

WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH THE REPUBLICAN PARTY?:
FACTIONALISM IN PARTY PRIMARIES, 1976-2000

Patrick Ryan Miller

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Political Science in the Department of Political Science.

Chapel Hill
2007

Approved by:

George B. Rabinowitz

Michael B. MacKuen

Thomas M. Carsey

ABSTRACT

PATRICK MILLER: What's the Matter with The Republican Party?:
Factionalism in Party Primaries, 1976-2000
(Under the direction of George B. Rabinowitz)

Thomas Frank's *What's the Matter with Kansas* argues that social issues have become more important to lower income voters than economic issues, leading to a greater probability for them to vote against their own economic interests by voting for conservative candidates. This paper takes his much disputed theory and applies it to the Republican primary elections rather than general elections. Scholars have documented the presence of a conservative Republican wing associated with the religious right and a more moderate wing which emphasizes social issues less and distances itself from the religious right. My analysis connects this elite level dynamic to mass political behavior through an examination of county level election returns in presidential primaries from 1976 through 2000. When candidates from the two wings engage in a competitive national primary a pattern emerges that shows different demographic sources of support for the two factions.

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INTRODUCTION

In *What's the Matter with Kansas*, a qualitative analysis of Kansas Republican Party politics, Thomas Frank argues that working class voters have come to care more about social issues than economic issues. As a result, these lower income voters are not only more likely to vote Republican than in the past, but also more inclined to support the far religious right of the Republican Party. In essence poorer voters are voting against their economic interests by supporting fiscally conservative candidates who court them through appeals to faith and hard right positions on classic culture war issues such as abortion, gay rights, and teaching creationism in public schools.

Frank's thesis certainly has its detractors. Stonecash (2000) and Bartels (2005, 2006), the latter responding directly to the assertions in *WMK*, both present strong evidence for the idea that lower income voters still support Democrats and still weigh economic issues more heavily than social issues. Frank has fired back with his own rebuttal¹ in an attempt to salvage his theory. Both sides present credible evidence for and against the picture of faith based, working class conservatism painted in *WMK*.

Though many scholars dismiss *WMK* as unscientific entertainment, I believe Frank touches on an important phenomenon deeper than the debate over the voting tendencies of the working class in the general election. At its core, the book is a case study of a Kansas Republican Party which has thoroughly divided itself into two competing factions that are

¹ <http://www.tcfrank.com/dismissd.pdf>

often more at war with each other than they are with the minority Democrats in the state. These factions do not define themselves along economic cleavages, though sometimes issues such as “no new tax” pledges do arise in primaries pitting candidates from the two factions against each other. Instead, they divide along religious, so called “culture war” lines, with a coalition of moderate, libertarian, and economic conservatives/social moderates facing a rival camp of socially and economically conservative Republicans affiliated with the religious right and drawing upon the grassroots support of Evangelical Protestants.

This form of factionalism within state Republican parties is nothing new. Indeed, since the late 1970’s as the religious right has grown in both its organizational strength and its importance as part of the Republican base, many states have seen Republican party politics evolve into perpetual bitter feuds between the “moderate”² and “conservative” camps. Kansas Republican primaries have been bloody battlefields between moderates and conservatives since the early 1990’s, often featuring races more expensive and more caustic than the general election (Cigler and Loomis 2000). Kansas Democrats were able to capitalize on this division in 2006 as they recruited many prominent moderate Republicans to run under the Democratic label, resulting in the defeat of every Republican “conservative” running statewide³ and rare Democratic gains in the state legislature.

² I use the terms moderate and conservative loosely. At least within the ideological range of the Republican Party, the moderates are certainly more moderate than the conservatives, though they are certainly farther to the right than the Democrats. Since these are the terms used in both *WMK* and accounts of state Republican politics in the Kansas press, I shall stay in that tradition.

³ Interesting note: The 2006 elections show the dramatic consequences of this party division in Kansas, one of the most Republican states in the country. Moderate Republican incumbents holding statewide constitutional offices (secretary of state, treasurer, insurance commissioner) survived brutal primaries in 2006, but the Democrats did not seriously target them for defeat. Democrats instead focused on reelecting Governor Kathleen Sebelius whose current and past lieutenant governors have been party-switching past chairs of the Kansas Republican Party. They also convinced the GOP county prosecutor in Johnson County, Kansas’s largest jurisdiction, to switch parties, resulting in the defeat of the ultra-conservative incumbent Republican attorney general. Party switching Democrat Nancy Boyda also knocked off a far right six term GOP

Such party in-fighting is not a single state phenomenon. Most recently in the 2005 Virginia elections the extreme conservatism of the Republican gubernatorial nominee drove a more moderate Republican state senator into the race as an independent (Shear 2005b). Earlier that year in the Virginia legislative primaries, over a dozen fundamentalist candidates, many recruited by religious right organizations and many of whom received the tacit support of the official Republican Party organization, challenged incumbent legislators perceived as too moderate on social issues and taxes (Shear 2005a). Actively challenging and defeating your own safe incumbents is perhaps the most irrational thing a party organization can do; however, this is exactly what is happening in states all over the country, resulting in the loss of many of these open seats to the Democrats. Other scholars have documented the rise of the religious right as a major faction at the national level (Oldfield 1996, Layman 2001).

Clearly the Republican Party is home to two competing groups – the organized religious right with a universally conservative message on economic and social issues and a second, more moderate group that, if its members have nothing else in common, is loosely held together by its opposition to extreme religious conservatism. Though this religious divide manifests itself more prominently in some states than others, it is certainly fair to say it exists, at the very least at the level of political elites. Given that, where do these two factions find their support? What demographics support them? Is this elite factionalism reflected in the behavior of the Republican masses – the party-in-the-electorate? We as political scientists have established fairly well that these two factions exist at least in the elite circles of Republican Party politics. It is critical we begin extending our analyses to the

congressman in one of the nation's most Republican congressional districts by capitalizing on the moderate-conservative division within Republican ranks.

partisan masses to understand better the relationship between elite dynamics and mass electoral behavior.

THEORY

Frank argues that if we dissect the electoral map, certain demographics are more likely to support one faction of Republicans over the other. Geographical areas characterized by lower real estate values, lower per capita incomes, and fewer people with college educations are more likely to support conservatives in his view (Frank 2004, 104). To Frank's profile I would add that areas with greater numbers of Evangelical Protestants should be more likely to support the conservative wing. It is widely documented that Evangelical Protestants are the religious group most likely to support the religious right agenda (i.e. Guth et al 1996). This combination of characteristics has strong theoretical grounding in the large number of studies which characterize Evangelicals as poorer than the average American and less educated (i.e. Karnes et al. 2005). Areas not fitting this profile should be more likely to support more moderate Republican candidates.

As the competition between the factions takes place in the context of party primaries, those elections are the focus of my analysis. Primaries are quite useful tools for party factions because they provide information to potential voters belonging to these competing intra-party groups about which candidate is most sympathetic to a particular identity group, issue group, or ideology (Bartels1988); in essence, they are learning opportunities which allow the partisan masses to behave as if they are reflecting the divisions of their respective party elites.

Is this picture of factionalism a valid representation of the Republican party-in-the-electorate? At the mass level, is there one camp of poorer, less educated, more Evangelical Republicans towing the more conservative line on a litany of economic and social issues? Is there a rival group of higher income, better educated, and less Evangelical Republicans supporting a more moderate, perhaps economically conservative but socially more liberal, agenda? I argue that such a division does indeed exist at the mass level, but that electoral conditions must be right for it to emerge.

Certainly not every Republican primary evolves into a fight between the moderate and the conservative. Many Republicans of both ideological camps are obviously unopposed in primaries ranging from the presidency to local school boards in every election cycle. Though the questions of candidate emergence and under what circumstances candidates from the two factions contest the primary are important, I do not address them in this work. However, when a credible candidate from the conservative wing competes against a credible candidate from the moderate wing, we should see these voting divisions emerge within the mass primary electorate.

Candidate credibility is important because more serious, higher quality candidates are more likely to be able to raise the money needed to communicate their messages to primary voters than candidates of less quality. Only if voters receive and internalize messages from two competing candidates will they be able to learn enough information to place those candidates in one party faction or the other. This enables primary voters to engage in sincere voting that best reflects their interests and their own identification with partisan factions. Serious candidates, as opposed to less serious, “gadfly” candidates, are better able to

convince calculating voters that casting a ballot for them is not a wasted vote; instead, that ballot is a strategically well used vote for a potential winner.

How do social issues come to the front of the primary contest, though? In the context of most recent Republican primaries, all of the major candidates have run as fiscal conservatives. Even the moderates in these races generally run on platforms of cutting taxes, refusing to sign new tax increases into law, rolling back federal spending to cut the deficit, or balancing the budget. Social issues and image are where the real differences appear between candidates, providing the kind of contrast and candidate definition that allows voters to form impressions of the ideological orientations of the candidates and to associate them with various constituencies in the party. If McCain and Bush take generally conservative positions on economic issues in 2000 (though with some policy differences between them), then the key contrast between them becomes their vehement disagreement over the role of the religious right in the party (Caesar and Busch 2001). Likewise, abortion provides a key contrast between Bush and Reagan in 1980 (Rae 1989). When these social issues take on a prominent role in a primary between two genuinely credible candidates, we can expect to see *WMK*-style division in the Republican ranks.

WHY NOT INDIVIDUAL DATA?

I analyze county level election returns from Republican presidential primaries from 1976 through 2000 to see whether or not this division emerges in the aggregate. Why aggregate and not individual level data? If the religious right is the core of the conservative wing and its power base has been growing in Republican circles over the course of several

decades, the most feasible approach is to look at primary returns over the long term. Exit polls do ask respondents to identify whether or not they are members of the “religious right,” but the wording of the question changes over time and it is not present in all state polls during the twenty-four year period in question. Even in 2000 when the Christian right actually became an issue itself, the item was not in all state exit polls and it varied between asking respondents whether they are born again or whether they “belong” to the religious right. Whether this religious right question measures religious belief, movement affiliation, or some other concept is another question all together.

Explicit measures of religious belief are absent from the exit polls, though the closest they get to it is the lone question occasionally appearing asking respondents whether or not they are born again Christians. This item does not appear frequently nor is it in enough state exit polls even in one year to be a useful measurement tool for this analysis. Church attendance might be useful as a way to operationalize religion and certainly more frequent church attendees who go to fundamentalist churches are more likely to hear conservative political messages (Guth et al. 1998), but that measure does not capture the strong association of the religious right with Evangelicalism.

Denomination or religious belonging, then, is the only remaining conceptualization of religion useful for this analysis. Unfortunately, while exit polls report the number of Catholics voting in the primary, the data do not distinguish between Mainline versus Evangelical Protestants. This is a critical distinction given the differing politics of the two groups, with Mainline Protestants on average being more liberal than Evangelicals on social issues and more resistant to the political appeals of the religious right (Fowler et al. 2004). While Evangelicalism is not synonymous with fundamentalism or the broader religious right

movement and even though the movement has appeal to some Catholics and Mainline Protestants, Evangelicals are the core of the constituency the movement seeks to mobilize (Guth et al. 1996).

Since individual level data are inadequate and since Frank frames his theory of who socially conservative Republicans are in terms of what the areas look like where you can find them, the county level is the next best focus where we can find consistent demographic and election data. Fortunately, using data from the Churches and Church Membership reports from 1970 through 1990 and the Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States 2000⁴ report, we can construct a fairly valid approximation of the religious make up of a county in terms of Catholics, Mainline, and Evangelical Protestants. Thus, aggregate data are more practical than individual data.

MODEL

The thesis here is fundamentally about division between candidates in primaries. The best approach for measuring this division is to set up a regression equation for each primary in question modeling the percentage of the overall vote a certain candidate receives. For example, in 1976 we would construct one equation modeling the Reagan share of the Reagan plus Ford vote total. Though one may be tempted to set up a separate regression equation for each candidate competing in a primary modeling the percentage of the vote he receives, a more appropriate test that reflects the concept of division would be the single equation for each contest. If we create separate equations for Ford and Reagan in 1976, for

⁴ Data are available at the Association of Religion Data Archives (www.thearda.com). I would extend this analysis further back than 1976 to a period before the religious right movement become such a strong force, but there are no county religious data available for 1960. Data for 1950 are, however, available.

example, we may get results that tell us that a predictor like income is significant for one candidate but not the other. This does not make sense theoretically. Each independent variable either significantly affects the choice between Ford and Reagan or it does not. If a variable affects the decision to vote for Ford, then it automatically affects the Reagan vote share. The electoral choice is an evaluation of the competing candidates and their images and positions against each other, not separately.

See appendix 1 for a full description of the variables in the model and more in-depth rationale for why I use certain predictors. For years in which there are only two major primary candidates, I drop out minor candidates, candidates not competing in all primary states, “no preference” votes, “none of the above” votes, and write-ins. For years in which there are more than two major candidates, I model the division between the candidate most affiliated with the religious right and the candidate who ultimately wins the nomination. This means that I model the Robertson share of the Robertson plus Bush vote in 1988 and the Buchanan share of the Buchanan plus Dole vote in 1996. Though other candidates do contest these primaries, Bush and Dole are clear frontrunners who dominate the contests while rival candidates perform much more poorly. Frontrunners are the most credible candidates, so it is important that include them in my analysis.

Robertson and Buchanan are the candidates in 1988 and 1996 respectively who most seriously court the religious right. Though they eventually lost, both men start their respective primary seasons with unexpectedly strong showings. Robertson earned a surprising second place finish in the Iowa caucus, while Buchanan upset Dole in the New Hampshire primary. Each of these contests gave the candidates momentum to carry on with their ultimately unsuccessful bids. As such, Robertson and Buchanan certainly do not merit

being labeled as less credible candidates or gadflies, terms we might call contenders such as Alan Keyes or Gary Bauer in 2000 who never demonstrate the ability to contest even a single primary seriously.

For all election years in question, I stop including primaries in the data sets after the point in the season at which the race no longer remains competitive (see election year descriptions for further details). This eliminates returns where one candidate receives a massively inflated percentage of the vote because his opponents are no longer actively campaigning even though their names remain on the ballot. Other scholars have argued that there is a critical time component in the primary vote in that momentum is accumulated early, and then it either builds or decays from one contest to another rather than being stable throughout the period of several weeks (Norranders 1993). I do not necessarily argue with this theory, but the best measure the literature uses to account for this in primary vote models is including candidate vote share in the most recent primary as an independent variable in a regression.

[Table 1 Here]

Table 1 shows the primaries I include in my analysis and the vote shares of the candidates I study. If we look at a losing candidate like George Bush in 1980, his performance does not seem particularly related to his previous wins and losses. He loses New Hampshire rather decisively, but actually scores his biggest win in Michigan at the tail end of the competitive period (the day before he concedes to Ronald Reagan). He gets 19% in Louisiana one day, wins Pennsylvania and Texas with 51% right after, then drops back

down to 16% just three days after his Texas win. These results do not appear driven by decaying momentum from primary losses, so I find Norrander's (1993) method of using lagged vote share as a predictor particularly unsatisfying. .

Pooling contests in the competitive period is a better approach, thereby controlling for competition and momentum through the design of the study. Both of these factors necessarily stop being relevant when a candidate loses the nomination war, not individual battles. Looking at any of the losing candidates in Table 1, their vote shares in races where their names are still on the ballot drop off massively after the final primaries shown. It would appear, then, that primary voters are certainly attentive enough to realize when a candidate has either dropped out or clearly lost, but they are not basing their votes for the most part on how that candidate performed in the state where their fellow partisans most recently went to the polls.

The regression model I use is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Candidate Vote \%} = & \beta_0 + \\ & \beta_1 (\text{per capita county income}) + \\ & \beta_2 (\text{\% of county population with a bachelor's degree or higher}) + \\ & \beta_3 (\text{\% of county population attending Mainline Protestant churches}) + \\ & \beta_4 (\text{\% of county population attending Catholic churches}) + \\ & \beta_5 (\text{\% of county population attending Evangelical churches}) + \\ & \beta_6 (\text{\% of county population that is racial minority}) + \\ & \beta_7 (\text{Republican presidential vote \%}) + \\ & \beta_{8-\infty} (\text{dummies for individual states}) + \\ & \varepsilon_i \end{aligned}$$

ELECTIONS

I include six relevant elections in my analysis:

●**1976** – Ronald Reagan is more conservative than Gerald Ford on racial, social, and economic issues (Rae 1989). The entire primary season is competitive, so all primaries are included in the data set. Reagan goes into the convention hoping Ford delegates will abandon the incumbent in favor of his more conservative challenge. The model should predict county vote decently in this year as Reagan is a very credible challenger.

●**1980** – George Bush is the choice of the more moderate Republican establishment (Rae 1989). Reagan reaches out more extensively to religious conservatives than he did in 1976, courting groups such as the Moral Majority and shifting his emphasis from the implicitly racial issues he used against Ford to more social issues like abortion. Bush wins his last primary in Michigan on March 20, two months after New Hampshire. Despite this win, Reagan's mounting victories give him enough delegates to clinch the nomination and Bush drops out the next day. Again, Bush and Reagan are both credible candidates, so I expect the model of party factionalism will perform well.

●**1988** – Bush is the front runner from the start and secures the nomination on March 15 with his win in Illinois one month after New Hampshire (Barone and Ujifasa 1990). Bush campaigns on socially conservative positions, but is not perceived as a religious conservative nor does he market himself as such. Televangelist Pat Robertson runs in the primaries, however, and consistently garners between 10% and 25% of the primary vote through Bush's win in Illinois (Wilcox 1992). Despite some early caucus victories, Robertson fares much more poorly in primaries, a venue where his highly committed supporters are less likely to

dominate. Given Bush's front runner status and the lack of a strong showing from Robertson, I do not believe the model will work well in this year.

●**1992** – Though George Bush's renomination is never seriously in doubt, he faces a vigorous challenge on his economic and social right from commentator Pat Buchanan (Barone and Ujifasa 1994). Buchanan makes explicit appeals to the religious right for support, but gains little traction. He admits after his loss in Connecticut on March 24, that he cannot win the nomination; however, he continues to campaign even though this admission leads to greatly diminished vote shares. Buchanan's quixotic bid is not credible enough to allow the two party factions to polarize fully around the candidates, so the model should not perform well.

●**1996** – Buchanan again mounts an underdog, hard right challenge to frontrunner Bob Dole. His performance is better than in 1992, but Dole wins the nomination outright after the March 26 primaries (Barone, Cohen, and Ujifasa 1998). Buchanan's campaign yet again is not strong enough to overcome the frontrunner, so the model should not perform well this year.

●**2000** – Fundamentalists Alan Keyes and Gary Bauer run in the primary, though their campaigns are never credible. George W. Bush is the candidate who allies himself most with the religious right and he courts the movement aggressively during the nomination phase even to the point of openly identifying himself as a born again Christian, a move no major presidential contender had done since Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1976 (Caeser and Busch

2001). John McCain rails against the influence of social conservatives and the religious right movement over the Republican Party, calling Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson “evil influence[s]” and “agent[s] of intolerance.” Bush’s delegate lead becomes overwhelming after the Super Tuesday (March 7), causing McCain to suspend his campaign the next day. Given the polarization over the role of religious conservatives in the party this year, the model should work very well at predicting the county vote.

ELECTION RESULTS

Table 2 shows regression results of county level election returns for conservative Republican presidential primary candidates from 1976 to 2000.⁵ The thesis I derive from Frank’s *WMK* story is that there is factionalism within the Republican Party, and that it falls along lines of income, education, and religion.⁶ If any one of these factors is significant, we

⁵ Notes on diagnostics and method: Estimates are derived using robust regression to remedy issues of heteroskedasticity. The 1976 model passes the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test with an insignificant chi-squared value; however, all other years fails the test with significant chi-squared values, indicating heteroskedasticity. OLS assumes homoskedasticity, so I cannot use it without violating a basic OLS assumption. Robust standard errors compensate for heteroskedasticity, so I use it on all six election models, including 1976, for consistency. Though I do not present all six correlation matrices, the per capita income and college education correlation is by far the strongest correlation in the data sets in that it is the only correlation ever to exceed a .5 value. It is also the only one whose value led me to worry about multicollinearity. I ran the variance inflation factor test after each regression. Each application of the model passed the test with VIF values substantially less than 10, the point at which multicollinearity becomes a methodological problem. Lastly, I tested for influential data points which might excessively affect the regression results due to their status as outliers or their having leverage. I calculated difference in fitted value (DFFITS) measures after the regression. After correcting for a handful of miscoded data points, no cases exhibited DFFITS scores in excess of -1 or 1, so I am not concerned about leverage.

⁶ To control for possible fixed effects I include dummy variables in the regression for individual states. See Appendix 3 for a chart of the coefficients for all states in the six models. The baseline for the dummies is New England. The states in New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) have so few counties in each that I was uncomfortable making any single one of the baseline, so I combined them into one dummy. I do not see this as a problematic approach because the states in the region are all very similar in both their demographic homogeneity and their primary election results. Including fixed

are better able to understand the sort of divisiveness Frank paints in his book and which is very typical of many state Republican parties.

[Table 2 Here]

How do the predictors of the greatest theoretical interest perform in the model? County per capita income turns out to be a virtually irrelevant predictor of the primary vote. Of the six primaries analyzed, it is significant for only the 1976 and 1980 contests. Ignoring the significance levels for a moment, the result for per capita income is contrary to my theory in that more conservative candidates are performing better in wealthier counties with the exception of Reagan in 1980. Interestingly, the two Reagan results, the only effects which are significant, mirror each other. For a \$1,000 increase in per capita income in 1976, Reagan does about half a percent better in a county, but the finding is the opposite four years later and stronger.

Income is surprisingly not included in all of the state exit polls for the Republican primaries; in fact, in no single year is it even an item in all of the state polls as it is absent from some of the primaries. The measure they do have is personal income rather than per capita income and the dollar values defining income categories respondents choose from actually change from exit poll to exit poll, even within the same year; however, simply looking at the data show that more moderate candidates do tend to do better with Republicans who earn more money. The measurement variations with the exit polls prevent us from performing a reliable statistical analysis with pooled data.

effects dummies does not change the overall interpretation of the results. I also combing Delaware and Maryland because the former only has three counties.

We cannot be sure whether or not these aggregate income results actually indicate that wealthier Republicans are voting for the more conservative candidate, but this result does not bode well for the *WMK* thesis given its prediction that cultural conservatives would run better in poorer locations. Controlling for education, though, helps explain the irrelevancy of income. For all post-Reagan elections income has no significant effect on the vote in the full model. Regressing income alone on vote share paints a different picture, however. For example, in the 2000 primary income yields a coefficient of -.938 (significant at $p < .001$ for a \$1000 increase), a substantively strong effect in the predicted direction indicating that wealthier counties have a tendency to vote against Bush. Thus, once education is introduced into the regression, the income effect vanishes and, if anything, conservatives do better in the richer counties, but this effect is insignificant. The effect of income, then, is generally an indirect one that is mediated by education rather than exerting direct effects on voting patterns itself.

College education at the county level is the predictor that exerts the largest substantive effect on the vote. The coefficients on this variable are both ample in size and in the predicted direction, offering support for the *WMK* thesis as applied to Republican primaries. Its effect consistently works against the more conservative primary candidates as indicated by the negative coefficients and the result is actually significant in all contests except for Buchanan in 1992. Reagan suffers the most in better educated counties, losing roughly 1% for every percentage increase in college educated residents. The education effects, however, are still substantial in other years, mainly 1996 and 2000. Whereas I posited that we would see division in the Republican electoral ranks only when two very credible candidates faced each other, the fact that the Buchanan 1996 effect is larger than the

Bush 2000 effect seemingly indicates that county education is a decent predictor of vote share even when less serious candidates contest the nomination.

We must bear in mind that we cannot make confident generalizations about individual behavior from aggregate data; however, regardless of the ecological inference problem, aggregate results are always driven by some individual behavior. We should devote some mental energy to theorizing about what might be happening at the individual level. If better educated Republicans are more moderate, a reasonable inference given the positive relationship between education and social liberalism (Himmelstein and McRae 1988), and they reject the Christian conservative agenda, perhaps the education effects reflect their reactions against social conservatives.

There is some support for this proposition in individual level data. If we look at the exit polls, better educated respondents are significantly more likely to vote for the more moderate Republican candidates as a simple direct effect. We should accept this result cautiously, however, given that we cannot reproduce the aggregate model fully for even one election year because of the problems previously described with the religion measures. Surprisingly, even predictors as basic to political behavior as income and ideology that are always on general election exit polls are not included on all of the primary exit polls as they are missing for many states in different years. Furthermore, given the significance of racial proximity as a predictor for several years as seen in the minority percentage variable in Table 2 (Glaser 1997; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000) and the lack of racial attitude measures in the exit polls, any attempt to replicate this model with individual data is essentially futile. Income and racial attitudes are both closely related to education, so even the finding that education has a direct effect that advantages more moderate Republicans should be looked

upon cautiously given that we cannot account for these other two important effects. Nevertheless, aggregate data always reflect some underlying micro behavior summed up across individuals, so it is worth thinking about what dynamics are actually driving the effects of education at the county level even if we cannot test our ideas fully.

To Frank's theory I add measures of religious belonging. How do these predictors perform? There is literature which empirically supports the idea that county level measures of religious affiliation are indeed indicative of how various denominational groups are voting (Campbell 2006), but one article on this matter does not constitute a broad enough literature in my view to toss aside ecological fallacy considerations and make the kind of generalizations to individual level behavior that we might with a well studied aggregate measure like minority population. Thus, we should keep in mind this qualification as we examine the religion effect.

The main variable of concern is county level Evangelicalism as it is Evangelical Protestants who form the core of the religious right movement. This variable generally performs as predicted in that it benefits conservative primary candidates with the curious exception of 1976; in fact, it is the only religion variable here which consistently shows significant effects. Evangelicalism is not nearly as substantively important as the education effect, however. As the values on this variable run from zero to nearly 100% in the actual data, the real gains a candidate can nab at the county level from Evangelicalism hover in the 10% range.

There also does not appear to be any discrimination between candidates based upon their credibility. While Reagan 1980 and Bush 2000 certainly do make substantial gains in more Evangelical localities, the Republican who benefits the most is arguably the least

credible and most extreme contender in the lot – Pat Robertson. We might theorize that this 1988 effect is a result of his candidacy mobilizing the Evangelical vote, a conclusion the Campbell piece relating aggregate and individual data would certainly support and the scant literature on Robertson certainly shows strong mobilization among fundamentalists resulting from his campaign (Wilcox 1992); however, we do not have enough concrete evidence here to support such a supposition about what individual level effects these aggregate data might be indicating. At best we are left with the supportive finding that more socially conservative candidates do fare better in counties with greater numbers of Evangelical adherents.

The contrast between the significant Reagan gains from Evangelicalism in 1980 and the significant and slightly greater losses he suffers in 1976 is worth exploring a bit given the importance of this predictor. Reagan actually does receive a sizeable boost from county Evangelicalism in 1976 (.122, $p < .001$) until I add both college education and minority population to the regression, though neither of these controls alone is enough to make religion switch signs. Thus, the direct effect of Evangelicalism is as expected, but it takes both education and minority percentage to flip it. Given the significance of both education and race in 2000, as well, and the significant but positive boost for Bush from Evangelicalism, there is clearly some dynamic that distinguishes these two elections. Reagan performs worse in counties with more religious adherents if we look at all three religion variables, though this effect is not significant for Mainline Protestants and Catholics. If we run the model on individual states rather than the entire set of states in the 1976 data set, this effect generally replicates itself.⁷ This is a curious exception to the Evangelicalism effect

⁷ If you are interested in seeing how the model performs when run on individual states, Appendix 5 shows this for the 2000 primary. The state results are largely consistent with the overall results in Table 2.

given that Reagan took socially conservative positions in 1976 on issues such as abortion, though he did not emphasize them greatly in his campaign (Black and Black 2002).

Three of the six elections readily exhibit the kind of division within the Republican electorate which I expected – 1980, 1996, and 2000. For these contests the more conservative primary candidate performs significantly worse in counties with more college educated populations, but better in counties with more Evangelicals. The negligible effects of income I have already explained, but just on the surface of things without performing any kind of statistical analysis the moderate candidates do better in wealthier counties.⁸ The 1992 case also shows this pattern of division, though none of the coefficients are significant. Even the Robertson candidacy exhibits the theorized education and income division in the county vote, but the exception here, as stated above, is that the televangelist performs better as a result of there being more religious followers in a county regardless of their affiliation. Thus, we have five primaries which more or less follow the expected pattern of division in the aggregate. Reagan's 1976 case certainly shows the strongest anti-conservative effect on college education, but the performance of the Evangelical coefficient that year keeps this election from being a good match to my theory.

It is possible that a regional effect for the South is influencing the results? That region is traditionally associated with higher levels of poverty, lower levels of education, the highest percentages of Evangelicals, and a fundamental salience of race in its politics (Black and Black 1987). Some candidates such as Reagan have tried to market themselves

⁸ I have divided the counties in every primary year into per capita income quartiles. To determine quartiles I took the range of per capita incomes for all counties and divided the range into four equal income groups. I then calculate the average county vote for both relevant primary candidates in each quartile. The positive relationship between per capita income and support for the more moderate candidate is visible in most of the bar graphs, though this effect washes out in regression and even reverses in 1980. The distance between candidate performance in higher and lower quartiles is greatest in the three years with two competitive candidates, meaning the division between the richest and poorest quartile is most prominent in those years. See Appendix 4 for these graphs.

especially to Southern conservatives on the basis of racial and cultural issues, plus candidates from the South have a natural advantage in primaries in the region given the salience of Southern identity among voters there (Black and Black 2002). Thus, given the importance of the region itself and its relation to some of the key predictors in the model, it is important to account for regional effects in the model. Running a Southern dummy with the state fixed effects dummies, however, introduces multicollinearity as the variable yields variance inflation scores between 30 and 40.

To remedy this situation, I run a version of the model dropping the state dummies and including a Southern dummy as a predictor. Appendix 6 shows the results of this analysis. In these applications, the South dummy is significant on three occasions, indicating occasional regional effects in primary voting; however, we are most concerned with how the presence of this variable in the model affects the other predictors of interest. Though there are some changes on certain coefficients, including the Southern variable leaves the basic pattern of effects for education, income, and county Evangelicalism intact. The education coefficients exhibit modest changes in size, though there are no sign changes and only one significance change (Buchanan 1992 become significantly negative – consistent with the theory). Income becomes more consistently significant to the disadvantage of conservative primary candidates, though Reagan 1976 drops out of significance and there are two sign changes in directions consistent with the division theory. Evangelicalism remains basically intact with the Southern dummy. Overall, then, we can be fairly sure that the results of the county vote model we have seen are not driven by misspecification in the form of an absent Southern dummy. Adding that variable enhances the predictive power of the model, but it

just should not be run at the same time as the fixed effects dummies given the multicollinearity problem.

How, then, do these results help us understand Frank's *WMK* thesis and the general issue of intra-party factionalism within Republican ranks? Is there support for his argument when we reapply it to the Republican Party instead of the electorate as a whole? Overall the key variables in the model demonstrate considerable support for the thesis of division within the Republican party-in-the-electorate and how that division manifests itself along demographic lines, at least in the aggregate. Though he writes a book about the Kansas Republican Party, Frank frames his argument in *WMK* in terms of the general electorate. His argument is compelling, but Frank's dubious generalization finds limited support when Bartels and Stonecash look at the population as a whole. It makes more sense to restrict our analysis to the Republican Party itself given that that is what Frank wrote about in his book. Indeed, doing so generates support for the basic *WMK* thesis about how the electorate is divided and where social conservative candidates and moderates can find support. Frank is on the right track with his argument, but his theory is much better suited for helping us understand internal Republican Party dynamics than it is for shedding light on political behavior within the broader electorate.⁹

⁹ The analysis here clearly deals with division within the national Republican electorate in the context of party primaries, not with divisions within specific state Republican parties. As *WMK* is a case study of the Kansas Republicans, it makes sense to apply the same model I use on national primaries to Republican primaries for statewide office in Kansas. I collected election results for all contested statewide Republican primaries in Kansas from 1994 to 2006 for offices as high as senator and governor to ones as low as insurance commissioner and state treasurer. I then selected those contests where there was clearly a candidate from the moderate faction opposing a Republican from the conservative faction and applied the model to those election results. Surprisingly, in over a dozen races I analyze, very few of the predictors – neither the main ones of interest nor the other controls – emerge as significant. Why should there be such a disparity between the promising results at the national level and the dismal results in Kansas? After all, if there is any one state that should reflect mass Republican division of the kind Frank describes, it should be Kansas – the very state about which he writes. Perhaps one statistical explanation for these results lies in the numerical ranges of the predictors. For the national data there is a wide range of values for all the independent variables, but Kansas is much more homogeneous than the national picture, particularly on the most important variables – income, education, and

Though I am certainly aware of the ecological inference problem and acknowledge that my results here can only tell us what dynamics are occurring at the aggregate level, I have obviously tried to theorize about what individual level phenomena these aggregate results might be reflecting. If the data were available to compare individual voting trends over time, I would certainly prefer that approach; however, those data do not exist in any reliable and academically suitable form, so I have tried to hypothesize as best I can based on micro theory why candidates might be performing better in areas with certain demographic traits.¹⁰

religion. Indeed, its lack of diversity is striking. In other words, these variables might be too close to being constants at the county level for an effect to be observed. You cannot predict a variable with a constant obviously. Frank does couch his thesis more in terms of neighborhoods and precincts, especially the divide between socially conservative working class areas of Johnson County in the Kansas City suburbs and its wealthier, more moderate upper class neighborhoods. An analysis at that level might reveal the kind of differing bases for the two factions he theorizes, but that pattern does not emerge at the state level.

¹⁰ I have tried to employ Gary King's Ecological Inference (EI) program to infer voting patterns among Republican Catholics, Evangelicals, and Mainline Protestants for all the primaries from 1976 to 2000; however, it produces estimates that are clearly inaccurate. When I use the EI on the 2000 data, for example, it estimates that Bush won only 7% of Republican Catholics with a lower bound of the possible true value at almost zero and the upper bound at almost one. Given that the bounds of EI estimates run from 0 to 1, this is not an estimate in which I put much confidence. Exit poll data from 2000 reveal that a 7% share is far off the mark anyhow. EI also estimates that Bush won 87% of the Evangelical vote. Though I do not doubt he won a majority of Republican Evangelicals, I have a hard time believing it was such an overwhelming landslide. EI requires three columns of data to produce estimates. Let us imagine we want an estimate of Bush's Mainline Republican vote in 2000. Two columns are the total primary vote in a county and the percentage of it which Bush won; obviously, we can know both of these. The third column requires me to input the percentage of Republicans in a county that are Mainline. No such data exist, so I used the National Election Study from each of the years to find regional estimates of the percentage of Southern Republicans, for example, who are Mainline Protestants. In 2000, 28.74% of Southern Republicans identified as Mainline, so I used that value as the county estimate for every Southern county. Though not perfect, this is better than a national estimate at least for Protestants. It is problematic approach when estimating the Catholic vote, especially in the South because I would be telling EI that a certain percentage of Republicans in a county are Catholic when the religious census data indicate that no Catholics live in that county (and there are many localities like this in the South). Obviously we cannot estimate a percentage of something that does not exist. The results which EI gives, however, are clearly questionable, possibly as a result of my regional estimates, so I do not even bother to report these results. I cannot think of any other method which would overcome the ecological inference problem and provide estimates of the Republican vote by religion using the data at hand.

FEELING THERMOMETERS

The NES includes data about religious belonging that does discriminate between Mainline and Evangelical Protestants, plus other measures of religious activity and belief. Is there any support for the mass factions theory in those data? No NES samples include enough respondents who voted in their respective party primaries to allow any sort of adequate statistical analysis of primary voting. The next best variable available for which a measurement is taken for most major primary contenders is the feeling thermometer. These items might offer an interesting supplement to the county vote models.

Obviously I cannot use the same exact variables for individual data as I do for counties, so I must find the closest question in the NES to all of the county demographics. For example, household income is the best individual level proxy for per capita income while the black feeling thermometer is the most consistently used replacement for county minority population. As the NES includes measures of religiosity other than just belonging, I take advantage of these data. Church attendance is available as a measure of religious activity. Belief in the Bible as the literal word of God, the core characteristic of Christian fundamentalism, is included as a measure of religious belief.¹¹ See appendix 2 for a list of the NES variables I use to approximate the county data and their codings.

[Table 3 Here]

¹¹ I was concerned about using the church attendance and fundamentalism dummies in the feeling thermometer model when I had no counterpart for them in the county level election results model. I ran two separate OLS models for the feeling thermometers, one including the two measures of religious activity and belief and one excluding them. Using church attendance and fundamentalism does not significantly change the basic pattern of significant coefficients observed, nor does it radically alter coefficient sizes. Thus, I am confident that they only increase the fit of the model and do not lead me to conclusions which are of any real difference from those I would have had in their absence.

Table 3 shows the average thermometer scores for all Republican candidates with the entire NES sample divided into the three major partisan groups. The dependent variable in the regression models in Table 4 is the difference between the thermometer scores of the conservative and moderate primary candidates (i.e. Reagan – Ford in 1976). Negative coefficients indicate an advantage for the moderate candidate whereas positive results reflect a conservative candidate advantage. It might also make sense to construct separate models for the individual candidate feeling thermometers. While choosing to vote for one candidate necessarily precludes voting for the other (thus, affecting his vote share), this is not the case with affect. The thermometer score a respondent gives to one candidate may be completely independent of the score she assigns to another. Many NES respondents do indeed rank all candidates high on the thermometer, perhaps due to some positivity bias. Even with respondents in the same party, there are many Republicans who feel favorably toward both Bush and McCain, for example, even though they chose to support one or the other in the primary.

[Table 4 Here]

Nevertheless, the difference between the scores would be more revealing of any affective divisions among Republican partisans. The *WMK* thesis is fundamentally about the schism within Republican ranks; thus, it makes sense to restrict the thermometer analysis to self-identified partisans. Table 4 shows the OLS results for the thermometer differences.¹² If

¹² Every OLS equation here passes tests for multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and influential data points. No interactions were significant in the models, so they are excluded from the tables.

we are to judge partisan division on the basis of significant regression coefficients, then these results are hardly the picture of deep factionalism one might expect based upon the aggregate results. Especially if we think of a candidate like McCain whom conventional wisdom says particularly raised the ire of the religious right by condemning it for all the wickedness and political misfortune it supposedly brought upon the party, it is a bit disappointing not to see more significant differences.

Only a few predictors are significant to any consistent degree. Two religion measures, weekly church attendance and fundamentalist Bible beliefs, show large biases toward conservative candidates (except Buchanan 1996 on attendance) across a number of elections. These are actually some of the most substantial effects in the table. Not surprisingly, Robertson is the candidate who gains the most from these items, a reflection of the symbolic nature of his candidacy among the most religious and doctrinally conservative Republicans. Attending church regularly or maintaining an often maligned fundamentalist belief requires a certain degree of commitment which simple church affiliation does not demand. The extremity of certain candidates almost certainly works as a signal to the most committed of the religious right, producing more favorable feelings toward them and greater electoral support from these movement conservatives when other partisans shy away from them in favor of more mainstream contenders. It is generally the candidates who are the most extreme in their religious rhetoric and the least credible – Robertson and Buchanan – who gain the most from these two items. Catholic animosity toward Robertson clearly comes across on the Catholic dummy in 1988, the absolute largest effect in the entire table. Republican strength is the third rather consistently significant predictor, though it most often affects these two least credible Republicans and it does so to their detriment.

If we ignore significance for a moment, the results do show some remnants of primary season division that are extremely muted. Though the results are insignificant, there is a tendency for college educated, wealthier, and Catholic Republican respondents to score the more moderate candidate higher on the thermometer. Church attendance and Biblical beliefs generally outdo any Evangelicalism effects both in size and significance, generally boosting scores for the conservatives as outlined earlier. Though Evangelicals are generally associated with more frequent church attendance and a greater probability of fundamentalist beliefs when compared to Mainline Protestants and Catholics, it is well documented that measures of religious belief and behavior are far more powerful than simple measures of belonging such as denomination (Layman 2001). Thus, it is not surprising to see attendance and the Bible variable as the strong religious predictors of division among Republicans in the NES with denominational variables less important.

The question remains, however, about why these divisions are so subdued in the NES. The first possibility has to do with the nature of the NES itself and the time frame in which it is in the field. The part of the survey with the thermometers is taken in late fall, more than half a year after the primaries end. In 1980, that is months after Bush stopped criticizing Reagan and agreed to be his running mate. For 2000, that is months after McCain dropped out, endorsed Bush, and campaigned extensively for the Texas governor. The gap between the primaries and the NES interview leaves plenty of time for factional animosities to wane, especially as the dynamics of the general election might reinforce partisan predispositions and make Republicans feel more favorable towards even the politicians from other party factions they voted against in the primary. Evangelical Republicans, for example, may have felt a healthy amount of animosity toward McCain in early 2000, but by the time the NES

rolls around to their doorsteps around Election Day McCain looks good in comparison to Al Gore. They still may not feel as warmly toward McCain as they do toward Bush, but months of partisan campaign messages might prime his partisanship over his anti-Christian right rhetoric in their considerations of how to respond to the thermometer item.

Secondly, affect as measured by the thermometer might not be the same as voting preferences within a partisan primary. Socially conservative voters may prefer Reagan to Bush because of policy preferences or perceived affiliation with the religious right, but that does not necessarily translate into negative feelings for Bush. The same argument applies to McCain despite conventional wisdom. Certainly at the elite level there are a number of Republican politicians and party leaders who take this moderate-conservative division so seriously that it becomes for them a matter of bitter personality politics or an emotionally-laden civil war to defend what they perceive are correct Republican values. These ideologues, however, may succeed in conveying the cognitive, perhaps more rational aspects of Republican division without also imparting the affective component of that conflict.

For example, churchgoing Republicans should act consistently with their values and policy interests by voting against McCain because he is more of a social libertarian who opposes a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage than a true social conservative. Though they may disagree with McCain on these relevant social issues, this may not stop rank and file Republicans from feeling rather positively about him given his record of military service, likable personality, his dedication to Reagan-style fiscal conservatism, or the simple fact that he, like them, is also a Republican. There are no exit poll or publicly available survey data from the actual primary time frame that would allow a test of whether Republican voters are making this kind of affective versus cognitive distinction in their evaluation of potential

presidential nominees. This theory, however, might explain the subdued division among Republican respondents in the NES if the time component which I offered as my first explanation is insufficient.

CONCLUSION

I began this work with an attempt to resuscitate many of the assertions Thomas Frank makes in *WMK* by taking his theory and refocusing it more specifically on the Republican Party. Factionalism at the elite level of the party clearly exists, but does the Republican party-in-the-electorate reflect that division? Is there one mass camp of Republicans who are characteristically higher income, better educated, and less Evangelical who support more moderate party candidates against more conservative candidates who find their support from the ranks of partisans who are poorer, less likely to be college educated, and more Evangelical?

The aggregate data here support the idea that such a division in the electorate does indeed emerge in voting patterns. Though not all of the important predictors are significant and in the expected direction in the same election, there is evidence of the theorized factional lines that manifests itself across the set of six elections analyzed here. Indeed, the voting divides within the Republican ranks do not confine themselves simply to elections where credible candidates from the two camps engage in a genuinely competitive primary contest as we see intriguing results for the less competitive nomination battles. While the aggregate data are reasonably supportive of the theory presented here, we must bear in mind that these results cannot necessarily be generalized to individual level behavior. Certainly we may

theorize about what underlying micro phenomena the aggregate data reflect, but the data simply do not exist for us to test such ideas. Though we cannot say definitively whether division in the act of voting carries over to affective evaluations among Republicans, there is at least partial support for the basic WMK thesis in the thermometer evaluations available in the NES. The fault lines within the party are visible in survey respondents, but they are muted to the point that they are generally not even significant.

On a broader level, why does any of this matter? Why care about how Republicans are dividing themselves in the process of choosing their nominees? From a purely academic perspective it seems as though primaries are the obscure cousin of general elections in the campaigns and elections literature. Scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the November contests, but the work on primaries is much less developed. Anything which advances our understanding of these contests is worthwhile, especially as primaries have come to play an important role in weeding candidates out of the presidential races early and as primaries at the congressional level have become the real forum for popular choice and representation in light of the increased partisan gerrymandering of late which has made general elections virtually irrelevant in many places. Other political scientists have engaged the *WMK* thesis with the intent of discrediting it completely, but its reapplication to the context of Republican primaries certainly helps us understand what mechanisms are at work in those contests.

These divisions within Republican ranks help us understand the growing place of religion in American politics. Religion has undergone a dramatic transformation from something that candidates like Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower shunned talking about openly to something candidates now must embrace and profess publicly even to be

considered as viable. Religion has been the driving force behind growing Republican strength in recent decades, bringing the religious right movement to the heart of political power in American democracy. Christian conservatives have sunk their lot into the Republican Party just as African-Americans have done with the Democrats, so we need to understand better the place they have found for themselves as scholars.

As the religious right has grown stronger and division within elite Republican ranks has become more caustic, we have begun to see real consequences of this partisan infighting that carry over into the general election and governance. Capitalizing on splits among Republican voters and the inability of that party to unify itself after contentious nomination contests, Democrats have found themselves better able to compete in states like Kansas that ten years ago were killing fields for anyone with a D next to their name on the ballot. Democrats are surging in states like Virginia and North Carolina that were seemingly slipping from their grasp in recent years.

These primaries, when they do not occur in places that Democrats can legitimately contest, help fuel the growing elite polarization of American politics. There are real policy consequences in choosing a McCain versus a Bush. When Kansas Republicans held their Senate primaries in 1996, they faced a clear choice of either moderating the Senate by renominating appointed incumbent Sheila Frahm or turning the chamber to the right by nominating her challenger Sam Brownback. They obviously chose the latter, a choice replicated by Republicans in many states that has had dramatic consequences for both the tone and policy output of Washington politics.

While this analysis is a good first step at empirically tackling this problem, there is clearly further work that needs attention. Ideally the model presented here should be run on

individual level data taken at the time of the Republican primary. Exit polls are not the best data for this next step due to their treatment of religious questions, but that is the next logical direction for this work. As other data sources become available and certain statistical techniques are better applied, it is my hope that more evidence can shed light on the elite-mass dynamic taking place within the Republican Party. This question is a critical one for understanding the growing importance of religion in our political system and the niche the religious right has found within the Republican ranks, so it is certainly one that merits further exploration beyond this initial analysis.

Table 1. Primary States Included in Analysis by Year

Year	State	Date	Primary Type	Candidate %	
				Ford	Reagan
1976	New Hampshire	2/24	Modified Open	50	49
	Massachusetts	3/2	Modified Open	62	33
	Vermont	3/2	Open	85	15
	Florida	3/9	Closed	53	47
	Illinois	2/16	Open	59	40
	North Carolina	3/23	Open	46	52
	Wisconsin	4/16	Open	55	44
	Pennsylvania	4/27	Closed	94	5 (write in)
	Georgia	5/4	Open	32	68
	Indiana	5/4	Open	49	51
	Nebraska	5/11	Closed	45	55
	West Virginia	5/11	Modified Open	57	43
	Maryland	5/18	Closed	58	42
	Michigan	5/18	Modified Open	65	34
	Arkansas	5/25	Closed	35	59
	Idaho	5/25	Open	25	74
	Kentucky	5/25	Closed	51	47
	Nevada	5/25	Closed	29	66
	Oregon	5/25	Modified Open	55	45
	Tennessee	5/25	Open	50	49
	Montana	6/1	Open	35	63
	Rhode Island	6/1	Modified Open	51	24
	South Dakota	6/1	Closed	44	51
	California	6/8	Closed	35	66
	Ohio	6/8	Modified Open	55	45
1980				Bush	Reagan
	New Hampshire	2/26	Modified Open	23	50
	Massachusetts	3/4	Modified Open	29	28
	Vermont	3/4	Open	22	30
	South Carolina	3/8	Open	15	55
	Alabama	3/11	Open	26	73
	Florida	3/11	Closed	30	57
	Georgia	3/11	Open	13	73
	Illinois	3/18	Open	11	48
	Connecticut	3/25	Closed	38	34
	Kansas	4/1	Modified Open	13	63
	Wisconsin	4/11	Open	30	40
	Louisiana	4/15	Closed	19	75
	Pennsylvania	4/22	Closed	51	43
	Texas	5/3	Open	51	47
	Indiana	5/6	Open	16	74

	North Carolina	5/6	Closed	22	68
	Tennessee	5/6	Open	18	74
	Maryland	5/13	Closed	41	48
	Nebraska	5/13	Closed	15	76
	Michigan	5/20	Modified Open	58	32
	Oregon	5/20	Modified Open	35	54
				Bush	Robertson
1988	New Hampshire	2/16	Modified Open	38	9
	South Dakota	2/23	Closed	55	20
	South Carolina	3/5	Open	48	20
	Alabama	3/5	Open	65	14
	Arkansas	3/8	Closed	47	19
	Florida	3/8	Closed	62	11
	Georgia	3/8	Open	54	16
	Kentucky	3/8	Closed	66	4
	Louisiana	3/8	Closed	58	18
	Maryland	3/8	Closed	53	6
	Mississippi	3/8	Open	66	14
	Missouri	3/8	Modified Open	42	11
	Oklahoma	3/8	Closed	38	21
	Tennessee	3/8	Open	60	13
	Texas	3/8	Open	64	15
	Virginia	3/8	Open	53	14
	Illinois	3/15	Open	55	26
				Bush	Buchanan
1992	New Hampshire	2/18	Modified Open	53	38
	Colorado	3/3	Modified Open	68	30
	Georgia	3/3	Open	64	36
	Maryland	3/3	Closed	70	30
	South Carolina	3/7	Open	67	26
	Florida	3/10	Closed	68	32
	Louisiana	3/10	Closed	62	27
	Massachusetts	3/10	Modified Open	66	28
	Mississippi	3/10	Open	72	17
	Oklahoma	3/10	Closed	70	24
	Rhode Island	3/10	Modified Open	63	32
	Tennessee	3/10	Open	73	22
	Texas	3/10	Open	70	24
	Illinois	3/17	Open	76	23
	Michigan	3/17	Modified Open	67	25
	Connecticut	3/24	Closed	67	22
				Dole	Buchanan
1996	New Hampshire	2/20	Modified Open	26	27
	Delaware	2/24	Closed	27	19
	Arizona	2/27	Open	30	28

	South Dakota	2/27	Closed	45	29
	North Dakota	2/27	Open	42	18
	South Carolina	3/2	Open	45	29
	Colorado	3/5	Modified Open	44	22
	Georgia	3/5	Open	41	29
	Connecticut	3/5	Closed	55	21
	Maine	3/5	Modified Open	46	25
	Maryland	3/5	Closed	53	21
	Massachusetts	3/5	Modified Open	48	25
	Vermont	3/5	Open	40	17
	Florida	3/12	Closed	57	18
	Louisiana	3/12	Closed	48	33
	Mississippi	3/12	Open	60	26
	Oklahoma	3/12	Closed	60	22
	Oregon	3/12	Modified Open	51	4
	Tennessee	3/12	Open	51	26
	Texas	3/12	Open	56	21
	Illinois	3/19	Open	65	23
	Michigan	3/19	Modified Open	51	34
	Ohio	3/19	Modified Open	67	22
	Wisconsin	3/19	Open	52	34
	California	3/26	Closed	66	18
	Nevada	3/26	Closed	52	15
	Washington	3/26	Open	63	21
				McCain	Bush
2000	New Hampshire	2/1	Modified Open	49	30
	Delaware	2/5	Closed	25	31
	South Carolina	2/19	Open	42	53
	Arizona	2/22	Open	60	36
	Michigan	2/22	Modified Open	51	43
	Virginia	2/29	Closed	44	53
	Washington	2/29	Blanket Open	63	34
	California	3/7	Blanket Open	35	60
	Connecticut	3/7	Closed	49	47
	Georgia	3/7	Open	27	68
	Maine	3/7	Modified Open	43	53
	Maryland	3/7	Closed	36	56
	Massachusetts	3/7	Modified Open	65	32
	Missouri	3/7	Modified Open	35	58
	Ohio	3/7	Modified Open	37	58
	Rhode Island	3/7	Modified Open	60	36
	Vermont	3/7	Open	61	35

Note: Vote shares do not add up to 100% because they are the candidate share of the vote for the entire field of candidates, not the share of the two candidate vote. For Bush and McCain in 2000, for example, the 49% and 30% respectively in New Hampshire reflect the fact that other candidates such as Lamar Alexander and Steven Forbes took sizable shares of the vote.

**Table 2. Robust Regression of County Republican Primary Vote
for Conservative Candidates, 1976-2000**

Variable	Reagan 1976	Reagan 1980	Robertson 1988	Buchanan 1992	Buchanan 1996	Bush 2000
College Educated	-.829*** (.116)	-.961*** (.117)	-.054** (.018)	-.086 (.064)	-.681*** (.095)	-.438*** (.047)
Per Capita Income	.446* (.203)	-1.301*** (.210)	.283 (.172)	.093 (.140)	.009 (.155)	.068 (.096)
% Mainline	-.067 (.039)	.048* (.023)	.022 (.036)	-.015 (.029)	-.134*** (.025)	.048 (.036)
% Evangelical	-.110*** (.024)	.078*** (.022)	.139*** (.023)	-.005 (.020)	.071** (.023)	.099*** (.026)
% Catholic	-.030 (.028)	-.012 (.020)	.014 (.028)	.036 (.022)	.007 (.021)	-.103*** (.024)
% Minority	.174*** (.031)	.005 (.017)	-.003 (.013)	-.030 (.019)	-.054* (.024)	.145*** (.019)
Republican Vote	-.005 (.038)	.143*** (.028)	-.162*** (.030)	.013 (.027)	-.024 (.016)	.409*** (.031)
Constant	17.610	75.553	26.789	30.554	47.030	42.492
R ²	.722	.802	.475	.504	.580	.784
N	1607	1544	1387	1130	1624	832

Note: Table entries are OLS estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses.

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (two-tailed)

Table 3. Average NES Feeling Thermometer Scores for Republican Presidential Primary Candidates, 1976-2000

Year	Candidate	Republicans	Independents	Democrats
1976	Ford	75	61	51
	Reagan	68	56	50
1980	Bush	62	57	51
	Reagan	73	57	46
1988	Bush	79	62	45
	Robertson	36	32	33
1992	Bush	73	50	40
	Buchanan	55	53	49
1996	Dole	69	52	43
	Buchanan	54	50	48
2000	McCain	64	60	57
	Bush	75	56	43

Table 4. NES Feeling Thermometer Differences for Republican Presidential Primary Candidates, 1976-2000

Variable	1976	1980	1988	1992	1996	2000
College Education	-3.757 (3.007)	-5.920+ (3.149)	-1.459 (3.373)	.718 (2.604)	-1.278 (2.869)	-3.667 (2.674)
Household Income	.356+ (.212)	-.094 (.235)	-.126 (.273)	-1.749* (.857)	-1.269 (.948)	-.271 (.328)
Mainline Protestant	-2.711 (4.338)	-2.559 (4.059)	-1.061 (5.583)	-4.076 (3.479)	-10.142* (4.176)	8.358* (3.463)
Evangelical Protestant	-6.632 (4.474)	-.926 (4.309)	-1.412 (5.908)	-4.083 (3.725)	-4.164 (4.562)	5.496 (3.571)
Catholic	-3.749 (4.975)	-3.653 (4.509)	-16.261** (6.071)	-6.770+ (3.924)	-.465 (4.521)	2.785 (3.655)
Weekly Church Attendance	1.294 (2.698)	6.854* (3.136)	8.890*** (3.332)	6.126* (2.584)	-5.957* (3.012)	-1.670 (2.766)
Bible	N/A	1.776 (2.866)	12.768*** (3.416)	.008*** (2.625)	10.621** (3.201)	4.630 (2.881)
Strong Republican	-1.240 (2.289)	1.058 (2.719)	-10.237** (2.942)	-7.198** (2.248)	-9.060** (2.614)	5.628* (2.419)
Black Thermometer	-.131+ (.076)	-.074 (.075)	.026 (.079)	.021 (.055)	.020 (.064)	-.028 (.063)
Southerner	-.767 (3.158)	3.876 (3.128)	-7.204* (3.554)	1.128 (2.617)	-1.267 (2.782)	3.410 (2.534)
Constant	.569	15.297	-40.931	-9.268	-2.958	7.494
Adjusted R ²	.003	.015	.132	.019	.069	.045
N	466	287	393	624	471	344

Note: The 1976 difference fails the F-test, but the rest pass with significant F-statistics.

Table entries are OLS estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses.

+p <.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (two-tailed)

Appendix 1: County Election Results Model

Dependent Variable

● **Percent of vote for candidate** – scaled 0 to 100 (Cooke 2000 for 1976-1996, various state election board websites for 2000 primary results)

Independent Variables

● **Percent College Educated** – scaled 0 to 100; percentage of population in a county holding at least a four year college degree (US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000);

● **Per Capita Income** – scaled to the exact dollar with coefficients in tables reported as unit change per \$1000 increase in per capita income (US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000);

● **Percent Mainline Protestants** – scaled 0 to 100, white denominations only;

The Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States 2000 does not report membership numbers for traditionally African-American churches, so I exclude those churches from my county counts for 1970 through 1990. This should not present a problem given that the hostility blacks feel toward the religious right makes them less susceptible to movement rhetoric (Calhoun-Brown 1997). Blacks have not made up more than a trivial percentage of the vote in Republican presidential primaries since 1976 anyhow (Mayer 2002), so excluding their churches would not be putting potential primary voters into the “unknown” affiliation column.

● **Percent Catholics** – scaled 0 to 100;

● **Percent Evangelical Protestants** – scaled 0 to 100, white denominations only;

● **Percent Minority** – scaled 0 to 100, calculated as African-American plus Hispanic population (US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000);

This is a necessary control. Proximity to black (Glaser 1994) and Hispanic (Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000) populations produces voting patterns among whites based upon negative affect for minority groups. Racial appeals have been a critical component in the Republican strategy for growth in the South, a region where many white Evangelicals reside (Black and Black 1987, 2002), so controlling for racial proximity is a necessity.

● **Previous Republican Presidential Vote** – scaled 0 to 100 (McGillivray 2005); If the previous election was competitive (1976, 1988, and 1996), then I just take the Republican vote from that year as the value for this variable. If the previous election was a landslide (1972 and 1984) or featured a third party candidate who took a large percentage of the vote (1992 and 1968), then I average the previous two elections for this value;

Appendix 2: Feeling Thermometer Model

Dependent Variable

- **Feeling Thermometer Score** – scaled 0 to 100

Independent Variables

- **Household Income** – continuous variable scaled in \$1000 increments
- **College Degree** – dummy variable; 0 = no degree, 1 = bachelors degree or more
- **Mainline Protestant** – dummy variable; 0 = not Mainline, 1 = Mainline

Note: I group respondents into the Mainline or Evangelical category based upon the affiliation of their specific Christian denomination. For example, self-reported Baptists I code as Evangelicals as their church is considered an Evangelical one, but Methodists are categorized as Mainline. Some NES years ask respondents specifically whether they are Mainline or Evangelical; however, upon examining the data, it is clear that a sizable minority of respondents cannot correctly place their church within the correct school of Protestantism for some unknown reason (perhaps unfamiliarity with the terms or simple confusion over where their church belongs). I choose to match respondents with the correct school myself as I believe this is a more error free and objective measure of the general religious doctrines to which they are exposed in church. An Episcopalian may not know his church is Mainline; nevertheless, since his report of his denomination is probably extremely accurate, we know the types of messages he encounters in his religious experiences.

Note: The baseline group for this regression consists of all NES respondents who are not identified as Mainline, Evangelical, or Catholic as I include one dummy variable for each of these groups. The vast majority of respondents in the baseline group are seculars who profess no religious affiliation, with Jewish respondents being the next largest bloc (who do not differ greatly in their voting or party identification from seculars), and minor religions making up the remainder.

- **Evangelical Protestant** – dummy variable; 0 = not Evangelical, 1 = Evangelical
- **Catholic** – dummy variable; 0 = not Catholic, 1 = Catholic
- **Weekly Church Attendance** – dummy variable; 0 = does not attend church weekly, 1 = attends church weekly
- **Fundamentalist** – dummy variable; 0 = does not believe that the Bible is the literal word of God and should be followed literally; 1 = believes the Bible is the literal word of God and should be followed literally
- **Black Feeling Thermometer** – continuous variable scaled 0 to 100
Note: The question wording on the NES items relating to aid to blacks changes from 1980 to 2000 and the civil rights issues asked in 1980 are not included in the 2000 NES, so the only relevant and usable question that remains constant between the two surveys is the feeling thermometer.
- **Southerner** – dummy variable; 0 = non-Southerner, 1 = Southerner


Appendix 3: Fixed Effects Coefficients for State Dummy Variables

State	1976	1980	1988	1992	1996	2000
Alabama		11.851*** (1.964)	-7.157*** (1.457)			
Arizona					14.948*** (2.621)	-17.588*** (1.680)
Arkansas	50.269*** (2.058)		12.980*** (2.182)			
California	48.134*** (1.907)				-15.094*** (1.497)	9.982*** (1.414)
Colorado				-.509 (1.559)	-2.923+ (1.525)	
Florida	35.37*** (2.2027)	6.960*** (1.906)	.058 (1.630)	2.582 (1.667)	-7.397*** (1.693)	
Georgia	54.718*** (1.953)	24.846*** (1.946)	-1.142 (1.235)	9.275*** (1.817)	8.509*** (1.763)	9.290*** (1.663)
Idaho	58.025*** (2.054)					
Illinois	28.572*** (1.695)	22.031*** (1.770)	16.078*** (1.931)	-8.692*** (1.437)	-10.953*** (1.484)	
Indiana	35.147*** (1.665)	18.473*** (1.804)				
Kansas		24.280*** (1.708)				
Kentucky	31.685*** (1.879)		-9.482*** (1.142)			
Louisiana		20.919*** (1.887)	6.771*** (1.723)	-.635 (1.782)	7.323*** (1.766)	
Maryland & Delaware	26.508*** (1.995)	.306 (2.372)	-9.871*** (1.439)	-1.607 (1.530)	-1.819 (1.860)	9.570*** (1.659)
Michigan	20.194*** (1.716)	-24.757*** (1.740)		-3.341* (1.486)	.636 (1.413)	-9.404*** (1.309)
Mississippi			-7.641*** (1.291)	-12.940*** (2.007)	-8.962*** (2.130)	
Missouri			13.727*** (2.496)			6.340*** (1.475)
Montana	52.543*** (1.906)					
Nebraska	46.067*** (1.719)	21.099*** (1.762)				
Nevada	59.501*** (2.348)				-14.324*** (1.819)	
North Carolina	37.471*** (2.054)	13.089*** (1.856)				
North Dakota					-3.147+ (1.629)	
Ohio	29.584*** (3.015)				-12.275*** (1.437)	5.407*** (1.456)


Oklahoma			13.151*** (1.511)	-4.052* (1.698)	-11.042*** (1.689)	
Oregon	38.063*** (2.193)	8.202*** (2.182)			-6.367*** (1.439)	
Pennsylvania		-11.841*** (1.834)				
South Carolina		14.411*** (2.036)	5.026** (1.453)	-4.863* (1.955)	.515 (1.940)	-7.671*** (1.861)
South Dakota	42.931*** (1.848)		31.150*** (1.642)		4.123** (1.504)	
Tennessee	36.425*** (1.903)	17.723*** (1.898)	-8.576*** (1.134)	-7.855*** (1.723)	-6.509*** (1.635)	
Texas		4.543* (1.994)	.346 (1.123)	-5.351** (1.666)	-8.360*** (1.699)	
Virginia			-2.839* (1.151)			2.052 (1.707)
Washington					-12.550*** (1.635)	8.750*** (1.495)
West Virginia	26.451*** (1.669)					
Wisconsin	30.650*** (1.791)	-.897 (1.843)			.127 (1.425)	

Appendix 4: County Election Results by Per Capita Income Quartile


1976




1980




1988




1992



1996



2000



Appendix 5: State Regression of 2000 Primary Results

Variable	Arizona & California	Delaware & Maryland	Georgia	Michigan	Missouri	New England	Ohio	South Carolina	Virginia	Washington
College Education	-.280 (.344)	.227 (.207)	-.465*** (.097)	-.321** (.093)	-.079 (.125)	-.734*** (.197)	-.720*** (.138)	-.592* (.265)	-.519*** (.089)	-.004 (.122)
Per Capita Income	.763 (.491)	-1.226* (.470)	.724** (.221)	.812** (.227)	-.541+ (.292)	.774+ (.420)	.182 (.363)	1.180 (.701)	-.057 (.204)	-.081 (.293)
% Mainline	.920 (1.145)	-.114 (.137)	.131 (.123)	.128 (.105)	.046 (.068)	.559+ (.307)	.136 (.103)	.039 (.146)	-.145+ (.075)	.158 (.169)
% Evangelical	-.570 (.466)	-.109 (.243)	.019 (.037)	.215* (.085)	.102* (.049)	3.505*** (.789)	.308* (.118)	.134 (.096)	.169** (.053)	.825** (.220)
% Catholic	.017 (.149)	-.059 (.152)	-.575* (.260)	.031 (.044)	.037 (.059)	-.150* (.064)	-.060 (.048)	-.773+ (.406)	-.112 (.085)	-.029 (.153)
% Minority	.143 (.106)	.022 (.100)	.144*** (.037)	.111+ (.065)	.066 (.082)	.056 (.136)	.435*** (.103)	.602*** (.106)	.050 (.038)	.220* (.080)
Republican Vote	.846*** (.175)	.405+ (.202)	.294*** (.073)	.459*** (.079)	.302*** (.082)	.020 (.196)	.526*** (.083)	.867*** (.134)	.346*** (.077)	.440** (.134)
Constant	11.000	72.158	51.271	10.679	57.441	34.910	40.248	-19.115	55.111	33.578
Adjusted R ²	.281	.559	.214	.521	.197	.458	.757	.539	.555	.711
N	73	27	159	83	115	67	107	46	135	39

Note: Table entries are OLS estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses; ⁺ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed); Note: As some states in 2000 have so few counties that I cannot run OLS on them by themselves, I am forced to combine several states with other states that are similar both demographically and in terms of the primary election outcome. Combinations include: 1) Arizona and California, 2) Delaware and Maryland (though this combination still falls just short of the recommended minimum of 30 cases to run OLS), and 3) Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont into New England. All individual regressions in this table pass VIF tests for multicollinearity and Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey tests for heteroskedasticity. Calculating DF-FITS indicates that no cases are influential data points (DF-FITS > 1.0).

**Appendix 6: Robust Regression of County Republican Primary Vote
for Conservative Candidates with South Dummy, 1976-2000**

Variable	Reagan 1976	Reagan 1980	Robertson 1988	Buchanan 1992	Buchanan 1996	Bush 2000
College Educated	-.509** (.186)	-1.144*** (.177)	-.030* (.014)	-.275*** (.073)	-.542*** (.096)	-.428*** (.064)
Per Capita Income	.096 (.326)	-.914** (.302)	-.515* (.207)	.606*** (.144)	-.564*** (.155)	.296* (.132)
% Mainline	-.452*** (.053)	.370*** (.040)	.359*** (.042)	-.197*** (.037)	-.086*** (.023)	-.032 (.047)
% Evangelical	-.090** (.027)	.160*** (.031)	.110*** (.027)	-.073*** (.019)	-.029 (.019)	.205*** (.025)
% Catholic	-.251*** (.042)	-.166*** (.032)	.191*** (.031)	-.030 (.022)	.020 (.018)	-.200*** (.034)
% Minority	.334*** (.034)	.066** (.025)	-.030 (.023)	.008 (.020)	-.082** (.031)	.192*** (.023)
Republican Vote	.177** (.052)	-.059 (.038)	-.057 (.041)	.092** (.030)	-.008 (.021)	.457*** (.040)
South	3.822** (1.124)	1.757 (1.304)	-1.405 (.944)	1.177 (.602)	5.383*** (.901)	-2.310** (.864)
Constant	51.391	85.527	25.420	22.758	46.977	39.460
R ²	.227	.277	.095	.079	.175	.497
N	1607	1544	1387	1130	1624	832

Note: Table entries are OLS estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses.

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (two-tailed)

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