Perceived Threat, In-group Insularity, and Anti-Immigrant Policy Support

James Ronald Smerbeck

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Approved by:
Donald Searing
Andrew Reynolds
Liesbet Hooghe
Abstract

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There has recently been a sharp increase in support for anti-immigrant policies in Europe. This paper tests whether this increase can be explained by an in-group insularity (rooted in Social Identity Theory) felt by traditional natives toward immigrants, or whether it acts in tandem with perceived economic and demographic threat (rooted in Realistic Group Conflict Theory). I ran a cross-sectional OLS model that incorporated both in-group insularity and perceived threat across 14 European countries individually, and then a cross-national analysis controlling for state-level factors. The results demonstrated that in-group insularity is more powerful in explaining support for anti-immigrant policies than perceived threat.
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Introduction

Immigration is one of the most divisive and controversial issues facing Europe today. While there has been immigration from outside the continent since the 1960s, the types of immigrants have recently changed from skilled workers alleviating labor shortages in many countries to immigrants either seeking asylum or entering Europe illegally. As the nature of immigration has changed, public opposition toward immigration has increased. In the 1960s many Europeans believed that too many immigrants were entering Europe. But by the late 1990s and early 2000s, these concerns over immigration were leading to support for anti-immigrant parties and policies. It is this shift in public opinion, at least in part, that has resulted in many governments—even those without anti-immigrant parties in coalition—advocating restrictions on immigration and on job opportunities for immigrants in efforts to please their constituents. To understand the politics surrounding immigration, it is important to determine the motivations behind the increasing demands of traditional nationals for restrictions on immigration. In this paper, I will examine two potential underlying causes: insularity of traditional nationals and perceived economic and demographic threat.

The in-group insularity explanation is explained by social identity theory, a theory based on the premise that people label themselves and others to achieve a sense of belonging and unity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This was a successful strategy for

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1 I define traditional nationals as residents of a country whose family’s residency predates World War II. This is the most accurate term, as some second and third-generation immigrants—many of whom are citizens—are still victims of discrimination and are not treated as equals in their country.
generating strong in-group identities among traditional nationals, but made conditions ripe for viewing groups from a different country, religious tradition or way of life as interlopers. When the immigrants of the 1960s and 1970s settled, they were treated with suspicion and hostility, despite their economic necessity as guest workers (Gurr and Huff 1994). A potential reason for this cold reception is that these immigrants simply did not fit in with traditional nationals’ conceptions of their nation-states, despite the de-legitimization of nationalism in post-war Europe (Joppke 1998).

But by itself, this in-group insularity and lack of openness toward immigrants is not likely to drive traditional nationals to strongly support anti-immigrant policies or parties, according to Anthony Marx (2003), who suggests that such social psychological mechanisms drawn from social identity theory are more likely to be necessary but not sufficient causes for collective action and nationalist mobilization (Marx 2003).² For example, in 1966, eighty-one percent of Germans already believed that there were too many foreigners entering the country, despite the labor shortage (Gurr and Huff 1994). However, German citizens did not elect a party that supported anti-immigrant policies until 1983 (Conradt 2001).³ Is there another explanatory factor that would combine with traditional nationals’ insularity to push public opinion toward anti-immigrant policies? Some observe suggest that German policy changed in response not only to increased immigration but also to poor economic conditions in the early 1980s.⁴ This result

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² Marx’s work was based on social identity theory, which is designed to be applicable across time periods.

³ The center-right Christian Democratic Union/Free Democratic Party coalition offered to refund the pensions of guest workers if they agreed to return to their country (Gurr and Huff 1994).

⁴ This change in policy reflected German public opinion; a majority of respondents believed guest workers needed to leave the country when jobs were tight (Hoskin 1985).
presents the possibility that perceived economic and demographic threats may be the additional causal factors I am seeking for my general theory.

This economic and demographic threat explanation is suggested by realistic group conflict theory. The theory states that group conflict is likely when opposing groups share finite resources, and one group perceives the other as threatening to obtain a disproportionate share of those resources (Sherif and Sherif 1969). In contemporary Europe, the finite resources are jobs and welfare provisions. During periods of economic stagnation and high unemployment, anxious traditional nationals may come to believe that immigrants are taking away “their” jobs. In Austria, for example, the government rapidly privatized many state-owned industries during the 1990s (Bock-Schappelwein 2005). This caused both a sharp spike in unemployment and apparently rising resentment toward foreigners. The far-right, anti-immigrant Freedom Party received an astonishing 27 percent of the vote in the 1999 elections and entered into coalition (Luther 2001). At the same time, due to their generally lower economic status, immigrants may become vulnerable to anxiety-driven accusations that they receive a disproportionate share of welfare benefits. This charge is also realistic because a higher percentage of immigrants qualify for means-tested welfare provisions than do traditional nationals, due to immigrants generally being of lower socioeconomic status.

While there are many articles devoted to testing social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory by themselves (Hogg et al 1995, Hogg 2001, Sherif 1966, Sherif and Sherif 1969, Bobo and Hutchings 1996) and testing the two against each other (Bobo 1983, Insko et al 1992), there has been little research in political science examining their
potential complementarities and seeking to integrate the two theories.\textsuperscript{5} The aforementioned success of the Freedom Party and the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands makes it important to study the issue currently. This is what I do in this paper. Using the European Values Survey (EVS), I investigate the strength of insularity among traditional nationals. And I also investigate whether this insularity, lack of openness to foreigners, and subsequent negative bias, when combined with perceived economic and demographic threat, increases support for immigration restrictions.

It is also important to test whether the experience of Germany—where it apparently took poor economic conditions to bring to power parties advocating anti-immigrant policies—is indicative of other countries. I will test my basic hypothesis across fourteen European countries. The countries chosen and reasons for being chosen will be discussed in the next section.

Although there has been growing support for both anti-immigrant parties and policies over the last 10 years, I have chosen to focus my investigation on support for policies as the dependent variable rather than parties. There are many issues a voter considers when deciding to support a party in an election, while support for policies is a reflection of what traditional nationals would want their government to do on immigration, regardless of which party is in power. For my purposes, this gives opinions on policies greater internal validity. Thus, the dependent variable will be an ordinal measure of a respondent’s support for immigration restrictions.

The next section will present the relevant literature on social identity theory, and I will interpret it in light of the legacies of European liberalism, specifically the ideal of

\textsuperscript{5} Insko et al (1992) demonstrated how the two theories can explain different parts of the same problem, but the theories were not examined as complementary. It was also in the field of social psychology.
tolerance—a hallmark of western political thought since John Locke—and reactions toward immigrants. This will provide a contemporary social psychological context to the insularity felt by traditional nationals about their countries and why they view immigrants as threatening their conception of the nation-state. I will then turn to a description of the data, including which countries were chosen and why, how the composite dependent variable was constructed, and how each of the key predictors are hypothesized to affect the dependent variable. Finally, I will present and discuss the OLS regression analyses and conclude with a brief discussion on where scholars should concentrate future research.

**Theory**

*Social Psychological Bases and Application to Contemporary Europe*

Although first presented in social psychology, the three main stages of creating intergroup discrimination are applicable to the insularity felt by many traditional nationals about the nation-state and why this insularity may result in negative bias and a lack of openness toward immigrants. Categorization, the first stage, happened when rulers of states classified certain people and groups as members of the nation—a collective in-group—and other groups as not being members (Marx 2003). The state, using the rule of law, attempted to embed in-groups and out-groups within the country’s legal framework, with their hope in doing so that the in-group would support the state and help the state consolidate its own power (Appiah 2005). An example of this was the relative ease with which ethnic Germans were able to obtain citizenship in West Germany, while strict citizenship regulations remained in place for non-Germans (Hoskin 1985).
Identification, the second stage, is the process by which individuals categorize themselves as part of an in-group and identify against an out-group. This is done because in-group members (traditional nationals) have a desire to see themselves in a positive light, which in turn produces negative bias against an out-group (immigrants), because traditional nationals view themselves as better (Brown 2000). For instance, many traditional nationals view the better jobs available as being reserved for them, because they view themselves as being true members of the nation-state, while immigrants should primarily be doing lower-status jobs, because they are not viewed as equal members (Hoskin 1985). Identification also increases the insularity and subsequent out-group bias of traditional nationals, because they are less likely to perceive a common fate with immigrants and are thus less willing to form with them a new, larger in-group. This increases insularity of traditional nationals and maintains lack of openness toward immigrants. (Brown 2000).

The third stage is comparison, where members of the in-group stigmatized the out-groups, forcing them to the margins of society or physically out of the country. There has been evidence that respondents who have stronger in-group identification will more readily display prejudice and hostility toward out-group members than those who possess weaker identifications (Brown 2000). The justification was that these groups were not a part of the true nation, so they should not be accorded the same rights and privileges. The race riots that occurred in the Paris suburbs in late 2005 were an example of the societal marginalization felt by non-traditional nationals (Ossman and Terrio 2006).
The recent influx of immigrants onto the European continent is very problematic from a social and psychological perspective. In contemporary Europe, otherwise-unpopular governments can use nationalist sentiments and portrayals of immigrants as not belonging in the country to maintain a stronghold on power during elections. In turn, these expressed sentiments can increase insularity and lack of openness towards out-groups. The two areas in which the effect is strongest are culture and “race.”

Many of the immigrants to Europe are from the Middle East and North Africa (Peach and Glebe 1995, Garson and Loizillon 2003). These immigrants are stigmatized for their Islamic faith and culture. Many Europeans are suspicious of the practices that Muslim immigrants have brought to the European continent, and traditional nationals are reluctant to allow them to continue these practices while living in Europe. Traditional nationals, especially those in the left and center politically, want immigrants to adopt the secular, post-materialist culture that is now pervasive in Europe (Inglehart and Abramson 1994). The most famous example is the headscarf controversy in France, in which French authorities sought to prohibit the wearing of religious symbols in public schools (Judge 2004).

The second area of stigmatization—race—may carry a unique power in Europe. Race is a powerful stigmatizing factor because it is the difference between groups that is most readily apparent (Oakes et al 1994). The belief in the unique stigmatizing power of race has, however, not been universally accepted. Research in Italy found that prejudice toward non-white immigrants was deeply ingrained, as Central Africans, who are mainly black, were more likely to be perceived as inferior by nature. However, there was a

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6 Although prominent far-right politicians such as Jean Marie Le Pen in France and Joerg Haider in Austria appeal to materialist sentiments in efforts to win support.
higher level of overall prejudice and negative feelings toward Central and Eastern Europeans (Sniderman et al 2002).

This stigmatization and push for anti-immigrant policies blocks the growth of a culture of tolerance toward immigrants. The liberal ideal of tolerance suggests that different values and ways of life should at least be endured and at best, be met with open-mindedness and respect (Walzer 1997, Searing et al 2005). However, it is not clear how well the ideal of open-mindedness and respect works in Europe’s traditional nation-states, most of which have only begun to see themselves as multicultural immigrant societies, if they have at all. Brewer (1999) argues that societies that have fewer cross-cutting divisions may be more prone to out-group antagonism. This is a potential explanation for the insularity and reluctance of many Europeans, especially Western Europeans, to view immigrants as equals—they have been traditionally more homogeneous societies than have countries such as the United States and Canada. Some have proposed that the more modest goal of enduring out-groups while encouraging their conformity to established norms is the most that can realistically be expected. However, the headscarf controversies in France and Germany demonstrates a lack of even endurance that traditional nationals are willing to display toward immigrants.7 This insularity and lack of openness to immigrants threatens the Enlightenment liberalism that these European states are at least partially founded upon.

By itself, however, such insularity displayed by traditional nationals appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for supporting anti-immigrant policies (Marx 2003). Christian Joppke writes that while guest workers were always received coolly by

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7 In addition to the French case, in several German Landers school teachers are prohibited from wearing headscarves as well (von Campenhausen 2004).
traditional nationals, there was never a push for the government to repatriate these workers (Joppke 301). It is possible that traditional nationals’ insularity and lack of openness toward immigrants needs to be called into action by a perceived threat or threats that can generate sufficient support for anti-immigrant policies in the political arena.

Donald Kinder and David Sears suggest that two distinct types of racism have replaced traditional racism. The first sees members of out-groups as a symbolic threat simply because their permanent residence in the in-group’s community arouses negative sentiments and opposition, as out-group members are not perceived as true members of the nation-state. I incorporate this in the social identity part of the model. The second is perceived economic and demographic threat; the feeling that the out-group’s continued existence within the in-group’s community will eventually have negative economic consequences for the in-group, most notably a lower standard of living (Kinder and Sears 1978; Quillian 1995). I hypothesize perceived threat in my model’s treatment of realistic group conflict theory.

Realistic group conflict theory posits that there will be intergroup competition when one group (traditional nationals) perceives another group (immigrants) as receiving disproportionate shares of resources. Unlike social identity theory, realistic group conflict theory does not assume any symbolic-based predisposition against members of the out-group entering (Monroe et al 2000). Rather, it is the perceived economic threat of competition for jobs and welfare benefits, along with the demographic threat of an increased out-group as a proportion of the population that would be prompting support for anti-immigrant policies.
With respect to job security, there is a fear among traditional nationals that immigrants will take away lesser-skilled jobs because they will be willing to work for lower wages. While traditionally immigrants have either entered legally as guest workers or as asylum seekers, the recent surge of illegal immigration has only heightened this fear by increasing the size of the out-group (Garson and Loizillon 2003). The increasing number of illegal immigrants seeking work also provides companies with an incentive to pay lower wages and have worse working conditions, as illegal immigrants do not have the legal recourse against substandard wages and working conditions that the above-mentioned two groups do (Borjas 1994, Bradley et al 2003). Either of these scenarios has the potential to cause an increase in unemployment or a depression of wages in Europe, both among traditional nationals and overall.

These are acute concerns in many European countries, with their budgets constrained by the European Union (EU) Stability and Growth Pact. With many countries having deficits approaching or exceeding the 3.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deficit cap, they do not have the budget flexibility to absorb unskilled workers into both welfare benefits and Active Labor Market Policy programs. This could result in a reduction in services or an increase in taxes for in-group members—how Kinder and Sears conceptualized “threats to the good life” (Kinder and Sears 1978). This could lead to consternation among skilled workers and the middle and upper classes, even though there is not the same economic threat as there is for unskilled or semi-skilled workers.

This fear of reduction in job security and welfare provisions has multiple consequences, both social psychological and political. First, there is a tendency to homogenize out-group members when there is a competition of resources—that is, once
in-group members perceive certain out-group members as threatening a disproportionate share of resources, they will view all out-group members as threatening to do so, even if in-group members did not view other members of the out-group as an economic threat initially. Thus, immigrants who are in the country legally as guest workers may be perceived as just as much of an economic threat as illegal immigrants or asylum seekers, even though traditional nationals may not have initially viewed guest workers as an economic threat (Jackson 1993).

The second implication follows closely off the first. There exists the possibility that perceived threat pushes in-group members who otherwise have positive views of the out-group toward supporting policies that would hurt the out-group (Smith 1981, Bobo 1983, Kluegel and Smith 1983). This view has been challenged with respect to white attitudes toward black equality in the United States for lack of evidence (Sears et al 1979, Kinder and Rhodebeck 1982). Given the possibility that immigrants in Europe may be perceived in ways similar to racial minorities in the United States (Pettigrew 1998), it is important to test whether a perceived threat will push otherwise tolerant Europeans toward supporting anti-immigrant policies.

Third, there is a tendency to stereotype and stigmatize out-group members in an effort to gain maximum resources (Sherif 1967). This is especially true during times of economic downturn or resource scarcity. When there are multiple groups competing for jobs and resources in a tough economic environment, leaders need an out-group to turn in-group resentment toward the out-group and away from the government for not doing enough to combat the adverse economic conditions. In many cases, the tough economic conditions have led to out-groups (e.g. Jews in Weimar Germany, African-Americans in
the Reconstruction South) being perceived as security and cultural threats, even though the root cause of in-group unease was economic (Monroe et al 2000). It is possible that traditional nationals may be more willing to support anti-immigrant policies when they perceive an acute threat to their safety in addition to a perhaps more abstract threat of them taking their jobs, rather than the latter threat by itself.

Fourth, and most importantly for the purposes of this paper, is that the perceived threat by traditional nationals has the potential to re-align the political landscape of Europe. Traditionally, anti-immigration platforms have been utilized almost exclusively by right-wing groups, with the premise that immigration would destroy national identity and the “way of life” of the dominant nationality. However, difficult economic times in many European countries has made organized labor and citizens who would otherwise be more left-leaning more sympathetic to concerns that increasing immigration will contribute to loss of jobs and social benefits among traditional nationals (Sniderman et al 2002; Ireland 2007; Gradstein and Schiff 2005).

Whereas most studies have chosen to investigate social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory either as separate phenomena or to test them in opposition to each other (cited above), I argue that in explaining the tensions over immigration in Europe the theories may be best approached as complementary. Strong national identities (hypothesized by social identity theory) created an insular culture and lack of openness toward immigrants, and when a perceived economic or demographic threat is added (hypothesized by realistic group conflict theory), this lack of openness should transform into outright support for anti-immigrant policies by traditional nationals.

Countries Chosen
Thus far, I have presented a general picture on the present immigration situation across Europe. However, there is wide variation across European countries in the construction of national identities, their lack of openness toward relevant out-groups, and economic situations. Thus, a simple “on average” continent-wide analysis of the relationship between attitudes toward immigrants, perceived economic threat, and policy preferences would be less informative than would be a comparison of these factors across the fourteen European countries being studied. Many European countries differ from one another in a particular area mentioned above but are similar in other areas. Thus, a cross-national comparison will help to determine whether these differences are influential in differences on support for anti-immigrant policies.

These fourteen countries were chosen both to provide representativeness of the geographic areas, different populations, and economic situations in Europe—the latter two falling under perceived economic and demographic threat. They were also chosen based on similarities and differences on strength of identity—in-group insularity and lack of openness toward immigrants. Based on these criteria and for ease of analysis, I divided the fourteen countries into three groups.

The first group is comprised of the five large Western European democracies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy. These five large countries comprise over half of the population and GDP of the EU (Eurostat 2006, CIA 2007). They are also the most popular destination countries for immigrants. However, they also differ based on the criteria outlined above.

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8 The survey was asked to Northern Ireland independently of the British Isle, so the results reflect only those respondents from England, Scotland and Wales.
As stated above, it is necessary to determine whether Germany is indicative or exceptional. Also, France and Great Britain were chosen because they have the highest and third-highest concentrations of immigrants in Europe, respectively. However, France’s recent race riots may be indicative of greater insularity by traditional nationals (and thus, more out-group marginalization) than in Great Britain, which in turn may translate into higher levels of support for immigration restrictions.

Spain and Italy were chosen because they are both Southern European countries with rapidly-growing immigrant populations (Migration Policy Institute 2006) and both countries recently changed their formerly liberal immigration policies to more restrictive ones. However, Spain has pursued a much more aggressive immigration policy than has Italy, and the government has made it clear that Spain is not a country of immigration (Al-Jazeera 2007). It is important to determine whether differences in policies of these countries reflect differences in public opinion.

The second group is five smaller Western European democracies. They were chosen in order to provide a representative picture of smaller Western European countries. As stated above, these choices were made based on similarities and differences in in-group insularity and openness toward foreigners, along with similarities and differences in perceived economic and demographic threat. Finland was the Scandinavian country for which data was available, and due to its dynamic economy and low immigrant populations, the country should be lower on perceived economic and demographic threat. At the time of the survey (1999-2000) Ireland was enjoying great prosperity, with standards of living rising rapidly (Hill et al 2005). Thus, perceived threat should be low in both countries.
Austria and the Netherlands were chosen because each has had anti-immigrant parties enjoy large success in elections over the past ten years, and the parties have declared that their countries are not ones of immigration—a clear statement of in-group insularity. I seek to determine whether the determinants of widespread mainstream support for immigration restrictions in the two countries have the same causes.

Belgium, unlike most of the other countries discussed, does not have a unified conception of the nation. Belgians who held strong regional, rather than national identities, exhibited more insularity and negative bias toward foreigners (Maddens, Billiet, and Beerten 2000). I hope to determine whether the strong regional identities held by many citizens translate into a higher level of overall support for immigration restrictions.

The third group is four post-communist Central and Eastern European countries. The Czech Republic represents the most Western of the post-communist countries. It also has the most generous welfare state and is the second-richest by GDP per capita of the countries. Because of these factors, Czechs may perceive an economic threat (both to jobs and welfare provisions) that would not necessarily be shared by the other post-communist countries. Poland is the largest in population of the post-communist states in the EU and has traditionally been a proud, homogeneous nation centered on Roman Catholicism. Poles should exhibit greater insularity and lack of openness than other post-communist countries.

Bulgaria was chosen to represent both the most recent round of accession and the EU’s southeastern border. It is also the poorest of the 12 new countries and has a long

9 Although this effect was much stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia.
history of discrimination against its Turkish minority. Bulgarian respondents should be among the strongest in both in-group insularity and perceived threat.

Croatia was chosen to represent the Balkan region. It is also unique because it has historically had a strong national identity defined by superiority toward out-groups, defined first by being distinct from the rest of Yugoslavia and later as being Roman Catholic and not Serb. Unlike many other countries, Croatia experienced a nationalist resurgence relatively recently (in the early 1990s). Its respondents should score higher in the insularity part of the model.

The different histories of national insularity and unfavorable bias against those who were not traditional nationals, along with the different demographic and economic circumstances of the fourteen countries surveyed provide considerable variation, so that conclusions can be reasonably drawn about the nature of support for anti-immigrant policies. I will now turn to the OLS model, a description of the dependent variable, and the hypothesized effects of each key predictor on the variable.

Data and Models

The data for the study were taken from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS), conducted by the Inter-University Consortium on Political Science Research (ICPSR) under the auspices of Ronald Inglehart at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor from 1999 until 2002. The interviews were face-to-face and respondents also completed extensive questionnaires. In order to ensure a sufficient sample size from each country being studied, no fewer than 1,000 respondents were interviewed in any country and as many as 2,000 were interviewed in some. The questions varied somewhat across nations and within them. Nonetheless, the scope of the questionnaires and the breadth of respondents in each
country make the WVS/EVS arguably the most exhaustive survey research that is done on Europe.\(^{10}\)

As stated before, the primary goal of the paper is to determine whether adding predictors assessing economic or demographic threat to those measuring in-group insularity—the comprehensive model—will provide more leverage in explaining support for anti-immigrant policies. Thus, there should be a significant increase in the r-squared values when the comprehensive model is run compared with the in-group insularity only model.\(^{11}\)

The dependent variable is designed to capture a respondent’s preference on the extent to how liberal or restrictive a country’s immigration policy should be—arguably the most basic anti-immigrant policy preference. While I understand that I lack components that may explain other areas of anti-immigrant sentiment (e.g. forced assimilation and preferences for jobs), a component measure would be unreliable and internally invalid. I believed preference on immigration policy is a better measure than both forced assimilation (which carries strong cultural, as well as political, overtones) and whether natives should have preference for jobs (which is a hypothetical situation—i.e. when jobs are scarce). The question was asked on an ordinal scale, with “1” meaning that anyone should be allowed to enter the country and “4” meaning that all immigrants should be prohibited from entering.

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\(^{10}\) The only survey that approaches it is the Eurobarometer, due to its semi-annual frequency. However, its narrow focus on one issue per survey makes the WVS/EVS better suited to my research.

\(^{11}\) To show the differences between the in-group insularity only model and the comprehensive model, the former was run separately and the r-squared values for the former model are in the appendix.
Five different explanatory variables comprise the simple in-group insularity part of the model, rooted in social identity theory.\textsuperscript{12} The first is an interval-level predictor on how concerned a respondent is about the lives of immigrants. This accurately reflects insularity because a respondent who is unconcerned about immigrants likely has a narrow conception of what views immigrants as unwelcome in the nation-state. It seems logical that someone who has no concern for immigrants would be amenable to support for anti-immigrant policies.

The second predictor, to what extent a respondent is prepared to help immigrants improve their lives in the country, is closely related to the first, it also interesting in that it captures a different aspect of a respondent’s openness to immigrants. A traditional national may be concerned on a distant level about immigrants’ lives; he or she may not be so open to immigrants to help improve their lives, which could mean expanding the in-group to include immigrants. Like the first predictor, it is an ordinal-level variable asked on a five-point scale.

The third predictor is level of pride in a respondent’s nationality. This is the variable that perhaps best measures the extent to which a respondent is insular and view immigrants as interlopers, because the more proud a respondent is of his or her nationality, the more likely he or she will view immigrants as unfavorable due to their out-group status.

The fourth predictor is a whether a respondent thinks it is important to teach tolerance to children, as those respondents who think it is important are likely more open to immigrants entering the country. If there is no connection between believing teaching tolerance is important and opposing anti-immigrant policies, people advocating more

\textsuperscript{12} Higher scores on the predictors indicate higher levels of insularity unless otherwise explicitly stated.
open immigration policies may need to make economic, rather than tolerance, arguments.\textsuperscript{13}

The final predictor for the first part of the model is whether religion is an important factor when deciding on a spouse. This will hopefully measure the extent to which a person has true bias toward people who are not part of the dominant Christian culture.\textsuperscript{14} This is a valid predictor because there is a strong possibility that the immigrants were not raised in a Christian culture. A respondent who considers religion very important when choosing a spouse is less likely to be open to non-Christian immigrants. As the importance one places on religious beliefs as a part of a marriage decision increases, there should be more support for anti-immigrant policies.

The second part of the model—which adds perceived economic and demographic threat rooted in realistic group conflict theory to build a more comprehensive model-- has four predictors and one control, based mostly on socioeconomic standing.

The first predictor for economic and demographic threat is income level. Those people who have higher income levels are more likely to have symbolic analyst jobs that cannot be easily replaced by immigrants (Reich 1991). A higher level of income also means that a respondent would be less reliant on means-tested poor relief; therefore, they should perceive less of a threat to their standard of living (both from employment and welfare provision standpoint) than would someone of lower income.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} E.g. “Immigrants are only doing jobs traditional nationals are unwilling to do.”
  \item \textsuperscript{14} While it would be ideal to test whether a respondent is comfortable with marrying a foreigner and how that affects anti-immigrant support, the question was not asked in enough European countries to be included as a predictor, and this question seemed to be the closest proxy.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} This was initially measured with level of education. However, due to level of education being highly correlated with tolerance (and thus negatively correlated with in-group insularity), it was replaced by income level.
\end{itemize}
The second predictor is the type of job the respondent has, which follows closely on the income variable, but gives a more concrete economic threat than income levels. The reason for this is that, while a higher level of income positions you better generally in a competitive job market, some types of jobs are simply more likely to be lost to immigrants in a more concrete sense. Those who are more likely to lose their jobs should more strongly support anti-immigrant policies. The predictor was recoded and collapsed into three ordinal categories by level of threat to their jobs posed by immigrants.\textsuperscript{16,17}

The third explanatory variable in the economic or demographic threat subgroup whether a respondent would not like to have immigrants as neighbors. I chose to include this under the economic or demographic threat subgroup because this builds off V.O. Key’s racial proximity theory for the American South, which posits that the closer whites live to a greater number of minorities, the more they will perceive their group interests being threatened (Key 1949). This variable tests whether this is applicable to Europe. A respondent saying that he or she would not be comfortable with an immigrant living in his or her neighborhood should predict for support of anti-immigrant policies.

The fourth explanatory variable is whether a respondent that to maintain order in a country is the government’s highest priority. This is a key predictor because the debate over immigration is often framed by anti-immigration activists that immigration will

\textsuperscript{16} See Table A-2 for precise coding of the variable.

\textsuperscript{17} I realize the constraints of trying to compress a survey question with thirteen answers into an ordinal level variable, in this case with only three levels of threat to job security. I also realize that there are some answers that do not fit very well into any category. However, this was the most comprehensive question asked in the survey on type of employment, and threat to employment is one of the key indicators of a perceived economic or demographic threat, so it was essential include this variable. This was the most nuanced classification I could think of drawing distinctions for which I have no theoretical basis.
disrupt national security and civil society. Those who are inclined toward preserving order tend to be warier of immigrants (Adorno et al 1950, Sniderman et al 2002).

As discussed earlier, the potential for race as a stigmatizing factor may mean that racial, rather than xenophobic, threat is driving support for anti-immigrant policies. Thus, a question on race will be a control variable in the full model to determine whether racist, rather than xenophobic, sympathies drive support for anti-immigrant policies.

The comprehensive model (model 1) is as follows:

\[ Y(i) = \beta_1 \text{IMMIGRANT CONCERN}(i) + \beta_2 \text{HELP IMMIGRANTS}(i) + \beta_3 \text{NATIONAL PRIDE}(i) + \beta_4 \text{TOLERANCE IMPORTANT}(i) + \beta_5 \text{RELIGION IMPORTANT MARRIAGE}(i) + \beta_6 \text{INCOME LEVEL}(i) + \beta_7 \text{TYPE OF JOB}(i) + \beta_8 \text{IMMIGRANT AS NEIGHBOR}(i) + \beta_9 \text{ORDER MOST IMPORTANT}(i) + \beta_10 \text{DIFFERENT RACE NEIGHBOR}(i) + \varepsilon(i) \]

First I will run the model is run across each of the fourteen countries being examined. Then I will conduct a cross-state analysis, controlling for macro-level statistical factors that vary across countries but not across respondents within a country.18 These countries all are or will soon be part of the EU and will be competing for the same finite resources. National governments will be advocating EU policy toward immigrants in response to state-level statistical factors. Thus, it is important to recognize how being a resident in a certain country may affect support for anti-immigrant policies.

The first predictor is national birth rate, significant because many countries in Europe are experiencing a voluntary population decline. Countries with lower birth rates

---

18 Individual respondents, differentiated by macro-level statistical controls, will still be the unit of analysis.
should feel more threatened by immigration, as immigrants would then occupy a larger proportion of the population than they would if birthrates were near replacement level.

The other predictor in this category is the immigration rate. Countries with higher rates of immigration should have stronger support for anti-immigrant policies, but a finding of no relationship would have important implications as well; it would suggest cognitive dissonance between the perceived and actual rate of immigration.

This cross-national model is as follows:

\[
Y(i) = \beta_1 \text{IMMIGRANT CONCERN}(i) + \beta_2 \text{HELP IMMIGRANTS}(i) + \beta_3 \text{NATIONAL PRIDE}(i) + \beta_4 \text{TOLERANCE IMPORTANT}(i) + \beta_5 \text{RELIGION IMPORTANT MARRIAGE}(i) + \beta_6 \text{INCOME LEVEL}(i) + \beta_7 \text{TYPE OF JOB}(i) + \beta_8 \text{IMMIGRANT AS NEIGHBOR}(i) + \beta_9 \text{ORDER MOST IMPORTANT}(i) + \beta_{10} \text{DIFFERENT RACE NEIGHBOR}(i) + \beta_{11} \text{FERTILITY RATE}(i) + \beta_{12} \text{MIGRATION RATE}(i) + \epsilon(i)
\]

*Results and Discussion*

The results for the individual country analyses revealed some expected findings and some surprising findings. The first significant findings emerge when we compare the support for immigration restrictions across the countries. The highest scores come from the three post-communist countries that are geographically in Central Europe—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria all have scores over 2.71 (out of 4.00) on the dependent variable, whereas in nine of the other eleven countries (France and Great Britain excluded) the score for the dependent variable did not rise above 2.65. Despite Spain’s more aggressive anti-immigrant policies, its respondents exhibited by far the lowest amount of support for immigration restrictions (although Italy was second-lowest).

The higher scores for the post-communist countries may be due to an underlying security fear about increased illegal immigration due to what respondents perceive as
their own countries’ insufficient eastern EU border controls, but there was no means of controlling for this type of security fear in this wave of the EVS/WVS. Hopefully, such a question will be included in future waves of the study.

**Table 1: Support for Anti-Immigrant Policies across Countries Studied**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support Score</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Support is on 1-4 scale, with higher scores meaning higher support for immigration restrictions.

For the first part of the model—which measures the impact of traditional nationals’ insularity and lack of openness to foreigners—three of the five predictors were statistically significant in a majority of the countries studied. In one of the strongest findings for traditional nationals’ insularity and lack of openness toward immigrants being the primary cause for support for immigration restrictions, the predictor on level of concern for immigrants—the most valid predictor of insularity—was statistically significant in the expected direction in 11 of the 14 countries. In eight of the countries, the coefficient is greater than 0.1, meaning that someone who is not at all concerned about immigrants’ lives tends to score 0.4 higher on support for restrictive immigration policies than someone who is very much concerned.

Also the question as to whether teaching tolerance is important was a statistically significant predictor in only four of the 14 countries. This finding suggests that not believing teaching tolerance to be important is an expression of apathy towards immigrants, rather than a respondent being less open to the possibility of immigrants
entering the country. The strongest predictor was to what extent a respondent is prepared to help immigrants acclimate in their new countries. This is not inconsistent with the weak predictive power of teaching tolerance, because while many respondents may not exhibit outright antipathy toward immigrants, these respondents are likely not eager to make conditions conducive for increased immigration, and this is reflected in the high regression coefficients.

The coefficients for the in-group insularity part of the Austrian model were more significant, and in three of the five variables larger, than in the Dutch model. This suggests that support for anti-immigrant policies in Austria are much more driven by insularity of traditional nationals and anti-immigrant bias than in the Netherlands.

The results for the second part of the comprehensive model—the variables to account for realistic group conflict and perceived threat—were mixed. There was an increase in the adjusted r-squared values in 10 of the 14 countries. The strongest predictors were whether a respondent believed maintaining order to be the most important goal for government and whether a respondent would want an immigrant as a neighbor. The measures were statistically significant at no less than the p<0.05 level, and in the expected direction, in five and six of the 14 countries studied, respectively. The race control variable revealed significant results in only four of the fourteen countries—Germany, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Poland. This finding suggests that it may be xenophobic, rather than simply racial, concerns that factor into traditional nationals’ support for anti-immigrant policies.

The perceived threat predictors differed only once between France and Great Britain. Whereas in France, the question of whether a respondent would not like having
an immigrant as a neighbor was strongly significant, in Great Britain it was insignificant. This finding, along with their similar high scores on the dependent variable, suggests the large immigrant populations may have a similar effect in both countries. As expected, the predictors for economic threat had no significance in Finland or Ireland and very strong significance in the Czech Republic.

The adjusted r-squared values varied from .059 in Croatia to .241 in France, with higher values coming from the Western continental countries, and much lower values coming from Eastern countries in general. This suggests the possibility that the model may be better suited to Western Europeans than those in the East. A future path of research may be to design different survey questions that may capture better the sentiments of Eastern Europeans.
Table 2: Analysis of Model 1 In Five Largest and Five Smaller Western European Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant concern</td>
<td>.128**</td>
<td>.139**</td>
<td>.084*</td>
<td>.127**</td>
<td>.117*</td>
<td>.084**</td>
<td>.112**</td>
<td>.078*</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.125**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help immigrants</td>
<td>.117**</td>
<td>.143**</td>
<td>.243**</td>
<td>.145**</td>
<td>.122*</td>
<td>.173**</td>
<td>.118**</td>
<td>.201**</td>
<td>.132**</td>
<td>.072+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride in nationality</td>
<td>.088**</td>
<td>.091**</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.050+</td>
<td>.117**</td>
<td>.130**</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.117*</td>
<td>.068*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach tolerance imp.</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>.190*</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.081*</td>
<td>.112*</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion marriage</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.073**</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.123**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order important</td>
<td>.134**</td>
<td>.099*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.129**</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.142**</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.167**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income level</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Type of job</td>
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<td>-.008</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant neighbor</td>
<td>.216**</td>
<td>.272**</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>.263**</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.336**</td>
<td>.279**</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff. race neighbor</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.234*</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>1109</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. r-squared</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root MSE</td>
<td>.628</td>
<td>.616</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>.661</td>
<td>.665</td>
<td>.573</td>
<td>.654</td>
<td>.670</td>
<td>.653</td>
<td>.598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+=Sig. at 0.10 level; *=Sig. at 0.05 level; **=Sig at 0.01 level; two-tailed tests
Table 3: Analysis of Model 1 In Post-Communist Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Czech Rep.</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant concern</td>
<td>.078+</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.116**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help immigrants</td>
<td>.158**</td>
<td>.157**</td>
<td>.186**</td>
<td>.084**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride in nationality</td>
<td>.075*</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.045+</td>
<td>.079+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.037)</td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching tolerance imp.</td>
<td>-.113+</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>-.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.067)</td>
<td>(.123)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion marriage</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.122**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.040)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Czech Rep.</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Order important</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.076)</td>
<td>(.069)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income level</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.012+</td>
<td>.036**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of job</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.068+</td>
<td>.079**</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant neighbor</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.174**</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.089)</td>
<td>(.099)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff. race neighbor</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>-.245*</td>
<td>.137*</td>
<td>.153*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.085)</td>
<td>(.100)</td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>1239</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. r-squared</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root MSE</td>
<td>.748</td>
<td>.721</td>
<td>.594</td>
<td>.704</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+=Sig. at 0.10 level; *=Sig at 0.05 level; **=Sig. at 0.01; Two-tailed tests

While there is evidence that a perceived economic threat helps to explain at least some of the support by traditional nationals for immigration restrictions in some countries, only in Great Britain is the adjusted r-squared increase larger than .03 over the in-group insularity only part of the model, and in no country was the r-squared higher than .241 (France). Some of the predictors, especially on income levels, did a poor job of predicting support for the dependent variable. This may be due to the fact that people were asked to self-report their income decile, thus the variable may suffer as a predictor because many people do not know which decile they fall into. Nonetheless, the weak
findings with the perceived threat variables included suggests that economic and demographic concerns, despite being important to most traditional nationals, may not be complementing in-group insularity and bias toward foreigners in explaining support for anti-immigrant policies.

Table 4: Cross-National Analysis with Additional Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>0.098**</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>0.012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant concern</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>Type of job</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help immigrants</td>
<td>.157**</td>
<td>Immigrant neighbor</td>
<td>.196**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride in nationality</td>
<td>.043**</td>
<td>Diff. race neighbor</td>
<td>.070**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach tolerance imp.</td>
<td>.040*</td>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>.116**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion marriage</td>
<td>.027**</td>
<td>Migration Rate</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income level</td>
<td>.027**</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=10,772; Adj. r-squared=.151; Root MSE=.662
+=Sig at 0.10 level *=Sig at 0.05 level; **=Sig at 0.01; two-tailed tests
OLS Regression with robust standard errors clustered by country.

Finally, the cross-national regression did not support my hypotheses that there would be a negative relationship between birthrate and support for restrictions on immigration, and supported my hypothesis that there would be no relationship between inward migration rates and support. The latter finding suggests that many Europeans may believe their countries to have higher immigration rates than is actually the case, and it may be this perception that drives anti-immigrant policy support, rather than actual data. The positive relationship between fertility rate and support for restrictions on immigration was surprising, but further confirms that a perceived demographic threat probably does not explain support for these restrictions. Rather, it may be that countries

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19 Because the question of whether maintaining order is important was not asked in Great Britain, the question was dropped from the cross-national analysis.
with higher birth rates may support immigration restrictions because they do not see immigration as necessary to stop the population decline that many European countries are experiencing or will experience shortly. However, more research will be necessary to determine whether this is the case.

**Conclusion**

Immigration is one of the chief issues facing Europe today, and the recent success of candidates running on platforms that advocate anti-immigrant policies reflects a deep unease felt by many traditional nationals over immigration by non-Europeans. Discovery of why traditional nationals are intolerant toward immigrants has important policy implications; a perceived economic or demographic threat has vastly different policy solutions than if the source is primarily traditional nationals’ insularity.

My findings reveal that insularity and lack of openness toward foreigners appears to be a much stronger predictor of support for anti-immigrant policies than is perceived economic or demographic threat. This is evidenced by the small increases in r-squared between the in-group insularity only part of the model and the full model, along with the fact that the most powerful indicators in the comprehensive model were whether a respondent expressed concern over immigrants and whether he or she was prepared to help immigrants become acclimated. These were both in the in-group insularity part of the model. The fact that support for anti-immigrant policies was positively related to a country’s fertility rate suggests that the possibility of immigrants as an ever-increasing proportion of a country’s population is a threat to a tolerant society.

Despite the strong support for these findings, there are other issues that merit further study. There needs to be better measures for post-communist Europe, given the low amount of variance explained in the four countries examined compared to their
Western counterparts. It would be interesting to see whether the explained variance would increase if comparable but more appropriate questions had been asked to post-communist respondents. The question about whether a respondent would not feel comfortable having an immigrant as a spouse needs to be asked in all European countries to give a better sense of the level of comfort traditional nationals have with immigrants. Also, if respondents are asked to assess their level of job security—rather than simply the type of job they had—there may be more of a relationship between level of perceived threat to job security and support for anti-immigrant policies than the analysis suggests.

As stated earlier, education was dropped from the models due to its high predictive power for tolerance, raising concerns about multicollinearity. However, it is clear from earlier iterations of the models that raising the overall levels of education does reduce support for anti-immigrant policies. Thus, a government promoting policies that would raise the level of education for most citizens might be the most realistic way to reduce traditional nationals’ hostility toward immigrants and encourage support for more liberal immigration policies.

Finally, the finding that economic and demographic threat does not appear to be the complement in explaining support for anti-immigrant policies presents the puzzle of whether a complement exists. More research is necessary before this can be ascertained.
Appendix

Table A-1: Levels of threat for each type of job

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Job</th>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Type of Job</th>
<th>Threat Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional workers</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremen/Supervisors</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Never had job</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Junior-level non-manual worker</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Military</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Semi-skilled manual</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee with more than nine co-workers</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unskilled manual</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee with fewer than nine co-workers</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Agriculture worker</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-level non-manual office worker</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Low=1; Medium=2; High=3

Formula for In-group Insularity Only Part of Model 1

\[ Y_i = \beta_1 \text{IMMIGRANT CONCERN}(i) + \beta_2 \text{HELP IMMIGRANTS}(i) + \beta_3 \text{NATIONAL PRIDE}(i) + \beta_4 \text{TOLERANCE IMPORTANT}(i) + \beta_5 \text{RELIGION IMPORTANT MARRIAGE}(i) + E(i) \]

Table A-2: Adjusted R-squared values for In-group Insularity Only Part of Model 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>.103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Al-jazeera, “Spain Expels Hundreds of Africans.”


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