Introduction

The mood of the men gathered inside the commander’s quarters in Fort Loudoun on August 6, 1760 was decidedly grim. Captain Paul Demere, commander of the fort, had summoned his subordinates to a council of war in order to discuss their surrender to the Cherokee warriors encamped outside.¹

![Figure 1: A modern drawing of Fort Loudoun as it looked during the Anglo-Cherokee War.](image)

This research was funded by a Gold Fellowship from the Office for Undergraduate Research at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.


The Cherokee had held Fort Loudoun under siege since March. Cut off from the more settled areas of South Carolina by the Appalachian Mountains, the fort had proven impossible to succor with more men or provisions, and the Cherokee had turned back the relief effort by Colonel Archibald Montgomery earlier that summer. When Demere convened his council of war on August 6, the garrison had only three days’ worth of food remaining.\(^3\) Dangerously low on resources and convinced they had done all they possibly could to hold Fort Loudoun – the garrison of approximately 150 men had maintained their post in hostile territory against a numerically superior enemy for nearly five months – Demere and his officers decided that it was impossible to hold out any longer. They chose to surrender.\(^4\)

With the help of trader Samuel Terron, who had lived among the Cherokee for five years, Captain John Stuart of the South Carolina Provincials finalized the terms of surrender over the next day. The garrison would leave the fort, its cannon, and any extra small arms and ammunition to the besiegers. In return, they would be allowed to march safely over the mountains to Fort Prince George, a British outpost in the Cherokee Lower Towns. Terron asked the Cherokee to give the garrison a European style recognition of their dogged defense of Fort Loudoun. The warriors accommodated this request and granted the garrison the honors of war: the enlisted men would keep their muskets, the officers would keep their side arms, and they would march out with flags flying and music playing.\(^5\)

---

\(^3\) William Bull to Jeffrey Amherst, October 29, 1760, in James Grant of Ballindalloch Papers, 1740-1819, microfilm, Library of Congress, box 33. The garrison initially consisted of about 200 men, but by the time of Fort Loudoun’s surrender, casualties and especially disease had lowered its numbers to approximately 150. See John Oliphant, *Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 136-137.


At 10:00 AM on August 8, 1760, the British flag over Fort Loudoun went down and the men of the garrison together with their wives and children who had been living with them in the fort began to march away. They traveled for two days without incident, but at daybreak on August 10, a force of about seven hundred Cherokee warriors ambushed their column. The Cherokee killed all of the garrison’s officers except Stuart. At least one of these deaths – Demere’s – was an execution; the warriors captured him alive and forced him to dance before killing and scalping him. The Cherokee also killed twenty-five enlisted men and three women. Those deaths, they told Stuart, were in retaliation for the twenty-three Cherokee chiefs and warriors who had been summarily arrested by South Carolina’s governor while they were on a trade mission to Charleston in 1759, and later executed at Fort Prince George. The warriors took Stuart and the surviving members of Fort Loudoun’s garrison into captivity, distributing them among the Cherokee Overhill Towns.

---

6William Bull to Jeffrey Amherst, October 29, 1760, in JGP, box 33.  
8William Bull to Jeffrey Amherst, October 29, 1760, in JGP, box 33.
About one month later, Attakullakulla (Little Carpenter), a Cherokee chief who tried to maintain good diplomatic relations with the British despite the war, helped Stuart to escape. On his journey east, Stuart ran into a three hundred man force from Virginia on its way to relieve Fort Loudoun, told its commander that his mission was no longer necessary, and explained why. His story traveled quickly to Charleston, where South Carolina’s Lieutenant Governor, William

---

Bull, received it with shock and outrage. In a letter explaining the situation to British General Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Bull wrote of “the Savage Nature of Indians” and their “perfidy,” of which he believed “their Violation of the Capitulation” at Fort Loudoun was a manifestation.\textsuperscript{10}

This incident, later known as the Cane Creek Massacre, suggests the extent to which British and colonial officials conceptualized surrender and the acceptable treatment of prisoners of war differently from how Cherokee chiefs and warriors conceptualized them. Indeed, the two sides imagined the whole idea of captivity in markedly different ways. This difference applied not only to the Cherokee, but also to many other Native American tribes.

Although this difference could spark conflict, the example of the Cane Creek Massacre also illustrates that the gulf between British and Native ideas of captivity was not so wide that it could never be bridged. The Cherokee understood enough about British conceptions of captivity to know that Fort Loudoun’s garrison would march peacefully away (and leave their valuable cannon to the besieging warriors) if its members were allowed to display their flags and keep their muskets. In granting these European honors of war to the garrison, the Cherokee warriors besieging Fort Loudoun followed European norms of surrender. However, as the aftermath of the surrender illustrates, they did not do so at the expense of their own cultural imperatives. Once the garrison was out in the open, the warriors inflicted casualties that would avenge their dead and took captives to carry back to their villages as proof of their success.

The mixture of European and Native rites of surrender and conceptions of captivity evident in the Cane Creek Massacre is emblematic of the broader mingling of European and Native cultures that occurred throughout the colonial period in the space that Richard White calls

\textsuperscript{10}South Carolina Gazette, October 18, 1760, 55-56; William Bull to Jeffrey Amherst, October 29, 1760, in JGP, box 33.
“the Middle Ground.” This geographic area encompassed a large portion of North America’s interior, running from the St. Lawrence River in the north and the Great Lakes in the west through the Ohio Valley and to the Southeastern Appalachian Mountains. The Middle Ground was also home to a metaphorical space within which neither Europeans nor Natives could force their belief systems, ways of life, or cultural practices on the other. Instead, they created a hybrid world by reinventing Native and European customs so that they were intelligible and usable to both sides.\textsuperscript{11} Of course, these reinventions were almost never total. Native warriors and European soldiers entered battlefields knowing roughly how their adversaries would behave, but each side’s specific ways of fighting, taking prisoners, and negotiating still surprised the other over a century after initial contact.

I use the word “side” in this thesis with some reluctance, since neither eighteenth-century Native Americans nor their European contemporaries were members of a single homogenous group. One can make generalizations about European cultural and military norms with reasonable accuracy. As Stephen Conway points out, European officers tended to conduct campaigns in accordance with the internationally accepted “laws of war” that were being formulated and circulated by philosophes in Switzerland, France, and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{12}

Generalizing about Native cultural and military norms is more difficult. Differences in the culture, politics, social hierarchy, and so on of Native tribes varied hugely depending on ethnicity, region, and a host of other factors beyond this thesis’s scope. My analysis, however, will be confined to those tribes who inhabited the Middle Ground during the Anglo-Indian


conflicts of the mid-eighteenth century and were adversaries of the British sometime during that period. This thesis, therefore, will focus mainly on the Ohio Valley tribes (the Delaware, Mingo, and Shawnee), some Great Lakes tribes (the Ottawa, Chippewa, and Pottawatomi), two northern Iroquoian tribes (the Caughnawaga Mohawk and the Wyandot), and one Southern one (the Cherokee). Some of these groups were ethnically or linguistically related, and many were relatively recent amalgamations of peoples banding together to recoup their numbers after the devastating effects of European diseases and intertribal warfare.

Central to the analysis here are the Anglo-Indian conflicts of the mid-eighteenth century, beginning in 1754 and ending in 1765. Within that period were three major Anglo-Indian Wars: the French and Indian War, the Anglo-Cherokee War, and Pontiac’s War. The French and Indian War began as a contest between New France and the British colony of Virginia for hegemony in the Ohio Country, spilled over into Europe itself, and ended when Britain conquered Canada, leaving it the sole European power in North American east of the Mississippi River. The Anglo-Cherokee War broke out when Cherokee warriors, dissatisfied with the reimbursement they had received for accompanying a British military expedition during the French and Indian War, stole horses from British colonists on the way back to their villages. The colonists attacked, the warriors retaliated, and the conflict escalated until British soldiers razed two thirds of the Cherokee villages over the course of three separate expeditions from 1759 to 1761. Pontiac’s War began in 1763, when a loose confederation of Great Lakes and Ohio Valley tribes, alarmed by rapid British encroachment onto their lands, undertook to drive colonists out of their territory by attacking British forts and settlements. British expeditions into the region in 1764 brought the
Natives to the negotiating table. The British had not been driven out, but they agreed in the final peace treaty that ended the war not to settle west of the Appalachian Mountains.13

Within the context of these three wars, British officers and Native warriors demonstrated their differing conceptions of captivity and the uses of captives. Chapter 1 explains the differences between British and Native conceptions of captivity and the roles that captives played in those respective societies. Chapter 2 describes how the British and Natives attempted to use captives in order to facilitate peacemaking. These attempts were sometimes successful, but at other times the two sides’ differing ideas of captivity hampered them and instead escalated conflict. Chapter 3 examines how, in conjunction with other tools of coercion, the British use of captives to signify their dominance over their Native adversaries forced some tribes to acknowledge, albeit reluctantly and superficially, that the British were now the dominant European power in eastern North America. This thesis demonstrates that, by understanding the different meanings and functions of captivity in the Anglo-Indian conflicts of the mid-eighteenth century, it is possible to at least partially explain those wars’ frequent escalation and to determine when the balance of power on the Middle Ground began to shift in favor of the British.

13 Anderson, Crucible of War, xvii-xviii, 457-471, 617-632. This provision, of course, proved impossible to successfully enforce.
Chapter 1

“You Are Waging War Very Differently from Us”: Conceptions of Captivity in North America and Europe

In August of 1762, Britain was winning the Seven Years’ War. Two years earlier, a British army had taken Canada from France and, now, another was about to take Cuba from Spain. After a three-month siege of the capital city of Havana, troops under the command of General George Keppel, 3rd Earl of Albemarle, had taken the Moro and the Punta – the two large forts that overlooked the city and guarded its harbor. Though his men were in position to turn the forts’ guns on Havana and bombard it into submission, Albemarle did not take this course of action. Instead, he negotiated generous terms for the city’s surrender with its Spanish governor, Don Juan de Prado. The first article of these terms stated:

in consideration of the gallant defence of the Moro fort and the Havanna, [the defeated Spanish garrison] shall march out of the Punta-gate, with two pieces of cannon, and six rounds for each gun, and the same number for each soldier, drums beating, colours flying, and all the honours of war.

In addition to this recognition of their bravery, the men of the Spanish garrison were allowed to keep their personal belongings and, as long as they did not fight the British, move freely in and out of the city until a British ship arrived to take them back to Spain.14 In short, although they had been defeated, Havana’s Spanish defenders retained both their honor and their lives.

One year later, a British officer who had been captured by Ottawa warriors in the Great Lakes region of North America faced a very different fate. The warriors, part of an intertribal

---

14 Thomas Mante, *The history of the late war in North-America, and the islands of the West-Indies, including the campaigns of MDCCCLXIII and MDCCCLXIV against His Majesty’s Indian enemies* (London: W. Strahan and T. Caddell in The Strand, 1772), Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 445-449.
alliance that was besieging the British outpost of Fort Detroit, seized Captain Donald Campbell when he left the fort to parlay with them. They kept him locked in a nearby house until British troops sallied from the fort and killed a Chippewa warrior. In order to avenge his death, other Chippewa warriors resolved to kill a British soldier. Since Campbell was the closest target of that nature to hand, they dispatched him. After he was dead, another British officer who had been captured by the Natives, John Rutherfurd, reported that “he was scalped and his ears, nose, an arm, a leg and other parts of his body cut off. It was a very shocking spectacle to me.”

These incidents illustrate that British soldiers and Native American warriors treated prisoners of war in markedly different ways. To the British, releasing captured enemies to their home country after the close of local hostilities (even if that country and Britain were still at war) was normal. Likewise, killing a male prisoner of war and mutilating his body was normal for many Natives. The two sides imagined the idea of captivity in radically different ways, with the result that captives were treated according to different rules and performed different functions in their captors’ societies.

“Shocking Barbarity” and Wholehearted Adoption: Captivity in North America

Warfare played a key social role in most Native American societies on the Middle Ground, for which captives were necessary. War was an essential rite of passage as boys grew into men, and skillful performance in battle was a prerequisite for military leadership positions in

---

most tribes.\textsuperscript{16} James Smith, a Pennsylvanian officer who spent four years as a captive of the Caughnawaga Mohawk, noted in his narrative that “No one can arrive at any place of honor, among them [the Natives], but by merit... some exploit in war, must be performed, before anyone can be advanced in the military line.”\textsuperscript{17} If a warrior wanted to advance in his group’s esteem or military hierarchy, he had to provide tangible proof of his “merit,” either by taking home scalps or, preferably, live captives. Warriors preferred to take captives over scalps for several reasons. Taking a captive and transporting him or her back to a warrior’s home village was more dangerous and difficult than simply killing someone and taking their scalp, so warriors may have believed captive-taking constituted better proof of their courage. More importantly, captives were essential to Native cultural life, societies, and economies.\textsuperscript{18}

The treatment of captives varied widely. Since captives were used to prove the bravery of individual warriors, each person taken was initially his or her captor’s private property. For instance, when he described his capture, John Rutherfurd, a Scottish officer taken by the Chippewa in 1763, recalled that “every one of us was seized by our future master, for by their custom whoever first seizes a captive by his hair, to him he belongs, and none may take him from him.”\textsuperscript{19} Once they reached their destination, they turned their captives over to the community. Now, their fate depended on factors other than their captors’ whims. Many Native societies were matrilineal, so clan matrons or other female authority figures decided what would


\textsuperscript{17} James Smith, \textit{An account of the remarkable occurrences in the life and travels of Col. James Smith, during his captivity with the Indians, in the years 1755, '56, '57, '58, and '59. With an appendix of illustrative notes by Wm. M. Darlington} (Cincinnati: R. Clarke, 1907), 141.

\textsuperscript{18} Snyder, \textit{Slavery in Indian Country}, 86, 91, 97; Richter, “War and Culture,” 534-535.

\textsuperscript{19} Rutherfurd, Journal, 226.
happen to the captives based on their age, sex, and what they had been doing when they were captured. Depending on these factors, Native communities used their captives for a variety of ritual, demographic, and economic functions.

A few days after his capture in July 1755, Smith witnessed a Native war party using other captives for an important cultural function. The Caughnawaga Mohawk band that had taken him had, on July 9, joined other Native tribes and their French-Canadian allies in an attack on a British column of 1,400 men on its way to take Fort Duquesne, a French outpost situated at the confluence of the Ohio and Monongahela rivers. The ensuing battle was an overwhelming Native/French victory, and the warriors returned with many prisoners in tow. Decades later, Smith recalled what happened next:

I beheld a small party coming in with about a dozen prisoners, stripped naked, with their hands tied behind their backs, and their faces, and part of their bodies blacked — these prisoners they burned to death... I beheld them begin to burn one of these men, they had him tied to a stake and kept touching him with fire-brands, red-hot irons, etc., and he screaming in a most doleful manner, — the Indians in the mean time yelling like infernal spirits.

Scenes like this, though horrifying to Smith, were not uncommon on North America’s eastern seaboard, the Great Lakes region, or the Ohio Valley during the colonial era. Native

---


21 Smith, An account of the remarkable occurrences in the life and travels of Col. James Smith, 12.
communities used adult male prisoners (usually enemy warriors or soldiers) who had been taken fighting to ritually exorcise their collective grief and anger over their own casualties. After a battle, an entire Native village – men, women, and children – participated in a ceremony during which they slowly and inventively put those captives to an excruciating death.\(^{22}\) Some Native tribes also believed that torturing a captive warrior or soldier was necessary to release the soul of a relative who had perished in battle into the afterlife.\(^{23}\)

Sometimes, the bodies of tortured prisoners of war filled a social role for their Native captors. Warriors believed that, just as skill in battle increased their prestige, taking a courageous prisoner increased their bravery and chances of success in future battles. If a prisoner killed in a grief-exorcising ceremony demonstrated personal courage in facing his death, the warriors of some tribes ate his heart, limbs, or other parts of his body. They hoped thereby to absorb some of their enemy’s bravery.\(^{24}\) Rutherfurd witnessed such an instance of ritual cannibalism shortly after he was taken prisoner. Though describing it as a “shocking piece of barbarity,” Rutherfurd acknowledged that there was a reason behind it, explaining that it was “not for want of food, but as a religious ceremony, or rather from a superstitious idea that it makes them prosperous in war.”\(^{25}\)

Native communities believed that enemy warriors or soldiers who had been captured in battle were acceptable targets for both of the tremendously violent practices described above. Any captive was, in Native eyes, someone who existed outside of the tribe’s kinship system. The complexities of Native kinship are beyond this thesis’s scope, but the most important social unit


\(^{23}\) Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 96.

\(^{24}\) Lee, *Barbarians and Brothers*, 155; Richter, “War and Culture,” 534.

\(^{25}\) Rutherfurd, Journal, 229.
for many of the tribes studied here was the clan. A clan was a group of real and fictive relatives who were believed to share a common mythical ancestor, usually an animal or element. Membership in a clan was a fundamental component of a person’s identity; it conferred specific social positions, rights, obligations, and even names on its members. If someone was not affiliated with a clan, Natives believed that he or she did not have an identity and was not a full human being. Therefore, captured soldiers or warriors, who had no kin ties in their captors’ villages, could be tortured to death and eaten in order to satisfy their captors’ cultural imperatives.26

This was true of, for example, the Cherokee. For them, to be captured in battle was to fail as a warrior. Writing from the British outpost of Fort Loudoun (then under a Cherokee siege) in 1760, South Carolinian officer John Stuart stated in a letter that “the Indians know no Difference between a prisoner and a Slave, to which they prefer Death. It is impossible to give them an Idea of any Confinement that is not Ignominous.”27 Whether he knew it or not, Stuart’s word choice is significant. According to Theda Perdue, the Cherokee word for “slave” translates closely to “man without a clan.”28 Therefore, a “slave” was someone who did not have a fixed identity. As was the case in other Native societies, Cherokee men had to earn their identity as warriors. Once they achieved it, barring any costly battlefield errors or “ignominious” conduct on their part, it was theirs for life. In his memoir of his time as a British diplomatic envoy among the Cherokee, Virginian officer Henry Timberlake wrote that “Old warriors likewise, or war-women, who can no longer to war, but have distinguished themselves in their younger days, have

26 Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 5-7, 37.
27 John Stuart to James Grant, May 2, 1760, in JGP, box 33.
the title of Beloved.” If a warrior was captured, however, he became, according to Stuart, “a Slave.” In other words, he lost his hard-earned identity; he failed as a warrior. Since, as Stuart wrote, the Cherokee believed that death was preferable to this, men who had been captured in battle were acceptable targets for communal grief exorcism ceremonies.

Unlike adult men who had been taken while fighting, most prisoners were not killed by their Native captors, but rather used for a variety of social and economic purposes. As James Axtell notes, Native warriors tended to capture far more women, children, and young men than men of military age. This pattern as well as the roles these captives played varied from tribe to tribe. Natives living in Canada and New England, close to thinly populated French settlements that perpetually needed labor, tended to take captives for economic purposes. They captured men as well as women and children, whom they either sold to the French or returned to their relatives in exchange for ransom. Warriors from the Ohio Valley, Great Lakes region, and Southeast, more distant from the main French settlements, tended to keep their captives. They used some of these captives as slaves (though these people’s status was usually more complicated, as we shall discuss below) and adopted others into their families.

Due to a host of factors – the need to satisfy blood revenge, intertribal competition for territory and European trading partners, and competition with Europeans for land, to name just a few – deadly violence was nearly endemic to the mid-eighteenth century Eastern Seaboard.

Coupled with the devastating demographic effects of diseases introduced by European colonists,
it created a need for tribes to replenish their populations. Adopting captives was the means by which many sought to fill this need.31

Native warriors and their families took pains to assimilate their adopted captives fully into their societies. The day after he took John Rutherfurd captive, Chippewa warrior Peewash informed him that he “was never to think of going back to the English and so ought to conform to the custom of the Indians.” Shortly thereafter, Peewash’s family gave Rutherfurd a breechclout and trade blanket to wear, shaved his head, and painted his face so that he (at least somewhat) physically resembled a Native rather than a European. Peewash’s father told Rutherfurd that his physical transformation was meant to make him “a savage as soon as possible.”32 A modern reader might expect Rutherfurd’s different race to be a stumbling block for his metamorphosis into a Chippewa but, according to Christina Snyder, “those who practiced cultural forms, no matter what their original state, could be groomed into kin.”33 Therefore, Rutherfurd’s race did not factor into his transmutation, but wearing clothing, a hairstyle, and face paint that fit Chippewa norms did.

Natives adopted prisoners to replace specific family members, and the adoptees were expected to fill the deceased person’s exact role in the community.34 Early in his captivity, James Smith spent a day helping a group of Caughnawaga Mohawk women hoe corn in a field near their village. When he returned to the village in the evening and the men found out what he had done, they reprimanded him, “and said that I was adopted in the place of a great man, and must

32 Rutherfurd, Journal, 233
33 Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 102-104.
34 Richter, “War and Culture,” 530-531; Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 103.
not hoe corn like a squaw.” In Native society, agricultural labor was solely women’s work and was considered beneath a man’s dignity. Smith had been adopted by a man named Tontileaugo to replace his brother, who had been a highly esteemed warrior, or, in other words, a “great man.” Throughout Smith’s captivity, Tontileaugo constantly reminded his adopted brother that he ought to act like his predecessor. For example, when Smith told Tontileaugo that he had offered venison to a Wyandot who happened to pass by their hunting camp, Tontileaugo asked Smith if he had given the Wyandot some sugar and bear oil with which to season the venison. When Smith replied that he had not, Tontileaugo chided him for not behaving “like a warrior” and told him that, in the future, he must be more generous or, in other words, “do great things.”

Of course, the process by which captives were adopted and assimilated into Native society varied from tribe to tribe. It is from these variations that confusion over whether a given captive was a slave arises. As noted above, the Cherokee word for “slave” referred to someone without a fixed identity. Captives awaiting adoption into a particular family fell into this category. People awaiting adoption, who were no longer Europeans but not yet Natives, were used for menial labor in some other tribes. For example, before he became a fully-fledged member of Peewash’s family, John Rutherfurd passed through a limbic stage, in which his identity changed over one month from a European to a Chippewa. During this time, Rutherfurd referred to Peewash as his “Master” and described himself as a “slave.” Though he was dressed and had his hair cut like a Chippewa man, his name was Saganash, which meant “Englishman.” He performed women’s work, such as working in the fields, hauling firewood, and building hunting shelters under the direction of Peewash’s wife. At night, his hands were tied to a post in

---

35 Smith, *An account of the remarkable occurrences in the life and travels of Col. James Smith*, 43-44.
Peewash’s house to prevent him from escaping. At the end of the month, Peewash took his entire family as well as Rutherfurdf to his son’s grave. There, they shared a ceremonial meal, after which Peewash “told me [Rutherfurdf] I was as much their son as if I had sucked these breasts (showing me those of his wife), telling me at the same time to look upon the boys as my brothers.” To denote his change in status, Rutherfurdf also received a new name, Addick, which meant “white elk.”

Unlike Rutherfurdf, some captives were enslaved for the duration of their time living in Native territory. These people were never adopted into a Native family. Since they lacked kin ties, they could be bought, sold, and owned. Slaves performed manual labor, such as farming and fetching firewood and water. Native masters frequently gave their male slaves (even temporary ones like Rutherfurdf) these traditionally female tasks in order to symbolically emasculate them. Some male slaves, however, performed the traditionally masculine roles of hunting for their masters and even helping them in war. For example, many members of Fort Loudoun’s garrison were enslaved by their Cherokee captors after the fort fell. The Cherokee immediately began planning to take Fort Prince George, and, according to another report in the _South Carolina Gazette_, “they are now coming in a body, with the great guns, to attack [Fort Prince George]…and that their white slaves are to manage the cannon” that the Cherokee had taken from Fort Loudoun.

Depending on their age, sex, and occupation, captives played many roles in Native society. Adult men who had been captured fighting were the means through which Native communities purged their grief in wartime and, sometimes, a source of courage for warriors. In

---

38 Snyder, _Slavery in Indian Country_, 128-133.
39 _South Carolina Gazette_, September 20, 1760, 46.
the Northeast, Natives profited from the sale of captured men, women, and children to the French or their ransom to the British. Variations aside, across the Middle Ground, captives were frequently adopted into Native families in order to replace losses from war and disease.

“When An Enemy is Conquered, A Great Soul Forgets All Resentment”: Captivity in Europe

Unlike their contemporaries who had been captured by Native war parties, prisoners taken by European armies in interstate conflicts could, by the eighteenth century, have some reasonable certainty about their future. Europeans did not consider prisoners of war to be the property of their individual captors. Rather, they became the responsibility of the state whose army had captured them. When a British army took Havana in 1762, therefore, the provision that “ships…will be provided at the expence of his Britannic Majesty, to transport the [captured Spanish] garrison to the nearest part of Old Spain” appeared in the agreement that finalized the city’s surrender.\(^{40}\) Since prisoners of war were the responsibility of states, internationally accepted laws of war governed their treatment. In keeping with the Enlightenment quest to subject human behavior as well as the natural world to reason, *philosophes* wrote books laying out and expounding upon these laws. Swiss legal theorist Emer de Vattel’s 1758 book *The Law of Nations* discussed the legal treatment of prisoners of war at length.

European armies did not generally kill prisoners of war because, according to the eighteenth-century definition of victory and the tenets of international law, they had no reason or right to do so. (There were, of course, exceptions to this rule, which we will discuss below).

\(^{40}\) Mante, *The history of the late war in North-America*, 449.
According to Vattel, “The lawful end gives a true right only to those means which are necessary for obtaining such end.” In other words, officers and soldiers could only do what was necessary to secure victory. To European armies, “victory” meant taking and holding whatever piece of land two belligerents were fighting over, whether it was a battlefield, a fort, or an entire city. Once an army had compelled its opponent to retreat from the field, or captured the fort, or taken possession of the city, the battle was won and local hostilities ceased. There was no need to kill enemy soldiers who had surrendered to achieve any of these goals. Therefore, “As soon as your enemy had laid down his arms and surrendered his person, you have no farther right over his life.” Vattel elaborated further on this point, writing that it was not only unjust to take a soldier’s life after he had surrendered, but also inhumane.

There were, however, three scenarios in which the laws of war permitted European soldiers to kill their prisoners. First, an officer could order the mass killing of prisoners if necessity demanded it. For example, if it looked like the prisoners were about to escape or turn on their captors, or if an attacking army was about to liberate them, they could be put to death. According to Vattel, “necessity excuses severity, or rather causes it to be overlooked.” Second, if the defenders of a fort or city refused their attackers’ calls to surrender and forced them to take their objective by storm (which tended to be hugely costly), the attackers could kill everyone inside. Therefore, when he issued his call for the Spanish governor of Havana to surrender to his army in 1762, British General Lord Albemarle took care to point out that his troops had shown exceptional restraint during the siege. They took the Moro (the main fort that defended Havana

---

and its harbor) by storm, but did not kill all of its defenders. Albemarle correctly wrote that “the custom of war would have authorised and justified their putting to the sword the garrison.”

Finally, as Vattel wrote,

> When the war is with a savage nation, which observes no rules, and never gives quarter, it may be chastised in the persons of any seized or taken, they are among the guilty, that by this rigour they may be brought to conform to the laws of humanity.

In other words, people who did not follow international – or, more accurately, European – law in warfare could be killed when captured. This happened multiple times in British Lieutenant Colonel James Grant’s 1761 expedition against the Cherokee. As his mixed force of British regulars and Catawba warriors torched each Cherokee village they came upon, he noted several instances when the Catawbas killed “two poor old women” or “a poor old man” in his campaign journal. Though Grant’s tone conveys clear regret about the killings, he made no note of trying to stop them.

Normally, however, European armies did not deliberately target women, old men, or children for death or capture. According to Vattel, women, children, and other noncombatants were to be considered as enemies. Nevertheless, “these are enemies who make no resistance, and consequently give us no right to…use any violence against them.” In other words, since women and children posed no threat to soldiers, the latter were not justified in treating them as if they did. Indeed, during the siege of Havana, Albemarle even tried to avoid taking women prisoner. In his letter enjoining the governor of Havana to surrender, he wrote “Should your

—

45 Mante, *The history of the late war in North-America*, 441-442, 445.
Excellency want passports or escorts for the ladies who are at present in the town, I shall most readily send them to you."

Rather than take them into custody as he would enemy soldiers, Albemarle offered to permit female residents of Havana to leave the city.

A European officer could do credit to his reputation by showing such generosity to people his troops captured. According to Vattel,

> When an enemy is conquered, and submits, a great soul forgets all resentment, and is entirely filled with compassion for him... We extol, we love the English and French at hearing the accounts of the treatment given to prisoners of war on both sides, among those generous nations.

His laudatory language suggests that treating prisoners of war “generously” was worthy of admiration and emulation. Albemarle probably acted with this idea in mind when he offered to let the women of Havana leave the city. He wrote to Havana’s governor that he made the offer because he was “very desirous to shew you, upon all occasions, how truly I am, Your Excellency’s &c. &c. &c. Albemarle.” That he chose to sign off in this way is significant. He connected his offer with his title – in other words, his identity. By doing this, Albemarle intentionally attempted to portray himself as someone to whose character generosity was integral.

Just as an officer could boost his reputation by treating captives generously, he could also win laurels by becoming a captive himself after a sufficiently spirited period of resistance to his adversary. This happened to British Colonel William Blakeney in 1756, when a French army under Field Marshal Armand de Richelieu compelled him to surrender the Mediterranean island

---

50 Mante, *The history of the late war in North-America*, 445.
52 Mante, *The history of the late war in North-America*, 445.
of Minorca. Richelieu had besieged Blakeney’s outpost, Fort St. Philip, for one month and, in late June, had unleashed a massive assault on it. Heavy French artillery bombardments had badly damaged the fort’s walls and destroyed many of its cannon. The British garrison, about half of what was needed to defend a post of Fort St. Philip’s size, could not repair it and repel the second French assault they knew was coming. Therefore, Blakeney surrendered. Richelieu evidently believed that the British garrison had put up a dogged enough fight, for he gave them generous terms. He allowed them to depart for Britain immediately and gave them the full honors of war: the tangible symbols of a stubborn resistance. Officers could keep their sidearms, enlisted men could keep their muskets, and their units retained their flags. Even though he had been defeated, the British public and even King George II feted Blakeney as a hero upon his arrival in Britain. Poems were written about him, the popular press featured stories about his life, and the King promoted him to the rank of Brigadier General and even ennobled him.  

Conclusions

It is clear that Native warriors and British soldiers approached the Middle Ground with vastly different conceptions of the idea of captivity and beliefs regarding the acceptable parameters of behavior toward captured adversaries. For Natives, captives filled many important cultural, economic, and social roles. Therefore, their treatment varied widely. Nevertheless, patterns emerged based on the captives’ ages, sexes, and occupations. Adult men who had been captured fighting were usually tortured to death in elaborate ceremonies intended to purge a

---

village’s grief over their own losses in battle. These captives were acceptable targets for this ceremony because, to Natives, to be captured in battle was to fail as a warrior. Indeed, some groups believed that death was preferable to captivity. Most captives, however, were not tortured to death. Native warriors took far more women, children, and young men captive than they did men of military age. These people were used for labor and often adopted into Native families.

European armies, by contrast, did not treat their captives in so many different ways. Since captives were the responsibility of the state whose army had captured them, internationally accepted laws of war regulated their treatment. Under these laws, captured soldiers could not be put to death, unless they somehow threatened their captors, they had forced their captors to take an objective by storm, or they were members of a “savage race” who did not follow European laws of war. Unlike in Native societies, women, children, and other noncombatants were not targets for killing or capture. Whereas Native warriors viewed captivity as ignominious, European soldiers could burnish their reputations by treating their captives well or even by becoming captives themselves after doggedly resisting their attackers.
Chapter 2

“The Reputation of Faith Is Sacred Between Enemies”: Captivity and Peacemaking

William Bull II, of Charleston County, South Carolina, was that colony’s lieutenant governor and therefore held the highest political office to which a colonial-born Carolinian could aspire.\(^{54}\) While Bull was sensible of the honor, there were undoubtedly days when he privately lamented its timing. One such day must have occurred in mid-May of 1760, when he sat down with his secretary to formulate his response to the latest development in the war with the Cherokee, one that had the potential to dramatically increase the conflict’s scope, destructiveness, and violence.\(^{55}\)

In April, two headmen from the Cherokee Lower Towns, Tistoe and the Wolf, had gone to Fort Prince George and informed its commanding officer, Ensign Alexander Miln, that they were willing to negotiate peace terms. As proof of their veracity and a gesture of their goodwill, the two Cherokee offered to surrender one of the white captives currently in the Lower Towns. However, when Tistoe and the Wolf reappeared at Fort Prince George one month later and without the promised captive, Miln concluded that he had been tricked. Tistoe and the Wolf attempted to assure him that his suspicions were unfounded; the intra-tribal negotiations necessary for the release of a captive simply took time. However, Miln remained certain that they were lying. Consequently, he told a lie of his own.\(^{56}\)

On May 8, Miln invited Tistoe, the Wolf, and six other warriors to have dinner with him. While he waited for them inside a tent pitched just outside the fort’s gates, Miln ordered his

\(^{54}\)“The Bull Family of South Carolina,” *The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan., 1900), 76-90.

\(^{55}\)William Bull to James Grant, [May 1760], in JGP, box 33.

\(^{56}\)Oliphant, *Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier*, 118.
garrison to stand to arms. After the warriors arrived and entered the tent, Miln gave a signal and his men rushed in and seized them. The warriors were bound and hurried inside the fort. Shortly afterward, Miln released the Wolf to take a message to the Lower Towns: unless the promised white captive appeared, Miln would execute his remaining seven Cherokee prisoners.57

Miln, in short, had created a hostage crisis. Responding in mid-May to Major James Grant, the British officer who had brought the matter to his attention, Lieutenant Governor Bull tried to take a diplomatic tone. He wrote that Miln’s action was “very excusable when one considers he is a young inexperienced Officer.” However, he still clearly condemned it. Paraphrasing Hugo Grotius’ *On the Law of War and Peace*, Bull wrote that “faith is the surest Bond of Human things.”58 He elaborated further, stating that “The reputation of faith is sacred between Enemies. Faith and Justice are to be strictly observed in War, and are to be kept even against Interest.” Since Miln had broken the truce under which he had invited the eight Cherokee warriors to dinner (in other words, he had made a breach of faith), his act was “in strictness … unwarrantable.”59 Bull’s condemnation of Miln’s action probably did not stem solely from legal or moral qualms. The Anglo-Cherokee War, which had been going on in one form or another since 1758, had entered its most destructive phase in October 1759 thanks to a similar hostage crisis (which will be discussed below).

From the hostage crisis at Fort Prince George in 1760, it is clear that the British and the Cherokee both used captives to influence their opponents’ behavior. British officials such as Miln saw Indian captives as mechanisms for control. Miln attempted to influence his Cherokee

57 Oliphant, *Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier*, 118-120.
59 William Bull to James Grant, May 1760, in JGP, box 33.
opponents’ behavior by threatening to kill hostages if they did not fulfill his demands.\textsuperscript{60} Cherokee leaders, too, used captives to try to induce their opponents to act a certain way. However, they tended to do so less coercively than the British. Cherokee leaders often attempted to use captives as tools of communication rather than control. Like Tistoe and the Wolf, many Cherokee leaders prefaced their peace overtures with offers to surrender European or Euro-American captives to whichever British officer they were negotiating with. In this way, they attempted to signal the veracity of their intentions.\textsuperscript{61}

The use of some physical object to manifest a peace agreement – whether it was a calumet, a wampum belt, or a piece of paper bearing the signatures of the parties to the agreement – was part of a tradition of symbolic diplomatic exchanges that had been present in both Native American and European societies for centuries before the Anglo-Indian wars of the 1750s and 1760s.\textsuperscript{62} Both cultures included captives in these transactions. The ways in which they used captives to facilitate the peace process, however, differed widely. Sometimes, British armies and Native warriors successfully adopted each other’s methods of peacemaking. However, the differences in their conceptions of captivity and uses of captives as peacemaking tools were often great enough to escalate conflict rather than bring peace.

\textsuperscript{60} Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War}, 464-465; Oliphant, \textit{Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier}, 118-120. 
\textsuperscript{61}Oliphant, \textit{Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier}, 118.
“I Will Grant You Peace Upon the Following Terms”: Prisoners and Peacemaking in Europe

The end of the Thirty Years’ War marked a watershed in European military and diplomatic history. Starting with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, treaties routinely ended European wars and the mutual exchange of captives became an integral part of the peacemaking process. Indeed, treaties ending a whole war or agreements ending local hostilities (such as, for example the siege of a particular fort) between European powers customarily included clauses mandating the repatriation without ransom of all prisoners taken by all combatants.63 For example, the agreement that ended the British siege of Havana in 1762 stipulated “That all the prisoners made on both sides…shall be returned reciprocally, and without any ransom.” European laws of war required such provisions; according to Vattel, prisoners’ “liberty must, if possible, make an article in the treaty of peace.”64

Without a mutual exchange of captives, conflicts between European powers could not end. Again according to Vattel, “the enemy who should have released the prisoners when the war is at an end…continues the state of war by detaining them in captivity.”65 In other words, if one of the former belligerents continued to hold captives after hostilities had nominally ceased, they would prolong the war.

European powers used hostages to ensure that neither party to a peace agreement prolonged hostilities by ignoring some or all of the agreement’s stipulations. For example, in their draft of the agreement that, with British edits, ended the siege of Havana, the city’s Spanish

64 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 56.
authorities requested that “hostages [be] given on each side” to ensure that both they and the
British followed the treaty. The British agreed to this, but first requested that the Spanish turn
over any British prisoners they had taken during the siege.66

This reluctance on the part of the British to hand some of their officers to the Spanish
unless the latter made the first move indicates that, even when they dealt with another European
power, the British did not automatically trust their erstwhile adversaries. This inherent distrust
was even more pronounced when the British and Native American tribes attempted to reach
peace agreements. Both sides tried to bridge this gap by making their peace overtures mutually
intelligible. They did this by adopting some of each other’s methods of making peace, as will be
discussed below. First, however, a look at how Native Americans typically made peace is
warranted.

“With This String of Wampum, We Wipe the Tears from Your Eyes”: Peacemaking in
North America

Just as European powers used peace treaties to record and finalize the negotiated end to
conflicts, many Native tribes used calumets and wampum belts to facilitate the peacemaking
process and seal agreements with European as well as Native adversaries.67 On October 7, 1760,
British Major Robert Rogers met with a party of Ottawa Indians. He told them that their French
allies had surrendered to Britain and the fighting in the Great Lakes region was over. Britain and
the Ottawa were consequently no longer enemies. In his journal, Rogers wrote “that Evening we

66 Mante, *The history of the late war in North-America*, 457.
67 Though wampum was ubiquitous on the Middle Ground, calumets were not widely used east of the Appalachian
Smoked the Culumet or Pipe of Peace, all the Officers and Indians Smoking by Turns out of the same Pipe, the Peace thus Concluded.” Rogers’ word choice in this passage is significant. By writing that “the Peace [was] thus Concluded,” he manifested the belief that the act of passing the calumet around had ended hostilities between his men and the Ottawa.

According to William Smith, a contemporary chronicler of British Colonel Henry Bouquet’s military and diplomatic relations with the Ohio Valley tribes in 1764, some Native Americans routinely passed around a calumet before peace talks began. He wrote that the gesture was “agreeable to their custom.” It was a sign of goodwill and a manifestation of erstwhile enemies’ willingness to lay aside their differences and jointly negotiate an end to a conflict.

Though in some cases, like Rogers’ October 1760 meeting with the Ottawa, smoking a calumet could constitute a peace agreement, typically the ritual tended to be merely the opening move in longer negotiations. These were sustained and, in the end, sealed by strings and belts of wampum—a tradition more widely shared than the calumet. Wampum performed many important diplomatic functions; it served as an expression of condolence for casualties of war, a promise that an orator was speaking the truth, and it “symbolically sealed” promises. A series of meetings in 1764 between British Colonel John Bradstreet and representatives of six Great Lakes tribes to begin negotiating an end to Pontiac’s War in that region illustrates some of the uses of wampum quite well. The Chippewa chief Wasson’s first act at this meeting was to

---

68 Robert Rogers, Major Rogers’s Journal to Detroit, in Correspondence and Papers of Sir Jeffery Amherst 1717-1797 in the Kent Archives Office (Brighton, Sussex, England: Harvester Microform, 1983), microfilm, Davis Library, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, reel 10, file 49.


present a string of wampum. He explained to Bradstreet that its purpose was “to open your Ears” so that Bradstreet would listen to what he had to say. Wasson next held up another string of wampum and delivered the main part of his speech, expressing his remorse for the past violence between the British and his tribe and expressing his desire for a lasting peace. After he finished speaking, he gave the string of wampum to Bradstreet.\textsuperscript{71} Wasson’s use of wampum at specific times during his speech demonstrates his belief that the wampum played specific roles in moving the negotiations forward. One string could ensure that he had an attentive audience, and another could symbolize his desire for peace.

In addition to wampum and calumets, Natives used captives as an integral part of their peacemaking processes; according to Christina Snyder, “the gifting of captives – of bringing life rather than death – was a powerful overture of peace in a violent world.”\textsuperscript{72} Native headmen often released a few captives to their adversaries (whether Native or European) in order to open peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{73} Tistoe and the Wolf’s offer to surrender one white captive to Miln (discussed at the beginning of this chapter) is an example of this phenomenon. According to a report in the \textit{South Carolina Gazette}, when the news that South Carolina would get a new governor reached the Cherokee one month later, “The OLD KING of Hyawuasse [Hiwassee]…purchased the pregnant Long Canes [white] woman and her four children…from the fellow who claimed them as his slaves…and behaved extremely kind to them, declaring he would keep them to deliver to

\textsuperscript{71} Anonymous, Transactions of a Congress held with the Chiefs of the Ottawaws and Chippewaw Nations with several others, who are hereafter mentioned, in Correspondence and Papers of Sir Jeffery Amherst, reel 9, file 48, item 4.

\textsuperscript{72} Snyder, \textit{Slavery in Indian Country}, 37.

\textsuperscript{73} Lee, \textit{Barbarians and Brothers}, 157; Snyder, \textit{Slavery in Indian Country}, 135-136; All of these transactions were small-scale. In the more or less consensus-based Native societies of the Middle Ground, chiefs, though they had some prerogatives, had no authority to compel a warrior to do anything with his captives. Therefore, they could only make diplomatic transactions using captives that they owned personally. In consequence, the large-scale prisoner exchanges ubiquitous in Europe were hardly ever to be seen on the Middle Ground. See Lee, \textit{Barbarians and Brothers}, 132 and White, \textit{The Middle Ground}, 204.
the Governor.”\textsuperscript{74} In other words, the Old King planned to use the woman from Long Canes and her children to extend an olive branch and begin establishing good diplomatic relations with South Carolina’s new governor. Like the “Long Canes woman,” most of the captives who were used in diplomatic exchanges were slaves.\textsuperscript{75} Since slaves had no kin ties to keep them in Native villages, chiefs and warriors could give them away in diplomatic gestures.

\textbf{Deadly Difference: Misunderstandings and the Escalation of Violence in the Anglo-Cherokee War}

Just as their conceptions of captivity differed (as discussed in Chapter 1), the ways in which British armies and Native tribes used captives to facilitate the peacemaking process were different. The British (and other European powers) sometimes used hostages to ensure that opposing armies released all their prisoners of war without ransom at the end of hostilities. Native military leaders frequently presented a few captives to their erstwhile adversaries as an overture to peace negotiations. Because of these differences, one side’s attempts to use captives to bring about peace were frequently misunderstood by the other, leading to an escalation of violence. The Anglo-Cherokee War is particularly illustrative of this point.

As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, the war had broken out when a group of Cherokee warriors returning home from a British military expedition stole horses from some settlers in Virginia. The Virginians retaliated by attacking the warriors and soon there were “People killed on [both] Sides,” according to Ensign Lachlan McIntosh, a British officer

\textsuperscript{74} South Carolina Gazette, May 17, 1760, 21.
\textsuperscript{75} Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 135-136
stationed at Fort Prince George in the midst of the Cherokee Lower Towns. Cherokee war parties mobilized and, seeking revenge for their dead kin, began raiding British settlements on the frontiers of Virginia and South Carolina. This conflict’s pattern, known as a “blood feud,” was ubiquitous on the mid-eighteenth century Middle Ground. The violent death of any Native – whether in battle, by murder, or simply by accident – obligated his or her kin to exact revenge in kind. If the perpetrator was from another kin group and could not or did not want to surrender, the killing of any member of that group would satisfy the revenge requirement.

South Carolina Governor Henry Lyttleton tried to stop the blood feud before it got too far out of hand. In order to make his pacific intentions clear to the Cherokee, he couched them in a traditional Native diplomatic gesture. In a letter to the headmen and warriors of the Lower and Middle Towns, Lyttleton offered to compensate the Cherokee for their dead by “giv[ing] Presents to the Relations of your People that have been slain, suffecient to hide the Bones of the dead Men and wipe away the Tears from the Eyes of their Friends.” In other words, Lyttleton offered a “blood gift” to the Cherokee. This gesture, in which the offending party (or, as in this case, a mediator) offered a payment in wampum, goods, or captives to a dead person’s kin, was one way in which blood feuds could be ended.

Similarly, in mid-May 1759, the headmen of thirteen of the Middle Towns couched their joint message of peace to Lyttleton in a mixture of Cherokee and British diplomatic symbols. They sent Lyttleton a letter denouncing the raids and affirming their friendship to the British.

---

76 Lachlan McIntosh to Governor Lyttleton, June 5, 1758, in Documents relating to Indian Affairs 1754-1765, ed. William L. McDowell, Jr. (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives & History, 1992), 462.
77 Lee, Barbarians and Brothers, 136-137; Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 80-81.
78 Governor Lyttleton to the Lower and Middle Cherokee Headmen and Warriours, in DRIA, 481.
79 Lee, Barbarians and Brothers, 136-137; Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 80-83; Tooker, “The League of the Iroquois,” 423-424.
that letter, one of the headmen said that “I send those white Beads...as a Token that what we Warriours has specified here shall never in any Shape be acted to the Contrary.”80 The white wampum that he sent with the letter was both a traditional Cherokee symbol of peace and a representation of the headmen’s promise to maintain good relations with the British.81 In case the British still had any doubts about the headmen’s commitment to peace, they finished the above sentence with “we...the Headmen putt our Hands to certify it,” followed by their signatures.82 A signature, of course, was a European symbol of a promise.

From these exchanges, it is clear that the British and the Cherokee understood each other’s diplomatic practices well enough to be able to communicate in mutually intelligible ways. However, the same cannot be said for each side’s understanding of the other’s conception of captivity. When warriors from the Overhill Towns continued to raid into South Carolina and Virginia, Lyttleton summarily imprisoned a Cherokee trade delegation that came to Charleston. He interned the prisoners at Fort Prince George as hostages, promising the Cherokee that no harm would come to the delegation if the warriors ceased their raids.83 According to Emer de Vattel, using hostages to de-escalate a conflict in this manner was acceptable. In The Law of Nations, he wrote that “some person...for whom the sovereign has an affection” could “lawfully be...made [a] prisoner” if “the deliverance of these valuable pledges [the captive] may induce him to equitable conditions of peace.”84 Therefore, by taking hostages to make the Cherokee stop their raids, Lyttleton acted in accordance with European norms of warfare and captivity. However, this tactic backfired dramatically.

80 Thirteen Cherokee Towns to Governor Lyttleton, in DRIA, 494.
82 Thirteen Cherokee Towns to Governor Lyttleton, in DRIA, 494.
83 Anderson, Crucible of War, 464-465.
84 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 52.
Because they did not have the concept of hostages, the Cherokee did not see Lyttelton’s move as de-escalatory. Rather, it incensed them. According to John Stuart, Cherokee warriors believed that any kind of captivity – even if it was temporary – was so dishonorable that “they prefer Death” to it.\(^85\) Therefore, rather than cease their attacks on backcountry settlements, a Cherokee war party from the Overhill Towns – the region that several hostages in Fort Prince George came from – mobilized and traveled to the fort in order to get the hostages back. On February 14, 1760, three headmen from the Overhill Towns (Attakullakulla, Great Warrior, and Little Raven) arrived at Fort Prince George and asked that the hostages be released. The fort’s commander, Lieutenant Richard Coytmore, and its second-in-command, Ensign Alexander Miln, refused. After the headmen left, trader John Calwell warned Coytmore and Miln “that the Overhills Indians had hitherto behaved quietly, but that he was certain they would join with the Rest having been denied their Hostages.”\(^86\) In short, Calwell feared that, rather than stop their raids on the backcountry, Lyttleton’s hostage-taking would prompt the Overhill Cherokee to go to war.

Two days later, events proved Calwell right. Great Warrior lured Coytmore out of Fort Prince George on the pretext of asking for an interpreter to accompany him to Charleston so he could negotiate with Lyttleton for the hostages’ release. After they had talked for a few moments, Great Warrior gave a signal and “off went about 25 or 30 Guns from the Indians that had concealed themselves” nearby. The salvo wounded Coytmore fatally and, since a larger formation of hidden warriors quickly followed it up by firing on the fort itself, terrified the British garrison.\(^87\)

\(^85\) John Stuart to James Grant, May 2, 1760, in JGP, box 33.
\(^86\) Alexander Miln to Governor Lyttleton, February 24, 1760, in DRIA, 498-499.
\(^87\) Alexander Miln to Governor Lyttleton, February 24, 1760, in DRIA, 498-499.
In the events immediately following this ambush, the British again acted in accordance with European norms of captivity, which again enraged the Cherokee and precipitated an escalation of the war. According to Miln, “The Men swore bitterly…that they would kill every Indian in the Fort…for they said they were sure, they would do us more Hurt than those out if we should be engaged.” Given the day’s events, the garrison believed that the fort was under imminent threat of attack from the warriors outside. If that happened, they feared that the hostages inside would somehow assist the attackers. Therefore, they wanted to execute the hostages. 88 Extreme though this may seem, it was sanctioned by eighteenth-century European laws of war. Vattel wrote, “When our safety is incompatible with that of an enemy, tho’ subdued, it is out of all question, but that in cold blood a great number of prisoners should be put to death.” 89 According to his own account, Miln tried to dissuade his men from this course of action, but he eventually did have all 23 of the Cherokee hostages put to death that same day. 90 Predictably, this action enraged the Cherokee. Obligated to exact blood revenge for their dead kin, more war parties from the Overhill Towns and elsewhere rapidly mobilized. 91

The hostage crisis at Fort Prince George precipitated the most destructive phase of the Anglo-Cherokee War. After the hostages’ execution, one Cherokee war party maintained a loose siege of Fort Prince George. Another set off to besiege the more lightly defended and more isolated Fort Loudoun. In response, Major General Jeffrey Amherst, the commander-in-chief of British forces in North America, sent 1,200 British regulars under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Montgomery to relieve Fort Loudoun. Montgomery never made it to there, but along the way, his men razed many of the Cherokee Lower Towns and set their fields of

88 Alexander Miln to Governor Lyttleton, February 24, 1760, in DRIA, 499-500.
90 Alexander Miln to Governor Lyttleton, February 24, 1760, in DRIA, 500.
91 Anderson, Crucible of War, 464-465.
crops on fire. Major James Grant, Montgomery’s second-in-command, wrote a striking account of the destruction of Estatoe that, because it so vividly illustrates the devastation that occurred there, deserves to be quoted at length:

…many of the inhabitants who had endeavoured to conceal themselves, I have reason to believe perished in the flames, some of them I know for certain. In order to continue the blow, and to shew those savages that it was possible to punish their insolence, we proceeded on our march, took all their towns in our way, and every house and town in the Lower Nation shared the same fate with Estatoe.  

This highly destructive form of warfare characterized the rest of Montgomery’s campaign in 1760 and Grant’s campaign in 1761, in which the Middle Towns met the same fate as the Lower Towns. It is obvious that the hostage crisis at Fort Prince George, which had begun as Lyttleton’s attempt to de-escalate a growing conflict, caused that conflict to escalate dramatically. This happened because the Cherokee did not understand or accept certain European norms of captivity.

The British, too, did not possess or fully understand some of their opponents’ norms of captivity, and their reactions to these norms also escalated violence. For example, Grant wrote that, on the same day his and Montgomery’s men destroyed Estatoe, “we intended to save Sugartown as the place nearest [Fort Prince George]…but [when] we found the body of a dead man, whom they had put to the torture that very morning, it was then no longer possible to think of mercy.” Disgusted and angered by the Cherokees’ torture of a white man, the British destroyed Sugartown.

92 Anderson, Crucible of War, 464-465.
93 South Carolina Gazette, June 7, 1760, 24.
94 Anderson, Crucible of War, 464-465.
95 South Carolina Gazette, June 7, 1760, 24.
“Thou Art French as Well as We”: Cultural Adaptation and Prisoner Exchanges in Pontiac’s War

Despite their misunderstandings, British and Native diplomats did successfully adopt some of each other’s methods of peacemaking, as Robert Rogers’s acceptance of a calumet as a manifestation of peace and Wasson’s signature on the treaty that John Bradstreet presented to him at their meeting illustrate. Calumets never made an appearance on the battlefields of Europe and, in the absence of Europeans, Native Americans did not resort to paper treaties as symbols of peace.96

Figure 3: The signatures of Wasson and other Chippewa leaders on their 1764 treaty with John Bradstreet.97

97 Anonymous, Transactions of a Congress held with the Chiefs of the Ottawaws and Chippewaw Nations with several others, who are hereafter mentioned, in Correspondence and Papers of Sir Jeffery Amherst, reel 9, file 48, item 4.
The transfer of people from one hostile group to another was an integral part of the peacemaking process in both cultures. Therefore, British armies and Native tribes attempted to use the release of captives, prisoner exchanges, and hostages to facilitate peace negotiations between them. Just as they did with paper treaties, Native tribes adopted some European methods of using captives to facilitate the peacemaking process.

In 1763, the Pottawatomi wanted to break off the siege of Fort Detroit that they had been conducting together with several other Native tribes from the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley regions. In order to begin negotiating a peace with the fort’s British garrison, the Pottawatomi initiated a prisoner exchange. Over a period of several weeks, they exchanged nineteen British soldiers they had captured for two of their chiefs who were being held by the British. That the Pottawatomi conducted a relatively large-scale exchange rather than the small-scale unilateral surrender of a captive demonstrates that they had adopted a European method of making peace.

Some Native groups went further than adopting European methods of peacemaking. An exchange between Delaware military leader Kinonchamek and Ottawa chief Pontiac implies that the former’s branch of the Delaware may have adopted a European conception of captivity. After a group of Ottawa warriors tortured and ate some British prisoners they had taken during their siege of Fort Detroit in 1763, Kinonchamek condemned their action. He told Pontiac that “it is all right to kill during battle, but afterwards, and when one has taken prisoners, it is no longer of any value.”

---

informing Pontiac that “you are waging war very differently from us.” With this sharply drawn binary of you/us, Kinonchamek disassociated himself and his warriors from the fundamental Native view that prisoners of war could be tortured to death.

The Delaware alliance with France precipitated Kinonchamek’s adoption of a European conception of captivity. In his address to Pontiac, Kinonchamek characterized his tribe as French. When a Native tribe concluded an alliance with any outside group, they cast themselves and their new ally in a fictitious family relationship. Just before the outbreak of Pontiac’s War, Delaware prophet Neolin made this bond between his tribe and the French explicit, essentially calling them the same people. In a speech to Ottawa, Pottawatomi, and Huron warriors on May 7, 1763, Pontiac quoted Neolin as saying “God said… ‘I do not forbid you to allow the Children of your Father [French colonists] among you. I love them. They know me and pray to me, and I give them their needs and everything they bring with them.’” In other words, Neolin had said that the French and the Delaware were brothers. He affirmed that the French worshiped the same deity as the Delaware, and that figure provided for them just like he provided for Natives. Since Neolin’s teachings were widely popular among the Delaware and advocated war with the British, Kinonchamek, a Delaware military leader, would undoubtedly have heard of them. One cannot say with certainty whether or not he accepted them, but his affirmation to Pontiac that

---

100 Navarre, *Journal of Pontiac’s Conspiracy*, 143.
101 The Delaware, who were not supposed to embark on foreign policy independent of the Iroquois, allied themselves with France in order to assert their autonomy. See White, *The Middle Ground*, 245.
102 Pulsipher, “Gaining the Diplomatic Edge,” 21-22; Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 126. In the Delaware alliance with France, the French governor at Quebec was the “father,” which the matrilineal Delaware understood to be a benevolent figure who did not have absolute authority over his Native “children,” but who protected them, provided for them, and mediated their disputes. See Pulsipher, “Gaining the Diplomatic Edge,” 25-26 and especially White, *The Middle Ground*, 190-200.
“you are French as well as we” indicates that he did. Since Kinonchamek believed that his people and the French were the same, he adopted the French (and European) view that prisoners of war were nearly always to be exchanged. He told Pontiac that the French did not “kill those whom they have brought home with them...but they keep them to exchange for their own men who are prisoners among the enemy.” 105

Conclusions

Just as the ways in which they conceptualized captivity differed widely, the ways in which British armies and Native tribes used captives to facilitate peacemaking were very different. Sometimes, these differences were great enough to lead to conflict, as was the case in the Anglo-Cherokee War. At other times, however, both sides were able to successfully adopt each other’s ways of peacemaking, as happened during Pontiac’s War. However, it is important to note that Native military leaders, like Kinonchamek, adopted European ways of using captives to facilitate peace far more readily than British officers adopted Native methods of using prisoners as peacemaking tools. Indeed, throughout the mid-eighteenth century’s Anglo-Indian conflicts, British officials demanded that their Native adversaries conform to European norms of captivity and surrender all of their prisoners of war at the close of hostilities. The next Chapter of this thesis will examine the increasing success of those demands.

Chapter 3
Captives and Conquest (Or Not?)

On October 17, 1764, Colonel Henry Bouquet, whose large British army had recently marched into the Ohio Valley, gave a speech to chiefs and warriors of the Seneca, Delaware, and Shawnee tribes who lived there. Bouquet’s goal was to convince them to go to Fort Niagara in order to negotiate a final peace settlement that would end Pontiac’s War with Sir William Johnson, Britain’s Indian Agent for the Northern tribes. Nevertheless, his tone was bellicose. After claiming that “it is…in our power totally to extirpate you from being a people,” Bouquet demanded that, before the chiefs could negotiate with Johnson, they “deliver into my hands…all the prisoners in your possession, without any exception…whether adopted in your tribes, married, or living amongst you under any denomination and pretence whatsoever.”

Reluctantly, the Natives eventually acquiesced. About one month later, they began bringing their captives into Bouquet’s camp on the Muskingum River. William Smith, a writer and an acquaintance of Bouquet, noted that even those captives who had been adopted and did not want to go back to the British were forced to leave their Native families. For example, “the children who had been carried off young…look[ed] upon the Indians as the only connexions they had,” and “considered their new state in the light of a captivity, and parted from the savages with tears.”

This incident illustrates that, as the mid-eighteenth century’s Anglo-Indian wars dragged on into the early 1760s, British attempts to force the Natives to relinquish their captives became

---

106 Smith, An Historical Account, 14-16.
107 Smith, An Historical Account, 29.
successful. As we shall discuss below, this constituted an ostensible submission to British
dominance on the Middle Ground, tenuous though it certainly was. From 1755 to 1765, British
military and civilian officials used a variety of tools to bring their erstwhile adversaries into the
imperial fold. Force of arms and the attendant destruction of Native settlements and food
supplies were perhaps the most spectacular (they certainly got extensive press coverage), but
unilateral British demands for the return of captives were probably just as shocking and
humiliating to the Natives. In conjunction with other tools of coercion, the British used
captives to signify their dominance over their Native adversaries, forcing the latter to
acknowledge, albeit very reluctantly and superficially, that the British were now the dominant
European power in eastern North America.

“We Expect the Same Punctually on Your Side”: Unilateral Prisoner Transfers and the
Problem of Guilt

Ironically, pacifist Pennsylvania, with the help of the neutral Iroquois, first attempted the
practice of using a unilateral transfer of captives to demonstrate one group’s dominance over
another. In the early and mid-1750s, before Britain and France officially declared war on each
other, Pennsylvania was already at war with the Delaware, a tribe with whom they had
previously lived peacefully and even closely. For instance, Barbara Leininger, a young woman
who was taken captive by the Delaware on October 16, 1755, knew her captors personally. In
launching raids such as the one that captured Leininger, however, the Delaware had embarked on
war without Iroquois consent.

108 Steele, Setting All the Captives Free, 337.
The Delaware were subordinate to the larger Iroquois Confederacy. In the matrilineal society of the two groups, maternal uncles had considerable authority over children. Therefore, in the fictive kin relationship that bound them together, the Iroquois were the “uncles” who could exercise power over their Delaware “nephews.” Within this arrangement, foreign policy became the prerogative of the Iroquois. Therefore, the Delaware were not supposed to go to war without the permission of their northern neighbors. Pennsylvania Governor Robert Hunter Morris and the colony’s Quaker-dominated Assembly, both wanting to stop the raids on their frontiers, saw an opportunity to use this Delaware subversion of Iroquois authority to their advantage. They engaged Iroquois diplomat Kanuksusy to negotiate an end to the conflict with the Delaware on behalf of both Pennsylvania and the Iroquois Confederacy. Kanuksusy was to invite the Delaware to a peace conference with representatives of Pennsylvania if the former consented to cease their raids and turn all their Euro-American captives over to the Iroquois.

Delaware war chief Teedyuscung was receptive to Kanuksusy’s overture, at least in part because Kanuksusy made no mention of surrendering captives. He had dropped the matter because he knew that, if he insisted on it, the peace negotiations would have ended before they even started. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Native Americans chose to keep or surrender captives for various reasons in wartime. When they turned a captive over to the enemy, it was either to physically carry a message to enemy leaders or to signal the earnestness of a desire for peace. People (not just captives) could also change hands as part of a final peace settlement. Many inter-tribal wars began as blood feuds, and virtually all could take that form once they got going. One of the warring parties could end a blood feud by offering to surrender the person

110 White, *The Middle Ground*, 225.
111 Pulsipher, “Gaining the Diplomatic Edge,” 22.
112 Steele, *Setting All the Captives Free*, 268.
113 Steele, *Setting All the Captives Free*, 269.
whose original act of violence started the feud. If that person was unavailable, a captive could take their place as a “blood gift.” Of course, surrendering someone to the enemy in order to stop a blood feud constituted an admission of guilt or criminality on that person or their kin group’s part. According to Ian Steele, a “large-scale, one-sided offer of prisoners” would serve as “an admission of guilt.” When he relayed Morris’s invitation to a peace conference to Teedyuscung, Kanuksusy omitted the part about surrendering prisoners because he knew that the Delaware did not consider themselves the guilty party.

Unpalatable and humiliating as it may have been for a Native group to have to hand someone over to the enemy, compelling them to do just that was a very forceful way that one group could assert its dominance over another. To Natives up and down North America’s Eastern Seaboard, captives were initially the private property of their captors and symbols of their prowess in battle. Eventually, captives could even become part of their captors’ families. By making a group unilaterally give up all of its captives, an enemy would therefore steal warriors’ property, undermine their martial reputations, and break up their families in a single stroke. Since the unilateral surrender of captives was also an admission of guilt, such a demand would cast blame for a war onto an entire tribe. If one group was able to force another to submit to such humiliation, it would be a powerful way of signaling their dominance over their erstwhile adversaries.

The Pennsylvanians were unable to assert authority over the Delaware in this way because they did not possess sufficient power to force the Delaware to unilaterally surrender captives. On July 9, 1755, a war party made up of a few hundred Native Americans and French-

---

115 Steele, *Setting All the Captives Free*, 269.
Canadian militiamen defeated a force of 1,400 British soldiers (the largest number of regular troops deployed on colonial soil to date) in a sensationally bloody two-hour battle near the French outpost of Fort Duquesne on the Ohio River. Appropriately dubbed Braddock’s Defeat after the hapless British general who was killed during it, that engagement was the first major battle of the (still undeclared) Seven Years’ War in North America. It left such a powerful impression on British authorities that no force of redcoats set foot on the frontiers of Pennsylvania, Maryland, or Virginia for the next three years. In consequence, Pennsylvanian officials did not have the military power necessary to compel the Delaware to surrender all of their white captives. Pennsylvania’s Iroquois neighbors, interested in maintaining their own power by playing the warring British and French off against each other, and not yet sure who would win the emerging conflict, were not willing to throw their military weight behind the Pennsylvanians.

When Teedyuscung accepted Kanuksusy’s invitation to a peace conference with Pennsylvania authorities, Governor Morris went ahead with preparations for the meeting. However, he wrote to Sir William Johnson, Britain’s Superintendent of Northern Indian Affairs, that Kanuksusy should “have insisted” on the Delaware unilaterally surrendering their white captives.

---

117 Anderson, Crucible of War, 86-107.
119 Though the Scotch-Irish settlers of Pennsylvania’s western regions were more than willing to form militias and fight Native raiders, the formation of regular Provincial regiments had always been a fraught issue because the Assembly was dominated by pacifist Quakers. See Steele, Setting All the Captives Free, 267.
120 The complexities of Iroquois alliance politics are beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, it is sufficient to note that some Iroquois who lived in their original territory (an area roughly encompassing modern New York), notably the Mohawk, fought in colonial conflicts as British allies. Iroquois who lived at and near Jesuit missions on the St. Lawrence River, however, fought as French allies. The two groups almost never fought each other, and both carefully calibrated their involvement in wars between the British and French to prevent either empire from becoming too powerful in North America. See Richter, “War and Culture,” 553-557 and especially Jon Parmenter, “After the Mourning Wars: The Iroquois as Allies in Colonial North American Campaigns, 1676-1760,” The William and Mary Quarterly 64, no. 1 (2007): 39-76.
captives to the Iroquois “as a Preliminary” to any peace negotiations. Morris reiterated his insistence that all prisoners be surrendered when he and Teedyuscung met at Easton in July 1756. Teedyuscung ignored that point but, over the next few months, surrendered four captives. When he and Morris met again in October, he surrendered one more. All of these people belonged to Teedyuscung personally. Therefore, he could give them to whomever he wished. However, since the Delaware viewed captives as the sole property of their captors, Teedyuscung had no authority to round up all the white captives living among his people and present them to the Iroquois or Morris.

In the summer of 1757, Teedyuscung met with Lieutenant Governor William Denny at Easton. Like Morris before him, Denny insisted that, unless Teedyuscung surrendered all the white captives in his nation, the peace that Teedyuscung had negotiated with him and Morris was not official. Outraged, Teedyuscung refused the wampum belt that Denny had proffered. The conference broke up without anything being concluded. Indeed, Pennsylvania did not conclude a formal peace treaty with the Delaware until 1762, by which time the outbreak of Pontiac’s War was rapidly approaching.

The inconclusive results of the three conferences at Easton between the summers of 1756 and 1757 are illustrative of the balance of power between the British and Native tribes on the Middle Ground during the French and Indian War. Neither side had enough military or political clout to compel the other to comply with its wishes. Though they insisted that Teedyuscung surrender all white captives in Delaware possession, Morris and Denny did not have military

121 Steele, Setting All the Captives Free, 269-271.
122 Steele, Setting All the Captives Free, 271-272.
123 Anderson, Crucible of War, 165; White, The Middle Ground, 250.
124 White, The Middle Ground, X-XI.
force at their disposal with which they could coerce him to do so. Though a prominent war chief, Teedyuscung had no authority over other Delaware warriors that could force them to surrender their captives. However, this lack of power would cease to be an obstacle for both sides as the mid-eighteenth century’s Anglo-Indian conflicts went on. As the French withdrew from the Middle Ground and unprecedented numbers of British troops moved in to take their place, British attempts to force the Natives to comply with some (though certainly not all) of their demands became increasingly successful. By examining the changing fates of captives in the Anglo-Cherokee War and Pontiac’s War, it is possible to trace how and when this shift occurred.

“I Have Told the Indians I Am Going to Destroy Their Country, Which I Hope Will Forward the Peace”: Force and Its Limits in the Anglo-Cherokee War

After an almost uninterrupted string of military defeats at the hands of the French from 1755 to 1757, British Secretary of State for the Southern Department William Pitt decided to commit unprecedented numbers of regular troops to North America. He aimed to strike France’s empire at its weakest point, overwhelm its defenders with sheer numbers, and thereby oust France from the continent and gain new colonies for Britain.¹²⁵

As British regulars poured into North America and Provincial regiments became more numerous and well-organized (galvanized by Pitt’s generous subsidies), British generals and colonial governors finally felt they now had enough men to forcibly make British dominion of the continent – including its frontiers – a reality. More importantly, in the years after Braddock’s Defeat, British regulars had learned to effectively fight Native warriors. Units and tactics

intended specifically for this purpose were instituted in the British forces in North America. One oft-cited example was Colonel Thomas Gage’s 80th Regiment of Light-Armed Foot, a unit raised in 1758 whose members were trained to fight from cover, aim carefully, and fire individually rather than on the word of command. Foot soldiers in ordinary regiments also received training in combatting Native warriors. For example, the command “Tree all,” an order for everyone to take cover behind a tree, was invented to deal with ambushes in the forest. In addition, rifles were issued to the best marksmen in some regiments, indicating that battalion soldiers now aimed their shots at individual targets rather than fired en masse like they would have on European battlefields.\footnote{Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War}, 243, 411. The details of the British military’s adaptations to campaigning in North America are beyond the scope of this thesis, but for an in-depth treatment, see Brumwell, \textit{Redcoats}.}

These adaptations, of course, were not totally successful. Even after the initial defeats of 1755-1757, British regulars were not always capable of meeting and defeating Native warriors in the forest.\footnote{White, \textit{The Middle Ground}, 290.} For example, in 1758, Major James Grant (who would later come to prominence during the Anglo-Cherokee War) attempted to teach the men under his command “the art of bush fighting.” Despite this training, a force of French soldiers and Native warriors was able to intercept Grant’s September 11-12 night raid on Fort Duquesne and bloodily repulse it.\footnote{Brumwell, \textit{Redcoats}, 218.} Furthermore, British armies marching through the wilderness in search of a battle were not always able to find their enemies. When Grant invaded Cherokee territory in 1761, he and his men found themselves marching into one empty town after another. Except for a few women, children, and old men who could not flee, the Cherokee had abandoned the Lower and Middle Towns to Grant and retreated across the Appalachian Mountains.\footnote{James Grant, Journal, in JGP, box 33.}
Since victory in battle could not be relied upon to bring the Natives to heel, the British tried an alternative application of military force. Though rarely seen on contemporary battlefields in Western Europe, laying waste to an enemy’s country was (despite Enlightenment military theorists’ emphasis on restraint) an acceptable way to encourage surrender. Unable to defeat the Cherokee decisively in battle, Montgomery and Grant opted to scorch the earth. Both General Amherst and Lieutenant Governor Bull approved this strategy. As Bull put it in a letter to Grant on July 17, 1761, “Altho the Indians would not give you an opportunity of chastising their persons more, the severe military Execution on their Towns & Plantations, I hope will humble them, with the dread of famine.” A few weeks later on August 1, Amherst wrote to Grant expressing his hope that “the Burning of Fifteen Towns, & Destroying above 1400 Acres of Corn” would “reduce and Chastise” the Cherokee so that they would “Sue for Peace.”

The entries for three consecutive days in Grant’s 1761 campaign journal contain startlingly laconic descriptions of these tactics. Grant’s entry for June 15 reads, “Halted and sent Partys to burn the houses & destroy every thing in the Country.” On the next day, he wrote, “We marched to Upanah in the Evening where the Country shared the same Fate as in every other Place.” On June 17, Grant wrote, “Moved to Cowhishhe destroyed every thing about that place.” Grant’s monotonous descriptions, of course, do not give an idea of the human suffering his expedition must have caused. In a span of less than two months (May 18 to July 9, 1761), Grant’s force destroyed all fifteen of the Cherokee Middle Towns. Their four thousand inhabitants were now homeless. When these were added to the inhabitants of the Lower Towns who had fled before Montgomery’s advance one year earlier, as many as three out of every five

---

130 Lee, Barbarians and Brothers, 191.
131 William Bull to James Grant, July 17, 1761, in JGP, box 33.
132 Jeffery Amherst to James Grant, August 1, 1761, in JGP, box 33.
133 James Grant, Journal, in JGP, box 33.
Cherokees were refugees in the Overhill Towns. The local food supply could not feed all of these people, especially since Montgomery and Grant had destroyed the Lower and Middle Towns’ harvests.\footnote{Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War}, 466-467.}

Despite the destruction that Montgomery and Grant had wrought in the Middle and Lower Towns, the Cherokee were more apprehensive of Colonel William Byrd’s advance on the Overhill Towns in the summer of 1761. Byrd commanded the Virginia Regiment and, according to a report in the \textit{South Carolina Gazette}, “the Indians…are afraid of no other troops than Virginians, who they say know how to shoot and fight them in their own way.”\footnote{South Carolina Gazette, October 25, 1760, 55.} Facing famine, disease, and an enemy that they were not confident of being able to defeat, the Cherokee decided to seek peace. In August, a Cherokee delegation met with Colonel Adam Stephen (who commanded Byrd’s regiment after the latter had abruptly returned to Virginia) at Fort Robinson on the Holston River.\footnote{Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War}, 467.}

On November 19, they signed the Treaty of Long-Island-on-the-Holston which, together with the Treaty of Charleston signed shortly thereafter, ended the Anglo-Cherokee War.\footnote{King, introduction, xxiv.} The Cherokee agreed to return the white prisoners in their possession to British officials. However, the Cherokee did not have to give up all the people that Bull and Grant had demanded earlier.\footnote{Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War}, 467.} The tribe did not have to surrender “One or two Cherokee Offenders from each of their four settlements… to be put to Death”—a demand that British officials had been making in one version or another since 1759.\footnote{List of peace terms “taken from a Letter of the Lieut. Governor’s,” April 14, 1761, in JGP, box 33.}
Furthermore, this gesture was not unilateral. Immediately after signing the treaty at Long Island, Cherokee war chief Standing Turkey asked for one of Stephen’s officers to accompany him back to the Overhill Towns. He claimed that the officer’s presence would help convince his people of Britons’ good intentions toward them and signal the veracity of their desire for peace. However, he also wanted to take a Virginian officer to the Overhill Towns for another reason that he did not share with Stephen. By sending one of their officers to the Cherokee, the Virginians and, by extension, the British, would unwittingly shoulder the blame for the late war.\(^{140}\) As discussed above, the transfer of a person from one group to another as part of a final peace settlement was, according to Native custom, an admission of guilt on the first group’s part.\(^{141}\) Eager for an opportunity to distinguish himself on the frontier, Lieutenant Henry Timberlake volunteered to go with Standing Turkey, unknowingly sealing the peace deal.\(^{142}\)

In contrast to Morris and Denny’s inability to coerce the Delaware into surrendering all of their white captives, Montgomery, Grant, and Byrd together had enough military force to violently shift the balance of power on the Southeastern part of the Middle Ground in their own favor and make the Cherokee give up their captives. The British exertion of military force in the scorched-earth campaigns of 1760 and 1761 put a strain on Cherokee food resources with which the Natives were unable to cope. This, combined with Virginia’s threat of more force, compelled the Cherokee to, as Amherst put it, “sue for peace.” Nevertheless, this was not enough to subordinate the Cherokee to the British. The prescribed surrender of captives under the Treaty of Long-Island-on-the-Holston was not unilateral. The Cherokee did not, as Bull and Grant had previously desired, have to surrender any of their own people for execution and thereby shoulder

---

\(^{140}\) King, introduction, xxiv-xxv.

\(^{141}\) Steele, Setting All the Captives Free, 269.

\(^{142}\) King, introduction, xxiv-xxv.
the blame for the late war. Rather, thanks to Standing Turkey’s cagey negotiations with Stephen, a British officer was surrendered to the Cherokee which, in Native eyes, constituted British acceptance of the responsibility for the conflict. Since this exchange was bilateral and involved, as the Cherokee saw it, the British apologizing to them, it did not constitute Cherokee subordination to the British.  

“By What Methods These Faithless Savages Are to Be Best Reduced to Reason”: Force and Diplomacy in Colonel Henry Bouquet’s Muskingum Expedition

By the autumn of 1763, Pontiac’s War seemed stalemated. The Natives had taken eight small British forts in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region, but their main objectives, Forts Pitt, Detroit, and Niagara, continued to hold out. A British relief force bound for Fort Pitt had managed to fight its way out of a Native ambush, but its commander, Colonel Henry Bouquet, still feared that any advance too far away from the protection of the forts would meet with disaster. By 1764, however, this situation changed. Pontiac’s frustrated allies began abandoning their sieges of the remaining British forts. Meanwhile, Bouquet led a large military expedition into the Ohio Valley that brought the Natives to the negotiating table at his camp on the Muskingum River. Nearly bloodless, this expedition is emblematic of the shift in the reality and Natives’ perception of British military capability that tipped the balance of power on the Middle Ground in favor of Britain.

143 King, introduction, xxiv-xxv.
144 White, The Middle Ground, 288-289.
145 Anderson, Crucible of War, 625.
By the time Pontiac’s War broke out in May 1763, Bouquet, a Swiss-born officer in the British Army, was widely regarded as one of the best European practitioners of frontier warfare in North America. His reputation was bound up in that of his unit, the 60th Regiment of Foot (more commonly known as the Royal Americans, though most of its members were from the German states), which he trained for the “service of the woods.” The regiment proved its mettle at the Battle of Bushy Run on August 5-6, 1763. A 900-man column under Bouquet was marching to the relief of the besieged Fort Pitt when Delaware, Huron, Mingo, and Shawnee warriors ambushed and quickly surrounded it. Bouquet’s men improvised defensive field fortifications using bags of flour and managed to hold their position for two grueling days. Finally, Bouquet laid an ambush of his own. He had part of his line begin what looked like the maneuvers for a retreat. Believing they had beat their enemy, the Natives rushed forward and were met by two bayonet charges. They retreated, leaving the British to continue their march to Fort Pitt. One year later in 1764, Bouquet commanded another expedition into the Ohio Valley. His reputation, which Bushy Run had cemented, and the number of men in his force – some 1,150 – were, according to Ian Steele, enough to force the Ohio Valley tribes to comply with Bouquet’s demand that all white captives in their possession be unilaterally surrendered to him.

The tightness of Bouquet’s march column was perhaps of greater importance in compelling the Natives to acquiesce. Scouting parties of Virginians always went out ahead of Bouquet’s column, followed by British light infantry, which was trained to fight in the woods. The legendary 42nd Regiment of Foot (the Black Watch) and the Royal Americans came next.

---

147 Smith, *An Historical Account*, iv-xii.
148 Steele, "Surrendering Rites,” 156.
Behind them were the vulnerable supply wagons and pack animals, shielded on the right by more men from the Black Watch and Royal Americans and on the left by provincials from Pennsylvania. Behind them came the elite grenadiers. Light horsemen and Virginian militia brought up the rear, and the column’s flanks were protected by Pennsylvanian militia. This entire arrangement formed a rectangle with the most vulnerable elements of the column in its middle, the strongest units protecting them, and the men best able to fight Native warriors screening its front and flanks. Native warriors would have been hard-pressed to surprise this arrangement and, even if they succeeded, its deep ranks and large numbers would have made it very difficult to breach.
Figure 4: An illustration of Bouquet’s march column in William Smith, *An Historical Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians, in the Year MDCLXIV, under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Esq. Colonel of Foot, and Now Brigadier General in America* (Dublin, 1769).
On its march, the column came across grisly warnings left by Native warriors against proceeding further. For example, on October 6, the men marched by a skull mounted on a pole. That same day, scouts found the tracks of fifteen Natives near Bouquet’s campsite. Three days later, the column found “several trees painted by the Indians… denoting the number of wars in which they have been engag’d, and the particulars of their success in prisoners and scalps” – a clear attempt to intimidate. Despite these bellicose warnings, the Native warriors watching Bouquet’s column could not stop its progress.149

Faced with such large numbers of British troops that their warriors could not stop, leaders of the Ohio Valley tribes, including the Shawnee, reluctantly met with Bouquet to negotiate the unilateral surrender of their captives. Before he gave them leave to negotiate an official end to the war with Sir William Johnson, Bouquet demanded that the Shawnee surrender all of their Euro-American captives to him. The Shawnee, of course, knew that to do so would constitute an admission of guilt for the war and would subordinate them to the British. In his first speech to Bouquet, therefore, Shawnee warrior Red Hawk insisted on calling Bouquet “Brother” instead of “Father,” implying an equal relationship rather than one which recognized the British as the dominant European power on the Middle Ground.150 He also told Bouquet that the Shawnee could not surrender all of their captives at once because some of them were a great distance away with hunting parties. Nevertheless, the Shawnee were desirous of making peace with the British.151

149 Smith, An Historical Account, 8-10.
150 As previously noted, the Shawnee were matrilineal and fathers did not have absolute authority over their children. In this case, “father” was the term by which the Shawnee referred to the governor of New France. Red Hawk’s reluctance to transfer it to the British illustrates the Shawnees’ unwillingness to enter into the same relationship with Britain that they had with France. See Callender, "Shawnee," 628; Pulsipher, “Gaining the Diplomatic Edge,” 25-26; White, The Middle Ground, 190-200.
151 Smith, An Historical Account, 16, 24.
Bouquet, however, refused to shake hands with the Shawnee representatives in a gesture of peace until they surrendered all of their captives. In his reply to Red Hawk, he insisted that the Shawnee “were subjects to the king of England” and demanded six Shawnee hostages to ensure that the captives were brought to him by the spring. The Shawnee found themselves faced with this or the destruction of their towns. The absence of their French allies compounded this situation. After France ceded all its lands east of the Mississippi River to Britain in the Treaty of Paris in 1763, there was no rival empire on the Middle Ground to keep the British in check. There was now no European army in the Ohio Valley that could stop an advancing British force, and the British did not need to treat the Natives as equals out of fear that they would ally with France if the British acted otherwise. 152 Because they had no other options, Shawnee representatives made another speech to Bouquet several weeks later, calling him “Father” instead of “Brother.” Satisfied that the Shawnee recognized Britain’s dominance and would keep their promise to surrender white captives, Bouquet finally shook hands with the Shawnee chiefs.153

To call Bouquet’s 1764 dealings with representatives of the Shawnee and other Ohio Valley tribes a “negotiation” would be something of a misnomer. On the part of the British, very little negotiation took place. Instead, Bouquet delivered an ultimatum: either the Natives could unilaterally surrender all of their white captives to him, or he would destroy their towns. Because he had such a large and capable force at his disposal and they had no French counterweight, the Natives had no real choice in the matter. Thus, by 1765, all white captives among the Ohio Valley tribes, even those who had been fully assimilated into Native society as adoptees, were returned to the British.154
Richard White argues that the peace settlements that ended Pontiac’s War, including the Natives’ unilateral return of all white captives, represented a return to the status quo ante bellum on the Middle Ground.\(^{155}\) For the British, who did not believe a conflict was over until the status quo ante had been partially achieved by the repatriation of all prisoners held by both sides, this was certainly true. For the Natives, however, it was not. To them, taking captives rather than giving them back to their opponents represented a return to the status quo ante. When a member of a Native community was killed, his or her family lost a relative and the community as a whole lost that person’s labor and spiritual power. By adopting a captive in place of the dead person, the community recouped that loss. For Northern Iroquoian tribes, the adoption of a captive even “requickened” a dead person; in other words, it transferred that person’s unique “social role and spiritual power” to the captive.\(^{156}\) Even tribes who did not believe that adoption ceremonies requickened the dead expected adopted captives to take on a deceased family member’s position and duties in the community.\(^{157}\) When they had to surrender their adopted captives to the British, therefore, the Ohio Valley Tribes lost the community members, labor, and spiritual power that they had previously recouped during the French and Indian War and Pontiac’s War. For them, this did not constitute a return to the status quo ante bellum.

**Conclusions**

Demanding the unilateral surrender of white captives was a devastating way in which British army officers and colonial governors sought to subordinate Native tribes to Britain. It threw the blame for wars onto the Natives, deprived warriors of tangible proof of their martial prowess, and broke up mixed-race families. In the 1750s, the combined efforts of Pennsylvanian

\(^{155}\) White, *The Middle Ground*, 305.

\(^{156}\) Richter, “War and Culture,” 530-531.

\(^{157}\) Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 103.
and Iroquois officials to make the Delaware surrender their captives were unsuccessful. The Pennsylvanians did not possess sufficient military power to force the Delaware to acquiesce to their demand. By the 1760s, the collapse of the French and the arrival of British regulars in North America in large numbers, now with better training to challenge Native warriors on their own ground, changed the power dynamics. Through scorched-earth tactics, Montgomery and Grant forced the Cherokee to sue for peace in 1761. However, the Cherokee were not completely cowed, as evidenced by Standing Turkey’s successful bid to get the British to (albeit unwittingly) take the blame for the war. In 1764, however, threats of destruction from Bouquet’s large and (at least ostensibly) unassailable army, left Ohio Valley leaders with no other option than to accept peace on British terms. This required the unilateral surrender of all of their white captives. Therefore, by the end of Pontiac’s War, British forces had succeeded in forcing some tribes, however reluctantly and superficially, to subordinate themselves to the British—a subordination exemplified by the changing fate of captives.
Conclusion

The period between 1754 and 1765 saw devastating conflict and the beginnings of permanent change in the Middle Ground—both in the physical sense of the operation of British power in the trans-Appalachian world, but also in the metaphorical space of cultural adaptation. Increasingly the Anglo-Colonial population felt less compelled to observe or respect Native American ways of life and ways of war. British officers and Native warriors had approached the French and Indian War, the Anglo-Cherokee War, and Pontiac’s War with very different conceptions of captivity. As these conflicts wore on, both sides began to understand each other’s ideas surrounding captivity and attempted to use captives to facilitate the peace process in ways that their opponents would understand. Sometimes, these efforts succeeded. However, this learning process was almost never complete, as the repeated British hostage-taking and its disastrous consequences in the Anglo-Cherokee War illustrates. By 1764, the shift in Natives’ perception and the reality of British military power forced the Natives, albeit with great reluctance, to at least ostensibly eschew their traditional conceptions of captivity for the European model of prisoner exchanges. By tracing the changing meanings of captivity and treatment of captives through the Anglo-Indian wars of the mid-eighteenth century, it is possible to see why those conflicts tended to escalate so dramatically and to determine when the balance of power on the Middle Ground began to shift in favor of the British.

During the French and Indian War, Pennsylvania did not have enough troops to force the Delaware to release all of their captives in accordance with European norms. After the Anglo-Cherokee War, the Cherokee had to surrender some captives to the British. However, though Montgomery and Grant’s expeditions had destroyed two-thirds of their villages, the Cherokee did not subordinate themselves completely to the British. By sending Henry Timberlake to the
Overhill Towns, the British inadvertently salvaged Cherokee honor by making the exchange of people after the war bilateral. However, once there were enough British bayonets in the Ohio Valley, Henry Bouquet could force his Native adversaries to surrender all of their captives to him and thereby submit at least outwardly to British hegemony, tenuous though it certainly was.

The best illustration of this state of affairs is perhaps an engraving depicting Bouquet’s negotiations with the Ohio Valley tribes in 1764. The image appeared in the 1766 London edition of William Smith’s *An Historical Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians in the Year 1764, under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Esq.* Smith, a Scottish-born Anglican minister working in Philadelphia, was an ardent supporter of Anglo-Colonial expansion into the Ohio Valley and war against the Natives who lived there. He knew Bouquet personally, and wrote *An Historical Account* to glorify his hero and trumpet Bouquet’s achievement as a praiseworthy example of bloodless conquest. Another of Smith’s acquaintances, the renowned Pennsylvania-born British history painter Benjamin West, illustrated the book with two sketches. One of these, widely reproduced as an engraving, depicts Seneca chief Kiyashuta delivering a speech and proffering wampum to Bouquet. Though rendered by one of Britain’s most famous artists for a book that was written as a triumphal celebration of an “imperial moment,” this engraving is a surprisingly accurate portrayal of the Middle Ground after the Anglo-Indian wars of the mid-eighteenth century.

---

159 Steele, *Setting All the Captives Free*, 342-347.
Judging from the composition of this image and the body language of the figures in it, Kiyashuta and his warriors appear to have the upper hand. Kiyashuta’s pose is active and assertive; he strides forward and reaches out into the space around him with both hands. By

Figure 5: Engraving by Charles Grignion after Benjamin West’s “The Indians giving a Talk to Colonel Bouquet in a Conference at a Council Fire, near his Camp on the Banks of Muskingum in North America, in Oct. '1764” in William Smith, An Historical Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians in the Year 1764, under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Esq. (London, 1766). Image from Wikimedia Commons.
contrast, the Briton standing nearest to him appears passive and submissive; the position of his feet would not allow him to move easily and his arm is clasped protectively to his chest. The strong diagonal lines of Kiyashuta’s arm and the faces of the warriors seated behind him, evoking drama and dynamism, are only weakly reflected in the bent arm of the man standing near to him. Whereas the Seneca warriors crowd their side of the space and lean forward towards the viewer, the British delegation huddles around a small table.

In addition, the image’s foreground is undoubtedly a Native space. The structure that the figures occupy – boards laid over a frame of poles – is suggestive of the type of dwelling standard in Native communities from the St. Lawrence River to the Ohio Valley to the Great Lakes.161 A calumet and a wampum belt, Native implements of peacemaking, are highly visible. By contrast, the viewer has to look for the pen and paper that suggest European treaties.

All of these details seem to indicate that the Natives have the upper hand in the negotiations West depicted. However, closer inspection shows that the balance of power in the Middle Ground is beginning to shift toward the British. The Seneca warriors, wearing trade blankets and with their hair in scalp locks, are dressed to impress their British counterparts. The members of the British delegation, wearing a mixture of military and civilian clothing, are dressed for the same purpose. In contrast to Native warriors and even other European officers, who tended to put on considerable amounts of finery in preparation for battle, British officers tended to dress casually whenever possible.162 This was ostentatious; by wearing clothing other than their uniforms, officers, who came mainly from Britain’s upper classes, demonstrated that they had financial means and social status independent of the military. Both sides in this image

are jockeying for the upper hand in the Middle Ground and trying to impress their counterparts with their style of dress as one way to achieve that end.

While the Natives appear more threatening, a small but significant detail in the image’s background suggests that the balance of power in the Middle Ground is or soon will tip in favor of the British. Partially obscured by the Seneca warriors on the right of the image and the trees on the left, rows of tents – a British military encampment – stretch into the distance. Contemporary regulations stipulated that each of these tents held 5-6 soldiers. The implied presence of all these men in the background of Bouquet and Kiyashuta’s negotiations is an ominous suggestion of British military power and the threat it posed to the status quo in the Middle Ground.

---

163 Brumwell, Redcoats, 120.
Bibliography

Primary Sources


Secondary Sources


Pulsipher, Jenny Hale. “Gaining the Diplomatic Edge: Kinship, Trade, Ritual, and Religion in Amerindian Alliances in Early North America.” In Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural


