
Classified national security information, as governed by the most recent presidential directive, is not always as securely protected as it should be. Sometimes classified documents get mixed in with the files of Congressional members. If former members decide to donate their personal papers, these documents may appear in the special collections of libraries. This study is a survey of a number of academic libraries that keep classified documents outside of government control in their holdings. The results reveal how many participant libraries house congressional records and the amount that have classified items in their collections. The results also provide an account of how many respondents have policies, or if none exist - then a general understanding - about the handling of classified documents. The findings indicate how prevalent the existence of classified documents is in library collections.

Headings:

Archives -- Processing.

Classified information -- United States.

Government information -- United States.

Information policy -- United States.

National security -- United States.

Security classification (Government documents) -- United States.
ACADEMIC LIBRARIES AND CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

by
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A Master’s paper submitted to the faculty of the School of Information and Library Science of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Library Science.

Chapel Hill, North Carolina
April 2011

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1 Introduction

At the end of November 2010, the whistle-blowing, international media organization, WikiLeaks, released an estimated quarter million classified documents comprised of U.S. diplomatic cables over its website. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first described the material resulting from this breach of classified documents as "stolen information" before it was later discovered to have been leaked. Since then, the WikiLeaks incident has caused the White House administration to reevaluate agencies' policies and procedures regarding the protection of classified national security information (Lee 2010).

Under federal law, classified information is defined as:

information or material designated and clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order issued pursuant to a statute or Executive order), as requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security (Kosar 2010, R41528 CRS-2).

The most recent directive from President Obama, Executive Order 13526, specifies which types of information are to be classified:

- military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
- foreign government information;
- intelligence activities, intelligence sources/methods, cryptology;
- foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
- scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
Leaks are not the only issues with the mismanagement of classified information. Problems are also caused by the misplacement, mishandling, and loss of classified documents; lack of observance to the rules, recommendations, and standards that have been created to safeguard classified materials. A Program Analyst from the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) believes that classified documents are not as closely guarded and secured as is necessary for sensitive information. They are often stored in cardboard boxes with the words, "Top Secret," written or marked on both the boxes and documents. As a result, such negligence often leads to classified documents getting mixed in with the personal files and papers of Congressional members. Once those members complete their incumbencies, they take their files with them and some may eventually decide to donate their personal papers to their alma maters. Although the papers become the property of academic institutions, people are still obligated to turn in all classified documents or "see to it that they are properly handled" (Schlessinger and Russell 1992, 11). However, not everyone follows the proper procedures and some may not know that they possess classified documents. The Program Analyst at ISOO estimates that hundreds of academic libraries keep classified documents in special collections. My research will study a number of academic libraries that keep classified documents outside of government control in their holdings.
1.1 Special Collections

In terms of education and classified documents, Lieutenant Commander J. Heston Heald from the Office of Naval Research in the Department of Navy noted in 1952 that security is rarely a topic of study during the course of a librarian's "formal training" (Heald 1952, 139). Today, it has yet to become part of the standard Library and Information Science (LIS) curriculum. Classified and classification are terms that library professionals apply to "subjectwise [sic] compartment of information" (Heald 1952, 139). Within LIS research, these concepts relate to "systems that humans invent and maintain to be able to find information they need" (Thompson and Kaarst-Brown 2005, 249). On the other hand, those who are responsible for national security use these terms to refer to layers of secrecy and to assign policies for the protection and proper disclosure of classified information (Heald 1952, 139). In "The Reports Librarian and National Security," although Heald focused on librarians who are involved in government research science projects, his comment is still relevant to librarians who ignore the importance of security issues and maintained that, "I'm sure there are those who are wont to divorce security as something that doesn't belong to the profession" (Heald 1952, 139).

If there is any validity to the Program Analyst's beliefs about classified documents stored in special collections, then the problem with discovering these items begins at the point of archival processing. In a two-day workshop supported by the Society of American Archivists' (SAA) Congressional Papers Roundtable (CPR) titled, "The Acquisition, Processing and Reference of Legislative Collections," issues associated with acquiring and processing congressional collections, such as the mass quantity of these records and the chance of finding classified materials were addressed (Congressional
Papers Roundtable). Archives formerly have a history of collecting, for example, medieval manuscripts, then arranging, describing, and meticulously preserving each item. In a report written for the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories (AFCRL) Library in 1969, their library was to serve as an "agency archives" and "secure and preserve each and every document " (Rea 1969, 11). The amount of work involved in such preservation requires detailed processing, which with the mass quantities of records in multiple formats (e.g. digital/electronic, print, manuscript documents, film, and other media) that add to backlogs, is seldom possible anymore. In 2005, archival processing visionaries Greene and Meissner addressed the archival inertia and introduced MPLP (More Product, Less Process) to solve a crippling problem:

processing is not keeping up with acquisitions and has not been for decades, resulting in massive backlogs of inaccessible collections at repositories across the country (and across all types of archival institutions)...our profession has been struggling with backlogs for at least sixty years (Greene and Meissner 2005, 208-209).

Greene and Meissner believe that the cause of the backlogs was due to the archival profession's reluctance to change and improve its processing methods in order to meet the challenges of "greater quantities of acquisitions" (Greene and Meissner 2005, 211). MPLP offers a solution to alleviate the backlogs by applying a light, less detailed treatment at every stage of processing - arrangement, description, and storage of the records. Another issue that may arise as a result of archival practice is the tendency to handle documents in aggregates, whereas the classification of sensitive information has always been handled at an item level - document by document, stamp by stamp. For institutions where MPLP has been incorporated into processing policies, each and every individual document has not been secured or preserved, much less glanced at for that
matter. It is therefore highly likely in those instances for classified documents to slip out from the backlogs and into lightly processed collections without anyone's knowledge.

1.2 Background

There are valid reasons for safeguarding sensitive information and classifying it by certain degrees, depending on the level of importance. Protecting classified documents helps to ensure the protection of national security interests. National security has been the main impetus behind most executive orders and legislation created in the U.S. over classified information. Concealing sensitive government information protects national security by:

- restricting access to military weapons information;
- setting up background checks, security clearances, polygraph examinations, and other methods to ensure that the "right people" are granted authorization;
- holding everyone with access to classified information accountable by penalizing those who disclose that information to unauthorized parties;
- maintaining records of where and how classified documents are kept, who views them, who requests to view them, where they go, and how many there are;
- hiding the identities and activities of intelligence agents and other operatives;
- keeping track of what gets classified, thereby avoiding over-classification;
- making sure that agencies who create and manage classified documents are marking and categorizing them in the same manner;
- defining the requirements and procedures for declassification;
- and ensuring the proper disposal of classified documents (Obama 2009).

While the list above is certainly not exhaustive, these are the key reasons for why it is essential to national security to protect classified information.

1.3 Executive Orders

The current system for protecting and preventing the disclosure of classified information did not originally stem from the Executive Branch. One of the earliest practices for exercising secrecy can be traced back to George Washington who labeled documents as "confidential" or "secret" (Schmitt 2003, 22). After reviewing British and
French policies during WWI, the U.S. military started to mark sensitive information, using the terms, "Secret," "Confidential," and "For Official Use Only" (Morrissey 1997, 9). It was not until 1940 when Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the first executive order (E.O.) on sensitive information and placed the responsibility for determining security classification procedures entirely under executive control (Mitchel 1987, 445). This meant that the president had the authority to establish the rules, regulations, and standards for governing classification, although Congress has also in the past influenced developments by passing legislation to protect classified information (Elsea 2011, RS21900 Summary). Since Roosevelt, the classification system for national security information has been changed and shaped by shifts in the White House administration (Elsea 2006, RS21900 CRS-3). For example, while Roosevelt's E.O. 8381 focused on strategic military and naval installations, Truman's E.O. 10104 was more inclusive and expanded the classification authority over to non-military agencies (Schmitt 2003, 22). Nixon's E.O. 11652 was particularly innovative because it not only limited the number of classification authority from forty to twenty-five agencies, but it also officially created a standardized process to review records under the General Declassification Schedule. Under this arrangement, classified documents of the highest priority would be downgraded to the second highest priority after two years, then from the second highest to the lowest priority after two more years. After six additional years, the documents under the lowest priority would be declassified, totaling ten years (Mitchel 1987, 447). Under Carter's E.O. 12065, classification procedures were handled more cautiously, specifying that "when in doubt, a classifier should use a less restrictive classification category, or not classify at all" (Mitchel 1987, 448). Reagan's E.O. 12356 on the other
hand revoked Carter's E.O. and reversed certain measures by ordering that "when there is doubt about whether to classify, documents should be classified" (Mitchel 1987, 449). The same directive further discontinued the requirement to downgrade documents and ignored the declassification schedule; classified documents could be classified for "as long as required" (Mitchel 1987, 449). Presently under President Obama, the current directive has returned to reflect the classification procedural standpoint of Carter's E.O. (Elsea 2011, RS21900 CRS-3-4). E.O. 13526 now holds individual agencies with classification authority responsible for not only protecting the classified information that they produce, but also for establishing procedures to safeguard that information. The directive also places standards for protecting classified information, such as the "handling, storage, distribution, transmittal, and destruction of and accounting for" it, in ISOO's care (Elsea 2011, RS21900 CRS-5).

1.4 Classification Markings versus Agency-created Control Markings

The markings associated with security classification indicate the degree of significance that the information has to the nation's security. The current Executive Order prescribes three levels of classification, depending on the extent of damage to national security in the event of its disclosure:

1) “Top Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe;
2) “Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe;
3) “Confidential” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe (Kosar 2010, R41528 CRS-11).
The original classification designations under Roosevelt's E.O. 8381 were, from the highest to the lowest level of protection, "Secret," "Confidential," and "Restricted." After World War II, Truman's E.O. 10104 introduced the fourth and highest level - "Top Secret." The "Restricted" category was later eliminated under Eisenhower's E.O. 10501 (Relyea 2008, 6).

In addition to government-wide security classifications, there are other markings that exist, utilized internally by federal agencies to restrict access to information, but do not necessarily fall under the directive's requirements. Some of these markings include, "sensitive security information" (SSI) or "sensitive but unclassified (SBU) (Sinclair 2007, 38). Agencies have also assigned various protective markings such as, "Limited Official Use," which was used by the Department of State, "Official Use Only," and "Eyes Only" (Schlessinger and Russell 1992, 5-6). Citing "For Official Use Only" as an example, a CRS report defined these types of markings as "agency-created control markings" (Kosar 2010, R41528 CRS-2). The reasons for relying on this extra level of protection are due to agencies' desires to limit internal access among its employees and to follow stipulations established by specific legislation:

Because security classification...was not possible for some kinds of information deemed in some quarters to be "sensitive," other kinds of designations or markings came to be applied to alert federal employees regarding its privileged or potentially harmful character. Sometimes these markings derived from statutory provisions requiring the protection of a type of information (Relyea 2008, 1).

One such statutory provision is the Atomic Energy Act, which labeled sensitive information as "Restricted Data," "Formerly Restricted Data," and others (Mount and
Newman 1985, 48-49). For the purposes of this study, only current presidentially-prescribed security classified markings are considered in the survey.

1.5 Interagency Classification Review Committee and Information Security Oversight Office

Due to their influential roles in ensuring compliance to classification standards, there are two agencies worth examining. During Nixon's revisions of the security classification program, E.O. 11652 created a review committee under the National Security Council's (NSC) administration. The directive placed the Interagency Classification Review Committee (ICRC) in charge of overseeing observance to its rules by agencies with classification authority (Mitchel 1987, 447). The ICRC was eventually replaced in Carter's E.O. 12065 by the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), relocating it from the NSC to NARA (Mitchel 1987, 449). ISOO's director is appointed by the Archivist of the U.S. and holds the authority to declassify information that does not comply with the directive's classification standards (Elsea 2011, RS21900 CRS-5). As an office and component within NARA, ISOO's responsibilities are similar to the functions of the ICRC; they produce annual reports over the "estimated classified information policy costs" of agencies, as well as monitor agencies' compliance to the guidelines in the most recent E.O. (Kosar 2010, R41528 CRS-5, CRS-7). In addition to making policy recommendations to the president through the NSC, ISOO's other responsibilities include handling:

1. classification, declassification, and classification marking principles;
2. safeguarding classified information;
3. agencies’ security education and training programs;
4. agencies’ self-inspection programs; and
5. agencies’ classification and declassification guides (Kosar 2010, R41528 CRS-7).
ISOO also fields suggestions and complaints from those within and outside of the federal government and solves them accordingly, as outlined by the directive's guidelines. The agency has been known to visit university campuses, searching through collections for classified documents, which was the case in 1984 when they examined the Frank Church Papers, a former senator from Idaho, at Boise State University (Paul 2005, 1).

1.6 Rules Pertaining to the Mismanagement of Classified Documents

When classified documents are mishandled due to negligence, loss, or other reasons caused by carelessness, there are hardly any laws available to hold people accountable. As it currently stands, "no blanket prohibition exists to make it unlawful simply to disclose without authority any information that is classified by the government for national security reasons" (Elsea 2011, RS21900 CRS-10). The laws that do punish people for mismanaging classified information are those that pertain to criminal intent, such as the espionage provisions regarding the gathering, transmission, or delivery of defense information to foreign governments. Criminal sanctions and laws can be applied against those who take pictures of or draw out defense installations and tamper with restricted data (Bazan 1989, CRS-7-12). 18 U.S.C. § 1924 penalizes federal government officers and employees for the deliberate and unauthorized removal and disclosure of classified information with fines of up to $1,000, along with a prison sentence of no more than one year (Elsea 2006, RL33502 CRS-9). None of these federal laws, however, apply in circumstances when criminal intent is either difficult to prove or seemingly nonexistent. Former New York Senator Daniel P. Moynihan has commented in the past on the challenging nature of the problem:
Congress has not been willing to make unauthorized disclosure of classified information an action subject to criminal sanctions without consideration of the intent of the communicator. This being so difficult to prove, such cases have been all but impossible to prosecute (Moynihan 1998, 204).

This appears to be the case when government officials take classified information without authorization, despite explicit rules against their removal. ISOO's second director, Steven Garfinkel, has stated that classified information and copies of it are not considered to be personal property (Lardner 1990). Therefore, officials who leave from office are not allowed to take classified records with them (Special to The New York Times 1991). However, without substantial laws to punish those who mismanage classified documents, incidents involving their removal and disclosure will most likely continue to occur.

1.7 Incidents

There may be no more than a handful of documented incidents that directly involve classified papers in special collections, but there certainly are quite a few other examples of classified documents outside of government control. In the past, the removal of classified documents by Cabinet members to aid in the writing of their memoirs has been a "well-known" practice criticized by Congress and the Government Accounting Office (GAO). In particular, memoirs written by former officials from the Reagan administration stand out as being the most notorious. Both former secretary of defense Caspar W. Weinberger and former secretary of state George P. Shultz took "thousands of pages" of classified documents to write their memoirs (Lardner 1990). Weinberger admitted to using classified information for his book, "Fight for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon," even though he had previously signed an agreement that required a "pre-publication review" of any books written about former employers, as well as
promised not to expose any classified information (Tolchin 1992). Although the Cabinet officers acted irresponsibly, they were not alone to blame; the departments themselves from whence the classified documents originated did not have an adequate system in place to protect the records. When the GAO reported that members of Reagan's Cabinet had taken classified documents with them after leaving office, it was discovered that the State, Justice, and Treasury departments were not even aware which of their documents were missing (McAllister 1991).

In another case, former U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Graham Martin, took classified documents during the evacuation from Saigon so that he could get in the "last word" on former secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger. As an ambassador, Graham had authorized access to top secret material and had revealed to a newspaper that he kept correspondence between himself and Kissinger to make for "interesting reading" material. The breach in security became much worse when Graham failed to report the loss of the "highly classified" documents after the top secret intelligence information disappeared from Graham's trunk when his car was stolen (Babcock 1979). Yet in another case, Averell Harriman served as an ambassador, chief of the Marshall Plan, and assistant secretary of state and ambassador at large to both former presidents Kennedy and Johnson. During his extensive career, Harriman's positions granted him access to top secret documents, which he proceeded to collect from the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the White House. Later, a biographer was able to publish two volumes based on the classified documents stored in Harriman's file cabinets down in his attic (Bird 1998). In a different case that involved a disregard for declassification procedures, Lyndon B. Johnson requested to have his files reviewed by Defense
Department officials for "early clearance." When Pentagon officials denied his request, Johnson went ahead anyway to read from a classified memorandum during a nationally televised interview with Walter Cronkite (Barker and Fox 1972, 58).

Aside from the deliberate removal of classified records, there have been instances where sensitive information has appeared in unexpected places. More than two dozen State Department documents, some of which were classified as "Top Secret," were found in a desk that was donated to a prison in Washington, D.C. (Curry 1985). In a case of mistaken declassification, the Department of Energy made a document on nuclear weapons publicly available when a copy of it was found on the shelves of its library in Los Alamos, New Mexico. After realizing its mistake, the department performed a more thorough sweep, checking for additional classified documents and found about 2,000 pages on nuclear weaponry. A year later, they found another report on nuclear weapon design and 14 more classified records on the shelves (Curry 1985). In another library-related incident, a newspaper reported that a researcher had discovered technical manuals on cryptography that were still classified at a public library (Markoff 1992).

For special collections and archives-specific examples, the University of Washington's Special Collections Division once received a visit from employees representing the CIA, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and ISOO in February of 2005. The visit, led by the CIA, was related to a classified document that the Division had turned in for declassification. After it had been returned to them, someone from the CIA visited the Division to look at the Henry M. Jackson papers more closely, and found more classified material. This soon prompted a more extensive visit where the five-member team poured over the Jackson papers and scrutinized 400 boxes
out of the 1,200 box collection. The CIA had originally wanted the 400 boxes to be closed to the public despite the fact that they had been accessible and open to researchers for ten years. In the end, they removed eight classified documents from the collection to be considered for declassification (Rickerson 2005, 11, Paul 2005, 3).

At the University of South Carolina, the State Department became interested in the papers of John Carl West in the Political Collections. West, now deceased, was a former governor and ambassador to Saudi Arabia. The university acquired the collection as a gift in 1995, which remained closed until 2005. Before opening the collection to the public, a staff member called the State Department about correspondence from the agency and after discovering documents marked as, "Classified" and Confidential. When the Political Collections sent hundreds of more pages for review, the State Department sent two staff members to examine the rest of the collection for a week (Congressional Papers Roundtable 2006, 13, McWhite 2005, 3).

In August of 2006, while processing the collection of former senator, James O. Eastland, the Modern Political Archives at the University of Mississippi had to contact the Center for Legislative Archives at NARA after turning over three boxes of classified material to their campus security officer's vault. The FBI subsequently visited the university to handle their own agency's records. After removing four documents, they returned the rest of its records to the Political Archives (McWhite 2007, 4).

1.8 Post-WikiLeaks Environment

The arrival and perseverance of WikiLeaks has presented a game-changing challenge to the security classification program. According to a CRS Report from earlier this year, WikiLeaks' publication of classified information has renewed the U.S.
government's interest in the "legal framework that governs security classification, access to classified information, agency procedures for preventing and responding to unauthorized disclosures, and penalties for improper disclosure" (Elsea 2011, RS21900 Summary). Library professionals have recently been divided over and debated about whether libraries should collect and provide people with access to the leaked cables (Jacobs 2011). Although they have been published on the WikiLeaks website, and are therefore accessible to anyone in the public, the cables are still considered to be classified information. In James R. Jacobs’ response to Bill Sleeman's, "A Librarian Reacts to WikiLeaks," he questions if Sleeman is particularly against libraries holding leaked information in its collections and stacks. If that is the case, Jacobs wonders if he is also suggesting for libraries to purge its collections of all copies and versions of the Pentagon Papers (Jacobs 2011). As it currently stands, the Pentagon Papers, which were leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in 1971, are still classified at the highest level - Top Secret - even though the material is freely available for anyone to read (Prados 2010). No reasonable explanation exists as to why information does not become declassified once it has been made public, as former director for the NSA, Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer, proved when he stated that "just because information has been published doesn't mean it should no longer be classified" (Taubman 1983).

The U.S. government's reaction to WikiLeaks has been swift. WikiLeaks' release of the cables has prompted federal agencies to scrutinize their security polices more closely. In a memorandum from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), it noted that on November 28, 2010, "departments and agencies that handle classified national security information were directed to establish assessment teams to review their
implementation of safeguarding procedures" (Lew 2011, M-11-08). By January 28, 2011, the agency teams had to answer in a report, "what [their] agency has done or plans to do to address any perceived vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or gaps on automated systems in the post-WikiLeaks environment," in addition to other security issues (Lew 2011, M-11-08).

2 Literature Review

In 1967, Herbert Luger and Ronald Booser prepared a report titled, "Classified Information and Technical Libraries" for the U.S. Army Materials Research Agency. After conducting a review of the literature over the field, the authors noted that there were "very sparse" resources on and "scant attention paid" to handling classified materials in libraries (Luger and Booser 1967, 6). The same things could be said for the literature regarding the experiences of archives and special collections' management of classified documents.

The works consulted for this study seem to naturally divide into four distinct, thematic categories: 1) project reports, journal articles, and newsletters relating to government research libraries or archives and classified documents, 2) newspaper articles featuring stories on classified documents outside of government control, 3) reports written by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the nonpartisan, public policy research branch of Congress, and 4) books, journal articles, and conference papers studying the history of security classification and classified information.

Literature from the early 1950s and late 1960s for this study mainly deal with libraries whose normal functions involve managing classified information. In Jack Rea's final report for the AFCRL Laboratories Library, he recorded his team's efforts to develop policies for incorporating collections of classified documents in with other, more
general materials. They focused on "factors involved in the management and control of a document collection containing both classified and unclassified documents" (Rea 1969, 3). Before applying any practices to the AFCRL, they first discussed policies and procedures, concepts of user services, accession, retention, and archival functions.

As part of the Technical Leaflet Series for the Mid-Atlantic Regional Archives Conference, Kenneth Schlessinger and Marvin F. Russell in 1992 contributed "Identifying and Handling Classified Documents in Private Papers" as a quick reference guide for novices in the archival profession. The guide provided a brief background of the government's security classification system, listings and definitions of the classification markings, explanation of declassification markings, and information regarding the handling and storage of classified information. This resource would have proven to be invaluable if it had been updated regularly to reflect the changes and amendments in the executive orders.

Current literature from the LIS field has been less prolific in addressing problems with handling classified materials in library collections, which is understandable due to the published nature of general collections. In cases when there are sources dedicated to classified information, most of the literature revolves around efforts to advocate freedom of information (e.g. providing access to Wikileaks) and to fight censorship. One of the few exceptions to this is Thompson and Kaarst-Brown's article, "Sensitive Information: A Review and Research Agenda" on intelligence and security informatics (ISI). They examine patterns surrounding human categorization and classification of sensitive information, as well as begin to scratch the surface of looking for factors that "influence judgments about the degree of sensitivity" (Thompson and Kaarst-Brown 2005, 245).
While it is interesting to consider the "number of different ways humans conceptualize sensitive information" (Thompson and Kaarst-Brown 2005, 245), it does not directly relate to the type of classification of sensitive information that is prescribed by a presidential directive. For that particular subject, a handful of newsletters from SAA's CPR proved to be the most relevant.

The earliest CPR newsletter cited in this study comes from a 1998 advertisement for a workshop focusing on issues associated with congressional and legislative collections - from the point of acquisition to providing reference services. In addition to covering organizational news, events, and announcements important to the group, their newsletters also feature various articles on select topics concerning congressional records. For example, from the year 2005, there are two articles directly related to the topic under study, Carla Rickerson's "Federal Team Reviews Henry M. Jackson Papers" and Karen Paul's "What to Do If: You Find National Security Classified Documents When Processing a Collection of Congressional Papers OR You are Unexpectedly Visited by Agency Declassification Officials." From 2006, there is a report on a roundtable program over "Classified Documents in Congressional Collections: What You Should Know" where someone from ISOO was invited as a guest speaker. Lastly, under Institutional News in 2007, there is a section devoted to the University of Mississippi. All of these articles feature detailed accounts from the archives and special collections sector, as well as provide information about their experiences with handling classified materials and interacting with federal staff members.

The newspaper articles deliver brief documented incidents of agencies and government officials' mismanagement of classified information. Although the news
articles tend to sensationalize the misconduct of the same public officials, people are still able to gather and piece together the reports to develop a more accurate picture of security classification policy and its weaknesses, e.g. ISOO's position regarding the unauthorized removal of the materials, and problems stemming from over classification and public access. Other news reports included stories on the NSA's intervention in libraries and the storage of highly classified documents in unlikely places, such as car trunks and attics. In Charles R. Babcock's "Graham Martin Won't Be Prosecuted" from The Washington Post, the Justice Department decided not to prosecute Martin for losing - and then failing to report the loss of - classified documents due to his age (67 years old) and poor health. From the same paper in "Special Privileges for Ex-Cabinet Members," George Lardner, Jr. reported the misuse of privileges to access classified documents by former secretaries of defense and state from the Reagan administration. Both officials had taken and used classified documents to write their memoirs, then kept and stored the documents at the Library of Congress. In the New York Times, "In Retreat, U.S. Spy Agency Shrugs at Found Secret Data" by John Markoff, the NSA demanded the return of "secret technical manuals" found at a public library by a researcher. The manuals were written by a founder of NSA and were part of a book about military code-breaking. In the end, the NSA allowed the researcher to keep the manuals once they had been declassified.

CRS reports serve as excellent resources for locating impartial policy and legal analyses on topics of import to Congress and committee members. The reports also have the added benefit of providing the latest information on classified national security information policy. In "Classified Information Policy and Executive Order 13526," Kevin
R. Kosar, listed as an analyst in American national government, gives an overview on the history of policy changes, including a list of previous directives, and discusses the Obama administration's review of classified information policy that resulted in E.O. 13526. During 2006 and 2011, Jennifer K. Elsea, a legislative attorney from the American Law Division, wrote reports on "The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework." In both reports, Elsea starts with a summary of recent incidents that have drawn attention to protecting classified information in addition to providing a brief background on the topic. In 2006, the incident that inspired a report involved internal leaks of information. Then in 2011, another report was written due to WikiLeaks' release of "secret information." Elsea's most recent report cites some of the classification standards as stipulated by the latest directive, discusses other agencies' practices for handling unauthorized disclosures, as well as lists criminal and civil penalties that are pertinent to disclosures.

The last group of sources is mostly comprised of books with a few journal articles that are either written about the history of security classification or the right to access classified documents. In Carol M. Barker and Matthew H. Fox's "Classified Files: the Yellowing Pages," they largely focus on complaints by researchers regarding the access restrictions enforced in presidential libraries. The authors discuss the issue of and press for the opening of government archives to scholars. "Top Secret/Trade Secret" by Ellis Mount and Wilda B. Newman is for information professionals, whether they are working in an academic or commercial capacity, who are interested in exploring different ways to not only safeguard information, but to also make the right type of information accessible to authorized users. David H. Morrissey closely examines the various directives
motivated by changes in U.S. presidency and its effects on the handling of classified security information in "Disclosure and Secrecy: Security Classification Executive Orders." Daniel P. Moynihan in "Secrecy: the American Experience" attempts to demonstrate how secrecy in the U.S. has been detrimental rather than beneficial to the country in terms of international relations/diplomacy, arms race, and the budget. In "Security Classified and Controlled Information," Harold C. Relyea provides a brief history on the presidential directives, including practices predating the E.O.s, and introduces a variety of security classification markings.

3 Methodology

This study is based on a survey conducted over a three-week period in February 2011. Prior to sending the survey to the study sample, the questions, along with a link to the pilot survey and a copy of the recruitment letter, were emailed in mid-January to various professionals working at the Louis Round Wilson Special Collections Library at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill for review. Requests for suggestions and comments were sent to archivists in Collecting and Public Programming, Electronic Records, and Manuscripts Process, and also to librarians in Research and Instruction, and Manuscripts Reference. After considering their recommendations, adjustments were made to the final version of the survey and recruitment letter, and the link was activated.

The survey link was emailed to libraries belonging to 99 different academic institutions with the subject line, "Classified Congressional records in your collections?" In case the participants had no knowledge over the questions' content, they were encouraged in the recruitment email to forward the message with the link to the most appropriate individual on their staff. Excluding the question on the IRB Consent Form,
there were four questions with single answer responses, i.e. "Yes" or "No," including one "I don't know" answer choice, three questions with single-line text responses, and two optional questions with a multi-line text response and a single-line text response. All of the questions that were not optional were under "Force Response" (Odum Institute for Research in Social Science 2010, 3). This meant that the respondent could not move on to the next question without providing an answer. On the survey, the first question asked respondents to enter the name of their academic institution; two more questions inquired about respondents' institutional demographics, such as the number of full-time archivists on staff and the extent of their records in linear or cubic feet; the last four questions were on institutional holdings and policies concerning the discovery and handling of classified documents found in the papers of U.S. Congress members. Responses were then recorded using Qualtrics, the web survey data collection and research software. All identifying information regarding the respondents, including emails to and from participants, their titles, names, and IP addresses, as well as the names of their academic institutions, have been deleted for confidentiality purposes. The survey libraries were chosen due to their considerable presence in the library and information science profession. The reasoning was that if any library contained classified documents as part of their holdings, perhaps the prestige associated with these libraries would have some impact in gaining these kinds of records. Along with survey participant data, information identifying the libraries has also been withheld to protect confidentiality. The purpose for maintaining this level of anonymity was to encourage respondents to answer the survey questions truthfully. Although the identities of survey respondents and libraries are not available, this survey
is still replicable by sampling any number of academic libraries, as long as the size of the problem can be approximated.

3.1 Limitations

The survey link distributed to participants in this research was based on the option to "open access without authentication" (Odum Institute for Research in Social Science 2010, 1). Within Qualtrics, researchers can use the Qualtrics Mailer to send customized survey links to participants. One of the advantages of this is that once a respondent completes the survey, the link is no longer active; this prevents the link from being used more than once. Another alternative is for respondents to enter a unique identifier that will enable them to gain access to the survey in "open access with authentication."

Participants are also unable to complete the same survey more than once under this option. Although the open access without authentication option is typically used in cases when a single survey link is distributed through a listserv, for the purposes of this study, this option was the most appropriate given the circumstances, and despite the following disadvantages (Odum Institute for Research in Social Science 2010, 1):

- there is no method to determine who has or has not responded,
- it is difficult to distinguish between survey responses, unless a question about the respondent's identity is included, and
- there is no way to deter a participant from responding to a survey more than once

Since the participants in the study sample were asked to forward the link to others (if they lacked knowledge), the data-gathering could not have been processed through a single customized link if someone other than the original recipient answered the survey. To solve the problems associated with the first two points, the question pertaining to the respondent's academic institution was added into the survey at the last moment. Before the link was officially sent to participants, it was anticipated that this question might
incite suspicion about the anonymity of the survey. The purpose of that question was to keep track of institutions that already completed the survey and to avoid emailing the same link to those participants again when reminders were sent. During the course of gathering data, it was discovered that the question may have been unnecessary after all, since IP addresses are traceable through websites such as WhatIsMyIPAddress.com. However, identifying the location of an IP address would not be beneficial if the participant happened to respond to the survey off campus. As for the last point, in instances when more than one survey was completed by the same institution, the responses were compared, then only one survey was saved while the others were deleted from the overall results; either surveys with the most complete answers were retained or surveys that featured inappropriate answers were discarded. Under these conditions, only two survey responses were deleted from the overall results.

Another limitation to the survey could be due to requiring respondents to give an answer before moving to the next question. If a participant realizes that they cannot proceed through the rest of the survey without skipping a question, they may quit and leave it unfinished. A "Back" button was provided in the survey to mitigate the negative effects of Force Response and allow respondents to return to their answers to correct them. Selecting the Force Response option was one way to ensure that only participants with knowledge of the collections answered the survey; it was utilized to prevent those with inadequate knowledge from skipping questions.

Finally, there are two questions from the survey that were intentionally left out in the final version of this study. For instance, I did not go over the name of respondents' universities or colleges for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality. I also chose not to
address any of the responses from the last optional question regarding follow-up interviews, since none were conducted. Also, throughout the study, the term "library" or "libraries" is used to encompass special collections, manuscripts collections, and archival collections.

4 Findings

Out of 99 different academic institutions that received the link to the survey, libraries from 57 of these institutions responded, coming to a total response rate of 58% (57/99). While this study did not return a response rate of 100% from the selected survey sample, the findings do nonetheless indicate how prevalent the existence of classified documents is in library collections. The findings reveal how many participant libraries house congressional records and the number that have classified items in these collections. The survey results also provide an account of how many respondents have policies, or if none exist - then unspoken rules - about the handling of classified documents. While it is important to examine the topic under study through results that can be quantified, the text responses to one of the optional questions helped to add a valuable, contextual element to the numerical results.

4.1 Congressional Papers in Collections

The first graph shows that a majority of survey respondents hold congressional papers in their collections. Out of 57 participants, 48 respondents or 84% house such documents.

One of the participants who responded "No" commented that "While not holding the records of members of congress, we do have some congressional committee files donated by high level committee staff." It would have been beneficial to this study to
examine those committee files, in addition to members' papers, as part of congressional records to determine if any contained classified information.

1. Do your libraries and/or archives at your institution hold any papers* from U.S. Congress** members in its collections?  *Personal papers or official documents ** Former incumbents who served in the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives

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<td>48</td>
<td>84%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
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4.2 Classified Documents

Kenneth Schlessinger and Marvin F. Russell in "Identifying and Handling Classified Documents in Private Papers" wrote that "many archivists, librarians, academics, and others" have found documents marked Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, or Restricted in their manuscript collections (Schlessinger and Russell 1992, 1). In the second graph, it shows that there is not a significant difference among libraries that either do or do not have, or remain unaware of, classified documents in their collections. Of the 48 respondents who do house congressional records, 16 (33%) answered that they hold classified documents, 18 (38%) do not have them, and 14 (29%) do not know whether or not if any of the records they possess are classified. For those who do not know, it would be interesting to find out if the reason for not knowing is due to collections that have been lightly processed (and described), unprocessed, or for other reasons.
2. Are any of the U.S. Congressional papers and/or documents in the holdings at your institution classified (stamped with any of the following in either red or black ink: "Confidential," "Secret," or "Top Secret")?

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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29%</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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A respondent who answered "I don't know" remarked that, "None of our Congressional collections are recent -- i.e., the "newest" date to the 1960s and early 1970s -- and by and large, given what we know about committee assignments and so on, extensive classified material is unlikely, and classification, where marked, may well have lapsed. Hence classification has been a potential, but in practice a non-issue." On the subject of declassification authority and members' papers, a staff member from ISOO commented that:

Declassification can only be done by the United States Government. The automatic declassification provision of certain documents over 25 years old does not apply to personal papers; these must be reviewed by agencies. Agencies have to retain control of classified information and classified documents must have clear declassification markings (Congressional Papers Roundtable 2006, 14).

Previously, in E.O. 13292, classified documents outside of government control and over 25 years old were not automatically declassified (Paul 2005, 4).

Another "I don't know" response concerned unprocessed congressional collections, "Some of our Congressional collections have not been processed, so I do not know whether they contain classified information." A participant who also did not know cited both closed and unprocessed collections as reasons, "We have...Congressional Papers that are closed to research until the death of the former congressman. Although
the papers date from 1967-82, they are, as yet, largely unprocessed." One other respondent believes that the collections had come to them void of classified documents, "The Congressional collection we hold is closed until 2016. Very little of it has been closely examined to date, though I strongly suspect it was "scrubbed" of anything of a controversial nature prior to deposit."

A few of the "Yes" responses are somewhat problematic because there were participants who counted formerly classified documents as currently classified documents. For example, a respondent who answered "Yes" to the question did so even though the documents do not remain classified after going through the declassification process, "In the limited cases where classified documents are present in the collection, such documents are also marked de-classified." Another individual who responded "Yes" also included declassified documents, however, those documents do not have the requisite classification markings from the directive, "to my knowledge, all of the documents stamped as "classified" (etc.) have been properly de-classified and are so indicated." A different participant who answered "Yes" was not sure of the documents' current status, "I believe that the documents in question, although stamped, have since been declassified. But am in the process of verifying." Other "Yes" responses referred to different types of sensitive information, such as personal privacy information, that were irrelevant to this study. In the same way, the following answer was more relevant to access restrictions than to directive-designated security classification, "Nearly all the restrictions on Congressional papers are those relating to privacy--case files, etc. There are no "national security" type restrictions still extant in any of the collections."
Similar to participants who answered "I don't know," there were "Yes" respondents who also dealt with closed and unprocessed collections. The following individual stated that while archivists had previously come across classified documents, there are yet more collections in their holdings that they are uncertain about due to the fact that they are currently closed to the public:

We have had only a few items marked confidential or secret. I recall we sent copies of some documents to NARA for evaluation. NARA declassified these items. We have a large group of closed collections (by deed of gift). Only when we process those collections will we know if any contain classified items.

Another respondent replied "Yes" to the question and cited specific restrictions for keeping their collections closed, "At present time, almost all our Congressional papers collections are closed to the public due to donor restrictions."

For individuals who answered "No," some had their collections examined thoroughly by congressional staffers before the point of acquisition, "Any collections we received, were reviewed by the politician's staff and confidential material was removed before we acquired and accessioned it." The collections from a different respondent who replied "Yes" also had their materials reviewed but not until after the collections were processed:

We had classified documents in our Congressional papers. Several were removed at the time of processing, but some were missed. These classified pieces were later found by a Central Intelligence Agency staff member, resulting in a review of over one hundred boxes of documents by staff from the CIA, the Air Force, the Energy Dept, and some other agencies.

The following statement from a "No" respondent underscores the problems associated with processing materials - especially congressional papers - under MPLP, and as a result, increasing the likelihood for missing individually classified items:
No academic institution should have Classified Documents in their repository. If there is any question about whether a document is a Classified Document, NARA, Center for Legislative Studies [sic], or the Department of Homeland Security should be contacted. The possible existence of such material in a congressional collection is one of the major reasons More Product - Less Processing (MP-LP), a processing strategy favored by Mark Greene and Dennis Meissner, should never be used to process a congressional collection.

4.3 Library Policies

Although 16% of survey participants do not have congressional papers in their collections, 47% of respondents have policies that address the handling of classified documents. The third graph shows that 27 libraries have these policies while 30 do not. What motivates libraries from almost half of the survey participants to create policies that deal directly with handling classified national security information?

3. Do the policies in your libraries and/or archives at your institution address the handling of classified U.S. government documents?

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<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
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One participant who answered "Yes" revealed that the policy came into place after having to deal with issues concerning the declassification of classified documents:

Policy addressing classified documents is not a formal written policy, just one developed after having dealt with this issue before. I would also point out that just because documents might not be stamped with those terms you used doesn't mean they aren't classified...something we learned all too well from our experiences having things declassified by the federal government.

The comment above demonstrates how library policies have had to adapt after coming across classified information. In addition, the respondent's remarks about other security classification terms used outside of those prescribed by directives make me wonder if the
participant is referring to agency-created control markings, or the markings associated with statutory provisions, such as the Atomic Energy Act. Another respondent who answered "Yes" seemed not to have meant their own library's policies but policies outside of their library, "We do not have an official policy to handle classified government document[s], however we follow what I would say are standard rules and contact the National Archives if we have questions or concerns about these type of documents."

Someone different who replied "Yes" to the question also indicated that a staff member at their library had contacted NARA as part of procedure when they found classified documents:

A limited number of classified documents were discovered during processing of one collection 1989 and submitted to Declassification Unit of NARA (now IS00 [sic]). Some of these have been declassified and returned; at least one is still awaiting declassification.

Judging from the few textual responses regarding library policies in the survey, it seems more likely that the procedures for handling classified documents are not informed by individual library policies, but by the knowledge of outside regulations and standards established by NARA and ISOO.

4.4 Unspoken Understanding

For the 30 libraries whose policies do not provide specific guidelines on how to deal with classified information, a great number of them seem to have a general understanding of how to manage these sorts of documents. The fourth graph indicates that a little over half - 20 respondents or 67% - of these libraries have an unspoken awareness of the procedures for handling classified documents.
4. If there is nothing officially noted in your policies, is there a general understanding among staff regarding the handling of classified U.S. government documents?

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A participant who answered "Yes" talked about the SAA workshop they attended where they learned about working with legislative collections:

I attended SAA's Congressional Papers workshop and was taught there how to handle anything marked Classified or Top Secret. I followed that protocol (notifying the Security Officer at NARA) when we did find something.

A respondent who answered "No" commented that, "We wouldn't accept a donation of classified U.S. documents; if we inadvertently did, we would return the documents to the donor."

The 10 "No" responses to this last question probably had more to do with the 9 individuals who answered "No" at the beginning when they were asked if their library housed congressional papers. It is highly likely that if 9 of these libraries do not handle these type of records, then it follows that the same - or close to the same - number of respondents should have no knowledge over the handling of classified materials in the absence of guidelines provided by their libraries' policies.

Whether a library's policy specifically addresses the handling of classified national security information or not, ISOO encourages people who discover classified materials in their collections to contact the Center for Legislative Archives for congressional records, and ISOO for other federal government documents. ISOO is able
to help with the process of declassification, as well as with finding temporary storage for classified documents (Congressional Papers Roundtable 2006, 14).

5 Conclusion

The question remains if the other 42 academic institutions chose not to answer the survey because they did not hold congressional records, or perhaps they had no time or inclination to respond. During three weeks of email exchanges, there were a few people from the survey sample who indicated that they were not going to take it because their particular library did not house congressional records in its collections. After data collection and analysis had been completed for the study, I was not able to group responses by any type of institutional demographics because the answers were either unquantifiable or more varied than I had originally anticipated. For example, for the question pertaining to the number of full-time archivists that work in special collections, a participant answered that, "there are several different archives and special collections libraries in this university." For the question regarding the extent of records in linear feet, cubic feet, or a different metric, there were respondents who did not indicate any unit of measure, or responded with "unknown," "I do not know," or "none." I considered deleting these responses but decided not to in the end for the sake of preserving the rest of the data in the surveys.

If I could repeat the survey again, one of the things that I would change is to describe classified national security documents more clearly. For instance, not only would I provide a description of the markings from the most current directive - Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential - but I would also mention the one other marking from past directives - Restricted. In addition, I would list which classification markings to
disregard, such as agency-created control markings that include, but are not limited to, SSI, SBU, For Official Use Only, Restricted Data, and Formerly Restricted Data. Another piece of information that I would tell participants to ignore is declassified documents; I would ask respondents to not include documents marked or stamped with "declassified" into their answers. Inspired by some of the textual responses to one of the optional questions, I would add one to two more questions to the survey to measure peoples' knowledge over NARA's or ISOO's policies and procedures on classified documents.

A potential next step or direction for a following survey to take is to examine the processing procedures of libraries that collect congressional records. For instance, if the libraries collect congressional papers, what level of processing and description do they use? Do some follow and practice MPLP while processing legislative collections? If they do, how often do they discover classified documents in their holdings? A comparison can be made between the libraries that process according to MPLP and those that do not. We can determine if a pattern exists from instances when classified materials are found based on differences in processing practices.

Despite a few survey respondents including declassified items into their answers, it can still be safely inferred that at least a third of participant libraries that collect congressional records have classified documents in their holdings. As can be seen in the following pie chart, a little more than a third are certain that their collections do not contain classified information, while less than one third do not know.
For the libraries that are unsure, do we verge toward "Yes" due to the possibility that they may contain classified documents, or do we lean toward "No" because it does not matter since the closed records are inaccessible to the public? It can be reasonably argued that much of the uncertainty is due to unprocessed, closed, or lightly processed collections; it is not possible to have knowledge over every single item that is stored in the archives.

The three percentages from the pie chart are evenly spread out with no significant gaps between them. Due to the nearly equal standing that the unknowns have in the question, this study does not provide the Program Analyst at ISOO with definitive proof that hundreds of special collections hold classified documents. These documents certainly exist outside of the government's control and in libraries, but the difficulty lies in approximating the exact size of the problem.

It has been said that our society thrives on information; that our "waking hours are filled with accessing and evaluating information" (Mount and Newman 1985, 3). What happens though when we do not have the time and resources to thoroughly examine and evaluate this information? What happens when there is too much information to evaluate?
And, is it even feasible to keep certain information secret for long? Current archival practices typically do not allow processors to comb through each item in every collection, but in mass quantities; spending extra time on one collection means sacrificing time in processing others. For those who strive to safeguard national security interests, controlling access remains problematic, despite the existence of directives to govern what information is restricted or who is allowed to see it (Mount and Newman 1985, 7). Others estimate that it is not even possible to protect classified information for as long as five years, or prevent its access by unauthorized persons after one year through "independent discovery, clandestine disclosure or other means" (Relyea 1999). At ISOO, a past director remarked that they were not applying a "concerted effort" to investigate every document that is outside of government control (Paul 2005, 4). If that is the case, then let's hope that more effort is being applied instead to preventing those documents from escaping the government's control in the first place. Could checking members' papers for classified documents before their departure from office be offered as a possible solution? A few of the survey respondents had this experience when their collections were examined by congressional staff prior to acquiring and accessioning them. Another participant stated that they would return materials to the donor if they "inadvertently" accepted classified documents. Of course, the return of classified items would depend on their discovery during processing, which in turn, would depend on individual processing practices.

This study does not pretend to provide solutions for solving the difficulties associated with archival processing practices, nor does it attempt to offer suggestions for protecting classified national security information. The purpose of this research is to shed a sliver of light onto the present situation of special collections storing classified
information outside of government control. The potential impact that this may someday have on national security remains to be seen and depends on the type of information that is contained in the classified document, as well as on the type of person who finds it. If it is impossible after all to stop unauthorized access to or disclosure of classified information - and that possibility seems more likely with WikiLeaks - then is there a different alternative available? I think Heald points us in the right direction but more clarification is needed. He maintains that security involves a more cognitive process rather than an adherence to a set of rules:

Security is a means, not an end. Rules which govern security of information cannot guarantee absolute protection. Essentially, security is a state of mind rather than an item of physical equipment that can be installed and removed at will (Heald 1952, 142).

We cannot rely on state of mind alone nor can we depend entirely on executive regulations to safeguard our nation's secrets. Perhaps more efforts should be poured into establishing a series of checks for classified information, if none already exist. For instance, the checks could serve as a blockade to the improper handling of classified documents; they could function at the midpoint and threshold before classified documents completely leave the government's control. These checks do not need to start and end with the government; they could also be distributed to libraries and repositories that could develop policies to include, for example, either NARA or ISOO's URL addresses as a reference. It may be impossible to guarantee the absolute protection of classified information but steps could be taken to minimize incidents where unauthorized access to and removal of such material occurs.
Survey Recruitment Email

Subject: Classified Congressional records in your collections?

Dear First name and Last name,

Good day to you. I am a second-year Master's student attending the School of Information and Library Science at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. I am conducting a study on academic libraries which retain classified congressional records in their special collections holdings. My study sample includes 102 academic institutions. Could you please take a few minutes to complete my online survey? Survey completion duration should take no longer than 10 minutes.

If I have made an error in contacting you about classified congressional records in your special collections, could you please forward the survey to the most appropriate person on your staff? I would appreciate this very much.

As a final note, the names of the people I contact, as well as the names of their academic institutions, will remain confidential. Once I hand in the final version of my paper on April 4, 2011, I will delete all participant contact information, survey responses, and correspondence/emails related to this study. Therefore, please do not hesitate to answer freely.

Should you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact me at ccheng09@email.unc.edu.

Sincerely,

Christine Cheng
Survey

Survey Questions:

1. What is the name of your university or college?

2. How many full-time archivists work in the special collections library or department at your institution?

3. What is the extent of records (i.e. linear feet, cubic feet, etc.) that are held in the special collections library or department at your academic institution? Please indicate the unit of measure (e.g. linear feet, cubic feet, etc.)

4. Do your libraries and/or archives at your academic institution hold any papers* from U.S. Congress** members in its collections? If "Yes," you will be directed to Q5. If "No," you will be directed to Q6.

   [ ] Yes  [ ] No

*Personal papers or official documents  
**Former incumbents who served in the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives

5. Are any of the U.S. Congressional papers and/or documents in the holdings at your academic institution classified (stamped with any of the following in either red or black ink: "Confidential," "Secret," or "Top Secret")?

   [ ] Yes  [ ] No  [ ] I Don't Know

6. Do the policies in your libraries and/or archives at your academic institution address the handling of classified U.S. government documents? If "Yes," you will be directed to Q8. If "No," you will be directed to Q7.

   [ ] Yes  [ ] No

7. If there is nothing officially noted in your policies, is there a general understanding among staff regarding the handling of classified U.S. government documents?

   [ ] Yes  [ ] No
Optional questions:

8. Is there anything more that you would like to briefly add?


9. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up interview?

☐ Yes, I would. You may contact me at:

☐ No
Works Cited


