not mentioning deeply autocratic allies like Saudi Arabia, likely reinforces negative Russian views. The US has also used democracy to frame NATO expansion, the invasion of Iraq, Colored Revolutions, and the 2008 Georgia War—all of this framing has likely reiterated the Russian association between America and democracy. It has also likely contributed to a negative perception of both.

Thus, five factors explain Russians' association of democracy and America; a resilient identity with the United States as the democratic "other," social modernization via the US, an association between the US and early 90s "democracy" in Russia via operational con-

2015).

ditioning, and both Kremlin and America reinforcement of the association. Given these factors, my hypothesis is that Russians who indicate a positive perceptions of the US, will also tend to prefer democracy. In fact, I will show that there is a causal relationship from Russians' perception of the US, to their opinions of democracy.

Empirical Strategy

To test the idea that Russians have an association between the US and democracy, and that their perceptions of the US are determinative of their opinion on democracy, I use data from Pew Global Polling⁸. In Russia Pew worked via Romir, using a probability-based sample design, via face-to-face survey of adults over 18 years of age. The margin of error is 3.1% and the survey is 100% representative of Russia's adult population. I used surveys for 2002, 2007 and 2012, each with 1002 nationally representative respondents (all of the other years were missing several key questions/variables important to a proper regression with views on democracy as the dependent variable)⁹. I ran separate logit regressions for Russia in 2002, 2007 and 2012. Moreover, having data for these three years makes for robust results because Russians' evaluation of the US ranges from majority positive (64% positive) in 2002, to majority negative (44.8% positive) in 2007.

My dependent variable comes from the question: "Some feel that we should rely on a democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems. Which comes closer to your opinion?" The respondent had to choose between a democratic government and the alternative—with the strong implication being that the alternative is not democratic. "A ruler with a strong hand" brings to mind a ruler with harsh human rights records, but with other aspects of "success," like "maintaining order," industrializing the country, and especially military victory. In the Russian context, "a leader with a strong hand" might bring

⁸ Free to download from <http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/>

⁹ Also, I used multiple imputation to fill in occasional instances of missing data.

to mind Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, or Stalin—but not a democratic government.

Key Independent Variables

My key independent variables are questions indicating perception of the US¹⁰. However, they do not all show the same thing, as a result there is no multicollinearity in my regressions¹¹. The first key variable that indicates a positive perception of the US is whether someone like American movies, TV, and music. This is indicative of liking social modernization from the US.

Such social modernization often comes via American media: Yandex, Russia's largest search engine created a map showing the three most common words Russians use in their searches in relation to specific countries. The three most commonly searched words in connection with the United States were 1. TV series, 2. movie, and 3. American Horror Story (Gazdyuk and Rozin 2012). In addition, the record for most number of weeks as a number 1 hit song in Russian history (16 weeks) is "Diamonds" by Rhianna. Table 1 shows the most popular movies in Russia, and more anecdotally, the most popular TV shows currently. What Table 1 also shows is that endogeneity is not a problem for this variable—it is plausible that liking American movies, music and TV will cause one to improve their evaluation of the United States—to make a positive association. However, is not plausible that preferring democracy to a strong leader will cause people to like Rihanna, or Shrek Forever After.

¹⁰ The exact questions are listed in the Appendix, along with summary statistics

¹¹ The variable with the highest variance inflation factor of all of the variable in all three regressions is 1.82. The highest correlation between US-related variables in any of my regressions is .36

Table 1: Popular Media in Russia

Highest grossing movies in Russian history 1-20 (BOM 2015)	The most popular TV series in Russia (RussianSearch 2014)
1. Avatar	1. Sherlock (UK)
2. Pirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides	2. Games of Thrones (USA)
3. Stalingrad	3. Krik Sovi (RU)
4. Shrek Forever After	4. House (USA)
5. Puss in Boots	5. Friends (USA)
6. Ice Age, Continental Drift	6. Fargo (USA)
7. Ironiya Sudby. Prodolzhenie	7. Breaking Bad (USA)
8. Madagascar 3: Europe's Most Wanted	8. Homeland (USA)
9. Transformers: Age of Extinction	9. Seventeen Moments of Spring (Soviet Union)
10. Transformers: Dark of the Moon	10. Prison Break (USA)
11. Ice Age: Dawn of the Dinosaurs	
12. Iron Man 3	
13. The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey	
14. The Avengers	
15. The Twilight Saga: Breaking Dawn - Part 2	
16. Alice in Wonderland	
17. Madagascar: Escape 2 Africa	
18. Maleficent	
19. Guardians of the Galaxy	
20. Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows (Part Two)	

My second key variable is whether someone thinks it is a good thing that US customs and ideas are spreading to Russia. This is also a social modernization related variable, which may represent US views on greater availability of choice in society (including free speech/expression and political choice). It is also contrasted by questions about the spread of foreign culture and influence not specific to America.

The third key variable is Favorable opinion of the United States, this is an important attitude to take into account, but it is not an all-encompassing perception of the US¹². This may be similar to having a favorable attitude of a rock star, which does not mean you want them to live next door, or trust them to make good moral choices—which are relevant in evaluating overall perception. I take two things into account regarding the potential endogeneity of this variable: 1. I include variables for the opinion of other countries in my regressions, including liberal democracies like the UK, Germany, France, etc. as well as the EU (unlike favorable opinion of the US, none of these are correlated with Russians' preference for democracy) 2. I argue that shocks which greatly decrease how favorably Russians view the US (but should not affect what form of government Russians think is best) are accompanied by major drops in Russians' opinion of democracy. Perhaps the best example of this is the effect of the conflict in Ukraine from 2014-2015. Ukraine looms large in the minds of Russians, who have a long and deep connection with the country. The Russian perspective on the matter seems to be that the US helped overthrow a democratically elected president, resulting in additional purging of political representation of those in Eastern Ukraine. As a result, favorable opinion of the US, and of democracy plummeted between 2014 and 2015. Specifically, there was a 30 percentage point (roughly 69%) decrease in favorable opinion of the US (Levada Center 2015*b*) and a 10 percentage point (a roughly 50%) decrease in support for democracy (Levada Center 2015*a*). It is not feasible that the events in Ukraine over the past year and half were coincidentally a time where a large part of the population reconsidered their views on the best form of government (for which there was not a major stimulating event). The causality was that a decreased perception of

¹² The US-related variables are each informative in and of themselves. Moreover, the US-related variables taken together only weakly explain “favorable opinion of the US.”

the US led to a decrease in the opinion of democracy.

The fourth key variable (present only in 2007) is whether the respondent thinks the US is spreading democracy where ever it can, or where ever it serves its interests. This may indicate whether the person views the US as a benevolent actor. This variable also avoids endogeneity as it is not plausible that whether people prefer democracy determines their opinion on the specific tactics of a state—whether it is spreading democracy everywhere, or just where it benefits. However, given the association between the US and democracy, it is reasonable that perception of American spreading of democracy affects how people perceive the US (and democracy via association). The fifth key variable (present only in 2012) is whether someone approves of Barack Obama’s foreign policy. This is similar to the fourth key variable, and it also indicates whether the respondent perceives the US as more or less benevolent.

The sixth key variable (present only in 2012) is whether the respondent thinks that the 2011 protests for fair elections in Russia were genuine, or Western efforts to destabilize Russia. This variable represents whether the respondent views the US as nefarious. Again, endogeneity is not an issue as it is not plausible that whether someone prefers democracy causes them to assign American motives to an event. These six factors are the available questions from Pew that are related to the US, and they represent the respondents’ perception of the US.

Control Variables

Scholars analyzing support for democracy have theorized about several factors, most of which I have incorporated in my model as well. Several authors have argued that increasing wealth is correlated with increased support for democracy (Mishler and Rose 2001; Magalhaes 2014; Norris 1999), thus I use a variable for income. Inglehart argues a similar point—that as wealth grows, people transition to “self-expression” values (Inglehart 2003). Self-expression values are social modernization, which entail greater social choice (including political choice). Thus, I include variables accounting for social modernization, i.e. whether the person prefers more social choice or less. Like other authors, I also include

variables for age—perhaps especially relevant in Russia, where different generations were raised under very different governments, education—typically thought to be correlated with a relative preference for democracy, and urbanity—another idea from modernization (that as industrialization/development happens, people become more “modern”).

Per the work of Magalhaes, I also include a measure of for corruption. I use a respondent’s answer on how often they give bribes in 2002 and 2007. In 2012 this question was not asked, so instead I use the stand-in question “does the following describe your country well? the existence of law and order.” I also include how important the respondent thinks it is for a democracy to include freedom of speech and the ability to criticize the government, fair elections, and a judicial system that treats everyone the same. These are important as people sometimes have different ideas about the specifics of democracy. Finally, I have a control variable for whether the person believes that they live in a democracy—most Russians do not. Pew data shows that in 2002, 2007 and 2012, respectively, 16.7%, 18.2%, and 17.4% of respondents thought that “honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties” described Russia very well. In addition, a 2012 RIA Novosti poll showed that just 8% of Russians believe “democracy exists in today’s Russia” (RIA News 2012). This shows consistency between our understanding of democracy, and that of most Russians.

Results

Below, my statistical analysis supports the idea that people associate the United States with democracy. It also supports the idea that Russians’ change in perception of the US causes a change in their view of democracy. I begin with a logit regression of Pew data for Russia in 2002, presented in Table 2.

Logit Results for 2002

Table 2 shows the logit regression of Pew data for Russia in 2002.

Table 2: 2002 Regression Results

Russia 2002, N=1002	Odds Ratio	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	0.009	0.0001 ***
Agree? Our way of life needs protection from foreigners	0.746	0.0069 **
Agree? Religion is personal, should separate from govt.	1.399	0.0247 *
Agree? Consumerism and commercialism threaten our culture	0.729	0.0831
Good? globalization	0.891	0.3399
Y/N? I like American music, movies and television	1.816	0.0049 **
Good? Foreign movies, TV, music available in Russia	0.910	0.4866
Good? Increasing international trade	1.078	0.6647
Good? faster communication/travel between Russia/countries	1.239	0.2495
Good? Increased availability of products from abroad	0.947	0.6953
Good? "American ideas and customs are spreading here"	1.538	0.0403 *
Favorable opinion of the US	1.445	0.0055 **
Opinion, are there regular/honest elections in Russia?	1.020	0.8315
How often do you give bribes?	1.129	0.1642
Importance of: free speech/ability to criticize the govt?	1.263	0.0653
Importance of: regular/honest elections?	1.306	0.0382 *
Importance of: judicial system treats everyone the same	0.881	0.4956
Age	0.988	0.0653
Education	1.157	0.0657
Income	1.002	0.0625
How urban is your area of residence?	0.708	0.0997


First, note that liking American movies, music and TV is positively and statistically significantly correlated with a preference for democracy over a leader with a strong hand. However, note that there is not a statistically significant correlation between a person's evaluation of "the way movies, TV and music from different parts of the world are now available in Russia" and their preference for democracy or a leader with a strong hand. This supports the idea that Russians strongly associate specifically America with Democracy. In fact, the odds ratios indicates that someone that likes American movies, TV, and music is 81% more likely to prefer democracy than someone who doesn't.

Second, note that the positive and statistically significant correlation between people positively evaluating "American ideas and customs are spreading here" and a preference for democracy. There is a 53% higher chance that someone approves of the spread of US ideas and customs also prefers democracy. Also, note the lack of correlation for the variables evaluating increased international trade, communication, travel, and the availability of foreign goods. The variable noting whether people believe their way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence is significant and negative, but US ideas still stand out as statistically significant correlations, while foreign influence is mostly not relevant¹³. Favorable views of the US are also correlated with preference for democracy which is consistent with the outlined theory. Figure 1 is a plot of predicted probabilities for statistically significant variables related to the United States.

¹³ There is correlation between social modernization ("self-expression") variables, and preference for democracy as Modernization Theory would predict. Specifically the preference for religious freedom, and not thinking that "our way of life needs to be protected from foreigners." However, there is not a statistically significant correlation between income and preference for democracy. In fact, running similar regressions on dozens of country-years I do find a correlation between the GDP of a country and the percent of its people that preferred democracy. However, this relationship is not statistically significant on an individual level.

Fig. 1: Holding all other variables at their mean, the probability that a Russian prefers democracy in 2002, as opposed to “a leader with a ’strong hand”

1=US culture spreading to Russia
2=US movies, music and TV show
3=Opinion of the United States



Logit Results for 2007

Table 3 shows the logit regression of Pew data for Russia in 2007.

Table 3: 2007 Regression Results

Russia 2007, N=1002	Odds Ratio	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	0.014	0.0000 ***
Good? increasing trade with other countries	0.943	0.5913
Agree? Our way of life needs protection from foreigners	0.905	0.3082
Good? “American ideas and customs are spreading here”	1.972	0.0021 **
Y/N? I like American music, movies and television	1.416	0.0414 *
Should boys education be prioritized over that of girls?	0.625	0.0537
Good? arranged marriage	0.743	0.0322 *
Agree? Religion is personal, should separate from govt.	1.411	0.0024 **
Opinion, is US democracy promotion, cynical?	1.887	0.0033 **
Opinion of the US	1.211	0.0372 *
Opinion of France	0.827	0.2031
Opinion of Japan	1.088	0.3964
Opinion, are there regular/honest elections in Russia?	0.890	0.1593
How often do you give bribes?	1.053	0.5212
Importance of: free speech/ability to criticize the govt?	1.652	0.0000 ***
Importance of: regular/honest elections?	1.176	0.1736
Importance of: judicial system treats everyone the same	0.825	0.1760
Age	0.999	0.8804
Education	1.187	0.0047 **
Income	1.000	0.7988

There four things to note. First, believing “The United States promotes democracy wherever it can” as opposed to “the United States promotes democracy mostly where it serves its interests,” is positively and statistically significantly correlated with preferring democracy over a leader with a strong hand. Second, the favorable view of the United States variable is again positively and statistically significantly correlated with preference of democracy, consistent with my theory. Moreover, opinions of other countries are not correlated with opinion of democracy. Note that the a favorable opinion of France and Japan is not statistically significant (I also tried Germany and the UK, the other two Western countries for which there is data, and they too were not correlated with preference for democracy at a statistically significant level of .05).

The third and fourth important indicators to note in the 2007 regression are that “I

like American music, movies and television” (as opposed to dislike) and a positive assessment of “American ideas and customs are spreading here” are both positively and statistically significantly correlated with a preference for democracy. These choices go along with a 42% and an 98% higher chance, respectively, of preferring democracy. This despite other social modernization variables not being statistically significant, specifically the evaluation of increasing trade, and whether one believes their way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence. Figure 2 is a plot of predicted probabilities for statistically significant variables related to the United States.


Fig. 2: Holding all other variables at their mean, the probability that a Russian prefers democracy in 2007, as opposed to “a leader with a ’strong hand”

1=Motive attributed to US democracy promotion

2=US movies, music and TV show

3=US customs and ideas spreading to Russia

4=Opinion of the United States



Logit Results for 2012

Table 3 shows the logit regression of Pew data for Russia in 2012.

Table 4: 2012 Regression Results

Russia 2012	Odds Ratio	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	0.036	0.0001
Good? “American ideas and customs are spreading here”	1.631	0.0073 **
Y/N? I like American music, movies and television	1.632	0.0027 **
Agree? protests for fair elections were genuine? (as opposed to “Western efforts to destabilize Russia”)	1.442	0.0252 *
Favorable opinion of the US	1.309	0.0083 **
Favorable opinion of Iran	1.010	0.9155
Favorable opinion of the EU	0.902	0.3499
Favorable opinion of Turkey	1.069	0.4872
Approve? “International policies of President Barak Obama”	1.688	0.0008 ***
Opinion, are there regular/honest elections in Russia?	0.989	0.9027
Opinion, is law and order well maintained in Russia?	1.120	0.1688
Importance of: free speech/ability to criticize the govt?	1.0909	0.4524
Importance of: regular/honest elections?	1.177	0.2153
Importance of: judicial system treats everyone the same	0.985	0.9115
Age	1.001	0.8793
Education	1.034	0.6395
Income	1.000	0.1073
How urban is your area of residence?	1.096	0.0255 *

The first thing to note in Table 3 is the positive and statistically significant correlation between preference for democracy and belief that recent protests for fair elections were genuine, as opposed to “Western efforts to destabilize Russia.” Believing the protests are not Western efforts means a 44% higher chance of preferring democracy. This is another indication of association between US and democracy—the more people view democracy as a cynical tool of the US, the less they like it.


The second thing to note is that approval of “the international policies of President Barak Obama” is positively and statistically significantly correlated with preference of democracy. Approving of America’s foreign policy means a 69% higher probability of preferring democracy. The third and fourth things to note are that “I like American music, movies and television” and a positive assessment of “American ideas and customs are spreading here” are both positively and statistically significantly correlated with a

preference for democracy. Each corresponding to a higher likelihood of preferring democracy of 63%. Unfortunately the Pew 2012 survey did not have a close match to a generic question about the spread of foreign culture in 2012 for contrast, though the results are still consistent with there being a causal relationship between perception of the US and preference for democracy. Finally, there is again a positive and statistically significant correlation between favorable view of the US and democracy consistent with my theory. Moreover, there is not a statistically significant relationship between preference for democracy and opinion of other countries or the EU¹⁴. These results indicate that perception of the US causally affects Russians' evaluation of democracy. Figure 3 is a plot of predicted probabilities for statistically significant variables related to the United States.

¹⁴ I chose Turkey and Iran as confirmation of the consistency of my results, because they are not traditionally considered part of the West, nor do they do not pose a military threat to Russia for which respondents could prefer a "strong hand."

Fig. 3: Holding all other variables at their mean, the probability that a Russian prefers democracy in 2012, as opposed to “a leader with a ’strong hand”

- 1=US role in Russian protests
- 2=US movies, music and TV show
- 3=US customs and ideas spreading to Russia
- 4=Barak Obama’s International Policies
- 5=Opinion of the United States



Conclusion

My analysis shows how and why Russians have formed an association between the US and democracy. This happened because of their resilient Soviet identity (including nostalgia), due to social modernization emanating from the US, conditioning via a poor experience with US-associated “democracy” in the early 1990s, as well as Kremlin and US reinforcement of the US=democracy association. Moreover, my analysis shows that this association has a causal effect—Russians adjust their opinion of democracy based on their perception of the United States. This is a new idea, and it reveals a factor that are important in determining Russians’ opinion of democracy.

In addition to contributing to democratization theory, this causal association between the US and democracy also has policy implications: while the US is certainly not to blame for Russia’s problems, how it is perceived matters. For example, when Hillary Clinton says (in regard to Ukraine) “Now if this sounds familiar, it’s what Hitler did back in the ’30s” (Rucker 2014). This is not simply inaccurate, it worsens perceptions of the US because most Russians have relatives that suffered or died defeating Hitler’s armies. Given that Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings have not fallen below 61% since 2000, personal attacks on him by American officials (Like Joe Biden saying he told Putin that he has no soul) also likely worsen Russians’ perception of the US. But Such incidents don’t only worsen Russians’ opinion of the US, they also reduce Russians’ support for democracy. Perhaps a better approach, one that the average Russia is more likely to get behind, would be to focus on government accountability and a fair election process.

Also, given that there is an 89% higher chance that a Russian who thinks the US is spreading democracy because it’s a good thing to do, is likely to prefer democracy over a leader with a “strong hand,” we should be careful that our democracy promotion not look very biased. American methods of democracy promotion in certain places should even be re-thought—they may be perceived by the public in general as a nefarious effort, and thus be counter-productive. Furthermore, issue-framing by elites in non-democratic countries

is made easier when US-related democratization looks bad. Theodor Gerber puts it well, “Although U.S. policymakers cannot control the Kremlin’s rhetoric, they can reverse policies that undermine the international image of the United States as a guarantor of human rights norms and as an alternative to authoritarian regimes around the world” (Mendelson and Gerber 2008). Selective criticism of autocrats, refusing to join international bans on mines and cluster-bombs, water-boarding, reduced interpersonal contact with unfriendly states, the linking of our military operations with democracy, and unnecessary insults, all have an impact on the way the US is perceived, and hence, on the prospects of democratization—at least in Russia. A deeper consideration of how the US is perceived in Russia can increase demand for democracy there. Moreover, if the relationship I described, between perception of the US and opinion of democracy is true in Russia, it may be true in other places as well¹⁵ .

APPENDIX

In the Logit estimates below darker lines represent one standard deviation and lighter lines represent two standard deviations.

¹⁵ I also ran regressions for 75 other country-years, most countries do not have the correlation between opinion of democracy and variables related to perception of the US. My hunch is that this is because people in those countries do not have the same degree of psychological association between democracy and the United States. This should be considered in future research.

Fig. 4: Logit estimates for 2002




Fig. 5: Logit estimates for 2007




Fig. 6: Logit estimates for 2012




Table 5: 2002 Variable Statistics

Question	% first statement	% second statement
Which comes closer to your view? Consumerism and commercialism are a threat to our culture, OR consumerism and commercialism are not a threat to our culture.	46	54
Which is closer to describing your view? I like American music, movies and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television.	47	54
Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here.	21	80
(Does the interviewee live in an Urban location, or a rural location?)	74	26

Question	Strongly negative	Somewhat negative	Somewhat positive	Strongly positive
What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between (survey country) and other countries—do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?	2	6	65	28
And what about the faster communication and greater travel between the people of (survey country) and people in other countries—do you think this is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?	1	6	65	29
And what about the different products that are now available from different parts of the world—do you think this is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?	4	14	60	23

Question	Strongly negative	Somewhat negative	Somewhat positive	Strongly positive
There has been a lot of talk about globalization these days. Do you think that globalization is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing?	11	22	60	8
Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with this statement. Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy.	1	4	39	57
Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with this statement. Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.	5	16	46	32
Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where (INSERT)? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? you can openly say what you think and can criticize the (state/ government)	5	15	47	33
Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where (INSERT)? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties	5	15	41	40
Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where (INSERT)? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way	1	2	26	72

Question	Strongly negative	Somewhat negative	Somewhat positive	Strongly positive
What about the way movies, TV and music from different parts of the world are now available in (survey country) —do you think this is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?	10	32	45	14
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)? The United States	8	30	55	8
Does (INSERT) describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties	14	25	45	17

Question	never	not at all	not too often	Somewhat often	very often
In the past year, how often, if ever, have you had to do a favor, give a gift or pay a bribe to a government official in order to get services or a document that the government is supposed to provide—very often, somewhat often, not too often, not at all?					
% of respondents per category:	10	54	22	10	5

Question	Min	Median	Mean	Max	St. dev
How old were you at your last birthday?					
% of respondents per category:	18	43	44.01	79	15.64

Question	No formal edu.	Some primary school	Complete primary school	Some secondary school	Complete secondary school	Some univ.	Univ. with degree
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? % of respondents per category:	0	1	4	15	55	5	21

Question:	750	1750	2500	3500	5000	7000	9000	12500	17500
Here is a list of incomes. Which of these does your household fall into counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in? Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions. Percent of respondents per category (income in rubles): (N=1002)	13	13	21	17	18	10	6	3	1

Table 6: 2007 Variable Statistics

Question	% first statement	% second statement
Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here.	15	85
Which is closer to describing your view? I like American music, movies and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television.	40	60
And which comes closer to describing your view? The United States promotes democracy wherever it can, OR the United States promotes democracy mostly where it serves it's interests?	13	87

Question	Strongly negative	Somewhat negative	Somewhat positive	Strongly positive
Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where (INSERT)? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way	1	5	25	71

Question	% first statement	% second statement	% second statement
Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion about educating children? 1. It is more important for boys than for girls 2. It is more important for girls than for boys 3. It is equally important for boys and girls	6	91	4
Do you think a woman should choose her own husband, or do you think it is better for a woman's family to choose her husband? (the respondent could also volunteer "both")	71	4	26

Question	Strongly negative	Somewhat negative	Somewhat positive	Strongly positive
What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between (survey country) and other countries —do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?	2	11	55	32
As I read another list of statements, for each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with it. Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy.	2	9	32	58
As I read another list of statements, for each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with it. Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.	3	15	38	45
I am going to read you the same list. Does (read from list below) describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties	13	27	43	18
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)? The United States	20	36	36	9
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)? Japan	3	17	61	19
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)? France	1	11	67	22

Question	Strongly negative	Somewhat negative	Somewhat positive	Strongly positive
Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where (INSERT)? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? you can openly say what you think and can criticize the (state/government)	4	16	47	34
Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where (INSERT)? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties	3	13	43	41

Question	never	not at all	not too often	Somewhat often	very often
In the past year, how often, if ever, have you had to do a favor, give a gift or pay a bribe to a government official in order to get services or a document that the government is supposed to provide—very often, somewhat often, not too often, not at all? Percent of respondents per category:	10	55	20	10	5

Question	Min	Median	Mean	Max	St. dev
How old were you at your last birthday? % of respondents per category:	18	45	46.32	99	18.78

Question	No formal edu.	Some primary school	Complete primary school	Some secondary school	Complete secondary school	Some univ.	Univ. with degree
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? % of respondents per category:	1	4	8	30	32	6	21

Question:	750	1750	2500	3500	5000	7000	9000	12500	17500	24000
Here is a list of incomes. Which of these does your household fall into counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in? Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions. Percent of respondents per category (income in rubles): (N=1002)	4	3	14	12	15	13	14	12	7	8

Table 7: 2012 Variable Statistics

Question	% first statement	% second statement
Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here.	24	77
Which is closer to describing your view? I like American music, movies and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television.	54	47
Some people say the protests for fair elections are the result of efforts by Western powers to destabilize Russia. Others say the protests are the result of genuine Russian dissatisfaction with the conduct of the elections. Which comes closer to your view?	31	70
Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the international policies of President Barak Obama?	37	64

Question	Strongly negative	Somewhat negative	Somewhat positive	Strongly positive
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)? The United States. % of respondents per category:	12	30	47	12
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)? Iran % of respondents per category:	13	38	41	8
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)? The EU. Percent of respondents per category:	5	20	62	14
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)? Turkey. Percent of respondents per category:	11	24	54	12
I am going to read you the same list. Does (INSERT) describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties. % of respondents per category:	15	30	38	18
I am going to read you the same list. Does (INSERT) describe our country very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? law and order is maintained % of respondents per category:	25	33	24	19

Question	Strongly negative	Somewhat negative	Somewhat positive	Strongly positive
Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where (INSERT)? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? you can openly say what you think and can criticize the (state/government) % of respondents per category:	3	9	43	46
Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where (INSERT)? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties. % of respondents per category:	3	7	37	54
Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where (INSERT)? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? there is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way. % of respondents per category:	1	5	23	72

Question	Min	Median	Mean	Max	St. dev
How old were you at your last birthday? % of respondents per category:	18	41	43.05	87	16.90

Question	Rural	Town <50k	City 50–100k	City 100–500k	City .5m–1m	City >1m
[Urbanity of respondent] % of respondents per category:	26	17	8	19	11	20

Question	No formal edu.	Some primary school	Complete primary school	Some secondary school	Complete secondary school	Some univ.	Univ. with degree
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? % of respondents per category:	0	1	14	23	34	7	28

Question	48	129	194	273	403	645	968	1355
Here is a list of incomes. Which of these does your household fall into counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in? Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions (2012 USD per month) % of respondents per category: (N=1002)	1	2	4	15	19	26	15	19

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